U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

28–970 2018

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–67] 

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND 

THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 6, 2018 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

JIMMY PANETTA, California 

JEN STEWART, Staff Director 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Mattis, Hon. James N., Secretary of Defense ........................................................ 4 

Selva, Gen Paul J., USAF, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .............. 9 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Mattis, Hon. James N. ..................................................................................... 37 

Selva, Gen Paul J. ............................................................................................ 52 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 34 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ ............................................................... 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Dr. Abraham ..................................................................................................... 73 

Mr. Bacon .......................................................................................................... 74 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 69 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 61 

Mr. DesJarlais .................................................................................................. 73 

Mr. Gallagher .................................................................................................... 74 

Mr. Gallego ........................................................................................................ 77 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 66 

Mr. Hice ............................................................................................................. 75 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 64 

Mr. Knight ........................................................................................................ 72 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 62 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 76 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 58 

Ms. Rosen .......................................................................................................... 79 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 67 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 76 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 57 

Dr. Wenstrup .................................................................................................... 71 

(1) 

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND 

THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 6, 2018. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:36 a.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ Thornberry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

The committee meets today to hear testimony on the administration’s National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review, both 

of which were recently released. We welcome back the Secretary of 

Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss these important documents. 

I cannot count the number of times I have heard members of this 

committee talk about the importance of having a defense strategy 

to help guide decisions that we and the executive branch have to 

make. Now we have one. It is a component of the broader National 

Security Strategy released in December, and it has within it the 

Nuclear Posture Review, the first of its kind since 2010. A lot has 

changed since 2010, and both documents come at a critical time. 

As the National Security Strategy points out, quote, ‘‘America’s 

military remains the strongest in the world. However, U.S. advantages are shrinking as rival states modernize and build up their 

conventional and nuclear forces,’’ end quote. 

There will undoubtedly be criticism of both documents. Some of 

it will be based on valid shortcomings; some of it may spring from 

more ideological differences. Debates about the particulars are fair 

and to be expected. But it is also fair, I think, to commend the administration for its attempt to bring structure and rationality to 

our wide-ranging national security efforts in what is surely a dangerous and volatile world. 

One last point: We must never forget that, with any strategy, the 

heart of our Nation’s defense, our most valuable asset, remains the 

people who serve. It is morally wrong to send brave men and 

women out on missions under any strategy for which they are not 

fully trained, equipped, and supported with the best that this country can provide. That support should not be conditioned on any 

other issue. And we can never forget that there is a real human 

cost to failing to fully support them. Strategy is important, but 

nothing is more important for Congress than for us to do our job 
2 

to support the men and women who protect us fully and unconditionally. 

I yield to the ranking member. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 33.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretary Mattis, General Selva. I appreciate you 

both being here. And I very much appreciate the fact that, as the 

chairman said, you have put out the National Security Strategy. 

That is obviously a crucially important step in figuring out how we 

put together our budget and how the Department of Defense does 

its job. 

And I will start by agreeing with the last point that the chairman made. I think it is the most important one, and that is whatever our strategy is, whatever it is that we tell the men and women 

who serve in our military, this is what we expect you to do. 

It is our paramount obligation to make sure that we fund that, 

that we do not have a situation where we give them so many tasks 

but not enough resources to train for them. I think we can—that 

is the definition of a hollow force, when we send them into battle 

unprepared to do what we had told them to do. 

And, unfortunately, due to a lot of the budgetary challenges that 

we have had in the last 6 or 7 years, that has been happening far 

too often, because we have lurched from continuing resolution to 

government shutdown, to continuing resolution, to sometimes an 

appropriations deal. 

It is very difficult for both of you and for your predecessors to 

plan what you are going to do when you do not know how much 

money you are going to have one week to the next. I think that is 

a very significant problem. 

So I appreciate the strategies put together. My biggest concern 

is, does it match the amount of resources that we are likely to have 

to fund it. We are $21 trillion in debt, and counting. The deficit last 

year was close to $700 billion, and it is going up, not down. 

So how do we make this fit? How does this work? And then when 

you look at the broader picture, and we just cut taxes by what is 

going to amount to $2 trillion. The immediate short-term impact of 

that is that we are going to hit the debt ceiling sooner than we had 

expected to because less revenue is coming into the Treasury, so we 

will have to go ahead and do that. 

So in the face of a $21 trillion debt, $700 billion deficit, and all 

of the needs that the chairman outlines—and your strategy lays it 

out, and I think in this committee, certainly, we all know the list. 

It is sort of up on the wall over there, minus Iran and the threat 

from radical Islamist extremisms—those are the threats that we 

face and how do we meet them. 

In the face of all of that, we decided to give away $2 trillion. And 

I could make an argument that in so doing, this Congress made a 

public policy decision that we were not going to fund defense at the 

levels that this committee thinks they should. We decided not to 
3 

fund it and then, okay, well, there is other places we can get the 

money. 

But the President has said he is not going to reform mandatory 

spending at all. The State of the Union Address promised more 

money than I think I can possibly imagine. And as a side note, I 

think we ought to ban the State of the Union Address—and I say 

that for Democrats and Republicans alike—because the main thing 

that it does is it gives the Executive a chance to stand up there 

and promise things that are absolutely, utterly, and completely impossible to deliver. And then the American public comes to expect 

it and rightfully gets a little bit irritated when magic does not 

make it happen. And, again, that is bipartisan. Every State of the 

Union Address I have seen since I have been here I have walked 

out of there thinking, we do not have that money. What is he talking about? So we need to make improvements on that, to be sure. 

And I worry greatly about how this strategy is going to be implemented in the face of our debt and our deficits. And if interest 

rates go up—I mean, we have been incredibly lucky that we have 

been able to borrow all this money on the cheap. If interest rates 

go up to 3 percent, you can forget about all this stuff. 

And I do not blame that on the defense budget. I understand it 

is a piece of it. It is 17 percent of the budget. But our overall budget picture does not add up, and I worry that, ultimately, that will 

wind up costing the men and women who serve, costing our ability 

to give them the training and the equipment they need to carry out 

the missions that we all hear—that we need. 

The last thing I would say and what I want to hear is, as I said, 

we have the list: China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, violent Islamist 

extremist groups. How do we confront those threats and protect our 

country? I just want to make a couple quick comments on that. 

There is a common thread between all of those threats, and that 

is a threat to representative democracy, freedom, and capitalism. 

All of those groups want to make the world safe, I guess, for autocratic dictatorships. Then each one of them has a slightly different 

viewpoint on what that dictatorship should look like, but it is a 

fundamental threat to democracy and representative government. 

And I think we need to understand it in that context and push 

back comprehensively to try and create a world that is safe for 

freedom and democracy, because I think that is incredibly important in keeping a peaceful and prosperous world. 

And lastly, I am interested in hearing from you—we hear a lot 

from the military about what you do not have, about where we are 

not spending enough money, about the threats that we are not 

meeting. If we are going to get to where we need to go, we need 

to hear where can we save money, you know, what part of our National Security Strategy could we not spend money on. Because if 

we do not hear places where we can save money, there is no way 

we are going to have enough money to meet all the places where 

we are being told that we need it. We need to hear that. 

And I want to say that I think your leadership at DOD [Department of Defense] and the leadership that came before under Ash 

Carter has really—and the leadership of the chairman, has done a 

good job at getting at procurement reform, getting at, you know, 

trying to get more out of the money that we spend and pulling com-
4 

mercial technology, a bunch of different ideas that can enable us 

to get more for less money. 

But that is never going to be more important than it is going forward, given the fiscal situation that we are in and given the threat 

environment that is as described. How do we meet that? So we are 

going to have to be a lot smarter about how we spend our money, 

given the situation that we are in. 

With that, I yield back, and I look forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 34.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is pleased to welcome the Secretary of Defense, Honorable James Mattis, and the Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Paul Selva. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Without objection, your full 

written statements will be made part of the record. 

Mr. Secretary, you are recognized for any comments you would 

like to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MATTIS, 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee. 

I am here at your invitation to testify on two subjects: the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review. I am 

joined by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief, General Selva. 

Even in the midst of our ongoing counterterrorism campaigns, 

my role is to keep the peace for one more year, one more month, 

one more day, giving Secretary Tillerson and our diplomats time to 

resolve crises through diplomatic channels. The Department of Defense does this by providing the Commander in Chief with military 

options that ensure our diplomats negotiate from a position of 

strength. 

Upfront, I need to note, 3 days from now I will visit our Nation’s 

first security force assistance brigade in Fort Benning, Georgia, as 

they prepare to deploy to Afghanistan. To advance the security of 

our Nation, these troops are putting themselves in harm’s way, in 

effect, signing a blank check payable to the American people with 

their lives. They do so despite Congress’ abrogation of its constitutional responsibility to provide sufficient, stable funding. 

Our military have been operating under debilitating continuing 

resolutions for more than 1,000 days during the past decade. These 

men and women hold the line for America while lacking this most 

fundamental congressional support: a predictable budget. 

Congress mandated—rightfully mandated this National Defense 

Strategy, the first one in a decade, and then shut down the government the day of its release. Today, we are again operating under 

a disruptive continuing resolution. It is not lost on me that as I testify before you this morning, we are again on the verge of a government shutdown, or at best, another damaging continuing resolution. 

I regret that without sustained predictable appropriations, my 

presence here today wastes your time, because no strategy can survive, as you pointed out, Chairman, without the funding necessary 

to resource it. Yet we all know that America can afford survival. 
5 

Nations as different as China and Russia have chosen to be strategic competitors. They seek to create a world consistent with their 

authoritarian models and pursue veto power over other nations’ 

economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. Rogue regimes like 

North Korea and Iran persist in taking outlaw actions that undermine and threaten regional and global stability. And despite our 

successes to date against ISIS’s [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s] 

physical caliphate, violent extremist organizations continue to sow 

hatred, incite violence, and murder innocents. Across the globe, democracies are taking notice. 

We recognize great power competition is once again a reality. We 

will continue to prosecute the campaign against terrorism by, with, 

and through our allies. But in our new defense strategy, great 

power competition—not terrorism—is now the primary focus of 

U.S. national security. 

Our military remains capable, but our competitive edge has eroded in every domain of warfare: air, land, sea, cyber, and space. 

Under frequent continuing resolutions and sequesters, budget caps, 

our advantages continue to shrink. The combination of rapidly 

changing technology, the negative impact on military readiness resulting from the longest continuous stretch of combat in our Nation’s history, and insufficient funding have created an overstretched and underresourced military. 

During last week’s State of the Union Address, President Trump 

said weakness is the surest path to conflict. To those who might 

suggest that we should accept a yearlong continuing resolution, it 

would mean a return to a disastrous sequestration level of funding 

for the military. And in a world awash in change and increasing 

threats, there is no room for complacency. History makes clear that 

no country has a preordained right to victory on the battlefield. 

Framed within President Trump’s National Security Strategy 

and aligned with the Department of State, our 2018 National Defense Strategy provides clear strategic direction for America’s military. A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power, diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military. 

The Department’s principal priorities are long-term strategic 

competitions with China and Russia. Given the magnitude of the 

threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, Congress 

must commit to both an increased and sustained investment in our 

capabilities. 

Concurrently, the Department will sustain its efforts to deter and 

counter rogue regimes, such as North Korea and Iran; defeat terrorist threats to the United States; and consolidate our gains in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, while moving to a more resource-sustainable 

approach. 

More than any other nation, America can expand the competitive 

space. We can challenge our competitors where we possess advantages and they lack strength. To restore a competitive military 

edge, this defense strategy pursues three primary lines of effort: to 

build a more lethal force, to strengthen traditional alliances while 

building new partnerships, and reform the Department’s business 

practices for performance and affordability. 
6 

Our first line of effort emphasizes that everything we do must 

contribute to the lethality of our military. In war, an enemy will 

attack a perceived weakness. Therefore, we cannot adopt a single 

preclusive form of warfare; rather, we must be able to fight across 

the spectrum of combat. This means the size and composition of 

our force matters. The Nation must field a sufficient capable force 

to deter conflict. If deterrence fails, we must win. To defend our 

way of life, our military will embrace change while holding fast to 

traditional proven attributes that make us the most formidable 

force on any battlefield. Those who would threaten America’s experiment in democracy must know, if you threaten us, it will be 

your longest and worst day. 

To implement this strategy we will invest in key capabilities, recognizing we cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts 

with yesterday’s weapons and equipment. Driven by this strategy, 

next week you will see in our fiscal year 2019 budget investments 

the following: space and cyber, nuclear deterrent forces, missile defense, advanced autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and 

professional military education to provide our high-quality troops 

what they need to win. 

We will prioritize rebuilding readiness while modernizing our existing force. We will also be changing our forces’ posture to 

prioritize readiness for warfighting in major combat, making us 

strategically predictable for our allies and operationally unpredictable for any adversary. 

Our second line of effort is to strengthen traditional alliances 

while building new partnerships. History is clear that nations with 

allies thrive. We inherited this approach to security and prosperity 

from the greatest generation, and it has served the United States 

well for 70 years. Working by, with, and through allies who carry 

their fair share is a source of strength. Since the costly victory in 

World War II, Americans have carried a disproportionate share of 

the global defense burden while others recovered. 

Today, the growing economic strength of allies and partners has 

enabled them to step up, as demonstrated by more than 70 nations 

and international organizations participating in the Defeat-ISIS 

campaign, and again in the 40-some nations standing shoulder to 

shoulder in NATO’s [North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s] Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. Most NATO allies are also increasing their defense budgets, giving credence to the value of democracies standing together. 

Our third line of effort serves as the foundation for our military’s 

competitive edge: Reforming the business practices of the Department to provide both solvency and security and thereby gaining full 

benefit from every dollar spent. 

Every day we will earn the trust of Congress and the American 

people. We must be good stewards of the tax dollars entrusted to 

us. In this regard, we will deliver our Department’s full financial 

audit this year, because results and accountability matter. The first 

audit in DOD’s history will reveal how we can be better stewards. 

The Department is transitioning to a culture of performance and 

affordability that operates at the speed of relevance. We will 

prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent 

modular upgrades. With your critical support, we will shed out-
7 

dated management and acquisition processes while adopting American industry’s best practices. If current structures inhibit our pursuit of lethality, I expect my service secretaries and defense agency 

heads to consolidate, eliminate, and restructure to achieve the mission. 

One of the key elements of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 

is to ensure America’s military provides a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Last January, President Trump directed a 

Nuclear Posture Review to ensure the United States nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately 

tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure allies. 

I recently received a letter from Senators concerned that the 

2018 Nuclear Posture Review would undermine decades of U.S. 

leadership on efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. To the contrary, the 2018 

Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the mutually reinforcing role of 

nuclear deterrence in a complex and dynamic security environment, while underscoring continued U.S. commitment to nonproliferation, to counter nuclear terrorism, and to arms control. 

Specifically, the review reflects the Department of Defense’s strategic priority to maintain a safe and effective nuclear deterrent 

that will successfully deter nuclear and nonnuclear strategic attacks, assure our allies and partners, respond effectively should deterrence fail, and hedge against future uncertainties and dangers. 

The United States remains committed to its global leadership 

role to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and to fulfill existing 

treaty and arms control obligations, leadership that has reduced 

our nuclear weapons stockpile by over 85 percent from its Cold 

War high. Yet we must recognize that deterrence and arms control 

can only be achieved with a credible capability. 

A review of the global nuclear situation is sobering. While Russia 

has reduced only the number of its accountable strategic nuclear 

force, as agreed upon in the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty, at the same time, Russia has been modernizing these 

weapons as well as other nuclear systems. 

Moscow advocates a theory of nuclear escalation for military conflict. China too is modernizing and expanding its already considerable nuclear forces pursuing entirely new nuclear capabilities. It is 

also modernizing its conventional military to challenge U.S. military superiority. Despite universal condemnation in the United Nations, North Korea’s nuclear provocations threaten regional and 

global peace, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain an unresolved 

concern. Globally, nuclear terrorism remains a tangible threat. 

As Senator McCain said last week, since the end of the Cold 

War, we have let our nuclear capabilities atrophy under the false 

belief that the era of great power competition was over. As the new 

National Defense Strategy rightfully acknowledges, we now face 

the renewed threat of competition from Russia and China, and we 

cannot ignore their investments in nuclear weapons in addition to 

conventional forces. 

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the findings of previous reviews that the nuclear triad comprised of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, bomber aircraft, and nuclear submarines is the most strategically sound means of ensuring nuclear 
8 

deterrence. To remain effective, however, we must recapitalize our 

Cold War legacy nuclear deterrent forces, continuing a modernization program initiated during the previous administration. 

To quote my predecessor, Secretary Carter, quote, ‘‘We have been 

in a nuclear arms race for two decades now, but the U.S. has not 

been running the race,’’ unquote. 

And as you can see demonstrated in this chart over here in the 

corner of the room, that gives credence to my predecessor’s observation. The nuclear delivery system development over the last 8 years 

shows numerous advances by Russia, by China, and by North 

Korea, versus the near absence of such activity by the United 

States, with competitors and adversaries developing 34 new systems in that time as compared to only 1 for the United States, the 

F–35 aircraft. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

Secretary MATTIS. Nuclear deterrence will continue to play a critical role in preventing nuclear attack and large-scale conventional 

warfare between nuclear arms states for the foreseeable future. 

U.S. nuclear weapons assure and defend our allies against conventional and nuclear threats, furthering our nonproliferation goals 

and increasing global security. 

The National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review 

align with the President’s National Security Strategy guiding all of 

our efforts. As I said earlier, no strategy can survive without the 

necessary stable, predictable funding. Failure to modernize our 

military risks leaving us with a force that could dominate the last 

war but be irrelevant to tomorrow’s security. 

We need Congress to lift the defense spending caps and support the budget for our military of $700 billion for this fiscal year and 

$716 billion for next fiscal year. Let me be clear: As hard as the 

last 16 years of war have been on our military, no enemy in the 

field has done as much to harm the readiness of the U.S. military 

than the combined impact of the Budget Control Act’s defense 

spending caps, worsened by operating for 10 of the last 11 years 

under continuing resolutions of varied and unpredictable duration. 

The Budget Control Act was purposely designed to be so injurious that it would force Congress to pass necessary budgets. It 

was never intended to be the solution. For too long we have asked 

our military to carry on stoically with a success-at-any-cost attitude. Our troops work tirelessly to accomplish every mission with 

increasingly inadequate and misaligned resources simply because 

Congress has not maintained regular order. The fact that our volunteer military has performed so well is a credit to their dedication 

and professionalism. We expect the men and women of our military 

to be faithful in their service, even when going in harm’s way. We 

must also remain faithful to them. 

Chairman, as you said in January, ‘‘If Congress does not come 

together to find a way to fund this strategy, Secretary Mattis must 

explicitly inform Congress and the American people of the consequences of failure.’’ 

The consequences of not providing a budget are clear. Even 

though we are protecting ongoing operations from continuing resolution disruptions, each increment of funding in support of our 

partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria requires a 15-day congres-
9 

sional notification. My commanders in the field write to me for help 

in getting timely and predictable funds for their efforts as they 

work to execute our strategy against the enemy in the field. 

Additionally, should we stumble into a yearlong continuing resolution, your military will not be able to provide pay for our troops 

by the end of the fiscal year. We will not recruit the 15,000 Army 

soldiers and 4,000 Air Force airmen required to fill critical manning shortfalls. We will not maintain our ships at sea with the 

proper balance between operations and time in port for maintenance. We will ground aircraft due to a lack of maintenance and 

spare parts. We will deplete the ammunition, training, and manpower required to deter war, and delay contracts for vital acquisition programs necessary to modernize the force. 

Further, I cannot overstate the impact to our troops’ morale from 

all this uncertainty. 

Today, as I sit here, we are engaged in prudent planning in the 

Pentagon for another disruptive government shutdown. You know 

that I cannot care more about our country’s defense than this Congress, for it is Congress alone which has the constitutional authority to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a 

navy. 

We need Congress back in the driver’s seat, not in the spectator’s 

seat of the Budget Control Act’s indiscriminate and automatic cuts. 

I know that in time of a major war, Congress will provide our military with all it needs. But money at the time of crisis fails to deter 

war. And you know we would be at that point to have nothing— 

no time to prepare, as it takes months and years to produce the 

munitions, the training, and readiness required to fight well. 

To carry out this strategy you rightly directed we develop, we 

need you to pass a budget now. If we are to sustain our military’s 

primacy, we need budget predictability. Congress must take action 

now to ensure our military’s lethality is sufficient to defend our 

way of life, to preserve the promise of prosperity, and to pass on 

the freedoms we enjoy to the next generation. And I ask that you 

not let disagreements on domestic policy continue to hold our Nation’s defense hostage. 

General Selva will now discuss the military dimensions of the 

2018 National Defense Strategy and our Nuclear Posture Review. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Mattis can be found in the 

Appendix on page 37.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General Selva. 

STATEMENT OF GEN PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, VICE CHAIRMAN 

OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General SELVA. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to join Secretary Mattis to brief on the National Defense Strategy and the 

Nuclear Posture Review. 

General Dunford and I, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, fully 

support the strategies outlined in the National Defense Strategy 

and in the Nuclear Posture Review. Both documents are the product of significant consultation and collaboration between members 
10 

of the Joint Staff and the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] 

staff. 

The National Defense Strategy provides detailed defense policy 

guidance for military strategy, planning, and operations. Therefore, 

the chairman’s 2016 classified National Military Strategy will require an update to maintain complete consistency with the National Defense Strategy and the President’s National Security 

Strategy released in December. 

Immediately upon release of the National Defense Strategy published last month, General Dunford directed the Joint Staff to commence a revision of the National Military Strategy, and that process is now underway. Other subsequent guidance and plans will be 

revised in turn to support the lines of effort outlined in the National Defense Strategy and to operationalize the concept of Dynamic Force Employment. 

Additionally, we have begun to review the Joint Staff’s organization and processes to determine if we need to make adjustments to 

support the chairman’s global integrator responsibilities and to better position the chairman to support the Secretary’s decision-making processes. 

Refining the National Military Strategy and the Joint Staff’s organization and processes are a step towards increasing the 

lethality and flexibility of the joint force in light of the reemergence 

of great power competitions. 

The Nuclear Posture Review also reflects the realities of today’s 

security environment, as well as projecting the future environment 

and its potential impacts on U.S. nuclear weapons policy and strategy. More specifically, the Nuclear Posture Review paid particular 

attention to Russian, Chinese, and North Korean activities intended to develop, modernize, and expand their nuclear weapons 

capabilities and to integrate them into their military strategies and 

doctrine. The Nuclear Posture Review takes into account the potential for Iran to renew its pursuit of nuclear weapons and capability 

in the future. 

The review has determined that our strategy must be tailored to 

each of these potential adversaries to effectively communicate the 

cost of aggression, and this tailored strategy approach requires that 

the United States maintain a flexible and credible mix of nuclear 

and conventional capabilities that can address a spectrum of adversaries and threats over a significant period of time. It should not 

be lost on this committee that the Nuclear Posture Review conducted its assessment across a 30-year swath of the future. 

The Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the Nation’s nuclear triad 

as the bedrock of our ability to deter aggression, assure our allies, 

and hedge against an uncertain future. And as the Secretary has 

mentioned, it reaffirms the need to recapitalize each component of 

our legacy nuclear systems to ensure that our nuclear capabilities 

remain ready, secure, capable, and credible now and into the future. 

Two supplemental capabilities recommended in the Nuclear Posture Review, the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile and a 

modification of a small number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads, would enhance deterrence by ensuring that 

no adversary under any set of circumstances can perceive an ad-
11 

vantage through the use of a limited nuclear escalation or other 

strategic attack. 

Fielding these capabilities will not lower the threshold at which 

the United States would employ nuclear weapons; rather, it will 

raise the nuclear threshold for potential adversaries, making the 

use of nuclear weapons less likely. 

Nuclear weapons pose the only existential military threat to our 

Nation. Therefore, there is no higher priority for the joint force 

than fielding all of the components of an effective nuclear deterrent 

to deter potential adversaries from nuclear attack on any scale. 

It is important to note that the National Defense Strategy and 

the Nuclear Posture Review both make the assumption that the 

military will receive timely, predictable, and sufficient funding to 

execute these strategies. As General Mattis has emphasized, we in 

uniform appreciate the support of this committee and Congress, 

and we trust that Congress will provide the funding needed to turn 

these strategies into reality. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, thank you for your time. 

We look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Selva can be found in the 

Appendix on page 52.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Let me just take a moment and give members a heads-up on 

what our schedule looks like today. We are going to have votes on 

the floor at about 11:30. The Secretary and General Selva were 

gracious to move the start time of this hearing up to 9:30 to try 

to give us more time to get in questions before the votes. But we 

are still not going to have time to get to everybody. So we are going 

to do the best we can until we have votes. We are going to break 

and go to the floor, and then we will reconvene after votes in a 

closed, classified session so that we can get further details about 

the National Security Strategy. 

Now, the Secretary still has to be over in the Senate later today, 

so—but I think that is the best combination of things to give us the 

most useful information in both public and in a classified session. 

Mr. Secretary, I was sitting here thinking that I believe the 

statement you just gave is the clearest, most direct, bluntest statement I have heard from any administration witness about the importance of Congress doing its job in a way that Mr. Smith and I 

both talked about in our opening statements. And you were very 

clear about CRs [continuing resolutions] and the damage they do 

to the military. 

Later today, the House is going to vote on an appropriation bill 

for the Department of Defense for the rest of the fiscal year. It is 

consistent with about $700 billion of total spending for our national 

defense account. And my question to you is, is that bill, that level 

of funding consistent with the National Defense Strategy that you 

have talked about today? And if for whatever reason that does 

not—that level of resources does not happen, what does that do to 

the strategy? 

Secretary MATTIS. Chairman, that is sufficient. I would tell you, 

sir, that with it we can restore the competitive advantage—or begin 

down the trail of restoring the competitive advantage that has been 

eroded. 
12 

I would tell you additionally, sir, that without it, we will be put 

into the position where the strategy would have to be changed and 

we would have to accept greater risk, especially in terms of deterring adversaries who might think that we are weaker because they 

can register where our readiness is being eroded. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Let me just ask one other thing in the interest of time so we can get to other members. When you assumed 

this office, there was speculation perhaps that you were a skeptic 

on some aspects of our nuclear triad, our nuclear deterrence. 

You spent a year looking through it. The Nuclear Posture Review 

is the result of the study that you and the Department have put 

into it. But can you just kind of tell us, what—as you have looked 

at our nuclear deterrence, how has your thinking evolved? I mean, 

I do not know if you want to say if you were a skeptic or not at 

the beginning, but it looks like there was a change or at least some 

evolution. Why? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think that is a fair statement, Chairman. I 

was confident that when I received the waiver from the House and 

the Senate to go into this job that you expected me to exercise my 

judgment. I came in wanting to challenge just about everything. I 

wanted it to be proven to me that we needed to spend every cent, 

that every time we had a troop in harm’s way it was for the wellbeing of the American people. 

In this case, I looked at the triad piece by piece and the elements 

of each leg of the triad. I was especially attentive to the intercontinental ballistic missile force. After talking with a lot of people, visiting the missile fields, and doing a lot of study, I believe it is a 

stabilizing element that would be a strong deterrent to anyone who 

decided they wanted to employ nuclear weapons against us. 

There was another weapons system that I was concerned could 

be destabilizing, an air-launched cruise missile or a cruise missile. 

You can see over here on the chart that, clearly, Russia does not 

consider that destabilizing. Look at the number that they have developed and fielded. And as I put together how do we keep us in 

a position where this is a nuclear deterrent, it has got to have 

those capabilities to be most persuasive. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

Secretary MATTIS. Deterrence is in the eye of the adversary. And 

that was the journey I embarked on. And it was a little rough on 

the staff and those who came in promoting it at first, but I think 

they were compelling by the time we were done. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think you are quite correct that we have entered an era where 

great power rivalry is back on the table. Obviously, China and Russia have become more active in a variety of different ways. 

What disturbs me about the direction of this conversation is, I 

do not believe that great power rivalry equals endless arms race, 

that basically whenever you have a great power rivalry all that is 

involved is military power. You have to build as much as you can 

build, they have to build as much as they build, and it goes up and 

up and up and up and up. 
13 

Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that there are other important 

elements of dealing with great power rivalry, starting, for instance, 

with the State Department, with diplomacy, with the idea that dialogue between our adversaries—between us and our adversaries is 

important? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman Smith, I would agree 100 percent. And I would point out we are not developing, for example, nuclear torpedoes. Our Nation is quite capable of developing new 

weapons, as you know. And unlike Russia, for example, we have 

chosen not to do that to give opportunity for our diplomats to do 

what you are recommending. 

Mr. SMITH. My question is, deterrence is also your diplomatic 

stance. Deterrence is dialogue. And this is what concerns me is, 

yes, we have to be able to deter Russia and China from moving forward. But part of the way you deter them, particularly in the nuclear arena, is to have a dialogue, to, you know, do what, you know, 

Ronald Reagan did with Gorbachev and with others, you know, and 

not just arms reduction, but at least have an open discussion so 

that you do not miscalculate. 

I mean, a lot of what we are building into here is we are assuming that the Russians—gosh, if we do not have low-yield nuclear 

weapons, then the Russians will think that they can get away with 

a low-yield nuclear strike. Part of the way that you make sure that 

they do not think that is you let them know. You have a dialogue. 

And I am very concerned right now that we do not have much 

in the way of a dialogue with Russia or China. We did get something in the DOD bill that we passed this year that would mandate 

that happening, but we mandate a lot of things that the executive 

branch does not do. So we need to do that. 

But in the larger point, essentially what we are presented with 

and what the chairman has presented us with is we have to cut 

taxes massively, of course. So we have done that. And then we 

have to fund defense. 

So when you go back through those numbers that I mentioned 

on the $21 trillion debt and $700 billion deficit that is growing, 

now we are going to have a massive increase in defense, we had 

the massive tax cut, you are going to gut everything else. And let 

us forget for the moment our infrastructure, education, things that 

are, I think, also important to actually having a just and prosperous society. Defense is important, without question. But if you 

gut everything else, you create problems. 

And let us just focus on security. If we pass this budget that the 

Republicans want to put before us today, the State Department 

will continue to be destroyed. As we all know, career diplomats are 

leaving, there have been massive cuts in their budget, and now we 

are proposing no budget for the State Department. But we will give 

them a CR, but we are not going to pay any attention to that whatsoever. 

And it becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy, okay. How do we know 

we have to build massive weapons to deter Russia and China? 

Well, we are not talking to them, so we have to presume the worst. 

We are going to give up on diplomacy and simply focus on having 

as many weapons as is humanly possible to make sure that they 

are deterred. 
14 

Dialogue is incredibly important to deterrence. And not just dialogue with Russia and China. We need allies. Look, if we are in a 

great power rivalry in this world with both Russia and China, 

given our massive debt and China’s economic might, that is going 

to be a tough hill to climb. 

I mean, we can build the military—$1 trillion military, and it is 

going to be hard to match all of that. We need allies. We need 

friends. And there are a lot of possibilities: India, Vietnam, South 

Korea, Japan. We still do not even have an Ambassador to South 

Korea, but we are degrading diplomacy at an incredibly rapid level. 

We are also degrading development, which I think is an important 

part of it. 

This is part of how—we talk about, you know, all that stuff in 

the chart over there that China is doing. One of the biggest things 

China is doing is they are spending a ton of money all across the 

world to try to curry favor with countries and also build their own 

economic might. 

Now, they are doing it in an incredibly crass and terrible way, 

because they do not care what the government does. They are not 

going to pull money out of a country because of the human rights 

violation. They do not care. They are doing it. We are pulling back 

again. This budget that is being proposed guts development. 

And now let us just talk about the Department of Homeland Security, passingly important, I would hope, for our national security. 

It is part of the nondefense discretionary budget. It too will be gutted by this approach. We will just leave it in the wind in the CR 

because defense takes priority. We do nothing else. 

The Justice Department has played an enormous role in stopping 

terrorist attacks and also, you know, bringing to justice those who 

have committed them. It too gets gutted by this budget. 

So I always bristle a little bit when I hear the, you know, how 

can we hold defense hostage to domestic political priorities, as if 

those domestic political priorities were some kind of luxury that, 

you know, we just engage in for fun and enjoyment and are not 

really important. 

All of those things are important. The State Department is really 

important. In fact, I do not think it was you, but I think it was 

your predecessor or someone who said—I think it was you—said, 

if you are going to cut the State Department, you better give me 

five more divisions, okay, because that is what I am going to need 

to defend this country. It was either you or General Dunford, I 

apologize. 

So to sit here and say, you know, we are going to stand up, spend 

all this money on defense because it would just be wrong to 

prioritize other things is patently absurd and insulting. Defense is 

incredibly important. It is not the only thing that is important in 

keeping the peace. 

This is more a speech than a question, but I think it is important. You have got to agree, there are other things that are important than keeping the peace. And if we do what is being proposed 

today, we say to those other things, eh, they do not matter. Department of Homeland Security does not matter, Department of Justice 

does not matter, State Department does not matter, none of that 
15 

matters. Does that not make your job vastly more difficult? That 

was a question. 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman Smith, I take no issue with the 

fact that we need to have regular order across all government expenditures. Unfortunately, right now, what we are doing is we are 

creating security vulnerabilities that can no longer be denied. 

Again, one look at the chart and you can see where we are at. 

We cannot do new starts, we cannot get into cyber protection, the 

very thing you hold dear, because we do not have the ability to do 

so under continuing resolutions, 9 out of the last 10 years. 

I do not think there is anything contradictory in the way you and 

I look at this right now. Secretary Tillerson and I have a very close 

working relationship. Our military operations are wrapped firmly 

inside our foreign policy. And the President has directed Secretary 

Tillerson and I to find ways to engage on nonproliferation and 

arms control. 

Right now, we have constant communication with the Russians 

on what I would call operational matters, counterterrorism, for example, North Korea. But some of these are on pretty, pretty big 

issues. But I agree that we need more communication with Russia, 

with China along the level of I would almost call it philosophical 

engagement as well as operational matters. 

And I do not think there is anything at all ill-advised about making certain that protecting the country is put foremost so the country can do all the other things that you were referring to. 

Mr. SMITH. I guess, I—foremost is okay. Only, exclusively, while 

ignoring everything else, not okay. And that is what we are about 

to do this afternoon. 

So the only contradictory thing is to completely ignore the rest 

of the budget, massively cut taxes and fund defense, and act like 

you provided for security for the country. 

But other people have got to get in. I made my point. I appreciate you answering the question. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just for the record, I hope we get a complete 

budget agreement and we do it this week for all aspects of the government. We can do that and we should. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to talk about the graveyard of empires. I think that is 

what they say about Afghanistan and the history of Afghanistan. 

Mr. Secretary, a few headlines from the last 2 weeks: ‘‘Kabul attacks cloud U.S. Afghan strategy.’’ 

‘‘Why are we still shedding our soldiers’ blood for pedophiles?’’ 

Subtitle: ‘‘The full extent of child sexual assault committed by Afghan Security Forces may never be known.’’ 

Another heading: ‘‘The Taliban is gaining strength and territory 

in Afghanistan.’’ 

Another headline: ‘‘Taliban threatens 70 percent of Afghanistan.’’ 

Last headline: ‘‘Pentagon blocks release of key data on Afghan 

war.’’ ‘‘The Pentagon has restricted the release of critical information on the progress being made in the war in Afghanistan, a move 

that will limit transparency.’’ 
16 

In your prepared remarks you very kindly said, we need to build 

the trust of the American people. How can we build the trust of the 

American people after 16 years, over 2,300 Americans killed, over 

20,000 wounded, and we spent $1 trillion? 

I do not have to add to Mr. Smith’s comments, but this country 

is headed for bankruptcy. Mr. Trump campaigned—I have 30 of his 

comments and tweets. He was opposed to being in Afghanistan. He 

wanted to pull out. He was very critical of those who wanted to 

stay. 

We are now increasing the number of our troops in Afghanistan, 

and after 16 years, the American people have a right to know of 

the successes. Some of that, I am sure, is classified information, 

which I can understand. But I also know that we are not getting 

the kind of information that we need to get to know what successes 

we are having. And after 16 years, I do not think we are having 

any successes. 

I would love to have a classified hearing. Maybe that will happen 

in a couple hours, and you would be able to tell us of some benchmarks that we have made after 16 years. 

A friend of yours is a friend of mine. The former Commandant 

of the Marine Corps, Chuck Krulak. He has been my unofficial adviser on Afghanistan for 5 years. Previous Secretary of Defenses 

have gotten questions that he asked me to ask during hearings like 

this one. Not today did I get that from him. 

But 3 or 4 months ago when you talked about increasing the 

number of troops in Afghanistan, he sent me a five-paragraph 

email. I am certainly only going to read one sentence and then I 

want to ask you the question. ‘‘No one has ever conquered Afghanistan, and many have tried. We will join the list of nations that 

have tried and failed.’’ 

Mr. Secretary, how can we, with this budget situation we have 

got and an economic collapse in this country, how can we continue 

to go on a policy after 16 years when the Secretary of Defense that 

follows you and the Congressman that follows me or Congresswoman, if we are still talking about Afghanistan in the future and 

nothing is changing, I think there has got to be a time that you 

would say to President Trump we have done all we can do. Blood 

and treasure is lost, and we have nothing to show that we have 

gained, except we still have trouble with the leaders of Afghanistan 

having sex with little boys. Give me a quick response if you can. 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, if we were engaged in conquering Afghanistan, I would agree 100 percent with what you just 

stated, if that was our sense of empire. In fact, what we are doing 

to earn the trust of the American people is to ensure another 9/11 

hatched out of there does not happen during our watch. 

Further, the strategy we put together—and President Trump 

challenged every assumption. It took months to put it together to 

answer every question he had, and the gravity of protecting the 

American people caused him to change his mind based on what the 

intelligence services told him was the vulnerability we would have 

if we pulled out of there. 

That strategy did permit a more regional approach. It has been 

embraced by nations as diverse as those in NATO and India. We 

have now—we had declined to 39 nations fighting in the NATO 
17 

campaign from 50 years ago. It has gone now to 41. It has started 

growing more allies. They are there because they believe in the 

strategy, which means the Afghan boys continue to carry the load 

for the fighting but now with advisers that bring the NATO air 

support and fire support to bear to help them. 

The Taliban and Haqqani, they have not made their pitch to the 

Afghan people in a positive way by murdering innocent people. 

They are not incurring the support of the Afghan people, whereas 

NATO does have that support. 

It has been a long, hard slog, and I recognize that. But I would 

also tell you that any attempt to keep information from the American people, it was a NATO decision at that point. It was a mistake, I might add, and that information is now available. A number 

of those headlines, obviously, are selected by their editors in order 

to make the story line they have. 

We believe that the regionalized strategy will draw even more allies, and it puts the enemy on the path towards accepting reconciliation. We are not out to conquer it. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman is more than expired. 

I would just mention to members, you can ask whatever you 

want to, but if you ask a question for 4 minutes and leave the Secretary less than a minute to offer, I am not going to cut him off, 

but we are not going to get very far if that is the approach. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to both of you for your service and for being here 

this morning. 

I wanted to associate myself with the ranking member’s comments regarding the whole-of-government approach that is so critical. I know that, Secretary Mattis, you mentioned too that we 

must negotiate from a position of strength so that our military capability should be clear and send that message. But at the same 

time, we know how long it takes to develop high-ranking officers 

who can provide our country with the best of advice. And we must 

have that same timeline for the State Department and for those individuals that negotiate, whether it is in commerce or whatever, 

whatever realm that it is. 

So I wanted to just go to the issue of lowering the threshold in 

terms of nuclear capability. And there is a question whether or not 

the Nuclear Posture Review is clear on what it considers to be lowering the threshold versus some of the comments that I think General Selva made that it is possible to modernize nuclear capability 

and at the same time lower that threshold as it is perceived by our 

adversaries. 

Can you speak to that more? Because I think we are all concerned about the Russian doctrine of escalating to deescalate. 

Where are we, and how can we make that clear, I think, to the 

American people? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think part of it can be addressed through the 

continuity of our nuclear deterrent—and, again, I never say ‘‘nuclear’’—nuclear deterrent strategy and how we manage it and how 

we talk about it. 

And if you look at the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review in which it 

said we would only use nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances, 
18 

I would refer to 2018 where we say in the most extreme circumstances would we use those weapons. You see the continuity 

between two different administrations, two different political parties for the President. 

And in regards to the lower-yield weapon, it is to make certain 

that no one thinks that they could use a low-yield weapon and put 

us in a position where we could only respond with a high-yield 

weapon with the supposition that maybe we would not. 

And we can say what we know we would, but what matters in 

deterrence is what does the adversary think. And in this regard, 

deterrence is dynamic, and we must recognize that today’s deterrent must keep pace with the thinking of today’s adversaries or 

competitors. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Could you respond, sir, though, to the belief that a 

nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, that no matter what that size 

may be, it would still signal that we are using a nuclear weapon 

and perhaps even changing the rules of the game? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, I would agree. I do not think there is any 

such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapon used 

any time is a strategic game changer. That said, we do not want 

someone else to miscalculate and think because they are going to 

use a low-yield weapon, that somehow we would confront what Dr. 

Kissinger calls surrender or suicide, that we do not want even an 

inch of daylight to appear in how we look at the nuclear deterrent. 

It is a nuclear deterrent and must be considered credible. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

General Selva as well, I mean, looking at that nuclear modernization, the cost, $700 billion, $1.5 trillion, is that something 

that, given the whole scope of what is needed in terms of our defense budget, that makes sense today? 

General SELVA. My response is yes, it does make sense. It makes 

sense in the context that we are talking across about a 40-year 

timespan, the cost of about $700 million to modernize the three 

legs of the triad, to make available to future Secretaries of Defense 

and Commanders in Chief a credible, secure, reliable nuclear triad 

that allows those individuals 20 or 30 years into the future to be 

able to tailor strategic responses as well as support the possibility 

of negotiating away entire types and classes of weapons. 

That process will have to continue over a long timespan. The arsenal and weapons that we have today are ready, secure, and credible, but they must be modernized over the span of time to keep 

those options available to our Commanders in Chief. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. And, Secretary Mattis, General Selva, thank you so 

much for your service and being here today. I especially appreciate 

what you are doing, as a veteran myself, but particularly as a 

grateful dad. I have had four sons and a nephew serve overseas in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Army, Navy, Air Force. And so I am just 

very, very grateful for your service and your leadership. It is so reassuring as a military parent. 
19 

Secretary Mattis, your Nuclear Posture Review, NPR, recommends that the United States develop two supplemental nuclear 

capabilities: First, a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile, 

SLBM; and second, a sea-launched cruise missile. Why are these 

needed for deterrence and assurance? 

And following on that, some are arguing that they lower the 

threshold for the United States to use nuclear weapons. Do you believe that the addition of these capabilities to the U.S. nuclear arsenal is an increase or decrease to the likelihood of a nuclear war? 

And another angle, why should we need a low-yield SLBM when 

we already have a low-yield nuclear gravity bomb? Are these capabilities redundant? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, I do not believe it lowers the 

threshold at all. What it does, it makes very clear that we have a 

deterrent if the Russians choose to carry out what some of their 

doctrine people have promoted, their political leaders have promoted, which would be to employ a low-yield nuclear weapon in a 

conventional fight in order to escalate to deescalate; in other words, 

to escalate to victory and then deescalate. We want to make certain 

they recognize that we can respond in kind. We do not have to go 

with the high-yield weapon. Thus, the deterrent effort stays primary. It is not to in any way lower the threshold to use nuclear 

weapons. 

On the sea-launched cruise missile, as you know, we have an ongoing issue with Russia’s violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces Treaty]. I want to make certain that our negotiators have something to negotiate with, that we want Russia back 

into compliance. We do not want to forego the INF, but at the same 

time we have options if Russia continues to go down this path. 

So the idea is, once again, to keep our negotiators negotiating 

from a position of strength. I do not believe you can go into a negotiation and try to get something for nothing. I do not think the 

Russians would be willing to give up something to gain nothing 

from us in terms of reduction. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, if there is any negotiation, I certainly have 

faith in your capabilities, and we look forward to working with you. 

Another issue that is so important and, Mr. Secretary, that needs 

to be restated over and over, you referenced it in your opening 

statement, but is there any stronger indication of Congress’ resolve, 

any action with better deterrent value to peer competitors than repealing the Budget Control Act sequestration and supporting our 

military with adequate and reliable funding? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, there is not, Congressman. Congress 

speaks for the American people I would probably say in the most 

stabilizing and sobering message that this democracy will stand up 

for itself. 

Mr. WILSON. And an issue that Chairman Thornberry has been 

leading on is to address our readiness issue. As we are here just 

2 days from another government shutdown, can you tell, in your 

view, if Congress does not do its part to turn this crisis around, can 

we expect to see further impacts to the military? Should we anticipate more accidents, tragic accidents, as we saw in the Pacific this 

year with the Fitzgerald and McCain? 
20 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, we are doing everything possible to avoid any such repeats of those accidents. However, there 

are a number of areas where when time is lost, if you have pilots 

who are not taking in their flying time now, 5 years from now 

when they are majors or they are lieutenant colonels, they will not 

have the level of expertise we would expect, because they did not 

get the opportunity that they lost during continuing resolutions or 

during budget shutdowns, governmental shutdowns. It impacts us. 

And so it is not like we maintain even the status quo if we go into 

one of these kind of situations yet again. We actually lose ground— 

and I can go on for a number of examples—in all the forces. 

Mr. WILSON. I thank both of you for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary and General Selva, thank you for your service and 

for your testimony here today. I also want to associate myself with 

the comments of the ranking member when it comes to taking a 

whole-of-government approach to funding our national security priorities as well. But I want to turn to another aspect of a security 

challenge that faces our country today. 

Mr. Secretary, it is an accepted fact that our planet’s climate is 

changing. You acknowledged this yourself to our committee, and 

you have shown leadership in this regard submitting at your confirmation hearing that you will, and I quote, ‘‘ensure that the Department continues to be prepared to conduct operations today and 

in the future, and that we are prepared to address the effects of 

a changing climate on our threat assessments, resources, and readiness. And I want to commend you for those statements. 

However, both the President’s National Security Strategy and 

the Department’s National Defense Strategy fail to note climate 

change as a threat. I am perplexed by that and certainly ask why 

was that omitted? But as these changes occur, how will you ensure 

the Department is prepared to respond? What steps will the Department take to mitigate the challenges of a changing land and 

seascape to ensure America’s mission resiliency and assurance? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, on a military level, every base 

we have has what we call extreme weather plans. We acknowledge 

any kind of environmental impacts from the weather, whether it be 

drainage systems or whatever we need in order to keep that base 

operating, whether it be airfields, seaports, marshalling bases for 

deployment, that sort of thing. This is a normal part of what the 

military does and under any strategy it is part and parcel. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, I still find it perplexing that it was left out 

of the National Defense Strategy. 

But, General Selva, let me turn to part of your testimony. I 

might take issue just with one part of it where you say nuclear 

weapons pose the only existential military threat to our Nation. I 

would add cyber weapons as also posing an existential and asymmetric threat to our Nation as well. 

In your assessment, both to you and to the Secretary, how wellresourced and trained are our forces to deal with the threats of 

cybersecurity? 

General SELVA. Congressman, we have established U.S. Cyber 

Command [CYBERCOM] as the bulwark for the military networks 
21 

that we operate on in order to be able to defend the Nation. 

CYBERCOM, in consultation and collaboration with the National 

Security Administration, also provides for some of the cybersecurity 

for critical infrastructure and industries around the country. 

My point in saying that nuclear weapons represent the only military existential threat is because they would be used uniquely for 

military purposes to threaten us and cause us to capitulate or surrender in the face of a military threat. There is no question that 

cyber is an asymmetric capability and this Nation has vulnerabilities both in critical infrastructure as well as civilian infrastructure, 

and we will continue to do the work of normalizing our ability to 

defend those and provide the kinds of advice we can through the 

National Security Agency as well as Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security to defend those networks. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you feel that our training is meeting expectations as to where we need to be at this time to deal with our cyber 

challenges? 

General SELVA. Sir, collaboration between both the military capabilities to defend our networks and Department of Homeland Security, Justice, and NSA [National Security Agency] to defend national networks, the training’s as good as we can possibly make it 

and we are reacting to the threats that we can see. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Secretary, the National Defense Strategy 

states that inter-state strategic competition rather than terrorism 

is now the primary national security concern. It is also our eroding—it also notes our eroding competitive military advantage 

should diplomacy and deterrence fail. While I agree that we must 

increase our military edge in the event of conflict, today, our competitors are launching political, economic, information, and cyber 

operations targeting us. 

Where do you believe we are with respect to our competitive advantage in these types of activities that do not rise to the level of 

armed conflict? To what extent do you feel we should be prepared 

to increase our proficiency in these areas? 

Secretary MATTIS. It is a great question, sir, because this was 

what I was alluding to when I mentioned that we have the potential to enlarge the competitive space, and it is right into the areas 

you are talking about. We have to remember we are a revolutionary act, this country, the kind of democracy that we stand for. 

And you can practice all the predatory economics you want. You 

can send your military into Syria to prop up a despot if you wish 

to. But the fact is we have areas of diplomacy, of education, that 

go far beyond what other nations can reach back and find strength 

in, and we can use that to build modern partnerships. In other 

words, not abandon our traditional partnerships, NATO for example, but certainly expand to a broader array of partners today that 

do not want to be basically made tribute states to someone else’s 

economic or political system. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you both. And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for 

being here. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your strong statements here today. 

I have got two thank yous and a question, then I am going to yield 
22 

the remainder of my time to Mr. Gallagher. The chairman said we 

are in tough time constraints and so not everyone is going to be 

able to answer a question. 

The two thank yous are, one, thank you for your strong statements on the budget. I voted against the Budget Control Act because I believed that sequestration would be damaging to our military and that it would happen. And certainly, everyone on this 

committee has fought ever since it has been implemented to try to 

lift that burden on our military. Your strong words are important 

to let people know the real effects of that. 

It is very sad that in your comments you have a whole section 

on impact of congressional inaction. But I must say that the House 

has not really been inactive. We passed a budget, the National Defense Authorization Act. We passed the appropriation bills three 

times. We are going to do it again. 

We really are dealing with a handful of those in the Senate who 

are causing inaction. And I certainly call on Democratic leadership 

in the Senate to dislodge the defense funding for the military because of the various reasons that you are giving us of the damage 

that is occurring by connecting defense funding to other items. 

Secondly, I want to thank you for your strong words in the Nuclear Posture Review. We know we are coming off the 2010 Obama 

Nuclear Posture Review that actually assigned DOD the responsibility of reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. National 

Security Strategy, while at the same time giving them the responsibility to modernize. It is very hard to reduce at the same time 

you are to modernize. 

Your chart is important because it certainly over here on the 

right shows that those who say that we need to reduce our nuclear 

weapons or slow our modernization because others will follow is 

folly. Our reducing our nuclear weapons does not result in anyone 

else doing so. It certainly is not based on reality or history. 

One correction, on the bottom right on your chart, you say airlaunched and the F–35. As you know, we are not—that is on paper 

currently. That is not an accomplished capability. I look forward to 

working with you on that. 

Then to my question, you indicated that the INF Treaty was continuing to be violated by Russia and we are continuing a dialogue. 

We also know that, you know, they violated the territorial integrity 

of a treaty with the Ukraine. They have violated the Open Skies 

Treaty, violated the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. How 

do we approach their violation in the INF in dialogue when they 

show no indication that treaties even matter to them? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, sir, I have had extensive discussions 

with our NATO allies and the Secretary General at NATO on this 

issue. I have made clear that our approach is that we do not want 

to withdraw from INF, but we are going to have to see effort by 

Russia to get back in line with it. And State Department is engaged on this with the Russians as we speak right now. And also, 

we are going to stay inside the INF-compliant requirements, but 

we are going to do research and development of an alternative 

weapon that should put Russia in a position to see the value to returning to be an INF-compliant. 

Mr. TURNER. I yield to Mr. Gallagher. 
23 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your tough words today and for 

your hard work on the National Defense Strategy, particularly its 

focus on great power competition. 

As we try to operationalize that new focus, I am particularly interested in some of the second-order consequences where we might 

need to shift our thinking in order to stay ahead of our competitors. 

And you recently endorsed the Foreign Investment Risk Review 

Modernization Act, and you have talked about China’s pursuit of 

veto authority over other nations’ economic decisions. Why, in your 

view, is this legislation and a hard look at CFIUS [Committee on 

Foreign Investment in the United States] needed? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, we have made very keen observations of 

the amount of intellectual property that has been basically under 

industrial espionage, has been rifled through in our country and 

exfiltrated. And it is time that we also look at what are the most 

critical national security industries that may not be covered under 

the current act that we need to broaden and deepen the protections 

for this advantage that we have available, whether it be Silicon 

Valley, Seattle, or elsewhere in the country. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. And then can I quickly ask, General Selva, 

what concerns do you have, from a military advice perspective, on 

our ability to protect DOD’s supply chain, critical technology, and 

our industrial base, given current tools, practices, and authorities? 

General SELVA. Thank you, Congressman. The supply chain and 

the industrial base speak directly to the timeliness of CFIUS actions and our ability to control who invests in those key capabilities 

that allow us to supply, train, and deploy our military forces. So 

the notion that we would not pay attention to who is investing in 

the companies that actually allow us to move and mobilize our 

force is folly. So the refinement and renewal of the powers within 

the CFIUS capabilities to determine who is doing that investing 

and for what reason put us in a position of being able to understand the potential vulnerabilities of those investments. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you both. My time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I could not help but notice in the response to a 

question earlier, you said that—I think I heard you say that we 

need SLCM [submarine-launched cruise missile] and the SLBM 

[submarine-launched ballistic missile] in order to have democracy 

stand up for itself. I think that is what your response was to a 

question. 

You are not suggesting that if any one of us do not support the 

development of SLCM or SLBM that we are not standing up for 

our democracy? 

Secretary MATTIS. That would never be the way I characterize 

someone’s vote, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

So you also argued that the Nuclear Posture Review provides, I 

think it was SLCM provides a bargaining chip in dealing with INF 

Treaty violations of the Russians. Did I get that correct? 

Secretary MATTIS. That is correct, Congressman. 
24 

Mr. LARSEN. Is it a logical extension, then, that if we saw a 

change in Russian behavior, the administration would stop the development of either one or both? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not want to say in advance of a negotiation and undercut our negotiator’s position what we would or would 

not do. The point I would make is that deterrence is dynamic. We 

have to deal with it as it stands today, as we see it on the chart. 

And in that regard, I believe that we have to give our negotiators 

something with which to negotiate. 

Mr. LARSEN. Do you have any indication there would be a change 

in Russian behavior with the development of either one of these? 

Secretary MATTIS. I can only tell you that we go into this with 

capabilities to make certain the Russians understand that we have 

a capability and a deterring capability, and it is based on not just 

the two nations, but the broader deterrent portfolio as well. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. Does the United States currently have the 

ability to deliver a nonstrategic nuclear weapon, a nuclear response 

without this investment? Do they have the ability? I am sorry, do 

they have the ability to deliver that without this investment? 

Secretary MATTIS. Are you referring to a sea-launched cruise 

missile? 

Mr. LARSEN. No, I am talking about the delivery of a nonstrategic nuclear response. It would not have to be a sea-launched. 

Secretary MATTIS. I would be cautious about saying any nuclear 

weapon is nonstrategic, sir. If you mean a low-yield, yes, we do. 

Mr. LARSEN. And what is the difference between that capability 

and, say, a sea-launched? 

Secretary MATTIS. The gravity bomb that is the low-yield means 

the bomber would have to penetrate, but today, air defense systems 

are altogether different than 10 or 20 years ago. 

Mr. LARSEN. And is there any investment going on in counterair defense to deal with that or is this the only—is the development 

of a new capability the only solution? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, sir. We are certainly working on air defense penetration capability; but, again, we have to deal with 

where we are at today. We are working on the issue. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Kind of the where we are at question gets to 

something I am not going to bore you with the details, because we 

will probably get to it in subcommittee hearings, but the CBO 

[Congressional Budget Office] estimate of now $1.2 trillion over 30 

years, which I think the Department would say—for the nuclear 

modernization, which the Department would say is only or merely 

6.4 percent of the budget when it was much higher in the past. I 

do not know if that means the rest of the defense budget is out of 

control and this one is under control, or the fact that we do not 

really have an accounting of what that $1.2 trillion is and that we 

are now looking at an NPR that presumes additional development 

of capabilities, which I presume would be on top of this current 

CBO estimate. 

You can maybe address that briefly, but we are going to have 

plenty of time over the next couple of months to explore that, the 

money question, which is a big concern of all of ours. 

Can you tell us about the assurance? Since nuclear deterrence is 

partly an assurance of allies, can you tell us about the assurance 
25 

a new low-yield nuclear weapon gives to our allies or any response 

from specifically our NATO allies at this point? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, we engaged in extensive consultation with 

our NATO allies. I was on the phone this morning with one of my 

counterparts, and she expressed the deep appreciation of her country for the amount of collaboration that went into the Nuclear Posture Review. And so, right now, I can tell you the deterrence posture we have and we have outlined in the posture review has 

gained a great deal of support from our allies. 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, I get thanks for collaboration all the time and 

people then work against me. So I am just wondering has NATO 

then yet taken a position? And I will follow up with you later on 

that. Thanks a lot. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for your attendance and your service to the 

country. 

The last Nuclear Posture Review published 8 years ago said, 

quote: ‘‘Russia is not an enemy and is increasingly a partner,’’ close 

quote. At that time, there were many of us on this committee that 

did not believe that statement, and we certainly do not today. 

Russia continues to brazenly violate the INF Treaty, continues to 

conduct dangerous nuclear exercises directed against the United 

States, NATO allies, and regional partners, and continues a military occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory. Finally, China 

clearly demands recognition as a regional gatekeeper and a global 

influence. 

With that backdrop, Secretary Mattis, how would you characterize the changes we have seen in the global security environment 

since the 2010 NPR, and why do these changes matter, and how 

is your NPR recommending we adapt our nuclear posture and policies? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. I believe what we have seen is that 

Russia and China, from, as you point out, Ukraine to mucking 

around in our elections in the case of the Democratic elections in 

the case of Russia, to China’s militarization of features in the 

South China Sea, we have seen them choose to become strategic 

competitors with us vice what at one time we had hoped would be 

some level of partnership. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe that the 6 or 7 percent of our defense budget that we are devoting to the nuclear enterprise is an 

adequate level of spending to fund our Nation’s number one priority defense mission? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do believe it is. And I would point out that 

it is around 3.5 percent for many years, climbing to 6.5, 6.7 at its 

top percentage about 2029, we believe. And at that point, it would 

go into a more measured maintenance of what we have built: the 

Columbia class, the B–21, this sort of thing, Congressman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you. 

With that, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary and General Selva, thank you for your testimony. 
26 

Mr. Secretary, in the National Defense Strategy, you noted that 

we are a resilient joint force in regards to our forward-deployed 

forces. I am concerned regarding the U.S. Navy’s ability to remain 

resilient during conflict with a peer adversary, specifically with 

depot-level ship repair capability in the Pacific. 

Now, in the Fleet Comprehensive Review, the Navy identified capacity issues at the ship repair facility in Yokosuka, Japan. The fiscal year 2018 NDAA, section 1047, requires the Secretary of the 

Navy to submit a report on the ship depot maintenance capability 

in the Western Pacific. It further requires the Secretary of Defense 

to certify to congressional defense committees whether or not the 

current ship depot maintenance capability and capacity, including 

dry docks, in the Western Pacific are sufficient to meet both peacetime and contingency requirements. 

So my question is, where is the Department in terms of meeting 

these requirements, and how are you going about determining if 

there is sufficient capability and capacity? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, where we are at right now is 

we are examining the sufficiency of it in terms of just raw capacity, 

the anticipated need if we go into conflict, and the distribution over 

a number of locations, for obvious reasons. So right now, we are 

still in the assessment. We obviously know what we have right 

now, but whether it is sufficient for the future is where we are concentrating the study. And I will make certain that the Secretary 

of the Navy follows up on this as we get more mature in our output. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The next question I have is that the people of Guam are proud 

to host the continued bomber presence and one leg of the nuclear 

triad with the recent addition of the B–2 and B–52 bombers. Considering the bomber presence and as the westernmost territory of 

the United States, Guam holds vital strategic bases, and I am 

happy to see the Department place a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] system to aid in its defense. However, in your 

strategy, you call for investment on layered missile defense from 

North Korean threats. 

Considering our strategic importance, is Guam adequately defended from theater missile threats, and how do you intend to bolster these defense systems in the future? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, we will continue bolstering them to keep 

pace with the threat out of North Korea. As you know, besides the 

THAAD system, ma’am, we also keep the Aegis, the ballistic missile defense U.S. Navy warship in the waters out there, and we can 

always reinforce that. We also have several of those ships in Japanese waters right now, and they can move back and forth to include coverage of Guam in the mobile way that comes to our Navy. 

But we are looking at all the systems, to include Aegis Ashore, as 

we look toward the future protection of our Pacific area. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think we have 

talked about this. Just keep Guam in a secure position and keep 

all the bombers and everything else you have there for a while, 

anyway. And I thank you again. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 
27 

The CHAIRMAN. Votes have come early. We do not have time to 

get two more members in. So as soon as votes are completed on the 

floor, we will come back and be in classified session up in 2212. 

At this point, the open hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the committee proceeded in closed 

session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 6, 2018 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 6, 2018 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 6, 2018 

(57) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. In April 2017, the State Department released its most recent arms 

control compliance report. It found that Russia remains in violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. a. Secretary Mattis, what is your assessment of the impacts from Russia’s violation of this treaty—both on the U.S. and 

our allies? b. How does the NPR and the Administration’s December 2016 Russia 

strategy propose to address this violation? c. How long should the U.S. continue to 

remain in the INF Treaty if Russia continues to violate it? 

Secretary MATTIS. Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 

(INF) Treaty is a concrete threat to U.S. forces and to allies and partners in Europe 

and Asia. The value of the INF Treaty, or any arms control treaty, depends on all 

parties remaining in compliance. Moscow must understand that the United States 

will not indefinitely endure Russia’s non-compliance. The status quo, in which the 

United States continues to comply while Russia continues deployments in violation 

of the Treaty, is untenable. Therefore, the United States is pursuing an integrated 

strategy supported by diplomatic, economic, and military research and development 

actions to persuade Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance. This includes 

a review of U.S. options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems, which would enable the United States to defend itself and its allies 

and partners should Russia fail to return to compliance. The supplemental sealaunched cruise missile capability identified in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is 

also, in part, designed to persuade Russia to return to compliance. 

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Mattis, should we be considering extending the New 

START Treaty while Russia is violating the INF Treaty, violating the Open Skies 

Treaty, violating the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, and failing to comply 

with the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and 

many other arms control commitments? a. Do you believe we should pursue further 

nuclear arms control measures with Russia while Russia is in violation of so many 

existing arms control agreements? 

Secretary MATTIS. The United States remains willing to engage in a prudent arms 

control agenda. We are prepared to consider arms control opportunities that return 

parties to predictability and transparency, and remain receptive to future arms control negotiations if conditions permit and the potential outcome improves the security of the United States and its allies and partners. The United States will continue 

to implement fully the New START Treaty, which complements U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy by contributing to a transparent and predictable strategic balance between the United States and Russia. We will consider next steps related to the New 

START Treaty at the appropriate time, taking into account Russia’s compliance 

with its obligations under the New START Treaty and other arms control agreements. 

Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is a concrete threat to U.S. forces and to allies and partners in Europe and Asia. The value 

of the INF Treaty, or any arms control treaty, depends on all parties remaining in 

compliance. Moscow must understand that the United States will not indefinitely 

endure Russia’s non-compliance. The status quo, in which the United States continues to comply while Russia continues deployments in violation of the Treaty, is 

untenable. Therefore, the United States is pursuing an integrated strategy supported by diplomatic, economic, and military research and development actions to 

persuade Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance. This includes a review 

of U.S. options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems, which would enable the United States to defend ourselves and our allies and 

partners should Russia fail to return to compliance. The supplemental sea-launched 

cruise missile capability identified in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is also, in 

part, designed to persuade Russia to return to compliance. 

Mr. TURNER. In April 2017, the State Department released its most recent arms 

control compliance report. It found that Russia remains in violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. General Selva, you told us last year in 

March that Russia had now operationally deployed the cruise missile that is violating this treaty. Tell us—is Russia taking any steps that indicate it will come back 
58 

into compliance with this treaty? Have they stopped deploying these missiles or are 

they deploying more of them? 

General SELVA. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Mattis, you are now the third consecutive Secretary of Defense that has identified nuclear deterrence as the highest-priority mission of the 

Department of Defense. Two different Administrations, three different Secretaries. 

Do you believe 6 or 7 percent of our defense budget is an appropriate level of spending for the nation’s number one priority defense mission? Do you believe this is affordable? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes. Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent is much less 

expensive than fighting a war that we are unable to deter. We can afford this level 

of investment against one of the few existential threats that we face. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Selva, we’ve now had three consecutive Secretaries of Defense identify nuclear deterrence as the highest-priority mission of the Department 

of Defense. Two different Administrations, three different Secretaries. Do the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff agree with this prioritization? Do the Joint Chiefs believe 6 or 7 percent of our defense budget is an appropriate level of spending for the nation’s number one priority defense mission? Do you believe this is affordable? 

General SELVA. Yes, the Joint Chiefs agree the nuclear mission is the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense. The Joint Chiefs also support the nuclear force modernization program. I agree with what Secretary Mattis said, ‘‘America can afford survival.’’ 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Mattis, how do the supplemental capabilities proposed by 

the NPR—a low-yield submarine-launched weapon and a sea-launched cruise missile—help shore up deterrence and assurance in this new era of great power competition? 

Secretary MATTIS. The low-yield ballistic missile and sea-launched cruise missile 

are necessary to address our concerns that potential adversaries may believe they 

can effectively threaten or employ limited nuclear strikes. These supplemental capabilities, along with the existing elements of our Triad, provide a diverse set of nuclear capabilities that will provide flexibility to tailor the U.S. approach to deterring 

different potential adversaries. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Mattis, do the supplemental capabilities proposed by the 

NPR lower the threshold for nuclear use? Are they about nuclear warfighting or 

about ensuring conflict is avoided all-together? Do you believe the addition of these 

capabilities to the U.S. nuclear arsenal increase or decrease the likelihood of a nuclear war? 

Secretary MATTIS. By convincing adversaries that even limited use of nuclear 

weapons will be more costly than they can tolerate, we raise the threshold for nuclear weapons use and decrease the likelihood of nuclear war. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Mattis, why do we need a low-yield SLBM when we already have a low-yield nuclear gravity bomb? Are these capabilities redundant? How 

do adversary air defenses factor into the recommendation for a low-yield SLBM? 

Secretary MATTIS. The low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is 

highly survivable when deployed in ballistic nuclear submarines at sea, while our 

gravity bombs are more vulnerable in fixed storage and operating locations. SLBMs 

are highly accurate and, given their speed and trajectory, are better able to penetrate modern defenses that could challenge air-delivered weapons. This does not reduce the need for air-delivered gravity bombs and dual-capable aircraft, which can 

be forward deployed, contribute to allied burden sharing, provide visible assurance 

to both allies and partners, and serve as a tangible demonstration of U.S. extended 

deterrence guarantees. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Selva, in your professional military judgment, why do we 

need a low-yield SLBM when we already have a low-yield nuclear gravity bomb? Are 

these capabilities redundant? How do adversary air defenses factor into the recommendation for a low-yield SLBM? 

General SELVA. One of the main roles of U.S. nuclear capabilities is to deter adversaries. Deterrence is an art, not a science. It is not possible to determine precisely what is needed to deter with high confidence across a range of potential adversaries and circumstances. 

It is, however, possible to get indications that one’s deterrence strategy, posture, 

and capabilities are potentially inadequate, and that as a result there is an unacceptable risk of deterrence failure. Russian strategy, doctrine, and capabilities call 
59 

for the limited use of nuclear weapons to coerce NATO, and to defeat NATO conventional forces through the wider use of nuclear weapons if their coercive use fails. 

They would not have adopted this strategy and doctrine, and they would not be expending their limited resources to modernize and expand their non-strategic nuclear 

forces (which are already approximately ten times larger than NATO’s), if they perceived current U.S. and NATO nuclear posture as undeniably sufficient to deter 

such nuclear use. 

The strategy and capabilities recommended in the NPR are intended to reduce 

Russian confidence in their strategy by providing a wider array of credible response 

options that can render their strategy ineffective. Our purpose is to raise Russia’s 

nuclear threshold, not reduce our own. 

A low-yield SLBM warhead will provide a near-term, relatively inexpensive augmentation of our ability to credibly strike any target in response to Russian limited 

nuclear use. A low-yield SLBM warhead is survivable, prompt, and is able to strike 

targets that are heavily defended against air-delivered strikes. All current U.S. lowyield options are air delivered. Acquiring this capability will not lower the threshold 

at which the United States would employ nuclear weapons. Rather, it is designed 

to raise the nuclear threshold of potential adversaries. 

Possessing multiple low-yield strike capabilities is not redundant. These systems 

will be ‘‘complementary’’ capabilities necessary to address various potential adversary threat environments (e.g. integrated air defenses) in a more credible manner. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Selva, in April 2017, the State Department released its most 

recent arms control compliance report. It found that Russia remains in violation of 

the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. General Selva, you told us last 

year in March that Russia had operationally deployed the cruise missile that is violating this treaty. Tell us—is Russia taking any steps that indicate it will come back 

into compliance with this treaty? Have they stopped deploying these missiles or are 

they deploying more of them? 

General SELVA. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Mattis, what is your assessment of the impacts from Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty? What impact may this violation have on our military, defense posture, and that of our allies? How does the NPR and the Administration’s December 2016 Russia strategy propose to address this violation? How long 

should the U.S. continue to remain in the INF Treaty if Russia continues to violate 

it? 

Secretary MATTIS. Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 

(INF) Treaty is a concrete threat to U.S. forces and to allies and partners in Europe 

and Asia. The status quo, in which the United States continues to comply while 

Russia continues deployments in violation of the Treaty, is untenable. Therefore, the 

United States is pursuing an integrated strategy supported by diplomatic and economic measures as well as military research and development actions intended to 

persuade Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance. This includes a review 

of U.S. options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems which would enable the United States to defend ourselves and our allies and 

partners should Russia fail to return to compliance. The supplemental sea-launched 

cruise missile capability identified in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is also, in 

part, designed to persuade Russia to return to compliance. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Mattis, should we be considering extending the New 

START Treaty while Russia is violating the INF Treaty, violating the Open Skies 

Treaty, violating the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, and failing to comply 

with the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and 

many other arms control commitments? Do you believe we should pursue further 

nuclear arms control measures with Russia while Russia is in violation of so many 

existing arms control agreements? 

Secretary MATTIS. The United States remains willing to engage in a prudent arms 

control agenda. We are prepared to consider arms control opportunities that return 

parties to predictability and transparency, and remain receptive to future arms control negotiations if conditions permit and the potential outcome improves the security of the United States and its allies and partners. The United States will continue 

to fully implement the New START Treaty, which complements U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy by contributing to a transparent and predictable strategic balance between the United States and Russia. We will consider next steps related to the New 

START Treaty at the appropriate time, taking into account Russia’s compliance 

with its obligations under the New START Treaty and other arms control agreements. We will also work to bring Russia into compliance with its existing arms control obligations, using military tools integrated with diplomatic and economic measures as appropriate. 
60 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Mattis, is the nuclear declaratory policy in the 2018 NPR 

in any significant way different from the Obama administration’s declaratory policy? 

Secretary MATTIS. No. The declaratory policy outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is consistent with the declaratory policy outlined in the 2010 

NPR. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme 

circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies and partners. Unlike the 2010 NPR, the 2018 NPR provides examples of ‘‘extreme circumstances,’’ which could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Selva, is the nuclear declaratory policy in the 2018 NPR in 

any significant way different from the Obama administration’s declaratory policy? 

General SELVA. It is different only in that it is deliberately somewhat less ambiguous regarding what might constitute the ‘‘extreme circumstances’’ in which we 

might consider the use of nuclear weapons to defend the vital interests of the U.S. 

and our allies and partners. This clarification does not in any way expand those circumstances. It clarifies them in order to prevent misperception or miscalculation 

that could result in deterrence failure. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Selva, do all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend and 

support the major recommendations of the Nuclear Posture Review? Why? 

General SELVA. Yes. Because they recognize that deterrence of nuclear attack is 

the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense, and is thus a ‘‘No Fail’’ 

mission. The NPR recommendations are a prudent approach to ensuring mission 

success. Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Mattis, were our allies consulted as the NPR was being 

considered and drafted? What did they say? How are they reacting to the proposal 

to continue the Obama administration’s program of record and add two supplemental capabilities? 

Secretary MATTIS. Throughout the Nuclear Posture Review, we consulted extensively with allies and partners. They were unanimous in the view that the security 

environment has changed for the worse since 2010; offered a range of opinions on 

the environment and the continued need for nuclear deterrence; and appreciated our 

efforts to consult with them. Our East Asian allies in particular appreciated the reaffirmation of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. In Europe, reactions were 

positive, particularly our moves to strengthen deterrence, reaffirm our declaratory 

policy, and further the goals of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 

A number of European allies emphasized the importance of balancing deterrence 

with arms control and non-proliferation initiatives. Reactions to continuation of the 

U.S. nuclear modernization program were generally positive. No European allies objected to the inclusion of the supplemental capabilities. Many viewed these supplemental capabilities as an appropriate counter-balance to Russian, Chinese and 

North Korean developments, while some did express reservations over possible Russian and Chinese reactions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Mattis, are you satisfied with DOD’s relationship with the 

National Nuclear Security Administration (which supplies and maintains U.S. nuclear warheads)? What works best in this relationship? What would you change? Is 

the forum for this relationship, the Nuclear Weapons Council, functioning as it 

should? How often do you speak to your counterparts in NNSA and the Department 

of Energy? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Department of Defense works closely with the Department 

of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ensure that the 

U.S. nuclear stockpile and its supporting infrastructure provide the warheads our 

forces need to reliably deter nuclear attack against the United States, our allies and 

partners. I look forward to working closely with Secretary Perry and the new NNSA 

Administrator, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, on modernizing and recapitalizing all aspects 

of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and U.S. nuclear infrastructure to ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent that protects the homeland, assures allies and above 

all, deters adversaries. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Selva, are you satisfied with DOD’s relationship with the 

National Nuclear Security Administration (which supplies and maintains U.S. nuclear warheads)? What works best in this relationship? What would you change? Is 

the forum for this relationship, the Nuclear Weapons Council, functioning as it 

should? How often do you speak to your counterparts in NNSA and the Department 

of Energy? 

General SELVA. Are you satisfied with DOD’s relationship with the National Nuclear Security Administration (which supplies and maintains U.S. nuclear warheads)? Overall, I am satisfied with the relationship between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). That 

doesn’t mean there’s no room for improvement. 

What works best in this relationship? The Nuclear Weapons Council. 
61 

What would you change? There is an increasing requirement for transparency and 

timeliness of communication between the DOD and NNSA through the NWC and 

its subordinate committees and staff. This needs to improve in order to ensure success in the nuclear enterprise modernization effort. 

Is the forum for this relationship, the Nuclear Weapons Council, functioning as it 

should? Yes. 

How often do you speak to your counterparts in NNSA and the Department of Energy? The NWC meets monthly, and I also meet with my DOD and NNSA counterparts as needed in addition to these regularly scheduled meetings. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Mattis, the Obama administration had a policy of not pursuing any new U.S. nuclear capabilities and reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. The 2010 NPR claimed this would show leadership and discourage other nations from pursing their own new nuclear capabilities. Has this policy influenced the behavior of foreign nuclear powers, in particular 

of Russia? If our potential adversaries are not following our lead here, is it dangerous for us to continue down this road indefinitely if no other nation—except perhaps our closest ally in the U.K.—is doing the same? In your view, how likely is 

it that the U.S. nuclear deterrent can remain credible to 2050 or beyond if we never 

modify or improve its nuclear capabilities while other countries continue to advance? 

Secretary MATTIS. For decades, the United States led the world in efforts to reduce the roles and number of nuclear weapons. The assumptions and priority goals 

that guided these efforts, as well as the content of the 2001 and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews, proved to be mistaken. Although the United States has reduced its 

nuclear arsenal by more than eighty-five percent since its Cold War peak, others 

have moved in the opposite direction. Russia, China and North Korea are growing 

their stockpiles, increasing the prominence of nuclear weapons in their security 

strategies, and—in some cases—pursuing the development of new nuclear capabilities to threaten peaceful nations. In this environment, it is not possible to delay 

modernization of U.S. nuclear forces if we are to preserve a credible nuclear deterrent. This is a top priority of the Department of Defense. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Mattis, one of the supplemental capabilities your NPR proposes is a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, which we had in our arsenal 

for decades until the Obama administration decided to eliminate it in 2010. So is 

this a ‘‘new’’ capability—or is it just bringing back an old capability because the 

world didn’t turn out to be quite as benign as we may have wished. 

Secretary MATTIS. The nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missile is not a new capability as the United States deployed such weapons in the past. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. Are you familiar with the Chinese telecommunications firms, 

Huawei and ZTE? As you know, these firms are closely linked to China’s Communist Party and its intelligence services. Do you believe it is appropriate for the 

Department of Defense to use that equipment with its intrinsic risks to department 

cybersecurity? Do you think cleared defense contractors should use it? Please elaborate any thoughts or comments you have. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, the Department is familiar with Huawei and ZTE and 

their linkages to the Government of the People’s Republic of China. Yes, the Department is concerned with use of any hardware, software or service that foreign governments have influence over the supply chains. I agree these companies’ products 

present a risk to the Department’s cybersecurity and their use by cleared defense 

contractors as it pertains to the Department’s systems and information. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Are you familiar with the Chinese telecommunications firms, 

Huawei and ZTE? As you know, these firms are closely linked to China’s Communist Party and its intelligence services. Do you believe it is appropriate for the 

Department of Defense to use that equipment with its intrinsic risks to department 

cybersecurity? Do you think cleared defense contractors should use it? Please elaborate any thoughts or comments you have. 

General SELVA. Are you familiar with the Chinese telecommunications firms, 

Huawei and ZTE? Answer: Yes. Huawei and ZTE are two of the largest Chinese 

telecommunications equipment providers in the world. Historically, both companies 

have engaged in business practices of concern, especially within the context of U.S. 

National Security. Additionally, Chinese security laws may present situations that 

would prioritize Chinese National Security interests over corporate interests—a 

threat that increases the more saturated the telecommunications market becomes 

with both companies. 
62 

Do you believe it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to use that equipment with its intrinsic risks to department cybersecurity? Answer: While I personally 

have no formal role in DOD procurement actions, I do feel that cybersecurity supply 

chain risks need to have a stronger consideration in acquisition decisions. The critical nature our information has on national security and military operations demands we use companies that are vetted and screened to provide the highest level 

of security. We must continue to improve network security and resilience to ensure 

adversaries gain neither a real or perceived advantage. It remains a priority for the 

Joint Force to protect and defend its critical infrastructure from attacks, as well as 

defend the nation’s networks against cyberattacks of significant consequence. However, there is no policy that currently restricts the use of these products. 

Do you think cleared defense contractors should use it? Answer: DOD acquisition 

decisions to reduce supply chain risks to cybersecurity ultimately depend upon 

cleared defense contractors to be effective, and demands we use companies that are 

vetted and screened to provide the highest level of security. Within that context, 

these cleared defense contractors should be very cautious in their acquisition and 

use of certain products, not just in DOD systems, but also in corporate networks, 

systems and devices that could provide a threat actor with access to DOD systems 

and associated critical program information. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. The National Defense Strategy acknowledges space as a 

warfighting domain and rencognizes the need to organize for innovation and introduce streamlined approaches to fielding new capabilities. 

But DOD’s record on producing space systems is abysmal. One recent example is 

SBIRS, the Space-Based Infrared System that provides us with missile warning. It 

experienced a 221% per unit cost increase with a 9-year delay. 

• What kind of reforms is the Department taking to ensure our space warfighting 

readiness? 

We have observed the long-term strategic competition with China and Russia for 

years, specifically with regard to our space capabilities. While we have stagnated 

in delivering space capabilities to our warfighters, China and Russia are dangerously close to outpacing us. 

• What kinds of capabilities, policies, and authorities does the Department need 

to ensure that we stay ahead of these countries and are able to fight and win 

through the space domain? 

• Clearly our failure to adequately prioritize space warfighting is not merely a 

budgetary issue, but given that we’re coming off of a 30-year low in R&D investment, more resources would certainly be useful, and also would say a lot about 

our commitment to space. When should Congress expect to see space given a 

higher priority in DOD’s budget? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congress can see the higher priority on space security in the 

President’s Budget request, in the new National Strategy for Space, in the National 

Security Strategy, and the National Defense Strategy. Aligned with those strategies, 

the President’s Budget request includes $12.5 billion for Department of Defense 

(DOD) space programs in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, which is an increase of 9.4 percent 

over the FY 2018 request. The President’s Budget request also includes $65.6 billion 

over the FY 2019–23 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), which reflects 13.9 percent 

growth over the previous five-year planning period. As Congress has directed, DOD 

has consolidated this funding under Major Force Program-12 to facilitate the DOD 

leadership’s strategic management and Congress’ oversight of DOD’s space funding 

and programs. To compete, deter, and win through space, DOD must continue to 

develop, test, deploy, and sustain the innovative and resilient space capabilities our 

warfighters need to fight and win in all domains. To that end, the FY 2019 defense 

space budget request provides for increases in mission assurance of DOD’s spacebased capabilities against growing threats, leverages commercial innovation and our 

international partnerships to accelerate development and deployment of new capabilities, strengthens lethality and readiness of the total force, and enhances the nation’s overall deterrence and warfighting power. Furthermore, as Congress directed 

under Section 1601(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018, the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense is assessing the performance of the entire defense 

space enterprise and developing reform recommendations that DOD will be providing to Congress by August 2018. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The NPR puts considerable focus on three elements of our nuclear 

deterrent that sometimes receive scant attention: (1) the nuclear command, control, 

and communications (NC3) system, which is old but reliable and must be modern-
63 

ized; (2) the infrastructure within NNSA that is literally falling apart; (3) and the 

people in uniform and out civilian clothes, across DOD and NNSA, that form the 

backbone of our deterrent. Without any of these three, we simply do not have a nuclear deterrent in this country. 

• How have threats to our nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 

system changed over time? What are the nature of the threats to our NC3, particularly with regards to cyber attacks, attacks on space-based assets, and potential adversary use of limited, low-yield nuclear strikes? 

• Because it is so large and complex, responsibility for the NC3 system is scattered across DOD. What steps does the NPR recommend to address this organizational problem? 

• What steps are being proposed to get after NNSA’s $4 billion backlog of infrastructure problems and deferred maintenance? 

• How will we ensure we take care of the unsung heroes of national defense in 

DOD and NNSA that operate, support, and provide our nuclear deterrent? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Nuclear Command, Control and Communication (NC3) system is subject to challenges from both aging system components and new threats, 

in particular space and cyber-space, adversary strategies of limited nuclear escalation, and a diffusion of authority and responsibility. The Administration is pursuing a series of steps to strengthen NC3, including: 1) improving protection against 

space-based and cyber threats; 2) enhancing integrated tactical warning and attack 

assessment; 3) improving command post and communication links; 4) advancing decision support technology; and 5) integrating planning and operations. The Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR) directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deliver 

to me by 1 May a plan to reform NC3 governance. 

There is no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical infrastructure 

needed to produce strategic materials and components for U.S. nuclear weapons. 

Just as our nuclear forces are an affordable priority, so is a resilient and effective 

nuclear weapons infrastructure. The NPR lays out several specific initiatives that 

National Nuclear Security Agency will pursue and fund in its budget requests, and 

implementation of these efforts is ongoing. The personnel who maintain our nuclear 

deterrent are true professionals; I am committed to ensuring they have the tools 

needed to execute their mission. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The NPR puts considerable focus on three elements of our nuclear 

deterrent that sometimes receive scant attention: (1) the nuclear command, control, 

and communications (NC3) system, which is old but reliable and must be modernized; (2) the infrastructure within NNSA that is literally falling apart; (3) and the 

people in uniform and out civilian clothes, across DOD and NNSA, that form the 

backbone of our deterrent. Without any of these three, we simply do not have a nuclear deterrent in this country. 

• How have threats to our nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 

system changed over time? What are the nature of the threats to our NC3, particularly with regards to cyber attacks, attacks on space-based assets, and potential adversary use of limited, low-yield nuclear strikes? 

• Because it is so large and complex, responsibility for the NC3 system is scattered across DOD. What steps does the NPR recommend to address this organizational problem? 

• What steps are being proposed to get after NNSA’s $4 billion backlog of infrastructure problems and deferred maintenance? 

• How will we ensure we take care of the unsung heroes of national defense in 

DOD and NNSA that operate, support, and provide our nuclear deterrent? 

General SELVA. Q: How have threats to our nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system changed over time? What are the nature of the threats to 

our NC3, particularly with regards to cyber attacks, attacks on space-based assets, 

and potential adversary use of limited, low-yield nuclear strikes? 

A: The Cold War legacy nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 

system, which was last comprehensively updated almost thirty years ago, was designed to operate in the face of a singular threat from a single adversary. Since 

then, the NC3 system has grown increasingly vulnerable to cross-domain threats 

from multiple actors. Potential adversaries are expending considerable effort in the 

Space and Cyber domains in particular that create new challenges for the NC3 system. The potential for adversaries to employ limited nuclear options further complicates the NC3 system’s ability to assure the command and control of nuclear 

weapons at all times. 

Q: Because it is so large and complex, responsibility for the NC3 system is scattered across DOD. What steps does the NPR recommend to address this organizational problem? 
64 

A: To address this challenge, the Nuclear Posture Review report directed the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with key DOD stakeholders 

to deliver to the Secretary of Defense no later than May 1, 2018, a plan to reform 

NC3 governance to ensure its effective functioning and modernization. We must, 

and we will improve NC3 governance to ensure the Department of Defense (DOD) 

is properly organized to maintain a fully capable NC3 system to address current and 

future environments. 

Q: How have threats to our nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 

system changed over time? What are the nature of the threats to our NC3, particularly with regards to cyber attacks, attacks on space-based assets, and potential adversary use of limited, low-yield nuclear strikes? 

A: The Cold War legacy nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 

system, which was last comprehensively updated almost thirty years ago, was designed to operate in the face of a singular threat from a single adversary. Since 

then, the NC3 system has grown increasingly vulnerable to cross-domain threats 

from multiple actors. Potential adversaries are expending considerable effort in the 

Space and Cyber domains in particular that create new challenges for the NC3 system. The potential for adversaries to employ limited nuclear options further complicates the NC3 system’s ability to assure the command and control of nuclear 

weapons at all times. 

Q: What steps are being proposed to get after NNSA’s $4 billion backlog of infrastructure problems and deferred maintenance? How will we ensure we take care of 

the unsung heroes of national defense in DOD and NNSA that operate, support, and 

provide our nuclear deterrent? 

A: The United States will pursue initiatives to ensure the necessary capability, 

capacity, and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons infrastructure and the needed 

skills of the nuclear enterprise workforce, including the following: 

• Pursue a joint DOD and DOE advanced-technology development capability to 

ensure that efforts are appropriately integrated to meet DOD needs. 

• Provide the enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium pits at a 

rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030. A delay in this would result 

in the need for a higher rate of pit production at higher cost. 

• Ensure that current plans to reconstitute the U.S. capability to produce lithium 

compounds are sufficient to meet military requirements. 

• Fully fund the Uranium Processing Facility and ensure availability of sufficient 

low-enriched uranium to meet military requirements. 

• Ensure the necessary reactor capacity to produce an adequate supply of tritium 

to meet military requirements. 

• Ensure continuity in the U.S. capability to develop and manufacture secure, 

trusted strategic radiation-hardened microelectronic systems beyond 2025 to 

support stockpile modernization. 

• Rapidly pursue the Stockpile Responsiveness Program established by Congress 

to expand opportunities for young scientists and engineers to advance warhead 

design, development, and production skills. 

• Develop an NNSA roadmap that sizes production capacity to modernization and 

hedging requirements. 

• Retain confidence in nuclear gravity bombs needed to meet deterrence needs. 

• Maintain and enhance the computational, experimental, and testing capabilities 

needed to annually assess nuclear weapons. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. Right now we are seeing North Korea pursuing a charm offensive 

with South Korea through its offered participation in the Winter Olympics. How 

long do you anticipate the charm offensive will last and do you see it as genuine 

progress or just a temporary distraction? What concern do you have if North Korea 

continues to advance its weapons and delivery programs at the pace it is undertaking during this lull? Where does this all end? What should the Congress be prepared for if a military conflict occurs? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congress can see the higher priority on space security in the 

President’s Budget request, in the new National Strategy for Space, in the National 

Security Strategy, and the National Defense Strategy. Aligned with those strategies, 

the President’s Budget request includes $12.5 billion for Department of Defense 

(DOD) space programs in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, which is an increase of 9.4 percent 

over the FY 2018 request. The President’s Budget request also includes $65.6 billion 

over the FY 2019–23 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), which reflects 13.9 percent 

growth over the previous five-year planning period. As Congress has directed, DOD 
65 

has consolidated this funding under Major Force Program-12 to facilitate the DOD 

leadership’s strategic management and Congress’ oversight of DOD’s space funding 

and programs. To compete, deter, and win through space, DOD must continue to 

develop, test, deploy, and sustain the innovative and resilient space capabilities our 

warfighters need to fight and win in all domains. To that end, the FY 2019 defense 

space budget request provides for increases in mission assurance of DOD’s spacebased capabilities against growing threats, leverages commercial innovation and our 

international partnerships to accelerate development and deployment of new capabilities, strengthens lethality and readiness of the total force, and enhances the nation’s overall deterrence and warfighting power. Furthermore, as Congress directed 

under Section 1601(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018, the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense is assessing the performance of the entire defense 

space enterprise and developing reform recommendations that DOD will be providing to Congress by August 2018. 

Mr. HUNTER. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommends we retain the longstanding ability to forward-deploy dual-capable aircraft, like F–15s and eventually 

F–35s, around the world—not just in Europe. This includes Asia. Why is the ability 

to deploy dual-capable aircraft like F–35s to Asia—in support of allies like Japan 

and South Korea—important? Do our dual-capable aircraft help reassure our allies 

in Asia? 

Secretary MATTIS. Dual capable aircraft should be capable and ready to forward 

deploy to any region, to provide a clear signal to potential adversaries that the 

United States possesses the forward-deployed capabilities to respond promptly to potential escalation. Their tangible presence also contributes significantly to the assurance of allies. Dual capable aircraft make the U.S. nuclear deterrent more flexible 

and enable better tailoring of our strategy to possible regional adversaries. 

Mr. HUNTER. Right now we are seeing North Korea pursuing a charm offensive 

with South Korea through its offered participation in the Winter Olympics. How 

long do you anticipate the charm offensive will last and do you see it as genuine 

progress or just a temporary distraction? What concern do you have if North Korea 

continues to advance its weapons and delivery programs at the pace it is undertaking during this lull? Where does this all end? What should the Congress be prepared for if a military conflict occurs? 

General SELVA. 

• It is important to first remember that North Korea has a consistent track 

record of following periods of increased provocations with ‘‘charm offensives’’ in 

hopes of extracting favorable concessions from negotiations. 

• At this point, it is difficult to assess whether North Korea’s current calls for 

engagement will offer any different results. It is likely, however, that North 

Korea will not conduct any actions that will jeopardize the North-South Summit 

tentatively targeted for April and the potential meeting with President Trump 

in May. 

• It would be a mistake to assume that North Korea will cease to advance its 

weapons and delivery programs during this period. We certainly do not operate 

under this assumption and remain focused on supporting the Maximum Pressure Campaign to the fullest extent. We will also maintain the readiness of our 

military forces to conduct a wide range of military options. 

• Our end state still remains the Complete, Irreversible, and Verifiable Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 

• Both Secretary Mattis and General Dunford have been clear on the potential 

costs of military conflict on the Korean Peninsula. We will prevail but Congress, 

and the American people, must be prepared for a conflict that would result in 

a loss-of-life unlike any of us have experienced in our lifetimes. 

Mr. HUNTER. he Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommends we retain the longstanding ability to forward-deploy dual-capable aircraft, like F–15s and eventually 

F–35s, around the world—not just in Europe. This includes Asia. Why is the ability 

to deploy dual-capable aircraft like F–35s to Asia—in support of allies like Japan 

and South Korea—important? Do our dual-capable aircraft help reassure our allies 

in Asia? 

General SELVA. The United States retains dual-capable aircraft (DCA) to enhance 

stable regional deterrence and assure our allies. They can be deployed globally to 

signal to both adversaries and allies U.S. resolve and capability to respond to aggression and escalation. The NPR did not conclude that permanently deploying DCA 

to Asia at this time is necessary for deterrence or assurance purposes. Having the 

ability to forward deploy DCA assures allies that the United States has effective, 

credible, and flexible options to respond to aggression against them. 
66 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Would you please discuss the requirement for the LRSO cruise 

missile? Some are saying we don’t need the LRSO if we already have a penetrating 

bomber, such as the B–2 or B–21, armed with nuclear gravity bombs. But the new 

Nuclear Posture Review states very clearly that we need both LRSO and the B–21 

bomber. 

a. How do capabilities like LRSO, our bombers, and the nuclear-armed sealaunched cruise missiles contribute to assurance and deterrence in Asia? Do they 

reassure allies like Japan and South Korea while deterring potential adversaries 

like China and North Korea? 

b. We know how hard it is to defense against cruise missiles. Is LRSO a cost-imposing strategy on our adversaries—would it force them to spend lots of money if 

they want to defend against it? Please discuss aging and maintenance in our current 

air-launched cruise missiles. What happens to these missiles and this capability if 

LRSO is not fielded on time? What is the risk to a credible nuclear deterrent? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile is critical to ensure 

a diverse range of nuclear response options. Along with a series of modernization 

efforts, LRSO will enable the B–52H to remain an effective part of the nuclear-capable bomber force. The B–21 will be able to deliver both gravity bombs and the 

LRSO, maximizing operational flexibility and effectiveness against a wide variety of 

threats around the world. 

Capabilities like the LRSO, bombers, and a modern sea-launched cruise missile 

(SLCM) will provide the capability and capacity to disperse forces across a variety 

of geographical locations and with multiple flight profiles. This flexibility complicates adversary defense planning, deters potential adversaries, and assures allies 

and partners, particularly in Asia. Although the SLCM is complementary to the 

LRSO, it is not a substitute because LRSO is necessary to sustain an effective 

bomber-leg of the Triad. Further, LRSO will preserve the bomber-leg’s survivability 

potential and serve as a hedge against unforeseen technical, programmatic, and geopolitical challenges. 

The Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), a system initially fielded in the 1980s, 

is decades beyond its planned lifetime, faces a growing threat from advanced air defense systems, and is becoming more difficult to effectively sustain as it ages. It will 

not last much beyond the LRSO planned availability. We must replace the aged 

ALCM force in a timely way to maintain the credibility and viability of the Triad’s 

bomber-leg. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. The force shaping construct will likely drive additional requirements for a larger force structure. The Navy and the Air Force appear to be acutely 

impacted by the NDS. What is the timeline for the services to align with the NDS 

and complete the new force structure assessments? 

Secretary MATTIS. I anticipate the Services will have completed their assessments 

and any required adjustments will be reflected in the President’s Budget for Fiscal 

Year 2020. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. The NDS makes clear that the size of our force matters. Could 

you discuss what impact the current budget uncertainty has on the ability to responsibly and effectively grow the force? 

Secretary MATTIS. The budget uncertainty associated with spending caps and repeated continuing resolutions certainly had negative impacts on the Department, 

and I welcome the recently enacted spending levels that will hopefully afford the 

Department more budgetary predictability. The National Defense Strategy requires 

modernized force structure and the Department needs forces that are lethal, resilient, agile, and ready. The Department needs sufficient quantities of those capable 

forces to amass the combat power necessary for major contingencies where the force 

will be contested across all domains. 

Budget predictability is essential to striking the right balance of investment in 

modernization, force structure sustainment, and readiness across the FYDP to 

achieve these effects. In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget submission, 

we intend to grow end-strength (manpower) and certain types of platforms (e.g., surface ships), but we are not yet growing major combat formations (e.g., whole new 

brigade combat teams or fighter squadrons) given the priority to modernize the 

Joint Force before we grow in that specific way. The Department is doing everything 

it can to ensure the best return on investment with the stable budgeting Congress 

is giving us in FY 2018 and 2019, and we need that stability to continue into FY 

2020 and beyond. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. The end of the Cold War, along with other factors, resulted in 

the early termination of the B–2 program—ultimately only 21 of the planned 127 

were built, ballooning ‘‘per copy’’ costs and creating a ripple effect of supply chain 
67 

issues that plague the program to this day. The B–2 bomber is the only aircraft in 

the bomber fleet that is able to operate in contested airspace. Today, we have 20 

B–2 bombers—less when you take into account the number that are undergoing 

maintenance versus combat coded. In addition, the B–52s, which are not able to operate in contested airspace, are over 50 years old. Can you comment on the importance of keeping the B–21 program on time, on budget, and at the full number requested? How do continuing resolutions effect DOD’s ability to do just that and 

what is the ultimate impact on our nuclear assurance and deterrence? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Department will continue to maintain a strong, credible 

bomber force, comprised of B–1s, B–2s, and B–52s until the B–21s are operational. 

The B–21 will replace much of the legacy bomber fleet and will become the backbone of the U.S. strategic bomber fleet and serve as a highly capable, visible, flexible 

deterrent to our adversaries. Therefore, it is essential the program continue to execute on time and budget and that we field a minimum of 100 B–21 aircraft. 

Continuing resolutions add considerable budget uncertainty and are detrimental 

to the ability to execute modernization efforts across the board, to include programs 

like B–21 which is integral to nuclear assurance and deterrence modernization. Stable and predictable budgets are absolutely essential to satisfying B–21 cost and 

schedule targets. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. Secretary Mattis and General Selva, in light of the changes in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the emphasis on Great Power competition, this 

Committee received testimony on January 30, 2018, on ‘‘Readying the U.S. Military 

for Future Warfare’’ which pointed to the over-dependency of the force on space, as 

a critical vulnerability. 

Do you believe it is wise to double-down on the vulnerabilities of space versus the 

development of capabilities which can operate in the absence of connectivity with 

space? 

Do you believe system redundancy is a necessity when facing the reality of a highend war with a peer competitor? 

Secretary MATTIS. Space is integral to modern, multi-domain warfare. Space capabilities compound the lethality of U.S. forces, enabling them to shoot, maneuver, and 

communicate with greater speed, precision, accuracy, and clarity. Space provides 

many advantages that cannot be replicated from other domains. As in any 

warfighting domain, it is essential to balance our reliance on space capabilities with 

mission assurance of those capabilities in the face of growing threats. The National 

Defense Strategy places high priority on strengthening mission assurance in the 

space domain by creating more resilient space capabilities that are also more easily 

defended and reconstituted. Redundancy is one of many pathways the Department 

pursues to strengthen resilience. Redundancy can be achieved by diversification 

within the space domain and across all domains through networks of U.S., allied, 

partner, and commercial capabilities. 

Mr. SCOTT. Secretary Mattis, in your National Defense Strategy (NDS) document 

you describe a need to be ‘‘strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable.’’ Can you describe for the Committee what this means for troop rotations and 

overseas assignments in terms of the new Global Operating Model of ‘‘contact,’’ 

‘‘blunt,’’ ‘‘surge,’’ and ‘‘homeland forces’’? 

Secretary MATTIS. Deterrence calls for the Department to unfailingly meet the nation’s defense commitments and defend the nation’s interests against any foe. Simultaneously, the Department must be more agile and flexible in how we fulfill those 

commitments to make the job of our competitors as difficult as possible. 

The Global Operating Model and Dynamic Force Employment balance these demands. The four layers mix persistent forward forces with an ability to surge when 

and where needed. Dynamic Force Employment supplies forces in a less predictable 

way and improves the long-term readiness of the Joint Force. 

Mr. SCOTT. Secretary Mattis, with the shift in the Department’s focus towards 

Great Power competition and high-end warfare, can you speak to the risk we are 

incurring and possible capability losses in terms of low-intensity conflicts in areas 

such as AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM? Is there a risk in returning to a dominate 

focus on Great Powers which would come at the cost of readiness for low-intensity 

operations, that to date have been a focus for the Department of Defense? I believe 

the homeland would come under significant risk if the Department were to shift resources away from these mission areas. 

Secretary MATTIS. The National Defense Strategy’s (NDS) focus on lethality and 

readiness for high-end warfighting generally requires different kinds of capability 
68 

and force structure than that needed to meet the demands of low-intensity operations in the U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command areas of responsibility. The Fiscal Year 2019 budget sustains funding for general purpose and special 

operations capabilities tailored for these low-intensity demands. The NDS prioritizes 

readiness recovery and more targeted capabilities to meeting these kinds of demands (e.g., light attack fighters) going forward. 

Mr. SCOTT. Gentlemen, the rise of ‘‘Mega-cities’’ including the build-up of urban 

areas in Asia, Africa, and Europe, increase the likelihood of future urban warfare. 

Do you foresee protracted warfare in urban and peri-urban areas as an inevitable 

conclusion and if so, what steps are being taken to prepare the Force? 

Secretary MATTIS. Urban combat has been and will remain a fundamental aspect 

of warfare. The Joint Force has gained significant experience in urban operations 

over the last 17 years of war and has worked to preserve the hard-won lessons 

learned. The Joint Force continues to hone its expertise and preparedness for urban 

warfare across the spectrum of conflict. In this vein, the Department is enhancing 

close combat lethality and survivability, including in urban environments. 

Mr. SCOTT. Secretary Mattis, during your confirmation hearing you stated you 

would examine the arguments behind whether or not the Long Range Stand-Off 

Missile (LRSO) is destabilizing because it can be armed with either a conventional 

warhead or a nuclear warhead. Well, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) you released last week fully endorses LRSO and calls for its development to continue. It 

notes that several potential adversaries, particularly Russia, have many weapons 

systems that can be nuclear or conventional and that our current air-launched 

cruise missiles have this capability too. So did you conclude that LRSO is not, in 

fact, destabilizing? 

Secretary MATTIS. As part of Nuclear Posture Review deliberations, we reaffirmed 

that the inability of a nuclear-armed adversary to distinguish between nuclear and 

conventionally-armed missiles is not destabilizing. Cruise missiles and dual-capable 

aircraft have existed for decades and have contributed to strategic stability. 

Mr. SCOTT. Secretary Mattis and General Selva, in light of the changes in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the emphasis on Great Power competition, this 

Committee received testimony on January 30, 2018, on ‘‘Readying the U.S. Military 

for Future Warfare’’ which pointed to the over-dependency of the force on space, as 

a critical vulnerability. 

Do you believe it is wise to double-down on the vulnerabilities of space versus the 

development of capabilities which can operate in the absence of connectivity with 

space? 

Do you believe system redundancy is a necessity when facing the reality of a highend war with a peer competitor? 

General SELVA. The Department fully recognizes space as a contested domain, 

with our adversaries seeking to offset any of our space-derived advantages. As in 

other contested domains, we do not see the solution as an ‘‘either/or’’ problem. Rather, we believe we need to improve the survivability of our space systems while also 

exploring terrestrial alternatives that will best add the resiliency needed by the 

Joint Force. System redundancy does have a place in that solution set, to include 

expanded, lower-cost commercial spacelift. The solution is more about resilience, 

and to that end we are investing in capabilities (I can describe these at a higher 

level of classification) that cut across defensive operations, reconstitution, and resilience to provide space mission assurance. 

Mr. SCOTT. Gentlemen, the rise of ‘‘mega-cities’’ including the build-up of urban 

areas in Asia, Africa, and Europe, increase the likelihood of future urban warfare. 

Do you foresee protracted warfare in urban and peri-urban areas as an inevitable 

conclusion and if so, what steps are being taken to prepare the Force? 

General SELVA. Each of the big four (North Korea, Iran, Russia, China) contain 

large urban areas that would present a substantial military challenge to U.S. and 

partner nation forces. While fighting in a mega-city (population >10M) would represent a significant challenge, the impact of the migration of global populations into 

urban areas and the corresponding increase to the number and size of cities worldwide should not be underestimated. It is possible that we will find ourselves fighting 

in urban and peri-urban areas, and we must continue to prepare for military operations in urban settings. As an example, the Army is presently conducting several 

studies on dense urban environments that will examine current capabilities, required capabilities, and make recommendations across the doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF–P) domains to address urban operations. 

The Services and USSOCOM train for urban operations from the individual level 

through maneuver unit up to brigade, inclusive of both ground forces as well as 

fixed and rotary wing assets in an Urban Close Air Support (CAS) supporting role. 
69 

The DOD has 66 ranges with urban operations training capabilities identified in the 

most recent range report with additional urban warfare training initiatives under 

consideration by a number of the Services. Training in replicated sub-sections of a 

megacity, as well as including electromagnetic warfare/spectrum challenges more effectively into all training, are two examples of urban warfare training initiatives 

being pursued. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. Please describe the changes made to the U.S. nuclear deterrent since 

the Cold War. The NPR states the U.S. has reduced our nuclear stockpile by over 

85% since the height of the Cold War—how have our nuclear forces and capabilities 

changed? 

a. What classes or types of weapons have we eliminated since the Cold War? How 

have foreign nuclear weapons programs changed? 

b. Is the U.S. in a nuclear arms race with Russia? Please describe Russia’s nuclear forces modernization program—comparing and contrasting it to ours. 

Secretary MATTIS. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has made significant reductions in nuclear forces eliminating approximately 85% of U.S. inventory at the height of the Cold War including capabilities such as short and medium 

range ballistic missiles, nuclear mines, and artillery delivered weapons. 

Foreign nuclear programs have changed at different times for different reasons. 

The United Kingdom and France have retained their core nuclear capabilities consisting of submarine-based systems and dual capable fighter aircraft. China is modernizing and expanding its already considerable nuclear forces with little to no 

transparency into its intentions, and is pursuing entirely new nuclear capabilities 

tailored to achieve particular national security objectives. North Korea continues its 

illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. The United States is not 

in an arms race with Russia. Russia has expanded and modernized its strategic and 

non-strategic nuclear forces, including the addition of a number of novel systems as 

described by President Putin in March 2018. By comparison, the United States is 

recapitalizing systems at the end of their service life to maintain a credible Triad. 

The Nuclear Posture Review also identified two capabilities, a Low Yield Ballistic 

Missile and a Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, to strengthen deterrence against Russia’s growing arsenal of theater-level nuclear weapons. 

Mr. BROOKS. Please describe the changes made to the U.S. nuclear deterrent since 

the Cold War. The NPR states the U.S. has reduced our nuclear stockpile by over 

85% since the height of the Cold War—how have our nuclear forces and capabilities 

changed? 

a. What classes or types of weapons have we eliminated since the Cold War? How 

have foreign nuclear weapons programs changed? 

b. Is the U.S. in a nuclear arms race with Russia? Please describe Russia’s nuclear forces modernization program—comparing and contrasting it to ours. 

General SELVA. In 1991, the United States had deployed 22 nuclear weapon types 

in the stockpile across three military services (see Table 1). Today the U.S. has 

seven weapon types in the stockpile, five of which are deployed by the Air Force, 

and two of which are deployed by the Navy. The Army and Marine Corps no longer 

field nuclear weapons. 

Table 1 

Warhead/Bomb Service Type Disposition 

B28 AF Gravity bomb Retired 

W33 Army 8-inch AFAP Retired 

B41 AF Gravity bomb Retired 

W48 Army 155-mm AFAP Retired 

W50 Army Pershing I Retired 

W56 AF Minuteman II Retired 
70 

Table 1—Continued 

Warhead/Bomb Service Type Disposition 

B57 AF, Navy Depth charge Retired 

B61 AF Gravity bomb Active 

W62 AF Minuteman III Retired 

W68 Navy Poseidon C3 Retired 

W69 AF SRAM Retired 

W70 Army Lance SRBM Retired 

W71 Army Spartan ABM Retired 

W76 Navy Trident C4 Active 

W78 AF Minuteman III Active 

W79 Army 8-inch AFAP Retired 

W80 AF, Navy ALCM/TLAM–N Active/Retired 

B83 AF Gravity bomb Active 

W84 Army GLCM Retired 

W85 Army Pershing II Retired 

W87 AF Minuteman III Active 

W88 Navy Trident D5 Active 

We are not in a nuclear arms race with Russia. However, we are cognizant of the 

significant ongoing changes in the nuclear forces of three key states of concern: Russia, China, and North Korea. 

Since 2010, Russia has continued to prioritize nuclear forces modernization, resulting in increased warhead delivery capacity, and improved operational capability. 

Russia plans to continue this effort. In addition to modernizing ‘‘legacy’’ Soviet nuclear systems, Russia is developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and 

launchers across every leg—land, air, and sea—of its strategic nuclear triad. For example, Russia is developing at least three new intercontinental range systems, a 

hypersonic glide vehicle, and new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, 

undersea autonomous torpedo, and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile. 

None of these systems is currently limited by New START. Russia is also modernizing and expanding its non-strategic nuclear forces and possesses significant advantage in its nuclear weapons production capacity. 

The U.S. nuclear modernization program will also modernize each leg of the strategic nuclear triad. However, unlike Russia, the U.S. program will not introduce 

new kinds of intercontinental range nuclear systems. The U.S. modernization program also does not seek to quantitatively match Russia’s growing non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenal, as our strategy does not require us to do so. Finally, the U.S. 

program does not build new nuclear warheads. Instead, we life extend existing systems. 

China continues to increase the size and capabilities of its nuclear forces. For example, China has developed a new road mobile strategic ICBM, a new multi-warhead version of a silo- based ICBM, and has armed its most advanced ballistic missile submarine with new Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. It has also deployed a nuclear-capable precision guided intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of attacking land and naval targets. Furthermore, it announced development of 
71 

a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, which will give China a nuclear triad. In 

1991, the United States had deployed 22 nuclear weapon types in the stockpile 

across three military services (see Table 1). Today the U.S. has seven weapon types 

in the stockpile, five of which are deployed by the Air Force, and two of which are 

deployed by the Navy. The Army and Marine Corps no longer field nuclear weapons. 

We are not in a nuclear arms race with Russia. However, we are cognizant of the 

significant ongoing changes in the nuclear forces of three key states of concern: Russia, China, and North Korea. 

Since 2010, Russia has continued to prioritize nuclear forces modernization, resulting in increased warhead delivery capacity, and improved operational capability. 

Russia plans to continue this effort. In addition to modernizing ‘‘legacy’’ Soviet nuclear systems, Russia is developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and 

launchers across every leg—land, air, and sea—of its strategic nuclear triad. For example, Russia is developing at least three new intercontinental range systems, a 

hypersonic glide vehicle, and new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, 

undersea autonomous torpedo, and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile. 

None of these systems is currently limited by New START. Russia is also modernizing and expanding its non-strategic nuclear forces and possesses significant advantage in its nuclear weapons production capacity. 

The U.S. nuclear modernization program will also modernize each leg of the strategic nuclear triad. However, unlike Russia, the U.S. program will not introduce 

new kinds of intercontinental range nuclear systems. The U.S. modernization program also does not seek to quantitatively match Russia’s growing non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenal, as our strategy does not require us to do so. Finally, the U.S. 

program does not build new nuclear warheads. Instead, we life extend existing systems. 

China continues to increase the size and capabilities of its nuclear forces. For example, China has developed a new road mobile strategic ICBM, a new multi-warhead version of a silo- based ICBM, and has armed its most advanced ballistic missile submarine with new Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. It has also deployed a nuclear-capable precision guided intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of attacking land and naval targets. Furthermore, it announced development of 

a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, which will give China a nuclear triad. 

North Korea has accelerated its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, and made explicit threats to use nuclear weapons against the United States 

and its allies. In the past few years, North Korea has dramatically increased its 

missile flight testing, most recently including the testing of intercontinental-range 

missiles possibly capable of reaching the U.S. homeland. It has conducted six explosive nuclear tests since 2006, including a test of a significantly higher-yield device. 

It also continues to produce plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear 

weapons production. 

While Iran has agreed to constraints on its nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it retains the technological capability and much 

of the capacity necessary to develop a nuclear weapon within one year of a decision 

to do so. Further, absent extensive international actions many of the JCPOA’s restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program will end by 2031. Iran’s development of increasingly long-range ballistic missiles, combined with its aggressive strategy and activities to destabilize neighboring governments, raise questions about its long-term commitment to foregoing a nuclear weapons capability. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP 

Dr. WENSTRUP. How did developments in foreign nuclear weapon programs, or 

other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into the Nuclear Posture Review’s process 

and conclusions? Being specific but unclassified, what developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign nations concern you the most, and how does that factor 

into the NPR’s recommendations for U.S. nuclear posture? 

Secretary MATTIS. The starting point for the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was 

an assessment of today’s strategic environment, including an examination of foreign 

nuclear weapon programs. As stated in the National Security Strategy, the National 

Defense Strategy, and the NPR, the return of great power competition and the 

growing importance of nuclear weapons in the security strategies of other nuclear 

powers were of significant concern. The NPR’s resulting conclusions and recommendations ensure that any potential adversary understands the unacceptable 

costs they would incur should they employ a nuclear weapon against the United 

States or our allies or partners. 
72 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Leaving aside the poor-descriptor of ‘‘non-strategic,’’ which really 

just means they aren’t captured by any sort of arms control agreement, what types 

of ‘‘non-strategic’’ nuclear weapons does Russia have? We’ve heard its something like 

11 different types, including nuclear torpedoes, nuclear land-mines, nuclear-armed 

air defense missiles, and more. a. How many of these non-strategic nuclear weapons 

does Russia have? The unclassified estimates we’ve seen say several thousand. b. 

How many types and how many numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons does the 

U.S. have? I understand it’s just the B61 gravity bomb and only a few hundred of 

them? c. Is this 10:1 imbalance significant? Does it impact deterrence or assurance? 

Secretary MATTIS. In the unclassified context, the Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that Russia possesses approximately two thousand non-strategic nuclear 

weapons (NSNW) and the numbers are expanding. Russia has NSNW for close- and 

short-range ballistic missiles (0–500 km range); air-, ground-, and sea-launched 

cruise missiles; anti-submarine weapons including torpedoes, depth bombs and missiles; anti-ship missiles; gravity bombs and air-to-surface missiles delivered by aircraft; anti-aircraft missiles and anti-ballistic missiles. In contrast, the United States 

has one type of NSNW—the B61 gravity bomb delivered by dual-capable fighter aircraft. 

The magnitude of the imbalance, when combined with Russian military doctrine 

and practice, is concerning. Although this NSNW imbalance is less meaningful for 

deterring direct attack on the U.S. homeland, it is significant for extended deterrence and assurance of allies and partners. Russian investment in these weapons 

and its behavior during exercises indicate that it believes it can leverage these 

weapons to coerce the United States and our allies and partners. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. How did developments in foreign nuclear weapon programs, or 

other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into the Nuclear Posture Review’s process 

and conclusions? Being specific but unclassified, what developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign nations concern you the most, and how does that factor 

into the NPR’s recommendations for U.S. nuclear posture? 

General SELVA. From the outset, the Nuclear Posture Review working group 

worked closely with the Intelligence Community conducting a month’s long deep 

dive into the latest assessments of foreign nuclear weapon programs. Based on this 

review, the working group noted the rapid deterioration of the threat environment 

since the 2010 NPR despite U.S. efforts to reduce the role and number of nuclear 

weapons. Our potential adversaries did not follow our lead. Rather, Russia, China, 

and North Korea continued their efforts to expand and modernize their nuclear 

forces, and other advanced military capabilities. Of particular concern is the combination of Russia’s nuclear strategy, doctrine, and non-strategic nuclear capabilities. The NPR concluded that we need to take steps to reduce Russia’s confidence 

in their strategy to initiate limited nuclear use to coerce the U.S. and NATO, and 

recommended two additions to the existing nuclear modernization program to do so: 

(1) a limited number of low-yield SLBM warheads in the near-term, and (2) pursuit 

of a low-yield capable, nuclear-armed SLCM. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Leaving aside the poor-descriptor of ‘‘non-strategic,’’ which really 

just means they aren’t captured by any sort of arms control agreement, what types 

of ‘‘non-strategic’’ nuclear weapons does Russia have? We’ve heard its something like 

11 different types, including nuclear torpedoes, nuclear land-mines, nuclear-armed 

air defense missiles, and more. a. How many of these non-strategic nuclear weapons 

does Russia have? The unclassified estimates we’ve seen say several thousand. b. 

How many types and how many numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons does the 

U.S. have? I understand it’s just the B61 gravity bomb and only a few hundred of 

them? c. Is this 10:1 imbalance significant? Does it impact deterrence or assurance? 

General SELVA. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KNIGHT 

Mr. KNIGHT. The Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that our nuclear forces 

need to both deter potential adversaries and assure our allies. Were our allies consulted as the NPR was being considered and drafted? What did they say or recommend? When the Obama administration eliminated the sea-launched cruise missile in the 2010 NPR, Japan in particular was concerned. Has Japan or any of our 

other allies expressed support from bringing this cruise missile capability back? 

How does the ability to signal strategic intent with our nuclear bombers, including 

the B–2 today and the B–21 in the near-future, contribute to assurance of allies? 

In particular, how are our allies reacting to the proposal to continue the Obama administration’s program of record and add two supplemental capabilities? 
73 

Secretary MATTIS. Throughout the Nuclear Posture Review, we consulted extensively with allies and partners. They were unanimous in the view that the security 

environment has changed for the worse since 2010; offered a range of opinions on 

the environment and the continued need for nuclear deterrence; and appreciated our 

efforts to consult with them. Our East Asian allies in particular appreciated the reaffirmation of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. In Europe, reactions were 

positive, particularly our moves to strengthen deterrence, reaffirm our declaratory 

policy, and further the goals of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 

A number of European allies emphasized the importance of balancing deterrence 

with arms control and non-proliferation initiatives. Reactions to continuation of the 

U.S. nuclear modernization program were generally positive. No European allies objected to the inclusion of the supplemental capabilities. Strategic nuclear bombers, 

as well as dual-capable aircraft, both of which can be forward-deployed, provide a 

visible display of U.S. capabilities and resolve, providing effective signaling for deterrence and assurance, especially in times of tension. Many viewed these supplemental capabilities as an appropriate counter-balance to Russian, Chinese and 

North Korean developments, while some did express reservations over possible Russian and Chinese reactions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. DesJARLAIS 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. What does the NPR recommend to finally get on top of the massive and complex challenge of NC3 modernization? What steps are being proposed 

to get after NNSA’s $4 billion backlog of infrastructure problems and deferred maintenance? How will we ensure we take care of the unsung heroes of national defense 

in DOD and NNSA that operate, support, and provide our nuclear deterrent? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Nuclear Command, Control and Communication (NC3) system is subject to challenges from both aging system components and new threats, 

in particular space and cyber-space, adversary strategies of limited nuclear escalation, and a diffusion of authority and responsibility. The Administration is pursuing a series of steps to strengthen NC3, including: 1) improving protection against 

space-based and cyber threats; 2) enhancing integrated tactical warning and attack 

assessment; 3) improving command post and communication links; 4) advancing decision support technology; and 5) integrating planning and operations. The Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR) directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deliver 

to me by 1 May a plan to reform NC3 governance. 

There is no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical infrastructure 

needed to produce strategic materials and components for U.S. nuclear weapons. 

Just as our nuclear forces are an affordable priority, so is a resilient and effective 

nuclear weapons infrastructure. The NPR lays out several specific initiatives that 

National Nuclear Security Agency will pursue and fund in its budget requests, and 

implementation of these efforts is ongoing. The personnel who maintain our nuclear 

deterrent are true professionals; I am committed to ensuring they have the tools 

needed to execute their mission. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. What would be the consequences, risks, or benefits of delaying 

or cancelling certain modernization programs—such as the GBSD land-based missile, the B–21 bomber, the long-range standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, or the COLUMBIA-class submarine? How firm is the need for the current schedules for these 

programs—or is there room for slipping their schedules? 

General SELVA. Any delay or cancellation of these programs would severely limit 

the capability and capacity of the Joint Force to meet the objectives of the Nuclear 

Posture Review. Delays would require service life extensions to legacy systems, and 

in cases such as the OHIO class submarine, the service life cannot be extended. If 

any of these programs are delayed or cancelled, our nuclear deterrence would be severely degraded. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. ABRAHAM 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Secretary Mattis, your Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) mentions the 

importance of refurbishing the infrastructure that supports our nuclear deterrent, 

both at DOD bases and across the NNSA enterprise. Several of the Air Force facilities that desperately need recapitalization are the Weapons Storage Facility at our 

strategic bomber bases, including Barksdale Air Force base. When you say nuclear 

deterrence is our number one priority mission and we need to recapitalize our force, 

do you include this type of infrastructure in that prioritization? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes. The Nuclear Posture Review commits the United States 

to a safe, secure and effective nuclear posture through a program to modernize and 
74 

recapitalize the Triad and supporting infrastructure, including National Nuclear Security Administration infrastructure. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER 

Mr. GALLAGHER. In recent years, there have been press reports of a number of 

joint ventures between U.S. companies and Chinese companies on Chinese soil that 

involve the transfer of U.S. technology to the detriment of the warfighter. These 

transactions appear to be designed to both evade CFIUS and game the export control system. What is your view on these types of transactions? 

Secretary MATTIS. I am concerned about China’s attempts to increase its military 

capabilities by gaining access to sensitive U.S. technologies and know how, both directly within the United States and through our allies and partners. China uses a 

range of acquisition methods, both legal and illegal, in a comprehensive approach 

that tests the gaps and seams in U.S. protection measures. For example, when a 

Chinese company failed in successive attempts to secure export licenses to access 

a U.S. company’s equipment and technology, the Chinese sought to circumvent U.S. 

exports controls by instead attempting to acquire the company itself. 

Furthermore, increasingly globalized science and technology means that attempts 

to obtain U.S. technologies do not stop at U.S. borders. A Chinese entity recently 

made an attempt to acquire a German company with U.S. subsidiaries developing 

cutting-edge semiconductor technologies. The Committee on Foreign Investment in 

the United States (CFIUS) conducted an investigation and ultimately the parties 

abandoned the acquisition and immediately entered into a joint venture, a structure 

that is currently outside CFIUS’s jurisdiction. 

We must ensure that both the CFIUS review and the export control processes effectively address the complexities of today’s globalized and dual-use science and 

technology environment. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 

2017 (FIRRMA) legislation proposed by Senator Cornyn would enhance the available processes to protect our military technological advantage and national security 

interests by expanding the scope of covered transactions, including to joint ventures. 

Our export control licensing processes and authorities should be similarly enhanced 

to complement any change to the CFIUS process, including to protect emerging 

technologies, in order to ensure that the U.S. Government response is sufficiently 

effective and comprehensive in addressing this multi-vectored threat in a world 

characterized by rapidly evolving science and technology. 

We must take a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to securing our 

sensitive technologies, with a range of robust and agile authorities employed in concert to prevent transfers to China and other countries that use similar methods to 

exploit our technology. Both the methods of exploitation and the potential national 

security implications are many and varied. The approach to securing American technology must be similarly comprehensive. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON 

Mr. BACON. Nuclear Command, Control & Communications (NC3). A recent review by the House Armed Services Committee staff shows at least 35 different organizations claim to have responsibility for NC3: 9 separate organizations establish 

policy; 18 identify threats and gaps; 12 establish requirements; 9 advocate capabilities; 20 organizations acquire and sustain systems; 15 organizations plan and conduct operations. Most concerning, it appears that 31 organizations provide oversight. 

Questions: 1. Who is in charge of the NC3 enterprise in the Department of Defense?; 2. Do you believe organizational reforms are necessary to ensure clear responsibility and accountability for the readiness and effectiveness of our NC3 enterprise? If yes, what changes would you recommend?; 3. What are your priorities for 

NC3 modernization?; 4. Do you believe it is prudent to revisit our airborne NC3 posture? If yes, what would the Department require to resume a sustained NC3 airborne alert? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Nuclear Posture Review directs the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff to deliver a plan to me no later than May 1, 2018 to reform Nuclear 

Command, Control and Communication (NC3) governance to ensure its modernization and effective functioning against current and future environments. In addition 

to NC3 governance reform, the Administration will pursue a series of initiatives to 

strengthen NC3, including: 1) strengthening protection against space-based and 

cyber threats; 2) enhancing integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; 3) 

improving command post and communication links; 4) advancing decision support 
75 

technology; and 5) integrating planning and operations. Airborne NC3 capabilities 

are key to the overall survivability of the NC3 system; their modernization and 

sustainment are well-warranted. 

Mr. BACON. Nuclear Command, Control & Communications (NC3). A recent review by the House Armed Services Committee staff shows at least 35 different organizations claim to have responsibility for NC3: 9 separate organizations establish 

policy; 18 identify threats and gaps; 12 establish requirements; 9 advocate capabilities; 20 organizations acquire and sustain systems; 15 organizations plan and conduct operations. Most concerning, it appears that 31 organizations provide oversight. 

Questions: 1. Who is in charge of the NC3 enterprise in the Department of Defense?; 2. Do you believe organizational reforms are necessary to ensure clear responsibility and accountability for the readiness and effectiveness of our NC3 enterprise? If yes, what changes would you recommend?; 3. What are your priorities for 

NC3 modernization?; 4. Do you believe it is prudent to revisit our airborne NC3 posture? If yes, what would the Department require to resume a sustained NC3 airborne alert? 

General SELVA. 1. Who is in charge of the NC3 enterprise in the Department of 

Defense? A: In accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 35, the Secretary of Defense is in charge of the Nuclear Command and Control Communications (NC3) enterprise for the DOD. The Council on Oversight on the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System (CONLC3S) is responsible for oversight 

of the command, control, and communications system for the national leadership of 

the United States and provides oversight of the NC3 enterprise. 

2. Do you believe organizational reforms are necessary to ensure clear responsibility 

and accountability for the readiness and effectiveness of our NC3 enterprise? A: The 

2017 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff to provide a plan to the Secretary of Defense for improving and reforming governance of the overall NC3 System no later than 1 May 2018. 

2a. If yes, what changes would you recommend? A: In response to the NPR task, 

the Joint Staff is leading an effort to identify what, if any, changes to existing roles, 

responsibilities, and authorities would be required to improve and reform governance of the overall NC3 system. 

3. What are your priorities for NC3 modernization? A: The NC3 enterprise is a 

complex system of systems, each part of which contributes to its overall effectiveness. The Joint Staff is leading an effort to ensure the Department is able to make 

risk-informed, prioritized investment decisions within the NC3 enterprise. 

4. Do you believe it is prudent to revisit our airborne NC3 posture? A: The Department continually assesses the posture of the entire U.S. nuclear enterprise within 

the context of evolving threats and emerging capabilities. As part of that effort, the 

Department is exploring revised concepts of operation that include sustained NC3 

airborne alert, but no decisions have been made to date. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HICE 

Mr. HICE. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommends deploying a low-yield 

submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on our submarines in order to better 

deter Russia. Some have argued that deploying such a low-yield warhead alongside 

our higher-yield SLBMs will lead to instability in a crisis, an adversary mistaking 

a low-yield for a high-yield warhead, or even that the submarine would be vulnerable to counterattack if it only launches a single low-yield missile. Do you put any 

credence into those arguments? 

Secretary MATTIS. No. Deploying a low-yield variant of the submarine-launched 

ballistic missile (SLBM) will increase stability, particularly in crisis, by demonstrating to an adversary that the United States has the ability to respond to any 

level of nuclear use. This reduces an adversary’s incentive to use nuclear weapons 

in the first place. Adversary discrimination is not a critical concern. There is little 

to suggest that an adversary would view a single ballistic missile launch—regardless of the weapon’s yield—as an all-out attack leading to a response in kind. In 

addition, the NPR examined the risks of launching a single or small number of lowyield SLBMs from a single nuclear-powered submarine and determined the risks to 

the ship are minimal. 

Mr. HICE. Do you believe the relationship between DOD and NNSA is working? 

Are NNSA and DOE appropriately focused on their number one mission of delivering nuclear weapons to the military? NNSA’s contracting structure with its labs 

and plants is very focused on operational minutiae and cost savings, and mission 

deliverables to the military often seem like an afterthought. 
76 

Secretary MATTIS. The Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy’s 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are both committed to modernizing and recapitalizing all aspects of the U.S. deterrent. DOD looks forward to 

working with the new NNSA Administrator, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, and endorses her 

recent remarks reinforcing that DOD is NNSA’s primary customer. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. LARSEN. Is reducing the role of nuclear weapons in conflict a goal of this administration? If so, what new actions will be taken to reduce the role of nuclear 

weapons? 

Secretary MATTIS. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration 

has made clear its long-term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons coupled with the 

requirement that the United States have modern, flexible and resilient nuclear capabilities until such a time as nuclear weapons can prudently be eliminated from 

the world. 

Mr. LARSEN. The NPR makes clear that a portion of the ICBM forces are in an 

alert status that would allow prompt launch in order to prevent their destruction 

in a ‘‘surprise first strike.’’ Yet the NPR criticizes the use of the term ‘‘hair-trigger 

alert.’’ Would ‘‘launch on alert’’ be a correct description of the alert status of these 

weapons, and what is the decision making process and timeline for their launch? 

Secretary MATTIS. ‘‘Launch on alert’’ is not a correct description of the alert status 

of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force. The United States maintains 

a portion of its nuclear forces on alert day-to-day, and retains the option of launching those forces promptly. This posture maximizes decision time and preserves the 

range of U.S. response options. Forces on day-to-day alert are subject to multiple 

layers of control, ensuring clear civilian and Presidential decision-making. Over 

more than half a century, the U.S. has established a series of measures and protocols to ensure that ICBMs are safe, secure, and under constant control. Any U.S. 

decision to employ nuclear weapons would follow a deliberative process. 

Mr. LARSEN. Does the ability to deliver a proportional nuclear response enhance 

deterrence? Should proportionality be directly related to the explosive yield of a nuclear weapon? How long would it take the United States to ascertain the yield of 

a nuclear weapon used against the U.S. or an ally? How long would it take an adversary to make a similar calculation regarding a weapon used against its territory? 

Secretary MATTIS. Effective nuclear deterrence is about ensuring potential adversaries do not miscalculate regarding the consequences of any nuclear employment. 

As described in the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States will apply a tailored 

approach supported by flexible capabilities to effectively deter across a spectrum of 

adversaries, threats, and contexts. In support of this, the United States will now 

pursue select low-yield supplements that will enhance deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United States and its allies. 

The U.S. nuclear detection system is able to promptly determine the yield of a 

nuclear detonation. Depending on the adversary, it could take a similar timeframe 

to make a similar determination. 

Mr. LARSEN. How would deploying sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles change 

operations, security, personnel and training requirements for the Navy? What are 

the costs expected to be and how would this requirement impact existing Navy missions and operations? 

General SELVA. We do not yet know how nuclear-armed SLCM deployment will 

affect Navy operations, security, personnel, and training requirements, as we have 

not yet developed the concept of operations for this system, nor have we identified 

a specific technical solution. The Navy will evaluate any required changes to operations, security, personnel and training requirements as it implements the Nuclear 

Posture Review direction for pursuing a sea launched cruise missile (SLCM) capability. This effort will include conducting an Analysis of Alternatives which will refine the costs associated with any proposed SLCM options. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. The B83 is the last megaton-range weapon in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with a maximum yield about 75 times larger than the bomb used against Hiroshima. While the B83 was set to be retired, the Nuclear Posture Review sustains 

the weapon indefinitely. Why did the Administration postpone the B83’s retirement? 

What deterrence requirements are met by retaining this weapon? 
77 

Secretary MATTIS. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reiterates the prior Administration’s commitment to retain the B83–1 in the stockpile until there is sufficient 

confidence in the B61–12 gravity bomb. Given the changed threat environment, deterrence requirements to hold a variety of protected targets at risk, and the unique 

capabilities of the B83–1 bomb to fulfill those requirements, the Administration decided to postpone B83–1 retirement until a suitable replacement is identified. 

Ms. SPEIER. The Nuclear Posture Review indicates that the United States could 

return to explosive nuclear testing if ‘‘geopolitical challenges’’ occur. Please cite examples of geopolitical challenges that could precipitate a return to explosive nuclear 

testing. 

Secretary MATTIS. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reiterates U.S. policy to 

continue observing the nuclear test moratorium that began in 1992. The NPR recognizes, however, that global threat conditions have worsened markedly since 2010, 

and that the United States must remain ready to resume nuclear testing if necessary to meet severe technological or geopolitical challenges. Examples of geopolitical challenges could include the emergence of new adversaries, expansion of adversary nuclear forces, changes in adversary strategy and doctrine, new alignments 

among adversaries, and the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

Ms. SPEIER. The B83 is the last megaton-range weapon in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with a maximum yield about 75 times larger than the bomb used against Hiroshima. While the B83 was set to be retired, the Nuclear Posture Review sustains 

the weapon indefinitely. Why did the Administration postpone the B83’s retirement? 

What deterrence requirements are met by retaining this weapon? 

General SELVA. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Ms. SPEIER. The Nuclear Posture Review indicates that the United States could 

return to explosive nuclear testing if ‘‘geopolitical challenges’’ occur. Please cite examples of geopolitical challenges that could precipitate a return to explosive nuclear 

testing. 

General SELVA. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) explicitly identified the capacity to hedge against an uncertain future security environment as a role of nuclear 

weapons in U.S. national security strategy. This role is a recognition that the future 

security environment is unknowable, and that it can change rapidly, as it did since 

the 2010 NPR. A geopolitical challenge could emerge that would require the United 

States to develop nuclear weapons with new military capabilities that could only be 

achieved with confidence through explosive testing. Due the uncertainty noted 

above, I cannot tell you today what that challenge might be, but it would be prudent 

to be prepared to address such a challenge. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO 

Mr. GALLEGO. The Nuclear Posture Review mentions that the United States 

would consider using nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks that have 

strategic effects. Can you provide more detail under what scenarios the United 

States would consider use of nuclear weapons in a scenario that has stayed nonnuclear to that point? 

Secretary MATTIS. The United States will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United Sates, its 

allies, and partners. The Nuclear Posture Review provides examples of ‘‘extreme circumstances,’’ which could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks. Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the 

U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or 

allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment 

capabilities. That said, there is nothing automatic about a United States nuclear response. Our response to aggression will be with a means and at a time of our choosing. 

Mr. GALLEGO. In which arenas and against which nuclear-armed foes are we expecting to possibly use nuclear weapons to deter or turn back non-nuclear attacks? 

Secretary MATTIS. The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear 

weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Treaty on NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty. The United States is pursuing a tailored deterrence strategy, supported by flexible capabilities designed to deter a range of adversaries across a diverse set of potential contingencies. The Nuclear Posture Review describes tailored strategies for Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Under a Great Power Competition model, our allies and strategic 

partners may have to shift their priorities and actions as well. Competition with 
78 

states can be expensive, especially for our smaller allies and partners in Europe and 

Asia, many of which have invested heavily in boutique counterinsurgency capabilities—often at our request—since 2001. How should allied and partner states—many 

of which cannot afford to make wholesale, rapid changes to their capital acquisition 

schedules and force size—fit into this strategy? Can we expect and rely on them to 

both fight with us in Coalitions against terrorists and be a bulwark against a large, 

nuclear-armed state? 

Secretary MATTIS. The National Defense Strategy directs the Department of Defense to strengthen and evolve our alliances and partnerships to meet shared challenges. We expect allies and partners to contribute their fair share to security. Each 

ally and partner is unique. The Department of Defense is consulting with each ally 

and partner on how it can contribute to addressing shared challenges. Some allies 

and partners are postured to contribute to fighting terrorists and deterring threats 

from states. Others will have capabilities that incline them more toward one of 

those objectives. The overall constellation of allies and partners will provide the potential to build coalitions to meet a range of future challenges. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Great power competition can, of course, lead to great power war, 

which holds the potential for much higher servicemember- and civilian casualties 

than the wars we have fought since Vietnam. Many in Congress know and understand this, especially on the Armed Services Committees, but Americans in general 

may not. What is the Department and wider Administration doing to ensure that 

the the American People are ready, willing, and able to pay the potentially massive 

human costs of modern state-on-state conflict? 

Secretary MATTIS. The greatest deterrence to war is for the enemy to be overmatched in all aspects and forms of warfare. My goal is to build such a lethal military that it will enhance our diplomatic persuasiveness. And we build such a Force 

of deterrence by successfully implementing and resourcing the Department’s strategy. Directly inspired by the President’s National Security Strategy, the Department 

developed the National Defense Strategy (NDS) that clearly articulates a strategic 

approach to deter aggression in critical theaters and, should deterrence fail, prevail 

in protracted war with any great power adversary. This approach encompasses 

three lines of effort: (1) build a more lethal force; (2) strengthen alliances and attract new partners; and (3) reform the Department for greater performance and affordability. Proper resourcing of the strategy not only calls for stable and predictable 

budgets, but also prioritizing mission-critical operations and programs that most directly contribute to the success of the strategy. 

As part of building this lethal force, we are also prioritizing medical and family 

readiness programs that allow our Service members to be fully deployable and provide support for their loved ones, whether the Service members are at home base 

or abroad. With this in mind, the Department aims to make the best possible use 

of its resources to give the strategy the best possible chance to succeed in both 

peacetime and in wartime. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Under a Great Power Competition model, our allies and strategic 

partners may have to shift their priorities and actions as well. Competition with 

states can be expensive, especially for our smaller allies and partners in Europe and 

Asia, many of which have invested heavily in boutique counterinsurgency capabilities—often at our request—since 2001. How should allied and partner states—many 

of which cannot afford to make wholesale, rapid changes to their capital acquisition 

schedules and force size—fit into this strategy? Can we expect and rely on them to 

both fight with us in Coalitions against terrorists and be a bulwark against a large, 

nuclear-armed state? 

General SELVA. Allies and partners have made significant investments in 

counterinsurgency capabilities, but many have also advanced their capability and 

capacity to support major combat operations. We must continue to assure allies and 

partners while maintaining the ability to deter potential adversaries. We see that 

some potential adversaries continue to operate below the threshold that would drive 

a traditional military response. In this area, counterinsurgency capabilities will likely be the best response. In contested areas of the competition space, counterinsurgency is a viable mission that could provide a competitive advantage in an allied 

or coalition undertaking. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Great power competition can, of course, lead to great power war, 

which holds the potential for much higher servicemember- and civilian casualties 

than the wars we have fought since Vietnam. Many in Congress know and understand this, especially on the Armed Services Committees, but Americans in general 

may not. What is the Department doing to ensure that the Force and military families are ready, willing, and able to pay the potentially massive human costs of modern state-on-state conflict? 
79 

General SELVA. The department does not prepare, per se, our Service Members 

and their families to be ready, willing, and able to pay massive human costs of 

state-on-state conflict. We prepare our Service Members and their families to mobilize, deploy, fight, WIN, redeploy, and reintegrate. That being said,—DOD and Joint 

Force senior leaders routinely engage with external audiences, including the press, 

as well as with military members and their families in an effort to keep them informed about today’s strategic security environment. Those discussions often include 

frank conversations about how a high-end war against a great-power adversary 

would result in catastrophic impacts to all involved. As Secretary Mattis has consistently maintained, diplomacy remains the priority effort in the current environment of great power competition, but the Joint Force is working hard to restore 

readiness to ensure the military is prepared to respond to any contingency.—Services have Service Member and Family Readiness programs. Current resiliency programs and Family Readiness best practices prove to be effective, and will prove useful should there be an high-end conflict.—The department is also prepared with contingency plan for recovery, removal and next-of-kin notification for mass casualties. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN 

Ms. ROSEN. If we are indeed abiding by the 1992 nuclear test moratorium and 

are not conducting explosive nuclear testing, why won’t the Administration push for 

ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? 

Secretary MATTIS. The United States will not seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but will continue to observe the nuclear test 

moratorium that began in 1992. This approach is needed because America confronts 

an international security situation that is more complex and demanding than any 

since the end of the Cold War and must remain ready to resume nuclear testing 

if necessary to meet severe technological or geopolitical challenges that may emerge. 

Ms. ROSEN. In what ways could the expanded scenarios in the Nuclear Posture 

Review allowing for the use of nuclear weapons against NON-nuclear threats—including cyber threats—increase the likelihood of a nuclear exchange between the 

United States and North Korea? 

Secretary MATTIS. The United States will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its 

allies, and partners. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provides examples of ‘‘extreme circumstances,’’ which could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks. 

Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on 

the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. 

or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities. Although the NPR discusses the need for a tailored strategy visa-vis North Korea, this strategy does not lower the threshold for consideration of 

U.S. nuclear use. 

Ms. ROSEN. The Nuclear Posture Review states that ‘‘geopolitical challenges’’ 

could lead to a possible return to explosive nuclear testing. What challenges might 

necessitate a return to explosive testing, either below ground or above ground? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reiterates U.S. policy to 

continue observing the nuclear test moratorium that began in 1992. The NPR recognizes, however, that global threat conditions have worsened markedly since 2010, 

and that the United States must remain ready to resume nuclear testing if necessary to meet severe technological or geopolitical challenges. Examples of geopolitical challenges could include the emergence of new adversaries, expansion of adversary nuclear forces, changes in adversary strategy and doctrine, new alignments 

among adversaries, and the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPR directs the National Nuclear Security Administration to maintain the capability to resume underground nuclear explosive testing if called upon to do so. It contains no 

requirement for an above-ground nuclear explosive test capability. 

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