J. S67005/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

AKI JONES, : No. 3017 EDA 2015

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, September 21, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0003683-2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J. AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 25, 2016

Aki Jones appeals from the September 21, 2015 aggregate judgment 

of sentence of 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment imposed after a jury found him 

guilty of attempted murder, aggravated assault, witness intimidation, and 

criminal conspiracy.1 After careful review, we affirm.2

The trial court summarized the lengthy factual background of this case 

as follows:

On November 22, 2010, on the 2400 block of 

Turner Street, in Philadelphia, after witnessing 

[appellant] place a gun to the head of a juvenile 

female, Michael Vessels called police. Vessels also 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2702, 4952, and 903, respectively.

2 The Commonwealth has not filed a brief in this matter.
J. S67005/16

- 2 -

heard [appellant] shoot the gun into the air. 

[Appellant] was arrested the same day.

According to Tiffany Reid ([appellant’s] 

girlfriend at the time), prior to [appellant’s] 

preliminary hearing for the gun matter, [appellant] 

did not know the identity of the witness against him. 

[Appellant’s] friend, Jay Thomas, was supposed to 

reach out to Troy Cooper (also known as “Taz”) for 

information on the witness as Cooper and the 

witness lived on the same block.

On December 13, 2010, Vessels testified at a 

Preliminary Hearing against [appellant]. Reid, who 

was present at the hearing, informed [appellant] that 

she saw the witness there. At some point after the 

preliminary hearing, Cooper informed [appellant] of 

Vessels’ name and address.

About a week after the preliminary hearing, 

Cooper approached Vessels and disclosed that the 

person arrested for shooting the gun was his friend. 

Cooper told Vessels that he did not need to go to 

court on this matter. In response, Vessels told 

Cooper that because he called 9-1-1 the day 

[appellant] was arrested, he felt obligated to go to 

court. 

In March or April 2011, [appellant], while 

incarcerated, devised a plan to prevent Vessels from 

testifying against him. [Appellant] told Reid that, if 

need be, the witness would be harmed to prevent 

him from going to court. [Appellant’s] plan involved 

Thomas, whose role was to find Vessels and kill him. 

At [appellant’s] request, Reid contacted Thomas, and 

relayed that [appellant] said to “handle it,” referring 

to the witness, [to] which Thomas replied, “I know, I 

got it.”

In the subsequent months, Cooper approached 

Vessels numerous times about Vessels not testifying. 

In one conversation, Cooper told Vessels that 

[appellant’s] girlfriend would provide $500 for 

Vessels not to testify. As the conversations about 
J. S67005/16

- 3 -

not testifying increased, Vessels avoided Cooper by 

entering the neighborhood from different directions.

On September 19, 2011, [appellant], from 

prison, instructed Reid to call Thomas in a three-way 

call. During the three-way call, [appellant] stated, 

“Yeah, that’s part one. Part one, I was away.” 

Thomas replied, “Yeah. And now we got to get part 

two out of the way.” At trial, Reid testified that “part 

two,” which was always part of the plan, was to find 

Vessels and to shoot him to ensure that he did not 

go to court.

On September 23, 2011, in a recorded call 

between [appellant] and Reid, [appellant] stated 

“Jay [Thomas] gonna be on post.” At trial, Reid 

testified that the term “post” meant that Thomas 

would wait for Vessels outside of his house to see 

whether he was going to court.

On this same date, in another phone call 

between Reid and [appellant], [appellant] instructed 

Reid to call Pop Hoagie (Charles Alexander). Reid 

testified that both [appellant] and Cooper knew 

Alexander from the neighborhood. Two days later, 

Alexander approached Reid at a basketball court and 

gave her $500. Approximately fifteen minutes after 

Reid collected the money, [appellant] and Reid 

discussed, in a recorded prison call, the money 

amount. [Appellant] then directed Reid to give the 

money to Cooper[.]

. . . . 

On September 25, 2011, the day before 

Vessels was shot on the street, Reid took the money 

to Cooper’s house. While at Cooper’s house, Reid 

spoke with Shaheed Williams and exchanged phone 

numbers. (Reid testified at trial that [appellant] 

knew Williams as they were from the same 

neighborhood.) After exchanging numbers, Williams 

asked Reid to call him at 6:30 the next morning so 

that he could stand post outside Vessels’ house. 
J. S67005/16

- 4 -

Williams informed Reid that if he saw Vessels going 

to court, he would kill him. 

On the same day that Reid dropped the money 

off to Cooper, Cooper approached Vessels outside his 

home and offered him the $500 not to appear in 

court. Cooper said, “they finally dropped it off,” 

referring to the money. Vessels replied that he could 

not take it. Cooper responded with, “then it is 

whatever.” Vessels testified at trial that he 

understood “whatever” to mean “anything goes” and 

that “if you don't do what I want you to do, then I’m 

going to do something to you.”

The next day, September 26, 2011, at 

6:30 a.m., Reid called Williams. Reid testified at trial 

that this was the wake-up call that Williams had 

requested so he could stand post outside Vessels’ 

home. After the wake-up call, there were another 

four phone calls between Williams and Reid, from 

7:06 and 9:11 a.m.

That morning, September 26, at around 

9:30 a.m., Vessels left his house on the way to meet 

a member of his church. As he walked to the corner 

on the next block, Williams jumped out, immediately 

drew a silver revolver, and said, “You like to talk.” 

Williams then placed the gun six inches from Vessels’ 

face and pulled the trigger. Vessels blocked the shot 

with his wrist. Williams fired again, shooting Vessels 

in the side. After the second shot, Vessels took off 

running, with Williams in close pursuit. While 

Vessels ran, Williams fired several more shots, 

striking Vessels in his elbow and back, the latter of 

which knocked him to the ground. Williams then 

stood over Vessels, and said[,] “you won’t talk no 

more,” and shot Vessels in the neck. 

Within a few minutes of the shooting, Williams 

called Reid at 9:45 a.m. At 9:56 a.m., Reid called 

Williams back. At 9:59 a.m., Reid sent a text 

message to Williams, followed by an exchange of 

several more text messages. Lastly, at 2:59 p.m., 

Reid called Williams.
J. S67005/16

- 5 -

On the same day, Reid also spoke with 

Williams in person. According to Reid, Williams 

informed her that Vessels did not go to court and 

described in detail how he had shot him. Williams 

told Reid that he spotted Vessels leaving his house, 

dressed like he was ready to go to court. Williams 

then ran around the corner, up a block, approached 

Vessels from behind, and shot him. Williams told 

Reid that Vessels had placed his hand in front of his 

face and was shot in the arm. He also told Reid that 

he shot Vessels five times, and that he tried to keep 

shooting, but the gun jammed. 

On November 14, 2012, Vessels identified 

Williams from a photographic array as his shooter. 

At trial, Vessels again positively identified Williams. 

On the same day Williams shot Vessels, Reid 

visited [appellant] at Curran-Fromhold Correctional 

Facility (“CFCF”) in Philadelphia. While [appellant] 

was not surprised about the shooting, he expressed 

some surprise that Williams was the shooter as it 

was his understanding that Thomas would [be] 

carrying out the shooting.

On February 14, 2012, the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms (“ATF”) executed a search 

warrant on Tiffany Reid’s home. From her home, 

federal agents recovered a letter sent to Reid by 

[appellant] from prison. The letter was addressed to 

Lulu Blackchild. (Lulu is Reid’s middle name and 

[appellant] sometimes referred to her by that name.) 

Written on the back of the letter was “The date is 

5/25/11 and the last letter received from you is 

5/18. Payback is fair.” At trial, Reid testified that 

the handwriting was [appellant’s]. Inside the 

envelope was a transcript of Vessel[s’] preliminary 

hearing testimony regarding the incident in which 

[appellant] had shot a gun into the air.

In March of 2014, Carla Reid received a letter 

at her home addressed to her daughter, Tiffany Reid. 

The letter was addressed from another prisoner, 

Jacque Walker, with a return address from the 
J. S67005/16

- 6 -

Philadelphia prison system. [Appellant] was 

imprisoned with Walker in the same building at the 

CFCF, and in the same pod (Pod One), at the time 

the letter was postmarked (March 26, 2014). In the 

letter, the author threatened Tiffany Reid and her 

family. Although the letter was not in [appellant’s] 

handwriting, the author referenced “Zaire” as his 

son–[appellant] and Reid’s child–and referenced 

several of Reid’s family members by name. The 

letter was also signed with “A.DoTTTTTT,” 

[appellant]’s nickname. After reading the letter, 

Carla Reid took it directly to the police. 

Trial court opinion, 12/4/15 at 2-8 (citations to notes of testimony and 

footnotes omitted).

Appellant was arrested and charged with, inter alia, attempted 

murder, aggravated assault, witness intimidation, and criminal conspiracy in 

connection with this incident. On June 8, 2015, appellant proceeded to a 

jury trial alongside co-defendant Williams and was subsequently found guilty 

of the aforementioned offenses on June 15, 2015. On September 21, 2015, 

the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 25 to 50 years’ 

imprisonment. On September 23, 2015, appellant filed a post-sentence 

motion challenging the weight of the evidence. (See “Post Sentence 

Motion,” 9/23/15 at 2-4.) The trial court denied appellant’s post-sentence 

motion on September 30, 2015. Thereafter, on October 5, 2015, appellant 

filed a timely notice of appeal. On October 13, 2015, the trial court ordered

appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal in 

accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed his timely Rule 1925(b) 
J. S67005/16

- 7 -

statement on November 3, 2015, and the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion on December 4, 2015.3

On appeal, appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err and cause irreparable 

harm to [a]ppellant by permitting the 

Commonwealth to elicit irrelevant and highly 

inflammatory information regarding a prior 

crime wherein [a]ppellant was alleged to have 

held a gun to a teenage, female’s head?

2. Did the trial court err by admitting a letter that 

was purportedly written from [a]ppellant to 

Tiffany Reid which was not in [a]ppellant’s 

handwriting, was addressed from another

prisoner, and which contained threats when 

this letter was not authenticated in any 

legitimate way, was inflammatory, and caused 

irreparable harm to [a]ppellant?

3. Did the trial court err by not striking the 

testimony of Tiffany Reid and by not precluding 

her from testifying because Ms. Reid was an 

admitted and repeated perjurer and was not 

competent to testify because she did not 

understand the solemnity of the oath?

4. Did the trial court err in denying [a]ppellant’s 

post-sentence motion because [a]ppellant’s 

conviction is against the weight of the 

evidence?

5. Is the evidence insufficient as a matter of law 

to convict [a]ppellant of conspiracy and, 

therefore, witness intimidation and attempted 

murder because he did not initiate the 

payment scheme to pay off [Vessels] and he 

did not conspire with anyone and involve 

 

3 We have elected to address appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence and 

weight of the evidence claims in a different order than presented in his 

appellate brief.
J. S67005/16

- 8 -

himself with any known person in initiating an 

overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy?

Appellant’s brief at 4-5.

Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

permitting the Commonwealth to elicit testimony at trial that appellant was 

arrested on November 22, 2010 after Vessels observed him holding a gun to 

a juvenile female’s head and called police. (Id. at 11; see also notes of 

testimony, 6/8/15 at 46-50; 6/9/15 at 34-36.) Appellant maintains that this 

inflammatory “prior bad act” evidence was inadmissible under Pennsylvania 

Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) and caused irreparable harm to his case. (Id. at 

12-13.) We disagree.

“[T]he admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly 

abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Fransen, 42 A.3d 1100, 1106 

(Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013) (citation 

omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; rather 

discretion is abused when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the 

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record.” 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 745 (Pa.Super. 2014), 

appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

Generally, “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 

to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
J. S67005/16

- 9 -

therewith.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1); see also Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 

A.2d 1182, 1189 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 986 A.2d 150 (Pa. 

2009) (stating, “[e]vidence of distinct crimes is not admissible against a 

defendant being prosecuted for another crime solely to show his bad 

character and his propensity for committing criminal acts.” (citation omitted; 

emphasis in original)). Evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible, 

however, “when offered to prove some other relevant fact, such as motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of 

mistake or accident.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 57 A.3d 85, 98 (Pa.Super. 

2012), appeal denied, 72 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). Prior 

bad acts evidence “may also be admissible . . . in situations where the bad 

acts were part of a chain or sequence of events that formed the history of 

the case and were part of its natural development.” Commonwealth v. 

Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). “In determining whether evidence of other prior bad acts is 

admissible, the trial court is obliged to balance the probative value of such 

evidence against its prejudicial impact.” Ross, 57 A.3d at 98 (citation 

omitted).

Upon review, we conclude that the testimony at issue was admissible 

because it was part of the sequence of events that formed the history of this 

case and was relevant to establish appellant’s underlying motive for the 

witness intimidation charge. As noted, the record establishes that on 
J. S67005/16

- 10 -

November 22, 2010, Vessels called police after he observed appellant place 

a gun to the head of a juvenile female and heard appellant discharge the 

gun into the air. (Notes of testimony, 6/9/15 at 28-36.) Following 

appellant’s arrest, Vessels testified against appellant at his preliminary 

hearing. (Notes of testimony, 6/8/15 at 49-50.) Thereafter, appellant 

learned of Vessels’ identity and conspired with several individuals to prevent 

Vessels from testifying against him, first by attempting to bribe him with 

$500, and then ultimately by devising a plan to have him murdered outside 

his home. (See notes of testimony, 6/9/15 at 189-98, 220-224, 233-234; 

6/10/15 at 30-33, 202-212.)

Clearly, the evidence that Vessels observed appellant place a gun to a 

female juvenile’s head was relevant to explain why appellant attempted to 

prevent him from testifying as a witness at trial, in addition to completing 

the story surrounding the incident. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of 

discretion on the part of the trial court in allowing this testimony to be 

admitted into evidence.

Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

“admitting a letter that was purportedly written from [a]ppellant to [Reid] 

which was not in [a]ppellant’s handwriting, was addressed from another 

prisoner, and which contained threats as to the burning and killing of 
J. S67005/16

- 11 -

[Reid’s] family.” (Appellant’s brief at 14.)4 Appellant avers that he is 

entitled to a new trial because this letter was “not authenticated in any 

legitimate way . . . and caused irreparable harm” to his case. (Id.) For the 

following reasons, we disagree.

“There are three basic types of evidence that are admitted into court: 

(1) testimonial evidence; (2) documentary evidence; and (3) demonstrative 

evidence.” Commonwealth v. McKellick, 24 A.3d 982, 986 (Pa.Super. 

2011), appeal denied, 34 A.3d 828 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). “To 

satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, 

the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 

item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a). Evidence may be 

authenticated by circumstantial evidence, including both the “[t]estimony of 

a [w]itness with [k]nowledge . . . that an item is what it is claimed to be[,]” 

and/or “[t]he . . . contents . . . or other distinctive characteristics of the 

item, taken together with all the circumstances.” Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1), (4) 

(emphasis omitted).

Contrary to appellant’s contention, our review of the record in this 

matter reveals that this letter was properly authenticated. As the trial court 

aptly noted in its opinion, 

both Reid and her mother testified with relevant 

knowledge that, based on the letter’s contents, 

[appellant] was its author. The letter’s author not 

 

4 Reid was called as a witness by the Commonwealth and testified against 

appellant at trial. (See notes of testimony, 6/10/15 at 28-64.)
J. S67005/16

- 12 -

only made several references to his son, Zaire—

[appellant] and Reid’s child—but also referenced, by 

name, several of Reid’s family members. Further, 

[appellant’s] nickname was signed at the letter’s 

conclusion. 

Finally, the letter was sent from the same 

prison facility [where appellant] was incarcerated. 

Although the letter’s return address suggested that 

the letter was from Jacque Walker, [appellant] and 

Walker were imprisoned at the same time the letter 

was post-marked (March 26, 2014), in the same 

building at the CFCF, and in the same pod 

(Pod One).

Trial court opinion, 12/4/15 at 11 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

Furthermore, the record reflects that the trial court provided a 

cautionary instruction to the jury with regard to how the contents of this 

letter should be considered. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury 

as follows: 

There was evidence tending to show that 

[appellant] made statements that could be 

considered threatening against the potential witness 

in this case. You know I’m talking about 

Tiffany Reid. If you believe that evidence, you may 

consider it as tending to prove [appellant’s] 

consciousness of guilt. . . . You are not required to 

do so. You should consider and weigh this evidence, 

along with all the other evidence in the case.

Notes of testimony, 6/15/15 at 37-38.

Courts in this Commonwealth have repeatedly recognized that “when 

examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary jury instruction 

may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied,
J. S67005/16

- 13 -

135 S.Ct. 164 (2014) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. 

Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 497-498 (Pa. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S.

1111 (2010) (finding that cautionary instructions were sufficient to 

overcome the prejudicial effect of prior bad acts evidence). Jurors are 

presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions. Commonwealth v. 

Elliott, 80 A.3d 415, 445 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 50 (2014). 

Accordingly, we conclude that even assuming any potential prejudice may 

have resulted from the introduction of this letter at trial, it was cured by the 

trial court’s limiting instruction to the jury.

Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

failing to strike the testimony of Commonwealth witness Tiffany Reid or 

preclude her from testifying because she acknowledged at trial that she had 

previously lied under oath when she stated that she did not know who shot 

Vessels. (Appellant’s brief at 16; see also notes of testimony, 6/10/15 at 

125-126.) Appellant avers that he is entitled to a new trial because Reid 

clearly “did not comprehend the solemnity of the oath[,]” and thus, was not 

competent to testify. (Appellant’s brief at 17-18.)

Competency relates to the “capacity of the witness to communicate, to 

observe an event and accurately recall that observation, and to understand 

the necessity to speak the truth.” Commonwealth v. Walter, 93 A.3d 

442, 451 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “Generally, a witness is presumed 

competent to testify, and the burden falls on the objecting party to 
J. S67005/16

- 14 -

demonstrate that a witness is incompetent.” Id., quoting Pa.R.E. 601(b). 

As discussed, “[a]n appellate court’s standard of review of a trial court’s 

evidentiary rulings, including rulings on the . . . determinations of witness 

competency, is abuse of discretion.” Id. at 449 (citation omitted).

Upon review, we find that appellant’s claim that Reid was not 

competent to testify is belied by the record. The record reflects that 

appellant’s counsel cross-examined Reid at great length during his trial and 

impeached her with her prior inconsistent statements. (See notes of 

testimony, 6/10/15 at 119-196.) The trial court, in turn, properly instructed 

the jury with regard to Reid’s inconsistent statements, stating as follows:

Now, in this case you have heard evidence that 

a witness or witnesses, and I am referring to . . . 

Ms. Reid made a statement on an earlier occasion 

that was inconsistent with their present testimony. 

You may, if you choose, regard this evidence as 

proof of the truth of anything that the witness said in 

the early statement. You may also consider this 

evidence to help you judge the credibility and weight 

of the testimony given by the witness at this trial. 

Once again, when you judge the credibility and 

weight of the testimony, you are deciding whether 

you believe the testimony and how important it is.

Notes of testimony, 6/15/15, at 31. Jurors, as noted, are presumed to 

follow the trial court’s instructions. Elliott, 80 A.3d at 445. Accordingly, we 

discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in failing to strike 

Reid’s testimony or preclude her from testifying.

We now turn to appellant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence 

to sustain his conviction for criminal conspiracy, and thus, his convictions for 
J. S67005/16

- 15 -

witness intimidation and attempted murder cannot stand. (Appellant’s brief 

at 22.) In support of this contention, appellant avers that, “he did not 

initiate the payment scheme to pay off [the victim] and he did not conspire 

with anyone and involve himself with any known person in initiating an overt 

act in furtherance of a conspiracy.” (Id.) We disagree.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we must determine whether the evidence admitted 

at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to 

prove every element of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. As an appellate court, we may 

not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of 

doubt is for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal 

denied, 4 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted).

Criminal conspiracy requires the Commonwealth to prove that 

appellant “(1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act 

with another person or persons; (2) with a shared criminal intent; and 

(3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 135 A.3d 1097, 1102 (Pa.Super. 2016); see 

also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a). A conspiratorial agreement can be proven by 

circumstantial evidence and “inferred from a variety of circumstances 

including, but not limited to, the relation between the parties, knowledge of 
J. S67005/16

- 16 -

and participation in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of the 

parties surrounding the criminal episode.” Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 

67 A.3d 19, 26 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 

(Pa. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, 

“[t]he law is well-settled that conspirators are responsible for the actions of 

their cohorts, whether such conduct is planned by the consortium or 

engaged in by a conspirator without prior approval of the group.” 

Commonwealth v. Geiger, 944 A.2d 85, 92 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal 

denied, 964 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2009) (citations omitted).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the verdict winner, we agree with the trial court that there 

was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that appellant was guilty of 

criminal conspiracy, as well as witness intimidation and attempted murder. 

As the court explained in its opinion,

[Appellant] conspired with Reid, Alexander, 

Williams, and Cooper with a shared criminal intent to 

prevent Vessels from testifying. Reid testified that it 

was [appellant’s] plan from the very beginning for 

Vessels not to appear in court. The prison phone 

records corroborated her testimony as they 

illustrated [appellant] directing many of the plan’s 

moving parts leading up to the shooting of Vessels. 

It was [appellant] who requested Reid to place a 

three-way call with Thomas, who discussed with 

[appellant] “part two” of the plan to have Vessels not 

testify. [Appellant] also told Reid that Thomas would 

stand “post” at Vessels’ home. At trial, Reid testified 

that the term “post” meant that Thomas would wait 

for Vessels outside his home to see if he was going 

to court. It was also [appellant] who requested Reid 
J. S67005/16

- 17 -

to call Alexander two days before Reid met with him 

to collect the bribe money. Within fifteen minutes 

after Reid collected the bribe money, [appellant] 

instructed her to give the $500 to Cooper.

. . . .

In this case, after Reid gave the money to 

Cooper—at [appellant’s] direction—she exchanged 

numbers with Williams for a wake-up call so Williams 

could stand post at Vessels’ home. The next 

morning, Reid called Williams to wake him. Later 

that morning, Williams shot Vessels five times. That 

Williams’ shot Vessels on the morning of 

[appellant’s] court date, and admonished Vessels—

“You like to talk” and “you won't talk no more”—

before shooting him, indicated that Williams acted in 

furtherance of [appellant’s] conspiracy to have 

Vessels not testify. 

That same day, when Reid informed 

[appellant] of the shooting, he only expressed some 

surprise on the identity of the shooter, not the 

shooting, as it was his understanding th[at] Thomas 

would shoot Vessels. 

Trial court opinion, 12/4/15 at 15-17 (citations to notes of testimony 

omitted).

Based on the foregoing, appellant’s claim that there is insufficient 

evidence to sustain his convictions for criminal conspiracy, witness 

intimidation, and attempted murder must fail.

Lastly, appellant argues that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. (Appellant’s brief at 18.) “One of the least assailable reasons for 

granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the 

verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new 
J. S67005/16

- 18 -

trial should be granted in the interest of justice.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 

64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “A true weight of the 

evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the 

verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed.” Commonwealth v. 

Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 561 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 911 A.2d 

933 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). Weight of the evidence claims “are 

addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Galvin, 

985 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1051 (2010) (citation 

omitted). 

[W]here the trial court has ruled on the weight claim 

below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review 

is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused 

its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

Instantly, appellant contends the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence because: 

(1) [Reid] never told anyone prior to trial, despite 

multiple statements and testimonies, that [a]ppellant 

said to kill [Vessels;] (2) [a]ppellant did not even 

know about [Williams] (the shooter) even after the 

shooting of [Vessels] had occurred[;] (3) [Williams] 

approached [Reid] and told her that he would take 

care of [Vessels] and [Reid] was [a]ppellant’s only 

known connection to the non-prison world; (4) [t]he 

bribe to pay off the witness was initiated by someone 

else and [a]ppellant did not even know if [Vessels] 

was to be paid $500 or $5,000 and [a]ppellant states 
J. S67005/16

- 19 -

in a prison phone call "I do not know what the f[**k] 

is going on[;]” and (5) [a]ppellant did not know of 

[Williams’] involvement and another individual, Jay, 

never agreed with [appellant] to kill [Vessels].

Appellant’s brief at 20-21 (citation to notes of testimony omitted).

Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 

court in rejecting appellant’s weight claim. “The trier of fact while passing 

upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is 

free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. 

Caban, 60 A.3d 120, 132 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 79 A.3d 1097 

(Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). Here, the jury evidently found the 

Commonwealth’s witnesses credible and elected not to believe appellant’s 

version of the events. We are precluded from reweighing the evidence and 

substituting our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055. 

Accordingly, appellant’s weight claim must fail.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/25/2016