Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1267 | November 30, 2018 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Melinda K. Jackman-Hanlin

Greencastle, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. MacKenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeffrey Hunter,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 30, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-1267

Appeal from the 

Putnam Circuit Court

The Honorable 

Matthew L. Headley, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No.

67C01-1612-F1-305

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1267 | November 30, 2018 Page 2 of 16

[1] Jeffrey Hunter appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw 

his plea of guilty to attempted murder.1 On appeal, he raises the following 

issue: whether the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea resulted in a 

manifest injustice because 1) his plea was not knowing and voluntary and 2) 

there was no factual basis that he shot the victim and intended to kill him.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 10, 2016, Hunter tried to buy a chainsaw from a Tractor Supply 

Company store, but his credit card was denied. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 15. 

Hunter grabbed the chainsaw and left the store, pushing aside two customers 

who tried to stop him and striking a store employee who also tried to thwart his 

departure. Id. at 15-16. Putnam County Deputy Donnie Pettit pursued Hunter 

back to Hunter’s residence, where Cloverdale Officer Luke Brown (“Officer 

Brown”), Greencastle Officer Daryl Bunten, and Putnam County Deputy 

Elizabeth Campbell arrived to help. Id. at 16. Inside the house, Hunter was 

yelling so loudly that the officers could hear him from the driveway. Id. 

Hunter was arguing with his mother, who wanted him to go outside to talk to 

the police. Id. at 17.

1

Ind. Code § § 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1.
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[4] The officers made contact with Hunter at the front door of his residence. 

Hunter opened the glass storm door, continued to complain in a loud voice, 

and failed to cooperate. Id. at 16. The officers saw a double-barreled shotgun 

leaning in a corner directly beside the doorway, and Officer Brown attempted to 

pull Hunter out of the house. Id. A struggle ensued in which Hunter pulled 

Officer Brown through the threshold of the home, and moments later, Officer 

Brown fell backwards outside the house. Id. As Officer Brown stood up, 

Hunter grabbed the shotgun, leveled it at Officer Brown, and fired it into Officer 

Brown’s chest from approximately one foot away, striking him in his protective 

vest. Id. Officer Brown retreated from the doorway and fired two rounds with 

one round striking Hunter in the left side of his stomach. Id. at 17. 

[5] On December 13, 2016, the State charged Hunter with Level 1 felony attempted 

murder, Class A misdemeanor theft, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, 

Class B misdemeanor battery, Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly 

weapon, and Level 3 felony aggravated battery. Id. at 18-23. The trial date was 

eventually set for March 7, 2018, fourteen months after the date that Hunter 

was charged. During those intervening fourteen months, the trial court twice 

extended the deadline for a plea agreement, once at the request of both parties 

and once at the request of Hunter. Id. at 7-8. 

[6] At some point before he pleaded guilty, Hunter, accompanied by his attorney 

and his father, met with the prosecutor in the prosecutor’s office to discuss a 

plea deal. Id. at 18. In discussing a potential plea, the prosecutor discussed 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1267 | November 30, 2018 Page 4 of 16

with Hunter the evidence and arguments the State would use if the case went to 

trial. Id. at 18-19.

[7] On March 1, 2018, Hunter entered a plea agreement by which he would plead 

guilty to attempted murder, the State would dismiss the remaining two felony 

counts and the two misdemeanor counts, and Hunter would receive a twentyyear sentence. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 24. At his guilty plea hearing Hunter 

confirmed that: 1) he intended to plead guilty; 2) nothing was affecting his 

ability to think or reason; 3) no one coerced him to plead guilty; 4) he was 

waiving his rights; and 5) there was nothing else he thought his attorney should 

have done for him. Tr. Vol. 2 at 4-5. 

[8] At the guilty plea hearing, the following colloquy occurred between the 

prosecutor and Hunter: 

Q. And you’re admitting that you shot Officer Luke Brown with 

a shotgun. Is that right? 

A. Yes. I did raise the gun, and it was fired, yes. 

Q. And you’re admitting that you were somewhere from about 

two to six feet away. You raised the shotgun, shot it, you hit him 

in the chest at close range. Is that right? 

A I’m not positive, but I know it was around ten feet. 

Q. A close distance. Is that right? 

A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And you’re admitting that constitutes a substantial step 

towards that commission of the crime. Is that right? 

A. That’s correct, sir. 

[9] Id. at 5-6. The trial court took Hunter’s guilty plea under advisement and set a 

sentencing hearing. 

[10] At Hunter’s May 3, 2018 sentencing hearing, his counsel informed the trial 

court for the first time that Hunter wanted to withdraw his plea because he 

believed that he was forced into taking the plea and that he was not guilty of 

attempted murder. Id. at 14. Thus, Hunter contended that 1) his plea was not 

knowing and voluntary and 2) there was no factual basis for attempted murder, 

more particularly claiming that he did not have specific intent to kill Officer 

Brown.

[11] In support of his claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, Hunter 

said he felt pressured to accept the plea for three reasons. First, he claimed that 

he believed the purpose of the meeting with the prosecutor was to review the 

State’s evidence against him, not negotiate a plea. Id. at 18. Second, he 

claimed that the one-hour meeting with the prosecutor did not give him enough 

time to decide whether he should plead guilty. Id. Third, after the trial court 

had denied Hunter’s motion to withdraw his plea, Hunter argued during 

allocution that his father had pressured him to plead guilty. Id. at 24. 

However, in arguing that he was pressured to plead guilty, Hunter said only 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1267 | November 30, 2018 Page 6 of 16

that he was “rushed,” not that he was coerced. Id. at 18. The following 

colloquy occurred between the State and Hunter:

Q. Mr. Hunter, what duress was -- you said there was -- or your 

attorney said there was duress used against you, or you said that, 

to get you to plead guilty.

A. I just -- I felt that it was rushed. I was under the impression 

that we were just coming over to listen to what the arguments 

that you had were, and then I would decide later if I was going to 

take the plea agreement. And everything was just done right 

then. I really didn’t have time to think about it. 

Q. So you don’t feel duress; you felt rushed now. Is that right? 

A. Yes, that’s correct. I -- I don’t know that I had time to really 

consider the plea . . . [.] 

. . . . 

Q. But is it safe to say nobody forced you or under duress made 

you sign that plea agreement? You did that of your own free 

will? 

A. I was under the impression that I couldn’t get anything better, 

and that this was all that was going to be—ever be given.

Id. at 18-19.

[12] As to his claim that he lacked specific intent to kill Officer Brown, the following 

exchange occurred between Hunter and his attorney at the sentencing hearing: 
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Q. And the reason why you want to withdraw the guilty plea is 

because you do not believe that you intended to kill. Is that 

correct? 

A. That’s correct. You said that I formed a specific intent in just 

a few seconds, and that’s what the Court is trying to say, and I 

just -- I do not believe that I have ever wanted anyone to die. I 

mean, I’m not a murderer, so I just can’t see – it’s just 

unfathomable to me.

. . . .

Q. Okay. And so based upon all that -- and I’ve told you that 

intent can be inferred from actions. You understand that? 

A. Yes, I guess I understand. 

Q. Okay. So still with all that, you are adamant that you did not 

form specific intent to kill, and therefore you’re stating that you --

that is the reason why you can’t withdraw the -- or you want to 

withdraw the plea and you can’t plead guilty. Is that correct? 

A. That’s correct.

Id. at 16-17.

[13] The trial court denied Hunter’s request to withdraw his plea. As to Hunter’s 

claim that he was coerced into pleading guilty because he was rushed, the trial 

court found as follows: 

I find that this was a specific plea. You knew exactly what you 

were going to get if the Court accepted it. I can’t find that you 
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had any coercion because you had at least a one-hour meeting 

with your attorney and the prosecutor and your dad to talk about 

all of this. 

. . . . 

You say you were rushed, but you weren’t rushed at all. I mean, 

I remember sitting here three or four times waiting on your 

lawyer and the state’s lawyer and yourself before I could come in 

to court on the case because they kept asking me to have 

additional time to talk to you about the case. I can’t find that 

you had any coercion because you had at least a one-hour 

meeting with your attorney and the prosecutor and your dad to 

talk about all of this.

Id. at 21.

[14] As to Hunter’s claim that there was no factual basis that he intended to kill 

Officer Brown, the trial court found that Hunter’s intent could be inferred from 

his actions. Id. It concluded that withdrawal of the plea was not necessary to 

prevent a manifest injustice. Id.

[15] Later during allocution, Hunter contended: 1) “I had no intention of hurting 

anyone,” 2) “I felt threatened for my life,” 3) “I wouldn’t have gotten the gun 

out if I didn’t think my mom’s life was in danger by the guy that was chasing 

me,” 4) “I had no intention of firing at any person,” and that 5) he did not 

believe there was a factual basis for attempted murder but that there was a 

factual basis for aggravated battery, to which he would have pleaded guilty. Id.

at 23-24. Hunter now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision2

[16] A motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed before a person is sentenced is 

governed by Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b), which provides: 

After entry of a plea of guilty, or guilty but mentally ill at the 

time of the crime, but before imposition of sentence, the court 

may allow the defendant by motion to withdraw his plea of 

guilty, or guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, for any 

fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially 

prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant’s plea. The motion to 

withdraw the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at the time of 

the crime made under this subsection shall be in writing and 

verified. The motion shall state facts in support of the relief 

demanded, and the state may file counter-affidavits in opposition 

to the motion. The ruling of the court on the motion shall be 

reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. However, 

the court shall allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty, 

or guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, whenever the 

defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to 

correct a manifest injustice. 

Id.; see also Weatherford v. State, 697 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Ind. 1998). “[T]he moving 

party has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of 

the evidence.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(e). “The trial court’s ruling on a motion 

to withdraw a guilty plea arrives in our Court with a presumption in favor of 

2 We agree with the State that Hunter has waived review of the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea because he did not file a written and verified motion but instead only made an oral request. “The 

motion to withdraw the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime made under this 

subsection shall be in writing and verified.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b); see also Carter v. State, 739 N.E.2d 126, 

128 n.3 (Ind. 2000). Nonetheless, we choose to address Hunter’s claims on the merits. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1267 | November 30, 2018 Page 10 of 16

the ruling.” Johnson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 2000). In determining 

whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw 

a guilty plea, we examine the statements made by a defendant at his guilty plea 

hearing to decide whether his plea was offered “freely and knowingly.” See 

Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995). “A trial court abuses its 

discretion as to plea agreements only ‘when the failure of the trial court to grant 

the motion would result in either a manifest injustice to the defendant or in 

substantial prejudice to the State.’” Johnson, 734 N.E.2d at 244-45 (quoting 

Weatherford, 697 N.E.2d at 34). Instances of manifest injustice include a plea 

that was not knowing and voluntary. I.C. § 35-35-1-4(c)(3); see also Jeffries v. 

State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 778-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 

[17] A sufficient factual basis to support a guilty plea exists when there is evidence 

about the elements of the crime from which a trial court reasonably could 

conclude that the defendant is guilty. Oliver v. State, 843 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. An adequate factual basis may be established by 

the defendant’s acknowledgement that he understands the nature of the charges 

and that his plea is an admission of the charges. Id. Additionally, the standard 

for a sufficient factual basis is less rigorous than that required to support a 

conviction. Rhoades v. State, 675 N.E.2d 698, 701-02 (Ind. 1996). A factual 

basis may be established by relatively minimal evidence about the elements of 

the crime from which the court could reasonably conclude that the defendant is 

guilty. Graham v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1091, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “With 

regard to the crime of attempted murder, it has long been held that the specific 
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intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner 

likely to cause death or great bodily harm.” Miller v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1067, 

1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. 

Manifest Injustice – Plea Not Knowing and Voluntary

[18] Hunter argues that withdrawal of his guilty plea is necessary to prevent a 

manifest injustice because his plea was not knowing and voluntary. 

[19] He first argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he thought 

his attorney was going to procure a deal to plead guilty to aggravated battery, 

not attempted murder. Appellant’s Br. at 21; Tr. Vol. 2 at 24. During allocution, 

Hunter said: “I was under the impression that [my attorney] was going to get 

the aggravated battery [deal], and that’s what I thought it was going to be.” Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 24. 

[20] Hunter’s second argument that his plea was not knowing and voluntary is that 

he was “rushed” into pleading guilty. Id. at 18. In support, he refers to the 

meeting where he and his lawyer met with the prosecutor for just one hour and 

where he claims he was surprised that the meeting was for negotiation of a plea 

deal. Id. at 18. Hunter claims he felt even more pressure to plead guilty 

because his father also attended the meeting and had been pressuring Hunter to 

plead guilty. Id. at 24.

[21] We reject Hunter’s claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. First, 

the guilty plea hearing shows that Hunter was fully aware that he was pleading 

guilty to attempted murder. Hunter signed a written plea agreement specifying 
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that he was pleading guilty to attempted murder, that all remaining counts 

would be dismissed, and that he was to receive a twenty-year executed 

sentence. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 24-25. In the acknowledgment of rights in 

the plea agreement, Hunter declared, “I believe this agreement to be in my best 

interest.” Id. at 25. At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court asked Hunter if he 

intended to plead guilty to attempted murder, and Hunter responded, “That’s 

correct, sir.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 4. Hunter was then asked by the State, “Mr. Hunter, 

you’re here today to plead to the count of attempted murder, a Level 1 felony.

Is that right?” Id.at 5. Hunter responded, “That’s right, sir.” Id. Hunter never 

sought clarification about the offense to which he was pleading guilty; likewise, 

he did not claim that the agreement was not what he thought it was until much 

later during his allocution at the sentencing hearing, which occurred after the 

trial court had already denied his motion to withdraw his plea. Thus, Hunter’s 

claim that he thought his counsel was going to obtain a plea for aggravated 

battery is not supported by the record. Compare Johnson, 734 N.E.2d at 245 

(record belied defendant’s claim that he pleaded guilty only because his 

attorney pressured him to do so; defendant acknowledged that he read and 

understood the plea agreement; this was sufficient to indicate his plea was 

voluntarily entered and that denying motion to withdraw plea did not result in 

manifest injustice). 

[22] Second, the record shows that Hunter was not coerced into pleading guilty. 

Before Hunter and his attorney met with the prosecutor, the case had been 

pending for more than one year, and the trial court had twice extended the 
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deadline for the parties to file a plea agreement. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 3-8. 

After all that time, the fact that the time for Hunter to decide whether to plead 

guilty after a one-hour meeting strikes us as hardly unusual or unreasonable. 

Thus, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Hunter had sufficient 

time to consider whether a plea agreement was in his best interest and to also 

conclude that Hunter was not coerced, or even “rushed,” into pleading guilty. 

Tr. Vol. 2 at 18-19.

[23] Hunter “has failed to show that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and 

that withdrawal of his plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice on that 

basis. See I.C. § 35-35-1-4(c)(3); Jeffries, 966 N.E.2d at 778-79. He freely and 

knowingly” pleaded guilty to attempted murder. See Coomer, 652 N.E.2d at 62. 

Manifest Injustice – Guilty Plea Lacked Factual Basis

[24] Hunter next argues that affirming the denial of his motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea will result in a manifest injustice because the guilty plea hearing did 

not establish a factual basis for attempted murder. Specifically, he claims that 

there was no factual basis that he fired the shotgun at Officer Brown and that he 

had the requisite specific intent to kill Officer Brown. In support, he refers to 

his exchange with the prosecutor:

Q. And you’re admitting that you shot Officer Luke Brown with 

a shotgun. Is that right? 

A. Yes. I did raise the gun and it was fired, yes.
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Tr. Vol 2 at 5 (emphasis added).

[25] We reject Hunter’s claim that this testimony did not establish a factual basis 

that he shot the gun and intended to kill Officer Brown. Hunter’s argument 

rests largely on his somewhat ambiguous admission that “it [the gun] was 

fired.” This admission, standing alone, is sufficient to establish a factual basis 

that he shot Officer Brown and intended to kill him, especially considering the 

less rigorous standard to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea than to 

support a conviction after a trial. See Rhoades, 675 N.E.2d at 702. Moreover, 

the broader context of the “it was fired” statement reinforces that there was a 

factual basis that Hunter shot Officer Brown and intended to kill him.

Q. And you’re admitting that you shot Officer Luke Brown with 

a shotgun. Is that right? 

A Yes. I did raise the gun and it was fired, yes.

Q. And you’re admitting that you were somewhere from about 

two to six feet away. You raised the shotgun, shot it, you hit him 

in the chest at close range. Is that right? 

A. I’m not positive, but I know it was around ten feet. 

Q. A close distance. Is that right? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And you’re admitting that constitutes a substantial step 

towards that commission of the crime. Is that right? 
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A. That’s correct, sir. 

Tr. Vol. 2 at 5-6. This acknowledgment by Hunter established a factual basis 

because it showed that Hunter understood the nature of the attempted murder 

charge and that his plea was an admission to that charge. See Oliver, 843 

N.E.2d at 588. 

[26] Finally, since “it has long been held that the specific intent to kill may be 

inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or 

great bodily harm,” Miller, 106 N.E.3d at 1074, the trial court reasonably 

concluded that there was an adequate factual basis for attempted murder. 

Despite Hunter’s protestation of innocence during allocution, the trial court 

reasonably concluded that Hunter fired the gun and that his specific intent to 

kill Officer Brown could be inferred from his use of the gun,. See Oliver, 843 

N.E.2d at 588; compare Carter, 739 N.E.2d at 131 (no abuse of discretion in 

denying withdrawal of a guilty plea when the defendant admitted guilt at plea 

hearing, and later proclaimed his innocence at the sentencing hearing); compare 

also Owens v. State, 426 N.E.2d 372, 374-75 (Ind. 1981); Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 

863, 868-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); and Harris v. State, 671 N.E.2d 864, 869 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1996). 

[27] The foregoing facts amply satisfy the standard that a “factual basis may be 

established by relatively minimal evidence about the elements of the crime from 

which the court could reasonably conclude that the defendant is guilty.” 

Graham, 941 N.E.2d at 1098. Hunter has failed to demonstrate that withdrawal 
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of his plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice because of an allegedly 

inadequate factual basis, and he also failed to demonstrate that withdrawal of 

his plea was necessary because his plea was allegedly not knowing and 

voluntary. 

[28] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.