No. 3--01--0928

	_________________________________________________________________

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	THIRD DISTRICT

	A.D., 2002

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 		)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS,				)	for the 14th Judicial Circuit,

 						)	Rock Island County, Illinois

	Plaintiff-Appellee,		)

						)	No. 97--CF--200

	v.					)

						)

CLAUDE SPAN,				)	Honorable 	

						)	Larry S. Vandersnick,

	Defendant-Appellant.	)	Judge Presiding

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JUSTICE 	ORDER	JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the opinion o f the Court:fh

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	Following this court's remand for resentencing, the

defendant, Claude Span, was resentenced to a 20-year term of

imprisonment for armed violence.  This sentence was ordered to

run consecutively to Span's sentences for other crimes.  On

appeal, Span argues that the trial court failed to make the

requisite finding that consecutive sentences were required to

protect the public.  He also argues that the court erroneously

believed that consecutive sentences had to be imposed.  We vacate

the sentence and remand. For the

reasons that follow, we modify defendant's sentence.

	Following a jury trial in 1997, Span was found guilty of

armed violence and sentenced to 25 years in prison.  He was also

found guilty of violating the terms of his probation for prior

convictions of unlawful use of a credit card and burglary.  For

those offenses, Span received concurrent sentences of three and

five years.  Because the trial court determined that the nature of the offenses and Span's character warranted that consecutive

sentences be imposed to protect the public, it ordered that the

sentence for armed violence be served consecutively to the other

two sentences.  

	In a subsequent appeal, this court held that Span had been

sentenced under an unconstitutional version of the armed violence

sentencing statute.  We remanded the matter to the trial court

for resentencing.  People v. Span, No. 3--00--0837 (2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).  On remand, an

updated presentence investigation report (PSI report) was filed

and a new sentencing hearing was held.  At the hearing, Span

addressed the court and apologized to the victim and his family. 

Span advised the court that while incarcerated he had completed a

child parenting program, obtained his associate's degree and

participated in various religious programs.  At the conclusion of

the hearing, the trial court sentenced Span to a term of 20 years

for armed violence and ordered the sentence to run consecutively

to the other sentences.  The court noted that Span had shown some

remorse and rehabilitation and that it had considered the

evidence received at the jury trial, the new PSI report and

Span's statements at the hearing.  Though he did not file a

motion to reconsider with the trial court, Span appealed.

	Span argues that after the first sentence was vacated, the

trial court was required to make a new finding that the public's

protection required consecutive sentences.  He also argues that

the court erroneously believed that the new sentence had to run consecutively to the previously imposed sentences.  The State

responds that Span waived this issue because he failed to file a

posttrial motion challenging the consecutive nature of the new

sentence.  The State also argues that the court's remarks at the

second hearing failed to show that it had abandoned its earlier

finding.  This court reviews the trial court's decision for abuse

of discretion.  People v. Golden, 323 Ill. App. 3d 892, 753 N.E.2d 475 (2001).

	Section 5--8--4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code)

states as follows:

		"The court shall not impose a consecutive sentence

*** unless, having regard to the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and

character of the defendant, it is of the opinion that

such a term is required to protect the public from

further criminal conduct by the defendant, the basis

for which the court shall set forth in the record." 

730 ILCS 5/5--8--4(b) (West 2000).

Though the court is not required to recite the specific language

of section 5--8--4(b) when imposing consecutive sentences, the record must show that consecutive sentences were motivated by the

court's belief that the public's protection required them. 

People v. Dorosz, 217 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 578 N.E.2d 67 (1991).

	Based on our review of the record, we hold that the trial

court failed to articulate a sufficient rationale for the

imposition of consecutive sentences.  We acknowledge that the court stated that it had considered the trial record, the updated PSI report, and the new evidence relating to Span's remorse and

rehabilitation.  However, a general statement that this evidence

was considered is inadequate to show that consecutive sentences

were motivated by a belief that the public's protection required

them.  Nor does it show that the nature and circumstances of Span's offenses or his history and character were considered. 

See People v. Jones, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 598 N.E.2d 380 (1992) (stating that the imposition of consecutive sentences does not

automatically warrant a conclusion that the court believed they

were necessary to protect the public).

	The State argues that the trial court's comments during the

second sentencing hearing did not indicate that it had abandoned

its earlier finding that consecutive sentences were necessary. 

We do not agree.  In our view, the record of the hearing fails to set forth a clear basis for the court's belief that consecutive sentences were warranted.  While the State asserts that Span waived this issue because he did not request a specific finding

in the trial court or challenge the imposition of the consecutive

sentences, we refuse to apply the waiver rule in this case.  See

Dorosz, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 1023, 578 N.E.2d at 71 (rejecting an argument that defendant waived his right to contest his

consecutive sentences because a sufficient rationale for the

sentences was not articulated or reflected in the record).   	Accordingly, we vacate the defendant's sentence and remand this case to the circuit court of Rock Island County for

resentencing. under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4)(134 Ill. 2d

R. 615(b)(4)), defendant's 20 year sentence for armed violence is modified to run concurrently with his previous 3-year and 5-year

sentences.  This cause is remanded to the circuit court of Rock

Island County to correct the mittimus.  

	Vacated in part and remanded. Sentence modified; and cause remanded with directionss.  

	HOLDRIDGE, J., with	 SLATERslaterslaterSLATER AND ANDand LYTTON, JJ., concurring.