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Introduction

Indo-Pacific Perspective │1

Introduction: 

Can Human 

Rights Survive in 

the Indo-Pacific 

Order?

Dr. Peter Harris, editor

o say that the emerging international order in the Indo-Pacific

will be “rules-based” is to convey

precious little about its likely contents or normative appeal. It is true 

that rules will be a primary constituent of the coming regional order in 

the Indo-Pacific, just as rules are a 

primary constituent of all such international orders. The more important 

point is that, today, regional actors 

are in severe disagreement over 

which rules ought to apply in the 

Indo-Pacific, how, when, and on 

whose authority. This is what makes

the Indo-Pacific’s rules-based order a 

contested framework, not the fact 

that it will be rules-based per se.

The purpose of this roundtable is to 

draw attention to the (non)inclusion 

of human rights in the “rules-based” 

Indo-Pacific order. In most official descriptions of the incipient Indo-Pacific rulebook, principles such as 

state sovereignty, noninterference, 

and territorial integrity take center 

stage—a formulation of international 

order that Sung Won Kim, David 

Fidler, and Sumit Ganguly once 

called “Eastphalia.”1 Yet if such 

norms are made cardinal to the IndoPacific then the future of human 

rights must surely be regarded as unsafe at best. This is because human 

rights protections invariably place 

constraints on states; any international order that exists primarily to 

uphold state sovereignty will be one 

in which human rights struggle to

flourish. So, should proponents of 

universal human rights be pessimistic about the trajectory of the IndoPacific order?

The roundtable’s contributors tackle 

these questions from a range of perspectives. First, Frédéric Krumbein 

provides an overview of the contested 

place that human rights occupy in 

the larger Indo-Pacific order. He 

points out that human rights are 

rarely included in core definitions of 

the rules-based order but that, paradoxically, support for human rights is 

something that binds together some 

T

1
Harris

Indo-Pacific Perspective │2

of the Indo-Pacific order’s largest proponents.

John Ciorciara complements 

Krumbein’s analysis by exploring the 

challenge of promoting human rights 

in a region that is home to an array 

of illiberal, semi-authoritarian, and 

outright undemocratic regimes. Actors like the United States and European Union have demonstrated an 

interest in promoting human rights, 

Ciorciara argues, but operate under 

unpropitious international conditions. How can the West strengthen 

strategic ties with regimes amenable 

to resisting Chinese influence in Asia 

while simultaneously pressing these 

regimes to democratize, liberalize, 

and uphold human rights?

Bich T. Tran takes up exactly this 

question with a focused examination 

of US policy toward Vietnam. Tran 

explains that authoritarian countries 

such as Vietnam are open to international cooperation with Washington—especially in the shadow of 

China’s rise—but are nervous about 

the West’s commitments to human 

rights, which is viewed as a threat to 

regime security. She argues that 

there are some strategies available to

those who wish to promote human 

rights without provoking the ire of

regimes like Vietnam’s, including

working via multilateral institutions 

and making tactical concessions in 

terms of rhetoric and framing.

Next, Priya Chacko and Bec Strating 

offer an arresting take on the viability of building a “liberal” rules-based 

order in the Indo-Pacific. They point 

out that some of the staunchest supporters of liberal order are, in fact, 

responsible for some high-profile violations of human rights. Focusing on 

Australia, they argue that these inconsistencies and contradictions 

might well point to a larger problem 

with using liberalism as slab foundation for international order.

Finally, Elaine Pearson provides a 

practitioner’s view of human rights 

in the Indo-Pacific. Pearson joins a 

sober reckoning of the grim human 

rights abuses that have marred the 

region in recent years with an optimistic argument for how countries 

such as Australia might help turn 

the tide in favor of enshrined protections for human life and dignity.

The five contributions make clear 

that there will be “a” rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. That much, at 

least, is beyond doubt and does not 

depend upon which regional actors 

are in the ascendency. But it remains 

to be seen whether “the” rules-based 

order will be substantially different 

from the state-centric types of international order that have been typical 

in world politics for the past 200 

years or more. That is, it is an open 

question as to which rules will prevail in the Indo-Pacific, why, and for 

whom. In particular, the future of 

human rights laws in the emerging 
Introduction

Indo-Pacific Perspective │3

Indo-Pacific order is far from assured. The purpose of this volume is 

to assess the trajectory of the region’s 

emerging rules-based order, draw 

conclusions about the current and future place of human rights in the regional architecture, and lay down 

markers for what a more human 

rights–friendly regional order might 

look like. ■

Dr. Peter Harris

Dr. Harris is an assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University 

and editor of the Indo-Pacific Perspectives

series.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in 

Indo-Pacific Perspectives are those of the authors 

and should not be construed as carrying the official 

sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, 

Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

Notes

1 Sung Won Kim, David P. Fidler, and Sumit Ganguly. “Eastphalia Rising? Asian Influence and the 

Fate of Human Security,” World Policy Journal 26, 

no. 2 (2009): 53–64.
Krumbein

Indo-Pacific Perspective │4

A Free versus 

Repressive Vision: 

The Role of Human 

Rights in IndoPacific Strategies 

and Policies

Dr. Frédéric Krumbein

nternational relations in the IndoPacific region are increasingly 

shaped by “great power competition” between the United States and 

the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

What matters most are the power 

and interests of these two states and 

their allies and partners. Values, 

such as human rights, are only of 

secondary importance. However, domestic political systems and the values that underpin these domestic orders play a crucial role in defining 

how states large and small view 

themselves and “the Other” on the 

world stage.

For the most part, the United 

States and its closest allies in the 

Indo-Pacific region share the same 

values of democracy and human 

rights. Importantly, they tend to define competition with China in terms 

of these values. The 2017 US National Security Strategy, for example, 

stated that “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in 

the Indo-Pacific region.”1 Thus, there 

is a recognizable first group of states 

in the Indo-Pacific that not only 

views democracy, human rights, and 

the rule of law as part of their own 

identity but also wishes to promote 

these values in their foreign policies 

as well. These are mainly the “Western” countries, including the United 

States, European countries,2 and Japan.

A second group of Indo-Pacific 

states shares, to varying degrees, the 

same values as the first group, but 

they are more reluctant to promote 

human rights in their relations with 

other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The Asian democracies (with 

the exception of Japan) fall under 

this category, such as India, South 

Korea, and Taiwan. These actors either do not wish to provoke China 

and the other authoritarian regimes 

in the region by promoting human 

rights and democracy3 or else they 

adhere to the principle of

I

2
A Free versus Repressive Vision

Indo-Pacific Perspective │5

noninterference and want to avoid 

criticism of their own human rights 

situation.4 The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) share 

some commonalities with this group 

in that they collectively emphasize 

shared democratic values but, when 

acting as the Quad, exhibit a primary 

concern for upholding the rules-based 

order in the region, not the promotion of human rights and democracy.5

A third group of states does not 

necessarily share the values of democracy and human rights but does 

nevertheless advocate respect for international law and the rules-based 

order in the Indo-Pacific region. 

ASEAN is the most notable proponent of this approach. Due to the political diversity of its members and 

its traditional principles of neutrality 

and noninterference, the organization rarely interferes in the domestic 

affairs of its members and other 

countries. Consequently, the 

“ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” 

mentions neither human rights nor 

democracy. On the other hand, 

ASEAN has explicitly called for respecting international law (including 

the UN Charter) and promoting good 

governance and the rule of law.6

Of those that have been put forward by national governments and 

regional organizations like ASEAN, 

most Indo-Pacific strategy documents 

and policies aim to maintain the 

political status quo in the region. At 

least implicitly, most also seem to be 

directed against China’s authoritarian influence and Beijing’s territorial 

claims over Taiwan, the South China 

Sea, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Even though human rights 

play only a secondary role in the 

Indo-Pacific strategies and policies of 

most stakeholders, the democracies 

in the region—and China—view human rights as an area of competition.

Human rights are not part of the 

PRC’s identity. Nevertheless, the 

PRC has a well-developed conception 

of human rights and has published 

over 100 white papers about human 

rights in China, as well as international human rights policy.7 The 

PRC’s conception of human rights 

comprises three pillars: authoritarianism, social and economic development, and relativism. First, the oneparty dictatorship is portrayed as the 

foundation for human rights in the 

PRC: “The Party’s leadership is the 

fundamental guarantee for the people of China to have access to human 

rights, and to fully enjoy more human rights.”8 Second, social and economic human rights (such as the 

rights to social security, shelter, education, food, or healthcare) take priority over civil and political human 

rights; the two most important human rights from the PRC’s perspective are the collective rights to subsistence and development.9 Finally, 
Krumbein

Indo-Pacific Perspective │6

the PRC government argues for human rights relativism and the related concept of “human rights with 

Chinese characteristics.”10

China does not promote human 

rights, whether in the Indo-Pacific 

region or elsewhere. Rather, the 

main objectives of the PRC’s human 

rights policy are to discourage other 

states and international actors from 

criticizing the PRC’s human rights 

record, to weaken the international 

human rights regime, and to propagate its own relativist conception of 

human rights as opposed to rival definitions. 

To achieve the objectives of its human rights policy, the PRC has used 

both hard and soft power. On the one 

hand, the PRC has built alliances 

with so-called like-minded countries—that is, authoritarian and developing countries—in international 

forums such as the United Nations 

with a view toward shielding each 

other from human rights criticism. 

The PRC also signals cooperation 

and nominal acceptance of human 

rights to the international community by signing and ratifying human 

rights treaties, by being an active 

member in UN human rights institutions, and by conducting human 

rights dialogues with (mainly Western) states. If the PRC criticizes 

other countries’ records on human 

rights, it is almost always directed 

against Western states to counter 

their criticism of the PRC’s dismal 

human rights situation. Most of the 

time, however, China refrains from 

criticizing human rights in other

countries and expects not to be criticized in return.11

On the other hand, when confronted with criticism of its own human rights situation, the PRC usually denies the accusations and accuses the critics of not knowing the 

facts or of being biased against the 

PRC. If this tactic is not successful, 

the PRC government initiates a 

counter-narrative that portrays the 

alleged human rights violation as a 

lawful policy. Many of the PRC’s 

white papers on human rights describe a rosy human rights situation 

in Tibet and Xinjiang or in areas 

such as freedom of expression or religious freedom.12 Sanctions are another typical reaction against countries, companies, or other actors that 

speak out for human rights in the 

PRC; states that openly criticize the 

PRC’s human rights situation are 

punished, often by impeding their access to the vast Chinese market.13

Given that China is a larger trading 

partner than the United States for 

every country in the Indo-Pacific except Bhutan, these threats of economic punishment are significant.14

The PRC’s vast hard power resources 

are the major reason why a lot of 

countries refrain from “naming and 

shaming” the PRC in their Indo-
A Free versus Repressive Vision

Indo-Pacific Perspective │7

Pacific strategies in favor of talking 

about upholding the rules-based order in more vague terms, without 

pointing the finger at the PRC as the 

“norm-disrupting elephant in the 

room.”

In sum, the PRC is often successful 

in limiting criticism directed against 

its human rights record by other 

Indo-Pacific stakeholders. At the 

same time, balancing against the 

PRC is largely shaped by shared values and norms among democracies 

and human rights-abiding countries 

in the region. At least, such nations 

have shown the strongest resolve to 

confront China in recent years. 

Whether this dividing line will result 

in human rights becoming a core pillar of the so-called rules-based order 

remains to be seen, however. ■

Dr. Frédéric Krumbein

Dr. Krumbein is the Heinrich Heine Visiting Professor, Tel Aviv University, Tel 

Aviv, Israel.

Notes

1 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” White House, December 2017, 45, 

https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

2 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 

Security Policy, “The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the 

Indo-Pacific,” 16 September 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf.

3 This is the case with South Korea and Taiwan, for 

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in 

Indo-Pacific Perspectives are those of the authors 

and should not be construed as carrying the official 

sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, 

Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

example. Wongi Choe, “The Quest for Strategic Balance 

and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Conundrum,” The Diplomat, 13 August 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/the-quest-for-strategic-balance-andsouth-koreas-indo-pacific-conundrum/; and Frédéric 

Krumbein, “Two Chinese Tales of Human Rights– Mainland China’s and Taiwan’s External Human Rights Strategies,” The International Journal of Human Rights, forthcoming.

4 This is the case with India. See Arkoprabho Hazra, “Why 

Is India Silent on China’s Human Rights Record at the 

UN?,” The Diplomat, 27 October 2020, 
Krumbein

Indo-Pacific Perspective │8

https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/why-is-india-silenton-chinas-human-rights-record-at-the-un/.

5 “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The Spirit of the 

Quad”,” White House, 12 March 2021, 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-thespirit-of-the-quad/.

6 “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations, 23 June 2019, 

https://asean.org/speechandstatement/asean-outlookon-the-indo-pacific/.

7 “Archive - White Papers,” State Council of the People’s 

Republic of China, n.d., http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper.

8 “70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China,” State 

Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of 

China, n.d., 4, 

http://english.scio.gov.cn/node_8014390.html.

9 “National Report Submitted in Accordance with 

Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21 - China: A/HRC/WG.6/31/CHN/1,” UN Human Rights Council, 18 May 2021, 7,

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CNindex.aspx.

10 “National Report,” UN Human Rights Council, at 2.

11 Ann Kent, “China and the International Multilateral 

Human Rights System,” in Sarah Biddulph and Joshua 

Rosenzweig, eds., Handbook on Human Rights in China

(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019): 61–83.

12 “Archive - White Papers,” State Council of the People’s 

Republic of China.

13 Krumbein, “Two Chinese Tales of Human Rights.”

14 Yu Jie, “Indo-Pacific Is Rigorous Test of China’s Foreign 

Policy,” Chatham House, 26 April 2021, 

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/04/indo-pacificrigorous-test-chinas-foreign-policy.
International Headwinds for Human Rights in Southeast Asia

Indo-Pacific Perspective │9

International 

Headwinds for 

Human Rights in 

Southeast Asia

Dr. John D. Ciorciari

n many Indo-Pacific countries, human rights and democracy are in 

recession. This is particularly true 

in Southeast Asia, which lies at the 

core of the Indo-Pacific area, both geographically and in terms of its strategic significance. In recent years, 

the region’s residents have endured 

military coups and crackdowns in 

Thailand and Myanmar; abuses by 

populist authoritarian strongmen in 

Cambodia and the Philippines; continuing suppression of civil liberties

in Laos and Vietnam; and significant 

human rights violations elsewhere.

Although domestic forces certainly 

have contributed to human rights 

erosion in many countries, 

international politics also have 

played a vital role. Chinese backstopping of illiberal regimes has helped to

insulate them from local and international opprobrium and has reinforced

norms of non-interference and Westphalian sovereignty. At the same 

time, concerns about surging Chinese 

influence have induced caution from 

the United States and its allies in 

pressing for reform in authoritarian 

states. Regional institutions remain 

highly constrained on human rights 

issues.

Countercurrents exist, including US 

and European sanctions and Myanmar’s de facto suspension from the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the overall 

international environment presents 

serious obstacles to the advancement 

of human rights in the region. 

China’s ascent, the dynamics of a 

budding “new Cold War,” and regional institutional sclerosis all tilt 

the playing field in favor of Westphalian norms and against a liberal human rights agenda.

Several factors at the international 

level have contributed to human 

rights backsliding in Southeast Asia 

over the past decade or more. One is 

China’s emergence as the top trading 

partner and a major source of investment for every country in the region. 

China’s economic heft brings many 

benefits to Southeast Asia, but by offering reliable assistance with few 

I

3
Ciorciari

Indo-Pacific Perspective │10

governance strings attached, Beijing 

has made it easier for Southeast 

Asian governments to stifle domestic 

dissent at an acceptable cost. Chinese aid has become a reliable bulwark against Western sanctions for 

governments that choose to confront 

domestic challenges with violent repression and politicized justice.

After US officials criticized the 2014 

coup in Thailand and suspended military assistance, for example, Chinese officials embraced Thai military 

leaders and promptly offered aid. 

China has stepped forward to offer 

aid to Cambodia whenever Western 

governments or multilateral institutions have sought to impose costs on 

the Hun Sen government for its human rights abuses—such as the 

forced displacement of residents 

around Boeung Kak Lake in 2010, 

the repression of opposition protesters in 2013–2014, or the shuttering 

of civil society organizations and disbanding of the main opposition party

in 2017. In Myanmar today, Chinese 

aid helps an abusive junta stay afloat 

and hold opposition protesters under 

heel, countering the effects of US and 

European sanctions since the February 2021 coup. Chinese assistance 

does not dictate Southeast Asian repression but makes the expected consequences much easier to bear.

In this context, the United States 

and its allies have struggled to promote human rights effectively in the 

region and to reconcile that objective 

with their strategic interest in countering Chinese influence. The concept 

of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” 

(FOIP), introduced in 2016, suggested the possibility of US and Japanese Indo-Pacific strategies that 

would attempt to marry these two objectives—that is, confronting China 

while giving added priority to human 

rights. The FOIP concept’s progenitor, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 

Abe, initially envisaged an area that 

“values freedom, the rule of law, and 

the market economy, free from force 

or coercion.”1 US Secretary of State 

Mike Pompeo conveyed a similar vision in a 2018 address, saying:

When we say “free” Indo-Pacific, it 

means we all want all nations, every 

nation, to be able to protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries. At the national level, “free” 

means good governance and the assurance that citizens can enjoy their fundamental rights and liberties.2

The emphasis on fundamental domestic freedoms suggested a liberal 

logic of promoting democratic norms 

in Indo-Pacific societies, in part by 

challenging Westphalian sovereignty 

and the norm of non-interference. 

The emphasis on preventing coercion 

suggested a realist logic of curbing 

Chinese influence, potentially by accommodating illiberal regimes rather 

than seeking their reform.

The latter logic has tended to prevail 

as the members of the “Quad”
International Headwinds for Human Rights in Southeast Asia

Indo-Pacific Perspective │11

(Australia, India, Japan, and the 

United States) have implemented 

their respective national policies and 

strategies in the Indo-Pacific. This 

reflects the challenges of promoting 

human rights while seeking to 

strengthen strategic ties in a region 

home to an array of mostly illiberal 

or semi-authoritarian regimes. As 

one important illustration, Vietnam 

was invited to the first meeting of the 

“Quad Plus” in 2020 alongside South 

Korea and New Zealand. Although 

Quad members continue to put rhetorical emphasis on building a region 

“anchored by democratic values,”3 the 

inclusion of autocratic Vietnam 

would seem to betray the Quad’s 

greater focus on constraining China.

US policy has followed a similar pattern. President Donald Trump generally downplayed human rights in 

Southeast Asia. Trump applauded 

Philippine President Rodrigo 

Duterte’s ruthless “war on drugs” despite mounting evidence of myriad 

extrajudicial killings, for example, 

and said little about human rights 

during his 2017 trip to Asia. In an 

October 2018 speech, Vice President 

Mike Pence made clear that the US 

priority was to confront China. Like 

the preceding administration of President Barack Obama, the Trump administration dealt gingerly with human rights concerns in key US strategic partners such as Vietnam, 

Thailand, and Singapore. The Trump 

administration did impose sanctions 

for human rights abuses in Cambodia and Myanmar, two countries long 

subject to US criticism, but even 

those sanctions were tempered by 

concerns about driving Naypyidaw 

and Phnom Penh further into 

China’s embrace.

The administration of President Joe 

Biden pledged to elevate values in 

US Asia policy but has struggled to 

do so while pursuing closer strategic 

partnerships. The Biden administration has doubled down on sanctions 

against Myanmar, demanding an end 

to repression and the release of political prisoners. In neighboring countries, however, US criticism has been 

more restrained. Deputy Secretary of 

State Wendy Sherman raised human 

rights issues with Cambodian Prime 

Minister Hun Sen in July 2021, for 

example, but bundled that message 

between concerns about strategic 

Chinese investment and the need for 

the US government to work with 

Cambodia as the latter assumes the 

2022 ASEAN chair. Senior US diplomats also have expressed human 

rights concerns to Thailand and Vietnam, but substantive engagement 

reflects more continuity than change 

from the Trump administration’s approach. In December, the Biden administration was flayed for inviting 

Duterte to its “summit for democracy” alongside just two other 

ASEAN member states, Indonesia 
Ciorciari

Indo-Pacific Perspective │12

and Malaysia (the latter represented 

by its second consecutive unelected 

government). Singapore, a crucial US 

strategic partner, was excluded, adding to the general unpopularity of the 

initiative across Southeast Asian 

capitals. Similar challenges have induced caution in Canberra, Brussels, 

and elsewhere.

Japan also backed away from Abe’s 

initial plan to prioritize values-centric diplomacy as Southeast Asian 

misgivings became apparent. Notably, the 2019 “ASEAN Outlook on the 

Indo-Pacific” refers in passing to 

“good governance” but lacks any explicit reference to democracy or human rights.4 Japanese lawmakers 

and the administrations of Yoshihide 

Suga and Fumio Kishida have decried Chinese human rights violations in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, but 

they have been less assertive in advancing rights protections in Southeast Asia. Japan has condemned the 

Myanmar coup and subsequent repression but was slow to suspend 

new aid programs and quietly has 

worked to build a relationship with 

the governing junta, mindful of countering Chinese influence.5 Japan also 

has been quiet on the Rohingya crisis, refrained from joining sanctions 

against Cambodia, and otherwise 

kept a low regional profile on human 

rights promotion.

Within ASEAN, important countercurrents are apparent. The abuses in 

Myanmar prompted an unprecedented move in October 2021, when 

the other nine members excluded 

junta leaders from a virtual summit 

hosted by Brunei. More recently, 

some Southeast Asian governments 

declined to attend an ASEAN foreign 

ministers meeting when they learned 

that Cambodia, the Association’s current chair, planned to invite Myanmar’s foreign minister to attend.6 Indonesian, Singaporean, and Philippine officials have demanded more 

progress before Myanmar is brought 

back into the fold, and the ASEAN 

Parliamentarians for Human Rights, 

a network of national legislators, has

flayed Cambodian Prime Minister 

Hun Sen for reaching out to Myanmar military chief Min Aung Hlaing 

and seeking to draw Myanmar back 

into ASEAN. Yet no ASEAN member

has an interest in expelling Myanmar, which would likely propel it toward China, and most are reluctant

to set precedents of strong and sustained collective action to address domestic governance failures. In general, ASEAN member governments 

are less concerned about human 

rights than the effects of disunity 

and discord on regional stability and 

the organization’s external influence. 

These factors help to explain why 

ASEAN members have not moved beyond diplomatic shaming to level 

sanctions against Myanmar.

In sum, international politics in 
International Headwinds for Human Rights in Southeast Asia

Indo-Pacific Perspective │13

Southeast Asia and the surrounding 

Indo-Pacific region are evolving 

mostly in a manner that exacerbates 

the difficulty of advancing human 

rights. These currents are neither insuperable nor irreversible, but they 

are likely to endure for some time to 

come. If Southeast Asian human 

rights conditions are to improve

markedly in the years ahead, this 

analysis suggests that local movements are likely to be the primary 

drivers. That is often the case even in 

more favorable international environments, and one important policy 

implication is the need for continued 

investment in social development 

and local civil society organizations 

even as high-level international politics appear less conducive to positive 

change. ■

Dr. John D. Ciorciari

Dr. Ciorciari is an associate professor and 

director of the Weiser Diplomacy Center 

and International Policy Center at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan. He is the author of Sovereignty Sharing in Fragile States (Stanford 

University Press, 2021) and co-editor with 

Kiyo Tsutsui of The Courteous Power: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific 

Era (University of Michigan Press, 2021).

Notes

1 Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at 

the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, Nairobi, Kenya, 27 August 2016, 

https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in 

Indo-Pacific Perspectives are those of the authors 

and should not be construed as carrying the official 

sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, 

Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

2 Michael Pompeo, “America’s Indo-Pacific 

Vision,” US Mission to ASEAN, Washington DC, 

30 July 2018, https://asean.usmission.gov/.

3 “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The 

Spirit of the Quad”,” White House, 12 March

2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/.
Ciorciari

Indo-Pacific Perspective │14

4 “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 23 June 

2019, https://asean.org/.

5 Teppai Kasai, “Japan Plays a Diplomatic 

Double Game on Rights in Myanmar,” Human 

Rights Watch, 2 December 2021, 

https://www.hrw.org/.

6 Siti Rahil, “ASEAN May Face Bigger 

Challenge On Myanmar Under Cambodia’s 

Chair,” Asia Times, 22 January 2022, 

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.
A Better Approach to Promoting Human Rights in Vietnam and Southeast Asia

Indo-Pacific Perspective │15

A Better Approach 

to Promoting 

Human Rights in 

Vietnam and 

Southeast Asia

Bich T. Tran

n the last few years, Vietnam has 

gained more importance in US foreign policy. The 2015 National Security Strategy highlighted US partnerships with Vietnam and other 

Southeast Asian countries.1 The 2017 

National Security Strategy named 

Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 

Singapore as growing security and 

economic partners.2 The 2019 IndoPacific Report viewed Vietnam as one 

of the key players in the Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN), which was in turn portrayed as playing a central role in US 

efforts to safeguard peace and guarantee prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.3

The 2021 Interim National Security 

Strategic Guidance indicated that 

the United States would deepen its 

partnership with India and work 

alongside New Zealand, Singapore, 

Vietnam, and other ASEAN members 

to address common challenges and 

advance shared objectives.4

However, differences on human 

rights and the distrust that follows 

have hindered efforts to advance 

closer diplomatic and security ties 

between Hanoi and Washington. Despite Vietnam’s substantial improvements in its human rights record in 

recent years, concerns remain in several areas, including freedom of expression and labor rights. While the 

US government sometimes downplays human rights issues in its relations with Hanoi, as it did during the 

Trump administration, the US Congress keeps these issues front and 

center. America’s support for pro-democracy dissidents and its promotion 

of higher human rights standards 

have led Hanoi to grow more suspicious about a perceived “peaceful evolution” aimed at overthrowing the Vietnamese Communist Party. This 

lack of trust and Hanoi’s concern regarding Beijing’s reaction to this 

matter have prevented the United 

States and Vietnam from upgrading 

their comprehensive partnership to a 

strategic partnership.

To be clear, Vietnam does recognize and institutionalize human 

rights. On 2 September 1945, Ho Chi 

I

4
Tran

Indo-Pacific Perspective │16

Minh declared the independence of 

the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 

by echoing the Declaration of Independence of the United States of 

America: “All men are created equal. 

They are endowed by their Creator 

with certain unalienable rights, 

among them are Life, Liberty, and 

the pursuit of Happiness.”5 Meanwhile, Article 3 of the constitution of 

the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 

says that “the State guarantees and 

promotes the people’s mastery; 

acknowledges, respects, and protects 

human rights and citizens’ rights; 

implements the objectives of affluent 

people, powerful state, democracy, 

justice, civilization, and that all people enjoy abundant, free, and happy 

life and are given conditions for allsided development.”6

In practice, however, the Vietnamese government curtails freedom of 

expression out of fear that some citizens might challenge the regime’s 

authority. This trend has intensified 

as the Internet and social media have 

created numerous platforms for criticizing the Party. Although Vietnam 

occasionally allows nationalist protests when doing so serves the state’s 

interests, such as protests regarding 

the South China Sea disputes, such 

public expressions of nationalism are 

usually prohibited for fear that opposing groups can use organized protests to undermine the regime.7 Labor rights are also thinly upheld, the 

result of an inadequate social protection system. Millions of people in Vietnam migrate from rural areas to 

cities in search for a better life, but

many of these migrants end up working in industrial zones with minimal 

wages and have no choice but to work 

overtime. About 79 percent of Vietnam’s labor force is employed in 

the informal economy with no or little social protection from unemployment, sickness, and retirement.8

Like any ruling party, the Communist Party of Vietnam wishes to 

remain in power. This motivates the 

regime. In 2017, Vietnam established 

Task Force 47, a combat unit within 

the Vietnam People’s Army that consists of 10,000 members, to counter 

“wrong” views on the Internet.9 In 

2018, Vietnam adopted the Law on 

Cybersecurity that includes data localization and controls on content 

that could affect freedom of speech 

and dampen foreign investment. Vietnam’s 2018 criminal code includes 

Article 109 to criminalize activities 

aimed at overthrowing the people’s 

administration; Article 117 to criminalize making, possessing, and 

spreading information, materials, 

and items for the purpose of opposing 

the State of Socialist Republic of Vietnam; and Article 331 that makes it 

a crime to abuse democratic freedoms 

in ways that infringe upon the interests of the State, the lawful rights 

and interests of organizations and 
A Better Approach to Promoting Human Rights in Vietnam and Southeast Asia

Indo-Pacific Perspective │17

individuals.10 Notably, besides sentences for the organizers, instigators, 

and people who are found responsible 

for carrying out these transgressions, 

the law also punishes “those who prepare to commit” such crimes. 

To promote human rights in Vietnam without straining the US-Vietnamese bilateral relationship, 

Washington first needs to address 

Hanoi’s suspicion about peaceful evolution. Most basically, the United 

States should continue to give reassurances—as it frequently has done 

in the past—that it respects Vietnam’s political system. At the same 

time, the United States should utilize 

multilateral mechanisms whenever 

possible to promote higher human 

rights standards. Multilateralism is 

advisable for two reasons. First, it 

will help to reduce Hanoi’s suspicion 

about Washington’s intentions toward its political system. Second, 

multilateral arrangements have actually produced some successes when 

it comes to enhancing Vietnam’s human rights practices. 

During the negotiation of the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), for 

instance, Hanoi and Washington 

signed a separate agreement to provide a well-defined framework for 

how Vietnam must reform its laws 

and practices to conform with international labor rights standards. The 

agreement was only abandoned when 

the Trump administration withdrew 

the United States from the agreement, thus nullifying Hanoi’s labor 

rights commitments. Another example is Vietnam’s 2019 Labor Code, 

which was passed to comply with the 

European Union-Vietnam Free Trade 

Agreement. The new code offers 

greater protection for employees and 

marks the first time Vietnam has allowed the establishment of independent trade unions. The United States 

and like-minded countries should apply the same sort of multilateral approach to the digital economy and 

convince Vietnam to adjust its cybersecurity law.

In addition, increasing the capacity 

and independence of Vietnam’s judicial and legislative bodies can help to 

improve its human rights practices. 

One way is to increase the clarity of 

Vietnam’s laws on anti-state crimes. 

In Article 109 and 331 of the 2018 

criminal code, for example, it is unclear what “serious consequences” 

mean and what constitutes an abuse 

of the rights to freedom. In the short 

to medium terms, the United States 

and other developed countries could 

offer projects that specifically target 

this area. In the long term, providing 

scholarships and training to the next 

generation of Vietnamese legislative 

leaders could seed the change.

Improving human rights will benefit 

Vietnam in many ways. Economically, higher human rights standards 

will attract foreign investment for 
Tran

Indo-Pacific Perspective │18

economic development which, in 

turn, will create a stronger foundation for social protection. Vietnam 

has been reaching out to the world 

through proactive economic integration. However, if Vietnam wants the 

world to view it as a regional hub, it 

must comply with international 

standards. In terms of security, Vietnam’s improvement on its human 

rights record will help to bolster its 

ties with the United States and likeminded countries to counterbalance 

China in the South China Sea.

In a broader context, the Biden administration should rephrase some of 

the terms used when approaching 

the nations of Southeast Asia. Unlike 

his predecessor, President Joe Biden 

has pledged to prioritize US commitments in “fighting corruption, defending against authoritarianism, 

and advancing human rights in their 

own nations and abroad.”

11 Although 

this helps to set his administration 

apart from his predecessor’s, it might 

be counterproductive given that several Southeast Asian countries are 

non-democracies and that Vietnam,

in particular, is a one-party state. Instead of security, prosperity, and 

Notes

1 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” White House, February 2015, 

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/.

2 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” White House, December 2017, 

https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/.

3 “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report,” Department of Defense, 1 

human rights, the United States 

could emphasize shared goals such as

trade and investment, regional stability, and human development. This 

will help the United States build 

closer ties with Southeast Asian 

countries with a view to countering

Chinese coercion, promoting peace 

and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and laying the foundation for 

gradual improvements in human 

rights. ■

Bich T. Tran

Bich T. Tran is a PhD candidate at the University of Antwerp, a fellow at Verve Research, and a nonresident fellow at the 

Center for Strategic and International 

Studies. Her research interests include 

Vietnam's grand strategy, Southeast Asian 

states’ relations with major powers, and political leadership. Her work has appeared 

in outlets such as Asia Pacific Issues, Asian 

Perspective, and Asian Politics & Policy.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in 

Indo-Pacific Perspectives are those of the authors 

and should not be construed as carrying the official 

sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, 

Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

June 2019, https://media.defense.gov/.

4 “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” White 

House, March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

5 “Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic 

of Vietnam,” History Matters, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/.

6 “The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” 

ConstitutionNet, https://constitutionnet.org/.

7 John D. Ciorciari and Jessica Chen Weiss, “Nationalist 
A Better Approach to Promoting Human Rights in Vietnam and Southeast Asia

Indo-Pacific Perspective │19

Protests, Government Responses, and the Risk of Escalation in Interstate Disputes,” Security Studies 25, no. 3 

(2016): 546–583.

8 “Workers’ Rights,” Oxfam, https://vietnam.oxfam.org/.

9 “Vietnam Has 10,000-strong ‘Cyber Troop’: General,” 

Tuoi Tre News, 26 December 2017, 

https://tuoitrenews.vn/.

10 “Bộ luật Hình sự,” Thu Vien Phap Luat, 27 November

2015, https://thuvienphapluat.vn/.

11 Joe Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 2 (2020): 64–76.
Chacko & Strating

Indo-Pacific Perspective │20

Australia’s “RulesBased Order” and 

the Contradictions 

of Liberalism

Dr. Priya Chacko and 

Dr. Bec Strating

n a 2021 speech to the Perth 

USAsia Centre, the Australian 

Prime Minister Scott Morrison argued that “our countries can support, 

defend, and (where necessary) renovate a liberal, rules-based international order that supports universal 

human rights and opportunities for 

all. A world order that favors freedom over autocracy and authoritarianism.”

1 The speech was a departure 

from earlier iterations of Australia’s 

rules-based order (RBO) rhetoric in 

its explicit espousal of liberalism. 

Earlier versions of the RBO avoided 

the mention of liberalism to give the 

appearance of normative neutrality. 

This was useful in a diverse and 

rapidly changing region, in which 

key partners in countering, deterring, and opposing revisionism have 

not just been resistant to Western 

posturing on values but have even 

put forward communitarian notions 

of “Asian values” as alternatives to 

liberal rights. Yet, the RBO has become increasingly political and normative, with liberal and democratic 

values coming to the fore in government discourse. In the process, however, this change in emphasis has exposed the deep contradictions of Australian liberalism.

Liberalism is a slippery concept 

constituted of contradictory ideas 

and a fraught history of political 

practice. It is generally agreed, however, that liberalism’s central ideas 

are the protection of universal individual rights and the reduction of violence in human relations. These 

foundations support various tenets 

such as the protection of private 

property, the rule of law within and 

between states, the promotion of civil 

society, an enlightened sovereign in 

the guise of a minimal state, rationalism, secularism, tolerance, and opposition to autocracy and totalitarian 

collectivism.

Yet, these liberal ideas are potentially contradictory in practice. Not 

all individuals own private property, 

for example, and so the elevation of 

that right (as in economic liberalism) 

can lead to the differential treatment 

I

5
Australia’s “Rules-Based Order” and the Contradictions of Liberalism

Indo-Pacific Perspective │21

of individuals. Similarly, force and 

unequal treatment have been legitimized in the theory and practice of 

liberalism when meted out against 

those deemed irrational or intolerant. 

Internationally, this has led to liberal 

imperialism. Domestically, it has 

permitted punitive welfare systems 

designed to punish the so-called undeserving poor. Meanwhile, it has often proved difficult to curtail state 

authority in practice; states often reserve the right to abrogate self-limitations on executive power, which allows them to exercise power beyond 

normal rules.

Australia’s RBO rhetoric reflects 

liberal ideas, but its practices reflect 

liberalism’s internal contradictions. 

Australia’s RBO is a proxy for a regional order built upon the primacy 

of the United States: an idealized liberal status quo overseen by a benign 

sovereign dedicated to protecting its 

liberal allies with minimal force. The 

RBO’s unspoken illiberal “Other” is 

the People’s Republic of China, with 

the obvious subtext of phrases such 

as “challenges to the rules-based order” being that rising and authoritarian China is attempting to revise and 

rewrite the regional order that has 

long served Australia’s interests. 

Support for an idealized status quo

centered on US regional hegemony 

was expressed in the 2017 Australian 

Foreign Policy White Paper, which 

noted that China was challenging the 

post–Second World War liberal international order “built, contributed to 

and led” by the United States.2 This 

“liberal” RBO is seen to be “premised 

around human rights, democracy, 

and free trade, taking the world towards deeper integration, interdependence, and cross-border cooperation.”3

The declining power of the United 

States and doubts about its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region have

spurred a desire to create new regional liberal institutions such as the 

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 

(“Quad”), consisting of Australia, the 

United States, Japan, and India. Recent Quad proclamations highlight 

their role as rule-abiding maritime 

democracies in the Indo-Pacific and 

express a desire to limit China’s economic power through the creation of 

China-free “resilient supply chains.”4

The statement announcing the AUKUS trilateral security partnership 

between the US, UK, and Australia 

began by emphasizing their “enduring ideals and shared commitment . . 

. to the international rules-based order,” as well as their shared traditions as “maritime democracies.” 

Throughout his leadership, Prime 

Minister Morrison’s speeches have focused on sovereignty and democratic 

values as part of a simplistic, binary 

vision of an Indo-Pacific split between democracies and autocracies.5

The apparent threat posed by 
Chacko & Strating

Indo-Pacific Perspective │22

illiberal China has been used to justify the curtailing of individual freedoms and civil society autonomy. 

Several key pieces of legislation—

from the Espionage and Foreign Interference Act 2018, Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018, 

to Australia’s Foreign Relations Act 

2020—all purport to be country-neutral, but political leaders have made 

clear that the laws are intended as a 

response to Chinese “foreign interference.” The broad and vague scope of 

such legislation targets mere contact 

with foreign actors rather than improper conduct. As such, these laws 

threaten civil liberties, effectively 

criminalizing actions as indeterminate as sharing information about 

“political, military or economic relations with another country,” linking 

on social media, or purchasing laptops.6

The portrayal of China as Australia’s main geopolitical challenge 

has also led to ignoring the illiberal 

actions of Australia’s allies and partners, who are described as “likeminded states.” While Australia 

forcefully criticized China’s rejection 

of the South China Sea arbitral tribunal ruling, for instance, there has 

not been a similar willingness to 

question US transgressions.7 India, 

too, has been embraced as a democratic ally despite its increasing illiberal and antidemocratic government.8

Australia’s refugee policies also expose the internal contradictions of 

liberal governance. Australia’s adoption of economic liberalism in the 

1980s occurred alongside the introduction of restrictive migration and 

refugee policies, which have become 

more so with time. This “liberal paradox” can be understood as the result 

of political leaders seeking to assuage 

the disaffection produced by liberal 

economic policies among significant 

parts of the electorate with the assertion of sovereign border protection.9

Immigration policy since the 1980s 

has been built on differential categories of treatment for migrants, with 

refugees who have arrived in unauthorized ways treated as criminals, 

wealthy migrants given fast-tracked 

residency and citizenship, and lowskilled migrants subjected to laws 

that create workplace insecurity and 

mistreatment.10 Australia’s migration and refugee policies have become 

increasingly punitive. Immigration 

ministers now have unchecked power 

to determine entry, which can be denied on character grounds including 

expressing nonviolent political opinions contrary to government policy 

and popular opinion, as the tennis 

player Novak Djokovic recently discovered.11 Indeed, the criminalization 

of dissent and protest has become a 

general feature of Australian governance, with the federal and state governments passing antiprotest laws to 

protect the agricultural and mining 
Australia’s “Rules-Based Order” and the Contradictions of Liberalism

Indo-Pacific Perspective │23

industries.12

Australia’s immigration policies not 

only erode domestic civil liberties but 

have resulted in noncompliance with 

international human rights law via 

the use of offshore processing centers. In 2012, the Australian Government began transferring asylum 

seekers who had arrived in Australia 

by boat to Nauru and Papua New 

Guinea. Asylees’ claims for protection 

were then processed under the laws 

of those third countries. Australia’s 

Human Rights Commission held serious concerns that the regional processing regime would risk violation of 

core human rights principles, including “the prohibition on arbitrary detention, the right to claim asylum, 

and the rights of children and the 

family.”13

In 2014, the Australian Human 

Rights Commission conducted an inquiry into Australia's practice of 

placing asylum-seeking children in 

detention. It found that, since 1992, 

Australia’s detention practices (especially as applied to children) have 

breached the right not to be detained 

arbitrarily.14 In the same year, then–

Immigration Minister Scott Morrison 

steadfastly defended his border protection policies during the inquiry, 

arguing that when it came to the issue of child detention, “sentiment 

cannot be indulged at the expense of 

effective policy.”15

Significant international attention 

has also been devoted to Australia’s 

failure to ensure the human rights of 

asylum seekers, including those 

housed abroad and those detained on 

Australian soil. In its sixth periodic 

report on human rights in Australia, 

the UN Human Rights Committee 

(UNHRC) noted that Australia’s policies and legal framework concerning 

non-refoulement, mandatory migration detention, and the use of offshore processing centers (and Christmas Island) failed to meet international standards.16 In 2013, the UNHRC argued that Australia’s detention of people in immigration was arbitrary and in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.17

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights working 

group on arbitrary detention has also 

criticized Australia’s indefinite incarceration of asylum seekers in immigration detentions on mainland Australia.18 This continues to be an issue, as asylum seekers who arrive in 

Australia without a visa are subjected to “punitive measures” that 

impact “their ability to meaningfully 

engage in the refugee status determination process” even if they are released into the community. These 

measures include waiting up to four 

years to be granted permission to apply for protection, inability to be reunited with family or apply for permanent residency, and, in many cases, 
Chacko & Strating

Indo-Pacific Perspective │24

the removal of free legal assistance. 

The UNHRC estimates that there 

are approximately 30,000 asylum 

seekers affected by these measures, 

described by the Australian government as a “legacy caseload.”19

Australia has sought to defer some 

of its international legal obligations 

to smaller regional states. Offshore 

regional processing centers have 

been central to the border policies of 

both Labor and Coalition governments. In 2016, however, a court in 

Papua New Guinea declared the detention centers unconstitutional under section 42 of that country’s constitution, a human rights provision 

that prohibits arbitrarily depriving 

an individual of “personal liberty.” 

Australia’s position was that it did 

not exercise “effective control” of asylum seekers in regional processing 

centers and so should not be held accountable. The UNHRC refuted this, 

however, arguing that Australia’s establishment, funding, and servicing 

of detention centers met the standard 

of “effective control,” even if located 

in a third country.20 As such, Australia was viewed as responsible for 

the severe conditions in the camps. 

Such policies raised criticisms that 

Australia was seeking to “pick and 

choose” the rules it wanted to follow, 

particularly when human rights 

norms (and international refugee 

law) conflicted with a political interest in maintaining “sovereignty” over 

Australia’s borders. 

Given the multitude of problems in 

abiding by domestic and international rules that promote individual 

rights among even avowedly liberal 

democratic states in the Indo-Pacific, 

effusive appeals to liberalism as a 

core feature of a “free and open IndoPacific” strain credulity. Australia’s 

vigorous promotion of a liberal RBO 

at the same time as its own liberaldemocratic credentials are being 

called into question is a case in point. 

Increasingly, it is becoming clear 

that liberalism’s internal contradictions provide a shaky foundation 

upon which to build regional cooperation. ■

Dr. Priya Chacko

Dr. Chacko is Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Adelaide. 

She is the author of Indian Foreign Policy: 

The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 

1947 to 2004 (Routledge, 2012) and editor 

of New Regional Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific: Drivers, Dynamics and Consequences

(Routledge, 2016).

Dr. Bec Strating

Dr. Strating is Director of La Trobe Asia 

and Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at La Trobe University. She is the author of Defending the 

Maritime Rules-Based Order: Regional Responses to the South China Sea Disputes

(East-West Center, 2020), The Post-Colonial Security Dilemma: Timor-Leste and the 

International Community (ISEAS, 2019), 

and Social Democracy in East Timor

(Routledge, 2016).
Australia’s “Rules-Based Order” and the Contradictions of Liberalism

Indo-Pacific Perspective │25

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in 

Indo-Pacific Perspectives are those of the authors 

and should not be construed as carrying the official 

Notes

1 Scott Morrison, “Address to the Perth US Asia 

Centre,” 9 June 2021, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/address-perth-usasia-centre-perth-wa.

2 Commonwealth of Australia, Foreign Policy White 

Paper (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 

2017), 80. 

3 Lee Jones, “Does China’s Belt and Road Initiative 

Challenge the Liberal, Rules-Based Order?” Fudan Journal 

of Humanities and Social Science 13, no. 1 (2020): 113–

133.

4 “Joint Statement from Quad Leaders,” White 

House, 24 September 2021,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/09/24/joint-statement-from-quad-leaders/.

5 Morrison, “The Beliefs that Guide Us,” address to 

Asia Briefing Live, 1 November 2018, 

https://www.pm.gov.au/media/keynote-address-asiabriefing-live-beliefs-guide-us.

6 Melissa Conley Tyler and Julian Dusting, “What 

Should Australia Do About Its Foreign Interference and 

Espionage Laws?”, China Matters, May 2021, https://chinamatters.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/CMEMay-2021-Foreign-Interference-Melissa-Conley-Tyler-andJulian-Dusting.pdf. 

7 Gregory V. Raymond, “Advocating the RulesBased Order in an Era of Multipolarity,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 73, no. 3 (2019): 219–226, at 

223.

8 Soutik Biswas, “‘Electoral Autocracy’: The Downgrading of India’s Autocracy,” BBC News, 16 March 2021, 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56393944.

9 Anne McNevin, “The Liberal Paradox and the Politics of Asylum in Australia,” Australian Journal of Political 

Science 42, no. 4 (2007), 611–630.

10 Shanti Robertson, “Status-Making: Rethinking 

Migrant Categorization,” Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 

(2018), 219–233.

11 Paul Sakkal, “‘Dangerous in a Democracy’: Civil 

Rights Groups’ Alarm at Government’s Djokovic Case,” 

The Age, 16 January 2022, 

https://www.theage.com.au/sport/dangerous-in-a-democracy-civil-rights-groups-alarm-at-government-sdjokovic-case-20220116-p59omd.html.

12 Isabelle Reinecke, “The jailing of a young climate 

protester is a prime example of Australia’s authoritarian 

sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, 

Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

drift,” The Guardian, 25 November 2021, 

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/25/the-jailing-of-a-young-climate-protester-is-a-prime-example-of-australias-authoritariandrift.

13 “Asylum Seekers and Refugees,” Australian Human Rights Commission, n.d., https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/publications/asylum-seekers-and-refugees#:~:text=Seeking%20asylum%20in%20Australia%2C%20or,or%20in%20any%20other%20country.

14 “The Forgotten Children: National Inquiry into 

Children in Immigration Detention,” Australian Human 

Rights Commission, November 2014, https://humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/forgotten_children_2014.pdf.

15 Anna Henderson, “Scott Morrison clashes with 

Human Rights Commission head amid defence of child detention on Christmas Island”, ABC News, 22 August 2014, 

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-22/moral-burden-will-not-impede-border-policies:-morrison/5687820?nw=0&r=HtmlFragment. 

16 “Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic 

Report of Australia,” United Nations Human Rights Committee, 9 November 2017, 6–8, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/AUS/INT_CCPR_COC_AUS_29445_E.pdf.

17 “Casenote: FKAG v Australia and MMM v Australia”, Australian Human Rights Commission, 15 October 

2013, https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/asylumseekers-and-refugees/publications/casenote-fkag-v-australia-and-mmm-v-australia; and “Examination of the Migration (Regional Processing) Package of Legislation,” Australian Human Rights Commission, January 2013,

https://humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/20130211_migration.pdf.

18 “Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,” United Nations Human Rights Office of 

the High Commission,” n.d., 

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Detention/Pages/OpinionsadoptedbytheWGAD.aspx.

19 “Monitoring Asylum in Australia,” United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 25 January 2022, 

https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/asylum-in-australia.html.

20 “Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic 

Report of Australia.”
Pearson

Indo-Pacific Perspective │26

Human Rights and 

Diplomacy in the 

Indo-Pacific: 

A View from Australia

Elaine Pearson

hat is the future of human 

rights in the emerging IndoPacific order? With the many 

challenges to human rights across 

Asia, it is easy to feel pessimistic. 

The current trend seems to be toward 

authoritarianism, and we see an erosion of democracy, rule of law, and 

human rights. 

People have, however, been taking 

to the streets and standing up for 

their rights across the region, providing a cause for hope. Governments

including middle powers such as 

Australia, politicians, and civil-society organizations have an array of

foreign policy tools they can use to 

defend human rights. It is essential 

that they do so. From Australia’s perspective, it is firmly in Australia’s interests to exist in a region alongside 

governments that are transparent

and accountable and that respect human rights and the rule of law. 

There is no doubt that the Indo-Pacific region is facing grave challenges 

when it comes to human rights. Last 

year alone produced several reasons 

for despair. In Myanmar, a February 

2021 military coup presaged a brutal 

crackdown resulting in the deaths of 

more than 1,400 protesters. Many 

thousands more were arrested, detained, beaten, and abused in custody. United Nations investigators 

have concluded that the junta should

be investigated for crimes against 

humanity.1

Six months later, the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan was a 

horrific reminder that advances in 

human rights can be perilously fragile. The Taliban pose a clear and 

grave threat to the rights of Afghanistan’s women and girls, journalists, 

and civil society activists. The current humanitarian crisis—precipitated by the abrupt cut-off of foreign 

aid to a country whose budget is almost entirely funded by donors—has 

pushed over 24 million Afghans into 

acute hunger. Meanwhile, armed 

groups affiliated with the Islamic 

State carry out devastating attacks 

targeting the Shia minority.

Authoritarianism has been on the 

march elsewhere, too. In China, the 

central government has been dismantling human rights in Hong 

W

6
Human Rights and Diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │27

Kong following the imposition of its 

draconian national security law in 

2020. Hong Kongers who advocated 

for human rights and democracy,

such as Jimmy Lai and Joshua 

Wong, are now in prison. At the same 

time, Chinese leaders defend their

arbitrary detention of more than a 

million Uyghurs and other Turkic 

Muslims in re-education camps under the so-called “Strike Hard campaign against violent extremism.”

2

Vietnam, too, has escalated crackdowns on democracy campaigners, 

activists, independent journalists,

and bloggers for exercising their

basic civil and political rights. More 

than 150 political prisoners languish 

behind bars, and dozens more face 

trial in the country’s politically controlled courts.

Even in countries that call themselves democracies, the world has 

witnessed what Kenneth Roth, the 

executive director of Human Rights 

Watch, calls “zombie democracies.”

3

In countries like Cambodia and Thailand, for instance, political parties 

that represent a legitimate challenge 

to ruling elites have been banned 

from operating on bogus legal 

grounds, and elections that are far 

from free and fair have entrenched 

the powers that be. In Cambodia, political activists have been forced into 

exile, imprisoned, or barred from 

running for office. 

In Thailand, hundreds of youth 

face years in prison for taking part in 

protests, speaking up, and demanding reforms to politics and the monarchy. Recently, the Thai government aggressively pushed to introduce draft laws to tightly control all 

civil-society organizations, including 

by restricting foreign funding, which 

will become a chokehold on the country’s vibrant civic space. Squeezing 

democratic institutions comes alongside efforts across the region to monopolize the media, restrict and control civil society, punish critical expression on the internet, and manipulate state institutions.

Across the Indo-Pacific region, civil 

society organizations are under 

threat. Even in an established democracy like India, the national government has intensified a crackdown 

on freedom of speech and peaceful assembly. The government of Prime 

Minister Narendra Modi has enforced new information technology 

rules that are ostensibly meant to 

curb misuse of social media and the 

spread of “fake news” but, in fact, allow greater governmental control 

over online content. Similar developments have taken place in Singapore, 

Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia—

countries that all seem to be going 

down the path of weakening freedom 

of expression online and undermining their citizens’ rights to privacy.

These are grim trends, but this is not 

a time for defeatism. Governments in 
Pearson

Indo-Pacific Perspective │28

the Indo-Pacific that believe in 

stronger human rights protections do 

have tools at their disposal to bring 

this about. This is certainly true of 

Australia, a country with a strong 

stake in the region’s political trajectory. Australia has its own human 

rights problems. But as one of the 

oldest democracies in the region, it 

has rights-respecting institutions, an 

independent judiciary, and a vibrant 

civil society and media.

What specific steps can the Australian government take to defend 

human rights values that are under 

attack?

First, Australia should advance 

human rights in coalition with likeminded democratic governments. As 

a middle power, Australia can amplify its voice by working through

multilateral institutions to stand 

against crimes against humanity and 

push back against authoritarian governments. 

This is already happening to some 

degree. Last June, for example, Australia joined with 43 other governments to condemn China’s human 

rights record at the United Nations.4

In the future, Australia should do 

more to mobilize international condemnation of human rights violations by other governments in our region, not just China.

Second, Australia should impose 

targeted sanctions, including travel 

bans and asset freezes, against those 

commit serious human rights abuses

or corruption with impunity. In December, the Australian parliament 

passed new amendments to make 

this happen, like the Global Magnitsky Act in the United States. The 

United Kingdom, Canada, and European Union all have their own versions of such legislation.

Such laws make sense given that 

diplomacy is about both carrots and 

sticks. Targeted sanctions raise the 

cost of serious human rights violations. Now, it is up to the Australian 

government to use these provisions 

without delay and sanction serious 

human rights violators, starting with 

the abusive generals in Myanmar.

Third, Australian officials should 

engage in robust diplomacy on human rights, both in public and behind closed doors. Officials should articulate a consistent and principled 

position on human rights violations

wherever abuses occur. The Australian government has shown courage 

in speaking up at the UN Human 

Rights Council on abuses committed 

by China and Saudi Arabia, but a 

more consistent approach is needed. 

The point here is not for Canberra to 

lecture other countries, but Australia’s leaders should never be reluctant to have frank discussions with 

their counterparts about their obligations to respect international human 

rights law.
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Indo-Pacific Perspective │29

If Australian officials meet with 

the leaders of governments implicated in serious human rights 

abuses, the Australian government 

should issue strong public statements accompanying those meetings

to make its concerns crystal clear. 

Without such statements, it is too 

easy for an abusive government to 

turn a photo op into an expression of 

support for their rule. This is important not only for transparency 

with the Australian public but also

for the public in other countries to 

get an accurate picture of Australia’s 

interests and values.

Fourth, to be most effective in advancing human rights around the 

world, the Australian government 

should set a positive example by 

strengthening its commitment to human rights at home. Australia can do

much better in its treatment of marginalized people, especially First Nations people, refugees, and asylum 

seekers.

The importance of this relationship 

between domestic politics and credibility on the world stage cannot be 

overstated. When Myanmar forcibly 

displaces ethnic Rohingya to Bangladesh and Bangladesh responds by 

rounding up many of those Rohingya 

and putting them on Bhasan Char, a 

flood-prone island in the Bay of Bengal, it is hard for Australia to have 

moral authority when Canberra’s 

policy is to send refugees to Papua 

New Guinea and Nauru.

Similarly, it is difficult for Australia to call on countries like Pakistan and Iran to open their borders 

to fleeing Afghans when Australia 

has shown a distinct lack of humanity and compassion in its treatment 

of those who arrive at its borders 

fleeing persecution.

An overlooked part of improving 

Australia’s record on human rights is 

the need to safeguard the rights of 

Australian citizens abroad. This includes working harder for Australians who are arbitrarily detained 

abroad, such as Cheng Lei and Yang 

Hengjun in China, Chau Van Kham 

in Vietnam, and Sean Turnell in Myanmar. These are political cases that 

require a firm government response.

One lesson of the tragedy unfolding 

in Afghanistan is that effective international human rights monitoring is 

essential. Australia can promote such 

monitoring work through a stronger 

voice at the United Nations Human 

Rights Council. In the past, Australia 

has been good at joining statements 

of concern when they are prepared by 

others, but Canberra could show 

more leadership by helping to establish mechanisms for accountability 

for human rights violations. Traditionally, the Australian government

has tended to focus attention on thematic issues, but the Human Rights 

Council is most useful when it comes 

to holding states to account through 
Pearson

Indo-Pacific Perspective │30

country-specific reporting mechanisms. 

At this point Australia is not leading on a single resolution at the Human Rights Council regarding rights 

violations in another country. It 

needs to do more on this front. It

could, for example, join a core group 

on the Philippines to advance accountability for the thousands of unlawful killings carried out in the 

name of President Rodrigo Duterte’s 

murderous “war on drugs.” It could 

ensure follow-up to its joint statement on rights abuses in Saudi Arabia or demonstrate much-needed 

leadership to address Egypt’s relentless crackdown on civil society.

Finally, Australia can do better at 

building relationships with civil society and young people across the IndoPacific region. At minimum, this 

means increasing support for civil society groups. However, it also means 

being better at public diplomacy by

engaging foreign and domestic media 

(and being active on social media) to

advocate for human rights. 

Ultimately, ordinary people—especially young people—will determine 

the future of human rights in our

shared region. Canberra can assist 

young people across the region by 

making it clear at every opportunity 

that Australia stands in support of

human rights and of those who are 

doing the important work of building 

a more human rights–friendly IndoPacific.

For Australia and other likeminded countries, the Indo-Pacific’s 

tilt toward authoritarianism and 

away from democracy and human 

rights is a cause for concern. This is 

part of the reason why Australia has 

strengthened its trade and security 

relationships with partners in Southeast Asia and the so-called Quad 

grouping of Australia, India, Japan,

and the United States. Developing 

foreign policies that are directly 

aimed at promoting human rights 

needs to be part of the solution, too.

There are options in this regard—

ones that Canberra and other regional capitals should take seriously.■

Elaine Pearson

Ms. Pearson is the Australia Director of 

Human Rights Watch. This article is based 

in part upon her 2021 Sir James Plimsoll 

Lecture at the University of Tasmania.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in 

Indo-Pacific Perspectives are those of the authors 

and should not be construed as carrying the official 

sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, 

Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
Human Rights and Diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │31

Notes

1 Edith Lederer, “UN investigator: Crimes against humanity under Myanmar junta,” Associated Press, 6 November 

2021, https://apnews.com/article/crime-myanmarunited-nations-c8d30050193ccc2affc15c508ee4be3d.

2 Casey Quackenbush, “Human Rights Watch Warns of 

‘Massive Crackdown’ on China’s Muslims,” Time, 10 September 2018, https://time.com/5391300/china-hrwmuslim-uighur.

3 Kenneth Roth, “The Age of Zombie Democracies: Why 

Autocrats Are Abandoning Even the Pretense of Democratic Rituals, Foreign Affairs, 28 July 2021, 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2021-

07-28/age-zombie-democracies.

4 John Feng, “China Backed by 65 Nations on Human 

Rights Despite Xinjiang Concerns,” Newsweek, 23 June 

2021, https://www.newsweek.com/support-chinas-human-rights-polices-doubles-among-un-members-1603246.