[Cite as Mohler v. Bur. of Sentence Computation, 2011-Ohio-7015.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us

ERIC S. MOHLER 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

BUREAU OF SENTENCE COMPUTATION 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2011-11262 

Judge Alan C. Travis 

Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo 

ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

{¶1} On October 24, 2011, defendant filed a “motion to dismiss or for summary 

judgment.” On October 27, 2011, the court issued an entry stating that the motion is 

construed as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B). On November 

4, 2011, plaintiff filed a response. The motion is now before the court for a non-oral 

hearing pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D). 

{¶2} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows: 

{¶3} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of 

evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as 

stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from 

the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable 
minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party 

against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to 

have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also 

Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, citing Temple v. Wean 

United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317. 

{¶4} Plaintiff is currently an inmate in the custody and control of the Department 

of Rehabilitation and Correction at the Noble Correctional Institution pursuant to R.C. 

5120.16. Plaintiff asserts that defendant erred in calculating his release date for a prior 

prison term that he served for a sexual offense. According to plaintiff, due to the error, 

he was forced to register as a sexually-oriented offender upon his release pursuant to 

the newly enacted “Megan’s Law.” Plaintiff asserts that defendant violated his civil 

rights, including those guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the 

United States Constitution. 

{¶5} Defendant argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims 

predicated upon constitutionally guaranteed rights. Defendant further argues that to the 

extent that plaintiff has asserted claims for false imprisonment or defamation, such 

claims are untimely. 

{¶6} With respect to plaintiff’s claims that his civil and constitutionally guaranteed 

rights were violated, it is well-settled that the court of claims lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction to entertain such claims. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist. (1989), 491 

U.S. 701; Burkey v. S. Ohio Correctional Facility (1988), 38 Ohio App.3d 170; White v. 

Chillicothe Correctional Institution (Dec. 29, 1992), Franklin App. No. 92AP-1230. 

{¶7} Plaintiff’s assertion that defendant improperly calculated his release date 

states a claim for false imprisonment. 

{¶8} R.C. 2743.16(A) provides in relevant part: 

{¶9} “[C]ivil actions against the state permitted by sections 2743.01 to 2743.20 of 

the Revised Code shall be commenced no later than two years after the date of accrual 

of the cause of action or within any shorter period that is applicable to similar suits 

between private parties.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶10} R.C. 2305.11(A) provides, in relevant part: 
{¶11} “(A) An action for * * * false imprisonment * * * shall be commenced within 

one year after the cause of action accrued * * *.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶12} “False imprisonment occurs when a person confines another intentionally 

‘without lawful privilege and against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable 

time * * *.’” Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 

quoting Feliciano v. Kreiger (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 69, 71. 

{¶13} Plaintiff filed his original complaint on September 21, 2011, and attached a 

December 22, 2009 judgment entry from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas 

dismissing an indictment filed against him for failure to register as a sexually-oriented 

offender. Plaintiff asserts that the indictment was dismissed because he never should 

have been required to initially register as a sex offender in 1998. Plaintiff argues that 

his claim accrued on December 22, 2009, when the judgment entry was issued. 

{¶14} However, an action for false imprisonment accrues upon release from 

confinement. Robinson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Franklin App. No. 10AP-550, 

2011-Ohio-713. Plaintiff filed an affidavit from his mother, Marjorie Allen, who states 

that she drove plaintiff to his attorney’s office on the Monday after his release in April 

1998 to discuss with her whether he had to register as a sexually-oriented offender. 

Inasmuch as the undisputed evidence establishes that plaintiff was released in April 

1998, his claim for false imprisonment accrued at that time, and is now time-barred. 

{¶15} Furthermore, construing plaintiff’s allegations as a claim for defamation, 

such claim is also time-barred. 

{¶16} R.C. 2305.11 provides, in pertinent part: 

{¶17} “(A) An action for libel [or] slander * * * shall be commenced within one 

year after the cause of action accrued * * *.” 

{¶18} An action for defamation upon an improper order to register as a sexuallyoriented offender accrues when the registration requirement is first imposed. Pankey v. 

Ohio Adult Parole Auth., Franklin App. No. 11AP-36, 2011-Ohio-4209, ¶8, 11. The 

affidavit establishes that plaintiff was first required to register in April 1998. Accordingly, 

any defamation claim that may exist against defendant is untimely. 

{¶19} Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and 

judgment is rendered in favor of defendant. All pending motions are DENIED as moot. 
Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice 

of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. 

 

 _____________________________________ 

 ALAN C. TRAVIS 

 Judge 

cc: 

 

Christopher P. Conomy 

Assistant Attorney General 

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor 

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130 

Eric S. Mohler, #625-937 

Noble Correctional Institution 

15708 McConnelsville Road 

Caldwell, Ohio 43724 

Filed December 16, 2011 

To S.C. reporter March 5, 2012