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NO. 12-21-00037-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

THERESA BREEDLOVE AND BOB 

BREEDLOVE, 

APPELLANTS

V.

ANTHONY VINCENT MOFFITT, 

DECEASED, ORKIN, LLC, AND 

ROLLINS, INC.,

APPELLEES

§

§

§

APPEAL FROM THE 114TH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Theresa Breedlove and Bob Breedlove (collectively Breedlove) appeal the trial court’s 

summary judgment rendered in favor of Appellees Orkin, LLC (Orkin) and Rollins, Inc (Rollins) 

(collectively Appellees). In two issues, Breedlove contends that the trial court improperly 

granted summary judgment for Appellees because there is more than a scintilla of evidence that 

(1) Orkin’s employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of 

the accident at issue and (2) Rollins, as the parent company of Orkin, exercised such a right of 

control that it could be liable under the theory of respondeat superior. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

This case stems from a head-on automobile collision, which occurred on September 11, 

2018, at 12:15 p.m. The record reflects that at that time, Orkin employee Anthony Moffit was 

driving westbound in his vehicle on West Grande Boulevard, in Tyler, Texas when the vehicle 

he was driving suddenly veered into oncoming traffic and struck the vehicle driven by Theresa 

Breedlove. Moffit was killed in the collision; Theresa suffered serious injuries.
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Breedlove filed the instant suit on October 9, 2019, in which they alleged that Theresa’s

injuries were caused by Moffit’s negligence. By way of amended pleadings, they alleged that 

Orkin and Rollins also were liable for Moffit’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat 

superior.

On November 15, Appellees filed both traditional and no evidence motions for summary 

judgment, in which they alleged that there is no evidence to support that (1) Moffit was acting 

within the course and scope of his employment with Orkin at the time of the accident and 

(2) Rollins is not vicariously liable for any of Orkin’s alleged negligence because the services it 

provides Orkin do not extend to the day-to-day management of Orkin’s pest control business. 

Breedlove responded and, ultimately, on October 14, 2020, the trial court granted both 

Appellees’ traditional and no evidence summary judgment motions. Following an order severing 

the suit against Appellees from the suit against Moffit, Breedlove appealed.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In their first issue, Breedlove argues that the trial court erred in granting Appellees’

traditional and no evidence motions for summary judgment because there is more than a scintilla 

of evidence to support that Moffit was acting within the course and scope of his employment at 

the time of the accident.

Standard of Review

The movant for traditional summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). A defendant 

who conclusively negates at least one essential element of the nonmovant’s cause of action is 

entitled to summary judgment as to that cause of action. See Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. 

Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). Likewise, a defendant who conclusively establishes 

each element of an affirmative defense is entitled to summary judgment. Id. Once the movant 

establishes a right to summary judgment, the nonmovant has the burden to respond to the motion 

and present to the trial court any issues that would preclude summary judgment. See City of 

Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678–79 (Tex. 1979). The only question 

is whether an issue of material fact is presented. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). 
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Additionally, after an adequate time for discovery, a party without the burden of proof at 

trial may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more 

essential elements of a claim or defense. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). Once a no evidence 

motion has been filed in accordance with Rule 166a(i), the burden shifts to the nonmovant to 

bring forth evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged evidence. See Macias v. Fiesta 

Mart, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). We review a no 

evidence motion for summary judgment under the same legal sufficiency standards as a directed 

verdict. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex. 2003). A no evidence 

motion is properly granted if the nonmovant fails to bring forth more than a scintilla of probative 

evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the nonmovant’s 

claim on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 751. If the 

evidence supporting a finding rises to a level that would enable reasonable, fair minded persons 

to differ in their conclusions, then more than a scintilla of evidence exists. Id. Less than a 

scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere 

surmise or suspicion of a fact, and the legal effect is that there is no evidence. See id. 

When reviewing traditional and no evidence summary judgments, we perform a de novo 

review of the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every 

reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. See Sudan v. Sudan, 199 

S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 

S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). We are not required to ascertain the credibility of affiants or to 

determine the weight of evidence in the affidavits, depositions, exhibits, and other summary 

judgment proof. See Gulbenkian v. Penn, 252 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1952); Palestine HeraldPress Co. v. Zimmer, 257 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2008, pet. denied). 

Further, all theories in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 

must be presented in writing to the trial court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). If the trial court’s 

order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds relied on for its ruling, we will 

affirm it if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 

858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993). 

Lastly, when a party moves for both a traditional and a no evidence summary judgment, 

we ordinarily review first the trial court’s summary judgment under the no evidence standard of 

Rule 166a(i). See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). If the no 
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evidence summary judgment was properly granted, we do not reach arguments under the 

traditional motion for summary judgment. See id.; but see Neurodiagnostic Tex., L.L.C. v. 

Pierce, 506 S.W.3d 153, 163 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2016, no pet.) (rule dictating court of appeals’

order of analysis when party moves for both traditional and no evidence summary judgment not 

absolute).

Respondeat Superior

The common law doctrine of respondeat superior, also known as vicarious liability, is an 

exception to the general rule that a person has no duty to control another’s conduct. See Painter 

v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 131 (Tex. 2018). It provides that “liability for 

one person’s fault may be imputed to another who is himself entirely without fault solely 

because of the relationship between them.” Id. at 130 (quoting St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 

S.W.3d 513, 540 (Tex. 2002)). To prove an employer’s vicarious liability for an employee’s 

negligence, the plaintiff must show that, at the time of the negligent conduct, the employee was 

acting in the course and scope of his employment. Painter, 561 S.W.3d at 131. In the “course 

and scope of employment” means within the scope of the employee’s general authority, in 

furtherance of the employer’s business, and for the accomplishment of the object for which he 

was hired. Id. (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 757 (Tex. 

2007)). Additionally, to be within the scope of employment, the employee’s act must be of the 

same general nature as, or incidental to, the authorized conduct. Painter, 561 S.W.3d at 131.

Thus, if an employee deviates from the performance of his duties for his own purposes, his 

employer is not responsible for what occurs during that deviation. Id.

Summary Judgment Evidence of “Course and Scope”

In their brief, Breedlove argues that they provided more than a scintilla of evidence in 

response to Appellees’ no evidence motion for summary judgment to demonstrate that Moffit 

was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. 

Specifically, as it relates to respondeat superior, the evidence in the summary judgment record is 

as follows:

• Moffit was employed by Orkin as an outside salesman (Orkin Commercial Account Manager). 

Among his job duties was to meet with established and potential customers to make pest control 

sales for Orkin.
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• Moffit’s job did not require him regularly to report to the Orkin office in the mornings, and on 

the day in question, Moffit began his workday working from home. He sent an email to a 

potential customer at 8:20 a.m. He had multiple business phone calls that morning, including a 

conversation with Arnoldo Hernandez at La Hacienda Restaurant at 10:36 a.m. and Lakisha Price 

at Journeys of the Heart daycare at 10:44 a.m. 

• Moffit had two appointments scheduled for that day, but at no specified time––one with Price at 

the daycare facility at Mount Cavalry Baptist Church, located at 806 Duckenfield, Tyler, Texas 

75702, and another for later that evening with Hernandez at La Hacienda in Whitehouse, Texas.

• Moffit left his house sometime after 11:28 a.m. and was driving his personal vehicle, which he 

often used for work and which had a Texas Pest Control License number belonging to Orkin 

affixed to it. No Orkin logo was displayed on the vehicle.

• The accident occurred on West Grande Boulevard at 12:15 p.m. 

• Orkin’s office is located approximately one mile to the north of the accident site. 

• Moffit was wearing a shirt with the Orkin logo on it at the time of the accident, which he was 

required to wear while he was working. Moffit’s wife testified that he rarely ever wore his Orkin 

shirt when he was running personal errands.

• Moffit’s wife testified that it was possible that Moffit was traveling to the Orkin office from their 

home in the event he needed to pick up supplies before meeting with customers scheduled for later 

during a workday. 

• Moffit had an upcoming trip to California planned on September 12, 2018. The day before the 

accident, he told his wife that he was going to finish up some items for work and prepare for his 

vacation.

• Price called Orkin at 2:14 p.m. to inquire about Moffit’s whereabouts.

From the aforementioned evidence, there is no doubt that Moffit was working on the day 

in question, but the evidence does not permit a factfinder reasonably to determine the location of 

Moffit’s primary destination at the time of the accident so as to support a finding that he was 

within the course and scope of his employment at that time. Appellees argue that the evidence 

supports a finding that Moffit either (1) was driving somewhere to conduct personal business in 

preparation for his upcoming trip to California or (2) was driving to the Orkin office. Breedlove 

contends that the evidence supports that Moffit either was driving to the Orkin office or was 

driving to meet with Price at the daycare facility. Breedlove challenges the strength of the

inference underlying Appellees’ contention that Moffit was on a personal errand at the time of 

the accident, but even if we were to agree with Breedlove on this point, the outcome would not 

change.
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The “Coming and Going Rule”

One particular rule that has developed in the context of course-and-scope-of-employment

law is the “coming-and-going rule.” EAN Holdings, LLC v. Arce, 636 S.W.3d 290, 295–96 

(Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2021, pet. filed); see also Painter, 561 S.W.3d at 131. Under this rule, in 

the third-party liability context, the criteria for course and scope of employment generally are not 

met when an employee is traveling to or from work. See Painter, 561 S.W.3d at 139 (“We 

confirm that the coming-and-going rule, under which an employee is generally not acting within 

the scope of his employment when traveling to and from work, applies in the vicarious-liability 

context”). Thus, since the evidence suggests the possibility that Moffit was en route to the Orkin 

office at the time of the accident, we must consider whether the “coming and going” rule applies

if that was, in fact, his primary destination.

Breedlove argues that the facts of this case are distinguishable from the more typical 

scenario involving the application of the coming and going rule wherein an employee with a 

more traditional work schedule is driving from home to the office or vice-versa, since the 

evidence demonstrates that Moffit began his workday working from home and regularly 

conducted business away from the Orkin office. Thus, Breedlove suggests that since Moffit 

already had begun his workday, the coming and going rule should not apply in the event that his 

primary destination at the time of the accident was the Orkin office. However, Breedlove cites to 

no authority, nor is this court aware of any such authority, which supports such an exception to 

the coming and going rule. 

The parties have discussed cases which, although they are not directly on point, are 

pertinent to our analysis. For instance, one of our sister courts has held that business calls with 

an “on call” employee both before and after, but not at the time of, the accident does not indicate 

that the employee was within the court and scope of his employment at the time of the accident 

when the evidence demonstrated that he was driving home. See Mejia-Rosa v. John Moore 

Servs., Inc., No. 01-17-00955-CV, 2019 WL 330972, at *8–9 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 

Jul. 25, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Furthermore, another of our sister courts has held that an 

employee’s negligent conduct did not occur while he was acting in the course and scope of his 

employment because, despite his having worked from home in the past, the evidence 

demonstrated that the conduct occurred when he was on his way home from work, the employee 

did not intend to work from home that evening, and did not, in fact, work from home that 
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evening. See Arce, 2021 WL 4783156, at *6. These cases are relevant inasmuch as they suggest 

the importance of maintaining the focus of our analysis on the employee’s conduct at the time of 

the accident and not the overall nature of the employee’s role with the company. See also 

Farrell v. Com. Structures & Interiors, Inc., No. 05-02-0031-CV, 2002 WL 31411022, *2–3

(Tex. App.–Dallas Oct. 28, 2002, no pet.) (op., not designated for publication) (employee driving 

home with stated purpose to work from home not within course and scope when involved in 

accident while driving home). Based on the aforementioned holdings and absence of any 

caselaw which provides the exception to the coming and going rule similar to that for which 

Breedlove advocates, we conclude that in this case, in the event Moffit’s primary destination was 

the Orkin office, the coming and going rule applies.

Discussion

Here, the location of the accident along with other circumstantial evidence1 suggests at 

least two plausible primary destinations for Moffit at the time of the accident––the Orkin office 

or the daycare facility. But only evidence which supports a finding that Moffit was driving 

directly to the daycare facility would support a conclusion that Moffit was acting within the 

course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. See Painter, 561 S.W.3d at 139

(coming and going rule). Breedlove contends that evidence that Moffit was scheduled to go to 

the daycare facility some time that day coupled with the fact that Price called Orkin at 2:14 p.m. 

to inquire as to Moffit’s whereabouts, satisfies their burden to provide evidence that Moffit was 

driving directly to the daycare facility at the time of the accident. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). 

We disagree. 

The circumstantial evidence upon which Breedlove relies is highly speculative and 

amounts to little more than conjecture. See, e.g., Jones v. Coppinger, No. 08-20-00040-CV, 

2021 WL 3878878, at *6 (Tex. App.–El Paso Aug. 31, 2021, no pet.) (op.) (when plaintiff’s 

claim based solely on speculation or conjecture, summary judgment is appropriate). Ultimately, 

given the nature of the summary judgment evidence on which Breedlove relies, no factfinder 

reasonably could determine Moffit’s primary destination at the time of the accident. Thus, we 

1 The equal inference rule provides that a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from meager 

circumstantial evidence “which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than another.” 

Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001). Thus, in cases with only slight circumstantial evidence––such 

as the location of the accident in this case––something else must be found in the record to corroborate the 

probability of the fact’s existence or nonexistence. See id.
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conclude that the summary judgment evidence does not amount to more than a scintilla of 

evidence to support that Moffit was acting within the course and scope of his employment for 

Orkin at the time of the accident. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting 

Appellees’ no evidence motion for summary judgment on this ground. Breedlove’s first issue is 

overruled.2 

DISPOSITION

Having overruled Breedlove’s first issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

GREG NEELEY

Justice

Opinion delivered April 29, 2022.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

2 Because we have overruled Breedlove’s first issue, we need not consider their second issue of whether 

Rollins may be held vicariously liable for Orkin’s conduct. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 
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COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

APRIL 29, 2022

NO. 12-21-00037-CV

THERESA BREEDLOVE AND BOB BREEDLOVE,

Appellants

V.

ANTHONY VINCENT MOFFITT, DECEASED,

ORKIN, LLC, AND ROLLINS, INC.,

Appellees

Appeal from the 114th District Court

of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 18-2328-B/S)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the oral arguments, appellate record and 

briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no 

error in the judgment. 

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of 

the court below be in all things affirmed, all costs of this appeal are assessed against the 

Appellants, THERESA BREEDLOVE AND BOB BREEDLOVE, and that this decision be 

certified to the court below for observance.

Greg Neeley, Justice. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.