Isaly v Garde

2024 NY Slip Op 30490(U)

February 14, 2024

Supreme Court, New York County

Docket Number: Index No. 160699/2018

Judge: James E. d'Auguste

Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip

Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York

State and local government sources, including the New

York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official

publication.
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 200 

INDEX NO. 160699/2018 

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

NEW YORK COUNTY 

PRESENT: Hon. James E. d'Auguste 

Justice 

-------------------------------------X 

SAMUEL D. ISAL Y, 

Plaintiff, 

-vDAMIAN GARDE, DELILAH BURKE, 

Defendants. 

----------------------------X 

PART 55 

INDEX NO. 

MOTION DATE 

160699/2018 

06/23/2023, 

09/19/2023 

003, 004, 007, 

MOTION SEQ. NO. 008 

DECISION + ORDER ON 

MOTION 

Plaintiff moves in Motion Seq. No 007 for an order vacating the stay and protective orders granted 

in this defamation action as part of the Court's December 6, 2022 decision and order published at 2022 

NY Slip Op 34108(U) (the "December Decision"). 1 Plaintiff also seeks, in Motion Seq. No. 008, leave to 

conduct discovery to oppose those branches of defendants' motions to dismiss (Motion Seq. Nos. 003 and 

004) that had been held in abeyance pending the Court of Appeals' consideration of New York's AntiSLAPP Law, and to deny those motions to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs motion for 

discovery is denied, plaintiffs motion to vacate the protective orders and stay is granted to the extent of 

lifting the stay and granting defendants' motions to dismiss this action pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Law, 

and the Court directs further proceedings to determine the award of defendants' reasonable attorney 's fees 

and costs.2 

Background and Previous Proceedings 

This action, which has already been the subject of multiple reported decisions, arises from 

defendant Garde' s December 2017 article in STAT reporting the accounts of five women that plaintiff 

1 The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the December Decision in a May 30, 2023, decision published 

at 216 A.D.3d 594. The Court also declined to vacate the December Decision in a decision dated June 27 2023 

and published at 2023 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3365. ' ' 

2 In considering Motion Seq. Nos. 007 and 008 (and through them, the remaining branches of Motion Seq. Nos. 

003 and 00~), the C~urt read all of the papers respectively filed in those motion sequence numbers in NYSCEF, 

and the parties are d!fected to NYSCEF for that information pursuant to CPLR 2219. Because of the sheer 

volume of papers, the Court has not listed them all here. To the extent any party wishes a separate list delineated 

by NYSCEF document number, they may settle an order doing so on notice. 

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had "for years perpetuated a toxic culture of sexual harassment. .. routinely subjecting young female 

assistants to pornography in the workplace, lewd jokes, and pervasive sexist comments ... kept a set of 

breast implants on his desk, palpating them like stress balls during idle conversation ... and wantonly 

demeaned and verbally abused female employees," while managing a prominent hedge fund firm. 

(Amended Complaint, Ex. A., at 1). Plaintiff and his colleagues conceded during defendant Garde's 

interview of them that "the firm had investigated claims against (plaintiff]," (but had "concluded none 

rose to the level of 'a sexually egregious behavior,"' without defining that standard) while plaintiff 

acknowledged having had breast implants in his office. (Amended Complaint, Ex. A., at 2; and Interview 

Transcript filed NYSCEF Doc. No. 16, at 19). In a final comment to defendant Garde prior to publication, 

one of plaintiffs colleagues stated that "[i]fthis article proceeds I hope that you will be fair and focus on 

the person responsible, not the entire firm." (Amended Complaint, Ex. A., at 2). On December 5, 2017, 

the article published under the headline "[b ]iotech hedge fund titan Sam Isaly harassed, demeaned women 

for years, former employees say." (Amended Complaint, Ex. A, at 1). 

Plaintiff subsequently commenced a series of actions litigated in state and federal court- including 

this action - variously alleging defamation by defendant Garde and his employers for having written and 

published the article, and against defendant Burke, the sole female accuser of plaintiff willing to speak 

with Garde on the record. See, Jsaly v. Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC, Dkt. No. 23-67-cv, 2023 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 26124, *2-4 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (affirming dismissal of federal action and discussing case 

history in state and federal courts).3 The Court initially dismissed this action by decision and order dated 

July 11, 2022, and published at 2022 NY Slip Op 32203(U), about which plaintiff sought leave to reargue, 

which the Court granted in part by the Court's December 6th decision to the extent of holding defendants' 

Anti-SLAPP motions and a portion of defendant Burke's motion to dismiss in abeyance pending the Court 

of Appeals' action in Gottwald v. Sebert. 40 N.Y.3d 240 (2023). The First Department affirmed the 

December Decision (as noted previously), and denied plaintiff leave to reargue or appeal by decision and 

order dated September 7, 2023, and published at 2023 NY Slip Op 72896(U). Plaintiff then sought leave 

to appeal from the Court of Appeals, which the Court of Appeals denied by decision and order dated 

January 16, 2024, and published at 2024 NY Slip Op 60632. 

3 This is the first of three actions plaintiff commenced before the Court. Subsequent to this action, plaintiff 

commenced_lsaly v. Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC under New York County Index No. 151825/2022 on March 

3, 2022 (wh1c_h was removed to federal court as noted by the Court's June 13, 2022, order in that action), and fsaly 

v. Garde (agamst defendant Garde alone) under New York County Index No. 161333/2023 on November 20, 2023. 

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Defendants do not oppose vacating the stay but instead request that the Court deny discovery and 

grant their applications for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Law. The Court 

addresses the parties' arguments in tum. 

The Anti-SLAPP Law as Amended by Chapter 250 Applies to the Continuation ofthis Action 

Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the First Department's holding in Gottwald, which held that 

Chapter 250 did not apply to actions (like this one) commenced prior to its enactment, remains in force 

following the Court of Appeals' decision reviewing it. 

While the Court of Appeals was divided 5-1 in holding that Chapter 250 was not retroactive to the 

commencement of all potential SLAPP actions pending at the time of its enactment, the Court 

unanimously held 6-0 that the First Department erred in Gottwald and that "continuation of Gottwald' s 

suit beyond the effective date of the amendments entitles Sebert to recover damages," provided that 

defendant could establish an anti-SLAPP claim. Gottwald, at *259. It is, as the Court of Appeals held in 

Gottwald, the continuation of this action following Chapter 250's enactment, that raises the specter of 

Chapter 250 remedies. The Court has noted as much in this action once already. June Decision, at *13. 

"Plaintiffs theory .. .is like the rabbit hole of Alice in Wonderland, a portal into a realm in which down is 

up and up is down," and neither the Court nor the parties are served by repeating arguments that are not 

only flatly contradicted by the plain text of decisions but have been expressly considered and rejected in 

this action. Brivikv. Murray, Dkt. No. ll-cv-2101, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26784, *10 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 

3, 2014). See also, D'Lil v. Best Western Encina Lodge & Suites, Dkt. No. cv 02-9506, 2010 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 163123, *31 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13,201 0)(noting Court's concern that plaintiffs repetition ofrejected 

arguments "was not the first time [plaintiffs counsel] had raised untenable arguments, wasting the Court's 

time and Defendants' money"). 

In re-casting his applicability argument in the instant motion, plaintiff relies upon the Appellate 

Division, Second Department's recent holding in VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v. Sproule, 2024 NY Slip 

Op 00205 (2d Dept. Jan. 17, 2024), which held that a plaintiffs complaint filed days before Chapter 250 

took effect (and in which no subsequent action had been taken) was not subject to Chapter 250. 4 VIP Pet 

Grooming Studio, at *4-5. See also, Burton v. Porcelain, 2024 NY Slip Op 00291 (2d Dept. Jan. 24, 

2024) (citing VIP Pet Grooming Studio in finding that Chapter 250 did not apply in motion to dismiss 

4 See, Jan. 22, 2024, email from Alan Lewis to Brian Krist. 

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pending at the time of its enactment). Although plaintiff argues that VIP Pet Grooming Studio controls, 

plaintiff is incorrect. This action is immediately distinguishable in the sheer scale of plaintiffs postenactment litigation activity, and the Court of Appeals has stated that "[t]here is no retroactive effect when 

these provisions are applied, according to their terms, to the continuation of the action beyond the effective 

date of the amendments." Gottwald, at 258. This particularly includes plaintiffs August 2022 effort to, 

again, amend his complaint in Motion Seq. No. 005, long after Chapter 250 took effect. 

Plaintiff is essentially inviting the Court to disregard the Legislature and the Court of Appeals 

because plaintiff disagrees with them, which the Court cannot do. The Court "is bound to apply the law 

as it exists, and as interpreted by controlling ... precedents," and cannot "usurp the role of the legislature 

or the Appellate Courts." Luongo v. Records Access Officer, 150 A.D.3d 13, 26 (1st Dept. 2017); and 

People v. Alvarez-Hernandez, 2002 NY Slip Op 50493(U), *5 (Westchester Co. Ct. 2002). The Court is 

"not free to disagree, to disregard in the guise of reinterpretation, or to speculate upon probabilities or 

personalities," and "must follow the decisions and interpretations of our highest court in spite of any 

individual predilections," plaintiff may have. United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. 

Ill. 1960). The Legislature and the Court of Appeals have spoken clearly that Chapter 250 applies to the 

continued litigation of existing cases after its enactment, and the Court will heed them. 

Plaintifrs Constitutional Obiections to Anti-SLAPP Legislation are Misplaced 

Plaintiff asserts that the Anti-SLAPP Law, as amended by Chapter 250, violates his state and 

federal constitutional rights of petition and jury trial. Once again, plaintiff is wrong. "[I]n amending its 

anti-SLAPP law to set a higher standard of fault for defamation claims involving private individuals ... the 

New York legislature sought to protect an important substantive interest: the exercise of free speech about 

matters of public concern." Shannon Jankowski, SLAPP-ing Back: Recent Legal Challenges to the 

Application of State Anti-SLAPP Laws, American Bar Association (Mar. 16, 2022), at *8. "The news 

media-and those who share their stories with the news media-have faced an onslaught of retaliatory 

and meritless litigation in recent years," which is a pernicious harm that New York may, and has, sought 

to curb without offending the state or federal constitutions. Jankowski, at *9 

Federally, the Framers recognized the idea that while "the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy 

of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 

U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (citing James Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798). While the 

Supreme Court noted that "the individual's right to the protection of his own good name reflects no more 

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than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being -- a concept at the root of 

any decent system of ordered liberty," -- the Court has also "been especially anxious to assure to the 

freedoms of speech and press that 'breathing space' essential to their fruitful exercise," and "(t]o that end 

this Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood." Gertz, at 342. While 

"many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount 

the barrier," imposed by that "strategic protection," society's interest in protecting the marketplace of 

ideas trumps plaintiffs desire for heartbalm. Gertz, at 342. Put simply, and recently, "[t]he First 

Amendment, we have concluded, requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that 

matters." Counterman v. Colorado, 143 S. Ct. 2106, 2115 (2023) (discussing Gertz). 

Plaintiffs reliance on decisions from Washington, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Maine is 

misplaced. The Supreme Court of Washington premised its jury trial concerns about Washington's antiSLAPP law entirely upon the Washington Constitution and, while finding that Washington's anti-SLAPP 

law interfered with plaintiffs' federal First Amendment rights, the Court simultaneously noted that 

"[f]rivolous suits (i.e., those that lack a 'reasonable basis,' are 'based on insubstantial claims,' or are 

11 baseless') are not within the scope of a First Amendment protection." Davis v. Cox, 183 Wn. 2d 269, 

290 (2015). In Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme Court based 

its holding striking down Minnesota's anti-SLAPP law entirely upon the Minnesota Constitution, without 

reference to the federal constitution at all. 895 N.W.2d 623, 634-635 (Minn. 2017). The New Hampshire 

Supreme Court similarly relied upon state, not federal, constitutional provisions in an ex parte advisory 

opinion to the New Hampshire Senate against a proposed anti-SLAPP bill. See, Opinion of the Justices 

(SLAPP Suit Procedure), 138 N.H. 445, 446-447 (1994). Although the Maine Supreme Judicial Court 

noted Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment concerns generally about Maine's anti-SLAPP law in Thurlow 

v. Nelson, the Court, again (like its sister courts), ruled upon its own state constitution. 2021 ME 58, *17 

(2021). 

Plaintiffs cherry-picking of precedent also failed to disclose that constitutional arguments against 

anti-SLAPP legislation have failed elsewhere. 5 See, Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of 

America, 115 Cal. App. 4th 322, 360-361 (Cal. Ct. App, 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 2004 Cal. LEXIS 3097 

(Cal.), cert denied, 543 U.S. 942 (2004) (finding that anti-SLAPP laws did not violate plaintiffs First 

5 

Pl~intiff has burden~~ the Ciurt throug~ such ~ac~ics befor~, an~ been cautioned in this action against doing so 

prev10usly. June Decision, at 10 n. 7 (notmg plamtiff s selective disclosure of precedent and noting that "the Court 

expects greater care from counsel when advancing arguments in the future"). 

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Amendment rights); and Klem v. Access Ins. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 595, 608 n. 6 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. 

2017), de publication denied, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 1729 (2018) ( collecting authorities and holding that "AntiSLAPP is no impediment to redress of grievances or jury trial rights"). The Supreme Court of Nevada 

expressly cited and distinguished Leiendecker and Davis in upholding Nevada's anti-SLAPP law. See, 

Taylor v. Colon, 136 Nev. Adv. Rep. 50, *10-11 (2020). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 

while limiting certain anti-SLAPP procedures on home rule grounds, rejected plaintiffs constitutional 

arguments when presented with them. See, Morgan Banks v. Hoffman, Dkt No. 20-cv-0318, 2023 D.C. 

App. LEXIS 258, *34-37 (D.C. Sept. 7, 2023) (discussing constitutional objections to local anti-SLAPP 

law and finding that "[w]e need not pause long over these claims"). 

In addressing burden-enhancement and shifting in anti-SLAPP regulation, the Morgan Banks 

Court explained: 

We cannot agree that the Act's burden-shifting prov1s1on infringes on appellants' 

constitutional right to petition. The Supreme Court has explained that the right of access 

to the courts is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have 

suffered injury by being shut out of court. The burden-shifting provision imposes on 

SLAPP plaintiffs the burden of showing that the complaint rests on more than unsupported 

claims that do not meet established legal standards, and of successfully rebutting any 

argument that the plaintiff could not prevail as a matter of law after allowing for the 

weighing of evidence and permissible inferences by the jury. A plaintiff who is shut out 

of court because it cannot meet that burden has not been denied its constitutional right to 

petition the courts. 

Morgan Banks, at *35-36 (quotations and citations omitted). 

While not specifically addressing this State's or the federal constitution, the Court of Appeals cited 

Gertz and others in noting that while the "actual malice standard need not apply to private figures," New 

York and other states "may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for those 

individuals." Gottwald, at* 1 (quotations and citations omitted). As the Court previously discussed in the 

December Decision, "[t]he Court of Appeals has noted and affirmed the expansive language of our State 

constitutional guarantee of a free press and the consistent tradition in this State of providing the broadest 

possible protection to the sensitive role of gathering and disseminating news of public events," and that 

"we value speech and public participation knowing that the power may be misused, aware that the 

advocacy of some may be injurious or false, refusing to judge in individual cases whether debate itself 

would be good or bad." December Decision, at *5-6 (citations and quotations omitted). That New York 

has chosen to protect more speech under its state constitution and statutory law than might be required by 

the federal constitution is within New York's sovereign discretion, and "[a]bsent a debilitating 

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constitutional flaw in the Act, this Court must effectuate the common will expressed in the purpose of the 

legislation." Swails v. State, 263 Ga. 276, 276 (1993). Accordingly, the Court finds that Chapter 250 is 

permissible under both the state and federal constitutions. 

Defendants May Seek Attorney's Fees by Motion Pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Law 

Procedurally, plaintiff also objects to awarding fees and costs as part of an order dismissing this 

action, instead arguing that defendants cannot recover fees and costs without asserting their demand by 

answering the pleadings in this action with a counterclaim or filing a new action. (Mem of Law in Supp., 

at 6). Plaintiff relies upon a number of decisions from coordinate state and federal courts, and appellate 

decisions predating Chapter 250. Plaintiff's position is unavailing. 

Pursuant to Civil Rights Law§ 70-a(l)(a): 

[C]osts and attorney's fees shall be recovered upon a demonstration, including an 

adjudication pursuant to [CPLR 32Jl(g)]. .. that the action involving public petition and 

participation was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and 

could not be supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification or reversal 

of existing law. ( emphasis added). 

In contrast, "other compensatory damages may only be recovered upon an additional 

demonstration that the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued for 

the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of 

speech, petition or association rights," and "punitive damages may only be recovered upon an additional 

demonstration that the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued for 

the sole purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise 

of speech, petition or association rights." Civil Rights Law § 70-a(l )(b) and ( c ). That is a marked, and 

presumably purposeful distinction crafted by the Legislature. While a demand for costs and fees is nondiscretionary and may be premised solely upon a decision granting a CPLR 3211 (g) motion to dismiss, 

the other discretionary compensatory and punitive damages claims available to deter SLAPP's require 

progressively higher levels of intent and motive that are more conducive to pleadings and litigation 

independent of the underlying CPLR 321 l(g) motion to dismiss.6 

6 

T~ ~e clear, nothing in this de~i~ion_should be read as deciding that claims for non-cost-and-fee compensatory or 

pumttve damages pursuant to CIVIi Rights Law § 70-a(l) cannot be awarded through motion practice, as that issue 

ts not before the Court. 

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Indeed - and troublingly contrary to plaintiffs argument - the First Department has addressed this 

issue in reinstating a motion for fees and costs in Aristocrat Plastic Surgery P. C. v. Silva, 206 A.D.3d 26, 

29 (1st Dept. 2022). 7 There, as here, a defendant sought attorney's fees and costs as part of a CPLR 

321 l(g) motion, which was denied. While the gravamen of the First Department's decision in Aristocrat 

Plastic Surgery and the parties' arguments concerned whether Supreme Court correctly found that the 

claim at issue was subject to the Anti-SLAPP Law at all, the question of whether fees and costs could be 

sought by motion rather than a counterclaim or standalone pleading was posed by the parties and answered 

by the First Department. And the answer was yes. That the answer was short does not diminish its 

substance, as the First Department has "broad discretion in determining the level of detail that it provides," 

and "some issues and actions may require a greater level of detail than others, and discerning which case 

calls for a heightened level of detail is part of the subjective art of judging." Charalabidis v. Elnagar, 188 

A.D.3d 44, 49 (2d Dept. 2020), citing, NYCTL 2012-A Trust v. 1698 Lex Corp., 169 A.D.3d 577 (1st Dept. 

2019). That point is further illustrated by the First Department having affirmed the very practice 

contemplated, citing itself in Aristocrat Plastic Surgery, nearly a year ago. See, Golan v. Daily News, 

L.P., 214 A.D.3d 558, 559 (1st Dept. 2023). Plaintiffs problem is not that the First Department has not 

considered plaintiffs motion versus claim argument, but that the Appellate Division has considered it and 

does not agree with him. 

Even assuming the question remains unsettled following Aristocrat Plastic Surgery or Golan 

arguendo, the answer would be the same on a fresh slate. In interpreting Chapter 250, the Court notes the 

Legislature's clear intent in crafting Chapter 250 as a vehicle through which defendants could 

expeditiously halt SLAPP claims and recover attorney's fees and costs without the burden of the same 

protracted litigation that Chapter 250 was designed to combat. The pre-Chapter 250 decisions plaintiff 

relies upon are unavailing because of the marked changes brought forth in Chapter 250, which the 

Legislature enacted in direct response to its disagreement with the Courts' interpretations of the Anti7 As plaintiff expressly referenced (in his sur-reply, at 7) the substance of the briefing in Aristocrat Plastic Surgery, 

the Court took notice of the briefs. While plaintiff asserts that "the argument was raised perfunctorily and at the 

end of a long brief," this precise issue was one of Aristocrat Plastic Surgery's two counter-questions presented on 

appeal, and the subject of an entire point (Point 2 of 3, which the Court also notes is the middle rather than the end) 

in its opposition brief. That brief itself is available on NYSCEF, and published on Westlaw at 2022 WL I 125935. 

T~e defendan! in Aristocrat Plastic Surgery replied to that argument with its own point (Point 2 of 4) in their reply 

bnef, consummg over 4 pages of an I I-page reply, itself also available on NYSCEF. That is flatly not perfunctory. 

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SLAPP Law, and post-hoc coordinate decisions to the contrary are unpersuasive. 8 See, Sponsor's Mem. 

of Sen. Hoylman-Sigal, Bill Jacket, Chapter 250, at 1; and Aristocrat Plastic Surgery, at 29 ( citing the 

sponsoring memorandum in support of Chapter 250 and the "narrow interpretation by the courts" of the 

Anti-SLAPP Law prior to Chapter 250). 

Even if, arguendo, the Court were to find (which it expressly does not) that Chapter 250 was 

ambiguous or inartful, that clear legislative intent would disfavor plaintiffs argument. See, People v. 

Vespucci, 144 A.D.2d 48, 55 (2d Dept. 1988), affd, 74 N.Y.2d 434, cert. denied, sub nom. Corrigan v. 

New York, 498 U.S. 814 (1990) (director of the Organized Crime Task Force could apply for 

eavesdropping warrants because "literal construction" of a statute is inappropriate when it "circumscribes 

its application," and "fails to meaningfully incorporate as guiding criteria the policy objectives sought to 

be achieved by Congress in utilizing the statutory term") (internal quotations and citations omitted); 

Turner v. Dept. of Finance, 242 A.D.2d 146, 147 (1st Dept. 1998) (in interpreting local freedom of 

information statute, "the spirit and purpose of the act and the objects to be accomplished must be 

considered and given effect," and a literal reading of the text "should not be adhered to or suffered to 

defeat the general purpose and manifest policy intended to be promoted") ( citation omitted); and King v. 

Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 493 (2015) (cautioning that courts should not interpret "statutes to negate their 

own stated purposes" in interpreting the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), quoting, New York 

State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973). 

Plaintiffs suggestion that the Legislature intended for those it intended to protect through an 

enhanced anti-SLAPP pre-answer motion to dismiss by requiring those same people to forgo the very preanswer motion practice the Legislature expressly crafted for them in order to recover the enhanced 

penalties specifically designed for them through protracted litigation the Legislature expressly intended 

to avoid, and that the Court should impose such a procedure, is illogical. The defendants in Aristocrat 

Plastic Surgery argued as much to the First Department, in stating that "Appellants did not file an answer 

denying the allegations of the Complaint and asserting a counterclaim for alleged damages," as "[s]uch a 

course of conduct would have caused Appellants to engage in needless and expensive discovery-the very 

harm that the anti-SLAPP statutes are intended to eliminate." Reply Brief for Respondents, Aristocrat 

Plastic Surgery, at 6. 

8 See, Chin~~e Am. Civ. Right~ Coal. ~- Trump, 21-cv-4548, 2022 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 82562, *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 

4, 2022) (c1tmg federal cases m denymg motion for anti-SLAPP attorney's fees); and 315 W. 103 Enters. LLC v. 

Robbins, 171 A.D.3d 466 (I st Dept. 2019). 

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Plaintiffs reliance on federal cases denying fee applications by motion in favor of requiring 

defendants to pursue separate claims is particularly misplaced because of conflicting federal decisions 

regarding the applicability of state anti-SLAPP laws claims heard in federal court by diversity jurisdiction. 

See, Jankowski, supra. That the Legislature established a separate cause of action for anti-SLAPP 

remedies merely reflects the common will of New York that anti-SLAPP remedies be available in federal 

court (where awarding anti-SLAPP remedies through procedural rules may not carry through diversity 

procedure) as well as state court. However, nothing in the text or intent of the Legislature precludes 

awarding fees by motion rather than a pled claim. 

For proceedings in state court, to the extent the First Department has not already resolved this 

question in Aristocrat Plastic Surgery or Golan, plaintiffs argument remains unavailing. 

Plaintiff Has Not Established Good Cause to Conduct Anti-SLAPP Discovery 

Pursuant to CPLR 321 l(g)(3) (emphasis added), "[t]he court, on noticed motion and upon a 

showing by the nonmoving party, by affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury that, for specified 

reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, may order that specified discovery be 

conducted," that "shall be limited to the issues raised in the motion to dismiss." Plaintiff has not met this 

burden. 

In seeking discovery from defendant Burke, plaintiff relies solely on his attorney's affirmation as 

the basis of his purported necessity. That is deficient. The person in the best position to state what 

information plaintiff has concerning communications between plaintiff and defendant Burke is plaintiff 

himself, yet plaintiff has not offered an affidavit detailing his own personal knowledge in the instant 

motion. That alone is largely fatal to plaintiffs motion for discovery. See, People v. Trump, Index No. 

452564/2022, 2023 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 12067, *40 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. Oct. 30, 2023), interim stay 

denied, Case No. 2023-5460, slip op., at 1 (1st Dept. Nov. 2, 2023) (Mendez, J. in chambers) (noting lack 

of affidavit upon personal knowledge in denying motion to quash subpoena). Further, plaintiff does not 

offer an affidavit from anyone asserting that they conducted a search of materials under plaintiffs control 

regarding communications between plaintiff and defendant Burke at all. 

Indeed, a recent First Department decision plaintiff cited for a different point in his memoranda of 

law illustrates the issue: Carey v. Carey, 220 A.D.3d 477 (1st Dept. 2023). In words that might as well 

have been written at the outset for the instant motion: 

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The court's denial of his CPLR 321 l(g)(3) discovery motion was a provident exercise of 

its discretion. Plaintiff cites no authority-construing CPLR 3 211 (g)(3) or otherwise-to 

support his assertions that he was, by definition, entitled to discovery because the 

court found certain of the statements potentially defamatory, or because of the enormous 

burden the anti-SLAPP amendments place on defamation plaintiffs. CPLR 321 l(g)(3) 

allows for discovery in connection with a motion to dismiss only if, for specified reasons, 

the nonmovant states, under oath, that it cannot present facts essential to justify its 

opposition, in which case the court may order that specified discovery be conducted 

notwithstanding the general stay of discovery otherwise effected by CPLR 3211 (g). His 

statements that facts relevant to actual malice are, as a general matter, typically in the sole 

possession of a ... defendant, fall short. 

Carey, at 478-479 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In the absence of any proof, the Court cannot simply assume that discovery must be necessary to 

defeat an anti-SLAPP motion. Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiffs motion for CPLR 321 l(g)(3) 

discovery from defendant Burke. 

Plaintiff Has Not Established a Substantial Basis in Fact and Law to Continue This Action 

In opposing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (g), plaintiff must demonstrate "that the 

cause of action has a substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, 

modification or reversal of existing law." Plaintiff has not done so. 

Plaintiffs arguments that Chapter 250 does not apply to this action because it was commenced 

prior to the effective date of Chapter 250 do not offer a substantial basis in law as contemplated by the 

statute following the Court of Appeals' holding in Gottwald and the First Department's holdings affirming 

the Court in this action and denying reargument or leave to appeal (about which the Court of Appeals also 

denied leave). For the same reasons, plaintiff's arguments do not offer a substantial argument to extend, 

modify, or reverse existing law. 

Turning to the facts, plaintiffs argument is, at its essence, that defendant Burke told defendant 

Garde false stories of sexually harassing acts by plaintiff, and that Garde published them in an article. 

Plaintiff offered nothing in support of this in his unverified pleadings, and has continued to offer nothing 

(either by his word or through supporting statements or documents) in support through the course of three 

years of protracted motion practice in Motion Seq. Nos. 004 through 008. Plaintiff's unadorned assertions 

amount to nothing more than the very type of bare notice pleadings that Chapter 250 is specifically 

designed to foreclose. In considering the standard plaintiff must meet to survive defendants' motion to 

dismiss, the Court notes that the Second Circuit has affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's allegations in 

160699/2018 ISALY, SAMUEL D. vs. GARDE, DAMIAN 

Motion No. 007 008 

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plaintiff's parallel litigation against Garde's publisher based on the federal plausibility standard, "rejecting 

Isaly's main argument that he was physically incapable of taking the actions attributed to him in the article 

- primarily, sending inappropriate emails - because he is quadriplegic and has limited use of his arms 

and fingers." Jsaly v. Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *2-3, quoting, Isaly 

v. Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC, Dkt. No. 21-1330-cv, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 1006, *1 (2d Cir. 

Jan. 13, 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court found, and the First Department affirmed, 

plaintiff's claims against Garde failed even under the pre-Chapter 250 pleading standard. As plaintiff's 

claims are not even plausible, they cannot be substantial. 

Instead, the continuation of this action after the Legislature's enactment of Chapter 250 has been 

a veritable archetype of the strategic litigation against public participation that the Legislature intended to 

curb in reforming the Anti-SLAPP Law. After the enactment of Chapter 250, plaintiff has noticed four 

motions before the Court (Motion Seq. Nos. 005 through 008) and vigorously litigated motions and crossmotions in two others (Motion Seq. Nos. 003 and 004), sought to amend his complaint again, noticed two 

appeals to the First Department, sought reargument from the First Department when he did not prevail 

there, and then sought leave from the Court of Appeals. That plaintiff has pursued this course oflitigation 

on allegations that are not even plausible, let alone substantial, harkens directly to the Supreme Court, 

Westchester County's warning that "SLAPP suits function by forcing the target into the judicial arena 

where the SLAPP filer foists upon the target the expenses of a defense," and "(t]he longer the litigation 

can be stretched out, the more litigation that can be churned, the greater the expense that is inflicted and 

the closer the SLAPP filer moves to success." Gordon v. Marrone, 155 Misc. 2d 726, 736 (Sup. Ct., 

Westchester Co. 1992). Plaintiff has not met his burden in opposing defendants' motions, and the Court 

accordingly finds that plaintiff's claims lack a substantial basis pursuant to CPLR 321 l(g). 

The Court Will Conduct a Hearing Regarding Defendants' Demands for Attorney's Fees 

"It is well established that courts have broad discretion in determining an award of attorney fees 

and costs," and that "New York courts often use the lodestar method, which is based on a reasonable 

hourly rate times a reasonable number of hours expended." New York Times Co. v. New York Office of 

the Mayor, 2023 NY Slip Op 32941(0), *3 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 2023) (citations omitted).9 Courts 

9 The lodestar method is based upon a 12-factor test considering: 

(I) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite 

to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to 

160699/2018 ISALY, SAMUEL 0. vs. GARDE DAMIAN 

Motion No. 007 008 ' Page 12 of 14 

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applying the lodestar method have varied in considering fee applications on papers alone or through 

evidentiary hearings. Compare, e.g., JO v. New York City Dept. of Educ., Dkt. No. 20-cv-5061, 2021 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122346, *1 (S.D.N.Y Jun. 29, 2021) (determining reasonable attorney's fees in IDEA 

litigation after trial); and Matter of Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund Securities Litig., 2023 NY Slip Op 

34527(U), *19 (declining to grant attorney's fees without hearing); with, R.S. v. New York City Dept. of 

Educ., Dkt. No. 21-cv-2257, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176654, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) (determining 

reasonable attorney's fees in IDEA litigation on papers); and New York Times Co., at* 1. (determining 

fees in FOIL litigation on papers). If anything, New York courts have generally favored hearings rather 

than papers in determining fees, especially where there is sharp disagreement at the fore or on the horizon. 

See, e.g., Matter of Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund Securities Litig., supra., citing, Sheridan v. Police 

Pension Fund, 76 A.D.2d 800, 801-802 (1st Dept. 1980). Based upon the litigation of this action thus far, 

Matter of Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund Securities Litig. is particularly instructive, and the Court will 

conduct a hearing to calculate reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 

Conclusion 

The Court does not minimize plaintiff's incandescent disagreement with defendants' statements in 

the article. However, the common will of this State has considered and accepted that plaintiff's ill-feeling 

is an accepted consequence to preserving the marketplace of ideas. Plaintiff's path to relief from that 

policy decision runs through the Legislature in Albany, not a courthouse in New York City. Thus, he has 

not stated a claim for which relief can be granted and, given the nature of plaintiff's dismissed claims, 

defendants may now recover their costs and attorneys' fees due to plaintiff's continued litigation of this 

action. 

Accordingly, it is hereby, 

ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for discovery (Motion Seq. No. 008) is denied; and it is further 

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to lift or vacate the stay in this action (Motion Seq. No. 007) is 

granted to the extent set forth below; and it is further 

acceptance of the case; ( 5) the customary fee; ( 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent: (7) time 

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved, and the results 

obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the "undesirability" of the 

c~s~; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in 

s1mtlar cases. 

New York Times Co., supra. (citations omitted). 

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Motion No. 007 008 

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ORDERED that the branches of defendant Damian Garde's motion to dismiss this action pursuant 

to CPLR 3211 (g) as part of Motion Seq. No. 003 and 004 are granted; and it is further 

ORDERED that the parties shall contact the Court by email to SFC-Part55@nycourts.gov and 

bkrist@nycourts.gov within 30 days of this decision to schedule a fees hearing. 

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. 

2/14/2024 

DATE 

CHECK ONE: 

APPLICATION: 

CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: 

CASE DISPOSED 

GRANTED □ DENIED 

SETTLE ORDER 

INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN 

160699/2018 ISALY, SAMUEL D. vs. GARDE, DAMIAN 

Motion No. 007 008 

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James d'Auguste, J.s.c: 

NON-FINAL DISPOSITION 

GRANTED IN PART 

SUBMIT ORDER 

FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT 

0 OTHER 

□ REFERENCE 

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