U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

31–367 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S GLOBAL THREAT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 11, 2018 

Serial No. 115–90 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

http://oversight.house.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Darrell E. Issa, California 

Jim Jordan, Ohio 

Mark Sanford, South Carolina 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Thomas Massie, Kentucky 

Mark Meadows, North Carolina 

Ron DeSantis, Florida 

Dennis A. Ross, Florida 

Mark Walker, North Carolina 

Rod Blum, Iowa 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma 

Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin 

Will Hurd, Texas 

Gary J. Palmer, Alabama 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Paul Mitchell, Michigan 

Greg Gianforte, Montana 

Vacancy 

Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Carolyn B. Maloney, New York 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts 

Jim Cooper, Tennessee 

Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia 

Robin L. Kelly, Illinois 

Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan 

Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey 

Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois 

Jamie Raskin, Maryland 

Jimmy Gomez, Maryland 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands 

John P. Sarbanes, Maryland 

SHERIA CLARKE, Staff Director 

WILLIAM MCKENNA, General Counsel 

SAMUEL WISCH, Professional Staff Member 

SHARON ESHELMAN, National Security Subcommittee Staff Director 

SHARON CASEY, Deputy Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Jimmy Gomez, California 

Vacancy 

Vacancy 

Vacancy 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 11, 2018 ............................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Hillel Fradkin, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 5 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8 

Jonathan Schanzer, Ph.D., Senior Vice President, Foundation for Defense 

of Democracies 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 18 

M. Zuhdi Jasser, M.D., President & Founder, American Islamic Forum for 

Democracy 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 40 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 43 

The Honorable Daniel Benjamin, Norman E. McCulloch Jr. Director, John 

Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, Dartmouth College 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 66 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 69 

APPENDIX 

Statement by Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Diplomat in Residence, Princeton 

University, submitted by Mr. Lynch. ................................................................. 88 


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THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S GLOBAL 

THREAT 

Wednesday, July 11, 2018 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives DeSantis, Duncan, Gosar, Hice, Comer, 

Lynch, and DeSaulnier. 

Also Present: Representative Grothman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The Subcommittee on National Security will come 

to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. 

The Muslim Brotherhood is a militant Islamist organization with 

affiliates in over 70 countries, including groups designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. 

Whether the Muslim Brotherhood writ large should be designated as a foreign terrorist organization has been the topic of debate here in Congress in recent years and has been under consideration by the Trump administration. 

Thankfully, the Trump administration has discarded the Obama 

era policy of treating the Brotherhood as a potential ally. Now the 

questions are focused on how expansive to make the terror designation and whether it should be done through the State Department 

or Treasury Department. 

The Muslim Brotherhood has been militant from its very beginning. Its founder, Hassan al-Banna, who started the group in 1928, 

said that, quote: ‘‘Jihad is an obligation from Allah and every Muslim and cannot be ignored nor evaded.’’ 

And in a book titled ‘‘The Way of Jihad’’ he wrote: ‘‘Jihad means 

the fighting of the unbelievers and involves all possible efforts that 

are necessary to dismantle the power of the enemies of Islam, including beating them, plundering their wealth, destroying their 

places of worship, and smashing their idols,’’ end quote. 

This belief was put into action in the decades that followed as 

the Muslim Brotherhood’s members committed numerous acts of 

terrorism, including the assassination of Egypt’s Prime Minister in 

1948. 

This jihadist ideology continues to fuel the Muslim Brotherhood 

today. The Brotherhood mourned the death of Osama bin Laden 

and its leaders developed teachings justifying revolutionary vioVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:00 Nov 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\31367.TXT APRIL

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lence under sharia law. The Brotherhood has preached hatred towards Jews, denied the Holocaust, and called for Israel’s destruction. The Brotherhood has incited violence against Coptic Christians in Egypt amidst a wave of church bombings and other attacks 

by terrorist groups, including ISIS. 

Yusuf al-Qaradawi, perhaps the Brotherhood’s preeminent cleric, 

issued a fatwa legitimizing terrorist attacks against American 

troops in Iraq. And he’s also deemed the Holocaust to be a, quote, 

‘‘punishment for Jews,’’ and expressed hope that another Holocaust 

would someday be carried out by his fellow Islamists. 

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, Mohammed Badie, 

has said that the organization’s goal is to establish a new Islamist 

caliphate, including the imposition of sharia law, which is the totalitarian Islamic legal code. We saw what happens when the 

Brotherhood takes control of a country in Egypt from 2012 to 2013, 

and the results were chilling, that then-President Mohamed Morsi 

defied the rule of law and granted himself near absolute power. As 

Egyptian leader Mohamed El Baradi put it, Morsi usurped all state 

powers and appointed himself Egypt’s new pharaoh. 

The Brotherhood’s legislators enshrined the principles of sharia 

as the main source of law in Egypt’s Constitution, while the Morsi 

government used state institutions to promote Islamic radicalism, 

roll back freedom of the press, and launched a wave of blasphemy 

prosecutions. 

The Morsi Muslim Brotherhood government is no more, but the 

Brotherhood and its affiliates continue to advance their agenda 

across the Middle East and throughout the world. 

There’s no question that the Muslim Brotherhood affiliates are 

involved in terrorism. Former FBI Director Robert Mueller confirmed as much in testimony before Congress when he said that 

elements of the Brotherhood, both here and overseas, have supported terrorism. 

A number of these Brotherhood affiliates have been designated 

as terrorist organizations by the United States Government. The 

Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch Hamas has been a designated foreign terrorist organization since 1997. Hamas has taken 

control of the Gaza Strip, launched thousands of rockets against 

Israeli civilians, and committed suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks that have murdered numerous Israeli and American 

civilians. 

Muslim Brotherhood networks raise money here in the U.S. to 

support Hamas’ terrorist activities in the Middle East. According to 

the Department of Justice, in the early 1990s, Hamas’ parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, planned to establish a network 

of organizations in the U.S. to spread a militant Islamist message 

and raise money for Hamas. 

And the Texas-based Holy Land Foundation became the chief 

fundraising arm for the Palestine Committee in the U.S., created 

by the Brotherhood to support Hamas. In 2008, the Holy Land 

Foundation leaders were convicted of crimes, including providing 

material support for Hamas. 

Most recently the State Department designated two offshoots of 

the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, HASM and Liwa al-Thawra, as 

terrorist organizations under Executive Order 13224. The State DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:00 Nov 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\31367.TXT APRIL

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partment noted that these groups are responsible for bombings and 

assassinations of senior Egyptian officials. 

This hearing is an opportunity to discuss what the United States’ 

next step should be in combating the Muslim Brotherhood’s threat. 

Countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 

Emirates have all designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. 

I know there’s disagreement among experts on how best to use 

terrorist designations to address the threat posed by the Brotherhood and its affiliates, and we have different perspectives on this 

issue represented within our panel today, and I look forward to 

hearing the witnesses’ recommendations. 

Between the radicalism of it hateful ideology, the danger of its 

theocratic rule, as seen in Egypt, its networks, including Hamas 

and HASM, and its powerful state sponsors, it is clear that the 

Brotherhood constitutes a real threat for the national security interests of the United States. We can debate the best way to counter 

this threat, but simply ignoring the threat is not an acceptable answer. 

We do have a distinguished panel of witnesses here to discuss 

these issues. I want to thank all of them for taking their time to 

come and provide testimony. 

And it is my pleasure to now recognize the ranking member, Mr. 

Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d also like to thank you 

for holding this hearing to examine the multinational, religious, political, and social movement known as the Muslim Brotherhood. I’d 

also like to thank our witnesses for their willingness to help this 

subcommittee with its work. 

The Independent Program on Extremism at George Washington 

University describes the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 in 

Egypt, as, quote, ‘‘the world’s oldest and arguably most influential 

contemporary Islamist movement,’’ close quote. 

While the Muslim Brotherhood spans the Middle East and Africa 

and has spread into Southeast Asia and the West, it has manifested itself globally in very varied forms, ranging from nonviolent 

political actors to groups that have resorted to terrorism. 

According to the Program on Extremism, some affiliated groups, 

chapters, and radical offshoots inspired by the Brotherhood’s Islamic ideology are marked by their adaptability to the local politics 

in a given country, their pursuit of individual organizational goals 

and their complete operational independence. 

While at one point the central Brotherhood body in Egypt officially renounced terrorism and violence under the Sadat regime in 

the 1970s, there is no doubt that certain affiliated organizations 

and spawn groups continue to espouse and engage in violent terrorist activity. 

Chief among them is Hamas, which has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States State Department 

since 1997. The original charter issued to establish Hamas in 1988 

identified the terrorist group as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Muslim Brotherhood splinter groups such as Liwa al-Thawra and 

HASM also continue to engage in violence in Egypt. These organiVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:00 Nov 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\31367.TXT APRIL

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zations have perpetrated assassination attempts against Egyptian 

defense and security officials and bombings against government 

sites, including attacks against the police training center in the city 

of Tanta and the Myanmar Embassy in Cairo in 2017. 

Meanwhile, democratically elected political parties that also fall 

within the Muslim Brotherhood umbrella represent a significant 

voting bloc in the parliaments and governing coalitions of some of 

our key counterterrorism allies in the Middle East and North Africa. 

In Jordan, which has served as the most critical regional ally in 

our coalition efforts to degrade and destroy the Islamist State, 

Brotherhood-affiliated opposition parties, such as the Islamic Action Front, hold several seats in the national assembly. 

In Morocco, which remains a reliable regional partner in U.S. efforts to counter extremism and combat the Islamic State, the 

Islamist Justice and Development Party leads the coalition government. 

Ennahda, the main Islamic party in Tunisia, similarly leads the 

coalition government and has overseen the country’s democratic 

transition since 2011. 

The State Department lists Tunisia, along with Jordan and Morocco, as our committed partners in the coalition to defeat the Islamic State. 

In light of the multifaceted composition of the Muslim Brotherhood, our national security strategy under Republican and Democratic administrations alike has focused on identifying the terrorist 

threats posed by individual affiliates and leaders. 

Most recently, the State Department listed the president of 

Hamas’ political bureau as a, quote, ‘‘specially designated global 

terrorist,’’ close quote, in January of 2018, stemming from his ties 

with Hamas’ military wing. The two Brotherhood branches involved in the 2017 terrorist attack in Egypt also received this designation. 

It’s my understanding that some of my colleagues in Congress 

have called for the Trump administration to go further and to designate the entire Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization, just as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Russia, and the United 

Arab Emirates have done. 

The effectiveness of our counterterrorism and force protection operations in the Middle East and North Africa demand that we approach this issue with caution. A wholesale designation would severely complicate our relationship with the regional security partners, including Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, and Kuwait, 

where the Muslim Brotherhood functions within mainstream government and society. 

Former Secretary of State Tillerson underscored this challenge 

during his congressional testimony last year. His statement was, 

and I quote: ‘‘I think you can appreciate the complexities this enters into our relations with governments where the Muslim Brotherhood has matriculated to become participants, and in those elements they have done so by renouncing violence and terrorism,’’ 

close quote. 

It could also further escalate the tension in the Middle East, 

which is already operating in a heightened state of conflict, where 


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we still have 2,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Syria, an estimated 6,000 troops deployed in Iraq. 

Just last month, Mr. Issa of California and I led a bipartisan congressional delegation to the Middle East to assess regional security 

and stability amidst the 8-year civil war in Syria and the fourth 

year of civil war in Yemen. As we discussed during bilateral meeting Sing Abdullah of Jordan, President el-Sisi of Egypt, Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel, and other allied leaders and military officials, national security currently demands that we deconflict the 

chaos coming from these multilayered conflicts. 

The Muslim Brotherhood is experiencing significant decline in 

many countries in the Middle East. It is social conservatism that 

is being rejected by a younger generation that is leading to that 

and accelerating that decline. 

It would be counterintuitive if we lumped political actors, nonviolent, nonterrorist, in with the groups that we wish to designate 

for their violent and terrorist activities. 

I would hope that our witnesses would give us direction on how 

best to isolate those who engage in unacceptable terrorist activity 

and not inadvertently give support to those very same individuals. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 

I’m pleased to introduce our witnesses. We have 

Dr. Hillel Fradkin, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute; Dr. 

Jonathan Schanzer, senior Vice President for the Foundation for 

Defense of Democracies; Dr. Zuhdi Jasser, president and founder of 

the American Islamic Forum for Democracy; and Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, director of the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College. 

Welcome to you all. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. So if you could please stand and raise your right 

hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you’re about to 

give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 

help you God? 

Please be seated. 

All witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony 

to 5 minutes. Your entire written statement will be made part of 

the record. 

As a reminder, the clock in front of you shows the remaining 

time during your opening statement. The light will turn yellow 

when you have 30 seconds left and red when your time is up. 

Please also remember to press the button to turn on your microphone before speaking. 

And with that, Dr. Fradkin, you’re up for 5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF HILLEL FRADKIN 

Mr. FRADKIN. First, I’d like to begin by thanking Chairman 

DeSantis and Ranking Member Lynch and their colleagues for the 

invitation to address this hearing. It’s a privilege to participate in 


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this hearing and its discussion of a most important subject, the 

Muslim Brotherhood’s global threat. 

After listening to the opening statements, it’s a particular privilege because I can see from the statements that both the chairman 

and the ranking member are extremely well informed about the 

subject. But that leads to a problem: I’m not sure what I may reasonably add to what has already been said. I will give it a go and 

probably go over some of the same points that you enunciated and 

maybe flesh out a few things along the way. 

Generally speaking, this subject entails three general questions. 

First, is the Muslim Brotherhood a global threat? Second, if it is 

a global threat, how successful has it been or might be? Third, 

what can be do address this threat? And I do understand that’s one 

of the principal objectives here. 

I’m going to principally address the first two questions in the 

prepared remarks and then I expect we’ll discuss the third question 

more generally during the discussion period. 

Is the Muslim Brotherhood a global threat? Part of the answer 

is clear. The Brotherhood certainly means to be global and it 

means to be a threat. 

More specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood is devoted to a political and religious project that in principle, in its essential character 

and goals, is hostile to other forms of politics, including our own. 

And it means for this project to be global in extent. And both of 

these things have been true for a long time, since the founding of 

the Brotherhood some 90 years ago by Hassan al-Banna. 

This had to do with the nature of the project itself. What was 

that project? In response to this question, Banna offered a simple 

fivefold formulation that has remained the model slogan of the 

Brotherhood ever since. Quote: ‘‘Allah is our objective, the Prophet 

is our leader, the Koran is our constitution, jihad is our way, dying 

in the way of Allah is our highest hope.’’ 

Banna proposed this political-religious goal as the alternative to 

the new nation-state politics of his native Egypt. More emphatically, he proposed this as the only legitimate form of Muslim politics. Simply, its virtue was to renew and embody the authentic 

Muslim way of life, the way of life constituted, as he put it, by the 

Koran and the example the Prophet. 

As such, it applies to all Muslims everywhere. Hence, his project 

was necessarily global in principle. To use a term that has recently 

become familiar, it was to be—wind up establishing the Islamic 

State. 

In accord with this, Banna sought to establish branches of the 

Brotherhood in other countries and over time partially succeeded. 

Banna was murdered in 1948, but the essential tenets he prescribed for the Brotherhood have never been repudiated. And this, 

I believe, is not controversial nor should it be, that there has been 

no real change in the essential principles. 

And this, I may add, this was enunciated very, very clearly by 

a man named Khairat al Shater, who was the deputy guide of the 

Egyptian Brotherhood, in the spring of 2011 after the revolt had 

started, in a very, very interesting speech, which I might reference 

again later, in which he insisted that nothing that they were doing 


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was inconsistent with or in violation of what the original vision 

was. 

What has been controversial is what the Brotherhood project 

practically means and where it falls within the universe of other 

radical Islamic organizations. The controversy is—put it this way— 

there was the suggestion, especially beginning after 9/11, that by 

comparison with al-Qaida and other similar organizations the 

Brotherhood was moderate and could be a force for moderation. It 

was argued that it no longer seriously embraced the radical vision 

Banna had enunciated. Rather it was ready to participate in ordinary politics and through that participation would further moderate. 

As Chairman DeSantis mentioned, we have now had one important test of those hopes and they have proven to be false. The form 

of this test was the Brotherhood’s sudden if brief rise to power in 

Egypt after the revolt of 2011. While in power it attempted to establish a new regime in Egypt that would more or less conform to 

its founding radical vision. And I want to stress that this was by 

intention. Well, Shater thought that the time of the final stage of 

the Muslim Brotherhood project had arrived. He was wrong and 

the project failed. 

Where does that leave the Brotherhood today? I know my time 

is up, but I will conclude with a couple of sentences. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Just wrap it up if you can. 

Mr. FRADKIN. Certainly within Egypt the Brotherhood is for the 

present a broken organization. But it has sustained defeats before, 

partially by finding bases elsewhere. In the 1960s this meant Saudi 

Arabia; today it means Turkey and Qatar. What it will attempt to 

do from these bases remains to be seen. 

I also want to add one final thing. It is often thought that alQaida is hostile to the Brotherhood and that’s been certainly true. 

Very recently, I think within the last month or so, the present head 

of al-Qaida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, made a speech in which he referenced the old ties, the old roots between the Brotherhood and alQaida with great nostalgia and welcomed the Brotherhood members to his own project or to a reconciliation of sorts. 

Thank you for your attention, and thank you for your permission 

to go over. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Fradkin follows:] 


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The Muslim Brotherhood's Global Threat 

Dr. Hillel Fradkin 

Hudson Institute 

Testimony Prepared For 

A Hearing of the Subcommittee on National Security 

Congressional Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

July 11, 2018 

I would like to thank Chairman DeSantis and Ranking Member 

Lynch, as well as their colleagues, for their invitation to address this 

hearing. It is a privilege to participate in this hearing and its discussion 

of a most important subject: The Muslim Brotherhood's Global Threat. 

This subject entails 3 general questions: 

First: Is the Muslim Brotherhood a global threat? 

Second: If it is a global threat, how successful has it been or might 

be? 

Third: What can be done to address this threat? 

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In these remarks I will principally address the first two questions. 

I expect we will address the third in the discussion. 

Let me begin with the first and primary question: 

Is the Muslim Brotherhood a global threat? 

Part of the answer is clear: The Brotherhood certainly~ to be 

global and it means to be a threat. More specifically the Muslim 

Brotherhood is devoted to a political and religious project that in 

principle, in its essential character and goals, is hostile to other forms of 

politics, including our own. And it means for this project to be global in 

extent. 

The global intent has been true of the Brotherhood from the time 

of its founding some 90 years ago by a school teacher named Hassan al 

Banna. Although an Egyptian, Banna looked to transcend his Egyptian 

base and establish his organization elsewhere in the world. This was not 

simple personal ambition. It followed from the character of the project. 

What was that project? 

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In response to this question, Banna offered a simple five-fold 

formulation that has remained the motto of the Brotherhood: 

"Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur'an is 

our constitution. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our 

highest hope." 

Implicitly this rejected the contemporary political arrangements of 

his native Egypt that was in the process of becoming a modern nation 

state. But he also understood his project to apply to all Muslims and the 

forms of governance under which they lived. That is he rejected as such 

the nation state as a legitimate form of Muslim governance; he rejected it 

as a form of governance of alien origin and at variance with the 

traditional forms and ideals of Muslim governance that were imperial 

and ultimately global in character. But he also rejected the nation state 

because it was intimately connected with new modern ways oflife that 

violated a proper Muslim way oflife, a way of life, as he put it, 

constituted by the Qur'an. 

Banna's ultimate goal was a new Muslim state that would embrace 

all Muslims and would restore the authentic Muslim way of life as well as 

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restore Muslim political powered, military power, and Muslim prestige. 

To use a term that has recently become familiar it was to be an Islamic 

and not a national state, or rather The Islamic State. 

In accord with this, Banna sought to establish branches of the 

Brotherhood in other countries and over time partially succeeded. Since 

Hanna's Brotherhood was based in an Arab country he had to expect 

some limits to its expansion to other non-Arab Muslims. But he found de 

facto partners in the form of analogous movements elsewhere - initially 

in South Asia; subsequently in Turkey. 

Banna was murdered in 1948. But the essential tenets he 

prescribed for the Brotherhood have never been repudiated. They are 

reaffirmed in its instruction of new members. This is, I believe, not 

controversial or should not be. 

What has been controversial is what the Brotherhood project 

practically means and where it falls within the universe of other radical 

Islamic organizations that have arisen since its founding, for example AI 

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Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. This controversy has 

a lot to do with two things: first, Banna's original calculations about the 

best way to proceed with his project; second, the successes and failures 

of his project after his death and the calculations of the Brotherhood 

leaders who succeeded him. 

First, as for Banna, despite the celebration of jihad and the 

immediate results it might provide, Banna thought that his project 

required a long period of implementation that required what came to he 

called the "gradualist" approach. This approach entailed the gradual 

transformation of society to Brotherhood principles before the seizure 

of political power, in Egypt and elsewhere. Indeed, he seems to have 

thought that through such a transformation the fruit of power would 

drop into the Brotherhood's hands. 

The main exception to the deferral of jihad during his lifetime was 

the mass participation of Brotherhood members in the general Arab 

attempt to destroy Israel in the 1948 War. 

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As for his successors, they had to deal with a series of successes 

and failures, especially failures. In the 1950's and 1960's Gamal Abdul 

Nasser, the president of Egypt, brutally suppressed the Brotherhood and 

executed its most charismatic figure, the ideologist Sayyid Qutb. 

This led to three different results: first, some Brotherhood 

members were energetic in the reaffirmation of the gradualist approach; 

second, other Brotherhood members emigrated from Egypt, especially to 

Saudi Arabia but also to more foreign parts, for example Europe and the 

United States; but third, some Brothers repudiated the gradualist 

Brotherhood approach and went on to establish new radical 

organizations that put the stress on violent jihad, for example AI Qaeda. 

This new situation has occasioned, especially since 9/11, a 

controversy about the Brotherhood and how to understand the threat it 

represents. The crux of this controversy was the suggestion that by 

comparison with AI Qaeda and other similar organizations, the 

Brotherhood was moderate and could be a force for moderation. It was 

argued that it no longer seriously embraced the radical vision Hanna had 

enunciated and the establishment of an Islamic State. Rather it was 

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ready to participate in ordinary politics and through that participation 

would further moderate. The alleged model of its new destination was 

something like the Christian Democratic parties of Europe. 

We have now had one important test of these benign hopes and 

they have proven to be false. The form of this test was the Brotherhood's 

sudden, if brief, rise to power in Egypt after the revolt of 2011. While in 

power it attempted to establish a new regime in Egypt that would more 

or less conform to its founding radical vision. This story has predictably 

some complicated twists and turns. But I want to stress that it was not 

an accident that it tried fully to implement its project as one can see 

from the views of Khairat al Shater expressed in the spring of 2011. AI 

Shater was the deputy guide ofthe Brotherhood and de facto the real 

director of its policy. In a speech to Brotherhood faithful he declared 

that the hour Banna had predicted, the hour that they had been waiting 

for and toiled for had arrived. 

Well it turned out he was wrong. Where does that leave the 

Brotherhood today? Let me conclude with a few words on this subject. 

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Certainly within Egypt the Brotherhood is for the present a broken 

organization. But it has sustained defeats before, partially by finding 

bases elsewhere. In the 1960's this meant Saudi Arabia; today it means 

Turkey and Qatar. What it will attempt to do from these bases remains 

to be seen. But I should note that recently Aymen al Zawahiri, the 

present head of AI Qaeda, reached out to the Brotherhood expressing 

nostalgic appreciation for the fact that AI Qaeda had been born out of the 

Brotherhood project and welcomed its members to join his own. 

Thank you for your attention. 

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Mr. DESANTIS. Appreciate it. 

Dr. Schanzer, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN SCHANZER 

Mr. SCHANZER. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, 

and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of FDD, thank you for 

the opportunity testify this morning. 

In 2011, President Barack Obama’s Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, famously sparked an outcry when he said 

that the Muslim Brotherhood was a, quote, ‘‘heterogeneous group, 

largely secular, which has eschewed violence and has decried alQaida as a perversion of Islam,’’ end quote. 

Clapper was way off the mark. For one, the Muslim Brotherhood 

is a gateway to jihadism, as we have already noted this morning. 

It’s also a hate group. Its ideology is xenophobic, bigoted, and totalitarian. 

And the Brotherhood is not exactly heterogeneous either. Many 

branches subject their members to rigid indoctrination and demand 

unwaivering commitment to the Brothers’ deeply intolerant interpretation of Islam. 

Still, the Brotherhood’s branches do differ tactically. In Tunisia 

and Morocco it is part of the ruling elite. In Jordan and Malaysia 

it’s the loyal opposition. In Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE it is 

banned outright, forcing the group to work underground. And the 

fact that the various factions do not all engage in violence makes 

it difficult to designate the movement in its entirety. 

But that does not mean that Washington is without recourse. 

The Treasury and State Department designated two suspected 

Egyptian Brotherhood offshoots, HASM and Liwa al-Thawra, earlier this year. Both groups carried out deadly attacks against the 

army, the judiciary, and the police since 2016. 

In making the case for the designations, the Brotherhood links 

to these groups were actually inconsequential. What mattered was 

the legal criteria, their track records of violence and support for 

terrorism. 

The goal now is to find others that meet this criteria, and to that 

end I have two suggestions. One is the Libyan Hizb al-Watan, led 

by Abdelhakim Belhaj, who previously led the Libyan Islamic 

Fighting Group, a designated terrorist group here in the U.S. 

Belhaj was also believed to be training members of Ansar al-Sharia 

in Tunisia, another U.S.-designated terrorist group. 

Another is al-Islah, which is Yemen’s affiliate. One cofounder of 

Islah is Abdul Majid al-Zindani, who allegedly helped to coordinate 

the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. In 2013 the Treasury noted that 

Zindani issued religious guidance in support of Al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula. Islah figures also reportedly harbored 

archterrorist Anwar al-Awlaki prior to 2011 death by a U.S. drone 

strike. 

Do these groups meet criteria? I don’t know. Ask the intelligence 

community. 

In the meantime, we must also look at the Brotherhood’s state 

sponsors, namely Turkey and Qatar. Turkey’s ruling AKP party is 

effectively the Turkish arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkish 

president Recep Tayyip Erdogan famously dispatched a Turkish 


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campaign strategist to Egypt to help Mohamed Morsi win the election, then sent billions of dollars to keep his regime afloat. 

After Morsi’s ouster in July 2013, Turkey became a home for exiled Brotherhood. Hamas operatives have also made their home 

there, including Saleh Arouri, the head of the West Bank military 

wing, who ordered a triple murder in 2014 that sparked a massive 

rocket war with Israel. 

Turkish support for the Brotherhood-linked military activity also 

appears to extend to Libya. Press reports suggest that Turkey has 

been shipping arms to Libyan Brotherhood factions. And Turkey 

now hosts several Brotherhood affiliate TV channels as well. 

And speaking of TV channels, we can’t forget Qatar. Qatar is 

owner of the pro-Brotherhood TV channel Al Jazeera, but its support extends far beyond that. 

After Morsi was elected, Doha gave the Egyptian regime billions 

in aid. Qatar today provides safe haven for many exiled Brotherhood figures. Other factions that enjoy Qatari support include 

Tunisia’s Ennahda movement, Yemen’s Islah, Libya’s Hizb alWatan, and of course Hamas. 

Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, I offer four recommendations today: 

One, do not waste valuable Federal resources trying to designate 

the entire Brotherhood. Focus on the factions that have a record of 

violence and terrorism finance. 

Number two, use Treasury’s tools to reinforce existing designations. For example, Hamas, HASM, Liwa al-Thawra are already 

designated. Treasury should sanction the support networks. These 

derivative designations are bureaucratically easier to achieve, 

while designations of new entities can often get caught up in the 

red tape of the interagency process. 

Number three, confront Turkey and Qatar. Their support to the 

Brotherhood is undermining our efforts in that crucial battle of 

ideas. 

And four, support the House NDAA provision calling for a report 

on the Muslim Brotherhood. It is important that we here in the 

U.S. conduct our own assessment of this organization and formulate a strategy to address this important challenge. 

On behalf of FDD, thank you again for the opportunity to testify, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Schanzer follows:] 


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Jonathan Schanzer July 11,2018 

Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and distinguished members of the committee, on 

behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

The Muslim Brotherhood is often conectly described as a gateway to extremism and jihadism. Its 

ideology is xenophobic, bigoted, and totalitarian. And although its various branches all seck to 

promote this ideology, they differ in terms of their prefened tactics. Specifically, some of its 

branches are violent and some are not. This, in short, is the challenge in targeting the entire 

Brotherhood under the current system. 

But my testimony will also explain that there are still opportunities for designating some of the 

worst factions of the Brotherhood. In addition to being less controversial, such a piecemeal 

approach is more suitable to the current U.S. system. I will suggest some possible targets in my 

testimony today. 

Finally, I will argue today that if U.S. policyrnakers truly wish to undermine the global reach of 

the Muslim Brotherhood, it must take a hard look at the group's state sponsors. Qatar and Turkey, 

often refcned to as U.S. allies, are the primary state backers today of the Brotherhood. Congress 

must craft thoughtful policies on how to deter this support. 

Background 

The Muslim Brotherhood~ al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin in Arabic was founded in Egypt by Hassan 

al-Banna in 1928. 1 Al-Banna famously established the "secret apparatus" within the Brotherhood, 

a paramilitary outfit that "represented the organization's commitment to jihad" and engaged in 

political violence.2 In 1948, the group assassinated a judge, a police chief, and Prime Minister 

Mahmud Fahmi al-Naqrashi. The Egyptian government responded with a crackdown on Muslim 

Brotherhood activity, including the assassination of al-Banna. 

Through the 1950s and 1960s, the group became increasingly militant under the influence of one 

ofthe Brotherhood's most prominent ideologues, Sayyid Qutb, who argued that most Arab rulers 

were heretics, and that their governments were un-lslamic. He suggested holy war, orjihad, as the 

answer. In 1966, he was tried and hanged for opposing the regime. 

Today, the group operates in as many as 92 countries. 3 Its ideology is widely viewed to be the 

gateway to jihadist violence. Indeed, the leaders and adherents to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State 

have drawn inspiration from al-Banna, Qutb, and other Muslim Brotherhood thinkers. 

Interestingly, as scholar Mokhtar A wad notes, "soldiery and violence is not central to the Muslim 

Brotherhood's stated methodology for social and political change," but it did feature in "Muslim 

l For the authoritative history of the Muslim Brotherhood's early years, see: Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the 

Muslim Brothers, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). 2 Eric Trager, ''The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power," rVaslzington Institute for Near East Policy, 

Summer 2013. (http: \VWW.\\ashitHitl..mln~titutc.on.! policv-analvs1s vie!\ !h~:Jmlslim-brotherhnod-l'rorn-oppositilm: 

to-pO\\er) 

3 Jane Arraf, "Muslim Brotherhood, Mainstream in " NPR, 

february 22, 2017. 

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Jonathan Schanzer Julyll,2018 

Brotherhood founder Hassan ai-Bmma's writings and vision for an ideal Muslim society."4 Today, 

the Brotherhood's creed is unambiguous: "Allah is our goal. The Prophet is our leader. The Quran 

is our constitution. Jihad is our way. Death in the service of Allah is the loftiest of our wishes. 

Allah is great, Allah is great."5 

And while al-Banna ex to led the vi1tue of violent anned struggle to fmthcrthc global Islamic cause, 

it was his successor, Sayyid Qutb, who blamed the Christians and the Jews for the Muslim world's 

crisis. In his most influential book, Milestones, Qutb alludes to "one of the tricks played by world 

Jewry so that the Jews may penetrate into body politic of the whole world and then may be free to 

perpetuate their evil designs."6 

Christian principles and teachings, according to Qutb, were "absolutely incomprehensible, 

inconceivable and incredible."7 He contended, "it would be extremely short-sighted of us to fall 

into the illusion that when the Jews and Christians discuss Islamic beliefs or Islamic historv ... 

they will be doing it with good intentions."8 Modem-day Brotherhood leaders like G~mal 

Heshmat, whom Turkey now hosts, similarly believe that '·Jewish and Christian religious 

extremists" arc culpable for attempts to destabilize Jslamist-led governments. After the overthrow 

of lslamist President Mohammed Morsi, a prominent Muslim Brotherhood figure warned that the 

country's Christians should '·reconcile with Muslims or their blood will continue to run like rivers 

and nobody will care.''9 

The Brotherhood also vilifies secular democracy. Al-Banna founded the Brotherhood out of a 

conviction that "Westernization'' and, in particular, the West's modernity, had caused the decline 

of Muslim societiesw Qutb was even more anti-Western, finding Western values abhorrent after 

he had spent a short time in the United States. In his book "77ze America I Have Secn,'' 11 Qutb 

ofiered a distorted chronology of American history and condemned America as a soulless, 

materialistic place that no Muslim should aspire to live in. 12 He believed that the Western world's 

4 Mokhtar Avvad, "The Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood," Hudson Institute, November 6, 2017. 

(lll.m?.~- www.hudson.or~ research J37X7-thc-ris('-of-the-\ iolent-muslim-brotherhood) 5 Thomas Joscelyn, "The Muslim Brotherhood" Understanding its Roots and Impact," Fmmdationjor D~fense of 

Democrades, accessed July 5, 2018. (http: \\ \V\\.defendds:mocracv.or!l the-muslim-brotherhood-unckrstandm~-itsroL)ts-and:.LmQ{!£1.) 

6 Sarah Schlesinger, "A History of Hatred: The Muslim Brotherhood and Anti~Semitism," Hudson Institute, 

December 19, 2011. (http~: \\ W\\ .huJson.or~ resr:arch X506-a-historv-of-hatred-the-muslim-brotherhcK)d-and-anti-

~cmitJsm) 

7 Paul Berman, "The Philosopher of Islamic Terror," The New J'ork Times. March 23, 2003. 

(http-;: W\\"\V.nvtimes.CL)m 2003 03 .,3 mauaz.ine the-philosopher-of-islamic-tcrror.html) 8 Robert Irwin. "Is this the man who inspired Bin Laden?'' The Guardian (UK), October 31, 200!. 

(https: W\\'\\.the~uardian.com world. 2001 110\ 01 afuhal11stan.!ermnsm3) 9 Eric Trager, "The Cynical Conspiracy War on Egypt's Christians," Foreign Policy, May 27, 2017. 

(https: · t~)feignpolicv.cnm 7017 05 27 the-cvnical-conspiracv-war~on-ei!VJ?ts-christians) 

10 "World Almanac oflslamism." American Foreign Poli(v Council, accessed July 3, 2018. 

(http: almanac.atQc.org ...-ites, almanac.afpc.on.! files \luslim0 o20Rrotherhood ~ o 1 0\Vebsik O.pdt) 11 Sayyid Qutb ash-Shaheed, '"The America I Have Seen': In the Scale of Human Values (1951)," part of the Cl.4 's 

Noremhcr 2017 Release of Ahbottabad Compound Material, accessed July 6, 2018. 

(https: www.cia.~ov Iibrarv abbottabad,compound. 3F 3F56ACA~730H~3Ml_:\C I 740f65D5C3B6 Sayvid Outb -

rhe America l Have Seen.pd0 

"''Sayyid Qutb's America: AI Qaeda Inspiration Denounced U.S. Greed, Sexuality," NPR, May 6, 2003. 

(http~: \V\\'\V .npr.on.! kmplates storv stDr\-.php'.)storvid.-! 253 790) 

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separation of religion and state was "hideous schizophrenia." He thus believed Muslims had a duty 

to return Islam to public life.t 3 And for those Muslims who did not agree, he endorsed takjir- the 

process of declaring a Muslim an apostate. 14 

The ideas of al-Banna and Qutb continue to echo within today's Muslim Brotherhood. In2015, 

for example, a group of Brotherhood and allied lslamist scholars published a book titled 171C 

Jurisprudence a,{ Popular Resistance to the Coup, in which they claimed that the "goal of Egyptian 

army operations in the Sinai is ... for the benefit of the Jews."t 5 A series of articles posted to the 

Brotherhood's Arabic-language website in October 2010 feature titles such as "Authenticity of 

Perversion and Corruption in Jewish Personality."t 6 Jurisprudence also claims that "enemies of 

Muslim peoples," a thinly veiled reference to the West. have "long harmed Muslims" and rendered 

them incapable ofretaliation17 

Finally, the Brotherhood has not forgotten the call to jihad. ln recent years, Brotherhood members 

continued to extol "the Jihadi tendency settled as a doctrine in the foundation oflmam al-Banna's 

methodology and the acculturation of the Muslim Brotherhood."ts 

Muslim Brotherhood Offshoots in Focus 

President Barack Obama's director of national intelligence, James Clapper, in 2011 sparked an 

uproar in Washington when he declared that, '·The tenn 'Muslim Brotherhood' ... is an umbrella 

term for a variety ofmovcments, in the case of Egypt, a very heterogeneous group, largely secular, 

which has eschewed violence and has decried Al Qaeda as a perversion of Islam.'' Clapper 

eventually retreated on this point, and for good reason. 19 The Brotherhood is not a patchwork of 

disparate groups, and nor is it secular. It is not exactly heterogeneous, either. Many Muslim 

Brotherhood branches subject their members to rigid indoctrination processes and vet their 

members for their commitment to the organization's ultimate goal, which is to empower the 

Brotherhood's politicized and deeply intolerant interpretation of Islam. 

Still, the Brotherhood's various branches differ in terms of the tactics that they use to spread and 

empower the organization's totalitarian ideology. In places like Tunisia and Morocco, the group 

has become an accepted clement of the ruling elite. In places like Jordan, it has an uneasy modus 

11 Paul Berman, "The Philosopher of Islamic Terror," The New York Times, March 23. 2003. 

(http:-;: www.nvtimc-~.com !(}OJ OJ ~J ma~aLine. the-philosophcr-of-tslamic-km.lr.html) 14 "Qutubism," Counter Extremism Project, accessed July 6, 2018. 

(https: www.CilUJlterextremism.com threat. qutbism) 15 Mokhtar A wad, "The Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood." Hudson Institute, November 6, 2017. 

(https: \\\\\\ .huds1>n.on!·research lJ7X7-the-ri:-;e-of-the-vio\ent-muslim-brothr:::rlh)Od) 

"'Sarah Schlesinger, "A History of Hatred: The Muslim Brotherhood and Anti-Semitism," Hudson Institute, 

December 19,2011. (ilttp:-.: YVW\\,_huds,)n.or\2 rcsean:h i-\596-a-historv-of-hatrcd-thc-muslim-brotherhood-and-antl-

.,cmitism) 

17 Mokhtar A wad. "The Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood," Hudson Institute, November 6. 2017. 

(Imps: W\\W.hudson.oro research 13 7X7 -the-rise-of'.-t!lC-\-iL)lcnt-muslun-brothcrhnod) 18 Mokhtar A wad, "The Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood," Hudson Institute, November 6, 2017. 

(https: \\,;\\"\\·. hudson.onr research, 13 78 7 -thc-rise-of..the-\·iolent-muslim-brothcrhood) 19 Josh Gerstein, '·DNI Clapper retreats from 'secular' claim on Muslim Brotherhood," Politico, October 2, 2011. 

(https: \\·\\ w.politicQ_._r;om blons. undt'r·:Jhe-radar 20 ll 02. dm-clappcr-retreats-from-sentlar-clalm-on-muslimbrothcrhood-03 325~) 

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Jonathan Schanzer July 11,2018 

vivendi with the government, fulfilling the role of the loyal opposition. In Egypt, the Brotherhood 

won elections following a dramatic popular revolution, but was soon the target of a second mass 

uprising and a subsequent military coup. In the Gulf monarchies, the Brotherhood is viewed as an 

existential threat to the ruling regimes that forbid the admixture of religion and politics 20 It is for 

this reason that Saudi Arabia and the UAE designated both the Muslim Brotherhood and local 

affiliates as terrorist groups in 2014 21 

For the purposes of this testimony, there are simply too many offshoots to cover all of them. And 

I will not engage today on the issue of U.S.-based charities that maintain close ties to the 

Brotherhood. lfthere are ties to terrorism, that is for the FBI to discover. 

Below are three case studies to demonstrate the three basic categories of Brotherhood offshoots 

that can be f(mnd today: Politically Viable, Active in Opposition, and Outlawed. 

Morocco's PJD: Politically Viable 

Morocco's Party of Justice and Development (PJD) is one of the more successful Brotherhood 

offshoots, as evidenced by its achievements in Moroccan politics. The PJD's Abdelilah Benkirane 

was prime minister of the country from 2011 to 2017. The PJD still plays an active role in the 

cun·ent government through the new prime minister, Saadeddine Othmani. 

Morocco is not the only Brotherhood faction to have reached these heights. In 1989, the Islamic 

Action Front (IAF) forged a government in Jordan before the monarchy altered the elections laws 

to diminish their power. In Tunisia, the Ennahda movement ruled following the revolution that 

toppled Zine al-Abidinc Ben Ali in 2011. Similarly, in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood rose to 

power under Mohammed Morsi after it won the elections following the 2011 ''Arab Spring:· 

For the PJD, it was undeniably the Arab Spring that paved the way. King Mohammed VI was 

forced to enact constitutional reforms in response to the biggest anti-establishment protests the 

country had witnessed in decades. This opened up the political space and provided a chance for 

lslamist parties to play a greater role in leading the country22 The PJD won the majority of votes 

in the 2011 general election. It also won the parliamentary elections in October 201623 

Even as it was thrust into the world of polities, the PJD remained active on campuses and among 

the grass roots, namely the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR), a large da "wah (outreach) 

institution that is often considered the religious ann of the PJD with a presence across the kingdom. 

This effort was ftn1her buttressed by an external network of loosely affiliated schools, health 

20 Eric Trager, "The Muslim Brotherhood is the Root of the Qatar Crisis,"" The Atlantic, July 2, 2017. 

(https: \HV\V.theatlantic.com· intemational:archi\e 20 l7· 07··musl!m~brotht:rhot._)d-qatar 5323RO ) 21 "UAE lists Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist ,. Reuters. November 15,2014. 

"Morocco's Mohammed unveils constitutional reforms," BBC Nen·s (UK), June lS, 201 L 

(http: \\\\ w.b_h!;;,com new~:world-africa-l~.81fJ974) 

ll "Moderate Moroccan Islamists win election. coalition talks seen tough."' Reuten. October 8, 2016. 

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centers, and other professional organizations. Although MUR and PJD members insist there is a 

firewall between the two, the links between them remain strong and have been characterized as 

"strategic cooperation. "24 

However, the palace- which is still the ultimate decision-maker in Morocco- began to view the 

party as a threat. When the PJD won a plurality in the 2016 parliamentary elections but proved 

unable to form a coalition,25 the king replaced Benkirane in March 2017 and appointed the more 

submissive PJD figure Saadeddine Otlunani, who was foreign minister from 2012-2013 and had 

most recently served as the head of the PJD's parliamentary group26 On March 17, 2017, Othmani 

ot1icially became Morocco's prime minister27 

The PJD today serves as a good example of a local Brotherhood affiliate pmiicipating in electoral 

politics. And it serves as a warning to those seeking to designate the Muslim Brotherhood in its 

entirety. Indeed, the designation of the PJD would be tantamount to the designation of the 

Moroccan government- a move that would be unwise, to the say the least. 

Malaysia's PAS: Active in Opposition 

The Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam seMalaysia, or PAS) is Malaysia's oldest and largest 

opposition political party. It plays an important role in the political system, particularly in 

countering the ruling coalition. Yet, the party also stands for some deeply trouhling ideas. Indeed, 

PAS advocates for establishing Malaysia as an Islamic state28 PAS has even advocated for the 

harsh Islamic penal code called hudud29 Nevertheless, Malaysian politicians court the Islamist 

faction, which is widely viewed as an important political constituency. 

Other Muslim Brotherhood factions that are openly recognized by their governments and are active 

in opposition currently include the aforementioned Islamic Action Front in Jordan and ai-Eslah in 

Kuwait. They are not likely to gain much ground, but are also not likely to be dispatched by the 

mling regime. 

24 ''Morocco· s lslamist 

Peace. December 28, 

under-prcssure-pub-7 51~ 1) 25 Mohamed Daadaoui, ''In Morocco's election last week, the major Islamist pmty won again. Here's what that 

means;' The Washington Post, October 13,2016. 

Amy Chew, "The rising force in Malaysia's opposition;· Ai-Jazeera (Qatar). February 10,2013. 

(Imps: \\ W\\·.alja7eera.cLml mdepth teatures 2U 13 02.20 l32l09'433869402.html) 20 Asrul Hadi Abdullah Sani, "Break up of Malaysia's opposition bloc Pakatan Rakyat: What happened and what's 

next?" The Straits Times (Singapore), June 18, 2015. (https:., \V\vw.straitstirne'i.cmn asia/s.;;-asia_,'br~ak-up-of ... 

Lnalavsias-opposltiQJ1-bloc-pakatan-rakvat-\vhat-hapoened-and-what:->-ne:xt) 

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In the case of Malaysia, the PAS has a history of strong ties to the broader Muslim Brotherhood 

movement dating back to its early years 30 Even today, Malaysia plays host to some of the 

movement's top figures 31 And not unlike the Moroccan PJD's Movement of Unity and Reform 

(MUR), the PAS maintains an outreach capability in the fom1 of the Muslim Youth Movement of 

Malaysia (ABIM). 32 

But unlike the PJD, the PAS has some troubling ties to terrorism. Specifically, the group may be 

providing in-country assistance to the Palestinian terrorist group Barnas, which is itself a splinter 

of the Muslim Brotherhood.33 Ties date back to at least 2002 34 

In 2012, at least ten members ofHamas traveled to Malaysia for training to prepare for a crossborder attack against Israel. The group reportedly trained for kidnapping soldiers, anti-tank 

ambushes, and sniper attacks35 In 2014, Israel conducted a sweeping raid in the West Bank, during 

which it captured Majdi Mafarja, who admitted to training in message encryption and computer 

hacking for Hamas in Malaysia. Israeli security services arrested him for having served as courier 

for encoded messages on behalf of the Izz ai-Din ai-Qassam Brigades~ the so-called military wing 

ofHamas36 

Also in 2015, the Israeli press reported that at least two senior Ham as officials were operating out 

of Malaysia: Ma'an Hatib and Radwan al-Atrash. Hatib was described as "responsible in Malaysia 

for the Hamas foreign desk," while A trash was seen as "a senior figure in the Shura [consultative] 

council'' for the organization37 Hamas also operated a cultural organization in Malaysia 

called Rabitat Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria Association) 38 

In 2015, Israel alleged that a group of Palestinian students had been sent to Malaysia back in 2010 

to leam how to use hang gliders to infiltrate Israel for an attack. This came after the Israel security 

services arrested Waseem Qawasmeh, a 24-year-old student who had studied in Malaysia. He was 

30 Zulkifly Abdul Malek, "From Cairo to Kuala Lumpur: The Influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on the 

Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM)," Thesis submitted to Georgetown University, April26, 2011. 

may head to Malaysia, says repOI1," The Star, June 4, 2018. 

(https: '\\ \\ \V.thestar.com.mv llt:\\ ;-;,nation "10 l-t 09 17 muslim-brotherhOlld-lcadcrs-expdled-tl:nm-uatar-malavsla) 32 "Anwar Ibrahim: Malaysia's leader-in-waiting," BBC News (UK), May 16,2018. 

(http:, \\ ww.bbc.com news. Wllfld-asia-16-+40290) 33 See: Jonathan Schanzer, "How Malaysia Became a Training Ground for Hamas,'' Tablet, tvfay4, 2018. 

(https: \\ ww. tablctma<J .com' scroll· 261.f6-t ho\\:malavsla-became-a-tra1mno-grounJ-fc.lr-hamas) 34 "Hezbollah, llamas Speakers Address Malaysian Opposition Conference," Associated Press, May 30, 2002. 

(htws:. ··\\ \\ \V ,haarctz.com 1 .S 17979~) 

35 Adam Sterman, "Malaysia Denies it Trained Hamas Operatives." The IYmes of Israel, July 31, 2014. 

(https:, \\ ww.tim~sofisrae!.com malavsia-demes-it-tramed-hamas-operatiYcs) 

"Mitch Ginsburg, ''Ababs Orders Probe into Hamas Coup Plot Revealed by Israel," The Times oflsrael, August 19, 

2014. (httns: \\ W\\·. timesotisrJel.com abhas-order-.;-in\·estigation-into-hamas-coup-plot-re\·ea.led-bv-tsraet) 

J

7 Amos Hare!, "Shin Bet: Hamas training Palestinian Students in Malaysia," Haaretc (Israel), April28, 2015. 

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charged with belonging to Hamas and receiving funding from the tenorist group. Both Malaysia 

and Hamas denied this accusation39 

In 2013, a Hamas delegation led by then-Politburo chiefKhaled Mcshaal visited Kuala Lumpur. 

Meshaal returned in 2015, when he openly advocated for violence against Israel. 40 

A tenorism designation of the PAS in Malaysia would be highly controversial, particularly given 

its longstanding role in the political system. But the growing suspicion of ties with Hamas is an 

important issue to watch, and could open the door for U.S. action. 

Egypt: Outlawed 

Egypt was the cradle of the Brotherhood, but it now appears the group is in a grave. In 2011, it 

made up a large part of the protests that forced Hosni Mubarak out of office. Upon Mubarak's 

departure, the Brotherhood created the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and won nearly half of the 

seats in parliament alongside fellow Islamists in the country's first post-Arab Spring political 

contest41 Its presidential candidate, senior leader Mohamed Morsi, then won the June 2012 

presidential elections. However, Morsi's autocratic behavior specifically, his attempts to seize 

unchecked executive power and ramming a theocratic constitution to ratification - sparked new 

protests against his rule, which intensified as the economy tanked thanks to the Brotherhood's 

inexperience in government. 

Nearly one year into Muslim Brotherhood rule, Egypt's military responded to a second mass 

uprising- this one against the Brotherhood- by ousting Morsi on July 3, 2013. Abdel Fatah alSisi then led a massive crackdown, culminating in the killing of hundreds of Brotherhood 

protestors in August 2013.42 In December 2013, the government designated the Muslim 

Brotherhood as a terrorist group. 43 It authorized punishment for membership, funding, activities, 

or other support- even through writing or speaking positively about the group44 The government 

also froze the assets of 132 Brotherhood leaders 45 The Supreme Administrative Court then 

YJ Shaul Shay. ''Malaysia-Hamas Military Cooperation,'' International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (Israel), May 

13,2015. (https: W\\\\.ict.on..::.il Artide 1394 J\1a!av~ia-Hamas-Cooperatilm) 

40 Stuart Winer, "Hamas Political Leader: Stabber are the' most exalted, noblest of people,., 7he Times of Israel, 

December 15,2015. (https: \VW\\·.timesofisrael.com hamas-politiGal-teadcr-urges-more-stabbinn-attacks) 41 "Egypt's Jslamist parties win election to parliament," BBC News (UK), January 21, 2012. 

(https: \\\\ w.bbc.com news \Vorld-midJk-east-16665748) 42 Ian Black and Patrick Kingsley, "Egypt: resentment towards Brotherhood fuels crackdown 

Guardian (UK). August 16, 20 13. (h!llb.:....JC~~~lli!!:sh!l'.U:sl.U:L.>O:Q[]<J.2Q.Llill;g_l!'..'~l'.\.:llil.!lQI@liilll:!l]jlSJilJl: 

brothcrhood-crackdo\vn) 

43 "Egypt designates Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist 

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dissolved the FJP and confiscated its assetsY' Most of the Brotherhood's leaders are now either in 

prison47 or have fled abroad (mostly to Qatar, Turkey, and the UK) 48 

The Egyptian Brotherhood is not the only outlawed branch in the Middle East. The United Arab 

Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and others have banned their branches, too. And while it is not hard to 

understand the motivations of these authoritarian states seeking to isolate a mobilized Islamist 

opposition, doing so sometimes backfires. ll engenders sympathy for the groups they seek to 

banish, and certainly makes U.S. designation less likely, if only for fear of the optics. 

Egypt is a prime example. Sisi has used a combination of arrests, asset seizures, and forced 

dissolutions to dilute the Brotherhood. His government has introduced laws to dry up the 

Brotherhood's sources of income, including its vast network of charities, clinics, and other social 

services. The government in December 2013 froze the assets of 1,055 organizations f(Jr belonging 

to the Brotherhood or merely being sympathetic with it49 It further seized the assets of 1,345 

Brotherhood members, including 103 schools run by the group. 50 According to one report, by yearend 2015, the government shuttered over 480 NGOs due to alleged Brotherhood 1inks51 

While Cairo has come under fire for these policies, Egypt still faces a legitimate threat from violent 

Brotherhood-linked groups. The group has a history of violence dating back to its early days and 

its "secret apparatus." In the 1990s, it was a breeding ground for two al-Qacda affiliate groups: 

Gama'a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad. The head ofal-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is a former Muslim 

Brother. 5

2 And while he has not put Cairo in his crosshairs, many other Brotherhood splinter 

groups have. These include Hasm, Liwa al-Thawra, Kata'ib Helwan, Revolutionary Punishment, 

and Ajnad Misr. 

Muslim Brotherhood Designation Targets 

Hasm and Liwa al-Thawra were designated as terrorist groups by the State and Treasury 

Departments in January of this year53 The designations were well deserved. Hasm (Harakat 

46 "The Supreme Administrative Court dissolves the Freedom and Justice party and confiscates its funds and 

properties," Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 9, 2014. (http: gate.ahram,on.::.eg News. 5~3329.a~p.x) 

47 "Muslim Brotherhood leaders sentenced to life in prison,'' Associated Press, February 28, 2015. 

(htJQ: W\\ w. timesufl~rael.com musl im-brothcrhnoJ-lcadt;rs-scntcnced-to-life-in-prison) 48 Abigail Hauslohncr, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood finds havens abroad," The Washington Post, November 6, 

2013. {https: \VWW. washingtonpost.com \\'orld middle east egvpb-rnuslim-hrotherhood-tinds-haYensahroad, ?0 13 II 05 .JJ~l~dfe-.Jn3a-lld-95a9-3l'l5b5<i 18ha8 storv.html'?utm term-.b30c8c86bdf4) 49 "The government notifies the Central Bank of freezing the assets of 1,055 charitable organizations belonging to 

the Muslim Brotherhood or being sympathetic with it," AI-Masrv al-Youm (Egypt), December 23, 2013. 

(http: \\ W\v.almasrva!vounl.ClH11 ncv;s dctaib 3h0 135) 50 "Assets of 1,345 Brotherhoods confiscated: Justice Minislry," Egypt Independent, December 15,2015. 

(http: W\vw .C!!vptmdcpendent.cont. asst•ts-! 345-brptherhoods-conliscatcd-J usticc-mimstrv ) 51 "Amnesty International Report 2015!16: The State Of The World's Human Rights," Amnesty International, May 

16,2016. (l1ttps: \\\V\\.amnestV.l)rn d~)\\n!oad Documents POLI0255'2016ENGLISH.PDF) 52 "Profile: Ayman ai-Zawahiri," BBC News (UK), Augusil3, 2015. (!illn" ww\\ ,hbc.com news world-middleU.S. Department of State, Press Release, ''Slate Department Terrorist Designations of Ismail Haniyeh, Harakat aiSabireen, Liwa al-Thawra, and Harakat Sawa'd Misr (HASM)," January 31, 2018. 

'"'"""'-'-''-"-"-""-"'~=..w"'-'-'-""-""-"'-"-'-"--'-'-'~-'..!..!.-"="-"'-"" U.S. Department of the Treasury. "Counter Terrorism 

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Sawa'id Masr, or the Anns Movement of Egypt) had executed deadly attacks against the anny, 

the judiciary, and the police in Egypt since 2016. Liwa al-Thawra (Brigade of the Revolution), 

founded roughly the same time as Hasm, has also targeted the military and law enforcement. While 

Egypt asserts a Brotherhood link to these two groups, the connection is unclear 5 4 

What is important to note here is that the Brotherhood Jinks to Hasm and Liwa a!-Thawra mattered 

not one iota to the U.S. Treasury and State Departments. They designated the two groups based on 

the legal criteria- their track records of violence and suppmt fiJr terrorism. 

Sanctioning the entire Muslim Brotherhood- as some have called for would be difficult, if not 

impossible. As I have noted above, the Brotherhood appears homogenous in its adherence to a 

hateful, bigoted, and radical ideology, but it remains heterogeneous when it comes to violence. 

The right move is for the U.S. Treasury to take the lead in targeting overtly violent factions and 

those that finance terrorism pnrsuant to Executive Order 13224. I would not recommend trying to 

pursue this process via the State Department's Foreign Tcnorist Organization list, which is a bit 

more political in nature. 

Factions of the Brotherhood without a history of violence or terrorism finance do not wanant 

scrutiny. But, as we have seen in the past, the intelligence does sometimes support terrorist 

designations for Brotherhood factions. For example, Hamas was an obvious target after it began 

its campaign of suicide bombings and other gruesome acts of violence in the 1990s. 55 More 

recently, Hasm and Liwa al-Thawra were the most obvious designation candidates among 

suspected or known Muslim Brotherhood factions because of their violent track records. Next in 

line, based on the Treasury Department's criteria, should probably be Libya's Hizb al-Watan and 

Yemen's al-Islah Party. The following summaries explain the known terrorist ties. But only an 

intelligence review can determine whether designations are warranted. 

Libya's Hizh al-Watan 

Under strongman Muammar Gaddafi, the Muslim Brotherhood was not allowed to operate openly 

in Libya. In fact, Brotherhood members faced imprisonment and torture. But after the fall of the 

Gaddafi regime in November 2011, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood held its first public 

conference in decades. The conference included guests from Tnnisia's Brotherhood-linked 

Ennahda party, Syria's Brotherhood branch, and others 56 While some Brotherhood offshootslike the Justice and Development Party-joined Libya's political scene, others took a militant turn. 

Foremost among these is Hizb al-Watan. 

Enforcement Pages, 20 l XO 131 .aspx); Romany Shaker, "US designated Egypt-based I-IASM and Liwa al-Tha\\Ta as 

., FDD 's Long War Journal, January 31, 2018. 

"Stand up against these terror groups to bolster the US-Egypt alliance," New York Posl, 

September 22, 2017. (https: ·nvpust.conL20 17 09 22 stand-up<lgainsHhese-terror-groups-to-holstcr-thc-u..;-egvptalliance ) 51 U.S. Department of State. ''Foreign Terrorist Organizations." accessed July 6, 2018. 

(.h.tm_L~V\\'\\·,state.gO\ j ct rb other de:-;. 1230S5.htm) 56 Francois Murphy, '·Muslim Brotherhood goes public with Libya summit." Reuters) November 17, 2011. 

(http: '' W\\ .reuters. com article us-libva-muslun-brt.\thcrhood-tdUS l Rl::. 7 AG20Y1 0 Ill 117} 

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Translated as either the Homeland Party or the National Party, Hizb al-Watan is led by Abdelhakim 

Bclhaj and Salafi cleric Ali al-Sallabi, 57 Prior to 2011, Sallabi had lived in Qatar and had studied 

under Yusuf ai-Qaradawi,58 who is regarded as a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Belhaj, also known as Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq, previously led the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group 

(LIFG), a designated terrorist group in the United States. 5

9 

The LIFG staged three failed assassination attempts on the life of Gaddafi in the l990s. 60 Belhaj 

then fled to Afghanistan where he reportedly ''developed 'close relationships' with AI-Qaeda 

leaders and Taliban chief Mullah Omar, according to an arrest warrant issued by the Libyan 

government in 2002."61 In 2007, Ayman ai-Zawahiri announced that a wing of the LIFG had 

officially joined al-Qaeda.62 

The U.S. Treasury Department designated the LIFG on September 23, 2001,63 and the UN Security 

Council added the LIFG to its consolidated list of entities associated with al-Qaeda on October 6, 

2001.64 Belhaj was arrested in 2004 by the CIA, and then sent back to Libya where he was 

imprisoned until 201065 While incarcerated, he was part of the LIFG faction that released a series 

of "revisions'' rejecting its ties to al-Qacda.66 These "revisions .. clearly were not binding, as the 

LIFO's imprisoned men also foreswore violence against Gaddafi- a vow they reneged on as soon 

as they were given the opportunity to take up anus in 20 II. Sallabi, who had been negotiating with 

Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam for the release of imprisoned Islamists since 2007, was also party to 

these revisions67 

57 ·'Libya's political parties;· Al-Jaceera (Qatar), July 3, 2012. 

(http: \\\\ \\·.aljab:era.com nc\vs africa. 2012. U6 20 !2A26 '24516:200 I 09.html) 58 Guido Steinberg, "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Support for ls!amists and New Anti-Syria Policy," German Institute 

(or lnternaiional and Sec uri!}' Affairs, Febmary 2012, page 5. (https: · \\'W\\ .S\\ pbnlm.on.! fikadrmn contentsiproducts~ comments 20 12CU7 sb2:.pdf) 5

" U.S. Department of the Treasury. Press Release, ·'Treasury Designates UK-Based Individuals, Entities Financing 

Al Qaida-Affi!iated LIFG," February 8, 2006. (.ill.!P-s: \\'\\·\\'.trea:-.urv.~ov press-center pressrd~,-·ascs Pa!.!es \:±-tO 16.aspx) 60 Sam Dagher, Charles Levinson, and Margaret Coker, "Tiny Kingdom's Huge Role in Libya Draws Concern,'' The 

Wall Street Journal, October 17, 201!. 

(http-;: \\\\ w,_~·~cnm. artldG_>\58 I 000 l4 -W~;97020400 30..t.:'766:?.7000Q2276-{650) 

61 '"Profile: Libyan rebel commander Abdelllakim Bclhadj,'. BBC News (UK), July4, 2012. 

(bJ.!Q .. ~_W\\ \\ .hbl'.COlll tlt..'\\·:-;, \Vl1l"ld~afnca-l-l-7X6 ~~D 

62 Ina! Ersan, ''Zawahri says Libyan group joins Al-Qacda,'' Reuters, November 3, 2007. 

(lmp: \\ \n\·.rcwcrs.cGm article us-lihvic.t.:~Fl.eda-idUSLOJ2_g282200711 03'.'~p---tnJe) 

63 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, "Treasury Designates UK-Based Individuals, Entities Financing 

Al Qaida-Affiliated LIFG,'' February 8, 2006. (.b..ttps: WW\\.treasurv.!:?Jl\ pre~s-...-:enter pressrele-ases Panes js-1-0 lO .. aspx) 

"'United l'iations Security Council, '"Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List,'' accessed 

August I, 2017, page 146. 

''UK top court says ex-Libyan rebel commander can sue former minister;· Reute1:s, January 17, 

2017. (http: \\ \\'W.rt:uters.com artick us-brit.:!tn-libva-bdhadJ·:tdUSKBI\ 1511 D2) 66 Daveecl Gartcnstein-Ross and Luke Lischin, "Doha's Dangerous Dalliance;· 17te Journal of International Security 

Ajfairs, Fall/Winter 2014. (http: \VW\\ .dcrenddemocracv.om content. uploads ducuments. Ross Lis_chin.pdQ 67 Sam Dagher and Charles Levinson, "Tiny Kingdom's Huge Role in Libya Draws Concern.'' The TYall Street 

Journal. October 17, 2011. (bJJmi.c,llc\lo'. '' sj.cum articl.cs. SB I 000 l4241J529701 04002304:'i7oo270tl091 27o4n50) 

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During the 2011 uprising against Gaddafi, Sallabi's cadres received assault rifles, rocket-propelled 

grenade launchers, other small anns, and military training from Qatar. At least three shipments 

went to the Western Mountains where Belhaj led a brigade of rebel fighters 68 

Afler overthrowing Gaddafi, Sallabi fonned the National Gathering for Freedom, Justice and 

Development party69 - a name similar to both Turkey's Justice and Development Party and the 

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party. This political party aimed to make 

Islamic law the basis of Libya's constitution70 

Belhaj, for his part, announced the launch ofHizb al-Watan71 Belhaj, however, failed to win any 

seats in both 201272 and 2014.73 All the while, Belhaj was believed to be training members of 

Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, and of sheltering the group's leader 

Abu lyadh ai-Tunisi. 74 Belhaj's social media account contains some evidence of his active ties to 

other al-Qaeda-linked actors inside Libya, as well. For example, in June 2015, a Twitter account 

attributed to Belhaj honored two fallen jihadists, Nasir Atiyah al-Akar and Salim Dcrbi, both senior 

leaders in the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC).75 Akar and Derbi were killed by Islamic 

State loyalists, but their opposition to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's caliphate did not make them 

moderates. Indeed, DMSC had ties to al-Qaeda76 

Hizb al-Watanjoined other Islamist militias in the ''Libya Dawn'' operation in 2014, which drove 

the elected and internationally recognized government from Tripoli. The government now ruling 

Islamic democracy," 17te Telegraph 

(http: vv\V\.\·.te-le!!raph.co.uk. ne\v:.;. \\Orldnt:\\ s afncaandindianocean lihva. i\fP995~ l_ihvan-ckric-announccs-rlt'\\-

part\ -on-li ncs-o r- m~..1dcra tc-Islam ic-democrac v. htm I) 71 "Libya's Bclhaj quits military to enter politics," Age nee France Presse (France), May 15, 2012. 

(https: \\ \Vw.bbc.com t1C\\ s. world-africa-! S07X-lJO) 72 UK House of Commons Librm)·, ''Libya's General assembly election 2012," July 18, 2012, page 5. 73 Ann Marlmve, "The Next Dangerous Move in Libya,'' The Dai~v Beast, February 22, 2016. 

O:Hm W\\ \Y.thedailvheast.com the-ncxt-dam.!er~.)us-mo\·e-m-libv:J.) 

74 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, "Abdelhakim Belhadj and Ansar ai-Sharia in Tunisia." Foundationfi>r Defense of 

Democracies, October 8, 2013. (http: \\W\\.ddCnddcmocrJcv.oru media-bit abd.;lhq.kim-bclhadj-and-ansar-al~ 

sharia-m-tunisia ) 75 "' .J_,_.,Jl .:;. ~~ c)c .illl "-=-.J ~~ (The deceased, may God have mercy on him, is on the right of the 

June 9, 2015. (!illQo;:. t\\itter.com 4belhaJ s;atus AOR33RX5X7160698S9); @4belhaj," JWI ~J 

(.)y.:?-\J~) U]J.ili '~.J~.J:! L.. ';/) J,U YJ • Jl~)'\J J.W! s~J • ..YJI ~~~4.li~ .,.~.J.)~t...,., (The hero Salim Derby joins 

the convoy of the martyrs of truth in support of justice and moderation.] only say what pleases my Lord. 'Indeed we 

belong to Allah, and indeed to Him we will return.')," Iivitter, June 10,2015. 

(https: 1\\'Htcr.com ..fbelhaj status 60i\:"739'Jl272521729) 76 Thomas Joscelyn, "Veteranjihadists killed by Islamic Stale's 'province' in Derna, Libya," FDD's 

Journal, June 12,2015. \ill!]lli;___o~"-J,'ill!m:ill]'Q1!!:rlliL\.l!2.Jl[l;l]i!.~2L:ll'illl.ill.ill:J.!ll<!'ll~:\ll!.t!J<':::Q<;m;cQ]lJl) 

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from Tripoli is supported by Libya Dawn, Qatar, and Turkey. 77 Belhaj, according to one Arab 

intelligence agency, is accused of running weapons to the Tripoli govemment through an aviation 

company called Libyan Wingsn This has not been con finned, but has been reported elsewherc.79 

Sallabi and Belhaj now appear on a list of 59 people that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and 

Bahrain accuse ofhaving links to terrorism and enjoying Qatari support. 80 Also on the list is Nabaa 

TV, a Libyan media outlet Belhaj controls and uses to publish militia statements and ideologies81 

Nabaa is broadcast from Turkey,82 where Bellmj resides83 

Yemen's al-Islah 

Al-lslah is Yemen's local Brotherhood affiliate, its membership consisting of both Brotherhood 

supporters- who enjoy influence in urban centers and universities- but also Salafists and tribal 

figures, who have more reach and influence with the rural Yemeni population84 The group 

believes that Islamic law should be the basis oflegislation and refonn. 85 

Al-Islah's recent history is filled with ties to terrorism. One co-founder of al-lslah is Sheikh Abdul 

Majid al-Zindani 86 A federal lawsuit identifies Zindani as a coordinator of the 2000 attack on the 

USS COLE that killed 17 U.S. Navy sailors. 87 The United States designated Zindani in January 

2004 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for being a "spiritual leader" to Osama bin Laden 

77 Cameron Glenn, "Libya ·s Islamists: 

Centerfi>r Scholars, March 8. 2016. (!ll!J2.:;~~~"-110llil<'."-ill.<;L"DLillll.d\:J.llmc'i::!2ili!illl~:]o;Jl!,t:lli;;:Y::!ille:i!.U!!::.'illill:: 

Interview with Arab intelligence agency oflicers, July 2, 2017. 

"'"What you need to know about the five Libyans on the terror list." Al-Arab(ya (UAE), June 9, 2017. 

(https: en!!ltsh.alarabiva.net. en· features 20! 7 06 09 \\'bat-\ou-nced-tt)-know-about-the-Fivc-Libvan-names-on-thetc!Torism-li~t.html); '"Private Libyan airline Libyan Wings on track to commence operations between Malta and 

Mitiga," The (UK), December 27, 2014. (http: w\vw.indcpendcnt.c~)m.mt'artic!es. 2014-l2-27·Iocalpeople, groups on terror list," Reuters, June 9, 2017. (http: i::ultl:k'\Vs.com ne\\·~ uulf qatar qatat:.: 

l!nb:·d-peopk-u:roups-on-tt::rror-ll't-l.21l406SA) 

81 "Saudi. allies release complete list ofterrodinked individual, entities." Khaleej Times (UAE). July 26, 2017. 

(b.!lD: \\ \\ \\ .khalcejtunes.com 'fCi!i~, lll qatar _..;auJI-alhes-rclc:a...;e-complete-li~t -of-terror-! inkcQ-ind1 vidual-entities:) 

"·'Sources: Spies of the "Two Hamads" support a militia to attack the Libyan army," AI-Bayan (UAE), June 16, 

2018. (Imps: \V\\ w.a.lbavan.ae one-\\·orld arahs 201 ~-06-16- I .32930! 5) 

Wl Inn Cobain, Owen Bowcott, Pippa Crerar, and Kareem Shaheen, "Britain apologiscs for ·appalling treatment' of 

Abdel Hakim Belhaj," The Guardian (UK), May 10,2018. 

Stacey Philbrick Yadav, "Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood and the perils ofpowersharing,'' Brookings Institution, 

August 2015. (https: \\W\v.brookin~s.cdu wp-cont~nt uploads :?016 07 Yemen_ Yada\-FlNALE.pdt) 85 Amr Hamzawy, "Between Government and Opposition: The Case of Yemeni Congregation Reform," Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, November 2009, pages 3~4. 

(http: carnegieenPowment.or~ file~ V9mem cow,rauatton n.:tC:m1.ru;li) 8

" Steven Erlanger, '·At Yemen College, Scholarship and Jihadist Ideas," The Nmr York Times, January 18,2010. 

(http: \YWw.nvtimes.com 20 lO Ol 10 \\or!d midJ!eea:-;t l9vemen.html'!mcubJ> t) 

"Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of2015, H.R 3829. 114'" Congress (2015). 

(hUQ~:__y{y .. \\,t:Gngres\,g_\,_1_~~ 114 bills hr3~N2 BIJ.t~::JJ~hr3X9 ih.pd1) 

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and playing "a key role in the purchase of weapons on behalf of Al-Qaeda and other terrorists,"88 

and the UN followed suit a month later.89 As recently as 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department noted 

that Zindani. along with another designated terrorist. had "issued religious guidance in support of 

AQAP [Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] operations.''90 

In 2006 - two years after being designated Zindani led a fundraising campaign for llamas in 

Yemen, collecting over $279 million from 50,000 mosques for the terrorist group. 91 He is a board 

member of the Union of Good, an umbrella organization the U.S. designated for financing 

Hamas92 Zindani also founded al-Iman University, which has served as ajihadist recmiting hub93 

According to a recent UN report, AQAP's "new sharia official'' is Abdullah Mubarak, "a Yemeni 

national and graduate ofiman University in Sana'a."94 

Major General Ali Mohsen ai-Ahmar, one of Yemen's most important military figures. is also 

repm1edly aligned with al-Islah.95 He is purported to have overseen $20 million given by Osama 

bin Laden to resettle Arab Afghan fighters in Yemen, and reportedly ''oversaw the deployment" 

of Islamic 1,>roups in the 1994 civil war.96 He is married to the daughter of Tariq Nasr al-Fadhli, 

who the FBI says was behind the failed 1992 bombings of two Aden hotels housing more than 100 

U.S. troopsn 

88 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, "United Slates Designates bin Laden Loyalist," February 24. 

2004. (http:-;: WW\\.trea:-:urv.gov press~center press-releases. Pages H1l90.asp.x) 8" United Nations Security Council, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for listing: Qdi.l56 Abd-al-Majid Aziz alZindani," accessed August 23, 20 l7. 

(hups: \\'\\· \\ .un.org sc suborg en sanctl~H1S ! ::!61 ay sanctions list sumnw.ries indi\ idual abd-al-majid-aziz-31-

U.S. Treasury Department, press Release, ''Treasury Designates Al-Qa'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen," 

December 18,2013. (https:r www.trt'asurv.uov press-center press-releases Pages il2249.asp~) 

01 Amani al-Safoni. "Yemen collects donations for Hamas via official accounts." Elaph (Saudi Arabia), March 22, 

2006. (!J.WL.S:ll!lli:L£Q.!~'siliJ!:.<ilil!0..1illl.!o..Ll)J'Jillhtm~:lli21:t;lli;])ill;.e:EQl.Jli.£,) 

(https: \\\\ w.treusurv.gov press-center pres,-;-rdeas.:s Pages hp 1 ~67.aspx) 

91 Thomas Joscelyn, ''Resolving the Conflict in Yemen: U.S. Interests, Risks, and Policy,'' Testimony before Senate 

Foreign Relations Commil!ee, March 9, 2017. 

(http: W\\W.deknddemocracv.orn contt:nt uploads docunwnts 0_30917 n Re:-:.ohing Cont1ict Yemen.pdt) 

""Thomas Joscelyn, "Analysis: AQAP remains under pressure." FDD 's Long War Journal, May 26, 2018. 

(l1ttps: www. !on!!\Vaqournai.on.! arch1ve:-. 10! S 05 an~lvsis-aqap-rcmaub-undt.:r-prcssure.php) 

05 Kareem Fahim, "Yemen's Opposition May be Caught by Its Own Double Game,'' The 1Vew York Times, 

December 2, 2011. (http: W\n\ .nvtm1e~.l..'om 20 I l 12 03 \vorld midJleeast vemens-opp~..)sition-partv-blah-iJc~.·scrcdibilitv-Qap.html?mcubz""""'! ); Stacy Philbrick Yadav, ''How war is changing Yemen's largest Islamist coalition,'' 

17w 1Vashington Post, March 22, 2017. (https: W\\ \\ .washin2tonpost.cnm news mtmke\-cal.!e\\p .,.,0! 7 03 22 hO\\-

war-L'>-chanoini!.-vemens-laroest -tslamlst-coali rion '.'utm tenn-::: .4R8b6be79604) 96 John F. Burns, ''Yemen Links to bin Laden Gnaw at F.B.I. in Cole Inquiry," The New York Times, November 26, 

2000. (Jlli:IL':D!:.;>~t.!.ill.S~~:illlli_ll_~,_Q.!:l."'.Y\~m~!.dLrLI-c"'·='~''-b'm:l~cskn=!."'-::f!l::llii.:.!!t~ 

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Senior al-Islah Party members reportedly harbored Anwar al-Awlaki prior to his 2011 death in a 

U.S. drone strike.98 The U.S. Treasury labeled Awlaki a terrorist in 2010. As Under Secretary for 

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stumi Levey stated, Awlaki was involved in ''every aspect of 

the supply chain of terrorism fundraising for terrorist groups, recruiting and training operatives, 

and planning and ordering attacks on innocents."99 

Interestingly, the Saudi-led war in Yemen may be forcing al-Islah to change. The Islah leadership 

met with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed 

bin Salman in late 2017. This was a remarkable moment given the Saudi and Emirati antipathy tor 

the Brotherhood. But they were drawn together in opposition to Iran and the Houthis. 100 Al-Islah 

subsequently announced it was distancing itself from the Brotherhoodw1 

Whether or not al-Islah moves away from the Brotherhood, again, is irrelevant to the process of 

targeting a terrorist group. The Treasury and State Departments should simply assess the available 

intelligence on Islah to detennine whether the group remains supportive of al-Qacda and other 

tenorist groups. 

State Sponsors of the Muslim Brotherhood 

In addition to targeting groups that have a clear connection to terrorism, the U.S. should also 

engage the Brotherhood's two top state sponsors: Turkey and Qatar. Both countries are understood 

to be U.S. allies. Yet, both continue to support a movement that is anti-American and extremist at 

its core. 

Turkey 

Turkey's Islamist Justice and Development Pa1iy (AKP) is effectively the Turkish ann of the 

Muslim Brotherhood. Turkish President and AKP founder Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly 

supports the movement. That supp01i was most evident during the height of the Arab Spring, when 

Erdogan apparently believed he could hamess the growing political power of the movement under 

his leadership. 

98 Bill Roggio, "Anwar a! Awlaki sheltered in homes of senior lslah party members," FDD ·s Long War Journal, 

October 6, 2011. (https: wvvvv.lon• \\arjournal.or~ archl\es. :.:0 ll lO an war_ al awlaki shelter in hom.php) 99 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, "Treasury Designates Anwar Al-Aulaqi, Key Leader of AlQa' ida in the Arabian Peninsula," July 16, 2010. (https: \\ W\\ .treasurvYO\ press-center· pressreleases. PaQ.es H!.779.aspx) 

too Ali al Mujahed and Sudarsan Raghavan. "Yemen's vvar is so out of control, allies are turning on one another." 

The Washington Post, February 3, 2018. (https: \\W\\·.washin!!tonpo:-.Lcom \\oriJ vcmens-war-Is:-so-out-of-controlthat-allies-are-tuming-on-one-another 2018 0:2 0~ 50d2()420-05fe-ll<.:>8-aah! 

DJ9l373R67e storv.htmi·?utm term'-.!le233Rcd39e9) 101 Abdul Hadi flabtoor, "Yemen's Al-Islah Parly to Reintroduce New Administrative framework." 

Awsat (UK), January 7, 2018. (hlW.c.;__nill'C:\i!L£QilLS:.!l.\;llllibJK'!ll\'-illlliJ.dliS'i.l::fucmlfll"JJ.~<ill.Q~i<ili:!!.t.lili!l!c 

part v -remtroduce-ne\\: -adrmmstrat in~- framt:\\"ork) 

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Erdogan dispatched Turkish campaign strategist Erol Olcok to Egypt to help with Morsi's 

campaign. Olcok helped Erdogan's AKP party win eleven elections in Turkey. 102 On September 

30, 2012, after Morsi's victory was secured, Erdogan invited the Egyptian president, along with 

the Brotherhood-linked Palestinian Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal to the AKP convention in 

Ankara. After Morsi delivered a speech at the convention praising Erdogan and the AKP, he 

announced a $1 billion loan from Turkey to Egypt. 103 In February 2013. Turkey's then-President 

Abdullah Gul became the first foreign leader to visit Egypt under Morsi's government. 104 In 2015, 

Erdogan further admitted that he provided $2 billion to Morsi at a time when no one else was 

helping Egypt. 105 

Turkey's support became increasingly strident after the collapse of Brotherhood rule in Egypt. The 

AKP organized public demonstrations in Turkey in support ofMorsi following the coup, 106 and at 

least I ,500 members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood found refuge in Turkey. 107 On August 

23, 2013. a month after Morsi's ouster, then-Prime Minister Erdogan fired up his base with a 

"Rabia'· four-finger salute in commemoration of the Egyptian government's crackdown on the 

Brotherhood at Rabaa Square. 108 His salute became a global symbol of solidarity with the Muslim 

Brotherhood. 

Last summer, Erdogan coopted the Rabia sign to signify the "four principles" of the AKP: '"one 

homeland; one state; one t1ag; one nation.'' The AKP added the principles to Article 4 of the patty's 

bylaws in May 2017. 109 

After Morsi's ouster in July 2013, Turkey became the hub for both the Egyptian and international 

Brotherhood. 110 Numerous Egyptian Brotherhood figures have relocated to Turkey to escape Sisi's 

102 Vahap Munyar, "'AK Parti'n!n reklamctst M1s1r·a 

"business'')." Hurrirct (Turkey). September 8. 20 II. \illill.~l'J.U!g]l~:!of'~.lL!!!S.:.lli!L!l:l!l!l:I!~ill.llf!:i!.:!!!WI:!!.:.!-": 

tcm-eidivor-1 Xn 756110) 10 ~ "'Egypt signs $1 billion Turkish loan deal," Reuters, September 30. 2012. (https: WW\\ .reuters.com article u~­

C!!Vpt-turkev-loan-idl!S BR Dl 8TOG9 20 1209 3(J.1 k.:dTvpe---c RSS&feed;-.Jame--\~;orlJNews) 

'

04 Scncm Aydin Duzgit, "The Seesaw Friendship Between Turkey's AKP and Muslim Brotherhood," 

Endmrmentfor International Peace, June 24, 2014. (bJlR.:.._\]illTIITJ.IT!lili'-ill!l<;JJ1.\'-ill_:;_Q'l±Jl1~~~= 

"Ba~bakan Erdogan'dan Rabia i~arcti (Rabaa sign ti'orn Erdogan)," Aksam (Turkey). August 23, 2013. 

(https: \\"\\ \\ .ab.anu.:om.tr sivaset basbakan-erdo!:!anljan~rabia-tsareu habcr-23~093) 

109 '"Turkey's AKP adopts Muslim Brotherhood's Rabia sign in its bylaws." BiJ;<{un (Turkey), May 20, 2017; 

(https: W\V\\ .hinwn.net habcr-dctav turkeY-~-akp-adoph-nltt'-!im-brotherhood-s-rabJa-sJgn-m-it~-bvlawslnO~l!J.html); '"Erdogan slams CHP leader Kthqdaroglu over Rabia sign." ffurriyet (Turkey), June 8, 2017. 

(http: \\ \V\\ .hurri\etd<lilvnews.Ct1m erdouan-slams-chp-leJder-kiliCdaroulu-o\er-rabta-siun-ll.f08 1 ) 

tto Mohammad Abdel Kader, "Turkey's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood," Al-Arab(va (UAE), October 14. 

2013. (1l!.!Jl:_~!J.l.!lish.abrabiva.net enpn~~ne ;.darabiva-studres 20l3. lO 1-f Turkev-s-relationshm-with-thc-

\ 1 us I 1m-~1_rot herhn~..xL htm!) 

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crackdown, including Mahmoud Izzat, Mahmoud Husayn, Muhammad Jamal Hishmat, Salah 

Abd-ai-Maqsoud, Amr Darrag, Majdy Salim, Khalid al-Sherif, Murad Ghurab, 111 and Wagdy 

Ghoncim. 112 According to Emirali officials, Turkey is also home to nine Brotherhood-linked UAE 

citizens.II 3 

Hamas operatives have also made their home there, including Saleh Arouri, the head of the West 

Bank military wing, who notoriously ordered the kidnapping of three Israeli teens in the summer 

of 2014. 114 Arouri, who officially lives in Lebanon now but visits Turkey frequently, is a 

designated terrorist in the United States. 115 Mahmoud Attoun and Taysir Suleiman, both Hamas 

operatives sentenced to life tenns in Israel, are based in Turkey and are actively involved with 

HIKMET, 116 a Turkish NGO associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.ll7 

Erdogan is an unabashed supporter of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Qatar-based spiritual leader of the 

Brotherhood known for his ./{ttvvas permitting usc of suicide bombings against Israel. 118 Erdogan 

defended Qaradawi after Interpol issued an arrest warrant for him in 2014. 119 Moreover, in the 

midst of the 2014 Gulf spat between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, Erdogan 

stated that Turkey would welcome Brotherhood figures who were asked to leave Qatar under 

pressure from other Gulf States. 120 

Turkey now hosts a number of media outlets to support the Brotherhood. For example, the 

Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies (EIPSS) was established in Istanbul in 2014 

and is chaired by Amr Darrag, a prominent Muslim Brotherhood figure who served as Egypt's 

Minister of Planning and International Cooperation under former President Morsi' s government. 

111 "\;Sji .)1 'i;).,JI 'l,.;lp.)'i ,:,iolii\1 .. ,Lu.YL, (Names ofMB leaders who fled to Turkey)." Veto Gate, July 16, 2016. 

ll.l Kenan Akin "BAE: Turkiyc'nin Katar'da Ussu Olmasina ltirazimiz Yok (UAE: We Don't Object to the Turkish 

Base in Qatar),'' Yenicag (Turkey), July 17,2017. (http: \\\\ \\.vemcae!.WZctc:-.i.com.tr hae~turkivenin-katJrda-ussu­

~._,!ma::-ina-itirazimil-vok-43553vv.htm) 

114 Jonathan Schanzer, "Hamas Still Finds Harbor in Turkey,'' The f:Veek(vStandard, June 8, 2016. 

(https: \\ \V\\. wet:klvstandard.com jonathan-scbanzl'r hamas-~·aill-fincls-harbor-in-turkev) 

115 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, "Treasury Sanctions Major Hamas Leaders, Financial 

Facilitators and a Front Company.'' October 9, 2015. (l:l!.m.i: \\ \\'\\ .treasun .ot)\ press-center pressrclca...,cs Pages jlOlSY.astn) 116 Jonathan Schanzcr and Michael Argosh, "Lying Down With Dogs,'' Foreign PoliLy, August 20,2014. 

(http: fl)rt:ii!npl>ilcv.cnm 201-+ OR 20 lvin~-dnwn-with-Jous) 

117 Steven G. Merley, '·Turkey. the Global Muslim Brotherhood. and the Gaza Flotilla;' Jerusalem Center/or Public 

(Israel), 2011, page 24. (http: '" \\\\ .icpa.l.lf~ t~xt:furkev ivfuslim Brotherhood. pdf) 

Hassan Hassan, "Hatred, violence and the sad demise of Yusuf AI Qaradawi," The National (UAE), January 28, 

2014.\~W~~~mill~~~~illlli~!~SWillU~~~~~~~~~~bk~~~~ 

''Erdogan defends Brothcrhood1S Qaradawi after arrest wanant'' Al-Afonitor, December 12, 2014. 

(https: wd2,.<!rcJJivc.or11 web 20 l.f l 1

JJQ2;;JBO bttp:. WW\\.o.al-m~mtWr.com pubc on~inab 2014 l, qarada\\·i-el!vptturkev-in teron !-arrest-warrant-brat hcrhood. html) 120 Tulay Karadeniz and Elif Karaca, "Turkey would welcome Muslim Brotherhood 

Erdogan," Reuters, September 16,2014. \h\)Q;.__\lc.lU.'-J:s:.lli',Il&Jl!lliillllli'-ll~C::Silltl'llilll\:t:h.\:>QQ::illds£:Y: 

IdUSKBNOI mllfFcO 140916) 

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Darrag was previously an executive board member of Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), 

as well as the chairman of the party's Foreign Relations Committee. 121 

Turkey hosts several Egyptian Brotherhood-affiliated TV channels, 122 including El-Sharq TV, 

Mekamclecn TV, and Watan TV. Two other channels, Misr ai-Aan TV and Rabaa TV, 123 launched 

in Istanbul in late 2012-early 2013, have been shut down. There are allegations that the Turkish 

intelligence service was behind the launching ofRabaa TV. 124 Brotherhood-at1iliated channels 125 

have advocated for the killing of Egyptian President Abdei-Fattah al-Sisi 126 and other Egyptian 

security of1icials. 127 

Ankara has not shied away from military support for the Brotherhood, either. Turkish intelligence 

officer Irshad Huz was mTested in Egypt for allegedly funneling weapons and activists to the 

Egyptian Brotherhood. 128 On July 12, 2015, the Egyptian military spokesman announced that a 

recently uncovered "teJTorist cell'' with a mission to destabilize Egypt received instructions from 

the Brotherhood headquartered in Turkey. 129 

Turkish support for Brotherhood-linked military actlVlty also appears to extend to Libya. In 

January 2013, Turkey's Hurriyet newspaper reported that Greek authorities found Turkish 

weapons aboard a ship headed for Libya. 130 In December of that year, the Egyptian press also 

reported that the Egyptian customs intercepted four containers of weapons from Turkey 

believed destined for Libyan militias.Ll! In November 2014, Greek authorities found 

20,000 AK-47s in a ship captained by a Turk heading from Ukraine to Libya. The captain said 

121 ":_,.,...;:;..(About Us)," Egyptianlnstitutefor Political and Strategic Studies (Turkey), accessed June 4, 2018. 

(http:->: cipss-eg.org about-us ) 122 ·"ihvan medya' Bagcilar'dal ('Ikhwan Media' at Bagcilar')" Radikal (Turkey), February 3, 2015. 

(!J!tR~. \\'\Vw.radikal.com.tr turkl'-C ihvan-medva-baucJlarda-1 "185334) 123 "Muslim Brolhcrhood 'Rabaa channel launched, airing from Turkey," AI-Ahram (Egypt), December 21,2013. 

(http: en!.!lish.ahram.org.e~-L New:-.Content I h-1- 80647 Euvpt Politics- Muslim-Brotherhood-Raba.a-chmmelJaunched.-airino-.aspx) 124 '·Turkish Intelligence Service MIT behind New Egyptian lslamist TV Channel,'' nsnbc.mc, December 9, 2013. 

(http;;;: nsnbc.mc 20 !3 l., 09 turkish-inte\Jigt-n-:e-sen ice-mit-behind-new-ezvptwn-islmmst-tY-channel ) 

"'Duygu Guvenc, "Ollim cmirleri istanbul" dan (Death Orders From Istanbul)," Cumhuriyet (Turkey), February I, 

2015. (http: W\V\\·.cumhur1vd~com.tr haber dunva ~03X 13 Olum cmirkn i:-tanbul dan.html) 126 "Calls to Kill President AI-Sisi and Egyptian Journalists on Muslim Brotherhood TV Channels,'' A1iddle East 

llv!edia Research Institute, January 26, 2015. (http~: w~n\ .memn.on.~ tv calb-kdl-nre~Ld~nt-a!-s:is:i-and-egvptianJOUrnalists- n1us I i m-bn1thcrhu~.xi- t\ -c hanne! ~ transcript) 127 ··Muslim Brotherhood Operalives in Turkey Call For Killing Egyptian Officials, Threaten 

Shelters MB And Ham as Members,"' Aiidd/e East Afedia Research Institute, 

Jacques Ncriah. "Egypt Accuses Turkey of Subversion," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (Israel), July 14, 

2015. (http: · jcpa.org pdf Egvpt-Accuses-Turkev-of-SubH~rston-Jacques-Neriah- Vull5Nq~ l.pd!) 130 "() gemi AB yasagma takrldr (That Ship Encounters EU Ban)," Hurriyet (Turkey), January 31. 2013. 

(http: \\\\ w.hurnvet.com.tr gundcm o-l!etnl-ab-va:-:au_ma-takiidi<?2..:J..S 1.:.:75) 

m Mona Zia, ·'~ :;?.:,J W...\ J.-:i t,;Sji ,j..<> :i...._jli.:JYJl..::.. 4 ~ :..aJ\..,;;Jl (Customs: 4 shipments carrying weapons and 

live ammunition from Turkey seized)," l"oum Sabi" (Egypt), December 28, 2013. 

(http:-;:· \\\\\\.V(_~l!DJ7.com storv 20!3 1~ ~8 l-t22258 :.,:-;e..:,-~1-~-45-f-.,Y.-~..:~-~~1~-4~'~:~· -..d /~i) 

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the ship was bound for Turkey's Alexandretta port, but the maritime traffic data reportedly 

indicated that it was bound for Libya. 132 According to a press report from Saudi-owned AlArabiya a month later, Libyan authorities intercepted a Korean steamer headed to the embattled 

port city ofMisrata that reportedly embarked from Turkey. The ship was carrying containers of 

weapons and ammunition allegedly intended for Islamist militias. 133 These are just a few 

examples of what has been reported out of Libya. 

In the meantime, Arab intelligence officials allege that Turkey provides financial support to 

Hamas. 134 Open source reports suggest the same. 135 Israeli intelligence has further suggested that 

Turkey, through a private intelligence finn, provides military training to the Gaza-based arm of 

the Muslim Brotherhood. 136 

Qatar 

Qatar is undeniably the world's most welcoming and generous jurisdiction for the Muslim 

Brotherhood. The relationship began in the early 1950s when the tiny emirate "provided a 

lucrative, stable and welcoming platform where Brotherhood members could safely base 

themselves, recruit fellow members and prosper:· In the 1960s, the Brotherhood began to use Qatar 

as a '·launching pad" for expansions into other jurisdictions, like the United Arab Emirates. Qatar 

tacitly approved those activities, so long as the Brotherhood continued to be "outward-facing" and 

did not pose a threat to Doha. 1

3

7 

As scholar David Roberts notes. ''only Qatar has as small, as rich and as cohesive a local population 

and can host a group like the Brotherhood, confident that its own security will not be undermined." 

Blessed with enonnous gas reserves that have generated significant wealth, the Qatari state saw to 

its citizens' every need, which meant the Brotherhood could not penetrate Qatar by providing 

social services as they had done in Egypt. 1

38 

As former FDD senior fellow David Weinberg observed, it was Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion 

of Kuwait that inspired Qatar's strategic support for the Brotherhood. "Saudi Arabia's 

powerlessness in the face of the Iraqi invasion was a lesson to key Qatari leaders that their nation's 

132 "20 bin kala,nikofta>tyan geminin kaptam TUrk ytklt (The captain of the ship carrying 20,000 Kalashnikovs 

turns out to be a Turk)," T24 (Turkey), November 10,2013. (http: t:!4.com.tr haber :'O-bin-kalasmko!Ct<Nvanl.!t'minin-kaptani-turk-ciktL24JfJ 71) 

UJ ··:i.:il~ 4SY l)A 4....,.1u; ~'x4 ~;_;.:..~~(Steamer carrying weapons from 

December27,20I4.t~~~~~@IT~D~~~~WbllU9LU~ULdU~~~~==~~~ 

':"L:':::'.:±.~~~~ill.IJ 

intelligence agency officers, July 2, 2017. 

DS Jonathan Schanzer, "Terrorism Finance in Turkey: A Growing Concern," Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies, Febmary 2014. 

(http: www.ddCndd('l11(lt.:rJcv .on: content upload~ documents Schanzcr Turk~~\ Final Repon _3 smallcr.pdl) 

DD Judah Ari Gross, "Shin Bet accuses Turkey of allowing Ham as to raise~ launder money," The Times ofl5rae1, 

February 12, 2018. (https: www. t!m~.:iQJJ.::u~Qt;;.L~l11 arab~J:->ral:'l i~nutn~tud<..i:ih<Itizen~arn::-.tcd-for~helpinQ-tt)-fundhama:-.) 

m David Roberts, "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: or Preference?'' Middle East Policr Council, 

Fall20 14. U.lliL~..\L!lli:£'S!l~L'.lli!L:illlli:.!m!:o.!Jm::l2!:!2l.!.J.\J:lli.l£'.CL:J21J!'W.lillli.m.::s=~=~) 

l.lS Ibid. 

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survival required building influence with great powers, and perhaps even non-state actors, beyond 

the Arabian Peninsula." Qatar soon became the Brotherhood's biggest backer. 139 

After Morsi was elected, Doha gave the Morsi regime $2.5 billion from August 2012 until early 

2013. In January 2013, it announced another $2.5 billion in aid, sending $2 billion in loans and a 

$500 million grant. The emirate also pledged to invest $18 billion in Egypt over the next five years, 

while Qlnvest, a Qatari investment group, sought to buy a majority stake in Egyptian investment 

bank EFG Hennes. 140 Also part of the package was free liquefied natural gas. 141 

As of July 2013, when the Morsi regime collapsed, Qatar had pumped $8 billion in financial aid 

to Egypt, according to the Financial Times 142 Qatar today serves as a safe haven for many 

Egyptian Brotherhood figures. It hosts the Brotherhood's de facto spi1itual guide, Yusuf alQaradawi, along with other figures like Asim Abd-al-Majid, Wagdy Ghoneim, Ehab Shiha, Ashraf 

Badr ai-Din, and Hamzah Zawbaa. 143 The fact that Doha hosts these figures became one of the 

main complaints against Qatar from its Gulf neighbors. 144 

Al-Jazeera, also an object of GCC derision, was undeniably a tool to advance Qatar's pro-Muslim 

Brotherhood foreign policy. Signs that the network was purposefully favoring the Brotherhood 

were evident when Egyptians were protesting against Muslim Brotherhood rule in early 2013. AlJazeera was critical of them- reflecting the political leanings of the government in Doha. 145 But 

the real tipping point, notes former AI Jazcera English employee Gregg Carlstrom, was the summer 

of2013, when the Egyptian anny ousted Mohammed Morsi. 146 Al-Jazeera effectively became the 

Morsi network. The Al-Jazeera Mubasher Misr channel devolved into an outlet whose goal was to 

present '·local news with a clear pro-Brotherhood bias:· The Al-Jazeera website featured pieces 

similar in tone. In late 2013, one article falsely claimed Morsi achieved positive economic results 

while decrying "the war that was waged against him in other media outlets." With the headline 

LN David Andrew Weinberg, "Qatar vs. The 

Nationallntcrcst, June 8, 2017. (ht.\L':_ll'llisll!l.!ill!.f!'~ill!d.'2l!!J:<;.SJ!!Ji!.!::.\.i:.!ill.llil.!=ill:@ill:::~o:::.t!:ill!'::.!bd'i'.'.~ill\~ 

Wn.>the~gulf-..., I 06S) 140 ·'Qatar Doubles Aid to Egypt," Associated Press, January 8, 2013. 

(h!.Uls: \\WW.nvtimcs.com'2013 Ol 09 \\orld n11dd!eeast qatar-doubks-aid-to-e!!vpt.html) 141 David Roberts, "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?"" Middle East Policy Council, 

Fall 2014. (http: W\\ \\ .mepc.org qatar-nnd-muslim-brotherhood-praumatism::_QI.-prcl'erence.) 142 Simeon Kerr, "Fall ofEgy}'t's Mohamed Morsi is blow to Qatari leadership," Financial Times (UK), July 3, 

2013. (Imp~: \\'\V\V. fu:c•m contt!nt af5d06Ra-c3d-_ lle'-b35b-OO 14-+fcabdcO) 143 "~~.J':JI ~~_) ~ 0~~ Y--"'A ..).4lu~)-t.ll :IY..'f\ .. .::L....u.:":l\1 (Names of Brotherhood members who fled Egypt to 

Qatar, the state sponsoring teiTorism)." £1-Fagr (Egypt), April 25, 2017. (http: W\\ '' .elfagr.com ::0564320) 144 Eric Trager, "The Muslim Brotherhood is the Root of the Qatar Crisis," 11Ie Atlantic, July 2, 2017. 

(httn~: \\·ww.thcatlanticcnm internationaL archi\e 2() 17 07 muslim-brotherh(10d-qatar 532380.) 145 Alexander Kuhn, Cristoph Reuter, Gregor Pdcr Schmitz, ''AI-Jazeera Losing Battle for Independence,'' D(7r 

Spiegel (Gcnnany), February 15,2013. (http: WW\\.spie~~l_.dc international \H)rld al-i;ueera-criticized-tl)r-lack-ofmdependenct"-a Iter <lra b-s.prinu-a-X 83 J4 3. html) 146 Gregg Carlstrom, "What's the Problem with AI Jazeera''" The Atlantic, June 24,2017. 

(https: \\ W\\ .thcatlanttc.com 1ntematlonal archi\T "'O l: 06 al-iazeera-qatar-:-.audi-arabJa-muslimbwtherh'c<.'..d 531~71 ) 

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"Morsi's economic successes and the coup government's failure," the article did not even attempt 

even-handed reporting. 147 

AI-Jazeera also voiced full-throated suppmi for other Brotherhood branches during the Arab 

Spring, such as Tunisia. 148 Qatar is, not surprisingly, presumed to be the main sponsor of Tunisia's 

Ennahda party. As one author notes, ·'the tact that Prime Minister Rashid ai-Ghannouchi's first 

post-election intemational visit was to Qatar-and that his son-in-law, fonnerly a researcher f()r 

AI Jazeera in Doha, became his Foreign Minister-has further stoked suspicions about ties 

between the Gulf emirate and the Ennahda party." 149 A 2012 report from the Tunisian Court of 

Auditors even raised "pointed questions" about the provenance ofEnnahda's funding- suggesting 

Qatari support. 1 50 

Cooperation between Qatar and Tunisia grew between 2011 and 2013, when Tunisia was ruled by 

the Ennahda-led coalition. Fonner Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani inked ten agreements with 

Tunisia, spanning investments, construction, oil and gas, and more. 151 The Tunisian Ministry of 

Defense even sent its anned forces to join military drills in Qatar, and Qatar gave vehicles to 

Tunisia's army. Qatar's standing in Tunisia grew somewhat wobbly after the Ennahda pa~iy's 

prime minister resigned in 2014. But in 2016, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad was the only foreign 

head of state to attend the Tunisia 2020 investment conference, where he pledged an aid package 

of $1.25 billion to Tunis while Qatar's ambassador to the country signed an extra $2.2 million 

check to cover the conference's costs. 152 

Likewise, Doha has been a longtime supporter of Yemen's al-lslah. Anti-govemmcnt protests 

supported by ai-Islah in 2011 often featured signs thanking Qatar for its backing ofYemen's Arab 

Spring movemcnt. 153 Fonner President Ali Abdullah Saleh famously took a shot at Qatari support 

for al-lslah in a 2011 speech, in which he declared, "We derive our legitimacy from the stren~o>th 

of our glorious Yemeni people, not from Qatar." 154 

147 "y~~l 4.... ~ J.-..d 3 ~.)~)11 ~yo ~lj\.~J! (Morsi's economic successes and the failure of the coup go•vernment 

AI-Jazecra September 10,2013. \ill.!JL-"'c=~!!cs=hll\:LD~:o_\:!W.!IJ<;~;.<JJ.L:CJJL::~-:':".!:.::.==:'d.±:: 

Osman, "Qatar partner in Tunisia's democratic transition, 

lhc Peninsula (Qatar), December 3. 2016. (hJill;O:__:;~'l:J]l!;;r'<lli!L!.!O!lli!!J.i!J!lLS;QJIIJ![lli.],;JllJ2.;~hllmil£:!1illl.!l£J::.u.t 

Youssef Cherif, "Tunisia's Fledgling Gulf Relations," Carnegie Endmvmentfor International Peace, January 17, 

2017. (http:.· carncuicendm.vmcnt.onz sada 67703) 153 Adam Baron, "Qatar's Dispute with Neighbors Reverberates in Yemen." Arab UulfStates Institute in 

Washington, July 19, 2017. (http: \HV\V.<H!~i\\ .om qatars-dispute-\vith-11<2"ighbors-re\erberates-in-vemen) 154 Manuel Almeida, "What Qatar's role in Yemen tells about the Gulf crisis," Arab News (Saudi Arabia), June 16, 

2017. (http: ·w\\w.arabne\v:-..com 0!-)'-k LU.Jl~llil) 

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Qatari backing for Libya's Islamists is also well documented. During the Libyan revolution, Qatar 

sent hundreds of troops to the frontlines. 155 This may explain, in part, why rebels raised the Qatari 

flag in Tripoli after the fall of the Gaddafi regime. 156 According to Kristian Coates Ulrichsen of 

the Baker Institute for Public Policy. "Qatar developed close links with key lslamist militia 

commanders [in Libya] such as Abdelhakim Bclhadj, once the head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting 

Group and, in 201 I. the commander of the Tripoli Brigade." 157 A March 2013 UN report noted 

that in 2011 and 2012, Qatar violated the UN anns embargo by '·providing military materiel to the 

revolutionary forces through the organization of a large number of flights and the deliveries of a 

range of arms and ammunition." 158 And according to another report in the Egyptian al-Masry alYoum, Doha has provided more than 750 million euros ($890 million) to extremist groups in Libya 

since 201 L 159 Arab intelligence officials believe that this assistance arrives in Westem Libya by 

way of a commercial airline bankrolled by Qatar. 160 

In June of last year, the Libyan National Anny (LNA) held a press conference alleging proof of 

Qatar's malign role in Libya. The LNA charged that Qatari intelligence services supported alQaeda, the Islamic State, and the Muslim Brotherhood by transferring $8 billion from the Qatari 

Tunisian National Bank to the Housing Bank ofTataouine Govcmorate in southem Tunisia. 161 

And while that may be difficult to prove, Qatar's funding of Palestinian Hamas is well known. 

Fonner Emir Hamad pledged $400 million to the group in 2012. 162 His son, Emir Tamim, pledged 

$100 million in 2017163 llamas' fotmer leader, Khaled Meshaal, calls Doha home, as well as 

Hamas spokesman Ezzat Rishq and others. 164 Qatar served as llamas' primary advocate, alongside 

Turkey, during the 2014 rocket war with lsrael. 165 

This is just a sample of the support that Qatar provides to Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups. 

155 Ian Black, "Qatar admits sending hundreds of troops to support Libya rebels," 77Ie Guardian (UK), October 26, 

2011. (http,.;: \\ \V\\ .thev.uardian.cGm world 20 LLQ~L2fL9.atar-ttoi)QS-!lhva-rebcb-:mpport) 

156 Habib ToumL ·•Raising of Qatar's flag in Libya \vas an eerie moment," GulfNevvs (UAE), June 12, 2017. 

(b!J.n":. ~ulft1C\\':-;.com news. ~ulf qatar rabmg-of-qatar-s-flag-in-libva-\va:hm-cerie-momcnt-1.2042345) 157 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arah Ernirates: Power, Politics and Policy-}vfaking, (New York: 

Routledge, 20 17). (l:!l.u:!i;__ tinvurl.s;Q!1LY.nJ.b.:x2.fD 158 United Nations Security Council, "Final rep0!1 of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution !973 

(20 ll) concerning Libya," S/20 13/99, March 9, 2013. \lHW~'--"'..=~Dlllfr"!ltm:.WS'JllillQQ!.JllL£L.:=!i!llli~t.:il:1.c 

Schanzcr, "By hosting Hamas, Qatar is whitewashing terror,'' Nevvsn·eck, r-.1ay 11, 

2017. (h!~V\\W.nt:ws\\\:?~kcom qatar-hostml!-hamas-~vhlttl.\\ashmv.-temJr-606?50) 

164 Richard Min iter, "Why is our ally Qatar hosting terrorists like Ham as?" Forbes, April 28. 2017. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 22 www.defenddemocracy.org 
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Jonathan Schanzer July II, 2018 

I testified last year about the oveti and tacit support that Doha has provided to terrorist groups like 

al-Qaeda, the Tali ban, and others. 1 66 

Recommendations 

Chainnan DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, crafting a sensible policy to address the challenge 

of the Muslim Brotherhood is not easy. The factions vary in their tics to violence and terrorism. 

And their backers are U.S. allies. I offer four recommendations to this committee: 

I. Designate the violent actors while keeping a close eve on non-violent ones: Do not 

waste valuable U.S. government resources trying to designate the entire Brotherhood or its 

more political factions. Focus on the factions that have a demonstrable record of violence 

and terrorism finance. Successful individual designations should be seen as pragmatic steps 

toward the larger goal of both blocking the terrorism finance intermingled within the 

broader network, and messaging to the broader Muslim world that the Brotherhood remains 

a breeding ground for extremism. In the meantime, keep an eye on the other factions. The 

makeup of these groups can change quickly, presenting new opportunities for designation. 

2. Usc Treasurv's financial warfare tools to reinforce existing designations: Hamas, 

Hasm, and Liwa al-Thawra arc already designated. So are a number ofHamas officials, as 

well as al-lslah's Abdul Majid al-Zindani. Treasury should continue to monitor the groups 

and designated entities that provide suppmi to their terrorist operations. Such designations 

are bureaucratically easier to achieve, given that they arc already in the system. 

Designations of new entities can often take longer, and get caught up in the red tape of the 

inter-agency process. 

3. Deter Turkcv and Qatar: Financial and logistical suppoti funneled to various 

Brotherhood figures and local branches undermine the work of the U.S., our European 

allies, and other actors in the battle of ideas. The U.S. should emphasize this to Doha and 

Ankara. Washington should make it clear to both countries that investment ties, military 

sales, and security benefits could be in jeopardy if such support continues. 

4. Support the House NDAA Provision Calling for a Report on the Muslim 

Brotherhood: 167 It is important for the U.S. govemment to conduct its own assessment of 

the organization, and to assemble a strategy for addressing an influential global movement 

whose various branches promote a radical and ultimately violent ideology, even when some 

are not directly engaged in terrorism. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to your questions. 

166 Jonathan Schanzer, "Assessing the US-Qatar Relationship," Testimony hefore the House Foreign AflGirs 

Committee, Subcommiltec on the Afiddle East and North A/ika, July 26, 2017. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 
40 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Dr. Jasser, you’re up for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF M. ZUHDI JASSER 

Dr. JASSER. Thank you, Chairman DeSantis and Ranking Member Lynch and other members of the House Subcommittee on National Security, for holding a very important hearing on the Muslim Brotherhood’s global threat. 

Our American Islamic Forum for Democracy is a counter-Islamist 

American Muslim think tank and activist based in Phoenix, Arizona. 

I ask that my full written testimony be placed into the record. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Without objection. 

Dr. JASSER. I am here today because as an American Muslim I 

have dedicated my life to American security and freedom, not only 

with 11 years in the U.S. Navy, but since 9/11 formally countering 

the oppressive and radicalizing influence of Islamist groups in the 

West upon our communities. 

No group embodies the threat of the radical Islamists more than 

Muslim Brotherhood, or in Arabic, Ikhwan al-Muslimin. The Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization. Help us modern-minded, secular, liberal Muslims marginalize their influence by declaring what they are: a terrorist organization. Unfortunately, much of 

the conversation about the Brotherhood has been obstructed, 

muted, marginalized, deferred, minimized by the Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers or their allies here in the West. 

I have to tell you, in my heart of hearts, I think those who give 

the Ikhwan excuses—either say they are not monolithic, they are 

democratic, they are nonviolent, they have branches—must really 

believe that our entire faith of Islam, my faith, is just shades of oppressiveness of theocracy, so we have to tolerate the nonviolent 

theocrats. 

Somehow, we Muslims are since terminally having to accept the 

leadership and control of the global network of the terrorists of the 

Muslim Brotherhood. 

In point of fact, nothing would be more pro-Muslim than the 

marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood and its direct affiliates. 

Making the Muslim Brotherhood radioactive would allow the light 

to shine upon the most potent antagonists in Muslim communities: 

those who reject political Islamist groups and believe in liberty and 

the separation of mosque and state. 

In my short time I wanted to quick paint two pictures for you. 

First, this diagram. It may be hard to read. But bottom line, just 

so we understand what we are talking about, the Muslim Brotherhood, if you look at the top there, 1.6 billion Muslims, I think you 

can divide them politically into Islamists, who believe in Islamic 

states, and secularists. 

Under the Islamists, you’ve got Sunni and Shia strains. All Muslims have two major sects, if not more. There are other heterogeneous sects. But 90 percent are Sunni, 10 percent are Shia. 

Within the Sunni stream of Islam are political Islamist groups, like 

the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, and Jamaat e-Islami in Pakistan. 


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The Brotherhood has offshoots of terror groups, and the nonviolent group, I believe, gives cover to the Muslim Brotherhood terror groups, if you will. 

So that just sort of lays it out as being a strain of Sunni Islam. 

I think that’s important because if we start this project by labeling 

the Muslim Brotherhood factions in various countries terror 

groups, I think it also then should not give a pass to the 

Khomeinists in Iran, to other strains, the Salafi jihadis, ISIS, et 

cetera. So just so you understand where they fit. 

The next slide looks at the logo. And I think it’s important to understand what they are. They have not changed their logo. And at 

the bottom, under those swords, which are not peaceful, that are 

not violent symbol, it says wei du(ph). 

And wei du (ph) is from chapter 8, verse 16 of the Koran, and 

it says ‘‘make ready.’’ And it’s not the Boy Scouts’ ‘‘be prepared, 

make ready.’’ This is a passage in the Koran that refers specifically 

to battle and preparing for militancy. This, despite them coming to 

power in Tunisia and Egypt and elsewhere, they never change the 

symbol and what they are. 

Thank you for those slides. 

al-Banna and Qutb, as you’ve heard before me, put forth the notion that Islam is all-encompassing for society. And if you look at 

the motto it says, as has been pointed out, that death for the sake 

of God is their highest aspiration. 

So let’s define a terror group. Terror group means that the actors 

use any possible targeting of noncombatants or even combatants 

outside the rules of war in order to advance their supremacist hegemonic aspirations. 

The Muslim Brotherhood has never condemned theologically or 

ideologically the use of terrorism. And if they have it’s been a 

cover, since they’ve reverted to that repeatedly. 

Now, Muslims are not monolithic. But the Brotherhood, whether 

it’s 1.0 or 9.0, in the last 90 years is monolithic, and trying to say 

it’s not monolithic is dancing on the head of an pin. 

Like the Cold War, communism was a cancer, but the war was 

against Soviet communism. Here, Islamism is the cancer within 

our faith communities, but the war is against the Ikhwan. 

We need to be on the offense, and for too long we’ve been on the 

defense worried about what the reactions will be. And ultimately 

I see that concern, that defensiveness on the American posture 

about naming the Brotherhood a terrorist organization, as at best 

a form of bigotry of low expectations when it comes to Muslims. 

The common enemy theory, saying that, well, the Brotherhood 

has a common enemy with us against ISIS and al-Qaida, is offensive to me, not only as an American, but as a Muslim. I hear the 

same thing in saying that we should support genocidal tyrants like 

Assad because they have common enemies with us against ISIS. 

Many people try to separate the central elements of these parties 

from the militant terrorist progeny. Recep Erdogan, the head of the 

Muslim Brotherhood group in Turkey, also known as the AKP, 

said: Democracy is like a train; we ride it until we get where we 

want to go and then we get off. 

It is time that we made them radioactive. And I detail in my testimony all of the connections, the revolving door between various 


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al-Qaida groups, humanitarian organizations in the West and in 

the Middle East. 

The Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood said just in 2010, 

long after the 1970s in which they supposedly condemned violence, 

he said: Resistance is the solution against Zio-American arrogance 

and tyranny. The resistance can come from fighting and understanding—this is from Mohammed Badie, the head of the Brotherhood in Egypt, this is 2010, basically reiterating the declaration of 

war that Osama bin Laden said in the 1990s. There is no coincidence that there is a revolving door between leaders of al-Qaida 

and the Muslim Brotherhood. 

I think, as has been said before, we begin pegging off various 

groups, terrorist groups from Syria, to Libya, to Yemen, to Kuwait, 

and on, and then ultimately that will begin to cut the funneling of 

money, funneling of ideas into other Muslim Brotherhood groups in 

the West. 

So my final recommendations, Chairman, is to, one, designate 

the MB a foreign terrorist organizations beginning in Egypt, and 

then on a country-country basis in Libya, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan, 

and Yemen. 

Call on American Muslim leaders to take a position on the Muslim Brotherhood and its overarching theo-political ideology. I ask 

my fellow Muslims: Will they be the side of freedom, liberty, and 

modernity, or will they be on the side of tyranny of the Muslim 

Brotherhood, Turkey’s AKP, the Iranian Khomeinists, or Pakistan’s 

Jamaat e-Islami? 

Develop foreign policy mechanisms to disincentivize Qatari and 

Turkish Government facilitation of the Brotherhood and ultimately 

think about suspending Turkey from NATO. 

Use the MB designation as a template to transition immediately 

from the currently useless ideological center of CVE, countering 

violent extremism, to the more practical one of countering 

Islamism. 

And please stop engaging Muslim Brotherhood legacy groups in 

government, media, and NGOs, and recognize their Islamist terrorist sympathies. 

Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Dr. Jasser follows:] 


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TESTIMONY for Hearing before: 

The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National 

Security 

"The Muslim Brotherhood's Global Threat" 

Submitted by Dr. M. ZUHDI JASSER 

PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ISLAMIC FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY 

July 11, 2018 

Introduction: Thank you Chairman DeSantis and members of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform Subcommittee on National Security for holding this very important hearing on "The Muslim Brotherhood's 

Global Threat." I am Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser, President and founder of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD) 

based in Phoenix, Arizona. I am here today, because as an American Muslim, I have dedicated my life to countering 

the oppressive and radicalizing influence of Isla mist groups in the West upon our communities. No group embodies 

the threat of radical lslamism more than the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and no group runs deeper into the 

consciousness of global Islam ism, especially in our Arab Sunni communities than the Muslim Brotherhood and its 

global network of affiliates and progeny across the world. Unfortunately, much of the conversation about the Muslim 

Brotherhood has been obstructed, muffled, marginalized, deferred, or minimized by Muslim Brotherhood 

sympathizers or their allies. 

As a devout Muslim who loves my faith, and loves my nation, the avoidance behavior of confronting the Muslim 

Brotherhood is a major obstacle to our national security and harmony. This has stemmed from a bigger policy to deemphasize "radical Islam" and the "Isla mist" root cause of globallslamist terror. There is no better place to begin an 

honest conversation about the Isla mist threat imposed upon our nation than a focus on the Muslim Brotherhood. A 

denial of the truth about the Muslim Brotherhood has actually emboldened extremists on both sides of this debate: 

both radicallslamists and anti-Muslim fascists. In fact, nothing would be more pro-Muslim than the marginalization 

of the Muslim Brotherhood and its direct affiliates. Making the Muslim Brotherhood radioactive would allow the 

light to shine upon their most potent antagonists in Muslim communities-those who reject political Islam and 

believe in liberty and the separation of mosque and state. 

Since 9/11 the discussion of the global security threat of the Muslim Brotherhood has sadly and noticeably 

demonstrated our national disfunction in addressing the depth of the real threat of radical Islam and more 

specifically the threat of lslamism (aka, political Islam). Our negligence, ignorance, and distraction has enabled 

groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to take advantage of our unprecedented freedoms and excessively thrive in a 

manner frankly often not possible anywhere else in the world. It seems that almost every discussion about Muslims 

and Islam looks at our communities, organizations, faith, and movements through a binary lens of good or bad, ally 

or enemy. The reality is that it is far more complicated and yes, at times, nuanced. 

As we take a look at the Muslim Brotherhood, I will lay out for you their origins, history, networks, ideologies, and 

direct connections to terrorism. 

Neither Islam nor Muslims are monolithic and should not be treated as such by anyone- much less our government 

and media. Please understand, it is as equally foolhardy in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization work to 

refuse to acknowledge the role of political islam in the threat as it is to villainize the whole of Islam and all Muslims. 

The majority of Americans are smart enough to understand that truthfully identifying the Muslim Brotherhood as a 

radical terror organization does not demonize all or even most Muslims. In fact, identifying the primary cancer cell(s) 

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of global radical lslamism will go a long way towards beginning to assuage the fears of concerned Americans. Any 

gross generalization either way is dangerous. 

Stating the House of "Islam has no problems" is just as problematic as declaring that "islam and all Muslims are the 

problem." I am here to tell you that our national security policy of refusing to say that "Islam currently has a problem" 

is dangerous. This surrender, which began just after 9·11, has chartered a course towards failure. It has hamstrung 

our homeland security heroes from addressing any of the most centrallslamist precursors of militant Isla mists. If the 

agency actually emphasized the central role of radicallslamism and its attendant theo·political ideologies of groups 

like the Muslim Brotherhood, it would shift the entire axis of our agency apparatus toward once and for all beginning 

to actually address the root cause of the theocratic strains of Islam (or lslamism), which would begin to make us 

safer. So·called Violent Extremism (VE) is simply an endpoint of a common supremacist ideology that is innately 

theo·political and is a radicalization process that occurs over months to years and is far easier to publicly monitor 

than waiting for guess work on "Violent Extremism". There is no better representative of an organization with global 

reach that endlessly produces Isla mist terror progeny than the Brotherhood. 

Almost 17 years after 9/11, it is not too late to begin correcting this wrong·headed policy. The best place to begin 

this course correction is in our approach towards the Muslim Brotherhood. Those who say that an honest 

identification of the radicalism behind membership and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood would enflame 

Brotherhood sympathizers both ignore the successes of Muslim Brotherhood's global project during the past two 

decades (if not the last century), and they use the very evidence that the Brotherhood are militant Isla mists to argue 

against us identifying them as a threat. It also presumes that the United States is afraid of facing terror groups and 

their sympathizers due to their radicalization. It also presumes that the United States national security policy should 

forever remain in a posture of defense against the Muslim Brotherhood rather than one of an offense. 

Background on AIFD, The Muslim Reform Movement and Important Terminology 

Our American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD) was founded in 2003 in the wake of the horrific attacks of 

September 11. For us it is a very personal mission to leave our American Muslim children a legacy that their faith is 

based in the unalienable right to liberty and to teach them that the principles that founded America do not contradict 

their faith but strengthen it. AIFD's founding principle is that we as Muslims can best practice our faith in a society 

like the United States that guarantees the rights of every individual under God but blind to any one faith with no 

governmental intermediary stepping between the individual and the creator to interpret the will of God. Because of 

this, our mission is explicitly to advocate for the principles of the Constitution of the United States of America, liberty 

and freedom through the separation of mosque and state. Thus, our mission is directly intended to counter the global 

Isla mist project through the advancement of the ideas of freedom and liberty and deconstruct the ideas of Isla mist 

theocracy much along the lines of America's founding fathers. We believe that this mission from within the "House 

of Islam" is the only way to inoculate Muslim youth and young adults against radicalization. The "Liberty narrative" 

is the only effective counter to the "lslamist narrative." 

AIFD is the most prominent American Muslim organization directly confronting and attempting to reform against 

the ideas of political Islam and its global byproducts embodied in groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. We believe 

Muslims can openly counter the common belief that the Muslim faith is inextricably rooted to the concept of the 

Islamic state (lslamism). We reject the stranglehold which the Muslim Brotherhood, its establishment, and its 

affiliates have on our communities. AIFD's mission is derived from a love for America and a love of our faith of Islam. 

The theocratic "Islamic" regimes of the Middle East and many Muslim majority nations use their interpretations of 

Islam and 'shar'ia' as a way to control Muslim populations. Similarly, Isla mist movements and their political parties 

like the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the Khomeinists of Iran, and the Jamaat e·lslami of Pakistan use their 

liberation theology to repress vulnerable populations and fuel countless militant lslamist offshoots. Many people try 

to separate the central elements of these parties from their militant terrorist progeny. However, that separation is 

exactly the deception with which theo·politicallslamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood try to advance. As 

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Recip Erdogan, the President of Turkey, has infamously said about democracy, "it is a train that we ride until we get 

where we need to get and then we get off." 

AIFD was founded on the premise that the root cause of lslamist terrorism is the ideology of political Islam and a 

belief in the preference for and supremacy of an Islamic state and its attendant global union in a caliphate. Terrorism 

is but a means to that end. Most lslamist terror is driven by the desire of Isla mists to drive the influence of the west 

(the ideas of liberty) out of the Muslim consciousness and Muslim majority societies. With almost a quarter of the 

world's population Muslim, American security will never be sustained until Muslims understand and embrace the 

ideas of liberty and non-Muslims understand the perils of political Islam. This will happen neither without identifying 

the enemy: radicallslamism nor without identifying our allies: Muslims who believe in liberty and reject theocracy. 

At the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD), we constantly ask that Americans not just observe what is 

happening inside the House of Islam but that you take the sides of the reformers, dissidents, and secularists against 

the theocratic Isla mists like the Muslim Brotherhood. There is no better time than now, for the United States to 

declare its support for freedom loving Muslims by calling out one of the most insidious and dangerous terror threats 

within global Muslim communities-the Muslim Brotherhood. 

AIFD most recently convened and helped launch the Muslim Reform Movement (MRM) in December 2015 in 

Washington D.C. 1 The Muslim Reform Movement is a coalition of over 15 Western Muslim Leaders (from the U.S., 

Canada, and Europe) whose goal is to actively fight radical Islam from inside by confronting the idea of lslamism 

at its roots. The MRM has written a Declaration for Muslim Reform, a living document which was presented 

to all Islamic organizations, leaders and mosques across the U.S. in 2016 (Appendix 1), with hopes of using 

its principles as a firewall to clearly separate radical Isla mists (like the Muslim Brotherhood) from Muslims 

who believe in universal human rights. 2 

Not one iota of this work is possible in an environment where government agencies and the American public 

writ large are unwilling to call out influential groups like the Muslim Brotherhood as theocrats and terrorists 

while engaging other reform minded, modernists with diverse interpretations of core terms, ideas, and 

movements. Any attempts and policies to protect the Muslim Brotherhood as somehow a group that can 

evolve within a climate of democracy belies their 90-year history and continues to hand them dominion 

over Muslim leadership, tribalism, and their 'establishment'. 

Islamic ideological Framework and the Muslim Brotherhood 

Our founding fathers were able to navigate a war of ideas against theocracy. We can do it again in the 21" 

century with Islam. It is absurd to assert that just because the Muslim Brotherhood is an ls!amist group 

which uses its interpretation of the faith of Islam as a basis for its rule, that the United States cannot wage 

a battle against lslamist theocrats while cherishing Muslim liberals, modernists and critical thinkers. We 

have for too long been playing a "whack-a-mole" program against byproducts of Muslim Brotherhood 

ideologues rather than directly countering the primary cancer cells of the Muslim Brotherhood operations. 

In order to understand the Muslim Brotherhood, the following terms and ideas must become part of the 

fair domain of our national security agencies. Our agency analysts and government experts are both smart 

and fair enough to know that each of these terms carries with it a diverse set of interpretations from within 

the 'House of Islam' and that suppressing this essential debate hands the debate to our lslamist enemies. 1 

submit the following terms and proposed definitions for the record in hopes that other government 

1 Press Conference of the Launch of the Muslim Reform Movement, National Press Club, December 4, 2015: 

https://youtu.be/x1Anr8bllr8 

2 Declaration of the Muslim Reform Movement. Washington, D.C. December 4, 2015. 

I 

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agencies follow suit and rather than engaging Isla mist apologists who obstruct and deny, that they instead 

begin engaging honest Muslims who are ready to confront the global radical movements that use them: 

A. Islam: the faith tradition, its practice, and scriptures identified by over 1.6 billion Muslims 

in the world. 

B. Islam ism and lslamists: the thea-political movement (lslamism) or party and its adherents 

(Isla mists) who seek to establish Islamic states governed by shar'ia law in Muslim majority nations 

and institutions. Muslim Brotherhood members are lslamists. 

C. Shar'ia: Islamic theological jurisprudence as interpreted by Muslim jurists and clerics and 

practiced by Muslims. The legal instrument of Isla mist theocrats. 

D. Jihad: a holy war or armed struggle against unbelievers or enemies of an Islamic state. It 

can also mean spiritual struggle within oneself against sin. 

E. Wahhabism: a Sunni Jslamist movement based in a puritanical literalism and intolerance 

of any other interpretations or faith. A revivalist movement originated in the Najd of Arabia in the 

mid-19'" century by Ibn Abdul Wahhab. It is the dominant strain of thought empowered by the 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Its ideas are central to the Salafi-jihadism of groups like Islamic State in 

Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 

F. Salafism: Sunni Islamic fundamentalism which attempts to return normative Muslim 

practices to the literal ways of the Prophet Muhammad in the 7'h century. Salaf literally means 

"companions of the Prophet". It is often synonymous with Wahhabism but is far more ubiquitous. 

Salafism, like Wahhabism deplores invention. 

G. Salafi-jihadism: The expansionist ideology (a combination of Salafism with militant 

jihadism) of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood that seek to create Islamic states and a global 

caliphate. 

H. Caliphate and Caliphism: the thea-political ideology or desire by Isla mists to re-establish 

the caliphate, a globally unified Islamic governance of Islamic states which are led by a single caliph. 

I. Ummah: the entire Muslim Faith community, but it can also mean the Islamic state 

J. Islamic reform, ljtihad: critical interpretation of scripture (exegesis) and Islamic 

jurisprudence in the light of modernity. 

K. Takfir: the rejection ('excommunication') of another Muslim from the faith community. 

The declaration of another Muslim as an apostate. 

Please see the attached diagram to understand where the Muslim Brotherhood fits into various ethnic, 

sectarian, historic, and ideological divisions within the faith. (Appendix 2). 

To think that these words and concepts, and others are off limits in the freest nation on earth, censored to 

our agencies, is just incredulous considering the growing threat we face today from violent lslamism. It 

smacks of a bizarre invocation of blasphemy laws in America. It is groups like the Muslim Brotherhood that 

have benefited from our refusal to discuss these elements of Islam and Islam ism. Violent manifestations of 

each of these above ideas is a natural byproduct of the intolerant non-violent underbelly of thea-political 

autocratic belief systems. Any security apparatus unable or unwilling to connect the dots between the nonviolent and violent manifestations of these ideologies is leaving us bare and will continue to miss the signs 

of radicalization. A designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization will necessitate a 

bring about a long overdue better understanding of these concepts by our security apparatus. 

The latest recommendations from the Homeland Security Advisory Council ignorantly state the exact 

opposite recommending that only "plain American English words" be used and these terms be avoided. 3 

We cannot functionally address the global threat of the Muslim Brotherhood without understanding these 

concepts. 

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I hope and pray that my testimony today about the Muslim Brotherhood will open your eyes to the reality our 

government has been dismissing when it comes to their global threat upon our national security. 

Personally, I will add that we are rendered entirely unarmed in our work at AIFD and in the Muslim Reform 

Movement in America, Canada, and Europe if we cannot engage our own faith community within the House of Islam 

on these ideas and if agencies are too timid to address the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood and its influence in 

radicalizing Muslims across the planet into "Violent lslamism". 4 All of the Muslim leaders in our Muslim Reform 

Movement would agree that looking just at "Violent Extremism" (VE) is too nebulous, nonspecific and will result 

over and over in agency blinders to the attacks we have seen including the radical Isla mist attacks at Fort Hood, 

Boston Marathon, Chattanooga, San Bernardino, and now Orlando. We cannot hold security agencies accountable 

to precursor ideologies and warning signs when those precursors and their groups like the Muslim Brotherhood are 

not identified as real threats. 

History of the Muslim Brotherhood 

We hear many denials all over the map about the Brotherhood threat. From dismissals that the Muslim Brotherhood 

is disorganized, to it is normalized, to it is too weak. We hear uit is not one organization" to "it is nonexistent!/ to "no 

one knows what it actually is" to "it is a legitimate peaceful political party that participates in elections in Egypt and 

Tunisia and elsewhere". On and on. Essentially, it is imperative that we first agree on what the facts are regarding 

the Muslim Brotherhood. 

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928. It expanded rapidly across Egypt upon the ideas of its 

founder Hassan AI-Banna on the premise the Islamic world was declining against Western hegemony. From the 

outset it established a secret apparatus to serve as "defender of the movement against the police and governments 

of Egypt." Another founding father of the Brotherhood lslamist movement, Sayyid Qutb authored the primary 

manifesto of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology Milestones in 1964. This book argued for the establishment of 

Islamic political systems with whatever means necessary most particularly using violent jihad. Having been 

particularly impacted by his impression of freedom in America during his two-year stay at the University of Colorado, 

referred to any part of the world without an Islamic governance as corrupt and ignorant or "jahilliyah". They both 

called for the implementation of traditional and theocratic Islamic society. 

AI-Banna and then Qutb put forth the notion that Islam is all encompassing for society and their motto became and 

remains until today, 11AIIah is our objective_, the Prophet is our Leaders_, the Qur-'an is our constitution~ jihad is our 

way, and death for the sake of God is our highest aspiration." 5 

AI-Banna argues for Islamic liberation theology in a step-wise process from individual_ to family, home, education, 

society, and nation to rid it of foreign domination, political, economic, and spiritual in an Islamic state and its 

caliphate of states in order to master the world. This process begins with the societal 'upbringing' process of children 

also known as-tarbiyah-a program seen in the youth programs of all Muslim Brotherhood indoctrination programs 

including western Brotherhood organizations like the Muslim American Society (MAS). 

For decades the Muslim Brotherhood cut its teeth on its own perennial victimization and repression by severely 

autocratic Arab regimes like the Egyptian dictatorships of Gemal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak as 

well as other Arab regimes that they conveniently associated with secularism even though the distinction between 

Western liberal democratic secularism and Arab tyrannical secularism was intentionally dismissed by them as all 

beingjahilli (ignorant). It is no coincidence that Qutb was not only the founding father ideologically of the Muslim 

Brotherhood but also inspired Osama bin Laden, AI Qaeda leaders, and radical jihadists across the planet. There have 

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been many less frontal more supposedly democratically accommodating descendants of Qutbian ideology. However, 

it's underlying supremacist jihadist mission of its party and secret apparatus never changes. 

Their logo and motto has always been the same. Some apologists try to say that jihad is a greater jihad and not a 

lesser jihad of militant movements. In fact, the founder, Hassan ai·Banna, rejected the greater jihad and in his tract 

"On Jihad" said as: " ... Jihad in its literal significance means to put forth one's maximal effort in word and deed, and 

Benessa said in an undated speech in the sacred law it is the slaying of the unbelievers and related connotations, 

such as beating them, plundering their wealth, destroying their shrines and smashing their idols ... It is obligatory on 

us to begin fighting with them after transmitting the invitation to embrace Islam, even if they do not fight against 

us." 6 Thus, terrorism is appropriate when it suits the MB and its affiliates. Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, today's 

contemporary AI·Banna, in his speeches and books, has enlisted the same thought process on salafi·jihadism. 

Moderating the Muslim Brotherhood? 

Robert S. Leiken and Stephen Brooke of the Nixon Center tried to bizarrely argue in 2007 that the Muslim 

Brotherhood could somehow be moderated and be an ally against supposedly more radical groups like AI Qaeda and 

against other common more radical enemies like Iran. 7 They famously argued that American policy should be to find 

the moderates within the Muslim Brotherhood and use them rather than avoid them. As Muslim brotherhood 

expert, Eric Trager points out in his book, Arab Fall, Mark Lynch even "went further to say that the Muslim 

brotherhood could serve as a firewall' against AI Qaeda style radicalism." He further noted that Lynch said its 

organization "allows it to effectively monitor and control social space through mosques, charities, organizational 

networks, and widespread networks adding that the brotherhood's presence in religious institutions made it a more 

effective counter to jihadis than domestic intelligence agencies or non·lslamists neither of which could penetrate the 

religious sphere.N 8 9 

It is unfathomable that D.C. thought leaders were convincing Americans that the mothership of Sunni Muslim 

radicalization would be our ally only because it was positioned so centrally within the Muslim theological network 

of Egypt and other Muslim states and communities. It is a "bigotry of low expectations" that caters only to the 

existing Islamic establishment at the expense of Muslims and all the vulnerable populations under the boots of 

Isla mists. In fact, in D.C. its very cancerous network became the reported reason for which we should tolerate and 

turn a blind eye to supposedly "minority radical offshoots" rather than treat the primary cancer of the Muslim 

Brotherhood itself. Put another way. According to voices of policy makers sympathetic to Muslim Brotherhood 

Isla mists, the alternative to trying to defeat the Muslim Brotherhood is allying with the radical global terrorist group 

in the hope of somehow sharing some goals. I find that very premise deeply offensive both as an American and as a 

Muslim. 

There was also a growing false premise that the Brotherhood had rejected violence and accepted electoral politics, 

political parties and nonviolence. Many in the West even wanted to believe that they had rejected Qutbism. 

However, none of these statements, which were fa<;ades, were joined with theological and ideological reform and 

rejection of core lslamism. Trager summarized that: "The Brotherhood's autocratic behavior in power (after 2011) 

discredited the moderate Muslim Brotherhood argument to a great extent and not because the Brotherhood's 

behavior or goals fundamentally changed once it became Egypt's ruling party as some have argued. Rather those 

6 Majmuat Rasail Al·lmam al·shahid Hasan Al·banna. International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations. pp. 

238 https :1/www. i nvestigativeproject. o rg/ documents{ m isc/837. pdf#pag e~ 239 7 RobertS. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (March·April 

2007), 108, 113. 

8 Marc Lynch, "Assessing the MB Firewall" Abu Aardvark, May 13, 2008, 

{http://abuaardvark.typepad.com{abuaardvark/2008{05{assessing·the·m.html) 

9 Eric Trager. Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days. Georgetown University 

Press. Washington, D.C. pp. 41. 

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who touted the Brotherhood's moderation mistakenly privileged the group's political tactics which have shifted over 

time in their analysis while downplaying the totalitarian and anti-Western goals that have defined the brotherhood 

since its founding. 10 ~~In short~ the MusUm Brotherhood was never a moderate organization or a democratic one in 

any sense of that word. It is a rigidly hierarchical, purpose driven vanguard that seeks total control over its members 

so that they can mobilize them for empowering Hassan ai-Banna's deeply politicized interpretation of Islam as on all 

embracing concept. It accepts electoral Institutions as a mechanism for winning power but Its ultimate goal is 

theocratic: it seeks to establish an Islamic state and ultimately establish a global Islamic state that will challenge the 

West. And following Mubarak's ouster it was the only political group in Egypt with a nationwide political machine. 

The brotherhood therefore had an unprecedented opportunity to finally transition from spreading its message within 

Egyptian society to pursuing power outright"11 

Simply put: there is no 'moderate' Muslim brotherhood; that is a misnomer. Every arm of the organization goes 

towards the purpose of supporting its central primary mission of Isla mist hegemony and rule. 

The Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization 

Prior to the Arab Awakening in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership often made no qualms about supporting 

the goals of AI Qaeda. In September 2010 the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Badie, 

delivered a weekly sermon mirroring the ideological themes of AI-Qaeda's August 1996 declaration of war against 

the United States. Calling on Arab and Muslim regimes to confront not just Israel, but also the U.S., he declared that 

"Resistance is the only solution against the Zio-American arrogance and tyranny." This "resistance" can only come 

from fighting and understanding "that the improvement and change that the [Muslim] nation seeks can only be 

attained through jihad and sacrifice and by raising a jihad! generation that pursues death just as the enemies pursue 

life." He also predicted the imminent downfall of the U.S., saying, "The U.S. is now experiencing the beginning of its 

end, and is heading towards its demise. " 12 Barry Rubin remarked, "The Muslim Brotherhood' s leader has endorsed 

anti-American jihad and a view virtually identical to ai-Qaida ' s ideology. Since the Brotherhood is the main 

opposition in Egypt and Jordan and the mast powerful group in Muslim communities of Europe and North America, 

this is serious stuff" ... "it was a declaration of war that went unnoticed. The Muslim Brotherhood recently called for 

jihad on the U.S. and Israel, adopting a view almost identical to AI-Qaeda's."13 

For any naysayers over the years, the Muslim Brotherhood's recent period of rule of the Egyptian government of 17 

months that came to an end in June 2013 proved that it was not a functional moderate democratic organization but 

rather a radical militant lslamist organization which produced and continues to produce many terrorist offshoots in 

their network of organizations and individuals. At some point every honest analyst will need to recognize that the 

fruit of the poisoned tree will never be acceptable, and it is the Brotherhood's tree which is the primary problem in 

the Arab Sunni world and not just its "whack a mole" byproducts. 

We have learned many lessons from the revolutions of the Arab Awakening in 2011. Most significant of those is how 

directly related the Muslim Brotherhood is to almost every Sunni radical Isla mist group in the region. There was 

direct communication between Pres. Mohammed Morsi and AI Qaeda leader Ayman AI-Zawahiri according to a 

10 Erick Trager. Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days. Georgetown University 

Press. Washington, D.C. pp. 44. 11 Eric Trager. Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood won and lost Egypt in 891 Days. Georgetown University 

Press. Washington, D.C. pp. 54. 12 Dispatch 3274. Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide: 'The U.S. is Now Experiencing the Beginning of Its End': 

Improvement and Change in the Muslim World 'Can Only Be Attained through Jihad And Sacrifice. MEMRI. October 

6, 2010. 13 Barry Rubin. The Region: The Declaration of War that went Unnoticed. JPost. 23:29. October 10, 2010 

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November 22, 2013 article in Egypt's AI-Watan newspaper. Morsi allegedly agreed to grant a presidential pardon to 

over 20 terrorists including one of the lotteries childhood friends who was running Ansar Bayt-ai-Maqdis, an ISIS 

branch in the Sinai. 14 Morsi's brother actually mediated the initial contacts between AI-Zawahiri and Morsi himself. 

In a telling confluence of ideologies and strategies, AI-Zawahiri told Morsi, "Rule by God'slaw for us to stand beside 

you, there is no so-called democracy, then get rid of your opponents," according to the EI-Watan transcript. The AI 

Qaeda militants also even agreed at a remote border area training camps with common personnel to defend the 

Brotherhood regime. For those who question the veracity of these accounts, there is no doubt that attacks in the 

Sinai increased following Morsi's fall from power. And Brotherhood leader Mohammed ei-Beltagy following Morsi's 

deposition said that attacks in the Sinai would stop the second president Morsi is reinstated"" Ansar Beit ai-Maqdis, 

the group responsible for most of the attacks, belonged to ai-Qaida before joining the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014. 

Reports indicate that Ansar Beit ai-Maqdis was "structurally" tied with the MB. 

On January 27, 2015, the Muslim Brotherhood published on their official lkhwanonline.com website an 

announcement that the organization was entering a "new phase" and calling its followers to prepare for a "long, 

uncompromising jihad" against the Egyptian government. The statement also positively recalled the Muslim 

Brotherhood's terrorist past, including the operations of the "secret apparatus" terror wing active in the 1940s and 

19SOs, and the group's battalions organized by Brotherhood founder Hassan ai-Banna that fought against Israel 

during its War of Independence in 1948. 16 Since Aug 2013, Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt have been killed 

in firefights during attacks on police and military targets, and during the manufacture and placement of explosives 

for acts of terrorism. There were innumerable calls for violence in '14-'1S by the leadership of the Muslim 

Brotherhood including calling for retribution and beheadings from rotten bodies. Coptic Christians faced ongoing 

violence from vigilante Muslim extremists, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of whom acted 

with impunity. Attacks included 70 churches and more than 1,000 homes and businesses of Coptic families torched 

in the ensuing violence. During the Muslim Brotherhood protests, direct incitement towards the Copts was 

repeatedly reported from leading Muslim Brotherhood figures, and since the protest dispersal this targeting of the 

Christian community continues in official statements on Muslim Brotherhood social media outlets and from its 

leadership. As the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom {USCIRF) has previously noted, this 

terror campaign by the Muslim Brotherhood is not a new development. Over the past decade violence by the Muslim 

Brotherhood has been directed at the Coptic community, as it observed back in its 2003 Annual Report. 17 MB Sheikh 

Essam Telemeh said if police detain your family you should organize and kidnap their family as hostages. 18 A senior 

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader, Ashraf Abdel Ghaffar, gave a July 3, 201S interview where he defended the 

sabotage of power stations and high voltage pylons targeting Egyptian citizens by the Muslim Brotherhood as 

punishment for support of the Egyptian government. 19 Then, On May 27, 201S, a group of 1S9 Muslim Brotherhoodassociated scholars from 3S nations announced the publication of a document endorsing violence in Egypt in 

response to a "war against Islam's principles." Specifically, Article 4 of the "Call to Egypt" calls for "retribution 

punishment 11 against government officials, judges, police, soldiers, religious officials, and media personalities backing 

the government. 20 The document was affirmed by the Muslim Brotherhood in an English-language statement 

published on their official website. 21 

I served on USCIRF from 2012 to 2016 and visited Egypt in 2013 when the Muslim Brotherhood was in control of 

government. I was not only struck by their inability to rule but by their monocular lslamist lens with which they 

14 John Rossomondo. "Emails show Clinton was Told about MB-AQ Links".IPT News. May 2, 2016. 15 John Rossomondo. "Em ails show Clinton was Told about MB-AQ Links".IPT News. May 2, 2016. 

16 Adam Kredo. Open Jihad Declared in Egypt Following State Dept. Meeting with Muslim Brothhood-Aiigned 

Leaders. Muslim Brotherhood call for 'long, uncompromising jihad'. January 30, 201S. 

17 USCIRF Annual Report. Egypt: A Country of Particular Concern (CPC}. May 201S. 

18 Patrick Poole. Muslim Brotherhood Steps Up Terror in Egypt, While U.S. Provides Cover. Pl Media. June 2, 201S. 19 Leila Fadel. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Divides over Response to Killings. July 11, 201S. 20 Muslim Brotherhood supports call for retribution. Daily News Egypt. May 31, 201S. 

Muslim Brotherhood Statement Reiterates Commitment to January 25 Revolution Goals. May 29, 201S. 

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viewed Egyptian society, government and the world. I was also struck by the number of American Muslim 

Brotherhood sympathizers who had gone back to help facilitate the Muslim Brotherhood's governance. Even with 

that, they were all quite young and not very interested in making the Constitutional process egalitarian and secular. 

They insisted upon keeping final authority of law with the clerics in determining its adherence to shar'iah. Last, they 

would have nothing with abandoning their motto, symbol and jihadism. 

Furthermore, if not most importantly, the connection between the Muslim Brotherhood, AI Qaeda, ISIS, and other 

radical lslamist groups was noted in a series of emails between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and confidant Sid 

Blumenthal on April 7, 2011. Blumenthal reported at the time that he was directly told by the highest levels that the 

relationship between the MB, AI Qaeda and other radical groups was "complicated"." 

Muslim Brotherhood's Global Threat 

This relationship was also not only limited to Egypt. The Clinton emails describe definitive links between the MB and 

AI Qaeda in Libya as seen for example with Ali AI-Salabi, who founded the AI Qaeda linked Libya national party (LNP). 

AI-Sallabi is described as Qaradawi's man in Libya (Muslim Brotherhood leader Sheikh Yusuf AI-Qaradawi based in 

Qatar since exile from Egypt in 1961). 23 The LNP was dominated by former members of AI-Qaeda linked Libyan 

Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) who maintained ai-Qaeda ties during their struggle with forces of former dictator 

Muammar ai-Qaddafi. Militias of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood joined forces with U.S. designated terrorist 

organizations, particularly Ansar ai-Sharia, as part of the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries and Libya Dawn 

forces fighting against the military forces of the internationally recognized Libyan government. 24 

Similarly in Tunisia, Rached ai-Ghannouchi, head ofTunisia's Brotherhood affiliated Ennahda Party, was allied with 

Ansar ai-Sharia and its late leader, Abu lyadh, a former Bin Laden ally sanctioned by the U.S. after 9/11. Abu lyadh 

was responsible for ai-Qaida's assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Masood two days before the 

attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. 25 

Yemen's MB also has deep connections to AI Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula through Sheikh Abdul Majid ai-Zindani. 

Treasury Department officials described ai-Zindani as a "Bin Laden loyalist" in a 2004 press release. He also helped 

ai-Qaida leader Anwar ai-Awlaki, while serving on the board of the Brotherhood-linked Union of Good, which raises 

funds for Hamas. 26 27 On February 2, 2004, the Treasury Department designated Shaykh AI-Zindani, a leader of the 

Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood's Al-lslah political party, a terrorist. The Treasury Department's designation states that 

ai-Zindani has a "long history of working with Bin Laden, serving as one of his spiritual leaders," in addition to his 

activities in support of AI-Qaeda, including recruiting and procuring weapons. AI-Zindani was also identified in a 

federal lawsuit as a coordinator of the October 2000 suicide attack targeting the U.S.S. Cole in Aden, Yemen that 

killed 17 U.S. Navy sailors, including personally selecting the two suicide bombers. In September 2012, ai-Zindani 

reportedly called for his supporters to kill U.S. Marines stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen. 

Zindani is the personification of the link between elements of the Muslim Brotherhood and AI-Qaeda because 

Zindani has been a leader of the Yemeni Brotherhood's Al-lslah Party, a member of AI~Qaradawi's International 

"John Rossomondo. "Emails show Clinton was Told about MB-AQ links". /PT News. May 2, 2016. 

"Email (February 27, 2011) from Jake Sullivan to Hillary Clinton. Wikileaks. https://wikileaks.org/clintonem a i Is/ e ma i I id/2862 7 

"AI Arabiya Institute for Studies. Libyan Dawn: Map of allies and enemies. A/Arobiya. August 25, 2014. 

Top Tunisian Militant killed by U.S. Strike in Libya. AFP. July 3, 2015. https://tribune.com.ok/story/914209/toptu nisi a n~m il ita nt -killed-by-us-strike-in-libya-report/ 25 U.S. Designates Bin Laden Loyalist. Department of Treasury Press Release. February 24, 2004. 

https ://www. treasury .gov /press-center /pr ess-releases/Pages/js 1190.aspx 

"Abdul Majid AI-Zindani. The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch. https://www.globalmbwatch.com/abd~almajid-al-zindani/ (accessed July 8, 2018). 

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Union of Muslim Scholars, the Union of the Good Hamas fundraising syndicate, and was identified as a mentor of 

Osama Bin Laden and an advisor to AQAP in 2013. Additionally, AI~Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood have also 

used many of the same funding mechanisms, such as the Lugano, Switzerland based AI~Taqwa Bank. 28 

And in what was a significant low point in American foreign policy Blumenthal reported to Clinton that "MB leaders 

were pleased with the results of the discussions with the USG and IMF both of which in the analysis of the MB leaders 

appear to accept the idea of Egypt as an Islamic state". This sentiment from the U.S. continued and was reinforced 

at the 2012 World Economic Forum in Davos. Their entire model for rule as expressed by the Supreme Guide 

Mohamed Badie was that they would use the Turkish model of civilian rather than clerical rule as long as it always 

was in line with Islamic law as the Egyptian Constitution of 2012 enumerated. This is by definition a theocracy. Gem a I 

AI~Banna, Hassan ai~Banna's brother warned prior to his death in January 2013, that shari'ah would then always 

prevail in such a system. 

In Kuwait, the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood's Lajnat ai~Daawa al~lslamiya ("Islamic Call Committee") was designated 

by President George W. Bush on September 23, 2001 by Executive Order 13224 and by Secretary of State Colin 

Powell on January 9, 2003. Reasons cited for the designation included Lajnat ai~Daawa being used as a financial 

conduit for Osama bin Laden and AI~Qaeda, and its funding of terrorist groups in Chechnya and Libya. Both AI~Qaeda 

operations chief Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Youse! held positions with the 

organization. 29 

Last but not least, the designation of Muslim Brotherhood entities as terror organizations is not new. The Hamas 

designation is a Muslim Brotherhood designation. The United States has previously designated global elements of 

the Muslim Brotherhood. The terrorist group HAMAS, which self~identifies as "one of the wings of the Muslim 

Brotherhood in Palestine," was designated a terrorist organization by President William Clinton on January 23, 1995 

by Executive Order 12947, and later by Secretary of State Madeline Albright on October 7, 1997. 30 31 

The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States 

This all then comes full circle with many obvious connections of American lslamist leaders to the Muslim 

Brotherhood and its terror apparatus. One glaring example is Esam Omeish, a former president of the Muslim 

American Society (MAS). The MAS is a well known as the overt arm in the US of the global Muslim Brotherhood as 

chronicled by an extensive investigative series in the Chicago Tribune. 32 He remains a prominent figure at Dar al~ 

Hijra mosque in Falls Church, Virginia. Last summer he was labeled by the national security committee of the Libyan 

House of Representatives as an enemy of the state. He has recently advocated that the U.S. support a group known 

variably as the "Revolutionary Shura Council," or the "Mujahideen Shura of Derna," despite ties between its officials 

28 Matthew Levitt. Untangling the Terror Web. AI Qaeda is not the only Element. Policy 672. October 28, 2002 

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy~analysis/view/untangling~the~terror~web~al~gaeda~is~not~the~only~ 

element 

29 Executive Order on Terrorist Financing. Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who 

Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism. White House Press Secretary. September 24, 2001. 30 The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement. August 18, 1988. 

https:l/fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/880818a.htm 

31 Foreign Terrorist Organizations. U.S. Dept. of State. Hamas. October 8, 1997. 32 Noreen S. Ahmed~UIIah, Sam Roe and Laurie Cohen. Chicago Tribune. September 19, 2004. 

http://www.chicagotribune.com/newoJwatchdog/chi~0409190261sep19~story.html 

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and ai-Qaida. Egypt's air force bombed the group in retaliation for terror attacks against Coptic Christians in April. 33 

Omeish endorsed Libya's Muslim Brotherhood in a 20121RIN News article, stating that although it came in a distant 

second in Libya's 2012 elections, it "may be able to provide a better platform and a more coherent agenda of national 

action." 34 After appointment to a statewide immigration commission in 2007 by Virginia Senator Tim Kaine, Omeish 

was asked to resign after a revelation among others that he praised "Palestinians who chose the jihad way to 

liberation" during a rally in 2000. He has also congratulated Palestinians who gave "up their lives for the sake of Allah 

and for the sake of AI-Aqsa". The connection of the MB motto, mission, militant groups and their American affiliates 

could not be more obvious. There is no public information that Omeish was directly involved in any terror support. 

But his advocacy for jihad, the Brotherhood and its affiliates speaks volumes. The common link for many radical 

Isla mist groups regionally and globally is the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Another clinic in how American Muslim Brotherhood affiliates serve to water down or misdirect their global 

connections to terrorism is in the wake of the Syrian Revolution of 2011. Make no mistake. Like other revolutions in 

the wake of the Arab Awakening, the Syrian Revolution began as a popular attempt at shedding the yoke of Bashar 

AI-Assad's tyranny and his Ba'ath Party. But in the wake of the regime's genocidal approach to its own citizenry, a 

vacuum arose which was filled by militant Isla mist groups that coalesced into ISIS in 2013. I discuss this evolution in 

depth at Georgetown University's Religious Freedom Institute in: "Understanding the Cauldron that Brewed ISIS. " 35 

However, all of that does not ameliorate the direct connection between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the 

host of radicallslamist groups operating in the region including ISIS and AI Qaeda. Because of its Muslim Brotherhood 

connections and ideologies, the Syrian American Council (SAC) became a dominant force among Syrian-Americans 

lobbying for American influence among anti-Assad revolutionary movements in Syria. 

As has been typical, despite our diversity within the Syrian Muslim community, lslamists with a strong mosque and 

Brotherhood network are able to marginalize the rest of us secular liberal democratic thinkers. The Syrian American 

Council has repeatedly represented Isla mist interests in Syria. They brought lslamist members of the Free Syria Army 

(FSA) to D.C. to lobby for support only days prior to the FSA working with Turkey to invade the Kurdish enclave of 

Afrin in Northwestern Syria, an American ally who helped defeat ISIS in Syria and Iraq. As the Investigate Project 

notes, "no distinction existed between the FSA, Ahar at-Sham or Jabhat ai-Nusra, An as ai-Abdeh, fomer president of 

the anti-Assad National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (ETILAF)" told the London based AIHayat in 2016. The SAC's connection to the MB is apparent. Molham ai-Droubi a key leader of the Syrian MB told IPT 

in 2013 that many of the SAC's members formerly belonged to the Syrian MB. An Arabic post in 2014 notes that its 

ideology is closer to ISIS that to the West. In fact the Syrian MB stated that American attacks against ISIS and its allies 

are not the answer. They have openly mourned the death of AIQaeda leader in Ahrar AI Asham. 36 Then in Qatar, 

the global MB leader, Yusuf ai-Qaradawi an influential spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood joined in criticizing 

the American military campaign against ISIS since while he is anti-ISIS, he only wants movements acting in the name 

33 John Rossomando. lslamist Activist Asks Obama to Support Libyan AQ Group. IPT News. March 18, 2016. 

https :1/www. i nvestigativep ro j ect. org/5 217 /islam ist -activist -asks-oba m a-to-support -libyan-a q 34 John Rossomando. Libyan Security Committee calls U.S. Muslim Leader a Terrorist. IPT News. June 12, 2017. 

https:((www.investigativeproject.org/6273/libyan-security-committee-calls-us-muslim-leader 

35 M. Zuhdi Jasser. Understanding the Cauldron that Brewed ISIS. Religious Freedom Institute. Georgetown 

University. July 12, 2016. https://www.religiousfreedominstitute.org/cornerstone/2016/7}12/understanding-thecauldron-that-brewed-isis 

36 Ravi Kumar. Syrian Brotherhood stands nearer to ISIS than to the U.S. /PT News. September 16, 2014. 

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of Islam and jihad to fight in the region. 37 According to Kamal ai-Labwani a former ETILAF member and secular 

democratic activist, SAC's lobbying led the U.S. to support extremists who posed as moderates. 38 

Another illustrative focal point between the Muslim Brotherhood and radicallslamist groups is Mohammed Ghanem. 

He openly supported MB ideologue, Sheikh Qaradawi saying in a 2012 Facebook post, "/love this appreciated scholar 

very much/ even J adore his jurisprudence. I consider this a great honor and now I am over the moon." Ghanem is a 

central figure in U.S. government and State Department contacts with the Syrian opposition and was in fact was 

romantically involved with Khulood Kandil the former State Department Syria Opposition Outreach Desk Officer. 39 

Her uncle, Hisham Kandil, was Egypt's prime minister during the Brotherhood's brief rule in Egypt. Ghanem openly 

minimized the threat of radicallslamist groups. He stated, "Americans never felt this insecure when Ahrar of-Sham 

or other 'extremist' rebels established safe havens inside Syria. This is because when Syrian rebels- whatever their 

political beliefs- conquer territory from Assad or ISIS, they do so to seek greater opportunity and freedoms for their 

homeland ... contrary to some news reports, rebel fighters are not barbarians. '"0 He went on to condemn the Obama 

administration's 2012 labeling of Jabhat ai-Nusra (a known AI Qaeda affiliate) a terrorist organization because "it 

cooperates closely with the Free Syrian Army and because it has achieved military successes and has delivered critical 

civilian aid." 41 

SAC also notoriously brought Sheikh Mohammad Rateb Nabulsi, a known terror apologist, to the United States for a 

speaking and fundraising 17 city tour in early 2014. His website had a April 2001 fatwa fully sanctioning suicide 

bombing against Israeli civilians. He also is a known homophobe with long screeds against homosexuality appearing 

for example in April 28, 2011 on AI-Aqsa TV of HAMAS saying "Homosexuality involves a filthy place and does not 

generate offspring ... that is why brothers, homosexuality carries the death penalty." He also directly and repeatedly 

connected what he described with homosexuality to his hate for western free nations. This cleric was clearly 

responsible for radicalizing countless Muslims. 42 

The Muslim Brotherhood's network is also bolstered by a direct support by leadership of various humanitarian 

organizations. Islamic Relief USA (IRUSA) is a prime example of this activity in the United States. Khaled Lamada, 

IRUSA board chairman has been criticized for his connections to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. A Facebook 

picture in January 2015 shows him displaying a Muslim Brotherhood salute along with Egyptian MB luminaries like 

Waleed Sharaby, a leader of the MB-Iinked Egyptian Revolutionary CounciL43 His social media profile is rife with 

Egyptian MB support He posed in 2015 with MB Shura council member Gamal Heshmat and exiled pro-Brotherhood 

Egyptian judge Waleed Sharaby. Heshmat and Shraby have openly supported terrorism. Heshmat met in 2014 in 

Qatar with Khaled Meshaal, who was a top Hamas official at the time. He has ridiculed the U.S. designation of Hamas 

as a terror group. 

37 Qatar-based cleric criticizes US role against Islamic State. Reuters. Middle East and North Africa. September 14, 

2014. 

38 John Rossomando, Syrran American Council Learns How to Pressure Wash·rngton. /PT News. April 3, 2018. 

https ://www. i nvestlgativepro ject.org/7 393/syri an-america n-cou nci 1-1 earns-how-to-pressure 39 John Rossomando, Syrian American Council learns How to Pressure Washington. IPT News. April 3, 2018. 

https://www.investigativeproject.org/7393/syrian-american-council-learns-how-to-pressure 

40 Mohammed AI-Ghanem. Americans can trust Syrian rebels. The Hill. September 12, 2014. 

http: 1/th eh iII. com/b logs/ co ngress-blog/foreign-pol icy/217504-am ericans-ca n -trust-the-syria n-rebels 41 Mohammed AI-Ghanem. Taking Syria back from extremists. The Washington Post. December 27, 2012. 

'

2 Kenneth Timmerman. Obama Administration let anti-gay Muslim leader into the U.S. NY Post. March 2, 2014. 

"John Rossomando. Photos show IRUSA Chairman's Muslim Brotherhood Support. IPT News. May 29, 2018. 

https://www.investigativeproject.org/7468/photos-show-irusa-chairman-muslim-brotherhood 

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Lamada is tied closely to the Egyptian Americans for Freedom and Justice (EAFJ) who have endorsed Brotherhood 

linked terrorists in Egypt. EAFJ connections to MB leadership in Egypt are deep. Lamada spoke at the EAFJ 2016 

Ramadan lftar fundraiser. Lamada for his part denies any of these affiliations. But social media posts also suggest 

other IRUSA board members Mohamed Amr Attawi and Hamdy Radwan also have deep MB loyalties. Many of their 

names link back to the 1991 Muslim Brotherhood phone book founded by Palestine Committee of the MB in the U.S. 

The United Arab Emirates included IRW on a 2014 list of terror groups. They described IRW as 'Islamic Relief of the 

Global Muslim Brotherhood'. Bangladesh has barred IRW from working with Rohingya refugees from Burma due to 

concerns it would radicalize them. Israel did the same in Gaza since IRW had been known to employ HAMAS 

members. These are all claims IRW denies. A number of European banks including Credit Suisse, HSBC, and UBS, 

have refused to do business with IRW over concerns with their terror financing. IRW is the largest U.S. Muslim charity 

and provides 25 percent of its annual budget. It is a USAID partner. 44 A recent comprehensive report by the Middle 

East Forum lays out the detailed case for IRW's connection to the Muslim Brotherhood and its global militant Isla mist 

network. 45 

The Explanatory Memorandum of 1991 and the US Muslim Brotherhood 

Some detractors to Muslim Brotherhood designation have stated that such a designation would be "exploited and 

manipulated for political gain". Some have dismissed the MB as "non-existent" and that the 1991 Memorandum 

presented in the Holy Land Foundation Hamas terror financing trial and convictions in 2008 as suspect and 

"conspiracy theories". The document's veracity has withstood multiple legal challenges during the HLF trial and 

multiple other circumstances. It was seized from the "archivist" Ismail Elbarasee of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 

U.S. The network's existence and mission is certainly not only dependent upon this document, but now over the past 

27 years since they met in Philadelphia in 1991 and plotted a "civilizational jihadist process" whereby Brotherhood 

members in America work toward destroying the Western civilization from within" all of the actions of these MB 

legacy groups in the America have towed the MB lslamist line with little deviation and certainly no open antagonism. 

From the previously mentioned Muslim American Society, Syrian American Council, to the larger Islamic Society of 

North America, North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), and CAIR (Council on 

American Islamic Relations) to name a few, their agendas are consistent with this global support and theocratic, 

thee-political activist process and network of the Muslim Brotherhood. For those of us who have grown up in Muslim 

communities with families from Muslim majority nations, we know who the thea-political advocates for the Muslim 

Brotherhood are and the leadership of these organizations typically fits that ideological pattern. It is abjectly false 

to state that the only evidence of the MB in the U.S. is that memorandum. 

In the Holy Land Foundation prosecutions - the largest terrorism financing trial in American history - Justice 

Department officials successfully argued in court that the international Muslim Brotherhood and its U.S. affiliates 

had engaged in a wide-spread conspiracy to raise money and materially support the terrorist group HAMAS. The 

Holy Land Foundation (HLF) officials charged in the case were found guilty on all counts in November 2008, primarily 

related to millions of dollars that had been transferred to HAMAS. During the trial and in court documents federal 

prosecutors implicated a number of prominent U.S. Islamic organizations in this conspiracy, including the Islamic 

Society of North America (ISNA), the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), and the Council on American-Islamic 

Relations (CAIR). These groups and their leaders, among others, were named as unindicted co-conspirators in the 

44 John Rossomando. Photos show IRUSA Chairman's Muslim Brotherhood Support.IPT News. May 29, 2018. 

https:/(www.investigativeproject.org/7468/photos-show-irusa-chairman-muslim-brotherhood 

45 Islamic Relief: Charity, Extremism, Terror. Middle East Forum. July 2018. 

I 

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case. The Justice Department told the court that these U.S. Muslim Brotherhood affiliates acted at the direction of 

the international Muslim Brotherhood to support terrorism in a July 2008 court filing: "ISNA and NAIT, in fact, shared 

more with HLF than just a parent organization. They were intimately connected with the HLF and its assigned task of 

providing financial support to HAMAS. Shortly after HAMAS was founded in 1987, as an outgrowth of the Muslim 

Brotherhood (Govt. Exh. 21-61}. The International Muslim Brotherhood ordered the Muslim Brotherhood chapters 

throughout the world to create Palestine Committees, whose job it was to support HAMAS with "media, money and 

men." (Govt. Exh. 3-15}. The U.S.-Muslim Brotherhood created the U.S. Palestine Committee, which documents reflect 

was initially comprised of three organizations: the OLF (HLF}, the lAP, and the UASR. CAIR was later added to these 

organizations (Govt. Exh. 3-78) listing lAP, HLF, UASR and CAIR as part of the Palestine Committee, and stating that 

their is "[n]o doubt America is the ideal location to train the necessary resources to support the Movement 

worldwide ... "). The mandate of these organizations, per the International Muslim Brotherhood, was to support 

HAMAS, and the HLF's particular role was to raise money to support HAMAS' organizations inside the Palestinian 

territories. Govt. Exh. 3-17 (objective of the Palestine Committee is to support HAMAS). 46 

The fact that the international Muslim Brotherhood does terrorism financing inside the U.S. was attested to by thenFBI Director Robert Mueller, who testified before the House Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2011, and 

responded to a question about the Muslim Brotherhood's networks and agenda in the U.S.: "I can say at the outset 

that elements of the Muslim Brotherhood both here and overseas have supported terrorism. To the extent that I can 

provide information, I would be happy to do so in closed session. But it would be difficult to do in open session."47 

The lack of a terror designation for the Muslim Brotherhood has given them freedom to operate terror financing 

indirectly to the MB which then provides support to AI Qaeda. One of the examples cited by Richard Clarke in his 

U.S. Senate Banking Committee testimony was the case of Soliman Biheiri, who ran an investment firm specializing 

in lslamically permissible investments, the Secaucus, New Jersey~based BMI Inc. BMI offered a range of financial 

services for the Muslim community, and invested in businesses and real estate. According to federal prosecutors, 

among the shareholders of BMI were AI-Qaeda financier Yassin AI-Qadi and top HAMAS leader Mousa Abu Marzook 

-two specially designated global terrorists. Both Qadi and Marzook operated separate businesses out of BMI's offices 

that also did business with BMI. Other BMI investors included Abdullah bin Laden, nephew of Osama bin laden, and 

Tarek Swaidan, a Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood leader. In a Sept. 2003 detention hearing, federal prosecutors 

described Biheiri as "the U.S. banker for the Muslim Brotherhood," and stating that "the defendant came here as the 

Muslim Brotherhood's financial toehold in the U.S." Biheiri was convicted on federal immigration charges on October 

9, 2003. 48 Even prior to that the connections have been well known. Before the U.S. Senate Banking, Housing and 

Urban Affairs Committee in October 2003, Richard Clarke, former National Coordinator for Security and 

Counterterrorism for Presidents William Clinton and George W. Bush, testified to the extent that terrorist 

organizations continued to operate inside the U.S. and the connection to the Muslim Brotherhood networks: "Dating 

back to the 1980's, Isla mist terrorist networks have developed a sophisticated and diversified financial infrastructure 

in the United States. In the post September 11th environment, it is now widely known that every major lslamist 

46 CR No. 3:04-CR-240-P. Governnment's Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioners Islamic Society of 

North America and North American Isla mist Trust's Motion for Equitable Relief. USA vs. HLF et.al. 

'

7 House Select Committee on Intelligence, "International Security Threats," C-SPAN, Feb. 10, 2011, ~ 

spanvideo.org/program/lnternationaiSecuri 

48 Glenn Simpson, "The U.S. Provides Details of Terror~Financing Web," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 15, 

2003, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB106358213631213600 

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terrorist organization,from Homos to Islamic Jihad to AI Qaeda, has leveraged the financial resources and institutions 

of the United States to build their capabilities. We face a highly developed enemy in our mission to stop terrorist 

financing. While the overseas operations of lslamist terrorist organizations are generally segregated and distinct the 

opposite holds in the United States. The issue of terrorist financing in the United States is a fundamental example of 

the shared infrastructure levered by Homos, islamic Jihad and AI Qaeda, ali of which enjoy a significant degree of 

cooperation and coordination within our borders. The common link here is the extremist Muslim Brotherhood- all of 

these organizations are descendants of the membership and ideology of the Muslim Brothers." 

In court papers, federal prosecutors noted that the Holy Land Foundation trial included "numerous 

exhibits ... establishing both ISNA's and NAIT's intimate relationship with the MB, the Palestine Committee and the 

defendants in the case." 49 A 1988 FBI report also identified many of these ideologically obvious Isla mist groups ISNA, 

NAIT and lilT as members of the "ikhwan model" with the aim for recruiting support for an Islamic revolution in the 

U.S." The Saudi funded "Bridge Initiative," an arm of Georgetown University's Prince Alwaleed bin Tala I Center for 

Muslim-Christian Understanding, argued in 2016 that the document was merely "one man's utopian vision". Their 

response was that if the idea "was central in a Muslim movement one would think more would have taken up the 

idea and spread it". As is typical of Salafi-jihadi apologists funded by the Saudis, they ignore the vast number of 

attacks on our soil linked to American Muslim radicalization by Muslim Brotherhood affiliated ideologies and 

mosques from Fort Hood in 2009 to the Boston bombing of 2013 to San Bernardino and on. Not to mention that 

from the beginning global MB icons had no qualms in engaging openly as endorsers of their Brothers in the United 

States. 

For example, in 1995, global Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader Sheikh Yusuf ai-Qaradawi confirmed the 

connections between Muslim Student's Association and the Brotherhood, and said that the goal of the organization 

was to "conquer" the U.S. through dawa (Islamic proselytizing). In a 1995 speech to an Islamic conference in Ohio, 

ai-Qaradawi, said victory will come through dawa. He said, "conquest through dawa, that is what we hope for." 

Qaradawi is well chronicled in fa twas justifying Hamas suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. He further said, "We 

will conquer Europe, we will conquer America, not through the sword but through dowa.' He has long been barred 

from the United States. In his speech, ai-Qaradawi further said the dawa would work through Islamic groups set up 

by Brotherhood supporters in [the U.S.]. He praised supporters who were jailed by Arab governments in the 1950s 

and then came to the United States to "fight the seculars and the Westernized" by founding this country's leading 

Islamic groups. He named the MSA [as one such group]. Though many Muslim youth today may reject any association 

with Qaradawi, good luck finding any denunciations of Qaradawi or the Muslim Brotherhood for that matter by 

Muslim Student's Assocation chapters around the United States. 

The dvilizational argument is made by their continued denigration of western society, government, and the United 

States by the progeny of these programs. The Explanatory Memorandum, like Qutb's Milestones, should serve in 

their own words to highlight their global threat. 

The Cold War Analogy 

In the Cold War, Leninist communist principles fueled the Soviet hegemonic global plan for driving communist 

revolutions. Similarly, Ladan and Boroumand argue in "Terror, Islam, and Democracy" that "Like Mawlana aiMawdudi and various Western totalitarians Sayyid Qutb identified his own society (in his case, contemporary Muslim 

polities) as among the enemies that a virtuous, ideologically self-conscious vanguard minority would have to fight 

49 John Rossomando. Explanatory Memorandum' Detractors Ignore Evidence about MB in America. IPT News. 

March 1, 2017. https :1/www. i nvestigativepro ject. org/580 7 I expla n atory-memora ndu m-d etractors-ign ore-evidence 

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by any means necessary, including violent revolution, so that a new and perfectly just society might arise. His ideal 

society was a classless one where the "selfish individual" of liberal democracies will be banished in the exploitation 

of man by man would be abolished. God alone would govern it through the implementation of Islamic law (shar'iah). 

This was Leninism in Isla mist dress." 50 Qutb may have railed against some aspects of the godlessness of communism 

and socialism within his works; however, it is clear that he was influenced by them in the formulation of some of his 

core ideas. Ibrahim AI-Hodaiby writes in an article four decades after Sayyid Qutb's execution: "In Milestones Qutb 

presents a manifesto for change, one heavily influenced by Lenin's revolutionary "What is to be Done?" with the clear 

Islamization of its basic notions." They even borrowed the term 'vanguard' from Lenin. 

So in essence for those of us reformists who reject socialism and communism as well as the Muslim Brothehood's 

Islam ism and seek liberty, there is nothing more pro-Muslim and pro-modern Islamic interpretations then supporting 

a Muslim Brotherhood designation as a global terrorist organization. They are today's equivalent in a liberation 

theology mantra of the Cold War's communist parties (Muslim Brotherhood) and communism (lslamism). 

Other states have designated the MB an FTO 

Multiple states have declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization and/or proscribed the group from 

operating in their countries. An Egyptian court banned the group in October 2013, and the government officially 

declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization in December 201351 ; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 

designated the group on March 7, 201452; the Cabinet of the United Arab Emirates published a list of terrorist 

organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood and its local affiliates 53; on March 21, 2014, the Foreign Minister 

of Bahrain backed the terrorist designations of the Muslim Brotherhood by both the United Arab Emirates and Saudi 

Arabia. While certainly various members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation have their own hypocrisies when 

it comes to terrorism and the promotion of salafi-jihadism, their designations carry with them some admission with 

regards to the associated global network, funding streams and a shift, especially with petro-lslamist gulf states to 

some of their previous rather facilitative policies with pertaining to the Muslim Brotherhood. 

While the MB is a Sunni Isla mist group hatched in Egypt, the overlap with Isla mist movements in Pakistan and Asia 

are quite central. This dates back to the relationship between Hassan ai-Banna and Mawlana AI-Mawdudi. While the 

MB hatched groups like ISNA and NAIT, Mawdudi's Jamaat-e-lslami hatched similar groups like the Islamic Circle of 

North America (ICNA). There has always been major overlap between leadership and organizational ideologies, but 

no conversation on the MB should ignore their major cross cultural affiliates like the Turkish AKP, the Pakistani Jl, or 

even the Shi'a Iranian Khomeinists. 

Public Obstacles 

Denial fuels bigotry rather than quelling it: If the reason for routinely publicly engaging Muslim leaders after acts of 

lslamist terror against Americans is simply to quell the fear of Americans, I will contend that the denial and 

obfuscation of the administration and the Muslims they engage does the exact opposite. Enabling the deep denial 

of the need for American Muslims to address the root causes of lslamist inspired terrorism and its separatism by not 

naming the Muslim Brotherhood a terror organization actually in the end fuels a growing fear of Muslims and Islam 

due to our policy choices for avoidance over transparency. Pew polling demonstrates that American feelings about 

50 Ladan and Roya Boroumand. Terror, Islam, and Democracy. Journal of Democracy. 13.2 (2002) 5-20. 

" Egypt Bans Muslim Brotherhood. CBS News. October 8, 2013. 52 Reuters Staff. Saudi Arabai designates Muslim Brotherhood terrorist group. Reuters. March 7, 2014. 53 Reuters Staff. UAE lists Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist group. November 

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Muslims is "cooler" than any other faith group scoring a 40 out of 100. 54 In fact, there is nothing that would do more 

to melt away anti-Muslim bigotry to the extent that it exists than for Americans to see Muslims step away from 

denial and actually engaging and confronting the Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood with their own jihad for liberty 

and against theocracy. We should be calling for a jihad against jihad rather than shielding Muslims and Americans 

from the tough love that they need. 

Defensive posture: the last 90 years of the Muslim Brotherhood existence has proven that a Western fear of riling 

up the militant lslamists by proactively identifying them as terrorists is only going to empower them through 

appeasement and defensiveness rather than taking them on offensively. Every day the Muslim Brotherhood 

militants will find an excuse to commit an act of terror or blame the west for their ills rather than their own theocracy. 

It is long overdue for us to take the offense against the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Bipartisan blinders and false assumptions: Both the Bush administration and the Obama administration have thus 

far erroneously felt that giving the radical Isla mists air time for their Islamic theological verbiage will lend them 

credibility. From the time of Attorney General Gonzales, onward there have been significant attempts by the 

Department of Justice to control the lexicon used to describe radical Isla mists, with repeated recommendations to 

avoid any religiously charged terminology. The assumption that radicallslamists need our air time in order to brand 

themselves is false and it is more absurd to assume that their identity and branding can be defeated by ignoring 

groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact it requires the opposite-honest exposure, engagement, and 

marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact the suppression of the truth of their Isla mist identity is an 

obstacle to a whole host of policies and engagements which would be the beginning of their defeat. 

The problem of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (Ole) lobby: The OIC is the proverbial elephant in the 

room. On the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood there is some significant division within the Arab Sunni world. The 

constant refrain from the Obama administration that the United States should not "declare war against 1.6 billion 

Muslims and their governments" is related to global intimidation by the OIC sadly while ignoring the plight of Muslim 

and non-Muslim dissidents in their nations who lead the fight against Isla mist movements. 

First, make no mistake. Across the Middle East and Muslim majority world, many leaders, scholars, and pundits call 

these individuals and their acts exactly what they call themselves-lslamists and jihadists. Some of these governments 

like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt, have come around and perhaps in the interest of self-preservation have identified 

the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood and are finally beginning to defund the very Isla mist groups their petro-l slam 

fed around the world that were berthed by the Muslim Brotherhood. 

However, their approach is very schizophrenic because the Islamic states of each OIC nation is based in some form 

of autocratic theocracy and platforms for thea-political movements that are either directly lslamist like the 

Khomienists of the Islamic Republic of Iran or the shar'ia state of the islamic Republic of Pakistan or the Wahhabism 

of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. All these states have state sponsored ideologies that are the underbelly that inspires 

militant movements like ISIS, Hamas, AI Qaeda, and Hizballah and their Muslim Brotherhood common ideologies. 

Those Isla mist governments often exploit the militancy of jihadists in order to dictate the ruling form of Islam. Only 

in the United States and in the West can we both identify the radicalism of the Muslim Brotherhood while also 

countering with an offense of secular liberal ideals of universal human rights which is far more effective than the 

lslamism and Salafism of OIC nation-states who are just jihadists of a different flavor. 

There is no country that would be more effective at beginning to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood than the United 

States due to the profound safe harbor they have enjoyed in the United States. 

The OIC nations hide behind the fa,ade of "countering violent extremism" all the while their governments fuel 

({violent ls!amism". lt is heartbreaking as an American Muslim to see my own American democratic government 

invoke OIC-Iike blasphemy law behaviors preventing the antiseptic of sunlight upon the lslamist ideas which 

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radicalize our co-religionists. With our founders' history in defeating theocracy, Americans are uniquely qualified to 

understand the battle against theocracy from within a faith. The best summary of the influence of the OIC upon our 

public discourse regarding Islam is Deborah Weiss' monograph, "The Organization of Islamic Cooperation's Jihad on 

Free Speech". 55 

The Dangers of Qatar and Turkey 

These divisions are beginning to bare out with countries like Qatar and Turkey which are dominated by leaders 

sympathetic to or directly involved in Isla mist party politics. 

With Qatar for example, it has become the Arab national safe haven for former Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 

luminaries and activists. They have provided them not only safe haven but a global perch from which to spread their 

ideology and hegemony. Their media arm, AI Jazeera, is reportedly staffed by upwards of 90 percent MB 

sympathizers. Their position on the MB has placed them squarely in the crosshairs of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 

Emirates and Egypt. It is not surprising that along with Qatar's relationship with the Brotherhood it is also very 

sympathetic politically ideologically and economically with Iran and its Khomeinists. This schism within the Sunni 

region led to an embargo last year on Qatar that remains until Saudi demands are met with abandonment of the 

Muslim brotherhood being primary. 

The Emir of Qatar has been historically close to Sheikh Yusuf ai-Qaradawi who has been there since 1961. Qatar has 

been all in with the belief that the brotherhood represented the wave politically of the future in the Middle East. 

They similarly have supported Hamas and the Iranian global sponsorship of terror turning a blind eye to their support 

of Hezbollah and the Assad regime. They share rich natural gas fields with the Iranian regime. The Brotherhood's 

desire to create a global Sunni caliphate and Islamic state positioned the Qatari royal family to be part of that 

leadership. However this positioning has put them not only in the advocacy of all of the terror connections of the 

Muslim Brotherhood globally but also at odds with the other regimes in the Middle East who see the Muslim 

Brotherhood as an existential threat. Make no mistake. The Muslim brotherhood would not be what it is today were 

it not for petro-lslam billions coming from Qatar and until a year ago the rest of the Gulf states. 56 

A designation of the Muslim brotherhood as a terror group is essential for American and global security and the 

containment of the Qatari royal families anti-Western and anti-democracy pro-Isla mist positions. Additionally, their 

fealty for the Iranian theocrats and their heavy economic cooperation also demands their containment. 

The other global platform for the Muslim brotherhood is growing with the country of Turkey which also has an 

Isla mist party in control--the lslamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Recip Erdogan. Turkey is a separate 

case study requiring a hearing on its own; however, its decades-old support of Hamas, it's aid to help Iran subvert 

the sanctions against them, and its own evangelical Dawa into the West including now the largest mosque in the 

United States built in Maryland by the Turkish Republic's diyanet religious authority are all consistent with and in 

parallel to the project of the Muslim Brotherhood. While Erdogan's government for years was sympathetic to the 

Assad regime in Syria, the revolution of 2011 was viewed as an opportunity to have a neighboring Sunni Isla mist 

power sympathetic to the AKP in place. So Turkey along with Qatar proceeded to aid and support the radicallslamist 

element of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and marginalize the more liberal secular elements of the revolution. It 

also helped them counter their Kurdish enemies. Qatar did the same. Nothing epitomizes the relationship between 

Erdogan's AKP and the global Muslim Brotherhood then the recent hosting by the Republic of Turkey of the 90'h 

anniversary gala of the Muslim brotherhood. Speeches and rhetoric from the event and releases around the event 

in Turkey noted the Brotherhood's call to continue on the path of a comprehensive restoration of Islamic states 

around the world. 57 

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Turkish groups closely allied to President Recip Erdogan have lobbied Congress to end U.S. support of the Kurdish 

People's Protection Units (YPG) which is the backbone of the US supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against 

ISIS. The Turkish American branch of Erdogan's lslamist AKP, MUSAID USA and the Turkish American National 

Steering Committee (TASC), were closely involved. Interestingly IPT reported that none of these groups lobbied with 

FARA registration (Foreign Agents Registration Act). Michael Rubin of AEI notes that "It's not just MUSAID USA. 

There's at least half a dozen organization and maybe twic that who have down the same rabbit hole" of influence 

operations. Apparently, these two organizations have also been on the FBI's radar. MUSIAD Executive Director 

Ibrahim Ulya sent an email to President Erdogan's son-in-law Berat Albayrak, Turkey's energy minister and thought 

to be Erdogan's heir apparent. In that he discussed the accusations of espionage by the FBI. Frequent 

communications between them expose how close these American organizations are with the lslamist AKP ruling 

party of the Republic of Turkey. 

IPT notes that these groups have courted U.S. Isla mist groups as they have the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle 

East. They have coordinated protests and other activist work with CAIR (Council on American Islamic Relations) and 

USCMO (United States Council of Muslim Organizations). In fact, CAIR has presented its annual humanitarian award 

to the Turkish government in 2017 "for its humanitarian efforts for Syrian and Iraqi refugees"." Just a few weeks 

ago, the USCMO leadership was in Ankara to congratulate President Erdogan on his recent sham of an electoral 

victory as guests of the Turkish regime. CAIR's Hussam Ayloush praised it's "democracy and the rule of Law" in 2016 

and also congratulated Erdogan on his victory. They all did not seem to care about the fact that the Committee to 

Protect Journalists named Erdogan's Turkey "the worst jailer of journalists in 2017." 59 In fact, leaders of the Egyptian 

Americans for Freedom and Justice (EAFJ) like Mahmoud EISharkawy with strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood 

have also worked closely with these Turkish Isla mist organizations in the U.S. They have all sought an aggressive 

activist role in downplaying the 1915 Armenian genocide that killed 1.5 million people. They all promoted a 

FactCheckArmenia.com anti-Armenian propaganda site. 

Conclusions and Recommendations: 

The importance of identifying the Muslim brotherhood as a terrorist organization could not be more clear to our 

national security and counterterrorism strategy. This will begin not only a necessary process of treating the cancer 

at its core before it metastasizes rather than its byproducts after it has already spread. But now we can also begin a 

a much longer strategy of identifying other lslamist movements that are parallel to the Muslim Brotherhood and 

equally dangerous. !leave you with the following recommendations: 

1. Designate the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) a foreign terrorist organization beginning in Egypt and then on a 

country by country basis. Libya, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan, lraq and Yemen branches of the MB are the most 

obvious follow-ons based on my testimony here. But I would recommend that the designation be taken on 

a country by country basis and not a blanket global one, and only be driven by a need to designate every 

group in the world which is either a self-identified actual Muslim Brotherhood organization or an obvious 

Isla mist terror group. This designation is not only an ideological one but one related to material, social, and 

militant support of the Muslim Brotherhood's sa/afi-jihadi movement. 

2. Use this designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terror organization as a pilot strategic designation to 

be made country to country across the world, but do not dismiss the equal global threat of parallel militant 

Isla mist groups like East Asia's Jamat-e-lslami, Iran's Khomeinists, or Turkey's AKP to name a few. 

3. Call out American Muslim leaders to take a position on the Muslim Brotherhood, the evidence provided 

here, and its overarching thea-political ideologies. Will my fellow Muslims be on the side of freedom, 

58 Abha Shankar. Will Turkey's New Diplomatic Push Reduce its American MB Support? IPT News. July 7, 2016. 59 IPT News 2018. 

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liberty, and modernity or will they be on the side of the tyranny of the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey's 

Erdogan's AKP, Iran's Khomeinists or Pakistan's Jamaat e-lslami? 

4. Develop foreign policy mechanisms to disincentivize Qatari and Turkish government facilitation of the 

Muslim Brotherhood and its global affiliates including those in the West. Considerations should include a 

move to suspend Turkey from NATO (perhaps warranting a separate hearing on the very complex U.S.-

Turkey relations). 

5. Lift up diverse pro-liberty, secular reformist Muslim voices beginning with our Muslim Reform Movement 

and its allies within the Muslim community who are anti-Isla mist. Use that strategy and our Declaration of 

our Muslim Reform Movement to identify allies within Muslim communities across the world. 

6. Use the MB designation as a template to transition immediately from the currently useless non-ideological 

center of gravity that relies on "Countering Violent Extremism" (CVE) to a much more practical one centered 

on "Countering Islam ism" (CI) or (CVI). 

7. Stop engaging Muslim Brotherhood legacy groups in government and media and NGO's and recognize their 

lslamist terror sympathies, misogyny, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and anti-American ideological 

underpinnings. We must recognize that they are not the only voice for American Muslims or any community 

of Muslims. 

8. Re-open investigation into CAIR's radical ties and into the extensive domestic and foreign network of 

foundations and poorly hidden branches. Also investigate the Syrian American Council, MUSAID USA and 

Islamic Relief USA to name a few organizations with concerning globallslamist ties. 

Respectfully submitted, 

M. Zuhdi Jasser, MD 

President, American Islamic Forum for Democracy 

July 11, 2018 

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MUSLIM REFORM MOVEMENT 

PREAMBLE. 

w(' are Jlfus/ims 1rho /ire in the 2l."it ('('Tl[Uf)'"· fr7e Statu/ for a respectful} merc~fitf and inclusil'f! 

interpretation~{ Islam. We are in a battle for the soul~{ islam. and an Islamic renewal must defeat the 

t~d~ology of Islamism, or politicized Islam, which seeks to create islamic states, as 1Bell as an fslamic 

caUphate. Jt7e srek to rPclaim the progressive spirit tvith which islam, lt:as born in the 7th ccntwy to fast 

forward it into the 21st century. TVe support tlw Unil'ersal Declartttion of Human Rights, which was 

adopted by United Nmions member states in 1948. 

~Ve reject interpretations (~f Islam that call for any riolenn•, socia-l i1~;ustice and politicized Islam. 

Facing the threat o_f'terrorism, intolerance, and social injustice in the name of I slant, we hare reflPctPd 

on hmv H.'P can transform our communities based on three principles: peace~ human rights and secular 

governn11ce. JT7

t: are an1wuncing today the formation of nn international initiatiz:e: the 2HHslim Rrform 

lVl ormnt?nt. 

Wr have cou.rageou.s reformrrs from arounrl the tvorld trho hamJ wrhten our Declaration for tlfuslim 

R1:fOnn, a liL•ing document that tve tvill tontinue to enhance as our jounu~y omtinues. Tf7e inrite our 

fellow Muslims and neighbors to join us. 

DECLARATION 

,\.Peace: National Security, eountm·terrm·ism and Foreign Policy 

l. \V,. stand for universal peace, love and compassion. We reject violent jihad. We 

believe we must target t hf' ideology of violeut Isla mist extn•miE-nn~ in order to 

liheratc individuals from the seourgr of oppre-ssion and terrorisn1 hoth in 1\lnslirnnwjority sociC'ties and the \Vest. 

2. \V c stand for the prot<•ction of all people of all faiths and non-faith who seek 

freedom from djetatorships, theocracies and lslamist extrmnists. 

3. We rcjf'et higotry. oppressimt and violence against all people based ou any 

prejudice~ including ethuicity~ gender~ languagP, belief~ religion~ .sPxual orieu1atiou 

aud gender expression. 

13. Human Rights: Women's Rights and Minority Uights 

L W c stand for human right~ anrl justice. \Ve support equal rights and dlf!;Hity for all 

people~ including minoritir-~. \Ve support the United Nations Declaration of I hunan 

Hights. 
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2. \V e reject trihallsm~ castes, n1onarchies and patriarchies awl eonsider all people 

equal '\'ith no birth rights other than human rights. All hum au beiugs are horn free 

and equal in dignity and rights. 3-1usliuts don't have an -exclusive right to Hhcavcu.~~ 

3. We support equal rights for wornen, including equal rights to inheritance, '"·itness, 

work, mobility, personal law~ education! and e1nployment. 1\'Ien and \VOHH'H have 

equal rights in rnosqucs~ hoards, leadership and all spheres of society. \Ve rPjeet 

sexisnt and ntisogyny. 

C. Secular Governance: Freedom of Speech and Religion 

L We are for secular governance} dernor:racy and liberty. \Ve are against political 

movements in the umne of religion. \Ve separate mosque and slate. \Vc are loyal to 

the natious in which we live. We reject the idea of the Ishnnic state. There is no need 

for an l.sla1nie caliphate. \Vt~ oppose .institutionalized sharia. Sharia is manmade. 

2. W ~believe in life, joy, free speech and the beauty all around us. Every individual 

has the right to publicly express criticism of Islam. Ideas do not have rights. Human 

beings have rights. \Vc reject blasphemy laws. They are a cover for the restriction of 

freedom of speeeh and religion. \Vc affirm every individuars right to participate 

equally ]n ijtihad. or critical thinking. aud we seek a revi-val of ijtt~had. 

3. We believe in freedom of religion and the right of all people to express ami practice 

their faith. or non~fai"!h~ without threat of intimidatio11, persecution, diserimlnatiou 

or violencP. Apostasy is not a criinf'. Our wnmah~-our conununity~~is uot jnst 

Muslims. but all of humanity. 

Tf/e stand for peace, human rights and secular gol'ernanct!. Please stand with us! 

Affirmed this Pourth Day of December, Tm>· Thousand and Fifteen 

B_y thP founding authors trho are signatories be/ott' 

#MuslimReform 

Twitter: @~Tlw~f uslimReform 

lnstah•nun: ([~The~lusliml{efornt 

Facehook: .\1 u:-;lim Hf'form \lo"\ enwnl 

'Vebsite: \\\\ \\.:\lnslimRf'forw\Io, f'nW!Lt.or!< 

Please .<>ign our dr.cla.ration "w·w.cha1wc.or~ 

2 
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3 
66 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Ambassador Benjamin, you’re up for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL BENJAMIN 

Mr. BENJAMIN. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting 

me here today to discuss this important subject. 

The title of this hearing, ‘‘The Muslim Brotherhood’s Global 

Threat,’’ invites comment on two questions. The first is whether 

there is a singular entity entitled the Muslim Brotherhood. The 

second is whether that entity or some group of Muslim Brotherhood branches or affiliates represent a genuine global threat. 

On the first question the answer is straightforward. As scholars, 

intelligence analysts, and policymakers over many years have come 

to agree, there is today no singular monolithic Muslim Brotherhood. Decades after the genesis of the Egyptian Ikhwan, there is 

no central administration linking these many different groups 

which are often said to have Brotherhood links, or of ideology or 

origins. In character and matters of doctrine they vary greatly. 

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is an outlawed organization, 

many of whose members are incarcerated. In Jordan, the Brotherhood plays a legitimate political role in the form of the Islamic 

Front, which has played an important role in Jordan’s Parliament. 

The Kuwaiti Brotherhood’s party is a legitimate member of that 

country’s parliament. In Morocco, the Justice and Development 

Party has held the prime minister’s position and is also said to be 

linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Tunisia’s Ennahda is frequently characterized as having ties to 

the Brotherhood, though the party has probably confounded the expectation of Brotherhood members elsewhere by saying that it is 

separating politics from religion. It’s notable that just a week ago 

an Ennahda member, a woman, was elected mayor of Tunis and 

that she does not wear a veil. 

Again, no serious researcher has demonstrated durable links between these groups that could be described as ones of command 

and control. 

Does the Muslim Brotherhood constitute a global threat? Hereto 

I would answer that it does not. Most of the groups that are said 

to be Brotherhood affiliates or franchises support the democratic 

process and have abjured violence, if they ever embraced it. 

The Egyptian Brotherhood forswore violence in the 1970s. There 

is no compelling evidence that it has reversed course. 

It is noteworthy that two Egyptian Brotherhood splinter groups, 

Liwa al-Thawra and HASM, were designated earlier this year 

under Executive Order 13224 as terrorist organizations and both 

do indeed have a record of violence. It is, however, fallacious to 

suggest that this is a sign of the Brotherhood’s return to violence. 

These groups appear to have split off because their members wanted to commit violence while the Brotherhood as a whole did not. 

I want to be clear, I have no sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian group, for example, often delivers hate-filled 

anti-American and anti-Western pronouncements that are truly repellant. But if there’s a threat emanating from the various organizations that can be grouped as part of the Brotherhood family, it 


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67 

is that repression against them may cause them to decide that violence is their only option. 

Anyone looking for the place where the next great jihadist wave 

will break would have to consider Egypt a strong possibility. The 

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has hundreds of thousands of members and, despite the poor governance of Mohamed Morsi, millions 

of sympathizers. 

The widespread use of extrajudicial killing, indiscriminate incarceration, and torture has created a situation in which modern 

Islamists, people who want their society to be more Islamic but do 

not support violence, have no good options. They may come to see 

themselves as cornered and having no alternative but to take up 

arms. 

And it is important to remember that jihadism emerged in 

Egypt, and specifically from the notorious Tora Prison, amid the 

persecutions of the Nasser period. It will be a tragedy and indeed 

a strategic blunder if that lesson has been forgotten. 

A few other quick observations. 

First, the Trump administration evaluated the Brotherhood immediately after coming into office and determined that there was 

no legal basis to designate the group. 

Although there has been much speculative writing in the press 

about the orientation of the Brotherhood, the State Department’s 

decision not to designate is telling. Department decisions are not 

based on open-source information of uncertain quality. Instead, 

designation decisions are based on all-source information, including 

classified intelligence. 

The fact that such a review took place and that the wishes of 

senior policymakers to designate the group were well-known tells 

a clear story. No basis was found for designating at the time. I am 

unaware of any indication that there is more of a basis now. I’m 

also unaware that this issue is being reviewed again within the 

government. 

A final point. Policymakers and legislators, like physicians, must 

keep in mind the injunction to do no harm. A hardline approach 

to the Muslim Brotherhood groups and their members could do significant harm. 

The United States may be enjoying improved relations with some 

Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, countries, it 

should be noted, whose opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood is at 

least in part rooted in their opposition to democracy. 

But its reputation globally among Muslims—that is the United 

States’ reputation—is at a low point due to President Trump’s travel ban, his talked about a national registry of Muslims, and other 

negative comments about Muslims. 

The U.S. faces a real and continuing threat from jihadist terrorist violence. Unwise actions to target the Muslim Brotherhood 

groups will only deepen the animus against America, and we 

should not do anything that helps our enemies attract more recruits. That, too, would be a blunder. 

It would also be a blunder to further alienate already 

discomforted members of the domestic American Muslim community. The last thing the U.S. needs to do is to encourage 

radicalization at home. 


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68 

I want to thank you for your time, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Benjamin follows:] 


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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 54 here 31367.054

Ambassador Daniel Benjamin (ret.) 

John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding 

Dartmouth College 

The Muslim Brotherhood's Global Threat 

Testimony Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Washington, DC 

July 11, 2018 

Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, Distinguished Members ofthe Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me to appear here today. The subject of the Muslim Brotherhood remains 

one of broad interest both for policymakers and the public. I welcome the opportunity to 

contribute tn a discussion that could have important consequences for our nation's relationship 

with the Muslim world and, ultimately, our national security. 

As a starting point, I would like to address the title of this hearing: "The Muslim Brotherhood's 

Global Threat." I do so because I believe it is important to deal with two questions the title begs. 

The first is whether there is a singular entity entitled the Muslim Brotherhood. The second is 

whether that entity or some group of Muslim Brotherhood branches or affiliates- represent a 

genuine global threat. 

With regard to the first question, this answer is fi:tirly straightforward. As scholars, intelligence 

analysts and policymakers in past administrations have come to agree, there is no singular, 

monolithic Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in the 1920s in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna, the 

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood inspired and even assisted in the creation of many of other 

branches in other counttics, including Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates 

and Yemen. Some countries have Islamist parties that have ties to the Brotherhood of varying 

kinds. But decades after the genesis of the Egyptian lkhwan, there is no central administration 

linking these disparate groups. In character and matters of doctrine, they vary greatly. 

For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is an outlawed organization, many of whose 

members are incarcerated or on the run. In Jordan, the Brotherhood supports a legitimate 

political party, The Islamic Front, which has played an important- even central- role in 

Jordan's parliament. The Kuwaiti Brotherhood's party is also a legitimate member that 

country's parliament. In Morocco, the PJD, or Justice and Development Party, which has held 

the prime minister's position, is also said to be linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. Tunisia's 

Ennahda is frequently characterized as having ties to the Tunisian Brotherhood, though the party 

has probably confounded the expectations of Muslim Brotherhood members elsewhere by saying 

that it is separating politics from religion. Ennahda's inclination toward conciliation and 

cooperation have made it a major supporter of the democratic development of that country. 

Interestingly, a female member of Ennahda was elected mayor of Tunis just last week, and she 

does not wear a veil- another demonstration of heterogeneity among groups described as 

belonging to the Brotherhood. 
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lt worth underscoring: No serious researcher has yet demonstrated durable links between these 

groups that could be described as ones of command and control. If one of the questions looming 

behind the title oftoday's hearing is whether the Muslim Brotherhood should be designated as a 

foreign terrorist organization by the State Department, then the answer would have to be no for 

several reasons of which is that the Muslim Brotherhood does not have the first desideratum of 

being ''a foreign organization." While many organizations have links to the original Egyptian 

Muslim Brotherhood, there is no single foreign organization. 

Does the Muslim Brotherhood constitute a global threat? Here too, I would answer that it does 

not. Most of the groups that are said to be Muslim Brotherhood affiliates or franchises support 

democracy and abjure violence. The Egyptian Brotherhood has foresworn violence since the 

1970s, and there is no compelling evidence that it has reversed course on that issue. It is 

noteworthy that two Egyptian MB splinter gronps, Liwa a! Thawra and HASM, were designated 

early this year under Executive Order 13224 as terrorist organizations, and both do indeed have a 

record of violence. It is, however, fallacious to say that this is a sign of the Brotherhood's return 

to violence. These groups appear to have split off because their members wanted to commit 

violence while the Brotherhood as a whole did not. 

The Palestinian terrorist t,>roup Hamas is often described as the Muslim Brotherhood's 

Palestinian chapter, so it is worth discussing in this context. There is no doubt that at its 

inception, Hamas has ties to the Egyptian Brotherhood. But it is a mistake at this point to say 

that the group is an affiliate of the Brotherhood. Hamas has its own charter and a history of 

foreign relations including with Iran that no other Brotherhood group would sanction. If we 

are being precise about our language, Ham as is certainly not an affiliate of any other 

Brotherhood entity in the way that, say, a! Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula is an affiliate of a! Qacda. 

The group does not take orders from any other entity. [t is, I would add, in no way a global 

organization, and thus not a global threat. Moreover, it is worth noting that Hamas has 

historically restrained- sometimes violently-jihadi groups in Gaza that sought to target Israel 

with catastrophic attack. Though it carries on its own offensives against Israel, Hamas has not 

sought to carry out the massive attacks against Israel tbat were characteristic of a! Qaeda for fear 

that it would elicit a devastating Israeli invasion of Gaza or rule the group out as a possible future 

negotiating partner for IsraeL It is also worth noting that for all the opprobrium that both Egypt 

and Saudi Arabia have heaped on the Muslim Brotherhood, both have engaged with Hamas. 

Egypt's security discussions with Hamas are well known; King Salman has courted the group 

and hosted its leadership in the Kingdom just three years ago in an effort to prevent it from 

renewing its ties to Iran 

To be clear, I have no particular sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian group, for 

example, often delivers hate-filled anti-American and anti-Westcm pronouncements that are 

truly repellent. But if there is a threat emanating from the various organizations that can be 

t,>rouped as part of a Brotherhood family, it is that the repression against them may cause them to 

decide that violence is their only option. 

Anyone looking for the place where the next great jihadist wave will break would have to 

consider Egypt a strong possibility. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has hundreds of 

thousands of members and, despite the poor governance of Mohamed Morsi, millions of 
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 56 here 31367.056

sympathizers. The widespread use of extrajudicial killing, indiscriminate incarceration and 

torture has created a situation in which moderate lslamists people who want their society to be 

more Islamic but do not suppmi violence have no good options. They can capitulate and 

abandon their beliefs, which most religious believers are unlikely to do. Or they may come to see 

themselves as being cornered and having no alternative but to take up anns. It is important to 

remember that jihad ism emerged in Egypt and specifically from the notorious Tora Prisonamid the persecutions of the Nasser period. It will be a tragedy if that lesson has been forgotten, 

aud a renewed jihadist movement again emerges from Egypt's jails. 

Let me make a few more observations: First, the Trump administration evaluated the Muslim 

Brotherhood immediately after coming into oflice and determined that there was no legal basis to 

designate the group. Although there has been much speculative writing in the press about the 

orientation of Muslim Brotherhood, the State Department's decision not to designate is telling. 

The Department's decisions area not based on open-source information of uncertain quality. 

Instead, designation decisions are based on all-source infmmation, including classified 

intelligence. The fact that such a review took place, and that the wishes of senior policymakers 

to designate the group were well known, tells a clear story. No basis was found for designating 

was found at the time, and I am unaware of any indication that there is more of a basis now. 

That fact should play an important role regarding any deliberations about the United States's 

posture toward the !kvvhan. 

A final point: Policymakers and legislators, like physicians, must keep in mind the injunction to 

do no harm. A hardline approach to Muslim Brotherhood groups and their members could well 

do significant harm. The U.S. may be enjoying improved relations with some Arab countries 

such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but its reputation globally among Muslims is at a low point 

due to President Trump's travel ban, his loose talk about a Muslim ban or a registry of Muslims 

and an atTay of negative comments about Muslims. The U.S. faces continuing threat from 

jihadist tenorist violence. Unwise actions to target Muslim Brotherhood groups will only deepen 

the animus against America, and we should not be doing anything that helps our enemies attract 

more recruits. Since the Egyptian Brotherhood and al Qaeda have been sworn enemies the antiBrotherhood animus of a] Qacda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri is legendary- driving the groups 

into an embrace would be a first-class strategic blunder. Intelligence assessments leaked to the 

press have expressed concern about precisely this kind of consequence from a designation or 

other measures against Brotherhood groups. 

This is not just a problem in other countries. Muslims here in the U.S. who already feel 

discomfited by the rhetoric and actions of the administration may become more alienated, a 

development with potentially negative effects. The last thing the U.S. needs is to accelerate 

radicalization at home. Even short of that, anything that contributes to the estrangement of the 

Ame1ican Muslim community should be avoided. U.S. law enforcement relies on its ties with 

the Muslim commtmity for a large portion of the tips it gets about potential bad actors. 

Damaging that relationship make no sense whatsoever. 

Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to your questions. 
72 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentlemen. 

The gentleman notices the presence of the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, a member of the full committee. 

We thank you for your interest in this topic. 

Without objection, I’d like to welcome Mr. Grothman to participate fully in today’s hearing. And without objection, so ordered. 

The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

Dr. Jasser, the argument I think somewhat sketched out by Ambassador Benjamin is that if you take a strong stand against the 

Brotherhood like you articulated, that you’re alienating so-called 

moderate Islamists and that that ends up leading to more terrorism. So how do you respond to that? 

Dr. JASSER. Well, again, I’d use the Cold War analogy. Were we 

worried when we took on the militant Soviets that we would alienate the moderate non-Soviet communists. 

It is beyond bigoted to say that the Muslim community is represented only by our establishment Islamists who dominate oppressively our community. 

So what better way than the country founded on defeating theocracy, the United States, to take a position against the militant arm 

of the theocratic branches of the Islamic faith? And I think that it 

would send a message around the world that we recognize that the 

Brotherhood is a militant organization and we that way build a 

platform for what I believe is a majority of the non-Islamist voices. 

There were 10 million people that went to the streets in Egypt 

to protest in Revolution 2.0 against the Brotherhood; 90 percent of 

those folks were Muslims. And yet, it seems that from the arguments of the ambassador and others that the only people that we 

care about are the wings of this oppressive party that are nonviolent and somehow want to use democracy as a tool to get the 

power and then oppress the rest of the folks. 

If you look—I was on the U.S. Commission on Religious Freedom, met with the Brotherhood in 2013 in Cairo. And I can tell you 

that in speaking to them they have no interest in changing their 

mission, what they are, what their goal is. They see the world 

through the lens of theocracy, not through egalitarian rights. 

To say you can moderate the Brotherhood is like saying you can 

moderate the Communist Party into capitalists. It’s impossible. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So, I mean, just to sketch out the ideology, I 

mean, what does that mean for Christians and Jews or other religions? 

Dr. JASSER. Well, there’s barely any, if any, Jews left in Egypt 

because of the Islamists and what they’ve done in that country and 

also dictatorship. The Islamists, when they get into power, are not 

only anti-Semitic, listen to their imams and clerics and what they 

preach out of Al Jazeera, from Qaradawi on down. 

Women’s rights, the ambassador may have cited that they had 

one not hijabed woman, but the bottom line, that’s window dressing 

for a central authority that is misogynistic and interprets the 

Koran and other sharia interpretations that say that women get a 

half a vote of a man, a quarter of the inheritance, et cetera. 

So they, as you saw in the way they put forth the constitution 

in Egypt, have no interest in an egalitarian, liberal, secular constitution. Their interest is the Islamic state and giving people 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
73 

rights not under God, but under Islam and their interpretation of 

Islam, where minorities, Coptic Christians, apostates—they call 

moderate Muslims who are anti-Islamist apostates. They put people in jail, as Morsi did hundreds and thousands, for criticizing him 

as criticizing Islam. That’s theocracy. 

Mr. DESANTIS. This notion of a moderate Islamist, I mean, 

Islamism is inherently not moderate, because, I mean, if you want 

Islamism to be the governing faith, that is a totalitarian system, 

not democratic. And so to say that that’s moderate, I mean, maybe 

it means you’re not launching terrorist attacks, but you still want 

an end that is very illiberal, I think. 

The chart you put up, and I want to see if you had—you had the 

Islamist wing, then you had the Brotherhood, and then kind of the 

terrorism growing out of that. And people say, well, the Brotherhood, they are not necessarily directing every terrorist attack, and 

I think that’s true, but is it safe to say that the Brotherhood’s ideology has served as kind of the intellectual foundation that has 

sprung a lot of the terrorist groups that we’ve seen, from al-Qaida 

to ISIS to everything in between? 

Dr. JASSER. Absolutely. I’m a doctor. In the daytime I treat patients and disease. We don’t treat symptoms. One of the primary 

global cancer cells for the development of al-Qaida, Islamic Jihad, 

all of these offshoots, the primary source of training ground is Muslim Brotherhood. Some of them train to be part of the secret committee to ultimately be violent, and some of them come to the West 

to make sure our policy remains defensive and not offensive. 

So ultimately the goals of their ideology is to create Islamic 

states and a caliphate, and that has never changed. 

Mr. BENJAMIN. Mr. DeSantis? 

Mr. DESANTIS. Dr. Fradkin, Sisi gave a speech probably a couple 

of years ago now where he challenged a lot of the Islamist clerics 

and said: Look, we cannot—and he’s a devote Muslim, but he was 

making the point that you can’t have a faith that is at war with 

everybody who disagrees, that’s billions of people. And I think he 

has made the decision that you really have to marginalize the 

Brotherhood. 

What do you think? Is Dr. Jasser right or is a more targeted approach as enunciated by Dr. Schanzer? What are your views? How 

would you comment on those? 

Mr. FRADKIN. Thank you very much for the question. It’s an excellent one. 

I’m not myself clear yet about just how one goes about tackling 

the Brotherhood in terms of the designation as a terrorist group. 

What I am clear about is that it does—it creates the conditions for 

terrorist groups, the way in which Dr. Jasser said, in the sense 

that it is the original version of the ideology which underlies the 

undertaking. 

Another thing I think should be observed is this: We have tried 

to engage with the Brotherhood. And let’s put it this way: Egypt 

has been an experiment in several ways. 

First, we had an experiment of how the Brotherhood would behave in power. And it had been proposed before that that when 

they come to power they would be, through the exercise of power, 

they would learn to be moderate. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
74 

That we saw was false, and there are reasons why it was false, 

because when they saw the opportunity to exercise total power they 

were keen to. 

We also had an experiment of trying to understand them as a vehicle for moderate politics, of engaging with them in that direction. 

That experiment began—well, it began actually in the Bush administration, in a variety of ways, but its most visible expression was 

President Obama’s speech in Cairo, which, among other things, 

went out of its way to welcome the Brotherhood. They were welcomed to the speech itself, somewhat against the wishes of Mubarak. 

Mr. DESANTIS. My time’s up, so you all will have a chance. But 

I want to give Mr. Lynch, get him in here. So I will recognize Mr. 

Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask unanimous 

consent, I have a letter here, a statement by Ryan Crocker, an eminent diplomat in the service of our country. And I’d ask that it be 

entered into the record. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Without objection. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, sir. 

I do want to make a distinction here about what the designation 

of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. 

So there are a lot of conservative, we would even say repressive 

regimes around the world. There are many militant or extremist 

groups around. But the terrorist, terrorist designation is targeted 

toward activity, conduct, war on the civilian population. 

And so that’s a different terminology and a different meaning 

than simply targeting regimes or organizations because they are 

conservative in their ideology. So it’s an important distinction to 

make. 

The other challenge we have here, and I heard it from each of 

you, is our ability to target specific organizations for that unacceptable behavior, that waging of war on the civilian population and 

terrorist activity. 

So, Mr. Fradkin, you’ve said as much. 

Dr. Schanzer, you were saying in your testimony, which was very 

helpful, I think, and thoughtful, that rather than do this blanket 

label of terrorism on the whole Muslim Brotherhood, then go after 

the individual groups that are actually undertaking this unacceptable activity, and I completely agree. 

Dr. Jasser, you as well, country by country, let’s target these people and call them out, call them out and isolate them in a way that 

doesn’t make them stronger, but isolates them and weakens them. 

Ambassador Benjamin, I know you didn’t speak directly to this 

issue, but in the past our success in isolating some of these groups 

has been our ability to differentiate the bad actors from the surrounding population and severing their local support. 

That seems to be what’s happening in many cases in the Middle 

East where the younger population, as I mentioned in my opening 

remarks, the younger population is rejecting some of the more extreme edicts of the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Is that something, is that an approach that you think would be 

successful given your experience on the ground as an ambassador? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
75 

Mr. BENJAMIN. Mr. Lynch, the United States has had great success in isolating terrorist groups and cutting off their wellsprings 

of support, if you will, and diminishing their appeal to the broader 

population. 

The United States has a much more mixed record when it comes 

to intervening in the politics of other countries and telling foreign 

populations who we approve of and who we don’t. 

And our ambassadors, our envoys should by all means speak out 

against hatred, speak out against anything that promotes division 

and promotes antipathy towards the West, but our ability to take 

on the Muslim Brotherhood in the various countries when it is not 

a group engaged in terrorist activities is going to be challenging. 

If anything, given the fact that most of these countries the Muslim Brotherhood now has a political party, it’s in the parliament, 

requires I think that we engage with them more and suggests that 

the benefits of moderation are available to all of those who pursue 

truly democratic policies and the pluralistic vision that the United 

States has stood for. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. 

I do want to take a minute here. I thought the statement by 

Ryan Crocker was instructive and important. 

He says here—and obviously Ryan Crocker served in Beirut during the bombings of the Marine barracks there, served for many 

years in Iraq. I’ve had many, many dealings with him. I think I’ve 

got over 20 trips to Iraq while he was our ambassador there. 

But he writes that, after 38 years of his service as a Foreign 

Service officer, the Muslim Brotherhood is not a monolithic organization. 

He adds that it’s not an organization at all in the conventional 

sense of the term. It has no international headquarters, nor an 

identifiable global leadership. Individual country franchises vary 

dramatically in their ideology and politics, and especially in their 

attitudes towards political violence. 

At one extreme, he acknowledges, would be the Syrian Muslim 

Brothers who carried out a number of lethal bombings throughout 

the country in the 1970s. The other would be the Muslim Brothers 

in Egypt, Jordan, and North Africa. 

In Iraq post-2003 the only organized Sunni political party was 

the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Party in Iraq. And during his time in Iraq, 2007 to 2009, he worked closely with the Islamic Party and its leader, Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. 

So I think what he’s pointing to is the wisdom of discerning 

which of these affiliates and groups is engaging in terrorism and 

which are engaging in political activity, the distinction I made before about whether someone is labeled a radical or an extremist 

and one who is labeled as a terrorist. And so I hope we are precise 

in our language here and precise in our goal. 

The other challenge with terrorism is their ability to adapt. And 

I think that just putting out a blanket designation on the Muslim 

Brotherhood, they will sidestep that in a heartbeat, and those organizations will reconfigure and reassemble in a way that will do 

nothing to reduce their lethality. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 


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The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Dr. Jasser, good seeing you again. 

This conversation is headed just in the right direction here. So 

one of the biggest problems in making policy decisions with regard 

to the Muslim Brotherhood is the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood 

frequently creates front groups that while ostensibly are separate, 

but in reality have close ties to the mother ship in Egypt. 

This can include respectable institutions such as civil rights organizations, community groups, and charities. A recent report by 

the Middle East Forum concerning Islamic Relief, an international 

aid charity, documented extensive ties between Islamic Relief and 

the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 

One of the numerous examples given was the fact that Essam ElHaddad, cofounder of Islamic Relief Worldwide, became a foreign 

policy adviser to Mohamed Morsi, and according to Egyptian prosecutors used Islamic Relief moneys to fund Muslim Brotherhood 

terrorism in Egypt. 

Question: Does this tendency of the Muslim Brotherhood to form 

ostensibly separate spinoff groups under more respectable sources 

concern you? And secondly, what should our policy towards those 

organizations be? 

Dr. JASSER. Thank you, Congressman Gosar. And it is good to be 

here. Thank you. 

I can’t tell you enough how important this issue is. And while I 

believe that the—the first thing I’d respond is tell you that the best 

way to marginalize groups that are front groups in the West—so 

I call them Muslim Brotherhood legacy groups, because they don’t 

go by the name Muslim Brotherhood. 

In the United States we’ve not had religious parties, so they’ve 

not operated openly. In London they operate openly. The Muslim 

Brotherhood has an office. The Ikhwan website is operated out of 

London. 

But if you want to decrease their influence, the to and fro passage of money, Islamic Relief, for example, it’s a great example. 

They have donated to Islamic Relief Worldwide. 

The Middle East Forum has an excellent report that was put out 

a week or 2 ago that looks at all of the revolving doors between 

radical Islamist terror groups around the world and Islamic Relief. 

I mean, Bangladesh, a Muslim country, does not allow Islamic Relief to do humanitarian work with Rohingya refugees because 

they’re worried about radicalization. 

So the problem with front groups in the West, I think, will be 

diminished not by designating group that operate in the West here 

under other names. I think it’s too hard to do that. But once you 

designate the mother ship in Egypt, the Brotherhood, a terrorist organization, you designate the Yemeni, the Kuwaiti Brotherhood as 

terror organizations, it is going to be much more radioactive, their 

platform of dominating our community. 

And this is why, if you look at the Muslim Sunni Association, I’d 

ask you all to look at the explanatory memorandum. The FBI put 

it into the documentation of the Holy Land Foundation trial that 

laid out the network of Muslim Brotherhood organizations and 

what their plan is in the West. That’s stood the test of time in the 


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court system and has not been refuted effectively because it is the 

truth, that that was their operation. 

So they are a threat. I think they oppress our own community 

here through their money, through their work with Qatar and 

other; Turkey. I mean, in Turkey just 2 weeks ago an organization 

called USCM, or the U.S. Consortium of Muslim Organizations, 

which is basically the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in America, 

went to congratulate Erdogan on his win in Turkey, supposedly as 

a democratic win. Forget the fact that he imprisons journalists, tortures professors, all these things it didn’t matter to them because 

he’s one of Brothers. 

So if I’m going to have a voice and our Muslim reform movement 

is going to have a voice in the United States, the best way to weaken our main antagonists, which are the Islamists, is to begin to diagnose their foreign terror organizations that they sympathize with 

as terrorist organizations, the Brotherhood. 

Mr. GOSAR. So my next question should be right along the line. 

In the case of the Islamic Relief USA, a chapter of the Islamic Relief International that pays 20 percent of its income to Islamic Relief International, it has received at least $700,000 in Federal 

funds, and when accounting for various umbrella groups possibly 

much more. Should U.S. tax dollars be barred from going to such 

organizations? 

Dr. JASSER. I believe once you designate the Muslim Brotherhood 

in Egypt and many of the offshoots I talked about, name Muslim 

Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, then you can do the same 

thing to Islamic Relief that you did to the Holy Land Foundation 

because Hamas is a terrorist organization. But because they are 

funneling money through third parties that are not designated as 

terrorist organizations, they get away with. 

So the short answer to your question is, yes, we should stop giving them money. But you can’t do that until you designate the 

Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. 

Mr. GOSAR. I thank the gentleman. I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Comer for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My questions will be asked to the first three gentlemen on the 

panel. 

Ambassador Benjamin testified that most Muslim Brotherhood 

affiliates support democracy and renounce violence. Is that true? 

Mr. FRADKIN. No. I don’t think so. What has been true is the 

issue of violence as far as the Brotherhood is concerned, going back 

to the beginning, was a tactical question. Was it useful at any particular stage to use violence to advance their goals? And al-Qaida 

has no doubt that violence is good, but the Brotherhood sees it otherwise, but as such, there is no repudiation of violence, and that 

is is just—there is no such statement in the historical record. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Of course there is. The Egyptian Brotherhood has formally adjured violence in the 1990s. 

Mr. FRADKIN. No, no. You said in your testimony they adjured 

it in the 1960s and 1970s when they—— 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. No, I didn’t say that. 


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Mr. FRADKIN. And they did—it says that—what the past was. In 

the 1960s and 1970s, they were in prison, so they had no option 

to exercise violence. 

I am not saying that they are for it, you know, in a big way, but 

it’s just not true that, A—and this is the flip side of the assertion— 

the flip side of the assertion is that they are interested in entry 

into a normal, moderate politics, and that also is not true. 

And in the case of the Egyptians, they thought—they took what 

they could get under Mubarak, under Sadat. And then when they 

thought they had bigger opportunities, they went in a different direction. 

I want to, if I may, this brings up to the question—or an observation that Congressman Lynch made earlier that the question before 

us has always to do with action, terrorist action and violence. And 

it’s important to focus on that, because that’s the way in which we 

conceive of the threat and also the way in which our laws are written. And that’s terribly important, but to some degree, and I agree 

with you, Congressman Lynch, that’s the way in which we first 

have to approach the issue. 

The problem is, it does skew the discussion insofar as it suggests 

that those who are not immediately active in violence, or even if 

they’ve, you know, eschewed violence, as Ambassador Benjamin asserts, are the parties to be worked with, the parties that are useful 

for interaction. And this is a continuous tendency. Once you’ve sort 

of made the distinction between the Brotherhood and al-Qaida, you 

say, okay, these are the guys we can work with. And it was worthwhile having the experiment, perhaps, but we have had such experiments, and they haven’t worked. 

Mr. COMER. Thank you. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Congressman Comer, thank you for the question. 

What I would say is that in each of the cases that we look at 

around the Middle East, these groups have been shaped by their 

environments. So if they operate under a repressive regime, they 

are often left with no recourse but to recognize the regime and to 

renounce violence. They are more than willing to engage in the 

democratic process, but there’s really nothing in their creed, all 

right, which is ultimately the dogma that they all adhere to at 

their core, that suggests that they have given up violence as an approach or that they’ve embraced democracy. 

So I think we just need to remember that they have been forced 

into making a lot of these decisions over time. Whether they are 

organically going to remain there, I think, is another question entirely. 

Dr. JASSER. And if I can add, I think to take what one or two 

Muslim leaders that happen to be sitting with Americans at the 

time and telling ambassadors what they think they want to hear 

is one thing, versus what they’re actually telling their own people. 

And when the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in 

2010, decades after the so-called change of approach towards violence, tells his leaders that he is telling them that the best goal is 

to attain death and sacrifice through a jihadi generation against 

the U.S. and against the Zional-American conspiracy, that is a 

jihadi call to arms. And that was in 2010 at the same time of, you 

know, with al-Qaida and other groups, so it sounded very similar. 


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And I think basically we’re hearing from some leaders that we 

should just continue a whack-a-mole approach to the Muslim 

Brotherhood program rather than actually treating the primary 

central organization as being a terrorist organization based on its 

ideology. 

And, by the way, if the antiviolence approach to them is true, we 

would be able to find rifes of theological, you know, disagreements 

with the Brotherhood’s approach, their logo would have changed, 

all these things would have changed. None of that has happened. 

They’re just telling a few ambassadors when they meet with them 

what they want to hear so that we don’t interfere in their business 

in taking over various countries. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. If I may, sir, my points are largely being 

distorted here. 

First of all, there’s no legal basis whatsoever for designating the 

Brotherhood on the basis of ideology. Terrorist designations are 

done on the basis of violent act. 

Mr. FRADKIN. Right. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. That’s it. So for Dr. Jasser to talk about 

designating the Muslim Brotherhood is absurd. 

Dr. JASSER. Well, what percent of them should be violent suicide? 

And answer is 10, 20, 80 percent? What percent? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. You have to identify individuals and you 

have to identify groups that are carrying out these acts, and that’s 

how the law works and that’s how the State Department works and 

that’s how we have worked throughout. 

And if we get into the business of deciding that a group should 

be designated because we don’t like its ideology, first of all, we’re 

contravening our own values in terms of freedom of speech and of 

discourse and we’re undermining our own interests. 

The United States Government has espoused the belief for many, 

many decades that anyone who participates in the democratic process honestly, and so far as we can tell, and this is based on both 

intelligence and on the basis of their statements, that we ought to 

talk to them. That is what engaging with them means. It’s doesn’t 

mean that we are giving them money, it doesn’t mean that we’re 

giving them any benefits. We are talking to them, and that is it. 

And socialization through those processes typically, but not always, has positive effects. And we might have actually had a worse 

experience with Mr. Morrissey if we had not known the Muslim 

Brotherhood at all before, and we might have had a better experience had we had a more robust dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood before. 

And it’s important to note that the reason that we did not have 

a more robust dialogue was because autocratic leaders prohibited 

us from doing so in their country, and the cycle of repression and 

rebellion will go on as long as we are always beholden to those 

autocrats. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. 

Duncan, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m sorry I had to be over on the floor, so I didn’t get to hear 

your testimony. And I really know very little about this particular 


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issue, and I read that the Muslim Brotherhood has affiliates in 70 

countries. 

How many members are there? How many people are there in 

the Muslim Brotherhood all together? Does anybody know? 

Mr. FRADKIN. I don’t know. No. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes. Ambassador? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We don’t know. No one has a global figure, but it’s in the millions. 

Dr. JASSER. Well, they won an election in Egypt. So they did that 

by having initially 20 to 30 percent of the vote and then they won 

a runoff against the former intelligence operation for Mubarak. 

So, you know, in various countries, they can swing 20, 30 percent 

of the active Islamists, which are 30 percent of the population. So 

politically they’re a large group. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I understand that at least the first three witnesses here think we should designate. Is that not correct? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Not correct. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Oh, okay. So of the people who are in the Muslim 

Brotherhood, what percentage do you think are violent or advocate 

violent activities? Does anybody have an opinion about that? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Congressman Duncan, in my testimony, I did 

note that there are a number of organizations that have already 

been designated: Hasm, Liwa al-Thawra, Hamas. I suggested two 

others, one in Libya, another one in Yemen, where I think we 

would probably see evidence that would meet the criteria, which is 

a fairly simple criteria when you look at the Treasury designation 

process in particular. The State Department’s a little bit more 

fuzzy. 

And then I think, you know, from there, we need to think about 

targeting violent individuals within the factions that are officially 

nonviolent or are taking part in the process, because we know that 

there are more hard line members within each of these factions, 

those that support violence, those that don’t. So this needs to be 

a targeted process across the board according to our criteria of designation. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. But do we have an opinion as to—I mean, 

is it a very small number or percentage of the people who are in 

the Muslim Brotherhood that would be considered violent or prone 

to violence? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Very, very small. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Very small. 

Dr. JASSER. Congressman Duncan—— 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Very small. Certainly those who have actually been involved in violent activities, it would be significantly 

less than 1 percent. Those who have joined splinter groups, that’s 

another matter, but those splinter groups tend to be small. 

You know, one of the things that is somewhat problematic about 

this panel is that, you know, the vast scholarly literature on the 

Muslim Brotherhood emphasizes that the overwhelming amount of 

energy in the last 2 decades has gone into the creation of political 

parties, which are by definition opposed to carrying out violence. 

Okay? 

It is true that the Muslim Brotherhood historically has been a 

group from which splinters or sparks have been thrown off, and 


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those people have become more violent. Al-Qaida, the original alJihad group, those people were originally influenced by the Muslim 

Brotherhood and then became more radical. 

But the Brotherhood itself, as far as we know, and certainly this 

was the state of the intelligence when I left the government, there 

are no major entities of the Muslim Brotherhood, setting aside 

Hamas, which is a special case and may not even be considered by 

some people to be Brotherhood, that are committed to violence. 

Dr. JASSER. Congressman, there’s a very—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me just say this. You know, I’ve been here a 

long time. This is my 30th year. I was here for the first Gulf War, 

which I voted for, because I heard all of our top leaders say that 

Saddam Hussein was the greatest threat since Hitler and they 

talked about his elite troops, and then I saw those same elite 

troops surrendering to CNN camera crews and empty tanks, and 

so I became kind of skeptical about some of these things. And so 

when the second Gulf War rolled around, I ended up voting against 

it because I thought too many of our leaders were too eager to go 

to war to prove they were the new Winston Churchills or prove 

they were great leaders. 

And so I’ve felt for a long time that it’s been a very sad thing 

that we have sent so many young Americans to fight what I 

thought were very unnecessary wars. And I also noticed that many 

of the people or groups that we are talking about how great these 

threats were were people or groups that were going to get money, 

and that these threats seemed to be more about money and power 

than they were about any great threats. 

But I see, Dr. Schanzer, you wanted to respond to the ambassador, so go ahead and respond. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Yes. Look, what I would say is that I don’t know 

where that number comes from that it’s 1 percent or 5 percent or 

10 percent. It’s not like, you know, we’re looking at poll numbers 

coming out of the Muslim Brotherhood where people are calling 

their homes and saying, ‘‘How many of you are radical?,’’ and 

they’re openly admitting to it, right? I mean, we don’t know exactly 

what the numbers look like within—— 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I said this was the number of people involved in violence. 

Mr. SCHANZER. What we can say, though, is that when we look 

at radicalization, we have to look at those that go to the battle 

fronts, that’s number one. And we do see a good number of people 

who were former Brothers that have gone on to join groups like alQaida and the Islamic State. 

But also, when you look at the criteria, the Treasury criteria, I’m 

a former Treasury terror finance analyst, we look at basically four 

criteria. One is, are organizations owned or controlled by a terrorist 

organization, are the individuals members. That’s number one. 

That’s obvious. 

Number two is financial support. That is the same, in the view 

of law, as engaging in violence itself. 

Another is technical support and then another one is material 

support. 

These are the criteria that we need to look at what when we assess Brotherhood groups and individuals. And I think we’ll find 


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that it’s not 1 percent, but it’s also not 50 percent. There is some 

fuzzy math in there. I don’t know how we’ll ever get to it, but there 

is a problem within the Brotherhood. We know that for a fact. 

Dr. JASSER. And if I could add just one thing, Congressman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Sure. 

Dr. JASSER. These mental gymnastics and confusions that you’re 

having is exactly what the Brotherhood wants to happen, by dividing themselves into secret committees that push forth violent arms 

and other committees that use political processes to come to power. 

They use liberation theology to basically advance, no different than 

a Nazi party would or other Fascist arm would, and they use militant arms and then claim denial when they are pushed by more 

moderate democracies like ourselves. 

So at the end of the day, that wing, if it truly has—they might 

eschew violence on the one hand; on the other hand, they have 

never condemned openly those arms of their organizations or ever 

taken ownership of having sprouted those ideas and legitimized 

those factions of terrorist organizations. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Thank you very much. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s timed has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Listen, whether the number is 1 percent, 5 percent or, as you 

mentioned, up to 50 percent, the question and the issue, as we all 

know, it doesn’t take but a small number of radical terrorists to 

create an enormous problem around the world wherever they may 

strike. 

So with that in mind, Mr. Jasser, let me begin with you. How 

important a role does violent jihad play in the Muslim Brotherhood 

ideology? 

Dr. JASSER. Well, I think it’s central. And they might condemn 

certain tactics here or there, but at the end of the day, their model 

has remained advocating for violent jihad, their ‘‘be prepared’’ passage from the Koran is simply a battle that they use as their rallying cry. So at the end of the day, they are a jihadist organization 

that believes in the technique of violence as one of the avenues to 

be used. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. So let’s look at an example of that. How did the 

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood treat religious minorities, say, Coptic Christians? 

Dr. JASSER. I was there in 2013, and they committed, and their 

leaders and imams, called for acts of violence upon Christian communities, upon the Coptic community. And while there may have 

been some debate here or there, there was impunity given to various Islamist leaders that called for those acts of violence. And especially after they lost power in 2013, it became no holds barred, 

and it’s been that way since. 

Mr. HICE. All right. So let’s bring it closer to home. What kinds 

of activities does the Muslim Brotherhood engage in here in the 

United States? Do we know what’s happening here or what kind 

of plans? What can you tell me about that? 


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Mr. SCHANZER. Look, I have to say, I’m not an expert on the 

Muslim Brotherhood here in the United States. I’ve been more focused on the splinter groups and affiliate groups abroad, but what 

we can say is certain groups have been involved in terror finance 

cases. We have seen examples of this. The Holy Land Foundation, 

for example, is sort of a famous one. That was an organization that 

was providing $12 million to Hamas over the course of about a decade, and the Muslim Brotherhood group CAIR was an unindicted 

coconspirator in that case. It had an unspecified role in that case. 

So we have seen examples of this in recent history, but again, 

I think the important thing to note here is that, you know, we need 

to see a certain criteria in order to designate them. In some cases 

we just might see examples of troubling behavior. And this is 

where I think we need to—you know, with all respect to all of my 

panelists—we need to be looking simply at the criteria, not how 

troubled we are about a certain ideology. We need to be—look, 

there is a criteria in the U.S. Government for designation. We go 

after those groups in the U.S. that are in violation of our law and 

we continue to watch those that may be exhibiting some troubling 

behaviors. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Thank you. But by your own admission, you’re 

not an expert of this in the United States. 

Dr. Jasser, let me go back to you. What other radical Islamic 

movements outside of the Muslim Brotherhood should we be concerned about here in the United States? 

Dr. JASSER. Well, it’s interesting, actually. If you look, for example, at the Khomeinists, Hezbollah, Hezbollah was designated a 

terror organization. We had sanctions against Iran for decades. 

That’s one of the reasons there haven’t been as many acts of Shiainspired radical—it’s not because the Hezbollah or the Khomeinists 

in Iran love America, they chant ‘‘Death to America’’ all the time, 

but the sanctions and the inability to fund and build mosques like 

the AKP now is building in Maryland and elsewhere, like the funneling of money from Saudi Arabia—I mean, up until just a few 

months ago, Saudi Arabia was actually intimately involved in this 

threat of the Brotherhood into Europe and in the West. 

So if you look at our own national security incidents, San 

Bernardino, the Boston bombing, Al Awlaki. Al Awlaki came 

through the Muslim Student Association, which was part of the 

mother ships of the Muslim Brotherhood history progeny here in 

the United States that then evolved. Now, Al Awlaki then left the 

Brotherhood ideology to become a Salafi Jihadist and join al-Qaida 

and go to Yemen, but that revolving door of ideology, if you look 

at the radicalization of a lot of Islamists in the United States that 

go from the conveyor belt of nonviolent sort of political 

antiAmerican, antiSemitic political Islam that go towards 

radicalization, it often starts with Brotherhood legacy groups in 

America. 

And I’ll tell you, the Syrian American, the Syrian American 

Council is one of the central parts of that. Its own leadership has 

said its affiliation with the Brotherhood in Syria is one of the reasons the United States ended up funding a lot of radical Islamist 

groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and other radical groups in Syria, because of Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers 


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in the United States that told them, ‘‘Oh, they’re okay,’’ and you 

can find it by doing research, by looking at their Facebook, social 

media posts that sympathize with those groups in Syria. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you. Could you provide this committee with a 

list of all those? 

Dr. JASSER. Absolutely. It’s in my written testimony that was 

submitted, sir. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. All of them? 

Dr. JASSER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Thank you. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. If I may, Mr. Hice, I believe just to expand on Dr. Schanzer’s testimony, there hasn’t been a prosecution 

in the United States of a Hamas affiliate since the Holy Land 

Foundation. 

Is that correct, Jonathan? 

Mr. SCHANZER. No, I don’t believe there has been. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. And that that was in the late 1990s? 

Mr. SCHANZER. That was early 2000s, 2008. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Okay. Early 2000s. 

My point being simply that the Department of Justice and the 

Treasury Department are watching potential terrorist activity, and 

the FBI, of course, very, very vigorously. And I think that the paucity of prosecutions tells a very important story about the lack of 

activity going on in the United States at this time. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I’d like to respond to that for just a moment, because I don’t think that that actually captures the full picture. 

There has not been a designation of a U.S. charity here in the 

United States since 2009. Okay? What it means is, is that we have 

a problem with the system, that we are not looking at charities, 

we’re not looking at the nonprofits that could be in violation of our 

laws. 

I actually believe that during the Obama administration, not to 

make this political, but during those years, the fact that we did not 

have a designation to me is very troubling, because I don’t believe 

that there was no terror finance activity coming out of the U.S. 

So that does not exonerate the Muslim Brotherhood. To me it 

seems as if the system was not working for the last decade, and 

I’m hoping that we get to see a reinvigoration of that system now. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you for that answer and I agree. I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s timed has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Thank you. I’d like to thank you all for being 

here today. 

Ambassador Benjamin, I’ll start with you. You’re affiliated with 

the Brookings Institution. Is that correct? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I’m a nonresident senior fellow there. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. I’m not sure how familiar you are with 

the inner workings of the Brookings Institution, but are you aware 

they’ve taken almost $15 million from the Qatari Government? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I am aware that Brookings has a center 

in Doha and that it has, like many other institutions in the United 

States, accepted funds from foreign governments, including Qatar. 


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Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Do you know why Qatar would be funding 

the Brookings Institution or why they would find it of interest to 

give them $15 million? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. So I don’t want to speak for the institution. I know, because I have participated in it, that Brookings 

hosts, or cohosts, an annual Islamic World Forum, which is held, 

I think, half the time in the United States, half the time in Qatar, 

and brings distinguished speakers from all over the world to talk 

about issues of common interest. 

And as I said before, Brookings has a center in Doha where it 

carries on scholarly activities much like those that it carries on 

here. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. A fellow at the Doha center, this is what 

I’m trying to come around, someone named Saleem Ali, was quoted 

as saying, in The New York Times, if you can believe The New 

York Times, there was a no go zone when it came to criticizing the 

Qatari Government, and the Members of Congress using Brookings 

reports on Qatar should be aware they’re not getting the full story. 

Do you feel that by accepting $15 million, it colors at all the view 

of the Brookings Institution when it comes to talking about Qatar 

and therefore the Muslim Brotherhood? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I worked at Brookings before going into 

the Obama administration. I was the director for the center on the 

U.S. and Europe. We accepted grants from the European Union, 

among others. And I have the highest regard for my fellow scholars 

at Brookings and believe strongly that their views are not influenced by the sources of their funding, in much the same way that 

their views are not influenced by the corporate funding, which is 

another frequent source of funding at Brookings and throughout 

the think tank world, or from foundations, whose leadership may 

have particular views, but those views are not imposed upon the 

scholars. And the think tanks generally in Washington work very 

hard to avoid having the views of their donors appear in their reports. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. I don’t know how big Brookings is, $15 million 

just hits me as kind of a large sum of money. 

And I just wondered, can you speculate on what motive the 

Qatar government, which is sponsoring the Muslim Brotherhood as 

well, what motivation they would have in giving such a large contribution to Brookings? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. In my dealings with the Qataris, which 

has been quite extensive, I know that they are interested in building dialogue between the United States and their country and the 

Muslim world more broadly. And, you know, we see this in many 

other contexts as well. You know, probably the biggest contributor 

to the think tank world is Norway. 

I see no reason to impute any ill intentions to the Qataris here, 

nor would I to the many think tanks that are receiving money from 

the UAE or from the Saudis, whose, you know, opposition to the 

Muslim Brotherhood is very well known right now, even if in, particularly the Saudi case, it’s been anything but consistent. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. I’ll ask either one of the other of you, it’s 

been implied by Mr. Benjamin that the Muslim Brotherhood is just 

kind of an umbrella name and there’s not a lot of coordination beVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:00 Nov 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\31367.TXT APRIL

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tween the Muslim Brotherhood in one country to another. I’d ask 

you to comment on that in general, whichever one of the other 

three wants to comment. 

Mr. FRADKIN. I can say a little bit about that. I think that originally there was a good deal of coordination and there’s a desire for 

there to be such. Over time, it’s been a mixed picture. For a very 

long time, the other Brotherhood chapters looked to the Egyptian 

chapter as the founding chapter. They still cooperate. In the context of the 2011 Arab revolts, people went from Egypt to Tunisia 

to consult with their Brotherhood chapter. Actually, the Tunisians 

recommended that the Egyptian Brotherhood be a little bit more 

restrained. It was good advice, which they didn’t take. And there 

is that kind of thing. 

Because of the situation that was referred to before by Jonathan 

Schanzer, it’s harder for them to coordinate, but they will be looking to coordinate. And one of the issues, one of the relevant considerations, is where they will coordinate from. 

Qatar is one place, because they do support the Brotherhood and 

they provide, in particular, support for Al Jazeera, which is a platform for the most significant Brotherhood cleric, al-Qaradawi, but 

I think actually more important in the near future is going to be 

Turkey, because Turkey is a much bigger country, it’s a more powerful country, and it has the wind in its sails now, or its president 

does. And I think it’s pretty clear he’s acting as if he is going to 

be the godfather to the Brotherhood. He’s provided a safe haven for 

many of the Egyptians who had to flee, Brotherhood and others. 

And what exactly he will do or what they will do under his auspices, I don’t know, but because of the character of Turkey and the 

fact that the government is so completely under the control of its 

president, there is much greater opportunity in the future for coordinating action, I would say. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Thank you. I believe my time is up. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 

I want to again thank our witnesses for appearing before us 

today. The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks for any 

member to submit a written opening statement or questions for the 

record. 

And if there’s no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 


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APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD


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July10, 2.018 

Statement by Ryan Crocker 

Diplomat in Residence, Princeton University 

Former American Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait and Lebanon 

Brotherhood's Global Threat 

1 was a career Foreign Service Officer for 38 years, almost all of it spent in the greater Middle East. 

During those years, ! experienced and interacted with the Muslim Brotherhood in its many forms. My 

observations here reflect that experience. 

First, the Muslim Brotherhood is not a monolithic organization. It is not an organization at all in the 

conventional sense of the term. It has no international headquarters an identifiable global 

leadership. Individual country franchises vary dramatically in their ideology and politics, and especially in 

their attitudes toward political violence. At one extreme of the spectrum would be the Syrian Muslim 

Brothers who carried out a number of lethal bombings throughout the country in the 1970s. At the 

other would be the Muslim Brothers Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq post 2003, the only 

organized Sunni political party was the Brotherhood affiliated Islamic Party. During my time in 

Iraq 2007-2009, we worked dose!y with the Party and its leader, Iraqi Vice President Tariq a!-

Hashimi. 

pose a threat to the national security of 

the United States or its allies, the not be among them. Groups such as 

Hizballah, ai-Qaida and Islamic State do pose that threat and that is our focus should be. While 

groups such as ai-Qaida and Egyptian 

ideological/theocratic underpinnings through the writings 

Qutb (executed the Egyptian government 

leader Ayman al- Zawahlri, himself an Egyptian, has denounced the Brothers as apostates precisely 

because they have renounced violence and chose to work within the system. 

Third, while traditional U.S. allies in the region such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 

have outlawed the Brothers, we need to understand that sometimes their threat perceptions 

differ considerably from In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers post-Mubarak elections 

and governed until they were overthrown is current 

regime fears, not a non-existent engagement Saudi the government has 

made a deal with the Salafist movement, arguably more extreme than the Muslim Brotherhood, 

whereby the government seek to break any rival political organization exchange for a Sa!afl 

pledge not to conduct violent actions inside the kingdom. These a!iles have their own reasons to 

suppress opposition movements; we do not share them. Simply put, the Muslim Brothers do not 

threaten the United States. We should not treat them as though they did- we have enough real 

enemies. 

Fourth, just as we understand nature Brotherhood 

organizations in the region, we need to act in cases where there is convincing evidence of involvement 

by groups and individuals in acts of terror. The previous Administrations have pursued this 

approach, is the right one. One size 
89 

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