RENDERED: APRIL 12, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2023-CA-0401-MR

LESLIE WARDEN CARR APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JANET J. CROCKER, SPECIAL JUDGE

ACTION NO. 18-CI-01518

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, 

JUDICIAL BRANCH, 

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 

COURTS; AND CATHERINE RICE 

HOLDERFIELD, IN HER 

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND AS 

JUDGE OF THE WARREN CIRCUIT 

COURT, 8TH CIRCUIT, DIVISION IV, 

FAMILY COURT OF THE 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND TAYLOR, 

JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Leslie Warden Carr appeals from orders of the 

Warren Circuit Court which granted summary judgment in favor of Judge 
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Catherine Holderfield and dismissed the Administrative Office of the Courts

(AOC) from the case. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant worked as a court administrator for Judge Holderfield from 

about September 16, 2017, to September 4, 2018. She resigned from her position 

to take a job with a law firm. On November 2, 2018, Appellant filed a complaint 

against Appellees. She raised numerous causes of action, including an allegation 

that her employment was constructively terminated in violation of the Kentucky 

Whistleblower Act (KWA) found in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.101, et 

seq. On December 18, 2019, the AOC was dismissed from the case. On January 

12, 2023, summary judgment was granted in favor of Judge Holderfield. This 

appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

We begin our analysis by noting that Appellant has raised no 

argument on appeal regarding the AOC’s dismissal. While Appellant appealed the 

order dismissing the AOC, her brief focuses solely on Judge Holderfield’s 

summary judgment. “Any part of a judgment appealed from that is not briefed is 

affirmed as being confessed.” Osborne v. Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Ky. 2000)

(citation omitted). As Appellant has raised no issues regarding the AOC, we 

affirm its dismissal from the case. 
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We now move on to the main issue on appeal, the order granting 

summary judgment in favor of Judge Holderfield. 

The standard of review on appeal of a summary 

judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that 

there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and 

that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. . . . “The record must be viewed in a light 

most favorable to the party opposing the motion for 

summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in 

his favor.” Summary “judgment is only proper where the 

movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail 

under any circumstances.” Consequently, summary 

judgment must be granted “[o]nly when it appears 

impossible for the nonmoving party to produce evidence 

at trial warranting a judgment in his favor[.]”

Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996) (citations omitted). 

“Because summary judgment involves only legal questions and the existence of 

any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer to the trial 

court’s decision and will review the issue de novo.” Lewis v. B & R Corporation, 

56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001).

Appellant’s arguments on appeal only concern the KWA. The KWA 

states in pertinent part:

No employer shall subject to reprisal, or directly or 

indirectly use, or threaten to use, any official authority or 

influence, in any manner whatsoever, which tends to 

discourage, restrain, depress, dissuade, deter, prevent, 

interfere with, coerce, or discriminate against any 

employee who in good faith reports, discloses, divulges, 

or otherwise brings to the attention of the Kentucky 

Legislative Ethics Commission, the Attorney General, 
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the Auditor of Public Accounts, the Executive Branch 

Ethics Commission, the General Assembly of the 

Commonwealth of Kentucky or any of its members or 

employees, the Legislative Research Commission or any 

of its committees, members or employees, the judiciary 

or any member or employee of the judiciary, any law 

enforcement agency or its employees, or any other 

appropriate body or authority, any facts or information 

relative to an actual or suspected violation of any law, 

statute, executive order, administrative regulation, 

mandate, rule, or ordinance of the United States, the 

Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any of its political 

subdivisions, or any facts or information relative to actual 

or suspected mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse of 

authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public 

health or safety.

KRS 61.102(1). 

In order to demonstrate a violation of KRS 61.102, 

an employee must establish the following four elements: 

(1) the employer is an officer of the state; (2) the 

employee is employed by the state; (3) the employee 

made or attempted to make a good faith report or 

disclosure of a suspected violation of state or local law to 

an appropriate body or authority; and (4) the employer 

took action or threatened to take action to discourage the 

employee from making such a disclosure or to punish the 

employee for making such a disclosure. The employee 

must show by a preponderance of evidence that “the 

disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel 

action.” The burden of proof is then on the state 

employer “to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the disclosure was not a material fact in the 

personnel action.”

Davidson v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Military Affairs, 152 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Ky. 

App. 2004) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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We will first note that the trial court found that the first and second 

KWA factors were met. While Appellees argue they cannot be deemed 

“employers” due to issues surrounding the separation of powers, they did not 

appeal the court’s finding regarding whether or not they were employers. For our 

purposes, we will accept that the first two KWA factors were met and focus our 

attention to the third factor, the reporting or disclosing of a violation of state or 

local law to an appropriate authority.

Here, Appellant raises three instances of where she made a report or 

disclosure of a violation of a law or rule in relation to Judge Holderfield. The first 

is that Appellant informed another judge and the Warren Circuit Clerk that she 

believed Judge Holderfield was violating the Warren Family Court local rules by 

refusing to appoint certain attorneys as guardians ad litem in her court. The rule at 

issue was Warren Circuit Family Court Rule (WFCR) 704A, which states:

Guardians ad Litem and military attorneys shall be 

appointed from a panel of attorneys who have registered 

their willingness to accept appointments with the Warren 

Circuit Court Clerk’s Office. See WFCR 604. 

Appointments shall be made in rotation according to the 

register, except in those cases where an emergency 

exists, a member of the panel previously represented the 

party, or special language or communication skills are 

known to be needed for adequate representation of a 

party.
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Appellant claimed that Judge Holderfield violated this rule by refusing to appoint 

certain attorneys who were on a list of qualified attorneys and who had been 

approved by a Guardian ad Litem Committee. WFCR 604.

The second instance is that she informed another judge and the 

Warren Circuit Clerk that Judge Holderfield violated local rules by refusing to

accept mediation agreements from qualified mediators. The rule at issue is WFCR 

707B, which states in relevant part:

The Chair of the Mediation Review Committee shall be 

selected by the Warren Family Court Judges. The Chair 

shall select additional members if determined to be 

necessary. The mediation review committee shall review 

the qualifications of applicants, ensure compliance with 

the rules of ethics and make recommendations regarding 

the applicants to the Court.

Appellant claimed that Judge Holderfield excluded some qualified mediators from 

participating in cases in her court. 

The third instance of a disclosure of an alleged violation of a law or 

rule concerns a substance abuse referral list. Appellant claims that she informed 

another judge that Janet Carter-Martin was on a list of providers who could provide 

a substance abuse assessment; however, Ms. Carter-Martin was allegedly not 

qualified to provide such assessments. Appellant informed the other judge that 

Judge Holderfield continued to utilize Ms. Carter-Martin as an assessor even 

though Judge Holderfield knew Ms. Carter-Martin was unqualified.
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We begin our discussion of Appellant’s alleged whistleblower activity 

with the guardian ad litem list. The trial court found that the Guardian ad Litem

Committee would revise the list of qualified attorneys each year. Judges would 

then make appointments from the list on a rotation basis and without any material 

deviation. Judge Holderfield, however, would not appoint some attorneys on the 

list regardless of his or her qualifications. Appellant believed this was improper 

favoritism. Judge Holderfield claimed she excluded attorneys who had a history of 

not showing up for hearings. Judge Holderfield also believed that a smaller 

guardian ad litem roster would provide more appointments per attorney and would 

create a financial incentive for attorneys to appear for hearings. 

The court held that Appellant did not make a protected disclosure 

because Judge Holderfield’s actions regarding the guardian ad litem list were

widely known. “[T]he ‘disclosure’ of information which is public information or 

otherwise already widely known within the organization cannot qualify as a 

whistleblower disclosure. The statute protects the whistleblower who exposes 

information not generally known.” Harper v. University of Louisville, 559 S.W.3d 

796, 802 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted). Here, Judge Holderfield’s limited use of 

the guardian ad litem list began prior to Appellant’s employment. As such, the 

following people knew of Judge Holderfield’s use of the list: some members of 

the staff in the Warren Circuit Clerk’s office, the Warren Circuit Clerk, Judge 
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Holderfield’s prior administrative assistants, the Guardian ad Litem Committee 

members, and some Warren County attorneys. 

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion on this issue. While the 

public at large may not have known about how Judge Holderfield used the 

guardian ad litem list, we believe that enough people in the Warren County legal 

community and Warren Circuit Courthouse knew so as to make the issue 

“generally known.” As it was generally known within the Warren County legal 

community, Appellant cannot meet the third requirement to maintain an action for 

the violation of the KWA.

We now move on to Judge Holderfield’s alleged refusal to accept 

mediation settlements from qualified mediators. Appellant alleged that Judge

Holderfield had personal animus toward a person qualified to perform mediation 

settlements, but refused to allow this person to serve as a mediator in any of her 

cases. The trial court found that Appellant provided no evidence to substantiate 

this allegation. After reviewing the record, we agree. There is no evidence that 

Judge Holderfield refused to accept a mediation agreement from this particular 

individual or that Judge Holderfield otherwise excluded this person from 

participating in mediations. Courts of the Commonwealth have “often stated that 

speculation and supposition are insufficient to justify a submission of a case to the 

jury, and that the question should be taken from the jury when the evidence is so 
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unsatisfactory as to require a resort to surmise and speculation.” O’Bryan v. Cave, 

202 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Ky. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In addition, we agree with Judge Holderfield’s argument that WFCR 

707B, the mediation rule cited above, is not a “law, statute, executive order, 

administrative regulation, mandate, rule, or ordinance” or related to 

“mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific 

danger to public health or safety” as required to be a KWA violation. KRS 

61.102(1). WFCR 707B allows the Mediation Review Committee to determine 

who is qualified to be a mediator in Warren Family Court and then make 

recommendations to the judges. It does not have any requirement that the judges 

follow those recommendations in any sort of order or, for that matter, follow the 

recommendations at all. The trial court made no error on this issue.

Finally, we address Appellant’s claim that Judge Holderfield 

continued to use Janet Carter-Martin to perform substance abuse assessments even 

though she was not qualified. Appellant received a phone call from Ms. CarterMartin’s former business partner claiming Ms. Carter-Martin was not qualified to 

perform substance abuse assessments. Appellant sent an email to Judge 

Holderfield and another family court judge of this information. The other judge 

informed Appellant to stop making referrals to Ms. Carter-Martin; however, Judge 

Holderfield continued to utilize Ms. Carter-Martin’s services. 
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The trial court found that this was simply a disagreement about Ms. 

Carter-Martin’s qualifications and not a protected disclosure. We agree. After 

reviewing the record in this case, along with the depositions given by the parties 

and the witnesses, we conclude there was no protected disclosure here. Appellant 

informed Judge Holderfield and another judge that she believed Ms. Carter-Martin 

was not qualified to provide substance abuse assessments. Judge Holderfield 

believed otherwise and continued using Ms. Carter-Martin’s services. Appellant 

cites to no evidence in the record, and we could find none, that she then informed 

the other judge, or anyone else, that Judge Holderfield was continuing to utilize an 

unqualified substance abuse assessment provider. 

This appears to be a disagreement over whether Ms. Carter-Martin 

was qualified to perform drug abuse assessments. “[D]isagreements with 

supervisors over job-related activities are commonplace and do not constitute 

whistleblowing.” Moss v. Kentucky State University, 465 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Ky. 

App. 2014) (citation omitted). Without some affirmative evidence that Appellant 

informed another authority that she believed Judge Holderfield was knowingly 

using an unqualified assessor, summary judgment was properly granted as to this 

issue. See Godman v. City of Fort Wright, 234 S.W.3d 362, 370 (Ky. App. 2007).
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in 

granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Thomas E. Clay

Louisville, Kentucky

Dixie R. Satterfield

Harlan E. Judd, III

Bowling Green, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 

THE COURTS:

Melissa Norman Bork

Brent R. Baughman

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE JUDGE 

CATHERINE RICE HOLDERFIELD:

Matthew F. Kuhn

Marc Manley

Alexander Y. Magera

Frankfort, Kentucky