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Allen G. Peck, Lt Gen, Commander

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Anthony J. Rock, Brig Gen, Commandant

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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

The Head Side of the Coin

A Smarter Way to Fight the Moro

Secessionists in the Southern Philippines

Araus Robert F. Musico

Lieutenant Colonel, Philippine Air Force

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 42

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2010
ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.au.af.mil.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other 

US Government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
iii

Foreword

It is with great pride that Air Command and Staff 

College presents another in a series of award-winning 

student research projects from our academic programs 

that reach nearly 11,000 students each year. As our series 

title indicates, we seek to promote the sort of imaginative, 

forward-looking thinking that inspired the earliest aviation 

pioneers, and we aim for publication projects that combine 

these characteristics with the sort of clear presentation 

that permits even the most technical topics to be readily 

understood. We sincerely hope what follows will stimulate 

thinking, invite debate, and further encourage today’s air 

war fighters in their continuing search for new and better 

ways to perform their missions—now and in the future.

ANTHONY J. ROCK

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

v

Abstract

This paper examines the counterterrorist strategy employed 

on the Island of Basilan during Operation Enduring FreedomPhilippines (OEF–P) and discusses its potential applicability in 

the current Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) insurgency. The 

strategy used the principles found in the Diamond Model, the 

counterinsurgency (COIN) model that Dr. Gordon McCormick 

developed. The Diamond Model establishes the interactions 

of four key players in an insurgency environment, pinpoints 

the “people” as the center of gravity, and demonstrates how 

either the insurgent or the counterinsurgent can take actions 

as each competes to win the people’s support. The US forces 

dispatched to the island province used it as a framework 

to advise and assist the armed forces of the Philippines in 

building up its capability and to launch civic action initiatives 

aimed at isolating the local people from the influence of the 

local terror group, the Abu Sayyaf. 

This paper provides a thorough examination of the root 

causes of the MILF conflict. It shows that the Muslims in the 

southern Philippines have been subjected to a long history of 

attempted subjugation, forced assimilation, and dislocation 

from their ancestral territories. It also shows why the MILF 

rose in arms to seek an independent homeland for the Moro 

people. The MILF symbolizes the hopes and dreams for a 

better future of all Muslims in the Philippines. The Moro 

people aspire for a better future and see these aspirations 

being achieved only if they rule independently of the national 

government. Because of this lofty goal, a COIN strategy 

that provides them temporary improvements in their living 

conditions may not be enough to wean their support from 

the MILF.

1

Introduction

The US global war on terror (GWOT) brought the armed 

forces of the Philippines (AFP) and US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) together to 

confront the local terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). This 

operation forced the ASG out of its base of operations on 

the Basilan Island and drove it to the neighboring island of 

Jolo, with the AFP and some US special operations forces 

(SOF) in pursuit. The authorities eventually captured several top ASG leaders. Aside from the operational dividend, 

the operation reinforced familiar counterinsurgency (COIN) 

tactics of blending military firepower and socioeconomic offensive, with the latter taking a more dominant role. The 

AFP and JSOTF-P undertook community development on 

the island and offered its people better security. This action enhanced the national government’s legitimacy and 

curtailed the ASG’s access to potential recruits, logistics, 

and intelligence. 

Some of these same tactics broke the back of the Huk 

insurgency in the early 1950s. The success of this strategy 

demonstrates the government of the Philippines’ capacity 

to win a war decisively against insurgency. The AFP, in fact, 

had employed this same COIN doctrine against the armed 

wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in the 

early 1990s, diminishing its forces to a level law enforcement agencies could handle. The same cannot be said of 

the operations against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 

(MILF). Thus, this paper attempts to address why the AFP 

has been so unwilling to use proven COIN doctrines against 

this separatist group. 

No two insurgencies are the same. The operation in Basilan specifically targeted the ASG. While both MILF and ASG 

embrace Islam and use it to drive their respective brand 

of insurgency, the latter operates more like a bandit and 

terrorist organization.1 Because of the nature of ASG activities, ranging from kidnappings to mass bombings and rampant killings, separating ASG followers from the people of 

the Basilan Island, after the AFP and SOF undertook COIN 

operations, was fairly easy.

On the other hand, the MILF is well recognized as an 

organization with a legitimate separatist agenda. Its mem-
2

bers share with the rest of the Filipino Muslims the same 

centuries-old grievances of discriminatory colonial policies, 

intermittent wars, subjugation by the central government, 

and destruction of their culture. Considering its pervasive 

influence over many areas in Mindanao, the MILF may not 

be as susceptible to the COIN strategy used against the 

ASG. This paper analyzes the validity of this argument. 

Beginning with an overview of the past and present historical grievances that contributed significantly to the Mindanao conflict, five sections help to develop the thesis of this 

paper. The second section offers readers the opportunity 

to learn about MILF origins, aspirations, and war strategy. 

The third section provides a picture of the COIN operations 

in Basilan, followed in the fourth section by a discussion of 

the various strategies the AFP has used against the communist and secessionist insurgencies. The concluding fifth 

section presents the author’s interpretation of the information presented in this paper.

Carl Baker asserts that “the conflict in Mindanao is first 

and foremost political and only secondarily about religion 

or economics.”2 A political problem requires a political solution, and the military as a government policy instrument 

can serve to influence the outcome of the government peace 

panel (GRP)-MILF peace negotiations. Indeed, a smarter war 

strategy, incorporating the good lessons from the Basilan 

experience plus other elements of national power working 

together in coordinated fashion, can support the objective 

of ending the MILF conflict. 

Historical Background of the Conflict

The post-colonial conflict that began as a struggle for a 

separate Moro3 homeland began with these proud people 

intermittently fighting against Manila-sanctioned subjugation.4 The Muslim-dominated areas currently are the 

poorest in Mindanao. This war-torn region is as volatile 

as ever.

Southern Philippine comprises the main island of Mindanao and the more than 360 smaller islands constituting 

the Sulu archipelago. It is home to some 4.5 million Filipino 

Muslims, accounting for about 5 percent of the country’s 

population of 85 million. Once the majority, they now domi-
3

nate only five of the 22 provinces of the region. Colonial policies of integrating Christian and Muslim Filipinos, which 

the national government continued practicing after acquiring independence, drove the former to migrate and reside 

in Muslim enclaves.

Islam was a thriving religion in the Sulu islands long before the Spanish conquistadores arrived. Arab traders and 

missionaries brought and passed on their religion to the 

various indigenous people at the end of the thirteenth century.5 Accordingly, Islam provided a shared worldview that 

tied together these loosely dispersed tribes and differentiated them from the rest of the population.6 Thus, when the 

Spaniards arrived in 1521 and attempted to subjugate the 

inhabitants by converting them to Christianity, the Muslims in the south offered a more organized resistance. Years 

of persistent campaigns to overcome Muslim resistance 

(the Moro Wars) caused division among Muslim and nonMuslim inhabitants. Spaniards would later employ Christianized natives in their crusade, further fueling animosity 

between the two.7 The deep-seated resentment between the 

Christian Indios8 and Muslim Moros continued to develop 

during the 300 years of Spanish occupation and long after 

the Spaniards left.

The Americans fared better when they purchased the 

Philippines from Spain after the Spanish-American War of 

1898. Realizing the “diversity of race, religion, and habitat,” 

the United States established distinct government structures for the Moro areas.9 While the colonial policy of “benevolent assimilation”10 succeeded in ending Gen Emilio 

Aguinaldo’s guerilla resistance during the early stages of 

American occupation, it did not work as well in overcoming 

the Moros.11 What subdued the Islamized tribes of Mindanao 

instead was the Bates agreement that gave the Moros some 

form of local autonomy in the administration of their political and cultural affairs. As Brian McAllister Linn notes, the 

Moros initially found US colonial authority acceptable, as 

it “protected both Islam and their traditions from their hereditary enemies, the Christian Filipinos.”12

Another reason for the American success in breaking 

the Moro resistance was its encouraging the relocation of 

Christians from Luzon and the Visayas to the southern islands.13 Though this policy initially increased tensions, the 
4

establishment of Christian settlements on lands the Muslims considered their ancestral property ultimately helped 

to dilute Muslim influence and power in those areas. Employing a mix of “brutal pacification” and “pious paternalism,” the Americans discharged their authority over Mindanao with better control.14

When the United States granted the Philippines full independence shortly after the Second World War, the central government in Manila began exercising jurisdiction 

and administrative control over the whole of the Philippine 

archipelago despite strong objections and pleas from the 

Moros for a separate state or retention of the status quo.15

The Americans transferred ownership of all the territory 

ceded to the United States by Spain in the December 1898 

Treaty of Paris. This action defined the present territory 

of the Republic of the Philippines that included Mindanao 

and Sulu islands. 

Confronted with the complex dynamics of nation building, Manila continued the policy of integrating Christians 

and Muslims into one Filipino mainstream society. A massive wave of Christian settlers established residence in once 

Muslim-dominated areas over the years and slowly tilted 

the demographic balance. The Moros eventually found 

themselves the minority in many of the lands they had controlled for centuries. From 98 percent of the total population in the southern Philippines during the Spanish administration, they now constitute only 20 percent.16 Moreover, 

political and economic power also changed hands as the 

new settlers acquired more lands and controlled most of 

the natural resources.

The Moros’ gradual loss of lands and increased socioeconomic marginalization fueled their discontent and feelings of 

inadequacy. Outside influence, particularly from neighboring Islamic countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, spurred 

a surge of religious renewal that brought more mosques, 

Madrasah (Islamic schools), and preachers to Mindanao. As 

W. K. Che Man notes, such developments alone stimulated 

the Moros’ cultural awareness and sense of nationalism.17

Compounded by their perception of an inept central government they called “Imperial Manila” that promoted prejudicial policies, the Moros alienated themselves more from the 

rest of the Filipino population. Thus, a volatile condition 
5

emerged, setting the stage for the Moros to express through 

violent means their indignation and to reassert their historical claims to the homeland they call “Bangsamoro.”

Emergence of the MILF

The Moros have fought for self-determination against 

the national government for close to four decades. Various 

groups have surfaced in pursuit of this objective, though 

the more prominent and resilient are the Moro National 

Liberation Front (MNLF) and the MILF. As some historians 

maintain, and as the preceding discussion suggests, the secessionist movement had its roots in the centuries-old Moro 

resistance against the colonial policies of forceful assimilation, which the newly independent government also later 

adopted. A long history of intermittent wars was a Moro 

collective experience that may have drawn many of them to 

support the struggle for separatism. Art Ryan L. Seachon 

argues that extreme poverty and a tradition of tribal warfare, lawlessness, and clan conflicts caused more violence 

that exacerbated such secessionist sentiments.18

While all these factors may have contributed to stirring 

the passions for self-rule, the “Jabidah massacre” provided 

the impetus for the creation of a militant organization that 

transformed long-standing grievances into armed rebellion.19 The government clandestinely trained Moro recruits 

from the Philippine Army to reclaim Sabah from Malaysia. 

Later, the government was accused of ordering the murder of these troops. The incident not only gave birth to the 

MNLF, but it also gave rise to supporters who provided 

material and moral support from Malaysia. To Galula, this 

support reflected two of several important requisites for insurgency to blossom and survive.20

MNLF: The Foremost Representative of the Muslim 

Filipinos

Nur Misuari, a professor at the University of the Philippines, founded and led the MNLF in its guerilla war against 

the government. Its core fighters were the initial batch of 

young Moros whom the Malaysians trained in paramilitary 

skills. Though more secular in leanings,21 the MNLF never-
6

theless obtained, in 1975, the backing of the Organization 

of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an association of nations 

from the Middle East, Libya, Indonesia, and Malaysia. This 

recognition gave legitimacy to its cause and gained it widespread support across all social classes of Muslim Filipinos. It is also what prodded former Pres. Ferdinand Marcos 

to launch diplomatic measures to assuage OIC members 

and extend conciliatory gestures to the MNLF.22 The unprecedented move resulted in the signing of the Tripoli 

Agreement in 1976. The accord had the prospect of ending all armed hostilities by devolving governance in several 

Moro provinces to an autonomous body. Its implementation, however, ran into a constitutional obstacle concerning 

the plebiscite and was never put into effect. Regardless, it 

would serve as the framework for succeeding peace negotiations with the secessionist groups. 

In the early stages of the separatist insurgency in the 

late 1960s, the government, through its AFP, undertook a 

full-scale war after Marcos vowed to crush the MNLF.23 Retired soldiers who participated in that war remembered the 

military using the full might of its hardware, from tanks to 

artillery to fighter jets. Most agree that such military actions were appropriate, as they regarded the Moros as vicious enemies who decapitated captured soldiers and stuck 

their severed heads on stakes.24 Military documents also 

revealed a predilection for employing battalion-sized infantry in sweeping maneuvers to trap Moro insurgents. The 

military’s offensive against the Moro gained further strength 

with the imposition of martial law throughout the Philippine archipelago in 1972. Relentless shelling and punitive 

bombings became standard operating procedures against 

MNLF lairs declared as no-man’s land. The MNLF retaliated 

with such familiar guerilla tactics as ambuscades, assaults 

on military installations and logistics, terror bombings, and 

random assassination of soldiers. In the first half of the 

1970s, the war caused more than 120,000 military and civilian casualties and dislocated more than one million inhabitants from their homes.25

The breakthrough for a final peace agreement with the 

MNLF occurred in 1996 during the presidency of Fidel Ramos. Indonesia brokered the negotiations, unifying the GRP 

and the MNLF together in accepting a new blueprint for 
7

an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) agreement. A watered-down version of the Tripoli Agreement, the 

new accord was designed to create a strong autonomy with 

the inclusion of new concessions for the MNLF. However, 

according to Astrid S. Tuminez, the legislative machine of 

the Philippine Congress tempered those concessions and, 

together with incompetent leaders including Nur Misuari, 

who had previously run ARMM, the autonomous government “has become a symbol of failure” for Moro aspirations.26 Nevertheless, ARMM holds up to this day, and the 

MNLF is no longer a national security threat. Some splinter 

groups, however, continue challenging the government and 

remain unbound by the agreement.

MILF: The Breakaway Faction

The MILF broke away from the MNLF in 1984 to pursue 

a struggle towards an independent Bangsamoro under an 

Islamic form of government. The adoption of its parent’s 

name with the slight modification emphasizes this group’s 

Islamic orientation.27 MILF’s founder, Hashim Salamat, was 

a charismatic religious scholar who was educated at a university in Egypt. Likewise, the MILF hierarchy consists of Islamic scholars called “Ulamas.” Regarded more as spiritual 

leaders than insurgents, this core of MILF officers wields 

considerable power and commands respect from Muslims 

both inside and outside the organization.28 Their influence 

extends to the common people.

Salamat made no secret of his group’s ultimate objective 

of establishing a separate Islamic state that will be governed with “complete independence or, at the very least, 

meaningful autonomy.”29 A close examination of his unpublished manuscript, “The Bangsamoro Mujahid: His 

Objectives and Responsibilities,” reveals plans to employ a 

combination of civic and military strategies to achieve that 

objective—“da’wah” (Islamic outreach) and “jihad.”30 The 

first has the flavor of a military psychological operation. 

It pursues Islamic indoctrination of the populace through 

relentless preaching in town halls, schools, and places of 

worship.31 The second strategy advocates armed struggle 

against perceived enemies, with the jihad serving as the 

vehicle for change. 
8

Ironically, AFP intelligence sources also uncovered an 

MILF strategy exhorting members to avoid needless direct 

engagements with government troops. Unless forced to defend itself against AFP attacks, the MILF prefers minimum 

confrontation and desires to be free to recruit and train 

its army, gain a widespread following and support through 

da’wah, and fortify its camps. This strategy was notable 

when the GRP-MNLF peace process was taking place32 and 

before the government pursued an “all-out war” in 2000 

that shut down most MILF camps.

MILF Camps

Before the 2000 AFP offensive, 46 MILF-maintained and 

-operated camps (13 major camps and 33 satellite detachments) proliferated across 10 provinces in the southern 

Philippines. This investment in fixed facilities stands in 

contrast to the highly mobile nature of an insurgency.33

These camps more resembled colonies or settlements 

than they did conventional military camps. They lacked 

physical boundaries, a requirement for effective camp administration, control, and security.34 Some of the camps 

were fortified with some form of perimeter defense, such 

as bunkers or trenches. Others, particularly the satellite 

camps, were merely areas in towns where the MILF had 

some level of influence.35

The largest of these camps was Abubakar, where the 

seat of MILF central power also resided. It hosted “schools, 

mosques, Sharia courts, multi-purpose cooperatives, a 

military academy, an arms manufacturing center and a 

prison.”36 It covered tracts of lands and rolling hills where 

MNLF members and their families planted seed crops and 

raised farm animals. In other words, it was home to a thriving communal society where the elemental political, military, social, and religious infrastructures provided basic 

government and civic services to residents. The practice 

and observance of Sharia or Islamic law also encompassed 

all facets of life within the camp. The national government 

ignored media reports of the execution of Moros whom the 

Sharia courts had found guilty of committing criminal offenses. Thus, for many Filipino Muslims, Camp Abubakar 

was proof they could manage their own political, social, and 
9

economic affairs without interference from Manila. Given 

this, they viewed the MILF as their rightful representation. 

Indeed, Abubakar was a symbol of the genuine Muslim society Salamat had envisioned.

The MILF was not particularly secretive about its camps’ 

locations.37 During the cease-fire that started in 1997 when 

the GRP and MILF were negotiating for peace, local and 

foreign VIPs frequently toured Camp Abubakar.38 A son of 

Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddhafi even paid a courtesy 

visit to Salamat. The AFP Office of Strategic and Special 

Studies (OSSS) assessed that the MILF wanted these camps 

“to serve as ‘landmarks’ to indicate the extent of MILF territory.”39 This assessment is hardly surprising, given the 

MILF’s political objective and the path it navigates towards 

achieving that end.

Because the MILF wants to form an Islamic state for the 

Moros independent of the republic, the MILF deemed it 

necessary to project a modicum of that image: a self-ruled 

mini-state. This requires some level of legitimacy, a position 

the MILF’s political front can always use to its advantage 

in any negotiation. Without it, other nations will simply 

regard the MILF as just another group of insurgents or, 

worse, terrorists challenging the legitimate government to 

acquire concessions. Camp Abubakar, the other landmark 

camps, and, as shown in the following sections, the MILF 

forces and its war strategy, are just some indications that 

the group is trying to redefine itself as capable of independent governance. 

Interestingly, with all the grandstanding, the MILF never 

has obtained the same recognition the MNLF received from 

the OIC regarding the peace accord the latter has signed 

with the GRP. The government has been successful in its 

diplomatic initiatives to cut the material and financial support the MILF is receiving from Libya and Malaysia.40 Without external backing, its ability to sustain its operational 

aims will be somewhat limited. 

MILF’s Armed Component

One important product of the 2000 AFP campaign was 

the creation of a more accurate picture of the MILF’s capabilities and strengths. In short, OSSS described MILF 
10

fighters as lacking in military skills, training, and discipline.41 In the eight major battles the MILF fought to defend its camps against AFP assault, OSSS can only count 

one battle in which MILF fighters put up a stand strong 

enough that army soldiers were forced to defend. Both 

sides sustained heavy casualties. The battle occurred 

along a portion of the Narciso Ramos Highway, a major 

thoroughfare running east and west along the main island 

of Mindanao.42 The MILF had taken a section of that road 

and utilized it as an outside security perimeter of Camp 

Abubakar. Guard details also used it as a main outpost 

to set up checkpoints and extort money from road users. 

Trenches, bunkers, concrete ditches, and gun emplacements reinforced the structures along one side of that 

road section, proof of the strategic value it provided to the 

security of Camp Abubakar.

From an estimated strength of 15,690 members with 

11,280 firearms before the fall of Camp Abubakar, MILF 

strength has dwindled to about 11,668 members with 

7,739 firearms. In the five years before the 2000 offensive, 

recruitment had averaged an annual rate of 25 percent of 

total strength.43 Since 2008, the membership has remained 

relatively static with losses and gains keeping it under 250 

members. The loss of its camps has indeed affected members’ ability to sway people to join its ranks.

Antecedent to the “all-out war,” the MILF built its forces 

and capabilities in preparation for a conventional type of 

warfare. Its armed component, the Bangsamoro Islamic 

Armed Forces (BIAF), is structured and organized in divisions like the military—at least, that is the image it sought 

to project. But, as the OSSS found out, some “‘divisions’ 

were mere labels” that lumped together fighters of different 

skills and orientation into one group.44 The BIAF hierarchy had “a typical military structure with staff units for administration, intelligence, operations, supply and logistics, 

training, transportation and communications.”45 True to its 

religious orientation, the MILF had specific staff offices for 

the promotion of da’wah. 

Regarding the quality of its soldiers, the BIAF was an 

effective force a couple of decades back. Cadres trained in 

Malaysia, old-timers of the AFP-MNLF 1970s war, and more 

than 50 veterans of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets 
11

comprised the bulk of its members. Some of these Afghan 

war veterans became friends with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 

members at the training camp. But as the attacking government troops in 2000 found out, that generation of MILF 

fighters were mostly Muslim youths, unschooled and unaccustomed to the sound and fury of battle.46 Thus, they 

fled from the battle scene as the fighting heated up. In one 

of the battles, a soldier recounts that “We had penetrated 

the sides of the bunkers, and found these to be the rebel 

camp’s weakest point. The fighting was now bunker to bunker. It was then that we saw young MILF fighters in their 

early teens and even younger fleeing from the bunkers and 

crying. I felt pain in my heart at the sight of young and innocent children going to war.”47 This information suggests 

a decline in the capacity of the group to engage in conventional warfare. 

The 2000 AFP Campaign against the MILF

OSSS described it as a military offensive “of the grandest 

scale since independence in 1946.”48 Indeed, it was the first 

time the AFP confronted an enemy in pitched conventional 

battles. Most of the fighting the AFP had done before 2000 

was against small groups of insurgents, members of the 

New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of the CPP, and 

the MNLF. These small groups employed guerilla tactics, 

engaged the government troops sporadically, and challenged them in brief skirmishes. The 2000 campaign took 

about five months to complete and exhausted two-thirds of 

the combat strength of the AFP.49 Major battles that developed as the AFP took on each camp ran to several days. The 

shortest battle was a week, while the longest, an offensive 

aimed at ousting the MILF from the Narciso Ramos Highway, took 35 days. 

Indeed, former president Joseph Estrada actually had 

advertised the objective of the campaign as such. However, 

the government’s resolve was far greater than these short 

engagements suggest. The government’s aim was to regain its sovereignty throughout the Moro strongholds, but 

the primary emphasis was on controlling all Moro camps. 

Though the MILF rebels undertook conventional warfare to 

defend their camps,50 the asymmetry of numbers and the 
12

hardware of the warring forces dictated from the start the 

likely winner of the campaign. The MILF just was no match 

for the superior forces of the AFP in a conventional war. 

It was precisely the kind of warfare soldiers are trained to 

fight. Even most of their equipment was designed to operate in this environment. Thus, MILF fighters were doomed 

from the beginning when the AFP brought the full might of 

its conventional forces to bear.

But the capture of Camp Abubakar, which officially ended 

the campaign, did not come close to decisively defeating the 

MILF.51 That the MILF did not put up a strong defense for 

the camp suggests a conscious move to transfer the match 

to new yet familiar ground—guerilla warfare. Though the 

AFP drove the MILF fighters out of their camps, the AFP 

also forced them to adapt Mao Tse-tung’s “fish swimming 

in the water” technique.52 Now full-time insurgents, they 

were difficult to distinguish from the Muslim population. 

Drawing some lessons learned from the joint Philippine–

US counterterrorism effort in Basilan may be useful in 

this respect.

The Target and the OEF—Philippines

The decades-old conflict in Mindanao never has attracted 

as much attention and concern from the United States before as it has recently. The United States viewed the conflict 

as an internal matter that should be left to the discretion 

of the Philippine government.53 This comes as a surprise, 

given that, only half a century ago, the Philippines was also 

beset with the same domestic problem of rebellion that the 

United States helped in suppressing. To this day, American 

involvement in the Huk rebellion is still being heralded as a 

successful post-war foreign internal defense (FID) operation. 

The Huk insurgency proved more than just the effectiveness of two governments cooperating to fight a common 

Maoist enemy. It evidenced that insurgencies indeed can 

be defeated given the appropriate COIN methods, those emphasizing winning the “hearts and minds” of the masses.54

Some valuable lessons that came out of that campaign 

include the employment of intensified psychological operations, effective propaganda, and intelligence sharing. The first 

caused dissension in the ranks; the second squelched the 
13

ideas it touted to expand its mass base; and the third neutralized most of its leaders.55 These basic anti-insurgency 

principles were integrated in the training of local security 

forces that boosted confidence and developed capacity for 

self-reliance.56

The current GWOT brought American FID specialists again 

to the Philippines. Though the causes of the conflict are different, the warfare remains unconventional and is reminiscent 

of the Cold War containment of communism that brought 

Col Edward Lansdale and his FID team to the Philippines 

at the height of the Huk rebellion. The following discussion 

shows the JSOTF-P that is assisting the AFP in battling certain terrorists57 is also employing some elements of the same 

Lansdale-inspired COIN measures. Albeit with fancy names, 

enhanced intelligence sharing is now known as intelligence 

fusion, while propaganda has been replaced by the doctrinal 

term information operations (IO). In any case, the basics of 

intelligence, psychological operations, and propaganda are 

characteristic elements of a sound COIN strategy.

Basilan: Target Area

From renewed interest in Mindanao after 9/11, the Island of Basilan became the testing ground for the application of this indirect approach. Hundreds of US soldiers, 

mostly from the special operations forces, set up camp in 

this remote southern Philippine island in February 2002.58

Before the JSOTF-P operations, the island had been, since 

the early 1990s, home to the notorious Abu Sayyaf Group. 

ASG members used Basilan as a sanctuary for planning 

and launching their bombing, beheading, and kidnapping 

activities. Strategically located, it also served as a getaway 

location for terrorists operating in mainland Mindanao 

whom the AFP forces were tracking or pursuing. Terrorist 

training camps operated in this once quiet place without 

much interference from local authorities. Periodically, the 

Philippine Air Force would conduct strike-bombing operations aimed at blasting away these camps, but the camps 

survived.59 Many JI members travel to this island to obtain 

terror and guerilla warfare training.60

 Basilan is approximately 40 miles east to west and 25 

miles north to south. It is the biggest island in the Sulu ar-
14

chipelago. A plain along the coastal perimeter, it slopes gently up towards the hinterlands. The center is dotted with 

lush hills that dominate the landscape and with dense canopied jungles that provide perfect natural cover for terrorists. Major cities are near the coasts, where most of the more 

than 496,000 inhabitants live. Many people live off produce 

from rubber and coconut trees that stand on vast tracts. 

Economically, the island is viable for sustained growth, but 

years of government neglect have marginalized the population (predominantly Muslims) and have driven most of 

them to poverty. Cities and towns are accessible only with 

difficulty due to inadequate transportation infrastructures. 

Because the presence of the ASG and past military operations against them made the island ungovernable, basic 

government services like health care are scarce. In addition, years of civil unrest and intermittent wars resulted in 

the closure and relocation of businesses to islands that are 

more hospitable. Taking these factors into account, Basilan 

Island falls under what Sean Anderson calls a “gray area.”61

Such territories, “over which unstable, weak national governments have but minimal control,” are open invitations 

for terrorists to conduct their activities freely.62

Abu Sayyaf: The Target Terror Group

The primary target of the JSOTF-P in Basilan and, lately, 

in Sulu, is the Abu Sayyaf Group. Literally, the “Bearer of 

the Sword,” ASG is arguably less of an insurgency and more 

of a terrorist organization. Gregory Wilson notes that “the 

connection between terrorism and insurgency is now well 

established, and in fact, there is tremendous overlap between 

the two. However, the distinction is still necessary, as it has 

implications in the employment of countermeasures and in 

conflict resolution.63 Both insurgents and terrorists use terror and guerilla tactics to undermine the legitimacy of the 

existing government by demonstrating its inability to protect 

the population and maintain order. The difference is that insurgents are more inclined to employ guerilla tactics. Their 

terror acts are less frequent, but they are more careful in 

their targeting to promote their cause versus raising the ire 

of the locals. If they do terrorize, military and police forces 
15

are more often their targets.64 Whether they use guerilla or 

terror tactics, insurgents engage less in attacking civilians.

Terrorists, on the other hand, conduct more attacks 

against civilian targets, often to achieve such short-term 

concessions as ransom money, personal revenge, and prisoner release rather than to attract popular support.65 The 

effectiveness of earning mass-base sympathy through terror 

means, however, is debatable. Bard O’Neill states that alQaeda’s conduct of “transnational terrorist acts like bombings and skyjackings” has not produced measurable proof 

of effectiveness in attracting passive or active supporters.66

Nevertheless, terrorists direct their attacks primarily at innocent civilians and tend to avoid unnecessary contact with 

the military.67

The ASG’s actions fall more into the second category. The 

AFP describes this group as fundamentalist in religious orientation and radical in its interpretation of the tenets of 

Islam, especially the jihad.68 To ASG jihadists, everything 

is fair game. Armed struggle is the chief means of attaining their goal of an independent Mindanao state, governed 

by Islam in its unadulterated form—a theocracy.69 Interestingly, ASG firmly believes that Allah accepts and even 

encourages all methods of terrorism in the advancement 

of jihad.70 Philippine Army soldiers who fought against 

this group observed that it “systematically and deliberately 

targeted civilians, specifically Christian religious leaders, 

Christian schools, foreign and local tourists, wealthy individuals, places of worship, Christian villages, and public 

places, in all their activities. These attacks (kidnappings, 

killings, abductions, extortion, bank raids, and raids on villages) were intended to spread fear, chaos, and sow terror 

among the people, specially [sic] Christians, in order to get 

rid of them.”

In a well-documented study, the International Crisis 

Group (ICG) is more candid in describing the character of 

this organization, saying, “The ASG is not an insurgency in 

the same sense as the MILF or MNLF, or even a clearly delineated organisation. It is best understood as a network of 

networks, an alliance of smaller groups around individual 

charismatic leaders who compete and cooperate to maximize their reputation for violence. The greater the violence, 
16

the bigger the pay-off, in terms of higher ransom payments 

and foreign funding.”71

ICG further adds that members of this group continue to 

embrace and practice a militant form of Islam as a way of 

life and in pursuit of their fundamental objective. A dangerous assumption among military pundits in the AFP is that 

the ASG started out as a militant religious organization and 

assumed a criminal character after the loss of its founder. 

Such postulation runs the risk of erroneously relegating the 

task of confronting this group to law enforcement forces. In 

contrast, ICG contends that ASG’s criminal activities have 

been a standard operating procedure since its inception.72

Based on the foregoing, there is no mistaking the real identity of the ASG—a terrorist organization rather than a guerilla force.

The Basilan Model—COIN Strategy against the ASG

The Basilan Model acquired its name following the successful operations that drove the ASG out of its sanctuary 

in Basilan. It used the Diamond Model, the strategic COIN 

principles developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick (fig. 1).73 The 

diagram shows the Diamond Model as a network representation of four principal actors and the interplay of forces among 

them in an insurgency environment. The diamond shape 

demonstrates symmetry of action and effect in what Wilson 

calls a “zero-sum game.”74 Thus, either COIN or an insurgent 

force can use this model by applying its principles. 

In the diagram, both insurgent and COIN forces (all government instruments of power) are targeting the population 

for support (segment 1). To further illustrate, let us say the 

military is conducting a medical mission in a town controlled 

by insurgents. One individual who views soldiers as abusive may, after receiving medical care, suddenly “change his 

heart” and find them caring and competent. That person 

won over to the military’s side will be a corresponding loss to 

the insurgents, hence the zero sum. As a corollary to that, a 

stray artillery shell that explodes near the town and injures 

that same person has the effect of reinforcing his view of an 

abusive military and has the simultaneous effects of creating 

a new active supporter for the insurgents and a new enemy 

for the military. Insurgents will also take parallel actions to 
17

International

Community

Insurgent

Force

COIN

Force

Population

1 1

2 2

3

4 4

5 5

Feedback

Feedback Feedback

Feedback

Strategies

Graphical Representation of Dr. McCormick’s Counterinsurgency Model

Counterinsurgency Model

Figure 1. COIN Diamond Model. (Reprinted with permission from Gordon 

McCormick, The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism, RAND Corporation, Document No. P-7297)

lure people into their ranks. One familiar insurgent tactic is 

to organize peasant groups and teach them livelihood skills. 

Segment 2 shows insurgent and COIN forces attacking each 

other’s hearts and minds strategy. The idea is to undermine 

the other’s image in the minds of the population. Thus, a media broadcast of the person who suffered an army artillery 

hit has the effect of setting back tenfold any progress civilmilitary goals achieved. Success in segments 1 and 2 often 

leads to feedback from the population that translates into 

actionable intelligence. Where information is concerned, the 

insurgents have the initial upper hand because they usually 

live with the local population.75 It is therefore the government forces’ objective to counter the imbalance by pursuing 

efforts that contribute to the success in segments 1 and 2. 

Once those goals have been achieved, the COIN force is in 

the position to attack the insurgent force along segment 3. 

Actionable intelligence as a product of segments 1 and 2 
18

allows COIN forces to correctly identify and attack the insurgent force.

Representing the lower half of the diamond is the external 

support COIN or insurgents receive from outside sources. 

In segment 5, both forces are targeting the international 

community to obtain material or moral support. A major 

outside military power may provide FID to either COIN or 

insurgents. As in segment 2, the COIN and insurgent forces 

can employ measures to disrupt the other’s relationship 

with the international community along segment 4. As in 

the upper half of the diamond, the side that achieves success in legs 4 and 5 can strike a decisive blow against the 

other along segment 3.

Balikatan 02–1: Shoulder-to-Shoulder Exercise

The 1,300 American troops deployed to the southern Philippines in February 2002 comprising the Balikatan 02–1 

found themselves undertaking a unique mission much different from the current GWOT efforts in Afghanistan and 

Iraq. While US military forces are directly involved in combat 

operations in those countries, their role in the Philippines is 

limited to that of “advising and assisting” the AFP forces.76 In 

the words of a US special forces (SF) officer, “It was a unique 

mission, because in one sense SF was ‘training, advising, 

assisting, and maintaining,’ but the location was a combat zone where AFP soldiers were fighting the Abu Sayyaf 

Group.”77 It is interesting to note, however, that the initial 

plan of the Bush administration was to send US troops to 

engage the Abu Sayyaf directly in combat and to dispatch an 

elite team of Delta Force personnel to rescue an American 

missionary couple the terrorist group was holding.78 Though 

not expressly stated, the Philippine constitutional provision 

banning the permanent basing of a large contingent of foreign troops in the country could lead to all sorts of interpretations preventing US troops from participating in actual 

combat. Had the Philippine government’s hands not been 

tied by this constitutional restriction, the COIN operations in 

Basilan could have taken a different turn. 

Exercise Balikatan 02–1 was the first bilateral training exercise between the Philippines and the United States 

performed in a “hot area.” Since the 1990s, both countries 
19

have conducted combined peacetime exercises in the relative 

safety of camps and in designated field training areas vetted 

for security. Previous exercises involved the mobilization and 

use of conventional forces and equipment routinely aimed at 

enhancing operability between participating teams.79 Exercises emphasizing COIN doctrines and tactics were confined 

to the army and involved only a small group of special forces 

counterparts. Thus, Balikatan 02–1 was a unique experience 

because it took a form similar to on-the-job training (OJT) 

with American soldiers serving as FID specialists (training 

supervisors) to their Filipino counterparts (apprentices). The 

mission (job) was threefold and became the basis for conceptual planning towards developing lines of operations80 aimed 

at affecting the center of gravity, which is, as prescribed in 

the Diamond Model, the People. These missions or lines of 

operation are “building AFP capacity, focused civil-military 

operations, and information operations.”81

The first mission focused on improving the AFP troops’ 

skills and ability to undertake COIN operations against the 

ASG. Efforts along these lines correspond to actions taken 

in segments 1 (establishing security to gain popular support) and 3 (direct action against the enemy) of the Diamond Model. The JSOTF-P, through SF cadres who were 

embedded in select battalion units of the Philippine Army 

(PA),82 provided training in “combat lifesaving skills, nightvision goggle (NVG) use, small-unit tactics, maritime interdiction operations, close-air support, and leadership development.”83 Though not allowed to engage the enemy, SF 

teams nevertheless went along with PA patrolling units to 

conduct on-scene training and advice.84 The newly acquired 

life-saving skills, the use of NVGs, and the availability of US 

helicopters for immediate medical evacuation increased the 

Filipino soldiers’ motivation to conduct more patrols day 

and night.85 Thus, improvements in combat capability created a secure environment for Basilians and increased the 

fighting troops’ willingness to confront the ASG. 

AFP intelligence specialists also received training on 

basic intelligence fusion and analysis of raw information 

acquired from different sources.86 Timely and reliable intelligence provided the means to undertake direct action 

against ASG by obtaining knowledge of its members and 

their movements, its location, its organizational structure, 
20

and its tactics. In COIN operations, collection of intelligence 

and security of the populace are mutually exclusive. As David 

Galula points out, “Intelligence is the principal source of information on guerillas and intelligence has to come from the 

population, but the population will not talk unless it feels 

safe, and it does not feel safe until the insurgent’s power 

has been broken.”87 In time, Basilians found reassurance in 

their physical safety and slowly volunteered information to 

the AFP and US security forces.88 Also, as part of the capacity 

building, both the AFP and the JSOTF-P, the latter utilizing 

its “robust reach-back capability” in commanding such a 

wide array of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) assets as space-based systems and unmanned aerial 

vehicles, combined their intelligence efforts and transformed them into actionable intelligence.89 James S. Corum 

and Wray R. Johnson acknowledge the importance of these 

ISR assets in small wars for real-time intelligence gathering 

and for offsetting terrorist advantages during night-time 

movements.90 However, experiences in Afghanistan and 

Iraq point to human intelligence (HUMINT) as a proven and 

time-tested COIN method of collecting grass-roots information about insurgent enemies who normally live with the 

populace.91 During the rescue of the Burnhams,92 an AFP 

HUMINT embedded in the ASG ranks provided the initial 

location of the hostage takers while ISR imagery gave their 

movements to the pursuing rescue teams, resulting in the 

killing of ASG representative Abu Sabaya.93

Establishment of security in villages in Basilan afforded 

the US civil affairs (CA) specialists, together with their 

Filipino counterparts, the ability to proceed in undertaking 

humanitarian assistance and community development 

projects.94 The second mission of focused civil-military operations (CMO) was actions taken to support segment 1 of 

the Diamond Model and was intended to draw support for 

the national government from the local populace by showing 

concern for their basic welfare and needs. The focused element of the CMO projects means resources were tailored and 

allocated to address the root causes of popular dissatisfaction that tend to attract local support for the terror group.95

Thus, the CA team visited different villages and towns to conduct a two-week demographic survey.96 Assessment results 

gave the team knowledge on projects whose implementation 
21

would have a significant impact on Basilians. Thus AFP engineering units and US Navy Seabees constructed and repaired roads and built bridges to enable people to travel to 

different towns more conveniently and merchants to market 

their agricultural produce cheaply and efficiently.97 The construction teams also drilled manual-pump water wells to address the shortage of clean and potable water. They restored 

electricity to some areas that had lost electrical power due 

to storm damage. Additional schools were built. Combined 

Filipino and US MEDCAP and DENTCAP teams conducted 

medical and dental treatment and health care services.98

Many of the patients who benefitted never had seen a doctor or a dentist.99 After only a year, these medical missions 

and infrastructure projects quickly improved life in Basilan, 

transformed the government image from one of inefficiency 

to one of competence and concern, made the people trust 

the AFP more for protection, and empowered townspeople to 

demonstrate their intolerance of the presence of ASG terrorists in their island province.100

The information operations effort in Balikatan 02–1 took 

on the aspect of influencing the minds of the local populace to gain their allegiance to the government (segment 1 

of the Diamond Model) and to break their support for the 

ASG (segment 2). PSYOPS thus became a significant element of the JSOTF-P COIN strategy of communicating to 

the local people the intentions and goals of the AFP and the 

US military in Basilan.101 IO teams executed actions aimed 

at increasing public awareness of the peace and development efforts of the Balikatan exercise and making the people realize the downside of continuing to harbor terrorists 

in their communities.102 The active use of print and broadcast media and the Internet promoted positive messages of 

COIN activities to a wide audience. Creative designs of leaflets, posters, print ads, and handbills translated in different southern Philippine dialects supported the US government’s rewards program.103 The IO campaign also included 

the proper and careful handling of the Philippine media, 

which is generally biased against US presence in the country.104 The Philippines have a diverse culture and, aware of 

this, PSYOPS teams undertook a study of the history and 

culture of the different areas targeted for information campaigns.105 The resources expended on the IO campaign sup-
22

ported the gains of the two other lines of operation of the 

Balikatan 02–1 and contributed to the overall objective of 

weaning the local populace from ASG influence. Referring 

to the reality on the ground in Basilan, the command sergeant major of JSOTF-P said, “The battle in the Philippines 

is a battle against an idea.”106

Past Philippine COIN Strategies

Just a few years after the Philippines gained full independence, the Huks posed a serious challenge to the security of 

the state and the existence of the national government. After the Huk insurgency was contained in 1955, succeeding 

insurgencies came into being in the late 1960s, namely, the 

CCP and the different secessionist groups in the southern 

Philippines. Different administrations employed various 

strategies to address these insurgencies. All used a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means, though none was 

as successful as Magsaysay. This section provides a short 

description of some of these strategies.

The Huk Campaign

The Hukbalahap (short for Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa 

Hapon, or National Armed Force against the Japanese) 

started as a resistance movement against the Japanese occupiers.107 After World War II, it continued as a resistance 

movement against government inefficiency, corruption, 

and lack of coherent policy for land reform. Then Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay introduced a 

strategy he dubbed “All-Out Friendship or All-Out Force,” 

which employed COIN principles and techniques similar to 

those discussed previously.108 A guerilla leader during the 

Japanese occupation, he probably saw what fueled the rebellion and took actions to contain it.109 His objective was 

clear from the start: to cut the Huk guerillas’ main source 

of strength by steering the growing popular support away 

from them and directing it towards the established government.110 Thus, when he initially ordered his troops to 

conduct “large-scale conventional sweep operations” that 

caused harm to civilians caught in the crossfire, he immediately shifted to aggressive small unit tactics in engaging 
23

the insurgents.111 Interestingly, his lines of operation have 

the same elements as that of the JSOTF-P. 

With the military aid and training assistance provided by 

the US government, Magsaysay propped up the Philippine 

military capability. Key officers and enlisted soldiers received 

training in leadership and professionalism that abated inefficiency and abuses in the ranks.112 Equipment came from 

World War II stocks that were easy to operate and maintain.113

Therefore, the AFP became more effective and confident in 

fighting the Huks. The Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) became Magsaysay’s vehicle for implementing his CMO 

offensive. EDCOR was an ingenious resettlement and socioeconomic assistance program conceived to counter the Huks’ 

slogan of “Land for the Landless.”114 The program helped to 

sway peasant sympathies away from the Huks and enticed 

active members to return their allegiance to the government. 

Magsaysay also introduced the rewards program as part of 

his IO campaign. The large sums offered for the arrest of Huk 

leaders helped to sow dissension within the Huks’ organization.115 His “Cash for Guns” program was so effective it resulted in the surrender of 50 percent of the Huks’ firearms. 

Lastly, Lawrence M. Greenberg concludes that the success 

of COIN operations resulted in large part from Magsaysay’s 

dynamic and persistent leadership.116 In the eyes of many 

Filipinos now and then, he was and is a true icon of honesty, 

dedication, and sincere servitude. His presence in the forefront of the COIN campaign against the Huks contributed to 

the enhancement of the government’s legitimacy.

Marcos and Operations Plan Katatagan (Operation 

Plan Stability)

In the early 1980s, President Marcos was saddled with 

the rising tide of communist insurgency in many areas 

throughout the Philippines. Walden Bello states that “the 

brutal and corrupt dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos was 

driving people into the hands of the NPA.”117 Homegrown 

communism and its negative impact to the region-wide efforts of containing communism in Southeast Asia moved 

the US government to pressure Marcos to create a strategy 

to defeat the CCP.118
24

Philippine defense officials devised Operations Plan 

(OPLAN) Katatagan, which sought to apply the same COIN 

strategy that defeated the Huk insurgency. The plan, in 

fact, had the markings of the United States all over it and 

required compliance with some US demands to rid the military of its corrupt and abusive practices to become “a more 

effective counterinsurgency force.”119 Consequently, several 

Filipino military personnel flew to the United States to receive training in CMO, PSYOPS, and COIN courses.120 Emphasis was placed on the purchase of US COIN equipment 

to enable Filipino troops to move, shoot, and communicate 

instead of acquiring external defense articles like fighter 

jets. The plan also called for consolidating the capabilities 

and resources of the military and other government agencies to stamp out the problem of lawlessness and the lack 

of social services that fueled the insurgency.121

Marcos, despite his formidable ability to compel line 

agencies to coordinate their actions in support of OPLAN 

Katatagan, was still unsuccessful in containing the growth 

of the communist insurgency. According to Leonardo I. 

Peña, the plan did not differ much from the hearts and 

minds strategy of the Magsaysay COIN plan.122 It failed to 

produce positive results because, unlike Magsaysay, Marcos was more focused on maintaining power than faithfully 

addressing the insurgents’ grievances.123 Nor did the repressive nature of his governance and the radicalization of his 

military following years of military rule succeed in enlisting 

the population’s support for the security and development 

goals of his plan.

Post Martial Law Lambat-Bitag (Net-Entrapment) Plan

Lambat Bitag sought to rectify errors in OPLAN Katatagan. Though both plans contained aspects of security and 

development in their lines of operation, they differed in 

the execution of the security component. OPLAN Katatagan, the latter plan, involved the employment of tactical 

actions in the form of “strike campaigns, or what is commonly known as ‘search and destroy’ operations, clearing 

operations, mopping up operations, sweeping operations, 

etc.”124 Lambat Bitag, on the other hand, purged the plan 

of the “search and destroy” tactics and incorporated the 
25

four-stage clear-hold-consolidate-develop (C-H-C-D) operations concept.125 The clearing stage involved the immersion 

of a special operations team (SOT)126 into the influenced 

community to eradicate the insurgents’ political mass-base 

structure through intensive PSYOPS, civic-action, and 

intelligence efforts.127 The holding stage utilized the AFPadministered paramilitary units called the Civilian Armed 

Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU) to serve as auxiliary 

territorial guards in cleared communities.128 The CAFGU 

supported the local police by providing perimeter security. 

The consolidation stage cast the military in a supporting 

role to the local executives responsible for providing basic 

government services.129 The development stage overlapped 

the consolidation stage and usually involved the participation of NGOs and other private entities in implementing 

poverty alleviation projects.130

The consolidate and develop stages required involvement 

of other governmental agencies, whereas the Lambat Bitag 

plan lacked the national character or authority needed to 

compel agencies to coordinate and work with the military. 

Unlike the Magsaysay and Marcos COIN campaigns, Lambat 

Bitag was an AFP unilateral conceptualization. Thus, the AFP 

was often reduced to performing the task of civic and community development by expanding its CMO efforts.131 Notable among these CMO projects were dental and medical missions, academic tutoring through the Army Literacy Patrol 

System, road repair, construction of schools and markets, 

and assistance in establishing small-scale businesses.132

An important aspect of this COIN strategy was the continuous indoctrination and education of soldiers in leadership, core values, human rights, and the overall campaign 

objectives.133 Such education was particularly necessary 

for all SOT members who performed immersion missions 

to engage and work with the people in the target communities. According to Roy T. Devesa, in the six years since 

1987, when Lambat Bitag was implemented, the communistinsurgents’ ranks diminished exponentially from 25,000 to 

only about 5,000 in 1994.134 Likewise, a steep decline also 

occurred in the number of communist-influenced villages, 

from 8,500 to 450 within the given period.135 Accordingly, 

the success of this COIN strategy prompted the AFP to prematurely declare victory against the CCP and to relegate the 
26

national task of internal security operations (ISO) to law enforcement agencies in 1996.136 It would take the AFP two 

years to realize and admit this blunder. Thus, in 1998 the 

AFP took back its responsibility for the ISO and has held 

it since. 

Note that Lambat Bitag focused on the suppression of 

the communist insurgency, not the separatist movements 

in the southern Philippines. In fact, Peña states that MILF 

and ASG members increased during those years the AFP 

pursued entrapment of the communists.137 He adds that the 

GRP was reluctant to employ the same COIN plan against 

the MNLF and MILF because the GRP was engaged in peace 

talks with them.138 However, there could be other underlying reasons the AFP never employed strategies that blend 

kinetic and non-kinetic methods against the Moro insurgents. The conclusion addresses this issue.

Conclusion

Not until 2002 and the launching of OPLAN Bantay Laya 

(Freedom Watch) did the AFP develop a strategic plan to 

address all insurgencies in the country. This new plan is 

essentially the same as the OPLAN Lambat-Bitag, except it 

emphasizes a comprehensive and coordinated solution to 

the insurgency problem by uniting government agencies, 

NGOs, and other civil groups to work with the AFP. This 

time, the authority comes directly from the Office of the 

President. Establishing area-coordinating centers in every 

region allows for central planning and execution near operational environments. The plan also provides for the implementation of modified SOT more attuned to the culture in 

the southern Philippines. As mentioned earlier, past COIN 

strategies focused mainly on defeating the communist insurgencies. Sound as these strategies were, their application never was tested against the MILF or even the MNLF. 

COIN operations against these two Moro rebel groups involved mostly kinetic methods.

One possible reason for this apparent lack of enthusiasm 

toward COIN methods in confronting the MILF is that the 

AFP did not consider it a bona fide guerilla group. The AFP 

spoke of its armed component, the BIAF, more as a semiconventional force because, while the MILF attempted to 
27

project the BIAF as a large and well-organized force capable 

of engaging in conventional battles, its members occasionally conducted guerilla operations against AFP troops and 

military installations. Its inventory of weapons consisted 

mostly of light arms with a few heavy machine guns, rocketpropelled grenades, and 60mm and 81mm mortars. In a 

conventional contest against the AFP, these weapons were 

considered inferior. During the AFP-MILF showdown, these 

weapons afforded the latter the capability to inflict damage 

upon armored troop vehicles and tanks. There were reports 

before the 2000 offensive that the MILF possessed surfaceto-air missiles, but those rumors proved false. But the most 

obvious aspect of the MILF strength is its camps. AFP intelligence obtains positive identification of all camps before 

troops set out to seize them. Effective insurgents are highly 

mobile. They set up camps but only temporarily. They also 

take actions to prevent counterinsurgent authorities from 

discovering them and their hideouts. The MILF in contrast 

transformed some of their camps into fortified territories 

and openly gave out their locations, as if these camps were 

tourist destinations. After the AFP overran these camps, 

the MILF found haven in the thick grasslands of Central 

Mindanao. Some members took refuge in communities 

that are under their influence and continue to undertake 

operations to consolidate their mass base. They are now 

full-blown insurgents dispersed in highly mobile units and 

frequently carry out ambushes on patrolling troops or raids 

on AFP installations.

Another likely reason the AFP preferred bombing and 

large-scale sweeping maneuvers to suppress the Moro rebel 

groups has something to do with the prevailing perception 

of the Moros. Soldiers who have not seen action in Mindanao acquire their information from veterans in the field. 

Gruesome stories about Moros beheading captured soldiers 

and putting the decapitated heads on display reinforced the 

historical depiction of Moros as brutal and fanatical warriors. Spaniards in the colonial period portrayed them as 

“pirates, slave traders, and violent warriors.”139 Colonial 

Americans, on the other hand, viewed them “as ‘wild’ or as 

‘non-Christian tribes’ that needed to be civilized.”140 These 

distorted images of the Moros and the historical animosities 

between Christians and Muslims have survived to this day 
28

and sometimes feed into the consciousness of the majority 

of the soldiers. Few soldiers from outside this region understand the cultural and historical causes of the Moro rebellion. Thus, in a Christian-dominated military organization, 

military planners are likely to miscalculate when designing and implementing countermeasures or seeking to win 

hearts and minds.

The above discussion established Abu Sayyaf as operating more of a terrorist than an insurgent group. The difference underscores the ASG’s predisposition to conduct 

terror activities with wanton abandon and extreme brutality. Its actions have often raised the question of whether 

it uses Islam as mere cover to justify engaging in lucrative kidnappings and other forms of banditry. The MILF, on 

the other hand, though not above performing guerilla acts, 

is more careful in selecting targets and even takes great 

lengths to employ its extensive IO networks to justify terror 

acts swiftly. Except for the renegade members of the group, 

there has been no major report of mainstream MILF atrocities against civilians. MILF members employ guerrilla tactics occasionally against military and police forces to demonstrate the helplessness and inefficiency of the national 

government. Other than that, the MILF is quietly content 

with mobilizing its mass base through da’wah, building its 

strength, fortifying and transforming its camps into viable 

communities, broadcasting its messages through public relations and the Internet,141 and consolidating its forces and 

supporters throughout the southern Philippines.

The foregoing arguments show that the ASG has long 

been alienating Basilians because of years of bombings, beheadings, and kidnappings. O’Neill points out that “relying 

on terrorism as a means to garner popular support runs 

the risk of its prolongation and intensification which may 

be counterproductive,” as it induces suffering in the people 

and destroys the insurgent’s image of a reliable and competent alternative to the national forces.142 Some suggest the 

JSOTF-P was positioned to gain significant support from 

the residents of Basilan because of ASG abuses. Surveys 

confirm this support, with 60 percent of Mindanao Muslims 

showing approval for the exercise.143 Fear, of course, may 

contribute to the initial reluctance of the local residents to 

support the combined AFP and JSOTF-P contingent. Never-
29

theless, that was easily overcome as the AFP gradually built 

its capability and showed competence in taking charge of 

the situation.

Driving a wedge between the MILF and its supporters may 

be a different story in the application of the Diamond Model. 

The MILF has long been a symbol of Muslim unification and 

resistance against forced assimilation by the Manila-based 

rulers. Centuries-old grievances of Moro marginalization 

and dislocation have established a minefield of potential 

Muslim supporters who can easily identify with the MILF 

cause of creating a Bangsamoro homeland. According to 

Astrid S. Tuminez, “Many educated and politically active 

Moros express a longing to return to self-rule,” similar to 

the Sultanate system of government of the old southern 

Philippines.144 She added that the MILF before was fixated 

on establishing an independent state but now is more open 

to the idea of a “strong Moro autonomy” with little “interference from Manila.”145 If a majority of Moros who actively 

and passively support the MILF share this cause, this may 

be a strong indication of a national aspiration distinct from 

Filipino nationalism.

Bard O’Neill argues that “nationalist appeals” can be a 

strong cause for mobilizing popular support and establishing cohesion in insurgency movements because they can always bring up culturally divisive grievances and also point 

to the present rulers as the cause of their suffering and 

marginalization.146 With Moros having cultivated a sense of 

living as second-class citizens in their own land,147 the feeling of subjugation is further exacerbated. When nationalist 

feelings predominate over mundane grievances, a focused 

CMO may not be enough to sway popular support away 

from the MILF. At the tactical level, MILF supporters may 

respond with gratitude to such humanitarian and community development efforts, but, unless improvements in their 

lives can be sustained and the Moros are given more opportunities for social mobility, application of the Diamond 

Model may fail in the strategic sense.

Tuminez inquires, “Does the government have a credible 

plan for enhancing Moros’ sense of Filipino citizenship?”148

Michael Hecter partly answers that question in his book, 

Containing Nationalism. He suggests the importance of 

containing nationalism or at least mitigating nationalism’s 
30

powerful appeal for mobilization by re-engineering or creating institutions that address the specific needs of the people and strengthening them so that they maintain an image 

of fairness without favoring anyone in particular.149 In other 

words, a successful COIN strategy against a group like the 

MILF should complement actions that would give Moros a 

sense they belong within mainstream Filipino society. 

Notes

(Notes appear here in shortened form. For full details, see appropriate 

entries in the bibliography.)

1. International Crisis Group, “Philippines Terrorism,” 1.

2. Baker, “Looking Forward in Mindanao,” 45.

3. Spaniards saw resemblance between the Muslims of Sulu and the 

Moors (Muslims from North Africa who conquered Spain in the 8th century) 

in their viciousness and fighting style and thus labeled the former “Moros.” 

4. Tuminez, “The Past Is Always Present,” 1.

5. Majul, Muslim in the Philippines, 63.

6. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 22. 

7. Briefing presented by Dr. Nestor M. Nisperos.

8. Indios is a pejorative label the Spaniards used to refer to Philippine 

inhabitants. 

9. Linn, Philippine War, 226. 

10. Pres. William McKinley instituted this policy in the administration of 

Philippine state affairs. Benevolent assimilation “downplayed the military 

side of pacification” and instead emphasized civil affairs. See ibid., 200. 

11. Ibid., chapter 9.

12. Ibid., 226.

13. Aijaz, “Class and Colony in Mindanao,” 6. 

14. Tuminez, “The Past Is Always Present,” 4.

15. Martin and Tuminez, “Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines,” 2.

16. Bacani, “The Mindanao Peace Talks,” 4.

17. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 89.

18. Seachon, “Insurgencies in History,” 16.

19. Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon, 20. 

20. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 25–30.

21. Unlike the MILF, which pursues an independent Islamic concept of 

state and government, the MNLF is more inclined to establish a democratic 

system of government separate from the national government. The MNLF 

recognizes the Philippine constitution and was able to strike a peace deal with 

GRP based on that framework. The MILF, however, does not, and this is one 

major reason the current peace talks between the GRP and the MILF always 

hit a snag. (See interview of the late Hashim Salamat in the 23d issue of 

Nida’ul Islam magazine at http://www.islam.org.au, April–May 1998. Also 

see Liss, “Abu Sayyaf and US and Australian Military Intervention in the 

Southern Philippines,” available from http://www.globalcolab.org/Nautilus/
31

australia/apsnet/policy-forum/2007/abu-sayyaf-and-us-and-australian

-miltary-intervention-in-the-southern-philippines. 

22. Bacani, “The Mindanao Peace Talks,” 4.

23. Abat, The Day We Nearly Lost Mindanao, 25.

24. Personal encounters with soldiers who fought the MNLF in the 1970s. 

25. Tuminez, “The Past Is Always Present,” 1.

26. Ibid., 8–9.

27. Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon, 122.

28. Bacani, “The Mindanao Peace Talks,” 5.

29. Salamat, The Bangsamoro Mujahid. 

30. Ibid.

31. International Crisis Group, “Southern Philippines Backgrounder,” 9.

32. Bacani, “The Mindanao Peace Talks,” 5.

33. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Field Circular, Knowing the 

Terrorists. 

34. AFP OSSS, In Assertion of Sovereignty, 22.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., 11.

37. Ibid., 28.

38. Ibid., 13.

39. Ibid., 28.

40. Abuza, “The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).”

41. AFP OSSS, In Assertion of Sovereignty, 124.

42. Ibid., chapter 5.

43. Ibid., 24.

44. Ibid., 20.

45. Ibid., 19.

46. Ibid., 124.

47. Ibid., 121.

48. Ibid., 115.

49. Ibid., 116.

50. Ibid., 125.

51. Ibid., xxviii.

52. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 28.

53. Tuminez, “The Past Is Always Present,” 13.

54. For a detailed discussion on the counterinsurgency employed 

against the Huks, see Greenberg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection. 

55. Ibid., 117–32.

56. Ibid.

57. The completion of Balikatan 2002 in Basilan did not end the presence of US troops in Mindanao. Instead, the JSOTF-P mission was extended 

to an indefinite period and expanded to the island of Jolo and in Western 

Mindanao. See Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf,” 12. See also Jacinto, “RP, US Troops 

Finish School Building in Sulu,” available from http://www.gmanews.tv/

print/124775.

58. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in 

the Philippines,” 19.

59. The author participated in many strike-bombing operations against 

the ASG in Basilan in 1995.

60. AFP Field Circular, Knowing the Terrorists. 
32

61. Anderson, “US Counterinsurgency vs. Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism,” 225.

62. Ibid.

63. Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation,” 2.

64. O’Neil, Insurgency & Terrorism, 36.

65. Ibid., 34.

66. Ibid., 104.

67. Ibid., 36.

68. AFP Field Circular, Knowing the Terrorists. 

69. Ibid., 1.

70. Ibid., 3.

71. International Crisis Group, “The Philippines,” 7.

72. Ibid.

73. Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation,” 4.

74. Ibid., 5.

75. Corpus, Silent War, 111–12.

76. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in 

the Philippines,” 18.

77. Ibid.

78. Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf,” 10.

79. AFP J8, Education and Training.

80. Line of operation, according to Dr. Jeff Reilly, “is the visualization 

of a campaign’s concept of operations that links tactical and operational 

objectives to the end state.” See Reilly, Operational Design, 27.

81. Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation,” 6.

82. Small and independent groups of special operations specialists 

called the liaison coordination element (LCE) “advise and assist” in the 

AFP battalion (numbering between 4,000–5,000 troops) level in combat 

planning and intelligence fusion. Ibid., 9. 

83. Eckert, “Defeating the Idea,” 18.

84. Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation,” 7.

85. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in 

the Philippines,” 22.

86. Ibid., 21.

87. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 50.

88. Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation,” 8.

89. Ibid., 9.

90. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 430.

91. Ollivant and Chewning, “Producing Victory,” 57–58.

92. Martin and Gracia Burnham were American Christian missionaries 

who were kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf while vacationing in a tourist resort 

in Palawan Island in May 2000. Only Gracia came out alive from the AFP 

rescue effort. See Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf,” 4. 

93. Lecture at Wood Auditorium, Air Command and Staff College 

(ACSC). Found in Walley, “Civil Affairs,” n. p.

94. Ibid., 30.

95. Ibid., 32.

96. Ibid., 31.

97. Ibid., 37.

98. Ibid., 34.
33

99. Ibid.

100. Eckert, “Defeating the Idea,” 19.

101. Ibid., 20.

102. Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation,” 10.

103. Briscoe, “Wanted Dead or Alive,” 28–29.

104. Ibid., 27.

105. Eckert, “Defeating the Idea,” 21.

106. Ibid., 16.

107. Greenberg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection, 15.

108. Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerilla Operations, 23.

109. Greenberg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection, 146.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., 86.

112. Ibid., 108.

113. Ibid., 148.

114. Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerilla Operations, 177.

115. Joes, Modern Guerilla Insurgency, 79.

116. Ibid., 145.

117. Bello, “Counterinsurgency’s Proving Ground,” 162.

118. Ibid., 166–69.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid., 167.

121. Hernandez, “Institutional Response to the Armed Conflict,” 10.

122. Peña, Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy, 42.

123. Ibid.

124. Corpus, Silent War, 108.

125. Devesa, An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology, 36.

126. “SOT is a concept originated by Capt. Alex B. Congmon of the 

Philippine Army designed to dismantle the CPP/NPA political structure in 

one enemy guerilla front. Initially, clearing operations in affected communities involved the killing of insurgents. Years of failed COIN, however, 

made the Philippine Army (PA) realized the importance of dismantling the 

political structure of the insurgents to prevent the continued mobilization 

of mass-base support in the community despite the elimination of key 

leaders of the movement. The PA is primarily responsible in the conduct of 

SOT. SF constitutes the bulk of a team numbering between 7–8 members. 

Members are specially trained in intelligence, PSYOPS, and CMO. See Corpus, Silent War, 189–91.

127. Ibid., 174.

128. Ibid., 175.

129. Ibid., 176.

130. Ibid., 177.

131. Devesa, An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology, 36.

132. Ibid.

133. Peña, Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy, 43.
34

134. Devesa, An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology, 36.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid., 36–37.

137. Peña, Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy, 44.

138. Ibid.

139. Martin and Tuminez, “Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines,” 7.

140. Ibid.

141. Before the 2000 AFP offensive, the MILF had opened the door in 

most of its camps to government officials, diplomats, and journalists. It 

also has posted several Web sites on the Internet to communicate its messages to a broader public. The YouTube archive has a number of video clips 

containing interviews of key MILF personalities. 

142. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 103.

143. Abinales, “American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines,” 2. 

144. Tuminez, “The Past Is Always Present,” 7.

145. Ibid.

146. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 170.

147. Tuminez, “The Past Is Always Present,” 11. 

148. Tuminez, “Ancestral Domain in Comparative Perspective,” 12.

149. Hechter, Containing Nationalism, 136–56.
35

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