1

Filed 12/11/17; Certified for Publication 1/10/18 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

ABM INDUSTRIES OVERTIME CASES JCCP No. 4502

 A132387, A133077 & A133695

 (City & County of San Francisco

 Super. Ct. No. CJC-07-004502)

Respondent ABM Industries, Inc. (collectively with related respondents, ABM) is 

a large facility services company with employees throughout the United States, including 

thousands of janitorial workers at hundreds of job sites in California. Appellants 

(referred to herein as plaintiffs) are present or former ABM janitorial employees. On 

behalf of themselves and similarly situated Californians, plaintiffs filed their complaint in 

this coordinated proceeding in September 2007, alleging that ABM violated California 

labor laws by, among other things, failing to properly record and compensate employees 

for meal breaks; requiring employees to work split shifts without appropriate 

compensation; and failing to ensure that employees were reimbursed for expenses 

incurred when traveling between work sites. In June 2010, plaintiffs moved for class 

certification of a general class of ABM workers and various subclasses of such workers 

who had been subjected to particular wage and hour violations. After briefing and 

argument, the trial court found plaintiffs’ expert evidence inadmissible and indicated 

orally that it was denying the class certification motion. In response, plaintiffs filed a 
2

motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (the 473(b) 

motion), attempting to supplement the evidence previously provided with respect to the 

qualifications of their expert. By order dated June 29, 2011, the trial court denied 

plaintiffs’ 473(b) motion. Thereafter, on September 1, 2011, the trial court issued its 

written order, formally denying plaintiffs’ class certification motion. We conclude that 

the trial court’s wholesale exclusion of plaintiffs’ expert evidence in this case was error. 

We further determine that the trial court’s refusal to grant class certification on these facts 

was an abuse of discretion, and therefore reverse. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts Underlying the Consolidated Complaint 

ABM’s numerous California janitorial employees work at customers’ workplaces 

scattered throughout the state. ABM’s job sites in California are organized into two 

regions (Northern California and Southern California), various branches within a region, 

and dozens of distinct districts within a branch. A district is a number of buildings within 

a geographic area. Each branch is under the supervision of a different branch manager. 

Employees report to an individual site supervisor, who in turn reports to the branch 

manager. According to ABM, the site supervisor is responsible for “the daily operations 

of the location, including assurance that employees are paid properly and provided with 

their meal and rest breaks . . . .” However, it appears that ABM’s wage and hour policies 

are controlled centrally and thus applied uniformly throughout all janitorial job sites. In 

addition, ABM pays all of its employees through use of a single software application, the 

Labor Management System (LMS). 

ABM provides janitorial services to clients under contracts obtained through 

competitive bidding. According to ABM, “[t]he low cost of entry in the facility services 

business has led to strongly competitive markets comprised of a large number of mostly 

regional and local owner-operated companies, primarily located in major cities 

throughout the United States.” In order to compete, ABM provides various contracts at 

agreed-upon prices. For instance, ABM provides a fixed price contract where “the client 

agrees to pay a fixed fee every month over a specified contract term.” Under the cost-
3

plus arrangement, “the clients reimburse [ABM] for the agreed-upon amount of wages 

and benefits, payroll taxes, insurance charges and other expenses associated with the 

contracted work.” Given the fixed-price nature of these contracts, it is ABM, not the 

customer, who is responsible for higher labor costs if their employees cannot finish their 

assigned work within budgeted timeframes. As Faisal Algaheim, ABM’s Regional 

Operations Manager for Northern California, testified: “The customer paid the 

contracted amount; the contracted price. And if it is a fixed job—which means the 

customer will only pay us a contracted amount—whether we work more or less, it is our 

problem to maintain the cleaning specifications, and pay the employees currently.” 

All of ABM’s non-exempt janitorial employees, who provide the services under 

these contracts, are entitled to the benefits prescribed by California’s labor laws and the 

related wage orders promulgated by the Industrial Welfare Commission (Wage Orders). 

For instance, “[p]ertinent meal period provisions require that ‘[n]o employer shall employ 

any person for a work period of more than five (5) hours without a meal period of not less 

than 30 minutes . . . .’ (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 11(A).) ‘[A]n employer’s 

obligation is to provide a first meal period after no more than five hours of work and a 

second meal period after no more than 10 hours of work.’ (Brinker [Restaurant Corp.

v. Superior Court (2012)] 53 Cal.4th [1004,] 1049 [Brinker].) To qualify as a lawful 

meal break under California law, an employee must be relieved of all duties for an 

uninterrupted 30 minutes. (Id. at p. 1040; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 11(A).) 

If an employer fails to comply with these requirements it must pay one hour of pay at the 

employee’s regular rate ‘for each workday that the meal period is not provided.’ (Cal. 

Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 11(B); see Lab. Code, § 226.7, subd. (c).)” (Alberts 

v. Aurora Behavioral Health Care (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 388, 400 (Alberts).) We refer 

to any extra hours of wages potentially due to employees under the labor laws as 

premium pay. 

Similarly, pursuant to Wage Order 5-2001(4)(C): “When an employee works a 

split shift, one hour’s pay at the minimum wage shall be paid in addition to the minimum 

wage for that workday . . . .” (See Lab. Code, § 1197 [“The minimum wage for 
4

employees fixed by the commission or by any applicable state or local law, is the 

minimum wage to be paid to employees, and the payment of a lower wage than the 

minimum so fixed is unlawful.”]; see also id., §§ 1194, subd. (a) & 1194.2 [allowing civil 

action for recovery of unpaid wages].) For purposes of this requirement, “split shift” is 

defined to mean “a work schedule which is interrupted by non-paid non-working periods 

established by the employer, other than bona fide rest or meal periods.” (Wage Order 5-

2001(2)(R).) Although the Wage Order does not define “bona fide meal period,” the 

Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) has historically taken the position that 

a bona fide meal period “is one that does not exceed one hour (60 minutes) in length.” 

(DLSE Of Counsel H. Thomas Cadell, Jr., letter to Paul K. Schrieffer, Dec. 11, 2002.)1

Finally, California law requires employers to fully reimburse employees for 

expenses actually and necessarily incurred in the discharge of their duties, including 

automobile expenses. (Lab. Code, § 2802; Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc. (2007) 

42 Cal.4th 554, 569 (Gattuso).) This right to reimbursement cannot be waived. 

(Gattuso, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 561.) However, an employer can discharge its 

reimbursement obligation in a number of different ways, including through 

reimbursement for actual expenses or mileage, or through lump sum payments. (Id. at 

pp. 567–571.) 

On September 19, 2007, plaintiffs filed their consolidated class action complaint 

in this matter (Complaint). The Complaint alleges numerous violations of California’s 

labor laws and Wage Orders, including violations related to missed meal periods, failure 

to provide mandatory split shift premium pay, and failure to compensate ABM 

employees for travel expenses incurred when travelling between job sites. The 

Complaint additionally alleges unfair competition under Business & Professions Code 

section 17200, based on the asserted labor law violations. Finally, it contains a claim 

 

1 Although the DLSE is responsible for enforcing California’s labor laws, 

including Wage Orders, its interpretations of Wage Orders—while entitled to 

consideration and respect—are not binding. (Aleman v. Airtouch Cellular (2012) 

209 Cal.App.4th 556, 573 (Aleman).)
5

under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Labor Code section 2698 et seq. 

(PAGA), to collect penalties based on ABM’s alleged systemic wrongdoing. 

B. Class Certification Motion

After a number of years of discovery and other preliminary matters, plaintiffs filed 

their motion for class certification on June 14, 2010. The motion sought certification of a 

general class described as “[a]ll non-exempt janitorial employees and former non-exempt 

janitorial employees employed by ABM in the State of California at any time from April 

6, 2002 to the present” (ABM Workers) (italics omitted). This putative class was 

estimated as of 2007 to include approximately 35,000 ABM janitorial employees. In 

addition, the motion proposed seven subclasses of ABM Workers, the following four of 

which are relevant here: (A) “ABM Workers who . . . suffered an automatic deduction of 

a half-hour although the employee actually worked through the deducted meal 

period . . .” (Unpaid Time/Meal Period Subclass); (B) “ABM Workers who were not 

paid premium meal period wages when they (1) worked shifts of at least five hours 

without an uninterrupted meal period of at least 30 minutes, (2) worked shifts of at least 

10 hours without a second uninterrupted meal period of at least 30 minutes, or (3) were 

provided a first meal period after the fifth hour of work” (Unpaid Meal Premium 

Subclass); (C) “ABM Workers who were scheduled or required in a workday to work 

two or more shifts separated by a period of time that was not a bona fide meal period, but 

were not paid an additional hour of wages for each split shift” (Unpaid Split-Shift 

Premium Subclass); and (D) “ABM Workers who were not reimbursed for expenses that 

were necessary to carry out their duties, including (1) the use of their own vehicles to 

travel between jobsites, or transport ABM supplies or equipment” (Reimbursement 

Subclass).2 

Plaintiffs argued that class certification was warranted because, among other 

reasons, common legal and factual issues predominated. For instance, plaintiffs alleged 

 

2 Plaintiffs declined to appeal from the denial of class certification for their other 

three proposed subclasses—the Unpaid Rest Premium subclass, the Unpaid Reporting 

Time subclass, and the Paystub subclass.
6

that ABM applied a uniform payroll policy which compensated employees according to 

anticipated work schedules rather than for hours actually worked, leading to 

uncompensated time. In particular, according to plaintiffs, the LMS, ABM’s payroll 

system, automatically deducted 30 minutes of work time for a meal period whenever an 

employee was scheduled for a shift of five or more hours, without sufficient documentary 

evidence that those meals were actually taken. In addition, plaintiffs averred that analysis 

of the LMS disclosed a company policy of never paying statutorily required premium 

wages for missed meal periods or split shifts, despite the fact that some employees were 

scheduled to work split shifts and, reportedly, many routinely missed meals if they 

otherwise had insufficient time for cleaning. Finally, plaintiffs claimed that, although 

ABM scheduled route workers to provide janitorial services at different locations within 

the same workday—and required them to travel between sites—the LMS disclosed very 

few instances in which employees were reimbursed for expenses. 

According to plaintiffs, the legality of these common practices could most 

appropriately be decided on a classwide basis, and ABM’s computerized payroll records 

could be used both to identify violations and to establish common policies. In support of 

their motion, plaintiffs submitted declarations from 50 ABM Workers, including four 

named plaintiffs, stating that the schedules under which employees were paid often bore 

little relationship to the hours actually worked. For instance, they often worked through 

meal periods because there was too much work to do. In addition, plaintiffs provided 

evidence of company practices from various ABM supervisors and officials. Finally, 

plaintiffs also submitted expert declarations from Aaron Woolfson, a provider of database 

services who analyzed certain timekeeping and payroll data maintained by ABM with 

respect to its employees. For example, Woolfson determined that, of the 1,141,903 shifts 

greater than five hours that failed to show any time-out/time-in entries during the 

scheduled workday, 1,070,517 of those shifts (94 percent) nevertheless showed an 

automatic 30-minute meal period deduction. Further, there was no indication in the 

records that premium pay was ever provided for missed meal periods. In addition, 

although Woolfson identified 6,331 employees for whom ABM reported at least one shift 
7

containing shift segments separated by more than one hour, there was no indication in the 

payroll records that split shift premium pay was ever provided. Finally, as stated above, 

analysis of the payroll records disclosed very few instances in which employees were 

reimbursed for travel expenses (12,834 checks to 826 employees out of the 6,396 

employees who worked 155,485 shifts at more than one job site). 

ABM opposed plaintiffs’ class certification motion, claiming that plaintiffs had 

failed to offer any “common evidence of a pattern or practice of wrongdoing.” Rather, 

ABM asserted, it promulgated its written meal policy both in its employee handbook and, 

as of late 2006, on timecards used by some employees.3 ABM also had a policy for 

travel reimbursement, and stated that its practice was not to schedule split shifts. With 

respect to payroll, ABM acknowledges that there is no data in the LMS that describes 

when a meal period is taken. Rather, the LMS shows the hours scheduled for each 

employee, by listing the scheduled start and end time for each shift. In addition, the LMS 

automatically deducts a 30-minute meal period when warranted due to the length of the 

scheduled shift. According to ABM, when employees have worked their regularly 

scheduled shifts, they are paid according to their schedule as listed on the LMS. In 

contrast, if an employee worked additional time, including through a meal break, the site 

supervisor was required to submit an exception report for input into the payroll system, 

showing that the employee worked different hours than scheduled.4 Under these 

 

3 Specifically, the employee handbook stated: “If you are a non-exempt employee 

. . . you may receive at least one half hour time off as a meal period. Your supervisor 

schedules meal . . . periods.” The timecards, as of late 2006, stated more directly: “State 

law requires that you take a meal break of at least thirty (30) minutes whenever you work 

five consecutive hours or more in a day. The meal period must begin before you exceed 

five hours of work and you must sign in and out for your meal period.” According to the 

plaintiffs, however, timecards that recorded meal breaks were used by less than 

15 percent of ABM employees. 

4 According to Woolfson, however, despite ABM’s “timesheet maintenance” 

policy, of the 1,836,083 time entries in the data he reviewed, only 5,625 (0.3 percent) 

contained any adjustments to pay. Moreover, at least one ABM manager testified that 

exception reports did not list missed meal breaks and that, in fact, supervisors were not 

required to report missed meals. 
8

circumstances, ABM argued that class treatment was inappropriate because resolution of 

plaintiffs’ claims would turn on multiple individualized inquiries, such as whether and 

when each employee took lunch breaks, why an employee failed to take a lunch break, 

how many miles a particular employee drove between work sites, whether a split shift 

employee received total wages for that day less than the minimum wage that they would 

otherwise have been owed, and whether the employee requested a split shift. 

In support of its opposition, ABM submitted declarations from 14 current 

employees as well as excerpts from the depositions of certain of plaintiffs’ declarants. 

According to ABM, the deposition testimony of plaintiffs’ declarants cast “serious 

doubts” on their credibility. With respect to expert testimony, ABM did not provide its 

own expert, but argued generally that Woolfson’s expert declaration should not be 

considered. ABM also requested that the court take judicial notice of certain deposition 

testimony provided by Woolfson in another case. 

After hearing on April 19, 2011, the trial court issued its oral ruling denying class 

certification. As a preliminary matter, the court opined that the evidence submitted by 

Woolfson was inadmissible because his declarations failed to qualify him as an expert on 

anything material to the class certification motion. Although the court did not strike the 

Woolfson material, it concluded that it was not admissible “because it doesn’t prove 

anything.” When asked about the validity of the many factual findings set forth in the 

Woolfson declarations, the trial court responded that the question at hand was “whether 

or not a class should be certified” and that, in this regard, it was “not sufficient to ferret 

out individualized common questions.” With respect to Woolfson himself, the court 

found many of the statements regarding his expertise conclusory and thus believed that 

he had not “demonstrated that this court should accept him as a person with particular 

background, experience, skills, [or] expertise to differentiate him from the rest of the 

world so he should be accepted by this court as an expert.”5 Since the trial judge rejected 

 

5 Although there was evidence in the record that Woolfson had previously 

qualified as an expert in both state and federal court, it was attached to an attorney 

declaration rather than incorporated into Woolfson’s own declaration. Under these 
9

Woolfson as an expert, he was not qualified “to present to me opinions that are not 

generally understood by the rest of the world and to allow him to present hearsay material 

to rely on and to give me opinions.” 

On the merits, the trial court found certification inappropriate due to issues with 

the subclass definitions. In particular, the court appeared concerned that the subclasses 

were defined in terms of individuals who had been harmed, making class members 

unascertainable until the conclusion of the case. In addition, it concluded that the

plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden to show that common issues of fact and law 

predominated over individual questions, “given the employment structure and the variety 

of circumstances that each worker finds him or her under.” The trial court further noted 

with regards to predominance that the number of declarations submitted by plaintiffs 

disclosing labor code violations was insufficient standing on its own to establish 

commonality. Rather, it believed “evidence besides declarations would have to be 

submitted to show a common practice.” However, when asked about whether the 

existence of ABM’s auto-deduct policy for meal periods was evidence showing a 

common issue sufficient to support certification, the trial court responded: “Your class 

definition is wrong. It’s not up to me to ferret through what you present and to see if I 

can craft a class somehow from what you are arguing.” In the end, the trial court opined: 

“[T]he concept is not whether we can find a common question here. There are plenty of 

common questions, but the question is whether the common questions predominate over 

individual questions so that it would be appropriate to utilize the class action mechanism. 

And it’s just a procedural device for the convenience and efficiency of the court and for 

the efficiency and economic self-interests of the litigants . . . . [¶] . . . Just because you 

might have a common question in here somewhere doesn’t mean it’s appropriate to have 

this case proceed as a class action.” 

Plaintiffs filed notices of appeal with respect to this oral ruling in June 2011 (case 

No. A132387). 

 

circumstances, the court found it to be hearsay and indicated, regardless: “I feel it’s my 

job to figure out whether somebody is an expert.” 
10

C. Motion for Relief Under Section 473, Subdivision (b)

In the meantime, on May 11, 2011, following the oral denial of their class 

certification motion, plaintiffs filed their 473(b) motion, asking to augment the record 

with further evidence of Woolfson’s credentials and expertise. Plaintiffs sought 

introduction of this additional evidence in hopes that the trial court would accept 

Woolfson as an expert, reassess its ruling that Woolfson’s declarations were hearsay, and 

reconsider its class certification decision in light of Woolfson’s expert findings and 

conclusions.6 In support of their motion, plaintiffs argued that it was excusable neglect 

not to have made a more thorough demonstration of Woolfson’s qualifications prior to 

the hearing on the class certification motion because ABM had given no indication that it 

was raising a serious challenge to those qualifications. Specifically, ABM had failed to 

lodge a formal objection to the evidence, move to strike the declaration, depose Woolfson 

on his credentials or conclusions, and/or provide their own contrary expert opinion. 

Instead, ABM simply made a brief argument in its opposition papers that Woolfson was 

not qualified to analyze the data in question and that the opinions he offered were 

conclusory and based on common experience.7

The trial court denied plaintiffs’ 473(b) motion after hearing on June 8, 2011. 

According to the court, plaintiffs had not shown grounds for relief under that statute. In 

particular, the trial court opined: “Well, the problem with your certification motion was 

discussed in great detail at the hearing on the motion, and the problem was multifaceted. 

It covered a full range of matters, none of which falls into the category of a technical 

 

6 Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part: 

“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal 

representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him 

or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”

7 This was apparently in contrast to a previous case where counsel for ABM 

(representing a different party) had vigorously challenged the same Woolfson declaration 

by submitting written objections, filing rebuttal declarations by defense experts, and 

extensively cross-examining Woolfson at deposition. According to plaintiffs’ 473(b) 

motion, these efforts failed and Woolfson was nevertheless qualified as an expert in that 

case. 
11

failing by the lawyer; in other words, the idea that the problem here is that the lawyers 

did something wrong and therefore I should relieve the parties from the lawyers’ mistake 

is not what happened here.” 

According to the trial court, the real issue in the case was that ABM Workers were 

not a group of workers that were susceptible to being treated as a class, and thus there 

were no predominant questions of fact or law. The trial court also reiterated its problems 

with the plaintiffs’ proposed class definitions. In the end, the court indicated that it had 

reviewed the supplemental evidence provided by plaintiffs and that—even if it agreed to 

consider it—it would not change the court’s view on certification. As the court opined: 

“Whether or not this witness is qualified to give the opinions, the opinions are not 

material to this case . . . .” A written order memorializing the trial court’s denial of the 

473(b) motion was filed on June 29, 2011, and a timely notice of appeal with respect to 

that order was filed on August 29, 2011 (case No. A133077). 

D. Order Denying Class Certification

The trial court’s written order denying class certification was ultimately filed on 

September 1, 2011. The court first reiterated its conclusion that the Woolfson 

declarations submitted by plaintiffs in support of their class certification motion were 

inadmissible, stating “there is no evidence that Mr. Woolfson is an expert in any area that 

is material to this case.” As discussed above, the record did contain two orders (from 

state and federal courts) certifying Woolfson as an expert. The trial court, however, 

found that the facts set forth in those orders were hearsay and concluded, regardless: 

“Whether Mr. Woolfson was accepted as an expert in state and federal court is 

immaterial: the Court does its own work regarding the admissibility of expert 

testimony.” 

With respect to the merits, the trial court first concluded that plaintiffs’ class 

definition was unworkable. It found plaintiffs’ general class definition permissible: “All 

non-exempt janitorial employees and former non-exempt janitorial employees employed 

by ABM in the State of California at any time from April 6, 2002 to the present.” 

However, noting that courts have rejected class claims when the class definition is simply 
12

shorthand for persons possibly wronged by the defendant, the trial court found fault with 

the plaintiffs’ seven subclasses, opining that “defining the proposed class(es) by reference 

to the alleged injury or injuries sustained is a fatal defect, because the members of the 

class cannot be ascertained until the lawsuit is concluded.” According to the trial court, 

under such circumstances, “it is impossible to identify who is a member of the putative 

class, which makes it impossible to provide them with notice of the lawsuit, and which 

therefore also makes it impossible to determine who will be bound by the judgment.” 

The trial court also found fault with the fact that the sum of the seven subclasses did not 

add up to the entire general class. 

In addition to these ascertainability issues, the trial court also concluded that class 

treatment of plaintiffs’ claims was inappropriate because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 

that common questions predominate over individual inquiries. In particular, the court 

found that plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence of a common scheme with 

respect to the negotiation of contracts which, by their terms, led to ABM employees 

being underpaid. In addition, the court determined that the declarations submitted by 

plaintiffs regarding claimed labor law violations were insufficient in number, “without 

additional evidence,” to demonstrate a common practice. In sum, the court opined that 

“consideration of all the factors relevant to class certification demonstrates that individual 

inquiries will predominate in determining all of the putative class members’ claims, and 

therefore class certification is not a superior method of resolving the instant case.” 

Following entry of the trial court’s written order denying class certification, 

appellants filed a third notice of appeal (case No. A133695). By order dated January 26, 

2012, the three cases were consolidated for all future proceedings in this court. In 

addition, at the parties’ request, we stayed the matter pending issuance by the Supreme 

Court of its decision in Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th 1004. Once the Supreme Court’s 

opinion in Brinker was final, a briefing schedule was set, and the matter is now before us 

for decision. 
13

II. DISCUSSION

A. Admissibility of Expert Evidence

As a preliminary matter, we must address the trial court’s decision to disregard the 

declarations of plaintiffs’ expert, Woolfson, in making its class certification 

determination. As both parties have accurately asserted, we review a trial court’s ruling 

on the admissibility of expert evidence for abuse of discretion. (Garrett v. Howmedica 

Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173, 187.) “ ‘However, the discretion to admit 

or exclude evidence is not unlimited. “The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, 

uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal 

principles governing the subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal where no 

reasonable basis for the action is shown.” ’ ” (Kotla v. Regents of University of 

California (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 283, 291–292 (Kotla).) This is especially true when, 

as here, a trial court’s exercise of discretion “implicates a party’s ability to present its 

case.” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 

747, 773 (Sargon Enterprises); see Brown v. Colm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 639, 647 (Brown) 

[“the exclusion of the sole expert relied upon by a party because of an erroneous view of 

his qualifications is, in a case where expert testimony is essential, an abuse of discretion 

as a matter of law requiring reversal”].) Indeed, in this context, courts must “be cautious 

in excluding expert testimony” as the trial court’s gatekeeping goal “is simply to exclude 

‘clearly invalid and unreliable’ expert opinion.” (Sargon Enterprises, at p. 772.) 

Should we determine in this case that an abuse of discretion has occurred, that 

conclusion alone is not sufficient to support reversal of the trial court’s certification 

decision. Rather, the “judgment of the trial court may not be reversed on the basis of the 

erroneous admission of evidence, unless that error was prejudicial.” (Grail 

Semiconductor, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc. (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 786, 799 (Grail Semiconductor); see Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) Article 

VI, section 13, of the California Constitution further provides that “a judgment may not 

be set aside based on the erroneous admission of evidence ‘unless, after an examination 

of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error 
14

complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ ” (Grail Semiconductor, supra, 

225 Cal.App.4th at p. 799; see Evid. Code, § 353.) “In civil cases, a miscarriage of 

justice should be declared only when the reviewing court, after an examination of the 

entire cause, including the evidence, is of the opinion that it is reasonably probable that a 

result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of 

the error.” (Grail Semiconductor, at p. 799.) Thus, our task on appeal is to determine 

whether an abuse of discretion has occurred and, if so, whether it is reasonably probable 

that a result more favorable to plaintiffs would have been obtained absent the error. 

As detailed above, the trial court in the present case based its decision to exclude 

Woolfson’s expert declarations on two separate grounds—that Woolfson had not 

properly established himself as an expert and that, regardless, the information that he 

presented via expert declaration was not material to this case. With respect to 

Woolfson’s expert qualifications, although the trial court acknowledged in its order 

denying class certification that Woolfson indicated an expertise “in creating, managing 

and analyzing large databases,” it rejected him as an expert, finding no evidence that he 

had “formal training or degrees that would qualify him as an expert to review the 

timekeeping and payroll data at issue.” The trial court also noted that “Mr. Woolfson’s 

declaration does not set forth any evidence that he holds certificates, has obtained any 

kind of college or other professional degree, belongs to any professional organizations, 

has published any articles, taught or has ever testified as an expert witness at trial.” 

Further, at the April 2011 hearing denying class certification, the trial court indicated that 

it believed the qualification information supplied by Woolfson in his expert declaration 

was too general to establish him as an expert. For example, the trial court stated: 

“[Woolfson] says he has extensive experience in creating, managing, and analyzing large 

databases, including, and then he lists a number of things. I have no idea what the term 

‘extensive’ means. It looks to me like a conclusion that he hasn’t explained in any way. 

He doesn’t say how many years, how many assignments, what the nature of the 

assignments were, what the nature of his tasks were or anything of the like.” Similarly, 

the trial court noted that “without any detail” Woolfson stated that he “has provided 
15

payroll and timekeeping database analysis for attorneys in numerous wage-hour cases. 

That does not communicate any specific facts of the type that is usually relied upon to 

qualify an expert.” 

While the better course of action in this case clearly would have been to provide 

the trial court with a more extensive explanation of the specifics of Woolfson’s expertise, 

we believe that, under the circumstances, the trial court erred by refusing to qualify 

Woolfson as an expert in database management and analysis based on the materials 

before it. “A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to 

which his testimony relates.” (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a), italics added.) “Expertise, in 

other words, ‘is relative to the subject,’ and is not subject to rigid classification according 

to formal education or certification.” (People v. Ojeda (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 404, 408.) 

Rather, an expert’s qualifications can be established in any number of different ways, 

including “a showing that the expert has the requisite knowledge of, or was familiar with, 

or was involved in, a sufficient number of transactions involving the subject matter of the

opinion.” (Howard Entertainment, Inc. v. Kudrow (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1115 

(Howard Entertainment).) In sum, with respect to expert qualification, “[t]he 

determinative issue in each case must be whether the witness has sufficient skill or 

experience in the field so that his testimony would be likely to assist the jury in the search 

for the truth, and no hard and fast rule can be laid down which would be applicable in 

every circumstance.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 645; see Howard Entertainment, at 

p. 1115.) 

Once this threshold has been met, questions regarding the degree of an expert’s 

knowledge go more to the weight of the evidence presented than to its admissibility. (See 

People v. Tuggle (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1079–1080; see also Jordan v. Allstate 

Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1217 [where expert declaration was 

sufficient to demonstrate “ ‘special’ ” knowledge of the subject matter, the “weight and 

value” of the expert opinion was a matter for the trier of fact].) Finally, the ability of an 

expert witness to testify as to either facts or opinions is limited to matters that are not 
16

common knowledge. Thus, for example, “[e]xpert testimony as to facts may be 

necessary where the facts from which conclusions are to be drawn are peculiarly within 

the expert’s knowledge and are not a matter of common knowledge as to which an 

ordinary witness may competently testify.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Evid. (5th ed. 2012) Opinion 

Evidence, § 27, p. 638.) Similarly, expert opinion should be excluded “ ‘ “when ‘the

subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that men of ordinary education 

could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness.’ ” ’ ” (Kotla, supra, 

115 Cal.App.4th at p. 291; see Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) 

Here, Woolfson provided a declaration indicating that he was a founder of 

TelSwitch, Inc., a company which “builds and develops telephonic database service for 

several major telecommunications companies to manage their billing, as well as 

calculating and maintaining extensive databases related to the accurate calculation of the 

rates and rounding mechanisms used on telecommunications services.” Woolfson further 

declared that he was a managing partner of Merkt-Woolfson, a company which 

“produces billing and database mechanisms for banks to keep track of the paperwork that 

banks require to maintain mortgage and loan origination” and also provides “extensive 

database management services to both government and private industries,” including “the 

largest banks, military contractors, and publicly held telecommunications carriers where 

accuracy and accountability are a necessity.” Moreover, according to Woolfson, a 

“typical transaction load” for an “average database” maintained by his company was 

approximately one million records a day; he was “accustomed to, and comfortable with, 

working with a large amount of data across a variety of industries, including for litigation 

purposes”; and he had “extensive experience in creating, managing, and analyzing large 

databases,” including specifically timekeeping databases. 

Woolfson’s expert declaration additionally indicated that he had provided “payroll 

and timekeeping database analysis for attorneys in Northern and Southern California 

involving numerous wage and hour class action cases.” He then described the 

timekeeping records he had received from ABM—including, for example, “1,836,083 

Time Entries in Microsoft ExcelTM files covering 27,183 employees who performed 
17

1,500,175 shifts of work at 5380 Job Site locations from 12-08-02 through 07-18-07”—

and walked through his step-by-step analysis of those records. Indeed, Woolfson went so 

far as to set forth the specific Structured Query Language (SQL) queries he used to 

extract relevant information from ABM’s records.8 

We reiterate that additional information regarding the specifics of Woolfson’s 

expertise in matters relevant to this case would clearly have been preferable.9 However, 

 

8 As stated above, in addition to Woolfson’s expert declarations, the plaintiffs 

submitted an attorney declaration that, among other things, attached two court orders 

from cases in which Woolfson had reportedly been qualified as an expert under similar 

circumstances. (See Avalos v. La Salsa, Inc. (Super. Ct. Santa Barbara County, 2010, 

JCCP No. 4488 (Avalos) [order dated May 17, 2010, granting in part and denying in part 

plaintiff’s motion for class certification]; see also Hines v. KFC U.S. Properties, Inc.

(S.D. Cal., Oct. 22, 2010, No. 09-cv-02422-JM (POR) (Hines) [order granting in part and 

denying in part motion for class certification, which states at page 6 that “Mr. Woolfson 

is an expert in the compilation and analysis of databases, based upon his declaration 

which sets forth his qualifications and the methods and procedures adopted to analyze the 

data.”].) At the April 2011 hearing on class certification, the trial court initially indicated 

that it believed there was evidence in the record that Woolfson had not previously 

qualified as an expert. When plaintiffs’ counsel mentioned the two cases cited above as 

instances where Woolfson had been qualified, the court opined that the referenced court 

orders were hearsay and that, regardless, it chose not to take judicial notice of them 

because it believed it was the court’s job “to figure out whether somebody is an expert.” 

The court’s written order denying class certification reiterated this sentiment, stating that 

whether Woolfson was “accepted as an expert in state and federal court is immaterial; the 

Court does its own work regarding the admissibility of expert testimony.” We agree with 

both the trial court and ABM that one court is not required to adopt another court’s 

conclusion that an individual is an expert in a particular matter, although it may do so. 

(See Mora v. Big Lots Stores, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 496, 513–514.) However, that 

a proposed expert has been previously qualified seems, at the very least, relevant to 

another court’s subsequent qualification analysis and we question the trial court’s perhaps 

overly technical application of the hearsay rule when establishing prior expert 

qualification via judicially noticed court order. Nevertheless, we need not finally reach 

the issue, as we would find error here regardless of whether Woolfson’s history as a 

qualified expert is considered. 

9 For instance, in a supplemental declaration filed in connection with plaintiffs’ 

473(b) motion, Woolfson clarified that he had over 24 years of experience developing 

highly accurate database applications for companies such as Japan Telecom America, 

Experian, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase; that his database techniques were 
18

we conclude that the materials submitted in advance of the April 2011 hearing on class 

certification in this case were sufficient to qualify Woolfson as an expert in database 

management and analysis, and that the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary was an 

abuse of discretion. In particular, we find that the trial court’s emphasis on formal 

education and membership in professional organizations was misplaced with respect to 

Woolfson’s stated expertise, given his clear familiarity with numerous, highly complex 

transactions in that subject matter. (See Howard Entertainment, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th

at p. 1115.) Indeed, while admittedly not detailed, Woolfson’s declaration did indicate 

that he had “extensive experience” in database management and analysis, including 

statements that he held leadership positions in two database companies which serviced 

the “largest banks, military contractors, and publicly held telecommunications carriers”; 

that his company handled typical transaction loads of approximately one million records 

per day on “average” databases it maintained; and that he had previously provided 

payroll and timekeeping database analysis in numerous wage and hour class action cases 

in California. Moreover, although ABM did argue briefly before the trial court that 

Woolfson was not qualified to analyze the data at issue and that certain of his conclusions 

were overly broad and lacked sufficient factual foundation, ABM did not challenge the 

veracity of any of Woolfson’s qualifications as set forth in his declaration, nor did it 

contest even a single one of the myriad factual findings made by Woolfson during the 

course of his analysis. 

 

used by the federal government, including by the Department of Justice and the Patriot 

Missile Defense Training System; that he had a number of relevant professional 

certifications; that his authored works included an analysis of the merger between 

Continental Airlines and United Airlines that was presented to the Senate Judiciary 

Committee in 2010; that he had qualified as an expert in Avalos and Hines, both wage 

and hour class actions in which the courts relied on his analysis in granting class 

certification; and that he had been retained as an expert in over 40 cases (90 percent class 

actions) by both plaintiffs and defendants to analyze “timekeeping, payroll records, 

telephone call records, credit card records, reimbursement records, and travel records 

(e.g., gps data and locations where employees worked).” 
19

Under these circumstances, plaintiffs’ evidence supporting Woolfson’s expert 

qualifications showed that he had “sufficient skill or experience” in the field of database 

management and analysis such that his declarations should have been considered by the 

trial court. (See Brown, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 645.) Nevertheless, the trial court chose to 

reject all of the information provided by Woolfson, despite the fact that, as we discuss 

further below, Woolfson’s analysis of the ABM database was central to plaintiffs’ class 

certification motion, and thus the trial court’s decision effectively foreclosed plaintiffs’ 

ability to put on their case. (See Sargon Enterprises, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773; Brown, 

supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 647.) This was error. 

While we do not here pass on the admissibility of every opinion reached by 

Woolfson based on his manipulation of ABM’s database, we find the many facts 

generated by Woolfson’s analysis clearly admissible as matters beyond the common 

knowledge or experience of an ordinary witness.10 (See Business Objects, S.A. 

v. MicroStrategy, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2005) 393 F.3d 1366, 1368 [noting that SQL requires the 

user to “understand the structure and content of the relational database as well as the 

complex syntax of the specific query language” and that “[t]hese complexities generally 

prevent laypersons from drafting queries in query languages.”].) Moreover, as evidence 

of ABM’s common wage and timekeeping practices, Woolfson’s results would 

unquestionably aid a jury in its search for the truth regarding any alleged classwide wage 

or hour violations in this case. (See Brown, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 645; Howard 

Entertainment, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115; see also Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 

p. 1033 [“Claims alleging that a uniform policy consistently applied to a group of 

employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the sort routinely, and 

properly, found suitable for class treatment.”].) 

 

10 As just one example, Woolfson identified ABM workers scheduled to work shift 

segments separated by more than one hour on the same day, without any indication of 

premium pay, through use of the following SQL queries: “1. select count (*) from 

workdata where SplitShiftViolation=‘YES’ and isWork =‘YES’ [¶] 2. select distinct 

reference from workdata where SplitShiftViolation =‘YES’ and iswork =‘YES’.” 
20

Frankly, we are somewhat mystified by the trial court’s wholesale exclusion of the 

entirety of Woolfson’s evidence in this matter. Upon review, it appears that the trial 

court’s conclusions regarding the admissibility of the Woolfson materials were 

impermissibly tainted by its strong views with respect to the underlying merits of 

plaintiffs’ class certification motion—that is, that class certification was improper due to 

the individualized inquiries that would be required to establish which ABM employees, if 

any, had been harmed in this matter. This determination, moreover, appears to have been 

based, at least in part, on the mistaken notion that database analysis of timekeeping and 

payroll records cannot be used as a means to show common practices for purposes of 

class certification. Indeed, at the June 2011 hearing on plaintiffs’ 473(b) motion, through 

which plaintiffs were attempting to bolster Woolfson’s expert credentials, the trial court 

opined that ABM workers were “not susceptible to be treated as a class, period” and that 

the “basic problem” in the case was that “individualized analysis of working situations” 

would be needed “to understand why a worker may not have been given a lunch break.” 

Thus, in the opinion of the trial court: “Whether or not this witness is qualified to give 

the opinions, the opinions are not material to this case.” (Italics added.) 

In sum, it was error for the trial court to completely disregard plaintiffs’ proffered 

expert evidence of common practice, rather than accepting it for what it was and 

weighing it against the existence of any individualized inquiries that might properly have 

defeated plaintiffs’ request for class certification. Moreover, as we discuss in detail 

below, the trial court’s decision clearly prejudiced plaintiffs, as it left them without any 

evidence of systemic wrongdoing other than the information contained in the declarations 

and deposition testimony submitted in connection with their class certification motion, 

materials which the trial court found insufficient in number to demonstrate predominant 

common questions. Indeed, the trial court expressly stated: “The number of declarations 

[submitted by plaintiffs] compared to the number of employees by itself would not be 

sufficient [to demonstrate predominance]. . . . What I’m suggesting is that evidence 

besides declarations would have to be submitted to show a common practice.” (Italics 

added.) Yet this was precisely the evidence that the trial court excluded. Since we find it 
21

reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the plaintiffs would have been 

reached in the absence of this error, the trial court’s order denying class certification 

cannot stand. (See Kotla, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 294.)11

B. Class Certification Issues

1. Rules Governing Class Actions and Standard of Review

The requirements for class certification are well established and were recently 

summarized by our high court in Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021: “Originally 

creatures of equity, class actions have been statutorily embraced by the Legislature 

whenever ‘the question [in a case] is one of a common or general interest, of many 

persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before 

the court . . . .’ [Citations.] Drawing on the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 

382 and federal precedent, we have articulated clear requirements for the certification of 

a class. The party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an 

ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and 

substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the 

alternatives. [Citations.] ‘In turn, the “community of interest requirement embodies 

three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives 

with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can 

adequately represent the class.” ’ ”

“ ‘[T]his state has a public policy which encourages the use of the class action 

device.’ ” (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 340 

(Sav-On).) Further, whether class certification should be granted is a procedural 

question, and not a question of whether the action is “ ‘legally or factually meritorious.’ ” 

(Id. at p. 326.) As a general matter, “ ‘a class action is not inappropriate simply because 

 

11 Because we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to consider Woolfson’s 

expert declarations when making its class certification determination at the hearing in 

April 2011 (as memorialized by the court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion for class 

certification filed on September 1, 2011), we need not reach the issue of whether the trial 

court also erred in refusing to grant plaintiffs’ 473(b) motion so that additional evidence 

of Woolfson’s expert qualifications could be brought before the court. 
22

each member of the class may at some point be required to make an individual showing 

as to his or her eligibility for recovery or as to the amount of his or her damages.’ ” (Id.

at p. 333.)

In addition, with respect to the superiority of the class action mechanism—and as 

is pertinent to our present inquiry—we have previously noted that “[c]ourts regularly 

certify class actions to resolve wage and hour claims. [Citations.] In this arena the class 

action mechanism allows claims of many individuals to be resolved at the same time, 

eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and affords small claimants with a 

method of obtaining redress for claims which otherwise would be too insignificant to 

warrant individual litigation. [Citation.] Moreover, the issues slated for contest are 

primarily common issues involving common evidence. It would not be efficient or fair to 

relegate these complaints to multiple trials.” (Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc.

(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1208 (Bufil); see Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1033.)

Indeed, as our high court elaborated in Brinker, a theory of liability that an 

employer “has a uniform policy, and that that policy, measured against wage order 

requirements, allegedly violates the law—is by its nature a common question eminently 

suited for class treatment.” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1033.) “[I]n the general case 

to prematurely resolve such disputes, conclude a uniform policy complies with the law, 

and thereafter reject class certification . . . places defendants in jeopardy of multiple class 

actions, with one after another dismissed until one trial court concludes there is some 

basis for liability and in that case approves class certification. [Citation.] It is far better 

from a fairness perspective to determine class certification independent of threshold 

questions disposing of the merits, and thus permit defendants who prevail on those 

merits, equally with those who lose on the merits, to obtain the preclusive benefits of 

such victories against an entire class and not just a named plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 1034.)

“California courts consider ‘pattern and practice evidence, statistical evidence, 

sampling evidence, expert testimony, and other indicators of a defendant’s centralized 

practices in order to evaluate whether common behavior towards similarly situated 

plaintiffs makes class certification appropriate.’ ” (Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc. (2010) 
23

181 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1298 (Jaimez).) Other relevant factors include “ ‘whether the 

class approach would actually serve to deter and redress alleged wrongdoing.’ ” (Ibid.) 

Moreover, in the wage and hour context, “[w]e have recognized that retaining one’s 

employment while bringing formal legal action against one’s employer is not ‘a viable 

option for many employees,’ ” and thus a class action may be appropriate as “a current 

employee who individually sues his or her employer is at greater risk of retaliation.” 

(Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 459, abrogated on other grounds as 

stated in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 359–

360; see also Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 558, citing Gentry.) And, 

in Gentry our high court noted that class actions may be particularly useful for immigrant 

workers with limited English language skills, as illegal employer conduct might 

otherwise escape their attention. (Gentry, at p. 461.) 

A ruling on class certification is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Brinker, supra, 

53 Cal.4th at p. 1022; Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) Under this standard, “ ‘[a]

certification order generally will not be disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported by 

substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on erroneous legal 

assumptions.’ ” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1022; see Bufil, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1204 [noting that while “[t]rial courts enjoy wide discretion with regard to class 

certification,” we will nevertheless reverse and order denying class certification “if the 

order is based on improper criteria or incorrect assumptions”].) Moreover, “[a]n appeal 

from an order denying class certification presents an exception to customary appellate

practice by which we review only the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale. If the trial 

court failed to conduct the correct legal analysis in deciding not to certify a class action, 

‘ “an appellate court is required to reverse an order denying class certification . . . , ‘even 

though there may be substantial evidence to support the court’s order.’ ” ’ [Citation.] In 

short, we must ‘ “consider only the reasons cited by the trial court for the denial, and 

ignore other reasons that might support denial.” ’ ” (Alberts, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 399.)
24

On the issue of predominance, a trial court’s finding is generally reviewed for 

substantial evidence. (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1022.) Thus, “[w]e must 

‘[p]resum[e] in favor of the certification order . . . the existence of every fact the trial 

court could reasonably deduce from the record . . . .’ ” (Ibid.) However, since the focus 

of this type of certification dispute “is on what type of questions—common or 

individual—are likely to arise in the action, rather than on the merits of the case 

[citations], in determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a trial court’s 

certification order, we consider whether the theory of recovery advanced by the 

proponents of certification is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class 

treatment. [Citations.] ‘Reviewing courts consistently look to the allegations of the 

complaint and the declarations of attorneys representing the plaintiff class to resolve this 

question.’ ” (Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 327, italics added.)

In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion, both 

in concluding that their proposed subclasses are not ascertainable and in determining that

common issues do not predominate over individual inquiries. We consider each claim in 

turn.

2. Ascertainability

As stated above, the trial court refused to certify this matter as a class action 

because, among other reasons, it believed the subclasses proposed by appellants were not 

ascertainable. In particular, the trial court opined that defining the proposed subclasses 

by reference to the alleged Labor Code violations sustained was a “fatal defect,” because 

the putative subclass members could not be identified without a determination on the 

merits of each class member’s case. The court reasoned that, when the “class definition 

is simply shorthand for persons possibly wronged by the defendant,” it is impossible to 

identify putative class members until the lawsuit is concluded, making it impossible both 

to provide appropriate notice and to determine who will be bound by the judgment. The 

trial court also found fault with the fact that the sum of the seven subclasses did not add 

up to the entire general class of non-exempt janitorial employees, because some members 

of the general class may not have suffered any harm. Unsurprisingly, ABM agrees with 
25

the trial court on appeal, arguing that “the only means by which the many subclasses 

could be ascertained was by a trial on the merits, requiring the testimony of each and 

every putative class member on each and every claim, a concept that is antithetical to the 

very concept of class litigation.” In our opinion, however, both the trial court and ABM 

have fundamentally misapprehended the concept of ascertainability as it applies to the 

circumstances of this case. 

“Ascertainability is achieved ‘by defining the class in terms of objective 

characteristics and common transactional facts making the ultimate identification of class 

members possible when that identification becomes necessary.’ ” (Bomersheim v. Los 

Angeles Gay & Lesbian Center (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1483; see Nicodemus 

v. Saint Francis Memorial Hospital (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1212 (Nicodemus); 

Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1300 (Aguirre).) “In 

determining whether a class is ascertainable, the trial court examines the class definition, 

the size of the class and the means of identifying class members.” (Bufil, supra,

162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207, italics added.) Thus, a plaintiff is not required to establish

the identity of class members at the class certification stage of the proceedings. (Reyes 

v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1274.) 

Moreover, “[w]hile often it is said that ‘[c]lass members are “ascertainable” where 

they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to 

official records’ [citations], that statement must be considered in light of the purpose of 

the ascertainability requirement.” (Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood (2008) 

166 Cal.App.4th 89, 101 (Medrazo).) “ ‘Ascertainability is required in order to give 

notice to putative class members as to whom the judgment in the action will be res 

judicata.’ ” (Aguirre, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300.) Therefore, “[t]he goal in 

defining an ascertainable class ‘is to use terminology that will convey “sufficient 

meaning to enable persons hearing it to determine whether they are members of the class 

plaintiffs wish to represent.” [Citation.] “ . . . Otherwise, it is not possible to give 

adequate notice to class members or to determine after the litigation has concluded who is 

barred from relitigating.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 1300–1301; see also Medrazo, at p. 101 
26

[ascertainability requirement is satisfied if “the potential class members may be identified 

without unreasonable expense or time and given notice of the litigation, and the proposed 

class definition offers an objective means of identifying those persons who will be bound 

by the results of the litigation”].)

In sum, a class is ascertainable if a plaintiff supplies a reasonable means of 

identifying potential class members and the class is defined in terms of objective 

characteristics and common transactional facts sufficient to allow a class member to 

identify himself or herself as having a right to recover based on that description. So long 

as these requirements are met, a class is ascertainable “even if the definition pleads 

ultimate facts or conclusions of law.” (Hicks v. Kaufman and Broad Home Corp. (2001) 

89 Cal.App.4th 908, 915–916 (Hicks); see Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc. (2013) 

216 Cal.App.4th 220, 226, 240–241 (Faulkinbury) [directing certification of subclasses 

based on meal break, rest break, and overtime violations]; Jaimez, supra,

181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1291–1292, 1295–1296 [directing certification of classes found 

ascertainable by the trial court, including a meal break class “based upon the failure to 

permit or authorize meal breaks and the failure to pay one hour of wages for each meal 

break violation” and an overtime class “based upon the failure to pay overtime to the 

class”]; Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1529, 1539 

[directing certification of two subclasses based on failure to pay earned wages and 

overtime and failure to provide mandatory rest breaks].) Under this established analytical 

framework—and when one considers the data supplied by Woolfson—the trial court’s 

conclusion that the proposed subclasses in this case are unascertainable due to the need 

for individualized merit determinations is simply not defensible. 

Indeed, we recently considered and rejected a similar argument in Nicodemus, 

supra, 3 Cal.App.5th 1200. In that case, the plaintiff filed an action alleging that she was 

overcharged for copies of her patient medical records, which were sought in anticipation 

of litigation by her attorney pursuant to Evidence Code section 1158. The named 

defendants were the plaintiff’s hospital (Saint Francis) and HealthPort Technologies, 

LLC (HealthPort), a company that, during the relevant timeframe, provided Saint Francis 
27

with patient medical record release of information services pursuant to a contract. 

(Nicodemus, at pp. 1205, 1207.) The plaintiff moved for certification of a class 

comprised of all patients who requested medical records from a California medical 

provider through an attorney prior to litigation and who were charged by HealthPort more 

than the statutory maximum set forth in Evidence Code section 1158. (Id. at pp. 1205–

1206, 1208.) The trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s proposed class was 

unascertainable. (Id. at p. 1210.) Although HealthPort tracked all attorney requests using 

a separate billing code in its database, the trial court concluded that the data set was overinclusive because the plaintiff “had not presented a mechanism for determining whether 

attorneys’ requests were submitted ‘ “prior to litigation” . . . without individualized 

inquiry, for example, by asking’ each attorney.” (Ibid.)

On appeal, we concluded that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that 

the proposed class was not ascertainable. (Nicodemus, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1213–

1217.) Because it is highly relevant to the case at hand, we set out our reasoning in some 

detail: “[E]ven assuming the attorney request data set does include some unknown 

number of requests that were submitted after litigation was commenced (or after 

defendants’ first appearance) or for reasons unrelated to litigation, this fact would not 

defeat ascertainability. HealthPort argued, and the trial court concluded, that a class is 

not ascertainable if the class members who are entitled to recover from the defendants 

cannot be identified without an individualized inquiry. That is not, however, the standard 

for determining whether a class is ascertainable. As noted, ‘[a]scertainability is required 

in order to give notice to putative class members as to whom the judgment in the action 

will be res judicata. [Citations.] . . . As long as the potential class members may be 

identified without unreasonable expense or time and given notice of the litigation, and the 

proposed class definition offers an objective means of identifying those persons who will 

be bound by the results of the litigation, the ascertainability requirement is met.’

(Medrazo, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 101.) Plaintiff here has identified the class in 

terms of objective characteristics, tracking the provisions of section 1158; if it is 

determined later in the litigation that the ‘07’ data set includes requests not made 
28

pursuant to section 1158, ‘those [persons] can be eliminated from the class at that time.’

(Aguiar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 136 (Aguiar); see also SavOn, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 333 [‘ “a class action is not inappropriate simply because each 

member of the class may at some point be required to make an individual showing as to 

his or her eligibility for recovery” ’]; Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2004) 

115 Cal.App.4th 715, 743 [class of all employees in certain job categories ascertainable 

even though some employees may not have worked overtime and thus may not be 

entitled to any recovery].) Nor should a court ‘decline to certify a class simply because it 

is afraid that insurmountable problems may later appear at the remedy stage.’ ” 

(Nicodemus, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1214.) Thus, contrary to the trial court’s belief, 

possible over-inclusiveness in the method proposed for identifying potential class 

members does not defeat ascertainability. 

In reaching our conclusion in Nicodemus, we distinguished Hale v. Sharp 

Healthcare (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 50 (Hale)—a case relied on by ABM here—in which 

a class was decertified after nearly three years of litigation, discovery, and notice to 

potential class members. (Id. at pp. 53–55; see Nicodemus, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 1215–1216.) Hale involved an allegation that a class of persons who self-paid for 

emergency room treatment were overcharged when compared to insured persons. (Hale, 

at p. 53.) In moving to decertify, the defendant argued that the class was not 

ascertainable because the defendant did not keep records in such a way “as to reasonably 

and readily identify those included in the class definition without individualized 

inquiries.” (Id. at p. 55.) The trial court agreed with the defendant and the appellate 

court affirmed, opining with respect to ascertainability that “[i]t is the inability to 

reasonably distinguish those individuals [later determined to qualify for coverage] from 

individuals who were actually uninsured and then to identify any disparity in amounts 

paid that make it unreasonable to ascertain the defined class.” (Ibid.) In Nicodemus, we 

distinguished Hale, both because of its “distinctive procedural posture” and because, 

under Hale’s facts, “it was indisputably demonstrated that there was simply no way to 
29

avoid a complicated individualized inquiry to determine not just eligibility for damages 

but to prove liability.” (Nicodemus, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1216, italics added.) 

In contrast, we found Bufil, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 1193, instructive. In Bufil, 

which involved meal and rest break claims, “[t]he proposed class was defined as 

employees for whom the defendant’s records showed a meal period not taken because the 

employee was the only person in the store or was the only person present except for a 

trainee.” (Nicodemus, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1216.) “Although employees who 

missed a meal period could be identified from the defendant’s records, employees who 

missed a rest period could not.” (Ibid.) However, Bufil submitted evidence that the 

defendant had a policy that hourly employees who were working alone or only with a 

trainee were not allowed to go off duty for any type of break, and argued that the records 

identifying class members who missed meal periods for the reasons specified thus also 

identified those who missed rest breaks. (Bufil, at pp. 1206, 1208.) Under these 

circumstances, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of class certification, 

concluding that “the class was ascertainable from the defendant’s records.” (Nicodemus, 

at p. 1216.) “In doing so, the court rejected the defendant’s ‘speculation’ that an 

employee who missed a meal break nonetheless might have received a rest break, 

observing ‘speculation that goes to the merits of ultimate recovery [was] an inappropriate 

focus for the ascertainability inquiry.’ (Ibid., citing Medrazo, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 101 [defendant’s sales records offered an objective means of identifying potential class 

members, and plaintiff’s inability at the class certification stage to identify precisely 

which buyers qualified as class members was “irrelevant”] and Harper v. 24 Hour 

Fitness, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 966, 976 [“the need to individually examine each 

member’s contract to ultimately determine whether he or she qualifies for inclusion in the 

class does not . . . demonstrate a lack of ascertainability or manageability”].) 

Adopting this analysis in Nicodemus, we concluded that potential class members 

could be readily identified by reference to HealthPort’s attorney request data set, and the 

“speculation” that the data set might be over-inclusive went “to the merits of each class 

member’s recovery” and thus “was an inappropriate focus of the ascertainability inquiry.” 
30

(Nicodemus, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1216.) Our analysis of ascertainability in the 

present case mirrors our conclusions in Nicodemus. Here, as established by Woolfson, 

the potential subclass members are all readily identifiable by reference to ABM’s own 

employment and payroll records. 

For instance, the subclass of ABM Workers who “suffered an automatic deduction 

of a half-hour although the employee actually worked through the deducted meal period” 

can be identified through ABM’s timekeeping and payroll records showing numerous 

instances where a meal deduction was made for a shift without any corresponding time 

entry indicating that a meal period was taken. The subclass of ABM Workers who were 

not paid premium meal period wages when they worked shifts of a particular length 

without a recorded meal period can similarly be ascertained through reference to the 

same records, reviewed to determine whether any required premium wages were paid 

where no meal period was recorded. The Unpaid Split-Shift Premium Subclass— “ABM 

Workers who were scheduled or required in a workday to work two or more shifts 

separated by a period of time that was not a bona fide meal but were not paid an 

additional hour of wages for each split shift”—can be identified by examining ABM’s 

timekeeping and payroll records to determine which employees worked two or more 

shifts in the same day separated by more than an hour, but were not paid premium wages 

related to the split shift(s).12 Finally, members of the Reimbursement Subclass—ABM 

Workers who were not reimbursed for expenses related to the use of their own vehicles 

for travel between jobsites—can be identified by searching ABM payroll records to 

determine which employees worked at multiple jobsites separated by a certain baseline 

number of miles during the same workday, but did not receive reimbursement for 

travel.13 

 

12 As discussed above, the DLSE has historically taken the position that a bona 

fide meal period is one that does not exceed one hour in length. (See ante at p. 4 & 

fn. 1.)

13 Woolfson opined below that the ABM databases contained location information 

for each worker’s shift and that from this information, along with the addresses of the 
31

In addition, the subclasses are all defined using objective characteristics and 

common transactional facts sufficient to allow a potential class member to identify 

himself or herself as having a right to recover pursuant to that subclass. For example, the 

nonexempt ABM workers who would receive notice as part of the general class would all 

be aware whether they worked though meal periods, failed to receive reimbursement for 

their travel expenses between worksites, or otherwise fell within the articulated 

subclasses. Under these circumstances, ABM’s speculation that some potential class 

members identified in the data may ultimately not be entitled to relief—because, perhaps, 

they actually took an otherwise unrecorded meal, or were not entitled to a split shift 

premium on a particular day, or did not drive themselves between job sites—goes to the 

merits of each class member’s recovery and, as such, was an inappropriate focus of the 

trial court’s ascertainability inquiry. (See Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 338 [class can 

be certified based on partial commonality, meaning not every single member of the 

proposed class needs to be exposed to the wrongful practice nor does the practice have to 

be unlawful or lawful as to every class member].)14

 3. Predominance.

Having determined that the plaintiffs have proposed ascertainable classes, we must 

next address the trial court’s conclusion that class certification was inappropriate in this 

matter because individual inquiries predominate over common questions. As mentioned 

above, “[t]he ‘ultimate question’ the element of predominance presents is whether ‘the 

issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate 

adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would 

 

work locations, it would be possible to calculate the mileage each worker traveled each 

day. 

14 In this regard, we note additionally that “if necessary to preserve the case as a 

class action, the court itself can and should redefine the class where the evidence before it 

shows such a redefined class would be ascertainable.” (Hicks, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 916.) Thus, as this action progresses, the trial court should be open to making 

modifications to the class definitions as necessary to avert developing certification 

problems or to otherwise enhance the efficiencies of the class certification model. 
32

be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.’ [Citations.] The answer 

hinges on ‘whether the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, 

as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment.’ [Citation.] A court 

must examine the allegations of the complaint and supporting declarations [citation] and 

consider whether the legal and factual issues they present are such that their resolution in 

a single class proceeding would be both desirable and feasible. ‘As a general rule if the 

defendant’s liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class, a 

class will be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages.’ ” 

(Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1021–1022, fn. omitted.) Indeed, “at the class 

certification stage, as long as the plaintiff’s posited theory of liability is amenable to 

resolution on a classwide basis, the court should certify the action for class treatment 

even if the plaintiff’s theory is ultimately incorrect at its substantive level, because such 

an approach relieves the defendant of the jeopardy of serial class actions and, once the 

defendant demonstrates the posited theory is substantively flawed, the defendant 

‘obtain[s] the preclusive benefits of such victories against an entire class and not just a 

named plaintiff.’ ” (Hall v. Rite Aid Corp. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 278, 293–294, italics 

omitted.)

In short, when analyzing the element of predominance for purposes of class 

certification “the focus must be on the policy the plaintiffs are challenging and whether 

the legality of that policy can be resolved on a classwide basis.” (Lubin v. The 

Wackenhut Corp. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 926, 940.) Thus, for example, in Morgan v. Wet 

Seal, Inc. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1341, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s 

denial of class certification in a case alleging that the company required employees to 

purchase company clothing to wear to work but failed to reimburse such purchases. 

Because there were no clear companywide policies requiring employees to purchase 

company clothing as a condition of employment or describing what an employee was 

required to wear, the trial court determined there was no common method to prove the 

fact of liability on a classwide basis. Rather, individualized inquiries would need to be 

made regarding, among other things, what employees were told by store managers about 
33

wardrobe, how employees interpreted any such discussion, and what each store manager 

actually required employees to purchase. (Id. at pp. 1356–1357.) 

In contrast, numerous other cases have held that individualized issues regarding 

proof of the amount of damages class members may recover does not defeat a class action 

so long as there are common questions of liability amenable to class resolution. (See, 

e.g., Faulkinbury, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th 220, 232–240 [common issues of fact 

predominated for subclasses related to meal, rest, and overtime violations because 

liability could be determined classwide based on uniform policies, or lack thereof; 

individual issues, such as whether individuals took rest breaks, went to the issue of 

damages and did not preclude class certification]; Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2013)

221 Cal.App.4th 986, 997 [a uniform policy denying compensation for preshift work 

presented predominantly common issues of fact and law because liability depended on 

the existence of the uniform policy, rather than individual damages determinations]; 

Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701, 726 [theory 

that defendant violated wage and hour requirements by failing to adopt meal and rest 

break policies is amenable to class treatment; whether employee was able to take required 

breaks goes to damages].) 

The common theme in these cases is that the plaintiff’s theory of liability could be 

determined based on common uniform policies applicable to the class as a whole. (See 

also Department of Fish & Game v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1356 

[“Class treatment is not barred where a single wrongful act has different effects on 

different claimants such that some may have claims while others may not. ‘ “In such 

cases, the Courts will generally certify a class if the defendant’s action can be found to be 

wrong in the abstract even if no individual person has been damaged. [Citations.] These 

situations are distinguishable from situations where the Court cannot determine the 

wrongfulness of an action without reference to individuals.” ’ ”].)

In line with this precedent, and of particular relevance to the case at hand, is the 

Second District’s opinion in Jaimez, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 1286. In Jaimez—a case, 

like this one, involving claims of various wage and hour violations, including meal break 
34

issues—the appellate court concluded that the “trial court misapplied the criteria [for 

determining whether a class should be certified], focusing on the potential conflicting 

issues of fact or law on an individual basis, rather than evaluating ‘whether the theory of 

recovery advanced by the plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class treatment.’ ” (Id.

at p. 1294.) Since the plaintiff’s theory of recovery focused on uniform policies and 

practices (such as the defendant’s failure to compensate employees for missed meals, rest 

breaks, and earned overtime), it was “more amenable to class treatment than individual 

disposition.” (Id. at p. 1300.) Indeed, in Jaimez, the defendant had a policy and practice 

of automatically deducting 30 minutes per shift for each employee’s meal break 

regardless of whether that meal break was actually taken, and the appellate court 

expressly found that this policy raised common legal and factual issues. (Id. at pp. 1294, 

1304.) 

Further, in balancing these common issues against any individual inquiries 

necessary, the Jaimez court rejected the trial court’s notion that common questions of fact 

and law did not predominate because the defendant had submitted declarations indicating 

that some employees did, in fact, get meal breaks, rest breaks, and proper pay stubs and 

thus there was a “ ‘strong indication that there could be conflicting testimony regarding 

whether these employees have common factual issues to be presented at trial.’ ” (Jaimez, 

supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1296.) Specifically, the appellate court declared that the 

trial court had improperly “focused on the merits of the declarations, evaluating the 

contradictions in the parties’ responses to the company’s uniform policies and practices, 

not the policies and practices themselves.” (Id. at p. 1300.) Unfortunately, the trial court 

in this case fell prey to the same errors that infected the trial court’s certification decision 

in Jaimez.

Specifically, instead of identifying the principal legal issues presented in this 

matter and determining whether those “operative legal principles, as applied to the facts 

of the case, render the claims susceptible of resolution on a common basis’ ” (Alberts, 

supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 399), the trial court here improperly focused on the minutiae 

of each individual janitor’s personal situation. This was a legal error and appears also to 
35

have been the reason the trial court found Woolfson’s evidence irrelevant to the class 

certification inquiry. However, when the merits of the ultimate damages issues are set 

aside and Woolfson’s analysis of ABM’s payroll practices is considered, along with the 

other evidence submitted by plaintiffs, it becomes clear that numerous common issues 

predominate in this matter, rendering class certification appropriate. 

For instance, the legality of ABM’s uniform payroll policy—which assumes each 

employee works his or her scheduled shift and takes any legally required meal breaks 

absent some type of exception report—is a legal question that can be determined by 

reference to facts common to all class members. Certainly, the evidence provided by 

Woolfson that a mere 5,625 of the 1,836,083 time entries for ABM Workers he 

investigated (0.3 percent) contained adjustments to pay calls into question the efficacy of 

ABM’s asserted “timesheet maintenance” procedure, as does the evidence presented by 

plaintiffs that ABM does not generate exception reports for missed meals periods. 

Moreover, the legality of ABM’s auto-deduct policy for meal breaks in light of the 

recordkeeping requirements for California employers is also an issue amenable to 

classwide resolution. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. (7)(A)(3).) In addition, 

ABM’s apparent uniform practice of never providing premium pay to its employees, 

either for split shifts or missed meal breaks, is susceptible to classwide treatment. 

Moreover, ABM’s defenses with respect to split shift premium pay—that voluntary split 

shifts are not compensable and that class members are paid more than the threshold under 

which premium pay is mandated—are also susceptible to common proof. (See Saechao 

v. Landry’s, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016, No. C 15-00815 WHA) 2016 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 33409 at pp. *22–23; Kamar v. Radio Shack Corp. (C.D. Cal. 2008) 254 F.R.D. 

387, 405; see Aleman, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574–575 [interpreting split shift 

Wage Order as a legal matter].) Finally, whether ABM fails to properly reimburse its 

employees for work-related travel, despite its asserted policy to do so, is also subject to 

common proof. (See Brewer v. General Nutrition Corp. (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014, 

No. 11-CV-3587 YGR) 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159380 at pp. *27–30 [predominance of 

common questions on a travel reimbursement claim supported by evidence of 
36

“exceedingly small percentage of employees who sought reimbursement”; evidence of 

mileage incurred could be determined on a class-wide basis where all relevant locations 

known].) Under these circumstances, fear that the determination of individual damages 

might prove overly complex should not have provided a basis for denial of class 

certification. 

Indeed, although we do not reach the issue, the trial court’s concern regarding the 

need for numerous individualized damage inquiries in this case may turn out to be overexaggerated, given existing precedent indicating that the burden of proof shifts to 

employers “in the wage and hour context when an employer’s compensation records are 

so incomplete or inaccurate that an employee cannot prove his or her damages.” (Amaral 

v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1189; see Cicairos v. Summit 

Logistics, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 949, 961 (Cicairos) [“ ‘[W]here the employer has 

failed to keep records required by statute, the consequences for such failure should fall on 

the employer, not the employee. In such a situation, imprecise evidence by the employee 

can provide a sufficient basis for damages.’ ”], overruled on another ground as stated in 

York v. Starbucks Corp. (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2012, No. CV 08-07919 GAF (PJWx)) 

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190086.) Thus, for example, since employers have a duty to 

record their employees’ meal periods, “[i]f an employer’s records show no meal period 

for a given shift over five hours, a rebuttable presumption arises that the employee was 

not relieved of duty and no meal period was provided.” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 

p. 1053 [Werdegar, J., conc.]; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. (7)(A)(3).) 

Under such circumstances, a court may award damages, even if they are only 

approximate and based on statistical sampling. (Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, 

115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 746–751.)

In summary, given that the classes proposed by plaintiffs in this case were 

ascertainable and plaintiffs’ allegations presented predominantly common questions, the 

trial court’s determinations to the contrary cannot stand. Rather, we conclude that the 

trial court’s denial of class certification—including its decision regarding the 

admissibility of the Woolfson materials—rested on improper criteria and erroneous legal 
37

assumptions, amounting to an abuse of discretion. Plaintiffs have made a showing 

sufficient to allow them to take the next step in attempting to prove the merits of their 

contentions on a classwide basis.15

III. DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying class certification is reversed and the matter 

remanded for certification of classes as set forth in this opinion. Plaintiffs are entitled to 

their costs on appeal. 

 

15 In making this determination, we are cognizant of the trial management 

concerns raised by counsel for ABM at oral argument in this case, issues which may 

make the ultimate resolution of all or parts of this matter on a classwide basis 

problematic. However, as detailed above, our review following a denial of class 

certification is limited. (See Alberts, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 399.) Because the trial 

court’s order was based on improper criteria and erroneous legal assumptions, we 

reverse. Moreover, based on the record before us and as we have detailed at length 

above, it appears that plaintiffs have identified a number of common questions suitable 

for classwide resolution. Should plaintiffs’ trial plan subsequently prove unworkable, 

however, ABM may address any such issues to the trial court. 
38

_________________________

REARDON, J.

We concur:

_________________________

RUVOLO, P. J.

_________________________

RIVERA, J.
1

Filed 1/10/18

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

ABM INDUSTRIES OVERTIME CASES JCCP No. 4502

 A132387, A133077 & A133695

 (City & County of San Francisco

 Super. Ct. No. CJC-07-004502)

 ORDER MODIFYING OPINION 

 AND CERTIFYING OPINION FOR 

 PUBLICATION

 (NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT)

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed December 11, 2017, be modified as follows:

The citation to Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 949 

located on page 36 of the opinion shall be modified to delete the reference to subsequent 

history such that the case citation shall read in full: “see also Cicairos v. Summit 

Logistics, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 949, 961 (Cicairos) [“ ‘Where the employer has 

failed to keep records required by statute, the consequences for such failure should fall on 

the employer, not the employee. In such a situation, imprecise evidence by the employee 

can provide a sufficient basis for damages’ ”].)

There is no change in the judgment.
2

In addition, the opinion in the above matter was not certified for publication in the 

Official Reports when filed on December 11, 2017. For good cause it now appears that 

the opinion, as modified herein, should be published in the Official Reports and it is so 

ordered.

Dated: _______________________ _________________________

RUVOLO, P. J.
3

Trial Court: City & County of San Francisco Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Richard A. Kramer

Counsel for Appellants: Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, David A. 

Rosenfeld, Christian L. Raisner, Emily P. Rich, 

Roberta D. Perkins; Mallison & Martinez, Stan 

S. Mallison, Marco A. Palau, Joseph D. Sutton; 

Rastegar & Matern, Matthew J. Matern

Counsel for Respondents: Littler Mendelson, Keith A. Jacoby, Dominic J. 

Messiha, Lauren E. Robinson