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Present: All the Justices 

BOYD W. GARRETT, ADMINISTRATOR OF 

THE ESTATE OF JAMES HENRY BROWN 

v. Record No. 951833 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 June 7, 1996 

CHRISTINE T. MAJIED 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY 

William W. Sweeney, Judge 

 James Henry Brown died intestate on March 7, 1993. On 

August 20, 1993, Christine Trent Majied filed a bill of 

complaint against Boyd W. Garrett, administrator of Brown's 

estate (the Estate), alleging that she was Brown's daughter and 

seeking a two-thirds share of Brown's estate under the 

provisions of Code §§ 64.1-1 and -11. The Estate filed a 

response denying that Brown was Christine's father and that she 

was entitled to any portion of his estate. Christine filed a 

"motion for paternity testing" requesting that the circuit 

court issue an order directing the exhumation of Brown's body 

so that the GeneLex Corporation could obtain tissue samples to 

perform paternity analysis through DNA testing. The Estate 

opposed the motion. Following an ore tenus hearing and 

argument of counsel, the trial court entered an order granting 

Christine's disinterment motion. We awarded the Estate an 

appeal and will reverse the order of the trial court. 

 On appeal, the Estate asserts that the trial court erred 

in ordering the disinterment of Brown's body because the 

evidence was insufficient to support her contentions that Brown 
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was her putative father and that the samples she sought to 

obtain for genetic testing were reliable. Our disposition of 

the case, however, does not require us to reach these 

assignments of error. The record, briefs, and argument of 

counsel show that the parties and the court assumed that the 

trial court had jurisdiction to issue an exhumation order 

pursuant to Subsection B of Code § 32.1-286. Whether this 

subsection authorizes the trial court to order exhumation for 

the purpose of paternity analysis is a question of subject 

matter jurisdiction which can be raised sua sponte at any time. 

Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 170, 387 S.E.2d 753, 756 

(1990). 

 Examination of Code § 32.1-286 in its entirety shows that 

Subsection B cannot be read apart from the rest of the statute. 

 The statute provides the grounds and procedures for the 

issuing of an exhumation order under very specific 

circumstances.1 Subsection A authorizes exhumation only when 

 

 1 Code Section 32.1-286 provides: 

 A. In any case of death described in subsection A of § 

32.1-283, where the body is buried without investigation 

by a medical examiner as to the cause and manner of death 

or where sufficient cause develops for further 

investigation after a body is buried, the Chief Medical 

Examiner shall authorize such investigation and shall send 

a copy of the report to the appropriate attorney for the 

Commonwealth who shall communicate such report to a judge 

of the appropriate circuit court. Such judge may order 

that the body be exhumed and an autopsy performed thereon 

by the Chief Medical Examiner or by an Assistant Chief 

Medical Examiner. The pertinent facts disclosed by the 

autopsy shall be communicated to the judge who ordered it. 

 
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death was the result of one of the causes listed in Code 

§ 32.1-283, such as trauma, injury, or violence or where the 

death occurred under any suspicious, unnatural, or unusual 

manner. Furthermore, Subsection A restricts exhumation under 

this section to circumstances where the Chief Medical Examiner 

authorizes investigation of the death. Subsection B provides 

the procedural conditions for implementing Subsection A; it 

does not create blanket statutory authority to order exhumation 

regardless of the reason. 

 This construction is consistent with the legislative 

history of the statute. Prior to 1979, the substance of 

Subsection A was part of former Code § 32-31.19.2

 The relevant 

provisions did not indicate who could or should file a motion 

 B. Any party in interest may petition the judge of 

the circuit court exercising jurisdiction over the place 

of interment and, upon proper showing of sufficient cause, 

such judge may order the body exhumed. 

 2 Former Code § 32-31.19 provided in pertinent part: 

 If, in any case of sudden, violent or suspicious 

death, the body is buried without any inquiry by a medical 

examiner as to the cause and manner of death, or without 

any autopsy being held or performed, it shall be the duty 

of the medical examiner, upon being advised of such fact, 

to notify the attorney for the Commonwealth thereof, who 

shall communicate the same to the judge of the circuit 

court, and such judge may, by an order entered in the 

common-law order book of his court, require that the body 

be exhumed and an autopsy performed thereon by the Chief 

Medical Examiner or by a pathologist or toxicologist 

designated by him for the purpose, and the pertinent facts 

disclosed by the autopsy shall be communicated to the 

judge who ordered it, for such action thereon as he, or 

the court of which he is judge, deems proper. 
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for exhumation, whether the court where the death occurred or 

where the interment occurred had jurisdiction to order 

exhumation, or if notification of the absence of an autopsy 

alone was sufficient to support an exhumation order. 

 When the section was recodified in 1979, Acts 1979, ch. 

711, these issues were clarified by the addition of Subsection 

B. It identified the circuit court of the place of interment 

as the proper venue for implementing the exhumation authorized 

in Subsection A, conferred standing on any interested party to 

seek exhumation, and established a "proper showing of 

sufficient cause" as the standard of proof required to support 

the order of exhumation. 

 Based on the analysis set out above, we conclude that Code 

§ 32.1-286 does not authorize an exhumation order for the 

purpose of establishing paternity. Brown's death was not 

alleged to have resulted from any cause listed in Code § 32.1-

283, and no medical examiner authorized further investigation 

of the circumstances of Brown's death. Therefore, the trial 

court was without subject matter jurisdiction to enter an 

exhumation order based on Code § 32.1-286. No other ground was 

asserted as a basis for the trial court's jurisdiction. 

 Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the trial court 

and remand the case for further proceedings on the bill of 

complaint. 

Reversed and remanded.