Air University

Stephen R. Lorenz, Lt Gen, Commander

Air Command and Staff College

Jay H. Lindell, Brig Gen, Commandant

Dale L. Hayden, Col, PhD, Dean

Fred P. Stone, Lt Col, Director of Research 

John T. Ackerman, PhD, Series Editor

Brett Morris, Lt Col, Essay Advisor

Air University Press

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Please send inquiries or comments to

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The Wright Flyer Papers

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00Trautmann.indd 1 1/23/08 10:13:50 
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Designing Bare Base

Systems for Logistics

Efficiency in the Joint

Operational Environment

William D. Trautmann, Jr.

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 28

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

December 2007

01Trautmann.indd 1 1/23/08 12:01:19 
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government 

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

01Trautmann.indd 2 1/23/08 12:01:19 
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staff 

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best student 

research projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC 

research program encourages our students to move beyond 

the school’s core curriculum in their own professional development and in “advancing air and space power.” The 

series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering 

spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. Projects 

selected for publication combine solid research, innovative 

thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer 

Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, 

organizational, and operational questions. Some of these 

studies provide new solutions to familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing 

new possibilities. By making these research studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage 

critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further 

research in these areas.

JAY H. LINDELL

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

01Trautmann.indd 3 1/23/08 12:01:19 
01Trautmann.indd 4 1/23/08 12:01:19 


Abstract

The current service-centric approach to bare base capability has produced capability overlaps and logistics inefficiencies. The two primary bare base systems—the Air 

Force Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources (BEAR) and 

the Army Force Provider—have limited interoperability. In 

recent conflicts, the lack of joint doctrine or joint bare base 

architecture has hampered the ability of the services to 

achieve fully operational forward locations within a satisfactory length of time. The current approach to bare base 

operations is at odds with Department of Defense (DOD) 

transformation plans, which direct the development of joint, 

interdependent capabilities to support the current operating environment, in which interservice operations and rapid 

deployments are the norm. The DOD also has a domestic requirement to contribute to disaster response and homeland 

security operations, which may be slowed or complicated by 

service-specific bare base capabilities. To prepare for operations in a joint environment and eliminate inefficiencies, the 

services should establish a joint bare base architecture that 

is simplified, modular, and interchangeable. This study proposes a joint architecture that potentially would reduce the 

resources required to procure, move, store, and maintain 

bare base assets. Because expeditionary basing is one of its 

distinctive capabilities, the Air Force should be designated 

as the executive agent for joint bare base operations, with 

each service continuing to train its bare base support forces 

and meet its service-specific requirements.

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01Trautmann.indd 6 1/23/08 12:01:19 


Introduction

Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance 

on other service and joint capabilities to maximize 

their complementary and reinforcing effects while 

minimizing service vulnerabilities.

—2004 Army Transformation Roadmap

In 1991 Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm 

marked a milestone in joint and coalition operations. However, they also highlighted interoperability issues, which 

subsequently drove joint doctrine, tactics, and concepts of 

operations (CONOPS). Today, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) transformation is hurtling the services past interoperability towards joint interdependence, but they are not 

there yet. Capability seams and gaps create suboptimal efficiency and compel the services to pursue organic capability 

that when aggregated results in an overly redundant structure.1 This mind-set has driven a service-centric approach 

to bare base capability and resulted in capability overlap 

and logistics inefficiency. Considering the fiscal struggle to 

transform and recapitalize military forces, it is imperative 

that the DOD find operational efficiency from the simplest 

to the most sophisticated weapon system. While not glamorous, bare base capability is a critical enabler to expeditionary operations, which in turn, are critical to US national 

security and defense strategies. Therefore, in the context 

of a joint operational environment, the goal of the services 

should be to present a combatant commander with effective 

bare base capability at the least cost.

The joint operational environment is not a future concept; 

it is the present. Today, locations such as Bagram and Qandahar, Afghanistan, and Camp Anaconda/Balad Air Base, 

Iraq, bed down coalition, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental personnel. Many of these joint forward operating 

locations (FOL) consist of an ad hoc architecture utilizing 

Army, Air Force, and commercial materiel. Sometimes the 

materiel is interoperable; often it is not. Despite the logistics 

inefficiencies inherent in this design, the services continue 

to develop stovepipe bare base capability. Thus, a capability overlap exists in the basic building blocks of a bare 

02Trautmann.indd 1 1/23/08 12:01:37 


base—food, water, hygiene, electrical power, and billeting. 

This overlap is driven by adherence to different CONOPS 

and a lack of interdependence among the services. 

In defense of the services, there is no joint doctrine or 

joint bare base architecture despite lessons learned from 

Operation Desert Storm (ODS) to the present. During Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 

the lack of joint doctrine resulted in differing views on required levels of base operating support (BOS), and the reliance of other services on Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources (BEAR) strained Air Force assets.2 Furthermore, 

no organization exists to integrate bare base development, 

acquisition, operational use, and sustainment. 

Recently, the nation has participated in a debate regarding the military’s role in homeland defense and disaster response. An interagency requirement may further increase 

the complexity of requirements definition and development 

and fielding of bare base systems. 

How can the DOD manage bare base capability more efficiently? Existing DOD guidance and joint publications can 

help answer this question. The DOD should develop and 

manage an interdependent bare base capability to eliminate 

capability overlap and satisfy operational requirements at 

the least cost. Because bare base is an Air Force–distinctive 

capability,3 the DOD should appoint the Air Force as the 

bare base executive agent.

This study examines joint management of bare base 

systems. It begins by describing existing bare base capability and then discusses how bare base systems support 

national military strategy. The study continues with a discussion of lessons learned and interoperability, followed by 

a review of published literature concerning the capabilities 

and limitations of bare base systems as they are managed 

today. Lastly, it offers recommendations on the future of 

bare base management.

Bare Base Today

Generally, the Air Force BEAR and the Army Force Provider 

represent the bare base capability of the DOD. Classified as 

war reserve materiel, BEAR and Force Provider are glob02Trautmann.indd 2 1/23/08 12:01:37 
ally prepositioned to provide regional combatant commanders with austere basing capability. BEAR, formerly known 

as Harvest Eagle and Harvest Falcon, is a critical enabler 

to rapidly establishing and operating from austere airfields. 

BEAR consists of seven component subsystems designed for 

rapid deployment via C-130 or C-17 aircraft: shelters, environmental control, power, waste/water, hygiene, feeding, and 

airfield support.4 The subsystems are prepackaged into sets, 

including a 150-person shelter and hygiene system supporting rapid air base opening; 550-person sets with billeting, 

feeding, and hygiene capability; and industrial operations 

and flight-line support sets containing shelters and equipment supporting maintenance and logistics operations.5

The capabilities-based sets support five prebuilt force 

modules: (1) open the base, (2) establish the base, (3) provide command and control, (4) generate the mission, and 

(5) operate the base. Several of the subcomponents, such 

as water and electrical, represent stand-alone capability 

options that provide combatant commanders with a flexible, modular, and scalable bare base system. In addition to 

materiel, BEAR also presents limited personnel capabilities, 

providing technical supervision, planning expertise, initial 

equipment assembly, and asset accountability critical to 

establishing the deployed air base in an efficient manner.6

According to its CONOPS, BEAR supports the full spectrum 

of military operations.7

Like BEAR, the Army Force Provider system provides the 

capability to establish and operate from austere bases. Force 

Provider presents soldiers with temperature-controlled billeting; hot meals; laundry services; showers; latrines; and 

morale, welfare, and recreation facilities.8 Force Provider is 

modular and supports base camps from 275 to 3,300 personnel.9 Embedded and augmented Force Provider units, 

quartermaster personnel, and engineer personnel build 

and sustain Force Provider capability.10 Unlike BEAR, Force 

Provider is designed around intermodal shipping containers mainly configured for surface transportation. However, 

just as the Air Force is shifting from large Harvest sets to 

modular BEAR capability, the Army is redesigning the Force 

Provider bare base system from a large, mostly immobile 

system to sets with the capability to rapidly deploy, forward 

02Trautmann.indd 3 1/23/08 12:01:37 
deploy, and redeploy.11 Force Provider is also applicable to 

full-spectrum military operations.12

Bare Base Systems and National Strategies

Bare base systems are a critical enabler to US national 

security, defense, and military strategies. The 2002 National 

Security Strategy states that the military must be prepared 

to deploy to remote nations and transform its forces toward 

maneuver and expeditionary capabilities.13 Likewise, the National Defense Strategy states that the United States will deter aggression and counter coercion by maintaining capable 

and rapidly deployable military forces.14 Because the DOD 

must possess the “capacity to move swiftly into and through 

strategic pivot points and remote locations, increasing the 

flexibility and support provided by prepositioned equipment 

and materiel is an important aspect of military capability.”15

Therefore, national security strategy requires that the military possess efficient bare base capability. 

The national strategies also direct joint capability development. The National Military Strategy states that the 

military must develop deployable joint forces and combine 

the strengths of the individual services, other governmental 

agencies, and multinational partners. Our national strategy 

requires new levels of interoperability and systems that are 

conceptualized, designed, and acquired with a joint architecture. The DOD must ensure that cultural, technical, and 

doctrinal barriers do not limit its ability to achieve national 

security objectives.16 Therefore, expeditionary capabilities 

are critical to supporting US national strategy, and the development and employment of those capabilities should be 

accomplished through a joint architecture.

OEF and OIF Lessons Learned

The lack of joint doctrine, BOS standards, and designated 

lead agencies slowed the services’ ability to achieve fully operational forward locations in support of OEF. At the outset 

of OEF, without existing forward presence or established 

operating locations within Afghanistan, coalition forces 

required the capability to open and operate from austere 

02Trautmann.indd 4 1/23/08 12:01:37 
bases. At the time, the Air Force’s goal was to open an FOL 

in five days; however, the average time to establish a base 

in OEF was 44 days. Why the discrepancy? Differences in 

interservice and coalition CONOPS created challenges and 

lengthened the time required for a location to reach fully operational status. These challenges included gaining country 

clearances; poor interservice and coalition site-survey processes and procedures; fragmented site-planning data; and 

extensive site preparation and buildup that severely stressed 

engineering forces.17 Additionally, shifting executive agent 

responsibilities in joint operations proved cumbersome and 

delayed FOL establishment and setup. At Karshi-Khanabad, 

the Army assumed FOL support from Special Operations; 

however, the Air Force moved forces faster than the Army 

could support them. As a result, Air Force engineers set up 

Force Provider assets, and the Army and Air Force both supported bare base operations at Karshi-Khanabad. In addition to assuming Army FOL development, the Air Force also 

supported Special Operations. Eventually, the Air Force assumed responsibility for 77 percent of the 14 sites developed during OEF, far more than were identified in the campaign plan. These unplanned support operations stressed 

Air Force bare base assets.18

The self-imposed stresses are the result of stovepiped 

planning processes, differing service CONOPS, and a lack 

of joint doctrine. In their article “Retooling Global Mobility 

and Forward Presence,” Lt Col Rodney Croslen, USAF, and 

Lt Col Marsha Kwolek, USAF, retired, noted that “doctrinal 

differences between the Army, Air Force, and Special Operations led to piecemeal planning and unclear direction on 

who should take the basing lead. This confusion led to challenges in planning the right support for beddown, daily operations, base growth, and sustainment. Air Force Civil Engineers stated that the reliance on Air Force capability and 

quality-of-life assets strained the Air Force.”19 The article 

also noted that the Air Force is rewriting “base opening” doctrine and coordinating with the Army to reflect these lessons 

learned.20 However, the services should not stop at writing 

base-opening CONOPS. Instead, they should extrapolate the 

lessons learned from the OEF base-opening missteps and 

apply them to bare base management to ensure the right 

02Trautmann.indd 5 1/23/08 12:01:37 
capability is available in the right quantity at the right time 

to meet the combatant commander’s requirements. 

Expeditionary operations also proved critical to supporting OIF. While the services applied lessons learned from 

OEF, there were still delays and confusion when establishing FOLs. According to the RAND Corporation, the Army 

and Air Force integrated civil engineers to establish austere 

locations; as in OEF, it took on average 44 days to achieve 

fully operational status.21 While the services experienced 

delays due to political and site-access issues, a considerable amount of time was also required to prepare FOL sites 

and construct facilities. To relieve stress on engineers, the 

DOD used contractor reception teams at nine locations to 

assist in setting up initial housekeeping sets. While this approach may have relieved stress on the engineers, the Army 

experienced “poor living conditions” because contractors 

did not perform work. In the end, RAND concluded that the 

notional Air Force goal of five days is probably not achievable.22 Despite having more planning time than was available in OEF, having more familiarity with the sites than in 

OEF, and utilizing contract support to relieve stress, there 

was no decrease in the time required to establish FOLs. 

Considering the unpredictable nature of the global war 

on terrorism, the services may not enjoy lengthy planning 

cycles or possess extensive FOL site familiarity; therefore, it 

is critical that combatant commanders have flexible, rapid, 

and dependable bare base capability. Given the known inefficiencies in bare base operations during OEF and OIF, 

why is the DOD not planning to establish joint bare base 

capability?

Bare Base Interoperability

How joint is bare base today? The answer: not very. Because bare base systems lack a joint architecture, there is 

very little interoperability between the major components of 

BEAR and Force Provider. While chief of BEAR Operations 

for the Air Force, I received several combatant command 

requests during OIF to support Army bare base laundry requirements. Due to different CONOPS and major end-item 

02Trautmann.indd 6 1/23/08 12:01:37 
components, the Air Force was unable to fill the request 

despite having available assets. 

The lack of interoperability has not gone unnoticed. The 

Army and Air Force conducted a joint study to determine 

the interoperability of BEAR and Force Provider. Specifically, 

the teams were chartered with the following: (1) identify systems and equipment within BEAR and Force Provider, (2) 

isolate the differences between these assets, and (3) identify 

the requirements to achieve interoperability in the field.23

Ultimately, the study found that a lack of joint architecture 

or doctrine limits bare base interoperability, and the resultant logistical complexity inhibits efficient joint bare base 

operations. The findings of the joint bare base interoperability study are discussed below. 

The study compared major subcomponents such as laundry, kitchen, water, and electrical and determined that BEAR 

and Force Provider could achieve limited interoperability by 

supplying the existing sets with varying locally manufactured or commercially procured connectors or adapters. For 

example, engineers could “join” Army batch laundry and 

Air Force individual laundry systems by utilizing various 

connectors. However, the fundamental difference in equipment and operating concepts between batch and individual 

laundry precludes interoperability. Instead, they provide 

distinct but overlapping capability. Likewise, Force Provider 

and BEAR kitchen systems possess limited interoperability, 

operate under different feeding concepts, and utilize different major end items. Fundamental configuration differences 

exist in water and electrical systems as well. BEAR utilizes 

a pressurized-loop water distribution system, and Force 

Provider utilizes individual bladders; therefore, the systems 

are completely incompatible. Lastly, the Army and Air Force 

operate under differing power-generation and distribution architectures. While BEAR operates on a high-voltage 

electrical grid utilizing 750-kilowatt (kW) generators, Force 

Provider operates on a low-voltage electrical grid using 60kW generators. The systems could be connected; however, 

the connectivity is dependent on local manufacturing availability and capability. The study concluded that engineers 

could achieve limited interoperability if Force Provider and 

BEAR were joined. However, the ad hoc design would require 

various supplied or locally manufactured connectors, suffer 

02Trautmann.indd 7 1/23/08 12:01:37 
from incompatible water-distribution systems, and possess 

insufficient power generation and distribution.24

Continuing Service-Specific Capabilities

Does the DOD really need to develop a joint bare base 

system? Several studies have identified that a lack of joint 

doctrine or guidance results in inefficient management of 

the DOD prepositioning program. Despite these findings, the 

services continue to develop service-specific bare base systems. Over the past decade, the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) conducted multiple studies of DOD prepositioning programs, of which the bare base systems are a subset. 

Generally, it found the DOD prepositioning program lacking 

in management and oversight. The GAO revealed significant 

issues with prepositioned equipment during OIF, such as a 

lack of spare parts and less-than-modern equipment; these 

issues still exist today. The GAO concluded that combatant commanders would likely face difficult challenges due 

to the current state of these assets.25

The GAO also noted that a lack of joint doctrine is the root 

of many of the problems. For example, the GAO stated, 

In the absence of a department-wide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution and future plans for [prepositioning] programs, the military services have been recapitalizing some stocks 

and developing future plans for their programs without a clear understanding of how they will fit together to meet the evolving defense 

strategy. This service-centric approach to pre-positioning is out of 

step with the department’s goals of transforming the military to be 

more joint and expeditionary, and potentially misses opportunities 

to achieve greater efficiencies where service programs overlap in 

making future investment decisions.26

Furthermore, “the DOD cannot provide assurances to 

Congress that future programs will operate jointly, support 

the needs of the war fighter, and are affordable.”27 In response, Air Force commanders stated they could overcome 

shortfalls and any maintenance problems in the event of 

a conflict by using supplemental funding or cross-leveling 

equipment from other theaters.28 Does the “robbing Peter to 

pay Paul” mentality truly meet all combatant commanders’ 

requirements? Should not the services be seeking efficient 

management solutions? 

02Trautmann.indd 8 1/23/08 12:01:38 
The service-centric approach to developing and sustaining bare base capability misses opportunities to achieve 

greater efficiencies where service programs overlap. The 

GAO notes a 2003 Joint Staff–sponsored study on prepositioning strategies prepared by the Logistics Management 

Institute, which found that the 

military services continue to program for prepositioning materiel to 

meet individual service rather than joint requirements. As a result, 

the services may overstate operational requirements and put unnecessary burdens on limited transportation assets that would be 

required to move these prepositioned assets from their storage locations to the operational sites. For example, although the Army 

and Air Force have separate bare base programs, there is a lack of 

commonality among the design and components of these programs 

even though basic capabilities are the same. Moreover, the servicecentric approach to prepositioning is out of step with [the] DOD’s 

transformation guidance, which states that developing concepts to 

operate in a joint environment and a continuing emphasis on the 

importance of expeditionary operations is key to the department’s 

transformation efforts. . . . 

Without a plan or joint doctrine to guide their efforts, the services 

are planning for the future of their programs without an overarching framework that establishes priorities for prepositioning among 

competing initiatives, develops performance goals to measure success, and identifies resources to implement plans. Until the department determines how prepositioning fits into future military plans, 

it cannot provide assurances to Congress that the substantial investments required to recapitalize the stocks will be affordable.29

In August 2004, the Science Applications International 

Corporation completed a comprehensive review and assessment of DOD bare base capabilities across the services and 

identified a number of problems. The study, prepared for 

the Joint Staff director of logistics, found that the

primary deficiency was the lack of a common understanding of doctrine that should provide the foundation for the services’ bare base 

programs. This lack of understanding of doctrine (1) impacted all aspects of bare base support, to include its relationship to other basing operations, the methods of providing bare base support, and the 

responsibilities associated with bare base support; and (2) inhibited 

the ability of combatant commanders to articulate requirements, 

and the ability of the services to develop the appropriate capabilities. 

The study also found no simple solutions to the challenge of bare 

base, that the procurement of additional or new bare base assets 

was not the key, and those materiel solutions that were not linked to 

doctrinal requirements and not part of a coordinated solution would 

result in inefficient and less effective support.30

02Trautmann.indd 9 1/23/08 12:01:38 
10

The DOD partially concurred with the GAO findings and embarked on a study to assess the ability of its prepositioning 

program to deploy forces to a distant theater in 10 days.31

Transformation Plans, Doctrine, and Directives

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been 

engaged increasingly in interservice and coalition operations such as ODS, OEF, and OIF. Over the same period, the 

DOD has written guidance directing the services to establish 

joint, interdependent capabilities. The DOD Transformation 

Planning Guidance highlights a requirement for substantive 

joint capabilities planning that enables forward-deployed 

and CONUS-based forces to rapidly deploy, employ, sustain, 

and redeploy in austere regions and antiaccess and areadenial environments. The transformation plan states that 

the DOD should integrate forward-deployed, CONUS-based, 

and coalition forces into the overall joint operation, enabling 

the near-simultaneous synergistic employment and deployment of air, land, sea, cyber, and space war-fighting capabilities. The plan also directs the services to transform 

through jointness and to link integrated architectures.32

The Air Force wishes to set the DOD standard for BOS. 

The Headquarters Air Force A4 Directorate (Installations 

and Logistics) seeks to improve the responsiveness, deployability, and sustainability of combat air and space forces to 

achieve a more agile, responsive, and effective sustainment 

process for the combat support community. Specifically, it 

is an Air Force goal to “define base operating support in 

Air Force terms, and ensure integration into Joint Doctrine 

to allow for a standardized view of BOS and the process 

required.”33 The A4 wants to ensure that Airmen are the 

combatant commanders’ first choice and codify in doctrine 

that Airmen will “open and establish” airfields.34

There is no better way to leverage change than to transform the planning, programming, and budgeting process 

for the services. Today, the military services provide most 

DOD resources. This arrangement leads to gaps or redundancies within capability areas as each service attempts 

to supply a complete war-fighting package rather than depending on capabilities provided by other military depart02Trautmann.indd 10 1/23/08 12:01:38 
11

ments.35 Therefore, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review

(QDR) emphasizes the needs of combatant commanders as 

the basis for budget priorities. It directs the development of 

joint capability portfolios rather than individual, stovepiped 

programs. Furthermore, the DOD will begin to break out its 

budget according to joint capability requirements such as 

the ability to deploy rapidly, assemble, command, project, 

reconstitute, and reemploy joint combat power from all domains to facilitate assured access.36 The DOD believes that 

“using such a joint capability view­—in place of a Military 

Department or traditional budget category display—should 

improve the understanding of the balancing of strategic risks 

and required capability trade-offs associated with particular decisions.”37 By shifting the focus from service-specific 

programs to joint capabilities, the DOD should be better positioned to understand the implications of investment and 

resource trade-offs among competing priorities.

While each service is responsible for organizing, training, 

and equipping its forces, it is the joint task force commander’s 

responsibility to maximize the unique but complementary 

capabilities of each in integrated action.38 Existing doctrine 

does not specifically direct the services to develop a joint bare 

base capability; however, the guidance implies that services 

should present a unique but complementary capability. It 

does not imply that services should develop over­lapping, 

service-specific capability. For example, Joint Publication (JP) 

4-07, Common-User Logistics, directs the services to “eliminate 

duplication of effort provided by services, DOD, host nation 

support, and contract support. By utilizing common-item and 

common-service support, the combatant commander may be 

able to produce significant savings in equipment, personnel, 

and supplies deployed to a particular joint operations area 

(JOA). These savings may further reduce the requirement for 

strategic lift, the logistic footprint within a JOA, and possibly 

the overall cost of an operation.”39

Bare Base in an Interagency Environment

To this point, this study has focused on providing joint expeditionary bare base capability. However, there also exists 

an equally critical interagency requirement. The 2004 Na02Trautmann.indd 11 1/23/08 12:01:38 
12

tional Response Plan lists the DOD as a supporting agency 

to Emergency Support Function Six, which includes mass 

care, housing, and human services. Specifically, “the DOD 

may be called upon to coordinate non-medical mass care 

services to include sheltering of victims, organizing feeding 

operations, providing emergency first aid at designated sites, 

as well as assistance for short- and long-term housing needs 

of victims. In the future, should other catastrophes overwhelm civilian capacity, the Department may be called upon 

to respond rapidly with additional resources as part of an 

overall U.S. Government effort.”40 The exact role of the DOD 

during catastrophic events is still under debate. However, 

the QDR clearly states that “in order to respond effectively to 

future catastrophic events, the Department will provide U.S. 

NORTHCOM with authority to stage forces and equipment 

domestically prior to potential incidents when possible.”41

Using Hurricane Katrina as an example, one could assume 

that any DOD response would likely be a joint response. 

Multiple configurations of bare base capability would only 

serve to exacerbate the complications of an interagency effort and potentially preclude a rapid response.

Analysis and Recommendations

To support US national security, defense, and military 

strategies, the services must be prepared to conduct expeditionary operations in a joint environment. OEF and OIF 

present classic examples of joint expeditionary warfare where 

joint and coalition forces opened, established, and operated 

from many of the same forward locations. However, bare 

base capability, as a critical enabler to expeditionary operations, is not a joint system. Hence, during OEF and OIF, 

confusion regarding BOS requirements delayed the achievement of full operational capability at expeditionary locations. 

Furthermore, the services face an unknown interagency requirement to support homeland catastrophes. In spite of the 

lessons learned and the unknown homeland defense requirements, the services continue to develop service-specific bare 

base capabilities with limited interoperability. This approach 

generates logistics inefficiencies, limits the DOD’s ability to 

articulate requirements, and does not support the evolution 

02Trautmann.indd 12 1/23/08 12:01:38 
13

to establish joint, interdependent capabilities. Therefore, to 

present a coherent capability to regional combatant commanders and interagency partners and eliminate existing 

confusion and inefficiencies, the services should establish a 

joint bare base architecture.

Incorporating Logistics Efficiency

The services should design a bare base system to satisfy 

combatant command requirements and incorporate logistics efficiency. Incorporating logistics efficiency into design 

includes (1) simplifying the design to reduce the number 

of models and parts and eliminate chunks of administrative and production work, (2) basing the design on practical specifications which incorporate realistic requirements, 

(3) designing standardized components to maximize scale 

leverage and allow economically feasible stocking, and (4) 

designing interchangeable component modules.42

Current bare base systems were not designed for logistics 

efficiency. For example, a key performance parameter for 

the design and procurement of BEAR equipment is the ability to be airlifted on C-17 aircraft.43 Hence, BEAR sets are 

configured and stored in airlift configurations. While storing 

BEAR in an airlift configuration supports rapid air mobility, 

it is not always the most efficient method of storage, maintenance, and transportation. Because of timing and tempo, 

it may be more economical to transport BEAR via surface 

transportation rather than high-demand, low-density airlift. 

However, BEAR is not intermodal and requires reconfiguration to support surface transportation. Also, to minimize the 

strain on strategic lift, the services incur a cost to store and 

maintain bare base sets at prepositioned locations around 

the globe. Therefore, would it not make sense to develop a 

joint, simplified, modular bare base architecture incorporating both rapid air movement and efficient bulk surface 

movement to satisfy timing and tempo requirements while 

eliminating extensive global prepositioning sites?

Designing logistics efficiency into a joint bare base system 

is feasible and satisfies the logistics principles of responsiveness, economy, attainability, and sustainability. The services should eliminate capability overlap while maintaining 

required service-specific capabilities. Core capabilities can 

02Trautmann.indd 13 1/23/08 12:01:38 
14

provide for feeding, billeting, and hygiene and include modular capability for kitchens, water storage and distribution, 

power generation and distribution, cold weather, and laundry. Additionally, services would maintain required servicespecific capability such as the Air Force flight-line sets supporting flying operations at austere airfields. 

A Joint Architecture

The following is a suggested architecture for a joint bare 

base system. First, develop a joint “open the base” capability 

configured for rapid air movement. Second, develop a joint, 

intermodal “establish the base” capability. These modular 

sets would be configured for either air or surface movement 

depending on the combatant command requirements and 

base buildup scenario. Third, develop a modular “operate 

the base” capability. Since history has proven that it takes 

longer than 14 days to reach the operate-the-base phase, 

these sets could be designed and configured for surface 

transportation. The building blocks of each set would consist of common capability modules, such as power, water, 

feeding, billeting, and hygiene, that would “plug together” 

to establish an FOL. Based on site-specific requirements, 

storage and maintenance units would deploy only the capability modules required to build the base. For example, 

if commercial power and water were available, then those 

modules would not deploy. This approach avoids unnecessarily moving materiel not required for base operation.

An intermodal and joint architecture could eliminate 

multiple overseas storage and maintenance requirements. 

Reducing the airlift burden, increasing reliance on surface 

transportation, and focusing on effective materiel movement could potentially reduce the reliance on prepositioned 

assets for rapid response. Sets configured for rapid airlift 

could be stored and maintained at CONUS locations. Sets 

configured for surface transportation could be sea-based 

or stored at CONUS locations. By defining realistic requirements and designing a system to take advantage of both 

air and surface movement capability, the DOD could consolidate storage and maintenance locations and reduce the 

associated administrative and contract costs.

02Trautmann.indd 14 1/23/08 12:01:39 
15

A joint bare base architecture can result in efficiencies 

throughout the supply chain. Eliminating competing servicespecific requirements and establishing common operational 

concepts for systems such as power, water, kitchen, hygiene, 

and laundry would result in fewer overall configurations and 

systems. Potentially, fewer configurations and systems would 

require less materiel procurement, readiness spares packages, maintenance, bench stock and supply, storage, and 

personnel to manage the supply chain. Furthermore, one 

would expect consolidating requirements to result in some 

economies of scale from volume procurement and fewer facilities, support equipment, and maintenance and management personnel.

Developing a joint bare base system could also simplify 

training and bare base operations. The services could eliminate service-specific training and utilize joint bare base 

training centers and exercises such as Eagle Flag. Currently, joint bare bases consist of ad hoc systems made up 

of Air Force, Army, and contract-procured equipment and 

systems. This architecture delays base buildup and suboptimizes logistics support. However, having common technical data, specifications, tools, and spares means that personnel are trained and equipped to erect and support the 

entire base, and the supply chain is prepared to sustain it. 

Furthermore, a joint architecture presents a common planning perspective to combatant commanders, so they understand the capability it represents.

Providing a common planning perspective will aid bare 

base responsiveness. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support 

of Joint Operations, describes responsiveness as getting the 

right support, in the right quantity, to the right place, at the 

right time.44 A joint bare base architecture would present 

planners with a common, clearly articulated capability. To 

achieve a joint architecture, the services must first agree on 

a single BOS standard. Developing this standard and a joint 

bare base capability to support it would eliminate the current 

confusion over whose BOS standards to follow. A single bare 

base standard would simplify mission-capability status reporting and provide planners with a more accurate estimate 

on what capability is available to support a contingency. 

Furthermore, having one distinct bare base system would 

assist the services in determining total bare base require02Trautmann.indd 15 1/23/08 12:01:39 
16

ments. For example, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) 

guidance on sustained expeditionary operations and contingency base camp standards states that if a base is projected 

to operate for more than 180 days, then USCENTCOM recommends utilizing commercial lease or purchase of prime 

power.45 Using this type of data, USCENTCOM planners can 

clearly articulate power requirements, and the supply chain 

will procure and sustain only to that requirement. Today, 

equipment buys are based on sets, not capability modules; 

therefore, power is purchased to support a set, whether or 

not there is an actual requirement. This is just one example; 

the GAO has documented findings on many ill-defined requirements over the past decade.46 If the DOD cannot define requirements, then the services cannot be sure they 

are procuring, sustaining, and deploying the right capability. Because the Air Force is reducing manpower to pay for 

recapitalization, it is crucial that the DOD find operating 

efficiencies in both manpower and materiel.

Codifying Joint Bare Base Capability

Achieving a joint architecture means having to codify joint 

bare base operations. The DOD does not need more doctrine telling the services how to operate their individual systems within a larger joint system. Instead, when possible, 

the DOD should attempt to eliminate seams altogether. Bare 

base can accomplish this by designing a joint, interdependent architecture. First, the services should review existing 

service and joint doctrine, existing and proposed CONOPS, 

and other DOD guidance such as the QDR and the transformation plan. Central to establishing a joint bare base architecture is identifying core bare base capabilities and required 

service-specific capabilities. Once the joint capabilities are 

identified, the services must adopt a joint architecture that 

supports both DOD joint evolution and combatant command 

plans and conduct joint technical, acquisition, and sustainment reviews. The services must also generate supporting 

documentation such as acquisition and sustainment strategies; training requirements; and tactics, techniques, and 

procedures to operate and sustain bare base capability. 

Who should oversee the development of a joint, interdependent bare base capability? The US Joint Forces Com02Trautmann.indd 16 1/23/08 12:01:39 
17

mand is a logical choice to lead the development of a joint 

bare base architecture. However, it does not have the authority to plan, program, and budget for the acquisition 

and sustainment of bare base capability. Since the services 

are required to organize, train, and equip forces, and the 

Air Force has declared expeditionary basing as one of its 

distinctive capabilities, the DOD should designate the Air 

Force as executive agent for joint bare basing. Each service would retain the responsibility to organize and train 

forces to support bare base capability, as well as equip their 

service with any required service-specific capability. This 

would likely result in significant manpower, budget, and 

organizational impacts as well as significant organizational 

resistance. However, since ODS and as recently as OIF, 

the Air Force has set the standard and demonstrated its 

capability to open, establish, and operate austere bases. 

Additionally, the QDR states that services should no longer expect to supply a complete war-fighting package, but 

instead should be able to rely on another service to provide 

that capability.47 Therefore, the DOD should designate one 

service to organize and equip joint bare base capability. 

Conclusion

The joint operational environment is not a future concept—it is the present. However, there is very little jointness 

in bare base capability. The services continue to develop 

stovepipe bare base systems with minimal interoperability. 

The capability overlap between the services and the ad hoc 

design of joint FOLs lead to logistics inefficiencies. This study 

examined how the DOD can more efficiently manage bare 

base capability. Specifically, the DOD should develop and 

manage an interdependent bare base capability to eliminate 

capability overlap and satisfy operational requirements at 

the least cost. The Air Force should serve as the bare base 

executive agent. There is no existing joint bare base doctrine or architecture despite lessons learned from ODS to 

the present. However, ample guidance and doctrine, while 

not specific to bare base, imply that the services should further examine developing a joint bare base architecture. 

02Trautmann.indd 17 1/23/08 12:01:39 
18

Developing a joint bare base system is not a new topic. 

The Joint Staff reviewed bare base interoperability, and several studies identified that the lack of joint focus in the bare 

base program resulted in management and logistics inefficiencies. Additionally, lessons learned from OEF and OIF 

and an unknown interagency homeland defense requirement clearly demonstrate the need for a joint base-opening 

capability and joint BOS standards. Therefore, this study 

proposes a joint bare base architecture. This proposal is 

not meant as a definitive answer, but rather as a starting 

point for continued study on joint bare basing options. For 

example, it would be interesting to see a cost-benefit analysis of globally prepositioned materiel versus sea-based and 

CONUS-based storage and maintenance. Nevertheless, 

even without major program changes, there is room to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of bare base systems. 

The real challenge is not developing a logistically efficient 

bare base system; the real challenge lies in overcoming organizational resistance to joint interdependence. This is a 

leadership challenge that the DOD can no longer afford to 

ignore.

Notes

1. Department of the Army, 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2004), 2-7.

2. Lt Col Rodney L. Croslen, USAF, and Lt Col Marsha Kwolek, USAF, 

retired, “Retooling Global Mobility and Forward Presence,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 29, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 21.

3. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 

November 2003, 81.

4. Department of the Air Force, Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources: 

An Enabling Concept (Langley AFB, VA: ACC/LG, 6 October 2005), 16.

5. Ibid., 22.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 8.

8. Maj Eddie Rosado, “Proposed Force Provider Company Redesign,” Quartermaster Professional Bulletin, Winter 2003, http://www.quartermaster 

.army.mil/oqmg/professional_bulletin/2003/Winter03/Proposed_Force 

_Provider_Company_Redesign.htm.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Pres. George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United 

States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), 30.

02Trautmann.indd 18 1/23/08 12:01:39 
19

14. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United 

States of America (Washington, DC: DOD, March 2005), iv.

15. Ibid., 19.

16. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), National Military Strategy of the United 

States of America (Washington, DC: JCS, 2004), 13.

17. Robert S. Tripp et al., Supporting Air and Space Expeditionary 

Forces: Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom (Arlington, VA: RAND 

Corporation, 2004), 36–37.

18. Ibid., 44–45.

19. Croslen and Kwolek, “Retooling Global Mobility,” 21.

20. Ibid., 26.

21. Kristin F. Lynch et al., Supporting Air and Space Expeditionary 

Forces: Lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 47.

22. Ibid., 58–59.

23. Alex Szumanski, Report to AF/ILGM: Force Provider and BEAR 

Equipment Compatibility Study, n.p.

24. Ibid.

25. Government Accountability Office, Defense Logistics: Better Management and Oversight of Defense Prepositioning Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and Improve Future Programs: Report to Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives (Washington, 

DC: GAO, September 2005), 4.

26. Ibid., 6.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 16.

29. Ibid., 29, 33.

30. Ibid., 40.

31. Ibid., 48.

32. DOD, Transformation Planning Guidance (Washington, DC: DOD, 

April 2003), 33.

33. Department of the Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations 

and Logistics, Transformation Roadmap for Fiscal Years 2005–2011 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 22 July 2004), 8.

34. Ibid., 21.

35. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: DOD, 

6 February 2006), 68.

36. Ibid., 4, 31.

37. Ibid., 67.

38. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 

November 2000, i.

39. JP 4-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User 

Logistics during Joint Operations, 11 June 2001, I-2.

40. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Response Plan

(Washington, DC: DHS, December 2004), ESF-6.

41. DOD, QDR, 26.

42. Ken Homa, “Designing Products for Efficient Global Logistics,” 

Global Sites and Logistics, August/September 1997, available at http://

faculty.msb.edu/homak/kensweb/logistics.html.

02Trautmann.indd 19 1/23/08 12:01:39 
20

43. Department of the Air Force, Base Expeditionary Airfield Resources, 14.

44. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, 6 April 

2000, II-1.

45. US Central Command Regulation Number 415-1, Construction and 

Base Camp Development in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility, 1 December 2004, 53.

46. GAO, Defense Logistics, 39–42.

47. DOD, QDR, 68.

02Trautmann.indd 20 1/23/08 12:01:39 
21

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