The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. 

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title: Megan’s Law: Assessing the Practical and 

Monetary Efficacy

Author: Kristen Zgoba, Ph.D.; Philip Witt, Ph.D.; Melissa 

Dalessandro, M.S.W.; Bonita Veysey, Ph.D.

Document No.: 225370

Date Received: December 2008

Award Number: 2006-IJ-CX-0018

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to 

traditional paper copies.

Opinions or points of view expressed are those 

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 

the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice.
0

Megan’s Law: Assessing the Practical and Monetary Efficacy 

Grant Award # 2006-IJ-CX-0018

National Institute of Justice

Principal Investigator:

Kristen Zgoba, Ph.D.

New Jersey Department of Corrections

Research & Evaluation Unit

Trenton, NJ 08625

(609) 777-4256

kristen.zgoba@doc.state.nj.us

Co-Principal Investigator:

Philip Witt, Ph.D.

Associates in Psychological Services, P.A.

25 N. Doughty Ave.

Somerville, NJ 08876

(908) 526-1177

phwitt@optonline.net

Research Assistant/ Data Manager:

Melissa Dalessandro, M.S.W.

New Jersey Department of Corrections

Research & Evaluation Unit

Trenton, NJ 08625

(609)-292-5670

melissa.dalessandro@doc.state.nj.us

Consultant:

Bonita Veysey, Ph.D.

Rutgers University

School of Criminal Justice

Newark, NJ 07102

veysey@andromeda.rutgers.edu

The Research & Evaluation Unit

Office of Policy and Planning

New Jersey Department of Corrections

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The research that follows concerns the various impacts of community notification and 

registration laws (Megan’s Law) in New Jersey. Although this report includes a variety of 

interesting findings and many ideas that will be explored upon post grant period, this research 

was embarked upon, in general, to investigate: 1) the effect of Megan’s Law on the overall rate 

of sexual offending over time; 2) its specific deterrence effect on re-offending, including the 

level of general and sexual offense recidivism, the nature of sexual re-offenses, and time to first 

re-arrest for sexual and non-sexual re-offenses (i.e., community tenure); and 3) the costs of 

implementation and annual expenditures of Megan’s Law. These three primary foci were 

investigated using three different methodologies and samples. 

Phase One was a 21-year (10 years prior and 10 years after implementation, and the year 

of implementation) trend study of sex offenses in each of New Jersey’s counties and of the state 

as a whole. In Phase Two, data on 550 sexual offenders released during the years 1990 to 2000 

were collected, and outcomes of interest were analyzed. Finally, Phase Three collected 

implementation and ongoing costs of administering Megan’s Law. 

The following points highlight the major findings of the three phases of the study.

 New Jersey, as a whole, has experienced a consistent downward trend of sexual offense 

rates with a significant change in the trend in 1994. 

 In all but two counties, sexual offense rates were highest prior to 1994 and were lowest 

after 1995. 

 County trends exhibit substantial variation and do not reflect the statewide trend,

suggesting that the statewide change point in 1994 is an artifact of aggregation. 

 In the offender release sample, there is a consistent downward trend in re-arrests, 

reconvictions and re-incarcerations over time similar to that observed in the trend study,

except in 1995 when all measures spiked to a high for that period. This resulted in 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

2

significant differences between cohorts (i.e., those released prior to and after Megan’s 

Law was implemented).

 Re-arrests for violent crime (whether sexual or not) also declined steadily over the same 

period, resulting in a significant difference between cohorts (i.e., those released prior to 

and after Megan’s Law was implemented).

 Megan’s Law has no effect on community tenure (i.e., time to first re-arrest).

 Megan’s Law showed no demonstrable effect in reducing sexual re-offenses.

 Megan’s Law has no effect on the type of sexual re-offense or first time sexual offense 

(still largely child molestation/incest).

 Megan’s Law has no effect on reducing the number of victims involved in sexual 

offenses.

 Sentences received prior to Megan’s Law were nearly twice as long as those received 

after Megan’s Law was passed, but time served was approximately the same.

 Significantly fewer sexual offenders have been paroled after the implementation of 

Megan’s Law than before (this is largely due to changes in sentencing).

 Costs associated with the initial implementation as well as ongoing expenditures continue 

to grow over time. Start up costs totaled $555,565 and current costs (in 2007) totaled 

approximately 3.9 million dollars for the responding counties. 

 Given the lack of demonstrated effect of Megan’s Law on sexual offenses, the growing 

costs may not be justifiable.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

3

INTRODUCTION

On July 29, 1994, Jesse Timmendequas, a sex offender who had been released after 

serving a maximum sentence in a New Jersey correctional facility, raped and murdered sevenyear-old Megan Kanka in Hamilton, New Jersey. The intense community reaction that followed 

extended well beyond the state. One expression of community outrage was the enactment of 

laws to notify the public of the presence of sex offenders living and working in their community. 

The premise was, and still is, that with this knowledge, citizens will take protective measures 

against these nearby sex offenders. As Beck, Clingermayer, Ramsey and Travis (2004) note, 

“Exactly what action is expected is not clear, but it is hoped that, armed with this critical 

information, citizens will work on their own or in concert with government to make their 

neighborhoods safer” (p. 142). 

During the following decade, all 50 states and the District of Columbia enacted some 

version of such community registration and notification laws, collectively referred to as 

“Megan’s Laws” (Presser & Gunnison, 1999; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000). Although a few states, 

such as Washington, had enacted community notification laws prior to 1994, the federalization 

of community notification laws in 1996 created strong incentives for other states to follow suit 

(Presser & Gunnison, 1999). 

The legislation known as Megan’s Law, includes both registration and notification. Sex 

offenders must register their addresses with local police jurisdictions within a specified time of 

release from prison. By way of the registration process, the public is then notified of the 

offender’s presence in the neighborhood. The goal of notification is to inform both the public and 

past victims so that they can protect themselves accordingly. As with other states, registration 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

4

and notification are separate steps in New Jersey, but are often referred to as one process. In 

New Jersey, offenders are placed into one of three tiers, representing a hierarchy of potential risk 

of an offender’s re-offense. A risk assessment instrument is used to predict the offender’s 

likelihood of re-offense, which ultimately determines placement into the tier. Tier one represents 

the lowest risk and requires only notification of law enforcement officials and the victims. 

Offenders are considered low risk and eligible for a tier one placement if they received a low risk 

assessment score and are on probation/ parole, receiving therapy, employed and free of alcohol 

and drugs. A tier two classification represents a moderate risk of a re-offense. It requires 

notification of organizations, educational institutions, day care centers and summer camps. The 

factors for placement into a tier two category include a moderate to high risk assessment score, 

failure to comply with supervision, lack of employment, abuse of drugs or alcohol, denial of 

offenses, lack of remorse, history of loitering or stalking children and making threats (Brooks, 

1996; Matson & Lieb, 1997; Witt & Barone, 2004). Tier three offenders are those who are 

predicted to present the greatest risk to re-offend. This category has generated the most legal 

resistance because it calls for the broadest level of notification. The entire community is notified 

through posters and pamphlets. The factors necessary for the placement into a tier three category 

are a high probability of re-offending evidenced by a particularly heinous instant offense or a 

high-risk assessment score, repetitive and compulsive behavior, sexual preference for children, 

failure or refusal of treatment, denial of the offense and lack of remorse (Brooks, 1996; Rudin, 

1996; Witt & Barone, 2004). 

Despite their existence for over a decade, little work has been done to examine the 

effectiveness of these laws on sexual offense rates. A few researchers, such as Beck and 

colleagues (2004), have conducted surveys to determine what protection methods community 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

5

members use when given information regarding the presence of sex offenders. Beck and 

colleagues (2004) approach their research from the viewpoint that community notification laws 

were enacted more to change the behaviors of potential victims than those of potential sexual 

recidivists. In this study, Beck and colleagues (2004) differentiated between two types of 

protective measures: (1) “self-protective measures,” or behavioral measures initiated by the 

potential victims themselves; and (2) “altruistic protective measures,” or behavioral measures 

initiated by family members to protect other household members (e.g., their children) (Beck & 

Travis, 2002). These studies found that community notification did, in fact, increase altruistic 

behaviors by community members to protect members of their households, although the findings 

are inconsistent with regard to whether self-protective behaviors increased after community 

notification. Because of these results, Beck and colleagues (2004) posit that it is not the 

enactment of community notification laws themselves that influences protective behaviors, but 

the community members’ perceived risk of victimization (also measured in these surveys) that 

mediates these behaviors. This mediating factor presents problems for identifying the true effect 

of these laws on sexual recidivism rates.

A few studies have also surveyed sex offenders to determine the impact that community 

notification laws have had upon them. Tewksbury (2005) found that social stigmatization, loss of 

relationships, employment and housing, and both verbal and physical assaults were experienced 

by a significant minority of registered sex offenders (see also Tewksbury & Lees, 2006). Zevitz 

and Farkas (2000) also found that a majority of sex offenders reported negative consequences, 

such as exclusion from residences, threats and harassment, emotional harm to their family 

members, social exclusion by neighbors, and loss of employment. Furthermore, according to 

many tier three offenders interviewed, these laws would not deter them from committing future 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

6

sex offenses (Zevitz and Farkas, 2000). In fact, Presser and Gunnison (1999) suggest that 

notification laws may be counterproductive in that public scrutiny causes additional stress to 

offenders who are transitioning back into the community. The fear of exposure may cause 

offenders to avoid treatment, and in the case of pedophiles, may encourage offenders to seek out 

children as a result of adult isolation. If these assumptions are true, the risk of recidivism may be 

increased (Presser & Gunnison, 1999), or at least such factors would work against any protective 

measures taken, thus lessening or eliminating any positive effect of the law.

None of the aforementioned research, however, addresses the critical question of whether 

community notification and registration laws actually reduce sex offense rates (primary offenses 

or re-offenses) in the communities in which the laws are applied, or what patterns of sexual 

offense rates appear. Despite Megan’s Laws being in effect in all 50 states, only one study was 

found that examines pre- and post-Megan’s Law sex offense rates. That study, conducted in the 

state of Washington, compared sexual recidivism rates between two groups of sexual offenders: 

one released three years prior to the implementation of community notification laws in that state, 

and one released three years after the implementation. The pre- and post- target groups were 

those most likely to be affected by the law (i.e., those who would qualify for tier three 

classification). To account for population differences, offenders in both groups were matched on 

the number of sex convictions and the type of victim (i.e., adult or child) (Schramm & Milloy, 

1995). Their analysis of potential group differences revealed that at the end of 54 months (fourand one- half years “at risk”), there was no statistically significant difference in the arrest rates 

for sex offenses between the two groups (19 percent versus 22 percent). However, the study did 

find that notification had an effect on the time of the next arrest for any type of offense. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

7

Offenders subject to notification were arrested for new crimes much more quickly than were 

offenders not subject to notification. (Schramm & Milloy, 1995).

These results suggest that Megan’s Laws may not be effective in reducing recidivism 

rates. One can make a case, in fact, that Megan’s Law, at least as implemented in Washington, 

had no effect on the rate of sex offense recidivism, although it may result in more rapid detection 

of new sex offenses (see discussion in Pawson, 2002).

This lack of outcome studies means that Megan’s Laws constitute an untested mandate in

the domain of empirical research. Despite widespread community support for these laws, there 

is virtually no evidence to support their effectiveness in reducing either new first-time sex 

offenses (through protective measures or general deterrence) or sex re-offenses (through 

protective measures and specific deterrence). 

The study described below investigates various impacts of community notification and 

registration laws (Megan’s Law) in New Jersey. The primary areas of study are: 1) the effect of 

Megan’s Law on the overall rate of sexual offending over time; 2) its specific deterrence effect 

on re-offending, including the level of general and sexual offense recidivism, the nature of sexual 

re-offenses, and time to first re-arrest for sexual and non-sexual re-offenses (i.e. community 

tenure); and 3) the costs of implementing and maintaining Megan’s Law. These three primary 

foci were investigated using three different methodologies and samples. 

Phase One was a 21-year (10 years prior and 10 years after implementation, and the year 

of implementation) trend study of sex offenses in each of New Jersey’s counties and the state as 

a whole. In Phase Two, data on 550 sexual offenders released during the years 1990 to 2000 

were collected, and outcomes of interest were analyzed. Finally, Phase Three collected 

implementation and ongoing costs of administering Megan’s Law. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

8

PHASE ONE: THE TREND STUDY

This study attempts to remedy one aspect of the gap between the lack of research and the 

legislation, by examining the trend of sexual offense rates between and within the 21 counties of 

New Jersey from 1985 through 2005. The study was conducted in New Jersey, the state in which 

Megan Kanka was a victim and the subsequent origin of Megan’s Law. Phase One is a trend 

study, which will provide information on whether statistical differences exist in sex offending

arrests before and after the implementation of Megan’s Law. 

The trend analysis focuses on the pattern of sexual offense rates in New Jersey over a 21-

year timeframe while comparing them to drug offense rates and non-sexually based offending 

rates. The data represent crime rates for the state as a whole and for each of the 21 counties for 

the ten years prior to the legislation and the ten years after the enactment of the legislation and 

includes the first full year in which Megan’s Law was implemented (i.e., 1995). 

Methods

The purpose of this study is to determine whether Megan’s Law had an effect on the rate 

of sexual offending in New Jersey. Several different analyses were conducted to answer this 

primary question. First, a trend analysis of New Jersey sex offense rates pre- and post-Megan’s 

Law implementation provides both a visual and statistical test of effectiveness. Second, 

aggregation sometimes masks important differences at a lower level. Therefore, the same trend 

analyses were conducted on each of the 21 counties in New Jersey. Third, historical effects

broader than that solely for sex offenses may be responsible for observed changes (i.e., an 

observed effect of Megan’s Law may be spurious). Two comparative analyses at the state level 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

9

were conducted to contrast changes in rates of sex offenses to other offenses (i.e., drug and other 

non-sex/non-drug) over the same period of time. These additional analyses were made in an 

effort to place sex crimes in the context of overall crime and a specific crime (drugs) that has 

been subjected to several types of legislation.

Sample and Data Collection

This study is based upon a simple pre-post research design to determine whether any 

significant changes in the rates of sexually based offenses reported by law enforcement agencies

occurred after the implementation of New Jersey’s Megan’s Law in late 1994. Rates for sexually 

based offenses, non-sexually based offenses, and drug offenses were collected for the years 1985 

through 2005 in order to construct a comparative trend analysis. Data for the three types of 

crime were collected for all 21 counties of New Jersey, using Uniform Crime Report (UCR) 

numbers for years 1985 through 2005. Prevalence rates for the three offense categories were 

established using population estimates from the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor 

Statistics. The Department of Labor’s population estimates for New Jersey were cross-referenced 

with the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, a yearly federal government publication. 

Because no significant differences in population estimates were found between these two 

sources, UCR numbers were used for trend analyses conducted in this study. In order to compare 

state and county trends in sexually based offenses, non-sexually based offenses, and drug abuse 

violations, UCR aggregate numbers and prevalence rates for years 1985-2005 were entered into 

an Excel spreadsheet and SPSS. 

Definitions and Measures

Uniform Crime Report statistics are based upon number of arrests, and as such, use of the 

term “offenses” in this study refers to number of reported arrests. Three crime categories were 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

10

used for trend analysis comparisons: 1) sexually-based offenses, 2) drug offenses, and 3) other 

offenses (non-sex/non-drug). Analyzing the single set of sex offense rates for the 21-year time 

span provides an initial test of rate change. Across the US, crime rates in general have been 

dropping since the late 1990’s. The inclusion of all New Jersey non-sex/non-drug crime rate 

trends presents a visual contrast: (1) to confirm/disconfirm the national trends, and (2) to 

contextualize the sex offense rate trend within the general trends. Other offenses allow a control 

for New Jersey specific historical factors that might influence rates across crime categories, such 

as increased or decreased enforcement or prosecutorial budgets, the number of police or 

probation officers, or aggressiveness of prosecutors’ and the State Attorney General’s offices.

Drug offenses, like sex offenses, have been the target of law enforcement policies. 

Although drug offense rates may change over time based upon what drugs are most common, 

drug arrests rates are also particularly vulnerable to changes in federal and local policies and law 

enforcement efforts. Furthermore, although the contrast between drug and sex crimes may not 

be immediately obvious, the inclusion of drug offense rate trends provides an opportunity: (1) to 

demonstrate the variations in rates over time, and (2) to evaluate whether these variations have 

similar patterns to those of sex offense rates.1

These crime categories were based on the state’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR), a yearly 

statistical report based upon crimes reported to law enforcement agencies throughout the State of 

New Jersey. Definitions of certain sexually-based crimes, such as rape, were clarified via phone 

interviews with the New Jersey State Police in December 2006. In addition, legal definitions of 

specific crimes (e.g. endangering the welfare of a child) were verified by reviewing Title 2C of 

the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice in LexisNexis Academic. Because “Rape” is designated 

 

1 No formal statistical tests were performed contrasting drug and non-sexual offense rates to sex offense rates. The 

visual displays are used to provide general contrasts, only. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

11

as a separate category by the UCR, the UCR categories “Rape” and “Sex Offenses” were 

combined under the category “Sexually-Based Offenses” for the purposes of this study. The 

category “Non-Sexually Based Offenses” is comprised of all UCR categories except “Rape”,

“Sex Offenses” and “Drug Offenses”. Furthermore, “Drug Offenses” included various types of 

drug crimes, such as the manufacturing and distribution of controlled substances, possession with 

the intent to sell and distribution of a controlled substance within a school zone. 

Analytic Strategy

In studies of this type, typically a simple pre-post test of rates is conducted to determine 

whether an intervention is successful. Given that these data are points in time, namely crime 

rates by year, time based strategies are commonly used, including time-series/ARIMA models 

and regression discontinuity designs that allow for temporal autocorrelation. These analyses are 

constructed based upon a known change point. Although it is known that Megan’s Law was 

passed in late 1994, it is not known when the agencies charged with implementing the law were 

fully prepared to do so. Further, Megan’s Law may not have been uniformly implemented 

across the state at a standardized point. The earliest change point that might be attributed to the 

legislation, therefore, is between 1994 and 1995. Given delayed implementation, the true effect 

of the legislation may occur during a subsequent year. For this study, a method is required that 

will allow for the detection of such delayed effects.

Several authors have considered the problem of change-points (see Pettitt, 1979 for a 

brief review). Some make assumptions regarding the nature of the pre- and post-change sample 

distributions. Most assume that the change-point is known. Pettitt (1979) offers a solution to the 

crime trend problem by suggesting a method of determining the most probable point of change 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

12

and using a non-parametric procedure to test for significance. The logic of Pettitt’s argument is 

summarized below. 

Assume a sequence of random variables; X1, X2, ... , XT and a change-point at , where 

Xt for t = 1, ... , have a distribution function of F1(x) and Xt for t = +1, ... , T have a 

distribution function of F2(x) and F1(x) F2(x). Since the change-point is unknown, T-1 two 

sample comparisons are necessary. In the complete sample of T,

Ut,T = 2Wt – t(T +1)

where Wt is the sum of the ranks of all observations from 1 to t. This produces a U statistic for 

each point in the time series comparing the mean of the series prior to t with the mean of the 

series after t. A version of the Mann-Whitney U statistic, used to test that the two samples, X1, 

... , Xt and Xt +1 , ... , XT , come from the same population, is applied to the maximum U value:

KT = max Ut,T

 1< t < T

The approximation of significance probabilities that is associated with KT is:

P 2 exp (-6k

2

/ (T 2 + T 3))

where the approximation holds accurate to two decimal places for p< .5 (Pettitt, 1979). 

This analysis employs this technique used to determine significant differences when the 

change point is unknown. This technique was selected specifically because we did not want to 

make any assumptions regarding the implementation phase. In most cases, where a law requires 

changes to procedure, the effect is likely to be delayed by some unknown period.

Data from the 21 New Jersey counties were entered separately, the New Jersey total was 

aggregated from the counties’ summary numbers and the resulting rates were adjusted for yearto-year population changes at the state level. For each county and for the state as a whole, the 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

13

yearly rates were rank ordered and a Mann-Whitney U test was performed to test for a change in 

trend. Thus, for the state and for each county, every year is tested as a potential change point. 

Results

The results are organized into two major sections. The first section presents the trend 

analysis for both the state and for the individual counties. The second section contrasts the sex 

offense trend rates to trends in other offenses (i.e., drug and other non-sex/non-drug) over the 

same period of time.

County and Statewide Sex Offense Rates

Figure 1 displays the rates of sex offenses for New Jersey as a whole from 1985 to 2005. 

The rates varied from 51 offenses in 1986 to a low of 29 offenses per 100,000 population in 

2005. In general, there is a consistent downward trend. 

Individual counties varied substantially both between counties and within counties over 

time. Table 1 presents summary statistics of each county and the state as a whole. Counties 

varied in population size from under 100,000 population in the smallest counties of Cape May, 

Salem, and Warren, to over three quarters of a million residents in the largest counties of Bergen 

and Essex. The population size of the county is not consistently related to the rate of sex 

offenses. For example, one of the largest counties, Essex County (Newark), has a relatively high 

rate of offenses (68), whereas the largest county, Bergen, has a relatively low rate (32). In 

contrast, the highest rate of offenses is in one of the smaller population counties, Cumberland. In 

the smallest counties, Cape May has a rate of 72 offenses per 100,000, whereas Warren has a rate 

of 36.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

14

Figure 1. New Jersey Sex Offenses per 100,000 Population from 1985 to 2005

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

8587899193959799010305

Rate per 100,000 Residents

Year

In 19 of the 21 counties, the year with the highest rate of sex offenses occurred before 

1994; Passaic and Sussex Counties were the exceptions. In 19 of the 21 counties, the year with 

the lowest rate of sex offenses occurred after 1995; Morris and Passaic Counties were the 

exceptions in this case. The rank trend tests (Mann-Whitney U tests) revealed that (1) six 

counties had no statistically significant change point (Bergen, Hunterdon, Mercer, Morris, 

Passaic and Sussex), and (2) an additional six counties had a change point that preceded Megan’s 

Law (Burlington, Camden, Monmouth, Salem, Somerset, and Union). This means that only nine 

counties have a change point after Megan’s Law was passed with the years of change falling 

between 1994 and 1998. One final observation of county contrast should be noted. In several 

cases, counties had substantial drops in sex offenses after Megan’s Law was enacted. However, 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

15

in the last several years these counties have had substantial increases in sex offense rates 

(analyses not shown). This is true, for example, of Ocean, Hudson, and Warren Counties. 

Table 1. County and State Summary Statistics for Sex Offenses

County Population

in 1994

Average 

Rate

Highest 

(Year)

Lowest 

(Year)

Change 

Year

Atlantic 236,589 71.0 128 (1991) 31 (2005) 1994

Bergen 848,392 32.0 71 (1988) 24 (2002) n.s.

Burlington 407,060 30.4 51 (1985) 16 (2002) 1993 **

Camden 508,479 42.9 97 (1986) 29 (2005) 1989 **

Cape May 99,561 72.2 111 (1992) 38 (2003) 1995

Cumberland 144,544 91.1 127 (1992) 63 (2001) 1998

Essex 784,460 67.6 95 (1990) 35 (2004) 1994

Gloucester 242,161 35.6 53 (1993) 22 (2005) 1997

Hudson 572,720 44.0 56 (1993) 33 (2001) 1998

Hunterdon 113,522 18.3 32 (1985) 9 (2004) n.s.

Mercer 335,229 46.4 67 (1986) 35 (2005) n.s.

Middlesex 701,090 27.1 38 (1985) 19 (2004) 1998

Monmouth 577,069 37.6 56 (1988) 25 (2002) 1992 **

Morris 439,533 23.1 33 (1986) 15 (1993) n.s.

Ocean 461,152 24.7 38 (1993) 15 (2001) 1996

Passaic 478,164 50.8 82 (1997) 36 (1988) n.s.

Salem 64,691 50.8 78 (1991) 27 (2005) 1992 **

Somerset 262,243 18.9 27 (1988) 10 (1998) 1991 **

Sussex 137,021 21.8 32 (1999) 12 (2005) n.s.

Union 504,864 30.0 53 (1986) 13 (2004) 1993 **

Warren 95,762 36.4 63 (1987) 14 (2001) 1996

NEW JERSEY 39.8 51 (1986) 29 (2005) 1994

** Change point precedes implementation point

Also, many counties demonstrated a predictable “jump” after Megan’s Law was 

implemented. After a large initial drop in rates, there was a large rebound in sexual offenses (but 

not as high as pre-Megan’s Law levels), followed by a continued decline. One example of this 

phenomenon is Cumberland County. As can be seen in Figure 2, the large dip at year 10 (1994) 

is followed by a spike the following year and then returns to a downward trend. This spike in 

sexual offenses most likely reflects increased surveillance and arrests, rather than increased 

offending.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

16

Figure 2. Cumberland County Sex Offense Trend 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

8587899193959799010305

Rate per 100,000 Residents

Year

Although individual counties vary, the aggregate state statistics indicate a significant 

change in trend in the year 1994 (MW-U=110.0, p<.001). Figure 3 displays the rates before and 

after the implementation of Megan’s Law. The upper line represents sex offenses for the years 

1985-1994, and the lower line represents sex offenses for the years 1995-2005. Superimposed 

on the yearly rates is a linear trend line. There are two important differences between these trend 

lines. First, beginning in 1995 the rate of sex offenses never again approaches the pre-1994 

levels (i.e., the intercept and average are different). Second, the slope is steeper in the postMegan’s law period. This is particularly notable, since sex offenses are low base rate crime. The 

fact that the decrease accelerates as the number of crimes decreases is unexpected. In fact, one 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

17

might expect that an effective intervention would exhibit diminishing returns over time. This is 

not the case in this instance. 

Figure 3. Comparison of Sex Offense Rates per 100,000 Before and After Megan’s Law

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 11

Number of Years Before or After Implementation

Rate per 100,000 Population

Pre-Megan's Law

Post-Megan's Law

Statewide Sex Offense Rates Compared to Non-sex/non-drug and Drug Offenses

The aggressiveness with which arrest, prosecution and surveillance of specific crimes is 

pursued changes over time. After Megan Kanka’s death at the hands of a convicted sex offender, 

public sentiment demanded an immediate and aggressive response by law enforcement, the 

courts and corrections. However, sex offenses are not the only crimes to receive this type of 

attention. The federal War on Drugs was experienced at the state and local level as well. Special 

task forces and interdiction programs resulted in vast numbers of arrests. At the same time, the 

crack epidemic hooked thousands of individuals. It is difficult to disentangle the effects of law 

enforcement and prosecution efforts from addiction trends. In the case of sex offenses, the trend 

in reduced rates of offending preceded Megan’s Law. The challenge of this analysis is to 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

18

separate the effects of intervention from the existing rate reduction momentum. The first set of 

analyses addressed this point. The second concern is to control for historical effects. Drug 

offenses, like sex offenses, should reveal rate patterns consistent with intervention efforts. Other 

crimes should be more resistant to these specialized influences, but sensitive to larger social and 

political influences. The following analyses contrast the statewide sex offense trends with drug 

and other non-sex/non-drug offense trends.

Figure 4 displays the rates of non-sex (non-drug) offenses. The average number of crimes 

per 1,000 population is 50.0 with the highest rate of offending at 56 in 1989 and the lowest at 45 

in 2003. As illustrated, there is a consistent increase in crime rates in the late 1980’s, followed 

by a five- year decline. Over the next several years the rates increased again, only to drop to their 

lowest levels in recent decades. For the last five years the rate has remained stable at about 45 

crimes per 1,000. In these data, there is a significant change point in 1998 (MW-U=98.00; 

p=.005), indicating that the levels of crime prior to 1998 were significantly higher than those 

after 1998. 

Figure 4. New Jersey Non-sex /Non-drug Offenses per 1,000 Population from 1985 to 2005

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

19

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

8587899193959799010305

Rate per 1,000 Residents

Year

Unlike general crime, drug-related crimes showed very different rates by year. On 

average, there are 68 drug crimes per 10,000 population. This varied from a high of 89 in 1989 

to a low of 52 in 1985. As can be seen in Figure 5, drug crimes spiked in 1989, then dropped 

precipitously. Although the rates increased again following 1993, this never again approached 

the 1989 rate. The most recent decline appears be to be stable at around 65 crimes per 10,000 

and has not achieved the 1985-86 rates. There is no significant change point.

Figure 5. New Jersey Drug Offenses per 1,000 Population from 1985 to 2005

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

20

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

8587899193959799010305

Rate per 1,000 Residents

Year

The general decline in sex offenses in NJ is similar to that of non-sex/non-drug crimes. 

However, the statewide change point for sex offenses occurred during the Megan’s Law 

implementation year (i.e., 1994), whereas the change in trend for non-sex crimes occurred later, 

in 1998. The wide year-to-year fluctuations in drug crimes in fact may reflect specific policy 

and practice efforts, although those efforts were not sustained. In the case of sex offenses, the 

statewide change occurred when it was predicted to change and has maintained its impact over 

time.

PHASE TWO: SEX OFFENDER OUTCOME STUDY

Methodology

Phase Two of the National Institute of Justice grant used a sample of sex offenders 

released from New Jersey Department of Corrections facilities (either the Adult Diagnostic and 

Treatment Center [ADTC] or one of the general population facilities) before and after the 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

21

implementation of Megan’s Law. Fifty sex offenders per year (25 from the ADTC and 25 from 

the general population) were randomly selected for the period covering 1990 through 2000, 11 

years in total. This yielded a sample of 550 cases. 

For each of these cases, extensive demographic, clinical, institutional and service use, 

criminal history, and crime offense characteristics information was collected. This provides an 

opportunity to contrast outcomes (i.e., recidivism, time to failure, and harm variables) of 

offenders arrested and released prior to the passing of Megan’s Law with offenders arrested and 

released after the legislation passed. 

This component analyzed pre-post group differences on three outcomes:

Reduced recidivism- including re-arrests, re-convictions, and re-incarceration;

Increased community tenure- including days to first arrest and days to first arrest for a 

sexual offense; and/or

Reduced harm- including fewer sex offenses, less violent offenses, and fewer child 

victims. 

The following sections present offender characteristics, bivariate differences in characteristics, 

and pre-post group outcomes.

Results

Demographic Characteristics

Table 2 displays the demographic characteristics of the sample. The sample is 

comprised only of males. Half of the sample is white with black and Hispanic offenders 

accounting for 35% and 15%, respectively. Only 0.2% of offenders classified themselves as 

“Other.” At release, offenders were 34 years of age (sd=12.2). Nearly half (49%) were married 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

22

at one time and 66 percent had at least one child (including stepchildren). On average, each 

individual had 1.9 children (sd=2.1). 

Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of Sex Offenders (n=550)

Variable % Mean (sd)

Race

 % white 50.5

 % black 34.8

 % hispanic 14.6

 % other 0.2

Average Age 34.1 (12.2)

% Ever Married 49.0

% With Children 65.9

Average Number of Children 1.9 (2.1)

Education Level

 % less than high school 50.3

 % high school diploma/GED 33.6

 % some college or more 16.1

% Ever Employed 62.8

Employment Type

 % white collar/professional 7.8

 % blue collar/skilled trade 75.4

 % service industry 13.2

 % other 3.6

Half of the sample never completed high school. Specifically, 14 percent only achieved 

an eighth grade education, whereas 36 percent attended high school, but did not graduate. 

Twenty-five percent completed high school and 8 percent obtained a GED. Sixteen percent had 

some college education with 4 percent completing an Associate Degree or higher. Sixty-three 

percent had an employment history of a year or greater prior to committing the offense. Although 

most offenders reported some variety of employment history, the median years of employment 

was considerably low, at less than three years of past employment. Of those who had been 

employed, most had held unskilled or trade jobs (75%) or jobs in the service industry (13%). A 

notable 8 percent held white-collar or professional jobs. Offenders’ prior employment income 

was unable to be determined for 29% of the sample. Of those offenders reporting employment 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

23

income, 25% reported an income of $20,000 or less, 5% reported an income of $21,000 to 

$30,000, 3% reported an income of $31,000 to $40,000, 1% reported an income of $41,000 to 

$50,000, and 0.5% reported an annual income of $50,000 or higher. 

Clinical Characteristics

This section includes measures commonly associated with risk (e.g., history of abuse, 

familial criminal justice involvement), behavioral health problems, and past treatment 

experiences. Table 3 displays these measures obtained from an offender’s folder. 

Table 3. Clinical Characteristics of Sex Offenders (n=550)

Variable %

% With History of Child Abuse 39.0

% Raised in Two Parent Home Up to Age 13 65.7

% With Family Member Involvement in CJ System 8.6

% With History of Mental Health Problems 23.1

% With History of Drug Use/Abuse 44.8

% With History of Alcohol Abuse 47.1

% Received Mental Health Treatment 34.7

% Received Mandated Sex Offender Treatment in Prison 94.0

% Received Other Treatment Services in Prison 88.4

Most offenders were raised in either a traditional two-parent home (66%) or in a motheronly headed household (23%), and the majority of offenders did not report any history of child 

abuse (61%). Twenty-six percent, however, reported having experienced sexual abuse as a child. 

A large majority of offenders (91%) did not have any family members involved in the criminal 

justice system. 

Only 23 percent of offenders reported some type of past mental health problem. These 

mental health issues included problems diagnosed in childhood (e.g., emotionally disturbed, 

developmental disorder) as well as more common diagnoses problems such as depression. In 

addition, a sizeable proportion of offenders had a drug or alcohol abuse history, with 45% 

reporting a prior drug abuse problem and 47% reporting a prior alcohol abuse problem. 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

24

Thirty-five percent reported having received mental health treatment in the past. Most 

offenders (94%) were reported as receiving some type of sex offender treatment while 

incarcerated. A majority of offenders (88%) also received treatment in addition to the standard, 

mandated treatment groups. Types of adjunct treatment offered to inmates included adult basic 

education classes, life/social skills groups (e.g. anger management), and drug and alcohol 

counseling.

Offender Criminal History 

Offender criminal history includes information on prior arrests. These data are presented 

in Table 4. In general, the men incarcerated for a sex crime were more likely to have been 

engaged in previous non-sex crimes than in sex crimes per se. Sixty-five percent had a previous 

arrest for a non-sex crime. On average, they had been arrested 3.4 times (sd=5.77) and were 

arrested for the first time when they were 21.5 years old (sd=8.21). Only 27 percent had been 

previously arrested for a violent crime with an average of .5 prior arrests (sd=1.07). Even fewer 

(24%) had been arrested for a sex crime in the past, with an average number of .4 prior arrests 

(sd=1.02). On average, these offenders were 24.8 years old (sd=9.01) at the time of their first 

arrest for a sex crime. Only 6 percent had been arrested as a juvenile for a sex crime.

Table 4. Offender Criminal History

Variable % Mean (sd)

% with Any Prior Arrests 64.9

Average Number of Arrests 3.64 (5.77)

Average Age at First Arrest 21.5 (8.21)

% with Prior Arrests for a Violent Crime 27.3

Average Number of Arrests for Violent Crime .50 (1.07)

% with Prior Arrests for a Sex Crime 23.5

Average Number of Arrests for a Sex Crime .43 (1.02)

Average Age at First Arrest for a Sex Crime 24.8 (9.01)

% with a Juvenile Arrest for a Sex Crime 5.7

Target Offense Characteristics

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

25

Table 5 displays information regarding the sex crime(s) for which the men in the sample 

were serving sentences. Eighty percent of offenders were serving time for child molestation 

(incest=21% vs. non-incest=59%). Cases of rape and general exhibitionism accounted for 20% 

and 0.4% of all cases, respectively. 

Sixty-two percent of offenders denied committing certain acts of the instant crime, or 

denied the sexual offense in its entirety. Most often, offenders in this latter group denied the 

more egregious acts of the offense (i.e. penetration) or instances of multiple acts. According to 

police reports, however, a majority of offenders (55%) engaged in multiple acts over a period of 

time, and in 26 percent of the cases the offender had multiple victims.

The 550 offenders in the sample victimized a total of 796 individuals. That is an average 

of 1.45 victims (sd=1.07) per offender for the current offense alone. However, this number is 

skewed. In 74 percent of the cases, there was only one victim identified. Of the cases involving 

two or more victims, the average number of victims was 2.7 (sd=1.49). Of the victims, 79 

percent were female and 30 percent were male. These percentages include the cases where both

males and females were victims (8%). The mean age of victim in the index offense was 12.3 

years old (sd = 9.74). Ages of victims spanned from 1 year to 87 years old; 65 percent of the 

victims were 12 or younger, 24 percent were between 13 years old and 18, and the remaining 11 

percent were 19 or older. 

Table 5. Characteristics of Target Crime

Offense Type 

 % child molestation 79.5

 % rape 20.2

 % exhibitionism/voyeurism 0.4

% Offender Denied Some or All Aspects of Crime 62.2

% Cases Occuring Over Multiple Dates 55.2

Variable % Mean (sd)

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

26

Most offenders had an established prior relationship with their victims, with only 16 

percent of cases where the perpetrator was a stranger. In fact, nearly half (48%) of the 

perpetrators were family members, with the remaining crimes committed by either acquaintances 

of victims (34%) or victims’ significant others (2%). Further, 43 percent of offenders lived with 

their victim(s) and in 77 percent of the cases the offense(s) were committed in the victim’s or 

offender’s home (including shared residence).

In 13 percent of the cases a weapon was used. Of those cases, the most common weapon 

used was a knife (52%), followed by a gun (27%), other weapon (14%) or the use of some form 

% Cases Involving Multiple Victims 26.0

Victim Gender

 % male 21.1

 % female 70.5

 % both 8.4

Mean Age of Victim 12.3 (9.74)

Age Group of Victims 1.4 (1.1)

 % 12 and under (1.1) 65.4

 % 13 through 18 23.7

 % 19 or older 10.9

Relationship of Offender to Victim

 % stranger 16.1

 % family 48.2

 % acquaintance 33.6

 % significant other 2.2

% Lived With Victim 42.6

% Crime Occurred in Victim or Offender Home 77.2

% Cases Involving Weapon Use 13.2

Type of Weapon

 % gun 27.3

 % knife 51.5

 % rope/tape/bondage 7.6

 % other 13.6

% Drugs Involved in Crime 13.4

% Alcohol Involved in Crime 

T

26.0

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

27

of restraint (8%). In 13 percent of the cases drugs were involved and alcohol was involved in 26 

percent of the offenses.

Criminal Justice Factors

On average, offenders were sentenced to nearly nine years of incarceration (104 months, 

sd= 63.8), with the most frequently imposed sentence being five years. The minimum and 

maximum imposed sentences for the sample were one year and 36 years, respectively. In 

actuality, offenders served approximately five years on average (56 months, sd=40.4), with time 

served ranging from three months to 21.5 years. Only 32 percent of offenders were paroled 

whereas 68 percent maxed out; leaving the prison with no post-incarceration supervision 

requirements other than those imposed by Megan’s Law. 

Table 6. Criminal Justice Factors

Sample Equivalences

In studies that use random sampling it is assumed that the samples will be equivalent in 

all relevant factors. This is, however, an assumption, and statistical theory suggests that although 

rare, samples may be found to differ. In this case, it is known that samples differ temporally. 

The differences in cohorts may be reflected in institutional responses (e.g., changes in court 

procedures. In this case “Truth in Sentencing” legislation came into effect during this period), 

social or community behavior (e.g., increases or drops in specific drugs of choice or type of 

crime), or other historical sociopolitical changes. Bivariate analyses were conducted to confirm 

offender similarity in: demographics, risk factors, and prior criminality; all known to associated 

with the likelihood of recidivism. 

Variable % Mean (sd)

Mean Length of Sentence (in months) 104.4 (63.8)

Mean Time Served (in months) 56.2 (40.4)

% Paroled 32.4

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

28

No statistically significant differences were found in demographic characteristics. Among 

the risk factors, only receipt of other treatment services was significant (with the earlier cohort 

more likely to have received services [95% vs. 83%; χ

2

= 14.6, df=1, p<.001]). In terms of 

criminal history, no variable was found to be significant except for the average number of prior 

sex offenses (with the earlier cohort averaging a higher number [.56, sd=1.16 vs. .32, sd=.87; 

F=7.21, df=1, 546, p=.007]). Among the target offense variables, only alcohol use was 

significant (with the earlier cohort more likely to have used alcohol during the commission of the 

crime [31% vs. 22%; χ2= 6.09, df=1, p=.014]). Thus of the over fifty variables analyzed, only

three were significantly different between groups. Again appealing to statistical theory, with 

multiple tests there is an increased likelihood of detecting significant relationships. No correction 

was made in these analyses to account for this threat. However, given the vast number of 

equivalencies, these groups are assumed equal for purposes of the outcome analyses. 

Offender Outcomes Pre- and Post-implementation of Megan’s Law

Before presenting pre-post contrasts that are controlled by time at risk, year-by-year 

graphs demonstrate several important points that must be kept in mind when interpreting the 

remainder of the analyses. The outcome measure of recidivism was collected through June 15, 

2007. The remaining measures were adjusted to assure that all offenders had an equal time at 

risk, specifically 2,358 days or approximately six and a half years. Figure 6 presents the percent 

of offenders released in each year who generally recidivate within the follow-up period (i.e., 6 1⁄2 

years). In this case, this figure presents the percent of persons who are re-arrested, the percent of 

the sample re-convicted and the percent re-incarcerated. Clearly, these are three closely linked 

outcome measures (e.g., conviction cannot occur in the absence of a chargeable offense). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

29

Figure 6. General Recidivism by Year

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00

Year

% Arrested

% Convicted

% Incarcerated

Overall, 46 percent of offenders were re-arrested (9 percent were re-arrested for a sex 

crime), 41 percent were convicted, and 35 percent were re-incarcerated. Although the figure 

shows substantial movement up and down over time, there are no significant differences by year 

(this is largely a power problem). Further, excluding the year 1995, all measures of recidivism 

are declining over time from highs in the 50 to 60 percent range in the 1990 release cohort to the 

25 to 40 percent range in the 2000 release cohort. What is interesting about this figure, however, 

is the rates relative to each other within year. In most years, a stable percentage of persons who 

are arrested are convicted. In this sample, over the 11 years, 88 percent who are arrested are 

convicted. Of those convicted, 86 percent are incarcerated as a result. However, these rates vary 

from year to year. For example, of the 1993 release cohort 46 percent were re-arrested; of those, 

96 percent were convicted; and of those convicted 96 percent went back to prison. In 

comparison, of the 1995 release cohort, 56 percent were re-arrested and nearly all were convicted 

(96%), but only 70 percent of those convicted were re-incarcerated. It is not clear from these 

data whether the year-to-year differences are a result of procedural and administrative changes or 

a reflection of a system response to public pressure.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

30

Recidivism

Table 7 presents the comparisons of the pre- and post-implementation groups on all 

outcome measures, including recidivism, community tenure and harm (sexual re-offending). In 

the first “recidivism” section, all measures (i.e., arrest, conviction and incarceration) are 

significant. In all three variables, the post-implementation group has a lower percentage of cases 

that have experienced the outcome. This is for general recidivism. Forty-one percent of the 

post-implementation group was re-arrested compared to 50 percent of the pre-implementation 

group (χ2= 3.94, 1 df, p=.047). Similarly, 34 percent of the post-implementation group was 

convicted compared to 46 percent of the pre-implementation group (χ2= 8.59, 1 df, p=.003). And 

29 percent of the post-implementation group was re-incarcerated compared to 40 percent of the 

pre-implementation group (χ2= 7.53, 1 df, p=.006).

Table 7. Offender Outcomes Pre and Post Megan’s Law Implementation (n=550)

Variable Pre Post Total Χ

2

/F (df) sig.

Recidivism

% re-arrested any crime 49.7 41.2 45.8 3.94 (1) .047

% re-convicted at least once 46.3 34.0 40.7 8.59 (1) .003

% re-incarcerated at least once 40.0 28.8 34.9 7.53 (1) .006

Community Tenure

Days to arrest any crime (sd) 772.2(636.9) 726.0(616.5) 753.3(627.8) .329(1,250) n.s.

Days to arrest sex crime (sd) 813.7(690.5) 765.3(706.0) 794.9(689.6) .056(1,47) n.s.

Harm

% re-arrested sex crime 10.0 7.6 8.9 .97 (1) n.s.

Sex crime type (n=48)

 % child molestation

 % rape

 % other (voyeurism, exhibitionism)

54.5

13.6

31.8

66.7

20.0

13.3

59.5

16.2

24.3

1.70 (2) n.s.

% violent 31.9 20.5 26.7 9.01 (1) .003

Community Tenure

Time to failure is an important outcome measure. Situations may exist where equal 

percentages of experimental and comparison groups demonstrate an outcome, in this case, rearrest, but the average length of time to the arrest differs. Even in the case where equal 

percentages of pre- and post-implementation subjects are re-arrested, more days in the 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

31

community without committing a crime2reflects improved outcomes in community and personal 

harm, as well as cost savings. 

The average time to an arrest for any type of crime was 753 days (sd=628) or about two 

years, one month (see Table 6). There was no significant difference by implementation cohort. 

The average time to an arrest for a sex offense was 795 days (sd=690) or about two years, two 

months. There was no significant difference by implementation cohort for this variable.

A survival analysis was also conducted on these data to determine whether the rate of 

failure by time at risk varies significantly by implementation cohort. Figure 7 displays the 

survival curves for the two groups. Cases that experienced an arrest are designated by their 

inclusion in the continuous curve (i.e., continuous line), cases that were not arrested are censored 

and are represented as pluses. The strength of this analysis is the inclusion of censored cases. 

They are included with the time value computed as the time from release until the last day of 

data collection (i.e., June 15, 2007). 

The curves reflect several facts: (1) all cases are censored if their time at risk exceeds 

2358 days regardless of whether they were arrested or not, (2) 60 percent of post-implementation 

cases compared to 50 percent of pre-implementation cases survive (i.e., have not been arrested)3, 

and therefore visually demonstrating the cohort difference in overall re-offending, and (3) the 

curves, while diverging a small amount, are proportionally similar across time at risk, thus 

reflecting no significant difference in the failure rate (confirmed by statistical tests, including the 

log-rank test). 

Figure 7. Survival (days to re-arrest) of Pre and Post Implementation Groups

 

2 Assuming that supervision and surveillance practices are equivalent and that the individual does not indeed commit 

any crimes.

3 These are the same percentages in reverse (100%-%arrested) as those displayed in Table 1

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

32

Days

0 2000 4000 6000

Cum Survival 1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

Yes-censored

No-censored

Yes

No

Was offender released after 

Megan's Law 

implementation (after 

1995)?

Survival Functions

Reduced Harm by Deterring Sexual Re-offending

Re-arrests for sexual offenses do not significantly differ year to year (see Figure 8). 

Holding time at risk constant, 9 percent of the sample has been re-arrested for a sex crime, 

representing about 19 percent of the arrest charges. This varies from a high of 14 percent in 

1991 and 1992 to a low of 6 percent in 1994, 1995, and 2000.

Pre- and post-implementation groups do not differ in the percent of persons re-arrested 

for a sex crime (10% vs. 7.6%). Of the 484cases represented in the sexual re-offense type 

analysis, 60 percent were charged with child molestation or incest, 16 percent with rape and 24 

percent with another type of sex offense, including voyeurism and exhibitionism. The pre- and 

post-implementation groups also did not differ significantly on sex offense type.

Figure 8. Re-arrest for Sex Offense by Year

 

4 Allowing time at risk to include the full period of time from release, only 62 individuals were re-arrested on a sex 

charge: 13.2% of the pre-implementation group with between 4,565 and 6,386 days at risk and 9.7% of the postimplementation group with between 2,374 and 4,561 days at risk.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

33

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00

Year

% Sex Offense

As a side note, the percentage of violent crimes, excluding sex crimes, was also 

investigated. Overall, 28 percent of the sample was re-arrested for at least one violent crime. 

Importantly, only 21 percent of persons released after Megan’s Law was implemented were rearrested for a violent crime compared to 32 percent of the pre-implementation cohort.

PHASE THREE: COST STUDY

Methodology

The final stage of this research grant proved to be the most challenging, as delineating 

costs associated with community registration and notification were difficult to disentangle from 

other state and county level spending. The research team mailed a cost assessment questionnaire 

to the Megan’s Law Units housed within each of the 21 county prosecutor’s office. Megan’s Law 

Units are responsible for the enforcement and administration of community notification and 

registration statutes in New Jersey (i.e., Megan’s Law). Examples of functions performed by 

Megan’s Law Unit personnel include risk assessment (i.e., tier classification), door to 

door/community notifications, trainings (e.g., law enforcement, day care center employees), 

prosecution/litigation, internet registry maintenance, etc.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

34

Prior to mailing the cost assessment questionnaires, the research team met with Assistant 

Prosecutors in order to review questions contained in the survey and to address any questions 

prosecutors may have had in completing the survey. Survey questions were subsumed under two 

general categories: start up costs and ongoing yearly implementation costs. 

Specifically, startup costs include those initial costs associated with the establishment of 

each county’s Megan’s Law Unit. Three variables were included under startup costs: 

establishment of the internet sex offender registry, equipment costs, and other/miscellaneous 

costs (e.g. computer software). Ongoing costs consist of expenses such as staff salaries, internet 

registry maintenance, equipment maintenance/supplies, and other/miscellaneous expenses (e.g. 

mailings, printings, software updates, etc.). Survey questions concerning on-going expenses 

pertained to costs accumulated during the calendar year ending 2006. 

In addition, a section concerning percentage of time allotted to job tasks (i.e. itemized 

according to staff title) was included and was to be completed for all staff working within each 

county’s Megan’s Law unit. For example, if an investigator was included under personnel, a 

percentage breakdown of time allotted to specific job functions such as risk assessment, door to 

door notifications, training, etc. was required.

Of the 21 counties that were surveyed, 15 surveys were completed and received by the 

research unit, for a total response rate of 71.4 percent. Upon receipt, researchers scanned survey 

responses for possible misreading/interpretation issues related to specific survey items. For 

additional clarification, researchers called county prosecutor offices to confirm questionable 

survey item responses and made any changes accordingly. After survey responses were finalized, 

an Excel database of cost assessment variables was created for analysis.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

35

Along with the cost assessment survey, prior New Jersey state budgets were reviewed for 

costs associated with the incarceration, rehabilitation, and tracking of sex offenders. 

Specifically, the budgets were searched for any allocation to Megan’s Law. Moreover, original 

grant documentation and archived folders were also reviewed for costs not included or found in 

the other sources. Sources were challenging to locate, as was the origin of much of the funding. 

Results

The results that follow include statistics based on the 15 counties that responded to the 

research unit’s Megan’s Law Cost Assessment Survey. For the 15 responding counties, the initial 

aggregate implementation cost of Megan’s Law totaled $555,565. Of this total startup cost, 

establishment of the internet sex offender registry accounted for $186,190, an average of $31,032 

(sd=$24,140) per county, equipment accounted for $232,407 ($19,367 average per county, 

sd=$14,212), and other/miscellaneous costs accounted for $136,968 ($12,452 average per 

county, sd= $17,702). In addition, total aggregate expenses for all 15 counties attributable to the 

ongoing implementation of Megan’s Law were estimated to be $3,973,932 per annum (i.e.,

according to the fifteen participating counties). Of total per annum costs, staffing costs accounts 

for $3,605,972 ($257,569 average per county, sd= $160,180), internet sex offender registry 

maintenance accounts for $146,300 ($20,900 average per county, sd=$20,178), 

equipment/supplies accounts for $130,483 ($10,037 average per county, sd= $8,196), and 

other/miscellaneous expenses accounts for $91,177 ($6,513 average per county, sd= $6,002).

Additional information gathered from the prosecutor’s surveys includes counts of staff 

within each county’s Megan’s Law Unit, number of cases handled per year, and number of door 

to door notifications per year. According to completed surveys, the number of employees 

dedicated to Megan’s Law Unit operations totals 78 (5.2 average per county, sd= 3.2), and an 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

36

estimated 5,873 Megan’s Law specific cases were processed (391.5 average per county, sd=

303.4). Moreover, counties reported that law enforcement officers performed a total of 31 door–

to-door notification events (3.9 average per county, sd= 2.7) throughout the year (e.g. 1 event 

equals 300 households) for tier three sex offenders. 

A question concerning ongoing costs for the calendar year ending 2006 was also included 

in the survey to measure yearly cost increases/decreases. The cost for Megan’s Law 

implementation during calendar year 2006 was estimated to be $1,557,978, whereas 

implementation costs during calendar year 2007 totaled $3,973,932 for responding counties5. 

This change represents a 155% increase in ongoing expenses from calendar year 2006 to 

calendar year 2007. These increases were obtained from raw figures provided by the Megan’s 

Law Units and did not reflect specific costs. However, with the inception of the Global 

Positioning Satellites used for Tier 3 sex offenders, it can be surmised that a portion of the 

increases can be attributed to increased surveillance. Finally, research of prior state budgets 

documented a $200,000 expenditure on Megan’s Law DNA Testing for fiscal years since 2000. 

There are no other distinguishable appropriations. Most costs are combined with salaries or

another type of operating expenses. 

PROJECT SUMMARY

 

5 As noted, fifteen out of a possible twenty one counties in New Jersey responded to the cost assessment survey, which translates to an 

approximate response rate of 71.4%. In order to provide a more accurate assessment of initial and on going costs statewide, said costs 

were interpolated by adding 28.6% (i.e. 100% - 71.4%) to the implementation and ongoing grand totals of the fifteen responding 

counties. . In effect, using this general interpolation method, implementation costs were estimated to be $714,457 and ongoing costs were 

estimated to be $5,110,477 statewide. Again, because these figures are interpolated, these costs do not take varying county demographics 

into account and should be interpreted with this caveat.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

37

The three phases of this study were designed to test the effectiveness and cost of Megan’s 

Law using multiple methods and strategies. In none of the analyses was Megan’s Law 

definitively found to be effective. Since sex crime rates have been down prior to Megan’s Law 

and pre and post samples do not indicate statistically lower rates of sexual offending, the high 

costs associated with Megan’s Law are called into question. 

Summary of Results

As a preliminary step in assessing the effect of community registration and notification 

laws on sexual arrest rates in New Jersey, the goal of the trend study was to explore crime trends 

and to identify possible changes over a 21-year period. Specifically, the main research areas 

concerned the patterns of sexual offense rates both prior and subsequent to the implementation of 

Megan’s Law, as well as comparisons in crime rates between sexual, drug, and non-sex/non-drug

based offenses during the same time period. The results presented in this report support findings 

by other researchers exploring relevant topics. Most notably, Finkelhor and Jones (2004) found 

that there has been a consistent downward trend in child sexual abuses cases since the early 

1990s.

This trend analysis did indeed find a significant change in the statewide decreasing sex 

offense rate in the year Megan’s Law was implemented, which may lead some readers to believe 

that the legislation is solely responsible for the decline. Because sex offense rates began to 

decline well before the passage of Megan’s Law, the legislation itself cannot be the cause of the 

drop in general. It may, in fact, be the case that continuing reductions in sex offending in New 

Jersey, as well as across the nation, are a reflection of greater societal changes. Having said this, 

it is nevertheless hard to explain the steeper decline in rates after the implementation of Megan’s 

Law. Given that sex offenses are low base rate events, the finding that these rates continue to 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

38

decline at an accelerated rate after 1994 suggests that something other than a natural decline may 

be responsible. Although the initial decline cannot be attributed to Megan’s Law, the continued 

decline may, in fact, be related in some way to registration and notification activities. However, 

there may well be additional factors causing this steeper rate of decline after 1994, perhaps some 

attributable to other public policies. For example, in 1998, New Jersey began civilly committing 

those sex offenders found to present the highest risk to the community, termed sexually violent 

predators. Assuming the accuracy of the risk assessment that underlies the civil commitment of 

these sexually violent predators, then those at highest risk to reoffend have been removed from 

the community, thereby potentially lowering the sex offense rate. Although, the number of 

civilly committed sexual predators only includes approximately 350 sex offenders.

Moreover, this statewide finding of a declining sex offense rate should be taken with 

considerable caution. The variation in the pre-post-implementation rate trends at the county 

level suggests that the statewide effect may be an artifact of the aggregation process. Although

many counties (9 of 21) follow the state trend, many others show no differences in rates over 

time or have experienced reductions followed by increases to near pre-Megan’s Law levels. Even

so, with only two exceptions, the rates of sex offending were highest prior to 1994 and lowest 

after 1995, with the most recent years having the lowest rates. Differences in population, sociopolitical status, policing and prosecutorial resources may be related to differences in the 

effectiveness in notification and surveillance activities in specific counties.

Although impossible to distinguish the nature of the effects, the reductions of sex 

offenses is related to some historical process: either (1) registry/notification, surveillance and/or 

aggressive prosecution under a more mature Megan’s Law is responsible for the continued

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

39

reductions or (2) general public awareness, publicity, and/or exclusion and intolerance feed the 

continued decline. Most likely, it is a combination of these factors.

In the offender release sample, there is a consistent downward trend in re-arrests, 

reconvictions and re-incarcerations over time similar to that observed in the trend study, except 

in 1995, when all measures spiked to a high for that period. This resulted in significant 

differences between cohorts (i.e., those released prior to and after Megan’s Law was 

implemented). Similarly, re-arrests for violent crime (whether sexual or not) also declined 

steadily over the same period resulting in a significant difference between cohorts (i.e., those 

released prior to and after Megan’s Law was implemented). However, because these trends 

began before Megan’s Law was passed, this decline cannot be attributed solely to Megan’s Law 

activities.

In all other pre-post measures, including other measures of recidivism, community tenure 

and harm reduction (decreased sexual offending), no significant differences between cohorts 

were found. As such, Megan’s Law does not illustrate effectiveness in:

o increasing community tenure (the time spent in the community prior to re-arrest);

o reducing sexual re-offenses;

o changing the type of sexual re-offense or first time sexual offense (for example, 

from hands-on to hands-off offenses); or

o reducing the number of victims involved in sexual offenses.

Costs associated with the initial implementation of Megan’s Law, as well as ongoing 

expenditures, continue to grow over time. Start up costs totaled $555,565 in 1994 and now 

current costs (in 2007) total approximately 3.9 million dollars. Given the lack of demonstrated 

effect of Megan’s Law, the researchers are hard-pressed to determine that the escalating costs are 

justifiable.

Limitations

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

40

Conducting a study of this type with sensitive sexual arrest data introduces a number of 

limitations. The most noted problem plaguing sexual offense research, the low base rate of 

reported sexual offenses, is tied to the under-representation of official data. Because sexual 

offenses are under-reported, most measures of recidivism under-represent the true offending 

rates (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1999; Belknap, 2000; Furby et al., 1989; Hall, 

1995; Hanson & Bussiere, 1998). It has been suggested that the present statistics on sexual 

abuse represent approximately one-third of the number of actual victimizations, leaving 

researchers and practitioners concerned about the “dark figure” of sexual abuse (APA, 1999; 

Belknap, 2000; Chesney- Lind, 1997). Legal definitions, fear and shame, and a desire for 

privacy are the main contributors to the unwillingness of many victims to report their abuse. 

Conversely, it has been noted that some types of sexual abuse may be over-represented to the 

police, such as stranger rapes (Belknap, 2000). For example, victims of stranger rape, as 

opposed to incest victims, may be more inclined to report their sexual victimization because their 

perpetrator is unknown. This disparity may lead many to believe that stranger victimizations 

occur more frequently than other types of sexual victimizations because the reports may appear 

disproportionately higher (Zgoba & Simon, 2004). Although most individuals know that 

acquaintance or familial crimes are more frequent, these factors may make it difficult to achieve 

a clear picture of sexual offense rates (Belknap, 2000; Chesney- Lind, 1997). Given this low base 

rate of reporting, it is notable that sex offenses decrease rapidly in the post-Megan’s law period; 

the fact that the decrease accelerates as the number of crimes decreases is unexpected.

Another issue that has been difficult to fully address in the format of this study is whether 

the noted decreases in the post-Megan’s law period can be attributed to specific deterrence or a 

more general deterrent effect. The intent of Megan’s law was to reduce repeat arrests among 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

41

known sex offenders. That is, Megan’s law was designed as a specific deterrent. However, the 

idea of notification and increased surveillance may have a general deterrent effect. Further, 

increased attention and public contempt of sex offenses and offenders may also contribute to 

general deterrence. This study illustrated downward trends in sexual arrest rates, but cannot 

differentiate whether the reduction is due to decreases in new first-time sex offenses (general 

deterrence) or to decreases in sexual re-offenses (specific deterrence). 

One of the largest challenges, and a subsequent limitation, associated with this grant was 

obtaining the financial costs regarding Megan’s Law. County Prosecutor Offices, as well as the 

offices dealing with Treasury and Budget, had the same difficulties the researchers experienced 

when attempting to isolate and identify the costs listed in the State of New Jersey Budgets. 

Furthermore, initial start-up costs were sometimes funded through grants that providing few 

specifics regarding disbursement patterns. In an effort to provide close estimates, the researchers 

developed proxy measures that should be read with some caution. 

Conclusion

Despite wide community support for these laws, there is little evidence to date, including 

this study, to support a claim that Megan’s Law is effective in reducing either new first-time sex 

offenses or sexual re-offenses. Continuing research should focus on matching samples of sex 

offenders before and after the implementation of Megan’s Law and also examining levels of 

supervision associated with Megan’s Law. Further research will be conducted utilizing the data 

accumulated here, specifically exploring low base rate offending and potential predictors of 

sexual recidivism. Should future studies establish that Megan’s Law has no demonstrable effect 

on the rates of sexual offending, policy makers and legislative leaders should investigate other 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

42

options for lowering sex offense rates, such as mandated treatment of all sex offenders, potential 

use of polygraph testing and intensive probation and parole supervision. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
MEGAN’S LAW

43

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