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The Wright Flyer Papers

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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

The Last Manned Fighter

Replacing Manned Fighters with

Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles

Robert B. Trsek

 Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 32

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

May 2008
ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government 

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Flyer Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and Staff 

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best student 

research projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC 

research program encourages our students to move beyond 

the school’s core curriculum in their own professional 

development and in “advancing air and space power.” The 

series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering 

spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. Projects 

selected for publication combine solid research, innovative 

thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war at the 

operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer 

Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, 

organizational, and operational questions. Some of these 

studies provide new solutions to familiar problems. Others 

encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing new 

possibilities. By making these research studies available in 

the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage critical 

examination of the findings and to stimulate further research 

in these areas.

JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR.

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant



Abstract

This paper addresses the question, can and should 

the Air Force pursue an unmanned multirole fighter to 

replace manned systems? Unmanned aircraft systems 

have demonstrated enormous intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in both flexibility 

and persistence. Current and emerging technology 

may permit unmanned fighters to replace conventional 

multirole aircraft in the face of high endurance missions, 

evolving threat systems, and political pressure to preserve 

human life.

This research is framed in the context of a specialized 

weapon in military aviation: an unmanned multirole 

fighter capable of replacing manned systems and their 

respective missions. This paper gives a brief history 

of unmanned aerial vehicles and their employment as 

weapons to demonstrate the evolution from ISR platform 

to unmanned combat air vehicle and then evolves into two 

main sections of “can we” and “should we” pursue this 

avenue of development. The primary means of answering 

the research question is both technical and philosophical. 

Before being able to answer if the Air Force should pursue 

an unmanned fighter, it is necessary to determine if it 

is technically feasible for such a system. A methodical 

analysis of mission subsets and common tasks that fighters 

currently perform and how those tasks might be performed 

in an unmanned vehicle are examined to substantiate 

technical capability. Inherent to this discussion are the 

obvious questions of remote piloting versus autonomous 

operations, command and control, and weaknesses that 

may be presented to an adversary. Modern media, political 

costs of human life, single points of failure, command and 

control, and monetary costs are then addressed to develop 

the subjective main point of pursuing acquisition. 

The range and endurance of unmanned combat air 

vehicle (UCAV) fighters offer persistence and attractive 

options in a world of growing antiaccess strategies. They 

offer advantages in performance, altitude, and employment 

without the limitations of human physiology. UCAV fighters 
vi

deny the political use of prisoners of war by our adversaries 

and preserve the tactical knowledge of our pilots at home. 

The research finds there are no technological barriers that 

prohibit the design and use of UCAV fighters on a large scale. 

There are anticipated limitations in bandwidth and concern 

for performance during within-visual-range maneuvering if 

man-in-the-loop is the solution to command and control. 

Ultimately, UCAV fighters are not a panacea but offer the 

presence of force in a threat environment that 20 years from 

now will be extremely lethal. The costs and risks associated 

with UCAV fighters are significant but surmountable. The 

single point of failure may be in our command and control 

through the radio frequency spectrum. Autonomy provides 

a solution but is incompatible with US ascription to the law 

of armed conflict and its mandates. If sufficient bandwidth 

can be secured and the control of remote vehicles can be 

assured, there are immense dollar and political costs to be 

saved in their employment. In the context of future threat 

systems and antiaccess strategies, the Air Force would be 

foolish not to pursue UCAV fighter technology.
vii

Preface

This paper examines the potential use of unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAV) as multirole fighters in both 

unmanned and autonomous capacities. Previous research 

in the field of UAVs and unmanned combat air vehicles is 

widely available and tends to focus on specific mission sets 

such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or 

suppression of enemy air defenses while quickly dismissing 

UAVs as multirole fighters. The focus of this research is to 

demonstrate the technical feasibility of unmanned fighters 

across multiple mission sets and is, therefore, inherently 

broad in scope. The goal is to consolidate proven concepts 

and capabilities, address those capabilities with subjective 

questioning, and determine the likely future of unmanned 

fighters in our combat air forces (CAF).

This paper assumes the reader has a basic understanding 

of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), close air support 

(CAS), air interdiction (AI), and similar tasks/mission sets 

attributed to multirole fighters, as well as the lexicon of the 

CAF community.

The author is an Air Force pilot with 14 years of service, 

formerly a command and control officer, AC-130H navigator, 

F-15C four-ship flight lead, and F-4F instructor pilot, and 

has served as project officer for Air Force Doctrine Document 

2-1.3, Counterland Operations, at the Air Force Doctrine 

Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 

I would like to thank Lt Col Anthony Gould, my ACSC 

faculty research advisor, for his guidance and assistance in 

bounding this effort. I would also like to thank Maj Ernest 

Teichert for his expertise on the F-22 and Maj Rob Preston 

from the Air Force Judge Advocate General School for his 

contributions regarding the law of armed conflict. Finally, 

I’d like to thank Lt Col “Skid” Greene, 42d Attack Squadron 

commander, for his assistance in obtaining unclassified 

details regarding command and control of UAVs, specifically 

with regard to command delay.



Introduction

There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the 

unfamiliar with the improbable.

—Thomas Schelling

The notion of unmanned fighters patrolling the skies of 

future battlefields is intriguing to some and heresy to 

others but should not be confused with the improbable. 

Advances in communications technology, microprocessors, 

artificial intelligence, and weaponry now permit unmanned 

systems at costs and lethality previously thought unattainable. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) have been used for 

many years in warfare but only recently have demonstrated 

such enormous success in the intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) realm that their potential use in 

combat systems has gained real interest and momentum in 

the United States. The latest addition to the growing UAV fleet 

in the US military is the MQ-9 Predator B, boasting an external payload of 3,000 pounds and supported by synthetic 

aperture radar (SAR) and forward-looking infrared (FLIR) 

sensors.1 The MQ-9 is pushing the leading edge of UAV technology as a combat vehicle and is just a few steps short of an 

unmanned multirole fighter. The MQ-9 can be armed with 

Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) as well as the Air 

Intercept Missile (AIM)-9X air-to-air missiles but is confined 

to an airframe designed for endurance with high-aspectratio wings and a turboprop power plant. Such demonstrated capability begs the question of the practicality and 

utility of an unmanned jet fighter, commonly regarded as too 

complex and demanding a mission for a machine alone—the 

last bastion of the fighter pilot.

UAVs had a more humble beginning, of course; the 

first UAV designed for warfare was the “Kettering Bug” 

in World War I.2 The Bug was little more than a flying 

bomb whose propeller would stop turning after a preset 

number of revolutions—the wings would literally fall off, 

and the Bug would drop unguided to the earth. Based on 

rudimentary calculations of speed versus time, the Bug 

could be set to drop at an approximate distance, albeit 

with some margin of error.
Entire books are devoted to the evolution of UAVs, but 

there are at least two fundamental themes to be drawn from 

the pursuit of such programs. First, UAVs are not born of 

fanciful design but mission requirements; in the case of the 

Bug, an unguided bomb with a range of 50 miles was called 

for.3 The arming of an MQ-1 Predator by the Central Intelligence Agency was not a novelty but born of the need for a 

high-endurance ISR asset with the capability to destroy a 

fleeting target, as done in November 2002, killing suspected 

al-Qaeda terrorist Ali Qaed Sinan al-Harthi (also known as 

Abu Ali).4 Second, the failure of such programs in the past is 

largely attributed to cost overruns and failure to meet mission 

requirements as outlined by the armed services.5

If the Air Force can replace manned fighters with unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) and meet mission requirements at lower costs, why risk the presence of aircrew 

over hostile territory? The preeminence of UCAVs should be 

viewed through the variables of costs, risks, and capabilities; 

what can the Air Force get, at what cost, and at what risk? 

It is practical to outline this research in this context, but it is 

more appropriate to address the technical requirements of unmanned fighters before examining if the Air Force should pursue replacing manned cockpits with machines. Specifically, can 

an unmanned fighter do what manned fighters do, and should 

the Air Force engage in such an enterprise based on costs, risks, 

capabilities, and other underlying factors?

The next section addresses technical requirements for an 

unmanned fighter based on the tactics and procedures used 

in its manned equivalent, followed by a second section that 

examines costs, capabilities, and limitations of unmanned 

fighters. Finally, a recommendation is made based on what 

the data supports and the philosophical answers point 

towards. Ultimately, there is an opportunity cost to pursuing or not pursuing this technology, and if it is technically 

possible to employ UCAV fighters, the time to answer the 

acquisition question is now.

Technical and Mission Requirements

Modern fighters engage in a variety of missions but share 

common mission tasks that must be met in order to perform 

tactically. These tasks include cooperative employment, for-
mation flight, aerial refueling, and target identification. These 

tasks provide for air interdiction (AI), close air support (CAS), 

and counterair missions, holding within-visual-range (WVR) 

and beyond-visual-range (BVR) engagements as a baseline. 

For the unmanned fighter, however, it is first necessary to address command and control (C2) of the aircraft.

Command and Control

The issue of command and control is addressed throughout this paper; it is paramount because it not only provides 

a potential single point of failure for the unmanned aerial 

system (UAS) but also because it is one of perhaps two of 

the most challenging areas for meeting manned-equivalent 

tasks. UAVs are either remotely controlled by a human while 

in flight, also known as man-in-the-loop (MITL), or they are 

preprogrammed to carry out a mission and return to base 

(autonomous). Both forms of control are more thoroughly 

addressed in the philosophical section of this research, but 

for the technical question at hand, it has been proven repeatedly that unmanned fighters can be reliably controlled 

or preprogrammed to carry out assigned tasks. Unmanned 

F-6F Hellcats were flown from 1946 to 1948,6 and unmanned 

QF-4s are still flown today from Holloman and Tyndall Air 

Force Bases as target drones. The Global Hawk, roughly 

the weight of an unarmed F-16, flies profiles in excess of 

28 hours autonomously. QF-4s are flown MITL and in the 

event of data-link failure revert to preprogrammed profiles, 

but this doesn’t solve the unmanned fighter problem so 

easily. QF-4s are generally flown in formations of two; if the 

Air Force seeks to replace manned machines with UCAV 

fighters, it is necessary to control large formations such 

as strike packages simultaneously, and this requires both 

bandwidth and cooperative employment. 

The problem of bandwidth can be solved in one of at least 

two ways. Data can be processed locally on the UAV from 

partial to complete autonomy, or data must be squeezed into 

the finite radio frequency (RF) spectrum for transmission to 

and from the ground station controlling it. Complete autonomy has its own disadvantages but is an instant solution to 

bandwidth requirements. Naturally this would require a high 

degree of problem-solving capability and reliable heuristics for 
a machine to generate a desired behavior, but the technical 

aspect was proven in 1989 when the UA (unmanned aircraft) 

Condor accomplished a completely autonomous flight from 

takeoff to landing.7 Any degree of MITL requires transmissions through the RF spectrum, now accomplished via the 

Kurtz-under (Ku) band for the Predator and Global Hawk,8

but technology affords nearly limitless bandwidth for transmitters/receivers with requisite sensitivity. Consider two 

radio stations of 98 megahertz (MHz) and 99 MHz, with a 

third squeezed in at 98.5 MHz. If the radio station can focus 

a transmission well enough and the receiving radios are 

sensitive enough to pick it out, nothing prevents data from 

being transmitted on 98.5 MHz as well as 98.5125 MHz or 

98.5125050, and so forth. Naturally, this may require both 

power to overcome range and background noise and money 

for expensive equipment—but the point is it’s possible with 

current technology, complemented by future advances in 

compression and cryptology. Technology aside, determining what frequencies (Ku or otherwise) are allotted to C2 

becomes a simple matter of RF requirements and priorities 

in-theater. Manually controlling a single UCAV that leads 

others in battle would reduce bandwidth requirements proportional to the size of the formation considered. Again, the 

point is that large-scale control of UCAV fighter formations 

is technically possible, even more so if UAV formations have 

a leader/follower relationship and operate cooperatively. 

Cooperative Employment

Cooperative employment, the second half of the C2 

problem as well as a common fighter task, has also been 

successfully demonstrated. As previously mentioned, the 

QF-4 target drone is regularly flown in formation and can 

take off/land in nearly the same timing and proximity 

as manned fighters. In February of 2007, “a single SkyWatcher UAV successfully demonstrated cooperative flight 

with three simulated SkyWatchers, each UAV performing 

a different role and operating a unique sensor package.”9

It is the software, of course, that allows autonomous vehicles 

to operate cooperatively and even complementarily. Dynamic 

programming (DP)10 and “high order sliding modes”11 have 

demonstrated the ability of UAVs not only to deconflict 
or coordinate but to cooperate against target sets, maximizing available weapons for the greatest effect, the effect of successive weapons, and survivability of the UAV 

formation itself. This technology holds great promise for 

autonomous weapons employment but has obvious legal 

implications without MITL and is addressed in the second 

half of this paper. In sum, the bandwidth and cooperative 

employment tools necessary are available to keep MITL or 

autonomous UCAV fighters aloft for extended durations. 

Lacking the high-aspect-ratio wings of ISR UAVs, however, UCAV fighters will need to air refuel as their manned 

counterparts do.

Air Refueling

Manned fighters must air refuel often; it is a byproduct 

of limited fuel storage capacity, high fuel burn rates, wing 

forms optimized for speed rather than endurance, and 

requisite maneuverability. If UCAV fighters are to replace 

manned fighters, they must be able to air refuel safely and 

expediently. Modern commercial and some military aircraft 

can land themselves by electronic guidance and regularly 

do so more precisely than human operators. Landing with 

zero visibility and cloud cover at the surface is facilitated 

by a radar altimeter, electronic flight controls, and a combination of electronic guidance telling the airplane lateral 

and vertical displacement relative to a predetermined flight 

path outlined by RF transmissions. It should come as no 

surprise then that it isn’t difficult for a UAV to maneuver 

itself into a relatively static position in space in order to 

air refuel using the same type of electronic guidance. The 

three key steps to air refueling are making the rendezvous, determining refueling order, and the air refueling 

itself. The rendezvous is perhaps the simplest process as it 

is already very regimented and predictable—ideally suited 

for automated guidance that is supported by on-board radar; 

identification, friend or foe (IFF); and air-to-air tactical navigation (TACAN). Tankers and receivers have preset altitudes, 

times, and turn points; this is a predictable structure easily 

navigated by UCAV autonomy. After all, relying on computers to calculate rates, angles, distances, and times is 

the foundation of modern flight-management systems. The 
simplicity of this process is demonstrated every time two 

QF-4s are maneuvered into formation following separate 

takeoffs. The greatest difficulty is determining the refueling order for a given number of receivers based on time 

constraints, fuel levels, or other mission priorities. Normally, this is solved verbally between flight leads and the 

tanker. This could still be done with MITL UCAVs, but 

autonomous UCAVs would require additional DP to resolve 

priorities. Research supported by the AF Office of Scientific 

Research has demonstrated that DP algorithms are possible to determine and control the flow of UCAVs in the 

receiver chain while minimizing shuffling of priorities as 

UCAVs join and leave the tanker cell.12 Once prioritized for 

refueling, control of the UCAV during refueling could be 

done MITL from a ground station or second boom operator 

or autonomously. In August of 2006, Boeing demonstrated 

its automated aerial refueling program when a UAV Learjet 

maintained refueling formation with a KC-135R for multiple orbits.13 Later, in August of 2006, the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency configured a NASA F/A-18 for an 

unmanned test (with a safety pilot aboard) and successfully 

took fuel using the probe/drogue basket method, guided into 

the contact position using optical sensors and the global 

positioning system (GPS).14 Unmanned air refueling technology is immature, to be sure, but the technology exists 

now, is advancing rapidly, and can’t be considered prohibitive for UCAV fighter acquisition. Just getting to the fight 

isn’t enough, of course. Air refueling provides for range, 

endurance, and payload, but to engage targets UCAVs will 

need to be capable of target identification. 

Target Identification and Engagement

As with previous topics, this problem has several 

parts; static and emerging targets may be loaded into 

fire-control computers or uploaded via data link, but 

some targets will have to be identified as friend or foe in 

dynamic environments. 

Static targets, the simplest of four possible cases, are 

common to AI missions and cruise-missile profiles. MITL 

and autonomous UCAVs are virtually identical to manned 

fighters when it comes to flying to a point in space, slewing a 
targeting pod to a point on the Earth, confirming the target, 

and dropping a weapon. There is no requirement for a pilot 

to be in the cockpit vice a ground station, although the latter adds the burden of bandwidth. With ranges around 15 

nautical miles, aircrew in the cockpit today may never see 

the JDAM target they are attacking. Like the cruise missile 

and JDAM, an autonomous UCAV is authorized at launch

to seek out a set of coordinates. In this mind-set, even 

autonomous UCAVs are capable of destroying static targets. 

At best, they are preprogrammed like cruise missiles. At 

worst, targets are confirmed via video piped to a ground 

station, but the process remains largely unchanged. 

Identifying dynamic targets in air-to-air at long range is 

equally feasible. Manned fighters identify hostile aircraft 

BVR using on-board electronic ID and inputs from off-board 

sources (Airborne Warning and Control System, Rivet Joint, 

data-link networks—Link16, situation awareness data link, 

etc.). Target ID is not accomplished directly by the human 

in the cockpit and therefore permits UCAV substitution. 

Discussion of morality, responsibility, and authority to kill 

aside, there is no technical reason prohibiting UCAV fighters from engaging in BVR combat.

Identifying dynamic targets in air-to-air at close range is 

more difficult but also possible with current technology. If 

an opposing aircraft is able to merge with friendly fighters 

without being identified, it is often up to the human in the 

cockpit to determine friend or foe status. Relative closure 

and angular changes between aircraft can preclude the use 

of electronic systems, and pilots revert to the “Mark 1 Eyeball” for positive ID (PID). Therefore, if the human eye is the 

sole means of PID in such an engagement, technology must 

be able to replicate that function and transmit it to a ground 

station for MITL, or the UCAV must make its own decision 

if autonomous. As before, technology has already overcome 

this hurdle; clearly, the supremacy of modern optics over the 

human eye is beyond question, but what is seen, the speed 

with which it can arrive at a decision point, and what is interpreted is critical. Synthetic vision can be accommodated 

by multiple cameras as hosted on the F-35 Joint Strike 

Fighter (JSF). The JSF’s distributed aperture system (DAS) 

“consists of multiple infrared [IR] cameras providing 360° 

coverage using advanced signal conditioning algorithms.”15 
The DAS provides day/night vision in a digital stream that 

can be interpreted either on a helmet display in manned 

systems, piped to a ground control station for MITL, or interpreted by software in autonomous UCAVs (fig. 1). 

Figure 1. F-35 DAS. (Reprinted from Lockheed-Martin briefing, “JSF Capability Brief” [Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 

24 October 2006].)

The speed with which the human eye moves this data is 

roughly that of an old network card, 10 megabits per second,16 whereas most US households today host computers 

with 10/100 mega bit network cards. Clearly our technology is beyond this stage, and even the data from six DAS 

cameras is captured and moved efficiently through the F-35 

military data bus. This information must be interpreted, 

however, and in the case of MITL remains at a ground station and subject to the inherent strengths and weaknesses 

of human vision. If autonomous, target identification must rely 

on a database for comparison and will require detailed imaging of anticipated adversaries. The AIM-9X Sidewinder missile hosts an imaging IR seeker that combines visual and IR 

spectrums for target ID and greater counter-countermeasure 

capability.17 Identifying the aircraft itself, vice a prominent heat 

source, aims to improve probability of kill but demonstrates 

the advanced state of imaging technology (fig. 2). Chargecoupled device cameras and IR sensors like the combined 

seeker of the AIM-9X provide for autonomous ID of aircraft 

type, and MITL brings image processing to the ground control station of a UCAV fighter. Therefore, current technology 

demonstrates the capability to acquire imaging as fast as 

the human eye, move that data at speeds greater than the 

human eye, and interpret it via database or MITL to achieve 
the same end state as the human operator in the cockpit. 

The technical aspects of WVR target ID in air-to-air cannot 

be considered prohibitive for the fighter UCAV.

Discriminating between dynamic targets on the ground as 

found in CAS scenarios can be more difficult than BVR or 

even WVR air engagements, as air-to-air targets reside in a 

sterile environment compared to the chaos of close-quarters 

ground combat. The capabilities of fighters that support CAS 

missions, such as the F-16, F-15E, and A-10, must be transferable if the Air Force seeks to replace these manned aircraft with UCAV fighters. As discussed in target ID technical 

requirements, optical range and resolution used in modern 

sensors outperform the human eye and allow the analysis of 

additional spectrums aside from visible light (fig. 3). 

Figure 2. AIM-9X seeker head and digital imaging. (Reprinted 

from “Aim 9-X,” Jane’s Defence online [accessed via Air Command 

and Staff College subscription], http://www4.janes.com.)

Figure 3. Global Hawk imagery from approximately 60,000 

feet. (Reprinted from Wright-Patterson AFB, Aeronautical 

Systems Center [ASC/RAVP].)
10

Targeting pods, in combination with SARs, deliver highquality imagery to the cockpit or UCAV ground station but 

in comparison to the human eye have a very narrow field 

of view. The MQ-1 predator ultra-wide field of view is 34° x 

45°18 as compared to the human eye, which is 180° x 90° 

in binocular vision.19 Even so, existing technology in the 

Global Hawk as well as the F-35 JSF provides the level of 

detail required for CAS, and SAR imagery allows targeting in 

all weather conditions where laser-guided munitions may 

be degraded or unsuitable due to cloud cover (fig. 4). To 

enhance available technology, advances in synthetic vision 

promise to supplement human vision with computergenerated graphics, overlays that both ease bandwidth 

requirements and hope to improve situational awareness 

of UCAV pilots.20

Figure 4. F-35 Targeting. (Reprinted from Lockheed-Martin briefing, “JSF Capability Brief” [Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 24 

October 2006].) 

None of the four categories of static, air-to-air (BVR), 

air-to-air (WVR), or dynamic ground targets prove to 

be beyond the capacity of existing technology for target 

identification. The Air Force’s procedural instruction for 

the tactical employment of unmanned aircraft systems,21

published in 2006, serves to reinforce the UCAV coming 

of age in support of CAS. UAVs are shown to provide situational awareness and target identification in support of 

manned fighters. The optics available and the ability to 

see outside the visible light spectrum introduce the ability 

to see RF “tags” or IR strobes used to identify friend from 

foe. The same end is achieved now with bulky night vision 

goggles and interpreting FLIR targeting pods. Nothing 

precludes a UCAV fighter from accomplishing the mission 
11

with its own sensors and weapons to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess the enemy in CAS. 

While CAS is very challenging, to be sure, UCAV fighters 

are quickly dismissed in the role of air-to-air superiority due 

to the extremely dynamic art and science of WVR maneuvering, also known as the dogfight. Close-range air-to-air 

engagements have been exceedingly rare since Desert Storm, 

yet the Air Force learned long ago that there is always a need 

for close-range capability. The missiles of Vietnam didn’t 

make the gun of previous generations obsolete; even the 

high-tech F-22 maintains an internal canon for close-range 

engagements. The lesson is that dogfights will happen. When 

they do, the UCAV fighter must be able to respond, survive, 

and kill as well as its manned equivalent. This is no small task 

considering the speed and durations involved in dogfighting, 

where even the smallest misjudgment can prove fatal. Once 

again we revisit the two cases of MITL versus autonomous 

control and find technical options. 

For MITL, the greatest problem is C2 delay, which approximates two seconds from command-input to commandexecuted by the remote vehicle.22 In other words, the remote 

pilot is reacting to what he sees, but that data is two seconds 

old. Prior to the merge, a two-second advantage equates to no 

less than about a four-nautical-mile lead time for an opponent to fire an equally capable weapon. Post-merge, at a nominal turn rate of 15 to 18 degrees per second—a two second 

advantage given to the adversary from an otherwise neutral 

pass—will land the friendly UCAV at a 30 to 36 degree geometric disadvantage. This, of course, is wholly unacceptable 

in today’s world of high-off-boresight weapons and helmetmounted sights with “look and shoot” capability (see fig. 5). 

Figure 5. Lead turn by enemy fighter exploited to achieve 

nominal weapon engagement zone (WEZ)
12

The AIM-9X air-to-air missile WEZ is superior to the Soviet short-range AA-11, but this advantage is only recent 

and may be fleeting as other countries develop similar 

capabilities. If MITL is to be employed WVR, UCAV fighters 

will have to rely on superior training, weapons, or maneuverability to outperform near-peer adversaries. Fortunately, 

we maintain a global advantage in all cases while UCAV 

fighters promise even greater maneuverability without the 

frail human pilot. Maneuvering above roughly 10Gs will 

normally cause gravity-induced loss of consciousness in 

a manned fighter whereas unmanned fighters are limited 

only by structural design. UCAV fighters have the potential 

for maneuvering up to the load limit of turbine engines. 

Until different or more durable engines can be designed, 

the current limit is speculated to be about 20Gs.23 However, 

such maneuverability may only be useful in an end-game 

defensive maneuver, as such turn rates come at huge 

expense to airspeed and lift. When combined with an unpredictable orthogonal roll, this maneuvering will drive 

missiles to abandon lead-pursuit trajectories and fall back 

to pursuit geometry, for which high-G maneuvering may 

prove good enough to survive. If the initial merge can be 

survived, follow-on maneuvering with MITL is virtually 

the same as if done from within the cockpit, using sensors 

such as DAS or FLIR to provide vision. The human operator 

is then responsible for maneuvering at the sizeable disadvantage of a two-second delay in C2. 

The notion of autonomous maneuvering in a dogfight is 

sure to cause a great deal of debate in the fighter community, but none can deny the regimented and scripted 

process that pilots train to during basic fighter maneuvers 

(BFM). There is no shortage of lists and priorities in any 

BFM training brief, and the repetitive structure has great 

utility for learning tactics and generating a decision matrix 

required for split-second reactions in combat. Such lists 

and priorities are also ideal for automation, which a computer can navigate and forecast much faster than a human 

being. This is illustrated in the following sample human 

decision matrix for BFM, following a bandit in the vertical 

(i.e., vertical jinks): 
13

• Pull to bandit point of departure, and set weapons to 

combined mode (Gun/Aim-9).

• Assess your altitude and airspeed.

• If no room to go vertical then begin oblique maneuver 

(exit matrix).

• If room to follow then set your power to reach the control zone and continue.

• Begin your follow-on.

• Seek an optimum range inside the control zone of 2,500 

to 3,000 feet.

• If you are too close—go later, with line-of-sight away to 

increase range.

• If you are too loose—go earlier, cutting the corner to 

reduce range.

It is ironic that dogfighting is sometimes referred to as a 

game of chess—move and countermove—as 10 years ago a 

computer (dubbed “Deep Blue”) beat world champion Garry 

Kasparov in a six-game tournament.24 Modern personal computers and retail software are able to “look ahead” much further than their human counterparts for possible outcomes 

based on the present. This, of course, is exactly what fighter 

pilots do—assess range and angles to the enemy fighter; assess enemy intentions based on energy depleted, plane of 

motion, and angular change; assess their own position in 

space and weapons capability; and make a decision for maneuvering. Provided the UCAV fighter can maintain “sight” of 

the enemy fighter, it is capable of doing all of the above, faster 

than a human pilot, and can apply flight controls more precisely to achieve the required geometry to achieve a WEZ. 

Human pilots are susceptible to common errors such as 

poor assessment of the enemy fighter (eyesight), improper 

plane of motion (lift vector placement), pulling too hard or 

not enough (energy mismanagement), improper prioritization (task management), intimidation (bleed energy when 

not required), and so forth. Computer algorithms, on the 

other hand, are subject only to their programming and the 

input their sensors provide, for better or worse. A great deal 

can be learned from watching a computer play chess against 
14

itself; computer algorithms for BFM can be improved and 

adapted in much the same manner. As with Kasparov, fighting against the best human fighter pilots and subsequently 

against its own algorithms, automated BFM can provide for 

superior maneuvering against the majority of the pilots the 

world over. Although Kasparov defeated Deep Blue in early 

matches, the computer was reprogrammed to anticipate 

how he fought and became invulnerable to his traps. Such 

lessons for UCAVs are easily transferable code—replicated in hours fleet-wide if necessary, versus the years 

of experience and hundreds of flight hours required to 

produce a single human combat veteran. 

Technical and Mission Requirements Summary

Existing technology has demonstrated the capacity to perform the essential tasks that current manned fighters engage 

in. UCAV fighters have the potential to operate cooperatively 

both in formation and in aerial refueling operations. In combat they can identify friend from foe in static and dynamic 

scenarios against targets in-flight and on the ground. They 

are capable of conducting simple profiles such as AI as well 

as complex tasks such as CAS and WVR maneuvering. They 

have a greater degree of survivability due to exclusive highperformance maneuvering and, combined with algorithms 

defined from mathematics and human experience, are all

capable of being the most experienced pilot the United States 

has to offer. As we have seen, however, none of these capabilities comes without a price or trade-off. What then are the 

subjective reasons the Air Force must consider in pursuing 

or not pursuing unmanned fighters?

Analysis

If it weren’t for the novelty of not having a man in 

it, would we even be thinking about this vehicle?

—Gen John P. Jumper

Former USAF chief of staff

As mentioned at the outset of this paper, weapon systems 

are usually acquired by the military to fill a mission requirement. Traditionally this has meant bringing a capability to the 
15

fight that soldiers, sailors, marines and Airmen need—and 

know they need. Alternatively, history has demonstrated that 

new technologies developed outside the military have great 

potential for the armed forces, if only we knew how to best apply them. UAVs in the ISR role have demonstrated their vast 

potential in Iraq and Afghanistan and are only now making their way into service and joint doctrine. What the USAF 

calls “best practices” the Army often calls “validated.” In other 

words, you have to demonstrate that a new system can fill a 

role before it will be accepted in that role, be it as a replacement or augmentation. Only then will its use be scripted and 

written into doctrine. This is an important concept, as noted by 

Dr. Richard Hallion a full 20 years ago at Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base: “Mere technological superiority could not, on its 

own, drastically reshape military events. Rather, such superiority had to be coupled with appropriate doctrine in order to 

generate a kind of catalyst to change.” In his article on doctrine 

and technology, Hallion cites the pre–World War II convictions 

of Great Britain that the submarine was only a coastal defense 

weapon and “ignored [as an] offensive potential.”25 With the 

rise of the UAV in ISR, we also cannot ignore the first uses of 

airplanes in World War I for reconnaissance. The natural 

progression seems to be to validate new technology in support roles before it moves to more critical roles in combat. 

What then can a UCAV fighter do that manned fighters 

cannot, at what risk, and at what cost? This ultimately determines the opportunity cost of pursuing or not pursuing UCAV 

fighter technology and corresponding doctrine.

Capabilities and Advantages

Perhaps the primary benefit of the UCAV fighter is as 

deceptively simple as it is profound; there is no human in 

the aircraft. Human beings with all of their mental prowess 

are frail indeed when lifted from the surface of the Earth. 

Pilots require food and rest at regular intervals; are subject 

to chemical, biological, radiological, and blinding effects; 

restrict gravitational and altitude limits of aircraft; and are 

hugely expensive to train and replace if lost. Placing them 

in an aircraft requires life-support equipment and people to 

maintain that equipment, and in regard to aerodynamics 

and radar cross section, has adverse impacts on airframe 
16

design. In short, human pilots bring a lot of baggage to aircraft in general, and so UCAV fighter advantages are a natural reflection of manned-fighter limitations, with a few added 

tricks of their own.

Large aircraft with multiple crewmembers and room to 

move about have nearly limitless range and endurance. 

This has been demonstrated by B-2s flying halfway around 

the world and hitting targets, only to fly back to the United 

States and land at home station. Single-seat fighters have 

no such luxury but have demonstrated impressive capabilities nonetheless. In Operation El Dorado Canyon fighters 

flew 14 hours to cover 5,500 miles in the longest tactical 

mission ever accomplished.26 Such endurance in fighters 

is uncommon, and a mission of that length poses risks 

of fatigue to aircrew, who (tactically speaking) after seven 

hours en-route to their targets are unlikely to be in peak 

condition for the attack itself. In his remarks to the American Enterprise Institute in 2005, Gen T. Michael Moseley 

acknowledged that two reasons to “go down this [UAV] road” 

were risks to the human and when “the human could be the 

limit.”27 UCAV fighters offer an endurance limited only by 

air refueling and perhaps engine oil life. Multiple pilots can 

manage a single or multiple fighters to and from a theater 

or target, spending only several hours at a time flying before being relieved. France and Spain denying overflight in 

Operation El Dorado Canyon tells us, and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reminds us, that we need to be 

prepared for antiaccess strategies; UCAV fighters are one 

way to bring tactical forces to bear at great distances. As 

the QDR states: “Based on the Department’s Global Defense 

Posture Review, the United States will continue to adapt its 

global posture to promote constructive bilateral relations, 

mitigate antiaccess threats and offset potential political 

coercion designed to limit U.S. access to any region.”28

Human frailty also reveals itself with altitude and G-forces, 

both of which are within the regular working environment 

of fighter aircraft. Altitude provides for range/endurance 

as well as speed. Long-range missiles, such as the advanced 

medium-range air-to-air missile, perform much better in the 

less dense air at altitude and maintain higher end-game energy 

if fired above the speed of sound. For these reasons, F-15Cs 

can regularly be found operating in the high-30,000- to 
17

low-40,000-foot block. Previously exclusive to pilots with 

full pressure suits, such as in the U-2 and SR-71, F-22 

pilots now exceed the 50,000-foot “space equivalent” boundary29 and employ up to 60,000 feet with the aid of partial 

pressure suits.30 Unprotected humans or those experiencing complete loss of cabin pressurization cannot survive at 

these altitudes; it is here the human is the limit. Humans 

find themselves equally ill equipped to deal with G-forces 

in excess of about 10Gs over any length of time. Although 

the body can withstand such force, the heart is simply unable to produce enough pressure to keep oxygen flowing 

across the membranes of the eye and brain to sustain sight 

and consciousness. Thrust-vectoring nozzles, increasingly 

powerful engines, and fly-by-wire flight controls now permit aircraft to perform in radically different fashion than 

simply rolling and turning. While these innovations are 

ideal for aerial combat, the human pilot simply can’t go 

where the machinery can; the human is the limit. 

As a last note on physiological limitations, humans in the 

cockpit can be blinded by lasers or incapacitated/killed by 

airborne chemical weapons, biological agents, or nuclear radiation. Fighter pilots train annually to operate in chemical 

and biological environments, but flying with cumbersome 

breathing equipment limits performance and often precludes 

the use of other specialty gear like night vision goggles. 

Nothing prevents UCAVs from operating in any of these environments; therefore, they must be considered as an instrument in a global environment where access to chemical and 

biological agents is growing. 

Humans are not only a physiological limitation, but they 

have adverse effects on aircraft design, particularly for 

stealth. Human pilots require space—space for an ejection 

seat, space for a control panel, space for life-support equipment, and space to look out and around the aircraft they fly. 

This space could otherwise be used for fuel or payload, but 

given that in a UCAV it is likely to be used for avionics and 

C2 equipment, this point might well be a wash. It is the last 

requirement for visibility—the canopy itself—that degrades 

aircraft design. With stealth now an inherent requirement to 

fighter design (F-117, F-22, F-35), it is critical to limit anything that might increase the radar cross section (RCS) of 

new aircraft. It is no secret that the largest radar reflectors 
18

on any aircraft are flat surfaces; in fighters this includes the 

radar dish in the nose, the engine intakes/fan blades, and 

vertical tails, for instance. Numerous aircraft demonstrate 

efforts to reduce this effect: saw-tooth landing gear panels 

on the B-2, mesh screens on F-117 engine intakes, engine 

nacelles on top of the B-2 fuselage where they are unseen by 

ground radars, and angled vertical tails on the F-18, F-117, 

F-22, and F-35 (fig. 6).

Figure 6. Efforts to reduce RCS: mesh screens, raised nacelles, 

canted tails. (Photos courtesy of US Air Force.)

Much less considered outside of design circles, however, 

are the pilot and helmet within the cockpit. A large bubble 

canopy that gives way to a cluttered cockpit filled with multiple edges can quickly defeat other efforts to make an aircraft 

stealthy. The F-16 cockpit uses a thin gold film to help diffuse 

reflected radar energy, as do the saw-tooth edges of the F-117 

cockpit. Much simpler in design, of course, is to remove the 

cockpit altogether and place the engine intake in its place on 

top of the fuselage (fig. 7). This capability is inherent only to 

unmanned aircraft as any attempt to minimize the RCS of a 

cockpit can approach but never equal removing it entirely. 

Here again, a limitation of a human in the cockpit is an advantage for UCAV aircraft.

Figure 7. Efforts to reduce RCS: gold canopy, saw-tooth edges, 

raised engine nacelle. (Photos courtesy of US Air Force.)
19

Another obvious limitation of manned aircraft that gives 

weight to UCAVs is the vulnerability and penalty of losing aircrew members in combat or as prisoners of war. As long as 

there have been aircraft, the time and monetary cost of training pilots have been considerable—but much more expensive 

are the political and strategic implications for losing pilots in 

combat. In 1960 Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the 

Soviet Union while performing reconnaissance in his U-2, a 

mission that the US government denied until it was revealed 

that the pilot survived and his film had been developed. Relations between the two nations soured, and in May of 1960 

the Paris Summit between Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower 

and Nikita Khrushchev “collapsed” in what was attributed to 

Eisenhower’s refusal to apologize for the incident.31 A more 

recent example of the negative exposure downed pilots 

create is how Capt Scott O’Grady seized the headlines in June 

of 1995 when his F-16 was shot down over Bosnia. The US 

public was enamored with his story, drawing media attention 

and scrutiny of the military and foreign policy alike. The 

story repeated itself three years later when an F-117, thought 

to be nearly invisible to radar, was shot down by a Sovietmade SA-3. Again, stories of the pilot and his rescue circulated in the press and drew unwanted attention to the military 

and foreign policy (fig. 8).32

Figure 8. The trial of Gary Powers, Captain O’Grady. (Photos 

courtesy of US Air Force.)

What wasn’t seen in the press in 1995 was the fact that 

two UAV Predators had been lost within four days of each 

other. According to a report on the Bosnian conflict released in 2002, one Predator had been lost to engine problems while another was shot down by the Bosnian Serb 

army.33 Regardless of cause, these unmanned losses went 

unnoticed and unquestioned by the media or public at 
20

large. The overwhelming success of Desert Storm gave the 

public the perception that a sanitary war was possible and 

reinforced the value of human life; it is acceptable to lose 

machines, not people. General Moseley has acknowledged 

the benefit of UAVs in high-risk scenarios but was quick 

to add that we have yet to encounter air defenses we are 

unwilling to penetrate, even at some risk of lives lost.34

While the United States has always been willing to penetrate 

the air defenses arrayed against us in the past, it’s necessary 

to consider the context of time when proposing the future 

UCAV fighter. Specifically, the acquisition time for jet fighters is lengthening. As technology advances, it is increasingly 

difficult to cut off concept development for an ever-evolving 

weapon system. Coupled with the need to get the most “bang 

for the buck,” it is attractive to package as much new technology as possible into an airframe in an attempt to lengthen its 

useful life. Chief USAF scientist Dr. Mark J. Lewis has noted 

how long acquisition periods span multiple changes in political office, making the process of acquisition more difficult and 

unstable. The bottom line is that each system, once procured, 

must last as long as possible; new systems are exceedingly 

difficult and expensive to get off the drawing board and onto 

the flight line (see fig. 9). 

Figure 9. Concept to IOC for Jet Fighters. (Reprinted from Dr. Mark 

J. Lewis, chief scientist, USAF, briefing [Air Command and Staff College, 

Maxwell AFB, AL, March 2007].) Compiled from Post-World War II 

Fighters (Washington, DC: USAF, 1986) and data from Secretary of 

the Air Force Office of Public Affairs. Courtesy of Dr. R. P. Hallion.

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Air defense systems of today pose formidable threats to 

all aircraft, stealth included. Recall that the F-117 shootdown in Bosnia in 1999 was using an SA-3 system fielded 

in 1961.

35 Systems built 10 years ago—such as the SA-10, 

SA-12, and SA-20, exported by the former Soviet Union and 

built under license in other countries—are much more capable, with ranges nearing 150 nautical miles and altitudes 

of over 100,000 feet (fig. 10). 

Figure 10. SA-10/12/20 users and producers. (Reprinted from 

Wikipedia, s.v. “Users and Other Versions,” http://en.wikipedia 

.org/wiki/SA-10.)

6TFST

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The F-15 has had to continue in service for over 30 years. 

If the F-22 and the F-35 are to accomplish the same feat, 

they must be capable of dealing with new threats that evolve 

over their life cycle. Although Moore’s Law is an analysis 

of the number of transistors on an integrated circuit relative to cost, it has shown to be a useful tool in forecasting 

the speed of growth in hard-drive capacity, pixels in digital 

cameras, and other technology in general. It reveals a logarithmic progression of technology, not a linear one. While 

it is unclear just what air defenses may look like 20 or 30 

years down the road, we can be fairly certain that the F-22 

and F-35 will not have changed as drastically. Technology 

breeds countertechnology to be sure, but as we’ve found 

with our legacy aircraft, there are only so many upgrades 

and patches you can make before it’s tactically unwise or 
22

economically prohibitive to continue. If we cannot remove 

the risk or the exposure to that risk, then it is best to reduce the potential consequences of taking that risk. Quite 

simply, UCAVs remove the element of human risk in future 

air combat.

A final advantage of a certainly unexhausted list of UCAV 

benefits is the prospect of controlling multiple fighters with 

one ground-station pilot (fig. 11). Fighters employ now in 

twos, fours, eights, or more, and the ability to control multiple UCAVs from one station is a force multiplier. A typical formation today consists of two flight leaders and two 

wingmen. A minimum of one flight leader must be four-ship 

qualified and provides tactical direction to the entire formation. Tactics, techniques, and procedures for air combat 

are well known to all pilots in the formation, but they are 

virtual extensions of the leader who is responsible for the 

safety and combat effectiveness of the whole. The transition to controlling multiple fighters with one pilot therefore 

is no great leap in tactics or concept. As previously discussed, UCAV fighters using dynamic programming are 

able to maintain formation in cooperative leader-follower 

relationships. This capability frees up the UCAV operator to control his entire formation through the control 

of a single unit. As also mentioned, controlling one of 

four vehicles directly reduces the amount of bandwidth 

required for relay proportionally. 

Figure 11. Raytheon’s advanced multiunmanned aerial system’s cockpit. (Source: Defense Update online, 2006, issue 2, 

http://www.defense-update.com/products/u/UCS.htm.)
23

Despite the many and clear advantages to UCAV fighters, some of the risks and limitations have already become 

evident. In determining if UCAV fighters are the next logical progression for the USAF, it is still necessary to consider 

these risks, limitations, and costs.

Risks, Limitations, and Costs

As assuredly as this paper has not identified all the advantages and capabilities of UCAV fighters, it is equally 

impossible to identify all of the risks and limitations that 

may confront their use in combat. As we have seen thus 

far, there are at least three major hurdles to overcome if 

UCAV fighters are to reach their potential: legal issues with 

autonomy, WVR combat maneuvering, and C2 as a single 

point of failure. 

Throughout this research it has become clear that MITL 

operations would require substantial bandwidth when operating over the horizon. Video data requires much more 

bandwidth than audio or simple telemetry. If UCAVs are 

used in the manner and numbers described, the amount 

of bandwidth necessary could easily saturate C2 capability. As a minimum, videos that must be streamed to a 

control station for each fighter are radar, targeting pod(s), 

and synthetic vision (such as DAS). This fact makes autonomous operations like that of the Global Hawk today 

very appealing but raises the legal issue of responsibility 

for lethal force. If UCAVs are to interpret and act on data 

dynamically without MITL, who is responsible when those 

acts lead to the death of noncombatants or are disproportionate in effect? The law of armed conflict (LOAC) is based 

on international law arising from the conduct of nations in 

hostilities over time, as well as treaty law that is binding 

upon those signatory to it. The laws and customs break 

down to basic principles that are familiar to those in uniform. Violence may be used only in military necessity, with 

distinction between civilians and combatants, in a proportional manner to objectives, and with humanity to limit 

unnecessary suffering.36

Based on these principles, The Military Commander and 

the Law (produced by the Judge Advocate General School 

at Maxwell Air Force Base) gives examples of lawful and 
24

unlawful weapons. Among those cited as unlawful are those 

that kill indiscriminately, to include “weapons incapable of 

being controlled.”37 It is interesting, then, that the United 

States did not sign the treaty banning antipersonnel mines. 

The most common reason offered for not signing the treaty 

is the important role of land mines in enforcing the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. The use of 

these indiscriminate and potentially inhumane weapons is 

a curious artifact in our foreign policy and gives way to the 

concept of the ends justifying the means. Other modern 

weapons that are decidedly indiscriminate are the cruise 

missile, the JDAM, and BVR missiles. Cruise missiles are 

used against static targets, however, and typically include 

planning for time of day, anticipated collateral damage, 

and so forth. The JDAM also seeks the coordinates programmed into it and is responsible for fratricide in several 

cases, to include killing three friendly special forces soldiers in December of 2001.

38 The BVR missile works in the 

same manner, with authority to kill given at launch against 

targets that have not been seen but have been identified

by electronic means, point of origin, or other rules of engagement. The shootdown of an Iranian airliner in 1988 

by the USS Vincennes demonstrated through the death of 

248 civilians the serious potential flaws of electronic IFF in 

beyond-visual-range environments.39

If loopholes are not found in existing law, autonomous 

UCAVs already face these serious challenges. MITL provides for a human to make conscious decisions for applying 

force as well as someone to hold responsible for mistakes. 

Autonomous systems must have code, heuristics, DP, 

algorithms—whatever you choose to call some sort of 

intelligence—for discriminate killing. Modern sensors can 

tell an F-15 from a MiG-29. They can tell a T-72 tank from 

an M1A1 Abrams. They cannot tell a wounded soldier from 

a healthy one, a chaplain from a combatant, or a terrorist 

wearing black civilian clothes from a civilian wearing black 

civilian clothes. While they may be smart enough to attack 

a tank and not a Coca-Cola truck, they are unlikely smart 

enough to know if a mob surrounding a tank includes soldiers or liberated civilians. Quite simply, a UCAV is discriminate, but it is not discriminate enough—at least not yet.
25

For now, the answer for UCAV fighters seems to require 

MITL, and MITL will require huge amounts of bandwidth. 

The present demands for bandwidth have already impacted 

plans for future spectrum management and hold promise 

that what is needed may, in fact, be available for the widespread use of UCAV fighters. The March 2007 UAS concept 

of operations (CONOPS) predicts:

By 2014 the first UAS possessing networked C2 should be operational. The migration from current point-to-point data links to network data links will allow more users access to high bandwidth data. 

. . . Future systems that have onboard algorithms to filter and reduce 

redundant data into processed information can reduce bandwidth requirements and free bandwidth for other systems. Data compression 

technologies can also reduce the required bandwidth to communicate and pass data. . . . Also, airborne and ground relays (or other 

UAS acting as relays) can lessen the burden on other BLOS [beyondline-of-sight] or SATCOM [satellite communications] systems.40

The second hurdle for UCAV fighters is WVR combat and 

the delay found in C2 of the remote vehicle. The command delay is most hazardous inside visual ranges, but it is presumptuous to assume that short-range engagements are a thing of 

the past. In fact, at least 13 of the kills made in Desert Storm 

were with short-range missiles in the WVR arena (see table). 

Table. Gulf War AIM-9 kills

Date Target Pilot Aircraft Unit

17 Jan 1991 MiG-21 Fox F/A-18C VFA-81

17 Jan 1991 MiG-21 Mongillo F/A-18C VFA-81

24 Jan 1991 Mir F.1 Shamrani F-15C 13 Sqn, RSAF

24 Jan 1991 Mir F.1 Shamrani F-15C 13 Sqn, RSAF

27 Jan 1991 MiG-23 Denny F-15C 53rd TFS

27 Jan 1991 MiG-23 Denny F-15C 53rd TFS

6 Feb 1991 MiG-21 Dietz F-15C 53rd TFS

6 Feb 1991 MiG-21 Dietz F-15C 53rd TFS

6 Feb 1991 Su-25 Hehemann F-15C 53rd TFS

6 Feb 1991 Su-25 Hehemann F-15C 53rd TFS

7 Feb 1991 Mi-8 Broce & McElraft F-14A VF-1

20 Mar 1991 Su-22 Doneski F-15C 22nd TFS

20 Mar 1991 Su-22 Dietz F-15C 53rd TFS

Source: “AIM-9 Sidewinder,” F-16.net, http://www.f-16.net/f-16_armament_article1.html. 
26

One potential solution for command delay is MITL control until PID of the opposing fighter is made, after which 

permission can be given for an autonomous engagement. 

As with firing missiles BVR, “absence of friendly” and PID 

have both been satisfied, consent to kill has been given by 

a human (responsibility), and the adverse effects of command delay are overcome with autonomy. If man must 

remain in the loop for WVR engagements, it will be at a distinct disadvantage given the advanced state of short-range 

weaponry: thrust-vectoring missiles and helmet-mounted 

sights, for example. The second potential solution, of course, 

is complete autonomy, already found to be mutually exclusive with today’s LOAC and rules of engagement. Unless 

the LOAC shifts to permit machines killing discriminately, 

UCAV fighters will remain tethered electronically to a control 

station and their human masters.

The final limitation addressed in this research, and perhaps the largest target for our adversaries, is the electronic 

link required for man-in-the-loop UCAVs. I will quickly dismiss the safety issues of losing link with a remote vehicle, 

as the QF-4 and Global Hawk have demonstrated the success of lost-link profiles. The fail-safe measure of a returnto-base profile or self-destruct is irrelevant here because 

the end state is the same; the asset is lost as a combat 

vehicle until link is reestablished or until the sortie can 

be regenerated. C2 must be secure and near-continuous 

with each remote vehicle if MITL UCAVs are to be successful. If flown in cooperative formations, at least one of the 

fighters in the leader-follower formation will require positive control. Over-the-horizon control in UAVs is now accomplished with SATCOM,41 and navigation is normally 

inertial navigation with GPS updates or GPS only. The joint 

CONOPS for UASs is quick to point out the susceptibility of 

GPS to jamming and interference. Our command systems 

will require frequency-agile equipment with transmissions 

that are secure as well. The Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

Roadmap, 2005–2030 cites the most common cause for 

frequency interference as more often from friendly sources 

rather than hostile but sums up the critical requirements 

in one succinct paragraph that calls for all the services to 

pool resources in an effort to mitigate this threat: 
27

In general, there are two main areas of concern when considering link security: inadvertent or hostile interference of the uplink 

and downlink. The forward (“up”) link controls the activities of the 

platform itself and the payload hardware. This command and control link requires a sufficient degree of security to insure that only 

authorized agents have access to the control mechanisms of the 

platform. The return (“down”) link transmits critical data from the 

platform payload to the warfighter or analyst on the ground or in 

the air. System health and status information must also be delivered 

to the [ground control station] or [unmanned aircraft] operator 

without compromise.42

There is no easy solution to the C2 challenge for ISR 

UAVs today, let alone the prospects of UCAV fighters in 

mass replacing their manned equivalents in the future. Prioritized spectrum management will be required among the 

services, and significant investment will have to be made in 

the C2 systems necessary to field such a force, from ground 

stations to satellites to the receiver, and must include some 

level of redundancy. All of this must be accomplished in a 

time of increased oversight on military spending, shrinking 

budgets, and costly new technology.

A great deal has been written about the vast savings available through the use of UAVs, but most research is based 

on ISR UAVs of similar design and function to the Predator or Global Hawk. Almost nothing is available regarding 

the costs of UCAV fighters because the concept is so new 

and, as yet, deemed implausible. The cost of an ISR UAV is 

very inexpensive indeed, with a Predator costing about $2.7 

million and a Global Hawk $19–26.5 million.43 The hidden 

expenses are in the fine print, however, where “costs are 

minus sensor costs.” The telemetry package of a QF-4 is 

roughly $400K alone, but ISR sensor packages can easily 

exceed the price of the vehicle itself—electro-optical sensors, 

SAR, and FLIR can reach into the millions. 

I will quickly concede that the airframe of a UCAV fighter 

offers no substantial savings in cost over a manned fighter. 

Cost savings include no cockpit interface (which is significant for design, ergonomics, glass multifunction displays, 

etc.), no life-support equipment or ejection seat, and no 

life-support personnel or infrastructure as a minimum. 

Reciprocal costs added include expensive C2 systems (the 

pilot), C2 infrastructure (life support), and ground control 

stations (the cockpit) as a minimum. The real savings expected 

in UCAVs come from training and human lives. 
28

Pilots and their aircraft spend a disproportionate amount 

of time training, and training is an expensive endeavor. A 

single F-15 sortie, for example, will use roughly 13,000 

pounds of fuel in 1.3 hours, or about $4,000 at $2 per gallon of jet fuel. This excludes the infrastructure that supports it, such as the maintenance and inspections required. 

While the SR-71 is not a fighter by any means, it is useful to 

note that of its 17,300 sorties flown before retirement, only 

3,551 were actual missions, or about 20 percent.44 Of the 

roughly 650 hours I personally have in fighters, only 100 

hours are in combat, or about 15 percent. Of the 301 F-16 

losses prior to the 2005 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap release, only six were lost in combat; 98 percent were 

lost in training.45 We do a lot of training indeed, and training is expensive! Training for UAVs can be indistinguishable 

from flying an actual mission, as it can be done from the 

same console used for combat aircraft. QF-4 drone pilots at 

White Sands Missile Range accomplish simulator training 

on the very consoles they fly the drones with. Whether or 

not there is a real airplane at the other end of the C2 structure is transparent to the instrumentation before them. 

This form of training facilitates huge cost savings potential 

in fuel, parts, maintenance, and aircraft losses. But people, 

of course, are the greatest savings of all.

Fighter-pilot training in the United States is a road that 

never ends, but to achieve proficiency as a flight lead takes 

years of training. Pilot training is a year long, the fighter 

fundamentals course is several months long, and primary 

training is about six months long. Before a pilot ever reaches 

an operational unit, he or she has spent two years in training. It takes about another year to become a flight lead and 

a short time thereafter to become a four-ship flight lead. 

It takes even longer to become an instructor or evaluator, 

and real proficiency comes only after hundreds of hours of 

training. The loss of a single pilot is so expensive that our 

military devotes a huge amount of resources and Airmen 

to recover a pilot who has been shot down. What’s more is 

the time it takes to “grow” a new fighter pilot for one lost 

in combat. A well-trained pilot force cannot be replaced in 

weeks or months or a year. The loss of a combat veteran or 

instructor is even more costly. As General Moseley said, we 

have yet to find a defense system we can’t penetrate, but we 
29

may find that the threat systems of tomorrow will narrow 

the pool of those willing to try. 

Conclusion

Department of Defense spending on unmanned systems 

is spiraling upwards even as military budgets decline. Our 

senior leaders have seen the utility of UAVs in ISR for their 

endurance, flexibility, and sheer volume of intelligence. 

The Air Force has stood up the UAV Battlelab, and Nellis 

AFB (Nevada) now hosts the Joint UAV Center of Excellence. The age of UAVs is upon us, and as technology advances exponentially, the Air Force must decide what the 

next fighter will look like. How will we replace the F-22 and 

F-35 20 or 30 years down the road? There are no technological barriers that prohibit the design and use of UCAV 

fighters on a large scale. They are capable of cooperative 

employment, air refueling, WVR and BVR engagement, AI, 

and CAS. There are anticipated limitations in bandwidth 

and concern for performance in WVR if MITL is the ultimate solution to command and control, but this can be 

overcome with automated sequences once permission to 

engage has been authorized.

The range and endurance of UCAV fighters offer persistence and attractive options in a world of growing antiaccess strategies. They offer advantages in performance, 

altitude, and employment without the limitations of human physiology. UCAV fighters deny the political use of 

prisoners of war by our adversaries and deny them a great 

tool in a media campaign. Ultimately, UCAV fighters are 

not a panacea but offer the presence of force in a threat 

environment that 20 years from now will be extremely 

lethal. The costs and risks associated with UCAV fighters are significant but surmountable. The single point 

of failure may be in our command and control through 

the RF spectrum for over-the-horizon operations. If sufficient bandwidth can be secured and the control of remote 

vehicles can be assured, there are immense dollar costs 

to be saved in their employment. While we cannot place 

a price on the human element, the value of our pilots is 

demonstrated in the training they receive and the assets 

assigned to recover them. In the context of future threat 
30

systems and antiaccess strategies, the Air Force would be 

foolish not to pursue UCAV fighter technology.

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the 

change in the character of war, not upon those who 

wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.

—Giulio Douhet 

The Command of the Air 

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate 

entry in the bibliography.)

1. “MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.”

2. Encyclopedia of Science, s.v. “Kettering Bug,” 

3. Ibid.

4. “CIA ‘killed al-Qaeda suspects,’ ” BBC News World Edition.

5. Carlson, Past UAV Program Failures.

6. Department of Defense (DOD), Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

Roadmap, 15.

7. Ibid., 60.

8. Ibid., 115.

9. “USAF Battlelab.”

10. Alighanbari and How, “Cooperative Task Assignment.”

11. Galzi and Shtessel, “UAV Formations Control.”

12. Jin and Schumacher, “Scheduling and Sequence Reshuffle.”

13. “Boeing Demonstrates UAV Refueling.”

14. Schanz, “Aerospace World: Midair Refueling Tests Successful.”

15. “F-35 Lightning II.”

16. Koch et al., “How Much the Eye Tells the Brain,” 1428–34.

17. “Aim-9X.”

18. “MQ-1 Predator,” Nellis Air Force Base, 57th Wing, 

19. Tidwell, Virtual Retinal Display.

20. Tadema and Theunissen, “Feasibility of Using Synthetic 

Vision.”

21. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Instruction 

3-2.64, Multi-Service Tactics.

22. Lt Col Jonathan Greene (42d Attack Squadron commander, Nellis 

Air Force Base), telephone interview by the author, January 2007.

23. Fulghum, “Payload, Not Airframe,” 51.

24. Wikipedia, s.v. “Deep Blue.” 

25. Hallion, “Doctrine, Technology, and Air Warfare,” 16.

26. Global Security.org, “Operation El Dorado Canyon.”

27. Moseley, “Adaptive and Flexible Air Force.”

28. DOD, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.
31

29. Naval Aerospace Medical Institute, U.S. Naval Flight 

Surgeon’s Manual.

30. Maj Ernest Teichert (F-22 pilot), interview by the author, Air 

Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, January 2007.

31. Wikipedia, s.v. “U-2 Incident of 1960.” 

32. “Serb Discusses 1999 Downing.”

33. Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, “Srebrenica.”

34. Moseley, “Adaptive and Flexible Air Force.”

35. Federation of American Scientists, “S-125 SA-3 GOA.”

36. Goldman, Military Commander and the Law.

37. Ibid.

38. Gruetzmacher, Holtery, and Putney, Fratricide.

39. International Civil Aviation Organization, Resolution and 

Report.

40. Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 96.

41. Global Hawk Integrated Communications System, “L-3 

Communications.”

42. DOD, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap, 68.

43. Ibid., 56.

44. Wikipedia, s.v. “SR-71 Blackbird.” 

45. DOD, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap, 70.

33

Abbreviations

ACSC Air Command and Staff College

AI air interdiction

AIM air intercept missile

BVR beyond visual range

BFM basic fighter maneuvers

C2 command and control

CAF combat air forces

CAS close air support

CONOPS concept of operations

DAS distributed aperture system

DP dynamic programming

FLIR forward-looking infrared

GPS global positioning system

ID identification

IFF identification, friend or foe

IR infrared 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

Ku Kurtz-under band

LOAC law of armed conflict

MHz megahertz

MITL man-in-the-loop

PID positive ID

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RCS radar cross section

RF radio frequency

SAR synthetic aperture radar

SATCOM satellite communications

TACAN tactical air navigation

UA unmanned aircraft

UAS unmanned aerial system

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UCAV unmanned combat air vehicle

WEZ weapon engagement zone

WVR within visual range

35

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