SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4137-16T1

DEANA CYNAR, 

Plaintiff-Respondent/

Cross-Appellant,

v.

LOUIS CEREFICE,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Respondent.

______________________________

Submitted June 4, 2018 – Decided 

Before Judges Whipple and Rose.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hunterdon 

County, Docket No. FM-10-0159-15.

Carter, Van Rensselaer and Caldwell, attorneys 

for appellant/cross-respondent (William J. 

Caldwell, on the briefs).

Einhorn, Harris, Ascher, Barbarito & Frost, 

attorneys for respondent/cross-appellant 

(Kristi L. Terranova, of counsel and on the 

brief; Jessie M. Mills and Matheu D. Nunn, on 

the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

August 7, 2018
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Defendant Louis Cerefice appeals from two orders of the Family 

Part dated February 22 and April 28, 2017, and plaintiff Deana 

Cynar cross-appeals from the April 28, 2017 order. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm the trial court's decision.

We discern the following facts from the record on appeal. 

The parties were married in 2005 and divorced on April 17, 2015, 

after entering into a marital settlement agreement (MSA)

incorporated into a Dual Final Judgment of Divorce. Under the 

MSA, defendant was obligated to pay plaintiff limited duration 

alimony of $30,000 per year, payable in $1250 bi-monthly 

installments, for five years. The alimony was based on plaintiff 

earning approximately $88,000 per year and defendant earning 

approximately $200,000 per year.

In May 2016, defendant learned his employment would be 

terminated effective May 31, 2016. The employer agreed to pay 

severance of $185,525 through November 2016. He also received a 

payment of $28,255.67 for unpaid bonuses and was eligible for 

another lump sum payment for unused vacation days. 

On October 25, 2016, defendant moved to suspend his alimony 

obligation because he was unemployed. On December 1, 2016, 

plaintiff cross-moved asking the court to deny defendant's motion 

in its entirety, enforce the MSA, and for attorney's fees. She 

also advised the court that she recently lost her job. 
3 A-4137-16T1

While his motion was pending, defendant made no alimony 

payment for December 2016. For January and February 2017, 

defendant, on his own initiative, paid a reduced alimony of $833 

per month.

However, by December 9, 2016, defendant had obtained new 

employment with a salary of $108,000 and bonus potential. He did 

not notify the court or submit an updated certification. Rather, 

plaintiff's counsel informed the court by letter dated February 

7, 2017. The letter also advised the court that plaintiff found 

new employment with a $75,000 salary.

The trial court denied defendant's motion to suspend his 

alimony obligation and awarded plaintiff $1000 in partial 

attorney's fees on February 22, 2017. The court explained 

defendant did not show changed circumstances warranting a 

suspension of his alimony obligation, noting his severance only 

recently ran out in November 2016. The court further noted 

defendant obtained a new job between filing his motion and oral 

arguments, but he did not inform the court. 

On March 6, 2017, defendant moved for reconsideration or 

alternatively, to stay the February 22 order. Plaintiff crossmoved for, among other things, attorney's fees. Defendant filed 

a reply certification, wherein he advised the court he accepted 

another new job with a base salary of $172,000.
4 A-4137-16T1

On April 28, 2017, the court denied defendant's motion and 

awarded plaintiff an additional $2500 in attorney's fees. The 

judge determined defendant did not satisfy his burden for 

reconsideration pursuant to Rule 4:49-2. The court also further 

explained its reasoning for denying defendant's initial motion to 

suspend his alimony obligation, stating the motion was premature 

because although defendant's job ended in May 2016, he received 

severance equal to his full salary through November 2016. The 

court found defendant's employment circumstances were only 

temporary and did not warrant modification. Defendant failed to 

present significant evidence of his job search efforts and did not 

provide the court with information regarding his newly obtained 

job. The court granted plaintiff's request for additional 

attorney's fees because defendant's motion was premature and 

defendant violated litigant's rights by engaging in self-help and 

failing to pay the appropriate alimony.

This appeal followed. Our scope of review of Family Part 

orders is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). 

Due to "the special jurisdiction and expertise of the family 

court," we defer to factual determinations made by the trial court 

as long as they are "supported by adequate, substantial, and 

credible evidence in the record." Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. 

Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413). 
5 A-4137-16T1

We will not disturb the fact-findings of the trial judge unless 

"they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the 

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend 

the interest of justice." Abouzahr v. Matera-Abouzahr, 361 N.J. 

Super. 135, 151 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. 

v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "[D]eference 

is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely 

testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" MacKinnon 

v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J.

at 412). Absent compelling circumstances, we may not substitute 

our judgment for that of the trial court, which has become familiar 

with the case. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 68 N.J. Super. 223, 232 

(App. Div. 1961).

I.

Defendant argues now that on the initial return date of his 

motion, his annual income had substantially decreased to mere 

unemployment benefits, which impaired his ability to support 

himself. He contends he was unemployed for over six months since 

he was terminated in May 2016 and did not obtain a new job until 

December 2016. Defendant contends the motion judge erred by 

declining to hold a plenary hearing because there was prima face 

proof of changed circumstances. We disagree.
6 A-4137-16T1

Under the MSA, defendant agreed to pay plaintiff limited 

duration alimony in the sum of $30,000 per year, payable in $1250 

bi-monthly installments, for five years. It further provided the 

alimony obligation "shall be subject to modification or suspension 

. . . as permitted by New Jersey statutory or case law." 

Accordingly, the onus was on defendant to demonstrate changed 

circumstances in order to suspend his alimony obligation. J.B. 

v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 327 (2013) (citing Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 

139, 146-48 (1980)) ("When a party to a comprehensive negotiated 

[MSA] seeks to modify any support obligation, that party must meet 

the threshold standard of changed circumstances."). Changed 

circumstances that justify an increase or decrease of support 

include an increase in the cost of living, an increase or decrease 

in the income of the supporting or supported spouse, cohabitation 

of the dependent spouse, illness or disability arising after the 

entry of the judgment, and changes in federal tax law. Lepis, 83 

N.J. at 151. Temporary circumstances are an insufficient basis 

for modification. Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 504 (1990) (citing 

Bonanno v. Bonanno, 4 N.J. 268, 275 (1950)).

The decision to modify or suspend an alimony obligation "based 

upon a claim of changed circumstances rests within a Family Part 

judge's sound discretion." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 

21 (App. Div. 2006) (citations omitted). "There is, of course, 
7 A-4137-16T1

no brightline rule by which to measure when a changed circumstance 

has endured long enough to warrant a modification of a support 

obligation." Id. at 23. Rather, "such matters turn on the 

discretionary determinations of Family Part judges, based upon 

their experience as applied to all the relevant circumstances 

presented, which we do not disturb absent an abuse of discretion." 

Ibid. The threshold issue in determining whether to hold a plenary 

hearing is if "the movant has made a prima facie showing that a 

plenary hearing is necessary." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 

106 (App. Div. 2007). 

The trial court's determination defendant failed to 

illustrate a prima facie case of changed circumstances warranting 

a plenary hearing is supported by competent evidence in the record. 

The record reveals defendant continued to receive substantially 

the same income as contemplated in the MSA. As such, he has not 

shown an inability to pay and the judge's sound decision to deny 

him a plenary hearing was not an abuse of discretion.

II.

We further reject defendant's assertion that the motion judge 

abused her discretion in awarding plaintiff partial attorney's 

fees. The record demonstrates his bad faith. However, we also 

reject plaintiff's cross-appeal, arguing the motion judge should 

have awarded her full attorney's fees because defendant's motion 
8 A-4137-16T1

for reconsideration was baseless, defective, and filed in bad 

faith. Plaintiff argues defendant earns significantly more money 

than her, and while he had a period of unemployment, he continued 

to receive severance equal to his previous salary. She contends 

that he improperly engaged in self-help in modifying alimony, 

twice failed to inform the court of new employment, purposely 

omitted relevant information from his applications to the court, 

filed a motion for changed circumstances while still receiving his 

base salary in the form of severance, and filed a motion for 

reconsideration without any basis.

"An award of counsel fees is only disturbed upon a clear 

abuse of discretion." J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 492 

(App. Div. 2012) (quoting City of Englewood v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 

406 N.J. Super. 110, 123 (App. Div. 2009)). We "will disturb a 

trial court's determination on counsel fees only on the 'rarest 

occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion.'" 

Ibid. (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)). Rule

4:42-9(a)(1) states "[n]o fee for legal services shall be allowed 

. . . except [i]n a family action . . . pursuant to Rule 5:3-

5(c)." 

Here, plaintiff requested an award of $5881.25 in counsel 

fees and costs for defendant's motion for reconsideration. The 

motion judge awarded plaintiff $1000 in partial attorney's fees 
9 A-4137-16T1

for defendant's initial motion and an additional $2500 for the 

motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff has not demonstrated the 

motion judge abused her discretion in awarding partial attorney's 

fees.

Affirmed.