Self-Guided Tour 

THE BATTLE OF 

SECOND MANASSAS 

Joseph W. A. Whitehorne 

Center of Military History 

United States Army 

Washington, D.C. 1 990 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Whitd10rn~:. Jo,cph W. A .. 19-U-

'1 he Balik of \ccond \1an'"'a' : ~df guidcd tour I Jo,cph \\ \ . 

Whih:hornc. 

p. em 

I. Bull Run. 2nd Battle of Va. IX62- (itudc-hooh. 

E473.77.W4X lt.ltJO 

lJ73.7'12 -Uc:?O 

1. Title. 

X9 -4XMO 

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Unlc'~ otherwi-.e m:<.IHcd the photo~ u,cd herein arc derived from: Jame~ Long~treet. From 

Manana.\ to Appomallo\ Mem01rs of the Chi/ ~~~r in America. Philadelphia. Lippincou 

Co .. 1K96, Battles and Uculer:. of the Ci1·tl ~~"· New York The Century Co .. 1887; Lt·e 

7bkes Command: From Sc•\'e·n Days to Sewnd Bull Rem. Aleltandria, Va : Timc-L1fe Book~. 

1984: from photos on file at the National Archives. and Record' Adminiwatmn, Washington, 

D.C.; and from the Lihrary of Congre~s. Maps arc by John R. Treiber. 

The cover art for thl\ brochure appear\ in 11att/es and Lc•aders. Vol II It 1\ from an 

cngravang in black and while. for which a color vers1on ha' hccn contributed by the ~1ana,-.a, 

National Battlctield Park 

The quotations in thi' booklet are derived from the followmg 'ources: lluntcr McGuire\ 

Stonewall Jackson; Abmm Smith's Hiswn of the Sel'l'nn -Sctth ReKimem; Ph1hp Cheek and 

Mair Po1nton\ Histon of tire Sauk Coull/\ Rifll'lnen; Rufu, Dawc!>' Ser11ce wah tire Sixth 

Wc.H·on.\111; William Chapman\ "Dixie Battery at 2d ManaS\a\". Daniel Lca,urc\ "Ob,ervation' in the Pope Campaign in Virginia"; Col. David Strother's "Personal RecollectiOn~ of 

the War": Edward McCrady\ "Gregg\ Brigade in the 2d Manassa~": Oliver Bosby~hell\ 

The Fort\·-!;cglcth Regiment in the War; J.G Beatty\ "Second Bull Run"; Marsena Patnek\ 

Journal, William McClendon\ Recollection.\ of War Time ~ Henr; Blake\ Three Years in tht• 

Amn of the• Pmomac; Man an Hayne'' I hi ton· of the Second New Hamp.1l11rt> Regimelll; 

Willt;un Jone,· Diary; George Lewis' History of Batten E. l.~t Rlwdt• /.\land Artillery. 

Jo~cph Polley\ Hood'.1 Tt•w.1 llrixade; Alexander Hunter·~ Blcu• and Gral'; Ph1lip Faulk's "A 

Fighting Regiment ... "; T. F. Shoemaker\ Elmira Wc•t'klv Joumal; Charles Walcott\ 

Hi:.ton of the Ii1·erll\ -First Man·achu.H'/1\ Rc•ximelll. and /'he Official Record of the War of 

the Rel>ellum 

First Printing CMH Pub 70 26 

For 'ale by th~ Sup.:nntcntlcnt ot Document,, lJ S GCl\cmment Pnnting Offi<:c 

wa,hangton, 0 C 20402 
Foreword 

We study our military past not only to draw inspiration from the exploit~ of 

those Amcncan soldiers and their commander~ who went before us. but also to 

sharpen our t..nowlcdge and under~tanding ot the art of war. thereby equipping us 

for the n11litar)" challenges of the future It i~ our belief that the careful study of 

battlefield' \UCh a' Second Mana''"' allows today's military student\ to understand 

better the eomplexllies and inevitable pressures of warfare. It can also provide them 

the chance to reflect on and assess military operations. an opportunity rarely 

attainable in the daily execution of their uaft. This is the third in a \Cries of boot.. let-. 

on American battlefields intended to help soldiers use the past to enhance their 

under~tanding of the Army's future. 

Washington. O.C 

I September 1989 

MICHAEL 0. KRAUSE 

Colonel. USA 

Acting Chief of Military History 

iii 
Introduction 

The conlc~t around Groveton. Ytrginia. on 29 and JO August 1862 \\JS charactcriLed by complex maneuver~ and fighting over the ~ame areas at several dtflerent 

times. New unit\ were funneled mto the battle throughout it-. course. while others 

were rushed from one point to another as the action shifted. As a result. it is not 

possible to cover the ground chronologkally. to follow the sequence of events in an 

orderly manner. Thb lack of order is a reflection of the high level of confusion 

experienced at the tunc. At its simplest. after an engagement the previous night. the 

ftrst full day of the battle may he s;ud to have con-..t,ted of three fierce Federal 

attack' conducted ptec:cmeal against the posuions of Jackson\ corps. then a meettng engagement hetween the divistOil'. of Hood and !latch to the evemng The 

-;econd day was a quiet morning followed by a fierce Federal attack in the afternoon. 

succeeded by an overwhelming Confederate counterattack that soundly defeated 

Maj. Gen. John Pope's army. 

The tour\\ ill go to twelve locations important to a-..pcch of the battle. Although 

it ,., not po-.sible to arrange in -..equem:e the event\ hccau-.c of terrain tn relauon to 

the original episode,. the :-tops have been selcctcJ to help the visitor sec the battle 

developing. The nmrage of the men on both sides was exemplary. but technolog) 

ha., overtaken the tactics they used. Nevertheless. the lessons in leadership. command. the usc ot intelligence. and the performance of men under stress :-hown by 

this battle have a la-..ting value. 

The following "Overview" shou ld be read before taking the tour. Stops are 

keyed to the action described in the Overview. Numbered stops are those 

made by car. "CR" indicates County Road; "SR" indicates State Road. Stops 

with numbers and letters are optional additions to the motor phase of the 

tour. In the Overview name~ of Confederate personnel and unitl> appear in italic 

type. Union personnel and unit~ 111 n:gular type. 

Washington. () C 

I September 1989 

IV 

JOSEPH W. A. \VHITEIIORNE 

Lieutenant Colonel. Reurcd 

Un11ed Statel> Am1y 
Contents 

Page 

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Introduction 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 •• 0 • 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 •• 0 • • 0 • • 0 0 • •••• 0 • • • • • • • • • • iv 

Overview of the Battle 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 •• 0 • 0 0 o 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 1 

Suggested eading~ . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0. 0 . 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 

Chronology . 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 • • 0 0 0 • 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 • 0 • 0 • 0 0 0 •• • 0 0 • 0 0 • •• 0 • • 0 • 19 

Order of Battle 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 

Self-Guided Tour 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 • 0 • 0 0 0 0. 2~ 

Stop !- Pageland Lane .. 0 •• 0 0 • 0 • • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 • • 0 0 • • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 28 

Stop 2-Brawner':- Farm ... 0 • •• 0 • 0 • 0 • 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 •• 0 • 0 0 0 • 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 

StOp :>-Battery ht~ 0 0 0 •• 0 0 • 0 0 •• • 0 0 • 0 0 • •• 0 0 •• 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 33 

Stop 4-Cont'ederate Cemetery 0. 0 0 0. 0 . 0 0. 0 0 0 . 0 . 0 0 . 0 ••• 0 0 0 0. 0. 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 

Stop 5-Railroad Parking Lot .. 0 0 0 0 • 0 • 0 •• 0 • 0 0 0 •••• 0 • 0 • 0 • 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • 41 

Stop 6-Sudlcy Churc h 0 • 0 • 0 • 0 • 0 • 0 0 • • • 0 0 0 0 • 0 • 0 ••• 0 • 0 •• • • •••• • • 0 • 0 • • • • • 50 

Stop 7-Picnic Area 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0. 0. 0 0. 0. 0 0 0 •••• 0. 0 0 0. 0 0 0. 0 0. 0 52 

Stop S-Stonc Ho use 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 • • • 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 53 

Stop 9A- Ncw York Avenue .. . • 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • • •• 0 0 •• 0 • 0 •• • 0 ••••• 0 • 0 • • 0 0 • • 55 

Stop 98 - New York Avenue 0. 0 . 0. 0 •• • 0. 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 • • 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 • • 0 0 0 0. 0 . 0 0 57 

Stop 0-Chinn·~ Ridge . 0. 0. 0 . 0. 0. 0 • • 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 •••• • 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 •• 0 0 . 58 

Stop 11- Henry Hill . . . . .... • 0 ••• 0 0 0 • • •• 0 •• • 0 • ••• 0 0 . 0 0 ••• 0 . 0. 0 0 0. 0 0 0 62 

Stop 12-Stone Bridge 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 ••• 0 0 0 ••• 0. 0. 0. 0. 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0. 0 0 0 0 67 

v 

Overview of the Battle 

In June 1862 President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton were searching for 

a solution to an embarras.,ing deadlock in Virginia. Federal operations in the transAllegheny west had gone relatively well with the capture of Forts Henry and 

Donelson and the standoff at the Battle of Shiloh. By comparison, in the east, 

Northern units had experienced a chain of defeats at rhe hands of Stonewall Jackson 

in the Shenandoah Valley. The superbly equipped and trained Army of the Potomac 

from which so much had been expected was in an apparent stalemate before 

attempting to seize Richmond after inching its way for months up the Peninsula. 

The two civilian leaders brought two western generals to Virginia in the hope of 

reviving the situation. 

The first to arrive was Maj. Gen. John Pope, who was appointed on 26 June 

1862 to command a new creation, the Arn1y of Virginia. This force was composed 

of the various hitherto-independent commands that had operated to such little effect 

in Nonhern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley that spring. Many of the units 

collectively had experienced a severe hammering from Stonewall Jackson while 

others were suffering from lack of discipline and poor leader~hip. General Pope was 

followed on II July by MaJ. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, who was appointed General in 

Chief with directing authority over both Pope and Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, 

commanding the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula. 

The 26 June orders creating the Anny of Virginia specified that it should 

"operate in such manner as while protecting Western Virginia and the national 

capital from danger or insult. it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome 

the rebel Ioree under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of 

Charlouesville and render the most effective aid to relieve Gen. McClellan and 

capture Richmond. ·• 

General Pope knew by the time he received his orders that Jackson had left the 

Valley and was with Let· near Richmond. Thus he saw his mission as covering 

Wa~hington from an) attacks from the direction of Richmond while deploying to 

assure the safety of the Valley He felt fun her that he should position himself to pull 

Southern troops away from Richmond. thus mdirectly aiding McClellan. Pope 

believed these objectives could be met best by concentrating his scattered forces in 

the Sperryville-Warrenton area. Doing so allowed him to safeguard the approaches 

to the Valley. At the same time his position threatened the important railroad and 

depot center at Gordonsville, vinually forcing Lee to send troops from Richmond to 

protect it. 

Bringing his forces together allowed Pope to assess the polyglot units he had 

inherited and to begin establishing teamwork and standards. The Army of Virginia 

needed all the trainmg it could get. There were tensions among the senior officers. 

particularly those from the Army of the Potomac who saw Pope as a threat to their 

idol General McClellan. Staff inexperience was revealed throughout the summer 

campaign by poor march planning, improper terrain appreciation, and disregard of 
Jolm Pope (1822- 1892) wa.f commis· 

sioned in the TopographiCCll Engineers 

Pope receh·ed two bre1·eu for gallamry 

in the Mexican War cmd was promoted 

to brigadier geneml i11 June /86/, assigned to MisJmm. 1/e commanded a 

district. then a do•ision, and firwlly 

the small Army of the Mississippi. He 

achieved promi11e11t mcces:. at Madrid 

and Isla11d No. 10. helping to open the 

Mississippi River. Pope was promoted 

to major general i11 1862 and partici· 

pated in the Corimh Campaign umil 

given command of the 11ew/y created 

Army of Virgmtu in Jtme 1862. After 

the defeat at Second Ma11u.uus, Pope 

was relie1·ed and assi~:ned to the De 

partment of the Northwe.\1. 

logistical aspects. The supply problem was compounded by poor load planning on 

the part of Army of the Potomac units deploying as reinforcements from the 

Peninsula. Many arrived without basic ammunition load~ or critical equipment 

items. The effect of this lack of experience was that Pope's army seemed like a 

balky team. Its movements were slow and were accomplished with great friction. 

Staff work was poor and undeveloped. and the new commander did little to help. 

General Pope was a man of little tact, often discourteous and overbearing. 

arrogant and boastful. A pompous assumption of command address to his overworked troops compared them unfavorably to the men he had led in the West, 

alienating his Easterners permanently. Soon after taking command. Pope had issued 

orde~ that stirred up the civil populace and embittered many Southerners against 

him. The orders authorized foraging. directing Union troops to subsist off the 

country. The intent of the orders apparently was to restrict guerrilla activity but 

seemed more to encourage violence against civilians His actions led General Lee to 

declare that Pope had to be "suppressed." 

Pope's threat to Gordonsville led Lee to send Stonewall Jackson 13- 16 July with 

his and Richard Ewell's Divisions to protect that place. By 27 July. Pope's growing 

stmngth caused Lee to add A. P. Ifill's Division, raising Jackson's force to about 

24,000 men. Lee was able to risk reducing the Richmond defenses because of 

McClellan's inactivity and indications that the Army of the Potomac was preparing 

to leave. These signs included such things as the retrograde of wounded and the 

divc~ion of reinforcements from the Hampton area to Aquia and Alexandria on the 

Potomac. 

On 3 August, General Halleck directed General McClellan to begin his final 

withdrawal from the Peninsula and to return to Northern Virginia to support Pope. 

McClellan protested and did not begin his redeployment until 14 August. The 

situation created an opportunity for General Lee. The removal of the Am1y of the 

2 
Robert E. Lee (1807- 1870) wus in the 

Corps of Engineers and won three gal 

lantn brevN:; 111 the Mexican ~1r He 

was supenmemltllf of WeJt Point 1852-

1855. Lee emered Confederate sen-ice 

20 April/861 AtMser to President 

Jefferson Dcll'ls. commander of the 

Army of Northern Virginia I Jww 1862 

to the md of the war. "Lee ranks 

tmwng the able.\/ field commandus in 

American Hi.1tory. In battle he was imperturbable. lit• enjoved a rare ability 

to command respt>ct and affection from 

his troops. wa.\ a master 111 rlw art of 

field fortificarwm, and possessed an 

uncmmy under.Hcmding of hi.1 opponems." (Freemtm) Let> was presidem of 

~Hhington Cullegt (later Wa.1hingron 

cmd Lee) 111 l.exingron. Virginia, after 

the war umil hi.\ death. 

Potomac as a threat meant that there would be a short period when he could tum on 

Pope's force and actually outnumber it before the merger of the two Federal annies. 

Under these circumstances Pope should have assumed a defensive role from the 

time Halleck had decided to move McClellan, but his flexibility was impeded by 

Halleck's insistence that Pope remain forward along the lines of the Rapidan and 

Rappahannock Rivers. Pope wao; required at first to keep Brig. Gen. Rufu~ King's 

Division at Aqu.a and Fredericksburg to secure the docks there and also to usc other 

parts of his force to keep open the Orange and Alexandria rail line from Culpeper to 

Washington. This extended Pope to the maximum. Even when King was released to 

him on 8 August, Pope still had to hold the river line. Halleck\ insistence on this 

reduced Pope\ planning options and exposed his force unnecessarily. 

Stonewall Jackson noted thh and attempted a move against Pope's forward units; 

however, poor staff work delayed his movements and he collided with Maj. Gen. 

Nathaniel Banks' II Corps of the Army of Virginia. The two men's units fought a 

fierce battle at Cedar Mountain !iOUth of Culpeper on 9 August. Pope's aggressive 

rhetoric and cautious directives had made his Intentions unclear to Banks who, m 

doubt, chose to attack. The battle was a VIrtual draw, but Jackson withdrew a' the 

rest of Pope's force advanced to support the battered Banks. l.ee joined Jackson at 

Gordon1>ville on 15 August, bringing with him by rail the corps of Pope's West Point 

classmate James Long.Hreet. A skeleton Con!Cdcrate force remained in Richmond to 

watch McClellan depart. 

Lee felt the best way for him to assure the full relief of R1chmond was to unite 

his forces and move on Pope. "The disparity of force between the contending forces 

rendered the risks unavoidable." At this point, Lee's united force of about 55.000 

men slightly outnumbered Pope's. He hoped to trap Pope in the triangle fonned 

between the convergence of the Rap1dan and Rappahannock Rivers. Agam. staff 

planning was poor and the Southern forces were slow to take up their attack 

3 
1homas J. ( "Stmtewa/1") Jackson 

( 1824-1863) became tl Confederate ma· 

)or in 1861. Jackson IWH promoted to 

brigadiu f<eneral on 18 Jtme 1861 and 

transferred to the brigade that was to 

share ltis nickname. At First Mtmassas 

his fora ser1·etl as the rttllymg poillf 

for the Confederates. Jackson ll'as pro· 

moted ta major general on 7 October 

/861 anc/ ossiRrted to command the Va[. 

ley DiMrict, whert• he performed brilliamlv Jackson JOined Lee at Richmond 

in 1862 where lte did not perform as 

MtCces.ifully. Ills greatest momems 

were ll'hen lte t•njored independence. m 

during the flank march around Pope at 

Suomi Marws.ws in Auf<USI 1862 and 

It is capture of Harpers Fan· and ruslt 

tc1 Sharpsburg during the Afllil'ftlm 

Campmgn 111 September. Jackson was 

promoted to lh•utt•nam gnzeral on 10 

October 1862 

positions. While this was taking place, on 18 August a patrol from the 1st Michigan 

Cavalry encountered Maj. Gt•n. 1 E. 8. Stuarl's headquarters group at Verdiersville 

and made off with a copy of Lee's plan. Pope made usc of the inforn1ation to 

withdr.t~A s"-tllfull} north of the Rappahannock on the night of 18 19 August, basing 

himself in WaJTcnton. Lee unsuccessfully probed Pope's flanks along the river for 

the next several days 

J. F.. B. Stuart led a retaliatory raid against Pope's headquarters then at Catlett's 

Station during the night of 22-23 August. The Confederate cavalry made off with, 

among other thmgs. Pope\ dispatch book. From it Lee learned of lhe Arm} of 

Virginia's disposittons as well as the expe<.:ted rate of reinforcement from the Army 

of the Potomac. Pope's letters also revealed his plan to remain on the defensive until 

his strength grew. 

Lee decided he had to break the stalemate along the Rappahannock quickly 

before he wa~ overwhelmmgly outnumbered. All the major fords along the swollen 

river were well covered, with most of Pope's army concentrated ~tween Sulphur 

Springs and Warrenton. The Federal right was at Waterloo, six miles northwest of 

Warrenton. Lee saw only one chance to change the situation. "If one runs great 

risks, it is for the purpose of gaining great advantages." He thus spht hb forces and 

sent Jackson's force completely around Pope's northern flank. His objecttve was to 

bring about a decisive battle in which the advantages of position would be hts, 

forcing Pope to fight on his terms .. He knew from the captured papers lhat Pope was 

being controlled from wa,hington. which control required him to keep links to 

Aquia and along the nver line, thus tmpairing his initiative and freedom of action. 

Lee also was aware of the internal command problems and lack of cohesiveness in 

Pope's army and wanted to take advantage of them while he had the chance. 

Jackson's move would compel Pope to give up the river line to safeguard his rear, 

thus 'preading confusion and creating the opportunity for an engagement on terms 

4 
favorable to the Confederates. 

Jackson did not tell his senior commanders his plans, but merely started his 

corps moving after a conference with Lee, Longstreet. and Stuart. He left behind his 

quartermaster and subsistence trains, but brought along his cattle herd, ordnance, 

and ambulance trains. The men were ordered to carry three days' rations and 

foraging was allowed. The route to be followed was selected by Jackson's chief 

engineer Capt. 1 Keith Boswell and screened by cavalry raised in the region. 

The March Around Pope-A prototypical airborne assaulr. 

At first light on 25 August, Boswell led Jackson's force out of Jeffersonton on 

the road to Amissville. Ewell's Division was in the lead. followed by A. P. Hill's and 

then Taliaferro's. The column turned northeast just pass Amissville, crossing the 

Hedgeman River at Henson's MiU. Once across, elements of the 2d Virginia 

Cavalry moved ahead to screen the line of march. The main body trudged by way of 

Orleans and Thumb Run Church toward Salem (modem Marshall). The issue of 

rations to Jtlckson's men had been uneven. Departure was so early that some men 

had been unable to cook their three-days' supply; others had eaten their full issue by 

the end of the first day. Thereafter, green com and apples foraged along the way 

were the staple ration. The head of the column closed into bivouacs about a mile 

south of Salem at sunset. Later that night, Col. Thomas T. Munford with the rest of 

his 2d Virginia Cavalry Regiment rode into town and bedded down. There had been 

no encounters with the enemy the entire day. Longstreet's Corps smoothly supplanted Jackson's units along the Rappahannock, sustaining the illusion of a strong 

Confederate presence with artillery duels and aggressive patrolling. Late in the 

afternoon of the twenty-fifth Lee sent Stuart with all his cavalry eastward to 

rendezvous with Jackson. Doing so deprived Longstreet of any reconnaissance 

capability. 

General Pope on his side continued to array his forces on the defensive along the 

Rappahannock River line. The dust from Jackson's column had been noted and 

reported by Federal cavalry and signal stations. The Federal headquarters dismissed 

the information as indicating a Confederate withdrawal into the Shenandoah Valley. 

Major General Fitz-John Porter's and Maj. Gen. Samuel Heintzelman's Corps 

arrived during the day as reinforcements from the Army of lhe Potomac. Heintzelman's men especially were underequipped because of poor load planning incident to 

their move from the Peninsula. They did not have their corps reserve stocks with 

them; consequently. the infantry units carried only the minimum basic ammunition 

load. Porter's Fifth Corps had marched up the Rappahannock from Aquia and had 

considerable difficulty discovering its final destination. Pope had failed to send 

guides or guidance to the corps commander while he was en route. 

Jackson renewed his advance early on 26 August. The most likely blocking 

position on the next day's route was Thoroughfare Gap. Accordingly, Jackson 

hastened Munford's Regiment forward at dawn to hold it. The horsemen found the 

Gap unoccupied, and the infantry followed them through White Plains to the Gap 

and on to the village or Haymarket. The dust covered Jackson's troops, and his 

officers continually pressed the infantrymen to stay closed up and to keep up the 

pace. As the column entered Gainesville. it was joined by J. E. B. Stuart and the rest 

5 
Wrldetn~s · 

6 
of his cavalry division. The presence of the larger cavalry force aJlowcd a relaxation 

in the march discipline. Jackson then headed south from Gainesville to Bristoe 

Station located on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, Pope's line of communication. His cavalry van arrived at sunset in time to interdict three Federal supply trains 

after tearing up the tracks and cutting the telegraph wires. Isaac 7Nmble's brigade of 

Ewell's Division along with Stuart's cavalry advanced eastward along the railroad 

later that night to the Federal supply depot at Manassas Junction. They secured that 

place by 2400, taking over 300 prisoners in the process. 

In the meantime Longstreet's wing had begun to follow Jackson's forces, pulling 

out of its Rappahannock positions by midmorning and leaving only Brig. Gen. R. 

H. Anderson's Division to divert Pope. Lee and Longstreet had considered forcing 

the river crossings and reuniting with Jackson by the most direct route but disregarded doing so as impracticable. Moving somewhat more cautiously because of 

the absence of cavalry, Longstreet camped lhe night of the twenty-sixth at Orleans, 

II miles from his starting point. 

Continued cavalry reports of these movements to the northwest persuaded 

General Pope to send out on the afternoon of the twenty-sixth a larger cavalry force 

under Brig. Gen. John Buford to investigate. The Army of Virginia was still 

deployed to defend the Rappahannock crossings. Major General Irvin McDowell's 

I1l Corps had one division (Ricketts') four miles from Warrenton on the Waterloo 

Road, one (Reynolds') in Warrenton, and one (King's) around Sulphur Springs. The 

forward divisions continued to engage the Confederates with artillery. Major General Franz Sigel's I Corps remained camped around Warrenton and Maj. Gen. 

Nathaniel Banks' 11 Corps, still recovering from the 9 August fight near Culpeper, 

was at Fayetteville (modem Opal). Heintzelman's III Corps was joined by Reno's 

small corps near Pope's headquarters at Warrenton Junction. Morrel's 1st Division 

of Porter's V Corps was at Kelly's Ford on the lower Rappahannock, while Porter's 

other division, commanded by Maj. Gen. George Sykes. was 6 miles east of 

Bealeton along the railroad. Some of Buford's scouts early in the evening reported a 

large force moving through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains, well to 

the northeast. This information, plus loss of communications to the east along the 

railroad. led General Pope about 2000 to direct his forces to redeploy to the 

Gainesville area. Preparations went on through the night but there was little 

movement until the next day. 

Very early on the twenty-seventh, Jackson sent A. P. Hill's and Taliaferro's 

Divisions to consolidate Trimble's and Stuart's hold on the vast Manassas supply 

dumps. Ewell's Division with its three brigades was left at Bristoe as a rear guard 

with orders to fall back on the main force if hard pressed. The main force in the 

meantime devoted itself to helping itself to the tons of Federal supplies in the dumps 

and box cars at the Manassas junction. 

About 1000 the New Jersey Brigade of Slocum's Division, VI Corps, approached Manassas under Brig. Gen. George Taylor, east from the direction of 

Union Mills. Jackson ultimately deployed most of A. P. Hill's Division to confront 

this threat. The veteran Jerseymen detrained north of the railroad bridge and 

advanced toward Manassas, apparently expecting to disperse a raiding force. They 

gallantly pressed against Hill's fire until forced to retreat about 1100 with heavy 

7 
James Longstreet (1821- 1904} wt1s 

serving as a paymaster at the wne he 

resigned hi.s commission and entered 

Confederate service I June 1861 as a 

brigadier gmeml. He commanded a 

brigade at First Manassas, eaming 

promotion and division command m 

October /861. He led his unit with distinction during the Peninsula battles. 

His performance led General Lee to 

place him in command of one of the 

wings of Iris army during the Pope 

campaign all(/ at Amietam. Longstreet 

fought at fh•derickshurg, Gettysburg. 

cmd Chickamauga. Wounded at the 

Wilderness 111 Ma\' /864. LOIIKStreet 

returned to duty in October. when he 

sen·ed in the defense of Richmond and 

Petersburg until the end of the war. 

losses. General Taylor was mortally wounded, pleading with his officers "for God's 

sake to prevent another Bull Run." The Confederate infantry pursued up to the 

railroad bridge, then returned to join in the ransacking of the depot, while Rebel 

cavalry pressed the hapless Federals all the way back to Fairfax Courthouse. 

At sundown Ewell brought his division back to Manassas after contending briskl> 

at Bristoe with Hooker's Diviston of Heintzelman's Corps throughout the afternoon. 

The full Confederate force evacuated Manassas Junction late that night after destroying everything it could not eat or carry away. Each of the Confederate divisions 

took different routes to their new location on the old battlefield 7 miles to the north 

of Manassa~. '10/iaferro moved directly north up the Sudlcy Springs Road. A. P. Hill 

crossed Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford and marched to Centreville where at 1000 on 

the twenty-eighth he turned west on the Warrenton Pike to the old battlefield. Ewell, 

the last to leave, also crossed at Blackburn's Ford, but then followed the north bank 

of Bull Run until he reached the bridge on the Warrenton Pike where he also turned 

westward onto the old battlefield. The march was attended with some confusion as 

Jackson had not been clear as to his plans or his corps' destination. The multiple 

routes also thoroughly confused General Pope as to his enemy's location and 

intentions. 

Longstreet continued his progress eastward throughout the twenty-seventh. A 

Federal cavalry patrol rode into his van during a midday rest stop at Salem. Buford's 

blue horsemen aggressively demonstrated. threatening Lee and his headquarters. 

then pulled out of town. The size and intentions of the Fedeml cavalry force could 

not be determined by Longstreet without cavalry of his own. Consequently, the 

Confederate move thereafter was even more cautious than before, arriving at White 

Plains late at night for its second halt. 

Pope's forces had begun moving about 0800 on the twenty-seventh. McDowell's 

and Sigel's Corps moved to the vicinity of New Baltimore and Buckland Mills. At 

8 
the Iauer place, Brig. Gen. Robert Milroy's Brigade saved the bridge from destruction by Confederate cavalry in a brisk fire fight. Late in the day, Milroy's Brigade 

and another of Sigel's units, Brig. Gen. Carl Schurz's Division, moved eastward 

into Gainesville. Reno's Corps, along with Kearny's Division deployed to Greenwich to be in a supporting position. Major General Joseph Hooker began moving 

his division early in the day eastward down the railroad. This was the unit that 

collided at 1400 at Kettle Run near Bristoe Station with Ewell's Division, which it 

pressed back effectively until Ewell withdrew. 

Pope arrived at Bristoe Station that night. He assumed Jackson was "in the bag'' 

at Manassas and directed his forces to concentrate there. He thus removed them 

from excellent blocking positions, opening the way for the rest of the Confederate 

Arn1y to join Jackson in the vicinity of Groveton. His plan overlooked the need to 

keep Lee's two wings separated. The Gainesville position was key and should have 

been held until Southern deployment and intentions were understood fully. Earlier, 

General McDowell had placed his and Sigel's units around Haymarket and Gainesville and as far west as New Baltimore. He also had sent out the cavalry forces that 

caused Lee and Longstreet problems, incidentally confirming their imminent arrival. On his own responsibility, about 1500, he forwarded James B. Ricketts' Division 

to block Thoroughfare Gap while probing eastward with another division looking 

for Jackson. He seemed to be forming a realistic picture of the situation. However, 

later McDowell had to redeploy in response to Pope's orders, leaving Ricketts 

behind, unsupported. The forces of Porter, Reno. and Heintzelman were concentrated at Bristoe by midmorning of the twenty-eighth. Banks' Corps guarded the 

army's trains at Catlett Station. 

Contact Regained 

Jackson's command was reunited by 1200 on 28 August in the vicinity of the 

junction of the Warrenton Pike and the Sudley Springs Road. Later he moved it 

farther northwest past the hamlet of Groveton in response to reports of Federal troop 

movements. The Confederates established themselves on a ridge running southwest 

to northeast, which was protected on its eastern side by the trenches and banks of an 

unfinished railroad. The position promised to allow linkage with Longstreet's Corps 

approaching from Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville. It also provided access to the 

Aldie Gap, eight miles to the northwest, as an escape route if the two wings of Lee's 

army failed to connect. It was an excellent defensive position from which to 

challenge Pope's forces. Jackson's men rested in the summer shade while Pope's 

Divisions sought them out. Finally. late in the day Stonewall saw the right moment 

to reveal his presence and bring on the battle envisaged by General Lee. 

The Federal movements throughout the day had been floundering and cumbersome. In McDowell's area, General Sigel misunderstood the orders requiring his 

left flank to move along the east-to-west Manassas Gap Railroad, instead plunging 

southward to align on the more north-to-south Orange and Alexandria Railroad. 

Sigel further impeded the movement of McDowell's elements with his trains. which 

he had retained despite orders to the contrary. Reynolds' Division finally headed 

east from Gainesville along the Warrenton Pike in midmorning. About 1000 it 

encountered a Confederate brigade led by Brig. Gen. Bradley T Johnson of Taliafer9 
m·, l>mwon. Jackson·., Corp.\, ncar the JUnction of the Pike and Pageland Lane. 

Reynolds deployed ~1cade\ Brigade with a bauer}. and a bri'k exchange of fire 

ensued until Jolumm bmke contact. Reynoltb assumed he had brushed a rcconnais-

''"Ke Ioree and proceeded down Pageland Lane tm1.ard Maruts-.a\ as ordered 

without laking further act Jon. 

Meanwhile U.S. cavalry p1eh.cd up Conl'l!derate ~traggll!r!. on the road to Centreville. General Pope weighl!d the inforrn<~tion of Jackwn\ mulliplc tleparture 

routes and decided that his opponent was at Centreville. Accordingly. about 1200 he 

i-.sucd new order-. directing everyone to move on that village. Hemttclman '1> Corp~ 

slogged tlirectly through Manas\as Junction. Kearny. in the lead, reached Centn:\'ilk late in the afternoon, m tum: to engage brietly a reg1rncnt of Confederate 

ca\'alry screening the Warrenton P1kc west of the village. Reno\ Corps bivouacked 

~tween Centreville and Blm.:kburn \ hml while Pope -;et up\\ 11h Hooker's D1vision 

ncar the Ford. Elsewhere, Sigel 'tartcd north on the Sudley Springs Road. en route 

to Centreville. McDowell <,p(it his corps. Reynolds continuing down Pageland Lane 

while Brig. Gen. Rufus King. just turned off the Pike. wa' ordered to backtrack and 

head west on the Pike ibelf toward Centreville. 

Late in the afternoon Pope had learned from McDowell of l.ongstreet'':> presence 

at White Plain~. but ~till assumed he h;~d ~ufficient lime to deal with Jackson alone. 

l'hl\ would not pn>\'C 10 be the ca,e. however. Longstreet had moved out early on 

the t\\enty-~eventh. h1-. lead umt-. r~?achmg Thoroughfare Gap by 1500. There. Brig. 

Gen.(, 7: Anderson's GMrgw Bngade encountered Rickeus· 1:edcrals blocking the 

passage While John B. Hood's 7i.•\w Brigade probed localtr:ul\ to support Anderlon and to flank the Federal\, Wilco.\ · s Dil·ision made a longer flankmg movement 

through llopcwcll Gap three mite ... to the north. Hood\ force Mlccceded in turning 

R1ckctts' llank about sunset. forcing him w withdraw. Hy 22<X) the bulk of 

l.oiiKJtreet's force had moved through the Gap and was in camps as far east as 

llaymarkct. 

Well before that. Jackson had revealed hi::. position to prevent what he a~sumed 

wa ... a general Federal Withdrawal to the Centreville area King\ Division had 

.,uccccded m reversing it)> course and by 1700 was headmg east on the Warrenton 

Pike. unknowingly proceeding acros'> Jackson's right nan h. and front. near Brawner\ F-arm. a mile west of Groveton Naturally ignorant of the absence of Federal 

coordination. Jackson as-.urned King wa-. Pope's north flank guard and had to be 

attacked before the whole Federal Ioree escaped. The cnsumg fight wa-. one of the 

mo~t brutal of the war. Two of Jack.1on' 'f. Di,·isions engaged in a \lugging match 

with Brig. Gen. John Gibbon's Brigade anti clements of Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday's. Each l>ide valiantly exchanged volleys in the growing darkness. sometimes at 

ranges of 100 yards or less. Losses were high on both sides. but especially damaging 

10 Jackson was the wounding of two division commander~. £11•('// .md TtJ!iaferro. 

The fightmg died down b) about 2100. By that time, however. S1gel and Reynolds 

had moved to the sound of the gun-.. brushed aside !>Ome of Jackson\ vedettes and 

set up on the old battlefield north and ~outh of Henry Hill 

Generab King and Ricketts. out of touch with each other and thc1r superiors. 

had experienced a rough handlmg from larger Confetlerate force'>. Neither knew 

what Pope's intentions were nnd both were unable to find General McDowell. their 

10 
Pope·.~ Mm, irt the rain 011 the march from Warremon toward ManassaJ. (Skrtch by 

Edwin Forbel in Library of Congre.u) 

corps commander. He had gone to confer with Pope. got lo~t in the woods. and did 

not appear again until the following morning. The importance of their position wa~ 

not apparent to either general. Consequently. in the absence of any guidance both 

decided, on their own. to withdraw, Ricketts moving to Bristoe Station and King to 

Manassas. 

The way was now fully clear for Lonxsrreet to reunite with Jackson. Pope. 

however, continued to disregard Lo11x.Hreet's presence. Instead, he read into the 

facts on hand his own version of reality. He considered A P. Hill's withdrawal 

westward from Centreville to be an indicator that Jackson was retreating. He learned 

of the Brawner's Farm fight by 2100 and again assumed it was the rcarguard action 

of a retreating enemy. As a result. he changed his orders again. directing all his 

forces to head for the old Manassas Battlefield to go in for the kill on Jackson's 

presumably retreating force. 

By this time most of the Federal units had been marching hither and yon since 

late on the twenty-sixth without rations or a clear idea of their objective. Pope 

ignored their plight, compounding their problems with poor staff work. An example 

of this with serious consequences was the orders to General Porter. He was directed 

on the afternoon of 28 August to move his corps then at Bristoe to the old battlefield 

by way of Centreville. Porter complied, but, when his force had reached Blackbum's rord on the morning of 29 August, Pope told him to tum about and move to 

Gaine~ville by way of Manassas. This was Pope's reaction to the news of King and 

Ricketts' withdrawal. Earlier. it will be seen, Pope had directed Sigel on the old 

battlefield to fix Jackson until everyone ehe could converge. 

Porter got as far as Dawkin 's Branch about two miles northwest of Manassas 

Junction about 1100. 29 Augu~t. He had in the meantime rendezvoused with 

General McDowell. The two men then received an additional order addressed 

jointly to them from Pope, which told them to get to Gainesville, to link with the 

II 
Jackson's Me11, seizi11g Union suppltes at Mtmassas Depot, 27 August. (From Battles 

and Leaders) 

forces to the north, to be prepared to fall back on Centreville, and to use their own 

discretion . Porter chose to remain in place observing a growing Confederate force 

in front of him. McDowell took his corps northward on the Sudley Springs Road to 

try to establish contact. nellher general clear as to what he should do. Pope was 

continuing l<l focus exclusively on Jackson while ignoring the growing evidence that 

Longstreet was nearby. 

Battle Joined 

The twenty-ninth of August had opened hot and bright with Sigel's Corps 

(Schenck's Division, Schurz's Division, and Milroy's Brigade) bivouacked in the 

vicinity of the Sudley Springs Road Warrenton Pike. Reynolds' Division was 

farther south near the old village of New Market. He had sent patrols nearly as far 

west as Groveton. General Sigel, responding to Pope\ orders to fix the allegedly 

fleeing Jackson. quickly pressed an attack. By 0500 on 29 August all the forces at 

his disposal were in a movement to contact. Jackson was hardly leaving. His forces 

were set up in the positions he had selected along the old railroad bed and the ridge 

behind it The Confederate right starting around Brawner's Farm was occupied by 

Jackson's old division, now commanded by Brig. Gen. William E. Starke. who had 

replaced the wounded Taliaferro. The center was defended by Ewell's Di,•ision, 

commanded now by Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton in place of the grievously 

wounded Ewell. The left, or northern, Clank was held by A. P. Hill's Light Division 

almost up to the Sudley Springs. 

The Federals attacked all along the line. Nowhere had they built depth enough to 

exploit any local succel.ses. Neither were their assaults coordinated sufficiently to 

12 
Georgians .from Longstreet's Corps, fighting their way through nzorouglifare Gap, 

28 August. (From Manassas to Appomattox) 

support each other. As a result, Jackson was able to move reserves Lo each 

threatened point without concern for any gaps he may have created. These disjointed efforts were well fought at the unit level and did succeed in pressing 

Jackson's men back into their main lines along the oJd railroad. By 1000, the Federal 

forces were exhausted and Sigel called a halt for reorganization and to await 

reinforcements. 

About the same time, Longstreet's Corps had arrived and was moving into line 

south of Jackson's position. It had made contact with Stuart's Cavalry early in the 

morning between Haymarket and Gainesville. Elements of the cavalry deployed on 

Longstreet's southern flank, enabling him to move his force rapidly to the sound of 

the guns with less concern for security. A little after 1000 Hood's Division came into 

Jackson's view and deployed to the right of his corps in line on both sides of the Pike 

just east of its intersection with Pageland Lane. Hood's Batteries and the Washington Artillery deployed on Jackson's immediate right to provide him additional fire 

support. Wilcox's Division was echeloned to Hood's left rear north of the Pike while 

Kemper's Division was echeloned to his right rear southward. D. R. Jones' Division 

extended from Kemper's farther south across the Manassas Gap Railroad and 

Robertson's Cavalry Brigade screened toward Manassas. 

It was these forces that Porter had noted as his lead division (Morell's) approached Dawkin's Branch. Ironically, each was arriving on the scene at about the 

same time. Porter was possibly inspired to greater cauLion not realizing that part of 

the large dust cloud he noted was caused by Stuart's cavalry dragging bushes on the 

roads to deceive any observers and to give D. R. Jones more time to get in place. 

Porter immediately set up a skirmish line and deployed some of his artillery, which 

13 
exchanged tire with the Confederates for the rest of the day. His presence bred 

sufficient caution in Longstreet twice to contest successfully Lee's suggestion that 

he launch a corps attack. At 1800 Pope in tum directed Porter to launch an attack, 

but then later changed his mind and ordered Porter to the main battle instead, still 

ignoring Longstreet's presence. 

While this drama had been going on to the south, the pressure on Jackson had 

been renewed dangerously. Pope arrived on the scene from Centreville about noon. 

bringing with him Heintzelman's Corps (Kearny's and Hooker's Divisions) and 

Reno's Corps (Reno's and Stevens' Divisions). The fresh troops deployed from the 

Stone House area into the northern part of the line. While they were doing this, 

elements of Schurz's Division attacked at 1200 and seized and held part of the old 

railroad until relieved by Heinuelman's Corps about 1400 Several hours of regrouping and rest followed before the assaults were renewed. Then Pope directed 

Heintzelman to attack with both his divisions. Unfortunately, the assault was again 

uncoordinated. At 1600 Grover's Brigade of Hooker's Division made a legendary 

bayonet assault against the center of Jackson's line. Five hundred men were lost in 

20 minutes to no avail because lack of reserves prevented exploitation of the Federal 

penetration and Grover was forced to withdraw. Two hours later Kearny's Division 

with Stevens' Division in support finally launched its attack against Jackson's 

extreme left (north). The Federals threatened to roll up that part of the line held by 

Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg's S.C. Brigade of A. P. Hill's Division, but were stopped 

and repulsed by Lawton's and Early's Brigades of Ewell's Division hustled from 

less threatened portions of the Confederate line. 

As this fighting was dying down, General McDowell arrived with his lead 

division. Hatch's (fonnerly King's). with Ricketts' Division about an hour behind. 

Pope was convinced that some adjustments Jackson was making to his line presaged 

a withdrawal. Thus at 1730 he ordered Hatch to pursue. Ironically, at the same time 

General Lee had suggested a probe of some sort to Longstreet. The latter agreed to a 

reconnaissance by Hood's Di~·ision. Thus. about 1830 Hatch's Division collided 

with Hood's in the vicinity of Groveton. Fighting endured around the crossroads 

until about 2015, when Hatch was compelled to withdraw. Reynolds' Division south 

of the Pike had been prevented from supporting effectively by Longstreet's artillery. 

Pope continued to ignore news of Long.Hreet's presence in strength, treating Porter's 

evidence on his arrival from Dawkin's Br'anch merely as excuses for the latter\ 

inactivity. The redeployment of Porter on the evening of the twenty-ninth meant that 

Longstreet was free for the next day, despite Pope's fatuous assessment of the day's 

events as a great victory. In fact, Confederate strength had grown further with the 

arrival about 2400 of R. H. Anderson's Division from the old Rappahannock line. 

The thirtieth of August also dawned hot and dry as both armies eyed each other 

warily. About 0800 Federal artillery opened up vigorously and Maj. S.D. Lee's ISgun battalion wa-; wheeled onto the right of Jackson's line to reply. Within an hour 

firing on both sides died down in favor on an uncanny summer morning silence. Lee 

and his corps commanders conferred at his command post on a hill near the corps 

coordinating point. They concluded that the Federals had had enough and the battle 

was probably over. They discussed plans for what to do next before the officers 

returned to the commands. Then, at noon, additional Federal artillery began rolling 

14 
Ponton Bridge on Blackburn's Ford, 1862. 

into view followed by waves of infantry. Obviously, another attack loomed. 

Pope planned to attack Jackson's position on the nonh side of the Warrenton 

Pike . He left only Reynolds' Division to secure his left flank opposite Longstreet, 

whose presence he continued to disregard . General Porter was to conduct the main 

attack with Hatch's and Morell's Divisions while Heintzelman's Corps supported on 

the right (nonh). At 1500 the two divisions with Sykes' in suppon commenced the 

main attack, with Butterfield's Brigade of Morell's Division to the south. The first 

Federal wave actually reached Jackson's desperate defenders along the old railroad 

bed. More waves approached and Jackson signaled to Lee that he needed help. 

Longstreet had been siting up the situation on Jackson's flank. He directed Stephen 

D Lee's eighteen guns to enfilade the advancing Federals about the same time he 

received orders from Lee to help Jackson. This fire from their left (south) quickly 

shattered the Federal lines, forcing them to withdraw. Meanwhile. Heintzelman's 

units fought briskly with A. P. Jli/1\ to the nonh. About 1530 Pope directed 

Reynolds to leave his position on Chinn\ Ridge south of the Pike and move to back 

up Poncr\ shattered divisions. Reynolds objected to no avail. His departure left 

only Warren's Brigade (Sykes' Division), supporting a single battery. south of the 

Pike to confront Longstreet. Warren on his own had moved into a position previously occupied by Reynolds when the latter had shifted to Chinn's Ridge on orders 

from General McDowell. 

Almost simultaneously, Lee and Longstreet saw their opportunity. The latter was 

giving orders for his whole line to advance about the time he received orders from 

Lee to do ~o . About 1545 umgsrreet's Corps attacked. pivoting on Jackson's 

position. Lee ordered Jackson .. to look out for and protect his [l.ong.street's] left 

flank. " Hood's Division advanced at the pivot along an axis fonned by the Pike 

while Longstreet's other units attacked in a great arc nonh-nonheast. Hood made 

contact within 150 yards of his start but quickly overwhelmed the fierce resistance 

offered by Warren's little brigade a few hundred yards southeast of Groveton. Pope 

15 
Ambrose P. Hill (1825-/865) was commissioned i11 the Artillery; Hill saw 

service in the Seminole Wars and the 

Mexican War. He resigned his commission m1d emered Confederate service 

as colonel, 13th Virginia lnfamry, on 

1 March 1861. He served with his regimeflt ar First Manassas and was promoted to brigadier general in February 

1862 His dynamic brigade leadership 

in the defense of Williamsburg and 011 

the Peninsula led to his promotion to 

major general and command of the 

Light Division on 26 May 1862 . He and 

his unit performed well at Cedar MouiiJain. Seco11d Manassas. and A11tietam. 

He briefly replaced the fallen Jackson 

at Chancellorsvil/e until wounded. Hill 

was promoted to /ieuterumt general on 

23 May 1863 and given command of a 

newly created corps. 

was to be fortunate in the quality of fighting demonstrated by those of his units 

hurled in to oppose Longstreet. 

Hood advanced a few hundred yards farther, where he was resisted by Anderson's Brigade and Kerns' Battery of Reynolds' Division, caught while shifting to the 

north. Jackson's tired force had not pressed at the same pace, allowing the Federal 

buildup of an artillery line to remain north of the Pike. This fire greatly impeded 

Hood's progress as he approached Chinn's Ridge (Bald Hill) and ultimately prevented any significant Confederate moves north of the Pike. 

The developing crises were recognized quickly by McDowell and Pope. While 

Warren and Anderson sacrificed themselves. the generals rushed units to Chinn's 

Ridge and to Henry Hill. Sigel covered the withdrawal of Porter's Corps. concurrently sending two brigades from Schurz's Division south of the Pike. These were 

reinforced by two brigades from Ricketts' Division marched down from the northem edge of the battlefield. A desperate battle developed on Chinn's Ridge as wave 

after wave of Federals. each arriving just in time, beat back the attacking Confederates. By this time, Kemper's and D. R. Jones' Divisions had supplanted Hood's. The 

time bought on Chinn's Ridge allowed Milroy's Brigade. Reynolds' Division, and 

Sykes· Division to establish themselves in a defensive position along the Sudley 

Springs Road on the west side of Henry Hill. 

The Confederates pushed the last Federal defender off Chinn's Ridge about 1800 

and charged against this final Federal line. The approach of D. R. Jones' Division 

from the south forced the Federals to extend and refuse their southern flank. Their 

line held, however. These defenders were relieved by elements of Reno's Corps 

about 1930. They repulsed one final Confederate effort in the darkness. Then, about 

2030, all was quiet except for the groans of the injured. Pope ordered Banks at 

Bristoe to save what trains he could and to evacuate. He also directed his forces at 

16 
hand to withdraw to Centreville, which they did in reasonably good order. Schurz's 

Division was the last out, leapfrogging rearward from high ground to high ground. 

It vacated a final bridgehead west of the Bull Run Bridge at 2300. destroying the 

bridge itself two hours later. 

The Second Battle of Manassas was over. In an aftershock at Chantilly on I 

September Kearny and Stevens were killed. But then Pope's battered anny withdrew 

to the safety of the defenses of Washington and Lee's thoughts shifted to consider an 

invasion of Maryland to seal his summer triumphs. In less than three weeks he was 

to fight the great battle of Antietam. quickly overshadowing the achievements and 

failures on the Plains of Manassas. 

Discussion 

The operational lapses shown by both forces reflect the greenness of the two 

opposing annies. These lapses underline the point that the most able commander is 

constrained in his achievements by the quality, training. and professionalism of the 

units he commands. Armie~ grow; they cannot be created on demand. Robert E. 

Lee's leadership and command relationships developed a much greater responsivem:ss in his force. The rank and file on both sides were equally sound. The difference 

between the two armies lay in the quality of their senior leaders and how they dealt 

with each other. Ironically. aspects of trust affected both forces. Pope lost at Second 

Manassas because he refused to trust his subordinates; Lee lost a chance for a 

decisive blow on 29 August because he trusted Longstreet's cautious judgment too 

much. 

General Lee capitalized on the strengths of the Army of Northern Virginia and 

its leaders, completely reversing the strategic situation in a matter of months. 

Seemingly trapped between McClellan and Pope at Richmond. he took advantage of 

the opportunities offered by federal mistakes to relieve that city while moving to 

threaten his enl!my's capital. TI1is shift further reserved to the Confederacy for 

another ~cason the assets of a large part of Virginia hitherto occupied. It also paved 

the way for Lee\ first inva'iion of the North as he retained the strategic initiative. 

The hapless Pope was relieved shortly thereafter and sent to command a 

department in Minnesota and the Dakotas. His brief career in command of the Army 

of Virginia is pitilessly summarized by the historian of the U.S. n Corps. ''The 

braggart who had begun his campaign with insolent reflections . . . had been 

kicked, cuffed. hustled about, knocked down. run over. and trodden upon as rarely 

happens in the history of war. His communications had been cut; his headquarters 

pillaged; a corps had marched into his rear. and had encamped at its ease upon the 

railroad by which he received his supplies; he had been beaten or foiled in every 

attempt he had made to 'bag' those defiant intruders; and, in the end, he was glad to 

find a refuge in the entrenchments of Washington." Understanding the fatlures of 

this not unable but flawed leader may ~ the most valuable legacy of Second 

Manassas. 

17 
Suggested Readings 

The Battle of Second Manas~as has not attracted as much attention from 

historian~ a~ have many other Civil War engagement!>. A few books have been 

published on Pope's Campaign 1n the summer of 1862. Many able authors have 

provided chapter' on the battle in larger works. However. dispanties in fact. 

interpretatiOn'>. and opinion indicate that the world is still waiting for a definitive 

~tudy. The memoir<; of individual<. anu units that partictpated in the operations often 

provide good mcidental informatiOn. hut '>hould not be accepted Without corroboration. The Official Record of the ~~1r oftlw Rebellion. Serie:-. I. Vol. 12, Pan II. ts 

ind1spcns<1ble . 

Rope:-., John C., The Armv Under Popl'. New York: C. Scribner and Son~. 1881. 

One of the few work~ devoted exclusively to the Army of Virginia. Despite its age, 

it remains a balanced. detailed narrative. 

Gaff. Alan D .. Brave Men·., Tears: Th£• Iron Brigad£' at Hrall'ner's Farm. 

Dayton. Ohio: Morningside House. Inc .. 1985. An excellent, detailed account of 

the opcnmg phase of the battle. 

tootc. Shelby, The Cn·il War. A Narrmh·e. Vol. I. Fort Sumter to Perr_n ·il/e, 

New YorJ...: Random House , 1958 Chapter 6 places the camp:ugn m its strategic 

'>Citing and provides a dramatic narrative of the battle. 

18 
29 August 1862 

0500 Sigel's Corps with Reynold'~ Divi~ion pre~sed westward and became engaged in a ~eric~ of disjointed attack> against Jackson\ 

position along the railroad. 

1000 Sigel called off auack~. 

0900-1000 LongMreet's Corp~ began arriving SI)Uth of Jackson's line and 

completed its deployment about 

1100 

Hood\ Division was on both 

sides of the turnpike near Pageland Lane. Wilcox's Division 

wa~ echeloned 10 his lefl rear, 

while Kemper's Divi\ion wa, 

cchdoned to his right rear. D. R. 

Jones' Division extended from 

Kemper's farther south across 

the Manassa> Gap Railroad and 

Robemon's Cavalry screened toward Manas~as. Jones engaged 

clements of Morell's Division: 

Porter's Corps was engaged m 

desultory figiHing all afternoon. 

1100 Heimzelman's Corps (Kearny's 

and Hool.er's Divisions) and 

Reno's Corps (Reno's and Stevens' Divi,ions) arrived near the 

Stone House. 

1200 The Federal auack was renewed. 

Schun's Division sei..:cd part of 

Jackson's railroad posiuon and 

held it unail relieved at 1400 by 

Heintzelman's Corps. 

1400-1500 Period of regrouping and rest 

with some skirmishmg. 

1500 Grover's Brigade, Hooker\ Division made a successful bayonet 

auack agaiMI the center of Jackson's line; lost 500 men m 20 

minutes, was not supported and 

wa~ forced back. 

1700 Kearny auacked on Jackson\ 

extreme left (north) and began 10 

roll up that part of the line held 

by A.P. Hill'~ Division. Two briChronology 

gade~ of Confedcr;1Le reinforcemen!~ were rushed from an unlhrcatened portion of their line 

and repulsed Kearny·~ men. 

1700 Wilcox's Division wa~ ~hifted by 

Longstreet to support D.R. Jones 

toward Manassas; it soon returned when no threat devel· 

oped. Fit1.-John Porter's pre~­

enee to the south had fixed 

Longstreet's right wing all afternoon. The Confederate did not 

want 10 commit himself until 

he had determined Porter's 

mtentions. 

1730 Hatch's (forn1erly King\) Divi-

'ion arrived at the Stone Hou'c 

and was ordered to a11ack westward along the Pike. 

1830 Hatch's Divbion collided with 

Hood\ Divi!.ion. which wa~ 

probing eastward along the Warrenton Pike. Fighting endured 

around Grovewn until about 

1915. Reynolds' Division ;.oulh 

of the Pike had been prevented 

from ~UpjJQrting effectively by 

Longstreet's artillery. 

c. 1830 Pope ordered Porter 10 bring hi~ 

corp> to Groveton. Pope fell 

Jack~on was retreating and disregarded Porter'!. report~ of Longstreet's presence south of the 

Pike. Longstreet was freed for 

the next day. 

30 August 1862 

1200 Federals began 10 move into attack posiuons: Reynolds shifted 

to Chinn\ Ridge. 

1500 Buuerficld\ and Hatch's Divisions with Syke,· in ;.uppon 

commenced the main auack. 

They pu~hed 10 the railroad held 

by Jackson's men but were enfiladed by Longweet'!. artillery 

on their left (south). Meanwhile 

Hemtzclman 's unit, pressed farther north. 

19 
1500 Re)·nold~ wa~ pulled from hi' 

position to support Porter. Only 

Warren's Brigade (Sykes' Otvision) and Anderson\ Brigade 

(Reynolds' Dsvision) remained 

~nuth of the Pike. 

1530 Longstreet attacked, pivoung on 

Jachon':. position. Hood's Divisson advanced along an axis 

formed by the Pike while Long-

'tr.:ct\ other unib advanced sn 

an arc nonh-nonheasl. 

1600 Warren\ position wa\ overrun, 

Pope placed more troops on 

Chinn\ Ridge: Ricketts'. along 

with Schurz's and parts of 

Schenck\ Division were rushed 

sn; Sykes' Divison went to Henry 

li1ll farther c&t and was JOined 

later by Reynolds with two <>f hi~ 

brigade~. Reno and Heintzelman 

delayed north of the Pike again't 

Jackson, who conformed to 

Long~trec:t\ advance. 

1800 Chinn\ Rtdge was taken. Fighting shiltcd to Henry Hill. Sykes 

and Reynolds held until relieved 

by Stevens' Otvhion of Reno's 

Corps, which halted the last 

Confederate attack. 

2030 All quiet . 

2300 Schurz\ Division evacuated a 

bridgehead west of Stone 

Bridge. 

31 August 1862 

0100 Turnpike Bridge wa~ blown up: 

Federals drew into Centreville 

positions. (The stone bridge had 

been destroyed 9 March I 862 by 

Confederates. The bridge destroyed 31 AuguM was a temporary wo•'ldcn span.) 

Defeat of Fedem/ Troops (From Manassas 10 Appomattox) 

20 
By the summer of 1862 the annics of 

both sides were beginning to develop 

corps headquarters to control the divisions assigned to them. In June 1862 

General Lee divided his army into 

"wings" under Jackson and Longstreet, 

respectively. These were organilcd formally into corps in November of that 

year. An informal corps organization 

had existed among the Federal forces 

since late 1861. These were formally 

designated in July 1862, but first were 

numbered sequentially within their respective field armies, causing some 

confusion. Many of the corps were still 

forming at the time of the Second Manassas Campaign, hence they were not 

much better structured or coordinated 

than their Southern counterparts. There 

were usually two or three divisions in 

each corps, sometimes more. Normally 

three, occasionally four. brigades composed a division. Four or five regiments 

were assigned to a brigade. 

Various manpower practices. plus 

battle losses. make it extremely difficult 

to calculate strength accurately by unit 

designation alone . Volunteer infantry 

regiments were composed of ten companics, each authorized a maximum of 

101 off1cers and men. With staff included. a full regiment would have numbered about 1,025 officers and men. 

Regular U.S Army Infantry reg1ments 

were orgamzcd into three battalions of 

three companies each and Federal heavy 

artillery regiments converted to infantry 

had three four-company battalions. As a 

rc!'lult, they were slightly larger than the 

volunteer regiments. Federal regiments 

at Second Manassas had an average 

Order of Battle 

strength of 300 men, while similar Confederate units averaged 200 men. 

Artillery batteries on the Federal side 

generally were standardized with six 

Ml857 12-pounder Napoleon pieces. 

There were about 100 men in a full 

strength Federal battery. Confederate 

batteries, on the other hand, ranged 

from six to two pieces and usually had 

various models of guns grouped together. This lack of uniformity was offset by 

a much better higher-level structure. 

Most Confederate artillery was grouped 

in battalions deployed under the orders 

of the wing commander. This arrangement allowed greater firepower to be 

brought to bear more respon!.ively than 

on the Federal side. There. batteries 

were assigned to division. even brigade. 

levels. often operating independently 

once battle was joined. The Federals 

had 38 batteries with 182 guns at Second 

Manassas. while the Confederates had 

184 guns grouped in 45 batteries. 

The dissimilarities 1n centralization 

extended also to the cavalry. Confederate hon;e was organi1ed in a single cavalry division. responsive to the needs of 

the anny commander. It was used primarily to gather infonnation. Federal 

practice assigned cavalry to corps and 

sometimes to as low as brigades. This 

deprived the army commander of any 

reconnaissance capability of his own. 

There was the probability. rcali1ed in 

the 1862 Campaign, that information 

would not get to him. This shortcoming 

was made worse by General Pope's philosophy of cavalry use. He caused his 

subordinates to push the cavalry mercilessly in deep raids and as hard-riding 

21 
escorts and headquarta~ guards Rarely 

was cavalry u'>ed hy the Federals solely 

to obtain information. As a consequence. Pope frequently lost contact 

during critical changes. fatally hampering hi' planning At the same tune. the 

cavalry hecame M> debilitated 11 could 

not be a factor when it was needed the 

most at the climax of the campaign. 

Ordl'l of Baffle 

28-30 August /862 

Am1y of Virginia 

Maj. Gen. John Pope. Commanding 

I Corp,, Ann~ of Vtr~mi;~ (.\1aj Gcn Fr;~nl 

St!!CIJ 

hi l>l\ '''on 1 Bn!! Gcn Robert C '>.:hem:~) 

ht llrigatlc (Brig Gen. Juhu' II St.thdl 

27th Penn,ylvanta 

Xth Ne" Y<lrk 

4 ht ~I!'~ York 

45th Ne'~ Y<nl. 

2d Bng;ttle (Col Nathaniel C. McLt•an~ 

25th Ohio 

'\'\th Ohto 

7Jd Ohio 

7'\th Oh10 

2d Dtvtston (merged mthc others) 

Jd Divl'inn (Brig. (len. Carl Schurt) 

22 

ht Bngade (Cnl Alc\ander 

Schtmmclfenmgl 

6ht Ohto 

74th Pcnn~ylvant:t 

l!th Wco;t Virginia 

2d Bngade (Col Wladtmir Krl}Jano"''kil 

5-Ith Nl!w Yorl. 

5Kth New Yorl. 

75th Penn\ylvanin 

1d Bngade (Col Jt~hn A. KoJtc,) 

2~th New Yorl. 

6Xth New Yorl. 

7ld Penns) lvama 

Independent Brigade !Brig. Gcn Robert H. 

l\1tlroyl 

2d \Vest Vtrgmta 

.ld We~t \ irgmta 

'\th Wc~t Vtrgmta 

l\t Wesl Virgima Cavalry 

X2d Ohio 

Arlilkr} of the I Corps. Army uf Vtrgmi,t 

K. hi Ohto Ltght !Ha,km'\1 

2d New Yurt.. Ltght (S.:htrnwr'') 

F. Pcnthylvania Light (Hampton's) 

L. 2d New York Light (Roemer\) 

I. ht Ohto Light (Dtlgcr\) 

12th Bauer). Oh•o Light IJohn,on\) 

I, 1\t 'lc\1. Yurl-. Light (\\tcdnch\1 

Dth Baucry. New York Ltght (Dtcckmann\) 

C. Wc't Vtrguua Light (l!tiJ',) 

II C'l'l'l''· Ann~ of Virgtm<t (Maj. Gen. Nath,mto:l 

P Bank\) 

ht 01\1\ion (Hng Gcn \lpheu' S Willt<tm'l 

hi Brigade (Bng. Gcn Samuel W. 

Cr;twlurd) 

lOth Mamc 

46th Penn') lvania 

2Rth Nc"' Yorl. 

Sth Connccllcut 

2<.1 13rig;tdc (merged in tlw other<) 

Jd Bngadc <Bng. Gen George H Gordon) 

:!d ~1.1\\JChU\CttS 

Jd Wi,Wn\ln 

27th lndwna 

2d Divi~iun (Brig. Gen. Gcurgc S. Grl'cnc) 

bt Brigilde <Col Charlc' Candy) 

5th Ohtu 

7th Ohtu 

29th Ohttl 

66th Oh111 

2llth Pcnn,ylvama 

2d Bngadc (Col M Schlaudedcrl 

109th Penn') lvama 

lltth l'enn,ylvama 

3d Maryland 

t02d New York 

8th \.. S lnfantr} 

llth U.S lnfantr) 

Jd Bng;tdc (Col. Jam1'' A. rait) 

t\t Dl\trtct l)f Culumbta 

78th Ne" York 

60th !';c"' York 

Purnell lcgton, Maryland 

3d Delaware 

Arllllcry of the II Corp,, Anny of Virgmia 

4th B;mcry. !l-1ame Ltght !Robm,on\1 

6th Bilttcry. Maine Ltght (McGihcr) ·,, 

M Battery, 1\t New Yorl. l.tght (Cothr,m·,, 

lOth Battery. New York Light (Bruen\) 

E Battery. Penn,ylvania l.tght (Knap\l 

F B;tttcf}. 4th lJ.S. (Bc,t'\1 

Ill Corps. Ann) of \'trgima <MaJ Gen lntn 

McDowell) 

l~t Divistun CBng. Gcn John J> llatch \'ICC 

Rufu' Ktng) 
hi Bngadc (Col lllllOih) Sullivan vice 

John P. Hatch) 

2d U.S. Sharp~hootcl'o 

22d New York 

24th New York 

.'lith Ne" York 

X4th Nc" Yol1. 

2d Bngadc <Brig. Gen. Ahner Doubleday) 

~6th Pcnn,ylvama 

76th New York 

95th New York 

ld Brigade (Brig. Gcn M,lr,ena R. Patrick) 

2hl New Yor~ 

23d New Yor~ 

25th Ne" York 

liOih 1\cw York 

4th Ungac.lc (Brig. Gen John Gibbon) 

2d Wl\cnn'm 

19th Indiana 

6rh Wbconsin 

71h \Vi,con,in 

2d D1vi\10n <Brig. Gen Jamc' B Rieken~) 

1,1 Bn!!adc !Brig. Gcn Abram Duryee) 

97rh Nc" York 

l<).lth Ne" York 

105rh New York 

l071h New York 

2d Bngadc <Brig. Gen. /..calou~ B. Tower) 

26rh New York 

941h New York 

I!Hih Penn~ylvama 

\IOih Penns}lvania 

.ld llngade <Col John \\ Sule') 

lllh Pennsylvanaa 

IIJd New Yort.. 

121h Ma,sachu,crh 

l.llh Ma~sachuscu~ 

4rh Brigade (Col Jo-cph Thnburn) 

hi \\bt Virgm1a 

li·hh Pennsy han1a 

I lOth Penn'} lvani•• 

7th lmhana 

Pcnn,ylva111a Re,cr'e' 1 Bng. Gen. John F. 

Reynold>) 

hi Brigade (Brig (i~n G~orgc G Meade) 

hi R1flc, 

ld lnfamry 

4th lnfanlr) 

7th Infantry 

Nth lnfamry 

2d Bng.tdc !Bng Gcn 'truman Seymourl 

hi Infantry 

2d lnfanlry 

5th Infantry 

6th lnfan1ry 

3d Brigade <Rnf (ien . Conrad F. Jack,on) 

9th Infantry 

lOth Infantry 

lllh lnfan1ry 

12th Infantry 

Mullcry of 1hc Ill Ct>rp,. Army of Virgm1a 

(\1ajor Tdhnn. Ch1cf of Artillery ) 

hi Bauery. Nc" Hamp,h1re Light 

!Gem,h's) 

D Bauery. IM Rhode hland L1gh1 

!Monroe\) 

B Bancry, 41h U.S <Campbell's) 

C Banery. 5th U.S <Ran,om's) 

.!d Bauery. Mamc I 1gh1 <Hall'~) 

51h Banery. Mamc l.1gh1 !l..eppien'~) 

A B:mery. Penn'} hJnia l.ighl CSimp,on\l 

B Banery, Pcnn,ylv<~nia L1ght (Cooper's) 

C' Bauery. Pcnn,yh;miJ Light (Thomp,tm\) 

(j s .. ucry, P.:nn,ylv;IOJ;I Light (Kern,·) 

Cavalary of lht' Army of Yirgmia 

Cav<Jiry ot the I Cnrp' 

Buford's Brigade !Bng. Gen. John 

Buford) 

lsi Mrch1gan 

hi Vennom 

1~1 We'' V1rgm1a 

Beardsley\ Brigade (Brig Gen. John 

Bcard~lcy) 

bt Connccucu1 Banal ion 

hi Maryland 

4th New York 

9th "'~" Yorl.. 

6th Ohio 

Cavalry of the Ill Curp' 

Bayard\ Bngadc !Brig Gen. George D. 

Bayard) 

1st New Jcrwy 

IM Pcnn,ylvanra 

lsi Rhode bland 

1'>1 ~!.tine 

IM :>:c" Yurt.. 

Ill Corp,. Ami} of the Pn1omac (Maj. Gcn 

Samuel P. Hc1nllclmanl 

hi Divis1on (Maj. Gcn Ph1hp Kearny) 

hi Brigade (Bng. Gen. John C. Rohin,on) 

20th lndtana 

6Jd Penn,)'l'an~;l 

105th Pcnn,]hJnla 

JOth Ohio (6 companic') 

2d Bngac.lc <Bng Gen . Da\ld D. Btrneyl 

hi Nc" Yort.. 

381h New Ynrt.. 

40th Nc" Yort.. 

lOht NC\\ Ynrl.. 

57th Pcnn\ylv;lnta 

23 
3d Maine 

.tth Mame 

. 1d Bngad~ !Col Orl;mdo M. Poe) 

17th Nev., York 

2d Mtchig<tn 

'd \1 ichigan 

5th Mtchtgan 

lJ<Jth Pcnns}lvanta 

:!J l>1' tsion ( :1.1aJ Gcn Jo-e ph Hool.crJ 

ht Bngadc ( Bng. Gcn Cu' 1cr Growr) 

IM Mas-.achuscll' 

lith Massachuscth 

16th Ma,sachuscth 

2<1 Nev. Hampshtre 

26th Pcnnsyhama 

2d (or ExcehtorJ Bngadc !CoL :-.cbnn 

Ta)lorl 

70th Nev., Yorl. 

71M Nev., York 

72d New York 

73d New Yml. 

74th Nev., York 

Jd Bngadc !Col Jnscph B Carr) 

:!d Nev., Yorl. 

5th :\cv., Jer-e~ 

6th Ncw Jef\C) 

7th New Jcr\C} 

llth New Jcr..ey 

I 15th Penn,ylvanta 

Arllllcry of the Ill Corps. Army of the 

Potomat 

K Bauery. ht L S t<iraham \) 

1:' Bauery. ht RhoJc hland (Randolph\) 

6th Banery. Matnc l.tght 1 "-1cGtlvery \) 

V Corps. Army t)f the Potomac (MaJ. Gen. 

Htz-John Pnner) 

ht Dtvt\um (Maj Gcn George W Morelli 

24 

ht Brigade (Col Jame' Barnes) 

2d Mame 

18th ~ta~sa..:huscth 

2:!d \1a\\<KhU..Cih 

13th New Yorl. 

25th Ne" York 

1st Michtgan 

:!d Brigade (Brig. Gen CharJe, Griffin) 

9th Massat·hu,eth 

32d \1assachusclls 

14th Nev., Yorl. 

6:!<.1 Pennsyhama 

.tth 'vltchigan 

Sharpshooters 

3d Bngadc (Bng. Gen. Dan Bunerfieldl 

12th New Yorl. 

17th New York 

44th New Yml. 

16th MKhtg;tn 

li3d Pennsylvani;t 

ht u.s . 2<1 Dtvt~ton !Bng Gen. George Syke\) 

1st Brigade (Lt ('nl Robcn C. Buch<tnanl 

3d U S Infantry 

4th U S lnl;tntry 

12th L.S Infantry. ht Banalion 

14th L S lnlantry. ht Banalion 

14th L .S lnlantr). :!d Battalion 

2d Bngadc (1.1. Col. William Chapman) 

1st U.S. Infantry <Company G) 

2d U.S lnfanll y 

61h U.S lnf.mtr) 

lOth U.S lnfantr) 

lith L. S lnlantr) 

17th L S Infantry 

3d Bngade !Col Gouverneur K. Warren I 

5th Nev., Yort.. 

lOth New Vorl. 

Pian's Brig:tdc lllng. Gcn A. Sander' Pt<lll) 

l!6th New York 

63d lndtana 

Artillery of the V Cnrp,, Army vf the Pntnmal· 

3d Ma-.,achusctl\ Baller) (Martin'') 

C BalleT}. hi Rhude bland Light 

(Waterman·,) 

E and G Baneric'>. hi U.S. (Randolph's) 

D Banery. 5th U.S. {HaLicll'~J 

I Bancry. 5th ll. S 1 Weed's) 

K BaneT}. 5th L ~ <Smead'') 

IX Corp,, Anny ot thc PCllomac (Bng . Gcn. 

Jesse L. Reno) 

ht Oivt,ton !Bng Gen. l'aac I Steven\) 

bt Bngadc !Col BenJamtn C. Christ) 

8th M1ch1gan 

50th Pcnn\ylv;mi.t 

2d Bngadc (Col D<m•el Lea,urc) 

IOOth Penn,yh <mta 

~6th :-;ev., Yurl. 

Jd Bngade (Cill Addison Farn,\\Orthl 

79th New Ynrl; 

28th MJ\\JChU\CII\ 

2<1 Division CBng Gcn Jc"e L. Reno) 

1st Brigade (Col Jame' Nagle) 

48th Penn,ylvama 

2d MarylJnd 

6th Nev., Hamp,htrc 

2d Bngadc !Cnl. l:dv., ard Ferrero) 

51st Nev., Yorl. 

5bt Penn') lvanta 

2ht Ma .... achu\CII'> 

Anillery of the IX Corp,, Army of the 

Potomac 

1::. Batter). 2d U S <BenJamin\) 

D Bauery. Pcnnsyhama Ltght (Durell\) 
Army of Northcm Y1rginia 

General Robert E. Lee, Commanding 

R1gh1 Wmg CLL Gcn James Longstreet) 

lnlanlry 

llnod\ (Evan,·) DIVI\IOn IBrig. Gen. 

:-.:aahan G. E'ans) 

Hood's Bng:uJ~ IHng. Gen. John B 

Hood) 

b1 Texa-. 

4th Tcxa' 

5ah 1exa' 

ll!lh Georgia 

Hampton\ I.e gum 

Whiling\ Cor Law·,, Hng.1de cCol. 

hander '\1 I aw) 

4th ·\labarna 

61h Nonh Carolina 

2d Mj,,j,,ippi 

lith Mi,,is>~ppi 

Lvan,· Brigade <Col P 1- SIC\Cn\) 

17th Snuah Camhn.1 

18th Sou1h Cawhna 

22d South C.uohna 

2.1d South Camhna 

Holcombe\ Lcg•<m 

W1lcox \ DiVI>IOn <Bng Gen C'atlmu' M. 

Wilcox) 

Wilcox\ Brigade 

lllh Alahmna 

9th Alabama 

lOth Alabama 

lith Alabama 

Pryor'' Bngadc 1 Brir Gcn Roger ;.\ 

Pryor) 

2tl Aond<~ 

5th Ronda 

l!th f-lorida 

Jd Vtrginia 

14th Alabama 

l·calhcrston \ UngaJc 1 Bng. Gen. 

\\infieldS rcalhcNon) 

2d Missi'"PPi 

121h MiSSI\\IJlPI 

16th Ml~\i\\IJ'PI 

19th MIS!>I\\1ppt 

Kemper\ 01\I\IOn <Brig. Gen . Jame\ L. 

Kempen 

Kemper·, Bngadc <Col. Montgomcr) D. 

Corse I 

1,1 Virgm1a 

71h Virgima 

lllh Virgima 

171h V1rglma 

241h V 1rg1n13 

Sharp,hcl<tler' 

knlun,· Bngack IBng Gen. M1cah 

kn~m,) 

IM South C.mthna 

2d South Camhna 

5th South C.m>lma 

6th South Caruhna 

Palmcnn 

P1cken\ Brig<tde CCnl. Eppa HuntonJ 

8th V1rgmia 

llllh Virgm1a 

19th Virgmia 

28th Virginia 

56ah V1rg101a 

D. R. Jonc<.' Dl\1\u>n IBng. Gen Oa"itl R. 

Jone,) 

Anderson\ Bn)!ade !Col. G. 1 

Andcr\ltn) 

ht Gcorg1a 

7ah Gcorg1a 

lllh Georg1a 

9th Gcorg1a 

lith Georg1.1 

Toomb\ Bn)!otd~: CCnl. Hcnf) L. 

Bcnnmgl 

2d Georg1a 

15th Gcnrg1a 

17th Gcorg1:t 

20th Gcorg1a 

Drayton\ Bn)!;tdc IBng Gcn Thoma' I( 

Drayton) 

15th South Camhna 

50th Georg1a 

51st Gc:or)!IJ 

R. H Anderson\ Dl\'1'1110 (MaJ Gcn 

Richard H Andcr,onJ 

Mahone\ Hrig;ulc CIJrig Gen. Wilh;mt 

Mahone) 

6th Virgm~<t 

121h Virg1n1a 

16th Ylrg101a 

4bt V1rgm1a 

Wrigha·~ Brigade cBrig. Gen. A. R. 

Wright) 

3d Georgi;~ 

22d Georgia 

48th Gcnrg1ot 

44th Alabama 

-\rnti>tcad\ Brig.tdc Cl3ng Gen. Lcw1' 

A. Arntl,leadJ 

9th V1rgm1a 

14th Virglnhl 

38th Virgima 

'\3d Virgm1a 

57th V 1rgi111.t 

25 
5th Virginia llanah1>n 

Anillcry 

Lee\ Bauahon (('ol, Stephen D Lee) 

Bath Arlilh::ry. Virgima (Eubanks') 

Ponsmouth Anollcr)', Virginia (Oakham\) 

Bedford Arlollcry. Vorgoma (Jordan\) 

Parker's BalleT). Vorgmoa 

Taylor\ Saner). Vorgmoa 

Rheu's Baucry. South Carolina 

Wa,hington Arlillcry Bauahon, Loui,i;on<o 

(Maj. J. 13. Wullon) 

ht Company (Squire\) 

2tl Company CRochanhun \) 

3d Company (Moller\) 

4th Company cE,hlcman'') 

Oovl\oon Baucrie' 

Thomas Arllllcry, Vorgmoa (Andef\on\) 

Di~ie Arcillery. Vorgmo;1 cChapman\) 

Gennan Arllllcr)·. South Carolma 

<Bachman\) 

Palmeuo Arcoll~ry. South Car<llina 

<Garden\) 

\1oonnan\ Baucry, Vorginoa 

Loudon Amllcry. Virgmoa <Rogef\') 

Rowan Arlollcry. North Carolina (Reilly\) 

Macbeth Arullcry, South Carolina 

(Boyer\) 

Norfolk Arlillery. Virgmia (Huger's) 

Goochland Arllllcry. Virginia (Turner\) 

Donald,onvillc Arullcry, Loui'>oana 

Fauquocr Anollcry. Vtrgmoa tSlribhng\l 

Leh Wing tMaJ. Gen . Thoma.\ J Jackson) 

!;well\ Dovi~ion !Brig. Gcn Alel\ander R 

La\\< tOn) 

26 

Early·~ Bngadc Cllng Gen. Jubal A. Early) 

13th Virgima 

25th Virginia 

31st Vorgonta 

44th ViT)!IIliJ 

49th Virgmia 

52d Virgino;s 

58th Virgima 

Lawton's Brigade CCul Marccllu~ Dougla") 

13th Georgia 

26th Georgia 

.1ht GcOr)pJ 

38th Georgta 

60th Georgia 

61\t Georgia 

Hay'' Bngadc cCol StmngJ 

5th Loui~i;ma 

6th Loui,iana 

7th Louisiana 

8th Ltl\ll~iana 

9th Lom\lana 

Trimble\ Brigade CC~pt. Vv. E Bro\\<n) 

12th Gcorgta 

21st Georg"' 

2ht North Carnlma 

15th Alabama 

lst Nonh Carolina Banalion 

Ltght Dimum C:'v1aj Gcn Ambn.>~ P. HiiiJ 

Branch\ Brigade CBng. Gen Lawrence 

0 ' 13 Bram:hl 

7th Nonh Camllna 

18th Nonh Carolina 

28th North Camlina 

33d North Carolina 

37th Nonh Carolina 

Gregg\ Bngadc CBng. Gen. Mal\cy Grcggl 

Orr's Rstlc,, South Carolina 

ht Sooth Carolma 

12th South Caroltna 

13th Sooth Carol ina 

14th South Carolina 

Field's Bngadc (Col. J. M. Brockcnhroughl 

22d Virgmoa Baualton 

40th Vorgoma 

47th Vtrgmia 

55th Virgsma 

Pender\ Bngt~dc (Bng. Gen. William D 

Pender) 

16th North Carolina 

22d Nonh Carolina 

34th Nonh Carolina 

38th Nonh Carolina 

Archer\ Bngadc CBrig. Gen. Jame' J 

Archer) 

ht Tennc\,CC 

7th Tennc!>~cc 

14th Tcnnc~'cc 

19th Tcnncs,cc 

5th Alabama 

rhoma,· Bngadc !Col Edward L. Thoma') 

14th Georgta 

35th Gcorgsa 

45th Georgsa 

49th Gcorgo;t 

Jackson's Divtsinn ([lrig. Gen. William ~: 

Starke vice Wolliam Taltaferro) 

"Stonewall'' Bng;sdc (Col. William S If 

Baylor) 

:!d Vtrgini .. 

4th Virgmta 

5th Virgsma 

27th Virg1n1a 

33d Virgmia 

Campbell\ Cor J R Jones') Brigade (Col 

Bradley 1 JohnMm) 

ht Virgmoa Ballahon 
.:!ht \'irgima 

42d Vtrgtnta 

4~th Virgmia 

f';thafcrro\ Brigade tCol. Alexander G. 

'lahalcrro) 

lOth Virgima 

2:ld Ytrginia 

Hth \' trgmia 

47th Alabama 

4!1th Alabama 

St<lllord\ Bngadc (Col. lwny A St~ffordl 

ht L.oUI~iana 

2d lAlUI~iana 

9th Loui~iana 

lOth Loui\lana 

15th Loui~i.ma 

Coppcn·~ Battalmn 

Cavalry ( Maj Gcn J I; B Stu;~rt 1 

Robcrhnn\ llrig;tdc (Brig. Gen. Beverly H. 

Robcrt>on) 

2d Virginia 

6th Ytrgmia 

7th Virgmia 

12th Vtrginia 

17th Virginia 

Lee\ Rngade (Bng Gen . Fitthugh Lee) 

bt Virginia 

3d Vtrginia 

4th Ytrgmta 

5th Virginia 

9th Ytrgmta 

Art tiler) 

Jacl.,nn\ Oi' 1\ion !Maj. 1.. \.1 Shumaker) 

B;tltlmorc Artillery. M.lfyland 

( Brod.enhrough \J 

Allcghen) Arulkr). Virgima 

(Carpenter\) 

Hampden Arttlkry. Ytrgtnta <Ca~l.tc\) 

Winchc~tcr Batter). Virginia !Cut\haw\) 

Rockbndgc Arttlkry. Vtrginia !Poaguc\) 

Lee Artillery. Ytn~tnia (Ramc,· 1 

Ru.:c's Batter). Vtrgtma 

Danville Arttllcr). Ytrgmta 1\\'rx>ding\1 

Htll\. Dtvl\ion !l.t Col Rubert L Walker) 

hcdenck,hurg Artillcr]. Virgtma 

lllraxton \) 

Crenshaw\ Battery. Virgmia 

!.etcher Artillery. Vtrgtnta !Davtd,on\) 

/l.ltddlc:.c' Antllcry. Ytrgmia IHardy\J 

Purcell Artillef). \'trgmia !Pegram·,, 

Branch Antllcr). '\'orth Cart>lina (Pott,' l 

Pee Dec Anillcr). South Carolina 

(Mdnto,h\l 

Ewell's DtVI\JOn 

L<>oi,iana Gu;~rd i\rttllcry (D'Aquin'•J 

Chesapeake Artillery. Maryland (Brown\) 

ht Maryland Batter) (Dement's) 

Juhn,on\ Battery. Ytrgmia 

CourtnC} Artillcr}. Vtrj!mia (latimer\) 

Staunton Art tiler]. \ irginta (Garber\) 

Second Mmwssas Losses 

Unum 

futal engaged 75.696 

Cmifedactt<' 

48,527 

Killed .. ........ 1.724 1,481 

Wounded . . . . . • • 1\, n2 7.627 

Mt"ing . 5,'15!1 89 

Totallossc~ . . 16.054 !21~k) 9.197 (19ql 

27 
Self-Guided Tour 

Before you begin your tour, be sure to 

read the battle Overview. Begin your 

tour with a visit to Manassas Nationa l Battlefield Park Visitors' Center. 

It is located on Henry Hill, just off 

State Road (SR) 234, . 7 mile north of 

the 1-66 interchange and .5 mile 

south of its intersection with Route 

29 (Lee Highway, the old Warrenton 

Turnpike). 

Pageland Lane 

Upon completion of the museum 

visit, return to SR 234 and drive 

north .5 mile to Route 29. Thrn west 

(left) on 29 and proceed 2.8 miles 

through the park property until you 

reach the intersection of 29 and 

County Road (CR) 705 (Pageland 

Lane). Turn south on CR 705 and 

stop at the first safe place below the 

junction. Do not visit any of the sites 

en route, since this is a familiarii'ation drive and you will be able to 

spend time at each of these places 

later. The JUnction of the two road" ,.., 

JU'>t \Ollthwe:-.t of the coordinating or 

linl..mg pomt of Jachon\ and Long-

'treet\ Corp~ . There is a monument 

commemorating a fallen Texan ahout ·'0 

yard~ tn~ide the woods on the ~outhwest 

quadrant or the intersection. 

On 28 Augu'>t. about 0<)30. Reynold•.' Divr•don en route to Mana-. ... as 

from Game'\ tile wa-. turning on Page 

land Lane "'hen it wa-. fired on hy two 

gum. with the ht Virginia Ca\alr) ... upported h)' mfantry from the 2ht Vtrgtrua 

lnlantr)'. part of Brad h.!} T. John ... on \ 

Brigade. The 42d Virginia Infantry was 

in Brawner's Woods. 

Cooper\ U.S. Bauer) returned the 

fire . Companie ... B. D. and K. 13th 

Penn-.ylvanta Reserve' deployed toward 

Bra\\ner\ Farm \.\hile Companie.., A. E. 

and F went into the W<l<ld' south of the 

Pike. Mt.!adc·~ Brigade deployed behind 

them. 3d and 7th Pennsylvania Reserve:-. 

north of the intersection. 4th Pennsylvania Reserves south, with the Hth Penn-

~ylvania Reserve" held inactive. 

The 13th Penm.ylvani.t Rc~ervc Companit.!s nonh of the road "coutcd up to 

Sudlc) Mill. encountering no one. but 

seeing actn it) ea..,t\\ ard Rc\ nold-. wnh 

~kDowell dcctded the fore~ wa' rearguard cavalry and rcMtmetl their march 

to Manassa ... down Pageland Lane. 

On the same day. at 1700. Patrick's 

Brigade held on the southeast ~ide of the 

inter-,ection during the Brawna\ Farm 

fight: 35th and 2Jd New York deployed 

northeast. The hngadc had been fired 

upon h) art iller) from Bra\\ ncr\ Fam1. 

Gerrish\ bauer) wa' in place b} the 

nur:;ery. 

On 29 Augusl. between 0100 and 
0300. Ktng \ Ot\ I'>IOn may have '' ithdrawn down Pageland Lane lO\\ard 

Mana"as. And on the same day. between 0300 and 1000. Earl)\ and J·nr· 

no ·s Brigade~ of Lawton\ Di" i'ion 

moved into the fields northwest of the 

inter-,ection about -,unrise. The 13th and 

J bt Ytrgtni<~ ''we .tdvanced ~" pickets 

JUSt cast of Stuart Hill on the other \tde 

of the nursery. Early was protecting 

Jackson\ lla;-~k '' hlle looktng for Longstreet His men -.kinntshed \VIIh the 

Pennsy lvania Bucktaib of Reynolds· 

Divi,ion. 

Dunng 1000 to 1200. Longstreet's 

Corps arrivctl from Thoroughfurc Gap. 

He immediately pl:.lced llood\ Divbion 

in this area: 

On .tpproa.:hmg the field some of Brigildter 

General Hood\ batteric' were ordt:rcd into 

p<Nllon and hi' llivi\JOil was deployed on the 

nght and left of the turnpike at nght angb 

29 
with it. and ~upported by . . . Evans' 

Brigade. 

Reilly's Battery (Rowan Artillery) went 

into position on the ridge east of the 

nursery {Stuart Hill). 

ln•in McDowell (18/H -1885) was bre· 

~·etted for gallantrv at Buena Vista dur· 

i11g the Mexiccm War When the Ci1•il 

War broke 0111, he wm made brigadier 

general in Mu)' 1861 OIUI given com· 

mand of the troops ar01md Washington. 

lie was defeated tll Ma11assas m /861 . 

Promoted i11 March 1862. he c-omma!lded a corps around Fredericksburg 

umil it was merged as part of Pope's 

Army of Virginia. The defeat at Second 

Manassas destroyed the fast vestiges of 

his reputarion as a field leader. 

Line. 

D. R. Jones' Division moved down 

Pageland Lane to the sourh opposite 

Daw.kin's Branch on the ManassasGainesville Road. 

Wilcox's Division went into line on 

Hood's left (north). 

Then on 29 August at 1200 Lee established his headquarters on Stuart H1ll 

Kemper's Division deployed south of (known as Munroe's Hill in 1862). just 

Hood to the Manassas Gap Railroad south of the turnpike. 

Brawner's Farm 0 

Return north to Route 29 and 

drive east .6 mile to the crossover 

allowing you to get on the north side 

of the road by the driveway to 

Brawner's Farm. This is marked by a 

large metal gate securing a dirt 

driveway traversing about .5 mile to 

an unpainted farmhouse and outbuildings. Pull off 29 and park in the 

driveway entrance. 

30 

Jackson's force had occupied the 

ridge to the northeast for most of 28 

August. The approach of King's Division in the evening caused the Confederate commander lo open the baulc. Jackson's reaction to King's presence was as 

follows. 

He rode acro.\S the broomsedge fields to 

within easy musket range of the Union column There he trotted his horse back and 
forth eyeing the blue troops. We could ••1-

mo~t tell hi' thoughts by his movements 

Sometimes he would halt. then trot on rapidly. halt again, wheel his horse and pass 

along the: nank of the column. Then he 

pulled up suddenly. wheeled and came galloping toward us. "Here he comes. by 

God," said several and Jackson rode up to 

the assembled group [of officers) as calm as 

a May morning and. touching his hat in a 

military salute, said .. "Bring out your 

men. gentlemen!" The Second Battle of 

Manassas was about to begm (From 011 ad· 

dress bv Huma McGuire at the dedicution 

of Jack~·o11 Memorial Hall. VMI) 

Reaction in Doubleday's Brigade, 

Hatch's Division. along the Pike, as 

recorded by A. P. Smith in the 76th 

Regimem: 

A~ the rcbcb opened thi!> fire upon our 

Rcg•mcnt. a shell passed through the ambu· 

lance train. caus1ng great con!>ternallon 

among the drivers and teamsters. The ambu· 

lance~ were immediately ordered to the rear. 

Just as the} were wheeling for that purpose. 

a frightened teamster on a baggage wagon 

put his whip to his horses in the act of forcing his \\a)' up the narrow road, without 

regard to ambulance loads of s1ck and 

wounded. Surgeon Metcalfe. of the Seventy· 

Dtll'id R. Jones (1825-1863) resiRned 

his commission 15 February 186/ and 

entered COit(ederate .1en•icc• as tl major 

and chief of suiff toP. G. T Beau· 

regard at the seige of fort Sumter. He 

was promoted to brigadier geneml on 

17 June /861 ill time to command a brigade at First Manassas. On 10 March 

1862 he was promott•tl to maJor geneml 

and led a division with .1'()/itl competence lhrouglwut the P<•mnmla 

Campaign. His di\'isicm secured 

11wrou~:hfare Gap 28 August /862 and 

later proved a key t'lement in the decisi\·e assault 011 the second day of Second Manassa.~ . The next momh Jones 

again distinguished hilmelf at South 

Moumain and at Antiewm. 

'ixth, realizing the danger from such conduct in the crowded highway. quickly drew 

his pistol. and in his convincing style, tn· 

formed the dnver if he moved another inch 

he would end his fears. This had its desired 

effect. The teamster. finding himself between two fires. concluded 10 rake the 

chances of the most remote, and thus a panic 

was avoided. 

Previously. on 28 August at 1800 Gib· 

bon's Brigade. King's Division, came 

under fire. Gibbon first committed the 

2d Wisconsin on the assumption that the 

fire was cavalry (horse artillery) harassment. 

.•. ordered the 2d Wisconsin to face to the 

left and march obliquely 10 the rear agamst 

these pieces to take them in the nank. As it 

rose an intervening hill it was opened upon 

by some infamry on ib right flank. The left 

wing was thrown forward to bring the regiment facing the enemy. and the mu~ket firing became very warm. The 19th lnd1ana 

was now ordered up in !'>Upport and formed 

the left of the 2d Wisconsin whilst ... the 

6th and 7th Wisconsin were both ordered 

into line. 

As recalled by Pvt. George Fairfield, 

the 7th Wisconsin came on line. 

31 
A~ ~oon as we emerged from the wood the 

rebels opened upon us with a terrible infantry fire . We steadily advanced to the brow of 

the hill ... While we were arrangmg ourselve~ in line we could ~ee their line which 

looked like a black mass ... not more than 

fifty yards distant. My God. what a 

slaughter. No one seemed to know the object 

of the fight. and there we \tood one hour. the 

men falling all around; we got no orders to 

fall back, and Wisconsin men would rather 

die than fall back without orders. 

The 19th Indiana came up to the 

farmhouse. 

1 formed my line of battle in the road, 

marched through a piece of woods some 

three hundred yards. came out into open 

ground gradually rising from about 3 or 4 

hundred yards. The regiment w-ent at double 

quick from the time it left the woods. On 

arriving on the top of the hill. crossed n fence 

and marched about 2 rods. when I halted the 

regiment. (As recalled by Col. Solomon 

Meredith) 

The Confederates quickly came into 

position. General Taliaferro reported, 

at this time our line~ were advanced from 

the wO<xh in which they had been concealed 

(into} the open field. The troops moved forward w1th splendid gallantry and in the most 

32 

John Gibbon (1827- 1896) was commis 

sioned in tlw Artillen. He ww servic(' 

in the Seminole and i.tt' tican "~rs and 

taught tactics <If West Point. He first 

served as McDowell's chief of artillery 

and was promoted to brigadier general 

in May 1862. commanding the "Black 

H(l(" or "Iron" Brigade in King's Dh·i· 

.~ion. McDowell's Corp.\, Army of Virgima. He fought with thi.\ brigade 

throughout tht' Second Manassas and 

Antietam Campaigns. If~ wa.1 II'Oundt'd 

at Fredtric/i .. ~burg whi/t' commanding u 

dil·ision bm rt>tumed to dun· ill time to 

command his division and iata its 

corps (Hancock's) at Geuysburg. Therl' 

he was wounded again. He rt>joined 

his di1·ision to fight with it throughout 

Gram's 1864 01·ala11d Campaign. Gih· 

bon was gil·en commarul of a corps i11 

January 1865. 

pcrlect order. Twice our lines were advanced 

until we had reached a farmhouse and orchard on the nght of our line and were within 

about 80 yard~ of a greatly ~uperior force of 

the enemy. Here one of the most terrific 

contests that can be conceived of occurred. 

Our troops held the farmhouse and one edge 

of the orchard. while the enemy held the 

orchard and the encJo,ure next to the tumpike. To our left there wa.s no cover, and our 

men stood in the open field .... The enemy, 

although re-enforced, never once attempted 

to advance upon our position. but withstood 

with great determination the terrible fire 

which our line~ poured upon them . ..• In 

thi~ fight there was no maneuvering and very 

little tactics, 

Taliaferro wrote after the war. "lt was a 

question of endurance. and both sides 

endured." 

The 2d Virginia was opposite the 7th 

Wisconsin. cast of the farmhouse, 

we were then ordered to advance. when 

our column moved steadily forward in full 

view of the enemy's line. On descending a 

knoll some 150 or 200 yard~ from the enemy 

our hne was opened upon w1th a most terrific 

and deadly fire of musketry from the ene· 

my·, line in the edge of the woods and behind a fence. 
Battery Heights 0 

Continue eastward on 29 by making a "U" turn at the first crossover, 

300 feet west of the Brawner's Farm 

Road. Proceed .4 mile to a lane on 

the north side of the road bordered 

by a snake fence; turn in and park. 

This is Battery Heights. Read the 

signs provided by the Park Service, 

then walk halfway to t he gun battery 

visible to the northeast. This area 

ma rks the eastern flank of Gibbon's 

for ce in the Br awn e r's Fa rm 

struggle. 

Again on 28 August, between 1800 

and 2400. General Gibbon had committed the 6th Wisconsin on his right. It 

moved right down to the northern edge 

of the ridge on which the Park Service 

guns now are located. 

As remembered by members of the 

6th Wisconsin, 

the regiment advanced in line of battle 

acmss a field. Soon we heard a rip-rip, but 

did not fully reali.re the slluation until the 

boys began to fall . . . We finally reached 

the assignment •.. and the old 6th gave a 

volley that awoke a cheer from the other 

three regiments and a corresponding yell 

from that other side .. • . from then on, for 

:1bout 2- 1

/ : hours. the fight was terrific . So 

near together was the fighting line~ that by 

the flash of the muskets we could sec the 

enemy distinclly and they us. We did not 

remember to have heard another order than 

the first given. except an occasional one 

from the officers. "Give them hell! boys. 

give them hell!" 

Major Rufus Dawes of the 6th Wisconsin described the scene: 

When Colonel Cutler shouted "March ... 

every man scrambled up the bank and o~cr 

the fence, in the face of shot and shell, with 

something of the feeling that one would hurry to save a fnend from peril. My hor\C 

partook of the ftercc excitement. and ran up 

the! bank and leaped a fence like a squirrel. I 

could now see the men of the Second Wi!i· 

consm. They were under the concentrated 

fire of at lealit six times their own number of 

the enemy. Our regiment. five hundred and 

four men in ranh, pushed forward rapidly tn 

perfect I ine of baule, field officers and Adjutant E. P. Brooks mounted and in their 

places, and colors advanced and flying in the 

breeze. 

The regiment advanced without firing a 

shot, making a half wheel to the left in line 

of battle as accurately as if on the dnll 

ground . Through that baule smoke into 

whtch we were advancing. I could see a 

blood red sun, sinking behind the hills. I can 

not account for our immunity from the fire 

of the enemy while on thb advance. When at 

a ~hort range. Colonel Cutler ordered the 

regiment to halt and fire. Our united fire did 

great execution. It seemed to throw the rebels into complete confusion and they fell 

back into the woods behind them. We now 

gave a loud and jubilant cheer throughout the 

whole line of our brigade. Our regiment was 

on low ground which, in the gathering darkncs~. gave us great advantage over the ene· 

my, as they over~hot our line. The other 

three regiments of the brigade were on higher ground than the enemy. There was space 

enough vacant between our regiment and the 

other~ for a thousand men. Colonel Cutler 

sat upon his horse near the colors at the 

center of the regiment. Lieut. Colonel BrJgg 

was on the nght and. being myself upon the 

left, 1 was in good position to observe the 

progress of the baulc. It was quite dark when 

33 
the enemy\ yclhng columm again carne for· 

ward. and they came with a rush. Our men 

on the left loaded and fired with the energy 

ol madmen. and the sixth worked with an 

e4ual de~pcratum. This ~topped the ru'h of 

the enemy. and they halted and fired upon u~ 

the1r deadly mu~ketry. Dunng a le\\ a\\ lui 

momcnh. I could sec by the lund hght ol the 

p<>wder flashes. the whole nf both lines. I 

sa\\ a rebel mounted officer shot lrom h1' 

hm'e at the very front of the1r battle hnc. It 

was e\'ldcnt that we were being overp<>\\ered 

and that our men were gi,·ing ground. l'he 

two crowds, they could hardly he called 

line ... were within. it ~ccmeu to me. filly 

yards ol each {lthcr. and they were pouring 

mu,ketry into each other a~ rapidly a~ men 

could load and \hoot. Two of Geneml Dou ~ 

bleday \ reg1mcnts I 56th Penn~ylva111a and 

76th Nev. York! nO\\ came 'uddenly 1nto the 

gap on the left of our regiment. and the) 

fired a cra~hmg \Olley. Hurrah~ J'he) have 

come at the very nick of time l'hc low 

ground ''wed our regiment\, a' the enem) 

overshot us in the darkness. 

34 

Moving about along the woodline just 

to your west. the 76th New York and 

56th Penn!.ylvania of Doubleday's Brigade were rushed on line bl:tween the 

7th and 6th Wtsconstn. 

But a fC\\ moment\ elapsed alter entenng 

the wood. before 'harp and ~:nntmuou-. rnusketr) hnng was heard \a) ncar. and up the 

h1ll hidden by the wm>d' A strange nwunted 

oft1ccr came nding thm n thmugh the woods. 

shouting-

"Come on! Come on' Qui~:k! Quick!" 

The Scvcnty-~i\th wa' immediately in 

motion-over fcm:c.:'. lhmugh the bu\hes. 

around the tree,. tl\'Cr log' the bullet~ and 

'hell" teanng thn>ugh the wooth hke a hail 

'10m1 throu!!h a \\heat fic:ld. on ru\hed the 

Rcg1mcnt. Sc' cml of the men \\Crc killed 

and \\oundcd before IC.:a\mg the wood . ;\ftcr 

go1ng about !went) rods. the Regiment 

emerged into an open lidd. H.:re \\.t~ battle 

in real carncM . 
Just at thi!> juncture. as the rebels were 

preparing in great number~ in the woods 

beyond, for a charge upon our lines, the 

Seventy-sixth New York and Fifty-sixth 

Pennsylvania were ordered into line to fill a 

gap between the Sixth and Seventh 

Wisconsin. 

During a lull in the action. a body of men 

wa~ :.een moving on the extreme left ll<mk . 

As they came forward they shouted-

" Don't shoot your own men!" 

At that distance it seemed doubtful whether they were friend or enemies. and it wa~ 

not without much hesitation that the Colonel 

gave the order. "By the left oblique! Aim! 

Fire!" 

No rebel of that column who escaped 

death, will ever forget that volley. It seemed 

like one gun. So well wa~ it directed by our 

men. as could be judged by the immediate 

result~. that there can be no doubt it very 

materially contributed to the repulse of this 

attempted flank attack. 

The Regiment had been thoroughly drilled 

in firing and target practice. and it seemed as 

though every man took deadly aim. and 

brought down one or more of the enemy. 

When the smoke cleared away a little, the 

few left of that mass of human beings who 

had so rapidly left the wood~ a few momems 

before. had disappeared. but the ground was 

literally covered with their dead and wounded. (as recalled by A. P. Smith. in 76th 

Regiment, New York Volunteers) 

Campbell's Battery <B. 4th U.S.) had 

followed the 6th Wisconsin; it set up 

first north of the parking lot, then farther out on the ridge where the guns arc 

located now. 

Monroe\ Battery (D. 1st Rhode Is· 

land Light) posted two guns west of the 

parking lot. 

The 95th New York of Doubleday's 

Brigade provided security for the guns. 

It was joined by the 30th New York of 

Hatch's Brigade. Hatch's guns fired support ea~t from near Groveton. 

The fighting ended about 2000. After 

a conference. General King decided to 

withdraw about 0100, 29 August. 

Activity in the area was renewed on 

29 August as the Federals probed castward in an effort to fix Jackson's force 

for what Pope hoped was a final blow. 

On 29 Augu!il, about 0500, elements 

of Sigel's Corps attacked. 

At 0900 Schenck's Division of Sigel's 

Corps rcacheu this point as the left Oank 

of Sigel's auack. Stahel's Brigade straddled the road while McClean's extended 

southward. 

Reynold's Division moved overland 

from Conrad's (now the SR 23411-66 

intersection) in response to Sigel's request for support on that flank. Two 

brigades remained around the Lewis 

House (now where CR 622 goes over 1-

66). Meade's Brigade went forward with 

Cooper's Battery (B, 1st Pennsylvania 

Light). The battery moved east of the 

Brawner House with one regiment (4th 

Pennsylvania Reserves) in support. The 

remainder of the brigade skirmished 

westward in the direction of Pageland 

Lane as far as a line parallel to the 

Brawner Fam1 Lane. 

At 1000 Stahelmovcd to a point north 

of the Stonewall Memory Gardens, 

along Dogan\ Branch to be in a position 

to support Milroy's Brigade engaged 

farther north. 

McClean's Brigade gradually pulled 

back clQser to Groveton to conform with 

the new line. 

At 1030 these changes required 

Meade to pull back from near Brawner's 

Farm to south of the turnpike. Seymour's Brigade of Reynold's Division 

moved up the Groveton Road and the 

Pike to relieve him. while Jackson's Brigade came overland from the Lewis 

House to come on line. Meade's Brigade 

then pulled back to the Lewis House. 

35 
Shortly thereafter. Reynolds learned 

of the large Ioree coming 111 front of him 

and pulled all ht\ unth back to the Lewi'> 

House area 

Between 1200 and 1600. after the 

Federab had \\ ithdrawn. Hood\ Dtviston moved forward on both 'ides of the 

Pike to the eastern edge of the woo<h 

ju~t wcM of the parklllg lot. Colonel E. 

M . Law, bngade commander. \atd, 

I wa' ordered by Bngadtcr Gcncralllood. 

. . . to tom1 the brigade tn line of battle to 

the left of the turnptkc and almo~t at right 

angle~ with it , the nght re~ttng on the road 

and the left connecting with Gen. Jack<.on'::. 

line. The Texa~ Brigade had been previou~ly 

fom1ed on the right of the road, its left joining my right. With a strong line of riflemen 

tn lrotll. whtch drove the enemy's sktrmbhcr-.. as it advanced. the hrigade moved 

forward accompanied by Gens Long<.trcet 

and llood unttl 11 reached a commanding 

posllton about ' ;,of a mile lmm Dogan\ 

Hou,e. 

Hood later launched a night attack 

from here that will be dc,cnbed at the 

next \lOp. 

Later dunng the da) La\\ 1110\'Cd forward to the cast 'tdc of the Stonewall 

Memory Gardcn' when Federal guns 

farther ea ... t all wtthdrcw for ammumtion 

rc,upply. 

On 30 Augu't. about 1530. Porter\ 

heavy attack could be seen clearly from 

here .6 to .8 miles to the northeast. 

Confederate guns in this area (the Dixie 

Artillery and other batterie~ on Douglas 

Heights beyond Brawner·~ House) effectively shattered it. General Cadmus 

Wilcox observed the l· cdcral attack on 

Jackson\ line from here . 

About JO p.m . the cm·my·, infantry 

were \CCII emerging from a \\O<xl upon an 

11pcn field in line ol hattie. the wood ami 

field being in front of Jack,<lll \ extreme 

nght <IOU to the left and ncar Fcathcr,ton\ 

36 

Brigade. thi~ is a field about 500 yards wide 

and terminating 150 yard' from J;achon \ 

line. the ground here rising rather steeply fur 

a \hort distance and then level to the rail · 

road. behind the embankment of "hich at 

thi' p<>int were Jachon \ men Sectng th" 

advance or the cnem}. I repaired at once to 

the interval between Pryor\ and 1-'eath · 

eNon \ Brigade' hom this point there was 

an excellent vic'' of the field and not more 

than 400 yards dt~tant. The ftN ltnc of the 

enemy advanced in fine \tyle acros' the open 

field. There was but little to oppt)'e them. 

They were fired upon b) our ptckeh and 

skirmishers. but they conllnucd to advance . 

and. ascending the rise above rclerreo Ill. 

came within full view of Jackson\ ltnc. and 

were here received wtth a ternftc ltrc of 

musketry at short range . They hesitated for 

an in~tant. recoiling slightly. and then ad 

vanccd to ncar the embankment. Twice did I 

sec this line advance and retire. CXp!l\Cd to a 

close and deadly fire of musketry. Seeing a 

second line issuing from the woo<h upon the 

field. I wa<. in the act of ordering a battery to 

he placed in pol>ition to fire upnn them \\hen 

a battery wa' directed by the OltiJilf·gencral 

commanding to fir.: upon them. thi' battery 

being ncar the turnpike 111 an C'lccllcnt and 

commanding position The fire Ill the hatter) 

wa, mo't opportunely delivered uptm th" 

ad\·ancing ltne or the enem) They wen: 

caught in the open licit!. The effect of every 

shot could be 'cen. A raptd ftrc of \hot. 

shell. and spherical case . dclt,ercd "ith admtrable prccl\ion. checked their advance A' 

the 'hell' and spheru.:al case would hurst 

over in front and ncar them thetr rank' would 

break. hesuate and scatter. Thi' art tiler> fire 

alone broke regtment after regunent and 

drove them back into the wooc.h. 

Jackson asked for as~i~tance. and 

Longstreet decided artillery would be 

the fastest solution. Colonel S. D. Lee's 

battalion or 9 smooth bore~ and 9 rilles 

was on the north side of the ridge between here and the Brawner Farm. Lee 

said that, beginning about 1600. 

with these IR gun-. a conttnuou' !tre '~as 

kept up on the enemy dunng h" attack 

Hi' rc~er.e~ mo,cd '''icc out ul the wnods 

to the :.uppon of the attackmg columns anJ 

tw tee were the} repulsed hy the art iller~ and 
driven bat:k to the woods. Alter the reserves 

failed to reach the front or attacking columns 

th..:y were repubed and endeavored to rally in 

the open field, but the range of every part of 

the field was llbtaincd. and a few discharges 

broke them in confusion and sent them back 

to the woods . . . two batteries olthe enemy 

were firing on u~. but generally overshot us. 

General Longstreet. as noted above. 

also directed Chapman's Battery (Dixie 

Artillery) onto the ground here. Chapman reported. 

we moved instantly. and at a gallop, soon 

reached the point . . . on the left of the 

turnpike. SO or 100 yards from it. ... We 

went into position where .. . indicated and 

commenced firing at a heavily massed body 

of infantry on our left. not more than 400 

yards distant. .. . I fired from this position 

until their ranb were hroken and driven 

back . 

Confederate Cemetery 

Con tinue east on Route 29 1. 1 

miles, across the in tersection with 

CR 622 (Featherbed Lane) about 100 

yards to the turnoff on the left for the 

Confederate Cemetery. Pull in and 

park. The Confederate Cemetery on the 

east side of the parking lot contains the 

remains of about 260 men, very few of 

whom arc identified. The cemetery was 

begun by local ladies who, after the war. 

assumed responsibility for Confederate 

remains found on the battlefield. The 

))mall white structure west of the parking 

lot at the road intersection is the Dogan 

House . lt ir, a Jog and frame building 

dating from the 1850s. which was the 

overseer's house for the Peach Grove 

plantation. The plantation included the 

modern Stonewall Memory Gardens and 

acreage to the north and west. 

Again, back on 28 August between 

1800 and 2100, Hatch':, Brigade halted 

just west of the intersection during the 

Brawner's Farm fight. Reynolds' Battery (L, lo;t New York Light) fired in 

support of Gibbon. pulling out westward about 2130. 

On 29 August at 0900 Schenck's 

Divi~ion moved down the Pike. then 

crossed to the south side in line of battle 

at about New York Avenue to the cast. It 

continued forward to a point south of 

Brawner's Woods. 

Dilger's Battery (I. 1st Ohio Light) 

was po~ted just to the south on the high 

ground where the 14th Brooklyn 

Memorial is. The 73d Pennsylvania provided security. 

Blume's Battery (2d New York Light) 

set up where the Confederate Cemetery 

is now. It wa~ supported by four companics from the 41st New York. 

Johnson's Bauery (12th Ohio Light) 

set up ju:-.t north of the cemetery to provide direct support to Milroy's Brigade. 

Milroy (2d, 3d. 5th West Virginia. 

82d Ohio) deployed on line to the north. 

When he heard heavy firing farther to 

the north. he sent two regiments to help 

while he planned to use his two remaining to ~ake some Confederate batteries 

to his front. However. he soon shifted 

everything northward to join the fight he 

heard. 

At 1000 additional artillery wa!> 

37 
o J 

PORTER 

HATCH 

38 
brought into the line so that five batteries were in place from the 14th 

Brooklyn Monument extending northward for about 600 yards. When Milroy 

deflected northward, Stahel's Brigade of 

Schenck's Division had to adjust northward to just above the Stonewall Memory Gardens. He was in the open. subject 

to Confederate artillery, and eventually 

pulled east to a point just north of the 

Confederate Cemetery. 

At 1200 Col. Daniel Leasure's Brigade (IOOth Pennsylvania, 46th New 

York [6 Companies] of Stevens' Division, Reno's Corps (IX]) came forward 

to support Schenck's Division. Stevens 

accompanied. Colonel Leasure recalled, 

... as we were passing the first height, 

and about 'h my command had passed over 

the top and were descending into the valley 

that intervened between the first and second 

...• we suddenly encountered the fire of the 

enemy's skirmishers occupying the ... 

heights in our front, and we immediately 

turned and marched by our left flank till we 

regained the crest of the hill we were passing 

over, where Gen. Stevens instructed me to 

take position on the left of the pike, my right 

resting on the road and as Dilger's Battery of 

Sigel's Corps had a few minutes before retired from that position, his ammunition being exhausted, Gen. Stevens replaced it by 

Benjamin's Battery, consisting of four 20-

pound Parrotts. 

As for Benjamin's Battery (E, 2d 

U.S. Artillery), 

Benjamin had been on our front, a little to 

our left, and was moving obliquely to the left 

across an open field, when he encountered 

the fire of the enemy's skirmishers, and as a 

battery opened on the . . . heights at the 

same moment. he wheeled his battery, gaining the pik.e, and passing to the right, took, 

his position, and unlimbered ... , but in the 

open space . . . he overturned one of his 

caissons full of ammunition .... 

On the twenty-ninth at 1300 Benjamin's fire had succeeded in neutralizing the Confederate artillery sufficiently 

to enable Stahel to cross south of the 

turnpike at the Groveton crossroads, 

reestablishing contact with McClean, 

his right resting on the road junction. 

Confederate skirmishers were about 300 

yards west and were fmally pushed back 

by "aggressive volleying," according to 

Stahel. 

Benjamin's guns continued to suppress the Confederate artillery, and 

Leasure continued, 

meanwhile, Benjamin was plying his 20-

pounders as cooly as if he were practising for 

fun, though the concentrated fire of five bat· 

teries. at fifteen hundred yards, was telling 

upon his men and horses, as well as upon the 

men of my command in support. ... Benjamin himself rode slowly about among his 

guns, and sometimes dismounted to point a 

piece. He used a crutch, owing to a wound 

received in a previous battle, and his lieutenants ably seconded him. 

The gun that had had itS muzzle blown off 

still stood grinning with itS ragged jaws towards the enemy, and the gunners withdrew 

it a few rods and buried it, placing a headand foot-stone to it, a~ if it were the grave of 

a soldier lef1 alone in his quiet rest. 

At 1600 on the twenty-ninth Schenck 

gradually withdrew eastward to Chinn 

Ridge under growing Confederate artillery fire. The batteries on both sides of 

the road conformed. This was when 

Law's Brigade moved forward to Groveton (c. 1700). 

About 1900 the withdrawal of some 

of Jackson's troops back to the railroad 

after a local attack north of here led 

GeneraLs McDowell and Pope to conclude that the Confederates were retreating. McDowell therefore ordered General Hatch (who had replaced King) to 

begin a pursuit. 

Late on the afternoon of the 29th ultimo I 

was ordered by General McDowell in person 

(who was at the time stationed near the Stone 

House, on the turnpike from Gainesville to 

Centerville) to move the division on the 

39 
Gainesville road in pursuit of the enemy, 

who, he informed me. were retreating. Gibbon's Brigade had been detached to support 

some batteries. With the three other brigades 

of the division and Gerrish's battery of howitzers I proceeded with all the speed possible, hoping by harassing the enemy's rear to 

tum their retreat into a rout. 

After marching about lhree-quarters of a 

mile the Second Regiment of U.S. Sharpshooters was deployed to the front as skirmishers. the column continuing up the road 

in support. The advance almost immediately 

became warmly engaged on the left of the 

road. Two howitzers were then placed in 

position. one on each side of the road. and 

Doubleday's Brigade was deployed to the 

front, on the left of lhe road. and moved up 

to the support of the skirmishers. We were 

met by a force consisting of three brigades of 

infantry, one of which was posted in the 

woods on the left, parallel to and about an 

eighth of a mile from the road. The two other 

brigades were drawn up in line of battle, one 

on each side of the road. These were in tum 

supponcd by a large portion of the rebel 

force~. estimated by a prisoner, who was 

taken to their rear, at about 30,000 men. 

drawn up in successive lines, extending 11/z 

miles to the rear. Doubleday's Brigade 

moved to the front under a very heavy fire, 

which they gallantly sustained; but the firing 

continuing very heavy, Hatch's brigade, 

commanded by Colonel Sullivan, was also 

deployed. and moved to the support of General Doubleday. Patrick's brigade, which had 

been held in reserve, took up a position on 

the opposite side of the road, completely 

commanding it. The struggle, lasting some 

three-quarters of an hour, was a desperate 

one. being in many instances a hand-to-hand 

conflict. 

Night had now come on, our loss had been 

severe, and the enemy occupying a position 

in the woods on our left which gave them a 

flank fire upon us, I was forced to give the 

order for a retreat. The retreat was executed 

in good order. the attempt of the enemy to 

follow being defeated by a few well-directed 

volleys from Patrick's Brigade. (General 

John P. Hatch) 

General Hood's version as recorded in 

official records: 

40 

At sunset an order came to me from the 

commanding general to move forward and 

attack the enemy. Before, however, this division could come to attention it was attacked, 

and I instantly ordered the two brigades to 

move forward and charge the enemy, which 

they did most gallantly. driving them in confusion in (ront of them. Colonel Law's brigade. being engaged with a very heavy force 

of the enemy. captured one piece of artillery, 

three stand of colors, and 100 prisoner~. and 

the Texas brigade three stand of colors. It 

soon became so very dark that it was impossible to pursue the enemy any farther. 

Some of Pope's staff a mile eastward 

observed the fight. 

When it became quite dark there was a 

beautiful pyrotechnical display about a mile 

distant on our left, and near the Warrenton 

Turnpike, occasioned by a collision of 

King's Division of M'Dowell's Corps with 

the enemy's right. The sparkling lines of 

musketry shone in the darkness like fire-flies 

in a meadow, while the more brilliant flashes 

of artillery might have been mistaken for 

swamp meteors. This show continued for an 

hour, the advancing and receding fires indicating distinctly the surging of the battle 

tide; and at this time not the slightest sound 

either of small-arms or artillery wa\ perceptible. It seemed at length that the fire of the 

enemy's line began to extend and thicken, 

while ours wavered and fell back, but still 

continued the conte:.t. Between eight and 

nine o'clock it ceased entirely, and we returned to our head-quarters station, where 

we picketed our horses and prepared to pass 

the night beside a campfire. (Col. David 

Strother, "Personal Recollections of the 

War'') 

At 2100, as Hood's men pressed eastward they captured one gun from Capt. 

George A. Gerrish's Battery (A, New 

Hampshire Light). plus the wounded 

battery commander. 

One remained and continued to fire until 

my men were so near it as to have their faces 

burned by its discharge. 

The battle ended at 2200, when a 

squadron of the 2d New York Cavalry 
charged to cover Hatch's withdrawal. 

Law's Confederates chewed it up badly. 

This occurred about midway between 

the Confederate Cemetery and the Stone 

House. Hood then pulled back to a point 

south of Brawner's Woods. 

The next day. between 0700 and 

1200. Reynolds' Division moved forward from near the Henry House and 

cleared the area around the Groveton 

crossroads. The 13th Pennsylvania Reserve set up a skirmish line west of the 

intersection and linked with skirmishers 

from the 3d U.S Infantry, who arrived 

after 1200 and were :-.et up on the eru.t 

Jolm B. Hood (1831-1879) was commtssioned imo the Infantry. He resigned on 

17 April 1861 and e111ered Confederate 

service as a lie111erumt of cavalry. He 

led a cavalry force on the Peninsula before promotion on 6 Man·h /862 to 

brigadier general and command of the 

!has Brigade. He led this force durinR 

the Se~·en Days Battle:.. at Second 

Manassa.r, and til Anttetmrr. Hood was 

prt~moted to major genaal and commmul of a division in October 1862. He 

saw action at Fredericksburg and lost 

a11 tlrm at Gettysburg. Upon recovery, 

Hood commanded a reinforced corps 

at Chickamau.~a 111 St'ptember 1863. 

where Ire lost a let(. 1/e returned to 

corps command and was promoted to 

lieutenant genua/ in February 1864. 

side of the modern StonewaJI Memory 

Gardens. Syke\ Division set up northeast of the Confederate Cemetery. 

On the thirtieth of August at 1200, 

Reynolds pulled back to Chinn's Ridge 

under pressure from Longstreet's skirmishers and reported a Confederate 

buildup south of the Pike. 

At 1345 Ha1leu 's Battery (0, 5th 

U.S.) occupied the hill by the 14th 

Brooklyn Monument. 

At 1430 Warren's Brigade of Sykes' 

Division deployed south of the Pike to 

support Hazlett. 

Railroad Parking Lot 

Retrace your route 50 yards west 

to the intersection of Route 29 and 

CR 622. Thrn right (north) on CR 

622. Proceed .6 mile to a small parking area on your left. Pause and look 

to the west across the swath cut through 

the woods by the Park Service. Your 

view is across a small valley to a rise on 

which may be seen a brown sandstone 

monument. This was one of two erected 

41 
1 I 1 I • 

Manassas, Virginia, Battlefield, /900. 

in the battle area in the winter of 1865 by 

GeneraJ William Gamble's U.S. Cavalry 

Brigade. Its inscription reads: "In memory of the patriots who fell at Groveton 

August 28, 29. 30, 1862." Its mate may 

be found on Henry Hill near the visitors' 

center. The white marker visible on the 

valley floor was originally erected by a 

Private AJbee, a soldier from Wisconsin 

Company G, 1st Regiment, Berdan's 

Sharpshooters. Both markers will be 

visited walking from the next stop. 

Continue northward .5 mile to a 

parking lot on the right side of the 

road. This part of the tour will entail 

a walk of about . 75 mile in a loop 

along part of the old railroad bed. 

The railroad was begun in the 1850s in 

an effort to link Alexandria directly with 

the Manassas Gap Railroad at Gainesville. thence to western markets. The 

project was a failure and although the 

well-made cuts and fills were completed. no track was ever laid on it and it 

has never been used for its intended 

purpose. 

Again. on 28 August between 1200 

42 

and 2400, this area was occupied by 

Col. Bradley T. Johnson's Brigade of 

Lawton's Division after its midday skirmish with Reynolds' Division. The position also marks the approximate center 

of Jackson's Corps line. 

Five separate Federal auacks occurred 

on this spot or within 800 yards to the 

north or south: 

0500-1200-Schurz (Krzyzanowski) 

north of you. 

1000- 1200-Milroy's attack, in this 

vicinity. 

1530-Hooker (Grover), north of you. 

1600-Reno (Nagle) in this vicinity. 

1700-Keamy (Robinson/Birney) north 

of you. 

Walk from the parking lot south 

across the road to the sign describing 

the railroad. 

On 29 August between 0530 and 

1200, Krzyzanowski's Brigade of 

Schun 's Division reached the railroad 

about 800 yards north of here. He had 

lost touch with Milroy to his south and 
Schimmelfennig to his north. When he 

thinned his lines to regain contact, a 

Confederate counterattack from Gregg's 

Brigade thrust him back. He rallied his 

troops and regained a line on the railroad. The position as seen from the 

Confederate side is described by one of 

Gregg's men: 

Our position upon this hill or rocky knoll 

was slightly in advance of Jackson's general 

line: here the ground rising to some extent. 

the grade of the railroad bed, in our immediate front, rendered the depth of the cut about 

six feet, but sloping away to our right and 

left. reduced it to one or two feet on our 

flanks, while further on our right m front of 

Thomas' Brigade, it rose to an embankment. 

The ground upon our side of the road-bed 

was almost entirely bare, while on the other 

side it was covered by a thick growth of 

brush. On our right, too. this growth extended to (within] about fifty yards of our flank, 

while on our left. at the same distance. was a 

field enclosed by a worm fence. The portion 

of this field nearest our position was cleared 

and open. but on one side of the field, furthest from us, there was a stand of com 

closely covering it. This position was important, not only because it was our extreme 

left, but because of the Sudley Road, which 

it commanded. (Edward McCradv 

"Gregg's Bde in the 2d Manassas") -

Knyzanowski's Brigade remained in 

line until it was relieved at 1400 by 

Kearny's Division. Earlier, about noon, 

Schimmelfennig's Brigade had come 

west of the Sudley-Manassas Road and 

seized part of the railroad north of 

Krzyzanowski. 

Walk about 150 yards south along 

the railroad embankment until you 

encounter a trail forking to your left. 

Take this left fork about 20 yards to 

the Park Service marker showing a 

terrain photograph. 

On the twenty-ninth between 1000 

and 1200, when Milroy heard the fighting to his north (Krzyzanowski and 

Gregg). he eventually moved toward it 

and attacked Trimble's Brigade, Lawton's Division, just south of where the 

Groveton-Sudley Road crosses the unfinished railroad. Milroy reported, 

the two regiments sent to Schurz were 

soon hotly engaged, the enemy being beh.ind 

a railroad embankment, which afforded 

them an excellent breast work. The railroad 

bad to be approached from the cleared 

ground on our side through a strip of thick 

timber from 100 to 500 yards in width .... I 

observed that my two regiments engaged 

were being driven back out of the woods by 

the terrible fire of the rebels. 

I then saw the brave Colonels Cantwell 

and Zeigler struggling to rally their broken 

regiments on the rear of the forest out of 

which they had been driven, and sent two of 

my aides to assist them and a:;sure them of 

immediate support. They soon rallied their 

men and charged again and again up to the 

railroad. but were driven back each time 

with great loss. I then sent the Second Virginia to their support, directing it to approach the railroad at the point on the left of 

my other regiments. where the woods ended, 

but they were met by such a destructive ftre 

from a large rebel force that they were soon 

thrown into confusion and fell back in disorder. The enemy now came on in overwhelming numbers. General Carl Schurz had been 

obliged to retire with his two brigades an 

hour before, and then the whole rebel force 

was turned against my brigade, and my 

brave lads were dashed back before the 

storm of bullets like chaff before the tempest. I then ordered my reserve battery into 

position a ~hort distance in the rear, and 

when five guns had got into position one of 

the wheel horses was shot dead, but I ordered it to unlimber where they were, and 

the six guns mowed the rebels with grape 

and canister with fine effect. My reserve 

regtment, the Third Virginia. now opened 

with telling effect. Colonel Cantwell, of the 

Eighty-second Ohio, was shot through the 

brain and instantly killed while trying to rally his regiment during the thickest of the 

fight. 

While the storm was raging the fiercest 

General Stahel came to me and reported that 

he had been sent by General Schenck to 

43 
support me, and inquired where he should 

place his brigade. I told him on my left, and 

help support my battery. He then returned to 

his brigade, and soon after being attacked 

from another quarter I did not again see him 

during the day. I was then left wholly unsupported, except by a portion of a Pennsylvania regiment, which I found on the field, and 

stood by me bravely during the next hour or 

two. 1 then rallied my reserve regiment and 

broken fragments in the woods ncar my battery and sent out a strong party of skirmishers to keep the enemy at bay while another party went forward without arms to get 

off as many of our dead and wounded as 

possible. I maintained my ground, skirmishmg. and occasionally firing by battalion, 

during the greater part of the afternoon. 

Grover's Brigade of Kearny's Division came on the field and supported 

Milroy about 1100. 

At 1200 a gap between Milroy and 

Krzyzanowski was filled by Carr's New 

Jersey Brigade of Hooker's Division. 

... was ordered into the wood . . . I sent 

in the 6th and 7th N.J. Vols. Afterwards 

received orders to take the balance of the 

brigade into the woods, which I did at about 

2 I'.M. Here I at once engaged the enemy ... 

44 

Philip Kearny (1815-1862) served as 

aide to the commanding general of the 

Army between 1840 and 1846, after 

which he commanded a cavalry compa11)' in the campaign against Mexico 

City. He resigned in 1851, eventually 

moving 10 France where in 1859 he 

earned his second [,egion of Honor. 

Kearny returned to the United States 

in 1861 to be commissioned brigadier 

general of volunteers. He first led the 

Jersey Brigade; then i11 1862 was assigned command of the 3d Division in 

Heintzelman's Ill Corps. Army of the 

Potomac. Promoted to major general 011 

4 July 1862, he had see11 action on the 

Peninsula before fighting at Second 

Manassas. Kearny was killed at Chantilly, Virginia. on I September 1862. 

holding my position until our ammunition 

wa, all expended. About4 o'clock we were 

relieved by Gen Reno, but did not reach the 

skirt of the woods before a retreat was made 

and the woods occupied by the enemy. 

(Carr occupied the area from trail fork to 

north of the parking lot.) 

Walk a farther 100 yards down this 

trail to a point where it forks to the 

right. Step down the right fork and 

pause. 

At 1600 Nagle of Reno's Division relieved Carr and was immediately attacked by Douglas' Brigade of Lawton's 

Division. 

I gave the order to advance. The line had 

advanced but a few steps when the left was 

struck with such violence by a regiment 

(which continued the line to the left) which 

had broken that the (7lst New York). which 

was on the left of the brigade line. was almost carried away with it. I hastily rode to 

this part of the line ... and endeavored to 

stay this disgraceful retreat, but it was in 

vain; the tide could not be stemmed. On they 

rushed over and through my line perfectly 

panic stricken. breaking and carrying away 

with them the left of my line. The enemy 
~eeing this charged after them. I then endeavored to throw back my line to give the 

enemy a flank fire . This I found • .. impracticable. the wood being too den~e to execute 

the movement. By this time the enemy had 

availed them.,elve~ of the large interval 

opened on my left and poun:d through in 

large number~. and had got 50 or 60 pace~ in 

my rear, giving my line an enfilading and 

rever..e fire. They. however. !'>OOn ceased firing, a-; they were so milled up a~ to endanger 

their own men: they then commenced taking 

prisoners. Finding my line completely 

flanked and turned. and in danger of being 

entirely cut off. I gave the order to fall back. 

which was done in as good order as could be, 

situated as we were. After extricating the 

brigade from its entanglement, I reformed 

the line and immediately sent forward skirmishers upon the line we had occupied. and 

followed them myself. 

Also at 1600 Nagle counterattacked 

and Milroy tried to support. The 26th 

New Hampshire moved south of the 

parking lot, the 48th Pennsylvania 

across it with the 2d Maryland to its 

north just inside the present woods. The 

experience of the 48th Pennsylvania was 

typical. 

The regiment advanced firing for about a 

quarter of a mile. when Lt. Col. Sigfried 

halted it. commanded "cease firing,·· ordered an advance with bayonets, which were 

fixed • . . the enemy being driven out of 2 

ditches. one of them being an old railroad 

cut. . . . Receiving a volley of musketry 

from the rear. and supposing that some union 

troops were firing by mistake •.. the more 

frequently the colors were raised and spread 

out to the supposed friends in the rear. the 

more rap1d the musket firing therefrom. 

{O.C. Bosbwhell, The 48th in the War) 

The attacking Confederates were 

troops from Johnson's and Stafford's 

brigades of Starke's Division. They attacked through Milroy into Nagle's rear. 

Hampton's Battery F, Pennsylvania 

Light Artillery tried to delay the attack. 

Sergeant J. G. Beatty. commanding the 

left gun of the left section, recounted, 

our li<!Ction was ordered to [Milroy\] support, and one section. the left (Lieut. 

lnsh's), passed through a strip of wood~ and 

up to Gen. Milroy's line, and as we were 

moving by the left. my piece was in the lead. 

Gen. Milroy pointed out the spot where I 

should place my gun I obeyed the order and 

commenced firing canister at three lines of 

rebel!> just beyond the Railroad Cut, and after each shot, io looking under the rising 

smoke, I observed that the rebel~ were run· 

ning toward us and disappearing. and I so 

reported to Lieut. Irish. who, with Gen. Milroy, was close on my left. We had fired ~ix 

shots, and were loading the seventh when 

General Milory and Lieut. Irish, having rode 

far enough in advance to see into the Railroad Cut, and at this moment the rebel yell 

was raised and Law's [Johnson's and 

Stafford's) rebel brigade charged our ... 

section (the only two pieces that crossed the 

strip of woods). Just then Gen. Milroy 

passed close in front of my gun and gave the 

order to faU back, while at the same time. I 

had taken the precaution to reverse my limber, and the gun in recoiling passed the trJiJ 

under the limber. and the handspike striking 

a l>mall stump could not. for the moment, be 

disengaged, and the rebels being upon us I 

gave the order" Drive on." and all started to 

fall back to the other section of our battery 

on the other side of the wood. 

At this moment Corp'l Hess. of my piece, 

jumped on the limber-chest with his face to 

the rear, and in going to my hor..c 1 passed 

close to him, looked in his face. and in the 

next lOStant he was shot in the forehead . . . . 

Before the limber moved the dead body of 

Henry Hess dropped off the chest. The reb· 

cis then came forward and took my gun, at 

the trail of which lay the body of Corp'l 

Hess. (J. G. Beauy. "Second Bull Run") 

ln the official records Bradley T. 

Johnson said of this attack: 

In the afternoon the enemy carried the 

embankment to my left. and while I was 

trying to rally some men not of my command (the enemy] came close on me and 

between my command and the railroad cut. 

The men were lying down at the time in 

ranks. concealed, and unexpected. I ordered 

a charge, and with a yell the Second Brigade 

went through them. shattering, breaking. 

45 
Starke's ~ouisiana Brigade, defending the Deep Cut. 30 August. (From Battles and 

Leaders) 

and routing them. The struggle was brief, 

but not a man faltered, and with closed ranks 

their rush was irresistable. They drove the 

enemy into the railroad cut and out of it. 

Johnson and Stafford rampaged 

through Milroy's troops, forcing him 

and Nagle to retire. 

Continue another 100 yards down 

tbe trail until you reach a small 

stream, sometimes bridged by the 

Park Service; pause. 

On 30 August at 1600 Porter attacked, Butterfield's Division on the 

left, Hatch's on the right, Sykes' in support. Heintzelman's and Reno's Corps 

confom1cd farther north. Patrick's Brigade of Hatch's Division was in this 

area. Patrick described the attack: 

The 21st and 35th N.Y. moved steadily 

forward ... untillhe whole had reached lhe 

further edge of the wood, lhe left (35lh) 

having on its front a strong body of the 

46 

enemy in a cornfield and behind a railroad 

bank, after temporary confusion ... the 21st 

eros-~ed the fence . . . where it sustained a 

most galling crossfire, which was returned. 

and the regiment moved forward to the ditch 

about midway between the fence and the RR 

eml>ankmcnt. (Marsena Patrick. Journal) 

The 15th Alabama of Trimble's Brigade, Lawton's Division, defended this 

area. William A. McClendon described 

the attack from his view. 

"Look out boys. they arc coming, lots of 

'em." They just simply jammed up against 

the embankment. . . . They were so thick 

that it was impossible to miss them. Cicero 

Kirkland of my company, . . . mounted on 

top of our breastwork and poured buck and 

ball ln!O them as fast as some of the Boys 

could load and hand him a musket. 

Walk a farther 100 yards until the 

trail emerges into the open at the 

base of the incline midway in the 

swath leading to the monument 

viewed earlier from the road. Private 
Albee's simple marker is about 40 

yards to your left front (south). 

Pause. 

Robert's Brigade of Butterfield's Division attacked up what is now the open 

swath. Week's Brigade was just on its 

western edge. MaJor William Grower of 

the 17th New York reported, 

we crossed the road. the men scrambling 

over the fence on the other !.ide. and moved 

forward ~teadily in quick time. No sooner 

had we appeared in plain view of the enemy 

than he opened a tremendou~ lire of artillery 

and mu~kctry on our advandng hne ... 

steadily closing the huge gaps made in the 

ranks .... I now gave the word "double 

quick. charge" and with a mad yell the gallant fellows rushed up the hill to what was 

almost certain death. 

We now reached a sort of plateau. a battery on the l>ummit of the hill playing upon 

us, while another in the right opened with 

. canister, completely enfilading our 

lines .... 

Anthony Graves. a member of the 

44th New York. recalled. 

their fire . . . made ~ad havoc in our 

ranks; the rain of 'hot and shell . . . was 

something terrible. About midway across 

this open field was a dry brook into which 

many of our men fell for 'hehcr. 

Walk the approximate 200 yards 

up the incline to the south side of the 

monument. Look back over the open 

space traversed by the Federals. You 

are . 8 mile from Battery Heights and 

would have been in full view of S. D. 

Lee's gunners on Douglas Heights in 

1862. 

Bradley T. Johnson's Brigade defended in this area. He reported, 

about 4 p.m. the movements of the enemy 

were suddenly developed in brigade manner 

They stormed my position. deploying in the 

woods m brigade, up the hill on the thicket 

held by the Forty-eighth and the railroad cut 

occupied by the Forty-~econd: but as they 

uncovered from the wood in which they had 

been massing during the whole day I ordered 

the Twenty-first and Irish Battalion to 

charge, which they did with empty guns. I 

halted them under the shelter of the cut, 

where. with the Forty-second, they held 

back the enormous force pressing up the hill 

on them. Lieutenant Dabney had unfortunately been wounded early in the day, and 

Captain Goldborough, whom I had ordered 

to take command. had fallen by my !>ide in 

the charge, leaving the Forty-eighth without 

a superior officer with them, and they consequently were soon driven out by the tremen· 

dous odds against them; but for a short lime 

the three regiments above named, vir., the 

Forty-second, Twenty-firS!, and Irish Battalion. by themselves breasted the storm. driving back certainly twenty times their numbers. As soon as their position was known 

the rest of the division came to their support, 

except the Third Brigade. which under Colonel Taliaferro, was employed in whipping a 

division by itself. Before the railroad cut the 

fight was most obstinate. I saw a Federal 

flag hold its position for half an hour within 

10 yards of a flag of one of the regiments in 

the cut and go down six or eight times. and 

after the fight 100 dead were lying 20 yards 

from the cut, some of them within 2 feet of 

it. The men fought until their ammunition 

was e~hau:.ted and then threw stones. Lieut. 

Lewis Randolph, of the battalion, killed one 

with a stone, and I saw h1m after the fight 

with his skull fractured. Dr Richard P. Johnson. on my volunteer staff. having no arms 

of any kind, was obliged to have recourse to 

this means of offense from the beginning. As 

line after line surged up the hill time after 

time, led up by their office~. they were 

dashed back on one another until the whole 

field was covered with a confused mass of 

struggling, running, routed Yankees. They 

failed to take the cut. The battle of the left 

wing of the army was over, and the whole of 

Jackson's corps advanced about a mile, its 

right on the Warrenton road toward the stone 

bndge. facing Bull Run. I was not further 

engaged that day. 

After examining the monument 

and the railroad cut, proceed north 

back along the railroad embankment 

until you reach the Park Service 

painting showing the Confederate 

47 
defense. Pause. 

Stafford's Brigade on Johnson's north 

also began to run low on ammunition. 

He reported, 

the men procured some from the dead 

bodies of their comrades. but the supply was 

not sufficient, and in the absence of ammunition the men fought with rocks. 

They were relieved by Brockenbrough 's Brigade before the situation 

became critical. Porter's assault was repulsed all along the line by about 1600 

and Longstreet then began his devastating counterattack. 

Continue along the embankment 

across the Deep Cut marked by the 

Park Service back to CR 622. Pause. 

At 1530 on the twenty-ninth Hooker 

committed Grover's Brigade about 800 

yards north of the parking lot as part of 

what was supposed to have been a coordinated attack with Kearny's Division. 

Milroy recalled, 

toward evening General Grover carne up 

with his New England brigade. l saw him 

48 

Cuvier Grover (1828-1885), a11 1nfan· 

try officer with extensive frontier experience, evaded Confederates with his 

command from Fort Union, New Mex· 

ito, in 1861. Appointed brigadier general in 1862. he led a brigade on the 

Peninsula and at Second Manassas. He 

was transferred in December 1862 to 

the XIX Corps in Louisiana to command a division there and later in the 

Shenandoah. He was wounded at 

Cedar Creek and brevetted for gal· 

Lamry there. 

fomling a line to auack the rebel stronghold 

in the same place I had been aJI day, and 

advised him to form line more to the left. 

and charge bayonets on arriving at the railroad track, which his brigade executed with 

such telling effect as to drive the rebels in 

clouds before their bayonets. 

The attack began with a staff officer 

approaching Grover. 

"What doe~ the general want me to do 

now?'' General Grover asked. 

"Go into the woods and charge," was the 

answer. 

"Where is my support?" the commander 

inquired. 

"It is coming." 

After waiting fifteen minutes for this 

body to appear, the officer returned and 

said that General Hooker was much displeased because the charge had not been 

made. 

"Colonel, do you know what we are going 

to charge on?" 

A private inquired of the colonel. 

"Yes: a good dinner." {Henry N. Blake) 
A soldier from the 2d New Hampshire described the attack. 

Colonel !Gilman] Marston came forward 

and gave the order to "fix bayonets!" Grover 

rode the length of the line, telling the men 

they were to fire one volley, then rely upon 

the bayonet .... Slowly and steadily the line 

went forward. No sound was heard but the 

crashing of the brush, with an occasional 

muttered order, such as "Give way to the 

right," or "Give way to the left." The left of 

the line approached an open field, and a halt 

was ordered while Grover went forward to 

reconnoiter the front. ... Many of Milroy's 

dead and wounded were scattered about; it 

was also evident that a few of his effectives 

were lying low, watching the enemy, near the 

edge of the open in front of the 2d. Some of 

these arose and passed to the rear as Grover's 

line came up. 

At any rate, after spying out the land to the 

front, Grover moved the brigade a considerable distance by the right flank before closing with the enemy. . . . Hardly had the 

advance been resumed when there was a 

crash of Rebel musketry, an answering roar 

of Yankee cheers. and almost instantly the 

2d was pouring over the railroad embankment. The dash was evidently a suprise to 

the Rebels, as most of them, having delivered their fire, were closely hugging the 

ground under cover of the bank. They were 

expecting a retum volley, apparently, but had 

not anticipated looking into the muzzles of 

the guns that delivered it. Those that made a 

fight were instantly shot or bayoneted, and in 

less time than it has taken to write it the first 

Rebel line was disposed of. Some threw up 

their hands and cried for mercy: some, 

doubtless, .. played possum," lying as if 

dead and making no sign: while others, as 

soon as they could realize what had happened. made a break for the rear, closely 

followed by the men of the 2d, now wild 

with rage of bailie. There was a desperate 

dash for a stand of Rebel colors. but they 

were saved by the fleetness of their bearer 

and the devoted bravery of the color guard. 

The fragments of the first line were driven 

in upon a second, a few rods beyond the 

railroad. and here occured the most desperate fighting of the day-a hand-to-band 

melee with bayonets and clubbed muskets. 

The second Rebel line was routed and scattered to the rear. 

The Confederate reaction was equally 

violent. Pender's Brigade was rushed to 

support Thomas' crumbling line. 

My men moved forward very gallantly, 

driving the enemy back across the railroad 

cut, through the woods on the opposite side. 

... My line was halted on the edge of the 

field in front of the enemy where I remained 

some little while. . . . My men advanced 

well receiving grape from their batteries; but 

support waited for in vain .... l withdrew. 

and marched back to the railroad cut. 

Cross CR 622 and walk about 100 

yards north of the parking lot along 

the railroad bed. Pause. 

Meanwhile, at 1700, Kearny's Division had taken over the line to the north 

from Schurz's Division (c. 1400). At 

1700, finally after four hours' preparation, he sent Robinson's and Birney's 

Brigades into the attack. The assault 

pushed tlhe Confederates over the railroad and! west of the Sudley-Groveton 

Road. Colonel Nelson A. Gesner of the 

lOlst N.Y. described the action. 

We were then ordered to march forward 

and attack the enemy. We moved forward by 

the flank into the woods, and upon arriving 

near the enemy formed line of battle--the 

Fortieth New York and One hundred and 

first being together, the Fortieth being on our 

right. We then advanced and soon the enemy 

opened a heavy fire of musketry on us. The 

line then halted and commenced firing. After 

a few minutes the order was given, "Forward," and the regiment went on in splendid 

order, through a heavy fire, at a doublequick. The enemy could not stand the 

charge, but broke and fled (a few now and 

then turning to fire). After falling back some 

distance they came to a deep cut. Here they 

attempted to rally, and partially succeeded. 

We arrived too soon, however, and they 

again broke and fled. We continued to drive 

them before us, stopping now and then to 

fire a volley into them, until we had driven 

them clean out of the woods into the clear 

space beyond. Here we received a heavy 

49 
~:ros~-fire from the left at a distance of about 

200 paces. I here turned. and found that my 

regiment in the charge had got somewhat 

scauered, and ordered a halt in order to reform After remaining here half an hour. and 

continuing w fire upon and receive the fire 

of the enemy. I found that their fire was 

increasing and working more to our rear. Not 

))eeing any support on our left, and finding 

that combined strength of the Fortieth and 

One hundred and first would not amount to 

over 250 men. I deemed it prudent to retire. 

and accordingly the command was given. 

and we fell back in good order at quick-time. 

We halted in the center of the woods and 

took shelter behind a ~ort or rine pit. built of 

fence rails. until we were ordered by General 

Birney to fall back and camp. 

were reinforced by Early's and Forno's 

Brigades from Lawton's Division. 

which counterattacked from the southwest. flanking Kearny's units. Early 

stated, 

my brigade ... advanced upon the enemy 

through a field and drove him from the 

woods and out of the railroad cut, cros~ing 

the Iauer and following in pursuit several 

hundred yards beyond ... it was not desirable that I go beyond the railroad and as ~oon 

as I could arrest the advance of my brigade I 

moved it back to the railroad and occupied it. 

This was the last attempt made by the enemy 

on the afternoon of ... the 29th. 

Return to your vehicle and go on A. p Hill., h"dP""·~: :~~~h ~~:~::,·cv 

Thrn nort h from the parking lot 

back onto CR 622. After going about 

300 yards, t he road makes a second 

sharp curve. This ma rks the approxima t e po i nt wher e o n t he h igh 

ground to the east Crenshaw's Virginia Ba tte r y esta blis hed itself. 

Pause if traffi c a llows. 

Artilleryman William Ellis Jones, 

Crenshaw's (Virginia) Battery, recorded 

in his diary, 

Skirmishing commenced early in this 

morning. We were put in a commanding 

position on a slight rise in an open field and 

had to keep a bright lookout for yanh. We 

had not been there long before a column of 

them were seen making their way through a 

comfield about a hundred yards off, when 

we o~ned fire. for I the enemy] skecdaddled 

ingloriously. We were under a hot fire from 

one of their batteries. shells bursting and 

~eauering their fragments all around u~ but 

doing no damage to either the men or the 

horses. We were preuy quiet after this. 

50 

Continue 1.3 miles to a stop sign 

and the junction of CR 622 with SR 

234. Thrn right (south) and pull into 

the Sudley Church parking lot a lmost .1 mile on your rigth. The original Sudlcy Church was built in 1814 but 

was so badly damaged during the war 

that it was ultimately rebuilt by the 

1880s. Some of the funds for its restoration came from fonner Federal soldiers. 

grateful for the kindness shown by local 

residents to Union wounded. The building was used as a Union hospital at the 

Battle of First Manassas. Confederates 

may have used it briefly sometime during Second Manassas. 

On the twenty-eighth between 0600 

and 1200, Schimmelfennig's Brigade of 

Schurz's Division engaged Gregg's 

South Carolina Brigade and pressed it 

back. It first approached east of the 

road. then shifted to the west. Major 
Sudley Church. 

Franz Blessing, 74th Pennsylvania Infantry, described the experience. 

The regiment was then ordered to the left, 

where it took iL~ position in the general battle 

line, after advancing about 400 yards under 

the heavy fire of the enemy, driving the I alter 

back and out of his positions; but by the 

withdrawing of a regiment stationed on the 

left of the Seventy-fourth the enemy took 

advantage, and, outflanking us. we were 

forced back about 100 yards. Forming again 

in column for attack the regiment advanced 

in quick time toward the enemy. who gave 

way until he arrived at the other side of the 

railroad dam. Here again flanked by tbe enemy, and under a galling fire of grape-shot 

and canister. the regiment had to leave its 

posiuon, which it did by making a flank 

movement to the left, forcing the enemy to 

withdraw from the woods. We advanced 

over our former position, capturing an ambulance with two wounded officers, to the 

!>eam of the woods. At this point a heavy 

shower of grape-shot and canister pouring 

into us, we withdrew to the railroad dam. 

After resting here for about thirty minutes 

we were ordered by General Schurl to support a battery on the extreme right, keeping 

in that position till the battery left. We then 

again joined our brigade. Wearied and exhausted, we camped for the night on the 

same ground the enemy held the night 

previous. 

Lieutenant Colonel Edward McCrady, 1st South Carolina Infantry, described what it was like to be on the 

receiving end of Schimmelfennig's repeated assaults. 

The cheers were soon again heard and the 

breaking of the bushes as they advanced. 

Upon our left, too, this time they came in 

force up the railroad cut, and were soon on 

us with a fire both from front and left flank. 

This time they were in force also to cross 

around upon our right and endeavor thus to 

cover the cut. Here as they advanced they 

came upon Thomas' brigade, posted in the 

thicket on our right. A short resistance was 

made and Thomas' brigade gave way. As the 

enemy followed them they came upon the 

right flanks of Edwards and ourselves. We 

had no time to form a regular line to meet 

them, but such as proved itself equal to the 

task was soon filled up. l directed Companies A. C. and L to wheel to the right, which 

with their reduced numbers just fiJled in the 

space between Colonel Edwards and ourselves. He. too, found some of his men to 

the right. The enemy pressed m on us in 

pursuit of Thomas' men. but here they met 

desperate resistance. They came upon us in 

10 and 20 paces. but our men stood gallantly 

to their posts. The work of death was terrific. 

but as each man fell his place was fllled by 

another. Here Captain Barksdale. Lieuten51 
ants Munro and Hewct:.on. and Sergeant 

Smith. of Company C. distinguished them-

~elve~ by their gallantry and efficiency; but 

this unequal fight could not long have been 

maintained. Fortunately. just at this time 

Colonel Barnes. with the Twelfth. came to 

our assistance. With a shout the Twelfth 

came ,·harging with the bayonet. and the 

Georgian~ having rallied behind and supporting them, the enemy broke and were driven 

back across the cut and far into the wood 

from which they came. 

You arc standing where, later in the 

day about 1700. skinnishers from the 

4th Maine or Birney's Brigade marked 

the northern flank or Kearny's assault. 

Robinson 's Brigade crossed to the 

south. heading. westward against Gregg 

and Branch of A. P. Hill's Division. The 

JOist New York southward sustained 75 

percent casualties in Kearny's attack. 

Randolph's Battery deployed about 

400 yards south. just west of SR 234. to 

support Kearny's attack. 

After passing through the woods we came 

to an open field which was skirted on the 

south and east by woodland . The unfinished 

railroad ... ran diagonally across our front 

on the north and west of this open space. 

(George E. Lewis. History of Battery E. 1st 

R.I. Arty) 

The battery engaged in prolonged 

counter-battery fire. suffering light 

casualties. 

On 30 August about 1600 Gregg's and 

Branch's Brigades of Hill's Division 

pressed Kearny's elements eastward as 

the Federal line conformed to events farther south. 

Picnic Area 0 

Drive south from Sudley Church 

on SR 234 1.2 miles to the park picnic area. Pull into either of the picnic 

sites. Federals using route 234 (Sudley 

Road) reported coming under hostile artillery fire as they pulled off it to the 

west. 

On 29 August at 0600. Krzyzanowski's Brigade of Schurz's Division 

deployed across this area as part of 

Sigel's first attack. 

Hampton's Battery (F. Pennsylvania 

52 

Light) set up beyond the latrine building 

in the middle of the field to support 

Krzyzanowski's attack. 

At 1000 Heintzelman's Corps staged 

through here at midmorning, Kearny 

east of the road and Hooker south and 

west of the picnic area. 

Reno's Corps bivouacked in this area 

the night of 29-30 August and remained 

here until deployed to the rear under 

pressure from Jackson's advance about 

1715 on 30 August. 
Stone House 

Continue south on CR 234 . 5 mile 

to the Stone House at the junction 

with Route 29. There is a parking lotto 

your left adjacent to the house. The 

place was built about 1820 and was used 

as an ordinary. or tavern, probably into 

the 1850s. The building became a hospital during both battles in the area. General Pope established his headquarters 

on Buck Hill directly to the north of the 

house. After visiting the house, walk 

up to the lone cedar on the crest of 

Buck Hill. 

53 
.. 

Stone House. !862. 

On 29 August Pope arrived on the 

field shortly after noon. He first set up 

on the Dogan House hill forward of this 

position. but soon moved to here because it was easier lor everyone to find. 

He then rode forward to inspect the line. 

About 1300. David Strother on hi~ staff 

described arriving at the command post. 

I found the General and Staff grouped 

around a large pine-tree wh1ch ~tood solitary 

on the crest of an open hill. overlooking our 

whole line of bailie. The summit immediately 10 our front wa~ occupied by a line of 

batteries. some thiny or forty pieces, blazmg 

and fuming hke furnaces. Behind these a 

fine brigade of Reno\ command lay resting 

on their arms. To their right ~tood Heinttelman, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearney. whose musketry kept up a contJnuou~ 

roar. Supporting the left of this line of guns 

was Sigel. also sharply engaged with smallamls On an open bluff still funher to the 

left, and on the opposite side of the valley 

traversed by the Warrenton Turnpike, lay 

54 

Schenck's Division. which had been a good 

deal cut up. and was not actively engaged at 

this moment. The dry grass which covered 

the hill he occupied had taken fire. and was 

burning rapidly. occasionally obscuring that 

portion of the field with its smoke. Beyond 

him. on the extreme left of our hne, General 

Reynolds with the Pennsylvania Reserves. 

lay masked from the enemy by a wood . The 

enemy's position can only be known by the 

smoke of his guns. for all his troops and 

baneries arc concealed by the wood. 

Other points of interest arc to be :;ceo 

from this site: 

Sigel's bivouac, night of 28 29 August-Robinson Hill, the White House 

to the southeast. 

Hatch's bivouac, night of 28- 29 August-base of Chinn's Ridge. on the 

southwest side of the road intersection. 

McDowell's approach, 1500. 29 August 

and Porter's c. 0730. 30 August- up 
route 234 from the \(lllth 

McDowell based him~cll ncar the Stone 

Hou~e. but made per~onal recons 

elsewhere. 

Southca\t of road junction along SR 234 

an.: the final po~itton\. IXOO. 30 August. 

ot Meade. Milroy. and Sykes. north to 

MJUth. 

This area to the north was occupied 

by Sigel and Reno th~ evening of the 

di..,a-.ter. 30 August. 

New York Avenue 

From the Stone House d rive west 

on Route 29, 1.1 miles to New York 

Avenue. En route .. 5 mile), west of the 

Stone llou.,e, notice the yellow. greentrimmed farmhouse on a rise on the 

north 'ide of the road It i' on the site of 

thc Dogan Hou~e. ··Roscfield ... marking the area where the 1-edcrab established a heavy gun line against the 30 

August final Confederate assault. Thrn 

left into the avenue and park in the 

small lot on the right. Walk the 150 

yards west up the hill to the 14th 

Brooklyn Monument. 

On 30 August General McDowell ordered Reynolds to pursue the Confederates south of the Pil..e in conjunction 

v. ith Porter's attack farther north. 

About noon Reynold•,' -.kirmishers 

crossed south of here and encountered 

Long~trcet in force '>evcral hundred 

yards to the west. Reynold~ recognized 

the situation and informed McDowell. 

Becoming convinced that the enemy were 

not 111 retreat. but were po'ted m force on our 

left nank. I pushed through the 'kirmbher' 

to the edge of the W()(l(h on the left. gaining 

\lght of the open ground beyond, and advandng myself into the open ground. I found 

a line of ~kinnisher.. of the enemy nearly 

parallel to the line of sl..irmi,h<.'r~ covcnng 

my left nanl... with cavalr) formed behind 

them. perfect!} ~tationary. evidently ma\1.. 

ing a column of the enemy fonned for attack 

on my left !lank when our line ~hould he 

\Ufficicntly advanced. The skirmbhcr~ 

opened fire upon me. and I was obliged to 

run the gauntlet of a heavy fire to gain the 

r<.'ar of my dl\'i!.10n. hl\lng one of my orderlie ... ~ ho had fullowed me through the 

wood\. I 1mmed1ately communicated th1s to 

the commanding general of the corp~. who 

came upon the ground. and directed me to 

form my division to resht thi' attack. the 

di~p<l\ition~ for which were rapidly completed 

Thus about 1330 Reynolds recoiled to 

a p<.)~ttton forward of the Chinn Hou'c 

on the southwest '>lope of Chinn's 

Ridge. About 1545, McDowell relayed 

Pope's order-; for Reynolds to come 

north of the Pike to ..,upport Porter's 

failed attack 

Other troop-. were tu be \Cnt to my \upport. when the command1ng general. ob-

'ervlllg the attack of Porter to have been 

repulsed. ordered me with my divi~ion 

acros\ the field to the rear of Porter, to form 

a line behind which the troops might he 

rallied I immediatcl} \tartcd my d1vi,1on 111 

the direction md1cated. but before the rear ot 

m} column had left the p<hlllon the threat 

ened attack by the enemy\ right began to be 

fell. and the rear hngade. under Colonel 

Andcr~on. with three battcnes of artillery. 

were obliged to form on the ground on which 

they found thcm\elve, to oppose it. Pa"1ng 

aero'' th<' field to the nght '"1th Meade\ and 

55 
Scy muur\ brigade~ and RaiN>m \ bauery, 

my cour'c was d1vencd by the difficult na 

tun: of the ground. and the retn:aung mas,es 

of the broken column~ among troops of 

Hcmttclman \ corps. already formed. by 

which much time wa~ lost and confu~ion 

created. which allowed the enemy to ~weep 

up wuh hi\ right so far as almost w cut us off 

from the pike, lcavmg nothmg but rhe rear 

brigade and the three bauerics of artillery of 

my divi~ion and \Catlered troops of other 

command\ to res1st the ad,·ance of the enemy upon our left. h ''as here that the most 

~evere loss of the dl\ 1s1on was sustamed both 

in men and material. Kerns lo\ing h1s four 

gun\, but not until wounded and left on the 

field; Cooper h1s t:al\son~. 

Colonel Hanlin, commanding Twelfth 

Regiment was hen: severely wounded. The 

brigade under command of Colonel Ander-

\On sustained itself most gallantly. and 

thou!!h severely pushed on both front and 

nank mamtamcd lh posiuon until overwhelmed by number:.. when it fell back, 

takmg up new po~itions wherever the advantages of ground pcm1111ed. 

August thirtteth at 1345 Reynold~· 

withdrawal left Hat.lett's Battery (0, 5th 

U.S.) unsupported on the ridge opposite 

the modern Ridge. First Lieutenant 

Hazlett reported. 

in the afternoon I w;Js ordered by MaJOr 

General Porter to pl<~cc the bauery on " hill 

to the left of the mad. in order to shell the 

w<Xxh m front of our pos1110n until our mfantry advanced. and then tum my guns on 

the enemy's baucries When the order was 

given General Reynolds' division occupied 

the woods on the left and from uf the de:.lgnated (Xl\ltlon. but a\ I Wil~ prcx:ecdmg to it I 

saw h1s division withdrawing. I rode forward 

<1nd found that all the troops hatl hcen withdrawn. not even leaving picket\. /\' thi~ was 

a dangerous positum to place the battery in 

w Hhout a Mrong \Uppon. I asked Colonel 

Warren. commandmg the Fifth and Tenth 

New York Volunteers, 1f he could not give 

me ~lllllC support while I sent back word to 

General Pvrter of the state of affair\ He d1d 

... o. and 1n con\equencc ~aved the battery 

from capture. The firing from the battery 111 

this po~111on was extremely etTcctive as the 

cffcl't was very vb1hlc. 

56 

Soon Colonel Warren informed me that 

the enemy were apprnad11ng through the 

wood~ on my left. and Immediately alter 

they wen: UfX>n him w llh an ovcrv. helming 

force. Colonel Warren\ troop~ were between 

the enemy and the battery. on the left of the 

battery. \O that I could afford him no a~\1\t· 

ancc by my f1rc I immedwtcly limbered up 

and left the held at a \\alk. Although opposed to :1n ovcrwhelmmg force. Colonel 

Warren\ men \tood their ground unul the 

tlattcry was removed. though at a CO\! nf half 

the1r number I would give all praise and 

credit to Colonel Warren <~nd hi' command 

for the noble manner in which they stood 

their ground, thereby preventing the capture 

of thi' battery. 

Warren\ Bngade (5th and lOth New 

York) moved west on the Warrenton 

Pike and overland to a supporting po!>ition. arri\ ing a little after 1300. Warren 

reported, 

this battery was then without support and 

our whole left nank was uncovered. I unmediately aswmcd the responsibility of occupying the place Reynolds· divi,ion had ... -acatcd. and made all the show of force I 

could. For this purpose I deployed threefifths of the Tenth New York Volunteers to 

hold the edge of the W<X><h toward the cnCm) 

on our left. and kcepmg the hfth New York 

Volunteers m reserve ncar l-1. out of view of 

the enemy\ battery at C. Notice of this 

movement uf mine I immediately \Cnt by an 

officer to General Sykc' or General Porter. 

lie found the l<~tter. who (.hrccted me to hold 

on. and \Cnt me mounted orderlic' to keep 

hun informed. He wa,, I believe, ncar the 

point N. where Weed\ battery was placed. 

From the (Xllnt G. I pmbabl) had the best 

v1cw of what followed that the battlefield 

presented. 

A~ ~oon as General But!crfield\ brigade 

advanced up the hill there wa' great commotion among the: rebel force~. and the whole 

\Ide of the hill and edge~ of the \\Oolb 

swarmed with men before un,een. The effect 

wa~ lll)l unlike flushing a covey of quail~. 

The enemy fell back to the line of the nulroad. and t(lilk shelter on the railroad cut and 

behind the embankment and lined the edge:. 

nl the wood' hcyond. Butterfield\ advance 

beyond the brow of the hill B wa' illl(XIS· 
sible, and taking his pOSitiOn his troops 

opened fire on the enemy in front. who from 

his sheltered position returned it vigorously. 

while at the same time a battery, somewhere 

in the prolongation of the line E B, opened a 

most destructive enfilading fire with special 

case-shot. 

II became evident to me that without 

heavy re-enforcements General Butterfield's 

troops must fall back or be :.laughtered, the 

only assistance he received being from Hazlett's battery, which I was supporting. and 

Weed's near N. After making a most desperate and hopeless fight General Butterfield's 

troops fell back, and the enemy immediately 

formed and advanced. Hazlett's battery now 

did good execution on them. and forced one 

Gouvernt~ur K. Warren (1830-1882), a 

Topographical Engineer, wt1s a liemenam colonel of the 5th New York in May 

186/ and fought with it at Big Bethel. 

Virginia. He assumed command of the 

regiment as colonel in August. He led it 

at the Siegt> of Yorktown, then in May 

1862 assumed command of the brigade 

to which it was assigned. He fought in 

all the Peninsula battles and suffered tl 

wound at Gaines Mill. His brigade was 

sacrificed m Second Manassas to buy 

time to prevent a Federal rout. Warren 

was promoted to brigadier general in 

September 1862 and continued to lead 

his brigade at Antietam and Fredericksburg. He was made chief ellgineer of the Army of the Potomac in 

February 1863, a major general in May 

1863. 

column, that advanced beyond the point of 

the wood at A. to fall back into it. Unwilling 

to retire from the position I held, which 

involved the withdrawal of this efficient battery and the exposure of the Oanks of our 

retreating forces, I held on, hoping that fresh 

troops would be thrown forward to meet the 

enemy, now advancing. [The letters appear 

in Warren's report and refer to a map now lost.) 

The 3d U.S. Infantry skirmish line 

north of the Pike in the modern Stonewall Memory Gardens broke up as Porter's auack disintegrated and six companies drifted southward to tie onto l11e 

5th New York behind Hazlett. 

New York Avenue @ 

Return to your car and continue 

southward .25 mile to a traffic loop 

and park in the spaces provided. 

This was the area held so heroically 

by Warren's Brigade against Longstreet's masses. 

On 30 August at 1600 Longstreet 

gave the order to attack. Colonel 1. B. 

Robertson, 5th Texas of Hood's Brigade. described hitting Warren. 

57 
At the edge of the timber the enemy's 

irmishcrlo were encountered by my :-kirmi\her~> and driven hack to a point in the 

timber about 100 yards from the open field 

beyond. Here I encountered the regiment of 

the enemy that had been deployed as skirmi~her~ who had rallied un their right. I 

ordered the regiment to fire on and charge 

them. They broke and were closely pres~ed 

in the open field. where we encountered a 

'ccond line of the enemy in the Sth Regiment 

New York Zouave~. who. after pcrmilling 

the lleeing regiment to pa~~ it~ lines. prc-

~ented a solid front for a ~hort time. Their 

~tand wa~ hut momentary. They gave way 

before the impctuou~ charge of my men and 

llcd. lc;lVing the field strewn with their dead 

and wounded. 

General Warren described the 

tragedy. 

Reynolds' division on my left. probably aware of the superior fmcc of the enemy 

gathering in hb front. fell back from I to· 

ward P. The enemy advanced with rapidity 

upon my po~i inn . with the evident intention 

of capturing Ha~lctt's bauery. The Tenth 

New York was compelled to fall back. 

'ocarcely arriving at the position held by the 

Fifth New York before the enemy. and in 

such a manner as to almo~t completely prevent the Fifth from firing upon them. Whi le I 

wa:. endeavoring to clear them from the front 

the enemy in force opened fire from the 

wood~ on the rear and left llank of the Fifth 

with most fearful effect. I then gave the 

order to face about and march down the hill, 

so as to bring the enemy all on our front, but 

in the roar of mu~ etry I could only be heard 

a short dbtancc. Captain Boyd. ncar me . 

repeated the command. but his men only 

partially obeyed it. They were unwilling to 

make a backward movement. He was 

wounded while trying to execute it. Adjutant 

Sovereign carried the order along the line to 

Captain Win~low. commanding the regiment. and to the other captain~. but wa\ 

killed in the act. Captain Winslow's horse 

wa~ ~hot. Captain Lcwi~. acting. field officer, 

was killed. Captain Hager was killed. Captains McConnell and Montgomery were 

down with wounds, and Lieutenants Raymond. Hoffman. Keyser and Wright were 

wounded. Both color-bearers were ~hot 

down. and all but four of the ~ergeant' were 

killed or wounded. 

Before the colors and the remnant of the 

regiment could be extricated. 298 men of the 

Fifth and 133 of the Tenth New York were 

ki lled or wounded. 

In the T~.:n h New York Lieutenant llcddcn 

was killed, and Captain Dimmick. Lieutenant Dewey, Lieutenant Mosscrop, and Lieutenant Culhane wounded. The colors of both 

regiments were brought off, and the batteries 

we were pwtccting were withdrawn. 

We assisted from the field 77 wounded of 

the Fifth and 8 of the Tenth. The rcmamdcr 

fe ll into the hands of the enemy. Among 

these were Captains Boyd. McConnell. and 

Montgomery. and Lieutenants Wnght and 

Raymond. of the Fifth. and Captain Dim· 

mick. Lieutenants Mosscrop and Dewey. of 

the Tenth. Braver men than those who fought 

and fell that day could not be found. It was 

impossible for us to do more. and. as is well 

known. all the efforts of our army barely 

checked this advance. 

Chinn's Ridge 

Return to Route 29. Turn east 

(right) and retrace your route back 

1.1 miles to the intersection with 

route 234. Turn right (south) on SR 

234 , go .5 mile, a nd make a right 

turn onto a road opposite the drive58 

way to the Visitors' Center. T his park 

road will take you to Chinn's Ridge. 

Follow it .6 mile to a stop sign. Turn 

right and go .3 mile up the hill to the 

parking spaces on your left. You arc 

at the site of Hazel Plain. or the Chinn 
Hou~e. on the \Outh side of Chinn\ 

Ridge. The origin<~l structure represented by the present foundations was 

built in 1804 and wa!>t used a~ a hospital 

after both battles. 

When on 30 Augu't at 1630 

McDowell learned from Reynold' of the 

obvitlll~ Confederate butldup on the 

Fedcral flank, he reacted by 'hifting 

whatever forces he could to Chinn\ 

Rtdge and Henry Hill. 

Nathaniel McLean·, Hrig~tde of 

Schem:k \ Div1sion had hcen on Chinn\ 

R1dge s1nce 1400. apparently overlooJ..cd by hi~ di\ i~t<lll and his corp~ 

(Sigel's). 

McDowell had directed Reynold!> to a 

po\ltiOn around the Chinn How.e. then 

redeployed h1m from there about 1500. 

By thc time Reynold~: la-.t clement. 

Hardtn \ Brigade v. ith Kerns· Battery 

(G. b.t Pennsylvania Light), approached 

the Pike in front of Chinn's Ridge. 

Hood\ men were on it. Hardin at 

McDowell\ direction turned and fought 

a bncl actmn on the ndge center and 

we-.t of Chinn\ Ridge Colonel Hardin 

wa-. severely wounded. Captain Kern~ 

was J..illed and his battery captured. The 

dying Kerns told :-.omc 4th Texas soldiers "I promi!>tcd to drive you back. or 

d1e under Ill) gun'. and I have kept Ill) 

word." 

Jame' Longstreet descnbed his advance. 

My whole line wa' rthhed forward at a 

charge The troops ~prang to tht·ir work and 

moved forward with all the steadme" and 

firmne" that characterites war w om Vl'tcrans. . . The auael\1ng t·nlumns movl'd 

steadily lnmard. dnving the ent•my from h1s 

dlllerem pm.itions as rap1dl) as he toollhem :'v1y battcnes were thrown forward. 

from point 10 point followinl! lhe mowmenb 

ot the general line. The":. however. were 

some\\hat delamcd b) an enlllade lire .•. 

1111 my left Thi' threw more than '" proper 

'hare of fighting upon thl' mlanlry. 

And Colonel McLean dc:-.t:ribed what 

happ\!ncd. 

~1uch to my surpri'e. Gen. Rl'ynold' put 

hJS twop' in motum ;md marched entirely 

past ;md acro~s my I ront to \\hat point I am 

not 1nfom1ed. . . I unmed1atcly changed 

the pos111on of my troop' and deployed 111 

l111e uf batllc the 73d and 25th Ohio reg 

iments fronting the west und to I he left of the 

battery and the 75th and 'i5th Ohio on 

the nght or the battery. thus makmg 01) hne 

of l'lattle fronting the west. \\ith the battery 

111 the center and 2 regiments on each side . I 

l'!lUid by this time \CC thl' enemy advancmg 

on my front and a httlc 10 my right, driving 

hcfore them a reg1ment uf 1\luaves. They 

c;une on rapidly. when some troop~ advanced to meet them lrum beh1nd a hill on 

my nght. These troops were aho dnvcn baclin l'nnfusion. and a' soon "' they got out of 

the way. I opcncd upon the enemy with the 4 

p1cces of artillery. throwing l1rst ~hell. and 

as they ;tpproached nearer. camstcr. I also 

t·ornmcnccd a heavy fire wuh infantry. and 

in a short time the enemy retreated in great 

confu'lon During thb June. my allcmion 

had hccn called l<l a body of troop~ advam; 

ing toward my p<Ntion in the rear of my left 

tlanl\. and suppol>ing them to be l'nemie\, I 

gave the order to turn 2 pieces of artillery 

upon them. bul countermanded it upon the 

a'surance of some onl' who profcs\cd to 

knnw the fact I hat thl'y were our own troop'. 

and I n:adily believed this. a\ !heir clothing 

\\a' dark. and then re,ted ea,)'. thinking reint'nrcl'mcnts were conun~ Ill take position on 

my left and <>ecup) the place vacated b) 

Gen. Re)'nold~ . . Soon ;1ftcr this a heavy 

fmcl' of the enemy. much ~upcrior to rny 

own. marched out of the woods acros' the 

)Jil~it inn formerly oct·upied by Gen. Reynolth. 1n front of my ldl !lank. and swept 

..round 'o as to come 10 heavy Ioree both on 

lhc.: I runt and flanl\ of m) left \\ ing. This 

Ioree opened a he a\ y fire upon the 7 Jd 

Ohio ... I m\Jlled1atd). \~hen thi~ attac.:J.; 

wa' made. gave the tlrder t1> l'hange frolll. 'o 

ll'> to rl'pcl 11 1f poss1blc. hut I he retreat ot I he 

hallcr) at this momc111 mtcrfercd ~ome what 

with the movement. as 11 pas\ed lhrough the 

75th . The 55rh on lll) right flank 

\\heell'd b) hattahon t1• the lett and came up 

59 
into hne . . ,md the other regiment' 'pcedil:y formed on lm tell and delivered 'uch a 

heavy and contmuou~ tire that 111 a ,hort 

time the enem) cca,cd to advance. and comml'nccd to fall bad .. My men followed with 

cheer,. dnving the enemy hack rapidly. 

On the thirtieth of August at 1700 

McLean repdlcd Hood\ and Evans' asc..aults tn desperate fighting . But then he 

had to confront Corse\ Brtg.ade of Kemper\ Diwm>n. 'hh1ch proved to be the 

group seen to h1s rear earlier. Cor'>c approached from the southeast up to the 

Chinn ou~e Private Alexander Huntcr. 17th Virginia. described what happened. 

We neared th.: Chinn llow.e, when suddenly a long line of the enemy r<N: from 

beh1nd an old ~tone wall and poured raight 

in our bro.:;1sts a withenng volley at point 

blank d1,tancc It wa' so unexpected. thb 

anad. .. that 11 strm:l. the long ltne ol men like 

an clectnc ~hocl. . Many were falling killed 

or wounded and but h1r the intrepid coolnes~ 

ot 1l\ colonel. the 17th would have retired 

from the f1cld m d1sorder. . No\\ tndl\ idual bravery made up tnr the Ji,aster. ... 

The line of blue wa' not ftfty yard~ di,tant 

and every man took a sure ci(»C a1m before 

h1s finger pre"ed the tnggcr It \\<1\ a dec1-

s1ve fight ot about 10 minutes. and both s1dcs 

stood up gamely to the1r work. Our foe'> 

were a westem regiment from Ohl(), who 

gave and rcec1vl'd and <lsked no odds 

McLean was pressed back nevertheless. 

The forces pcrmiued to approach our rear 

had got into such a position as to rake u' 

with grape, can1,1er, and musl.etry while we 

were attacl.ed ~evercly in front. Under all 

this, however. my hngade retained the hill 

unttl I myself gave the order to f:tll back 

~lowly ... only when my attention was 

c;1llcd to a heav} force ol the enemy ap· 

proach1ng to attack u' on our then right flank 

but former front I 'a'~ that it would but 

destroy my "hole command to :t\\ait that 

anack. and therdore gave the 11rder under 

wh1ch \\l' left the h1ll 

Generab McDowell and Sigel bmh 

60 

began to react to the wor~enmg. ~ituation 

on the left. McDowell earlier had ordered Hardin's Brigade to turn and 

fight. Then he dtrccted fir~t Tower\ 

then Stile~· Brigade of R1d.eu-.· 01\1· 

:-.ion to cro~s to Chinn's Ridge. Tower\ 

men arrived fm.t 111 good order. Alexander Hunter of the 17th V1rginia 

recalled. 

there wa-. hardly a breathing 'flCII . , • and 

the enemy wa\ upon us with a frc'h 

line . .. 

We were now loading and ftring <It the 

swiftly approachmg enemy. who were about 

200 yards distant, advancing straight towards 

u~ and \houting with th~:1r \tcady hurrah, \O 

different from the Rebel yell It was a try1ng 

moment and proved the m~:llle of the individual man. Some ran or cowered white with 

fear behind the Chinn I lou-.c ... :other' yet 

'tood in an irregular form and loaded and 

fired unnundful of the duM and noi'c of the 

hurtling shell and 'creamtng shot 

When the Union troop~ came up to retake 

the Chinn Hou,c. our men began to g1'e 

ground. On the Yankee .. came 111 'plcndid 

:.tyle. with the Star~ and Stnpc-. wav1ng and 

thetr line cap11all> dressed It \\a' a pcrtcc1 

advance. and some of U\ forgot 10 fire our 

musket-. while watching them. In their front 

hne was a little drummer beating a pa' de 

charge. The only ume we ever heard the 

Inspiriting sound on the battlefield. The 

dauntless ltttle fcllo'"' wJs handling h1' \ticks 

heav). too. for the roll of the drum \\as heard 

above the noi\c of the guns 

Continue no rth d own C hinn 's 

Ridge. The road a fte r leavin g the 

pa rking lot traces the first Federa l 

line until it was turned by Kemper's 

a ttack . About .3 mile down the rid ge 

is a pulloff. Pa use. East of it i" a grove 

of trees with a boulder honoring Col. 

Fletcher Webster, 12th Massachu~clls. 

son of the great orator. The stone was 

brought from Dante! Webster\ home in 

Marshfield. Ma\sachu'letts. and emplaced in 1914 b) the 12th Mas\aehusett\ 

veterans. Continue down t he ridge .3 
mile to the parking lot at the end. 

Tower's Brigade was pushed back 

onto Stiles' men. who fought midway 

down the ridge to protect the guns set up 

there. The lith Pennsylvania was the 

center regiment. 

Here a most murderous fire of musketry 

swept the hill. ... In our front long gray 

lines in echelon formation bristly with Mecl 

and fringed with sheeted Oame. were moving magnificently and steadily through the 

storm. We were upon the open. naked fields. 

Instantly. our fire opened and in as many 

minutes our flag went down 5 time~ . !Phil 

K. Faulk. National Tribune. /9 February 

/88!) 

General Sigel ordered Milroy's Brigade onto the ridge. The 5th West Virginia started out. but Pope countermanded Sigel. sending Milroy to Henry 

Hill. 

At 1730 the 5th West Virginia tied in 

with Schenck's Brigades under Colonels 

Koltes and Krzyzanowski, which were 

committed as Tower and Stiles started to 

collapse. Colonel Gustav Muhlcck of 

the 73d Pennsylvania in Krzyzanowski's 

Brigade described what happened. 

We reached the top of the hill under a 

terrific ~hower of shell, solid shot. chain. 

&c. I deployed at once. The enemy was right 

in front. advancing slowly but steadily in 

deep. dense masses. A galling fire commenced from both sides. To our left. where 

we found the DeKalh regiment isolated from 

their brigade. a baucry of some other corps 

d'armec had been abandoned. The lastnamed regiment. which General Stahel had 

wished Colonel Koltes to take under his temporary command (it being too far off from 

hi~ main body). endeavored to save, the cannons, but in vain. The enemy by this time 

had brought up and posted near the border of 

the woods {~outh-southwest of our brigade) 

two \ections of artillery. which, from a distance of scarcely 200 yards, covered my own 

regiment as well as the others with [a] perfect shower of projectiles. It was at that supreme moment that the brave Colonel Koltcs 

rode up to the front of his brigade. and 

~winging his sword high in the air, while 

ordering his command to take that rebel battery. that a fragment of a ~hell killed both 

horse and rider. A rush was made toward the 

rebel cannons. Some of my men with Second Lieutenant Kennedy. Company F. 

reached the pieces, but were unsupported, 

surrounded. and the lieutenant made a prisoner. He escaped a few moment~ afterward, 

a man of Company D, Seventy-third Pennsylvania Yolunt..:ers. killing the rebel who 

had made him a prisoner. The terrain was 

most unfavorable for deploying. being surrounded right and left by woods, with a deep 

ravine in the rear. and forming a kind of 

clearing not more than two acres in length. 

The combat here raged fierce and terrible 

for about half an hour, when our small regiments. exhausted and decimated and unsupported, had in their tum to fall back. though 

not before Colonel Koltes. who saw the enemy outllank us on the right. had given the 

order to fall back a little on our right and 

make a stand again. By thb time immense 

force~ of the enemy poured through the 

woods in splendid order and fighting desperately. The colors of my regiment had become 

rags. I had lost five of the color-bearers and 

nearly one-half of the eight companies I 

brought into action. Two companies had 

been detailed by General ___ to Mop the 

stragglers. of the corps which did retreat from 

the plain beneath. My acting major. Capt. A. 

Bruckner, had fallen too. My adjutant was a 

prisoner. My own horse had been shot under 

me by four balls. We then slowly left the 

field, still fighting. and taking along the 

dead body of Colonel Koltes, whom my men 

carried that night on muskets to Centreville, 

which latter place the regiment reached rather in broken fragments. and where they rallied again on the next morning. 

The vigorous assault of Corse's Brigade, Kemper's Division. on the Federal 

guns precipitated the clearing of Chinn's 

Ridge. Corse reported, 

at this time. discovering a batlery of the 

enemy to the left and rear of the Chinn 

house, I ordered a charge of the whole line. 

The order was gallantly re~pondcd to and 

brilliantly executed, the enemy being driven 

from their gun~ . Great gallantry was di~

61 
pla)C:d O) all engaged, l.tcutc:nant·Colonc.:l 

[I ·. (, I sr..tnner. Ftrsl Ytrg.ima. da,htng for-

\\artl tn advance of the \\hole line. ''a' the 

fiN to reach the ballcry. and I 'aw him 

dealtng deadl) blow~ with hi~ ~atx-r to the 

Yanr..ce gunners. The steady vctl'r<m ·Jerry. 

with the gallant Twenty fourth. delivered a 

dl.''>tructivc: volley into the enemy\ ranks on 

our ll.'ft and pu,hcd forward to the charge. 

The: valiant Patton led the hcr11k S~.:vcnth 

Virgtnia 

North l)f the Pike. for mo't of the 

battle. Stgel had set up a gun line along 

the Dogan House Ridge. deterring 

Hood'~ and Law's people':-. efforts to 

cross the road. The Federals north of the 

Pike pulled eastward to conform with 

the southern part of the line. 

Meanwhile. two bauerie~ anti two brigades of D. R. Jones' Division moved 

up the Chinn Branch east of the C'hinn 

Hou'e Most of the Federal\ wtlhdn:w 

Return .9 mile down the Chinn 

Ridge Road, past the Chinn House 

site and continue past the road you 

came on for another .6 mile to where 

the road joins SR 234 about ISO 

yards south of the entrance to the 

community college. Thrn left (north) 

and go .5 mile to the entrance to the 

Visitors' Center. Your route along SR 

234 parallels the final Federal defensive line. Drive up and park in the 

Visitors' Center lot and walk back 

west about 150 yards to a blue sign on 

a knoll midway between the museum 

buildi ng and SR 234 north of the 

museum driveway. 

At 1700 on the thirtil.!th Cil.!neral 

McDowdl and hi!> aides frantically di62 

hack do"' n Chtnn \ Rtdgc to the Stone 

House. the 5th West Yirginta and 83d 

New York, however. moved tlirectl) 

ea..,t to Sudley Road and Joined the line 

forming there. As the Southerner~ 

moved northeast. they came under fire 

from the direction of Sudley Road and 

changed direction to confront the new 

resistance. 

R. H. Anderson\ Dtvision moved to 

the right of D. R Jones and engaged 

along Sud ley Roatl. later, Dra) ton's Brigaue of Jonc-. · Dtvtston extended Longstreet's nght flank even farther eastward. 

Longstreet\ Corps then aligned north 

to south with D. R. Jone.., on the left and 

R. H. Anderson/Drayton on the south 

and southeast. 

~ Henry Hill ~ 

reeled troop!> toward llenry Hill as the 

dcfen!>e~ on Chinn\ Ridge began to 

crumble. Pope sh1fted hi" headquarters 

to the Rob1n,on llou-.e and Sigel's 

Corp~ occupied the hilb north of the 

Stone Hou~c . 

Milroy's Bngadc. diverted en route to 

Chinn':. Ridge, wa-. the first unit to take 

up position along the Sudlcy Road. He 

covered the area from the park entrance 

to the grove of trees to the north. 

Meade\ and Seymour's Brigade~ of 

Reynold.,· Dtvision cros.,ed from the 

north, fiN tal..mg up a position close to 

the Henry House Ran-.om \ Battery set 

up to Milroy\ nght rear The Pennsyl\'anian~ came forward as they saw Confederates approachtng. Meade covered the 
Sudley Road and Stone House. 1890. 

line from the grove north to the Stone 

House. 

General Milroy became increasingly 

overwrought in the course of the 

fighting. 

1 soon received an order to move my brigade off to the left on double quick, the 

enemy having massed their troops during the 

day in order to tum our left nank. J formed 

line of battle along the road, my left resting 

near the edge of the woods in which the 

battle was raging. Soon our troops came 

rushing. panic-stricken, out of the woods, 

leaving my brigade to face the enemy, who 

followed the retreating masses to the edge of 

the woods. The road in which my brigade 

was formed was worn and washed from 3 to 

5 feet deep, affording a splendid cover for 

my men. My boys opened fire on them at 

short range, driving the rebels back to a 

respectable distance. But rhe enemy, being 

constantly re-·enforced from the masses in 

their rear, came on again and again. pouring 

in advance a perfect hurricane of balls, 

which had but little effect on my men. who 

were so well protected in their road entrenchment. But the steady fire of my brigade, 

together with that of a splendid brass battery 

on higher ground in my rear, which I ordered 

to fire rapidly with canister over the heads of 

my men, had a most withering effect upon 

the rebels, whose columns melted away and 

fast recoiled from repeated efforts to ad· 

vance upon my road breastwork from the 

woods. But the fire of the enemy, which had 

affected my men so little, told with destructive results on the exposed battery in their 

rear, and it required a watchful effort to hold 

them to their effective work. My horse was 

shot in the head by a musket ball while in the 

midst of the battery [that was] cheering on 

the men. 

George G. Meade's troops were fighting just north of Milroy. He reported 

that after moving north across the Pike. 

Reynolds' Division was ordered south 

of it to Henry Hill. 

II was ordered to march back to the 

plateau of the Henry House. At this point the 

brigade. in conjunction with the division, 

was deployed in line of battle and charged 

down the slope of the Henry House ridge 

toward the Sudley Springs Road, driving before it such of the enemy as had advanced 

across this road, and taking a position in this 

road, which was firmly maintained under 

heavy infantry fire until it was relieved by 

Buchanan •s brigade of regulars. 

It is due to the Pennsylvania Reserves to 

say that this charge and maintenance of this 

position wa~ made at a most critical period 

63 
of th~ day. The enemy had repulsed the attad. made b} u~ on our right nank and had 

himself a~~umed the offensive on our left 

nank. IIi~ ml"imtry had emerged from the 

wood~. had already secured one of our battcrie~. and was advancing to the Henry 

House ridge, which. if he had succeeded in 

gammg. might have materially altered the 

fortune of the day. It was the good fortune of 

the Re~crve~ to be brought mto action at this 

moment. and by their gallant bearing and 

finn advance to compel the enemy to rcure 

to the sheller of the woods, where he was 

held in check until the clo\e of the action . 

Sykes' two brigade~ of regul:m. arrived next. Colonel Chapman's men 

were ordered immediately to take up a 

line south of Milroy along the Sudley 

Road to confront a building threat to the 

fla nk. T he regulars occupied a line 

south from the park entrance down to 

the community college. 

My brigade was ordered by Gcnerah 

Pope. McDowell and others to advance to 

our proper front: then toward the left of the 

(l(.1sition occupied by the Federal forces. My 

arrival was most opponune. 

Not a regiment or brigade of the immense 

reserve held on that field was in effective 

64 

George Sykes ( 1822- /l/80) wtH commis· 

Jioned in tire lnfmttry~ Sykes serred in 

the Seminole !*1rx. em lire fromier. and 

in the M exiam Wcu; 11'/rere h(• eamed a 

brcvn for gallalllry. fie began the Cil·il 

\~u c1s major. 14th lnfcmtrr. S\'kes com· 

manded the 1st Battalion. 14th Infantry, at First Mana.\.W1.1· am/ a brigade of 

regulars upon promotion in September 

/861. then c1 di1•isicm in Porter's Corps. 

/lis unit fought at Sc•cmul Manassas 

and was lightly enKagt·cl Cit Antietam. 

Fredericksburg. and Clwncellor.n-ille. 

Sykes had been a major gt'llaal since 

Norember 1862 ami .wcrudt"clto corps 

command wlren Meade 11'11.\ promoted 

to command of the Arm.\' of tht• Potomac. His corps sm·ed the• cltl) at Get· 

/l'.rburg when the Union hft threatened 

to t•o/lapse. 

proximity to rcpd the advance of the enemy 

at the point of their approach . The Seventeenth Infantry. leading, marched to the 

pomt indicated. followed by the Eleventh, 

Sixth. Second. and Tenth, and occupied the 

edge of the v.:ood, through which a heavy 

force wa!i advanc1ng again~t us. The line was 

fonned with the Sixth Infantry advanced a 

little way in the woods. Here. cooly and 

calmly, my brave tmop~ awa1ted a vis1blc 

evidence of the presence of the enemy. when 

a volley was poured into the•r hne!>, with 

v.:hat effect could not be seen for the cover of 

underbru~h. &c. It was replied to by a terrific fire of musketry. The firing contmued 

three-quarters of an hour with no material 

decrease on the part of the enemy. One effect 

of our fire v.:as notable-the enemy v.:as 

checked. 

The brigade coolly delivered its fire until 

our loss urged a withdrawal. The enemy, 

finding himself checked here. dispatched a 

force farther to the left. with a section of 

artillery, threatening our rear. The Ninth 

Nev. York Regiment of Volunteers. on the 

left of our hne, soon retired. exclaiming, "It 

is too hot ... thus leaving our nank exposed. 

Th1s also urged the withdrawal of the left. 

Another volunteer regiment left our right after being engaged but a few minute~. When 

the First Brigade moved up within view I 
ordered the brigade to fall bad.. While this 

was being done the enemy opened on us with 

grape and caniMer, firing very rapidly: but 

few ca~ualtie$ were caused by it, however. 

The FirM Brigade advanced toward the right 

of the position left by u~. My brigade fell 

back some 600 yard!> to Bull Run Hill, on the 

side toward Centreville. We rested here until 

order$ were received. about 6:30 p.m .. tt) 

march to Centreville . We reached Centreville about II p.m .. and bivouacked for 

the night. 

Colonel Chapman was referring 10 the 

12th and 14th U.S. Infantry from 

Buchanan's Brigade serving as a mobile 

reserve. They came forward and allowed Chapman's men to withdraw and 

reorganize; Buchanan recounted. 

from thi~ point I wm, ordered across the 

turnpike to a position on the plateau between 

the Henry and Robin~on house~. where the 

brigade was deployed in line of battle, with 

it~ right resting on the Henry house. 

About 6 p.m .. I was ordered to take the 

baualion of the Twelfth and Founeenth to a 

wood to our left and front. to support 

Meade\ brigade. then ~everely pressed by 

the enemy; and almost immediately after 

placing the5e troops in position. I observed 

that the Third and rourth had also been or· 

tiered up. I found the enemy in very strong 

force in the wood. and during the heat of a 

v.:~ry ~ewrc engagement discov.:red that he 

was nanking me with large masses of troops. 

I immediately commenced to gain ground to 

my ll-ft. so as to meet hb movements. and 

held him in che\:k for nearly an hour. But at 

length I found the conleM too unequal; my 

command wa~ being cut to pieces: the am· 

munition of the men nearly expc:ndetl. and, 

the enemy's mas~e~ vastly out numbering 

my force. I was forced to give the order to 

retire. This was done in most excellent order. 

the men marching steadily and slowly and l 

rc~umcd my position on the plateau. 

The other part of the Brigade consisting of the 3d and 4th U.S. Infantry 

moved forward near the Henry House 

road to support Meade and were joined 

later by the 12th and 14th U.S. coming 

from the south. Captain Hiram Dryer. 

commanding the 4th U.S. Infantry. described the action. 

We had not been long in position on the 

plateau above mentioned. then engaged on 

the left and! about 500 yards in our front. On 

arriving in rear of General Meade's line. 

which wa~ lying down and firing from a 

ditch. I halted the regiment and opened fire 

by battalion. firing six rounds. The enemy 

having disappeared in front of this position 

and moved to hb right. where he wa:, massing a large body of troops in a dense forest, I 

received an order from Colonel Buchanan to 

move the Fourth to the left. I immediately 

placed the regiment about its length to its 

left. on a road immediately in front of the 

wood!>. where the enemy were expected to 

make their appearance in a few moments. 

We had not long to wait for them, when we 

discovered that they were two brigades 

strong. by battalion in mass. not 20 yards 

distant. I immediately gave the command to 

fire by the battalion. and we gave them three 

round\ before they could recover thcmsclve~ 

enough to reply. Their loss must have been 

terrible. I then received an order from Colonel Buchanan to retire. I immediately gave 

the command to face about, and marched in 

line of battle about 30 yards to the rear. 

halted and faced about. and gave them another volley. 

The enemy's fire having become very severe I here faced about and marched about 

60 yard!> more. halted, and faced about. The 

left !lank of the regiment being covered by 

one of our own regiment~ the order wa!> 

given to fire by wing. firing two rounds. 

when we were ordered to fall back to our 

original posillon on the plateau above mentioned. where we remained but a few moment\. then receiving an order to fall in and 

march to Cc:ntrcvillc. 

The folding southern flank of the 

U.S. line was bolstered next by the g6th 

New York (Steuben Rangers) of Sanders 

Piatt's small brigade attached to V 

Corps. It went into line and held off 

Confederate attackers massed .. six 

rods .. away. (7: F Shoemaker. Elmira 

Weekly Journal) 

65 
Ct>rrtrl'l'ilie. Virginia, 1862. 

This occurred about where the museum is. 

The 86th New York, in tum, was supported by Ferrero's Brigade of Reno's 

Division and Schimmelfcnnig's of 

Schurt's Division posted on Henry Hill 

to the north. Ferrero's Brigade took up a 

position with a six-gun battery on the 

knoll west of the museum, lining up 

right to left, 51st Pennsylvania. 21st 

Massachusetts. 51st New York . Captain 

Charles F. Walcott. 21st Massachusetts. 

described the final action . 

... ju~t before sunset General Reno suddenly ordered the brigade to move to the left 

at the double-quick. I can conscientiously 

say that the regiment and brigade responded 

to the order with hearty enthusiasm and a 

~tern determination to show the Arn1y of 

Virginia how they had learned to light in 

North Carolina. As we hunied acro~s the 

field by the flank. shot. shell. and piece~ of 

rdilroad iron rained around us from badly 

~rved rebel artillery. but we were soon covered by the hill on which we were to take our 

revenge: the 21st losing in the pa.,sage of 

about half a mile only four men ... . As we 

66 

came to the hill, Gcnerdl McDowell. known 

to us all by his peculiar white hat. came up to 

General Reno and shook hands; the last 

Union troops withdrew from our front. and 

we moved into position on the crest of the 

hill. drowning the rebel yells with cheer!! for 

ten thousand men. The white-haired General 

Milroy, who stood alone on the crest as we 

came up, was fmntic with joy as he welcomed us: and. as we dressed our lines. rode 

along our front. shouting like a crazy man. 

.. . In our front was an open space of a few 

hundred yards of gently sloping ground ending in a grove. Behind us a struggling mass 

of artillery and wagons were trying to cross 

the bridge over Young's Branch, blocking 

the road as far as we could sec. and not a 

soldier that we saw or knew of besides ourselves stood in line of banle, or in reserve. 

Close in our rear, under the shelter of the 

hill. a temporary hospital had been cstab· 

lished. and all around us the ground was 

thickly covered with wounded men . The 

mere fact that the thin unsupported line of 

fifteen hundred men waited there so steady 

and fearless for the a.'sault of the rebel masses which were forming in their front. W:lli an 

act of heroism seldom paralleled in war. 

General Reno ... walked along the line. 

ordering the men to lie down and keep perfect silence. and then took position in the 
centre. We had not long to wait: the sun had 

set, and it was beginning to grow dark, when 

we heard a confused hum, and the rush of 

many feet in our front; stand up was the 

order, and every man was on his feet; the 

open space m our front was now alive with 

the rebel masses, and General Reno gave the 

welcome order, ''Give them about ten 

rounds, boys. Fire!" A simultaneous volley 

rolled from infantry and artillery, and then it 

was every man for himself. and they made 

quick work: our cartridges were of such 

small calibre that no ramming was required, 

and the men had hardly got well warmed up 

The Confederates made one more 

small attack along the gully south of the 

museum. then darkness and disorganization ended the fighting. Reno's men 

pulled out about 2100. Cadmus Wilcox 

recalled, 

the firing continued till after dark for more 

than half an hour and then gradually ceased. 

The artillery continued to fire after the musketry had ceased, but by 8:30 it had all 

ceased. My brigade bivouacked at this point 

of the field. 

before the firing was stopped. Nothing was (This engagement took place about 

standing on the field in front of us, and a chorus of groans and curses filled the air. opposite the museum driveway.) 

Stone Bridge @ 

Return to SR 234, turn right 

(north) and drive .5 mile to the Stone 

House and Route 29. There, turn 

right (east) and drive 1.2 miles to the 

Stone Bridge. Notice the ridges perpendicular to the road used as positions by the Federal rear guard. Turn 

left into the Stone Bridge parking lot 

and walk to the east side of the 

bridge. 

Federal units had been leaving the 

field eastward for several hours. when at 

2000 Pope ordered a general withdrawal. Sigel's Corps was the last out 

with Schenck's Division bringing up the 

rear. He later told Sigel, 

about 8 o'clock you ordered me to withdraw Colonel Schimmelfcnnig's brigade and 

to march with my whole command across 

Young's Branch. two pieces of Captain Dilger's battery and one of my regiments 

fom1ing the rear guard of the corps. For this 

office the Sixty-first Ohio wa!> selected-a 

regiment which throughout the whole campaign had exhibited the most commendable 

spirit. According to your order I passed the 

bridge across Young's Branch about 9 

o'clock, and took position with your whole 

corps on the hilly ground between Young's 

Branch and Bull Run. Colonel Schimmelfennig furnished from his command the necessary guards and outposts along Young's 

Branch and in the direction of the Bull Run 

Ford. There we remained over two hours. 

and after all other troops had passed Bull 

Run. and the road was clear of wagons for 

several miles. you ordered your corps to re-

~ume its march toward Centreville. We 

crossed the Stone Bridge between II and 12 

o'clock. You ordered me to take position on 

the left of the road. front toward the creek. 

while General Stahcl did the same on the 

right, throwing out our outposts on the other 

side of the creek and placing Captain Dilger's two pieces so as to command the 

bridge. Some time afterward one of General 

McDowell's officers informed you that we 

were threatened by the enemy on our left. 

About I o'clock a.m. you ordered your 

corps to resume liS march. My First Brigade, 

under Colonel Schimmelfennig. wa~ to fom1 

the rear guard and was instructed to destroy 

the bridge. Colonel Kane, of the Pennsylvania Bucktail Rifles, reported himself to you 

with a battalion of his men and several pieces 

67 
Bridxe Ruins. Bull Run. 

Dedication of Monument, Bull Run Battlefield, 1865. 

68 
of artillery whtch he hall ptlked up on the 

road The bridge wa' de,troyed 'ome time 

after I o'clock and we marched toward Centre\ tile. taking with u ... Colonel K<tne\ pro 

mi,cunu' ptece' ol artiller) bchmd the fir-.t 

regtment of Colonel Schtmmcllenmg\ brigade. I rejoined you about 3 o\:lock a .m. 2 

mile' from Centreville . 

Thi" conclude\ the guided tour. You 

can return to Washington by continuing east on Route 29 from the 

Stone Bridge to Centreville, where 

signs will direct you a long Route 28 

to 1-66. Route 29 west will get you to 

1-66 by way of SR 234 south or fa rther west at Gainesville. 

We hope that a., you leave thc\e now 

4uiet ftelds a greater undcr,tandtng 

of the sacrifices made by the men who 

fought here has enhanced your apprcciallon of our national ideals. The~c sol 

dicr\' dedication. courage. and conviction serve as an in.,piration w tht' day 

The land itself :-.tands a., theit monument. 

69 
Notes 

70 
Acknowledgments 

Many people have kindly assisted me in the preparation of this work. and they all 

have m~ gratitude. I would like especially to thank James Burgess and Edmund 

Rause of the Manassa:- National Battlefield Park and John Hennessy of the New York 

Division of llbtoric Preservation lor reading and commenting on the manuscript. 

Their contributions have been most helpful. Special thanks for their interest and assistance go abo to Dr. Wilfred Howsmon. Provost of the Manassas Campus of Northern 

Virginia Communi!) College. and to Larry A. Ballard and K1m B. Holien of the U.S. 

Army Center of Military History. My appreciation goes also to Rae 1. Panella. 

M. Dixon Robin. and ArthurS. Hardyman for making editing and production a pleasure. Linda M. Cajka designed the booklet. and Sharon Dougherty did her ususal perfect typing job of the manuscript. Thank you one and all. The errors arc mine: the 

credit is yours. 

J. W. A. Whitehorne 

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. A. Whitehomc is a retired U.S. Army officer last assigned 

to the Jn~pcctor General's Office at the Pentagon a~ its historian. The first book of his 

multivolume history of the IG Corps was published in August 1987. The author of numerou~ 

m1htary history anicles. he has lectured at the Smithsonian Institution. the University of 

Maryland. and Montana State University. He is currcmly teach1ng hiMory at Lord Fairfax 

Community College in Middletown, Virginia. and he is involved in a ~cries of brief histories 

of the Shenandoah Valley during the Civil War.