JIPAThe Journal of

Indo-Pacific Affairs

Chief of Staff, US Air Force

Gen Charles Q. Brown, Jr., USAF

Chief of Space Operations, US Space Force

Gen John W. Raymond, USSF

Commander, Air Education and Training Command

Lt Gen Marshall B. Webb, USAF

Commander and President, Air University

Lt Gen James B. Hecker, USAF

Director, Air University Academic Services

Dr. Mehmed Ali

Director, Air University Press

Maj Richard T. Harrison, USAF

Chief of Professional Journals

Maj Richard T. Harrison, USAF

Editorial Staff

Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell, Editor in Chief

Patricia Clough, Deputy Editor in Chief

Jon Howard, Assistant Editor in Chief

With additional assistance from the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers

Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA)

600 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6010

e-mail: JIPA@au.af.edu

Visit Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs online at https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/.

ISSN 2576-5361 (Print) ISSN 2576-537X (Online)

Published by the Air University Press, The Journal of Indo–Pacific Affairs ( JIPA) is a professional journal of the Department 

of the Air Force and a forum for worldwide dialogue regarding the Indo–Pacific region, spanning from the west coasts of 

the Americas to the eastern shores of Africa and covering much of Asia and all of Oceania. The journal fosters intellectual 

and professional development for members of the Air and Space Forces and the world’s other English-speaking militaries 

and informs decision makers and academicians around the globe.

Articles submitted to the journal must be unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. Features represent fully 

researched, thoroughly documented, and peer-reviewed scholarly articles 5,000 to 6,000 words in length. Views articles 

are shorter than Features—3,000 to 5,000 words—typically expressing well-thought-out and developed opinions about 

regional topics. The Commentary section offers a forum about current subjects of interest. These short posts are 1,500 to 

2,500 words in length. Submit all manuscripts to JIPA@au.af.edu.

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government.

Timothy Thomas, Illustrator

Sumnima Karki, Typesetter

Megan N. Hoehn, Print Specialist

Sunaina Karki, Typesetter

https://www.af.mil/ https://www.spaceforce.mil/ https://www.aetc.af.mil/ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/
ii JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021)

VOL. 4 NO. 4 SPECIAL ISSUE 2021

PREFACE

4 Hindsight 20/20

Culture and Language Lessons Learned in the Indo-Pacific Operational 

Context as Presented at the 2020 AU LREC Symposium

Dr. Jessica Jordan, editor

 5 Introduction

Reflecting on the Past and Future of the Premier Scholarly Event for 

Department of Defense Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture Scholars

Dr. Jessica Jordan & Dr. Patricia Fogarty

SENIOR LEADER PERSPECTIVE

15 Multinational Business Organizational Models and the US Air 

Force

An Interview with Brig Gen Leonard J. Kosinski, USAF

VIEWS

26 Erga Omnes Securitas

International Security and Reliance on Sustainable Partnerships

Maj Logan H. Barlow, USAF

39 Opening the Door to Cultural Understanding and Mutual 

Cooperation

Multinational Military Partnerships and Educational Outreach

Capt Julian Gluck, USAF & Capt Byron Muhlenberg, USAF

48 Strengthening Interoperability through the Language Enabled 

Airman Program

Perspectives from the 2018 to 2019 US–Philippine ISR-MTT Mission

MSgt Timothy, USSF

INTRODUCTION
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) iii

57 Expanding Cultural Competencies

Exposing All Outside Continental United States Airmen to the Local 

Populace

Capt Jasmine “B-Fly” Bogard, USAF

COMMENTARY

70 What Would a North Korean Do?

Washington Must See Issues from Adversaries’ Perspectives in Order to 

Move Past Outmoded Policies

1st Lt Shaquille H. James, USAF
Editorial Advisors

Gen Kenneth S. Wilsbach, USAF, Commander, Pacific Air Forces

Gen Herbert J. Carlisle, USAF, Retired; President & CEO, National Defense Industrial Association

Amb. Daniel Shields, Retired, Department of State

Maj Richard T. Harrison, Director, Air University Press

Reviewers

Air Cdre Nasim Abbas, PAF

Instructor

Air War College (Pakistan)

Dr. Sascha-Dominik “Dov” 

Bachmann 

Professor of Law and Justice

University of Canberra (Australia) 

Dr. Lewis Bernstein 

Historian, retired 

US Army 

Dr. Paul J. Bolt 

Professor, Political Science 

US Air Force Academy 

CDR John F. Bradford, US 

Navy, ret.

Executive Director

Yokosuka Council on Asia–Pacific 

Studies

Dr. Sean Braniff 

Asst. Professor, International 

Security Studies

US Air War College

Dr. David Brewster

Senior Research Fellow, National 

Security College

Australian National University

Dr. Stephen F. Burgess 

Professor, International Security 

Studies

US Air War College

Dr. Chester B. Cabalza 

Vice President, Center of Research and Strategic Studies

Development Academy of the 

Philippines 

Mr. Eric Chan 

Policy Analyst 

US Air Force 

Dr. Adam Claasen 

Senior Lecturer in History 

Massey University 

CDR Mark R. Condeno 

Philippine Coast Guard 

Dr. Zack Cooper 

Senior Fellow for Asian Security 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Dr. Scott Edmondson

Assistant Professor, Regional and 

Cultural Studies

Air Force Culture and Language 

Center

Lt Col Alexander B. Fafinski, 

USAF

Military Professor, National 

Security Affairs

US Naval War College

Dr. Ian C. Forsyth 

Analyst 

Department of Defense

Dr. Jai Galliott 

Defense Analyst, Cyber Security 

University of New South Wales–

Canberra @ ADFA

Maj Jessica Gott, USAF 

Strategy Officer 

Dr. Manabrata Guha 

Senior Lecturer/ Senior Research 

Fellow

University of New South Wales–

Canberra @ ADFA

Dr. Achala GunasekaraRockwell 

Adjunct Professor, Foreign Languages & Literatures

University of Alabama at Birmingham 

Dr. Amit Gupta

Professor, International Security 

Studies

US Air War College

Dr. Akhlaque Haque 

Professor, Political Science & 

Public Admin.

University of Alabama at Birmingham 

Dr. Jessica Jordan 

Assistant Professor

Air Force Culture and Language 

Center

Dr. Isaac Kardon

Assistant Professor, China Maritime Studies Institute

US Naval War College

Maj Gen Brian Killough, 

USAF, ret.

Former Deputy Commander, 

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces

Mr. Chris Kolakowski 

Director

Wisconsin Veterans Museum

Dr. Carlo Kopp 

Lecturer 

Monash University 

Dr. Amit Kumar 

President 

AAA International Security 

Consultants 

Dr. Suzanne Levi-Sanchez

Assistant Professor, National 

Security Affairs

US Naval War College

Lt Col Scott D. McDonald

United States Marine Corps, 

retired

Dr. Montgomery McFate

Professor, Strategic and Operational Research

US Naval War College

Dr. Sandeep "Frag" Mulgund

Senior Advisor (HQE)

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations 

(AF/A3)

Headquarters United States Air 

Force

Dr. Brendan S. Mulvaney 

Director

China Aerospace Studies Institute

Dr. Satoru Nagao 

Visiting Fellow 

Hudson Institute 

Dr. Dayne Nix

Professor, Joint Maritime Operations

US Naval War College

Dr. Frank O’Donnell

Postdoctoral Fellow, National 

Security Affairs

US Naval War College

Dr. Jagannath P. Panda

Research Fellow & Centre

Coordinator, East Asia

Manohar Parrikar Institute for

Defense Studies & Analyses

Dr. James E. Platte 

Assistant Professor

Center for Unconventional 

Weapons Studies 

Dr. Terence Roehrig

Professor, National Security 

Affairs

US Naval War College

Dr. Jim Rolfe 

Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies 

Victoria University of Wellington 

Mr. Richard M. Rossow 

Senior Adviser and Wadhwani 

Chair in US–India Policy Studies 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Maj Gary J. Sampson, USMC

Speechwriter/Special Assistant to 

the CJCS

Dr. Yoichiro Sato

Professor

Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific 

University

Cmdre Abhay Kumar Singh, 

retired 

Research Fellow 

Institute for Defence Studies and 

Analyses 

Mr. Daniel K. Taylor 

Defense Intelligence Officer for 

East Asia

Defense Intelligence Agency

Dr. Lavanya Vemsani 

Professor, History and Religious 

Studies 

Shawnee State University 

Dr. Michael E. Weaver 

Associate Professor

Air Command and Staff College 

Mr. Keith Webster 

Senior Vice President for Defense 

and Aerospace 

US–India Strategic Partnership 

Forum 

Brig Gen Craig D. Wills, 

USAF

Director of Strategy, Plans, and 

Programs 

Pacific Air Forces

Dr. Roland B. Wilson 

Program Coordinator & Professor 

of Conflict Analysis & Resolution 

George Mason University, Korea 

Campus 

Dr. Austin Wyatt

Research Associate

University of New South Wales–

Canberra @ ADFA
4 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021)

PREFACE

Hindsight 20/20

Culture and Language Lessons Learned in the Indo-Pacific 

Operational Context as Presented at the 2020 AU LREC 

Symposium

Dr. Jessica Jordan, editor

 This special edition features selected Indo-Pacific–focused papers

presented at the 2020 Air University Language, Regional Expertise and Culture 

(LREC) Symposium. This event was themed, “Hindsight 20/20: The Past 

Shapes Our Future,” and hosted panels on topics related to the past 10–20 years

of global operations that also reconsidered the connections between broad US 

foreign policy goals and Department of Defense LREC programs and initiatives. 

Many presenters made recommendations for improvements while considering 

the anticipated impacts that LREC education could have on global operations 

over the next 10 years. This volume features papers that successfully combine 

academic research and experience-based insights about Indo-Pacific operations

toward suggesting specific, actionable recommendations.
 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) 5

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Reflecting on the Past and Future of the Premier Scholarly 

Event for Department of Defense Language, Regional 

Expertise, and Culture Scholars

Dr. Jessica Jordan & Dr. Patricia Fogarty

Abstract

This introduction applies the “Hindsight 20/20” theme to the history of the 

symposium as an event, while making the argument for continued language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) education across the force. It begins by reviewing the history of the symposium, followed by a reflection on lessons learned 

from the 2020 event, before concluding with a summary of the enclosed papers 

that collectively suggest the need for greater LREC research and teaching on the 

themes discussed herein.

LREC Symposium History and Lessons Learned

The idea for the Air University (AU) LREC Symposium began as a response 

to three concerns at AU in the 2014–2015 period. First, we wanted to showcase 

the work done in the LREC area by students, faculty, and staff at AU, as a way to 

improve awareness of the contributions of the Air Force Culture and Language 

Center (AFCLC) to AU and the Department of the Air Force. We were seeing 

many well-researched student research papers that were not getting the attention 

we thought they deserved, either at AU or more broadly. Second, we wanted to 

provide a venue for discussions about LREC education, training, and practice that 

we felt did not get enough attention in local or national circles. There are conferences focused on military history, international relations, foreign language teaching and learning, and armed forces and society, but none that covered all these 

topics for the Department of the Air Force or military audiences at large, and few 

that address LREC-related best practices in military operations and planning. We 

saw a niche that could be filled, much in the same way that AFCLC was set up to 

fill the gap in LREC education, training, research, and practice. Finally, the mid2010s were an era of enduring budgetary constraints, resulting in limited travel 

funds for professional development. We hoped to provide a setting for our colleagues to present their work locally if they could not do so nationally or internationally.
6 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021)

Jordan & Fogarty

The first LREC Symposium was restricted to personnel at Maxwell AFB and 

Gunter Annex, both in Montgomery, Alabama, with a few invitations extended to 

nonmilitary or non-Maxwell/Gunter people in the local area. We had a few dozen 

presenters and attendees and felt the event was enough of a success to propose a 

second annual event. The second annual symposium (and every one since) opened 

participation to anyone in the Department of Defense (DOD), the general public, 

and even to international partners. The papers in this special edition represent 

some of the best works presented at our fifth annual event, which hosted more 

than 2,000 attendees, as you will read below.

Planning for the 2020 event began well before the COVID-19 pandemic 

changed the world. The “Hindsight 20/20” theme was chosen because the year 

2020 called to mind this phrase. And with our US efforts drawing down in Afghanistan and Iraq, it seemed to be a good time to reflect on the growth of LREC 

education and training in the military since 2001. Back in 2019, the coordinating 

committee had no way of knowing that this theme ironically foreshadowed the 

fact that this meeting would turn out to be historic in its own right. The lockdowns and disruptions to everyday life that began in March 2019 had by June led 

the committee to transition to planning for an all-virtual event. We had never 

coordinated a virtual symposium before. The planning team met the myriad technical, managerial, and intellectual challenges with energy and creativity.

Going virtual meant that we could open the event to vastly more participants 

than ever before, including people presenting and attending. Over  120  people 

presented on a total of 75 panels, and almost 2,100 individuals registered to attend. The scope of the event was nearly 600 percent bigger than all previous years’ 

figures combined in terms of overall participation. The potential impact of the 

greater number of views on the content presented, some of which was recorded 

and still lives online, was correspondingly much more significant.

Thus, one lesson learned is that AFCLC ought to continue to entertain virtual 

or hybrid formats for future events, even after things return to “normal.” This is 

something that much of the industrialized world is also discussing in 2021 as we 

gradually shift back to more in-person work events. Virtual events—from small 

meetings to large, multiday gatherings—are often more cost-effective for sharing 

ideas than in-person gatherings. However, virtual events are arguably less productive for encouraging ad hoc networking characteristic of large in-person conferences. On balance, there are benefits and drawbacks to both approaches. Rather 

than simply returning to in-person meetings because many of us prefer to interact 

face-to-face, the relative strengths of the virtual, or hybrid, formats ought to be 

accounted for when discussing goals and objectives for information sharing toward the generation of new ideas and professional contacts.
Introduction

 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) 7

Beyond lessons pertaining to the event’s virtual format, the specific conceptual 

challenges that came to light while planning and executing this event are worth 

considering in more depth. These deal with core themes that comprise a separate 

set of evolving lessons learned.

There are working conclusions to be drawn about the opportunities that emerge 

when military and nonmilitary audiences interact at the LREC Symposium. As 

noted earlier, this event brings together career professionals in the military and 

academia who share an interest in LREC across DOD programs. These groups of 

people represent a cross-section of society that tends to be acutely aware of what 

the US military is doing domestically and abroad, while also being conversant 

with popular and scholarly debates about these activities. Participants tend to be 

both operationally savvy and strategically or intellectually curious and/or established thinkers in their own right (for example, military university educators often 

present their research at the symposium). In summary, these groups include various people who do not often come together elsewhere, and their interactions 

create the potential for original thinking to emerge about broad themes related to 

the US military in the world.

Whereas many people living outside the continental United States first encounter Americans in military uniforms, this fact is not immediately apparent to 

many people living inside the continental US, particularly people who have not 

themselves served in the Armed Forces. The first US citizens that many foreign 

nationals, especially in the most important ally and partner countries (like Germany, Japan, and South Korea), get to know are members of the US Armed 

Forces. The United States’ global/overseas-facing persona is armed, possesses a 

right to violence, and tends to have a lot of resources compared to host nationals. 

There is an ongoing risk that civil society, particularly in the US “mainland,” (i.e., 

not Hawaii, Alaska, the US territories, or overseas installations), is relatively outof-touch with the view held by many people in foreign countries of US culture as 

heavily militarized. More frequent scholarly exchanges between US military and 

civil society stakeholders might help narrow gaps between competing discourses 

about the culture and the shifting relevance of the American global presence toward more adept relations with allies, partners, and adversaries the world over.

The issue of the US global footprint and its ongoing challenges was an important theme at the 2020 event, as exemplified by Dr. David Vine’s keynote presentation followed by several presentations related to global US military basing. Dr. 

Vine’s work, and the topic of whether the US military presence should be scaled 

back, were discussed at several engaging panels. It became clear as the event progressed that some in the military community may have been a little uncomfortable with these conversations—particularly those which talked around the ques-
8 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021)

Jordan & Fogarty

tion of whether the US “ought” to be abroad in the first place. As teachers, we 

know that when someone reacts with discomfort to an idea, this could signal the 

fact that real intellectual engagement is about to take place. By opening a space to 

engage with genuinely challenging questions, last year’s symposium created opportunities for personal and institutional reflection. For example, the aforementioned questions fostered a heated, yet polite, exchange of ideas among speakers, 

participants, and event planners alike. Ultimately, to one degree or another, various US government departments, civilian academics, and not-for-profit groups 

are actively questioning the scope and rationale behind the global US military 

presence.

Last year’s symposium was held during what was a polarizing time just prior to 

the 2020 US national election. After the symposium, we began to consider 

whether this USAF center with a research and teaching mission ought to host 

such charged discussions if they risk projecting bad optics—which is to say, giving 

the impression that we are against the global military presence simply because we 

are asking questions about it. As academics, we think that as long as difficult topics are contextualized well, they can be entertained at these yearly gatherings. This 

may mean stating clearly that academic speakers can push boundaries of what is 

politically correct, status quo, or acceptable in DOD strategic messaging. As suggested, the DOD should be having better conversations with civil society on certain topics, the role of the US military in the world being one of the most important of them.

We believe that military and civil society need to know what is happening in 

the outposts of the US overseas military footprint. Foreign nationals who host 

bases and the US military members who are sent abroad are aware of some of the 

day-to-day headwinds they face that implicate populations living both inside and 

immediately outside the proverbial fences bordering installations. In other words, 

many people—inside and outside military installations—are aware of what the 

US military is doing, how they are doing it, and often if they are not doing things 

as efficiently as they could be. This knowledge can be operationally and strategically consequential, and indeed it is used by global protest groups with an ax to 

grind against the global US military. Viewed positively, these contested issues are 

where we find an opportunity for growth. The intellectual, ethical, and practical 

questions that emerge when one considers the specific details of what goes on in 

US installations abroad are interesting from an academic perspective, and they 

have profound implications for global operations (and strategy) as well. More US 

citizens and nationals in and outside of the US military ought to be aware of, and 

engaged with, policies that send Americans abroad every day.
Introduction

 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) 9

Authors who contributed to this special edition have provided much-needed 

visibility about the on-the-ground footprint of America in the world in their 

papers, which also consider the linguistic, regional, and cultural contexts in which 

they are operating. What follows is a summary of these papers.

Contributed Paper Summaries

Brig Gen Leonard J. Kosinski, USAF, participated in the 2020 Symposium as 

a featured speaker. His talk was entitled, “Going Multinational in Defense: Lessons for Developing Military Leaders,” which is also the title of his dissertationin-progress from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. 

The article included herein is based on an interview transcript with Dr. Jessica 

Jordan and is entitled, “Multinational Business Organizational Models and the 

US Air Force: An Interview with Brig Gen Leonard J. Kosinski, USAF.” The article is presented in the style of a transcript, with Dr. Jordan’s questions followed 

by General Kosinski’s answers. Compared to the other papers in this special edition, this transcript is presented in a less formal writing style to reflect the nature 

of the conversation.

As the title implies, General Kosinski is advocating for adopting some of the 

best lessons learned in the academic studies of multinational businesses leadership 

to the management of what he calls “multinational military organizations.” With 

this project he “seeks to contribute to the development of a theory on military 

strategic alliances, incorporating the knowledge-based view, which informs scholars, defense policymakers, and practitioners on the implications of knowledge and 

integration of forces in seeking higher level military capabilities through multinational cooperation” (p. 16). The enclosed interview transcript unpacks what he 

means by this while exploring how he came to pursue this research. The transcript 

also touches on various case studies he is using to advance the idea that merging 

organizations and cultures—a difficult challenge—lies at the heart of what is 

meant by the adjective multinational in these examples.

General Kosinski told stories during his symposium presentation about growing up in Japan, specifically in Iwakuni from grades 7–11. These formative years 

shaped his view of himself in the world and his view of Japan and its people. His 

personal background along with his ever-growing professional credentials endow 

him with a decided advantage to weigh in on contemporary questions about US–

Japan relations. While listening to his symposium talk, we appreciated his depiction of the US Armed Forces as a group with an international presence that employs personnel who are only sporadically valued as culture or language experts. 

We also agree that if one of America’s key strengths is to continue to be its relationships, they should be made into a more central focus of efforts by educating 
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Jordan & Fogarty

and training uniformed representatives of the US government for forward positions across the globe.

Maj Logan H. Barlow’s “Erga Omnes Securitas: International Security and Reliance on Sustainable Partnerships” draws upon original research he conducted 

while an Air Force Fellow. This research includes interviews with key leaders, 

politicians, and scholars, along with observations and Japanese government data 

he gathered while working in Japan as a Mansfield Fellow. His research sheds 

light on the ways that Japanese and US units make decisions about multilateral 

training events, while arguing that security cooperation could be improved by 

some easily implemented policy recommendations. These include increasing exchanges of people, assessing large-scale exercises from the unit perspective, and 

restructuring and planning in an innovative way.

Major Barlow finds that personal relationships are at the core of successful 

government cooperation, at every level. He adds that positive human interactions 

are going to continue to be paramount for future security cooperation, especially 

in this dynamic region, and suggests that this will require cultivating cross-cultural 

competence among individual USAF personnel. These recommendations resonate with many other papers in this special edition—in many ways, he speaks for 

the other contributing authors when he writes: “if a healthy human-based mutual 

understanding can be fostered on a regular basis, then sustainable security relationships will continue to be a cornerstone of stability in numerous regions around 

the globe” (p. 28). As a KC-135 Instructor Pilot and certified Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Japanese-speaking Foreign Affairs Officer who worked 

with various large Japanese businesses as well as Government of Japan ministries, 

Major Barlow’s insights are based on a wide breadth of professional experience in 

Japan. What is more, his academic background as a Mansfield Fellow infuses his 

research with a depth and rigor characteristic of a graduate thesis, an excerpt of 

which he reworked for this project.

US Air Force captains Julian Gluck and Byron Muhlenberg’s “Opening the 

Door to Cultural Understanding and Mutual Cooperation: Multinational Military Partnerships and Educational Outreach” argues for improved cultural understanding as the basis for strengthening US relationships with allies in INDOPACOM. The co-authors cite academic studies along with anecdotal observations 

from experiences working in Japan in different operational capacities, including 

distinguished visitor support and assignments and exercises with multinational 

partners. Gluck and Muhlenberg have different strengths and cite various successes and failures they personally observed that they bring to bear on their argument that the DOD could improve operations significantly by investing in cultural education for Airmen.
Introduction

 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) 11

For example, Captain Gluck discusses his experiences at Cope North, when he 

participated as a B-52 pilot and a Japanese Language Enabled Airman Program 

(LEAP) scholar who was able to interpret multilateral exercise instructions for his 

Japanese counterparts. Some challenges he witnessed during this operation included language barriers due to the dearth of bilingual participants, most of whom 

were from the Japan side. This is important because “mission planning, briefings, 

sorties, and debriefs were less effective due to language barriers and the cultural 

differences that existed with planning and analytical processes.” In addition, he 

points out that nations’ varying levels of classification of tactics, techniques, and 

procedures, although essential for security, may diminish “full interoperability” 

between forces. (p. 43).

Captain Muhlenberg’s experiences include twice serving in contracting management roles in Japan, such as his current role as Director of Business Operations at Misawa AB, as well as traveling to Hokkaido to support the bilateral exercise Northern Viper where he assisted the Marines in synchronizing port 

operations. He echoes his co-author Captain Gluck, in arguing that in all his activities in Japan involving the USAF and Japan Air Self-Defense Force “determined interaction over the course of the operation was the key to success” (p. 43). 

He goes on to caution that increased interactions between forces is not the same 

thing as cultural understanding, which is a point that the co-authors clarify in the 

final section of the paper.

The authors summarize their respective experiences in joint exercises by saying 

that exercises tend to get off to a rocky start because “there is not rapport yet between the two sides or there is a lack of knowledge of the other’s culture, problems 

for which there are not enough experts to fill in these and other possible gaps” (p. 

44). They also suggest that while the AFCLC does a good job hosting various 

language and culture programs and courses for the USAF and US DOD, overall, 

too few of these kinds of opportunities exist. What is more, they suggest that 

there is a lack of awareness of the existing AFCLC opportunities. They recommend: (1) greater training and education for people going abroad, (2) proliferating greater utilization of the regional experience identifier subset of the Special 

Experience Identifiers (SEI) to leverage personnel’s language capabilities and/or 

cultural savvy, and (3) facilitating even better outreach about existing programs. 

They suggest that this outreach could consist in part of efforts toward galvanizing 

"involvement and cooperation with local and regional civic groups” (p. 45).

MSgt Timothy, US Space Force, is a LEAP scholar in Tagalog who draws extensively upon his own experiences in the article “Strengthening Interoperability 

through the Language Enabled Airman Program: Perspectives from the 2018 to 

2019 US–Philippine ISR Mission.” As an active-duty service member directly 
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Jordan & Fogarty

involved in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, per 

regulation MSgt Timothy’s name is limited to rank and first name only. He argues that achieving the 2018 National Defense Strategy call for more interoperability with allies and partners like the Philippines will require focused US assistance 

to help advance these nations’ national and multinational military and humanitarian operations (and in the future, autonomy), while also ensuring that US war 

fighters receive even better cultural and linguistic education.

He opens by describing an ISR mission in which the US–Philippine mission 

relied heavily on US resources and labor before identifying specific operational 

gaps and opportunities upon which he makes two types of recommendations. 

These are: (1) providing more local interagency support and bilingual documentation to bridge language gaps, and (2) cultivating more awareness of LEAP across 

the force to maximize its reach. His recommendations come directly out of the 

operational context in which he has been working, and they provide a muchneeded glimpse into the highly sensitive military relations in the Philippines in 

which, as MSgt Timothy makes clear, culture and language competence are of 

vital importance for interoperable mission success.

The next article by Capt Jasmine Bogard, USAF, returns the reader’s focus to 

Japan, while bringing the examination in to a more localized context to consider 

global implications of an exemplary program. In, “Expanding Cultural Competencies: Exposing All Outside the Continental United States Airmen to the Local Populous,” Captain Bogard draws upon anecdotal and experience-based evidence assembled during her time at Misawa Air Base, Japan, where she is the 

Assistant Director of Operations assigned to 35th Operations Support Squadron, 

35th Fighter Wing.

This article reworks her symposium presentation, in which she described being 

inspired by the longstanding Misawa AB course for Airmen newly assigned to 

Japan. She cites academic literature on microaggressions and “othering” to contextualize several instances of cultural faux pas she witnessed that had the potential 

to impact US operations in Japan. Next, she summarizes portions of the US National Defense Strategy dealing with alliance building and interoperability, both of 

which require cultural competence in her assessment, before outlining common 

barriers to such competence including inadequate cultural awareness and insufficient language proficiency. Finally, she provides an example model of cultural 

competence drawn from academic literature before stitching all these ideas together to suggest specific qualities the Department of the Air Force ought to 

ensure are part of a proposed program to bolster cultural competence for all Airmen assigned OCONUS. The article does a good job of putting the reader in the 

shoes of someone witnessing an American making a preventable gaffe abroad 
Introduction

 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) 13

before walking us through research on how to prevent these moments buffered by 

real-world programmatic examples toward a conclusion replete with specific recommendations that senior leaders could read and potentially act upon immediately.

Lieutenant Shaquille James’ contributed commentary piece, “What Would a 

North Korean Do? Washington Must See Issues from Adversaries’ Perspectives 

in Order to Move Past Outmoded Policies,” walks readers through his thought 

process for untangling the thorny issue of how to (re)formulate an effective foreign policy toward North Korea (DPRK). He starts with an example of insights 

he gleaned one day when he was talking with a member of the North Korean 

defector community and moves into an exposition of the vexing questions about 

the DPRK facing US leaders before providing recommendations about how to 

begin answering some of these questions.

Lieutenant James is doing the work of seeing North Korea “like” a North Korean, while of course not “as” a North Korean, to argue that their point of view 

must be understood if progress toward better relations is to be achieved: “in order 

to form effective policy and have a real shot at solving things once and for all, the 

outstanding questions regarding Pyongyang’s desires, intentions, and willingness 

must be resolved” (p. 74). Lieutenant James argues that since leaders in Washington have unfortunately often made decisions based on bad assumptions, a deeper 

understanding of the constraints faced by a broad range of people who live in the 

DPRK might help leadership move away from a tendency to treat this country as 

a monolith. He contends that ultimately, “failure to truly understand North Korean intentions, goals, and what can realistically be expected of them,” has historically pervaded the US policy orientation (p. 71). Lieutenant James’ years of 

education in the Korean language and his relationships with the defector community have afforded him proximity to voices from this country that can otherwise be difficult to understand.

Conclusion

Future symposia should continue to build on the best of what is showcased by 

sharing good ideas widely so that they will be more likely to make a difference. 

Indeed, the desire for these ideas to have an impact outside of the event itself is 

the primary motivation behind our effort to pull together this special issue of the 

journal. Far too often, those of us in professional military education hear stories 

about military members’ experiences in operational settings wherein they recognized an inefficiency or opportunity for improvement, wrote up their ideas and 

passed them up the chain of command, only to find that ultimately nothing came 

of their efforts. This is an understandable state of affairs, to be sure, given the ever-
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Jordan & Fogarty

present constraints on time, money, and personnel that are most often focused on 

retrospective rather than forward-looking program reviews. Bottom-up innovation is difficult to create in the first place, difficult to pass upward to people who 

could mobilize change around innovative ideas, and difficult to resource in a big 

bureaucracy even after it is embraced by the right people. However, we must keep 

trying to share ideas borne out of operational contexts with people in higher levels 

of policy making and implementation. We hope this special issue will amount to 

one step in this direction.

Dr. Jessica Jordan

Dr. Jessica Jordan is Assistant Professor of Regional and Cultural Studies (Asia) at the AFCLC. She received her 

Ph.D. in History (Modern Japan) from the University of California, San Diego and has taught courses on the history 

of Japan, Micronesia, Southeast Asia, WWII in Asia and the Pacific, and the world since 1500. Her dissertation 

research involved interviewing several dozen Northern Mariana Islanders about their memories of life under Japanese colonial rule (1914-1945), and she is currently revising chapters for publication as peer-reviewed articles. Her 

teaching and research interests include: historiography, modern colonialism, nationalism and ethnicity/race, and 

the politics of memory. 

Dr. Patricia Fogarty

Dr. Patricia Fogarty is Assistant Professor of Cross-Cultural Relations at the AFCLC. Dr. Fogarty has worked at 

AFCLC since 2009, and finished her PhD in Anthropology in 2012. Her dissertation research revolved around the 

work of an internationally funded development agency in the Republic of Moldova (a former Soviet state). Through 

the topic of development, she explored Moldovans’ experiences of citizenship, national identity, and corruption. 

Research conducted since joining AFCLC has included documenting the intercultural experiences of Airmen of all 

ranks and AFSCs. Teaching and research interests include: general cross-cultural awareness and competence; ethnic 

and national identity; the effects of corruption on military operations; incorporating cultural property protection 

into professional military education, exercises, and wargames; civil-military organizational relationships in humanitarian and stability operations; and the use of museums and heritage sites for political ends.
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) 15

SENIOR LEADER PERSPECTIVE

Multinational Business Organizational 

Models and the US Air Force

An Interview with Brig Gen Leonard J. Kosinski, USAF

The following is a transcript of an interview with Brig Gen Leonard J. Kosinski, 

Vice Commander, Fifth Air Force, and Director, Joint Air Component Coordination Element–Japan, at Yokota Air Base, Japan. The transcript is based on a 15 

March 2021 interview by Jessica Jordan, PhD, Assistant Professor of Regional 

and Cultural Studies (Asia), Air Force Culture and Language Center, Maxwell 

Air Force Base, Alabama.

Background

General Kosinski participated in the 2020 Air University LREC Symposium 

as a featured speaker. His presentation was entitled “Going Multinational in Defense: Lessons for Developing Military Leaders.”  He agreed to talk with Dr. 

Jordan to discuss some of the ideas he presented that originate in the dissertation 

he is writing. This dissertation is for a PhD in international security studies and 

business relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. To be allowed to pursue a degree like this while also fulfilling his current job 

duties, he was handpicked to be a Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) PhD 

Program Fellow/National Defense Fellow. He shared the first two chapters of his 

dissertation-in-progress with Dr. Jordan prior to this interview, which she cites 

throughout the transcript that follows. Her initials are JJ and Brig Gen Kosinski 

is LK in the transcript. This transcript appears in a conversational style to better 

reflect the tone of the conversation, and it has been edited for clarity.

The Interview

JJ: Thank you for presenting at last year’s LREC Symposium and for sharing your 

dissertation chapters with me. Can you tell me more about this research project?

LK: Pursuing a PhD was rather unexpected. I got a master’s in industrial engineering at Texas A&M University (1994) right out of the Air Force Academy, 

after which time the plan was to go on operational tours once or twice—then I

was supposed to come back and teach at the Air Force Academy. Additionally, I

received an MBA during my Olmsted Studies in Tokyo, Japan. Following that I

did a master’s in law and diplomacy at Tufts University. Considering all these 
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Kosinski

academic experiences, I thought I was done with school. Nonetheless, an opportunity for the prestigious CSAF PhD fellowship came about following my squadron command at the Heavy Airlift Wing in Pápa Air Base, Hungary.

This fellowship was intended for a young captain who could one day become a 

general officer and was based on a General Petraeus-type model. I was kind of a 

guinea pig, as they wanted to get someone who had already done a joint job and 

squadron command to see how this could work. I enrolled in what is normally a 

three-year program that ended up being a year-and-a-half since I had to go back 

out early to resume command and complete flying and other training. I have been 

busy since then, and not asking for additional time to complete and defend before 

starting O-6 command did not help. The longer you stay away, the harder it is to 

return.

Right now, I am close to finishing because I completed all the research, but I’m 

finding that there is always an interesting new problem or example to consider. 

The entire manuscript is about 300 pages, with a focus on three case studies of 

prominent multinational organizations.

JJ: Your dissertation is entitled “Going Multinational in Defense: A Theory of 

Integration and Knowledge in Military Strategic Alliances.” The first sentence 

summarizes your main goals: “This dissertation seeks to contribute to the development of a theory on military strategic alliances, incorporating the knowledgebased view, which informs scholars, defense policymakers, and practitioners on 

the implications of knowledge and integration of forces in seeking higher level 

military capabilities through multinational cooperation.” Lots of people write on 

this issue. What was your motivation for choosing this topic for your dissertation?

LK: The knowledge creation theory aspect of my work comes from mentorship I

received while studying in Japan. At the time (2000–2002), I didn’t realize how 

lucky I was working under Dr. Ikujiro Nonaka of the Graduate School of International Corporate Strategy at Hitotsubashi University. He is probably the most 

recognized academic from Japan, perhaps also across Asia, on the business scholarship I reference in this project.

Although my ideas about knowledge management and creation come from his 

influence, really the spark for this project was the time I spent at the Pápa, Hungary Heavy Airlift Wing, when I was part of standing up a first-of-a-kind combat 

airlift and airdrop unit involving multiple nations. But my interest in international 

approaches to security questions dates even further back. I grew up in Japan, 

which was a formative experience that planted seeds from a young age that would 
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later bloom into an interest in cultivating multinational know-how among the 

force.

Another genesis for my interest in this approach was one of my first deployments in supporting NATO in the Kosovo conflict right before I started the Olmsted Scholarship. As my squadron prepared to deploy from McConnell Air 

Force Base in Wichita, Kansas, we were told neither our final destination in Europe nor what role we would play in the impending conflict. Our KC-135 squadron was originally scheduled for a routine deployment to Turkey for Operation 

Southern Watch. With preparations for Operation Allied Force quietly executing, 

we first arrived in Rhein-Main Air Base at Frankfurt, Germany. There were not 

enough US airfields to support all the operations, especially in France where many 

had been closed decades earlier; so, aerial refueling units were sent to various 

unexpected locations throughout Europe. Eventually, after a very short stint in 

Frankfurt, we ended up setting up operations to fly out of Mont-de-Marsan, 

France (1999). Only one person in our group of over 100 could speak French, and 

that was the flight surgeon who had studied some French in college.

For the first couple days, our job was to fly our air refueling planes, the KC-135, 

to support various critical air operations across the AOR [area of responsibility]. 

However, we found that we were unable to launch planes for some reason—due 

to communications difficulties with the air traffic control tower. At first, it was 

thought that there were problems on the technical side such as old transmitter 

radios or something blocking signals from the flight line. But it turns out that the 

problem was not with our technology. We found out that in the evening the tower 

was manned by French civilians, and they were ignoring the American pilots because they thought the Americans were rude or lacking in manners and French 

politeness in the way some of our pilots barked over that radio. Consequently, we 

did not launch flights for a couple of nights because of this cultural issue—it turns 

out that how you say something in the context of a multinational operation is 

sometimes just as important as what you say. We Americans often think we can 

go anywhere and operate. But that is not the case. At the same time, I remember 

thinking, this is France and the US, and we are arguably not that different compared to other cultures in the world. It shouldn’t be this hard.

This experience, along with working US-Japan relations at the Pentagon and 

the Japan desk, prepared me to write this dissertation. But the pinnacle experience 

shaping my thoughts on this topic was in Hungary, when I was standing up something new. Before moving to Hungary, my boss was pleading with SAF/IA [Secretary of the Air Force/International Affairs] asking for a cultural course to prepare all the inbound initial US members—in the end it took about six months to 

just get a CD-ROM on basic Hungarian sent to us. Now that I have looked at 
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Kosinski

Hofstede1 and some of the world cultural values on differences between cultures, 

I think that this would have been nice to know going into that assignment. We 

had some people on the mission who had good cultural experience, but this information wasn’t to be found on any résumé—we just lucked out. We tried to hire 

people with special regional or linguistic experience, but the enlisted assignment 

system doesn’t give you a choice. Really our questions were focused on things like, 

can we just find someone comfortable to talk with the Hungarians and people from other 

cultures? Can we screen for people who have the ability to work in multinational environments or overseas? New personnel for these kinds of assignments also should 

have been asked, do you know what this assignment means, and do you want to do 

this?

All of this was on my mind when I went to get a PhD and I had to consider 

what I wanted to do. This was a good topic about which I had some opinions 

based in real-world lessons learned.

When I dove into the academic reading required for the PhD, I did not see a 

lot in the military literature about strategic alliances, which is a term I define differently in this work. I define strategic alliances in a more inclusive, business sense.

JJ: Right. You defined them in the following way: “Military strategic alliances are 

the broad range of interactions with foreign defense establishments to pursue a 

set of agreed upon goals or, more precisely, to develop and access capabilities. A 

capability is the ability to achieve a specific wartime or other military objective” (p. 

17). Can you say more about why you think this definition is not common in the 

military?

LK: We have been getting better over time, and it is a kind of natural evolution. 

After WWII, as you know, Europe was demolished as was much of Asia. In the 

course of helping to lead reconstruction efforts in these areas under the guidance 

of treaties and agreements—the more formal mechanisms of strategic alliances—

the US was also a huge presence economically and businesswise. In those initial 

postwar decades, the sense in the US was, why do we need to go abroad? It was not 

until the 60s or 70s when the idea that partnering with foreign companies became 

widely seen as favorable way of doing business in order to succeed.

Returning to the present day, partnering with companies from foreign countries to maximize business potential domestically and abroad is a standard way 

that large businesses operate. Applying this kind of thinking, along with some of 

the best practices established by businesses, to the security complex makes sense. 

A classmate of mine just sent me a note about a Franco-German collaboration 

example that will be ready in a couple of years. NATO has talked about pooling 
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and sharing of resources. These endeavors get at this, and they sound good, meanwhile the business side shows us that the right incentives are important. How do

you incentivize and motivate sharing?

One of my case studies, NATO AWACS [North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Airborne Warning and Control System], is also not a bad example of such an 

attempt. But there are some organizational issues when relationships that make 

these collaborations work start to become more nationalistic and less integrated. 

Challenges in NATO AWACS for example include the fact that one person 

should be in charge, and promotions are supposed to be based on merit rather 

than backdoor political maneuverings. That said, politics absolutely plays into the 

leadership structure. Some participants have had almost a secret structure below 

the formal one that is made up of people who actually do some of the important 

work involving standardization and training. So, my assessment is that this is not 

a very good example upon which to model future initiatives, unless some of the 

challenges are addressed head-on.

Another challenge related to boundaries of authority can be understood 

through the example from a member (European) country who committed sexual 

assault or some other heinous offense. Not even a two-star general in charge of 

the organization could say, I want you out. It was up to the nation in question to 

replace their representative to the organization. The boundaries of authority to 

manage personnel are harder to internationalize than boundaries of ownership of 

assets like technology.

In contrast--and this is a relatively small nuance to point out, but it is worth 

considering—in the Heavy Airlift Wing, based on the MOU [memorandum of 

understanding], the colonel that rotates through authorizes or certifies people 

(both US and foreign nationals) to be in the organization. This authority is seldom used to push a preference that might counter the wishes of a foreign nation, 

but this authority is built-in, nonetheless. Putting something like this into action 

of course takes a great deal of coordination, but it is a significant structural feature 

enabling oversight of key leaders that you just don’t have in NATO units.

This is where I find it is helpful to think through the business literature on joint 

ventures, which have an integrated structure that is good for ensuring effective 

and equitable control. Because I am proposing in my dissertation that this model 

be adopted for military organizational needs, I am also proposing that a new term 

be used: multinational military organization. This is as opposed to a coalition, nonintegrated, or national military unit.

JJ: This makes me think of the “bureaucracy to business” informal initiative that is 

popular in the DOD, which seeks to apply the wisdom of business practices to 
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Kosinski

running the military. Some of the counterarguments one often hears to this approach include the critique that businesses have a profit motive at the core of their 

missions, whereas this is not present in the public sector. To the contrary, profit 

seeking stands in opposition to one of the fundamental definitions of public service, which is to serve the greater good without seeking profit or personal gain. 

How do you reconcile the apparent contradiction between profit motives and 

public service?

LK: First of all, profit motives are not the only missions at the core of for-profit 

businesses. This point is critical to remember. For example, an auto manufacturer 

is not only focused on making a profit, but on making the best cars they can. Their 

mission statements are therefore also qualitatively similar, in some important 

ways, to those of non-profit-seeking organizations.

There are other differences between businesses and the military that are also 

often mentioned, the most obvious perhaps being that military personnel routinely risk their lives on their missions, and this is almost never a factor in business. Thinking through the wide chasm of differences that might spool out from 

this comparison are not productive for my work, which considers similarities to 

try to yield a hybrid approach.

There are a lot of similarities worth considering, as big business and big government are both large and complex organizations. In this way, international organizations are another relevant model. But the profit-motive incentives that have 

pushed the business literature farther than many other branches of scholarship 

make this field one that is extremely well-developed, tested, and practiced around 

the world in ways that arguably ought to make it attractive to military leadership.

Where my mind is now with my dissertation manuscript is considering the 

vexing problem, how do you merge organizations and cultures? In my last chapter, 

which I am currently writing, I make a leap into debating different approaches 

while maintaining a focus on Japan. Right now, being in Japan after having been 

away for so long, I am considering all that has changed in the direction of multinationalism in the US and Japanese security apparatus. Where I am sitting at 

Yokota AB, right next door is the Kokujieitai [ Japan Air Force] Air Defense 

Command Headquarters. We are now doing ACE [Agile Combat Employment], 

which was unheard of 15 years ago. Yet, of course, we are still operating as bilateral 

operations—this is a subtle but marked difference. Bilateral means that commandand-control structures are different, but they could, and ought to, be integrated to 

work more effectively. My role in Fifth Air Force exists because we are not like 

Korea or NATO, where one coordinator exists. Bilateral might sound good, but 

executing in a crisis or contingency quickly poses other issues—the most critical 
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among them being a lack of efficiency. The structure as it stands now is, of course, 

the result of political decisions, but if one were to focus on efficacy and mission 

success, this would suggest another course of action. Ultimately, you can be the 

best bilateral coordinator in the world, but bilateral will never be integrated. Japan, on the military side, is leaning forward as much as they can to integrate, and 

we should too.

JJ: You write that interorganizational relationships are what enable alliances to 

work, because these relationships propel the development, transfer, and utilization 

of capabilities. When forces are more integrated, you go on to say, then organizational factors become more important, factors such as what you call “collaborative 

know-how.” You explain that the organizations can either develop these skills, or 

they don’t and fail at their missions—that is how critical they are: “military strategic alliances do not always work out and failure can be costly in terms of resources, politics, and weakened security” (16).

What’s more, you suggest that using a “capability and knowledge-based” approach results in a different mind-set, and that this mind-set is much-needed in 

the current environment, which is knowledge-driven and increasingly competitive. You add that there are current and emerging threats that cannot be handled 

except on a collaborative, international basis because of their transnational, crossborder nature and include such things as cyberdefense, transnational terrorism, 

natural disasters, and piracy. To the extent that you can talk about these transnational challenges at the unclassified level, can you share any specific examples/

stories that help to prove this claim?

LK: This goes back to the history of international businesses and US decisions to 

go abroad, and decisions to partner—there were many who initially thought, why 

would I give away control? I want to do it on my own. But these companies faded 

away, and the multinational corporation emerged as a norm. The military was in 

that older headspace years ago, but we have to be able to partner with foreign 

countries. Militaries that are able to partner well will succeed.

The most important factor shaping our capabilities is selecting partnerships 

with key allies. Our strengths compared to Russia and China include many examples, like our NATO efforts and close security partnerships in the Pacific, and, 

of course, the Heavy Airlift Wing in Pápa, Hungary. The thinking by some senior 

leaders on the US military side of that organization initially was, we need C-17s 

for our national needs and we can’t give them over. We can’t lose control. Yet it seems 

to me that the F-35 program is one that may have been designed especially for 

interoperability and partners. I really can’t stress enough that we have to be able to 
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move past the Cold War mentality where we believe that we can’t share with our 

Japanese and other partners. My time in the Joint Staff was insightful because I

got to work on an interagency level—I saw foreign military sales, and came to 

appreciate that at the Air Force we had the SAF/IA. At the time, on some of the 

Japan issues, we didn’t devote adequate energy to international defense. We just 

didn’t take it as seriously back then, but we do better now.

Another example, not at that high level, but . . . I’m struggling here in Japan 

with the MPEP [Military Personnel Exchange Program]. We have seven US officers working and embedded at engineering, material, cyber, and operational flying units. About 10 years ago, SAF/IA engaged in a bureaucratic decision to 

consolidate administrative control of all the MPEP exchange officers around the 

world centrally out of SAF/IA rather than out of the major commands that specifically cover those regions. This move meant that control was more centralized 

and less subject to regional oversight, thereby removing the ability of leadership 

assigned in-country to manage local talent. At the Fifth AF, we have a staff here 

that can handle this work. I showed up, and I saw these Air Force officers, and 

soon realized that they can’t really talk to us. They are off on their own, alone and 

without appropriate support and advocacy. These folks don’t know what Fifth AF 

mission is and could benefit from help and support that Fifth Air Force was designed to provide. While I think being an exchange officer is one of the most 

important things in the world, big AF may not understand their unique and impactful role to the Alliance and critical interoperability between our forces. Of 

course, during COVID nobody’s really traveling internationally. But here in Japan, I was able to visit Japan’s Air Training Command one day, and I remember 

sitting across from Japanese senior officers there . . . they were telling me how 

grateful they are for our exchange officer and support . . . but those key visits with 

general officers have stopped over the last 10 years. We could and should take 

better care of these folks—again, we have a staff here, and we could handwork 

their assignments and provide the support and advocacy they need. Right now, if 

they are doing bilateral work and come up with some good ideas, it goes up to a 

lieutenant colonel in Hawaii who is the administrative control person, but it does 

not go to us or to PACAF [Pacific Air Forces]; so, I don’t really know what comes 

of the knowledge and insight they are acquiring. I think this is a misuse of an 

incredibly important resource. In my job right now, I’m trying to regain some 

oversight and engagement with them.

So basically, as an Air Force enterprise, we have showed a trend toward centralizing to try to make things efficient, such as the creation of the AF Installation 

and Mission Support Center or [IMSC], but you really can’t centralize across 

multiple, different regions and expect things to be culturally efficient. The result is 
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suboptimal. I happen to know that the Chief of Staff of Japan Air Self-Defense 

Force has also noticed this as an issue where we can and should improve.

JJ: In your dissertation, you point out that there is no consensus on the need to “go 

multinational in defense,” or to seek strategic partnerships and collaboration in 

security efforts. Your second chapter points out the fact that the scholarship and 

literature about lessons learned within the US DOD, NATO, and other military 

organizations on multinational military cooperation is similarly lacking. You say 

that there is a surprising absence of micro-level studies that show “the integration 

and interaction at the most fundamental working levels required in multinational 

partnerships” (p. 33). This special journal edition includes other papers that make 

similar suggestions from an operational point of view, including for example the 

articles by Barlow and co-authors Gluck and Muhlenberg. Both of these provide 

insight into specific areas where improvement in the functioning of partnerships 

and alliances might be achieved without too much additional effort, while other 

papers in this volume address very similar themes.

I want to return to the question about tensions in the model you propose. You 

cite Joint Publication 3-16, 2007, when talking about how, “integration of command and control is a key principle in US military doctrine and is recommended 

for multinational military operations” (p. 20). You go on to explain that there are 

some inhibitions to alliances—especially the fact that the US president has ultimate command authority over US forces, and this poses a challenge to integration. You also point out that there are significant funding restraints, among other 

countervailing forces. After explaining these conditions, you say, “[I]t is of interest 

to see how this doctrinal dichotomy functions, or rather dysfunctions, in application” (p. 24). So, how do issues like the US president retaining ultimate commandand-control authority play out in an operational or tactical setting?

LK: As for how this looks in real life, the Heavy Airlift Wing provides a good 

example. Essentially, the short answer is that if culture is right at a tactical level, 

then things just get done. It could be compared to a timeshare—you have time in 

the condo, but you all have to agree to the schedule. The structure with the MOU 

is that there is already a prioritization structure that gives all authority to the 

commander. So, if a country does not want to go on a mission, they can give a kind 

of compromise support, which is to say that there is flexibility for what national 

support looks like in a given program or mission. In 2010, Haiti suffered the terrible earthquake, and when crafting a response, the unit had to work around the 

prioritization since the US had already booked the C-17s for missions to Afghanistan. This crisis saw many countries wanting to send help to Haiti, and what 
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the steering board did, much like a family sitting around a table, was to figure out 

ways to make this work so that all the countries, in particular, the Scandinavian 

members, could send support to Haiti. There are always ways to incorporate national concerns while also enabling operations and timelines to work—but this all 

depends upon a culture of trust and willingness to collaborate.

JJ: This underscores your argument that cultures of multinational military organizations matter to their success. The rules are one thing, and people will pull together to work around challenges—sometimes those challenges being the rules 

themselves—as long as their relationships are solid.

LK: Right.

JJ: There are other challenges to multinational collaboration in military context 

that you have identified that I think are worth pointing out here. You say that “US 

military forces often expend much more time studying enemy forces rather than 

working to understand their allies and the cultural, organizational, and leadership 

aspects for successfully working in a multinational military environment” (p. 25). 

The know-your-enemy approach to national security was a lesson learned from 

WWII that gave rise to civilian academic departments that focus on foreign area 

expertise, like the one where I got my PhD. I agree that this foreigner-as-potentialenemy orientation is very much baked into the concept of what threats to national 

security look like, and it is clear that thinking of foreign nationals as allies to be 

trusted with US national secrets is a less-developed way of thinking in the DOD. 

Another related problem you mention in your dissertation is that knowledge 

transfer has tended to be seen as going from the US to allies and partners but not 

the other way around. This is a cultural bias that I have also witnessed, and I agree 

that it is runs counter to the goal of maximizing the potential of multinational 

collaboration.

To conclude our chat, I want to call attention to a case you described of a 

multinational naval unit in WWII about which one scholar discerned six key 

features contributing to its success. These included operations, communications, 

communal living, inclusiveness, fairness/right to appeal, unity of command, and 

leadership. Under leadership, there were three additional bullet points: leadership 

rotation, quality of leadership, and “leader’s foreign/multinational experience (this 

seems to be a common trait for leadership success and also is supported by studies 

on the importance of cultural sensitivity when operating in a multicultural or 

multinational workplace)” (pp. 42–43). I want to briefly turn to the last bullet 
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point in order to ask you to discuss some of your own background and qualities as 

a leader.

LK: Multinational experience tends to be a key quality of successful leaders in 

today’s world. In my case, some of my opportunities were by sheer luck—like the 

fact that I grew up as a Marine dependent, and especially my formative years 

spanning middle to high school in Iwakuni, Japan in which I became the person 

I am today while also establishing a diverse group of lifelong friends. Living 

downtown in a Japanese neighborhood away from the base, early on I came to 

understand that there are vast differences between people at the same time as one 

can usually find similarities. I was fortunate to be able to participate in the Olmsted Program, which allowed me to study abroad for two years. Continuing on, I

worked on the Japan desk at the Pentagon. This was all great, and in my case my 

experiences resulted from me going out and pursuing these opportunities, and I

was also just lucky at times. But we need institutionalized ways of doing this—

even the best companies also have to keep working on this. I am hopeful that the 

US Air Force will continue to do better at engaging in some of the ideas we’ve 

discussed today toward achieving strength through real multinational military 

integration. 

Notes

1. Geert Hofstede and Michael Minkov, “Hofstede’s Fifth Dimension: New Evidence from 

the World Values Survey,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 15 December 2010. The “World 

Values Survey” is an open-access website that consolidates related research into a related data set: 

https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.
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VIEW

Erga Omnes Securitas

International Security and Reliance on Sustainable 

Partnerships

Maj Logan H. Barlow, USAF

Sustaining the United States partnership with Japan will require continued investment 

in the people who will carry this alliance forward in a turbulent and unpredictable world.

—Mike Mansfield, former US Ambassador to Japan

The global state of affairs requires mutually beneficial security partnerships 

to counterbalance the emerging threats to global peace and stability. 

Without sustainable security partnerships, the long-term viability of the 

United States of America as an international actor will undoubtedly come into 

question. It is more important than ever, for national security leaders, policy makers, and military leadership to critically analyze the state of international security 

partnerships and the impact security cooperation has on the stability of the international order and national security. Leaders must ask, will existing security partnerships continue to produce the needed advantage to be successful in the current 

and future security environment? Furthermore, how should engagement with 

current partners change or evolve to meet future US national security objectives?

Using US–Japan security cooperation as a case study, this article will aim to be 

informative for US military leaders and policy makers, while encouraging creative, 

innovative solutions to strengthen existing and future security partnerships. Based 

on firsthand research, interviews with key leaders, politicians, and scholars, and 

information provided by various ministries within the Government of Japan during tenure as a Mansfield Fellow, I found that improvement to security cooperation could be achieved through a number of easily implemented and innovative 

policy recommendations. Strategies including an increase of personnel exchanges, 

assessment of large-scale exercises from the unit perspective, and creative restructuring and planning must all be considered. I further concluded that when genuine strategic policy discussions regarding international security cooperation take 

place, it becomes clear that, based on the changing global security environment 

and increased challenges in maintaining a globally dominate force, the United 

States must be willing to critically examine its current partnerships. Similarly, 

Washington must be creative with establishing new, mutually beneficial security 

cooperation activities. Innovative strategies including the increase of personnel 

exchanges, assessment of large-scale exercises from the small-scale or unit per-
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spective, along with creative restructuring and planning all must be considered as 

options for improvement. The future of international partnerships and coalitions 

from the broader perspective of the DOD and the United States Government as 

a whole depend highly upon positive human-to-human, bureaucrat-to-bureaucrat, military officer–to–military officer interactions beginning at the lowest level 

and continuing all the way to the highest of leadership positions.

The US–Japan alliance teaches policy makers and military leaders alike that 

there is a clear need for strong regional alliances that directly impact regional and 

global stability. The US–Japan relationship will be the most important international relationship for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the US–Japan relationship will continue to rely heavily on strong and sustainable interpersonal relationships. As such, if a healthy human-based mutual understanding can be 

fostered on a regular basis, then the US–Japan relationship will never dissolve.

If the USAF intends to meet the dynamic and ever-changing security environment of the global community, strategists and policy makers alike must reassess 

the current partnership strategy and defense cooperation agreements, including 

exercise planning and formulation of new innovative and practical approaches to 

strengthening those security partnerships that are most vital to global stability 

and US national security interests. Personal diplomacy, innovative thought, and 

interpersonal relations founded on trust will be vital to the future ability of USAF 

personnel to work effectively with security partners during times of conflict or in 

highly contested regions of the world. In today’s dynamic security environment, 

leaders must understand the complexities associated with bilateral security cooperation and foreign domestic politics in some instances. 

The future of not only international security partnerships but also the fundamental opinion that other nations have of the United States will continue to be 

highly dependent upon the example set by individual members. Security partnerships are the critical asymmetric advantage that the United States has with regards 

to great-power competition. The human-level interaction, both positive and negative, has the potential to impact every aspect of the current and future rapport of 

the United States. If the DOD and the USAF intends to meet the dynamic and 

ever-changing security environment of the global community, specifically the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, strategists and policy makers alike, 

must reassess the current security partnership strategy and defense cooperation 

agreements in accordance with the most recent National Security Strategy and 

National Defense Strategy. This should include an assessment of current exercise 

planning, along with the formulation of new and practical approaches to strengthening those security partnerships that are most vital to global stability and US 

national security interests. If a healthy human-based mutual understanding can 
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be fostered on a regular basis, then sustainable security relationships will continue 

to be a cornerstone of stability in numerous regions around the globe.1

Revitalizing the Squadron: The Tactical Bridge

In delving into revitalizing the squadron through deepened operational coordination and security activities and a brief discussion on pace setting, the core of the 

research comes from five site visits coordinated through the Japan Air Self-Defense Force ( JASDF) Air Staff Office to five JASDF bases and interactions with 

base-, group- and squadron-level leadership and unit officers and enlisted personnel. In recent years, it has been adamantly articulated that the war-fighting unit of 

the USAF is the squadron, and that it requires revitalization—meaning empowering tactical-level leaders to make in-time combat and noncombat related decisions, which represents the moving of the locus of decision-making authority to 

individuals who have greater proximity to the fight.

One potential area where the service should empower squadron-level leadership is when engaging with security partners and counterparts who operate at the 

same tactical level. While the US–Japan security agreement is one of the most 

vital to global stability in general and East Asia and the free and open Indo-Pacific 

in particular, the United States and Japan have never actually been engaged in 

combat operations together. Through various discussions and interactions with 

the JASDF, it became abundantly clear that there was much to be learned from 

security partners’ command structure and approach to decision making. Thus, the 

most opportune times in which to observe Japan’s command structure and decision-making chain tends to be in the context of large-scale, bilateral and multilateral defense exercises.

Large-scale Exercises

The United States and Japan cooperate on numerous levels, one of which is 

large-scale, multiforce, multiservice exercises. These occur in both a bilateral and 

multilateral context at regular intervals. Large-scale exercises serve as an opportunity to execute and practice in a controlled environment the simultaneous employment of capabilities from each of the participants.

Sometimes exercises tend to be more of an execution of operations in the same 

area of responsibility rather than truly operating together. Additionally, bilateral 

cooperation activities are often concluded with some sort of ceremony in which 

each side expresses gratitude to the other for participation while vowing to continue to work more diligently together. This style of cooperation is superficial at 

best. Post-exercise feedback along with pre- and post-exercise personnel ex-
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changes have the potential to make large-scale exercises more effective for each 

participant nation. Fundamental knowledge of the command and rank structure, 

unit hierarchy, and culture and language fundamentals all support the development of mutual understanding. This was a readily apparent area for improvement 

when examining Cope North Guam, the longest running bilateral exercise. Arriving at an exercise with individuals who possess a mutual understanding for each 

other, as well as departing with the intent to address lessons learned and conduct 

activities that would allow for mutual improvement will more likely have a greater 

overall effect on the security partnership than the actual exercise itself.

Cope North has an overarching goal of increasing the ability of JASDF and 

USAF assets to effectively complete a variety of missions together. Cope North 

Guam 2018 was the first to be conducted as a trilateral exercise with “the US Air 

Force, Navy and Marine Corps, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, and the Royal 

Australian Air Force to enhance multilateral air operations between the nations,” 

and focused specifically on integrated operations for, “humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief with aerial and force employment events focused on increasing 

readiness.”2

The JASDF Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (AMES) is responsible for 

maintaining and employing the Kido Eisei unit.3 The Kido Eisei unit is a cargo 

container that has been adapted into a plug-and-play unit for medical and casualty evacuation operations. The JASDF has the capability to place two of the four 

units they have on either a C-130 or their C-2 mobility aircraft. Each unit has the 

capability of carrying up to three patients and, in extremely critical situations, has 

all necessary equipment to conduct small-scale lifesaving surgeries while airborne. 

The Kido Eisei unit also resolves the issues of poor aircraft lighting and excessive 

aircraft noise. The AMES unit brought the Kido Eisei unit to Cope North Guam 

2018 as an opportunity to share and show a capability that both the US and 

Australian forces do not have, at least not as a consolidated plug-and-play system.

The commander of the JASDF AMES gave frank feedback from the Japan 

perspective on Cope North Guam. Some points that the colonel elected to make 

during a feedback session were that, firstly, he felt that there still exists a clear 

language barrier among the nations, even within the medical career field where 

there is a relatively high percentage of English-speaking doctors and nurses. The 

colonel articulated that the JASDF participants felt more like observers; they felt 

like they could not keep up because of the language barrier and essentially were 

left behind. There was recognition that solving this will require better language 

training on the Japanese side. However, the AMES commander also articulated 

the idea that more personnel exchanges focused on casualty evacuation and medical evacuation prior to the exercise would be highly beneficial to the overall co-
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operation effort and would perhaps lead to a more reciprocal and effective exercise.4

Small-scale Exercises

While large-scale exercises provide a training and validation opportunity for 

contingency-level responses, smaller-scale exercises at the tactical and operational 

levels help develop the lethality of the force. There is an annual small-scale bilateral fighter exercise conducted between Japan and the United States, often hosted 

at a JASDF base. A few years ago, during one of these exercises, aircraft were 

segregated on the ramp, and no actual flying occurred together. Essentially, the 

US fighter squadron traveled to the JASDF base and operated in shared airspace 

but not directly with the JASDF unit. Responsibility for this arrangement falls 

equitably on each side; however, from the Japanese perspective there was a lack of 

after-action discussion on how to increase the effectiveness of the exercise in the 

future.5

The JASDF commander suggested an idea worth considering as a necessary 

shift in current bilateral exercise management practices: line maintenance exchanges. What this means is that JASDF maintenance personnel would work 

side-by-side with US ground crew from the time the pilots arrived for preflight 

inspection, through engine start and block out. The key part of this idea was the 

fact that it would not be a solely JASDF ground crew launching a US fighter but 

instead an integrated ground crew with an USAF lead. This discussion from the 

squadron commander was brought up in large part due to the force structure; 

JASDF flying units tend to take the same form as Army Aviation units, with an 

imbedded maintenance flight and capability. Regardless of the differences in force 

and command structure, however, a line maintenance exchange had the potential 

to be a highly effective method of further integrating capability. This line maintenance exchange would ideally provide opportunity to have younger JASDF and 

US enlisted personnel work together toward the common goal of safely launching 

the aircraft for its mission. The 305th Fighter Squadron commander further articulated that perhaps this was a way to prepare for contingency environments in 

which JASDF line maintenance may have a necessity to fuel, marshal, and launch 

US aircraft due to limited availability of US forces or adaptive basing requirements. This insightful and forward-thinking observation ought to be taken seriously by leadership across the spectrum of Indo-Pacific region’s numerous security 

cooperation agreements.

Recent observation of this same exercise (October 2020), two years after the 

305th Fight Squadron commander’s feedback, revealed a much different story. 

While the line maintenance exchange has yet to be implemented, the level of in-
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tegration and interoperability has been drastically improved: the groups do not 

simply fly in the same airspace but also actually fought together. The most recent 

iteration of the exercise involved flights with commanders of both US and Japan 

units, bilateral news and public affairs announcements, integrated airborne and 

ground control operations, and bilateral air-refueling support in which US receivers conducted air refueling with JASDF tankers and vice versa. Continued efforts 

in this area, including further development of an integrated operations tactics 

handbook and use of each nations’ various strengthens and assets, will result in a 

significantly positive outlook for future security cooperation efforts and the lethality of the alliance.

Informal Personnel Exchanges

Informal operational-level exchanges support the intent of the more formalized strategic level exchanges of personnel. Through another firsthand experience, 

I observed that the Naha Rescue Squadron has often participated in rescue exchanges with personnel from Kadena Air Base—at one point they even participated in an annual exercise called Cope Angel. While these exchanges are highly 

beneficial for the JASDF pararescue jumpers (PJ), there is a still a significant lack 

of knowledge regarding what survival equipment USAF pilots take with them 

when they fly. This lack of knowledge limits the effectiveness of the JASDF PJs in 

water rescues when US pilots eject. An exchange in which survival tactics and the 

differences in training between Japanese and US pilots is highlighted would help 

improve the efficacy of these training events.

Personnel exchanges between various partner and allied nations occur regularly. 

Within the US–Japan relationship, there are a number of officer exchanges that 

include an exchange of aviators, maintenance, and even cyberspace or communications personnel.6

 However, these exchanges tend to be limited to educational 

positions. Often, exchange pilots, such as the USAF F-15 exchange officer imbedded with the JASDF F-15J unit at Nyutabaru Air Base in Miyazaki Japan, are 

limited to instructing new F-15J pilots or teaching ground school.

While formalized programs such as the Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs’ (SAF/IA) Military Personnel Exchange Program are beneficial and 

worth continuing, there is a gap at the operational unit level that needs to be filled. 

Bureaucratic red tape often creates a nightmare of limitations; however, no actual 

limitations exist to prevent either side of a partnership from engaging in informal 

personnel exchanges. Nonetheless, all too often such innovative efforts aimed at 

improving bilateral interpersonal relationships, albeit the simplest idea, frequently 

elicit an immediate negative response from leadership. Some of the most easily 

accomplished exchanges involve simply visiting a security partner’s base and par-
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ticipating in a day-long shadow exchange like the types of exchanges and site 

visits I was privileged to participate in as a Mansfield Fellow.

Formalized exchanges serve the purpose of supporting the overall strategic 

concept of the alliance or partnership. Less formal and more substantial interpersonal relationship-focused exchanges increase operational cooperation, streamline 

bilateral coordination processes, and, ultimately, enhance the effectiveness and 

lethality of the bilateral partnership. If there is mutual interest and benefit, then 

informal level personnel exchanges should be pursued and encouraged from the 

lowest level up.

Bottom-to-Top Approach

Most exercises and exchanges outlined in formal policies and agreements tend 

to have solely a strategic-level focus and involve mostly coordination and planning at the upper echelons of leadership and policy making. This leaves a significant cooperation gap at the lower levels of cooperation, specifically the squadron 

level. To fill this cooperation gap there is a need to reassess the way cooperation 

takes place, which is currently top to bottom. There are significant areas in which 

lower-level, laterally coordinated cooperation could occur that would inherently 

be supportive of the larger exercises and the overall strategic goals of the security 

partnership.

The issue that arises from informal cooperation tends to be top support. In 

most situations where concrete benefit cannot be clearly articulated, most leaders 

are less willing to be supportive. Despite the abstract benefit these informal cooperation practices produce, the long-range impact is far more valuable than merely 

objective accomplishment during large- or small-scale exercises. If anything, the 

informal coordination processes allow for a more rapid and smooth execution of 

tactical and operational objectives in both peacetime exercises and would ideally 

have the same effect in future conflict. A bottom-to-top approach would be highly 

beneficial to the strategic objective of any security partnership and would allow 

greater bilateral decision-making capability at the squadron level. Critical in-time 

decision making and execution coordinated with tactical-level partners affords 

the most lethal response to developing threats; furthermore, action taken would 

remain in line with overall strategic objectives and the principle of centralized 

command and decentralized execution. Tactical-level ideas with operational support and strategic integration allow for greater bilateral decision making at the 

squadron level. Lateral cooperation with security partner equivalents should be a 

key concept in continuing to revitalize the squadron. The bottom-to-top approach 

will be vital to winning future conflicts, specifically in the Indo-Pacific region.
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Pacesetting

International security partnerships require formulation of common goals and 

coordination of security cooperation activities to achieve those goals. In most instances, the cooperation-and-coordination piece rarely addresses the operational 

execution processes, and instead procedures and challenges tend to be thought of 

as strategic in nature. Despite having positive intentions and coordinated goals 

and objectives, when one party outpaces the other or has a different concept of 

what execution should look like, the partnership becomes less effective than it 

should be, and the potential for a breakdown in security cooperation overall could 

occur. Coordinating objective and purpose is only the first step in security cooperation, and operational execution coordination and pacesetting are just as vital, if 

not more important, to the overall health of the relationship. Working toward a 

common goal and working together to achieve a common goal are not always the 

same thing.

The United States’ Pace—Train Like You Fight

The DOD approach to training and military readiness is to “train like you 

fight.” Every motion and action taken in the training environment is intended to 

increase lethality and provide realistic training. The intent is to prepare people to 

eventually use developed skill sets in a lethal manner during times of real-world 

conflict or contingency operations. US forces train like they fight by fostering 

simulated environments that are intended to mimic actual contingency conditions: “Success hinges on practicing the profession of arms in the same manner it 

will be executed on the battlefield or during a contingency.”7 The DOD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms even defines exercise as, “a military maneuver 

or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation and execution 

carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation.”8 Thus the DOD approach 

to training is simply to train for real-world operations through simulated contingency environments to validate or evaluate mission capabilities.9

While this is highly effective and practical, do bilateral or multilateral largescale exercise and exchanges produce the same sort of effectiveness, or are we 

setting a pace that is too fast for US security partners? If the goal is to fight 

alongside security partners, then improvement of security partners’ operational 

capability through training and education needs to be a priority of security cooperation. There is an obligation to adjust the pace of the simulated contingency 

exercises currently being conducted with security partners.
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The Security Partners’ Pace—Train to Improve

JASDF leadership at various levels articulated a common theme of feeling as 

though they could not “keep up” with the US military.10 When this defense “gap” 

becomes apparent, it essentially has two significantly detrimental effects. First, a 

loss of effectiveness in training and development ultimately results in a loss of 

trust. The Japan Self-Defense Force often adjusts US training objectives and goals 

to ones that are more reasonably achievable for its own level of capability.11 Additionally, objectives such as “ensuring that they are not a hindrance on the US 

execution portion” or “do the best to provide necessary support to US assets when 

unable to maintain unified action” speak to a common sentiment that sometimes 

the goal is to just “not be in the way.”12

A second detrimental effect of US security partners is the development of dependence. Fundamental to the overall US foreign policy is the development of 

self-reliance, a desire to empower friends and allies to become self-sufficient—be 

that economically or within the context of national security. This idea of dependency is not one desired by a majority of security partners, most of whom maintain significant capability, such as Japan, which has a strong desire to make a significant contribution to the security relationship.13 However, when outpaced in 

training exercises, the habit of leaving certain tasks to US forces becomes the root 

cause of dependency on US military power. This is called “induced” dependency. 

In times of actual conflict, this kind of dependency would make US security partners less reliable.

From the strategic perspective of security cooperation, and in accordance with 

the emphasis in Joint Publication 1-0 Joint Personnel Support on “unity of effort,” 

understanding allies’ and partners’ training and education “pace” is more vital than 

having a comprehensive exercise to validate all aspects of DOD capabilities.14

Reflecting the US train-like-we-fight mentality, in almost every case the US pace 

far exceeds a pace that allies and partners can maintain. In most instances, and as 

explained by JASDF officers, security partners of the United States often view 

training as “an opportunity to learn about DOD capabilities, learn from more 

experienced partners and develop their own talents, skills and capabilities [sic].”15

Essentially, US security partners “train to improve.”

However, if the United States intends to continue to facilitate unity of effort 

through security cooperation, then in certain bilateral instances it would behoove 

the United States to either set a pace that is more appropriate to its security 

partner and/or allow partners to take a larger role in planning, preparing, and 

leading execution of such exercises and training events. Aligned ends do not always ensure coordinated means.
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Partnership Development

If the goal is to fight alongside our security partners, then the United States has 

an obligation to facilitate the improvement of security partners’ operational capability through training and education as a priority for fostering sustainable security partnerships. Fundamental to the overall US international security posture is 

the development of self-reliant, self-sufficient security partners. In a manner 

similar to the way the DOD approaches force development through training and 

education, there is a need to establish clear guidance, procedures, and practices for 

partnership development. Joint Publication 3-16 Multinational Operations, Joint 

Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 

through discussion on “security assistance,” articulate some very broad and overarching goals of security cooperation and partnerships but offer no real concrete 

methodology that could be useful to commanders who work with security partners on a regular basis.

This “crawl, walk, run” approach could also be applied to US security partnerships throughout the world. Furthermore, the same approach to partnership development through training and education cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach 

due to the vast range of capabilities that US partners maintain. Joint Publication 

3-16 lays the foundational support needed for a partnership development strategy 

and standalone doctrine, articulating “When the situation permits, FCs at all levels should seek opportunities to improve the contributions of member nation 

forces through training assistance and resource sharing . . . this could include the 

development of interoperable C2 [command-and-control] and joint fires capabilities an procedures; the sale or loan of equipment; consistent and shared doctrine; common TTP [tactics, techniques, and procedures]; and participation in 

multinational exercises, including training at US national train centers when 

appropriate.”16 If the United States is to continue to be influential throughout 

various regions in the world, then commanders with responsibilities within the 

context of a bilateral or multilateral security cooperation agreement should seek 

to improve the contributions of partner nation forces through training assistance 

and educational programs.

Conclusion

The US–Japan relationship teaches policy makers and military leaders that 

there is a clear need for strong regional alliances that can directly influence regional and global security stability in a positive manner. While this article takes a 

comprehensive approach to framing the issue, it does not offer a solution for every 

problem that emerged during research conducted for the thesis from which it is 
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excerpted. It does articulate a clear need for innovative and creative minds willing 

to work directly on an interpersonal and, in some instances, ad hoc basis with 

counterparts from partner and host nations to achieve a common objective in the 

most efficient and productive way possible.

The squadron is the war-fighting unit of the USAF and, as such, it should be 

the focus of security cooperation efforts. Squadron leadership should be actively 

engaging with their security partner equivalents on a regular basis and encouraging personnel exchanges, smaller-scale unit exercises, and/or informal learning 

opportunities. This requires continued empowerment of squadron commanders 

from the upper levels of leadership; without such empowerment, lower-level cooperation is stonewalled unnecessarily. Failure to cooperate at the tactical level 

could potentially have dire consequences when conflicts give rise to a need to 

conduct coordinated operations. Before a conflict arises is the time for the development of cooperation at the squadron and unit levels.

The DOD pace is often fast and lethal, and this is almost never the same pace 

as that of US security partners. During times of peace, it would be more beneficial 

for the US side of the partnership to slow the pace, educate and encourage understanding, facilitate capability development, and work side-by-side with security 

partners. While there is a need to train for realistic wartime situations, we must 

understand that this also requires developing our security partners. If security 

partners are left in the dust during peacetime exercises and cooperation activities, 

it would be illogical to assume those partners would be a benefit to operations 

during times of conflict. There is a time for both training and executing at the 

DOD pace of lethality, and there is also a time to work at a pace appropriate to 

security partners and facilitate comprehensive education and employment of capabilities.

Ultimately, sustainable security partnerships depend highly upon positive human-to-human interactions from the lowest level of leadership to the highest. 

Even in long established security partnerships, interpersonal relationships are irreplaceable. Personal diplomacy founded on innovative strategies that increase 

critical personnel exchanges and facilitate trusting interpersonal relations will be 

vital to the USAF ability to capitalize on the asymmetric advantage that such 

partnerships provide. The success of these relationships relies heavily on the crosscultural competency of the individual.

If a healthy human-based mutual understanding can be fostered on a regular 

basis, then the US–Japan security relationship will continue to be the cornerstone 

of stability in East Asia. The lessons suggested in this article are not only applicable to the US–Japan alliance but also apply to the bilateral and multilateral relationships throughout the Indo-Pacific and across the globe. That same concept 
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of sustainable interpersonal relationships as applied to the US–Japan relationship 

also holds true of other security relationships. Interpersonal relationships and 

cultural and language competence will be vital to sustainable security relationships continuing to be an asymmetric advantage in regions around the globe. 

Maj Logan H. Barlow, USAF

Major Barlow is assigned as the Director of Staff, 18th Operations Group, 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base, Japan. He 

earned his commission from the United States Air Force Academy in 2011. He completed undergraduate pilot training at Vance AFB, Oklahoma, and began his flying operational flying in the KC-135R Stratotanker while stationed 

at Fairchild AFB, Washington. He executed world-wide missions in the, including five deployments to Al Udeid Air 

Base, Qatar supporting Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Freedom Sentinel. Major Barlow is a 

graduated Mansfield Fellow, where he worked within the Government of Japan, including postings at the Ministry 

of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet Office, and as an intern for a member of the National Diet 

among other government and private industry assignments in Tokyo, Japan.He is a certified INDOPACOM Foreign 

Affairs Officer, with Japanese language credentials and a certified Level II, Northeast Asia Regional Expert.

Notes

1. The abovementioned concerns were the focus of the fellowship thesis titled, Erga Omnes 

Securitas: International Security & Reliance on Sustainable Partnerships, which was completed while 

assigned to Air University, Air War College, Air Force Fellows from the summer of 2018 to the 

summer of 2019. Most research and anecdotal evidence are based on firsthand research from interviews conducted with key leaders, politicians, and academic experts, as well as information 

provided by various ministries within the Government of Japan during tenure as a Mansfield 

Foundation Fellow. The primary focus of the Mike Mansfield Fellowship is the US–Japan relationship; in this article the US–Japan security alliance will be the primary case study for considering a reassessment of current security partnerships.

The Mansfield Fellowship is a yearlong experience in which selected federal employees work 

with their counterparts and other bureaucrats within ministries and offices of the Government of 

Japan. This experience gives unique government leadership engagement opportunities and represents a hands-on approach to understanding the strategic implications and importance of the 

US–Japan partnership at various strategic and operational policy levels. The purview of the research is restricted to US–Japan security cooperation. To this end, this research partially draws 

upon firsthand interviews as well as site visits to vitally important Japan Air Self-Defense Force 

( JASDF) bases to provide insight into cooperation gaps in communication and highlight a number of missed opportunities for strengthening collaboration and focused efforts to mitigate these 

shortfalls. The hindsight from firsthand interviews and site visits to JASDF units during the latter 

part of 2018, specifically those in Naha Air Base (Naha Rescue Squadron) and Nyutabaru Air 

Base (305th Fighter Wing, F-15J) provided significant insight into Japan’s security partnership 

perspective.

Erga Omnes Securitas: International Security & Reliance on Sustainable Partnerships is available in 

its entirety. The thesis is a 113-page in-depth analysis that focuses on nine topics critical to sustainable partnerships. Those topics included: economic partnerships and national security, congressional delegations, revitalizing the squadron, pace setting, peace cooperation, humanitarian 
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assistance and disaster relief cooperation, enterprise engagement, and the impact of foreign domestic politics. However, this article will provide a brief synopsis and extract of only few of the 

most relevant chapters of the thesis, specifically focusing on revitalizing the squadron and pace 

setting, through a discussion on large- and small-scale exercises as well as “outpacing.” These topics will frame the discussion to provide necessary hindsight, insight and foresight into sustainable 

security partnerships and their vital role in the United States’ asymmetric advantage in the IndoPacific region. A number of practical policy recommendations that further strengthen, not only 

the US–Japan alliance but any strategic partnership that the US currently maintains or will pursue 

in the future are also articulated.

2. Charisy Panzino, “More than 2,000 troops, 100 aircraft train on Guam for Cope North 

2018.” Air Force Times, 15 February 2018, https://www.airforcetimes.com/. 

3. Kido Eisei 機動衛生—Japanese word most accurately translated as “mobile medical unit.” 

The Japanese characters utilized are 機 ki [machine, aircraft, and so forth], 動 do [movement], 衛

ei [protection], and 生 sei [life]. 

4. Commander of JASDF Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, interview by author, Komaki 

Air Base, Nagoya, Japan, 30 November 2019.

5. Commander JASDF 305th Tactical Fighter Squadron, interview by author, Nyutabaru Air 

Base, Miyazaki, Japan, 18 December 2019. 

6. Former US Military Personnel and Exchange Program Officer, interview by author, Tokyo, 

Japan, 19 November 2019.

7. LeMay Center for Doctrine, Annex 1-1 Force Development: Common Guiding Principles, 

https://www.doctrine.af.mil/. 

8. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, June 2019).

9. LeMay Center for Doctrine, Annex 1-1 Force Development.

10. JASDF 403rd Tactical Airlift Squadron Pilots and Loadmasters, interview by author, 

Miho Air Base, Yonago, Tottori, Japan, 5 December 2018.

11. Commander of JASDF Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, interview by author, Komaki 

Air Base, Nagoya, Japan, November 30, 2019.

12. MOD, Defense Policy Bureau, Joint Training Division Officials, interview by author, Ichigaya, Tokyo, Japan, 16 April 2019.

13. Jeffrey W. Hornung, Japan’s Potential Contributions in an East China Sea Contingency 

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020). 

14. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0 Joint Personnel 

Support (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, May 2016), vii. 

15. JASDF 404th Tactical Airlift Tanker Squadron, interview by author, Komaki Air Base, 

Japan.

16. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16 Multinational 

Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, March 2019), III–10.
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VIEW

Opening the Door to Cultural 

Understanding and Mutual Cooperation

Multinational Military Partnerships and Educational Outreach

Capt Julian Gluck, USAF

Capt Byron Muhlenberg, USAF

The world we live in is quickly shifting: former threats are receding while 

new dangers materialize, and growing adversaries begin their assertive 

force projection on the regional and global stages. Since the end of the 

Cold War, the United States has been able to stay ahead of these emerging threats 

through economic, military, and scientific dominance and through mutual cooperation within its strongly knit alliance network. As American hegemony wanes—

particularly in the Indo-Pacific—strength in numbers and diversity will only increase in necessity as the international system begins to reveal elements of 

multipolarity with increasingly bellicose centers of gravity. Improving the efficacy 

of our multinational military partnerships through better educated and trained 

personnel will be the key to effective operations overseas in our most paramount 

area of responsibility.

Within US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), American politicomilitary foreign relations have included bilateral arrangements to coordinate with 

our allies, execute multinational exercises, and arrange arms sales with our partners. However, there are more actions necessary to maintain collective defense 

security agreements and a norms-based liberal international order for the deterrence of near-peer adversaries, particularly in the new administration. This article 

will explore the current status of our military and diplomatic relations with allies 

in the Indo-Pacific theater through published research and the authors’ anecdotal 

experiences from working with multinational partners during different assignments, exercises, and distinguished visitor support to highlight Department of 

Defense successes, failures, and areas for improvement. These qualitative experiences will illuminate how cultural understanding is the key to the multilateral 

success of the United States’ alliance network.

Additionally, the authors will provide recommendations on how the US Air 

Force could construct a force equipped with the organic capacity to understand 

the numerous cultures in our expansive but strong-knit alliance network to better 

cope with emerging threats over the next decade. These recommendations focus 

on key points such as the education of our in-theater personnel at the base level 
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Gluck & Muhlenberg

with respect to culture, the provision of more opportunities for cross-cultural exchange outside of the established Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC) sphere, and the galvanization of involvement in local and regional civic 

groups. Only through a deeper cultural understanding of language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) can we hope to strengthen our mutual security for 

the future.

Partnerships and Exercises

The Air Force’s core missions of global vigilance, reach, and power and American national interests are leveraged with the ability to synchronize interdependent 

operations through unprecedented range anywhere in the world.1 However, the 

Department of Defense—unable to execute its operations everywhere unilaterally—relies upon foreign partners for basing forward deployed personnel, staging 

operations, and coordinating military efforts. Except for Bhutan (informal), Iran, 

North Korea, and Taiwan (informal), the United States currently maintains formal diplomatic relations with nearly every country in the Indo-Pacific and is party 

to numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements.

As detailed in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the emergence of long-term, 

strategic competition with China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific and the weakening of the post–World War II international order present challenges to the United 

States’ military advantage and its ability to promote liberal values in the region.2

Rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war—along 

with the impact of nonstate actors—further complicate a simple, holistic response 

and necessitate the new administration to promote greater flexibility by the myriad of American military forces in cooperation with local partners.

Our long-term strategic competitors have increasingly engaged in multilateral 

exercises and security arrangements in opposition to the liberal international order and traditional American allies. Portraying elements of anti-Atlanticism on 

one end of the geopolitical spectrum and of antidemocratization as a whole, the 

growing direction of the United States’ near-peer adversaries is toward a Eurasian 

continentalism made visible through increases in geopolitically motivated regional 

exercises and expansionist posturing.3 Some examples include Russia’s Central 

Asian military exercise Tsentr in 2019 that notably included such regional players 

as China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 

and also China’s Sea Guardians 2020, which was a bilateral naval exercise between 

regional partners China and Pakistan.4 There have also been aggressive overtures 

for regional influence including increased drills in the South China Sea and incursions of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea by vast numbers of Chinese 

vessels5 further highlighting the encroachment of the dominant continental pow-
Opening the Door to Cultural Understanding and Mutual Cooperation

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ers and the United States’ command of the sea.6 Japanese Defense Minister Taro 

Kano at the Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defense in the Diet warned in 

August 2020 that the Japan Self-Defense Forces “will act firmly” to counter the 

intensification of Chinese activity in the region.7 Technological advances by 

China, North Korea, and Russia with aircraft carriers, longer-range ballistic missiles, and hypersonic glide missiles further expand the offensive reach of adversarial powers.8 These changes have been part of the driving force heightening 

threat levels in the Indo-Pacific, causing other regional players, such as South 

Korea, to either vacillate between sticking with the US alliance-based multilateralism and nonintervention or, in countries such as Japan, to turn further toward 

the United States as a means to protect their interests—both realities of which the 

United States should continue to be cognizant and seek to leverage.9

The United States alliance network consists of multiple collective defense arrangements. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization between the European powers, United States, and Canada may be the most famous, the IndoPacific is home to a number of historic arrangements established during the 1950s 

and 1960s, including those with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, and South Korea.10 Contemporaneously, USINDOPACOM is the 

primary unified combatant command associated with five mutual defense treaties 

and postured American forces numbering 375,000 in personnel, more than one 

thousand aircraft, and five carrier strike groups.11 With a sphere of influence of 

36 nations and 50% of the world’s population, USINDOPACOM is the largest 

of the combatant commands and arguably will be the most critical in the near 

future.12

Anecdotal Experience

The authors have had a number of experiences working alongside allied partners in the Indo-Pacific through assignments at bases in the theater and in bilateral and multilateral exercises. These have furthered their understanding of the 

intricate multilateral relationships in the alliance and solidified their conclusion 

that cultural differences are a strength and that cooperation is critical for our relations in the region.

Captain Gluck

In 2018, Capt Julian Gluck was deployed as a B-52 pilot to the Indo-Pacific as 

part of Pacific Air Forces’ (PACAF) Continuous Bomber Presence. The main 

training event he participated in during this time was Exercise Cope North—a 

long-standing joint and trilateral exercise with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force 
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Gluck & Muhlenberg

( JASDF) and Royal Australian Air Force. With a focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief training, the combined force of nearly 3,000 service 

members from 21 flying units flew more than 100 aircraft in the skies over Guam 

to “enhance multilateral air operations” and “promote stability and security 

throughout the Indo-Pacific by enabling regional forces to hone vital readiness 

skills critical to maintaining regional stability.”13

As an intermediate-level proficiency Japanese speaker in the Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP), Captain Gluck leveraged his language background during mission planning with his fellow aviators, acting as an unofficial 

translator and intermediary when linguistic confusion arose between the Englishand Japanese-speaking planners and flyers prior to their sorties (flying events). 

During the exercise, he translated an unclassified B-52 capabilities briefing into 

Japanese and presented the slides to pilots and mechanics from the JASDF to 

help familiarize the other players in the aircraft stack with the B-52 bomber’s 

abilities and limitations for better integration. He also provided tours of a static 

display of the B-52 to JASDF maintenance personnel and notably served as the 

lead for the distinguished visitor event involving the then-commander of Air Defense Command, Lt Gen Hiroaki Maehara, and his entourage, which was highlighted by PACAF public affairs and LEAP as an example of leveraging language 

capability abroad.14

The official and unofficial events at Exercise Cope North—including a large 

party hosted by the Japanese prior to the exercise’s kick-off and a culminating 

celebratory event at the end with revelry and the trading of military patches—illuminated the strengthening of international ties that can occur at these multilateral events when executed correctly. Over the course of the exercise, the author 

noted the increased synergy in planning and the execution of operations that 

came with practice, while the social events and interaction between the senior 

leaders forged relationships with an increased appreciation for their partners’ international cooperation. The sorties familiarized the countries’ deployed forces 

with coordinated employment across diverse mission sets, and participants finished the exercise with tangible experience working with their regional allies.

Challenges noted by the author during Exercise Cope North focused primarily 

on language barriers where non-English-speaking participants relied upon a small 

cadre of bilingual participants (primarily on the JASDF side) with varying levels 

of fluency and miniscule contingent of professional translators or Foreign Area 

Officers for the event. Mission planning, briefings, sorties, and debriefs were less 

effective due to language barriers and the cultural differences that existed with 

planning and analytical processes. Lastly, the classification of information—a vital 

and omnipresent element when working with multinational partners—diminishes 
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full interoperability with capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures, 

while preserving necessary information for the countries’ respective intelligence 

and military apparatuses.

Captain Muhlenberg

Capt Byron Muhlenberg has led a majority Japanese workforce and organized 

multiple bilateral cooperation events—including senior leader gatherings, annual 

community events, and officer exchanges—affording him the opportunity to directly observe the transformative effect of partnership in the Indo-Pacific.

In one such experience, Captain Muhlenberg traveled to Hokkaido, Japan, to 

support the bilateral exercise Northern Viper as an Air Force interpreter through 

LEAP. Involving the US Marine Corps and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force 

( JGSDF), the exercise’s focus was on practicing maneuvering and winter combat 

training as a combined force. Exercises such as these are critical, as they show a 

direct and public commitment to mutual cooperation and interoperability. The 

author’s role in this exercise was to assist the Marines in synchronizing port operations and equipment movement with the Tomakomai Port Authority, the local 

city government, the JGSDF, and the shipping contractor to ensure smooth 

equipment offloading from the cargo ship and transportation to the training 

grounds. He noticed that determined interaction over the course of the operation 

was the key to success. As the participants from the highest level to the lowest 

Marine increased their interactions with their local counterparts, the operation 

became smoother, and cooperation increased. It is likely that deeper cultural understanding resulted from these increased interactions and was the key to the bilateral operation’s success.

In another experience at Yokota Air Base, Japan, Captain Muhlenberg led a 

team of Airmen in a bilateral exchange with JASDF members. While the ostensible goal was to assist the JASDF team in an English-medium speech competition, the actual intent was to sow the seeds of interchange between the two allied 

forces. Over the course of six months, members employed in various job specialties from both nations met over speech practices, base visits, public ceremonial 

events, and social hours. These interactions developed fellowship and promoted 

otherwise improbable information exchange about each other’s respective services 

and functional skills—joint efforts personally commended by the JASDF Chief 

of Staff.

Captain Muhlenberg noticed a few major themes in these experiences. These 

concerted efforts to display unity and promote exchange actually led to greater 

individualized opportunities to deepen cultural understanding, heightening the 

personalized importance of the alliance. There was also a marked transformation 
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Gluck & Muhlenberg

in world perspective—US members’ tones changed when speaking about the mission in Japan, and their behaviors in conducting operations with the Japanese 

changed as well. These transformations were driven by two factors in particular 

that were and still are inherent in the force: (1) there is an overwhelming interest 

in forging bilateral relationships, and (2) mission execution is paramount. These 

are factors that leaders need to keep in mind when promoting multilateralism.

There were also a few potential pain points observed throughout these experiences. While US military members do want to meet service members from other 

countries’ militaries, there either are limited opportunities, or the individuals are 

unaware of the opportunities that exist. Furthermore, bilateral exercises and events 

generally start out rocky, either from a paucity of knowledge of a partner’s culture 

or because the relationship between the two sides has yet to be fully developed. 

This is further compounded by the inability to employ cultural experts early in the 

process to fill in these and other possible gaps.

In the next section, we will provide a few recommendations on how to resolve 

these pain points.

Recommendations

Our first recommendation is for better education of in-theater personnel at the 

base level and prior to multinational exercises. Currently, Expeditionary Culture 

Field Guides,15 tailored by AFCLC to the needs of the Department of Defense 

and peer-reviewed by academics, exist to better familiarize military members with 

particular countries; however, greater support for their expansion to more nations 

and greater proliferation of the materials through awareness of their availability 

online and in the Culture Field Guide mobile application would assist personnel 

with applying this knowledge to hands-on training.16 Additionally, training prior 

to deployments or exercises with components based on cultural clusters and crosscultural analytical models like Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theorywould aid in 

the collective understanding of the foundations of local culture and differences 

with one’s own—better equipping American forces to integrate with their foreign 

partners.

17 With added linguistic, cultural, and regional education, war fighters 

will immediately build better relationships for success, rather than spending time 

trying to learn the basics about each other prior to cooperating, or worse, during 

the exercise or operation.

The second recommendation is to provide to all Airmen, regardless of their 

level of cultural understanding, more opportunities for cross-cultural exchange 

outside of the more formalized opportunities within the Air Force. LEAP within 

AFCLC is a “career-spanning, volunteer program open to officers and enlisted 

across all specialties to sustain and enhance foreign language skills of Airmen.”18
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The more than 3,000 Airmen who as a whole train in 95 languages represent a cadre 

of more adequately skilled regional specialists with prior language backgrounds.19

Outside of LEAP exist other culture and language experts in the Air and Space 

Forces whose experiences the Department could better leverage to further develop 

Airmen and Guardians when engaged with foreign partners domestically and overseas; this could be better accomplished with more utilization of the regional experience identifier subset of the special experience identifiers (SEI) catalogued by the 

Air Force Personnel Center. These SEIs track levels of regional experience in particular geographic regions (e.g., Northeast Asia) based on a number of quantitative 

and qualitative factors. In addition to the more specifically trained and focused 

groups, greater outreach to personnel who desire more generalist learning and cultural knowledge would enhance the foundations of military members who would 

otherwise lack the mentorship or opportunity to learn—due to an unawareness of 

how to take advantage of the many tools available online and at bases. Deeper 

sponsorship of local exchange groups and base events for language and culture (e.g., 

Japanese or Korean) would provide Airmen and Guardians the framework to establish relationships with foreign peers, build knowledge, and increase baseline cultural 

awareness when moved or deployed.

The final recommendation is to galvanize involvement and cooperation with 

local and regional civic groups. Through municipal and international organizations and charitable programs, military members and foreign citizens can further 

culture exchange. While our bases are consistently working to improve relationships with local communities and municipal governments, there are areas of opportunity past these traditional channels. These groups may be based on similar 

interests (e.g., the Knights of Columbus or sports fandom), foreign exchange or 

communication (e.g., Global Shapers, Rotary, or Toastmasters), or be organic or 

impromptu efforts (e.g., disaster relief teams or 5K races). In addition to the benefit of armed forces personnel gaining cultural awareness, these programs expose 

citizens of foreign countries to military members involved in activities other than 

their core job duties as war fighters—showing the human element behind the 

uniform, engaging individuals in communication between citizens and service 

members, and promoting positive civil-military relations. The Department of the 

Air Force should continue to take positive steps to promote partnership with 

these organizations and others like them and provide opportunities for service 

member involvement.

Conclusion

To open the door to cultural understanding to a greater number of actors across 

the force, the USAF should increase efforts at raising foundational knowledge for 
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Gluck & Muhlenberg

personnel and enhance cultural training prior to military exercises, deployments, 

and permanent changes of station overseas. The implementation of the aforementioned recommendations would address our ability to respond to the LREC challenges highlighted in the National Defense Strategy and increase mutual understanding while strengthening relationships with our multilateral partners and 

local populations. These changes are actionable efforts to counter the encroachment by near-peer adversaries on current and potential partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Through the formation of war fighters with outward-looking mindsets ready to leverage similarities and differences in, and fight alongside, 

multilateral coalitions, the United States through the Air Force and USINDOPACOM will improve the responsiveness and flexibility of our alliance network to 

react to emerging threats and ensure collective defense in this vital region.

Capt Julian R. Gluck, USAF

Captain Gluck is a B-52 instructor pilot newly serving as the Aide-de-Camp to the Commander, Seventh Air Force 

(US Air Forces Korea). He is a distinguished graduate of the United States Air Force Academy and member of the 

Program for Emerging Leaders at National Defense University. He has deployed twice and is a member of the Language Enabled Airman Program for Japanese.

Capt Byron H. Muhlenberg, USAF

Captain Muhlenberg is the Director of Business Operations and a contracting officer with the 35th Contracting 

Squadron. He is a distinguished graduate of the United States Air Force Academy and holds his Master of Business 

Administration from the University of Southern California. He has been stationed in Japan twice and is a member 

of the Language Enabled Airman Program for Japanese.

Notes

1. United States Air Force, Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America (2015), 4, 

https://www.af.mil/. 

2. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States 

of America, 2, https://dod.defense.gov/. 

3. Yixiao Zheng, “Rediscovering continentalism: the new geographic foundations of Chinese 

power,” International Politics ( January 2020), https://doi.org/.

4. Sergey Sukhankin, “What Did Russia’s Strategic Military Exercise Tsentr-2019 Reveal?,” 

International Centre for Defence and Security, 24 October 2014, https://icds.ee/; and Rajeswari 

Pillai Rajagopalan, “China-Pakistan Naval Drills: More Than Just Symbolism,” The Diplomat, 10 

January 2020, https://thediplomat.com/.

5. “Chinese government ships enter Japanese waters near Senkakus for second day in a row,” 

Japan Times, 10 May 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.

6. Jennifer Riehl, “Has the United States Lost Command of the Sea?,” Proceedings 145, no. 1 

( January 2019), https://www.usni.org/.

7. “Kono tells China SDF will respond to intrusions around Senkakus,” Asahi Shimbun, 5 

August 2020, http://www.asahi.com/.
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) 47

8. China Power Team, “How Does China’s First Aircraft Carrier Stack Up?,” Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, 26 August 2020, https://chinapower.csis.org/.

9. Duyeon Kim, “Washington and Seoul Must Heal Their Alliance: Confronting North Korean and Chinese Aggression Requires It,” Foreign Affairs, 26 January 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.

10. “U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements,” United States Department of State, 20 January 

2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/.

11. “About USINDOPACOM,” United States Indo-Pacific Command, accessed Jan 2021, 

https://www.pacom.mil/ . 

12. “About USINDOPACOM,” United States Indo-Pacific Command.

13. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs, “COPE NORTH 2018 Set to Strengthen 

Multilateral Partnerships in Pacific,” United States Indo-Pacific Command, 12 February 2018, 

https://www.pacom.mil/.

14. Jarrod Vickers, “Taking the LEAP,” Andersen Air Force Base Public Affairs, 5 March 

2018, https://www.andersen.af.mil/.

15. “Expeditionary Culture Field Guides,” Air Force Culture and Language Center, https://

www.airuniversity.af.edu/.

16. In addition to AFCLC’s Expeditionary Culture Field Guides, the Defense Language 

Institute-Foreign Language Center produces materials to include Language Survival Kits: 

https://fieldsupport.dliflc.edu/. Other resources are available via the US Army Training 

and Doctrine Command Culture Center: https://atn.army.mil/; the Navy’s Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture team: https://www.netc.navy.mil/; and other DOD sites.

17. David Livermore, “Customs of the World: Using Cultural Intelligence to Adapt, Wherever You Are,” The Great Courses, 2013, audiobook; and Geert Hofstede, “Dimensionalizing Cultures: the Hofstede Model in Context,” Online Readings in Psychology and Culture 2, no. 1 (2011), 

https://doi.org/.

18. “Language Enabled Airman Program Fact Sheet,” United States Air Force, May 2018, 

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.

19. “Language Enabled Airman Program Fact Sheet,” United States Air Force.
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VIEW

Strengthening Interoperability through 

the Language Enabled Airman Program

Perspectives from the 2018 to 2019 US–Philippine ISR-MTT Mission

MSgt Timothy, USSF

Abstract

Interoperability is a priority for operational concepts, modular force elements, 

communications, information sharing, and equipment. It is also a key element for 

strengthening alliances and partnerships under the 2018 National Defense Strategy. 

The Air Force Language Enabled Airmen Program (LEAP) is a valuable tool for 

deepening interoperability but may be currently underutilized in some regional 

and cultural settings due to the scarcity of program participants. This article will 

illustrate the importance of building up such a pool of LEAP-trained workforce 

talent from the perspective of an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

mobile training team (ISR-MTT) deployed by the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to drive Philippine military independence on producing 

actionable intelligence from organic capabilities. It will describe the recruitment 

and training process; highlight key milestones that were achieved to elevate the 

ISR-MTT’s efforts as a benchmark for training other regional partners; address 

operational gaps; and provide recommendations to diversify the reach and potential of LEAP in support of the expansion of Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships.

Introduction

US forces today are operating in a rapidly changing global strategic environment where their military advantage no longer goes unchallenged as in the years 

immediately following the post–Cold War era. In response to this “new normal,” 

the United States is actively cultivating its alliances and partnerships—particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. According to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 

“Our allies and partners provide complementary capabilities and forces along 

with unique perspectives, regional relationships, and information that improve 

our understanding of the environment and expand our options.”1 Maximizing 

interoperability along these lines is difficult when the United States finds itself in 

an asymmetrical position where it provides the bulk of military training and capabilities to its partners but underutilizes the latter’s resources in a mutually ben-
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eficial manner, and when there is a scarcity of technically skilled, language- and 

culturally-enabled US war fighters who can effectively engage with allies on an 

operational level and carry out joint missions seamlessly.

This article will illustrate the above issues at work in the context of a US–Philippine intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) training mission that 

involved heavy reliance on US resources for technology, education, and translation 

services. Subsequent sections of this article will provide a background of current 

US–Philippine relations and outline the major objectives of the training mission; 

describe my recruitment from the LEAP pool; provide an overview of the Philippine unmanned aerial systems (UAS) training program; identify operational gaps 

and opportunities; and recommend strategies to improve the reach and impact of 

similar training programs, which include: 1) bridging language and education 

gaps with the assistance of local agencies and the provision of bilingual documentation; and 2) increasing recruitment and participation in existing language- -

training programs such as the Air Force Language Enabled Airmen Program 

(LEAP) to generate a larger, more diversified pool of suitable and mission-ready 

candidates for training and special operations.

Background

The Philippines is considered a major non-NATO ally. Its partnership with the 

United States is fostered by strong historical and cultural linkages as well as a 

joint commitment to democracy and human rights.2 The two countries reaffirmed 

shared obligations under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty by signing the Manila 

Declaration in 2011. The signing came with the expectation “to maintain a robust, 

balanced, and responsive security partnership including cooperating to enhance 

the defense, interdiction, and apprehension capabilities of the Armed Forces of 

the Philippines (AFP).” 3

In accordance with the Manila Declaration and the principles outlined in the 

2018 US National Defense Strategy,

4

 allied units partnered within the US Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM) deployed an Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Mobile Training Team (ISR-MTT) to conduct a comprehensive 

training program with the following objectives: 1) enable the AFP to utilize the 

ScanEagle UAS5 that were acquired by the Philippine Department of National 

Defense in 20186 to its full potential in various mission settings (e.g., counterterrorism, territorial defense, humanitarian and disaster relief operations); and 2) 

gain AFP autonomy in UAS operations as demonstrated by focused mission 

planning, integration, and interoperability. It became apparent to the USSOCOM 

that a Tagalog (a major dialect that serves as the foundation of the mainstream 
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MSgt Timothy

Filipino language) speaker was needed on board to support the ISR-MTT efforts. 

The LEAP became the primary resource for the latter.

Recruitment via LEAP

The Language Enabled Airman Development Resource (LEADeR) is a website 

that maintains a directory of all Airmen and Guardians who are enrolled in LEAP. 

It was used to help USSOCOM identify this author as a potential candidate for 

the ISR-MTT. In 2018, I was the only Tagalog-speaking imagery analyst 

(1N1X1A). The ISR-MTT program owners initially contacted me via e-mail to 

explore my interest in participating in a Philippine-based mission, followed by an 

in-person interview to verify technical and instructional skills, language proficiency, and prior special operations experience. Once it was determined that I was 

a good fit for the ISR-MTT team, I made several predeparture preparations over 

the course of a month, which included securing buy-in and support from my 

command’s leadership, brushing up on drone capabilities and Tagalog fluency, and 

conducting background research on the local area of operations, military organizational structure and customs, and current security issues.

The Philippine UAS Training Program Overview

The previously stated twofold objectives of the ISR-MTT were accomplished 

over a two-year period in different provinces across the Philippines. The training 

program itself was designed to “train-the-trainer”: after an initial cohort (comprised of active-duty AFP personnel from various service branches) completed all 

learning modules, it was expected that the graduates had gained sufficient mastery 

and proficiency in UAS operations to teach their peers in an on-the-job setting. 

At least three different cohorts were brought in, with some overlaps of the same 

AFP personnel participating as peer instructors in subsequent training sessions.

Table 1 organizes the various activities that took place over the course of the 

training program into three broad phases. It is beyond the scope of this article to 

discuss each phase in detail. However, in the next section I will provide some insights gleaned from the implementation and evaluation phases as they relate to 

language and cultural competencies.
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Table1. Phased training approach. (Simplified table adapted for purposes of this article. 

22 February 2021.)

Phase Activities

Planning

Coordination: Establishing timelines, expectations, ownership 

between US and Philippine stakeholders

Curriculum Development: Foreign Disclosure Officer–approved modules, lesson plans, unclassified resources

Logistical Preparations: (e.g., hardware/software requirements, classroom setup, travel and lodging arrangements)

Implementation

Classroom Instruction: Introduction of UAS concepts and 

principles ranging from basic to advanced

Practical Exercises: Hands-on opportunities to engage in UAS 

mission scenarios as observers, operators, or customers

Evaluation

Feedback: Critique of job performance and output (products) 

by instructors and peers; integration of student input / needs 

in subsequent training sessions

After-Action Reports: Submission of progress reports and 

recommendations to program owners via diplomatic and military channels

Interoperability Assessment: Instructors assume an exclusively observer role to gauge student proficiency and product 

quality vis-à-vis US-led UAS mission standards

Operational Gaps and Opportunities from a Language and Culture 

Perspective

The Philippines ranks 27th globally in the English Proficiency Index (EPI) and 

holds one of the highest EPI in Asia (second only to Singapore).7 Thus, minimal 

language barriers were encountered during the implementation and evaluation 

phases. English was the primary medium of instruction. The cohorts were largely 

bilingual; however, a few communication gaps still occurred as artifacts of the 

following:

• Some technical terms do not have direct translations/functional equivalents 

in the vernacular. Tagalog was often used to clarify highly technical concepts. 

When certain terms (for example, sensor and line-of-sight) cannot be translated directly, the English word is used as the default and its corollary explanation is comprised of Tagalog and English (“Taglish”). To further aid understanding, references to commonly used Tagalog words, visuals, and props 

such as a toy drone were occasionally used (see fig. 1).

• English proficiency levels varied among participants. Most students were 

able to conduct basic conversational English, but few were able to express 

themselves well enough to formulate follow-up questions on intermediate- -

to-advanced technical concepts. They would often whisper among themselves or refer to the most proficient English speaker among them for clarity. 
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MSgt Timothy

Occasionally, I would step in to articulate the questions in English for the 

benefit of the instructors and then translate the answers back to Tagalog.

(Image courtesy the author)

Figure 1. References and toy drone

It must be noted that while I was the only LEAP-trained team member, I

could not physically support the ISR-MTT efforts 100 percent of the time due to 

commitments with my CONUS-based command. Were it not for the fact that I

was able to find Tagalog-speaking Airmen (albeit not LEAP-trained) within my 

professional and personal network to fill in for me during certain training periods, 

the ISR-MTT would have been forced to carry on without a language translator 

and facilitator. This issue will be revisited at the conclusion and recommendations 
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section. From a cultural standpoint, there were opportunities to establish rapport 

with students and leverage their resourcefulness:

• During breaks or post-duty hours, one accepts the invitation to tambay (A 

slang word meaning “to hang out”; originally derived from the English word, 

“standby.” The place where one hangs out is called tambayan. Such informal 

occasions to chat in the designated break areas tambayan or participate in 

social events such as the occasional karaoke or a “boodle fight”8 enables students to feel at ease and to enjoy camaraderie.

• Due to limited resources, students had latitude to bridge technology gaps 

with free to low-cost software solutions. For instance, mapping software and 

communication applications helped improve technological capabilities in 

these areas. The downside of these technologies is that strict adherence to 

operational security protocols is not always feasible.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Post-evaluation data (not shown) indicate that the ISR-MTT-led training 

program has been successful in cultivating a pool of certified UAS operators in the 

Philippines. As of November 2020, the UAS capability has continued to thrive 

across various branches of the AFP (specifically, the Philippine Air Force and 

Philippine Navy).9 Remarks such as Kaya namin ito (“We can do this”) and similar positive feedback coming from the trainees themselves provide reassurance 

that the AFP is well on track to maintaining autonomous UAS operations.

The Philippine UAS training program was to become the benchmark for partners in the Indo-Pacific region who may be interested in establishing their own 

UAS capabilities.10 To facilitate day-to-day operations and sustain interoperability in future iterations, I recommend the following:

• Engage local academic, government, and industry partners for educational, 

linguistic, and technological support. Much of the educational heavy lifting 

could have been accomplished through the University of the Philippines’ 

National Institute of Geological Sciences and National Institute of Physics.11 The university could provide instructors who could teach geospatial 

and satellite technology principles, respectively, using layman’s terms.12 The 

Commission on the Filipino Language (Komisyon sa Wikang Filipino, the 

official regulating body of the Filipino language) could have provided guidance on translations.13 Finally, geographic information system providers 

could have shared access to their data at a reduced cost.
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MSgt Timothy

• Provide bilingual documentation. To address English fluency gaps, it would 

be helpful to develop bilingual documents. These ensure that all operators 

understand policies and procedures across the board (see fig. 2).

•

•

•

(image courtesy of the author)

Figure 2. Excerpt from a bilingual (English/Tagalog) mission tracker. (Created by author, circa 2019).

Finally, the shortage of LEAP-trained Tagalog speakers should be addressed. I

believe the reason behind shortage is that the program is not well-advertised 

among Tagalog-speaking Airmen and Guardians. The following strategies may 

provide greater prominence and incentives to join the program:

• Publish LEAP information in official Air Force and Space Force guidance 

documents such as the Career Field Educational Training Plan (CFETP). 

Standard verbiage about the program should be disseminated for consistency 

and ease of inclusion—eliminating the need to consult the LEAP website 

(see sample CFETP excerpt, fig. 3). This would also increase the likelihood 

of diversifying the pool of subject matter experts who are LEAP-trained.

• Develop and authorize a uniform patch or tab to indicate that an Airman 

and Guardian is an active participant in LEAP. Patches and tabs are great 

conversation starters. While optional, this is a low-cost, high-visibility approach for LEAP to spread through word-of-mouth.

• Streamline the process of obtaining benefits associated with Special Experience Identifiers and Foreign Language Pay Bonus through a centralized hub 

or automated system. This will eliminate the need to manually fill out various 

forms and coordinate with multiple approval authorities.

In conclusion, interoperability will be greatly enhanced not only through collaborations with the US partners’ local agencies but also with the expansion of 

LEAP program participation to include more Airmen and Guardians who speak 

the languages of the Indo-Pacific region. In fact, good command of one or more 

of these languages may become a primary recruiting tool that will advance the 

careers of prospective Airmen and Guardians for unique conventional and special 
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operations assignments. Building up this talent pool to a critical mass will contribute to a more lethal, resilient, and agile force that is prepared to meet US defense objectives and preserve its global influence.

Figure 3. US Air Force 1N1X1A CFETP–LEAP (verbiage emphasized)

14

MSgt Timothy, USSF

As an active-duty service member directly involved in ISR missions, the author’s biography is limited to rank and 

first name only, per regulation.

Acknowledgment

This article is dedicated to my wife and our children.
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MSgt Timothy

Notes

1. James Mattis, 2018 National Defense Strategy Summary (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, 2018), 8, https://dod.defense.gov/.

2. US Department of State, “U.S. Relations with the Philippines,” 21 January 2020, https://

www.state.gov/.

3. US Department of State. “Signing of the Manila Declaration on Board the USS Fitzgerald

in Manila Bay, Manila, Philippines,” 16 November 2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/.

4. Mattis, 2018 National Defense Strategy Summary, 8–9.

5. See: Insitu – Boeing, “ScanEagle,” Insitu.com, 2021, https://www.insitu.com/.

6. US Embassy in the Philippines, “Philippine Air Force receives drones from US,” 13 March 

2018, https://ph.usembassy.gov/.

7. EF, “Philippines,” EF English Proficiency Index, 2020, https://www.ef.edu/.

8. See: “What is a Boodle Fight,” Ang Sarap, n.d., https://www.angsarap.net/.

9. Xavier Vavaseur, “Philippine Navy Takes Delivery of Eight ScanEagle UAV,” Naval News, 

25 November 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/.

10. Author’s note: Based on official communications and ISR-MTT final debrief with host- -

nation partners, circa 2019.

11. See: University of the Philippines (U.P.), Diliman, “National Institute of Physics,” U.P.

College of Sciences, 2020, http://nip.upd.edu.ph/.

12. See: University of The Philippines, Diliman, “National Institute of Geological Sciences,” 

U.P. Center of Excellence in Geology, 2020, https://nigs.science.upd.edu.ph/.

13. See: Pamfilo D. Catacataca, “The Commission on the Filipino Language,” Republic of the 

Philippines National Commission for Culture and the Arts, https://ncca.gov.ph/.

14. Inclusion of LEAP in the 1N1 CFETP was made possible by the Air Combat Command 

Readiness Division (ACC/A23) and Headquarters, Air Force (AF/A2/6) team.
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VIEW

Expanding Cultural Competencies

Exposing All Outside Continental United States Airmen to the 

Local Populace

Capt Jasmine “B-Fly” Bogard, USAF

Abstract

On a regular basis, there are incidences of intercultural conflict between local 

non-US communities and Airmen at outside continental United States (OCONUS) bases. Even when illegal infractions are not occurring, there are moral or 

social transgressions that erode the appearance of the US Air Force (USAF). The 

aim to build, maintain, and expand alliances and partner nations cannot be accomplished until there is an understanding of allies’/partners’ histories, cultures, 

religions, and languages. This understanding must be gained through intentional 

training and exposure. The training should be mandatory for all Air Force- -

affiliated personnel who are stationed outside the United States, including Active 

Duty, Guard, Reserve, General Schedule, and contracted employees. Preparation 

for living overseas should include language, culture, history, and geopolitics courses 

for representatives of the USAF. The purpose is to equip American individuals 

with a baseline knowledge of the people and region of the country to which they 

are assigned. With this education, USAF-affiliated individuals will be able to 

expand their cultural competencies, decrease cultural faux pas, increase collaborative efforts with partner and ally nations, and better focus on the tenets of the 

2018 National Defense Strategy.

Expanding Cultural Competencies

In the US Air Force (USAF), a large percentage of Airmen are stationed across 

the globe, and some of those Airmen possess an innate desire to learn about others different from their own. Some individuals take the initiative to purchase 

materials to study on their own or utilize the plethora of free or low-cost resources 

online. Others join meetups or language and culture exchange groups. The USAF 

has a number of programs in place for Airmen who are self-motivated to study 

such regional matters. For example, the Air Force Culture and Language Center 

(AFCLC) at Air University has propelled Airmen into unforeseen realms of cultural competencies across the globe. The AFCLC provides continual language 

study programs or expeditionary language courses and publishes country-specific 

field guides that contain a wealth of information from history to political struc-
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tures to economics. In another program, men and women of all ranks and AF 

Specialty Codes (AFSC) have taken advantage of opportunities provided by the 

AFCLC’s Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP). In LEAP, participants 

take language classes and bi-/triennially apply that acquisition by participating in 

a Temporary Duty (TDY) assignment where that language is primarily spoken or 

utilized. Endeavors like LEAP and its corresponding TDY are essential to the US 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) aim to gain and maintain partners and allies 

across the globe in support of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Because 

these programs are optional for Airmen, and since some are only offered to Active 

Duty (AD) USAF members, they are not enough to meet the NDS goals alone. 

Thus, a solution must be implemented that can train and equip the large number 

of Americans located at overseas bases.

According to the DOD’s 2018 Base Structure Report, the USAF has 166 sites 

outside of the United States and its territories.1 Additionally, per MilitaryOneSource’s 2015 Demographics Report, approximately 28,000 AD USAF members 

are stationed in Europe, 20,000 in East Asia, 500 in North Africa, 450 in the 

Western Hemisphere, and 1,100 in other places.2 Thus, the estimated total of AD 

USAF members stationed outside of the United States and its territories in 2015 

was 50,050. When considering dependents, contractors, and GS employees, this 

service’s OCONUS footprint can easily be quadrupled to 200,000 Americans. 

Given the significant number of individuals in a foreign country, one can presume 

that negative interactions between Americans and the local populous occur. 

Moreover, conflicts are expounded through microaggressive or overt comments 

and actions based largely in ignorance and misunderstanding the “Other.”

Kevin Nadal, a professor of psychology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 

defines microaggressions as “the everyday, subtle, intentional—and oftentimes unintentional—interactions or behaviors that communicate some sort of bias toward 

historically marginalized groups. [One] difference between microaggressions and 

overt discrimination or macroaggressions, is that people who commit microagressions might not even be aware of them.” An example Nadal gives is “someone 

commenting on how well an Asian American speaks English, which presumes 

the Asian American was not born [in the US].”3 Professor Lilia Melani of Brooklyn College defines the Otheras “an individual who is perceived by the group as 

not belonging, as being different in some fundamental way. Any stranger becomes 

the Other. The group sees itself as the norm and judges those who do not meet 

that norm (that is, who are different in any way) as the Other. Perceived as lacking 

essential characteristics possessed by the group, the Other is almost always seen as 

a lesser or inferior being and is treated accordingly.”4
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The process of “othering” can take place in a variety of manners. One American 

may scoff at the tendency of restaurants in Japan to have dine-in only options and 

not allow customers to take food to go. Another American might ask a German 

colleague, “Why do y’all always sound so angry when you speak?” When US citizens view host-nation (HN) citizens as the Other and act upon their biases either 

overtly or via microaggressive behavior, this often results in either party applying 

their personal experience to their view of the entire people group and eventually 

harboring dislike toward and distrust of “those people.”

If Airmen and other USAF-affiliated personnel are introduced to the new culture’s belief system(s), customs, traditions, and expectations, this would curb a lot 

of the unintentional offenses with local nationals like those described above. It 

would also allow for greater focus on mission-essential activities, such as mutual 

defense and strategic operations. In this article, I will briefly introduce a portion 

of the 2018 NDS as it relates to partner nations and allies. Next, I will explore 

three barriers that prevent the USAF from having numerous culturally intelligent 

Airmen through presenting my anecdotal evidence based upon personal experiences. Finally, I will propose a solution for the USAF to implement, with an end 

goal of creating culturally and linguistically competent Airmen and USAF- -

affiliated employees who are stationed OCONUS.

National Defense Strategy

There is often a power imbalance between DOD members stationed overseas 

and HN citizens. While the American is legally the visitor and guest, strategically 

he or she holds the power as an armed forces member of what some HN residents 

consider as the occupying force that perpetually projects global power and dominance through its presence. This dichotomy is important, particularly when tensions become fraught. To deter aggression and maintain regional hegemonic stability, the United States must work effectively with the HN’s government and 

military. The 2018 NDS focuses on three lines of effort to achieve a capable alliance and partnership network.5

 An excerpt of the NDS detailing Washington’s 

aim to strengthen alliances and attract new partners is below:

1. Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability. Our alliances and coalitions are built on free will and shared responsibilities. While we will unapologetically represent America’s values and belief in democracy, we will not seek to impose our way of life by force. We will 

uphold our commitments, and we expect allies and partners to contribute an 

equitable share to our mutually beneficial collective security, including effec-
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tive investment in modernizing their defense capabilities. We have shared 

responsibilities for resisting authoritarian trends, contesting radical ideologies, and serving as bulwarks against instability.

2. Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning. We 

will develop new partnerships around shared interests to reinforce regional 

coalitions and security cooperation. We will provide allies and partners with 

a clear and consistent message to encourage alliance and coalition commitment, greater defense cooperation, and military investment.

3. Deepen interoperability. Each ally and partner is unique. Combined forces 

able to act together coherently and effectively to achieve military objectives 

require interoperability. Interoperability is a priority for operational concepts, 

modular force elements, communications, information sharing, and equipment. In consultation with Congress and the Department of State, the Department of Defense will prioritize requests for U.S. military equipment 

sales, accelerating foreign partner modernization and ability to integrate 

with U.S. forces. We will train to high-end combat missions in our alliance, 

bilateral, and multinational exercises.6

Given the three above-stated focus areas, maintaining amicable relationships 

with the HN is critical. Fissures that arise inevitably detract leaders from the 

missions of mutual defense, leading in technological developments, and maintaining security. On a micro scale, local communities may have qualms with 

American military presence. Negative encounters with citizens, whether criminal 

or a clash of cultures, exacerbate what may be an already unstable relationship. 

Protests and political threats could prompt municipal leaders to request hardline 

policies for military members, drive our armed forces’ counterparts to avoid working with the USAF, or foster an overall distrust of the USAF. On a larger scale, 

problems that are broadcast on international news networks convey to our adversaries that a breakdown in the partnership either has occurred or is occurring. The 

frayed relationship may allow adversaries to inject negative influencers into it, 

which would have direct and indirect impacts to combined readiness and focus. 

Depending upon the magnitude of the story, opponents could view the distraction as an opportunity to infiltrate or disrupt networks or operations. Altercations 

between Airmen and HN individuals are not the only problems military leadership encounter. Even the most well-mannered, hardworking Airman can prevent 

mission accomplishment if he or she proves to be ignorant of regional, cultural, 

and basic linguistic matters.
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Barriers to Cultural Competency

For the DOD, there are three main barriers that prevent the existence of culturally competent Airmen: a lack of regional expertise, inadequate cultural awareness, and insufficient language proficiency. In this section, I will explain how I 

concluded that these three barriers exist and briefly discuss their detrimental impact to national security and how they inhibit the fulfillment of the NDS objectives.

Lack of Regional Expertise

The first barrier to the USAF having culturally competent Airmen is the general lack regional expertise. In my 10 years on Active Duty and across five areas of 

responsibility (AOR), I have found that many Airmen and USAF employees do 

not have a basic knowledge of regional history, politics, or current events. Many 

could not convey a brief history of the country in which they are stationed, nor 

could they explain the development of the relationship between the United States 

and the country. I have encountered individuals from medical group, operations 

group, mission support group, and maintenance group, for example, who are stationed in Japan and do not know why there is animosity between Japan and China 

or Japan and North and South Korea. Additionally, while I was deployed to the 

Persian Gulf, I noticed some Americans were not aware of the conflict between 

Iran and Saudi Arabia. They were familiar with neither the development of their 

relationship to one another or the involvement the United States had in their 

histories and the influence over them that the United States currently holds. Not 

only is it important for individuals to be aware of the relationships among countries of a particular region but also imperative for them to have some familiarity 

with America’s and other world powers’ role in that area’s modern history. Furthermore, some do not know what the US aims and intentions are within the 

country or the AOR in which they are stationed. Each Airman and every American who works for the USAF should be able to explain why there is a US military 

base at that particular location.

One may ask why this matters when a DOD employee’s duty is simply to carry 

out orders. Other than being a responsible citizen of the globe, as the USAF 

transitions to execute the strategies of Agile Combat Employment (ACE), it 

needs Airman “X” and Flight Commander “Y” to be able to understand what is 

happening in the bigger picture and make well-informed decisions as authorities 

are being delegated to lower levels. The USAF needs multicapable Airmen to not 

only learn multiple tasks from another’s AFSC but also to know how his or her 

efforts fit within the DOD’s mission, which will better equip Airmen to make 
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strategically beneficial decisions. In fact, in 2008, the DOD identified regional 

expertise as a critical war-fighting skill that all deployed forces should possess.7

Probable consequences of not possessing basic regional knowledge include insufficient, ineffective, or erroneous operational planning and may even intensify already contentious relationships in multinational operations.

Inadequate Cultural Awareness

The second barrier to the USAF having culturally competent Airmen is an 

overall lack of awareness of the culture(s) where individuals are stationed. Many 

times, there are unrecognized or stark cultural differences with no apparent bridge 

between gaps. The times when this appears include when there is an unwillingness 

to adopt flexibility and incorporate sensitivity into one’s interactions with a person of another culture. The root of this behavior may stem from an elitist or 

prideful outlook that one’s own way of thinking and acting is better than another’s. 

While stationed in Japan, I bowed my thanks to a lieutenant colonel who then 

resolutely told me that he will never bow to anyone since it is akin to worshiping 

a false god, according to Christianity. I was initially taken aback at his firmness 

and then saddened by his decision. I too have a Judeo-Christian background and 

was raised in church; I know the Old Testament biblical stories about how God’s 

people were punished for bowing to anyone or anything other than the “one true 

God.” I also know that bowing in Japanese culture is a foundational sign of respect 

and has no connection to religion. In some cases, it is similar to the Western tradition of shaking hands. It concerns me that a representative of America and the US 

government who regularly meets with Japanese military members and business 

personnel is averse to this ingrained practice of cultural connection. It also concerns me that Japanese individuals might feel slighted and most likely will not 

know why the high-ranking officer is refusing to reciprocate this fundamental 

gesture of respect.

On a more basic level, nonverbal communication cues or gestures can build or 

erode relationships. Knowing the critical dos and don’ts of a counterpart’s culture 

is an important way to preserve credibility and allow for the saving of face for all 

involved. Different hand gestures and body positions are just two among a plethora of ways that could make for awkward, embarrassing, or offensive situations if 

a taboo occurs. In the United States, for example, a thumbs up is an encouragement or an acknowledgment of affirmation, whereas in Iran, it is equivalent to 

flashing the middle finger in the United States and is thus highly offensive. After 

experiencing several infractions or offenses, mounting frustration is inevitable. If 

all parties involved have some semblance of cultural awareness, it can help prevent 

resentment and bitterness.
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A lack of cultural awareness can have various mission impacts. While in the 

Middle East, for example, I planned exercises with various Arab military personnel. In most Arab cultures, relationship building prior to any type of “business” or 

“mission” talk is essential. To its credit, the operations center that hosted the exercise scheduled a social hour every morning prior to the first operational event. The 

Army and USAF members continually groaned at this perceived waste of time. 

Some tried to get out of participating, requesting to show up at the “actual start 

time.” To its discredit, the operations center did not initially relay the cultural 

importance of this social hour. The Army lieutenant colonel in charge essentially 

told the Americans to “shut up and color.” By the time the explanation was disseminated, attitudes and grudges were already established. The time to teach this 

important cultural concept was prior to deployment, or at the latest prior to the 

exercise start date—but definitely not several days into it. The result was a divide 

between the participating nations and several different lines of effort with little- -

to-no debrief; there was a lot of blame instead of humility, helping, and learning, 

which served to harden attitudes and solidify lines of division.

Insufficient Language Proficiency

The final category of challenges is a lack of language proficiency. The USAF 

reflects American society, and its members are a product of its values and morals. 

Unfortunately, non-English languages and education are not a nation-wide priority. I have interacted with American and non-US citizen language teachers since 

middle school, and the majority of them claim that for decades the pervasive 

mind-set in the United States has been that Americans do not need to learn other 

languages because it is neither geographically nor economically necessary, nor is it 

advantageous. In fact, many schools do not begin teaching a foreign language 

until late middle school or high school. According to a 2017 report by American 

Councils for International Education, only 20 percent of K-12 students are enrolled in foreign language classes.8

 Additionally, many universities are facing budget cuts, and the culture and language programs are often the first to go. Journalist 

Steven Johnson with The Chronicle of Higher Education reported in January 2019 

that colleges closed more than 650 foreign language programs in a short three- -

year span.9 Throughout my career, I have been on several TDYs and deployments 

to other countries and have witnessed DOD members make few attempts to 

connect linguistically. Everyday terms such as hello, goodbye, and thank you are 

conveyed in English to nonnative English speakers. This resistance to speaking 

commonly used terms does not place Americans in a positive light. One’s language is such an integral part of identity, self-worth, and expression that simply 
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attempting a few words in the receiver’s tongue conveys that he or she is seen, 

recognized, and valued.

Inadequate linguistic skills are apparent in operational settings as well. US 

forces regularly coordinate and mission plan in bilateral or multinational settings. 

While the assumption is that all representatives will speak English, that is not 

always accurate. I have planned operations with multiple languages occurring at 

the same event. It is helpful to have multilingual Airmen present to both break 

the proverbial ice and assist in liaising. For both training exercises and real-world 

operations, the involvement of these Airmen can serve to decrease ambiguities 

that may arise concerning matters of safety, planning, and mission execution.

Many USAF-affiliated personnel are not culturally competent because they are 

faced with one or more of these three barriers. Whether the American lacks regional expertise, does not possess adequate cultural awareness, or has insufficient 

language proficiency, these deficiencies negatively impact the USAF’s ability to 

carry out the NDS. Consequently, upholding a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability; expanding regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning; and deepening interoperability will be insurmountable objectives if the HN feels offended by, or distrustful of, the USAF. 

Thus, a negative correlation between the three barriers and the three aims of the 

NDS exists. The method to influence the relationship between these two variables 

is through mitigating that negative correlation by developing cultural competencies—as cultural competencies increase, the existence of barriers decreases.

Cultural Competency Model

To bolster or build cultural competencies within Airmen, I recommend utilizing a model from London’s Research Centre for Transcultural Studies in Health 

(fig. 1) to first establish a common understanding of this term, then to propose a 

plan to achieve it. As an educator of nursing and the head of the research center, 

Dr. Rena Papadopoulos created a diagram for her students to walk them through 

the process of interacting with other cultures to ultimately gain and regularly 

practice cultural competency. Although the model was designed for nurses, it can 

be adopted and adapted to fit any situation where two cultures must engage each 

other.

Cultural awareness, the first quadrant, begins with an individual looking inwardly to gain self-awareness. An individual should define his/her own identity 

and explore what biases may exist within. The second quadrant is cultural knowledge. At this point, one can learn or be taught the overarching similarities and 

differences between the culture of the country in which he or she is stationed
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Figure 1. The Papadopoulos, Tilki, and Taylor model of transcultural health and cultural competence10

and that of the United States. Attaining cultural sensitivity is the next quadrant. 

When an individual can view a circumstance from the HN’s perspective or foster 

a relationship where trust, respect, and acceptance of the Other exists, he or she is 

exhibiting elements of cultural sensitivity. Finally, when a person can identify and 

challenge prejudices, discrimination, and inequalities within oneself or among his 

or her fellow Americans, then subsequently address them, he or she is considered 

culturally competent, according to Papadopoulos’ model.
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The barriers can be juxtaposed to the model. First, learning how and why the 

HN makes a certain decision versus a choice that a US national might make is a 

process that develops regional knowledge. For example, when posturing for defense, one nation may prioritize defending a cache of weapons over other inanimate objects, while a second country may have natural resources at the top of its 

defended asset list and a third nation may list its metropolitans as the most important asset. Knowing the country’s geography, geopolitics, and history will allow 

for a better understanding of the nation’s objectives. Additionally, gaining awareness of the various facets of a culture will help learners become more cognizant of 

it. For instance, as a generally individualistic and low-context culture, Americans 

value direct and explicit verbal communication. Contrastingly, a collective and 

high-context culture usually relies more on nonverbal communication and previously established norms and customs. Moreover, many times standard practices 

fall on a spectrum rather than within binary models. Finally, building a repertoire 

of words and phrases can serve as a link between HN citizens and foreigners. 

Voicing a greeting that signifies friendship, peace, and fidelity, for example, may 

serve to build a foundation of trust that may not be possible without that expression.

USAF Program Implementation Proposal

Even though it is possible for individuals to achieve cultural competency 

through means other than formal education, when considering the multitude of 

USAF-affiliated persons abroad, as well as the inbound/outbound assignment 

rate, an established USAF program would be more beneficial and effective. The 

two primary ways to combat the barriers are through education and exposure. I 

propose all USAF military members, USAF DOD employees, and USAF- -

affiliated contractors attend a total of four weeks of language and culture training 

when assigned to an overseas location, whether it be a short tour or Permanent 

Change of Station (PCS). Preferably before arriving on station to the new overseas location, but no later than three months after arrival, members will receive 

language and culture training from qualified instructors. Ideally, the member will 

TDY in place and complete classes virtually with his or her cohort of no more 

than 15 other trainees. The Defense Language Institute–Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) is flexible and has instructors who are equipped to instruct common languages. For languages in which there is not a faculty member established 

(Swahili, for example), DLIFLC will have to hire a contract instructor, which will 

likely have to be funded by the gaining major command (MAJCOM).

The language and culture training program should be mandatory for all USAFaffiliated personnel, including Active Duty, National Guard, Reserves, GS em-
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ployees, and contractors. The precedent has been set with the Air Traffic Control 

career field. Controllers attend DLIFLC prior to arriving at their new overseas 

base. Since a certain language proficiency level is required, some controllers remain at DLIFLC for several months. Instead of mirroring that model, this proposal’s requirement is only an initial four-week commitment. The training should 

be added as a mandatory readiness item just like chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear (CBRN) and combat arms training and maintenance (CATM) lessons and qualifications. Successful completion of the program will be annotated 

in military members’ permanent records. Furthermore, contracting squadrons 

should begin adding this stipulation to all overseas contracts.

According to the head of budgeting and scheduling at DLIFLC, the US Navy 

has a similar on-going program. Every few months, a group of 8–10 students attend a virtual language class with a DLIFLC instructor for two weeks. For my 

proposal, determinant upon the amount of personnel inbound, these courses may 

begin every 4–8 weeks, location-dependent. For individuals with special circumstances, such as the inability to interrupt job training, or operational currencies, a 

hybrid course that will have one full week of the most critical language and cultural materials will be offered. Then, every Friday for eight weeks, the member will 

complete the other course content. The hybrid schedule can be utilized for members whose gaining commanders have submitted a MAJCOM-level waiver stating the individual cannot attend the 4-week TDY and is needed in place as soon 

as possible for mission essential reasons.

Once Airmen arrive on station, guided cultural immersion should occur. This 

event or series of events would create a much-needed foundation for all Airmen 

serving overseas. At Misawa Air Base, Japan, for example, after the mandatory 

newcomer’s brief, all personnel who in-process the base must take part in a cultural tour. Hosted by a HN employee, the tour consists of a brief history of the 

country and region and site visits to key places in the area. At one of the locations, 

several basic greetings are taught and distributed in writing for attendees to keep 

as a reference. This one-day tour should be expanded to provide depth and address 

key cultural how-tos, dos, and don’ts, because this rudimentary exposure to the 

local community is crucial for Americans and for their interactions with the HN.

Since conflicts between HN individuals and Americans may continue to occur 

after the initial training program is implemented, a continuation training program 

should be established as well. Airmen, GS employees, and contractors who commit infractions will be required to attend a course focused on acquiring, maintaining, and growing cultural sensitivity, awareness, and respect. Just as Airmen who 

fail their Physical Fitness Assessment must attend the Fitness Improvement Program, individuals who need remedial training will attend the cultural course. This 
68 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021)

Bogard

class should be hosted by the force support squadron (FSS) and taught by a HN 

instructor, most likely in the Airman and Family Readiness Center. It will focus 

on enhancing emotional intelligence and instilling cultural sensitivity and intelligence. The behavior for which an individual will need to attend this training 

should be established through a collaboration between equal opportunity, legal, a 

HN liaison element, and the FSS.

Conclusion

Through consistently providing language and culture training to USAF- -

affiliated personnel, the US relationship with the host country is bound to improve. While this proposal may have many nuances that still need to be discussed 

and dissected, it is not an impossible endeavor to implement. It is imperative for 

US Airmen to be armed with the necessary tools and knowledge to be stationed 

overseas. So much money and time is spent on other readiness items with lessons 

which thankfully do not come to fruition during real-world operations. I do not 

think the DOD should expend as many resources as it does on trainings such as 

CBRN and CATM, yet comparatively little time, effort and funding on programs 

that ensure Airmen know basic information about the people with whom they 

will interact daily.

Admittedly, the scope of this article could cover only a few areas. The USAF 

needs to know the current capabilities and levels of knowledge within its ranks. 

An official USAF-wide questionnaire of all Airmen, GS employees, and contractors should be conducted to gather analytical data. The topics can cover general 

AOR knowledge and questions on culture. Over a set span of time, Airmen should 

be required to take the Defense Language Proficiency Tests (DLPT) and Oral 

Proficiency Interview (OPI) in whichever language they choose. The results of the 

questionnaire and language aptitude measurements will provide the military with 

a baseline upon which to formulate the proposed language and culture program. 

Additionally, several career fields within the USAF need to be consulted to capture the second- and third-order effects of implementing such a program and 

ensure any negative impacts are mitigated. For example, the Air Force Personnel 

Center should monitor personnel’s career progression, PCS timings, and language 

and culture qualifications to aid in OCONUS placement considerations and 

quality checking credentials and training needs.

The desired end state should be a baseline of culturally aware and linguistically 

capable Airmen and USAF-affiliated employees at each OCONUS USAF site. 

After gathering the preliminary information that is needed, the USAF can build 

upon programs and curricula that already exist to save on cost and work hours. 

Next, a few OCONUS bases in different MAJCOMs can be selected to test the 
Expanding Cultural Competencies

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) 69

program’s implementation. Ultimately, the initial and continuation training program will yield a force of individuals who have a familiarity with the culture and 

language of the nation where they are stationed, as well as a general understanding of the United States’ strategic purpose for being there, thus yielding Americans ready to support and execute the NDS along with partner nations and allies.

Capt Jasmine “B-Fly” Bogard, USAF

Captain Bogard is an Assistant Director of Operations (ADO) at Misawa Air Base, Japan. As an ADO, she supports 

the management of the 35th Fighter Wing's $72 million F-16 flying hour program, the bombing and electronic attack range, and INDOPACOM’s F-16 demonstration program. Operationally, Captain Bogard is a Senior Air Battle 

Manager in charge of the tactical command and control weapons team. She also instructs and evaluates tactical 

controllers and team leads. She studied Middle Eastern studies, Arabic language & literature, business, international 

relations, and human relations. She is a proud Texas native and an even prouder Longhorn. She mothers two fur 

babies. A few of her favorite pastimes include bonding with family and friends, traveling, volunteering, and studying 

cultures and languages. Captain Bogard is a member of the Language Enabled Airman Program for Japanese.

Notes

1. Department of Defense, Base Structure Report- Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Infrastructure, 2018), 18–28, https://

www.acq.osd.mil/.

2. Department of Defense, 2015 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family 

Policy), 31–33, http://download.militaryonesource.mil/.

3. Andrew Limbong, “Microaggressions Are A Big Deal: How To Talk Them Out And When 

To Walk Away,” NPR, 9 June 2020, https://www.npr.org/.

4. Lilia Melani, “The Other,” Brooklyn College, 5 February 2009, https://academic.brooklyn.

cuny.edu/.

5. Department of Defense, 2018 Summary of the National Defense Strategy of The United States 

of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 8–10, https://dod.defense.gov/.

6. Department of Defense, 2018 Summary of the National Defense Strategy, 9.

7. House Committee on Armed Services, Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in 

the Military: DOD’s Challenge in Today’s Educational Environment, 2008 (Washington, DC: Committee Print 110-12), 13–24, https://prhome.defense.gov/.

8. Kat Devlin, “Most European Students are Learning a Foreign Language in School While 

Americans Lag,” Pew Research Center, 6 August 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/.

9. Steven Johnson, “Colleges Lose a ‘Stunning’ 651 Foreign-Language Programs in 3 Years,” 

Chronicle of Higher Education, 22 January 2019, https://www.chronicle.com/.

10. Research Centre for Transcultural Studies in Health, “About the Centre,” Middlesex University London, 2019, https://cultureandcompassion.com/ .

Acknowledgment:

This article is dedicated to my (3) parents, (4) siblings, (2) nieces, and friend, Shumi.
70 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021)

COMMENTARY

What Would a North Korean Do?

Washington Must See Issues from Adversaries’ Perspectives in 

Order to Move Past Outmoded Policies

1st Lt Shaquille H. James, USAF

On an unremarkable evening in Seoul, South Korea, I walked into an unmarked office space located on the second floor of a small office building. There, I met a short, middle-aged Korean man by the name of Choi 

Jong-hoon. The office itself belonged to the North Korean People’s Liberation 

Front (NKPLF) —an organization of former North Korean soldiers opposed to 

the Kim regime in the North. Mr. Choi, a former North Korean soldier himself, 

was the commander in chief of the group.

I met with Commander Choi that day to get some answers. More specifically, 

I had some questions about a particular province in North Korea: Jagang province. 

During the course of my studies on North Korea, Jagang province proved to be an 

anomaly. Most North Korean defectors—about 80 percent—hail from one of the 

four North Korean provinces that share a border with China, of which Jagang 

province is one. All provinces in this area produce more defectors than almost any 

other provinces to the south, with the notable exception of Jagang province. Despite sharing a border with China, Jagang province accounts for a shockingly 

small portion—just 0.5 percent—of all North Korean defections, while its neighboring provinces account for a combined 79.5 percent of all defections. This was 

despite the fact that Jagang province had a greater population than at least one of 

the neighboring provinces. Something about Jagang province was leading to an 

extraordinarily low number of defections, and I wanted to know what it was. On 

that day, Commander Choi was going to give me some answers.

I divide my time spent as a North Korea watcher into two distinct phases: the 

time before I learned to speak and understand Korean, and the time after. Although there is a wealth of English-language resources on North Korea studies 

readily available online, being able to speak Korean changed the game entirely. 

While I understood much about North Korea before learning Korean, it was only 

after acquiring language skills that I have been able to learn about North Korea 

directly from the people who once lived there and to gain insight into issues with 

which only they are familiar. In essence, language allowed me to begin to think 

like a North Korean, by which I mean deeply understanding the circumstances, 

mind-set, and perspectives of our adversaries to the north.
What Would a North Korean Do?

 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) 71

It was out of a desire to think like a North Korean that I sought out Commander Choi that day. At our one-on-one meeting, he explained to me that Jagang province is heavily fortified and, because of its military importance to the 

regime, has very stringent security measures even by North Korean standards. 

Furthermore, he explained, due to the high security needed, only people deemed 

sufficiently loyal to the regime are allowed to live and work there. The result of 

these policies and other factors was that Jagang province, despite being perfectly 

positioned to be a significant source of defections, produced very few.

There was, however, also an ideological aspect to the issue as well. As Commander Choi explained, the other provinces along the border had been historically seen as less loyal to the regime and were thus subject to particular forms of 

neglect. With the exception of Jagang province, the northern provinces typically 

bore the brunt of the hardships that North Korea experienced over the years. As 

a result, these provinces tended to be more ideologically hostile to the regime.

It was not just a simple case of geography, or even just a case of Jagang province 

being a more regime-friendly province. In reality, there was a lot more at play in 

that the people of the other provinces were not just normal North Koreans but 

were actually on the opposite side of the spectrum—they were borderline unfriendly toward the regime. This meant that, despite the typical view of North 

Korea as a type of ideological monolith, there are, in fact, areas that the regime 

itself historically considered hostile, and this reality could be seen in the regime’s 

treatment of the people there and the subsequent willingness of those people to 

defect. For us on the outside, this characteristic manifested itself in a statistical 

gap of defections by province.

Commander Choi was not the first North Korean defector with whom I spoke 

directly, nor would he be the last. Eventually, through speaking with many defectors from all walks of life—from poor, hostile northerners to loyal Pyongyang 

elites—I was able to attain greater insight into and better understanding of North 

Korea and North Koreans. This new insight did, in some cases, change my opinions on a number of issues regarding North Korea.

Fast-forward to the present day, and the United States once again finds itself at 

odds with the North Korean regime. With a new presidential administration in 

place in Washington and a North Korean weapons program that seems destined 

to press on, there may be a desire to hastily concoct and enact “new” (but perhaps 

not entirely novel) North Korea policy measures. By doing this, however, the 

Biden administration risks committing the same critical North Korea policy mistake of the past: failure to truly understand North Korean intentions, goals, and 

what can realistically be expected of them.
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James

Previous North Korea policy initiatives were typically conducted while critical 

questions regarding North Korean intentions remained unanswered. In lieu of 

answers to these questions, Washington has instead tended to form and enact 

North Korea policy based upon assumptions. These assumptions filled in for valid 

information and clarification on Pyongyang’s willingness to negotiate sincerely, 

denuclearize, liberalize its society and economy, go to war, and so on. These assumptions—often wrong—in part contributed to the sometimes predictable collapse and failure of most efforts at North Korea negotiations and policy. The result 

of these successive failures is a North Korea problem that is not only more dire 

now than ever before but is also still a mystery in a number of respects. In effect, 

many of the critical questions regarding North Korean intentions that confronted 

the policy makers of the past remain unanswered to this day.

If Washington wishes to not repeat the mistakes of the past, it must first seek 

answers to these critical questions. If the Biden administration wishes to succeed 

on the North Korea policy front and enact comprehensive and effective North 

Korea policy, then it must make every effort and leverage every resource to better 

understand North Korea and North Koreans.

Perhaps the most critical of questions regarding North Korean intentions is 

Pyongyang’s willingness (or lack thereof ) to truly denuclearize. Indeed, the answer to this question alone could have a dramatic effect on the direction of future 

North Korea policy and the prospect of success for that policy. Given just how 

long the issue of North Korean denuclearization has confronted Washington, the 

fact that North Korean intentions on this issue are still not well known or understood is troubling to say the least, and the lack of clarity makes for a great stumbling block for forming effective policy. Needless to say, policy vis-à-vis a North 

Korea that is sincerely willing to denuclearize can and should be very different 

from policy for a North Korea that is unwilling to denuclearize. Before the United 

States can settle on a direction for North Korea policy, it must first answer this key 

question.

The question of willingness to denuclearize is only one in a long list of questions Washington must seek to answer before formulating and enacting policy. 

Other key questions include whether or not Pyongyang is willing to open the 

country, allow liberalization of its society and economy, address its human rights 

record, dismantle its international and cyber-criminal enterprises, and so on. Answers to these questions will indicate how far, if at all, Pyongyang is willing to go 

in terms of reform and offer Washington multiple options for reducing the tensions felt between the two countries.

Washington must also understand, however, that an answer to a question does 

not necessarily indicate an end to the clarification needed on a particular issue. In 
What Would a North Korean Do?

 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) 73

many cases, an answer—even a less than desirable one—can and should lead to 

further questions. If, for example, it is revealed that Pyongyang is not truly willing 

to denuclearize, policy makers should then consider exactly why this may be the 

case. This is also important because the answer to this question can also adversely 

affect the direction of policy and the options available. The policy “fix” for a North 

Korea that is, for example, unwilling to denuclearize out of insincerity and nefariousness is very different from a North Korea that will not denuclearize out of 

genuine fear or distrust. In the response to the latter, there is still room for progress, and Washington must also seriously consider whether the specific reason for 

not denuclearizing is an issue that itself can be resolved via other policy means.

In the same vein, policy makers must also understand that the North Korea 

issue is inherently a dynamic one and that negotiating with North Korea today is 

different from negotiation attempts of the past. North Korea, as a country, a society, and even as a government, today faces significant and verifiable stressors and 

crises because of the COVID-19 pandemic, natural disasters, and failed economic 

policy. The failures were so significant that Kim Jong-un himself took the unusual 

and surprising step of publicly admitting to, and accepting responsibility for, the 

failures. At a time when North Korea is particularly stressed and vulnerable, the 

United States must consider whether there is more room to leverage Pyongyang’s 

desires now. North Korea’s current situation may provide an opportunity for the 

United States to better gauge North Korean intentions and, perhaps, provide a 

viable off-ramp from Pyongyang’s current path. As the situation evolves, however, 

Pyongyang’s willingness to denuclearize may also ebb and flow. This liability to 

change is also something about which Washington must remain aware.

Similarly, Washington must also take careful inventory of its own policy goals 

and, in response to clarification on North Korean intentions, reassess the best 

path forward. One key tendency of Washington’s negotiation platform is the inclination to focus on denuclearization above, and sometimes at the expense of, 

other initiatives. Given Pyongyang’s historical hesitance to negotiate nuclear issues outright and the failure of such a focus to produce tangible results thus far, 

Washington would do well to consider whether increasing efforts toward other 

initiatives may produce more favorable results. This is particularly worth exploring 

as Pyongyang already has some nuclear capability. Nominally, Pyongyang developed nuclear weapons for the singular goal of regime survival—specifically as a 

deterrence to outside aggression. In essence, Pyongyang believed that nuclear 

weapons were key to its survival, and therefore, it developed nuclear weapons. A 

possible approach by Washington can be to convince Pyongyang that nuclear 

weapons are not key to regime survival, and that such survival is better entrusted 

elsewhere—such as by collaborating with the United States and its allies. This can 
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James

be achieved by offering Pyongyang viable alternatives for survival that do not involve the more reprehensible activities typical of its state policy, including, for 

example, human rights abuses, international crime and terrorism, and cyber vandalism. Instead, Washington can offer economic, diplomatic, and military incentives for change. This method, though by no means guaranteed to succeed, cannot 

be conducted if negotiations on nuclear weapons continue to dominate Washington’s diplomatic agenda. To that aim, Washington must consider first (or concurrently negotiating) other issues and build trust with the Kim regime—if it is determined that the lack of trust is a barrier to progress on the nuclear issue.

Though the temptation to enact North Korea policy and respond to the North 

Korea problem quickly may be strong, the Biden administration would be wise to 

resist the urge. The North Korea problem is far more complex now than ever before, and, to form effective policy and have a real shot at solving things once and 

for all, the outstanding questions regarding Pyongyang’s desires, intentions, and 

willingness must be resolved. By working to better understand the true nature of 

the challenge, Washington can gain greater insight on exactly how to best address 

the issue and avoid the blunders of the past. Though by no means a guarantee of 

success, greater understanding of North Korea on the cultural, societal, political, 

economic, scholastic, and military levels will lead to better understanding of 

Pyongyang’s greatest concerns and intentions. In turn, this would better equip 

Washington to negotiate with Pyongyang—particularly at a time when Pyongyang may be more open to sincere negotiations considering the dire conditions 

faced at home. While it is difficult to tell exactly where negotiations with Pyongyang will go from here, it is nevertheless clear that a new strategy is very much 

warranted.

The key to this strategy, however, is not the strategy itself but the principles and 

vision upon which it would be founded. Washington must develop a wider, more 

comprehensive vision of the North Korea problem now, the North Korea problem 

then, and the best direction in which to take the North Korea problem moving 

forward. This key first step that Washington must take before establishing a 

promising North Korea policy is best accomplished by, in essence, thinking like a 

North Korean—or carefully considering the issues from the North Korean perspective to better gauge and understand their scope and value within negotiations. 

Understanding how North Koreans think regarding economic, social, military, 

and other critical issues will better equip negotiators to avoid the diplomatic errors of the past and better understand—for better or for worse—the validity of 

negotiations with North Korea moving forward.
What Would a North Korean Do?

 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE ( JUNE 2021) 75

1st Lt Shaquille H. James, USAF

Lieutenant James is a 13N intercontinental ballistic missile launch officer and graduate of Georgetown University. 

He has worked extensively with North Korean defectors as well as with multiple agencies, organizations, and university programs relating to North Korean affairs. Lieutenant James graduated with a major in linguistics, a minor 

in Korean, and a certificate in Asian studies and has studied in multiple Asian countries and territories, including 

South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. He is currently a member of the Language Enabled Airman Program 

(LEAP).
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Assistant
The Air Force Culture and Language Center invites 

you to attend the sixth Annual Air University 

Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (AU LREC) 

Symposium. This year’s LREC Symposium is themed, 

“The Great Power of Culture,” and calls for participants 

to address the influence of culture in the workings of 

power, and to foster conversations about the role of 

language, regional expertise, and culture in the 

current U.S. national security and defense orientation 

to a world characterized by great power competition. 

I was excited by the diverse 

array of topics that 

speakers presented at this 

symposium... I hope that 

future LREC symposia can 

continue to expand [these] 

topics and perspectives.

QUESTIONS?

Phone: 334.953.1139 | Email: af.clc@us.af.mil

“

“

The impact of LREC on 1 operations and engagements

Addressing the “human domain”

through LREC concepts and 

curricula

2

The power of cultural competence

 in building partnerships and 

strengthing alliances

3

Techniques for improving 4 foreign language competence

Call for Papers

Below are a few possible presentation topics.

More topics and the full call for papers are 

available on our event website: 

AIRUNIVERSITY.AF.EDU/AFCLC/AU-LREC/

- 2020 AU LREC Symposium Attendee