I`E.`=E`=49S`

-61-6
--/62)-6

VSS=E4`S91`IN.1N`

=RLVS1`=E`=RSIN=-'D`

IES1ZS`

-64(+  56

!91`';=RS(  E` E.='`

'E.`9=H'`!N='E6^C1`

-6-6)06

"N$,@A7^`T:0`>G<`

+0TY00G`:BG*Q` JG,2MT`J3` JX0N0?7^FT[`

*G.`?C?T%N[`7_8
P0QQ?JG`

.6-,-(62#6

4(6		6

F.>$:>F%`JN.0N`

?QKUT0Q`%F.` TN%T05^?,`

?W&CO\`>G`T:0`G.J]

$,>3>,`

-6
0)"6-&6

!91`9=E'E/='`

#'S1N`=RLVS1`

-6 $!(6
)6



9=E)	E.=)
`IN.1N`

 N=R=R`

6%6&26




  
  
    
  
  

*'636

	
	
		

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │ 1

No End in 

Sight

Understanding 

the Sino-Indian 

Border Dispute

Dr. Peter Harris, editor

ndia and China compromise over 

a third of the world’s population. 

Both maintain operable nuclear 

triads in addition to being the 

planet’s second and third highest 

spenders on conventional military 

arms. When the two countries’ militaries came to blows in May-June 

of last year, then, it is no surprise 

that the whole world took notice.

Dozens of slain Indian and Chinese 

soldiers was a tragedy. A wider 

conflagration between the two 

nuclear powers could easily have 

become a catastrophe.

At stake was disputed territory 

high in the Himalayan Mountains. 

For a variety of historical reasons, 

India and China have never been 

able to agree upon a border to separate their two states. In the east, 

China claims much of what is now 

governed as the Indian state of 

Arunachal Pradesh. In the west, 

India claims the territory of Aksai 

Chin, governed by Beijing as part 

of Xinjiang and Tibet. In between 

those two disputed territories runs 

a 2,500-mile border (punctuated by 

the independent states of Nepal 

and Bhutan) that has never been 

demarcated. Even the so-called 

Line of Actual Control (LAC) that

supposedly separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory is the subject of 

vigorous dispute. Both sides station troops along portions of the 

LAC and conduct regular patrols. 

They jockey for position by building infrastructure—camps, roads, 

lookout posts—and trying to occupy strategic points. But physical 

clashes are rare. Until last year, 

fatalities had not been recorded in 

decades.

In this roundtable, six scholars—

some based in the region, the rest 

longtime analysts of Sino-Indian 

relations—put the recent border 

I

1
Harris

Indo-Pacific Perspective │2

clashes in context. Liu Xuecheng

begins by lamenting the flareup in 

violence and calling for a return to 

diplomatic negotiations. Liu is 

frank that a resolution (or “settlement”) of the border dispute is unlikely to materialize any time soon. 

The best that China and India can

hope for is to “manage” the situation and avoid further bloodshed. 

Liu encourages readers in China 

and India to put the border dispute 

in a wider perspective, urging that 

this singular issue not be allowed 

to blind either side to the manifest 

benefits of political and economic 

cooperation.

Offering a view from Pakistan, 

Maira Qaddos agrees with Liu that 

peaceful co-existence between India and China is both possible and 

essential for regional prosperity. 

Qaddos concedes that, in Pakistan, 

there had been little sympathy for 

India during the bloody clashes

with China. As she explains, it is 

perhaps overdetermined that Pakistan will always tend to side with 

China in any conflict with India. 

Few readers will be surprised by 

this. But Qaddos warns that such 

zero-sum thinking can only lead to 

ruin in the long term. What is 

needed is for China, India, and Pakistan to all find common ground 

for the sake of peace and stability 

across South Asia and beyond. 

Qaddos is realistic about the 

trilateral relationship’s future; she 

knows that the India-China and 

India-Pakistan sides of the triangle 

will remain fraught for the foreseeable future. But she is also hopeful, 

recognizing that a cycle of conflict, 

humiliation, resentment, and more 

conflict will bring nothing good for 

the people of South Asia.

Sripana Pathak offers a starkly 

different, less optimistic take on 

last year’s clashes. According to 

Pathak, it is unrealistic to expect 

Indians to subordinate their country’s border dispute to economic or 

strategic concerns, as Liu wants. 

There is too much anger. The killing of Indian soldiers—unjustified 

and unprovoked—will not easily be 

forgotten. Pathak represents a 

prominent strand of thought 

among Indians when she squarely 

lays the blame for last year’s 

deadly clashes at the feet of 

China’s leaders. She argues that it 

is China’s conception of sovereignty—one rooted in a unilateral 

concern for restoring China’s former glory rather than an understanding that rival powers each 

have conflicting claims that must 

be reconciled—that fuels the bilateral dispute. In the end, it is China 

that is at fault; it is China that 

must change for there to be peace.

Ashok Sharma expands on this 

view to suggest that China’s 
No End in Sight

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │3

actions along the Sino-Indian border did not just provoke a backlash 

among the Indian public and political class—they also spurred international-level pushback against 

perceived Chinese aggression. In 

this sense, Sharma explains, conflict along the LAC must be considered part of a larger Indo-Pacific 

struggle for mastery. In Sharma’s 

telling, international opinion 

seems to have firmly swung behind 

India and against China—especially among the Quad (and “Quad 

Plus”) states. Sharma’s analysis 

leaves little room for optimism that 

the Sino-Indian border dispute can 

be managed or resolved bilaterally; 

if the conflict truly does become regionalized—just another theater in 

the Indo-Pacific great game—then 

it surely will become unlikely that 

a grand bargain between India and 

China could ever be struck.

Selina Ho adds to the discussion of 

hope versus pessimism with her 

analysis of water security in the 

Sino-Indian borderlands. On the 

one hand, Ho explains that, 

against all the odds, both China 

and India have managed to desecuritize their relationship over water

resources—even though access to 

water ought to be considered one of 

the highest stakes issues to define 

the Sino-Indian bilateral relationship. This raises the possibility, 

perhaps, that the two sides could 

desecuritize other aspects of their 

relationship. Might the border itself be moved outside of the realm 

of security and into the realm of 

normal politics and diplomacy? Unfortunately, Ho argues, this might 

be wishful thinking. While it is 

promising that China and India 

have so far found ways to avoid securitizing water management issues, this bright spot in their relations does not provide much of a 

blueprint for desecuritizing other 

aspects of the relationship. On the 

contrary, the trend might well be 

in the opposite direction: that is, 

toward the eventual securitization 

of water rather than the desecuritization of other issues.

Finally, Jeff Smith offers yet another reason to be gloomy about 

the prospects of a peaceful resolution to the dispute: the fact that 

Chinese leaders seem to have 

adopted the position that the question of demarcating the international boundary cannot be divorced 

from the question of Indian “interference” in Tibetan affairs. From 

the Chinese perspective, this 

makes some sense. After all, what 

use is an agreed-upon international border if New Delhi persists 

in pursuing policies that meddle in 

affairs across that border? India, 

however, is unlikely to abandon 

the Tibetan exile community as the 

price of settling its border disputes; 
Harris

Indo-Pacific Perspective │4

to agree to China’s demands in this 

respect would be nothing better 

than base appeasement. Viewed in 

this context, the border dispute is 

not so much about lines on a map 

as it is about mutual trust, respect, 

and toleration of each other’s internal politics. Lines on a map would 

be hard enough. Adding the other 

issues to the mix makes the problem all but intractable.

These contributions make clear 

that just as China and India disagree on the border between their 

states, so too do they disagree over 

what the border dispute is truly 

about. As the old adage goes, 

where you stand depends on where 

you sit. The view from China looks 

precious little like the view from 

India. In many cases, the perspective of those living closest to the 

border seems to be distorted—

quite understandably—by anger, 

distrust, and a burning sense of injustice. This spells danger ahead. 

The entire region—indeed, the 

whole world—has an interest in 

avoiding a return to violence along 

the Sino-Indian border. But efforts 

to manage the conflict failed badly 

last year. It is not obvious that the 

world can afford those efforts to 

break down again. ■

Dr. Peter Harris

Dr. Harris is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University and Editor of 

the Indo-Pacific Perspectives series.
Indo-Pacific Perspectives │ 5

Putting 

the Border 

Dispute in 

Historical 

Context

Dr. Xuecheng Liu

he Sino-Indian border dispute 

is left over from history, both 

the legacy of colonial period 

and the more recent history of 

Sino-Indian relations. Since the 

1950s, the border dispute has always shadowed the ebb and flow of 

the Sino-Indian relations. Looking 

back at the twists and turns of 

their bilateral relations for the 

past 70 years, it is clear that the 

simmering border disputes have 

existed along three dimensions: legal arguments, international circumstance, and domestic politics. 

The interplay of these three dimensions has complicated the efforts to 

settle the territorial disputes between China and India.

The Chinese and Indian governments have attempted to resolve 

their border disputes through diplomatic negotiations since the

1980s. The border negotiations 

have been institutionalized and

have generated several meaningful 

agreements—not least of all, several effective dialogue mechanisms

for maintaining peace and tranquility along the border areas. 

However, the respective positions 

of the Indian and Chinese governments have never changed.

Although both governments have 

made efforts to clarify and affirm 

the Line of Actual Control (LAC) 

on the ground, the disputes over 

the LAC have often led to violent 

clashes. The recent bloody clashes 

in the Galwan Valley and Pangong 

Lake areas have constituted the 

gravest flare-up in recent times,

with dozens of soldiers losing their 

lives on both sides. These skirmishes worsened the Sino-Indian

bilateral relationship and further 

eroded mutual strategic trust.

T

2
Liu

Indo-Pacific Perspective │6

Lessons Learned from History

The Sino-Indian border has never 

been defined and demarcated by 

any bilateral boundary agreement 

through diplomatic negotiations. 

No mutually recognized boundary 

has existed between the two countries. As a researcher on Sino-Indian border dispute and Sino-Indian relations, I prefer to use the

term “border dispute” rather than 

“boundary dispute,” and I also prefer to discuss “management” of the 

border dispute rather than “settlement” of the border dispute. Furthermore, I refer to “clarification 

and affirmation” of the LAC, rather than the “definition and demarcation” of the Sino-Indian 

boundary. Under the current circumstances, my judgment is that 

any approach to “settle” the border 

dispute would be premature.

Violent clashes along the Sino-Indian border started in May 2020,

continuing into June. Partial disengagement from Galwan, Hot 

Springs, and Gogra occurred in 

June-July 2020, while complete 

disengagement from Pangong 

Lake’s north and south bank took 

place in February 2021. The border 

areas returned to the pre-clash status quo by around March 2021. 

Overall, what happened in the 

western sector of the Sino-Indian 

border proved that military 

maneuvering and confrontation 

cannot solve the fundamental problems that mar Sino-Indian relations. Diplomatic negotiation is the 

right way forward. Border disputes 

can be managed only through 

friendly dialogue and sincere consultation, with occasional resort to 

the various management mechanisms that have been established 

to jointly maintain peace and tranquility in the border area.

Looking back at the road the two 

countries have walked along, the 

Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) 

emergence as India’s ruling party

in 2014 seems to have been a turning point—that is, the juncture at 

which India and China walked off 

the normal and constructive track. 

In the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese 

leaders had always talked about 

the traditional customary lines 

transformed from history. India, on 

the other hand, emphasized the 

importance of historical lines 

drawn or unilaterally imposed by 

British diplomats. The eight 

rounds of negotiations held in the 

1980s led to an agreement to establish a joint working group on 

the border question and to maintain peace and tranquility along 

the LAC (even though there was no 

agreement on the demarcation of 

the LAC).

With the signing of the 1993 
Putting the Border Dispute in Historical Context

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │7

Agreement on Maintaining Peace 

and Tranquility in the Border Areas along the LAC, the Sino-Indian 

joint working group made some efforts to clarify and affirm the LAC 

in the disputed border areas. Under this agreement, both sides appointed diplomatic and military experts charged with advising the 

joint working group on how to resolve differences regarding the 

alignment of the LAC, as well as 

how to address issues relating to 

military redeployments in the border areas along the LAC. With the 

conflicting versions of the LAC unsolved, however, attempts to clarify and affirm the LAC were put 

onto the back burner in the late

1990s.

Since the start of this century, the 

failure to clarify the LAC has led

the two governments to shift their 

attention to exploring the possibility of border dispute settlement as 

opposed to mere management. Two 

new dialogue mechanisms were 

created: (1) the Special Representative mechanism on the IndiaChina boundary question 

(SR/SRM) was constituted in 2003 

to promote negotiations on a 

framework for border settlement, 

including the establishment of political parameters and guiding 

principles, a framework for arriving at a final settlement, with a 

view to delineating and 

demarcating the boundary; (2) the 

Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination was set up

in 2012, during the 15th round of 

the SR talks. During this period, 

however, the two sides failed to 

make progress in pushing forward 

the border-settlement approach. 

Meanwhile, border skirmishes 

erupted frequently in the disputed 

areas along the LAC.

These border clashes have persisted in recent years. On Indian 

social media, the disputes and 

clashes are sometimes manipulated, portrayed as Chinese intrusions into India’s territory in a way 

that stirs up anti-China sentiment 

among the Indian public. In some 

cases, Indian officials have had to 

come out and clarify the facts to 

the citizenry. Overshadowing the 

frequent border clashes is the problem of an unsettled LAC. This 

problem can be managed to an extent using mechanisms such as the 

China-India Corps CommanderLevel Meeting, which has played 

an important role in facilitating 

communication between the two 

sides. Frontline military commanders are committed to maintaining

communication and working toward mutually acceptable preventive measures that are conducive 

to the reduction of tension and the 

avoidance of any possible incidents 

in the disputed areas. These 
Liu

Indo-Pacific Perspective │8

frontline commanders have also 

jointly agreed to maintain peace 

and stability on the ground by refraining from taking any provocative moves along the LAC in the 

border areas.

Development Partners or Geopolitical Rivals

The wider context is that China 

and India are the largest developing countries in the world. Their 

combined population is 2.8 billion. 

India has been regarded as the 

world’s office while China is cast as

the world’s factory. Their joined 

hands could multiply their already

huge potential for development. 

China and India are member 

states in global, regional, multilateral institutions such as the

BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 

China, and South Africa) grouping 

of rising powers, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the East Asia Summit 

Meeting. All these institutions are 

focused on cooperative development. When Chinese President Xi 

Jinping visited India, he agreed 

with his Indian counterpart to the 

China-India Plus Approach in 

jointly developing trade and investment projects in third countries. 

All these dialogues and cooperative

mechanisms have been working toward the partnership for shared 

development.

On several occasions, both China 

and India have agreed that they 

would commit themselves to expanding and enhancing cooperation and coordination in other 

fields, while simultaneously seeking the settlement of border disputes through diplomatic negotiations. This is the right approach. It 

is almost certain that the Sino-Indian border dispute cannot be settled in the immediate years to 

come. The two countries need to 

manage the dispute properly and 

at the same time, expand and enhance their bilateral diplomatic 

consultations and military coordination so that they might prevent 

costly incidents in the disputed areas along the LAC. In time, this cooperative approach might create 

favorable conditions for the settlement of the territorial disputes at 

some point in the future.

Since the end of the Cold War, the 

top leaders of the two countries

have always stressed that India 

and China share more common interests than differences and that 

each will not constitute a threat to 

the other. With reference to international and regional affairs, the 

two countries share the same or 

close positions on a wide range of 

issues due. China and India can be

each other’s friends and partners, 
Putting the Border Dispute in Historical Context

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │9

not threats or rivals. The two countries should help each other succeed instead of undercutting each 

other.

The border dispute is one component of the Sino-Indian relationship. In recent years, unwanted 

skirmishes and clashes along the 

LAC have been highly politicized, 

exacerbating antagonistic domestic 

dynamics as well as furthering the 

perception of an international competition. To continue intensifying 

cooperation among China, India, 

and the rest of Asia, leaders would 

do well to remember that “divide 

and rule” remains a powerful strategy in world politics. Indian and 

Chinese leaders should each avoid 

falling into that trap. ■

Dr. Xuecheng Liu

Dr. Liu is a senior research fellow of China Institute of International Studies and Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of The Sino-Indian Border 

Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations (The University Press of America, 1994).
Indo-Pacific Perspectives │ 10

The Pakistan, 

India, and 

China Triangle

Pakistan’s Place in 

the Sino-Indian 

Border Dispute

Dr. Maira Qaddos

t is quite evident from the history 

of Pakistan’s relationship with 

China that Pakistan views SinoIndian border disputes through a 

Chinese lens. This is not just because of Pakistani-Chinese friendship, of course, but also because of 

the rivalry and territorial disputes 

that have marred India-Pakistan 

relations since their independence.1 Just as China and India 

have longstanding disputes that 

led to wars in the past (including, 

recently, the violent clashes in the 

Galwan Valley in May-June

2020),2 so too do Pakistan and 

India frequently experience clashes 

along their shared borders, especially on the de facto border of Pakistan-administered and India-administered Kashmir.3

The triangular relationship between India, China, and Pakistan 

is of critical importance to regional 

and global stability.4 Managing the

relationship is an urgent task. Yet, 

the place of Pakistan in the triangular relationship has sometimes 

gone overlooked. When India and 

China were embroiled in the recent 

military standoff at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Pakistan was 

mentioned only because of an expectation (or fear) that Islamabad 

would exploit the situation to press 

its interests in Kashmir. At that 

time, the Indian-administered portion of Kashmir had been experiencing lockdowns and curfews for 

months, raising expectations that 

Pakistan might raise the temperature. But although this insight 

(that the Sino-Indian clashes 

would affect Pakistan’s strategic 

interests) was correct, it was incomplete. The focus should not 

have been on Pakistani opportunism, which did not materialize, but 

on the fundamental interconnectedness that characterizes the 

South Asian security situation—of 

which Sino-Indian border disputes 

are just one part.

I

3
The Pakistan, India, and China Triangle

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │11

Strategic Triangle in Contemporary Times

The India-China-Pakistan relationship is a strategic triangle of three 

nuclear powers. Given the geographic and strategic factors at 

play, it is impossible for these 

three powers to co-exist in complete isolation from one another; 

they interact with one another as a 

matter of ongoing political reality. 

The only option, then, is for all 

three governments to understand 

the implications of their behavior 

on the other states in the triangle. 

This means working toward a 

friendly, peaceful, and amicable 

neighborhood. The worst outcome 

for all parties would be if any two 

powers joined forces against the 

third, which would run the risk of 

upsetting the balance of power in 

South Asia and creating insecurity 

for the entire region.

5

When it comes to the Sino-Indian 

border disputes, some International Relations experts have predicted that Pakistan will be the big 

winner of a worsening Sino-Indian 

relationship.

6 While overstated, 

this observation rests on the observation that Pakistan and India are 

engaged in a strategic rivalry while

Pakistan and China have maintained a strategic alliance for several decades. Recently, China has 

expanded its investments and 

engagement in various sectors of 

the Pakistan economy. For example, the China-Pakistan Economic 

Corridor (CPEC) is expected to create jobs and infrastructure for the 

people of Pakistan. Moreover, 

China is the largest defense and 

military-equipment supplier for 

Pakistan, with a full 70 percent of

Pakistan’s imported weapons coming from China between 2015 and 

2019.

From the Indian perspective, a 

two-front war with both China and 

Pakistan cannot be ruled out 

whenever there are tensions along 

the Sino-Indian border.

7 India’s 

General Manoj Mukund Naravane, 

Chief of the Army Staff, expressed 

his concerns about a two-front war

in May 2020. He cautioned that it 

is not just the military that fights 

wars, but also other pillars of nations like the bureaucracy and 

elected officials.

8 Dealing with two 

adversaries at the time—especially 

at a moment when India, China, 

and Pakistan were all consumed 

with the Covid-19 pandemic—

would pose a grave security and 

foreign policy challenge for India.9

In Pakistan, meanwhile, the fear is 

that India might one day provoke a 

border clash with Pakistan if Indian forces were to suffer humiliation or defeat along the Sino-Indian border. Last year, for 
Qaddos

Indo-Pacific Perspective │12

example, Islamabad was concerned 

that Prime Minister Modi would 

plan a face-saving mission against 

Pakistan in response to the embarrassment of a setback in Ladakh.

10

The distrust runs both ways. During the Galwan Valley clashes, Indian media outlets claimed that 

Pakistan and China had coordinated a grand conspiracy against 

India, with Pakistan allegedly deploying around 20,000 troops in 

Gilgit-Baltistan at the behest of

Chinese generals. According to Pakistani officials, however, Pakistan’s troop movements were not 

extraordinary, but rather a reasonable response to a regional security 

crisis; a prudent move to deal with 

any unexpected contingencies.

The Need for Regional Peace 

and Stability

The reality is that Pakistan had no 

interest in pursuing an aggressive 

or opportunistic policy during the 

clashes along the LAC. To do so 

would have been to undermine Pakistan’s own territorial security. To 

be sure, there was a general feeling 

of excitement in Pakistan at the 

sight of its rival’s military struggle 

to contain China. But Pakistan’s 

approach was to let China fight its 

war with India on its own, while 

taking steps to lower the temperature along the Kashmiri line of 

control.

11 In the end, Pakistan is 

interested in preserving a stable 

balance of power in South Asia—a 

goal not served by a weakened and 

humiliated Indian neighbor.

Pakistan is exposed to the Sino-Indian border disputes in complicated and cross-cutting ways. In 

some respects, the Sino-Indian border conflict of 2020 was detrimental to Pakistani interests. For 

example, the conflict diverted the 

attention of the global community 

from India’s controversial actions 

in Jammu and Kashmir, which 

were regarded as atrocities in Pakistan and elsewhere.

12 India’s abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, a move that 

eliminated special status for the 

Indian-administered states of 

Jammu and Kashmir, is a topic 

that Pakistan would like the international community to focus upon. 

However, the issue garners less attention than would otherwise be 

the case whenever violence erupts 

on the Sino-Indian border. On the 

other hand, Pakistan has benefitted indirectly from the Sino-Indian 

conflict insofar as it has spurred 

Sino-Pakistani cooperation. In July 

2020, China and Pakistan signed a 

hydropower agreement worth $2.4 

billion, with the project to 

launched in Pakistan-administered 

Kashmir. Part of the CPEC, this 

project is expected to deliver 
The Pakistan, India, and China Triangle

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │13

around 3.3 billion units of reusable 

energy upon its completion in 

2026.13 Because the project is being 

pursued in Pakistan-administered 

Kashmir (claimed by India), this 

decision can be regarded as bolstering Pakistan’s position—a diplomatic and strategic win. Pakistani officials deny that they have 

wanted to exploit a worsened security situation for economic benefit.14

Conclusion

To conclude, it may be argued that 

Pakistan has a strong interest in 

managing periods of tension and 

rivalry between China and India. 

To be sure, there are many factors 

that push Pakistan toward taking 

a pro-China position. This cannot 

be denied. Not only is Pakistan 

working with China on the CPEC 

megaproject, but it also has close

defense ties with Beijing. Both 

countries have a strategic partnership that spans various fields and 

has persisted for several decades.

Even so, it is notable that Pakistan 

tried to maintain a comparatively 

neutral stance during the Galwan 

Valley conflict. It instead put great 

energy into de-escalating the conflict. This is because the spillover 

effects of bloodshed and rivalry can 

only sabotage the economic activities, developmental programs, and 

overall peace process of the whole 

region.

The governments of India, China, 

and Pakistan ought to each realize 

that their actions and interactions 

affect one another in profound 

ways. Right now, the world faces a 

bigger challenge than border disputes, in the form of the deadly 

Covid-19 pandemic. There is a 

pressing need to put collective effort into fighting this scourge, instead of waging violent conflicts.

Unfortunately, the future of the India-China-Pakistan triangle seems

to be quite unstable. A lot of diplomatic work will be required to understand the importance of building a peaceful neighborhood, let 

alone implement such a vision. ■

Dr. Maira Qaddos

Dr. Qaddos is Lecturer in the Department of 

Mass Communication at the National University 

of Modern Languages, Lahore, Pakistan. Her research on the Sino-Indian border dispute has 

been published in Policy Perspectives, the flagship journal of Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad.
Qaddos

Indo-Pacific Perspective │14

Notes 

1 Muhammad Akbar Notazai, “What Does the China-India 

Standoff in Ladakh Mean for Pakistan?” The Diplomat,

June 24, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/whatdoes-the-china-india-standoff-in-ladakh-mean-for-pakistan/. 

2 The clashes in Ladakh resulted in the deaths of at least 

20 Indian soldiers. See Alyssa Ayres, “The China-India 

Border Dispute: What to Know?”, Council on Foreign Relations, June 18, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/chinaindia-border-dispute-what-know. 

3 Notazai, “China-India Standoff.”

4 Monish Tourangbam, “The China-India-Pakistan Triangle: Origins, Contemporary Perceptions, and Future”, 

Stimson, June 25, 2020, https://www.stimson.org/2020/the-china-india-pakistan-triangle-originscontemporary-perceptions-and-future/. The history of 

these political conflicts is grounded in Cold War. Anik 

Joshi, “China Is Pushing India Closer to the United States,” 

Foreign Policy, June 09, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/09/china-india-border-united-states-pakistan/. 

5 Satyabrat Sinha, “The Strategic Triangle: India-ChinaPakistan,” China Report, 40, no. 2 (2004): 221–25; Haans 

J. Freddy, “China, India & Pakistan strategic triangle – the

Pakistan factor in Sino-Indian relations,” Global Affairs, 6,

no. 4-5 (2020): 559–75.

6 Claude Rakisits, “Why India-China Border Conflict is

Music to Pakistan’s ears?,” The Quint, June 18, 2020,

https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-chinaborder-conflict-kashmir-issue-benefits-to-pakistan-beltand-road-cpec-projects.

7 Shalini Chawla, “Indo-China Conflict- What’s in it for

Pakistan?,” Financial Express, September 16, 2020,

https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/indo-chinaconflict-whats-in-it-for-pakistan/2084091/. 

8 “First China, now Pakistan: How India’s battling on two 

fronts,” The Economic Times, Last modified July 03, 2020, 

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/first-china-now-pakistan-how-indias-battling-ontwo-fronts/articleshow/76761327.cms?from=mdrSoutik

9 Soutik Biswas, “India-China clash: 20 Indian Troops 

Killed in Ladakh Fighting,” BBC, June 16, 2020, 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53061476. 

10 Tom Hussain, “China-India Clash Marks a Huge Regional Shift and Pakistan is its epicenter,” TRT World, July 

01, 2020, https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/china-india-clash-marks-a-huge-regional-shift-and-pakistan-isits-epicentre-37775. 

11 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Why Pakistan is keeping mum about 

India-China LAC conflict?,”The Print, July 04, 2020, 

https://theprint.in/opinion/why-pakistan-is-keepingmum-about-india-china-lac-conflict/454034/. 

12 Maham S. Gillani, “India-China Border Dispute has Implications for Pakistan and Region,” Centre for Aerospace 

& Security Studies, July 15, 2020, 

https://casstt.com/post/india-china-border-dispute-hasimplications-for-pakistan-and-region/229. 

13 “Pakistan, China sign $1.5 billion Hydropower Project 

Agreement,” The News International, July 06, 2020, 

https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/682889-pakistanchina-sign-15-billion-power-project-agreement. 

14 Adnan Aamir, “Pakistan Benefits from China-India 

Clash with Hydropower Deal,” Nikkei Asia, July 06, 2020, 

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Pakistan-benefits-from-China-India-clash-with-hydropowerdeal. 
Indo-Pacific Perspectives │ 15

Tracing the 

Link between 

China’s Concept 

of Sovereignty 

and Military 

Aggression

Dr. Sriparna Pathak

he modern concept of territorial sovereignty dates at least 

to the Peace of Westphalia in 

1648, a set of agreements to end 

one of Europe’s bloodiest wars, but 

its relevance to international politics shows no signs of waning. This 

is especially true when it comes to 

understanding the rise of India 

and China, and the fraught bilateral relationship that exists between them. Before 2020, IndiaChina relations were largely a 

mixture of cooperation and conflict.

Since last year, however, the relationship has undergone a sea 

change. In India, voices in favor of 

cooperation have been swept away 

by Chinese aggression along their

shared border.

Over a year since the deadly 

clashes of May-June 2020, the Chinese army still occupies Indianclaimed territory and refuses to 

budge. At the same time, however, 

Chinese leaders tell their Indian 

counterparts not to let the boundary issue—in India’s view, China’s 

violation of Indian territorial sovereignty—affect overall bilateral.

1

On its face, this is a puzzling treatment of sovereignty issues from

Chinese officials, seemingly ignoring the strength of feeling inside 

India that the border dispute must 

be resolved in a just fashion. The 

question presents itself: What exactly is the Chinese understanding 

of territorial sovereignty? Is 

China’s appetite for territorial expansion growing, whether in the 

South China Sea, vis-à-vis Taiwan, 

or in Central Asia? And does 

China’s understanding of territorial sovereignty breach with that of 

the rest of the world? An analysis 

of China’s approach to the Sino-Indian border can help answer these 

questions. Over time, China’s emphasis on securing its borders has 

changed in line with prevailing 

T

4
Pathak

Indo-Pacific Perspective │16

domestic and international conditions. This is important for understanding the tactics China has 

used at the border, from the 1962 

border skirmish to the latest 

deadly conflict at Galwan.

China’s position on issues of territorial boundaries and sovereignty 

is often portrayed as being rooted 

in China’s experience of Western 

and Japanese imperialism from 

the middle of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the idea of inviolable 

territorial sovereignty has been a 

key component of Chinese nationalism since this period. Although 

the concepts of sovereignty and nationalism have been used differently across time periods, one common theme is that Chinese leaders

portray violations of the country’s

borders as shameful acts; preserving territorial integrity is therefore 

a matter of national pride. Whenever China’s borders are placed in 

jeopardy, the central authorities 

tend to cast China as a victim of 

unprovoked foreign predation—a 

pattern of external threats that 

they trace back to the colonial era.

China invoked the victim narrative 

to describe the 2020 conflicts along 

the line of actual control (LAC). 

This is despite China flouting its 

prior undertakings to respect the 

LAC at Galwan,

2 and despite the 

barbaric methods used to kill 

Indian personnel, which included 

the use of nail-studded rods. 

China’s invocation of the victim 

narrative fits a pattern of how Beijing has long described its territorial disputes with India and other 

neighboring states. To illustrate 

how longstanding this tendency is, 

consider the transcript of a meeting between Soviet Premier Nikita 

Khrushchev and Chinese leaders 

including Mao Zedong and Chinese 

Premier and Foreign Minister 

Zhou Enlai.3 The meeting took 

place on October 2, 1959. In that 

year, after India granted asylum to 

the Dalai Lama after the Tibetan 

uprising, there had been a series of 

skirmishes between India and

China. When Khrushchev asked 

why Indians had been killed at the 

border, Mao replied that India attacked first and fired for 12 hours.

Khrushchev then asked how, if India had attacked first, no Chinese 

had been killed yet numerous Indians had lost their lives. Zhou responded that Chinese Communist 

Party leaders were not involved in 

managing the incident at the border, and that it was local authorities who had undertaken all the 

measures there, without any authorization from the center. Zhou 

appeared to contradict Mao’s confident assertion that India had been 

the aggressor—an early instance,

perhaps, of China reflexively “playing the victim” when it came to 
Tracing the Link between China’s Concept of Sovereignty and Military Aggression

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │17

Sino-Indian border disputes.

China’s reliance upon the victim 

card is closely linked to its official 

usage of the concept of sovereignty. 

China’s foreign policy pronouncements often use narratives like the 

Century of Humiliation, lost glory, 

rejuvenation, glorious past, and 

other such ideas. When Chinese 

figures use these narratives, they 

are alluding to China’s historical 

stature as the Middle Kingdom—

when several kingdoms from 

across Asia kowtowed to the Chinese Emperor. During that period, 

China as the Middle Kingdom saw 

itself as the center of the world, enjoying a formidable stature in regional affairs owing to its dominance of the Silk Road trade. It 

was only with the weakening of the 

Qing Dynasty that China lost this

stature and external security, becoming vulnerable to the imperial 

forces of Britain, Japan, Russia, 

Germany, and others.

In the twenty-first century, China 

wants to avenge the humiliation 

that was inflicted upon it. Chinese 

leaders seek rejuvenation and to 

recreate the glorious past of the 

Middle Kingdom. However, the 

Middle Kingdom did not operate

according to modern (Westphalian) 

concepts of territorial sovereignty. 

On the contrary, recreating the 

Middle Kingdom of old would

require China to violate the territorial integrity and sovereign authority of several neighboring countries. However, Chinese leaders do 

not seem to empathize with foreign 

counterparts who fear their own 

territorial claims being undermined by China’s rise and assertiveness. At least along the SinoIndian border, Beijing has shown 

itself willing to use force to seize 

territory that it sees as its own.

How can China enforce its own territorial claims while denying those 

of other countries? There are obvious problems with this approach. 

First, an overly aggressive stance

would seem to jeopardize China’s 

claims to be a responsible member 

of the international system. Second, Chinese aggression would 

complicate domestic justifications 

for fighting border wars. To solve 

this problem, perhaps, Beijing has 

habitually grasped for the victim 

card, invoking the historical narrative of Chinese territorial dismemberment to justify the contemporary use of force against foreign 

states—including, in the case of 

the Sino-Indian border, the forcible 

occupation of territory claimed by 

India.

The example of the Senkaku Islands, a Japanese-administered 

territory claimed by China as the

Diaoyu Islands, illustrates how
Pathak

Indo-Pacific Perspective │18

discrete territories have been made 

part of China’s narrative of national territorial integrity. Aside 

from 1945 to 1972, when it was administered by the United States, 

the archipelago has been controlled 

by Japan since 1895. As some observers have noted, the People’s 

Republic of China only began 

pressing the question of sovereignty over the islands in the latter 

half of 1970, when evidence relating to the existence of oil reserves 

surfaced.

4 This suggests that interests other than reclaiming Qing 

territory are at play. China’s economic growth and increasing appetite for energy might lead to more 

such territorial claims going forward. Indeed, there are some parallels with the contested territories

along the Sino-Indian border.

In conclusion, the Chinese concept 

of sovereignty is different from how 

the concept is understood by the 

rest of the world. It is not conducive to mutual respect and shared 

understanding. What is common 

between China’s understanding 

and that of the rest of the world, 

however, is that territory can be an 

important index of power. To this 

end, China is willing to use all 

tools at its disposal to keep increasing its territorial reach. China 

uses anti-imperialist narratives to 

portray itself as the victim in all its 

active territorial disputes, a 

necessary way to justify its uncompromising stances to external and 

domestic audiences. In this sense, 

the Chinese concept of sovereignty 

is a tool of diplomacy and statecraft; a way of preserving China’s 

international image as an historical victim of foreign conquest even 

as it pursues its territorial disputes with growing confidence and 

power. ■

Dr. Sriparna Pathak

Dr. Pathak is Associate Professor at the Jindal 

School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal 

Global University, India. She teaches courses on 

Chinese Foreign Policy, International Relations 

Theories and the People’s Republic of China Before and After World War II. She tweets at 

@Sriparnapathak.
Tracing the Link between China’s Concept of Sovereignty and Military Aggression

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │19

Notes

1 TNN, “Keep border dispute & bilateral ties separate, 

China tells India,” Times of India, 5 August 2020,

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/keep-borderdispute-bilateral-ties-separate-china-tells-india/articleshow/77362414.cms. 

2 “India-China clash: 20 Indian troops killed in Ladakh 

fighting,” BBC News, 16 June 2020, 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53061476. 

3 See Sriparna Pathak, “The Chinese Concept of Sovereignty and the India-China Border Dispute,” in Re-imagining Border Studies in South Asia, ed. Dhananjay Tripathi

(New York: Routledge, 2021).

4 Seokwoo Lee, “Territorial Disputes Among Japan, China 

and Taiwan concerning the Senkaku Islands,” Boundary 

and Territory Briefing 3, no. 7 (2002), 11.
Indo-Pacific Perspectives │ 20

India–China 

Border Disputes 

and Strategic 

Rivalry in the 

Indo-Pacific 

Dr. Ashok Sharma

hina and India’s rise over the 

last two decades has enabled 

them to wield increasing 

amounts of influence on the global 

stage. Even though they share several characteristics—including being the world’s most populous nations, the fastest-growing major 

economies, and developing status—their relationship has been 

fraught with skepticism and hostility since their war of 1962. 

Amid the COVID-19 outbreak, Chinese and Indian forces clashed in 

the Galwan Valley on 15 June 

2020, the first deadly collision 

between the two sides since 1975. 

China claimed the Indian territory 

of Galwan Valley as its own, which 

India rejected as an unfounded and

unacceptable unilateral attempt to 

change the status quo. Though 

both sides agreed to withdraw 

troops from the border in February 

2021, the situation remains volatile.1

At first blush, the Galwan Valley 

clash is seen primarily in the context of a long-standing border dispute and differing perceptions of 

the Line of Actual Control (LAC). 

However, it is the strategic rivalry 

between India and China that undergirds the conflict—part of the 

unfolding geopolitics of the IndoPacific region, which has become 

more intense during the COVID-19 

pandemic.

After successfully controlling the 

virus at home, China attempted to 

use the humanitarian crisis of 

COVID-19 to advance its geopolitical goal of displacing US primacy, 

especially in the Indo-Pacific. The 

United States and its allies reacted 

to China’s diplomatic offensives on 

economic and strategic fronts. For 

its part, India has emerged as a 

strategically significant player in 

the Indo-Pacific, the only country 

capable of matching China’s manufacturing scale amid the debate 

over the global supply chain’s overC

5
India–China Border Disputes and Strategic Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │21

reliance on China. China’s aggression along the LAC was intended 

to send a message to India that it 

was no match for China. This has 

only exacerbated the already tense 

relationship between the two nuclear-armed nations and heightened their strategic rivalry in the 

Indo-Pacific. 

Concerns about international security and stability in the Indo-Pacific have grown in recent years, as 

China’s economic and military policies in the region have grown more 

assertive. China’s bravado over its 

military and economic might have 

hinted at its geopolitical intentions 

in the Indo-Pacific, the region most 

significant for the global prosperity 

in the twenty-first century.2

China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) 

is driven by China’s economic and 

military intentions: to ensure the 

economic growth necessary to underpin the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, and to present China as a viable alternative 

to the United States in terms of 

global leadership. This is concerning for New Delhi, given the BRI’s 

visible footprint in India’s immediate South Asian neighbors and 

elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific. 

China’s debt diplomacy (aimed at 

enticing India’s South Asian neighbors), the China-Pakistan allweather friendship, and the construction of new ports and bases 

across the Indo-Pacific constitute 

additional concerns from the Indian perspective. 

India’s Indo-Pacific strategy is 

driven by its economic and cultural 

links in the region, its security concerns, and the larger aim of playing a more pro-active role on the 

international stage. India has been 

expanding its presence in the region since Narsimha Rao Government launched “Look East Policy” 

in the 1990s, which accelerated under the Modi Government’s “Act 

East Policy.” During the COVID-19 

outbreak, the latent geopolitical rivalry between China and the 

United States, as well as China 

and India, escalated—an unpropitious backdrop for border clashes 

to emerge.

That the Galwan Valley clash was 

discussed at the summit-level by 

Quad leaders is a sign that the India-China relationship has deteriorated to a significant low point. 

China’s perceived aggression has 

sparked concern among likeminded democracies, prompting 

them to take countermeasures. 

This is a major development: 

China’s geopolitical ambition is being now countered by the converging strategic interests of likeminded states, of which India is a 

major strategic player. The 

reemergence of the Quad in 
Sharma

Indo-Pacific Perspective │22

November 2017 is the surest sign

of this new dynamic.3 Moreover, 

the Quad is now moving beyond 

the military dimension,4 has developed vertically from the secretariat 

level to the summit level and is 

likely to expand horizontally to include more nations concerned with 

the Indo-Pacific stability such as 

Vietnam, South Korea, New Zealand (the “Quad Plus” states).5

Growing strategic competition between India and China is also visible in New Delhi’s growing focus 

on strengthening Indo-Tibet border 

infrastructure, augmenting its naval capabilities, and forging strategic ties with China-wary nations in 

the region, including Vietnam, 

Thailand, and Indonesia. This is in 

addition to India’s deepening and 

robust strategic partnership with 

the United States, which has been 

elevated to the level of Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership,6

as well as strategic ties with Japan, Australia, and South Korea. 

Amid heightened tensions with 

China, both India and Australia 

have intensified their engagement 

on the economic, political, and military front. During the COVID-19 

pandemic, India and Australia 

strengthened their defense ties, as 

evidenced by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian 

Prime Minister Scott Morrison 

signing two defense agreements: 

the Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement and the Defence Science and Technology Implementing 

Arrangement,7 as well as Australia 

joining the Quad for a military 

drill in November 2020. These 

strategic alignments have received 

significant US support.

In conclusion, the deadly clash in 

the Galwan Valley strained already acrimonious Sino-Indian relations. More confrontations are 

likely unavoidable. However, unlike the 1962 situation, both India 

and China today have nuclear 

weapons. They are each well aware 

of the dangers of full-fledged war 

and its fatal consequences. IndiaChina relations will be intense and 

competitive in the post-COVID-19 

world, with both vying, in many 

cases, for the same resources, markets, and influence in pursuit of 

their great power ambitions. The 

India-China relationship will be 

marked by suspicion and mistrust. 

To overcome this worsening international environment, massive political and diplomatic efforts will be 

required to restore normalcy to 

India-China relations. ■

Dr. Ashok Sharma

Dr. Sharma is Visiting Fellow at the Strategic 

and Defence Studies Centre, Coral Bell School of 

Asia-Pacific Affairs, Australian National University. He is also a Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales in Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy, and the Deputy 

Chair of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Auckland Branch.
India–China Border Disputes and Strategic Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │23

Notes

1 “India, China agree to pull back troops from disputed 

Himalayan lake after months-long standoff,” 11 February, 

2021, ABC News, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-

02-11/india-china-agree-to-pull-back-troops-from-himalayan-lake/13146658. 

2 Rory Medcalf, Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China 

Won't Map the Future (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2020).

3 The Quad—the US, India, Japan, and Australia—

emerged after the Malabar Exercise in 2007 but went 

backstage after protests from China. See Ashok Sharma, 

“The Quadrilateral Initiative: An Evaluation,” South Asian 

Survey 17, no. 2 (2010): 237–53.

4 John Blaxland and Ashok Sharma, “Bolstering the Quad 

beyond its military dimensions,” 30 April 2021, 

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/04/30/bolsteringthe-quad-beyond-its-military-dimensions/. 

5 Derek Grossman, “Don’t Get Too Excited, ‘Quad Plus’ 

Meetings Won’t Cover China,” The Diplomat, 9 April 2020,

https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/dont-get-too-excitedquad-plus-meetings-wont-cover-china/. 

6 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint 

Statement: Vision and Principles for India-U.S. Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership,” 25 February 2020, 

https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32421/Joint_Statement_Vision_and_Principles_for_IndiaUS_Comprehensive_Global_Strategic_Partnership. 

7 Department of Defence, Government of Australia, “Australia and India sign Defence arrangement,” 4 June 2020, 

https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/media-releases/australia-and-india-sign-defence-arrangement. 
Indo-Pacific Perspectives │ 24

The China–India 

Water Dispute

The Potential for 

Escalation 

Dr. Selina Ho 

he conflation of the China–India 

water dispute with larger territorial and political disputes exacerbates water as a source of conflict between them. The waters of the Himalayas are an invaluable resource for 

the two countries as rapid economic 

development and population growth 

stress their water supplies. Among 

the rivers that cross their disputed

border, the Brahmaputra River/Yarlung Tsangpo is the most significant 

water resource they share. Originating from Tibet, the Brahmaputra 

crosses the border into Arunachal 

Pradesh, which is occupied by India 

but claimed by China as Southern Tibet.

As the upper riparian, China wields 

significant advantage over India. It

withheld hydrological data from India during the Doklam standoff despite an existing hydrological datasharing agreement between them. In 

November 2020, China announced

plans for hydropower construction on 

the section of the Brahmaputra closest to India, triggering strong responses from the Indian side. Of 

greatest concern to India are reports 

of Chinese plans to build a mega-dam

just before the Brahmaputra enters 

India. News of these plans came at a 

time when relations between China 

and India are at a low point, with 

troops facing off at the Galwan Valley. There were also reports that in 

the aftermath of the border clashes, 

China has blocked the flow of the 

Galwan River, which crosses from 

the disputed Chinese-administered 

Aksai Chin region into Ladakh region in India. Indian pundits have 

accused China of “weaponizing” water and using water for political and 

strategic leverage over India. They 

believe that China could cut off water 

or raise the water levels to flood India should a military conflict break 

out between them.

The water dispute between China 

and India is further compounded by 

the fact that institutionalized cooperation between the two sides is low, 

consisting only of an expert-level 

body and a series of memorandums 

T

6
Ho

Indo-Pacific Perspective │25

on hydrological data-sharing. There 

is no water-sharing agreement or a 

joint river commission for managing 

their shared river resources. The difficulties in managing their shared 

waters, the intertwining of the border and water disputes, and the water scarcity problems they both face 

have led to predictions of “water 

wars” between them. Despite these 

dire predictions, however, armed conflict has not broken out over water. 

Even when relations are at a nadir, 

the water dispute did not completely 

become embroiled with the border 

dispute even if it did add to the tensions. Why have China and India 

managed to keep their water dispute 

from escalating into violent conflict? 

What are the conditions under which 

the status quo could change leading 

to armed conflict over water?

Desecuritizing the Water Dispute

A key strategy both governments

have used to prevent their water dispute from boiling over is to desecuritize it. That both sides have desecuritized their water dispute is a bit of a 

puzzle. Almost all the disputes between them, including the border dispute, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama issue, are painted as existential 

threats and accepted as such by both 

sides. Disputes over water are prone 

to securitization because water concerns basic human rights and survival and is therefore an existential 

issue. In fact, “the most obvious resource that is prone to securitization 

is transboundary water.”1 Despite 

these characteristics of water that 

lends itself to securitization, both the 

Chinese and Indian government have 

worked to desecuritize their water 

dispute. Desecuritization is defined 

as the “moving of issues off the ‘security agenda’ and back into the realm 

of public political discourse and ‘normal’ political dispute and accommodation.”

2 Rhetoric, discourses, and 

narratives are used to neutralize or 

reduce the security implications of an 

issue to lower tensions with another 

country.

The Chinese government has used 

assuaging rhetoric to reduce perceptions of its dams as a threat. An oftrepeated rhetoric is that the dams 

are “run-of-the river,” meaning that 

they are not capable of storing or diverting large bodies of water. This 

assuaging rhetoric is most clearly observed during the spring of 2010, following an official Chinese announcement that China is building the 

Zangmu Dam on the Yarlung 

Tsangpo. During a China–India strategic dialogue, Chinese Vice-Foreign

Minister Zhang Zhijun assured the 

Indian delegation that the project 

“was not a project designed to divert 

water” and would not affect “the welfare and availability of water of the 

population in the lower reaches of

the Brahmaputra.”3 The Chinese 
The China–India Water Dispute

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │26

applied desecuritizing rhetoric even 

when the two armies were facing off 

at Doklam. In response to Indian revelations that India had not received 

hydrological data from China during 

the standoff, the Chinese government 

avoided linking the data disruption 

to the Doklam standoff, instead offering a technical explanation that the 

monitoring stations were being renovated. Similarly, the Indian government has sought to downplay the 

threats posed by Chinese dams. In 

response to the news that China was 

constructing the Zangmu Dam, the 

Minister of External Affairs said in a 

statement, “We have ascertained 

from our own sources that this is a 

run-of-the river hydro-electric project, which does not store water and 

will not adversely impact downstream areas in India. Therefore, I 

believe there is no cause for alarm. I 

would like to share with you the fact 

that a large proportion of the catchment of the Brahmaputra is within 

Indian territory.”4

The two countries have cause to 

desecuritize their water conflict. 

Lowering tensions with each other 

will allow both sides to focus on economic growth and development. For 

China, it is aimed at stabilizing its 

southern periphery, expanding bilateral trade and investment with India, and reducing India’s motivations 

for aligning with the United States. 

On the Indian side, a possible 

explanation is that India would not 

want to provoke China, the more 

powerful state that dealt it a humiliating defeat in 1962. However, these 

accounts do not explain why desecuritization only took place for the water dispute but not the other disputes 

between them. I have argued elsewhere that desecuritizaton of the water dispute is not only the result of 

these material reasons but because of 

a set of ideas among the epistemic 

communities in both countries that 

values and prioritizes collaboration 

on water resources and reducing the

perceptions of the water dispute as a 

threat.

5

What Can Lead to Escalation?

Nevertheless, the position that 

both governments have taken to 

desecuritize their water dispute can 

change. There are already indications from the overall increase in tensions between the two countries in 

the past few years that keeping a lid 

on the water dispute has become 

harder. Water disputes are never 

about water resources alone. The water dispute between the two countries is linked with larger political issues and the border conflict. In the 

limited incidents of water wars in 

history, water had acted as a catalyst 

or was used as a pretext for war between countries whose overall relations had deteriorated to the point of 

hostility.6 The Doklam crisis and the
Ho

Indo-Pacific Perspective │27

armed clashes in the Galwan Valley

resulting in deaths and causalities on 

both sides point to the rapidly deteriorating relations between them.

Overall relations between the two 

countries have soured considerably 

in the past few years. Apart from 

border issues, China’s blocking of India’s ascension to the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2016, which denied India recognition of its rising status, 

and refusal to name the leader of the 

Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammed, Masood Azhar, as a terrorist in the United Nations, did not go 

down well with the Indians. China

has also displayed insensitivity to Indian concerns with initiatives such as 

the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. India has been suspicious of 

China’s Belt and Road Initiative. On 

its part, India has acted in ways 

deemed provocative by the Chinese, 

including the former’s decision to 

send in troops to Doklam to block 

Chinese construction there as well as 

India’s road construction in the Galwan River Valley.

Even more critically, Chinese 

threat assessment of India has gone 

up because of India’s growing strategic relations with the United States, 

Japan, and Australia. Competition 

between China and India has heated 

up in recent years, as the result of 

rising nationalism in both countries

and the muscular foreign policies of 

both President Xi Jinping and Prime 

Minister Narendra Modi. The IndoPacific strategy, the revival of the 

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, India’s activities in Southeast Asia, and 

China’s increasing presence in the 

Indian Ocean and South Asia have

expanded the arena for engagement 

and competition between the two 

sides. Their interests are competing 

and overlapping, intensifying the rivalry between them. The COVID-19 

pandemic and the race between the 

two sides to provide vaccines for developing countries have further worsened the rivalry and hostility between the two countries. Increasing

competition between them and recent 

border clashes do not augur well for 

the management of their water dispute. The efforts of the two governments to desecuritize the water dispute and to prevent overall deteriorating relations from spilling over 

into the water dispute is increasingly 

untenable. ■

Dr. Selina Ho

Dr. Ho is Assistant Professor in International Affairs at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, 

National University of Singapore. She is the author 

of Thirsty Cities: Social Contracts and Public Goods 

Provision in China and India (Cambridge University Press, 2019) and co-author of Rivers of Iron: 

Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia

(University of California Press, 2020), in addition to 

articles in journals such as International Affairs, 

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Journal of 

Contemporary China, and Water Policy.
The China–India Water Dispute

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │28

Notes

1 Itay Fischhendler, “The Securitization of Water Discourse: Theoretical Foundations, Research Gaps and Objectives of the Special Issue,” International Environment 

Agreements 15, no. 3 (2015), 249–50.

2 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies 

Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003), 523. 

3 Cited in Sebastian Biba, “Desecuritizaton in China’s Behaviour Towards its Transboundary Rivers: The Mekong 

River, the Brahmaputra River, and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, No. 85 (2014), 30.

4 Cited in Satu Limaye, “The Middle Riparian Quandaries: 

India and the Brahmaputra River Basin,” in Water Resource Competition in the Brahmaputra River Basin: China, 

India, and Bangladesh, ed. Nilanthi Samaranayake, Satu 

Limaye, and Joel Wuthnow (Arlington: Center for Strategic 

Studies, 2016), 25. 

5 Selina Ho, Neng Qian, and Yifei Yan, “The Role of Ideas 

in the China-India Water Dispute,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 12, no. 2 (2019): 263–94. 

6 Aaron T. Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways,” Water Policy 1, no. 2 (1998): 251–65.
Indo-Pacific Perspectives │ 29

China–India 

Border Crisis

Jeff M. Smith

he crisis that began at the disputed China–India border in 

early 2020 was not the first - and 

almost certainly will not be the last -

standoff at the Line of Actual Control

(LAC). But the crisis was unique and 

its implications for China–India relations are likely to be far-reaching. It 

underscored the degree to which the 

longstanding border dispute, and the 

increasingly troubled relationship, 

have entered a new and more volatile 

chapter.

A great deal of ink has already been 

spilled analyzing the standoff, which 

began in May 2020 when People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers advanced to occupy a “grey zone” near 

the LAC claimed and patrolled by 

both countries on the north bank of 

Pangong Lake in Ladakh. This was 

followed by a buildup of military 

forces at multiple junctures farther

north along LAC where Ladakh 

meets Tibet, including at Hot Spring, 

Gogra, the Galwan Valley, and, later,

the south bank of Pangong Lake.

Brief, nonviolent encounters between 

Chinese and Indian border patrols 

are not uncommon along the LAC but 

are generally well-managed thanks

to a detailed set of de-escalation protocols. Prolonged standoffs at the 

LAC, in which Chinese forces set up 

camp beyond established patrol lines, 

are more uncommon. But they have 

been growing in frequency since 

2013, the year Xi Jinping was elected 

president (and one year after he became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist 

Party).

The summer of 2017 saw a new form 

of border crisis emerge when Chinese 

and Indian troops engaged in a 

standoff in territory disputed by 

China and Bhutan, not far from a 

sensitive sector of the China–India 

border. India retains outsized influence over Bhutan’s foreign and security policy and when Chinese forces 

began extending a road southward 

into disputed territory, nearby Indian forces intervened, prompting a 

prolonged standoff.

The ten-week crisis was unpreceT

7
China–India Border Crisis

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │30

dented in some ways, including the 

unusually incendiary rhetoric that 

emerged from official outlets in Beijing, which threatened India with 

war-like ultimatums if it did not 

withdraw from the standoff site unilaterally. However, like the prolonged standoffs in Ladakh in the 

years prior, the Doklam crisis was

eventually de-escalated peacefully

following the negotiation of a mutual 

withdrawal agreement.

Then, in 2019, amateur videos began 

surfacing online showing unusually 

hostile encounters between Chinese 

and Indian patrols near the LAC, engaging in fistfights and rock-throwing, including along the banks of 

Pangong Lake. There are a handful 

of disputed sectors in Ladakh where 

the two sides disagree about the precise location of the LAC; the videos

helped to underscore how, in recent 

years, Pangong Lake has become one 

of the most volatile. The lake also 

registers a disproportionate share of 

Chinese “transgressions” of the LAC, 

according to official Indian statistics.

In years prior, an unstable status 

quo had emerged on the north bank 

of Pangong Lake, in a grey zone between an Indian military encampment near “Finger 4” and a Chinese 

encampment several miles to the 

east, near “Finger 8.” Both sides patrolled this area, although China enjoyed superior access and 

infrastructure. The 2020 crisis began 

when, following a tense encounter between border patrols, several hundred Chinese soldiers pressed forward toward Finger 4, establishing 

new camps and staking more permanent claim to the grey zone behind 

them. Soon after, satellite imagery 

revealed a major buildup of Chinese 

forces at other volatile sectors of the 

LAC farther north in Ladakh. Unusually, this included the forward positioning of tanks and artillery. They 

were met by a comparable buildup of 

Indian forces at forward positions 

and a substantial escalation of political tensions.

Initial attempts at de-escalation 

turned tragic in June when Chinese 

and Indian forces engaged in a bout 

of medieval combat by moonlight, resulting in 20 Indian casualties and 

an unknown number of Chinese casualties. It marked the first deadly 

outbreak of hostilities at the border 

in over 40 years. The multilayered 

standoff endured through 2020, with 

India later occupying strategically 

valuable heights along the southern 

banks of Pangong Lake. Eventually, 

negotiators reached terms on an interim de-escalation agreement which 

saw both sides pull back from forward positions at Pangong Lake. The 

buildup of forces at the standoff sites 

farther north in Ladakh persist, even 

as the two militaries remain on their 

respective sides of the LAC. The PLA 
Smith

Indo-Pacific Perspective │31

has also reportedly blocked Indian 

forces from patrolling near the LAC 

in the Depsang Plains, though the 

phenomenon appears to pre-date the 

events of May 2020.

What does this crisis tell us about 

the broader relationship and accelerating rivalry? Why is the over-60-

year-old China–India border dispute 

heating up now? And why have the 

two been unable or unwilling to resolve this legacy dispute? The secrecy 

surrounding the Chinese Communist 

Party and its decision-making often 

leaves analysts with more questions 

than answers. But the 2020 border 

crisis was likely precipitated at least 

in part by India’s attempts to upgrade its infrastructure near the 

LAC, and China’s attempts to coerce 

India to halt these projects.

China has long enjoyed an infrastructure advantage near the LAC in 

Ladakh and in recent years India has 

accelerated belated attempts to narrow that gap. This has prompted opposition from Beijing and several of 

the prolonged standoffs in Ladakh in 

the mid-2010s arose out of attempts 

by the PLA to pressure India to halt 

or dismantle new infrastructure projects. In some cases, it worked.

At the outbreak of the 2020 border 

crisis, India was advancing several 

new major infrastructure projects, including an important north-south 

road running parallel to the LAC, 

complete with “feeder” roads extending east toward the LAC. When New 

Delhi refused to heed Chinese demands calls to halt or dismantle this 

infrastructure, Beijing may have calculated that it could compel such a 

change through military pressure. If 

so, China was drawing from a similar 

playbook it had adopted in years 

past, albeit with sharper edges and a 

greater appetite for risk, paralleling 

a broader trend of Chinese “Wolf 

Warrior” assertiveness in recent 

years. It is unlikely, however, that 

Beijing foresaw the bloodshed that 

might arise from the adventure, or 

the considerable blow it might deal to 

the already tense relationship.

The episode also revives a bigger 

question about whose purposes are 

served by the continuation of this 

border dispute. While the Indian government has not publicly committed 

to such a position, it is widely believed New Delhi would at least give 

due consideration to a form of status 

quo territorial “swap” that more or 

less enshrined the LAC as the international border. India would give up 

its outstanding claims to Aksai Chin

in the “Western Sector”; China would 

do the same in the “Eastern Sector” 

where it claims most of the Indian 

state of Arunachal Pradesh; and 

some minor adjustments would be

made to the relatively less contentious “Middle Sector.”
China–India Border Crisis

Indo-Pacific Perspectives │32

Such an agreement would appear to 

be eminently practical given that, today, there is very little prospect of either side “reclaiming” Aksai Chin or 

Arunachal Pradesh short of a major 

war that neither side desires. Arunachal Pradesh has been an Indian 

state or Union Territory for nearly 50 

years and will not be negotiated 

away or easily seized by force. And 

the Indian government apparently 

has little interest in a conflict with a 

nuclear-armed rival to seize the relatively barren Himalayan territory of 

Aksai Chin.

What is obstructing this seemingly

practical territorial swap? After registering tangible progress between 

1993 and 2005, border negotiations 

that have been ongoing for roughly 

40 years slowed to a halt in 2007. 

That year, China signaled that any

territorial swap would have to include India ceding to China the town 

of Tawang, a nonstarter for New 

Delhi. Perched in the Himalayas only 

a dozen miles from the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh, Tawang carries historical and religious significance as 

the birthplace of the sixth Dalai 

Lama. It was also the first refuge 

reached by the current Dalai Lama 

when he made a hazardous two-week 

trek to flee Chinese rule in Tibet in 

1959.

As a result, Tawang has become enmeshed in the contentious set of 

issues surrounding the 85-year-old

Dalai Lama’s eventual reincarnation.

In Tawang lies part of the history

and traditions of Buddhism and the 

institution of the Dalai Lama. And in 

recent years the Chinese government 

has become increasingly concerned

with securing a greater hold over the 

Tibetan plateau and Tibetan Buddhism, unveiling a wave of repressive 

measures, hand-selecting Buddhist 

monks, and claiming sole authority 

over the selection of the next Dalai 

Lama.

As many of India’s most astute China 

watchers have argued, for Beijing the 

border dispute and Tibet are inextricably linked. China has long expressed displeasure with India for its

hosting the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan 

Government in Exile, and a large 

population of Tibetan exiles. It has 

repeatedly accused India of interfering in its internal affairs on Tibet-related issues. It is indignant about the 

possibility the Dalai Lama may identify his successor within India’s borders.

In its own way, China has repeatedly 

sought to signal to India that the border dispute will remain an issue so 

long as the question of Tibet goes unresolved. When the LAC was relatively peaceful, the costs of that 

strategy appeared to be modest. But 

with the dispute entering a more volatile phase, one more destructive to 
Smith

Indo-Pacific Perspective │33

the overall bilateral relationship, it is 

becoming more costly for China to

link the border disputes to Tibet. It 

remains to be seen whether China 

will double down on its more aggressive border tactics or reassess and readjust. ■

Jeff M. Smith

Mr. Smith is a Research Fellow at The Heritage 

Foundation in Washington, DC. He is the author of 

Cold Peace: China–India Rivalry in the Twenty-First 

Century (Lexington Books, 2015), as well as numerous pieces of commentary and analysis on the SinoIndian relationship.
The Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers

Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell

Director & Editor in Chief

Patricia Clough

Deputy Editor in Chief

Jon Howard

Assistant Editor in Chief

Dr. Chulanee Attanayake

Senor Resezrcher & Writer

Dr. Hyun-ji Rim

Senior Editor

Dr. Indu Saxena

Senior Writer

Dr. Nitika Srivastava

Senior Writer & Researcher

Lt Col Terence "TV" Vance, USAF, ret.

Senior Multimedia Specialist & Asst. Senior 

Researcher

Maj Kaoru Elliott, USSF

Senior Researcher

Maj Matthew House, USA

Senior Editor

Maj J.R. Sessions, USA

Senior Writer

Thilini Kahandawaarachchi

Senior Researcher & Writer

Ashish Saxena

Senior Artificial Intelligence Liaison

Donna Budjenska

Assistant Senior Editor

Tom Connolly

Assistant Senior Researcher & Editor

Mrityunjaya Dubey

Assistant Senior Editor, Multimedia Specialist, 

& Writer

Dr. Achala Gunasekara-Rockwell

Assistant Senior Multimedia Specialist

Anvesh Jain

Assistant Senior Writer

Leo Mathers

Assistant Senior Writer

Emilio Angeles

Researcher, Multimedia Specialist, & Writer

Benafsha Attar

Researcher

Capt Michael Brodka, USA

Researcher

Soumyadeep Deb

Researcher & Writer

Lt Col Steve Drinnon, USAF, ret.

Editor & Researcher

Prakash Jangid

Researcher

Sumnima Karki

Researcher & Editorial Assistant

Sunaina Karki

Researcher & Editorial Assistant

Aakriti Kumar

Writer

Dr. John Lash

Editor & Writer

Capt Neil Law, USA

Writer

Eleanor Lewis

Writer

Maj Christopher Little, USAF

Editor. Multimedia Specialist, & Writer

Leo Lin

Writer

Capt Peter Loftus, USAF

Editor

Dr. Adam Lowther

Editor

Asst. Prof. Rubaiyat Rahman

Editor, Multimedia Specialist, & Writer

Atandra Ray

Researcher & Multimedia Specialist

Rushali Saha

Researcher & Writer

Mrittika Guha Sarkar

Researcher & Writer

Arushi Singh

Researcher & Writer

Mahika Sri Krishna

Writer

CDR Michael Tomsik, USN

Editor

Fabio van Loon

Researcher & Writer

Ankush Wagle

Researcher

Sanskruti Yagnik

Researcher, Writer, & Communications 

Assistant
The Air Force Culture and Language Center invites 

you to attend the sixth Annual Air University 

Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (AU LREC) 

Symposium. This year’s LREC Symposium is themed, 

“The Great Power of Culture,” and calls for participants 

to address the influence of culture in the workings of 

power, and to foster conversations about the role of 

language, regional expertise, and culture in the 

current U.S. national security and defense orientation 

to a world characterized by great power competition. 

I was excited by the diverse 

array of topics that 

speakers presented at this 

symposium... I hope that 

future LREC symposia can 

continue to expand [these] 

topics and perspectives.

QUESTIONS?

Phone: 334.953.1139 | Email: af.clc@us.af.mil

“

“

The impact of LREC on 1 operations and engagements

Addressing the “human domain”

through LREC concepts and 

curricula

2

The power of cultural competence

 in building partnerships and 

strengthing alliances

3

Techniques for improving 4 foreign language competence

Call for Papers

Below are a few possible presentation topics.

More topics and the full call for papers are 

available on our event website: 

AIRUNIVERSITY.AF.EDU/AFCLC/AU-LREC/

- 2020 AU LREC Symposium Attendee