SHETLAND ISLANDS OIL SPIU 

OVERSIGHT HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON 

NATURAL RESOURCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TIIlRD CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

SHETLAND ISLANDS OIL SPILL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR OIL 

TRANSPORTATION AND SPILL RESPONSE IN THE UNITED STATES 

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC 

FEBRUARY 4, 1993 

Serial No. 103-3 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING omCE 

WASHJNGTON: 1993 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Off~ 

Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 

ISBN 0-16-041252-8 
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

GEORGE MILLER, California, Chairman 

PHILIP R. SHARP, Indiana DON YOUNG, Alaaka, 

EDWARD J . MARKEY, Maaaachusetta Ranliing Republican Member 

AUSTIN J . MURPHY, Pennsylvania JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah 

NICK JOE RAHALL II, West Virginia BARBARA F. VUCANOVICH, Nevada 

BRUCE F. VENTO, Minneaota ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

PAT WILLIAMS, Montana ROBERT F. SMITH, Oregon 

RON DE LUGO, Virgin Islands CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut JOHN J. DUNCAN, Ja., Tenneaaee 

RICHARD H. LEHMAN, California JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado 

BILL RICHARDSON, New Mexico JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana 

Samoa KEN CALVERT, California 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota SCOTT McINNIS, Colorado 

LARRY LAROCCO, Idaho RICHARD W. POMBO, California 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii JAY DICKEY, Arkansaa 

CALVIN M. DOOLEY, California 

CARLOS ROMERO-BARCELO, Puerto Rico 

KARAN ENGLISH, Arizona 

KAREN SHEPHERD, Utah 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam 

HOWARD BERMAN, California 

LANE EVANS, Illinois 

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii 

THOMAS J. BARLOW III, Kentucky 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

DAN BEARD, Staff Director 

RICHARD MELTZER, General Counsel 

DANIEL VAL KlsH, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMI'ITEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

GEORGE MILLER, California, Chairman 

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut ROBERT F. SMITH, Oreron, 

CALVIN M. DOOLEY, California Ranliing Republican Member 

NATHAN DEAL, Geoflia JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah 

PHILIP R. SHARP, Indiana BARBARA F. VUCANOVICH, Nevada 

BRUCE F. VENTO, Minneaota JOHN J . DUNCAN, JR., Tenneasee 

RICHARD H. LEHMAN, California JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

KARAN ENGLISH, Arizona KEN CALVERT, California 

KAREN SHEPHERD, Utah RICHARD W. POMBO, California 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York JAY DICKEY, Arkanaaa 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

LANE EV ANS, Illinois 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

DAN BEARD, Staff Director 

JEFFREY P. PETRICH, Counsel 

JULIE PETRO, Profeuional Staff Member 

LINDA GoRDON STEVENS, Clerk 

TED CASE, Republican Consultant on Oversight and lnvutigationa 

D . LEE FORSGREN, Republican Counsel on Landa and Foreatry 

CID 
CONTENTS 

Hearing held: February 4, 1993 ............................................................................ . Member statement: 

Hon. George Miller .......................................................................................... . Witneu statements: 

Malcolm E. Green, chief executive, Shetland Islands Council, Lerwick, 

Scotland ........................................................................................................ . Panel colllisting of: 

Nina Sankovitch, senior attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, New York, NY, accompanied by Sarah Chasis, senior attorn~yl Natural Resources Defense Council, and director of the couw project .................................................................................................... . Scott Sterling, representative of the city of Cordova and president, 

Prince William Sound Re«ional Citizens' Advisory Council, Anchorage, ~ accompanied by 1l'ex Edwards, board of directon Regional· Citizens. Advisory Council [RCACJ, and chairman, RCAC Port Operations and Vessels Traffic Systems Committee .............................. . Rear Adm. Arthiμ- E. "Gene" Henn, Chief of the Office of Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, Heailquarten, accompanied by Comdr. Ed Rollison and Margie Hegy, Office 

of Navigation Safety and Waterway Services, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarten ............................................................................................ .' ........... . Additional material submitted for the record from: 

Malcolm E. Green, chief executive, Shetland Islands Council: 

1. Letter to Chairman Miller dated February 3 containing draft proposals for action to improve vessel traffic management .................... . 2. Letter to Chairman Miller dated February 2 including attachment 

regarding Managing the Marine Environment Conference .............. . 3. Press release dated Feb. 4, 1993, including detailed maps .............. . Hon. George Miller: Letter to Chairman Miller from Hon. Byron D. 

Sher, chairman, California Legislature Assembly Natural Resources 

Committee .................................................................................................... . 

APPENDIX 

Tm.lRsDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1993 

Additional material submitted for the record from: 

Subcommittee on Ovenight and Investigations: 1. Background memorandum dated Feb. 3, 1993.,_ including executive 

summary, "Safety at Baz-A Review of Oil 1:1pill Prevention and 

Cleanup in U.S. Waten, Natural Resources Defense Council, DePap 

1 

1 

2 

37 

50 

72 

11 

13 

26 

68 

cember 1992 ........................................................................................... 107 

2. Warner Chabot & Associates: Memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1993, 

regarding oil spill ovenight hearing-50-mile buft'en for oil tank- en ........................................................................................................... 121 

3. "BRAER Incident"-report received from the director of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund on Feb. 4, 1992, and 

attachments ................................... .......... ..... .......... ........................ ...... .. 124 

Center for Marine Conservation: 

1. Oil tanken and airlinen, prepared by Burr Heneman, Jan. 31, 

1993 ········································································································· 127 2. Memorandum from Burr Heneman to subcommittee staff dated 

Feb. 2, 1993, regarding oil spill ovenight hearing ...... ...... ... ...... .. ...... 130 

(III) 
IV 

Additional material submitted for the record from-Continued 

Natural Resources Defense Council: Letter to Chairman Miller from Nina 

Sankovitch dated Feb. 18, 1993, and attachments ................................... . Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations, Inc., Sausalito, CA: 

Letter to Chairman Miller dated Feb. 2, 1993, regarding oil spill over- sight hearing-50-mile buffers for oil tankers .......................................... . Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission, Portland, OR: Letter to 

subcommittee staff from Stephen H. Phillips, habitat biologist dated 

Feb. 3, 1993 .................................................................................................. . Regional Citizens' Advisory Council, Anchorage-, AK: 

1. Additional recommendations for the subcommittee from Rick 

Steiner, of Cordova, as provided to RCAC .......................................... . 2. Status of current projects as of Mar. 16, 1993 ................................... . 3. 1992 year in review .............................................................................. . Ocean Sanctuary Coalition of San Luis Obispo County, CA: Letter to 

Chairman Miller from Steven L. Rebuck, executive director dated Feb. 

8, 1993, enclosing proC to use Monterey Bay National Marine Sanc-

;!naziedana!a ~=fuge ~~ .. ~~ .. ~~~~~~ .~~~ .. ~~~~~ .. ~ . ~~~ American Oceans Campaign: Letter to Chairman Miller dated Jan. 29, 

1993 ............................................................................................................... . Doi:tjon Marine Co., Inc., Hillside, NJ: Memorandum to Chairman Miller 

dated Feb. 18, 1993, regarding "OPA '90, Salvage, Fire-fighting, 

Dr~Y~!!~fn w:o:·wiiis;·sh~ti~d:··&c°,ti~d;··~t~;··i;;·ch~~··Mili~~ 

dated Feb. 4, 1993, including prepared statement ................................... .. 

134 

140 

142 

143 

145 

150 

170 

192 

195 

200 
SHETLAND ISLANDS OIL SPILL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR OIL TRANSPORTATION 

AND SPILL RESPONSE IN THE UNITED 

STATES 

THURSDAY.FEBRUARY 4, 1993 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITl'EE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:22 a.m., in room 

1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. George Miller (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MILLER 

Mr. MILLER. The subcommittee will come to order. The first 

order of business will be for me to extend my apologies to the witnesses and to the audience and to others for the delay in this hearing. We had a meeting with President Clinton, and unfortunately 

we were not notified of that meeting until very late last night, and 

I was not able to apprise people prior to this morning. I hope that 

you understand; meetings with the President weren't something 

that ordinarily interrupted my schedule the last couple of years. 

The committee meets today to hold a hearing on the recent oil 

spill in the Shetland Islands and its implications for the United 

States. Nearly 4 years ago, national concern about the vulnerability 

of our coastal environment was raised dramatically by the Exxon 

Valdez oil spill in Alaska. In response, the Congress passed OPA 

90, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which was intended to significantly improve our oil spill prevention and response capabilities. 

The focus of today's hearing is on both the event in the Shetlands, and what we might learn from it. How are we better able 

to look toward the implications of OPA 90 with that event in mind, 

and is there more that needs to be done as we start to review the 

law against the actualities of the implementation of that law? 

As this committee has done for a number of years, it has continued to engage in oversight of OCS, of oil spills, and their implications not only with respect to our jurisdiction of the Alaska situation but also on the Outer Continental Shelf of the United States. 

Our first witness has had much experience with oil industry operations in the Shetland Islands and the North Sea and has been 

closely involved in the response to the January oil spill. We are 

very pleased and honored to have Mr. Malcolm Green, who is the 

l l l 
2 

executive director of the Shetland Islands Council, join us this 

morning, and we look forward to his testimony. Mr. Green, if you would come forward. Welcome to the committee, and again, my apologies, especially since you have been so generous with your time and your effort to help this committee. My 

apologies for our late start this morning. I hope it has not incon- venienced you to a great extent, and I want you to proceed in the 

manner in which you are most comfortable. We look forward to 

your testimony. Your entire statement will be put in the record, 

and you may proceed in the manner which you think will be the 

most helpful. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MALCOLM E. GREEN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, 

SHETLAND ISLANDS COUNCIL, LERWICK, SCOTLAND 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Chairman. 

If I could perhaps begin by setting the scene for those who don't 

know where Shetland is-and there are a lot of people in that category-and describing what the Islands Council 1s and what its responsibilities are, so you get a feel for how we can then react to 

this kind of severe incident. 

Shetland stands in the North Sea. It stands fairly close to the 

conflux of the Atlantic and the North Sea itself. It is quite small. It is beyond Orkney, and it doesn't often appear on the maps within the United Kingdom. When they show weather, for example, 

they usually miss Shetland out. When they show nature programs, 

they occasionally miss Shetland out. But that is where it is; it is 

in the North Sea almost equidistant between Scotland and Norway, 

and to the west above it are the Faroe Islands, which belong to 

Denmark. Shetland didn't always belong to the U.K., which it is part of. It 

used to be part of Norway, so it has had a stl'ong history, a history 

of lots of invasions-if that is the right word. Invasions in the past 

were carried out with a degree of violence; invasions in the recent 

past are commercial invasions to do with, at the tum of the century, the fishing industry, which brought a lot of people into Shetland and out again. In the last three decades we have had the invasion and the absorption into the economy and the social infrastructure of Shetland of the oil industry. 

[The map follows:] 
3 

I 

n!SCREEI & SQUARE IAlFT9NEJ 
4 

I 
5 

I 
6 

I can show you on the more detailed map Shetland itself, and I 

think you have, Mr. Chairman, a copy handy to look at in detail. 

It shows Shetland itself. It is not big. You are looking at something 

about 70 miles, or thereabouts, long-perhaps a bit longer-and 

not too wide. It is a collection of islands, of which some are populated. They all are under the jurisdiction of the Shetland Islands 

Council. It is the single local authority. 

In the United Kingdom you have two levels of government. You 

have the national government and local government, and the two 

work reasonably well together, but there is obviously a tension, and 

that has shown itself in the recent past with a degree, quite a severe degree, of centralization of authority and power towards Westminster. Shetland is, first of all, part of Scotland and recognizes 

that it is different in lots of ways. 

The Islands Council is made up of 25 elected representatives, 

elected every 4 years. They don't stand on party ticket; they don't 

stand on national policy at all. They stand based on the direction 

and the push that comes from their constituents. It is a very good 

example of democracy at work. The responsibility that they have 

is fairly broad. Within the Islands, they are responsible for social 

services, education, roads and transport. And that includes responsibility within Shetland for providing the equivalent of a bridge between islands. We run inter-island ferries, roll on/roll off ferries, 

and charge for them, keep the cost low for users. We are responsible for housing and for the development of industry and commerce within Shetland, and we put quite a bit of money into that. 

Education, leisure, and recreation. We have a very strong system, 

though it is part of a joint committee on police and fire. So we 

cover virtually everything including the national issues like defense 

and, indeed, what happens in the seas beyond our jurisdiction. 

We are unique, along with the Orkney Islands, in that we have 

a significant oil terminal on Shetland, and ours takes out from 

what are called the Brent Systems. They are owned by 32 oil companies who operate in the North Sea. The terminal itself is a transshipment point for oil, and it is the largest trans-shipment port in 

Europe. Its turnover in cash terms and in terms of the product that 

it shifts is greater than the Port of London. It handles around 700 

to 1,000 tankers a year, and it is shifting something on the order 

of a million barrels a day at the moment. It is starting to decline 

but is still very active. 

The Council owns the site on which the terminal is built, and it 

charges a rent for that. It also has agreements with the oil industry in the terminal, and it gets what was intended to be the effect 

of a royalty or a barrelage charge. It also gets an import charge for 

oil coming into the terminal, and it charges for oil going out. It is 

not, though, as rich as has been described in the press. It does fairly well with its interface with the industry, but it recognizes that 

it is there as a part of the local economy. 

Very important, it has additional powers that most local authorities don't have. In fact, no other except Orkney in the United Kingdom has these powers, and that is the ability to manage and operate the port of Sullom Voe. That gives it fairly extensive powers on 

pilotage and the management of ships and tankers in and out of 

Sullom Voe, these 700 that I mentioned earlier. 
7 

If you were to draw around the Shetland Islands-as is drawn 

on most international charts-a 10-mile exclusion zone around the 

coastline on the west side, that has been achieved by agreement 

with the Council and the tanker users. But it is voluntary, and this 

is where we start to come into the problems that may or may not 

lead to tanker incidents around the coast. 

If there are tankers that are due to come to uplift oil from 

Sullom Voe, or indeed gas, the Council has a schedule which tells 

us who they are, who owns them, where they are from, what they 

have been doing, what their record is, when the last safety inspection was, and where they are coming from. We start to talk to them 

from the port control at Sullom Voe when they are about 200 miles 

away, and then we start to monitor them when they get closer so 

that we have got a clear idea of where they are, where they are 

coming from, what their track is, and then we overfly them using 

a helicopter when they get within range of Shetland. The reason for that is that, as you probably know, tankers do in 

some instances discharge their ballasts. They clean their tanks at 

sea, and that causes pollution. If we see this happening, then we 

ban that tanker. We don't allow it to uplift oil from the terminal; 

they don't get to go back again, so the sanction is a commercial 

sanction. If we find that the tanker has done anything we think is 

less than the standard which we think is appropriate for using the 

terminal, we ban it. It is a commercial sanction; it is not any other 

than a commercial sanction. The Council members-as I said, 25 in number- are elected 

every 4 years, and they sit on a variety of committees. They have 

the authority to make a lot of decisions within Shetland as a group. They don't have individual authority, but as groups of two or more 

and, indeed, as committees they have a great deal of authority. They delegate quite a lot of that to the executive, which is a staff 

in total of 2,500, of which I am the chief executive. So I take my 

direction from the Council and make sure that it is carried out by 

delegation down through the various departments, most of which 

interface with the committee. In the case of the Braer grounding, that is what is described as 

the application of emergency powers within Shetland by the Coun- cil. In that case I have a great deal of authority to act without hav- ing to refer decisions to the Council, to act, obviously, in an emer- gency. If I declare a state of emergency, which I did in this case, 

then I can take quite significant and fast action. In the case of the Braer, we expected it to happen or something 

like it to happen, and had been warning the Government of this 

possibility for some time. As I said, in the waters where we have 

authority, which is around the Sullom Voe area, we can do a great 

deal to ensure that the standards that are applied there-seamanship and management of tankers, the state of the tankers them- selves-are of a standard acceptable to Shetland. We have coined 

the label "the Shetland standard," which we want to try and per- suade other people beyond our jurisdiction to adopt, and this is 

part of the message I have today to do with international stand- ards. The Braer itself, as has been said elsewhere, was an accident 

waiting to happen. We don't know what caused it. There is a lot 
8 

of speculation which the Council and I are staying clear of, because 

the U .K. Goverrunent's Marine Accident Investigation Branch will 

carry out an initial investigation to determine whether there needs 

to be a formal judicial inquiry into the incident. That will take time 

to take place, and we have to wait for that to happen. That is the 

way it has to happen, and there is no point in trying to speculate 

on it. . What the Council has done in order to get awareness raised, not 

because of this incident but because of the likelihood of it happening either in Shetland or elsewhere in the world, is organize a conference in March this year in Shetland, and the items on the agenda are those which will surround this kind of accident. They are 

to do with improving and raising the standards of the management 

of ships at sea, particularly those that are carrying dangerous 

cargo, and it isn't extreme to say that what we are after is the ability to manage tanker traffic and other hazardous cargo traffic 

internationally at the same standard as occurs with the management of air traffic internationally. 

We have some way to go to raise the standard of management 

at sea to that level, but it has to happen because the conservative 

estimate of the cost of clean-up in this case is at least 50 million 

pounds, and it may be higher-50 million pounds, $80 million, or 

thereabouts. That cost is what has to be taken into account after 

an event of this nature, and there are other events around the 

world. The Exxon Valdez is one example. 

So there has to be an investment, in the Council's opinion, in 

standards of ship management at sea to reduce dramatically the 

chance of this kind of thing happening. And those are fairly 

straightforward things, like ensuring that tankers don't operate at 

the margin that commercial competition dictates. It isn't the tanker 

or the tanker owners' fault necessarily that these things happen. 

It is the commercial regime in which they operate, and that commercial regime will always be close to the safety margin if the gov-. 

ernments of the world don't insist on standards at sea similar to, 

if not better than, standards of management in the air. 

If I could mention briefly the response that took place towards 

the specific incident-and I don't want to dwell on it because our 

concern is to do with trying to make sure that this kind of thing 

doesn't happen again, trying to encourage others to participate in 

that. I heard at 6:30 in the morning. I got a phone call to say that 

there was a tanker adrift without power to the south of Shetland, 

and the estimate then was that it was some 10 miles away. There 

is no certainty about that, and there is no certainty as to how long 

it had been in that condition, but there is fairly good and a fairly 

widespread weight of evidence to indicate it was several hours before the n~ws actually got to me. It got to the Coast Guard earlier, 

but not a great deal earlier. 

It was then necessary to mobilize the people that I was responsible for at that time, which essentially was the emergency control 

room. At that time we had no idea whether it was going to drift 

past Shetland and miss it altogether-it was certainly coming towards Shetland-or whether it was going to hit where it did hit, 

the southernmost point. 
9 

So we set up the emergency center in the center in Shetland, 

which is in Lerwick, in the capital of Shetland, and started to monitor it. That center was set up and fully staffed by 9:00 a.m. We 

had people down by helicopter from Sullom Voe, which is some 50-

odd miles away from the incident site. They were down there by 

7:00 a.m. to monitor from the shore and from the airport what was 

happening. 

The responsibility in the U .K. is twofold for this kind of incident, 

and it depends on the geography or the location of the pollution itself. If it is at sea, it is almost, in fact, up to the shoreline, then 

it is the responsibility of the U.K. Government's Department of 

Transport and, in particular, the Marine Pollution Control Unit of 

that Department. They have the same degree of authority as I have 

in an emergency situation to act. They, for example, are responsible for initiating, managing, and controlling the spread of 

dispersants to break up the oil slicks on the surface, and that was 

one of the things that caused most of the problems for us with the 

local residents. 

The Council is responsible for all that happens beyond the shoreline, but it also has an additional responsibility. Because of the existence of Sullom Voe and the existence of the Act that allows us 

to run marine pollution control units of our own, it has some responsibility at sea. 

The Coast Guard are also involved. They are a separate branch 

of the Department of Transport. So are, to a limited extent, the police and the fire units if they are needed. So there is a variety of 

agencies involved, none of whom are responsible to a single individual or single entity. 

What we did was set up a joint response center to deal with that 

particular incident. That was up and running by lunch time that 

day, which was about an hour or so after the Braer had hit the 

shore, and it worked very well, but it worked on the basis of cooperation. I, by agreement with all the agencies concerned, acted 

as controller and coordinator for the whole of the operation. It could have gone wrong if the cooperation hadn't been as good 

as it was. People were operating at very high levels of tension and 

stress, working probably 18 hours a day in these conditions, and 

it would have been possible for somebody to snap and for something to go seriously wrong. It didn't happen. All concerned rose to 

the challenge and, in my opinion, dealt with it extremely well. 

Despite the warnings about low morale, depression, and so on 

that can hit a community after this, there is a very clear determination in Shetland to beat this problem, what is left of it, and 

to go on into the future and to try and persuade all those concerned, all those who have authority, to take action on ship management and traffic, to do something positive to try and stop this 

thing happening. 

The response indicates that quite a few birds and mammals were 

killed by the oil, they were polluted by it. The media, the press, 

enjoy or seem to want to focus on issues like dead birds, oiled animals, and so on. That is dealing with the aftermath. A lot of money 

is raised for these kinds of things. What the Shetland Islands 

Council has done is said that it doesn't want to get into that kind 

of arena because that is dealing with the effect. It wants to con-
10 

centrate on dealing with the cause of these incidents. So it has set 

up what is called the Marine Environment Foundation whose purpose is to raise money to continue the work that this conference in 

March will begin, to raise consciousness, to try and encourage people around the world to operate at a safer and better standard environmentally. 

Thank you. 

[Documents submitted by Mr. Green follow:] 
11 

,~ 

~ 

Shetland l•land• Councll 

Towro Hdll, Lerwick, Shetland. ZE:1 OHS 

Our ref: MEO/JA1e1 .2 

T clopho,·•· Le, w;ek !OSie) 3&35 

Fn· ill696J 4349 

3 February 1993 

Mr. George MIiier 

Chairman, Sub-Commin11e Oversight 

& lnvutlgationa 

Committee on Natural Resources 

U.S. House of RepreseotatJves 

Washington DC 20515-6201 

Deer Mr. MIiier 

The concern of the Shetland Islands Council for Improvements In vessel traffic 

management is contained in the following draft proposals for action which may go for 

det>ate to the International Conference, Managing the Marine Environment in 

Shetland in March this year. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4 . 

5. 

There shOuld be an international convention requiring vesHla carrying oil and 

other hazardous cargoes to comply with reporting requirements, passage 

planning and agreed routes, through vessel traffic management systems 

administered by coastal states on a basis of local control. 

In areas of environmental and economic sensitivity mandatory, traffic 

separation schemes and areas of avoidance shOuld established. 

Surveillance systems, sutttclent for the purpoH, and under local control, 

manned bv properly qualified staff should be provided under an Internationally 

accepted funding r9gime to manage the passage of traffic as proposed in 1. 

and 2. above. 

SUfficient powers of intervention in potential casualties should be available to 

the vessel traffic management systems together with a.e.,istance to provide 

protection to coastal communities. 

National Governments should take steps to ern:;ure that ships are properly 

operated In accordance with existing International conventions and 

regulations. In order to make this certaln they should create the financial 

climate whioh will remove the preS&lre for shipowners to operate at the 

margins, merely to stay tn buslneu. 
2. 

Mr. G. Miller 

CommlttN on Natural Reaourcea 

us Houu of Representatives 

Wahington DC 

12 

3 February 1993 

6. There ahould be a return to direct links between the flao-atate. tne ba8e of 

operation of the beneficial owner and the nationality of the complete crew to ensure • coherent management atructure wltt'I adequate accountability. 

Language oommonality and proper efficient tralnl"i principles should be 

un(uirplnned financially and administratively by the national Govemmcnt. 

Yours llncerely 

c\&. i Chief Executive 
lffll 

~ 

016 ref: MEG/JA/81 .2 

Mr. George MIiier 

Chairman, Sub-commiuee Oversight 

& lnYNtlgation8 Commltt .. on Natural Resources 

U.S. HouM of ~tatlvn 

Washington DC 20515-6201 

U.SA 

Dear Mr. MIiier 

13 

Shetland l•l• nd• Council 

Tnwn MAIi. I.Nwiclc. Sh,nfand. ZE1 OH8 

M. E. GREEN, A.CM.A.. Chief Cxtwlivc 

2 February 1993 

Thank you tor your lethlr ot 2!111'1 January 1993 lnvlllng me to tnUfy at a hearing ti.fore the Sub-committee on ()veraight 411d lnvestigatlona on 4th Febl'uaty at 0.00 

Lm. The putpON of the hearing being to examine and consider the evema 

aurroundlng tne grounding of the vaset nv't Braer, on Shetland on 5th January 

1913, In order to examine wtlat mcuurea may be taken to help prevent auch 

diaUt8rs In the future. 

The ruoonalbllltY far dealMg with the Incident la ahared betWeen the U.K. 

Government rd the Shellaticl lllandS Councll. In broad term1 the national 

GoYwnment is raponalble far controlling poilutton at aea whllet the loc:al 

Government body, In thlt cue Shetland lslanda CouN'JI, iS ruponalb!e for 1he 

effecrs of poltuuon blyOnd the ahortlline end on land. Thia Incident is dlfirent from 

moat in that pollution from U-boffle droplets WM ..,.rlenced liOffle diltance 

Inland. 

Shetland lalAndc Councll allO hai addltlonal exceptional powera wNCl'I give It 10me 

authOrltY ewer certain hll1)oUr areu In Shetland and apedally the haltic>Yr.,.. at 

Sullom Voe, Ille ol Cul'clN'8 .... trel'lahlpment .oil terminal. For lhla r98IOn the 

Council 18 partlcularly well equipped to deal wllh oil apilla bUt It NIS tD De UICI that 

the ..,.. weal'ler conditions sncluded any attempt to control and contain tl'lia 

=and Indeed It Wat 1hc weather which eventually dlspef'Md and, M hope, 

of the cargo ancs th8 fuel oil. 

The lmp:act of the Incident hu yet to be property measured. n,e Gnundl has 

comrnlSSIOned an Impact assessment study which wlll aeek to eatabllah, Am0n9St 

other things, the likely final cost of the lnclclont and thla In tum should provide an 

lndlcation • to whether lt1e compensatlOn available wm De sufflcl1nt. First 

Mllffl8tU lhOUid be available in about two weeks. 
2, 

Mr. G, MIiier 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Washington DC 

14 

In the meantime, some buslnes.c;es In Shetland face growing difficulty because of the 

lack of cash flow which would have been achieved by normal seaaonal harvesting at 

this time of, for e>C31Tlple, salmon. Other longer term etrect5 include the damage 

Which may have been done to Shetland's image as a clean place whose products 

sold on the reputation of fre11dom from taint. It hae to be emphasised that because 

of the nature of the cargo - light crude - and the extreme severity of the wealher, 

the pollution effects were nol as serious or as visible as they might have been, but 

nevertheless a very l:irge quantity of oil was spilled on the Sheflant1 eoast and the 

damage to our Image Is likely to persist 

I 

Obviously Shetland Intends to win the battle tor recovery and In my opinion it will uo 

so quite quickly and effectively. The people are hardy and resourceful and have had 

to deal with ill-fortune ceusod by i:olatlon and severe weather In the past and will do 

so this time. 

f'art of thct resourcefulness shows itself In foresight and In careful planning ror the 

future. The Council has an excellent Interface with the oil Industry at Sullom Voe 

and has taken careful steps to try end secure a reasonable flnanc1al Mura for the 

community. Another example ot foresight, panicularty appr01)r1ate at this time, Is the 

Marine Environment Conference scheduled in Shetland in March this year at which 

issues fundamental to the avoidance of a Braer type of incident are due to ba. 

debated. You already have an Invitation to attend and speak e.t this conference and 

I hope you will be able to do so. In order to. as:lst you and IIJe enquiry and to 

emphasl:e the euenUal International nattire of TnA conference I anach a C<lpy of the 

brochure. , 

As you will ,appreclal"e, the impact of this Incident Is complex anu widespread and 

there Is hardly anyone In this community who wlll not be effected. The, Council i1 

determined to do :ill it can to mitigate the effects but is committed to prevention 

rather than cure. as evidenced by the creaUon of the Marine _Environment 

Foundation. Thi$ Is designed to raiee awarene68 of the danger to the aeas lntcrn;itionally and of the need· t6 ,raise stlnd11rds In the manageme'nt of the nll:ll'lne 

environment, no_t only around Shetland,, but everywhere. Shetland cannot do.this on 

It's own. We hope that your enquiry will contribute towards the objectives which 

need to be shared by everyone . ., 

113 you wtll appreciate, whilst I can give you Information about The incident, how we 

dealt with It and what we, now propose to do; there are certain areas on which I 

cannot at the moment comment. Tho \J.l<., Go\'ernment hat ,prime reiponslbility for 

eetabllcning cause for :·this incid!!nt Through lrs OWi') enquiry ilfld we, and others, 

must await the result uf , that enquiry before attempting to attcch fault or. ,blarr,ia to 

anyone. 
3. 

Mr, G. Miller 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Washington DC 

15 

Notwithstanding that, Shetland has bean damaged and we must all work together to 

do our best to avoid an lnevitAble slmilar disaster here, or elHwhere unless 

standards arc significantly Improved. I look forward ro meeting you later In the week. 

Yours sincerely 

Chief E,cecutive 
16 

"The Sea is the lifdinl! of the 

world. The measures we take 

to protect and sustain 

that lifeline, at a time when 

it is under serious threat, 

should be an example for 

others to follow" 

,.~:'C! -~ -,.~ 

'.~) . 

- MANAGING 

THE MARINE 

ENVIRONMENT 

A WOkLD CONn:111.lNC! 

!;.HETLJ\NO 1093 
u .. 1. ~~ ._._.. 

"'--"" if .... ~ ttsalf. 

- -•nt 

advaf'IC .. '" .... ~-

ffltlftt of- tfle ocuns.'" 

17 

SicuaM M lh• cr•1--'c ol the NOf"'tfll S.a an~ d-1'1 Arb"rir o,.,,,._ Iha 

Shtdand btands n In I \i""f- ¥Ws,•-.,l1~ po5lliOn » monl'°r Ole 

~ Impact or lftln's aa:ions on th• rr.arlnt ,n,,.,.onment. 

.-.....i, ........ , th• 11ud to reven• tll• da111a1• 

wl\dl COl\dl'IUIC '° N Inf.lead on an Jnaculnt'r 111-..al•• Koill-. ~ 

Sh..i.r.d lst.nds COUIICil ~ soonsonnr l"IANAGING THE l'IMJNk 

ENVIRONMENT: TI;C SM,TLANO STAN0AA0, a rt1ajor -arid 

Th- r:,.,,.,_~•. wh~ wfll be w.e•d in a,• Shtdlnd ltlat\dl from 

Jo Ml'<h w 1 ,.,,., 1993, ..;n ,.,,.. .. , 1111 unparallel•d 

opportunity to, pve,nments, """"""'"•' .,._,, .,.,.,.. 

todelllat• .... f11l111wt111 to111caa 

rt!_, ., ,11 four ic:,;a: a po11t1ve 1Utame11t ot 

,_ ,y ,., ... ., , ,.... •• to l11flue11ce, 111011ltor and 

motlvat• onwlronmental mana111ment " • 

cc,f-.ef"Mtf01"U. 

ly 4eif'II ••• chc ,.,.fuence -ill be l11ltlatln1 and ....... 

llallln1 tll• lh•ll•nd Stand•rd u an id<nowlc,lpd 

JNUUra ol marine en,,.,.c:nm1ne&I •icy u a dine whe."' d-Mt i1 an 

...-zer.t Mtlll t• ftft ... di. ,.a.deal -ii! s)i.-, It UI• R.e Sllffl"'I' !ft-. 

a concerted effort to rucuo tlla world's 

.... from 11verlastln1 da111a1e, C-1.,.••c• C:,.airmM11 

C.n••ner. Shetlan• l•IMff 
18 

Tho su " m>ny thin1s 10 1n111y people. 

To some. a so11rt1 cf enerr,, food and wtaich. A nawral l""tnue 

to esQbli1hint wortd tt2G1 !Inks or w111n1 wars. An open c!oor 

to man', 11f'lnar~• queu fer new horizons. 

variety of ar,lmal, nst,, !:JirC .ir,d pl~nt llfe evoivW ov•r mllllons 

ur , • .,s. 

Too often, the sea 11 1omethtn1 to Ille 

explvited In the name of lndUJtrlal 

ancl commercial adiYlty. 

Fuollod by tho present lack of International 

s1reemant on wtys to monitor and c:,nuol th&\ &aivity, 

it le p•r"'i!)s not 1urpri1ln1 r.im. r.hll H'plo:utlon of tht SH has 

been inn,;md Into a serious threat 

Pollutlon, the extraction of oil and 1as, 

shlpptn1 and fl1h1n1 are all recognised 

elements In wh:ilt has become ;m cmu\itc inut of ...-orldwide cone.tr!'\. 

Sdmulateci by media itttl'ldon, ~e ovtl'Vltw 1s one of 1ccnom1C 

•~ ,w.rilh~ r•lla far iltttU'• 

national. action. Gi\l•n 

ditec'tlon. then I• no l"USOn 

why th•r• lftOl.lld not De 

lffl«naaonal~mtnc 

prooaem.·• 

qt.Mnl°" of ~~.,.....-1.-,,,,,,. 

lno. It I• "'° longer enouoh 

to hooe tnat someone. 

sam,...,here. will take the 

Ind.'' 
nna '°'" • ,-.w1.- •f 

81\lp,13,i"- :SbindaNI• •:; they 

,.,..,...,~t •"" ao• of 

--1•. and Vie COffl• 

JM'H:nc e of Ct'ews. •· 

"'The b\lrnifll IHue 19 

wnem« mn quot"• ano1o.11a 

move from w 1,..,, 

be -•weM af'd •o+, i" a 

fr-m•l'tf-" 

19 

!El' EXE:CUTI'--£ 

mac.t"f•I•. ftff,i\or• ell spiils from shlp;,inf. ch• devUQtion of ff1h 

,:ociu ind oU'l•r nuu"I muint habitats. 

od111 r 1y11chetic d.cmicab, uabll"da coated In oil, ;ht l'leu.lni c,I 

MANA<.ilN<i THf MA~IN! :Nv1•0NM!NT. TIIC SliETI.ANO 

STANOAAO (onftrtl"ICt w1il takt place &galnn IJ1i• b•ck• 

irnund and the 1cc:epc.a~ce thac many of the 1x11t1n1 m&tln• 

en1i1ir,:in,ri,r,ul Qiob11ms OCC\lt despite tht 1mpo,1t1on of 

r.suiaiv• llcences and iruarn1t1a:""..N r-iulatlon. 

It I; All the IPIO,.. 1,1,g•"t.. ther•'"'•· rh1r rfflll!fUIS address 

th• urtou1 threat to th• world'& •••• 

with • .,.,. "' prodson, a definitive A1enda for 

Action wh\d, wlll i,uujt,t UI• ~hett&nd Scandard a: a reslltdc 

Tht Shtt!and IU11"Jd s Counol welcomt tnq\.tlrles f,um ii! who 

wish to p1rticip1c1 '" ;he Conference &nd ccncr1butt ,o U,c 

d•bm whlrh w~I provide a Uni'IY9 opportunity 

to tllflueniee I Mw 1rr,rn•ch co udlisinf :ht resources of 

d,c :.ca wfthout dHtroyh"C the "'arine • l'lvlrnnment. 

P . ? .'13 
02 n:s 

.... ,, .... , ..... , ... -

" " ' · CIC t ...... ,.,., , •••· 

M,• 1•.,. ,.r .. , • • .,. • • 

.,. .. ., .... ~ .. . ·-· .. .. 

---r· 

20 

• T-

---, c ... ,,.,./l'vlf• ,, .... , ,,.. Jo 

n..t.r,-. to :ti.e ,-.ANACING Tlif l"tAA!Nf ENV1A0N.~t:N I: I Mt 

SH'7\,,Nrrr4O ITAHo••o ,~ - · h u k-4 ,... -,M,.. ..... 

con&rol and monltorln& of fl'•lho.ion In • 

lecal, national and lnternatlonal contul. 

.., •~ 10. °"• r;,,,,,_.~,.. ,..:1 1u \ to fOf'fflYlatt pre,.,._ 

all • hkh .,.. ,.., .-w, ••,-....W. :. a-c ,..i,. ., "'• ~ ""44\,al • --cr,1 

,.,,_..,,., b .interface on a world wide i.ai11. 

n.. u :pe,1ence r••n•tl 1rom a nUfflll•r 01 

•l"l"••prlato Shetland Islands Council lnltla• 

t.lves wUI It• cen tral •• tllscwul•n• ~..., . ... duo• 

d':" Co...ncir, ~can r. .. ~ nr 1i1p ,...,_ 11111.11~n.. '" ~ ron,, ot :Pie 

2.t1.11e '=o.,"ty (-:>o ... ,.I .. ,., 1'7, . to du f wt01 <out.Ii r.'1-&."\l.Cll'l'AJ'I:. CM 

for.n.d.--, 61\4 e,-nu•" cf the Sli11"-4 0.1 T ,., .,._,u1 [I. .. :,.,..,,.. ~ 

~o,y Grou;, anct • utwqi.• ar.( 'MO•l"9'1! lppl'CHUI ~ .,...Ui..i ....... , 

,~ .,.d ;,r."'• nucr. u c~ tn 1 tr,:e:n of Su=•~ )u.-.ey, 

fe, ......... """"· 

C---,-0~ prcc.a:cr- '(• r,cn . 

n.1.i :ti.rue...-.; tou o' lcQI KCO\ll"lab.ii:Y, 1114 tonttol. aftCI .r.c ~ &rWI 

S,.,niwt,, CM CQfUt"W\<e • • .IN Ill • ...._......,_ of :nt..U.IIU W.el"I to 

~ , '""' ,.,.,.._.,_ r,,w,.,.~ el the .u '" ccher ;i:aru of c.h• .one u 

a11 .... ,..,.., 1111r-4taftt -'•• -•,...• •~ ..... ,·1 11--. .... 

bOn1 "'wl\1c. ~ •• ll'oJt:1 IM•~ •• uu~llal\ the 

enferCeffle"t of lf''Hci ,...,-..Ndo,u lrt llltt l'ft&CtOl\.ll #'\tlfl, for 

••~• ch, c ... .i.,-: el WI IM~ ''°"•~ Con.;,cu.11,C. 

P. 8-•13 

......, ....... "'-9 • .- """""" 

~l.&61 -Ito.._.. ·-_ ., P,..rl\c.r... ____ 

wi _ 

""'· .. .,., .... , . , .. ., 

.. .. "' ...... .a.I'\ , ...... <,! 

~ ...... .. ......... . 

• •••• • ' :>1tc t: e r1 • • 

... . , .. -"-.. .... 1 , ...... _,_. , , , ... 

, . _ .,. ...... , ... ... ..u ~ 

--o--..•-- ---- "'...:..~ <!'!"-u, acr.... ....,..,, 

~ 

~-... _.. 5-" ' - · ? .... 

.. ---- ~-· -...:rt • ., ,.~ ~:t- ,... ___ ,_, __ _ 
~ ' ~ / 

~TCSf't•--:C•• 

,,. ..... ~ ... "., I/IJ1'· 

111 ........--- . ~r. .. l&Wfte. ,........,.. ., ~- • ,.. _____ , ••:O. .... 

..,. __ ...,_ __ .....,... .. ... • 1'11.r':Ml"'r.' CNCW r:. .... ,.._,,._ 

•~•11t"Ja: 

...,. ......... ~ - ~~-~-. . ._ ~ ··-..,,. ._.,__To.~-.,, v .. 

--1119'!:~~ 

21 

IT_,... 

~ Su #i,lt,rt• u.,..,, • ..,, 

A ka7n•~ s,iaalilcr wlll ,,u9111 811 everwtew Of tra••• 

tlenal and exl1tln1 ••• f11har1e1 111an-

•r•menl -,ncllCH u I ••ckcro\ln<I to :ht Conference 

, • ..., at • tl111• when the future ownerllUp 

of flah tteclu la • U'lldal llau• of wertllwlde 

lllffrat, 

Worb"'"'r ttiVJ,.tln" wtl! addra1 cht qun:ict\ of wf'ltther tilh quow 

thoulcf lll'Mffll, "'-"' i-cff'la a c•"'"'•" NCOvrt• tO dm: rl r,wtta f't'CPtrty 1n hftl w!V. tht lit1l1nc.lh: \1.1.i,;cn .-:,( 1?1! whef'I ~111'1, ••t.kin 

wrkOrl.al wuars amt '.iftdtr th1 o""nenh1p of d'llt counuy's ftsh1n1 

ce"',-nl.c. 

MANAGING TIit 1'1MJNE £NVl~ON,.,iNT, TMi SWiTI.ANCI 

STANDAKU ...,_. Wfll N U.Ud to es1m1r,c Vie lu~Gnt ol 

"""' • rulcal CIIUIIO OIi • worlllwld• ltalu, 

hishlirw'C ahc ,.~ .,,._ •" tM ~ti'! o,,+i'"I iNluaay &rid 

COfflfflUf'lltltS Which arc ~---•17 ~~, •n • ...,~, 

It -JN afJo :. the :ua of the WOf1tNtl to '11Ch & Coti:lldlon on •"-ch• 

"'-"- NIM be ,..tf'VT'iMt M .,o:a 11111 1ft ordtr to ~ tM 

• i,t'lU I)( CIM!lfflUNtiu • f:1iil ,.....,, wu.N. LJlc.-,tce, ..... tfl w lN ,uk 

m ftctf'ffllne -hect.r. owricnhlp ol ~woca thwiiJ ,.,\lin wkh ~"ai 

..,..,...,.,.. _.lh alo_ by_toff"'1,c- -poure 

,.,__,n, ~AlieP.f er le IN •wfMWI .)f f'1~ .,....,L 

•r do1n1 so, cnt ~nu, .... ., ' """P ...;lf ,.,,,_!a .. M A~• fer 

Aftleft - wUI projl« "'' - Sw,41111 aa .... m••· 

efflclellt _,. ......... ..USM et IUll&lffll 

,.,._.fllllerynceun• . 

,-.n,,.._z.t~!':V"·-.. 

I,-.• ......., o-.... - ... ....,..;1,..., rw~, to 

····•~tt .,.~ .... c.,:a. 

l'\91'\a ~ '°"' •tt'"S:X: N°.:1" 

t..., ............ woi. ---

•• .,.. ........ ft , 

..... ~ .. ..,.,. ... ~ ... ~ 

..,. ~,1 ....... c ...... ~ :..,.·.•-

,eM ..... 1.C. ~~•-

lf"flitr .. _.-..,_.:!"',:-, l AH=· 

•··-=-· ... ,. •·••<t-.--:••· ::rte,,,.ulAf': v.cr • ..,..: . 

'"' -, • i"',..,!'P.lllet' 7f ~,•.• 

s....:-.a."'4 ..... u :-.a-tw 

~_., ~.-,~. ~., . .,. ......... ~,...-,-~:-,,a, .... 

a,...-.-. :.-- " ---~ r,,er.t .. : r. t"'ce ...,"Ill.,, .. ~.!'It,,,, ':I" .. =---:~ 
02 F"EB 

I T•,ic 

:-:a,a,-1&~ ; ..... -:·.· c•Ci": 

22 

CHIEF" EXEOJTiv'E 

l Dr, ...... iui11•• .. 1 •iOffiJ.•n z,.,,.11.,i ... , ••• s .. , ......... P.,.u .. u 

-11) 

n-. P"Otpv.t ,,, a rSuai dediM '" Nomi s., oil ,nc! ,., p~:Y.t!M 

our r.he r,.xc 2~ run hu sam"'lwcd d~ .:>n :h• ,n..,lronmsnCM 

Impact. ct dctommuSionint ctr1hort In1WllCioN 1."'ld 1u1:1mann1 

plpcllftu. 

Y$, Co•Vftffl~C. ~ .U e,w4 Attl•P'lu ln.,1.1:wta -,,ct marl"c t.ielo&ll:a 

are at variance on how best to ur:denake ch• chartnce of che ~ -

M"NAGING THE M"RJNE EN\IIRONMENT: THE SiiEnANC 

STM,OARO w;II be•'°"''" lo, tr:llnll:lltlnt d~llulte Into 

pos1•1vc •hlnkln11 on •pponunl•y •• pr•• 

duce arreed proposals whleh WIii becor,,e <ht bull ., I 

n,. oconomlc lmpllc:atlona of docommlaslon• 

Ing wlll b• c:,~tnl t0 conftreno constCkrlaoru which •Ill 1lso wt.e 

into 1cc:ount <ht •itws or die Oil and fuhtf"':ts inelusmes at a tim1 when 

tk•r• ii 'I"' J./'f.'ff'Mt ii\ ftw~I" of l'tUit\int Hltcttc! pll"°"" eofflf)"'l'IUIU 

1,1 m•c.srl•I (gr lri,horc .nifld&l rHf1, 

P, 10-'13 

itt:ti"I -.ctrcet"" l"l•t..arcr. 

V.O' ll'lol,,2trtll SerY,ctt ~tel 

u,,.:,; .. ,~, . ......... ww<wt, •• te 

- it.,,~~"".ar 1r.:er.st;n 

V'l•_.,,...-.-11-..i.a, 

t10t11 0#' ~• •wrc~•r,,: 

ot ~l"I~ nlafl'tlr.""1• --= ., • ., ,..r •-t•O Ola~ 

CC'ff!i::,,,er.u •• l'T'laa;.t'l#I r-,r 

.-.,..,.~ .. --. t',-.f••••r Al•••"••.- ~ 

.. c.rJ-•.,,. 'P"'<...,,.,., .,, ..... .,-c:,. ,,., ~...,., 

............ c:-................ ... . 

~-mmct'l:s, ~ ...,~ 

l.1:i1o.. U:'l•t•-: Na.::o,,.; .;.r,c 

~ .&.cir-..e~ur• II'-: ~PIL.-'WV•t,vy 

,..~, "' c._,,;.,,, .... 1 ;,. 

.:.:.,•::o:• a.-.CI 'w ... . 

-=----= --'!-~ ~ !'l,Jl'llt\~ Ii",. 

~--""'' '"' t:-=~--"· ,~,,.....,. ~ =c:-t.":.: 

C:Ha 0 tTl. 
02 n:s 

Ott• o.i--,'\.. «:~-~ 

"' ... ,:. • ..., ..... c-.._ 

~ 

~ >~ ~ 9!-

... .,._....o-u,-.. 

MQ~.,. d\tNt. 

---- . - ~ ..... _ 

---..,--,.,._a.ca-• 1..-...rs. ~ .,, .I ~ 

~.: 

__ :-O«-.• . ... a.,,. ......,_, ..... 

23 

I T•flHC 

---1 P.~, .,,, Sli i11i•J .\f'.u,,, ... ,,., "'' c.·.,.,,., .)J.1111.1,,, 

ft! proMe "'"°°""' dlwt.11'1 • NCl'I rt••• l'l44 potent•any cat• 

a1tro,t1tc effeCU 011 t.h. mtnN t11•irontMt11. "'" •t'IJCII N•• 

.t..:; hen QWr,u '•r ,,.,._, -«fflf •" 1,,w,,,o,.at,,i'l.,I ~~C 1"""41c.e. 

ftt N1'e an rna11, oeher .,..,. J "'-t·w-4•1 Uf'<•,." l"l'p,'1f."C d\e 

m&l'll'I., 11'1 • l'tiel INo• 1-'\d po,,,, (.:IJl'ld\ja. tMH' bcwMu. Tl'lc 1(1"1: ol 

the ..... ,., ~., fl" '- tll.fi poor r4'(loNlt M "'••1~ dw to o-,., . 

COftn~&, the w-,-..,.-,c , &dwak." It! ~"u,,-,.u: el ffii,-, U'le fl'f:l'lt 

frof"I :n:Ntonal rtlfl <d UM ~nt rtdUctlOt'I ltl 1.,',c uwu 'Y91 ,i14 

~"'..r"Y el a .-t..-4 ,,. unac.c,~ and ton1Anbou, pt'laku "" •l'lat 

W,I °" "'" u • I'·'",,., 4tc0M ,)ri.,1"' ,~1111hl"d1 

l'hts ·1 p,r.,o.:tuty noU<ubl41 at tlM: J,..,.,J...,,, ,NU"f.u &NII 1, ..;, !• '" 

O'Ul!t'lf :>Ott and port-1:l:.l L"!.'-"'fflOO"' 1n wtw VlOUfd Oc n.c-1a.w. 

·-- MANAGING TH'! MAAINt E>M•ONMiNT, TM' SHITl.ANO 

STANOAAO wCI >t III O~fttCY io ,ear .. c.tt. i,,.&.,- ~, 

l11flue11c1111 t11"ter men1tor1n1 uul co11tre1 

o/ .,.,...,.,._, ..,.., •• M 9ect,i aJ ..... U'IC.lf'ft~ .... 

Ship owntrl, ~ ~ o..,~ ~ .. -4 ....,.,. .. l,,,,",,.,.. 

- • , .. k '° .,_ new tlllnkln1 en IUuea "'"' .. 

INfl~ .......,"t yt,.,.,_ ~ l'IIAMint:. pon awe 1ND1a:fon. 

W '!'ri""""'r ~ - 111 IIJO UICOl'!\pU.I th• l•IAl~ 01 : roftU!Oft&I 

... ....... ..,,, ·• ...,.... J 91,,..,._cn,"-1. CM'~• ,.J IPlod•~ t\l•lfl• 

~.-Mlt'd-.J'1CIOft&l11J"'IC:UW,. 

w,,.,. .,,... .... .,._.,_,NI ,...,,._ o( •~ .,_, _,..., 

co leMI ,. lftlt.lall•• ca,••lc ., wert<lll-whle 

9"'llc•t1- 111 1m11reY1111 Ule stMNlartll of 

.,....... ... -'•• -.,tfl\&M'.•f' ...... 

P , 11 ' 1> 

.... ... ... ,_ ... ., ct, • ..-11111. 

, .. ,.... :, .... ,., •.. 

,_, »sa-.- U1'9"" 

- t. ,_..,_ ..... 

~-- =" ~ -. ,u-

"":: .... :!I-<-; ... , :.c,-,. 

. ,... ..... _,,,. ~ ,..,...,._. - ~--"'¥••-· e.-c, ........,.._."'4a..~-

•l'l•r•. ~,. •· ,.., ....... 

~ ~ . ..... t • . •.~ -:, 

._ '-• ...... .,.,.. .... .._,. ·- .:c-~ . ... .......... ..,,.... :.-.. 

s....... .,:. ·····~•1• ..... .,.. lns •-•'-· 

C.t•• •• I --.•••'"••• 
24 

n,e Sll«laMI tllllnds Cound'1 --"'""",_ .,,4 ..._. 

l'IANAulNI, THE r,.uJNl INV1'-0N11fNT: TH! SHfnANO 

STANDAAO ,._ • wmmlunent te tile 

ce11upt et ucepuona1 ~ualltJ, 

Alrnd1 -P'"I MIi apjl!yt,,f Ille S-- ID ,._ 

tecte4 - uwl ,.....__any !lie ShedaftCI ..,,,._ lt.e 

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1993 

26 

CONTACT: MALCOLM GREEN 

(202) 828-2202 

Malcolm Green, Chief Executive of the Shetland Islands 

Council (Scotland), today urged the United States Government to 

join an international effort to prevent further oil spills from 

ocean-going tankers. In testimony before the House Natural 

Resources Committee, Mr. Green proposed that ocean-going tankers 

should be subject to the same kind of radar and radio control as the air traffic control system that has been in place throughout 

the world for many years. 

Testifying in the wake of three major tanker spills that 

have occurred during the past two months, Mr. Green said that the 

governments of the world can no longer ignore the fact that oil 

spills at sea have a global environmental effect. He made the 

following specific recommendations for change: 

ships carrying oil and other hazardous cargoes 

should be required to file voyage plans just as airplanes file flight plans, and to communicate wi th traffic controllers in local areas before 

deviating from their agreed route 

when sailing in local coastal areas, tankers 

should be monitored on radar by people who are knowledgeable about local waters, hazards, cur- rents and tides 

mandatory traffic separation lanes should be 

established in heavil y traveled areas which are environmentally sensi tive 

tankers should be registered and crewed in the same country where the owner is based, to assure there is a common language between the·owner and 

the crew, and proper training of crew members. 

international conventions and regulations 

governing operation of tankers should be 

strictly and uniformly enforced by all nations 

[MORE] 
The Shetland Islands, in the North Sea just west of 

Norway, are home to the Sullom Voe Oil Terminal, the largest oil 

shipping port serving the North Sea oi l fields. Prior to the 

BRAER grounding, the Shetland Islands Council organized an international conference on "Strategies For Improving the Marine 

Environment", to bring together representatives of governments and 

other relevant interests from around the world to discuss ways to 

reduce the risks posed by the exploration, drilling and ocean transportation of oil and other hazardous products. The 

conference is scheduled to begi n on March 29, 1993 in Lerwick. 

"We are no longer living in an age when clipper ships car- ried cargoes of silk and spices," said Green. "Today, when a supertanker full of oil spills its cargo, enormous environmental 

and economic damage is done. The nations of the world, and the 

shipping industry, must cooperate to create an international traffic management system that prevents oil spills like the EXXON 

VALDEZ, the AEGEAN SEA, the BRAER, and the MAERSK NAVIGATOR. " 
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30 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

You said at one point in your testimony that out of economic and 

commercial necessity tankers operate to some extent at the commercial margin and because of commercial regimes of competition 

that are placed on them. That is a well-recognized argument in the 

debates around whether or not to impose additional regulatory 

command and control on tankers and requirements on the owners 

of the cargo and the owners of the ships. But it also appears, from 

where I sit, that the Shetlands were able to provide your Council 

some ability to, in fact, override those arguments of commercial necessity, if you will, in terms of the protocols that you have established. Why in the Shetlands and not in many other areas, if any 

other areas, of the world to that extent? 

Mr. GREEN. Chairman, the answer is that the interface with the 

oil industry at Sullom Voe is one which is carried out by the Council on behalf of the community. 

When oil first came to Shetland-there was a great deal of oil 

in the East Shetland Basin-it was a fact that it had to come 

ashore somewhere, and the only place it could come ashore was 

Shetland. So the practical, pragmatic answer to that particular 

problem, which could have led to the Council staying entirely clear 

of it and leaving it to the Government, was that the Council decided to control it by participation, and it has done so ever since. 

The Sullom Voe Association, as it is called, is a management 

body which sits over the management of the terminal; 50 percent 

of the directors are Council members, and 50 percent are oil industry representatives. It is because of the significant involvement in 

a commercial interface by the community that these safeguards 

have been applied, and they are not being applied purely for esoteric or environmental reasons on their own. There is a significant 

fishing industry in Shetland, and now there is a significant salmon 

farming industry. Shetland, by large measure, markets itself internationally with an image of purity, clear clean air, clear clean waters around its shore.s from which its products come and from 

which we sell and get our own commercial benefit. It is to safeguard those that very stringent controls are applied through the 

Sullom Voe Association and in the various legal interfaces that 

exist, and it has to be said that the agreement of the oil industry 

terminal managers. They give us information on tankers, where 

they have traded with them elsewhere, and they are as keen as we 

are to apply these standards of management at the port, but the 

initiative has come from the Council. 

Mr. MILLER. Many of those criteria that you just set out, in fact, 

existed-and this is why we looked at Sullom Voe-at the time of 

the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. The oil had to come ashore 

but, in fact, leaves Alaska at one point. What you are telling us is 

that you were able to use that as leverage to get a regime that the 

people of the Shetlands felt comfortable with and that would provide for their protection. Let me ask you two questions with respect 

to that-really one question for the moment. 

That is, when the negotiations took place between the people of 

Alaska and the Federal Government and the oil industry, many 

representations were made about how that facility would be run. 
31 

I don't expect you to comment on those, but those representations 

were made, and then from that time to the 10 years later when you 

got to the Exxon Valdez, you saw a steady erosion of those standards of operation. The margins of safety just continued to erode to 

such a point that on the night of Exxon Valdez, of course, there was 

absolutely no ability to cope with a spill of that magnitude. 

How are you able to maintain the standards and the margins 

that you set some time ago and, as of today, feel that you are still 

able to maintain and prevent the erosion of the margins of safety? 

It is somewhat of a political question because the pounding constantly comes in from the operators that you have got to keep 

changing this because they can't afford to operate in that fashion. 

Mr. GREEN. We have this as well, and I will give examples of it. 

I think there are two main areas in which we have managed to 

have sufficient control to insist upon standards. The first is that 

the Council moved to buy the land on which the terminal was to 

be built and in doing so then had the leverage to ensure that it was 

built to a particular standard environmentally, and as far as Shetland is concerned, it could insist upon it being returned to green 

field after it was finished with. That was also part of the planning 

condition. 

The Council then and now has probably more significant powers 

than you may have in some of your local administrative areas, but 

I'm not too sure. 

The other one is that the Council then worked very hard and, I 

think, very competently to have enacted through Parliament what 

is called the Zetland County Council Act. It used to be that the 

name of the county was Zetland prior to the creation of the Shetland Islands Council in the 1970s. It is that Zetland County Coun- cil Act that carries in it quite significant powers to operate and 

manage harbors and ports, particularly those around the terminal, 

and to insist upon particular standards in the operation of those 

ports. We have that one. 

We also have a variety of legal deals done with the oil industry. For example, there is one called the Port and Harbor Agreement 

which brings us income, but it also allows us to insist, for example, 

on the maintenance of the jetties. The terminal is served by four 

jetties, four tanker jetties, and the oil is shipped over those from 

the holding tanks on to the tankers. 

The deal with the industry- this is a 25-year deal due for renegotiation in a few years time-is such that the Council gets a 

payment for every barrel, every ton of oil, that goes over those jetties, but it also owns the jetties as well. It owns the hardware of 

those jetties from the shoreline out to the point where oil is transshipped on to the tankers. That ownership gives it the ability to 

insist, through the agreement, on the standard of maintenance for 

those jetties. 

Now there has to be commercial tension between the Council in 

insisting on those jetties being maintained at a particular standard-as they stand in the sea and the sea is quite corrosive-and 

the need of the oil industry to keep its costs down. But the Council 

has, in a sense, the last word on these issues, and it will insist 

upon standards that it thinks are appropriate. They are quite severe standards for the maintenance of those jetties because while 
32 

the throughput of the terminal is declining, as it is now-going 

down and will go down towards the end of the century-it also is 

the case that the weather, as you have seen, in January and at 

other times of the year around Shetland is very severe. It can be 

severe even in the relatively sheltered waters around Sullom Voe. 

We need standby jetties in case anything happens, as happened 

15 years ago with the Esso Venesia. A jetty purely to take on a 

tanker that can't get on to an existing jetty. So we have insisted 

that those four jetties are retained and not decommissioned as the 

industry would like to do. So that, as I said, leads to tension, but 

the reasons for doing it, we believe, are the appropriate ones. And 

we do have the authority to insist upon them either by special legislation, which we have, which gives us additional powers, or by 

straightforward commercial deals to do with rental or legal agreements that give us the ability to insist. Mr. MILLER. When the Braer became disabled, you were made 

aware of that by the ship? 

Mr. GREEN. The police told me. 

Mr. MILLER. So that you did not have command and control of 

the ship at that point. Is that correct? 

Mr. GREEN. That is correct. What happens is that the interface 

and the responsibility is with the Coast Guard, and they are not 

part of the administration in Shetland. They exist in Shetland, but 

they are a Department of Transport branch. It was the Coast 

Guard who talked to the ship. 

Mr. MILLER. What was the time, or do you know yet, from the 

time the ship became disabled to the time you were able to respond? 

Mr. GREEN. I don't know when it--

Mr. MILLER. It is not clear yet? 

Mr. GREEN. No. 

Mr. MILLER. They haven't fixed a time yet? 

Mr. GREEN. We could tell you from the time that I heard about 

it. It was then 11:20 or 11:30 when it finally grounded. Prior to 

that, it had been unmanned for about 2 hours. It was drifting without anybody on for about 2 hours. 

Mr. MILLER. The channel that the Braer was going through, was 

that at one time considered to also be under your command and 

control? 

Mr. GREEN. No. 

Mr. MILLER. In the early debates, it was never debated to extend 

the system to that area? 

Mr. GREEN. No. It is an international channel. 

Mr. MILLER. And the Braer picked that route because of weather? 

Mr. GREEN. Well, we would need to ask the Braer why it was 

going that way, but it was, as far as we can see, a track which was 

legitimate. 

Mr. MILLER. I'm sorry? 

Mr. GREEN. The track it was on was legitimate. It wasn't, as far 

as we know, in an area where it shouldn't have been. 

Mr. MILLER. I understand that, but it could have taken the 

northern route. Is that correct? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, it could. 
33 

Mr. MILLER. Would that have been a normal route or a regular 

route, or are both of them used? 

Mr. GREEN. Both. Mr. MILLER. They are both used. Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. MILLER. You mentioned also in your testimony the fact that 

you in the Shetlands apparently watch the histories of various 

ships. Is that correct? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. MILLER. And if those ships, or the companies, I guess, are 

engaged in various practices, the Council has the ability to keep 

that ship from entering the port? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. MILLER. How do you arrange for those histories? How is that 

information passed on to you. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, if you take the Braer itself, it had been at 

Sullom Voe almost a hundred times itself to collect cargoes of oil 

over the years-different names but the same ship. We do, at the 

terminal as well, put people on board to check out the variety of 

things that need to be done to ensure that the safety standards are 

those that are necessary. Mr. MILLER. So this isn't a matter of a central classification system; this is a matter of your own histories and logs and information that you gather with regard to those ships that call on Sullom 

Voe. 

Mr. GREEN. That is right. 

Mr. MILLER. And you gather that from--

Mr. GREEN. Wherever we can. Mr. MILLER. Wherever you can. So if they have incidents in other 

ports, other parts of the world, you continue to gather that information. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. Mr. MILLER. I was in London right after the tragic fire in the Underground, and at that point the authority responsible for the Underground was engaging an outside entity that looks at industrial 

systems and all kinds of large systems for reviews of safety. What 

kind of review do you anticipate to be undertaken with respect to 

the grounding and its interrelationship with your system? 

Mr. GREEN. The initial investigation is what is called an inspector's inquiry. It is by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch 

from the Department of Transport, but the manner in which it can 

conduct an inquiry is quite severely set out in the relevant legislation. 

For example, the inspector in his report isn't permitted to at- tribute blame for an incident like this. The intention of the inquiry 

initially essentially is to see if there are any lessons to be- learned 

about the management of tankers or management of ships at sea. The Council has obviously got an interest in this for itself and 

also on behalf of the people of Shetland, and has resolved that it 

wishes the inquiry, whatever it is, to be held in public, to be held 

in Shetland, and using terms of reference which are acceptable and 

have been agreed by the Council on behalf of the community. The 

same thing has been said about the inquiry by Lord Donaldson, 

which is an inquiry into the issues to do with tanker management 
34 

around the shores, that it should be held in Shetland because that 

is where the incident happened, that it should be held in public, 

and it should be using terms of reference that have been agreed 

with the community by the Council. 

I think that the second one has certainly been rejected by the 

Government and they are going to conduct the inquiry in London. 

They may come and look at Shetland, but they aren't going to conduct it even in Scotland, it is going to be in London. The inspector's inquiry is prescribed by statute, and I suspect 

that the answer we get to the request, when we do get an answer, 

for it to be in public on Shetland and on terms of reference acceptable, will be that we will have to wait for this initial inquiry. The 

next stage is the equivalent of a judicial inquiry, a formal hearing 

by the sheriff principal of the area, and that becomes an adversarial attempt to try and identify blame. 

So these things are off yet; there is some way to go. Mr. MILLER. The port facility at Sullom Voe, as I am led to understand it, is somewhat more analogous in this country, I guess, 

to our airline system in terms of the command and control that you 

have over those ships and maybe a seagoing example may be more 

like a pilot on a ship that enters San Francisco Bay or the Columbia River System or what-have-you, where the pilot t~es over the 

control of that ship. Had you had that kind of system in place in 

this area where the Braer was, would you have known sooner that 

it was disabled? Would you be able to read that from your current 

system? 

Mr. GREEN. If it had been trading or intending to trade with 

Sullom Voe, we would have known because, as I say, we talk to 

those tankers. What we don't have is a surveillance system beyond 

the area around the harbor of Sullom Voe or the north end of Shetland. We don't have a surveillance system. Surveillance systems 

are the responsibility of the national government. 

Mr. MILLER. If a ship of this size stops making progress, it is 

going to become apparent at some point on the control system that 

this ship is not making way, and that prevents the ship from making a series of decisions that they may decide are very good for 

their careers, for their companies, for their ship, but may be very 

bad in the end· in terms of not wanting to yell for help at the earliest moment. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. MILLER. I think that the first instinct is, "I can fix this," but 

the fact may be, if you were objective and you looked at the surrounding area, whether it was in Prince William Sound or the 

Shetland Islands or San Francisco Bay, an objective person looking 

at that situation might decide there is no time to fix that and other 

actions have to be taken to try to prevent the worst-case scenario. 

So that is really the distinction, as I understand it. Had they 

been coming to your port, you would have been talking to them, except they might not have been giving you the information you 

would have needed at that particular moment, especially as the 

weather turned out to be a factor. 

Is that a fair summation of the distinctions? 
35 

Mr. GREEN. It is. It would have been better, or better controlled 

perhaps, if they had been trading with us at Sullom Voe, but it 

wouldn't have been foolproof. 

Mr. MILLER. I understand that. 

Mr. GREEN. Because there is no monitoring system at all of ships 

beyond the range of our radar-and that is in the harbor area that 

we are responsible for-and there is no legislation, there is no 

international standard, that says if part of your equipment fails, 

whatever it is, you have to report straight away or you have a 

black box on board that monitors and identifies what happened 

precisely when it happened, and the master becomes liable for not 

taking specified action to correct that straight away. There is nowhere the ability to actually interfere with the master's control of 

the ship no matter what state it is in, and that needs to be reviewed. 

Mr. MILLER. We clearly have the ability now, with the locator 

systems, satellite systems. All sorts of people who are in private 

boats sail up and down the coast of California with a great deal of 

confidence because they are in contact with the satellite. Their 

skills sometimes don't match up when they lose that contact with 

the satellite, but in any case, for a moment they are very happy 

because they believe they know within 100 feet or 100 yards of 

where they are at all times. I forget what the name of the system 

is, the guidance system. 

We found in Desert Storm that we couldn't quite undertake the 

battle plan because as we sent the tanks out at night, they kept 

getting lost, so we quickly had to make these available to commanders of the tanks in the desert. So the system no longer really needs to be one that, as I understand it, would be dependent upon Sullom Voe. It can be a system 

that can monitor tankers worldwide, because it is a very inexpensive system now to put on the bridge of a tanker, and again, if the 

tanker stops making way, given how these things are calibrated, 

somebody is going to know that if they are paying attention. So a 

tanker's ability to founder for whatever given period of time really 

now is no longer necessary to accept, and these are inexpensive 

enough that you can afford one for a 40-foot boat or any size boat; 

they are available to the general public. 

It seems to me that that kind of information, if not command and 

control, but that information, is now readily available should the 

industry and the various governments decide that that can improve 

the margins of safety. 

Mr. GREEN. I think the hardware certainly exists, but if you like, 

it is the software--

Mr. MILLER. GSD is what I'm talking about, I'm informed. 

Mr. GREEN. It is the people who actually make it work, and unless governments themselves insist upon particular standards at 

sea that allow the commercial regime to lift its game, it is going 

to cost more to do it. Unless that game is lifted to the point where 

safety and the grounding of tankers in circumstances where 

grounding perhaps need not have happened changes-unless the 

game is lifted-the hardware/software isn't going to be a great deal 

of use. 
36 

If you can see them and you can't interfere with them, or if they 

are not obliged to report to you or to some authority straight away 

the instant something happens, as happens in the air, then it isn't 

going to be a great deal of use just to see it. 

Mr. MILLER. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but this 

is the second time I think you have alluded to this. In fact, the 

command and control, your ability to control that tanker in those 

designated areas-again, whether they are in Shetlands or in other 

areas that pose a threat-is really the key ingredient. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, and it is a national government responsibility. I don't want the Shetland Islands Council to have to do this in its 

own area; it has to be international, it has to be worldwide, for it 

to work. 

Mr. MILLER. It is highly resisted by the owners of large ships. 

Mr. GREEN. It is, but unless it is done these kinds of incidents 

are going to continue to increase. And eventually it is going to be 

impossible to clean up the pollution that is left behind. We were 

lucky in this instance. 

Mr. MILLER. One final question because, for the purposes of this 

committee and not necessarily for you, we are looking at two different systems here and trying to measure some of that. That is, 

when the people who work for you at the Council, the people running the port at Sullom Voe, when they make a decision that traffic 

by an individual tanker, for whatever reason, whether it is for 

weather, for questions about the tanker, the crew, or what-haveyou, when that decision is made, is that it? That is final? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. MILLER. Now we have had certain allegations and some evidence suggesting that at times when our Coast Guard and others 

thought that the winds were too high or the weather was improper 

in the instance of Prince William Sound, that decisions were made 

to slow traffic down or to space the ships at greater length, that 

that was then overridden at the national level. Can the owner of 

a tanker company pick up the phone and call somebody in London 

and say, "I've got to get this tanker out of here at 8 o'clock tonight"? 

Mr. GREEN. No. We have absolute authority within the harbor 

area for which we are responsible. It is important to say that last 

piece: We are responsible for it. It is not a case of draconian control; we are responsible for the traffic of ships within that area, for 

the pilotage of them and for their safety while they are there. So 

we don't let them in if it is not safe; we don't let them go out if 

it is not safe. 

Mr. MILLER. Two entirely different systems. 

Let me thank you very much for your testimony, and also let me 

thank you for your invitation to the conference in March. We didn't 

get into them in detail, but let me also thank you for the recommendations that you have left with the committee with respect 

to international regulations on tanker traffic that I think will be 

of great interest to us and to the other committees of jurisdiction. 

I will also make sure that your invitation to the conference is forwarded to President Clinton. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you very much. 
37 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. Thank you very much for your time and 

for your information. 

Mr. GREEN. Let me say thanks for the invitation. I have enjoyed 

it. It is my first visit to the United States. I got here before my 

luggage----

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MILLER. That is another system. It is not in our jurisdiction. And let me tell you, as one who flies across this country every 

weekend, that system can't be fixed. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much, and we hope you enjoy your 

stay. 

PANEL CONSISTING OF NINA SANKOVITCH, SENIOR ATTORNEY, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, NEW YORK, 

NY, ACCOMPANIED BY SARAH CHASIS, SENIOR ATTORNEY, 

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, AND DIRECTOR 

OF THE COASTAL PROJECT; AND SCOTT STERLING, PRESIDENT, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND REGIONAL CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL, ANCHORAGE, AK, ACCOMPANIED BY TEX 

EDWARDS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, REGIONAL CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNSEIL (RCAC), AND CHAIRMAN, RCAC PORT OPERATIONS AND VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEMS COMMITTEE 

Mr. MILLER. The next panel will be made up of Nina Sankovitch, 

who is a senior attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council, accompanied by Sarah Chasis, a senior attorney for the Natural 

Resource Defense Council; and Scott Sterling, who is the president 

of Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council, who 

will be accompanied by Tex Edwards, who is on the board of directors of the Regional Citizens' Advisory Council. 

Welcome to the committee. We look forward to your testimony. Again, my apologies for earlier this morning, and we will recognize 

you in the order in which we called you, if that is all right with 

you. 

Nina, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF NINA SANKOVITCH, ESQ. 

Ms. SANKOVITCH. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. 

The Natural Resources Defense Council appreciates this opportunity to offer testimony on the implementation of the Oil Pollution 

Act of 1990. NRDC has worked on the issue of oil pollution for over 

20 years, and in December of this year we issued this report, "Safety at Bay," which details oil spill prevention and response in the 

United States and implementation of the OPA 90. The recent tanker spills of disastrous proportions, the 23 million 

gallons spilled from the Aegean Sea off the coast of Spain, the 24 

million gallons spilled from the Braer of the Shetland Islands, and 

the potential 84-million-gallon spill from the Maersk Navigator off 

the coast of Indonesia, have underscored the fundamental problems 

which underlie the transportation of oil products. Despite the passage of OPA 90, these problems persist not only 

in foreign waters but also off the sensitive and productive coastlines of the United States. Accidents may always occur in naviga-
38 

tion, but accidents do not have to become disasters, and the number of accidents that occur can be reduced. 

In our testimony, we will present the controls and measures that 

should be implemented to eliminate the causes of spills and to minimize spills when they do occur. We will also summarize the findings of our report, "Safety at Bay," regarding the inadequate implementation of the Oil Pollution Act and will recommend how key 

provisions of OPA 90 should be promptly developed and implemented. 

First, it is important to understand the conditions of the world 

tanker fleet today. The world tanker fleet is aging. By 1996, 62 per- cent of the world's fleet will be 15 years old or older, including 

many of the world's largest oil tankers, and 27 percent will be 25 

years old or older. Older tankers run higher risks of structural deterioration and failure. 

A recent report that was issued by the Shell International Petroleum Company said that close to 20 percent of the world tanker 

fleet is substandard, and the U.S. Coast Guard has reported finding tankers entering U.S. waters with structural deficiencies, including paper-thin plating, excessive wastages, missing vents and 

hatches, soft patching in piping, and unsatisfactory repairs. 

In addition, the huge majority of oil tankers are single-hulled; 95 

percent of the tankers that come into U.S. waters are single-hulled, 

and even by the year 2000, 75 percent will still be single-hulled. 

Finally, the world tanker market is in a slump. There is a surplus of tankers available to carry oil products, and the result is 

stiff competition among tanker owners, with resulting pressure to 

cut costs to remain competitive. 

Given these facts about the world tanker fleet, it is vital that 

strong regulatory measures be in place to ensure that vessels navigate safely and that when an accident does occur the risks of a spill 

can be avoided, can be prevented, or reduced. 

Unfortunately, many key measures for preventing and minimizing spills are lacking worldwide and in the United States. For example, the significant risks posed by single-hulled vessels has not 

been addressed in this country or internationally. OPA 90 requires 

the Coast Guard to develop regulations for single-hulled vessels by 

August of 1991. These regulations have not even been proposed. 

We recommend that the Coast Guard promptly issue regulations 

requiring single-hulled vessels to utilize measures for reducing oil 

spills. These should include the use of tug escorts; advanced navigation aids like the GSD; prohibitions against carrying oil cargo in 

the wing tanks of the vessel, thereby creating, in effect, a double 

hull; increasing training requirements for crew; and increasing the 

number of crew required on board; and using rapid cargo transfer 

systems to move oil from a damaged tank to one that is intact. 

The expansion of vessel traffic services has also not occurred in 

this country as envisioned under OPA 90. Vessel traffic serviceVTS-systems monitor vessel traffic, alert vessels to potential hazards, and under OPA 90's statutory mandate even control traffic 

where necessary to avoid accidents. In ports where VTS operates, 

collision and grounding accidents have been averted and oil spills 

avoided. 
39 

OPA 90 mandated that a study be undertaken to determine 

which ports could benefit from a new or expanded vessel traffic 

service. The Coast Guard's Port Needs Study found that 11 ports 

clearly benefit from new or expanded VTS systems. However, other 

ports that we have identified as needing expanded or new VTS systems were put low on the priority list or even identified as not meriting expanded VTS. . I was told today by the Coast Guard that they are planning a 

5- to 7-year expansion of VTS but this plan hasn't been made available to Congress or to the public. We recommend that that plan be 

made available and that the schedule be expedited so that we don't 

have to wait 5 to 7 years to have expanded VTS in this country. 

Tug escorts are another important spill prevention measure that 

has yet to be adequately utilized. Tug escorts help tankers navigate 

and maneuver in difficult areas or under emergency circumstances 

like loss of engine power. This was recently illustrated by some 

near misses in Alaska, where engine failure or loss of steerage resulted in trouble for the tanker. 

OPA 90 mandated that tug escorts be required in Prince William 

Sound, Rosario Strait, and in Puget .Sound. In addition, the Coast 

Guard is required to designate additional areas that, because of environmental sensitivity or navigational hazards, should have tugescort requirements. 

However, the Coast Guard has only issued proposed rules for 

Prince William Sound, Rosario Strait, and Puget Sound, and has 

not yet even proposed any additional areas for tug-escort requirements. The rules it has proposed for Prince William Sound, Rosario 

Strait, and Puget Sound are inadequate to ensure that tug escorts 

will be helpful in preventing spills. For example, speed limits aren't 

set, and there is no requirement that a line be maintained between 

the towing vessel and the vessel being escorted. 

We recommend that the Coast Guard promptly designate additional areas where tug escorts are required, including areas that 

are difficult to navigate and environmentally sensitive, and that it 

promulgate strict requirements for tug escorts, including speed limits, development of tug-escort plans, and requiring to be connected. 

Tanker-free zones are another important spill-prevention measure. By preventing tankers from traveling in or near environmentally sensitive areas, the risks of spills in these areas can be 

reduced to zero. For example, there currently exists a voluntary 

agreement among oil shipping companies that bring oil down from 

Alaska to the Lower 48 by which tankers will stay 50 miles off the 

coasts of Canada, Washington, Oregon, and California. That is a 

voluntary agreement. In addition, there is an area that the International Maritime Organization has designated off the Florida 

Keys which restricts tanker traffic. 

OPA 90 required the Coast Guard to study areas of navigable 

waters and the exclusive economic zone that should be designated 

as zones where the movement of tankers should be limited or restricted. This is a crucial study that we believe has not received the 

priority it deserves. According to OPA 90, the study was to have 

been completed by August of 1992. However, we understand that 

it may not be completed until 1995. We recommend that the Coast 

Guard study be completed expeditiously and that tanker-free zones 
40 

be designated sufficiently far enough offshore to protect sensitive 

coastlines of the United States. The Coast Guard should also aggressively pressure the IMO for approval of such designations. 

In addition to improving spill prevention in this country, we have 

to improve how we plan for oil spills. Thorough pre-spill planning 

is essential to ensure that the most effective response possible to 

oil spills is mounted. OPA 90 requires owners and operators of vessels and facilities that handle oil to develop response plans and to 

enter into binding contracts for spill response equipment. 

The Coast Guard has developed an interim final rule on vessel 

response plans, and EPA has developed proposed rules but not yet 

any binding regulations on facility response plans. The guidance 

that was provided by the Coast Guard and basically copied by EPA 

is comprehensive with respect to plan format and content. However, the limits on the amount of equipment that must be contracted for are set at levels too low to ensure that enough equipment will actually be available to control and clean up the oil if 

there is a worst-case spill. 

In addition, the salvage requirements that are set for vessels are 

much too general to ensure that salvage capability is quickly available in the event of a grounding, collision, or engine failure. It is 

also not clear whether the pre-rigged towing package-whereby the 

vessel is able to initiate a tow to a tug instead of a tug having to 

throw a line up to a vessel, which can be difficult in bad weatherit is not clear whether that will be required on tankers. Rapid salvage response and perhaps the pre-rigged towing package could 

have possibly prevented the Bra,er's engine failure from turning 

into a disaster for the Shetland Islands. 

In short, under the proposed facility and vessel response regulations, facilities and vessels will not be prepared to control and 

clean up the worst-case spills as required under OPA 90. We recommend that the Coast Guard and EPA quickly finalize their response plan regulations and, in doing so, increase the amount o1 

equipment that must be contracted for by vessel and facility owners and operators. In addition, the Coast Guard should develop specific requirements for pre-rigged towing packages and salvage capa- bilities for vessels. 

The OPA 90 also requires contingency planning by the government on the local and national levels. The area and national contingency plans were to be finished by August of 1991. The area contingency plans are slowly being finalized by the Coast Guard, bu1 

the national contingency plan is far from complete by EPA. We rec- ommend that the Coast Guard require development of the area 

contingency plans as soon as possible in time for incorporation intc 

vessel and facility plans and that the U.S. EPA issue their revised 

national contingency plan before August 1993, again, in time for incorporation into vessel and facility planning efforts. 

In conclusion, OPA 90, passed unanimously by Congress, was B 

promise that spill prevention and response would dramatically improve. Unfortunately, more than three-and-a-half years after thE 

Exxon Valdez and more than 2 years since passage of OPA 90, ke) 

prevention and response measures still have not been implementec 

and others have been watered down. 
41 

If the recommendations made in our testimony were implemented, we believe that much of the promise of OPA 90 would be 

fulfilled and that the transport and transfer of oil would finally be 

made safer, reducing the risk of oil spill disasters and setting a 

model for other nations currently struggling with the issues of oil 

spill prevention and response. 

Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Sankovitch follows:] 
42 

TESTIMONY OF 

Natural &sourrt!S 

Defense Council 

~WolUJth Slrut 

Nr.c YM ,'hr,,, YIWC ' ""ll lIJ 727•l700 

Fu !12 727- 1773 

THE NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 

BEFORE 

THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

ON 

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 

February 4, 1993 

IJSiJ Nao Yori- At-t .. XW. Waslri111Jflffl. DC 2.0()IJS 

u,z ;s;-,soo Fu l~l ;sJ-Hl 7 

S.11 71 --fnufCUa,, CA '1-i l'15 

, u m-111.ZJJ 

far "'15 -''15-3~ 

Prepared By: 

Nina Sankovitch, Esq. 

61 i 5oMllt Olio, Strut 

Ln A•tdo. CA 90014 

l IJ :!9l-15v0 

Fu !11 619-S!S~ 

Sanh Chasis, Esq. 

NRDC 

21.z Mtr'CMnt St .. 5,.;1, .!.c.,; 

H.:,,.•fi./11. H.wi'i 9c8ll 

&JS SH- 1075 

f.az i .. ,f. 5! 1-C'~JI 
43 

Good morning, Mr. Chainnan and members of the Subcommittee. The Natural Resources 

Defense Council (NRDC) greatly appreciates this opponunity to offer testimony on the 

implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. NRDC has worked on the issue of oil 

pollution for two decades and released in December of 1992 a report entitled Safety at Bay, 

in which we reviewed the starus of oil spill prevention and response in the United States and 

implementation of the Oil Pollution Act 

L L'lTRODUCTION 

The recent tanker spills of disastrous proportions - the 23 million gallons spilled from the 

Aegean Sea off the coast of Spain, the 24 million gallons spilled from the Braer off the 

Shetland Islands in Scotland, and the potential 84 million gallon spill from the Maersk 

Navigator off the coast of Indonesia - have underscored the fundamental problems which 

underlie the transportation of oil products. Despite the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 

1990, these problems persist not only in foreign waters, but also off the sensitive and 

productive coastlines of the United States, placing fisheries, shorelines, and the public health 

at risk. 

Accidents may always occur in navigation but accidents do not have to become disasters, and 

the number of accidents that occur can be reduced. Sound, proven oil spill prevention and 

minimization measures are available to make oil transportation safer but they have not been 

implemented. It is rime to take action to ensure that these measures are implement:d, and 

that our nation's coastlines and natural resources are protected from the potentially 

devastating impacts of oil spills. 

In our testimony, NRDC will present the controls and measures that should be implemented 

to eliminate the causes of spills or to minimize the impacts of spills when they do occur. We 

will summarize the findings of our report Safety At Bay regarding the inadequate 

implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and recommend how key provisions of that 

Act should be promptly deve!op.:d and implemented. 

But first it is important to understand the conditions of the world tanker fleet today. The 

world tanker fleet is aging: by 1996, 62 percent of the world fleet will be IS years or older 

(including many of the largest oil tankers) and 27 percent will be 25 years or older. Older 

tankers run higher risks of structural deterioration and potential failure. A recent Shell 

International Petroleum Company report (referenced in a January 27, 1993 New York Times 

article) said that more than half of the world's 3,200 or so oceangoing tankers are more than 

IS years old and close to 20 percent of the world tanker fleet is substandard. According to 

Admiral J. Kime, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, in a speech he gave in September 

1992, tankers currently entering United States waters have been found with structural 

deficiencies, including "paper-thin plating, excessive wastage, missing vents and hatches, soft 

patches in piping and unsatisfactory repairs." · 

1 
44 

The huge majority of oil tankers arc single-hulled: 95 pcn:cnt of the tankers coming into U.S. 

waters arc currently single-hulled and even by the year 2000, it is estimated that 75 pcn:cnt of 

the tankers entering U.S. waters will still be single-hulled. 

And finally, the world tanker market is in a slump, with a surplus of tankers available to 

carry oil products. The result is stiff competition among the tanker owners, with resulting 

pressure to cut costs to remain competitive. 

Given these facts about the world tanker fleet, it is vital that strong regulatory measures be in 

place to ensure that these vessels navigate safely and that when an accident does occur, the 

risks of a spill can be prevented or reduced. Unforrunately, many key measures for 

preventing and minimizing spills are lacking worldwide and in the United States. 

II. MEASURES FOR PREVENTING Ai"IID l\llINIMIZING OIL SPILLS 

The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) mandates that measurable and enforceable actions be undertaken 

by any vessel traveling in U.S. waters, by oil transfer and storage facilities, and by the 

government, to reduce the risks posed by spills. NRDC has found that many of the 

regulations necessary to translate these mandates into action have been delayed and others are 

being implemented in a manner inconsistent with the Act itself. Moreover, the Act ignores a 

number of important issues of spill prevention. 

A. Preventing Oil Spills 

I. Double Hulls 

Double hulls are one of the most effective means of preventing oil spills. The Coast Guard 

recently confirmed this in its repon to Congress entitled "Alternatives to Double Hull Tank 

Vessel Design" (December 1992). The repon found no design as effective as the double hull 

for the prevention of oil spills due to groundings, the most prevalent type of casualty in U.S. 

waters. It also found that four recent spills from tanker groundings in the U.S. would have 

been avoided if the vessels had had double hulls. (The World Prodigy spill off Rhode Island 

in 1989, the Presidente Rivera spill in the Delaware Bay in 1989, the American Trader spill 

off California in 1990, and the B.T. Nautilus in New York Harbor in 1990.) In light of these 

findings, we think that Congress should consider speeding up the lengthy timetable set in 

OPA for phasing in double-hulled tankers (through 2015). 

Despite recognition of the imponancc of double-hull protection, recent Coast Guard 

regulations have seriously compromised the efficacy of the double hull requirement The 

Coast Guard's interim final rule on double hulls, issued in August 1992, requires inadequate 

inter-hull. spacing for double hull construction on tankers and barges, fails to provide muchneeded guidance on hull strength and corrosion protection, and does not require protection of 

bunker fuel tanks. 

We recommend that the Coast Guard revise its interim final rule to require inter-hull spacing 

equivalent to the breadth of the vessel divided by 15 or 2 meters, whichever is greater, as has 

2 
45 

been recommended by expens, plus increase standards for hull strength and corrosion 

protection. We also recommend that the phase-in schedule for double-hulled tankers be 

accelerated. 

2. Single Hulls 

Given the current long phase-in period (through 2015) for full implementation of the double 

hull requirements, Congress required the Coast Guard to develop, by August 1991, interim 

operating and structural measures for single-hulled vessels that would reduce the risks posed 

by these vessels. The Coast Guard has yet to release even a proposed rule mandating interim 

measures. The result is that marine and coastal environments are still exposed to the risks of 

thinly-hulled vessels carrying millions of gallons of oil, without additional protections. We 

recommend that the Coast Guard promptly issue regulations requiring single-hulled vessels to 

utilize measures for reducing oil spill risks. These should include tug escons, compliance 

with vessel traffic control systems, advanced navigation aids, wing tank cargo restrictions, and 

tank level monitoring devices. 

3. Vessel Traffic Services 

Vessel Traffic Service. (VTS) systems monitor vessel traffic, alen vessels to potential hazards, 

and even control traffic where necessary to avoid accidents. In pons where VTSs operate, 

collision and grounding accidents have been avened and oil spills avoided. OPA mandated 

that a study be undertaken to determine which pons could benefit from a new or expanded 

Vessel Traffic Service. The Coast Guard's Port Needs Study found that eleven U.S. pons 

would clearly benefit from new or expanded VTS systems. However, the Coast Guard has 

made no specific recommendation to Congress to implement these findings. Moreover, there 

appears to be a serious question as to whether the repon properly concludes that certain areas 

do not need a new or expanded VTS system. For example, the Pon Needs Study concluded 

that there was no benefit from expanding VTS coverage in San Francisco Bay. However, the 

state of California, the local Coast Guard and NRDC all have supported expansion of VTS 

coverage in San Francisco Bay. 

We recommend that the Coast Guard seek funding to implement and expand VTS systems in 

areas where such systems could substantially_ reduce the risks of ciil spill damage to 

environmentally sensitive marine and coastal environments and that Congress act on their 

recommendations. 

4. Tug Es_corts for Tankers 

Tug escons help tankers navigate and maneuver in difficult areas or under emergency 

circumstances. This was recently illustrated by one near miss in the Valdez Narrows which 

could have resulted in a disastrous spill had the tanker not had a tug escort. 

OPA mandated that tug escons be required in Prince William Sound and in Puget Sound; in 

addition, the Coast Guard is to designate other areas that, because of environmental sensitivity 

or navigational hazards, should have tug escort requirements. However, the Coast Guard has 

only issued proposed rules for Prince William Sound and Puget Sound and has not yet 

3 
46 

proposed any additional areas for tug escort requirements. Furthel1ll0re, the rules it has 

proposed for Prince William Sound and Puget Sound are inadequate to ensure that tug escorts 

will be helpful in preventing spills. The result is that the oil spill risks associated with loss of 

tanker engine failure, congested traffic conditions, and narrow and difficult passages, persist. 

We recommend that the Coast Guard promptly designate additional areas where tug escorts 

are required, including areas that are difficult to navigate and environmentally sensitive, and 

that it promulgate strict requirements for tug escorts, including speed limits and development 

of tug escort plans. 

5. Tanker-Free Zones 

Government control of tanker traffic can also be effectively implemented through the use of 

tanker-free zones. By preventing tankers from traveling in or near environmentally sensitive 

areas, the risks of spills in these areas can be reduced. For example, there currently exists a 

voluntary agreement among the oil shipping companies by which tankers bringing Alaskan 

crude oil to California will remain fifty nautical miles off the coast until approach to port. 

There is also an IMO-approved area to be avoided which restricts tanker traffic off the 

Florida Keys. 

The Oil Pollution Act required the Coast Guard to study areas of navigable waters and the 

exclusive economic zone that should be designated as zones where the movement of tankers 

should be limited or restricted. The Coast Guard is currently focusing on ten areas for 

possible tanker exclusion zones: Montauk (Long Island), Santa Barbara, and along the coasts 

of Washington, Oregon, California, the Eastern Gulf of Mexico, and sections of the Atlantic 

coastline. 

This is a crucial study that has not received the priority it deserves. We understand it may 

not be completed until 1995. We recommend that the Coast Guard study be completed 

expeditiously and that tanker-free zones be designated sufficiently far enough offshore to 

protect sensitive coastlines of the United States. The Coast Guard should also aggressively 

pressure IMO for approval for such designations. 

B. Planning for Oil Spills 

I. Vessel and Facility Response Plans 

Thorough pre-spill planning is essential to ensure the most effective response possible to oil 

spills. OPA requires owners and operators of vessels and facilities that handle oil to develop 

response plans and enter into binding contracts for spill response equipment. The Coast 

Guard has developed proposed rules-but not binding regulations-on vessel response plans 

and EPA has developed proposed rules-but not binding regulations on facility response plans. 

The guidance is comprehensive with respect to plan format and content; however, the limits 

on equipment that must be contracted for are set at levels much too low to ensure that enough 

equipment to control and clean up the oil will be available in the event of a worst-case spill. 

In addition, the salvage requirements for vessels are much too general to ensure that salvage 

capability is quickly available in the event of a grounding, collision, or engine failure. Rapid 

4 
47 

salvage response might have prevented the Braer's engine failure from ruming into a disaster 

for the Shetland Islands. 

In shon, under the proposed facility and vessel response regulations, facilities and vessels will 

not be prepared to control and clean up a worst case spill. We recommend that the Coast 

Guard and EPA quickly finalize their response plan regulations and in doing so, increase the 

amount of equipment that must be contracted for by vessel and facility owners/operators. In 

addition, the Coast Guard should develop specific requirements for salvage capabilities for 

vessels. 

2. National and Area Contincency Plaas 

OPA requires contingency plannin& by the government on the local and national levels. 

However, the Area and National Contingency Plans, which were to be finished by August 

1991 , are far from being finalized; in some pons, development of the Area Plan has not even 

begun. The result is that governmental planning for oil spills has not improved very much 

since the Exxon Valdez spill over three years ago. We recommend that the Coast Guard 

require development of the Area Contingency Plans its Area Committees as soon as possible, 

but no later than August 1993, in time for incorporation into vessel and facility plans. The 

United States EPA, responsible for revision of the National Contingency Plan, should issue 

the revised plan before August I 993, again in time for incorporation into vessel and facility 

planning efforts. 

C. Paying for Oil Spills 

1. Natural Resources Damage Assessment 

The full costs of an oil spill include damages to natural resources, such as loss of wildlife. 

Any assessment of such damages must take into account all values associated with the 

impacted resources. OPA required the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) to develop regulations for assessment of natural resource damages by August 18, 

1992. However, NOAA has only issued limited proposed rules for damage assessment. Now 

that a panel of expert economists, including two nobel laureates, convened by NOAA has 

endorsed the use of contingent valuation (subject to strict guidelines) as a valid means of 

assessing natural resource damages, NOAA should move to complete its rulemaking. 

We recommend that NOAA move quickly to adopt regulations that support use of contingent 

valuation, as recommended by the panel of experts. 

D. Loopholes In the OU Pollution Act 

Important measures that can be taken to prevent oil spills were virtually ignored in the Oil 

Pollution Act. One of the most important is pilotage. 

Pilots are responsible for the safe navigation of vessels. OPA ignores significant issues of 

pilotage, including distinctions between state and federal pilots, which allow for different 

standards and oversight of pilots and varied enforcement of pilotage requirements; the need 

for pilots 10 be independent (not employed by the vessel owner); the exemption of certain oil5 
48 

carrying vessels from pilotagc requirements; and the need for different requirements for pilots 

depending on the size of the vessel. The result is that pilotage continues to be underregulated, leading to serious risks of spills due to pilot error. We recommend that a 

comprehensive scheme be adopted by Congress to ensure that pilots arc competent and 

prepared for the vessels and routes that they pilot 

ill. CONCLUSION 

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, passed unanimously by Congress, was a promise that spill 

prevention and response would dramatically improve. Unfonunately, nearly four years after 

the Exxon Valdez and more than two years since passage of OPA, key prevention and 

response measures still have not been implemented and others have been watered down. In 

addition, important issues like pilotage were not adequately addressed in the Act 

If the recommendations made in our testimony could be implemented, we believe that much 

of the promise of the Oil Pollution Act would be fulfilled and that the transport and transfer 

of oil would finally be made safer, reducing the risks of oil spill disasters, and setting a 

model for other nations currently struggling with the issues of oil spill prevention and 

response. 

6 
I. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

49 

DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF OPA'S OD... SPD...L PREVENTION 

AND RESPONSE PROVISIONS 

PROVISION: SCHEDULED ACTION: STATUS: 

Interim Measures for Final Regulations by No regulations have been 

Single-Hulled Vessels August 18, 1991 proposed 

Vessel Traffic Service Submission of study to Srudy has been completed but 

Study Congress with the Coast Guard docs not 

recommendations for intend to submit 

implementation by August 18, recommendations with the 

1991 report to Congress 

Tug Escort Initiate issuance of regulations Issuance of regulations 

Requirements for by February 1991 initiated in July 1992 

Prince William Sound 

and Puget Sound 

Designation of Initiate designation of areas by No areas have been proposed 

Additional Areas February 1991 for designation 

where Tug Escorts are 

Required 

Regulations on Vessel Final Regulations by August Proposed Regulations issued 

Response Plans 18, 1992 in June 1992; Guidance 

Document issued in September 

1992 

Regulations on Facility Final Regulations by August Coast Guard issued Guidance 

Response Plans 18, 1992 Document for Coastal 

Facilities in September 1992; 

EPA issued Proposed 

Regulations for inland 

facilities in October 1991 

National Contingency Revision of NCP issued by Revision of NCP has not been 

Plan A~ 18, 1991 completed 

Arca Contingency ACPs to be completed by No ACPs have been 

Plans February 1992 completed 

Natural Resource Final Regulations issued by Proposed Regulations were 

Damage Assessment August 18, 1992 issued in March 1992 but not 

for all assessment 

requirements under OP A 

7 

.. 
Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Ms. Chasis. 

50 

Ms. CHASIS. I'll wait and help answer questions, if I can. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Sterling, welcome to the committee. We look forward to your 

testimony, and it will be put in the record in its entirety. You may 

proceed as you desire. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT STERLING 

Mr. STERLING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

My name is Scott Sterling. I represent the city of Cordova, Alaska, on the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council, and I currently serve as the Council's board president. With me 

is Mr. Tex Edwards, who represents the city of Homer, Alaska, on 

the RCAC board and also chairs our Port Operations and Vessel 

Traffic System Committee. 

We are here today because one of the most important lessons of 

the Exxon Valdez oil spill was that the oil industry can learn much 

from the people who live and work in the areas at risk, the people 

with the most to lose from that risk. 

RCAC's eighteen member organizations are the communities and 

boroughs impacted by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill as well as 

Alaska Native, recreation, tourism, and environmental groups. Our 

policy decisions are made by the 19-member board of directors, and 

they are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of those member 

entities. Our work is guided by our contract with Alyeska Pipeline 

Service Company and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Although the 

RCAC was organized before the passage of OPA 90, we are certified 

by the President as an alternative council that meets the intent of 

that law. 

I wish to thank the committee for inviting us today especially to 

talk about the wreck of the tanker Bawr in Shetland in January 

of this year and what lessons we believe can be brought to bear for 

our situation in Alaska and, indeed, for the coastlines around our 

country. . Every major oil spill is an opportunity to gain knowledge for use 

at home, and for that reason RCAC sent a team of three of us to 

the Shetland Islands shortly after the Braer incident began on January 5. Our purpose was to carry home whatever lessons we could 

gather about the events leading up to it, the causes, the response, 

and the outcomes. 

What does the Braer tell us about our own gaps in spill prevention and vulnerabilities we might not have been aware of before? 

Are there practices or systems that we can learn from to improve 

our own environmental safety? 

As with the Exxon Valdez, the full implications of the Braer will 

play out over time, but a few important items are clear. First, we 

must-emphasize must-have a system on an international basis 

for monitoring tankers and providing aid and assistance to tankers 

in distress. It was gratifying to hear you, sir, talk knowledgeably 

about the need for that and the technology that is in place today 

that can be utilized. 

Second, we need to ask ourselves whether we are vulnerable to 

the same scenario in Alaska as the result of the Braer breakup. We 
51 

believe the answer is clearly yes. Many of us believe that the sequence of events involving the Braer-that is, bad weather, loss of 

power, and then a tanker on the rocks-can very likely.account for 

the next big oil spill in the waters of Alaska. 

Because of the Braer grounding, we are informed that the Coast 

Guard in Valdez is evaluating the safety of the tankers as they 

transit through Hinchinbrook Entrance between the Gulf of Alaska 

and Prince William Sound. The conditions at that point rival those 

of Shetland for some of the worst weather in the world. 

At present, an assist tug and a so-called ERV, or escort response 

vessel, accompany loaded tankers from the Valdez Marine Terminal to Seal Rocks, which are right outside Hinchinbrook Entrance. There are safety limits for those escort vessels. They don't escort 

in sustained winds over 40 knots. When the weather gets rough, 

escort vessels may be forced to hang back in the Sound or even 

head back to the terminal, leaving the tanker to sail alone in precisely the conditions they probably shouldn't be exposed to in the 

first place. This doesn't happen all the time, but it does occur. 

So why do tankers leave the terminal at all if the weather is 

bad? The answer is that the tankers don't often know what the 

conditions will be until they get out into the Sound. There aren't 

enough weather reporting stations to monitor conditions, and I 

would like to underscore that this is one of the positions and problems that should be looked at very carefully by the Congress in trying to help us increase our margin of safety in Prince William 

Sound. 

The truth of the matter is that the technology for weather reporting buoys exists, and in fact, in the immediate aftermath of Exxon 

Valdez NOAA blanketed the Sound with reporting stations, but 

then NOAA took those stations away. We have investigated at the RCAC weather buoys and weather 

reporting technology, and it all exists, it is all on the market, and 

it is all available. The question is one of funding, and to that we 

must look to the Congress and to industry to help provide the 

funds necessary to increase our protection. 

One of the facts about the spill in Shetland was that the violence 

of the weather had a silver lining in that it dispersed much of the 

oil into the water column. That isn't to say that the water column 

was saved from injury or that life in the immediate marine environment escaped harm, but we saw nothing like we saw in Prince 

William Sound in the spring and summer of 1989. The Norwegian Gullfax crude spilled by the Braer acts nothing 

like the heavy, sticky, North Slope crude that is transported in the 

TAPS trade. Gullfax crude is light, easily dispersed, and doesn't adhere to every surface, and that is very different from North Slope 

crude. 

While t_he weather may have mitigated shoreline damage in 

Shetland, we also think it is important to note that the weather 

made salvage and lightering impossible. I'm sure Mr. Green and 

numerous other people who were involved directly in the response 

in Shetland could tell everyone that the level of frustration of not 

being able to do anything was high, because salvage and lightering 

are two tools in the toolbox for oil spills that you want to have 
52 

available and use whenever you can, and unfortunately they 

couldn't. 

Among the salient points regarding the management of the spill 

response, we made the following observations. Number one, the 

Shetland Islands Council appeared to react swiftly and authoritatively to the crisis. Number two, the joint response effort clearly 

and publicly included salvage personnel and representatives of the 

P and I club insurers in the response management. Number three, 

the Joint Response Committee appeared, at least externally, to 

speak with one coherent and coordinated voice. Number four, the 

Joint Response Committee succeeded in providing timely and accurate information to the press and the public without sensationalizing events, and the press appeared to respond positively to that approach. Number five, overall we had the impression that the government closest to the people with the most to lose played a very 

strong and active role in dealing with the situation. 

You will note that these observations come from people whose 

basis of comparison was the handling of the Exxon Valdez spill, 

and with that comparison in mind we would now like to move to 

talk to OPA 90 and certain provisions that we think, with regard 

to implementation, we should address. 

We believe the Braer and, for that matter, the Aegean Sea and 

the Maersk, point out how important it is that OPA 90 be implemented at a much faster pace. We echo the Natural Resources Defense Council in its call for a more aggressive approach to implementing and enforcing OPA 90. It seems to us that the Coast 

Guard requires more staff, more qualified assistance, and maritime 

consultants, along with appropriate funding, to accomplish that 

goal. 

Section 4111 of OPA 90 requires that the Coast Guard assess 

tanker navigation safety standards and look at, among other 

things, the potential use of electronic vessel tracking systems and 

the need to limit or prohibit movement of tankers in certain areas. 

As Nina pointed out in her testimony, the Coast Guard has estimated the report will not be submitted until early 1995. We, too, 

believe that this work should be put on the front burner. We need 

to identify critical areas, set up the vessel traffic systems, and, 

where appropriate, prohibit tanker traffic altogether. We can't accomplish any of that work unless we start expediting the basic research and acquire the knowledge to make good decisions. 

We strongly urge the Congress to help the Coast Guard focus 

more of its resources into marine safety and protecting the marine 

environment. I would like to emphasize, however, that RCAC's direct experience with the Coast Guard has been very positive. Coast 

Guard officials seek our comments and give our input due and serious consideration. We have worked together cooperatively and instructively. We believe that relationship between RCAC and the 

Coast Guard has lived up to the expectations of OPA 90. 

With regard to Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska in 

particular, the situation right now is much better in terms of response equipment and resources than it was in 1989 and presently 

compares quite favorably with other ports. For example, Alyeska 

Pipeline Service Company's drill activities meet or exceed both 
53 

Alaska and Federal requirements. Major, all-systems drills are 

being conducted twice a year. 

In 1992, Alyeska had nine drills at the Valdez terminal, including two that were surprise exercises. Smaller equipment exercises 

are held much more frequently, often on a weekly basis, and these 

drills are held with a full-time RCAC monitor and participation by 

RCAC citizen volunteers and staff in order to establish our role in 

the actual response to the next oil spill. The drills enable response personnel to become knowledgeable 

and proficient in the strengths and weaknesses of equipment and 

procedures, and we continue to support drilling on a very active 

and frequent basis as much as government and industry can possibly do. 

If there is another Exxon Valdez-and I like to use the word "if," 

but I must say that most of us always just say "when we have our 

next spill," rather than if-we should be in much better shape to 

respond and mitigate the damages. 

Another note of progress in Prince William Sound is that in 1992 

Alyeska publicly committed to build a dedicated emergency response operations center in Valdez as part of its settlement with 

the State of Alaska of claims resulting from that disaster. But 

while the response capability in the Sound is much better than before, there are still significant gaps, and I will speak more about 

those in just a minute. 

We would like to make the following point. People have a tendency to assume that OPA 90 is more comprehensive than it is. The 

Prince William Sound RCAC has major concerns about the adequacy of oil spill response capabilities outside Prince William 

Sound but within what we now call the Exxon Valdez impact area, 

and as most people know, that area extends for over 2,000 miles 

of Alaska coastline. 

Kodiak Island was hit very hard by the oil from the Exxon 

Valdez, yet Kodiak and the other areas in the Gulf of Alaska and 

our sister communities along the coastline have nowhere near the 

level of response resources in place that we have in Prince William 

Sound. The question of responsibility for cleaning up a spill, especially after the first 72 hours, continues to be a serious concern for 

us. Alyeska has taken the position that they are merely a response 

action contractor obligated by their contracts with tanker owners 

and operators to manage only the initial response. On the other side of the coin, Alyeska has _begun efforts, especially in Kodiak, to establish a community response center there, 

and under Alaska State law we are required to set up local emergency response depots and trained cadres of volunteers in oil spill 

response. We are very frustrated with the State of Alaska, at the 

slow pace of implementing that law, but that is not particularly a 

federal concern. 

Another separate area of concern for us is towing, and this relates back to the questions posed by the Brper in terms of the ability of tugs to tow a tanker in distress. Crude oil tankers leaving 

Valdez carry the so-called Prince William Sound emergency towing 

package. One problem is that there is a tremendous disparity in 

how that package is installed and used by different owners on different vessels. 
54 

The towing equipment is buried on some tankers such that it 

could take a crew of 8 up to 4 hours to deploy it if they still have 

power to use the winches. Lacking power, it could take the crew 

2 days to deploy it, and even in the best case it can take 8 people 

45 minutes to deploy, and even that is not good enough. Arco and 

Exxon have towing packages that can be deployed by 2 people in 

15 minutes. 

We don't know for sure, but it is questionable whether even the 

Arco or Exxon regime would have done the Braer any good. Even 

if the Braer had the package and the Star Sirius, let's say, pulled 

up, as she did, without the crew and captain on board, it wouldn't 

have mattered anyway. However, we are informed and are making inquiries into the fact 

that the Norwegian Government and industry, the State oil company in Norway, are experimenting with a towing package system 

that self-deploys, and we intend to look further into that _to see 

whether it might have some applicability in the TAPS trade. We have a very critical navigation situation in Valdez Narrows 

because the Narrows is a passage that, at its narrowest point, provides only .5 nautical miles of navigable water. A towing package 

would not be of much use in the Narrows because a tanker can go 

on the rocks in well under 15 minutes. The only chance of preventing such happenstance is that if an escorting tug could push the 

tanker away from the grounding. It is not clear to us that escort 

tugs and ERVs now being used in the Narrows are capable of doing 

the job. 

In conclusion, we would like to emphasize our view that we can 

no longer treat our oceans like garbage dumps capable of taking 

prolonged abuse and neglect. The United States has been the leader, and should continue to be the leader, in correcting the imbalance between commercial enterprise and energy needs on one hand 

and stewardship of our environment on the other. Prince William 

Sound RCAC urges the Congress to heed the lessons to date of the 

Braer spill. We need an international system to monitor tankers in 

the system in distress, and we need faster implementation of OPA 

90. 

In our area, weather reporting stations in Prince William Sound 

would be a major boost to accident prevention. We need to further 

address boosting response capabilities in the path of the Exxon 

Valdez outside Prince William Sound, and we are striving and wish 

to work with industry and government to answer outstanding questions about escort and towing capabilities. 

Thank you very much for this opportunity to speak, and we will 

try and answer any questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Sterling follows:] 
55 

-~-

Regional Citiftnl• Advilory Council i &01 West Firth Avenue, Suite 500 AnchofaRe, Al.uka 99501-22;-I 1 190712ii-7222 l FA.X !907) 277- 4523 

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Overs1&ht and Investigations. 

Backp,and 

House Committee on Natural Resources 

by Scott Sterltnc. President 

Prince William Sound Regional Clttzens· Advisory Council 

February4. 1993 

My name Is Scott Sterling. I represent the City of Cordova on the Prince William 

Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council and currently serve as the councll"s board 

president. With me are Rick Steiner of Cordova. who recently returned from the 

Shetlands. and Tex Edwards of Homer. who also sits on the RCAC Board of Directors. 

One of the most Important lessons of the Exxon Valdez on splll was that the oil 

Industry can learn much from the people who live and work In the areas of risk - the 

very people With the most to lose from that risk. 

The Prince William Sound Regional Citizens· Advisory Counc!I - RCAC - Is a 

national experiment In providing cltl1.er.s With a voice In corporate decisions that 

arrect them and their communities. At Its core. the RCAC Is citizens promoting 

environmentally safe operations of the· Alyeska terminal and the tankers that transit 

Prince William Sound. 

It does so by monitoring the environmental Impacts of terminal and tanker 

operallons and by advising Alyeska. other Industry groups and regulatory agencies on 

permits. regulations. slte-specl0c standards. practices and oil splll prevention and 

response. 

The work of the RCAC Is guided by Its contract With Alyeska Pipeline Service 

Company and the OU Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). Although the RCAC was organized 

before passage of OPA 90. It Is certl0ed as an alternative council that meets the Intent or 

Sec. 5002 of OPA 90. 

RCAC ceslimony page I 
56 

Structure 

RCAC's 18 member organizations arc communities and boroughs Impacted by 

the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil sptll, as well as Native. recreation. tourism and 

environmental groups. Policy decisions arc made by the 19-mcmber Board of Directors. 

Directors arc appointed by. and serve al the pleasure of the member organtzallons they 

represent. 

Much of the work of RCAC Is done by citizen committees composed of volunteers 

with Interest. experience and background tn specific fields. Each committee has at least 

one member or the Board of Directors. 

The committees are organized around specific technical fields. such as oil spill 

prevention and response. terminal operatlons-envtronmcntal monitoring. The 

committees work for the council. with assistance from staff provided by the council. 

Shetland Jnddent 

Every major oil sptll Is an opportunity lo gain valuable knowledge for use at 

home. For that reason. RCAC sent three or us to the Shetland Islands shortly after the 

Bracr Incident began Jan. 5. Our purpose was to carry home whatever lessons we could 

gather, about the events Jeadtng up to It. causes, response and outcome of the Braer. 

What docs the Braer tell us about our own gaps In spill prevention. and 

vulnerabilllles we might not have been aware of before? Arc there practices or systems 

that we can learn from to Improve our own environmental safety? 

Just as with the Exxon Valdez oil spill. the full tmpllcallons of the Braer sptll 

will piny out over lime. But a few Important Items have emerged. 

First. we must have systems on an International basts for monitoring tankers 

and providing aid and assistance to tankers In distress. 

Secondly, we need to ask ourselves whether we are vulnerable to the same 

scenario that resulted In the Braer break-up. In Alaska, the answer Is clearly yes. Many 

of us believe that sequence of events - bad weather. loss of power. tanker on the rocks -

will account for the next big oil spill there. 

Because of the Braer grounding. the Coast Guard tn Valdez Is evaluating the 

safety of tankers In Hlnchlnbrook Entrance. the gateway to Prince William Sound from 

the Gulf of Alaska. Conditions there rival the Shetlands for some of the worst weather 

In the world. 

An assist tug and a so-called ERV. escort response vessel. accompany loaded 

tankers from the Valdez Marine Terminal to Seal Rocks. right outside Htnchtnbrook 

RCAC testimony page 2 
57 

Entrance. There arc safely limits for those escort vessels: they don'l escort In sustained 

winds over 40 knots. 

When the weather gels rough. escort vessels may be forced lo hang back In the 

Sound pr even head back lo the lermtnal, leaving the lanker lo sail alone In precisely 

the condtllons they probably shouldn't be exposed lo In the first place. This doesn't 

happen all the Umc, bul tl docs happen. 

So why do they leave the lermtnal al all If the weather ts that bad? 

Because they don't know whal the conditions arc unUI they gel there. There 

aren't enough weather reporting stations lo monitor conditions. The technology ts 

there: In facl, In lhe aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill, NOAA blanketed the Sound 

wtth reporting staltons. Bul they took them back out again. 

RCAC has done some tnvcsugaung tnlo weather buoys. bul It's a money Issue: 

something you In lhts room can tnnuence. 

The fact that the violence of the weather In the Shellands had a silver lining - tn 

that tl dispersed much of the oil tnlo lhe waler column - should nol be taken as comfort 

Lo us. The Norwegian Gullfaks crude sptlled by the Braer acts nothing like the heavy, 

sUckY North Slope crude. Gullfaks crude ts light. easily dispersed and doesn't adhere to 

every surface. Very different stuff from what came out of the Exxon Valdez. And while 

the weather may have millgaled shoreline damage In the Shellands. It was the weather 

that made salvage and lightering Impossible. 

Among the salient points regarding the management of the sptll response, we 

offer the following observations: 

• The Shelland Island Council appeared lo react swtflly and authorltauvcly lo 

lhc crisis. 

• The Joint response effort clearly and publicly Included salvors and P and I club 

representallves In the response management. 

• The Joint response committee appeared, al least externally, to speak with one 

coherent and coordinated voice. 

• The Joint response center succeeded In Pt?Vidtng Umcly and accurate 

tnformallon lo the press and the public without sensallonaltztng events: the press 

appeared lo respond positively. 

• Overall. we had the Impression that the government closest to lhe people wtlh 

the most to lose played a very strong and acUvc role. 

RCAC testimony page 3 
58 

OPA 90 /Tanker Na'l'iptlcm Safety Report 

The Braer tnctdent points up how Important It Is that OPA 90 be implemented al 

a much faster pace. We do echo the Natural Resoun:cs Defense Council In tts call for a 

more aggressive approach lo tmplemenung and enforcing OPA 90. 

A study on tanker navigation safety standards, required under Scclton 4111. Is 

supposed to assess, among other things. the potenUal use of elcctronle vessel tracking 

systems and the need to ltmtt or prohibit movement of tankers tn certain areas. 

Currently, the Coast Guard estimates the report will be submitted tn early 1995. 

This work must be put on the front burner. The Coast Guard should bring reltrcd 

mariners Into the OPA 90 stafT and get this work done. We need to tdenUfy crltleal 

areas. set up vessel tracking systems and tn some cases, prohibit tanker tralTtc 

altogether. We strongly urge you lo help the Coast Guard focus more of tts resources Into 

marine safety and protccltng the marine environment. 

I don't want to lel this opportunity go by without menltontng that our direct 

experience with the Coast Guard has been very positive. Coast Guard officials seek our 

comments and gtve our Input due and serious conslderalton. We've worked together 

cooperaltvely and construcUvely. The relaltonshtp between RCAC and the Coast Guard 

has lived up to the expcctaltons of OPA 90. 

Prince William Sound/Gulf of Aluka 

In terms of response equipment and resources. the sttualton right now tn Prince 

William Sound ts much better than tt was tn 1989 and compares quite favorably with 

other ports. 

Alyeska's drill acltvtltes meet or exceed state and federal requirements. Major. 

all-systems drills are conducted twice a year. In 1992. Alycska had nine drills al the 

terminal. Including two Lhal were surprise exercises. Smaller equipment exercises are 

held much more frequently, often on a weekly basts. 

These drills enable response personnel to become knowledgeable and proficient 

In lhe strengths and weaknesses of equipment and procedures. If there ts another Exxon 

Valdez. we should be tn much better shape Lo respond and mitigate the damages. 

In 1992 Alyeska publicly committed Lo build a dedlealed emergency operaltons 

center In Valdez. as part of its settlement with the Stale of Alaska over the Exxo·n 

Valde,. 

Bul while the response capablllty In Prtnce William Sound ts much better than 

before. there are still stgntftcanl gaps tn prevention. I'll speak more about that tn a 

minute. 

RCAC testimony page 4 
59 

People have a tendency to assume that OPA 90 ts more comprehensive than tt ts. 

We have major concerns about the adequacy of response capablllltes outside Prince 

Wtlltam Sound. Kodiak Island was htt hard by oil from the Exxon Valdez, yet Kodiak 

and other areas tn the GuJr of Alaska have nowhere near the level of response resources 

that we have tn the Sound. The queslton of responstblltty for cleaning up a sptll, 

espectally after the first 72 hours. continues to be a serious concern for us. Alyeska has 

taken the posttton that they are merely a response aclton contractor. obliged by their 

contracts wtth tanker owners and operators. to manage only the tntttal response: 

Towing 

Another area of concern ts towing. which relates back to quesltons posed by the 

Braer Incident tn terms of the ability of tugs to tow a vessel tn distress. Crude oil 

tankers leavtng Valdez carry the so-called Pnnce William Sound Emergency Towing 

Package. One problem ts that there Is tremendous disparity tn how the package Is 

Installed and used. 

That towtng equipment ts so burled on some tankers that It could take a crew of 

8 up to four hours to deploy, If they sttll have power to use wtnches. Lacking power. tt 

could taken the crew two days to deploy. Even tn the best case. tt takes 8 people 45 

minutes to deploy. 

And that's not even good enough. ARCO and Exxon have towtng packages that 

can be deployed by two people In 15 minutes. Even the ARCO or Exxon packages would 

not have done the Braer any good, because there was no one to lnlltate the deployment. 

We have a dlrferent sltualton tn the Valdez Narrows. a passage that at Its 

narrowest provides only 0 .5 naultcal miles of navigable water. A towtng package Is 

useless In the Narrows. because a tanker wtll go on the rocks In well under 15 !t]lnutes. 

The only chance there ts If the escorting tug can push the tanker away from grounding. 

IL ls not clear that the assist tugs and ERVs now betng used In the Narrows are capable of 

doing the Job. 

Closlnl 

Before I conclude. I want to say that humankind can no longer treat our oceans 

like Infinite garbage dumps. capable or taking prolonged abuse and neglect. This 

country has been the leader. and should continue to be the leader. tn correcltng the 

Imbalance between commercial enterprise and energy needs on the one hand. with 

stewardship of the environment on the other. 

RCAC tesltmonj/ page 5 
60 

RCAC urges you to heed the lessons lo dale of the Braer splll. We need 

tntemallonal systems lo monitor tankers and assist them In distress. and faster 

Implementation of OPA 90. 

In Alaska. weather reporting stations In Prince WIiiiam Sound will be a major 

boost to accident prevention. We need to address response capabllltles In the path of the 

Exxon Valdez outside the Sound. And we must answer outstanding questions about 

escort and towtng capabllltles. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. We would be happy to try lo 

answer any questions. 

RCAC testimony page 6 
61 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much for your combined testimony. I am getting a sense that this hearing has already started to make 

sense in terms of some directions that the Congress and the new 

Administration might take. 

One of the frustrations of being a legislator sometimes is, when 

you work very hard to pass a law, that law is then put into the 

hands of people who are hostile to it and have no sense of urgency 

about the implementation of it. That obviously feeds into those who 

were critical of you ever engaging in the process of passing the law 

the first time. I would hope that with the new Administration, the 

new Secretary of Transportation, that there are some opportunities 

to fill in these voids. 

Clearly, one of the wise things we did was make room in that 

law for RCAC, because your testimony points out the fact that you 

are filling a rather substantial void where the political system and 

all of the tugs and pulls of the special interests in Washington or 

in Anchorage are unable so far to meet that demand. So we appreciate your time. 

Let me just begin where you left off on the issue of the escort 

tugs. After Exxon Valdez, all of a sudden every ship was escorted 

by a tu~, and the theory was, well, maybe if you had done that in 

the beginning, there wouldn't have been a problem. And you saw 

news clip after news clip of the tugs following the ships leaving the 

port, going through the Sound. 

There is a press report that, after the near miss in October, they 

lost steering capability. Was that it? 

Mr. Edwards-whoever wants to respond. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, actually the Kenai, 120,000-deadweight tons, had a rudder angle indicator casualty. Two set screws 

on the sendin~ unit on the rudder arm itself were loose, and although they did have steering control they did not know that, so 

in the wheelhouse the master and the pilot were obliged to assume 

that they had lost steering, and they treated the emergency, or apparent emergency, in that manner. 

The pilot appropriately asked for the tug escort to come up to the 

starboard bow to attempt to push the ship away from Middle Rock. At the same time, we radioed and asked for other tugs to come 

from the terminal and assist. At about the same time that the tug began to push, as near as the POVTS-Port Operation Vessel Traffic System-committee staff has been able to determine, the engineer responded in the steering flat, was able to manually steer 

from that location, and the ship also began to steer. The newspaper article was accurate in praising the people who 

put the system in place in the beginning. It should be pointed out 

that tankers were always escorted through Valdez Narrows with 

one tug. That escort system was expanded in 1989. · Mr. MILLER. In the article, it suggests that the next trip through 

there were four tugs. Is that accurate? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Only if wind conditions demanded it. The Coast 

Guard guidelines state that between 30 and 40 knots the tug escort 

is doubled and above 40 knots they do not transit. 

It is not clear in the incident of the Kenai that the tug actually pushed the ship away. The steering was reestablished at about the 

same time. The same report from our staff indicates that on a larg70-544 0 - 93 - 3 
62 

er tanker, or if there actually had been a steering casualty, the 

critical element of response time would have made the outcome 

very doubtful. That is one of the areas we are looking at very closely at this time. 

Mr. MILLER. In reading the article-and I am trying to just clarify the facts here because I am not clear on this-they say that the 

next trip had four tugs. You are saying that is because conditions 

required that to take place, or was that in response to what happened to the Kenai? 

Mr. EDWARDS. I am not sure exactly what the situation was with 

the next tanker. I do know that the Coast Guard policy and the escort response to that policy is that under certain wind conditions 

there are more escort vessels. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Sterling, you raised the issue of whether this 

is a proper match of equipment in terms of mission and whether 

the tugs that are currently engaged in the escort have the required 

capability to deal with these kind of emergencies. Specifically, you 

raised the issue of whether they have the ability to push a tanker 

as opposed to being a towing operation. Would you care to elaborate on that? What is the issue there? Is it the type of tug, the size 

of the tug, or the crew, or what is it? 

Mr. STERLING. Well, all the relevant factors are being studied. 

Mr. MILLER. Studied by? 

Mr. STERLING. RCAC. We have set up what is called the Disabled 

Tanker Towing Study Group. 

Mr. MILLER. Is that with the Coast Guard? 

Mr. STERLING. It is the Coast Guard, RCAC, and the Prince William Sound Tanker Owner and Operators Association 

Mr. EDWARDS. And Alyeska. . Mr. STERLING. And Alyeska. Mr. EDWARDS. And the ADC. 

Mr. STERLING. Right, and the Alaska Department of 

Environmental--

Mr. MILLER. Give us a list of who is not involved. [Laughter.] 

Mr. STERLING. It is a major study, and in the end it may cost 

well over a half-million dollars, but the purpose of the study is to 

establish as definitively and as '!once and for all" as we can an honest and objective assessment of present operating conditions, equipment, and training, a qualitative comparison of those with the alternatives that are available, and recommendations as to what 

would be the best and safest system to use in the TAPS trade in 

Prince William Sound. 

We are subject to a protocol with the group that calls for all re- ports to be evaluated and distributed and reviewed by everybody 

before they are released, so we don't have anything to offer other 

than to assure the Congress and the world that the study is well 

under way and that we are closely pursuing the question of what 

is the best complement of towing and assistance for the TAPStrade tankers. 

Mr. MILLER. And that comes under the heading of what is your 

capability to respond and what is your response time in the event 

of an incident that threatens the integrity of the tanker. 

Mr. STERLING. That is right. 
63 

Mr. EDWARDS. The Kenai incident alone, even i'ldependent of the 

study, raises doubt as to whether the equipment we have with a 

larger tanker or a genuine rudder casualty will be able to handle 

that situation. 

In the Valdez Narrows and in any constricted waters anywhere 

in the world, the key element is response time, and there have 

been a number of other studies conducted. We have researched 

that literature. Clearly, it seems to have been established that having escort vessels already made fast is one of the elementary principles in constricted waters. 

Mr. MILLER. Made faster to the tanker. · Mr. EDWARDS. Correct. And there are a variety of types of equipment available to do that. 

There is a question about the safety of making fast a conventional-style tug, and we are looking at other equipment that might 

do that job a lot better. 

Mr. MILLER. Are there tugs that you can make fast? When I 

worked on a tug, you could be made fast in the wrong place and 

it wouldn't be of terrible help in that particular incident; you would 

have to go around and be made fast somewhere else. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Precisely, and in Puget Sound where Arco is 

transiting at 10 knots, whereas in the Narrows where it is 6 knots, 

Arco Marine has contracted with Foss to build a 7,000-horsepower 

cycloidal propulsion tractor tug which is towed stem-to-stem and, 

in the case of a steering casualty, tows in an indirect manner. In 

other words, it can break and steer the tanker at the same time, 

which is obviously a significant advantage. 

Mr. MILLER. Are they expensive? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Compared to what? 

Mr. MILLER. That is my second question. 

Mr. EDWARDS. We have looked at that question, and the answer 

is yes, the initial outlay is expensive. On the other hand, this is 

a piece of machinery which would be a long-term investment and 

which would be in demand anywhere in the world people are moving oil. 

Mr. MILLER. Sarah. 

Ms. CHASIS. Yes, I just wanted to jump in. Under California's oil 

spill law there are harbor safety committees that were established, 

and it is our understanding that they have made recommendations 

about the use of tractor tugs in San Francisco and Los Angeles. We 

can get you information on that, but they felt strongly that those 

ports should deserve the same level of protection as Puget Sound 

and some of the other areas where these are used. 

Mr. MILLER. When you get into areas of restricted waterways, 

you get close to my house here. What do we have? About a thousand tankers a year cross the bay at San Francisco, come under 

the Golden Gate, depending on how the economy is doing, but that 

is about the number. Is that fair to say? 

Ms. CHASIS. I think that is roughly right. I don't know exactly. 

Mr. MILLER. But we have not gone through an upgrade of escort 

vessels in San Francisco. Is that correct? I mean that is the study 

that you are talking about? 

Ms. SANKOVITCH. Escort vessels aren't required now in San Fran- cisco. 
64 

Mr. MILLER. I understand that. 

Ms. SANK0VITCH. And then this Harbor Safety Management 

Committee made their recommendation that there be tug escorts 

and made specific recommendations of what kind of vessel would 

serve as a tug escort so you wouldn't have the problems that they 

have in Prince William Sound now. 

Mr. MILLER. A thousand tankers come through the Golden Gate 

each year. Obviously many more ships make that trip throughout 

the year, and obviously there is a very good safety record. A couple 

of bad incidents, but essentially a food safetI record. That is what 

you are bumping up against here, assume. The industry suggests, 

"Look, we have been doing this, and we have been doing it right, and we have improved the radar system in the bay since the collision. We don't need these other things in this bay." How do you 

weigh that in that discussion? 

Ms. SANK0VITCH. The Harbor Safety Management Committee is 

made up of industry representatives as well as Coast Guard, State, and environmental representatives. Somehow there was a consensus that was able to be reached. Mr. MILLER. Where is that in terms of implementation? 

Ms. SANK0VITCH. It is just a recommendation so far, and we can 

get more information to you about that. Someone in our San Fran- cisco office serves on the committee for San Francisco Bay. 

Mr. MILLER. What can you tell me about the question of the VTS 

system for San Francisco? 

Ms. SANK0VITCH. I was told today by the Coast Guard that they 

are planning on expanding the VTS north of the San Rafael Bridge, which was a recommendation that we had made already in 1990 

in a report we issued then and which the local Coast Guard has 

wanted, but the time frame for that, again, is 5 to 7 years I under- stand. When the Coast Guard comes up, maybe you can ask them. 

I just was told that. 

Mr. MILLER. All right. I will ask them why that is. 

The arrangement that we have with the TAPS tankers-is that 

correct-it is just the TAPS tankers that have entered into the 

agreement not to go within 50 miles? So that doesn't apply to other 

tanker traffic that might be moving north or south along the coast? 

Ms. CHASIS. That is right. It is something like 85 percent of the 

tankers transiting. But what about the other 15 percent? And 

shouldn't there be consideration given to requiring that those go 50 

miles offshore as well? 

Mr. MILLER. So if a tanker leaves Longworth or Richmond and 

goes to Long Beach or L.A. or Sterile Bay or somewhere, they are 

not held to that agreement because they didn't originate in the 

TAPS trade? 

Ms. CHASIS. Correct. It is only tankers carrying the Alaskan 

crude oil, and there is no clear enforcement mechanism for that 

agreement, it is purely voluntary, and the companies self-monitor. 

Mr. MILLER. And that does not apply then either to large barge 

traffic that might be carrying petroleum products. 

Ms. CHASIS. That is correct. In talking to people in California, 

there is a lot of concern about this whole question of how far offshore tankers should be required to transit, and also there is concern about tanker transit through the marine sanctuaries. Tankers 
65 

come within 2 nautical miles of the Caroline Islands, apparently 

within a mile and a half of Point Reyes, and there is a lot of concern about the adequacy of those buffers to protect those areas. 

Under the Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary, there is a study 

going on as to how to direct tanker transport. We think that this 

is perhaps one of the most important questions that blows from the 

Braer incident, the need to establish these tanker-free zones. This 

is not something that has been done extensively in this country, 

and not something I think the Coast Guard is necessarily eager to 

do, but we think that that is something that should be a very high priority. 

Mr. MILLER. To read your testimony and to listen to you, it 

seems to me that what you are suggesting is that, while clearly we 

are moving on implementation of the OPA 90 legislation, there are 

obviously gaps because it hasn't been fully implemented. That is 

understandable, but you are also suggesting that there arefaps because there are simply some issues that were not addresse in that 

legislation. Is that fair to say? 

Ms. SANKOVITCH. Yes, it is. 

Mr. MILLER. And, again, I am not quite clear on whether there 

is authority should the Coast Guard decide or should other studies 

decide to go to the kind of command and control system that the 

earlier witness, Mr. Green, testified to-whether that would be 

available or not. 

Ms. SANKOVITCH. Under the Oil Pollution Act the Coast Guard 

VTS systems are given authority to control traffic in situations of 

navigational hazard like congested traffic or bad weather. I know 

in New York Harbor there have been restrictions placed in certain 

conditions of weather where certain dredging operations were going 

on. So·it has been exercised in New York Harbor. I don't know 

about elsewhere. 

Mr. MILLER. But it is not a general method of operation at this 

point. Ms. SANKOVITCH. That is correct. Mr. MILLER. Okay. 

Mr. STERLING. Mr. Chairman, just to illustrate, the situation in 

Alaska is that local jurisdictions, such as the city of Cordova, the 

city of Valdez, we have very limited power legally over the operation of our ports and harbors. Our jurisdiction is limited, and 

mainly we proceed under State law. It is the Captain~of-the-Port 

zone and the Federal authority that really lay the groundwork for 

how we manage the operation of tankers and other vessels in our 

port and harbor areas. In the event of an oil spill we are stuck with 

working with the fact that it is the Federal 0-ovemment and the 

State of Alaska that assume control and power over what happens. 

Local municipalities, we are not exactly analogous to Shetland 

Islands Council, but the fact is that the Shetland Islands Council 

enjoyed a great deal of not only the legal power it needed to act 

and does _act in Sullom Voe, but it is the 25 councillors and the employees and the staff and Mr. Green that people know, and that is 

whom they work with, and we don't have that sort of regime available to us. 

Mr. MILLER. That is the issue that is raised in this hearing, and 

fortunately we were able to have Mr. Green with us. Matching po-
66 

litical rhetoric and action sometimes is difficult-in case anybody 

doesn't know that-but the fact is that we continue to talk all the 

time about local control and local government and the government 

closest to the people is best for the people, and all of those prin- ciples. But it is interesting, when those principles run up against 

large economic interests, we decide that maybe we know better in 

Washington. What we are really saying is, we can insulate those 

interests from the interests of the people that might clash with 

those interests. 

Now if I can follow that sentence, so can you. 

The point being this, that I think if you asked people in the San 

Francisco Bay whether they wanted a positive command and control system of all tanker traffic and if they were informed of the 

volume of that traffic, the answer would be yes, because that was 

basically the answer after we had the collision in the bay. 

If you asked all the people that worked hard and benefit and will 

enjoy the experience of the Monterey Marine Sanctuary, whether 

they want it to be tanker-free, the answer will be yes. But if you 

take that answer and bring it back to Washington, it will get filtered and sifted and modified and rounded off until, "Maybe so, 

maybe not, we are studying it, we will look at it next year." 

That is entirely different than the desires of the people who live 

in the affected areas, and clearly when we talk about this and 

when we investigate it, Exxon Valdez, the problem is when you say, 

"We need to know what the weather is." If you know the weather, 

you are going to be responsible for your actions, but if you can go 

out there and then you can make a decision when your tanker is 

under way that you are going to proceed without the tugs, you are 

essentially home free if you make it. 

If you said, "Gee, I can't go out there, let's turn this baby 

around"-if you have got the room-"and let's go back to the port," the problem is, your berth is already taken because the oil is coming down the pipeline, and it is on schedule, and you have got to 

be out of there m 18 hours. As we found out in the investigation, 

those who try to interrupt that throughput of oil on that system 

run into all kinds of political ramifications right up the levels of 

government, and that 1s the distinction. 

The same thing is true in the area I . represent. I have five or six 

refineries, all of whom rely heavily on their port facilities, and 

there are certain economics of that port. There is scheduling, and 

that tanker is leaving at 3:00 in the afternoon, and at 4:30 somebody else is coming through the gate to take that place. So those 

are the pressures. 

But I suspect that people who thought that that weather would 

impact their coast, their livelihood, and all of the rest of it might 

make different decisions. The clash of what Mr. Green called the 

commercial regimes for the most part up to date have overridden 

those considerations, and but for accidents, we are not very good 

at responding to that. 

Your Council, as distinguishable as it is from Shetland's, is still 

probably the model in the United States, but it was only a horrendous event that overrode the normal political systems her~ which 

said you have got to give some voice to local individuals. Even in 

the system of the Coast Guard, people were there trying to say 
67 

throughout the operation of that facility, you know, there are days 

when the wind is a little high here and the ice is moving around 

a little too much, but the overriding concern was the schedule of 

the port as opposed to the rest of the system. 

Mr. EDWARDS. A quick note in light of two of those observations: 

The accident of the Braer has prompted the Captain of the Port in 

Valdez to look specifically at Hinchinbrook Entrance as possibly 

reenacting the same type of a problem. There have been a few 

ships that have exercised their judgment and not sailed out into 

the Gulf of Alaska in certain weather conditions, but he is considering making that a Coast Guard decision where there would be certain tide and weather considerations where he would say, ''You will 

not go through Hinchinbrook Entrance." 

Mr. MILLER. I think it is a very unfair and somewhat unrealistic 

decision to ask a master of a vessel to make. We all believe he 

should, and he clearly has the authority, but we also understand 

all of the other decisions and the ramifications from that decision, 

whether it is small vessel traffic in San Francisco Bay or tankers 

in Prince William Sound. That is why the public likes to have the 

Coast Guard in between them, because you don't want to leave 

those decisions to people who would naturally have a series of conflicts about that decision. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Exactly, and RCAC will .support his decisions 

when he needs to make them, and we hope that his superiors will 

also support that, and today we would enlist political support for 

using that judgment. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, Ms. Sankovitch. 

Ms. SANK0VITCH. That raises another issue, which is the importance of having an independent pilot on board-that is, a pilot who 

is not _part of the crew and not hired by the company. Now under 

the Oil Pollution Act, a State pilot-that is, an independent pilot--

is required on vessels in Prince William Sound, but that same requirement hasn't been extended to the Lower 48. 

I have spoken with pilots in the New York area who have said 

that as a State pilot, independent pilot, they are free to tell a vessel owner, "Your radar isn't workin~," or ''The weather is too bad; 

I'm not moving." But the pilot who 1s part of the crew would probably not have that same flexibility. Mr. MILLER. We have pilots for two reasons, if I am historically 

correct, both for that independent decision making and knowledge 

of the waterway. 

Thank you very much for your testimony. I also want to enter into the record a letter from Assemblyman 

Sher on hearings that they just had which address some of the issues that you raised about the California situation, and we will be 

working with Assemblyman Sher on these issues and with your report. 

[The letter follows:] 
-

... , __ ,_ 

68 

CHIIJCOJlrdlA.T&HT· .,.,_ 

--- aixlifarnia ~•gi•latun 

~HHtblv ~•hmzl 

~uaur.eH ainnnitbe 

BYRON O. SHER 

CHAIRMAN 

COHILll..T.t.NTS 

-·.,. -·- ,..,.o.n..,., Ttn'y~IIIIMli' .... _ COWMITTII IIClfTAaY• 

AllflL'-"t 

.. _ 

..... ._ ... M_,. ITATICA~TOL 

,._0.10• .. c"o ~TO. C.t. MUMI0IU 

.. _ 

... , ... "'-c,,... 

Cllf'tllfl.Cl-., . .6, Fton:1ry l . 1991 (fLl!f',...,,..t: Jtl0: -5•NOT 

Cona,•••••n Oeora• Ki!.hr 

Chairaen. Co1111itt.11e en Natua.l Ku ou rce, 

U.S . Ho1.ue of lepr•••nc.ativ•• 

1,14 t.on,wocd~ 

HOUH Offico luildina 

v11111na,011 DC zo,i, 

Dur Concrellm&ll ll1lllr1 

Th.t CaU,forni• AUflmbly Natu ra l Re10ur:e1 Cora11ittee cond-.cted an over1i1ht 

hurilll on C&l1torn1a · • Oil lpill Preveotion and 11.uponH Ao< (OSPlA) on 

Jamary %~, 1193. At that htari ns ve dhr.utud 1everal 111\ltl, Which •itne11•• 

aart•d could only bt addroned at tne todtral and 1nterna<1oH1 lt,rol. I •• 

,rritilll to Uk Jou to revi1v thtH inuu during <ht hbruary 4, lH! hurina 

of th• Coaa.Ltt•• on Natu.ral luourc:,, Co:nn'littt• on tht ted1ral 011 Pollu.tiun 

Aet af HOO (OPA QO) . 

Ctliferoie ' e Ail ieill Prev1;:,,; 4 ;-- and B,1000,, i"to1c1a 

OSPL\ r• qu.i.1.·•• Californ.1• to eu.ablhh • coaprehenatv• ,,, 11 •pill pro1raa. 

Vhile tht pro1r1m •111 h•v~ l'!lany ele1una . key h1u::e1 include a SlOO • ill ion 

cnntinsency tud. eontin11ncy ;,hn nqu.i:1oeni.a for t.ankeu and oil h.a,uUiftl 

tu;J.11t1111 att.4 harbor 1afety r•auhtione . l')SPIA uquirtt that the pro1r1m 

prov1,, the beat a('~ t1111vabl1 prctte:ton to th.t ca11::>rn i1 coau. •1th 

req1Air1aent1 recard i r.& !:)uth oil 1;:>i~l ;,nveni.ion ant! r••ponH. 

Tb• hHdn& part1<1ranu ill llrtta tn1t , vnil1 C&l!!ornh nttdt to ~• prepared 

to rHpond to an ell •p1ll , ;a•vtr,t l or. 1l:.ould be o~r Urot priority . OIPlA 

r1q1"1r•• that our pr:11r1a in.clu.de provhion, r111rdi:'I.I t:.1.1 1ecort1 for tanker, 

Ln eclecu4 l\arbon. improver! nav1iltl0llll equipment 1n<I rutuo capability for 

diaahlad tlnkttl , tlovtvtr, tvo preventative 1Ha1uru nq,'4irt fe4er&l 

part1c1pation for iap1•••a.tation . 

tecet 101 I101r.1r 1.au,,1 !A ff 4 l1• Oflebou 

T••t'8on.7 r•c•ived by tht c:o=a1tttt u.ro11aty ,u.pp~rud 11ov.1.n1 tul&•r ro1i1t•• 

further ott1hor1 •• U&• ~••t •••n• for preveftt!aa •il tpiUt . fllh tett1aony 

11 cn1let1at with the a recent vol11P1t.ary indu1try a1:11mtnt to k••p tank•n in 

tbt Califomi••Aluka trade 1t ltatt ,o Qiln grf <h• ,out. 

Thi• aar••=•nt l=;r~v•• protectit'lrt frna 1;,ill.1 for ttveral r111un•• 1'1 t tt, • 

aro..ndin& ,uch u r.ht one v:iit ~ occ~rred in •h• Shet!1nd hlandt it lau likely 

to occ1,,1r it tanker, arc k•pt !ar o!hhor1 bocau.u th•n vould be anr1 t1•t tor 

re•\.'.'-• t"I' to r1aci.. Tft, .l.1J,u vat only 1 l 111111 of t short When 1t lo1t 

power. Second, the turth.1: ott1l'lo:• tanker• arc ""p•r•tit\C, the fiver 

r11traint1 there ar• ti,) c.anel.lvtrinc . thereby reduc:in& th• ch.inc• of co11111on. 
Con1re11111n t:•er1• Miller 

, ....... "' J. lttJ 

,.,. "'" 

69 

PJ.Aally, 1ho1.ald • 1pill occu.r !'.rom • u nlr:u· lacat• d more than ,o 1Dil11 troc th• 

coa1t, tll• •pill ii likely t0 bt c0n :.a1n1d or to diuipat.1 b1for1 it r1ach11 

tlll CO<, 

Unfortunately, the 1nc1u.stry· I vo !.i;:-.•ary •ir c•iu•ii ~ doe• not cover all \anlc1r1 

Wtl1Ch op1r1t1 off e.1.Uo.1:nh. :eatt o!l 2;,!ll offichlt ~•v• ,rr.11,nr,tad tc 

1ncou.ra11 oil t.ankere to op•r-at• ir. n r ,- t han Hfty =11e1 from th• co11t, b\lt. the 

1tat1 baa only liaittd ililtho:1:.y over Vthcls 01.:.tsiliit of 1tata water,. thu.1 •• 

need ttll htlp of th• C1d1.ra l ,~ver:,~ent in nq1,1,irina tanker, to or,•rat1 at 

lHtt fih7 •il•• oft <OU<. I " "'""'"d <ha: kt1p1n1 ••nk•n tllio hr oft 1hor1 ••r require ch1n1t1 tc i ntt::.a:.! or.al 1.:unvea 1.!on1 blilt California ha, no 

ability to •••k th••• chana•• wh.ih t he !e:lt:cal goveS"naent can . 

v,eeel Trat'f!c 11atc:.a 

Th• 1econd preventative 1u11:;:e whic~ r equ1r11 tr:1eral 111i1tanc1 ar• v1111l 

tru:z:1c 1,rv1c,1 (VTS). O5P!tA 4c ..:Jgr.i ua that the Co11ot C\l&td ha,_ pr•••ptiv, 

&\lt.b.or-it7 over t1avJ.11tional J. .. u .. liiu VT~ hut r1quir11 our 1tat1 officl&ll to 

n11otiat1 to provide VTS 1n t nr!I l:c&tl0n1 in C1l!L'u,.11J.1 • Lo, An1•l11 / Lona 

IIICh, San Pranci1c.:u 111, • nd t~e :ant a !arbara Channel . OSPU alto r"'lu.ir11 

ne1otiation to 4et1reit11 if ot.hu· •r••• nee<! th1u IJlttlH . 

Currently. 1xi,an1ion aml ..,,pgade of t~ c VTS 1y1te= in San Franci1co la1 ha111 

been appr1:1v1d . lat&blhh1H:\t o! a VTS 1y•!'. em in Lo1 An&tl11/Lon1 leach h&I 

•lipped a 1••t because ot tede ral ~~01et p:ob1•=•, bi.t t w.nd•~•t.aa.4 tl\at 

tuncUn1 11 conta1n•Y iu Lhe p.:eun-: b'1.d1•t . 

VTS •1?'• 1111nt1 covtr1n1 thl Santa Jarbu·a Ch annel &::\d other 1r••• have not been 

reached . 0111 of the r111on1 . Acc-.:ird!n, to tha Coan C11ard, i • that it ftll 

inoufficient fund • to 1n1t1 ll ,.h,11 ,y1t1u . Purouar.< to '"ction H70.2l of 

the Cov1rn11ent Code. conta!ntd 1n CSP!l>. ( 1?:\Clo11d), c..,,r 1tat1 prograe l\11 th1 

authority to ,•ai•• fu.nd.1 t.o ?~'1 for a 'IT) •11t11l vhi r:!-1 ii approved and operated 

by c.h• Co11t Cu.ard . Thu• th• cr!. ttri. a fer Co11t <.uard n11oti1tion on VTS in 

Califorllil 1hould be the ••f•tr val ... • of th• propoud •1•t•m and not available 

fun4o . · 

.Tn eon.elution . tanke: r0:Jt !:-., a:1d v;3 ay a!e111 a rc 1ndi 1paru1bl. 1 pi•c•• nf • 

co• pr1hen.1iv1 oil apill ;,-:ognm. ~• n••~ to rely on ::,,1 cooper&tion or the 

federal aovernatnt to put. these ~!.e c: u i.n p l ace . 

thank JO\l for an7 111htanct vhlch y~u ean rrn:i•tr· on t !'ltll 111u.11. 

S!n;:1nly 

A11em1Jly 

By~~~ Nat..,,r&l luou.r~!,.• Co-1tt•• 

IDS :pf 

1tt&chaent 1 Oil Sp1!.l P:ever:.t~or. u :.! l11puu H Act 
• 

a,. U48 -12-

nmu,d -roil ,pill -~ plalu tc lbe origiaatina pwty wilh 

~-for anwidramts neceauy lo ........, that tbe _....,_prolectod. 

8fllUO. t•I Any ,-tJ ..,.._.ble for • laalrer a, t...., ohaU aolify the C.... C-.d wilhia cee ......, ol the dioobility ii lhe 

disol>led IIIDlcroo bugeiawit.Wa IS mile, ol~ tho,e ollk otate. 

11ae odDLiaiomltor ..ct tloc Ollice oi F.me<- Servia:s sholl requat tl,e C.... C..-.1 ID_.,. Ille Of6ee cl F.nier1-=,, 5ervica 

. u""'"' upoa;l,le ofl« tlieC.O..tC-d n,oe;_ ,_...,.,,:•disabled 

~ or t-g,, wilia It ma.. cl the 1MCe of !he state. The 

..i.....ta< oball .._. lo neac,ciot,, - ·-- with the 0-C...d eoverru,a .....,...., .. foe Ccut Cuud IIOtilicalion to 

tite Ible rtt•din& dis&Yed IMllcn. 1 

(b) WheM:ver the ~ G E.aeraeuc, Setvioc:s n,cei•H oolire 

ol o 4isobled w,i,e, ., ........ tt.e .a;..., moll UWJM<liatdy noti(y the 

admiautu1IOI'. lf tlle adlninistrator rcccivCI aot:ice hOII\ any other 

- •esudu11 the preomoe ol • d;..bl,d tanhr or ba'l!• within Umilesofthc shotcollhe,ta1c. the odJwnis1ratw ohalliranJ£dio1et, 

,..lily 1hc Office ol i,;,..,.,encr S.mce,. 

(c> For tl,c purpos,,, ol this ,ectim\. • ,.....,,. &hall be COD>iden.-u 

clisobled if ao~ ol the f•llowiDa ocruaa 

(1) Any M!Cideolal or ialt!atiooa.l pouadiag wluch Ct4".ata a 

huard to 1he eovil"OI\IMtlll or .:he a.le:IJ -' tbit vescl. 

(2) l-cf-.a pr..,._..or primary stce...._ oc any oonpooent 

or coatrol ,yll:c,o which c• UM'S • reduction in Lbo aa .. cuvcrifl8 

.c:.i-bil;ties of th, v....:I. Falk purpec, or this i-agn,pl.. ·1-" 

oeara lllat any tr•ern. C'Of'al)CJDCal, J»,,11. IUhq'SCIIJl. or cant.-ol 

.,..iea, d- DII perform lhe ..,«ified .. required f-ctioa. 

13> An occ,,neoor: ma1 .. ...u, and advenely alfocting the veael'1 

N8WOl'lhoelS cw fitness fgr RfVlce, iad-1ia& but 1101 liaited lo, fire, 

Ooocliaa, or ..n...on .,ill, uoll.n -1 

C4) An)· OCCtiaRalCe nol nwd.ia3 the •bove oit.eria_ but which 

CIUlel tlw aerioou .-,ilrility ol an oil ,pi.I or on oocwreoa: wluch ..., ,-,It in ... oil spill . 

td• Foo tloc p..._ ol Ibis--.• boac lllall be couide,-cd _ claWed ii any ol lhe hllowiq ea:w: 

ll>Tbelowinl__,_.:,eu.....,.cliaol,led. 

II> Tbe ,.._. 10...,1 ..., larae becomes tLsabled 11u-.., - de6ned in Nbclmaoo (c). ' 

-· (•• 11,e -.. .... sluill --·· ..... .,._ ... ...-with lbe Cami Cuud by DecuibeT 31, 1991, b a ,,,,_J traffic ISTice ,,.. ... to polDd the hodien of the _._ Tbe 

--,...y adJde ill the ..,__,,. prowiou for v-1 lnll6c IIICllilDrin& ond-c:atioN IJII_,.. •- or the- o.lide of i.rbon oo .....,,_lie • ,epan,te qn,ema,1. 11.oy INCh 

...,.,..te - • w:nt olull be nqioliated by Dccierobe, JI, 1993. The pup,oer .,/ the •end traffw lfll'Yic,e 11nd the v~ traffic 1111.lnilorillfC 

and COIIIWlwucatKNU tytlelm ah.t.11 be 1c1 &ill ruiwi.galioe by J)TOVW.~ 

..idlite tr

locatiow an

(b) U lh

l)'$1enlS pu

adminislnl

plan for im

MJbdivuioo 

ba.bon of 

Bulara C

1,affic aen

syste,o i

for the ,qi

and rrgkx

1he adain

be a,mpld

operaltd 

srllcm tru&

plan shal

retammen

speafied i

dlS deadli

·rhe plan 

povMk fo

(<I 11,

and ve.s

,duntary 

,d...-y 

adrwnulr

<01\D.tte

areas fo..

~ 

adnininn

coram.ni

,ubcl;v;s;

l.ereby tt

Mone,- i

oc,ldy IO

ir..,._! 

ud _

trodoil>1 

,ball ul

odmnltr

horn aco

tonka i., 

vnarrl 1n

(di A

.ad c-

adminU.t
a.. IStll -14-

included iD lhe plaa urd receiWII spc,cific: appro,.. by the 

Lep,la«w~. 

(el For tK - o( this aectiGa, • ..,...... """"" vesels u de'8ed in Sec1;a. 21 ol lloe Huban ud !llnisllion Code. 

(f) It ii lhe inleal ellloe .........,...., tlut VIS syllcms aad _,..1 

b~ ~ and _...,.lion, syslems be 00IIJl>lded and 

_....... by the Cout C...NI. 

85Nl.!2 .voy vead lhal is - in romplw,ce wil• lhe tilae 

od,edales utd ,eq_,...-. nlaaa1 IO double hulb ,et i .. 1b in •·• 

iecleral Oil Pallutiool PrOWl>tMln, Re,po,ue, Liabwt1· u.d 

~ioo Act d 1990 iliall be prahibiied from dodlnc, ~ - or unloildir1c al any marine tetaaul ia the stair. 

16JO..!J. (a) 1-.c edlni•irtnlw shall cr~ale h.ulio.>r iafcl.) 

committocs for tlu~ h.arbon ol San Die1o:; Lui Aagclcs, Long lle&ch; 

fort U\AC•t."JDC; San Pranci~•. Saa Pablo, .. d SL1isun Uays, ud 

llwnboldt Hay by J,tly I. l!BI. 

lb) Tiu: admmistrllor ,hall appoint to e.u-h harbc..- saf,1y 

corrwnitltt for a l e ,,. of tlvce )CHS all of the &ollowinc "'a•bcrs. 

{I) A ,IL"'Dgnue of each of the poet .a.Jthoril:im within the h1rbol', 

u c~ ctut tlic h.,,,bor .aid) cotllftttoe for the harbor ol SAA 

•·~ncOO>, S...O Pablo. ux.l SUtSU.a lb>-s ,hall u~ fuuc Ocdx:•ocs. (2) A reprc11entalivc of taalter oper•lon,. e1oept thal the bubor 

s.k.-ty coramillee (or the hubon of Sa.n f~r.-,cisc:o, S...1 !"at.blo, anil 

Swun lbr,, shal hue two repre1enh1tives. 

(l) A r~pre,entati\•e Qf lk pilots or,:an1:uli<1u5 within the harb.H. 

(•) A reprewnta1iveof dr, nr10YeUt:lopeullon. eucpt th.ti the 

llsbo .. s.af..:ty co«DmiU~e fo, the- hwbon ol San t 'nu1ci1C"• Sa.n t'ablo, 

and Swst.a.a fta!(S lh:d ha1,;e two rel)l"e,entativu 

(5) A rrp,nailati\,e of oommcn:tal r1J.Nn1 OI" plellSUlc bo.at •peralon. . 

(6) A. rcprexslhtive cl :a r«ogni.N"d ,w .. profil envifu11111t•nbl 

Ofl&NJ.lltion 11•• l•s a. • pu11,l(>1,e tM." p-otecha, oi ~inc 

,e1011rces. (11 A reprcscntalivc olllw, Califurna C..ou1al CollllJlilsioo, e,iccpt 

tlac lor tl>e llubor Safety C--itloe fo< San i;nacisco, San Pol,lo, 

ud 5uioMa lleya. lhe admoniobatar slllil appeinl I rep-aenlatmo d 

theS.. Francisco &yC--.·onon u>el ~ ~ - (II A represeQlati-;e fr- o NO<oSnir.ed labor ,.......,..., 

iavolved with _.alioN d voaeh 

(9) A ,ep.-at;ve ol lhe Coptu, d lhe l'crt, the Coast c..,,t, the ea.,. d &p,cen. ud die Navr to the elleat eact........,.,.. to 

putic:ipete on the co,...;uoe. 

(10) A •....-tative ol lul o, IM,ge ope-, ,.t,o is not ol,o 

eopaed in the liusitieu d opentin1 either unl<rn •• dry ca,go 

v .... b, eacepl lhot th, bubor ..fcty conuniti- foo lhe hart.on ol 

S.. Puacia,o. S.n Pahlc> and S...U,, Bays sl...u have one 

A"p-esenlatiwe of tug opertllen &Ad one r~pl'f!"ICl'...,_,C d buae 

opente>n. neilllll!r ol wl.ora ahall UIO br eqqoJ in the hw.iaes: oI 

-••tine dt

My man

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72 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Ms. CHASIS. Could I raise one last point? It is sort of ironic to 

me that we haven't really focused at all on the double-hull question. You know how hard fought that issue was in enactment of 

OPA 90, and now we have a recent Coast Guard report which says: 

yes, double-hulls are clearly more effective in controlling the major 

sources of spills in the United States-Le., groundings-than any 

other alternative, and four major spills that occurred, two in 1989 

and two in 1990, would have been avoided with double-hulls. 

In light of that, one thing we would like you to think about is 

whether or not this very long phase-in requirement for double-hulls 

extended through 2015 should be speeded up. 

Mr. MILLER. It is very much part of this discussion and this oversight. It has been a part of the discussions both with people in the 

Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and also with the authors of the original amendment about that timetable, because I 

think there is some concern that we get to a point here. Maybe the 

Coast Guard can address this, but at some point out of economics 

you start to get a horrible mix of ships; you have some real old 

ones you are trying to hold on to until you have to make that decision. It is of concern, especially given some of the other studies 

done on conditions of ships. So it is part of the mix here. Thank you very much for your help and your testimony before 

the committee. We appreciate it. 

Next will be Rear Admiral Arthur E. Gene Henn, who is the 

Chief of the Office of Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental 

Protection, for the U.S. Coast Guard, who will be accompanied by 

Commander Ed Rollison and Margie Hegy from the Office of the 

Chief of Navigation and Waterway Safety. Welcome to the committee. We appreciate your willingness to testify and the information that you have provided. Your entire statement will be placed in the record. Proceed in the manner in which 

you are most comfortable, but if you would also feel free to comment on previous testimony where you think you can help expand 

or complete the record, that would also be appreciated. Admiral Henn, please go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ARTHUR E. GENE HENN, 

CHIEF OF THE OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, U.S. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS, ACCOMPANIED BY COMMANDER ED ROLLISON; 

AND MARGIE HEGY, FROM THE OFFICE OF NAVIGATION 

SAFETY AND WATERWAY SERVICES, U.S. COAST GUARD 

HEADQUARTERS 

Admiral HENN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good 

afternoon. It is a pleasure to be here. 

I might just lead in by saying that I have two fine folks with me 

to help me answer some of the questions that you and your committee might have. Principally, I will feel very comfortable answering any questions dealing with maritime safety, environmental protection, port-State and flag-State responsibilities, and of course, 

OPA 90 rmplementation. 

Ms. Hegy has particular expertise in the navigational arena and 

things dealing with areas of exclusion zones and things like that, 
73 

and Commander Rollison has been a commanding officer of Vessel 

Traffic Service [VTS] San Francisco, so he has a great deal of background in that area. I say this just so you know where our expertise lies. 

Sir, you mentioned that the written statement will be entered. I 

have a general statement I could read, but I really think the thrust 

of what we can give you today is going to be principally in response 

to your questions. 

I think that from my standpoint, both the Commandant and I, 

here at home and internationally, have said time and time again 

that we believe OPA 90 is, in fact, the next best thing to sliced 

bread; I say with true feeling, that certainly Congress responded to 

the will of the American people in a time when all of us-and I'm 

saying the Federal Government, State government, local government, industry, and even the environmental proponents, the good 

stewards of our environment-did not take as active a role as they 

should have. I am referring to the decade of the eighties; I term 

it ''the decade of disaster" as far as the enhancement of and 

progress in maritime safety and environmental protection. 

I also am very pleased to say that having the biggest part of implementation of OPA 90 within my responsibility-over 60 or so 

regulatory projects, over 30 studies, and over 30 reports to this 

body-that I am pleased with the progress that we have made. On 

the one hand, I am very proud of what we have done; I prefer we 

would have done some of it sooner, but I am proud of the advancements that we have made. 

I would report to you, sir, that taking this sense of Congress, taking this sense of the U.S. public, the whole host of customers that 

we have out there in this fine country of ours, and including the 

good stewards of the environment, such as Nina Sankovitch and 

her organization, Greenpeace, and the whole host of others that we 

work with, on the international scene, at the International Maritime Organization, we are advancing beyond what is in OPA 90-

indeed, putting together a universal regime where many of the 

things that we wish we had today will be inflace, where the safety 

nets will be there to minimize casualties an certainly mitigate the 

results of those casualties when they occur. We are a leader in the 

international scene on that. 

We have done some things during the past several years-and I 

am talking since the passage of OPA 90-within the International 

Maritime Organization that, to tell you the truth, sir, we could not 

have advanced if it hadn't been for the passage of OPA 90, the shot 

heard around the world. The message that was sent was that it is 

no longer business as usual, there is a new wind blowing, and it 

is time to change the way we play the ball game. So that is the statement I would like to give you, sir, and certainly we stand ready to answer questions, and as we go through 

the questioning I will certainly try and piggy-back on some of the 

statements that were made by the previous panels. 

[Prepared statement of Admiral Henn follows:] 
74 

U.S.Departments of Transportation 

United States 

Coast Guard 

Commandant 

U.S. Cout Guard 

211Xl Second StrHt S.W. 

WUhington. DC zo5g3-0001 

Slaff Symbol: 

Phone: 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

U.S. COAST GUARD 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ARTHUR E. "GENE" HENN 

ON THE SHETLAND ISLANDS OIL SPILL ANO 

IMPLEMENTATION OF OPA 90 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT ANO INVESTIGATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 4, 1993 
75 

Rear Admiral A. E. 0

Chief, Office of Marine Safety, 

Geneu Henn 

Securl 

~~ ~-. 

and Envlronmental Protection 

United States Coast Guard 

Rear Admiral Arthur Eugene Henn became Chief, Office of Marine Safety, Security and 

Environmental Protection at Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D·.c., in June 1991 . 

Prior to this assignment, Rear Admiral Henn was Commander of the Maintenance and 

Logistics Command, Atlantic. 

Earlier assignments included that of Operations and Engineering Officer on the Coast 

Guard cutter Chincoteague; Assistant Chief, Merchant Marine Technical Branch, New 

Orleans, LA; and Special Project Action Officer, Merchant Marine Technical Division, Coast 

Guard Headquarters. 

He was also Marine Inspector and Senior Investigating Olf1C&r, Marine Inspection Office, 

Philadelphia, PA; Chief, Engineering Branch and Chief, Marine Technical and Hazardous 

Materials Division, Coast Guard Headquarters; Captain of the Port, New York; Commander, 

Group, New York; Commander, Subsector, New York, Maritime Defense Zone, Atlantic; and 

Chief, Operations Division and Chief of Staff, Eighth Coast Guard District, New Orleans, 

LA. 

A 1962 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy, Rear Admiral Henn earned combined 

master of science degrees in naval architecture, marine engineering and metallurgical engineering from the University of Michigan in 1968. Also, he is a 1882 graduate of the Army 

War College. 

His decorations include the Legion of Merit, two Meritorious Service Medals, four Coast 

Guard Commendation Ribbons, Coast Guard Unit Commendation Ribbon, Coast Guard 

Achievement Medal and two Commandant's Letter of Commendation Ribbons. 

Rear Admiral Henn is a member of the American Soclety 0of Naval Engineers, American 

Bureau of Shipping, International Cargo Gear Bureau, Marine Index Bureau, Marine 

Engineering Council of Underwriters Laboratories and the Sealift Committee of the National 

Defense Transportation Associ11tion. 

During the past 20 years, he has represented the United States Coast Guard as a member of delegations to the International Maritime Organization, a United Nations specia_lized 

agency. j-te heads United States delegations to meetings of the MarltirrMJ Safety and Marine 

Environment Protection Committees of IMO. 

A native of Cincinnati, Ohio, Rear Admiral Henn is married to the former Susan Frances 

Pedritti, also from Cincinnati. They have two grown children, David and Jennifer. 
76 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL A. E. HENN 

U.S. COAST GUARD 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 4, 1993 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished m-bers of the 

subcommittee. I am Rear Admiral Gene Henn, Chief of the Coast 

Guard's Office of Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental 

Protection. I appreciate this opportunity to bring you up to 

date on the recent Shetland Islands Oil Spill and to discuss some 

of the issues it raises as they relate to the Oil Pollution Act 

of 1990 (OPA 90). I would also like to update _you on various OPA 

90 accomplishments and additional -••urea which are underway to 

curb marine pollution. 

BRAER SPILL 

In the early morning hours of January 5, 1993, the Liberian 

tankship BRAER lost power in gale force winds while navigating 

the passage between Fair Isle and Shetland Isle in the North Sea. 

The British Coast Guard waa alerted, and evacuated 110at of the 

34-man crew by helicopter. Ship'• engineer• r-ained aboard and 

worked over the next five hour• att-pting to repair the 

machinery, thought to have failed fr011 fuel cont-ination. Tug 

assistance from the aajor oil terainal at Sull011 Voe, only 40 

miles to the north, waa impeded by heavy _.ther. 

1 
77 

After drifting almost six hours, the BRAER grounded at Garths 

Ness, a rocky headland near the southwestern tip of the Shetland 

Islands. Powerful winds and heavy seas continued to buffet the 

tanker for several days until it broke up. The tanker lost 

virtually all of its 24 million gallons of North Sea light crude 

oil, over twice the amount spilled by the EXXON VALDEZ, in an 

ecologically sensitive area. 

Extremely poor weather and sea conditions prevented initial 

response efforts, while at the same time they helped to disperse 

the oil. On January 6, the United Kingdom (U.K.) Department of 

Transport dropped 100 metric tons of chemical dispersants onto 

the spill to help break up the oil and • ix it into the water 

column. (The effectiveness of the chemical dispersant• has been 

debated.) As weather and seas permitted, response crews deployed 

containment boom to protect some shoreline areas. Since it 

involved relatively light oil, the spill tended to disperse and 

evaporate more readily, and will continue to break up through the 

normally stormy winter in the area. 

The BRAER was a single hulled tankship, 17 yrs old, current in 

its classification society inspection. At the ti- of the 

casualty, the BRAER was enroute Quebec, canada from a North Sea 

oil port in Norway, using a com• on navigational route for such 

vessels. 

2 
78 

A United States offer to provide technical , operational , and 

r esearch assistance was made on January 11, 1993, but it was 

declined by the U.K . Government. 

While regrettable, the T/V BRAER incident provides us with a 

sobering opportunity to examine our own marine environmental 

protection program -- its strengths and weaknesses, and the 

progress we have made since EXXON VALDEZ. I must note at the 

outset, however, that the transportation of oil has inherent 

risks, and no currently feasible system of environmental 

protection will provide a 100\ safeguard against accidents. 

A wide array of issues were raised by the incident, but I'd like 

to begin with those most closely related to the casualty itself. 

PREVENTION ISSUES 

LOSS OF POWER 

The BRAER ' s loss of power for 5~ hours before grounding on the 

rocks captured public attention and highlighted frustration with 

the variety of risks involved in transporting oil. Despite the 

vast breadth of legislation and international attention on the 

heels of the EXXON VALDEZ spill, major accidents continue, and in 

fact propulsion failures were not addressed specifically in OPA 

90. 

3 
79 

Oil spill prevention is complex and multifaceted. Solutions are 

necessarily aimed at different fronts -- structural integrity, 

crew competence, operational procedures, maintenance, 

navigational controls, technology, and financial responsibility; 

all are aimed at reducing risk. While propulsion failure isn't a 

new problem, we've collectively made substantial headway. Our 

data on U.S. waters shows that between 1981 and 1991, thirty-two 

tankships suffered propulsion failures. Of those, six ultimately 

went aground. None spilled oil. 

Could it happen here? Unfortunately, we're no less vulnerable 

than Scotland or any other coastal nation. Transportation of oil 

involves inherent risk to some degree, but - have many 

regulatory systems in place to reduce the risks. We are 

aggressively implementing our myriad new taskings from OPA 90, 

and we continue to evaluate risks -- both circumstantial and 

causal to further identify weak points and options for 

improving the U.S. spill prevention infrastructure. 

ABANDONMENT 

One of the more widely reported aspects of the BRAER spill was 

the Captain's order to abandon ship an hour before tugs arrived. 

Without a crew aboard the BRAER, tugs were unable to get lines on 

the tanker to arrest its drift ·toward the rocks. 

Speculation in hindsight is rampant, but I wouldn't be too quick 

to second-guess the Captain's judgment in such a situation. 

' 
80 

Dozens of human lives were at stake. While I am awed by the 

magnitude of the oil spill and its potentially severe effects on 

the envi ronment, we simply don't use human life as currency for 

preventing environmental damage. 

ESCORTS 

The BRAER ' s loss of power and abandonment before tugs could 

arrive also highlight the issue of escorts for tank ships. The 

purpose of escort tugs is primarily to provide a ba ckup in the 

event of mechanical problems such as the BRAER encountered or as 

a check against navigational error. This is an issue most 

recently dealt with legislatively by OPA 90 . Section 4116(c) of 

the Act required us to issue regulations defining certain areas 

where single-hulled t ankers larger than 5,000 gross tons 

transporting oil in bulk would be required to be escorted by two 

towing vessels. Three areas -- Prince William Sound , Alaska; 

Rosario Strait and Puget Sound , Washington -- were specified in 

the law. We published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on July 7 , 

1992 (57 FR 30058) . The response to t his Notice has highlighted 

the complexity of the escort issue . We must balance the large 

capital and operational costs with the benefits. Associated 

complexities include the need to devel op relevant and feasible 

horsepower standards and the need to consider new escort 

propulsion technologies. These issues and others arising from 

response to the Notice are currently being studied. 

5 
81 

The reality is that the BRAER incident occurred outside the type 

of confined and heavily traveled waters for which OPA 90 

specified escort requirements. We expect, however, to learn much 

from the rulemaking regarding the costs, benefits, and 

feasibility of tanker escorts. As we gain experience from 

implementation of the current mandates, we will have a clearer 

view of the applicability of such provisions to vessels in more 

open waters. 

TANKER FREE ZONES 

The proximity of the BRAER incident to the oil terminal at Sullom 

Voe naturally drew attention to the voluntary 10-mile tanker free 

zone which has been in effect around the Shetland Islands since 

the terminal was opened in 1979. The Shetland Islands Council 

recently proposed to the International Maritime Organization 

(IMO) that an area to be avoided be established in the vicinity, 

and IMO has endorsed this proposal. In the case of the BRAER 

casualty, however, the ship was reportedly navigating beyond this 

10-mile tanker free zone. 

Domestically, and at Congress' direction (Section 4lll(b)(7) of 

OPA 90), the Coast Guard is evaluating whether certain areas 

within U.S. navigable waters and the 200-mile Exclusive Economic 

Zone should be designated, in which tanker operation would be 

limited or prohibited. We're working quickly, and we're anxious 

to conclude the study and implement its findings. It is a 

significant undertaking , however, and we must carefully balance a 

6 
82 

variety of national needs and interests. The report will be 

delivered to Congress as geographic segments are completed, with 

final delivery of all segments by 1995. 

VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES (VTS) 

One of the paradoxes of the BRAER casualty was its proximity to 

Sullom Voe, which offers a widely acclaimed Vessel Traffic 

Service (VTS) System for the port and terminal area just 40 miles 

to the north .. At about 20 miles offshore, the BRAER was outside 

the range and the jurisdiction of the VTS. 

We don't know if VTS would have helped avert the oil spill. How 

might a VTS have helped? A VTS might have reduced the time 

required to detect and respond to the loss of propulsion. It 

would not have prevented the engineering failure. 

Domestically, we have completed the OPA 90 mandated study of VTS 

for U.S. ports. That study has given us a much improved 

perspective of our own VTS needs and has positioned us for a 

dramatic expansion in VTS installations. 

Since the passage of OPA 90, the Coast Guard has reactivated VTS 

New York and expanded service in other areas. New VTS's are 

being established in New Orleans, Los Angeles/Long Beach, and 

other critical ports. Rulemaking is underway to make 

participation in these VTS's mandatory, consistent with the 

provisions of OPA 90. 

7 
83 

Internationally, the IMO is considering alternatives for 

mandatory offshore reporting in circumstances other than port 

entry. It is anticipated that this reporting would be linked to 

established VTS systems. The Coast Guard will remain actively 

invol~ed in these negotiations. 

DOUBLE HULLS 

The BRAER was a single hull vessel and its loss calls to mind the 

intense debate, both domestically and internationally during 

recent years, on the benefits of tankers with double hulls. Most 

recently, the Department of Transportation submitted to Congress 

an in-depth report, commissioned by the Coast Guard and conducted 

by the National Academy of Sciences, on alternatives to double 

hulls. The key conclusions of the report were that there is 

currently no other design which offers equivalent protection, but 

that continued evaluation of new technologies was warranted. The 

outcome of these debates has forever changed the face of tanker 

construction, and it has left us with margins of environmental 

protection that are orders of magnitude greater than we knew a 

few short years ago. Domestic regulations require double hulls 

for new tankers built after June 30, 1990. These regulations 

also require existing single hull tankers to be retrofitted with 

double hulls starting in 1995. International regulations will 

require double hulls on new tankers starting in July 1993 and 

will require existing single hull tankers to be retrofitted or 

retired not more than 30 years after delivery. Desplte this 

extraordinary progress, the BRAER brings home the realization 

8 
that [IQ improvement in the prevention arena is a cure-all. A 

double hull would not have helped prevent the BRAER spill. 

PREPAREDNESS ISSUES 

RESPONSE PLANS 

I am not fully familiar with the BRAER's level of preparedness to 

respond to its own spill. I can, however, describe the 

preparedness regime in which we would find ourselves if a BRAER 

incident occurred in our waters. I'll begin with the benefits of 

the OPA 90 mandated vessel response plan. 

As you know, the stringent vessel response planning requirements 

of OPA 90 become effective on February 18, 1993. Under those 

requirements, a tanker which was involved in such an incident in 

navigable waters of the U.S. would have in place an extensive 

response plan designed to ensure effective response to loss of 

its entire cargo in adverse -ather. Key aaong th• many required 

provisions of the plan would be the identification, and contract 

(or other approved means) to ensure the availability, of private 

personnel and equipment necessary to remove a worst case 

discharge, or threat of discharge, to the • axi• um extent 

practicable. Coupled with this provision, the plan would also 

identify a qualified individual fully authorised by the owner to 

implement r-oval actions. I cannot -phasise enough that a 

major benefit of the new vessel plan requir-,its is that they 

require owners to_ think through their response activities in 

9 
85 

advance, and we have learned throughout the years that planning 

is more important than the plan. I am convinced that compliance 

with these provisions will immeasurably improve the quickness and 

efficiency of response along our shores, and will constitute a 

major step toward protecting our marine environment. As you 

know, publication of the interim final regulations implementing 

these planning requirements is scheduled for February 5, 1993. 

In an effort to ease the burden attendant with preparing these 

plans, and to compensate for the delay in publishing the 

regulations, we have provided the industry with extensive written 

guidance in the form of Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 

Number 8-92. 

I would be remiss if I did not note here that a foreign flag 

tanker in transit passage in our Exclusive Economic Zone would 

not be subject to this rule unless the tanker had previously been 

in a U.S. port and had contemplated the transit. 

Also relevant to vessel response plans, I cannot help pausing to 

note that the "worst case discharge", (i.e., discharge in adverse 

weather conditions of a vessel's entire cargo), which has been 

widely criticised aa an unreasonable planning standard, ia 

exemplified by the BRAER spill. 

Finally, on this subject, I would like to note that - played an 

integral part in negotiating the international atand~rd for 

response plans that ia now articulated in Regulation 26 of Annex 

10 
86 

I of International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 

from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating 

thereto (MARPOL 73/78) . In addition to tankers over 150 gross 

tons, this requirement will apply to cargo vessels over 400 gross 

tons. 

ON BOARD RESPONSE EQUIPMENT 

Another preparedness issue which is somewhat tangential to the. 

loss of the BRAER is the carriage of on board response equipment. 

This has been a subject of ongoing debate during the rul-aking 

arising from Section 4202(a)(6) of OPA 90. Our Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking proposed a requirement for the carriage of an 

emergency towing package which may, in the future, help to 

prevent such accidents as the BRAER grounding. The circumstances 

surrounding the BRAER spill suggest that on board oil containment 

boom or skimmers would not have been of value. The BRAER 

incident therefore tends to validate the posture the Coast Guard 

has so far taken on shipboard equipment. The comment period on 

this rulemaking is closed and development of the final tule is 

underway. There continues to be much debate regarding the 

safety, effectiveness and feasibility of tanker-deployed 

equipment . In the long run, this is an area that is technology 

sensitive and is likely to need periodic reexamination. 

11 
87 

AREA CONTINGENCY PLANS 

I cannot leave the assessment of our preparedness for a BRAERlike incident without touching on the status of the Area 

Contingency Plans that were mandated by OPA 90. These plans will 

form the shoreside comp~ement to the vessel response plans. They 

will provide the mechanism for the necessary coordination among 

Federal, State, and local agencies during a spill response. The 

plans will be significant enhancements over existing local 

contingency plans, but their greatest advantage comes from the 

fact that they will be developed by Area COmmittees made up of 

relevant Federal, State, and local agencies, and will involve 

local industry, environmental groups and academics. This Area 

Committee/Area Plan concept, by broadening the planning process, 

will establish response relationships and enhance coordination 

during the stress of actual response. we are well along with the 

large task of realizing these genuine benefits. July 1993 has 

been set as the target date to have all Area Plans in place. I 

am absolutely convinced that a BRAER-type spill occurring under 

an OPA 90 preparedness regi-, from the vessel side and 

shoreside, will be handled with an efficiency never before seen. 

RESPONSE ISSUES 

DISPERSANTS 

The BRAER incident has not raised a broad array of response 

issues. The severity of the weather precluded any i111111ediate 

containment efforts and limited the response to application of 

12 
88 

dispersants. While the severity of the weather limits human 

response, it does expedite natural dispersion of the oil. There 

has been much debate on the effectiveness of the dispersants used 

in the BRAER incident but it would not be productive for me to 

enter that debate. I would like to emphasize that should a BRAER 

incident occur off our coast, our National Response System, as 

detailed in the National Contingency Plan and implemented by the 

Area Contingency Plans, provides for structured, planned, 

knowledgeable decision-making to ensure effective use of 

dispersants in appropriate circumstances. 

RESPONSE CAPABILITY 

An incident of the BRAER's magnitude makes us reflect on our own 

response capabilities. The Coast Guard ' s National Strike Force, 

whose mission is to provide specialized equipment and technical 

support for major incidents, has been greatly enhanced through 

OPA 90. A thi rd strike team was commissioned at Fort Dix, New 

Jersey and the National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC) 

was established at Elizabeth City, North Carolina to oversee 

strike team operations, training, and equipage. In addition, the 

NSFCC will oversee the expanded new Federal, State and private 

exercise programs of OPA 90. 

We have dramatically boosted our response capability by 

purchasing extensive OPA 90-authorized response equi~ment for 

prepositioning at various sites around the country. We are 

beginning to deliver this equipment to 19 major sites and expect 

13 
89 

to have it all delivered by May 1994. In addition, we have 

supplied each of our Captains of the Ports with significant 

"first response" equipment for their use during more routine 

spills. This equipment has already been effectively used in 

response. OPA 90 clearly promotes growth in the private sector's 

ability to provide its own response equipment. While there is a 

long way to go, the evolution of organizations such as the Marine 

Spill Response corporation and the National Response corporation 

are strong indicators that OPA 90 is having the desired effect. 

For response to truly major incidents, we have developed a 

special organizational concept which we call the Spills of 

National Significance protocol. This protocol would draw on 

existing fe'deral resources, and, within the context of the 

National Contingency Plan, would restructure them to better deal 

with spills that overwhelm the resources of the spill area. 

Supported by OPA 90, research and development into new response 

technologies continue, and it is now better coordinated (through 

the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research) 

to promote efficient use of research and development funds. 

14 
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 

The ability to pay for the damages caused by oil spills is always 

an issue in cases of the magnitude of the BRAER. Under the 

liability regime established by OPA 90, a vessel the size of the 

BRAER would have had to demonstrate financial responsibility 

nearly seven times greater than that required under the existing 

international liability regime. Much of the international 

shipping community has stated that it is not prepared to comply 

with the OPA 90 financial responsibility provisions. This has 

delayed the development of realistic and functional financial 

responsibility implementing regulations while we diligently seek 

resolution . I can assure you we are sparing no effort to bring 

this difficult issue to closure with the iaauance of appropriate 

regulations. In the meantime, aome comfort can be taken in the 

fact that nearly all tankers currently serving the United States 

carry at least $500 million in pollution liability coverage, 

which exceeds the OPA 90 limits. 

ADDITIONAL MEASURES 

While not particularly related to the Shetland Islands spill, I 

would like to give you a brief look at some other key initiatives 

that are planned or underway to reduce the risks of further 

environmental damage . 

15 
91 

We have been an active proponent of, and will be an active 

participant in, the International Maritime Organization's new 

Subcommittee on Flag State Implementation. Among the primary 

issues on the Subcommittee ' s agenda is the establishment of 

guidelines and standards for flag states, classification 

societies, and organizations acting on behalf of flag states. 

These standards will do much to raise existing substandard 

performance in ensuring compliance with international pollution 

conventions. 

Domestically, we have regulatory initiatives to close gaps in the 

coverage between Federal and state pilotage provisions in New 

York, Los Angeles/Long Beach, and Barbers Point, HI. In 

addition, we are working with the National Academy of Science ' s 

Marine Board in their study of pilotage issues. 

The Marine Board, with funding assistance from the Coast Guard, 

is studying the status of salvage capabilities in U.S. waters. 

This study will provide key information to assess gaps in salvage 

coverage and to seek means to compensate for those gaps. 

SUMMARY 

I have touched on a number of current marine environmental 

protection issues and initiatives directly or indirectly related 

to OPA 90. Incidents such as the BRAER grounding give us all a 

chance to reflect on where we are, how far we have come and where 

16 
92 

we have yet to go in protecting America's • arine environment. 

Overall, we are doing very well. I believe OPA 90 has brought us 

unprecedented progress on the road to environmental protection in 

the two and a half years since its enactment and our posture in 

both prevention and response capability has been significantly 

enhanced. That progress could not have been achieved without the 

combined and aggressive efforts of the public, industry, and the 

environmental community, working with us in the framework aet by 

Congress. We, of course, have more to do and we look forward to 

the continued joint efforts betw-n govern• ent, industry and the 

public in achieving full implementation of OPA 90. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you • ay have. 

17 
93 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, and obviously we are pleased to hear 

your statement of purpose. Obviously, the Exxon Valdez was a very traumatic event for this 

nation and called into question a whole series of conflicting issues. To a great extent, those issues were reconciled in the oil spill legis- lation. In some cases even where committees spoke, the Floor of 

the House spoke even stronger and, I think, were echoing what we 

were hearing from our constituents-whether or not they would 

ever be impacted-that tragedy and the attention given to it was 

simply unacceptable to them. I think the Coast Guard is clearly viewed as the "thin blue line," 

if you will, between the · recurrence of that and the prevention of 

those actions. It is a very serious charge, because I think if you 

talk to anybody in the industry, as I often do, they realize the last 

thing they need is another one of these events. It was true after 

the blow-out at Santa Barbara-it is certainly true after the Exxon 

Valdez and the Braer-that there is nothing like one of these 

events to sort of focus the mind and the pocketbook of the industry. 

But there is still a tendency to slide back as time removes the 

event from your current and urgent concerns. That is true of the 

public, and that is true of the industry, but we cannot let that be 

true of the Coast Guard, because your charge is to do this every 

day, as difficult as that task is. The previous panel mentioned a number of requirements of OPA 

90 that have not been met, regulations that have not been proposed, and I wonder if you might comment on that and what you 

really believe the schedule is, and also if you could tell us what are 

the major impediments to the production of those regulations and 

the proposals for regulations. 

Admiral HENN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. I realize that is a mouthful, but it kind of goes to 

the crux of our reliance on the Act. 

Admiral HENN. Well, sir, I share your concerns. I understand the 

importance of that question itself. It is one that I ask myself day 

in and day out, and I have to tell you, the Commandant asks me 

that same question fairly frequently. 

But to sum it up this way, I think we are about a third of the 

way toward where we want to be. I have said in many forums that 

I eat and sleep OPA 90. I estimate that we will have implemented 

the Coast Guard portions of OPA 90 as I leave my watch, which 

looks to be the summer of 1994, and I think that the major issues, 

those that had congressionally mandated deadlines, for the most 

part have been met. Certainly with regard to vessel response plans 

and facility response plans, those interim rules will be on the street 

as of this Friday. I mean published in the Federal Register; they 

are already out in xeroxed copies. 

The one issue that I think is not where I want it at the present 

time is the issue that Nina brought up on the single-hulled vessels, 

the existing ships. There was a deadline-this was a congressionally mandated deadline-of August 18, 1991, to have the final regulations in place. We don't have those in place, and we don't have 

them in place because, as we have told the subcommittees that we 

normally appear before, we don't have the answers, and neither 

does the international regime, neitp.er does Government, and nei70-544 0 - 93 - 4 
94 

ther do the stewards of our environment, those who are dedicated 

full time to that, such as some of the groups like Greenpeace and 

others; the answers just aren't there. However, we think we have 

the answers fairly well developed, but we are not 100 percent 

there. 

We are going to get a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking out on the 

single-hulled vessels fairly quickly. I expect that that will be out 

in the next month or two. What has delayed it has been the fact 

that, working through the International Maritime Organization, seeing what other nations are trying to do, meeting with those who 

have come up with what they think are good engineering alternatives, seeing if, in fact, those are good engineering alternatives 

or if they are good money-making devices for an individual or corporation. Congress did give us specific guidance. They said, "Whatever you do must be technically feasible and also economically reasonable," and therein is the real hang-up. 

If we just had to provide an engineering solution, sir, we could 

come up with that. I certainly have the talent within my organiza- tion to come up with a good engineering solution. I'm not sure the 

world would want to pay for it, but to meet the mandate that you 

have given us of being economically and technically feasible, that 

is where the real hang-up is. 

I can go into some other specifics, but let me kind of drop back 

a little bit and answer the root of your question of, why have there 

been these general delays? Why two and a half years after OPA 90 

was passed, why don't you have it all done, regardless of those 

items that have congressional deadlines on them? And, I have to 

tell you, you know, the old story of the comic strip character that 

said, "We have met the enemy, and it is us." 

Our Government, to be fair to the public that we serve, has put 

constraints on the way we do rulemaking. It takes about 200 days 

to get a rule through the system and on the streets, except in emergency situations where life is in imminent danger. That is just the 

system that we have set up within the Administration. I am, of 

course, talking about my own Department, the Department of 

Transportation, which the Coast Guard is a part of. 

I deal within that regime. I recognize that there is a good side 

and a bad side to it, but it is a regime that works. It ensures that 

we don't do anything screwy. It does ensure that there is input to 

our ref!U}ations from the public, and certainly that is demanded by 

the Administrative Procedures Act. 

There are some deadlines just as a result of our form of government. Certainly within the Executive Branch, the rulemakings 

must go through 0MB and through the Department, and that too 

is important, and there are good reasons for that. So there are 

some delays there. Obviously, there are some outside delays that we have been faced 

with, such as the two moratoriums that we have had on rulemaking just during the past year. It wasn't just a moratorium on 

sending the rules up, but it was actually a moratorium on working 

on the rules, unless they had congressional mandates and a couple 

of other kickers that would allow them to go forward. 

But I think within the best intentions of our Government, we 

were told to go back and look at standing regulations that were in 
95 

place and see if we couldn't do away with regulations that were 

still lying around that had served their purpose. Sir, we did find 

some of those, and we did do away with some of those. So that, I 

think, was a fairly good idea, but it has set us back somewhat. 

I am very pleased with where we are on the response plans. As 

you know, OPA 90 says that industry must have their vessel response plans and their facility response plans to the Coast Guard 

by the 18th of this month. Now some-some who have not taken 

the time to become well informed or understand the rulemaking, 

or some who just intentionall}' want to not understand it-would 

say that February 18 is a wall and that the industry is not going 

to be able to meet it, that the storage and transportation of oil as 

we know it in the United States today will cease, the lights will 

go out, and we will all die of cold. I want to tell you, absolutely, 

it is ho~ash. It is almost nonsense even making that statement, 

but obVIously there is a segment out there that is still saying that 

today. 

The response plans must be in to us by the 18th. The vessel owners and the facility owners must be in compliance with their plan 

by August 18, 1993. There is a 2-year window from the 18th of this 

month for the Coast Guard to take final approval action on those 

plans. I won't bore you with all the details here, but we have -done 

some things to make sure that industry and the public know how 

we are going to make this regime work and that on February 19 

the oil will be flowing and it will be flowing, we think, more safely 

than it is today. 

There are a lot of red herrings that have been hung out, a lot 

of smoke and mirrors that have been put up with regard to this 

issue. One of them is, a lot that has been said about the national 

contingency plan not being published as it was supposed to have 

been, and I tell you that is a true statement. EPA has the lead on 

that. I am not trying to badmouth the EPA. The Coast Guard is 

the second biggest player in that. However, there are 12 other 

agencies involved. 

The reason that it is a red herring is that what we have told people with regard to the response plans is: "Use the present national 

contingency plan. The modifications are some style, some rearrangement, some substantive, but not horrendously different from 

what we have now. If you use the present national contingency 

plan, we are going to accept that in this first response plan submittal, if you have done it in accordance with the guidance we put out 

several months ago, which the final rules are going to look just like. If you do that, your plan is going to be valid for 5 years because it is going to be a good plan, and then you can fine-tune 5 

years from now with the national contingency plan," which I hope 

is published within maybe the next few months. Then there is another red herring that has been hung out saying, 

well, the area committees, and the area contingency plans are just 

in planning, but their work isn't done, and part of a vessel's response plan, part of a facility's response plan, requires us to have 

information in there that only can be obtained from the area contingency plan. We have put this out in writing, and we have talked 

about it to every forum we could talk to-that the area contingency 

plans are a beefed-up version of the local contingency plans which 
96 

the Coast Guard has had in place with industry for over two decades now. So again, we have told industry, and we have told the 

public that if in your response plans you use the information in the 

present local contingency plans-and we have made those available 

to folks who need them-your plan will be good for the next 5 

years, and indeed it will be a good plan. There has been a lot of concern that EPA has not come out with 

their rulemaking on the facilities. I cannot address that for EPA, 

but I can tell you the Coast Guard has put out its rulemaking. In 

fact, the interim final rules will be printed in the Federal Regis-ter 

this Friday for both vessels and those facilities for which the Coast 

Guard is responsible. 

However, again, working with the public and industry, we have 

said that you don't need to make a response plan for EPA and a 

response plan for the Coast Guard. We, the Coast Guard, are willing to put our stamp on an EPA-approved plan. In the interim, if 

it is a Coast Guard-regulated facility, we will put our stamp on 

your plan, and if the EPA wants anything additional, you can negotiate that with them, but we have a regime in place that, again, 

as I say, the oil is not going to stop flowing come the 19th of this 

month. 

I think I will just stop there, sir, and see if you want to attack 

another area or if you would like some more information on this 

particular issue. Mr. MILLER. Let me ask you with respect to the first issue you 

raised on the double-hulls. Am I correct that the decision is, in fact, 

made that you are going to have double-hulls for U.S. traffic? 

Admiral HENN. Yes, sir. Mr. MILLER. But there is a tension between that and international standards and traffic and what-have-you. Is that accurate? 

Admiral HENN. Well, there is, sir, but we have successfully negotiated that internationally, and indeed the international standard 

for new tankers will be double-hulled. 

I think the thing we have to bear in mind is that here in the 

United States, if you are going to have a U.S.-flag tanker or you 

are going to bring a new tanker in-and our date for defining a 

new tanker is as of the enactment in 1990-it must be a doublehulled tanker, and then of course the ones out there, most of which 

are single-hulled, have this phase-out period. 

There are some differences, some tension, between the United 

States and the international community, and I will discuss that if 

you would like, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, I would. 

Admiral HENN. The hang-up is this. I say we have successfully 

negotiated the double-hull standard internationally; we did. I headed the U.S. delegation that made that all happen, and the delegation had . three congressional staff members on it to assist us. They 

did provide a great deal of assistance, and the world took note of 

that. 

The implementation date for new tankers is somewhat different 

for the international world, but that is only for them to trade in 

places other than the United States. 
97 

Mr. MILLER. Whether under American flag or foreign flag, if you 

are doing business in U.S. waters, you are going to be doublehulled. 

Admiral HENN. Yes, sir. Now that pill went down hard within 

the international community. They have ways of doing this, and 

certainly they have stuck me in the eye before the international 

community-since I was representing the United States-prior to 

accepting the double-hull standard. But the important point was 

that we successfully negotiated. 

They also proceeded to set up a regime for existing vessels, a 

phase-out period much like what we have in the United States. In 

fact, their phase-out schedule is slightly quicker than our phase-out 

schedule. 

Mr. MILLER. Why is that? 

Admiral HENN. There was a general feeling that, for the reasons 

stated by other panels, there was a need to phase out the existing 

tankers quicker, that it could be done quicker. Frankly, sir, I think 

part of it was, they wanted it to be different than the OPA 90 timetable, and we certainly understand the international politics of 

that. 

Mr. MILLER. But that would suggest that our phase-out and our 

guidelines aren't based in either economics or technology but based 

in what? 

Admiral HENN. I think they are based in economics and technology, sir, and I say that knowing congressional staff members 

worked on that timetable-I know many of the members here also 

took a look at that timetable. 

The timetable in OPA 90 takes into account the fact that we 

have a coastal U.S. tanker fleet that is fairly old and there is going 

to be some time needed to actually bring these new tankers in just 

for our own coastal trade; and, there were real-world co:nsiderations 

that there would not be the capacity to transport oil in the United 

States, or the capacity needed, if in fact you varied markedly from 

that timetable. 

Mr. MILLER. Has that turned out to be,true? 

Admiral HENN. Looking at the timetable itself, and looking at 

some of the industry association runs that have been made on 

those numbers, I believe that to be true, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. Because one of the concerns that was raised on the 

other side of that issue was that if you gave the long lag time and 

you knew you had this second bite at the apple at the international 

level, that that could also be used as leverage to come back and try 

to weaken these standards later. It now appears that that, in fact, 

is not going to take place. 

Admiral HENN. No, sir. , Mr. MILLER. But it also mildly draws into question in my mind 

as to whether or not, as I say; those guidelines are really now 

based upon factual evidence with respect to the commercial restraints, as you say, and/or technology and the economics of this 

business, because with all due respect, I'm sure a lot of people did 

a lot of work about those guidelines but that is not how we arrived 

at them. 

I mean people made different cases for different dates, but the 

sequence of events that has happened since then has suggested 
98 

that those weren't necessarily accurate. There was a suggestion that nobody was going to bring oil to the United States because of 

either liability or double-hulls. Well, that has turned out not to be 

true, so obviously there is going to be a larger universe of ships 

available for this trade than people were saying who said, "If you 

don't give us 2015, we will never be able to phase it in." 

So I just raise that as an issue, now that you have gone through 

these difficult negotiations, whether you look back and the same 

rationales that were driving that date are true today or we think 

they are as valid as people suggested they were at that time. 

Admiral HENN. Yes, sir, I think that is a very telling point that 

you make, and I look at it this way. First of all, internationally, 

IMO took a look at the phase-out schedule. They ran the same 

numbers or used basically the same approach. I recognize it is 

somewhat of a soft analysis to do this, but the fact that they came 

up with a phase-out schedule for the world fleet that pretty well 

matches the U.S. fleet-we are talking about a couple of years dif. 

ference here or there-is supportive of the fact that we probably 

did it pretty much right. 

The other thing is, we have to look at the fleet that we are dealing with. As you know, most of the double-hulled tankers that are 

being built now-and there are a number of them being built in the 

range of 90,000 deadweight to 150,000 deadweight-are pretty 

good-size ships. 

The U.S. coastal fleet that is so vital to our Nation, at least the 

movement of oil as we know it, is more the handy-size tankers; we 

are talking the 30,000 to 50,000 deadweight. The world is not 

building those type of tankers right now for double-hulls; that type 

of fleet is not going to be available to us unless we build a U.S. 

fleet. 

W ~ could, of course, I suppose, through congressional action, do 

away with the restrictions that exist now for trading between U.S. 

ports; that that must be a U.S.-flag vessel to do that-a foreign 

vessel couldn't do that. But if you say we will handle that one legislatively, you are still faced with the fact that the double-hulled 

tankers that are being built right now are the big tankers to move 

oil across the Atlantic, and the Pacific-not necessarily to run up 

and down our coast. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Commander Rollison, are you familiar with the Natural Resources Defense Council report, "Safety of the Bay"? 

Commander ROLLISON. Yes, sir, I have read it. 

Mr. MILLER. What is your impression of it? 

Commander ROLLISON. It is a very informative report. 

Mr. MILLER. Does it accurately portray the circumstances? 

Commander ROLLISON. There may be some inaccuracies in it. 

Mr. MILLER. What would those be? And I am not trying to set 

up a point of contention, I am just bouncing off my reading of it 

and what you might technically disagree with. 

Commander ROLLISON. Since I don't have it memorized and 

didn't come prepared to speak to that, I would like to--

Mr. MILLER. Well, if I might submit that question to you in writing, because I think it would be helpful to us to have that. 
99 

Admiral HENN. Mr. Chairman, if I might just put a little footnote 

on what Ed has said, certainly we would be more than pleased to 

respond in writing, but we, the Coast Guard, think the report that 

Nina and her folks have put together is a fair assessment. You 

know, you can always quibble on dotting i's and crossing t's, but 

to give you one example, if you look at the table which says "Delays 

in Implementation of OPA Oil Spill Prevention and Response Provisions," I've got no argument with that table; that is an accurate 

reflection. Monthly, I put out a table which deals with 100 items, 

and my table will pretty much match up with this table. 

Regarding the conclusions which the group brings in that report, 

I think we all recognize that certainly it has a spin of an environmental group whose day-to-day thrust is being the good stewards 

of the environment, and we need those folks, and that is exactly 

what they should be doing. But no, we have no real differences with that report, and I found 

it to be a very informative and, in fact, very good report. 

Mr. MILLER. Let me, if I might, turn to a couple of California issues, some because they are involved in the TAPS. I assume, Commander, you could respond to these. 

The voluntary 50-mile limit, what is your impression of that? 

Commander ROLLISON. I am not conversant with that, no, sir; 

that is out of my field. 

Admiral HENN. Sir, Margie can respond to that. 

Mr. MILLER. If you would. 

Ms. HEGY. Sir, the voluntary 50-mile limit, I think, seems to be 

very effective. I think that it is great that the oil companies and 

the State were able to work out that agreement. That, of course, will be one of the things that we will be looking at and reporting 

to you on when we submit our report to the Congress on the tanker-free zone study which was required by OPA 90. 

I have heard groups speak previously that it was due in Congress in August and it is still not complete. That is a monumental 

study. That is the one where we were tasked with evaluating areas 

of the navigable waters and the exclusive economic zone to determine if tanker traffic should be limited or prohibited. In the legislative history of the Act, Congress indicated a specific 

interest in areas that were under moratorium from oil and gas 

drilling, also the Santa Barbara Channel and Montauk Point. The 

Coast Guard chose the eight Minerals Management Service planning areas that are under moratorium from oil drilling as our 

study areas and also Montauk Point and the Santa Barbara Channel. There have been. a lot of documents gathered, and a lot of effort put forth, to bring this study to conclusion, but because of the 

importance of it we have not been able to complete it. 1 

Just to provide you with a brief overview, if you are interested, 

we are identifying the resources in these areas, we are determining 

where vessels transit in these areas, and we are trying to determine the volume of tankers in these areas. We have worked very 

closely with the Minerals Management Service to do trajectory 

analysis to show us where oil would go if it were spilled-from a 

tanker in its present traffic pattern, what the probability would be 

that it· would reach a coast or an environmental resource within a 

specified 3-, 10-, or 30-day period, and also where we would have 
100 

to move vessels in order to reduce that risk. We are doing a risk 

anal}'sis as well. It is a major undertaking. It encompasses the entire West Coast, the East Coast, and the eastern portion of the Gulf 

of Mexico, and we hope to have the West Coast portion of that 

study to you by the end of 1993. 

Mr. MILLER. What is your understanding of the voluntary limit? 

I am making an assumption, and tell me if I am correct, that that 

has not turned out to be burdensome to the signatories of that 

agreement. 

Ms. HEGY. Not from the information that I have, sir. Mr. MILLER. How does that work? When you exit San Francisco 

Bay, do you have to go out 50 miles before you head north or south, 

or do you head out of there on an angle, or what is the protocol? 

Ms. HEGY. That is one of the things that our tanker study will 

have to consider. Mr. MILLER. What are they doing under their agreement? 

Ms. HEGY. I am not sure how that works, sir. There is presently 

a traffic separation scheme that is internationally adopted in place 

in San Francisco, and vessels are using that. They have been using 

it, and it has been in place for quite some time. 

One of the other parts of the study that we are going to have to 

look at prior to making our report to you is the fact that the tankers are not going to go away; they still need to go into port. So if 

there are areas that are environmentally sensitive where tankers 

should be kept out, we have to make some provision for them to 

come into port, and maybe other vessel-routing measures such as 

traffic separation schemes are necessary in order to do that. Someone earlier mentioned the Monterey Bay Sanctuary. The 

Coast Guard is working with NOAA, and we are going to be conducting a study to determine what the vessel-routing needs off the 

California coast are and also what regulations relating to vessels 

should be promulgated for the Monterey Bay Sanctuary. 

Mr. MILLER. Commander, what is the status of the VTS in San 

Francisco Bay? 

Commander ROLLISON. It is alive and well, sir. It is working just 

fine. 

Mr. MILLER. No, no. What is the status of the notion of whether 

you are going to expand that? Are you going to expand that beyond 

San Rafael Bridge? 

Commander ROLLISON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. Are you going to use that up the river? 

Commander RoLLISON. Absolutely. We have plans in place, and 

we are proceeding actively to secure the property, to expand surveillance, add radar sites and camera sites all the way up river to 

the weapons station. Mr. MILLER. So that would include the weapons station. 

Commander RoLLISON. Yes, sir, right up to the San Rafael 

Bridge, the SP Railroad Bridge near the weapons station. We are 

going to put a camera site at Ozol, a radar site at Mare Island, and 

a radar site at Chevron. 

Mr. MILLER. That is to be completed when? 

Commander RoLLISON. The third quarter of fiscal year 1994. 

Mr. MILLER. Are there any impediment.a? Is that a funding matter, or is the funding on line for tbat? 
101 

Commander ROLLISON. We have all the funding necessary to go forward with our property acquisition and utility acquisition, depending upon funding in 1994. 

Mr. MILLER. Where are you with respect to this discussion 

around escort vessels, tugs, and the right mix of tugs, and whether 

they should be used or not used in San Francisco Bay? Is that an 

ongoing proposition, or has that not been raised? 

Admiral HENN. Sir, we are taking a look at that. We have another study going into that. I think some of the discussion brought up whether a tractor tug 

is better than a conventional tug. I think some of the things you 

said probably give the answer. There is a yes and no answer. A 

tractor tug is better in some cases; a conventional tug is better in 

others; depending on the ship or the port, you might want one over 

the other. But we are taking a look at that. One of the things that we do right now-in areas where the Captain of the Port is concerned, for one reason or another-the Coast 

Guard Captain of the Port can specify when tugs have to be used. Out on the West Coast in Seattle, they go so far as to also specify 

the horsepower and the dimensions of the tug that are appropriate 

for a certain deadweight tanker, so it gets pretty specific. In the 

port of New York, when I was Captain of the Port there, we didn't 

find a need to do that. But in certain areas, obviously, it is more 

important than others. Also, for the most part, in the port of New 

York we had a fairly soft bottom, and that is not the case in all 

the ports of the United States. 

Mr. MILLER. That is the assumption, that this bottom could absorb one of these tankers without breaching the integrity of the 

tanker. 

Admiral HENN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. That is not the safety system that most Americans 

have in mind when they think about this. Let me just make that 

clear. 

Admiral HENN. Oh, I recognize that, sir. Mr. MILLER. The good news is, it is up on a sandy beach. Let me ask you a follow-on to that question. This whole issue 

that was raised earlier this morning on the question of a positive command and control system in busy ports-again, I appreciate the 

safety record and what, in fact, appears to be an improved safety record over the last couple of years. 

But, you know, people who fool with statistics tell you that a 

time comes when you are due, and some people would argue that 

the shuttle accident was right on schedule, that that is about when 

you could expect that system to engage in some kind of major failure. You know, you do a thousand trips across the bay in San 

Francisco, and you say, "Well, in five years we are going to have 

the study done to take a look at this." That sounds like 25,000 

trips, and it sound like you are reaching the point where the confluence of events takes over, and the question is, are you, in fact, 

prepared? 

Let me ask you, what kind of debate is taking place within the 

Coast Guard and the Department of Transportation about this 

issue of, in fact, positive command and control or what we would 

equate here to the Shetland harbor model and/or our air control 
102 

system because of the movement of traffic? We know, when the 

economy picks up, the West Coast can get real busy in the water- ways rather quickly. You can look south of San Francisco Bay Bridge, and you have got more people out there lightering one an- other and moving around and at anchor than you may know what 

to do with. 

So where are we in this debate? Is this just simply dismissed as 

a Shetlands model- that that is interesting, what they did in the 

Shetland Islands, but we are not looking at that? Or where is this 

debate? 

Admiral HENN. I think the debate is in several areas on that 

whole issue, sir. For years, the Coast Guard has had the authority and used the authority at the Captain-of-the-Port level to manage 

the flow of traffic on either a daily or an incident type basis. You 

know, limitin~ traffic to just one direction. We do that day in and 

day out, particularly on the rivers with regard to barge traffic at 

low water times. On another piece of the issue though, the VTSs, of course we 

have done a study and we have taken a look at where we think 

VTS should be and a priority regime on which ones should go in 

first. That has been done; that has been looked at. So we have 

something in place that is working; and we have a study that looks 

at the VTS regime. 

Now if you get to an incident where a casualty has occurred, 

what do we do there? That involves the National Contingency Plan 

where the authority and the regime on how to control it is already 

set up, right down to who is the man with the hot potato, who is 

in charge at the local level, and that is the Federal On-Scene Coor- dinator. It spells out whether it is going to be the Coast Guard or 

the EPA. So I think there are at least three areas to that issue, 

sir. I am not sure I have covered all that you were thinking of. 

Mr. MILLER. Am· I correct that in one of your studies you deter- mined that a positive VTS system was not necessary for Prince 

William Sound? Is that correct? 

Commander ROLLISON. It is correct, yes, sir. Mr. MILLER. That raises questions in my mind about what were 

the criteria that you used. What sifted that out? I mean we are 

constantly told that this is some of the more challenging weather 

and ships from time to time have been surprised by ice activity, 

have been surprised by winds, and again, when we go back and 

look at the Coast Guard logs and concerns, these issues are not unusual in that area. Commander ROLLISON. As the Admiral points out, the Captain of 

the Port in each zone has always had, and still has, the authority 

to close the bay, close the harbor, close the channel, or do whatever 

he considers necessary in response to whatever condition has arisen. In Prince William Sound specifically, we have all the control 

necessary now to control that tanker traffic. Mr. MILLER. We also have substantial evidence that that control 

system has been politically challenged, in the case of high winds, 

in the case of slowing tanker traffic through that Sound. So you 

have the appearance of all of the control necessary, but the past 

record is that control may not, in fact, be in the hands of that individual at any particular time, or if it is exercised, it may not be 
103 

exercised for the duration of a period of time necessary for the circumstances to pass. So I am suggesting that when we talk about positive control, we 

are talking about control that can be implemented based upon the 

circumstances as they are at that time as opposed to the circumstances paired against the political considerations. Obviously 

TAPS presents a special problem because you have got one heck of 

a lot of oil coming down that slope and that pipeline, and you have 

got limited capacity at that port, and you have got schedules that 

have been predetermined on a fairly regular basis about the usage 

of that port, and when you start tinkering with that a lot of ripples 

appear from that initial decision. 

We constantly hear that the Coast Guard in fact has that control. 

I tend to believe you do have the authority, but I don't know that 

we have provided the political setting in which that authority can 

be exercised. You know, just as a lot of judges have authority to 

throw politicians who got caught drunk driving in jail, but until 

MADD-Mothers Against Drunk Driving-came along, nobody had 

the political will to do so. That authority, it is on the books, I agree 

with you, but is it there in fact? 

Admiral HENN. I believe it to be there, sir. In fact, I believe we 

use it day in and day out. I did when I was Captain of the Port 

in New York. Even under ice conditions I specified what size tug 

would escort ships going through the port of New York up to Albany. As I said, those were decisions that we made day in and day 

out, and other Captains of the Port do that as part of their normal 

regime. 

However, the local Captain of the Port cannot make a decision 

on whether there is going to be a VTS there or not. 

Mr. MILLER. I understand that. 

Admiral HENN. That, of course, rightfully, should be a Head- quarters-level decision, and that is why we did that study and put 

the priorities there. But it is more than on paper, sir; we exercise 

it every day. 

Mr. MILLER. I won't belabor the point, but obviously it is crucial 

to the confidence of the public in a system that we think we developed with oil spill liability. Of course it only comes into question, 

unfortunately, after an incident has taken place, and then we find 

out whether people did or did not. You start taking depositions and 

you find out that there may even have been an immediate debate 

about whether, "Gee, should we do this or shouldn't we, or who 

should we call before we make this decision?" That, all of a sudden, then violates the confidence that the public has in the system. But I guess just to tell you that that, I think, is a very major 

concern-when we see both the options and the expense and the 

technology become more and more friendly to that kind of systemnot to have that in place. Certainly in an area like San Francisco 

Bay I think it raises those questions for us. Admiral HENN. Sir, ifl could just add a footnote on that. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. Admiral HENN. I think I am getting a better sense of the ques- tion, and I haven't addressed it, I think, very well. The thing I 

think is important for us to know here is that the authority we vest 

in the Captain of the Port is an immense authority: his authority 
104 

to tell a vessel to leave port, and his authority to tell a vessel it 

will not leave port. We carefully select people for those Captains- of-the-Port positions for that reason. In addition, the line of authority that that Captain of the Port 

operates under with regard to that decision-making goes from the 

Commandant to a District Commander (someone of flag rank), to 

the Captain of the Port, (no one in between), and that authority is 

given to the title; we are very precise on that. That is why that 

man can make those decisions, that is why he doesn't get secondguessed when he inakes those decisions, and I think that is very important, that is very vital, and I think the rest of the world, 

when they look at the Coast Guard of the United States as being 

a model for flag-State and port-State activities and control, authority, and responsibility, that that regime is vital to that. 

Mr. MILLER. You are not going to get any disagreement out of 

me, but I guess to some extent I am a little cynical because I am 

in the world of politics and I know what happened in Alaska. I 

think the pressures are different in New York than they are in San 

Francisco or Alaska. You may make a decision one day, or one 

month, in New York or San Francisco about an APL ship, and the 

next time you make the decision you may be affecting a Shell Oil 

ship or an Exxon ship, and you may never get back to that company again. 

In Alaska, that person is sitting there making decisions basically about one single company, a number of different ships but essentially one entity that has one mission in life, and that is to move 

oil from the Arctic Circle to the Lower 48. That is a difficult position for that person to be in. 

One of the reasons we had the oversight hearings and the investigation and the whole business was to try to strengthen the ability of the Coast Guard to implement that system as it should be and 

as we are led to believe it is. I am just asking the question now 

a couple of years later whether that is the case and whether the 

failure to have a positive VTS system on an ongoing basis diminishes the capability of making that one-time decision, because I 

think when masters and companies have to deal with you telling them to follow this route or to slow down or to speed up, that becomes the regime that then over time becomes compatible. Whereas 

one day if you assert yourself and say, "We are not leaving port 

today," that becomes a confrontation. There is a world of difference 

between those two orders of business, as the airline industry shows; they tell you to land, they tell you to circle, they tell you 

to go somewhere else. That is the normal course of business, and 

the pilot is taken off the hook, and the port captain of the entity 

of Alyeska, or Chevron, or whoever it is, he or she is taken off the 

hook also because that is part of the daily procedure. 

I think the person that makes that decision at Sullom Voe is in 

a much different :\)Olitical position because that is the ordin~ 

course of doing business. That is the issue I am raisin~, and I don t 

know how to make it any clearer. It is our confidence m your sense 

of mission that causes me to raise that issue because I believe that 

the people in the Coast Guard, and the record shows that the people m the Coast Guard, raised these concerns and then were pres- sured by people not in the Coast Guard. 
105 

That is the concern I raise, and it is a very difficult political 

issue when you are living in a one-company town for the person 

who is on line there, standing in the public interest, because the 

parties never change. That is much different than in the port of 

San Francisco where you are dealing with dozens and dozens of 

shipping companies and thousands of different events that take 

place. I just raise that as a concern of this committee, and clearly 

it is a concern of the people in Prince William Sound. 

But I won't keep you any longer. I do have some questions that 

we would like to submit to you in writing, and if you could respond 

to those in a timely fashion we would appreciate it, and I thank 

you very much for your time and your help this morning. Thank 

you. 

Admiral HENN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. Again, my apologies-I didn't give them to you at 

the outset of your testimony-for the delay. I am sorry if it has 

'lpset your schedule. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 2:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

APPENDIX 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1993 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD 

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MEMqRANDUM 

II.I,. J,ouiu of l\tprt1tntatibt1 

(ommilttt on 

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• asbinirton, laC 20515--6201 

February J , 1993 

TO: Democratic Members, Subco1111Dittee on oversight and 

Investigations 

FROM: Chairman George Mil ler 

SUBJECT: Hearing on the Shetland Islands Oil Spill 

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0 ....... 1 \I&~.,, .. 1111,v, uc..,.su,n O<l't C?Oon Thursday, February 4 at 9 : 45 a.m. in 1324 Longworth the 

Subcommittee on oversight and Investigations will hold a hearing on the recent Shetland Islands oil spill and its implications for 

oil transportation. and spill response both internationally and in 

the U.S . This oversight hearing will focus in part on the status of implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("CPA 1990," 

P, L. 101-JSO) - which the Co1111Dittee helped write in response to the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska - and will include 

testimony on additional measures that need to be taken to better 

protect natural resources from o il spills. 

Providing testimony on the Shetland Islands oil spill will 

be Malcolm Green, executive director of the Shetland Islands 

Council , a local Shetland government entity involved both in the 

response to the spill and in the operations of the marine oil 

terminal at Sulloa Voe . Raising concerns about the 

implementation of OPA 1990 will be Nina Sankovitch of the Natural 

Resources Defense Counc i l. Scott Sterling of the Prince William 

Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council (authorized under OPA 

1990 to monitor operations of the Alyeska terminal and Trans- • Alaska Pipeline system tanker traffic) will provide a perspective on what has changed in Alaska since Exxon Valdez. Mr. Sterling 

traveled to the Shetlands to observe the spill and response 

efforts. Rear Admiral Arthur E. Gene Henn, Chief of Marine 

Safety for the U.S . Coast Guard will provide the Administration's 

perspective on the Shetland spill and issues related to implementation of OPA 1990 . 

(107) 
108 

Background 

I. 8hetlu4 Ialu4a Oil Spill 

The Shetland Islands are located about 200 miles north of 

Aberdeen Scotland. The region has abundant marine and bird life 

and is renown for its salmon fisheries. The largest maritime oil 

terminal in the United Kingdom, which receives oil produced by 

offshore rigs in the North Sea, is located at Sullom Voe on the 

north end of the main island of Shetland. 

On January 3, 1993, the tanker MIT Braer sailed from the oil 

terminal at Mongstad, Norway loaded with over 26 million gallons 

(600,000 barrels) of crude produced from offshore oil rigs in the 

Norwegian North Sea. The .Bra.el:, which was registered in Liberia 

and managed by the B&H Ship Management Company of Stamford, 

Connecticut, was bound for Quebec City, Canada. 

According to a recent statement released by the U.S. owners, 

the Drui:'s captain responded to a bad weather forecast by 

following a route which passed through a 25 mil• strait to the 

south of Shetland. En route, gale force winds and rough seas "resulted in damage which allowed water to enter the tanks which were supplying fuel to the vessel's generators and her main 

engine." The loss of power, which occurred about ten miles away 

from the southern tip of Shetland, resulted in the tanker being 

pushed by storm winds and currents and running aground on rocks 

at Garths Ness on the morning of January 5. Prior to rescue tugs 

arriving at the scene, the crew of the~ had been taken off 

the tanker by the Shetland coastguard. 

Despite the presence of oil spill response equipment at the 

Sullom Voe oil terminal and a mobilization of supplies from 

elsewhere in Europe, efforts t~ contain the spill were futile in 

the face of continuing severe weather. Dispersants, which are controversial as to toxicity, proved to be ineffective. Pounded 

by the seas for days, the ,Bra.e,r broke into pieces, spilling the 

entire cargo. 

Although damages from the ,Bra.e,r spill are still being 

assessed, two characteristics are significantly different from 

the Exxon YAldez spill: 1) the oil spilled in the Shetland is 

much lighter and dissipates more quickly than the heavy North 

Slope crude which was spilled in Alaska; and 2) the extremely severe weather and exposure to heavy seas in the Shetland is 

expected to break up the oil more quickly than the comparatively 

sheltered waters of Prince William Sound. 

II. Debate in Burope 

Following in the wake of another major oil spill on December 

3, 1992 when the Greek tanker Aegean sea hit the rocks at Coruna, 

2 
109 

Spain, the~ disaster has inspired a flurry of activity and concern in Europe related to prevention of oil spills. 1 British 

government inquiries into the specific facts of the Braer 

accident have not been completed. 

An irony of the Shetland oil spill is that the island's oil 

terminal at Sullom Voe is widely considered to maintain among the 

highest safety standards and best procedures of any marine 

transportation center in the world. The operational features of 

the sullom Voe terminal which could be considered for adoption 

elsewhere include: 

- a computer system whi ch keeps track of the safety record 

of tankers. The harbor master has absolute power to ban unsafe 

tankers from the coastal waters of Shetland; 

- a "positive" vessel traffic control system (comparable to 

the system used internati onally for air traffic control) where 

all tanker movements are under the strict control of the harbor 

master; 

- the use of sophisticated "tractor" tugs (which can apply 

pressure in any direction) as escorts to assist tankers coming 

into or leaving port. 

The strict Sullom Voe standards were inspired by a severe spill within months of the terminal opening in 1978 and have 

resulted in an excellent safety record since then. However, much 

of the recent debate in Europe has focused on concerns that 

unilateral actions by any one port or country may not be 

sufficient to deal with the problems of international oil 

traffic. A perspective on the extent of these problems comes from Shell oil company which concluded that 20 percent of the 

tankers it inspected in 1992 failed to meet international safety 

standards. In addition, half of the world's 3,250 oceangoing oil 

tankers are more than 15 years old . 2 

Among the measures being considered by the European 

Community are: 

1) establishing exclusion zones which prohibit tankers from 

environmentally sensitive areas ; 

1

In addition, on January 20, the Maersk Navigator. carrying oil from the Persian Gulf to Japan, collided with another oil and 

tanker and caught fire off the northwest coast of Sumatra. 

2.rhe ~ ia 17 years old and the Aegean Sea which ran aground in Spain is 19 years old. A survey of international oil 

spill• in 1991 found that three-quarters of the oil came from 

vessels over 15 years old. 

3 
110 

2) increasing the financial responsibility ot shippers for 

environmental damage (the~. which carries $700 _million in 

pollution insurance, could be liable tor as little as $10 million 

under existing international conventions); 

3) improving international tanker safety, crewing and 

inspection standards and banning vessels trom all European ports 

which tail to meet the tougher standards; 

4) increasing radar coverage and surveillance ot tankers; 

and, 

5) requiring the accelerated phase out ot older vessels and 

the incorporation of double hulls for new construction (the U.N. 

International Maritime Organization (IMO) has adopted double 

hulls as the standard for new construction beginning in July 

1993). 

III. Reaponae in tbe United states 

As the Oil and Gas Journal recognized on January 25, 1993 , the "safety record of the world tanker industry is rapidly 

growing worse." Yet the American Petroleum Institute notes that 

"the incidence and volume of U.S. tanker spills have been 

dramatically declining .... in the first half ot 1992, the most 

recent period tor which data are available, there was not a single major spill reported in U.S. waters." In addition, the 

oil industry-sponsored Marine Spill Response Corporation is in 

the process of establishing cleanup vessels and crews in 16 

locations across the country. 

What is subject to debate, however, is the extent to which 

the recently improved safety record in U.S. waters and the lack 

of major accidents are the result of the provisions ot the Oil 

Pollution Act of 1990, self-imposed improvements in industry 

safety standards, or s i mply good luck. The recent Shetland spill 

should inspire a review, both by the Congress and the 

Admi nistration, ot the status of oi l spill prevention measures in 

the U.S . 

A. Oil Pollution Act ot 1990 ("OPA 199011 ) 

Considered by ·many to be landmark legislation, OPA .1990 

placed expanded regulatory responsibilities on the Coast Guard . From the perspective of NRDC in their Safety at Bay report, the 

Coast Guard has not implemented major provisions ot OPA 1990 

properly nor have statutory deadlines been met. NRDC also 

4 
111 

concludes that in certain areas, the law is not sufficient. 3· 

Especially in light of concerns raised by the Shetland Islands 

spill, key provisions of OPA 1990 which should be considered 

include: 

1) Double Hulls - Double hulls are required for new construction and existing vessels are phased out by the year 2015. NRDC is concerned that the Coast Guard has failed to 

promulgate interim measures to improve safety for single hulled 

vessels in the interim period before double hulls are required. 

2) Y.1111 Traffic services (VTS) - No port in the u.s. has a "positive" control VTS system such as that operated. in Sullom Voe 

at the Shetland. Only relatively few U.S. ports have any VTS 

systems to monitor vessel traffic. In addition, the Coast Guard 

has not proposed any new systems. 

J) Tanker Exclu•ion zones - OPA 1990 requires the coast 

Guard to do a study of tanker exclusion zones for environmentally 

important coastal areas, but does not mandate the designation of 

any particular zone. The study has not been completed. 

4) Liability/Financial Bespon•ibility - OPA 1990 increased 

federal liability limits for oil spills and expressly preserves 

the rights of states to enact higher limits. Many states have 

unlimited liability laws. The Coast Guard has not issued 

regulations implementing the OPA 1990 requirements for tankers owners or operators to demonstrate adequate financial 

responsibility. 

5) spill contingency Planning - The Act requires contingency plans for oil spills to be developed nationally (EPA) and locally 

(Coast Guard). The plans have not been completed. 

6) Natural Resource Damages - NOAA has not issued 

regulations covering the assessment of damages to natural resources from oil spills. 

B. lgoD V&l4t•/Tr-s-alaska Pipeline 8yst- ("TAPS") 

One of the Committee's primary interests in OPA 1990 are the 

provisions affecting the Trans-Alaska Pipeline system ("TAPS"). over 20 percent of the oil produced in the u.s. is transported by 

TAPS. Tankers from Alaska provide the majority of oil refined on the West Coast. In addition to writing provisions included in 

OPA 1990, the Committee held a series of hearings on the Exxmi 

3 In considering new legislative initiatives, it should be 

recognized that the primary jurisdiction for many important 

aspects of OPA 1990 belongs to the Merchant Marine and Pw>lic 

Works Committees. 

5 
112 

YA.l.!lll oil spill and safety and environmental matters related to 

TAPS during the 101st Congress. 

In part modeled after the Shetland Islands Council, the 

Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council ("RCAC") 

is authorized under OPA 1990. The intent was to increase the 

level of citizen participation in oversight and monitoring of 

TAPS which is operated by Alyeska, an oil company consortium. 

According to RCAC, Alyeska has substantially upgraded its 

response equipment and resources and the situation in Prince 

William Sound "compares quite favorably with other ports." 

Despite the improvements, however, RCAC has identified 

"significant gaps in prevention." Among the concerns identified 

by RCAC are the need for: 

- improved tanker monitoring and weather reporting stations 

in Prince William sound, where conditions can rival the Shetlands as among the worst in the world; and 

- increased emphasis on escort and towing capabilities 

(although OPA 1990 requires tug escorts for tankers in Prince 

William Sound, the state-of-the-art "tractor" tugs such as those 

used at Sullom Voe in the Shetland may be needed.) 

The same scenario that led to the Shetland Islands spill - bad weather, toss of power, tanker on the rocks - remains of 

great concern in Alaska. As a recent example, a tanker chartered 

by B.P. lost steering control and came within 100 yards of the 

rocks at Valdez Narrows on October 20, 1992. In addition, three 

tankers lost power in Alaska's Cook Inlet after drawing ice into 

their cooling systems during the month of December. 

A witness list and a copy of the Executive Summary from 

NRDC's "Safety at Bay" report are attached. Please contact me or Jeff Petrich of my st~ff (5-1714) with any questions. 

6 
113 

SAFETY AT BAY 

A Review of Oil Spill Prevention and Cleanup 

in U.S. Waters 

Principal Author 

Nina Sankovitch 

Coruributing Authors/Researchers 

William Schrenk 

Carol Lee Rawn 

Natural Resources Defense Council 

December 1992 
114 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) mandates 

that measurable and enforceable actions 

be undertaken by any vessel traveling in 

U.S. waters, by oil transfer and storage 

facilities, and by the government, to 

reduce the risks posed by spills. NRDC 

has found that many of the regulations 

necessary to translate these mandates to 

action have been delayed and others are 

being implemented in a manner 

inconsistent with the Act itself. 

Moreover, the Act ignores a number of 

important issues of spill prevention. 

The need for prompt Coast Guard and 

Congressional action to address these 

failings is underscored by the following: 

The world tanker Oeet is aging. 

According to the International 

Salvage Industry Survey 

completed in April 1992, by 1996 

62 percent of the world fleet will 

be 15 years or older (including 

many of the largest oil tankers) 

and 27 percent will be 25 years or 

older. Older tankers run higher 

risks of structural deterioration. 

Exisdng tankers are not all in 

cood shape. According to 

Admiral J. William Kime, 

Commandant of the U.S. Coast 

Guard, tankers currently entering 

United States waters have been 

found with structural deficiencies, 

including "paper-thin plating, 

excessive wastage, missing vents 

and hatches, soft patches in piping 

and unsatisfactory repairs." 

2 

The tanker business is In a 

slump, which may lead companies 

to cut corners. Economic 

concerns in the 1980s resulted in 

reduced crew sizes in some 

companies and the construction of 

tankers with 18 percent less steel 

in their hulls than those 

constructed in the 1970s. Further 

cuts could increase risks of human 

error. Coast Guard studies have 

shown that the majority of oil 

spills are caused by human error. 

Oil traffic is increasing. Due to 

the failure of the country to adopt 

needed energy conservation 

measures, oil imports arc 

expected to increase, raising the 

number of oil vessels traveling in 

U.S. waters. In the Gulf of 

Mexico alone, tanker traffic is 

estimated by the State of 

Louisiana to double by 2007. 

Perhaps most importantly, oil 

spills continue to occur routinely 

in U.S. waters. Thousands of 

spills are reported every year, 

spilling millions of gallons of oil. 

For example, in 1992 the Shoko 

Maru spilled over 96,000 gallons 

of crude oil into the Texas City 

Channel and a leak at an offshore 

well in Louisiana spilled at least 

30,000 gallons before the well 

caught fire; in 1991 there were 

677 spills in the Port of New 

Orleans, 398 spills in New York 

Harbor, 239 spills in Port of 

Hampton Roads, 235 spills in Port 

of Philadelphia, 130 spills in 
Seattle and 116 spills in Boston 

Harbor. The amount of oil 

spilled in these pons alone in one 

year exceeded 300,000 gallons. 

Over the past several years, 

barges alone have accounted for 

millions of gallons spilled. 

Key regulations that· have been delayed 

or that are too weak to fulfill the 

mandates of the Oil Pollution Act, 

include: 

A. Preventin& Oil Spills 

Double Hulls: 

Double hulls are one of the most 

effective means of preventing oil 

spills. Recognizing this Congress 

required, ,the phase-in of double 

hulls and required the Coast 

Guard to develop design 

requirements for double hulls. 

However, the interim final rule on 

double hulls, issued in August 

1992, requires woefully 

inadequate inter-hull spacing for 

double hull construction on 

tankers and barges, fails to 

provide much-needed guidance on 

hull strength and corrosion 

protection, and does not require 

protection of all tanks carrying oil. 

The result is that the double-hull 

protection envisioned by Congress 

has been significantly reduced 

under Coast Guard regulation. 

We recommend that the Coast 

Guard revise iu interim final rule 

to require inter-hull spacin& 

equivalent to the breadth or the 

ftlld divided by 15 or 2 meters, 

wbicbeftr i1 &rester, •• bas been 

recommended by experts. 

115 

3 

Single Hulls: 

Given the long phase-in period 

(through 201S) for full 

implementation of the double hull 

requirements, Congress required 

the Coast Guard to develop, by 

August 1991, interim operating 

and structural measures for single• 

hulled vessels that would reduce 

the risks posed by these vessels. 

The Coast Guard has yet to 

release even a proposed rule 

mandating interim measures. The 

result is that marine and· coastal 

environments are still exposed to 

the risks of thinly-hulled vessels 

carrying millions gallons of oil. 

We recommend that the Coast 

Guard promptly Issue rqulations 

requirin& sin1le-bulled vessels to 

utilize measures (or reducin& oil 

spill risks. 1bese should include 

tu& escorts, compliance with 

vessel traffic control systems, 

advanced naviption aids, ~DI · 

tank car,o restrictions, and tank 

level monitorin1 devices. 

Vessel Traffic Services: 

Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) 

systems monitor vessel traffic, 

alert vessels to potential hazards, 

and even control traffic where 

necessary to avoid accidents. In 

pons where VTSs operate, 

collision and grounding accidents 

have been averted and oil spills 

avoided. OPA mandated that a 

study be undertaken to determine 

which pons could,!)enefit from a 

new or expanded Vessel Traffic 

Service. The Coast Guard's Port 

Needs Study, a cost/benefit 

analysis of the issue, is based on 
faulty assumptions and cannot 

form the basis of a comprehensive 

plan to improve and expand vrs 

systems in United States pons. 

The result is that VI'S expansion 

remains limited and new systems 

have not been proposed, much 

less funded. We recommend that 

the Coast Guard seek tunding to 

implement and expand VTS 

systems In all areas where such 

systems could substantially 

reduce the risks or oil spill 

damqe to environmentally 

sensitive marine and coastal 

environments. 

Tue Escorts ror Tankers: 

Tug escorts help tankers navigate 

and maneuver in difficult areas or 

under emergency circumstances. 

0PA mandated that tug escorts 

'be required in Prince William 

Sound and in Puget Sound; in 

addition, the Coast Guard is to 

designate other areas that, 

because of environmental 

sensitivity or navigational hazards, 

should have tug cscon 

requirements. However, the 

Coast Guard has only issued 

proposed rules for Prince William 

Sound and Puget Sound and has 

not yet proposed any additional 

areas for tug escon requirements. 

Furthermore, the rules it has 

proposed for Prince William 

Sound and Puget Sound are 

inadequate to ensure that tug 

escorts wil be helpful in 

preventing spills. The result is 

that the oil spill risks associated 

with loss of tanker engine failure, 

congested traffic conditions, and 

116 

B. 

4 

narrow and difficult passages, 

persist. We recommend that the 

Coast Guard promptly designate 

additional areas where tuc escorts 

are required, including areas that 

are difficult to navigate and 

environmentally sensitive, and 

that it promulgate strict 

requirements for tuc escorts, 

includin1 speed limits and 

development or tug escort plans. 

Planning ror Oil Spills 

Vessel and Facility Response 

Plans: 

Thorough pre-spill planning is 

essential to ensure the most 

effective response possible to oil 

spills. OP A requires owners and 

operators of vessels and facilities 

that handle oil to develop 

response plans and enter into 

binding contracts for spill 

response equipment. The Coast 

Guard has developed guidancebut not binding regulations-on 

vessel response plans and facility 

response plans. The guidance is 

comprehensive with respect to 

plan format and content; however, 

the limits on equipment that must 

be contracted for arc set at levels 

much too low to ensure that 

enough equipment to control and 

clean up the oil will be available 

in the event of a worst-case spill. 

The result is that facilities and 

vessels are not prepared to 

control and clean up a worst case 

spill. We recommend that the 

Coast Guard increase the amount 

or equipment that must be 
c. 

contracted for by vessel aad 

facility owners/operators. 

National aad Area 

Coatiaceacy Plaas: 

OPA requires contingency 

planning by the government on 

the local and national levels. 

However, the Area and National 

Contingency Plans, which were to 

be finished by August 1991, are 

far from being finalized; in some 

ports, development of the Area 

Plan has not even begun. The 

result is that governmental 

planning for oil spills has not 

improved since the Exxon Valdez 

spill over three years ago. We 

recommend that the Coast Guard 

require development or the Area 

Coatiageacy Plaas its Area 

Committees by Aucust 1993, ia 

time for lacorporatioa into vessel 

aad facility plans. The United 

States EPA, responsible for 

revision or the National 

Coatlaceacy Plan, should issue 

the revised plan by Aupst 1993, 

again ID time for Incorporation 

Into vessel aad facility planning 

errorts. 

Paylac ror Oil Spills 

Fbaaac:ial Responsibility: 

The Oil Pollution Act requires 

vessel owners or operators to 

demonstrate that they have the 

assets or insurance adequate to 

cover the costs of an oil spill up 

to OPA's statutory limits. The 

Coast Guard, however, has 

117 

s 

delayed in releasing regulations 

implementing the financial 

responsibility requirements. The 

result is that pre-OPA standards 

apply and inadequate coverage in 

the event of spills persists. We 

recommend that the Coast Guard 

premptly issue recwatioas 

implementing the financial 

responsibility provisions or OPA. 

Natural Resources 

Damage Assessment: 

The full costs of an oil spill 

include damages to natural 

resources, such as loss of wildlife. 

Any assessment of such damages 

must talce into account all values 

associated with the impacted 

resources. OPA required the 

National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) to develop regulations 

for assessment of natural resource 

damages by August 18, 1997. 

However, NOAA has only1issued 

limited proposed rules for damage 

assessment. The result is that 

government agencies are allowed 

to continue to assess damages 

without talcing into account all the 

true and complete costs of an oil 

spill. We recommend that NOAA 

promptly release regulations 

requiring run assessment or costs, 

including use and nonuse values 

as defined ia OPA. 

Other important measures that can be 

taken to prevent oil spills were virtually 

ignored in the Oil Pollution Act. These 

include: 
Pilotage: 

Pilots are responsible for the safe 

navigation of vessels. OPA 

ignores significant issues of 

pilotage, including distinctions 

between state and federal pilots, 

which allow for different 

standards and oversight of pilots 

and varied enforcement of 

pilotage requirements; the need 

for pilots to be independent ( not 

employed by the vessel owner); 

the exemption of certain oilcarrying vessels from pilotage 

requirements; and the need for 

different requirements for pilots 

depending on the size of the 

vessel. The result is that pilotage 

continues to be under-regulated, 

leading to serious risks of spills 

due to pilot error. We 

~mmend that Congress and 

'the states pass comprehensive 

legislation to ensure that pilots 

are continually competent and 

prepared for the vessels and 

routes that they pilot. 

Pipelines: 

Faulty underwater pipelines have 

spilled millions of gallons of oil 

spilled into marine and coastal 

environments. Yet, OPA does 

not make provisions for improving 

underwater pipeline operations, 

other than recommending 

research into pipeline alarm 

systems. Legislation recently 

passed by Congress, amending the 

Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety 

Act, does address many issues 

related to pipeline spills but 

regulations have yet to be 

implemented and problems 

6 

118 

remain. The most serious of 

these is that there is no allinclusive requirement for mapping 

and inspecting underwater 

pipelines. The result is that there 

is no assurance that an aging 

pipeline infrastructure is being 

adequately maintained or 

inspected. We recommend that a 

full mapping, inspection, and 

maintenance prop,am for all 

undenntter pipelines be carried 

out and that the recent Pipeline 

Act amendments be Implemented 

promptly and erl'ectively. 

Tanker-Free Zones: 

Zones where tanker traffic is 

prohibited or restricted prevent 

oil spills from tankers in 

environmentally sensitive areas. 

These zones have been 

implemented to varying degrees 

off the coasts of Alaska, 

Washington, Oregon, and 

California and off the Florida 

Keys. OPA requires the Coast 

Guard to study which areas would 

benefit from tanker-free zones but 

the study is far from being 

completed. The result is that the 

most effective way to protect 

sensitive coastlines is not being 

utilized. We recommend that the 

Coast Guard promptly designate 

tanker-tree zones to protect areas 

or environmental sensitivity. 

Recent reports issued by the Petroleum 

Industry Research Foundation, Inc. (an 

industry-funded non-profit organization 

that prepared their report for ·the 

Department of Energy) and Richard 

Golob of World Information Services (an 
organization that tracks oil spills 

worldwide) have stated that there have 

been improvements in the tanker 

industry since the passage of OP A 

However, industry's improvement efforts, 

although laudable, are largely voluntary 

prevention and response measures which 

are unregulated and unenforceable. Nor 

have these efforts been instituted 

industry-wide by all tanker and facility 

ownen and operaton. In order to 

ensure nationwide, uniform 

119 

7 

improvements in oil spill prevention and 

response, the Coast Guard and EPA 

must enact comprehensive regulations 

implementing the Oil Pollution Act, and 

Congress must implement pilotage, 

pipeline, and tanker-free zone legislation. 

In addition, the Department of 

Transponation must promptly issue 

effective regulations implementing recent 

amendments to the Hazardous Liquid 

Pipeline Safety Act. 
1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

I 

5. / 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

120 

DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF OPA'S OIL SPILL PREVENTION 

AND RESPONSE PROVISIONS 

PROVISION: SCHEDULED ACTION: STATUS: 

Interim Measures for Fmal Regulations by No regulations have been 

Single-Hulled Vessels August 18, 1991 proposed 

Vessel Traffic Service Submission of study to Study has been completed 

Study Congress with recommenda- but the ·Coast Guard does 

tions for implementation by not intend to submit 

August 18, 1991 recommendations with the 

report to Congress 

Tug Escort Initiate issuance of Issuance of regulations 

Requirements for regulations by February 1991 initiated in July 1992 

Prince William Sound 

and Puget Sound 

Designation of Initiate designation of areas No areas have been 

Additional Areas by February 1991 proposed for designation 

where Tug Escorts 

are Required 

Regulations on Final Regulations by August Proposed Regulations issued 

Vessel Response 18, 1992 in June 1992; Guidance 

Plans Document issued in 

September 1992 

Regulations on Final Regulations by August Coast Guard issued 

Facility Response 18, 1992 Guidance Document for 

Plans Coastal Facilities in 

September 1992; EPA issued 

Proposed Regulations for 

inland facilities in October 

199i 

National Contingency Revision of NCP issued by Revision of NCP has not 

Plan August 18, 1991 been completed 

Area Continaency ACPs to be completed by No ACPs have been 

Plana .. February 1992 completed 

Natural Resource Final Regulations issued by Proposed Regulations were 

Damage Assessment August 18, 1992 issued in March 1992 but not 

for all assessment 

requirements under OPA 

8 
121 

W,:i,n.t, 

w 

Cllcohot & Associatu 

116 N~' Monli()TnerY Strtet/Suite 910/ Sall Francisco. California 94105 

T";1cp!ione 4t5/ 243-,'«l03 FAX:.4!5.243.0Sl9 

Date: February 1, 1993 

To: Jeff Petrich 

From: . Warner Chabot 

Re: Oil Spill Oversight Hearing- so·MJle Buffers for Oil TE\kers 

Summary 

Ertdosed is relevaI\t in{ormation for Thursday'Sc'Oil Spill Oversight Hearing: 

Thi~ mformation concerns voluntary and lega.l options for: 

· • keeping oil t~ers at least 50 miles from ~ore, 

• strict .i-esponse rules' for oil tanlc~.rs dperatin~_·w I in ·so miles from shore:· 

I ho?! that you'll .consider some qμe$tions·.to Thursday's will}es~ to explore . 

· st&te and federal authority and incentives ~ provide a SO mile buffer and to 

require tough .~pill response capabilities fo.r t;mkers within .the 50 inile zone. 

Background 

A major issue r_aised by the recent 'spills and the near miss off N. Carolina is 

how much of a safety buffer sho)l1d exist for ·oil tankers' transiting the coast? 

In California, almost 90% of our imported oil comes down from Alas~, 

much of it travel, fairly clo,e to shore. Last M_ay, the members of TAPS made 

a landmark voluntary agreement to keep their tankers 50 miles off 

California's coast (enclosed press release/ fact sheet has good argumen~). 

Are Voluntary Buffers Enough? 

Many agree that a 50 mile buffer may be the.single most important policy to 

protect our coast from d_isabled tank!!IS or spills.at sea. But is a voluntary 

buffer agreement el)ough? Can st&te/federal incentives or mandatory rules 

guarantee compliance with the buffer? If yes, how should state and/or federal 

officials enforce such rules. · 

The California Approach 

(!nder state <;>11 splll .legislation, California's Office of Oil Spill Prevention & 

Response (OSPR), is now writing regs to require oil spill plans for tankers. To 

.(continued) 
M9Jl'!m"r 

122 

memo to Jeff Petrich rt: 50 milt tanker buffers 

·enforce· this 'voluntary' agreement, California plans to require tough spUI 

response requirements for any oll tanker operating within 50 miles from 

shore. Oil La.nkers opera.Ling out•idc the 50 mile .wne would be ex.:mpt ftum 

thte rte4uireme11ts. 

But oil industry leaders oppose this slate requirement. They claim California 

doesn't have the legal authority to require response standards for vessels 

beyond 3 mile:: from ohorc. Ar. we fight thi£ b~ttlc ovor the next fow month• 

in California it will help California if we can generate federal support for 

mechanisms to enforce a 50 mile buffer. 

Can Federal Rules Enforce a SO Mile Buffer for Oil Tankers? 

I hope that you will consider encouraging Congressman Miller to raise some 

questions to the Alaskan and Coast Guard witnesses to explore these issues, 

ie: 

• Do they think 50 mile buffers for oil tankers are a good ldea? 

• What information has thte Cua~t Gu4ru pruuuu,u (tu uat1:e), on thteir Ol'A 

requirw<l •tu<ly vf t.uiJ..;,r vxclu,ion zon.,.. (Not,- On, C.G. vffi<iul t,;,ld m• 

that " co11/racto, hired to complete tl1is study, produced a11 imzdequi,te 

report i,11d tliat the C.G. is 110w puuming to complete the effort iri-lwusa. 

But there is no timetable for a completed report other tlran meeting a 1995 

deadline). 

• Should a ~ mile buffer policy be "enforced" by requiring tougher •pill 

response requirements for tankers within 50 miles? 

• Can tht< policy tlE' be.<;t enforced by state or federal offtctal<? (lf <0, how?) 

- What can states do? 

- What can the federal government do? 

Attachments May 92 Oil Industry Press Release/Fact Sheet on 

Voluntary 50 Mile Oil Tanker Buffer 

c.c. Kate Anderton & Mary Reth ~tham (r/o Congr~<man Hamburg) 

Karen Chapman k/o Congresswoman Anna Eshoo) 

.. ,, v .. - , .. ., u nuwww. mcx:mc..:Jn. nocan en@rtlnJIJEDty. SJJ11ltOC)'coiiip11cics ~ toe a,rc-emcorliive 

don• IO on z voluntary basis. Respeeti,,e eon,plJlies ..,11 monitor their own opentiom.. 
123 

WEST COAST VOLUNTARY VESSEL AVOII>ANCB ZONE 

for 

A!.uka1i Cl'\llU Oil Trad~ 

Tit! belo,., mcntloned mc111b1: ~tnp&aics of tne We5tem S111=> Peirola,m 

Assoei11ion 111cc to uiablis~ a =inillllllll offellcrt Wes1 CoaJI ro~ting di11&Ma ot $0 

milci fer load.cl 1111rl!le 1111ker1 mnspol'lln1 AA1kan ttudc oil b-•• AJackt ltll1 

Ca!i£orni1 pol'II. 

'fo "'"•~lah • vol,,r,tal'!' minimurr. i,,o~o 1112rtne ankcr op;r&tlllf dis\lllCC o&llctt 

the wtl! eou, 1111trJand, uncD 1-p;,roa;h 10 !'ffl. to provide •• addttio:,aJ 11\l!rar for ~~r.aJ TC$Oijrc; proi:;1ion in \ll: 1.•11li~ely &"1111 of tn ineic!e!ll (EzctpitonJ "'1114 

belo,,.·.) 

The offchorc rourill; disttnce !I bised 011 iraje:101')' studies whlcll ual)'Ud olJ 

oul!lo,.·, probability or shor:linc polilltion, C'IIZnlll ••• a:,d drift, •=•• to • clisuled 

"eue: ,no lf:Utl salvaJ:. 

June ~- 199, 

The following mm'oe: compL~ies wl\0 ow:', opcn.i:. manaac, or wner -ala wlll 

--olia,W'lly eemp)i, ,.,;,~ tbi1 VOh!n!l."Y 'Vessel A'l'O!dancc Zone: 

JJ{CD Marin:, In,. 

E.,;x~r, Sbippills Co, 

Plullips !'e:r~lCUlll Co. 

ll!' Oi, Siu:i,pmJ Cc. 

W. Coa11 Shippli!J CO. 

Shel! Oil C'.o. 

MobD Oil Co,p. 

(Compeni:1 n01 DWl>in' U.S. ve1scil .. 1u adYisa inelr !llll6-Cl!Al'lcrcan1,n io c:o111ply.) 

b:cptio1.:: 1t sll&ll bf. U:,demoo~ lllal !ht llllp's Mlil~ ahall alw&)~ ~ 1M &,al 

authori1y u,d 11 empowered ro deviate !rolll I.hi, &ifC~lll~lll III th& illttmt of Ilk!)'. 

Mu1:;1 may allo deViai: from thil 1grecm1111 lf ptn:!Uion 10 procet.d lhrOllll! Iii• 

V1.1tdenbw-g AFB mus»• ran1• 111d/01 Iha U.S. Na")' !'aeifi, Misslle Tes1 11.&nas is 

d:niec. Oeviatlor.$ ,nail no, 'o< 'cued OD lfl aoo,,omic deekto11. 
124 

BRAER Incident 

The following report was received from the Director of the 

International. Oil Pollution Co.apensation Fund on February 4, 1992: 

The BRAER incident occurred in .the early hours of Tuesday, 

January 5, 1993. Experts representing the International Oil 

Pollution Compensation Fund ( IOPC Fund) and Assuranceforeningen 

Skuld (the Skuld P&I Club, the shipowner's insurer) were at the 

scene of the incident in the afternoon of the same day. The IOPC 

Fund and the Skuld Club opened a claims office in Lerwick 

(Shetland) on Friday, January 8. The IOPC Fund's Claims Manual, 

giving explanations of the claims procedure, was made available in 

the Claims Office from that date. 

Claims forms have been made available in the Claims Office. 

More than 670 claims forms have been issued. Some 30 have been 

returned, most of these during February 2 and 3. However, only 

four are complete and these have all been approved and are ready 

for payment. One salmon farmer submitted a claim, and within five 

working days, during which time some further information was 

requested, an advance payment of £150,000 was made. 130 sheep 

farmers have registered, requesting assistance for the purchase of 

additional feed, and the first payments totalling £9,300 are about 

to be made by the Skuld Club . 

The IOPC Fund and the Skuld Club have, from the very 

beginning, enjoyed close contacts and excellent cooperation with 

the Shetland Islands Council as well as with the United Kingdom 

Government. The Shetland Islands Council and the IOPC Fund/Skuld 

Club have together acted to assist sheep farmers in order to enable 

them to bring in feed for sheep which could not graze on 

contaminated grassland. There have also been discussions between 

the Shetland Islands Council, the IOPC . Fund/Skuld Club and the 

fishermen's representatives concerning the extent of the 

fishermen's losses. 

The IOPC Fund and the Skuld Club have made liquid funds 

available for the rapid payment of claims and for making advance 

payments to persons suffering financial hardship. The United 

Kingdom's Scottish Office has set up a special Bridging Fund in 

order to ease cash flow within the compensation system. This 

Bridging Fund is not a separate compensation scheme, but will make 

advances in respect of loss or damage admissible under the Civil 

Liability Convention and the International Fund Convention. 

A copy of an explanatory notice issued by the IOPC Fund and 

Skuld Club is attached. 
125 

-•PUBLIC NOTICE 

Explanatory note by Anuranceforeningen Skuld and 

the IOPC Fund. conceming compensation and . advance 

hardship payments folowing the BRAER a~nt 

COIIPENSATION SYS1Df . Cua.wli&a,ID ........ ol .. ..-...iillit ........... Ult .......... _..._,.. .... ,.___, 

.._ ._...,. ...,llillial.al--. n. m-aallo.. _.•.....,......,by h Slipeww,ra lrw 

t,la± I ..................... a...,af,_.CM&l,..111.,_.af 1 .-m.s~ . ••--w--1.-it11,j,o_......_w; C ,..,. ...... ,...,,.. __ ........, 

._ • ........,..Cl...._,C.,njia_.,_;Fadoo,c,._.,wllldlla•.,._;i.ioi.,nw••••......-- ......... .,....~ .. - . . .... . ' 

,,. ......__._ .. ~ ......... __________ .,..._ ....... _.,. to.rm ......... I ...,_~ Al dlill&_,.._11.e...__,.,. ... _,au_,_,. 

IOl'C,... .. .......,....,_ ... _,..__ .. ....,... __ ... n&tlnM. . . 

TYPES OF CLAIMS , ................. :..,. • ..._.._.._ .. ..,_ ....... _______ 4 -

tle.aAB ............... ., ... _____ ..,,.,,, ___ ........ __ ., __ 

-.._,,, _.,....,.,_. __ __ ,.....,...._, ~~., .............. __ . ___ --. ........ ~.-..-. · · ··•CLAJII PROCEDURE, 11.ellMIIO..-._IOl'C,_ _ _...•lainl,.._llllamlAlll°"""' .•.• •·ilj.~~·. 

a..a~ ...................... -............. • . ............. , . :.r.z..::~-?:?~!~~-=~~~~f-s-1.r~:: • • ... . • • • • • •• • , -. ' 1"T, :.,i _ • • _ • • 

...................... " ........... ..,. .................................. -. ..... _ .. .., ...... _ ........... _,, . . :. . . . ·:-:-· "'T" . 

Cllilill .............. _;.._,__ ...... ............ ~ ................. T1ot9'1111d 

a..-,oc,... .. .-. ... _.._... ....... _.., ....... q,i...~•.--•_..._ . . . t. . . 

. · ADVANCE HARDSHIP ·PAVfl!l!!S · -. ,. . Cllllo.-............................ ..-.-........... ,. ........... ..,._... 

--_,_ ........... -.... ,_...._ ---..----- __ ... _,,ba 5 Vll.a..__.__....,. Id -.. • .-,w,r..•- .................... __ .... _ ___,_ . . 

,_....... .. ..__..,._.,. .... i..-,. .. ·twlUElla...Olla-,.,_..111.aiw, ..... "".. __. ......................... ...... .................... ._. .... _____ .._ ................ ....,. __ """__,.af_ ... _ . ................ !fie..... . . . . 

DIE IIRAER CUW-S OFFICE .. INldw-•...,_.a.. ..... _,_ ___ .._ • .......,. .. ~ .. - -., ............ n._,, ............... -..aw.,..._,_,.. .. _ ........................... -... .. 

. . ·•·· ·. ·

= -- ' . 

-e•i . -~· · .· .. In....,. cw-°"'"' - C . i ..., ~ 1-wlaA;. .... d I . . Tel:OING2WINO . ,-,;-a,o . , 

70-544 0 - 93 - 5 
126 

De IQPC P1m4 

The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund) 

is a worldwide inter-governmental organization which was set up in 

October 1978 for the purpose of providing compensation for oil 

pollution damage resulting from spills of persistent oil from laden 

tankers. 

The IOPC Fund operates within the framework of two 

international conventions establishing a legal regime for 

compensation for damage caused by oil spills from laden tankers, 

namely the 1969 International Convention on.Civil Liability for Oil 

Pollution Damage (Civil Liability Convention or CLC) and the 1971 

International Convention on the Establishment of an International 

Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund Convention). 

The CLC deals with the liability of shipowners for oil pollution damage. This convention lays down the principle of strict 

liability for shipowners and creates a system of compulsory liability insurance. The shipowner is normally entitled to limit 

his liability to an amount which is linked to the tonnage of his 

ship. The Fund Convention, which is supplementary to the CLC, 

establishes a system of additional compensation. 

The IOPC Fund was established to administer the regime of 

compensation created by the Fund Convention. The organization has 

its headquarters in London. 

The main function of the IOPC Fund is to provide supplementary 

compensation to those suffering oil pollution damage in Fund Member 

States who cannot obtain full compensation for the damage under the 

CLC. The compensation payable by the IOPC Fund in respect of any one incident is limited to 900 million (gold) francs equivalent to 

60 million Special Drawing Rights (approximately £46 million or US$86 million), including the sum actually paid by the shipowner or his inaurer under the CLC. 

[Excerpt from the 1991 Annual Report of the IOPC ·Fund] 
127 

Center for Marine 

~ Conservation f-C,trn( rlt (.·,:·,i1c·r f.~• • -,1,:r,:•llr.,.·:l{~ l- 01\•·~11.·-r· Fc.1 I c,,; i 

Burr Heneman 1/31/93 

Oil Tankers and Airliners 

The recent spate of ll'lajor tanker accidents spared the United States. 1n fact, Golob"s Oil 

Pollution Bulletin reports that, sillce January 1991 we have had the lowest level of Wiker spills in 

14 years. Two years do not establish a trend however, when we average several years between 

megaspills. We should feel lucky, ncit reassured: there have been at least seven power or 

steering failures Involving laden tankers in Prince William Sound sina tht Exxon Valdez spill. 

Any of those tankers might also have become a household name, especially the Ktn11i, which 

lost power once In 1990, and had steering system problems last October. In the sl!Cond incident, 

the Kenai missed Middle Rcick in Valdez Arm by about 100 yards. 

This version of Russian roulette is not limited to Alaskan waters. The same tankers in 

those seven Incidents, for example, called a total of 48 times at San Francisco Bay Area ports In 

1991. The point is that these Incidents can occur on any tanker at any time or place. In the case 

of the Brau, which lost power 10 miles from the Shetland Islands In a full gale, ii was the wrong 

time and place. 

In the 20-odd years I have studied major oil spills, the world tanker safety record has 

not improved. It's time we tried a fresh approach. We should focus, for the first time, on spill 

prevention rather than response. Once oil is on the water, the best possible response amounts 

to nothing more than unsatisfactory damage ccintrol. 

We should keep our eye on the big picture - basic reform of tanker safety- not our 

traditional search for the simple explanation and the quick fix. Had Captain Hazelwood been 

drinking, and why was he In his cabin when the Enon Valda hit Bligh Reef? Why was the 

Azgton St11 operating without a pilot? Did the master and crew of the Braer abandon ship too 

soon? The equivalent question.•, with their fixation on the details of the most recent disaster, 

niay be appropriate following an airline accident. Safety systems for the airline lndwtry are 

strong enough that minor adjustment Is all that ls needed. This piecemeal habit of mind, 

however, misscs the point wh,m it comes to the basic in.ideqw,des of tanker sarety. 

Why does the tanker Industry have such a poor safety reccird globally, and why may it 

get even worse? A glut of agillg tankers, many built in the early 1970s when cNde oil prices 

surged, has put competlth·e pressurot on tanker rates. Although tankers over 15-ycars old 

account for a disproportionate share of casualties, decisions to build mC'ldern tankers are being 

postponed. A significant per cent of United States flag tcinnage is ovter JO-years old. 

Tanker operators are having to pare operating costs, and industry critics - and insiders 

- say that explains the shift tci flags of convenience in the world fleet. More than 1,600 ships 

were registered in the United Kingdom when the Broer was built in 1975. Now there are fewer 

than 300. Low taxes, Lax safety standards, ,1nd fewer restrictions on crew levels and training 

have made the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, and Malta the fastest growing tanker 

fleets In the world. While Panama and Liberia, "home" to nearly one third of all tankers, have 

terrible mart time safety records, casualty rates for Turkey, Greece, South l<ciru, .the Philippines, 

and St. Vincent and the Grenadines ne even worse. 

!.: ! ... ) ',J !-(J/(; 1 
128 

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, our major federal reaction to the Erron V<lldu spill, 

u,cludes a multiplicity of requirements for spill response but no comprehensive approach to 

spill prevention. Moreover, some of the Act's few prevention elements - the financial 

responsibility and unlimited liability requirements and improved Vessel Traffic Service radar 

systems for some ports •· are mired in the federal regulatory and budget processes. ()ne other 

provision o{ the Act deserves mention: aher 20 years of lnconcluslve debate at the International 

Maritime OrganiZ.atlon, the United States unilaterally required that double hulls be phased in 

by the year 2015. Double hulls do not prevent accidents, of course, although in accidents less 

severe than the BrtUT' s they may reduce the amount of oil that spills. 

What la a realistic prescription for improved tanker safety? 

Tanker Design - The alarming frequency of power and steering failures Indicates 

Inadequate redundancy and maintenance standards in those systems. To gct rid of the NSt 

buckets, there should be disincentives for bringing old tankers into our ports and incentives for 

construction of new vessels. Some of these changes will be expensive, will ta lee time to phase 

In, and may need the approval of the International Maritime Organization to be most effective. 

We have not, however, been aggressive about taking unilateral action. Australia and Norway 

have the reputation of being much tougher than other nations In refusing entry to old or 

substandard vessel,. 

Vessel Traffic Services - Ports In the United States could leam a great deal from our alr 

traffic control systems. This area of pon safety ictually deteriorated for some yeus: as a cost• 

cutting measure, the Reagan administration shut down the VTS ves.sel monitoring systems in 

New Orleans and New York and tried to close them In several other busy pons. The United 

States could gain an inexpensive increment In vessel safety by installing state-of-the-art 

equipment to cover not only our ports but also tanker lanes close to our outu coasts. Then we 

should consider hiring highly qualliled VTS operators and giving them some of the authority 

that we take for granted with air traffic ce>ntrollers. 

Tug escorts - fncreaslngly, major world oil ports ue requi.."ing specially designed tugs 

lo escort tankers through hazardous areas. The tugs' function ls to control the tanker in the 

event of a power or steering failure. The irony of the Brau accident is that Sullom Voe in the 

Shetland Islands is the international leader on tug escorts. In this country, the Louls!ar.a 

Offshore Oil Pon, a consortium of five oil companies, and ARCO, Exxon, and BP In Puget 

Sound are beginning to catch up. France and South Africa have also stationed salvage tugs 

along their coasts to respond to emergencies like the Brae, that occur outside of ports. These an 

medlum<ost prevention measures that provide maximum benefit in the highest rtsk areas. 

Tanker routes - The Bratr disaster provided further proof that there are places of such 

environmental or economic importance that tankers should not be allowed, or not allO"-'ed • 

under certain weather conditions, or not allowed unless there ar.i salvage tugs on standby. The 

State of California has recently gained voluntary agreement of shippers to keep laden tankers 

on the Valdez run at least 50 miles off the state's ce>ast. Mandatory changes In routes, being 

sought by the Eure>pean Community since the Bratr, normally require the Imprimatur of the 

International Maritime Organization, and that approval can takt years to obtain. France and 

Italy are not waiting; they just banned vessel, carrying oil or hazardous cars~ from the straits 

between Sardinia and Corsica. The United States should also move to institute both un_ilateral 

and IMO•s.nctioned coastal protection. 

Crews - With human error by far the largest cause of tanker accidents, the United States 

should both take unilateral action and push the international maritime community for higher 

standards e>n manning. Issues such as-crew slZe, training. and even language. The Briur, for 

2 
129 

0&mple, had a Greelc. Filipino, and Polish crew. Crews often Lack a common Language these 

days, and the maritime industry is rife with Tower of Babel horror stories about some flag-of• 

convenience vessels. 

J1nplementation and enforcement - U we continue lhe approach of recent decades, 

progress will be painfully slow. The International Maritime Organization, a United Nalloru 

organization lhat often appears to function as an Industry association, is the traditional forum 

for debating maritime rules. For too long, the IMO decision making process has been 

dominated by tradition and Industry-defined economic considerations rather than safety 

concerns. When changes are finally agreed on. lmplemenlatlon and enforcement generally are 

Wt to the nations where ships are registered. 

The US. tanker Industry is understandably concemed when L'\is country adopts new 

safety requirements un!Latually. Safety costs money. ReguLatlons that primarily affect US. 

companies can put them at a competitive disad\•antage. Higher standards enforced only by the 

more responsible nations and implemented by the more respc,nsible tanker companies he! p 

drive the trend to flags of convenience. The ocean may look like a level playing field, but It's 

not. Nonetheless, If the United States and other safety-conscious nations can not reform the 

IMO process, we must start to protect ourselves with restrictions adopted outside the IMO, but 

ones th.at do not penalize the responsible operators. 

We can not eliminate human error or mechanical failure, the primary causes of tanker 

accidents, but some Industries have a far superior safety record. The Alilska Oil Spill 

Commission, appointed to Investigate the Ezzon Va/du spill, concluded that we would average 

about 10 airline disasters each week if the airline Industry had a safety record slmU.r to thal 

predicted for the Valdez tanker trade. That we dc,n't is not attributable to some superior 

technc,logy unavailable to tankers. The airline industry has a better record because the public 

demands It; anything less is unacceptable. The lesson for tanker safety Is simple: we either 

abandon our buslness•ll5-U.SUlll Approach and Insist on comprehensive reform, or wt should not 

be surprised when aome of the next megaspills Are in c,ur back yard. 
130 

Center for Marine ~ Conservation 

To= 1eff Pdrlch 

Prom: •ur Henem111 

Dale: M,aaary 2, 1!19S 

Fotmcrly C.mer for Envimnmenal Education. F.st. 1972 

Subject: Oil Spill Ovenlght Hur_ialg 

Swmnuy 

This memo includes information relevant to the oversight hearing Thursday and supplements 

the oped pi«e I faxed you Monday. This provide more deWl on Issues of: · 

Harbor safety • tug escorts. pilot.age. and Vessel Traffic Service systems {VI'S); 

Outer coast protection• tanker routes (you have good Information on this from Warner 

Chabot), salvage tugs, and VTS; 

Tanker design, age, lnspectlor,, manning. 

For more Information from the environmental community on these subjects, I'd say NRDC Is 

the best place to go on pilotage Issues nationally, Center for Muine Conservation on tugs, and 

either of us on tanker routes and VlS. 

Harbor Safety 

Background 

First, let me palnt a little picture of how things work In one U.S. port• San Francisco Bay (which 

includes Oakland, Richmond, Stockton, Benicia, etc. u well u San Francisco • and contrast it 

with Sullom Voe, which Is typical of the European ports that are aggre-ssive about marine 

safety. Your Shetland witness may be too polite to go Into all of this. a was given an excellent 

-introduction to Sullom Voe by its safety officer last summer.) 

An Incoming tanker checks In with San Francisco VI'S. The VT5 equtpment It and obsolete, 20-

yar old system that may finally be upgraded next year. CAI we understand it, the upgraded 

system will still not provide coverage the entitt way &om the Carquinez Strait Bridge to the 

Exxon nflNry In Benicia. That aitlre NII ls In Chairman Miller's district, and we hope he will 

pras the Coast Cuud on what It would take to OVffl:Olne the technical prob~ that Coast 

Cuud thlnb precludes that covange.) The Coast Cuard's VTS II advisory, not mandatory, 

although ships tend to take the occasional advice offered partly out of concern for their liability. 

The VlS Is operated by a combination of Coast Cuard uniformed personneL US\Wly With little 

experience, and civilians, long-term employees who have not been on a ship in a long, long 

time. Pilots generally do not give VT5 operators a lot of respect. In every way • equipment, 

training, and authority - it', very different from air traffic control 

Most tankera take on a pilot at the pilot boat u they aiter the traffic S<!paratlon scheme off the 

Colden Cate. Some tankers have deck officers qualified to act as pilots. Pilotage Is another rat's 

ll2 SullerSIJect. Suille606 Sin Frandsco. CA 9' IOS l'ISI 391-6204 'ticfax (41 SJ 956-7441 
131 

nest of varied state and federal requirements, with some vessels requiring only federally 

licensed pilots and some requiring state-licensed pilots. California'• pilot-licensing 

requirements (which apply only to San Francisco Bay) are much tougher than the federal 

requirements. Even so, the state system Is pathetically unable to weed out poor pilots, some of 

who.mare a menace on the water. Also, each state-licensed pilot Is an independent 

businessman; they work for themselves, and there Is no employer for quality control. The 

tanker masters that have enough experience ill San Francisco Bay know who the good and bad 

pilots are and will insist on one of the good ones for a challenging job. The masters who have 

not been to San Francisco Bay often don't know enough to tum down a bad pilot. It's a pretty 

loose system, with plenty of room for error. 

Unless the tanker Is going to an anchorage, the agent for the vessel arranges for assist tugs to 

berth the tanker. Soon San Francisco will be unusual In this country (along with Puget Sound 

and Prince William Sound) in requiring state-mandated escort tugs, starting just outside the 

Gate. Unfortunately, there are no state-of-the-art escort tugs in the region, but then the state tug 

escort system, as now written, does not require meaningful tug escorting. There are no 

performance standards that set out what Is expected of an escort vessel (ability to tum the 

vessel, or to stop it in a certain distan<:e, In case of a power or steering failure), and no 

requirement that the escort vessels actually demonstrate an ability to be effective at the normal 

operating speeds of tankers in San Francisco Bay. Furthermore, their Is no requirement or 

incentive In the proposed regulations to require the tanker or tug Industries to upgrade the 

escort equipment 

There are no federal requirements yet for tug escorts. The Coast Guard has started a proposed 

rulernaklng for tug escorts for Prince William Sound and Puget Sound. Their first run at that 

was one of the weakest proposals I've ever seen: the Coast Guard essentially suggested leaving 

everything up to the master, pilot, and tug operator in each instance. 

Each of these elements Is very different in Sullom Voe. The VTS system Is the.best equipment 

available, and it's mandatory. The local Harbour Authority trains and hires the pilots and VTS 

operators and they tllke tum$ doing both jobs. That means that the VTS operator on duty is always 

a current, experienced pilot, and when the VTS operator and pilot are talking to each other, they 

are peers and,.ln essence, team mates. 

Similarly, the Harbour Authority owns the escort tugs, which are state-of-the-art tractor tugs. 

No other kind of tug makes any se~ at all for tankers traveling at speeds greater than 3 or 4 

knots. 

Recommendations 

1) VTS • Coast Guard needs to get serious about designing and installing modem systems In 

virtually all of our major ports, and Congress needs to give them the money and direction. 

OPA '90 required Coast Guard to do something, and they came out with a Port Needs Study 

(August 1991) that was so strange that it concluded there would be "positive net benefit" to 

Installing systems at ports such as Corpus Christi, Port Arthur, and Houston/Galveston, but a 

"negative net benefit" for San Francisco, Santa Barbara, Anchorage/Cook Inlet, and southern 

Chesapeake Bay! In reality, probably all 23 ports Coast Guard studied should have some 
132 

form of VTS. Guidance from Congress would be timely now since Coast Guard is starting a 

new Ntional study with I new advisory gn,up. 

2) PUotage - We need tougher federal requirements for pilot training and recertif~catlon, since 

they are the one standard that applies everywhere. NRDC should have more detailed 

recommendations. 

3) Tug Escorts - Perhaps Congress can give some additional direction to Coast Guard on this 

one. Judging by the proposed Nie makjng for Prince William and Puget sounds, Coast Gwird 

wants to take the easy way out. Industry Is fond of saying tug escorts might prevent 10% of the 

accidents, but if one of those prevented is a major spill, the savings pay for many years of 

escorts In many ports. 

The direction to the Coast Guard could be that, unless Coast Guard makes findings that there 

isn't a need, there la a pre&UDlption ol the utility of tug escorts at, say, the 10 U.S. ports with 

the highest volume of traffic (number of vessel movements and/or tonnage) of oil barges and 

tanJccn. The Coast Guard should also understand that there should be performance standards 

for each port and some demonstration that the tug equipment available can meet the 

performance standards. Of course, the standards should be designed to meet hazard 

conditions of each port, not to allow use of whatever tugs happen to be available (San 

Francisco's mistake). Further, the Coast Guard, not industiy, should have the fuw say In 

designing the performance 1tandards and choosing a national system for certifying tugs for 

tanker escort service. 

Outer Coaat Protection 

Rec:ollllilendations 

1) VI'S - Some areas outside ports need VIS. Santa Barbara ChaMel and the Florida Straits are 

good examples. So far, Coast Guard is confining Its studies to areas that are too dose to ports. 

2) Tanbl' routes and salvage tugs -These two topic, are interrelated beause, II ocean-going 

tugs are not available, tankers should be kept farther offshore. The rough calculation comes 

from an,wering two questions: In a given area, how fast will a disabled tanlcer drift given 

conditions? and how many hours away ls the nearest salvage tug? With the allSWffl to those 

questions, one can cakulate how far ofrshore tankers should be. 

Warner gave you comments on tanker routes. We would suggest that salvage tugs should be 

added to the equation. 

Tanker Design 

Recommendations 

A huge subject, of course. We'll only mention a couple of points. Congress took a major step 

with OPA '90 in unilaterally requiring the phase-In of double hulls !or tankers entering our 

ports. The International Maritime Organization process has proved that it does not work, or · 

doesn't work except over geologic time. IMO has been talltlng about double hulll for over 20 

.3 
133 

years. After the recent tanker spills, the European Community and some of its member states 

have also gotten Impatient enough to take some unilateral actions. We need to encourage U.S. 

tanker operators to reduce the average age of our fleet, and we need to follow Australia's lead 

in cracking down on old, poorly maintained tankers from other countries. A$ we understand It, 

Australia Is being aggressive about denying entry to the rust buckets. In this country, that Is 

Coast Guard's responsibility. U they don't have enough authority, they should tell you what 

they need. 

Another series of questions for Coast Guard could be about the terrible failure rate of tanker 

power and steering system.,, at least compared to airliners. In the other piece I faxed you, I 

mentioned the 7 such failure involving laden tankers on Prince Willlam Sound since the Exxon 

Vtildn spill. One of those tankers, the Kn11n, narrowly missed Middle Rocle. Those same failure 

are happening elsewhere, as well These failures happen wherever there are vessels. An Exxon 

tanker lost power just outside the Golden Gate last summer. Fortunately, it wasn't bad 

weather, and they got It fired up again before it got into trouble. How can these things happen 

so often? Is there inadequate maintenance? Is there Inadequate redundancy in power, steering, 

and navigational systems? 
134 

February 18, 1993 

Representative George Miller 

Subc011111ittee on oversight and Investigations 

House Co-ittee on Natural Resources 

Washington, o.c. 20515-6201 

Natural Resoun:es 

Defense Council 

40 Wtsl UJlh Slrtd 

Ntw Yori. Neu, Yon: lOOII 

212 727-2700 

Fu 212 727-1773 

Re: Impl-entation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 

Dear Mr. Miller: 

Thank you again for inviting NRDC to testify at last week'• 

hearing concerning impl-entation of the Oil Pollution Act 

of 1990. We remain very concerned with the manner in which 

the coast Guard is implementing its duti- under the Oil 

Pollution Act and are hopeful that your hearing can lay the 

groundwork for pushing th- to illpl-nt OPA more aggressively. 

One important issue which was not -discussed at the hearing 

(although it was -ntioned in our testiaony) is the issue of 

how· vessels plan for salvage assistance under the Interim 

Final Rule for Vessel Response Plans. Despite OPA's 

requirement that vessel owners contract for spill r-oval 

equipment, which includes equipment for mitigating or preventing oil spillage, the Coast Guard'• Interim Final 

Rule does not require that vessel owners contract for 

salvage services: it only requires that by llll vessel owners identify salvage companies that can arrive to the 

port nearest where the spill occurs (not even on-scene) in 

twenty-four hours. In addition to violating the explicit 

laJ19Ua9e of section 4202(a)(5)(C)(iii), thia requiruent contradicts the recoaaendation of the Negotiated Ruleaaking 

co-ittee on vessel Response Plans that salvage services be 

contracted for and that they be on-scene within 12, 18 hours 

l350 Neu, Yon: Aot., N.W. 

W4shington, DC WOOS 

202 783-7800 

Fu 202 783-5917 

nsim..o.S/m! 

S..n mncisco, CA 94105 

415 777-0220 

fu4l5 495-5996 

617 Soldlr 0/ior Sim!. 

Los Angd,s, CA 90014 

2l3 892-1500 

Fu 213 629-5389 

212 Mmluint SI., S•ilr 203 

H..,,J,J,,, Hmooi'i 96813 

BOB 533-1075 

fu/Kl852l-684l 
135 

or 36 hours depending on the location of the spill (36 hours 

for spills occurring more than so • iles from shore). To 

d-onstrate the potential for how the Coast Guard's Interim 

Final Rule will be co• plied with by the vessel owners, I've 

attached a letter fro• a company •promising• salvage resources: as you can see from the letter, no assurance is 

offered that salvage resources will be available in the 

event of a spill in u.s waters. 

Salvage services, which include the supply of assistance 

tugs and the transfer of cargo from the damaged vessel to 

another vessel (lightering) are an important and effective 

spill prevention measure, as well as a spill response action. For example, prompt assistance of a salvage tug can avert or minimize the loss of cargo from a stranded or grounded vessel. Salvage of the cargo remaining on board 

the Exxon Valdez reduced the potential for an even more disastrous outcome. Timely salvage assistance to the Braer 

may have prevented its disastrous grounding after the vessel 

loss power. 

The importance of marine salvage was underscored in a 1982 

study carried out by the National Research Council entitled 

•Marine Salvage in the U.S.", which concluded that: 

"There are approximately 60 to 70 marine salvage 

operations in U.S. offshore waters annually with little 

change expected in the next two decades. Of these, two or three have potentially serious public consequences - - cases involving hazardous cargoes or imminent threat 

to human life or the environment •••• The need to 

maintain the capability to conduct salvage operations 

relates more to the potential consequences that can ensure of a casualty requiring salvage occurs and no salvage is conducted, than to the number of casualties 

that require a salvage response. Given current or foreseeable [salvage) capability, some easily 

conceivable maritime accidents cannot be salved at 

all. " 

The Committee then recommended that the national statement 

of salvage policy (10 US 7361-7367) be updated to recognize 

"the vital role that salvage plays in minimizing the public 

consequences of maritime casualties." 

Unfortunately, national r ecognition of the importance of 

marine salvage has not occurred and salvage capability in 

the United States has declined. The remaining salver on the 

west coast recently was threatened with bankruptcy and it was only through a buyout by an east coast salver that these 

illportant salvage resources remain available for west coast 

casualties. By requiring vessel owners to contract for 

salvage services, as required under OPA and recommended by 

the Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, the Coast Guard can 
136 

ensure that some degree of salvage resources are maintained 

and perhaps even increased in the u.s. 

It is important to note that ·the National Research Council. has again convened a panel to review the issue of salvage 

capability ·in the United States, as well as to consider the 

issue of whether OPA liability should apply when a salvor 

intentionally jettisons oil cargo in order to prevent a larger accident (the co-ittee was convened at the request of the U.S. Navy). NRDC serves on that co1D1Rittee and would 

like to invite you to a symposium being held on February 23 

to discuss the issue of jettison of cargo (I've attached 

information on that symposium). 

Thank you for your interest in these issues of spill prevention and reoponse. Your continued support and 

monitoring of the Oil Pollution Act is vital to its eventual 

proper implementation. 

Sincerely, 

~μ11-

Nina Sankovitch 

Senior Project Attorney 

cc: Jeff Petrich 

Rear Admiral Arthur E. Renn (USCG) 

Captain Gerry Willis (USCG) 

captain Robert North (USCG) 

Captain Richard P. Fiske (US Navy) 

William L. Peck (US Navy) 

Scott Sterling (PWS RCAC) 

Ann Rothe (NWF) 
SMIT AMERICAS, INC, 

,oo,, $,1'111:1.,.,lot'Pllwy. f . . 

S..IUIQ "°""°" •••~, nc,,io 

T.-Cpnolltt 1/"JI 111,)l•UIO 

,...., 1'·\0IL" ~, M6Q'6 

Ttftfu ~7•:'I: ~t1l4 

137 

Janu~ry ~7, 1?9l 

Thie loteer confinis that, in thci event tllat 

and its affiliates o:icporienc• an oil spill incident ~nd 

request responca • oi:vices, S•Jt Am<tr.i.e""• :Cnc. ("S111it") lntend,i tr, 

re•pnnn to the extent possible within the Unitet1 Stat11a nt Anuod,;a . 

Respon~a services to be provided ore~" rnll~w•: 

0 sa1va9e and Fireriql\t I nrJ" 

Thia l~tter ot intent peniits . and Its 

lfti llu.e• to identity Sait H ;,n .iv.:iJl.,bl 111 8.llva9a and tiretlqht i n9 

responne resource in cont1n9ency Plans d~veloped in co~pltance with 

th• require•enta of tile Oil Pollutl.on Act ut 1990. Prc.1tit!Ad 

however, that Blllit aakes no r• Frlll'H'tntlltion or guarant:H nr. t:n 

respnn11e tiJDOs or adequacy of resourc111r.. 

C011mercial terJIG to be neqotiatP.d on 6 case by c~so ba~19. 

:lalt A•cr.l.caa, :i:no. 1• 1;0 b,a conr.11ct'.c,d UI a preferred :.alva9c 

contrmctor, it poosible, in any salv~q~ projects. 

In an •Mer9ency, you can cont4ct UN i4 hrs. a d~y at (713) tJ1-~1~0 . 

Very trul, yourr., ]W:..::, 

l"resid<1nt 
138 

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMISSION ON ENCINEERINC AND TECHNICAL SYSnMS 

2101 Constihltion AVffluo w.......-. D.C. 21Mll 

MAllNE iOAaD 

AGENDA 

~'--1tla,,: 

1.ectme Room 

NadoulAl:alkayofScie.a 

2101 Com111udoll AveDae 

W~D.C 

202-334-3119 

0800 ~ ,,_,,,,_ AWIUllblt in Mtdillf RDam 

0830 1.0 Welcome, Symposium ObjcctMs and 

Orpalzalioll; Video Praaua1ioll 

Welmme floal tlle U.S. Na.y Supervisor of 

SaJva&c 

Welcome from tlle U.S. Coasl Guard 

0930 3.o Purpoeelul Jclliloll of ear10: Decision 

·F0945 BRL4K 

1000 4.0 Lcpl SCatua of Jatllonias 

4.1 Praelliadoll of l.epl '"-

HO#/: 

SLJ950~51.-NW 

WISblqloll. D.C 20037 

202-457.0SOO 

FAX: 202-t66-6484 

RADM A E. Hema. U.S. Coast Ouanl 

{lavlltd) 

Midlael Ella, SaJva&c AsloaalioD, 

Lotldotl 

Keanelb Fullwood. Mobil Sblppill& 

Compaay 

Warrea Dcaa and !Aurie Crict, Dyer, 

Ella, .IOICpb and Milli 

PbWp llenls, l)eputmQI of JIISllt:e 

Fnd Burp, Le Boeuf, l..amb, LdllJ, and Macrae 

""--~ .... ,._..,..._,., ... _......,., __ ..,_......,.,r..-.. ............ -............. 
139 

- 2-

1130 5.0 Imponanc:e of Spill Size on the Environmental 

Effects of a Spill Incident 

1215 LUNCH in Mming Atta 

1300 6.0 Oil Spill Trajectory Modeling 

1345 7.0 Panel Discussions 

• Kenneth Edgar, Diversified Technologies 

• Roger Gale, BP Nonh America 

• Don Jensen, U.S. Coast Guard 

• Tim McKinna, Texas General Land Office 

• John Driscoll, Smit International Americas 

Inc. 

• Anne Rothe, National Wildlife Federation 

• Steven Van Dyke, Maritrans and West of 

England P&I Oub 

7. 1 Information Needed to Suppon a Defensible 

Decision to Jetiison Cargo 

1500 BREAK 

1515 7.2 Decision Making: By Whom and How? 

1630 8.0 Plenary Discussion and Closing Comments 

1730 RECEYTTON 

January 14, 1993 

Rainer Engelhardt, Marine Spill 

Response Corporation 

Jerry Galt, NOAA 

Gordon Paulsen 
140 

PACIFIC: COAST FEDERATlON OF 

f"ISHERMF.N'S ASSOCIATIONS, INC. 

PO 8()X ~II~ 

SAUSAllTO. CA 949(16 

TEL: (~151 332 6080 

~AX · (415) 331,27,, 

2 February 1993 

Tha Honorable George Miller 

Chairman 

Hous• N11t.11~11l R•sourc:as Commi ttee 

1324 Lungworth orr1c• Building Washin9ton, o . c. 20515 

RE : Oil Spill ov .. rsight Hearinq - ,o Mlle ~utters ror 011 Tankers 

Dear Chairman Miller: 

Th• Pac:ific .Co,13t Federo1tion of Fishermen's Associations 

(~CFFA), reprasAntA wnrkin? men and women in th• wast coast 

fishin9 rleeL. Our members' livelihoods, as well as tne 

s:horaside inductric::i o1nd co111munitiea they support, depend on a clean and healthy m11rinl!! l!!nvironm•nt. Wa wish to thank you and 

you,· couunitL .... !Yr sc.:hedulinq an oil spill oversiqht hear1nq on this issue of 9rc3t import,1ncc to the nation's fiahin9 industry. 

PCFFA support# 1 .. ~isloLiun to establish mandatory snipping 

lan•• a minimWII ot SO nautical milcc from 3hora tor oil tankers 

and other ships carry1nq large qu11nt.it.io1A r.,f bunker oil. It also 

supports a Co119raasiunol iJ•LiLiuu Lu the International Maritime 

Organization (IMO) for th·• ectablichmcnt of chippin9 l,1nea ,1 

111ini111U111 ot !>U nautical miles t'.rom shore thrnughnut th>!! world. 

Th• recant disaster in the Shctlo1nd Iol,1nds 111,1kea clear the 

dan9er ot tanJCers operating t.oo c:ln,;11 t .,:, shore . What happened in 

the Bayot Quenllalor ..:uulcl ,::o:;ily happen along cal1Corn1a•s 81g Sur or Loat Coa•t, both n,1tional trc,1ourea, off the ore9on and 

wasnington coast. New Engl11nd, th.a c:11rnl In,,,;, or the Florida 

coast and Keys. Mui>L uC Lht::.o: on1d» hdve been protected rrom oft•hor• oil development, and the potcnti,11 for spill• from 

drilling, as a result of Congression11l mnr11t-.nri11m~. but remain 

vulnero.ble to catast1·ophi.:.: £iJilh, Ct·um o Lonk.•c qroundinq or cinldnq . 

Kovinq oil tankers and other lllrgei· can-1 .. ,·:; uf bunk.er a minimum of 50 ail•• from shore would pro~idc the time ncceo3~ry 

to respond to a vessel that nas lost power or h11c:nmA ~i,.11bll!!d, or respond to a spill resulting rrow a .:.:olli:.iun, fire or sinking. 

Obviously, tha creation of o!fahore tanker lane:; will not prevent 

all spills resulting trom tanker operations since t.hArA ArA ,.till 

ports to.nkera must move in and out or, n&vor1·t1a .. 1 .. »:1 the 

establishment of lancis: a minimum of SO nautical milco from 3hore, 

together with tug escorts in and out of port11, Jthn111~ hAlr t.r, 

minimize the 0<:cu,·rence oC t1111ker-r•lat .. .i liJ-1.i.ll:,; . 

,STEW, .. RllS or TII[ FISH!IUES 
Tho Honorable ~•orge Hiller 

2 rebruary 1993 

r.iqe Two 

141 

ror the west coast fi"'hlnq industry, legislation mandating 

off• hore tankei: limes .i.s extr-emely important. first, and 

fnrAmr.,• t, is: the dam.age done to our m.irinc environment -- Cish 

<ilnd • helltish resources - - when II mi,jor spill , such as the~ or the Exxon Valdet . occurs. z:v.,11 in those areas not directly 

atfactAn by a spill, the fishing inductry would have difficulty 

11111rk.ating uncontaminated product bat:1111"'"' of public: perception 

that ,1.ll fish from that region wai. unsate to eat. l''Urther, as we founti nut. in Prine:• William Sound, it t,1.kes yeiirs to clean up a cua»tal oil spill. 

Seconn, without legislation requiring t,1.nker~ triinsiting the 

coast le., be a specified distance ot!'shore, th"'r" 1,1ill continue to 

be the thre.it to the coast of II major u.i.l :.pill. The U.S. fish Ii 

WildlifA s-..rvice, in its roeovery plan for the ~outhern sea 

ut.L.,r, has identified, correctly , a major nil Rpill as the single 

greatect threiit to the recovei:y of this l.i.sled species. However, 

rather th11n attacking the oil spill problem directly, U6FWS' 

VentuL·a-based otter recovery team has sugqested inste11n t .hA 

animalc be cpre:id up and do"n the Califo~·nia coast su Lhat a 

major o1J. spi 11 wn11ld not wipo out th• ontiro population . Thi:; 

"solution" uuly c.:c.,mpounds the r1shermen's problem: a) it does 

nothing. to minimize the potential for such II spill, and b) 

threatens our st11tP.'~ "'h-..lltish tishories, including those for 

abalone and "~11 un:hin, by expanding the otter range rroa central 

California into the productive shelltish qrounds to tha north .snd 

south. As an altP.rnative to the USFWS plan, PCFFA and other 

fishery grouvs :suggested to USl"WS the establishment or t .anlter 

lanes SO mile£ offchorc th• otter's range to protect the animals 

trom the catastrnph i'" spill, but those recommend.ations tell on deat ears 111 Llue last, and unabasheclly pro-oil, administration. 

We are hoping Sccrot:iry Babbitt will change this and call ror a recovery plan th11r. pr~t-..cts the otter An.st the fishery. But juct 

the potential Cuc ii miiior spill presents an eminent danqar now to 

California•• multi-million dolliir shellfish fishery . 

on a JanuiirY, PC?'l"A sent a letter to ::.enator tsarbara Boxer 

suggesting both legi:ll.ition :ind a Congressional petition to the 

IMO on tanker l11nP.~ . W~ did this knowing of her interest in tho 

paat on 1:.1&.i,,. iasue when she was a member ot tne House. we are grateful that you ,1.nd the Niitur:il Resources Committee are taking 

up this iss1111 11nn ""' lc,c,k for1,1ard to working 1,1ith you and your 

stare iu U1v development or tederal standards t ·o protect our nation's ooaot :ind its fishing industry from tanker-related oil 

spills. 

i::~cc;re~, I /' .. _;. w. llz:eii'1 Graaer , Jr. 

E , utive Director .. 
142 

PACIFIC STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMMISSION 

l!JI.OCUflVF. {>UW.(...,UR 

OUY N. 'OIOllNIUROII 

February 3, 1993 

Mr. Jeff Petrick 

2'°1 S.W. nRST AVF.Nllt;, SUIT!: 200, l'ORTI.ANU, ORF.GON '17201 

PHONF. (503) 326-7025 FAX(~)) 326-7033 

c/o Congressman George Miller 

Washington, D.C . 20515 

Dear Mr. Petr~ck : 

I would like to add our concerns to those in both the fishing and 

conaervation communities regarding near-shore oil tanker traffic. 

We applaud last years voluntary agreement on the part of West 

Coast oil shippers to keep a minimum distance of 50 miles 

offshore . However, we strongly feel that some sort of federal 

regulatory oversight be provided to _assure .total industry 

compliance with the 50 mile distance. 

Such a regulation would add a vital buffer in case of a catastrophi c event at sea or disabled vessel drifting toward 

shore. Based on recent events off the coasts of North Caroli na and Scotland, I am sure you can eee the value of such lanes to 

the fishing, aquaculture, and tourism industries of the West 

coast, as well as the Nation. 

The Pacific States Marine Fisheri es Commission, established 

through an act of Congress in 1947, addresses i saues that fall outs ide state or regi onal management council jurisdiction, issues 

that cannot be resolved within an individual state, and coastwide 

and national i ssues that affect the . Pacific fisheries . We have a 

deep commitment to the protection of marine f i sheries habitat, 

especially highly proquctive near-shore areas . 

Please feel free to contact me at any time . 

s~¥4 

Stephen H. Phillips Habitat Biologist 

cc: PCFFA 

PFMC 

'Tu pmnk>l.c the 1,:on.wnr1dion , ,kvclopmcn1 end man1ticment of .-.11:i(ic C()M..;t 

11-thcry rtkn.m.:e~ 1hrnueh t.:onrdin:.ted n.:giC111 .tl research, muniiorini :md u1 ili~.i1io11 " 
-~~--

·jRCAC~-

143 

Additional recommendations for the 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

House Committee on Natural Resources 

from Rick Steiner, of Cordova, as provided to RCAC 

• Because OPA 90 is taking so long to implement, should establish 

interim protective measures. For example, establish voluntary 'areas to be 

avoided' 

• Marine Inspection Program is, by Coast Guard's own admission, 

ineffective. Needs to be beefed up, especially inspection of foreign vessels 

• Consider re-establishing independent marine inspection service, 

answerable only to the Coast Guard. One of the problems now is that inspectors 

are non-mariners who rotate out after a year or two. Marine inspection service 

needs re11red career mariners. 

• Review standards of open-registry countries (llags of convenience). 

especially of nations that are not IMO signatories. 

• Review and compare slandards of all International Association of 

Classification Society (IACS) members and non-member classification 

societies. Congress should consider the concept of assigning some liability for 

inadequate surveys that result in an oil spill. 

• Improve the Marine Safety Information System (MSIS). the casualty 

reporting system 

• Use Lloyd's 'Sea Data System· to evaluate lhe condition of all vesse!s 

bound for U.S. ports. 
144 

• Involve maritime unions in discussions of lanker safely, even if it has to 

be on a confidential basis. 

• Institute special licensing training requirements for VLCC/ULCC (very 

large crude carriers arid ultra-large crude carriers). 

• Analyze the incentives (fines, rewards) paid by shippers and/or 

charterers to hold vessel to schedule. This practice can force the master to take 

unnecessary risks. Congress might consider making such incentives illegal. 

• Pursue development in the IMO of international consensus on natural 

resource damages so that governments will be able to collect natural resource 

damages from oil spills. 

• Initiate major research into the human factors that we know cause 80% 

of all tanker accidents. 
1'5 

-~·- Regional Citizms• AdviooryCouncil / 601 West fifth Avenue, Suite 500 / Anchorage, Alaska 99501-2254 / (907) 277-7222 / FAX (907) 277-4523 

Status of Current Projects 

Port Operations and Vessel Traffic Systems 

Disabled tanker towing study 

Year-tong study evaluating the capability of existing emergency towing equipment and 

practices; also to examine alternatives to enhance escort and assist capabilities for disabled 

tankers. Study is funded by RCAC and the Prince William Sound Tanker Association. Nonfunding sponsors are the U.S. Coast Guard, the Alaska Department of Environmental 

Conservation and Alyeska. The study began in October and should be completed in fall of 

1993. 

SW!l,s: Report on Phase I is being revised. (Reviewing and evaluation of existing and 

alternative towing equipment and practices). Part II is in progress - computer modeling and 

simulation scenarios. 

Fire prevendon task force 

A joint task force was organized by the POVTS and TOEM Committees to assess 

current capabilities for responding to terminal and tanker fires. The task force includes 

representatives of the POVTS, TOEM, Alyeska and other oil industry representatives, the 

U.S. Coast Guard and the City of Valdez. The task force will develop recommendations for 

improvements, if needed. 

Slil!ls: Alyeska, City of Valdez and tanker owners have agreed in principle to hold 

cooperative fire drills. 

T/V Kenai report 

POVTS staff reviewed information available about the October 20, 1992 incident in 

which the tanker Kenai experienced steering problems in Valdez Narrows. Contrary to 

newspaper reports, the RCAC found insufficient information to determine whether the tug 

escort saved the lanker from grounding. 

Safety or navfgadon survey 

Approximately 300 to 400 people who use marine navigation system in Prince William 

Sound are being surveyed to determine attitudes about suitability of current navigation aids 

and escort procedures. The results will be used to develop recommendations for 

improvements. 

SW!l,s: Anticipate final report in September 1993. 

projects •tal.. 3/1'"3 Pace 1 
146 

Weather reporting upgrades 

POVI'S members and staff are working with the National Data Buoy Center, a branch 

of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administralion, on obtaining additional weather 

reporting stations in Prince William Sound. Currently, there aren~ enough reporting stations 

to determine from the port what weather conditions are in Hinchinbrook Entrance and the 

middle of Prince William Sound. 

Scientific 

Long term environmental monitoring project (L TEMP) 

This two-year study is designed to collect baseline data and monitor oil-related impacts 

on the ecosystems and organisms of Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska. The 

overall purpose of the study is to delemline present conditions and potential future impacts of 

oil transportation within the study aica. The study is monitoring hydrocarbon concentrations 

and characteristics-in nearshore sub-tidal sediments and accumulations of hydrocarbons in the 

tissue of blue mussels. Field surveys are conducled twice a year in Prince William Sound and 

the Gulf of Alaska. 

~ : The first sampling began March 19 and was expecled to take approximately two 

weeks. 

Socio-economic impact mitigation 

A multi-year study was begun to assess the social. cultural and economic impacts of oil 

spills for the purpose of developing future mitigation strategies for communities in the 

region. The first phase of the study, most of which was completed in 1992, consisted of 

focus groups in selected representative communities to confinn impacts identified in earlier 

public testimony. 

RCAC and its consultants will work with residents in nine communities selected from 

the 18 identified as impacled by the Exxon Valdez oil spill, to develop specific strategies for 

dealing with the impacts of a future spill 

SW!ls: Focus groups were held in Kodiak, Ouzinkie, Port Graham, Cordova and 

Seward. Notes compiled from the focus groups are available to the general public. Phase II, 

to identify data and procedures to develop mitigation strategies and review literature, is 

underway. 

Bibliography- Bibliography of bibliographies on natural sciences in Exxon Valdez impact area. 

SW!ls: Underway 

Current research profile - Database of active research projects: A concise guide to what 

resean::h is ongoing and through time what research has been done. 

SW!la: Underway 

project, 1tala1 311"'3 
Oil Spill Prevention and Response 

Contin1ency planning 

147 

The first project RCAC ladded in 1989 was to review and comment on Alyeska's oil 

spill contingency plan for Prince William Sound. Under a steering committee structure 

organized by die State Deparlment of Environmental Conservation, RCAC works with 

industry and regulators to review, revise and finalize die Prince William Sound Tanker Spill 

Prevention and Response Plan. The steering committee and its working groups are 

consensus-driven. RCAC also submits its own comments and suggestions for contingency 

plans. 

SWll,i: The Mechanical Assessment Wooong Group is finalizing its interpretation of 

equipment requirements for Prince William Sound response plans. The requirements will 

determine the type and quantity of storage modules need for nearshorc response. 

Nearshore response 

Nearshore response is an element of response planning that has been a primary focus of 

RCAC's Oil Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) Committee. RCAC chaired a multiagency/organization wodcing group formed to develop contingency plans for responding to 

spilled oil that threatens shoreline. Outside die wooong group process, OSPR sponsored 

several sbldies on die concept of providing nearshore response through a cooperative of 

coastal communities using resources and personnel from the communities. Now that lhe 

nearshorc plans have been completed, the OSPR Committee is focusing much of its effort on 

·gaps in response, specifically, response aftec the initial 72 hours and response outside Prince 

William Sound. 

SWll,i: RCAC has a representative on a state worlc group developing a nearshorc 

demonstration project using local resources and personnel 

Drills and simulations 

Since 1990, RCAC has participated in, monitored and critiqued spill drills, deployment 

exercises and spill simulations conducted by industry. Staff, directors and committee 

volunteers participate in die major drills. In 1992. RCAC representatives participated in major 

drills conducted by Chevron and Alyeslca. 

At the Alyeslca drill in October, RCAC first used a draft Emergency Response Plan 

spelling out die organization's role in the event of a major spill and procedures for operating 

during an incidenL 

RCAC also began using a contractor to monitor and evaluate drills and exercises on a 

consistent basis. RCAC assisted industry and regulatory agencies in drill planning and postdrill evaluations. RCAC representatives submit written critiques and comments aftec every ·•~J- ...... J/103 •• ,. 3 
148 

drill or exercise observed. 

Slllnls: RCAC will participate in major drills April 7•8 (Tesoro) and October 5.7 (BP). 

Terminal Operations and Environmental Monitoring 

Ballast water treatment 

Public concerns over ballast water at the Valdez Marine Terminal led the TOEM 

Committee to conduct a review of sampling and analysis programs at the ballast water 

treabnent plant With state funding, three programs were reviewed: sampling and testing of 

influent; sampling and testing of effluent; and sampling and testing to determine toxicity. 

RCAC has reviewed Alyeska's literature-based materials balance calculation study and 

is recommending that a "dip and sample" study be conducted. 

Slani,s: RCAC issued formal recommendations for improvements in sampling and 

monitoring program. Depending on response to recommendations, RCAC may initiate an 

independent monitoring program. 

Air quality In Valdez 

At issue is whether Alyeska will be required to install vapor recovery system to control 

emissions from tanker loading. Alyeska would like to be exempted from requirements of 

Clean Air Act and hopes to show that benzene emissions from tankers do not constitute a 

significant share of the benzene that Valdez residents are exposed to. RCAC retained 

independent specialisls to conduct peer review of methods used and conclusions reached in 

Alyeska' s Valdez air health studies (V AHS). RCA C's scientists concluded that terminal 

sources contribute a significantly higher percentage of the benzene in Valdez air than 

Alyeska's study found. 

After monitoring air quality in Valdez and Seward for two weeks, Alyeska concluded 

that benzene in Valdez is in line with a coastal community surrowided by mountains. An 

addendum to V AHS raised only slightly the estimates of cancer risk and amowit of benzene 

attributable to terminal EPA has asked many of the same questions raised by RCAC. 

Alyeska has reiterated that it will not install vapor controls unless health risk is shown or the 

law requires it 

Slalul: Alyeska is developing its response to EPA's questions. RCAC's panel of 

independent scientists is reviewing the addendum to the Valdez Air Health Study. 

Occupational Exposure 

The Terminal Operations and Environmental Monitoring (TOEM) Committee is 

gathering information on govemm\..tt inspection reports that address exposure to air toxics. 

The first step is a literature•based sean:h to delemline whether workers are being protected 

from unhealthy exposure to benzene and other pollutants. 

proJac:ts 1tala1 3/l"t3 ..,. 4 
Community Information and Education 

"The Observer" 

149 

RCAC publishes an eight-page quarterly tabloid distributed to approximately 13,000 

households in the Exxon Valdez impact area. The last issue was published in February; the 

next "Observer" will come out in April or May. 

Video 

RCAC produced a IO-minute general information video, "A Voice for Prince William 

Sound." The video has been distributed to member organizations, other interested groups, 

government agencies and libraries throughout the impact area. Copies are available free of 

charge from RCAC. 

"Then & Now" 

A reader-friendly 20-page booklet on changes and improvements in oil spill prevention 

and response since 1989. The booklet is expected to be available in May 1993. (3/12193) 

RCAC Handbook 

A comprehensive guide to RCAC, designed primarily for new council and committee 

members as an orientation tool. 

General council-wide 

Regulatory comments/OPA 90 Implementation 

RCAC comments on federal rulemaking, as well as state laws and regulations, 

pertaining to oil spill prevention and response, crude oil tankers and terminal operations. 

RCAC participated on the federal negotiated rulemaldng committee on vessel response plans. 

RCAC has submitted comments on rules for vessel response plans, escort vessels in Prince 

William Sound, facility response plans, double hulls standards, tank level monitoring 

devices, and use of automatic pilot. 

OPA 90 Symposium 

Co-sponsored with Cook Inlet RCAC and the U.S. Coast Guard, a symposium Feb. 5 

on implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 

Formation of Prince WIiiiam Sound "Association" 

Alyeslca, the Prince William Sound Tanker Association, the Alaska Department of 

Environmental Conservation and the U.S. Coast Guard are considering organizing an 

"association" as described in OPA 90. RCAC is being asked to provide comment and input 

since the association would likely affect RCAC's relationships with industry and agencies. 

projects 1t• tu l/1,/93 l'a1• 5 
150 
151 

Executive Director's Letter 

I If - ~ !If PIK! WtJJNI. SaN> REooNAl 

Citizens' Adviscry Counc,1 are ~ al 

the wen Valdez Oil Spill', alled.d tom11U1i1ies 

and~. NolMt """"'' ClllllfflWtial 6"'""'-', and 

aquacuhu,w, ..-.ironmentol and od,er organizalions in 

Prince Wiliam Scu,d and the GJI al Alaska. We ha,e 

18 diflnnt enli1ies with 18 diflnnt W>ices. 

wt.en CWICil diredon meet 1o disa,ss issues, they 

l1Qluraly bring lo the table d"rflnnt ~. aincems, 

rnc,li,,alions and points al view. Alllnd .... meelfflgs and 

you wii witness discussions that 011 intense, powerlul, 

penetrating, sprin&l with i....o,, at tinm heatod, but 

always lied with a prcl,ing~ al penpedNes 

and laadod with issues. ~ is net in ...- w,a,l,ulary. 

Fram the Yf!f'( Grst meeting I altlnded, I was slnidt by 

the d".-.enity al penpoctMS applied lo a multiplicity al 

-- No .-what the issue, i-, one slrong 

and enduring constant hos always choraclerized the 

~ and reasonable decisions. 

(M diredon wifl continue lo mob good and ,... 

sonable decisions under the dirwdion ollnd by ...- long 

range plan. During 1992 the Gioncil ~ thrcui,, a 

long range planning process designed lo guide the organization. This plan wiN help RCAC increase ill eilodi,eness, improve the organization end maintain a clear 

lows. <» long range plan empl,osizes that direclon are 

port al something larger than tnem..i.e. or their indi· 

viMI o,gonizotions. 1he Council's purpo,e cl 'Citians 

promoting envircnmrilly sale operation cl the Ai,.,i., 

terminal and ossociatod tankers• requim that brooder 

- end ccmmitment. 
From the President 

t/BClM 10 TIE 1992-i!IOIT<:# TIE PINI 

William Sound Regional Ci~ZIIIS' Advii«y 

Council. As yo, read OU( "PO", please nole 

ary queslions 01' - Wt welccine r..lxxk ln,m 

arycreinlnslodinpr.....,.;,,goilspilsandoilpobor, 

in the°"""' Valdez~ cno. 

lAlring 1992, the Prince WiHiam Sound RCAC citi· 

............ and llaff ln,m the Oil SpiD Pr-'an and 

Re,ponse IOSl'ltl and Port Opmons and v..sel Traffic 

Syslems (POVTSJ comm~ participated in _.,., 

~ng groups and committees. Examples include a 

worb,g pp organiDd lo dMlap a pier, lar l.ong 

all spilod 011 lhat lhreal,,,, shorelines, a ~ aommillot charged di negalialing oil sp,1 canlingency plm,s lar 

lank ......i. carrying crvde oil, and a WCfl< pp -.dying aplians lar lawing ~ tanbn al sea. 

Prince Wolian Sound RCAC's participalian in sud, 

QRlUP$ iluslraln t- citian i""°"'""'"" in rep,lir,g 

and CMnOOing crudo oil induslry aperotions helps la 

152 

change the ~ i-, indu,11-y and ""'11'1Uli· 

ties ln,m conlnnalian la ---

In 1992, the council aha commissicnod multi-,.ar 

sludies ol l00CHICX)f1QINC mi1igalian ,,_...1a, caaslal 

ccnvnunilies olledod by oil spils, and the ~ phase ol 

an independent envin,nmento/ maniloring lludy. These 

lang-llnn scienlil"ic IMlies en DpOClld la yield wiluable 

insig,t and inlarmalian. Bath sludies en being ~ 

by the aauncil's Scienlilic Adwii«y Ccnrnitlot (SAC). 

In Valdez, the cauncits Tenninal Operations and 

Environmenlol Maniloring Commitloe (TOEMJ euculod 

f1e cauncits r9'iow ol ~s lludy ol harmU air emis· 

si011s from the Valdez Marine Ttrminal. The cauncits 

p<0C11$ irmlod r9'iow by a panel ol indepnl,nt icion-

~sls and p,hlic lllllllings. Allhaug, Ai,..., criticiad .. 

process at ~- and ultimallly declined lo follow the 

aauncil's mai,, ,.,.,.,.JJiao, lar ari'llling sud, emis· 

sials, "8 p<0CII$ domanslrdod M laail cuns en Mly 

a,pal,lo ol ,...,.;ng and undontanmng ~ icion-

~ sklCNI and policies !hat olloct hiir camnu,ilios. 

The RCAC's newest commi"", the Community 

Information and Educotian Commilloe (CIECJ, laid a 

strong loo..latian in 1992 lar p,hlic oonaci, and aommunimlians, """""'-led-t. ..,, pn,mi,15 lo - al 

the c:cuna1's Jlarts men ollocti,e. 

Cu bostwalies lar a ,alo and pab,,n-ho 1993. 
4 

153 

Responsibilities 

11£ -CJ 11£ RE<;c;w Crnz!NS' ~Ca.Na~ 

guided by its controd with Alyesko and the Oil 

Polution Ad ol 1990. The RCAC exish indepa,dently 

ol bolh, ~ its funding and work pion - from the a,n· 

lrad and its certificoticn under CPA 90. 

C0NTIACI 

The con1rac1 i.-. ~ and the Regional Citizens' 

Advisory Council is e,plicit about RCAC's independence: 

'The independence, and public perceplion of indepen· 

clenc:e, of the Commiffoe is oi cwerricling irnport,nca ID the 

Commiffoe in luHiNing its functions and in meeling public 

,-Is_ This a>nlrud shall be inlerprelecl in sud, a ""'Y as 

"'promole the independence, """' adva/ and permived, 

oi the Cammillee from AlyeJco . . . AlyeJco s/iol /,a,e no 

nr,,t ... "' ,_ any degree oi a,ntrr,J...,. the lonna6an 

or ope,olion oi the a,rporolion . . .' 

Under the lenns of its a,ntroct, the RCAC pn,vides 

specific servicm "'~ and the public. They include: 

• Re.iew, monitor and oommenl on: 

-Alye,/co's oil spill""'°""' and ,,,_,i;o,, plans; 

-Alye,/co's ,,,_,i;o,, and""'°""' capabililies; 

-Alye,/co, environmenld pr0ledion capabilmes; and 

-!he aduol and palenliol environmenlal impocts oi 

1enninal and Ionic,, ope,ulions; 

• lna.ne pubtic awon,ness ol: 

-Alye,/co's oil spi# response and,,,__,,,~' 

-Alye,/co's enviravnet1tol pr0ledion capabilities, and 

-aduol and poientiol environmenlal impocts oi lenni· 

no/ and Oli:er oporalions; 

• Comment on/participate in monitoring and asseuing 

the environmental, social and economic a,nsequences 

ol oil relolod oo:idents; 

• Provide input on actual or potential environmental 

impocts in or near Prince WiUiam Sound; 

• Comment on the design of measures ta mitigate the 

poienliol a,nsequences ol oil spills and other environ· 

mental impocts ol 1enninal and tanker ope,ulions; 

• Porticipoto in de.elopment ol the spiH ,,,_,i;o,, and 

response pion; annual plan review; periodic review 

of operations under the pion, including training and 

anlucting exen:ises; 

• Comment on/participate in selection of research and 

dMlopment projects. 

The controd states that the council may work on 

other ,.lated issues not specifically identified when the 

--written. The RCAC was initially funded at $2 miHion per )'101'-

The Wng level is roviewed evr,:y thn,e yean. 
OIL POLLUTION An OF 1990 

RCAC's -~ Alyoslu, ~ lhe Oil Pclitior, 

Ad d 1990 IOf>A 90), but hi ~milorities en rd a>inci· 

denlal. llmf d hi people i-i..d in lhe ~ 

ol lhe RCAC also actr,ely pn,moled cilizen il!Y0Mfflent 

pro,isions in lhe ledertil law. 

OPA 90 establishes two demonstration p<ojects in 

Alasko-ooe in Prina, Wiftian Scund, lhe clhor in Cook 

lnlet--desipl to promole cccpe,ation betw., local citi· 

ZIIIIS, incinlry and go,emment; build trust and pro,ide citizen ....,;ght d environmental compliance by ail terminal 

lacitmes crod lanken. 

1he RCAC is Clffiliecl by lhe President d lhe U.S. as 

the voluntary alternative advisory council for Prince 

Wiflian Sound. 1he law specilical~ alia-l lor an existing arganizalian to meet the requirement for a ci~zen 

g«>up. A> lhe certified advi,ary council for Prinai Wilt1011l 

Sound, RCAC's jab is to: 

• Ad,;,e cr,d make recoomendation, an paticies, permit,, 

and sile-Sf"'Cilic regulalians relating to lhe ail lerminal 

and tankers; 

• Monitor lhe environmen!al impacts of lhe lerminal and 

tanbn; 

• Monitor terminal and tonker operations lhaf aflect o, 

rray affect the environment in the terminal vicinity; 

154 

• Re¥iow lhe adequacy d ail spil ~ and conlingency plans for crude ail tankers apernting in Prinat 

Wiliam Sound; 

• Ad,i,e and make IOCCil"""odalia,,s 00 part aperolians, 

policiescrodprnctices; 

• Reaimnend standard, and modifications for 1erminal 

and tan!... aperotions la minimiza lhe risk d ail spills 

cr,d 0hr environmental i..,act,, and erlmce pre,en· 

lion and response. 

RCAC ,...._.. ..,. lo,.;.;,,,;,,, rho ris4 o/ oil ,pi1s and oh, 

environrnenlolirrp:xts. COl.fflSYAl.'1'(:SU.Pft!HSO'Y'Q'CO. 
155 

History 

It£ REGloNAl °'1z!Ns' NM£ff.'I Couo. G11£W our ~ the Exxon Valdez 011 spiU rJ 1989. 1he idea rJ a 

cmzens' group lo advise Alyeska Pipeline 5e<vice 

~ • ..l,id, cperalos the lrans-Alcnlra pipeline and 

Iormina! 011 behalf rJ the 011 """""1Y owners, had Ii., 

proposed by local residents hebe. The Exxon Valdez oil 

spill gen«ated a change in leadenhip and attitude at 

Alyeska; the - leadenhip scught 

citizen in,,cl,ement, 

~ ~ o amict. RCAC had insislod 011 absolute 

indep.,dence from~. 01X911 lo Alyeska locilities, 0 

guartl1llled """"'rJ °"""" Md, and""'""""" that the 

centred would last 01 long 01 oil flows through the 

pipeline. Al,-, agroed lo al four conditions. 

Under lhe 1em1s rJ lhe -. RCAC pn,,ides specific seMC8S lo~ o,,d 4,e pA,lic. They inducle envi· 

The <XlnClpl rJ 0 citizens' advif/JfY group was adaplod from Scctland, where the local governing 

body in the Shetland IJands is a 

par1ner with industry in the opera· 

lions rJ the Sullom Voe ninal. 

ronmrill mo,,iloring; researd,; local 

·····•····--··1 and regional input on contingency 

- - -- ~·- , planning, erwirOl1menlal and oihons1he Exxon Valdez experience 

had demonslralod that the 011 industry a:iuld learn from people ..l,o li>e 

and -" in the region aflected by 

the terminal and lonbr operations. 

A morol impemlive also ~ 

!rem the Exxon Valdez: that those 

people with the most lo lose from Oil 

011 spil ought 1o ha,e a ¥Oic:e in the 

por1alion iuues; and pJ,lic inlonnation """'~·· a,pal,i'lities in oil 

spill pmontion, spill response, and 

.,.;ronmn,I p,dodion. 

While the contract between 

RCAC and Al,-, stands 011 its awn, 

the relationship is reinforced end 

codified by provisions in the Oil 

Pol1IAion M rJ 1990 (CPA I/OI, the 

r.detol low enoc:ted in response lo 

the Exxon Valdez. 

decisions that put their 1.- and a,m- ' And,,,ag,Do,1yNows, Abdi 25, 1969. 

OPA 90 established ""° pilot 

projech-one in Prince William 

Sound, the other in c.oolt lnlet-lor 

ciHzen involvement in contingency 

ffM>itiesatrisk. planning and environmri,I mo,,ilorIn .lily 1989, ~ •• - l'nlsident, Jim Henniller, 

puled logelh,,- a group ~ ¥Oriou, CXlffllTUlffl05 

and in1ores1s in 4- ..... ~ by 4- oil spillo-" 

with Alyeska 011 revisions lo its oil spill pmontion and 

111p0111t plan I,,.. Princa Wiliarn Sound. 

In Doc:.nber 1989, the Regional Cilizens' Adviuy 

c.aunal ina,rporaled as o n011-prl!lit a,rparation. In Febnay 1990, alter six months rJ negoliations, RCAC and 

i ng of oil terminal end tanker operotions. OPA 90 

requires that terminal aperolors or industry coaperati,es 

in those two areas estoblisli and fund citizens' adviuy 

groups. The low specificolly allows exisling volumary 

organiiations 1o be <a1ified as lhe citizen pips. RCAC 

qualified as on ohernotive group rneeling the intent rJ 

OPA 90. As such, RC.A.( must be recertified by the 

Pmidont -r year. 
Organizational Structure 

I CAC's - CONSISTS OF COM/,liNlES t1 M 

path ol the E"""'1 Valdez oil ,piH, and inleresl 

group, wi1h a sig,ilicant "°"" in the ..,.;rc,m,nt 

and ......a. al risk from marine 011 lnln,pol1olion in the 

region. The 18 member orgonizotions include villages, 

lawns, sndl cities and borougu, Native and cnnsermtion group,, lcurism and l8CfOCllion i-, ccnwnwciol 

6shing and aquocvhure. 

Each member orgonim1ion appoints a ~ 

lo the RCAC Boon! ol Dn:lon, frequ.,tly ""'"-I lo OS 

"the a,uncil." ,,..,_ organizations ho,e one seat eocli 

on the board, wit!, the uceplion ol Valdez, which hos 

two seals. Boon! members - at the pleasure ol the 

orgonizntions hy reprew,I, SO long OS they 0lf'W wi1h 

RCAC bylaws and potocies. Boon! members ,_ twoY""' '"""'; tnere is no r.ma lo the number cl '"""' a 

dil9dor ma, - - ,1⁄4,ch ol RCAC's wal< is cxmided lhrcugh ....-

comm~. The comm~, with support from RCAC 

slall, dosig, and implement wal< plans and fon!MOle 

OIMC8 and ,ecanme,idolio,~ Jo, the board ol diieclon' 

consideration. Although formol advice and camments 

must be oppro,ed by the board, comm~ hcp,enlfy 

wal<ofldlywi1h incMtryand gc,,wnms,togency ~ 

senlolMs on a n,nge ol projects. 

156 

--Sl.tiloGaliJnra,nJ,,,-..ir .. &i....i.6dwords 

,,,,,_ lhe City a/Hom.on lho/lCAC 8oonl. 
157 

RCAC Member Organizations 

City of Corda,,a .................... . 

City of Homer ..................... . 

Kenai Peninsula Borough .. . 

Gty of Kodiak .......................... . 

Kodiak Island Borough 

City of Seldcwia . 

City of Seward ......... . 

City of Valdez 

City of Whittier .... 

Community of Chenega Bay 

CammonityofTatitlek ............. . 

Alaska Slate Chamber of Cammerce 

........... Charier(1989) 

. .......... Charier (1989) 

. ...... Charier (1989) 

....... Charier (1989) 

.................... Charier(1989) 

....... Charier (1989) 

........... Charier (1989) 

... Charier (1989) 

.... Charier (1989) 

................. 1992 

. .................... 1992 

............... 1990 

Alaska Wildeme» Recreation & Tourism Auoc. .. ...... 1992 

Chugach Alaska Corp. ............ . ......... Charier (19891 

Corda,,a District Fishermen United ...... . ............... Charier (1989) 

Kodiak VillageMa)'on Auoc ........... ........... ..... Charier (1989) 

National Wildlife Federotian ............... Chaner (1989) 

Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corp...... . ....... Chaner (1989) 

70-544 0 - 93 - 6 

Ex-OFFlCIO MMl:RS fdos, i ,.,,,.,.,,;ng/ 

NmJTHO..Gi 1992 SYIAWSA.llil'O'iNt. 

Ala,ka Depar1ment af Military and Veteran, 

Alioirs, Division of Emergency Service, 

Alaska Depar1ment of Environmental 

Can50Mllian 

Alaska Department of fi,h and Game 

Alaska Depar1ment of Natuioi Re,aun:e, 

U.S. Caa,t Guard 

U.S. Department of Interior, 

Office of Environmental Alloirs 

U.S. Environmental Protoctian J,,ge,q 

U.S. Fore,t Service 

U.S. National Oceanic and 

Atmo,pheric Admini""'1ion 

PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND 

C 

[IJ 
158 

RCAC Board of Directors '92 

Charles Christiansen (Kodiak Village 11ayr,rs Assoc.) ........................ 1989·91 ; 1992 

Wayr,e c.oleman (Kodiak Island Borougl,) ....................................... 1989 

Tex Edwards (Gty cf Homer) ............................................•....•......•.. 1992 

looy EYanofl (Community cf Chenega Bay)······································ 1992 

Mita Gallogl-« (Gty cf VrMez/Sed 2) ........................................... 1992 

Chri, Gales (Gty cf Seward) .......................................................... 1989 

Keith Gonlooff (C!.,god, Alasl., Co,p.) .......................................... 1989 

11,p/aa,d l,y Jim la Sele, Uy 1992, Mid,o,/ E. a-., Doc. 1992 

John Henchleb (Prince William s....J Aquacuitu!9 Co,p.) ................. 1992 

~ Hyce (Gty cf Wl,ittier) ··························································· 1990 

11,p/aa,dl,yCa,,lr,I, °"""1bor 1992 

Atdy Mad< (Kenai Peninsula Borougl,) ............................................. 1991 

11,p/aa,d l,y Rc,yd Htino,d,, °"""1bor I 992 

Carl Mam (Alaslca S1a1e Chamber cf c.c.n-a,1 ............................. 1992 

MidielleO'Leary (Cordo,a Oislricl Fishermen Uni1od) •.....•....•....•...... 1991 

Darrel Olsen (Community cf Tatitlek) ••·····•····•······•····•····•·•···••···•·····•· 1992 

Ann Reihe (National Wiklil,, Fedorntion ) ........................................ 1989 

Kmlin Slal,I. Johnson (Gty cf Kodiak) ............................................... 1991 

Sim, Slopl.,s {Ala,lca Wilderness Remiation & ""'""" Assoc.)' ...... 1992 

Scclt Slorling (City cf Cordo,a) ........................................................ 1990 

Bil Ww (City cf Valde,/Seat 1 ) ................................................... 1989 

lwln L Wodom (Gtycf Soldo,;a ) ..................................................... 1992 

-~ ,.,,,..,,.i,i,,Abln-C1iaml.tlc.m..- 1990-1992 

-

PIElm<r: SccltSlorfing 

Vn l'leaNT: Keith Gonlooff, Lynda Hyce 

(Ju/y-Oec,nJ,er, Tex Edwards {Deceml,er-/ 

SrofTAII': Midielle O'Leary 

TIWUIII: BiU Walbr 

-•T-lJ,IQc Atdy Mad<, lwln Wodom 

{Deceml,er-/ 

Ex-Omao MfMBERs /non-wting/ 

JorryBrossio 

(Abln 0.,,,. tlNaMal ~ 

Broce Von z., 

(U.S. Frn,tScmce} 

Conely Gilder 

(U.S. ~PrcadionAg,ncyj 

CDR BiU Hutmad,er 

(U.S. c,,.., Guard) 

Simon/la,,son/S-Pn,,a,t 

(Abino.,,t.tl~~} 

Doug ........ 

(U.S. 0.,,,. ti Hlri:r, Olla ti EmitonniriJ 

Al/o;,,J 

Pao Pelram 

(Abin 0.,,,. Milibyand V-Al/o;,,, 

Omsiantl6no,pnySenasi 

dauc5aSlalor 

(Abln D,pt. ti FiJ, and Gamel 

John 'Mlilnoy 

~0-.:&Mno,p/,oricAdnn.} 

9 
10 

159 

RCAC Work: PRooucr ~o Pmss 

'

HE - Of RCAC ~ IOllt fl!ODUCT---Yr111T1!N oocuments--and process. The written work of RCAC 

primori~ kie, two lonns: 

• REPoos Nfl S1\JDI&- n- projects are usual~ 

done under con110c1 with ccnsuhants, typical~ expem in 

specific fields. 1he ccnsuhant hquently works wry dasely 

with and under the direction al the commitloe that is span· 

soring the project. Repam and studies rray be used 1o lc,-

rnulato RCAC's position an specific issoes, or 1o educate 

the committee or council as a whale. 

• AfNcE Nfl COIM\ENIS • RCAC giYeS advice and 

comments an a wide range al issoes. 

-Federal rulemaking · As part of the regulatory 

proa,ss 1o ~t.eOil l'olJlian Mal 1990, toe U.S. 

Caasl Guard and the U.S. Envirorvnental Proledion lvJt,q 

issue 'nalices al prcposed rulemaking' and invilo public 

canvnenl. RCAC sJimib amnenb an pe,1inonl issues. 

-Slate regulations · RCAC formal~ comments an 

- law, and regulations related 1o terminal and 1onk« 

operation$, and environmental impacts of marine oil 

transpor1olian. 

-AJ the council and committee le.el, RCAC advises 

~ . regulatory agencies and the oil indu.lry an matten pe,taining lo terminal and tanker operations, oil spill 

pre,ention and ro,panse, and other ways 1o pre,ent and 

mitigate adverse enviranmentol impacts of marine oil 

transpor1olian. 

RCAC also works cooperatively with industry and 

regulatory agencies, thrcud, working g,aups, joint studies 

and task forces. RCAC is a membe, al the Prince William 

Sound Tank« SpiH PrMntion and Response Plan Steering 

Committee, a multi-oryanizatianal groop oryanized by 

the State of Alaska to develop revisions to the Prince 

William Sound plan. RCAC ha, also participa1ed in working groups formed 1o dMlop ccnsensus an - and federal oil spill regulations. 

~o/RCAC, Al)eslo, ...,_ andag,oc.ie,....udb 

d,..l,po...,,..,.,..,,.,..pl,n. RCAC d,.;n,d"1e-iinvl1""P-
~ 

~- .tt~~ ~:1-11, 11-1· -1-11~} -II ~~.z I, ~I 

fat;J~ 1 iiiJ~ij -IJl 

1

-11~ 11~ l~j·!1 1 4a 

I l1 l i ·" l : l ; 1 1-I j 

f

&j 1_11j~ tit~ l 1 .lf.t . ,§ l~ 32 i -la~ 

jl ,1·ilJ~illli 1lill!l1 

1

-,, ,.fj I~ 1:ti~ J 1r1.z lv 

I 

M 6.f]l li-i:1 .111 ·1·t~ .j1 ij ~~~,_zj 16 i~ 1~b-1_z~ • ~ lli 1 ~ i ] ~ ; ti 111 R '15 J 

~ l1-tl1§J1J 1 ·1t1r:11ft E = ·" -Cf & -I J 1 ~ 1 R j a 11 j 

E ~ 1 !.,; i l j :t j f 1 I ] . .I 1 I 

~ IHl11 1h1}~1pplt 1

~ l:Ji1j"IJJ!1 tlJ1JJ· 

1

--jfi 

1 J Ai! -.1.z '15 J 1 1 ~ 11 ~ 'i .1 
12 

161 

Committees 

IAUOiClllf ro..to'.S-5 OCN lHICI.Oi lQLNleer committees, ccnsisling ol council rnemben 

and olher citizen, with inll!l8sl, experience and 

badtground in a giwn field. The committees won< fc, the 

ccuncil, with assismce from slall prcwided by the council. 

All official policy is presented to the fvll council for 

approYOI and further oction. l'lhlic rnemben ol the CXJm· 

millees are selecled throud> a formal oppliamon proce,s 

concluded annual~. /' Donolm member of the board.} 

COMMUNITY INFORMATION AND EDUCATION COMWTTEE 

The Community Information and Education (OEC) Com· 

mitlee was organized in 1992 lo piomole public awareness ol oil spiU ,._-,lion ....cl response issues, the environmental impoct, ol roorine oil lnlllSportalion and ellorts 

lo mitigate tho,e impoct,. 

The CIEC promotes communication betwNn the 

RCAC and CXllMUlities in the Exxoo Valdez ~ cna; 

advises RCAC of information needs; identifies ways lo 

improve communications between CXJmmunities, RCAC 

and Alyeska; and educates Alasl.,ns about the history, 

relation.hip and re,pecti,e roles ol RCAC and Alyeska. 

Projects begun in 1992 include publication of a 

boo& on changes since 1989 in oil spiH pml!l1lion and 

response; an RCAC ~ a speaken' bureau and 

olher public outreach activities. 

W'l,fflH OtAII: Jocelyn Bo.I,,, 

MEM!es: Rick Kurtz 

Andy Maci' / Itm ta Belle' 

.lohnParbr 

The mission of the Oil Spill Prevention and Response 

(OSPR) Committee is lo minimize the riilcs and impact, 

associated with oil lmnsporlolion through strong spiU prevention and response measures, adequate contingency 

planning and ellectiYe regulations. 

The OSPR Committee monilors and comments on 

federol regulations iff'4)iementing the Oil Pollution Ac ol 

1990; reviews and comments on the Prince William 

Sound Tanker SpiU Prevention and Response Pion; identifies strengths ....cl wealcnesses in pmention and response 

ellorts; rep,msib RCAC in the tochnical ....ning gmup, 

of the Prince William Sound Sloering Committee; and 

monilon and ewiluales spill drills, exorcises and lnlining. 

In 1992, the OSPR Ccmmit1ee ~ won. on the 

Nearshon, Response Pion \'loRing Group, chair.d by an 

OSPR member; drahed final comments on the Prince 

Wiliam Sound ,_shon, response plans fc, the council; 

ropresenied RCAC in the federol rulemaking proce,s fc, 
.......1 respon,e plans; prq,ored fiool a>mments on the,.... 

sel respon,e plan rulemolcing; drafted aimrnents on locility 

response plan rulemaking; established a drill monitoring 

program; ccmpletod a report on Alo.kc's Oil and Hoz· 

orooos Substance Release Response Fund 1'470 Fund'I; 

and deYoloped the concept of a neorshore strike flam 

demanslralion ~ • ...+,id, - subsequently endooed 

Ir( RCAC and established Ir( the s1o1e legislo!ure. 

c-Owl: Floyd Heimbuch' 

lolEMBils: Wayne Colemon' 

Tom Copeland 

Goil Ewmoff 

John Herschleb' 

Lynda~• 

Charles wndfult 

Skip Ri<hanls 

Tim Robemon 

Patti Sounden 

Gordon Scott 

162 

PO!n OPERATIONS AND VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEMS 

The Perl Operations and Vessel Trollic Syslerns IPOVIS) 

Commitlee monitors port and tank. operations in Prince 

William Sound. In 1992, ti., POVlS Commitlee worl<ed 

with go,,enwnent agencies and industry groups, including 

Aly,,sko, to cx,-sponso, a mojor sludy of escort cm towing 

equipment and procedures in Prince Wittiam Sound. 

The commitlee olso gathered data on tank. structur· 

al integrity, designed a SUM)' ol mariners to assess ti., 

adequacy of navigation aids in Prince William Sound, 

and began to seel. W<rfS lo improve weather roporting 

and forecasting capabilities in Prince William Sound. 

POVTS and TOEM formed a task force to determine 

the pre,ent capabilities ol handling terminal and tanker 

fires and determine the polennal consequences ol a major 

tanker fire. 

The POVTS Commitlee is based in Valdez. 

CcH.wmE CH.a: Ston Slepl,ens' /Tex Edwards' 

ME,,ms: Bill Conley 

Chris Gates' 

Jeff Guan! 

Vince Kel~ 

Po4erKott 

Dennis Lodge 

Vince Mitchell 

TomMcAlister 

Etcoo1and _.. ...... am1.~~ 

0-..',Spilo.i~Mcnl,. 

13 
14 

163 

SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE 

The Scienlilic Ad,;SCIY Conmitloe (SAO prtNides scienti~ 

ic assistance and advice lo the olher RCAC commitloes on 

ledv,ia,I reports, scientific molhodology, dato interprmtion and position P"P""· SAC reccmmends resec,rd, pri· 

orities and poli<y, and reviews propmols. SAC reviews 

reseoid, spomorod by RCAC 1o ..,,... C0fr4>1ionce with 

hid, cx,ntn,cW, scientific and ledv,icol stondards. 

SAC began lwo multi-year studies in 1992. The 

socio-«onomic sludy is assessing the IOCiol, cultural and 

ea,nomic iff'4"Jd, ol major oil spills in onler 1o de..lop 

mitigation strotegies for oommunities in the spill-olloctod 

n,gion. /Jest ol the study, finl pho,r- comisling cl loon 

groups in seloded oommunities--wos ~ in 1992. 

SAC ol,o ~ the g,cundworlt on an environ· 

menial moniloring program lo establish a baseline for 

delermining polenliol long-n elltcts ol oil lronspor1otion and provide inlormolion for polenliol future iff'4"Jd,. 

Begiming in Morch 1993, field '"""Y' will be ainducted twice a yea. 

~CHAa: KrislinSlohl·Jolrucn' 

"""-,· · 51-aon Aroji, Ph.D. 

lwin Frohne 

Jomes Hemming 

Lynda Hyce' 

Go,yKompkc/1 

Jolv, Morsell 

A J. Pool, Ph.D. 

Chudc Smythe, Ph.D. 

JomesD. Slowa,-d 

c.arclWihcn 

lEl!,Yl'W O>ERAJOJS MJ Et-MRCNViN!Al MJNTQIIN; 

The Tenninol Operotions and Environmenlal Mcniloring 

(TOEM) Committee evaluates operation, at Alye1ka'1 

marine lonninol with rospoct lo their el!.ct on the environ· 

ment and identifies oduol and polenliol sources ol chronic 

pollution. TOEM reccmmends modilicotion, lo minimize 

risk and mihgolt the impact of terminol locilihes and 

Apon,lcli,d,p,n,1,,,-.,,,nilwibyl.TOEMCarwniooo" 

......, ~ •• ow r,x/,t, !Mly, "-II,,;, fin&nil, d a pli/k 

...,,;,g;,,va11t,_ 

operoticns in the vicinity ol the ninol. Major pn,jech in 

1992 wwe on independent reYiew ol on air health sludy 

a>nduded by Alyesko, and evaluation ol sompling and 

testing programs at the ll"<lfine tenninors ballast water 

treotment plant. TOEM al,o commented extensi-.ely lo 

Afyesko and n,gulotory agencies on permit, and sile-specific n,gulotions of!.cting air and water quality. 

~ CHAI: Scott Slorling' /Gn,g Wmw/ 

Da,e Dengel 

"""-,: Bob Benda 

Da,e Dengel 

MeHowe 

MlyKitigawo 

EAfimll'tine 

George s&dol 

Slon Slophens' 

Donnisui...tod 
Activities 

• DISA!llfD TANKER TOV.,NG STIJDY 

Alter more thon o yeor of negotiations, RCAC, the 

Prince William Sound Tanker Association, Alyeska, the 

U.S. Coast Guard and the Akma Department ol Erwi· 

rcnmenlal Ca,-.,. agreed to arspomar a yoar-long 

· sludy ol towing and escort a,pal,ilities in Prince William 

Sound. 

The study is MLating lie cq,cmility ol exiiling emergency towing equipment and practices, and examining 

allornati,es to enhance escort and assist a,pab,1ties for~-

obied lanbn. Approximaloly two-tl,irds ol the funding is 

1nm RCAC will, the balcra pu,ided by the Prince Wiliam 

Sound Tanker Association. The study began in October 

1992 and~ e,rpeclod to be~ in the k,I ol 1993. 

• NAVIGATION SAFETY SURVEY 

The groundwo,lc ...., laid for a suney ol people who use 

the marine navigation system in Prince William Sound. 

App,oximatoly 300 to AOO 'users• will be surwyod to 

darmine attiNdes about suitobo1ity ol current navigation 

aids and esa,rt proc8CMIS. The results will be used to 

dMloi,11001111•.dalioo~fori~. 

• FIRE fRMNIION TASK FORCE 

RCAC initiated a joint task force ta assess current 

a,pal,ilities for iwpond'mg to terminal and tanker fires. 

The 1osk Ion:. incblos r..,..-;..s ol RCAC, AJi-1:a 

and other oil industry ..-;-, the U.S. Coast 

Guard and the City ol ~ The losk Ion:. wi! dMlop 

11001111•.bio.~ for~.~ needed. 

164 

• T /V KENAI REPORT 

RCAC slaff ieviewed information Cl'IOiloble about 

lhe October 20, 1992 incidint in whid, the tanker 

Kenai experienced steering problem, in Valdez 

l'mows. Con1rary to newspaper reports, lhe RCAC 

found insollicient information to doiormine wlwiw 

11,e tug escort saoed 11,e tanker 1nm grw,ding. 

• SOCIO·ECONOMIC STUDY 

A ....lti-yoar study...., begun to assess the social, 

~ and eccnomic impacts o1 oil ipiHs for the 

puipose ol de.oloping !um mitigation slratogies 

for CXlfflllU1ities in the region. 

The fint phase of the study, most ol wl,ich 

...., ~ in 1992, ccnsistod of locus~ 

in selected ~ communities to con/inn 

impacts identified in eart.er pJ,lic testimony. 

RCAC and its ccndanls wil -" will, IISi· 

dents in nine communities selected from the 18 

identified as impact,d by 11,e won Valdez oil 

ipil, to dMlop ipocilic stallgies for dealing ~ 

the impacts ol a !um spil. 

15 
16 

165 

• ENV!RONMfNTAl MONITOR\t,G 

The contract was signed for a two-year environmenilll 

monitoring program, beginning in March 1993, la eslablish a baieline lor delermining possible long-term ellocts 

cl oil 1ranspar1olion and provide inlcrmation for polenlial 

future irnpad> in !he wdy area. The wdy will monitor 

hydrocarbon concentrations and characteristics in 

neorshore sub-tidal sediments and bioaccumulations of 

hydrocarbons in !he tissue of mussels collectod intertidal~. 

Field surveys will be done twice o year, in late winier ond 

summe,, with somples loken at """" la nine siles in Prince 

William Sound ond !he GuK of Aloslw. Samples will be 

tested for !he lull ,pectrvm cl hydrocarbons. 

• Oil SPIU CONTINGENCY PlANNll,G 

RCAC worh on o continuing basis with industry and reg· 

ulators la review, revise and 6nolize oil spill contingency 

plans. The so-coiled 'c·plans' are required documents 

that spell out how a tanker or facility would respond la an 

oilspill. 

Much of RCAC's wen< in contingency planning lakes 

place in a steering committee organized by !he Slate 

Department cl Environmental Coruer,ation la address revi· 

sions 1a !he Prince William Sound Tanker Spill Pmention 

ond Response Pion. The sleering committee and its lechni· 

col woning groups, oil of which operote by consensus, 

include industry, government and citizen representati,es. 

RCAC also submits its own comments and sugges· 

tions for oil spill contingency plans, outside !he steering 

committee process. 

• NEARSHORf RfSl'ONSE 

Neanhore response is an element cl response planning 

that...,, a primary focus of efforts in 1992. RCAC played 

a leading rcle in !he cooperative deYelopment cl oontin· 

gency plans for responding la spilled oil that threatens 

shoreline. AA RCAC board rnenw chaired !he inler-dis· 

ciplinory technical working group !hat developed !he 

major neorshore response plan for Prince William Sound. 

RCAC also sponsored SMRJI studies on !he concept 

cl coastal community c:ooperatM,s using local resoura,s 

ond personnel to respond to the lhreat of oil in the 

nearshore environment. A demonstration project using 

local resources wos approved by !he slate legislature. 

RCAC identi6ed gaps in nearshore response plans 

developed by industry and odvocoted grealer response 

ellorts, including pre-positioning of equipment, outside 

Prince William Sound ond ofler !he initial 72 houn. 

Fis/,;nga,,,,,,.,,..,-1,bo,m>,abuay,-l,,&ll,.,Wand 

ha/d,e,yMngan_,;,,co,w;Jtc/byAJie,lo. 

• HATCHERY PROTKTION PROGRAM 

AND AREA RESl'ONSE CENTER MOBIUZATKJN PlANS 

RCAC advised Alyesko during deYelopment cl - chapten in its comprehensive spill response plan and praised 

!he results. The - components address hatdiery prclec· 

tion ond mobilization of area response centen. How,,,,,,, 

RCAC u,ged Alyesko la proled hatcheries outside Prince 

William Sound, as well, ond provide more specifics about 

!he area response centen. 
166 

• BA11AsT WATI:R TREATMENT 

RCAC ...,,..,,.,dod specilic d,anges c..d impro,lnam 

lo tho losting c..d sa..-,g programs at AJie,la's balast 

I i - - pant, in order lo doloct c..d &,a,urage I ~ ol '"""'4horized balast, cnl assess tho elloctivetcAc 11o11w, Scolt n-,-..,i Mid.le~ pramce ness ol balast--- ..__--. ""'9 ... Ao\o,laH The rea>IMlelidations _,, based on three_. 

• Ol!lllsOOSWUAllONS 

Sm 1990, RCAC has participalocl in, monitored c..d 

critiqued ,pil ..a.,deplarm.,le.tises c..d ,pil nlalions ardldod by inmnlry. Slaff, dirldln c..d .......... 

...lunteen pamcipate in and ob.... major drills. In 

1992, RCAC ,._,.... participatod in major ..as 

ardldod by a-a, c..d AJiesl<a. M tho AJie,la drill in Odober, RCAC lint used a 

dn,/t &n.gonty .... Plan spoling °"tho ..... 

lion's role in tho--, ol a major ,pil c..d ~ for 

aperaling cuing an incident. 

RCAC also began using a arndor lo monitor c..d 

.,.... drils c..d e.tises on a mnsial basis. RCAC 

assisled inlMlry c..d ~ agencies in cHI plcming 

c..d past-drill ...luatians. RCAC .............. d.nit 

wri11on a..,. c..d CIIIIIOISlls alllr-, cHI ar ..-cise 

obsr«I. 

r...ded .-... ended by RCAC c..d ~ in 1992. 

The sludies ....luatod .....,ng c..d llsling of inlluent 

{ccnlaminated balast - as ~ goes into tho - plant); .....,ling c..d llsling ol effluent {natod ballast 

r.loased inlo tho Pert ol Valdez); c..d .....,i;ng c..d losting lo dolonnine toxicity ol tho elht. 

RCAC also monitored dMlapnns at tho stato c..d 

led.al IMls on -qual'lly stnlards. RCAC """"911-

ed on Alyesm's pn,po,ed re,isions lo its "Best Managtnwit Pradia,s: a ~ descripion ol haw 

ccnlaminated balast - is horded. M tho stato IMI, 

RCAC lannaly apposed plans by tho Alaslra Dopcmn 

of Envircnmenlal Consenatian lo lower water quality 

stnlards. 

• AJR OOAUTY IN VAIOeZ 

RCAC a,mmissioned a panel ol indepnl,nt scien1is1> 1o 

IMIW tho moll.xis c..d mnclusians ol a major -.dy ol 

air quality in Valdez ardldod by AJie,la. RCAC hold 

-.ii p<hlii: fflllJlings on tho air quality issut in an effort 

lo prwsent rational c..d lair inlonnation lo Valdez midenb abooi .. risk ol benzene DpOSIR, c..d snngihs 

c..d-'-- oltho AJiesl<a -.dy. 

M issue is ..W. AJie,la wil be roquired 1o instol 

a '"'I'°' --r syslom lo canlrol emissions ln,m tanbr 

17 
18 

167 

loading. The emissions contain significant amount, of 

benzene, a lcnawn carcinogen. 

Aiyeska'J sludy oondoood that wpon emi1tod wring 

lm1br loading aca,unt for Cl\ insignificant omount of the 

benzene lo whid, Valdez n,sidm an, expo,ed. RCAC's 

panel-Voldez Air Study Roviow Commi--.disputed 

aspects of ~•s sludy and oondoood that sources ot the 

marine lorminal CXlf1lrhAo o sig,ificmtly hp pem,,,toge 

of the benane in Valdez oir hln ~ •s sludy foood. 

RCAC fonnalty AICOIMWlflded that~ 'IOiuntari· 

~ inslall a Y0pOI"--, sy,lem. ~ responded that 

it wiU not inslall YOpOr controls unless and until a health 

risl. is attributed lo t.nninal '°'"""°'~is required 

lodoso. 

. • PuBltc EOUCAllON 

RCAC published lour issues of ib lal,lc,id newsletter 'The 

Obser,,e,,' whid, is dislributod he of charge lo ~ -

motely 13,000 hauselxilds in the Exxon Valdez impact 

an,a, as well as induslry and sc--,m. The newsletlor 

documents the worl< of RCAC and includes pieces by and 

cmout~. A special edition of the Obser,,e, in July 1992 addmsed p«>pased federof regulations "9"rding requirement, under the Oil Pollufion Ad of 1990 for vessel 

response plans. The Obser,,e, is <MJiloble lo the public on 

request. 

RCAC pn,duced a 10-minule introductory video, 'A 

Voice for Prince William Sound,' on RCAC's origins, 

s1n.<:1un1 and purpo,e. The video was dislributod 1o RCAC 

member organi~s, ga,emment agencies, libraries 

and olh« intnslod groups fhroud,out the impact Qn,Q. 

A series of ad,,enisement, wwe published in news· 

paper> fhroud,out the region lo alert the public lo issues 

and """"'· Topics oddmsed in the ads included studies 

on air quality in Voldez, public lorvms on spill prew,ntion 

and response, Alyeska's Ship Escort/Response Vessel 

Syst,,n, and the irnportarn of citizen -.lion lo industry 

operation,. 

• PuBUC PRESENTATIONS 

Memben of the RCAC Board of Directon, COfnmittoe 

rnemben and slaff ~ before public groups lo talk 

cmout the worl< of RCAC ond specific issues. 

In addition lo routine baord member report, lo mem· 

ber Df900izotions, presenlolions -. given lo the Alaslca 

Slate Chan¥>er of Commemo, the Resource DMlopment 

Council, the Home, City Council, the Arctic Science 

Conference, Minerals Management Service lnlomnotion 

Transfer Meeting, ond the Kodiak Island Son:,ugh local 

Eme,gency Plooning Commission. 

The Exec~ve Director mode COfnmunity presenta· 

~s in Cordova, Whittier, Soward, Seldcwia and Kodiak 

ond lo shareholder, of Totitlek ~ -The Oil Spill 

Proven~ and Response Committee also gave talks on 

neanhoro response in Kad"iolc, Soward and Valdez. 

• OPA 90 IMPlfMENTATION 

RCAC monilon the federof rvlemaking process, in whid, 

agencies write regulations lo implement the requirements 

of the Oil Pollution Ad of 1990. RCAC reviews and COfn· 

menb on p«>pased rules that penain lo oil spill prew,ntion 

and response, crude oil ton-. and tonninol aperatians, 

in the oneo impactod by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 

In 1992, RCAC commenled on draft r.deral rules lo, 

vessel response plans, escort vessels in Prince William 

Sound, locility response plans, use of oulomalic pilot, dis· 

charge removal equipment for vessels carrying oil and 

policies "9"rding appointment and responsibilifies of 

area =ifloes. RCAC also represented the public on a 

federal negotiated rulemoking committee on vessel 

response plans. 
• STATE Of Aw,!(). IAWS ANO REGWJJONS 

RCAC moniton enodmenl and enfon:enm of - laws 

and regulations penaining lo oil spill prevention and 

response, crude oil tonker> and terminal aporntions. In 

1992, RCAC conducled a study on how the - •s spiH 

response fund is used, advised - officials on ~irements for professional spill responden, called response 

action _conlrodon, and adYccatod strider intoq,retation, 

of Alaslca's oil sp,11 law. 

• NEW MEM8ERS AOOEO 

Three organizations became members of RCAC, resulting 

in tl,ree additional seats on the Board of Oiredon. The 

- member entities _,, the Alaslca Wilderness Recreation and Tourism Assaciation, the canvnunity of Tatitlelt 

and the canvnunity of Chenega Bay. 

• LONG RANGE PIANNING 

RCAC held a ,enes ol - lo nam,w the organizo· 

tion's loa,, and dMlap a long range pion. 

• iluoGET NEGOTIAllONS 

Con1istont wit!, provi1ions ol its contract wit!, Alyeska, 

RCAC began nogoliolion• with Alye,lco lo delem,ine the 

funding 1M1 fo< the next three yean. Under the cantroct, 

RCAC rocoiYed $2 million a year fa, the fir,t three yean, 

with wbsequent funding le..ls lo be renegolioted """Y 

three years. 

• Al.O!IS 

Three audits _,, conducted in 1992. Alye,lco audited 

RCAC', performance of services under its contract. The 

168 

U.S. General Aa:cunting Office (GAOi conducled a cam· 

prehen,ive audit of RCAC a, the alternative advisory 

group mooting the requirements of r.dorol law .,,de, the 

Oil Pollution Iv.! of 1990. The GAO oud"rt i, oxpedod lo 

be released in the spring ol 1993. RCAC', routine annual 

financial audit was canducted by KPMG Peat Morwidt. 

USCG CD/I. Ed"""""""• Wt, enjoy, o /ig/,1,,,,,_ .;II, RCAC 

board....., kdy Mock (K,r,o; - tlaooq,/ 

• C0oPBAnoN 'M1H ,l,Gll«Ei 

RCAC worl.ed cooperatively throughout the year with 

numerous slale and federal agencies on a wide range of 

regulatory and environmenloi iswes. Bea,u,e of it, loa,, 

on environmenlol and marine tron,po<lotion iswes, RCAC 

worked mo,t closely with the Ala,ka Department of 

EnYironmenloi Conser,otion and the U.S. Coast Guard. 

In 1992, the U.S. EnYironmental Proledion kJttq 

(EPA) began dilCUSSions with RCAC lo llrengll,en and for. 

malize its relationship with RCAC, con,istent with the 

~iraments of Section 5002(9) ol the Oil Pollution Ad of 

1990. RCAC will encourage other agencies 1o follow the 

EPA's lead by adopting similar memos of underslonding. 

Under a ledero! exchange progn,m, RCAC l1atianed 

an employee in the U.S. Coait Guard', OPA 90 1loff 

office. 

19 
20 

169 

Reports & Studies coMPLETEo 1N 1992 

Aa GuAIIIY V,az 

"Multi-media Fale and Efleds ol Airborne Hydrocarbons in 

the Port Valdez Region" 

-Multimedia Envirosolt Cap. (Mord, 14, 1992) 

"Interim Report, Re¥iew ol the Valdez Air Health Stud( 

-Valdez Air Sludy RINiew Commiffee (Mord, 19, 1992) 

"RO¥iew ol the Valdez Air Health Stud( 

-Valdez Air Study RINiew Commiffee (August 25, 1992} 

WA!f.R QuAIIIY /BAUAST WA!f.R TREATMENT 

"Sampling and Analysis ol lnffuent lo the Alyesk,, Ballast 

Water Treatment Plant' 

--Beak Conwhants, Inc. and AiBI. Consuhonls Lkl. (April 

30, 1992} 

"Design o/ A Sampling and Telling Plan for Ballast 

Water EIRuent' 

-IIIYllSliga1iw, Science, Inc. (August 24, 1992} 

"Toxicity Study RO¥iew for Alyeska Marine Terminal Ballast 

Water Treatment Plant' 

-Richard S. Coldwell, Pli.D. and Donald R. &,hler; Pli.D., 

Nor1hweslern Aqualic Sciences (Sept. I 6, I 992} 

5'tu RESPONSE PlANs 

"Status ol RCAC Comments on PWS Tonic« o;I Spill 

Pmention and Response Plans," 

-Falh Creeic Errviroomen,a/ (January I 992} 

"Report on Notional and Regional C-ontingency Plan 

and Response Sy,lem as a Applies lo o;r 

--8CS8 /February 1992} 

• Justification for ~iring the Use ol NIIMS ICS in 

Vessel Response Plans" 

-Incident Ma"'l1'fflOl1/ Associofos, Inc. (Ju/y 23, 199'i} 

"Comments on Regulatory lmpac! Analyses for Vessel 

Response Plans and Section 5005 ~irements" 

-Michele Slroobe, Esq. and Rlllh Ruttenberg, Pli.D. 

• Alask,,'s o;I and Hamnlous S.bstonce Release 

Response Fund" 

-KSB (December 1992} 

"Capitol Equipment Study and Recommendation, 

for the Alask,, Cooslal Communrties Coopert,ti,e" 

-l(lfii/, P. Kinde and Roy W. Honn Jr. Pli.D., 

1n1etno1iono1 Spill Technology (May 25, 1992} 

• An Analysis ol o;I SpiU Mechanical Reco,ery Opert,tions 

ol the Prince William Sound Neanhon, Response Plan" 

-f'ari<er Awcialm, Inc. and ECO, Inc. (June 9, I 992} 

"Caaslai c.ommunrties o;I Spill Caaperati-.. for Alask,,: 

Feasibility Stud( 

-lnlemafional Spill Technology Co,porulion (June 1992} 

"White paper: Wiklile Rescue Comments" 

--C1iar/e, Kalley WecM!rling (July J 7, I 992} 

OrHe COMPlffiD REPom 

"An I~ NaYigation Aid Sy,lem for 

Prince WiHiom Sound" 

-ECO Engi,-ing, Inc. (Jor,,ory 8, I 992} 

-·-~fl)rrJ,C.....,i,,.,cl,Fila; s..a..,t . K-t,and81..Muuols; S..Wiogroplry . Abdod,; K-t,and81..Muutls/ 

PriraW.S...s..,,d,i,,.,d,iFc,ruo,y 15, 11'92) 

"Deparlment of Errvirrnnen,a/ ConWYllfion ~ 

--8CS8 (August 1992} 
Ocean_ 

Sanctuan· 

Coalitio~ of 

San Liis Obispo 

.fj 

P. 0 . 80)( 1520 

Sl!n Luis Obispo 

Celifornia-93406 

faxi805) 544- 5415 

170 

The Honorable George Miller 

1522 Longworth H,O.B. 

Washington D.C. 20515 

Dear Congressman Miller , 

February 8, 1993 

We have just learned of your February 4, 1993 hearing on on spill 

oversight. In the hopes that the administrative record is still open, 

..., are sutxnitting the enclosed proposal to use the Monterey Bay National 

Marine Sanctuary and the proposed Central Coast National Marine 

Sanctuary (H.R. 3099, Panetta) as an expanded sea otter refuge . 

Since the reason sea otters in California ...,re listed as a threatened 

species is due primarily to the risks posed by oil spilled at sea, 

..., recogniz.e that any effort towards recovery and de-listing will 

require a reduction of those risks. We believe that our proposal could 

help to reduce the potential for oil spills along the south-central 

coast of Cal_ifornia, leading to protection of the sea otter and 

conservation of shellfish resources and valuable shellfish fisheries. 

I expect to be in Washington D.C. the ...,ek of February 22-26 for 

meetings with the American Seafood Harvesters Association and the 

National Fisheries Institute. I will contact your staff for an 

appointment. 

Thank you for your consideration of our proposal . 

Sincerely, 

~"'~ Steven L. Rebuck . Executive Director 

ph, 805/543-2248 
171 

Prepared by the Ocean Sanctuary 

Coalition of San -Luis Obispo 

P.O. Box 1520 

San Luis Obispo, CA 93406 

805/544-5415 
172 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In September 1992, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOM) will 

dedicate the waters offshore North-Central California as the Monterey Bay National Marine 

Sanctuary (MBNMS). In addition, site evaluation work has begun on a companion sanctuary 

- the Central Coast National Marine Sanctuary (CCNMS). 

It appears that the MBNMS and CCNMS could be utilized to protect sea otters and 

conserve shellfish fisheries by implementing a program of "zonal-management" for the sea 

otter in California, pursuant to the 1980 recommendations of the Marine Mammal 

Commission (MMC). 

In 1986 the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 99-625 to legalize experimental translocation 

of sea otters to San Nicolas Island, Ventura County. In response to concerns by local 

commercial and recreational fishermen, Congress approved a "management zone" of sea 

otters. An agreement between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the State 

of California, as represented by the California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) was 

signed in August of 1987. This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) remains intact 

However, in views of many, including CDFG, USFWS has not lived up to the MOU. 

In August of 1991 the USFWS released a revision of their 1982 sea otter recovery plan. The 

Draft Southern Sea Otter Revised Recovery Plan (DSSORRP) has drawn fire from coastal 

cities and counties, CDFG, and numerous fishing organizations. The DSSORRP offers 

range expansion as the only remedy to threats generally acknowledged to face sea otters in 

the foreseeable future. The revised plan provides no genuine protection to sea otters or 

their habitat 

Extensive scientific data, gathered by CDFG confirms the experience of commercial and 

recreational divers that significant harvests of shellfish, regardless of the extent of regulation 

and level of law enforcement, cannot co-exist within the sea otter range. Thus the 

DSSORRP requires elimination of fisheries, but does not protect sea otters from oil spill 

risks, such as offshore oil and gas leasing and development, adjacent to the sea otter range 

pose considerable real threats, yet USF&WS has not recommended deletion of these tracts. 

Our proposal seeks to protect sea otters by identifying the primary threat- that of massive 

oil spills at sea--as an activity appropriately managed within the MBNMS and CCNMS 

boundaries. As recently suggested by the USFWS regional director, improvement as the 

establishment of a traffic separation scheme could reduce oil spill risks, meet recovery goals 

and potentially meet delisting criteria. This is after all the goal of protective legislation. 

Ultimately, sea otters could be protected in perpetuity while allowing for continued use of 

shellfish resources outside the refuge by those that desire them for recreation or commercial 

use. 

i. 
173 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Summary . .. . .. ... .. . . .... ... ••.. . . . .. . •.•••... .. . .. •. . ... . .• . .. . .. 1 

Legal Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S 

Factors Threatening the Otte r ... . ........ .... .. • . . .. . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . 8 

Conclusion . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • • . • • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 

list of Exhibits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . 1S 

Sea Otters, Kelp Communities, and Fisheries: A Brief Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 

AQCNOWJEDGMBNTS 

Author Steve Rebuck, Executive Director of Ocean Sanctuary Coalition, San I 

County. Other acknowledgments include Richard Murphy, Energy Planner of 1 

Obispo County Planning and Building Department, and Cay Phipps, Conscrvat 

of the Central California Council of Divers. 

ii. 

· Obispo 

5an Luis 

Director 
174 

I. SUMMARY 

~ 

1bc goal of this proposal is to protect the sea otter, Enhydra lutrjs. its habitat and the 

remaining shellfish fisheries to the north of San Francisco Bay and south of Point 

Conception, outside the current sea otter range. 

Proposal 

To utilize the proposed Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary (MBNMS/HR 734, 1st 

session-lOOth Congress), and the proposed Central Coast National Marine Sanctuary 

(CCNMS/H.R 3099) as an "expanded sea otter refuge." This proposal applies the concept 

of zonal managemmt to effectively manage the sea otter and maintain the health and 

stability of the remaining shellfish fasherieS: 1bc expansion of the otter range is based on 

the availability of suitable habitat while .naintaining the economic integrity of the shellfish 

industry. Map I below relates the existing otter range to that of the proposed Monterey Bay 

National Marine Sanctuary and the proposed Central Coast National Marine Sanctuary. 

Map!. 

-1-

h:lstina I: Proposed Central 

California Marine Sanctuaries 

I JI • 311 .. iM • 

inllui • U;; 

~ .... Al. J ~ o,6., ,..._ 

:::::COMM lOII --- M. S 
175 

Exlstfnr Rerng< and Ranr< 

The entire Pacific population of sea otters (Enhydra lutris) came under international 

protection with the radification of the International Fur Seal Treaty of 1911. 

The California population received State legislative protection in 1913, when the sea otter 

was listed in Section 4700 of the Fish and Game Code. The 1914 population was assumed 

to be approximately 50 animals located between Pfeiffer Pl and Pl Sur. 

In 1941 the State of California created a sea otter refuge. Initially there were two disjunct 

zones, one bounded by Malpaso Creek and Swiss Canyon Anoyo and the second located 

between Castro Canyon and Dolan Creek. During 1959 the reserve was extended into one 

continuous zone encompassing all land west of Highway 1 to the State's three mile territorial 

distance offshore from Carmel River south to Santa Rosa Creek near Cambria'. 

Between 1914 and 1938 the sea otter population in California grew to an estimated 

population of 310. CDFG conducted sporadic surveys of the sea otter population using a 

variety of methods. By 1959 the population was estimated at 1,050. Table I provides 

information of the range utilization and population increase of the sea otter along the 

central coast of California. 

With the passage of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), protective 

jurisdiction was passed from the California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) to the 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (JJSFWS). During the mid-1970's CDFG attempted to gain 

a waiver to ·Jic taking provisions of the MMP A This attempt to regain management 

jurisdiction was thwarted by the 1977 listing of the sea otter in California as a threatened 

"species" under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). The State of California 

opposed the listing (cg: sea otter's habitat was not threatened, they were not being exploited, 

there was no disease or predation interfering with growth of the population and existing 

regulatory mechanisms were adequate). 

There is also an unresolved issue concerning the taxonomic status of the sea otter in 

California. Some argue the animal is a slightly isolated population of that found in Alaska, 

which could be used to bolster the California population should an oil spill or other malady 

affect them. Others support the separate sub-species designation, En!n'lln l.l!.!ru ~ and 

argue against mjxing the races. USFWS supports the conclusions of Wilson2 that there are 

three distinct sub-species in the north Pacific-'. CDFG on the otherhand concludes Wilson 

represents only the most recent work and is not conclusive•. The taxonomic debate 

continues. 

In 1991, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) released a revision to their 1982 

Recovery Plan for sea otters in California. The sea otter in California was listed as a 

1 USFWS 1984, et al 1 USFWS DSSORRP, Jnuoduc1ion, Systematics pg l 1 Wilson, et al 1991 

t CDFG Comments, DSSORRP pg 4 

-2-
176 

Table 1. Range Utilization and Population of the Sea Otter Along the California Coast, 

1914 to 1984 (USFWS); plus 1992/USFWS/CDF&G Joint Spring Survey. 

~ 1-ollMillkup A\Oeft .. {KJHM TOllltq ba T°"I T°"I Yu, iitUo.cten(m) •mpqYur ....., ofHabii.t .... CD.••« 

Non.kn I SolilMn ,.:. I s:~ I Toe.I N~ I S:m I Total 

.... 1o20r. . .... Jadivihab 

..... ,.,. 

1914 "s., Pkilk,Pl' (llf (23.0)' (SOY 

1931 ....,,, SlaitHot 11 (21) (32) 0.46 (O.U) (1.34) " 4.7.7 310 

Spri,p 

, .. , MalpoloO. MiltO. 23 JI ... 256 ).4S ,. MJ ,,. 1950 Y11ktcf'I. Go,d, 13 " . ., U) , ... .. 119.7 "° 

"" " ...... Juyed Pt 16 19 ... '·"' uo IOI tSl.3 ... .......... 19$7 P-.atkntl'l Pl.Semo 11 17 5JO , ... IJO "' 170.9 ... .,. 

1959 ·-" "'· PlPiNn.1 12 100 , .. 6.00 "' 192.2 1.050 .,._ 1963 o ..... SnSi•- 10 " 1.25 2JO "' 152 219.4 1,190 

1966 t.-r·, Pt Pico Cr. ... lOO 100 UI DU I.,.. '" .... ....... ,. .... ~ " .. 100 U) ..,, 177 m, 1-"0 ,.,. ,m ...... c.,....."' " " l.00 , ... , ... 192 324.3 l~lO 1,0601 

1971 P.1j.uo1Uwr Pl.Le~ 23 29 " 23.00 29.00 5l00 "' 367.1' 1,720 I.IQ)' 

1"74 s.-1su.1e lNbloC- II ... , ... 11.00 "' 1.130 

"""' 1975 RioDrl Mar Di&bloGc,,,,,c LOO ... . .. "' 195 

,,,. $ootNIP'I. Peck Rod: 10 16 1000 MO 1•00 279 1.719' ·~ 1m ..... IP\ Pl S.• Ui5 " ... . .. 14.00 "' 1971 5cNl1tCI Pl PtSnt..• 293 

'"' ..... , .. s.-1 000 ... •oo "' 1,443' 1,202' 

P,liMda 

, ... $ot•I Pl ~~ 13 " 0.00 .... 1>00 ]12 

,,., 5ootMIPI. ~~ ]12 1.331 

.,., .... _ S.•\I Maria .. IS 41 26 IS 41 35] 1.2>6 

""'' I ... .... _ Snu.Maria 1,304 (FWS) ..., .. 35] U72 1,21l3(C>Ri) 

'"' -·- P•ris• a Poitit 2,101• 

.nmw Ill ,.. '" 1.11 Uil l99 35) 

c.:o..a -·· ••tiiidi 19ll No Rc:icdl, f'Ollp aatapliou •ade (KC IUl). 

5-fun kio1u1c:n ol ronpa, bbiut •'-& PMo daa ka(.ka art muidert• 0..,0 ta' ~, li.M:ar ka of uH)' kac:L 

So.e ... ,,.,......,.,4. ,--•*' f.ONitiou d1N1 tM ~ k4 IO a lad: ol-tidcacc ia Ge bal ficwrt. ~ soac larr ,.,. udalk4. 

No....atueahllltd.. 

.... _ co .. 1 ••nae Aile ... , )'Pf. 

Ja•-. USf'WS. joial •pri•J Hf\leY 1992. 

( ... ttioul iabaalioa pn,••idd by D. Miler IMJ) 

-3-

Yun 

Bc:Jwen 

&ti• ua 

,. 

10 
177 

threatened "species" in 1977. 'The Draft Revised Southern Sea Otter Recovery Plan 

(DRSSORP) by USFWS offers range expansion as the only remedy to threats generally 

acknowledged to be facing sea otters in the forcsccable future. 'The revised plan provides 

Dl2 genuine protection to sea otters or their habitat 

Extensive scientific data, gathered by the CDFG, confirms the experiences of commercial 

and recreational divers that significant harvests of shellfish, regardless of the extent of 

regulation and level of law enforcement, cannot co-exist within the sea otter range. Thus 

the DRSSORP requires elimination of fisheries, but docs not protect the sea otter. 

Currently, the sea otter in California ranges from Pt Ano Nucvo, San Mateo County and 

Pismo Beach, San Luis Obispo County'. TIie 1991 spring survey of sea otters was 1941 

animals' compared to 1992's count of 2,101. 

Cllart I below shows seven of the highest otter population densities along the central coast 

Five of these seven locations arc located with the boundaries of the proposed Central Coast 

National Marine Sanctuary. 'These numbers arc based on 1990 USFWS data. 

O!art I. 

--

Seven Highest Oller Populotlon Densities 

1 ·390 Census - South to North 

.. 

. 

1 USFWS 1991, DSSORRP a.,.._ ' USFWS 1991, Otier Cea• 
178 

II. LEGAL FOUNDATION 

Zonal management of sea otters in California was first recommended to the U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service (USFWS) by the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission (MMC) in a letter to 

USFWS Director, Lynn A Greenwalt by MMC Executive Director, John R. Twiss Jr., 2 

December 1980: 

" ... recognize the ultimate need for 'zonal management' of the Califomio sea otter pursua/11 

to which the sea oner would be restored lo additional sites within its former ra11ge although 

1101 to each and every area it once inhabited. Such 'zonal manageme11t' would be based 

upon an optimum sustainable population can and should be achuved with reference lo the 

'health and stabilily of the marine ecosystem' and that historic levels and distribution are not 

necessary to satisfy that goal; ... • (Exhibit 1). 

Fish end Wildlife Amendment to the ESA: PL 99-'2S 

Existing provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMP A) allow for research 

programs involving depleted populations such as the sea otter in California, but not for longterm management and containment of an experimental population once research is 

completed. Therefore, progress toward recovery of the sea otter in California population 

pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA) would result from the establishment of a 

second breeding colony. To remedy this limitation, Congress passed P.L 99-625 on 

November 7, 1986 (Exhibit 2). P.L ?9-625 broadened USFWS authorization for Jong term 

management of an "experimental population". 

USFWS chose San Nicolas Island (Ventura County) and surrounding . waters as a 

"translocation zone" for their experiment In numerous state, county, city, and other public 

meetings, USFWS promoted their capabilities at containment 

In accordance with provisions of P.L 99-625, a 'management zone" that includes all of the 

Southern California Bight south of PL Conception and offshore islands except San Nicolas 

be maintained as an "otter-free" zone by use of 'non-lethal" capture techniques. This would 

result in containment of the translocated population, and the de facto containment of 

southward expansion of the donor population at PL Conception-' 

Memorandum of Understanding CMOJD In August 1987, USFWS and the California Department of Fish and Game signed a 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). In this MOU the USFWS and CDFG mutually 

agreed and understood 16 different provisions. One provision, number 10, states: 

"71ie USFWS agrees to initiate a process to dellt!lop, in consultation with CDFG, a l011g-term 

managemelll pla11 immediately followi11g approval and completion of the decisio11-maki11g 

process regardi11g tra11slocatio1L Among other factors, the plan shall i11c/ude discussions, 

strategies and milestones relative to determinations conceming delisti11g of the Soulhem 

(California) sea otter population, additional protections necessary lo restore the population 

1 USFWS Sea Otter Translocation FEIS 1987 

-5-
179 

to tire non-depleted and non-threatened status, zonal management for the mainland 

population, induding limitations on tl,e nortl,ern expansion of the mainland population 

(emphasis added), and an approach to defining Optimum Sustainable Population (OSP), b1 

accorda11ce with requirements of the MMPA, taku,g b110 consideration tlie amowll of suitable 

habitat available bi Califomia". {Exhibit 3) 

Unfortunately, USFWS has not lived up to this MOU in the eyes of many observers, 

including CDFG. Although CDFG has adequately trained personnel available for the 

containment program in the "no-otter" management zone, 5 years into the program, USFWS 

stiJI has difficulty fielding a dive team. The fact that USFWS has made minimal attempts 

at containment during the past five years should not be used to discredit the containment 

program. CDFG has demonstrated on numerous occasions that their capture techniques can 

be successful. 

Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary /ff.R.734 & HR 4148\ 

'The draft EIS and management plan for the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary 

"preferred alternative" sanctuary boundary included approximately 30% of the sea otter 

population, advocated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 

Sanctuaries and Reserves Division. Substantial public and political support for the largest 

sanctuary boundary alternative, No. 5, lead the Bush Administration to direct NOAA staff 

to revise the final management _ plan and EIS. Alternative No. 5 would encompasses 

approximately 48% of the current sea otter mainland population. 

Central Coast National Marine Sanctuary /ff.R. 3099) 

H.R. 3099, the Central Coast National Marine Sanctuary, is legislation that would establish 

a marine sanctuary off the central coast of California, encompassing approximately .: 2% of 

the mainland sea otter population. Congressman Leon Panetta introduced H.R. 5973 on 

October 27, 1990 which was later reintroduced as H.R. 3099 on July 30, 1991. 

H.R 3099 proposes Congress find the waters off the central coast of California to have 

special national cultural, educational, research and economic significance. 

In addition, the County of San Luis Obispo Board of Supervisors has requested NOAA 

expand a "non-active" National Marine Sanctuary candidate, Morro Bay, to include outer 

waters (Estero Bay and beyond). NOAA is considering this proposal as they modify their 

Site Evaluation List (SEL) criteria. NOAA staff has indicated the proposal demonstrates 

merit and will likely meet the new SEL bio-geographical criteria. If the Morro Bay site is 

not expanded and activated by NOAA, the county will submit a formal nomination package 

(occurs after NOAA has revised SEL criteria). A call for new nominations is expected in 

1992. 'The draft reauthorization biJI of the National Marine Research, Protection, and 

Sanctuaries Act includes language requiring NOAA to conduct a study of the Morro 

Bay/Central Coast site candidate, as defined by the agencies revised SEL Information on 

the marine resource of the central coast arc provided in exhibit S, a summary publication 

prepared by the County of San Luis Obispo. 

'The two charts below, Oiart II and Oiart III, depict the distnbution of sea otters within 

their established range off the central coast relative to the Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary 

preferred alternative and boundary alternative 5. 

-6-
600 

ou,.,, a Puo• 

Chart II 

Otter Distribution 

California Populatlon 

I m MBNMI • o-1ap "'•• o c..,1,111 coa.1 NMs I 

180 

2&00 

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Chart III 

Oner Oislrlbution 

Cal!tornla Population 

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Draft Southern Sea Otter Revised Recovery Plan 

In August 1991, USFWS released a Draft Southern Sea Otter Revised Recovery Plan 

(DSSORRP). 11ie agency has redefined the recovery criteria and suggests that '"The 

establishment of a contiguous population containing 5,400 individuals ranging between PL 

Conception and the California/Oregon border." 

The attached exhibits listed below are by those agencies and organizations opposed to the 

revised plan. Those opposed include: 

• California Department of Fish and Game (Exhibit 9) 

• Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations (Exhibit 10) 

• Central California Council of Diven (Exhibit 11) 

• California Seafood Council (Exlubit 12) 

• Resolutions from counties 

· Del Norte 

· Humboldt 

· Mendocino 

· Sonoma 

• Resolution from cities 

· Eureka 

· Lakeport 

· Fortuna 

· Ft Bragg 

• Trinidad 

.7. 
181 

· League of California Cities Environmental Services Police Committee. 

(Exhibits 13 & 14) 

Support of the revised plan is provided by: 

• Friends of the Sea Otter (Exhibit 15) 

The Marine Mammal Commission (MMq is the nation's highest authority on marine 

mammals. MMC is part of the Executive Branch of the federal government Responding 

to the USFWS DSSORP, MMC submitted 13 pages of comments and recommendations, 

much of it critical: 

"Precisely what is being proposed or recommended is not clear. Likewise, ti~ pros and 

cons of the apparent proposal/recommendation are not identified and described in 

sufficient detail to allow meaningful evaluation.• (pg. Z Exhibil 16) 

More recently, MMC contacted USFWS concerning rumon that a second draft would be 

released "without significant changes• (Carl Benz pen. comm, ct al). MMC reiterated its 

8 Nov 1991 comments that the DSSORP included: 

• ... a number of uncertaimies concerning the nature of. rational for, proposed or 

recommended changes in the Recovay Plan. In lighl of these w,certainties, the 

Commission recommended a second draft revision be done ... • (Erhibil 16) 

JJI. FACTORS THREATENING THE OTI'ER 

Impacts 

The sea otter population in California was listed as a threatened •species" (not immediately 

threatened with extinction). Its small population, limited range and threats from offshore 

oil spills were cited as reasons for the listing, The State of California and othen disputed 

the sea otter meeting the necessary criteria for listing, Because the population was stable 

or growing the available habitat was not threatened, disease and predation were at levels not 

threatening to the population, and ottcn were not being exploited beyond those of 

observation. 

One threat, little known and not recognized at the time the listing was!!!!!!" occurring in the 

set-net fJShety targeting on halibut Since 1984, the California Legislature has passed several 

bills designed to reduce such taking to levels approaching zero. Facton like El Nino and 

flipper tag entanglement were not considered as contributing to the population leveling out 

during the early and mid-1980's. 

Oil and Gas Development 

Offshore oil and gas leasing and resulting development, adjacent to the sea otter range arc 

considered real threats to the sea otter, yet the USFWS has not recommended deletion of 

• Deliaed ia the Mariae. Mammal Procectioa Act u llaraaacat or • aa• tborizcd ltilia&- Spociel covered 

by ... ESA alld MMPA are HIO ... licaly comideffil depleted. Depleted species may IIOI be taHL 

70-544 0 - 93 - 7 
182 

these tracts. Instead, USFWS has promoted translocations as a solution and primal)• 

protection from oil spill risk, dividing the ranks of environmentalists and fishermen who 

actually have similar concerns when it comes to offshore oil development. 

In 1986, the USFWS authored a Formal ESA Section 7 Consultation and Biological Opinion 

on the San Miguel Project, an offshore oil and gas project to be located off Point Sal in the 

Northern Santa Maria Basin. In an attempt to gain MMS support for the then proposed 

translocation to San Nicolas Island, USFWS offered the following: 

''.As described i11 the Service's proposed tra11slocatilm pla1~ there is ~ clear a,ul direct 

li11kage betwee11 successful establishme11t of a seco1ul col011y of sea ot1ers, the outcome 

of subseque111 Section 7 consultatic,rs, a,ul the overall recove,y of the species. 11ierefore, 

iJ is clearly possible that future co11flicts betwee11 OCS oil a,ul gas developme111 a11d sea 

olters ca11 be sig11i[ica11tly diminished or avoided if the recove,y effort is accelerated a,ul 

a seco,ul colo11y can be established over tlie 11ext 5-10 years." (Exhibit 17) 

The U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service (MMS), proposed 

leasing plans for the Santa Barbara Channel and northern Santa Maria Basin, northward to 

areas offshore Morro Bay, as a part of their 1992-1997 Comprehensive Program. These 

tracts have been deleted from the proposed final plan. Should these tracts have been 

included in the final plan, 52% or the sea otter population would have been threatened. 

The Secretarial Issue Document (SID) for the proposed final plan gave some consideration 

to this threat. As shown on the map below, the SID proposed a leasing alternative that 

would have created a coastal buffer to protect the sea otter. San Luis Obispo County has 

consistently requested such a buffer should lease sales occur off the central coast. Map II 

shows the otter buffer relative to existing and proposed tracts in the Santa Maria Basin. 

Twenty-four tracts would have been deferred if this option was selected by the Secretary of 

Interior rather then deferring the entire Southern California Planning Area from lease sale 

consideration. The Santa Maria Basin will not be considered for leasing until the 1997-2003 

Comprehensive Program is prepared. 

The California Coastal Commission (CCC) has recognized the environmental sensitivity of 

the northern Santa Maria Basin. On March 20, 1981, the CCC issued a determination that 

portions of Lease Sale 53 were inconsistent with the Commission's federally certified 

California Coastal Management Program (CCMP). Specifically, the CCC objected to leasing 

of four Northern California basins, of which 29 tracts were located in the northern Santa 

Maria Basin. Nineteen of the proposed 87 tracts considered in the 1992-1997 program were 

among the 29 the CCC formally objected to in 1981. On August 27, 1983, the CCC found 

Lease Sale 73 in the Santa Maria Basin to be inconsistent .with the CCMP. All 45 of the 

Santa Maria Basin tracts considered in the 92-97 program were among those objected to by 

the Coastal Commission. Map III represents this activity by the California Coastal 

Commission. 

Vessel & Tanker Traffic 

Correspondence to the California Coastal Commission from Texaco Trading and 

Transportation Inc_ Gaviota Terminal manager, Dan Mihalik, provided data showing 122 

million barrels of oil transported annually offshore the sea otter range by approximately 950 

oil tankers. Texaco also estimates 3,200 vessels passing the sea otter range and an additional 

-9-
183 

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25 million barrels of fuel for an estimated total of 147 million barrels of crude and processed 

oil. (Exhibit 18). Texaco suggests transport of oil should occur outside 25 mile$ from shore: 

"The option would keep the tankers at least 25 miles from shore except when they 

approach the entrance to San Francisco.• 

In response to concerns expressed by Congressman Frank Riggs (Exhibit 19) the USFWS 

regional director, Marvin Plenert (Exlubit 20) responded: 

"To further minimize the oil spill risk would require restncting vessels to traffic 

separation Janes 40 to 60 miles offshore, and the Chast Guard has informed us that 

it does not currently ha11e the authority to require this traffic restriction. Hawe11er, 

should such Janes become established, and adequately enforced, then the reeo11ery 

criteria for delisting the southern sea otter could be adjusted'. 

Such a mechanism has been discussed by USFWS bef~re. The FEIS for the Translocation 

of Southern Sea Otter, May 1987 states: · 

"Through the Secretary of the Interior, legislation would be proposed to establish a 

shipping fairway and traflic separation scheme (TSS) along the central California 

coast from San Francisco to Pt. Conception at a distance of at least 15 nautical miles 

from shore, and to require mandatory use of the route and TSS by all U.S. Flag 

carriert'. Vol 1, Pgs. III-31 &: 32 (Exhibit 21). 

The subject of vessel shipping fairways along the central California coast was also discussed 

at an October 4, 1984 meeting of the USFWS Interagency Project Review Team (IPRT) in 

San Francisco (Exhibit 22). 

The Department of the Interior has the apparent ability to reduce the threat of tankering 

and other .shipping posed to sea otters. 

Qn-Shm:e on & Ou Fadlitlea 

The supporting infrastructure for oil and gas activity on the central coast poses a significant 

threat to nearshore sea otter habitat. On August 3, 1992, Unocal Corporation's twelve inch 

pipeline, located on bluffs above fossil point near Avila Beach, ruptured. At least three sea 

otters were killed as a result of this spill, see Map IV. The spill consisted of approximately 

one hundred twenty-five barrels of San Jouquin Valley heavy crude oil. Approximately 80-

120 barrels was spilled into the nearshore environment. The relatively remote geographic 

character of the incident lead to a slower then desired response. Qean Seas, the Coast 

Guard, and FORT, Fishermen Oil Response Team, were deployed on site for cleanup. The 

nearshore nature of the incident, primary intertidal and kelp forest communities, has made 

it extremely difficult for a successfully cleanup of the area. Four days after the accident, the 

third dead oiled sea otter was discovered. 

A similar accident occurred at Shell Beach, south of Avila Beach, in 1985. No known sea 

otters were found dead as a result of the spill but kelp forest communities were degraded. 

Shell Beach is one of five highest sea otter densities in the existing otter range. 

-11-
185 

Map IV. 

H.R. 4045 (exhtbit 23), legislation to reauthorize and amend the Endangered Species Act, 

would make available grant monies to fund the development of a habitat conservation plan. 

Under Title III of the legislation, 'The Candidate Species Conservation Planning Assistance 

Program" outlines the criteria to obtain grant funding. To qualify for the grant, the habitat 

conservation plan must, A) cover an area sufficiently large in size to encompass adequate 

suitable habitat within which the species can be maintained over the long-term; B) include 

reasonable measures such as land acquisition, regulatory controls, exotic species controls, and 

active land management that will fully mitigate and offset the effects of any activities 

permitted under the plan that adversely affect the species, and C) include adequate 

measures for funding its implc,.1entation. The plan is a cooperative agreement between the 

Secretary of Interior and agency requesting the funding. 

The Candidate Species Conservation Planning Assistance Program would provide assistance 

to coastal counties for the inventory of all on-shore oil & gas infrastructure within the coastal 

zone adjacent to the existing sea-otter range and proposed refuge. These habitat 

conservation plans could provide information on the integrity of pipelines and other 

industrial infrastructure that pose a significant threat to the suitable sea otter habitat 

Essentially, an implemented comprehensive plan would help prevent an accident such as the 

one that occurred in Avila Beach and could be integrated into the counties general plan. 

JV. CONCLUSION 

The basic components of this plan remain in place, i.e. P.L 99-625, the current Southern Sea 

Otter Recovery Plan, the Memorandum of Understanding and the Federal Rule. The 

proposed Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary and Central coast National Marine 

Sanctuary identify protections for resources and unique habitats. Identification of research 

objectives could provide financial support for state and federal programs. 

All parties appear to agree that the sea otter translocation program at San Nicolas Island 

should continue. Even f15hery organizations which have previously opposed the program 

have recently offered "conditional support• These conditions are predicated on a workable 

"zonal-management" program as recommended by the Marine Mammal Commission. 

-12-
186 

Fishermen believe CDFG should take the lead in containment and be provided adequate 

ESA Section 6 funding. 

In addition, fisherman have founded an oil spill preparedness training program. The 

Fisherman's Oil Response Team (FORT) has trained over 100 commercial fishermen and 

crew members in the basic mechanical procedures associated with containing and recovering 

spilled oil at sea. Approximately 3 dozen commercial vessels have been surveyed for 

dcploymen!S during spills. 

Commercial abalone divers, members of the California Abalone Association (CAA) have 

recently offered their vessels and diving skills to the CDFG Oil Spill Prevention and 

Response Office (OSPRO) for specialized wildlife recovery training. Some CAA members 

have received FORT training and are awaiting classes in wildlife handling to be scheduled 

by FORT associates, Clean Seas. Additional programs in wildlife and hazardous materials 

arc subject to CDFG and Cal-OSHA approval. · 

USFWS has repeatedly cited the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill in the DRSSORRP, yet 

USFWS fails to acknowledge that the commercial fishing industry is well along in efforts to 

field oil spill response teams along the California coast. These teams have received 

approved training for effective rescue and cleanup action. Even without training, Alaskan 

commercial fishermen proved their capablitics as the only early responders to the EXXON 

VALDEZ spill. 

V. RECOMMENDATIONS 

This proposal represents a compromise. We have an opportunity to protect sea otters from 

risks associated with spilled oil-the reason for their ljstjng. Supporters of this proposal will 

have to advise the U.S. Congress. The following points arc suggested: 

t. Congress must recognize the need for "wnal management" programs in California. 

This may require additional amendments to the Endangered Species Act and Marine 

Mammal Protection Act; 

2. Congress must require traffic separation lanes offshore California at sufficient 

distance to protect sea otters and other living marine resources; 

3. Congress must provide adequate funding for research, management, and protection 

of resources existing in the proposed National Marine Sanctuaries of California. 

4. Congress should place permanent bans on OCS oil and gas activity in the Santa 

Maria Basin, Central and Northern California Planning Areas. 

5. Congress and the State Assembly should place performanoe standards on the upgrade 

of existing on-shore oil & gas pipelines adjacent to suitable sea otter habitats. ( e.g. 

Unocal Corporation - Avt1a Beach Tank Farm/Pipeline & Guadalupe Dunes Oil 

Field). 

-13-
187 

6. Congress should adopt H.R. 4045, "Candidate Species Conservation Planning 

Assistance Program• in order for adequate on-shore and off-shore planning for 

purposes of implementing a suitable habitat conservation plan. 

MapV. 

- Expanded Sea Oller Reruae 

Shippin& Vessel A' Tanker 

Tr afflc Scenerio 

• .. • • 41 -

11.tk.Jiiii 

:::::t. OCi. W. _....,. ML S 

--CONNJOffl 

-14-
188 

LIST OF EXHIBITS 

I. Letter, 2 Dec 1980, John R. Twiss, MMC to Lynn A Greenwalt, USFWS. 3pp. 

2. Public Law 99-625, 7 Nov 1986 to present. 3pp. 

3. MOU Aug 1987, USFWS Regional Director/CDFG Director. 5pp. 

4. Monterey Bay NMS, H.R. 734 & H.R. 4148. 

5. Letter, 9 Oct 1991, governor Pete Wilson to Robert Mosbacher, Secretary of 

Commerce, 4pp 

6. AH.R. 3099, 30 July 1991. 7pp. 

7. Central Coast NMS, SLO CO. Fact Sheet, 1991. 4pp. 

8. USFWS, Aug 1991, Executive Summary, DSSORRP. 2pp. 

9. CDFG, 29 Oct 1991, Comments: DSSORRP. 38pp. 

10. PCFFA, 30 Oct 1991, Comments: DSSORRP. 6pp. 

11. CEN-CAL, 1 Nov 1991, Comments: DSSORRP 

12 California Seafood Council, Comments: DSSORRP. 7pp. 

13. Resolutions: Cities 

14. Resolutions: Counties 

15. Friends of the Sea Otter, Comments: DSSORRP. 2pp. 

16. MMC, 8 Nov 1991, comments: DSSORRP. 13pp 

17. Formal Endangered Species Consultation--Offshore oil/Gas Development and 

Production in Northern Santa Maria Basin, San Luis Obispo County, California 

17. (1-6-86-F-24) 

18. Letter w/cnclosures, 18 Dec 1989, D.R. Mihalik, Texaco to Peter Douglas, CCC, 

Gaviota Terminal 30pp. 

19. Letter, 24 Sept 1991, Congressman Frank Riggs to Robert Russink, USFWS. 2pp. 

20. Letter, 25 Oct 1991, Response to Congressman Riggs from Marvin Plcncrt USFWS. 

2pp. 

21. USFWS, May 1987, excerpt, FEIS Proposed Translocation of Southern Sea Otter. 

2pp. 

22. Letter, 24 Oct 1984, Wilbur Ladd, USFWS to Lt. C. William Walker, USCG. 2pp. 

23. H.R. 4045, Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act • Congressman Studds. 

-lS-
189 

Sea Otters, Kelp Communities and Fisheries: A Brief Overview 

While many may dispute the sea otters role in shaping the nearshore environment, including 

their impact on shellfish fisheries, one may safely conclude that sea otters and shellfish 

f,sheries cannot cocxisl Data collected over the past twenty-five years by the California 

Department of Fish and Game has convincingly documented the preclusion of abalone, sea 

urchin and some clam fisheries. Similar data on possible· preclusion of the south-central 

coast Dungeness crab fishery is currently being ~ollected. 

Some scientists have argued that sea otters, by removing macroinvertebrates, thereby 

enhance kelp, primarily giant or pea kelp, Macrocystis pyrifera, an economically valuable 

species, and therefore offer an economic tradeoff. However, Foster and Schiel of Moss 

Landing Marine Laboratory summarized: 

"Observations at selected sites in the nonheastem Pacific have led to two generalizations: 

(J) kelp communilia on 11eanhore, sub tidal reef exist in one of two stable states, forested 

wilh few la~ sea urclwu or deforested wilh abundant la~ sea urchi11s, and (2) 

changes of state are controlled by keystone predator, the sea oner. In contras4 ma,iy 

observations made both within and outside tire sea o"ers' range in California indicate 

that these subtidal communilies are spatially and temporally variable. Our review of over 

220 descriptive surveys of sud, comm1111ities in California that occur outside tire range 

of tire sea otter shows that sea urclri11 grazing effects can be lrighly variable i11 the 

absence of sea oilers and deforestation by sea urclrins is tire excep1io11 ( <10% of tire siles 

surveyed). /11 addilio•~ tire comrn11ni1ies do not exist in two stales controlled by oilers, 

but rather exliibil a dynamic range of composition wlrere the above "states" are 

u11common extremes."" 

Thc following excerpts arc taken from the available literature on sea otter interactions with 

f,sherics. These excerpts demonstrate what is known about sea otter impacts on inshore 

fisheries. Two CDFG baseline studies exist: (1) Point Estero studies (Ebert 1968a, 1968b) 

included in Wild and Ames (1974); and (2) Preoperational baseline studies for the Diablo 

Canyon Nuclear Powerplant by Gotshall, Laurent, Owen, Grant, Law (1984). These excerpts 

arc by no means complete. They do, however, demonstrate the available literature and the 

need for continued work, possibly through the proposed marine sanctuaries research 

program or possible budget expansion of the USFWS otter research monies, ESA Section 

6 funding, Candidate Species Conservation Planning Assistance Program as proposed in 

legislation H.R. 4045. 

Foster, M.S-. D.R. schiel (1987), Kelp Commuailies altd Sea Otters: Keystone Species or just Another 

Brick ill Ille Wal? O..pler 5, Vao Blaricoa, & Estes, the Comm-•ity Ecology of Sea Ot1en. Spr•ie•· 

Verla1, Heidel>er1, pp.92-115 

-16-
190 

References: Fisheries/Sea Otter Interactions 

1. Kenyon, Karl W., 1969, the Sea Otter in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, Nonh American 

Fauna #68, Bureau of Spon Fisheries and Wildlife, U.S. Depanment of the Interior. 

Excerpts pp. 127 &. 128. 

2. Wild, Paul W., J.A Ames, 1974, A Report on the Sea Otter, Enhydra Iutrjs 1-, in 

California, CDFG, Marine Resources Technical Repon No. 20. Excerpt pg 87. 

3. Gotshall, O.W., L Laurent, S. Owen, J. Grant, P. Law, 1984, A Quantitative Ecological 

Study of Selected Nearshore Marine Plants and Animals At Diablo Canyon Power Plant 

Site: A Pre-Operational Baseline, CDFG, Marine Resources Technical Repon # 48, Vol. 

1, 1973-1978. Excerpt pp.544-554. 

4. Antonelis, G.A, S. Leatherwood, LH. Cornell, J.G. Antrim, 1981, Activity Cycle and 

Food Selection of captive Sea otters, "The Murrelet, 62:6-9 

5. Foster, M.S., D.R Schei!, 1987, Kelp Communities and Sea Otters:Keystone Species of 

Just Another Brick in the Wall?., Oiapter S, VanBlaricom and Estes, "The Community 

Ecology of Sea Otters, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, pp. 92-115. Excerpt pg. 92, 93, 94 

&. 107 

-17-
191 

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02103193 os, 51 e202 22s 5soe GEORGE MILLER 

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AMERICAN OCEANS CAMPAJGN 

January 29, 1991 

I Ion. Gcnr~c Miller 

U.S. Huu•e of Representatives Interior Commilrcc 

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LHOB 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

· A'J'J'N: Jeff Petridt 

Dear Congressman Miller: 

. .. JEFF 

E D C 

We have been advised by NKIX: that your cummittc:e will be holding hearings on 

February 4, 1993 regardini: oil spill 1,revention and response and olher issues associated 

with the tran•ponation of oil by marine tanker along the California coast. We would 

like to lake this opportunity to provide you with some relevant information and to 

expreu our grave concerns alx>ul the increaS(.-d threat to the Californi• cout arisin,. 

from the January 13, 199:\ decision by the California Coastal CommiS<ion to authori7.c 

tankering from Santa Barbara (Gaviota Marine Terminal) lo Los Ani;eles. In addition 

to the January 13 decision to permit tankcring by the Pt. Arguello partners, on 

February 17, 1993, the Commission will consider granting a new permit to the Gaviota 

Marine Terminal, and the State Lands Commission will rhen consider granting a new 

lease lo enal>le this tinkering to begin. 

The attached letter from the Environmental Defense Center to the Coaslal Commission 

outlines our objections to the procc,s and substance of the Coastal Commission's 

decision to permit tankering. We believe that decision contravenes policies of the 

California Coastal Act and the requirements of the Sanla Barl,ar-• County 1.ocal Coastal 

!'Ian. In practical terms, we are convinced that this decision will result in permanent 

marine tankering, not only of OCS oil from the Pt. Arguello project, but also from 

the Exxon Santa Yn~ Unit project, which is rxpec:Lcd to begin production within the 

year. This result is contrary to express commitments nude ten years ago by both 

Exxon and Chevron to lr~nsporl their OCS production to refineries by pipeline, and 

not marine tanker. We also believe it is contrary to the Commission's obligations 

under the Coastal Zone Mana~cmcnl Acl. 

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We er, panlc:ularly outraced by the fact that the Pt. Arsuello partn~n have suecee'ded in 

manipulating the Coastal Commiuion to sacrifiu the cenLTal California c:oaal and the SanLa 

Monica Bay to the permanent threat of 11nkerin, in order to stop the marin• ta~kering 

reeently initiated by Chevron from Martincr. to 1.os Angel,1. ln essenu, the Pt. AfKUtllo 

pannen acrccd to cease wha1 we would characterize II an illagal activity as a barcainin11 chip 

in order co obtain a permit Crom the Commission to tanker from Santa Barbara to Los 

Angeles. We believe that tinkering from Maninez is inconsistent with Chevron's approved 

OCS plan, and that, pursuant to tho Code or !lederal Rqulations. 15 C.P.a. 930.86, upon 

rtqveat by the Commission, the Seuetary of the Jncerior could and should take action 10 

111Spond that activity. Tho Commission's capitulation to Chevron wu therefore not only 

unwiH but \IDWartan~. 

The upcominc decision, by 1h11 California Couial CommiNion and the State Lands 

CommiNion relatinc to 1•ermin for 1he marine terminal 11 G1vio1a at~ destined to open 1h11 

door \() additional tankering by Enon, c!Npitt the fact that a piptline 011i1u with capacity to 

carry Euc,n'1 full production to iu previously designated refineritJ in Texu. Havint opened 

the door to tankcring by crantinc a permit to Chc:vron, tbe COlltal C'.on1mi11ion will be hatd 

prtHed to deny a similar petmit to won. 'J'o add insult to injury, while the Pt. Arguollo 

partners appear to have agreed to use only double bottom, double hulled tankers, ~non has 

daimed ar, absolute right to use sincle hulled tankers to transpon its oil . . 

We bellt.ve that the most effective m11hod of oil spill prevention it th• elimination of Lhe 

opponu.nity for marine tankering wherever possible. BueJ on recont spills in Spain, Scotland 

111d in U.S. Coastal waws, it should be 1111(-evldent that not enough is being done to prevent 

spills. and that when they occur they are impossible to c1mtain and clean up. Because of our . 

profound disappointment with the recent actions of the Coastal Commission, we urge your 

commiitoe to pursue federal initiativti to eliminate the threat posed by marine tanMring of 

oil IO the· California marine environ!Mnt, and its coastal-dependent fishing and tourist 

industriu. · 

We would be ploased 10 provide any additional information which may be useful to your 

committee. 'fhank you lor your conaidoration o{ our concorns. 

Sincer•ly, 

CAN OCEANS CAMPAIGN 

ENVIRONMENT.Al. Dt:l'l'.NSE CEN'l'ER OP 

SAN'l"A ~RA . 

2 
194 

02 / 03 / 93 08: 53 0202 225 5609 GEORGE MI LLER 

92 -' l2-'9l 14 : 51 S 815 962 l l 52 • • • JEFF E O C Id! 004 / 004 lf.a• 

1H11Eit\f'soi.0How TEL:805-687°-4156 ' Feb Ul ,':I.) · .l" ~'fO 1,u •V'-'.:O I •"'• 

By~ 

Linda Krop 

cc: Hon. 8trbara Boxer 

Hon. Dianno Flinllein 

Hon. Michael Hvffingum 

Sell. Gary Han 

J\.-iblyman J.ck O"Conncll 

Gray Divis, Su&e Lands Commiuion 

Leo Mceanhy, Stai. Lands Cc,mmission 

Gov. Pete Wilaon 

Thomu Gwyn, California Coasw Commission 

Jama Su~, Cal•EPJ\ Ooiaclas Whoolor, laourc,cs AgeMy 

Svpervilor Nae1111i Scbw~ 

Supervisor l'om Rop, 

Omld Mera!, Planning and CoaNl'Vltion J..oag11e 

Darryl Yovng, Club of California 

lob Solien, Sierra C'Ju~ l.01 Padru C'Jiapcu 

Ann NonhoCl, NkDC 

Hollister llanda Owner, Auoclation 

CiliNN ~la,iniag Auoclation 

Sur&lder l1011n41cion 

Sieve DuM and Alan Hw-, Commercial l'iahcrmen 

OetOil Ovt 

~\:':.y 

Jncue of Women V01Cn of San&& Barbara 

Laauc for eo..l Pr«eclion 

Richard Chaner, Local Government Coordination Program 
0211&193 11 , u 

FEB-I 8-93 THU 11 : 30 

195 

tt202 225 5509 GEORGE MILLER ••• JEFF 

DONJON MARINE CO. , INC. FAX HO. 908964 7 426 

DONJON MARINE CO., INC. 

ilJ00Z/ 001 

P. 02 

12150 L.I•••TY A.VE, 

H1u.s10E. N . J . 07205 P'ACSIMILII ,_,_...,,29 PHONE 

I.oe1e ... -ee1a 

'1'0• 

VIl\ Fl\X 

Re: 

I>ear Sir: 

February 18, 1993 

~~e Honorable Congressman Georg• M1ll• r ( 202 l 22S-S609 

OPl\ '90, Salva9e, Fire-fiqhtinq, Li9htering 

We would like t~ present our vi•w of OPA '90 interim final as relates to salvage, fire-fi9hting and cargo-lightering. 

feel that the regulations established under the mandate to 

TIEl.h 

WUl382111 

rules 

We 

the u.s. coast Guard (USCG), although spacific with re9ards to epill•respon••• do not adequately require preventative measures to mitigate or prevent the substantial threat of the wor• t ease discharge as defined by QPA'90. 

Al ~vidence of our competency on this isaue, we submit our experience of beinq under contract sine• 1979 to the Dept. of 

the Navy, Naval sea Systems Command, Office of the Supervi1or ot Salvage and Diving (NAVSEA-SUPSALV), to provide salvage and 

salvaqe-related services. capt. R. Fiske (SUPSALV•Code 00C) can confirm our experience, capabilities, and expertise as it 

relates to salva9e and tire-fighting. our company is also 

represented on the Executive Committee of The International 

Salva9• Union (ItU). 

Salvage and fire-fighting is clearly th• first lin• of defense 

against tha substantial threat of th• worst cas• diachar9e. The u.scG r• eo9n.i.les thia fact when they define "th• substantial 

threat" in Navigation and Veaael Inspeetion Cireular 8-92 (NVIC 8•92) as nany incident involving a vessel that may create a 

significant risk of discharge of fuel or cargo oil. Such 

incidents include but are not limited to groundings, strandings, collisions, hull damage, fire, explosion, loss of propulsion, flooding, on-d• ck spills or other similar occurrences." 

Th~ interim final rules (DOT, USCG, 33 crR Part 150, et al,, 

R• s1>0n•e Plans, Interim Final Rules), however, have virtually eliminated the "real" requirement for a vessel operator to ensure the availability of capable and experienced salvage and 

!ire•fightin~ resources. Presently, a vessel operator only must certify that they have written consent of a salvor and 

fira-fi9hter. Response times, resource descriptions, personnel experi• nc•, ar• not clearly defined as criteria to determine 
196 

02/ 18193 11 : 49 tt202 225 5609 GEORGE MILLER ••• JEFF 

FEB-18-93 THU tt :31 DONJON MARlNE CO. , INC. FAX NO. 8089647426 

February 18, 1993 

Page 2 

TO: Th• Honorable Congre&&man George Millar 

capabilities. A dangerous situation results, where 

"yellow-paga" salvora and fire-fighters ar• baing utili&ed in 

response planning . 

we have presented • imilar thoughts in a letter to the staff of 

Vice President Gore ; copy herewith attachad. 

We thank you tor your courtesies. If any addition~l information 

is required, please feel free to contact the undersigned . 

Very Truly Yours, 

~,;i~ 

Steven G. Newes 

Project Coordinator 

SGN/sgn 

at.tachment 

~003/ 006 

P. 03 
197 

0Z/18 / 93 11 , 49 ttzoz zzs 5609 GEORGE MILLER ••• JEFF 

FEB-18-93 THU 1 1 : 31 DOHJOH MAR !NE CO. , I NC. FAX NO. 908964 7 426 

DONJON MARINE Co .. INC. 

PHON£ 

(908) ... · 8812 

February lo, l553 

f 250 L18£RTY AVE. 

HILL.SIDE. N . J . 07205 

White House Office on Environmental .Policy Old Executive Office Building Room I 216 

Wa•hington , D,C, 20501 

ATTN: 

RE: 

Katie McGinty 

OPA'90 

Dear .Katie, 

~004/006 

P. 04 

FACSIMILE 

taoal •6'~?•2• 

TELltl< 

wu12-eas, 

We were given your nllJ!le by the Office of The Vice President . We 

want to express our concerns regarding the need for the government to place minimwn standards on salvage and firefighting contractors being named i.n oil operator respcnse flans being subllli tted in 

accordance with the Oil Pollution Act o 1590. 

Following the grounding of the •SJcxon Valdez", Congress passed the 

Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in an effort to curtail the pos•ibility 

of another such envirOMJental disaster. The U.S . Coa•t Guard has 

subsequently become the lead agency char11ed Iii th defining and 

implementing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 by issuing Navi11ation 

and ve,sel rn,pecti.on Circulars /NVICs) to oil operators. The•• 

NVIr::s have been expressive and detailed as to standards required to be met by spill r••ponse contractor& that must be retained by all 

oil carriers that operate throughout the United States. However, 

che detailed •tandards and criteria set tor spill response address 

only what occur• after the oil has left the ves••l and becomes a pollutant. No 11t•nd•rds Ji.ave been establi•hed for ••lvai,e and 

ti.ret111h.c1ng responders; the industry best capable ot protectini, cbe envi..ronment by keeping the oil in the veasel. 

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 clearly 1s intended to de•l with a ••ubatantjal threat of such " diacharge•. In NVIC B- 92, • 

substant.ial threat is described as •any incident involving a vessel 

which may create a 11i11nilic.nt risk o! discharge ot fuel or cargo oil. Such i.ncidence include but are not limited to ground~n11s, stranding•. colli•ione, hull damage, tire, explosion, lo•• ot propulsion, flooding, on deck •'f,ills or other •imilar occurrences.• Th• 111Andate tor a strong sa ·vage re11pon&e i• inherent in the 

language ot OPA'90. 

01'11'10 had aa a priJIIAry intent that 11•lvage and tireti.ghting be .an 

integral part ot any plan to protect the envi.ron111ent. In addition co the clear intent ot the law, it is •n uncontestable tact that a .,.ll directed salvage effort has done tar more to protect the 
198 

02/ 11/ 93 11 , 49 tt202 225 5109 GEORGE II LLER ...... JEFF 

FEB-18-93 THU II :32 DONJON MARINE CO., INC. FAX NO. 908984 7 426 

K.atie HcGinty 

February l6, lJJJ 

P.age 2 

llJ00S/ 001 

P. 05 

envirOlllllent chan c•n ever be accomplished by cleaning up atter a •pill. Never the less, the implementing NVICs h•ve .avoided the 

setting of any minimum •tand.1rds, requirement• or response cime for 

salvage and firefighting . 

The result of not setting sc.andards for s.a l vage and firefighting is now a• c1e.ar as the intent ot OPA'90 is to protect the environment. 

Operator• are selecting no cost itinerants, toreign s.alvors .,ith no domeatic assets, consul cants .and general contractors who can demonstrate no effective presence, no experience, and no assets in 

the areas that they are claiming to be able to protect . The only 

standard required by o1l operuors is that the people they identify 

in their contingency plans tor salvage and firefighting be fr•• of charge. 

our company, Donjon H.arine Co., Inc. has been in m.arine ,salvage and 

salvage related eervices tor over 30 years. our emergency response 

capability is well known by the U. S. coast Guard and U. S . Navy . We 

have been under contract to the u. S . Navy since 1J79 tor the 

provision ot salvage and salvage related services. 

With the passage ot OPA'JO , we recogni,ed the need tor establishing 

convni tted salvage and tiretight.ing capab1lity throughout the tl?li ted 

States. In an effort to accompli•h chi• we have been acquiring 

additional assets and enhancing our response capability around all U.S . coasts. However, companies like ourselves, who have gone to an expanded response level .in order to help satisfy the intent ot OPA'90, are being passed over in the operator's mandatory 

contingency plans in favor of the •no cost, no benefit• con tr.actors previ ously mentioned. 

Just a few words .a.bout the current st.ate ot affairs in the U.$ . salvage industry. The 'fa:ilurs of govsrnmsnt, th• marine .industry 

and the underwriting community co recognize the value of salvage as the leading tool in spill prevention has resulted in significant 

loss of salvage capability o~er the years. Today, we are the only 

salvage !,roup continuing to otter a significant salvage and· firefighting capability; We still maintain professional full time 

~ri•nced crews, vessels on standby illld a nationwide geog~aphic 

response. Our intention.s are not nece.ssarily self serving in 

asking th.at the e>bv.iou.s intent of OPA'!JO be implemented . · By 

raquiring clear standard• 'of th• salva!Je .industry in ·the 

enforcement of legislation, the m.arketplace will .then create competition and choice . We welcome the expansion of· the industry 

and would enjoy the competition and sharing among professionals. 

There would be no national oil spill response organisations like 

MPA or NRC without OPA'90 and the detailed regulations promulgat·ed 

by the U. S . Coast Guard . The escalation of local spill response by 

dozens ot contractors around our coasts and rivers would not have 
199 

__ o_z 1u 193 11 , 50 tt2oz 225 5609 

FEB-18-93 THU II : 33 DONJON MARINE CO. , !NC. 

Kati• HcGinty February l6, l993 

Page J 

GEORGE Ml LLER ••• JEFF 

FAX NO. 908964 7 426 

~006/ 006 

p, 06 

occurred but tor the legi•lative m.111date. one might •rgu• ch•C the 

r••ulc has been initial overkill but we believe chate the 

matrkecplace will evolve to create ,1 more 111,1cure, scabl• and 

stronger emergency response capability in the ne.ar future. 

It i• also import.ant: to point out that salvage And firefighting 

providers being named under OPA'90 .ar• using e,cpr••• disclaimers 

st.acing. •no representation or guarantee a• to rasponse cimes or adequacy of r••ources." re is difficult to comprehend how chis 

language could be acceptable to the U.S. legislacur• which enacced 

OPA'!IO . The curre11e mess.age is cle.ar. Enough money has been spent 

preparing for spill r••ponse . Gee ,1 salv.aga and firefighting 

contractor tor nothing. What is also unfortunate is chat many of 

those espousing the selection of no cost, no benefit salvage are former military officers now serving private indu•cry as consul can c•. 

We have attempted, without success. co convince Che Coast Guard co pl•c• even minimum 51Uidelines on salvage and firefighting response 

contractor• that are named in the oil operator's re•ponse plans, 

Although the Coasc Guard agree• chat all of the no cost, no benefit 

contractor• being named will be un.able to affectively re•pond, they 

do not seem to be willing to do anything further. 

We r•q,.i••t that you consider thi• problem and the con••quences associated with noe placing minimum response standards on •alvage and firefighting. Action in chi• m.accer is nece•sary in ordar to 

mitigate a potentially dis.aserous •ituaeion. You can imagine what 

public r•action will be when cha next oil ladened ship is fo 

distress off one of our coasts, response time becomes critical, and 

Che vessel operator's Coast Guard 11.pproved contingency plan's 

re•ponse is co call a salv.age company chat is no more than• name on a piece ot paper. 

Please give us• call on chis most .important issue. 

Si.ncerely, 

INC. 

JAW/dr 

cc: Nina Sankovitch, E•q. Fax 222-727-1773 
200 

Dr. Jonathan w. G. Wille 

Sundeide, BRESSAY 

Shetland, Scotland ZE29ER 

Tela,, 595 82 205 

February 4, 1993 

The Honorable George Miller 

Chairman 

Committee on Natural Resources 

United States Bouse of Representatives Washington, D. c. 20515 

Dear Hr. Chairman: 

Flls '' 595 82 344 

I respectfully request that the following statement be 

included in the record of your hearings today on the Shetland 

Islands tanker spill. 

Yours sincerely, 

......--7>1...~ t4~ 

Wil:ls) 

~. Chairman and Members of this Collllllittee: my fAlllily, friends 

and neighbors .are e• pecially grateful for the interest you have taken in .the sad events .we have been through in the past month. It is heartwarming to know that our concerns are shared 

by members of the US Legislature and it gives us hope that we 

can work together to prevent this ever happe'ning again. 

I am a writer and wildlife guide and have lived in the 

Shetland Islands for most of the past 30 years. I have 

reported on the oil and ehifping industries since 1972, when 

oil was first discovered of Shetland, and have been involved 

in several TV films about tankers, most recently "Slick 

Operators", aired in January 1990 by Channel 4 UK, which led 

the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company to embark on the illegal Wackenhut covert surveillance operation against my friend~ 

Charles Hamel of Alexandria, VA. 

I was the first reporter to file on the Braer story, at 7.15am 

on 5th January, and have been doing little else but write, 

broadcast and think about it ever since. I am writing a book 

1 
201 

about the wreck for an Edinburgh publisher and am currently in 

Washington doing research, The deliberations of your committee are an important source for me. 

I come from a Shetland family with strong maritime 

connections. My grandfather was a shipwright and my uncles 

were both merchant seamen. I hold a Boatman'• Licence from 

the UK Department of Transport and have over 20 years' experience handling small boats all around the Shetland coast. 

I am a former attending boatman at Britain's most northerly lighthouse, on the Muckle Flugga rocks, and at Noss Island 

National Nature Reserve. 

The wreck of the US-owned tankship Braer on the Shetland 

Islands, 5th January 1993, was not an "accident", It was a 

crime, Its effects have been drastic enough, but far less than 

anticipated when the islanders watched the tanker drifting helplessly onto the rocks on that dreadful morning, 

This was a very strange oilspill. The lightest crude oil ever 

involved in a 111ajor tanker wreck happened to meet the longest North Atlantic storm for a hundred years, In winds of up to 

100 miles an hour, a great deal of the oil became airborne, 

carried in the clouds of salt spray which commonly cover our 

islands to a height of 300 feet during winter gales, People, farm animals, houses, vehicles, cropland and pastures were 

drenched in crude oil. Fifteen square miles were seriously affected, The stench of the oil was noticeable up to 40 miles 

downwind of the wreck. 

The storm that drove the tanker ashore also removed the worst 

visual effects of the spill relatively quickly, Mother Nature 

cleared up the spill for us, this time. Next time we won't be 

so lucky, unless NASA or someone can figure out a way to send 

a 14 day hurricane to corral the spilled oil into a semicircular bay, churn it up with seawater into aomething like a 

toxic salad dressing, and then spread and dilute it with the 

tides - as a toxic cloud in the sea, rather than a slick on 

the sea, For that, as we have 1ust discovered in Shetland, is 

the only way to deal with an o~lspill of 84,500 tonnes (twice 

the "official" figure for the Exxon Valdez). 

Some rich fishing grounds have had to be closed, to eliminate 

the slightest risk of tainted fish beinCJ landed for sale. 

Boats are tied up with nowhere to fish. Several salmon farms 

have been affected by the invisible cloud of oil spreading under the water, Most of our fish farms have escaped but, like 

the fishing fleet, all now face ruin because of the damage done to the commercial reputation of island businesses, Our 

hitherto pristine environment is the basis of marketing strategies for our fish, shellfish, beef and lamb, 

2 
202 

I said the lo•• of the Braer was a crinie. So, Whodunnit? 

There are several prime suspect•• 

First the shipowner, who knowingly allowed his vessel to put 

to • ea for a midwinter voyage at 60 degrees north with no 

back-up generators or duplicated fuel supply, and with an 

anchoring system which he knew could not possibly be used in 

very heavy weather, should the vessel lose all power. 

Second suspect 11Ust be the Captain, who continued on hie 

course towards a channel notorious for its violent tides and 

wild seas (fully described in the pilot book for the area), 

knowing that even worse weather was imminent, and that he had 

a serious problem in hi• engine room, 

The Captain must also explain why he failed to sullllllon tug 

assistance when his steam boiler failed, why he did not 

i111111ediately declare a Mayday when he lost power and found his 

ship in grave and iffllllinent danger, and why he failed to leave 

a heavy towline hanging over the stern when he abandoned ship 44 minutes before the arrival of the tug which he had 

belatedly requested. 

The third suspect ie the marine insurance industry which for 

years has offered cover to vessels whose design 111ade them 

inherently unsafe, and which has failed to use its commercial 

power to promote better standards of ship design, construction, maintenance, crewing and seamanship. · 

The fourth suspect, I am sorry to say, is the British 

Government. The Government was warned, as long ago as 1979, 

of the danger from unwatched and uncontrolled tankers passing the Shetland Islands (and other parts of the British coast). 

After 11 years of pleading from Shetland Islands Council, the 

UK Government finally wrote to the International Maritime 

Organisation of the UN on 9th July 1990, asking the IMO's 

sanction for a purely advisory 10-mile exclusion zone for 

vessels of over 5,000 grt on the west and north coasts of the 

islands. In a 1110ve subsequently described as "active 

discouragement" of rogue tankers, the zone was marked on the 

charts for the first time. That was all. · 

That letter in July 1990 was written by a senior official of 

the UK Department of Transport, expressing the Government•• 

concern at the danger of a tanker disaster in Shetland and 

describing the exact circumstances of the Braer "accident", 

two and a half years before it happened. 

After this expression of concern the UK Government did nothing 

to improve shore-based surveillance of shipping around the 

coast of Shetland. When asked to commission new radars and a 

3 
203 

traffic control scheme, the Government replied that the amount 

of traffic around Shetland (some 1,000 large ships a year, plus about S00 tanker sailings from the Shetland oil port of 

Sullom Voe) did not justify such action. 

The Government did not follow the example of Shetland Islands 

Council, a local authority representing just 22,000 people, which in 1979 had pioneered a tanker safety scheme for the 

port of Sullom Voe, in partnership with BP, Exxon and other 

major shareholders in the terminal. Unlike the Council, the 

Government did not enforce no-go areas in the waters under its 

control, it did not use helicopters to spy on tankers, 

computerised radars to track them, nor tugs to escort them in 

confined channels. 

The Government preferred to let things slide. And they, as 

much as anyone, let the Braer slide into those rocks. 

The UK Government ' s inquiry into the cause of the Braer 

disaster has begun. It is being held in secret by the 

Department of Transport, which was responsible for the 

failures listed above. 

That is why many of us in Shetland hop• to see a full inquiry held in the United States. We know that in your country you do these things properly - in public. 

The situation with tankers around the global ocean is now so 

serious that we cannot wait for the results of inquiries, and 

the passing of new national and international laws, valuable as they may be. There is an urgent need for immediate, 

common-sense measure• which can reduce the chances of another 

disaster, not next year but next month. 

I suggest the following as urgent priorities: 

1 - ; • 

The technology has been available for several years now 

to link remote radar scanners by ordinary telephone lines 

to computer-controlled display screens. Targets such as 

large tankships can be acquired and tracked 

automatically, with the equipment programmed so that if a ship suddenly loses speed, stops or stray• out of lane, 

an alarm sounds. 

A Dutch company, INA of Rotterdam (a subsidiary of the 

Racal electronics corporation) i• one of several 

manufacturers offering this technology at moderate coat, 

The INA system i• operating at the Dutch port of 

Scheveningen, and at the general commercial port of 

Lerwick. A similar system has operated at Sullom Voe 

4 
204 

tanker harbour for the past 15 years. The entire 

coastline of France ia also covered by radar, a result of 

the Amoco Cadiz disaster in 1978. The British Government 

has left most of the Shetland coast as a massive radar 

blind spot. You have the same problem on most of the 

coastline of the US. Even with the US Coast Guard's 

admirable plans for Differential GPS linked to a new 

Vessel Traffic Service, radar will still be required. 

In my opinion, radar cover of d_angerous and 

environmentally sensitive coastlines is essential, 

particularly where shipping lanes pass throuvh confined 

channels such as the Fair Isle Channel and Binchinbrook 

Entrance, Alaska. Existing cover i • either absent or 

deficient on much of the coastlines at risk in Europe and 

North Alllerica, It can and must be improved, 

2 Inspection. 

Surveillance is little use on its own, We may just end up with a good radar picture of a tanker going aground, but 

be powerless to prevent it, So we have to be able to 

intercept, identify, advise and maybe even direct vessels 

when they are steering into trouble. 

A simple but expensive way to do this ia to send in the 

Navy to patrol • hipping lanes. "Sending a Gunboat" would 

make tanker skippers think twice before taking risks for 

commercial gain, And a Naval patrol, of course, has the 

radar on board already. 

The alternative, which is probably cheaper, is to spot- charter all-weather helicopters to check out and identify 

rogue ships. 

What I am suggesting here ia really an air traffic 

control system for tankers. If these ships had just been 

invented, no-one would think of sending them to sea 

without a traffic-control system (nor sailing a single- single-skinned, loaded tanker into the • ea ice of the 

Gulf of St Lawrence in January, which was the Braer·s 

intended course). 

3 Escorts. 

Experience in Alaska and Scotland etrongly suggests that 

large vessel• carrying dangerous cargoes should in 

certain weathers and tides be escorted by ocean-going 

ealvage tugs when passing within 12 miles of the coast 

and certainly when transiting confined channels studded 

with rocky islands. 

5 
205 

There are plenty of these tugs available for hire. They should be stationed at strategic points, so as to reach 

casualties within four hours - the time it took the Braer 

to drift 10 mile• on Sth January. 

Since Exxon Valdez there have been various proposals to 

improve tahker safety with double hulls, intermediate oil• 

tight decks, transponders, better maintenance and higher standards of crewing and seamanship, These are all worthwhile 

and desirable. But they will all take time. Time is what we 

do not have, after two months which have seen the Aegean Sea 

disaster off Spain, the Braer off Shetland, a serious fuel oil 

spill from an Estonian tanker in the Baltic, and the 

disastrous collision and fire in the Malacca Straits involving the tankship Maersk Navigator. In the two weeks after the 

wreck of the Braer, three other tankers were in serious 

difficulties around the Shetland coast, one of them within two 

miles of the wreck. 

The surveillance, inspection and escorting measures I have 

suggested can all be done now, without the need for new laws 

and international agreements. They will cost money but I am 

convinced that they can prevent the next Braer disaster, which 

is lying in wait tomorrow off Shetland, Cape Hatteras, the 

Florida ~eys and Alaska, among other lovely places. 

As my friend Dan Lawn from Alaska said when he saw what the 

wind and the sea had done to the Braer's oil, "I think Mother 

Nature sent us this as a warning. What • he' • saying to us is 

'Stop doing this to mel'" 

Mr. Chairman and Committee Members, please accept our special thank• for your work at this time and your efforts in the 

future to put an end to these senseless and totally avoidable 

"accidents". 

END 

70-544 (216) 

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ISBN 0-16-041252-8