J-S18036-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellee

 v.

CONRAD JARVIS CORLEY

 Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 No. 1197 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered January 23, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000353-2007

BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2016

Conrad Jarvis Corley (Appellant) appeals from the order entered on 

January 23, 2015, which denied his petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful 

review, we affirm.

The facts underlying Appellant’s conviction can be summarized as 

follows. On the morning of December 18, 2006, police officers arrived at 

Appellant’s residence to execute an arrest warrant for Maria Petruskevich. 

After officers knocked on his front door for several minutes, Appellant 

opened the door, appearing as though he had just gotten out of bed. 

Appellant admitted the police officers into the residence. 

While conducting a protective sweep of the residence, an 

officer observed drugs and drug paraphernalia scattered on the 

floor in [Appellant’s] bedroom. The officer seized all of the items 

that were in plain view.
J-S18036-16

- 2 -

In sum, police discovered twenty-nine small bags of 

heroin, three prescription pill-bottles containing narcotic 

medications, marijuana, a glass pipe used to smoke crackcocaine, two bent spoons used to liquefy heroin, a syringe, 

empty plastic bags, and a wallet containing $1,871.00 in cash.

Based upon that evidence, [Appellant] was charged with 

possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”) and other drugrelated offenses.

***

At the conclusion of his jury trial, Appellant was 

adjudicated guilty of PWID (heroin), [one count] of possession of 

heroin, possession of an adulterated controlled substance, 

possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

Thereafter, [Appellant] waived his right to counsel and 

proceeded to sentencing pro se, although standby counsel was 

present. The hearing was held on November 10, 2008, after 

which, [Appellant] was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 

93 to 189 months. [Appellant did not file a post-sentence 

motion, but timely filed a direct appeal.]

Commonwealth v. Corley, 23 A.3d 560 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished 

memorandum at 1-2). 

On December 7, 2010, a panel of this Court affirmed Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence, and on July 13, 2011, our Supreme Court denied 

Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. Id., appeal denied, 24 A.3d 361 

(Pa. 2011).
J-S18036-16

- 3 -

On August 15, 2011, Appellant timely filed pro se a PCRA petition. 

Counsel was appointed on July 29, 2013.1 On December 4, 2013, counsel 

filed an amended PCRA petition. That petition asserted trial counsel’s 

ineffective assistance with respect to interviewing witness Maria Petruskevich 

prior to trial. An evidentiary hearing was held on July 8, 2014, and on 

January 23, 2015, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition for PCRA relief.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the PCRA

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant presents one question for our review: “Whether the court 

erred in finding [Appellant’s] trial counsel effective when [Appellant’s] 

attorney failed to interview and investigate the Commonwealth’s primary 

witness?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.

In reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA relief, 

an appellate court is limited to ascertaining whether the record supports the 

determination of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009). This Court 

grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the record 

contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 

A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

 

1

It is not clear from the record why counsel was not appointed until almost 

two years after the filing of Appellant’s petition. 
J-S18036-16

- 4 -

As Appellant’s claim alleges the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 

we set forth the well-settled principles of law. In reviewing the PCRA court’s 

denial of such a claim, we bear in mind that counsel is presumed to be 

effective. Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). To 

overcome this presumption, Appellant bears the burden of proving the 

following: “(1) the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) 

counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged did not have a reasonable 

basis for his or her actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered 

prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance.” Id. Appellant’s 

claim will be denied if he fails to meet any one of these three prongs. Id.

The PCRA court summarized the circumstances underlying Appellant’s 

issue.

[Appellant’s jury trial was set to begin on September 23, 

2008.] The day before the 23rd, [Assistant District Attorney Cole 

(ADA Cole)] received word from a witness, Maria Petruskevich, 

that she would be available to testify the next day concerning 

[Appellant’s] delivery of heroin at or around the time of the 

incident in question. [ADA] Cole prepared a 404(b)(4) notice 

and submitted the same to [Appellant’s attorney, Attorney 

Ulmer,] via facsimile approximately fifteen minutes before 

[c]ourt closed. [ADA] Cole urged the [c]ourt to accept the 

evidence and argued that evidence of prior drug sales was 

admissible and cited case law to demonstrate his point. The 

[c]ourt interjected the notion that there was no surprise because 

the name of Ms. Petruskevich was known. [Attorney] Ulmer 

responded that although Ms. Petruskevich was known to the 

defense, she was not known for this purpose. Specifically, 

[Attorney] Ulmer argued that there had been no indication that 

Ms. Petruskevich would be material to the case vis-à-vis

identifying [Appellant] as delivering heroin. [Attorney] Ulmer 

knew Ms. Petruskevich was involved because it was on a warrant 
J-S18036-16

- 5 -

for her arrest that the officers responded to [Appellant’s] 

residence at all in December of 2006.1

1Though noted above, this fact bears mentioning 

again. The entirety of the witness’ involvement in 

the case was as the individual the police were 

searching for when they first encountered 

[Appellant]. Evidence of a drug-related relationship 

was absent, evidence of any knowledge on the part 

of the witness which in any way could incriminate 

[Appellant] was utterly absent from the case.

[Attorney] Ulmer testified that he believed he was being 

sandbagged by [ADA] Cole. He indicated that he was 

unprepared to effectively cross-examine Ms. Petruskevich. He 

felt that he needed a trial continuance in which to prepare. 

[ADA] Cole affirmed that he only came to interview Ms. 

Petruskevich the day before the trial, [and] according to him, the 

knowledge that Ms. Petruskevich was an eye-witness to 

[Appellant’s] delivery of heroin was new information to [ADA] 

Cole. In other words, he first learned this fact the day before 

trial. The [trial c]ourt denied the continuance, indicating that 

the witness was known to both sides for some time and that the 

use of the witness was a matter of Commonwealth strategy.

The jury was sworn, and the [trial c]ourt gave its opening 

instructions. At the conclusion of which, immediately prior to 

[ADA] Cole beginning the Commonwealth’s case, [Attorney] 

Ulmer requested a side bar.

At side bar, [Attorney] Ulmer indicated that after he 

explained to [Appellant] what had occurred in chambers and his 

own person[al] belief that he was being rendered ineffective by 

the [trial c]ourt’s ruling, [Appellant] fired him. [Attorney] Ulmer 

expressed a concern that the jury may have heard [Appellant’s] 

determination. The [trial c]ourt dismissed the jury to the jury 

room, and conducted a colloquy with [Appellant] regarding 

proper conduct in the courtroom. After having [Appellant] 

sworn, [Appellant] expressed his consternation at the notion that 

his counsel was ineffective.2

2Testimony at the PCRA hearing indicated that 

[Appellant], subsequent to his trial, reviewed the 
J-S18036-16

- 6 -

transcripts of [Attorney] Ulmer’s interaction with the 

trial court in chambers. After his review of the 

transcripts, he wrote [Attorney] Ulmer a letter and 

apologized for the things [Appellant] had said and 

done in respect to [Attorney] Ulmer during the trial 

and after.

He also indicated a desire to represent himself[, stating,]

I understand also that if my lawyer, right, is 

not doing what I asked him to do regarding my 

defense because I know my rights is being totally 

violated, right, I have a right to fire him right? You 

know what I mean? I’ll represent myself better than 

that.

The [trial c]ourt asked [Appellant] if it was his desire to 

terminate the representation of [Attorney] Ulmer? [Appellant] 

indicated “yes, sir.” The [trial c]ourt accepted his decision and 

appointed [Attorney] Ulmer as stand-by counsel.

Immediately thereafter, [Attorney] Ulmer made yet 

another request that the [trial c]ourt continue the case so he 

could regroup with [Appellant]. The [trial c]ourt denied the 

same.

The [trial c]ourt again questioned [Appellant] regarding his 

decision to proceed without [Attorney] Ulmer’s assistance. 

[Appellant] again indicated he wished to proceed pro se, and 

then indicated he wished to make several motions to the [trial 

c]ourt.

He made a motion to dismiss under Rule 600, a motion for 

a change of venue, and Baster motions (regarding lack of 

minority representation on the jury),[2]and a request for 

suppression. All motions were denied. 

The [trial c]ourt ordered the jury to be returned. [ADA] 

Cole delivered his opening argument. [Appellant] addressed the 

jury in his pro se capacity. [Immediately thereafter, Appellant 

 

2

Presumably, the PCRA court is referring to motions pursuant to Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
J-S18036-16

- 7 -

decided to reinstate Attorney Ulmer as his counsel. The trial 

court granted the request and permitted Attorney Ulmer to act 

as counsel for the rest of the trial.] 

Ms. Petruskevich was the second witness called by the 

Commonwealth and her testimony indicated that [Appellant] 

provided her with heroin. She indicated that “a few times it was 

bought and a few times it was given [by Appellant].” She 

indicated she was a heroin addict at the time of the drug deal 

and that she has since reformed. On cross she indicated again 

that she was a heroin addict and that heroin affects the mind 

and the memory. She also testified that she was “in trouble” 

with the law as a result of her involvement with [Appellant]. On 

re-direct, she was asked if she had “an axe to grind” with 

[Appellant], and she indicated she did not.

At the PCRA hearing, [Attorney] Ulmer indicated that he 

was aware that Ms. Petruskevich was wanted by Northumberland 

County Adult Probation on a warrant at the time of the incident. 

He was also aware she was listed as a confidential informant for 

the police. He indicated that he did not believe she was 

important enough to be called as a witness. He testified that he 

told the trial court repeatedly that he was being rendered 

ineffective if the [trial c]ourt would not grant his continuance 

request. He testified that [Appellant] told him at trial that 

[Appellant] had a list of rebuttal witnesses who could challenge 

Ms. Petruskevich’s credibility.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/23/2015, at 1-4 (some quotations, citations, and 

footnotes omitted).

We first consider whether the failure of trial counsel to interview Ms. 

Petruskevich prejudiced Appellant.3 “To demonstrate prejudice, the 

 

3

“A claim that trial counsel did not conduct an investigation or interview 

known witnesses presents an issue of arguable merit where the record 

demonstrates that counsel did not perform an investigation.” 

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 712 (Pa. Super. 2013). Thus, 

Attorney Ulmer’s failure to interview Ms. Petruskevich presents an issue of 

arguable merit. Moreover, we will assume arguendo that trial counsel’s 
J-S18036-16

- 8 -

petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Commonwealth 

v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 613 (Pa. 2012) (quotations and citations omitted).

Appellant argues that evidence of prejudice is clear because “trial 

counsel was unable to investigate rebuttal witnesses which [Appellant] had 

told him to call.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. At the PCRA hearing, Attorney 

Ulmer testified that had he known earlier that the Commonwealth planned to 

call Ms. Petruskevich, he would have “asked the [trial c]ourt to expend fees 

for an investigator” to interview her. N.T., 7/8/2014, at 8. Attorney Ulmer 

also testified that Appellant told him about some rebuttal witnesses, but 

there was no time to interview them on the eve of trial. Id. at 13. Appellant 

testified that once he learned that Ms. Petruskevich was going to testify 

against him, he told Attorney Ulmer that he “had Darryl Fife, Joey Feudale, 

and maybe a couple other people that [he] could have brought to court to 

discredit her testimony[.]” Id. at 42.

In considering this issue, we bear in mind that Appellant was convicted 

of five separate counts. The only count to which Ms. Petruskevich’s 

 

rationale for failing to interview her, ie. that she was not important enough, 

was unreasonable. 
J-S18036-16

- 9 -

testimony was related was PWID (heroin). The trial court charged the jury 

as follows with respect to this count:

In order for a person to be convicted of possession of a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver, the following four 

elements must be proved to you beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the item, in fact, is a controlled substance. And 

that substance as I have pointed out is heroin and it’s a 

controlled substance under Pennsylvania law.

Second, that the item was possessed by [Appellant].

Third, that [Appellant] was aware of the item’s presence 

and that the item, in fact, was the controlled substance charged.

And fourth, that [Appellant] possessed this item with the 

specific intent to deliver the item to another person. 

***

[T]here are basically three ways to determine whether [the 

intent to deliver] exists. The first is where [Appellant] is proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt to have engaged in the actual 

delivery of drugs. The second is where [Appellant] is proved to 

have expressed his intent to deliver. The third way recognizes 

that ordinarily it is not possible to prove intent by direct 

evidence.

However, intent like any other matter may be proven by 

circumstantial evidence. ... In determining whether it has been 

proven that [Appellant] had the intent to deliver the substance 

and not merely the intent to retain it for personal use, you 

should consider all the evidence including the evidence as to the 

quantity and quality of the items, in this case heroin, the 

monetary value, [Appellant’s] circumstances, and the 

circumstances of possession.

N.T., 9/23/2008, at 181-83.
J-S18036-16

- 10 -

At trial, in addition to Ms. Petruskevich’s testimony about Appellant’s 

actual delivery of heroin, the jury heard other testimony about the heroin 

that was found in Appellant’s bedroom. Todd Owens, a police officer who is 

a member of the Northumberland County/Montour County Drug Task Force, 

testified that he found three containers in Appellant’s bedroom, each 

containing nine or ten foil packets.4 Owens testified about what this 

packaging means:

Generally in a situation like this these were obtained from 

a source city, Reading or Philadelphia, Newark, somewhere --

one of the larger cities. And the reason for that is generally a 

bundle or a deck as some of the slang term[s] for heroin each 

one of these silver packs contained as I said ten and in one case 

one contained nine.

Through investigations with other agencies we’ve seen as 

high as 12 and as little as 9 in a bundle. It all depends on the 

person that someone is buying from if they’re going to get a 

little bit of a better deal or not.

So that’s a general good rule of thumb that these bundles 

contain ten individual. And I refer to them as bags. In this 

situation they were small little pieces of foil similar to if you 

crumbled up a small gum wrapper.

***

Generally in our area this would be -- this would be more 

consistent with someone who is a supplier [rather] than just a 

mere user. 

N.T., 9/23/2008, at 105-106.

 

4

John Evans, a forensic scientist supervisor with the Pennsylvania State 

Police, testified that the 29 foil packets containing off white powder found in 

Appellant’s bedroom all tested positive for heroin. 
J-S18036-16

- 11 -

Owens further testified about the $1,871 in cash found in Appellant’s 

wallet. That amount included “numerous hundred dollar bills, fifties, and 

then there’s some smaller denominations....” Id. at 109. Owens indicated 

that this distribution indicated that Appellant was purchasing large amounts 

of heroin from source cities because those transactions usually took place 

with $100 bills, rather than smaller denominations. Id. at 110. Owens also 

noted that there were several prescription pain medications found as well, 

which meant “it wouldn’t be necessary to get heroin if you’re already 

prescribed and you have a legal prescription to possess controlled 

substances.” Id. at 112. 

The jury could have found that Appellant guilty of PWID based only 

upon this testimony.5 Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant did not suffer 

prejudice by Attorney Ulmer’s failing to interview Ms. Petruskevich prior to 

trial. In other words, we cannot say there is a “reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different” had Attorney Ulmer interviewed Ms. Petruskevich. 

King, 57 A.3d at 613. The evidence found in Appellant’s bedroom was 

sufficient and overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s intent to deliver heroin. 

 

5 At trial, Appellant testified that he was a drug user, not a drug dealer. He 

stated that there was a party at his house the night before and everybody 

was “getting high.” N.T., 9/23/2008, at 133. He testified that he “shot six 

bags of heroin in one shot” and that between midnight and 9:00 a.m. that 

morning, he “ingested 29 to 39 bags of heroin.” Id. at 136. He also testified 

he had withdrawn $2,000 from his bank account days earlier to buy gifts for 

his children. Id. at 138. 
J-S18036-16

- 12 -

Even if Appellant had interviewed Ms. Petruskevich, and therefore had 

the opportunity to learn of rebuttal witnesses, Appellant’s proof at this 

juncture is woefully deficient. 

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness for failing to call 

a witness, a defendant must prove, in addition to meeting the 

three [aforementioned] requirements, that: (1) the witness 

existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the defense; 

(3) counsel knew or should have known of the existence of the 

witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for the defense; 

and (5) the absence of the witness’s testimony was so prejudicial 

as to have denied him a fair trial. 

Commonwealth v. Walls, 993 A.2d 289, 302 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 155 (Pa. 2008)) (citations 

omitted). Moreover, “Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15) states that a petition seeking 

an evidentiary hearing shall include ‘a signed certification as to each 

intended witness, stating the witness’s name, address, and date of birth, 

and the substance of the witness’s testimony. Any documents material to 

the witness’s testimony shall also be included in the petition[.]’” 

Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626, 640 (Pa. Super. 2014). In 

Pander, this Court also clarified that such certifications do not need to be in 

the form of affidavits. Id.

Appellant’s PCRA petition did not contain the names of these 

witnesses, let alone certifications about their availability, willingness to 

testify, or what they would have actually testified about. Accordingly, 
J-S18036-16

- 13 -

Appellant is not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/9/2016