Colloquium Brief

U.S. Army War College,

The National Bureau of Asian Research 

OTHER PEOPLE’S WARS:

PLA LESSONS FROM FOREIGN CONFLICTS

Daniel Alderman

Joe Narus

The National Bureau of Asian Research

KEY INSIGHTS:

•	 The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not fought in a major war since 1979, but has studied the

lessons of modern foreign conflicts from throughout the world. In some cases, those lessons have resulted

in observable changes to the PLA’s strategic, tactical, or operational posture.

•	 Conversely, what lessons from foreign conflicts the PLA has chosen not to explore may be equally illuminating for contemporary PLA watchers as they seek to better understand PLA self-perceptions, intentions,

and doctrine. Although it is more difficult to observe what potential lessons the PLA has ignored, the absence of study may provide important clues into how the PLA views its current and future roles.

•	 This conference identified the need for further research analyzing how the PLA as an organization progresses from observing a lesson to implementing that lesson within its ranks. In only limited cases can a

lesson observed by PLA leadership be conclusively linked to an actual adjustment made by the PLA.

Introduction.

	 Leading experts on the Chinese military gathered

at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, on October 22-24,

2010, for a discussion on “Other People’s Wars: PLA

Lessons from Foreign Conflicts.” The conference was

convened by The National Bureau of Asian Research

(NBR) and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the

U.S. Army War College (USAWC).

For over 20 years, leading scholars and experts

on the Chinese military have gathered at the annual

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Conference to discuss important trends in the modernization of China’s

military. The series of annual assessments that result

from these conferences has become an authoritative

benchmark on the pace, scope, and scale of the modernization of China’s military. In an effort to better

understand how the PLA may seek to utilize its newly

acquired capabilities, the 2010 PLA conference asked

the question, “What lessons does the PLA appear to

have drawn from the conflicts of others, and what

might the focus and content of those lessons reveal

about modern PLA tactics, doctrines, and intentions?”

As China seeks to build a modern, technologically-advanced military, it lacks firsthand experience in

the conditions of modern warfare. The Chinese military has not taken part in a major armed conflict since

its 1979 clash with Vietnam. Coming on the heels

of China’s self-destructive “Cultural Revolution,”

the PLA entered this conflict poorly trained, underequipped, and outmatched by battle-hardened

Vietnamese forces. It is from this low benchmark that

the Chinese military has undertaken just over 30 years

of modernization, during which the PLA has transformed itself into a relatively advanced, if untested,

military power.

	 With limited examples from its own past to draw

from, the PLA is presented with a range of options for

understanding the conditions of modern warfare and

the implications of technologically advanced equipment and weaponry. One such method is to attempt

to integrate lessons learned from foreign conflicts.

The 2010 PLA conference and its resulting publication

aim to fill a void within Chinese security literature by

assessing how the PLA has perceived, studied, and

learned from six modern conflict groups: the Kosovo

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war, the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the Iran-Iraq

missile battles, the two U.S. Gulf Wars, today’s war in

Afghanistan, and Russian small wars. A seventh paper examines how the PLA has studied and in some

cases learned from the operations of the U.S. Pacific

Command (PACOM).

Conference organizers asked authors to analyze

PLA lessons from each of these modern conflicts by

answering the following questions:

	 •	 What are the key observations that the PLA

has drawn from the conflict about the nature

and conduct of war?

	 •	 Are there lessons in military doctrine, strategy,

and training that were learned from this conflict?

	 •	 What other unique lessons, perhaps in other

fields, did the PLA learn by studying this conflict?

	 •	 Are there observable adjustments that the PLA

has made in response to the lessons learned?

Lessons from Air Campaigns. 

	 Over the past 3 decades, the Chinese military has

made determined efforts to improve its offensive and

defense air warfare capabilities. These efforts can be

traced, at least in part, to the lessons China learned

by studying U.S. offensive air warfare capabilities

and tactics during the two Gulf Wars (1990, 2003) and

the war in Kosovo, and by observing what defensive

tactics worked or failed in the face of unrivaled U.S.

air superiority and firepower. Conference papers explored what lessons China appears to have learned by

studying these campaigns and shed light on the operational lessons that may inform future PLA deployments.

	 In the years following NATO’s U.S.-led air campaign in Kosovo, three seemingly contradictory lessons have been articulated by different factions within the PLA. From one perspective, the war provided

evidence that rapid military modernization focused

on advanced technologies was the key to winning future conflicts. Accordingly, the PLA should focus on

building a military whose strength and technological

sophistication is equal to or greater than that of the

United States. A second view suggested that in light

of the sizable U.S. technological advantage, China

should avoid an arms race with the United States,

since it is unlikely to ever become a peer competitor. A final lesson was optimistic about the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia’s surprisingly robust defense

against a superior opposition. This conclusion supported China’s traditional belief in the viability of a

population-centric doctrine of “people’s war.”

	 With the benefit of historical perspective, it now

appears that these three contending schools do not

need to be viewed as mutually exclusive; rather, each

has manifest itself (to greater or lesser degrees) during

the intervening 14 years of PLA modernization. First,

China’s military has made significant investments and

advancements in their development, acquisition, and

deployment of high-technology weapons platforms.

Second, in spite of its rapid military gains China has,

by and large, carried out a cautious approach in its

relations with the U.S. military. Finally, those advocating for the continued utility of “people’s war” in

modern warfare continue to stress the need for welltrained personnel and the importance of political indoctrination, as evidenced by the National Defense

Mobilization Act of 2010, which reaffirms the importance of civilians in modern warfare.

Lessons Applicable to Conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Of recent foreign conflicts, two are unique for the

applicability of their lessons to a possible conflict over

Taiwan: the Falklands/Malvinas conflict and the IranIraq “War of the Cities Dual.” Perhaps no conflict is

more analogous to a potential Taiwan Strait crisis than

the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, where the geographically distant but militarily superior British armed

forces projected its power across thousands of miles of

ocean to repel the technologically inferior Argentine

military’s invasion of a near island. For China, this

conflict offers a case study in the strategies, successes,

and failures of the Argentine military as it attempted

to deny British forces access to the waters surrounding the island(s). The lessons of this conflict have likely made a direct contribution to China’s anti-access/

area-denial (A2/AD) strategies currently presumed to

be underway.

Beyond lessons learned from the militarily weaker

Argentinean perspective, China also appears to be

studying operational lessons from the British military’s projection of power. These lessons are not only

applicable to a Taiwan contingency, but also to a PLA

that is slowly expanding its reach and commitments

beyond the Chinese mainland and its periphery.

During the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, Great Britain

benefited from providing its own protection to a longdistance expeditionary force, maintaining access to

overseas bases, and building a superior network of air

power, merchant shipping, and amphibious forces. At

the same time, Chinese commentators recognize the
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double sided nature of logistics, both as the most crucial factor for projecting power and as an “Achilles’

heel” to be exploited in modern warfare.

The latest Department of Defense report on

Chinese military power cites approximately 1,110 missiles deployed opposite Taiwan, not to mention the

possible deployment of an anti-ship ballistic missile

and an anti-satellite capability. Rapid progress within

China’s missile sector implies that the use of missiles

has become a principal tenet of the PLA’s overall force

structure and perhaps the core element of PLA planning for a Taiwan scenario. Despite this central role in

PLA planning, relatively little is known of how PLA

leaders view other nation’s employment of conventional missiles.

China surely sees a strong deterrence factor in

their conventional missile force, but the PLA’s rapid

missile modernization process may also be moving

these weapons from only being objects of terror, to

also being instruments with legitimate military utility. Therefore, in studying the history of these weapons, and particularly their use in the Iran-Iraq “War

of the Cities Dual,” the PLA may have learned about

the limits of conventional missiles to inflict knockout

blows and to provide more than ineffective psychological terror on population centers. Thus, the PLA

may not be emulating the use of conventional missiles

in previous conflicts, but instead seeking to re-imagine the technological boundaries of these weapons so

that they might play a wider military role than what

has previously been employed.

Lessons from U.S. Conventional Wars and 

Contingencies. 

	 The PLA has devoted considerable time and attention to understanding how the U.S. military wages its modern wars, and in this pursuit, no conflicts

have been more influential in shaping the Chinese

military’s thinking than Operation DESERT SHIELD

in 1991 and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003.

In learning from the most powerful military in the

world, the PLA seems to have recognized that what

was especially significant about these conflicts was

their application of high-technology weaponry and

tactics during a period of U.S. hegemony, which was

free of the constraints that were present during the bipolar Cold War era. As the PLA learns from these two

conflicts, it also appears to be going to great lengths to

study how the U.S. military views operational contingencies in its Pacific Command (PACOM). Although

PACOM has not had operational command of a war

in nearly 40 years, its presence in China’s ocean fronts,

as well as its massive organizational and power projection capabilities, offer Chinese commentators fertile

ground for analysis.

Both of the U.S. Gulf Wars have provided lessons for the PLA across a range of strategic, tactical,

and operational level areas. One key theme running

through the lessons derived from both of these conflicts is the importance of technology in modern conflict. This lesson is perhaps most clearly evidenced

from the PLA’s study of the U.S. ability to relentlessly

use precision guided munitions across a range of targets despite otherwise crippling climate and environmental conditions. In both conflicts, it was argued that

the PLA saw this capability as dependent on the U.S.

ability to utilize a range of advanced weaponry, and

the PLA’s own procurement of cruise missiles, stealth

aircraft, and attack helicopters was likely influenced

by these decisions. Additionally, the PLA appears to

have learned the lesson of the immense significance

of communications and its impact on joint operations

that so well served the U.S. military in the opening

battles of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Interestingly, the importance of information technology appears to be a lesson that influenced Chinese

leaders well beyond the PLA to include: Chinese

commentators digesting lessons from these conflicts;

Chinese political leaders; and the civilian population.

This emphasis on technology at the strategic, tactical,

and operational level has specifically elevated hightechnology information as the “key point” for modern

warfare, with “information warfare” now seen in the

PLA as a critical component to all levels of modern

conflict, particularly as an issue of “perception management” within the military and civilian population.

Unlike the two Gulf Wars, PLA commentators appear to have written significantly less about their lessons from PACOM operations. The most notable reason for the PLA’s unique approach to learning from

PACOM is that it is viewed as a potential adversary.

This means that there are aspects of PACOM as an

organization and an implementer of modern warfare

that the PLA likely wishes to model, but a paradox exists in that the PLA must make contingency plans to

defeat that exact institution in the case of conflict with

the United States. Thus, the PLA would intuitively not

wish to integrate many of their lessons learned from

PACOM, instead preferring to develop asymmetric

capabilities capable of overcoming the militarily superior U.S. forces.

With that said, the PLA seems to be learning lessons from PACOM on some noncombat areas, such as
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the development of training centers, regional engagement, military diplomacy, humanitarian operations,

and civil-military coordination. Although the level

of PACOM influence from each of these areas likely

varies greatly, despite considerable strain in the U.S.-

China military-to-military relationship, the PLA has

still found areas of PACOM to partially imitate.

Lessons from Counterinsurgencies and Small Wars.

China is situated in a rough neighborhood that has

experienced considerable local turmoil over the last

30 years. This reality has led the PLA to spend considerable time learning from regional conflicts, both

for their proximity and their unique lessons. Perhaps

the two most significant modern conflicts involving

Chinese border countries include NATO’s operations

in Afghanistan and Russia’s actions in Chechnya. In

both cases, the lessons learned by the PLA and the

People’s Armed Police (PAP) seem to be primarily focused on domestic contingencies. In looking toward

the future direction of China’s own domestic operations, these two conflicts have proven to be most instructive for the Chinese.

As U.S. forces in Afghanistan have shifted their

focus toward conducting counterinsurgency (COIN)

operations, so too has the PLA begun learning lessons from U.S. experiences with this style of conflict.

Burdened with its own occasional acts of insurgency,

the Chinese leadership no doubt hopes to learn from

U.S. experiences in dealing with high-altitude operations that have utilized “network centric methods and

equipment” to carry out both intelligence and surveillance operations, as well as attacks on adversaries. In

the case of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, the PLA

literature suggests that the Chinese leadership has

primarily learned lessons at the tactical level, in areas

such as battlefield fire support and the integration of

unmanned aerial vehicles.

One area identified in the literature that has seemingly received scant attention is on the question of

whether the Chinese military could model U.S. efforts

to integrate its civilian and military relationships into

a unified COIN strategy. This as of yet unexplored

area would shed light on whether the Chinese military is prepared to adapt to a style of civil-military

integration that the U.S. military feels is essential to

winning the hearts and minds, as well as trust of the

local population. In the meantime, evidence suggests

that the PLA has learned the importance of eliminating insurgent leadership and the importance of limiting civilian casualties during COIN operations.

Beyond Afghanistan, Russia is another neighbor

that the PLA has studied extensively. The PLA appears to be learning a great deal from Russia’s experience in Chechen operations, which more closely models a regular war than the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.

In this regard, it seems evident from Chinese writings

that the PLA is not currently prepared to fight and win

a scenario similar to that of the Russian experience. In

this respect, there seems to be great debate among PLA

researchers over the efficacy of Russia’s firepower and

its application in urban settings. This is as of yet a still

largely unexplored area, which may prove influential

on PLA thinking.

Conclusion.

	 Many questions remain over the pace, scope, and

scale of the PLA’s future modernization efforts. In an

effort to better understand the priorities of this program, this conference addressed areas in which the

Chinese military might be drawing lessons from the

experiences of others. This inquiry indicated that

while it is often difficult to conclusively link a specific aspect of PLA modernization to a lesson learned

from abroad, the conference’s presentations and discussions did show that the PLA has devoted substantial time and energy to the study of others. Lessons

learned from abroad will almost certainly continue to

shape the course of China’s military modernization.

*****

	 The views expressed in this brief are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

*****

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