alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2012287EN.01001801.xml

| 22.9.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 287/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.9.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 287/18

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 20 June 2012 — X; other party: Minister van Financiën

(Case C-302/12)

2012/C 287/32

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: X

Appellant:

Other party: Minister van Financiën

Other party:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Is the exercise of powers of taxation by two Member States, in particular the imposition of a registration tax on a motor vehicle, unlimited in circumstances in which a citizen of the European Union lives, according to national laws, in two Member States, and in which that citizen actually uses — in both Member States and on a permanent basis — a motor vehicle that belongs to her? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is the exercise of powers of taxation by two Member States, in particular the imposition of a registration tax on a motor vehicle, unlimited in circumstances in which a citizen of the European Union lives, according to national laws, in two Member States, and in which that citizen actually uses — in both Member States and on a permanent basis — a motor vehicle that belongs to her?

| 2. | If the first question is answered in the negative, can the principle of proportionality in the context of the imposition of a registration tax in a case such as this have a corrective effect, and, if so, does that principle then have the effect that one or both of the Member States is/are required to restrict the exercise of their powers of taxation, and how should any such restriction be manifested? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the first question is answered in the negative, can the principle of proportionality in the context of the imposition of a registration tax in a case such as this have a corrective effect, and, if so, does that principle then have the effect that one or both of the Member States is/are required to restrict the exercise of their powers of taxation, and how should any such restriction be manifested?

---
<PAGE>   1
                                                                 EXHIBIT 10.5.15

                     FIRST AMENDMENT TO INDUSTRIAL SUBLEASE
             TUCSON AIRPORT AUTHORITY AND AAS COMPLETE CONTROLS INC.



                  This First Amendment to Industrial Sublease is entered into
this first day of January, 2000, by and between Tucson Airport Authority, Inc.,
an Arizona nonprofit corporation ("Authority"), and AAS Compete Controls, Inc.,
an Arizona corporation ("Tenant").

                  A. Authority and Tenant previously entered into that certain
Industrial Sublease dated August 1, 1999 (the "Lease") with respect to certain
premises located at 7001 South Park Avenue on the Tucson International Airport.

                  B. The Lease was for an initial term of five (5) years, with
five (5) one-year extension options, at the discretion of the Authority.

                  C. Tenant and Authority are also parties to that certain
Industrial Sublease dated January 1, 2000, concerning premises within the hangar
complex known as Tucson Industrial Center, located at 850 East Teton Road, on
the Airport. Tenant would like to align the terms of these two leases.

                  NOW THEREFORE the parties hereby agree as follows:

1. The term of the Lease, which is set forth in Article II of the Lease, is
modified to be as follows: The "Initial Term" of the Lease shall extend from the
Effective Date as set forth in the Lease, through December 31, 2004. The term
shall be deemed to be automatically extended on each of the first five
anniversaries of January 1, 2000, for an additional one-year period, unless the
Authority, at least 90 days prior to such date, notifies Tenant that the
Authority does not elect to so extend the term. The intent is to automatically
extend the term of the Lease each year (unless otherwise elected by Authority)
so that a remaining term of approximately five (5) years is maintained for the
first five years of the Lease, with a possible maximum total term of ten years.

2. The first rent adjustment under Section 3.1 of the Lease will be as of
January 1, 2002 (rather than August 1, 2001), and rent adjustments thereafter,
as set forth in Section 3.1 and Exhibit C of the Lease, will take place on
January 1 of each year.

3. In the event that Tenant makes any improvements or modifications to the
Premises, Tenant shall promptly pay all suppliers and contractors and will not
cause or permit any lien to be filed against either the Premises or the Tenant's
interest in the Premises or this Lease. In the event that any such lien is
filed, Tenant will promptly cause such lien to be removed.


                                      -1-
<PAGE>   2

AUTHORITY:                               TENANT:

TUCSON AIRPORT AUTHORITY, INC.,          AAS COMPLETE CONTROLS INC., an
an Arizona nonprofit corporation         Arizona corporation



By:                                      By:
         -----------------------                  ----------------------
         Walter A. Burg                           Micah Chapman
Its:     President/CEO                   Its:     President




                                      -2-
## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 19

- 00188

- CR

IN RE REGINALD D. REECE

Original Mandamus Proceeding

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess2 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Reginald Reece has asked this Court to compel the trial court to grant relief in

the form of jail days served before Reece’s conviction. Reece argues he is entitled to credit for

time served when he was incarcerated on a Cass County conviction, while a hold was in place for

a charge against him in Bowie County. 1 Because we find Reece has received the relief he seeks,

we dismiss his petition as moot.

The standard for mandamus relief articulated by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

requires the relator to establish that (1) there is no adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged

harm and (2) only a ministerial act, not a discretionary or judicial decision, is being sought. State

ex. rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Texarkana , 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). Due to the nature of this remedy, it is Reece’ s burden to

properly request and show entitlement to mandamus relief. Barnes v. State , 832 S.W.2d 424, 426

(Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) ( “ Even a pro se applicant

for a writ of mandamus must show himself entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks. ” )

. In its Third Judgment N unc Pro Tunc
, the trial court credited Reece with 801 days of jail

time credits . Reece then filed this petition for writ of mandamus asserting that he is entitled to

an other year of jail

- time credits

. Subsequent to the filing of Reece ’ s petition, the tri al court entered

a Fourth Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc granting Reece credit for 1,170 days served toward his sentence

1 Reece was ultimately convicted in Bowie County for theft with prior convictions. See T EX

. P ENAL C OD E A NN

. § 31.03(E)(4)(d). He pled true to sentencing enhancement allegations and was sentenced to twenty years ’ confinement. See T EX

. P ENAL C OD E A NN

. § 12.425(b). This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. See Reece v. State , 47 4 S.W.3d 483 (Tex. App.

— Texa rkana 2015, no pet.).3 of twenty years. The trial court ’ s F ourth Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc reflects an increase of 369 days

jail

- time credits over the amount previously granted in its Third Judgment Nun c Pro Tunc

. Accordingly, the trial court granted Reece the relief he requests in his petition.

Reece having obtained the relief sought before this Court, we deny the petition as moot.

Ralph K. Burgess Justice

Date Submitted: October 10 , 2019 Date Decided: October 11 , 2019

Do Not Publish
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-09-00782-CR

Beatriz PEREZ,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2004-CR-7657

Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 6, 2010

AFFIRMED

In accordance with a plea-bargain agreement, Beatriz Perez pled nolo contendere to 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and was placed on deferred adjudication community 

supervision for a period of ten years. Three years later, the State filed a motion to revoke Perez’s 

community supervision and enter an adjudication of guilt, alleging that Perez had violated the 

terms of her community supervision by committing a new offense – murder. After Perez was 

found guilty of that murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment for that murder, the trial 
04-09-00782-CR

- 2 -

court held a revocation hearing with respect to this case. The trial court found that Perez had 

violated the terms of her community supervision by committing murder. The trial court then 

revoked her community supervision, found her guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon, and sentenced her to twenty years’ imprisonment. 

Perez timely filed a notice of appeal. Her court-appointed appellate attorney filed a brief 

in which she raises three arguable points of error, but nonetheless concludes that this appeal is 

frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State, 573 

S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel states that Perez was provided with a copy of the 

brief and motion to withdraw and was further informed of her right to review the record and file 

her own brief. See Bruns v. State, 924 S.W.2d 176, 177 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no 

pet.). Perez did not file a pro se brief. 

We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree that the appeal is frivolous 

and without merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Furthermore, we grant the motion 

to withdraw. See Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d 83, 85-86 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no 

pet.); Bruns, 924 S.W.2d at 177 n.1. 

No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of 

this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, she must either retain an attorney to file a 

petition for discretionary review or must file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any 

petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this 

opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing that is overruled by this court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with this court, after which it will be 

forwarded to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals along with the rest of the filings in this case. 
04-09-00782-CR

- 3 -

See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review must comply with the 

requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.

Karen Angelini, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH
No. 39123.

#### Petitions 5685-R, etc., of Bata Shoe Co., Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Cline, J.

It appeared that the merchandise was entered at the invoice prices and was appraised under the American selling price provision in section 402 (g). On the record presented it was found that the petitioner was without intention to defraud the revenue or to conceal or misrepresent the facts, or to deceive the appraiser as to the value of the merchandise. The petitions were therefore granted.
#### STATE ex rel. Cleonis SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 98-KH-2105.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 15, 1999.

IN RE: Smith, Cleonis; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs; Parish of DeSoto 11th Judicial District Court Div. “C” Number 76,298; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Number 31250-KW

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J. not on panel.
| (1)   | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the      Company. |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                        |   |                         |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|------------------------------|--------|
| August      19th,      2008 | By:    | /s/ Peter      Voss     |   |
|                        |   | Peter      Voss              |   |
|                        |   | Chief      Executive Officer |   |
|                        |   |                         |   |
AMENDMENT TO THE
                   SOFTBOOK PRESS, INC. 1996 STOCK PLAN

                            RECITALS

          A.   On January 11, 2000, Gemstar International Group
Limited ("Gemstar") acquired SoftBook Press, Inc., a California
corporation, pursuant to that certain Agreement and Plan of
Merger dated December 23, 1999 (the "Merger Agreement");

          B.   The Gemstar Board of Directors (the "Board"), at a
meeting on December 22, 1999, (1) approved the assumption by
Gemstar of the SoftBook Press, Inc. 1996 Stock Plan (the "Plan") and
all of the then outstanding options granted under the Plan, (2)
approved the conversion of awards outstanding under the Plan to
awards to acquire Gemstar common stock as contemplated by the
Merger Agreement, and (3) authorized the officers of Gemstar to
execute and deliver any and all documents necessary to carry out
the assumption of the Plan and the assumption and conversion of
all the outstanding options granted under the Plan;

          C.   Gemstar has or will deliver to the holders of
outstanding options granted under the Plan a notice reflecting
the assumption of such options by Gemstar and the conversion of
the number of shares of common stock subject thereto in
accordance with the Merger Agreement.

          D.   It is advisable to amend the Plan to reflect
Gemstar's assumption of the Plan.

                            AMENDMENT

          The Plan is hereby amended as follows:

          1.   The definition of "Company" set forth in the Plan
is amended to read as follows: "`Company' means Gemstar
International Group Limited, a Delaware corporation."

          2.   The number of shares of stock set forth in Section
3 of the Plan is amended to read "893,585," which number of
shares equals the number of shares subject to the Plan
immediately prior to its assumption by Gemstar (3,500,000), as
adjusted in accordance with the Merger Agreement to reflect the
conversion of the shares to shares of Gemstar Common Stock.

          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Gemstar has caused this Amendment
to be executed by the undersigned duly authorized officer.

                              GEMSTAR INTERNATIONAL GROUP
                              LIMITED,
                              a Delaware corporation


Dated:  February 25, 2000     By:  /s/ Stephen A. Weiswasser
                                   ------------------------------
                                   Stephen A. Weiswasser
                                   Executive Vice President
                                   and General Counsel
- Characteristics of H-1B Speciality Occupation Workers FY 2009
- Foreward
- Executive Summary
- Table of Contents
- I. Legislative Requirement
- II. Background
- III. Data Report
3.1 General distribution of petitions
3.2 Distribution of petitions by country of birth
3.3 Distribution by age
3.4 Distribution of petitions by education
3.5 Distribution of petitions by occupation
3.6 Distribution of petitions by annual compensation
3.7 Distribution of petitions by industry

- Appendix
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04

- 12

- 00801

- CV
IN RE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA Original Mandamus Proceeding 1
PER CURIAM Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: May 8, 2013
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED
On November 28, 2012 , R elator Boy Scouts of America filed a petition for writ of
mandamus

. After the cause was abated to the trial court, Relator filed an amended petition for writ of mandamus on February 5, 2013 asking , in part , that we issue a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate her January 30, 2013 order

. The court has considered R elator’s petition for writ of manda mus, the real party in interest’s response, and Relator’s reply and is of the opinion that R elator is not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the petition for writ of
mandamus is DENIED. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.8(a).
PER CURIAM

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2011

- CI

- 02919 , styled John Adams, an individual proceeding under a fictitious name v. Boy Scouts of America and Alamo Area Council Boy Scouts of America , pending in the 288 th Judicia l District Court , Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Solomon J. Casseb, III presiding. However, the order complained of was signed by the Honorable Laura Salinas, presiding judge of the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-20559

Summary Calendar

 

VICTOR LEE HALL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THERESA A. LEGG; E.D. MURDOCK,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 96-CV-3719

- - - - - - - - - -

July 29, 1999

Before KING, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM and EMILIO M. GARZA,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction on its

own motion if necessary. Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th

Cir. 1987). An examination of the record in this case discloses

that the notice of appeal is ineffective.

Victor Lee Hall, prisoner #624871, seeks to appeal the

district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. 

The final judgment was entered on April 23, 1998. On April 22,

1998, Hall filed a motion for new trial and amendment of
judgment. On June 19, 1998, after being granted an extension of

time in which to file his appeal, Hall filed his notice of

appeal. The district court has not ruled on the motion for new

trial and amendment of judgment.

Rule 4(a)(4), Fed. R. App. P., provides that, if a timely

motion is made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, a notice of appeal

filed after entry of the judgment, but before disposition of the

motion, is ineffective until the entry of the order disposing of

the motion. A motion for new trial is a Rule 59(b) motion and a

motion to alter or amend judgment is a Rule 59(e) motion. Hall’s

motion was filed within the 10-day limit for Rule 59 motions. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b), (e). 

As the Rule 59 motion has not yet been disposed of, the

petitioner’s notice of appeal is ineffective. See Burt v. Ware,

14 F.3d 256, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the case must

be remanded, and the record returned to the district court, for

consideration of the outstanding motion. 

REMANDED.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

EDWARD SEELEY,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 536 EAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 15th day of April, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
Before the First Division,

March 26, 1943

No. 48140.

#### Protest 807570-G of J. S. Staedtler, Inc. (New York).

*426Opinion by

Walker, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel and on the authority of *United States*v. *Favor*(24 C. C. P. A. 399, T. D. 48854) the protest was sustained.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT

NICHOLAS FERA, JR.,
Petitioner

v.

BALDWIN BOROUGH, A MUNICIPALITY, JOHN CONLEY, MEMBER OF COUNCIL, DAVID DEPRETIS, MEMBER OF COUNCIL, MICHAEL DUCKER, MEMBER OF COUNCIL, MICHAEL E. FETSKO, JR., MEMBER OF COUNCIL, JOHN FERRIS, JR., MEMBER OF COUNCIL, FRANCIS SCOTT, MEMBER OF COUNCIL, BALDWIN POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHRISTOPHER T. KELLY, AN INDIVIDUAL AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY OF CHIEF OF POLICE, RESPODENTS : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 103 WAL 2014

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 14th day of August, 2014, the Petition for All owance of Appeal is
DENIED

. The Petitioner's Application for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel is DENIED AS MOOT

.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           28,776
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           708
<OTHER-SE>                                    (29,484)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 5,500
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (5,500)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,500)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,500)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.008)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>