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65–484 PDF 2011

IMPROVING OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND 

RESPONSE, RESTORING JOBS, AND ENSURING 

OUR ENERGY SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS 

FROM THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP 

DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 

OFFSHORE DRILLING 

(112–4) 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 11, 2011 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

TOM REED, New York 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

BOB GIBBS, Ohio, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

TOM REED, New York 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington, 

Vice Chair 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(IV) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Allen (Ret.), Admiral Thad, National Incident Commander, BP Deepwater 

Horizon Oil Spill .................................................................................................. 14 

Boesch, Donald F., Member, National Commission on the BP Deepwater 

Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling ............................................................. 14 

Garcia, Terry D., Member, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling ..................................................................... 14 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice, of Texas .................................................................. 47 

LoBiondo, Hon. Frank A., of New Jersey .............................................................. 52 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Allen (Ret.), Admiral Thad ...................................................................................... 54 

Boesch, Donald F. and Garcia, Terry D. ................................................................ 65 

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(1) 

IMPROVING OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND 

RESPONSE, RESTORING JOBS, AND ENSURING 

OUR ENERGY SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS 

FROM THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 

BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 

OFFSHORE DRILLING 

Friday, February 11, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, JOINT WITH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND

ENVIRONMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank A. LoBiondo, 

[chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 

Transportation] presiding. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Good morning. The joint subcommittee hearing 

will come to order. As this is the first meeting of the Subcommittee 

on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, I want to welcome 

all of our members, and congratulate Mr. Larsen on his selection 

as ranking member. I can’t tell you how thrilled I am that you 

have that position. Rick and I have a long-time working relationship. We are going to be off to a great start, and I think it’s going 

to be a great session, working together. And I certainly look forward to working closely with all the Members of the Committee. 

The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 

is meeting in a joint hearing today with the Subcommittee on 

Water Resources and Environment to hear testimony from members on the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 

Spill, as well as Admiral Thad Allen, former Coast Guard commandant and national incident commander for the oil spill. 

The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill was unprecedented in size 

and duration. It left a tremendous natural and economic disaster 

in its wake. The joint Coast Guard and Department of Interior investigation into the causes of the explosion and sinking of the 

Deepwater Horizon, as well as the failure of the blowout preventer 

to contain the spill is still ongoing. The subcommittee will examine 

the findings of the official investigation, once it is complete. 

While we await the findings of the investigation, the National 

Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, as well as the 

2 

report of the national incident commander has helped highlight significant questions regarding the best methods for the industry and 

the Federal Government to use to prevent and respond to future 

oil spills. 

This hearing provides the subcommittees with the opportunity to 

hear recommendations of the Commission and the national incident 

commander on the changes needed to Federal laws and regulations 

to help reduce the likelihood of a similar event happening in the 

future. 

I am concerned with the findings of the Commission and the national incident commander that officials at all levels of government 

were unfamiliar with the national contingency plan, our Nation’s 

42-year-old blueprint for how to respond to oil spills. But I am particularly alarmed that the senior leaders of the Department of 

Homeland Security were either unaware or simply misunderstood 

how the plan functions. 

I am troubled at the failure of the Department’s leadership to 

recognize, accept, and follow the plans, and—that slowed up the 

command and the control in the days after the spill, undermined 

public confidence in the government, and may have impeded the response. 

But this speaks to a larger issue this subcommittee has been concerned about since the Coast Guard was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security, and that is the Department does not 

understand nor appreciate the traditional missions of the Coast 

Guard, something we have talked about, something we have worried about, and unfortunately, I think, something that we see happening. 

While critically important, port security accounts for only 20 percent of what the Coast Guard does on a daily basis. The remaining 

80 percent are traditional missions like oil spill response. These 

missions require the Department’s leadership to understand that 

they need to commit adequate resources and attention, as well as 

participate fully in training and preparedness activities. Unfortunately, that was not the case with the BP Deepwater Horizon incident. 

Nearly 20 years ago, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was created 

and was a national framework for preventing and responding to oil 

spills in U.S. waters. Since the passage of the act, there have been 

significant changes in the offshore production, storage, and transportation of petroleum products. And with these changes, the requirements to respond to potential incidents have grown more complex. This bill demonstrates that we may need to re-examine the 

requirements under current law to ensure they are applicable to 

present-day operations. 

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to 

remember the 11 Transocean crew members who were lost as a result of this tragedy, and to express my sympathy to their families, 

friends, and their coworkers. 

With that, I would like to yield to ranking member, Mr. Larsen, 

for any comments you may have. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, as well, am excited to be a ranking member here, and working with you. We do 

have a good working relationship over the last several years here 

3 

in Congress, and I look forward to working here on the Coast 

Guard Maritime Transportation Subcommittee with you. Thanks, 

Frank. 

I want to thank you for conducting this joint subcommittee hearing, and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these recommendations today. I think today the message is clear: undertaking deepwater drilling requires a deeper understanding of the risks that accompany the clear benefits of deepwater drilling. 

Now that we have these recommendations in hand, Congress 

should act to ensure that our policies for offshore drilling are rigorous, that they safeguard workers, they benefit the economy, and 

they protect the environment. Too many lives are at stake, and too 

many jobs are at risk for the Congress to fail to act. If we cannot 

tap these offshore resources in a way that protects lives and the 

environment, there will be pressure to restrict the use of those resources. That would be devastating to the maritime industry, the 

jobs they support, and our economy, as a whole. 

We also need to have Federal agencies with adequate resources 

to prevent another tragedy such as this from happening again, and 

to respond, should we have to respond. 

I want to welcome Admiral Allen today to the subcommittee. I 

have appreciated your willingness to serve the United States as 

commandant of the Coast Guard, as well as the commander of this 

response effort, even following your retirement. And I look forward 

to hearing your observations and recommendations. 

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was a major human and environmental disaster of unprecedented proportions. As a representative 

from the Puget Sound, I understand how devastating oil spills 

would be to a coastal region, and I want to do everything we can 

possible to prevent oil spills from any sources occurring in my area 

of the country, or any other area of the country. 

The Commission report today clearly demonstrates that we have 

a long way to go to prevent similar disasters from occurring again. 

Unfortunately, Congress is proposing budget cuts into the muscle 

and to the bone of investments needed for economic growth, and to 

protect our environment. If nothing else, the BP spill shows the 

need for more robust public capacity to respond quickly and safely 

to oil spills, and that’s reflected in the report. 

The public depends upon Federal agencies to ensure the safety 

of deepwater drilling, and the safety of the men and women who 

work on these platforms. Diminishing this capacity through budget 

cuts is irresponsible, especially considering the Commission’s call 

for increased investment. 

Now, some voices in Washington, D.C. argue that we must reduce or eliminate regulatory burdens, and in some places I agree. 

But, once again, the BP spill demonstrated that the oil and gas industry was subject to too little regulation, and not too much. Improved regulation is both necessary in how BP implemented safety 

measures during drilling, and ensuring effective, meaningful response plans once the spill occurred. So, in fact, some of this does 

fall on the Federal Government. 

No one is suggesting that we eliminate deepwater drilling off our 

coast. Given what we know now about the risks of this drilling, we 

should put pieces in place to ensure the highest level of safety. 

4 

The report revealed what many of us expected to learn about the 

spill. First, the Federal Government’s oversight of offshore and oil 

gas drilling was too lax. We didn’t do the job. Second, Federal agencies and the industry were inadequately prepared to effectively 

stop, track, contain, and clean up a spill of this magnitude. And 

third, we learned that the Jones Act, the law which protects and 

supports a domestic maritime industry, was not a hindrance to the 

Federal Government’s response to this environmental calamity, 

and we will find—and we will hear this later. And I know that the 

Commission report and Admiral Allen concur with this finding. 

I proposed last year, along with many others, that—at the committee’s May 19th hearing on the spill, that the country take a step 

back to ensure that any future offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico lives up to claims of safety and reliability. And, if anything, the 

National Commission’s report only reaffirms my convictions. 

I look forward today to evaluating the Commission’s recommendations, and expect that our witnesses this morning will 

provide additional insights on these points. 

When the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Alaska in 

1989, Congress responded with the Oil Pollution Act. Now, 22 

years later, the BP spill demonstrated the need to amend and to 

strengthen that act. And I stand ready to work with Chairman 

LoBiondo and with Chairman Gibbs, with our ranking Democratic 

member, Congressman Rahall, and with Mr. Bishop and the other 

Members of this Committee in shaping legislation to strengthen 

our Nation’s oil spill response and prevention laws. 

Mr. Chairman, the Deepwater Horizon spill exposed the real 

risks and costs of energy production on the outer continental shelf. 

We have before us an opportunity to make the necessary course 

correction in our production of offshore energy. And I urge that we 

not let the current debate on the Federal budget or regulations 

deter us from making the necessary investments to ensure that offshore drilling can be done safely, efficiently, and with minimal 

harm to our environment and to the workers who work on the platforms in the Gulf. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. I would now like to yield 

to Chairman Gibbs of the Water Resources Subcommittee—and Environment—for his statement. 

Mr. GIBBS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to 

working on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and 

also chair the Water Resources and Environment, as we work to 

improve our infrastructure and oversight in those agencies that 

work on the infrastructure issues dealing with water. 

There are two major Federal laws that relate to oil spills like the 

one in the Gulf of Mexico last year: The Oil Pollution Act, and the 

Clean Water Act. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, OPA, was largely 

enacted in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and has improved 

the Nation’s ability to prevent and respond to oil spills. Under 

OPA, the Coast Guard takes the lead in organizing Federal oil spill 

responses and prevention efforts in tidal waters, while the EPA is 

responsible for coordinating efforts in non-tidal and inland waters. 

OPA authorized the use of the oil spill liability trust fund, which 

is capitalized by a per-barrel tax paid by the oil industry and penVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:04 Jul 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG&WR\2-11-1~1\65484.TXT JEAN
5 

alties paid by responsible parties. That trust fund is used to pay 

for the cost of responding to and removing oil spills. 

The second law is the Clean Water Act, which is the principal 

Federal statute for protecting navigable waters and adjoining 

shorelines from pollution. Specifically, section 311 of the Clean 

Water Act addresses pollution from oil and hazardous substances 

releases, providing EPA and the Coast Guard with the authority to 

establish a program for preventing, preparing for, and responding 

to oil spills that occur in navigable waters of the United States. 

The Act clearly establishes the responsibilities of the Federal 

Government, states, and the maritime transportation industries to 

establish liability and to carry out clean-up, restoration, and rehabilitation of natural resources that were damaged as a result of the 

oil spill. 

While the BP oil spill was a monumental disaster, and caused 

the tragic loss of 11 dedicated oil field workers, we must ensure 

that we do not use this as a catalyst to halt or hinder domestic energy production. Rather, the Nation requires a safe, secure, domestic supply of energy products, now more than ever. 

The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 

has studied this recent oil spill and has made several recommendations regarding the Federal response. Many of the proposals by the 

Commission are worth careful review and consideration as we 

move forward. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of the 

witnesses. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Gibbs. I would like to yield now 

to Ranking Member Bishop for his statement. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this important hearing to review the recommendations of the National Commission on BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 

Drilling. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, in the last Congress this committee 

held a series of hearings in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster to investigate what went wrong, what actions were 

being undertaken by BP and other responsible parties to stop the 

ongoing flow of oil, and to restore the lives and livelihoods of those 

impacted by the spill, and what measures were necessary to restore 

the Gulf Coast ecosystem. 

These hearings also focused on what efforts needed to be undertaken by the Federal agencies and the Congress to ensure that a 

similar preventable disaster could not occur in the future. 

Last year, members of the Subcommittees on Water Resources 

and the Coast Guard recalled a similar joint hearing of these subcommittees on the 10th anniversary of the Oil Pollution Act of 

1990, and the warnings given by Federal agencies and other stakeholders that our Nation was rapidly becoming unprepared to address future oil spills. 

Specifically, witnesses testified about the then-growing concern 

that the technologies to extract, process, and transport oil were 

well outpacing the development of technologies to quickly and safely control and clean up potential oil spills. 

Over the intervening years, our subcommittees also receive testimony from representatives of the Coast Guard that currently liabilVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:04 Jul 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG&WR\2-11-1~1\65484.TXT JEAN
6 

ity limits for both vessels and facilities such as the Deepwater Horizon were falling desperately behind the levels necessary to adequately address a worst-case release of oil. Unfortunately, this committee did not heed the warnings given to it over a decade ago, and 

this Nation grew complacent that a future oil disaster was unlikely 

to occur again. 

Fast forward 10 years, and unfortunately, our complacency 

proved wrong. In the summer of 2010, our Nation was again faced 

with a massive oil spill, although this time the release was not 

from the grounding of a ship, but from the seemingly limitless release of oil directly from the sea floor. Again, the questions arose 

on how this could have happened, why it was taking so long to stop 

the flow of oil, and whether this tragedy that resulted in 11 lives 

lost and impacted countless families along the Gulf Coast should 

have been prevented. 

Mr. Chairman, in the days following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, this committee took aggressive action to understand what 

happened and what changes were needed to take to prevent a similar disaster in the future. This committee drafted and moved legislation to address many of the shortcomings identified in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. This legislation reported 

from this committee by voice vote was later combined with proposals from our colleagues on the Natural Resources Committee 

under the then-leadership of our new ranking member, Mr. Rahall, 

and was passed by the House in early summer. Unfortunately, no 

further action was taken on that bill. 

However, with the beginning of the new Congress, we have the 

opportunity to start anew. Today, Mr. Chairman, we will hear testimony from two distinguished representatives from President 

Obama’s National Commission. In my opinion, we should not be 

surprised by the findings of the Commission into the likely causes 

of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, or the systemic failures of the 

oil industry that contributed to this incident. Many of these findings are consistent with what we heard during hearings before this 

committee in the last Congress. 

Similarly, many of the statutory and administrative changes recommended by the Commission are consistent with those included 

in both this committee’s bill and the Consolidated Land, Energy, 

and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, or the CLEAR Act, that was 

approved by the House last year. 

Mr. Chairman, in my view, the prudent choice is for this committee to once again move legislation to address the warnings 

raised by this Commission and other stakeholders on the very real 

threat of future oil spill disasters. While some of the recommendations of the Commission can be addressed administratively, we all 

know that several critical issues, such as the currently inadequate 

liability and financial responsibility limits and issues related to 

maritime safety can only be addressed by the Congress. 

Preventing the next Exxon Valdez or Deepwater Horizon is far 

too important to allow complacency to take over again. As noted by 

one of the witnesses last Congress, ‘‘We cannot let the months that 

have passed without a massive oil spill give us a false sense of security that everything is fine. We must recognize that 

7 

vulnerabilities remain, and take decisive action to address the recommendations made by this commission this year.’’ 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. Now I would like to recognize Mr. Rahall, the ranking member of the full committee. 

Mr. RAHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you and 

Ranking Member Larsen for conducting this hearing today. We will 

hear from the Presidential Commission examining the Deepwater 

disaster and retired Admiral Thad Allen regarding the recommendations for ensuring that offshore oil and gas development 

in the U.S. is far safer now and in the future, and that the devastation of the Deepwater Horizon is not repeated. 

I certainly want to commend our witnesses—you, in particular, 

Admiral Allen—and the Commission, all of the people representing 

our government at all levels for the around-the-clock work that 

they did, and for our country, in trying to ensure the safety and 

return to well-being of so many of our citizens. 

While the round-the-clock television coverage of oil spewing into 

the Gulf has long since faded to black, the urgency we once felt to 

identify the causes of the disaster and take the steps necessary to 

minimize the likelihood it would happen again should not fade with 

the coverage. This truly cannot become a case of out of sight, out 

of mind. We cannot forget the 11 good men who lost their lives, and 

countless families lost their incomes when fishing grounds were 

shut down and tourists canceled their visits to the Gulf. We cannot 

forget the environmental and economic impacts of the spill that 

will last long after the oil can be seen floating on the surface of the 

sea. 

Yet, in the weeks since the Commission released its broad range 

of recommendations for reforms and business practices, regulatory 

oversight, and broader policy concerns, we have heard an outcry of 

indignation from those who claim that it is too soon to take action, 

that we must wait until every aspect of every investigation has 

been completed. 

But we do not need to wait to know that we were not prepared 

for this type of blow-out, that our ability to clean up oil spills is 

woefully inadequate, that regulators were too cozy with the industry, and that a $70 million cap on liability is too small. 

That is why, in my former capacity as Natural Resources chairman, to which Mr. Bishop has referred, I did lead the House in 

writing and passing the CLEAR Act last summer. That legislation 

would have provided for a major overhaul of offshore drilling operations and regulations, decreasing the chances that another blowout would happen in the future, and making sure that we could do 

a better job of containing one, if it did. 

Many of my friends who voted against that bill argued that we 

should not act until the Presidential Commission had completed its 

work. Well, the recommendations are now before us. And again and 

again, they urge us to do the exact same things we did in the 

CLEAR Act. 

Recently, we introduced a new bill to implement all the Commission recommendations. But again, we’re told by some that we need 

to wait. But we cannot wait. The Commission itself said—and I 

quote—‘‘Inaction runs the risk of real cost too, and more lost lives, 

8 

and broad damage to the regional economy and its long-term viability, and its—and further tens of billions of dollars of avoidable 

clean-up costs.’’ 

We should not wait to reform the ranks of the inspectors who 

were supposed to be keeping an eye on—not playing around with— 

industry operators in the Gulf. We cannot wait to reform the laws 

that govern containment, response, and clean-up of spills, or to improve the technologies that these activities rely upon. Nor should 

we wait to improve safety and environmental protection provisions 

that will ensure the long-term sustainability of this industry, as 

well as the other industries that coexist in the Gulf and other areas 

of the country, where offshore energy development continues. 

We have a responsibility. We have a responsibility to the families 

of those who lost loved ones in the Gulf, who lost businesses in the 

aftermath of this disaster, and to the American people. We need to 

act on these recommendations, restore the economy and the ecosystems of the Gulf, and make sure offshore drilling is done in an 

efficient and safe manner. No one should have to risk their lives 

to earn a livelihood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Rahall. We are going to—we will 

entertain brief opening statements from Members, if they so 

choose. I will try to limit them to three minutes. If you can do it 

in less than that, I would appreciate it, so we can get to the meat 

of the hearing. 

Are there—Mr. Cravaack? 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Chairman LoBiondo and Gibbs, and 

Ranking Members Larsen and Bishop, for holding this imperative 

hearing. Welcome, Admiral Allen. It’s good to see you, sir. And 

thank you for your service to this country. Welcome, Dr. Boesch, 

and Mr. Garcia, and I look forward to learning from your testimony 

today, as well. 

A lot of the difficulties our country has faced attempting to cap 

the BP oil spill—it’s an imperative that we improve our ability to 

prevent future spills, and expand our country’s capability to respond and contain an oil spill in order to prevent another regionwide catastrophe. 

While understanding the immense technical difficulties involved 

with capping BP’s Deepwater blow-out, I am hopeful we can apply 

the lessons learned from BP’s oil spill and never again have 87 

days of oil spewing into our waters, and have a government bureaucracy impede recovery in an extremist situation. 

In closing, I would just like to extend my sympathy and concern 

for the American families on our Gulf Coast that have suffered not 

only from the effects of BP’s oil spill, but also because of loss of jobs 

to the Federal Government’s knee-jerk reaction in initially banning 

offshore drilling, and its disjointed response to the emergency situation. 

Thank you again, and I do look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Now I would like to recognize Mr. 

Cummings, former chair of the committee. And I want to publicly 

thank you for your work and cooperation over the last couple of 

sessions, and welcome your remarks. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations on your chairmanship. I want to thank the chairman 

9 

of the Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation and the Subcommittee on Water Resources, Congressman 

LoBiondo and Congressman Gibbs, and certainly our ranking members, Larsen and Bishop, for today’s hearing to enable us to examine the recommendations of the National Commission on the BP 

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 

Also, take a moment to thank Dr. Boesch, president of the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, and Mr. 

Terry Garcia for their service on the National Commission on the 

BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. 

Further, I take a moment to thank Admiral Allen for his service 

managing the Deepwater Horizon incident, and of course for service as commandant of the Coast Guard. It’s good to have Admiral 

Allen appear before us today. 

And during the 111th Congress, as chairman of the Coast Guard 

Subcommittee, I convened a subcommittee hearing to examine foreign vessel operations in the exclusive economic zone. And the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure convened two separate hearings to examine the Deepwater Horizon accident. I also 

traveled to the Gulf and had the opportunity to observe the onscene operations at the Macondo site several times. And I appreciate the thoroughness of the National Commission’s report, and 

the thoughtfulness of the Commission’s recommendations. 

Last year, under the leadership of then-chairman Rahall and 

former chairman Oberstar, the House passed the CLEAR Act, 

which would have implemented many of the reforms which the 

Commission is calling for today, including increasing the financial 

responsibility requirements for offshore drilling facilities. 

Responding to the issues we examined in the Coast Guard subcommittee, this legislation would also have required that vessels 

involved in resource development in the EEZ be owned by U.S. citizens who would pay U.S. taxes. The legislation would also have required such vessels to be crewed by U.S. citizens who would be protected by U.S. safety regulations. 

Further, to help those in the Gulf who were failed by the BP 

claim processing system, the legislation included a provision I authored that would have reduced from 90 days to 45 days the 

amount of time a responsible party has to settle claims before 

claims could be presented to the oil spill liability trust fund. I continue to believe that the CLEAR Act is the kind of strong legislation we need to ensure that our laws and regulations are equal to 

the risk involved in offshore drilling. My belief is only reconfirmed 

by the Commission’s findings and recommendations. 

And so, I look forward to our testimony—to the testimony today. 

I thank the witnesses for being with us. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. Master Chief Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that promotion. I will not take the three minutes. You and Mr. Larsen have 

invited an outstanding panel. I’m looking forward to hearing from 

them. Admiral, good to have you back on the Hill. Thanks for what 

you did. Yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. You scored extra points. Good job. Congresswoman Richardson. 

10 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having this joint hearing this morning, and also our ranking members. 

And I would like to thank our distinguished witnesses who are 

here today, who are helping us as we progress through this very 

difficult tragedy for this country. 

I asked to speak because I had kind of a unique role. In addition 

to being on Transportation, I was also, at the time, chair of the 

emergency communications preparedness and response with the 

Homeland Security Committee, and so I actually visited the Gulf 

several times to observe the progress from multiple areas. 

Within those visits there were some key things that I would like 

to acknowledge. One, I want to thank the Coast Guard and the 

EPA and the other Federal and local agencies who were involved 

in the response, who I thought took tremendous care and, really, 

effort to preserve our coastline and to resolve the problem of the 

millions of gallons of crude oil that was streaming into our shores. 

But I think, when we look at, overall, the observations of the 

trip—and I made a report, myself, of that—I want to underscore 

the large challenges that the response teams faced, and the lessons 

that ought to be learned in the aftermath of this catastrophe. 

For example, the failure or the confusion about the number of 

booms and skimmers that were located, and where they needed to 

be placed. The confusion surrounding the chain of command was 

exacerbated by the number of governmental agencies that comprised the unified response. And, moreover, the magnitude of the 

disaster rendered many of the Federal Government agencies’ contingency plans almost inoperable. 

I represent California’s 37th Congressional District. We have offshore drilling in my district. And I am concerned about what happened there, and how it can happen again. 

Finally, I brought forward legislation, Securing Health for Ocean 

Resources and Environment Act, called the SHORE Act, one, to 

look at improving at NOAA’s spill response and containment and 

prevention capacity; two, better to define to the coordination between Federal, state, and local responses—and I am disturbed to 

say that the same problems we had with Hurricane Katrina didn’t 

seem to be resolved in our response with Federal, state, and local 

elected officials—to clarify the existing authority for NOAA to receive funds from the oil spill liability trust fund, to double the 

amount that Coast Guard may receive from the OSLTF each year, 

with a percentage dedicated towards oil spill research and development; to mandate the improvements in the frequency and quality 

of the Coast Guard’s safety inspections and certification requirements; to require prompt posting by the Coast Guard unified command of oil spill incident plans publicly, utilizing all resources, not 

depending upon cable TV to tell the message; and finally, to 

strengthen the coastal state oil spill planning and response. 

I plan on reintroducing this legislation. But, more importantly, 

I am also very thankful for the report that all of you did. And we 

look forward to working together. I yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Congresswoman Miller. 

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, to all the 

chairmen. And, you know, with all deference, sitting next to a great 

Marine here, Duncan Hunter—and my dad was a Marine and my 

11 

son-in-law is a Marine, and my husband was in the Air Force— 

hats off to the Coast Guard, and to our witness. I am looking forward to hearing Admiral Allen because, as we all know, if it’s wet 

and impossible, always ready, send in the Coast Guard. And I just 

want to echo what’s been said here this morning. 

But just a quick comment, Mr. Chairman, in regards to the Jones 

Act, which is, I think, going to be coming up in the witnesses’ testimony, and I’m sure there will be some questions about that today. 

I personally believe that the Jones Act is a very critical component 

of America’s maritime heritage. And during this tragic incident, 

and the terrible incident in the Gulf, Jones Act suffered from an 

unfortunate, misguided, really untrue sort of media campaign 

against the Jones Act. They were saying that the Jones Act actually hindered the clean-up efforts, and had a lot of—created a lot 

of the confusion in the Gulf. 

And actually, looking through the admiral’s testimony here, in 

regards, as he says, to the application of the Jones Act, there was 

a misperception that the Jones Act impeded the use of foreign flag 

vessels for Deepwater Horizon response operations. In reality, the 

Jones Act had no impact on response operations. 

And just one other quick quote from the report that we all have 

in front of us. We did not reject foreign ships because of Jones Act 

restrictions. These restrictions did not even come into play for the 

vast majority of vessels operating at the wellhead, because the act 

does not block foreign vessels from loading or then unloading oil 

more than three miles off the coast. And when the act did apply, 

the national incident commander appears to have granted waivers 

and exemptions when requested. 

So, I just point that out. I think this hearing is a great way to 

explore everything that happened in the Gulf, and in particular set 

to rest a lot of misperceptions that many people in our country and 

around the globe found out about the Jones Act. As we see now, 

it had no negative impact. 

Again, thanks for calling this hearing, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. The gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs. 

Hirono. 

Mrs. HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, would like 

to thank the Coast Guard for everything that they do there. They 

are a major part of our response teams in Hawaii. 

And I also would like to echo the sentiments of Congresswoman 

Miller in her explanation of the impact of the Jones Act and the 

misinformation that arose about the Jones Act as a result of this 

BP disaster. 

What strikes me about the Commission’s report, moving on to 

that, is that this disaster could have been prevented. And the companies that were involved did certain things—commissions and 

omissions—that we really need to ensure never happens again. 

And, as far as I am concerned, there should be some—there should 

be major accountability of these companies in the follow-up of the 

disaster. 

And so, what I would like to see the committee do is move forward in supporting the recommendations of the Commission. And 

with that, I yield back. 

12 

Mr. LOBIONDO. We have the gentleman from coastal Louisiana 

wants to say something. Mr. Landry? There you are. 

Mr. LANDRY. Yes. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. 

Mr. LANDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman 

Gibbs, for calling this hearing today. I also thank Dr. Boesch, Mr. 

Garcia, for agreeing to serve on the President’s Commission, and 

for giving their time to testify today. Admiral Allen, I thank you 

for your service to the country, and for everything you have done 

for the Gulf Coast. 

As our chairman and ranking members have already stated, the 

accident that happened on April 20, 2010 was an economic, environmental, and human tragedy that cannot be minimized or forgotten now that the images of the accident have stopped playing out 

on the news. 

As the representative for coastal Louisiana, the Macondo incident is still seen in every corner of my district. A hundred thousand men and women of my district either work or are affected by 

both the commercial fishing industry and the oil and gas industry. 

And while our shrimpers, oystermen, and fishermen are doing their 

best to return to work, my neighbors in the oil and gas industry 

continue to sit at home, sidelined by the President’s de facto moratorium. 

Every day we fail to utilize our own energy resources in the Gulf 

of Mexico is a day America is held captive on ongoing crises in the 

Middle East, the turmoil in the rest of the world. And I wish the 

Commission’s report would have addressed the economic impacts of 

this moratorium. 

I am also concerned with the Commission’s recommendation to 

increase the liability cap in financial responsibility requirements. 

Make no mistake. I do not believe that any oil and gas company 

should be able to cause massive damage to our national economy 

and skate away into bankruptcy. However, I also believe that small 

oil and gas producers have a role to play in the Gulf of Mexico. And 

any action which drives these producers away will ultimately hurt 

this Nation. 

I am confident that the system—a system can be implemented 

that protects the environmental health of the Gulf, while still ensuring independent drillers are not pushed out of the industry. 

More broadly than the recommendations, I disagree with the 

Commission’s apparent stance that the entire offshore industry can 

be characterized or quantified by the mistakes or failures that happened on April the 20th. There have been more than 50,000 wells 

drilled in the Gulf of Mexico, 3,200 of which we drilled in deep 

water. Of these wells, Macondo was the first major incident. 

I believe we should always keep in mind—I do agree with the 

Commission’s report that we should always keep in mind the safety 

of the men and women who ply their trade in the Gulf of Mexico. 

And with that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Thank you, Mr. Landry. Mr. Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, first, appreciate the opportunity to serve on this committee with you, and look forward to 

working with you. And I am pleased to receive the testimony that 

we will be having today from Admiral Allen, and the distinguished 

13 

members of the Commission here on this BP Deepwater Horizon oil 

spill. 

The spill spewed oil into the Gulf of Mexico for 86 days, and was 

a human economic and environmental disaster, unparalleled in our 

country’s history, both—but it was both foreseeable and it was preventable. Thanks to the swift response of Admiral Allen, the administration, and the recovery workers in the Gulf, the negative 

impacts were dramatically reduced, yet still great. And as a result 

of the work performed by this Commission, we have a better understanding of the—why this spill occurred, and how we can prevent 

similar tragedies in the future. 

The Valdez taught us some things, but the Valdez was about 

property damage, and environmental damage, and maritime damage, ecological damage. But there were not a loss of lives. And in 

this situation, we’re dealing with the loss of human lives. We lost 

11 individuals on that rig, and we owe it to those individuals and 

to the thousands of Americans who risk their lives every day by 

stepping on to those type of rigs to heed the warnings and try to 

prevent future tragedies by looking at the recommendations and 

passing them. 

There are tens of thousands of people in the Gulf area whose economic livelihoods were devastated, and we owe it to them as well. 

But the main thing is the lives that were lost. If you don’t learn 

from history, you’re doomed to repeat it. And if there are people 

that die in the future, and we don’t do things to protect those oil 

workers there, their blood will be on our hands. 

The recommendations laid out are reasonable and practical. 

They’re improvements and updates to outdated regulations that no 

longer protect the health and well-being of American people and 

our economies. So I thank the Commission for their work. 

I hope that this Congress will heed the warning signs and respond with legislation that will save lives in the future, as well as 

the economies. I thank the witnesses for their work in trying to 

safeguard the people and our environment, and I look forward to 

hearing their testimony and working to try to see that American 

vessels in the future are safer, and that they are—approve their 

American vessels, and not necessarily ones that were flagged in the 

Marshall Islands. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. Were there any other 

Members that we missed who wanted to say a few opening remarks? 

[No response.] 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Seeing none, we will now go to our witnesses. 

And our witnesses today include two members of the National 

Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 

Drilling. Dr. Donald Boesch is the president of the University of 

Maryland’s Center for Environmental Science, and he is joined by 

fellow commissioner, Terry Garcia. Mr. Garcia is the executive vice 

president for the mission programs for the National Geographic Society. 

Mr. Boesch, thank you, and please proceed. 

14 

TESTIMONY OF DONALD F. BOESCH, MEMBER, NATIONAL 

COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 

AND OFFSHORE DRILLING; TERRY D. GARCIA, MEMBER, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL 

SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING; AND ADMIRAL THAD 

ALLEN (RET.), NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMANDER, BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 

Mr. BOESCH. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittees, 

thank you for giving me and my colleague, Terry Garcia, an opportunity to testify on behalf of the National Commission. It’s an 

honor to present the Commission’s findings concerning the explosion and spill, as well as our recommendations for change in U.S. 

policy concerning offshore drilling. 

As a native of Louisiana, and having lived for the difficult decade 

of the 1980s in Houma, Louisiana, I understand the importance of 

the oil and gas industry, both to the local economy and the Nation’s 

energy supply. Anyone familiar with the region understands the 

need to maintain a thriving energy industry, along with the 

healthy natural environment, and the many benefits that both provide. 

So, it was really deeply personal to me as I witnessed, as you 

did, the damage that was done to our coast, our wetlands, our 

economies, and communities as a result of this spill. 

In May of last year, President Obama created our Commission, 

and asked us to determine the causes of the Deepwater Horizon 

disaster, evaluate the response, and advise the Nation about how 

future energy exploration could take place responsibly. 

As you know, on January 11th, exactly 1 month from today, we 

released our final report. As co-chairman Bob Graham has previously noted, our report was completed on time, under budget, and 

contains no dissents among our members. 

Our final report includes recommendations directed at the administration, at Congress, and at the industry that will help to improve the safety of offshore drilling and substantially reduce the 

risk of something like this happening again. 

Today, however, I would like to focus my opening remarks on the 

equally important portion of our recommendations: ways to improve the government’s oil spill response and containment capabilities. In their response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, let’s face 

it, both the government and the industry fell short. 

Although many responders acted quickly, and in some cases heroically, and although Admiral Allen provided effective and valuable leadership during this response, the Commission concluded 

that neither BP nor the Federal Government was adequately prepared to respond to a spill of this magnitude and complexity. There 

was a failure to plan in advance, a failure to coordinate effectively 

with state and local governments, and a lack of information concerning what response measures would be most effective. 

In addition, neither the industry nor the Federal Government 

has invested in the research and development needed to improve 

spill response technology. Much of the technology was the same as 

used during the Exxon Valdez spill 20 years earlier. 

Equally troubling at the outset of the spill, the industry was unable to contain the flow of oil from the well, and neither the govVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:04 Jul 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG&WR\2-11-1~1\65484.TXT JEAN
15 

ernment or the industry had sufficient expertise to determine the 

rate at which the oil was flowing. The lack of accurate knowledge 

impeded the efforts to determine the appropriate control technology, and determine it quickly. 

All of these factors together made for a long and costly response 

effort that, at least in the early stages, did not meet the standard 

of what the law presently requires. In our report, the Commission 

makes a number of recommendations to improve response and containment. 

Among the recommendations: first, the Department of the Interior, consulting with other agencies, should develop a more rigorous 

set of requirements for industry response plans, and should require 

companies to submit containment plans, along with the oil spill response plans; second, EPA and the Coast Guard should involve 

state and local governments as significant players in the spill response planning; Congress should provide mandatory funding for 

oil spill response research and development; industry should fund 

a private organization to develop, adopt, and enforce the standards 

of excellence to ensure improvement and equipment for large-scale 

response and containment and rescue; and finally, the Federal Government should ensure that this has the needed expertise to oversee these industry containment efforts. 

The Commission’s recommendations are far-reaching in this 

area. There is a role for Congress, to be sure, the executive branch, 

and the industry, in significantly improving capabilities. There is 

also a role for Congress in conducting oversight, as our government 

takes these actions. 

I will conclude my remarks by noting that the drilling offshore 

is inherently risky. The risk will never be reduced to zero. But as 

a Nation we can take concrete steps that will dramatically reduce 

the chances of another Macondo well blow-out, and that will substantially improve our ability to respond, should an oil spill like 

this occur again. 

The Commission believes these steps are vitally necessary, that 

people of the Gulf who have suffered so much deserve to know that 

their government and industry are doing so. So, Mr. Chairman, 

thank you for this opportunity. You have our written testimony 

and our report for the record. Thank you. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Boesch. 

Mr. Garcia? 

Mr. GARCIA. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for giving us this opportunity to testify concerning the findings and recommendations of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 

Any severe catastrophe of national significance, like the explosion of the Macondo well and the subsequent oil spill in the Gulf 

of Mexico, strains public confidence, fosters widespread concern 

and anxiety, and creates an urgent need for candid explanation. 

But it can also create an opportunity to bring a renewed focus to 

existing challenges. As tragic as this disaster was, it can play a 

positive role in restoring one of our Nation’s most valuable ecosystems. 

So, today I would like to focus my remarks on the Commission’s 

recommendations for the restoration of the Gulf of Mexico. 

16 

As a result of the Deepwater Horizon spill, over 170 million gallons of oil went into the Gulf, with some portion remaining in the 

ocean and possibly settling on the ocean floor. But even before the 

highly visible damages caused by the spill became clear, many crucial Gulf economic and ecological resources—fisheries, transportation, tourism—faced long-term threats. 

First, more than 2,300 square miles of coastal wetlands, an area 

larger than the State of Delaware, have been lost to the Gulf. Powerful hurricanes, always a threat to the region, struck the coast in 

2005 and 2008, causing even more wetland loss. Last summer, 

even before the spill, a massive dead zone, extending up to 7,700 

square miles, was forming in the Gulf. 

And finally, the Deepwater Horizon disaster made matters 

worse. Eleven rig workers were killed by the explosion, seventeen 

were injured. Many thousands of people were exposed to contaminated waters, coast, beaches, and seafood. Thousands were out of 

work. Birds and sea animals killed and significant habitats damaged or destroyed. 

Restoring the Gulf to its condition just before the oil spill would 

certainly improve the environment, but it is not enough. Our goal 

here should not be to simply maintain an already degraded environment. We believe the country must aim higher, and that the region deserves better. That’s why we have recommended that the 

Federal Government, working closely with the Gulf states, make a 

renewed and national commitment to the Gulf of Mexico and its 

natural resources. 

Currently, no funding source exists to support comprehensive regional restoration efforts. Estimates of the cost of Gulf restoration 

vary widely. But according to testimony before the Commission, 

fully restoring the Gulf will require $15 billion to $20 billion, or a 

minimum of $500 million per year over 30 years. 

The litigation process related to the Deepwater Horizon spill is 

likely to generate at least some of the needed funding. But congressional action would be required to ensure that those funds reach 

the Gulf. The Commission recommends that 80 percent of any 

Clean Water Act penalties and fines be directed to Gulf restoration. 

Should Clean Water Act penalties not be redirected to the Gulf, 

Congress should consider other mechanisms for a dedicated funding stream not subject to annual appropriations. 

The Commission also recommends that Congress create an effective state/Federal authority to administer Gulf ecosystem restoration policy. This council should implement a restoration strategy 

for the region that is compatible with existing state restoration 

goals. If funding is to be efficiently directed at long-term ecosystem 

restoration, a decision-making body should see that binding priorities are set, and funding criteria are adhered to. 

Congress should also ensure that the priorities and decisions of 

that council are informed by input from a citizens advisory council 

that represents diverse stakeholders, and that restoration decisions 

are rooted in sound science. 

While coastal restoration is critical, we must also devote greater 

attention to the marine environment. Scientists have emerged from 

this incident with more precise questions to investigate, as well as 

a better sense of the monitoring needs in the Gulf of Mexico which, 

17 

because of its multiple uses and economic value, should be a national priority. 

The Commission recommends that, as part of management and 

restoration efforts, greater attention should be given to new tools 

for managing ocean resources that have the potential to improve 

overall efficiency and reduce conflicts among ocean users. 

This country’s need for oil will continue for the foreseeable future. The simple truth is that the bulk of new finds are offshore 

and in the deep water of the Gulf. We simply cannot walk away 

from these resources, even as we remain cognizant of the very real 

risk. And because we know that drilling will continue in the Gulf, 

it is vital that we take this opportunity to invest in this valuable 

ecosystem, and undo past damage, and improve its resiliency. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Garcia. We are now going to go 

to Admiral Thad Allen. And, Admiral Allen, I want to take the opportunity to publicly thank you for your service to our country. 

Very few people in our Nation’s history have been called upon to 

do what you have been called upon to do: one of the largest disasters in the form of a hurricane with Katrina that you were called 

in to, to oversee putting the pieces back together, and got extremely high marks across the board; commandant of the Coast 

Guard at a very critical time, when the Coast Guard needed exceptional leadership, and you went above and beyond the call with 

that; and then certainly the issue that we’re here with today, one 

of the disasters that our Nation could never imagine it would deal 

with, and you were asked and you responded to serve your country. 

We owe you a great debt of gratitude, and we thank you for 

being here today. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

Chairman Gibbs, Ranking Member Larsen, Ranking Member 

Bishop, thanks for having me here today, and thanks for the opportunity to speak. 

I have a longer statement for the record, and I will limit my remarks here this morning. 

A couple of caveats before I begin, if I could. As the subcommittee is aware, I am no longer in public service, having retired 

from the Coast Guard on 1 July 2011, and having departed government service as a senior executive on 1 October. Accordingly, my 

association with spill response and recovery activities, current legislation and regulatory reviews, and policy discussions regarding 

offshore oil and gas development has been limited to information 

pretty much contained in the public realm. 

I have been assisted by the Coast Guard in information that has 

been held regarding my duties as a national incident commander, 

but that assistance has been guided by the Anti-Lobbying Act, and 

has been complied with fully. 

I am currently employed as a part-time senior fellow at Rand 

Corporation, and am teaching at George Washington University. In 

my capacity here today I am representing myself only, and none of 

those entities. 

I have reviewed the findings of the Commission. I commend the 

Commission for the detailed work and their rigor by which they 

went about their business. I would say that there are a number of 

18 

other inquiries, as was noted by Ranking Member Rahall earlier 

on, that are in progress, including the joint investigation by the Department of Interior and the Coast Guard, and other inquiries 

being done by the Department of Justice. 

I realize there will be attention between wanting to act on what 

the Commission has reported, but I think there is information that 

will be developed in those inquiries that somehow should be taken 

into consideration, even if there are two phases associated with 

this. And I would commend to both committees it is my personal 

recommendation that the subcommittees take advantage of these 

additional investigative efforts to be included in any legislation 

that may be considered, going forward. 

For the purposes of my testimony here today I would like to 

focus on eight areas. There will be a Federal on-scene commander’s 

report that will be coming out, as well. I am trying to focus on 

issues that were related to my responsibilities as national incident 

commander, which only comes about when there is a spill of national significance, and where we need to focus, moving forward, to 

make sure that we have an effective way to do that, if it’s needed 

in the future. 

The first is oil spill governance and the role of the national response team. Throughout the entire response, even before I assume 

my duties as a national incident commander, there was significant 

misunderstanding about what the national contingency plan is and 

what it does. A lot of that was juxtaposed against the statutory 

underpinnings of the Stafford Act, and what is done pursuant to 

an emergency declaration, especially in relation to state and local 

governments and their authorities and jurisdictions. 

I think we need to have an open, frank conversation, moving forward, about what that means. And in the future, I think it’s undeniable that we will have to have greater participation at the state 

and local level regarding our area contingency planning process, 

and our oil spill exercising process. 

Spills of national significance in the national incident command. 

I believe, going forward, we need to consider having a presidential 

declaration when these things are occurring. And then, subsequent 

to that declaration, a number of things that could kick in that 

would be automatic authorities would not have to be sought during 

the actual event, itself. And these would be things like giving an 

authority the jurisdiction to act under the Clean Water Act and the 

national incident commander, the authority to reduce stand-by requirements for response equipment elsewhere in the country, and 

make that available, should we need it in some other part of the 

country. 

There has already been some comments made about oil spill preparedness and research and development. Members, I can tell you, 

as the national incident commander, the very worst time to do oil 

spill R&D is in the middle of an oil spill. 

And the atrophy of the R&D system following the passage of the 

Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the inter-agency forum that was set 

up to do that is something we really need to seriously look at, and 

I highly commend the recommendations to establish a recurring 

stream of fund, and to make sure we have a robust search—I mean 

rescue—sorry, research and development program, moving forward. 

19 

We did not make consequential progress beyond burning, skimming, and dispersant use from the legislation that was passed after 

the Exxon Valdez. 

There has been talk about the oil spill liability trust fund. Obviously, we have to take a look at the overall limit, what could be 

funded out of the oil spill liability trust fund, which currently 

stands at $1 billion. That needs to be seriously looked at, because 

there is a limiting factor on what the government could do if there 

was no responsible party that had the deep pockets that BP did. 

Inter-agency coordination was key. My goal, as the national incident commander, was to create unity of effort. I think we need to 

seriously look at the role of the national response team, moving forward, and how they are employed. We established an inter-agency 

solutions group at the national incident command to handle unique 

challenges that were presented to us, like the flow rate problem. 

I think, in the future, that needs to be institutionalized in the national response team, and made part of the national contingency 

plan doctrine, moving forward. 

Regarding the international offers of assistance, as was previously stated, we accepted every reasonable offer of assistance 

from foreign countries. And regarding the application of the Jones 

Act, there was no impact of the Jones Act on this response. There 

were seven waivers that were requested for foreign vessels that 

were never utilized, and those waivers were requested in the event 

that heavy weather would require us to bring those foreign flag 

vessels inside state waters. That was done as a contingency, but 

never utilized. So the Jones Act, as was stated, was not a factor. 

Two final issues. One, air space coordination. We took a lesson 

learned from Haiti when we took control of the air space to control 

the landing slots. Partially through the response, we took control 

of the air space in the Gulf and it substantially improved our performance. Had I to do it over again, I would have done that on the 

first day. 

And I would be glad to answer any questions you may have for 

me regarding the implication of these lessons for future operations 

in the Arctic. And I thank the chairman for inviting me here today. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Admiral Allen. I am going to start off 

by yielding my time to Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel. I especially thank the admiral. 

In the aftermath of—the Deepwater Horizon spill response was 

purely inadequate. But I say it was also inadequate with the Exxon 

Valdez spill, and we learned from that spill. I am not real excited 

about the Commission’s recommendations. And I do thank you, Admiral, for saying maybe we ought to look at the rest of it, because 

it doesn’t give us the answer to why the explosion occurred, the 

Deepwater Horizon. 

And I think that’s what we ought to address, what human factors were involved, and was there a mechanical, was there a criminal action. And until we find that out, I don’t believe we should 

rush into write any legislation. 

20 

Actually, what we came—after the Valdez it was for harbors. We 

had no protection for harbors until we had Exxon Valdez. It 

worked. But it wasn’t good in the deepwater area. 

BioMar says they’re going to require response capability of 400 

percent of worst case scenario discharge, yet they’re asked how 

they are going to insure it, the plan to actually meet that goal, and 

they say, ‘‘That’s not our job. We’re not boat people.’’ 

And then, the Coast Guard—all due respect, Admiral, you’re no 

longer with them—says, ‘‘That’s not our job. Our job is not to say 

how much oil gets picked up, or how it gets picked up. Our job is 

to ensure that whatever method is employed is safe.’’ 

As you can see, there is a gap, a regulatory gap. And, as a result, 

the industry is left to police itself, the very thing that every report 

has concluded is a major part of the problem of Deepwater Horizon. 

Some are proposing to have the American Bureau of Shipping fill 

that gap. ABS already does work for both agencies—as you know, 

Admiral—and it has expertise in evaluating the specifications and 

maintenance of the equipment and plan. 

What would you think about the ABS taking over that program? 

Either one or all of you. I don’t care. Admiral? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, I’ll take a stab at that. First of all, I think 

it’s clear and unequivocal there needs to be third-party inspection 

of drilling systems. We shouldn’t be left to industry standards. And 

that can be done by a variety of institutions. ABS does have a process whereby they drill that—I’m sorry, inspect that—and then review the plans. 

Several components of these drilling systems have to be the subject, in my view, of third-party investigations: the preventers, blue 

and yellow control pods, and the choke and the kill lines, at a minimum. And I think this is something that needs to be done. 

Mr. YOUNG. But right now it’s not being done. So we could do 

that. We could set that up, where there is a—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Right now there is a—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Frankly, Admiral, I don’t want the government to do 

it right now. 

Admiral ALLEN. Right now there is a certification industry standard, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Let’s get somebody—you guys agree with that? 

Mr. BOESCH. Yes, that’s consistent with our recommendations. 

Mr. YOUNG. OK, I’m glad to hear that, because that’s one of our 

biggest problems. 

Last summer’s spill in the Gulf of Mexico reminded us of the 

risks associated—there are risks, by the way. This is the first blowout we had in deep water, I believe—42,000 wells drilled in shallow 

wells and how many drilled in deep water? This is the first blowout we had. It was unexpected. And we did not have the capability 

to do it. 

But there was—in Mexico there was a number of vessels nearby 

to assist in recovery and clean-up immediately. What steps has the 

industry taken to mitigate the risks and effects of a spill in rural 

areas of the Arctic? See, I’m from the Arctic, guys. I want to drill 

in the Arctic. And your report is not too enthusiastic on that. 

And I heard some comments of the admiral—I’m not enthusiastic 

about that, either—like, ‘‘We can’t do it until we have proper ice 

21 

breakers, et cetera.’’ And, by the way, Admiral, we’re not going to 

get the ice breakers out of this Congress. I helped build those 

three, and we got two in dry dock right now are not working, and 

you’re not going to get any more ice breakers. We do it, we can 

have them leased, as they should be, at a cheaper rate—I’ve been 

pushing that for a long time—than buying them, because we’re not 

going to get the money for it. And we do need them in the Arctic. 

But what steps have been taken by the industry, like Shell, et 

cetera, in the Arctic that actually—it’s different than the Gulf—to 

work on it? Is there any steps that you know of? 

Mr. GARCIA. Yes, Congressman Young. We do address the Arctic 

in the report, and we do indicate in our report that drilling can be 

done in the Arctic. We are suggesting that there are certain steps 

that should obviously be taken before drilling commences. You’ve 

noted most of them, which is that industry should demonstrate it 

has the capacity to respond and to contain a blow-out. 

There are clear differences in the Arctic from the Gulf. It’s 

shallower water, it’s much deeper in the Gulf. But we were concerned about the government’s and the industry’s ability to respond. If they can show that they have the capability of adequately 

overseeing and responding to a spill, then drilling may commence. 

Mr. YOUNG. But my problem is it is shallower. It’s low pressure, 

is that correct? 

Mr. GARCIA. Yes. 

Mr. YOUNG. So we—the chance of blow-outs are minimum, and— 

because I don’t believe we have ever had one in the Arctic, anywhere. Now, maybe over—now I have Iceland drilling now, I have 

China drilling now, I’ve got—I believe Russia is drilling now. 

Greenland is drilling now. Everybody is drilling in the Arctic but 

us. 

And I want to suggest respectfully that—Mr. Chairman, if we 

keep delaying this action, we’re doing this country a disservice, because they have done the job. As far as I can tell—and I’ve reviewed their reports—now, we don’t have the ice breaker. We’ve got 

the Healy, which is on its last legs. 

We need to figure out what can be done in the Arctic. It may be 

easier to clean up in the Arctic if there was a spill, because it’s a 

much colder climate. And I don’t want to keep saying no, no, no, 

because it’s not failsafe. You said that, Mr. Garcia. 

Mr. GARCIA. Yes. 

Mr. YOUNG. Is there—— 

Mr. GARCIA. Sir—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. GARCIA. I agree. There are clear differences. But also, as you 

know, in the Arctic there are challenges. The remoteness of certain 

areas, the ability to stage equipment and personnel, as well as the 

fact that—weather factors, ice, darkness throughout much of the 

year. So all of that has to be factored in. But nothing in our report 

has suggested that we should not be drilling in the Arctic. We are 

only saying that the lessons that we learned from this incident 

should be incorporated into any decisions to move forward. 

I would also—if I could just add one other thing, the report—and 

I just commend it to the record and to your reading—but the report 

does address the root causes and the immediate causes of the blowVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:04 Jul 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG&WR\2-11-1~1\65484.TXT JEAN
22 

out, and our chief counsel is also coming out with a report next 

week that will be highly detailed, going through each of the factors 

that caused the blow-out of the Macondo well. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, that may be, but I know I’ve checked the background of every one of the Commission, and their support in the 

past, and I want you to know that. And I am —some got critical. 

We had two people before the Natural Resources Committee, and 

I did chew on them a little bit. I haven’t chewed on you. 

Mr. GARCIA. And I appreciate that. 

Mr. YOUNG. I might. I might. I just think there is a pre-thinking 

process, and—for offshore drilling. 

And, gentlemen, we have a problem in this country. As you mentioned, we’re not going to get off this kick for oil. There is no way 

for a long, long period of time. 

And I have—as you know, you talk about an economical disaster 

in the Gulf. Really, it’s because of the moratorium. That’s been the 

biggest hardship, other than the oil. The lack of work. It’s been 

lost—we’re buying that oil from Venezuela. Now all the ships that 

I know of are going down to Brazil. And we, as a Nation, have to 

do where the oil is. We have to do it and do it correctly. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Young. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just like to recommend 

that we get Representative Young maybe some bear meat he can 

chew on, and leave the folks alone that are testifying. 

Mr. YOUNG. You know me. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LARSEN. I want to thank the folks for testifying. I also want 

to be sure I thank the employees at the BP refinery in Cherry 

Point Ferndale, the Coast Guard and Federal employees out of the 

Coast Guard from district 13, and those from EPA, the Federal employees from EPA region 10 out of Seattle for being willing to take 

an assignment to go down to the Gulf and help with response and 

clean-up during the response over the summer, before we get started. Working side by side and hand in hand, everybody pulling on 

the same oar last summer. 

I have some questions with regards to something in my opening 

statement, and that’s about the costs and the budget. And first off, 

for Admiral Allen, you know, this Congress is exploring some fairly 

deep cuts to discretionary spending. Even assuming that the Coast 

Guard funding remains constant, there are recommended investments that would take funds from other Coast Guard accounts. 

In your—based on your experience with the Coast Guard, would 

that allow the Coast Guard to still adequately perform its existing 

missions, if we were to follow through on some of the things we’re 

looking at right now in congress? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, sir, as you rightly pointed out, I’m not the 

commandant right now. So any comments I had would be reflective 

on the experience I had in the last couple budget years moving forward. And I would just say, as a general statement, you get faced 

with a choice in any constrained budget environment about what 

you’re going to do with capital investment and replacing your aging 

assets. If you don’t do that, you create a hollow force that collapses 

on itself. 

23 

I made some very difficult decisions, as commandant, to make 

sure I sustained, to the extent it was possible, acquisition funding 

to keep building our cutters, because we need those desperately. If 

you’re going to do that in a constrained budget environment, then 

you’re going to have to look at your operating accounts as an offset 

to do that. 

What is needed is a frank, open conversation about the inherent 

opportunity costs of doing that. I talked last year in the budget development inside the administration about risks associated operations to be able to make capital investment. There is nothing 

wrong with talking about that, you just need to have a frank, open 

conversation and be clear about what it is you’re trading off. 

But I think we have a real hesitance and reluctance to talk about 

those things, and when they’re actual realties that we have to deal 

with in the budget. So my decisions, as it related to budget, reflected my need to build Coast Guard cutters. And if that was at 

the expense of some operating expenses, then you take a shortterm position when you’re going to have to manage with fewer resources to make sure you ensure the long-term viability of the service. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. And I know that current Admiral Papp has 

made some comments recently about the budget environment in 

the Coast Guard currently, and about what might have to occur 

there at the Coast Guard coming in to the future. 

For Mr. Garcia and Mr. Boesch, did—does the report—did you 

look at the amount of the investments that would be needed to implement your recommendations, but for the 80 percent of the—— 

Mr. BOESCH. Our staff has done a general appraisal. We’re obviously not in a position to cost out each of the activities that we recommend, in terms of improving the review and regulatory capacity 

in the Department of the Interior, including the studies and the 

like. 

But in a general estimation, just to put it in a context that we 

can understand, I think, our estimate is that it might induce a cost 

of somewhere between 7 and 12 cents on a barrel of oil that’s produced. And you put it into terms of a gallon of gasoline, it’s less 

than a quarter of a cent per gallon of gasoline. 

And we recommended that these fees not be recovered from the 

general taxpayers, who are the landowners in this case and are 

being paid by the oil companies for the right of exploiting the land 

and the resources, but by the industry itself, much as the Federal 

Communications Commission is funded by that industry. 

So, we think that this can be done in a cost-effective way that 

would actually increase the efficiency of regulation. Right now 

there are not enough folks to review the permits under these new 

standards. But also, do it in a way that doesn’t affect the Federal 

tax situation and our own fiscal health in this Nation, but also a 

very modest cost, which is easily affordable for the industry. 

Mr. LARSEN. Admiral Allen, I only have a few seconds. I will ask 

the question with the chairman’s indulgence, and perhaps have an 

answer. 

In your report and testimony, you discuss the initial difficulties 

of working with certain—well, with state and local officials, perhaps because of the difference between how people approach a natVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:04 Jul 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG&WR\2-11-1~1\65484.TXT JEAN
24 

ural disaster versus a disaster like we see in the Gulf. Did you 

have specific recommendations that you think we ought to be looking at, with regards to the Stafford Act, or any other legislation? 

Admiral ALLEN. I do. First of all, the area of contingency plans 

that identify sensitive areas and how they will be protected have 

been developed over the last 20 years, after the revisions made 

from the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. I think it’s absolutely essential 

that we get state and local governments more involved in that. 

Heretofore, those agreements have been made with the states representing the counties or the parishes. 

It was clear during this bill that the determinations that were 

made and the priorities established in that planning process were 

not understood by the local leaders in the areas that were impacted. I can see no other way of moving forward to solve that 

problem than to bring them in to the process, and make sure they 

are consulted and have a role in it. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK, thank you. Mr. Gibbs. 

Mr. GIBBS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I wanted to 

thank Admiral Allen for his service to our country, and appreciation of all he’s done. Your eight points for response coordination, 

I think that’s something we should look at. 

My first question that I wanted to address to the other two witnesses, in your oral testimony you talked a lot about ecosystem restoration. And obviously, that’s important. But I noticed in your oral 

testimony you didn’t mention what was the root cause of the disaster. Now, in your written report, you do. The Commission talks 

about several key human errors, engineering mistakes, and management failures. 

Specifically, there was flaw design in the cement to seal the bottom of the well. A negative pressure test was conducted that identified the cementing was a failure. Flawed procedures in securing 

the well with the mud, and getting the mud out of the well door— 

apparent inattention by key initial signals for an impending blowout. And so it was obviously human errors; management and engineering errors. You say that in your report. 

Now, where I come from, we in Ohio don’t have deepwater drilling. But I know in instances—my experience in the Ohio legislature—we have had problems. A lot of that was similar problems, 

somebody didn’t do the right thing. And what’s really been bothering me is when you think of all the challenges in deepwater drilling and the technical challenges and all that, and the amount of 

investment and all, compared to just drilling a normal well in Ohio. 

What is the function of the regulatory person? In one part of the 

report it talks about creating a new regulatory structure. Before I 

would want to support that, I need to know, on a deal like that, 

there is no regulatory person on these rigs, or—what’s the oversight? Can you expound on that a little bit? 

Mr. GARCIA. Sure. The—thank you for the question, Congressman. 

One of the findings of the Commission was that there was a failure of oversight. There was a serious failure. You had an agency 

that had an inherent conflict. Individuals who were responsible for 

overseeing safety were also involved in the collection of royalties 

25 

and making leasing decisions. We’ve suggested that we need to separate those functions, and the Department of Interior is moving in 

that direction. We think that they should probably go much further. So we’ve suggested removing it from the political process 

within the Interior Department. 

Inspectors from MMS did go out and visit rigs. But clearly, the 

oversight was inadequate. And we have made a number of recommendations on how the government can be more effective, as 

well as how the industry can be more effective in monitoring its activities and policing itself, rather than having the government be 

solely responsible for that. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. So I see independent agency—that’s your response for that, because you think for regulation—— 

Mr. GARCIA. Well, independent agency within the new BOEMRE, 

however they pronounce their new acronym. 

But also we have suggested that the industry follow the example 

of the nuclear industry, and set up an industry watchdog that 

would police its members, would set standards of excellence, so 

that an outlier would not be able to impact the entire industry, as 

happened in this case. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK. And my last question, Mr. Chairman, dealing 

with the Commission’s reasons why state and local authorities 

were not more involved in spill planning. And I think that would 

probably go to all three, with the recommendations on how the 

Coast Guard can be more effective working with local authorities 

for a response. 

Admiral ALLEN. I don’t think there is any disagreement between 

the Commission’s finding and at least where I stand as the national incident commander, that if you’re going to have an effective 

local response, the local political leaders can’t feel they’re 

disenfranchised and didn’t have a say in the priority. 

There was an assumption made that when we approved the area 

contingency plans with the state representatives, that they reflected the representation of the state and the local governments. 

That was not the case, especially in Louisiana. And I think, moving 

forward, there has to be visibility of what’s going to be protected, 

and how it will be protected, the tactics, including exercises in preparedness, that must involve local governments. 

Mr. GARCIA. I would just add that we heard a lot about this. I 

traveled throughout the Gulf, as did Dr. Boesch. Clearly, a better 

job needs to be done of bringing elected state and local officials into 

the planning process, so they understand what’s happening. And so 

that was one of the disconnects in this incident. 

Mr. GIBBS. Thank you. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you all for your testimony. And, Admiral Allen, thank you for your 

service. It’s nice to see you again. 

I want to focus in on the issue of financial liability, because I believe this is an area that the Deepwater Horizon disaster clearly 

demonstrates where our current law is insufficient. Current liability limits for deepwater drilling are—the responsible parties responsible for the cost of the clean-up and the removal, 100 percent 

of that, and then for $75 million of other costs. That’s the cap. 

26 

Now, thankfully, and responsibly, BP has indicated that they will 

not be constrained by that cap. 

The legislation that we passed last summer, the CLEAR Act, had 

completely eliminated a cap. There was no cap that the responsible 

party would be responsible for all costs associated with the spill. 

The Commission has recommended an increase in the liability cap, 

but without specifying it. 

So, my question is, how exposed are we? What are the consequences of our continued failure not to have passed legislation 

that addresses just that one narrow issue? Dr. Boesch? 

Mr. BOESCH. Well, there is pretty substantial exposure, because 

if an incident like this, or even much less than this, occurred, and 

the party didn’t have the deep pockets of BP, and did make the 

commitments that BP has, we would have been in a difficult situation. 

The Commission recommended raising the cap. The need to do 

this is clear from what had gone on. We did not recommend unlimited liability, nor a specific amount, because this requires more 

analysis than we were able to do within the remit that we had: 

specifically, the issues of insurance, and how that insurance market would work; and secondly, as Mr. Landry had pointed out, 

there are some smaller companies that are involved in this industry, and we didn’t want to, by making a recommendation without 

further analysis, exclude the participation of those companies in 

this industry. 

Mr. BISHOP. Understood. Admiral Allen, you have indicated—I 

don’t want to put words in your mouth, but I believe you have indicated that we should take somewhat of a go-slow approach with respect to legislation, wait until we have all of the reports in hand, 

and so on. 

But in this area of liability cap, isn’t it fair to conclude that we 

already know that the current liability cap is insufficient, given the 

enormity of the tragedy in the Gulf, and that at least that one area 

is an area that really demands that we move much more quickly? 

Admiral ALLEN. I think you can separate out what we know to 

a certainty needs to be fixed right now, and what we need to know 

from the detailed investigations and forensics that are going on 

right now with the joint investigative team. I don’t know how that 

translates to the agenda that you have regarding legislation, but 

there obviously is attention here. I think we just need to recognize 

that it exists, and what is the best way to move forward. 

I don’t think there is any issue regarding the liability cap and 

the total overall amount that could be spent on a response. I think 

the question is finding that right amount and the balance between 

the impact on the insurance industry and the small operators in 

the Gulf that Mr. Landry represents, and others. I think there 

needs to be some serious research done in that regard, and what 

the impacts would be on that liability. 

We did have a case in the Delaware River several years ago in 

LoBiondo’s area, where we had a vessel ran against an object in 

Delaware Bay. We had a significant spill. They reached the limits 

of liability, and basically the company walked and the government 

was insured. So, I think we need to go back and take a look and 

understand what’s going on. 

27 

And I would make one other comment. Under the Oil Pollution 

Act of 1990 we required certificates of financial responsibility for 

vessels that are entering the U.S. waters carrying crude oil. There 

was a lot of talk at the time that that might have a significant negative impact on the tanker business. It did not. They adjusted, and 

we moved forward. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. I—just to put a—you know, make the 

point even more pronounced, Mr. Garcia, your testimony was that 

fully restoring the Gulf will require, over the next 30 years, at least 

an expenditure of $15 billion to $20 billion, if we have the existing 

cap in place, and the responsible party is not being as responsible 

as BP is doing. That amount would very quickly dwarf the amount 

of money available in the oil spill liability trust fund, and so either 

the work would remain undone or it would revert to the taxpayers 

to take on that obligation. Is that right? 

Mr. GARCIA. Well, actually, what we’re recommending is that the 

penalties under the Clean Water Act, which are separate from the 

natural resource damages—and those penalties could be substantial; they’re based on the amount of oil that is spilled into the 

water per day—— 

Mr. BISHOP. And those remain to be calculated, correct? 

Mr. GARCIA. Those remain to be calculated. But whatever 

amount should be directed—80 percent should be directed to the 

Gulf. Congress will need to take action to allow that to happen. Because if you don’t, those funds would then revert to the treasury. 

And so, what we’re suggesting is that Congress authorize that 80 

percent of the Clean Water Act penalties from this incident be directed to the Gulf for restoration. 

Mr. BISHOP. A, that would require legislation. 

Mr. GARCIA. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. And—thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. Mr. Cravaack? 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things I’m 

concerned about is chain of command failure and breakdown. One 

of the things that I was concerned about when I was reading about 

this up in Minnesota, one of the things—I saw a governor enlisting 

16 barges, trying to save his shoreline—I will be gentle—and they 

were shut down by the Coast Guard. 

Admiral, I would like to know who made that command? Who 

shut those barges down? 

Admiral ALLEN. I’m not sure I know the specific incident, but it 

might have to do with the barges that were used as a protection—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Skimmers. 

Admiral ALLEN [continuing]. And harbors that were moved with 

incoming predicted weather associated with a potential hurricane. 

The Coast Guard has overriding jurisdiction regarding the safety 

of Federal waterways, and this is separate from oil spill responsibilities. With hurricanes approaching, decisions had to be made 

about—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK. This wasn’t for hurricanes, sir. It was because 

they didn’t have fire extinguishers on board. Or they were checking—not they didn’t have them. 

28 

Admiral ALLEN. Oh, I understand now. I was trying to figure out 

which barges you were talking about. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. OK. 

Admiral ALLEN. What the state did is they brought in barges, 

put vacuum trucks on the barges, and took the barges out, and 

were going to try and skim oil with it. We were trying to make sure 

that when they went out there, there wasn’t a maritime accident 

associated with the fact that you don’t normally put skimming 

trucks on barges and use that as an oil spill response capability. 

The company operators were completely supportive of making 

sure the inspections were done correctly and they were safe to operate before they did that. The state did not understand why we 

were holding them up, but there was an overriding safety need on 

those particular barges that you’re talking about, sir. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Would you agree, sir, this was an extremist situation the governor was trying to work in? 

Admiral ALLEN. I believe that you don’t complicate a problem by 

putting people’s lives at risk in the middle of the response, sir. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Would you agree it was an extremist situation, 

sir? 

Admiral ALLEN. It was an extremist situation, but I would not 

put people’s lives at risk, and that’s what we were looking at, sir. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. OK. In the—BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill was 

the first spill designated as a spill of national significance. Admiral 

Allen was the first national incident commander. The national contingency plan does little to define the roles of authority of the national incident commander, or the additional resources and procedures necessary to mitigate a spill of national significance. 

What changes—and I can ask all of you—what changes to the 

national contingency plan are necessary to better define the authority and chain of command responsibilities during the spill of 

national significance? 

Mr. BOESCH. We didn’t get into the specifics of all of that, other 

than to indicate that, obviously, there was not sufficient forethought and definition of the complexities of dealing with a spill of 

national significance. 

Admiral Allen will note it in his written testimony that there had 

been plans for an exercise that would engage the government on 

a spill of national significance that took place just a month before 

the incident. And there was not an adequate involvement of the appropriate officers at the right level in government to get learning 

from that experience. 

So, it’s not only the question of having the criteria that would 

move it to that level of response, but also making sure that the 

government is evergreen, is ready to actually exercise and perform 

under those capacities in an incident which could occur once every 

decade or so. 

Mr. GARCIA. As I mentioned a moment ago, one of the big problems was the failure to involve in the planning process state and 

elected officials who clearly need to be involved in and understand 

the procedure when you have a spill of national significance. And 

we have recommended that steps be taken to make sure that all 

levels of government are familiar with it. 

29 

I would say, though, that the professional career oil spill experts 

and responders at both state and Federal levels were fully trained 

in responding. It’s just that many of them had to be moved aside, 

because this thing was so big that elected state and local officials 

understandably wanted to be and had to be involved. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I understand. One of the—I’m sorry, sir. Go 

ahead. 

Admiral ALLEN. I think you were specifically asking about the 

national incident commander and the authorities that might be 

needed. Currently, the protocol calls that the commandant would 

designate a national incident commander. And it was previously 

understood that would be one of our two or three-star area commanders, either Atlantic or Pacific. We were in the process of a 

succession change in the Coast Guard, and I was designated. 

First of all, I think the national incident commander should be 

presidentially designated. I think there ought to be a standing delegation of clean water authorities, once that designation is made, 

and that that commander should have the authority to redirect assets nationally, and drop stand-by requirements to move response 

equipment where it’s needed, sir. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, sir. And I am out of time, sir. I yield 

back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Mr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask a question 

here. Admiral Allen, I guess, might be the appropriate party. 

The vessel was flagged by—under rules in the Marshall Islands, 

I guess, was it—the Marshall Islands. And they have different 

standards than we have. Do you believe that that was—that we 

should have all of these vessels under United States safety regulations, and flagged by the United States standards? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, I would submit to you there is an effect that 

we need to achieve, and it is this. Right now, for those vessels to 

operate in our waters, they have to be compliant with international 

standards that have been promulgated through the International 

Maritime Organization. To do that, the Coast Guard does a 

verification of whether or not the country of registry has met those 

international standards, and issues what’s called a certificate of 

compliance, where we would normally, for a U.S. flag ship, issue 

a certificate of inspection. 

I would submit that we need to take a look at the protocol that 

we use for cruise ships that are foreign flagged that carry a large 

number of U.S. passengers, and we do something called a control 

verification exam, which actually involves a physical inspection. 

There are two ways going forward. You can have the discussion 

whether they should be U.S. flagged or not, but they certainly 

should be held to a higher standard, and inspected. And I would 

say that the current regime we use to insure the safety of cruise 

ships is a good model to use for offshore drilling units. 

Mr. COHEN. The Marshall Islands was the standards, and I think 

they had somebody perform the safety standards that was from 

that area, and it was like a four to eight-hour examination, if I’m 

correct. If I’m wrong, correct my premise. But is that accurate? 

That was—— 

30 

Admiral ALLEN. I’m not sure what you’re referring to, sir. But 

what we would do with a cruise ship, there would be an extensive 

inspection while that ship was being built in the shipyard. There 

would be initial exam when it entered into service, and there would 

be quarterly inspections. 

I have taken a part in those myself, as a field commander. I 

think that type of regime should be applied to foreign flag vessels 

operating in our waters, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. You mentioned, I think in response to Mr. Young’s 

questions—and it might have been Mr. Garcia, I’m not sure, but 

somebody—that the government should not be the one that determines these standards. Is that what I understood? What was it? 

Mr. Garcia, it was something Mr. Young asked about, and he 

didn’t think the government should be the party, there should be 

a third party doing this—I think it was the safety inspections, and 

I think you—— 

Admiral ALLEN. I think what he was referring to was certification of drilling systems. Right now, let’s take a blow-out preventer. That is built by industry to certain standards that are 

issued by the American Petroleum Institute, and that constitutes 

the level of due diligence that’s applied to the construction and operation. 

I think what we’re saying is, as with vessel inspection, an independent third party such as American Bureau of Shipping or other 

classification societies, should be the ones that come in and verify 

especially blow-out preventers, killing choke lines, and the blue 

and yellow pods on these operations. 

Mr. COHEN. All right, that’s—thank you for refreshing my recollection. 

But let me ask you this. Do you think that—are there systems 

that make sure that there is not influences there that would make 

those standards more to the industry’s liking, rather than maybe 

the public’s needs? 

And government—it’s a bad rap, and government can and have 

proper regulations and proper oversight. That’s one of the issues in 

this Congress, is about regulation and regulation hurting the government, or hurting business. And yet there is a lot of regulations 

here that need to be adopted and implemented. 

And these might cost—I don’t know, what—there is something 

about the Raines Act, $100 million, and whether or not this would 

be determined as $100 million. I imagine it would. And if you 

couldn’t get the Senate to go along with what the House had in 

some regulation on standards, we would have no standards. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. If I could make a comment, there is an 

issue that was raised in the Commission report. It hasn’t been alluded to in this hearing yet today, but it probably needs to be discussed. 

If you look at the rest of the world and how they manage oil exploration off their coast, they do it through something called a safety case regime, where there is a risk assessment conducted. And 

as part of the regulatory process, the companies have to produce 

a plan on how they will mitigate risk and manage the overall process through a safety management system. That is going to be the 

subject, I think, of some pretty detailed discussion. 

31 

My personal view is you probably need a hybrid system, where 

there is some command and control issues related to inspection of 

drilling systems, and a way to assess risk and have them present 

a plan on how they would manage risk. But the commissioners may 

want to comment on that. 

Mr. GARCIA. And, in fact, that is exactly what we have recommended, that there be a hybrid system where—we need to obviously change and strengthen the regulations—— 

Mr. COHEN. Let me stop you for one minute, because I’ve got 12 

seconds before a red light goes off, and then you can go on. 

If we had some—passed this Raines Act, and you had regulations 

from the government that couldn’t go into effect unless the House 

and Senate approved them, you could have a disastrous oil spill, 

because we don’t have regulations. And how much would that cost 

business in the Gulf: fisheries, tourism, et cetera? Would the lack 

of ability to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations cost business a lot of money? 

Mr. GARCIA. Yes, sir. It would cost business a lot of money. 

Mr. COHEN. Great answer. 

Mr. GARCIA. If I could just answer one of your other points, we 

did recommend a hybrid system. The regulations that are governing the oversight of the offshore industry by the Department of 

the Interior need to be strengthened. They need to be brought into 

the 21st century, frankly. We should be setting the standard for 

the world. 

But we also suggested that we need to follow the lead of the 

United Kingdom and Norway, who had their own catastrophic 

events. And, following those events, they instituted a system that 

is called a safety case approach. And what that requires is that the 

operator and the driller must demonstrate on a site-specific basis 

that they have put into place all of the safeguards and measures 

necessary to properly drill in a particular place. 

And then, third, we recommended that the industry—it’s in the 

industry’s interests that it should set up its own watchdog that 

would be of and by and for the industry, to provide oversight, similar to what the nuclear industry has done, and which has been 

very effective. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you—— 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. We’re going to try to be very accommodating in this committee. But I think it’s important in the initial 

session—Mr. Cohen, you pointed out a good point. You were in 

your last couple of sessions, I wasn’t going to cut off the witnesses. 

But that’s really not fair to the folks who don’t squeeze in a question right at the last moment. 

And if it’s really important, we will go to a second round. We 

won’t cut you off if you have your questions. But I would just ask 

the Members to keep that in mind. Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I’ve got a 

Judiciary Committee hearing going on simultaneously, so I missed 

some of the testimony. But I appreciate the contribution that the 

panel has made. 

Mr. Garcia, Mr. Boesch, let me put this question to you. The 

President’s moratorium on oil and gas drilling was technically liftVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:04 Jul 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG&WR\2-11-1~1\65484.TXT JEAN
32 

ed mid-October, I think. But I’m told that there have been very few 

permits granted. 

Let me put to you all a three-part question. Did the Commission 

conclude that deepwater energy exploitation can be done safely? 

Did the Commission conclude that deepwater energy exploitation 

should continue to ensure our energy independence and national 

security? And, finally, how critical is offshore oil and gas drilling 

industry to the economy in the Gulf? 

Mr. BOESCH. I think the answer to the first two questions is yes. 

The first answer is yes, it can be done safely, and it is important 

to our energy supply. And, finally, it is very important to the economy of the northern Gulf of Mexico. 

We did not partake in the moratorium. We didn’t act on it. In 

fact, two of our co-chairs spoke that it was ill-advised to have a 

blanket moratorium. As I understand, though, the state of play is 

that in deepwater drilling, one requirement, which is actually in 

our recommendations and the Secretary of Interior is applying now, 

is the need to demonstrate, certify, that one has the capacity to 

control a blow-out if it occurs. 

I understand, from a comment made just the day before yesterday by the head of exploration and development of Chevron, that 

they’re just days away of coming to that agreement, and on the 

basis of his comments, we anticipate that these permits for deepwater drilling would be granted for those companies that have actually met the standard pretty soon. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, sir. Admiral, let me put a three-part 

question to you, as well, but playing Monday morning quarterback. 

Do you believe the Department of Homeland Security’s senior 

leadership was fully aware of how oil spill response is supposed to 

function under the national contingency plan? And I am told, Admiral, that some of the senior leadership at DHS in some cases 

failed to adhere to the plan. And did their misunderstandings of 

the process affect oil spill response efforts? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, let me start with a contextual comment. The 

Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the national contingency plan predate 

the development of the Homeland Security Act, and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. The major incident 

command doctrine under which the Secretary operates is Homeland Security Presidential directive number five. 

From the start, we have never been able to align, integrate, or 

deconflict the role of the Secretary of Homeland Security and incident management across the entire country with the specific doctrine that’s called out in the national contingency plan. 

The first impulse by political leaders is to go with what they understand and know. And, in this case, it is the role of the Secretary 

under HSPD 5. Since that was never deconflicted, there was never 

a determination of what supersedes and how they’re integrated. 

Now, we worked that out. But one of the recommendations I 

have made and continue to make is, going forward, the differences 

in the two regimes and the authorities and the accountability of 

senior leaders needs to be resolved, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, sir. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I 

yield back. 

33 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. Mr. Larsen, you have a unanimous consent 

request? 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 

statement of Congresswoman Johnson be entered into the record. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Without objection, so ordered. 

The gentleman from coastal Louisiana has some questions here. 

Mr. LANDRY. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On a lighter 

side, Admiral Allen, your favorite parish president, Bill Nungesser, 

told me to tell you hello today. 

[Laughter.] 

Admiral ALLEN. I’m feeling the love. 

Mr. LANDRY. I have three questions, and I would appreciate your 

keeping the answers as short as possible. They are very important. 

A lot has been said about the Jones Act. And my question to you, 

Admiral Allen, is do you feel that the waiver provisions in the 

Jones Act provide sufficient flexibility during emergencies, currently? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, they do. 

Mr. LANDRY. OK, great. After reviewing the Commission’s report—and this is for you, Admiral Allen, with you gentleman, certainly—after reviewing the Commission’s report, and based upon 

my experience in listening to people back home who have worked, 

you know, 50-plus years in the oil and gas industry, it’s apparent 

that there were regulations that were already in place that were 

being supervised by MMS that seemed to have been violated. 

In comparison, I have not seen that there were any regulations 

that were under the purview of the Coast Guard that caused the 

accident. Would you agree with that? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, that relates directly to my earlier statement, 

that we need to understand the results of the joint investigation 

team. If you think about it, what we had was a vessel that was attached by a riser pipe to a well. At the bottom of that riser pipe 

was a system that was regulated by the Department of Interior. At 

the top of that riser pipe was a vessel that was regulated by the 

Coast Guard. 

Mr. LANDRY. Right. 

Admiral ALLEN. There are issues with well control. 

Mr. LANDRY. Right. 

Admiral ALLEN. There were issues with the cementing job. There 

were issues with the gas that came up. Once the gas was released, 

then you have gas enveloping a vessel that was issued a certificate 

of compliance by the Coast Guard to see that—to ensure they complied with international standards. 

So, what the joint investigative team is going to be doing is not 

only looking at the cause of the loss of control of the well, but, for 

instance, how did the gas that came up be brought into the intake 

systems, into the engine room and possibly—so you’re looking at 

fire suppression systems and safety issues related to the vessel 

itself. So it’s a much more complicated system, because you have 

a floating platform connected to a well, and there are jurisdictional 

issues at both ends of that. 

And that’s the reason I think we need to take a very, very close 

look at everything associated with it, including the performance of 

the fire suppression systems on the vessel, itself. 

34 

Mr. LANDRY. Well, I hope not to have to get to the fire suppression systems on a rig. 

My only point to you all is that I have—it seems as though the 

inspections done by the Coast Guard out on the Gulf of Mexico are 

very, very sufficient, and MMS may have missed the boat on this, 

I guess you could say—and the recommendations to build additional bureaucracies within the same department that held oversight of MMS, which is now the BOEM. 

So, I don’t have a lot of confidence in BOEM. I’ve got a lot of confidence in the Coast Guard. I guess that’s my point here. 

The last question, very quickly, the motor vessel was on location 

at the time. And of course, this incident occurred in the spring, 

when water temperatures were certainly starting to warm up. But 

the Bankston—it’s not required to be at that platform while it’s 

drilling. There is no regulation that mandates that that vessel be 

there. If that vessel would not have been there, and this would 

have been in the winter time, and the men and women who had 

to jump off of that facility would have ended up in the water, do 

you believe we would have been able to recover all of those who did 

survive? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, you’re getting back to my original point. I 

think we need to look at the entire event, including the issue with 

the loss of life and the search and rescue—— 

Mr. LANDRY. If I may cut you—but, I mean, do you believe that? 

It’s like a yes or no—— 

Admiral ALLEN. I think we need to do an assessment of whether 

the resources on the scene were capable of rescuing in all conditions. I think that’s a legitimate point. 

Mr. LANDRY. OK, OK. But wait, wait, wait. On September 2nd, 

the Mariner platform had an accident where 10 gentlemen ended 

up in the water, one of them without a life preserver. Again, in the 

summer. It took 10 hours—there was no stand-by vessel there—it 

took 10 hours before we recovered them. 

My question to you is this. If that would have happened in the 

winter, would we have lost more—would all 10 of those men have 

survived? 

Admiral ALLEN. It would depend on their adherence to procedures, their safety suits and the systems they’re supposed to use, 

sir. 

Mr. LANDRY. No—well, evidently—— 

Admiral ALLEN. There are systems in place that will protect 

them—— 

Mr. LANDRY. Well, evidently, one of the systems—one guy ended 

up in the water without a life preserver. 

My question is that you would agree that they are—that they 

can be—that hypothermia can certainly affect them. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, it can. 

Mr. LANDRY. And ultimately lead to death. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes. 

Mr. LANDRY. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. Mr. Farenthold. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you. Just, first off, a real quick followup from the question from the gentleman from the coast of Louisiana. 

35 

You indicated that you felt like the waiver provision of the Jones 

Act was adequate to deal with this situation. My understanding 

was the waivers were taking 10 days to get processed. You think 

10 days is a reasonable enough time, in the event of a disaster like 

this blow-out, or something like Katrina? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, the waivers that were requested were 

stand-by waivers in the event we had to move these vessels due to 

heavy weather. So there wasn’t an extremist or urgency situation 

attached to that. 

I have been involved in other environmental responses in my career, where we needed timely waivers, and received them as part 

of an environmental response, sir. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Great. I think one of the other points we 

talked about, both in Arctic drilling and the Gulf of Mexico is the 

United States isn’t the only participant there, United States oil 

companies, and there is land out there that isn’t regulated by the 

United States. In the Gulf of Mexico, you’ve obviously got drilling 

from the state oil company of Mexico. China is operating off the 

coast of Cuba. And what I see out of this report is a plethora of 

new regulations and taxes on the domestic oil company with no 

thought about what’s going to happen in the event of an accident 

like this occurring on a foreign government-owned drilling platform 

or rig. 

What contingencies do you gentlemen see there? And do you 

think maybe the focus might be on developing more—on developing 

better responses for anything that happens regardless, as opposed 

to putting our domestic oil companies at a competitive disadvantage? 

Mr. GARCIA. Well, Congressman, certainly there is a challenge 

right now in international waters. You’re right. The Gulf of Mexico 

is shared by several nations. And the Arctic has a number of nations whose companies are beginning to examine the possibility of 

drilling. And we need to address that. 

If there were a blow-out by one of these other companies—and 

some of these companies are very safety-challenged—it would be a 

serious problem for us. And the Commission did, in its report, identify that as a problem. That’s going to require a transnational solution, though. 

We did recommend changes for U.S. industry. Again, we think 

that there are changes that can be done that would involve minimal cost, and would make this industry safer. The Commission’s 

report was designed to get the industry back to work. And I think 

that, if you have read it, hopefully you would agree with that. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I have—I will admit it was a big report, I was 

skimming during some of the opening statements, but have not 

read it cover to cover. I look forward to reviewing it thoroughly. 

There was also a comment regarding fully restoring the Gulf. 

And I would be interested to know how that is defined. As you 

know, oil in the Gulf of Mexico is not strictly a result of manmade 

operations. Obviously, we have got a huge point source over a short 

period of time. But, I mean, fossil evidence back—and arts and 

crafts of the Karankawa Indians indicate there is an ecosystem in 

place to take care of that. 

36 

What do we define as fully restoring the Gulf, and what do we 

leave to Mother Nature to restore? 

Mr. BOESCH. Sure. First of all, let me just, if I can, amend Terry’s comment, but also reflect on Mr. Young’s point about the oil 

and gas development taking place in many Arctic nations. We have 

some recommendations specifically for the Arctic, but also internationally, that it is in the U.S.’s interest to work with the international industry, but also the other nations, to develop common 

standards, both in terms of safety, as well as response. 

And in the Arctic, I want to point you to the last part of Admiral 

Allen’s written testimony, in which he says a really key part of that 

is the ratification of the Law of the Sea, the U.S. ratification of the 

Law of the Sea, which is greatly supported by the industry, by the 

military, and we really need to do it in order to have a level playing field in dealing with these international issues. 

Specifically with respect to restoring the ecosystems, I think we 

recognize that you can’t fully restore the evolving, changing Gulf 

of Mexico to the way it was at a certain time. What we are interested in, what we are recommending, is that the environment be 

restored to the point where it recovers a certain resilience. From 

the current state of dysfunction, it’s able to function so if you have 

future oil spills, it’s in much better capacity to withstand those impacts. And that’s what we recommend for this restoration program. 

To restore the longer-term damages, there is the natural resources damage assessment, which specifically addresses the impacts of this oil spill, and to try to correct those to the way it 

was—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. And finally, just for one second, the 

Hart Institute at Texas A&M Corpus Christi, is very active in coordinating state and local responses with the Federal Government. 

I commend them to you as a resource. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BOESCH. We have used them, right. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. Thank you. Mr. Bucshon. 

Dr. BUCSHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a background 

in medicine. I was a cardiovascular surgeon prior to doing this. 

And one thing I have learned from medicine is that the international community can be very valuable in understanding health 

care. 

And my question goes to the fact that there obviously have been 

oil spills in other parts of the world that we have not been involved 

in. And, other than from what the government response has been 

from a regulatory standpoint or otherwise, are there things that we 

have learned, or we could be learning about their platforms, about 

how they actually handle their clean-up afterwards? And were 

those countries offering advice, in our case, that U.S. regulations 

prevented us from utilizing those resources, and helping us? 

Admiral ALLEN. I will make a short comment and pass it to my 

colleagues here. 

First of all, I think the two best examples are probably Norway 

and the UK. In the 1980s there were 2 very serious accidents with 

significant loss of life in Norway and the UK. That resulted in a 

refinement of the regulatory environment to move to the safety 

37 

case-based system that we talked about earlier, and safety management systems. 

There was a recent blow-out of the Montera oil right off the 

northwest coast of Australia in 2009. They operate under that 

same system, and that was reviewed as part of their response. And 

that still supports a safety case way to go forward, as we said earlier, and I am supportive of a hybrid system that would take advantage of what we learned overseas, both with the requirement 

for third-party validation of their drilling systems. 

Mr. GARCIA. Yes, I fully agree with the admiral. One of the other 

things that we found was that the industry was not sharing best 

practices and information. And so the industry could do a better job 

of that. 

And, Congressman Farenthold, if I could say I’m on the board of 

the Hart Institute, so I agree with your assessment. 

Dr. BUCSHON. I think I—again, I understand the regulatory 

changes and the structural changes from the government level, 

but—and what you—your comment about the industry sharing 

technology, were there—are there clean-up methods that they have 

used that we could have used that our U.S. regulations prevented? 

I am naive to those, that’s not my area. 

But—and if there were—like I said, in medicine, the information 

from the international community is usually very valuable. And I 

have always found, as a citizen of the United States, that people 

always ask us to help, and we usually help. But when people ask— 

we don’t generally ask for as much help as we can. And I think 

sometimes there are things to be learned and things to take advantage of that maybe we don’t properly utilize. That’s my overall assessment. Thank you. 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, the overwhelming majority of foreign offers 

of assistance that we dealt with had to do with actual physical 

equipment, and this had to do with more of how much we could get 

and how we needed it and how fast we needed it. This usually involved skimming equipment, a boom, especially a fire-retardant 

boom, and dispersants, when we were using dispersants. 

Some of the more novel things we might have used, like bioremediation and some of the new technologies, fall into the comments that I made earlier, where, because of the paucity of research and development that took place in the last 15 years, we 

were at the point where we were trying to do research and development and bring new products to market during the spill itself. We 

can’t allow that to happen again. And I think the real challenge 

was, domestically, to bring those technologies in and get them into 

the game. 

Mr. GARCIA. And, sir, I would just say that, you know, one of the 

sad facts of this incident is that the industry simply did not have 

the response and containment technology that was adequate to contain this blow-out in a reasonable amount of time. It took them almost three months. 

Dr. BUCSHON. Just a comment, and then I will finish. Again, 

going back to medicine, I have learned that there is—international 

studies in health care, especially in the heart surgery area related 

to prosthetic devices and the like that have been utilized in Europe 

and other areas around the world for many, many years that, in 

38 

the United States, are prevented from being utilized by medical 

professionals, based on our very slow and very onerous regulatory 

process. 

And so, I guess I will—my question was directed at are there 

things like that in your industry that are out there, but that we 

want to do our own R&D, and we don’t rely on international data, 

and that our structure really prevents us from using for decades 

when they have been found to be effective in other areas? 

Admiral ALLEN. I guess I would say, in regard to well control and 

containment of the well, because it was operating offshore and basically in waters outside state waters, and BP and the industry 

were the ones that had the means to control that well and cap it, 

that the free market was flowing just about whatever was working 

and could be used there to that site. 

Mr. BOESCH. Let me just say also on that issue, there are two 

organizations which the industry is standing up to be able to provide that capacity, to contain a blown-out well. 

And so, they represent some substantial investment that they 

know they now need, and they are going to be based right there 

in the Gulf of Mexico, probably Mr. Landry’s district, this standby capacity. And the research and development associated with it 

is part of that evolving economy in the new world of how we do offshore oil and gas development. 

Dr. BUCSHON. Thank you. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Harris? 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, 

Admiral Allen, it’s a—thank you very much for coming and appearing. And you were a great face for the U.S. Government, really, 

during this entire crisis. And I thank you for that. 

Dr. Boesch, it’s good to see you. Of course, sitting on the environmental committee in the State of Maryland, I have seen you many 

times, and I’m glad to see you here—— 

Mr. BOESCH. I don’t have to call you ‘‘Senator’’ now, though. 

Dr. HARRIS. That’s right. Let me just ask a question. I had the 

privilege of attending a briefing by Mr. Riley and Senator Graham 

in the Natural Resources Committee, and my colleague from Alaska suggested at that time that the Commission members really all 

may have had an initial bias against offshore oil exploration and 

drilling. And I was pleased to see that in the forward to the report, 

it suggested on the last page that if the offshore energy enterprise 

is threatened, that the Nation’s economy and security are threatened, and I couldn’t agree more wholeheartedly. 

Off Maryland, which is one of the frontier areas that are described in the last part of the book, you know, our coastal counties 

have an unemployment rate between 10 and 18 percent. It’s seasonal employment, but it’s high. And I personally feel that perhaps 

we should be looking at offshore exploration, drilling off the shore. 

In the chapter where you talk about—chapter 10 of the report— 

you do say that the biological and environmental factors are well 

understood in those areas, unlike the Arctic. 

And, therefore, my question is, do you think, if we implement 

what’s found here—and this is specifically for Dr. Boesch and Mr. 

Garcia—do you think we should, in fact, because of our Nation’s 

39 

economy and security, go forward with OCS exploration off the 

mid-Atlantic coast? 

Mr. BOESCH. Well, we take no specific position about the expansion of oil and gas exploration and production outside of the two 

areas that we focused on, other than to indicate that we need to 

approach this in a different way, where there is more substantive 

analysis that engages the other agencies, in addition to Interior. 

The potential environmental risks should be judged in the context 

of the amount of economic gain and benefit, with respect to the energy supplies that may be there. 

One of the things that focused our attention so much on Alaska, 

quite frankly, in addition to its unique and unusual sensitivity, is 

that the industry and the USGS are saying that’s where most of 

the remaining oil is, outside of the Gulf. And so there is going to 

be enormous pressure to develop it. And we need those resources, 

if they can be developed safely. 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you. 

Mr. BOESCH. The other areas are less rich, in terms of resources, 

and we have to do that analysis. 

Dr. HARRIS. Mr. Garcia? 

Mr. GARCIA. I would just add that the Commission report was designed to provide recommendations on how to drill safely. Where 

that drilling might take place would be up to the administration, 

and perhaps to the Congress. 

Dr. HARRIS. Well, let me back into it, because, Dr. Boesch, you 

kind of indicate that you don’t—that you didn’t take a position, 

really, on the safety. I’m going to ask you not as a commissioner, 

but personally to address Mr. Young’s criticism. 

Do you feel that if you implement these recommendations in the 

Gulf, is it safe to do in the Gulf? And should we, in fact, be doing 

it in the Gulf? 

Mr. BOESCH. If these recommendations are implemented, yes. We 

have said that you can safely drill, and we believe this report sets 

that out. 

And I would also say, in response to Mr. Young’s point about 

whether there was bias, I believe Mr. Riley said that we should let 

the report speak for itself. And our position is contained in this report. 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you. Then let me take the next step. If your 

position is that, yes, it’s safe to do in the Gulf, and perhaps should 

be done in the Gulf, and in chapter 10 you say, ‘‘Well, you know, 

off the mid-Atlantic coast, the biology and the environmental considerations are fairly well known, it’s not—it perhaps should be 

treated different than the Arctic,’’ then if there are reserves found 

off the coast of Maryland, for instance, or Virginia, both of which 

will help employment in my area, in my district, then would you 

conclude that, therefore, it should be done in those areas also, if 

there are reserves that are proven to be economically beneficial? 

Mr. BOESCH. As I understand it, the President acted earlier last 

year to the Congress’s lifting the moratorium around a larger area, 

by saying that the U.S. is going to evaluate these very questions 

about whether the resources that are there are worth the potential 

risks, evaluating whether the benefits are there, as well as a more 

detailed analysis of the existing data. 

40 

What our comments were meant to suggest is that in those environments we’re not talking about or suggesting that one needs, you 

know, five years of intense study and data analysis, that we already know a lot about those regions. And that information, just 

as the proposal, should be brought into consideration of making the 

determination. 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Harris. Congresswoman Edwards. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Glad I 

made it back in the nick of time. Thank you very much to the witnesses. 

The question that I have actually regards some oversight issues 

that came up during the 111th Congress, and related to the flow 

rate and the wide variations of flow rate estimates, and the impact 

on response coordination. There were some questions that came up 

in our oversight in the last Congress about risk assessment and 

contingency planning. And particularly, I raised issues related to 

the worst-case scenarios, which didn’t even seem to come close to 

the scenario that was reached in the spill. 

And so, I wonder if you can talk to me a bit about the recommendation that you have made, and how we can improve the 

independence of the assessments that are done, so that they have 

a little bit more validity, because that’s also related to what the financial liabilities are, as well. And so, if you could shed some light 

on that, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. BOESCH. Sure. Ms. Edwards, first of all, you’re right. We did 

address this issue of the flow rate. First of all, with respect to the 

flow rate estimates, they probably had relatively little effect on the 

spill response, in terms of the assets and resources that could be 

deployed. That’s more of a function of where the oil is going. 

However, what we concluded is that there were two important 

lessons from the underestimation of the flow rate for so long. First 

is that it became very important to right-size and design the containment effort. So, the initial efforts to try to control and contain 

the well were doomed to failure, because they assumed a lower flow 

rate. So for containment, it’s really important. 

Secondly, for confidence of everyone that the government is on 

top of this thing, that confidence is not diminished. And so, for that 

reason alone. 

And then finally, as you pointed out, the flow rate becomes important with respect to the assessment of damages under the Clean 

Water Act. 

Mr. GARCIA. And, Congresswoman, if I could just add, the good 

news is that there are some very simple fixes that we have suggested in our report that would allow the government and the industry to be able to accurately estimate flow rates so that you don’t 

have this problem in the future. It’s just a matter of adding some 

simple instrumentation to the blow-out preventer. And it is a relatively inexpensive fix. 

Admiral ALLEN. Could I add a comment, please, ma’am? 

Ms. EDWARDS. Sure, thank you. 

Admiral ALLEN. First of all, I agree—very low-cost investment. 

And sensors on the blow-out preventer will give you an accurate 

41 

flow rate without any big dispute, I think, among the people that 

are involved. We have never had to deal with a well blow-out at 

5,000 feet, and having to establish a flow rate. That had never been 

presented to any response in this country in its history. 

Into the response—when this became a matter of public concern 

and political concern, I basically took that function and gave it to 

the flow rate technical group, which is a spin-off of our inter-agency 

solutions group that I established in the national incident command, to have an independent government way to assess that, with 

the means we had, lacking the sensor data that should be in there, 

and that was due to using the high-resolution video and other 

means. Once we did that, that allows us to have a baseline to tell 

BP what capability they had to build out, in terms of a containment. 

Ms. EDWARDS. And then lastly, if one of you could please comment on this question of kind of risk assessment and contingency 

planning, because both the estimates—and when I looked at the 

standards for what was essentially rubber-stamped from MMS regarding the risk assessments, it almost seems as though the industry could kind of put a risk assessment in front of MMS, there were 

a few questions that were asked about it, and they were all pretty 

much the same. And that, in itself, I would guess, had to contribute 

tremendously to the ability to project what the risk might be, and 

to establish mechanisms that would allow for appropriate contingency planning. 

Mr. GARCIA. Congresswoman, you’re right. We have suggested in 

the report that a better review be done of response plans. I think 

you’re referring to the fact that most of the companies essentially 

Xeroxed and submitted boiler-plate to MMS for their response 

plans. And neither the government nor the industry apparently 

were paying attention, since they referenced species that did not 

normally make their homes in the Gulf, such as walruses. So, yes, 

a much better job needs to be done. 

And again, it indicates the widespread failure of oversight, as 

well as a complacency within the industry. 

Mr. BOESCH. This is very important, because we’ve gotten some 

criticism for the use of the words ‘‘systemic problems.’’ And by systemic, we don’t mean that all companies were equally negligent as 

BP was. By ‘‘systemic,’’ we mean all companies were using those 

same irrelevant plans. None of the companies had a containment 

capacity. Any number of things were widespread problems throughout not only the industry, but also the regulatory regime. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you to the witnesses, particularly for the thoroughness and the expeditious manner in which you got this report done. With that I 

yield. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. Mr. Landry? 

Mr. LANDRY. Thank you all. I just got some important questions. 

I want to kind of—let me just make a comment. 

I appreciate you all continuing to edit your comments on systemic. I think you should go back and look. And not all oil companies designed and engineered their wells the same. So you’re getting there, Mr. Boesch. 

42 

Admiral Allen—you know, and I am—there are parts of this report that I am interested in helping these guys implement, and one 

of them concerns the safety of the workers. So I just simply want 

to go back to those scenarios and ask you do you or don’t you believe that having stand-by vessels or a vessel within at least an 

hour’s time where there are drilling activities or manned platforms, 

does that or does that not create a safer environment for those 

workers? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, obviously, having a vessel standing by is 

a safer environment. 

Regarding the threshold requirements on when you would have 

a vessel, I think those are the types of determinations that would 

be made by the current ongoing joint investigation. That’s not only 

looking at how the incident occurred itself, but the performance of 

the systems on the vessel, and the life-saving systems on the rig 

itself. And I think those are logical areas for inquiry, and where 

they need to be adjusted, as they should be. 

Mr. LANDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Larsen? 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just quickly here, page 

142 and 143 of the Commission report discussed the Jones Act. You 

said, ‘‘These restrictions on the Jones Act did not even come into 

play for the vast majority of vessels operating at the well head, because the act does not block foreign vessels from loading and then 

unloading oil more than three miles off the coast. When the act did 

apply, the national incident commander appears to have granted 

waivers and exemptions when requested.’’ Did I read that accurately? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. Page eight of your testimony, Admiral, 

‘‘In reality, the Jones Act had no impact on response operations.’’ 

Did I read that accurately? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Did my reading of those accurate statements accurately reflect your thoughts, as well? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. With regards to oil spill response recovery organizations, the OSROs, this is sort of the flip side of this argument about Jones Act, about wanting to get equipment in there, 

but then not really needing the equipment, where the OSROs had 

equipment here in the U.S. And I wouldn’t say it was a scramble, 

but it was briefed by our folks in Washington State and at district 

13, and just trying to identify who had what, what would be useful, 

and how soon can you get it there without impacting state-based 

needs and operations. 

Do you have recommendations about the OSROs and oil spill recovery organizations, and how they can fit in better and create an 

inventory to know where this equipment is when we need it? 

Mr. BOESCH. Well, I think we certainly do. And we identify, first 

of all, the lack of capacity to have responded to something which 

was so wide-scale and lasted so long by the OSROs. 

But also, related to that is our observations and conclusions 

about the diminution or the lack of advancement of the technology 

that they have used, and the degradation of their assets and capacVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:04 Jul 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG&WR\2-11-1~1\65484.TXT JEAN
43 

ity, if they were mainly dealing with smaller-scale activities on a 

more routine basis to then deal with something of this consequence. They were clearly out-gunned in that sense. And so we 

need a more effective way to do that. Perhaps Admiral Allen 

has—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, I think what you’re referring to is we actually went through an emergency rulemaking that allowed us to 

lower the stand-by requirements for the conduct of operations at facilities that had oil spill response equipment, but could not legally 

move it because it was a condition of operations. 

Mr. BOESCH. Right. 

Admiral ALLEN. This became very, very complicated, because the 

only way we could do that was actually to issue an emergency Federal rule. And, even then, there were residual issues with state law 

and state requirement, in some cases, personal liabilities for operators of facilities, and even commanding officers of naval installations, were they to give that equipment up, and something were to 

occur. 

I think, moving forward, we need to look at this, because if you 

have a spill and you want to bring all available means, we have 

emergency compacts between states that allow movement of resources when they need that. I think there needs to be a measured 

discussion and an evaluation of how we can do that. 

And that’s the reason I said if there is a national incident commander designated, there should be a presidential designation. And 

with that should come the authority to move those resources, if it 

is needed, without going through an emergency rulemaking process. That said, I think we all need to understand the threshold of 

what needs to stay behind, so you have a minimum level to respond, if you do have an incident. 

Mr. LARSEN. Something along the lines of when the National 

Guard might move from one state to the next for firefighting to 

help with a mutual aid type of situation. 

Admiral ALLEN. Exactly, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, yes. With regards to the Arctic, I will talk to 

Mr. Young afterwards, so I want to be sure I’m not—we have a 

good relationship, and I want to be sure I talk to him about these 

questions, so—I want to be clear about it. 

But he mentioned the leasing of ice breakers. From whom could 

we lease ice breakers for the Arctic operations, if we had to lease? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, sir, if I could just take one step back, there 

is a de factor implicit assumption in his statement that we need 

ice breaking capability. How you source that, whether you build an 

ice breaker or lease an ice breaker, is a second step. We haven’t 

even gotten to the point in this country where we have recognized 

that there is a capability requirement, and we need to do something about that. The lease is just one way you could remedy that. 

I tried unsuccessfully for four years to get this on a national 

agenda to talk about this, because we have—we will have no floating capability to exert command and control from Point Barrow, 

unless we have an ship that’s capable of doing that. And a lease 

could be one way. I really think that we probably need to have organic capability inside the United States to do that. 

44 

But regardless of that, the real issue is nobody is talking about 

the ice breaker capability problem, and it’s sitting there, staring us 

right in the face, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. But just to be clear, I understand Russia, China, 

Sweden all have ice breakers, probably none of whom would be 

willing to loan them to us or lease them to us unless they can recover the dollars for the lack of opportunity that they would have 

to use them for the same functions we would want to use them for. 

Admiral ALLEN. The National Science Foundation routinely 

leases foreign vessels to break out McMurdo for the annual resupply, and to stop using U.S. ice breakers. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, yes. I have other questions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Blake, you have anything? 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. No. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Go ahead, Rick. 

Mr. LARSEN. On the capacity of response in the Arctic, can you 

comment on our capacity to respond to a situation in the Arctic, 

separate from an ice breaker issue? 

Admiral ALLEN. I would be happy to. 

Mr. LARSEN. Planes, trains, and automobiles. What do you have? 

What’s going on? 

Admiral ALLEN. If I could specifically—I’m trying not to infer 

from the fact of whether or not there is response capability, there 

should be a decision on whether or not to drill, and these gentlemen have already stated that themselves. 

Mr. LARSEN. Absolutely. 

Admiral ALLEN. My premise has always been, in my four years 

as commandant—because we moved assets to the north slope of 

Alaska in the summer to see how they operate—is the lack of infrastructure, footprint, and accessibility by equipment up there to be 

able to stage a response and use command and control that you 

need to do to do that. 

If you were to go to Robert, Louisiana, New Orleans, Houma, 

Louisiana, or Mobile, and looked at the command posts that were 

established to try and deal with this oil spill, there is no place on 

the north slope of Alaska to put something like that. And I am differentiating what an oil exploration company might have out there, 

in terms of response vessels. The oversight that has to be done, the 

burning, access to airstrips, all-weather aircraft, all those are 

issues that come into play on the north slope of Alaska. 

And, from my standpoint as a former commandant, my concern 

was if I am held accountable to conduct a type of oversight that 

was basically pulled through a knothole by this Commission, there 

is a lack of a footprint up there to do that. This is independent of 

the merits associated with the oil and gas exploration. 

Mr. LARSEN. Absolutely. Thank you. I want to be clear. I was not 

implying that trains and automobiles would be part of the response 

up there. I was only trying to talk about the broad range of infrastructure necessary for the response. For the record, everybody. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Admiral Allen—and we talked about this a little 

bit—the Oil Pollution Act required the Federal Government to conduct exercises every three years to be prepared, and we think that 

was a good idea. 

45 

Was the failure of these officials to participate in the March 2010 

a missed opportunity for them to better understand how oil spill 

response functions under the national contingency plans would 

work, in your view? 

Admiral ALLEN. I do believe it was a missed opportunity, but I 

think we need to take a look at whether or not this was a problem 

of omission or commission. 

You know, in Washington we are under siege of the—this was 

not a tier one exercise and did not technically require the participation of cabinet-level officers. So there was basically no foul, but we 

gained no real benefit from having those folks exposed to the doctrine. 

My recommendation contained in my testimony is to hold another drill within one year, have cabinet-level officials involved, 

and let’s immediately test the premises and the notions that are 

contained in the Commission report, and what comes out of these 

investigations. Let’s not wait through the cycle, let’s do one and figure out whether or not we’ve fixed the problem, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I don’t want to second-guess what you might say, 

but if the officials, whoever these officials may be, had participated, 

that could have affected in a more positive way the response? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, you just have to look at who was called in 

when this event occurred. When the rig sunk on the 22nd of April, 

2 hours later myself, Secretary Napolitano, and the cabinet were 

in the Oval Office, briefing the President on what had happened. 

The people that were in the office having that discussion were 

not the people—because it was not a tier one exercise—that would 

have been involved in the spill of national significance drill in 

March. That’s the reason my premise would be moving forward to 

schedule another drill and make it a tier one exercise in which cabinet-level officials would participate. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Ms. Edwards? 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To Commissioners 

Boesch and Garcia, you have made some significant recommendations that really go to what you have indicated—the Commission 

had indicated—as deep failures in oversight and the regulatory 

structure. And you’ve made some very significant recommendations 

to improve the regulatory structure. 

I wonder if you could comment, please, as we are in an environment in which there are deep cuts proposed to some of the agencies 

that you believe, in your report, need to step up, in terms of their 

oversight of this industry and the process at the Department of Interior, at NOAA, at EPA, and Coast Guard. 

Do you believe there is any inconsistency in the deep cuts that 

are recommended in these agencies and the ability of the agencies 

then to fulfill the recommendations you have made to prevent both 

the safety concerns and environmental concerns that might come to 

pass if there were another spill of this kind of national significance? 

Mr. GARCIA. We certainly have indicated that changes need to be 

made in the agencies, and that they need to be adequately funded. 

One of the problems for the MMS was that it was underfunded and 

undermanned and, thus, incapable of effectively and fully overseeing this industry. 

46 

Now, we have suggested that the new BOEMRE be funded 

through fees that the industry pays—I mean right now, the industry is paying just a tiny fraction of that agency’s relatively small 

budget. And it would not be unreasonable for the industry, which 

is reaping large benefits from this resource, to pick up the cost of 

a competent and effective regulator. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Dr. Boesch, do you have any comment? 

Mr. BOESCH. Yes, we have been through this together, we think 

alike, and we just about finish each other’s sentences, but one 

thing just to add to that is that the Secretary of the Interior had 

requested of Congress an appropriation for fiscal year 2011 to enhance the capacity of BOEMRE to meet these high standards and 

to process these applications. 

And so, the lack of those funds obviously presents a handicap, 

not only to implementing our recommendations, but to getting the 

industry back to business. 

Ms. EDWARDS. If the Congress is unable or unwilling to impose 

the fees that you have—that are recommended, then inevitably, the 

cuts that are proposed for the agencies that would have oversight 

and responsibility in this regulatory framework would simply be 

unable to implement the regulations that you put forward, opening 

us up—if you could, comment on it—opening us up to the possibility that we would have another spill in deep water that we 

would be unable to clean up, and that we will not have been able 

to properly project. 

Mr. GARCIA. Yes. Congresswoman, I would just say that this spill 

has cost us tens of billions of dollars. And the final price tab is not 

in yet. So, to the extent that a failure to properly regulate the industry would result from inadequate funding, that would be a tragedy. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Yes, and just to conclude and I will yield my time, 

I mean it does strike me that there is a very significant inconsistency in our desire to make sure that both industry and commerce 

are not impacted by a spill of this kind of significance in the future, 

ff we are unwilling, in the Congress, to do what it takes to make 

sure that the resources are in place so that our agencies can fulfill 

their obligations. And with that, I will yield. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Landry, are you looking for more time? 

Mr. LANDRY. I just wanted to address the gentleman from Washington’s comment and ask Mr. Allen—— 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Because if you have additional questions, I am 

going to submit—I am going to suggest—— 

Mr. LANDRY. Sure. 

Mr. LOBIONDO [continuing]. You submit them for the record. 

Mr. LANDRY. Sure. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I don’t want to cut anybody off, but we could go 

on for a long time, and I think we need to wind it up. 

[No response.] 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. I want to thank the panel very much. I 

hope—well, we appreciate it. This was very informative. 

The subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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