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65–492PDF 2011

LIBYA: DEFINING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

INTERESTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 31, 2011

Serial No. 112–25

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of 

State ...................................................................................................................... 19

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

The Honorable James B. Steinberg: Prepared statement .................................... 22

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Ron Paul, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 59

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 60

Written responses from the Honorable James B. Steinberg to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ Carnahan .................................. 61

(1)

LIBYA: DEFINING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

INTERESTS 

THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, my good 

friend Mr. Berman of California, for 7 minutes each for our opening 

statements, I will recognize each member for 1 minute for opening 

statements. We will then hear from our witness. Thank you. And 

I would ask that you summarize your prepared statement to 5 minutes before we move to the question and answer period under the 

5 minute rule. 

Without objection, Mr. Steinberg’s prepared statement will be 

made a part of the record. And members may have 5 legislative 

days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to 

the limitations in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. 

Mr. Deputy Secretary Steinberg, I would like to recognize the 

Iranian Americans from my District and around the nation who are 

in the audience this morning and have family members in Camp 

Ashraf in Iraq. They are extremely concerned about the safety and 

the welfare the residents in Camp Ashraf and the actions of the 

Iraqi Government against them. I urge the State Department to 

ensure that the Iraqi Government will comply with its obligations 

under the Status of Forces Agreement and international human 

rights standards. 

Thank you, sir. 

The President’s address to the nation on Monday on the situation 

in Libya was a welcome development but left many questions unanswered. The President justified intervention by asserting ‘‘There 

will be times when our safety is not directly threatened but our interests and values are.’’ The President has also said that he authorized military action to ‘‘enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 

1973’’ and the ‘‘writ of the international community.’’

Whether we agree or disagree with the decision to intervene in 

Libya, concerns have now raised across both sides of the aisle 

about implied future obligations under the Responsibility to Protect, a vague concept first articulated in a U.N. General Assembly 

2

resolution more than 1 year ago, which the U.N. has endorsed but 

failed to define. 

Reports that the Senior Director of Multilateral Affairs on the 

National Security Council Staff, Samantha Power, reportedly 

helped lead the charge to intervene in Libya based upon this principle—over the objection of military planners—only compounds 

those concerns. Some Americans therefore question whether we 

have assumed obligations to forcibly respond to crises everywhere, 

including Ivory Coast, Sudan, or Syria. 

Another area of concern is the scope, duration and objectives of 

the NATO-led operation and the political mission that have not 

been sufficiently defined. Nor have the anticipated short, medium 

and long-term commitments of the United States. 

The President has called for Ghadafi to step down in favor of a 

government that is more representative of the Libyan people. However, administration officials have also said that Ghadafi himself is 

not a target and that the United States is not pursuing regime 

change. 

But then, Reuters reported yesterday afternoon that the President had signed a ‘‘secret order authorizing covert U.S. Government support for rebel forces seeking to oust the Libyan leader’’ 

and that the President had said the objective was to apply ‘‘ ‘steady 

pressure, not only militarily but also through these other means’ to 

force Ghadafi out.’’

So, Mr. Deputy Secretary, which is it? What is our objective? 

Further, what are the contingency plans if Ghadafi is able to 

cling to power? Would a political agreement that left Ghadafi in 

power be an acceptable outcome? What are the implications for 

Libya, for the region, and the United States if the civil war reaches 

a stalemate? When referring to Libyan opposition, is the President 

referring to armed rebels, to members of the Transitional Council, 

or to both? And what do we know about the armed forces? What 

do we know about the members of the Transitional Council? What 

assurances do we have that they will not pose a threat to the 

United States if they succeed in toppling Ghadafi? And how will 

opposition forces, both political and military, be vetted? 

Just yesterday, Secretary Clinton stated that Resolution 1973 

amended or overrode previous U.N. Security Council resolutions 

imposing an arms embargo on Libya. The Secretary said the resolution: ‘‘Amended or overrode the absolute prohibition on arms to 

anyone in Libya, so that there cold be a legitimate transfer of arms 

if a country should choose to do that.’’

So, Mr. Secretary, I ask how is the U.S. defining ‘‘legitimate?’’ 

Does the administration contend that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 overrides U.S. prohibitions? And does that mean that 

U.N. resolutions create U.S. laws? 

There are reports that some opposition figures have links to alQaeda and extremist groups that have fought against our forces in 

Iraq. My constituents are asking: Just who are we helping and are 

we sure that they are true allies who will not turn and work 

against us? 

These are valid concerns, particularly given the administration’s 

less than stellar record on promoting democracy and governance in 

Libya, which would have included funding organizations run by the 

3

Ghadafi family had this committee not intervened by not signing 

off on the funding. 

The record on transfers of military-related items involving Libya 

is also disconcerting. For example, for over 1 year, I requested a 

detailed national interest justification for two proposed weapons 

transfers to Libya. The Department failed to give us that written 

justification. Ultimately, the proposed transfers were withdrawn 

but only after Ghadafi began the slaughter of civilians. 

Remarkably, however, the committee received a letter from Secretary Clinton earlier this week regarding the overall Congressional consultation process for defense sales and seeking to limit 

the time for Congressional review. It is ironic that ill-advised weapons transfers to the Ghadafi regime were only stopped as a result 

of this committee’s due diligence, yet the State Department now 

complains about our efforts to carry out careful due diligence on all 

weapons transfers. 

I hope that the administration will commit to working with Congress effectively and transparently to address vital national security and foreign policy concerns relating to arms sales. 

The committee will continue to press for answers on the U.S. 

strategy in Libya going forward and our short, medium and longterms commitments. 

And now I am pleased to yield to my good friend, the esteemed 

ranking member, Mr. Berman, for his opening remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

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Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman, for 

calling for this very timely hearing. And before I begin the opening 

remarks, let me just say on a personal note that on behalf of the 

committee, thank you very much, Deputy Secretary Steinberg, for 

your exemplary service to the country. We are going to miss you. 

I enjoyed on so many different issues working with you. 

My own personal feeling is that former Deputy Secretary Lew is 

not as prickly as Felix and that you are not, perhaps, as combative 

and argumentative, as Oscar. You are also not as sloppy. And you 

have to read the Secretary’s release before you know what I am 

talking about here. 

But anyway, I do wish you the best of luck at Syracuse University, and we will miss you. 

President Obama’s decision to take military action in response to 

the humanitarian crises in Libya may provoke questions that are 

not fully answerable at this time, but I believe it was the right policy because the alternative, acquiescence in the face of mass murder, was untenable. And I believe it was done in the right way, 

namely with the cooperation of the international community. 

President Obama’s policy has unquestionably saved many lives, 

probably tens of thousands of them. And it has weakened a brutal 

dictator and an egregious sponsor of terrorism. It will also, I hope, 

cause other dictatorial regimes to think twice before they use unbridled violence against peaceful protestors. 

We have been prudent in focusing on civilian protection and 

doing so in a way that spreads the burden among our allies, including some Arab countries. The President has clearly stated that the 

United States’ military goals are limited, in line with the relevant 

U.N. Security Council resolutions. Together with our allies, America’s military mission has been: First, to implement a no fly zone 

to stop the regime’s attacks from the air, and; secondly, to take 

other measures which are necessary to protect the Libyan people. 

America’s involvement in Libya directly supports the United 

States’ national interest. 

First, the United States plays a unique role as an anchor of global security and advocate for human freedom. In Libya we embraced 

this important role head on by preventing a madman from slaughtering his own people. 

Secondly, Libya’s neighbors, Tunisia and Egypt, have just gone 

through revolutions which are changing the nature of the region, 

hopefully, for the better. If Libya were to spin out of control and 

instability were to pour over its borders, the entire region would 

suffer. This outcome would certainly not be in the national interest 

of the United States or our allies. 

But we have to acknowledge another fact. This operation will not 

be a success unless it ends with the demise of the Ghadafi regime. 

The reason is clear: The mandate for this operation is that it protect Libyan civilians, yet we all know there can be no enduring protection for the Libyan people as long as Ghadafi remains in power. 

But we also must acknowledge something else: That we do not 

know exactly how Ghadafi will be brought down. 

The President has placed limits on the operation, with which I 

agree. We do not want American boots on the ground. We do not 

want the operation to be too costly, and we do not want it to divert 

7

resources from Afghanistan and Iraq. At the end of the day, however, we have put our leadership prestige on the line. Whether voluntarily, by the hand of his own people, or as a result of coalition 

action, it is essential that Ghadafi go. 

Mr. Secretary, I hope you will be able to enlighten us about how 

our current strategy of sanctions and international isolation combined with military pressure will hasten the removal of Ghadafi 

from power, as much as can be discussed in this unclassified setting. I think we all understand, however, that there is no easy recipe. We are all aware of the reports yesterday and this morning 

about CIA operatives allegedly in Libya with the rebels. Again, this 

is an unclassified setting and I would not expect you to comment 

on those reports, but can you tell us if the administration has now 

made a decision to provide direct military support to the rebels? 

We would also like to know what the implications are of the 

hand over of the operation to NATO. Will the transition be seamless? Will the operation look essentially the same as it has over the 

past 2 weeks? Will other NATO member states pickup the operations that we are ceasing to perform? Will NATO be able to maintain the tempo of the operation once the U.S. assumes a supporting 

role? 

Further, I would like to hear some of your thinking on the postGhadafi era. It may seem premature, but we must be prepared if 

the regime rapidly crumbles under the weight of coalition strategy. 

In thinking about a post-Ghadafi era, we would be interested in 

your thoughts about the National Transitional Council; its composition, its viability, its goals and its level of support among the Libyan people. Are there any other contenders for power in a postGhadafi Libya? If we think the Council is the likely heir to power, 

what is our hesitation in recognizing it as the French and the 

Qataris have done? And would not our recognition help to increase 

the Ghadafi regime’s sense of isolation and deepen the international community’s sense that his departure is inevitable? Does 

the Council include elements that should cause us concern? And 

how are we going to make certain that a successor regime does not 

resort to the same thuggish tactics that have been Ghadafi’s hallmark? 

We have had a long and difficult history with Ghadafi, he has 

the blood of many Americans on his hands. For a brief period we 

were willing, tentatively, to open a new chapter with him after he 

agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction and related materials 7 years ago. But when we saw him firing on his people, we 

had no choice but to act for as we know all too well from our own 

bitter experience about his cynical disregard for human life and his 

almost casual willingness to commit murder and inflict torture just 

to stay in power. 

Mr. Secretary, before closing I would like to raise specific humanitarian issues of differing levels of urgency. 

First, Ghadafi’s forces have created a humanitarian disaster in 

Misratah. Why have we not, at the least, established a humanitarian sea corridor to Misratah in order to relieve the terrible suffering? 

Second, I understand there are some 1,700 Libyan students in 

the United States who cannot get access to their monthly stipends 

8

because of our appropriate decision to freeze Libyan funds. Is that 

accurate? And if so, what are we doing to rectify this situation? 

And finally, on a different note, I would like to say how important it is that we keep our eye on the Iranian nuclear ball at all 

times. I was pleased to see that the administration imposed sanctions earlier this week against Belarus Russian energy company 

called Belorusneft. I would be less than candid if I did not express 

some disappointment, however, that we have once again imposed 

sanctions on a company that does not do any business in the 

United States, so the sanction has no more than symbolic impact. 

That was also the case when we opposed sanctions a few months 

ago on the Swiss-based, but Iranian owned, energy company NICO. 

When we do that, I am afraid we are sending Iran a signal more 

of weakness than of strength and we are having no impact on their 

economy. Such impact is the very point of sanctions. 

With that, Madam Chairman, I will yield back my 9 seconds. 

Well, actually, it has gone the other way. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. I thank you 

for talking about the Iran sanctions, and I totally agree with that. 

So pleased to yield to my friend from New Jersey, the chairman 

for the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thanks for calling 

this very important hearing. 

I am once again grateful to the U.S. military personnel and our 

coalition forces for their courage, professionalism, and tenacity they 

have exhibited in executing their orders to implement U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. While our forces have heroically taken on yet another combat mission in the Near East and 

performed extremely well, I am nevertheless deeply concerned 

about our use of force in Libya, and more particularly about the 

path this administration took to bring us to this point. And I know 

the Under Secretary will answer our questions, and so very ably 

as he has done an extraordinary job as Under Secretary, but I 

would like to know when we first initiated military action did the 

administration who, exactly who, the leaders of the rebel forces 

were? What are their aspirations for a post-Ghadafi Libya? Are 

they surging or have they given commitments that they will seek 

a democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights? I think 

that is all very important, especially when we risk the lives of our 

men and women in uniform to give them air support. 

I have a number of other questions, but I am out of time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Ackerman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and South Asia. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chair. 

Mr. Secretary, I thank you very much for your service. We are 

really going to miss you. You have done an excellent job and always very cooperative with the members of our committee. 

I would like to use my 1 minute just to be introspective on what 

has been happening across the Capitol from both political parties. 

Because I have been a bit troubled on the reactor to the President’s 

announcements that have occurred from Congress in both Houses. 

9

Regardless of party, I do not think that the predisposition to liking the President or disliking the President is a substitute for questioning and evaluating foreign policy. We should be doing that on 

a nonpartisan basis. 

I was particularly troubled by so many people who just rubber 

stamped what the President was doing without thinking about it, 

and I was at least equally troubled by those who were critical of 

the President for doing what they suggested to do in the first place, 

and then were critical of him for doing it after he did it. 

We have to be a lot more careful because we are at a juncture 

in world history right now where the big things are happening and 

we really have to analyze and appreciate what we should be doing 

about that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I particularly want to thank the chair for having 

this hearing so early. I remember during the war in Iraq, it was 

1 year before we had a hearing on Iraq. So this is has been very 

important. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. 

Mr. Burton, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and 

Eurasia, is recognized. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I just had some questions that I hope we will be able to cover 

today. 

First of all, Congress was not involved at all in this decision 

making process, but the United Nations was and the Arab League 

was. And it seems to me we should have been involved very much 

at the very beginning of this. 

The Defense Secretary said that this was not a national security 

interest, but it was of interest. Why is that? 

There are people that are supposedly terrorists. I mean, Brad 

Sherman yesterday at the closed hearing gave names of people that 

have fought us in Afghanistan and Iraq, and why are we supporting people who may be terrorists, who are terrorists and maybe 

giving us a hard time down the road? 

You know, I just do not know how we pick these things. 

The Ivory Coast right now there is a real carnage there. Are we 

going to go to the Ivory Coast and have a no fly zone and start 

bombing people over there? Why did we pick Libya and not the 

Ivory Coast because there is more carnage there right now? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Payne, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Africa, 

Global Health, and Human Rights is recognized. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. And thank you, Madam 

Chair, for allowing us to have 1 minute and Mr. Steinberg, Secretary, for your commitment. 

Let me just say that, you know I guess anything that the President does is well, I heard someone say, ‘‘If you walk on water, they 

say you could not swim.’’ So, the fact that 1 year ago when the 

Lockerbie bomber was released, everybody said ‘‘How terrible it is. 

All of a sudden Libya is the worst place in the world.’’ It is amazing now that I heard people wondering why we are in Libya, all 

of a sudden in 1 year there has been a total change in our position 

10

against Libya. It is sort of strange. I do not know whether it is who 

called for action rather than the action taken. 

I would also certainly like to know that our responsibility to protect is certainly something that is very important. I think that we 

would like to find out about NATO’s roles. 

And, I would also like to know about the treatment of the socalled minorities that are in Libya right now who have been accused of being supported with the mercenaries. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

I give high marks to this administration, to the Secretary of 

State and to the President on how this crises in Libya has been 

handled. Yes, we are up against radical Islam and we will hear 

about that as this hearing goes on. But if the United States was 

not engaged in helping those fight for freedom, those people who 

want to overthrow tyrants and corruption in the Islamic world, we 

would leave the field to the radical Islamists. We need to be engaged. We do not need to send U.S. troops on the ground. If the 

President introduces troops on the ground, you have lost me. But 

this is consistent: Helping those people fight for their own freedom 

is consistent with what we did during the Reagan years. It is called 

the Reagan Doctrine. We did not send people all over the world and 

put them into action, we helped those people all over the world who 

were willing to fight for their own freedom. And in this case I understand, or I have been in direct contact with the leaders of Libya 

of the revolutionary movement, that they will repay the United 

States for every cent that we spend in helping them free themselves from the Ghadafi leadership. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So I am looking forward to the hearing. And 

I think they have handled the situation we have in the right way. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Meeks, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Europe 

and Eurasia. 

Mr. Sherman. I apologize. You were there first. I apologize. I 

missed your card. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I hope to learn today whether the administration 

will comply with Section 5 of the War Powers Act or whether in 

the guise in promoting of democracy in Libya, they are going to undermine democracy and the rule of law in the United States. 

The administration says that this has cost us $600 million so far. 

They arrived at this number using marginal costs. Any CPA would 

tell you that you should focus on field cost which would reveal that 

this is costing what the American people think it is costing, that 

is to say millions of dollars a week. The $30 billion we seized from 

Libya and Ghadafi assets should be used immediately to defer 

these costs. 

Ghadafi has American blood on his hands, but so do some of the 

rebel commanders. They fought us in Afghanistan and Iraq and we 

should demand that the rebels extradite these criminals, or at least 

use their best efforts and it would start by stopping cooperation 

11

with and seeking to incarcerate Abdel Hakim al-Hasidi who brags 

about the efforts he made against our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Royce, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Four weeks ago the Secretary of State was here, and I suggested 

at that time that we should jam Ghadafi’s communication system. 

There is no cost to doing it. And in fact we had a lot of officer defections at that time. 

I look for meaning in this. We recognize we got a $14 trillion debt, and we spent $0.5 billion in a few days on this operation. I 

think the estimates are that it is going to be for a 6-month no fly 

zone; a very expensive proposition. We have got $33 billion right now in frozen Libya assets. We 

need to put those to use. 

The President boasts about a coalition. It is time for that coalition to open its checkbook. If we are going to proceed, it needs to 

offset dollar-per-dollar because at the end of the day there are costs 

to our security, too. We focus, you know away from our strategic 

threats. It has taken us far too long, for example, to exit Iraq. Now 

we have this added commitment. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. The only way for it to go down is to pay for it out 

of those Libyan assets. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Royce. 

Now we are ready to hear from Mr. Meeks. This is going to be 

a good 1 minute because you had a lot of time to prepare. Sorry 

about that. 

The ranking member on the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Whenever the President of the United States commits our nation 

to any level of military engagement, it is a serious and sobering 

moment and there are bound to be questions and concerns that 

must be addressed. I have my full sheet of questions and concerns 

about our actions with regard to Libya, but I want to be sure to 

take this opportunity at the outset of this hearing to get on the 

record my appreciation for a key fundamental component of this 

particular engagement. That is the fact that we are operating in a 

multi-level partnership with NATO and coalition forces, sharing 

the responsibilities that come with the establishment of a no fly 

zone and necessary measures to protect civilians as authorized by 

U.N. Security Council 1973 on March 17th. 

From my perspective, the necessity, purpose, objective and methods of Operation Odyssey Dawn were made clear by the administration. That said, I expect the administration will continue to 

work closely with Congress on this engagement as we move forward. 

I recognize that this is a developing situation which the reports 

today of rebels in tactical retreat. We know that days coalition convened in London to discuss next steps politically and otherwise. So, 

12

today I look forward to getting more of the details and answers 

that will help inform my perspective and decision making as a 

Member of Congress. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Chabot, who chairs the Subcommittee on the Middle 

East and South Asia, is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

There has been a lot of concern, a lot of questions asked by members on both sides of the aisle. My principal concern is the fact that 

the administration had plenty of time to get the authorization, the 

okay of the U.N., of NATO, of the Arab League yet they could not 

find time in that period of time between President Obama indicating that Ghadafi had to go and actually taking military action 

to actually consult the elected representatives of the American people. That should have been a priority under these circumstances, 

and there was time. 

President Bush got the authorization of Congress before going 

into Iraq, Afghanistan, his father did in Kuwait. That was, I think, 

a key mistake on this administration’s part. 

There has also been far too much confusion, for example, on saying Ghadafi has to go, no he does not necessarily have to go. I 

think that should be very clear. 

And we also have to have much better insight on just who these 

rebels are. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

My list indicates that Mr. Connolly is next to be recognized for 

1 minute. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And, Mr. Secretary, job well done and you will be missed. 

You know, I think it is very important to remember that in this 

exercise of limited intervention by the United States we are operating under a legal framework. What makes this different than 

other places, Yemen, Bahrain and so forth, is that we had for the 

first time in my memory an Arab League resolution calling for a 

no fly zone in a fellow Arab country. We had a U.N. security resolution, in fact we had two of them, 1970 and 1973, calling explicitly 

for all necessary means to stop the bloodshed in Libya. The United 

States is part of that lawful international community and responded. Responded in a limited way with the coalition. 

I look forward to this hearing and I look forward in particular, 

Mr. Secretary, to your outlining not only this legal framework for 

the President’s response, but also how the administration views the 

necessary consultation with Congress as this event unfolds. 

And I was pleased to hear Mr. Rohrabacher’s support for the administration. 

Than you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Dr. Paul of Texas. 

Mr. PAUL. I thank the, Madam Chairwoman. 

Once again the American people are being suckered into one 

more war; illegal, unconstitutional and undeclared. We have been 

doing this since World War II and they have not been good for this 

country, and they have not been good for the world. 

13

This is said to be a war that is to prevent something. It is a preventative war. They say there is going to be a slaughter, but there 

has so far not been a slaughter. In checking the records the best 

I can, I have seen no pictures of any slaughter. But already it is 

reported now that our bombs have killed more than 40 civilians. So 

how can you save a country by killing civilians? 

This is a bad war. We got into it incorrectly. It will not help us. 

And unfortunately, I do not see that this administration or any administration is going to move back from this until we become totally bankrupt. It is very necessary for us to assess this properly. 

And the way we go to war is very important. Just not get token 

permission, we should never go to war without a full declaration 

and it should be strongly bipartisan. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Paul. 

Mr. Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I look forward to your 

testimony today. 

Over the last several days we have heard a lot of debate about 

our involvement in Libya. Everybody seems to be looking for false 

clarity. And the fact of the matter is war is very ambiguous and 

I would rather have cautious ambiguity than false clarity. 

Having said that, we are involved in other conflicts in the region. 

I think that Libya’s situation is very different from that, Egypt per 

se, where I think that movement is very organic where this is very 

different. We do not know what we are going to get in the end. 

And I am reminded of the United States’ efforts to assist the 

Mujahideen to break the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And at 

least components of the Mujahideen morphed into the Taliban. 

This is a very, very complicated situation. We have to treat it as 

such. We have to understand the complexities of the region and 

complexities of the country and apply those to realistic policies 

from which we can proceed. 

So, I look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

The vice chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

South Asia is recognized, Mr. Pence of Indiana. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this hearing. And thank the Deputy Secretary for his years of service to the 

country. 

We are at war in Libya. I know there is careful parsing of words 

to describe our military action; no fly plus and the rest. But we are 

at war in Libya. 

And while I am troubled by how we went to war in Libya, I will 

never jeopardize support for our troops, but I do not believe the 

President of the United States has the authority to take America 

to war without Congressional approval where our safety and vital 

national interests are not directly threatened. 

I also do not believe in limited war. I believe if America chooses 

to go to war, then by God you go to war to win. 

Now the President said this week that it would be a mistake to 

broaden our mission. He said ‘‘We went down that road in Iraq,’’ 

and we are certainly going down a very different road than we 

went in Iraq. In Iraq we had a clear objective. We had Congressional bipartisan approval in both Houses, then international supVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:08 Jul 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\033111\65492 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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port, then through trial and sacrifice of blood and treasure we prevailed. Here in Libya no clear objective, no Congressional approval, 

uncertain and wavering international support, aerial bombardment; we are on a different road. 

So, Mr. Deputy Secretary, I would like to ask you in the course 

of conversation today tell me why Congress should not immediately 

bring an authorization to the floor of the House of Representatives 

that would define our mission or end this mission and bring the 

clarity that the Constitution and the American people expect. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ms. Schwartz of Pennsylvania is recognized. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. First, I would like to also add my words of acknowledgement to the members of the armed forces who once again 

have stepped into harm’s way at this time as part of a international coalition to prevent Ghadafi regime from massacring Libyan citizens seeking democratic and human rights. 

President Obama has emphasized the military mission in response to potential humanitarian crises be both limited and have 

the support of a broad international coalition, including the endorsement of the U.N. and the Arab League and the African Union. 

The President has upheld this pledge by successfully handing off 

command and control the NATO lead coalition. The fact that the 

call to action by the broad international coalition is there has been 

absolutely critical. There is a clear regional and international 

agreement on the use of military force to protect civilian, and the 

coalition leadership helps ensure that we do not assume sole responsibilities for operations or costs. 

In addition to the military involvement, the United States has 

applied strong diplomatic and economic pressure on Ghadafi; that 

is a good thing. I hope to hear more about that, including freezing 

more than $30 billion of Libyan assets. 

Ghadafi is more and more isolated and his military capabilities 

has been seriously degraded. However, the outcome of our intervention is uncertain and I share the concern of so many Americans 

about the weeks ahead; the concern about the possible escalation 

of our intervention as well as the costs of continued or increased 

involvement. 

So I look forward to the information provided at this hearing to 

answer the many questions that we have posed on behalf of the 

American people. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Wilson of South Carolina is recognized. 

Oh, I am sorry, I forgot. Mr. Wilson has the minister for the day. 

So, we will go to Judge Poe; that is just the way it is. 

Mr. POE. Madam Chair, no question about it: Maummar Ghadafi 

is a world outlaw. So because he is a bad guy, it appears that the 

President has used military force in Libya. I am concerned about 

the legal authority for such military action in Libya. Has the Constitution and the War Powers Act been followed? Maybe not. 

Secretary of Defense Gates has stated that Libya is not in the 

vital interests of the United States. Then why are we dropping 

bombs in this country? 

15

The President has indicated that Ghadafi is treating the rebels 

in an inhumane way, therefore this Obama Doctrine of war in the 

name of humanity is troubling. Since our U.S. national security is 

not at stake, what constitutional authority do we have to be at war 

in Libya? The Constitution may be inconvenient, but it is meat to 

be. War is a serious matter and Presidents and Congresses should 

be inconvenienced on these roads to war. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Ms. Bass of California is recognized. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you for 

convening this timely hearing. 

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. 

I look forward to your testimony today. I think we all recognize 

that Libya presents a complicated set of events in a rapidly changing set of circumstances and many of us are concerned, but I think 

we were gratified to hear the President’s address to the nation. 

And I think our ranking member has correctly identified there are 

some issues where there will not be absolute clarity or certainty, 

I am anxious to hear from you so that we can make the best decisions based on the best and most accurate information. 

And again, I welcome you and look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson of Ohio. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And Mr. Deputy Secretary, thank you for being here today. 

With the onset of U.S. military action in Libya, I am troubled by 

the circumstances surrounding our nation’s involvement there. 

Having served in the United States Air Force for 26 years myself, 

my military experience has taught me that any mission must have 

clear objectives to be successful and an unambiguous end state in 

mind from the onset. 

And I appreciate the President providing the American people 

with the background leading to his decision, however our engagement in this conflict should not have begun without a clear definition of the mission we hoped to accomplish with our military forces. 

I find it extremely troubling that the President did not first discuss 

American involvement with the Congress, but rather consulted 

with the United Nations and the Arab League for approval. I submit that that is not who he gets his approval from. 

As we continue with the President’s stated mission of protecting 

the people of Libya, I hope to hear some clarification today on what 

our objectives are, what our long-term national security interests 

are and what the risks were that prompted our involvement there. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Cardoza of California. 

Mr. CARDOZA. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for your 

continued stewardship of this committee. 

I will associated myself with the remarks of Mr. Berman, Mr. 

Ackerman and Mr. Rohrabacher. I will not repeat them now, but 

I think they are very instructive. 

I think this is no time to engage in politics or pontification. This 

is a serious and critical time for our country and the world. I am 

16

very concerned, Mr. Secretary, about how may have leaked the 

President’s findings and whether or not that puts the men and 

women that we may or may not have on the ground in the intelligence community in that country at jeopardy. I think that we 

need to move forward cautiously, and this is a time for this committee to do its job, ask the tough questions but also to understand 

the difficult challenge that the President and your Department are 

engaged in. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cardoza. 

Ms. Buerkle of New York, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for 

hosting this timely hearing this morning. 

Thank you to Deputy Secretary Steinberg for being here. 

If I could respectfully recommend, you buy a heavy winter coat 

and boats because Syracuse University is in my District, so long 

hard winters up there. 

I, too, with my colleagues share the concerns that we have heard 

here, and I will forward to hearing the answers to these questions 

about why the U.N., why the NATO, why the Arab League was 

consulted before the Congress and before the American people. So, 

I look forward to this morning’s hearing. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Sires of New Jersey. 

I apologize to my colleague, my fellow Floridian, Ted Deutch. You 

know, the ones you love the most—uh-oh. Mr. Deutch is recognized, 

then we will go to our side, and then we will go to Mr. Sires. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I will ask you to finish that statement later. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes. I stopped before I got myself in 

deeper trouble there. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member for 

holding this timely hearing. 

Secretary Steinberg, thank you for being here. Thank you for 

your service, and good luck to you in those brutal Syracuse winters. 

I would also like to commend the State Department and Secretary Clinton for her leadership at the U.N. in securing passage 

of Security Council Resolution 1973. 

The actions of our Government over the past weeks in Libya 

have made it clear that the U.S. stands firmly in support of those 

seeking democracy and freedom. 

Monday, I was pleased to hear the President define our goals for 

the operation and strongly reiterate to the American people that 

there will be no U.S. troops on the ground. The decision to intervene in conjunction with the international community was one that 

was necessary to prevent a massacre of innocent civilians and stabilize a region on the brink. 

I look forward to hearing from your today, Mr. Secretary speak 

to your thoughts on what pressure will be necessary to assist the 

opposition in its quest to remove Ghadafi from power and short of 

that—short of that when we will know that this engagement can 

and should end. 

And I yield back my time. 

17

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you. I am sorry, 

Ted. 

Ms. Ellmers of North Carolina. 

Ms. ELLMERS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Deputy Secretary, for being with us today. 

Of course, this is just such an important hearing. 

And, you know I join with my colleagues and all the concerns, 

and I am very much looking forward to your input so that we can 

understand these issues better. 

My main concern is for our servicemen and women right now and 

their safety, especially at a time when we are stretched so thin in 

our military actions. I hope that I will be able to go back to my 

constituents and explain that this is a finite action and that we 

have a secure strong military strategy. 

And with that, I yield back the rest of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Sires. Do not be mad. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. You are so small, it is easy to jump 

over you. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Secretary, our congratulations and good luck on 

your next endeavor. 

And I just want to compliment the President for acting so quickly 

and commend him on working with the international community 

and the NATO community, especially on protecting the lives of civilians in Libya. But I am concerned now after we have thrown the 

first stone what is our next step. I read this morning where 

Ghadafi is taking back some of the cities, and I was just wondering 

if you can comment on that. 

And I wonder if you could comment on the foreign affairs ambassador that defected or is in France, I think it is. Can you just comment on that? And if we have any information from him that will 

help us make a decision going down the line. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sires. 

Mr. Marino of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Madam Chair. Nothing. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

My other Florida colleague, Frederica Wilson of Florida, is recognized. 

Ms. WILSON OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

It is very interesting to me to have listened to so many people 

urge the President to establish a no fly zone, to do something. 

There is a genocide in the making. We must do something. And 

then when he did something, the same people who urged him to 

do something are criticizing him. 

I think that when he consulted with the leaders of Congress, 

which I am sure I heard that he did, I do not think this is unprecedented. I think this has happened before. And I think that he is 

the Commander in Chief, and at some point in his administration 

in every Commander in Chief’s administration, they must make decisions that benefit the greater good of the country—of the world 

without having the opportunity to get permission, as we call it. So 

18

on March 17th when Ambassador Rice explained the U.S. vote in 

favor of Resolution 1973 stating that the Security Council——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ms. WILSON OF FLORIDA [continuing]. By stating that the Security Council had responded to the Libyan’s people cry for help, the 

Council’s purpose is clear to protect innocent citizens. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Wilson. 

Pleased to yield to Mr. Fortenberry, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this 

hearing. 

You know, the United States is constantly called upon to fix 

every measure of conflict throughout the world, and this is due to 

the generosity of the American taxpayer, the philosophical ideals 

that govern us. It is very difficult for us to stand by and watch humanity be slaughtered before our eyes. A third fact is that we are 

a unique and exceptional super power. 

So, in order to understand where we are now, we ought to look 

back just a few short weeks when the United States was being 

pressured to unilaterally implement a no fly zone by the international community and within this body as well. And once the 

British and French, particularly, stopped pontificating, were willing 

to put up their own assets, that then empowered the United States 

to be a part of an international coalition that is achieving some 

success now. 

With that, I know there are questions remaining about notification to Congress and the scope and duration of this, but questions 

also remain as to the robustness of the Arab League commitment. 

It was very important to get that affirmation up front, but we need 

to know what type of assets they are going to put up. 

Ultimately, Libya must be controlled, the outcome, by Libyans, 

North Africa must be controlled by North Africans. Where is the 

African Union? Where is the Arab League in terms of commitment 

to resources? 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And lastly, Mr. Murphy of Connecticut. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

I take faith in the President’s promise that we are not going to 

engage in a third large scale intervention, but I do think that there 

are some important lessons that we can learn from the mistakes 

made in the communication between the administration and Congress with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan. We need to talk about 

cost, and we need to be honest about it. And I appreciate the administration putting numbers on the table so soon, but we need to 

make sure that those are worst case numbers as well as best case 

numbers. 

And though I want clear objectives, I also want to be honest 

about the fact that terminology and explanations often are much 

more nuanced then are presented to Congress. And I appreciate 

both in the President’s speech and in briefings that have been 

given to Congress I think there has been some honesty about the 

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comes. I think that if that kind of honest talk continues, it makes 

it a lot easier for us to judge whether this is an engagement worth 

continuing investment. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

And now we are fortunate to have before us the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. James Steinberg, who has just been named, as 

we had heard, dean of the Maxwell School of International Affairs, 

and university professor for social science, international affairs and 

law at Syracuse University. Best wishes, Mr. Steinberg, on your future endeavor. 

He has had a long and distinguished career. He served as dean 

of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University 

of Texas and as vice president and director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute. 

He also served as Deputy National Security Advisor to President 

Clinton and held a number of positions at the State Department 

including Chief of Staff, Director of Policy Planning and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. 

He has written numerous books and articles, and holds a BA 

Harvard and a JD from Yale. 

And I would like to thank you for your help in securing the freedom of three journalists who had a direct link to my area in South 

Florida. Thank you for taking my call, and so many calls about 

their predicament. Thank you for your help in making sure they 

got home safety. 

Mr. Steinberg, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES B. STEINBERG, 

DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank 

all of you for the kind personal words. And I am working on the 

winter wardrobe, and looking forward to those wonderful winters 

in Syracuse, but also the beautiful springs, summers and falls. 

I am grateful for the opportunity to meet with the committee to 

update you on developments in Libya and to answer the important 

questions that you all have raised this morning and in other discussions. I will not cover them all in my opening statement, but I 

look forward to them in the rest of our discussions. 

And I want to begin by echoing a sentiment that so many of you 

have echoed, which is our gratitude toward the men and women 

who are serving the country so bravely and so skillfully, as they 

always do. 

In a speech on Monday night, President Obama laid out our 

goals and strategy for Libya and the wider Middle East. On Tuesday, Secretary Clinton met with our allies and partners in London, 

as well as representatives of the Libyan Transitional National 

Council, and yesterday she and Secretary Gates briefed members 

of both the House and the Senate. And I am going to take this opportunity today to underline their comments and to continue the 

valuable exchange between the administration and Congress that 

has been ongoing since shortly after Colonel Ghadafi’s regime 

began to resort to violence against its own people. 

20

Let me begin by reviewing why we are a part of this broad international effort. As the President said, and I quote, ‘‘The United 

States has played a unique role as an anchor of global security and 

as an advocate for human freedom. When our interests and values 

are at stake, we have a responsibility to act.’’

This crises began when the Libyan people took to the streets in 

peaceful protest to demand their universal human rights and Colonel Ghadafi’s security forces responded with extreme violence. The 

U.N. Security Council acted by unanimously approving Resolution 

1970 on February 26th which demanded an end to the violence and 

referred the situation to the International Criminal Court while 

imposing a travel ban and asses freeze on the family of Ghadafi 

and Libyan Government officials. Rather than respond to the international community’s demand for an end to the violence, Ghadafi’s 

forces continued their violence. 

With this imminent threat bearing down on them, the people of 

Libya appealed to the world for help. The Gulf Cooperation Council 

and the Arab League called for the establishment of a no fly zone. 

Acting with our partners in NATO, the Arab World and the African 

members of the Security Council, we passed Resolution 1973 on 

March 17th which demanded an immediate cease-fire including an 

end to the current attacks against civilians, which it said might 

constitute ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ imposed a ban on all flights 

in the country’s airspace, and authorized the use of all necessary 

measures to protect civilians and tightened sanctions on Ghadafi’s 

regime. As his troops pushed toward Benghazi, a city of nearly 

700,000 people, Ghadafi again defied the international community 

declaring, ‘‘We will have no mercy and no pity.’’ Based on his decades-long history of brutality, we had little choice but to take him 

at his word. Stopping a potential humanitarian disaster of massive 

proportions became a question of hours, not days. And so we acted 

decisively to prevent a potential massacre. 

All of this has been accomplished consistent with President 

Obama’s pledge to the American people that our military role 

would be limited, that we would not put ground troops into Libya, 

that we would focus on our unique capabilities on the front end of 

the operation and then transfer responsibility to our allies and 

partners. The President defined the military mission succinctly at 

the outset, and in his words, ‘‘The international community made 

clear that all attacks against civilians had to stop: Ghadafi had to 

stop his forces from advancing on Benghazi; pull them back from 

Ajdabiya, Misrata, and Zawizya; and establish water, electricity 

and gas supplies to all areas. Finally, humanitarian assistance had 

to be allowed to reach the people of Libya.’’

As we meet this morning, the North Atlantic Council with coalition partners fully at the table, has taken on full responsibility for 

the United Nations-mandated action against Libya, that includes 

enforcing a no fly zone, policing an arms embargo in the Mediterranean, and carrying out targeted air strikes, as part of a U.N. mandate ‘‘to take all necessary action’’ to protect civilians. 

As NATO assumes command and control of military operations, 

we are confident the coalition will keep the pressure on Ghadafi’s 

remaining forces until he fully complies with Resolution 1973. And 

we will support our allies and partners in this effort. 

21

We became involved in this effort because, as the President said 

on Monday night, we have an important strategic interest in 

achieving this objective. A massacre could drive tens of thousands 

of additional refugees across Libya’s borders, putting enormous 

strains on the peaceful, yet fragile, democratic transitions in Egypt 

and Tunisia. It would undercut democratic aspirations across the 

region and embolden repressive leaders to believe that violence is 

the best strategy to cling to power. It would undermine the credibility of the Security Council and our ability to work with others 

to uphold peace and security. That is why the President concluded 

that the failure to act in Libya would carry too great a price. 

Many have asked, and many of you this morning have asked, 

why Libya and not in other cases; why where we have seen forced 

use against civilians? Again, as the President said on Monday, in 

this particular country, Libya, at this particular moment we were 

faced with the prospect of violence on a prolific scale. We had a 

unique ability to stop that violence, an international mandate for 

action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab 

countries and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves. 

We had the ability to stop Ghadafi’s forces in their tracks without 

putting American troops on the ground. 

If I may, Madam Chairman, just briefly want to address three 

non-military elements of our strategy. 

First, on the humanitarian front, we are working with NATO, 

the EU and the U.N. and other international organizations to get 

aid to people who need it. The United States Government has provided $47 million to meet humanitarian needs. 

The second track is to continue ratcheting up pressure and further isolate Colonel Ghadafi and his associates. The Contract 

Group on Monday sent a strong international message that we 

must move forward with a representative democratic transition 

and that Ghadafi has lost legitimacy to lead, and must go. 

But President Obama has been equally firm that our military operation has a narrowly-defined mission that does not include regime change. If we tried to overthrow Ghadafi by force, the coalition could splinter. It might require deploying U.S. troops on the 

ground and could significantly increase the chances of civilian casualties. As the President said, we have been down this road before 

and we know the potential for unexpected costs and unforeseen 

dangers. 

The approach we are pursuing in Libya has succeeded before, as 

we saw in the Balkans. Our military intervention in Kosovo was 

also carefully focused on civilian protection and not regime change. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think 

we’ll get to your other points in the questions. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Could I just finish this last point, Madam Chairman? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Because I know that members are interested. 

Because I want to remind us that though the military operation in 

Kosovo ended with the end of the humanitarian crises and the 

withdrawal of forces, we kept the pressure on and 1 year from the 

time that the military operation ended, Milosevic deposed and on 

his way to The Hague. 

22

[The prepared statement of Mr. Steinberg follows:]


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Last night the regime’s former Intelligence Chief and Foreign 

Minister defected, as some members had pointed out. Will the U.S. 

Government question him or any other former regime member 

about the attack over Lockerbie, Scotland that killed hundreds of 

Americans? Americans, including my constituent John Binning 

Cummock, are demanding answers and this man has them. Have 

any of these former officials been deposed by the Department of 

Justice? What is the plan going forward to get information from 

them about that attack? 

And if I could remind the Secretary to please respond to the letter delivered to her by the families of Pan Am 103, including my 

constituent Victoria Cummock. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well thank you, Madam Chairman. I think, as 

you know, Secretary Clinton has taken a very strong personal interest in Pan Am 103 victims. It has been very close to her personally and she has a peak commitment there. 

And, as I think you know, the Department of Justice has a considerable interest in a number of these issues. Because there are 

ongoing investigations, I am not in a position to comment on them, 

but the Department of Justice is very actively involved in reviewing that and seeing whether there are actions that it needs to take. 

We obviously take this decision by the Libyan Foreign Minister 

very seriously. It is an indication that some of the efforts that we 

are making to try to put pressure on the regime, can be successful. 

And I think while we should not overstate the significance of this, 

we should not also understate the fact that someone with such a 

long association with the regime has seen that there is no future 

there. 

The British are beginning to question him. This is, obviously, a 

development of less than 24 hours so I can’t say in more detail. But 

we take the point that you have raised and it is something that we 

take as an obligation very seriously. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Berman is recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Just because so many members raised this whole issue of constitutional authority, War Powers authority, I want to take just a 

little bit of my time to at least throw out my perspective on all this. 

This is not the first time this issue is in front of us. And I am 

sure Congressman Rohrabacher, who was working for the Reagan 

administration at the time, remembers Lebanon, remembers Grenada, remembers Panama and I could cite 20 other instances 

where U.S. forces entered conflict without any vote of Congress. 

And in the early ’70s Congress intended to come to grips with that 

by passing and by overriding a President’s veto, the War Powers 

Act. There is a tension here because no President has ever accepted 

the constitutionality of the War Powers Act, but what Congress did 

when they passed that was to recognize there will be situations, 

and this was a classic case of one, where action had to be taken 

before Congress could authorize that action. And do not think there 

was plenty of time given the position that the administration had, 

and I think rightfully so, that they were not going to unilaterally 

impose a no fly zone. This was going to be either a coalition effort 

28

or it was not going to be, and it was going to be sanctioned by the 

Security Council or it was not going to be. 

So, so far the President has complied not in his words ‘‘pursuant 

to the War Powers Act,’’ but consistent to the War Powers Act with 

what he is supposed to do with Congress. The test will really come 

60 days from the date this started, the conflict started when if 

there was no authorization for the use of force, in this particular 

conflict. And what the President does then, I do not know because 

once again, no President has accepted the constraints imposed by 

the War Powers Act and there has never been an ability to litigate 

it because no court will give standing to this battle between two 

different, the congressional branch of Government and the executive. 

So, let us put this is a historical context when we start leveling 

charges about what the administration did and the role of Congress. By passing the War Powers Act we accepted the premise 

there were going to be situations where this would happen. And 

under the provisions of Section 5 of that Act, the time will come 

and on any given day the Speaker of the House, the leaders of the 

Senate could schedule for a vote, an authorization or a denial of authorization for this if they chose to do so. 

So, let us look inward before we level too many charges outward. 

Now, in my last minute let me ask you: (1) Given the position 

of the present world leaders that Ghadafi must go, should we not 

recognize the Transitional National Council, as the French have 

done, to help create the facts on the ground that Ghadafi is no 

longer Libya’s leader? Would that not be consistent with our statements and encourage other nations to do so as well further isolating Ghadafi and sending a message to his supporters or those 

sitting on the fence that they should abandon him? 

And finally, if you have a chance in that minute you will have 

left, the Misrata issue that I raised in my opening statement? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, thank you, Mr. Berman. And I am sure I 

will have an opportunity to discuss the issues you raised in terms 

of the authorities in the courses of conversation so I will go directly 

to your questions. 

First, with respect to what the Transitional National Council. I 

think we have deepened our engagement with them, we have had 

a great deal of contact with them. We are in the process of sending 

a special representative to meet with them in Eastern Libya. We 

obviously want to be supportive of the efforts of those who are trying to achieve democracy there. At the same time, we need to understand better about who they are and what their aspirations are. 

We very much welcome the statements they have made in the 

last couple of days, both in making their commitments to democracy and the very strong condemnation they have made and disassociations with al-Qaeda that they made yesterday, which is a 

very positive sign. But before we move forward to formal recognition, I think it is important for us to have a better understanding 

of their goals, objectives, their representativeness and the like. 

In Misrata we have had some success in achieving some humanitarian access, and it is an important objective. There have been 

ships that have gotten in by sea, but it is something that we continue to pursue. 

29

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

And acting with the consent of the ranking member, I would like 

to engage in a colloquy version of the authorization query. Mr. Deputy Secretary, the committee would like to make a request of you 

on a different issue. As part of the budget authorization process the 

Department has frequently provided the committee with draft legislative language for the changes in statutory authority that it is 

seeking, as well as supporting explanations and information. I 

would like to ask my good friend, the ranking member, if he would 

he join me on the record today in asking the Department to convey 

any such request to us as soon as possible so that we can give them 

adequate consideration as part of the State Department authorization process? 

Mr. BERMAN. And the answer is I am happy to join you in that 

request. I think that is the committee’s responsibility and this information is critical to being able to perform our function. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

And, Mr. Steinberg, can you commit to us that the Department 

will at least let the committee know within the next week whether 

or not any request for new or changes in existing statutory authorities will be forthcoming, even if they have not yet been finalized? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. 

With that understanding, because I am not sure that we will 

have all the detail present, but we certainly can give you a basic 

sense of what we will be looking for. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. That would be so helpful. Thank you, 

Mr. Steinberg. 

Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

With that, I turn to the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, 

Global Health, and Human Rights, Mr. Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Thank you very much Deputy Secretary Steinberg for your testimony. 

I agree no ground troops, but frankly, why tell Ghadafi? 

Secondly, when we first initiated military action, did we know 

who the rebels were and their plans for a post-Ghadafi Libya, especially as it relates to human rights, rule of law, and democracy? 

Third, are the rebel fights defined civilians as in the relevant 

U.N. Security Council resolutions authorization of force? 

And how is bad weather affecting the ability to deploy our air 

power? 

And finally, given the fact that Ghadafi has engaged in international terrorism, obviously we all know how horrific the consequences of that has been, what is his current ability to strike at 

our interests outside of Libya? Does not his ability to use asymmetric means to hit back at us increase the longer he remains in 

power? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Mr. Smith, for those very good questions. 

First, on the no ground troops issue. I certainly understand your 

point, and having grappled with this issue in the context of the 

questions a decade ago, I appreciate the point behind that. 

I believe this is a slightly different set of circumstances, in part 

because of the very strong conviction of our partners in the Arab 

30

League and the neighbors about the risks associated with having 

U.S. forces on the ground there. And I think it is very important 

that as a part of our overall strategy that we have tried to make 

sure that this is a humanitarian intervention, that this is one that 

has broad support, and this is not somehow an set of outsiders. 

So, understanding that normally we do not like to preclude these 

things, I think that there is a compelling case in this one instance, 

and I do think it has broad support among the American people. 

So, I think we could make the case while it may not generally be 

the right way to go, that in this case it was justified. 

Mr. SMITH. If the Secretary would yield on that? So that nothing 

would preclude an Arab force or some other hybrid force, AU whatever it might be, from going in? 

Mr. STEINBERG. There is language in the Security Council resolution that talks about occupation forces, and one could have a discussion about what that constitutes. But I think that at least our 

decision is based on our own national policy decision. 

In terms of knowing who they are, I think it is important to understand that we did not intervene explicitly on the side of the 

Transitional National Council. We intervened to prevent this humanitarian catastrophe. But at the same time as part of a broader 

strategy, we do want to see an inclusive democratic transition take 

place. And we are hopeful that the Transitional National Council 

can be the core of something that leads to that barter group. I 

think the Council itself would recognize that it does not fully represent all the people of Libya and that if we are going to move forward, it needs to be more inclusive. 

We have been very concerned about the issue of human rights 

and those assurances that you have been seeking, Congressman, 

and you have a long commitment to that. That is one of the reasons why we engage very closely with them and are very encouraged by the statements they issued both Monday in London and 

then yesterday, both with respect to their commitment on democratic transformation inclusiveness and respect for human rights 

and their strong condemnation of terrorism in general, and their 

distancing themselves from any association with al-Qaeda. These 

are obviously important commitments. We have to make sure that 

they are being honored in the fact as well as the words. But I think 

as several of you have said, the more we engage with them, I think 

the more influence we are likely to have. And that is one of the 

reasons why I think it is important that we engage. 

And while, as I mentioned to Congressman Berman, we are not 

at the stage where we think recognition is desirable, we have deepened our engagement with them including sending a representative 

on the ground. 

On bad weather and the military operations. I have long since 

learned that I would prefer to defer to my military colleagues on 

that, except to say that operations do continue. I did check-in just 

before we came, and the operations even as we move forward with 

the transition, that these efforts are underway. 

Mr. SMITH. On the issue of the terrorism and his ability to 

strike? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Yes. Obviously, it is something that we are concerned about. We know the past record and one cannot dispute 

31

this. Obviously, that is one of the reasons why we think it is important for this transition to take place and why we believe at the end 

of the day that Ghadafi should go. 

Mr. SMITH. Just finally, I remember reading the book Sun Tzu’s 

‘‘The Art of War.’’ He made a very powerful statement, many of 

them, one of them, ‘‘Let your plans be dark and as impenetrable 

as night and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.’’

And when the President said all options are on the table, obviously the Intelligence Committees and key Members of Congress 

need to know. And I think there is no support for ground troops, 

I certainly do not support it, but again telling Ghadafi, I think may 

unwittingly, and I mean that, unwittingly convey to him that he 

has other options and he is not as at risk as he might otherwise 

be. So, you know just going forward I would hope the key Members 

of Congress, especially the Intelligence Committee and the leadership be apprised, but for a short period of time some ambiguity 

might be helpful to ensure his demise. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. Ackerman, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and South Asia is recognized. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I find it interesting that we are in favor of killing Ghadafi, but 

we do not want to be there when we kill him. 

I continue to be troubled as I listen to some of our colleagues 

both in this room and outside of the room. And I welcome some of 

our friends to the newly found and newly discovered by them question of the War Powers Act. It is an interesting piece of work. But 

I wonder where those questions were, and to be clear I supported 

my President when we went to war in Iraq. But where were those 

questions from some of our friends who newly discovered the Constitution about that war? Where were the statements about the 

clarity of the mission when we engaged in that? Where are the demands for the end game? 

We are 8 years into that war, over 8 days, and nobody then and 

for 8 years demanded to know what the end game was. And it is 

interesting 8 days, 8 days into the action in Libya they are making 

the demands about where the end game. 

More people died in Iraq in the past couple of weeks then in 

Libya and yet the questions are asked under this President’s action 

then they were during any previous President that I can remember. 

The War Powers Act is vague. It does not answer all the questions. War does not answer all the questions when you start it. You 

do not know the answer to any of the questions until it is over, and 

sometimes you do not know when it is over. 

Nobody has tested the War Powers Act, the constitutionality of 

it is being argued but not in the courts, and deliberately so. And 

sometimes we have to understand that laws are sometimes written 

with deliberate ambiguity so that we have some flexibility to act 

in situations that we cannot fully understand when things begin. 

Maybe we need a different definition of war; I do not know. Is 

it war when you are fighting on behalf of the people of a country 

and against its leader when you are not against the country, when 

you do not want to defeat a country, when you do not want to deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:08 Jul 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\033111\65492 HFA PsN: SHIRL
32

feat its people but you want to help them liberate themselves from 

a corrupt, brutal and dictatorial leadership? Is that a war? 

Was France at war with England when so many there decided 

that their government’s policy and its citizens would be supportive 

of the American revolutionaries instead of the oppressive king? I 

think not. 

But if you think further about it, you know if a bomb dropped 

by a foreign government falls on your house, is it a war or just an 

intervention? 

And maybe we do not want to define war, and maybe we are not 

in one. But we have to give these things some thought as we think 

about the policy. 

And why Libya? A lot of my friends thoughtfully ask the question 

why of all the countries involved in the region, are we going to get 

involved in every single one of them? 

If you are approached on the street by somebody asking you for 

a few cents and has their hand out, and tells you their story and 

they are in need and you are trying to figure out whether or not 

to reach in your pocket and help or not because there are so many 

beggars out there to help. But if suddenly all of the street people 

say to you, ‘‘Help that one,’’ maybe you have to take a look at that. 

And this is the first time that I can think of when not just one 

Arab nation, but the entire Arab League, which seems to be in a 

little bit of difficulty on every individual basis, says to you ‘‘Help 

that one,’’ maybe there is cause for the exceptionalism that the 

President has indicated here. 

So, I want to thank him, and you, and the administration for 

taking the actions that they are taking. I mean, this is dictator in 

that country who has threatened no pity and only brutality to those 

who oppose him, we have heard that before. Had only Roosevelt at 

the outset and during World War II stepped up to the plate with 

the moral clarity and intervened when another dictator was annihilating people by the thousands and millions, maybe 1 million or 

millions of innocent people would not have been slaughtered. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Burton, chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia. 

Mr. BURTON. First of all, in answer to my good friend Mr. Ackerman, Congress approved going into Iraq before we went into Iraq. 

Now let me read what the War Powers Act says. The War Powers resolution states:

‘‘That the President’s powers, as Commander in Chief, to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities can 

only be exercised pursuant to: 

(1) A declaration of war; 

(2) Specific statutory authorization, or; 

(3) A national emergency created by an attack on the United 

States or its forces.’’

It requires the President in every possible instance to consult 

with Congress before introducing American armed forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities unless there has been a declaration 

of war or other specific Congressional authorization. None of that 

33

happened and yet we are spending hundreds of millions of dollars, 

and probably billions of dollars involved in this conflict. And my 

concern is, and I hope you will answer this, Mr. Secretary, why are 

we not in the Ivory Coast? Thousands of people are being killed everyday by a leader who was thrown out of office and will not leave 

because there was a democracy move and he is still there, and he 

is killing people every single day. Now why is that not as important as what is going on in Libya? 

And I would like to know, and this has been brought up a couple 

of times, how many of these citizen soldiers fighting against 

Ghadafi, how many are people who are tied in with terrorist organizations that killed Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, and do we 

know who they are? Do we have any idea? 

The Secretary of State when asked this question a couple of days 

ago said, ‘‘Well, we do not know all the players. We are looking into 

it.’’

It is a heck of a situation when we go into conflict and we do 

not know who we are supporting. I mean, this could be the Muslim 

brotherhood, it could be al-Qaeda, it could be Taliban, it could be 

a combination of all three, and we really do not know. And we have 

not decided whether or not we are going to give arms to these people. Will we be arming people who do not have our interests at 

stake? The whole northern Africa and in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Hormuth, the Gulf; all of 

that is in an uproar right now. How far do we go and where do we 

go next, and why is not the Congress consulted in advance? The 

War Powers Act, in my opinion, is very, very clear on this. 

And then we talk about the Arab League. You know, Saudi Arabia gets so much money from us it is not even funny, and many 

of the other Arab countries are well healed. Why can they not pay 

for this and if they are not paying for this, why not? And if they 

are paying for it, how much are they kicking in or is the American 

taxpayer on the hook for all of it, along with maybe some of our 

NATO allies? 

And one of the things that concerns me since we are going to try 

to be antiseptic about this and make sure we do not kill any civilians, we are just after the bad guys, well if Ghadafi has got control 

of cities and he is moving into cities when the crowds are overhead 

and we cannot impose the no fly zone, we have Ghadafi soldiers in 

among the civilians. How are you going to get them out? You are 

not going to get them out by dropping bombs on them without killing civilians. There is no question civilians will be killed. So what 

do we do? Do we support boots on the ground? Is France and Britain and other of our NATO allies going in there? And ultimately, 

will we go in there? 

All of these are questions that should have been looked into before we went into this conflict. And, you know there are a lot of 

we can go to war if we really want to. But we got a war in Afghanistan, we just finished in Iraq; that is still problematic in a lot of 

people’s minds. And we do not have the money to do all these 

things. 

We have a $14 trillion national debt. We are sinking in red ink. 

We are $1.4 trillion in the debt this year. We cannot reach an 

agreement with the Senate right now on cutting spending of $61 

34

billion and I see that there is going to be a compromise of $33 billion and we got a $1.4 trillion deficit this year. This country is in 

big trouble and we do not need to buy more trouble by getting into 

a conflict that is not necessary and in our national interest. 

I do not see Libya as in our national interest. Obviously, we want 

to protect civilians and people who are being killed, innocent civilians. But how do you pick and choose? And why are we not in 

places like the Ivory Coast or Syria, or elsewhere? These are questions that need to be answered and should have been answered before we went into this, and Congress should have been consulted, 

the War Powers Act in my opinion is very clear on this. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Burton. 

Mr. Payne, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Africa, 

Global Health, and Human Rights. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

As I indicated before, I commend the President for waiting until 

there could be a consensus with the Europeans and for the Arab 

League for the first time to ask the west to intervene I think is 

something that we keep losing the importance of that. 

Just about Ghadafi in general. You know, I think that his intimidation of many African leaders over the years have kept them 

quiet. As a matter of fact, though, if you want to put his hand on 

a dastardly group. Was Charles Taylor who went into Sierra Leone 

and got together with the group the RUF who were chopping off 

hands of women and children to get the blood diamonds. And so 

Charles Taylor is a direct result of Ghadafi, so I am not so sure 

that African leaders really have that much of a real appreciation 

for Ghadafi. 

They talk about the fact that we do not know who the persons 

are. I met with former Ambassador of Libya Aujali and he gave me 

the names of the 27 people who were in the provisional government 

at that time who are leading the discussions for Libya. So the governing group is not a total mystery. Many people who have been 

imprisoned by Ghadafi in the past are a part of the group. 

All of a sudden al-Qaeda comes up. I am not so sure that alQaeda is in Libya, but you throw that up and that sends a red flag 

to say that we need to be careful. 

I think we do need to be careful, but there will have to be somebody on the ground to combat Ghadafi’s troops. And it is going to 

have to be Libyans. I think if they are trained and are equipped, 

and they have the will to fight because they are fighting for their 

freedom that they have been suppressed for decades and decades. 

And so I think that the liberation persons will really have an opportunity because I also believe that there will be deflections from 

the military of Libya. 

I have a question, though, about the behavior of some of the liberation people as relates to sub-Saharan Africans. As you know, 

there are black Africans that work in Libya. It has been alleged 

that there were some mercenaries that were forcibly brought into 

Libya by Ghadafi. I question how many there are because 

Ghadafi’s forces are strong enough without a sort of ragtag group 

of mercenaries from sub-Saharan Africa. However, the liberation 

people have taken out on black Africans who are workers in Libya 

35

and have threatened them and have brutalized some of them. Some 

of them are afraid to go to the hospital because they think that 

they might get killed in the hospital. So I wonder whether our Government is looking into the liberation people, so called good guys, 

who are taking out black workers in Libya and also actually blacks 

who live in Libya who are Libyans because of the rumor about the 

mercenaries that are there. Do you have any light on that? And if 

we could have any message to the rebel groups, that we should say 

that we do not think that this is right? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Congressman Payne. 

We are aware of, of course, that along the lines you have discussed. I do not think we can confirm it, but because in general we 

would not want to see that happen, we have made clear to the 

Transitional National Council that we would concerned about that 

and that they need to do a very good job of demonstrating that they 

are not like Ghadafi and that they do provide human rights and 

decent treatment to all people involved. 

More broadly, we have been concerned about the possibility that 

Ghadafi would seek to use mercenaries. Again, there is conflicting 

reports about how many or how important it is. But we have been 

working with a number of countries in the region, particularly from 

Africa, to try to dissuade them and discourage providing mercenaries. 

If I could, just because of your longstanding interest in that, but 

I would like to say a word about Coˆte d’Ivoire too in answer to Congressman Burton because we are very deeply involved in that. As 

many of you know, the U.N. Security Council just passed a new 

resolution on Coˆte d’Ivoire. We have been a leader in recognizing 

President Ouattara and working with ECOWAS, the West African 

countries, and AU to see that transition move forward. 

Unlike Libya, however, we have not seen a call by the African 

regional organizations or sub-regional organizations for military 

engagement. So we have different tools for different circumstances, 

but that does not mean that we are not engaged and we are not 

supportive of that democratic transition. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight Investigations is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And I apologize. I have been having to run back and forth between two hearings that are significant. And if I cover a question 

that has already been asked, I apologize. 

Let me get to the cost. I have made several contacts with the 

Transitional National Council and those revolutionaries who are 

trying to free themselves from the Ghadafi tyranny. And, in fact 

Omar Turbi who is right here, just returned from Libya and was 

meeting there with the Transition. Thank you, Omar. And he 

assures me as well as some of the other contacts that I have had, 

that the Council has agreed that they will pay all of the cost of 

American operations in support of their efforts to free themselves 

from the Ghadafi dictatorship. What is your understanding about 

that? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, I have not heard anything specifically to that point, but we have had positive discussions about 

36

them about their support for what we are doing and trying to make 

this a success for all of us. 

In general, we have taken the position that the assets that have 

been frozen are for the benefit of the Libyan people, and so we are 

there to be a democratic transition and that will be a decision that 

they make. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Let me ask you specifically: The administration does support, does it not, or maybe you can tell me 

they are not at this point supporting the principle that if we are 

helping the people of Libya free themselves from Ghadafi dictatorship, that they will repay us? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think, Congressman, we would welcome a representative government from Libya taking that position. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And the American people will also 

welcome that. And let us note that one of the things that tears at 

the heart of the American people is that when we get involved in 

things like this, quite often we feel that the country that we are 

helping or the people that we are helping are not grateful to us. 

And whether it is Omar or others who I have been talking to, it 

is very clear that those people are struggling against Ghadafi today 

in Libya are grateful that the United States is playing a positive 

role toward their effort to free themselves. 

As I mentioned in my 1-minute opening statement, this is not 

unlike the Reagan Doctrine. We are not sending troops overseas to 

do the fighting for other people who are trying to win their freedom. We ended the Cold War during the Reagan years, and I might 

add, did not have bipartisan support in many of these cases, where 

we were supporting those elements that were fighting for their own 

freedom against communist tyranny. Well radical Islam now 

threatens the peace of the world and the freedom of people 

throughout the world. And I might add, by being involved with people who are fighting for their freedom, we are at least lessening the 

impact of radical Islam, if not offsetting it in important situations 

like this. Maybe you could expand on that? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well thank you, Congressman. 

First of all, thank you very much for your support. It is obviously 

very much appreciated. 

And second, I think as you said, I think there is a strong sentiment that there are a real resonance among the Libyan people. It 

is only anecdotal, but I think all of us were very touched by the 

way in which our two downed pilots were treated when they were 

supported and helped by the people who they were trying to help. 

And I think that is a real reflection of the recognition of what we 

are trying to do here. 

I think that as we go forward this is an important set of principles. And we have made clear, first, that we do expect and work 

to the Council and new representative government to reject extremism, to reject terrorism. And the statement that the Council 

made yesterday was a very welcome and very explicit and very 

clear statement. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And if we were not engaged, for my fellow 

colleagues who seem to be trying to suggest that American should 

not be engaged or at least are engaged in nitpicking themselves in 

terms of finding things wrong with what the administration has 

37

done; if we were not engaged, there would be no motive for those 

people on the ground to confront radical Islam on sight? Right now 

they know if al-Qaeda or any of these other operatives who hate 

the west as much as they hate Ghadafi, there would be no reason 

to confront their influence if it was not for the United States there 

helping. So, I would hope that we understand that this is in our 

interest, as it always is in the interest of the American people to 

stand with those people who are struggling for freedom and a 

democratic government. However, it is not in our interest to send 

our troops all over the world. 

I am sure this has been covered before, but maybe you could reassure me that we have no plans to send American combat troops. 

And let me note, Ronald Reagan built up our military forces, but 

rarely did he dispatch them into any type of combat zones around 

the world. Instead, we supported those people who were fighting 

for their own freedom. Is this going to be the case with this administration? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Again, certainly we reiterate the presence of we 

have no plans or intention to put ground troops in Libya. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And if you do, we just note you will lose the 

support of many of us who are now supporting your efforts if your 

plans include sending combat troops an putting them on the 

ground in Libya. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Royce. 

And I would like to tell the members of our committee that the 

Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. is in the side room if any of you 

would like to go and discuss the situation with the radiation leaks, 

and the terrible humanitarian crisis that his country is undergoing. 

And more than anything, he would like to thank the Members of 

Congress for the help that the U.S. has given to his beleaguered 

country. 

Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to pick-up on Mr. Robrabacher’s comments. 

Libyan assets should be used to pay the full cost, not the floating 

marginal cost of our operations. 

And I know, Mr. Steinberg, you say that this money needs to be 

held for the benefit of the Libyan people. First, I would think our 

actions are helping the Libyan people. And I see you nodding in 

agreement. 

And second, Libya at normal times produces more oil per capita 

than any country you can find on the map without a magnifying 

glass. More oil per capita than Saudi Arabia. 

Now I know if we were to seize those Libyan assets to the extent 

already expended for the benefit of the Libyan people, that in foreign policy circles would be considered petty and presumptuous. 

But in America, it is simply outrageous that we are going to hold 

this money and use American taxpayer dollars to carry out this operation. I would like you to respond to that for the record because 

I have got another series of questions. 

The rebels includes some very good people, the people who seem 

to be willing to embrace whatever help they can get not only from 

us but from al-Qaeda or terrorists as well. Have we demanded that 

38

the Libyan rebels apprehend, extradite or at least cease all cooperation with any of the terrorists in their midst? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, Congressman, as I mentioned earlier, we 

were very appreciative of the clear statement that the Transitional 

National Council made yesterday. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That is a clear statement. Have they apprehended 

a single person? I mean, vague statements against terrorism are a 

dime a dozen, especially in English. Have they ceased cooperation 

with Abdel-Hakim al Hasidi? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, again, looking a what we know we 

do not see signs of significant cooperation between the Transitional 

National Council and——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. What you are saying is there is some cooperation? 

Mr. STEINBERG. No, I am not. I am not. No. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. What about al-Hasidi, is he incarcerated or 

is he commanding rebel forces right now? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I do not——

Mr. SHERMAN. Or you do not care enough? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, again, I think if we want to get 

into the details, I think we could have a further conversation in a 

closed session on this. But what we can say publicly——

Mr. SHERMAN. I brought this up in the classified briefing yesterday and I got no answer. And I am sure if we do another classified 

briefing, you will give me no answer. 

Mr. STEINBERG. But I think we share your concern. I think that 

it is important that we have stressed this time and time again——

Mr. SHERMAN. How do I explain to American servicemen from 

my District that those with blood on their hands, American blood 

on their hands, are fighting in Libya and we are risking their lives 

to defend those with American blood on their hands? How do I explain that to soldiers from my District? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, as I said earlier, we are engaged 

with areas in defense of Libyan people. It is not on behalf of——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. One of the Libyan people that we are defending is Abdel-Hakim al Hasidi. Our bombs, we are risking the 

lives of our airmen to defend that man. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I cannot agree with that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. How do I explain that to servicemen and women? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I cannot agreed with that characterization. We 

are defending the civilians in——

Mr. SHERMAN. Is he not one of the civilians we are defending? 

I mean, he is the rebel commander in the Darnah area. 

Let me shift to another issue. I want to pick-up on Mr. Berman’s 

comments because I do not think your answer is all that specific. 

The World Powers Act is the law of the land. Section 5 says that 

the administration cannot continue military action without a resolution for Congress for more than 60 days. And then if we do not 

pass such a revolution, there is a 30 day disengagement period. 

Will this administration follow that law? Yes or no, sir. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, in my future life I will be spending a lot of time dealing with hypotheticals. But I do not know 

what the situation will be——

39

Mr. SHERMAN. Is it the position of the administration that that 

law is constitutional and binding on the administration or not? 

That is not hypothetical, that is what is the position of the administration on a law that was passed long ago. 

Mr. STEINBERG. The position of the administration is that we 

have consulted with Congress. That we have notified Congress——

Mr. SHERMAN. I am asking about Section 5 of the law, sir. 

Mr. STEINBERG. The position of the administration is that the action that we took in this case, which is an action——

Mr. SHERMAN. Will you comply with Section 5 or will you simply 

evade my question? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, it is not a question that can be 

answered in the abstract. The application of any provision applies——

Mr. SHERMAN. There is nothing abstract here. You cannot guarantee that this mission is going to be over within 60 days. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Again, Congressman, I think it is a question that 

cannot be answered in the abstract. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What is clear is that to bring democracy——

Mr. STEINBERG. Our President has certain constitutional powers, 

which he has exercised——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg. And thank 

you as well, Mr. Sherman. 

The chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Mr. Royce of California is recognized at this time. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I want to get back to something that I mentioned in my opening 

statement, and that other members have mentioned here, and that 

is the cost. One of the reasons I want to get back to it, Mr. Secretary, is because you did not mention it in your opening statement, and that caught my attention. 

In London this week, Secretary Clinton mentioned that there 

was discussion about financial assistance to the transitional government, to the Transitional Council I think is the terminology you 

used. What is envisioned in that sense? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, at this point the assistance we 

have given has been humanitarian assistance. We have given about 

$47 million in humanitarian assistance. 

On the military side, I know Secretary Gates is testifying this 

morning, and I would defer to him on what the military costs are. 

Mr. ROYCE. I have seen those figures. 

Mr. STEINBERG. In terms of going forward, this is a conversation 

that we are having with the Transitional National Council in terms 

of what might be appropriate assistance. We made no commitments. We need to understand better what they are and, obviously, 

this is something that we will continue to consult with you as the 

opportunity emerges. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I appreciate that. But what steps is the administration prepared to take to facilitate access to seize the $33 billion in assets that Ghadafi has here, that Libya has here in the 

United States? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, under the Security Council resolution the assets that we have frozen are frozen for the benefit of the 

Libyan people. 

40

Mr. ROYCE. Well this is my concern. I mean you have two ways 

to do that. You could facilitate access to proceeds from new oil 

sales, or you could access these assets. But let me ask you another 

question along that line. 

We have other coalition partners here; the Arab League. What 

commitment have they made? And I ask that because we are looking at a budget deficit $1.6 trillion for this year. We are borrowing 

42 percent of everything that we spend here in Washington. This 

is why I was pushing early on for an alternative approach: Jamming his communication system, which we did not do at the time 

so that Ghadafi could not for weeks communicate with the troops 

when they were defecting rather than an expensive proposition—

we have seen this before. 

I remember pushing jamming in broadcasting in Yugoslavia before the election. Milosevic came that close to being defeated by 

Panic. Had we done what was in the legislation, had it gone 

through, we could have effected the outcome. We could have 

jammed the broadcasting of Taliban radio in Afghanistan all of 

those years. We also could have done our own broadcasting with 

Radio Free Afghanistan. That legislation passed only after 

Massoud was killed. 

So what I am pointing out is a lack of understanding here in 

terms of cost effective ways to do diplomacy or to change governments, and there is a tendency to forget about how we are going 

to collect the check after we have left. I think we have proven that 

if we do not get that set up front, it is not going to happen. Could 

assets be used to repay the U.S. Treasury for war costs? I guess 

that is the question. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think I will answer two parts of the question 

first, because you did raise the jamming issue and I did not want 

to seem like we were avoiding that. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. STEINBERG. What I can say in this session is that we are 

doing some of it. 

Mr. ROYCE. You are doing it now for weeks later. 

By the way, the former government started the broadcasting into 

Yugoslavia the day of the bombing. We started the broadcasting 

under my legislation in Afghanistan only after Moussoud’s death 

and the day before the bombing. If we wait too late, there is a time 

which taken at the brink leads to a decisive move, especially when 

you are talking about jamming your opposition when his generals 

are defecting. 

The Defense Secretary said the military operations have been 

planned, I read this in the paper, on the fly. I hope this cost question is not being dealt with the same way. Because, again, that is 

how you get stuck with the check. And I have not gotten a definitive answer here that commits the administration to the idea that 

we are not going to get stuck with the check. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Okay. I do want to address that part of your 

question. too. 

First of all, I very much take your point about the fact that while 

some countries are contributing by providing planes or other kinds 

of support, there is an opportunity for other countries that are not 

doing that to provide financial support. We are very conscious of 

41

that, and very much engaged with other countries to make sure 

that they find a way to support it. 

Mr. ROYCE. I think I am going to come back with the legislation 

on this. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Because I do not have a definitive answer yet. And 

I think I will talk to Mr. Sherman on that front. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Good point. 

Mr. Meeks, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Europe 

and Eurasia, is recognized. 

Mr. MEEKS. I hope Mr. Royce got the money back from Iraq with 

costs. I heard back then that Iraq was going to pay for everything 

that we did when we entered that war. So, I hope he got the money 

back there first, and all the money that it has cost the American 

people for all of these years that we have been in Iraq. Amazing. 

Let me say that, first of all, as I started out in my opening statement the oceans do not protect us. You talk about American interests and we want to be safe, let us be safe if we do not have any 

allies. How can we be safe if we do not have anyone else working 

with us. 

When we were not attacked and none of our other allies were not 

attacked, we asked them to come with us to Afghanistan and Iraq. 

They cooperated with us. There are a number of our allies now who 

said we had a problem. We are supposed to be a team, we are a 

NATO unit, we need your help now. You have unique assets, 

unique capabilities so we need your help. We want you to be a part 

of this. We did not just go running into some place. And this is not 

just the United States saying it is my way or the highway. Because 

the last time we did that when somebody did not agree with us 

that we wanted to come in, we got Freedom Fries in the Capitol. 

But here’s a President who is being deliberate, making sure that 

we have our allies with us so that as we fight al-Qaeda and we 

fight terrorism we have people because we know we need their intelligence, their help, they are moving because it is a threat to all 

of us. It is a common threat. So, we are working together. 

And Libya happens to be the country that our allies says we 

need to work together on, just as we asked them. So it seems to 

me to make sense that it helps the American people and we all 

share in the costs here and what our particular roles are. So how 

dare are we say it is just United States go on your own again, forget our allies, forget what they need, forget working with them, forget considering anything that they said; that is unilateralism. That 

would make the American people unsafe. That is exactly what the 

terrorists want; they want to be able to isolate us and to say that 

we are just doing whatever we want irrespective of everyone else. 

I am glad that this President has not done that and is working 

collectively with everyone else. 

Let me just give you the opportunity, because I think that you 

were trying to in your opening statement and you ran out of time, 

and it was actually the first question that I had on my mind, to 

talk about Kosovo and what took place there and now. I know 

there is no exact situations. And what the difference is. 

42

And I was just wondering what lessons could we have learned or 

did we learn from Kosovo that we could apply now so that we can 

make sure that we get rid of the guy and move on about having 

some kind of a ground work for political options in Libya and having something politically done? Can you tell us about that? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, thank you, Congressman. And as you correctly guessed, that is what I was going to go on to say if i had 

a bit more time. And I know how pressed we are for time. 

But first of all, as you say, no situations are identical, but there 

are some important similarities between the situation in Kosovo 

because we did intervene there, it was done as a part of a coalition, 

it was done with NATO, it demonstrated our commitment to work 

with our allies in a situation. It was also a case in which we defined the military mission in the narrow terms, which was to stop 

the ethnic cleansing, stop the humanitarian crises that was caused 

by Milosevic’s attacks on the citizens of Kosovo. But we stopped the 

military operation when the humanitarian goal was achieved and 

the forces were withdrawn. But that did not mean we said we are 

just going to leave Milosevic in place and we do not care what happens. We understood the risk of his continued presence there, and 

so we continued the sanctions, we continued other forms of pressure. And working with the democratic forces in Serbia we led 1 

year later, it did not happen overnight but 1 year later he was 

ousted from power. So I think this idea that we can a different set 

of objectives for the military dimension and a broader dimension is 

one that has been validated. It does not guarantee we will succeed 

here, but it is a powerful lesson that the strategy can work, and 

that is what we are trying to pursue here. 

As you also said, I had hoped to say a word about our attempt 

to build a long-term democracy in Libya because I know there are 

concerns about the Transitional National Council, and it is important that as this evolves that this evolves beyond the individuals 

who are now taking on that role to be inclusive, to be broad-based, 

to be tolerate, to be committed to the kinds of principles of human 

rights, rejection of extremism and violence that we all believe in. 

And that is part of the reasons that we do engage with the Council 

is to make clear that we do look forward to that kind of success, 

but it has to be a broad-based one and one consistent with our 

principles. 

I think what we have seen through the Middle East when we do 

engage and we support those processes we have a chance of succeeding and we are planning for it now. It is something we do understand that we cannot just wait until the moment arises. But 

that is part of the purpose of our engagement with both folks on 

the Council and others who are interested in the future of Libya. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg. 

Thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. Pence, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia 

vice chair. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Chairman. 

And I want to thank the Deputy Secretary of State for your service to the country over the last several years and in prior administrations. And I do wish you well in your next employ. 

43

I actually want to get give you an opportunity to answer a couple 

of questions. I think you heard in my opening statement, I think 

it is important that we say we are at war in Libya. And while I 

am troubled about various aspects of how we began this conflict, 

I will never jeopardize support for our troops. And I always attempt to maintain the level of deference and respect that is due 

and owing to the Commander in Chief, and to the executive in matters of war. But I want to say, and it is not my question, I do not 

believe the President has the unilateral authority to take America 

to war with Congressional approval where our safety or vital national interests are not directly implicated. 

And so my first question, if you want to scribble it, is I will give 

you three and you can pick whichever ones, my first question is: 

How was the safety of the people of the United States of America 

or our vital national interests implicated in a way that justified the 

President bypassing the ordinary deliberation, consideration and 

authorization of the Congress in one form or another? 

Secondly, in my opening statement I also said I think history 

teaches that the wisest course of action is not limited war and that 

America has succeeded throughout our history when we have chosen to send our most precious heroes and a treasure into combat 

if we had made the decision that when you go to war, you go to 

war to win? 

And my next question is what is the objective here? I hear that 

there is a political objective that we hope Maummar Ghadafi goes, 

but that that is not the military objective. So my second question 

is how do we define victory? 

And thirdly, you know the President has said that we should not 

repeat the mistakes of Iraq. We have gone down that road before. 

He does not want the mission to involve regime change. And as I 

said before, I stipulate that this is a very different road than Iraq. 

In Iraq we had a clear objective; defeating the enemy and removing 

a dictator. We had a clear congressional bipartisan approval. We 

had careful military preparation. Then we went and got international support. And through trial and sacrifice of blood and 

treasure we prevailed. 

Here we have no clear objective. No Congressional approval. 

Military preparation, as was just suggested, has been done ‘‘on the 

fly.’’ We have mixed international support. And we are involved in 

an aerial bombardment campaign plus on the ground. 

And so my question is: Why should not the Congress take up and 

debate, and amend, and consider and vote on a resolution authorizing the use of force in this case and specifically lay out what the 

objectives and the mission, and the goal of the American people is 

in Libya? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, let me start with the last, which 

is that we obviously welcome the support of the Congress here. But 

as you know, Presidents of both parties have viewed their authority 

as Commander in Chief to use military force when it is limited in 

scope and duration. We have used it in Libya before where there 

was a limited scope and duration operation. 

So, we have consulted closely with Congress. We would look forward to working with Congress on this. And again, we would welcome their support. 

44

In terms of the interest, in my opening statement I quote the 

President because I think it is a very clear statement of how he 

sees the strategic interests. And I could repeat it, but I want to 

spend the time here——

Mr. PENCE. If I could interrupt because I respect your background and experience on this. When President Reagan made the 

decision to launch missiles into Maummar Ghadafi’s compound, did 

that go on for more than a day? What is the history of that? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Again, and that is my point, is that Presidents 

have viewed when the involvement is limited in scope and duration, that they have the constitutional authority to do it. And one 

of the things that is remarkable——

Mr. PENCE. But that instance was a day. It was one launch, it 

was on attack. And we have been at this in Libya now with over 

100 Cruise missiles and air support and ground bombardment and 

now we are talking about equipment and maybe more for several 

weeks. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Right. And I think what is distinctive about this, 

and there have been a number of instances, I just mentioned Libya 

because it is not the first time we have engaged in Libya. But that 

we have already significantly moved forward to reduce the scope 

and duration of our activity. To move it to NATO control is a reflection of that. And I think the President is very conscious of the fact 

that this is the way he has defined the mission. 

And so, as you said, it is important that we define the mission. 

As I was discussing earlier with Congressman Meeks, we have examples in the past where we have used limited force for a humanitarian mission and at the same time pursued the broader political 

objective as we did in Kosovo, and succeeded in our mission——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg. 

Thank you, Mr. Pence. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, again, thank you for being here. 

I am one who, based on the international framework that was 

created from calls of both the Arab League and the U.N. Security 

Council for a limited scope no fly zone, was cautiously supportive 

of the President’s actions in that respect. But I must say it is not 

often I, myself, am on common ground with Mr. Burton, but I do 

think this question is relevant and I want to give you the opportunity, you are about to go into academia, tell me what if anything 

with respect to the War Powers Act do you believe is triggered in 

this particular intervention? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, Congressman, as I said before, I mean this 

President and all Presidents read the War Powers resolution consistent with their constitutional authorities under Article II. And 

although I am aware of my training will be on the war faculty as 

well as my own faculty when I get to Syracuse, I am not here to 

represent the legal opinion of the administration. 

But I would say that we consulted the Congress, we provided the 

notification that is consistent with the War Powers Act within 48 

hours after the beginning of hostilities. So we are following the 

45

practice that administrations in the past have followed in terms of 

how we engage with Congress on these kinds of activities. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do you believe that pursuant to the War Powers 

Act some act of authorization is required from this Congress? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think, Congressman, that when the President 

engages in the use of military forces where the action is limited in 

scope and duration, that he has authority under the Constitution 

to do that. Having said that, we are mindful of the War Powers 

resolution and we have acted consistent with it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. In previous no fly zones, particularly in Iraq in 

the north and then subsequently in the south, what provisions of 

the War Powers Act did Presidents at that time follow? Did they 

also follow the reporting rule? 

Mr. STEINBERG. It is my understanding. I am not here as a Justice witness. But that the position of previous administrations of 

both parties is that they have had the practice of acting consistently with the War Powers Act while reserving the authorities that 

they saw of the President. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And would you refresh my memory? The authority in the Constitution you cite for the President to go into Libya, 

or anywhere else for that matter, is what again? 

Mr. STEINBERG. His authority as Commander in Chief. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. As Commander in Chief? So from your point of 

view the Commander in Chief de novo is free under the Constitution to deploy U.S. troops as he sees fit? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Again, Congressman, I am here acting not as the 

lawyer, but the client. But my understanding of the position of the 

Justice Department, the Office of Legal Counsel is that when the 

use of military activity, military force, is limited in scope and duration the President has certain powers under the Constitution. But 

they are defined, and the test is when the action is limited in scope 

and duration. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I understand. 

I guess, respectfully, I am a pretty constructionist with respect 

to War Powers. The Constitution could not be clearer that the War 

Powers contained in the Constitution are exclusively and entirely 

with the Congress of the United States. 

Mr. STEINBERG. You are a good lawyer, Congressman, and you 

know that it is that the authority to declare war is with Congress, 

and that is obviously the matter that we are discussing——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well but just as the executive branch claims inherent powers under the provision you cite, I mean if we have 

under the Constitution, clear as a bell, the power to declare war, 

it could not be clearer that there are inherent powers that flow 

from that as well, including the decision in advance whether or not 

to deploy U.S. military personnel. 

I do not agree with your interpretation of the Commander in 

Chief powers. He gets to be Commander in Chief after we decide 

whether or not troops are to be deployed. But that is a fight——

Mr. STEINBERG. It is a longstanding conversation. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

Mr. STEINBERG. And executive branch is——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. Yes. And the last President to recognize that 

was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Not a bad President, however. 

46

Final point: I want to give you the opportunity, what if anything 

are we going to do with the frozen assets that turned out to be 

much bigger than we thought of Libya and can we, should we use 

any of them to finance this endeavor? 

Mr. STEINBERG. This is something I know a number have asked, 

and I think at this point what I would say is that: (1) The assets 

were frozen for the benefit of the Libyan people. I think it is a conversation that we will have with both the existing Transitional National Council. Other countries have had frozen assets. And what 

we hope is a democratic government in Libya to find a good resolution that reflects the fact that there are many ways in which that 

could be done for the benefit of the Libyan people. 

We are having an ongoing conversation. No decisions have been 

made. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Ms. Buerkle, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade is recognized. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And thank you, again, for being here this morning, Mr. Steinberg. 

I want to start out my questions first with Pan Am 103 an what 

our chairwoman mentioned at the beginning of this hearing, and 

that is our concern. I am sure you are well aware of 38 students 

from Syracuse University were on that flight. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Yes. 

Ms. BUERKLE. And about a month ago we had the opportunity to 

interview Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and I asked her that 

question: What will this administration do to be sure that we are 

collecting evidence and that we will prosecute the parties responsible which we have good reason to believe is Mr. Ghadafi? And I 

would encourage you, strongly encourage you and this administration to pursue that. There are so many families who are still waiting for closure. They have not had this one final piece put into 

place. An so, on their behalf we implore this administration. 

We now have a good opportunity with the defection of the Foreign Minister yesterday to take this opportunity to ask questions 

and to find out so we can prosecute Mr. Ghadafi for this heinous, 

heinous crime. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congresswoman, I know how strongly Secretary 

Clinton feels about this, too. And working with the Justice Department and others it is something that we definitely intend to pursue. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you. 

Beyond that now I want to talk a little bit, we have heard so 

much about ground troops. And right now you have mentioned that 

we are not going to pursue that. But you did mention in the U.N. 

Resolution occupation forces, and you sort of touched on that but 

you did not really elaborate on that. Can you take that phrase out 

of the U.N. Resolution and expand for us what that means and 

whether or not, because we witnessed this administration unilaterally applying authority for the missiles, now whether or not any 

further steps would be required by this administration to commit 

grounds and if not? So, I would like to hear your thoughts on that. 

47

Mr. STEINBERG. Obviously, you know for us the issue of precisely 

what would constitute occupation for us does not really arise because the President has made a policy decision that he does not intend to send ground troops. So, I think if there were an intention 

or somehow if things would change, which I have absolutely no reason to expect I think the President has been clear about it, obviously that is something that we would welcome a conversation with 

Congress about. But I find it very difficult to imagine, given the 

strong position the President has taken on it, that that issue is 

likely to arise. 

Ms. BUERKLE. What does the U.N. Resolution call for with regards to this occupation forces? 

Mr. STEINBERG. It does not authorize an occupation force. It does 

not call for any. So what it says is all necessary means to help the 

civilians, but it does not authorize an occupation force. So it is just 

a limit on what is otherwise a very broad grant of authority to the 

international community to use military force. 

Ms. BUERKLE. I think the concern of this Congress is that the 

policies have been so vague in our mission, in our goals and what 

are we doing there, and what is the end game that we were concerned that now committing ground troops there may be something, again, it is not brought to the Congress and it is not brought 

to the American people. And I think that that is the concern here; 

that this whole operation escalates, we are in this position without 

Congress’ consent and without consent of the American people. As 

my colleague Mr. Pence mentioned, it was a unilateral authority 

that got us into this. So now how do we prevent any further commitment of troops from our country? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. 

But I would say first, and I have not mentioned this before, not 

only have we had conversation with Congress, but there have been 

significant expressions of support including by the other body on 

this issue. 

The other thing I would say is the President I think could not 

have been clearer about ground troops. And more importantly, 

what you see already a reduction in our military activities there. 

As we move forward with this transition, the United States is stepping back from the front line. We are focusing on providing support 

by things like intelligence and those kinds of things. 

So, I think the President has lived up to his commitment to the 

American people and to the Congress that this is a limited effort, 

that we are reducing our scope and far from moving in the direction that I know you are concerned about. We are moving, actually, 

in the other direction which is to reduce the U.S. military role 

there. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Can you assure this Congress that the President 

would not commit ground troops without consenting and having a 

conversation with the Congress? 

Mr. STEINBERG. At this point, Congresswoman, I could only say 

that the President has made clear to all of us in the administration 

that he has no intention of doing that. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you very much. 

Thanks for being here this morning. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you. 

48

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you to both. 

Ms. Bass of California is recognized. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

First of all, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to congratulate you on your 

new role. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you. 

Ms. BASS. And I wanted to start my comments by commending 

the Obama administration for making the tough decision at this 

critical moment which I believe ultimately prevented a potential 

massacre in Libya. 

I wanted to ask you a couple of questions, two questions. First, 

beginning with NATO, as it is often said that given the significant 

role that we play in NATO, what real difference did it make that 

we have now pulled away and turned over the command to NATO? 

So I wanted to know if you would specifically distinguish the role 

of the United States versus the role of the other nations that are 

in NATO? 

And then my second question. You were asked earlier about 

building a democratic government in post-Ghadafi Libya, and I believe you ran out of time and I wanted to know if you would expand on that? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Sure. First, in some ways from our perspective 

the transition to NATO command gives us the best of both worlds, 

which is that we are able now to step back, to leave the principal 

responsibility for enforcing the no fly zone and the protection of civilians to other forces, both NATO and the associated forces that 

are working under NATO command and control. And we will focus 

on support activities like intelligence and reconnaissance, and the 

like. So, we are definitely playing a less front line role in terms of 

the operation of military activities. 

At the same time, we get the benefit of the well established, well 

oiled machine that can conduct effective military activities. And 

even for the limited role we can be assured that our forces are 

under American command because ultimately all the forces are 

under Admiral Stavridis who is American Admiral. 

So, we have an opportunity for us to play less of an operational 

role, but still have the benefits of a well established and disciplined 

NATO command and control. 

In terms of the transition this is enormously important to us. Because while we are working with the Transitional National Council 

and we appreciate the efforts that they have made to step up to 

try to provide some leadership and some coherence here, that ultimately this has to be broadened. And as we move forward and have 

an opportunity to have a real democratic transition there, we need 

to make sure it is broad-based, we need to make sure that the different voices are represented, we need to make sure that it is consistent with the basic principles that we apply everywhere and the 

same things we are looking for in Egypt and Tunisia and throughout the Middle East. And that is a critical part of our engagement. 

And we have been encouraged by the dialogue that we have had 

with the membership of the Transitional National Council, their 

willingness to articulate a set of principles which I think we could 

all feel very comfortable about. 

49

I know members want to see the delivery as well as the words, 

and that is fair. We need to make sure that this is not just paper 

declarations by them, but that they carry it out. And that is something that we will work on. And so we are beginning to work with 

the Council, with forces and voices outside of Libya with neighboring governments, with NGOs to begin the process so that we are 

ready to go when that day comes that the process can move forward. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ms. Bass. 

Mr. Duncan of South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Let me just remind the panelist and the American people that 

we are still at war against terror. Military strategist Sun Tzu once 

advised if you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not 

fear the result of a 100 battles. So I ask the question: Do we know 

our enemies and do we understand their covert strategies? 

In this operation in Libya, do we know who makes up the rebel 

opposition? Are they receiving support from al-Qaeda or the Muslim Brotherhood? How do we know that the Libyan rebel opposition 

groups are not worse for America’s national security interests than 

Ghadafi? 

The Yemeni American cleric who is the top propagandist for alQaeda stated in the newest edition of ‘‘Inspire,’’ which is a recruit 

tool for al-Qaeda. Anwar al-Awlaki said this: ‘‘The Mujahideen 

around the world are going through a moment of elation, and wonder whether the West is aware of the upsurge of Mujahideen activity in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Arabia, Algeria and Morocco?’’ 

This is according to The New York Times, March 30th. 

Global Muslim Brotherhood leader Ouseef Qaradawi, I cannot 

pronounce that exactly right, he gave a sermon reported by the 

Gulf media in which he called Arab leaders to recognize the Rebel 

National Libya Council to confront tyranny in the regime in Tripoli. 

So I ask you, sir, do we honestly know who makes up the rebel 

opposition? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Congressman. 

You know, I think we can hear these claims by Awlaki and 

Qaradawi and others, but the truth is what we have seen throughout the region is that these movements, whether it is in Egypt and 

Tunisia, are not being driven by al-Qaeda or others. These are 

democratic forces. And they may want to try to claim it because 

they are behind the curve on this. And I think they are trying to 

catch up because they do not have the support. And what we have 

heard from our engagement with the Transitional National Council 

is they are not looking to al-Qaeda. They have rejected al-Qaeda. 

They issued a very strong statement the other day. 

So I would take these statements as a sign of groups that desperately want to be seen in the vanguard of these things because 

they are afraid it is moving in a direction that is against them. And 

that, in fact, our values, our principles are on the ascendancy. 

When you read the words that the Transitional National Council 

issued, those are words that would resonate for Americans and for 

people who believe in freedom and democracy. 

50

So, I do not take their statements as somehow reflecting the fact 

that they own these movements. And as Congressman Rohrabacher 

earlier suggested, it is precisely because we are engaged and supporting these movements that they have a future, they look to us 

in the West as being their partners and being on their side. So we 

have to be attentive, we have to be alert. 

We know that al-Qaeda has had a presence in Libya in the past. 

We want to make sure it does not reestablish it there. But what 

we have seen so far is that this is not a significant factor. That this 

is not something that the people we are engaging seem to want. 

And we need to stay vigilant, but we need to also not let the rhetoric of others who want to try to hijack this dissuade us from——

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. In the essence of time, I saw in the news 

today that CIA has gone into Libya to try to determine who the 

rebels are. And so I will commend the administration and the CIA 

for finally trying to determine that. 

On a separate line of questioning, the President said in his 

speech Monday night that in Libya we are faced with a prospect 

of violence on a horrific scale, and we had a unique ability to stop 

that violence. Did we? That is a rhetorical question. 

And you mentioned humanitarian intervention a couple of times 

as I have been sitting here. So, to be clear, if humanitarian intervention is the President’s justification for action, tell me why we 

have not invaded Uganda? And if this is the Obama doctrine that 

the United States will intervene for humanitarian reasons, then 

tell me why we have not invaded Sudan, Chad, Congo, Bahrain, 

the Ivory Coast, Syria, Iran, and other areas where we have seen 

humanitarian needs where civilian populations have been attacked 

by their governments, decimated in many local instances? And so 

is that what the Obama administration, this administration, is trying to set as American foreign policy that we are going to send 

Americans into harm’s way and expend American resources? When 

we are $14 trillion in debt, are we going to send to every corner 

of the world where there is humanitarian needs? And that is a rhetorical question as well. 

So, I am concerned that we are setting a precedent here that we 

may not be able to live up to. 

I am also concerned that this administration talked to the U.N., 

NATO, and the Arab League prior to talking to this Congress. 

I applaud him for coming yesterday, the administration coming 

yesterday to bring us up to speed. But, Madam Chairman, I wish 

he would have informed us ahead of time. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island is recognized. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I want to begin by thanking and really acknowledging the administration for its thoughtful deliberation and decision making in 

a very, very difficult set of circumstances. And I particularly want 

to commend the diplomatic leadership of Secretary Clinton and 

you, and others for building this strong international coalition with 

NATO and the Arab League and others. 

51

And I think most Americans are sort of genuinely conflicted. On 

the one hand we accept the representations of our President that 

he prevented a humanitarian crisis, or we did as a country in partnership. And also that we have a strategic interest in preventing 

instability in this region of the world, particularly as emerging democracies in Tunisia and Egypt are being born and so that there 

are consequences. 

And so I think we would normally not be necessarily having the 

conversation about the cost of it, except that we are in very difficult 

and challenging financial times. And I hope that part of the conversation with this emerging political leadership in a post-Ghadafi 

Libya will embrace the notion of accepting some financial responsibility for this work, both as a way to compensate American taxpayers, but also as a real indication of the actions of a responsible 

government. And I know you have heard that from the committee 

loudly and clearly. 

So, what I am really interested to hear from you is what is your 

sense of what is the post-Ghadafi political leadership in Libya like? 

Are they likely to embrace that view of the world of sort of some 

responsibility? Because I really think this money belongs to the 

Libyan people, but it would be a great sign of a new government 

that they accepted the responsibility for some of the costs that we 

are bearing. But is there religious elements to this emerging leadership of the Transitional National Council, is it likely to form the 

basis of a new political leadership in a post-Ghadafi Libya? And, 

you know I know we are deepening our engagement with them, but 

if you could share with us as much as you know about what that 

political leadership looks like and whether the principles that they 

articulated on March 22nd: The support for a constitutional and 

democratic civil state, and respect for human rights, and guaranteed equal rights, and opportunities for all its citizens, whether 

they are likely to have the capacity to give meaning to those principles? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, Congressman, I think it is our challenge to 

help shape that and help try to bring that about. I think we cannot 

know for certain. And, obviously, Libya is a country that has suffered tremendous destruction of its social infrastructure, the political infrastructure over 40 years. So it will be a struggle for them 

to build the kind of community and the kind of democracy that is 

more than just an election, but has civil society and it has protection of human rights. But that is why we need to be. That is why 

we need to be part of this, and that is why we need to help shape 

it and support those voices who issued these statements that are 

consistent with our values. 

I think our presence, our engagement, our support increases the 

chances that we will have that kind of outcome, just as it has been 

the case in all these other transitions that are taking place. That 

is why we are committed to doing it. 

If I could make a little commercial here. I think it is important 

as you consider your budget deliberations to make sure that we 

have the resources to support democratic moves, to support NGO, 

to support the rule of law, to support anti-terrorism; all of those 

forces that will allow us to be an effective force going forward. 

52

Mr. CICILLINE. And is there a historical precedent for our having 

persuaded someone that we helped in this way to bear some of the 

costs? And is that part of conversations at least that are currently 

underway with the Transitional National Council? I assume that 

that has come up? 

Mr. STEINBERG. You know, I think that it is obviously early days, 

yes. And you have heard from others members that they have 

heard that from the Transitional National Council. 

I think that what we are now focused on is what needs to be 

done to help them support it, and obviously if the outcome of this 

is that they see that as something that they would choose to do. 

But part of the reason we have been trying to be careful about this 

is because we do not want to be seen as telling them what is best 

for them. But on the other hand, encouraging them to do the right 

thing and move in the right direction. And we want to work with 

them and others to achieve the result. But I certainly understand 

the sentiments that have been expressed. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

And batting clean-up, Ms. Schmidt of Ohio. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you. And it is the opening day of the Reds 

today, and I am wearing my red scarf. Cincinnati Reds, by the way, 

sir. 

Mr. Deputy Secretary, I, like most Americans, am concerned 

about this endeavor, and concerned for a couple of reasons. 

The first is if we do not take Ghadafi out, my fear is that he will 

become emboldened in the region, and not only just emboldened in 

the region, but what he will do to the rebels. He said he will go 

after them and massacre them. And I truly believe that he will. So 

here is the problem I have—the strategy: We are only going to do 

an air strike, but an air strike clearly is not enough. And Ghadafi 

is smart enough to allow us to go in and strike and then let the 

rebels come in and think that they are going to take over a village 

or their area, and then he comes in and he gets them. Because the 

problems with the rebels are twofold. They do not have any training and they do not have real weapons to combat Ghadafi’s weapons. 

Now my concern is if there is an effort to get them training and 

an effort to get them weapons, do we have the security that these 

rebels will be better than Ghadafi or will they be worse? Again, the 

devil that you know sometimes is better than the devil that you do 

not know. So these are legitimate concerns that I have, and I do 

believe that Americans have. So that is my first question. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Congresswoman. And I think those 

are very good and serious questions. 

I would say first on the issue of getting Ghadafi out, I think we 

share your view. I do not think we think that it would be a stable 

or a successful outcome for Ghadafi to stay. But as I said talking 

earlier about the situation in Kosovo, we demonstrated in the past 

that you could have a military operation that is designed to blunt 

the humanitarian capacity as we saw in Kosovo, and an ongoing 

and political and economic strategy that can ultimately lead to the 

leader going. 

53

And what happened in Kosovo was very much a pattern that we 

hope will happen here, and we think we have the same kinds of 

tools and opportunity to do that. 

With respect to support for the opposition, I think you have 

raised the right questions, which is why on the one hand we believe very clearly that under the second Security Council resolution 

that there is an option that is available to provide support for the 

opposition. But if we were to do that or if others were to do it, we 

want to make sure that it would serve our broader interests in creating a democratic state of Libya. Those are the questions that we 

are discussing with ourselves, with others, and that is something 

that we have not yet made a decision about. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you. A couple of follow-up questions. 

While you might want to compare this to Kosovo, actually they 

are very different parts of the world. And while one strategy might 

work in one area of the world, it may not work based on a variety 

of issues, including the trade, the culture, the environment, the 

neighborhood in the other. And so I would not be so comfortable 

to compare this to the similar situation over 15 years ago in 

Kosovo. 

But having said that, the second concern that I have, that I 

think a lot of Americans have, is that we chose Libya clearly, as 

some other folks have suggested on this panel. Why Libya? Why do 

we go after Ghadafi for the cruelty and inhumanity that he has 

shown to the folks in this country when you have folks in Dhofar 

that have been suffering for almost a decade now, and maybe even 

over a decade, and we have done little to nothing for those folks? 

So, I am kind of surprised that we would put all of our eggs in 

this basket when there are other troubled spots around the world 

that might need the same human compassion. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congresswoman, the President addressed that in 

his speech and I had an opportunity earlier today to talk about 

that as well. 

I think we made very clear that Libya is a very specific case, and 

it is not simply the humanitarian dimension, although it is an important one. But as the President said, the instability in Libya 

threatened the democratic transitions that were taking place in 

Egypt and Tunisia, and I do not think anybody would dispute that 

we have a tremendous interest in making sure that we have a stable and a democratic Egypt. 

Second, we have a situation where we had the appeal of the regional organization, the Arab League, which is a very strong situation which is not the case with respect to some of these other humanitarian situation that we are dealing with. And there was an 

opportunity for the United States to play a limited role here to support the efforts of others. 

So, each case has to be taken on its own terms. 

We have a deep engagement on Dhofar we are involved. In the 

Sudan we have helped broker the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

which is now moving forward. And we are involved in trying to 

support that in Dhofar. 

And Coˆte d’Ivoire the same. We passed a new Security Council 

resolution yesterday that tightened the measures there which we 

54

hope will lead to the validation of President Quattara and the end 

of the humanitarian situation there. 

So each situation has to be dealt with in terms of our national 

interests and the tools that are available. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. And my final comment is if we are going after the 

bear in the woods and you strike the bear, you had better take the 

bear out because the bear will take you out. 

If we want stability in this region, Ghadafi then is going to have 

to go, because if Ghadafi remains, the region is not going to be 

more stable; in my opinion, it is going to be less stable. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ms. Schmidt. 

Thank you, Mr. Steinberg for excellent testimony. We look forward to continuing this conversation on such an important issue. 

And with that, the committee is adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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