1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### SCOTT v . HARRIS CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVE NTH CIRCUI T No. 05–1 63 1. Ar g u ed Feb r u a r y26, 2007 —D ec ided April 30, 20 07 D e pu tyTimoth ySc ott, petition erh e r e , termin ated a h i gh -speed pu r s ui t

of res p ondent ’ s ca r b ya pplying his pus hb u mper t o t h e rea rof t h e vehicle, ca us ing itt o leav e t h e roa da n d cra s h

. Res p ondentwa s ren der e d qu adr i pleg ic

. He filed su it u n d er42 U. S. C. §1983 alleg i n g , in

ter alia , the use of excessive forceresu lting in an unreasonab le sei

zure unde rt h e Fourt h A m endment

. The Dis t rictCourtdenied Sc ott’s su m m a r yju dg men tmotion , w h i chw a s ba sed onqu alified immunit y . The Elevent h Circuita ffirmed on int e rloc ut ory a ppea l , concludin g, inter alia, th at Sc ott’s ac tion s c o u l d c o n s tit u te “dead l y force” under Tenn es se ev. Garne r , 471 U. S. 1; that the use of such force in t h is cont extwould viola t e re s p on den t ’s c o n s titu ti on al r i gh t t o be fr ee fr om ex c e ssiv e for c e du r i n ga seizur e; an d th at a r e ason abl e j ury could s o fi nd. Held: Beca us e t h e ca r cha s e res p ondent init iat e d pos e d as u b s ta nt ia l

an d immed i at e r i sk of ser i ou s ph y s ic al in ju r yto oth e r s , Sc ott’s at

tempt to ter m in ate th e c h a se byforc in g r e spon den toff th e r o ad w a s r e ason able, an d Sc ott is en tit l ed to su mmar yju dg men t
. Pp. 3–13.

(a) Q u a lified immu n i tyr e quir es r e solu tionof a “th r e sh old qu estion : Takeninth e l i gh t mostfav o r able to th e p a r t yasser t in gt h e in ju r y , do the facts alleg e d show the o fficer’s condu c tviolat ed acons t i t u t i onal r i gh t? ” Sa ucie rv. Katz , 533 U. S. 194, 201. Pp. 3–4.

(b ) The re cordin t h is ca s e includes a vi deot a p e ca pturingt h e ev en ts inqu es tion

. Wh er e, as h e r e , th e rec o r dblatan tl yc o n t r a dic t s th e plain t iff’s v e r s ionof ev en ts so th atn o r e ason able ju r yc o u l d be

liev e it, a c o urt sh ou ld n o t adopt th at v e r s ionof th e fac t s forpur p oses of r u lingon a su mmar yju dg men tmotion

. Pp. 5–8.

(c) Viewing the facts in the light depic t e dbyth e v i de otape, i ti s c l earth at D e pu tySc ott di d n o t v i olate th e Fou r t h Amen d men t
.2 SCOTT v. HARRIS Sy llabu s Pp. 8–13. (i) Garn er did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid precondi t i ons whenever a nofficer’s a c t i ons cons t i t u t e “ d ea dly force.” The Courtt h ere s i mply a p plied t h e Fourt h Amendment ’s “r eason ablen e ss” tes tto th e u s e of a par t ic u l arty pe of fo r c e ina par tic u l arsitu ati on . Th at c a se h a s sc an t appl ic abili tyto th is on e, wh ic h ha s va st ly differentfa ct s . Whet her or no tS c ott ’ s a c tions cons t i t u t e d “deadlyfor c e ,” w h at matter s is w h e th ert h ose ac tion s w e r e r e ason able. Pp. 8–10

. (ii) In det e rmining as e izure’s rea s onab len e s s , t h e Court b a l a nces th e n atu r e an d qu al ityof t h e in tr u s iononth e in div i d u al’s Fou r t h Amen d men ti n ter e sts ag ain s t th e impor t a n c e of th e g o ver n m en tal in

terests a llegedly justifying the intrusion. United S t ate sv. Place , 462 U. S. 696, 7 0 3

. Inw e igh i ng th e h i ghlikelih ood of ser i o u s in ju r yor deathto r e spo n den tth at Sc ott’s ac tion s p o sed ag ain s t t h e ac tu al an d imminentt hrea tt h a tres p ondentpos e d t o t h e lives of ot hers , t h e Cou r ttakes a c c o un t of th e n u m berof lives at r i sk an d th e r e lativ e culpability of the parties involved. Respondent intentionally place d himself and the public in d a nger byunla w fully en ga gi ng inrec k les s , high-s peed flight ; t h os e w h o mighthave b e en ha rmed ha d S c ot tnot forced respondent off the road were enti rely innocent. The Co urt c o n c l u d es th at it w a s r e a s on able forSc ot t to take th e ac tionh e did. Itrej e ct s res p ondent ’s a r gu mentt h a tsa fet y could haveb e en a s s ured if the po lice s i mply ceasedt h eir p urs uit

. The Courtrules t h at apo lice officer’s attemp t to terminate a dan g erous high-speed car chase th at th r e aten s th e liv es of in n o c e n tby stan der s does n o t v i olate th e Fourt h Amendment , even when itpla c es th e fleein gm o tor i st atr i s k of ser i ou s in jur yordeath

. Pp. 10–1 3. 433 F. 3d 80 7, r e v e r s ed.

S CALI A , J ., delivered t h e opinion of t h e Court , in which R OBERTS , C. J., and K E NNEDY , S OUTER , T HOMAS , G INS B URG , B REYER , an d ALITO , JJ., joined. G IN SB U R G , J., an d B REY ER , J., filed conc urrin gopinions

. S TEVENS , J., filed a dissentin g opinion._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–1 63 1 

### TIMOT H Y SCOTT, P E TITIONE R v. VICTOR HAR R IS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Apr il 30, 20 0 7 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### delivered the opini o n of the Co urt. We consider whether a law enforcement official can, consistent with the Fo urth Amen dment, atte mpt to stop a fleeing mot o rist from continuing his public-endangerin g flight by ramming the motorist’s car from behind. Put another way: Can an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at ris kof serious injury ord e ath in ord e r to stop the motorist’s flight from endangering the lives of innocent bystanders? I In March 2001, a Ge orgia county deputy clocked re

spondent’s vehicle traveling at 73 miles per h o ur on a road with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The deputy activ a ted his blue fla s hing lights indicating that respondent should pull over. Instead, responde nt sped away, initiating a chase downwhat is inmost porti ons a two-l ane road, a t speeds exceeding 85 miles per hour. The deputy radioed his dispatch to report that he was pursuing a fleeing vehicle, and broadcas t its license plate number. Peti

tioner, Deputy Timoth y Scot t, heard the radio communica

tion and joined the pursuit al ong with other officers. In the midst o f the chase, respondent pulled into the par k in g2 SCOTT v. HARRIS Opinion of t h eCourt 

### lot of a shopping cente rand was nearly boxed in by the various police vehicles. Respondent evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott’s police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again downa two-lane highway. Following respondent’s sho pping center maneuvering, which resulted in sl ight damage to Scott’s police car, Scot t tookover as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six minutes an d nearly 10 miles after th e chase hadbegun, Scott decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a “Preci

sion Intervention Technique (‘PIT’) man e uver, whi c h causes the fleeing ve hicle to spi nto a stop.” Brief for Petitioner 4. Havingradioed his supervisor for permis

sion, Scott was told to “ ‘[g]o ahe ad and take him out.’ ” Har r isv. Co weta County , 433 F. 3d 807, 811 ( CA11 2005). Instead, Scott applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent’s vehicle. 1 

### As a result, respondent lost contro l of his vehic l e, which left the roadway, ran down an em

bankment, overturne d , and cra s hed. Respondent was badly injured and was rendered a quadriplegic. Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, a lleging, inter alia , a violation of his federal c o nstitutional rights, viz. use of exces s ive force result ing in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In response, Scott filed a motion for summary j u dgment b a sed on an assertion o f qualified immunity. Th e DistrictC o urt denied the motion, finding that“there are material issues of fact on which the issue of qualified immunity tu rns which p r esent sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Harr isv.

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1 S c ot ts a ys he decided notto employ t h e PIT ma neuverb e ca us e he wa s “ c oncer n e dt h a tt h e ve hicles were moving t o o qu ickly t o s a fe ly execute the maneuver.” Brief for Pet it ion e r 4

. Res p ondenta g rees t h at t h e PIT ma neuver could nothave b e ensafely employed. See Brief for Res p ondent9. It is irreleva ntt o our a n a l ys is whet h er S c ot thad per m issionto take th e pr ec ise ac tion s h e took.3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Coweta Co unty , No. 3:01–CV–148–WBH (ND Ga., Sept. 23, 2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a–42a. On i n terlocutory appeal, 2 

### the United States Court o f Appeals for the Elev

enth Circui taffirmed t h e Dis trict Court’s deci sion to allow respondent’s Fourth A m endment claim against Scott t o proceed to trial. 3

### Tak i ng respondent’ s view of the facts as given, the Court of Ap peals concluded that S c ott’s ac tions could constitute “d eadl y force” un der Tennesseev. Gar n er , 471 U. S. 1 (1985), and that the use of suchforce in this context “ w o u ld violate [respondent’s] constitu tional right to be free from excessive force du ring a seizure. Ac cor d

ingly, a reasonable ju ry could fi nd that Scott violated [respondent’s] Fourth Amendment rights.” 433 F. 3d, at 816. The Court of Appeals further concluded that “the la w as it existed [at the time of the incident], w a s sufficiently clear to gi ve reasonable law enforcement officers ‘fair notice’ thatramming avehicle under these circumstance s was unlawful.” Id. , at 817. The Court of Appeals th us concluded t hat S c ott w a s not entitled to qualified immu

nity. We gr anted certi orari, 549 U. S. __ (20 06), and now reverse. II In resolvin g questions of qualified immunity, courts are required to resolve a “threshold question: Taken in th e light most favorable to the part y asserting t h e injury, do

——————

2 Qualified immunity is “an immunity f r o m suitr ath er th ana mer e defense to liability; and like an absolut e i mmunity, it is effectively lost if a c a se is er r o n eou slypermitted to g o t o tr ial.” Mitc hell v. Fo rsyt h , 472 U. S. 51 1, 526 (1 985). Th u s , w e h ave h e ld th at anor derden y ing qualified imm unity is imme diately a ppeal able ev enth ou ghit is in ter

locutory; other w ise, it would be “effectively unre viewable.” Id. , a t52 7. Furt her , “ w erepea t e dly have s t res s e d t h e import a nce of res o lvin g immu n i tyqu estion s a tth e e a r liest po ssi bl e stag e inlitig ation .” Hunte r v. Bryant , 502 U. S. 224, 227 (199 1) (pe rcu riam)

.

3 Non e of th e oth e rc l aims r e spon den tbr ou gh t ag ain s t S c ott oran y other party are b efore this Court.4 SCOTT v. HARRIS Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.” Saucierv. Katz , 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001). If , and only i f , the court fi nds a violation of a constitutional right, “the next, sequential step is to ask whether th e right wa s clearly established .

. . in light of the specific context of the case.” Ibid. Although this or dering cont radicts “[o] ur policy of av oiding unnecessary adjudicatio nof consti tu

tional is sues,” United Sta t esv. T reasu ry Employees , 513 U. S. 454, 4 78 (1995) (citing Ashwander v. TVA , 297 U. S. 288, 346–3 47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurrin g)), we have said that s u ch a depa rture frompractice is “necessary to set forth principles which will b e come the basis for a [future] holding that aright is clearly established.” Sau

cier , sup ra , at 201. 4 

### We therefore turn to the threshold inquiry: whether De puty Scott’s actions violated th e Fourth Am endment.

——————

4 Prior t o t h is Court ’s a nnou ncementof Sa ucie r ’s “r ig id ‘or d erof bat

tle,’ ” Brossea uv. Haugen , 543 U. S. 19 4, 201– 20 2 (20 0 4) (B REYER , J. , conc urri ng), we ha d des c r ib e d t h is order of i n q u irya s t h e “b e t t er approach,” County of Sac r amentov. Le wi s , 523 U. S. 833, 8 41, n

. 5 (199 8), th ou ghn o t on e th at w a s r e qu ir ed inall c a ses. S e e id. , at 858– 859 (B REYER , J ., con cur ring); id. , at 859 (S TEVENS , J ., conc urri ng in judgment). T h ere has been doubt expressed regarding the wisdom of Saucie r ’s decis i on t o ma ke the t hres h old inq u iry ma nda t o ry, es pecia l ly inc a ses w h e r eth e c o n s titu tion al qu estion is r e lativ e lydi ffic u l t an d th e q u a lified immunit yq u es tion rela t ively s t ra ight forwa rd. S e e, e.g. , Brossea u , su pr a , at 201 ( B REYER , J., join ed by S CALI A an d G IN SB U R G , J J ., conc urri n g); Bunting v. Mellen , 541 U. S. 1019 (2 00 4 ) (S TEVENS , J., join ed byG IN SB U R Gan d B RE Y E R , JJ ., res p ect i ng denia lof cert iora ri); id. , at 1025 (S CALI A , J., join ed byReh n q u i st, C.J., dissen t in g)

. See also Lyons v. X eni a , 417 F. 3d 5 65, 58 0– 584 ( CA6 2 0 0 5 ) (S u tton , J., c o n c u r ring). We ne ed nota ddress t h e wis d om of Saucierin this case, how

ev er , bec a u s e th e c o n s titu tio n al qu estion w i thw h i c hwe ar e pr esen ted is, as di scussed in Part III–B, infra , ea sily decided. Deciding tha t qu estionfir s t is th u s th e “b e tterappr oac h ,” Lewis , su pr a , at 84 1, n

. 5, regardless of whether it is required.5 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### III A The first st ep in assessing the cons titutionality of S c ott’s actions is t o determine the relevant facts. As this cas e was decided on summary jud g ment, there have not yet been factual findings by a judge or jury, and respondent’s version of events (u nsurprisingly) differs substantiall y from Scott’ s version. When things are in such a posture , courts are r e quired to view the facts and dra wreasonable inferences “in the light most favor able to the partyoppos ing the [summary judgment] motion.” United S t atesv. Diebold, Inc. , 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curi am ); Saucier , su pra , at 201. In qualifi e d immunity cases, this usually means adopting (as the Court of Appe als did here) the plaintiff’s version of the facts. There is, however, an added wrin k le in this case: exis

tence in the record of a videotape capturing the events in question. There are no allegations or indications that thi s videotape was doctor e d or altered in any way, nor any contention that wha ti tdepicts di ffers from what ac tually happened. The videotape qui te clearly contradicts th e version of t h e story told by respondent and adopted by th e Court of Appeals. 5 

### For example, the Court of Appeals adopted respondent’s assertions that, during the chase, “there was little, if any, actual threat to p e destrians or other motorists, as the roads were mostly empty a n d [responden t] remained in control of his vehicle.” 433 F. 3d, at 815. Indeed, readin g the lower court’s o p in ion, one gets

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5 J USTI CE S TEV E NS sugg ests th at ourr e a c tion to th e v i deotape is somehow id io syncrati c, a n dseems to beli eve we a r e m i srep res e nti n g it s co nt e n t s . S ee po st , at 4 (dissent ing opi n io n) (“In s u m, t h e fac t u a l sta t e m en ts by th e Cou r t of Appeals q u oted by the Court

. . . we re ent i rely a ccu ra t e ” )

. We a r e ha ppy t o a llow t h e v i deotape to speak for it s e lf. See Rec o r d 36, Ex h

. A, av aila ble at ht t p ://www .s u p remecourt us . g ov/opinion s /vi deo/s c ot t

_v_ha rris

. rmvb a n d in Clerk of Co urt’s case file.6 SCOTT v. HARRIS Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the impression that re spondent, rather than fleeing fro m police, w a s attem p tin gto pass his dri ving test: “[T] akin g the facts fro mthe non- movant’s vi ewpoint, [respondent] remained in con trol of his vehicle, slowed for turns a n d intersec tions, and t y pi cally use dhis in

dica tors fo rturn s. He did no t ru n any moto rists off the roa d

. Nor was he a th reat t opedest ria n s in the shoppin g centerpa rkin g lot, whichwas f r ee f r om pe destria nand vehicula r traf f ic as th e center wa s closed

. Signifi c an tl y, by the ti me the par t i es were ba ck on the high way an d Sco tt ra mmed [res pondent] , t h e motorwa y hadbe en cleared of motoris t s and pe dest rians al

legedly because of poli ce block a de s of the nea rby inte r sections.” Id. , at 81 5–8 16 (ci t ation s omitted). The videotape tells quite a different story. There we se e respondent’s vehicle racing down narrow, tw o-lane roads in the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. W e see it swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cro ss the double- yellow line, and fo rce cars tra veling in both directions t o their respective shoulders to avoid being hit. 6 

### We see it r un multiple red lights and travel for consider

able periods of time in the occasional center left-turn-only lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to engage in

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6 J US TI CE S TEVENS h y poth esizes th a tth ese c a r s “h adalr e a d ypu lled t o th e side of th e r o ad orw e r e dr iv in galon gth e sh ou lderbec a u s e th e y h e ar d th e pol i c e sir e n s or sawth e flash i n gligh t s,” so th at “[a] ju r y could ce rt a i nly co ncludet h a tt h os e mot o ris t s were expos e d t o n o g r eaterr i sk th anper s on s w h o take th e same ac tioni nr e spon se to a speeding amb u lance.” Post , at 3. I tis n o t ou rex per i enc e th at am bu

la nces a n d fire engines ca ree ndownt w o-la ne roa d s a t8 5 -plus miles per h o u r , w i than u n m ar ked sc ou t c a rou t infr on t of th em. Th e r i sk th ey pose to th e p u blicis v a st lyles s th anw h at r e spon den tc r e ated h e r e . Buteven if t h a twere nots o , itwould in no wa y lea dt o t h e conclus ion t h a titwas unrea s onab l e t o elimina t e t h e t hrea tt o life tha tres p onden t pos e d. S o ciet y a ccept s t h e ris kof s p eeding a m b u la nces and fire engine s in order to save life and pr operty; itneed not(a nd as suredly does not) a cceptas i mila r ris kpos e d b yare ckles s mot o ris tfleeing t h e police.7 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the same h a zardous maneuvers just to k eep u p . Far fro m being the cautious an d contro lled driver th e lower cour t depicts, wh at we see on the vi deo more closely resembles a Hollywood- s tyle car c hase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent bystan ders alike at great risk o f serious inj u ry. 7 

### Att h e s u mm a ryju dg men ts t a g e, facts must be viewed in the ligh tm o st favo rab l e to the n o nmoving p a rt y onlyif there is a “genuine” di spute as to those facts

. Fed. Rule Civ. P r oc. 56(c). As we have emphasized , “[w]hen t h e moving party has ca rri ed its burden under Rule 56(c), i t s opponent must do m o re thansimply s h owtha tthe r e is some metaphysi c al do ubt as to the mate ri al facts

. . . . Where the record take n as a whole could not lead a ra

tional trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U. S. 574, 586–587 (1986) (footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleg e d factual dispute between the par t ies will not defeat an otherwise properly sup p orted moti on for summary ju dg

ment; the r e quirementis that there be n o genuineissue of materialfa ct.” And ers onv. Liberty Lobby, In c. , 477 U. S. 242, 247–248 (1986). When op posing parties tell t w o different stories, one of which is blatantly con tradicted b y the record, so that no reaso nable jury could believe it, a court should not adop t thatversi o n of the facts for pu r poses of ruli ng on a motion for summary judgment. That was t h e case her e with rega rd to the factual issue whether respondent was drivin g in such fashion as to endanger human life. Respondent’ s version of events is so utterly discredited by the reco rd that no rea s onable jury

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7 Th is is n o t to sayth at eac h an d ev eryfac t u a l state men tmade byth e Courtof Appea l s is ina ccur a t e . For e x a m ple, t h e vid e ot a p e va lidates th e c o u r t ’s sta t emen t th at w h enSc o t tra mmed res p ondent ’s vehicle it wa s nott hrea t e ning a n yot her vehicl es o rpedestrians. (Undoubtedly Sc ott waited f o r t h e roa dt o b e clea r b e fore exec ut ing his ma neuver.)8 SCOTT v. HARRIS Opinion of t h eCourt 

### could have believed hi m. The Court of Appe als should not have reliedon such vi sible f i ction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by th e videotape. B Judging th e matter on that basis, we think it is quite clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Four th Amendment. S c ott do es not contest that hi s decision to terminate the car chase by ramming his bumper into respondent’s vehicle constitute d a“seizure.” “[A] Fourt h Amendment seizure [occurs] .

. . when there is a govern

mental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” B rowerv. Co unt y of Inyo , 489 U. S. 5 93, 596–597 (1989) (e mphasis deleted). See also id. , at 597 (“If .

. . the police c r uiser had pulled alon g side the fleeing car and sideswiped it, produc ing the crash, then the termination of the suspect’ s freedom o f movement would have been a seizure”). It i s also conceded, by both sides, that a claim of “excessive force in t h e course o f making [a] .

. .‘seizure’ of [t he] person .

. . [i s] properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘o bjective rea

sonablen ess ’standard.” Graham v. Connor , 490 U. S. 38 6, 388 (1989). The ques t ion we need to answer is whether Scott’s actions were objectively reasonable. 8 

### 1 Respondent urges us to analyze this case as we analyzed Garn er , 471 U. S. 1. See Brief for Respondent 16–29. We

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8 J US TI CE S TEVENS in c o r r e c t lydec l ar es th is to be “aqu e s tionof fac t b e s tres e rved for aj ury,” a n d compla ins we a r e “ u s urp[ing] t h e j ury ’ s fa ct finding fu nct ion.” Post , at 7. At th e su mmar yju dg men tstag e, howeve r, o ncewe have det e rmined t h e rel e va nts e tof fa ct s a n d dra w n all inferences in favor of the nonmoving p a rty to the ext ent suppo rtab le bythe re cord , see Part II I–A, supra , th e r e ason ablen ess of Sc ott’s ac tion s—or , inJ US TI CE S TEVENS ’ pa rla n ce, “ [ w]het h er[res pondent ’ s ] a c t i ons have r i s e n t o alevel wa rra nt ingd e a d ly force,” po s t , at 7—is a pure question of law.9 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### must first decide, he says, wh eth e r the actions Scott took constituted“deadly fo rce.” ( H e defines “deadly force” as “any use of force which creates a substantial likelihood of causing death or serious bodily injury,” id. , a t19.) If so, respondent claims that Garnerprescribes cer t ain precon

ditions that must be met before Scott’s actions can survive Fourth Am endment scrutiny: (1) The suspec t must have posed an i mmediate threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others; (2) deadlyforce must have been n e ce s sary to pre v ent escape; 9

### and (3) where feasible, the officer must have given the suspect some warning. See Brief for Respondent 17–18 (citing Gar n er , supra , a t9 –12). Since these Garn er p r econdit i ons for using deadlyf o rce were n o t met in this case, Scott’s actions were per seun reasonabl e. Respondent’s argumen tfalters at its first step; Garn e r did not esta blish a magical on/o ff switch that t r iggers rigi d preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute “deadly force.” Garne rwas simply an application of th e Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” test, Graha m , supra , at 3 88, to the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation. Garn erheld that it was unreason

able to kil la “young, slight, and unarmed” burglary sus

-

——————

9 Res p ondent , like t h e Courtof Appea l s , defines t h is s e cond precondi

tionas “ ‘necessary to preve n t escape,’ ” Brief for Respond e nt 17; Harris v. Coweta County , 433 F. 3d 807, 81 3 (CA 1 1 2 005), qu oti n g Garn er , 4 71 U. S., at 11. Bu t th at qu ot e fr om Garne r is ta ken out of cont ext
. The neces s i t ydes crib e d in Garn erwas, in fact , the need to p r event “serious phys ica lha rm, eit h er t o t h e officer or t o ot hers .” Ibi d

. B yw a yo f example only, Garn er hy poth esized th at deadlyfor c e maybe u s ed “if neces s a ry t o p r eventes ca pe” whe n t h e s u s p ectis knownt o have “ c om mitted a crime involving the inflictionor threatened infliction of serious phys ica lha rm,” ibid. , s o t h a this mere b e ing a tla rge po s e s a ninheren t da nger t o s o ci et y. Res p onde ntdid notpos e t h a tt y pe of i nhere ntt hrea t t o s o ciet y, s i nce (prior t o t h e ca r cha s e ) he ha d committ ed only aminor traffic offense and, as far as the po lice were aware, had no prior crimi

na l record. Butin t h is ca s e , unlike in Garner , itwa s respondent ’s flight itself (b ymea n s of a speed i n gau tomobil e ) th at po sedth e th r e at of
“ s erious phys ica lha rm. . . t o others.” Ibid

.10 SCOTT v. HARRIS Opinion of t h eCourt 

### pect, 471 U. S., at 21, by shooting him “in th e back of th e head” while he was running away on foot, id. , at 4, a n d when the officer “could not reason ably have believed that [the suspect] .

. . posed any threat ,” and “nev er attempted to justify his actions on any basis other than the need to prevent an escape,” id ., at 21. Whatever Garne rsaid about the f a ctors tha t might have justified shooting th e suspect in that case, such “p reconditions” have sca n t applicability to this case, which h a s vastly different facts.
“ Ga rnerha d nothing t o do with one car stri king another or even with c a r chases in general

. . . . A police car’s bum p ing a fleein gcar is, in fact, not much like a policema n ’s shooting a gun so as t o hit a p e rson.” Adamsv. St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Dep t. , 962 F. 2d 1563, 1577 (CA11 1992) (Edmondson, J., diss enting), adopted by 998 F. 2d 92 3 (CA11 1993) (en banc) (per curia m )

. Nor is the threat posed by the flight on foot of an unarmed suspect even remotely comparable to the ex treme danger to human li fe posed by re spondent in this case. Although r e spondent’s attempt to craft an ea sy-to-apply legal test in the Fourt h Amendment context is admirable, in the end we must sti l l slosh our way through the fac tb o und morass of “reason

ableness.” Whether or not S c ott’s a ctions constitute d application of “deadlyforce,” all that matter s is whether Scott’s actions were reasonable. 2 In determining the reasonabl en ess of the manner in which a seizure is effected, “[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on t h e individu al’ s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the gov

ernmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” UnitedStatesv. Place , 462 U. S. 696, 703 (1983). Scott defends his actions by pointi ng to the paramount govern

mental interest in ensuring public safety, an d respondent nowhere suggests thi s was not the purpose motivating11 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Scott’s behavior. Thus, in ju dging whether Scott ’ s actions were reasonable, we must consider the risk of bodily harm that Scott ’ s actions posed to respondent in light of the threat to the public t hat Scott was tryingto eliminate

. Although there is no obvious way to quantify the risks o n either side, it is clear f r om the videotape that respondent posed an actual and i mminent threat to th e lives of a n y pedestrians who might have been present, to ot her civilian motorists, and to the officers inv o lved in the chase. See Part III–A, supr a . It is equally clear that S c ott’s a ctions posed a high lik elihood of serious injury o rdeath to re spondent—though not the near certaintyof death posed by, say, sh ooting a fleeing felon i nthe back of the head, see Garne r , supr a , at 4, or pulling alongside a fleeing motorist’s c a r and shooting the motorist, cf. Vaughanv. Cox , 343 F. 3d 1323, 13 26–1327 (CA11 2003). So how does a court go about weighing the perhaps lesser p r obability of injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the per

haps larger probability of injuring or killing a single per

son? We t h ink it appropriate in this process to take into account not only the number of lives at risk, but also thei r relative culpability. It was respondent, after all, wh o intentionall yplaced himself and the public i ndanger b y unlawfully engaging inthe reckless, high-speed flight tha t ultimately produced t h e choice between two evils t hat Scott confr o nted. Multiple police cars, withblue lights flashing and sirens blaring, had b een chasing respondent for nearly 10 miles, bu t he ig nored their war n ing to stop. By contrast, those who might have been harmed had Scott not taken the action he did we re entirely innocent. We have little difficulty in concluding it was re asonable f o r Scott to ta ke the action that he did. 10

——————

10 The Court of Appeals cites Browerv. County of Inyo , 489 U. S. 59 3, 595 (1 98 9), forits r efu sal t o “c ou n t en an ce th e ar g u men tth at byc o n tinuing to fle e , a suspect abso l ve s a pursuing police officer of any12 SCOTT v. HARRIS Opinion of t h eCourt 

### But wait, says respondent: Couldn’t the innocent public equally have been protected, and the tragic accident en

tirely avoided, if the police had simply ceased their pur

suit? We th ink the police need not have ta ken that chan ce and hoped for the best. Whereas Scott’s actio n—ramming respondent off the road—was cer ta into eliminate the risk that respondent posed to the public, ceasing pursuit wa s not. First of all, there would hav e been no way to conv ey convincingly to respondent thatthe chase was off, and that he was free to go. Had respondent looked in his rear

view mirror and seen the poli ce cars deactivate their flashing lights and turn around, he would have had n o idea whether they were truly letting him get away, o r simply devising a new strategy forcapture. Perhaps th e police knew a shortcut he didn’t know, an d would re ap pear down t h e road to intercept hi m; or perhaps they wer e setting up a roadblock in his path. Cf. Brow er , 489 U. S., at 594. Gi ven such u n certainty, respondent might have been just as likely to respond by continuing to drive reck

lessly as by slowing down and wiping his brow. 11 

### Second, we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the

—————— possi ble li abi li tyforall en su in gac tion s du r i n gth e c h a se,” 433 F. 3d, a t 816. Th e on lyqu estionin Brower w a s w h e th era polic e r o adbloc k c o n s titu ted a seiz u reunder t h e Fourt h Amendment

. In deciding t h at qu estion , th e r e lativ e c u l pa bili tyof t h e pa rt ies is , of cours e, irreleva nt ; as e izure occu rs whene ver th e police a r e “ r es pons ib [le] for t h e t e rmina

tionof [a person ’s] mov e men t ,” 433 F. 3 d , at 816, r e g a r d less of th e r e asonforthe ter m in ation

. Cu lpabili ty is releva nt , h o wever , t o t h e reaso nab lene s sof t h e s e izure—t o whet h er prevent i ng p o s s i b l e ha rm to t h e innocentj u s t ifies exposing t o pos s ible ha rm t h e pers on t hrea t e ning th em.

11 Cont ra ry t o J US TI CE S TEVE NS ’ a s s e rt ions , we do not “ a ss um[e] t h at dangers caused by flight fro mapo lice pu rsuit will cont inue after the purs uitends ,” post , at 6, n o rdo w emake an y“fac tu al assu mp tion s, ” post, a t5 , with res p ectt o wha twould have ha ppened if t h e police ha d g o n e h o me. We simp lypoin t ou t th e unce rtainti e sr e ga rding wha t would haveh a ppened, in r e s p ons e t o res ponden t’s fa ct ua l a s s u mpt i on t h a tt h e high- s peed flightwould have end e d.13 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### police to allow fleeing suspects to g e t away wh enever they drive so re ckless lythat they put other people’s lives in danger. It is obvious t h e perverse incentives such a rule would crea t e: Every f l eeing mot o rist would know tha t escape is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per hour, crosses the do uble- yellow line a few times , and runs a few red lights. The Constitution assuredly does not impose this invita tion to impuni ty-earned-b y recklessness. Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A police offic e r’s attemp t to terminate a dangerous highspeed car chase that threatens the lives of i nnocent by

standers does not vio l ate the Fourth Amendment, even when it pla c es the fleeing motoristat risk of s e rious injury or death. * * * The carch ase that re spondent initiated in this cas e posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others; no reasonabl e jury could conclude other

wise. Scott’s attemptto terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the roadwas reasonable, and Scott is enti

tled to summary judg ment. Th e Court of Appeals’ decision to the contr a ry is rever s ed. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J ., conc urri ng 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–1 63 1 

### TIMOT H Y SCOTT, P E TITIONE R v. VICTOR HAR R IS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Apr il 30, 20 0 7 ] 

### J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G 

### , concurring. I jointhe Court’s opinion and would underscore two points. First, I do not read to day’s decision as articulating a mechanical, per s erule. Cf. post , at 3 (B RE YE R 

### , J., co n curring). The inquiry described by the Court, ante , at 10 – 13, is situa t ion specifi c . Among relevant considerations: Were the lives and we ll-being of o t hers (motorists, pedes

trians, police officers) at ri sk? Was there a safer way , given the ti me, place, and circum s tances, to stop the flee

ing vehicle? “[A]dmirable” as “[ an] attemp t to c r aftan easy-to-app l y legal testin the Fourth Amend m ent context [may be],” the Court explains, “in the end we must still slosh our way throu gh the factbound morass of ‘reason

ableness.’ ” Ante , at 10. Second , we re this case suitable for resolutionon quali

fied immuni tygr ounds, withou t rea c hingthe co nstitu tional question, J UST I CE 

### B RE YER 

### ’ s discussion would be engaging. See post , a t1–3 (urgin g the Court to overrule Sau c ier v. Katz , 533 U. S. 194 (20 01)). In joining the Co urt’s opinion, howeve r, J UST I CE 

### B REYE R

### ap pare ntly sha r es the vie wth at, in the ap pe al before u s , the cons t i tutional q u estion wa r rants an answer. The video footage of the car chase, he agrees, de monstra tes that the officer ’ s co nduc t did not trans gress Fourth Am endm ent limitations. See post , at 1. Confron t ing Sauci e r , therefore, is prop erly reserved for another day and case. See an te , at 4, n. 4._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) B REYER , J ., concu rrin g 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–1 63 1 

### TIMOT H Y SCOTT, P E TITIONE R v. VICTOR HAR R IS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Apr il 30, 20 0 7 ] 

### J USTICE 

### B RE YE R 

### , concu rring. I join the Court’s opi n ion with o n e suggestion and t w o qualificatio ns. Because watching the video footage of the car chase made a difference to my own view of the case, I suggest tha tthe interested reader take adva ntage of the link in the Court’s opi n ion, ante , at 5, n. 5, and watch it. Having done so, I d o not believe a r e asonabl e jury could, in this instance, find thatOfficer Timothy Scot t (who joined the chase late in the day and did not k n ow the specific reason why the respondent was being pursued) acted in violation of the Constitution. Second, the video makes clear the highly fact-dependent nature of th is constitutional determination. And that fa ctdependency supports the argument that we should over

rule the requirement, announced in Saucierv. Katz , 533 U. S. 194 (2001), that lower courts must first decide the “constitutional question” before they turn to the “qualified immunity question.” See id. , at 2 00 (“[T]he first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right woul d have been violated on the facts alleged”). Instead, lower courts should be f r ee to decide the two questions in whatever order make s sense in the context of a pa rticular cas e . Although I do not object to ou r dec i ding the constitutional question inthis particular case, I believe that in order to lift the burden from lower courts we can and should recon

sider Sauci e r’s require ment as well.2 SCOTT v. HARRIS B REYER , J., co ncu rrin g 

### Sometimes ( e.g. , where a defendan t is clearly entitled to qualified i mmunity) Saucier’s fi xed order-o f-battle rul e wastes judicial resources in t hat it may require courts to answer a difficult constitutional question u nnecessaril y . Sometimes ( e.g. , where the defendant loses the constitu

tional ques t ion but wins on qu alified immunity) th at order-of-battle rule may i mmunize an incorrect constitu

tional ruling from revi ew. So metimes, as her e , the orderof-battle rule will spawn constitu tional rulin gs in areas of law so fact dependent that the result will be confusion rather tha nclarity. And frequ e ntly the order-of-batt l e rule violates that older , wiser judicial counsel “not to pass on question s of constitutionality .

. . unless su ch adjudica

tion is un avoidable.” SpectorMotor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin , 323 U. S. 101, 105 (1944); see Ashwand e rv. TVA , 297 U. S. 288, 3 47 (1936) (Brandeis, J ., concurrin g) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is al s o present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of ”). In a s harp departure from this counsel , Saucierreq u ires courts to embrace unnecess ary constitu

tional quest ions not to avoid them. It is not surprising th at commentators, judges, and, i n this case, 2 8States in an amicus brief, have invited us to reconsider Saucier’s requirement

. See Leval, Judgin g Under th e Constitution: Dicta AboutDicta, 81 N. Y. U. L

. Rev. 1249, 1275 (2006) (calling the require

ment “a puzzling misadventure in constitutional dictum” ); Dirr anev. Brookline Police Dept. , 315 F. 3d 65, 69– 70 (CA1 2002) (referring to the requ irement as “an uncom

fortable exercise” when “the answer whether there was a violation may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not ye t fully developed”); Lyonsv. Xenia , 417 F. 3d 5 65, 580–584 (CA6 2005 ) (Sutton, J., concu rring); Bri e f for Sta t e of Illin ois et al. as Amici Curi a e . I would accept that invitation.3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) B REYER , J., co ncu rrin g 

### While this Court should generallybe relucta nt to over

turn pre c edents, sta re decisi sconcerns are at their weak

est here. See, e.g. , Pay n ev. Tenn e ssee , 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Co nsiderations in favor of sta re d e cisis ” are a t their weakest in cases “involving procedural and eviden

tiary rules” ). The order-of-battl e rule is relatively novel, it primarily affects judges, and there has been little relian c e upon it. Third, I disagree with the Court i n sofar as it articulate s a per s eru le. The majority stat es: “A police officer’s at

tempt to te rminate a d angerous high-speed ca r chase tha t threatens the lives of i nnocentbystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleei ng motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Ante , at 13. This statement is to o absolute

. As J USTICE 

### G INSBU R G 

### points out, ante , a t1, whether a high-speed chase violates the Fourth Amendment may well depend upon more cir

cumstances than the majority’s rule reflects. With thes e qualifications, I join th e Court’s opinion._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–1 63 1 

### TIMOT H Y SCOTT, P E TITIONE R v. VICTOR HAR R IS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Apr il 30, 20 0 7 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### , dissenting. Today, the Court as ks whether an officer may “ta ke actions tha tplace a f l eeing motorist at ris kof serious injury or d e ath in order to stop the motorist ’s flight from endangering the lives of innocent bystanders.” An te , a t 1. Depending on the circumstances, the answer may be an obvious “ye s ,” an obvio u s “no,” or s u fficiently doubtful that the question of the reasonablen ess of the of ficer’s actions should be d e cided by a jury, after a review of the degree of danger and the altern atives available to the officer. A high speed chase in a desert in Nevada is, after all, quite different fr om one that tra vels through the heart of Las Vegas. Relying on a de novo review of a videotape of a portion of a nightti me chase on a lightly traveled road in Georgia where no p e destrians or other “bystanders” were present, buttressed by uninformed speculation about the possible consequenc es of discontinuing the chase, eight of the jurors on this Court reach a verdict that diff ers from the views of the judges on both the District C o urt and the Court of Appeals who are surely more familiar with the hazards of driving on Georgia ro ads than we are. Th e Court’s just ification for this unprec e dented departure from our well-settled standard of review of factual determina

tions made by a distri ct cour t an d affirmed by a court of appeals is based on its mistak en view that the Court of2 SCOTT v. HARRIS S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### Appeals’ de scription of the facts was “blata ntly cont ra dicted by t h e record” and that respondent’s version of t h e events was “so ut terlydiscreditedby the rec o rd thatno reasonable j u ry could h a ve believed him.” Ante , at 7–8. Rather tha nsupporting the concl u sion that what we se e on the vide o “resembl e s a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort,” ante , at 7, 1 

### the tape a ctually con

firms, rather than contradicts , th e lower cou rts’ apprais a l of the factu al questions at issue. More important, it su rely does not provide a principled basis for depriving the re

spondent of his right to have a jury evaluate the question whether th e police officers’ deci sion to use de adly force t o bring the ch ase to an en d was reasonable. Omitted fr om the Court’s descri ption of the initial speeding vi olation is the fact tha tresponde nt was on a four-lane p o rtion of Hi ghway 34 when the officer clocked his speed at 73 miles per hour a n d initiated the chase. 2 

### More significant—and contrar yto the Court’s assumption that respondent’s vehicle “fo rce[d] cars tra veling in both directions to their respective shoul d ers to avoid being hit” ante, at 6—a fact unmentioned inthe text of the opinio n explains why those cars pulled over prior to being passed

——————

1 I ca nonlyco nclude t h a tm ycollea g ues were undulyf r ight ened b y tw o orth r e e i m ag es onth e tape th at look ed like bu r s ts of ligh t n i n go r explos ions , b u twere in fa ct merely t h e hea d light s of vehicles zoomin g byinth e opposite lan e . Had th eylear ned to dr iv e wh enmost h i gh

speed dr iv in g took plac e on tw o-lan e r o ads r ath erth an onsu per h i gh

w a y s —w h e nsplit-sec on d ju dg men t s a b ou t th e r i sk of pass in ga slo w poke in t h e face of oncomingt r a ffic were rout ine—t h ey mightwell have r e ac ted to th e v i deotape mor e dispas sion a t e ly

.

2 Accordin g t o t h e Dis t rictCourtre co rd, wh en res p ondentwa s clocked a t7 3 miles per hou r , t h e de put ywhoreco rded his s p eed wa s s i t t ing in his patrol car on Highway 34 betw een L o ra Smith Ro ad and Sulliv an Road inCow e t aCou n t y , G eor g i a. At th at poin t, as w e ll as a tth e poin t at w h i c h High w a y34 in ter s ec ts w i thHigh w a y154—w h e r e th e deputy ca ughtup withres p ondenta n d t h e videota p e b e gins —Highwa y 3 4is a four-la ne roa d , cons is t i ng of t w o la nes in ea ch direct io n wit hawid e g r ass div i dersepar atin gth e flowof tr affic

.3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### by respondent. The sirens and flashing li ghts on the police cars following respondent gave the s a me warni n g that a spe e ding ambulance or fire engine would have provided. 3

### The 13 cars that respondent passed on his side of the road before entering the shopping cent er, and both of the cars that he passed on the right after leaving th e center, no doubt had already pulled to the side of the roa d or were driving along the shoulderbecause th ey heard the police sirens or saw the flashi ng lights before respondent or the polic e cruisers a pproached. 4 

### A jury cou l d certainly conclude that those motorists were exposed to no greater risk than persons who take the sa me action in response to a speeding ambulance, and that their reactions were full y consistent with the evidence th at respondent, though speeding, retained full control of his vehicle. The police s i rens als o minimized any risk th at may have arisen from running “multiple red lights,” ibi d

. In fact, respondent and his pursuers went through only two inter

sections with stop lights and in both cases all other vehi

cles in sigh t were stationary, presumably because they had been warned of the approaching speeders. Inciden

tally, the videos do show tha tthe lights were r e d when th e police cars passed thro ugh them b u t, because the camera s were farthe rawa y when respondent did so a n d it is diff i

cult to disce r n the colorof the sign al at thatp o int, it is not entirely clear that he ran either or both of the red light s. In any event, the risk of harm to the stationary vehicle s

——————

3 While still on the four-lane portio n of Hi ghway 34, the deputy who ha d clocked res p ondent ’s s p eed t urned on his b l ue lighta n d s i ren in an atte mpt to get respondent to pull over. It was when the deputy turned onh i s b l u e li gh t th at th e dash -mou n t edv i deo c a mer aw a s ac tiv ate d a n d b e ga n t o r e cord t h e p urs uit

.

4 Alth ou ghperh aps u n d er stan dable, bec a u s e th eirv o l u me onth e sound reco rding is low (possibly due to sound proofing in the officer’s vehicle), t h e Courta ppea r s t o minimize t h e s i gnifica nce of t h e s i rens a u dib l e t hroughoutt h e t a p e recordin g of t h e purs uit

.4 SCOTT v. HARRIS S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### was minimized by the sirens, an d there is no reason t o believe thatrespondent would have disobeyedthe signal s if he were not being pursued. My colleagues on the jury sa w respond e nt “swerv e around more than a dozen other cars,” and “force ca rs traveling inboth direct ions to their respective shoulders,” ante , at 6, but they apparentlydiscounted the possibi lity that those cars were already out of the pursuit’s path as a result of hearing the sirens. Ev en if that were not s o , passing a slower vehi cle on atwo-lane road always in

volves somedegree of swerving and is not especially dan

gerous if th ere are no cars co ming from the opposite direc

tion. At no point during the chase did respondent pull int o the opposite lane other than to pass a car in front of hi m; he did the l a tter no more than five times and, on most of those occasions, used his turn signal. On none of these occasions was there a car tra ve ling in the opposite direc

tion. In fact, at one point, when re spondent found himself behind a car in his own lane and there were cars traveling in the other direction, he slowed and waitedfor the car s traveling in the other directionto pass befor e overtaking the carin fr ont of him while using his turnsignal to do s o . This is har dly the stuff of Hollywood. To the contrar y , the video does not reveal any incidents that could even b e remotely characterized as “close calls.” In sum, the factual statements by the Court of Appeals quoted by the Court, ant e , at 5–6, were entirely accura te. That court did not describe res p ondent as a “cautious ” driver as my colleagues imply, ante , at 7, but it did cor

rectly concl u de that there is no evidence that he ever l o s t control of hi s vehicle. T hat court also correctly pointed out that the in cident in t h e shopping center pa rking lot di d not create any risk to pedes trian s or other vehicles be

cause the c hase occurred just before 11 p.m. on a weekday night and the center was closed. It is apparent from the record (inc luding the videotape) that local police had5 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### block e d off intersections to k eep re spondent from entering residential neighborhoods and pos s ibly endan g ering othe r motorists. I would add that the videos also show that no pedestrians, par k ed c a rs, sidewa lks, or residences wer e visible at any time du ring the ch ase. The only “innocent bystanders” who were placed “atgreat risk of serious injury,” ante , at 7, were the drive r s who either pulled off the road in response to the sirens or passed respondent in the opposite direction when he w a s driving on his side of the road. I recognize, of course, that eventhough respondent’ s original speeding violation on a four-lane highway was rather ordi nary, his refusal to stop and subsequent flight was a serious offense t hat merited severe punishment. It was not, however, a ca pital offe ns e, or even a noffense th at justified the use of deadly force rather than an abandon

ment of the chase. Th e Court’s concern about the “immi

nent threatto the lives of any pedestrians who might have been prese n t,” an te, at 11, while surely valid in an appro

priate case, should be discounted in a case involving a nighttime chase in anarea where no pedes trians were present. What would have hap pened if the police had decided t o abandon the chase? We now kn ow that they could have apprehended respondent later because they had his li

cense plate number. E v en if that were not true, and even if he would have escaped any punishment at al l, the use of deadly force in this case was no more appropri ate than th e use of a dea d ly weapon against a fleeing felon in T e nne ss ee v. Ga rner , 471 U. S. 1 (1985). In any event, any uncer

tainty abou tthe result of abandoning the pursuit has not prevented the Court from basing its conclusions on its own factual assumptions. 5

### The Court attempts t o avoid the

——————

5 Inn o tin gth at Sc ott’s ac tion“w as certain to elimin a t e t h e r i sk th at res p ondentpos e d t o t h e pub lic” while “ c ea s i ng purs uitwa s not , ” t h e6 SCOTT v. HARRIS S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### conclusion that deadly force was u nnecessary by speculat

ing that if the officers had let him go, respondent might have been “just as likely” to contin ue to drive recklessly as to slow down and wipe his brow. Ante , at 12. That specu

lation is un convincing as a matter of common sense an d improper as a matter of law. Our duty to view the evi

dence in th e light mos tfavorable to the non m oving party would foreclose such speculation if the Court had not used its observation of the video as an excuse for replacing the rule of law with its ad hoc judgme nt. There is no eviden

tiary basis for an as sumption that dangers caused b y flight from a police pursuit will continue after the pursuit ends. Indeed, rules adopted by countless p o lice depar t

ments throughout the country are based ona judgment that differs from the Court’s. S ee, e.g. , Ap p. to Brief for Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., as Amicus CuriaeA–5 2 (“Durin g a pursuit, the need to apprehend the suspect should a l ways outweigh the l e vel of dang e r created byt h e pursuit. When the immediate danger to th e public created by the pursuit is greater than the immedi

ate or pote ntial dange rto the public should the suspect remain at large, then the pursuitshould be discontinued or terminated.

. . . [P]ursuits should usually be disconti n -

—————— Cou r tpr ior i tizes tota l elimin ationof th e r i sk of h a r mto th e pu blicov er the risk tha trespondent ma y be se riously injured or even killed. Ante , a t12 (emphas is in origina l). The Court is only ab l e to ma ke s uch a sta t emen t by assu m i n g , bas ed onits in te r p r e tationof ev en ts onth e v i deotape, th a tth e r i sk of h a r mposed i nth is c a se, a n d th e ty pe of ha rm involved , ros e t o alevel wa rra nt ing dea d ly force. Thes e a r e t h e same ty pes of qu estion s th a t , w h e ndispu t ed, ar e ty pic a llyr e solv ed by a j ury; t h is is w h y b o t ht h e D i s t rict Courtand t h e Court of Appeals s a w fit to h av e th e mbe so dec i de d. Alth ou ghth e Cou r tc l aims on lyto h a v e dra wn fa ct ua l inferences inr e s p ondent ’s favor “ to t he ext e nt s u pportab le bythe recor d ,” ante , at 8, n

. 8 (emph a sis inor iginal), its o wn view of the record ha s clea rly precludeditfrom doing s o t o t h e s a me ext e nta s t h e tw o c o ur ts th r o u gh w h i chthis c a se h a s alr e adytr av eled, see ante , at 2– 3, 5–6.7 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### ued when the violator’ s identity has been e s tablished to the point that later apprehension can be accomplished without da nger to the public”). Although G a rnerma y not, as the Court sugg ests, “estab

lish a magical on/off switch tha ttriggers rig i d precondi

tions” for the use of deadly force, ante , at 9, it did set a threshold under whichthe use of deadly force would be considered constitutionally unreasonable: “Where the officer has probable c ause to b e li eve that the suspect poses a th reat of seri ous physical harm, either to th e officer or to ot hers, it is not constitution

ally unreas o nable to p r event escape by usin g deadly force. Thus , if the susp ect th reatens the offic e r witha weapon or there is probable caus e to believe that h e has committed a cri me involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may b e used if necessary to p r event esca pe, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.” 471 U. S., at 11 –12. Whether a person’s actions have risen to a level warrant

ing deadly force is a q u estion of fact best re served for a jury. 6 

### Here, the Cour t has usurped the ju ry ’s factfindin g function and, in doing so, implicitl ylabeled th e four other judges to review the case unreas o nable. It chastises the Court of Ap peals for failing to “vie[w] the facts in the light depicted by the videota p e” and im plies that no reasonabl e person could view the videotape and come to the conclu

sion that d e adly force was unjustified. Ant e, at 8. How

ever, the three judges on the Court of Appeals panel a p -

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6 In it s opinion, t h e Courtof Appea l s corre ct ly not e d: “W e rej e ctt h e defendants’ ar gument that Harris’ driv ing must, as a matter of law, be cons idered s u f f icient ly reckl e s s t o give S c ot tprob ab le ca us e t o b e liev e th at h e posed a su bst a n t i a l th r e at of immin e n tph y s ic al h a r mt o motor i st s an d pedestr i an s. Th is is a di sp u t ed issu e to be r e solv ed bya j ury.” Harri s v. Coweta County , 433 F. 3d 807, 81 5 (CA 1 1 200 5).8 SCOTT v. HARRIS S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### parently did view the videotapes entered into evidence 7 

### and described a very di fferent version of event s : “At the time of the ramming, apart from speeding and running two red lights, Harris wa s driving in a nonaggressive fashion (i.e., wi thout t r ying to ram or run into the officers). Moreover, .

. . Scott’ s path on the open highway was largely clear. The videos intro

duced into evidence show li ttle to no vehicular (or pe

destrian) traffic, allegedly becaus e of the late hour and the police block a de of the n e arby intersections. Finally, Scott issued ab solutely no warning (e.g., over the loudspeaker or oth e rwise) pri o r to usingdeadly force.” Har r is v. Coweta Coun ty , 433 F. 3d 8 07, 819, n. 14 (CA11 2005). If two groups of judges can disagr ee so vehemently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstan c es surround

ing that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reason

able juror could disagree with th is Court’s c haracteriza

tion of even ts. Moreov er, under the standard set forth in Garn er , itis certainly possible that “a ju ry c o uld conclude that Scott unreasonab ly used dea d ly force to seize Harris by rammin g him off the road under the instant circum

stances.” 433 F. 3d, at 821. The Court today sets forth a per serule that presumes its own version of the facts: “A po lice officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that thr e at ens the liv es of i nnocent bys t ande rs doe s not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleei ng motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Ante , at 1 3 (emphasis added). Not only does that rule fly in the face of the flexi

ble and cas e -by-case “reasonabl en ess” approach applied in Garn erandGraham v. Connor , 490 U. S. 386 (1989), but it

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7 In t o t a l , t h ere a r e four polic e t a p es which ca pt ured port ions of t h e pursuit, all recorded from dif ferent office rs’ vehicles.9 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### is als o arguably inapplicable to the case athand, given that it is n o t clear th at this cha s e threatened the life of any “innocent bystande [ r].” 8

### I nm yvi e w , t h e r i s k s i n h e r ent in justifying unwa rranted police conduct on the bas is of unfounded assumptions are unacceptable, particularly when less drastic mea s ures—in this case, the use of stop sticks 9

### or a simple warning issuedfrom a lou d speak e r— could have avoided such a tragic result. In my judgment, jurors in Georgia should be allowed to evaluate the rea

sonablen ess of the decision to ram respondent’s speeding vehicle in amanner that created an obvious risk of death and has in fact made him a quadriplegic at th e age of 19. I respectfully dissent.

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8 It is unclear whether, in referrin gto “innocent bystanders,” the Court is referring to the motorist s driving unfazed in the opposite direction or to the drivers who pulled ov er t o the side of the road, safely out of respond e nt’s and petitioner’s path.

9 “Stop s t ic ks” ar e a dev i c e w h i c h c a nbe plac ed ac r o ss th e r o adw a y an d u s ed to flattena v e h i c l e’s tir e s slow lyt o safelyter m in ate a pu r s u i t.