U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–326PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

THE ELECTRIC GRID 

OF THE FUTURE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 7, 2018 

Serial No. 115–63 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

ANDY BIGGS, Arizona 

ROGER W. MARSHALL, Kansas 

NEAL P. DUNN, Florida 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina 

DEBBIE LESKO, Arizona 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

MARK TAKANO, California 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CHARLIE CRIST, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY

HON. RANDY K. WEBER, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

NEAL P. DUNN, Florida 

RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas, Ranking Member 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

MARK TAKANO, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

June 7, 2018 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Randy K. Weber, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Energy, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 4 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 6 

Statement by Representative Marc A. Veasey, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 8 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Statement by Representative Lamar Smith, Chairman, Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................... 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable Bruce J. Walker, Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity 

Delivery and Energy Reliability, Department of Energy; Acting Assistant 

Secretary, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Department of Energy 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 19 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22 

Dr. John Sarrao, Principal Associate Director, Science, Technology, and Engineering Directorate, Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 28 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 30 

Mr. Robert Gramlich, President, Grid Strategies, LLC. 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 37 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 39 

Dr. Joseph A. Heppert, Vice President for Research, Texas Tech University 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 55 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 57 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 61 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

The Honorable Bruce J. Walker, Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity 

Delivery and Energy Reliability, Department of Energy; Acting Assistant 

Secretary, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Department of Energy ............................................................................ 74 

Dr. John Sarrao, Principal Associate Director, Science, Technology, and Engineering Directorate, Los Alamos National Laboratory ..................................... 80 

Mr. Robert Gramlich, President, Grid Strategies, LLC. ....................................... 82 
Page

IV 

Dr. Joseph A. Heppert, Vice President for Research, Texas Tech University .... 89 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Document submitted by Representative Donald S. Beyer, Jr., Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 94 
(1) 

THE ELECTRIC GRID OF THE FUTURE 

THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 2018 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:07 p.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Randy Weber 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
2 

L!IMAR S SMITH Texas 

\:!-'AiRMAN 

Q:ongrrns of the ilnitcd ~tatcs 

t'lousc of 1Rcprcsrntatiucs COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

2321 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUiLDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6301 

225-6371 

Subcommittee on Energy 

The Electric Grid of the Future 

Thursday, June 7, 2018 

1:00p.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

Witnesses 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON. Texas 

RANKING MEMBER 

The Honorable Bruce Walker, Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity Delivery 

and Energy Reliability, Department of Energy; Acting Assistant Secretary, Office 

of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Department of 

Energy 

Dr. John Sarrao, Principal Associate Director, Science, Technology, and 

Engineering Directorate, Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Mr. Robert Gramlich, President, Grid Strategies, LLC 

Dr. Joseph Reppert, Vice President for Research, Texas Tech University 
3 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HEARING CHARTER 

Thursday, June 7, 2018 

TO: Members, Subcommittee on Energy 

FROM: Majority Staff, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

SUBJECT: Subcommittee hearing: "The Electric Grid of the Future" 

The Subcommittee on Energy will hold a hearing The Electric Grid of the Future on Thursday, 

June 7, 2018, at 1:00 p.m. in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building. 

Hearing Purpose: 

The purpose of the hearing is to examine research programs and priorities within the Office of 

Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE). OE's research focuses on electrical grid 

modernization, the development of next-generation battery and grid-scale energy storage technologies, 

and improving grid reliability, grid resilience, and cybersecurity. The hearing will also explore 

cooperative research between industry, academia, and the Department of Energy (DOE) national 

laboratories, including through the DOE Grid Modernization Initiative and corresponding lab 

partnership titled the Grid Modernization Lab Consortium (GMLC). 

Witness List 

• The Honorable Bruce J. Walker, Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 

Reliability, Department of Energy; Acting Assistant Secretary, Office ofCybersecurity, Energy 

Security, and Emergency Response, Department of Energy 

• Dr. John Sarrao, Principal Associate Director, Science, Technology, and Engineering Directorate, 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

• Mr. Robert Gramlich, President, Grid Strategies, LLC. 

• Dr. Joseph A. Reppert, Vice President for Research, Texas Tech University 

Staff Contact 

For questions related to the hearing, please contact Jimmy Ward of the Majority Staff at 202-

225-0222. 
4 

Chairman WEBER. The Subcommittee on Energy will come to 

order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses 

of the Subcommittee at any time. 

Welcome to today’s hearing titled ‘‘The Electric Grid of the Future.’’ I now recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

And by the way, we may have votes called just in short order, 

so we’re going to probably be a little quicker than normal here, not 

that anything we do here is very normal. 

Today, we will hear from the Department of Energy (DOE), Los 

Alamos National Laboratory, the private sector, and Texas Tech 

University on research for creating the electric grid of the future. 

The goal of this research is to ensure energy delivery systems are 

reliable, resilient, and secure. A reliable grid delivers energy to 

consumers and businesses on demand regardless of the energy 

sources. A resilient grid keeps the energy flowing during an adverse event, such as a hurricane, and ensures a restoration of energy once an outage has occurred. A secure grid protects our energy 

infrastructure from hostile disruptions due to physical or 

cyberattacks, which are a growing risk as more industrial control 

systems are connected online. 

The DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability 

(OE) is leading the early-stage research and development programs 

that promise to deliver advancements in grid technology. Small but 

mighty, OE has the least amount of funding for applied energy programs at DOE but carries out a vital mission through partnerships 

with industry and research conducted by the national labs. 

Los Alamos applies science expertise in physics, network science, 

algorithms, and applied mathematics to develop computational 

modeling and data analytics to help optimize modern electrical 

grids. Los Alamos developed these capabilities through its nuclear 

weapons mission. This kind of basic science expertise—with multidisciplinary applications—is part of what makes the national lab 

system an incubator for new technologies and continues to advance 

research beyond its originally intended goals. 

Academia and industry are also partners on grid modernization 

research. Texas Tech University hosts the Global Laboratory for 

Energy Asset Management and Manufacturing, or GLEAMM, facility that works to develop innovative power technologies and advance next-generation energy delivery technology. GLEAMM focuses on wind, solar, battery storage, cybersecurity, and microgrid 

technologies that will all encompass the electrical grid of the future. 

Advanced grid technologies can have a significant impact when 

the grid is faced with weather-related events that can threaten reliability. This month brings the official start of the 2018 hurricane 

season, and last year, communities in my home State of Texas, as 

well as Florida and Puerto Rico, lost power. Modern grid technology in Texas, such as the use of smart meters, were able to 

identify power outages and quickly help restore power after Hurricane Harvey. 

Unfortunately, while they have made significant progress rebuilding capabilities, there are still communities in Puerto Rico 

without power. That’s why DOE, OE, and five national labs led by 
5 

Argonne National Laboratory are working daily to provide grid 

modeling tools to Puerto Rico. The national labs are combining 

their current skills and capabilities in order to help Puerto Rico to 

plan, to operate, and to rebuild a more resilient grid. These models 

help grid operators better predict where the highest risk of power 

disruption could be and determine the potential impacts on critical 

power loads that support Puerto Rico’s public health and its safety 

infrastructure. 

The national labs hope by improving existing grid models the island will be able to make key investments in resilient energy infrastructure before the current hurricane season. Additional analysis 

will inform Puerto Rico on long-term investment priorities for electrical transmission, distribution, renewable energy, battery storage, 

microgrids, and strategic power reserves. 

The partnership between the federal government, the national 

labs, academia, and industry has the potential to transform energy 

delivery systems. As we continue supporting advanced grid research, I would like to learn more about how DOE can improve the 

development of new technology and our understanding of electrical 

systems. 

I want to thank our panel of witnesses for their testimony today, 

and I look forward to a positive discussion about grid modernization research. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Weber follows:] 
6 

For Immediate Release 

June 7, 2018 

Media Contacts: Thea McDonald, Bridget Dunn 

(202) 225-6371 

Statement by Chairman Randy Weber (R-Texas) 

The Electric Grid of the Future 

Chairman Weber: Today, we will hear from the Department of Energy (DOE), Los Alamos 

National Laboratory, the private sector and Texas Tech University on research for creating 

the electric grid of the future, 

The goal of this research is to ensure energy delivery systems are reliable, resilient and secure, 

A reliable grid delivers energy to consumers and businesses on demand regardless of the 

energy sources, A resilient grid keeps the energy flowing during an adverse event, such as a 

hurricane, and ensures a restoration of energy once an outage has occurred, 

A secure grid protects our energy infrastructure from hostile disruptions due to physical or 

cyberattacks, which are a growing risk as more industrial control systems are connected 

online, 

The DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) is leading the early-stage 

research and development programs that promise to deliver advancements in grid 

technology, Small but mighty, OE has the least amount of funding for applied energy 

programs at DOE, but carries out a vital mission through partnerships with industry and 

research conducted by the national labs, 

Los Alamos applies science expertise in physics, network science, algorithms and applied 

mathematics to develop computational modeling and data analytics to help optimize 

modern electrical grids, 

Los Alamos developed these capabilities through its nuclear weapons mission, This kind of 

basic science expertise-with multi-disciplinary applications-is part of what makes the 

national lab system an incubator for new technologies, and continues to advance research 

beyond its originally intended goals, 

Academia and industry are also partners on grid modernization research, Texas Tech 

University hosts the Global Laboratory for Energy Asset Management and Manufacturing 

(GLEAMM) facility that works to develop innovative power technologies and advance nextgeneration energy delivery technology, GLEAMM focuses on wind, solar, battery storage, 

cybersecurity and microgrid technologies that will all encompass the electrical grid of the 

future, 

Advanced grid technologies can have a significant impact when the grid is faced with 

weather related events that can threaten reliability, This month brings the official start of the 
7 

2018 hurricane season, and last year. communities in my home state of Texas. as well as 

Florida and Puerto Rico lost power. Modern grid technology in Texas. such as the use of smart 

meters. were able to identify power outages and quickly restore power after Hurricane 

Harvey. 

Unfortunately, while they have made significant progress rebuilding capabilities, there are still 

communities in Puerto Rico without power. That's why DOE, OE and five national labs led by 

Argonne National Laboratory are working daily to provide grid modeling tools to Puerto Rico. 

The national labs are combining their current skills and capabilities in order to help Puerto 

Rico to plan, operate and rebuild a more resilient grid. These models help grid operators 

better predict where the highest risk of power disruption could be, and determine the 

potential impacts on critical powefloads that support Puerto Rico's public health and safety 

infrastructure. 

The national labs hope by improving existing grid models. the island will be able to make key 

investments in resilient energy infrastructure before the current hurricane season. 

Additional analysis will inform Puerto Rico on long term investment priorities for electrical 

transmission. distribution. renewable energy, battery storage, microgrids and strategic power 

reserves. 

The partnership between the federal government, the national labs, academia and industry 

has the potential to transform energy delivery systems. As we continue supporting advanced 

grid research, I would like to learn more about how DOE can improve the development of 

new technology and our understanding of electrical systems. 

I want to thank our panel of witnesses for their testimony today, and I look forward to a 

positive discussion about grid modernization research. 

### 
8 

Chairman WEBER. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the 

Subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Veasey, for an opening statement. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my fellow Texan, 

and everyone else that is here today, our distinguished panel. 

Just last week, I want to remind everybody that a White House 

memo was leaked that raised several questions. It detailed a plan 

to direct the Energy Secretary, also from Texas, to use authorities 

vested in him from the Federal Power Act and the Defense Production Act to save coal and nuclear power plants. Section 202 of the 

Federal Power Act has historically been used to address energy 

supply concerns related to natural disasters, other major energy 

shortages. Likewise, the Defense Production Act is a Cold-War-era 

statute that allows the President to nationalize elements of U.S. industry in the interest of national security. 

This proposal has been roundly criticized by a wide range of 

trusted independent experts, including Wall Street Journal editorial page, as poorly justified and legally dubious. Our utilities, 

States, and researchers do the hard work of hardening our energy 

infrastructure to cybersecurity threats and national disasters, and 

meanwhile, the Trump Administration is inventing emergencies to 

bail out coal and nuclear plants while ignoring the real problems. 

I’m sure the White House views this legal loophole that surfaced 

in the leaked memo as an easy way to try to fulfill campaign promises, which is very bad and very unsound when it comes to energy 

policy. However, the real impact has not been thought through by 

the Administration. 

It would wreak havoc on our energy markets and create a number of misaligned incentives. As severe weather, driven by climate 

change, becomes more intense and damaging to the electric grid, 

this Administration wants to address the problem by offering financial bailouts and picking winners and losers as it relates to coal, 

and any reasonable person would agree that this seems backward. 

Moreover, it wouldn’t do anything to make the electric grid more 

resilient. 

The grid experts that have examined the issue would characterize our nation’s priorities far differently than this politically motivated Administration does. That is why FERC unanimously—they 

unanimously rejected Secretary Perry’s last proposal to bail out 

coal and nuclear power plants. And while the Trump Administration works with coal CEOs to craft a plan to benefit the industry’s 

bottom dollar, the American people are being left behind. 

And I look forward to hearing today from Mr. Gramlich today on 

his recent report titled ‘‘A Customer-Focused Framework for Electric System Resilience.’’ I can’t think of a better way to approach 

this issue. The purpose of the electric grid is to provide reliable, affordable power to customers. Any conversation that does not first 

consider the customer is not worth having. 

And while I am critical of these actions by Secretary Perry on 

grid resilience, I want to be clear that I strongly support developing 

advanced technologies to enable carbon capture on coal-fired power 

plants and the next generation of nuclear reactors. In fact, I just 

introduced a bipartisan bill, H.R. 5745, the Fossil Energy Research 

and Development Act of 2018, that would authorize activities to 
9 

support the development of technologies and methods for carbon 

capture, storage, utilization, and removal. It is the most comprehensive legislative proposal for fossil energy research in Congress today. So I certainly have no issues with federal support for 

these energy options. I just think that we need to be a lot smarter 

about how we approach these issues. 

We’re very fortunate to have Assistant Secretary Bruce Walker 

with us today. I look forward to hearing justifications for the actions proposed by Secretary Perry in the White House memo, as it 

was proposed to FERC. I also look forward to hearing your priorities for the Office of Electricity. 

In the fiscal year 2019 budget proposal, the Administration requested a severe 37 percent cut to the Office of Electricity and reorganization of these investments. I’m sure we’ll discuss that here 

shortly. And again, while I’m not opposed to the reorganization in 

concept, I’m curious how splitting DOE’s smallest energy technology offices into two offices will ensure that these activities continue to be a priority in years to come. 

And before I close, I also would like to take some personal privilege to note that, unfortunately, this will be the last time that Joe 

Flarida will be staffing us here on the Committee at least in this 

Congress. That’s because he recently won the Bosch Foundation 

Fellowship and will be heading to Germany in a few weeks. I know 

that staff on both sides of the aisle recognize that Joe has done a 

tremendous job for the Subcommittee in his time here. 

Sehr gut, Herr Flarida. Auf wiedersehen. And we look forward 

to seeing you when you come back. 

He played a very key role in negotiating a bipartisan, bicameral 

legislative package, the Department of Energy Research and Innovation Act, that has since passed the House and is now advancing 

in the Senate. And he was the lead staffer in developing and vetting language for the fossil energy research bill that I previously 

mentioned. That bill has now been endorsed by a broad and impressive coalition of stakeholders, and I know that would not have 

happened without all the hard work that Joe put into this effort. 

We wish you luck, and I hope that we can find a way to work 

together again. And I know you’re going to have a great opportunity overseas. Congratulations, Joe. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Veasey follows:] 
10 

OPENING STATEMENT 

Ranking Member Marc Veasey (D-TX) 

of the Subcommittee on Energy 

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Energy 

"The Electric Grid of the Future" 

June7, 2018 

Good afternoon and thank you Chairman Weber for holding this important hearing. I would 

also like to thank this distinguished panel of witnesses for being here today. 

Just last week, a White House memo was leaked that raises several questions. It detailed a 

plan to direct the Energy Secretary to use authorities vested in him from the Federal Power 

Act and the Defense Production Act to save money-losing coal and nuclear power plants. 

Section 202 of the Federal Power Act has historically been used to address energy supply 

concerns related to natural disasters or other major energy shortages. Likewise, the Defense 

Production Act is a Cold War-era statute that allows the President to nationalize elements of 

U.S. industry in the interest of national security. This proposal has been roundly criticized by 

a wide range of trusted, independent experts as poorly justified and legally dubious. 

Our utilities, states, and researchers do the hard work of hardening our energy infrastructure 

to cybersecurity threats and natural disasters. Meanwhile, the Trump Administration is 

inventing emergencies to bail out uneconomic coal and nuclear plants while ignoring the real 

problems. 

I am sure the White House views this legal loophole that surfaced in the leaked memo as an 

easy way to fulfill the President's campaign promise of bringing back coal. However, the real 

impact has not been thought through by the administration. It would wreak havoc on our 

energy markets and create a number of misaligned incentives. 

As severe weather driven by climate change becomes more intense and damaging to the 

electric grid, this Administration wants to address that problem by offering financial bailouts 

to money-losing coal plants. Coal plants, I'll note, that have always been the heaviest C02 

emitters in the power sector. Any reasonable person would agree that this seems backwards. 

Moreover, it wouldn't do anything to make the electric grid more resilient. The grid experts 

that have examined the issue would characterize our nation's priorities far differently than 

this politically motivated administration does. This is why FERC unanimously rejected 

Secretary Perry's last proposal to bail out uneconomic coal and nuclear plants. 

While the Trump Administration works with coal CEOs to craft a plan to benefit the 

industry's bottom dollar, the American people are being left behind. 

I look forward to hearing from Mr. Gramlich today on his recent report titled "A Customerfocused Framework for Electric System Resilience." I can't think of a better way to approach 

this issue. The purpose of the electric grid is to provide reliable, affordable power to 
11 

customers. Any conversation that does not first consider the customer is not one worth 

having. 

While I am very critical of these actions by Secretary Perry on grid resilience, I want to be 

clear that I strongly support developing advanced technologies to enable carbon capture on 

coal-fued power plants and the next generation of nuclear reactors. In fact, I just introduced a 

bipartisan bill- H.R. 5745, the Fossil Energy Research and Development Act of2018- that 

would authorize activities to support the development of technologies and methods for 

carbon capture, storage, utilization, and removal. It is the most comprehensive legislative 

proposal for fossil energy research in Congress today. 

So, I certainly have no issues with federal support for these energy options. I just think we 

need to be a lot smarter about our approach to addressing these issues. 

We are fortunate to have Assistant Secretary Bruce Walker with us today. I look forward to 

hearing your justifications for the actions proposed in the White House memo and Secretary 

Perry's proposal to FERC. I also look forward to hearing your priorities for the Office of 

Electricity. In the FY 2019 budget proposal, this Administration requested a severe 37% cut 

to the Office of Electricity and a reorganization of these investments. I'm sure we'll discuss 

further shortly. While I am not opposed to this reorganization in concept, I am curious how 

splitting DOE's smallest energy technology office into two offices will ensure that these 

activities continue to be a priority in the years ahead. 

Thank you again to the witnesses for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 
12 

Chairman WEBER. Thank you. I’m not sure what you said in German, but I did speak with Joe a few weeks back about them going 

over there and told him he needs to learn to speak German, but, 

more importantly, since they’re thinking about starting a family, he 

better learn to speak wife. I’m just saying. So thank you, Mr. 

Veasey. 

I now recognize the Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Smith. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Subcommittee today is going to examine the Department of 

Energy’s effort to modernize the electrical grid, and I very much 

look forward to hearing what our witnesses have to say on that 

subject. 

DOE, our national laboratories, and universities across the country are working to develop next-generation technologies that will 

make up our future electric grid. This critical research and development will help address vulnerabilities that range from cyberattacks 

to natural disasters. 

Another challenge is developing grid-scale battery storage and incorporating that into our electric grid. Renewable energy and distributed energy resources are changing the way electricity is produced and delivered throughout the nation. These energy sources 

are intermittent and depend on the sun to shine and the wind to 

blow. Without the capacity to efficiently store the energy produced 

from renewable energy, these resources can only make a minimal 

contribution to America’s electricity needs. Energy storage is the 

key to modernizing the grid without sacrificing reliability. 

My home State of Texas offers a ready example of the impact 

battery storage could have on harnessing renewable power. Texas 

is the top wind-producing State in the country, so it’s no surprise 

that Sandia National Laboratory chose to partner with Texas Tech 

University on a wind-energy field testing site in Lubbock, Texas. 

The Scaled Wind Farm Technology Facility, or SWiFT, brings together academia, industry, and the expertise found only at the national laboratories to test and develop wind energy technology. 

While SWiFT’s primary objectives are to improve wind turbine performance and the efficiency of wind energy production, SWiFT also 

provides a testbed for supporting wind power with battery technology. 

Researchers at SWiFT are testing different battery chemistries 

and designs to harness the power of wind energy on demand. 

Breakthroughs in grid-scale battery storage technology will help incorporate renewable energy resources into the nation’s energy mix. 

But scaling up batteries will necessitate addressing cost, efficiency, 

and size limitation problems. DOE research and development can 

provide these solutions and build the foundation for the next fundamental breakthrough in modern grid technology. 

And DOE continues to prioritize the Grid Modernization Initiative, a crosscutting research program that harnesses the skillsets 

of individual labs to develop new grid technologies. At Los Alamos 

National Laboratory, home to one of today’s witnesses, researchers 

are developing new power system designs that will improve the reliability and resiliency of the grid. With the technical expertise developed through its nuclear weapons program, Los Alamos uses ap-
13 

plied mathematics and advanced modeling capabilities to research 

multiple energy resource delivery systems. 

The national laboratories are also home to the Joint Center for 

Energy Storage Research Energy Innovation Hub. The DOE hub 

brings scientists, engineers, and manufacturers together in order to 

develop transformative energy storage technologies. H.R. 589, the 

DOE Research and Innovation Act, has passed the House and authorizes the Department of Energy Energy Innovation Hub program to continue this important collaborative research effort. By 

developing a better battery, national labs and universities can help 

the private sector lead the way and bring battery storage technology to the energy marketplace. This early-stage research will 

help create a modern, reliable, resilient grid, and that’s what we 

all need in this country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I’ll yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Smith follows:] 
14 

COMMITTEE ON 

SCIENCE, SPACE, & TECHNOLOGY Lamar Smith, Chairman 

For Immediate Release 

June 7, 2018 

Media Contacts: Thea McDonald, Bridget Dunn 

(202) 225-6371 

Statement by Chairman Lamar Smith (R-Texas) 

The Electric Grid of the Future 

Chairman Smith: Today, the Subcommittee on Energy will examine the Department of 

Energy's (DOE) effort to modernize the electrical grid. 

DOE, our national laboratories and universities across the country are working to develop 

next generation technologies that will make up our future electric grid. This critical research 

and development will help address vulnerabilities that range from cyberattacks to natural 

disasters. 

Another challenge is developing grid-scale battery storage and incorporating it into our 

electric grid. 

Renewable energy and distributed energy resources are changing the way electricity is 

produced and delivered throughout the nation. These energy sources are intermittent and 

depend on the sun to shine and the wind to blow. 

Without the capacity to efficiently store the energy produced from renewable energy, these 

resources can only make a minimal contribution to America's electricity needs. Energy 

storage is the key to modernizing the grid without sacrificing reliability. 

My home state of Texas offers a ready example of the impact battery storage could have 

on harnessing renewable power. 

Texas is the top wind producing state in the country. So it's no surprise that Sandia National 

Laboratory chose to partner with Texas Tech University on a wind-energy field testing site in 

Lubbock, Texas. 

The Scaled Wind Farm Technology Facility, or SWiFT, brings together academia, industry and 

the expertise found only at the national laboratories to test and develop wind energy 

technology, 

While SWiFT's primary objectives are to improve wind turbine performance and the efficiency 

of wind energy production, SWiFT also provides a testbed for supporting wind power with 

battery technology. 

Researchers at SWiFT are testing different battery chemistries and designs to harness the 

power of wind energy on demand. 
15 

Breakthroughs in grid-scale battery storage technology will help incorporate renewable 

energy resources into the nation's energy mix. But scaling up batteries will necessitate 

addressing cost. efficiency and size limitation problems. 

DOE research and development can provide these solutions, and build the foundation for 

the next fundamental breakthrough in modern grid technology. And DOE continues to 

prioritize the Grid Modernization Initiative, a crosscutting research program that harnesses 

the skillsets of individual labs to develop new grid technologies. 

At Los Alamos National Laboratory, home to one of today's witnesses, researchers are 

developing new power system designs that will improve the reliability and resiliency of the 

grid. With the technical expertise developed through its nuclear weapons program, Los 

Alamos uses applied mathematics and advanced modeling capabilities to research multiple 

energy resource delivery systems. 

The national laboratories are also home to the Joint Center for Energy Storage Research (JCESR) Energy Innovation Hub. 

This DOE hub brings scientists, engineers and manufacturers together in order to develop 

transformative energy storage technologies. H.R. 589, the DOE Research and Innovation Act, 

has passed the House and authorizes the DOE Energy Innovation Hub program to continue 

this important collaborative research effort. 

By developing a better battery, national labs and universities can help the private sector 

lead the way and bring battery storage technology to the energy marketplace. 

This early~stage research will help create a modern, reliable and resilient grid. 

### 
16 

Chairman WEBER. I thank the gentleman for yielding back. 

It is now my distinct privilege to yield to the Ranking Member 

of the full committee, Ms. Johnson. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me get 

my breath. 

Let me thank all the witnesses for being here today. DOE’s Office of Electricity support programs that are critical to improving 

the flexibility and reliability to our electric grid while also enabling 

a broad range of clean energy resources to play a far larger role 

in our nation’s power and transportation sectors. This is another 

reason that I’m so concerned about the Administration’s budget 

proposal for the Department, which would cut funding for this office by 37 percent, and that overall cuts includes 62 percent cut to 

clean energy transmission and reliability, a 74 percent cut to smart 

grid research, and an 81 percent energy storage R&D. 

Despite the fact that Secretary Perry has now referred to energy 

storage as the Holy Grail of energy in several Congressional hearings, these large proposed cuts to energy reliability and resilience 

research are also curious in light of several recent proposals made 

by the Secretary to take unprecedented urgent actions that would 

prop up uneconomic power plants under the guise of ensuring the 

reliability and resilience of our electric grid. 

Independent experts across the political spectrum have 

resoundedly rejected these proposals in favor of far more rigorous, 

well-justified approach to addressing these issues, while continuing 

to make substantial progress toward our nation’s clean energy future. And I believe Mr. Gramlich will be able to discuss more—in 

more detail. There’s no reason that we can’t have a secure, clean, 

reliable, and resilient energy sector that takes advantage of a 

broad range of our resource and technology options, including renewables, energy storage, nuclear power, and fossil fuels with carbon capture without going to such an extreme of ill-conceived 

lengths to save one particular resource at the expense of the others. 

Lastly, I’d like to take this opportunity to note sadly that this 

will be the Committee’s last hearing staffed by Joe Flarida at least 

for now. He will—he’s worked for us over the last five years, started out as an intern, and rising to become one of the top staffers 

of our Energy Subcommittee team. He’s done an outstanding job. 

He’s the son of a nurse. He’s a highly professional—he’s done highly professional work throughout his time on the Committee, including developing several substantive, well-vetted, bipartisan legislative proposals that I’m confident will continue to advance even as 

he moves to bigger and better things. 

He’s leaving because he’s won the prestigious Bosch Foundation 

Fellowship. In a few weeks, he’ll be moving to Germany for one 

year. And I’d like to congratulate you, Joe, and wish you well and 

hope you’ll come back to see us after you’ve made our country 

proud. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:] 
17 

OPENING STATEMENT 

Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX) 

Conunittee on Science, Space, and Technology 

The Electric Grid of the Future 

Energy Subconunittee Hearing 

June 7, 2018 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing, and I would like to thank each of the 

witnesses for being here today. , 

DOE's Office of Electricity supports programs that are critical to improving the flexibility and 

reliability of our electric grid, while also enabling a broad range of clean energy resources to 

play a far larger role in our nation's power and transportation sectors. 

This is another reason that I am so concerned about the Administration's budget proposal for the 

Department, which would cut funding for this office by 37 percent. And that overall cut includes 

a 62% cut to clean energy transmission and reliability, a 74% cut to smart grid research, and an 

81% energy storage R&D - despite the fact that Secretary Perry has now referred to energy 

storage as the ''holy grail" of energy in several Congressional hearings. 

These large proposed cuts to energy reliability and resilience research are also curious in light of 

several recent proposals made by the Secretary to take unprecedented, urgent actions that would 

prop up uneconomic power plants under the guise of ensuring the reliability and resilience of our 

electric grid. Independent experts across the political spectrum have resoundingly rejected these 

proposals in favor of a far more rigorous, well-justified approach to addressing these issues, 

while continuing to make substantial progress toward our nation's clean energy future. 

As I believe Mr. Gramlich will be able to discuss in more detail, there is no reason that we can't 

have a secure, clean, reliable, and resilient energy sector that takes advantage of a broad range of 

our resource and technology options, including renewables, energy storage, nuclear power, and 

fossil fuels with carbon capture, without going to such extreme, ill-conceived lengths to save one 

particular resource at the expense of the others. 

Lastly, I would like to take this opportunity to note that, sadly, this will be the Committee's last 

hearing staffed by Joe Flarida- at least for now. Joe has worked for us for over 5 years, starting 

out as an intern and rising to become one of the top staffers on our Energy Subcommittee team. 

Joe has done outstanding, highly professional work throughout his time on the Committee, 

including developing several substantive, well-vetted, bipartisan legislative proposals that I am 

confident will continue to advance even as he moves on to bigger and better things. Joe is 

leaving because he's won the prestigious Bosch Foundation Fellowship, and in a few weeks he 

will be moving to Germany for a year. Joe, I'd like to congratulate you, wish you well, and say 

that I know you'll do our country proud. 

With that I yield back. 
18 

Chairman WEBER. The gentlelady yields back, and I do echo her 

comments. Can we all give Joe a hand? 

[Applause.] 

Chairman WEBER. I will introduce the witnesses. Our first witness today is Hon. Bruce Walker, the Department Of Energy’s Assistant Secretary for the Office of Electricity and the Acting Assistant Secretary for the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and 

Emergency Response. Assistant Secretary Walker has more than 

25 years of electric utility experience, previously working as the 

Vice President of Asset Strategy and Policy at National Grid and 

Director of Corporate and Emergency Management at Consolidated 

Edison of New York. He is the founder of Modern Energy Insights, 

Inc., and the cofounder of Global Smart Grid Federation. Assistant 

Secretary Walker has served as a member of DOE’s Electricity Advisory Committee, an advisory committee for the Megawatt-Scale 

Integration Lab, and was a member of GridWise Alliance, Incorporated. 

He was confirmed as Assistant Secretary by the United States 

Senate in October of 2017. He holds a bachelor of electrical engineering from Manhattan College and a juris doctorate in law from 

Pace University where he was the technical editor on the Environmental Law Review. Welcome, Mr. Walker. 

Our next witness is Dr. John Sarrao—am I saying that right? 

Okay—the Principal Director for Science, Technology, and Engineering at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Previously, Dr. Sarrao 

was the Program Director for Los Alamos Office of Science Programs and Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes facility. 

From 2013 to 2018, he served as LANL’s Associate Director for 

Theory, Simulation, and Computation where he applied sciencebased predictions to existing and emerging national security missions. 

Dr. Sarrao has held a number of leadership positions within 

LANL’s materials community, including Division Leader of the Materials, Physics, and Application Division and Group Leader of Condensed Matter and Thermal Physics. He has also served on a number of DOE Basic Energy Sciences Advisory Committees (BESAC) 

subcommittees, helping to set strategic directions for materials research. 

Dr. Sarrao is a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Physical Society, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He received his Ph.D. in physics from the 

University of California Los Angeles. Welcome, Doctor. 

Mr. Rob Gramlich, our next witness, is President of Grid Strategies, LLC. Prior to his current position, Mr. Gramlich oversaw 

transmission policy at the American Wind Energy Association as 

Senior Vice President for Government and Public Affairs, Interim 

CEO, and Policy Director. He was Economic Advisor to FERC 

Chairman Pat Wood, III, from 2001 to 2005. He has served on advisory committees for the United States Department of Energy and 

the North American Energy Standards Board as Vice Chair of the 

Business Council for Sustainable Energy and as Interim Executive 

Director of the Wind Energy Foundation. 

Mr. Gramlich has been the recipient of Energy Systems Integration Group Award, American Wind Energy Association’s Technical 
19 

Achievement Award, and the FERC’s Exemplar of Public Service 

Award. He received a bachelor of arts with honors in economics 

from Colby College and a master of public policy from the University of California Berkeley. Welcome, Mr. Gramlich. 

I now recognize the Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Smith, 

to introduce our last witness. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

being able to introduce our last witness today, and that is Dr. Joseph Heppert, who is Vice President for Research at Texas Tech 

University. It so happens that my district includes Fredericksburg, 

Texas, which has a satellite campus of Texas Tech with about 200 

students, and believe me, I leverage that to the maximum extent 

possible. 

We are glad to welcome Dr. Heppert today to hear about how 

Texas Tech is contributing to research that benefits the electric 

grid. Previously, Dr. Heppert served as Associate Vice Chancellor 

for Research at the University of Kansas. He also chaired KU’s 

Chemistry Department and was the founding Director of the University Center for Science Education. 

Dr. Heppert has been active in projects to improve science teaching and science teacher preparation and is the past Chair of the 

American Chemical Society’s Committee on Education. He is a fellow of the American Chemical Society and currently serves as 

Chair of the American Chemical Society’s Committee on Budget 

and Finance. 

Dr. Heppert received a bachelor of science in chemistry from San 

Jose State University and a Ph.D. in inorganic chemistry, often 

thought to be the toughest subject, from the University of Wisconsin Madison. 

Dr. Heppert, we welcome you and appreciate what Texas Tech is 

doing. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 

all the witnesses for being here today. 

I now recognize Assistant Secretary Walker for five minutes to 

present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE BRUCE J. WALKER, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY 

AND ENERGY RELIABILITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; 

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF CYBERSECURITY, 

ENERGY SECURITY, AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Weber, Chairman 

Smith, Ranking Member Veasey, and Ranking Member Johnson, 

and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the 

opportunity today to discuss the priorities and research programs 

within the Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity and Office 

of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Restoration. 

The Department of Energy is focused on ensuring that the energy infrastructure is capable of securing our national security. 

Therefore, the resilience and reliability of the nation’s electric grid 

is of the utmost importance. OE and CESER collaborate with in-
20 

dustry, academia, state and local governments, and other energy 

sector stakeholders on numerous research and development programs to achieve these objectives. 

Using the definitions set forth in the Presidential Policy Directive 21, resilience is defined as, ‘‘the ability to prepare for and 

adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly 

from disruption. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring 

threats or incidents.’’ 

DOE, which is a national security agency with a comprehensive 

intelligence community-informed view of resilience, recognizes that 

the energy sector has been the main focus of cyber and physical 

threat attacks. I will seek to highlight the actions we at DOE are 

taking to address the very real risks we face. 

First, the former Office of Electricity Delivery and Reliability has 

been divided into two separate departments in order to significantly increase the focus commensurate with the known risk of 

cyber and physical threats, thereby creating the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, as well as the 

Office of Electricity. 

My office’s first priority is the creation of a North American Energy System Resiliency model. This model capitalizes on previous 

national lab work and is being leveraged to fully understand the 

resiliency risks associated with operating a highly diversified, regionally isolated grid that supplies electric energy for North America. Most importantly, the model will include analysis regarding 

the significant interdependencies that have evolved over the last 

couple decades between the various energy infrastructures. 

Significantly, the model will highlight where there are strategic 

opportunities for specific capabilities offered by certain types of infrastructure, for example, energy storage for frequency control. 

Most importantly, from DOE’s vantage point, the model will inform 

national security investments that will improve our overall resiliency capability. 

Another priority for OE is to revolutionize sensing technology 

utilization. The goal is to use high-fidelity, reasonable cost-sensing 

technology to integrate near real-time data into the North American grid model. We will also be able to use signature recognition 

and correlation modeling informed by artificial intelligence and machine-to-machine learning to significantly improve the performance 

of the grid. Furthermore, these efforts will enable strategic investments by highlighting system vulnerabilities and enhance the integration of distributed energy resources in the use of microgrids and 

energy storage. 

Storage, the Holy Grail of energy, has a huge role to play in national security. There are various initiatives within DOE focused 

on storage from pump storage to flow batteries. There has never 

been a time where the availability of megawatt-scale storage has 

been more important. OE is pursuing storage technology capable of 

providing reactive and real-power control for bulk and distribution 

power systems, as well as frequency control. 

Working with the national laboratories, OE is pursuing three 

high-probability capabilities: flow batteries using aqueous soluble 
21 

organics, sodium-based batteries, and rechargeables—zinc manganese dioxide batteries. 

The potential contributions of storage to enhance national security across North America are astounding. OE and CESER are 

members of the Grid Modernization Initiative. The GMI focuses on 

the development of new architectural concepts, tools, and technologies that will better measure and analyze, predict, and protect 

the grid. Originally consisting of OE and the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, the GMI has been expanded to include CESER, the Office of Fossil Energy, and the Office of Nuclear 

Energy to ensure a coordinated and comprehensive DOE approach 

to R&D. 

The Grid Modernization Lab Consortium is part of the GMI, and 

it established a strategic partnership between DOE and the national labs. We are presently defining the next multiyear plan to 

continue our efforts for our R&D projects within—with our labs. 

In conclusion, the energy sector continues to face challenges and 

threats every day. The Department continues to pursue diverse yet 

targeted R&D projects to further enhance the resilience and reliability of our nation’s grid and energy infrastructure necessary to 

ensure national security. The cutting-edge technologies developed 

at our national labs and the ongoing research and development 

conducted in collaboration with our public- and private-sector partners will continue to strengthen the resilience and reliability of the 

grid for years to come. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:] 
22 

Written Testimony of Bruce J. Walker 

Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity 

Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Before the 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Energy 

U.S. House of Representatives 

June 7, 2018 

Chairman Weber, Ranking Member Veasey, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I 

appreciate the opportunity today to discuss the research programs and priorities within the 

Department of Energy's (DOE or Department) Office of Electricity (OE). 

The resilience and reliability of the Nation's electric grid is of utmost importance. The Office of 

Electricity collaborates with industry, academia, state and local governments, and other energy 

sector stakeholders on numerous research and development (R&D) programs to achieve these 

objectives. Essential to these R&D efforts are the Department's 17 National Laboratories, a 

preeminent federal research system. The Labs provide strategic scientific and technological 

capabilities that allow DOE to pursue the energy solutions of tomorrow. 

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability Reorganization 

Recognizing the importance of cutting edge research and development, as well as cybersecurity, 

to national security, DOE announced the standup of the Office ofCybersecurity, Energy 

Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). 

CESER is comprised of two former Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OEpredecessor) divisions, Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration and Cybersecurity for 

Energy Delivery Systems. This reorganization allows the Department to provide greater 

visibility, accountability, and flexibility in safeguarding our energy infrastructure. CESER is 

designed to elevate coordinated preparedness and response with our partners in the private 

sector, as well as government at every level. 

The remaining OE-predecessor divisions, Advanced Grid Research and Development and 

Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance, remain in the newly renamed Office of 

Electricity. The reorganized OE is focused on long-term strategic and foundational R&D efforts 

related to the resilience and reliability of our Nation's grid necessary to ensure national security. 

Specifically, OE is developing strategies to ensure the viability of our defense critical energy 

infrastructure against various threat vectors. 

1 
23 

Office of Electricity Priorities 

All of our cutting edge research and development programs underpin several major priorities for 

the Office of Electricity: the advancement of grid modeling; the pursuit of megawatt scale grid 

storage; revolutionizing sensing technology utilization; and long-term electrical grid recovery in 

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 

Working with stakeholders in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, OE is developing an integrated 

North American Grid Model to conduct planning and contingency analysis to address 

vulnerabilities in the North American energy system. This analysis will incorporate all relevant 

assets of the integrated energy grid and identify potential infrastructure investments to improve 

resiliency and mitigate risks associated with energy system interdependencies. The resulting 

model will also allow for sequencing of events that create risk across critical infrastructure 

sectors and identification of key critical infrastructure interdependencies. 

The advancement of energy storage is not only a focus of OE, but also one of Secretary Perry's 

top priorities. OE is pursuing the advancement of megawatt scale storage capable of supporting 

bulk and distribution power systems. In conjunction with fellow DOE Offices and our National 

Labs, OE will investigate and integrate latest technologies to develop a strategic approach to 

rapidly progressing megawatt scale storage which provides added resiliency and control 

capabilities. 

OE is also pursuing the integration of high fidelity, low cost sensing technology for predictive 

and correlation modeling. The Office of Electricity will advance the use of correlation modeling 

developed coincident with the advancements in computing capabilities and will build upon 

previous work undertaken regarding predictive modeling. OE will also evaluate opportunities to 

integrate sensing technology into oil and natural gas (ONG) monitoring systems and determine 

uses for enhanced physical security, as well as opportunities to improve phasor measurement 

units (post-2003 installation). 

Providing support to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, particularly long term resiliency 

efforts, is paramount. We continue our coordination efforts amongst key stakeholders and 

contributing members to compile a technical review of options, as well as working in 

collaboration on efforts regarding evaluation of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's 

future state. Additionally, OE is providing technical assistance to the Puerto Rico Industrial 

Development Company and other stakeholders for strategic investment in micro-grid 

installations for industrial corridors. 

Electricity Related Research & Development Efforts 

One ofOE's primary R&D efforts is the Grid Modernization Initiative (GMI). The GMI focuses 

on the development of new architectural concepts, tools, and technologies that will better 

measure, analyze, predict, and protect the grid, as well as enable the institutional conditions that 

allow for rapid development and widespread adoption of these tools and technologies. 

Originally consisting of OE and the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, the 

GMI has been expanded to include CESER, the Office of Fossil Energy, and the Office of 

Nuclear Energy, to ensure a coordinated and comprehensive DOE approach to R&D. 

2 
24 

The Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium (GMLC), a part of the GMI, was established as 

a strategic partnership between DOE and the National Laboratories to bring together leading 

experts, technologies, and resources to collaborate on the goal of modernizing the Nation's grid. 

The GMLC allows for the sharing of networks; more efficient use of resources; improving 

learning and preservation of knowledge; enhanced lab coordination and collaboration; and 

increased regional perspective and strengthened relationships with local stakeholders and 

industry. 

The GMI and GMLC are working together to create the Grid Modernization Multi-Year Program 

Plan (MYPP), a portfolio of activities to help set the Nation on a cost-effective path to a resilient, 

secure, and reliable grid that is flexible enough to provide an array of emerging services. The 

MYPP defines a vision for the modern grid and identifies key challenges and opportunities. 

To enhance transmission reliability, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in conjunction 

with four other partners, has undertaken a project on advanced machine learning for 

synchrophasor technology. LANL is developing a suite of new grid-modeling aware machine 

learning tools to monitor the transmission grid during its normal operations and localize 

significant frequency events seconds after they occur. Utilizing data and tools from several 

sources, they will build new machine learning software to provide situational awareness, 

computational, and map-visualization extensions for existing software. 

Another GMI research and development effort is our Resilient Distribution Systems Lab Call 

A wards. Announced in September 201 7, funding of approximately $32 million over three years 

has been awarded to the GMLC and their partners to advance resilient distribution systems, 

focusing on advanced controls, grid architecture, integration of distributed energy resources, and 

emerging grid technologies at a regional scale. 

One of the projects tackling these issues is the Grid Resilience and Intelligence Platform (GRIP) 

project. GRIP is a collaboration between the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the 

Stanford Linear Accelerator Center National Accelerator Laboratory, and seven universities, 

utilities, industry, and stakeholder partners. Its objective is to anticipate, absorb, and recover 

from grid events by demonstrating predictive analytics capabilities. Combining state-of-the-art 

artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques will allow for a quicker recovery from 

grid events. 

As part of the Department's commitment to a resilient and reliable power grid, DOE has recently 

funded R&D projects that will catalyze new design elements oflarge power transformers (LPTs) 

which are critical to the Nation's power grid and represent one of its most vulnerable 

components. Producing LPTs that are more flexible will help the energy sector better prepare for 

the sharing and long-term replacement ofLPTs in the event of catastrophic failure. The five 

projects are a collaboration between corporations, small businesses, and academic institutions in 

Georgia, Illinois, New York, and North Carolina to create new designs that will help produce the 

next generation ofLPTs. 

3 
25 

Cybersecurity Research & Development Efforts 

Any discussion of resilience and reliability must include the issue of cybersecurity. In May 

2018, OE released the DOE Multiyear Plan for Energy Sector Cybersecurity (Multiyear Plan) to 

improve cybersecurity and the resilience of the Nation's energy system. The plan aligns DOE's 

distinct roles and programs with the efforts of govermnent, energy owners and operators, and key 

energy stakeholders, at all levels. 

Anticipating and responding to the latest cyber threat is a ceaseless endeavor that requires 

dedicated resources and personnel. It is imperative to recognize today's realities: resources are 

limited, and cyber threats continue to increase in frequency and sophistication. To gain the 

upper hand, disruptive changes in cyber risk management practices must be pursued. 

DOE's cyber strategy is two-fold: (I) strengthen today' s energy delivery systems by working 

with our partners to address growing threats and promote continuous improvement, and (2) 

develop game-changing solutions that will create inherently secure, resilient, and self-defending 

energy systems for tomorrow. 

Meaningful public-private partnerships are foundational to DOE's strategy. Facing an everevolving threat landscape requires a coordinated approach to improving risk management 

capabilities, information sharing, and incident response. The Federal govermnent has also 

historically funded innovative research, development, and demonstration that cannot be 

economically justified in private-sector markets. 

CESER's cybersecurity R&D program aligns activities with Federal priorities as well as the 

strategy and milestones articulated in the Multiyear Plan, which envisions resilient energy 

delivery control systems designed, installed, operated, and maintained to survive a cyber incident 

while sustaining critical functions. 

The CESER cybersecurity R&D program was designed to assist energy sector asset owners by 

developing cybersecurity solutions for energy delivery systems through a focused research and 

development effort. CESER co-funds projects with industry partners to make advances in 

cybersecurity capabilities for energy delivery systems. These research partnerships are helping 

to detect, prevent, and mitigate the consequences of a cyber-incident for the energy delivery 

systems of today and tomorrow. 

The Collaborative Defense of Transmission and Distribution Protection and Control Devices 

against Cyber Attacks (CODEF) project is a highly successful collaboration between ABB, 

Ameren, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. CODEF provides real-time 

cybersecurity with power grid devices working together to validate cormnands and operations. It 

automatically detects and rejects malicious cormnands that could jeopardize physical grid 

operations, anticipates the effect of each cormnand, and only enacts those cormnands that will 

support grid stability. The technology was demonstrated successfully in a quasi-field 

environment, and private sector adoption is anticipated at the conclusion of the project. 

Additionally, in spring of2018 DOE announced another energy sector cybersecurity funding 

opportunity. The Department anticipates providing $25 million in funding for projects in five 

4 
26 

research areas: cybersecure communications; cybersecurity for the ONG environment; redesign 

for cyber-resilient architecture for the ONG and Electricity Subsector Coordinating Councils; 

cybersecure cloud-based technologies in the operation technology environment; and innovative 

technologies that enhance cybersecurity in the energy sector. The projects selected are 

collaborations between DOE's National Labs, industry, and academia, and will continue the 

cutting-edge research needed to increase the resilience and reliability of our energy subsectors. 

The information utilized by DOE and its partners in furtherance ofCESER's research programs 

and priorities is very often highly sensitive in nature. As part of DOE's responsibilities, the 

Department has the ability to protect information under its Critical Electric Infrastructure 

Information (CEil) designation authority. DOE is currently developing new administrative 

procedures for CEil designation. Completion of these procedures will allow DOE to access 

critical information needed to execute its responsibilities as the Sector-Specific Agency for 

Energy under Presidential Policy Directive 21. These proposed procedures are intended to 

ensure that stakeholders and the public understand how DOE would designate, protect, and share 

CEIL 

Conclusion 

The energy sector continues to face challenges and threats every day, both old and new alike. 

The Department continues to pursue varied, yet targeted, R&D projects to further enhance the 

resilience and reliability of our Nation's grid and energy infrastructure necessary to ensure 

national security. The cutting-edge technologies developed at our National Labs, and the 

ongoing research and development conducted in collaboration with our public and private sector 

partners, will continue to strengthen the resilience and reliability of the grid for years to come. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

5 
27 

Biography of the Honorable Bruce J. Walker 

Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity 

Acting Assistant Secretary, Office ofCybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Bruce J. Walker was nominated by President Donald J. Trump and confirmed by the U.S. Senate 

as Assistant Secretary for the Office of Electricity (OE) at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 

in October 2017. The focus of his responsibility is to provide leadership on a national level to 

modernize the electric grid, enhance the security and reliability of the energy infrastructure, and 

facilitate recovery from disruptions to the energy supply both domestically and 

internationally. This is critical to meeting the Nation's growing demand for reliable electricity 

by overcoming the challenges of our Nation's aging electricity transmission and distribution 

system and addressing the vulnerabilities in our energy supply chain. 

He holds a Bachelor of Electrical Engineering from Manhattan College and a Juris Doctor in 

Law from Pace University where he was the technical editor on the Environmental Law Review 

and received an Environmental Law Certificate. He has completed the Distribution Systems 

program from Siemens- Power Technologies International. He is a distinguished graduate of 

the United States Air Force Academy Preparatory School and received an Honorable Discharge 

from the United States Military Academy. 
28 

Chairman WEBER. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Sarrao, you’re recognized for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. JOHN SARRAO, 

PRINCIPAL ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, 

AND ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE, 

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Mr. SARRAO. Chairman Weber, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Veasey, Ranking Member Johnson, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address future research opportunities for the United States’ electric grid and to describe the many benefits and reduced risks that would result from 

a more integrated, resilient, and modernized grid infrastructure. 

My name is John Sarrao, and I’m the Principal Associate Director for Science, Technology, and Engineering at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. My personal research and technical leadership career has emphasized national security science 

from plutonium physics research to advanced materials design and 

discovery to stewarding Los Alamos’ high-performance computing 

resources and simulation capabilities. 

Energy security is a national security priority, and Los Alamos 

National Laboratory has contributed meaningfully to energy security in general and grid resilience research in specific for many 

years. The challenges that today’s domestic electricity grid face include the need for enhanced resilience against both natural events 

and external actors, robust optimization and control capability for 

integrating renewables, and expanded tools for grid operators to 

detect anomalies, including the effective utilization of machinelearning methods. 

In responding to these challenges, Los Alamos brings expertise 

in physics and engineering, applied math and statistics, and simulation and computation. We further have a proven track record of 

providing mission-centric reach-back expertise in weapons physics 

and design, including weapons effects, high-fidelity and multiscale 

earth systems modeling, and space science and space weather capabilities. 

Finally, Los Alamos is deeply committed to workforce development and idea dissemination, hosting a regular Grid Science Winter School and Conference to help educate and expand the grid research community. 

To further support these efforts, Los Alamos has launched the 

Advanced Network Science Initiative, ANSI. ANSI is designed to 

facilitate cross-project basic and applied research that is focused on 

modeling and understanding the nation’s critical infrastructures 

such as electric power, water, petroleum, and natural gas. 

Given our demonstrated history in infrastructure analysis and 

grid research, Los Alamos was excited to participate in the Grid 

Modernization Laboratory Consortium, the GMLC, beginning in fiscal year 2016. The initiative has allowed a number of national laboratories to work together, bringing their complementary capabilities to bear on key challenges and delivering positive impacts for 

our electricity grid. 
29 

As we look to the future of grid research both under the auspices 

of GMLC and more broadly, Los Alamos sees several important 

challenges that need to be addressed: first, complex threats to U.S. 

power systems. U.S. power systems are potentially vulnerable to 

large-scale impacts from complex threats, including geomagnetic 

disturbances and electromagnetic pulses from a high-altitude nuclear detonation. 

Second, cyber physical threats. Cyber or combined cyber and 

physical attacks on infrastructure can have widespread and lasting 

impacts on critical infrastructure. Developing a cyber-physical impact and consequences modeling and simulation capability will enable stakeholders to assess the possible consequences of different 

types of cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and prioritize additional investments. 

Third, gas-grid coupled systems. Natural gas pipelines are a key 

energy infrastructure for the United States, and they are only becoming more so with the addition of supply from unconventional 

natural gas resources. The expansion of central-plant natural gasfired electric generation in the electric transmission system and the 

expected expansion of gas-fire distributed generation in the electric 

distribution system would further expand that. 

And fourth, grid-water network coupling and control. Potable and 

wastewater systems are major electrical loads that can be controlled to the benefit of both the water and electrical systems. With 

storage naturally built in, potable water networks are an infrastructure that could play a key role in advanced control and optimization of the electrical system. However, these water resources 

must also maintain their own reliability and resilience. 

I appreciate the opportunity in these brief remarks to describe 

some of the future challenges and research opportunities for the 

United States’ electric grid that we see at Los Alamos. Success in 

these endeavors would result in a more integrated, resilient, and 

modernized grid infrastructure. The Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium has been a positive step forward in addressing 

these issues, and Los Alamos has been proud to play a role in 

GMLC with our peer national laboratories. As we look to the future, we see additional challenges in responding to complex 

threats, including cyber-physical challenges, to our grid infrastructure, and in considering the integrated systems of systems represented by our coupled gas and electrical infrastructure at both 

the transmission and distribution scales. 

In closing, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity 

to appear before the Subcommittee. I look forward to answering 

any questions that you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sarrao follows:] 
30 

Summary of Testimony for Dr. John Sarrao 

The challenges that today's domestic electricity grid faces include the need fori) enhanced resilience, 

against both natural events and external actors, ii) robust optimization and control capability for 

integrating renewables, and iii) expanded tools for grid operators to detect anomalies, including the 

effective utilization of machine learning methods. 

In responding to these challenges los Alamos brings expertise in physics and engineering, applied math 

and statistics, and simulation and computation. We also bring a mission-centric reach-back expertise in 

weapons physics and design, including weapons effects; high-fidelity and multi-scale earth systems 

modeling; and space science and space weather capabilities. 

While there were naturally some growing pains in the initial definition of GMLC, the initiative has 

allowed a number of National laboratories to work together, bringing their complementary capabilities 

to bear on key challenges and delivering positive impacts for our electricity grid. While the diversity in 

capabilities brought by the national laboratories is a strength of GMlC, they also previously competed 

with each other in some areas of grid research. As such, an early aspect of GMlC formulation was 

educating each other on our respective approaches to technical challenges. Initially, this can slow 

progress and lead to a lowest-common-denominator research approach. Fortunately, GMlC's use of 

peer review has ensured the best ideas are brought forward and implemented quickly. 

As we look to the future of grid research, both under the auspices of GMLC and more broadly, los 

Alamos sees several important challenges that need to be addressed. 

First, Complex Threats to US Power Systems-US power systems are potentially vulnerable to largescale impacts from complex threats including geomagnetic disturbances and EMP from high-altitude 

nuclear detonation. 

Second, Cyberphysical Threats- Cyber or combined cyber and physical attacks on infrastructure can 

have widespread and lasting impacts on critical infrastructure. Developing modeling and simulation 

capabilities will enable stakeholders to assess consequences. 

Third, Gas-Grid Coupled Systems- Natural gas pipelines are a key energy infrastructure for the US, and 

they are only becoming more so with the addition of supply from unconventional natural gas resources; 

the expansion of central-plant, natural gas-fired electric generation in the electric transmission system; 

and the expected expansion of gas-fired distributed generation in the electric distribution system. 

And Fourth, Grid-Water Network Coupling and Control- Potable and waste water systems are major 

electrical loads that can be controlled to the benefit of both the water and electrical systems. With 

storage naturally built in, potable water networks are an infrastructure that could play a key role in 

advanced control and optimization of the electrical system. 

Success in these endeavors would result in a more integrated, resilient, and modernized grid 

infrastructure. The Grid Modernization laboratory Consortium has been a positive step forward in 

addressing these issues. As we look to the future, we see additional challenges in responding to complex 

threats, including cyber-physical challenges, to our grid infrastructure and in considering the integrated 

system of systems represented by our coupled gas and electrical infrastructure at both the transmission 

and distribution scale. 
31 

Prepared Statement of Dr. John Sarrao 

Principal Associate Director, Science, Technology & Engineering 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

For the House Science, Space & Technology Committee 

Subcommittee on Energy 

June 7, 2018 

Chairman Weber, Ranking Member Veasey, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this 

opportunity to address future research opportunities for the United States' electric grid and to describe 

the many benefits and reduced risks that would result from a more integrated, resilient, and 

modernized grid infrastructure. 

My name is John Sarrao, and I am the Principal Associate Director for Science, Technology & Engineering 

at Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico. I have spent my entire professional 

career at los Alamos. Prior to being appointed to my current role in April, 2018, I was Los Alamos' 

Associate Laboratory Director for Theory, Simulation, and Computation for the prior five years. I hold a 

Doctorate in Physics from the University of California, Los Angeles. My personal research and technical 

leadership career has emphasized national security science from plutonium physics research to 

advanced materials design and discovery to stewarding Los Alamos' high performance computing 

resources and simulation capabilities. Energy security is a national security priority, and los Alamos 

National laboratory has contributed meaningfully to energy security in general and grid resilience 

research in specific for many years. 

Why Grid Research at Los Alamos National laboratory 

Los Alamos has a 75-year tradition of solving complex national security challenges using an 

interdisciplinary, team-based approach, providing solutions to decision makers. Our work in 

infrastructure analysis and grid research exemplifies this approach and includes our role in the National 

Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center supported by the Department of Homeland Security. 

Further, exercising and expanding our capabilities in these areas directly contributes to the successful 

performance of our core mission in stewarding the United States' nuclear deterrent. 

The challenges that today's domestic electricity grid faces include the need fori) enhanced resilience, 

against both natural events and external actors, ii) robust optimization and control capability for 

integrating renewables, and iii) expanded tools for grid operators to detect anomalies, including the 

effective utilization of machine learning methods. 

In responding to these challenges Los Alamos brings expertise in physics and engineering, applied math 

and statistics, and simulation and computation. We further have a proven track record of providing 

mission-centric reach-back expertise in weapons physics and design, including weapons effects; highfidelity and multi-scale earth systems modeling; and space science and space weather capabilities. 
32 

Finally, los Alamos is deeply committed to workforce development and idea dissemination, hosting a 

regular "Grid Science Winter School and Conference" to help educate and expand the grid research 

community. 

To support these efforts, los Alamos has launched the Advanced Network Science Initiative (ANSI). ANSI 

is designed to facilitate cross-project basic and applied research that is focused on modeling and 

understanding the nation's critical infrastructures, such as electric power, water, petroleum and natural 

gas. The initiative's expertise includes statistics, stochastic methods, machine learning, control theory, 

dynamical systems, discrete and continuous optimization, statistical physics, and graphical modeling. 

The interdisciplinary nature of ANSI ensures the scientific and technological validity of our approaches 

by working closely with physicists, engineers, mathematicians, statisticians, computer scientists, and 

economists through connections with industry, academia, and other national laboratories. 

A few recent examples of los Alamos' contributions to national energy security challenges include: 

Solar Geomagnetic Disturbances (GMD) and the science of transmission standards 

Critical input from lANl into FERC Order 830 on GMD standards. 

lANl's contribution called out individually by Commissioner La Fleur in Order 830 

Working directly with industry groups (EPRI) to improve updates planning standards 

Nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects; clarifying the threat to US power systems 

leading joint Department of Energy and Department of Homeland Security study to 

characterize nuclear EMP impacts 

leading interagency study to determine foreign nuclear EMP threats and impacts 

Working directly with industry groups (EPRI) to improve modeling and simulation 

Natural Gas-Electric Power Joint Reliability-Complex reliability assessments of Southern 

California's coupled energy system during Aliso Canyon outage 

Jointly worked with CaiSO, SoCal Gas, and California Public Utility Commission (CPU C) to 

resolve complex analysis issues 

Provided official testimony to CPUC proceedings on Aliso Canyon 

Successes of the Grid Modernization laboratory Consortium 

Given our demonstrated history in infrastructure analysis and grid research, los Alamos was excited to 

participate in the Grid Modernization laboratory Consortium (GMlC), beginning in fiscal year 2016. 

While there were naturally some growing pains in the initial definition of GMlC, the initiative has 

allowed a number of National laboratories to work together, bringing their complementary capabilities 

to bear on key challenges and delivering positive impacts for our electricity grid. 

While the respective National laboratories have complementary capabilities- and this diversity is a 

strength of GMlC, they also previously competed with each other in some areas of grid research. As 

such, an early aspect of GMlC formulation was educating each other on our respective approaches to 

technical challenges. Initially, this can slow progress and lead to a lowest-common-denominator 

research approach. Fortunately, GMlC's use of peer review has ensured the best ideas are brought 

forward and implemented quickly. 
33 

As a measure of the success of GMLC, not only are new multi-laboratory teams working together to 

address grid research challenges, but also these newly formed and GMLC-inspired teams are 

collaborating in broader areas of research beyond the initial scope of GMLC. 

Future Challenges and Opportunities for Grid Research 

As we look to the future of grid research, both under the auspices of GMLC and more broadly, Los 

Alamos sees several important challenges that need to be addressed. 

Complex Threats to US Power Systems-US power systems are potentially vulnerable to large-scale 

impacts from complex threats including geomagnetic disturbances and EMP from high-altitude nuclear 

detonation. Our understanding of the science underlying the components of these threats and their 

impacts on power systems has improved significantly over the last decade. Additional work is required 

to both provide high fidelity quantitative impact analysis to determine the scope of the concern and, 

where necessary, to provide improved situational awareness tools to provide input into operational 

responses taken by the infrastructure owners. 

Cyberphysicol Threats 

Cyber or combined cyber and physical attacks on infrastructure can have widespread and lasting impacts 

on critical infrastructure. Developing a cyber-physical impact and consequences modeling and 

simulation capability will enable stakeholders to assess the possible consequences of different types of 

cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and prioritize additional investments in both impact studies and 

research and development into cyber-physical systems modeling and simulation. 

There are also opportunities to develop new methods to jointly design cyber and physical systems to be 

resilient to natural and man-made threats. The objective of such an effort is to provide rigorous, 

optimization-based design methods to evaluate the optimal allocation of future, secure communications 

components (including quantum secured communications lines and associated trustworthy node relays). 

The goal is to utilize these methods to characterize the value of the future, advanced communications 

components to the resilience of electrical power systems. The results generated by this effort are 

threefold-rigorous mathematical models of cyberphysical components, prototype software that 

embodies optimal network design formulations for cyberphysical systems, and design results that 

characterize the resilience of different cyberphysical architectures. 

Grid resilience, optimization, and disaster recovery all depend critically on having communication links 

that are authenticated, secure, and reliable. We at Los Alamos have a twenty-year history of developing 

secured communication systems by leveraging quantum science and technology. DoE Office of 

Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability currently funds several LANL projects to develop and deploy 

quantum-secured communication hardware specifically tailored to the power industry. 

Gas-Grid Coupled Systems 

Natural gas pipelines are a key energy infrastructure for the US, and they are only becoming more so 

with the addition of supply from unconventional natural gas resources; the expansion of central-plant, 

natural gas-fired electric generation in the electric transmission system; and the expected expansion of 

gas-fired distributed generation in the electric distribution system. The economic and environmental 
34 

drivers behind this evolution will continue as the country leverages advances in the science and 

engineering of resource extraction. A side effect of this evolution of the US energy systems is the 

complex coupling between the electric power system and the "just in time" delivery of natural gas to 

electric generation. This coupling is necessary to leverage these new resources; however, it is also 

resulting in emerging technical and regulatory challenges that require foundational and applied research 

and development. 

Gas-Grid Coupling at the Transmission Level: 

1. LANL is working with our industry and commercial partners to develop intra-day, dynamical 

optimization and control of pipeline flow and compressor operation with the objective of 

developing a mathematically sound basis for advanced gas pipeline operation and potential 

natural gas balancing markets. 

2. LANL is also working across the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop integrated models of 

gas-grid systems that reveal vulnerabilities in this complex, joint systems. We are working to 

integrate these models of vulnerability into rigorous design approaches with the objective of 

providing methods to industry to eliminate vulnerabilities. 

3. LANL continues to work the coupled gas-grid reliability issue in Southern California. We are 

currently working with the California Public Utility Commission to develop methods to assess 

the needs for future underground gas storage to ensure the reliability of the gas pipeline 

systems and to provide gas supply to the regional electrical transmission and generation system. 

4. LANL is leveraging DOE-funded work on gas and gas-grid systems to provide strategic analysis 

tools to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and ultimately to USSTRATCOM, to assess 

impacts to natural gas pipeline networks. 

Gas-Grid Coupling at the Distribution Level: 

1. DOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewal Energy projections show substantial increases in 

distributed generation in the form of smaller scale combined heat and power (CHP). If this 

trend materializes, there are potential technical challenges that may arise in natural gas 

distribution that mirror the challenges already evident in transmission, i.e., the ability of the gas 

distribution pipelines to supply the increased and more variable demand from CHP. DOE should 

work together with the national labs to get ahead of the design, optimization and control issues 

to avoid the integration issues that arose with other distributed generation technologies, such 

as solar photovoltaics. 

Grid-Water Network Coupling and Control: 

1. Potable and waste water systems are major electrical loads that can be controlled to the benefit 

of both the water and electrical systems. With storage naturally built in, potable water 

networks are an infrastructure that could play a key role in advanced control and optimization 

of the electrical system. However, as a critical infrastructure, these water networks must also 

maintain their own reliability and resilience. Balancing the needs of these complex networks in 

optimization and control is a key gap in enabling advanced functionality. DOE should take a 

more active role is developing the foundational research needed to more closely integrate these 

systems. 
35 

In Conclusion 

I appreciate the opportunity in these brief remarks to describe some of the future challenges and 

research opportunities for the United States' electric grid that we see at Los Alamos. Success in these 

endeavors would result in a more integrated, resilient, and modernized grid infrastructure. The Grid 

Modernization Laboratory Consortium has been a positive step forward in addressing these issues, and 

Los Alamos has been proud to play a key role in GMLC with our peer National Laboratories. As we look 

to the future, we see additional challenges in responding to complex threats, including cyber-physical 

challenges, to our grid infrastructure and in considering the integrated system of systems represented 

by our coupled gas and electrical infrastructure at both the transmission and distribution scale. 

In closing, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee. I look 

forward to answering any questions that you might have. 
36 

JOHN L. SARRAO 

As of April 2018, John Sarrao is the Principal Associate Director for Science, 

Technology and Engineering (PADSTE) at Los Alamos National Laboratory. As 

PADSTE, he leads the Laboratory's science, technology, and engineering capabilities, 

overseeing a $1.28 organization with 3,000 staff. PADSTE spans the Laboratory's 

directorates for Chemistry, Life & Earth Sciences; Engineering Sciences; Experimental 

Physical Sciences; and Theory, Simulation, and Computation. John stewards LANL's 

Laboratory Directed Research & Development (LDRD) program and other institutional 

capability initiatives, including the Laboratory's student and post-doc programs. He also 

serves as LANL's Chief Research Officer. 

From 2013 to 2018, John served as LANL's Associate Director for Theory, Simulation, 

and Computation (AD-TSC). As AD-TSC, he led the Laboratory's efforts in applying 

science-based prediction to existing and emerging national security missions. TSC spans 

LANL's Theoretical; Computer, Computational, and Statistical Sciences; and High 

Performance Computing organizations. John also played a national leadership role in the 

Exascale Computing Project. Previously, Sarrao was the Program Director for Los 

Alamos's Office of Science Programs, and for MaRIE (Matter-Radiation Interactions in 

Extremes), LANL's signature facility concept which will provide transformational 

materials solutions for national security challenges. 

John has held a number of leadership positions within LANL's materials community, 

including Division Leader of the Materials Physics and Applications Division and Group 

Leader of Condensed Matter and Thermal Physics. John has also served on a number of 

U.S. Department of Energy Basic Energy Sciences Advisory Committee (BESAC) 

Subcommittees, helping to set strategic directions for materials research. 

John's primary research interest is in the synthesis and characterization of correlated 

electron systems, especially actinide materials. He was the 2013 winner of the 

Department of Energy's E.O. Lawrence Award and the 2004 winner of the LANL 

Fellows Prize for Research, in part for his discovery of the first plutonium 

superconductor. He is a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of 

Science (AAAS), the American Physical Society (APS), and Los Alamos National 

Laboratory. John received his Ph.D. in physics from the University of California, Los 

Angeles based on thesis work performed at LANL. 
37 

Chairman WEBER. Thank you, Doctor. 

Mr. Gramlich, you are recognized for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. ROBERT GRAMLICH, 

PRESIDENT, GRID STRATEGIES, LLC. 

Mr. GRAMLICH. Thank you, Chairman Weber, Ranking Member 

Veasey, and Members of the Subcommittee, for inviting me to testify on the electric grid of the future. 

Since modern society requires affordable, clean, and reliable electricity for most commercial and personal pursuits, there is no infrastructure more important than the interstate electric network. 

While reliability is very high and growing, as reported by NERC 

just today over at FERC across town, the grid is evolving rapidly 

and threats are changing. We need to expand grid capacity, implement protections against severe weather and cyber and physical attack, and make more efficient use of the existing grid. 

DOE’s Office of Electricity (OE) can play a key role in each of 

these areas. OE can contribute by continuing research development 

and demonstration of new technologies for the grid, promoting grid 

expansion through permitting and studies, developing and bringing 

grid operations technologies to market, developing customer and reliability and resilience options for critical uses such as military facilities and hospitals, and supporting studies of bulk power system 

reliability to address the evolving resource mix and evolving 

threats. 

The National Academies of Sciences recently had a resilience report that had 12 recommendations. Eight of those were for DOE. 

OE could play a lead role in implementing those recommendations. 

Given the importance of a reliable electric grid to modern society 

and the critical role it plays in integrating new both centralized 

and distributed resources and managing various threats, OE 

should have far greater resources than it has. At the same time, 

OE resources and attention should not be diverted to support the 

recently announced presidential directive to extend the lives of old 

coal and nuclear plants. Subsidizing such resources will ultimately 

harm rather than help customers, and OE’s work on it will detract 

from its otherwise important mission. 

There is no basis for this directive or for DOE action under the 

Federal Power Act, section 202(c); or the Defense Production Act. 

The directive ignores some basic facts about electricity. It ignores 

that coal and nuclear plants are just as susceptible to cyber attack 

as any other facility. It ignores the fact that coal plants have fuel 

delivery interruptions and often have mechanical failures during 

cold weather. It ignores the fact that both coal and nuclear plants 

are particularly vulnerable to droughts, and there is some evidence 

to suggest EMP attacks as well. And it ignores that coal and nuclear plants shut down in response to voltage infrequency deviations and a narrower band of tolerance than, for example, wind 

plants. This is actually what happened in the 2003 blackout affecting 50 million people when a large FirstEnergy coal plant automatically shut itself down. 

The point here is not to—oh, I should also say the directive ignores that 50-year-old plants have outage rates that are typically 

three times as high as new plants. So the point here is not to criti-
38 

cize any one technology or couple of technologies. All technology, all 

generating resources have their strengths and weaknesses and contribute to reliability and resilience in different ways, but none of 

them are essential. 

Reliability comes from having reserves. All generators fail to operate at some point. In fact, each region already has a strategic 

electric generation reserve. It’s called a reserve margin, and they 

are in a significant surplus condition right now in most regions. So 

whether or not there are national security interests at stake, the 

proposed solution will not help. 

Due to the futility of this directive, OE should steer clear of it 

and focus on what matters for electricity customers. OE’s modeling 

to support the bailout plan should be scrutinized carefully so that 

resources are not diverted from valuable work on reliability, resilience, efficiency, and the grid’s evolution, given changes in the resource mix and evolving threats. It will be important for Congress 

to rigorously oversee the Department of Energy and OE specifically 

to ensure that important work gets done and taxpayer dollars are 

not wasted on ill-conceived programs. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gramlich follows:] 
39 

f,l Grid 

Strategies .. c 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT E. GRAMLICH 

PRESIDENT, GRID STRATEGIES LLC 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

HOUSE SCIENCE COMMITTEE 

ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE 

Hearing entitled "The Electric Grid of the Future" 

June 7, 2018 

Thank you, Chairman Weber, Ranking Member Veasey, and Members of the Sub-Committee for 

inviting me to testify on the electric grid of the future. Since modern society requires 

affordable, clean, and reliable electricity for most commercial and personal pursuits, there is no 

infrastructure more important than the interstate electric network. 

I serve as Executive Director of the WATT Coalition (Working for Advanced Transmission 

Technologies), on the board of the Americans for a Clean Energy Grid coalition, and have a 

consulting practice called Grid Strategies LLC that provides analysis and regulatory policy 

support for clean energy integration and delivery. I have served as a member of the Electricity 

Advisory Committee of the DOE Office of Electric Delivery and Energy Reliability from 2008 

through 2012, as Senior Vice President of the American Wind Energy Association, as Economic 

Advisor to FERC Chairman Pat Wood Ill, and as a Senior Economist at PJM Interconnection LLC. 

1. The power system has never been more reliable and no emergency exists 

The grid is currently very reliable. There is no crisis or emergency. The grid is experiencing 

rapid changes as more clean, low-cost resources come on-line to serve customers and crowd 

out higher-cost, less flexible generation, at the same time that Americans' demand for 

electricity is flattening. There are also some new and emerging threats that should be 

addressed, as there always are over time. Reliability and grid authorities are on top of these 

issues. 

DOE and its Office of Electricity can best support reliability and resilience through continuing 

RD&D, promoting grid expansion and innovations to better use the existing grid, and by 

following through on recommendations from expert sources such as grid operators, national 

laboratories, and the National Academies of Science, Engineering & Medicine. The Department 

should refrain from pursuing misguided support for certain favored generators and 
40 

technologies, since such subsidies will ultimately harm rather than help customers -- including 

defense facilities and taxpayers- and harm rather than improve overall grid reliability, security, 

flexibility and costs. 

Over the past decade, authorities including the Department of Energy have consistently 

reported that the electric system is reliable and becoming more reliable. The North American 

Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) reported through its then-CEO to the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC), "I am pleased to report that the state of reliability in North 

America remains strong, and the trend line shows continuing improvement year over year." 1 In 

the region with the most recent and potential future retirements of coal and nuclear plants, 

grid operator PJM stated, "Our analysis of the recently announced planned deactivations of 

certain nuclear plants has determined that there is no immediate threat to system reliability." 2 

PJM continued, "The PJM electrical grid is more reliable than ever, with 23 percent reserve 

margins and billions of dollars of new investment. All of this is occurring while emissions are 

decreasing and wholesale prices are at historic lows for the 65 million consumers we serve. 

From 2008 to 2017, wholesale prices in PJM fell by more than 40 percent. Competition has 

required generators to operate more efficiently while also attracting new, more efficient 

technology, resulting in more than $1.4 billion in annual savings." 3 

Competitive power markets have been key to continued and growing reliability. PJM stated, 

"Markets have helped to establish a reliable grid with historically low prices. Any federal 

intervention in the market to order customers to buy electricity from specific power plants 

would be damaging to the markets and therefore costly to consumers." 4 

II. The electric sector faces evolving threats and opportunities 

The electric sector faces a new set of challenges every decade. In the 1990s the industry 

introduced competition through open access transmission, independent regional grid 

operation, and the development of an independent power producer sector. In the 2000s, the 

industry reversed the prior downward trend in infrastructure investment to build up 

transmission and distribution capability across the country, and implemented mandatory 

reliability standards after the 2003 Northeast blackout.5 

This decade seems to have two major defining characteristics: the opportunity to use more 

low-cost wind, solar, batteries, and natural gas, and the growing threats from severe weather 

and cyber and physical attack. 

Renewable energy costs have fallen by over two-thirds this decade, so it is certain that wind 

and solar use will continue to grow based on favorable economics regardless of public policy on 

1 https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170717080645-Cauley.%20NERC.pdf p.l. 2 htto://www.pjm.com/-/media/about-pjm/newsroom/2018-releases/20180601-pjm-statement-on-potential-doemarket-intervention.ashx 

3 http://www.pjm.com/-/media/about-ojm/newsroom/2018-releases/20180601-pjm-statement-on-potential-doemarket-intervention.ashx 

4 http://www.pjm.com/-/media/about-pjm/newsroom/2018-releases/20180601-pjm-statement-on-potential-doemarket-intervention.ashx 

5 htto://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/transmission/Documentsarans Project lowres bookmarked.pdf 

2 
41 

renewable energy or climate. This presents major opportunities for customers and utilities. It 

also creates new operational and planning issues related to variability, handling inverter-based 

technologies, and maintaining stability in some of the weaker parts of the grid. These 

challenges can be overcome in a safe and economical manner. Over the past decade we have 

moved from conventional wisdom that 5 percent annual energy from variable sources was a 

problem, to understand that a mix with 20 percent or more renewable energy is not a major 

grid management problem. 6 Some systems such as Ireland, even as an electrical island, are 

evaluating variable resource penetrations of up to 80 percent. Managing a system with high 

renewable penetration entails changes in system planning and operations, but this nation and 

others have been working successfully for the past decade to understand the challenges and 

develop effective solutions. 

There is an increasing focus on resilience to certain threats. The Executive Office of the 

President issued a report on electric system resilience in 20137 and the National Academies of 

Sciences (NAS) did the same in 2017.8 Severe weather events are growing in magnitude and 

frequency. Power systems have been challenged not only by Hurricanes Maria, Irma, Harvey, 

Matthew, Irene and Sandy, but also prolonged cold spells in the Northeast, drought in the 

South and West, ice storms in the Central region, and wildfires in the West. Intentional physical 

and cyber attacks are also increasingly plausible, and merit inclusion in reliability frameworks 

and standards. The NAS report concludes, "the risks of physical or cyber attacks pose a serious 

and growing threat,"9 and the Department of Energy and others have been documenting these 

threats and recommending solutions. It is appropriate for NERC and other reliability authorities 

to undertake analyses of any new issues or risks as the power system changes, and they are 

doing so with respect to physical and cyber security, geomagnetic disturbances, and other 

operational threats. 

An analysis of resilience which I recently co-authored offers some broad conclusions: 10 

1) Most outages are caused by distribution problems, not generation or fuel supply, and by 

routine rather than large events; 

2) Budgets are limited, and investments have opportunity costs- suggesting policy makers 

should compare actual reliability and resilience impact per dollar spent, such as on 

measures that address multiple threats; 

3) Spending to protect high levels of generation capacity (especially older, inflexible units 

with poor ride-through capability) yields little benefit, while spending on measures close 

to customers, such as distribution system hardening and critical spares for transmission 

6 For example, see https:/lwww. weforum.org/agenda/2017/02/wind-power-has-crossed-a-significant-milestonein-the-us 

7 https:/lwww.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Grid%20Resiliency%20Report FINAL. pdf 8 https:/lwww.nap.edu/read/24836/chapter/1 

9 https:/lwww.nap.edu/read/24836/chapter/3#12 

10 Silverstein, Gramlich, Goggin, "A Customer-Focused Framework for Electric System Resilience," 

https:/lgridprogress.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/customer-focused-resilience-final-050118.pdf. 

3 
42 

equipment, protects against a wide variety of threats and contributes more to reliability 

and resilience. 

Ill. Grid needs and opportunities 

The evolving resource mix and threat environment calls for attention from policy makers in 

certain general areas: bulk transmission infrastructure, customer-specific reliability for critical 

electricity needs, distribution system hardening, bulk transmission operations, developing 

flexible resources, distributed generation and storage, energy efficiency that protects customer 

survival during extended outages, and analysis and models to support inverter-based 

generation penetration. Generally these initiatives can be funded by ratepayers through 

federal and state regulatory policy (FERC and state public utility commissions); so there are very 

high leverage opportunities available today and emerging from federal and private sector 

research into better technologies and methods for power system infrastructure and operations. 

A. Bulk transmission infrastructure 

The transmission network is critical for reliability, resilience, efficiency, and connecting and 

integrating new clean energy resources. I shared a set of ideas recently at a House Energy and 

Commerce Committee hearing on opportunities to expand transmission.11 

Two opportunities in particular are inter-regional planning and cost allocation to increase 

power flow capability between regions, and high-voltage Direct Current (DC) lines using 

voltage-source converter (VSC) technology. Unlike the line-com mutated converter (LCC), the 

VSC can supply reactive power; go from no-load to full load, or reverse power flow direction, in 

3 cycles instead of seconds; and black-start an area. 

We must reform how transmission is planned and paid for-- particularly inter-regional 

transmission-- to break the current logjam limiting private investment in our grid. FERC has the 

authority to reform these policies, and should do so. Inter-regional transmission improves 

reliability and resilience and more than pays for itself by giving customers and regions access to 

lower-cost, diverse sources of energy.12 Inter-regional transmission also increases power 

system efficiency by aggregating diverse sources of supply and demand.13 

B. Customer-specific reliability for critical electricity needs 

Some customers highly value reliable electricity. The value of uninterrupted service for water 

treatment plants, emergency first responders, hospitals, nursing homes, military facilities, some 

industrial facilities, data centers, and other critical facilities is much higher than for other 

customers. 14 The most cost-effective solution for increasing reliability and resilience for these 

customers is to deploy reliability solutions like backup generators and storage, at the customer 

11 https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/20180510/108283/HHRG-115-IF03-Wstate-GramlichR-20180510.pdf 12 https://www.spp.org/documents/35297 /the%20value%20of%20transmission%20report.pdf, 

https:/ I cdn. misoenergy .org/MTEP17%20MVP%20Trienniai%20Review%20Report117065. pdf 13 http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/01/better-power-lines-would-help-us-supercharge-renewable-energystudy-suggests. https:/ I arpa-e .energy.gov I sites/ default/files/ ARPA-E%20Dale%200sborn.pdf 14 http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?Record!D=24836 

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43 

site. As stated by Argonne National Laboratory and quoted in the DOE Quadrennial Energy 

Review, ""One hundred percent of the following assessed facility groups have an alternate or 

back [-up] power in place: Banking and Finance; Critical Access Hospitals; Private or Private Notfor-Profit General Medical and Surgical Hospitals; State, Local, or Tribal General Medical and 

Surgical Hospitals."15 

Around 90% of outages at military facilities result from failures of equipment on the base. 16 

These failures should be a primary focus of efforts to increase bases' electric reliability and 

resilience, including17: 

o Increased maintenance of electrical distribution equipment serving the base 

(52% of base outages are caused by equipment failures). 18 

o Vegetation management to keep trees from contacting power lines serving the 

base (30% of base outages are caused by weather). 

o Adding healthy redundancy by converting radial lines to looped networks. 

o Undergrounding critical circuits. 

o Investing in more backup generators and Uninterruptible Power Supplies for 

critical loads. 

o Spare transformers and substations. 

o Better maintenance and regular testing of backup generators to reduce the high 

rate of backup generator startup failures (only 60% of military facilities are 

compliant with requirements for "testing/exercising;" one senior military official 

noted that, "Maintenance of generators is underfunded and no one checks.").19 

o Develop refueling plans for backup generators (only 84% of facilities are 

compliant). 

o Microgrids can increase base resilience by aggregating the base's backup 

generators and loads, protecting against failures of individual backup 

generators;20 this requires also hardening the base's distribution equipment, 

which must be intact for a microgrid to be able to share power across the base. 

C. Distribution system hardening 

Over 90 percent of customer outages are due to distribution system failures. 21 That share is 

likely to grow as severe weather threats increase, because the distribution system is more 

15 DOE QER at 4-46, and Julia Philips, Kelly Wallace, Terence Kudo, and Joseph Eto, Onsite and Electric Power 

Backup Capabilities at Critical 

Infrastructure Facilities in the United States (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory, 2016), ANL/GSS-16/1, 

https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/onsite-and-electric-power-backup.pdf 

16 https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671583.pdf 

17 See DOE QER at p. 4-46. 18 https://www.acg.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/IE/1%20-

%20Castillo%20DoD%20Energy%20Resilience%200verview Aug%202015.pdf, page 3 19 http://www.pewtrusts.org/~Jmedia/assets/2017/01/ce power begins at home assured energy for us milita 

ry bases. pdf, pages 10-11 20 Ibid. 21 U.S. DOE, Quadrennial Energy Review, Second Installment, Chapter IV, p. 4-2 and 4-29 

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44 

affected by severe weather and many natural disasters than transmission or generation 

infrastructure. Utilities and state regulators have principal responsibility for distribution system 

investments. DOE and the national laboratories can develop and share technologies, modeling 

techniques, and best practices for improving distribution system reliability and resilience. 

D. Bulk transmission operations 

As with most other forms of infrastructure, advances in monitoring and control systems can 

improve the reliability and efficiency of the transmission network. There is a set of costeffective technologies that can increase the flexibility, reliability and utilization of the existing 

grid.22 Technology options which can be used separately or together include dynamic line 

ratings,23 advanced power flow control,24 synchrophasor monitoring and analytics, and 

transmission topology optimization.25 

E. Expanding flexible resources 

Any increase or decrease in system load or generation requires system operators to ramp up or 

down other resources to keep supply and demand in balance at all times of day and throughout 

the year. Increasing penetrations of variable resources can make flexible resources that are 

able to respond to such system balancing needs more valuable. These include demand-side 

resources such as building energy management, demand response and customer-sited energy 

storage as well as flexible supply-side resources such as gas turbines, renewables resources 

themselves, and storage. System operators and market designers should remove barriers that 

block such flexible resources from participating in markets for flexibility services or from 

delivering such services in the 40% of the nation that does not have centralized competitive 

power markets. 

F. Analysis and models to support inverter-based generation penetration 

Some of the new technologies integrating into the grid such as wind, photovoltaics, and 

batteries are "non-synchronous," such that power electronics are used to integrate them into 

the bulk power system. This brings opportunities to improve reliability, such as through 

extremely fast response to support frequency deviations. However, these resources operate 

https://www. energy .gov /sites/ prod/files/2017/02/f34/Chapter%201V --

Ensuring%20Eiectricity%20System%20Reliability%2C%20Security%2C%20and%20Resilience.pdf 

22 https://watttransmission. files. wordpress.com/2018/03/watt-living-grid-white-paper.pdf 23 Dynamic Line Ratings (DLR) increase capacity on existing transmission lines by calculating capacity ratings based 

on actual monitored conditions rather than fixed worst-case assumptions. See DOE QER 

https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017 /02/f34/Chapter%201V--

Ensuring%20Eiectricity%20System%20Reliabilitv%2C%20Security%2C%20and%20Resilience.pdf p. 4-44. 24 Power Flow Control refers to a set of technologies that effectively push or pull power away from overloaded 

lines and onto underutilized corridors within the existing transmission network. Advanced power flow control 

provides this same function with advanced features such as the ability to quickly deploy, easily scale to meet the 

size of the need, or redeploy to new parts of the grid when no longer needed in the current location. 

25 Transmission topology optimization is a software technology that automatically identifies reconfigurations of the 

grid to route power flow around congested or overloaded transmission elements, taking advantage of the meshed 

nature of the power grid. 

6 
45 

differently than traditional synchronous machines and their settings need to be properly set to 

improve system reliability and not harm it. This is particularly true on "weak" systems (where 

there is a high sensitivity of local system voltage to variations in current injections), which tends 

to occur in remote areas where the best renewable resource areas are found. NERC and RTOs 

are performing research in this area.26 

IV. DOE's Office of Electricity can play a key role 

DOE has contributed a great deal to advances in transmission hardware, monitoring and control 

systems, and sensor development and deployment. Given the importance of a reliable electric 

grid to modern society, and the critical role it plays in integrating new centralized and 

distributed resources and managing various threats, the Office of Electricity (OE) needs full 

funding. 

A. Continue and Expand Research, Development, and Demonstration 

OE can contribute through its Grid Modernization Initiative (GMI)Y I agree with the office's 

focus on reliability, flexibility, efficiency, resiliency, affordability and security, 28 and the general 

direction ofthe GMI. 

I would emphasize the opportunities to demonstrate and evaluate some of the technologies 

DOE has helped foster. The technologies mentioned above-- Dynamic line Ratings (DLR), 

advanced power flow control, synchrophasors, and topology optimization-- have benefited 

from DOE RD&D support. They can all improve reliability, resilience, and efficiency, and are 

extremely affordable. The challenge is getting transmission owners to use them when they 

generally do not have an incentive to do so. FERC has the primary authority to address that, 

but DOE can help by funding local and regional studies of the benefits of these technologies. 

B. Support studies of the evolving generation mix 

NERC and RTOs are generally aware of the opportunities and risks of shifting to more use of 

inverter-based resources. 29 They could benefit from DOE support for studies to better 

understand what standards or guidelines to use in interconnection requirements. Better 

system models, generic resource models, and tools are needed, and no entity can support that 

better than DOE. For example, studies of weak grids with high penetrations of inverter-based 

resources would be extremely valuable. 

DOE management has been visionary for decades in imagining new energy production, delivery 

and use technologies and bringing them from idea into reality. These successes include 

hydraulic fracturing for natural gas, wind and solar technology, natural gas-fired combustion 

turbines, a host of energy-efficient building and appliance designs, and the smart grid. The 

26 https:/lwww.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/rg/ReliabilityGuidelines/Reliabiltv Guideline -

Integrating VER into Weak Power Systems.pdf 

27 https://www.energy.gov/grid-modernization-initiative-O 

" https:/ /www. energy.gov I oe/ activities/technology-development 29 https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/rg/ReliabilityGuidelines/Reliabilty Guideline -

Integrating VER into Weak Power Systems.pdf 

7 
46 

power system components and balance- particularly generation fleet composition-- has 

changed markedly in large part to these and other technology advances. DOE-OE should 

continue to conduct studies of how to modernize and evolve grid architecture and how to 

integrate distributed energy resources (DERs), to help the electric industry and society adapt to 

further evolution of power system capabilities and roles. 

C. Perform resilience functions as recommended by NAS 

In the National Academies of Sciences study of power system resilience, 8 of the 12 

recommendations to policy makers were for the Department of Energy. DOE's Office of 

Electricity can play a lead role in implementing these eight specific recommendations:30 

1. "Improve understanding of customer and societal value associated with increased 

resilience and review and operationalize metrics for resilience." 

2. "Support research, development, and demonstration activities to improve the 

resilience of power system operations and recovery by reducing barriers to adoption 

of innovative technologies and operational strategies." 

3. "Advance the safe and effective development of distributed energy resources and 

micro-grids." 

4. "Work to improve the ability to use computers, software, and simulation to 

research, plan, and operate the power system to increase resilience." 

5. "Work to improve the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of the grid." 

6. "The owners and operators of electricity infrastructure should work closely with DOE 

in systematically reviewing previous outages and demonstrating technologies, 

operational arrangements, and exercises that increase the resilience of the grid." 

7. "Work collaboratively to improve preparation for, emergency response to, and 

recovery from large-area, long-duration blackouts." 

8. "With a growing awareness of the electricity system as a potential target for 

malicious attacks using both physical and cyber means, DHS and DOE should work 

closely with operating utilities and other relevant stakeholders to improve physical 

and cyber security and resilience." 

D. Transmission expansion 

OE can play a key role in assisting with the planning and permitting of high-voltage longdistance transmission. OE can help facilitate inter-regional transmission through analytical and 

data support, and process facilitation to resolve differences in methodologies and metrics. 

OE can also perform its roles under EPAct 2005 for congestion studies and backstop federal 

transmission siting. I recommend DOE engage only in very specific limited circumstances when 

all other options have failed. 

V. Budget priorities should reflect the importance of the grid and DOE's role 

30 https://www.nap.edu/read/24836/chapter/2#6 

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47 

The most critical challenges for a reliable, resilient, and clean future power system lie in the 

integration of diverse resources into the grid, more so than the continued cost reductions or 

preservation of any one generation technology. Yet OE's budget is far smaller than most 

generation-specific or demand-side programs within DOE. This is not surprising given its 

relatively short program history, but Congress and the administration have a strategic 

opportunity to expand resources for future needs. 

a. The administration's proposed budget cuts would undermine reliability and 

resilience 

The administration's budget states, "The mission of the Office of Electricity Delivery (OE) is to 

drive electric grid modernization and resiliency in energy infrastructure."31 Yet it proposes to 

cut approximately 2/3 to 3/4 of the funding for transmission reliability and resiliency, resilient 

distribution systems, and energy storage. 32 

b. The House bill removes the cuts but does not increase funding to where it 

should be 

The House bill puts funding back up to $45 million, $48 million, and $51 million, respectively for 

transmission reliability and resiliency, resilient distribution systems, and energy storage (from 

$13 million, $10 million, and $8 million, respectively, in the administration's proposal). 33 This is 

an improvement relative to the Administration's proposed budget, but does not reflect the 

importance of the grid and DOE's key role. 

VI. OE should not support the administration's misguided initiative to bail out old, 

unreliable power plants 

On June 1, the President stated, "impending retirements of fuel-secure power facilities are 

leading to a rapid depletion of a critical part of our Nation's energy mix," and directed the 

Secretary of Energy "to prepare immediate steps to stop the loss of these resources."34 A 

leaked untitled draft memo identified "fuel-secure" units as coal, nuclear, oil and dual-fueled 

resources with adequate storage.35 This draft generator bail-out plan indicates that DOE has 

already concluded that, "recent and announced retirements of fuel-secure electric generation 

capacity across the continental U.S. are undermining the security of the electric power system 

because the system's resilience depends on those resources." 36 

There is no basis for this directive or for DOE's findings. It ignores some basic facts: 

31 https:!/www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/doe-fy2019.pdf page 383. 32 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/doe-fv2019.pdf p. 382. 33 https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP00/20180516/108312/HRPT-115-HR-FY2019-EnergyandWater.pdf p. 88. 34 https://www. whi tehouse.gov /briefings-statements/statement -press-secretary-fuel-secu re-power-faci I ities/ 35 https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4491203-Grid-Memo.html 36 https:/(www.documentcloud.org/documents/4491203-Grid-Memo.html 

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48 

• All types of power plants are vulnerable to reliability and resilience threats. Coal plants 

are vulnerable to disruption or congestion in rail and barge deliveries of coal. 37 During 

recent droughts, coal and nuclear plants have been forced to reduce their output in 

peak summer demand periods due to cooling water constraints.38 On page 20, DOE's 

memo quotes NERC's discussion of the impact of natural gas failures during the Polar 

Vortex event, while omitting the surrounding sections of NERC's report that discussed 

the equally large failures at coal plants. During the Polar Vortex, Bomb Cyclone, and 

ERCOT 2011 cold snap, equipment failures and not fuel supply issues caused most 

generator outages; these equipment failures occur regardless of fuel source. 39 

• Although the leaked memo warns that natural gas pipelines are vulnerable to cyberattacks, it ignores the fact that all power plants (including coal and nuclear) and control 

rooms are similarly vulnerable to cyber threats. 

• Nuclear plants are the least flexible of all major resource types and are unable to 

respond to grid frequency deviations. 

• Coal plants are also inflexible, and systematically fail to accurately follow frequency 

regulation signals.40 NERC has found that around 90% of conventional power plants fail 

to provide sustained response to stabilize frequency following a grid disturbance.41 

• 99+% of customer outage-hours are caused by distribution and transmission system 

failures, not by generation failures or fuel delivery problems. 

• As noted above, around 90% of military base power outages occur due to failures of 

power lines and other electricity distribution equipment on the military base. If the goal 

is to improve electric reliability and resilience at military bases, the solutions discussed 

earlier in my testimony would be far more effective than subsidizing unneeded coal and 

nuclear plants. 

• Most customer outages are weather-driven, and weather-driven events impact 

distribution systems more than generation. 

• Fuel security problems have historically caused fewer than 1 out of every 1.4 million 

hours of customer electricity outages.42 Nearly all U.S. power markets have a large 

surplus of capacity; the generation reserve margin in PJM is currently over 32%, twice 

the region's target level.43 PJM44 and other grid operators have documented45 that 

increasing reserve margins above 20% provides almost no incremental benefit to power 

system reliability. More fundamentally, when many power plants are facing economic 

pressures because electricity markets are oversupplied, subsidizing coal and nuclear 

plants will only exacerbate their challenges by sustaining over-supply and allowing 

37 https://www.ncac-usaee.org/resources/Documents/Presentations/2014/2014 12Heller.pdf 38 https :1/www .eia.gov /todayinenergy/ detail. ph p ?id= 7810 39 https:/lwww.aweablog.org/renewables-grid-market-based-solutions-support-reliabilitv/ 40 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6815753/ 41 https://www.nerc.com/docs/pc/FRI Report 10-30-12 Master w-appendices.pdf 42 https://rhg.com/research/the-real-electricity-reliability-crisis-doe-nopr/ 43 https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC SRA 05252018 Final.pdf, page 7 44 http://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/pc/20171012/20171012-item-03a-2017-pjmreserve-reguirement-study.ashx, page 39 45 https://gridprogress.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/customer-focused-resilience-final-050118.pdf, page 61 

10 
49 

expensive, inefficient and inflexible old power plants to crowd out more efficient and 

low-cost producers that better contribute to grid reliability and resilience. 

• Coal and nuclear plants have relatively poor "ride-through" capability, meaning they 

drop off-line when they encounter a small disturbance on the grid. Compared to new 

wind plants, it takes very little to shut down coal and nuclear plants, so they are not 

"resilient" on their own. These frequency and voltage disturbances are likely to be 

among the most disruptive consequences of a physical or cyber attack on the grid. Coal 

and nuclear plants are just as vulnerable to attack as other resources. If anything, 

renewable plants tend to be smaller, which reduces the impact of any failure. 

Regardless, generator-specific resilience has minimal impact on customers given the 

reliance on transmission and distribution to serve customers. 

• Keeping the lights on following the loss of large fossil and nuclear power plants is a far 

larger challenge and expense for grid operators than the gradual and predictable 

changes in wind and solar output.46 

• New generation tends to be much more reliable than the old generation that is retiring 

which has approximately 3 times the outage rates in PJMY 

• Contrary to the claim in the DOE memo that electric resilience is not being addressed, 

NERC has explained that its existing reliability standards and other requirements already 

address electric resilience. 48 The vast majority of the 150 comments filed in FERC's 

resilience docket AD18-7 offer extensive detail on how power system resilience is being 

addressed effectively today. 

The administration's leaked memo also relies on flawed studies. For example, the National 

Energy Technology Laboratory study referenced on page 14 calls coal power "resilient" because 

it increased output during the Bomb Cyclone event relative to an arbitrary time period in 

December 2017. All that example shows is that during the December time period many coal 

power plants were not operating at full output because the grid operator was properly 

dispatching less costly natural gas-fired and wind generation, so the coal plants had a great deal 

of idle capacity available to increase output when demand and prices increased during the 

Bomb Cyclone.'9 The NETL findings do not indicate coal plants' resilience, but rather just their 

poor economics. Similarly, oil-fired power plants increased their output even more than coal 

plants during the Bomb Cyclone. This does not mean oil generators are resilient, only that they 

are also expensive. This is basic power sector "economic dispatch," used since the beginning of 

the industry and in all countries. 5° 

46 https://www.aweablog.org/fact-check-winds-integration-costs-are-lower-than·those-for-other-energy-sources/ 47 https:l/www .pj m.com/-/ media/ committees-groups/ comm ittees/mc/20 171026/20171026-item-03-2017 -irmstudy-presentation.ashx slide 7. Recently retired generation has a forced outage rate of 14.56 percent while 

newly added generation has a forced outage rate of 4.42 percent. 48https://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Agenda%20Highlights%20and%20Minutes%202013/Draft PC Meeting Prese 

ntations March 6-7 2018 Jacksonville Fl. pdf, page 57 49 http://sustainableferc.org/fossil-lab-misses-mark-in-cold-weather-resilience-report/ 50 http://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/weather-related/20180413-pjm-response-to-netlreport.ashx?la=en 

11 
50 

The NETL study also understated the large contribution of renewable resources during the 

Bomb Cyclone. Even though wind energy output was well above average during the Bomb 

Cyclone event, NETL incorrectly claimed renewable output was low because NETL's analysis 

only compared output against the arbitrary December 2017 time period, when renewable 

output was also above average.51 

The leaked memo also cites studies by IHS Markit that assert the economic value of coal and 

nuclear power in the PJM region. Several articles have challenged the validity and quality of 

these studies' analytic methods and claimsY 

It is noteworthy that among the long list of resilience recommendations from the National 

Academies of Sciences, there is no recommendation to keep old coal and nuclear plants on line. 

The two issues simply have nothing to do with each other. 

Finally, the Administration's memo asserts national security concerns regarding the continuing 

loss of aging coal and nuclear plants, but as noted above there are far better ways to support 

defense facility reliability and resilience than keeping old coal and nuclear plants in operation. 

The annual cost of DOE's proposed subsidies, using either ratepayer or taxpayer money, is 

estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars per year. 53 Based on an estimated cost of $65 

billion per year for the DOE proposal, that money could be used to instead: 

o Increase grid resilience by installing over 300,000 miles of new electricity 

distribution lines each year, enough to cross the U.S. more than 150 times; 54 or 

o Move around 100,000 miles of existing overhead distribution lines underground 

each year;55 or 

o Install over 200,000 MW of backup generators each year, 56 enough to cover the 

Defense Department's total electricity needs more than a dozen times over; or 

o Make thousands of military facilities more energy efficient, reducing the electric 

load that must be served and protected when a grid or national emergency 

event occurs. 

51 http://www.aweablog.org/wind-energy-perform-bomb-cyclone/ 52 https:/ /www.aweablog.org/report -ignores-renewable-techno! ogy-advance5/ 53 Last fall, DOE issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that 

appears to be similar to DOE's latest proposal; but the latest proposal appears to apply nation-wide rather than to 

just the MISO, PJM, NYISO, and 150-NE grid operators. The PJM Independent Market Monitor estimated that the 

NOPR would have cost PJM customers between $3 billion and $32 billion per year, with a middle case of $13 billion 

per year. Since PJM accounts for about 20% of U.S. electricity demand, a central estimate is that the latest 

proposal would cost around $65 billion per year. See https://www.rtoinsider.com/doe-nopr-pjm-market-monitorcost-allocation-78830/. http5://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/climate/trump-coal-nuclear-power.html 54 https://www. eia.gov /todayinenergy/ detail. php ?id = 7250 

55 /d. 

56 Based on a backup generator cost of $300/kW 

https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/IE/Attachment%202%20-

%20What%20does%20$1M%20in%20resilience%20buv%20me v6.pdf 

12 
51 

However, actual spending for military base electric resilience has remained flat. The budget for 

DOD's Energy Resilience and Conservation Investment Program has fallen from as high as $174 

million in 2010 to $150 million today,57 with no increases for inflation, and with a $150 million 

request for FY2019.58 In FY2018, funding for only 7 energy resilience projects was requested 

(although the Senate did recommend spending an additional $15 million).59 The FY2019 budget 

request also proposes cuts to assessments of military base resilience. 60 

VII. OE's modeling to support the bailout plan should be scrutinized carefully and 

should not divert resources from valuable OE work 

A top OE priority currently is to spend two years on a continental multi-sector model. I am 

concerned that this model will be used to support the administration's misguided plan to bail 

out old uneconomic and unreliable generation sources and divert important resources and 

attention away from valuable OE work. 

A model with so many variables can easily be adjusted to lead to certain answers. Every model 

is a "black box" to some extent, but this one will be murkier than most given its complexity and 

the confidentiality of many of the inputs. Most technical models earn credibility after extensive 

peer review of both input assumptions and internal mechanics. In the case of a model 

purporting to identify critical national energy assets and infrastructure, such review is likely to 

be complicated by assertions that the inputs and outputs are classified national security 

information that should not be aired for public or expert technical review. 

It is not clear DOE will be able to gain access to the data it would need for such a model 

anyway. Utilities and RTOs have data on their system under confidentiality protections and 

they are not subject to FOIA. Utilities, RTOs and N ERC run analyses and have detailed models 

of their own systems, and likely have as good a sense of the security-critical assets on their 

systems as DOE-OE may eventually develop with its emerging infrastructure model. 

VIII. Conclusion 

I appreciate the Subcommittee's interest in this important topic. There are some very valuable 

work streams in the Office of Electricity that can support reliability, resilience, efficiency, and 

the grid's evolution given changes in the resource mix and evolving threats. That work should 

be continued and expanded. At the same time, the President and DOE are undertaking a 

misguided program to fund the continued operation of old, uneconomic and unreliable power 

plants. It will be important for Congress to rigorously oversee the Department of Energy, and 

57 https://www.acq.asd.mil/eie/IE/FEP ECIP.html 58 https:Udocs.house.gov/meetings/A5iAS03/20180418/108135/HHRG-115-AS03-Wstate-Niemeyerl· 

20180418.PDF. page 14 59 https:Uwww.congress.gov/115/crpt/srot130/CRPT-115srpt130.pdf, page 10 60http:Ucomptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fv2019/budget justification/pdfs/01 Operati 

on and Maintenance/0 M VOL 1 PART 1/Volume I Part l.pdf, page 574 

13 
52 

the Office of Electricity specifically, to ensure that important work gets done and taxpayer 

dollars are not wasted on ill-conceived programs. 

By driving grid expansion and better utilization of the existing grid, DOE can help provide 

consumers with access to more affordable and reliable power. 

14 
53 

Rob Gramlich 

President, Grid Strategies LLC 

Rob Gramlich has been working to drive grid modernization and expansion efforts since the mid1990s. Through senior positions in government and the private sector, he has developed and led 

initiatives on renewable energy integration, market design, and transmission policy. 

Rob oversaw transmission policy for the American Wind Energy Association from 2005 through 

2016 as Senior Vice President for Government and Public Affairs, Interim CEO, and Policy 

Director. He was Economic Advisor to FERC Chairman Pat Wood Ill from 2001 to 2005, Senior 

Economist at PJM Interconnection in 1999 and 2000, Senior Associate at PG&E National Energy 

Group in 2000-2001, and an analyst at the FERC Office of Economic Policy, ICF Resources, the 

World Resources Institute, and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in the 1990s. 

He has testified before the US Congress, US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and 

state regulatory commissions. He has served on advisory committees for the U.S. Department of 

Energy and the North American Energy Standards Board, on boards of a number of regional clean 

energy organizations, as Vice Chair ofthe Business Council for Sustainable Energy, and as Interim 

Executive Director of the Wind Energy Foundation. 

Rob has received the following awards and recognition: 

Energy Systems Integration Group Award "for contributions to market design and transmission 

planning for improved system planning and operation." (2018) 

The Hill magazine: Top Lobbyist each year from 2011 through 2016. 

American Wind Energy Association: Technical Achievement Award "in recognition of significant 

contribution to articulating how wind can provide 20 percent of US electricity demand by 

2030." (2008) 

US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: Exemplar of Public Service Award "for a 

distinguished career in pursuit of the vision, mission, and values of the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission." (2005) 

In the area of grid integration of clean energy, Rob has: 

led the development for the wind industry of the 2008 20 Percent Wind by 2030 project with the 

Department of Energy and wrote the transmission chapter. 

Led negotiations for the wind industry on transmission interconnection standards (low voltage 

ride-through, reactive power, SCADA) that became FERC Order No. 661. 
54 

led wind industry negotiations in FERC Order 890 which lessened imbalance charges and created 

conditional firm transmission service. 

led multiple coalitions in support of federal transmission policies. 

At FERC, played a key role in the creation of the Southwest Power Pool RTO, Midcontinent 

Independent System Operator, and the original market designs and structures of NYISO, CAISO, 

ISO-NE, PJM, SPP, and MISO. 

At P JM, served as principal market monitor of the P JM capacity market. 

Co-authored Green Power Superhighways report for AWEA and SEIA. 

Published articles on wind integration, wind markets and policy, economic incentives for 

environmental protection, power market regulation, and electricity market design. 

Rob has a Master of Public Policy (MPP) degree from UC Berkeley and a BA with Honors in 

Economics from Colby College. 
55 

Chairman WEBER. Dr. Heppert, you’re recognized for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH A. HEPPERT, 

VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH, 

TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY 

Dr. HEPPERT. Good morning, Chairman Weber, Chairman Smith, 

and Members of the Subcommittee. I’m Vice President for Research 

and Professor of Chemistry at Texas Tech University, and I’m 

pleased to address you today on behalf of Texas Tech University. 

Texas Tech University’s original mandate was to serve the educational needs of the citizens of West Texas, but its ambitions, as 

framed by its first President, have always been to make a mark in 

education, scholarship, and innovation for the nation and the 

world. 

Today, Texas Tech University—or ‘‘Tech’’ as it’s often referred 

to—ranks among the major public research universities in the 

United States. As many of you know from working with research 

universities in your states and districts, these institutions play a 

critical innovative role in defining the future of energy grid research. 

Both natural hazards and actions by our adversaries can pose 

significant threats to our grid. In—the 2017 hurricane season was 

a harrowing reminder of the intense suffering and economic loss 

that natural events can inflict on regional scales. Communities in 

Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico were—and in some cases continue 

to be—devastated in the aftermath of these storms. Based on modern scientific models of future weather events, the world can expect 

more frequent and more intense disruptions of this nature. 

At the same time, there’s a growing consensus that future conflicts among major military and economic adversaries may involve 

preliminary skirmishes in cyberspace with grid infrastructure as a 

prime target. Indeed, some recent cases provide indications that 

both state and nonstate actors have already targeted and demonstrated an ability to threaten our grid. On top of this, any grid 

of tomorrow must be developed with the assumption that the market for renewable energy generation will only continue to grow and, 

in turn, provide a more decentralized and therefore resilient system. 

In light of these challenges and with generous support of the 

State of Texas, Department of Energy, and partners in industry 

and at the national laboratories, Texas Tech has been working 

hard to address a central question: How can we make the U.S. energy grid more secure, reliant, robust, and, perhaps most importantly, resilient when under threat? 

Through the pioneering work of faculty at Texas Tech, we’re providing answers. Dr. BeiBei Ren in Texas Tech University’s 

Whitaker College of Engineering has developed a novel architecture for smart grids that allows an array of diverse power sources 

to interface with the grid. Her research has overcome a major hurdle to enabling reliable, resilient, and affordable grid integration of 

renewables with the real-world applicability of helping to rebuild 

Puerto Rico’s communication infrastructure post-Hurricane Maria. 
56 

Dr. Stephen Bayne, a senior faculty member in the Whitaker 

College of Engineering’s Department of Electrical Engineering, is a 

distinguished power grid researcher. Dr. Bayne’s group continues 

to develop techniques that enable grid integration when incorporating renewable energy sources and have placed a number of instruments across Texas to monitor grids in near real time. This research, when coupled with innovative models to determine and predict the performance of systems relying on distributed generation 

such as wind, is critical to a more resilient and reliable grid. In 2015, the State of Texas provided $13 million for Texas Tech 

University and several partners to construct GLEAMM. When fully 

operational later this year, the Global Laboratory for Energy Asset 

Management and Manufacturing will provide a world-class distributed generation microgrid and unique platform for field-testing certification and optimization of renewables and grid systems, new 

hardware and software solutions for managing grid function, and 

cybersecurity of grid systems. This work would not be possible 

without the support of Secretary Rick Perry. His vision as Governor of the State of Texas was critical to making this facility possible. 

The innovative team of researchers across Texas Tech University 

is committed to a research vision that enables the electric grid of 

the future. Over the next four years, we intend to invest a minimum of $8 million in research into cybersecurity and energy grid 

resiliency to enable the creation of a sustainable and diverse energy economy. We’re confident this investment will help the nation 

attain its goals in energy security, traditional and alternative energy utilization, and a 21st-century energy grid. 

I’m proud to have the opportunity to share Texas Tech’s capabilities, our expansive vision for the future, and serve as a resource 

for this subcommittee. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Thank you for this invitation, and, go Tech. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Heppert follows:] 
57 

'I' TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY 

Office of the Vice President 

for Research· 

Good morning Chairman Weber, Ranking Member Veasey, Chairman Smith, and Ranking Member 

Johnson, and members of the Subcommittee. I am the Vice President for Research and Professor of 

Chemistry at Texas Tech University. I am pleased to address you today on behalf of the Texas Tech 

University System. 

The Texas Tech University System's original mandate was to serve the educational needs of the citizens 

of West Texas, but its ambitions, as framed by its first president, have always been to make a mark in 

education, scholarship, and innovation for the nation and the world. 

Today, the Texas Tech University System- or just "Tech", as it's often referred to- boasts a student 

population of 37,000 and is the largest public research university in the western two-thirds of the State 

of Texas. Tech has been recognized as a Tier One public research institution, the highest classification 

offered by the Carnegie Foundation. Lubbock, home to our main campus, is one of the fastest growing 

communities in Texas. Reflecting the changing demographics ofTexas and the nation, Tech has recently 

been recognized for attaining the threshold required for Hispanic-serving institution status with over 

one-quarter of our undergraduate enrollment reflecting Hispanic heritage. Tech truly embodies the 

promise of the future of public higher education in the nation, and we aspire to lead in the quality of our 

educational experience; the prominence and impact of our research, scholarship, and creative activity; 

and our service and engagement in the community, the United States, and the world. As many of you 

know from working with research universities in your states and districts, these institutions play a critical 

and innovative role in defining the future of energy grid research. 

Both natural hazards and actions by our adversaries can pose significant threats to our grid. The 2017 

hurricane season was a harrowing reminder of the intense suffering and economic loss that natural 

events can inflict on regional scales. Communities in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico were and in some 

cases continue to be- devastated in the aftermath of these storms. Based on modern scientific models 

of future weather events, the world can expect more frequent and more intense disruptions of this 

nature. At the same time, there is a growing consensus that future conflicts among major military and 

economic adversaries may involve preliminary skirmishes in cyberspace, with grid infrastructure as a 

prime target. Indeed, some recent cases provide indications that both state and non-state actors have 

already targeted and demonstrated an ability to threaten the grid. On top of this, any grid of tomorrow 

must be developed with the assumption that the market for renewable energy generation will only 

continue to grow and, in turn, provide a more decentralized- and therefore resilient- system. 

In light of these challenges, and with generous support from the State of Texas, Department of Energy, 

and partners in industry and at the National Laboratories, Tech has been hard at work addressing a 

central question- how we can make the U.S. energy grid more secure, reliable, robust, and, perhaps 

most importantly, resilient when under threat? 

Box 41075 I Lubbock, Texas 79409-1075 IT 806.742.3904 I F 806.742-3959 I www.research.ttu.edu 

An EEO /Affirmative Action Institution 
58 

., 

TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY 

Office of the Vice President 

for Research· 

Through the pioneering work of faculty at Tech, we are providing answers. This morning, I am pleased to 

present the range of collaborations that Tech has developed to create a lasting national impact in 

ensuring the development of communities reflecting more resiliency and efficiency in energy grid 

technology. 

In 2015, the State of Texas provided $13 million through the State of Texas's Emerging Technology Fund 

to create the Texas Tech-led Global Laboratory for Energy Asset Management and Manufacturing- also 

known as GLEAMM. GLEAMM is a world class distributed generation micro-grid located at the Reese 

Technology campus (formerly Reese Airforce Base). As part of the Emerging Technology Fund award, 

TTU collaborated in the creation of Group NIRE, a 501(c)(3) corporation, whose mission is to partner 

with industry on the creation and certification of new grid technologies. Mark Harral, CEO of Group 

NIRE, is partnering with X-Fab Corporation, a regional silicon device manufacturer, and National 

Instruments Corporation of Austin, Texas on the project. Together, Tech and Group NIRE are developing 

$30 million in facilities at the Reese Technology Center site, including a new research-grade micro-grid 

and Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU). These new facilities will become operational later this year. 

GLEAMM is being constructed under the direction of Dr. Annette Sobel and will optimize conditions for 

the integration of solar and wind technology into grid systems, develop new hardware and software 

solutions for managing grid function, and enhance the cybersecurity of grid systems. This important 

work would not be possible without the support of Secretary Rick Perry. His vision as the Governor of 

the State of Texas was critical to making this facility possible. 

Dr. BeiBei Ren is a faculty researcher in TTU's Whitaker College of Engineering studying micro-grid 

control and energy grid integration. In collaboration with Syndem, Inc., Dr. Ren is developing 

synchronized and democratized architectures for next-generation smart grids. This novel architecture 

will allow diverse power suppliers to interface with the grid as virtual synchronous machines, playing an 

active role in the regulation of system frequency and voltage. Dr. Ren's micro-grid control technology 

received the 2017 TechConnect National Innovation award. Dr. Ren's group is collaborating with 

Syndem, Inc., Group NIRE, Inc., the Puerto Rico Telecommunications Regulatory Board, the National 

Renewable Energy Laboratory, the Pacific Northwest National laboratory, and the Oak Ridge National 

laboratory to develop photovoltaic storage inverters to generate reliable, resilient, and affordable grid 

integration to rebuild Puerto Rico's infrastructure following damage from Hurricane Maria. 

Dr. Stephen Bayne, a senior faculty member in the Whitaker College of Engineering's Department of 

Electrical Engineering, has a long history with power grid research. Dr. Bayne worked with Alstom, Inc. 

(now GE) to model wind turbines under steady state and transient conditions. His group developed 

advanced wind turbine control algorithms to minimize overvoltage and overcurrent conditions and 

created a battery model for a 1MW/1MWh li-lon battery connected to the distribution grid at Reese 

Technology Center. Dr. Bayne has studied a range of control techniques for grid integration when 

incorporating high penetration of renewable energy. Dr. Bayne's group has deployed a number of PM Us 

across Texas to monitor and potentially control energy grid systems in near real-time. Dr. Bayne's group 

has also developed model micro-grids to determine the performance of systems relying on distributed 

generation and loads. 

Box 41075 I Lubbock, Texas 79409-1075 I T 806.742.3904 I F 806.742-3959 I www.research.ttu.edu 

An fEO /Affirmative Action Institution 
59 

., 

TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY 

Office of the Vice President 

for Research· 

This research, when coupled with innovative models that determine and predict the performance of 

systems relying on distributed generation such as wind, is critical to a more resilient and reliable grid. 

Tech is a leading institution in grid research, but it also focuses heavily on advancing research in 

renewable energy technologies. Since the 1960s, Texas Tech University has been a national leader in 

wind damage research, collaborating to create many of the standard storm-resilient building codes in 

use throughout the U.S. today. This expertise in wind research led Tech's National Wind Institute (NWI) 

into collaborations with wind energy researchers in the early 2000s. In cooperation with Sandia National 

Laboratory, NWI helped establish a wind turbine test facility on our Reese Technology Center campus 

that boasts three test windmills just outside of Lubbock. This facility is fully instrumented to support the 

analysis of wind patterns and lightning events across the turbine farm. Under the direction of Dr. 

Michael Giesselmann, a pulsed power researcher, Tech has capitalized on this experience to collaborate 

with Pantex, Inc. in Amarillo, Texas to optimize the unit commitment of their wind farm. Dr. 

Giesselmann is collaborating on the development of a model to take wind forecast and other load 

forecast factors and to use artificial intelligence (AI) to derive locational marginal pricing information 

(LMP) with training datasets using historic data. This will enable operators to predict when it is not 

economically feasible (negative lMP) to feed wind power into the grid. 

The innovative team of researchers across Tech is committed to a research vision that enables an 

electric grid of the future. Over the next four years, we intend to invest a minimum of $8 million dollars 

in research into cybersecurity and energy grid resiliency to enable the creation of a sustainable and 

diverse energy economy. We are confident this investment will help the nation attain its goals in energy 

security, traditional and alternative energy utilization, and a 21'' century energy grid. 

I am proud to have this opportunity to share Texas Tech University's capabilities, our expansive vision 

for the future, and serve as a resource to the Subcommittee. I look forward to answering your 

questions. Thank you for this invitation, and "Go Tech!" 

Box 41075 I Lubbock, Texas 79409-1075 IT 806.742.3904 I F 806.742-3959 1 www.research.ttu.edu 

An EEO I Affirmative Action Institution 
60 

Y TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY 

Office of the Vice President 

for Research· 

Joseph A. Heppert, Ph.D. 

Vice President for Research 

Professor of Chemistry 

Texas Tech University 

Dr. Heppert is currently Vice President for Research at Texas Tech University. Previously, 

he served as Associate Vice Chancellor for Research at the University of Kansas (KU). He 

chaired the KU Chemistry Department from 2005-2009 and was the founding director of the 

University's Center for Science Education from 2001-2009. He is a Fellow of the American 

Chemical Society, and currently serves as chair of the American Chemical Society's 

Committee on Budget and Finance. 

Dr. Heppert's initial research focused on organo transition metal chemistry. This research 

resulted in the isolation and characterization of the first class of air stable terminal transition 

metal carbide compounds. Dr. Heppert has also been active in projects to improve science 

teaching and science teacher preparation. He is past chair of the American Chemical 

Society's Committee on Education. In this role he testified before the U.S. House of 

Representatives' Committee on Science and the National Science Board on science 

education policy issues. 

Dr. Heppert received a B.S. in Chemistry from San Jose State University in 1978, where he 

participated in heavy elements research at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He 

was awarded a Ph.D. in Inorganic Chemistry from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 

1982, studying under Donald Ganies. He completed postdoctoral training at Indiana 

University under the direction of Dr. Malcolm Chisholm. He joined the chemistry faculty at 

KU in 1985 and moved to Texas Tech University in 2017. 

Box 41075 I Lubbock, Texas 79409-1075 IT 806.742.3904 I F 806.742-3959 I www.research.ttu.edu 

An EEO /Affirmative Action Institution 
61 

Chairman WEBER. I’ll leave that alone. 

So they’ve called votes, so we’re going to recess, and we will reconvene immediately following the last vote. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman WEBER. This hearing is now reconvened. I thank the 

witnesses for their testimony. The Chair recognizes himself for five 

minutes of questioning. 

Mr. Walker, in your testimony, you stress that OE’s priorities are 

the development of grid modeling capabilities, megawatt-scale grid 

storage, and the Grid Modernization Initiative. As the smallest of 

the applied energy offices at DOE, how are you able to accomplish 

your research and development goals with a tight budget, number 

one? I guess, essentially, how does the OE do more with less? What 

do you say? 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. The 

focus with OE is definitely on those three things, as well as sensing 

technology. And how we accomplish our mission is through the 

hard work of the people within OE and CESER working in concert 

with the other applied sciences at DOE, so among fossil energy, nuclear energy, and the energy efficiency, primarily relying on the 

platform of the GMI, the GMLC, and that’s in fact why we expanded the charter to include those other applied sciences to be 

able to leverage and ensure that the investments we make are the 

best across the entire department and to leverage the resources, 

you know, equally from a national security perspective. 

Chairman WEBER. So prioritize. The programs within OE are 

squarely within the applied energy mission of the Department, and 

OE research goals are closely tied to the needs of the energy industry. The Department’s fiscal year 2019 budget request places an 

importance on federal funding only toward early-stage research 

programs—only towards early-stage research programs. What steps 

have you taken to ensure responsible stewardship of those taxpayer 

dollars by funding only the R&D that cannot be performed by the 

energy industry? 

Mr. WALKER. So at OE we focus very much on early-stage research, utilizing our capabilities both on the CESER side, as well 

as OE, to identify where are the cutting-edge technologies that will 

not be, by virtue of the cost and, more importantly, the intellectual 

capability that is realized through our national labs. So we identify, 

using a risk-based approach, how to best invest that money. 

Chairman WEBER. I thank you. Dr. Heppert, this question is for 

you. In your testimony, you explain how Texas Tech University 

partners with both Sandia National Lab and the private industry 

to conduct research. What is the difference between research conducted at the GLEAMM facility and the research conducted at the 

Sandia SWiFT site? And should there be more coordination between the national labs and academia on grid challenges like those 

identified in the GMI? 

Dr. HEPPERT. Sure. I think there’s a degree of commonality in 

terms of some of the research. The SWiFT site really has been a 

testbed for understanding windfarms and the fundamental impact 

of atmospherics and of fluid flow through windfarms. We’ve got 

highly instrumented systems there with radar that can help us 

model that and help us understand the impact of environmental 
62 

circumstances on the performance of those systems. So it’s really 

in part about predictive modeling and understanding how to optimize the configuration and structure of future windfarms, okay? 

The GLEAMM system is really going to be a testbed that will 

allow us to actually connect to some of these existing resources in 

addition to some resources that are held in the private sector nearby of both wind power, solar power, and battery capabilities. The 

focus there is really going to be on being able to testbed new technologies, both software and hardware technologies, to allow us to 

understand how to better integrate those and more seamlessly integrate those systems; model in real time, be able to model conditions 

that are going to lead to grid—potentially to grid failure; and understand, using artificial intelligence strategies, how we can more 

effectively integrate these; and also how we can improve and enhance the economics of utilizing energy from these systems as well. 

So I would say on the one side we’re talking about looking more 

at the fundamentals of wind, and we’re very pleased on that side 

that we’ll be helping to cohost the wind blade design conference 

that Sandia has held for many years at Sandia this year in Lubbock. But on the other side, we’re looking more at how we truly integrate these other technologies effectively. And it’ll be a great 

testbed for being able to take, as I said, both AI technology and 

new power grid technologies hardware and integrate them into a 

system. 

Chairman WEBER. Thank you for that. Can you get the dates of 

that conference to our staff here? 

Dr. HEPPERT. I’ll be happy to do that. 

Chairman WEBER. Yes, okay. Thank you. 

At this time the Chair recognizes Mr. Takano for five minutes. 

Mr. TAKANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Heppert and Dr. Sarrao, the Trump Administration has proposed a 37 percent cut in fiscal year 2019 for the Office of Electricity, or OE, which stewards the largest portion of our federal investments in grid research. Within OE, the budget proposes a number of steep cuts to important research, including a 74 percent cut 

to smart grid research, a 67 percent cut to clean energy transmission and reliability, and an 81 percent cut to energy storage research and development. 

I just want to know from all of you, what role do you think energy storage and the development of battery storage can play when 

it comes to distributing wind and solar, as well as grid resilience? 

Dr. HEPPERT. Well, I would say that the magnitude of the cuts 

you’re referring to are quite concerning. We’re dealing with technologies here that are in—really in development. The challenges 

we’re facing in terms of the scale of renewables that have to be integrated into the grid has changed dramatically over the last five 

years. The challenges associated with both creating a resilient system, understanding how to use battery technology effectively in 

order to create a stable microgrid system, a regional grid system, 

and doing the kind of effective modeling on how to optimize those 

systems, those are all landscapes that are changing. And in addition to that you’ll recognize what we—a number of us talked about 

with regard to the security issues, which is a constantly changing 

landscape as well. 
63 

So I think federal funding is critically important, sustained federal funding is critically important for us to be able to take advantage and leverage some of the model systems that we developed 

across the country, including what’s going on within the SWiFT 

and GLEAMM programs at my institution but also other institutions. 

So as far as impact is concerned on our programs, I would see, you know, in any one year we’re in the vicinity of $2.5 million 

worth of funding that could potentially be impacted by some of 

those cuts, and that—again, that would make it very difficult for 

us to leverage the investment that the federal government, the national labs, and the State of Texas have already made in some of 

the unique model systems we have on our campus. 

Mr. SARRAO. Yes, thank you for the question. As you know, certainly a decrease in budget would create challenges. I think from 

a Los Alamos perspective, one of our goals is to use capabilities 

that derive from our broader national security mission focused on 

challenges of grid modeling so that we can diversify our efforts in 

that regard. Certainly, our focus on early-stage research, as well as 

partnerships like the GMLC enable—cause us to be as effective as 

we can be. 

And then to your question about energy storage, I think thinking 

both about fundamental, for example, materials and chemistry research and energy storage and how you think about that in the 

broader context of the electricity grid is something that our grid 

modeling efforts help enable so that we find the right challenges 

to focus on to address the problems in an environment that’s potentially fiscally constrained. 

Mr. TAKANO. Yes. So, Mr. Gramlich, in your testimony you note 

that the recent DOE grid reliability staff report found that, quote, 

‘‘Increased deployment of solar and wind does and will not negatively impact the operation of the grid.’’ Mr. Gramlich, what role 

do you think energy storage and development of battery storage 

can play when it comes to distributing wind and solar, as well as 

grid resilience? 

Mr. GRAMLICH. Thank you for the question. I think energy storage can provide many services to the grid, to customers, specifically 

to distribution systems, transmission systems, and it provides services that are typically considered generation services, so it’s really 

the only technology that sort of provides almost some of everything. 

It will be, I think, important when we get to very high renewable 

energy futures. You can integrate a whole lot of wind and solar I 

think without a huge amount of storage now currently in most regional grids, but certainly island systems and other areas require 

more balancing. And, over time, as penetrations of renewable variable resources grow, storage will become more and more important. 

Mr. TAKANO. Well, great. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. I can yield back, please. 

Chairman WEBER. Okay. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer, for five minutes. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Walker, can you speak to the concerns that the more connected the grid becomes, the more vulnerable it becomes to cyber 

attacks similar to, you know, what happened in Ireland last year? 
64 

Mr. WALKER. The—as Dan Coats, our Director of National Intelligence, noted, the—we are recognizing more frequent and more sophisticated cyber threats. There is no question that the grid is vulnerable to cyber threats, whether they’re isolated or whether 

they’re fully integrated. What is clear, as we introduce cyber-enabled technologies through the Internet of Things and the advancements of things like smart grids, we introduce more and more devices on the system that have the capability of being penetrated 

through cyber, so it is extremely important that, as we develop 

these newer technologies and as we integrate additional technology 

on the system, that we do it with a cybersecurity focus. We have just recently issued a funding opportunity for $25 million back into the oil and natural gas as well as electric sector to 

look at the architecture and the design of cyber-enabled devices 

to—in order to stave off the risk as we move forward and capitalize 

on the existing underlying physics of the system. 

Mr. PALMER. Well, I understand we want to protect our systems 

from being hacked, but also, I think we’ve had some experiences, 

particularly in the last few years, with hurricanes and in the last 

couple of decades with Katrina and others where we lost whole sections of the power grid, and one of my concerns is if we had a 

major cyber attack or an EMP attack is whether or not you have 

redundant systems. And I don’t mean just having equipment to replace equipment that’s been fried basically or whether or not 

you’re—how quickly you’re able to shift from a technology-controlled system to a manual system, whether or not you have 

trained employees that—I see you’re nodding your head there. 

Those are the concerns that I have is in terms of preparation is 

how long would it take and, depending on the time of year, how 

serious restoring power would become. And so that—Mr. Chairman, I think that’s part of what we’ve got to figure out here is in 

the event that we have an attack like that, that, you know, in cases 

with the storms, it takes anywhere from a day to a week. You— 

that’s tolerable. But if you get into a situation where you have a 

massive loss of equipment and you can’t shift to a manual system, 

then you really got a problem. Our—is that some of the things 

that—— 

Mr. WALKER. That’s absolutely—— 

Mr. PALMER. —I’m sure you’re thinking through that. 

Mr. WALKER. That’s absolutely what we are 100 percent focused 

on. So under the FAST Act, there was a requirement for the Secretary to identify defense-critical electric infrastructure, and we 

continue to evolve that list of critical infrastructure with an understanding of what the impact is across the 16 critical infrastructure 

sectors throughout the United States. And we are developing within OE operational strategies that are—we’re executing on some of 

those now to better ensure that when we do have those widespread 

events, whether it be cyber or hurricane, that we have capability 

to restore the system, whether that be—and that’s one of the focuses of having a fuel-secure generation source. When we have 

that, we don’t have to rely on the supply chains and the risks associated with supply chains that might get realized during something 

like a cyber event or a hurricane where there’s destruction from, 

you know, the port all the way to any facility. 
65 

Mr. PALMER. Maybe Mr. Gramlich and Mr. Heppert could address this, but when you’re talking about a massive loss of the grid 

and you look at it in the context of what—what’s the first thing we 

do when we have a major storm? We go in with food and water and 

medicine, that sort of thing. And a massive loss of the grid, that 

will be the number one thing because most people depend on the 

grocery store for their food and sustenance, things like that. So it’s 

going to become absolutely critical that we either have redundant 

systems or the ability to shift to a manual system. And I’ll let the 

gentlemen respond to that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GRAMLICH. I think you’re absolutely right, Congressman, 

that preparing for that situation in advance, low probability as it 

may be, is absolutely something that needs to be done. Personally, 

I think the National Academies of Sciences’ report recently was 

strong, had good recommendations in that area, so I would commend that for more information. 

Dr. HEPPERT. I’d come back again to the concept that having 

both diverse grids and grids that have survivability at the local 

level where you can go down from a macroscopic grid to a 

microgrid, which will still operate and where you can bring up portions of that grid rapidly as the technology becomes repaired without risking bringing down the system again as a result of the initial insult is something that’s really critical. That’s—I think that’s 

part of the reason that the kind of modeling we’ve been describing 

and the kind of research that we’re promoting is really important 

for the future. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Chairman, if I may, if you’ll indulge me just for 

a moment here, I worked for a couple of engineering companies before running a think tank, and unless things have changed dramatically in the last 30 years, we have a patchwork grid. It’s not 

a uniform grid. And in some cases that could be helpful, but in 

other cases then a massive loss. Again, I want to emphasize—and 

to your point, it’s a low probability, but we need to be prepared. 

A low-probability event could have absolutely catastrophic and 

deadly consequences, so I really think that we need to be prepared 

for that. We need to recognize the fact that it is a diverse grid, it’s 

a patchwork, and that we have some ability to address that in a 

relatively short amount of time. 

So with that—and you can comment on that as you will, but, Mr. 

Chairman, thank you for indulging me, and I yield back. 

Chairman WEBER. Thank you. 

Mr. Tonko, you’re now recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Secretary Walker, it’s good to see you 

again. Members of this committee may not know it, but Secretary 

Walker and I went through energy deregulation in New York State 

together. And I think it was a bold move. Our electric markets— 

electricity markets may not be perfect, but they have blind spots. 

And I think Congress and States and grid operators and regulators 

can all work together to address some of those market failures. 

But in 2018 the toothpaste is out of the tube and drastic and unnecessary market interventions under the false pretense of an 

emergency to bail out uncompetitive generators like the one being 

discussed by the Administration I think are unacceptable. Mr. Sec-
66 

retary, I will not ask you to respond to that, but I hope you will 

carry that message back to DOE. 

However, I do want to ask you about the future of Puerto Rico’s 

grid. As we enter hurricane season, I’m concerned about the fragility, the lack of resilience of that system. Can you give us a sense 

of some of the recommendations and work that has been done to 

strengthen Puerto Rico’s grid for the long term? 

Mr. WALKER. Sure. We have been working with Puerto Rico to 

develop a sophisticated modeling system that enables them to better operate their grid, and we’ve been working with the technical 

advisory committee that was established by PREPA’s board to accomplish that. That model will also help identify the relaying setting changes that need to occur in order to better optimize the grid 

so that they don’t sustain the blackouts that they’ve recently seen 

over the last year or two. 

That being said, with the work that had—has been done from the 

emergency restoration component, you know, equipment was put 

back in place consistent with the north—you know, the standards— 

NAS standards, so, you know, the lack of O&M that was done on 

the system in one sense has been cured because the weak poles and 

the weak guying on the transmission system has been replaced. 

They are continuing and still working on one of the major transmission lines that goes through the north-south corridor. We are 

still there. DOE is providing technical assistance where we can for, 

you know, any of the technical components on the system, and 

we’re still continuing to work with FEMA. 

The PREPA is continuing to identify some of the strategies that 

they will employ for, you know, any events that will be realized, 

and, you know, one of the key components is we still have a—you 

know, a significant number of federal resources down on the island, 

including the generators, which were supplied for the critical infrastructure, the ones that were referred to Congressman Palmer. You 

know, we recognize that—and after the—the after-action reports 

that we’ve, you know, started to look at with PREPA and FEMA 

highlight that, you know, the 2,000-plus generators that are down 

there represent those critical infrastructure that we really need to 

make sure that we’ve got, you know, the microgrid capabilities, distributed energy resources so that when they do realize an event, 

it has less real impact on the safety and health of the people in 

Puerto Rico. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. And, Mr. Gramlich, I would like to get 

your thoughts on this. Americans in Puerto Rico are reeling from 

the most devastating blackout in our nation’s history. And obviously, Puerto Rico had unique challenges, but it is my understanding that many of its greatest grid vulnerabilities were damaged transmission and distribution systems, which is the cause of 

most disruptions in our continental United States. So Puerto Rico 

could be a testbed and model for grid innovation. Do you have 

ideas about how Puerto Rico can rebuild to have a stronger, more 

modernized grid? 

Mr. GRAMLICH. Sure, Congressman. I have not spent much time 

researching Puerto Rico, but, generally, we do have a lot of technologies and options that are available to any system that may be 

rebuilding its grid. And in fact, our mainland transmission grid is 
67 

aging, and so we have opportunities to improve the technology 

there as well. 

One key area that DOE and OE specifically support is the development of microgrids or backup generation, so when we’re talking 

about national security or military bases or others—or critical uses 

or hospitals or police stations or other critical needs, recognizing 

there are still tremendous efficiencies of the large grid and large 

regional markets and all of that, but there are also thousands of 

entry points and risks on such a system. So when you’re focusing 

on the end-use customer and their critical reliability needs that 

may exist, those ability to have backup generation or islanding capability that DOE can help and help bring down the cost for will 

be very important. 

Mr. TONKO. Yes, it seems as though, in response to their need 

as an island, as a people, we can come up with a nice innovative 

response that will also serve as a template for what can be done 

across the continental United States. So with that, Dr. Heppert, I 

don’t know if you wanted to say something, but I’m out of time, 

so—but if the Chair would allow for you to comment? 

Dr. HEPPERT. Sure. 

Mr. TONKO. With that, I would yield back. 

Dr. HEPPERT. I just wanted to point out that one of our faculty 

members, Dr. Ren, is involved in a collaboration with Puerto Rico 

telecom, which involves a number of national laboratories, Pacific 

Northwest National Lab, Oak Ridge, as well as NREL, to implement some innovative new technology for democratizing their telecommunications grid and really bringing it back. So I think this 

has been a great example of how that partnership that the omnibus bill talks about between the private sector, universities, and 

national laboratories can really help to have an impact in real-time 

on these kinds of situations. 

Mr. WALKER. Chairman, if I might address Congressman Tonko’s 

question? 

Chairman WEBER. Go ahead. He needs all the help he can get. 

Mr. WALKER. Congressman, this—there are some very specific 

items that we are working with the labs on putting into Puerto 

Rico that are cutting-edge that would—we’re basically looking to 

accelerate the commercialization of them and therefore utilization 

on the mainland by putting them in Puerto Rico, so things like our 

darknet, which is the use of the black fiber and the optical ground 

wire, which is on their transmission system is one idea. But using 

correlation through this high-fidelity sensing capability to enable 

optimization of their grid is another. That will be utilized in conjunction with the development of sophisticated microgrids that 

have the capability to expand and contract similar to some work 

that’s being done at the Electric Power Board in Chattanooga with 

Oak Ridge National Lab, so there are a number of very specific 

things that we think Puerto Rico is uniquely poised to be able to 

integrate. 

We’ve been working—I’ve been working with Walt Higgins, who’s 

CEO, and we’ve been working—I’ve been working—my team’s been 

working with HUD to help to find the guidance document with the 

supplemental funding that Congress provided all to ensure that, 
68 

you know, these type of technologies, the microgrids, the DERs, 

really do get in. 

And one of the things that, Congressman, is very interesting and 

you’re very familiar with, the Greenbank, one of the things we’ve 

talked about is actually a critical infrastructure bank in Puerto 

Rico and the possibility of that to enable those 2,000-plus locations 

that we previously identified through the installation of generation 

to come up with unique ways to basically island themselves and 

provide the capabilities for public health and safety that they do. 

Mr. TONKO. Well, thank you for that info. I think it also speaks 

to the wisdom of not cutting research and innovation investments 

like ARPA–E and all. We are on the cutting-edge, we’re an innovation economy, and we don’t go backward, we need to go forward, 

so I would just say those investments are critical to be able to have 

those responses you just outlined. 

With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

Chairman WEBER. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Virginia, Mr. Beyer, for five minutes. 

Mr. BEYER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And thank all 

of you for being with us this afternoon. 

Secretary Walker, you previously stated on February 20 of this 

year, and I quote, ‘‘We would never use a 202 to stave off an economic issue. That’s not what it’s for.’’ And now, FirstEnergy Solutions has recently asked the Department to use 202 to stave off an 

economic issue. Does that imply or do we understand that you 

won’t use a 202 for them? 

Mr. WALKER. The 202 application from FirstEnergy is being reviewed by my department as we speak. 

Mr. BEYER. Great. Well, thank you. I’m hoping that your earlier 

strong opinion will still prevail. 

You know, the draft grid memo was circulated before the National Security Council last Friday, and it’s widely understood that 

this draft came from the Department intended to fulfill the President’s June 1 directive to intervene in planned plant closures, but 

there’s been an awful lot of pushback from people who are grid operators and grid experts. Specifically, the CEO of Exelon, the largest nuclear generator in the United States, said the retirement of 

coal and nuclear plants do not constitute a great emergency that 

warrants urgent intervention from the federal government. 

Secretary Walker, the President of Electric—Electricity Consumers Resource Council in a study say—the large industrial electricity users say the latest DOE proposal would, quote, ‘‘devastate 

U.S. manufacturing.’’ Have you calculated the costs on American 

businesses, specifically, American manufacturing? 

Mr. WALKER. I have not. 

Mr. BEYER. The previous 403 proposal, which was rejected by 

FERC because it was unsubstantiated, they said it was going to 

cost—increase consumer costs by $8 billion annually from PJM 

alone. Now, the new plan nationalized the 403 proposal, so I would 

expect that that $8 billion is going to go up very significantly. 

Again, in putting together this draft plan, have you estimated what 

this will cost the U.S. taxpayer? 

Mr. WALKER. I have not. 
69 

Mr. BEYER. I have to give you wonderful credit for being able to 

answer these things very tightly. I would suggest, though, as a 

member of this committee, that moving forward with this new proposal, if it’s going to devastate U.S. manufacturing, if it’s going to 

add way more than $8 billion to the electricity cost of our American 

consumer, this is something that you and Secretary Perry and others should look very seriously at and should have numbers available for. I think it’s within purview of—as a member of this committee to ask you to go back and do the elementary research and 

report back to the Committee on those two things, please. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the 

record a letter I led with 36 of my colleagues asking that Secretary 

Perry and the Trump Administration cease the false narrative that 

bailing out uneconomic energy sources in competitive markets is 

needed for electrical grid resilience and to stop the attempts to use 

emergency authorities to intervene in planned power plant retirements. 

And I’d like to make three official points on the inappropriate 

use of emergency authorities that—— 

Chairman WEBER. Let me—— 

Mr. BEYER. —bail out planned power plant—— 

Chairman WEBER. Let me say without objection. 

Mr. BEYER. Oh, thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

[The information appears in Appendix II] 

Mr. BEYER. Number one, unlike these plant retirements in the 

PJM grid, we have a legitimate grid crisis in Puerto Rico. Thank 

you for addressing it, but we still have thousands of residents without power. The President himself has still not acknowledged the 

death toll, which we now understand to be higher than those lost 

on 9/11. This is his Katrina. 

Number two, this bailout plan does not actually help coal country. This is a short-term talking point that does nothing to create 

good-paying jobs, resilient jobs for the families in Appalachian. We 

need to work together with these resilient, industrious, great families to create good-paying jobs that will endure. 

And number three, the bailout plan ignores all the experts. Instead of listening to those in the universe of the world of energy 

grids and despite knowing what this would cost the American public, the Trump Administration is still moving ahead perhaps unfortunately likely because someone contributed to the campaign, and 

this is not how our democracy is supposed to work. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman WEBER. I thank the gentleman. 

And we now recognize Dr. Foster from Illinois for five minutes. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 

witnesses. 

Maybe I’d like to switch over to some sort of high-level direction 

that you need from Congress and the American people to think 

about your specifications for what you want the grid to accomplish 

in terms of reliability because there are—you know, people can be 

concerned about outages that are temporary, outages that—the tail 

risk of having an outage of six months or longer that can happen 

in some disaster scenarios. Insurance against the tail risk cost 

money, and there is a trade-off that, you know, everyone in life and 
70 

every one in business faces as to how much we’re willing to spend 

to reduce tail risk, you know, how much spare inventory of different components we need to have on hand, things like that. And 

so do you feel that you have adequate high-level guidance from 

Congress and the American people about what the specs you’re 

shooting for or do you think we need a wider discussion of that and 

related issues? 

Mr. WALKER. Congressman, I’ll answer the question from DOE’s 

perspective. The DOE is one of three organizations that fundamentally analyzes the day-to-day operation of the electric grid. FERC 

is the other one, NERC is the other one, and each of us has different lenses by which we look at the system. FERC looks at it 

from a market base, NERC from a reliability perspective, and DOE 

looks at it from a national security perspective. 

So from a national security perspective, the day-to-day reliability 

is not really something that we take a look at. Obviously, it’s important. We contribute to it. We make R&D investments where it 

makes sense, but we also look at those investments from how they 

can be utilized from a national security standpoint. We recognize, 

particularly given the recent evolution of the grid, particularly its 

interdependence mostly on gas pipelines, that we have now reached 

a point where—different than 20 or 30 years ago where if I lose the 

wrong gas pipeline, I can lose tens of thousands of megawatts of 

generation simultaneously, and that simultaneous loss of all those 

generators can then have deleterious effects through, you know, 

cascading frequency loss, as you well know as a physicist. And 

there are real risks in the system as a result of it. 

And, unfortunately, when we built these systems, built the gas 

pipelines, oil pipelines, the electric transmission system, things like 

cybersecurity didn’t even exist, and the word domestic terrorism 

was probably not even coined yet. But today, we deal with very significant risk every day. And why—while some may say it’s a low 

probability, we deal with tens of thousands of cyber intrusions on 

a daily basis. It’s just a matter of time before the sophistication 

level increases and those penetrations become real. 

We’ve seen this happen. We all watched the Ukraine event. So 

we can pretend that it doesn’t exist, but we have hard evidence 

through actual realization of things like Ukraine that these capabilities exist and they’re being utilized. And we spend our time focused on strategies that enable us to survive those type of events 

and avoid them. 

Mr. FOSTER. Other comments? 

Mr. GRAMLICH. Sure, Congressman. There is the North American 

Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) that is in charge of reliability under the ERO provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 

I think that organization and the institutions around reliability 

need to be—remain in place. They are doing a good job. FERC overseas the markets and transmission system. Their role needs to be 

respected. I think what we’re seeing with this presidential directive 

is, under the guise of national security, a nationalization of the 

electric system, which would be extremely damaging for the investment—the private investment that the industry currently relies on 

for all of the reliability and efficiencies that we get out of this 

power system. 
71 

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, there’s a tough situation where if, for example, 

one State decides that, for their own purposes, they want to subsidize a class of electrical generation and then if you’re in a 

multistate interconnected grid, that looks like dumping that will 

force, you know, other States’ generation stations to close. And so 

this is a complex set of problems because one state’s, you know, 

necessary subsidy for some purpose is another—it’s protectionism 

viewed from other states. And in trying to understand how we— 

as—nationally deal with those misaligned incentives between the 

states and not have the federal government come in with yet a 

third set of misaligned incentives for their own political reasons 

is—will be an ongoing challenge. 

And, let’s see, I have now negative 19 seconds, so I’ll yield back. 

Chairman WEBER. I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The record will remain 

open for two weeks for additional comments and written questions 

from members. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(73) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
74 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by The Hon. Bruce J. Walker 
75 

invite cybersecurity professionals from the energy sector, private industry, Department of 

Defense, and other Federal agencies to participate in CyberFire. We are expanding the 

coordination between DOE's Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency 

Response (CESER) and OCIO to ensure that CyberFire meets the future needs of the 

Department and our public and private sector partners. 

CESER supports preparedness through building capacity in the energy sector for incident 

response and information sharing, as well as advancing research and development to redesign 

the architecture to survive a cyber-attack. This requires multi-disciplinary expertise in power 

system engineering, energy sector operations, computer science, and cybersecurity. As such, 

CESER employees bring expertise from varied relevant backgrounds that, in combination, 

position CESER to support the energy sector in preparing for and reducing cyber-risk. 
76 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

"The Electric Grid of the Future" 

The Honorable Bruce J. Walker, Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity Delivery and 

Energy Reliability, Department of Energy; Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of 

Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Department of Energy 

Questions submitted by Rep. Don Beyer, Member, 

Committee on Science, Space, and Teclmology 

1. Please provide the costs to American businesses, especially U.S. manufacturing, of 

implementing the draft "Grid Memo" provided to the National Security Council 

and/or the Department of Energy's plan to implement President Trump's "FuelSecure Power Facilities" directive. 

The referenced "Grid Memo" was a pre-decisional document. I have not conducted a cost 

estimate to American businesses on the implementation of a proposal in a predecisional 

document. 

2. Please provide the costs to the American taxpayer of implementing the draft "Grid 

Memo" provided to the National Security Council and/or the Department of 

Energy's plan to implement President Trump's "Fuel-Secure Power Facilities" 

directive. 

The referenced "Grid Memo" was a pre-decisional document. I have not conducted a cost 

estimate to the American taxpayer on the implementation of a proposal in a predecisional 

document. 
77 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

"The Electric Grid of the Future" 

The Honorable Broce J. Walker, Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity Delivery and 

Energy Reliability, Department of Energy; Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of 

Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Department of Energy 

Questions submitted by Rep. Jacky Rosen, Member, 

Committee on Science. Space, and Technology 

1. This past March, I hosted a roundtable with Nevada stakeholders to discuss ways 

we can improve energy delivery and grid resiliency, strengthen cybersecurity, and 

build a capable energy workforce for a 21st century economy. I heard about the 

challenges these businesses, utilities, and non-profits face, including a lack of federal 

investment, shortage of skilled workers, and regulatory hurdles. One of the 

companies at the roundtable was a Nevada-based defense contractor with a focus on 

serving and protecting our military and critical national assets. They discussed 

operational technology, and how despite being the backbone of our nation's energy 

infrastructure, operational technology is not well understood or protected with 

standard IT methods. They also suggested that Congress create a new grant 

program or other funding source to help incentivize utilities to strengthen 

operational cybersecurity. 

a. What are your thoughts on a proposal like this? 

The Office ofCybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response's (CESER's) 

Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) Research and Development (R&D) 

program enhances the reliability and resilience of the Nation's energy infrastructure by 

partnering with the energy sector to reduce the risk that a cyber incident might disrupt energy 

delivery. CEDS R&D incents energy sector entities, including utilities, to participate in costshared partnerships that support advanced technologies in the highrisk!high-reward research 

stages. The CEDS R&D program builds an R&D pipeline through partnerships with energy 

sector utilities, vendors, universities, national laboratories, and providers of cybersecurity 

services to the energy sector. A $25 million CEDS funding opportunity announcement (FOA), 

entitled "Industry Partnerships for CEDS Research, Development and Demonstration," closed on 

July 2, 2018. The FOA focuses on advancing cybersecurity tools and technologies for energy 

delivery control systems, and is now in the evaluation and selection phase. 

Threat monitoring and detection is indeed less widespread in the complex operational 

technology (OT) environment of industrial control systems than on information technology (IT) 

networks. DOE's FY 2019 budget request supports a Cybersecurity for the Operational 

Technology Environment (CYOTE) pilot to enable OT data sharing and analysis capability with 

four pilot utilities. As part of this pilot, DOE is examining how we can work together with the 

electricity sector to leverage U.S. intelligence capabilities to prevent, detect, or delay a cyber-
78 

attack on utility OT networks that could disrupt power. The CYOTE pilot is in the initial stages 

and could be expanded to other utilities. 

2. Since I've come to Congress, I've made it a priority to advocate for policies and 

programs that strengthen our grid and to better prepare our nation's electric 

infrastructure against cyber-attacks. For the past two years, I sent a letter to the 

House Appropriations Committee urging robust funding for DOE's Office of 

Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, and specifically the Smart Grid 

Research & Development (R&D) program. As you know, Smart Grid R&D 

develops the technologies, tools, and techniques needed to modernize the electric 

power grid and ensure the U.S. energy delivery system is secure, resilient, and 

reliable. 

a. How critical is federally-funded research to technology development and 

deployment for the electricity sector? 

As the grid evolves, cybersecurity technologies must adapt to new power system equipment. 

CESER is working in close partnership with Office of Electricity R&D programs to design 

cybersecurity into new modernized grid technology from the earliest stages. Funding for 

research for technology development and deployment is critical as we continue to address 

increasing and more sophisticated cyber and physical threats. 

b. What are the scientific and industry consequences of defunding or stopping 

these R&D activities? 

The pace of innovation in the electricity system would likely slow, affecting national security 

through, among other issues, increased cybersecurity risk. 

3. Earlier this month, a memo from the Administration was leaked that details 

potential plans for the Secretary of Energy to save struggling coal and nuclear 

plants in the name of grid resilience and national security. In the wake of this memo 

surfacing, we have heard from many experts in industry who say that not only is 

this destructive to the purpose and efficiency of energy markets, but it would also 

not improve grid resilience in any meaningful way. 

a. What is the status of this proposal detailed in the memo? 

That document was pre-decisional. The Department of Energy is continuing to explore all 

options and no final decisions have been made. 

b. Will the Department of Energy allow industry representatives and academic 

researchers with the appropriate clearances to view the classified threats to 

the grid that DOE cites? 

Where a need to know exists, CESER works with DOE's Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence to provide classified threat briefings for participating energy sector 
79 

stakeholders. The need for academic participants in CESER activities to receive classified 

briefmgs has not yet arisen. Industry representatives with appropriate clearances, participating in 

CESER activities under the Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program (CRISP) and 

CYOTE projects, for instance, have been provided classified threat briefings, as have members 

of the Electricity and Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Coordinating Committees. 

CRISP analyzes near-real-time IT data from utilities using U.S. intelligence to detect cyberattacks and threats, and delivers alerts and mitigations back to owners and operators. 

The CYOTE pilot will enable OT data sharing and analysis capability with four pilot utilities for 

the complex OT environment. 
80 

Responses by Dr. John Sarrao 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

"The Electric Grid (){the Future" 

Dr. John Sarrao, Principal Associate Director, Science, Technology, and Engineering 

Directorate, Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Questions submitted by Rep. Jacky Rosen Member. 

Committee on Science. Space, and Technology 

I. This past March, I hosted a roundtable with Nevada stakeholders to discuss ways 

we can improve energy delivery and grid resiliency, strengthen cybersecurity, and 

build a capable energy workforce for a 21st century economy. I heard about the 

challenges these businesses, utilities, and non-profits face, including a lack of federal 

investment, shortage of skilled workers, and regulatory hurdles. One of the 

companies at the roundtable was a Nevada-based defense contractor with a focus on 

serving and protecting our military and critical national assets. They discussed 

operational technology, and how despite being the backbone of our nation's energy 

infrastructure, operational technology is not well understood or protected with 

standard IT methods. They also suggested that Congress create a new grant 

program or other funding source to help incentivize utilities to strengthen 

operational cybersecurity. 

a. What are your thoughts on a proposal like this? 

Effective approaches to cybersecurity are a key element of achieving and sustaining grid 

resilience. As I noted in my written testimony, Los Alamos believes that cyberphysical threats 

are one of the key challenges facing the grid today. We are actively working in this area, both 

researching and discovering new approaches to cybersecurity and working with academic, 

government, and industrial partners to translate these innovations to practice, with a particular 

focus on giving operators more effective tools to monitor for, detect, and respond to 

cyberphysical threats. While we do not have an opinion on specific proposals or funding 

mechanisms, we agree that enhanced investment in cybersecurity innovation would contribute 

positively to grid resilience. 

2. Since I've come to Congress, I've made it a priority to advocate for policies and 

programs that strengthen our grid and to better prepare our nation's electric 

infrastructure against cyber-attacks. For the past two years, I sent a letter to the 

House Appropriations Committee urging robust funding for DOE's Office of 

Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, and specifically the Smart Grid 

Research & Development (R&D) program. As you know, Smart Grid R&D 

develops the technologies, tools, and techniques needed to modernize the electric 
81 

power grid and ensure the U.S. energy delivery system is secure, resilient, and 

reliable. 

a. How critical is federally-funded research to technology development and 

deployment for the electricity sector? 

b. What are the scientific and industry consequences of defunding or stopping 

these R&D activities? 

Modernizing the electricity grid and enhancing its resilience is both a national security challenge 

and an important scientific frontier. As a result, Los Alamos National Laboratory is deeply 

committed to contributing to this effort, consistent with our broader national security 

capabilities, and we have been active and making important contributions for a number of years. 

Because of the long-term nature of the challenge and the innovation still required to achieve 

success, significant early-stage, pre-competitive research and development (R&D) is necessary, 

and we would agree that federal investment is appropriate and an important element of a broader 

R&D investment ecosystem. 

Reduced or eliminated federal funding in this sector would surely slow progress in addressing 

key problems. Because Los Alamos approaches our work in grid resilience, as we do all R&D 

topics, from a capability perspective, applying and ultimately enhancing skill sets developed for 

our core nuclear security mission, it is difficult for us to quantify specific negative impacts that 

would result from particular funding decrements. 
82 

Responses by Mr. Robert Gramlich 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

"The Electric Grid of the Future" 

Mr. Robert Gramlich, President, Grid Strategies, LLC. 

Questions submitted by Rep. Dan Lipinski. Member 

Committee on Science. Space. and Technology 

1. I notice there is a common trend among those that want to deny that human 

involvement is causing global temperatures to rise and our climate to change. They 

will say they do not know the extent to which humans are responsible. Or they will 

claim they are not a scientist in order to absolve themselves from taking a logical 

stand on a scientific issue. Yet we cannot afford to sit on our hands or pander to a 

certain political view when it comes to this issue, especially as we face more intense 

natural disasters and consider making major long-term investments in our 

infrastructure. 

So as we consider potential infrastructure investments, should states and utilities 

consider climate change as it relates to the resilience of our electricity delivery 

system? 

I think it is quite clear that the climate is changing, and various types of infrastructure need to 

withstand climate-driven threats that are of greater frequency and magnitude than in the past. 

The specific threats vary from region to region and include rising sea levels in coastal areas, and 

a wide range of more severe weather including more extremes for temperatures (both hot and 

cold), precipitation (both floods and droughts), and wind storms. States and utility planners 

must plan, authorize, and build new infrastructure and replace existing infrastructure to 

withstand these threats. The utility industry has seen examples such as Florida utilities building 

transmission and distribution assets designed to withstand higher wind speeds. The obvious and 

extremely unfortunate counter-example is Puerto Rico where vegetation management and other 

resilience activities were not well addressed leaving the island vulnerable. The extended outages 

caused by Hurricane Sandy also revealed that coastal transmission and distribution substations 

are vulnerable to rising seas and larger hurricane storm surges. The main job is for utilities and 

their state regulators to determine appropriate measures for hardening their distribution systems 

given plausible threats in their location, and providing for alternative local backup power 

sources for critical needs in the event of a widespread outage. DOE can help with research and 

analysis of those needs and opportunities. 
83 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

"The Electric Grid of the Future" 

Mr. Robert Gramlich, President, Grid Strategies, LLC. 

Questions submitted by Rep. Paul Tonko, Member, 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

1. It seems clear that additional interstate and interregional transmission will be 

needed to unlock our nation's clean energy potential. A number of organizations, 

including NREL, are studying the benefits of transmission grid expansion. 

a. What have been some of the initial findings of those studies? 

b. Have the estimated benefits exceeded the costs? 

Yes, I agree that additional interstate and interregional transmission will be needed. NREL is 

performing a "seams study." I described initial results of this study in my recent testimony to 

the House Energy and Commerce Committee. That testimony is posted here: 

https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/2018051 0/1 08283/HHRG-115-IF03-WstateGramlichR-201805!0.pdf. In it I state that the benefits of the transmission investment exceed 

the costs by a factor of two to three. I look forward to the release of the final report at Iowa 

State University at the end of July. 

' 

I also cited benefit-cost studies for transmission plans in the Midwest by MISO and SPP, which 

are also in the range of two-to-three times benefits in excess of costs. If anything these benefit 

estimates are conservative, as many transmission benefits are not included in these analyses 

because they are difficult to quantify. There is uncertainty in forecasting benefits, but 

transmission is a great hedge against uncertainty because it can be used in various ways in 

different scenarios, often with power flowing in the opposite direction than expected. 

2. The costs of the proposed market interventions being floated by the Administration 

will be borne by ratepayers. You recently co-authored a report, "A Customerfocused Framework for Electric System Resilience," looking at the values of 

different measures to improve resilience from the perspective of those that will be 

asked to pay for it. 

a. What did your study find? 

The study had some key take-aways: 

I). Bulk power system reliability has been defined and managed to include resilience (e.g., black 

start, system restoration); 
84 

2). Resilience should be measured in terms of impact on customers; 

3). Most outages are caused by failures on low-voltage distribution power lines and- to a lesser 

extent high-voltage transmission lines, not generation or fuel supply, and by routine rather than 

huge events; 

4). The Rhodium Group found that generation inadequacy accounted for less than Ill O,OOOth of 

all customer-hours of outages, with fuel supply emergencies an even smaller share at fewer than 

1 in 1.4 million. 

5). Some threats are increasing: routine and severe weather, cyber & physical attack; 

6). Some are not yet addressed: GMD, EMP; 

7). Some questions related to the evolving fuel mix are being studied through standard reliability 

assessments of grid changes: fuel security, frequency stabilization following the loss of a large 

conventional generator, risks and opportunities of DERs and micro grids; 

8). Budgets are limited, and investments have opportunity costs -- so the industry and regulators 

should maximize actual reliability and resilience impact per dollar with: 

a). Measures that benefit customers most; 

b). Measures that address multiple threats. 

9). It would waste consumers' money to spend it on old uneconomic plants in an environment 

with high reserve margins where the incremental reliability benefit of the investment is nearly 

zero .. Spending on generation issues that cause less than 1 in 10,000 customer outage hours 

harms reliability and resilience by diverting scarce resources away from the transmission and 

distribution system failures that cause 99+% of customer outages. Subsidizing obsolete 

generators that can no longer compete in the market would also harm consumers and reliability 

by undermining the markets that have succeeded in providing reliable and affordable power. 

b. How important is hardening of the distribution system? 

Hardening of the distribution system generally ranks at the top of the list of activities that would 

benefit customers the most per dollar spent on it. That said, every activity will have diminishing 

returns at some point so regulators and utilities need to prudently evaluate threats in their region, 

options for mitigation, and the costs of various actions. 

c. How did transmission investments, including deploying advanced 

transmission technologies, stack up- especially when compared to potential 

investments on the generation side? 

Transmission infrastructure and advanced technologies to better monitor and control 

transmission systems rank high on the list of activities that will benefit customers. Transmission 
85 

can instantaneously deliver power from over a thousand miles to address any disturbance or 

energy shortfall on one part of the grid. There are new technologies for implementing modular 

power flow control systems, Dynamic Line Ratings, and topology optimization in particular that 

are under-utilized and can improve system monitoring and power flow to increase reliability and 

provide consumers with access to low-cost energy. These technologies are described in this 

white paper: https://watttransmission.files. wordpress.com/20 18/03/watt-living-grid-whitepaper.pdf 

d. What is the relative value of subsidies to generators, as the Administration is 

suggesting? 

Subsidizing old inefficient and relatively inflexible generation in an environment with excess 

capacity has near zero value to customers. Grid operators including PJM have calculated that 

once the power system has 20% reserve capacity, the incremental reliability value from 

additional capacity drops dramatically. With PJM at 33% reserve capacity for the foreseeable 

future, and most other power systems similarly saturated with excess capacity, subsidizing 

existing generators will do nothing for reliability and only exacerbate market challenges by 

delaying the market exit of those uneconomic resources. What the system needs is "flexibility," 

resources that can respond quickly to sudden needs to have more or less power at a given time 

and place. It is very sensible therefore that representatives of the DOE Office of Electricity are 

talking about modem storage technology in the context of resilience. In contrast, it is a nonsequitur for the agency to support old inflexible poor performing power plants in the resilience 

context since they do not provide needed flexibility, including regulating frequency, and they are 

just as vulnerable to cyber and physical attack as any other generator. In fact, these older 

resources create more reliability and resilience risk because they fail more frequently than newer 

generators and are more prone to tripping offline following a grid disturbance than newer 

resources like wind energy. Grid operators must keep expensive fast-acting reserves online as 

backup 2417 in case a large conventional power plant abruptly fails, many times greater cost than 

the slight increase in need for the low-cost slower-acting reserves used to accommodate the 

gradual and predictable fluctuations in renewable energy supply. 

3. A number of proposed transmission projects have been mired in siting, permitting, 

and planning issues. Congress has tried to address delays caused by state and local 

governments in the past by creating a federal backstop authority. 

a. What changes to existing federal authorities might be considered to ensure 

needed transmission projects are completed? 

I agree that our permitting regime for transmission is not up to the task of the high voltage 

regional and inter-regional grid connections we need for reliability, efficiency, and clean secure 

energy access. Often states or even localities can block a line that benefits an entire region. 

Another approach is needed. I think Congress should review court decisions on this authority 

that have hampered its impact and separately look at whether this authority belongs fully at 
86 

FERC rather than DOE given the agencies' relative staffing capabilities and processes for 

infrastructure review. Transmission planning and cost allocation for transmission is also critical, 

and FERC has the authority to break the current logjam by expanding the pro-active planning 

and broad cost allocation policies adopted by ERCOT, MISO, and SPP to other regions, and in 

particular inter-regional transmission. 

b. What factors should Congress consider when trying to strike the right 

balance between the rights of states and the federal oversight role on 

interstate transmission planning? 

I agree there needs to be a balance. However currently there is almost no consideration given to 

regional or national benefits relative to local impact of transmission, in great contrast to how gas 

pipelines are permitted. A greater balance is needed to consider regional and national benefits of 

transmission. 

c. What factors should Congress consider when trying to strike the right 

balance between streamlining the process for new transmissions projects and 

requirements for grid operators to consider non-wires alternatives? 

There is plenty of need and opportunity for both infrastructure and alternative technology means 

of energy delivery. Transmission owners should consider more than one type of solution for 

identified needs. For many needs, such as the delivery of high-quality renewable resources from 

remote areas with few customers and little to no existing transmission, only expanding 

transmission helps. For many other needs, it makes sense to use new technologies, like dynamic 

line rating, topology optimization, and power flow control devices, that increase the utilization 

of both existing and new transmission lines. I believe FERC should review its planning 

guidance and the incentives inherent in current rate designs to ensure that the most economic 

option will tend to be chosen. 
87 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

"The Electric Grid of the Future" 

Mr. Robert Gramlich, President, Grid Strategies, LLC. 

Questions submitted by Rep. Jacky Rosen, Member, 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

I. This past March, I hosted a roundtable with Nevada stakeholders to discuss ways 

we can improve energy delivery and grid resiliency, strengthen cybersecurity, and 

build a capable energy workforce for a 21st century economy. I heard about the 

challenges these businesses, utilities, and non-profits face, including a lack of federal 

investment, shortage of skilled workers, and regulatory hurdles. One of the 

companies at the roundtable was a Nevada-based defense contractor with a focus on 

serving and protecting our military and critical national assets. They discussed 

operational technology, and how despite being the backbone of our nation's energy 

infrastructure, operational technology is not well understood or protected with 

standard IT methods. They also suggested that Congress create a new grant 

program or other funding source to help incentivize utilities to strengthen 

operational cybersecurity. 

a. What are your thoughts on a proposal like this? 

That sounds important, but unfortunately I am not an expert on operational cybersecurity. 

would be happy to try to identify other experts. I do know that cybersecurity threats exist for all 

energy sources, and NERC and FERC have developed stringent cybersecurity requirements. I 

also know that renewable plant owners take those threats seriously, having personally seen the 

stringent security protocols used at wind plant control centers. 

2. Since I've come to Congress, I've made it a priority to advocate for policies and 

programs that strengthen our grid and to better prepare our nation's electric 

infrastructure against cyber-attacks. For the past two years, I sent a letter to the 

House Appropriations Committee urging robust funding for DOE's Office of 

Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, and specifically the Smart Grid 

Research & Development (R&D) program. As you know, Smart Grid R&D 

develops the technologies, tools, and techniques needed to modernize the electric 

power grid and ensure the U.S. energy delivery system is secure, resilient, and 

reliable. 

a. How critical is federally-funded research to technology development and 

deployment for the electricity sector? 
88 

b. What are the scientific and industry consequences of defunding or stopping 

these R&D activities? 

(No response) 
89 

Responses by Dr. Joseph A. Heppert 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

"The Electric Grid of the Future" 

Dr. Joseph Reppert, Vice President for Research, Texas Tech University 

Questions submitted by Rep. Jacky Rosen Member 

Committee on Science. Space and Technology 

1. This past March, I hosted a roundtable with Nevada stakeholders to discuss ways 

we can improve energy delivery and grid resiliency, strengthen cybersecurity, and 

build a capable energy workforce for a 21st century economy. I heard about the 

challenges these businesses, utilities, and non-profits face, including a lack of federal 

investment, shortage of skilled workers, and regulatory hurdles. One of the 

companies at the roundtable was a Nevada-based defense contractor with a focus on 

serving and protecting our military and critical national assets. They discussed 

operational technology, and how despite being the backbone of our nation's energy 

infrastructure, operational technology is not well understood or protected with 

standard IT methods. They also suggested that Congress create a new grant 

program or other funding source to help incentivize utilities to strengthen 

operational cybersecurity. 

a. What are your thoughts on a proposal like this? 

The task of securing our nation's critical national security assets in the face of increasing cyber 

threats is a concern I specifically addressed in my testimony. The promise of creating a more 

dynamic, efficient electrical grid system through the optimization of diverse energy generation 

and storage systems in a real-time system aided by AI technology might also increase the 

vulnerability of our grid systems to outside meddling. Concerted attacks on the integrity of 

electrical power distribution would represent a national security threat affecting a) general civil 

order and economic wellbeing, and b) the effectiveness of critical components of our nation's 

defenses in case of an attack within the continental U.S. or on our interests abroad. 

Recognizing the magnitude of such a threat to national security and general civil order, it is 

entirely reasonable for Congress to formulate programs and incentives to ensure that the private 

energy sector and the defense industry are funding research and development activity in grid 

resiliency, cybersecurity, and a robust energy workforce. Opponents who would seek to 

capitalize on vulnerabilities in our electrical distribution system continue to invest in their ability 

to compromise our infrastructure; consequently, the threat profile is constantly evolving. 

Incentives to sustain research on defensive countermeasures should be an important element of 

assuring the protection of our critical infrastructure against interference by our competitors and 

adversaries. 
90 

Research universities have a key role to play in partnering with public utilities and the private 

sector to create a secure and resilient grid system. First, universities are at the forefront of 

applying AI and sensor technologies, as well as creating more robust high- power electrical 

components that can help to detect and mitigate cyber-intrusion events. Second, universities are 

a key source of the workforce the private sector needs to maintain its competence to meet rapidly 

developing cyber-threats and to construct a future electrical grid that exhibits resilience in the 

face of severe weather events and other environmental challenges. Creating incentives that 

generate lasting collaborations·and partnerships among industry, defense contractors, and 

research universities would optimize the effectiveness of these investments. 

This latter point is incredibly important. Many of the individuals whose skills are essential for 

building cybersecurity and resiliency in our critical electrical distribution and communications 

infrastructure have opportunities to pursue challenging and lucrative positions in other areas of 

high-technology industries. Universities consistently hear from our industry partners that 

recruiting the R&D talent required to sustain grid innovation is extremely challenging. By 

fostering a generation of engineers who have worked on grid cybersecurity and resiliency as part 

of their formative educational experience, collaborated with and interned in the electrical 

industry, and worked with professionals in national security positions, we create the best 

opportunity to cultivate a new generation of workers who will adopt these roles in their future 

careers. 

2. Since I've come to Congress, I've made it a priority to advocate for policies and 

programs that strengthen our grid and to better prepare our nation's electric 

infrastructure against cyber-attacks. For the past two years, I sent a letter to the 

House Appropriations Committee urging robust funding for DOE's Office of 

Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, and specifically the Smart Grid 

Research & Development (R&D) program. As you know, Smart Grid R&D 

develops the technologies, tools, and techniques needed to modernize the electric 

power grid and ensure the U.S. energy delivery system is secure, resilient, and 

reliable. 

a. How critical is federally-funded research to technology development and 

deployment for the electricity sector? 

As I noted in the answer to the first question, the cyberthreat landscape is in constant flux. We 

can expect the abilities of our adversaries to become more sophisticated and effective as time 

progresses. The electrical utility industry is under extreme pressure to restrain user rates. This 

pressure can become a disincentive to invest in new hardware and software technologies that 

will improve the resiliency and security of our electrical generation and distribution systems. 

The best way to ensure a critical threshold of investment in future technologies for grid security 

and resiliency is to provide federal funding as an incentive for industry to sustain its on R&D 

spending. Moreover, electrical utilities are unprepared to generate home-grown, cutting-edge 

talent in areas such as AI, sensor and control system innovation, and cybersecurity. Only by 

maintaining a Federally-sponsored research pipeline in these areas can we gain and maintain a 
91 

lead on adversaries dedicated to compromising security-critical infrastructure. As I have stated, T 

do not believe that the void in necessary research that would be created by a retreat from the 

Federal commitment to this area could be or would be filled by contributions from the private 

sector. Given the increasing threat profile in this area and its centrality to our national security, I 

would anticipate that substantially increasing the Federal research commitment in this area 

would be the appropriate response to the current situation. 

b. What are the scientific and industry consequences of defunding or stopping 

these R&D activities? 

In terms of the impact on TTU, in any given year drastic cuts in research on electrical grid and 

cybersecurity research could cost TTU upwards of $2.5 million in Federal sponsored research. 

Since roughly 80% of the funding in this area goes to salaries of students, postdoctoral 

researchers, and faculty, I estimate that TTU would lose between 10 and 15 individuals who are 

being trained in this area. This cuts directly into the pipeline of engineers who have the capacity 

to counter threats to our critical national infrastructure. This result would be multiplied many 

times on the national level. Researchers in academia are intensely entrepreneurial. They will 

choose to conduct research in areas where Federal investment is likely to be sustained. 

Increasingly, students in fields such as AI and cybersecurity recognize growth areas where 

challenging problems and opportunities for substantial compensation are creating high-quality 

jobs. They will vote with their feet if Federal support for research in these areas is substantially 

curtailed. The Federal government, given its role in ensuring national security, has a substantial 

interest in promoting and sustaining an environment where there is an adequate and committed 

workforce in grid resiliency and security. In a context where cyber-warfare events are likely to 

precede open hostilities with our economic and military adversaries, a retreat from Federal 

commitment to technology innovation and the building of human capacity in these areas would 

look incredibly short-sighted. Defunding technology innovation and depopulating the pipeline of 

top- flight engineers being trained in grid R&D would leave the U.S. population, our economic 

competitiveness, and our critical defense industries vulnerable to our adversaries in a manner 

that the public and the vast majority of policy makers would find unacceptable. 

(93) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
94 

LETTER SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE DONALD S. BEYER, JR. 

(!tongr££i!i of tl-,£ Jtnite" !!jfah~!i 

ltila.Gl)ingtnn, il(!!: 20515 

The Honorable Rick Perry 

Secretary 

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 

1000 Independence Ave, SW 

Washington, DC 20585 

Secretary Perry: 

June 7, 2018 

We write regarding our concerns with President Trump's directive on "Fuel-Secure Power 

Facilities," the draft "Grid Memo" to the National Security Council, and FirstEnergy Solutions' 

bailout request. We ask that you cease the false narrative that bailing out uneconomic energy 

sources in competitive markets is needed tor electrical grid resilience, and to cease attempting to 

use emergency authorities to intervene in planned power plant retirements. Using emergency 

authorities for unsubstantiated bailouts would be unprecedented intervention in U.S. energy 

markets at great taxpayer expense. 

Last year, under your direction, the Department of Energy tried to use Section 403 authority 

under the Department of Energy Organization Act to initiate a rulemaking at the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC). This attempted rulemaking was to create new rules that would 

provide cost recovery to merchant coal and nuclear plants, asserting that they are essential to 

resiliency.' FERC unanimously voted to terminate that proposal, noting that the evidence did not 

support the Department's arguments. FERC wrote, "[T]he Proposed Rule's on-site 90-day fuel 

supply requirement would appear to permit only certain resources to be eligible for the rate, 

thereby excluding other resources that may have resilience attributes."" 

Since then, FirstEnergy Solutions sent a request asking that the Department invoke Federal 

Power Act Section 202(c) to find an emergency condition within the grid footprint ofPJM 

Interconnection, LLC, a grid operator, to prevent PJM from retiring plants. FirstEnergy Solutions 

cited system resiliency as the reason to honor its request."' When asked to comment, Assistant 

Secretary Bruce Walker stated that· DOE would never use an emergency order under Section 

202(c) Federal Power Act to prop up uneconomic generators.ov Republican FERC Commissioner 

Neil Chattetjee also explicitly said that retirements would not impinge on resilience.' PJM 

Interconnection's own analysis found that reliability could be maintained even in the face of 

planned coal and nuclear retirements." 

However, despite the earlier repudiation from FERC of your section 403 request, and despite the 

rejection -- by both P JM and your own assistant secretary -- of the narrative that these bailouts 

are needed for grid resilience, you have entertained the idea ofFirstEnergy's request in multiple 

congressional hearings, indicating a concern about nuclear and coal plant closures and explicitly 

citing the implications for the resilience and reliability of the grid. You also indicated a 

willingness to consider authorities other than 202(c), such as the Defense Production Act, to bail 
95 

out these plants. Continuing this narrative is disingenuous, and while convenient for politically 

appeasing the current Administration's preferred energy sources, in real terms it would 

unnecessarily raise costs to customers and undermine the adoption of renewable energy sources. 

More recently, President Trump issued a directive asking your Department to intervene in 

impending "fuel-secure power facilities" retirements. vii A corresponding DOE draft "Grid 

Memo" offering a plan to implement the directive was circulated before the National Security 

Council .Viii It again offers a hypothetical doomsday energy scenario as justification to use 

emergency authorities to artificially prop up inefficient and uneconomic coal or nuclear power in 

the interest of national security. The memo failed to offer plausible support that such emergency 

bailouts are necessary for electrical grid resilience or national security. It also failed to rebut grid 

experts and grid operators' assessments, as well as widespread industry views, that such bailouts 

are not only unnecessary but in fact detrimental to wholesale electricity markets.;' Nor did it 

adequately explain how the proposed policy would be a legitimate use of the Defense Production 

Act and the Federal Power Act. 

Using emergency authorities to bail out energy resources that are not critical to grid resilience 

and reliability is irresponsible at best, and sets a dangerous precedent of abusing these 

emergency authorities to bail out any pet project or pet energy source. Given the lack of any 

specific evidence suggesting that the affected closing plants are needed, the precedent could later 

be used to prop up any energy source that is uncompetitive in competitive markets. The President 

of the Electricity Consumers Resource Counsel, an association of large industrial electricity 

users, said that the latest DOE proposal would "devastate U.S. manufacturing."x The CEO of 

Exelon, the largest nuclear generator in the U.S., said the retirement of coal and nuclear plants do 

not constitute a grid emergency that warrants urgent intervention from the federal goverrunent. xi 

Low-cost natural gas is' squeezing out less cost-efficient energy sources in competitive markets. 

Traditionally, it has been the role of states to pursue specific energy portfolio policies. Changing 

that dynamic and federally subsidizing expensive, less cost-efficient energy sources without a 

well-justified policy rationale has the potential to raise the cost of electricity by staggering sums. 

The Department's section 403 proposal would have increased costs by $8 billion annually in PJM 

alone.'ii 

Grid operators must resort to more expensive and less cost-efficient resources such as coal when 

electricity demand is high. That does not mean such resources are essential to resilience, rather 

that they are more expensive and therefore used only when essential. xiii In contrast, winter winds 

ensure that wind energy is a strong performer during severe winter weather, and wind has 

contributed more than its expected share to PJM's grid during the recent cold snaps over the past 

few winters.'iv Reducing physical and market barriers to wind resources in regions like PJM's 

footprint could help to cost-effectively and reliably operate the grid during extreme winter 

weather, but your department is apparently not looking to eliminate such barriers. 

Instead, the Department is proposing budget cuts that undermine resiliency tools, such as energy 

storage." Energy storage helps balance electricity demand with supply-- regardless of the 

energy source. 
96 

Your department is also ignoring the true cause of most disruptions to our electricity system: 

downed power lines. Customers are far more likely to suffer power outages from downed lines 

on the distribution system, with more than 6 million miles of wires and poles carrying power."' 

According to a January 2017 DOE report, 90 percent of electric power interruptions stem from 

disruptions on the distribution system."'" The Department could assist by supporting distributed 

energy resources sited near customers, such as customer-sited solar, batteries and electric vehicle 

chargers, to mitigate these distribution failures.""' 

We ask you to reject the political narrative and pressure to adopt policies that artificially and 

unnecessarily prop up uneconomic energy sources, which will raise costs on American 

taxpayers. We stand ready to work with you to more effectively enable distributed energy 

sources sited near customers and adequately fund technologies like energy storage that help with 

resilience. 

Sincerely, 

f.~~.!.~ Eliot L. Engel MarkPocan 

--~---

/1-&RLJ.-

Debbie Wasserman Schultz ~ 

~1-~ ce F. Napolitano ~~ Dan1el W. L1pmsk1 

'Eafi Ld~ Blumenauer 
97 

Alan Lowenthal 

Anna G. Eshoo 

Mark DeSaulnier )fL~ 

David E. Price Diana DeGette 
98 

,/ 

(-/'7.;:;(y 

--~--' -~---~·---~" -~ ___ , 

Ted W. Lieu 
99 

Æ 

' https:l/www.energy.gov/artlcles/secretarv-oerry-urges-lerc-take-swift-action-address-threats-grid-resiliency 

"https:l/www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20180108161614-RMl8-l-OOO.pdf 

"' https://statepowerproject.files.wordpress.com/2018103/fes-202c-application.pdf 

w https://www.utilitydive.com/news/doe-woul<t-never-use-emergencv-order·for-uneconomic-plants-walker-says1/517455/ 

'https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/newsletters/oolltico-new-york-energy/2018/0S/09/chatterjee-raisespipeline-concerns-062277 

"http:/lwww.plm.com/-/medial!lbrarv/reports-notices/speeial-reports/20170330-pjms-evolving-resource-mixand-svstem-reliabiljty.ashx· http://www .pjm .com/-/media/about -pjm/newsroom/2018-releases/20180601-pjmstatement-on-potential-doe-market-intervention.ashx 

,,; httos://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretarv-fuel-secure-power-facilities/ 

"' https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060Q83235/search?keyword=coal 

'' http://www.pjm.com/-/media/about-pjm/newsroom/2018-releases/20180601-pjm-statement-on-potentia~doe 

market-intervention.ashx 

' https:Uwww.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/06/04/us/oolitlcs/ao-us-trump-coal-plants.html 

" https:Uwww.utilitvdive.com/news/eKelon-ceo-no-grid-emergency-to-justify-doe-coal-nuke-bailout/525042/ 

''' http·/(bloss.edf org/energyexchange/files/2018/04/Joint-EDF-NROC-Letter-to-DOE-re-FES-202-Reouest.pdf; 

http:Uenergylnnovatlon.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/20171025 Resilience-NOPR -C9St-Research-NoteUPDATED.pdf 

"" http://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notice~'!'~they--related__{fQ_l80413-pjm-response-to·netl· 

reoort.ashK?ta=en 

'"' http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/AWEA%20Cold%20Snap%20Report%20Finai%20-%20January%202015.pdf 

~ httos://www.energy.gov/cfo/downloads/fy-2019-budget-justiflcation 

~• https://www.energy.goy/sites/0rod/files/2015/04/f22/0ER%20ch3%20final O.Ddf 

""https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/flles/2017 /Ol/f34/Chapter%20lV%20Ensuring%20Eiectricitv%20System%20 

Reliability%2C%20Security%2C%20and%20Resilience.pdf 

""' https:/lgridprogress.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/customer-focused-resillence-fonai-QS0118.pdf