[Cite as In re A.C., 2018-Ohio-386.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 105347 

IN RE: A.C., ET AL. 

Minor Children

[Appeal by L.C., Mother ] 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Juvenile Division 

Case Nos. AD13908673, AD13908674, AD13908675, 

and AD14911228 

BEFORE: Jones, J., E.A. Gallagher, A.J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 1, 2018 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jonathan N. Garver 

The Brownhoist Building 

4403 St. Clair Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44103 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 

For CCDCFS

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Anthony R. Beery 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

4261 Fulton Parkway 

Cleveland, Ohio 44144 

BY: Cheryl Rice 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

8111 Quincy Avenue, Room 440 

Cleveland, Ohio 44104 

For P.B. (Father) 

Jeffrey Froude 

P.O. Box 771112 

Lakewood, Ohio 44107 

Timothy A. Spurrier 

W.H. Hunt Legal Group L.L.C. 

24500 Center Ridge Road, Suite 170 

Westlake, Ohio 44145 
Guardian ad litem for P.B. 

Paul Berman 

24105 Duffield Road 

Shaker Heights, Ohio 44122 

For J.S. (Father)

Britta M. Barthol 

P.O. Box 670218 

Northfield, Ohio 44067 

Daniel J. Bartos 

Bartos & Bartos, L.P.A. 

20220 Center Ridge Road, Suite 160 

Rocky River, Ohio 44116 

Guardian ad litem for J.S. 

Suzanne F. Jucaitis 

P.O. Box 771661 

Lakewood, Ohio 44107 

For A.C. 

John M. Stryker 

Stryker Law, Co., Ltd. 

20006 Detroit Road, Suite 310 

Rocky River, Ohio 44116 

For T.H. (Maternal Grandmother)

Theodore Amata 

12107 Mayfield Road, Suite 202 

Cleveland, Ohio 44106 
Guardian ad litem 

Carla L. Golubovic 

P.O. Box 29127

Parma, Ohio 44129 

Jonathan Z. Wilbur 

13940 Cedar Road, Suite 246 

Cleveland, Ohio 44118 
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.: 

{¶1} Appellant, Mother, appeals the trial court’s ruling granting permanent 

custody of her four children to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family 

Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} In 2013, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that three of Mother’s children, 

B.B., C.C., and A.C. were dependent, A.C. was abused, and requesting permanent 

custody. The children were not in Mother’s custody at this time, having previously been 

adjudicated dependent in 2011. They were in a maternal aunt’s custody, but the aunt 

could no longer care for the children. The maternal grandmother moved to intervene in 

the case, which the trial court granted. 

{¶3} In 2014, the trial court granted permanent custody of the children to 

CCDCFS, but this court reversed the decision, finding that the juvenile court failed to 

comply with Juv.R. 29 when accepting B.B.’s, C.C.’s, and A.C.’s father’s (“Father 1”) 

stipulation to the agency’s request for permanent custody; the case was remanded to the 

trial court. In re A.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102351, 2015-Ohio-3673. 

{¶4} In September 2014, Mother gave birth to J.S. with Father 2. The agency 

filed a complaint alleging the child was dependent and requesting permanent custody of 

the child. The case for the older three children, which, as mentioned, was remanded by 

this court, and the new case were consolidated for the purposes of a new permanent 
custody trial. Maternal grandmother moved for legal custody of the three older children, 

but not for J.S. 

{¶5} The matter proceeded to trial in October 2016. 

{¶6} CCDCFS social worker Mi-Lin Tate (“Tate”) testified that she had been the 

family’s caseworker for almost two years. Mother’s three older children had been out of 

her care and custody for over five years. The youngest child had been out of Mother’s 

care and custody his entire life except for the first two days. Tate testified that the 

agency remained committed to working toward reunification, which was the permanency 

plan. Mother’s case plan included mental health, parenting, domestic violence services, 

and meeting the children’s basic needs. Tate testified that basic needs was on Mother’s 

case plan to ensure she could meet the children’s needs given her history of inconsistent 

housing. Tate noted that Mother most recently lived with Father 2, but ended her 

relationship with Father 2 just before trial and moved out. Mother was currently living 

with relatives and did not have adequate housing for four children; thus, she lacked stable 

housing. 

{¶7} Tate testified that when visitations were scheduled weekly, Mother would 

attend about fifty percent of the time. Eventually, due to Mother’s inconsistency and the 

children’s poor reaction to the visits, the visits were reduced to every other week. Tate 

testified that B.B. attends counseling to address her anger management and coping skills 

and receives special education services at school. 
{¶8} Dr. Amy Justice conducted Mother’s psychological evaluation; she also 

testified at trial. According to the results, Mother scored extremely low in terms of 

intellectual function and was functionally illiterate. Dr. Justice reviewed Mother’s 

mental health records and was concerned about her lack of consistency in mental health 

treatment, opining that a lack of consistency inhibited Mother’s progress. Dr. Justice 

was also concerned that Mother lacked comprehension with regard to why she did not 

have custody of her children — Mother told the doctor that the three older children were 

originally removed from her because they were biracial. Dr. Justice pointed out that 

Mother’s inability to understand why her children were originally removed from her was 

a concern because it was unlikely Mother could remedy the causes of removal if she still 

could not recognize what the causes were. 

{¶9} Dr. Justice recommended a number of services for Mother. The doctor 

recommended domestic violence services because Mother remained in abusive 

relationships and failed to understand that her most recent relationship was violent. Dr. 

Justice also recommended sleep practice services because Mother slept during the day 

and was awake at night, which was not conducive to raising children. Finally, Dr. 

Justice opined that no service could rectify Mother’s intellectual deficits. 

{¶10} Mother’s counselor at Recovery Resources testified that she was involved 

with Mother for the ten months prior to trial. The counselor testified that she worked 

with Mother on her anger issues and mental health diagnoses. The counselor noted that 

Mother struggled with consistency in attending appointments, and had failed to show up 
to appointments for the last two months. The counselor felt Mother had made some 

progress but any gains were inhibited by Mother’s inconsistency and Mother was in 

danger of being terminated from services due to her failure to attend her appointments. 

{¶11} The foster father testified that at the time the children came into custody 

B.B. was having seizures, B.B. and C.C. had head lice, and A.C. was malnourished and 

underweight. The children left foster care and were placed with a relative but returned 

to foster care in 2013. When the children returned to the foster home, all three had head 

lice. Since living with their foster family, B.B.’s seizures had stopped and the children 

had no major health issues. 

{¶12} According to the foster father, the children reacted poorly to the visits with 

Mother. B.B. displayed anger and poor behavior around visitation time, but these 

problems got better when the visits were reduced to every other week. C.C. was much 

happier after the reduction in visits and told her foster father that she just “wants it to be 

done and over with.” 

{¶13} CCDCFS social worker Venita Wiggins (“Wiggins”) testified that she was 

the previous social worker assigned to the family, and worked with the family for a 

couple of years. During her time working with the family, Wiggins had regular contact 

with maternal grandmother. Wiggins testified that based on her involvement with 

maternal grandmother, she would not support granting legal custody to maternal 

grandmother because it would not be in the children’s best interest. Wiggins expressed 
concern that grandmother had neglected her own children, including Mother, and that 

grandmother’s previous home was unsanitary and unsafe. 

{¶14} Maternal grandmother testified that she was seeking legal custody of the 

older three children and was aware the children would be separated from their youngest 

sibling if she was granted legal custody. Maternal grandmother admitted she had 

neglected Mother and her other children when they were young. Grandmother thought 

the juvenile court should grant custody of the four children to Mother because Mother 

could care for her children but that she would take legal custody of three of the children if 

the court did not grant custody to Mother. 

{¶15} The Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) for the children recommended the trial 

court grant permanent custody to the agency. The GAL noted that the foster family 

provided for the children’s needs, live in a child-centered home, and the children were 

“very happy” with their foster family. She opined that neither the parents nor maternal 

grandmother could provide for the children. She stated that Mother had “no stability. 

She doesn’t have stability of a relationship. She doesn’t have stability of housing. She 

doesn’t have the ability to properly parent. She doesn’t have the insight into what her 

children’s needs are.” The GAL noted that neither the fathers nor the maternal 

grandmother could provide appropriately for the children. 

{¶16} The juvenile court granted the agency’s motion for permanent custody. 

Mother filed a notice of appeal. Father 1 and Father 2 are appealing the termination of 

their parental rights concerning their respective children. See In Re A.C., 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 105336 (Father 1) and In Re J.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105344 (Father 

2). 

{¶17} Following oral argument in this matter, the parties were ordered, sua sponte, 

to brief the issue whether the trial court complied with 25 U.S.C. 1912 and this court’s 

holding in In Re: R.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 104434, 2016-Ohio-7897, with regard a trial 

court’s duty to inquire about a parent’s Native American ancestry. Post-briefing, this 

court remanded the case to the trial court to hold a hearing for the limited purpose of 

complying with this court’s decision in In Re: R.G. The trial court complied with our 

limited remand and issued a 

journal entry finding that no Native American ancestry had been established. 

{¶18} Mother raises one assignment of error for our review: 

I. The judgment terminating Appellant’s parental rights and awarding 

permanent custody to the agency is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

{¶19} In her sole assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court’s decision 

to grant permanent custody of her children to CCDCFS was against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

Permanent Custody 

{¶20} An agency may request permanent custody of a child as part of its original 

abuse, neglect, or dependency complaint. R.C. 2151.353(A)(4). A juvenile court’s 

decision to grant permanent custody will not be reversed as being against the manifest 

weight of the evidence “if the record contains some competent, credible evidence from 

which the court could have found that the essential statutory elements for permanent 

custody had been established by clear and convincing evidence.” In re A.P., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 104130, 2016-Ohio-5849, ¶ 16. 
{¶21} When granting permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.353, a trial court 

must make two determinations. The court must first find that “the child cannot be 

placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed 

with either parent” in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(E). The court must also find that 

permanent custody is in the best interest of the child pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D). 

Placement with Mother

{¶22} Mother argues that the trial court’s determination that the children could not 

be placed with her within a reasonable time is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

{¶23} As stated, to determine whether a child cannot or should not be placed with 

a parent within a reasonable time, courts look to the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E). 

 If a court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the following 

exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot 

be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either 

parent. Id. A trial court need only find that one of the factors set forth in R.C. 

2151.414(E) is met in order to properly find that a child cannot or should not be placed 

with a parent. In re Baby Boy M, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91312, 2008-Ohio-5271, ¶ 

29-31. 
{¶24} “Clear and convincing evidence” is that measure or degree of proof that is 

more than a “preponderance of the evidence,” but does not rise to the level of certainty 

required by the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in criminal cases. In re M.S., 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101693 and 101694, 2015-Ohio-1028, ¶ 8. It “produces in the 

mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 

established.” Id. In determining whether a juvenile court based its decision on clear 

and convincing evidence, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether 

the trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the degree of proof. In re 

T.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92816, 2009-Ohio-5496, ¶ 24, citing State v. Schiebel, 55 

Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990). 

{¶25} In this case, as it relates to Mother, the juvenile court found that the factors 

set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), and (4) applied and (11) applied to Father 1. As 

the court explained: 

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E), the Court finds by clear and convincing 

evidence that the minor child cannot be placed with either parent within a 

reasonable period of time or should not be placed with either parent due to 

one or more of the following factors: 

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and 

notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency 

to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to 

be placed outside the home, the parents have failed continuously and 

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be 

placed outside the child’s home. 

* * * 
(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellectual 

disability, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is 

so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent 

home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year. 

* * * 

(4) The parents have shown a lack of commitment toward the child. 

* * * 

(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect 

to a sibling of the child pursuant to this section * * * . 

{¶26} To support its finding under subsection (1), the trial court found that Mother 

failed to benefit from case plan services including mental health services and basic needs. 

 The court stated that Mother failed to consistently attend appointments with mental 

health service providers. 

{¶27} Under (2), the trial court found that the parents had been diagnosed with 

chronic mental and emotional illness that prevent them from providing an adequate 

permanent home for the children. 

{¶28} Under (4), the trial court found that the parents had demonstrated a 

commitment to the children by visiting but had failed to financially support the children, 

have not had suitable housing or employment, and therefore, cannot meet the basic needs 

of the children. 

{¶29} Under (11), the trial court found that Father 1 and Father 2 had previously 

had their parental rights involuntarily terminated as to other children. 
{¶30} We find competent, credible evidence in the record to support the trial 

court’s findings. Mother’s social worker testified that by the time of the permanent 

custody trial, Mother had failed to remedy the conditions that caused the removal of her 

children. Mother no longer had stable housing, was living with relatives, and did not 

have appropriate housing for the children. Mother’s counselor at Recovery Resources 

testified that she had been involved with Mother for ten months and while Mother had 

made some progress on her goals, her progress was inhibited by her inconsistent 

attendance at appointments and she was in danger of being terminated from the program. 

{¶31} Mother was reevaluated by Dr. Justice prior to trial and Dr. Justice opined 

that Mother had not sufficiently benefitted from services. Dr. Justice recommended 

additional services for Mother, including one-on-one domestic violence counseling, 

instead of the group counseling Mother had previously received. Dr. Justice 

recommended additional domestic violence counseling for Mother because Mother did 

not understand that she had been in a domestically violent relationship with Father 2; 

therefore, although Mother had previously attended domestic violence classes, she 

required more services. Dr. Justice recommended one-on-one counseling for Mother 

due to Mother’s intellectual deficiencies. 

{¶32} Dr. Justice further testified that Mother scored in the lowest two percent of 

all people in terms of intellectual function and identified Mother as functionally illiterate. 

 Dr. Justice had concerns about Mother’s lack of consistency with mental health 

treatment and her inability to understand why her children were not in her custody, 
including Mother’s belief that the agency took the children because they were biracial. 

Dr. Justice was also concerned about Mother’s sleep habits, which included sleeping all 

day and staying up all night and recommended sleep practice services. 

{¶33} The family’s social worker, Tate, testified that Mother attended visits about 

half of the time when they were scheduled weekly. The agency reduced the visits to 

twice a month based on Mother’s inconsistency and the children’s poor reaction to visits. 

{¶34} In light of the above, we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to 

support the juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E). 

Best Interests of the Children

{¶35} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) further requires that 

[i]n determining whether permanent custody is in the best interest of the 

child, the juvenile court must consider “all relevant factors,” including, but 

not limited to, the following: 

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s 

parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and 

any other person who may significantly affect the child; 

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the 

child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; 

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been 

in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies 

or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a 

consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or 

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive 

twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 

2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary 

custody of an equivalent agency in another state; 
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether 

that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent 

custody to the agency; 

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section 

apply in relation to the parents and child. 

{¶36} The juvenile court has considerable discretion in weighing these factors. 

In re J.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105078, 2017-Ohio-7070, ¶ 53. The best interest 

determination focuses on the child, not the parent. In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 59, citing In the Matter of: Austin Mayle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

Nos. 76739 and 77165, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3379 (2000). Although the juvenile 

court is required to consider each factor listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), no one factor is 

given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute. In re T.H., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 100852, 2014-Ohio-2985, ¶ 23, citing In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 

2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532. 

{¶37} Mother argues that the trial court’s decision to grant permanent custody of 

the oldest three children was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the 

maternal grandmother could have taken legal custody of the children. As Mother noted 

in her brief on appeal, while consideration of whether the children can be placed with a 

relative is not required by the statute, courts have held that the possibility of placement 

with a relative ‘“is a matter that ought to be considered in connection with the child’s 

interaction and relationship with the child’s parents, relatives, foster caregivers, 

out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child.”’ 
In re S.F., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25318, 2013-Ohio-508, ¶ 23, quoting In re F.C., 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 23803, 2010-Ohio-3113, ¶ 24. 

{¶38} The record shows that the agency investigated maternal grandmother as a 

possible placement; however, she did not file for legal custody of J.S. and the agency was 

concerned with separating the siblings from one another. Maternal grandmother also 

admitted that she had neglected her own two children and the first removal of Mother’s 

three oldest children happened when they were living with maternal grandmother. 

{¶39} The agency also had issues with maternal grandmother’s housing. 

Maternal grandmother had recently moved out of state and, although her new house had 

been deemed appropriate, she had lived in three different places in the ten months prior to 

trial. Maternal grandmother also has legal custody of three other grandchildren and both 

the agency and the GAL were concerned whether grandmother could handle additional 

grandchildren. Finally, maternal grandmother testified that she believed that Mother 

should have custody of the children and only filed for legal custody in case the court did 

not grant custody to Mother. Maternal grandmother testified she fully believed Mother 

could care for the children even though the children had not been in Mother’s care or 

custody for over five years. 

{¶40} The children had been placed with the same foster family the entire time, 

except for the 14-month period where the three oldest children were committed to the 

custody of a relative, and the foster family wished to adopt the children. The GAL 
testified that the children appeared more comfortable and bonded with their foster parents 

than their biological parents. 

{¶41} Next, Mother argues that the trial court erred in that it did not take the 

wishes of eight-year-old B.B. and seven-year-old C.C. into account when considering 

custody, contrary to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). But R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) also involves 

the child’s wishes as expressed by the child’s GAL. The GAL testified that the children 

had negative reactions to visitation with their Mother but were bonded to their foster 

family. B.B. displayed issues with anger and behavior when visits occurred, but these 

problems reduced when the visits were reduced and C.C. appeared to be happier after the 

reduction in visits and told the foster father that she “just wants it to be done and over 

with.” As to the wishes of children ages seven and eight years old, the statute requires 

the court to take “due regard for the maturity of the child” and the trial court expressly 

stated it considered the wishes of the minor child as stated by the GAL, “though the court 

has considered the age of the child.” 

{¶42} Based on the facts in the record, we find clear and convincing evidence in 

the record to support the juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(D). 

Agency Made Reasonable Efforts 

{¶43} Next, Mother contends that CCDCFS failed to make reasonable efforts to 

reunite her with her children. 

{¶44} R.C. 2151.419 provides: 
[A]t any hearing * * * at which the court removes a child from the child’s 

home or continues the removal of a child from the child’s home, the court 

shall determine whether the public children services agency * * * that filed 

the complaint in the case, removed the child from home, has custody of the 

child, or will be given custody of the child has made reasonable efforts to 

prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home, to eliminate the 

continued removal of the child from the child’s home, or to make it possible 

for the child to return safely home. The agency shall have the burden of 

proving that it has made those reasonable efforts. 

{¶45} Mother argues that CCDCFS should have offered her more services, 

services at an earlier date, and more follow-through on her services. Whether an agency, 

however, made reasonable efforts pursuant to R.C. 2151.419 is based on the 

circumstances of each case, not whether there was anything more the agency could have 

done. See In re K.M.S., 3d Dist. Marion Nos. 9-15-37, 9-15-38, 9-15-39, 

2017-Ohio-1412, ¶ 68. 

{¶46} When this case commenced in 2013, Mother’s older children had already 

been removed from her care and custody. The social worker, Tate, testified that 

Mother’s case plan requirements included mental health, parenting and domestic violence 

classes, and meeting the children’s basic needs. Tate testified that Mother had been 

referred by previous caseworkers for parenting, and domestic violence services and she 

referred Mother to Recovery Resources to address her mental health. Mother’s 
Recovery Resources counselor testified that while Mother was making some progress, she 

had failed to show up for two months of appointments and was in danger of being 

terminated from the program. 

{¶47} The trial court recognized that Mother had transportation issues, which may 

have prevented her from keeping some of her appointments at Recovery Resources, but 

the court also noted that Mother should have informed her social worker so the social 

worker could assist Mother with securing free transportation. 

{¶48} Mother also contends that she was prejudiced by having a psychological 

evaluation done just prior to trial. The record shows, however, that Mother’s 

evaluation with Dr. Justice was not her first evaluation — Mother was previously 

evaluated by the Juvenile Court Diagnostic Clinic and referred for services. Moreover, 

Mother’s initial psychological evaluation appointment was scheduled several months 

prior to trial, but Mother missed that appointment. Dr. Justice testified that had Mother 

not missed the appointment, she would have had her report completed and there would 

have been “three months or so to implement whatever recommendations there were 

before trial[.]” 

{¶49} Mother also contends that the agency did not make reasonable efforts as to 

the children’s fathers and maternal grandmother. But, as mentioned, both fathers 

appealed and could have raised that on appeal. The juvenile court denied maternal 

grandmother’s motion for legal custody and maternal grandmother did not appeal the 

court’s ruling. 
{¶50} Therefore, the trial court’s finding that the agency made reasonable efforts 

to prevent the removal or continued removal of the children was supported by competent, 

credible evidence in the record. 

Guardian Ad Litem 

{¶51} Mother argues that the there were multiple omissions in the GAL’s 

investigation that call into question the thoroughness of her investigation and reliability of 

her report and recommendation. Specifically, Mother claims that the GAL failed to 

observe Father 2’s interaction with J.S. or conduct a home visit at Father 2’s house, did 

not conduct a home visit at maternal grandmother’s house, and did not interview the 

children’s previous GAL. 

{¶52} The record belies her claims. The GAL attended multiple visitations with 

J.S. but Father 2 failed to show up at the visits that the GAL attended. The GAL also 

visited Father 2’s house and maternal grandmother’s house before maternal grandmother 

relocated out of state. Finally, the GAL testified that she spoke with the GAL assigned 

to the case that immediately preceded her. 

{¶53} The record shows that the GAL’s investigation included reviewing the court 

file, case file, discovery, reports, and court orders. The GAL testified that she visited the 

homes of Mother, Father 1, and Father 2. She interviewed the parents, maternal 

grandmother, maternal uncle, social workers, foster parents, the parents’ attorneys, the 

children’s attorneys, service providers, and school personnel. She also interviewed the 

children in their foster placement and at a visitation with their family. Finally, the GAL 
prepared a thorough report and recommendation, attended multiple hearings, and testified 

at trial. 

{¶54} There is nothing in the record that suggests that Mother was prejudiced by 

the GAL’s investigation or report and recommendation. 

{¶55} The juvenile court’s decision was supported by competent, credible 

evidence in the record and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Accordingly, the court did not err by granting permanent custody of the children to 

CCDCFS and Mother’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶56} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCURS; 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., CONCURS 

WITH SEPARATE OPINION 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., CONCURRING WITH SEPARATE OPINION: 
{¶57} I concur with the opinion of my learned colleagues but feel compelled to 

write separately regarding my concerns about the suitability of the current foster care 

placement. 

{¶58} The evidence in this case is scant as to the living conditions in the foster 

home. There was testimony that now living in the home are foster mother, foster father, 

A.C., B.B., C.C. and J.S. III (the minors subject to the current litigation and companion 

cases now before this court.) 

{¶59} In addition to those six people, testimony reflects that there are an 

unspecified number of tenants in the home whose identity was not revealed and there is 

no testimony as to the backgrounds of these persons. 

{¶60} In addition, there are numerous animals in the home as well as a suggestion 

that there are also two adult, biological children of the foster parents in the home and, 

again there is no testimony as to their backgrounds. 

{¶61} There was no testimony offered that these other persons, i.e. tenants and 

adult biological children have been investigated as to mental health issues, substance 

abuse issues or criminal records. 

{¶62} In addition, the record reflects that there are one and half bathrooms in the 

foster home that are used by up to nine adults and the four children. 

{¶63} For those reasons, although I agree to the permanent custody being awarded 

to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services, I believe that the current 

placement be investigated.