U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

32–927 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

ISIS POST-CALIPHATE: THREAT IMPLICATIONS FOR 

AMERICA AND THE WEST 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 23, 2018 

Serial No. 115–66 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 


Congress.#13
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

RON ESTES, Kansas 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

DEBBIE LESKO, Arizona 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

STEVEN S. GIAIER, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES

Hon. Ryan C. Crocker, Former Ambassador of the United States: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

General John M. ‘‘Jack’’ Keane, (Ret.-U.S. Army), Chairman of the Board, 

Institute for the Study of War: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18 

Dr. Joshua A. Geltzer, Former Senior Director for Counterterrorism, National 

Security Council: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 28 

APPENDIX

Question From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Ryan C. Crocker .... 55 

Questions From Honorable Shelia Jackson Lee for Ryan C. Crocker ................. 55 

Question From Honorable Kathleen M. Rice for Ryan C. Crocker ...................... 55 

Question From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for John M. ‘‘Jack’’ 

Keane .................................................................................................................... 55 

Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for John M. ‘‘Jack’’ Keane ....... 55 

Question From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Daveed 

Gartenstein-Ross .................................................................................................. 55 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Joshua A. 

Geltzer ................................................................................................................... 56 

Questions From Honorable Kathleen M. Rice for Joshua A. Geltzer .................. 57 

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ISIS POST-CALIPHATE: THREAT 

IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICA AND THE WEST 

Wednesday, May 23, 2018 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:47 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Michael T. McCaul [Chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, Rogers, Perry, Katko, Hurd, 

Ratcliffe, Gallagher, Fitzpatrick, Estes, Bacon, Lesko, Thompson, 

Jackson Lee, Langevin, Keating, Vela, Watson Coleman, Rice, 

Correa, Demings, and Barraga ́n. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Committee on Homeland Security will 

come to order. My apologies, I was questioning the Secretary of 

State that made me a little bit late to this hearing. But the committee is meeting today to examine the near-term and long-term 

homeland implications of the recent terrorist losses by ISIS, including the current state of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The heightened 

threat posed by the foreign fighter Diaspora, the growing role of 

ISIS affiliates, and the significance of the virtual caliphate. 

Let’s take a moment to welcome also the newest Member of our 

committee, Mrs. Debbie Lesko, representing Arizona’s Eighth Congressional District. Welcome, it is good to see you. 

Mrs. LESKO. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 took the lives of almost 3,000 

innocent people, and left our Nation in shock. In the aftermath, it 

was clear that serious changes need to be made to keep our homeland safe. While I believe we are safer today, terrorist threats persist. Terrorists and their followers are still killing innocent people 

and attempting to destroy our way of life. This has been made clear 

by the recent attacks against the West, London, Paris, Nice, Madrid, Manchester, Barcelona, Brussels, Berlin, and even New York 

have been targets of vehicle homicides, shootings, bombings, and 

stabbings. 

They are clearly following Sheik Adnani’s call to kill by whatever 

means necessary, wherever they are. Although many jihadists are 

resorting to small-scale attacks, the thwarted plot to take down an 

airliner in Australia last summer was a reminder that our aviation 

sector is still their crown jewel of targets. 

I continue to be concerned about the security at last-point-of-departure airports throughout the Middle East. Many of the world’s 

most dangerous terrorists are only one plane ride away. They will 

2 

not halt their blood-thirsty campaign to take innocent life unless 

they are directly challenged. Fortunately, we have had some recent 

success on the battlefield. Our military victory over the so-called 

caliphate in Iraq and Syria was a great achievement. However, 

there are remnants that remain in the Middle East and foreign 

fighters who have scattered throughout Europe and parts of Africa. 

Comprehensive strategy is needed so ISIS cannot rally, regroup, 

and rebuild from a new location. The strategy should address root 

causes that breed terrorists, including a lack of economic opportunity and good governance structures. We must also keep our eye 

on al-Qaeda. In recent years, al-Qaeda has expanded its global 

presence, and now is comprised of tens of thousands of fighters 

across 2 dozen branches. They, too, want nothing more than a devastating attack against the West. 

Mitigating the terror threat from these groups has always been 

one of my top priorities. At my direction, we established multiple 

task forces to discover ways that we can prevent terrorist entry 

into the United States. As a result of their work, we strengthen the 

Visa Waiver Program, enhanced our intelligence collection, and bolstered coordination to stop terrorist travel. 

Currently, we are examining ways that special interest aliens 

and potential foreign fighters are exploiting illicit pathways into 

our country from South and Central America. Just yesterday, ICE 

Director Thomas Homan, confirmed to me that, ‘‘Many known terrorists,’’ are taking this path as well. 

America is facing threats from all directions. To keep our homeland safe, we need to be prepared to confront each one. So I would 

like to thank our witnesses for joining us. Each of you have served 

as, or advised as, America’s top National security officials. Every 

Member of this committee is grateful for your service to our Nation, your time, and your expertise. I look forward to the discussion. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

MAY 23, 2018 

The terror attacks of 9/11 took the lives of almost 3,000 innocent people and left 

our Nation in shock. In the aftermath, it was clear that serious changes needed to 

be made to keep our homeland safe. 

While I believe we are safer today, terror threats persist. Terrorists and their followers are still killing innocent people and attempting to destroy our way of life. 

This has been made clear by recent attacks against the West. London, Paris, Nice, 

Madrid, Manchester, Barcelona, Brussels, Berlin, and even New York, have been 

targets of vehicular homicides, shootings, bombings, and stabbings. 

They are clearly following Sheik Adnani’s call to kill by whatever means necessary, wherever they are. 

And although many jihadists are resorting to small-scale attacks, the thwarted 

plot to take down an airliner in Australia last summer was a reminder that our 

aviation sector is still their ‘‘crown jewel’’ of targets. 

I am continually concerned about the security at last points of departure throughout the Middle East. 

Many of the world’s most dangerous terrorists are only one plane ride way. 

And they will not halt their bloodthirsty campaign to take innocent life unless 

they are directly challenged. 

Fortunately, we’ve had some recent success on the battlefield. Our military victory 

over the so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria was a great achievement. 

3 

However, there are remnants that remain in the Middle East, and foreign fighters 

who have scattered throughout Europe and parts of Africa. A comprehensive strategy is needed so ISIS cannot rally, regroup, and rebuild from a new location. 

This strategy should address the root causes that breed terrorists, including a 

lack of economic opportunity and good governance structures. 

We must also keep our eye on al-Qaeda. In recent years, al-Qaeda has expanded 

its global presence and is now comprised of tens of thousands of fighters across two 

dozen branches. They too, want nothing more than a devastating attack against the 

West. 

Mitigating the terror threat from these groups has always been one of my top priorities. 

At my direction, we established multiple task forces to discover ways we can prevent terrorist entry into the United States. 

As a result of their work, we strengthened the Visa Waiver Program, enhanced 

our intelligence collection, and bolstered coordination to stop terrorist travel. 

Currently, we are examining ways that Special Interest Aliens and potential foreign fighters are exploiting illicit pathways into our country from South and Central 

America. 

And just yesterday, ICE Director Thomas Homan confirmed to me that many 

known terrorists are taking this path as well. 

America is facing threats from all directions. To keep our homeland safe, we need 

to be prepared to confront each one. 

I would like to thank all our witnesses for joining us this morning. Each of you 

has served as, or advised, America’s top National security officials. 

Every Member of this committee is grateful for your service, your time, and your 

expertise. 

I look forward to our discussion and to working with you to strengthen our homeland security. 

Chairman MCCAUL. With that, I now recognize the Ranking 

Member. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank our witnesses for their appearance today. Today, the committee is meeting 

to examine a threat posed by ISIS to America and the West. While 

ISIS has suffered significant losses in the wake of attacks by U.S.- 

led coalition forces under both the prior administration and the 

current one, the so-called caliphate is not yet gone. Indeed, even as 

ISIS has lost territory, funding, and fighters, its threats to the 

United States and our allies persist, albeit in new forms. 

As the so-called caliphate has shrunk, you and I both know ISIS 

has turned to the virtual space and its affiliates and followers to 

recruit and radicalize new members around the world. Rather than 

planning or directing sophisticated attacks carried out by individuals traveling from overseas, ISIS can inspire lone wolves right 

here at home on-line with few resources and relative little effort. 

This more-dispersed asymmetrical threat will be harder for the 

United States and our allies to combat. It is essential for the 

Trump administration to ensure a careful coordinated effort among 

all elements of our National security apparatus, military, and intelligence assets, diplomats working with foreign partners, and homeland security officials at home. It remains to be seen whether this 

administration is up to the task. 

As Members of the Congress and Members of the Committee on 

Homeland Security, our role will be to conduct close oversight of 

the Trump administration’s effort. This is a critical juncture, as the 

remnants of ISIS on the ground attempts to regroup and determine 

the future trajectory of the organization. As we have witnessed before, these groups do not disappear, but often morph into a new entity that poses new threats. 

4 

Unfortunately, as the virtual space becomes increasingly important to ISIS, the organization’s existing efforts to recruit and 

radicalize followers are only furthered by the Trump administration’s rhetoric and policies. President Trump’s own hateful words 

about Islam and Muslims lend credence to ISIS’s message about 

the West. This kind of rhetoric also undermines our relationship 

with key partners abroad, jeopardizing essential information-sharing relationships. 

At the same time, the President’s comments stoke fear and division among the American people, which is exactly the goal of terrorist organizations like ISIS. If President Trump’s rhetoric has 

been harmful in this regard, his policies have been worse. From the 

Muslim travel bans to the Trump administration’s almost exclusive 

focus on Islamic groups in its counterterrorism efforts, his policies 

have actually made us less safe. 

Today, I hope to hear from our witnesses about the future of 

ISIS, and how the United States can best counter its threats to the 

homeland, both now and in the future, while upholding our American values. I appreciate the witnesses joining us today, and look 

forward to your testimony. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MAY 23, 2018 

Today, the committee is meeting to examine the threat posed by ISIS to America 

and the West. While ISIS has suffered significant losses in the wake of attacks by 

U.S.-led coalition forces under both the prior administration and the current one, 

the so-called caliphate is not yet gone. 

Indeed, even as ISIS has lost territory, funding, and fighters, its threat to the 

United States and our allies persists, albeit in new forms. As the so-called caliphate 

has shrunk, you and I both know ISIS has turned to the virtual space and its affiliates and followers to recruit and radicalize new members around the world. 

Rather than planning or directing sophisticated attacks carried out by individuals 

traveling from overseas, ISIS can inspire lone wolves right here at home on-line 

with few resources and relatively little effort. This more disbursed, asymmetrical 

threat will be harder for the United States and our allies to combat. 

It is essential for the Trump administration to ensure a careful, coordinated effort 

among all elements of our National security apparatus—military and intelligence 

assets, diplomats working with foreign partners, and homeland security officials at 

home. It remains to be seen whether this administration is up to the task. 

As Members of Congress and Members of the Committee on Homeland Security, 

our role will be to conduct close oversight of the Trump administration’s efforts. 

This is a critical juncture, as the remnants of ISIS on the ground attempt to regroup 

and determine the future trajectory of the organization. 

As we have witnessed before, these groups do not disappear but often morph into 

a new entity that poses new threats. 

Unfortunately, as the virtual space becomes increasingly important to ISIS, the 

organization’s existing efforts to recruit and radicalize followers are only furthered 

by the Trump administration’s rhetoric and policies. President Trump’s own hateful 

words about Islam and Muslims lend credence to ISIS’ message about the West. 

This kind of rhetoric also undermines our relationship with key partners abroad, 

jeopardizing essential information-sharing relationships. 

At the same time, the President’s comments stoke fear and division among the 

American people, which is exactly the goal of terrorist organizations like ISIS. If 

President Trump’s rhetoric has been harmful in this regard, his policies have been 

worse. 

From the Muslim travel bans to the Trump administration’s almost exclusive 

focus on Islamic groups in its counterterrorism efforts, his policies have actually 

made us less safe. Today, I hope to hear from our witnesses about the future of ISIS 

and how the United States can best counter its threat to the homeland, both now 

and in the future, while upholding our American values. 

5 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. The Ranking Member yields 

back. Other Members are reminded, opening statements may be 

submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Honorable Jackson Lee follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SHEILA JACKSON LEE

MAY 23, 2018 

Chairman Mccaul and Ranking Member Thompson, I thank you both for the opportunity to receive testimony on ‘‘ISIS Post-Caliphate: Threat Implications for 

America and the West.’’ 

As ISIS adapts to the changing environment and attempts to survive, we must 

adapt to prevent them from spreading its deadly influence throughout the region 

and the world. 

I thank today’s witnesses for their testimony: 

• The Hon. Ryan Crocker—Former Ambassador of the United States; 

• Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.)—Chairman of the Board, Institute for the Study of War; 

• Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross—Senior Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies; and 

• Dr. Joshua A. Geltzer—Former Senior Director for Counterterrorism, National 

Security Council (Democratic witness). 

This hearing will examine the threat of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 

given its territorial losses. 

The hearing will also allow for the consideration of: 

1. ISIS’ current operational state, 

2. The threat posed by returning foreign fighters, 

3. ISIS financing methods, 

4. The ‘‘virtual caliphate,’’ and 

5. The role of ISIS affiliates. 

ISIS continues to pose a threat as it continues to inspire and enable foreign fighters and Home-grown Violent Extremists to conduct attacks in the United States as 

well as strengthening ISIS affiliates world-wide in the wake of their territorial 

losses in Iraq and Syria. 

President Donald Trump’s travel ban announced in January 2017 against 7 Muslim-majority nations was reportedly used by ISIS as a recruitment tool, giving the 

militant group a major propaganda boost. 

The actions taken on the battlefield reduced the number, coordination, and ability 

of ISIS to retain territory, but their objectives to strike at the United States and 

other nations has not been eliminated. 

CURRENT STATE OF ISIS

Since late 2017, U.S. officials have stated that ISIS has lost more than 90 percent 

of the territory it once held. 

While the U.S. intelligence community assessed that ISIS will seek to maintain 

a robust insurgency in Iraq and Syria, experts have predicted that ISIS will also 

plan international attacks and encourage sympathizers to carry out attacks at 

home. 

Moreover, ISIS’s battlefield losses will not destroy its terrorism capabilities due 

to its significant investment in external operations over the last 2 years. 

As senior officials in the U.S. intelligence community have noted, ISIS has proven 

to be extremely resilient and continues to use attacks and propaganda to attract violent extremists and to protect its influence world-wide. 

ISIS fighters and communication networks have not been eliminated, but rather 

they have been dispersed in ways that will challenge the Trump administration to 

continue to fight obvious high-value targets, while also identifying and countering 

less obvious threats, including from Home-grown Violent Extremists, returning foreign fighters, and fighters who relocate to ISIS affiliates and conflict zones other 

than Iraq and Syria. 

RISE OF THE VIRTUAL CALIPHATE

ISIS’s territorial decline has resulted in a decrease in volume of propaganda and 

a messaging shift away from a narrative about building the so-called caliphate and 

toward inciting violence. 

By November 2017, ISIS’s media operation was producing 20 materials per week, 

down from a high of more than 200 materials per week in 2015. 

6 

ISIS has also shifted to encrypted applications. 

These tactical and messaging shifts will cause continued problems for law enforcement and intelligence services seeking to counter ISIS. 

ISIS has proved capable in their on-line messaging and recruitment utilizing a 

‘‘virtual’’ means to ‘‘real-world’’ end. Many have begun framing ISIS’s future in 

terms of a ‘‘virtual caliphate.’’ 

FOREIGN FIGHTERS

The mobilization of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq outnumbered all other mobilizations of jihadist conflicts during the past 40 years. At least 40,000 fighters from 

120 countries traveled to Iraq and Syria to engage in warfare, estimates hold. The 

foreign fighter flow came to a virtual standstill, however, as ISIS began to lose territory and countries implemented better measures to prevent travel. 

Authorities have expressed concern about the lack of specific numbers of returnees and unaccounted-for foreign fighters. 

A New York Times report in February 2018 shows that thousands of ISIS foreign 

fighters and family members escaped the U.S. military campaign in eastern Syria 

to the south and west through Syrian army lines, calling into question whether the 

group has been largely defeated. 

There are also large discrepancies in statistics collected by the United Nations 

from member states between the total number of foreign fighters and those recorded 

as having been killed, detained, returned, or relocated. 

In January 2018, the United Kingdom, for instance, noted that around 50 percent 

of its foreign fighters remain unconfirmed. 

HOME-GROWN VIOLENT EXTREMISTS (HVES)

The most immediate threat to the United States is violence carried out by Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs). 

ISIS’s capacity to reach sympathizers around the world through its social media 

capability gives the group access to large numbers of HVEs. 

In the United States the larger issue is the influence they be able to have over 

disaffected youth or the mentally ill who may be vulnerable to ISIS messaging. 

The greatest threat comes from ISIS is its training material on how to plan and 

carry out an attack that may provide instruction to those in the United States who 

wish to committee mass violence. 

On March 2, 2018, in the city of Austin Texas, the first of 7 bombs were detonated 

in what became a terrorizing series of attacks that killed Anthony Stephan House, 

39, and Draylen Mason, 17. 

On April 15, 2013, two homemade bombs detonated near the finish line of the annual Boston Marathon, killing 3 people and injuring several hundred others, including 16 who lost limbs. 

It has been 5 years since that terrible day, but we still remember the people of 

Boston, who said they would not be made to fear the terror that hides its face, to 

attack the innocent. 

An essential component of the success that local, State, and Federal law enforcement had during the investigation of the Boston Bombing was the full engagement 

of the public who shared valuable information with authorities, which provided important clues that led to the identification and ultimate capture of the terrorists. 

Today’s hearing is important because it allows Members of the Homeland Security 

Committee to assess the threat that ISIS continues to pose to the United States. 

Prior to September 11, 2001, the Federal Government had a wide range of law 

enforcement, National security, and benefits management agencies that collected information, but jealously guarded this information from other agencies. 

The 9/11 Commission Report allowed an in-depth assessment of the failures that 

led to the horrific terrorist attacks against the United States that cost the lives of 

nearly 3,000 people. 

I look forward to the testimony of today’s witnesses. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. We are pleased to have a distinguished 

panel of witnesses before us here today. First is probably the— 

when I think of an ambassador, I think of Ryan Crocker. He is currently a diplomat-in-residence of Princeton University, on leave of 

absence from Texas A&M. He has served in probably more hotspots 

than any Ambassador I know. I had the honor to be with him overseas in many of these locations, and saw his service to his country. 

7 

It is amazing to think, sir, you served in, you know, in Lebanon 

when the Marines were killed in Beirut. You served in Syria when 

we had an ambassador in Syria. You served in Pakistan. Served in 

Iraq. Served in Kuwait. Then the last time, I think, I saw you overseas in Kandahar and Kabul in Afghanistan. Your service is really 

extraordinary as a diplomat, and I know that is why you received 

the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the Nation’s highest civilian 

award, in 2009. 

Second, we have General Jack Keane, he is the president of GSA 

Consulting, serves as chairman of the board for the Institute for 

the Study of War. He served as a 4-star general. Completed 37 

years of public service in December 2003, culminating his appointment as acting chief of staff and vice chief of staff to the United 

States Army. Since 2004, General Keane conducted frequent trips 

to Iraq and Afghanistan for senior defense officials with multiple 

visits during the surge in that period in both countries. We thank 

you, sir, for your service as well. 

The third witness is Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow 

at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, an expert on jihadist 

movements. He is also the chief executive officer of Valens Global, 

a fellow with Google’s Jigsaw, an associated fellow at the International Center for Counterterrorism, the Hague, and adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University’s security studies program. I have had the opportunity to visit with you in my office. 

Thank you for being here as well. 

The fourth and final witness is Dr. Joshua Geltzer, who is the 

founding executive director of the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection, as well as visiting professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center. Dr. Geltzer served from 2015 to 2017, 

a senior director for counterterrorism at National Security Council, 

the NSC, and thank you, sir, also for being here. Your full written 

statements will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Ambassador Crocker for an opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF RYAN C. CROCKER, FORMER AMBASSADOR OF 

THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Thompson, Members of the committee. It is a privilege to be here 

at this very important time, a moment at which, as both you, Mr. 

Chairman, and Mr. Thompson noted, that Islamic State is on the 

verge of military defeat. They have been defeated in Iraq, and we 

are in a mopping-up mode now, I think, in Syria. So the hearing 

is very timely and is very important. 

It doesn’t stop with military defeat of ISIS, as you both have suggested. I have seen this movie before, in part. I was in Iraq as ambassador from 2007 to 2009, at the time of the surge, and at a time 

when the horrific bloodshed in that country was wound down. As 

the surge took effect, but especially as the political surge, if you 

will, took effect. The efforts to bring different Iraqi leaders together 

for a common cause. 

So as we look at the Islamic State on down the road here, I think 

it is very important not to believe that because they were defeated 

on the field, they have gone away. Islamic State’s predecessor, alVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:28 Nov 19, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0523\HM143000.TXT HEATH
8 

Qaeda in Iraq, was something that General Petraeus, and later, 

General Odierno, as well as myself, were fully focused on. But even 

at the height of the surge, we knew we had not completely eliminated them. Little pockets in Mosul, little pockets up the Euphrates River Valley, and it is, of course, in the Euphrates River Valley 

that we are operating with our allies today to try and destroy that 

presence. But even then, even when we have no more military targets, we will still have an adversary. That is what al-Qaeda in Iraq 

showed us. They went to ground and they waited for better days. 

Better days for them, or course, came with the beginning of the 

Arab Spring, particularly in Syria. 

So that is what we will see, I am ready to predict, with Islamic 

State. Because ultimately, Islamic State is, itself, not the problem, 

it is the symptom of the problem. You, Mr. Chairman, I think, got 

this exactly right. The lack of good governance in this region has 

given the space for groups such as al-Qaeda, such as Hezbollah, 

back in Lebanon at a time I was there, and, of course, for Islamic 

State. So unless these governance issues are addressed, the problem will still be there, and we will see another manifestation somewhere down the road. Maybe it will use Islamist’s language, maybe 

it won’t. We don’t know. We do know that the failure of governance 

is going to create space unless or until those problems of governance are addressed. 

I would say one thing here briefly about the United States. We 

are in 100-year cycle now, more or less, of momentous events related to the First World War. In the peace after the First World 

War, we were basically not present. The British and the French 

were quite ready to administer the Middle Eastern lands of the 

former Ottoman Empire, they did not really want to see us there. 

In any case, with the Senate in 1918 making it clear it was not 

going to ratify our membership in the League of Nations, we had 

no role to play. 

After World War II, it was completely different. We designed the 

post-war order. The San Francisco conference gave us the United 

Nations, Bretton Woods, the International Monetary Order, and 

not only did we create it, we led it. We led it for almost 70 years. 

Beginning in 2009, we saw a shift. Should the United States play 

that role or should it not? Those questions were asked then, those 

questions are being asked today. 

I would say, from my perspective as a foreign policy National security professional, while it was an imperfect order that we would 

be wise to work to preserve it, an order that we continue to lead 

because the world pretty clearly is not ready to lead or come together without us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crocker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RYAN C. CROCKER

MAY 23, 2018 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson, Members of the committee, it is a 

privilege to be here today to discuss this critically important topic. We are close to 

the moment when the Islamic State will no longer hold ground in Iraq or Syria. 

When one considers that less than 4 years ago, an ascendant Islamic State had 

surged through western Iraq, taking its second-largest city Mosul in a matter of 

hours and had reached the gates of Baghdad, this is a stunning development. It 

9 

demonstrates the extraordinary capabilities of our military forces, exercised in an 

extraordinarily complicated environment. It also shows the importance of U.S. leadership. We were not in this fight alone. Sevnty-five other nations have joined us, 

making this a truly global coalition. Islamic State threatened the world; the world 

responded by coming together to eliminate their so-called caliphate. 

ISIS AND THE FAILURE OF GOVERNANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

But is this fight really over? Does Islamic State teeter on the brink of extinction? 

Both the Trump and Obama administrations have largely treated Islamic State as 

a military problem with a military solution. That is a dangerous over-simplification. 

Islamic State itself is not the problem. It is the symptom of a much more complex, 

largely political problem: A chronic failure of governance. 

We are in a cycle of 100-year anniversaries that are relevant to our conversation 

here. WW I ended a century ago. The question of the political future of the lands 

of the Middle East had to be answered by the victorious Allies. The area had been 

a part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries. The future of this region was on the 

agenda for the Versailles peace talks, which concluded with the treaty of Versailles 

in 1919. But this was a formality. Those decisions had already been made by the 

British and the French, embodied in the Sykes-Picot accord of 1916 which was still 

secret when the Versailles talks began. Under its terms, these two countries would 

divide the region between them. The lines on the map that define the Middle East 

today were largely drawn by foreigners. As the British and French took over the 

mandates assigned to them, one element that was not on their minds was good governance, the building of stable institutions, respect for the rule of law, and preparations for peoples of the area to govern themselves. To project the image of independent states, the mandatory powers installed monarchies in a number of areas— 

Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan and by the Italians in Libya. These monarchies had no 

connections to the peoples over which they allegedly ruled, and certainly no interest 

in establishing the institutions and traditions of good governance. 

Lacking legitimacy and perceived as puppets of the imperialists, these monarchies 

were overthrown, replaced largely by military rulers. Other ‘‘isms’’ were developed 

to replace imperialism and monarchism. In Egypt, it was Arab nationalism personified by Gamal abd-al Nasser. In Iraq, undiluted authoritarianism following the 1958 

coup by Abdal Karim Qassim. Later, a Libyan military officer named Qadhafi overthrew King Idris. Other isms followed—Arab socialism (Baathism) in Iraq and 

Syria. Communism in South Yemen. Republicanism in Tunisia and Egypt post-Nasser. They all had one element in common: They failed to provide good governance 

for their people, and they all failed. This was the essence of the Arab Spring—a popular demand for better governance. But that takes time and respect for the rule of 

law as well as the development of institutions that provide for the common good. 

These are in exceedingly short supply throughout the region. In Egypt, for example, 

it was no surprise that the Muslim Brotherhood won the first election since it was 

the only political party independent of the Mubarak regime. But it was also no surprise it failed completely to provide good governance. It had no experience and found 

no experience of institutionalized democracy. 

Now we have yet another ism, Islamism. It too has failed. Interestingly, a recently-translated trove of documents suggests that Islamic State understood the 

problem and was making an effort to develop the skills of governance. 

So what happens next? It is impossible to predict with accuracy. However, it is 

a safe bet that without significant progress toward better governance in the region, 

another ism will arise. Perhaps it will be ISIS 2.0, just as ISIS was al-Qaeda 2.0. 

Perhaps it will be of a completely different nature. Whatever it is, it will not be 

good. To borrow from the great Irish poet W.B. Yeats, ‘‘What rough beast, its hour 

come around at last, slouches toward Bethlehem to be born?’’ 

And what does it mean for our interests in the region, especially in Iraq and Syria 

after the military defeat of the Islamic State? As we consider these questions, we 

need to look at Iraq and Syria as related but distinct challenges. I will start with 

Iraq. 

IRAQ

As you know so well, Mr. Chairman, we have been here before. I was Ambassador 

to Iraq during the surge, 2007–2009. As you know, the surge was built on the Awakening movement in the Sunni province of Anbar, when Iraqi tribal leaders who had 

stood with Islamic State’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, turned against them with 

our encouragement and support. By any measure, the surge was a success. Shortly 

before my departure from Iraq in February 2009, I visited Ramadi, the once and 

future stronghold of al-Qaeda and its successor, the Islamic State. The security situVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:28 Nov 19, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0523\HM143000.TXT HEATH
10 

ation was so good that Awakening leader Ahmad Abu Risha and I spent an hour 

walking through the Ramadi market. This owed a great deal to the courage and sacrifice of our troopers, so brilliantly led by General Petraeus and later by General 

Odierno. But even at the height of the surge, there remained small pockets of alQaeda in Mosul and the Euphrates river valley. Why? Because elements of the 

Sunni Arab population in those areas feared the Shia-led government in Baghdad 

at least as much as they feared al-Qaeda. Those elements, including future ISIS 

leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, went to ground and awaited better days. 

Those days came with the beginning of a civil war in Syria in March 2011 and 

the military and political withdrawal of the United States from Iraq, also in 2011. 

In our absence, Prime Minister Maliki and other Iraqi leaders reverted to a default 

position of zero sum thinking. When we were there in force, politically as well as 

militarily, we could help broker deals among Iraqis that they could not reach by 

themselves. For many leaders, compromise was a threat. In their world, compromise 

meant a concession, concessions equaled defeat and defeat meant death. Often in 

this country, we become impatient with leaders in countries like Iraq who do not 

speedily commit to the institutions of democracy. We consider that they lack political will and do not deserve our support. 

The reality is more complicated. In the case of Maliki, his greatest fear was of 

a military coup that would return the Baathists to power. Given Iraq’s history, this 

was not completely unreasonable. Iraq’s first military coup came in 1958, and was 

followed by a series of others until the Baath cemented its power a decade later. 

When we were there in force, we constituted a security guarantee to Maliki that 

allowed him to make senior military appointments on the basis of ability. As Dave 

Petraeus can tell you, it was not easy but we could do it. After we left, Maliki’s fears 

took over and commanders were not appointed on the basis of proven combat experience or leadership qualities. They were chosen on the basis of one quality only— 

loyalty. These were the commanders who fled the field as ISIL advanced. 

The post-ISIS phase in Iraq is significantly different and more encouraging than 

that which prevailed before ISIS swept through the country. Iraqi security forces, 

with new commanders, performed well through a long, hard ground campaign. They 

took significant casualties but morale and commitment remained significantly high. 

The United States has reinvested in Iraq. Our advisors, air power, and enablers had 

a meaningful impact on the campaign, and the Iraqis know it. We have some leverage, and the opportunity to use it. 

Why is this important from a homeland security perspective? Simply put, we are 

more secure if we are dealing with potential threats well before they reach our borders. Ultimately, it is good governance in the region that will prevent the re-emergence of terrorist organizations that target Americans, whether at home or abroad. 

In the interim, doing what we can to insure that the Iraqi government does not take 

actions that will further alienate its Sunni Arab population and give space to those 

who wish us harm is an imperative. If the Iraqis can get the politics right with our 

help, the military/terrorist threat ISIS has posed can be contained. If the politics 

are not right, we will be facing new security challenges in the region and at home. 

Here, I would like to say a word about terrorism. Over a long career in the Middle 

East, I have seen a lot of it. It’s part of life in the Foreign Service. I was an ambassador six times. In three of those countries, a predecessor as the American ambassador was assassinated. One of those was Frank Meloy in Lebanon. He and another 

Embassy officer were kidnapped and then killed in Beirut. The organization that 

murdered them was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Was 

that an Islamic terrorist organization? No—its communist ideology was the antithesis of any religion, including Islam. But perhaps its leader harbored secret Islamic 

tendencies? Its leader was George Habash, a Palestinian Christian. 

I make this point as a reminder that terror is a tactic, not an ideology. When 

there are major unresolved political problems in a society or a country that cannot 

be dealt with through the political process because of a lack of institutions and the 

absence of rule of law, the chances increase that some in that society will use terror 

to pursue their agenda. Von Clausewitz was right—war, whether regular or irregular, arises from politics and to politics it must return. There are no more purely 

military problems any more. This includes ISIS. Its roots lie in politics, and unless 

those political problems are addressed, it—or something like it—will be back. 

In Iraq, we have something to work with. By all accounts, Iraqi government forces 

have avoided retaliatory actions against the overwhelmingly Sunni civilian population. It will be important to stay politically engaged with the Government and 

support a stabilization process that will be political as well as economic. Revitalization of the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement would be a good place to start. 

It provides a broad basis for bilateral cooperation in the economic, political, technological, and security fields. On the latter, it is vital that we continue the robust 

11 

train-and-equip mission with Iraqi security forces that we began in 2014. We must 

not repeat the mistake we made in 2011 of disengaging from Iraq. That created the 

conditions that ISIS exploited so effectively 3 years later. 

Iraq has just completed its fourth National election since 2006. The process of 

Government formation is likely to be long and difficult. We should support principles in this process, not individuals. In so doing, we will demonstrate a sharp contrast with Iran whose direct interference is likely to anger and alienate the Iraqi 

people. The Iranian influence in Iraq is a challenge to some of our core interests 

in the development of an inclusive, capable government that can address some of 

the ills of bad governance that has plagued the country for many years. Our best 

defense is the kind of constructive engagement that will offer an alternative to the 

heavy-handed effort by Iran to create clients, not partners. 

SYRIA

If Iraq is hard, Syria is harder. The military defeat of ISIS will not end the civil 

war, nor will it lead to disengagement and withdrawal by Iran and its proxies. Iran 

is in Syria for the long haul, as it has demonstrated virtually since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. The United States and Israel paid a terrible price in 

Lebanon when Iran solidified its strategic partnership with the Asad regime and 

both worked to establish Hizballah. It is against this history that we must determine the future of our own military presence. Do we stay or do we go? If we stay, 

for what purpose and at what risk? If we go, with what consequences? 

The Syrian conflict is as complex as it is dangerous. An unprecedented number 

of international, regional, and local actors are involved. The United States and Russia. Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 

Emirates and Qatar. Hizballah and other Iran-supported Shia militias, al-Qaeda, 

the Syrian Free Army, Syrian Democratic Forces, the YPG, Ahrar al-Sham and 

many others, including ISIS. ISIS may be on the verge of a military defeat, but that 

will not eliminate them as a future force. We saw the same thing in Iraq a decade 

ago. In Syria as well as in Iraq, we can expect ISIS to go to ground and wait for 

more favorable circumstances. And in the chaos that is Syria, there will be plenty 

of places to hide. 

I spent a number of years in Lebanon during its civil war. The constellation of 

actors in Lebanon mirrored those in Syria, but on a smaller and less complex scale. 

The hot phase of the Lebanese civil war lasted 15 years, and ended only when the 

Syrian army occupied the Lebanese Presidential Palace. No army is going to occupy 

the Peoples Palace in Damascus to end that conflict. 

THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Chairman, this is a moment to consider the role of the United States in the 

region and the world. Again, I will take you on a brief, 100-year journey. At 

Versailles in 1919 and after, the United States played no significant role in the Middle East or the world. The 1918 elections returned an isolationist Congress that 

would not ratify our membership in the League of Nations, Wilson was ill and the 

British and French did not want the United States challenging their influence. 

What the world effectively got was a two-decade truce in the middle of one horrific 

world war. America played a very different role after World War II. The post-war 

international order was largely created by the United States. The United Nations 

was born in the San Francisco conference. The international financial order was created at Bretton Woods. We led on the establishment of NATO. We faced down the 

Soviet Union in Berlin, in Iran, in Turkey and in Greece. We launched the Marshall 

Plan. We rebuilt the economies of allies and adversaries alike. In short, we not only 

created the new order, we led it. There was broad agreement among Republican and 

Democratic administrations that the United States could and should lead. There 

were setbacks, certainly. But almost seven decades of U.S. leadership brought broad 

prosperity and averted another massive ground war. 

But beginning in 2009, we called into question our own leadership role. The slogan that we can’t do everything became a byword for not doing much of anything. 

America first came to be translated as America alone. 

Mr. Chairman, American leadership made the world a safer place. I know the 

American people are tired of wars. I get that. I spent 7 years of my life post-9/11 

in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. I was in Iraq and Afghanistan beginning in 

2001. I returned to all three countries as the American ambassador. So I get it 

about being tired. But there are worse things. 

Mr. Chairman, in my judgment American leadership is vital to homeland security. 

I hope very much we will reassert that role. The Middle East and the world will 

not run by themselves. 

12 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Ambassador. The Chair recognizes General Keane for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. ‘‘JACK’’ KEANE, (RET.–U.S. 

ARMY), CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, INSTITUTE FOR THE 

STUDY OF WAR 

General KEANE. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, 

distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for inviting 

me. I am honored to be here today with my esteemed colleagues, 

particularly my friend here, Ambassador Crocker, America’s most 

accomplished Middle East envoy. In the summer of 2012, the Islamic State of Iraq, then an al-Qaeda affiliate under the command 

of al-Baghdadi was operating in the shadows around Baghdad, 

when he made the most critical decision in his reign as a jihadist 

leader. He seized the opportunity to take advantage of the stalemated Syrian civil war. Al-Baghdadi correctly assumed that the 

civil war participants, largely fighting in western Syria, would be 

so preoccupied that he could occupy Sunni-Arab territory in northeastern Syria with little resistance, and establish a bona-fide safe 

haven with several hundred fighters, mostly Iraqis. 

Al-Baghdadi grew the organization to 30,000 fighters in 18 

months, invading Iraq in January 2014, by seizing Fallujah. In 

June, they captured Mosul, gained world-wide attention by forcing 

the collapse of the Iraqi Army. The exponential growth of ISIS in 

less than 2 years, using the internet exclusively to recruit with sophisticated cinematography and messaging was a remarkable historic achievement. 

With the eventual defeat of ISIS some 3 years later in terms of 

retaking territory that was lost in 2017 in Iraq—and also in Iraq 

and Syria, the ISIS caliphate was decimated, losing 90 percent of 

its territory, and reduced to several thousand fighters in Iraq and 

Syria combined. ISIS is badly damaged, but it is not defeated, as 

the Chairman and Ranking Member have mentioned. 

It is still capable of insurgency, and its ability to inspire others 

to engage terrorist attacks. Indeed, ISIS is still a thriving global 

terrorist organization. The virtual ISIS caliphate maintains the 

connectivity with ISIS affiliate organizations world-wide. ISIS uses 

it also to help maintain its external terrorist organization, and to 

direct or support network cells and individuals. But mostly, to inspire others to kill and maim their own people. 

The virtual caliphate, after considerable amount of effort, has finally been damaged, mainly because of physical destruction due to 

combat operations, but also due to offensive cyber operations that 

the United States has conducted. Further, the U.S. Government 

has enlisted the assistance of social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, to identify potential terrorist accounts and remove violent content from their platforms. 

In protecting the homeland, the best defense since 9/11 is still a 

good offense, the United States and coalition partners deployed to 

fight terrorists in their breeding grounds overseas. U.S. law enforcement agencies at home have remained vigilant in thwarting 

terrorist plots, as demonstrated by the fact that there still has not 

been a major terrorist attack since 9/11. 

13 

However, despite law enforcement’s best efforts, preventing inspired assailants from carrying out terrorist attacks remains a relentless challenge, as we experienced three attacks since 2015 in 

San Bernardino, Orlando, and New York. It is virtually impossible 

to monitor everyone of interest, which means we need the assistance of an informed population to report suspicious behavior. 

In looking ahead, despite the success to date over ISIS in Iraq 

and Syria, the remaining ISIS fighters and leadership should be 

driven out of southeastern Syria along the Euphrates River Valley. 

The Iraqi security forces assisted by the United States and coalition partners must maintain its vigilance in Iraq to prevent a resurgence of ISIS. Key is the formation of a government in Iraq 

after this recent election that enfranchises the Sunnis and the 

Kurds, and does not make the mistake of previous Iraq governments that disenfranchised the Sunnis. 

Political unity is vital to prevent the rise of ISIS again or another radical Islamic group. It appears likely that ISIS will resort 

to traditional terrorist tactics and attempt to exert control in weakly-governed space across Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia. They will always be seeking sanctuary or safe haven, 

and when they do, it must be rapidly destroyed. 

Europe, more vulnerable than us, could be the next battlefront 

as ISIS activates and motivates followers to carry out attacks and 

prove it is still a threat to the West. 

In conclusion, there is an understandable desire to declare victory over ISIS after retaking the lost territory in Iraq and Syria 

and go home. In my view, that is a serious strategic blunter. The 

lesson learned from the premature withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 

before political stability was achieved is, we got ISIS as a result. 

Similarly, we refused to assist the newly-elected moderate government in Libya after Qadhafi was deposed in 2011, and we got 

Benghazi in 2012, a failed state shortly thereafter. When we stay 

post-conflict to ensure political stability, as in Germany, Italy, and 

Japan, post-World War II, in South Korea, post-Korean War, and 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina for almost 9 years, significant and lasting success is achieved. 

The United States, our allies, and partners know we are in a 

generational struggle in confronting the ISIS threat and, in general, radical Islam where the key to long-term success is defeating 

their ideology and certainly their propaganda, as well as addressing the conditions that help spread it, such as political and social 

injustice, lack of economic opportunity, corruption and governance 

instability. 

Thank you. I look forward your to questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:] 

STATEMENT OF JOHN M. ‘‘JACK’’ KEANE

23 MAY 2018 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of the 

committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. Am honored to be here with 

my esteemed colleagues, particularly Ambassador Crocker, America’s most accomplished Middle East envoy, who I had the pleasure of visiting on many occasions 

when he was Ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan during the 9/11 wars, while I 

was conducting assessments for General Petraeus. 

14 

In the summer of 2012 the Islamic State of Iraq, an al-Qaeda affiliate organization, under the command of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was operating in the shadows 

and territory in the belt around Baghdad when al-Baghdadi made the most important strategic decision in his reign as a jihadist leader; he seized the opportunity 

to take advantage of the stalemated Syrian civil war, after Iran and Russia significantly assisted the Assad regime in halting the momentum of the Syrian opposition 

forces. As such, al-Baghdadi correctly assumed that the civil war participants, largely fighting in western Syria, would be so preoccupied that al-Baghdadi could occupy 

Sunni Arab lands in northeastern Syria with little to no resistance and establish 

a bona fide safe haven with several hundred Iraqi fighters. 

THE CALIPHATE IN IRAQ AND SYRIA

Unprecedented in the history of terrorist organizations, al-Baghdadi grew the organization to 30 thousand fighters in 18 months, invading Iraq in January 2014 and 

seizing Fallujah. By June they were 40 thousand strong and captured Mosul, the 

second-largest city in Iraq, which gained world-wide attention by forcing the collapse of an Iraqi Army whose previous competent leaders were purged by PM Maliki 

as he pocketed the funds intended to train the Army for the past 3 years. The exponential growth of ISIS in less than 2 years using the internet almost exclusively 

to recruit with sophisticated cinematography and messaging was an outstanding 

achievement and quite unprecedented. Many of the fighters came from throughout 

the region, also Afghanistan, with approximately 5,000 alone from western Europe 

and about 250 from the United States. In June 2014, al-Baghdadi, announced from 

the Grand Mosque in Mosul the establishment of the Islamic State, the so-called 

ISIS caliphate. 

Regrettably, it took the United States 9 months to respond to PM Maliki’s emergency request in January for air power support when it was finally delivered 2 

months after the fall of Mosul in August 2014. 

With the final defeat of ISIS in Mosul and Raqqa in 2017, the ISIS caliphate was 

decimated. ISIS has been badly damaged but not defeated in its insurgency capacity 

and its ability to inspire others to engage in terrorist attacks elsewhere. Indeed ISIS 

is a thriving global terrorist organization. At its peak ISIS governed 7.7 million people and controlled roughly 40 thousand square miles of land essentially forming a 

proto-state as large as the United Kingdom, and earned $80 million per month by 

the end of 2015. Mostly via illegal oil sales, while also relying on antiquities sales, 

the extortion and taxation of local populations, and kidnappings for ransom. 

Since the coalition military operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria it has lost 

90 percent of the territory it once controlled to include its former capital Raqqa as 

well as Mosul. An estimated 3–5,000 fighters remain in the area, down significantly 

from the estimated 40–60,000 fighters from over 100 countries, while it still earns 

roughly $4 million per month from oil sales and black market antiquities trading. 

There is potential for an ISIS resurgence in Syria and Iraq if the United States 

pulls its forces out prematurely. What the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) would lose most significantly is the assistance of competent American ground and coalition forces and the devastating use of American 

air power, while forfeiting the political and diplomatic support that the U.S. military 

presence brings to the table. 

VIRTUAL CALIPHATE

The virtual caliphate maintains the connectivity with ISIS affiliate organizations 

world-wide which indeed have expanded since the loss of the physical caliphate. 

Using the virtual caliphate ISIS maintains its external terrorist organization (ETO) 

to, at times, direct or support networks, cells, and individuals, but, mostly, to inspire others to kill and maim their own people. While it has taken longer than decimating the physical caliphate, the virtual caliphate has been severely damaged 

mostly because of physical destruction but also because of sophisticated cyber operations to reduce capacity. This was due to the combined efforts of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). The United 

States works alongside foreign partners to strengthen their counter-messaging strategies. Further, the U.S. Government has enlisted the assistance of social media companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to identify potential terrorist accounts and remove violent content from their platforms. To date Twitter has reportedly disabled nearly 1 million handles publishing pro-ISIS content. Despite that 

positive effort the social media companies must do more. 

Reducing the virtual caliphate begins to break the bond that ISIS has so successfully maintained with its world-wide affiliate organizations and its ETO which was 

also the basis for past recruiting successes. 

15 

AFFILIATE ORGANIZATIONS WORLD-WIDE

With the loss of the ISIS caliphate in Syria and Iraq, the network has shifted its 

resources to expand the influence and lethality of its affiliates in Northern Africa, 

the Sahel, The Sinai, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia. 

• Libya—Despite losing its presence in Derna and Sirte, ISIS has maintained a 

strong presence in Libya and remains a potent regional threat having regrouped 

and established training centers and operational headquarters in the central 

and southern parts of the country. ISIS maintains a force of 4–6,000 fighters 

in Libya. 

• Sahel region in Africa—Willingly ISIS roams this area and attacks local and out 

of region forces as it demonstrated in the October 2017 ambush of a joint U.S./ 

Nigerian patrol along the Mali-Niger border, resulting in the deaths of 4 U.S. 

troops and 5 Nigerian soldiers. Given the unwarranted publicity, the United 

States admitted it had 800 U.S. troops in Niger and that the U.S. military was 

operating a key drone base in the area. 

• Boko Haram—In northeastern Africa pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015 

and rapidly became the most infamous and violent terrorist group to join the 

ISIS network. Boko Haram is currently divided into 2 factions and continues 

to strike government officials, troops, and civilians from northeastern Africa despite a multinational Joint Task Force of 8,700 troops. Boko Haram is listed as 

the world’s deadliest terror organization. 

• Sinai—The ISIS Sinai branch has been active in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula since 

2011. Over the last few years Sinai Province has frequently attacked Egyptian 

military and security forces deployed in the Sinai. It has also conducted several 

attacks in Cairo and bombings of Coptic churches in Alexandria and Tanta. 

• Afghanistan—ISIS in Afghanistan also called ISIS Khorasan Province (ISKP) 

operates in the east in Nangarhar province and in the north in Kunar and 

Jowzjan provinces combined. ISIS has carved out a dangerous foothold in Afghanistan which has potential to expand into a bonafide safe haven. ISIS conducts an increasing number of attacks in Kabul against civilian and military 

targets. 

• Philippines—ISIS managed to overrun the city of Marawi located on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. The Philippine forces encountered more than 

expected resistance, ISIS forces aligned with other pro-ISIS brigade groups. 

After 5 months and over a thousand deaths, Philippine forces finally defeated 

the pro-ISIS militias with U.S. assistance. ISIS is planning to regroup. 

PROTECTING THE HOMELAND

The best defense since 9/11 has been a good offense, U.S. and coalition partners 

deployed to fight terrorists in their breeding grounds overseas. U.S. law enforcement 

agencies have remained vigilant in thwarting terrorist plots against the U.S. homeland as demonstrated by the fact that there has not been a major terrorist attack 

since 9/11. However, despite law enforcement’s best efforts, preventing highly motivated and inspired assailants from carrying out terrorist acts remains a relentless 

challenge. The December 2015 San Bernardino shooting, the June 2016 Orlando 

nightclub attack and the October 2017 deadly car ramming in New York are all 

stark reminders of the difficulty in containing the domestic terrorist threat. It’s virtually impossible to monitor everyone who you would want to. With 1,000-plus investigations in the United States spreading across the breadth of the Nation and 

23,000 persons of interest in the United Kingdom as reported by the director of MI– 

5, it is inevitable some people are going to get through. Our agencies hope to minimize and reduce those possibilities and turn the odds in our favor. This is the price 

of a free society. It’s also an allocation of resources issue. Do we want to deplete 

everything else we are doing with Government funding and throw it all at this problem, when in fact more people are killed in opioid overdose and in automobile accidents than are killed in terrorist attacks? We must make tradeoffs and with people 

operating alone who are not talking to people or linked to a terrorist group, it is 

very difficult to find them. 

LOOKING AHEAD

Despite the tactical victories over ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the remaining ISIS 

fighters and leadership should be driven out of southeastern Syria along the Euphrates River valley. And the Iraqi security forces assisted by U.S. and coalition 

partners must maintain its vigilance in Iraq to prevent a resurgence of ISIS. Key 

is the formation of a government after this recent election that enfranchises the 

Sunnis and the Kurds and does not make the mistake of previous Iraq governments 

16 

that disenfranchised the Sunnis. Political unity is vital to prevent the rise of ISIS 

again or another radical Islamist group. 

It appears likely that ISIS will resort to more traditional terrorist tactics and attempt to exert control in weakly governed space across Africa, the Middle East, 

South and Southeast Asia. It will always be seeking sanctuary or safe haven and 

when they do, it must be destroyed as rapidly as possible. 

Europe, much more vulnerable than the United States, could be the next battlefront as ISIS activates cells to carry out attacks and prove it’s still a threat to the 

West. 

In conclusion, there is a tendency and an understandable desire to declare victory 

over ISIS after retaking the lost territory in Iraq and Syria and go home both physically and psychologically; a serious strategic blunder. The lesson learned from the 

premature withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 before political stability was achieved is, 

we got ISIS. Similarly we refused to assist the newly-elected moderate government 

in Libya after Qaddafi was deposed in 2011 and we got Benghazi in 2012 and a 

failed state shortly thereafter. When we stay post-conflict to insure political stability 

such as in Germany, Italy, and Japan post-WWII, in South Korea post-Korean War 

and in Bosnia Herzegovina for almost 9 years, significant and lasting success is 

achieved. 

The United States, our allies and partners know we are in a generational struggle 

in confronting the ISIS threat where the key to long-term success is defeating their 

ideology and propaganda as well as addressing the conditions that help spread it, 

such as political and social injustice, lack of economic opportunity, corruption, and 

instability. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, General. The Chair recognizes 

Dr. Gartenstein-Ross. 

STATEMENT OF DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, SENIOR 

FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Thompson, and distinguished Members, it is an honor to be here 

to discuss this important topic at this vital time. We have agreement in all of the opening statements thus far that the territorial 

collapse of ISIS does not, of course, mean the end of the threat that 

the organization poses. 

What I want to focus on in this statement is the role of technology, because when we look at the rising threat level against 

Western States, including the United States, technological developments and geopolitics have been the two key factors over the past 

several years. We have seen three key developments that largely 

blindsided us. 

The first of these was just a few years after the 2011 Arab 

Spring Revolution in which we saw social media mobilization bring 

very idealistic protesters out to the streets. We then saw social 

media mobilization used for much more nefarious purposes, as ISIS 

was able to draw through both physical networks, but also virtual 

networks, a record number of foreign fighters to the Syria and Iraq 

theater. 

Just a few years after that, we saw a major iteration in the way 

terrorism occurs, something which I called the virtual planner 

model. This is terrorist groups taking advantage of the intersection 

of both social media accessibility to operatives throughout the 

world, and also the boom in end-to-end encryption, which allows 

them to talk to more people, and to do so in secure ways. 

In this manner, terrorist networks half a world away can perform all the functions that physical networks used to perform. 

Scouting for operatives, recruiting them, helping to select the target and timing of attacks, even providing various kinds of technical 

17 

assistance, bomb-making assistance and the like. This has been a 

major development, which has had a transformative impact on terrorism. 

In recent years and months, we have also seen the wide-spread 

adoption of consumer drone technology work to the advantage of 

militant organizations. We have, of course, seen that in Iraq and 

Syria. I can tell you for a fact that the weaponization of drones has 

already made its way to Africa. I was recently in Tunisia and got 

to talk to the members of the African Union Peacekeeping Force, 

who have seen Shabaab in Somalia pick up drone technology. 

In all of these cases, we see a clear pattern, which is something 

is widely adopted by consumers, and then it is taken by terrorists 

and adapted in a way that can serve their purposes. I think that 

we need to stay apprised of this, because when you look at the 

homeland security implications of the continued threat posed by 

ISIS, their adoption of technology and use of consumer-oriented 

technology is going to be absolutely critical and something we need 

to stay ahead of. 

Now, in terms of what we can do. One thing that we need to 

maintain at a Government level is dialog with leading tech firms, 

that is an area where over the course of the past 3 to 4 years, especially with ISIS’s exploitation of social media technology, there has 

been much more liaison between the U.S. Government and tech 

firms in such a way that they are now somewhat speaking the 

same language. 

Second, getting out ahead of technological uses that can be exploited by terrorists is important. This is something that we have 

had a hard time doing, in part, because often we are blindsided by 

these adoptions of technology. One thing I highlight, both in my 

written statement, and also instead of my recent popular press 

writing, is that artificial intelligence is likely to be an area in 

which terrorists are able to exploit the more wide-spread adoption 

of artificial intelligence at a consumer level. 

Finally, in terms of what we can do. I think that a lot will require international cooperation. When you see, for example, AI researchers arguing for international covenants to prevent automated 

weapons from being adopted wide-spread. Whether you agree with 

them or not on the issue, one of the reasons why they are doing 

this is because they believe that proliferation of automated weapon 

systems will help rogue states, and will help terrorist organizations. 

I think about what is needed at an international level is very important, as well as harnessing the potential of current technological 

development, including for such things as counter network warfare. 

For us, technology is not a panacea, it is simply a tool. I think that 

Ambassador Crocker puts his finger on the right question. Are we 

going to lead? 

It is not just a matter of our will to lead, but all the technological 

developments I put my finger on have really changed the way that 

so many spheres do business, including especially in the entrepreneurial space. But it has that impact in government and politics 

sphere. Within my organizations, we often think of violent nonstate actors as the equivalent of start-up firms in the political organizing space. 

18 

1See: Eric Schmitt, ‘‘American Warplanes Shift Tactics to Target Last ISIS Pockets in Eastern 

Syria,’’ The New York Times, April 24, 2018. (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/world/ 

middleeast/american-warplanes-isis-syria.html) 

These organization tend to be very good organizationally at what 

we are not good at. So asking the question not just about our will, 

but also our organizational design is, in my view, vital. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gartenstein-Ross follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS

MAY 23, 2018 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of 

the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to testify about the threat 

implications as the militant group known as the Islamic State (hereafter ISIS) 

moves into the post-caliphate phase of its existence. 

The collapse of ISIS’s ‘‘caliphate’’ is indeed an important milestone for the region, 

and will reduce both the threat of ISIS’s external operations (that is, terrorist plots 

abroad) and the extraordinary appeal that ISIS displayed in electrifying jihadist 

sympathizers and inspiring lone-actor attacks across the globe. When it controlled 

significant territory spanning Syria and Iraq, ISIS brutalized the population under 

its yoke, openly boasted of instituting sex slavery, adopted genocidal policies toward 

the Yazidis and other religious minorities, and planned large-scale terrorist attacks 

across the world. The fact that the group no longer controls its own proto-state is 

a positive turn of events that is hard to understate. But recent geopolitical developments have provided ISIS with breathing room. And even if ISIS’s decline were continuing apace, ISIS is not the whole of the jihadist movement, which remains in a 

relatively strong position. ISIS’s territorial decline should be understood in the context of a larger movement that remains dynamic, adaptable, and dangerous, and 

that has grown significantly in strength since the 2011 ‘‘Arab Spring’’ revolutions. 

Further, technological advances and geopolitical developments have helped to enhance the global jihadist movement in definable ways. 

My testimony addresses five critical points that I believe can inform how we 

should understand and address the threat implications of jihadism after the fall of 

ISIS’s caliphate: 

1. Recent geopolitical developments have given ISIS important breathing room. 

2. ISIS’s ability to preserve or reestablish its ‘‘virtual planner’’ model of external 

operations will have a significant impact on the threat that the group will pose 

against the United States and other Western countries. 

3. The global jihadist movement’s overall trajectory is one of growth, not of decline. 

4. Al-Qaeda has exploited the heightened counterterrorism focus on ISIS in recent 

years. 

5. Tackling jihadists’ exploitation of consumer-oriented technological advances will 

be critical to mitigating the threat in the future. 

RECENT GEOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS HAVE SLOWED ISIS’S DECLINE

ISIS began to experience a precipitous territorial collapse in 2017. When a militant group that had previously held territory experiences sudden decline, as ISIS 

did, the speed of its decline is often determinative of the extent to which it is able 

to preserve its most critical functions. ISIS will scramble to preserve its key leaders, 

as much of its forces as possible, its capacity for external operations, its monetary 

assets, and records necessary to allow the group to reestablish a viable network, all 

while trying to keep critical information away from adversaries trying to kill or capture its members. 

ISIS’s rapid collapse continued until recent months, but the group’s losses are now 

being reversed to some extent. One demonstration of this fact is the recent admission of Col. Ryan Dillon, the spokesman for the American-led coalition against ISIS, 

to the New York Times. Col. Dillon said that ‘‘he and senior coalition commanders 

are now saying the coalition and its Syrian militia partners have reclaimed more 

than 90 percent of the territory the Islamic State captured in Iraq and Syria in 

2014, instead of the 98 percent figure officials have been using for weeks.’’1 In other 

words, the relevant metric concerning ISIS’s territorial loss appears to be moving 

in the wrong direction, at least for now. 

The key reason why ISIS has experienced recent gains is the major offensive that 

Tukey launched in northern Syria against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units 

19 

2For an informative snapshot of the Turkish offensive, see: Martin Chulov, ‘‘Syria’s New Exiles: Kurds Flee Afrin After Turkish Assault,’’ The Guardian (London), March 18, 2018. (https:// 

www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/18/syrias-new-exiles-kurds-flee-afrin-after-turkish-assault) 3The most significant militant group operating in this area is the White Banners (Al-Rayat 

al-Bayda), which is accurately referred to as ‘‘shadowy’’ in press coverage. See discussion in: 

Borzou Daragahi, ‘‘After the Black Flag of ISIS, Iraq Now Faces the White Flags,’’ BuzzFeed, April, 1, 2018. (https://www.buzzfeed.com/borzoudaragahi/isis-iraq-white-flags-syria-newname?utmlterm=.maLzwqZq0#.htO9ZMAM6); Jeff Schogol, ‘‘A ‘Post-ISIS Insurgency’ is Gaining Steam in Northern Iraq, Analysts Say,’’ Task & Purpose, April 24, 2018. (https:// 

taskandpurpose.com/post-isis-insurgency-is-gaining-steam-in-iraq/) 4See discussion in: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Blackman, ‘‘ISIL’s Virtual Planners: A Critical Terrorist Innovation,’’ War on the Rocks, January 4, 2017. (https:// 

warontherocks.com/2017/01/isils-virtual-planners-a-critical-terrorist-innovation/) 5For a good synopsis of the ineffectiveness of DIY terrorism a decade ago, see: Emily Hunt, 

‘‘Virtual Incompetence,’’ The Weekly Standard, August 17, 2006. (http:// 

www.weeklystandard.com/virtual-incompetence/article/13724) 

(YPG) earlier this year.2 The Turkish assault diverted the highly effective YPG from 

its advance into ISIS’s territory, and has no doubt given ISIS more breathing room. 

In turn, this gives ISIS a better chance of preserving some of the vital functions 

enumerated above, including leadership, forces, external operations capabilities, and 

finances. 

The Turkish offensive into Afrin is not the only recent offensive against Kurdish 

actors that has helped militants to regroup. The Iraqi government’s military offensive against the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) following its independence 

referendum in October 2017 depleted the KRG’s effectiveness in eradicating ISIS 

and other militant groups in northern Iraq. Outgunned by Baghdad, the Kurdish 

Peshmerga were quickly overpowered and were forced to withdraw from, among 

other places, the strategic Hamrin mountains in Iraq’s northeast Diyala region. The 

Hamrin traditionally served as a stronghold for al-Qaeda in Iraq and other anti-government groups. Prior to the Baghdad-directed assault, KRG forces controlled the 

mountains, limiting their use as a militant safe haven. It is no coincidence that we 

have seen a significant uptick in militant activity in that area following Iraq’s offensive: After the KRG’s withdrawal, Iraqi government forces declined to set up a presence across the mountains, leaving a vacuum of authority.3

In addition to the recent breathing space that ISIS and other militant groups 

have gained, militants are likely to capitalize on festering Sunni grievances in Iraq. 

In the campaign to roll back ISIS gains in Iraq, many Sunnis (Arab or Turkmen) 

were forcibly displaced by the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), 

just as a large number of Kurds have been displaced by Shiite Arabs since the PMF 

helped Iraq’s government to suppress the KRG last year. Tens of thousands of 

young men with military training (ISIS or Peshmerga) now stand in limbo, and 

could potentially be spurred to action by a charismatic and well-resourced patron. 

The electoral success of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sairoon Alliance, as well as the significant influence that Iran wields inside Iraq, could further fuel the attractiveness of 

Sunni militancy. 

ISIS’S ABILITY TO PRESERVE ITS VIRTUAL PLANNER MODEL IS CRITICAL

It is extremely likely that ISIS’s ability to launch complex attacks abroad, such 

as the November 2015 Paris attacks, will decline significantly in the short to medium term. However, in recent years we have seen ISIS pioneer a new model of external operations, dubbed the ‘‘virtual planner’’ model, which combines easy accessibility to operatives via social media with advances in end-to-end encryption.4 While 

ISIS’s territorial losses will significantly constrain its capacity to launch attacks 

that rely on traditional safe havens, it is more likely that the militant group will 

be able to preserve or reestablish its virtual planner attack model. 

The virtual planner model allows on-line operatives to provide the same offerings 

that were once the domain of physical networks, including recruitment, coordinating 

the target and timing of attacks, and even providing technical assistance on topics 

like bomb-making. In this manner, ISIS has engineered a process by which the 

group’s operatives can directly guide lone attackers from thousands of miles away. 

The virtual planner model is a highly significant development, as it has helped 

transform lone attackers relying on the internet from the bungling wannabes of a 

decade ago into something much more dangerous.5 The operatives who are recruited 

and coached by virtual planners have been seamlessly incorporated into jihadist 

groups’ global strategy in a way that ‘‘lone wolves’’ never were before. 

In many ways, ISIS’s virtual planner model is an outgrowth of, and improvement 

upon, the radical preacher Anwar al-Awlaki’s approach. Awlaki, an official and 

20 

6See: Peter Finn, ‘‘Al-Awlaki Directed Christmas ‘Underwear Bomber’ Plot, Justice Department Memo Says,’’ The Washington Post, February 10, 2012. (https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-awlaki-directed-christmas-underwearbomber-plot-justice-department-memo-says/2012/02/10/gIQArDOt4Qlstory.html?utmlterm- =.805626d41421) 7See discussion in: J.M. Berger, ‘‘The Metronome of Apocalyptic Time: Social Media as Carrier 

Wave for Millenarian Contagion,’’ Perspectives on Terrorism, 2015. (http:// 

www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/444/html) 8 ‘‘Yusuf al-Hindi: The Mysterious Islamic State Recruiter in India Who’s Got Intel Agencies 

Worried,’’ First Post, July 19, 2016. (https://www.firstpost.com/world/yusuf-al-hindi-mysterious-islamic-state-recruiter-in-india-whos-got-intel-agencies-worried-2902536.html). 9Quoted in: Stacy Meichtry and Sam Schechner, ‘‘How Islamic State Weaponized the Chat 

App to Direct Attacks on the West,’’ The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2016. (https:// 

www.wsj.com/articles/how-islamic-state-weaponized-the-chat-app-to-direct-attacks-on-the-west1476955802) 10Thomas Joscelyn, ‘‘Terror Plots in Germany, France Were ‘Remote-Controlled’ by Islamic 

State Operatives,’’ FDD’s Long War Journal, September 24, 2016. (https:// 

www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/terror-plots-in-germany-france-were-remote-controlled-by-islamic-state-operatives.php) 

propagandist for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), became notorious for 

using the internet to call for lone-wolf attacks. He hoped that lone-wolf attackers 

would complement, rather than replace, al-Qaeda’s centrally-directed plots—some of 

which, such as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s Christmas Day 2009 underwear bomb 

plot, Awlaki himself helped to plan.6 Through his public statements, particularly his 

infamous YouTube sermons, Awlaki mobilized scores of people, even after a U.S. airstrike took Awlaki’s life in 2011. Recent plots influenced (at least in part) by Awlaki 

include the September 2016 bombings in New York and New Jersey, the 2016 shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, the 2015 San Bernardino attack, and the 

2013 Boston Marathon bombings. Yet despite his skill as an inspirational figure, all 

Awlaki could do was put out the call and hope someone would take up arms in response. He was a product of the age of mass communication and global 

interconnectivity, but even Awlaki’s superb oratorical skills could not match the 

feelings of ‘‘remote intimacy’’ with people halfway across the world that can be fostered through social media, or the volume and two-way nature of communications 

that medium allows.7 As one example of the strength of social media-based recruitment activities, Indian intelligence officials believe that ISIS’s South Asia virtual 

planner, Yusuf al-Hindi, was in touch with over 800 Indians through Facebook and 

WhatsApp.8 While ISIS’s various propagandists seemingly lacked the same kind of 

raw magnetism that Awlaki had for English speakers, they had the advantage of 

exploiting a medium that is simply more engrossing due to the constant contact it 

allows. 

This continuous contact seemingly allowed a higher recruitment rate than the essentially one-way communication of video postings. By building an ‘‘intimate’’ relationship with the potential attacker, the virtual planner provides encouragement 

and validation, addressing the individual’s doubts and hesitations. Virtual planners 

can replicate the same social pressures that exist in in-person cells. As Peter Weinberger of the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism put it, ‘‘People will get in these chat rooms and 

they will feel like they have a relationship with someone. That’s where the peerto-peer contact is drawing them in.’’9

In some instances, virtual planners have been in contact with attackers until the 

very moment of the attack, supporting and prodding these individuals into action 

even when they grew hesitant. In a July 2016 suicide bombing outside a concert in 

Ansbach, Germany, attacker Mohammad Daleel told the virtual planner with whom 

he was communicating that he found the security measures outside the concert 

daunting. The Long War Journal reports their ensuring conversation: 

‘‘The unnamed operative told Daleel . . . to look for an appropriate place to put his 

bomb and then try to ‘disappear into the crowd.’ The jihadist egged Daleel on, saying the asylum-seeker should ‘break through police cordons,’ run away and ‘do it.’ 

‘‘ ‘Pray for me,’ Daleel wrote at one point. ‘You do not know what is happening with 

me right now,’ Daleel typed, in an apparent moment of doubt. 

‘‘ ‘Forget the festival and go over to the restaurant,’ the handler responded. ‘Hey 

man, what is going on with you? Even if just two people were killed, I would do 

it. Trust in Allah and walk straight up to the restaurant.’ ’’10

And that is what Daleel did. He walked into a wine bar and blew himself up, injuring 15 people. Had Daleel not been communicating with a virtual planner up 

until the moment of attack, his cold feet very likely would have prevented him from 

completing his terrorist mission. 

21 

11Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, ‘‘Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment,’’ Testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, May 7, 2015. (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/ 

GartensteinlRosslHSGAClTestimonylJihad2.0.pdf) 12See discussion in: Thomas Joscelyn, ‘‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Backs Jihadists 

Fighting Islamic State in Derna, Libya,’’ FDD’s Long War Journal, July 9, 2015. (https:// 

www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/07/al-qaeda-in-the-islamic-maghreb-backs-jihadistsfighting-islamic-state-in-derna-libya.php) 

In the past, virtual planners were integrated into ISIS’s geographical command 

structure. ISIS’s virtual planners were assigned areas of responsibility according to 

their nationality and linguistic skills, and tasked with actively recruiting and handling attackers from those areas. The decision to assign virtual planners to geographic areas with which they were familiar allowed them to reach back to contacts 

they still had in the domestic militant scene. 

So will ISIS’s virtual planner model survive into its post-caliphate phase? On the 

one hand, the main equipment that virtual planners require is an internet connection and good encryption, which militates in favor of the model surviving. On the 

other hand, there are at least a couple of countervailing considerations that will create complications for ISIS’s efforts to make this model continue with the same 

tempo and the same deadly results. First, it is no coincidence that ISIS’s most 

prominent virtual planners were based in its caliphate territory. While an internet 

connection and encryption are theoretically all that a virtual planner requires, the 

fact that virtual planners in ISIS’s territory were not forced to constantly run from 

authorities helped them to focus on their external operations tasks. Further, the virtual planners were in close proximity to all the expertise they needed to help their 

operatives do their jobs, if those operatives needed technical assistance. The geographic dispersion of ISIS’s virtual planners may diminish the model’s effectiveness. 

Second, the available evidence suggests that ISIS’s model is losing a considerable 

amount, though not all, of its luster. ISIS recruitment and plots are in decline, a 

drop that is particularly noticeable in the United States. This fact is consistent with 

predictions I made in previous testimony before the U.S. Senate, when I described 

ISIS’s appeal as a ‘‘winner’s message.’’11 As ISIS’s ability to portray itself as a winning organization declines, so too does its ability to recruit and inspire attacks. 

Thus, ISIS’s plummeting fortunes may also hamper the virtual planner model. However, it is worth noting that new high-profile attacks or a major territorial advance—such as the advance that overran the city of Marawi in the Philippines for 

several months last year—could breathe new life into virtual planner efforts. 

The continuation of the virtual planner model, including the tempo, success, and 

lethality of virtual planner attacks, will be a leading indicator of the continuing external operations threat that ISIS poses in its post-caliphate manifestation. 

GLOBAL JIHADISM’S GROWTH

As noted at the beginning of this testimony, the global jihadist movement’s overall 

trajectory is one of growth, not of decline. One factor that for years has been highly 

relevant to analysts’ evaluation of the threats posed by jihadist groups has been the 

presence of ungoverned spaces that they can use as safe havens. Such spaces allow 

jihadist organizations to establish key organizational functions, train recruits, communicate, and plan terrorist plots or insurgent military operations relatively 

unimpeded. Ungoverned spaces that jihadist groups can exploit continue to play a 

larger role in the geopolitical picture than they did at the time of the Arab Spring 

revolutions, and this remains true even after ISIS’s territorial collapse. 

While ISIS is the group that observers associate most closely with the holding of 

territory, several different jihadist groups now hold or contest territory, even in 

Syria. In Libya, the government could never reestablish its writ after the fall of 

Muammar Qaddafi’s regime in 2011. Jihadists have predictably exploited this situation. ISIS succeeded in capturing and holding the city of Sirte for months, while 

other jihadist groups have experienced even more sustained success. The Abu Salim 

Martyrs Brigade (ASMB) and the Mujahedin Shura Council (MSC), an umbrella organization in which ASMB plays a leading role, have been major players in the eastern coastal city of Derna, frequently exercising control over it. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb officially endorsed the MSC in July 2015.12 Jihadists also have significant operating space in Yemen despite the United States escalating its kinetic 

campaign against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As the New York Times recently reported, ‘‘the threat of a terrorist attack—with the most commonly feared 

22 

13 Eric Schmitt and Saeed al-Batati, ‘‘The U.S. Has Pummeled Al Qaeda in Yemen. But the 

Threat is Barely Dented,’’ The New York Times, December 30, 2017. (https://www.nytimes.com/ 

2017/12/30/world/middleeast/yemen-al-qaeda-us-terrorism.html) 14See: Dan Lamothe, ‘‘ ‘Probably the Largest’ al-Qaeda Training Camp Ever Destroyed in Afghanistan,’’ The Washington Post, October 30, 2015. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 

checkpoint/wp/2015/10/30/probably-the-largest-al-qaeda-training-camp-ever-destroyed-in-afghanistan/?utmlterm=.afd665dd3af8) 15See discussion in, for example: Krishnadev Calamur, ‘‘ISIS in Afghanistan is Like a Balloon 

that Won’t Pop,’’ The Atlantic, December 28, 2017. (https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 

archive/2017/12/afghanistan-isis/549311/) 16 Joby Warrick, ‘‘Double Game? Even as it Battles ISIS, Turkey Gives Other Extremists Shelter,’’ The Washington Post, July 10, 2016. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/double-game-even-as-it-battles-isis-turkey-gives-other-extremists-shelter/2016/07/10/ 

8d6ce040-4053-11e6-a66f-aa6c1883b6b1lstory.html?utmlterm=.93214ed047f5). 17See discussion in: Hassanein Tawfik Ibrahim, ‘‘The Rise and Fall of Militant Islamic Groups 

in Egypt,’’ Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, Ed. Klejda Mulaj (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2010). 18Declan Walsh and Nour Youssef, ‘‘Militants Kill 305 at Sufi Mosque in Egypt’s Deadliest 

Terrorist Attack,’’ The New York Times, November 24, 2017. 19The arguments in this section are adapted from a longer piece that I co-authored. For a 

more in-depth explanation of how al-Qaeda has been able to exploit ISIS’s rise, see: Daveed 

Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, ‘‘How al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic State Challenge,’’ 

Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, March 1, 2017. (https://www.hudson.org/research/12788- 

how-al-qaeda-survived-the-islamic-state-challenge) 

target a commercial airliner—emanating from the chaotic, ungoverned spaces of 

Yemen remains high on the government’s list of terrorism concerns.’’13

Both Mali and Somalia face burgeoning jihadist-led insurgencies. In Somalia, African Union forces have already begun to reduce their numbers, bolstering the 

jihadist group al-Shabaab’s hopes that it could again become the dominant military 

force in southern Somalia. In the place where the ‘‘global war on terror’’ began— 

Afghanistan/Pakistan—not only has the Taliban been gaining ground, but available 

evidence, including the discovery of a 30-square-mile al-Qaeda training facility near 

Kandahar, suggests that the Taliban has not severed its ties to al-Qaeda.14 ISIS has 

also established a foothold in Afghanistan, where it has been responsible for a string 

of mass-casualty terrorist attacks.15 And although it does not fit the mold of other 

safe havens, which are typically made possible by ungoverned spaces, Turkey merits 

a mention. In recent years, U.S. officials have openly expressed alarm about Turkey’s growing willingness to shelter violent jihadists, including those connected to 

al-Qaeda.16

In addition to ungoverned spaces and safe havens, jihadism has experienced 

growth in areas where it had previously been marginalized. Prior to the outbreak 

of the Arab Spring, analysts held that Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak had defeated the 

country’s militant Islamic groups after they overplayed their hand in the 1997 

Luxor massacre.17 Today, jihadism has powerfully reemerged, and there are more 

frequent attacks than ever before by militant groups like ISIS’s Wilayat Sinai, including the devastating November 2017 attack on a Sufi mosque in northern Sinai 

that claimed over 300 lives.18 In countries like Tunisia and Jordan, jihadism has 

moved from an afterthought to a first-order strategic concern. Meanwhile, there is 

a visible jihadist resurgence from South to Southeast Asia, most dramatically underscored last year by the months-long capture of the Philippine city of Marawi by a 

regional ISIS affiliate. 

As jihadist groups are growing stronger, states face a growing number of challenges. Populations are burgeoning while ecological challenges and resource constraints are growing increasingly burdensome. Some ecological challenges amplify 

one another: Climate change makes food scarcity and water shortages more acute, 

which in turn can contribute to more environmental degradation, such as deforestation, as hungry populations scour for sustenance. Many economies cannot keep up 

with the expectations of their growing populations, while multiple states are saddled 

by unsustainable debt, leaving them with fewer resources to navigate the extraordinary challenges they confront. 

The overall direction of the global jihadist movement is thus one of growth, while 

the states that the movement seeks to topple face growing challenges. 

AL-QAEDA HAS EXPLOITED THE CT FOCUS ON ISIS

For years, while international efforts focused on ISIS, al-Qaeda flew relatively 

below the radar, building its support base in countries like Syria and Yemen, establishing safe havens, destabilizing enemy states, and preparing for a post-ISIS future.19

23 

20Osama bin Ladin, ‘‘Ila Ummati al-Muslima,’’ Al-Sahab (Al-Qaeda), May 19, 2011. 21 Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, ‘‘The People’s Revolt... The Fall of Corrupt Arab 

Regimes... The Demolition of the Idol of Stability... and the New Beginning,’’ distributed 

by the Global Islamic Media Front, February 16, 2011. 22See contemporaneous discussion in: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Aaron Zelin, ‘‘How the 

Arab Spring’s Prisoner Releases Have Helped the Jihadi Cause,’’ The Atlantic, October 11, 2012. 

(http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/10/how-the-arab-springs-prisoner-releases-have-helped-the-jihadi-cause/263469/); Hani al-Siba’i, in particular, chronicled these prisoner releases as they were occurring in the midst of the regional upheaval. See: Hani al-Siba’i, 

‘‘The Release of Prisoners After Nearly Twenty Years of Injustice,’’ Ansar Dawlat al-Iraq alIslamiyah, February 23, 2011; Hani al-Siba’i, ‘‘The Release of a New Batch After Long Years 

Behind Bars,’’ Al-Jahafal, February 27, 2011; Hani al-Siba’i, ‘‘Urgent: The Release of a New 

Batch of Those Charged with Military Verdicts,’’ Ansar Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyah, March 4, 

2011; Al-Maqrizi Center for Historical Studies, ‘‘Names of the Released Detainees from the alAqrab, al-Istiqbal, al-Wadi, and Burj al-Arab Prisons,’’ Shumukh al-Islam Network, March 18, 

2011. 23 Hamid bin Abdallah al-Ali, ‘‘The Joy Lies in the Harvest of the Two Revolutions,’’ posted 

on al-Ali’s official website, February 15, 2011. 24 Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, ‘‘The People’s Revolt.’’ 25Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bridget Moreng, ‘‘An Escalation in Tunisia: How the State 

Went to War with Ansar al-Sharia,’’ War on the Rocks, February 24, 2014. (http:// 

warontherocks.com/2014/02/an-escalation-in-tunisia-how-the-state-went-to-war-with-ansar-alsharia/) 

Even before ISIS’s rise, al-Qaeda had adopted a strategy for growth in the MENA 

region that entailed minimizing the amount of attention the group attracted. AlQaeda’s strategists saw the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions as ‘‘a great historical 

event,’’ to quote bin Laden’s only public statement on the uprisings.20 Al-Qaeda’s 

strategists assessed the uprisings as significant in part because they were a ‘‘historical opportunity’’ for the salafi jihadist movement, as senior al-Qaeda official Atiyah 

Abd al-Rahman put it in a February 2011 statement.21 Al-Qaeda strategists calculated that the political turmoil and instability of the post-revolutionary environment would play to the group’s strengths. Further, dozens to hundreds of veteran 

jihadists were released from prison during and after the region’s revolutions, giving 

al-Qaeda an immediate infusion of experienced manpower.22

Al-Qaeda also concluded that political dynamics in post-revolutionary countries 

had created a fertile environment for the group to expand its support base, and to 

introduce new populations to its theology and ideology. Post-revolutionary governments sought to distinguish themselves from their authoritarian predecessors by 

lifting restrictions on religious expression. Al-Qaeda saw this as an opportunity, as 

it allowed the group to publicly disseminate its salafi jihadist views to the general 

public in post-revolutionary states without fear of an immediate crackdown. As 

Hamid bin Abdallah al-Ali, a Kuwait-based jihadist commentator, remarked: ‘‘The 

Islamic project [will be] the greatest beneficiary from the environment of freedom.’’23

Al-Qaeda strategists directed supporters in Tunisia, Egypt, and other post-revolutionary countries to engage in dawa (evangelism), and to ‘‘spring into action and initiate or increase their preaching, education, reformation and revitalization in light 

of the freedom and opportunities now available in this post revolution era.’’24

This is where the group’s emphasis on minimizing the attention that it attracted 

came into play. Al-Qaeda calculated that use of its own moniker could alienate potential supporters and invite negative attention from Western counterterrorism actors. Al-Qaeda thus established or supported groups with ambiguous names, including Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and Libya, to mask its presence and spearhead its 

public campaign in new places. Thus, the group’s political operatives focused on 

dawa: Preaching, providing social services, and gaining the support of local populations. These political efforts were designed in part to lay the groundwork for an 

eventual military confrontation with the state. Al-Qaeda’s emphasis on dawa and 

community outreach allowed it to amass a considerable following in Libya and Tunisia. A 2012 conference in Tunisia hosted by Ansar al-Sharia, for example, drew between 3,000 and 10,000 participants.25 In this way, al-Qaeda came to maintain a 

presence in almost every country that experienced significant turmoil during the 

Arab uprisings. 

After this initial stage of growth, ISIS’s emergence as a jihadist competitor presented al-Qaeda with a challenge unlike any other the group had encountered. 

Among other challenges, ISIS’s rapid ascent threatened to disrupt al-Qaeda’s deliberate growth model, and oust al-Qaeda from its position of supremacy over the 

jihadist movement. ISIS’s strategy was diametrically opposed to al-Qaeda’s. While 

al-Qaeda often grew through clandestine means, ISIS stole the spotlight at every 

opportunity. ISIS built a robust propaganda apparatus suited for the digital age, 

pumping out a constant stream of videos, photos, and statements advertising its vicVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:28 Nov 19, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0523\HM143000.TXT HEATH
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26See: Clint Watts, ‘‘Al Qaeda Loses Touch,’’ Foreign Affairs, February 4, 2015. (https:// 

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2015-02-04/al-qaeda-loses-touch) 27The Al-Jazeera documentary featuring al-Muhajir can be found at: https:// 

www.youtube.com/watch?v=ODlA3CHzvjQ. 28Shiv Malik, Mustafa Khalili, Spencer Ackerman, and Ali Younis, ‘‘How Isis Crippled AlQaida,’’ The Guardian (UK), June 10, 2015. (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/ 

10/how-isis-crippled-al-qaida) 29 Ayesha Amr, ‘‘How al Qaeda Rules in Yemen,’’ Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2015. (https:// 

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2015-10-28/how-al-qaeda-rules-yemen) 30One of the most important studies on this issue, by political scientists Jacob Shapiro and 

Nils Weidmann, used micro-level data from Iraq to compare trends in cellphone network penetration with insurgent violence. The trends in declining violence that Shapiro and Weidmann 

found suggested ‘‘that cellphone coverage reduces insurgent violence largely because it enhances 

voluntary information flow from noncombatants to counterinsurgents by reducing the risks of 

informing.’’ Jacob N. Shapiro and Nils B. Weidmann, ‘‘Is the Phone Mightier Than the Sword?: 

Cellphones and Insurgent Violence in Iraq,’’ International Organization, March 2015, page 271. 

tories that were widely disseminated by its social media legions. With this brash 

approach, ISIS openly wooed al-Qaeda’s affiliates, attempting to absorb its parent’s 

global network. 

It was widely assumed at the time that the only way al-Qaeda could remain influential was by replicating ISIS’s conspicuous model—for example, by carrying out 

spectacular terrorist attacks to reassert the group’s relevance.26 But rather than 

trying to replicate ISIS’s model, al-Qaeda took the opposite approach. Al-Qaeda reduced its public profile, downplayed its successes rather than publicizing them, and 

embedded further within local populations. In this way, al-Qaeda presented itself 

to the world as a more palatable alternative to its bloodthirsty rival. 

The interactions al-Qaeda leaders had with the media provide a valuable lens 

through which to understand the group’s strategy for benefiting from ISIS’s rise. In 

a discussion with an Al-Jazeera documentarian in early 2015, Abu Sulayman alMuhajir, a high-ranking Nusra Front religious official who hails from Australia, accused ISIS of ‘‘delegitimizing’’ other Sunni Muslim groups.27 Muhajir contrasted 

ISIS with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front, which he portrayed as trying to ‘‘restore the right of the Muslim people to choose their leaders’’ in Syria. Further, in 

June 2015, the Guardian published an extended interview with Abu Muhammad alMaqdisi and Abu Qatada, two of al-Qaeda’s most senior religious figures, that revealed another remarkable aspect of al-Qaeda’s strategy. Rather than trying to convince the audience of al-Qaeda’s strength or continued relevance, they instead concentrated on fueling the illusion that ISIS had already destroyed al-Qaeda. Maqdisi 

claimed that al-Qaeda’s organizational structure had ‘‘collapsed,’’ while Qatada alleged that al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri had become ‘‘isolated.’’28

Consistent with these media themes, when al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP) seized control of the Yemeni port city of Mukalla, the group appointed a 

local council, known as the Hadhrami Domestic Council, to govern the city. Initially 

AQAP adopted a gradualist, rather lenient approach to the implementation of 

Sharia law (though it eventually began cracking down more heavily on Sharia violations).29 In this way, AQAP tried to win over local Yemenis. 

Ultimately, al-Qaeda was able to make some gains based on its response to ISIS’s 

rise. While ISIS horrified the world and alienated Sunni Muslims with its excessive 

violence and brutality, al-Qaeda appealed to local populations and other armed factions by casting itself as a less extreme, more tolerable, and more effective alternative to ISIS. At the same time, al-Qaeda avoided advertising its victories, and resisted the temptation to engage in a bloody battle for supremacy with ISIS. 

TACKLING JIHADISTS’ EXPLOITATION OF CONSUMER-ORIENTED TECHNOLOGICAL

ADVANCES

Turning from the present threat to what we may face in the future, anticipating 

and mitigating jihadists’ ability to leverage technological advances is critical. Technology has historically had an ambiguous impact on sub-state violence. On the one 

hand, states can leverage new advances, including for surveillance purposes and 

gathering information from local populations.30 On the other hand, militant groups 

can capitalize on these same platforms. But many key recent advances appear to, 

on the whole, favor jihadists. This is likely because the world has witnessed breakthroughs across so many spheres—including social media, encrypted end-to-end 

communication, and consumer drone technology—that exploiting new advances has 

seemingly proven easier for those who would use these technologies for the more 

straightforward task of destruction than for those who want to use them to protect. 

An early post-Arab Spring indication of jihadists’ ability to leverage technological 

advances was the manner in which these groups drove a record number of foreign 

25 

31See discussion in: J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining 

and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter (Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution, 2015). 32 J.M. Berger and Heather Perez, The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: How 

Suspensions Are Limiting the Social Networks of English-Speaking ISIS Supporters (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2016). Since the publication of this study, it has become even more difficult for ISIS and some other jihadist groups to exploit mainstream social 

media platforms, but their migration to alternative platforms has escalated. 33Don Rassler, Muhammad al-‘Ubaydi, and Vera Mironovo, ‘‘The Islamic State’s Drone Documents: Management, Acquisitions, and DIY Tradecraft,’’ CTC Sentinel, January 31, 2017. 

(https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/ctc-perspectives-the-islamic-states-drone-documents-management-acquisitions-and-diy-tradecraft) 34Mike Giglio, ‘‘Inside the Fight for Mosul,’’ BuzzFeed, June 3, 2017. (https:// 

www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/on-the-front-lines-of-the-fight-with-isis?utmlterm=.derRJnBnX#.- 

gy94lZxZ2) 35Peter Dockrill, ‘‘First-Ever Drone Swarm Attack Has Struck Russian Military Bases, 

Sources Claim,’’ Science Alert, January 11, 2018. (http://www.sciencealert.com/swarm-homemade-drones-strike-military-base-first-attack-kind-russia-uavs) 36Stuart Russell, Daniel Dewey, and Max Tegmark, ‘‘Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence,’’ AI Magazine, Winter 2015. (https://futureoflife.org/data/ 

documents/researchlpriorities.pdf?x70892) 

fighters to the Syria-Iraq theater. ISIS, in particular, combined a deft exploitation 

of social media’s potential with breakthroughs in do-it-yourself video production 

techniques to craft slick and effective propaganda.31 Suspensions of pro-ISIS accounts by service providers later reduced, but did not eliminate, the returns that 

ISIS could expect from social media.32 As I explained earlier in this testimony, 

ISIS’s exploitation of social media would ultimately lend itself to the highly effective 

virtual planner model. 

There are also technological advances that jihadist groups have not yet employed 

in Western countries, but that they have already begun using in Iraq and Syria. 

In January 2017, researchers from West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center and 

Harvard University’s Belfer Center published an article examining documents that 

the Iraqi military had captured that shed light on ISIS’s program for developing and 

enhancing its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities.33 They found that ISIS 

had ‘‘a formal, institutionalized, and resourced drone unit as early as 2015,’’ and 

that the group already planned to use UAVs in an offensive capacity. And ISIS did 

indeed use UAVs for military purposes. BuzzFeed’s Mike Giglio did some valuable 

embedded reporting from Iraq during the campaign to push ISIS from its territorial 

stronghold. In a report published in June 2017, he graphically described ISIS’s use 

of UAVs against Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force (ICTF) fighters with whom he was 

embedded: 

‘‘ISIS drones swarm overhead as the battalion’s convoy pushes into the outskirts of 

western Mosul the next morning. One after another they drop grenades, wreaking 

havoc as soldiers fire their weapons wildly into the sky. From one of the Humvees, 

I watch as the battalion’s portly cook makes his lunch rounds in an armored truck, 

driving up and down the convoy to deliver Styrofoam boxes of food. The drones track 

him, dropping grenades as soldiers gather to collect the boxes. They are remotely 

piloted by militants who weave in and out of civilian neighborhoods on motorbikes 

to take cover from airstrikes. ISIS also uses the video feeds on the drones to coordinate mortars and car bombs. On the front lines, its fighters are standing their 

ground, and soldiers at the head of the convoy can hear them shouting, ‘Allahu 

Akbar.’ ’’34

In January of this year, Russian forces in Syria destroyed a swarm of 13 improvised UAVs as they approached the Khmeimim air base and Tartus naval facility 

to carry out an attack. Though no Russian forces were killed, this fact should not 

cause undue complacency: As militant groups innovate, their early efforts often 

seem to be failures, but instead are sometimes better understood as steps in the 

learning process. Moreover, the Russian investigation of the UAVs revealed their 

impressive range. The UAVs were ‘‘launched from a site more than 50 kilometres 

(31 miles) distant from their targets,’’ and had a 62-mile attacking range.35

The militant uses I have outlined of social media, encryption, and drones illustrate a key pattern: As a consumer technology becomes widely available, terrorists 

will look for ways to adapt it. Looking to the future, artificial intelligence (AI) will 

almost certainly end up fitting into this pattern. Like drones, AI will become more 

widely available in commercial markets at reduced costs, and individuals will be 

able to modify and repurpose it.36 AI already enjoys diverse applications, from prodVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:28 Nov 19, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0523\HM143000.TXT HEATH
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37 ‘‘Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing,’’ The Washington Post, April 10, 2018. 

(https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-markzuckerbergs-senate-hearing/?utmlterm=.d7f4a1d66685&noredirect=on) 38Farah Samti and Declan Walsh, ‘‘Tunisian Clash Spreads Fear that Libyan War is Spilling 

Over,’’ The New York Times, March 7, 2016. (https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/08/world/africa/attack-tunisia-libya-border.html) 39Max Tegmark, Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, Kindle ed. (New 

York: Knopf, 2017), loc. 2142 of 6579. 40 John Markoff, ‘‘As Artificial Intelligence Evolves, So Does Its Criminal Potential,’’ The New 

York Times, October 23, 2016. (https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/technology/artificial-intelligence-evolves-with-its-criminal-potential.html) 41 Ibid. 42 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 

Report (2004), pages 339–48. 

ucts like Apple’s Siri, to voice-to-text, to Facebook’s counter-extremism detection systems.37

So how might terrorists use AI? Perhaps they will start with social-network mapping. ISIS’s early battlefield victories were enabled, in part, by ex-Baathist intelligence operatives who mapped a city’s key players and power brokers, monitored 

their pattern of life, and then helped ISIS to arrest or kill them. Similarly, when 

North African ISIS operatives attacked the Tunisian town of Ben Gardane in March 

2016, the available evidence—including the efficient way they killed key security officials—suggested that the militants had similarly worked to learn the human terrain in advance.38 Will social networks built using AI capabilities reduce the intelligence burden on militant groups and make it easier for them to conquer towns and 

cities? What of the next generation of terror drones? Will they use AI-enabled 

swarming to become more powerful and deadlier? Will terrorists use self-driving vehicles for their next car bombs and ramming attacks? 

How about assassinations? Max Tegmark’s book Life 3.0 notes the concern of UC 

Berkeley computer scientist Stuart Russell, who worries that the biggest winners 

from an AI arms race would be ‘‘small rogue states and non-state actors such as 

terrorists’’ who can access these weapons through the black market.39 Tegmark 

writes that after they are ‘‘mass-produced, small AI-powered killer drones are likely 

to cost little more than a smartphone.’’ Would-be assassins could simply ‘‘upload 

their target’s photo and address into the killer drone: it can then fly to the destination, identify and eliminate the person, and self-destruct to ensure that nobody 

knows who was responsible.’’ 

Thinking beyond trigger-pulling, artificial intelligence could boost a wide range of 

violent non-state actors’ criminal activities, including extortion and kidnapping, 

through the automation of social engineering attacks.40 The militant recruiters of 

the near-future may boost their on-line radicalization efforts with chatbots, which 

played a ‘‘small but strategic role’’ in shaping the Brexit vote.41

The 9/11 Commission’s report famously devoted an entire section to discussing 

how the 9/11 attacks’ success in part represented a failure in imagination by authorities.42 A failure in imagination as AI, and emergent technologies, become 

cheaper and more widely available could potentially be even costlier. 

CONCLUSION

As I have explained, ISIS’s territorial decline does in fact make us safer. Yet despite ISIS’s decline, the global jihadist movement is not receding, but rather growing, while the states that the movement seeks to topple experience mounting challenges. As I have outlined, the continuity of ISIS’s virtual planner model will be a 

leading-edge indicator of the threat that the organization poses in the short to medium term to the American homeland and other Western states. Meanwhile, alQaeda remains robust, and managed to in many ways turn ISIS’s meteoric ascent 

into a strategic opportunity. 

But as challenging as the current environment is, the rapid improvement and diffusion of a range of consumer technologies will likely allow various terrorist groups 

to pose a greater threat in the future. That is why I closed this testimony by emphasizing how these groups will attempt to exploit emerging technologies. Although 

jihadists currently seem to be getting more out of new technologies than do states, 

the advantages bestowed by new technologies can be understood as a pendulum, 

and states may be able to gain the upper hand in the future. In the interim, we 

should brace ourselves to deal with greater terrorist challenges related to these 

groups’ adoption of new technologies. 

Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

27 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Doctor. I would like to mention, 

this committee will be—I will be introducing an unmanned aerial 

system bill that I hope to mark up out of this committee, and 

thank you for mentioning technology. 

Dr. Geltzer is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF JOSHUA A. GELTZER, FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, NATIONAL SECURITY 

COUNCIL 

Mr. GELTZER. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, 

distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before this committee. It is an honor to do so, especially alongside 

such distinguished witnesses. ISIS’s so-called caliphate in Iraq and 

Syria is shriveling, but it is not gone. The threat posed by ISIS persists and is evolving into new forms as ISIS adapts to the loss of 

its core territorial safe haven. 

I want to focus for now on three particular causes for concern 

about the threat posed by ISIS today. Its continuing hold on territory; its persistent foothold on the internet to recruit and radicalize 

followers; and its potential turn to novel forms of cyberterrorism. 

Regrettably, elements of the Trump administration’s approach to 

all three aspects of today’s ISIS threat appear to be aggravating 

that threat rather than minimizing it. 

The encouraging fact that we are even considering what threat 

ISIS will pose post-caliphate is a testament to both the Obama and 

Trump administration’s relentless execution of the counter-ISIS 

campaign in Iraq and Syria. But the last mile of defeating a terrorist group can be the hardest one. That is a lesson, as others 

have acknowledged already, that the United States learned all too 

well from the remnants of ISIS’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

Today, thousands of ISIS fighters appear to be enjoying a worrisome opportunity to regroup, partly because the United States has 

been unable to keep in the fight against ISIS our key counterterrorism partner on the ground, the Syrian Kurds. That setback reflects the Trump administration’s inability to manage a delicate 

diplomatic balance between the Kurds and the Turkish government. So long as the Kurds remain occupied with defending themselves against Turkey, rather than pursuing ISIS, the group is likely to retain territorial safe haven from which to plot against us, 

and will continue to lay claim to a purported caliphate, the rallying 

cry for ISIS’s continued recruitment efforts via the internet. 

That points toward the second aspect of ISIS’s persistent threat: 

The group’s use of social media, file upload sites, and other modern 

communications platforms to radicalize and mobilize followers 

world-wide. ISIS’s on-line messages has multiple themes, and if 

battlefield losses force the group to shift away from messages emphasizing the holding of territory, the group can pivot toward its 

claim to victimhood. 

Unfortunately, ISIS’s internet-enabled message has resonated 

even here in the United States with individuals such as Omar 

Mateen in Orlando, and Sayfullo Saipov in New York. With territorial holdings dwindling, ISIS’s virtual foothold may increase in 

importance to the group. That is particularly concerning in light of 

28 

aggravating factors for radicalization of the Trump administration’s 

own making. 

Donald Trump, as a Presidential candidate and now as President, has spoken about Islam and Muslims in ways that validate 

ISIS’s attempt to portray the United States as waging war on a religion and its people. Moreover, President Trump has pursued policies that further alienate key communities whose cooperation is 

vital to identifying those who might be vulnerable to ISIS’s appeal, 

and to intervening before such individuals turn to violence. 

Those policies include imposing a travel ban that bears little relation to any real threats, but offends key communities and foreign 

partners alike. Those policies also include withdrawing previously 

awarded grants to organizations dedicated to addressing white supremacists’ brand of violent extremism, giving the distinct impression that the Trump administration is interested in countering terrorism only when it is carried out by groups purporting to act in 

the name of Islam. 

Thus far, radicalization has been ISIS’s primary use of the internet. But that may change as ISIS loses physical territory and looks 

to new forms of cyberterrorism. Such efforts would build on earlier 

ISIS cyber activity, such as the fast and public release of personally identifiable information about U.S. service members. In the 

years since, malicious cyber activity has dramatically increased 

with powerful hacking tools more readily available to non-state actors such as ISIS. Here, too, there is cause for concern that the 

Trump administration is not appropriately tackling the challenge. 

The top position overseeing cyber policy at the White House is 

vacant, and the next most senior cyber position was recently eliminated. If ISIS turns to new types of cyber operations to regain momentum and inflict harm, this lack of leadership to provide strategic guidance and interagency coordination may prove a serious 

vulnerability. 

The crumbling of ISIS’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria is a major 

positive development for U.S. National security, but it is not the 

end of the threat posed by ISIS. With some physical territories still 

under its control, a virtual foothold on the internet still in place, 

and the potential to turn to novel forms of cyberterrorism, ISIS 

represents a continuing danger to Americans at home and abroad. 

All of this would be challenging enough, but the challenge is compounded by aggravating factors of the Trump administration’s own 

making. 

I am grateful for the opportunity to be here, and I look forward 

to the committee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Geltzer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSHUA A. GELTZER

MAY 23, 2018 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, 

thank you for this opportunity to address the persistent threat posed by ISIS even 

as its physical safe haven in Iraq and Syria shrinks and the implications of this persistent threat for the United States and the West. 

ISIS’s purported caliphate in Iraq and Syria is shriveling, but it is not gone. That, 

in itself, poses a continuing threat to the United States, one worsened by the current administration’s inability to keep our key partner in the fight against ISIS. 

Moreover, even as ISIS faces increasing pressure in physical space, it retains a sigVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:28 Nov 19, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0523\HM143000.TXT HEATH
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1 Joshua A. Geltzer, ‘‘The Perils of a Post-ISIS Middle East,’’ The Atlantic, December 27, 2017, 

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/middle-east-isis-syria-kurds-iraniraq-turkey-trump/549227/. 2 Joshua A. Geltzer, ‘‘When Diplomacy Disappears,’’ Foreign Policy, April 18, 2018, http:// 

foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/18/when-diplomacy-disappears-counterterrorism-isis-syria-turkeykurds-ypg-pkk-erdogan-trump/. 3 Eric Schmitt, ‘‘American Warplanes Shift Tactics to Target Last ISIS Pockets in Eastern 

Syria,’’ The New York Times, April 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/world/ 

middleeast/american-warplanes-isis-syria.html. 4 Yaroslav Trofimov, ‘‘Faraway ISIS Branches Grow as ‘Caliphate’ Fades in Syria and Iraq,’’ 

The Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/faraway-isis-branchesgrow-as-caliphate-fades-in-syria-and-iraq-1526558401. 

nificant foothold in virtual space, and will utilize the global following that it has 

built through the internet to continue to reach into the United States to recruit and 

radicalize followers. That threat is, unfortunately, also aggravated by factors of our 

own current leadership’s making, with both rhetoric and policies that are alienating 

key communities. Finally, ISIS could turn to new forms of attacks against American 

targets, including novel types of cyber operations, against which the United States 

appears to be lagging in its preparation. 

ISIS’S CONTINUING HOLD ON TERRITORY IN SYRIA

That ISIS has been dislodged from almost all of the territory that it once held 

in Iraq and Syria is a tremendous accomplishment for which both the Obama and 

Trump administrations deserve major credit. From the work of our military on the 

ground and in the skies to target ISIS fighters, to the work of our diplomats to build 

and maintain an unprecedented coalition of partners, to the work of our intelligence 

community to track and locate key ISIS figures, to the work of our law enforcement 

and homeland security professionals to constrain the flow of Americans to the battlefield as foreign fighters, the progress achieved in the counter-ISIS campaign reflects the remarkable capability and dedication of America’s National security officials. 

But, as I have noted elsewhere, ‘‘the last mile of defeating a terrorist group can 

be the hardest one, as the United States learned all too well from the lingering remnants of ISIS’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq.’’1 And, with respect to ISIS today, 

thousands of fighters appear to be enjoying a worrisome opportunity to regroup. 

That is in significant part because the United States has lost its key counterterrorism partner on the ground in Syria, the Syrian Kurds, a major setback that reflects the current administration’s inability to manage a delicate diplomatic balance 

between them and the Turkish government. Since the earliest days of the counterISIS campaign, Washington has had to address both Turkish fears and Syrian 

Kurdish ambitions so as to retain, on the one hand, a key counter-ISIS and NATO 

partner in Turkey and, on the other hand, a vital counterterrorism ground force in 

the Syrian Kurds. In recent months, this delicate but essential arrangement has 

fallen apart, with the Turks bombing Kurds in the northern Syrian city of Afrin 

and, in response, fellow Kurds turning away from their pursuit of ISIS into the Euphrates River Valley to defend their brethren against the Turks. All told, and as 

I have explained at greater length elsewhere, ‘‘the Trump administration’s inability 

to continue managing the tensions between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds is providing the Islamic State with the time and space to regroup and pose a resurgent 

threat to the United States and the rest of the world.’’2

While one recent report suggests that a small number of those partner forces 

might be returning to the counter-ISIS fight, most appear still to have abandoned 

it, leaving the counter-ISIS campaign ‘‘effectively ground to a halt.’’3 That is a dangerous development for at least two reasons. First, it provides the remaining thousands of ISIS fighters with the type of safe haven that enables ISIS to plot attacks 

and rebuild networks into the West. That means ISIS can continue to use that space 

to hatch plots against us, as well as the safe havens outside Iraq and Syria that 

ISIS has built and even appears to be expanding, especially in parts of Africa and 

Southeast Asia.4 Second, it allows ISIS to continue to lay claim to a purported physical caliphate—the rallying cry for ISIS’s continuing virtual presence intended to recruit and radicalize followers through the internet. That means ISIS can continue 

to inspire attacks wherever its message resonates with vulnerable individuals, including here in the United States—a broader challenge to which I now turn. 

ISIS’S PERSISTENT VIRTUAL PRESENCE

As I have described in more detail elsewhere, while ISIS’s ‘‘claim to a physical 

caliphate helped [ISIS] to grab attention and gain adherents since its 2014 surge, 

30 

5 Joshua A. Geltzer, ‘‘ISIL, al-Qaeda, and What Goes Viral Next: Why Tomorrow’s Jihadist 

Movement Might Not Look so Different from Today’s,’’ Texas National Security Review, March 

20, 2018, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-future-jihadist-movement/#essay4. 6 Charlie Winter, ‘‘The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy,’’ Quilliam, July 2015, www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/fid/2589. 7 Jen Easterly & Joshua A. Geltzer, ‘‘The Islamic State and the End of Lone-Wolf Terrorism,’’ 

Foreign Policy, May 23, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/23/the-islamic-state-and-theend-of-lone-wolf-terrorism/. 8Peter Bergen, ‘‘Jihadist Terrorism 15 Years After 9/11: A Threat Assessment,’’ New America, 

September 8, 2016, https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/policy-papers/jihadistterrorism-15-years-after-911/. 9 Joby Warrick & Souad Mekhennet, ‘‘New Clues Bolster Belief that ISIS Leader Is Still 

Alive—and Busy with a Chilling New Mission,’’ The Washington Post, May 19, 2018, https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-clues-bolster-belief-that-isis-leader-isstill-alive-and-busy-with-a-chilling-new-mission/2018/05/19/83c2a62e-5ad2-11e8-858f12becb4d6067lstory.html?utmlterm=.83a2b7b662b6. 

that message gained swift global traction because of the group’s sophisticated use 

of social media, file-upload sites, and other modern communications platforms to 

radicalize and mobilize followers world-wide.’’5 The crumbling of the physical caliphate will undercut the credibility of key aspects of ISIS’s on-line appeal, but it will 

not undermine the group’s messaging entirely, nor will it dislodge the virtual foothold that ISIS has built for itself on-line, even as leading technology companies have 

taken some meaningful steps to address ISIS’s persistent presence on their platforms. 

That is because ISIS has a multi-faceted recruitment message; and, as battlefield 

losses force it to shift away from on-line messaging emphasizing the holding of territory and the attempt to govern such territory, ISIS can fall back on other themes 

to rally the faithful and appeal to those potentially vulnerable to the group’s outreach. Charlie Winter has identified six such themes: Brutality, mercy, victimhood, 

war, belonging, and utopianism.6 If emphasizing the theme of war appears to ISIS 

less promising for a period of time, at least in relation to battlefield trends in Iraq 

and Syria, then the theme of, for example, victimhood remains available. In this 

sense, ISIS’s message is essentially non-falsifiable: Victories and progress vindicate 

aspects of that message, but setbacks and suffering vindicate other aspects. 

The most important of ISIS’s themes, especially for luring new recruits, may well 

be that of belonging. Alongside the group’s proclaiming of a purported caliphate and 

holding of a wide swath of territory, its most distinctive accomplishment has been 

cultivating a sense of belonging among audience members around the world—even 

many who have never joined the group on the battlefield and do not intend to do 

so. Through visceral appeals to a sense of community grounded in the physical caliphate but extending far beyond it, ISIS has made these followers and supporters 

feel part of something bigger than themselves by belonging to ISIS and its movement. This is why my former White House colleague Jen Easterly and I have objected to the use of ‘‘lone wolves’’ to describe those inspired by ISIS to execute attacks from Orlando to Manchester to Berlin: ‘‘The Islamic State thus offers a chance 

to those who feel alone—those who may lack opportunities or who may simply disagree with the politics or mores of the society around them—not to be lone actors’’ 

but to belong to something bigger instead.7

ISIS’s internet-enabled message has, unfortunately, resonated even here in the 

United States. From American citizen Omar Mateen, who was responsible for the 

death of 50 innocent victims through his assault on Orlando’s Pulse Nightclub, to 

lawful permanent resident Sayfullo Saipov, who has been charged with killing 8 innocent victims with a rental truck in downtown Manhattan last Halloween, some 

who live on U.S. soil have proven susceptible to ISIS’s hateful exhortations of violence. As Peter Bergen has documented, a common link among those who attempt 

or succeed in terrorist activity in the United States is their consumption of terrorist 

recruitment materials on-line.8 ISIS’s ability to reach across National borders and 

into our country to attempt to recruit and radicalize followers is simply not going 

to disappear even as the group’s physical foothold in Iraq and Syria shrinks. If anything, ISIS’s virtual foothold may increase in importance to the group, leading it to 

devote more energy and effort to sustaining and augmenting the sense of belonging 

that ISIS has been able to cultivate among supporters world-wide. Indeed, as ISIS’s 

leadership reportedly focuses on ‘‘crafting an ideological framework that will survive 

the physical destruction of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria,’’9 it seems almost certain 

that the group intends to communicate and propagate that framework in significant 

part on-line. 

31 

10 Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, ‘‘ ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline of Trump’s 

Comments About Islam and Muslims,’’ The Washington Post, May 20, 2017, https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hates-us-a-timelineof-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/?utmlterm=.05443facd771. 11 Joshua A. Geltzer & Stephen Tankel, ‘‘Whatever Happened to Trump’s Counterterrorism 

Policy?’’, The Atlantic, March 1, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 

2018/03/trump-terrorism-iraq-syria-al-qaeda-isis/554333/. 12 Jennie M. Easterly & Joshua A. Geltzer, ‘‘More Die in Bathtubs than in Terrorism. It’s Still 

Worth Spending Billions to Fight It,’’ CNN.com, May 21, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/ 

21/opinions/deadly-bathtub-compared-to-terrorism-opinion-geltzer-easterly/index.html. 13 James R. Clapper, Jr., Joshua A. Geltzer, & Matthew G. Olsen, ‘‘We’ve Worked on Stopping 

Terrorism. Trump’s Travel Ban Fuels It,’’ CNN.com, April 23, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/ 

2018/04/23/opinions/trump-travel-ban-fuels-terrorism-clapper-geltzer-olsen/index.html. 14 Ron Nixon & Eileen Sullivan, ‘‘Revocation of Grants to Help Fight Hate Under New Scrutiny After Charlottesville,’’ The New York Times, August 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/ 

2017/08/15/us/politics/right-wing-extremism-charlottesville.html. 

AGGRAVATING FACTORS OF THE WHITE HOUSE’S OWN MAKING

ISIS’s continuing ability to mobilize potential terrorists here in the United States 

would be concerning enough, but that concern is compounded by rhetoric and policies of the current administration that are making the problem worse. Donald 

Trump, as a Presidential candidate and now as President, has persistently spoken 

about Islam and Muslims in ways that validate ISIS’s attempt to portray the United 

States as waging war on a religion and its people. As a candidate, Donald Trump 

said, ‘‘We have a problem in this country; it’s called Muslims’’; he called for ‘‘a total 

and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States’’; he characterized 

Muslims as ‘‘sick people’’; he stated that ‘‘We’re having problems with the Muslims’’; 

and, regrettably, he has said much more along these lines as well, even as President.10 In addition to being appalling, this sort of language appears to validate 

ISIS’s message and alienates key communities in the United States and abroad 

whose cooperation is vital to identifying those who might be vulnerable to ISIS’s appeal and to intervening before such individuals turn to violence. Moreover, President Trump’s ‘‘habit of stoking fears rather than reassuring the public in the wake 

of terrorist attacks’’11 increases the impact of those attacks precisely as terrorists 

desire, rather than thwarting terrorists’ goal of spreading fear as good counterterrorism strategy demands by ‘‘building resilience [that] can minimize the effects of 

terrorism.’’12

Beyond counterproductive language, President Trump has pursued policies that 

further alienate those communities and make us less safe rather than more. Most 

notable among these is the travel ban, now in its third iteration and under review 

by the Supreme Court. As I wrote recently alongside former Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper and former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center 

Matt Olsen, ‘‘Trump’s travel ban fails to respond to threats to our country and actually undermines our security.’’13 The ban simply is not responsive to real threats: 

no national from any of the countries affected by the ban has caused any of the terrorism-related deaths on U.S. soil since 1975. But the ban does create threats to 

the effectiveness of our country’s counterterrorism efforts. As we explained: 

‘‘The ban is so obviously, palpably, indeed explicitly anti-Muslim in nature that it 

has—understandably—offended Muslim-American communities around the world, 

including in the United States. Yet those are precisely the communities that can 

prove critical for identifying and responding to individuals becoming radicalized by 

groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda. Moreover, effective counterterrorism relies heavily 

on robust intelligence-sharing relationships with foreign governments. Banning all 

travelers from a foreign country seems a surefire way to offend that country’s government and impede intelligence-sharing, rather than enhancing the flow of information about terrorist threats as effective counterterrorism requires.’’ 

The travel ban is, unfortunately, not alone among President Trump’s policies that 

have been counterproductive for keeping Americans safe from terrorism. For example, the Trump administration withdrew previously awarded grants to organizations 

dedicated to addressing white supremacists’ brand of violent extremism, a baffling 

decision that came to look particularly egregious after the deadly violence last August in Charlottesville, Virginia.14 These types of policies make Americans less safe 

not only by deliberately doing less to protect them from domestic terrorism—which 

can be just as deadly as terrorism associated with jihadist organizations such as 

32 

15Miriam Valverde, ‘‘A Look at the Data on Domestic Terrorism and Who’s Behind It,’’ 

PolitiFact, August 16, 2017, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/aug/16/ 

look-data-domestic-terrorism-and-whos-behind-it/. 16Mary B. McCord, ‘‘Criminal Law Should Treat Domestic Terrorism as the Moral Equivalent 

of International Terrorism,’’ Lawfare, August 21, 2017, https://lawfareblog.com/criminal-lawshould-treat-domestic-terrorism-moral-equivalent-international-terrorism. 17Department of Justice, ‘‘ISIL-Linked Kosovo Hacker Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison,’’ September 23, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/isil-linked-kosovo-hacker-sentenced-20-yearsprison. 18 Nafees Hamid, ‘‘The British Hacker Who Became the Islamic State’s Chief Terror CyberCoach: A Profile of Junaid Hussain,’’ CTC Sentinel, Volume 11, Issue 4, pages 30–37, https:// 

ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/04/CTC-SENTINEL-042018-2.pdf. 19 Brian Barrett, ‘‘White House Cuts Critical Cybersecurity Role as Threats Loom,’’ Wired, 

May 15, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/white-house-cybersecurity-coordinator/ (quoting 

Joshua A. Geltzer). 

ISIS15 and, as my Georgetown Law Center colleague Mary McCord has explained, 

just as morally repugnant16—but also by giving the distinct impression that the 

Trump administration is interested in terrorism only when it is being carried out 

by groups purporting to act in the name of Islam. 

All told, President Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies play into ISIS’s 

hands as the group seeks to mobilize followers in the United States and around the 

world. The President’s language and policies serve as aggravating factors in the already-difficult challenge associated with addressing ISIS’s ability to radicalize followers through the internet. 

NEW FORMS OF CYBER TERRORISM

Thus far, radicalization has been ISIS’s primary utilization of the internet: As 

noted, the group has made novel use of social media, file-upload sites, and other 

modern communication platforms to inspire attacks world-wide. As ISIS loses its 

hold on physical territory in Syria, one concerning possibility is that the group will 

look to new forms of cyber terrorism to cause harm here in the United States. 

Without as much of a physical safe haven from which to plot attacks and inspire 

followers, ISIS may seek to wreak havoc through cyber operations that do not require large numbers of fighters or expansive territorial holdings. Such efforts would 

build on earlier ISIS cyber efforts, such as the collaboration between now-imprisoned Ardit Ferizi17 and the late Junaid Hussain18 to obtain and then make public 

the personally-identifiable information of U.S. service members. In the years since 

those efforts, malicious cyber activity outside the context of terrorism has dramatically increased, with powerful hacking tools no longer the exclusive province of nation-states. This would seem to make obtaining and using those tools increasingly 

appealing and, unfortunately, increasingly feasible for a terrorist group such as 

ISIS. For example, if ISIS were able to recruit and utilize the right technological 

expertise and acquire the increasingly available tools to do so, ISIS might exfiltrate 

sensitive data from computer systems or simply alter it in ways that could generate 

mayhem for financial markets or medical records. Alternatively, and perhaps more 

likely given ISIS’s desire to instill fear and grab headlines through dramatic attacks, ISIS might attempt to cause tangible damage in the physical world by hacking into the systems that are used to control and operate power plants and electric 

grids. These sorts of cyber operations would be novel for a terrorist group; and they 

would not only cause real damage but also generate the type of excitement and belief among followers and supporters that ISIS surely is seeking to recapture as the 

physical caliphate that the group once touted shrinks. 

Here, too, there is cause for concern that the Trump administration is not appropriately tackling the challenge. As of this writing, the top position overseeing cyber 

policy at the White House—the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 

and Counterterrorism—is vacant, and the next most senior cyber position—the National Security Council staff’s Special Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity 

Coordinator—was recently eliminated. As I have commented elsewhere, this 

undoing of key White House leadership on cyber-related policy matters ‘‘seems to 

send a strange message as to how this White House is prioritizing something most 

of us think the government needs to prioritize more.’’19 While there are various 

plausible arrangements for structuring the leadership of the National Security 

Council staff, this seemingly deliberate diminution of leadership on cyber issues is 

particularly puzzling given how rapidly cyber-related threats are evolving and given 

how much our response requires the type of strategic leadership and interagency coordination that only the White House can provide. To the extent that ISIS turns 

to new types of cyber operations to regain momentum and inflict harm, this lack 

of leadership may prove a serious vulnerability, even as our military is taking the 

33 

20Matthew Cox, ‘‘Cyber Command Elevated to Combatant Command,’’ Military.com, May 4, 

2018, https://www.military.com/defensetech/2018/05/04/cyber-command-elevated-combatantcommand.html. 

positive step of elevating Cyber Command to a unified combatant command.20 Military and other key tools available to our government in the cyber arena require 

clear and forward-looking strategies, authorities, policies, and legal frameworks—especially given that the likely target of cyber terrorism may well be critical infrastructure controlled by private industry, which introduces distinctive complexities 

when it comes to formulating and implementing a governmental response. 

CONCLUSION

The crumbling of ISIS’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria is a major positive development for U.S. National security, for the security of our allies and partners, and for 

the stability of the Middle East region. But it is not the end of the threat posed 

by ISIS to the United States. The group retains some territory in Syria; is expanding its physical presence in other parts of the world; continues to make shrewd use 

of its virtual presence to recruit and radicalize followers; and could look to novel 

cyber operations as access to dangerous cyber tools becomes easier for non-state actors. This state of affairs would be challenging enough for the dedicated National 

security professionals who work to secure our homeland; but the challenge is compounded by aggravating factors of the Trump administration’s own making. The 

failure to retain our key partner on the ground in the fight against ISIS; the relentless anti-Muslim orientation of President Trump’s rhetoric and policies; and the 

seemingly deliberate absence of White House leadership to provide strategic vision 

and interagency coordination in the cyber arena all make the persistent threat 

posed by ISIS harder to address. That is unfortunate given the considerable scope 

of the challenge in the first place and given ISIS’s likely evolution and adaptation 

to changed circumstances in ways that will pose new forms of terrorist threats to 

our country. 

I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss these important issues and look forward to the committee’s questions. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Yeah, I want to thank the witnesses for your 

opening statements. I recognize myself for questions. Yeah, I remember 2014 to 2016, my threat briefings, the ones that this committee had, were, for lack of a better word, intense. External operations were being talked about almost on a weekly basis. We were 

arresting ISIS, not only abroad, but in this country on almost on 

a weekly basis. That has actually calmed down a little bit. 

I was in Paris and Brussels before they were hit, warning them 

about the lack of sharing vital intelligence, lack of knowing the 

manifest on airplanes, and then they were hit shortly thereafter. 

Then a new threat emerged, and it was the internet. A man by the 

name of Junaid Hussain from the United Kingdom was in Syria, 

and I was down at CENTCOM looking at the internet cafe out of 

which he operated, and we finally were able to take him out, and 

that internet activity went down. But that became the power and 

the global outreach of the jihad movement through Junaid 

Hussain. 

But then by the end of 2017, even though they had gained territory the size of the United Kingdom, by the end of 2017, they lost 

over 90 percent of their territory. I will tell you the threat briefings, while I am still very concerned, I do think the tempo and the 

pace has gone down. But I do think the threat does remain, as they 

have retreated into the Euphrates River Valley, they are still in 

the Middle East, and they are also in Northern Africa, places like 

Libya, Tunisia, Sinai, in Egypt, and the Sahel in the middle of Africa, and also southeast Asia. 

My first question I want to direct to the Ambassador and the 

General, because you have been there in service for so long, and 

34 

it is almost a foreign policy question in a way. The post-caliphate 

strategy. I think, you know, the previous administration—you 

know, we always hear the phrase, ‘‘leading from behind,’’ but not 

making a decision is a decision in and of itself. Drawing red lines 

and allowing them to be crossed is a decision. 

Allowing countries like Russia to then come in to Syria, allowing 

Iraq—I am sorry, Iran, to establish a Shia crescent to Iraq and 

Syria and Lebanon and Yemen. So now, we have Iran in Iraq and 

Syria. We have the Russians back for the first time since 1979 

when they were in Afghanistan. We have got the Saudis. We have 

Israel launching rockets into Syria. One of the biggest crises—sort 

of a civil war conflict refugee problems of our lifetime in some respects, not to mention Turkey, now fighting the very forces that we 

fought with to defeat ISIS. 

This is, perhaps, the most complex and challenging foreign policy 

crisis I think that we have had. Can you make any sense out of 

this? What would be your focus and your strategy looking at the 

post-caliphate Iraq and Syria? 

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have summarized 

an impossibly complex situation very neatly. It is hugely complex. 

I spent more years of my life than I care to remember experiencing 

Lebanon’s civil war. In its hot phase, that lasted 15 years, and it 

ended in 1990, only when the Syrian Army occupied the Presidential Palace outside of Beirut, and forced Michel Aoun into sanctuary in the French Embassy. That would be the same Michel 

Aoun who is running the country. 

In Syria, the list of players is far longer than it ever was in Lebanon. You mentioned some of them. The United States, Russia, 

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, to 

name a few. Inside Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Syrian 

Free Army, the YPG, al-Qaeda, obviously, the Islamic State, Ahrar 

al-Sham, and again, we can go on. Why is this important? We saw 

why several months ago. 

The Iranians, I guess, having a slow afternoon, decided they 

would put a drone over Israel and see what happened. Israeli shot 

it down and then retaliated with air strikes, but they lost the 

plane, the first time since 1985. Fortunately, that plane crashed in 

Israel, and both crew members survived. Had it been otherwise, we 

could now be in a massive regional conflict. 

Everybody kind-of took a step back because nobody wanted that 

war then, but nobody wanted World War I either. So when an obscure archduke was assassinated in an even more obscure city, 

those were the Guns of August. I have dusted off my copy of the 

book by that name, Barbara Tuchman, it is worth taking a look at 

now in the Syria context. So this is highly dangerous. We cannot 

settle it militarily, but we need to be in concert with all of our 

friends and allies talking about a problem that can blow the lid off 

the region and beyond. We need to stay engaged. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. My time is just about expired. 

I want to give General Keane at least a minute to respond, because 

as I see it, Assad has never been more powerful now, backed by 

the Iranians and the Russians, and he is using chemical weapons. 

It is like the biblical sense of all roads lead to Damascus. 

35 

Can you make any sense of out of this and what should we doing 

moving forward? 

General KEANE. I really think the strategic imperative for the 

United States dealing with the Middle East is the hegemonic objectives that Iran has in imposing their will on the Middle East, and 

to dominate it and influence and control it. They have had some 

significant success in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and now in Yemen, and 

they certainly just recently, as mentioned, encroaching on Israel, 

which has always been a strategic objective for them. 

At a minimum, put enough pressure on Israel as Iran will eventually try to develop a nuclear weapon that Israel will not respond 

militarily, because the Iranians would have rockets and missiles 

fired at Israel from Lebanon, and also from bases in Syria, which 

they are trying do right now. I don’t know how you approach that 

problem of a major aggressor like that who is applying resources 

and achieving success without doing that as a multilateral approach. 

I felt, for a long time, that we need a sort of Arab NATO in the 

Middle East, a political and military alliance that works so well 

and stand it up against another ideology in the 20th Century. We 

need to approach this problem comprehensively in the Middle East. 

It is not just about using military weapons, it is the entire spectrum that a political, economic, diplomatic, and military alliance 

would bring to that problem. 

Second, of course, is the breeding ground for radical Islam. 

Again, to approach that problem, we have to be organized for it, 

we have to undermine their ideology and propaganda, and we have 

to encourage our allies in that region to move in the right directions in terms of moving away from the conditions that are so paramount and set the stage for people—the ability to recruit. I am 

talking about what I said in my statement in terms of lack of political and social justice, lack of economic opportunity, the instability 

by poor governance, et cetera. This is a major problem. 

The one thing I do know, Mr. Chairman, and I have had this discussion with the administration. To wash our hands of this and to 

walk away, because, No. 1, we have lost thousands of soldiers 

there; No. 2, we spent a lot of money there; and, No. 3, there may 

be a lack of political will in the country, it would be a huge strategic mistake. The Middle East cannot explode. If we let that explode, it will harm the United States in terms of our own security 

of our people, and also those of our allies and our National interests as well. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. I completely agree with you. The 

Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. Both answers were, to the 

Chairman’s questions, quite illuminating. The one thing that I 

would want a conversation with the Ambassador and General on 

this: To what degree will budget cuts for the State Department and 

others impact your response that you just made to the Chairman? 

Mr. CROCKER. Thanks very much for that critical question, sir. 

The 31 percent budget cut that was proposed for the State Department, and which then-Secretary Tillerson saw fit not to oppose, 

would have crippled the Department and the foreign service for 

36 

years to come. Damage has been done already. We took in about 

100 new officers in calendar 2017, the year before it was 370. 

We need to promote about 100 officers a year into the senior foreign service. Last year, we promoted 47. So this is creating a structural problem we will wrestle with for years to come. As we face 

this enormously complex threat and fight, to do that with a weakened foreign service is not protecting our National security. We are 

the ones who are forward. We are more expeditionary than the Marines even. That is why it is called the foreign service. 

We know the cultures, we know the languages. Every foreign 

service officer is fluent in at least one foreign language. But we 

have almost been decimated. I am very pleased to see that Secretary Pompeo realized, that from Day 1, and has already taken 

steps to undo some of the damage by the previous Secretary with 

his ending of the hiring freeze. There is more to be done, listening 

to his statements, I am confident that he will try to get that accomplished. 

But this is not the time to weaken the diplomatic side of this 

fight. If there is anything I learned in places like Afghanistan and 

Iraq, there are no purely military tracks. There are no purely diplomatic tracks, they are all fused together. If you weaken the diplomatic part of the triad, you are heading for trouble, and trouble in 

this instance would mean a threat to our National security. 

Mr. THOMPSON. General, do you have some comments? 

General KEANE. Yeah, just quickly. I agree with Secretary 

Mattis, who believes in a strong Department of State, and we only 

have several thousand diplomats. It is actually a very small service 

that we have. We clearly have to reinforce it. The thought of reducing the State Department’s budget is ludicrous. It makes no sense 

to me whatsoever. If anything, we should be increasing it. 

You know, when the budget numbers from OMB are presented 

to the Department of Defense, that begins the negotiations. We 

never accept those numbers. We fight like daylight to make sure 

that the budget is what it should be inside the Executive branch. 

When the State Department gets the budget, I know this from having spoken to them from OMB, they just accept it. 

The reality is, they are underfunded and they are on demand, 

and we cannot reduce this capability. They work hand-in-glove 

with the military. They keep us out of fighting wars, but the 

United States military can strengthen the diplomatic hand when 

we have a credible deterrence as we have seen around the world. 

So I totally agree with your sentiments, Ranking Member. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, you 

talked about, in this effort to defeat ISIS, that we are going to have 

to lead. The Ambassador talked a little bit about that, too. But everyone seemed to agree that the new frontier is around technology 

and the ability to recruit and do other things. Are there some 

things that you think we should be doing as Congress to fortify 

that new frontier? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Thanks for that great question, sir. I do. 

I think the most important thing that Congress could do is to take 

a strong look at the acquisition process. You know, there are multiple areas in which the U.S. Government has been trying to make 

the acquisition process more efficient and faster. Efforts like DIUX 

37 

and some of the special operations branches, retooling of their 

budgetary processes is important, because right now, everyone who 

is around Government knows that often, the U.S. Government ends 

up not getting the product that it wants, it ends up overpaying for 

an inferior service. For most private-sector firms, if they were run 

this way, they would be out of business fairly quickly. 

For technology, with things moving as quickly as they are, I 

think we can’t afford, not just for terrorism, but also for the great 

power competition that we now have with both China and Russia, 

to be significantly behind in this race. When it comes to things 

ranging from surveillance, and the ability of the Chinese government, in particular, to spy on us, to artificial intelligence, which we 

are right now, I think, falling behind in, there is a real need for 

the U.S. Government to be able to acquire private-sector expertise 

and private-sector research in a way that is efficient, and in a way 

that can ensure that it gets the product and the quality that it 

wants. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. Dr. Geltzer, can you comment on 

that? 

Mr. GELTZER. Thank you for the opportunity, Mr. Ranking Member. I think the tech companies are, in some ways, on the front 

lines of this fight, but I think there is a real role for Congress in 

pushing them to do more. They have taken some steps for which 

they deserve credit. If you go back a little over a year ago, some 

of the major companies agreed on what they called a hash-sharing 

coalition. So pieces of terrorism-related content that any one company in the coalition identifies now gets shared with the other companies to see if those companies deem them to violate their own 

terms of service. That was a step forward. 

Six months after that, the same company has agreed to share the 

tools that they used to find those types of content. That was a step 

forward. I think there are more steps forward that can and should 

come. For example, one might ask the tech companies, instead of 

just sharing the piece of the content, why not share the information 

associated with those pieces of content and with the accounts associated with the content? 

In other words, if a piece of content has been uploaded to one 

platform by an account, and is deemed to have broken its terrorism-related terms of service, maybe another company has an account created by the same email address, or otherwise affiliate 

with it, that has uploaded terrorism-related information or messages as well. That would be a step forward. 

Playing with artificial intelligence, even to try to identify, based 

on past terrorism-related pieces of content or accounts, future ones 

before they are even uploaded to see whether, in fact, they should 

be, or whether they violate service on terrorism-related grounds. 

That could be a step forward. 

So I think Congress has a role to play, especially as tech companies find themselves on the Hill sometimes these days, asking 

those sorts of questions and asking, What comes next? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Let me just echo the Ranking Member’s sentiments and the panel on—I had dinner at the Marine barracks 

with Secretary Mattis, and he talks about if you cut diplomats, you 

38 

are going to have to buy more bullets. I think his job is, as he said 

it, is put maximum pressure so the diplomats can do their job. So 

I just want to reinforce that point. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. 

Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 

here. General, you know, we have talked about—you made a statement about we regained most of the territory in Iraq and Syria 

that the foreign fighters had occupied. But as those foreign fighters 

are being pushed out, they are moving into the Africa and Asia. We 

have noticed that they have been pretty resourceful in moving 

around western Europe, and they continue to plot to get into the 

United States to execute attacks. 

Do you perceive those foreign fighters as they move into these regions, executing attacks from there, or trying just to refocus their 

energies to move back into the Middle East and try to retake territory? 

General KEANE. I don’t see them going back into Iraq and Syria, 

but I do see some of those foreign fighters, 2,000 of them have returned to Europe, and certainly, their potential to conduct terrorist 

operations for sure. Others have moved to other affiliate organizations that are ISIS-supported organizations in Libya and Tunisia, 

in Sahel in the Sinai. So there is plenty of opportunity for them 

to—once they have committed to that ideology, usually they don’t 

separate themselves from it. Usually death is what separates them 

from it. 

So regaining the caliphate, or some semblance of it, would only 

happen if we walk away. If the political situation in Iraq does not 

enfranchise the Sunnis, then you have a potential rise again of a 

radical Islamist organization in Syria. We have just got to finish 

what we started and recognize that it is not over, and continue to 

clean the remnants of that out. If we don’t, if we pull away from 

eastern Syria, than they will—the leadership is still there. They 

will certainly try to resurge and regain some small safe haven. 

That would draw foreign fighters if that happens. That is the only 

situation that I see that would bring back their return. 

But they are operating in other areas supporting movements in 

other countries as we speak, and also, hiding in the shadows in Europe waiting for an opportunity. 

Mr. ROGERS. An opportunity to do what? To bring down western 

civilization—— 

Mr. GELTZER. No, no. To conduct individual terrorist attacks, or 

to try to form a cell or larger network. 

Mr. ROGERS. To what end? 

General KEANE. Certainly, their objectives—yes, the goal of radical Islamist movement, whether it is al-Qaeda or whether it is 

ISIS does have a global objective to it. Replace western civilization, 

much more than that. To dominate world civilization, and undermine the international order as we currently know it; and that has 

been their aspiration, you know, from the beginning. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ambassador, what are your thoughts about that? I 

am particularly concerned about the large number of them in western Europe, but obviously here, too. What do you think is going on? 

39 

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Congressman. In a sense, the most 

dangerous period in terms of our own National security may be approaching, and it will come with the overt military defeat of Islamic 

State. Their ideology, as you know, had always been that the caliphate was critical. They are now losing the last traces of that 

physical caliphate. So they are going to have to develop a new ideology to justify their existence. 

So I would think that that is the moment when they will put all 

they have, wherever they are, into figuring out how they can do 

their version of 9/11. They couldn’t hold territory in the field. I 

think the next step will be for them to do everything they can from 

wherever they can stage it, to show that they can hit back, and hit 

back hard within our homeland and within the European homelands. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you think we are doing enough in concert with 

our European allies to prepare for that or anticipate that? 

Mr. CROCKER. I don’t really have visibility on the specific actions. 

My sense is that—and, again, indeed this committee would know 

far more, is that the administration, as was the case with the previous administration, takes this very, very seriously. I would say, 

though, we like to talk about intelligence failures, and certainly, 

there are intelligence failures. 

But the failures that hurt us the most are failures of imagination. We couldn’t imagine the 9/11 attacks. We couldn’t imagine the 

destruction of the Marine barracks in Beirut and the death of 241 

Marines, beyond our imagination. So I would hope that in the 

skunk works of the administration, there are some really bright 

people doing that kind of imagining. 

If we expect to get it all through intelligence, we won’t, we can’t. 

Again, the failure of the future that we may be holding endless 

hearings on would be just that. A failure of the imagination with 

respect to a committed enemy. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. My time is expired, I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. The gentleman from 

Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, is recognized. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

our witnesses for your testimony here today, and, in particular, 

Ambassador Crocker and General Keane, thank you for your service to the country. 

Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, let me start with you, if I could. On the 

issue of drones, you described in your testimony, ISIL’s extensive 

weaponization of commercial drone technology. I am sure you are 

very concerned, as the Chairman is, about the possibility of dronebased terrorism, including domestically. I worked with my colleague, Senator Whitehouse, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse from 

Rhode Island, legislation criminalizing the reckless operation of 

drones. 

Are you concerned that ISIL might aid or inspire someone in the 

United States to use a drone to carry out a violent attack? What 

more can we be doing to prevent this kind of an action? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Sir, that is a great question. Yes, I am 

definitely concerned. The major reason for my concern is that we 

are seeing major leaps forward in drone technology and what can 

be done with them. Ambassador Crocker talks about failures of 

40 

imagination. I feel like the technological sphere is one where we 

are seeing failures of imagination most frequently these days, when 

you look at the kinds of things that we can see with drones domestically. 

Drone swarm is where—we have seen drone swarms recently 

even in cartel arrests. We have seen them increasingly used just 

south of the border in Mexico by cartels and organized criminal elements. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. The ability to do something destructive 

with a drone, something serious, grows constantly, as the commercialization of the drones becomes more sophisticated. We see this 

learning curve with all technology. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Any thoughts on what we can we do to counter 

the—— 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I agree with the legislation that you 

spoke of, I mean, criminalizing reckless uses of drones. I think giving some thought to areas in which drones cannot be flown. As we 

all know, drones can’t be flown in the Capitol area. I think in areas 

where there—thinking about airport, routes that airlines fly and 

the ways that drones can be used to attack airplanes. Starting to 

think about how do you regulate this area? We are going to see a 

proliferation of technologies. 

One final thing is giving thought to privacy laws with respect to 

the drones. Because both in terms of our own personal privacy, but 

also the ability to surveil a target, I think there is a lot of dangers 

that exist there for assassinations and nefarious uses. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. To the panel, I know that in response 

to the Ranking Member’s question on the messaging and such, 

many of you had mentioned ISIL’s successful and continued use of 

social media to recruit individuals to inflict violence. What more do 

you feel that tech companies in the administration should be doing 

to counter these efforts of radicalization, especially inside the 

United States? 

Mr. GELTZER. I am happy to start. I am sure others will have 

thoughts as well. I mentioned before a couple of opportunities that 

I see for the companies to experiment with sharing more information with each other when it comes to terrorism-related content 

and the accounts associated with that. Maybe I will mention now, 

also, I think opportunities to share between Government and the 

tech companies. I am no longer privy to where those conversations 

stand, but it seems to me, much as the Government provides in the 

cyber arena threat information to companies, or when it comes to 

critical infrastructure threat information, there is an opportunity 

both for the Government to ensure that new trends, new trajectories and how terrorists are utilizing social media platforms and 

other communications technologies, new techniques, especially 

those that cross platforms which any one company is less likely to 

see but the Government may well see. 

My hope is that that is a more robust exchange, and it has been 

in the past, and a two-way exchange, in which the companies are 

sharing what they see, because they too, they are in their own 

pikes. They have unique insight into what is happening, and how 

users may be changing, how they regenerate accounts, for example, 

or how they link from their various pages or various accounts. For 

41 

that dialog to be in real time, I think, would enhance both parties’ 

ability to respond, the tech companies and the Government’s. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Anyone else on the panel care to comment? 

General KEANE. Well, I just think we have to continue what we 

have started, and that is closer cooperation between the U.S. Government and our social media companies. There has been some 

success, as was already mentioned in my testimony, you know, 

with Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, particularly Twitter, who 

has taken down over 1 million platforms as a result of that cooperation. We just need to continue that. I think there should be 

continuous dialog among other intelligence services, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency and our social media companies to get the kind of cooperation that is necessary, because as 

everybody here sitting on this panel knows, radical Islamist organizations are certainly going to continue to use these outlets given 

the extraordinary achievement that the ISIS leaders were able to 

accomplish in very short order in building an organization and sustaining it, largely riding on the waves of technology. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you all. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes 

General Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all four of you 

for being here today. I have just got to recognize Ambassador 

Crocker, my professor at National War College in our interagency 

class, if I remember that right. I also served with him in Iraq, so 

I know all the folks who served with you, see you as a hero. It is 

good to see you here, sir. He served in the worst spots, and the 

hardest spots in the world at our Nation’s calling. 

As you all pointed out, ISIS has been attrited to the point where 

they have no real estate that they control in Iraq, two little portions of real estate in Syria. We are we going to continue attriting 

them, and I think of the Secretary of Defense’s strategy of not one 

to try to retreat to the best of our ability and annihilating in place 

is the right strategy there. 

So we saw some kinetic operations that we have to do. But even 

if we take down these two pieces of real estate, there is still a 

threat. I think you pointed that out. There will be a terrorist threat 

that could reassert themselves at any point. So we had the military 

option, but we have to go after their finances. I think you have all 

done a lot of discussing here about going after their cyber recruiting capability and how they do that. 

But the one thing I have not heard, and I really think, getting 

to my National War College teachings, I don’t think we have gone 

to the real center of gravity of ISIS and al-Qaeda and other Sunni 

extremists, it is the ideology. How do we counter this ideology? Because in the end, it is the—cyber’s a tool, an avenue to transmit 

that ideology, finance is a tool. Until we figure out a way to counter 

this ideology, I don’t know that we can really in the end, declare 

victory. I would welcome any of y’all’s thoughts on that. 

Mr. CROCKER. Well, thank you for an excellent question, Congressman. I have to say that had you been posing questions like 

that when you were at National War College, you would have been 

a distinguished graduate. 

42 

Mr. BACON. I was close, that close. 

Mr. CROCKER. It is a key question. I come at this perhaps from 

a slightly different optic, it is—when I look at 100 years of the 

modern Middle East, I see a successive failure of ‘‘isms,’’ colonialism, imperialism, Monarchism, Arab nationalism, Ba’athism, 

Arab socialism, communism in south Yemen. They all have one 

thing in common: They failed to produce good governance and economic opportunity. Again, Mr. Chairman, the two points you made 

in your opening statement I think are just key. 

So they were overcome by the next ism. Now we have Islamism, 

they are also failing to show that they can govern properly. I see 

from some press reports that they seem to understand that going 

in, that a lot of the captured documents we have had access to 

shows that they were trying to get Government moving again; they 

just ran out of time, money, and luck and became victim to their 

own hateful ideology. They will yield to something else. Maybe it 

will be another run at Islamism. I don’t know. But unless that core 

problem of governance in the region is tackled and improved, you 

will just see this over and over and over again. I would cite one 

example from my own experience, I was, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, an ambassador six times. 

In three of those countries, a predecessor of mine as the American ambassador was assassinated. Ours is inherently a dangerous 

profession. One of those was in Lebanon, Frank Malloy, the Ambassador. He was kidnapped and then executed by the popular front, 

Liberation of Palestine. Was that an early Islamist terror group? 

No. Their ideology was the antithesis of Islam, or Judaism, or 

Christianity. They were Communists. Was their leader a closet Islamic radical? Their leader, George Habash, was a Palestinian 

Christian. So the ideologies may shift and the motivations may 

shift. We need not to be overly distracted by that, but more focused 

on what gives them purchase. What we have seen consistently is 

a failure of governance, and that is a big problem to fix. But as 

General Keane said, if we don’t stay engaged, it is only going to 

get worse. 

General KEANE. You know, I think that is a profound question 

if I can comment on it. I ended my written statement—my oral 

statement and written statement on that very question. You know, 

we dealt with two major ideologies in the 21st Century. One was 

Nazism, fascism which we destroyed by brute force, and the other 

was communism, which, I think, when you look at it, oversimplistically maybe, we beat it with better ideas, and those ideas was democracy and capitalism. I think that serves as an illustration on 

how to deal with this. 

We have to hold this horrific behavior that they demonstrate in 

their barbarism and killing people. We have to hold them accountable for that. That means that we have to use the tools of war to 

punish that behavior and stop it. 

But we also have to have better ideas. It gets back to what the 

Ambassador is talking about and that deals with the issues 

where—becomes the breeding ground for that. We have to stay engaged with our allies to help them, and help them shape. Make certain that they understand, even as Mohammed bin Salman is making transformational changes in Saudi Arabia, we have to stay in 

43 

that dialog so they understand how important it is to get this right, 

to move these societies in the proper direction and move away from 

political and social injustice, and the lack of economic opportunities, and, also, to achieve stable governance in these countries. 

Until you do that and provide an alternative, these ideologies will 

continue to fester and grow. 

Mr. BACON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time. I yield back. 

Unless you have—want to build on anything that was just said? 

OK, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes 

Mrs. Watson Coleman. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for having this hearing and thank you to the witnesses for being 

here. 

I guess I have a couple of questions, one concern I have is about 

the fire—the foreign fighters dispersing into other areas. I am particularly interested in the Sahel area of Africa, because I have been 

in other briefings where it has been brought to my attention that 

the lack of our presence, the lack of any diplomatic presence, the 

lack of any sort of relationship-building presence is very dangerous 

in this area because it is one in which governance is very weak, 

opportunities are very fruitful, and we are not making the kinds 

of connections that we should be making to sort-of counteract some 

of this. 

So I would just like to get your thoughts on it, particularly as 

it relates to stripping our Department of State from the resources 

it needs to have a diplomatic presence. I will start with you, if you 

don’t mind, Ambassador. 

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, ma’am. We are diplomatically represented in all of the countries of the Sahel. We have some assistance programs, but that budget has been under pressure for quite 

some time, as you know. There I would just make a short pitch for 

the third D: Defense, diplomacy, and development. USAID can be 

a very effective agency when it has the resources to do their work. 

I—we are doing great on defense; diplomacy and development have 

been seriously underfunded, and that does not make anybody’s life 

any easier. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Can I just add on to that, or carry on 

on that area? So it is not so much guns anymore and blowing up 

people, it has lots to do with a new way in which ISIS can be a 

threat to us, whether or not it is cybersecurity, internet or whatever, but it is also about relationships, or what we can do in regions that help people from their economic perspective not to be so 

vulnerable to these terrorist groups as well. 

I don’t get the sense that this administration gets that piece substantively about being on the ground, developing the better way of 

life for those individuals, creating those relationships and understanding those cultural issues. So, I would appreciate it if you 

would just give me your thoughts on that? Any of you, any, all. We 

can start with you, Ambassador. 

Mr. CROCKER. Just two quick points. USAID, of course, has an 

administrator now, Mike Green, not someone I know personally, 

but I know his background, and I have colleagues still serving in 

44 

USAID. He is quite highly regarded in the agency. We have a Secretary of State, as I just said, who starts with an enormous advantage in that building, simply because he is not Rex Tillerson. He 

does say, and he has done some of the right things there to reassure the institution that he has—that he will support them. So I 

think we have got some things in place that should yield good results. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. One of the insecurities of the institution 

didn’t just come from Tillerson, because I don’t believe that 

Tillerson just decided all on his own that he wasn’t going to staff 

the Department of State. I think that he was in align with whatever the President at that time thought was the best thing to do 

for whatever reason he thinks things are the best thing to do. But 

perhaps, he changed his position now that Pompeo is the Secretary 

of State. 

Is there anyone else who would want to comment on any of this? 

Thank you. 

General KEANE. I would just say that certainly I agree with the 

Ambassador about our diplomatic commitment. The military command that deals with Africa, as you know, is AFRICOM, and our 

policy is to assist our partner countries in helping to build their 

military capability. That is a significant commitment we have 

made, and it is growing. When we are doing that, so you should 

be aware of it, we just don’t teach them military skills. As part of 

that partnership that we have—and it doesn’t make any difference 

where we are doing this in the world—we teach them how important it is for the military to submit to civilian control, and also to— 

while we are using weapons of war on a battlefield, we do that in 

concert with the values of our country. 

So those are some of things that are important to us as we are 

partnering with them. In terms of United States taking a direct 

hand, the only time that we will do that in Africa is when we are 

dealing with a terrorist organization that we believe could be a 

threat to the United States outside the region, then we would attack that ourselves. Otherwise, we want to partner with the host 

country and bring their military up to a capability where they can 

deal with the problem. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. One thing I would add to General 

Keane’s comments when it comes to counterterrorism capacity 

building is that I think this is an interesting area that Congress 

could look into with respect to the overall strategy of CT capacity 

building, which is very important. But when you look at the range 

of the countries involved, like not just the United States, but you 

have multiple western European countries who are doing this, 

there is an overarching lack of strategy, and sometimes even internal lack of coordination, where different countries often don’t have 

visibility into what their allies are doing. Sometimes there is not 

visibility even within the U.S. Government. Sometimes there is a 

lack of coordinated strategy, and there is definitely a lack of consistent monitoring and evaluation metrics being used. So it is an 

area that is both very important, and where I feel that a wise look 

into how well the system is working, could, I think, help to improve 

it. 

45 

Mr. GELTZER. If I may, just a brief point, drawing from experience at the Justice Department and the national security division 

there, and it is really just to accentuate some of the points others 

have made about how critical it is to have a robust State Department and State Department presence. Not only did the State Department do its own important diplomatic work, not only is it 

hand-in-glove ideally with the military, but law enforcement assistance and Homeland Security assistance, that often is facilitated by 

the State Department. So when you get a DOJ and FBI training 

investigators and prosecutors on how to handle terrorism cases, 

which are distinct and often difficult, when you have DHS reps 

working with countries on how to monitor their borders better, how 

to maintain their databases better, how to make those databases 

exportable to countries like us when we want to see who is traveling here from there. It is often the State Department that makes 

that collaboration possible, which is, again, another reason that 

you want that to be a robust presence. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence and thank you for 

your answers. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Ratcliffe is recognized. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all 

the panelists for being here today. I was struck by the remarkable 

consistency between your comments, and about ISIS and the ISIS 

caliphate being badly damaged, but not defeated. 

General Keane, we will start with you, because you twice made 

the comment about what it comes to defeating ISIS, you have 

talked about the need to drive ISIS out of the footholds that they 

have in Syria. I assume those footholds are being fueled by the desperation of the Syrian people with Assad in power, power that he 

has been able to maintain by using Iran, Hezbollah, and the IRGC 

and Russia. 

So I guess my question is, when we talk about the Salafi Jihadi 

movement and radical Islamist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda, do 

you agree that at least with respect to Syria, the greatest factor 

into whether or not it continues to exist or expand and contract is 

whether or not Assad is in charge in Syria? 

General KEANE. Well, first of all, the—ISIS and al-Qaeda, which 

is a thriving organization in Syria, they are only there because 

there is a civil war there, and they were drawn to an area, and 

they were able to establish safe zones and take advantage of the 

circumstances that are there. So they are absolutely feeding on 

that. 

Certainly, Assad, a brutal dictator to be sure, you know, the socalled Arab Spring arose and the people wanted to turn him out. 

They were on their way to actually doing that when the Iranians 

and the Russians successfully intervened and stalemated the situation, and then the Russian military intervention, and the Iranian 

plus-up really changed the entire momentum. Assad is not going 

anywhere now. I mean, we have got to be honest about it. They 

have successfully propped up this dictator. What is going on in Geneva is a fantasy. I mean, the Russians and the Iranians may 

change Assad out because they want another Alawite dictator, but 

46 

their military intervention has succeeded in indefinitely keeping 

Assad or somebody like him in power. We have long since squandered the opportunities to do something about that. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. So do you think it is an overstatement, then, to 

say that the Jihadi movement there through groups like ISIS, or 

al-Qaeda, or whatever else may come, will continue as long as 

Assad reigns over Syria or someone just like Assad? 

General KEANE. Yes, the opposition to Assad is not going to go 

away either because they are very committed. They want a secular, 

most of them are democratic states, some of them, an Islamic state. 

So as long that continues, that will give radical Islam an opportunity. In that organization, we didn’t talk about it here, but the 

al-Qaeda organization, the son of al-Nusra that operates in Idlib 

Province, is a very dangerous organization, which clearly has objectives to operate outside the region in Europe and against the 

United States. So yes, this is a breeding ground for radical Islam. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. So I guess that leads to what is an unpopular 

topic for a lot of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle when we 

talk about regime change. But it seems to me that our best option 

for addressing the threat of ISIS and al-Qaeda, and, frankly, the 

threat of, as you call it, a hegemonic threat from Iran, and its ability to propagate Hezbollah and groups like that, is a Syria without 

Assad. You intimated a little bit about how we would accomplish 

that. I know, the Free Syrian Army, and arming those. I have 

heard the arguments about, well, you are just arming terrorists. 

You made reference, though, to an Arab NATO earlier. I am wondering—I heard John Bolton recently talk about a regional Arab 

force in the area, and so my first question is, are you talking about 

the same thing there? 

General KEANE. Yeah. Well, first of all, let me say that I don’t 

believe this administration has a coherent strategy to deal with 

this problem. I know for a fact the previous administration certainly did not, actually I think enabled the problem to get worse. 

It is a complex problem, as Ambassador Crocker so accurately 

pointed out. You can be on either side of this issue and be making 

what seems to be a very plausible argument, to be frank about it, 

because it is such a disturbing situation. 

But in my view, the—Syria is a strategic anchor for the Iranian 

hegemonic movement and their ability to encroach on Israel and 

move out of Syria. It is also a melting pot for radical Islamists. I 

think we should take an interest in what is happening there and 

try to push back on it. 

Yes, what I would do is try to control the eastern part of Syria 

of the Euphrates River Valley, and I would bring some regional 

Arab nations in to help do some of that. That gets us back at the 

bargaining table. In other words, it gives us some political leverage. 

We are not going to go to Damascus with military force, we are not 

going to go into Syria with tens of thousands of U.S. forces. There 

is no political will to do anything quite like that. But there are 

ways that we can get into a negotiated—have some negotiating leverage, if we have some skin in the game, as opposed to just walking away from it. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. So you talk about political will, and my time is 

expired, but this is an important question. I want your perspective, 

47 

I really would like it from all of you and hopefully some other panelists can follow up on it, but when you look at it from the other 

side of the ledger and political will, when we talk about this issue, 

do you think that Russia has enough invested that they would ever 

go to war over Syria? 

General KEANE. Russia doesn’t want to go to war over Syria. 

Russia certainly doesn’t want to go to war with the United States 

over Syria. We don’t need to be intimidated by Russia and Syria. 

We long since permitted them to take advantage of us. We—Secretary Kerry told the Russians, because they were rolling into 

Syria, do not, do not, under any circumstance, bomb the Syrian 

moderates who we were providing aid to by the Central Intelligence Agency. They had antitank missiles, and they were a formidable force as a result of that capability. The first people the Russians bombed were the Syrian monarchs with the antitank weapons. What did we do about that? Nothing. We should have told 

them right then and there, you do it that again, we are going to 

take down your airfield and we are going to go after your proxy 

force on the ground, the Syrian regime. 

In my judgment, that would not have led to World War III, it 

would not have led to a war with the Russians. They have a limited capability, have never been outside their region in 35 years, 

they had 30 to 40 airplanes. We dominate that area in terms of 

military power. They would have backed up, but we had no will, 

we lacked will. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I appreciate your insights, and I appreciate the 

Chairman’s indulgence. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. The gentlelady from 

Florida, Ms. Demings, is recognized. 

Ms. DEMINGS. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to 

all of our witnesses for being here with us today. 

If we could just go back for just a moment, I know we have 

talked quite a bit about tech companies and the role that they play. 

I certainly, as all of you know, that without the social media platforms, ISIS and other groups like them would not have had the opportunity to recruit, train, communicate as well as they have. I 

know you have talked about, you know, better sharing of information. I know they have taken some of the ISIS-related content 

down. Also you talked about international cooperation. 

If we just could go into some additional steps that tech companies could play to be held more accountable, or what could Congress do to assist in holding them more accountable? That is to all 

or any of the witnesses who would like to answer. Thank you. 

Mr. GELTZER. If you give me enough opportunities, I will keep 

adding to my list of things that I think are worth pressing on here. 

As I mentioned before, I do think while the companies have 

taken some steps in terms of hash-sharing and tool-sharing. It has 

been overwhelming focused on ISIS material. Congresswoman, you 

mentioned ISIS and other groups like it. That is a point worth 

pressing on, I think, as well. Because ISIS did, in a sense, revolutionize terrorist radicalization and recruitment on-line. They 

weren’t the first. Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 

had used the internet in ways that were novel at the time, but ISIS 

really took that to another level. But others have learned of course, 

48 

terrorist groups are learning, adaptive organizations. In particular, 

al-Qaeda and Syria, and General Keane mentioned them before, I 

agree with every word of his assessment of them as a real and possibly growing threat, they have changed how they use social media 

and websites and other platforms on-line to reach out, and recruit, 

and radicalize. But the company’s tools, their focus thus far have 

really been on ISIS, and perhaps that’s for good reason. ISIS was 

inspiring attacks world-wide, but the content from some of those 

other groups tends to remain up longer than the content from ISIS 

and that content is getting more and more worrisome, in my view. 

It is getting slicker, more sophisticated. It has always, of course, 

had a call for violence in it. So, to press the companies on taking 

the steps they have even made already and rapidly doing what 

they need to do internally, if that is resourcing, if that is staffing, 

to apply it to not just al-Qaeda in Syria whose names changes periodically, but they are fundamentally al-Qaeda in Syria, but also 

AQAP, and also al-Shabaab and also the groups probably yet to 

come, I think that is an important point, too. 

Ms. DEMINGS. Thank you. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yes. Thank you for that great question, 

Representative. The first thing I would like to point to is that I 

agree with Dr. Geltzer’s remarks about al-Qaeda playing the game 

quite a bit better, and allowing the material to stay up longer. I 

would like to point to you, though, that when the big companies 

focus on taking down material from a group, they are extraordinarily effective. If you look at the percentage of Facebook accounts, Jihadist Facebook accounts that are taken down before they 

put up a single post, it is massive. We know what the companies 

are using, it is artificial intelligence, it is tracking IP addresses, it 

is tracking associations, but they are very effective. 

Now in addition to that, the Chairman mentioned my past association with Google, I was a fellow at its think-tank, Jigsaw. They 

had a number of different very innovative initiatives, one thing 

they did was called the redirect method which took people who 

were looking for ISIS propaganda materials, and had a very ISISlooking ad that then redirected them to a playlist with very neutral-looking, but anti-ISIS materials, that is a project I worked on 

with them. I think that talking to organizations like Jigsaw about 

the really interesting initiatives they have would be both helpful 

and enlightening for Members of Congress and the administration. 

So this brings me to kind-of the key point that I would have, 

which is when you look at well-resourced organizations like 

Facebook, or Google, or Twitter, they are able do this well, and 

they have a fair—at least when their eye is focused on the ball, 

they have a fair sense of what their obligations are. But smaller 

tech companies are constantly arising, they are players in the 

space, and they don’t necessarily have either of the capabilities or 

the will to do what they need to remove this material. So I think 

a dialog about what Congress’ role with respect to smaller companies, and also what larger companies like Facebook, like Google, 

like Twitter, what their role should be in helping to enhance the 

capabilities and the set of standards for smaller companies would 

be very helpful. In my time in Silicon Valley, I have had dialogs 

49 

with people who worked for some of the larger companies, and they 

feel that this exact initiative is needed. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you. Ambassador or General. 

General KEANE. I don’t have anything to add. Those are excellent 

comments. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. All right. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentlelady yields. The gentleman from 

Wisconsin, Mr. Gallagher, is recognized. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Geltzer, in your testimony, you talked about the fact that we 

have lost our key counterterrorism part on the ground in Syria, the 

Kurds. Now, we do still have 60,000 strong Syrian democratic force 

which our special operators are working with, many of which are 

Kurds. But I think your broader point is well-taken, which is to 

say, it is hard to support those forces when they are under assault 

from the Turks. At a time when our interests seem to be converging with Israelis in the Sunni or Gulf States, Turkey is an 

outlier. It is hard for me to make sense of Syria without somehow 

getting the Turks to play a more productive role. 

So I would be interested in your assessment and the assessment 

of the panel, what do we do with respect to Turkey? What are our 

leverage points, and how can we, as you rightly lay out, protect our 

Kurdish partners on the ground at the same time? 

Mr. GELTZER. Thank you, Congressman Gallagher. I am grateful 

for the question. It is a hard balance. Partly, we marvel in the coalition that the United States has largely put together to execute 

this campaign; and partly the breadth of that collation creates exactly the sort of problems that you identify. Those problems will 

only get exacerbated as the conflict evolves from the original one 

that brought together that coalition. 

In terms of how to keep Turkey in the fight, which we needed 

to be, NATO partner, Incirlik Air Base, critical to our counter-ISIS 

operations, while at the same time, getting Turkey to back off the 

Syrian Kurds, that strikes me as an effort partly just sheer attention. The relationship that was built between a number of folks at 

the highest levels of our government and a number of folks at their 

counterparts in Ankara, was one of almost constant dialog, so that 

there were no surprises, there was an understanding that before, 

and particularly the Syrian Kurds were moving to a certain place, 

there was a sense of what their objectives would be there, what 

weapons they would have from us there, and how we would ensure 

that those weapons, as best we could, did not get into the hands 

of others associated with the Kurds, who are of concern to Ankara 

for good reason. 

It seems, at some point, that that dialog broke down, and the 

type of assurance, truly daily at times, about where weapons were 

going and when the next operation against the next city would 

wrap up, and what the pause would look like, was either no longer 

being communicated, or, at least, no longer being believed. 

I think as with a lot of diplomacy, the best solution is high-level 

attention again, probably visits from some of our most senior folks 

to there to get back on track, to get the assault on the Afrin Kurds, 

off the table, so that the Kurds can move away from Afrin and to 

50 

the Euphrates River Valley and take out the remnants of ISIS 

there, sir. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yeah, Representative Gallagher, I think 

that Turkey is a big concern, right. In addition to their military assault into Afrin, you have a slide toward authoritarianism within 

the country that we can all see. You have the scaling back of 

Ataturk’s legacy, and the scaling back of secularism in the country, 

and you have something which has been well-reported, including in 

The Washington Post, which is support for some of the nastier and 

more radical elements of the Syrian fighters, including the ability 

of some known al-Qaeda operatives to pass through Turkey’s border and to operate within Turkey. 

I think all of this is a concern. I agree with Dr. Geltzler about 

the need for on-going dialog, and I think we need to do this with 

our eyes open about the fact of problems in that country are escalating from the perspective of the U.S. National interests. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Sure. General Keane. 

General KEANE. Yeah. Certainly, we do have challenges here. 

The Turkish leadership certainly wanted Assad to go and are very 

frustrated with the United States because we were playing such a 

weak hand in Syria, largely due, I think, because we saw the Iranian intervention and what they were trying to achieve, and we 

didn’t want to rattle them in terms of the nuclear deal that was 

on the table, and negotiations that were taking place. 

Turkey also facilitated the growth of ISIS on their border openly. 

Turkey also facilitated the growth of al-Qaeda, because they strategically thought that those two radical groups would contribute to 

the removing Assad from power. That turned out not to be the case 

for ISIS, to be sure. 

I also think that we made a strategic mistake in the United 

States military when we sided with the Syrian Kurds. I think it 

made since tactically, they had will, they had skill, but growing 

that capacity when they are not interested truly in dealing with 

Arab lands and all the way down into southeastern part of Syria. 

What they are really interested in is carving out some territory 

for themselves in northern Syria, much to the detriment with our 

relationship with Turkey over this issue. I think we should back 

away from them, to be frank about it. I think that the relationship 

with Turkey, despite the Islamic nature of the country, they are a 

NATO country, they do matter. They have a significant military capacity that we have to value. We are using their air base. I think 

we have got to get back in the game with Turkey with some reasonable geopolitical expectations of what we want to achieve in 

Syria, which does not include a large dependency on the Syrian 

Kurds. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. I have run out of time. So I apologize, Ambassador Crocker. So maybe—I don’t know if we end up with more 

time afterwards I will revisit this and I also want to argue with 

Dr. Geltzer about one more thing. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Great points. Gentlelady from Texas, Ms. 

Jackson Lee is recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the Chairman and Ranking 

Member, particularly for insightful comments that have been 

51 

made, and thank the witnesses. Each of you are serving your Nation in a very important time. I, too, have known General Keane, 

first of all, in the series of work that he has done, and note that 

he was at the Pentagon on 9/11. That it must have been an experience that he will never want to repeat, never forget. We thank you 

for your service on that very tragic, heinous day. 

Ambassador, of course, we have crossed paths so many times in 

Iraq, Pakistan, and I believe Afghanistan, it just looks like we have 

seen each other, and you are certainly well-deserved of the honor 

that was given to you. So let me just be very quick and say, democracy is good, but sometimes the inconsistency of our policies here 

in the United States can be very challenging. Elections come, and 

policies come and go. So in your comments, I would appreciate your 

thoughts about how that influences, but I would like you to comment on some holistic perspectives, and that is, the inconsistent 

policy, Ambassador, with Pakistan, the willingness to sanction 

Pakistan for what seems to be incompatibility, or lack of appreciation of any work that they are doing with the Taliban in Afghanistan, putting things on that those of us that work with Pakistan 

have to put out the fire. 

The issue of foreign fighters who now don’t have maybe a foreign 

fight, well, I believe terrorism is franchised. Where are these 

120,000-plus or others? Obviously, some lost in the battle. Where 

are these foreign fighters and how do we have to look at that? 

Three, this is Homeland Security, but I think we are interrelated 

with the State Department on the issues that we have. So if you 

can comment on the technology end, what policy does the Government need to have in speaking to our tech community in saying we 

need you to be as vigilant constantly as you have been, and maybe 

you need to embrace the small companies to help them out as well? 

Ambassador and General Keane, if you would. 

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Congresswoman. It is a very important issue, our relationship with Pakistan, and it is worth spending 

a couple of minutes on. We are a great Nation, we are a great people. We do have our weaknesses. One of them is, we don’t care 

about history, that is, history a pejorative for most Americans. History in this region, history defines today and predicts tomorrow. 

We are ignorant at our cost. Important here, because the Pakistanis have their own version of their history and our history with 

them. They will recall that after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that we allied ourselves very closely with Pakistan. The antiSoviet Jihad was staged out of Pakistan’s northwest frontier province, organized by us with Pakistan as an absolutely critical partner. 

But once the Soviets were defeated, we decided our work there 

was done, even though we could see the Afghan civil war coming, 

which it did in all its horror. So not only did we pull out, we no 

longer needed Pakistan anymore, so we stopped requesting waivers 

to the Pressler amendment, which called for the cessation of all 

economic or military assistance to any country pursuing a nuclear 

weapons program. For a decade, the administration got a waiver 

for that. We didn’t need Pakistan anymore, no more waivers, and 

they were completely sanctioned as far as any assistance from us 

went. Then the civil war broke out on their border. When the 

52 

Taliban started to show some purchase, yep, the Pakistanis went 

in on that, because it looked like that might be the one group that 

could stop that civil war before it crossed their border. 

So where have we been post-9/11? Well, we are back. The Pakistanis asked themselves, Well, that is great. When are you leaving 

again? Because that is what you Americans do. I spent 3 years 

there. It is an imperfect relationship, goodness knows, and the 

Pakistanis do a lot of things that are bad for us and bad for themselves. But a country of 185 million people, nuclear weapons, I 

think we have to be careful how we see and use that relationship. 

In essence what the Pakistanis are saying, or said to me was: If 

you think we are going to go after the Taliban in Pakistan, turn 

them into a mortal enemy of ours, as you get set to leave, because 

that is what you do, you are going to leave, and then we will have 

that existential threat, if you think we are going to do that, you 

are completely crazy. 

So I would have liked to have seen the administration say, as the 

President did, that we are no longer driven by the calendar in Afghanistan, we are driven by conditions. We have important National security interests, we are going to be there to protect them 

with the force that we need at the time. To then have said to the 

Pakistanis, you worry about us going, we are not going this time. 

We have just made it clear, it is about conditions. So isn’t it time 

to rethink your own strategic logic? Oh, by the way, while you are 

thinking that through again, do you remember what happened to 

Mohammad Akhtar Mansoor, Mullah Omar’s successor, killed with 

a U.S. military drone strike with—inside Pakistan. That while you 

are working it out, any Taliban leader we can find, we are going 

to pop him. Maybe it will be in Balochistan, maybe it will be in Rawalpindi. So why don’t you take those two elements, and see if you 

want to develop a different strategic logic. That is not what we did. 

So once again, we are in this confrontational relationship with 

Pakistan over Afghanistan, largely. It is not going to take us anywhere good. But again, that failure to demonstrate strategic patience hurts us very greatly, there and really elsewhere in the region, and, indeed, in the world. 

General KEANE. Yes, I certainly agree and associate myself with 

everything that the Ambassador said. Listen, we created so many 

of these problems for ourselves with 17 years, you know, involved 

in this war in Afghanistan. Largely due—the protraction of the war 

is largely due to our own policy decisions. Because very quickly, 

after the Taliban were deposed as we know, we made a decision to 

go into Iraq. That immediately made the war in Afghanistan is 

what we call in the military economy of force, actually they were 

put on a diet. That was from 2002, that is when we started taking 

resources away, all the way to 2008. That was the first time we put 

any substantive resources back into Afghanistan, and that is because the surge had succeeded in Iraq, and we were able to reduce 

our forces, and we finally had capacity again. 

So this protraction has been due to our policy. I think President 

Obama had the right idea to do a surge in Afghanistan, but unfortunately, he pulled our forces out after 15 months, and that was 

a tragic mistake. 

53 

So that is what has given this pause to the Pakistanis who are 

harboring two safe havens of the Afghan Taliban inside their country. That also leads to the protraction of the war. 

For the first time now, we have had a President who has said 

I am committed to see this thing through, but that is going take 

more than rhetoric. There is going to have to be some real commitment here. We may have to adjust the force levels and other capacity levels based on the conditions that are taking place in that 

country and have flexibility. We also have to keep the American 

people engaged and explain, why is this important to us? We don’t 

do a very good job of that. Now, President Bush didn’t do a very 

good job of it, President Obama didn’t do a very good job of it, and 

I am hoping this President will see the need to do that. Why Afghanistan matters, and why we don’t want it to become a safe 

haven for terrorists again, for which to attack our allies, and also 

the American people. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentlelady yields back. I believe Congressman Gallagher had a brief wrap-up question. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have inherited 

General Perry’s time, so I will try and channel him with this one. 

So Dr. Geltzer, I think, if I understand your argument, is that 

the—what you call anti-Muslim and an anti-Muslim travel ban, the 

risk is that it would alienate key Muslim communities in the Middle East that we need to participate in the fight against ISIS, 

right? So my question is, is indeed that happening? How would we 

know? What is our metric for alienation? I mean, I perceive there 

to be, at least among leadership in key Sunni Muslim countries, a 

closer relationship between this administration and the last. 

Mr. GELTZER. Thanks for the opportunity to speak to that. So I 

probably worry most about the communities right here, I think 

there are communities here that have been fairly outspoken in saying that the travel ban, among other policies, but very much at the 

heart of those policies, feels to them to target them. In fact, I think 

they have good reason to feel that way, given how it has been 

framed as a campaign promise, and now delivered on as a Presidential policy. Those communities strike me as the ones that have 

an opportunity to intervene with those who might be prone to 

radicalization, or even radicalizing in ways that we would all like 

to see, ideally before those sorts of individuals become on the law 

enforcement route. You know, if you talk to FBI, they take no 

pleasure in finding teenagers who are on the road to material support, trying sometimes to dissuade them or their parents from staying on that path, and ultimately doing what the FBI should do, 

which is if they committed a crime, arresting them, and charging 

them for it. But ideally, communities can find ways to intervene 

sooner than that, and a number of studies have shown what is 

called a bystander effect, that in something like 70 to 80 percent 

of cases, those who are on the radicalizing path, give some indication of that to those who know them well, their family, their teacher, their community members. But if you alienate those communities, I am not sure they feel prone to intervene in those ways, or 

ultimately in the way that you might need by simply calling law 

enforcement. 

54 

I do think the overseas communities are important too, it is hard 

to get the data on exactly how foreign communities react to U.S. 

domestic policies, but it would seem, at a minimum, unlikely to appeal to them to have this religion-centric approach to filtering those 

who come to this country, rather than the very, very careful individualized vetting of which I am fully supportive, and that I think 

should always be strengthened to insure that we are using all of 

our intelligence to stop threats from entering our borders. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. I pressed my luck with time. So Mr. Chairman, 

thank you for your indulgence. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, I want to thank the witnesses 

for a very enlightening discussion. Ambassador, you mentioned failures of imagination, and a good friend of mine, Admiral Inman in 

Austin, worked with the 9/11 Commission to coin that phrase. Not 

to plug my book, but I wrote a book called Failures of Imagination 

to talk about what we have to imagine, what the threats could be 

and what keeps us up at night. It has been a great discussion and 

I want to thank all of you for being here today. 

Pursuant to committee rule VII(D) the hearing record will be 

open for 10 days. Without objection, this committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(55) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTION FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR RYAN C. CROCKER

Question 1. How have the Trump administration’s funding cuts to stabilization 

and assistance programs, particularly to countries in the Middle East, Africa, and 

South and Southeast Asia, including the Sahel region, hurt our ability to defend 

against terror threats to the homeland and to our interests abroad? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE SHELIA JACKSON LEE FOR RYAN C. CROCKER

Question 1. How have the Trump administration’s funding cuts to the State Department hurt our ability to defend against terror groups that are threatening the 

homeland and our interests abroad? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. What should be our polices in terms of technology companies and ensuring that technology platforms cannot be misused by terrorist groups? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE KATHLEEN M. RICE FOR RYAN C. CROCKER

Question. We currently do not have a Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretary of 

State for Near Eastern Affairs. The Trump administration has failed to even nominate people to the Ambassador positions for many of our key allies in the Middle 

East, including Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar. How can the 

United States conduct comprehensive foreign policy, including working with our regional partners to combat ISIS, without these critical diplomatic positions? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTION FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR JOHN M. ‘‘JACK’’ 

KEANE

Question. How have the Trump administration’s funding cuts to stabilization and 

assistance programs, particularly to countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South 

and Southeast Asia, including the Sahel region, hurt our ability to defend against 

terror threats to the homeland and to our interests abroad? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE FOR JOHN M. ‘‘JACK’’ KEANE

Question 1. How have the Trump administration’s funding cuts to the State Department hurt our ability to defend against terror groups that are threatening the 

homeland and our interests abroad? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. What should be our polices in terms of technology companies and ensuring that technology platforms cannot be misused by terrorist groups? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTION FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR DAVEED

GARTENSTEIN-ROSS

Question. How have the Trump administration’s funding cuts to stabilization and 

assistance programs, particularly to countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South 

and Southeast Asia, including the Sahel region, hurt our ability to defend against 

terror threats to the homeland and to our interests abroad? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

56 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR JOSHUA A. GELTZER

Question 1. How have the Trump administration’s funding cuts to stabilization 

and assistance programs, particularly to countries in the Middle East, Africa, and 

South and Southeast Asia, including the Sahel region, hurt our ability to defend 

against terror threats to the homeland and to our interests abroad? 

Answer. Sustainable counterterrorism requires not only addressing immediate 

threats to American interests but also building the foundations for undercutting the 

drivers of radicalization in the future. Stabilization and assistance programs can be 

critical to achieving that longer-term goal, and thus to ensuring that the United 

States and its partners do not find themselves in repeated cycles of using near-term 

military, law enforcement, and other tools to address immediate terrorist threats 

only to see similar threats reemerge because terrorists are able to capitalize on economic and political vacuums to recruit and radicalize. Cutting funding for such programs suggests a worrisomely militaristic and short-sighted approach to counterterrorism that bodes poorly for the enduring reduction of terrorist threats to Americans 

at home and abroad. 

Question 2. What do you deem to be effective counterterrorism tactics used by the 

private sector—as well as tactics used by the Government, or some combination of 

Government and the private sector—to marginalize ISIS on-line? 

Answer. Leading technology companies deserve credit for the steps that they have 

taken to attempt to address ISIS’s on-line recruitment efforts, even if more work 

remains to be done. In December 2016, Facebook, Google (including YouTube), 

Microsoft, and Twitter announced a hash-sharing coalition through which they 

would share the digital signatures of terrorism-related content removed by any single company so that the other companies could consider removing and blocking such 

content from their own platforms. Six months later, the same companies announced 

that they would be forming the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism in 

order to cooperate more broadly to address terrorist threats on-line, such as by sharing the tools that they use to identify terrorism content in the first place. Earlier 

this month, the Forum announced that it would be augmenting the earlier hashsharing database by identifying terrorism content not yet found on any single platform but identified externally so that participating companies could consider preventing that content from being uploaded in the first place. These are all worthwhile forms of cooperation undertaken by the private sector to prevent terrorism 

content from remaining unchallenged on major platforms. While these efforts live 

in the private sector, the companies undertaking them would surely benefit from 

being informed by the Government on an on-going basis as to what it is seeing in 

terms of new on-line tactics and behavior from terrorists. 

The private sector has also experimented with admirable efforts to try to 

marginalize ISIS on-line by augmenting positive counter-messaging. Most notable is 

the ‘‘redirect method’’ pioneered by Google’s Jigsaw. Under that approach, when a 

user searches on Google in ways that suggest a potential interest in joining ISIS, 

the sponsored (paid) content section of Google’s search results features links to alternative messaging that might lead the user away from joining ISIS, such as links 

to stories about ISIS’s hypocrisy or about parents who have lost their children to 

ISIS as foreignfighters. Similarly, Microsoft’s search engine, Bing, has devoted its 

sponsored content section to counter-messaging in response to ISIS-related searches. 

These are helpful steps; and they, too, would benefit from the Government’s distinctive, on-going expertise in what counter-messaging themes and tactics may be particularly effective. 

Question 3. What role should the Government play in regulating content versus 

partnering and empowering technology companies to self-regulate? 

Answer. While technology companies find themselves, in key respects, on the front 

lines of the terrorist challenge posed by activities on their platforms, the Government has a significant role to play in informing and thus augmenting the companies’ efforts. The companies, as private-sector entities, enforce their own terms of 

service, but the Government has an unparalleled expertise in what new messages 

terrorists are promoting on-line, how terrorists are rejuvenating on-line accounts 

once those are suspended, how terrorist activities on-line are crossing different platforms, and more. That sort of information should, to the maximum extent possible 

consistent with the critical protection of sources and methods, be shared with technology companies as expeditiously as feasible so that policy officials, lawyers, and 

perhaps most importantly engineers at the companies can make swift, effective use 

of it in addressing terrorists’ latest tactics on-line. Companies should, in turn, welcome and utilize that information and provide detailed feedback to the Government 

on what is particularly useful to the companies’ efforts and what more can be provided to empower and accelerate those efforts. 

57 

1 Ankit Panda, ‘‘Cryptocurrencies and National Security,’’ Council on Foreign Relations, February 28, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/cryptocurrencies-and-national-security. 2David Manheim et al., ‘‘Are Terrorists Using Cryptocurrencies?,’’ RAND Corporation, April 

21, 2017, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/04/are-terrorists-using-cryptocurrencies.html; Antonia Ward, ‘‘Bitcoin and the Dark Web: The New Terrorist Threat?,’’ RAND Corporation, January 

22, 2018, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/01/bitcoin-and-the-dark-web-the-new-terroristthreat.html. 

Question 4. How should we be judging technology companies’ work, both in terms 

of taking down ISIS content and implementing more holistic policies to counter violent extremism on technology companies’ respective platforms? What more can be 

done? 

Answer. Technology companies have made significant strides in recent years in 

contesting ISIS’s virtual presence and facilitating the offering of counter-messaging. 

The steps noted above, from the formation of the hash-sharing coalition to the 

founding of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism to the pioneering of 

the redirect method, deserve praise. At the same time, ISIS’s on-line presence remains both significant and concerning—indeed, threatening. That, in turn, suggests 

that there is value in technology companies at least experimenting with additional 

approaches to addressing ISIS’s persistent on-line recruitment efforts. For example, 

social media and file-upload platforms might try utilizing advances in machine 

learning to identify—based on similarity in content, similarity to accounts associated with related content, logo and language identification, and other factors—new 

pieces of terrorism content before such content has been uploaded, and then block 

its emergence. Reviewers employed by the companies could then assess ‘‘preblocked’’ content and permit the uploading of anything erroneously blocked, such as 

a legitimate news story about terrorism; the machine learning would also be improved by the feedback generated by these corrections. 

Additionally, social media and file-upload platforms might share with one another 

the information associated with accounts suspended for disseminating terrorism 

content, in addition to the existing sharing of that content itself. This would allow 

other companies to determine whether they have any accounts on their platforms 

associated with the same information and scrutinize those accounts for any terrorism-related violations of their respective terms of service. 

Also, search engines might expand their current offering of links to counter-messaging from the sponsored content section of search results to the primary (nonsponsored) search results themselves, sometimes called the ‘‘organic’’ search results. 

This expansion would boost the salience of that counter-messaging and thereby increase the likelihood that potential recruits to ISIS are exposed to the counter-messaging that might cause them to reconsider joining the group or at least delay their 

radicalization process. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE KATHLEEN M. RICE FOR JOSHUA A. GELTZER

Question 1a. I have introduced two bills, including one that has passed the House 

with this Committee’s support, to require Federal agencies to research if terrorist 

groups are using virtual currencies like Bitcoin to fund their illicit operations. 

To the best of your knowledge, is ISIS using these virtual currencies? 

Answer. Based on reports from leading sources such as the Council on Foreign 

Relations 1 and the RAND Corporation,2 it is my understanding that ISIS has made 

use of virtual currencies. I do not have independent knowledge of such use, however. 

Research on this issue by Federal agencies would seem timely and important. 

Question 1b. If so, what more should Congress and the Federal Government be 

doing to stop them? 

Answer. Assuming that, as the credible reports noted above and others suggest, 

terrorist groups are in fact using virtual currencies, Congress and the Executive 

branch should consider how to apply to such emerging currencies an adaptation of 

the ‘‘know your customer’’ regime that, in the context of traditional banking, has 

proven helpful in counter-terrorist financing efforts. Adapting that regime—implemented through the Customer Identification Program put in place after 9/11—from 

the highly regulated context of traditional banking to the notoriously unregulated 

context of virtual currencies poses a significant challenge, and doing so effectively 

may well require transnational cooperation. But that regime has helped to crack 

down on (though of course not entirely eliminate) terrorists’ efforts to move money 

58 

through the traditional banking system by requiring banks to obtain identifying information from those seeking to transfer funds of sufficient size to trigger the requirement; and an analogous approach to virtual currencies may prove helpful in 

addressing new forms of terrorists’ financial flows. 

Æ