COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFF AIR S

CLEM EN T J. ZA BL OC KI, Wisconsin, Chairman

L. H. F OUNTAIN , No rth Carolina 

DANTE B. FA SC EL L, Florid a 

CH ARL ES C. DI GG S, J r., Michigan 

BE NJ AM IN S. RO SE NT HA L, New Y ork 

LEE H . HA MILTO N, In diana 

L ESTE R L. WO LFF, New York 

JO NA TH AN B. BING HA M, N ew York 

GUS YA TR ON , Pennsylvania 

CA RD ISS CO LL INS, Illinois 

STE PH EN J. SOLARZ, New York 

DO N BON KER , Washington 

G E R R Y E. ST UD DS , Massachusetts 

ANDY IR ELA N D , Florida 

DO NA LD J . PE AS E, Ohio 

DA N MICA, Florida 

MIC HA EL D. BA RN ES , Maryland 

WIL LIA M H . GR AY III, Pennsylvania 

TO NY P . HA LL , Ohio 

HOWA RD W OL PE, Michigan 

DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi 

FL OY D J. FI TH IA N , Ind iana

John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff

Sandra P. Reinhardt, Sta ff Assistant

Sarah Lisenby, Sta ff Assistant

WIL LIAM S. BRO OM FI EL D, Michigan 

ED WA RD J. DE RW IN SK I, Illinois 

PA UL FIN D LEY , Illinois 

JO HN H . BU CH AN AN , J r., Alabam a 

LARRY W INN , J r., K ansas 

BE NJAM IN A. GILMAN, New York 

TE NNYSO N GUYER, Ohio 

ROBERT J. LA GO MA RS INO , California 

WIL LIAM F. GO OD LING , Pen nsylvania 

JO EL P R IT C H A R D , Washington 

M IL LI CE NT FE NW IC K, New Jersey 

DA N QU AY LE , I ndian a

Subcommittee on Africa

STEPH EN J. SOLARZ, New Y ork, Chairman

CH ARL ES C. DI GG S, J r., Michigan WILLIAM F. GO OD LING , Pennsylvania

CA RD ISS CO LL INS, Illinois JO HN H. BU CH AN AN , J r., Alabama

WIL LIAM H . GR AY I II , Pennsylvania M IL LI CE NT FE NW ICK, N ew Jersey

HOWA RD W OL PE, Michigan

FL OY D J. FIT HIA N, Indiana

John nie C arson, Subcommittee S taff Director

Step hen D. N elson, Minority Staff Consultant

Steve Weissman, Subcommittee Staff Associate

David F rank, Subcommittee Staff Associate

Subcommittee on I nternational Organizations

DO N BO NKER , W ashington, Chairman

TO NY P . HA LL , Ohio ED WA RD J. DE RW IN SK I, Illinois

FL OY D J. F IT H IA N , Indian a DA N QU AY LE , I ndian a

DA VID R. B OW EN, Mississippi

Alan E . Van E gmond, Subcommittee Staff Director

Lawrence B . Sulc, Minority Sta ff Consultant

Carole A. Grunber q, Subcommittee Staff Associate

Fariborz S. F atemi, Subcommittee Staff Associate

(U )
C O N T E N T S

<

WITNESSES

Monday, July 23, 1979:

George M. Houser, executive director, American Committe e on P a j e

Africa_____________________________________________________ 3

Anne Lippert, professor, Ohio Northern University, Ada, Ohio_____ 18

I. William Zartman, professor, New York Un ive rsity--------------------- 26

Tuesday, July 24, 1979:

William Qua ndt, senior fellow, the Brookings In stitu tio n---------------- 77

Hon. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of Sta te for Near Eastern

and Sou th Asian Affairs_____________________________________ 92

AP PE ND IX ES

1. Sta tem ent sub mitted by Jeffrey Schulman, Ur bana College--------------- 117

2. Background pap er sub mitted by I. William Zartman, Professor, New

York U niv ers ity_____________________________________________ 130

3. Sta tem ent on the conflict in the Western Sah ara and U.S. policy, by

Rober t A. Mortimer, associate professor of political science, Hav erford, Pa____________________________________________________ 140

4. Questions sub mitted in w riting to the D epartme nt of S tate and responses

thereto _____________________________________________________ 153

5. Most recent and previous U.N . resolutions on the Western Sa hara----- 158

6. Most recent and previous OAU resolutions on the Western Sahara----- 189

(in)

*

U.S. POLICY AND THE CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN

SAHARA

MONDAY, JTTLY 23, 1979

H ou se of R epr ese n tativ es,

C om mitte e on F ore ig n Affa ir s,

Sub co mm itte es on Afr ic a and on

I nte rn at io na l Org an izat ions ,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met at 2 :30 p.m. in room 225 5, Rayburn House 

Office Building, Hon Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the Subcommittee 

on Africa) presiding.

Mr. Solarz. The hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa and the 

Subcommittee on Inte rnationa l Organizations is hereby called to order.

Today the two subcommittees will begin joint hearings on one of 

the most importa nt and perplexing issues confronting Africa. I might 

note parenthetically that this is an issue with respect to which relatively little attention has been paid in Congress, the importance of the 

issue notwithstanding. So it seems entirely appropriate at this time for 

our two subcommittees, which have jurisdictions over our foreign 

policy in tha t p art of the world, to begin the process of taking a much 

closer look at what is going on in the area with a view to tryin g to 

make some judgm ents about the relevance of developments there for 

American foreign policy.

The current military struggle in the western Sahara between the 

Polisario independence movement backed by Algeria, Libya, Morocco, 

and Mauritania poses the question of whether or not a people has 

achieved self-determination in accordance with prevailing international standards. It also presents a major th rea t to peace and political

. stability in Northern Africa and contains serious implications for U.S.

international diplomacy in the Middle East and Africa.

As the conflict has intensified in recent months, it has become an 

object of urgent diplomatic concern. Our French and Spanish allies

* have become increasingly active in efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. Last week the Organization of African Unity summit endorsed 

a plan for a cease-fire and an internationally supervised referendum to 

resolve the status of the western Sahara.

At a moment when the international community is considering 

various approaches to this serious problem, it is bo th appropriate and, 

I think, desirable that Congress reexamine U.S. policy toward the 

western Sahara and its relation to U.S. interests in Africa and the 

Middle East.

Let me say at the outset that I have not yet arrived at a personal 

position on this ma tter and I am approaching these hearings with an 

open mind. I believe that the same is true for other members of the

(1)
subcommittees. Having followed the issue as a member of the Africa 

Subcommittee I have been impressed by its complexity and the resulting need for caution and subtlety in policymaking. Yet I am also convinced that our policy at this critical juncture must be a clear and 

coherent one with a firm basis in both U.S. national interest and 

knowledge of local and international circumstances.

As par t of a further effort to inform myself and my colleagues about 

this urgent issue, I will travel to Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and 

Spain during the upcoming congressional recess to talk with government leaders and other informed observers of various political persuasions about the situation in that p art of a troubled world.

U.S. interests in the conflict go beyond questions of self-determination and international law. The Moroccan monarchy has been tra ­

ditionally friendly to the United States. It permits our 6th Fleet to 

call at its ports, has encouraged the Israeli-Egyptian peace proposal, 

quietly sent troops to help preserve Western interests in Zaire’s 

Shaba Province and has acted as a moderate force in various international forums.

On the other hand, Algeria, with its strongly nationalist leadership, 

has become a major supplier of oil and gas to the United States and 

a major market for U.S. exports. There is recent evidence that its 

human rights record is improving. While its general stance in African 

and Third World forums is one of militance, its international prominence and growing pragmatism have encouraged increased U.S. diplomatic attention.

War between Algeria and Morocco, which is a clear and present 

danger, could draw the United State s into a serious confrontation 

with the Soviet Union, which is Algeria’s primary military supplier. 

Finally, the emerging positions of our allies and the OAU must inevitably affect the way we define our interests in the western Sahara.

We are very glad to have our distinguished witnesses with us today 

and look forward to being enlightened by them. George Houser, who 

is accompanied by Richard Knight, represents the American Committee on Africa, one of the leading organizations concerned with 

African liberation. Both Mr. Houser and Mr. Knight have recently 

traveled in Polisario-controlled areas.

Prof. Anne Lippert, of Ohio Northern University, has been active in 

the Western Sahara Support Committee. She has written several 

articles on the conflict and has j ust returned from a visit to the area.

Prof. William Zartm an teaches politics at New York University. 

Professor Zartm an is an expert on both North African politics and 

international negotiations. He is the author of several books on these 

subjects and is associated with the 1980’s project of the Council on 

Foreign Relations.

Prof. Robert Mortimer, of the Departm ent of Political Science at 

Haverford University, who has written widely on North Africa, is 

unable to be with us toda y due to a change in the hearing schedule. 

However his statement will be included in the record.1

Let me suggest that we temporarily recess now because there is a 

vote in progress. When we return we will ask Mr. Houser, to begin. 

I know tha t each of you has p repared a lengthy statement, but in the 

interest of time I will ask each witness to confine his initial presentation to no more than 10 minutes. This will provide the committee 

with a maximum amount of time to engage in questions with you.

1

 See appendix 3, p. 140, for Professor Mortimer’s statement.
3

Your full statements will be inserted as written in the record. Each 

member of the committee will undoubtedly read them. So if you can 

prepare to summarize your testimony, when we return I think we will 

begin with Mr. Houser. The hearing will recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Mr. Solarz. The hearing is called to order. We will commence the 

formal testimony by asking Mr. Houser, representing the Am erican Committee on Africa, to begin. Mr. Houser, you have 10 minutes in 

which to give us the benefit of your wisdom.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE M. HOUSER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA

Mr. Houser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad for the opportunity of the 10 minutes, knowing tha t the full testimony is available 

and that there may be some questions.

I should say that I and my colleague, Richard Knight, are associated, as you have noted, with the American Committee on Africa, 

which has been working in the field of African-American relations for 

the last 26 years. We have had contact with virtually every movement 

on the African Continent covering that period of time. Our contact 

with the Polisario is perhaps the most recent of the movements that 

we have had some relationship with.

Both of us were exceedingly grateful for our recent trips there, 

Richard Knight being there during the last part of February and up 

to the middle of M arch and I was there during a good part of May.

Probably the best thing that I can do in the few moments that are 

available here is to make some comments on what I saw, because actual experience is more meaningful than simply theoretical knowledge.

I should say for myself that one of the reasons I was so anxious to 

visit the area was precisely to see on the ground what I had had discussions about and what I had read about. As anyone who has traveled 

knows, you always get a different view when you are on the spot.

Having said tha t, I would like to say, just by way of introduction, 

that the general position which the American Committee on Africa 

has taken on the western Sahara is th at the process of decolonization 

never really took place. It is no t necessary nor is there time to go into 

it but I just w ant to establish the position which we take.

We look upon the Polisario as the liberation movement struggling 

for the independence and the freedom of the Sahara people in the 

western Sahara, and at the present time, unfortunately, Morocco and 

Mauritania are occupying powers, and the trip artite agreement among 

Spain, Morocco, and Mau ritan ia was a most unfortunate mistake.

The liberation struggle will continue, there is no doubt in my mind, 

as long as the forces of Morocco and Mau ritan ia are there, and this 

is what m ust be taken into account in terms of U.S. policy.

Now regarding Polisario, as I mentioned, I have personally had 

contact over the last more than 25 years with liberation movements 

all over the African Continent. I can say, on the basis of what I saw 

in the several weeks I was there in May, that the Polisario ranks 

right up with the best of the movements. Th at is, the be st organized, 

the clearest in their approach and w hat they are trying to accomplish. 

They know where they are going and how they are getting there.
4

Let me back that up by just referring to two portions of my own 

experience. I spent approximately 1 week of the time visiting the 

refugee camps located near Tindouf, in the western reaches of Algeria, 

where there are 23 different camps. They are divided according to the ■

geographical arrangement within the western Sahara itself.

The three provinces of the western Sahara are called wilayas. The 

districts within the provinces are called dairas. So there are three 

wilayas divided into 23 district camps called dairas. 1

This, I think, is one indication of the organization because if you 

are talking with a person in, say, the daira of Tishlah in the wilaya of 

Dakla in the camp in Algeria, that person comes from the district of 

Tishlah in the southern part of western Sahara just north of the border 

with Mauritania. This organization applies in all the camps.

The camps are exceedingly well organized with five essential functional committees administered by the people themselves. T hat is, you 

do not find personnel from outside, not Algerians, and it is in Algeria, 

not U.N. personnel, not international technicians. There are assistants 

from outside, yes; administrative a utho rity from only Polisario. They 

run it themselves.

The people are divided into committees dealing with what makes up 

the needs of people in a community, because these are neighborhood 

communities.

The people of the western Sahara at the present time are in these 

camps in Algeria; they are not inside the home territory. They had to 

flee the territory because of the bombing attacks of the Moroccans 

and the Mauritanians when the occupation began at the end of 1975 

and early 1976.

The functional committees deal with health, education, the problems of distribution of food and clothing, the question of justice, keeping some form of legal procedure going, handicraft, making the tents, 

and so forth. The system of organization with these responsibilities 

divided among the people is very impressive. Schools, hospitals, all of 

the functions which make up community life and national life are 

located in these camps. When we talk about camps, we are talking 

about ten t communities which house the families in the desert.

The second part of my experience was in the western Sahara itself.

I spent a little more than a week traveling by land rover with our 

Polisario friends all the way from Algeria as far as the Atlantic—we 

couldn’t go any furth er—and then back again. Now, we went through 

the hea rt of the supposed Moroccan-occupied areas of the country.

The key area would be the phosphate deposit region near Bu Craa, 

south of El Aaiun, the capital. 

g

If there was to be any interference, if Morocco was really running 

the show, if they had the country under control, we should have been 

sitting ducks. We traveled sometimes at night, bu t more frequently 

we traveled during the day, when we would be highly visible. We saw 

some Moroccan planes from time to time high in the sky bu t there 

was no evidence a t all of any Moroccan troops.

During that period, I visited two of the towns which had recently 

been taken from Moroccan occupying forces—Tifariti and Amgala.

I saw something of the debris of b attle which had taken place. And 

incidentally I was taken to some of the downed planes—the American 

F-5, for example, which Morocco, despite the agreement with the 

United States, is using in the western Sahara—and I took photo-
graphs and Richard Knight has other photographs, pointing out very 

clearly that this is U.S. equipment being used, and this is something 

certainly which must be taken into acco unt. 1

I could obviously say a great deal more, but I have almost used up 

my time. I want to make one final point, Mr. Chairman, and th at is 

that the United States is in a very dangerous position, as you have 

pointed out. The official policy is neutrality, but when you have a war 

situation taking place and a government is helping one side in th at 

war, it cannot be interpreted as neutrality.

In spite of the fact that the 1960 agreement between the United 

States and Morocco is that U.S. equipment will no t be used in the 

western Sahara, it is being used. This is not a secret. It has been seen 

by a number who have visited there, including ourselves. It is also 

attested to even by a spokesman for the U.S. S tate Departm ent.

Consequently the United States is not really pursuing a policy of 

neutrality and, in my judgment, is backing up the Moroccans in an 

adventure which they cannot win.

You cannot say that Polisario is a nonindependent entity. Algeria 

has not created this conflict. They may be glad for it for some reason 

or another. Maybe somebody else is glad for it for one reason or 

another. That is not the point.

The point is that the people of the western Sahara want freedom 

and independence for their country. They are organized to get it with 

amazing clarity in their ideological approach and in their military and 

in their community organization in the camps on the one h and and on 

the inside of the western Sahara on the other.

I will not try to cite any more at this point; there isn’t time. But the 

military assistance which the United States is giving to Morocco is 

not helping to stabilize the area, but is continuing the destabilization 

process. Thank you.

1

 The photographs referred to are on file in committee office.
6

[Mr. Houser’s prepared stateme nt follows:]

P repared Sta teme nt of George M. H ouser, E xecut ive Director,

I wan t to th ank th e Su bc om mittee on A fr ic a f o r th e o p p o rt u n it y to 

ex p re ss o u r vi ew s on th e q u e sti o n o f W es te rn Sahara . The Am erican 

Co mm itte e on A fr ic a was foun de d in 1953 to su p p o rt In de pen den ce an d 

m a jo rit y ru le on th e c o n ti n e n t. We ha ve th u s ha d a uniq ue op portu n ity to obse rv e e v en ts in A fr ic a fo r mo re th a n a q u a rte r o f a 

c e n tu ry . The te st im ony I would lik e to p re s e n t to yo u to day i s 

bas ed upon my own p e rs o n a l e x p eri e n ce w it h th e P o lis a r io an d th a t 

o f my c o ll e ag u e R ic ha rd K nig ht. He v i s i t e d th e W es te rn Sa ha ra in 

March o f t h i s y e ar an d more re c e n tly I spent two we eks in May 

stu d y in g th e s itu a tio n in th e c o u n tr y f i r s t han d. We both v i s ite d 

th e re fu g e e camps in A lg e ri a whe re a la rg e num ber o f Sah ar aw l a re 

e x il e d an d a ls o tr a v e le d w it h th e P o lis a r io in s id e W es te rn S ahara .

We w it n ess ed a c tu a l com bat an d wer e a b le to obse rv e th e ra v a g es o f 

p re v io u s b a t t l e s . As f a r a s I know, 1 was th e f i r s t Am erican to 

tr a v e l w it h P o lis a rio fo rc e s a l l th e way to th e A tl a n ti c by Land Rov er . 

The W es te rn Sa ha ra

Loc at ed in nort hw est A fric a , W es te rn Sa har a i s about 11 0, 00 0 square 

m il e s in a re a , o r som ewhat la r g e r th a n th e s t a t e o f C olo ra do. In 

th e n o rt h i t is bord ere d by Morocco an d A lg e ri a an d in th e so uth 

by M a u ri ta n ia .

The p o p u la ti o n o f W es te rn Sah ar a has bee n d is p la c e d by th e wa r now 

in p ro g re ss fo r c o n tr o l o f th e t e r r i t o r y an d many now liv e as re fu g e e s 

in neig h b o ri n g A lg e ria . The a c tu a l s iz e o f th e p o p u la ti o n i s th e 

s u b je c t of some d is p u te . Spanis h o f f i c i a l s in 1974 e sti m ate d th e 

c o u n try 's t o t a l p o p u la ti o n to be about 75,0 00, a f ig u r e th a t is 

c e r ta in ly to o low. From my p a st e x p eri e n ce I know t h a t th e c o lo n ia l 

po wers ha ve o fte n u n d e r- e sti m a te d A fr ic a n p o p u la ti o n s . For ex am pl e, 

a f t e r in de pe nd en ce P o rt u g u ese e s ti m a te s o f th e p o p u la ti o n of

Mozambique pr ov ed to be about 2 ,0 00,0 00 low fo ll o w in g a v a c c in a ti o n 

ca m pa ign by WHO which bro ught th e e s ti m a te to over 1 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . The 

S p an is h , o f c o u rs e , a ls o excl uded from t h e ir fig u r e th o se who were 

a lr e a d y re fu g e e s fro m th e W es te rn S ahara . P o lis a r io e s ti m a te s th e 

t o t a l p o p u la ti o n to be a ppro xim ate ly 75 0,9 00.

R ic h phosp hat e d e p o s it s e x is t in th e Bu Cxaa re g io n o f W es te rn S ahara ,

J u s t 58 m il e s from th e c o a s t. Bec au se o f re p e a te d P o lis a r io a tta c k s 

p ro d u c ti o n has be en v i r t u a l l y n i l , a lt h o u g h s o p h is ti c a te d m in in g 

eq ui pm en t an d a co nvey or b e lt to th e c o a s t a re a lr e a d y in p la c e .

The se d e p o s it s a lo n e could p ro v id e th e b a s is fo r a n a ti o n a l econo my 

an d th e fo re ig n ex ch an ge so n e c e ssa ry to b rin g de ve lo pm en t to t h i s 

d e s e r t re g io n . M or eo ve r, in a d d it io n to p h o sp h ate s, th e r e a re

th o u g h t to be e x p lo it a b le d e p o s it s o f o i l an d s e v e ra l m in e ra ls •

In c lu d in g ir o n .

The E s s e n ti a l Is su e s

As re g a rd s P o lis a r io an d W es te rn S ahara , th re e e s s e n tia l p o in ts mu st 

be made:
* Si xtee n Afric an co un tr ies reco gn ize the P o li sa rio -

formed government o f the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic

and more than ten ot he rs re co gn ize P olisa rl o as the

le git im ate re pre se nta tive of the Saharawi pe op le.

Ne ith er the United Nations nor the Or gan ization of

Afric an Unity r ecognlz es the ann exa tion of Western

Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania.

* P olisa rl o i s a po pu lar ly sup ported, dem ocratic

movement which has cle a rly proved I ts ca pa ci ty to

organize the people of Western Sahara and to pro vide

them with a ll the se rv ic es exp ected of a nat io nal

government.

* P olisa rl o is on the off en si ve in the war in Western

Sahara and op erates in v ir tu a ll y th e en ti re te rrit o ry .

The In te rn at io na l Aspect

The is su e of Western Sahara is cle arly one of dec ol on iz at io n and the

ri ght of the Saharawi people to se lf-d et er m in ati on .

Morocco j u s t if ie s i t s occupation of Western Sahara with cla im s that

t ie s ex is te d between the su ltan s of Morocco and ce rt ain Saharan

tr ib es pr ior to Spanish colo niz ati on. However, th e In te rn at iona l

Court of Ju st ic e found in an advis ory op inion in 1975 "th at the

m ater ials and inform ation prese nte d to i t do not est a b li sh any t i e of

te r r it o r ia l so ve re ignt y between the te rrit ory of Western Sahara and the

Kingdom of Morocco."

Furth er, i t should be noted that a ba sic pri nci ple of de co lo ni za tio n

in Afric a is re sp ec t fo r colo n ia l borders , ir resp ecti ve of pr ecolo n ia l d iv is io n s. Ind eed, were th is not the ca se , most African

co un tr ies could claim pa rts of other Afric an co un tr ies on th e bas is

of pre -c olo nia l t ie s . Spain co loni ze d Western Sahara in 1884 and

i t s mandate was recognize d by the Congress of Ber lin (1884-1 885).

Thus there is no reason why th is pri nci ple shou ld not be ap plied in the

ca se of Western Sahara as w ell .

There is no ju s tif ic a tio n fo r the annex ation of Western Sahara by

Morocco and Mau ritania witho ut th e con sen t of th e Saharawi pe op le.

One poss ib le way fo r Spain to have dea lt with the te r r it o r ia l claims

of th e two co untr ie s would have been to spon sor a jie b is c ite . In stea d,

i t signed the tr ip a r ti te Madrid Agreement th at divide d the country

between Morocco and Mau ritan ia witho ut even co nsu ltin g th e people of

Western Sahara. By mid-1975 , i t was cl ea r to ob serv ers th at Morocco

would have lo s t such a p le b is c it e . A United Na tio ns Mission to the

are a in May 1975 dramatized th is fa c t. I quote : "At every plac e
v is i t e d , th e M is si on was me t by ma ss p o l i t i c a l d em o n str a ti o n s an d had 

nume rou s p r iv a te m eetings w it h re p r e s e n ta tiv e s o f ever y s e c ti o n of 

th e Sah ar an co mm unity. From a l l of th e s e , i t bec am e e v id e n t to th e 

M is si on th a t th e re was an ov erwhe lm ing co nse nsu s among th e Sah ar an s 

w it h in th e t e r r i t o r y in fa v o r of in dep en de nce an d opposi ng in te g r a tio n 

w it h an y n e ig h b o ri n g c o u n tr y ." The M is sio n , w hi ch c o n s is te d o f I r a n , 

Iv ory C oa st an d Cu ba, un an im ou sly con cl uded th a t w it h in th e t e r r i t o r y 

th e p o p u la ti o n was " c a te g o r ic a lly f o r in dep en den ce an d a g a in s t th e 

t e r r i t o r i a l cla im s o f Morocco an d M a u rit a n ia ." The M is si on a ls o fo un a 

th a t P o lis a r io was th e do minan t p o l i t i c a l fo r c e .

Yet i t was a f t e r th e re le a s e o f th e UN M is s io n 's re p o rt an d a f t e r 

th e fin d in g s o f th e In te r n a tio n a l Cou rt w er e made p u b li c th a t Morocco 

e n te re d in to i t s m ilita r y o ccu p a ti o n o f th e W es te rn S ahara .

The "G reen Ma rch " o f November 19 75 , whi ch Mo rocco d e s c rib e s as 

"p e a c e fu l" was l i t t l e more th a n an in te r n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l pr op ag an da 

plo y th a t was ba ck ed by th ousa nds o f Moro cca n tro o p s . With Fr an co 

on h is d e ath b ed , a p o l i t i c a l l y d iv id e d S pain si gned th e Madrid Ag ree me nt 

th a t d iv id e d W es te rn Sah ar a be tw ee n Morocco an d M a u rit a n ia .

Fol lo w in g th e e n tr a ic e c f th e Mo roccan and M au ri ta n ia n arm ie s in to 

W es te rn Sah ar a in l a t e 1975 an d e a r ly 19 76 , th ousa nds o f Sah ar aw i fle d 

to re fu g e e cam ps In A lg e ria . P erh aps th e r e a re a s many a s 10 0, 00 0 

Sa ha ra w i re fu g e e s , o r maybe only h a lf th a t nu mbe r. I t i s d i f f i c u l t 

to g e t an a c c u ra te c o u n t. But in a se n se i t d o e s n 't m a tt e r. Ther e a re 

te n s o f th ousa nds of Sa ha ra wi people who ha ve be en fo rc e d o u t of t h e i r 

homes in W es te rn Sah ar a by ombing a tta c k s an d th e o ccu p a ti o n fo rc e s 

of Mo rocco an d M a u rit a n ia .

P o li s a r io , which be ga n i t s m ilit a r y r e s is ta n c e to Span is h c o lo n ia li sm 

in 1 9 7 3 ,d ec la re d th e Madrid Ag ree me nt v o id . P o li s a r i has co n ti n u ed 

th e f ig h t fo r in ep en de nc e fo r i t s c o u n tr y .

The is s u e of W es te rn Sah ar a Is a s e n s itiv e on e fo r th e O rg a n iz ati o n 

of A fr ic a n U nit y beca use i t in v o lv e s s e v e ra l m em ber- st ate s an d th e 

c r u c ia l is s u e o f s e lf -d e te rm in a ti o n . Ho we ver, th e OAU p o s it io n ha s be en 

th a t th e r ig h t o f s e lf -d e te rm in a ti o n h as n o t bee n e x e rc is e d . Even 

M au ri ta n ia ta k e s t h i s vie w . On ly Morocco c la im s th a t s e lf -d e te rm in a ti o n 

has bee n e x e rc is e d .

The OAU s e t up a co m m itt ee to stu dy th e q u e sti o n o f W es te rn Sah ar a 

an d to re p o rt i t s fin d in g s a t th e OAU m ee ting in L ib e ria now in s e s s io n . 

No d e t a i l s were a v a ila b le a t th e tim e t h i s te st im ony was p re p a re d .

T her e has bee n some su g g e sti o n o f an in te r n a tio n a lly sp on so re d 

re fe re ndum . I do not know i f a t t h i s l a t e d a te t h is i s a w ork ab le

appro ach.
9

The M au ri ta n ia n p o s it io n was s ta te d in a l e t t e r d ate d May 23 , 1979 

to th e S e c re ta ry G en er al o f th e U nited N a ti o n s. The l e t t e r sa ys 

th a t "M au ri ta n ia i s pre p are d t o stu dy ways an d me ans o f a c h ie v in g 

s e lf -d e te rm in a ti o n in S ahara 1

' an d th a t "M au ri ta n ia re m ain s in fa v o r 

of th e d ia lo g u e w it h P o lls a r lo w it h a vie w to a c h ie v in g th e p r a c tic a l 

im ple m enta tion of th e p r in c ip le o f s e lf - d e te r m in a tio n ."

Follow in g th e coup in J u ly 197 8 in M a u rit a n ia , P o lis a r io u n i l a t e r a l l y 

d e c la re d a c e a s e - f ir e w it h re g a rd s to th a t c o u n tr y . S in ce th a t tim e 

th e re ha ve be en nu me rou s m eetings be tw ee n P o lis a r io an d M a u rit a n ia . 

However, M au ri ta n ia ha s n o t y e t en de d i t s m ilit a r y o c c u p a ti o n of 

W es te rn S ahara . As a r e s u l t , P o lis a r io has r e c e n tly an no un ce d th a t 

i t c o n sid e rs th e c e a s e - f ir e v o id , b u t re a ffir m e d i t s d e s ir e fo r a 

n e g o ti a te d s e tt le m e n t.

P o lis a r io has s p e c if i c a lly la id o u t a fo u r p o in t p la tf o rm w hi ch i t 

see s a s th e b a s is fo r a sett le m en t* They a r e : 1) The w ithdra w al 

o f a l l fo re ig n tr o u p s 2) Fo rm al re c o g n it io n by Morocco an d 

M au ri ta n ia of th e n a ti o n a l s o v e re ig n ty o f th e Sa ha ra w i people in 

th e f r o n tie r s of th e Sa ha ra w i Arab Dem oc ra tic R ep ubli c 3) Fo rm al 

an d s in c e re adher en ce of Mo rocco and M au ri ta n ia to th e p r in c ip le s 

of n o n -r eco u rs e to v io le n c e in th e s e tt le m e n t o f d iff e r e n c e s over 

f r o n tie r s w it h th e Sah ar aw i Ar ab D em oc ra tic R ep u b li c, an d th e p r in c ip le 

of fr ie n d s h ip an d good n e ig h b o rli n e s s 4) To b eg in im m ed ia te n e g o ti a ­

tio n s fo r n o rm a li z a ti o n o f r e la tio n s in w hi ch th e Sa ha ra w i Arab 

D em oc ra tic R ep u b li c, A lg e ria , Morocco an d M au ri ta n ia w ill ta k e p a r t .

The P o lis a r io

E s s e n tia lly , P o lis a r io i s a n a tio n a lis t mov ement w it h a s o c i a l i s t 

o r ie n ta tio n . A ls o , a s alm ost th e e n tir e p o p u la ti o n o f W es te rn Sah ar a 

i s Muslim , th e P o lis a r io gove rn m en t, th e Sah ar aw i Ar ab D em oc ra tic 

R ep u b li c, d e s c rib e s i t s e l f a s an "Is la m ic R e p u b li c ."

The N a ti o n a l Pr og ra m , is su e d by th e T hir d G ener al Con gr es s o f 

P o lis a r io in Aug ust 19 76 , s t a t e s t h e i r b a s ic p r in c ip le s a s fo ll o w s ’: 

"The s p e c if ic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of th e Sa ha ra w i peo p le a re th a t th ey 

a re Ara b, A fr ic a n an d Is la m ic , th a t th e y belo ng to th e T hir d W orld, 

th a t th e y a re op po se d to im p e ri a li sm , c o lo n ia li s m an d e x p lo ita tio n .'1

Under " I n te r n a l P o li c y " th e N a ti o n a l Pr og ram o f 1976 s t a t e s "Our 

d e c is io n s a r e : a ) to m a in ta in th e re p u b li c a n , d em o cra ti c sy stem 

w it h a u n if ie d pr og ra m ; b) to m o b il iz e th e m ass es, g iv in g f r e e 

r e in to t h e i r s p i r i t of i n i t i a t i v e so th a t th e y may f u ll y p la y 

t h e ir p a r t . 11

The econom ic p la n of P o lis a r io c o n s is ts o f f iv e p a r» j 1) A pl an ned 

n a ti o n a l econo my 2) c o n tr o l of th e n a tu r a l re s o u rc e s 3) a g r ic u ltu r a l 

de ve lo pm en t 4) i n d u s tr ia liz a tio n and 5) p r o te c tio n o f th e m ari ti m e 

re s o u rc e s . I t i s a pr og ram whi ch c a l l s fo r th e s h a rin g o f th e 

p r o f i t s from th e e x p lo ita tio n of th e n a tio n 's n a tu r a l re s o u rc e s and 

t h e ir use to pr om ot e lo n g te rm econ om ic devel opm en t. I t i s a prog ram
10

wh ich mi gh t be recommended to any Independent go vernment.

In t h is re ga rd I t Is im po rtan t to note th a t P o li sa r lo I s above a l l

pr agmatic In th e ir app roa ch and th ey ha ve c le a r ly ex pre ss ed to me

th e d e s ir e fo r good r e la tio n s w ith th e United S ta te s . I might poin t

ou t th a t th e U .S . has ver y ex te n siv e tr ade w it h A lg e ria , and a

sim il a r s it u a tio n co ul d w e ll de vel op w ith an ind ep en de nt We ster n

Sa ha ra.

P o li sa r lo ha s rec eiv ed m il it a r y aid from a number o f c o u n tr ie s in ­

clu d in g A lg eri a and Lib ya . Much o f th e m ate ria l th ey r e c e iv e from

th ese c o u n tr ie s o r ig in a te s in th e S ovie t Un ion , A lg e ria ’s major arms

su p p li er . P o li sa r lo a ls o ca ptu re s a la r g e amount o f i t s m il it a r y

equipm ent from Morocco.

I t would be a gre at m ista ke to vi ew P o lis a r lo as a puppet o f A lg e ria .

I t i s tr u e th a t w ith ou t A lg er ia n su pp or t P o li s a r lo would no t be in

such a st ro ng m il it a r y p o s it io n to day. P o li sa r lo i s a movement

in dig en ou s to Western Sa ha ra. I t was no t u n t il la t e 1975 th at

A lg eri a st a rte d to g iv e P o li s a r lo s ig n if ic a n t su pport . By th is

tim e P o lis a r lo 's p o li t ic a l p o s it io n and uncompromising st ance o f

ind ep en de nc e had lo ng been e sta b li sh e d among th e peo ple o f We ster n

Sa ha ra, as was documented by th e U.N. M ission in May o f 19 75 .

In th e camps in A lg eria , P o lis a r lo fu n cti o n s fo r a l l in te n ts and

pu rp os es lik e a nati on al governme nt. P o li sa r lo i s or ga ni ze d al on g

de m oc ra tic lin e s . Every Sah ara wi bel ongs to a c e l l of e le v e n . Th is

i s th e b asic u n it of th e movement from wh ich r ep re sen ta ti v e s are

e le c te d to th e po pu lar co mmitt ee s in ea ch o f th e d a lr a , or d i s t r i c t s ,

and from th er e to th e w il la y a or p ro v in cia l c o u n c il s . R epres enta ti ves

from th e vario u s w il la y a c o u n c il s c o n s tit u te th e Ge neral Con gr es s,

th e to p po licy -m ak in g body o f P o lis a r lo . The N ational Cou nc il of

P o lis a r lo , th e P o lit ic a l Bureau and th e E xe cu tive Committee are

ch os en by th e Cc.gr e s s .

An a d m in is tr a ti v e st ru ctu re fo r th e runn ing o f th e co nm uni tles or

refu gee camps p a r a ll e ls th e p o li t ic a l str u c tu r e . In ea ch camp

v ir t u a lly ev er yo ne i s a member o f on e o f th e f iv e fu n cti on al

co mm ittees - h ea lt h , educati on , h a n d ic ra ft s, d is tr ib u tio n and ju s t ic e -

around wh ich th e com mu nit y's l i f e i s org aniz ed . R epres enta ti ves

from th ese committ ees form an ad m in is tr a ti v e comm ittee resp o n sib le

fo r ea ch camp. From among th e members o f' th e r e fiv e co mmitt ees

r e p re sen ta ti v e s ar e ch os en to th e d is t r ic t and p ro v in c ia l co m m itte es .

The p o li t ic a l and ad m in is tr a ti v e str u c tu r e s form th e P o li sa r lo

govern ment — th at o f th e Sah arawi Arab De mo cra tic R ep ublic.

C onditio ns hav e g r ea tl y improved in th e re fu gee camps in th e la s t

co uple of yea rs. As was exp la in ed to Richard Kn igh t in a mee tin g

w ith Sa le k Bab ei th , th e M in is te r o f H ea lth, when th e ref ugee s it u a tio n

was cre ate d by Moro cco 's in vasi on in la t e 19 75 , th er e was no t any
11

str u c tu r e to p ro v id e fo r th e p e o p le . T his pro bl em was Im m ed ia te ly 

a tt a c k e d by P o ll s a r lo , an d was a m aj or em ph as is o f th e th ir d 

P o lls a r lo co n g re ss in 19 76 . Now th a t s tr u c tu r e e x i s t s . One ca n 

o n ly be ama zed a t th e e f f o r t s P o ll s a r lo I s mak ing to Im prove th e 

c o n d it io n s of th e Sa ha ra w i p e o p le , In e d u c a ti o n , h e a lth an d s o c ia l 

dev el opm en t.

In v i s i t i n g th e s e re fu g e e ca mps, 1 fo un d i t alm ost Im p o ssib le to 

th in k o f th e se peo p le as re fu g e e s . I ha ve v i s i t e d many re fu g e e camps 

in A fr ic a over many y e a rs b u t I ha ve never seen a gr ou p o f people 

who a re mo re s e l f - r e l i a n t o r b e tte r o rg an iz ed th a n a re th e se p e o p le . 

They a re dep en den t on f r ie n d ly c o u n tr ie s an d in te r n a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n s fo r fo od and c lo th in g to be s u re . Bu t th e y a r e in dependen t 

o f o u ts id e c o n tr o l an d th e y ha ve o rg aniz ed th em se lv es a cc o rd in g to 

t h e i r own way o f l i f e . The cam ps a re n o t a d m in is te re d by A lg e ri a n s, 

o r U nited N ati o n s p e rs o n n e l, o r by te c h n ic ia n s from an y o th e r 

co u n tr y in th e w o rl d . I ha d th e f e e lin g I was v i s i t i n g a n a ti o n 

in e x ile . T his I th in k i s th e im port an ce o f th e cam ps p o l i t i c a l l y .

Many o f th e h e a lth pro bl em s can be han dle d in th e ca mps. For ex am pl e, 

i f c h il d re n show s ig n s o f m a ln u tritio n th e y a re a ssig n e d to te n ts 

somewhat seg re g a te d fro m th e o th e r t e n t s , an d a re g iv en a s p e c ia l 

d i e t . U su all y in le s s th a n th re e mon ths th e se c h ild re n a re a b le to 

go bac k to th e r e g u la r camp.

In a d d it io n to a c l i n i c in each o f th e d a lr a s , th e re i s a N a ti o n a l 

H o sp it a l an d a s m a ll e r r e g io n a l h o s p ita l. Two h o s p ita ls a re n e c e ssa ry 

beca use o f th e la r g e a re a over w hi ch th e re fu g e e cam ps a re sp re ad .

The N a ti o n a l H o sp it a l w ill e v e n tu a ll y ha ve 400 b e d s, an d i s d iv id e d 

in s e c ti o n s su ch a s m a te rn it y , g e n e ra l an d in te n s iv e c a r e . The 

s m a ll e r r e g io n a l h o s p ita l h as ab o u t 60 b e d s. A n u rs e re m ain s in 

every room in whi ch th e r e i s a p a t i e n t . Some o f th e s t a f f has be en 

tra in e d in th e h o s p ita ls , o th e rs ha ve ha d many y e a rs o f e x p e rie n c e .

E ducation i s a n o th e r a re a in whi ch P o lls a r lo has be en im pr ovi ng th e 

liv e s of th e Sah ar aw i p e o p le . One ex am ple i s th e r e c e n tly op en ed 

N a ti o n a l S chool, fo r c h il d re n 7 -1 3 . T his i s a b o ard in g school an d 

when co m pl et ed w ill acc om mo date ab o u t 3,0 00 c h ild r e n . E ducation 

ta k e s p la c e in A ra bic an d S p an is h . The sc hool i s about h a lf f in is h e d .

A dult li t e r a c y has a ls o bee n a co nce rn o f P o ll s a r lo . T her e i s a 

s p e c ia l sc hool fo r a d u lt women, f o r ex am pl e. And w it h alm ost a l l 

th e men away a t th e w ar, women ru n th e re fu g e e camps. The pr og ram 

o f th e th ir d co n g re ss o f P o lls a r lo s a id " th e woman’ s e d u c a ti o n sh ould 

be em ph as iz ed " an d t h a t " i t sh ould be s tr e s s e d th a t th e re i s no 

in c o m p a ti b il it y i f a woman ta k e s up a p ro f e s s io n ."

I wo uld lik e to em ph as iz e th e amount o f o rg a n iz a ti o n ne ed ed to ru n 

th e camps. Almo st e v e ry th in g need s to be pro v id ed in c lu d in g c lo th e s 

an d fo od. P r o te in has bee n a s p e c ia l pro ble m . Ho wever, c o n d it io n s
12

a re much b e tte r now th a n two y e ars ago. A ls o, th e ma in o b s ta c le to 

Im pr ov in g th e c o n d it io n o f th e Sah ar aw i peo p le i s th e con ti n u ed 

o c cu p a ti o n of W es te rn Sah ar a by Mo rocco an d M a u rit a n ia . The U.S . 

sh ould p ro v id e a id to th e s e re fu g e e s , p re fe ra b ly th ro ugh in te r n a tio n a l 

o rg a n iz a ti o n s .

The M il it a ry S itu a ti o n

D uring my tr a v e ls in s id e W es te rn Sah ar a I was a b le to see fo r m yse lf 

th e e x te n t to which P o lis a r io fo rc e s f r e e ly o p e ra te . 1 sp en t a week 

in th e Sah ar a tr a v e lin g by Land Ro ver w it h P o lis a r io g u e r i l l a s , fro m 

A lg e ri a to th e A tla n tic . 1 su pp os e th e ro un d t r i p , ta k in g in to 

acco u n t our zig z ag g in g c o u rs e , cover ed 1200 to 1300 m il e s . The re 

a re no ro a d s . The re a re o n ly tra c k s in th e d e s e r t. But P o lis a r io 

know s th e d e s e r t . They ha d no comps s s an d no ra d io b u t th e y coul d 

fin d t h e i r way w it h ease to a w e ll , o r to a sm all tow n fro m which 

th e M oroccans ha d r e c e n tly be en d riv e n , o r to a wre ck ag e o f an F- 5 

U .S . j e t p la n e th a t ha d bee n downed in th e d e s e rt by P o li s a r io .

T ra v e li n g w it h P o lis a r io I wen t r i g h t up to th e ocean, sto p p in g by 

an ab an do ne d li g h th o u s e n e a r Cabo B oja dor. R etu rn in g , we p ass ed n o t 

f a r fro m th e c a p i ta l o f E l Aalun an d f a i r l y c lo se to th e phosp hat e 

c e n te r a t Bu C ra a.

One o f th e tow ns fro m which th e Moroc cans ha d r e c e n tly be en d ri v e n 

th a t I v is i t e d was c a lle d T i f a r i t i . I t s p o p u la ti o n may ha ve be en 

15,0 00 a t on e ti m e , X was to ld . P o li s a r io re c a p tu re d (o r lib e r a te d ) 

i t in Marc h, 19 79 , a mo nth an d a h a lf b e fo re I was th e r e . In f a c t , 

when R ic har d K nig ht was in W es tern Sa har a in Mar ch he ha d se en some 

o f th e b a t t l e fo r T i f a r i t i . A ll th e peo p le were go ne b eca u se, lik e 

mos t of th e Sa ha ra w i p e o p le , th ey wer e in th e re fu g e e camps in A lg e ri a 

On ly a few P o lis a r io g u e r illa s guar ded th e p la c e . The re was a la rg e 

gra veyard c lo s e by w it h mounds m ar kin g g ra v e s. Some wer e th o se o f 

Sa ha ra w i c i v i l i a n s , many o f them k il l e d by na pa lm a tta c k s in th e 

i n i t i a l M oroccan o c c u p a ti o n . O th ers were th o se o f Moro cca n an d 

P o lis a r io com bata nts .

J u s t two we eks b e fo re I a r r iv e d , P o lis a r io fo rc e s a g a in pr ov ed 

t h e i r s tre n g th by c a p tu rin g th e f o r t i f i e d town o f Am gala, n o t f a r 

fro m th e phosp hat e m in in g c e n te r o f Bu C ra a. I was a b le to in s p e c t 

th e nume rou s un de rg ro un d defe ndes c o n str u c te d by th e M oroccans an d 

o v e r- ru n by P o li s a r io . On th e r e tu r n t r i p fro m th e A tl a n ti c I w it ­

ness ed th e P o lis a r io s h e llin g th e M oroccan d e fe n se s su rr o u n d in g th e 

m aj or tow n of Se ma ra.

Not f a r fro m th e A tla n ti c c o a s t I was ta k e n to th e s i t e o f a downed 

American F -5 . The Moro ccan p i l o t , who I was to ld was a h ig h o f f i c i a l , 

ha d p ara ch u te d to s a f e ty an d was a p ris o n e r o f wa r o f th e P o li s a r io . 

T her e were c le a r an d unm is ta kable m ark in gs on th e s c a tte re d p a r ts of 

th e p la n e id e n tify in g i t a s A m er ic an . T h is i s evid ence b o ls te re d by
13

o th e r th in g s I saw as w e ll as by wha t was seen by R ic har d K ni ght th a t 

Ame rican m ilit a r y eq ui pm en t I s bein g use d by Morocco in th e W es te rn 

S ah ara , c o n tr a v e n in g wh at i s su pp os ed to be an u n d e rs ta n d in g be tw ee n 

th e U.S . an d Mo rocco by a m ilit a r y ag re em en t in 19 60 . Much o f t h is 

an d o th e r M oroccan eq ui pm en t h as bee n c ap tu re d by P o li s a r io .

R ic ha rd Kni gh t an d I saw c o n sid e ra b le q u a n titie s o f c ap tu re d ar m s,

In c lu d in g su ch it em s a s la n d ro v e rs mo unted w it h wh at I u n d ers ta n d 

a re 106mm m o rta rs . We ha ve a num ber o f photo gra phs o f th e s e . The 

m o rta rs, we u n d e rs ta n d , a rc made unde r U.S . lic e n s e In S pain .

D esp it e th e f a c t th a t th e M oroccans ha ve co m m itt ed a la r g e num ber of 

tr o o p s , th e y a re c le a r ly on th e d e fe n siv e an d r a r e ly go f a r fro m th e occu pie d 

tow ns and only th e n In la r g e nu m be rs. P o li s a r io keep s a c lo se w at ch 

on th e tow ns an d fo ll o w s th e Mo roc can mov em en ts. The M oroccans ha ve perh aps 

30 ,0 00 tr o o p s co mmitt ed to th e W es te rn S ah ara . Some e s ti m a te s a re

tw ic e th a t nu mbe r. S t i l l , a s I ha ve re p o rte d , th e M oroc cans a re

li m it e d to a few tow ns w hi ch ha ve In ess e n ce become g a rris o n s fo r th e 

m ilita r y .

M au ri ta n ia a lr e a d y has p u b li c ly s ta te d th a t I t wo uld l ik e to o p t o ut 

o f th e w ar . But M au rit a n ia n tr o o p s c o n ti n u e to oc cu py a num ber of 

tow ns In W es te rn S ahara . M au ri ta n ia h as I n te r n a l p o l i t i c a l pr ob le m s 

an d Mo rocco m a in ta in s a la r g e num ber o f tr o o p s on M au ri ta n ia n s o i l .

I t s t i l l re m ain s to be seen w heth er a s e p a ra te peac e can be ma de.

M or oc co 's re c e n t com pla in t to th e S e c u rit y C ounci l i s f u r th e r evid ence 

o f P o l i s a r i o 's m ilit a r y s tr e n g th an d M oro cco 's wea kn es s in W es te rn 

S ahara . As p a r t o f i t s re sp o n se to M oro cc o's in v a sio n o f W es te rn 

S ah ara , P o li s a r io has a tta c k s in s id e M oroc co . Thi s

in c lu d e s a num ber o f a tta c k s on Tan T n , Assa an d on m ilit a r y co nv oy s. 

Morocco bro ught a c om pla in t to th e S e c u rit y C ounci l as a r e s u l t of 

th e se a tta c k s . I t li m it e d i t s com pla in t to 's p e c if ic tim e an d s p e c if ic 

p la c e " an d la b ele d th e P o li s a r io fo rc e s "arm ed b rig a n d s ." However, 

t h i s was n o t accep te d in th e S e c u ri ty C ounci l an d Mo rocco dr op pe d 

i t s co m p la in t.

Suppor t in Mo rocco fo r th e war has d e c li n e d s ig n if ic a n tly . A cc or di ng 

to an a r t i c l e in th e May 10 F in a n c ia l Time s (Lo ndon) "Most Moro ccans 

s t i l l pa y l i p s e rv ic e to th e o f f i c i a l l i n e .. .B u t co m p la in ts about 

th e c o s t o f liv in g an d d e te r io r a tin g s o c ia l c o n d it io n s a re gr ow in g.

'L if e i s e x o rb it a n t beca use o f th e S a h a ra ' i s a r e f r a i n hear d every w here ."

The F in a n c ia l Time s a r t i c l e a ls o r e p o r ts a d e c lin e in army m ora l.

" S o ld ie rs r e tu r n in g fro m th e Sah ar a sp ea k o f a gr ow in g m a la is e about 

a p p a lli n g c o n d itio n s .. .The men com pl ai n ab o u t th e d i f f i c u t l y o f fig h tin g 

fa st- m o v in g P o lis a r io co lumns from fi x e d p o s itio n s , o f n o t bein g g iv en 

le a v e (m ost ha ve be en th e re fo r fo u r y e a rs) an d th e bor edom th ey f e e l 

in t h i s in h o s p it a b le t e r r a i n whe re th e re i s no e n te rt a in m e n t an d no 

d rin k ."

5 1 - 3 0 3 0 - 7 9 - 2
14

M oro cc o's o c cu p a ti o n o f W es te rn S ahara , in v io la tio n o f a ccep te d 

in te r n a tio n a l no rm s, has le d to th e d e s ta b iliz a tio n o f th e re g io n 

an d some o b s e rv e rs p re d ic t th a t Morocco may la unch a h o t p u rs u it 

r a id in to A lg e ri a th a t w ill spark a wa r bet w ee n th e two c o u n tr ie s .

I do n o t wan t to make an y p r e d ic ti o n s m y self , but X would lik e 

to sa y th a t I wo uld fin d su ch a tu rn o f e v e n ts t r a g i c . C e rta in ly 

i t is in th e b e s t I n te r e s t o f th e U nited S ta te s to do a l l in i t s 

pow er to p re v e n t i t fro m hap pen in g.

U .S . P o li c y

U .S . p o li c y on th e q u e sti o n of W es te rn Sah ar a has o f f i c i a l l y be en on e of 

" n e u tr a lity " . In f a c t, th e U.S . has c le a r ly " t i l t e d " towar d M oro cco.

I t a p p ears th a t th e U.S. i s mo vin g c lo s e r to Moroc co , as evid ence d by 

th e re c e n t f in a liz a tio n o f a num ber o f m ilit a r y s a le s . At th e same tim e 

i t i s my u n d ers ta n d in g th a t U.S . go ve rnmen t o f f i c i a l s do not ev en 

mee t w it h P o lis a r 'i o . The la c k of in fo rm a ti o n grow ing o u t o f t h i s 

no c o n ta c t p o li c y was r e f le c te d in a d is c u s s io n I had w it h U .S . re p ­

r e s e n ta tiv e s in A lg e ri a . The end r e s u lt o f U.S . p o li c y has be en to 

c o n tr ib u te to th e d e s ta b iliz a tio n of th e re g io n w hil e op po si ng th e 

le g itim a te s tr u g g le fo r s e lf -d e te rm in a ti o n .

The U .S . i s a m aj or arm s s u p p li e r to M oroc co . This in c lu d e s a s ig ­

n if i c a n t amoun t o f m ilita r y c r e d i t s . The S ta te Dep artm en t has s a id 

th a t th e se m ilita r y s a le s a re n ot r e la te d to W es te rn Sah ar a b u t fo r 

wha t th e y sa y a re th e " le g it im a te " d efe n se nee ds of Moro cco. Howe v e r, Mo rocco ta k e s a d if f e r e n t vie w , as was expre ss ed by Ahmed Reda 

G uedir a, c o u n se lo r to King H as sa n I I in th e J u ly 11 is su e of Je un e 

A fr iq u e . I q uote :

"Th e p o s itio n o f th e U nited S ta te s has evolv ed a g re a t 

d e a l beca use Ame rican o f f i c i a l s b e tte r und ers ta n d th e r e a l 

sense of th e pr ob lem of th e Sa ha ra in i t s c o n te x t. Thi s 

b e t t e r u n d ers ta n d in g has le d them to re vie w t h e i r p o s it io n 

a s much in te rm s o f p o li c y p r in c ip le s a s a t th e f a c tu a l 

le v e l. The b e s t pro o f o f t h i s is t h a t — in s p ite of g e n e ra l 

budgeta ry r e s t r i c t i o n s in th e U nited S ta te s —m ilita r y c r e d its 

to Mo roc co ha ve in c re a se d 50%, T his i s enorm ous in th e 

Ame ric an c o n te x t an d u n d e rli n e s th e e x c e p ti o n a l c h a r a c te r 

o f th e r e a l p o s it io n o f th e U nited S ta te s ." (T ra n sla te d 

fro m Fr en ch )
15

Ame rican arm s a re su p p li e d to Morocco un der th e te rm s of a 1960

b i l a t e r a l d efe n se agre em en t. The U nited S ta te s c o n ti n u e s to sta n d by 

i t s in te r p r e ta tio n of t h i s tr e a ty a s li m itin g th e use of U.S . s u p p li e d 

we apo ns to th e d efe n se o f Morocco i t s e l f , n o t in c lu d in g th e W es te rn 

Sahara . King H as sa n, ho wev er , re fu s e s to a c c e p t th e Ame ric an i n t e r ­

p r e ta tio n of th e 1960 ag re em en t and cla im s W es te rn Sahara i s an in te g r a l 

p a r t of M oro cco. The S ta te Dep ar tm en t o;:sn ly ac kn ow le dg es Morocco i s 

u sin g U.S. su p p li e d we apo ns in W es te rn S ahara .

In s p ite of obvio us v io la tio n s o f th e ag re em en t und er which th e se

we apo ns a re so ld to M oro cco, ho wev er, th e U nited S ta te s i s now c o n sid e rin g fu r th e r m ilita r y a id . The S ta te D ep ar tm en t has j u s t r e c e n tly 

ap pr ov ed th e s a le o f $2.4 m il lio n w orth of sp a re p a r ts fo r M or oc co 's 

F- 5 and C-130 a i r c r a f t . The S ta te Dep artm en t has a ls o j u s t a u th o ri z e d 

th e s a le of $ 3 .0 m il li o n rj cr ’’. o f F- 5 am m un itio n, in c lu d in g bombs and 

r o c k e ts . I t sh ould be obvio us to ev en th e c a s u a l o b serv er th a t th e 

only p o s s ib le ne ed fo r su ch q u a n titie s i s to re p le n is h m unit io ns 

ex pe nd ed i l l e g a l l y in th e W es te rn S a h a ra .

In a d d it io n to th e s e arm s th e U nited S ta te s i s a ls o c o n tr ib u ti n g to a 

s ig n if ic a n t improv em en t in M or oc co 's f ig h tin g c a p a c it y in W es te rn 

S ahara . Thre e weapo n sy st em s th a t ha ve be en ap pr ov ed fo r s a le to 

Morocco a re p a r tic u la r ly d is tu r b in g : s ix CH-47 (C hino ok ) h e lic o p te r s , 

a Forward Ar ea A le rti n g Ra da r Sy ste m (FAAR) an d an in te g ra te d e le c tr o n ic 

d e te c ti o n sy st em . None o f th e se sy st em s has an e s s e n tia l m is si o n in th e 

d e fe n se of M oroc co . A ll th r e e , ho wev er , ha ve c le a r an d im p o rt an t uses 

in M oro cc o's Sah ar an w ar .

To und ers ta n d why t h i s i s th e c a s e , i t i s im p o rt an t to remember M or oc co 's 

m ilita r y p o s itio n in th e W es te rn S ah ara . As I s a id e a r l i e r , th e fo rc e s 

o f P o lis a r io c o n tr o l mos t o f th e c o u n tr y . Mo roc can fo rc e s hold Is o la te d 

g a rris o n s , b u t cannot c o n tro l th e t e r r i t o r y in bet w ee n. Nor ca n th e y move 

w ell-a rm ed cara v a n s w it h o u t fe a r o f P o lis a r io a tta c k . Fo r th e tim e b e in g ' 

s u p e rio r Moro ccan f i r e pow er and c o n tr o l o f th e s k ie s —b o th du e m ain ly to 

Ame rican we ap on s— mean th a t th e m aj or g a rris o n s a re r e l a t i v e l y s a f e . T h e ir 

co n ti n u ed e x is te n c e i s be coming in c re a s in g ly p ro b le m a ti c a l, ho wev er , as 

th e re c e n t P o li s a r io v ic to r y a t T i f a r i t i an d Amgala s u g g e s ts . P o lis a r io 

a tta c k s ta k e a d a ily t o l l of Moro cca n men, m ora le an d m a te r ia l. I t i s 

f o r th e se re a so n s th a t Mo roc co so d e s p e ra te ly w an ts th e s e th re e Ame rican 

we apo ns sy st em s.

Mo st American s rem ember th e Chino ok h e lic o p te r , th e work h o rs e of th e 

Vietnam w ar . In Vietnam th e Ch inoo k pro ved i t s c a p a c it y a s a car go and 

tr o o p c a r r i e r . I t s a b i l i t y to move up wards o f 10 to n s o f s u p p li e s a t 

a tim e w ill o b v io u sly g r e a tly e ase th e pr ob le m Mo rocco now fa c e s in 

re su p p ly in g i t s g a rris o n s in th e W es te rn Sa har a an d h e lp to g e t ar ou nd 

th e P o l i s a r i o 's c o n tr o l o f gr ou nd mo veme nts . The Ch inoo k w ill a ls o make 

p o s s ib le th e ra p id movement o f tr o o p s b o th to r e lie v e p re sse d o u tp o s ts 

an d to dr op tr o o p s in to co mb at a s th e U nited S ta te s d id in V ie tn am .. Suc h 

In c re a se d m o b il it y an d e f f ic ie n c y in th e use o f manpower w i l l , o f c o u rs e ,
16

improv e th e amount o f e f f e c tiv e pow er Morocco ca n e x e rc is e w it h i t s 

e x is tin g arm ed fo rc e s .

I u n d e rs ta n d th a t th e Ch inoo k h e li c o p te r s a le i s now s e v e ra l y e a rs old 

an d th e c o n tr a c ts ha ve a lr e a d y be en s ig n e d . In l i g h t of th e m ilita r y 

s ig n if ic a n c e of t h is s a le to Morocco an d th e c le a r lik e li h o o d th a t 

Mo rocco w ill v io la te th e te rm s of th e s a le , I b e li e v e t h i s s a le sh ou ld 

be c a n c e ll e d .

As fo r th e FAAR ra d a r sy st em , J a n e 's Weapon Sy ste m—a re s p e c te d sourc e 

on m ilit a r y ha rd war e— d e s c rib e s i t s no rm al use as "a li g h tw e ig h t e a r ly 

w ar nin g a i r s u rv e il la n c e ra d a r" me ant to ad d e x tr a a i r d e fe n se p ro te c ti o n 

fo r im port ant ta r g e ts l ik e a i r f i e l d s , ta n k p ark s an d da ms . In t h i s mod e, 

FAAR m ig ht ha ve a r o le in th e n a ti o n a l a i r d efe n se ra d a r sy st em bein g 

b u i l t fo r Mo rocco by W es tinghou se , p a r tic u la r ly fo r use w it h

th e b a t t e r i e s of s u r f a c e - to - a ir m is s ile s now in th e Moro cca n in ­

v e n to ry .

But FAAR has an o th e r more s i n i s t e r u s e . J a n e ' s t e l l s u s , and I q u o te , 

"O th er a p p li c a ti o n s a ttr ib u te d to th e sy stem 360° d e te c ti o n o f f i r s t 

ro un d motor and ro c k e t f i r e an d use a s a t a c t i c a l a i r t r a f f i c c o n tr o l 

c e n te r ." (p . 572) Set up in a g a rris o n in th e W es tern S ahara , su ch a 

sy stem wo uld g re a tl y in c re a s e M oro cc o's c a p a c it y to re sp ond to P o l i s a r i o 's 

h i t and ru n g u e rrilla a tta c k s . I t wo uld g iv e th e Moroc cans th e a b i l i t y 

to p in p o in t th e so urc e of a tta c k s im m ed ia te ly an d a c c u ra te ly to d ir e c t 

re sp o n d in g F - 5 's .

The S ta te Dep artm en t d e n ie s th a t FAAR i s c ap ab le of t h i s se condary r o le 

a t t r ib u te d to i t by J a n e 's . I am not an arms e x p ert and can not v e r if y 

on e p o s itio n or th e o th e r.

The th ir d s a le has a lr e a d y prov ok ed c o n sid e ra b le debate and in f a c t was 

tu rn e d down on ce b e fo re re c e iv in g a u th o r iz a tio n . I' m r e f e r r in g to th e 

pr op os ed s a le by N orthru p Pa ge o f $200 m il li o n In te g ra te d In tr u s io n 

D e te c ti o n an d Co mm unica tio ns Sy stem , a s o -c a ll e d " e le c tr o n ic b a t t l e f i e l d " . 

E s s e n tia lly t h is i s a v e ry s o p h is tic a te d p a ssiv e m o n it o ri n g sy st em u sin g 

seis m ic an d in fr a r e d d e te c to r s to sp o t tr o o p and armor movem ents in 

re m ot e a r e a s . Such a sy st em was u sed , fo r ex am pl e, to m onitor tr o o p 

an d m a te ria l mov ements on th e Ho Ch i Min t r a i l . Why Morocco ne ed s su ch 

a s o p h is ti c a te d and expensiv e sy stem fo r th e d e fe n se of i t s b o rd e rs is 

hard to im ag in e.

As I un d ers ta n d i t , v e ry few of t h is sy ste m 's co mpo ne nts a re a c tu a lly on 

th e m u nit io ns c o n tr o l l i s t an d mos t a r e , in f a c t , a v a ila b le o ff th e s h e lf 

in Euro pe . I a ls o u n d e rs ta n d , ho wev er , th a t when f i r s t c o n sid e ri n g N or th ru p 

P a g e 's p ro p o sal to s e l l su ch a sy st em to Moroc co , th e Arms C o n tr o l and 

Disa rm am ent Agency f e l t th a t th e te c h n ic a l know-how th e Am erican fi rm 

was to su pply in s e tt in g up th e sy stem was more s ig n if ic a n t th a n th e 

co mpo ne nts th em se lv es. A ppare ntly t h i s f a c t fig u re d in th e i n i t i a l 

d e c is io n to tu rn down th e pr opose d s a l e , sin c e th e sy st em i t s e l f 

in p la c e in th e countr y an d th e componenrej re a d ily a v a ila b le in

E uro pe, Moracco co ul d e a s ily ex te nd i t in to W es te rn S a h ara . A ls o, 

re s p o n s ib le so u rc es ha ve to ld me th a t ev en a s pla nn ed some o f th e 

co m m un ic at io n d ev ic es w ill be lo c a te d in W es te rn S ahara . I t wo uld 

seem to me th a t lo g ic a lly th e co m mun ication d e v ic es sh ould go 

beh in d an d n o t in fro n t o f th e d e fe n siv e d e te c ti o n s c re e n .
17

Alth ou gh c la s s if ie d as p a ss iv e and d e fe n s iv e , i t seems c le a r th a t 

th e N orthr up Page sy st em has o ffe n s iv e p o te n tia l. A f te r a ll, i " i t 

i s p o s s ib le to p in p o in t th e enemy i t i s easy to c a l l in a i r s tr ik e s

> o r tc p re p a re fo r gr ou nd a tta c k . Sin ce M oro cc o's m ilit a r y eq uipm en t

an d manpower a re now s tr e tc h e d to t h e i r l i m i t , t h i s ad de d e ffic ie n c y 

in t h e ir d e p ld y m e n t. w il l c o n s titu te a r e a l in c re a s e in M or oc co 's 

wa r f ig h tin g c a p a c it y . I t ’*as fo r p r e c is e ly t h i s re a so n th a t 'h a Arms 

C ontr ol an d Di sar ma ment Agency o r ig i n a lly decid ed th a t th e N or th ru p

, Pa ge p ro p o sa l wo uld v io la te th e Am erican p o li c y o f n e u tr a lity in th e

W es tern Sahara . We s t i l l th in k i t d o es.

Suc h s a le s ca n only h u rt th e U nited S ta te s . In s o fa r a s th e is s u e of 

th e W es te rn Sah ar a s p e c if i c a lly i s concern ed, th e s a le c f Am erican 

am mun iti on an d we apo ns sy stem s to Morocco makes a mcc ke ry o f ou r 

ex pre ss ed p o s it io n o f n e u tr a lity in th e c o n f lic t and mu st be c o n str u e d 

a s de fa c to su p p o rt fo r M oro cc o's e x p a n s io n is t p o li c y . T heir use by 

Morocco makes th e U nited S ta te s p a rty tc th e s y ste m a ti c an d v io le n t 

su p p re ssio n of th e human r ig h t s c f th e people of V aste rn S ahara . At 

th e same ti m e , conti nued arm sa le 3 to M or oc co , d e s p ite our pro cla im ed 

p o s it io n of n e u t r a l i t y , ca n only f u r th e r ero de U.S . c r e d i b i l i t y both 

in A fr ic a and els ew here in th e w orl d. I t can a ls o o n ly damage 

Ame rican p re s tig e to c o n ti n u e w it h o u t p r o te s t to p ro vid e arms to a 

c ountr y whi ch open ly v io la te s th e te rm s o f th e su pply t r e a t y . Such 

an ex am ple w ill le a d o th e r c o u n tr ie s in s im il a r s itu a tio n s to ig n o re 

t h e i r tr e a ty o b lig a tio n s .

I wo uld lik e to concl ude w it h a b r ie f su mmation. The people of W es te rn 

Sah ar a ha ve be en d enie d t h e i r b a s ic r i g h t s o f in dep en den ce and s e l f - 

d e te rm in a ti o n g u ara n te ed under ir .t c -. -r a ti o n a l la w . P o li s a r io , th e 

p o l i t i c a l movem ent th a t has bee n f ig h tin g fo r in dependen ce, i s str o n g 

m i l i t a r i l y an d p o l i t i c a l l y among th e Sa ha ra w i p eo p le . The P o lis a r io - 

form ed go ve rnmen t has be en re co g n iz ed l-y 16 A .‘.l e a n s ta t e s and many 

more A fr ic a n s t a t e s re c o g n iz e P o l i r r r i o a s th _ re p re s e n ta tiv e o f th e 

Sa ha ra w i p e o p le . Ho we ver, Morocco has re fu s e d to re c o g n iz e th e l e g i t i ­

macy of P o lis a r io an d i t ' s go ve rn m en t.

The U.S . has sid ed w it h Moro cco, alt h o u g h c l a i ..ing to be n e u tr a l. T h is 

p o li c y i s d e tr im e n ta l to th e U.S. an d w ill n o t sa ve th e c u rre n t 

Mo roccan re gim e. In s p ite o f U.S . p o lic y , P o lis a r io has expre ss ed a 

d e s ir e fo r f r ie n d ly r e la tio n s w it h th e U.S.

The b e s t p a th fo r th e U .S . i s to sto p a l l arm s a le s to Morocco an d ta k e 

a l l p o s s ib le s te p s to en co ura ge Morocco to w ithdr aw an d to re c o g n iz e th e 

in de pe nd en ce o f W es te rn Sahara .

In a d d it io n , th e re a re two o th e r c o u rs es o f a c tio n open to th e U nited S ta te s . 

F i r s t , a prog ram desi gned to me et th e nee ds o f th e th ousa nds o f Sa ha ra wi 

re fu g e e s in th e camps in th e Tin douf re g io n o f A lg e ri a sh ou ld be in a u g u ra te d . 

Suc h a pr og ram could be c a r rie d out in c o o p e ra ti o n w it h UNHCR an d A lg e r ia 's 

Red C re sc en t o rg a n iz a ti o n . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f su ch a prog ram sh ou ld be explo re d 

w it h o u t d e la y .

•

Se co nd , th e U nited S ta te s sh ould ta k e some i n i t i a t i v e in h e lp in g to a rr a n g e fo r 

an in te r n a tio n a l con fe re n ce to s e t t l e th e w ar . T his wo uld be welcom ed by 

P o lis a r io , I was to ld . O bv io us ly Moroc co , M au ri ta n ia and P o lis a r io would be 

th e p r in c ip a l p a r tic ip a n ts . Such a c o n fe re n ce pro bably could b e s t be arr an g ed

a un der in te r n a tio n a l sp o n so rs h ip , pro bably th e U nited N a ti o n s. Per hap s

th e tim e has n e a rly a rriv e d when n e g o ti a ti o n s un de r in te r n a tio n a l a u sp ic e s 

ha ve a ch an ce of su c c e ss.
18

Mr. Solarz. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Houser. I am 

sure that during the question period we will want to explore many of 

the points you have made. I have one technical question now. Do I 

understand you to be saying that you have photographic evidence of 

the utilization of American military equipment in the Sahara?

Mr. Houser. That is correct.

Mr. Solarz. Could you make those photographs available to the 

committee?

Mr. Houser. Certainly; we will be happy to.

Mr. Solarz. For inclusion in the record.

Mr. Houser. Yes, indeed. We have some here.

Mr. Knight. I have a couple.

Mr. Solarz. Perhaps you can pass those around to the members of 

the committee while we continue with the testimony. If you get us 

copies it would be appreciated. Do you have any way of documenting 

that those pictures were, in fact, taken in the Sahara?

Mr. Houser. I have some movies, which I can’t show here bu t which 

I would be happy to show under the proper circumstances, in which 

you can take a look at the Atlantic, but the Atlantic is a pre tty big 

ocean. There is a Spanish ship that is shipwrecked. It is very difficult 

to document where you took a picture by the picture itself. How do you 

document it when you take it? If you p ut something in the sand someplace——

Mr. Solarz. You are not under oath, of course, but your testimony 

is th at you took those pictures in the Sahara?

Mr. Houser. Right; and I would be very glad to be under oath on 

tha t.

Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much.

Professor Lippert, do you want to give us your views? It is now 3:05 

p.m. We will give you until 3:15 p.m.

STATEMENT OF ANNE LIP PERT, PROFESSOR, OHIO NORTHERN 

UNIVER SITY , ADA, OHIO

Ms. Lippert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have visited the refugee 

camps of the Saharawis of western Sahara, in the area around Tindouf, 

Algeria, three times. I spent 2 weeks in the camps in 1977, 10 days in 

1978. This summer I traversed part of the Saharan Arab Democratic 

Republic, the former Spanish Sahara, during a 10-day period. Th at is 

the western Sahara.

I have submitted my testimony in writing. The points t ha t I believe 

are relevant to discussion are the following:

The first is that the reason for the conflict is the richness of the 

western Sahara, or the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. The 

Atlantic coastline of the SADR is over 1,000 kilometers long. This is 

one of the richest fishing fields in the world today. About 1,500,000 

tons of fish were harvested from this area during Spain’s protectorate 

yearly. Of this fish, Spanish boats took only about 270,000 tons. 

Fishing rights were extended to many nations, including the United 

States, the Soviet Union, Japan, South Korea, et cetera.

The phosphate resources of the SADR are the fourth richest in the 

world. The area around Fos Bou Craa is 80 percent phosphate. In an 

area nearby that I visited this summer and where I picked up phosphate from the ground, it was said to be 65 percent. Mining tests
19

undertaken in the 1960’s indicate tha t there are vast mineral resources 

in the SADR : Titanium, vanadium, zinc, uranium, copper, gold, 

natural gas, magnetite, iron, and petroleum.

Iron reserves are estimated at 70 million tons. The large petroleum 

discovery made by Esso geologists in 1969 around Tarfaya, in southern 

Morocco, indicated that the greatest part of tha t find of petroleum is 

located within the SADR. I also observed the remainder of one of 

the American geologists’ finds in an area where they were exploring 

along the coast.

The SADR has one of the largest underground freshwater lakes 

in the world. According to the Saharawis there was cultivation of 

com, wheat, and barley in the north central area of that country— 

that is, south of the Oued Draa and along Oued Ja t to the west. At 

Tifariti, in the SADR, I observed the well that was used to feed the 

gardens and saw remains of a garden area. I was told that it would 

be possible to raise sufficient food in the SADR—herds, fish, and land 

crops—to feed all of Morocco and Mauritania.

The vegetation that exists that I saw—acacia trees, ground covers, 

thorn trees, et cetera—as well as the fauna I observed—rabbits, 

desert foxes, gazelles, birds of all kinds—indicate that the desert of 

this region is supporting life and can continue to do so. The limited 

farming by the Spanish was due to their policy of importation—that 

is, providing a market for Spanish goods and food imports.

As you will note from this description, the SADR can support an 

appropriate population for its area with its present resources. This 

territory has been described by some analysts as the potential Kuwait 

of Northwest Africa. Certainly it can support the Saharawi population 

currently in exile or on the battlefield, a population estimated between 

350,000 and 750,000 persons.

One of the fears frequently expressed in meetings about the western 

Sahara region is that a new microstate would pose an irredentist 

thre at to surrounding states and would prove unstable or be bound to 

another state—usually the fear is expressed about Algeria—so that 

it would not be a truly independent state.

This microstate argument was used by the French Government to 

disapprove the formation of the SADR at a time when France was 

moving to implement independence for Djibouti, a country considerably smaller in size. What is an appropriate size for a natio n is frequently a ma tter of political expediency and interest of another 

established state.

The second point I would like to make is the one tha t Mr. Houser 

has already made on the political organization of the Saharawis. 

There are two individual points I would like to make in this testimony, 

however.

The first is that, in studying the political institutions of the Saharawis and in discussing with them their long-term goals, I have noted 

that the Saharawis are committed to their formalized goal of nonalinement. This position has not altered since I first spoke with 

Saharawi leaders in 1977.

In 1978 Bachir Mustapha Sayed, Adjunct Secretary General of the 

Polisario Front and member of the Revolutionary Council, the President of the National Council and two members of that council, 

including a member of the former Djemaa, the Saharawi governing 

group formed during the Spanish protectorate, discussed with me for
20

several hours, Saharawi political philosophy. The points made at 

that meeting included the following:

One: The Polisario Front is a national movement for independence.

Two: National goals are defined through the General Congresses, 

popular meetings, and political organization.

Three : The Saharawis would not like to see an escalation of the war 

which would increase foreign involvement on all sides and might force 

them from their nonalined stance.

In 1979 this goal and policy of nonalinement was once again emphasized to me in the te rritory of the SADR by members of the E xternal Affairs Committee and of the Ministry of the Interior. I was told 

th at the Polisario Front had been offered foreign troops by several 

nations but that they had refused this assistance because of their 

desire to remain nonalined, to liberate their territory themselves, and 

to be truly independent at the moment of national independence.

The second point I would like to make with regard to the political 

organization of the Saharawis is their organization into democratic 

institutions. Mr. Houser has described the organization of the camps.

What I would like to emphaize is the fact that all of the groups that 

are in or make up the political organization of the front are democratically elected groups. The heads of the women, studen ts, and workers 

groups are automatically members. The 18 other members are 

elected by the Popular Congress delegates at the National Assembly. 

Delegates to the Popular Congress are elected in local and regional 

meetings.

The Saharawi National Council, composed of the 21-member 

Political Bureau and 19 representatives of popular meetings at local 

levels, exercises ongoing legislative responsibility. It is clear to me 

that this organization stems actually from their traditional tribal 

organizations and confederations.

The third point I would like to make and which I think has to be 

remembered m any discussion of the appropriate United States stance 

is th at the Polisario Front and Saharawi people are not the aggressors 

in this war. I t must be remembered tha t Morocco invaded the western 

Sahara in late October 1975.

One of the liberated cities th at I visited this last trip was Edchera.

Th at city was invaded on October 31, 1975, which is prior to the great 

march of November 1, 1975, and prior to the Madrid accords of •

November 14,1975. In no way, then, is the Polisario Front or Saharawi 

people the aggressors in the war.

As you probably recall from th e studies you have done, Mauritania 

joined the war on December 10, 1975. *

The fourth point I would like to make is that international opinion 

recognizes the rights of the Saharawi people. The U.N. General Assembly since 1963 has been calling for the exercise of these rights of selfdetermination and in the last session in 1978 again requested this. The 

OAU, which the chairman has referred to, has asked for and not 

admitted that the Saharawi people have exercised their right of selfdetermination.

Mr. Solarz. If you will stop for a minute, without objection I would 

like to ask the staff to collect for inclusion in the record at the appropriate point the text of all relevant resolutions adopted on this ma tter 

by the U.N., OAU, or any other international organizations that have 

taken a position on the question, together with the votes that were 

conducted on each of them. Please continue.
21

Ms. Lippert. I will not take the time in these few minutes to 

discuss the opinion of the Internatio nal Court of Justice which came 

out clearly for self-determination of the Saharawis in 1975, or the 

illegal status of the Madrid Accords or the fact that the SADR is 

actually a state, because it currently complies with the internationally 

accepted definition of w hat is a state.

I will, instead, refer you to an article by Dr. Jeffrey Schulman, of 

Urbana College, “The Legal Issues of th e War in Western Saha ra,” 

which I am submitting for inclusion in the hearing report.

Bu t I feel that it is importa nt to add here that even Spain, the 

colonizing and administering party of the former Spanish Sahara, 

in the person of Aldolfo Suarez, the head of the Spanish Government, 

has stated publicly tha t, although having definitely ended its administration of the territory on February 26, 1976, Spain could not 

transfer sovereignty of the territory because it did n ot possess it and 

that Spain is for a just solution which would involve the self-determination of the Saharawi people.

The fifth point is s trength of the Polisario. Mr. Houser has referred 

to what he observed in the area of western Sahara. In the 10 days I 

spent in western Sahara the only evidence of Moroccan presence there 

th at I noted—and, as he, I was in that triangle between Bu Craa, 

El Aaiun, and Semara—in that particular area was that I observed 

occasional reconnaissance planes and one helicopter that was looking 

over the area.

In the 10 days we traveled daytime and nighttime, and I include 

in my testimony the fact at one point the land rover broke down 

and we sen t up flares in the evening about 30 or 40 kilometers from 

El Aaiun. We were reached by another land rover with Polisario.

I also have pictures. This time in taking my pictures I photographed 

in some of the pictures, two Spanish journalists whom our reporter 

interviewed in Spain and who have been reporting for a magazine. 

They could perhaps document t ha t I was there at tha t time.

The other evidence of streng th, I think, is in the camps. In the 3 

years I have visited the camps—I spent only a short time in the 

camps—there has been no change in the attitude of the people about 

their desire for self-determination, about their desire for retu rn of 

the territory.

The sixth point I would like to make is that I understand very well 

the obligation of the United States not to abandon its friends. Morocco 

certainly has evidenced friendship to the United States. At the same 

time, I think that it must be underscored that friendship is not 

abandoning the principles for which this country stands. The United 

State s was found on the idea of liberty, n ot only individual, b ut liberty 

of nations.

In this particular instance, I think, the legal issues are quite clear: 

The rights of those people to self-determination, their desire for 

independence. It would be unfortunate if the United S tates would so 

desire to help its friends that it would abandon its principles along 

this line.

The second point I would like to make in this regard is th at friendship is not necessarily the business of supplying arms to other nations. 

In other words, peace is no t always gained by simply sale of arms. It 

would seem to me that particularly since 1975—I have even picked 

up remains of bullets from machineguns that were made around
Dayton, Ohio; this was around a well at Amgala—since 1975 Morocco 

has not been observing the 1960 agreement, we should not continue 

to sell arms to Morocco for whatever use we think there might be in 

Morocco.

I would urge, then, the following: That the United States exercise 

extreme restraint in both arms sales and gra nts to Morocco and insist 

on the Moroccans’ compliance with the 1960 arms agreement or else 

cease all arms shipments. I also think one of the best aids we could 

give to Morocco at this time would be to assist Morocco diplomatically 

to extricate itself from this war, which, like our own experience in 

Vietnam, is causing economic and moral ruin of a friendly nation.

[Ms. L ippert’s prepared statemen t follows:!

P re pa red Sta te m en t of Ann e Lip pe r t, P rofe ss or, Ohio N or th er n

U niv ersi ty, Ada, Ohio

Mr. Chairman: I have visited the refugee camps of the Saharawis of Western 

Sahara (in th e area around Tindouf, Algeria) three times. I spent two weeks in the 

camps in 1977, ten days in 1978. This summ er I trav ersed pa rt of the Saharan 

Arab Democratic Republic (the former Spanish Sahara) during a ten day period.

The Sah aran Arab Democratic Republic is a terri tory about 110,000 square 

miles, approximate ly the size of Colorado, or about one half t he size of France and 

just slightly smaller than Ita ly. Spanish colonizers gave 75,000 persons as the 

population, bu t there are reasons to believe t hat t hat num ber is considerably less 

than t he actu al population. Reasons for the discrepancy include the following: 1) 

a largely nomadic population during the Spanish pro tec tor ate ; 2) Spanish efforts 

(aided by France and Morocco in the 1950’s) at repression of the Saharawis in the 

1950’s and 1960’s which caused a good m any of the Saharawis to flee to M aur itania, 

sou thern Morocco, Algeria and t he Canaries; 3) Spain’s desire to retain the territo iy (lack of a sufficient population is still being used tod ay as an argument for 

app roval of Morocco’s invasion of the territory). There are presently over 100,000 

Saharawis in the refugee camps nea r Tindouf, Algeria (persons who fled to th at 

area from the S.A.D .R. beginning in 1976) and the re are still Saharawis in cities 

in t he S.A.D.R . (those controlled by Morocco), in Morocco and Mauritania, and, 

of course, in the Polisario fighting force in the S.A.D.R.

The A tlantic coastline of the S.A.D .R. is over 1,000 kilometers long. T his is one 

of the richest fishing fields in the world today. About 1,500,000 tons of fish were 

harves ted from this area during Spain’s p rotectorate yearly. Of this fish Spanish 

boa ts took only abou t 270,000 tons. Fishing rights were extended to many nations 

inclu ding the U.S., the Soviet Union, Jap an, South Korea, etc. The pho sphate 

resources of the S.A.D.R. are the f ourth richest in the world. The a rea around Fos 

Bou Cra a is 80% phosphate. In an are a nearby th at I visited thi s summ er and 

where I picked up phosphate from the ground, it was said to be 65%. Mining tests 

undertaken in the 1960’s indicate th at the re are vast mineral resources in the 

S.A.D.R., titaniu m, vanadium, zinc, uranium, copper, gold, natural gas, mag netite, 

iron, and petroleum. Iron reserves are estimated at 70 million tons. The large 

petroleum discovery made by Esso geologists in 1969 aro und Tarfaya (southern 

Morocco) indicated th at the gre atest pa rt of th at find of petroleu m is loc ated 

within the S.A.D.R.

The S.A.D .R. has one of the largest underground fresh water lakes in the world. 

According to the Saharaw is, there was c ultivation of corn, wheat, and barley in the 

north cen tral area of that country, i.e., sou th of the Oued Draa and along Oued 

Ja t to the west. At Tifariti (S.A .D.R .) I obse ived t he well t ha t was used to feed 

the gard ens and saw remain s of a gard en area. I was told th at it would be possible 

to raise sufficient food in th e S.A.D.R . (herds, fish, and land crops) to feed all of 

Morocco and Mauritania. The veg etation th at exists th at I sawr—accacia trees, ground covers, tho rn trees, etc.— as well as the fauna I observed—rabbits, desert 

foxes, gazelles, birds of all kinds—indicate th at the desert of thi s region is sup ­

por ting life and can continue to do so. The limited farm ing by the Spanish was 

due to t heir policy of im portation, i.e., providing a m ark et for Spanish goods and 

food imports.

As you will n ote from this description, the S .A.D.R. can sup port an appro priate 

pop ulation for its area with its present resources. This ter ritory has been described 

by some ana lysts as the potential Kuwait of North-West Africa. Certainly it can 

sup port the Saharawi population currently in exile or on t he battlefield (a population estimated between 350,000 to 750,000 persons).
23

One of the fears frequently expressed in meetings abou t the Western Sahara 

region is that a new “microstate” would pose an irredentist threat to surrounding 

states, would prove unstable or be bound to another state (usually the fear is 

expressed about Algeria) so tha t it would not be a truly independent state. This 

microstate argument was used by the French government to disapprove the formation of the S.A.D.R. at a time when France was moving to implement independence 

for Djibouti, a country considerably smaller in size. What is an appropriate size 

for a nation is frequently a m atter of political expediency and interest of another 

established state.

In studying the political institutions of the Saharawis and in discussing with 

them their long-term goals. I have noted the following: that the Saharawis are 

committed to their formalized goal of non-alignment. This position has not altered 

since I first spoke with Saharawi leaders in 1977. In 1978 Bachir Mustapha Sayed, 

Adjunct Secretary General of the Polisario Front and member of the Revolutionary 

Council, the President of th e National Council and two members of that Council, 

including a member of the former Djemaa (Saharawi governing group formed 

during the Spanish protectorate), -discussed with me for several hours Saharawi 

political philosophy. The points made at tha t meeting included the following: 1) 

the Polisario Front is a national movement for independence, 2) national goals 

are defined through the General Congresses, popular meetings, and political 

organization, 3) the Saharawis would not like to see the war escalate which would 

increase foreign involvement on all sides and might force them from their nonaligned stance. In 1979 this goal/policy of non-alignment was once again emphasized to me in the territory of tne S.A.D.R. by members of the External Affairs 

Committee and of the Ministry of the Interior. I was told th at the Polisario Front 

had been offered foreign troops by several nations, but th at they had refused this 

assistance because of their desire to remain non-aligned, to liberate their territory 

themselves, to be tr uly independent at the moment of national independence.

In the weeks that I have spent in the refugee camps of the Saharawis and in 

the S.A.D.R. I have noted the absence of other nationals. This has been corroborated in discussions I have had with Red Cross officials and a number of journalists. 

The non-alignment policy of the Saharawis seems to resemble that of other African 

states like Nigeria and Tanzania. I have also noted the political organization of 

the Saharawis and their ap parent control and direction of the war as well as of the 

camps.

In a communique from the Fourth General Popular Congress of the Polisario 

Fron t held from September 25 to September 28, 1978 in the S.A.D.R., the following statements were published as p art of the outcomes of the meeting. The Saharawi delegates to that Congress asked tha t their neighboring states: 1) recognize 

the national sovereignty of their people over their territory and respect their 

legitimate rights to self-determination and independence; 2) recognize the territiorial integrity of the S.A.D.R. in conformity with the principle of historic 

frontiers inherited from the colonial period and which are internationally recognized ; 3) respect the principle of non-recourse to force in relations with them and 

non-interference in their internal affairs; 4) respect the principle of settling 

differences by peaceful methods. The Congress also reiterated the fact th at the 

Saharawis’ battle is one for national independence. It is not intended to provoke 

the fall of foreign regimes, but is directed against the imperialistic aggression and 

expansionist policies of those nations that have invaded the S.A.D.R.

I have noted, as I said before, in all three visits I have made that within the 

refugee camps of the Saharawis it is they who direct all the activities of their 

daily life. The Saharawi Red Crescent distributes food stuffs, medicines, and clothing supplied by Support Committees, humanitarian groups, and the Algerian 

Red Crescent to local communities. Each camp (about 23 in all, grouped in three 

wilayas) has five committees: Child Care, Justice and Social Affairs, Supplies, 

Health, Crafts and Culture. At one time local health and education committees 

directed all local activities. Now Health and Education are national ministries 

and are organized on a national level. Saharawis guarantee the security of the 

camps.

The Political Bureau of the Polisario Fron t is an elected group. The heads of 

the Women, Students, and Workers groups are automatically members. The 18 

other members are elected by the Popular Congress delegates at the National 

Assembly. Delegates to the Popular Congress are elected in local and regional 

meetings.

The Saharawi National Council, composed of the 21 member Political Bureau 

and 19 representatives of popular meetings at local levels exercises on-going 

legislative responsibility. The Popular Congress also selects the Executive Com-
24

mittee, the highest authority of the Saharawi Republic. Heading its Executive 

Committee is the Secretary General of th e Polisario Front, Mohamed Abdelaziz, 

who names cabinet officers with both internal and external responsibilities. (It 

has seemed to me that this democratic representative form of government is a 

modernization of traditional triba l organizations and confederations.)

Since the announcement of the formation of the S.A.D.R. on February 27, 

1976, there has been a gradual development of governmental structures, formulation of policies, and a systematized statem ent of goals enunciated in a Constitution 

(approved by the Third Popular Congress of 1978) and in policy statements 

emanating from each Congress and implemented in the succeeding year. As one 

example of these policies, education is considered to be a primary goal for the 

development of the S.A.D.R. by the Saharawis. Policy decisions have included 

the building of local and regional schools. Children above the age of 6 now receive 

academic training in boarding schools in the refugee camps. Students for higher 

education or specialized training are sent abroad. The need (formulated into a 

goal at the Popular Congresses) for an alphabetization program for women and 

the old has developed into local programs in the camps and a boarding school for 

women where they can pursue their studies uninterrup ted by the work of the 

camps. Another example of a policy th at has been implemented is the Saharawi 

concept of the equality of all persons, stated in the Constitution of the S.A.D.R. 

This policy has been translated into the literacy and military training programs 

for all persons. (Women at one of the Popular Congresses insisted on military 

training for able-bodied women.) I t is demonstrated by the participation of all in 

the work of the camps. I noted that the principle th at all work is good and equal 

was demonstrated by the soldiers as well. There seemed little deference to status. 

I saw field commanders and ministry officials making bread or tea in the field, 

helping to repair tires or fan belts. Respect is shown for th e leaders, but it is not 

demonstrated by perks or special treatment.

In my discussions with official representatives of the Polisario government 

about the future of the S.A.D.R. after independence, these persons have repeated 

that they would be interested in developing economic ties with the West once 

independence is won. They are aware of their resources and their need for technology to develop and exploit these resources. They are aware that the United 

States and certain other Western nations could be their partners in this development. They are eager for collaboration. The fact that they have not rejected the 

West is furthe r emphasized by the fact that schooling plans include Spanish to 

be taught as a second language to all school children.

As a political organization the Polisario Front dates from 1973 while Spain still 

administered the Spanish Sahara as a Protectorate. Resistance to colonization in 

the area dates from the 14th and 15th centuries. There was very active resistance 

in the 30’s, the 50’s, the 60’s and the 70’s, prior to Spain’s departure. Given this 

history and the seriousness of Polisario’s efforts to maintain political independence 

once national independence is arrived at, I find it very difficult to envision an 

S.A.D.R. directed as a satellite state of another nation. The very fabric of their 

political organization militates against such as eventuality, as the fledgling U.S. 

resisted becoming a French protege or pawn following our own independence.

It is true that some Soviet arms have been supplied to the Polisario Front by 

Algeria and Libya. (I have only seen the Russian banana guns myself.) Much of 

the equipment used by Polisario to wage its war, however, still comes from captured arms from Morocco. In the ten days I spent in the S.A.D.R., all the trucks 

or landrovers I saw or rode in were formerly Moroccan as the stenciled i.d. marks 

indicated.

The argument is proffered tha t since Polisario receives arms from other nations, 

the U.S. should become even more involved in arms sales and grants to Morocco. 

Morocco is currently supplied with arms by France and the U.S. T hat nation has 

received major increases in U.S. arms grants and sales since 1975. In my opinion, 

what the U.S. needs to remember in its will to assist a friendly nation, Morocco, 

is th at its friendship should not extend to approving immoral and illegal actions 

by its friends nor assisting them in these endeavors. It must be recalled tha t 

Morocco was the aggressor in this conflict. There would be no attacks on Tan Tan, 

Morocco, if Morocco had not, even prior to the Madrid Accords and the Green 

March, invaded the territory of the S.A.D.R. with armed Moroccan forces. As an 

example, Echederia (Jdeira if you choose Arabic spelling over Spanish) was taken 

by Moroccan forces on October 31, 1975. I t was liberated by the Polisario forces 

on June 5, 1979, after the entire city was leveled by the Moroccans. (I visited it 

on June 29, 1979. Only pa rt of one building remained in the rubble. Wells were 

poisoned and the area was mined.) The Polisario Front in its earlier attacks in
25

Mauritania (stopped since the cease-fire of 1978) and now in Morocco, is acting 

as th e Allies and the Soviets did against Germany and Japan in World War II, 

attem pting to dissuade an aggressor from its policy of aggression by attacking in 

their own territory.

• If the U.S. is truly committed to retaining its friendship with Morocco, and is 

interested in Hassan Il’s continued presence on the Moroccan throne, then our 

nation should be using every diplomatic device available to it, to assist Morocco 

to extricate itself from this war tha t is ruining th at nation. Newspaper reports 

claim that the war is costing Morocco $1 million a day. The late of inflation is 

quoted from 15 to 32%. Forty thousand Moroccan military personnel are presently in the S.A.D.R. (There are about 100,000-110,000 Moroccan military personnel in all.) The majority of these forces are confined to the cities they hold. 

Convoys travel between Bou C raa and el Aiun, but Smara and other cities can 

only be supplied by airlift. The Polisario claims it takes a force of 8,000 men to 

guard the convoy between Bou Craa and el Aiun.

In discussing U.S. involvement abroad, a great deal is made of U.S. national 

interest. As a citizen I am most certainly concerned about the national interest, 

and it is in this context that I say t ha t I firmly believe th at our national interest 

would be jeopardized by further involvement militarily by the U.S. in this Moroccan war. Since 1963 the United Nations General Assembly has passed resolutions 

stating that the Saharawis of th e former Spanish Sahara have the right to selfdetermination and tha t this right should be exercised, to the creation of an independent state if th e Saharawis should so decide. The last resolution was passed 

at the U.N. in 1978. To inhibit (oi to assist in inhibiting) the clearly legal right 

of a people to self-determination, would most certainly be contrary to U.S. national 

interest, given the fact that over 1/8 of the nations of the world (22 nations) 

recognize the S.A.D.R., given the fact that the Polisario Fron t is recognized as 

the political organization of th e Saharawis by the majority of O.A.U. members, 

given the fact that both the U.N. and the O.A.U. consider the Western Sahara 

a decolonization question.

I will not take the time in these few minutes to discuss the opinion of the 

Internationa l Court of Justice which came out clearly for self-determination of 

the Saharawis is in 1975, or the illegal status of the Madrid Accords, or the fact 

that th e S.A.D.R. is actually a state because it currently complies with the internationally accepted definition of what is a state. I will, instead, refer you to an 

article by Dr. Jeffrey Schulman of U rbana College on “The Legal Issues of the 

War in Western Sahara,” which I am submitting for inclusion in the Hearing 

Report. But I feel it is important to add here th at even Spain, th e colonizing and 

administering pa rty of the foimer Spanish Sahara, in the person of Aldolfo Suarez, 

the Head of the Spanish Government, has stated publicly tha t although having 

definitively ended its administration of the territo ry on February 26, 1976, Spain 

could not transfer sovereignty of the territory because it did not possess it, and 

th at Spain is for a just solution which would involve the self-determination of the 

Saharawi people.

An Ad Hoc Committee of the O.A.U. has studied the problem and it is on the 

agenda for the O.A.U. Heads of State meeting this month in Monrovia. It is 

important, it seems to me, tha t in policy decisions the U.S. be cognizant of the

• fact that no nation in the world (outside of Morocco) recognizes Moroccan sovereignty of this ten ito ry while 22 nations regard the S.A.D.R. as a sovereign state.

In the days tha t I travelled in the S.A.D.R. recently, in a region generally held 

to be controlled by Moroccan forces, I saw no Moroccans. In those ten days we 

covered between 2,500 and 3,000 kilometers. We travelled during the day and at

• night. Only in two areas was I aware of a Moroccan presence. In Echederia which 

is close to the southern Moroccan border I heard a reconnaissance plane. In an 

area about 30 kilometers from el Aiun I heard occasional reconnaissance planes 

and saw a flight of 3 U.S. F-5’s. I also heard a helicopter th at had a plane cover. 

(I was asked not to look up as my glasses glinted, and I can’t see without them.) 

In those miles I noted that Polisario forces have major bases throughout the 

Moroccan “ controlled” territory. I visited the liberated towns of Tifariti, Echederia, Haousa, Amgala, and Lemsig (sp?) on the Atlantic Coast. Our group, my 

husband and two Spanish journalists, stayed with Polisario units throughout the 

territory, drank tea and warmed ourselves at fires while reconnaissance planes 

were about, observed Polisario send up flares to signify our position when our 

landrover broke down about 40 kilometers from el Aiun. What all this indicated 

to me is th at Polisario’s claims to military success are true. One field commander 

told us tha t they would soon win th e war. That conviction after several years of 

war (6 for many combatants), Polisario’s knowledge of the terrain and its ability
26

to fight a guerrilla war, the Saharawis commitment to independence of their 

territory (soldiers in the field, people in the camps), indicate that Polisario will, 

indeed, win this war that was begun by Morocco and Mauritania.

I repeat the statem ent about Moroccan and Mauritanian responsibility for 

the instability in the region because it is essential that basic facts not be forgotten. 

The instability in North-West Africa stems from the greed of those two nations and 

those nations that have aided them in attempting to satisfy that greed, and not from 

the Polisario Front tha t has defended its people and its territory. Further escalation of the conflict will lead to even greater instability in the region. The present 

Mauritanian instability in government is a direct result of Mauritania’s efforts to 

subjugate part of the S.A.D.R. The same might well be true for Morocco if the 

conflict continues.

I have been told by the U.S. State Department in a number of letters that the 

official position of the U.S. in the conflict is one of neutrality. It is difficult to 

square this statement with the fact th at the U.S. ignored Moroccan violations of its 

1960 arms agreement with the U.S. from 1975 to 1978 and continues to do so 

(use of U.S. arms outside of Moroccan territory). It is difficult to square this with 

the dramatic increases in arms aid and sales by the U.S. to Morocco just prior 

to and just after the Green March of 1975. It is hard to square this with the testimony I received of a Moroccan pilot of an F-5 downed over the S.A.D.R. last 

summer, or when I pick up bullets dated 1976 from an American-made machine 

gun (Dayton, Ohio) around the well a t Amgala (S.A.D.R.) which was the last 

battle of the Moroccan troops at tha t site. I find this difficult to square with the 

F

- 5’s I saw in the S.A.D.R. flying above my head, or when I learn we are supplying replacement parts for those same F -5 ’s even though we know they will be used 

in the S.A.D.R. or when I photograph U.S. arms captured from the Moroccans.

In recent days President Carter has asked U.S. citizens to reaffirm their belief 

in their nation, in its traditional beliefs and goals. As I learned these goals as a 

child, as an adolescent, and as an adult who has lived and travelled in several 

nations (thus learning to appreciate my own country and our freedoms), I grew 

to believe th at the U.S. stands for a nation commited to democracy, to personal 

and national liberty, to equality, to life, and to the pursuit of happiness in justice— 

this, despite our imperfections. I cannot see how the rejection of these principles 

through support of an illegal aggression by another state, even a friendly state, 

serves our nation or our national interest. U.S. contribution to th e genocide of the 

Sahai awi people is unthinkable. Such hypocritical activity could only lead to the 

undoing of our own nation and the continued eroding of its place in the international community, particularly among the nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin 

America. I am not advocating t ha t the U.S. abandon its friends, but I am stating 

that support of friends can not be rooted in the sale of arms and support for an 

untenable position. Some newspapers report tha t there are U.S. technicians alleady at el Aium. We continue to provide U.S. military training for Moroccan 

personnel who will fight in this desert war. We continue to send arms to Morocco 

for this conflict, even while saying we cannot be certain th at they will use them for 

it. In light of this, and in light of the very just cause of the Saharawi people, I 

urge that the U.S. exercise extreme restraint in arms sales and grants to Morocco, 

insist on Moroccan compliance with the 1960 arms agreement or cease all arms 

shipments, and assist Morocco diplomatically to extricate itself from this war, 

which like our own experience in Viet Nam, is causing the economic and moral 

ruin of a friendly nation.

STATEMENT OF I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, PROFESSOR, NEW YORK 

UNIVERSITY

Mr. Zartman. I wou ld like to ta lk ab ou t four m at te rs reflected in 

my testi mon y and in some wa y going beyond it. You ha ve a copy of 

my writte n sta temen t. I also ask th at my pa pe r prep ared for the 

Counc il on Foreign Re lat ions b e included in the record.

M r. Solarz. W ith ou t objection.

Mr. Zartman. T he first rel ate s to conflicts, the seco nd to prin ciple, 

the th ird to inter est, and the fo ur th to solu tion .
21

First of all, I think in regard to conflicts, it is important to realize 

that we are dealing with a conflict of decolonization, and we are dealing with that conflict within the context of a larger conflict. It really 

is in ignorance of the situation to state that the basis of this conflict 

is the riches in the territory. This conflict is an historic conflict; it 

relates to the claims of the Moroccan kingdom over this area, a 

kingdom that has been a recognized state for a number of centuries 

and, as I will develop later on, had a certain amount of expecta tion 

of recovering its territory.

If there were the kind of possessions that are talked about in this 

desert in regard to richness, then they would have been developed 

by Algeria or by France before it, and the idea that the western 

Sahara can feed Morocco and Mauritania together is a kind of wild 

imagination.

Bu t this conflict is also found— and I think this is important— 

within the context of a larger conflict of a balance of power in the 

region between Morocco and Algeria. These are two growing states, 

young states, that are kind of elbowing their way as they develop, 

and developing a relationship between each other in which the Spanish 

Sahara, western Sahara, is simply an irritation between them as their 

relations work out.

It is true that the Polisario today has a life of its own. I t is certainly 

not true that that life is totally independent of Algeria or that Algeria 

has nothing to do with creating it. In fact, if Algeria stopped its support of the Polisario, it could not exist, it could not get the arms that 

Lib ya sends it, and it would have a tough time continuing its own 

military act ivit y which is undeniable.

What is important in the conflict then, I think, is the area balance 

between the two powers, not one side or the other, b ut the maintenance 

of a balance between the two states, not a matter of right, but the 

continuation of an equilibrium between two parties in which one side 

or the other’s winning is not in our interest, in which a balance is in 

our interest.

This conflict is much larger than the conflict of the Polisario itself. 

We have heard a lot so far about the Polisario, but not about the 

area, the context in which it fits.

Second of all, the principles. We have heard a lot about selfdetermination and that is certainly one of the principles involved. 

We have also heard that decolonization never took place. I think we 

ought to stop and recognize that if this has been noted as a principle 

today in Africa, we are opening up an entirely new extension of the 

notion of decolonization in which any liberation movement can come 

to the fore with outside support and sa y that an African state now is 

exercising colonization over a part of the territory that it claims to 

represent.

Another principle that is important to Africa as well is the principle 

of Balkanization which is not mentioned enough. Everybody is aware 

of the way that map looks. These are colonial boundaries we are talking about. There is nothing natural about them, and the perpetuation 

of the state in this area is not only an element of instability, but also 

is one of the worst examples of Balkanization, something that is 

important to African leaders and people who look at Africa.

I think in principle we also ought to pay some attention to Morocco’s 

notion of principles and its idea of returned territories. Morocco,
28

after its independence in 1956, or beginning with its independence in 

1956, received back a number of its territories that were recognized 

as part of its historic state, including the Internationa l Zone of 

Tangier, Ifni, and Tarfaya. There was no referendum at that time.

The self-determination was expressed by the people 10 years later, 

in 1969, in Ifni. There was no self-determination in the specific sense 

tha t is being talked about now. Therefore, it was quite reasonable for . 

Morocco to expect in 1975 tha t this same kind of process would continue, particularly since this represented the last of the claims that 

Morocco had over this territory.

In addition—and I won’t go through all the details of it as you 

know, there was the expression of the Saharan Jama , that if we look 

at its composition as a partially directly elected body was exactly 

the same kind of body th at expressed its wish for independence in a 

number of the other territories. If you compare the composition of the 

Jam a with the National Assembly of Somalia, which voted in 1960 to 

accept independence, it is really hard to make a distinction.

Saharans have elected their representatives to Ra bat and have 

elected their local councils within the territory in 1976, jus t like 

Mauritanians voted for the former President ould Daddah, and for 

representatives to the former Mau ritanian National Assembly in 

their territory. It is reasonable to expect to consider these as applications of principles of politcial participation and self-determination as 

well.

My point in this is that if the Polisario has a claim on certain principles, Morocco has a claim on certain principles as well. Again, it is 

not a question of simply principles being pushed aside.

The third element is the ma tter of interest. Th at is really what we 

as Americans have to be concerned about. Our interest is in stability 

in this area.

I would suggest for greater discussion afterward, if you will, tha t 

the Sahara is unlikely to be a stable state in the region.

It is interesting that Mr. Houser said the Polisario is the best 

organization, and he caught himself, and he said he means the bestorganized organization. I suggest th at is not in the American interest— 

best organization. U.S. interest is in avoiding a war; and we should 

make no doubt about it—there is going to be a war if this continues.

The Moroccan army cannot stand by and see itseT attacked within •* 

its own territory, not within the Sahara, 2 days ago at Foum elHassan in Moroccan territory, by people based in Algeria, and then 

simply respect these borders. The U.S. interest is in area balance and 

not one side or the other winning. U.S. interest is also in good rela- • 

tions with both sides and certainly there is an Algerian interest in 

the conflict.

The U.S. interest is in some su pport for Morocco as well. I th ink it 

is imp orta nt here to recognize th at Morocco and the United States 

have had common interests in Africa and continuing interests in the 

Middle East.

As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the Moroccans helped in the 

stabilizing operation in Shaba. They also helped in the earlier operation in the same country in the Congo. They have prepared the Sadat 

initiative at Camp David. Some people have suggested, how is it 

that they have denied their participation in this, ana I think we should 

recognize th at we might do the same thing.
29

Morocco has helped pull our chestnuts out of the fire in the Middle 

East and Africa. When it comes to their chestnuts, we have not even 

given them a glove; instead, we act as if we don’t want to let them 

help defend themselves.

I don’t quite see what is so sinister about Moroccans using American 

arms to defend itself in its own territory, or in a territory whose administration by Moroccans we recognize. We recognize the administrative presence of Morocco in this area.

U.S. interest is in developing stable states. It is important to recognize we are talking about two state s th at have been developing, institutionalizing, and proceeding in a rather exemplary way among the 

Third World countries. Algeria has made remarkable institutionalized 

transfer of powers in recent months.

Morocco for 25 years has kept a multiparty democracy going within 

the monarchy. It has had problems, as all state s have. If we look at 

countries where a free press exists to a large extent, where free trad e 

unions exist, where there has been a m ultiparty system, we see a rare 

country here in the Third World.

If Moroccans lose completely in this, the monarchy will fall and 

we will find ourselves in a situation where we have an unstable antiwestern military regime, something that is n ot at all in our interest, 

and this is our problem.

Let me terminate, finally, with the last element, and this is the 

question of solutions. I hope I have made at least the point that the 

solution here should neither be a ma tter of right bu t a ma tter of 

balance, not a m atter of sides but a ma tter of finding something th at 

fits into the relations of the area.

I think what is important here is American good offices for a neg otiated solution, modified status quo, in which Morocco ratifies the 1972 

treaty with Algeria and gives it a stable, secure boundary and gets 

Algeria’s agreement to a solution in which Algeria joins in a settlement 

before it loses Polisario to Libyan domination or Libyan influence, 

which is anoth er element to take into account and in which Polisario, 

for example, will get the Tiris, the Mau ritan ian province, in a federated relation which under the present treaty between Maurita nia 

and Morocco would allow it to share, to participa te in the mineral 

wealth in the northern part of the area.

Monrovia makes it now ripe for countries with good relations with 

the parties to help them out of this problem : bu t we can’t lose very 

many more opportunities of this kina. I thin k it is important for the 

United States, with France, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and other African 

countries, to work toward a solution along these lines.

Tha nk you.

[Mr. Zartman’s prepared statement follows:]

5 1 -3 0 3 0 - 7 9 3
P repared Statement of I. William Zartm an, P rofessor,

New York University

The co nfl ic t in the western Sahara is above al l a co nf lict in power 

re la tion s between Morocco and Alge ria, two imp ortant st ate s in the African, 

Mtdeast and Mediterranean regions and two st at es of st ra te gic , p o li ti c a l, 

and economic importance to the United st ate s. These st at es are now locked 

into po sit ions of to ta l co nf lict over the western Saharan iss ue and are 

moving toward a wa steful , poi nt le ss , for eseeable war th at win leave both 

pa rtie s weakened, wounded, and re se nt fu l whatever it s sp ec ifi c outcome.

They need help in avoiding thi3 catastr op he , a work of good of fice s th at is 

as important to the United States as its cu rren t eff ort s in Nicaraugua or 

Korea and almost as important as mediation in the Middle East. Solutions 

are avail ab le and, above a ll , time is sho rt bu t ripe .

Even i f one does not agree with th eir po sitio ns , i t is important to 

understand the ba sis of each par ty 's at titu de in order to come to a minimally 

acceptable re so lutio n. Morocco regards the western Sahara as the la st pa rt of 

its his to ri c kingdom to be recovered from co lonial ru le , ju st as the in te rn ation al zone of Tan gier, Tarfaya and If n i were reun ite d with the re st of the 

kingdom aft er 1956. Although a le gal case w ill not be argued here, i t does 

take a ra th er in tr ic ate and ag ile le ga l mind to draw a va lid d iyhinr.t.jnn 

between the decolonization of If n i and Tarfaya , on one hand, and Spanish 

Sahara, on the other. I t should be emphasized th at, important as they may 

be, the phosphate dep osi ts in the te rr it o ry are secondary in Moroccan eyes 

to its hi st or ic inc lusio n in the kingdom; i t should als o be emphasized th at
31

de sp ite the diffe re nc e co nclus ion s i t drew from the fa c t, the In te rn ati onal 

w Court of Ju st ic e c le arl y rec ogniz ed the ex istenc e of such le gal Lies between

the kingdom and the western Sahara. Furthermore, Morocco fe els th at i t pro vid ed 

the means of de co loniza tio n of the te rrit o ry by ne go tiat in g the passage of

* a n m n -i st.rat.-j ve auth ori ty from Spain in the T ri p a rt it e agreem ent of 1975.

I t also rega rds the req uirement of se lf-d et er m in at io n to have been met both 

by the vo tes of the Saharan jama 1

 in 1975 and 1976—a re pr es en ta tive body d ir ectl y 

el ec te d in p art and si m ilar to the assem blies which voted on de co loniza tio n in 

Somalia, Sudan, Libya or th e French Af ric an te r r ito rie s —and by the Sa ha rans 1

el ec ti on of lo cal ass em blies and nat io nal re pre se nta ti ves in the Morocean 

el ec ti ons of 1976 and 1977. Fin all y, Morocco fe els stron gl y on th is issu e 

because i t has given up si m ilar h is to ri c claims, no tabl y ag ai ns t Ma uritan ia 

and Alg er ia, in re co gn iti on of th e ir independent st atu s, and the Saharan 

reg ion is the la s t and ir re ducib le po rtio n of the cla im. The Moroccan 

p o li ti c a l system has been stro ng ly un ite d about the is su e, which was a 

major plank in the p a rti e s ' pla tfo rm s before i t was a ro ya l demand, leav ing 

l i t t l e leeway fo r re tr e a t.

M au rita ni a's posi tion ori g in all y de riv ed from form er Pr es iden t Mokhtar 

ould Daddah's vis io n of a gre at er Ma uritania , unitin g si m ilar peoples in a 

geograp hic all y compact sta te . P art ic ip at io n in the T ri p art it e agreement 

appeared to assure Ma uritan ia two major p o li ti c a l go als: re unif ic ati on of 

many des er t fanri 1 1«a form erly divide d by an a r tif ic ia l borde r (as ould Daddah 

put i t ) , and Morocco's support and re nu nc iatio n of any claims th re at en in g 

■■feuritania. The T ri p a rt it e agreem ent with Spain and 'Morocco tr an sf er re d 

au th ori ty over the Spanish Sahara to the two neigh boring sta te s, and the

, subseque nt agreement with Morocco of 1U & 16 Apr il 1976 es ta bl is he d a

p art it io n lin e between the two par ts of the te rrit o ry . In June 1976, ould ^aadah 

was overthrown in a m il ta ry coup; the m il it ary government of Col. ould

Saleck pursued the po ss ib ly co nt ra di ct or y goals of ending the war ag ains t
32

the in su rg en ts (in ord er to re liev e the co un try of i t s heavy burd ens) and 

•■rinn-ing the war (i n orde r to re st ore the arm y's pre st ig e). The Saharan g u err il la s 

fo r a yea r helped re so lv e the dilemma by susp ending op erations in Ma uritania , 

and the Mauritania n army l e f t the g u e rr il la s unh indered in the sou the rn

par t of th e western Sahara (T ir is al -G ha rb ia). The grad ual removal of the r

ould Saleck government, by a second m il it ary coup, in ear ly Apr il and ea rl y

June , has no t alt ere d the dual go als of Mauritan ia, and the government of

LtCols ould Louly and ould Haidalla hopes fo ra ne go tia te d se ttl em en t acce ptab le

to a ll p art ie s.

Al ge ria re pe ated ly st a te s th at i t has no cla im to the we stern Sah ara , a 

disc laim er made so of ten as to begin to sound susp ec t. A lg eri a's posi tion is 

based on i t s h is to ri c sympathy fo r nat io nal li b era ti o n movements and i t s so li d 

commitment to the princi ple of nat io nal se lf-d et er m in at io n. Although i t s in te re s t 

in the area is fa r more remote th at Morocco's and M au ritani a's, the pe rson al 

engagement of the la te Pr es id en t Boumediene beh ind these pri nci ple s and th e *-•- 

continued sup port of Pres iden t Benjedid in th e absen ce of compelling reason s -

to th e co nt ra ry have made the issu e one of such pu blic commitment in Alg er ia 

th at i t would be d if fic u lt to change po lic y ra pid ly . But Alg er ia has i t s own 

in te rests too. Alge ria n^discussio n of the is su e is freq ue nt ly in terms of 

"the balan ce in the are a," and th ey see the Moroccan ann exa tion of part of the 

Sah ara, wi th i t s phosphates as w el l, as a th re at to Algerian predominance in 

the region and the ba si s of a dange rou sly stro ng Moroccan government. I f 

th er e has been l i t t l e Moroccan de si re in the pa st to show any f le x ib ili ty 

because of atta chm ent to the te rrito ry a t st ak e, th er e has been no more Algerian 

will in gn es s to be fl exib le because of the is su e 's la rg er co ntex t. Thus, when 

a fte r 3oum ediene's death, i'orocco ra is ed the matter of the planned meeting 

between him and King Hassan in Bru xe lle s, the Algerian response was to deny 

th at such a meeting had been planned, sin ce the p art ie s were so fa r ap ar t on

Sa da t's in it ia tiv e in the Middle East.' However, Al ge ria als o has an in te re st in •

ob tain in g re co gn ition of i t s Moroccan bo rder and i n coopera tio n in lo cal min eral
33

ex plo it at io n and ev acua tio n, two po in ts in a 1972 u n ra ti li e d Treaty with Morocco.

I t must be remembered above a ll th at the we stern Saharan issu e is im po rta nt 

and in tr acta b le because i t is an element in a la rg er co n fl ic t between two dynamic 

riv a ls , mi 1 »■ in si ze and p o te n ti al, opposite in ideol ogy and p o li ti c a l syste m, 

and so clo se cu lt u ra ll y , eth nic ly and li n g u is ti c ly th a t co n fl ic t becomes fu nct io nal 

as a way to develop se pa rate id e n ti ti e s. The Moroccan-Algerian c o n fl ic t is tne 

Franco—German r< ry o£ northwe st Af ric a and cannot be overcome exc ept through

as si st an ce from the ou ts id e, eon scious de cision s on the par t of the p a rt ie s, and 

an overa rch ing framework with in which the p art ie s can pursue a pe ac eful co ex istenc e.

There is anoth er par ty to the co n fl ic t whose in te re st and ex istenc e would be 

hard to deny. The FoIiSaRio Fron t is ho th an Al ge ria n cr ea tion and a going con cer n. 

Deprived of arms throug h and from Algeria and sa nc tuary in Alg er ia, i t would soon 

run in to mi 1 -ita -r y d if fic u lt ie s . 3u t i t has mo bilized the peo ple under i t s 

co ntrol in to a n a ti o n a li st fo rc e and cr ea te d a national con sciousne ss which di d 

no t ex is t be fo re. Without going in to a p o li ti c a l an al ysi s of the poLiSaHio, 

th re e remarks can be made abo ut i t s st re ngth s. F irs t, i t has been grad ua lly 

eff ecti ve m ilit a rily . In 1973, i t made war so cost ly th at Ma uritania dropped 

out of the fi g h t; in 1979, i t has forced the Moroccan army to abandon te rrito ry 

and ou tpos ts and has made some dem ora lizing ra id s in to pre-1975 Moroccan t e r r i ­

to ry . Second, i t is an elem ent of A lg eri a's in fle x ib il it y , fo r i t has enough 

l if e of i t s own and in te rn ati o n al re co gn iti on to embarras s the Algeria n government se riousl y i f the la tte r should withdraw i t s supp ort. Th ird , i t s p o li ti c a l 

suc cess is tes tim ony to i t s or ga ni za tion al cap ab il it ie s in the he at of the st ru ggle , 

bu t ho t to the pree xi sten ce of a "Saharan na tio n" or to the continued coherence of 

a Saharan n ati o n -s ta ta . The tr ib e s of the western Sahara have a m ille nia l his to ry 

of dissiden ce ag ai ns t co nst it ute d au th ori ty , so li d ari ty ( 1asabiyy a) under combat, 

and dis in te gra ti on once in power, and most re ce ntly the Mau ritanian Peoples Pa rty, 

once an eff ecti ve mob ili za tio n pa rty which b u il t a new nat io n, gr ad ua lly lo st i t s 

cohesio n a ft e r on ly a decade in power. la th is area where any boundary is a r tif ic ia l, 

some ?oLiSapJ.o le ader s ’.’ere born in Spa nish Sahara, some in Morocco, some in Mauritania
34

The PoLiSaRio has never made a very strong demand for self-determination.

It feels that it is the sole legitimate spokesmen for the Saharan people and 

the political arm of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) which it 

decreed in 19 76 . Although it proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire in Mauritania 

after the June 1978 coup, it has not been able to complete negotiations for 

the establishment of the SADR in the Tirisj as long as the war in Morocco is «'

going well, and the QAU, Non-Aligned and UN meetings in the summer and fall 

of 1979 offer hopes for further diplomatic recognition, it has no reaso n to 

lower its goals below total independence for the whole territory.

The other states with interests in the area are more flexible. Under

pressure f rom Algeria and its own Socialist opposition, the Spanish government 

has begun to waver in its commitment to the Tripartite agreement, signed before 

Franco's death. French policy has been to protect its citizens, support a 

balance of forces in the conflict, and work fo r reinforced ties with Mauritania, 

which combined to produce a policy supportive of Morocco and Mauritania.

After the Mauritanian coup of 1978 and restored communications with Algeria, 

however, French policy in 19 79 has moved to greater neutrality. The Soviets 

have been discrete, although their arms are being supplied by Libya and Algeria 

to the PoLiSaRio, but they have close political relations wit h Algeria and 

commercial relations with Morocco (the opposite of the Americ an position).

Thus, three important states with interests in the region are relatively free 

in their policy and able to join in a mediation effort.

The UN has generally declined to act as long as the QAU was siezed of the 

issue. The QAU is currently debating the conflict and will hear a report from 

its Committee of Wise MBn recommending self-determination. Morocco and Mauritania 

have been able to block action by the OAU until this year by threatening to 

withdraw from the Organization but that threat has only been effective at the 

level of the summit meetings; in the OAU Council of Ministers, Algeria and the 

FtoLiSaRio have found gre at er ~i f inconclusive— support. The OAU is tired of
35

and embarrassed by the a ff a ir , fo r its members pr ef er iss ues on which they are 

unanimous or disputes which they can rec on cile; as pres ented thus fa r, the 

Saharan iss ue has been one over which not only competing par ties but competing 

camps of moderates and ra di ca ls seek a decisio n by a ne ce ssarily narrow major ity, 

sp li tt in g the Organization.

The cu rre nt si tu at io n in the western Sahara is ch arac teris ed by Moroccan 

co ntr ol of the population centers with in its area , unhindered PoLiSaRio movement 

and in st all ati ons in the in te ri o r and an ab il it y to launch increasin gly deeper 

ra id s into pre-1975 Morocco, a growing economic burden and some domestic grumbling 

in Morocco, a le vel of diplomatic rec ognition s among A frican st at es fo r the SADR 

which is s t i l l about 10 short of an OAU majority but which could gain ex tra support 

at any time from among st at es with no in te re st in the area but a willin gness to 

gra nt rec ognition in exchange fo r support on iss ue s of in te re st to them.

The PoLiSaRio does no t appear to be sho rt of arms sup plies and augments them 

with armaments captured from the Moroccans; the Moroccans do not seem to be 

part ic ula rly short of arm3, although inc rea sed coun terin surgency weapons would be 

us ef ul, but are hindered by an in fl ex ib le command stru ctur e which leav es l i t t l e 

in it ia ti v e to the fi e ld and a lac k of morale , mo bility, and even responsiveness.

The most prop iti ou s si tu at io n fo r ne go tia tio n would be a prolonged stalem ate, 

where fo r example Moroccan troops held the pop ulation ce nter s, PoliSaRio was 

re st ri cte d fo r bases to i t s refu gee camps within Algerian sanctuary, and the 

in te ri o r was an inde ci sive ly conte ste d no-man' s-lan d, a situ at io n which obtained 

during 1978 u n ti l ea rly 1979. Since then, however, PoliSaRio inc urs ions into 

Morocco have al te re d the sta lem ate , broadened the co nfl ic t through escalat ion 

of both ends & means, and, unles s the opportunity fo r re co nc ili atio n is siezed
36

from outs id e, w il l have gr av ely extended the c o n fl ic t in st ea d of re so lv in g i t .

If PoLiSaRio att ack s conti nu e in to Moroccan te r r ito ry from pri vileg ed 

san ctu ary in A lg er ia , th e tfcroccan army i s li k e ly to tu rn e it h er to d ir ec t 

at ta ck on Al ge ria or to a m il it ary coup ag ai nst th e monarch. As Morocco, 

Ma uritania , and Alg er ia know, arm ies have a way of ac ting on th e ir own, in de ­

pendent of sta te co ntr ol, in cert ain w el l-de fine d cir cu mstances. Nei th er of 

these ev entu ali ti es is in any p a rt y 's in te re s t, no r w il l i t re so lv e e it h e r the 

Saharan is su e or th e broa der c o n fl ic t in re la ti o n s between Morocco and Alg er ia .

A m il it ary def ea t of e it h er side would have se riou s consequ ences fo r the 

lo si ng regime. Col. Ben jedi d's moderate government is st able bu t new, and a 

de feat could produce str a in s on the ne wly -estab lis he d reco rd of in s tit u tio n a liza tio n in Alg er ia. A Moroccan def ea t would produce a th re at to the ex istenc e 

of the en ti re mo narch ial syste m, no t ju s t to Hassan I I , bu t would br in g to 

power a regime—pr obably of the m il it ary —which would be more, no t le s s, h o sti le 

to Algeria and le s s, no t more, cap able of taki ng th e ne ce ssary de cision s to 

re so lv e the di sp ut e between the two co untr ie s. The Moroccan and Al ge ria n 

armies are about the same si ze, around 100,000, bu t the Algeria n army has 

undergone a more thorough mode rnization program with Russia n arms and i t s air fo rc e 

is su pe rior to Morocco 's. Although the war would most li k e ly remain a border 

war, a Moroccan dr iv e agai nst the he av ily defended bu t exposed Algeria n sa li e n t 

in Tindou f, where the PoLiSaRio camps are lo ca te d and where Moroccan te r r ito r ia l 

cla ims form erly ap pl ie d, would do ub tle ss be coun ter ed by an Al ge ria n dr ive 

ac ro ss the Moulouya pla in from Oujda to Taza, where the f i r s t natu ra l defence 

fe at ure s are deep in si de th e country .

Al ge ria ns have fr eq uen tly implied th at a change in the Moroccan p o lit ic a l 

system would br in g a regime th at would be easie r to de al with , per hap s even a 

so c ia li st regime th at would be id eo lo gic all y clo ser to i t s neigh bo r. There is 

no thi ng th a t supp orts such misplaced hop es, and the ex perie nces of Libya, Sy ria
37

and Irac vis-a-vis Egypt suggest quite the opposite. Morocco has hoped that an 

occupation of the Sahara would cause the PoLiSaRio nationalism to disappear; 

whatever hopes there might have been for such an eventuality if Morocco had 

been militarily successful, it seems unlikel y now. Finally, it has been suggested 

by observers in Algeria that the best thing might well be a war that ends in 

stalemate, like the Morocco-Algerian war of 1963, allowing both sides then to 

claim that they had made the effort and were re ady for a .settlement, but there 

is no guarantee that the wa r end in a stalemate or that a settlement would 

follow. There is a certainty, however, that the wax* would be costl y for two 

countries, both of which have shown some good progress twoard development.

Thus, neither principle nor war provides a solution for the specific 

A n n f t l e t in northwest Africa nor for its broader context. The combination of 

stalemate and impending catastrophe, however, do provide a moment propitious 

for conflict management an d possibly even conflict resolution. For this, 

the good offices of states with ties with both parties— such as the 0 S,

France, Spain, even the Soviet union— are required to help the parties off 

the limb and out of their zero-sum conflict.

America's direct interests in the western Sahara are minimal, but the 

general region of northwest Africa is highly important to U 3 national interests. 

The region is important precisely because it is Arab, African and Mediterranean 

(and Atlantic) at the same time. Located at the mouth of the Medi rranean, 

on the northernmost Atlantic coast of Africa, and on the westernmost extension 

of the Arab world, Morocco and Algeria oc cupy a strategic position. Morocco, 

the former site of American na val and air bases, continued to permit an 

American nri H tary communications presence after the evacuation of these bases. 

Morocco's foreign policy has long moved in the same direction as American 

interests: Morocco was an active participant in ONUC in the first Congo
38

crisis, and was the primary component of the stabilizing African force in 

the two Shaba affairs, it also was a strong Arab supporter of the Sadat 

initiative in Jerusalem in 1977 and wou ld doubtless be a supporter of the 

Washington treaty if it felt that there were an equivalent concern for its 

interests in northwest Africa on the part of the United States. Morocco is 

a leader among moderates in the Arab League and the QAUj for the moment, its 

freedom of action is immobilized by its need for support in the Saharan affair.

Algeria is one of America's top four suppliers of pe troleum products, 

and has been the leader of a more radical current in the OAU and the Group of 

77, and a member of the Rejectionist (Steadfastness) Front among Arabs.

For this reason, American relations w ith Algeria are important as well, 

and it would be shortsighted simply to pick sides and turn against one party 

or the other. But an avoidance of sides need not mean a passive policy.

An active approach in concert with other states that helps the parti es out 

of their conflict and restores the possibilities f or better co operation in 

the region is one that can retain the greatest degree of freedom of action 

for the United States and ca n be viewed positively by both sides.

Another point of interest that both parties have for the United States 

is the success that each shows in political development toward a more 

moderate and stable form of government. In a world where muc h of the 

developing world is having trouble keeping its political system together, 

Ifcrocco's thriving multiparty system and relative ly free press and elections 

and Algeria's institutionalized transfer of power within a participatory 

singlesparty system are matters of note and promise. If revoluti on and 

unrest are the Soviets' long suite, responsive dynamic stability should be

America's.

A n a l l y , although it may be unpopular to raise the issue when the right 

to life of smallest states b o m of national liberation movements seems so
39

unques tioned , in te r e s ts in th e c re a ti o n a f a SADR sh ou ld be dis cuss ed. An 

in de pe nd en t w es te rn Sa ha ran s ta te would be th e sm al le st. s ta te on th e co n ti n e n t 

of A fr ic a , r ic h in ph os ph at es and n o t much e ls e , and a c o n ti n u al so ur ce of 

i n s t a b i l i t y in th e re gio n. I t s weakn ess would ca us e i t to lo ok c o n ti n u a ll y f o r 

o u ts id e su pport and to pla y o ff i t s nei gh bo rs a g a in st ea ch o th e r; when nei ghbori ng 

so urc es of su ppor t wer e ex hau st ed , i t co ul d be an a ttr a c tiv e s tra te g ic in v e s tment fo r ou ts id e po we rs. SADR ha s a l l th e we ak ne sse s of a I- kuri ta nia compounded, 

and i s th e u lt im a te exam ple in th e b alk a n iz a ti o n o f A fr ic a by th e h e rit a g e of 

c o lo n ia l co nques t. D es pite t a c t i c a l p o s it io n s of th e moment, such a so ur ce o f 

i n s t a b i l i t y in th e re gio n i s n o t in th e i n te r e s t o f Morocco o r A lg eri a, nor of 

th e U ni te d S ta te s . P o s it iv e , p ro ducti ve, s ta b iliz in g re g io n al co oper at io n 

among e x is ti n g p a r tie s i s th e a lte rn a tiv e th a t re sp on ds to th e ir in te r e s ts .

Americ an p o li cy to dat e ha3 be en par al yze d and in a c ti v e in th e Sa haran 

d is p u te . I t ha s be en hung on m o ra li ti e s and le g a l i t i e s and th e re fo re ha s been 

un re sp onsi ve to th e ne ed s of e ith e r si de or to i t s own in te r e s ts . When th e 

US th ou gh t i t s e l f un ab le to su pp ly some o f th e weap ons th a t Morocco needed 

to pr ovi de se c u rit y fo r th e ad m in is tr ati o n which th e US re co gniz ed , i t did 

noth in g to use th is r e fu s a l to e l i c i t a p o sit iv e demarche fro m th e oth er si de

and th us move th e c o n f lic t toward an en d. We hav e fo cu ss ed ou r de bat es on th e 

is s u e on p rin c ip le s alo ne, w it hout ta k in g f u l l ac co un t o f ou r in te r e s ts .

I f th e tim e was n o t rip e b e fo re , Am eric an p o li c y sh ou ld now above a l l be 

wo rking fo r a mee tin g o f th e two s ta te s ' le a d e rs to work out a so lu ti o n wh ere by 

ea ch w ill "g et a lo t by giv in g up a l i t t l e , " in a more c e rta in and le s s c o s tl y 

way th an by co ntinued o r e s c a la te d wa r. The in g re d ie n ts of th is so lu ti o n 

are alr ead y p re sen t in an im pro ved s ta tu s quo . I t would in cl ude Moroccan r a t i ­

f ic a tio n of th e 1972 b ord er co nven tion, r a t i f i e d in 1973 by A lg eri a, which 

wou ld pr ovi de t e r r i t o r i a l s e c u rit y fo r A lg eri a and als o b il a t e r a l cooper at io n
40

on m in eral e xp lo it at io n an d e va cu at io n in t he r egi on; a r ec og ni ti on o f Morocc an 

sovere ig nt y ov er i ts cu rr en tl y- ad mi ni st er ed area; an d a Sa ha ra n re gi me in the 

Tiris which, fe de ra te d w it h Mau ritania, wo ul d b y exi st in g tr ea ty be ab le to 

share in t he riches of the Moro cc an Sa hara. The no ti on o f fe de ra ti on wa s 

ra is ed in se ve ra l quarters a y ea r ago, af te r the fi rs t Ma ur it an ia n coup, an d 

wa s re je ct ed b y Morocco and the PoL iSa Rio , bu t times an d t he A lg er ia n leader s 

hav e chan ged.

This type of a solution is u nl ik el y to be ad op te d un changed; co nf li ct 

re so lu ti on does no t wo rk that way. It ca n be mo di fi ed in a n um be r of way s— ne w 

bor ders, specia l status f or M or oc ca n Sa ha ra wit hi n the Kin gdom, special 

re fe re nd a to ra ti fy po litical agr eem ents, re su rr ec ti on of the id ea o f a 

Co mm on Org an iz at io n of the S ah ar an Reg io n amon g the thr ee sta tes al on e— 

wi th ou t af fe ct in g the ess ence of the sol ution. In a sta lemate co nf ro nt ed 

wi th e sca lation, ea ch p ar ty begi ns to w an t to form al iz e wh at i t has, even 

mor e than i t wa nt s to gai n some th in g f urt her: in th is case, Al ge ri a to co nsolidate 

its ha lf -r at if ie d cooper at io n an d b or de r agr eement, Morocco it 3 ha lf -a dm in is te re d 

provinces, PoLi Sa Ri o its ha lf -o cc up ie d ter rit ory . Ear lier, the time was n ot r ipe 

fo r thi s pe rc ep ti on to develop. N ow it is, becaus e no w the es ca la ti on l oo ms a nd 

the chance s of f ur th er g ain s are too u nce rtain. Al ge ri a' s in te re st i s in a settleme nt bef or e the PoL iSa Rio in w ho le or in pa rt switches to the Li by an s an d the 

ch an ce s fo r a b or de r an d c oo pe ra ti on wi th the Moro cc an s are lost ; Moro cc o' s 

in te re st is i n a settlement bef or e it l os es i ts provi nce s, it s ar my a nd its 

throne. The me di at or 's job is t o de velop the par tie s' pe rc ep ti on o f the si tuation 

an d the o ut comes, to change "ob jective" into "su bjective" rip eness. The pres en ce 

of bo th H as sa n and B en je di d at the OA U m ee ti ng i n Jfonrovia wou ld ha ve farH 1 -t t.a-haH 

the job; in the absence of th ei r meetin g, the me di at or is n»re impo rt an t than 

ever. Th e Uni te d S tat es, wo rk in g wi th F ra nc e an d ot he r Eur op ea n an d Afr ic an 

cou ntr ies, as f ri en ds of bo th side s, wo ul d do we ll to pre ss fo r su ch re so lu ti on 

be fo re i t is too late.
41

Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much, Professor.

There seems to be disagreement among the witnesses today about 

not only the situation in western Sahara but also what can be done

• about it. Perhaps during the course of the questions and answers we 

can clarify your differing points of view.

Could each of you very briefly give us your estimates of the size of 

the Saharawi population, b oth inside the western Sahara as well as in

• the Polisario camps in Tindouf? Could you simultaneously indicate 

what the basis of th at estimate is?

Mr. Houser, do you want to begin?

Mr. Houser. Let me observe that t ha t question is a tricky one. It 

is tricky because it is a small country and the point that those who are 

not so sympathetic to Polisario would make, is th at because it is small 

it is not importan t.

Now, having said tha t, the statistics difFer a great deal; they range 

from the census th at Spain had, of 74,000 or so, up to a Polisario 

estimate of 750,000; based on what, I don’t know. If you take a census 

inside the boundaries of wh at was Spanish Sahara, which is where it 

took place, how man y people are you leaving out among those who 

might have been in certain areas of Mauritania or in the southern pa rt 

of Morocco, or even in Algeria?

Mr. Solarz. When was th e census taken?

Mr. Houser. In 1974,1 think. So you have had estimates that have 

put it in the neighborhood of 500,000 as well?

Mrs. F enwick. Who gives that?

Mr. Houser. I think that came from a U.N. agency.

As I say, it is a tric ky question. I am concerned about the trickiness 

of it.

Mr. Solarz. At the moment, do you have any estimate of the number of Saharawi in Tindouf in the Polisario camps there?

Mr. Houser. In various camps? Again, the estimates difFer a great 

deal from, say, 25,000 up to as high as 100,000. All I can say is t ha t 

there are thousands of people there. There has been no proper census 

taken. I doubt if there is going to be.

Mr. Solarz. Is it your impression at the present time most of the 

Saharawi are in the Sahara, or are they in Tindouf?

Mr. Houser. The only Saharawi people who are still in the western 

Sahara are those who are living in the occupied areas, because when 

you talk with the people who are in the camps and ask them, “Where 

do you come from?” They will tell you where they came from. “When 

did you leave?” “We left when either the Moroccans or the Mau ri-

. tanians” —depending on wha t part of the country they came from—

“attacke d and bombed.” They walked across the desert to the only 

place that was available to them to go, which was to the camps in 

Algeria.

In visiting the liberated towns of Tifariti and Amgala, you only 

find the Polisario people the re; you do no t find the, shall we say, the 

citizens; they are in the camps.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Lippert?

Ms. Lippe rt. In the first page of my testimony I made some references to tha t, which I didn’t read today.

Again, it seems to me t ha t I share with Mr. Houser some difficulty 

in giving an actual figure. We have the 1974 census. I have indicated 

in the paper why I thought the Spanish were low on tha t. In addition
42

to the Saharawi, it seems to me there would have to be, if their figures 

are correct, somewhere between 100,000 and 110,000 in the camps 

around Tindouf.

Then you have Polisario fighters. I know there are supposed to be 

40,000 Moroccan soldiers. I assume there are n ot 40,000 Polisarios in 

western Sahara, but I don’t know.

Then you have the additional Saharawi who are actually in the 

occupied zone in the western Sahara.

Mr. Solarz. How many are there in that category?

Ms. Lippe rt. I don’t know, because there are also some of those 

people in occupied cities that were Moroccans. I was told there were 

more soldiers who had been brought in the western Sahara and were 

promised jobs.

In regard to the population, I also referred in my paper to the, 

repressions by the Spanish in the late 1950’s and again in the 1960’s, 

a number of Saharawi did flee into northern Mauritania and southern 

Morocco. So you still have some Saharawi population in those areas.

Mr. Solarz. Is there any reason to believe at the time of the 1974 

census that substantial numbers of Saharawi were outside of the 

Sahara?

Ms. Lippe rt. Yes.

Mr. Solarz. Is there reason to believe they were perhaps greater 

than the numbers still there?

Ms. Lippert. I don’t know. It is possible. I can’t give an abolute 

number. I would have to do some counting myself.

Certainly with the repressions, yes, in the 1950’s and 1960’s. The 

resistance in that area to the Spanish went on through the 1960’s into 

the 1970’s, and even around the time of the census.

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Zartman?

Mr. Zartman. There are four components to the population: Fir st 

of all, there are those who fled to Morocco from the late 1950’s on. 

Maybe as just a wild order of magnitude, 10,000 at a maximum. It is 

not significant in terms of your former question, nonetheless a number.

Second of all, those who have fled to Algeria after 1975; and third 

of all, those in the Spanish Sahara and the subject of the referendum; 

and, fourth , the nomads that go through, because this is an area in 

which the nomadic population goes from Mali into southern Morocco 

following the rains.

If one takes two indications that we have the figures for, the particpation in the Moroccan elections in 1975 and 1976, and uses the same 

participation percentage, we come up with about now the same 

figure, 75,000 people.

If one takes, let us say, an enlarged figure in the camps of 50,000, 

that gives us 125,000. If you come up to 150,000, maybe that is an 

appropriate inflation, probably a maximum inflation and way, far 

away from the 750,000 or 500,000.

Mr. Solarz. Where did you get the figure of 75,000 inside?

Mr. Zartman. From the Moroccan election participation. Applying 

the rate of participation on the national average to this area, which 

is kind of a reasonable guess.
43

Mr. Solarz. Are you saying 75,000 voted?

Mr. Zartman. No. I say applying the rate of participation and then 

adding on the rest of the nonvoting population, there is a bout a 60- 

percent participation. If we take the total figures and consider them 

at 60 percent of x and work that out-----

Mr. Solarz. W hat reason is there to believe tha t the rate of participation in the Sahara was the same as the rate of participation in the 

rest of Morocco?

Mr. Zartman. We don’t know that it was exactly the same. We 

have no reason to suggest that it was wildly different; tha t is all; 

because the Polisario people had fled, as they themselves claimed. 

That is ju st a rule of thumb.

Mr. Knight. I would like to point out that using those figures is 

pre tty arbitrary. In fact, during those elections, one town—I can’t 

remember the name—had its votes thrown out. At tha t time an 

American journalist was in that town when the Polisario guerrillas 

liberated it. There were no civilians in tha t town; there was a vote 

registered and somebody was elected to the Moroccan parliament.

Mr. Solarz. I gather you agree that like in our country, we know 

they are there, but we don’t quite know how many there are.

On the question of American military equipment which is being used 

in the Sahara, could you tell us precisely what kinds of American 

military equipm ent you were under the impression the Moroccans are 

using in the Sahara, other than the F- 5’s?

Ms. Lippe rt. I am not a military expert. I have had to ask some 

people. There is the C-105 I guess tha t is a gun that is used.

Mr. Solarz. C-105? Wha t is it used on?

Ms. Lippert. It is a machinegun kind of thing. Last summer I took 

a lot of pictures of the crates which I sent to the committee.

Mrs. Fenwick. I have one here.

Ms. Lippert. Of the crates of equipment that was found?

Mr. Solarz. Do you know whether we have provided th at to 

Morocco or whether they bought that on the international arms 

market?

Ms. Lippert. At Amgala this su mm er we picked up shells that 

matched a machine gun that was made in Dayton, Ohio. I guess th e 

bullets were made in 1976.

Mr. Solarz. What kind of machinegun?

Ms. Lippe rt. I think C-105.

Mr. Solarz. Do you know if we actually sold that equipment to 

Morocco?

Ms. Lippert. In certain cases, at least in the early part of the war, 

we used, as I understand, Jordan as a conduit. We would get the 

equipment to Jordan and then approve the transfer of equipment 

from Jordan to Morocco.

Mr. Solarz. Any other equipment?

Ms. Lippe rt. Aside from the F-5, there is another kind of machinegun that is used. If I could refer to some notes. There was a hearing 

that was held here a couple of years ago, by the House Armed Services 

Committee. They listed in there another kind of machinegun that 

had been transferred to Morocco.
44

Mr. Houser. We know about the sale of Chinook helicopters which 

has been proved. According to material which we have received, there 

are about 20 Bell helicopters which are in El Aaiun, and about 5 

F-5 A jet supersonic planes.

Mr. Solarz. What are the Bell helicopters used for?

Mr. Houser. They are very useful for surveillance and for transporting, not heavy transporting; the Chinook is; the Bell helicopter 

is not. It would be more for surveillance.

Mr. Solarz. Has the Chinook been sold to them yet?

Mr. Houser. I am not certain, but I believe so, because it was approved, I believe, in February of this year.

Mr. Solarz. But you do not know if it is being used yet in the 

Sahara?

Mr. Houser. I didn’t see any of them myself.

Mr. Solarz. Would either or both of you be opposed to our selling 

military equipment to Morocco tha t was clearly not suitable for use 

in the Sahara?

Mr. Houser. I would simply say that tha t is a different question.

Mr. Solarz. I know it is a different question.

Mr. Houser. We are talking about the western Sahara. If you mean, 

speaking for myself, do I have an anti-Morocco bias, as far as getting 

equipment is concerned, I would just say that must be decided on its 

merits.

Mr. Solarz. I am asking you the question. My question is: Are 

you opposed to providing military equipment to Morocco th at is not 

suitable for use in the Sahara?

Mr. Houser. I pointed ou t I was opposed to Moroccan troops going 

to Zaire. I would like to know what it is going to be used for before I 

give a carte blanche answer on that.

Mr. Solarz. Used for defense of Morocco.

Mr. Houser. If it is something for internal use in Morocco, t ha t is 

a different question. What I know is that equipment which is supposed 

to be used in Morocco has been used in the western Sahara. Now, what 

is it that would be useful to Morocco that could n ot be used inside 

western Sahara would be a critical question.

Mr. Solarz. I don’t know what is in the Moroccan military inventory, 

but I asked you to describe what weapons they used in the Sahara, 

and you gave me a p retty p altr y list. I don’t mean to diminish the significance of the F-5. We all know t ha t is being used. You mentioned 

some helicopters that, may or may no t have been sold to them. You 

said Bell helicopters are located in El Aaiun. There was reference to 

machineguns and machinegun bullets. If those are the only weapons 

used in the Sahara, then obviously they must have lots of military 

equipment they are not using in Sahara, because the army and air 

force do not consist of four items of military equipment. It must be 

much more.

It seems to me at least in theory th at military equipm ent they are 

now getting, they are not using there.

Mr. Houser. There is a lot of military equipment which is not 

coming from the United States also. Nor would i t necessarily make 

the case t ha t Morocco is dependent entirely on the United States for
45

wha t it does. I think the decision for the United States is, is this 

country going to supply any kind of military equipment which can be 

used in the western Sahara, even if it is five or six Chinook helicopters?

Mr. Solarz. I understand your position on that.

My question is, if we could be reasonably certain t ha t the particular 

item of military equipment would not be used in the Sahara because 

it simply was n ot suitable to the Sahara, leaving aside what t ha t was, 

which was presumably designed to enable the Moroccan Government 

to .provide for its own security, would you be opposed to the sale of 

th at equipment as a ma tter of principle in the same way you are opposed to the sale as a m atter of principle of military equipment that 

could be used in the Sahara?

Mr. Houser. At the present time, I would.

Mr. Solarz. Why?

Mr. Houser. Because I believe tha t the United States should stop 

military assistance to Morocco as long as Morocco is occupying the 

western Sahara. Th at is my principle reason.

Mr. Solarz. Even if the military equipment we would be selling 

them is in no way suitable for their military occupation?

Mr. Houser. I think it is to the best interest of the United States 

and for stability in the territory, for the United States to use what 

influence it has to bring this conflict to a stop, and it cannot bring it 

to a stop by supporting Morocco.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Lippert, what would your answer to tha t 

question be?

Ms. Lippe rt. I suspect my answer would be along the lines of Mr. 

Houser’s. The only point I would like to make is th at I am also very 

leery of saying for use in Morocco, because the argument or discussion th at is going on between Morocco and our S tate Departme nt 

is whether the western Sahara is or is not Moroccan territory.

So, the Moroccan Government says that “anything you have sold 

us is for use for the defense of Moroccans. We consider western Sah ara 

pa rt of our territory.”

Mr. Solarz. I unde rstand tha t. Even if there were military equipment not suitable for use in the western Sahara, you would be against 

our selling it to Morocco?

Ms. Lippe rt. In light of the fa ct that we have since 1975 really not 

been too strict with Morocco with regard to the 1960 agreement. I 

think after 3 years’ time that is enough time to discuss the thing and 

say at some point, “OK, you stop.”

Mr. Solarz. Professor Zartman, what would be your view of whether 

we should sell military equipm ent to Morocco under existing circumstances which would be suitable for use in the Sahara?

Mr. Zartman. I think it would be totally blind and irresponsible 

for the United States operating in this pa rt of the world to disarm 

Morocco next door to Algeria, which has just been modernized with 

no questions asked, by the Soviet Union, and through whom Soviet 

arms are flowing to the Polisario.

Maybe one does n ot agree with American policy anywhere in the 

world, or in Africa, such as the Shaba affair, and so on, but I think 

that is a much broader m atter, and I think it would be very irresponsible not to supply and no t to continue the arms tha t we have, in fact, 

contracted to furnish.

5 1 -3 0 3 0 - 7 9 - 4
46

Mr. Solarz. My question is n ot whether we should or should not 

sell arms to Morocco. M y question is: Should we sell them arms that 

are suitable for use in the Sahara?

Mr. Zartman. There are two categories of arms in Morocco. Those 

suitable for use in the Sahara and those that are not. Your question 

is about those t ha t are not.

Mr. Solarz. I am asking a different question. I asked Mr. Houser 

and Professor Lippert whether we should sell arms to Morocco which 

were not suitable for use in the Sahara. They b oth answered no. My 

question to you is: Should we sell arms to Morocco which are suitable 

for use in the Sahara?

I know w hat your answer would be to the question I asked them. 

You would say we should sell them arms t ha t are not suitable for use 

in the Sahara. Should we also sell them arms which are suitable for 

use in the Sahara?

Mr. Zartman. On that one I would not come down strongly in 

favor of selling them arms for use in the Sahara. It would be a little 

more of a nuanced answer and I would say th at certainly there should 

be no cutback, no restrictions on the pipeline of arms that have been 

contracted earlier and that the nonsale of arms should be used actively 

in connection with a good overseas attempt.

I do not think the military problem of Morocco is above all a 

question of arms.

Mr. Solarz. But it is one of the problems that confronts us in the 

formulation of our foreign policy. So, I am not clear what your position 

is. You say you are n ot strongly against it. Are you weakly m favor 

of it?

Mr. Zartman. Instead of selling the three items th at they have 

requested, perhaps a small amount of one of the items, or alternatively 

an indication that—well, an indication to Algeria that it is an opportunity we missed before, that if we are not selling arms to Morocco 

we may have to in the future if Algeria does not join in a discussion. 

That is what I meant by diplomatic use of the arms sale.

Mr. Solarz. Wha t arms are not suitable for use in the Sahara 

which Morocco might be interested in? Are there in fact, weapons 

we can give them tha t meet that criteria or is this a distinction 

without a difference, the idea tha t we will sell them arms which cannot 

be used in the Sahara?

Mr. Zartman. I do not know. It was your distinction.

Mr. Solarz. It has been a distinction on which our policy presumably has been based for several years. We are trying to explore 

the extent to which th at policy is based in reality, in fact.

Mr. Zartman. I was thinking of the distinction between the specific 

arms that they have requested, the radar system, the observation 

planes, and the helicopters.

Mr. Solarz. You would be in favor of going ahead with that?

Mr. Zartman. I would not be in favor—I am no t coming through. 

I am sorry. I would not be in favor simply of approving this list, no. 

The thrust of my testimony is for a negotiated solution at this point. 

I do not think tha t the solution is to be found simply by giving a 

complete response to the arms request in Morocco.
47

I am saying that at this point the military fortunes are going very 

well for the Polisario. What is needed in bringing the parties together 

is an indication that none of the parties can get out of this situa tion

• militarily. This may require perhaps upping the morale of th e Moroccan Army by supplying them with a small amount of one of these 

items, for example, but at the same time coupled with active diplomacy 

in order to bring the parties together.

* Mr. Solarz. One final question before I yield. Are you aware of 

any military equipment which the Moroccans might like to have or 

which would be suitable to them which would not also be simultaneously helpful in the war th at is now going on in the Sahara?

Mr. Zartman. Which would not be useful at all, you are saying? 

Mr. Solarz. Yes. I am trying to see whether there is any substance 

to this distinction on which we have presumably based our policy.

Mr. Zartman. There are weapons. Heavy tanks, as far as I know, 

are not as this po int in the war very useful in the Sahara, for exam ple.

Mr. Solarz. Mrs. Fenwick?

Mrs. Fenwick. I would like to ask a number of questions, thank 

you, about the American Committee on Africa. What is it? Who is 

it? How long has it been going on? Who is the head of it?

Mr. Houser. I am the executive director. The president is Judge 

William Booth.

Mrs. Fenwick. Could you give me a list of the members? Judge 

William Booth?

Mr. H ouser. I s this something 1 could submit to you later? We have 

a letterhead that includes members of our executive board and the 

national committee and you would recognize the names of many, 

including some of your colleagues in the Congress.

Mrs. Fenwick. Th at would be most helpful.

[The information referred to follows:]

T he Am er ic an Com mit te e on Afr ic a

The American Committee on Africa, founded in 1953, is devoted to supporting 

African people in their just struggle for freedom and independence. ACOA informs 

Americans about significant African issues, mobilizes public support for African 

freedom, and works for policies which will strengthen this aim.

WH ERE ACOA STA NDS

• ACOA recognizes the indispensable role of liberation movements in bringing the 

struggle for freedom to a successful conclusion.

ACOA supports the cultural and economic boycott of apartheid South Africa 

and Namibia, illegally occupied by South Africa, in accordance with the position 

taken by the Organization of African Unity and the African liberation movements.

* ACOA is opposed to U.S. corporate investment in South Africa and Namibia 

which strengthens the power of the white minority regimes.

ACOA supports strict implementation of United Nations sanctions against the 

illegal white minority government of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

ACOA supports the newly independent nations of Mozambique, Angola, 

Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde in their nation-building efforts after years of 

colonialism.

HOW ACOA WORKS

Supports African liberation movements in Africa and in exile. The Africa 

Defense and Aid Fund of ACOA was set up in 1957 to provide this assistance.

Provides a forum for African representatives through public meetings, news 

media, conferences, speaking tours.

Opposes specific instances of U.S. corporate collaboration with apartheid 

through bank loans, trade, investments; and supports workers refusing to offload 

goods from white minority countries.
48

Arranges meetings with African leaders and reports on decisions reached.

Testifies before the Congress and the Un ited Nations, and lobbies in coordination with the Washington Office on Africa to end governm ent policies which foster 

colonial and w hite m inority rule.

Acts through the courts to end prac tices suppor ting white min ority rule in 

Africa.

Mobilizes prominen t sports and en ter tai nm ent figures to “ Say NO to Ap arth eid” 

and refuse to perform before segregated audiences in Sou th Africa.

Publishes books, pamphlets, fact sheets and in-dep th rep orts and distrib utes 

resources in cooperatio n with The Africa Fund (associated with ACOA).

Communicates its message to Americans thr ough radio, TV, press conferences, 

magazine articles, speakers, and occasional ads on issues of curre nt importance.

Initiates action and cooperates with oth er organizations on public dem onstrations, pickets, rallies.

EX EC UT IVE BOAR D

William H. Booth, President, Elizab eth Landis, Vice Preside nt, Doroth y 

Hibbert, Secretary, Tilden LeMelle, Treasurer, Elom be Brath , Marshall Brown, 

Rober t Browne, Elsie Carrington, George Daniels, Michael Davis, Moe Foner, 

Mai Goode, Annette Hutchin s-Felder, Ja ne t Hooper, Ja y Jaco bson, Leonard 

Jeffries, William Johnston, David Lampel, Edgar Lockwood, Edward May, Gail 

Morlan, Lillian Roberts, Adelaide Schulkind, Fred erick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. , 

Michael Simmons, Leo Suslow, Rober t Van Lierop, Peter Weiss.

NATIO NAL COMMITTEE

Ra lph Abernath y, Bella Abzug, Sadie T. M. Alexander, Jam es Baldwin, Roger N 

Baldwin, Stringfellow Barr, Ric har d Bolling, Jim B outon, Che ster Bowles (Mrs.) 

Marguerite Cartwright, Jerome Davis, Max Delson, Ro bert Delson, Peter 

DeVries, Charles C. Diggs, Ric hard Falk, Walter E. Fauntroy, Carlto n B. Goodlet t, Seymour Halpern, Donald S. Harrington, Henry W. Hobson, Arthur N. 

Holcombe, Joh n L. S. Holloman, Sophia Yarnall Jacobs, Clare nce B. Jones, 

Sidney Josephs, Ledlie Laughlin, George M. Leader, Rayfo rd W. Logan, Eugene 

McCarthy, Rober t J . McCracken, Joh n A. M ackay, Joh n Marcum , Will Maslow, 

Howard M. Metzenbaum, Frank C. Montero, Fred erick O’Neal, F. D. Patterso n, 

Sidney Poitier, Melvin Price, A. Philip Randolph, Charles Rangel, Victor Re uth er, 

Cleveland Robinson, William X. Scheinman, William Scott, George W. Shepherd, Hugh Smythe, Mark Starr, Hope Stevens, C. Summer Stone, Frank 

Thompson, Jr., Howard Thurm an, W ya tt Tee Walker, Sta n Wright, Ro bert 

Delson, General Counsel.

Washington Office on Africa (co-sponsored by ACOA), 110 Mary lan d Ave. NE ., 

Washington, D.C. 20002, Tel. (202)546-7961, Director: Edward Lockwood, 

Associate: Christine Root.

Mr. Houser. Our committee was founded and was incorporated in 

the State of New York in August 1953. So, we are just abo ut 26 years 

old.

Mrs. Fenwick. You have always been concerned with movements. 

Are you backing Mr. Savimbi’s movement?

Mr. Houser. We go back to 1954, 1953 really. We have been in 

touch—this I think is what I said in my introductory remarks—with 

virtually every movement. Our objective has been to support the right 

of the African people for self-determination and for an American 

policy which would be supportive of this.

Mrs. Fenwick. Did you suppo rt Mr. Savimbi?

Mr. Houser. At the present time? At the present time we do not.

Mrs. Fenwick. Did you ever?

Mr. Houser. We have had contact with Jonas Savimbi.

Mrs. Fenwick. Have you ever supported the Savimbian movement?

Mr. Houser. It depends on what you mean by support.

Mrs. Fenwick. Supporting as you are now supporting Polisario.

Mr. H ouser. No.

Mrs. Fenwick. Are you disturbed by Algeria’s role in all this? Are 

they paying for the food in the camps and all th at?
49

Mr. Houser. It comes from a number of different sources. I cannot 

detail all of them. Algeria obviously has to be of great assistance 

because every thing is coming through Algeria. There is assistance 

which comes from a good number of African countries. I know Liberia 

is.

Apart from North African countries, Nigeria, for example, then there 

are some international organizations. OXFAM in Belgium, for 

example.

Mrs. Fenwick. I get the picture. Thank you.

I wondered how you felt about the refusal to allow the In tern atio nal 

Red Cross to go in those camps. Why is that?

Mr. Houser. I mentioned in my remarks th at the camps are 

administered by Polisarios themselves. They do no t have international 

civil servants, nor representatives of international organizations, or of 

government t ha t are administering them.

I think that they are not opposed to having representatives of 

international organizations to go in and take a look, but they are not 

prepared to agree for them to go in and participa te in the administration.

Mrs. Fenwick. I do not think that was the question. Algeria, as I 

understand, has refused to allow access to the camps by the Inter ­

national Red Cross. Is t ha t not true?

Ms. Lippert. It is not the Interna tional Red Cross. I think it is the 

High Commissioner of the U.N. From 1976 until almost the end of that 

year there was an international Red Cross representative there in the 

camps.

Mrs. Fenwick. Representative of the Internationa l Red Cross?

Ms. Lipper t. Right. It is the High Commissioner on Refugees of 

the United Nations. I gather that the objection of Algeria was to the 

idea of somebody constantly there. They said at certain periods it 

would be appropriate. They were afraid of Tindouf, Algeria. Th at 

particular area is a military base actually.

Mrs. Fenwick. They did n ot want the U.N. there?

Ms. Lippert. I gather tha t because they would be able to see 

inside Algerian installations.

Mrs. Fenwick. We were told tha t the International Red Cross was 

denied entrance.

You spoke of the elections, Professor. Are there two parties?

Ms. Lipper t. No. They have not developed a party system at 

present. The elections are on a regional basis. Mr. Houser mentioned 

the 23 camps and then the three wilayas.

Mrs. Fenwick. You mean they have one candidate for each office?

Ms. Lippert. Frankly I have not investigated that. I have been 

there when they have had some national popular meetings. I have 

been there at the time of some of their local elections. They propose 

people for elections to represent them to the national popular congress 

and then they are voted by the people in the camp.

Mrs. Fenwick. One person for each office? If there are not two 

parties, there must be one person for each office.

Ms. Lippert. We are talking about representatives to the national 

congress. It is not done partywise. It is done as we do in a town 

meeting sort of situation where we propose candidates to represent 

us, or as we did in the Democratic Party, people are proposed or
50

nominated to attend the midterm convention on a local level, and 

then on a regional level, and then on a national level.

Mrs. Fenwick. So, there are no parties?

Ms. Lippert. If there is any party, it is the Polisario; but that 

actually is a political organization. They do not think of themselves 

as a political party.

Mrs. Fenwick. Do you know of any Polisario atta cks on the 

territory of Morocco?

Ms. Lippert. Yes; there have been attacks on Tan Tan, Morocco, 

and some other areas in southern Morocco. In fact, I have talked to 

prisoners from Tan Tan from the June 27 raid in the desert.

Mrs. F enwick. Of what year?

Ms. Lippert. Of this year. Th at is why I made the point th at I 

made in my written testimony and also in the oral testimony. One of 

the things th at people are beginning to raise now is this question of the 

Polisario attacks on Moroccan territory. I repeat this again. I think 

it is terribly important to realize it was Morocco that invaded first 

the western Sahara, that territory.

Mrs. F enwick. You did mention the invasion of the Morocqans, 

but you did n ot mention the invasion of the Moroccan territory. Are 

you a member of this Committee on Africa? Do you go unde r the 

auspices of some other group?

Ms. Lippert. Actually I belong to a group called the Saharan 

People Support Committee. It is a group of interested people that 

was formed in late 1977.

Mrs. Fenwick. W hat do you call them?

Ms. Lippe rt. Saharan People Support Committee.

Mrs. F enwick. Could you give us a lette rhead or whatever with 

names on it?

Ms. Lippe rt. The headquarters of th at institution are in Ada, Ohio.

Mrs. F enwick. Who is the head of it?

Ms. Lippert. I am currently the president and chairman of that.

Mrs. F enwick. Is t ha t a big group?

Ms. Lippe rt. Actually, it is as difficult for us to give the number 

in the Sahara Support Committee as it is to give the number of 

people in the western Sahara.

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to refer to two very sharply contradictory statements 

in Professor Lippert’s paper and Professor Zartman’s paper and 

simply see if we could not reconcile wh at the fact is so that we migh t 

be a little more able to deal with this problem.

At the top of page 6, Professor Lipp ert says in those miles she 

traveled: “I noted Polisario forces have major bases throughout the 

Moroccan ‘controlled’ territory.” In your paper, Professor Zartman, 

you say: “If Polisario attacks continue into Moroccan territory from 

privileged sanctuaries in Algeria,” which leads me to believe these 

are hit-and-run attacks coming out of Algeria.

I am simply trying to see which of these reflect the actual situation 

there now. Do you reject Professor Lipp ert’s comment that the 

Polisarios have major bases throughout this whole territory and, 

therefore, it makes it necessary then to use privileged sanctuaries out 

of Algeria? Is that your contention?
51

Mr. Zartman. I think the difference would be on the major bases. 

The Polisario has bases, installations, it has arms caches w ithin the 

western Sahara. The center of its operations is in the Tindouf area.

* It is from there that the attacks start.

Now, there are installations within the territory as well and these 

have increased.

# Mr. Fithian. You are saying that the major origin of this is in 

Algeria?

Mr. Zartman. Th at is right.

Mr. Fithian. Do you agree with that?

Ms. Lippert. I have not seen any of the bases around Tindouf and 

I have traveled through the camps. I t is quite possible not to see th at. 

I hold to the statement that I noted no m ajor bases, in other words, 

large areas where there actually were land rovers, trucks, all kinds of 

equipment th at we traveled through.

Mr. Fithian. You are not really rejecting Professor Zartman’s 

indication th at certain portions of operations are coming out of sanctuaries in Algeria territory.

Ms. Lippe rt. I assume some of the arms shipments to the Polisario 

are going through that territory. I traveled in the western Sahara 

along through here over to the Atlantic coast. In all of that area I 

saw a t least two or three major staging bases.

Mrs. Fenwick. The reason for not having the U.N. man in the 

Tindouf you said was no t to be able to observe the Algeria bases.

Ms. Lippe rt. Tha t is a very different thing from the Polisario bases.

Mrs. Fenwick. How different?

Ms. Lippert. It seems to me in my logic if I were waging a war, if 

I were going to support the Polisario, why wouldn’t I use the airplanes 

that Algeria has along Tindouf?

Mrs. Fenwick. According to you, they do not want them to.

Ms. Lippert. And they do not do it, right. My theory is t ha t the 

Polisarios are operating. You have to make two distinctions. The 1962 

border war between Algeria and Morocco brought about some desire 

for peace along the whole frontier. With this whole increase in tension 

I am sure there is an arms buildup in Algeria.

Mr. Fithian. Professor Zartman, what you would like to see is a 

stalemate. I think tha t is w hat you say in your paper. Military defeat

♦ for either side would have serious consequences.

Mr. Zartman. Tha t is right.

Mr. Fithian. I take i t you would like to see the Polisario win. Am 

I reading you folks correctly?

• Ms. Lippert. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. I s tha t your position too, Mr. Houser?

Mr. Houser. I would not p ut it that way, but i t is true.

Mr. Fithian. A little tru th in these hearings does not h urt us at all.

Mr. Houser. We are talking diplomatically. The way to pu t it is 

that we are in favor of the independence of the western Sahara. Now, 

th at is quite a different thing. One point I agree with Professor 

Zartm an on and this is a point which is a m ajor point for U.S. policy, 

which is tha t there can be a negotiated approach to this and i t should 

be followed.

The essence of U.S. policy at this point should be to take some initia ­

tive in an international conference including the Polisario and/or 

their representatives, Mauritania and Morocco. It could be done in
52

a number of different places, New York, Washington, or in some p art 

of Western Europe.

Mr. Zartman. Not Algeria?

Mr. Houser. Do you want to include Algeria?

Mr. Zartman. I ask you.

Mr. Houser. All right, bu t I do no t think that would be the place 

it would be held. It could be. It would be any place that the parties 

involved would agree to meet. Therefore, the way to put the question, 

and tha t is why I answered as I did, is not the question of victory, bu t 

it is the question of the independence of the territory and how are you 

going to get this, because the war is going to continue; it is going to 

spread and there will be more attacks in Morocco as long as the problem is not settled.

Mr. Fithian. If we could focus on one other area.

Professor Zartman evaluates the situation that puts the armies of 

Algeria and Morocco at about the same size, but your analysis is th at 

the Algerian army is far stronger, far more modem, far more updated 

by the Soviets, et cetera. This leads to the question I thin k ultim ately 

for this committee as to what is in the best interests of the United 

States, to put it very baldly.

There are some options that we might seek. We may not be able to 

effect any one of these, but there are some options we mig ht seek. We 

could throw our weight behind OAU and say let us have a referendum 

and settle it that way. Would you agree with that sort of thing, Professor Lippert?

Ms. Lippe rt. I think the United Nations has asked the OAU to help 

resolve the thing. I would think th at the United State s would not want 

to do anything th at would keep that from happening. I know what you 

are asking me and the reason I am hedging is this.

Mr. Fithian. When I was a professor I used to hedge all the time.

Mr. Solarz. Professor, if you will yield for 1 minute, I feel 

obligated to point out to you when we have State Department witnesses they hedge all the time. We invite people like you so th at we can 

get some straightforward testimony about what we should do. Bu t the 

professors and the academics and the heads of organizations are beginning to sound more like the diplomats than the diplomats.

Ms. Lippert. I think we ought to support what the OAU is trying to 

effect.

Mr. Fithian. If it were left up to you, you would say let us have a 

referendum?

Ms. Lippe rt. Let us let the OAU resolve the problem. I t can be done 

by referendum. It will be difficult to do it by referendum at this time.

Mr. Fithian. Do the panel members here believe that the Polisario, 

in fact, would accept the OAU recommendation for a referendum?

Mr. Houser. One could say this about it and th at is th at t ha t has 

been the position of Polisario in the past. I think th ey would have to 

respond very sympathetically to any resolution such as this one tha t 

has passed the OAU. It is obviously up to them.

Mr. F ithian. Professor Lippert, do you think the OAU would accept 

that proposition?

Ms. Lippert. The Polisario would accept the OAU?

Mr. Fithian. Right.

Ms. Lipper t. Again, I cannot speak for the Polisario. In my own 

paper I made reference to the fact they talked about the undivided
53

territory. Th at certainly does not alter the fact of the referendum. I 

think they would respond affirmatively to the OAU.

Mr. Zartman. Interestingly the Polisario has been equivocal about 

the referendum. The Polisario consider themselves to be the sole and 

authentic representatives of the Saharawi people and that fact established, sometimes they talk of referendum; sometimes they have not.

I have talked to the Polisario and they have been very equivocal 

about it. Referendum depends, too, under what conditions it is held. 

If it is held with the Moroccans there that is different. Whether internationally supervised or not, that is different from one where all the 

people return.

Mr. Fithian. Let me ask one final question. In the larger context, 

to go beyond Africa now and include the entire Middle East, to what 

extent do you believe Algeria and Morocco and the influence of w hat 

might or might not eventuate here, to w hat extent are they importa nt 

to the overall comprehensive situation in the Middle Eas t with the 

settlement in the Middle East?

Mr. Zartman. I think it is extremely im portant to us. A settlem ent 

of this conflict will allow Algeria to do what i t is doing, th at is, suppo rt 

the rejection front. Settlement of this conflict will also allow Morocco 

to do what it has been doing before, but has not been able to do lately, 

and that is to support the Sadat initiative. It will untie its hands because Morocco’s diplomacy now is centered on this issue and this 

becomes a primary issue to it.

It is not as free, as we have seen from the state ment of Moroccan 

diplomats; it is not as free to support the Sadat initiative as it was in 

the beginning nor as it would be without the western Saharah question 

settled.

Mr. Fithian. Another part of that question is: What impact is a 

continuation of this sort of running war apt to have as far as you are 

concerned about he internal government of Morocco itself?

Mr. Zartman. I have said that a continuation of-----

Mr. Fithian. I am no t speaking of just whether they would be able 

to sit down and participa te in larger settlement in the Middle Eas t, 

bu t for the stability of their own government. Are they gettin g 

stretched out to any dangerous proportion by this continuance?

Mr. Zartman. The effect of this on the Moroccan domestic politics 

is very dangerous. The army, as I pointed out in my statement, as 

armies do and as Algeria and Morocco, can take independent action 

of its own, can turn either across the border or can turn against the 

monarchy. The army is in a very frustrating position at the present 

time. This issue is imp orta nt to the Moroccans’ political system, the 

entire Moroccan political system and a sharp defeat for the King puts 

the monarchy in great danger.

It is not because we are monarchists that one likes the monarchy 

in Morocco. I t is because it represents a particular direction in foreign 

policy, a particular political system under which party competition 

can operate as a stable government, the alternative to which is great 

instability. It is for this that the ma tter is important.

Mr. Fithian. A corollary to that would be that to the Polisario it 

would be to their advantage to continue to push this until Morocco 

crumbles in some fashion or another.
54

Mr. Zartman. The people I have talked to have said they recognize 

exactly w hat I have been saying, they said they would much rath er 

deal with the King because the King represents a coherent center of 

power in Morocco and can make decisions. It would be difficult to 

deal with a military regime.

A military regime tha t comes to Morocco will not give what the 

Polisario wants. It will be more adam ant in its war against the Polisario 

and against Algeria and will look for arms wherever it can find them.

I think the Polisario in its own interests, in its own goals, would 

rather deal with the King, assuming that it arrives where it wants to.

Mr. Fithian. Professor Lippert, with regard to the overall Middle 

Eas t question again, how important is this?

Ms. Lippe rt. Frankly, I have objected to linkage tightly with the 

Middle E ast, and say if you support Camp David and the Egyptian 

and Israeli accords then you have to vote for arms for Morocco. T hat 

is erroneous to me. I know th at both Morocco and Algeria have a role 

to play in the overall a ttitude of that , looking, I suspect, in terms of 

a final agreement on the Middle Eas t. At the same time I think it is 

dangerous to try to link all of N orth Africa to the Middle East.

Mr. Fithian. Sort of corollary to tha t, we asked earlier Professor 

Zartm an about the impact of this on Morocco internally. Do you see 

any way of negotiating a settlement which would allow Moroccans 

some face-saving in this?

Ms. Lippert. Truthfully I don’t. The Polisiyio would want the 

entire territory. In my judgment the territory should be an independent state. I am not sure how we could do it. I would th ink with our 

experience maybe on diplomacy we could manage to save the state. 

The problem with Morocco is that Morocco is in a very serious position. One of the soldiers I interviewed who had been captured at Tan 

Tan said he had spent all of his month’s pay buying food. Basically 

they were not getting enough food to eat in the army in Tan Tan. 

Maybe he was making up a story for me, b ut it was corroborated by 

a num ber of other people.

Some of the stories that we have about the rate of inflation—in 

some magazines it is listed as 50-percent inflation in the countryside— 

the real problem of getting food, I think i t is very important. I think 

we will all agree there should be a negotiated settlement.

Mr. Fithian. You have just commented on the overall Middle 

East aspect of this conflict and its imporatance.

Mr. Houser. M y judgm ent is t ha t it will not change the position 

either of Algeria or of Morocco, and I doubt if they have a tremendous 

effect upon the Middle Eastern situation in respect to the Sahara war 

except to the extent that you are involved in that kind of conflict. 

You are limited in what you can do elsewhere. I think the real danger 

is that the conflict could spread to a direct confrontation between 

Morocco and Algeria, bu t I think it must be clearly understood—I 

believe in my own mind that Polisario is not a puppet of Algeria. It is 

a definite independent political body of its own and I believe tha t the 

war which is taking place there is obviously affecting Morocco much 

more th an it is Algeria.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
55

Mr. Solarz. Professor Zartman, in what way would resolution of 

the conflict in the Sahara enable the King to resume his support of 

the peace process in the Middle East, which I believe was your re-

• sponse to a question by Mr. Fithian?

Mr. Zartman. The parallel has been made with the war in Vietnam. 

During the war in Vietnam our hands were tied. We had a tough time 

doing some other things that we might have liked to do because our

» attentio n was focused there, because we were looking for support for 

our actions there, and that was the dominant element. It is exactly 

the same thing. This is a dominant preoccupation with Morocco at 

the present time. M. Boucetta, the foreign minister, made a speech 

as I understand it announcing that Morocco had nothing to do with 

the Sadat initiative, that i t had nothing to do with the early part of 

the Camp David negotiations and so on, a perfectly logical statement 

for Morocco to make.

Morocco wants to pu t itself on good terms with anybody who will 

support it and hence with other Arab States because of this hand-tying 

issue. If the issue were resolved it would be free to pursue again a policy 

that it was able to pursue when the issue was no t that important, and 

that is to help work out a moderate solution in the Middle E ast such 

as its well-known help in setting up the Sadat visit to Jerusalem.

Mr. Solarz. Do you believe, in fact, Morocco would publicly 

change its position and express its support for the peace tre aty between 

Israel and Egypt if the conflict in the Sahara was somehow or other 

resolved?

Mr. Zartman. Absolutely. Not only do I believe it, but I think 

after the Camp David negotiations, Sadat made contact with Morocco 

and was speaking the same kind of thing. There are a number of other 

indications of this kind certainly.

Mr. Solarz. What do you think Morocco’s position would be if we 

were willing to sell them arms for use in the Sahara? Would they under 

those circumstances be willing to once again publicly support the 

peace process in the Middle East, or would tha t not constitute a 

sufficient inducement?

Mr. Zartman. If that co nstituted a sufficient action to enable them 

to win and end the issue that way, then with an appropriate lag or 

something like that one could expect that kind of response. I think 

that we are unlikely to sell them arms to the extent that they would 

need and carry with it the other kind of changes tha t would be required 

for them to win. Again my point is th at it is not winning for one side 

here that is important but helping everybody get out of this problem 

by a solution in which each side finds some interest in that kind of 

solution as well.

It will save the Moroccan position but it will provide something for 

Algeria, it will provide something for Polisario, and will take care of 

the problem.

Mr. Solarz. What kind of compromise can you envision which 

could conceivably be acceptable to all parties to the conflict?

Mr. Zartman. This was spelled out in the paper and alluded to in 

my statement. In stating it again I am not saying that this patricular 

compromise would have to be adopted 100 percent. That is not 

diplomacy. T hat does not work tha t way. This is the framework for a 

tradeoff. Something for Morocco, a continued presence, a sovereignty 

over part of this territory. The variations could be a special status,
56

perhaps attachment to the King, perhaps a different kind of relationship such as the Italian provinces, autonomous relationship to the 

kingdom, something of th at kind.

For Algeria a ratification of the 1972 treaty which would give it •

a secure border and also set up a kind of joint exploitation of the 

benefit from the resources in the area. For the Polisario a presence, 

giving over to the Polisario the southern pa rt of the territory in federation or confederation, as one would like with Maruitania which are *

the closest people ethnically and socially to the Polisario Saharawi.

Many of them are Mauritanians themselves by birth. This kind of 

arrangement would allow them in addition by the treaty of April 

1976, to participate in the phosphate. In this case each party would 

get something, but not everything, of wha t i t wanted.

Mr. Solarz. Do you preclude the possibility of the establishment 

of an independent Saharawi ministate as it were in the Mauritanian 

pa rt of the Spanish Sahara?

Mr. Zartman. That is a possibility as well, I think, as long as what 

Morocco gets as part of its share in this agreement is part of the 

territory. A ministate of this kind I think has tremendous dangers, 

dangers of instability in the area, because it is going to be a weak state 

and it is going to look for alliances elsewhere. That could be an acceptable variation, a possible variation.

Mrs. Fenwick. What is the west Sahara? Are they Berbers? Are 

they blacks?

Mr. Zartman. Some are Arabs. When we say Arabs and Berbers 

we are talking about language. Some are Arabic-speaking, some are 

Berber-speaking. The people that are represented by the Polisario, 

most of the people in the former Spanish Sahara are Arab-speaking 

except for the Tekra tribe.

Mrs. Fenwick. They are a different race from the Arabs?

Mr. Zartman. In North Africa the population is for the most part 

Arabized Berbers, that is, their biological basis is Berber. In the Arab 

conquest they were assimilated and converted to Islam. So that 

biologically, if that is what we mean by race, there is very little difference between them. There is a group of th e inhabitants of North 

Africa, a large group in Morocco, smaller in Algeria, smaller in Tunisia and Libya, that still speak various Berger languages.

Mrs. Fenwick. So, do the western Sahara people? 

Mr. Z (

artman. The Tekna tribe does.

Mrs. Fenwick. Are there any blacks at all?

Mr. Zartman. No; not in the Saharan population. There are in 

southern Mauritania. There are some descendants of slaves. These 

t

are very dark-skinned people, again, but they are not blacks.

Mr. Solarz. Let me ask each of you w hat you think would happen 

if a referendum were held in which the ethnically identifiable Saharawi 

over the age of 18 were given the oppo rtunity to vote, including those 

who are living inside the western Sahara as well as those who are in 

adjacent areas, and they were given a choice in this referendum between the establishment of an independent Saharawi state in all of the 

former Spanish Sahara or a continuation of the political administrative 

status quo, in other words, one in which the Sahara was divided up 

into a Moroccan part and a Mauritanian part? If such a referendum 

were held, those were the choices, how do you think it would come out?
57

Mr. Houser. And on the assumption that all the elements were 

satisfied with the conditions, in other words, the best possible 

circumstances?

* Mr. Solarz. Under U.N. or OAU supervision.

Mr. Houser. Right, and without the military being present?

Mr. Solarz. W ith observers from Cook County.

Mr. Houser. Of course this is guesswork. I would simply say that

* I believe that the Polisario movement would win an overwhelming 

victory. When the U.N. mission went there in 1975 their report, if one 

wants that kind of objective evidence for what it is worth, their 

report was t ha t the people wanted independence and Polisario is the 

only movement of independence.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Lippert?

Ms. Lippert. I agree.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Zartman?

Mr. Zartman. If all of the four groups of the population I referred 

to before—refugees to Morocco, refugees to Algeria, people in the 

Spanish Sahara, and nomads—all people conceivably could be included, participate in a referendum, it would be difficult to state the 

outcome. If the inha bita nts of the Sahara plus the people in Algeria 

alone, those two groups included, the Polisario would probably win.

Mr. Solarz. You said there were only 10,000 Saharawi that migrate d to Morocco. According to your own estimate there were I 

think you said-----

Mr. Zartman. 75,000 people there now.

Mr. Solarz. 50,000 in Tindouf.

Mr. Zartman. Under Moroccan administration, right.

Mr. Solarz. Th at is 125,000. In other words, I assume you would 

thin k that 50,000 in Tindouf would vote for independence?

Mr. Zartman. Th at is right.

Mr. Solarz. You think that the 75,000 in the Moroccan-administered areas would vote how? In favor of continued affiliation with 

Morocco under a genuinely independent impartial referendum?

Mr. Zartman. The people who are there now would split.

Mr. Solarz. Fifty-fifty?

Mr. Zartman. Well, we don’t know how many people there are.

Mr. Solarz. You estimated there were 75,000.

Mr. Zartman. OK.

* Mr. Solarz. You think it would be a roughly even division?

Mr. Zartman. Yes.

Mr. Solarz. How do you feel about that, Mr. Houser and Professor 

Lippert? We are talking about that p art of the Saharawi population

* that lives in the Moroccan-controlled part of the Sahara.

Mr. Houser. I really can’t give independent judgment on tha t. I 

have not visited that area or talked with the people.

Mr. Solarz. So do you preclude the possibility that they might have 

a different view?

Mr. Houser. No, not by any means. My own conviction is that 

Polisario has a tremendous following among the people in the southern 

part of Morocco and certainly in the north ern part of Mauritania. It 

has all the people in the camps in the Tindouf area of Algeria. My 

answer would be on the basis of w hat I do know and what I have seen 

of their organization is t ha t they would win.
58

Mr. Solarz. It is interesting to me tha t your view of the attitude 

of the Saharawi people is based on your experience in Tindouf 

basically.

Mr. Houser. Not entirely. It is based on my reading of reports 

from journalists who have been in the Moroccan areas where I have 

not at this point been.

Mr. Solarz. They seem to indicate an attitude essentially similar to 

the attitude of the Saharawi in Tindouf.

Mr. Houser. That is the basic impression I have, yes.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Zartman, what leads you to believe th at the 

attitude of the Saharawi in the Moroccan areas of the western Sahara 

would be so significantly different than the Saharawi in Tindouf?

Mr. Zartman. Some are returned refugees from Morocco. They are 

people who have stayed rathe r than people who have fled.

Mr. Solarz. Th at does not necessarily mean that they favor continued Moroccan sovereignty administration. There are always people 

who prefer to remain where they are for a variety of reasons even if 

they don’t necessarily favor the sovereignty which currently rules 

over then.

Mr. Zartman. I am afraid I wouldn’t have-----

Mr. Solarz. Have you been there—to El Aaiun?

Mr. Zartman. No; I have not been there. I think this is being 

pushed to a point where I wouldn’t have any faith in th e answer t ha t 

anybody else would give. One doesn’t know. How many people who 

have gone there and talked, speak Arabic and have been alone with 

the population?

Mr. Solarz. These are all relative questions. You have indicated in 

your testimony in your judgment the Polisario could not continue its 

struggle if it were not receiving sanctuary and support from Algeria. 

Am I correct?

Mr. Zartman. That is right.

Mr. Solarz. Why is that? Why couldn’t they continue?

Mr. Zartman. They would run out of arms, ammunition, and food.

Mr. Solarz. In Angola by comparison the UNITA insurgency 

which is led by Jonas Savimbi has no sancturaries in any neighboring 

country. The amount of outside support it receives is extremely 

indeterminate. Yet it has managed to maintain, in spite of the presence 

of 20,000 Cuban troops in tha t country, continually militarily effective insurgents. If they can do it in Angola, why could not the Polisario 

do it in the Sahara?

Mr. Zartman. For one thing you can live off the countryside in 

Angola. You can’t live long in the Sahara.

Mr. Solarz. Any other reasons?

Mr. Zartman. It depends on how rapidly they use their ammunition, the conditions for maintenance of a vehicle t ha t goes across this 

terrain. The terrain has been described.

Mr. Solarz. According to Professor Lippert, the Polisario already 

have bases all over the Sahara. They have been able to maintain bases 

throughout the Sahara. Why wouldn’t they be able to continue to 

maintain them if they didn’t have bases in Algeria?

Mr. Zartman. Where would they get the maintenance materials? 

Where would they get the food if they were cut off from th eir supply?
59

Mr. Solarz. They might get it from the Moroccans through military 

engagements in which they overrun outposts or cities.

Mr. Zartman. They would get some of that . They do now, t ha t is

• true, bu t that is not a continual supply. I think it would be very 

difficult to continue for any len gth of time under those conditions. The 

fact th at one has forward posts—I think you said staging bases at one 

point, and I agree with tha t description, is a very different thing from

• having a continual supply of p arts for trucks that are going through 

the hamada that is very wearing on vehicles.

Mr. Solarz. In your respective judgments why is Algeria supporting 

the Polisario? Is it out of a deeply rooted ideological political commitmen t to the idea of self-determination? Is it support of a liberation 

struggle? Is it because they see an oppo rtunity to establish a Polisario 

government, a government over which they will hold sway, because 

somehow or other they think this will give them a be tter opportunity 

to secure the resources of the Sahara because they want to weaken 

Morocco? There may be a mixture of motives, but which of these 

are predominant?

Mr. Zartman. The Algerian support it first of all for ideological 

reasons. I mentioned it in my statement. They believe in a struggle 

by a national liberation war because that is their history. You just 

heard we should support governments that look like us. We tend to 

read history in terms of our own experience. The Algerians are favorable to this kind of movement; particularly Boumediene was attached 

to the Polisario movement. Algeria believes that people should achieve 

independence by the same process it does, that is, a referendum at 

the end that consecrates a military victory.

Just as important, and one that counts now, is this rivalry with 

Morocco. Algeria does not want to see Morocco bigger and selfsufficient in a major element of supply in the phosphates that would 

give it a comer on the market on phosphates and therefore able to 

operate on its own. Algeria wants to be the dominate power in the 

area and this would challenge them.

Mr. Solarz. Are there any Algerian forces fighting with the 

Polisario?

Mr. Houser. No.

Mr. Solarz. Tha nk you, Mr. Houser.

• Professor Lippert, are you aware of any?

Ms. Lippe rt. No. One time in the war, and actually I would like 

to add a little bit to what he said about Algeria’s interests. Algeria 

I don’t think got committed to the struggle until 1976. In January 

t and February of th at year there were bombings with napalm on 

refugees. A t that poin t the Algerian convoy that went into Amgala, 

there were some Algerians perhaps captured in the war. Th at is the

only time.

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Houser and Professor Lippert, are you aware of 

any military aid which Algeria is giving the Polisario? They are not 

giving them troops. Do they have military advisers working with 

the Polisario?

Ms. Lippe rt. I didn’t see any.

Mr. Solarz. Were you aware of any?

Ms. Lippe rt. No.

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Houser?
60

Mr. Houser. I agree. There was absolutely no indication of anything other than material assistance and there is definitely military 

assistance.

Mr. Solarz. What kind of military assistance is Polisario provided?

Mr. Houser. Weapons. Some are captured of course. Some are 

purchased. But Algeria is helpful in terms of what Polisario needs.

Mr. Solarz. Does Polisario get the bulk of its weaponry from 

Algeria?

Mr. Houser. Through Algeria, but not necessarily from Algeria. 

I cannot answer t ha t because this is difficult. I did not snoop around 

to find out.

Ms. Lipper t. In some of the areas where I saw trucks, most of it 

was captured Moroccan material. The only arms I saw were Russian. 

I looked at the dates on those. There were dates like 1973 and 1975. 

There are reported larger arms.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Zartman, are you aware of the extent to 

which Algeria is helping the Polisario?

Mr. Zartman. As far as I am aware the orders given by the 

Algerian Government, the promise given Morocco that no Algerian 

troops will cross the line has been held since Amgala. No one knows the 

mix between Algerian and Libyan support.

Mr. Solarz. You don’t know of any Algerian advisers working 

with the Polisario in terms of providing military guidance?

Mr. Zartman. I understand that there is Algerian training given 

to the Polisario. I have brought back no Algerians with me or pictures 

of them.

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Houser or Professor Lippert, are the Algerians 

providing military training, in your judgment, to the Polisario?

Mr. Houser. No; I don’t think they are.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Lippert?

Ms. Lippert. I don’t think so. Going back to the history in the 

area, some of the people who are fighting still are people who were 

fighting in the early 1960’s.

Mr. Solarz. Is any country giving them training or are they 

self-trained?

Ms. Lippert. They have been asked by other countries to help 

train them.

Mr. Solarz. Other countries have volunteered the training?

Ms. Lippert. No. Because of the success of their guerrilla war 

they have been asked by other nations to give military training.

Mr. Solarz. They have not received military training from any 

other country?

Mr. Houser. At this point in their existence they are strong 

enough to give their own military leadership and training. I visited 

some of the schools which are open for persons going there.

Mr. Solarz. Are they receiving any kind of Cuban assistance?

Mr. Houser. No.

Ms. Lippert. No.

Mr. Solarz. Are they receiving assistance that you are aware 

of from any of the Eastern bloc countries?

Mr. Houser. There is nothing that comes from the Soviet Union. 

No; not that I know of. They do get some captured weapons that 

come from both West and E ast through Morocco.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Lippert.
61

Ms. Lippert. I am not aware of any.

Mr. Solarz. You indicated in your testimony that an independent 

Saharawi republic would be generally nonalined.

Ms. Lippe rt. That is right.

Mr. Solarz. I am not quite sure what nonalined means these days.

I take it you don’t mean it would be nonalined in the sense that, say, 

Cuba is nonlined?

Ms. Lippe rt. No. In fact in my paper I say their nonalinment 

policy resembles that of Nigeria and Tanzania. I think what they are 

trying to do is what a number of other nations are trying to do, t ha t is 

benefit from the technology, bu t at least control their own destiny.

Mr. Solarz. Do you have any sense of the exten t to which they are 

receiving help from Libya?

Mr. H ouser. I asked when visiting some of the refugee camps about 

certain obvious materials they had such as tents and they certainly 

have received some tents from Libya. Th at was one very definite thing. 

I think tha t most of the medical assistance does not come in th at way. 

I think some of the clothing perhaps does. But it comes through some 

international refugee organization. I thin k military assistance comes 

through Libya no doubt, some.

Ms. Lippe rt. Again I don’t really have any answer on tha t. I 

imagine Libya has been giving arms support, b ut I don’t know to what 

extent. The thing I would like to mention is that in terms of repair, our 

land rover broke down four times that one night in the space of 2 days 

with a fan belt. The fan belt was a rope. They would s it down and 

reweave the rope and put it back on the fan and we would continue on. 

We had a lot of punc tured tires. They would see a little bit of rubbe r 

left in some wreck of some Moroccan truck. They would pick that 

piece of rubbe r and stick it in.

Mr. Solarz. We spoke earlier about what would happen if there 

were a referendum. I gather the OAU by a substantial margin has voted 

in favor of a referendum as a way of providing a transition into 

nationally acceptable form of self-determination in tha t territory. Is it, 

in fact, practical and possible to hold a referendum assuming that 

Morocco, Algeria, Polisario, and Mau ritan ia all agreed, given the fact 

that you have some of them in Morocco, many are in Tindouf, others 

are wandering back and forth? Could you technically have such a 

referendum?

Given the e xtent to which also I gather some Moroccans have moved 

into the Sahara could you ever get agreement on who was entitled to 

vote in this referendum?

Mr. Zartman. I t seems to me there are two ways of looking a t this 

idea of referendum. One is endorsing a principle and somehow le tting 

somebody worry about how to apply it. The history of the OAU in 

this particula r one shows it has been a very troublesome problem to it 

and they would like to get rid of in some way. It may have been in 

this sense th at tha t was voted.

Other th an that a referendum I think almost universally follows an 

agreement on political conditions. Nobody would be so naive as to 

think that Algerians held their referendum, that people sat there 

wondering what would happen. Everybody knew that the Algerians 

would ratify their independence by something like tha t. The very 

notion of a referendum requires a political settlement beforehand, 

negotiated, and the parties to determine under w hat conditions, who

5 1 -3 0 3 0 - 7 9 - 5
62

will participate. The kind of thing I have been talking about is n ot 

incompatible with a referendum. It can take place in pieces and parts 

altogether. But it is the political decision that must come first. The 

OAU resolution is unenforceable, unoperative as it stand s now.

Mr. Solarz. Does the fact that Morocco has not agreed to a 

referendum until now indicate t ha t the y lack confidence in their ability 

to win such a referendum?

Mr. Zartman. Tha t is a legitimate inference. I th ink it also has to be 

seen in view of the fact that Morocco followed a pattern that was 

earlier endorsed by Algeria. Algeria agreed to this kind of settlement 

back in 1972 and 1973 before it was actually—a negotiated settlem ent 

between Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain. Morocco went forward with 

this kind of negotiation and then incorporated it in its territory. Now 

once this action has taken place, Morocco no more than Algeria could 

say we will throw it away and we will start a referendum all over again.

It means a denial of the agreement th at was reached in good faith.

Mr. Solarz. In your conversations with Moroccans have you 

gathered any impressions about the extent to which they believed if 

there were a referendum the people would vote for continued affiliation with Morocco?

Mr. Zartman. I t is a little bi t like asking the Polisario people if they 

get aid from Cuba. I t would be hard to get a straightfo rward answer.

Mr. Houser. It is not difficult

Mr. Solarz. Did you ask the question or not?

Mr. Houser. Yes.

Mr. Zartman. Yes.

Mr. Solarz. Wh at did they say.

Mr. Zartman. Again it depends on the conditions. There is a expectation under certain conditions one m ight win. U nder other conditions one might not win.

Mr. Solarz. What if it were conducted by the U.N. or OAU?

Mr. Zartman. It depends on who participates.

Mr. Solarz. If all of these various people partic ipated?

Mr. Zartman. I don’t know.

Mr. Solarz. I wonder if for conceptual purposes, so tha t I can get a 

better understanding of this, any of you can possibly compare the 

relationship between Polisario and Algeria to the relationship between, 

say, western Somalia Liberation Fr ont and the G overnment ol Somalia 

to the extent to which each is independent of the other, to the extent 

to which each is wholly independent for support.

Mr. Houser. I would like to make some other analysis with which 

I am personally more familiar. I would say the relationship is very 

similar to the Frelimo relationship with Tanzania. It is similar to the 

PAIGC relationship with the Republic of Guinea in the struggle for 

independence in Guinea-Bissan in Guinea. It is very similar to the 

relationship that Algeria had to Tunisia and Morocco after they became independent.

Mr. Solarz. Similar to the relationship of the Patriotic Front and 

Mozambique and Zambia?

Mr. H ouser. Yes. One can say in dealing with the previous question 

that if in the case of any of the countries in which the movem ent is 

based, if the policy of tha t country changed then you have a problem, 

but not always, a problem tha t cannot be dealt with in other ways if 

the necessity arises.
63

Mr. Solarz. All of you would agree, I gather, it would be in our 

interest if this conflict could be peacefully resolved. To what extent 

do we have a sufficient amount of interest to play a much more active 

diplomatic role in the search for such a settlement than we have in 

the pas t or to w hat extent do you think tha t this is one of these problems where we are perhaps best off to let the other countries take the 

leading role?

Really the United S tates cannot be the central diplomatic actor in 

every conflict in the world. We can only handle a number of issues. 

Wh at do you think our diplomatic approach should be? Should it be 

an active one trying to take the initiative in search for a se ttlem ent, 

proding the parties to get together, or should we tak e a neutral position and say:

This is not really our problem. We stand ready to help if you think there is 

some way we can be useful, but we don’t consider it appropriate for us to send 

missions here, there, everywhere, trying to get the parties together.

Mr. Houser. I thin k it could be approached in a very disinterested 

fashion if the United State s were not giving military assistance to 

Morocco. But as long as the United States is giving military assistance 

to Morocco the issue is going to be of importance, and growing importance, because it is receiving much more international attentio n 

tha n it has before a t the United Nations, at the OAU meeting.

The press is going there now and it is still pre tty unknown to be 

sure, bu t it no longer is as unknown as it was. I think the United 

States will have to take cognizance of that and play a role which is 

supportive of some kind of international conference, hopefully bringing all the parties together. Without all of them being there it would 

not be an international conference.

Mr. Solarz. Obviously the parties to the conference themselves 

can meet with each other if they want to. There is nothing to prevent 

them from doing th at if th at is w hat they prefer. Assuming there is 

a certain reluctance on their part to initiate such proceedings because 

th at would be considered a sign of weakness or because of the animosities t ha t have been built up, who should take the initiative in trying 

to bring them together, the OAU, Spain, the United States, or should 

we leave it to the people there themselves?

Mr. Zartman. I think th e United States working with other friendly 

parties, Spain, France. You will be going to Spain b ut not to Franc e; 

and France certainly has an important role in this.

Mr. Solarz. Add Paris to the itinerary.

Mr. Zartman. And I would think an Arab country which has 

already tried, there are two countries that have tried, a number have 

tried, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. E gyp t is not useful, Saudi 

Arabia could be. A number of countries working in concert. I am no t 

suggesting th at we try a Kissinger shuttle on this. It is n ot of t ha t 

magnitude for us nor are our interests that closely related, b ut working 

through providing good offices in concert with a number of other 

countries.

African and Arab and the two European countries mentioned I 

think are impo rtant. The OAU will no t do it.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Lippert, what is y our feeling?
64

Ms. Lippert. The reason I brought up the idea of the United 

States assisting in a negotiated settlement would be the fact that the 

United States has always claimed Morocco as a special friend. One of 

the parties that is particularly loath to extricate itself is Morocco. I t 

seems to me rather than send Morocco arms maybe we could assist 

them some way in extricating themselves from something that is 

causing them financial ruin. I wouldn’t wa nt too many to get involved 

in this.

There are real people at stake. There is a conflict between Polisario 

and Morocco, Polisario and Mau ritan ia. Th at cannot be lost from 

sight.

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Houser, Professor Lippert, if Morocco agreed not 

to use our arms in the Sahara and, in fact, was prepared to abide by 

that commitment, would you object under those circumstances to our 

providing arms to Morocco, assuming the conflict continued?

Mr. Houser. I thought we dealt with that earlier?

Mr. Solarz. I asked a different question. I asked earlier whether 

you would favor the sale of arms to Morocco if the arms were not 

suitable for use in the Sahara. Th at assumed a continued unwillingness on the part of Morocco agreeing not to use them in the Sahara. 

Supposed they reverse their position and tomorrow they said, “I agree 

not to use whatever you give me in the Sahara,” would you then be 

opposed to the sale of American arms to Morocco as long as the conflict continued?

Mr. Houser. Yes.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Lippert?

Ms. Lippe rt. One of the things tha t has struck me is that someone 

at the S tate De partment told me they have 13 people there to observe 

the use of U.S. arms in the country. I am really loath, given the history 

of this use of arms outside the territory, to take the state ment on face 

value.

Mr. Houser. I would like to explain the reason I said yes, was tha t 

there is an agreement at the present time that American arms will 

not be used in the Sahara, and they are being used.

I just don’t know how you police or inspect this sort of thing.

Mr. Solarz. We have people like you going there, taking pictures?

Mr. Houser. That is n ot very effective.

Mr. Solarz. Supposing Morocco were attacked by another country, 

are you saying that so long as Morocco maintains its insistence on 

holding on to the Sahara we should not provide them any help? 

Would that also be your position?

Mr. Houser. I don’t like to hedge either, but it is very difficult to 

give a yes or no answer to something that can be so misunderstood. 

Therefore, I really hesitate to do it. My position essentially is t ha t I 

do not believe the United States should give military supp ort to 

Morocco as long as Morocco is the occupying force and is using those 

weapons in the war which is going on. Th at is essentially my position.

Mr. Solarz. We should not provide them first, so long as they are 

an occupying power, and so long as they are using our weapons to 

maintain the occupation.

Now, if you can conceptually separate those two parts of your position, my understanding was tha t you testified earlier that even if the 

arms weren’t being used in the Sahara, you would still be opposed to
65

giving them arms so long as they remain an occupying power; is that 

a fair summary of your position?

Mr. Houser. Yes, sir; I think it is.

» Mr. Solarz. Because you would see that preseumably as a way of

putting pressure on Morocco to cease being an occupying power by 

denying them something which they want?

Mr. Houser. I would like to see that sort of policy followed with a

• positive approach to dealing with the solution to the problem.

Mr. Solarz. Doesn’t Morocco get arms from other countries?

Mr. Houser. Surely.

Mr. Solarz. The arms it get from us it buys from us basically? 

What would be gained if we stopped selling arms completely to 

Morocco? Surely the arms they get are not so sophisticated that we are 

the only country that manufactures them. There are plenty of oth er 

countries th at would be more than happy to boost their arms ind ustry 

by selling arms—France, Britain, Italy, Germany, other countries. 

So what would be gained if we adopted your recommendation as our 

policy?

Mr. Houser. We would have a policy.

Mr. Solarz. Pardon?

Mr. Houser. We would have a policy. It would be the policy tha t 

we are not supporting Morocco in the western Sahara.

Mr. Solarz. Th at I understand; bu t in terms of achieving any 

results as a consequence of t ha t policy, so long as Morocco can continue to get arms elsewhere, in what way would they be more likely 

to cease their occupation of the western Sahara?

Mr. Houser. I believe tha t that is a problem for Morocco, but the 

United States should have its own policy. If Morocco is going to get 

arms from elsewhere, let those other countries bear the blame for it.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Zartman, is Morocco getting arms from elsewhere?

Mr. Zartman. I don’t know what Morocco’s current arms purchases 

are. We are not the sole supplier of arms to Morocco.

Mr. Solarz. If we cease selling arms to Morocco, what do you think 

will happen?

Mr. Zartman. Morocco would get some arms elsewhere. I can’t 

answer that in a detailed way for each type of arm ament th at has been 

requested, bu t what would happen in regard to our relations, and it 

is our policy th at we are concerned about, our interests, is that a 

nonresponsiveness to Moroccan concerns means we lose a very good 

tie with a country that is important to us. I think sometimes we want 

a policy of purity, not effectiveness.

Mr. Solarz. In Morocco can you give us your sense of how much 

power the King has vis-a-vis the rest of the government; what is the 

dominant political factor in the country?

Mr. Zartman. The King is the dominant force in government. 

He relates to, negotiates with, has to face, the demands of the parties. 

He is not an absolute monarch by any means, but he is certainly 

the coherent center of power.

Mr. Solarz. Would you say he has as much power in Morocco as 

the new president has in Algeria?

Mr. Zartman. He certainly has more power, because the new president in Algeria is new and has not developed his position.
66

Mr. Solarz. In th at sense, you would not call Morocco a democracy? 

Mr. Zartman. I would not call Morocco a democracy, because

Morocco is a monarchy. If we are using one term to apply to a form 

of government, one has to use the broadest generalization. I am not 

quite sure where we go from there whether we only deal with democracies or what.

I would call it a country that has a multiparty system in which 

it has parties, par ty elections, where the people have a choice, where 

the parties have a history of existing, where there is one of the freest 

presses in the Third World, where there is a free and competitive 

trade union system.

Mr. Solarz. Does the government which is elected by these parties 

have any power?

Mr. Zartman. Certainly.

Mr. Solarz. But the monarch has much more power? Can they do 

anything he doesn’t want them to do?

Mr. Zartman. They can bargain with him to change hi s mind on some things, certainly. They have an effect on policy, yes.

Mr. Solarz. How would you compare the power of the Parliament 

in Morocco to the power of the Parliament in Iran under the Shah?

Mr. Zartman. Much more; much, much more.

Mr. Solarz. So the King has less power than the Shah had?

Mr. Zartman. Yes; th at is a meaningful way of putting it.

Mr. Solarz. There are a number of people who suggested th at 

the situation in Morocco is gettin g very serious from a political, 

economic, and military point of view. The war is unwinable, and the 

monarchy itself will be m danger if the war is not brought to an end 

relatively soon, because of th e growing dissatisfaction among military 

and other sectors of society with a war which is draining the country 

of its resources, which is not producing any favorable results.

In those terms, would a decision on the part of the United States 

to continue providing military assistance and maybe encouraging the 

King to continue fighting in the Sahara in the hope that eventually 

he might win and m that sense perhaps contribute to the undoing 

of the monarchy itself, and would it, on the other hand, perhaps, if 

we have an interest in maintaining a friendly government in Morocco, 

be helpful to the King to indicate that we are n ot prepared to be supporting Morocco with military assistance as a way of forcefully indicating it is in his interest to get out of this thing, because he can’t 

win, either with or without military assistance, and it does him no 

service to continue fighting?

Mr. Zartman. That argument draws all the wrong conclusions to 

the initial premises. As I said before, U.S. arms supplies to Morocco 

are not going to make the difference in winning the war, getting rid 

of the Polisario, getting us a solution, and we can forget about the 

problem after that.

The United States not giving support of some kind to Morocco, 

the United States, particularly with other countries, not helping to 

end this problem is certainly going to work more than anything toward 

a continuation of the war, a spreading of the war ou t of frustration of 

the military and quite possibly an end of the monarchy, quite the 

reverse of the conclusion-----

Mr. Solarz. Why would the cessation of military assistance lead 

to an expansion of the war or its prolongation?
67

Mr. Zartman. Cessation of all military assistance?

Mr. Solarz. Yes, by the United States.

Mr. Zartman. Th at is a difficult one to draw a conclusion on. 

Cessation of all military assistance—worsening fortunes in the war at 

the hands of the military—is likely to lead to the military doing one 

of two thin gs: Pursue the Algerians where they see the source of the 

problem, where they can get them—tha t may not be a rational 

response, the military acts that way sometimes—or turn against 

the throne.

Mr. Solarz. Is Morocco—given the existing balance of power in 

the area—is Morocco capable of winning?

Mr. Zartman. It is hard to call these kinds of things. The armies 

are of similar size. Your people tomorrow will tell you about them in 

much more detail, about the order of battle of the two parties.

Algeria’s air force I believe is superior, Algeria could do a good 

deal to Morocco, I think, more than the reverse, in the war.

Mr. Solarz. Why has Morocco refrained from striking at the 

Polisario bases in Tindouf, particularly given the Polisario attacks on 

Moroccan territory?

Mr. Zartman. For the same reason tha t any country would hesitate 

to cross the border of anoth er country. In the recent session of the 

security council, Morocco claims these attacks came from Algeria 

and was not able to show there were Algerians that carried it out. 

Th at puts Morocco in a weak position.

Mr. Solarz. Why would not Morocco limit itself to attacks on 

Tindouf?

Mr. Zartman. Tindouf is still Algerian. It means crossing the 

border.

Mr. Solarz. They stopped Rhodesia from attacking patriotic 

front bases.

Mr. Zartman. This is not Rhodesia.

Mr. Solarz. Why do you think they have not attacked these bases?

Mr. Zartman. Because there is an international border and because 

the Algerian army is capable of making a very strong response.

Mr. Solarz. I suspect the lat ter is a more relevant consideration. 

For example, if a Southwest American liberation movement formed 

and established bases in Mexico and started to conduct raids across 

the Rio Grande into Texas and New Mexico, I do not imagine we 

would stop at the border, if necessary, in order to deal with it.

Mr. Zartman. No comment.

Mr. Solarz. I am not advocating sending the Marines into Mexico. 

Obviously governments do what they have to do to protect their 

people when they can get away with it.

Mr. Zartman. Th at is exactly the problem in which Morocco finds 

itself.

Mr. Solarz. I wonder if each of you could comment on the circumstances surrounding the decision on the p art of the Djemaa to affiliate 

with Morocco. I gather the Moroccans claim this as a basis for their 

cooperation in their part of the Spanish Sahara. Was this a legitimate 

action or what?

Mr. Houser. I am not an authority on that . My understanding is 

that 100 out of 102 members have joined with the Polisario.

Mr. Solarz. One hundred out of one hundred and two members of 

the Djemaa at that time?
68

Mr. Houser. No; at the present time. One hundred out of one 

hundred and two of those who were at that time are now with the 

Polisario.

Mr. Solarz. There were 102 members at that time?

Mr. Houser. Th at is my understanding.

Mr. Solarz. When was th at exactly?

Mr. Houser. I cannot tell you.

Mr. Solarz. When did the Djemaa vote to affiliate with Morocco?

Ms. Lippert. Th at is another problem. Th at is a problem of 

numbers. Theoretically, there are two actions by Djemaa. One is 

Djemaa voted to affiliate with Morocco. Polisario claims there are 

some documented journalists who saw members of the Djemaa in 

Algeria later on who said Djemaa voted to disband itself and join the 

Poli sario front.

I do not have dates on the Moroccan, b ut I think it was November 

14, 1975.

Mr. Solarz. W hat is it that Djemaa allegedly voted for?

Ms. Lippert. According to the Polisario, they voted to disband 

themselves and to go with the Polisario. T hat is one statement.

Mr. Solarz. Do you know the Moroccan statement?

Ms. Lippert. I have heard the Moroccan statement.

Mr. Solarz. I used to teach in a university. To the exten t that 

you have an interest in dispassionately pursuing th e t ruth here, which 

is presumably what your intention is as a professor, I think it is all 

well and good to travel with the Polisario to find out their points of 

view. I find it hard to believe th at as someone who proclaims herself 

as a knowledgeable person about this conflict, th at you have not taken 

the trouble to ask the Moroccans wh at their point of view is.

Ms. Lippert. I have read a lot of the Moroccan material.

Mr. Solarz. You do no t seem to know wha t the Moroccan position 

is.

Ms. Lipper t. I said the Moroccan position was th at Djemaa voted 

to join the Polisario.

Mr. Zartman. On November 28, the Djemaa was gathered together by the Polisario, 65 members were gathered together by the 

Polisario after the tripartite agreements, and voted, gave supp ort to 

the Polisario as the national liberation movement of the Sahara and 

disbanded themselves.

They were then allowed to go their way. There is possibly a second 

vote that I am no t sure of.

Mr. Solarz. You say that 65 of them go t together?

Mr. Zartman. They were gathered together by the Polisario at 

Guelta Zemmur down in the eastern part of th e western Sahara.

Mr. Solarz. And voted to disband?

Mr. Zartman. I t is said one was given a speech to read and so on.

Mr. Solarz. When did they vote on the other part of it?

Mr. Zartman. There may be a second vote, and this I have not 

been able to verify although there are reports of a stat ement on 

December 22, in support of the Moroccan and Mauritanian administrations. However on February 28, 1976, Moroccan troops then being in 

place, there was a meeting called of the Djemaa again," This time they 

met at El Aaiun, including some 40—I do not think anybody knows 

exactly how much of an overlap there was—some 40 who had met at
69

Guelta Zemmur and passed a resolution in favor of Moroccan and 

Mauritanian registration.

Mr. Solarz. W hat was the total number at the Djemaa meeting?

Mr. Zartman. There were 65 on Febru ary 28, 67 on November 28.

Mr. Solarz. This is where the Moroccans were already in control?

Mr. Zartman. Sixty-five.

Mr. Solarz. How many members of the Djemaa were there all 

together?

Mr. Zartman. There were 102.

Mr. Solarz. In other words, we have an overlapping of the Djemaa 

that took part in each vote, once in the territory when the Polisario 

were around, then in the territory—what happened to the other 35?

Mr. Zartman. They were not there.

Mr. Solarz. Who were the people who belonged to the Djemaa?

Mr. Zartman. They are tribal chiefs chosen, we might say elected, 

by the tribal groups in the Sahara; a number of others, I do not have 

the numbers m front of me, but I can find the numbers of the composition, who were elected in cities under the Spanish by male voters 

in the Sahara; and a number of others then elected from a few professional groups, labor groups, chamber of commerce, and so on.

Mr. Solarz. Leaving aside the particular circumstances under which 

these votes took place, were not the Djemma considered more less 

broadly representative of the Sahara people?

Mr. Zartman. I thin k the Djemaa can be considered broadly representative of the Sahara people at the level of a territorial assembly 

as it exists in the last stage of colonial rule. That is why I said, similar 

to a lot of other countries. We can have many questions whether these 

tribal chiefs that represented the tribes are the same as those who 

would come ou t of a free election of all people. They are traditional 

leaders.

Mr. Solarz. You accept the argument that there was a prior vote 

by these—what was it, 40 members?

Mr. Zartman. No; 67 under the Polisario, 65 a t El Aaiun.

Mr. Solarz. You accept there was a prior vote by the 67 under the 

Polisario?

Mr. Zartman. Certainly.

Mr. Solarz. I am not an expert on this, but on the basis of what you 

say it would seem to me that a vote by 67 in the presence of the Polisario is no more likely to necessarily reflect an independent Djemaa 

than the vote of 65 in the presence of Moroccan forces. Would that be 

a fair statement?

Th at is not to say that one or the other is not correct, b ut to an outsider you could no t put much faith in either. I cannot imagine if I were 

a member of the Djemaa voting with the Polisario troops all around 

me that I would vote in favor of joining Morocco. Neith er can I 

imagine if I were a member of the Djemaa voting with Moroccan 

troops all around tha t I would vote for independence.

Mr. Houser. I can only give you an impression.

Mr. Solarz. Please.

Mr. Houser. My impression is tha t the Djem aa was not an effective 

instrument of the people. Now I am not prepared to go into details 

here today bu t perhaps it would be possible to submit something on 

this point of history.
70

I have heard about it and I have impressions. Maybe it would be 

possible for three of us to submit our own historical information dealing 

with this point because I do not believe it is an important point a t the 

present time.

Mr. Solarz. Does the legal and political legitimacy of the Moroccan 

position depend on their assertion that the Djemaa voluntarily voted 

in favor of incorporation into Morocco?

Mr. Zartman. It includes this in the elections that were held. The 

objections you are making are perfectly sound political objections. The 

only point t ha t can be made about this is tha t this is the same kind of 

action that was taken in the decolonization. It follows the precedent of 

decolonization. T hat covers the greater p art of Africa.

Mr. Solarz. I s it true that 100 out of 102 people who were a t the 

time members of the Djemaa now are identified with, allied with, or 

support Polisario?

Mr. Zartman. I have heard tha t. I would not give that as much 

credence as the figures on both sides that have been cited.

Mr. Solarz. I just have a few more questions. Supposing jus t for 

the purposes of discussion you were satisfied t ha t the great majority of 

the people, the Saharawi people, favored independence. If tha t were in 

fact the case, would that have any impact on your position? Would you 

at that point favor independence or would you say that because of the 

larger, greater power, geopolitical or other self-interest type of considerations, that tha t in and of itself is not dispositive of the issue?

Mr. Zartman. I think it is important to take into account larger 

geopolitical considerations as well. We are not a court of law. We are 

not setting up principles or looking a t things simply as political scientists. Our concern here at least is the concern of some kind of solution 

in the American national interest.

I think it is conceivable tha t there be a Polisario state. I do not 

think it is best for American interests.

Mr. Solarz. Let me ask Mr. Houser and Professor Lippert the 

opposite side of tha t question. Supposing hypothetically you were 

convinced tha t the great majority of the Saharawi people wanted to 

be associated with Morocco, but th at Polisario resisted tha t. At that 

point would you still support Polisario?

Mr. Houser. The struggle would disappear and there would be 

nothing to support after a short period of time. This is not something 

new in history. It has happened many times before, and in Africa.

If there is not a valid viable base for the movement, you could still 

support it if you want to, but it will just not be a movement tha t is 

supportable.

Mr. Solarz. I gather you would not support it, yourself, or your 

organization would not?

Mr. Houser. Of course not. We could not. Th at is not the case, I 

want to make it clear-----

Mr. Solarz. I understand. Th at was a hypothetical question. If an 

independent Saharawi state were established would you speak in 

terms of its foreign policy, would it be more or less a carbon copy of 

Algeria’s or do you think it would have positions th at differed in a 

number of different respects from Algeria?

Mr. Houser. In independence, yes, it would. It would be very 

independent.
71

Mr. Solarz. In what way would you think it would be likely to 

differ from Algeria?

Mr. Houser. It is difficult to answer th at in terms of what Algeria 

is. I think you have to answer it in terms of w hat the western Sahara 

is and what the Polisario is. They are a democratic movement based 

on their Muslim outlook. They have a socialism of their own which 

they are n ot in a position to implement under present circumstances, 

but within their structure in the camps I think one gets something of 

what it is. Just as they are independent now, they would be independent in the future.

If they were a carbon copy of anything else now, then one could not 

answer i t this way, b ut they are not.

Mr. Solarz. How much Marxist influence is there in the Polisario? 

Is the Polisario leadership Marxist-oriented?

Mr. Houser. If there is a contradiction, because you have to define 

Marxism, there are so many different brands, you have as many 

theologies of Marxism as you have religious sects.

I think their law is based on the Koran essentially. Their school is 

based on it. I was amazed in being with the Polisario people a t the 

devoutness of their faith and their prayers to Mecca.

Mr. Solarz. There are, as you know, some people who manage to 

weld a kind of strange philosophical and political amalgam between 

Marxism and Islam. There are such movements. It is not inconceivable. Robert Mugabe was described as a Marxist. Harli Mariam 

Mengistu was described as a Marxist. President Neto was described 

as a Marxist.

Mr. Houser. Polisario does not describe itself as Marxist. I also 

thin k of the statement of Cabral of the Guinea Bissau PAIBC, who 

said, “If you want to call me a Marxist, call me a Marxist. If you 

want to call me anything, call me tha t, but see what I am doing.” 

Th at is what you have to do in the case of the Polisario.

Mr. Solarz. They do not consider themselves Marxists?

Mr. Houser. I have no indication of it.

Mr. Solarz. There are liberation movements that clearly are 

oriented toward Marxism with some variation of it. There are others 

th at are clearly not. You would put, I gather, Polisario in the category 

of liberation movement which is not under Marxist influence or the 

leadership does not view itself as Marxist-oriented?

Mr. H ouser. It is a front that includes many tendencies. I think 

there probably are Marxists involved in them. They do not describe 

themselves as Marxists. You would have to define what was meant 

if you were going to try to make the case.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Zartman, how would you explain this?

Mr. Zartman. I do not think they are Marxist movements. There 

are a lot of factions in the organization. There are some people, I 

agree with part of the lat ter stateme nt, who may consider themselves 

Marxists. It is not a M arxist movement as a movement.

If anything it is a Qaddafist movement in Libya as beliefs go. I 

think it is important, it I can just add this, to realize that it is hard 

to predict what the situation is going to be 5 or 10 years from now on 

the basis of what the Polisario is at the present time. It is a movement 

that has done fantastically well under conditions of combat anti has 

welded a little spirit of national consciousness. That happened in 

Mauritania, not under combat but under political struggle, and the 

par ty fell apart within 10 years.
72

Its coherence is not assured. Certainly its Marxism is no t assured.

Mr. Solarz. One of our staff associates, Mr. Weissman, has been 

working very closely on this issue. He will be accompanying me in 

the area. Steve, do you have any questions you want to ask?

Mr. Weissman. I have just one question. Just in terms of Professor Zartman’s suggestion tha t a compromise might be some adjustment of the status of the southern tier of the western Sahara, you 

indicate Algeria might agree to such a compromise because they 

themselves perhaps do not want the collapse of the monarchy in 

Morocco because a military regime might rise up which might thre aten 

Algeria in some manner.

I am wondering whether given the fact that the events seem to be 

going Polisario’s way militarily on the ground, the position of the 

OAU, Maurita nia’s apparent withdrawal from the war, given the 

fact tha t according to many reports the Moroccan m ilitary is getting 

into not simply a mood of hot pursuit but there is considerable 

demoralization as well, would not Algeria, if they were thinking politically, bet tha t if this thing continues, if they do not accept a minimal 

compromise, they might achieve for their own purposes a weakened 

Morocco, that whoever succeeds might not be as clever or shrewd as 

King Hassan, they might achieve a situation therefore which would 

be better for their geopolitical advantage, and that even a military 

regime that could conceivably succeed? Hassan might be one tha t 

would, after some tough talk, be willing for Arab unity or whatever, 

to negotiate a settlement.

I am wondering whether the kind of compromise you suggest in 

other words fits the changing realities of the scene in the world, in 

terms of Polisario’s successes and in terms of Algeria’s real aspirations?

Mr. Zartman. W hat I had said earlier was th at Polisario felt that 

it had a greater, a more coherent party in front of it in the person of 

the King, not Algeria, th at Polisario was interested in dealing with the 

King.

Unfortunately, I am afraid that a lot of what you are saying is 

echoed in Algerian thinking. They think tha t a military regime or a 

weakened monarchy might be easier to deal with. I think some 

Algerians think a military regime might look like theirs, might be 

socialist, and so on.

I think they are very, very wrong in this. On the other hand, I do 

not think tha t what I am suggesting is outmoded, because there is 

Algerian interest in it. There are two of them in fact. One, I suggested, 

was that they might be interested in coming to an agreement before 

they lose what influence they have in the Polisario, and the Libyan 

side, the Libyan faction is increasing at the present time.

I am sure you have followed a similar type of situation in Chad 

where the factions were relating to each other and the two parties 

vied for influence.

Second of all, an agreement at the present time can get what Algeria 

thinks it deserves, and tha t is a ratification of t hat treaty. We have 

not gone into it and there is something in my testimony about it. I 

think it is an important element. It gives Algeria security on its 

border. A weak regime in Morocco would not be capable of signing 

tha t treaty, of securing a border. It would have to keep it open to 

justify its own position. Those are the elements of interest I think th at 

relate to Algeria. From my talks to Algerians, this is not inconceivable.
73

Mr. Solarz. None of you has said anything about Mauritania, nor 

have any of us asked about it. Briefly, what interest do they have in 

the situation?

Mr. Houser. I would like to say one thing about it, in regard to 

the OAU resolution, Mauritania voted for it, this one that has ju st 

gone through. Mau ritan ia’s position has been a different position than 

Morocco’s.

There are 7,000 Moroccan troops on Mauritanian soil. There has 

been a cease-fire for a year which has just recently ended because no 

positive steps were being taken by Mau ritan ia to implement it, bu t 

there have been many sessions held through the year between Mauritania and Polisario representatives.

Polisario looks at Mauritania in quite a different way than it does 

Morocco.

Mr. Solarz. Professor Zartman?

Mr. Zartman. Th at is true. Mauritania is drained and deeply 

wounded by this. The coup d’etat of June 1978, was the result of this. 

There was a second series of coups d ’eta t in April and May this year 

which resulted again in their inability to work their way out of it.

Mr. Solarz. If Maurita nia were willing to withdraw completely 

from this part of the Sahara and turn it over to the Polisario, could you 

conceive of the possibility tha t Polisario might be willing to accept 

this as a basis for settlement of the overall conflict giving them sovereignty over that part of the Sahara with some kind of relationship 

to the rest of it? Would that clearly be unacceptable to them?

Mr. Houser. It would be unacceptable but it would be the basis for 

an agreement with Mauritania, but that is all.

Mr. Solarz. In other words, the same way tha t Arafat might accept 

the West Bank and Gaza if he would give it. T hat does not necessarily 

mean that his ambition to establish a larger Palestinian stat e has 

necessarily been abandoned.

Mr. Houser. I t would be an agreement with Mauritania. It would 

not be an agreement with Morocco, nor would it be an agreement 

with the settlement of the struggle in the western Sahara.

Mr. Solarz. Which would continue?

Mr. Houser. I t would continue.

Mr. Solarz. Let me take this opportunity to than k all of you for 

coming. I think this has been a very interesting hearing. I think there 

really has been a lamentable lack of interest and concern on the part 

of the Congress with this issue. I t is clearly becoming more significant.

I think this has been a very good basis for beginning to lay a factual 

foundation for a congressional position on this issue. Certainly given 

the e xtent to which the Congress in the last few years has been playing 

an increasingly important role in the formulation of American foreign 

policy, I think the time for us to take a much closer look a t this issue 

is long overdue.

I want to thank you all very much for coming.

The hearing will continue tomorrow, I believe, at which time we 

will have testimony from Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders and 

also from William Quandt who used to work for the NSC, but is now 

with the Brookings Institution and so can speak to us unfettered by 

his obligation to maintain the party line.

I want to thank you for coming and the hearing is adjourned.

[Thereupon a t 5:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

U.S. POLICY AND THE CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN

SAHARA

TUESDAY, JUDY 24, 1979

H ou se of R epr ese n tativ es,

C om mi tt ee on F or ei gn Affa ir s,

Sub co mm itte es on Afr ica and on

I nt er nat io na l Org an izat io ns ,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met jointly at 10:30 a.m., purs uant to notice, 

in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen Solarz 

(chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa) presiding.

Mr. Sol ar z. The hearing of the subcommittee is hereby called to 

order.

Today we will be continuing our hearings on the conflict in the 

western Sahara, which commenced yesterday. During yesterd ay’s 

hearing we heard from several witnesses, all of whom seem to agree 

that this is an issue of growing importance for U.S. policy in North 

Africa, and to some extent in the Middle Eas t and Africa as well.

Today we hope to get a bette r understanding of U.S. policy in that 

part of the world from two individuals, one of whom has a contemporary and a continuing responsibility for American policy in that 

part of the world. Mr. Harold Saunders, the Assistant Secretary of 

State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, as well as from William 

Quandt, who was a member of the National Security Council, where 

he was the office director for Middle Eastern Affairs. Having helped 

to facilitate a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, he obviously 

thought to get out while the going was good. Mr. Q uandt has authored 

full-length studies of Algerian politics and U.S. policy toward the 

Arab-Israeli conflict. A former professor of political science at the 

University of Pennsylvania, he is currently with the Brookings 

Institution.

I am going to ask Secretary Saunders to begin his testimony and 

then after he is finished to ask Mr. Quan dt to give us his testimony. 

But before you begin testimony, Mr. Secretary, I gather there was 

some interest on your p art about the possibility of going into executive 

session la ter on as a way of facilitating your testimony.

I would frankly prefer as much of this as possible to be on the record. 

I would like to ask you, if I might, one or two questions about the 

need for going into closed session. My primary interest at this point is 

establishing exactly what American policy is toward the conflict in 

the western Sahara, toward arms sales to Morocco, the exten t to 

which policy has or has not changed over the course of the last year 

or 2, the implications of the current situation in the Sahara for our 

relationship with both Morocco and Algeria.

(75)
76

And I am not at all sure wh y the answers to these questions ought 

necessarily to come only*dn closed session. I should think this is the 

kind of thing that can easily be answered in public session. I have an 

open mind on it if you really think we ought to go into closed session.

Mr. Saunders. Let me explain what was in our minds because 

certainly we can answer questions about policy in open session. That 

is not the problem. We feel we are at a moment where we ought to 

look at the present situation as it is changing and the implications for 

existing policy.

We would like to use this opportunity to have a true consultation 

with the members of the subcommittee about the policy options which 

are before us. We did this in closed session with Senator Stone’s subcommittee on the Senate side Friday. I think it was a rather successful 

discussion. We just laid out the options that are before us from continuation of present policy right on through some of the options for 

change.

It seems to me that is where the really interesting discussion can lie, 

not just in a rehash of why we are where we are, although obviously 

that needs to be put on record, but it can be put on the record rather 

quickly.

So, one way or another I think it time for a genuine consultation 

between the executive and this committee. Now, whether you want 

to do it today or some other makes no difference to me. Bu t that is 

the substance of the problem as far as we are concerned.

Mr. Solarz. We will certainly welcome the opportunity for 

meaningful consultations with the Department and the executive 

branch. And in the past I think that is a tradition, at least with respect 

to this issue, that has been established and maintained.

Are there any questions, however, concerning the current situation 

there which you would feel unable to frankly answer in public at this 

time?

Mr. Saun der s. Well, there are always questions about the reasoning 

behind policy that are more easily dealt with in privacy than in public. 

In public obviously we have to make a formal statement of our position for the record. It does not permit us to get very deeply into the 

reasons behind where we are.

Mr. Solarz. I assume we do not ha ve a public position and a private 

position on that issue.

Mr. Saunder s. T hat is not the issue but when you delve into reasons 

of why you are doing what you are doing, as in human affairs generally, 

we all stop at a certain point in public and in private you go much 

more into the real reasons behind what you are doing.

Tha t is going to be the case in a public hearing no matter where it is.

Mr. Solar z. Well, this is a constant problem every time we have a 

hearing. And obviously we do not have as a standard procedure a 

public hearing and then at the end of it go into executive session. 

Generally when we go into executive session, it involves highly classified materials which relate to the national security or other developments which would not be to the advantage of the Nation to 

become public.

And I am not quite sure that applies here. Obviously, we would 

like this to be as productive as possible. If there are things you feel 

unable to tell us in public session that it is important for us to know,
77

everyone in the past has always voted to go into executive session 

under those circumstances.

But I have to confess I am not quite sure what you are telling us 

here in terms of the desirability of doing this in closed session.

Mr. Goodling. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

Mr. Solarz. Yes.

Mr. Goodling. I think when we are talking about a consultation 

session we have no idea what is going to be said: What we may ask 

or the witnesses may say. I for one think it would be a good idea to 

respect their wishes along those lines.

Mrs. Fenwick. I agree.

Mr. Saunders. We have come with the genuine desire to consult 

with Congress. I t has been productive on the Senate side and when I 

have come to your office and offices of your colleagues. It is a genuine 

offer of consultation today.

If you would rather we do it some other day, some other time, some 

other way, that is the committee’s decision. We are making an offer. 

It is up to you whether you want to do it today.

Mr. Solarz. We will certainly take you up on your offer of consultation. Hopefully, we can do it today. Wh at I would like to do is to have 

as much of this on the public record as possible and then we can go 

into executive session. Because this was called as a public hearing. 

There was an expectation on the part of the public there would be a 

public hearing.

I think frankly the public is entitled to know what our present 

policy is and to have some sense from distinguished witnesses like 

Mr. Quandt as to what the alternatives are. To the extent there is also 

a desirability for consultations, we can facilitate that and will do so, 

for example early.

But let ’s try to do as much as we can on the record and, time 

permitting, we will go into executive session as well.

Mr. Saunders. I thought maybe having seen Dr. Qua ndt’s testimony th at maybe the overview of the initial state ment might well 

come from him, if that is OK with you, and then I will dig into the 

policy p art of it, omitting the overview p art of it, if t ha t is a reasonable division of labor.

Mr Solarz Mr. Quandt. Your testimony will, of course, be included in the record as it was prepared and feel free to summarize 

your views.

STATEMENT OF WIL LIAM QUANDT, SENIOR FELLOW, THE 

BROOKINGS INST ITUTION

Mr. Quandt. Tha nk you. I have prepared a written statement tha t 

I would like to place in the record and I will not repeat it here. I will 

simply make a few general points about the nature of American interests concerning the Saha ra conflict and some of the choices facing us.

Let me emphasize that both my written statem ent and my remarks 

today are made in a personal capacity. They do n ot reflect Government policy. I am not a member of the Government. And they do not 

reflect the views of the Brookings Institution.

51-3 03 0 - 7 9 - 6
78

First, I would like to say a few words about why the Sahara conflict 

is of importance to the United States. There are, of course, many 

reasons one could point to, b ut it seems to me that the central concerns 

we have are that the continuation of this conflict is having a very 

corrosive effect on the viability and strength of an important country 

in North Africa with which we have had friendly relations in the past 

and with which we hope to have friendly relations in the future, namely, 

Morocco.

The economic and political consequences of the continued conflict 

in the Sahara for Morocco are likely to be very negative. And I believe 

that an early end to that conflict will strength en Morocco and eventually strengthen the prospects for stability in North Africa.

Second, as the conflict continues, there is an increasing risk tha t 

it will spread beyond the conflict in the Sahara to engage the regular 

forces of Morocco and Algeria. And it seems to me that this could be 

a much more dangerous conflict tha n the Sahara conflict per se. It 

would run the risk of a major escalation of violence; it would run the 

risk of drawing in greater Soviet involvement as an arms supplier to 

one side of the conflict at a time when I believe the Algerian Government is anxious to pursue a balanced foreign policy and not see its 

dependence on any outside power increased.

I do not think it productive today to spend a great deal of time 

talking about the rights and wrongs of the Sahara conflict and how 

the parties got to where they are at present. We cannot make a 

determ ination as to who is right and who is wrong in this conflict 

that will in any sense usefully guide our policy.

It is enough to say that Morocco and Algeria, and the Saharans 

organized under the Polisario, and the Mauritanians all feel strongly 

about their positions, and we are not easily going to convince them 

they are wrong.

As this conflict goes on, I think we have to ask ourselves about 

the prospects of either a military or a political solution. I am not a 

military expert, but from all I know there seems to be little prospect 

of a military solution in the near term. The Saharan guerrillas do not 

have the power to evict Morocco from the Sahara.

They have succeeded rath er well in neutralizing the Mauritanians 

in their sector of the Sahara. B ut against the Moroccan army, although 

they can inflict damage, I do not believe they can succeed in a military 

sense in imposing their will over the entire territory. Nor does it 

appear to be possible for the Moroccan armed forces to completely 

bring this territory under control, at least within any reasonable time 

period or without extraordinary expenses, which probably are not 

going to be made.

Unfortunately, the military stalemate does n ot yet seem to have 

produced a conclusion on the p art of all parties t ha t a political settlement is the only alternative, which I strongly believe it is. Unless one 

or more parties change their present positions, there is not yet the 

makings of a political settlement.

I do believe tha t in time the logic of a political negotiated settlem ent 

will impose itself on each of the parties. But I do not want to make 

it appear as if a political settlement is in sight. The present positions 

of the parties—Morocco, Algeria, the Polisario—are not now compatible and will require some further evolution. And it is by encouraging t ha t evolution that I believe outsiders can perhaps be helpful.
79

As you are all aware, the Organization of African Uni ty has recently 

tried to encourage a political solution by calling for a cease-fire and a 

referendum to determine the views of the population of the Sahara. 

As laudable as these goals may be, I believe that in the present circumstances, while the fighting goes on, a referendum is simply not 

practical. You cannot get people to express their will freely in the 

present circumstances in the Sahara, even if you could define the 

population eligible to participate.

So, for the moment the preconditions to carry out the OA U recommendations are not there, even if the parties were prepared to offer 

their cooperation, which I understand is not the case, at least on the 

basis of what I know of their policies.

Bu t there is an underlying point in the OA U recommendation which 

I think is solid and should be carefully considered by all the parties. 

That point is that the population living in this area, despite the fact 

that it is small and poor and has little voice on the international scene, 

should have some role in determining its own future. How that should 

be done, what way, and certainly with what eventual outcome is not 

for me to say.

Let me finish my remarks with some comments about American 

policy and the choices facing us. I believe our choices fall basically into 

two categories. One, on the diplomatic front— are there alternatives 

for American policy to encourage a peaceful settlement, which I think 

is clearly in the American interest? Second, does our present arms 

policy toward Morocco facilitate a peaceful solution or impede it, or 

does it have no impact on it whatsoever, in which case we might also 

want to consider it simply in terms of United States-Moroccan 

relations?

On the first, the diplomatic side, I think it would be a mistake to 

believe that the conflict has not been solved for lack of mediators. 

There have been plenty of parties offering their services as mediators: 

The Saudis, French, and Spanish, all of whom have rather good contacts with the parties involved.

What has been lacking to date is the will to settle, not the lack of a 

mediator. We could nonetheless make a clearer and more forceful 

statement of our own interest in seeing the conflict brought to an end. 

This is not the same as offering our services as a mediator. I do not 

happen to believe they are necessary. But despite the fact th at we have 

gone through the motions of supporting a peaceful settlement, I do not 

believe that we have convinced the major parties that it is a highpriority concern of American policy.

We have treated it as a relatively minor issue on the scale of our 

foreign policy objectives, and compared to many things, of course, it is 

much less important. Nonetheless, I think we could more forcefully 

explain to our friends in Morocco and in Algeria, as well as the most 

promising of the mediating parties— the French, Spanish, Saudis, 

some of the African mediators— that we believe the time has come for a 

determined effort, through whatever means, to bring the conflict to an 

end.

One step in a positive direction along these lines, it seems to me, 

would be to have the kind of dialog with K ing Hassan of Morocco that 

we have found it difficult to have in the past year— a frank discussion 

of the issues at stake and our perception of the developments in the
80

region and our concerns about the future. That dialog is long overdue 

and we have missed a number of opportunities to have it.

Turning to the arms questions, U.S. policy toward arms to Morocco; 

here I think we enter a very difficult area partly because of our own 

interpretation of an agreement that we entered into with Morocco in 

1960 whereby we agreed to provide arms to Morocco for the defense 

of the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco.

We have no t been able to come to a clear determination of whether 

defense of the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco also includes the 

use of American arms beyond Morocco’s recognized borders; that is, 

those borders which we presently recognize. We are not clear in our 

own minds how extensive one might interpre t legitimate self-defense. 

Does that include the right of hot pursuit?

All of these are very tricky issues. We run into them in our arms 

relations with many countries. In the case of Morocco, the terms of 

the agreement are slightly more restrictive than in many other cases 

of bilateral arms agreements.

I think the present issue for the Congress and the executive to come 

to terms with is whether the rath er restrictive interpretation we have 

placed to date on the 1960 agreement is warranted in light of some of 

the recent developments tha t have taken place, such as the escalation 

of Polisario attacks into territory that we recognize as Moroccan 

territory.

I think this does suggest that we might reconsider, on a rather 

limited scale, some arms supplies to the Moroccans which we have 

previously withheld. In making this general suggestion, which I will 

make more precise in a moment, I think we should have no illusions. 

Our arms supplies to Morocco will not bring the conflict in the Sahara 

to an early end.

I do not believe tha t there is a military solution which can be guaranteed by the supply of any p artic ular American weapon. At best, and 

this is perhaps an optimistic interpretation , a modest revision in our 

present arms supply policy might help to establish a balance of power 

in the area which would facilitate political negotiations. Tha t, in any 

case, should be a consideration as we proceed with our arms supply 

policy.

Another point I would make is t ha t Morocco does appear to have 

adequate sources of arms at present from European and American 

sources for her own self-defense in the present circumstances and to 

pursue the conflict in the Sahara as well. So, no one needs to make a 

case for any massive increase in arms to Morocco. The Moroccans are 

not on the verge of being militarily overrun.

There is, however, one item that might be of pa rticular value to the 

Moroccans which they have not been able to acquire elsewhere. This 

is a reconnaissance aircraft that would help them to detect Polisario 

patrols before they reach populated areas. This is a very fast-moving 

war in the desert. Polisario bands can move across extensive distances 

very rapidly. And a long-range reconnaissance capability of a limited 

sort for the Moroccans might help deter the kinds of attacks they 

have suffered recently within their own territory, as well as threats 

they have faced elsewhere in the Sahara.

The Moroccans in the past have shown some in terest in reconnaissance aircraft, the OV-10 in particular. An alternative might be the 

OV-1, a somewhat simpler version of the reconnaissance aircraft and
81

one not as well suited to carrying any offensive weapons. It is basically 

an unarmed reconnaissance aircraft.

As far as I know, we do not now have a formal request from the 

Moroccans for either of these aircraft, but we have had in the past 

expressions of interest. In my view, if the Moroccans do make a request for the OV-IO, or preferably the OV -1, this is the kind of case 

where I think the Congress should give careful and sympathetic consideration to the Moroccan request.

I would not recommend a whole-scale revision of our arms supply 

policy toward Morocco, nor would I urge at this point that we change 

our view on the question of sovereignty in the western Sahara, where 

we have abstained from making a determination and have instead 

recognized the administrative control of Morocco and Mauritania, 

without prejudging the final political settlement.

Other Moroccan requests, apart from the requests for reconnaissance aircraft, should be dealt with circumspectly on a case-by-case 

basis. I would not recommend a blanket reversal of our existing policy. 

Particularly at a time when the Organization of African Un ity has 

tried to grapple with the Sahara issue and has a resolution on the 

table calling for a peaceful settlement, a cease-fire, and a referendum 

of some sort, I do not believe this is the time for an escalation of arms 

competition in North Africa.

Instead, I believe this is a time to try to give the political process 

a chance to work, with the one qualification that I made that I do 

believe the Moroccans have a legitimate interest in enhancing their 

long-range reconnaissance capability. On that one issue I would urge 

sympathetic consideration be given to a slight revision in our arms 

supply policy.

Thank you.

[Mr. Quandt’s prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement op William B. Quandt, Senior Fellow, The

Brookings I nst itution

ThjL Sah ar a C o n fli c t

Among th e w o rld ’s tr o u b le s p o ts , th e W es te rn S ahara h as n o t bee n of 

much I n t e r e s t to th e i n te r n a tio n a l comm unity o r to th e U nit ed S ta te s . And 

y e t, fo r th e p a s t fo ur y e a rs a s m a ll- s c a le war h as bee n un de rw ay in t h i s 

fo rm er S pan is h co lo ny w hi ch h as p la c e d se v e re s t r a i n s on th e go ve rn m en t of 

Morocco and has r a is e d th e p ro s p e c t o f a b ro a d e r c o n f l i c t bet w ee n th e 

r e g u la r ar m ie s o f Morocco an d A lg e ria . In th e absen ce o f a c le a r - c u t 

m ilita r y s o lu tio n , which seem s u n lik e ly , o r a n e g o tia te d s e ttle m e n t, which 

re m ai ns e lu s iv e , th e danger w i l l gro w th a t th e W es te rn S ahara c o n f l i c t 

could hav e co nse que nce s t h a t go w e ll be yo nd th e im m ed ia te t e r r i t o r y in 

d is p u te . W hi le m aj or U .S . i n t e r e s t s ha ve n o t te n. n d eep ly a f fe c te d by th e 

c o n f lic t to d a te , U .S .-M or oc ca n r e l a t i o n s hav e a lr e a d y bee n h u r t and an 

ex pansio n o f 't h e wa r wo uld r i s k g r e a te r S o v ie t in volv em en t in A lg e r ia a t a 

ti m e when th e new re gi m e th e re seem s to be se ek in g an in dep en d en t c o u rs e.

Ther e i s l i t t l e p o in t in r e h e a rs in g th e re c e n t h i s to r y o f th e Sah ar a 

c o n f l i c t . I n te r n a tio n a l la w y ers w i l l arg u e e n d le s s ly o v er th e r ig h ts and 

wr on gs o f th e c a s e , b u t i t i s en ou gh to n o te th a t th e Sah ar a c o n f l i c t stem s 

fro m an un u su al p ro cess o f d e c o lo n iz a tio n , co uple d w it h lo n g sta n d in g 

r i v a l r y bet w ee n Mor occo an d A lg e ria as re g io n a l po w er s.
83

From th e Mo roccan p e r s p e c tiv e , th e Span is h Sah ar a was Mo roc can 

t e r r i t o r y w a it in g to be li b e r a t e d . U nli ke many o th e r c o u n tr ie s , Morocco’s 

in dep en den ce d id n o t c o in c id e w it h co m ple te e v a c u a ti o n o f fo re ig n fo rc e s 

from t e r r i t o r y cl ai m ed by M orocco. D e c o lo n iz a ti o n came in s ta g e s , and 

M oro cc o's t e r r i t o r i a l a s p ir a tio n s hav e al w ay s ex ce ed ed h e r re co g n iz ed 

b o rd e rs . At v a rio u s t i r e s , Mo rocco h as cl aim ed la r g e s e c tio n s o f M a u ri ta n ia 

an d A lg e ria , b u t Morocco cou ld fin d l i t t l e su p p o rt els ew h ere in A fric a fo r 

th e p r in c ip le o f b a s in g p re s e n t- d a y b o rd e rs cn a lle g e d " h i s t o r i c a l r i g h t s ." 

The s a n c i t it y o f th e b o rd e rs in h e r ite d fro m c o lo n ia li s m i s on e o f th e few 

p o in ts on which A fri c a n c o u n trie s hav e g e n e r a lly a g re e d . In du e c o u rse , 

Mo roc co re co g n iz ed M a u ri ta n ia and s ig n e d , b u t d id n o t r a t i f y , a b o rd e r a g re e ­

men t w it h A lg e ria .

I t was n o t u n t i l th e S panis h decid ed to le a v e th e S ah ar a co lo ny in 

1975 th a t Morocco ha d th e o p p o rtu n it y to r e a l i z e a p o r tio n of h e r i r r e d e n t i s t 

c la im s. By th e n , M oro cc o's Ki ng H as sa n was b ad ly in ne ed o f r e s to r in g h is 

p r e s tig e and a u th o r ity a f t e r h av in g n arr o w ly su rv iv e d a s e r ie s o f c h a ll e n g e s 

bet w ee n 1971 and 19 73 . The S ah ar a is s u e ap p eale d to M oroccan n a ti o n a li s m 

an d th e King c a p ita liz e d a d r o itly on t h i s s e n ti m e n t. In b r i e f , th e King 

s tr u c k a d e a l w it h S pai n an d w it h M a u ri ta n ia whi ch all ow ed him to e s ta b lis h 

c o n tr o l over th e n o rth e rn tw o -th ir d s o f th e W es te rn S ah ara .

The A lg e ria n s, who ha d e a r l i e r su p p o rt ed th e c a l l fo r Span is h 

e v a c u a ti o n , were m if fe d a t b e in g l e f t o u t an d w er e angere d by th e d e fe c tio n 

o f t h e i r fo rm er f r ie n d s , th e M a u ri ta n ia n s . In re sp o n s e , th ey th re w t h e i r 

su p p o rt beh in d a gr ou p o f S ah ar an s op po se d to Mo roccan ' hegemon y, th e 

P o l i s a r i o , whom th ey h elp ed to tr a n sfo rm in to a c r e d ib le f ig h tin g fo rc e . 

W hi le A lg e ria do es n o t hav e t e r r i t o r i a l c la im s in th e S ah ara , i t h as stu c k
84

to th e p r i n c i p l e o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r th e l o c a l p o p u la tio n , h a s 

p ro v id e d s a n c tu a r y f o r g u e r r i l l a s an d r e f u g e e s , and h a s s u p p lie d arm s, 

l o g i s t i c a l an d d ip lo m a tic s u p p o rt to P o l i s a r i o . Th e A lg e r ia n s h a v e h in te d

t h a t P o l i s a r i o de m an ds m ig h t b e m et by l e s s th a n f u l l in d e p e n d e n c e i n th e

e n t i r e W e ste rn S a h a ra , b u t th e r e i s l i t t l e e v id e n c e t h a t th e P o l i s a r i o h a s 

s c a le d down i t s g o a ls in th e p a s t y e a r . In d e e d , th e w ar h a s r e c e n t l y b e e n 

g o in g s u r p r i s i n g l y w e ll f o r th e P o l i s a r i o and t h e r e a r e so me r e p o r t s t h a t 

A lg e r ia i s e x e r c i s i n g l e s s in f l u e n c e o v e r P o l i s a r i o a s L ib y a n s u p p o r t f o r

th e S a h a ra n c a u s e h a s i n c r e a s e d .

Th e m ost s i g n i f i c a n t c hange i n th e n a tu r e o f th e c o n f l i c t in r e c e n t 

m onth s h a s b e e n M a u r i t a n i a 's w it h d ra w a l fr om th e s c e n e . F o r a l l p r a c t i c a l

p u rp o s e s , M a u r ita n ia h a s ced e d c o n t r o l o v e r h e r s e c t o r o f th e S a h a ra to

th e P o l i s a r i o i n r e t u r n f o r a c e a s e f i r e , w hic h h a s b e e n h o n o re d u n t i l 

r e c e n t l y . M a u r ita n ia w a n ts o u t o f th e c o s t l y , u n w in n a b le w ar and h a s go ne 

so f a r a s to a g re e to a re fe re n d u m to d e te rm in e th e w is h e s o f th e p o p u la tio n , 

an o f f e r t h a t P o l i s a r i o h a s r e j e c t e d . T h is h a s l e f t th e P o l i s a r i o f r e e to 

c o n c e n tr a te on e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n t r o l o v e r th e re m a in d e r o f th e S a h a ra n 

h i n t e r l a n d , a s w e ll a s o c c a s io n a lly t a r g e t i n g p o p u la te d a r e a s w i th in M or oc co

p r o p e r .

No r e s p o n s i b l e o b s e r v e r b e l i e v e s t h a t a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n to th e 

c o n f l i c t i s l i k e l y . P o l i s a r i o c a n n o t d r i v e M oro cc o fr om th e S a h a ra , n o r c an 

th e K in g 's f o r c e s e a s i l y v a n q u is h th e P o l i s a r i o g u e r r i l l a s a s lo n g a s th e y 

can f in d a s s i s t a n c e an d s a n c tu a r y i n A lg e r ia . An e x p a n s io n o f th e c o n f l i c t 

to in c lu d e th e r e g u l a r f o r c e s o f A lg e r ia and M or oc co w ould r a i s e th e c o s ts 

an d r i s k s w ith o u t n e c e s s a r i l y r e s o lv in g a n y th in g . I f th e c o n f l i c t i s to b e 

b ro u g h t t o an e n d , i t w i l l r e q u i r e p o l i t i c a l a n d d ip lo m a tic i n i t i a t i v e s .
W heth er o r n o t th e U n it e d S t a t e s can p la y a u s e f u l r o l e i n p ro m o ti n g

a s e t t l e m e n t i s u n c e r t a i n . To d a t e , th e A d m in is tr a tio n h a s p r e f e r r e d to 

s ta n d a s i d e , a d o p tin g a fo r m a l p o s i t i o n o f n e u t r a l i t y , w h ile e n c o u ra g in g 

th e e f f o r t s o f o t h e r s t o f i n d a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n .

U .S . I n t e r e s t s

T he p o lic y o f l i m i t e d U .S . in v o lv e m e n t i n t h e S a h a ra c o n f l i c t h a s 

stem m ed fr om an a s s e s s m e n t t h a t l i t t l e m or e w as r e q u i r e d to p r o t e c t o u r 

i n t e r e s t s i n th e r e g io n . R e c e n tly , a s U .S .- M o ro c c a n r e l a t i o n s h a v e 

a p p e a re d to d e t e r i o r a t e , t h e r e h a v e b e e n some p r e s s u r e s to i n c r e a s e ar m s 

s u p p lie s to M oro cco , a s w e ll a s s u g g e s tio n s t h a t t h e U .S . m ig h t h e lp to 

m e d ia te th e c o n f l i c t . B ut f o r th e m om en t, t h e r e h a s b e e n v i r t u a l l y no 

c hange i n U .S . p o lic y i n N o rth w e s t A f r i c a . P o li c y re v ie w s e a r l i e r t h i s 

y e a r c o n c lu d e d t h a t a n e v en h an d ed an d r e l a t i v e l y d e ta c h e d p o s tu r e to w a rd th e 

S a h a ra n c o n f l i c t i s c o m p a ti b le w ith c o n ti n u e d c lo s e r e l a t i o n s w ith M or oc co 

and w ith o u r e x p a n d in g e conom ic t i e s to A lg e r ia . I n s o f a r a s t h e r e h a v e b e e n 

c o n c e rn s w ith in th e A d m in is tr a tio n , th e y ste m fr om th e u n s a t i s f a c t o r y n a tu r e 

o f th e U .S .- M o ro c c a n m i l i t a r y s u p p ly r e l a t i o n s h i p to d a y an d th e e f f e c t s o f 

th e c o s t l y S a h a ra n w ar on M o ro c c o 's eco nom ic and p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e .

Th e U n it e d S t a t e s h a s s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i t i c a l I n t e r e s t s in M or oc co 

an d s i z a b l e econom ic i n t e r e s t s i n A l g e r i a . (F o r th e S o v ie t U n io n , th e 

s i t u a t i o n i s p r e c i s e l y th e o p p o s i t e , w ith v e ry l a r g e S o v ie t I n t e r e s t s i n 

M oro cc an p h o s p h a te s ) . M oro cc o h a s g e n e r a l l y a d o p te d m o d e ra te p o s i t i o n s on 

A f r ic a n and M id d le E a s te r n i s s u e s , and K in g H a ssan h a s p la y e d a m o d e st, 

d i s c r e e t r o l e i n s u p p o rt o f M id d le E a s t p e a c e e f f o r t s . In r e t u r n , th e 

U n it e d S t a t e s h a s m a in ta in e d c l o s e r e l a t i o n s w ith M oro cc o s i n c e in d e p e n d e n c e
86

h a s p ro v id e d s i g n i f i c a n t econom ic and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , and h a s s l i g h t l y 

" t i l t e d " in M o ro c c o 's fa v o r on th e S a h a ra n i s s u e , w h ile n o n e th e le s s 

a d h e r in g to th e UN-m an da ted c a l l f o r s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .

As p a r t o f o u r o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p w ith M oro cco , th e U .S . in r e c e n t 

y e a r s h a s o f f e r e d PL 48 0 a s s i s t a n c e w o rth $2 6 m i l l i o n i n PY 1979; F o r e ig n 

M i lita r y S a le s c r e d i t s w o rth $4 0 m i l l i o n i n FY 1 9 7 9 ; and m o d e st am ounts o f 

dev elo p m en t a s s i s t a n c e . M or oc co h a s s o u g h t a d d i t i o n a l a i d fr o m t h e U . S . , 

and th e r e i s p r e s e n t l y some u n c e r t a i n t y a s t o w h e th e r IMS c r e d i t s f o r 

FY 198 0 w i l l h e $3 0 o r 45 m i l l i o n . In e i t h e r e v e n t, i t w ould a p p e a r t h a t 

U .S . a id to M oro cco, w h il e im p o r ta n t, i s c o n s id e r a b ly l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t th a n 

g r a n ts fr om S a u d i A ra b ia . A t th e ti m e o f th e r e c e n t s la m ic C o n fe re n c e i n 

M oro cc o, th e S a u d is r e p o r te d ly p ro m is e d v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l su ms to M oro cco , 

w hic h c o u ld go a lo n g wa y to w a rd m e e ti n g M o ro c c o 's p r e s e n t n e e d s f o r

e x t e r n a l a s s i s t a n c e .

W h il e th e U n it e d S t a t e s h a s n o t e n jo y e d a p a r t i c u l a r l y c l o s e p o l i t i c a l 

r e l a t i o n s h i p w ith A lg e r ia , and th e A lg e r ia n s h a v e f r e q u e n t l y ta k e n o p p o s ite 

p o s i t i o n s fr om o u r own on i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s , we h a v e s t i l l m an ag ed to 

d e v e lo p a s u b s t a n t i a l eco nom ic r e l a t i o n s h i p an d to m a in ta in a u s e f u l d ip lo m a tic 

d ia lo g u e . Th e ne w A lg e r ia n re g im e h a s b e e n l a r g e l y p r e o c c u p ie d w ith i n t e r n a l 

m a tte r s i n r e c e n t m o n th s, b u t th e fe w o f f i c i a l c o n ta c ts we h a v e b ad w it h th e

le a d e r s h ip h a v e b e e n q u i t e c o r d i a l . P r e s i d e n t C a r te r h a s e x te n d e d an 

i n v i t a t i o n t o P r e s i d e n t B e n d je d id to v i s i t W ash in g to n n e x t y e a r . T h a t c o u ld 

p ro v e to b e an im p o r ta n t s te p i n th e e v o l u t i o n o f U .S .- A lg e r i a n r e l a t i o n s .

On th e econom ic f r o n t , th e U n it e d S t a t e s and A lg e r ia h a v e d e v e lo p e d a l a r g e 

tr a d e r e l a t i o n s h i p , t o t a l i n g n e a r l y $4 b i l l i o n i n 3978, m o st o f w h ic h cons i s t e d o f A lg e r ia n o i l s o ld to th e U .S . N e a rly h a l f o f A l g e r i a 's 1 m i l l i o n 

b . p . d . o f lo w -s u lp h u r o i l a r e s e n t to t h e U .S ., c o n s t i t u t i n g a b o u t 9 p e r c e n t
o f ou r t o t a l o i l Im port s a t p re s e n t. In a d d itio n , c o m p ara ti v ely sm all 

q u a n titie s o f A lg e ri a n liq u id n a tu r a l ga s a re b ro u g h t to th e e a s t c o a s t o f

th e U nit ed S ta te s .

Bey ond th e s e ta n g ib le eco no mic and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s in Morocco 

an d A lg e ria , th e U nit ed S ta te s has a s ta k e in th e s t a b i l i t y o f th e re g io n 

an d wo uld c le a r ly p r e fe r to se e p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s p e a c e fu lly re so lv e d 

l e s t th ey become th e e n tr y p o in t fo r in c re a se d S o v ie t in flu e n c e . In t h is 

c o n te x t, v i r tu a ll y an y r e s o lu tio n to th e S ahara c o n f l i c t w hi ch i s a c c e p ta b le 

to th e p a r t i e s co nce rn ed sh ould be a c c e p ta b le to th e U .S . I t i s le s s th e 

p r e c is e sh ap e o f th e s e ttl e m e n t th an a s e ttl e m e n t w hi ch w i l l l a s t and 

en han ce re g io n a l s t a b i l i t y th a t i s in our i n t e r e s t .

P ro s p e c ts : Dan ge rs an d Oppo r t u n it i e s

The mos t l i k e l y p ro s p e c t fo r th e Sah ar a c o n f l i c t i s t h a t i t w i l l dra g 

on in c o n c lu s iv e ly f o r a w h il e lo n g e r. T his w i l l p la c e a c o n ti n u in g econ om ic 

an d human burd en on Mo roc co an d may hav e th e e f f e c t o f e ro d in g th e re g im e’s 

a u th o r ity . At i t s w o rs t, th e Sah ar a c o n f l i c t h a s r e s u lte d in a s many as 100 

Mo roc can c a s u a ltie s p e r mo nth and has c o s t a s much a s $800 m illio n a n n u a ll y . 

Out o f f r u s t r a t i o n , th e Ki ng m ig ht be te m pt ed to a c t on h is d e c la re d p o li c y 

o f "h o t p u r s u it" o f th e P c li .s a rio in to A lg e ria n t e r r i t o r y , b u t to d a te he 

has see med to re c o g n iz e th a t su ch a c tio n co uld e s c a la te th e war w it h o u t 

doin g much to re s o lv e th e u n d e rly in g p o l i t i c a l pro b le m s.

The c o n tin u a tio n o r ex pansi on o f th e war co u ld a ls o hav e u n fo rtu n a te 

co nse quen ce s fo r A lg e ria . T he re hav e bee n some in d ic a tio n s t h a t th e new 

re gi m e i s u n d e rt a k in g lo ng ove rd ue d om esti c re fo rm s . A wa r w it h Mor occo 

co uld s e t bac k th o se e f f o r t s and m ig ht le a d A lg e ria to de ep en i t s de pe nd en ce

on th e S o v ie t Un ion f o r m ilita r y s u p p o rt.
88

F in a lly , th e w ea kes t o f th e p a r tie s to th e c o n f l i c t , M a u ri ta n ia and 

th e Sah ar an p o p u la ti o n , sta n d to s u f f e r th e mos t i f th e war c o n ti n u e s . 

M a u ri ta n ia has ha d s e v e ra l ch an ges o f go ve rn m en t in th e p a s t y e a r a lo n e .

For th e la r g e num ber of Sah ar an re fu g e e s i n A lg e ria , th e c o n tin u a tio n of 

th e f ig h tin g in s u re s th a t th ey w i l l re m ai n liv in g In m is e ra b le c o n d it io n s 

in re fu g e e camp s.

S in ce th e re ap pears to be no lik e lih o o d o f a m i l i ta r y v ic to r y , an d 

a l l p a r t i e s to th e c o n f lic t a re p ayin g a h ig h p r i c e , on e m ig ht ho pe th a t 

th e c o n d it io n s a re r ip e fo r a p o l i t i c a l s e ttle m e n t. Th us f a r , su ch h as n o t

bee n th e c a s e . Morocco w ill ta k e no s te p th a t c a l l s in t o q u e s tio n h e r 

so v e re ig n ty over th e Sahara ; th e P o lis a r io has shcr.ra no s ig n s o f b e in g 

w illin g to comp romise on i t s demand f o r an in d ep en d en t s t a t e in a l l o f th d 

S ahara ; an d A lg e ria c o n ti n u e s to bac k th e P o lis a r io an d th e p r in c ip le o f

s e lf- d e te r m in a tio n .

N o n e th e le ss, th e re hav e bee n d is c r e e t c o n ta c ts among a l l th e p a r t i e s

a t v a rio u s ti m e s. Num erous m ed ia ti o n e f f o r t s ha ve a ls o ta k e n p la c e . The

"w is e men" co m m itte e o f th e O rg a n iz a ti o n o f A fri c a n U n it y h as re p o rte d ly

reco mm ended a c e a s e f ir e an d a re fe re ndum to d ete rm in e th e vie w s o f th e

Sah ar an p o p u la ti o n . U n fo rtu n a te ly , Ki ng H as sa n an d P re s id e n t B endje did 

hav e n o t y e t had a d ir e c t m eeti n g .

A ll th a t see ms to be la c k in g i s th e p o l i t i c a l w i l l to make th e h ard 

ch o ic es t h a t m ig ht pro duce a s e ttle m e n t. The P o lis a r io and th e A lg e ria n s 

cannot ex p ect Morocco to r e lin q u is h c o n tr o l over h e r p o r tio n o f th e S ah ara ; 

Morocco can n o t exp ect A lg e ria to ab an do n th e P o lis a r io an d th e concep t o f 

s e lf- d e te r m in a tio n . Bu t be tw ee n th e a p p a re n tl y un w ork ab le a l t e r n a t i v e s o f 

a f u lly in d ep en d en t Sah ar an s t a t e and th e an n e x a ti o n o f th e S ahara by 

M a u ri ta n ia an d Mor occo w it h o u t r e fe re n c e to th e w is h es o f th e lo c a l
89

p o p u la ti o n , a numb er o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s e x i s t . A ra n g e o f im a g in a ti v e 

p o l i t i c a l s o lu tio n s — au tono mou s re g im es, c o n fe d e ra l a rra n g e m e n ts , 

c o o p ta ti o n o f Sah ar an le a d e r s , re g io n a l c o o p e ra ti o n — ca n b e e x p lo re d , 

p ro v id ed th e w i l l to s e t t l e i s p r e s e n t.

U .S . P o li c y Cho ic es

Two q u e s ti o n s ne ed to be a d d re sse d : ca n th e U nit ed S ta te s draw on 

i t s d ip lo m a ti c a s s e ts to pr om ote a p e a c e fu l s e ttl e m e n t? Has th e tim e 

come f o r a ch an ge in U.S. arm s t r a n s f e r p o li c y to w ar d Mo roc co?

1. D ip lo m ati c In i t i a t i v e s . The S ah ar a c o n f l i c t h as n o t la ck ed

f o r m e d ia to rs. The F re n ch , th e S p an is h , th e S a u d is , to sa y n o th in g o f th e 

UN an d th e OAU, hav e a l l made e f f o r t s . D ir e c t c o n ta c ts hav e a ls o ta k en 

p la c e . Given th e s e r e a l i t i e s , th e U nit ed S ta te s h as n o t ju d g ed i t 

n e c e s sa ry o r r e a l i s t i c to ta k e an y m aj or i n i t i a t i v e to s e t t l e th e Sah ar a 

c o n f l i c t . T his has p ro b ab ly bee n so un d p o lic y , a lt h o u g h i t cou ld hav e bee n 

.s o d if ie d by co nvey in g f o r c e f u lly to th e p a r t i e s in v o lv ed t h a t a p o l i t i c a l 

s e ttl e m e n t was e s s e n t i a l . We a re n o t in a p o s itio n , ho w ev er , to sh ap e th e 

c o n to u rs o f su ch a s e ttle m e n t, n o r do we ha ve eq u al am ou nts o f in flu e n c e 

w it h a l l o f th e p a r t i e s . N o n e th e le ss, we sh ould u se ev ery o p p o rtu n it y to 

em phas iz e th a t we su p p o rt a p e a c e fu l, p o l i t i c a l s e ttl e m e n t o f th e Sah ar a 

c o n f l i c t . In p a r t i c u l a r , we sh ould le n d c u t su p p o rt to th e c a l l fo r a 

c e a s e f ir e and th e b eg in n in g o f n e g o tia tio n s .

2 . Arms T ra n s fe rs . By th e te rm s o f an ag re em en t bet w ee n th e U.S. an d 

Mo roc co si g n e d in I9 60, we p ro v id e Mo roc co w it h we ap on s fo r th e purp ose o f 

d efe n d in g th e Kingdom of M orocco. T his s t i p u l a t i o n was in c lu d e d to p re v e n t

th e d iv e rs io n of U .S . arm s fro m Morocco to o th e r Ara b c o u n trie s whe re th ey
90

m ig ht u ltim a te ly be use d a g a in s t I s r a e l . W hi le th e U .S . do es re c o g n iz e

th a t Mor occo e x e rc is e s a d m in is tra tiv e c o n tro l in th e n o rth e rn s e c to r o f

th e S ah ara , we ha ve n o t y e t re cogniz ed Moro cca n s o v e re ig n ty th e r e . As

a r e s u l t , we ha ve bee n r e lu c ta n t to s e l l arm s to Mo roc co w hi ch wo uld 

p rim a rily be use d in th e S ahara . The re h as be en a d eg re e o f f l e x i b i l i t y 

in th e i n t e r p r e ta tio n o f th e 1961 agre em ent, aid a numb er o f e f f o r t s hav e 

be en made w it h th e Moroc ca ns to re ach a s a t is f a c t o r y u n d e rsta n d in g . Fo r

th e mom ent, King Il as sa n re m ai ns dee ply d i s s a t i s f i e d w it h U .S . p o lic y on 

arm s tr a n s f e r s and he i s p re s s in g fo r a ch an ge whi ch wo uld b e ta nta m o u n t 

to our dro ppin g a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s on en d -u se of U.S . s u p p li e d w ea po ns .

The mos t im m ed ia te c ase o f co nce rn to th e M oroc ca ns in v o lv e s th e

OV-10 arm ed re c o n n a is sa n c e a i r c r a f t . The Moroc ca ns b e lie v e t h a t im pr ov ed

reco n n ais san ce wo uld make i t e a s ie r to d e a l w it h th e h ig h ly m obil e

P o lis a r io u n its t h a t a re a c tiv e in th e S ah ara .

In re sp o n d in g to th e Mo roc can r e q u e s t, we m us t o b v io u sly c o n s id e r a 

num ber of f a c to r s : c o n s is te n c y w it h ou r own la w s; th e e f f e c ts on U .S .-

Kor oc ca n r e l a t i o n s ; th e e f f e c ts on th e p ro s p e c ts f o r a p e a c e fu l s e ttl e m e n t 

o f th e c o n f l i c t . C once rn in g our own law’s, I f e e l th a t C on gr es s sh o u ld sh a re 

r e s p o n s ib ility w it h th e A d m in is tr a ti o n in d e te rm in in g w het her th e s a le of 

12 OV-lOs i s c o n s is te n t w it h th e 1961 ag re em ent. I t i s a c lo s e c a l l , b u t 

w it h th e ex pansi on o f P o lis a r io a tta c k s in to Mo roc co p ro p e r, i t ' i s e a s ie r 

to j u s t i f y th e s a le s th a n i t wa s in th e p a s t. We sh ould n o t, how ev er , 

o p e ra te under any i l l u s i o n th a t th e OV-10 w i l l in s u re a s w if t M or ro ca n 

v ic to r y . One a l te r n a tiv e to th e OV-10 m ig ht be th e le s s -e x p e n s iv e OV-1 

re co n n ais san ce a i r c r a f t which co uld mo re e a s ily be made a v a ila b le to th e

M or oc ca ns .
91

One r i s k i s th a t th e n e t e f f e c t o f a d d itio n a l arm s s a le s w i l l b e to

pu sh th e c o n f l i c t to a h ig h e r le v e l o f i n t e n s i t y , w it h th e S o v ie ts o f f s e t t i n g 

w hate ver we do. In th e p ro c e s s , th e A lg e ria n s wo uld bec om e m or e, r a t h e r th an 

l e s s , . dep en den t on S o v ie t ar m s.

I wo uld p e rs o n a ll y recommend th a t th e A d m in is tr a ti o n and C ongre ss g iv e 

sy m p a th e ti c c o n s id e ra tio n to M or oc co 's re q u e s t to p u rc h ase a sm a ll nu mber o f 

OV-IQ s o r O V -ls. I f th e d e c is io n i s p o s i t i v e , ho w ev er , I b e lie v e t h a t i t 

sh o u ld be ac co m pa ni ed by a s e rio u s d ia lo g u e w it h th e Ik oce an s on th e ne ed 

f o r a p o l i t i c a l s e ttl e m e n t o f th e S ahara c o n f l i c t . King H as sa n h as sh ow n. a 

te nden cy to ask us fo r arm s b u t to r e s i s t an y genuin e d is c u s s io n o f bow to 

re a c h a r e s o lu tio n o f th e pro bl em . In p ro v id in g ar m s, we a ls o as su me some 

r e s p o n s ib ility fo r how th e y a re u se d . For ex am ple , I th in k we sh ould be 

q u ite fra n k in e x p la in in g to Ki ng H as sa n th a t U .S . m ilita r y eq uip m en t cannot 

be us ed in c ro s s -b o rd e r a tta c k s in to A lg e ria i f th e p o li c y o f h o t p u r s u it i s 

in f a c t a p p lie d . I f Ki ng H as sa n i s u n w il li n g to a c c e p t su ch c o n d itio n s , he 

may do b e t t e r to tu rn to Eur op ea n s u p p lie r s . O th er Moroccan arms r e s t r a i n t s , 

sh ould be c a r e f u lly w ei gh ed on a c a s e -b y -c a s e b a s i s .

In sum, we ca nnot a ll o w our m ilita r y su p p ly r e la tio n s h ip w it h Mo roc co 

to dry up e n t i r e l y , b u t a t th e same tim e we sh o u ld re c o g n iz e t h a t mo re arm s 

w ill only m a rg in a ll y a f f e c t th e ou tcom e o f th e Sah ar a d is p u te . The 0V- 10 

o r OV-1 w i l l h e lp Morocco to im pr ov e i t s re c o n n a is s a n c e c a p a b ility ; i t do es 

n o t re p re s e n t an e s c a la tio n o f th e M oro cc an-A lg er ia n arm s r i v a l r y an d pose s 

no th r e a t to A lg e ria ; and i t co uld h e lp to s t a b i l i z e th e m ilita r y s ta n d o ff 

in th e S ahara . But Ki ng H as sa n sh ould n o t draw th e c o n c lu sio n t h a t U .S . 

arms w ill h e n c e fo rth be a v a ila b le to win th e f r u s t r a t i n g war in th e S ah ara .

I n s te a d , he sh o u ld be en co ura ged to u se an y a d d itio n a l s tr e n g th to s t r i k e 

th e b e s t p o l i t i c a l d e a l t h a t be can, to n e g o tia te an h o n o ra b le s e ttle m e n t, 

b e fo re th e c o s ts o f th e c o n f l i c t f u rth e r er ode M oro cc o's ec on om ic s tre n g th 

an d th e K in g 's own a u th o r ity .
92

Mr. Solarz. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD SAUNDERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Saunders. I found in several years of working closely with Bill 

Quan dt that we work faster when we can make our remarks complemen t each other. I will try without duplication to do that today in 

order to give the subcommittee members a second perspective, not 

so much a different perspective on the issue as a basis for discussion.

Let me just begin by underscoring the American interests in this 

area. Dr. Quandt has laid out several, but I just want to emphasize 

the importance of this area on the southern coast of the M editerranean 

to us strategically. I want to emphasize the fact that both Algeria and 

Morocco play important roles in Africa and the Middle Eas t and, 

therefore, our relations with them are important in that context as 

well as for their own intrinsic merits.

And, finally, there are of course important national resources, petroleum and phosphates, in these areas. So, we are dealing with an 

area of consequence for American interests.

Tn the modem era, we have maintained a close political relationship 

with the Moroccans. We have had bases in Morocco over past years 

which have only been closed at our initiative in the p ast year. Morocco 

has historically taken like-minded views on international problems 

ranging from those in Zaire to the complex set of issues involved in the 

Arab-Israeli conflict.

With Algeria, we have had strong and growing common economic 

interests. Our relations have gradually improved over the last 5 years 

since the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1974. The current evolution of the new Algerian Government provides a moment of 

opportunity for further consolidating that mutually productive 

relationship.

I might add here this is also a relationship in which a number of 

Americans from the private sector are carrying the burden of the 

American presence because of the technology that they can make 

available to the Algerians and because of the contribution they can 

make at Algerian request to the development of Algeria.

So, we have here two countries where we have a substantial in terest 

in continuing the kind of close relationship that we have had in the 

past. It is into this complex of interests that the Saharan conflict is introduced. We do not need to go into the history of the conflict but 

rather to come down to the problem that i t poses for us today.

The basic fact from which we take off today is that the United 

States, along with most all other countries, recognizes the present 

state of affairs to be that Morocco and Mauritania have assumed 

administrative control of the territory of the western Sahara, bu t we 

continue to believe that the question of its ultimate sovereignty remains unresolved.

Against the background of the guerrilla war which has brought us 

to our present situation now, we believe tha t we face in the few past 

weeks a new situation. The Polisario, which had declared a cease-fire 

with Mauritania almost exactly 1 year ago, ended that a few days ago
93

by a strong atta ck on a Mauritanian post just before the convening 

of the African summit in Monrovia.

At the same time, Polisario attacks continued in the Moroccan 

portion of the western Sahara but have now been expanded so they 

are taking place within the territory that we would call the Morocco 

proper. These attacks have taken place, the first one back in Jan uary, 

but since, on M ay 31, Jun e 4, Ju ne 11, June 27, July 14, and probably 

yesterday. So this is an emerging pattern of military activity which 

we have not seen before. And I think i t creates a situation which we 

have to take into account.

As Dr. Quandt said, i t is difficult a t this point to see how either side 

can win a military victory. But as he also pointed out, a peaceful 

solution to the dispute does not appear immediately at hand either. 

Morocco has consistently rejected calls for a referendum arguing that 

the population of the Sahara expressed its will through the meeting of 

its territorial assembly at the time of the administrative transfer of 

the territory from Spain.

The renewed appeal for a referendum, this time by the OAU 

Committee of Wisemen, was considered last week at the OAU summit 

meeting in Monrovia. A resolution was passed there which calls for a 

cease-fire and a referendum. The Moroccan Government has not yet 

responded officially to this call by the OAU but appears willing to 

accept the principle of a cease-fire while continuing to set aside the 

idea of a referendum.

Now, a negotiated solution also seems distant. Both Morocco and 

the Polisario claim sovereignty over the entire Moroccan portion of 

the western Sahara. Recent information suggests tha t the Polisario 

may have begun to lay claims to portions of the southern Morocco 

proper. This leaves less room for compromise than we have experienced 

in the past.

Moreover, Morocco claims its dispute is with Algeria, without whose 

support the Polisario could no t survive. It insists negotiations should 

be directly with Algeria, while Algeria maintains the dispute is between 

Morocco and the Polisario and any negotiations should be between 

those two parties.

Now, many countries and international organizations have offered 

to try to resolve this dispute. And it is for tha t reason tha t the United 

States has not taken a central role, although we have considered this 

option on a number of occasions over the past 4 years.

There is no need to enumerate the various efforts tha t have been 

made but there has been a steady progression of them. There have 

been exchanges between the Moroccan and Algerian Governments 

at various levels informally on this subject.

Finally, as I have mentioned, representatives of the OAU Committee of Wiseman talked with everyone in the past few months in an 

effort to find a common ground for a peaceful solution. We favor a 

peaceful and negotiated solution which respects the rights of the 

inhabitan ts and we have made this clear to all concerned parties.

As I say, we have not ourselves offered to mediate; however, we 

have offered to help each of these countries and organizations. And 

we are in repeated touch with them constantly assessing the opportunities for a new effort to see whether there is anything that we 

can do directly.

5 1 -3 0 3 0 - 7 9 - 8
94

Now, this dispute faces us with difficult policy choices. Once again, 

the United States finds itself on the horns of a dilemma not of its 

own making. The Sahara dispute makes it difficult to pursue the 

interests which I outlined earlier in the way that we would like to 

pursue them with either Algeria or Morocco without encouraging the 

suspicion and even the hostility of the o ther country.

In trying to work this tangle of contradictions through, we have 

sought as closely as possible to work with the Congress. And as you 

pointed out, Mr. Chairman, I think there has been a good tradition 

of informal discussions over the last 2 years on this subject.

We have consistently, I think, agreed together that we recognize 

Moroccan administrative control in the Sahara while noting that the 

sovereignty issue remains unresolved. This remains a credible policy 

shared by most other countries and there is no intention at this 

point of suggesting th at we change t ha t perception of the problem.

Mr. Solarz. Bill, if it is OK for you, why don’t we recess 7 or 

8 minutes and we will be rig ht back.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.}

Mr. Solarz. Ladies and gentlemen, the hearing is called to order. 

Mr. Secretary, we interrupted you in the middle of a brilliant exposition of African policy.

Mr. Saunders. I was try ing to explain the problem. I am not sure 

about the policy.

Let me take a few more minutes.

Against the background of this situation and the interest I have 

described, we want to maintain our traditional close relationship with 

Morocco to the fullest extent possible while preserving the opportun ity to continue building the relationship with Algeria that has 

evolved so steadily over the last 5 years. W ith congressional approval 

we are continuing to provide financing for Moroccan military purchases 

and to furnish military training for Moroccan personnel.

The President received King Hassan here in Washington last 

November. Secretary of Commerce Kreps and then-Deputy Secretary 

Duncan visited Morocco this year in an effort to keep the dialog 

going at a high level. We are trying to expand academic exchanges, 

technical cooperation, trade, and investment with Morocco.

However, in one area, our m ilitary supply relationship, the conflict 

between our bilateral interests in Morroco and our Saharan policy 

has proved increasingly difficult to resolve. In practice, our policy of 

recognizing Moroccan administrative control but not sovereignty over 

a portion of the Western Sahara had meant a willingness to continue 

our historic role of arms supplier to the Moroccan Government, but 

only for weapons to be used to defend the territory of Moroccan 

property. B ut as you are aware, this policy has been easier to enunciate 

than to implement, and at times it has become a sticking point in our 

bilateral relations with Morocco* And now that a ttacks on Moroccan 

property have become a regular problem, I believe we are altogether 

faced with a new problem.

Since the beginning of this year the situation our policy is designed 

to cope with has changed in fundamental ways, as I have pointed out. 

And I believe th at it will be increasingly difficult to maintain Moroccan 

understanding for the arms supply relationship that we have maintained. Therefore, I think tha t we are at a point of examining how to 

continue the relationship with Morocco that we want while preserving
95

what we wish to preserve of the arms supply policy that we have 

followed. And that is the issue before us.

I will be glad to answer questions about present policy, and as I 

have indicated, I think at some point we will want to continue our 

consultations privately so that we can really delve into the dilemma 

that this poses to us, the options which are available to us. We have 

made no new decisions. The policy remains unchanged a t the moment. 

And it is the new decisions that we would like to bring the Congress 

in on the takeoff.

[Mr. Saunders’ prepared statement follows:]
P repared Statement of Hon. Harold Saunders, Assi sta nt Secretary State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Mr . Chairman and Congr essm en,

I SEE THIS DISCUSSION TODAY ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS 

THE WESTERN SAHARA AS PART OF A SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS ON THIS 

SUBJECT BEGINNING ALMOST TWO YEARS AGO. THESE CONSULTATIONS HAVE COVERED BOTH THE BROAD ISSUE OF THE 

western Sahara and specific policy questions as they

HAVE FACED THE ADMINISTRATION.

Our Regional and Bilateral Interests

It is important at the outset to put U.S. policy

TOWARDS THE WESTERN SAHARA IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR 

POLICY TOWARDS NORTHWEST AFRICA IN GENERAL:

— Since the early days of our indepen dence,

THIS REGION HAS BEEN IMPORTANT TO US BECAUSE

OF ITS LOCATION ON THE SOUTHERN LITTORAL OF 

the Medit erran ean, controlling the lower half

of the Straits of Gibraltar.

-- It is important to us because of the role it

PLAYS BOTH IN AFRICA AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

-- It is important because of its natural resources— petroleum AND PHOSPHATES.

Mqrqcca

In the modern era, we have had a close relat ion-
97

ship with Morocco, which shared many of our interests,

BOTH GLOBALLY AND REGIONALLY:

— ON THE STRATEGIC SIDE, WE HAD SAC BASES IN

Morocco until 19 63 , and we maintained naval

COMMUNICATIONS BASES THERE UNTIL WE CLOSED 

THEM AT OUR INITIATIVE LAST YEAR. MOROCCO 

CONTINUES TO PERMIT PORT VISITS BY U.S .

NAVAL VESSELS AND TO ALLOW U.S . MILITARY 

AIRCRAFT TO TRANSIT TO DESTINATIONS SUCH AS 

Saudi Ara bia.

— Morocco has historic ally taken a moderate

position on the Arab-Israel que sti on. It

HAS THE LARGEST JEWISH POPULATION OF ANY 

COUNTRY IN THE ARAB WO RLD— ALMOST 20,00 0—

AND ENCOURAGES THE RETURN TO MOROCCO OF JEWS 

WHO HAVE MIGRATED TO ISRAEL. KlNG HASSAN 

WAS THE FIRST ARAB LEADER TO FAVOR EGYPTIAN 

President Sad at's trip to Jerusal em. While

ASSOCIATING HIMSELF WITH THE MAJORITY OF 

Arab countries in opposition to the EgyptIsrael treaty, King Hassan maintai ns his

PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH SADAT AND SUPPORTS 

THE PRINCIPLE OF A PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SOLUTION to the Arab-Israel dispute.
98

— In Africa, Morocco has consist ently supported

MODERATE FORCES. MOROCCO TWICE SENT TROOPS 

IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FROM ZAIRE TO MAINTAIN 

STABILITY IN THAT COUNTRY'S SHABA PROVINCE.

It opposes Soviet and Cuban intervention in

Africa.

Algeria

While we have not had the same similarity of

VIEWS ON REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES WITH ALGERIA 

AS WE HAVE WITH MOROCCO, OUR RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA 

HAVE BEEN STEADILY IMPROVING SINCE WE REESTABLISHED 

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN 1974. We ARE ALGERIA'S 

LARGEST TRADING PARTNER. It SUPPLIES US WITH ABOUT 

NINE PERCENT OF OUR CRUDE OIL IMPORTS. AMERICAN FIRMS 

HAVE WON $6 BILLION IN CONTRACTS IN ALGERIA IN RECENT 

YEARS FOR ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION SERVICES.

These economic relations are only one indication of a

PRAGMATIC APPROACH OF THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT, AS A 

RESULT OF WHICH WE ARE ABLE TO MAINTAIN A FRANK AND

FRIENDLY DIALOGUE ON A WIDE VARIETY OF SUBJECTS.

The Wes te rn.. .Sahar a

Into this fabric of bilateral relations which I 

HAVE DESCRIBED THERE INTERVENED IN THE MID-1970S THE 

western Sahara dis put e.
99

When Spain decided to withdraw from the African

COLONY KNOWN AS SPANISH SAHARA, THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT ACTIVATED AN HISTORIC CLAIM TO THE TERRITORY.

The Gove rnm ent's effort reflected strong irredentist

FEELINGS THROUGHOUT MOROCCO, WHICH CONSIDERED SPANISH 

Sahara as part of Moro cco's historic territory and

VIEWED ITS REACQUISITION AS THE CONTINUATION OF A

GRADUAL PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION WHICH BEGAN WHEN 

the French protectorate regime ended in the Moroccan

HEARTLAND IN 19 56 . AFTER A COUPLE OF YEARS OF INTENSE 

DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING, SPAIN TRANSFERRED ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL TO MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA UNDER THE 

Madrid Agreement of 19 75 .

Morocco's quest aroused little sympathy in the

REGION, PARTICULARLY IN ALGERIA AND AMONGST SOME OF 

THE TRIBES WHICH TRADITIONALLY LIVED IN AND AROUND 

the Spanish Sah ar a. The case had been referred to

THE ICJ IN THE HAGUE, WHICH RULED IN EFFECT THAT THE 

DISPUTED TERRITORY HAD HAD HISTORIC LINKS TO THE 

Kingdom of Morocco but these did not constitute ties

OF SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT SOVEREIGNTY COULD BE ESTABLISHED ONLY BY DETERMINING THE WILL OF THE INHABITANTS 

Moroc co, howe ver, took the ICJ ruling as legitimizing
100

ITS CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. It REPLACED THE SPANISH 

ADMINISTRATION IN THE NORTHERN TWO-THIRDS OF THE 

TERRITORY' WHILE MAURITANIA TOOK OVER THE REST. The

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TAKEOVER WERE CONFUSED. MOROCCO 

CLAIMS THAT THE INHABITANTS EXPRESSED THEIR WISHES 

THROUGH A VOTE BY THOSE MEMBERS OF THE SPANISH SAHARA 

TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLY WHO WERE AVAILABLE AFTER MOROCCO 

HAD ENTERED THE TERRITORY (A SCANT MAJORITY). THIS 

EVENT HAS NOT BEEN GENERALLY RECOGNIZED AS CONSTITUTING

AN EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

The U.S., along with almost all other coun tries., 

RECOGNIZED THAT MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA HAD TAKEN OVER 

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE TERRITORY BUT CONTINUED

TO BELIEVE THAT THE QUESTION OF ITS ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNTY REMAINED UNRESOLVED. TRIBAL AND OTHER SAHARAN 

GROUPS OPPOSED TO MOROCCAN CONTROL' WHICH HAD COALESCED' 

BEFORE THE SPANISH DEPARTURE' INTO THE POLISARIO MOVE ­

MENT' BEGAN A GUERRILLA MOVEMENT AGAINST MOROCCAN AND 

Mauritanian armed forces in the terr itory' with arms

AND SANCTUARY PROVIDED BY ALGERIA.

The Polisario declared a ceasefire with Mauritania in July 1978 which it ended exactly a year later

WITH A STRONG ATTACK ON THE MAURITANIAN POST OF TlCHLA 

IN THE SOUTHERNMOST PORTION OF THE FORMER S PANISH
101

Sahara. Meanw hile, Polisario attacks continued in the

Moroccan portion of the western Sah ar a. In additi on, 

the Polisario increased its activities in southern

Morocco prope r, with major attacks on January 28,

May 31, June 4, June 11, June 27 and July 14 of this

ye ar. Some of these probably involved hundreds of

Polisario troops.

It is diffi cult at this point to see how either

SIDE CAN WIN A MILITARY VICTORY, BUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS DISPUTE DOES NOT APPEAR AT HAND.

-- Morocco has consiste ntly rejecte d calls for

A REFERENDUM, ARGUING THAT THE POPULATION 

EXPRESSED ITS WILL THROUGH THE MEETING OF 

THE TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLY. A RENEWED APPEAL 

FOR A REFERENDUM, THIS TIME BY THE OAU COMMITTEE OF WlSEMEN, WAS CONSIDERED LAST WEEK 

at the OAU Summit meeting in Monr ovi a. A

RESOLUTION WAS PASSED CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE 

AND A REFERENDUM. THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT HAS 

NOT YET RESPONDED OFFICIALLY, BUT APPEARS 

WILLING TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF A CEASEFIRE 

WHILE CONTINUING TO REJECT THE IDEA OF A

REFERENDUM.
102

— A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION ALSO SEEMS DISTANT.

Both Morocco and the Polisario claim sovereignty OVER THE ENTIRE MOROCCAN PORTION OF 

THE WESTERN SAHARA. RECENT INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT THE POLISARIO MAY EVEN HAVE BEGUN 

TO LAY CLAIM TO PORTIONS OF THE SOUTHERN 

Morocco pro per. This leaves less room for

COMPROMISE THAN EVER. MOREOVER, MOROCCO 

CLAIMS THAT ITS DISPUTE IS WITH ALGERIA, 

WITHOUT WHOSE SUPPORT THE POLISARIO COULD 

NOT SURVIVE. It INSISTS THAT NEGOTIATION 

SHOULD BE DIRECTLY WITH ALGERIA. ALGERIA,

FOR ITS PART, MAINTAINS THAT THE DISPUTE 

concerns Morocco and the Polis ario, and that

ANY NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE BETWEEN THOSE

PARTIES.

Many countries and international organiza tions

HAVE OFFERED TO TRY TO HELP RESOLVE THE DISPUTE. 

Spain, as the former colonial power, has discussed

THE PROBLEM WITH BOTH SIDES, MOST RECENTLY DURING THE 

visit of Prime Minister Suarez to Algeria in April

and of King Juan Carlos to Morocco in Jun e. France

ALSO EXAMINES THE SITUATION PERIODICALLY WITH THE
COUNTRIES INVOLVED, AND SAUDI ARABIA HAS TRIED ONCE 

AND POSSIBLY TWICE TO HELP RESOLVE THE ISSUE.

Finally, representatives of the OAU Committee of Wisemen TALKED TO ALL CONCERNED WITHIN THE PAST FEW MONTHS 

IN AN EFFORT TO FIND COMMON GROUND FOR A PEACEFUL 

SOLUTION.

We favor a peace ful, negotiated solution which

RESPECTS THE RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS AND HAVE MADE 

THIS CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED PARTIES. We HAVE NOT 

OURSELVES OFFERED TO MEDIATE BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER

OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE AL ­

READY INVOLVED AND WHICH ARE BETTER PLACED THAN WE 

TO PERFORM THIS SERVICE. HOWEVER, WE HAVE OFFERED 

TO HELP EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN

ANY WAY THAT WE CAN.

U.S, Policy

This dispute has faced us with difficult policy

CHOICES.

Once again the United States found itself on the

HORNS OF A DILEMMA NOT OF ITS OWN MAKING. THE SAHARA 

DISPUTE BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA MAKES IT DIFFICULT 

FOR US TO PURSUE OUR INTERESTS IN THE WAY WE WOULD
104 .

LIKE TO WITH EITHER COUNTRY/ WITHOUT INCURRING THE 

SUSPICION AND EVEN HOSTILITY OF THE OTHER.

In trying to work our way through this tangle of

CONTRADICTIONS WE HAVE SOUGHT TO WORK AS CLOSELY AS 

POSSIBLE WITH CONGRESS. We HAVE CONSISTENTLY AGREED 

ON RECOGNIZING MOROCCAN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL WHILE 

NOTING THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE REMAINS UNRESOLVED. 

This is a reasonable and credible policy shared by

MOST OTHER COUNTRIES; I HAVE NO INTENTION OF SUGGESTING TODAY THAT IT SHOULD BE CHANGED. THE PROBLEM IS 

HOW WE APPLY IT IN SPECIFIC CASES/ AND MOST PARTICULARLY THE QUESTION OF HOW IT AFFECTS OUR RELATIONS 

with Moro cco.

We WISH TO MAINTAIN OUR TRADITIONAL CLOSE COOPERATION with Morocco to the extent poss ible. With Congressional APPROVAL/ WE ARE CONTINUING TO PROVIDE 

FINANCING FOR MOROCCAN MILITARY PURCHASES AND TO 

FURNISH MILITARY TRAINING FOR MOROCCAN PERSONNEL.

The President received King Hassan in Washington last

NOVEMBER/ AND SECRETARY OF COMMERCE KREPS AND THEN 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Duncan visited Morocco

THIS YEAR. We ARE SEEKING TO EXPAND ACADEMIC EXCHANGES/ 

TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND TRADE AND INVESTMENT WITH 

Moro cco. Howev er/ in one area— our military supply
105

RELATIONSHIP— THE CONFLICT BETWEEN OUR BILATERAL INTERESTS in Morocco and our Sahara policy has proven

INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE.

In prac tice,, our general policy of recognizing

Moroccan administrative control but not sovereignty

OVER A PORTION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA HAS MEANT A 

WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE OUR HISTORIC ROLE OF ARMS 

SUPPLIER TO THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT, BUT ONLY FOR 

WEAFONS TO BE USED TO DEFEND THE TERRITORY OF MOROCCO 

PROPER. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THIS POLICY HAS BEEN EASIER 

TO ENUNCIATE THAN TO IMPLEMENT, AND AT TIMES IT HAS

BECOME A STICKING POINT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS

with Mor occo.

Furthe rmor e, since the beginni ng of this year

THE SITUATION OUR POLICY IS DESIGNED TO COPE WITH 

HAS CHANGED IN FUNDAMENTAL WAYS. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENT IS PROBABLY THE FACT THAT, AS 

I HAVE NOTED, THIS YEAR THE POLISARIO HAS BEEN VI GOROUSLY CARRYING THE WAR INTO AREAS WITHIN MOROCCO'S 

HISTORIC BOUNDARIES. MOROCCO IS NO LONGER FIGHTING 

ONLY TO PACIFY A REGION IT HAS ANNEXED; IT IS ALSO

DEFENDING ITSELF WITHIN ITS OWN TERRITORY AGAINST 

EXTERNAL ATTACK. THE POLISARIO*S DECISION TO INCREASE
106

THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF THE FIGHTING HAS MADE THE 

QUEST FOR PEACE MORE DIFFICULT. It HAS ALSO MADE IT 

MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO MAINTAIN MOROCCAN UNDERSTANDING FOR A U.S. ARMS SUPPLY POLICY OF GREAT RESTRAINT.

I AM PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS IN MORE 

SPECIFIC TERMS' PARTICULARLY THE RELATED QUESTIONS OF 

HOW THE U.S. CAN MORE EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE 

GOAL OF A PEACEFUL' NEGOTIATED SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE' AND HOW WE CAN BETTER MANAGE THE CONTRADICTIONS 

INHERENT IN OUR RESTRICTIONS ON MOROCCAN USE OF U.S.- 

SUPPLIED ARMS. I BELIEVE' HOWEVER' THAT THIS CAN 

MOST USEFULLY BE ACCOMPLISHED IN CLOSED SESSION.
107

Mr. Solarz. Tha nk you very much for your testimony. We certainly appreciate your willingness and determination to continue consultations with the committee. Since I understand you have to leave

• at 12:30, what I would like to suggest as a kind of general guideline 

is th at we remain in public session until about 11:45 and then go into 

closed session, and then we can have the final 45 minutes in closed 

session with you.

* If that is not objectionable, I would like to begin by asking Dr. 

Quan dt a few questions since we will have more time to explore some 

of these issues with you a little later.

Dr. Quandt, on page 2 of your testimony you made the point that 

Morocco recognized Mauritania and signed but did not ratify a border 

agreement with Algeria. Could you briefly tell us why Morocco did 

not ratify the border agreement with Algeria?

Mr. Quandt. To the best of my recollection, the conflict over the 

Sahara was beginning to emerge about the time the question of ratification arose and King Hassan simply did not proceed with final 

ratification. I think this was a political signal to the Algerians that 

Morocco was not going to recognize Algeria’s border as long as the 

Sahara conflict was stfil unresolved. I am not aware of any further 

developments on tha t score.

Mr. Solarz. Was there a similar agreement, border agreement, 

with Mauritania?

Mr. Quandt. The agreement with Mau ritan ia had to do with the 

partition of the Sahara. First there was recognition of Mauritania by 

Morocco. Morocco recognized Mauritania within its previous frontiers. 

Then they later divided the Sahara and agreed on a line of division.

Mr. Solarz. Th at agreement recognizing M auritania was ratified?

Mr. Quandt. I believe so, yes.

Mr. Solarz. But the one recognizing the borders of Algeria was 

not ratified?

Mr. Quandt. In the case of Mauritania, it involved recognition 

of Mauritania within its acknowledged borders. In the case of Algeria, 

Morocco recognized Algeria but had a border dispute with them.

Mr. Solarz. On page 3 you said, “The Algerians have hinted the 

Polisario demand might be met by less than full independence 

in the entire Western Sahara.” Could you tell us briefly where they 

gave these things, when, and to whom, and what they consisted of?

* Mr. Quandt. As I understand it, the formal position of Algeria 

is that the Polisario represents the population and they support the 

Polisario’s official position of independence for all the Sahara. There 

have been cases in discussions with Algerian officials over the past year

• or so of a greater degree of flexibility. There is some recognition that 

Moroccan interests in the north ern sector of the Sahara are substan tial and that any agreement would have to take that into account, 

and that some territorial compromise might be a possibility. I cannot 

go into greater detail about who said what to whom and on what 

occasion, b ut I think that is nonetheless a fair reflection of Algerian 

policy as I understand it over the past year.

There was some flexibility with regard to recognizing a special 

Moroccan interest in the north ern sector of the Sahara and, if necessary to accommodate that interest, something less than full independence for all the Saharan territory would be a possibility that 

Algeria would support.
108

Mr. Solarz. Did they seem to be thinking along the lines of a 

Polisario state in less than all of the Sahara or were they thinking 

in terms of some kind of autonomy for the Saharan people within the 

framework of a Moroccan sovereignty? •

Mr. Quandt. I think the Algerian position, as I understand it, 

was that they still favored a state, but perhaps in less than all of the 

western Sahara.

Mr. Solarz. Now, you also indicated on page 3 of your testimony ♦

tha t the Polisario has rejected the idea of a referendum to determine 

the wishes of the population of the people of the Sahara. My impression 

was th at the Polisario was prepared to accept a referendum.

Mr. Quandt. My statement was that they rejected the idea of a 

referendum just in the Mauritanian sector. They have rejected the 

idea of limiting a referendum only to the Moroccan sector. As you 

know, one alternative some people talk about is a Saharan entity 

only in the Mauritanian sector. As I understand it, the Polisario 

rejection only had to do with the notion of splitting the Mauritanian 

and Moroccan sectors.

Mr. Solarz. But they presumably would be prepared to accept 

the referendum in all sectors?

Mr. Quandt. I cannot speak authoritatively on tha t, but I see 

no reason why they would not.

Mr. Solarz. Our current policy toward arms sales to Morocco is 

tha t we are prepared to provide them with arms that are presumably 

suitable for use for the defense of what you call the Moroccan proper; 

is that correct?

Mr. Saunders. Yes; that is correct. And th at is what we have done.

Mr. Solarz. And our current position has been we will not sell 

them arms which are designed explicitly for use in the Sahara?

Mr. Saunders. Yes; we have had discussions over the last months 

about whether there was some understanding that could be reached 

which would provide us assurance tha t if we sold equipment tha t might 

be applicable to use to the Sahara, that it would indeed only be used 

in the Moroccan proper.

And we have not succeeded in working out any understanding of 

tha t kind.

Mr. Solarz. And they have often refrained from providing assurance th at equipment we give them will not be used in the Sahara?

Mr. Saunders. That is correct.

Mr. Solarz. My understanding is we have tried to resolve the 

dilemma by selling them equipment not suitable for use in the Sahara 

but which might serve other military purposes. Is that correct?

Mr. Saunders. I do not think that we have tried to solve the dilemma by doing that. The fact is t hat where equipment has been requested tha t was not appropriate for use in the Sahara, we felt there 

was no problem in providing it, but tha t does n ot resolve the basic 

dilemma we have been talking about.

Mr. Solarz. Well have we until now provided them with new military equipment which has been suitable for use in the Sahara?

Mr. Saunders. We have not in recent m onths provided any major 

system simply because our program has been a t a standstill.

Mr. Solarz. Well has it been our position until the present time 

tha t we would not as a matter of policy sell them military equipment 

which was suitable for use in the Sahara or was there no such policy?
109

Mr. Saunders. Tha t has been our practice in recent months. If 

you reach back into the earlier periods of our program when we were 

indeed actively selling equipment, this was not an issue. We have not

* in recent months, since that has become an issue, as I say, provided 

major new systems.

Mr. Solarz. My recollection is when we have had hearings on this 

in the past, the position of the administration given was that we

• wanted to continue to sell arms to Morocco but since they refused to 

give assurances the arms will not be used in the Sahara, we were confining ourselves to the sale of only those arms which were presumably 

not suitable for use in the Sahara?

Mr. Saunders. T hat is correct.

Mr. Solarz. That was the policy?

Mr. Saunders. Yes.

Mr. Solarz. Is that still the policy?

Mr. Saunders. Yes.

Mr. Solarz. How did we distinguish between what was suitable 

for use in the Sahara and what was not? C an you give us an indication 

of what we sold them?

Mr. Saunder s. Well for instance, something like a ship-to-ship 

missile, an air defense system, or things of that kind I think would be 

clearly not suitable for use in the desert warfare.

Mr. Solarz. And you think this description meets the character of 

the kind of equipment we have been selling them for the last few years, 

that is to say, equipment which was not suitable for use in the Sahara?

Mr. Saun der s. That is true. I think we have actually leaned over 

backward to try to stay within the confines of that policy.

Mr. Solarz. Y ou have indicated a new situation has developed in 

the sense tha t Polisario cadres are attacking Moroccan installations in 

Morocco proper. Under the doctrine of hot pursuit, have our people 

had an opportunity to examine whether within the framework of the 

1960 agreement where we provide Morocco with arms for the defense 

of Morocco proper they are entitled to use the arms we give them 

in hot pursuit of Polisario cadres th at have attacked installations in 

Morocco proper?

Would that be in our interpretation a legitimate use of military 

equipment we have given them?

Mr. Saun der s. This is the kind of issue we are examining. But

* I think this is what we need to consult together about. We need to 

talk about how one might or whether one should reinterpret the meaning of self-defense in this new context.

Mr. Solarz. Well we can get into that, I suppose, in the closed

• session. Just one or two more questions. Do we have an interest in 

preventing in a ny way the establishment of an independent Saharawi 

state in the western Sahara? Would the establishment of such a state 

be incompatible with our interests?

Mr. Saun der s. We have taken the position that we are neutral on 

the outcome. We have supported the notion that there should be, as 

has been stated in the U.N. resolution on the subject, that there 

should be an act of self-determination through consultations.

Mr. Solarz. And if as the result of that process an independent 

state were established, we would not consider that to be incompatible 

with our interests?

5 1 -3 0 3 0 - 7 9 - 7
110

Mr. Saunders. I think that our view of our interests is something 

that we do not state in advance of somebody else’s decision about 

his future. We have taken the position that we are neutral as to the 

outcome of that process.

Mr. Solarz. So whether the outcome of the process resulted in the 

perpetuation of the status quo, or some kind of Moroccan sovereignty over two-thirds of the Sahara, or the establishment of an 

independent state, is not directly related, in your judgment, to our 

interests; our interests are in effectuating a resolution of th e conflict 

through the peaceful process and through self-determination?

Mr. Saunders. That is our formal position.

Mr. Solarz. Has Algeria reacted to the arms we have been selling 

to Morocco? Has our arms sales policy with respect to Morocco been 

a source of tension in our relationship with Algeria?

Mr. Saunders. It has been a source of discussion, but I think we 

have found that the level a t which we are now operating is one everybody is accustomed to and it has not, to my recollection, occasioned 

serious comments from th e Algerian side.

Mr. Solarz. Ojie of the major justifications for increasing the supply 

of arms to Morocco or supply arms to Morocco has been the extent 

to which Morocco has been a moderate force in the politics of the 

Middle East.

People have pointed out the extent to which the King helped support 

the peace initiative of President Sadat. Yet, since the treaty has been 

signed, Morocco has voted for the Baghdad resolution. It severed 

diplomatic relations with Egypt. It refused to permit an Egyptian 

delegation to attend the Islamic conference in Fez. In light of all of 

these developments can it still be said that Morocco is at the present 

time a force for moderation in the Middle East?

Mr. Saunders. I think the answer is still yes because if I can be 

presumptuous and state what I think Moroccan interests are, I do 

not think it is in Morocco’s interest to stay long in close alinement 

with the rejectionists in the Middle East.

I do not think tha t is the interest of most of the Arab countries 

who were at the Baghdad summit, and I would expect us over time 

to see a reemergence of the more natura l Moroccan position. So while 

the position at the moment has not been helpful, I would think our 

interest would be in banking, as I say, on a more natural expression 

of Morocco’s real interests later on, which would be to support the 

efforts to achieve a reasonable negotiated settlement and to see Eg ypt’s 

position strong as a moderate force in the area.

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Goodling?

Mr. Goodling. You said tha t we should do one thing for sure, Dr. 

Quandt, and tha t is make a more clear and forceful statem ent as to 

just what our interests and policies are. You did not give any specifics. 

Do you have any specifics in mind?

Mr. Quandt. The one thing I will repeat is, I believe we need to 

have the kind of frank and serious discussion with the leadership in 

Morocco, and tha t really means with King Hassan, that we have not 

successfully had in the past year or so as the situation has deteriorated. 

I have no reason to believe the King is not aware of the situation, but 

I am not sure he has heard our views on some of the risks as this 

conflict continues.
I l l

As you no doubt know, we do not at present have an Ambassador 

in Morocco. Whenever an Ambassador does go out, I think he would 

have as high priority establishing that kind of dialog with the Moroc-

• can leadership, but clearly something needs to be done before that 

happens. We need to open that channel in a way that we have not, 

in m y judgment, succeeded in doing in the past year.

Mr. Goodling. I am sure that Algeria’s concern is not one of self-

• determination for the area, no matter what they may say. What do 

you really believe is their major concern? Is their nose just out of 

joint because they were not a part of the agreement for Spain’s withdrawal? What is the problem?

Mr. Quandt. T o a certain extent, 1 think the Algerian position can 

be understood as the result of their having been left out of the deal 

that was cut among Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain. There is, as 

you know, a longstanding geopolitical rivalry between Morocco and 

Algeria in that region. And to a substantial degree I believe the two 

parties are in disagreement over the Sahara for reasons of historical 

competition in the area rather than highly principled positions per se.

It is difficult, however, for a regime such as A lgeria’s which fought 

for its own independence, called for its own self-determination, to 

take anything other than a formal position in support of self-determination. As I have suggested, there are perhaps more nuances in their real 

position than in that formal position.

But I think when you add together Algeria’s position of leadership 

in the Third World, its own revolutionary past, its geopolitical rivalry 

with Morocco, and the extent to which they were outmaneuvered in 

1975 at the time the Sahara issue was dealt with by Spain, you have 

the basis for understanding their present position.

Mr. Goodling. Do you have any comments, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. Saunders. I would add one point. It is traditional Algerian 

policy to support wars of national liberation and liberation movements. So I think in the context of what Dr. Quandt said, it is also 

natural that the Algerians support the Polisario in this effort.

Mr. Goodling. But I would fully concur with the reasons he 

elaborated. Having read several articles recently in relationship to 

the Polisario, who would you say they are actually today? Not who 

they were, but who are they today?

Mr. Quandt. T o my knowledge, I have never met anyone from the

• Polisario, so I am not very well equipped to talk about the present 

leadership. I think what you are really asking is who supports them 

and who has influence over them.

I suspect that most of them genuinely do come from the Sahara

• area, whether they lived in the Moroccan or Mauritanian or the border 

regions. It is not so much a question of which tribe they are from, but 

the question of who influences them today, who supports them, and 

do they represent an independent actor or are they in some sense 

an agent of other powers.

Certainly there is a component of the Polisario which represents 

the aspirations of the local population not to come under anyone 

else’s control. I am enough a student of North African history to know 

this is a longstanding traditional pattern of tribes resisting central 

authority. It is not that they are nationalists; it is simply they do 

not want to take orders from any central government.
112

And to some extent what we are seeing is this traditional resistance 

to central authority expressing itself in modern nationalist terminology. Obviously, the educated members of this population recognize 

that nationalism and self-determination are very appealing concepts in 

the international arena today. But the basic political impulse is simply 

resistance to outside authority.

That has been true as long as history has been recorded in tha t 

region. The history of Morocco can almost be written in terms of 

the expansion and contraction of central auth ority and resistance 

to tha t authority from the tribal groups on the periphery. This is one 

of these tribal groups with a longstanding adverse relationship with 

central government. It would be the same if it were Algeria or any 

of the other countries tha t border the Sahara.

It is clear the Algerians do provide the bulk of support today to 

Polisario. They provide the sanctuary which is importan t and essential 

to a movement of this sort.

Increasingly one hears reports that the Libyans also are supporting 

the Polisario. I have no independent information on that, bu t I am 

prepared to believe that may account for w hat appears to be a somewhat more independent and aggressive Polisario stance. The Polisario 

is perhaps less responsive to Algeria today than it was in the past 

and is more able to play off its various supporters, Libya and Algeria, 

and adopt a somewhat more aggressive and independent policy.

Mr. Goodling. Thank you.

Mr. Solarz. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. Fenwick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Quandt, I wondered before colonial times and before anybody 

interfered, were there only tribes there? Was this area ever part of 

Morocco? Was there a Kingdom of Morocco that extended into this 

area at any time?

Mr. Quandt. If you go back far enough in North African history, 

there were Moroccan empires that included Spain as well as the territory all the way down to the Senegal River. We can get into an 

interesting argument regarding what basis that provides for presentday borders. I suppose many Spaniards would n ot be too happy about 

that, or southern Frenchmen.

But the Moroccan empires from the 12th and 13th centuries expanded and contracted. And the core of it was always built around 

the cities of R aba t and Fezo, and the central area of Morocco tha t we 

know. But there was no well-defined border for what we would call 

Morocco over any prolonged period of time. The hinterland would 

aline itself with the Moroccans, and it would break away and it 

would shift back and forth.

It has only been in the present era of the 20th centu ry that the 

concept of drawing lines on a map in the desert regions and calling 

them international borders made any sense. You did not talk about 

territorial control in tha t sense. I t was the allegiance of tribes. And 

tha t came and went. It was not a territorial concept as much as a 

network of tribal alliances that defined the natu re of the empire or 

kingdom a t any given time.

Mrs. Fenwick. Was there then, since I phrased it so wrongly, a 

tribal alliance between those who inhabited that area now called 

western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco?
113

Mr. Quandt. There were periods when such alliances existed and 

when such alliances were broken.

Mrs. Fenwick. When was the last one?

Mr. Quandt. You are getting beyond my area of expertise. You 

would have to go into 19th century history to find the maximum 

extent of Moroccan control prior to the colonial period. I suspect it 

included a portion of the Sahara, but I cannot honestly tell you 

how much.

Mrs. F enwick. When did the Spanish get there?

Mr. Quandt. The Spanish assumed effective control over northern 

Morocco and the Sahara in the early 20th century, around 1912, at 

the same time the French established their protectorate over Morocco.

Mrs. Fenwick. So the Spaniards went into what is called western 

Sahara now, at that time?

Mr. Quandt. I don’t know the exact date, but Spain did n ot complete its conquest of the Sahara until the 1930’s.

Mrs. Fenwick. And who protested? Anybody?

Mr. Quandt. I honestly do not know.

Mrs. Fenwick. Did the Berbers? Did the tribes? Did Morocco?

Mr. Quandt. I simply cannot answer the question. I do not know.

Mrs. Fenwick. Well, it is not a very clear picture. If you took a 

scale of dependability and reasonableness; and you pu t Libya at one 

end and the Sudan, let us say, at the other, where would Algeria fit?

Mr. Quandt. It sounds a little bit like the kind of report cards we 

have heard about with people asking about loyalty and reliability. 

And since I did no t much like that exercise, I do not think I will like 

this one. If I were forced to do it, I would say that increasingly 

Algeria belongs at the center or toward the Sudan end of t ha t scale 

rath er than the Libyan end of th at scale.

Mrs. F enwick. So the development has been toward more stability 

and more kindly trea tment of their populations?

Mr. Quandt. I believe there is a serious effort to focus on issues of 

development of their society and of reforming some of the structures 

that have not proved to be terribly efficient. I do not believe one could 

characterize present day Algeria as belonging to the most extreme or 

radical of countries.

Mr. Saunders. If I could add one point, I think the Internationa l 

Court of Justice asked itself many of the questions that you were 

just thinking about and, its conclusion, which it announced in 1975, 

was there have been allegiances b ut they did not constitute a base for 

Moroccan sovereignty. That is one Cou rt’s judgment which the 

Moroccans did not accept, but it is the inquiry of one group into 

precisely the subjects you are asking about.

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. D erwinski. I understand you are interested in going into executive session very shortly so I will make a brief comment. I have read 

the complete statements of Secretary Saunders and Dr. Quandt. The 

Secretary’s statem ent is interesting to me because knowing the process 

by which that there has to be approval along the lines, I am amazed 

there is no reference here to human rights and individual rights of 

citizens involved. And I thought that this administration was motivated entirely by nobility and tha t human rights was a key factor.
114

All I see here is a tortured balance between what is U.S. interests in 

Morocco, U.S. interests in Algeria, and obvious disregard for the 

factor of Soviet leverage in Algeria and a disregard for Soviet leverage 

in Libya. I am amazed that you come to the Hill without these more «

noble concepts involved. So I just can’t figure that one out.

Quite frankly, I think this administration’s policy toward Morocco 

has been an absolute disgrace. It falls into the same pattern we have 

had with Iran and Nicaragua where we are lettin g down our friends.

And no wonder we don’t have a foreign policy left. I think the whole 

attitude toward Morocco is one of the sad chapters of the Carter 

administration foreign policy. And this statement merely fortifies my 

recognition of what I think is basic incompetency.

Having said those noble things, if you want to go into executive 

session and be told even worse things, fine. We will to into executive 

session.

Mr. Solarz. We will go into executive session in a few minutes. Far 

be it from me to disagree with the distinguished gentleman from 

Illinois, but my sense is for better or worse there has been more or 

less of a continuation of our foreign policy toward Morocco from the 

previous administration into the current one.

And if there is fault to be found, I think it would lie on the shoulders 

of both just as both would have to share credit if any credit is to be 

given. Mr. Secretary, I don’t know if you want to respond to that before we go into executive session-----

Mr. Saunders. I don’t think there is a point. I would recommend a 

closed session where we can get down to the real issues.

Mr. Solarz. Just one final question in open session if you feel you 

can comment on it. Your testimony in the beginning in response to m y 

question is that our policy, at least until the present, has been to refrain from selling arms to Morocco which were suitable for use in the 

Sahara because we have not ye t recognized their claims to sovereignty 

over that area. If that is in f act the case, why did we permit the Moroccans to buy through Italy the hea vy-d uty helicopters when most 

people seem to believe are not only suitable for use in the Sahara but 

are likely to be used in the Sahara?

Mr. Saunders. That was a special case which came about because 

of a variety of circumstances, one of which was that the Moroccans 

in making that purchase had not realized there was any American 

involvement in the sale of the helicopters. The contract had been con- •

eluded, or at least the agreement on the sale had been concluded, before we got into this current line of policy. And in the end we felt the 

honest thing to do was to permit the arrangement to be concluded as 

something of a one-time case, without reference to our current policies. •

Mr. Solarz. Could you tell us which American military equipment 

to your knowledge is being used in the Sahara or has been used?

Mr. Saunder s. To our knowledge, there is only one item of equipment that has been provided under U.S. military assistance agreements and therefore would be subject to the agreement that we are 

talking about; namely, the F- 5 aircraft. Now there are other items 

of U.S. origin equipment that have been purchased outside the framework of formal agreements. And there are some items in Mauritania 

as well.
115

Mr. Solarz. When you say they were purchased outside the framework of formal agreements, does t ha t mean they were not purchased 

from us but purchased on the international arms market?

Mr. Saunders. Or bought commercially from the supplier in the 

United States. This is true of, for in stan je, 12 C-130’s th at Morocco 

just bought on the market.

Mr. Solarz. In other words, when a country buys arms commercially, another community in the United States, the agreements that 

we have with every country when we give them FMS restricting the 

use of tha t equipment to legitimate self-defense is not applicable?

Mr. Saunders. Th at is right. The restrictions apply to those t ran sactions that are conducted under the law where the restrictions are 

provided for. And if the items are purchased in some other way and 

not under that law, then obviously by law-----

Mr. Solarz. And this is true with respect to other countries as well?

Mr. Saunders. Oh, yes.

Mr. Solarz. In other words, if Turkey had bought American arms 

commercially rather than through the FMS mechanisift, they would 

have been free to use them say on Cyprus without violating American 

law in the process.

Mr. Saunders. I am not an expert in tha t case. I assume the answer 

is yes. It is certainly true w ith other cases which I am familiar.

Mr. Solarz. So the only arms we have sold them under the FMS 

mechanism with respect to which these restrictions apply where they 

have been presumably violated are the F- 5E ’s?

Mr. Saunders. Th at is right.

Mr. Solarz. We have reports they have used GMC trucks, 105- 

and 155-mm guns, and 31-mm ammunition, rocket launchers from 

Tally Industries, 106-mm recoilless guns, Bell helicopters, and machinegun ammunition.

Do you know if this kind of equipment was used? If it was, was it 

purchased commercially?

Mr. Saunders. We would have to go back and compare that list 

against the list of transactions. Maybe Depu ty Assistant Secretary 

Murray has a fuller answer to that. If not we can take the list and 

check it out.

Mr. Murray. I really don’t know.

Mr. Solarz. Could you do that ? I think it would be helpful for the 

record. It is one thing if Morocco is using equipment there and another 

if they are using it in violation of restrictions. I think it would be 

helpful for the committee, too.

At this point the C hair will entertain a motion of one of the members 

of the African Subcommittee to go into executive session. We have to 

exclude the other subcommittee because we won’t be able to get a 

quorum. But we will permit you to remain anyway.

Mrs. Fenwick. I will so move.

Mr. Solarz. The motion is made. I. think under the rules the clerk 

will call the roll.

Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Solarz. Aye.

Mr. Carson. Mr. Diggs.

[No response.]
116

Mr. Carson. Mr. Collins.

[No response.]

Mr. Carson. Mr. Gray.

[No response.]

Mr. Carson. Mr. Wolpe.

[No response.]

Mr. Carson. Mr. Fithian.

[No response.]

Mr. Carson. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. Goodling. Aye.

Mr. Carson. Mr. Buchanan.

[No response.]

Mr. Carson. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. Fenwick. Aye.

Mr. Solarz. The “ayes” appear to have it. Mr. Secretary, I don’t 

know what the proper procedure is with respect to Dr. Quandt. Do 

you have a problem of his remaining?

Mr. Saunders. I would request from our point of view he remain.

Mr. Solarz. Well, I think we would like him to stay as well.

The hearing is hereby closed and anyone not authorized to remain 

will please promptly depart.

[Whereupon, at 11:45, the open hearing of the Subcommittees on 

Africa and Internatio nal Organizations adjourned, and the Subcommittee on Africa moved into executive session.]
APPENDIX 1

• T he L eg al I ssu es of t h e W ar in W e st e r n Sa hara, by J e f f r e y

Sch u lm a n, U rbana C olleg e

I n tr o d u c tio n

Since 1975, hostilities have raged in t he Western Sah ara between Morocco and 

Mau ritania, and the inhabitants, over who will control the ter ritory . At stake, 

aside from the vast phosphate reserves the territory contains,1

 is th e inha bitants’ 

inalienable righ t to self-determination, and the danger historical ties pose for the 

san cti ty of boundaries. The following three items provide a framework for an alysis 

of the legal issues involved: (1) the Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara,2

 by the Intern ational Cou rt of Justice, in which Morocco and Ma uritania assert the ir 

territo iial claims were judicially recognized; (2) the Madrid Accords, whereby 

Spain att em pted to trans fer au tho rity over the former Spanish Sahara to Morocco 

and Mauritania; and (3) the announcement of the creation of a Sah aran Arab 

Democratic Republic by the inh abitants upon the dep artu re of th e Spanish from 

the territo ry.

T h e A d vis ory O p in io n

On December 13, 1974, in pursuance of its long sta nding discussion on decolonization of the Spanish Sahara, the General Assembly of the United Nations 

adopted a resolution 3 * requ esting an advisory opinion of the Int ern ational Cout t 

of Justice? Response to th e resolution in the intern ationa l community was divisive. 

To Morocco and Mauritania, who claimed the territo ry, the opinion would help 

facilitate a final determ ination on the sta tus of the area .5 * Others felt the issue 

was an inappropriate one for the International Cou rt of Justice.8

As adopted, the resolution requested an advisory opinion on the following two 

questions: First, was Western Sah ara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Ham ra) at the 

time of colonization by Spain a ter ritory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?

Second, if the answer to this question was in the negative, what were the legal 

ties between this ter ritory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian 

entity? 7

Prior to rendering an opinion, the Internatio nal Cou rt of Justice had t o respond 

to a jurisdictional challenge bro ugh t by Spain,8

 which had not consented to an

1

 Produc tion under the Spanish, begun in 1953, reached exportation level of six million tons ann ually b y 

1975. T he only countries exceeding thi s figure are Morocco an d the United States. Produc tion could be 

increased to ten million tons annually since the reserves conta in thirtee n billion tons of rock 70-80% rich in 

phosphate. See Stephen Carring ton, “ La Lu tte Pour L Inde pendence du Sahara Espagnol,” Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1974.

2

 Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, (1975) I.C .J. Rep. 12 (hereinafter cited as Advisory Opinion). » G.A. Res. 3292, 29 U.N. GA OR Supp. 31 at 103-04, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).

« U nder U.N. Ch arter a rt. 96, pa ra. 1; I.C.J. Stat. art . 65, para. 1.

5

 S tatements to the General Assembly on 30 September a nd 2 October 1974 by the Ministers for Foreign 

Affairs of th e Kingdom of Morocco an d the Islam ic Republic of Mauritania, and Algeria to the General 

Assembly’s F ourth Com mitte e, U.N. Doc. A/C. 4/SR. 2117, 2125, 2130; sta tem ent b y Algeria, U.N. Doc. 

A/PV. 2265 at 57-80 (1974). Algeria, an d others, endorsed the request pro vided the opinion would not derogate 

from the pa ram ountcy of the inh abita nts’ right to self-determination.

• To Spain, the ’’questions formulated * • * were, from a legal stand point, ambiguous, incomplete, and 

irre levant” with regard to decolonization ,U .N. Doc. A/C. 4/SR. 2131, at 8 (1974); Ambassador Salim Ahmed 

Salim, Cha irman of th e United Na tions Special Comm ittee of 24 on Decolonization a nd Perm ane nt Rep resen tativ e of the U nited Republic of Tanzania to th e Un ited N ations, stated before the General Assem bly’s 

Fo urt h Committee on 24 Nove mber 1975;

“ Put very succinctly, ou r reluctance stemmed from ou r conviction th at it was not a ppropriate to refer to 

the Intern ational Co urt of Justice a case which to us and to the Un ited Nations was a clear-cut colonial 

question to be given the sam e treatm ent as any othe r non-self-governing territory. It was, a nd still is, our 

position th at wha tever might have been the situa tion in the past, the territo ry was a colony to be decolonized 

in accordance with the provisions of U nited Nations resolutions a nd established U nited Nat ion s pra ctice.” 

U.N .Q. Against Apartheid, Racial Discrim ination and Colonialism, Objective Justice, 4'(No . 4, 1975). 7

 Supra note 3.

’ Advisory Opinion at 22-29.

(117)
118

earlie r Moroccan request th at the Court adjudi cate th e sta tus of the ter ritory.9

Spain invoked the rule, repeatedly reaffirmed in the Co urt ’s jurisprudenc e, th at 

a S tat e cannot, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other 

States to the Co urt ’s adjudication.10 In the Advisory Opinion on the Status of

Eastern Carelia,'1

 the Permanen t Cou rt of International Ju stice applied this rule 

to advisory jurisdiction. Spain contended th at this decision had not been modified by the present Court and was decisive,12 otherwise, the advisory procedure 

would circumvent the independence of Sta tes by achiev ing compulsory jurisdiction throug h a majority v ote in a political organ. 13

Although acknowledging Spa in’s lack of consent, the Court distin guished the 

Status of Eastern Carelia.u

 There one of the States was neither a pa rty to the 

Statute of t he Perman ent Cou rt nor a Mem ber of the League of Nations. In the 

present case, Spain is a Member of the United Nations, has acce pted the Charter 

and Statu te, and thus, has consented to the Co urt’s advisory jurisdictio n.15

Citin g the Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria,

Hungary, and Romania,16 which elucidated the principles governing contentious 

procedure as opposed to advisory opinions, the Cou rt held consent rele vant, not 

for competency, bu t for the propriety of giving an opinion.17 Only when a reply 

would circumvent the principle th at a State is n ot obliged to sub mit its disputes 

for adjudication, could lack of co nsent rend er the giving of an opinion improper.18

While Spain had not consented to adjudication of th e existing controversy, the 

conditions necessary for the envisaged exception to the Court exercising its 

advisory jurisdic tion were found to be absent. The four determining criteria for 

discounting the exception were: (1) the controversy arose within the General 

Assembly rathe r tha n bila terally; 19 (2) the issue concerned the ter ritory at the

9

 L etter dated 23 September 1974 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco addressed to the Min 

ister for Foreign Affairs of Spain stating;

“ You, the Spanish Governme nt, claim t hat th e Sahara was res nuUius. You claim that i t was a te rri tory 

or pro perty left uninh erited, you claim th at no power a nd no adm inistration had been e stablished over th e 

Sahara; Morocco claim s t he co ntrary. Let u s request the arbitra tio n of the Internatio nal Co urt of Justice 

at The Hague * * * It will state the law on the basis of the titles sub mi tted, U.N . Doc. A/9771, Annex 

(1974).”

10 The Intern ational Court of Justice has ju risd iction to decide contentious cases an d give ad visory opinions . In conte ntious cases, th e C ourt’s jurisdic tion is conditional on the co nsent of the parties to the disp ute. 

Un der I.C .J. Stat. art. 36, pa ra. 1, th e Co urt has ju risdic tio n over all cases w hich th e par ties refer to it. 

A unilatera l reference to the Court will be sufficien t if the o ther party cons ents the n or sub seq uen tly to a bjud ica tion of the dispute. Assent is neither req uire d before the in itiati on of proceedings, nor in a ny part icu ­

lar form, Corfu Channel Case (Pre lim inary Objection), (1948) I.C .J. Rep. at 15 et seg. Assent by conduct 

can scarcely be inferred where the respon den t State consistently denies th at the Court has jurisdiction; 

See Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case (Jurisdiction), (1952) I.C .J. Rep. 93 at 114. However, where there is 

no consent th e case must be rem oved from t he C ourt’s list. The Cou rt ordered such rem oval whe n A rgentin a and Chile denied jurisdiction in respect of B riti sh references of disputes with the m concerning An tart ica , (1956) I.C .J. Rep. a t 12.15. Similarly, with the Un ited States’ applic ation against th e Soviet Union 

regarding the aerial incident of 4 September 1954, (1958) I.C .J. Rep. at 158. S pain c onte nded t ha t this rule 

was applicable to advisory jurisdiction. The Cou rt has refused to exercise its advisory ju risd iction where 

the main point on which an opinion was requested was decisive of a contro versy between certa in States and 

one of these States was not before the Court. To render an opinion under such circumstances would be to 

adjudi cate witho ut the consen t of one party , Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia, P ub . P .C .I .J . 

(1923), Series B, No. 5 at 27-29. However, the Cou rt can render a n opinion which may clarify a factor i n a 

dis put e between States or betw een a State an d a n inte rnational ins titu tion, provide guidance for a n internation al organ, or determ ine the effect to be given to a m ultilateral Conv ention, notwithstanding tha t one 

of the States concerned is not before the Co urt or has n ot consented, Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation

of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, (Fi rst Phase) (1950) I.C .J. Rep. 65 at 221; Advisory

Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (1951) I.C .J. Rep. 15.

11 Pub. P. C. I.J . (1923), Series B, No. 5 (hereinafter c ited as Status of Eastern Carelia). 12 Advisory Opinion at 23.

■’ Ibid.

i« P ub . P. C. I.J . (1923), Series B, No. 5.

15 Advisory Opinion at 24.

“ (First Phase) (1950) I.C .J. Rep. 65.

« Id. a t 71;

(E)ven where the Request for an Opinion relates to a legal question a ctually pend ing betw een States * * * 

no State * * * can preven t th e giving of an A dvisory Opinion * * * The C ourt’s Opinion is given not to the 

States, b ut to the organ which is entitled to request it; the reply of the Court, itself an ‘organ of the United 

Nations’, represe nts its participation in the activ ities of the Organization, and * * * should no t be refused.”

18 Advisory Opinion at 25.

19 T he Court based this determin ation on two comm unications to the Secretary-Gene ral of the United 

Nations . On 10 Novembe r 1958, Spain stated;

“ Spain possessesses no non-self-goveming territories, since the territories subject to its sovereignty in 

Africa are, in accordance with the legislation now in force, considered to be an d classified as provinces of 

Spain.”

_ This elicited the “m ost explicit reservations” from Morocco who on 20 Novemb er 1958, stated t ha t she 

“claim(ed) certain African territories at present under Spanish control as an integral pa rt of Moroccan 

national terr ito ry,” Id., a t 25-26. T he whole area though , had been a basis of contention for several years . 

On 7 A pril 1956, Spain aban doned a nort hern zone to Morocco. The Spanish Sahara continu ed to be su bjected to incursions and in February 1958 an invasion b y Moroccan nationalists. Although the invasion was 

repelled, it led to Spain ceding th e northern part of the Sahara to Morocco on 10 April 1958. T ha t area be ­

came the province of Tarfaya, Hassan II, Le defi, 71 (Alb in Michel, Paris, 1976); La Documentation 

Francaise, Maghreb Machrek, 30 (Paris, No. 71,1976).
119

time of colonization and not cu rren tly ;20 (3) Ma uri tan ia’s claim diffe rentiated 

this case from th at which Morocco soug ht to adjudicate; 21 and (4) the opinion 

was non-binding and for the General Assembly.22 Thus, Spain has no standing 

to challenge the jurisdiction.23

This determ ination by the Court, while dispensing with the ju risdictional challenge, creates serious problems. Morocco’s claim is based on historic ties between 

the two areas. Any dete rmination of Morocco’s claim affects the territo ry ’s curren t statu s.24 The curren t status is what Spain refused to adjudicate.25 If the opinion 

does not affect the current sta tus of the area, then as several states argued,26 the 

opinion is irrelevant with regard to decolonization. Furthermo re, stressing historical ties is dangerous for the san ctity of boundaries in the extrem e, the re is no 

indigenous population.27

Spain further argued th at in advisory proceedings no parties are obliged to 

furnish evidence. Consequently, the Cou rt might not be in possession of all the 

pertin ent information that should be available in adversary proceedings.28 While 

the Court noted th at this was a valid consideration in the Cou rt deciding no t to 

exercise its advisory jurisdiction in the Status of Eastern Carelia,29 in the pre sen t 

case Spain, Morocco, Mauritania , and others, had furnished extensive evidence 

sufficient to rend er an opinion.30 This analysis is superficial, Spain as t he adm inistering Power, was under a du ty imposed by the General Assembly to supply inform ation as were Morocco and Mauritania.31 Further, Morocco a nd Ma urita nia

20 Th e Court reached this conclusion because the rights of Sp ain as the ad min istering Power wou ld not 

be affected by a reply. Thus, the Court cited th e Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with

Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, (Fi rst Phase) (1950) I.C. J. Rep. 65 at 72, and stated that the legal position 

of Spain, which has refused its cons ent, is no t “ in any way compromised b y the answers th at the Court 

ma y give to the questions pu t to it, ” Advisory Opinion at 27.

21 To th e C ourt, th e intera ction betw een the conflicting an d overlap ping claims of Morocco and Ma uritania 

introduces a subs tantial difference from the terms of the Moroccan Note of 23 September 1974. T he questions 

posed, “ are located i n a broader frame of reference th an th e settlem ent of a partic ular dispute a nd embrace 

oth er elements,” Id. a t 26-27.

22 T he Court cited the Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Pu nish men t

of the Crime of Genocide, (1951) I.C .J. Rep. 15 at 19, which sta ted; “ Th e object of this request for an Opinion 

is to guide the United N ations in respect of its ow n action.” Consequently, the General Assembly’s request 

“ cann ot be affected or prejudiced b y t he fact that Morocco mad e a proposal, no t accepted b y Spain, to s ub ­

mit for adjudica tion * * * a dispute raising issues related to those contained in the request,” Advisory Opinion

at 27.

23 Between Augu st a nd S eptember 1970, twelve nations re quested th at th e General Assem bly include on 

its agenda an item en titled: “ Review of th e Role of th e Internation al Cou rt of Justice.” According to the 

accompanying explanatory memor andum: “A review of the role of the Internationa l Cou rt of Justice, the 

principle judicial organ of the Un ited Nations , is urgently needed. The lack of business c urrently before 

the Cou rt is evidence of this fact,” 25 U.N . GA OR , Annexes, Agenda It em No. 98, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/8042/ 

Add . 1/Add. 2 (1970). ‘ ‘A num ber of delegations considered that the lack of political will on the pa rt of States 

to have recourse to the Court derived from the disapp ointment caused by some of the Co urt ’s decisions. According to those delegations, some of its judgm ents a nd adviso ry opinions—in the South West Africa ca se, 

for example—had shown it to be une qual to its task and had discredited it in the eyes of world public opinion,’ ’ 

Id. a t 6. For the next several years th is Revie w was the basis of extensive debate, 27 U.N. GAO R, Annexes, 

Agenda It em No. 90, U .N. Doc. A/8967; U .N. Doc. kISJAI (1972). F inally, on 8 Nov ember 1974, the Report 

of the Sixth Com mittee acknowledged tha t th e I nternational Court of Justice amended the Rules of Co ur t, 

with a view to facilitatin g recourse to it, 29 U .N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda It em No. 93, U.N. Doc. A/9846 

(1974). The nex t month the General Assembly reques ted the advisory opinion on Western Sahara. Per hap s 

the Review and the fact th at thi s was the only case pend ing in 1975 ((1975-1976). I.C. J. Y.B . 112) were 

factors in t he rejection of Spain's jurisdictional challenge.

24 As the Co urt no ted, the request embraces elements which “are not confined to the past, but are also 

directe d to the prese nt and f utu re.” However, the rights of S pain as a dministering power are “ not in an y 

way compromised b y th e answers the Co urt may give to the questions pu t to it,” Ibid. Technically, Spain’s 

sta tus as adm inistering power w ill not be affected; however, a determ ination th at Spain never acquired 

title would r estrict her legal rights over the area. Conversely, dismissal of the Moroccan and Mau ritan ian 

claims would free the territ ory from competing claims of title.

25 Su pra note 9.

2S Supra note 6.

27 C urr ently, there are there claim s of historic tit le before the U nited Nations buttressed by the assertion 

th at the territo rial residen t populations, in each case for over a c entury, are “i mpo rted population s” not 

nativ e to the area a nd not entitled to th e right of self-determination. Mr. Maldonado Aguirre stated Gu atem ala ’s claim to the G eneral Assembly, U .N . Doc. A/PV. 2431, at 37,38-40 (Dec. 8,1975): Spain claims selfdeterm ination is only for “those who had their roots” in a terr itory and not “se ttler s,” 23 GA OR , Fo urth 

Com m., 1799th meeting, at 14 (1968); Argen tina’s argu ment is similar for Falkland Islanders. Report of the 

Special Co mm itte e on th e Situation with Reg ard to the Implem entatio n of the Declaration on th e Gra ntin g 

of Inde pendence to Colonial Co unt ries and Peoples, 19 GAOR, Annexes, Annex No. 8 (Part I), at 436-37, 

U.N . Doc. A/5800/Rev. 1 (1964); Argen tina further stated th at th e displacement of the original population 

an d its replacem ent w ith an alien one to the region, is a wrong which nations may wish to redress, 28 GAO R 

Fo urth Com m., 2074th meeting, at 302 (1973); For discussion of th e thre at these claims pose, see 70 Am. J . 

In t’l L. 721 (1976).

23 Advisory Opinion, a t 28.

2» P ub . P. C. I.J . (1923), Series B, No. 5.

30 Advisory Opinion, a t 28-29.

31 The reque st for the Opin ion “call(ed) u pon Spain, in its cap acity as administering Power in particular, 

as well as Morocco an d Maritania, in their capacity as in tere sted parties, to sub mit to the Int ernational 

Co urt of Justice all such information and docu ments as may be needed to clarify those questions,” Supra

note 3.
each claimed the territory. These were the leasons tha t the Court found no shortage of evidence. Howeyer, Spain’s objection was to the credibility as well as the 

sufficiency of the evidence. Spain contended tha t the type and quality of evidence 

in adversary proceedings differs from that offered for a non-binding opinion.32

After dispensing with the jurisdictional challenge, the Court proceeded to examine the request for the Opinion and noted the interrelatedness and dependency 

of the second question on the reply given to the first.33 Prior to finding whether 

the territory was terra nullius, the Court had to first ascertain the time of colonization. Based on agreements between Spain and local chiefs, the Court held the 

time of colonization to be 1884.34 Only if th e territory belonged to no one (terra nullius) at tha t time, could it be open to acquisition through the legal occupation. It was this cardinal condition of a valid occupation, discussed at great length 

in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,33 upon which the Court relied.

Taking into account the unique character of the nomadic tribes that had inhabited the area,36 and the status Spain accorded the territory, 37 the Court found the area not to have been terra nullius.38 This finding, the Court stresses, was 

reached independent of the territorial claims of Morocco and Mauritania.38

The effects of such a finding are twofold. Legally, regardless of the effectiveness 

of the occupation, Spain did not acquire title to the area.40 Consequently, Spain 

cannot cede or transfer any rights over the area, nor would abandonment by her 

transfer title to a subsequent occupier.41 Analytically, unless viewed as an atte mpt 

to ensure the inhabitants’ right of self-determination, the finding is nonsensical. 

While discounting all claimants, the Court unanimously determined that the 

land was not terra nullius. Each of the tribes, although a social and political unit, 

lacked essential elements of sovereignty.42 Thus, the territory could not belong 

to th e tribes collectively or singly. The claims of Morocco and Mauritania played 

no part in the finding. This finding was based on Spain’s perception of the tribes.

In response to the argument of how im portant are historic ties in the final act 

of decolonization,43 the Court expanded and reframed the second question, and 

found self-determination for non-self-governing territories to be a jus cogens.*4

 The

35 Although the Court is co mpe tent to evaluate the evidence, t he evidence has not surmoun ted the rigors 

th at would be p resent in a c ontentious case where each party has the burd en of proof. Advisory Opinion, at 28,

33 For question s, see p. 3.

34 Advisory Opinion at 38.

33 A valid o ccupation consists of the establishment, of sovereignty over territo ry free from any other State ’s 

authority . In the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Pub . P. I.C .J. (1933), Series A/B, No. 53, the Perm anent 

Court of Intern at ional Justice held th at for an occupation to be effective, the appropriating State must meet 

two tests: (1) an intention or will to act as sovereign; an d (2) the adequ ate exercise or display of sove reig nty.

84 Advisory Opinion at 39.

87 In its Royal Order of 26 December 1884, Spain proclaimed th at t he King was taking the Rio de Oro 

under his prote ction on the basis of agreements w ith the chiefs of the local tribes. Id. a t 40. M While the Cou rt noted th at “differing views were expressed concerning the n atu re and legal value of 

agreements b etween a State and local chiefs,” it stated that it was “ not asked by Question I to pronounce 

upo n the legal character or the legality of the titles ,” Ibid. C onsequently, these agreements, even if a nu llity, 

are proof for the C ourt th at th e area was not terra nullius.

»’ Ibid.

40 Th e te rritory had t o have been terra nullius for a valid occupation, Legal Status o f Eastern Greenland, Pub. P.I.C .J. (1933), Series A /B, No. 53, pp. 44 f. a nd 63 f.; Advisory Opinion, at 39. 41 Only if the abandoning State had title could title then be acqu ired throug h a subsequent valid 

occupation.

42 The essential characteristics of a State are well settl ed. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 

on the Rights and Duties of States is illustrative:

“The State as a person of inte rna tional law shou ld possess the following qu alifications: (a) a permanent 

population; (b) a defined territ ory ; (c) a Gov ernment; an d (d) a cap acity to enter into r elations with other

See also, Section 4 of the Re statem ent of th e Foreign Relations Law of th e United States (1965), w hich 

defines a S tate as “ an ent ity th at has a defined ter rito ry and population under t he control of a governm ent 

and th at engages in foreign relations.”

43 Supra note 6.

44 A perem ptory norm from which no derogation is perm itte d and which may invalidate a tr eat y or agreement between States to the ex tent of the inconsistency w ith such norm. This is analogous to the principles 

of public policy which at common law render an offending contract void. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention 

on the Law of Treaties of May 22, 1969 states:

“ A tr ea ty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general intern ational law. For the purposes of the present Conve ntion, a peremp tory norm of general international law is a 

norm accepted and recognized by th e internatio nal com munity of States as a whole as a norm from w hich no 

derogation is p erm itted and which can be modified only by a su bsequent norm of general international law 

having the same character.”

Article 64 states: “ If anew perem ptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which 

if in conflict w ith th at norm becomes void an d terminates.”

The difficulty is acquiring consensus as to wha t are norm s of jus cogens. Although the Court does not specifically use the terms, its position with regard to non-self-goveming territories is u nequivocal. "T o develop 

friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal righ ts and self-determination 

of peoples” is one of the purposes of the United Na tion s, U.N . C HARTE R art. 1, para. 2. T he Cou rt cited 

this article and its further development in Articles 55 and 56. “ Those provisions have direct and particula r 

relevance for non-self-goveming territories, which are dea lt w ith in C hap ter X I of the Charter.” Advisory Opinion, at 31. Th e Declaration on the Gra nting of Indepen dence to Colonial Coun tries and Peoples states:
121

Court stressed that all legitimate forms of decolonization45 could only come 

about with “the freely expressed wishes of the territory’s peoples * * *” 48 The Court favorably enumerated the General Assembly’s resolutions 47 and made clear th at an opinion on historic title does not derogate from the right of a people 

to decide their destiny,48 but is intended to aid the General Assembly in “ensuring 

a free and genuine expression of the will of the people.” 49 To say the least, this was a generous reading of the request for the advisory opinion.

The results of such a reading are readily apparent. In answering objections of 

inappropriateness and irrelevancy,50 the Court adopted Algeria’s position tha t 

the opinion “ cannot have any practical effect” 51 without dealing with the fundamental right of the people to self-determination. The Court thus ensured the 

paramountcy of th at right. In the light of such a determination, it is difficult to 

see the utility of a finding on historic ties or what effect could be given to a holding 

that title vests in Morocco or Mauritania.

Within that framework, the Court proceeded to consider Morocco’s claim. 

Morocco introduced evidence dating back to the Arab conquest of North Africa 

in the seventh century A.D.,52 and invoked inter alia63 the decision in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland.6* Relying on the fact t ha t it was the only independent 

State in the area during a long period, the geographical contiguity of Western 

Sahara, and the desert character of the area,55 Morocco claimed title “upon continued display of autho rity.” 56

To claim sovereignty upon a continued display of auth ority “two elements** * 

must be shown to exist: th e intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual 

exercise or display of such autho rity.” 57 In the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,

“ All peoples have the righ t to self-determination; b y virture of th at right th ey freely determine the ir pol i' 

tical sta tus and freely pursue their economic, social and cul tural deve lopm ent.”

G. A. Res. 1514,15 U.N . GAO R Supp. 16, at 66, U .N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). This Declara tion has been characteriz ed as “ a programatic formulation based on new determinations th at could no longer validly be im ­

pugned,” J. Castafieda, Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions, 175 (Columbia University Press, 1969). The.C ourt cited the Declaration and its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued

Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution t76

(1970), (1971) I.C.J. Rep. 16 at 31, which sta tes:

“ . . . th e subsequent developm ent of inte rna tional law in regard to non-self-goveming territories, as e nshrined in the Cha rter of the United Nations, made th e principle of self-determination applicable to all of 

the m * * *A further import ant stage in this development was the Dec laration on the Granting of Ind pen den ce 

to Colonial Coun tries a nd Peoples * * * which embraces all peoples a nd territories which ‘ have not yet at ­

tained independence’ * * * (T)he C our t must take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the 

supe rvening half-c entru ry, a nd its inte rpretation can not remain unaffected by the subs equent dev elopment 

of law, thro ugh the C harter of the U nited Nations and by way of custo mary law * * * In the domain to which 

the present proceedings relate, the last fifty years, as in dicated above, have bro ugh t impor tan t dev elopments. These developments leave little doubt th at th e ultimate objective of the sacred tru st was the selfdeterm ination and independen ce of th e peoples concerned.”

Advisory Opinion, a t 31-32.

45 T he Declaration on Principles of I nte rna tio nal Law concerning Friend ly Relations and Co-operation 

Among State s in Accordance wi th the Charter of the U nited Nations , states:

“ Ev ery State has the du ty to prom ote, throug h join t and sepa rate action, realization of the prin ciple of 

equal rights and se lf-determination of peoples * * *

“ Th e establishm ent of a sovereign an d ind epe nde nt State the , free association or integration wi th an 

ind ependent State or th e emergence into any other political s tatus freely deter min ed b y a people cons titu te 

modes of implementin g th e r igh t of self-dete rmination by th at people.

“ Every S tate has the d ut y to refrain from a ny forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in 

the elaboration of the present princ iple of their rights to self-determination and freedom and independence.”

G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GA OR S upp. 28, at 121, U.N . Doc. A/8028 (1970).

« G.A . Res. 1541,15 U.N. GA OR Su pp. 16, at 29-30, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); Advisory Opinion, a t 32-33. 47 T hose previously mentioned, a nd in particular, those on Western Sahara and “the inalienable right of 

the people of th e Sahara to self-dete rmination an d independence,” G.A. Res. 2072, 20 (1965); G.A. Res. 

2229, 21 (1966); G .A. Res. 2354, 22 (1967); G.A. Res 2428, 23 (1968); G.A. Res. 2591, 24 (1969); G.A. Res. 

2711, 25 (1970); G.A. Res. 2983, 27 (1972); G.A. Res. 3162, 28 (1973); a nd G.A. Res. 3292 29 (1974); Advisory Opinion, a t 34-36.

<’ Id. a t 36-37.

« Id. a t 37.

M Su pra note 6.

51 Advisory Opinion, a t 29-30.

« Id. a t 42.

» Morocco also sought to estab lish possession on th e basis of Islamic un ity , t reaty demarcations, and h istorical references.

14 Pu b. P. I.C .J. (1933), Series A/B, No. 53.

M Tw o theories determ ine the ext ent of territory embraced by an act of occupation: 1) continuity, thi s extends the sov ereignty of the occupying State as far as necessary for th e security or natural developm ent 

of the occupied area; and 2) contiguity, which extends the sovereignty of the occupying Sta te to the neighboring geographically proximate areas. Morocco had to base her claim on contiguity since she had never actually 

occupied Spanish Sahara. The pro blem with contigui ty is that in the Island of Palmas Arbitration, 22 Am. J . In t’l. L. 875-76 (1928), A rbitrato r Ilub er rejected the th eory stating it was “w holly lacking in precision.” 

In th e North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, (1969) I.C .J. Rep. 3 at 30-31, th e Int ernational Cou rt of Justice 

preferred c ontinu ity to adjacency or proximity (contiguity ) as a n explanation of the coastal State ’s rights 

in rega rd to the continen tal shelf.

M Advisory Opinion, a t 42.

»’ Sup ra note 35.

« Pub. P. I.C .J. (1933), Series A /B, No. 53, pp. 45 f.
122

the Court recognized th at “ve ry little in the way of actual exercise of sovereign 

rig hts ” 59 migh t be sufficient to establish sovereignty, absent a competing claim, 

in thinly populated or unsettled areas. While acknow ledging th at the Western 

Sah ara was “sparsely pop ulated,” 60 the Court felt th at the presence of nomadic 

trib es was a sufficient distinguishing factor to deny the cases were iden tical.61

Although such a distinctio n ensures protection of the inha bitants’ rights, it is of 

dubious worth. The tribes lacked sove reignty.62 By analo gy to common law, the 

trib es at most acquired easements and profits. However, burd ened land does not 

impair the acquisition of title .63 Where the n, is the distinction between unsettled, 

thinly po pulated areas with Eskimos, and sparsely pop ulated d esert with nomadic 

tribes?

With regard to Morocco’s contiguity argument, the Cou rt held releva nt only 

“evidence directly relating to effective display of au thority in Western Sahara 

at the time of colonization.” 64 While sovereignty can be displayed by ove rt or 

symbolic acts, 65 an actu al manifestation of sovereignty on the locus of the ter ritory creates a stronger title than an historic claim of right uns upp orted by such a 

concrete act.66 The paucity of evidence of an actual display of authority unam ­

biguously relating to Western Sah ara by Morocco was conclusive.67 By a vote 

of 14 to 2,68 the Court found th at while Morocco displayed some au thority over 

some of the tribes, the evidence “does not establish any tie of terr itorial sovereignty 

between Western Sahara and th at State . It does no t show th at Morocco displayed 

effective and exclusive State act ivity in the Western Sah ara .” 69

The Court then examined the legal ties between Western Sahara and the Mau ritan ian entity . Use of th e term “ Ma uritanian e ntity ”, recognizes th at at the time 

of colonization there was no Mauritanian Sta te in existence. Consequently, the 

Court’s inquiry was concerned with ties oth er than those of Sta te sove reignty.70

Since only States can exercise sovereignty, the final outcome was tan tamou nt to a 

foregone conclusion. By a vote of 15 to l, 71 th e Court found “the existence of rights, 

including some righ ts relating to the land, which con stituted legal ties” bu t “do 

not establish any tie of territorial so vereign ty.” 72

Mr. Alphonse Boni, Presiden t of the Supreme Court of the Ivo ry Coast and 

ad hoc judge appointed by Morocco, cast dissenting votes in both the Moroccan 

and Ma uritanian determination s. Judge Rud a cast the other dissent in th e Moroccan determ ination on the belief th at the Court’s decision was insufficiently 

assertive. “Sporadic manifestations of allegiance and au thority ,” he stated, 

“even if established, are n ot sufficient to declare th e existence of legal ties, whether 

of a territor ial or personal chara cter.” 73

«»id. a t 46.

w Advisory Opinion, at 43.

" Id . a t 41-43.

92 Sup ra note 42.

83 There are servitude s i n international law whereby terr itory is burd ene d by c onditions or restrictions 

serving the interests of ano ther State or non-State e ntity . An example is the frontier tow n of H uning en in 

Alsace, which in the interests of th e Swiss C anton of Basle, is burdened by the condition th at it never be 

fortified. These serv itud es are rights in rem, and rem ain in force regardless of what happ ens to the burdene d 

terr itory; i.e., annexa tion or mergence with ano ther S tate. Servitudes are either positive or negative, require 

ing th e Government controlling the ter rito ry to either ac t or refrain from acting on the territory. Illustrative 

is Article 7 of the La teran T rea ty of 1929, which restricts construction in I talian territ ory of new buildings 

th at would overlook adjacent Vatican City. Although no t s tric tly a servitude, i n the Rigid of Passage over

Indian Territory Case, (1900) I.C .J. Rep. 6, the In ternational Co urt of Justice recognized a customa ry right of 

passage for Portuguese citizens and goods over Ind ian ter rito ry betw een Daman and certain Portuguese 

enclaves. This righ t was inapplicable to arms or armed forces and subject to control and regulation by India .

94 Advisory Opinion, a t 43.

95 The i nte ntion to act as sovereign can be inferred from the actua l display of auth ori ty; however, it mu st 

be a permane nt intention to assume control. Mere tran sient passage by the alleged occu pying Power is 

insufficient to estab lish such intention, as is independent, unautho rize d activ ities of private individuals, 

unless, subseque ntly ratified. Fisheries Case (1951) I .C.J. Rep. 116, a t 184. Consequently, the mere passage 

of tribes between th e territories will not establish this in ten t, and m ust be bolstered with an actual display 

of auth ority.

99 Th e Clipperton Island Arbitration (1931), 26 Am. J. In t’l L. 390 (1932), illustrates this poin t. In the Min- quiers and Ecrehos Case, (1953), I .C. J. Rep. 47, at 68-70, Great Britain and France bot h claim ed cer tain 

Channel islets. The I nternational C ourt of Justice stressed the imp orta nce of actua l exercise of “ State fun ctions” , i.e., local adm inistration, local jurisdiction, a nd acts of legislative au tho rity , for proving the c on tin uous display of sovereignty necessary fo confirm title. Upon evidence of a long co ntin ued exercise of State 

functions by British authorities, the Co uit preferred Great B rita in’s claim.

97 Th e lack of evidence was not cured by contig uity . T he geographical unity of the two areas was d eba table 

and tha t militates against contiguity. Regardless, the a rgu ment only makes the p aucity of evidence more 

difficult to reconcile w ith Morocco’s claim of immem orial possession, Advisory Opinion, a t 43. 99 Id. a t 69.

99 Id. a t 49.

79 Id. a t 57.

7

‘ Id. a t 69.

72 Id. a t 68.

73 Id. a t 176 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ruda).
123

Judicially, the Court recognized and validated Moroccan and Mauritanian 

claims short of territorial sovereignty. Although the Court stressed the inhabitants’ right to self-determination, the acquisition of territorial sovereignty thro ugh 

decolonization is sui generis. Territory is one of the components of statehood, and 

until the State exists, there is no entity to take title. To circumvent this difficulty 

and ensure the inhabitants’ rights, the Court had to rely on Spain’s perceptions of 

the tribes. The solution to this problem is to treat the people of the territory, 

provided they have a sufficient degree of political maturity, as having or acquiring 

sovereignty pending attainm ent of statehood.74

T h e M adrid Acc or ds

Ignoring the holding of the Advisory Opinion tha t historical ties did not constitute sovereignty over the territory, Morocco seized upon language in the opinion 

which stated tha t Morocco had had some rights to the territory.75 The day after 

the opinion was published, Morocco announced plans for the initiation of the 

“ Green March.” 76 Spain now had to decide whether to implement her statem ent 

that Spain would resist with force any incursion into Western Sahara.77 Faced 

with internal problems upon the demise of Francisco Franco, as well as a desire to 

end her involvement in the territory, Spain chose to negotiate.

On November 14, 1975, Spain entered into a trip arti te agreement with Morocco 

and Mauritania known as the Madrid Accords. The following is the only segment of the Accords to be published:

Rab at (UPI) Made public Friday, November 21 by the Moroccan Minister 

of Information, the official text of the accord by Morocco, Mauritania, and 

Spain on the subject of Western Sahara is as follows:

“ Meeting in Madrid on November 14, 1975, the delegations representing the 

governments of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania agreed on the following principles :

“(1) Spain reaffirms its decision, several times repeated before the U.N., 

to decolonize the territory of the Western Sahara by putting an end to the 

responsibilities and powers tha t she holds over this territory as administering power.

“(2) Bearing this in mind and in conformity with negotiations recommended by the U.N. among the parties concerned, Spain will proceed immediately to the establishment of an intermediate administration in the 

territory with the participation of Morocco and Mauritania and the collaboration of the Djema (local assembly), an administration to which the 

responsibilities and powers referred to in the preceding paragraph will be 

transferred.

“For t ha t purpose it has been agreed upon to name two adjunct governors, 

one to be proposed by Morocco, the other by Mauritania, to assist the 

governor general of the territory in his duties.

74 I n i ts Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in

Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), (1971) I.C .J. Rep. 16 at 

56, th e Intern ational Co urt of Justice tre ate d t he people of the Mandated T erritory of South West Africa as 

■ hav ing a right of progress tow ard independence, which has been violated by South Africa’s failure as

Ma nda tory Power to comply with its obligation to sub mit to the supervision of United Nations organs. 

Th e Court referred to the people as a “j ural en tit y’’. The Dec lara tion on Principles of Inte rna tional Law 

Concerning Friend ly Rela tions an d Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 

Un ited Nations , states t hat the territor y of a colony or non-self-goveming territ ory ha s “a statu s sepa rate 

and dis tin ct from t he te rritor y of the Sta te adm inistering i t,” which continues un til th e people concerned 

have exercised their right of self-determination, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GA OR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. 

• Doc. A/8028 (1970). Eq ually consisten t is the paramoun tcy of self-determ ination stressed in the present

Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, (1975) I.C .J. Rep . 12. T he requ irem ent of a sufficient degree of politic al 

matur ity does not require a fully operational an d sta ble Gov ernm ent, as was illu stra ted by the admission of 

Ru an da an d Bu run di to Un ited Nations mem bership, b ut serves as a basis for m eeting the other crite ria 

for sovereignty.

78 Morocco stated, “The opinion of the C our t c an only mean one thing: The state called Western Sahara 

was pa rt of the Moroccan ter rito ry over which the sovereignty was exercised b y the kings of Morocco and 

th at th e p opu lation of th is ter rito ry considered themselves an d were considered to be Moroccans. * * * T oday Moroccan d emands hav e been recognized by the legal ad viso ry organ of the United Nat ion s.” Press 

release of th e Perm ane nt Mission of Morocco to t he United Nations on 16 October 1975, quoted in U.N. 

Doc. S/PV. 1849, at 11 (1975).

78 As announced, this was to be a m assive m arch of 350,000 “u nar med civilians” from Morocco into the 

Sahara “to gain recognition of (Morocco’s) right to national un ity a nd territo rial int egrity.” Le tter dated 

18 October 1975 from the Permane nt Rep rese ntative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the 

President of th e Security Council. U.N. Doc. S711852 (1975). A s t he Western press covered the mar ch of 

the civilians, troops of Hassan II began entering th e region from th e n orth east. See Anne Lip pert, “Em ergence or Submergence of a Po tential State: T he Struggle in Western Sahara,” Africa Today, Jan.-M arch 1977.

77 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1852, at 13-15 (1975). (Mr. Arias-Salgade, Representative of Spain, addressing the 

Security Council.)
1976P a n iS h Pr e s e n c e in t l i e t e n i t o r y W’N e n d definitively before February 28,

“(3) The opinion of the Saharawi population, expressed by the Djema, 

will be respected;

“(4) The three countries will inform the Security General of the U.N. of 

the provisions made by virtue of the present document as a result of the 

negotiations held in conformity with article 33 of the Charter of the United 

Nations;

“ (5) The three contracting parties declare that they have arrived at the 

preceding conclusions in the best spirit of understanding, fraternity, and 

respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and as a 

contribution on their part to the maintenance of international peace and 

secu rity;

“(6) This document will go into effect the day of the publication in the 

official Bulletin of the State, the “Law on Decolonization in the Sahara,” 

authorizing the Spanish Government to put into effect the obligations contained in the present document.” 78

The reference within the text to article 33 of the United Nations Charter refers 

to the article t hat encourages negotiation as a means for the pacific settlement of 

disputes th at endanger international peace and security. When hostilities appeared 

imminent between Morocco and Spain, the U.N. recommended negotiations between all concerned parties. Although item number two within the text states 

that the Accords are in conformity with recommendations by the U.N., this is 

not entirely correct. Algeria, who was a concerned party, was not included in the 

negotiations, nor were the inhabitants of the territory even notified that there 

were negotiations.79 These objections though, are dwarfed in comparison to other problems the Accords present.

As an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 

governed by international law, the Madrid Accords constitute a treaty .80 It is binding upon the contracting parties and must be performed by them in good 

faith (pacta sunt servanda).61 Treaties should be interpreted according to the 

ordinary meaning of their terms.82 It is to the intention of the parties at the time 

the instrument was concluded, and in particular the meaning attached by them 

to the terms, t ha t primary regard must be paid. Hence, it is legitimate to consider 

what was the “purpose” of the parties in negotiating the Accords.83

In conformity with the Advisory Opinion, wherein Spain never acquired title to the territory and thus could neither transfer title nor rights to the same, the 

Accords, by its own terms, merely purports to transfer the responsibilities and 

powers of administering the territory to Morocco and Mauritania. Thus, upon the 

departure of the Spanish, there was to be a joint administration between Morocco 

and Mauritania over the territory.84 However, a tre aty should not be interpreted 

so as to restrict unduly the rights intended to be protected by i t,85 or reach a result contrary to the letter and spirit of the treaty .86 Such would be the case of the Accords is viewed solely as an instrument transferring the administration of the 

territory.

By the Accords own terms, the Djema 87 was to be an equal pa rty with Morocco and Mauritania in the administration of the territory. This is evidenced by the

78 See E lsa Assidon, Sahara Occidental un enjeu pour le nordouest africain, 154 (cahiers libres 350, Francois Maspero, Par is 1978), tra nsla tion A. Lip pert, Foreign Language Depar tment , Ohio No rth ern University. 78 See Thomas M. Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 Am. J. In t’l L. 694 (1976). 80 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May 23, 1969, a rt. 2, para. 1(a), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 at 289 (1969) (hereinafter cite d as Vienna Convention). As of Ju ne 30, 1977, 28 States 

had deposited instruments of ratification, U.N . Chronicles (July 1977).

81 Vienna Convention, 3rd recital of preamble (affirming th at the principles of free consent, good faith, 

and pacta sunt servanda are “ uni versally recognized” ), and a rt. 26 (all treaties are bin din g on the parties 

thereto, and m us t be performed in good faith). See Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties. 64 Am. J. In t’l L. 561 (1970).

82 This princ iple was reaffirmed by the Internatio nal Court of Ju stice in the Advisory Opinion on the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization,

(1960), I.C. J. 150; Vienna Conve ntion, a rt. 31, para. 1; 4 Int’l L. Com m’n, Report, 19 U.N . GAOR, Supp. 

(No. 9), U.N . Doc. A/5809 (1964).

83 The I nte rna tional Cou rt of Jus tice h ad recourse to the “ purpose” of the trea ty in th e Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of 190% Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands-Sw eden), (1958) I.C .J. 55.

88 This is analogous to the New Hebrides, where some functions of auth ori ty are assigned to the jo int 

adm inistra tion of the United Kingdom a nd Fran ce while others reside in each of th e nationa l authorities , 

such as each State having separate jurisdiction over its own respective subjects.

85 See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).

88 See South West Africa Cases, (Second Phase), (1966) I.C .J. 6, 48.

87 The Djema (a General Assembly of Saharan repre sentatives) was created by the Spanish to aid in 

adm inistra tion of the territory . For de tails on the makeup and function, see Rep ort of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, 1975, in The Report of the Special Com mittee on the Situ ation With 

Rega rd to the Implem entatio n of the Declara tion on t he Gra nting of Indepe nden ce t o Colonial Coun tries 

and Peoples, U.N . Doc. A/10023/Add. 5, Annex (1975).
125

use of the conjunctive in t he te xt in enumerating the p articipan ts of th e administration. Item two states th at Spain would estab lish an adm inistra tion “w ith the 

participation of Morocco and Ma uritania and the collab oration of the Djema 

r

(local assembly), an adm inistratio n to which the responsibilities and powers * * *

will be tra nsferred,” (emphasis added). The Accords confer righ ts on the Djema 

which must be recognized a nd given effect.88 Moreover, item th ree of the Accords 

specifically sta tes th at “ (t)he opinion of the Saharawi popu lation, expressed by 

the Djema, will be respecte d.” By inclusion of the Djem a in the adm inistration, 

, the s tatem ent th at its opinion will be respected, and Spain’s state me nts in items

one and six th at it is transferring its responsibilities as administering power to 

decolonize the territor y, it is evident th at the “purpose” of the Accords is no t the 

mere transference of adm inistration over the territory , but an att em pted delegation of the d uty of insuring the inha bitant’s inalienable right to self-determination.

The inte rests of th e in habitants of a non-self-governing territor y are paramount, 

and the administering Power has accepted as a sacred trus t the du ty t o prom ote 

the inh abitants well-being to the utm ost, develop self-government, and assist 

in the evolution of free political institut ion s.89 In the present instance, Spain’s 

du ty to insure the Saharaw i’s inalienable rig ht to self-determination was a nondelegable duty. By analogy to the common law, a pa rty to a con tract cannot 

delegate his duties und er the con tract if the non-assigning party will n ot receive 

comparable performance from the assignee. As Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim, 

Chairman of the Un ited Nations Committee of 24 on Decolonization and Permanen t Representati ve of the United Republic of Tanza nia to the Un ited Nations, sta ted before the General Assembly’s F ou rth Committee on 24 November 

1975:

“I t is self-evident th at this agreement does not conform with United Nations 

decisions and resolutions on the question. The righ ts of the peoples of Spanish 

Sah ara are clearly subordinated to the territori al claims of some of its neighbors. 

Tak ing into ac count the stated position of Morocco and Mauritania, it is ludicrous 

to expect th at a genuine exercise of self-determination can be realized. * * * And 

quite clearly, this agreement runs counter to the responsibilities of the ad min istering Power assumed und er the Charter and the Dec laration on decolonization. If 

this agreement is implemented, Spain would have clearly betrayed her sacred 

trus t to the people of th e territo ry.90

The U nite d Nation s General Assembly passed two resolutions in an attem pt to 

insure th at the inha bitants’ inalie nable right to self-d eterm ination would not be 

abroga ted by the Accords. In th e first resolution, Spain was again called upon to 

arrange a genuine and free exercise of self-determination by the in habit ants under 

U.N . supervision. 91 The second resolution acknowledged the interim three-power 

adm inistration and called on the Secretary General to “assist” the interim adm inistration in holding a “free con sultation” with the “S aharan pop ulations.” 92

This position of the General Assembly is analogous to the common law whereby 

performance und er an assigned con tract is sought from the assignee while the 

assignor rema ins liable for the assignee’s failure to perform. These resolutions 

att em pte d to insure th at the opinion of the Saharan population would be respected, which is w hat the Accords purports to do, and neither legitimized nor passed 

on the legality of the Accords. In fact, in ligh t of subsequent reve lations on the 

« secret agreements between Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain, it is eviden t th at

the Accords were void ab initio.

Fiist Minister of Morocco, M. Ahmed Osman, in the 8 Ja nuary 1976 Le Monde,

sta ted th at by the agre eme nt Spain would leave the Sahara but would retain a 

35 perc ent intere st in Fosbucraa, the 700 million dollar Saharan phosphate in- 

> du stry .93 This sta tem ent begs the question of how could Morocco guara nty Spain

an inte rest in futu re pho sphate p rodu ction should the inhabitants of th e ter ritory 

choose to become a sovereign indepen dent sta te, The Accords sta te th at the 

opinion of the Saharan population will be expressed throug h the Djem a. Prior to 

entering into negotiations w ith Spain, the Presiden t of the Djem a h ad defec ted to 

Mor occo,94 and Morocco and Ma uritania had alre ady agreed to partitio n the ter88 I t was aut horitati vely decided by the Permanen t Court of Internation al Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, (1928) P.C. I.J . Ser. B, No. 15, th at if by a particular tr ea ty the 

par ties i nte nded to confer rights on individuals, the n these rights shou ld receive recognition and effect at 

international law.

88 U.N . Charter Ch apter XI.

90 U.N .Q. Against Ap artheid, Racial Discrimination a nd Colonialism, Objective: Justice, C (No. 4,1975). 

w G.A. Res. 3458 (A), U.N . Doc. GA/5438, at 254-55 (1975).

88 G.A. Res. 3458 (B), U.N . Doc. GA/5438, at 256 (1975).

93 L a D ocu mentation Francaise, Maghreb Machrek, 45 (Paris, No. 71,1976).

94 Prior to the commencement of the Green March, Mr. K ha rti Ould Joum aini, the elected P resident of the 

Djem a, fled to Agadir a nd paid ritu al homage to Morocco’s King Hassan, U.N . Doc. S/PV. 1854, at 26-27 

(1975).

51 -3 03 0 - 7 9 - 9
ritory.

95 The conclusion is inescapable. The inhabitants were never meant to 

fieely exercise their right to self-determination. Thus, the Accords violate two 

jus cogens: (1) the inalienable right of self-determination foi non-self-governing 

territories, and, (2) the principle tha t treaties must be performed in good faith 

pacta sunt servanda. Moreover, in this context, Spain’s duty to insure the inhabitan ts’ right of self-determination was nondelegable. It is for these reasons th at the 

Accords were clearly illegal.98 In short, the Accords were a facade through which 

Morocco and Mauritania hoped to subjugate the territory.97

T h e S aharan Ara b D em o cratic R e p u b l ic

To avoid being used to legitimize the actions of Morocco and Mauritania, 

on November 28, 1975, the Djema, by unanimous vote of its members present, 

decided on dissolution. Moreover, the 67 members of the Djema, the 3 Saharan 

members of the Cortes, the representatives of other members of the Djema, 

and the more than 60 sheiks and notables of Saharan tribes present, signed a 

document which stated that the only way of consulting the Saharan people was 

by allowing them to decide their own future and to obtain their independence free 

of any outside interference. The document further declared the Frente Polisario 98

as the sole and legitimate authority of th e Saharan people.99

With the departure of the Spanish from the territory in February 1976, Morocco, 

in accord with her prior agreement with Mauritania, announced the partition of 

the territory, with the northern sector, in which the phospates are located, to be 

solely under Moroccan authority. Morocco annexed the northern sector claiming 

support by the Djema and the inhabitants who considered themselves Moroccans.9911 At the same time, on February 27, 1976, the Frente Polisario declared 

the creation of the “Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.” The Saharan National 

Provisional Council was to be the legislative assembly.1

 This declaration by the 

Polisario was overshadowed by the Moroccan announcement which appeared 

supported by the Accords, the Djema and the inhabitants, and the fact that 

Morocco and Mauritania actually occupied part of the territory. In realty, the 

Moroccan announcement was devoid of legality.

Although States can partition a territory, there must be some legal basis for 

their actions.2

 Under the Advisory Opinion and the Accords, Morocco and Mauritania never acquired sovereignty over the territory. Ignoring the question of any 

prior agreement between Morocco and Mauritania, Morocco stated th at the partition and annexation were the will of the inhabitants and the Djema. In reality, 

the partition was based on Moroccan territorial aspirations. The Djema had 

ceased to exist three months prior to Morocco’s announcement. Moreover, from 

the Djema’s dissolution declaration and the report of the U.N. Visiting Mission 

to the territory in 1975,3 45 it is evident th at the inhabitants overwhelmingly favored 

the creation of a sovereign independent State. Even the United Nations recognizes 

that the inhabitants did not freely exercise the right to self-determination under 

Moroccan authority? Thus, while Morocco and Mauritania effectuated an occupation, partition, and annexation, sovereignty was not acquired by the victorious 

States? The annexation had been achieved through gross aggression without

95 In Ap ril 1976, Morocco published an agreem ent whereby Morocco ha d agreed to sup ply phosphate pro ­

ceeds with Mauritan ia. Fu rther evid ence that there had been an agreem ent is included in the oral pleadings 

before th e Internation al Court of Ju sti ce for the Advisory Opinion in 1975. See Thomas M. Franck, supra

note 79.

99 Leading pub licists and organizations share the view t ha t the accords were illegal. See Western Sahara

and the Struggle of the Saharoui People for Self-Determination, Dossier by th e Intern ational League for the 

Rig hts and Liberation of Peoples, (Rome, 1978) (hereinafter cited as Western Sahara Dossier).

97 After the Accords were signed, Moroccan and Mauritanian troops poured int o the territ ory from the north 

and south respectively, and forcibly took over the major town s and villages. Spanish officials handed over 

the ir files on all inh abitants who had favored independen ce. Am idst innum erable atrocitie s, tens of tho usand s of the inhabit ants tied into th e interior. See Ann e Lippert, supra note 76.

99 T he Polisario was a political faction w ith in the territory th at had been attem pting to achieve independence for the te rrit ory from Spain an d was now forcibly resisting the Moroccan and Mau ritanian advance 

into the te rrit ory . African Research Bull., Nov. 1975.

99 U.N . Doc. A/10481-S/11902, Annex (1975). .

99» See Le Monde, Feb. 27,1976, at 4, cols. 1-3; Id. F eb. 28,1976, at 2, cols. 2-4; Id. Feb . 29, 1976, at 1, col. 1.

> U.N . Doc. A/31/23/Add. 5, at 17-18 (25 October 1976).

2

 An example is the Memorandum of Unde rstanding of October 5,1954, signed in London by Great Br ita in, 

the United States, I taly, a nd Yugoslavia, whereby th e Free Te rritory of Trieste was divided into a Western 

an d an Eastern Zone under the interim administration of Ita ly and Yugoslavia respectively.

3

 See The Rep ort of the Special Committee on th e Sit uation With Regard t o the Implementation of the 

Declaration on th e Gra ntin g of Independ ence t o Colonial Coun tries and Peoples, U.N . Doc. A/10023/Add. 

5, Annex (1975).

4

 T he General Assembly of th e United Nations has con tinu ed to pass resolutions calling for the selfdeterm ination of the inha bitants. See U .N. Doe. A/C.4/33/L. 7/R ev. 1 (24 Nov. 1978).

5

 According to Judg e Jessup in The South West Africa Cases, (Second Phase) (1966) I.C.J. R ep. 6 at 418-19: 

“I t is commonplace that intern ational law does no t recognize milita ry conquest as a source of title.’’
127

regard for the inhabitan ts’ rights.® Such an annexation having been effectuated 

by force, contrary to the United Nations Charter, General Assembly resolutions, 

and the opinion of the International Court of Justice, should not be recognized 

by other States.7

States generally withhold recognition in accordance with legal principles and 

precedents.8 To date, out of 151 members of the United Nations, only one State, 

the Ivory Coast, has recognized Moroccan and Mauritanian claims of sovereignty 

over the Western Sahara.® This situation is analogous to the universal condemnation of South Africa’s creation of Transkei and Bophutatswana.10 South Africa 

is the only nation which extended recognition while the whole international community withheld recognition and denied that they are States.* 11 Like Transkei, 

the Western Sahara situation has existed for over three years and the international community as a whole has withheld recognition of Moi ocean and Mauritanian claims of sovereignty, Moreover, the Ivory Coast’s interpretation of the 

legality of Moroccan and Mauritanian claims was completely refuted by the 

International Court of Justice.12 In short, Moroccan and Mauritanian claims of 

sovereignty are devoid of legality.

Conversely, with regard to the declaration of a Saharan Arab Democratic 

Republic, there is a valid legal foundation. The Advisory Opinion and the General 

Assembly cleaily give paramountcy to the inhabitan ts’ right to self-determination. 

Even the Accords, through which Morocco and Mauritania claim au thority over 

the territory, states that the opinion of the inhabitants as expressed by the Djema 

will be respected. The declaration of a Saharan State by the Polisaiio was based 

on the delegation of authority in the Djema’s dissolution declaiation. Therefore, 

Morocco and Mauritania cannot object to the declaration.13 If the Accords were 

a valid treaty as Morocco and Mauritania claim, then they must peiform them 

in good faith {pacta sunt servanda) ,u and the decision of the Djema to delegate its 

authority must be respected. Secondly, Morocco and Mauritania cannot in good 

conscience object to the Djema declaring the Polisario as the sole and legitimate 

authority of the Saharan people, since it was through Spain delegating her duties 

that Morocco and Mauritania claimed th e right to administer the territory. By 

analogy to the common law, should an assignee to a contract object to the nonassigning party assigning his half of the contract, the assignee would be p ut in the 

awkward position of arguing that the contract was nonassignable. Thus, as the 

legitimate authority for the Saharan population, the Polisario had the authority 

to declare the creation of a Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. Although the 

Polisario sought to exercise the inhabitants’ inalienable right to self-determination 

by the announcement of this republic, in the light of the occupation, partition, and 

annexation, the question arises as to what is the legal effect of this proclamation: 

Is the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic a State?

The essential elements of a State are well settled.15 Of the four requirements, 

definiteness of territo ry is not generally insisted upon.18 Neither does the requirement of a government mean one capable of effective domestic control.17 As a 

Spanish protectorate, the Western Sahara had defined boundaries, a permanent 

population, and local governmental structures in preparation for decolonization.18 What obfuscated the issue was the occupation by Morocco and Mauritania. However, since November 1975, the Polisario had forcibly resisted the

• Sup ra note 97.

7

 View of Judge Jessup in The South West Africa Cases, (Second Phase) (1966) I.C .J. Rep. 6 at 168-71.

8

 J. Starke, Introduction to International L aw, 144 (7th ed. 1972).

9

 Supra page 21.

10 On October 26, 1976, South Africa declared the Tran skei A frican reserve inde pen den t. Th e U.N. i n a 

formal vote un animously declared the creation a farce. The U.S. alone abstained, Africa New s, 10 (Dec 20, 

1976).

11 Under I.C.J. Stat. art. 38, para. 1(b), th e general practice of States is one of th e sources of inte rnational

law. •

12 Supra page 21.

13 Since Morocco has asserted th at the Accords were a valid treaty, Morocco m us t respect the decision of 

the Djema. In the Nuclear Tests Case {Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France), (1974), I.C .J. 253, 

statem ents m ade by the Pre sident of Fra nce were held to bi nd that State and France was estopped from 

asserting a contra ry position.

14 Supra note 81.

15 See Montevideo Convention of 1933 on t he Rights and Duties of States, su pra note 42.

14 An example would be t he recognition of Israel in 1949, while her b oun dar ies were still un de term ined .

17 Examples are th e adm ission of R uanda an d Bu run di to th e Un ited N atio ns. Und er th e Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Membership in the United Nations, (1948) I.C .J. 57, since stateho od is a p rim ary qualification for admission, t ha t admiss ion was t an tam ou nt to recognition of the Member admitted as a State.

18 Western Sahara is bordered b y the Atlan tic Ocean, Morocco, Algeria, and Maurita nia. Under Spanish 

rule cities and industries were estab lished , nom ads were traine d and relocated in ur ban centers, and t he 

Djema (a General Assembly of S aharan representatives) was created to aid in the ad ministration of th e 

territory. Moreover, t he Polisario had a substan tial following, a hier archial stru cture, and was politically 

active. See Rep ort of the Un ited Nations Visiting Mission, supr a note 103.
invasion by Morocco and Ma uritania and actually controlled two thirds of the 

territory. 19 Moreover, with the dep arture of the Spanish in Febru ary 1976, since 

the Accords were void ab initio, the Polisario, as the legitim ate representativ e of 

the Saharan popu lation, was the sole valid legal entity within the territo ry. 

Thus, with the announcement of the creation of the Saharan Arab Democratic 

Republic, the only qualification necessary to establish stateho od was the ability 

to enter into foreign relations.

The ability to enter intQ relations with oth er States was acknowledged when 

States extended recognition to the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.20 Accord­ ing to Article 1 of the Resolutions adopted at Brussels in 1936 by the Insti tute 

of Inte rna tional Law, recogn ition consists of :

“* * * the free act by which one or more States acknowledge the existence on 

a definite ter ritory of a human society politically organized, inde pen den t of any 

other existing State, and capab le of observing the obligations of internatio nal 

law, and by which the y manifest the ir inte ntion to consider it a member of the 

inte rna tional comm unity” .21

Consequently, the State, to be recognized, must possess the four characteristics 

mentioned in the Montevideo Convention, with par ticular regard to the capa city 

to conduct inte rna tional affairs. The act of recognition was mere ly a formal 

acknowledgement of an established situ atio n of fact.

This view is supported by the following rules:

(a) If a question arises in the Courts of a new State as to t he date a t which 

the Sta te came into existence, it will be irrelevant to consider when other 

States lecognized it. The only material date is when the requiremen ts of 

state hood were in f act first fulfilled.22

(b) Recognition of a new Sta te has retroac tive effect, dating back to its 

actual inception as an inde pendent State .23

Thus, upon issuance of the p roclamation of statehood on the day after the final 

dep arture of the Spanish, the Sah aran Arab Democratic Republic came into 

existence by meeting the requirem ents of state hood. The granting of recognition 

by twenty-two States confirmed this reality .24

Although many other States recognize tire Polisario as t he rightful government 

of th e Sahara, 23 the failure by many States to recognize the S aharan Arab Democratic Republic is to a large degree based upon facts which obfuscate d here inception. Superficially, it appears as if Spain simply ceded eithter the te rritor y or the 

adm inistration to Morocco a nd Mauritania. In re ality, the Madrid Accords was a 

nullity. It would further appear, with the announcem ent of the partition and 

annexation, th at the Polisario do not have any territo ry. In reality, the Polisario 

control over two-thirds of the territory comprising the Saharan Arab Democratic 

Republic, whereas Morocco and Ma uritania could only mainta in a few fortified 

strongholds with in the territory , Moreover, since the July 10, 1978 coup in 

Mauritania, Ma uritania has partially withdrawn from the so uthern sector, offered 

part of th at territory, to th e Polisario, and is attemp tin g a negotiated settlement.2* This change of position by Mauritania , aside from constitutin g de facto recognition

19 African Research Bull. Nov. 1975, a t 3837.

20 B y April 1976, the following te n States recognized the Saharan Arab Dem ocratic Republic; Algeria, 

Angola, Benin, Bu run di, Guinea-Bissau, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Madagascar, Mozambiqu e, Ruand a, and Togo, U.N . Doc. A/31/23/Add. 5,18 (25 October 1976).

21 30 Am. J. In t’l L. Supp. 185 (1936).

22 See Rights of Citizenship in Succession States Cases, Ann ual Digest of Public I nte rna tional Law Cases, 1919-1922, Nos. 5, 6, and 7. See also Article 9 of the Charter of the Organization of America n States, Bogota, 

1948: “ The political existence of the State is in dependent of recognition of other States.”

23 In B ritish Cou rts, th e retroactive operation of recognition is very broad. A cause of action based upon 

the existence of a pa rtic ular Sta te at the instit ution of proceedings, in nullified if by the tim e of the hearing, 

the British Gov ernmen t recognizes another State as having been in existence when the action was commended, Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Eg ypt and Liquori, (1937) Ch. 513. Also, a judg ment may be set aside on appeal if the British Gov ernment recognizes ano ther Sta te as havin g been in existence at the tim e 

of judg ment, Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A. M. Luther v. Sagor (Janies) <fc Co., (1921) 3 K.B. 532. Further autho rity is the Tinoco Arbitration (1953), where it was held th at pr ior nonrecognition d id not estop Great 

Britain from late r alleging th at the Tinoco Gov ernm ent was in fact duly constituted, 1 U .N. Rep. I nt’l. Arb. 

Awards 375 (1948).

24 On Febru ary 8, 1978, t he Popular Democratic Rep ublic of Yemen (Aden) extended recognition. In 

Jun e, the People’s Republic of the Congo became the fifteenth State to recognize the S aharan Arab Democratic Republic, Africa News, Jun e 12,1978, at 12. P anam a became the sixtee nth State in Jul y an d Tanz ania 

became t he sev enteenth in October 1978. Eth iop ia became th e eighteen th in Feb rua ry 1979, Id., March 16, 1979, at 12. Vietnam became th e n ine teenth in March 1979, Id., March 23,1979, a t 11. C amb odia an d Laos extended recognition in April and on May 20,1979, Afghanistan became the twenty-secon d State to recognize 

the Saharan A rab Democratic Republic, Sahara Libre, May 31, 1979, at 1. 25 See Western Sahara Dossier.

24 N .Y. Times, March 15,1979, at A15 cols 4-6; Africa News July-August 1978. Moreover, there has been a cease-fire between t he Polisario and Mauritania since the coup and bo th sides have released prisoners. Id., Feb. 9.1979. a t 9.
of the Polisario, should put to rest any question about the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic lacking territory. Finally, as other nations have attempted to 

deny the true nature of hostilities by perverting the facts,27 so Morocco categorizes the hostilities as Algerian incursions into Moroccan territory.28 However, even if the Western Sahara were an integral part of Morocco and Mauritania , the 

actions of the occupying forces toward the civilian population are so utte rly 

reprehensible and violative of international law,29 th at such assertions are stripped of any legitimacy th ey have.

Conclusion

As a precedent, the early success of Morocco and Mauritania posed a grave 

thre at to international peace and security. In Africa especially, where boundaries 

were drawn by colonial powers without regard for ethnic groups, any successful 

assertion of historical ties to territory would have a pronounced destabilizing 

effect. Somalia, whose claim to the Ogaden was also based on historical ties, 

invaded Ethiopia in 1978. Again the assertion was historical ties when Uganda 

invaded Tanzania in October 1978. Attempting to rectify past wrongs through 

force merely ushers in an era of instability, bloodshed, and war with no guarantee 

tha t the resultant frontiers are a substantial improvement over the previous ones. 

These dangers devolve from the imprecision of the concept of a people: is a people 

defined by linguistic, religious, cultural, geographical or other criteria? Conflict 

over choice of criteria leads to war as it did in Alsace-Lorraine. If there is to be 

peace in Africa, then the s anctity of boundaries must be maintained. As Somalia, 

Uganda, and Mauritania have discovered, the answer does not lie on the bat tlefield, if only because of the prohibitive cost. Even Morocco has begun to realize 

there can be no military solution in the Western Sahara. Moreover, as Mauritania 

attempts to extricate herself from th e war, Morocco stands alone while an erroneously perceived impediment for acceptance of the Saharan Aral) Democratic 

Republic into the international community is removed.

27 In an attempt to ci rcumvent prohibitions of the League of Nations, Japan labeled the Sino-Japanesconflict of 1937 a “ police ac tion.” A ltho ugh there had been no declaration of war, nor ha d diplomatic relae 

tions been severed, a sta te of war d id exist, Kawaaai K isen Kabushiki Kaiaha of Kobe v. Bantham Steamship Co. Ltd., (1939), 2 K .B. 544.

28 F or Moroccan accusations as well as Algerian denials, see Jeune Afrique, 32 (No. 924,20 September 1978). 22 Morocco had acceded to th e Ge nev a Conven tions of i949 prior to th e com mencement of hostilities, U.N .

Chronicles (Sept. 1977). The prim ary purpose of the Conv entions was to lim it the scope of all hostilities. 

This is indicate d b y article 3 w hic h is common to all four C onventions an d applies to hostilities of a n oninternational characte r w ithin the te rritory of a Contrac ting P arty. Article 3 distinguishes betw een com batants and noncom batants, with a strict prohibition against “ violence to life and person,” and any othe r 

actions which would inflict unnec essary suffering on noncombatants, Geneva Convention for the Am elioration of the Condition of the Wound ed and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of Augus t 12, 1949, 6 U.S .T. 

3115, 3116, T .I.A .S. No. 3362. Y et occupying forces engaged in repaine, rape, m util ation, posioning of desert 

water holes, and nap aiming of civilians, aee Western Sahara Dossier. These actions also cons titute genocide. Und er article I I of the Con vention on the Prev ention and Punis hm ent of the Crime of Genocide of Decem ­

ber 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, to which Morocco is a p arty, genocide is defined as the killing, causing serious 

bodily or m ental harm, or inflicting of conditions calculated to bring abo ut the physical destruc tion in 

whole or in part, of a nation al, ethnical, racial, or religious group. The protection afforded by the Conv ention 

s applicable in time of peace or war, a nd to situation s solely within th e domestic control of States.
A P P E N D IX 2

provide enough seasonal vegetation 

“em pty qu ar ter” covering northern 

n Ma uritania with huge dunes (’erg

C o n flic t in th e Sahara, B ackgro und P a pe r by I. W il li am

Zart m an, P r o fesso r, N ew Y ork Un iv er sit y

Travel across the great African desert, or “sa hara” in Arabic, is like a bridge 

tyin g togethe r two shores of a sea; mining brings isolated tem porary camps, 

similar to oil platforms in open water; and oases prov ide island s of difficult existence, buffeted by the wind and sand. But the main chann els of human movement 

and act ivity in the Sahara occur around its edges, the western one of which is the 

Atla ntic littora l of the dese rt, Here a series of inland plateaus manages to capture 

a b it of th e moisture from Atla ntic winds to

for mig rant grazing. Behind it lies a vast 

Mali, southwestern Algeria and northeaste i

Iguidi and ’erg Chech), pebb ly plains (reg) and rocky plateaus (ham ada). Dry as 

it is, the western Sahara forms an isthm us between Morocco and Senegal-Mali.

The vast arc between the southern Moroccan mou ntains and oases and the 

Senegal and Niger river valleys is sparsely inhabited by a mobile popu lation of 

1,000,000 or per square kilometer, a q uarte r of whom are settled in the few colonial 

coastal towns and tradition al inlan d centers bu t most of whom are pastoral tribes 

in movement. The B erber-speaking Tek na tribes, rela ted to the Moroccans of the 

Anti-Atlas mountains, inhabit the northern pa rt of the ir territo ry. The large 

nomadic and warrior tribes, notably the Arabic-speaking Ulad Delim and Reqeibat, are located along the coast and inland of t he central segment—primarily 

the Rio del Oro of the former Spanish Sahara—bu t in fact roam from Tisnit in 

Morocco to Tijikja in Mauritania . In land in the central pa rt of Mauritania are 

other Arabic-speaking Moorish trib es who move seasonally nor th and south 

within the ir territory.

These people know no boundaries, and the straight lines th at bound ed Spanish 

Sahara, like those th at separate Morocco, Algeria, Ma uritania and Mali, are 

unrelated to any features of hum an or physical geography. The southea st points 

of the Rio del Oro border do touch the escarpment of the Adrar massif and the 

curved p arts of the border in betw een arches at a 20 km distance from the valuable 

salt pan at Ijil, bu t the rest of the border corresponds to nothing. In the whole 

western Sahar an region, only the Mali-M auritan ian border takes into account the 

nomadic patterns and watering holes. It stands as a unique example of the way 

borders should be reg arded in Africa, for it was the subject of negotiations between 

inde pendent governments in 1963 and was altered by common agreement to 

reflect pastora l and trib al needs. Bu t even here, the actual lines have no physical 

or hum an feature to follow. A more complicating matter is the area between 

Bechar in Algeria and Tarfaya in Morocco, where no border exists at all, since 

the French earlier had found th at “a country which is withou t water is uninhabitable and a delimitation therefor would be superfluous.” In this kind of te rri ­

tory, any boundaries and te rritorial controls are difficult to apply, bu t a boun dary 

or territo rial dispute merely opens the area to its natural fluidity.

Not only is th e economic and related social organization of the Saharan population beyond stat e control, bu t they have also been in recurre nt war among the mselves and in rebellion against regimes on the edges of the Sahara. Both are 

typified by the action s of the famous pre-nationalist hero, Ma al-ainen, who at 

the turn of th e cen tury delayed the French conquest of Ma uritania with the help 

of the Moroccan sultan, and his son, al-Heiba, who from his dese rt bases was the 

last pretender to the Moroccan throne before World War I. Ibn Khaldun, the 

famous fourteenth-cen tury Arab sociologist, had a the ory abo ut such ac tiv ity ; he 

saw North African history as a succession of regimes established by overflowing 

desert bands of militant religious reformers who softened as the y ada pted to city 

life beyond the mountain s and fell prey to the next wave of fund amentalis t warriors. Such indeed has been the history of the Moroccan sul tan ate over the past 

millenium, and the present Alawi dynasty itself came from the Tafilelt oasis 

along the Algerian border region in the mid-seventeenth century .
131

The current Saharan conflict was born in a network of conflicts among Algeria, 

Mauritania and Morocco. Within the central area of the kingdom—the so-called 

“government land” (bilad al-makhzen)—Morocco certainly qualified as a state - 

, in-formation in th e Western sense during the ‘Alawi dynasty, but the traditional

Islamic view of the state was not as a territorial unit but as a population entity , 

reflecting centralized politico-religious focus within the common religious community (umma). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Moroccan Empire 

extended southward beyond the Atlas and Anti-Atlas mountains for an inde- 

, terminate distance, with th e sultan’s religious position as imam and khalifa of the

west recognized by tribes living throughout the great western arc of the Sahara 

where grazing and commerce was possible.

The central area of the kingdom fell under the cclonial control of the French 

and Spanish in 1912, but as a Protectorate, not as an outright colony. The continu ity of the kingdom was internationally recognized, and the United States 

pursued an important case to the International Court of Justice to reaffirm that 

continuity. The western desert was not conquered until twenty years after the 

establishment of the Protectorates, however, when the French took the Tafilelt 

and the Reqeibat base of Tindouf from the north and the Adrar from the south 

and the Spanish moved in from their few coastal posts to take their share of th e 

Sahara.

In another twenty years, the tide of history was reversed and the colonial 

“protection” of the monarchy began to be removed. The French and Spanish 

Protectorate were abolished in 1956 and Tangier was restored from international 

status to an integral part of the kingdom. The southern Spanish protectorate over 

Tarfaya, just south of the river Dra’, was removed in 1958, and the coastal enclave of Ifni was returned to the kingdom in 1969. It is not surprising tha t the 

Moroccans looked for the rest of their territory to be retroceded as colonial rule 

was gradually removed. The most articulate spokesman of this view was not 

King Mohammed V or, after his death in 1961, his son King Hassan II, but the 

Independence (istiqlal) Party, direct successor of the nationalist movement and 

Morocco’s largest political party. The eloquent spokesman for irredentism was 

its president (until his d eath in 1974), the ’alim and charismatic political leader, 

’Allal al-Fassi, who had long led the call for the independence of Tindouf and 

western Algeria, northern Mali and all of Mauritania and Spanish Sahara and 

their reunification with the Moroccan Empire. Even the other parties—notably 

the left opposition offshoot of the Istiqlal and the right groupings of independents 

and “king5

s men”—adopted some form of irredentism, making it part of the 

fundamental themes of Moroccan politics.

But Morocco is rare among colonial territories in having a historic state that 

continued under colonial rule. More common is the colonially-created state which 

then accedes to independence within its colonial boundaries, either through a 

territorial legislative act or through negotiations with a nationalist movement. 

Thus Algeria fought, negotiated and voted in 1962 in a referendum for its independence, in which one of the points a t issue was the very inclusion of the central 

Sahara and Tindouf. Its unmarked border gave rise to an inconclusive war with 

Morocco the following year. African mediation and OAU attentio n provided a 

cease-fire and gradually cooled down the conflict.

■ The crucible of Algerian political attitudes is quite different from the Moroccan

experience. Whatever the status of Algeria’s sovereign confederation of city states 

before the French conquest, it did not constitute a historic state. Algeria was 

the creation of 130 years of direct and intense colonization and of a revolutionary 

war of national liberation that won its independence. Its liberation struggle was

* a popular progressive cause of international dimensions, and its victory left it

with feisty aspirations to Third World leadership and a penchant for supporting 

national liberation movements. But Algeria, the second largest state on the maps 

of Africa (after Sudan) has a population slightly smaller than Morocco’s, a 

slightly larger GNP (and per capita GNP) and economic growth rate, and so a 

sense of sharp rivalry that is often created by the combination of a similar power 

base and a very different political system. Algerians frequently cite “the balance 

in the area” as the context for policy toward Morocco and the reasons for opposition to Moroccan irredentism, reflecting a common misperception of balance 

of power in which the speaker must hold the edge of the balance. Moroccans have 

learned to respond in the same way, in reverse. Algeria has frequently been the 

spokesman for progressive, activist, confrontationist groups of African and other 

Third World states on continental and international—notably New International 

Economic Order—issues; Morocco has led similar groups of African states on an
132

opposing, moderate stan d. Finally, the 1963 war, despite subsequent reconciliation, has left a legacy of an unfinished fight, par ticu larly among the military of 

both sides.

Ma uritania was created as a te rritor y of French West Africa (AOF) and became 

indepen dent in 1960, its very existence contested at every step along the way. 

Predom inan tly Arab in its population, it nevertheless has an important black 

(Toucouleur) minority rela ted to the population of its neighbor, Senegal, and its 

existence was supported by its former AOF neighbors and by the large r moderate 

alliance of some of them, the African and Malag asy Union (UAM) and then the 

African and Malagasv Common Organization (OCAM). In 1965, however, Mauritan ia resigned from OCAM and began to develop ties with the more progressive 

Arab states, and p articularly with Algeria as a counterweig ht to Morocco, and in 

1973 completed its switch of alliances by joining the League of Arab States. In 

the process, Morocco came to recognize the existence of Ma uritan ia and after 

1969 d ropped its claims on Ma uritanian territo ry.

During the process leading to independence, Preside nt-to-be Mo khtar ould 

Dadda h articulated a different philosophy to face the Gre ater Moroccan idea in 

speaking in 1957 of a Greater Mauritania, a dese rt entity of similar people between the Senegal and Dr a’ rivers and hence including the then-Spanish Tarfaya 

and then-Spa nish S ahara as well as Ma uritania. The independence of Algeria and 

the ret urn of Tarfaya to Morocco left litt le room for the realization of this idea 

during the 1960s and early 1970s.

Thus, the western end of th e Sah ara is the arena of three overlapping conflicts: 

A Moroccan-Algerian rivalry of growing powers across an inexistent border, a 

Morocc an-M auritanian conflict over identitie s, and a Ma uritanian claim over the 

neighboring Sahara. It is in this context th at the decolonization of the Spanish 

Sahara has arisen and it is only w ithin these sets of rela tions th at the conflict can 

be resolved.

CONFLICT

After initial conflict reflecting conflicting longterm goals, the three states neighboring on Spanish Sahara joined forces in the pursuit of imm edia te aims. The 

campaign for the decolonization of the territory began with a U.N. resolution of 

1965 calling for negotiations with Morocco and Mauritania, bu t the annual resolutions the rea fter called for self-determination through referendum. Throug hou t 

the 1960s, the two states each pursued its claim to the territo ry, while Algeria led 

the campaign for a referendum and Spain periodically announced plans for one; 

each of the latte r parties apparen tly hoped for a weak Saharan state th at would 

be d ependent on them, respectively. Once Morocco recognized Mauritania, at the 

Islamic Conference in Rab at in Septemb er 1969, however, the three neighbors 

started coming together, shifting their competition for ter ritory to cooperation 

against Spanish rule. In May 1970, King Hassan and Preside nt Houari Boumedienne of Algeria me t in Tlemcen and agreed to a joint campaign, and the following 

month Morocco and Ma uritania signed a friendship tre aty th at formally ended 

Morocco’s claim on Mauritania. In Septe mber, Hassan, Boumedienne and ould 

Daddah met at Nouadhibou to plan a joint campaign against t he Spanish.

The most extraordinar y component in this renversement des alliances was accomplished by Morocco. The early 1970s were difficult years for the monarchy, 

which had just lifted a 5-year sta te of emergency, estab lished two constitu tions 

in rapid succession, faced two bare ly unsuccessful milita ry coups, and had to 

contend with a extra-pa rty leftwing opposition which found san ctuary in neighboring Algeria. The wisest policy was to mend fences on the Algerian side, and 

the best way to mend fences was to fill in the inex isten t border. In Ifrane and 

Tlemcen, in May 1970, Hassan and Boumedienne agreed to set up a border commission, and on 15 Jun e 1972 Morocco and Algeria signed a border agreement 

which essentially acce pted th e Algerian terms: a bord er to be dem arca ted along 

the ham ada esca rpment sou th of th e Dr a’, Moroccan renuncia tion of claims over 

Tindouf, cooperation in evacua ting the iron mined at Gara Jebilet thro ugh 

Moroccan ports. However, the agreement won Morocco one point: Algerian 

support for Moroccan claims over the one remaining piece of the irredenta, the 

Spanish Sahara. Boumedienne called in ould Dad dah and told him to come to 

term s with Morocco.

Coo peration continued over the nex t two years. The day after the border convention was signed, Hassan announce d Algeria’s withdraw al from interest in 

the Sahara to the OAU and two years later Boumedienne explicitly blessed the 

Morocco-Mauritanian solution for the territory at a private meeting of heads of 

state (of which the Moroccans made a recording) of the Arab League in Ra bat,
133

as did Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika in Rab at as late as J uly 1975. In J uly 

1973, the thre e heads of sta te met at Agadir to coordinate the ir policy further. 

Morocco’s policy had found support among its neighbors, and Ma uritania felt 

w

it too had maintained a constan t policy, now made possible by the agreeme nt of

Algeria and by the willingness of Morocco to share the territory . Presumably, 

in the first discussions at thi s point, Morocco was to receive Saquiet al-H amra, 

the smaller part which contained the rich phosphate deposits of Bou Cra’ first 

mined in 1973 and mainly inha bited by the Tekna, and Ma uritania would receive 

, the larger poorer Rio del Oro largely inhabited by Req eibat and Oulad Delim.

By 1974, the year of the Portugue se decolonization, pressure on Spain had 

begun to be effective and events accelerated. Spain announced its intention to 

comply with the 1973 UN GA resolution and in 1975 to hold a referendum in the 

territo ry. Face d with this challenge, the Moroccan and Mauritanian strategy 

finally jelled, and at the end of the year the two introduced a resolution in the 

UN GA calling for an advisory opinion from the Intern ational Court of Justice 

on the precolonial legal ties of the territory to the Moroccan Empire and to a 

Ma uritanian entity . In consequence of the resolution, the two states the n submitte d their case t o t he Court. When the C ourt’s opinion was rendered, in October 

1975, it recognized such legal ties bu t declared th em insufficient for current claims 

of territo rial sovereignty; self-determ ination, not history, was the only acceptable 

basis for territorial disposition, as the U.N. resolution had declared for th e Spanish 

colony from 1966 to 1973, an d as contained in th e original resolution o n decolonization of 1960. Morocco, however, seized up on the first p hrase of the Court’s opinion 

and massed 350,000 civilians on its southern border for a “ Green March” into the 

territo ry.

Under this thr eat, Spain agreed to negotiate with Morocco and Ma uritan ia; 

Morocco called off the Green March, and the three coun tries soon arriv ed at the 

Tr ipartite Agreement at Madrid on 14 November 1975, transferring adminis tration of the t erritory to its two neighbors by 28 F ebr uar y 1976, On 14 April 1976, 

the two administering countries concluded an agreement p artitio ning the territory , 

the nor thern two-thirds becoming the thre e Moroccan provinces of Laayoun , 

Smara, and Boujdor and the sou thern third becoming the Mauritanian province 

of Tiris al-G harbia. Six months late r, the Tiris voted for ould Dad dah in the 

Ma uritan ia presidential elections along with the rest of the country, and sent its 

eight represen tatives to the National Assembly. In November, the Moroccan 

province elected their local councils along with the rest of Morocco, and in June 

1977, send inde pendent and Istiqlali represe ntatives to the Moroccan Na tional 

Assembly, in the national elections.

It is not known when or why Algeria changed its position from publicly committed sup port to active opposition against the Mor occan-Mauritania n solution. 

It has been suggested th at hardliners in the Algerian Council of the Revolution 

even tually convinced Boumedienne, or th at he realized on his own th at he had 

given up a strategic position, or th at a Morocco -Mauritania-S panish agreeme nt 

was so unlikely tha t he felt he could agree withou t any d ange r of realization, and 

any of these inte rpretations could be correct. It has also been suggested th at he 

changed position after Algerian ratification of the convention in 1973 because he 

felt th at non-ratification by Morocco effectively annulled the tre aty, bu t it is 

*• likely th at Algeria changed its position earlier and in any case it still does not

consider the convention to be invalid, When, in 1974, Morocco and Mauritania 

tur ned to the Inte rna tional Court of Justice for advisory opinion. Algeria appeared 

before the Court as a contesting rather than a supporting par ty.

In the event, by 1975, Boumedienne was personally committed to a defeat of 

• the Moroccan position by all means, probably for a num ber of reasons: personal

sense of umbrage at the successes of Moroccan diplom acy jus t when Algerian 

leadership was at its height, a personal sense of disdain for ould Dadda h whom he 

raga rded as a renegade progressive who turne d against his mentor, and a personal 

commitmen t to the dese rt warriors of the Sah aran national libe ration movement.

There have been a num ber of bodies which pio port to represen t the people of 

the territo ry. On one hand, the Spanish institut ed an assembly or jama’ (yemaa

in Hispano-Arabic) in 1967, elected for a second time in 1971, with 40 directly 

elected seats and 42 tribal chiefs; in 1973 memb ership was increased to 102. This 

was the body th at corresponded to the territo rial assemblies and legislative 

councils in other African terr itories which often legislated the independence of 

their countries. In Spanish Sahara, the jam a"s resolutions frequently favored 

cooperatio n with the colonial power (as did oth er territo rial assemblies on occasion) with bursts of individual independence; Khatri, chief of the leading
134

Reqeibat Leguacem faction, was arrested in an important nationalist demonstration in 1970 but elected president of the jama’ in 1971, an example of the 

shifting loyalties common to the region.

On 28 November, 67 members of the jama’ met under the aegis of the national liberation movement at Gulta Zemmour to declare themselves in favor of the 

movement and then to dissolve the body, But on 22 December, 72 members 

endorsed the Tripartite Agreement in writing, and on 28 February, 65 members— 

including some 40 who had met a t Guelta Zemmoui—again supported the Moroccan administration at al-Ayoun. However, U.N. Secretary Waldheim refused to 

attend any cf these meetings to certify them as self-determination.

A number of nationalist movements have appeared during the 1960s, usually 

under the patronage of one of the neighboring countries but usually not too long 

under any one country’s sponsorship. The most important—because eventually 

most independent—arose in 1968 among conservative Muslim students in Rabat 

who formed the Saharan Liberation Front and who organized an important 

nationalist demonstration in Laayoun on 18 June 1970. Pursued by the Spanish 

Army, the leaders and sympathizers fled to Mauritania and in May 1973 began 

the first in a series of attacks on Spanish troops under the name of the Popular 

Front for the Liberation of Saqiet al-Hamra and Rio del Oro (Polisario). The 

Polisario gradually shifted its patronage from Mauritania to Algeria, although 

many of its leaders are of Mauritanian origin and its Secretary-General, al-Ouali, 

killed in 1976, was a Moroccan.

When th e U.N. Visiting Mission came to the territory, in mid-1975, it found 

strongest sentiment behind the Polisario and its option for independence. When 

the Moroccan Army entered the territory with the vindictiveness th at “liberating” 

armies often show for “friendly” people, it was the Polisario that organized as 

much of the nomadic population as it could and directed them to refugee camps 

in Algeria, between Tindouf and Gara Jebilet. When a Sahrawi Arab Democratic 

Republic (SADR) was declared from Libya on 26 Februa ry 1976, it was the 

Polisario t ha t made the declaration, before the more usual interval of gueriilla 

successes had taken place. In the tradition of the area, the Polisario-SADR 

leadership has come from all over. One group was bom in southern Morocco: 

Prime Minister Mohammed Lamine, Information Minister Mohammed Salem 

ould Salek, Secretary General ’Abdul’aziz deputy Secretary General Bachir 

Mustafa Sayed. Another group comes from Mauiitania and was once active in 

Mauritanian politics: Foreign Minister Hakim Brahim, politburo member 

Ahmed Baba Miske.

These groups of origin in turn redivide into groups of followers: pro-Algerians, 

pro-Libyans, and other tendencies, where the lines are more fluid and change with 

the season, according to the custom of the area. Above all, by 1978, the Polisario 

had developed a life of its own, independent of its primary Algerian sponsors and 

difficult to extinguish by fiat, just as their political character is above all 

independent.

Prior to November 1975, the Sahara situation was fluid, with a number of 

competing parties pursuing different aims. With the signature of the Tripartite 

Agreement, conflict crystalized. There was an occupying power claiming sovereignty in each part of the territory, united in their efforts since mid-April 1976 

by a treaty of mutual cooperation. Between 1976 and 1979, 9,000 Moroccan troops 

were stationed in Mauritania, in addition to the 30,000 Moroccan troops in 

southern Morocco and the three Saharan provinces; the Mauritania army of 

1,500 in 1975 was rapidly brought to 17,000, a figure which eloquently symbolizes 

the burden of the conflict.

Moroccan and Mauritanian strategy through 1978 has been to occupy and 

defend their new provinces, bringing as much normalcy and prosperity as possible. 

This has meant above all a policy of sedentarization, more favorable both to 

control and to development. From the north Morocco has brought a $230 million 

development program, civilian technicians and administrators, and new settlers, 

including Saharans who fled Spanish and French territories in 1958 and thereafter. 

Morocco has also tried to win back refugees but has been unable to penetrate the 

Polisario-controlled camps. It has also tried to settle nomads, to the point of 

confiscating camels, in order to increase control of the population. Successful 

occupation and normalcy has been necessary to restore the economic worth of the 

area, by bringing the mining and transportation facilities back into operation.

Militarily, the strategy has been to establish defensive points at strategic locations and to ring them with three defense lines made of further armed posts. The 

strategy has generally been successful in occupying and defending settlements and
135

even in keeping open transportation routes, has been able to keep attacks away 

from the core, settled area in most cases. However, it has not been able to occupy 

the vast stretches of desert or to interdict them to enemy use, nor has it been able 

to assure complete security from attack on points and lines. As a whole, the st rat ­

egy is essentially defensive and depends on being able to hold on.

The domestic foundations of this common strategy bring out the greatest 

distinction between the two countries, however, in Morocco, the economic cost is 

high bu t the political effects are crucial to the stability of the political system, to 

the point where they impose real constraints on the policy latitude of the incumbent or any other government. Morocco’s general policy goals are primarily 

national in scope, and the Saharan issue is the final campaign in the struggle to 

define the nation. (The one general policy goal which transcends this issue is t he 

occasional leadership of a group of African and Arab moderates against radical 

encroachment, an effort not incompatible with the Saharan strategy).

The king is outflanked on the Saharan issue by the Istiqlal party, and the other 

parties—including the Communists—feel the issue to be so unquestionable tha t 

they can only situate themselves in th e narrow space between King and Istiqlal. 

The Green March was a remarkable feat of mobilization as well as logistics, and 

the belt-tightening that has accompanied the continuing Saharan conflict is seen 

as an unfortunate national necessity. When, on top of the war effort, the international demand for phosphate fell in the mid-1970s, the king decided to cancel 

the Five-Year Development Plan (1978-82) in its first year and impose an austerity plan for the same period. There are obvious limits to this popular commitment, 

but it is hard to tell where they lie. In any case, any eventual replacement of the 

monarchy would be a response to weakness, not to overcommitment, on the king’s 

part, and would be even more harshly attached to an anti-Algerian, pro-Saharan 

policy. In the meanwhile, the effect is to restrict severely the bargaining range of 

the king, as seen for example in his inability to secure ratification of the 1972 

trea ty (assuming he wanted to, which amounts to the same thing).

The reverse is true in Mauritania. Despite ould Daddah’s Greater Mauritanian 

dream, the issue was only as popular as its success and inversely as popular as its 

burden. But by 1977, defence took up 60 percent of the Mauritanian s tate budget 

and a 25 percent war tax was imposed on salaries. The largely rural and partly 

nomadic population grumbled because the war was diverting money from rural 

development, the youth complained because it was undermining Mauritania’s 

socialist option, and the businessmen protested because it limited their prosperity.

A special congress of the M auritanian people’s party (PPM), single party of the 

regime in January 1978, endorsed the Saharan policy but provided no enthusiasm 

behind the regime. Many of the new conscript were blacks from the Senegal 

valley, who had no interest in the affair (except to prevent a Polisario takeover of 

Mauritania itself, since the liberation movement was remarkably scornful and 

even racist about the black population). Furthermore, even ould Daddah’s policy 

was couched in the same human—rather than state—terms; when justifying 

Greater Mauritania, he spoke of uniting families, not balancing power. In real 

terms, Mauritania received a potential iron mine at Agracha, rich fishing grounds 

off the coast, a fine port a t Dakhla, and final settlement of the Morocco irredenta 

threat, but in the process it also found itself occupied by Moroccan troops. As a 

consequence of all these burdens of the wartime situation, and in accordance with 

some of the basic theorems of military coups, the Mauritanian army over threw 

ould Daddah on 10 July 1978 and put in a moderate military government under 

Col. Mustafa ould Mohammed Salek.

The Algerian strategy is more complex. It consists of military support for the 

Polisario to bleed th e enemy, and diplomatic support for the SADR, to keep the 

issue alive and eventually win, applying the lessons of the Algerian revolutionary 

war. At the end of 1975 there were some 20,000 Algerian troops in the Spanish 

Sahara and the Tindouf area, and in January 1976 there was a direct clash between Moroccan and Algerian troops at Amgala. The battle was crucial for it set 

one of the constraints of the conflict: no more direct contact between the two 

major adversaries. In 1976, in some frustration, Hassan publicly called on Algeria 

to come out and fight, or negotiate; Boumedienne did neither.

In November 1977, Hassan threatened hot pursuit but did not carry out his 

threat. In 1978, some further clashes in southern Morocco were said to involve 

Algerian troops and the atmosphere tightened again, but nothing was proven. 

Indeed, there are repeated stories about the active role of Algerian troops with 

the Polisario but no proof, and above all no prisoners.
136

In the absence of evidence of direct participation, Algeria can be said to arm 

and tra in the Polisario, joined by Libya in the milita ry supp ly function. In 

addition, Algeria provided san ctuary for the six refugee camps, which in the 

presence of the constraint against dire ct milita ry con tact was crucially protective.

Politically, Algeria has disclaimed any interest in the ter ritory bu t repe ated ly 

insisted on the procedures of self-determination. While it has sometimes forgotten 

th at most African countries were not born through a referendu m, con trary to 

Algerian experience, it has pressed the self-determination resolution thro ugh a 

num ber of internatio nal organizations as pa rt of its compaign. The UNGA has 

long (but not initially) been on record behind a referendum, and in 1978 it also 

gave recognition t o the Polisario.

The Arab League was earlier won over by Moroccan diplom acy, a process 

completed by Boumedienne’s endorsing speech at Rab at in 1974, and the only 

other Arab sta te besides Algeria (not even Libya) has recognized SADR, South 

Yemen. It is in the OAU th at the major diplomatic ba ttle has been waged, 

ending in a draw bu t by its very continuation providing a sense of an unresolved problem th at is useful to Polisario. Morocco (and Mau ritania) have 

been able to block discussion of the problem in the ann ual OAU Sum mit with a 

th re at to withdraw from the Organization if it gave any recognition to Polisario, 

alth ough the y lost the vote in the preliminary Council of Ministers in 1977. The 

OAU Sum mit decided to submit th e problem to a special S ummit, which Morocco 

accepted on condition tha t all heads of sta te be present; the meeting was scheduled 

for Lusaka in 1976 and the n for Libreville, and u nderstandab ly never took place. 

The African heads of st ate ha ve had no desire to be torn publicly between Morocco 

and Algeria, two major OAU members.

Finally, in 1978, the problem was handed to a 5-man Com mittee of Wisemen, 

which took some mon ths to form ; by early 1979, it finally comprised Sud an’s 

Nemeiry, Tan zan ia’s Nyerere (who recognized SAD R), Nigeria’s Obasanjo, 

Ivo ry Coast’s Houphouet-Boigny, Mali’s Traore and Guinea’s Toure, bu t its 

ope rative pa rt was a subcomm ittee of N igeria and Mali.

As of early 1979, 13 African states besides Algeria had recognized SAD R: 

Angola, Benin, Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Ethiopia, Guine-Bissau, Madagascar, 

Mozam bique, Rwanda, Sao Tome, and Principe, Tanzania, and Togo (plus 

No rth Korea and Pan ama, as non-Arab, non-African states), bu t only Panam a 

and Tanza nia had joined the list since 1977. A num ber of oth er African sta tes 

have moved toward recognition and then held off, a result favorable to Morocco, 

bu t as long as the issue remains to annoy the members of the OAU, Algeria will 

have been minim ally successful.

It has been the Polisario strate gy which has determined the course of the 

conflict. Initially, the Polisario underto ok dire ct att acks on the occupying 

Moroccan and Ma uritanian armies as they took over the ter ritory , and it was 

defeated. In early 1976, it withdrew to its Algerian san ctu ary to prepare a new 

strategy. From the n on, un til mid-1978, both for tac tical reasons and because of 

the na ture of its leadership, the Polisario thre w the main weight of its Fab ian 

att acks against Mauritania. Eac h success engendered a militar y escalation from 

the oth er side, however, until the weight of escalation becam e too heavy for the 

oth er side t o bear. In J une 1976, a daring raid of some 500 Polisario troops in 100 

vehicles under the leade rship of al-Ouali stru ck 1,000 miles into Mauritania at 

the cap ital itself. The No uak cho tt column was defeated and al-Ouali killed, and 

the Mauritanian arm y developed a more sophisticated defence against longrange 

raids, including cou nter-attack s around pre-identified cache-points.

A year later, in May 1977, ano ther deep raid interr upted mining operations at 

the iron mine at Zouerate and carried off 6 French technicia ns as hostages. While 

Paris negotiated the ir release, it also sent six Jag uars from the ir Dakar base to 

harrass Polisario units and pro tec t its nationals. The Jag uar raid ceased at th e 

end of the year bu t the th re at was prese nt.

Once Mauritania was knocked out of the war, the Polisario strate gy changed. 

It announced a unilateral cease-fire in Jul y 1978 in the Mauritanian sector, which 

it periodically th rea tened not to renew if Ma uritania did n ot show proper progress 

tow ard sepa rate peace. It also intensified its efforts against Morocco, particularly 

increasing its att acks on southern Morocco proper, and it declared its goal t o be 

a “m ilitary solution” no t by conventio nal military victory bu t by destroying 

enough costly military mate riel to break the Moroccan militar y machine—in 

reality, an “economic solution” as in Mauritania. The salient even ts of this 

campaign were the Janu ary and Jun e 1979 raids on the commercial center and
137

military base of Tantan, in Tarfaya, where the Polisario suffered heavy losses 

against but where it also showed its ability to penetrate defences and wreck havoc 

in Moroccan territory. The Tantan atta ck was also important, however, as a 

concerted effort to impress and commit the new Algerian leadership, meeting at 

the moment in p arty congress, and whose devotion to the cause was rumored to 

be less firm th an Baumedienne’s.

Resources are a primary element of conflict, and in the Sahara, military resources have remained at a steady level, if anything avoiding escalation. Since the 

beginning of the conflict the Polisario has been assured Communist countries’ 

arms through Algeria and Libya; the Algerian military budget rose by 25 percent in 

1976 and again in 1977, and an arms modernization program with U.S.S.R. was 

begun. Morocco continues to be supplied by France and the U.S., and the latte r, 

entangled in a legalistic notion of Moroccan territo ry and of human rights, has 

refused counter-insurgency arms useful to the Saharan campaign and even raised 

questions about other arms regularly supplied to Morocco. Mauritania has received financial aid from Libya and Saudi Arabia for budgetary and defense 

support; after the military coup, France, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, and 

Morocco provided additional aid. The French Jaguars did provide an escalation in 

arms that restored stalem ate; American low-flying aircraft would have at least 

done the same, but probably no more as long as Polisario continued to enjoy 

Algerian sanctuary.

Thus, the nature of the conflict has been a sudden, carefully controlled escalation that removed Spain from the territory, and then a stalemate among the 

remaining parties until one of them could not stand the weight of the stalemate 

any longer and dropped out. The remaining parties have returned to their stalemate. Each is safe in its home territory, the Moroccans secure behind the mountains and the Polisario secure behind the Algerian border. The conflict continues, not for territory as in 1975, which can never be fully conquered as long as 

each enjoys sanctuary, but over the ability to atta ck bases in the general area. 

In this conflict, Morocco is at a disadvantage, since its goal is territorial occupation 

and normaldy, but the ineffectiveness of the Polisario’s corresponding disadvantage is its lower level goal—merely disruption of the other side.

While it is possible th at one side or another simply wear down under the burden 

of costly stalemate, as did Mauritania, it is more likely that the stalemate be 

broken either by an escalation or a deescalation by one of th e parties, or by a 

direct move to settlement. Without judging their relative “merits” or the second 

level effects that might follow, escalation possibilities include: A Moroccan atta ck 

on the Polisario sanctuaries in Algeria, a direct Morocco-Algerian military confrontation, a Polisario atta ck on a Moroccan city north of the Dra’, a SADR 

takeover of Tiris, an international organization vote (UNGA, OAU) specifically 

favorable to the Polisario or SADR, or a wave of diplomatic recognitions of 

SADR. The first three would imply escalation by raising the level of military 

confrontation to that of conventional war on both sides and probably occasion 

the direct participation of a t.hrid party (Algeria), whereas the last two measures 

would enhance the legitimacy and rigidify the goals of the politically weaker party, 

raising i t to the status of its opponent.

Conceivable deescalatory measures include a reduction of goals or means on 

either side, such as an Algerian denial of sanctuary to Polisario, an end to Algerian 

or Libyan arms supplies (a more gradual measure), a Moroccan withdrawal from 

some of its defense perimeters, a Polisario return to Mauritania as an opposition 

movement with or without a territorial base in Tiris, and a clear OAU recommendation against recognition of Polisario/SADR.

CONFLICT RES OLU TION

There have been three phases to the conflict resolution efforts on the Saharan 

conflict: an initial flurry of contacts from outside states, a long period to let the 

stalemate ripen during which the parties to the conflict ke p t in touch, and the time 

for conciliation beginning with the disappearance of ould D addah and then intensified by the disappearance of Boumedienne.

During the first half of 1976, the heads of sta te or other top officials of Saudi 

Arabia, Tunisia, Iraq, Kuweit, Egypt, Senegal, Guinea, Gabon, the Palestine 

Liberation Organization, the Arab League, and the OAU visited or otherwise 

contacted one or both p arties to ascertain possibilities of reconciliation. They 

rapidly ascertained that there were none. Four attempts were especially serious.
138

One was the week-long sh uttle of Hosni Mubarek, Egy ptia n vice-president in la te 

Jan uary and early February, proposing a ceasefire, foreign ministers’ meeting, 

and th en su mmit among the three states in the conflict; Algeria demanded Moroccan 

evacuation of the Sahara before the summ it, however, and Morocco agreed only to 

the first two steps. The other was the effort, between Feb rua ry and May, by 

President Senghor to meet the form of all demands by proposing a referendum on 

th at would confirm the p artitio n and occup ation of the territory, as in the case of 

Iria n Barat, along w ith jo int exploitation of Gara Jebilet and Bou C ra’. In March, 

on Saudi and Yemeni request, an Arab League mission worked out an agreement 

among the parties not to use force, bu t it did not include the Polisario.

At the end of 1977, the Saudis again soug ht to mediate and a sum mit in Riad 

was rumored bu t never materialized. Only the latte r was tied to the evolution of 

the conflict, for it was a response to the escalation produced by the Zouerate raid 

and the introdu ctio n of French janguars. Bu t neither the escalation nor the s talemate were as yet serious enough to produce a will to negotiate among the partie s.

During 1977-1978 there were continuing con tacts among parties. Polisario 

approached Morocco and Mauritania separately to inquire about a sep ara te 

peace against the other party ; unfortunately for the proposer, the two allies 

exchanged intelligence reports. Again in early 1978, Polisario again suggested 

a separate peace with Mauritania and in May Mali tried to bring the two t og ethe r; 

in fact, at first it sought a whole Saharan summit, with the pa rticip ants in the 

Chad conflict invited as well. The sum mit never mate i ialized, since neither 

conflict was ready for it, bu t Mauritania -Polisario con tacts continued under 

Malian aegis.

The overthrow of ould Dadda h was the culm ination of the Polisario’s Mauritanian strate gy, but when it occurred the y did not know how to tak e it. The unilateral ceasefire was a clever move, for th e new military rulers of Ma uri tan ia were 

torn between their desire not to lose face as military and as nationalists, and 

hence to pursue the war, and their desire to end the war which they blam ed on 

ould Daddah. The cease-fire removed the need to prove their continuing re spe ctability as warm akers and concentrate on their ability as peacemakers. France, 

Libya and Mali saw the importance of the mom ent and offered venues, projects, 

and good offices. A meeting between Ma uritanians and Polisario in Bam ako was 

also atte nded by two of the Moroccan King’s closest collaborators, Maitre 

Guedira and Col. Dlimi, but the report of the meeting reached the King at the 

same tim e as th e news of Boumedienne’s illness and he is reported to hav e declared 

th at as long as Boumedienne was dying talk s were no longer necesasry. The illness 

was also to claim as its victim a proposed meeting between Hassan and Boumedienne 

in Bruxelles. In Septembei, Boumedienne addressed Hassan a conciliatory message 

(which still insisted on self-determ ination) of no imme diate consequence but 

perhaps encouraging the Bruxelles summ it.

All of these efforts focussed on contacts; only the earlier Senegalese attempts 

involved a form ula for agreem ent. In the midsummer and then fall of 1978, a new 

formula appeare d, associated with bu t denied by the French and also associated 

with Algeria. The original form involved handing the Tiris to the Polisario who 

would the n federate with Ma uritania. Hassan then threw cold wa ter on this 

proposal in an enigm atic speech on 20 August when he declared th at he would 

not permit a state of a different ideology on Morocco’s southern bord er. In response, a va ria nt on th e forumla was p ut forw ard: a “ Gambian solution” involving 

a slight retrac tion of the southern bord er of the Moroccan Sah ara so th at the 

Polisario-Tiris would be completely surroun ded by Mauritania. The prim ary 

obstacle to this round of proposals and con tacts was the “point in tim e” ; any 

solution was wasted as long as the status of Boumedienne and, eve ntually , his 

successor, was settled. The reafter, a dece nt inte rval was also requ ired so th at 

the new team of Col. BenJedid could settle into place and a ny policy changes not 

have the appeara nce of a public disavowal of his popular predecessor.

There are three possible outcomes. One side or the oth er may achieve its curren t demands and win, withou t any need for negotiatio ns. For Morocco to win, 

Algeria would be required to cut loose th e Polisario; end its arms supplies, its 

military activities from the refugee camps, and its use of Algiers as its political 

or diplomatic platform ; and Morocco gradually consolidate its milita ry control 

of the territo ry, with Ma uritania following in some way. For Polisario to win, 

it would need an overwhelming wave of diplomatic recognitions and some spectac ular raids on Moroccan territory , forcing both Mauritanian and Moroccan 

withdraw al from the Saharan territory . The first is more likely than the second, 

and the latte r would doubtless entail the overthrow of the monarchy as a consequence.
139

The third possible outcome is negotiated, and it will requ ire an acce ptable 

formula, a softening of all parties’ perce ption of the acce ptable, and static- free 

open comm unications, three elements th at need a thi rd pa rty role. The Algerian 

refusal of the Moroccan delegation to Boum edienne’s funeral is an example of 

a poor signal, fortun ately not taken seriously; the Moroccan sta tem ent by Foreign 

Min ister Bouce tta after the Polisario attack on Ta nta n, claiming it was an attempt to reinforce the Algerian hawks and drive a wedge between Morocco and 

Algeria, shows a good sense of both signals and audience. Third parties have 

urged th at Algeria tak e the Moroccan message seriously. A Polisario Tiris federa ted with Mauritania, join t exploitation of the area resources, Moroccan 

ratification of the 1972 tre aty , local autonomy for the Moroccan Sah ara are all 

possible elements in a package th at might grow out of a conciliation process.

In this case, escalation is not conducive to settlement, the sta lem ate in place 

is its own effective pressure for reconciliation (just as it is pressure for escalation , 

a fact which reinforces the pressure for negotiation), and the OAU sum mit in 

the summ er or the U.N. in the fall act as deadlines. Above all, a solution to be 

effective must respond, not to the rightness or wrongness of Morocco or the 

Polisario or anyone else, bu t to the three sets of conflictual relations across the 

Sah ara which underly the issue.
140

APP EN DIX 3

Sta teme nt on th e C on flict in th e W est ern S ahar a and U .S . P olicy, by R obert A. Mort ime r, Associate P rofessor of P olitical

Scien ce, H averford C ollege, H averford, P a.

Writin g of the conflict in the We stern Sahara some eighteen 

months ago, I concluded that the American interest was to encourage 

an Internationally supervised self-determination referendum.1 . In 

my judgment that is still the American interest. The basic cause 

of this desert war is the denial of the right of self- determination 

to the people of this former Spanish colony.

The United States has few material or strategic interests in 

Western Sahara itself. It does have a strategic interest, however, 

in averting an extension of the current guerrilla war into a full 

scale conflict between Algeria and Morocco. Such a war would destabilize 

the entire northwest African region and threaten great power intervention. The dynamics of escalat ion are difficult to predict but 

unattractive by any scenario. The way to stave off a dangerous 

expansion of the hostilities is to convince M orocc o that a negotiate! 

settlement is safer and more advantageous than its effort to maintain 

the status quo by milita ry occupation.

Beyond this broad strategic interest In the larger theater 

of conflict, the United States has an intangible interest in the 

human rights of the displaced and disfran chised Sah rao uis . A 

settlement would allow the large refugee population to return to 

its territory in peace. Self-de termination would satisfy a principle
141

that is universally recognized in colonial situations. I believe 

that the American government has a stake in the exercise of this 

right by the Sahraoui people.

The Maghreb and the we stern reaches of the Saharan region are 

not areas in which the United States has played a major role. They 

remain more important to our European allies than to us. Although 

the region is of indirect or secondary interest to the United States, 

it is always in our greatest interest to seize a timely opportunity 

to calm a potentially explosive troublespot. Such a moment appears 

to be at hand. One year after the o verthrow of Mauritania's Ould 

Daddah, half a year after the selection of a new President in Algeria 

the possibility of a negotiated settlement is taking shape.

Such a settlement would improve American relations with the 

new government in Algeria, a country which is an influential member 

of the Third World coalition and a valuable economic partner. It 

would also ease the problems facing Mauritania, a contribution which 

on balance would be welcomed by other West African states like Senegal. 

There would undoubtedly be some costs in st rained relations with 

Morocco, but these ought to recover more readily from a settlement 

than they would from the outbreak of an expanded conflict.

The W ester n Sahara issue has been p ercei ved by the various 

parties as an essentially African rather than Middle Eastern or Arab 

world issue. Decolonization is a critica l theme in African affairs, 

and the problem is validly seen as a decoloniz ation Issue. Although 

the major actors are of course Arab peoples, they are all actively 

involved In African politics. Algeria long ago established credentials as a militant supporter of black Africa n liberation movements.

It thus enjoys a measure of earned credibility In its current support

51-303 0 - 7 9 - 1 0
142

of Polisario. Morocco has a more ambiguous record in African affairs 

as a result of its decade-long claim (1960-69) to Mauritania which 

complicated its relations with the great m ajority of states that 

fully recognized Mauritania as a sovereign state. Mauritania itself, 

now essentially a secondary actor in the ongoin g conflict, has always 

been active in African affairs by virtue of its colonial legacy as 

part of French West Africa.

Furthermore the Saharan conflict has spurred an even more 

active African involvement as the parties have sought to bolster 

support for their positions in the Organization of African Unity 

(OAU). Most notable has been Morocco's dispat ch of armed forces to 

Zaire du ring the two Invasions of Shaba provinc e in 1977 and 1978.

In the early 1960's, Algeria was a prominent supporter of the 

Lumumbist wing in Congolese national politics, and it has never enjoyed 

very cordial relations with the Mobutu government. On the other hand 

it was an early supporter of the MPLA in Angolan pre-independence 

politics, reinforcing tensions with Zaire which backed the FNLA in 

the long prelude to the 1975 struggle for power in Angola. These 

various alignments are part of a larger pattern in continental politics, 

generally referred to as a split between mo derate and radical African 

states. Roughly speaking, the We stern Sahara issue has reproduced this 

familiar polarization in African politics, i.e., the regimes that have 

most prominently backed the Al gerian position notably by recognizing 

Polisario's government-in-exile (RASD) are among those generally 

considered to be radicals (for example, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Congo, 

Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Togo). Morocco's
143

succor to Zaire, coupled with the old school tie of Mauritania to 

many of the francophone Africans, has meant that moderates (.like 

Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Upper Volta and of course Zaire) have 

been the most supportive of the status quo. If one takes as a prem ise 

that Americ an interests in Africa generally are not well served by a 

sharp polarization into two blocs, than a settlement of the Western 

Sahara dispute would enhance the broad Ameri can interest. Polarization 

is likely to complicate the task of the United States in making headway 

on the southern African problems which are of the greatest concern to 

us at present.

A di sgrun tled Algeria, for example, could conceivably play some 

role in the posture of the front-line states toward Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 

or of Angola toward Namibia. The sentiment that the United States 

played a construc tive role in allowing the Sahraouis to determine their 

future could not harm our diplomatic efforts further south in other 

self-determination struggles.

Althou gh I see the African ramifications of Western Sahara as 

most significant, there is a Middle Eastern dimension as well. Just as 

it has given material support to Zaire, so too has Morocco given moral 

support to Egypt in its policy of peace-making with Israel. Conversely, 

Algeria has condemned the peace treaty and has been a leader in the 

effort to isolate Egypt diplomatically. Alge ri a’s strong support 

for the Palestinian cause is unlikely to change whatever the situation 

in Western Sahara, whereas Morocco might see little benefit in standing 

by Egypt if it feels that it has lost its stakes in the annexed territory. Neither Algeria nor Morocco is really a major determinant of 

politics in the Middle East, however.

Aside from a short-lived mediation effort by Saudi Arabia, the
Arab states of the Middle East have not become very actively involved 

in the Western Sahara dispute. Their abstention has tacitly supported 

the Moroccan case to be sure. Algeria has p ersisted in raising the 

matt er nonetheless. During King Hussein's recent visit to Algiers, 

for example, the Algerians saw to it that the Jordanian monarch held 

talks with the Prime Minister of the RASD. While the S aharan conflict 

seems ma rginal to the major issues of Middle Eastern politics, the 

longer it festers the more likely it is that Polisario's international au dience will grow and that other Arab states will be obliged to 

recognize that there is a problem.

Has United States policy taken accurate account of United 

States interests in dealing with this conflict now in its fourth year? 

It is widely assumed, in the Third World at least, that Secretary of 

State Kissin ger"gave the gr een light" to Morocco and Mauritania to 

annex the territory in 1975. Who needed another newly independent 

Third World state in the United Nations?; and why cross Morocco, 

whose relativ e increase in strength vis-a-vis Algeria seemed geopolitically reasonable from an American point of view? Such may well 

have been our reasoning in 1975, but it rested upon the assumption of 

a swift Moroccan/Mauritanian fait a ccompli . When these countries 

proved unable to digest the chunks of territory that they had b itten 

off, the United States was faced by an unresolved, politically 

ambiguous situation.

The United States declared itself neutral regarding the 

competing claims. Neutrality tended to preserve the status quo of 

annexation /occupation by Moroccan and M auritanian forces, whic h were 

in turn subjected to extreme harassment by Polisario. The military
145

pressure on Morocco gave salience to the issue of American arms 

sales to Rabat, on which the Am erican government has vacillated.

The Unite d States has traditionally been one of Morocco's arms suppliers 

but concerns arose over whether Moroccan requests for new arms shipments should be honored. The United States sought assurances that the 

weapons would not be used in Western Sahara. Morocco refused to make 

such a pledge. Early in 1978, the admini stration asked Congress to 

approve a $100 mill ion arms package, then partly because of Congressional resistance it changed its mind and the State Department undertook a long review of the wisdo m of such a sale. Early this year 

under heavy pressure from King Has san President Carter approved the 

sale of six heavy-lift Chinook military helicopters to Morocco. This 

was less than what Rabat was seeking, and the admin istration insisted 

that this single sale was not a precedent for others. Neutrality of 

this vacillatory nature has succeeded in displeasing b oth sides. The 

partia l restraint on arms sales has not been firm enough to persuade 

Morocc o to reconsi der its position, but neither has our partial support 

been a det errent to the other parties to the conflict. It has merely 

been one of the factors contributing to the prolongation of the 

conflict. The same might be said of American policy in general.

Seeking to hedge our bets on all sides through neutrality, we have 

accepted the risk of escalation and prolonged the plight of the refugees 

who remai n the foremost victims of the geopolitical struggle.

* * * # » » » * # » * # # * # » * »

There is evidence at present of conside rable diplomatic 

maneu vering on several fronts. The testimony that the Committee will

receive from the State Department should be more ample on these current
146

initiatives than one can glean from the press. The current round of 

diplomatic explorations in effect dates back to the overthrow of the

*

Ould Daddah government in Mauritania a year ago. The early intimations

that the new military regime wanted to liquidate the costly investment

in Tiris el Gharbia (the annexed province), to which Polisario •

immediately respo nded by decreeing a cease-fi re on the Mauritanian

front, set this process tentatively in motion. It was slowed down

by Hassan's blunt warning that he could not accept any hostile presence

in the border region between Morocco and Mauri tania (such as would

result from a cession of Tiris el Gharbia from Mauritania to Polisario.

But the process was not completely halted. It is thus pertinent to 

review the current position of the various actors Implicated in the 

conflict: Spain, France, the Soviet Union, Libya, the United Nations, 

the OAU and finally of course, Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria.

Spain has been embarrassed by the contentious epilogue to 

its colonial presence in the Sahara. The Spanish socialists some time 

ago came out in favor of the S ahraouis' right to s elf-determination, 

and more recent ly so did Prime Minister Suarez. During a visit to 

Algiers last May, he met with the S ecretary-General of the Polisario 

Front. This move was probably more closely related to a desire for 

increased Spanish-Algerian commercial relations than to the Western 

Sahara conflict itself. Much the same can be said of King Juan Carlos's 

visit in June to Morocco In the course of which the Spaniards pleased 

the Moroccans by affirming that their"international responsibilities" 

regar ding the territory were definitely terminated. King Hassan 

sought to circumscribe Spain's role even more by advising against even «

a mediatory role. Mediators, he is reported to have said, "always burn 

their tail feathers on one side or the o t h e r . S p a i n Is not likely
147

to initiate any major conciliatory effort, but under favorable circumstances, Prime Minister Suarez might risk singeing a feather or 

two to create the impression that Spain has acquitted itself of its 

moral r esponsibility toward a population that it governed for some 

ninety years.

Upon Sp ai n’s abdication, France became the most deeply involved external power. The overt military intervention of last year 

has b een put back under wraps, however, since the coup d'etat in 

Mauritania. As far back as last August, President Giscard d'Estalng 

held talks with representatives of the three governments to explore 

the implications of the coup for a settlement. Central to current 

French policy is Glscard's desire to effect a rapproch ement with the 

post-Boumediene government in Algeria. This led Giscard to acknowledge last Februa ry that there was an ongoing decolonization p roblem 

in Western Sahara, a step away from the pro-annexationist, though 

officially neutral, position of France to that time. Last month the 

new French Fo reign Minister Francois-Poncet was in Algiers; his Alg e r ia n counterpart will soon visit Paris and there are rumors of an 

upcoming secret m eeting between Giscard and Chadli Benjedid. It would 

appear at the minimu m that France believes that a negotiated settlement 

is possible, presumably utilizing the good offices of the OAU (as discussed below), for the success of any Franco-Algerian entente turns in 

some part upon Algiers' perception of a more helpful French attitude 

toward the Saharan conflict.

The position of the Soviet Union has not significantly evolved. 

The Soviet Union is a major weapons supplier to Algeria. It is also
148

an important trading partner of Morocco since the spring 19 78 

agreement to cooperate in the exploitation of a new phosphate mine at 

Meskala. It has tried to balance these two interests by a policy that 

is almost the mirror-image of American policy.

Libya on the other hand may be becoming more actively committed to a pro-Polisario stance. Libyan policy has fluctuated over 

the years between warm support and mild indifference to Polisario. P r e s i d e a t

Qaddafi was pursuing a vision of his own, the essence of which was a 

Mauritarian-Polisario accord the principal effect of which would be to 

separate Mauritania from its linkage to Morocco. About a year ago 

Qaddafi firmed up his alliance with Algeria in a common condemnation 

of French policy in Africa, whether in Chad or Western Sahara. This 

development was followed by the Mauritanian coup, and the Libyan leader 

sponsored talks between Polisario and the new Mauritanian leadership 

to no avail. Now he may discer n the outlines of a settlement at 

variance with his particular conception; if there is a diplomatic deal 

in the works at present, Libya may encourage any hard-line faction 

within Polisario inclined to resist such a deal. But the geopolitics 

of such an endeavor would be more difficult then the Algerian-backed 

resistance, so Libya's leverage upon the situation seems relatively 

limited .

Algeria has seen to it that the United Nations remain seized 

of the issue. In its most recent airing in the General Assembly, 

ninety states voted in favor of a resolution calling for self-determination while only ten voted against. The vote, however, is less 

significant than the operational role that could fall to United Nations 

organs if the Moroccans could be persuaded to concur in an internationally
149

supe rvise d referendum.

The OAU may prove to be the diplom atic Instrument by which agreement on

a referendum is fash ione d. As Implied by my ch ar ac te ri za tion of the c o n fli c t as

pr im arily an African is s u e , the OAU has been an Important forum fo r diplom atic

maneuvers. In 1976 and aga in in 197 7, Alg er ia won approval of the pri nci ple of

a sp ecia l OAU summit meetin g to co ns ider the dis pute , but no such summit has been

hel d. In 1978 the OAU appointed an Ad Hoc Committee on Western Sahara, which w ill

report to th is ye ar ’s summit con fer ence which is about to meet in Monrovia. There

are re po rts that the Committee w ill propose a se ttle m en t that Rabat and A lgiers

can agree upon. I f so , the OAU w ill be ac ting as a fa c ilit a to r , pr ov iding the

in stit u tio n a l framework and the diplom atic cover for a compromise th at might othe rwise be hard to s e l l in one or ano ther ca p it a l. The kind of compromise about which

rumors have ci rc ula te d in vo lv e the ce ss io n of some pa rt of the former Spanish

colony —presumably roughly the sou the rn th ir d, or T ir is e l Gharbia, to P o li sa rio .

The qu estio n th at comes to mind is whethe r Alger ia and P oli sario are ready to

s e tt le fo r th is .

F ir st, however, one can in dic ate b r ie fl y why th is would appear ac cept ab le

to Mau ritania and Morocco. The former cle arly wants ou t. The si tu ati on in

Nouakchott has been shaky ev er si nce th e coup, and the re have been se ver al recent

cha nges. Ould Sa leck , le ad er of the coup, has been force d out of power. A new

Prime M in iste r, Ould Bou ce it, st ate d la s t May that Mau ritania acc epted s e lf -

deter minatio n and wanted ta lk s wi th P o li sa rio . Ould Bo nceit die d in an ac ci den t,

and has been rep laced by Mahmoud Ould Louly , another m ili ta ry man but one reputed

to be o f a managerial ben t. His ro le would appear to be to car ry out a "south ern

th ird se tt le m en t." Although Morocco opposed th is id ea la st ye ar , i t now appears

w il li n g to accept i t . A se ttle m en t alo ng th es e li n e s would not d ir ectl y a ff ec t

Morocco's chunk of the former Spanish p ie . I t seems quite a sm all pr ic e fo r

Morocco to pay. _
150

What about Alg eria? Is Alg er ia , li k e Ma uritan ia, weary of the commitment

that i t took on in 1975? Clearly the commitment has been a fi nan cia l drain upon *

Alg erian re so ur ce s. I t has not moreover had the same pop ular backing among Al -

p o li o y

geria ns th at Hassan's.h as had among Moroccans. A lg er ia is in te rest ed in a s e tt le ­

ment but not at any pri ce . Pr ior to Boum ediene's de ath, there were sign s o f a

poss ib le thaw, f ir s t in a message la st October from th e Al geria n pre si de nt to the

Moroccan monarch and la te r in Moroccan as se rt io ns th at Boumedlene had agreed to

a se cr et meetin g wi th Hassan, a meetin g th at succumbed wi th the Algeria n lead er

i f th is was in fa ct h is in te nt. The d eli cate tr a n sit io n a l pe rio d to the Ben jedid

presi dency re stor ed the c h ill, however, as vario us spokesmen re it er ate d A lg er ia 's

commitment to the P olisa rl o c a u s e .N o w ther e are renewed sign s of a des ir e to

ex plore the terms of a se tt le m en t, but what A lg er ia 's neg ot ia ting go als are i s

un clea r. In any ca se , Alger ia i s no t so desperate fo r a so lu ti on as Ma uritan ia.

Ju st how fle x ib le , then , is Alger ia? Its st ak es , though no t so hig h as

Mo rocco's, are no ne th eles s co ns id er ab le. They in vo lv e de fense of a g eo p o li ti ca l

in te rest (p re vention of the ex tens ion southward of Moroccan power) and o f a

p rin ci p le .* As the London Times observed in the ea rl y days of th e c o n fli c t,

5

in te rest s do sometimes co in cide wi th p ri n ci p le ." One must assume th at the

Algeria ns w ill no t put th is commitment as id e lig h tly , but th at the y may be w il li n g

to en te rt ai n something le s s than Sahraoui independence ov er the en ti re ex -c olon y.

I t would be wrong to assume th at th e Algeria ns fe e l th at the burden of

compromise is upon them. Ju st la s t month, th e Alger ian ambassador to the United

Sta te s re ca pitula te d the arguments in the ca se fo r se lf-d et er m in at io n in a le tte r

♦Some ob ser vers pe rc ei ve an economic in te r e st, lin ke d to a co rr id or to

the A tl anti c fo r the outp ut of the Gara D je b ll et iron mines (the terms o f which

might be bet te r i f Al ge ria were de al in g with an inde pendent Sahraoui sta te than

wit h Morocco) , but th is seems sec ondary.
to th e Mew York Time s. & They see th e burden to be on Morocco to pr ov id e some opportu n it y fo r th e Seh ra ou ls to vote un der In te r n a ti o n a l su p e r v is io n . The op ti ons

pr ob ab ly must In cl ude more than th e "s ou th er n th ir d s o lu ti o n ," bu t A lg eri a m ight ,

fo r ex am ple, acq u ie sc e in a ref ere ndum wh ich do es not allow t o t a l inde pe nd en ce as

an im me dia te opti on fo r th e e n tir e te r r ito r y . I su sp e c t, in oth er wor ds , th at

A lg eria w i l l not drop P o lis a r lo fo r a p it ta n c e , but th a t i t Is ame nab le to an

arrangem ent th a t would allow Morocco to sa ve fa c e .

What sh ou ld th e U ni te d S ta te s be do in g In lig h t o f th e cu rr en t sit u a tio n ?

The moment do es seem to be rig h t to make p rogress. The major r o le In a r tic u la tin g

th e ter ms o f a sett le m e n t sh ould be v e ste d In th e OAU's Ad Hoc Comm itte e. The

Uni ted S t a te s , co ord in ati n g i t s e f f o r t s w ith th ose o f Fr an ce , sh ou ld h elp to su pp ly

th e Ad Hoc Committee w it h th e p o l i t i c a l con d it io n s th a t i t ne ed s fo r d ip lo m ati c

s u c c e ss. Th ese con d it io n s I ta ke to be grea te r f l e x i b i l i t y on Morocco's part tha n

th e cu rr en t rumors o f a so uth er n th ir d sett le m e n t Im ply .

The Uni te d S ta te s and France can tr y to in duc e th is f l e x i b i l i t y by d is ­

c r e e tly in fo rm in g th e Moroccan govern ment th at we s h a ll n ot su pp ly fu rt h er m il it a r y

p r e v io u s

ba ck-up su pport . Thi s s t if f e n in g o f ou r .v a d ll a to r y p o stu re, co up le d I f p o s sib le

i s

w it h an econ om ic ca rr o t,

a

 n eces sa ry to co nvi nce Morocco th at maintenan ce o f th e

sta tu s quo (in th e no rt her n tw o-t h ir d s) w i l l c o st more tha n i t i s wor th . Th ere

i s no b e n e fit fo r th e Uni ted S ta te s in en co ur ag in g Morocco to b e li e v e th a t i t can

p r e v a il on i t s cu rr en t term s. So lo ng as Morocco t r i e s , th e war i s lik e ly to

continue w ith th e at te ndant da ng ers o f e sc a la tio n and g reate r US in vo lv em en t. So

to o w i l l th e fl o u tin g o f th e p r in c ip le o f se lf -d e te r m in a tio n . G re at er Moroccan

f l e x i b i l i t y on th e oth er hand sh ou ld open th e do or to a sett le m e n t th at need no t

hu m il ia te Has san. P o li s a r lo co uld e n l i s t Moroccan te c h n ic a l aid and ple dge

econ om ic coop er at io n once th e Sa hr ou is we re no lo nger bein g de ni ed th e rig h t of

fr e e ly ch oosi ng th e ir fu tu re.

The Uni ted S ta te s i s c e r ta in ly not th re ate ned by an in de pe nd en t Sa hraoui
152

sta te . I t is threate ned by the war. The p re ci se terms of a se ttle m en t can be

worked out by th os e dir ec tl y in vo lv ed . The United Sta te s can bes t f a c ilit a te

th at pr ocess by throwing it s sup por t squa rely behind the pri n ci p le o f se lf -d et erm inat io n.

Ju ly 16 , 1979

Haverford, PA

Notes

1. "Western Sahara: The Diplo ma tic Per sp ec ti ve s, " Afr ica Re port.

March-April 1978.

2. The background reg ard ing A lg er ia 's African poli cy can be found in

inf "The Al geria n Revolution in Search o f th e African Re vo lutio n," The Journal of

Modern African Stud ies (P all 1970).

3. Le Mon.de (P a ris ), June 19, 1979.

4. The tr an si ti on is ana lyzed in my a r tic le "A lgeria: Which Way Ahead}"

Africa Rep ort. May-June 1979.

5. The Times of London. November 11 , 1975 as cit ed in John Mercer,

The Sahrawis of Western Sahara (London: Minority Rights Group Report #40, 1979 ).

6. June 14 , 1979.
153

APP EN DIX 4

*

Ques ti ons S ub mit te d in W rit in g to t h e D ep artm en t of Sta te an d

R es po ns es T he re to

• 1. According to the U.S. bilateral military agreement

with Morocco of 1960, which we clarified to Morocco 

in 1977-78, no U.S. equipment can be sold or trans ­

ferred from third countr ies to Morocco for use in 

the western Sahara. Still there are a number of 

problem areas that have been brought to the attention of the Subcom mitte es and in clarifying them I 

hope we can clarify U.S. arms sales policy to 

Morocco.

(a) We have received testimony (including some photos) 

and read reports that Morocco currently uses U.S.- 

origin military equipment in the western Sahara.

These reports focus on F-5 planes, GMC trucks, 105 

and 155 mm guns and ammunition, 81 m m ammunition, 

rocket launchers from Talley Industries in Arizona,

106 mm recoilless guns, machine gun ammunition, and 

Bell helicopters.

What U.S.-orig in equipmen t is being used in the 

western Sahara and exactly what does our monito ring 

system consist of?

A. In addition to the F-5s, comme rcial ly-pu rchas ed

C-130 aircra ft and comm ercially- purch ased U.S. 

trucks and jeeps are used in the western Sahara.

It is possible that some commer ciall y-pur chase d 

U.S. radios are also being used. 106 mm recoilless rifles, purchased from other western countries 

such as Spain as well as the U.S., are used by 

Moroccan forces in the Sahara and in Morocco proper. 

However, we do not know for certain whether those 

guns used in the Sahara are of U.S. manufacture.

Some U.S. ammun ition of various sorts, interchangeable wi th that provided by other suppliers, may be 

used in the Sahara.

• Certain U.S. equip ment is located in southern

Morocco and available for use in that part of 

Morocco proper, for example, 105 mm howitzers,

M-113 armored personnel carriers, and T OW and 

Dragon anti- tank missile systems. This material

• is not so far as we know used in the western Sahara.

Some 105 mm howit zers have been capture d by the

Polisario, repor tedly in Morocco proper. No U.S. 

produced 155 mm self-propel led guns are used in

the Sahara. There are no U.S.-manuf actu red Bell
154

helicopters in Morocco. Agusta-Be ll 206 he lico pters manufactured in Italy and sold to the Moroccans 

in past years by the Italians are used in the Sahara. 

Six Chinook helicopters ma nufactur ed in Italy under 

license and delivered in the sprin g/summer of 1979 

are not being used in the Sahara.

The U.S. Embassy in Rabat follows the use of U.S. 

equipment in Morocco and in the western Sahara. 

Morocco makes no secret of the use of ma jor items 

of equipment there. In the case of some guns and 

ammunition noted above, U.S. materiel is virtu ally 

identical to that obtained from other western 

suppliers, who impose no restrictions on its use, 

and we have no means of determining exact amounts 

of U.S. materiel included in that used in the 

Sahara.

(b) We are supplying through FMS spare parts and 

ammunition for F-5s whic h are apparentl y be ing used 

in the western Sahara contrary to the bilateral 

accord and constitute Morocco's major air weapon 

against Polisario.

What is the rationale of this supply? Will we con ­

tinue it? Is there other U.S.-or igin equip ment used 

in the western Sahara that we may refurb ish with 

spare parts and ammunition in the future?

A. In April, following consult ation s w ith Congress, we 

approved FMS cash sales of $3 million worth of 

munitions and $2.8 millio n worth of spare parts 

and support e quipm ent for Moro ccan F-5 aircraft.

We agreed to supply those items because of our longstanding defense supply relationshi p with Morocco, 

which serves the interests of both countries. The 

F-5 is Morocco ’s only operational fighter and therefore plays a crucial role in the defense of Morocco 

proper. We provided F-5s for this purpose, and 

it is only reasonable that we continue to sell spares 

and munitions for them.

Subject to congressional consultations, we would 

expect to continue such sales.
155

There is so little demonstrabl y U.S. orig in-e quip ­

ment curre ntly in the western Sahara, most of which 

can be resupplied through U.S. commercial purchases 

or foreign sources, that the question of U.S. Government refur bishment is not critical.

, (c) Why did we permit Morocco to buy (through Italy)

Boeing CH-47 Chinook h eavy duty helicopters, contracted only last February, when it is widely 

believed they will be used in the western Sahara 

against the bilateral accord?

A. Early this year we approved delivery of six CH-47 

helicopters manufac ture d by the Italian firm of 

Aeritalia under license from Boeing. These are 

unarmed, transport helicopters for which Morocco 

has a need irrespective of the fighting in the 

Sahara. The contract for this commercial sale was 

signed in December 1977, before we had d ecided to 

disapprove the sale of new weapons systems manufactured in the United States for use in the w estern 

Sahara. Neither Morocco nor the manufactur er had 

any reason at the time to believe we might object 

to the sale.

(d) We have approv ed sales presentati on to Morocco 

of Northrop's surveillance and detection system with 

sensors in Souther n Morocco and communications links 

to both Morocco and we ster n Sahara.

What would the communicatio ns link to the western 

Sahara be used for? Could Morocco move the sensors 

to the western Sahara? Would the technology obtained 

help Morocco to get the know-how to install sensors 

in the western Sahara and buy the components on the 

international market?

A. As the committee is aware, North rop Page initially 

proposed an intrusion- detec tion and communications 

system which would have placed detection elements 

in the Morocc an portion of the western Sahara. We 

disapproved this proposal in early 1979. The revised 

proposal w hich we approved eliminates all detection 

« units from the western Sahara. We specified in addition that no items on the Mu nitions list can be used 

in the western Sahara for this project. As the C ongress is aware, this list has its origins in U.S. 

desire many years ago to remain neutral in conflicts 

♦ then underway.
156

If Morocco decides to go ahead with the project, 

it will probab ly use the c ommun icati ons links to 

the western Sahara for militar y purposes. We 

understand, however, that it would not be able 

easily to transfer the sensors from the southern 

part of Morocco proper to the wester n Sahara.

Once the sensors are installed, they are very 

difficult to recover. Morocco might be able"to 

use the systems design infor mation obtained from 

Northrop-Page to install inte rnat ionally-p urcha sed 

sensors in the we stern Sahara, but it could in any 

case purchase the entire system on the international 

mar ket.

(e) What equipment do you plan to provide Morocc o 

through FMS, FMS credits and licensing of foreign 

sales of U.S.-origin equipment in FY 1979 and 

1979 and 1980?

— Could propos ed aerial tankers be used in the 

future to supply F-l M irages on order from 

France in the w estern Sahara?

— Is Morocco's request for OV-10 recon naisance 

planes and Cobra helicopter s still under 

consideration?

A. Morocco used the $45 million FMS credit available 

to it for FY 79 to make payments due on the Westinghouse air defense radar system and on the p reviously contracted Vulca n anti-airc raft gun. We 

have signed no agreements with Morocco in FY 79 

for new sales of weapons systems under the FMS 

sales program. Total FMS sales through the end 

of March 1979, the first six months of FY 1979, 

were $3.3 mi llion and covered spare parts, mun itions and support equipment.

We have had no di scuss ions wit h M orocco about use 

of its FY 80 FMS credit. It will have additional 

payments due on the We stingho use Air Defense Radar 

and on previously contract ed equipment. New sales 

will depend in part on the ou tcom e of congressional 

consultations now underway.

We have approved provision of technical data to 

Morocco on three aerial refu eling tanker systems, 

which would be for use with the Mirag e F-l interceptor aircra ft which Morocco is buying but which
157

are not yet operational. Morocco is interested 

in acquiring this capability to enable the Mirage 

» to remain aloft for longer time periods to protect

Moroccan territory. In vie w of the considerable 

air superiority of Algeria, Morocco considers 

its air defenses an important element of national 

security. Our agreement to provide data on the

* tanker aircra ft reflects our view that the Moroccans 

have an evident need for such an aircraft. We would 

wish to take into account C ongressio nal views before 

making a final decision on the transfer of the 

actual tanker aircraft. We w ould at that time again 

assess the possi bilit y of use of the tankers in the 

western Sahara— a possibility which appears slight 

now given the ex pense and risk inherent in using

in a ground attack role sophis ticat ed aircraft 

designed as interceptors.

In March 1978 we decided that we would not proceed 

at that time with the Mo rocc an request for OV-IO 

and Cobra /TOW aircraft.

(f) Do we have a di fferent policy w ith regard to 

prov ision of militar y equi pment via FM S, FMS 

credits and approval of third country transfers 

that is related to the we ster n Sahara?

A. We are legally able to approve third country transfers 

only when we find it possible to approve a direct 

sale. Items sold under the FMS sales program whether 

on a cash or credit basis must meet applicable 

statutory president ial arms transfer policy criteria.

(g) Can you illustrate any differ ences between e quipment "suitable" for the western Sahara which is 

formally excluded in c urrent p olicy and equipment 

that could be used there. Why don't we use the 

latter expre ssion?

A. We have cons idere d that almost any item of equipm ent 

could, in certain circumstances, be used in the 

western Sahara. Even a ship could bombard the shore. 

However, it would not normal ly be considered "suitable"

# for use in the western Sahara.

51-303 0 - 7 9 - 1 1
158

A P P E N D I X 5

Most Rece nt and P revious U .N . Reso lut ions on the W este rn

Sahara

Q uestion o f Wes te rn Sah ar a '

D ate : 13 December 1978

V o te a i A x

 90 +1 04 39 (r ecord ed)

B - G€-i30-40 (r eco rd ed )

M e e tin g i 81

R e p o rt » A /3 3 /4 6 0 and C o r r .l

The G e n era l A ss em bly ,

H av in g c o n s id e re d th e q u e s tio n o f W est ern S a h a r a ,

R e c a lli n g i t s r e s o lu tio n 15 11* (XV) o f lh Dec em be r I9 6 0 , c o n ta in in g th e 

D e c la ra tio n on th e C ra n ti n g o f In d ep en d en ce t o C o lo n ia l C o u n tr ie s an d F e o p le s ,

Hav in g c o n s id e re d th e r e le v a n t c h a p te r o f th e r e p o r t o f th e S p e c ia l Com mitt ee 

on th e S itu a tio n v i t h re g a rd to th e Im p le m en ta ti o n o f th e D e c la r a tio n on th e 

G ra n ti n g o f In dependence to C o lo n ia l C o u n tr ie s an d P e o p le s , 6/

H av ing h e a rd th e s ta te m e n ts cn th e s u b je c t o f W est ern S a h a ra , in c lu d in g th e 

sta te m e n ts by th e r e p r e s e n ta tiv e o f th e F re n te P o p u la r p a r a l a L ib e r a c id n de 

Sag uia e l- H a n ra y de Rio d e O ro , J /

R e c a lli n g th e c o n c lu sio n s o f th e 1975 U n it ed N a ti o n s V i s i ti n g M is sio n to 

W es te rn S a h a ra , 8 /

R e c a lli n g th e a d v is o ry o p in io n d e liv e r e d by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C ourt o f J u s t ic e 

cn 16 O cto b er 1975 9 / on th e Q u e sti o n o f W est ern S a h a r a , p a r t i c u l a r l y in r e l a t i o n 

to th e p r in c ip le o f th e r i g h t o f th e p e o p le o f W e ste rn S a h a ra t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,

3 e a rin g in mind th e p ro fo u n d co n cern o f th e U n it e d N a ti o n s , th e O r g a n iz a tio n 

o f A fri c a n U nit y an d th e n o n -a li g n e d c o u n tr ie s r e g a r d in g th e d e c o lo n iz a tio n o f 

W es tern S ah ara an d th e r i g h t o f th e p e o p le o f t h a t T e r r i t o r y t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,

R e c a lli n g i t s r e s o lu tio n 3 2/1 9 o f 11 No vember 19 77 r e g a r d in g c o - o p e r a tio n 

be tw ee n th e U n it ed N a ti o n s an d th e O rg a n iz a ti o n o f A fric a n U n ity ,

R e c a lli n g th e d e c is io n o f th e A ssem bly o f He ad s o f S ta t e an d G ov ernm en t o f 

th e O rg a n iz a ti o n o f A fri c a n U n it y a t i t s t h i r t e e n t h o r d in a r y s e s s i o n , h e ld a t 

P o rt L ouis from 2 t o 6 J u ly 1 9 7 6 , t o h o ld an e x tr a o r d in a r y s e s s io n d e v o te d to th e 

q u e s ti o n o f W es te rn S a h a ra , i a /

T ak in g n o te o f tn e d e c is io n o f th e Ass em bl y o f Hea ds o f S ta te an d Gov er nm en t 

- f th e O rg a n iz a ti o n o f A fric a n U n it y a t i t s f i f t e e n t h o r d in a r y s e s s io n , h e ld a t 

hh ar to um from 18 to 22 J u ly 1 9 78, t o e s t a b l i s h an ad hoc com m it te e o f He ad s o f 

T ta te .o c o n s id e r a l l th e d a ta on th e q u e s tio n o f W est ern S a h a r a , in c lu d in g th e 

rx e r c is e o f th e r i g h t o f th e p e o p le o f t h a t T e r r i t o r y t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , 1 1 /

R e ite r a tin g i t s f e r v e n t hope t h a t , by th e tim e o f th e t h i r t y - f o u r t h s e s s io n 

o f th e G e n era l A ss em bly , th e O r g a n iz a tio n o f A f ric a n U n it y w i l l have fo u n d , 

p u rs u a n t t o th e r e s o lu tio n s and d e c is io n s w hic h i t a d o p te d a t i t s t h ir te a a th 1 0 /

fo u r te e n th 1 5 / and f i f t e e n t h l l / o r d i n a r y s e s s io n s on t h e q u e s tio n o f W est ern

S a h a ra , a s o lu tio n to t h i s p ro b le m in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e r i g h t o f p e o p le s to a

s e lf - d e te r m in a tio n s e t f o r th in r e s o lu t i o n 15 11* (X V ),

Welcoming th e u n i l a t e r a l c e a s e - f i r e d e c is io n ta k e n on 12 J u ly 1978 by th e 

.F re n te Popul^ ^ j K lH tU L ib e r a c id n de S ag u ia el- H am ra y de Rid de O ro , w ith a vie w 

to pro m oti ng a d r iv e to w ar ds p e a c e in W est ern S a h a r a ,

1 . R eaffi rm s i t s commitm en t to th e p r i n c i p l e o f s e lf - d e te r m in a tio n o f 

p eo p le s in ac co rd a n ce w it h th e D e c la r a tio n on t h e G ra n ti n g o f In d ep en d en ce to 

C o lo n ia l C o u n tr ie s an d P e o p le s;

2 . R eaff ir m s th e in a l i e n a b le r i g h t o f th e p e o p le o f W est ern S ah ara to 

s e lf- d e te r m in a tio n an d in d ep e n d en ce ;

----------------- 

/

6 / A /3 3 /2 3 /A d d .3 and C o r r .l, ch ap . IX . .

7 / A /C .4 /3 3 /S R .2 2, p ara s. 7 8 -9 3 , and A /C .4 /3 3 /S R .30. See a ls o A /C . 4 /3 3 /L . 22 and L .3 1 .

O f f ic ia l Records o f th e G en era l Ass em bly, T h ir t ie t h S essio n, Su pp lemen t No . 23

(A /l0 0 2 3 /R e v .1) , v o l . I l l , c h a p . X I I I , p a r a . 11.

-

Z K e s t e r n Sah ara , Advla ory O p in io n , I . C . J . R e p o rt, 19 75. p. 12. For th e note o f

tra n s m it ta l to th e .e m ber s o f th e C enera l Ass em bly, se e A /1 0300.

1 0 / See A /3 1 /1 3 S -S /1 2 1 4 1 , annex I I , re s o lu tio n ABG /R es .B l ( X I I I ) . For th e p rin te d te x t

• * * ° f f l c ‘ » l Re cords o f th e S e c u rit y C o u n c il , T h i r t y - f i r s t Y e a r, Sup plem en t fo r J u ly .

August and Septe mb er 197 6. --------------- -----------------------------1

1 1 / A /3 3/2 35 and C o r r . l , an ne x I I , re s o lu tio n ABG/R es .92 (X V ).

1 2 / A /3 2 /3 1 0 , annex I I , AHG/D ec .110 (X IV ).
159

?

r

: i rv? r e s : . :. « :u ib il ’ t.y o f *.h«- >?n itc d io r.u w it h re g a rd to th e 

'v c o lz r. i -•••.£ ?n c: " e r te r n S a h a r a , in ac c o rd a n c e w it h th<* p r i n c i p l e s o f th e C h art e r 

o f U n it ed N a ti o n s ar.d o f th e D e c la r a tio n ;

t . R eq u ests th e S p e c ia l C om m itte e on th e S itu a tio n w it h r e g a rd to th e 

Im p le m en ta ti o n o f th e : c c l a y . t i o r on th e G ra n ti n g o f In dependence to C o lo n ia l 

C a s t r i e s nn .:

 ?*•»•.’-z s t i . o n ti n u o to kee p d ev elo p m en ts in t h i s m a tte r u n d er a c tiv e 

re v ie w w it h - vie w to th e f u l j arid s je e d y im p le m e n ta ti o n o f G e n e ra l As sembly 

r e - o : .. t.io n l?I»: (XV) n ’ to r e p o r t th e re o n to th e Asset*’: l y a t i t s t h i r t y - f o u r t h

?«. th e A d m in istr a tiv e Gee r e t a ry -G e n e ra l o f th e r**a:.i z a tio n o f

fr ic a r. U nit y to ?.e er th e f e c r e t ary -G e n e ra l o f th e U n it ed N a ti o n s in fo rm ed o f 

th e r re g re s s ' ac h ie v ed w it h re g a rd tc th e im p le m e n ta ti o n o f th e d e c is io n s o f th e 

O rg an iz e ti e r . o f A fri c a n " r .ity c o n c e rn in g W es te rn S a h a ra ;

i n v i t es th e S e c r e ta r y -G e n e ra l to su b m it a r e p o r t on th e q u e s tio n o f 

’’•s t e r n S ah ara to th e G e n era l Ass em bl y a t i t s t h i r t y - f e u t h s e s s io n .

- e c a ll ir . - i t s r e s o lu t i o n s 151U (XV) o f lU De cem ber i9 6 0 an d 15U1 (XV) o f 

IS Tecem.be r i9 6 0 .

r e c a l l i n g i t s r e le v a n t r e s o lu t i o n s an d th o s e o f th e O rg a n iz a tio n o f A fri c a n . 

U n it y c o n c e rn in g th e q u e s tio n o f W est ern S a h a ra ,

C o n sid e ri n g th e d e c is io n o f th e Assem bl y o f He ad s o f S ta te an d Go ve rn men t o f 

t? .e O r g a n iz a ti o n o f A fric a n U n it y a t i t s t h i r t e e n t h o r d in a r y s e s s io n , h e ld a t 

P e r t L ouis fr om 2 to 6 J u ly 1976, to h o ld an e x tr a o r d in a r y s e s s io n d evote d to 

th e q u e s tio n o f W est ern S a h a r a , 1 ^ /

C o n sid e ri n g a ls o th e d e c is io n o f th e As se mbly o f He ad s o f S ta te an d Go vernm ent 

o f th e O rg a n iz a ti o n o f A fric a n U n it y a t i t s f i f t e e n t h o r d in a r y s e s s io n , h e ld a t 

r.na rto um from 18 to 22 J u ly 1 9 7 8 , to e s t a b l i s h an ad ho c co m m it te e o f Heads o f 

S ta te to c o n s id e r a l l th e d a ta on th e q u e s tio n o f W est ern S a h a r a , 3.4 /

R e c a lli n g th e p a r t o f th e P o l i t i c a l D e c la r a tio n ad o p te d by th e F if th 

C onfe re nce o f He ad s o f S ta te an d Gov er nm en t o f N on-A ligned C o u n tr ie s , h e ld a t 

Colo mbo fro m l6 to 1 ° A uru ct 1 9 7 6 , r e l a t i n g t o W est ern S a h a r a , 1 5 /

T ak in g r. c te o f th e a: : e a l a d d r e s s e d to S ta t e s Mem bers o f th e U n it ed N ati o n s 

by th e c u r r e n t Cha irm an v f th e O r g a n iz a tio n o f A fri c a n U n ity , 1 6 /

R e c a lli n g i t s re sc V . v : 32/2 ') o f 11 Uov emL er 1 9 7 7 , re g a r d in g c o - o p e ra tio n 

: et w een th •• U n it ed C a ti o n s an d th e O rg a n iz a tio n o f A fric a n U n ity ,

1 . Ta ke s n o te o f th e d e c is io n o f th e As se mbly o f Heads o f S ta t e and 

Go ve rnmen t o f th e O rg a n iz a tio n o f A fric a n U n it y n t i t s f i f t e e n t h o r d in a r y s e s s io n 

to e s t a b l i s h an ad hue c o rc z itte e o f He ad s o f S t a t e ;

2 . E x p re sse s i t s c o n fid e n c e t h a t th e ad ho c com m it te e w i l l c o n s id e r a l l 

th e d a ta on th e q u e s tio n o f W est ern S a h a ra w it h a vie w to c o n v e n in g an 

e x tr a o r d in a r y summi t m e e ti n g o f th e O r g a n iz a tio n o f A fric a n U n it y ;

3. I n v i t e s th e O rg a n iz a tio n o f A fric a n U n it y t o ta k e pro m pt a c tio n t o fin d 

a j u s t an d e q u ita b le s e ttle m e n t c f th e q u e s tio n o f W est ern S a h a r a ;

1 3 / Se e A /3 1 /1 3 6 -S /1 2 1 4 1 , an ne x I I , r e s o lu tio n AH G/Res.81 ( X i l l ) . For th e pri nte d te«t»

se e O f f ic ia l R ec or ds o f th e S e c u r it y C o u n c il , T h i r t y - f i r s t Yea r, Su pp lem ent

Aug us t and Se pt em be r 1976.

1 4 / A /3 3/2 35 and C o r r .l, an ne x I I , r e s o lu tio n AH G/Re s.92 (X V).

1 5 / A /3 1 /1 9 7 , an ne x I , p ara . 35 .

1 6 / See th e l e t t e r date d 7 Nov emb er 1978 from th e Pe rm an ent R e p r e se n ta tiv e o f th e Sud*^

(A /3 3 /3 6 4 ).
. A p p e al s t o a ll St a t e s i n t h e r e gi o n t o r e f r a i n fr o m a n y a c ti o n t h at

mi g ht i m p e d e t h e e ff o rt s o f t h e O r g a ni z ati o n o f A fri c a n U nit y t o a r ri v e a t a

J u st a n d p e a c ef ul s ol u ti o n o f t h e pr o bl e m.

5. R e q u e st s t h e A d m i ni s tr ati v e S e c r et a r y - G e n er al o f t h e O r g a ni z ati o n o f

A fri c a n U ni t y t o i nf or m t h e S e cr et ar y- G e n er al o f t h e U n it e d N a ti o n s o f t h e

r e s ult s a c hi e v e d b y t h e a d h o c c o m mitt e e a n d i n vit e s t h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n er al o f t h e

U nit e d N ati o n s t o r e p o rt t h e r e o n t o t h e G e n e r al A s s e m bl y.

K C L. 1 D E D V OT E O N R E S O L U TI O N ^3/ 3 1 A*

Y E S • A 3 S T AI N - N O

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L i t e r a d vi s e d t h e S e c r e t a ri a t I t h a d I n t e n d e d t o v o t e a g a i n s t.
• ECORDEO VOTE ON RESOLUTIO N 3 3 /3 1 B«

161

YES - ABSTAIN - N O YES - ASS TAIN - N O

, Jljiomili

YES • ABSTAIN - NO

Kuwait (i

V’-u nu . . . ___ .. .. ©Dominican Republic__

• v cuador

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—Lebanon _ © . ____ _ __

_\ur »lj - P CLEfT P'-------------------

M ©El Salvador

_Equatori-J Guinea _

Ethiopia

—Libyan Arab Jatnahiriyx©

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F iji a —Mad agasc ar_________ ©

—Malawi _._A__________ R.ikrain

©K.neladed. . . . Fran ce

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O-Mali .Belgium Q . . ...... O Ga mb ia

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O Ghana

Ma lta

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Botswana .. . © -Gre ece __ 0 Mexico ©

^Bra zil _ ©.Grenada Mongolia ©

Bulgaria C.Cualeaial. *»

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O Hon du ras

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162

22 29 (X X I) . Que stio n of If ni an d Span is h Sah ar a

The General Assembly,

Having examined the chapter of the report of the 

Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the 

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara,

Having taken note of the oral and written statements 

of the petitioners from Spanish Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (X V) of 14 December 

1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling further the resolution adopted on 16 October 1964 by the Special Committee,

Reaffirming its resolution 2072 (X X) of 16 December 1965,

Noting that the Spanish Government, as the administering Power, has not as yet applied the provisions of 

the Declaration,

Having regard to the decision taken by the Assembly 

of Heads of State and Government of the Organization 

of African Unity at its third ordinary session, held at 

Addis Ababa from 5 to 9 November 1966, concerning 

the Territories under Spanish administration,

Noting the decision of the administering Power to 

apply in full the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2072 (X X), -

Noting further the statement of the administering 

Power on 7 December 1966 relating to Spanish Sahara, 

in particular with regard to the sending of a special 

United Nations mission to the Territory, the return of 

exiles and the free exercise by the indigenous population of its right to self-determination,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable ligh t of the peoples of 

Ifni and Spanish Sahara to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 

(X V );

2. Approves the chapter of the i eport of the Special 

Committee on the Situation w ith regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Indtpw.dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating 

to the Territories of Ifni cud Spanish Saha ia, and endorses the resolution adopted by the Special Cvuiuiiu.ee

on 16 November 1966,
163

\

r

3. Requests the administering Pow er to take immediately the necessary steps to accelerate the decolonization of Ifni and to determine with the Government of 

Morocco, bearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population, procedures for the tran sfer of 

powers in accordance with the provisions of General 

Assembly resolution 1514 (X V) ;

4. Invi tes the administering Pow er to determine at 

the earliest possible date, in conformity with the aspirations of the indigenous people of Spanish Sahara and 

in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania 

and Morocco and any other interested party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum under United 

Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous 

population of the Territory to exercise freely its right 

to self-determination and, to this end:

(a) To create a favourable climate for the referendum to be conducted on an entirely free, democratic 

and impartial basis, by permitting, inter alia, the return of exiles to the Te rritory;

(&) To take all the necessary steps to ensure that 

only the indigenous people of the Territory participate 

in the referendum;

(r ) To refrain from any action likely to delay the 

process of the decolonization of Spanish Sah ara;

(d) To provide all the necessary facilities to a (

United Nations mission so that it may be able to par ­

ticipate actively in the organization and holding of the 

referendum; *

5. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation 

with the administering Power and the Special Committee, to appoint immediately a special mission to be 

sent to Spanish Sahara for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the 

relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in 

particular for determining the extent of United Nations 

participation in the preparation and supervision of the 

referendum and submitting a report to him as soon as 

possible for transmission to the Special Committee;

6. Requests the Special Committee to continue its 

consideration of the situation in the Territories of Ifni 

and Spanish Sahara and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

1500th plenary meeting,

20 December 1966. t
164

23 54 (X XI I). Question of Ifni «mtl Spunisli Sa ha ra

The General Assembly,

Haying examined the chapter of the report of the 

Special’Committee on the Situation with regard to the 

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (X V) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting 

of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling also the resolution adopted on 16 October 

1964 by the Special Committee,- .

Reaffirming its resolutions 2072 (X X) of 16 December 1965 and 2229 (X XI) of 20 December 1966,

Noting that the Spanish Government, as the administering Power, Ins not yet applied the provisions 

of resolution 1514 (X V) ,

Recalling the decision concerning the Territor ies under Spanish administration taken by the Assembly of 

Heads of State and Government of the Organization 

of African Unity at its third ordinary session, held 

at Addis Ababa from 5 to 9 November 1966,

Noting the statement of the administering Power 

that a high-level dialogue had already begun between 

the Governments of Morocco and Spain concerning Ifni,

Noting further the statement made by the administering Power on 7 December 1966 relating to Spanish. 

Sahara, 21 in particular with regard to the sending of 

a special United Nations mission to the Territory, the 

return of exiles and the free exercise by the indigenous 

population of its right to self-determination,

Considering the consensus adopted by the Special 

Committee at its meeting.of 14 September 1967,
165

n •

1. Rea fi r ms the inalienable right of the people of 

Spani.-h Sahara to self-determination in accordance 

wi.h General Assembly resolution 1514 (X V );

2. slpprores the chapter of the report of the Special 

Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Spanish Sahara and endorses 

the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 

14 September 1967;

3. Invites the administering Power to determine at 

the earliest possible date, in conformity with the aspirations of the indigenous people of Spanish Sahara and 

in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and 

Morocco and any other interested party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum under United 

Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous 

population of the Territory to exercise freely its right 

to self-determination, and, to this end:

(n) To create a favourable climate for the referendum to he conducted on an entirely free, democratic/ 

and impartial basis by permitting, inter alia, the re-1 

turn of exiles to the Territor y; '

(ft) To take all the necessary steps to ensure that 

only the indigenous people of the Territory participate 

in the referendum;

(c) To refrain from any action likely to delay the 

process of the decolonization of Spanish Sah ara;

(d) To provide all the necessary facilities to a 

United Nations mission so that it may be able to 

participate actively in the organization and holding of 

the referendum;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation 

with the administering Power and the Special Committee. to appoint immediately the special mission 

provided for in paragraph. 5 of General Assembly recniiuicij 2229 (X XI) and to expedite its dispatch to 

Spanish Sahara for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant 

General Assembly resolutions, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation 

in the preparation and supervision of the referendum 

and submitting a report to him as soon as possible 

for transmission to the Special Committee;

5. Requests the Special Committee to continue its 

consideration of the situation in the Territor y of Spanish Sahara and to report thereon to the General Assetnbly at its twenty-third session.

1611st plenary meeting,

19 December 1967.
166

24 28 ( W ill) . Question of Ifni and Spanish

Sahara

The General Assembly,

Having examined the chapter of the repo rt of the 

Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the 

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (X V) of 14 December 

1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling also the resolution adopted on 16 October 

1964 by the Special Committee,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2072 (X X ) of 16 December 1965 and 2229 (X XI) of 20 December 1966,

Noting that the Government of Spain, as the administering Power, has not yet applied the provisions 

of resolution 1514 (X V),

Recalling the decision concerning the Territories 

under Spanish administration taken by the Assembly 

of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its third ordinary session, held 

at Addis Ababa from 5 to 9 November 1966,

Reaffirming its resolution 2354 (X X II ) of 19 December 1967,

Noting the statement made by the administering 

Power on 7 December 1966 relating to Spanish 

Sahara, particularly with respect to the sending of a

special mission of the United Nations to this Territory, 

the return of exiles and the free exercise by the indigenous population of its right to self-determination,

Noting further the statement made by the Permanent 

Representative of the administering Power on 29 

November 1968, - according to which an official Spanish 

delegation would leave in the immediate future for 

Rabat with a view to signing a treaty with the Government of Morocco on the transfer forthwith of the 

Territory of Ifni to Morocco,

Noting the difference in nature of the legal status of 

these two Territories, as well—as—the—p= esses of 

decolonization envisaged by General Assembly resolution 2354 (X X II) for these Territor ies, /'

* • • • •
167

II

• 

S

pa n is h S ahara

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of 

Spanish Sahara to self-determination in accordance' 

with General Assembly resolution 1514 (X V );

2. Approves the chapter of the report of the Special 

Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Spanish Sah ara;

3. Invites the administering Power to determine at 

the earliest possible date, in conformity with the aspirations of the indigenous .people of Spanish Sahara \ 

and in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party, j 

the procedures for the holding of a referendum under I 

United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the ' 

indigenous population of the Territory to exercise* 

freely its right to self-determination and, to this end: )

(a} To create a favourable climate for the referendum to be conducted on an entirely free, democratic and impartial basis by permitting, inter alia,

the return of exiles to the Territory;

(6) To take all the necessary steps to ensure that only 

the indigenous people, of the Territory participate in 

the referendum;

(c) To refrain from any action likely to delay the 

process of the decolonization of Spanish Sahara;

(d) To provide all the necessary facilities to a 

United Nations mission so that it may be able to 

participate actively in the organization and holding of 

the referendu l ;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation 

with the administering Power and the Special Com-

* mittee. to appoint immediately the special mission 

provided for in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2229 (X X I) and to expedite its dispatch to 

Spanish Sahara for the purpose of recommending

-i practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, and in particular 

for determining the extent of U nited Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of the referendum ard submitting a report to him for transmission 

to the Genera

1

 Assembly at its twen ty-fourth session;

5. Requests the Special Committee to continue its 

consideration of the situation in the Territory of 

Spanish Sahara and to report thereon to the General 

Assembly at its twenty-fourth session.

1747th plenary meeting,

18 December 1968.
168

259 1 (XX IV) . Question of Spanish Sahara

• •

The General Assem bly ,

Having examined ‘he chapter of the report of the 

Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of *

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of the so-called Spanish Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 

1960 containing the Decimation on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling c ’so the decision concerning the Territories under Spanish administration taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 

Organization of African Unity at its third ordinary 

session, held at Addis Ababa from 5 to 9 November 

1966,

Reaffirming its reschr ians 2072 (X X) of 16 December 1965, 2229 (X XI ) of 20 December 1966,

2354 (XXII) of 19 December 1967 and 2428 (X XI II) 

of 18 December 1968,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of 

the so-cH’ed Spanish Sahara to self-determination 

:n 

accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 

(X V);

2. Approves the chapter of the re port of the Special 

Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating 

to the Territory of the so-called Spanish Sahara;

3. Regrets tU’t it has not yet been possible for the 

consultations to take place which the administering 

Fewer was to conduct in connexion with the holding of 

a ivfcreu ’em in the so-c; h;d Spanish Sahara;

4. /g am invites the ad.hr'bte ring Power to determine at the earliest possible date, in conL cr uty with 

*

the aspirations of the indigenous people of the so-called

Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of Mr.urit..Xa and Morocco and any other interested party, the procedures fof the holding of a 

►

referendum under United N ‘lens auspices with a view 

to e.nnbr g the indigenous population of the Territory 

to exercise fii riy its right to self-dettrnu;cti&n and, 

to this end:
169

(c ) To create a favourable climate for the referendum to be conducted on an entirely free, democratic 

and impartial basis by permitting, inter alia, the return 

of exiles to the Territory;

(fc) To take all the necessary steps to ensure that 

only the indigenous people of the Territory participate 

in the referendum;

(c) To comply with the resolutions of the General 

Assembly on the activates of foreign economic and 

othe r interests operating in colonial countries and 

Territories and to refrain from any action likely to 

delay the process of the decolonization of the so-called 

Spanish Sab ma;

(d ) To provide all the necessary facilities to a 

United Nations mission so that it may be able to par ­

ticipate actively in the organization and holding of the 

referendum;

5. Requests the Secretary-General, in consult, tion 

with the administering Power and the Special Committee, to appoint immediately the special mission 

provided for in paragraph 5 of General Assembly 

resolution 2229 (XXI) and to expedite its dispatch 

to the so-called Spanish Sahara for the purpose of 

recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, and 

in particular for determining the extent of United 

Nations participation in the preparation and super ‘Con 

of the referendum and submitting a report to the Secretary-G eneral for transmission to the General Assembly 

at its twenty-fifth session;

6. Requ ests the Special Committee to continue its 

consideration of the situation in the Territory of the 

so-called Spanish Sahara and to report thereon to the 

General Assembly at its twenty-fifth.session.

lS3 5th plenary meeting,

16 December 1969.
170

2711 (X XV ). Question of Spanish Sahara

The General Asse mbly,

Having examined the chapter of the report of the 

Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the 

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Spanish Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting 

of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling also the relevant provisions of its resolution 2621 (XXV ) of 12 October 1970 ccuLaining the 

programme of action for the full implementation of 

the Declaration,

Taking into consideration the resolutions adopted, 

respectively, by the Assembly of Heads of State and 

Government of the Organization of African Unity at 

its seventh ordinary session, h ^d at Addis Aba ba horn 

1 to 3 September 1970, and by the Third Conference 

of Heads of State or Government of Ncn-Aligned 

Countries, held at Lusaka from 8 to 10 September 

1970,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2 072 (X X) of 16 December 1965, 2229 (X XI ) of 20 December 1966, 2354 

(X XI I) of 19 December 1967, 2428 (X XIII) of 18 

December 1968 and 2591 (XXIV) of 16 December

1969,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of 

the Sahara to self determination in accordance with 

General Assembly resolution 1514 (X V) ;

2. Approves the chapter of the report cf the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Tmplcmentation of the Declaration on the Granting, of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Spanish Sahara; . .

3. Expresses its regret that it has not yet been possible for the consultations to take place which the. administering Power was to conduct with the Go cmments concerned in connexion with the holding of a 

leferendum in the Teiritory;

4. Declares that the continued existence cf a 

colonial situation in the Territory retards stability ar.d 

harmony in north-west Africa;

5. Regrets the incidents of bloodshed which occurred in the Territory in June 19/0 and calls upon
171

the Spanish Government, in conformity with its obligations and its responsibility as administering Power, to 

take effective measures to create the atmosphere of 

detente required for the orderly holding of the referendum as defined by the relevant resolutions of the 

General Assembly;

6. Repeats its invitation to the administering Power 

to determine at the earliest possible date, in conformity 

with the aspirations of the indigenous people of the 

Territory’ and in consultation, with the Governments of 

Mauritania and Morocco ar.d any other interested 

party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum 

under United ’Nations auspices with a view’ to enabling 

the indigenous population of the Sahara to exercise 

freeiy its rig’ t to self-determination and, to this end:

(u) 'fo cr%te a favourable climate for the referendum to be conducted on an entirely free, democratic 

and impartial basis by permitting, inter alia, the return 

of all exiles tc the Territory;

(b) To take all the necessary steps to ensure that 

only the indigenous people of the Territory’ participate 

in the referendum;

(c) To comply with the resolutions of the General 

Assembly on the activities of foreign economic, financial and other interests operating in colonial countries 

and territories and to refrain from any action likely to 

delay the process of decolonization of the Territory;

(rf) To receive a United Nations mission and to 

provide it with all the necessary facilities so that it may 

be able to participate actively in the organization and 

holding of the referendum, in accordance with General 

Assembly resolution 7591 (X XI V) ;
172

7. Invites all States to refrain from making investments in the Territory in order to speed tire achievement of self-determination by the people of the Sahara;

8. Reaffirms that it recognizes the legitimacy of the 

struggle being waged by the colonial peoples for the 

exercise of their right to self-determination and to freedom of choice, and calls upon all States to provide 

them with all necessary assistance;

9. Urges the administering Power to respect and 

to implement scrupulously the provisions of the relevant 

resolutions of the General Assembly relating to . the 

free consultation of peoples under United Nations 

auspices and guarantees and in conformity with the 

principles of the Charter of the United Nations which 

deSue the conditions for the free consultation of peoples 

with a view to their self-determination;

10. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation

with the admini-'cring Power and the Special Committee, to appoint immediately the special mission provided for in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) and to expedite its dispatch to the 

Sahara in order to recommend practical steps for the 

full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the 

General Assembly, in particular to confirm UnitedNations participation in the preparation and supervision of the referendum and to submit a report to the 

Secretary-General for transmission to the Assembly at 

its twenty-sixth session; J

11. Requests the Special Committee to continue its 

consideration of the situation in the Territory and to 

report thereon to the General Assembly at its twentysixth session.

1929th plenary meeting,

14 Dec ember 1970.
173

29 83 (X X V II). Que stion of Spa ni sh Sah ara

The General Assembly,

Having examined the chapter of the report of the 

Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the 

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Spanish Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 

1960 containing the Dccbrarion on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Conr tries and Peoples,

Recalling also the relevant provisions of its resolution 2621 (XXV ) of 12 October 1970 containing the 

programme of action for the full implementation of 

the Declaration,

Taking into consideration the relevant resolutions 

adopted by the Ninth Assembly of Heads of S’ate and 

Government of the Organization of African Unity, held 

at Rabat, Morocco, from 12 to 15 June 1972, and by 

the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned 

Countries, held at Georgetown, Guyana, from 8 to 12 

August 1972,

Having regard to tire decision of the Heads of State 

of the countries concerned, adopted at the Conference 

held at Nouadhibou, Mauritania, on 14 September 

1970, to intensify their co-operatien in a positive manner in order to hasten the liberation of so-called Spanish 

Sahara,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2072 (X X) of 16 December 1965, 2229 (X XI ) of 20 December 1966, 

2354 (X X li) of 19 December 1967, 2428 (X XH I) 

of 18 December 1968, 2591 (XX IV) of 16 P ee..mm r 

1969 and 2711 (X XV ) of 14 December 1970,

Deploring that the administering Power has not p rovided sufficiently clear information on the conditions 

and time-table it intends to apply in bringing about uie 

complete decolonization of the Territory,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of 

the Sahara to self-determination and independence in 

accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 

(X V);

2. Reaffirms the legitim; c.y of the struggle of colonial pei pies and its solidarity v.i-b, and support for, 

the people of the Sahara in the struggle they me 

waging »n order to cucrclse their right to self-determination and independence, and requests all States to give 

them all necessary moral and material assistance in 

that struggle;
174

3. Declares that the continued existence of a colonial 

situation in the Territory is endangering stability and

harmony in north-west Africa; •

4. Expresses its support for, and solidarity with, 

the people of the Sahara, and calls upon the Government of Spain, in conformity with its obligations and

its responsibility as the administering Power, to take r

effective measures to create the necessary conditions 

for the free exercise of their right to self-determination 

and independence;

5. Repeats its invitation to the administering Power 

to determine, in consultation with the Governments of 

Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested 

party, the procedures for the holding of a ieferendum 

under United Nations auspices to enable the indigenous 

population of the Sahara to exercise freely its light to 

self-determination and independence and, to this end, 

invites the Government of Spain:

(a ) To create a favourable political climate for the 

referendum to be conducted on an entirely free, 

ocratic and impartial basis by permitting, infe-.- alia, the 

return of political exiles to the Territory;

(Z>) To take all the necessary steps to ensure that 

only the indigenous inhabitants exercise their light to 

self-determination and independence, with a view to 

the decolonization of the Territory;

(c) To receive a United Nations mission and provide it with all the necessaiy facilities so that it can 

participate actively in the implementation of measures 

making it possible to put an end to the colonial situation in the Territory;

6. Invites all States to comply with the resolutions 

of the General .Assembly on the activities of foreign 

economic and financial interests arid to r iiixiii from 

helping to perpetuate the colonial situation in the Territory by means of investments;

7. Reaffirms the responsibility of the United Na- •

tions in all consultations intended to lead to the free 

expression of the wishes of the people;

8. Urges the administering Power to respect and to

implement scrupulously, under the auspices and guar- »

antee of the United Nations, the provisions of the

relevant resolutions of the General Assembly relating 

to the decolonization of so-called Spanish Sahara;

9. the Secretary-General, in consultr.tion 

with the administering Power and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementa-
175

tion of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to appoint 

immediately the special mission provided for in paragraph 5 of General z\ssembly resolution 2229 (X XI ) 

and to expedite its dispatch to the Sahara in order to 

recommend practical steps for the full implementation 

of the relevant resolutions, and, in particular, to confirm United Nations participation in the preparation 

and supervision of the referendum and to submit a 

report to the Secretary-G eneral for transmission to the 

Assembly at its twenty-eighth session;

10. Cells upon the Special Committee to continue 

its consideration of the situation in the Territory and 

to report thereon to the General Assembly at its 

twenty-eighth s' H on.

2110(h plenary meeting

14 December 1972

31 62 (XX VIIT). Qu estio n of Spanirdi S.Tiara

The General Assemb ly,

Having examined the chapters of the report of the 

Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the 

Implem entation of the Declaration on the Gianting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating 

lo the Territor y of the Sahara under Spanish domination, -

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV ) of 14 December i960 containing the Declaration on the Gianting 

of Independence to Colonial Counfries and Peoples,

Recalling also the relevant provisions of its resolution °621 (XXV ) of 12 October 1970 containing the 

prog -am ns of action for the full implementation of the 

Declaration,

Taking into considerrCrn the relevant resolutions 

adopted by the Assembly of Heads ot State and .Government of the Organization of Af

'ierm Unity at its tenth 

ordinary s~mion, held at Addis Ababa from 27 to 

29 May 1973, and by the For dn Conference of Heeds 

of State or Government of Non-Aligned Count; held 

at Algiers from 5 to 9 September 1973,--
176

Having regard to the decisions of the two summit 

conferences of Heads of Stale of the countries concerned relating to the Sahara under Spanish administration,

Noting the statement by the representative of Spain 

in the Fourth Committee, - in which he renewed the 

commitment of his Government to respect the right of 

the people of the Sahara to self-determination,

Deploring, however, the fact that the special mission 

provided for in earlier resolutions on the so-called 

Spanish Sahara ■:-$ not yet been able to visit the Territory in order to cariy out the task entrusted to it,

Further reaffirming its previous resolutions on the 

so-called Spanish Sahara,

1. Declares that the continued existence of the 

colonial situation in the Territory is endangering stability 

and harmony in north-west Africa;

2. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial 

peoples and expresses its full solidarity with the people 

of the Sahara under Sparwh administration;

3. Reaffirms its attachment to the principle of selfdetermination and its concern to see that principle

applied within a framework that will guarantee the 

inhabitants of the Sahara under Spanish domination 

free and authentic expression of their wishes, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions on

the subject;

4. Repeats k s invitation to the administering Tower 

to determine, in consultation with the Governments of f 

Mauritania e 'd Morocco and any other interested party, 

the procedures for the holding of a referendum under J

United Nations ausp;ces to enable the indigenous 

population of the Sahara to e. crcrie freely its : I^Tt 

to self-determination and independence -...d, to tb’s 

end, invites the Gc v-mm t.u of Spain:

(a) To create a,fa vourable political climate for the 

referer J - n to be conducted on an entirely h ue, democratic and imp mth l baris by permitting, ii.i^r alia, the 

return of political exiles to the Territory;

(u) To take all the necessary steps to ensure that 

only the indigenous inhabitants exercise their i ’.3bt to 

self-determination and indcA ’"dence, with a view to the 

decolonization of the Territory;
177

(o) To receive a United Nations mission and provide 

it with ail the necessary facilities so that it can participate actively in the implementation of measures 

making it possible to put an end to the colonial i 

situation in the Territory;

5. Invites all States to comply with the resolutions of 

the General Assembly on the activities of foreign 

economic and financial interests and to refrain from 

helping to perpetuate the colonial situation in the 

Territory’ by means of investments;

6. Reaffirms the responsibility of the United Nations 

in all consultations intended to lead to the free expression of the wishes of the people;

7. Urges the administering Power to respect and to 

implement scrupulously, under the auspices and guarantee of the United Nat; ms, the provisions or the 

relevant resolutions of the General Assembly relating to 

the decolonization of the so-called Spanish Sahara;

8. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation 

with the administering Power and the Special Committee 

on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of 

the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 

Colonial Countries and Peoples, to appoint the special 

mission provided for in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2229 (X XI ) of 20 December 1966 and 

to expedite its dispatch to the Sahara in order to 

recommend practical steps for the full ;mplemcntation 

of the relevant resolutions and, in particular, to confirm United .Nations participation in the preparation 

and supervision of the referendum and to submit a

report to the Secretary-General for transmission to the 

Assembly at its twenty-ninth session;

9. Catls upon the Special Committee ‘o continue its 

consideratron of the situation in the Territory and to 

report thereon to the General Assembly at its twentyninth session.

22 02 nd plen ary meeting

14 Decem ber 19 73
178

329 2 (XX IX). Question of Spanish Sahara

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV ) of 14 December 

1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling also its resolutions 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2229 (X XI ) of 20 December 1966, 

2354 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2428 (XXIII) 

of 18 December 1968, 2591 (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2711 (XXV ) of 14 December 1970, 2983 

(XX VII) of 14 December 1972 and 3162 (XXV III) 

of 14 December 1973,

Reaffirming the right of the population of the Spanish 

Sahara to self-determination in accordance with resolution 1514 (X V) ,

Considering that the persistence of a colonial situation in Western Sahara jeopardizes stability and harmony in the north-west African region,

Taking into account the statements made in the 

General Assembly on 30 September and 2 October 

1974 by the' Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Morocco and of the Islamic Republic of 

Mauritania,—

Taking note of the statements made in the Fourth 

Committee by the representatives of Morocco ’ and

Mauritania, in which the two countries acknowledged 

that they were both interested in the future of the 

Territory,

Having heard the statements of the representative 

of Algeria,

Having heard the statements of the representative 

of Spain, -

Noting that during the discussion a legal difficulty 

arose over the status of the said Territory at the time 

of its colonization by Spain,

Considering, therefore, that it is highly desirable 

that the General Assembly, in order to continue the 

discussion of this question at its thirtieth session, should 

receive an advisory opinion on some important legal 

aspects of the problem,

Bearing in mind Article 96 of the Charter of the 

United Nations and Article 65 of the Statute of the 

International Court of Justice,
179

1. Decides to request the International Court of 

Justice, without prejudice to the applic ation of the 

principles embodied in General Assembly resolution 

1514 (X V ), to give an advisory opinion at an early 

date on the following questions:

, “I. Was Western Sahara (R io de Oro and Sakiet

El Ha mra) at the time of colonization by \ 

Spain a territo ry belonging to no one (te rra I 

nu /fi iu) ?”

If the answer to the first question is in the negative,

“II. What were the legal ties between this territory ty 

and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauri- ' 

tanian entity?” ;

2. Calls upon Spain, in its capacity as administering Power in partic ular, as well as Morocco and Mauritania, in their capacity as interested partie s, to submit 

to the Internationa l Court of Justice all such informa ­

tion and documents as may be needed to clarify those 

questions;

3. Urges, the administering Power to postpo ne the / 

referendum it contemplated holding TirW este rn Sahara 

until the Ge neral-

 Assembly decides on the policy to be , 

followed in orde r to accelerate the decolonization pro- ; 

cess in the Terri tory, in accordance with resolution ( 

15 14 (X V ), in the best possible conditions, in the ' 

light of the advisory opinion to be given by the Inte rnation al Court of Justice;

4. Reiterates its invitation to all States to observe 

the resolutions of the General Assembly regarding the 

activities of foreign economic and financial interests 

in the Territory’ and to abstain from contributing by 

their investments or immigration policy to the maintenanc e of a colonial situation in the Territory;

5. Reque sts the Special Committe e on the Situation 

with regard to the Implemen tation of the Declaration

«. on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries

and Peoples to keep the situation in the Terr itory under review, including the sending of a visiting mission 

to the Territory, and to report thereo n to the General 

a

 Assembly at its thirtieth session.

23 18 th plenary meeting

13 December 197 4
3158 (X X X ). Q uest io n o f S panis h S ah ara 

A

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Spanish (Western) Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (X V) of 14 December 

1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of 

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling also its resolutions 2072 (X X) of 16 December 1965, 2229 (X XI ) of 20 December 1966, 

2354 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2428 (X XI II) 

of 18 December 1968, 2591 (XXIV) of 16 December 

1969, 2711 (XX V) of 14 December 1970. 3162 

(X XV III) of 14 December 1973 and 3292 (XXIX) 

of 13 December 1974 on the question of Spanish 

Sahara,

Recalling further its resolution 3292 (XXIX) of 13 

December 1974, by which it decided to request an 

advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice and to invite the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaratio n on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 

Countries and Peoples to keep the situation in the 

Territory under review, including the sending of a 

visiting mission to the Territory,

Noting that, in paragraph 3 of resolution 3292 

(X XIX ), it urged the administering Power to postpone 

the referendum which it contemplated holding in 

Spanish Sahara until the General Assembly decided 

on the policy to be followed in order to accelerate the 

decolonization process in the Territory in accordance 

with resolution 1514 (X V), in the best possible conditions, in the light of the advisory opinion to be given 

by the International Court of Justice,

Having considered the advisory opinion delivered by 

the International Court of Justice on 16 October 1975 

in response to the request contained in General Assembly resolution 3292 (X XI X) ,

Having considered the chapter of the report of the 

Special Committee relating to the Territory of Spanish 

Sahara,
181

Having also considered the report of the United 

Nations Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, which in 

May and June 1975 went successively to Spain, the 

Territory, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania,

Having heard the statements of the administering 

Power and of the Governments of Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria,

Having also heard the statements of the petitioners,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 377 (1975) 

of 22 Octo ber 1975, 379 (19 75) of 2 November 1975 

and 380 (197 5) of 6 November 1975 on the situation 

concerning Western Sahara,

Considering the reports prepared by the SecretaryGeneral pursuant to Security Council resolutions 377 

(19 75) and 379 (1975) on the situation concerning 

Western Sahara,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of 

Spanish Sahara to self-determination, in accordance 

with General Assembly resolution 1514 (X V);

2. Reaffirms its attachment to the principle of selfdetermination of peoples and its concern to see that 

principle applied to the inhabitants of the Territory of 

Spanish Sahara within a framework that guarantees and 

permits them the free and genuine expression of their 

will, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the 

United Natio ns; \

3. Reaffirms the responsibility of the administering \ 

Power and of the United Nations with regard to the 

decolonization of the Territory and the guaranteeing 

of the free expression of the wishes of the people of 

Spanish Sahara;

4. Takes note with appreciation of the advisory 

opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning Western Sahara,

5. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of the 

United Nations Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara in

5 1 -3 0 3 0 - 7 9 - 1 2
182

19 75 7S and endorses its conclusion that measures should 

be taken to enable all Saharans originating in the Territory to decide on their future in complete freedom 

and in an atmosphere of peace and security, in accordance with resolution 1514 (X V );

6. Expresses its thanks to the Government of Spain 

and the Governments of Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania for the co-operation and assistance which they 

extended to the Visiting Mission;

7. Requests the Government of Spain, as the administering Power, in accordance with the observations 

and conclusions of the Visiting Mission and in accordance with the advisory opinion of the International 

Cou rt of Justice, to take immediately all necessary 

measures, in consultation with all the parries concerned 

and interested, so that all Saharans originating in the 

Terr itory may exercise fully and freely, under United 

Nations supervision, their inalienable right to selfdetermination;

8. Reques ts the Secretary-General, in consultation 

with the Governme nt of Spain, as the ad m in is te ri ng 

Power, and the Special Committee on the Situation 

with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration 

on the Grantin g of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to make the necessary arrangements 

for the supervision of the act of self-determination 

referred to in paragraph 7 above;

9. Urges all the parties concerned and interested to 

exercise restraint and to desist from any unilateral or 

oth er action outside the decisions of the General Assembly on the Territory;

10. Reques ts the Special Committee to follow the 

implementation of the present resolution and to report 

on the question to the General Assembly at its thirtyfirst session.

24 35 th plenary meeting

10 December 1 97 5
183

’ The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolution 1514 (X V) of 14 December 1960,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1541 (X V) of 15 December 1960 and 2072 (X X) of 16 December 1965 and 

all other relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular General Assembly resolution 3292 (XXIX) of

13 December 1974,

Takin g note of the report of the United Nations 

Visiting Mission dispatched to the Territory in 1975,74

Taking note of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 16 October 1975 concerning 

Western Sahara,

Considering Security Council resolutions 377 (19 75) 

of 22 October 1975, 379 (197 5) of 2 November 1975 

and 380 (197 5) of 6 November 1975,

1. Takes n ote of the tripartite agreem ent concluded 

at Madrid on 14 Novem ber 1975 by the Governments 

of Mauritania, Morocco and Spain, the text of which 

was transmitted to the Secretary-G eneral of the United 

Nations on 18 Novem ber 1975;

2. Reaffirms the inalienable right to self-determination, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 

1514 (X V), of all the Saharan populations originating 

in the Territory;

3. Requests the parties to the Madrid agreement of

14 November 1975 to ensure respect for the freely 

expressed aspirations of the Saharan populations;

4. Requests the interim administration to take all 

necessary steps to ensure tha t all the Saharan populations originating in the Territor y will be able to exercise their inalienab le right to self-determination thro ugh

free consultations organized with the assistance of a

• representative of the United Nations appointed by the_

Secretary-General.

243 5th plenary meeting

JO December 1975
8. Requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the Government of 

Spain, as the administering Power, and the Special Committee on the Situation with 

regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 

Colonial Countries and Peoples, to make the necessary arrangements for the 

supervision of the act of self-determination referred to in paragraph 7 above ;

9. Urges all the parties concerned and interested to exercise restraint and to 

desist from any unilateral or other action outside the decisions of the General Assembly on the Territory ;

10. Requests the Special Committee to follow the Implementation of the present 

resolution and to report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-first 

session.

B

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolution 1514 (XV) o f 14 December 1960,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960 and 2072 (XX) of 

16 December 1965 and all other relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular 

General Assembly resolution 3292 (XXIX) of 13 Decem ber 1974,

Taking note of the report of the United Nations Visitin g Mission dispatched 

to the Territory in 1975,

Taking note of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 

16 Octo ber 1975 concerning Western Sahara,

Considering Security Council resolutions 377 (1975) of 22 October 1975, 

379 (1975) of 2 Novem ber 1975 and 380 (1975) of 6 November 1975,

1. Takes note of the trip artite agreement concluded at Madrid on 14 November 

1975 by the Governments of Mauritania. Morocco and Spain, the text of which was 

transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 18 Novem ber 1975 ;

2. Reaffirms the inalienable right to self-determination, in accordance with 

General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), of all the Saharan populations originating 

in the Territory ;

3. Requests the parties to the Madrid agreement of 14 November 1975 to ensure 

respect for the freely expressed aspirations of the Saharan populations ;

4. Requests the interim administration to take all necessary steps to ensure 

that all the Saharan populations originating in the Territory will be able to exercise 

their inalienable righ t to self-determination through free consultations organized with 

the assistance of a representative of the United Nations appointed by the SecretaryGeneral.

V O T I N G D E T A I L S

3458 A

Y E S : 88 N O :0 A B STEN TIO NS : 41

YES:

MALI - NIGER - UPPER VOLTA - SIERRA LEONE - GUINEA - GUINEA-BISSAU - 

EQUATORIAL GUINEA - BENIN - GHANA - NIGERIA - CONGO - CHAD - BURUNDI 

- RWANDA - COMOROS - MAURITIUS - M ADAGASC AR - TA NZ AN IA - ZAM BIA
185

- MOZAMBIQUE - KENYA - UGANDA - ETHIOPIA - BOTSWANA - SWAZILAND - 

MALAW I - LESOTHO - ALGERIA - SOMALIA - LEBANON - KUWAIT - YEMEN, 

DEM. REP. - U.S.S.R. - BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R. - UKRAINIAN S.S.R. - BULGARIA

- CZECHOSLOVAKIA - GERMAN DEM. REP. - HUNGARY - ROMANIA - POLAND - 

YUG OSLAVIA - FRANCE - GERMANY, FED. REP. OF - AUS TRIA - BELGIUM - 

LUXEMBOURG - NETHERLANDS - ITA LY - UNITED K1NDGOM - IRELAND - ICELAND - SWEDEN - NORWAY - DENMARK - FINLAND - CYPRUS - GREECE - JAPAN

- CUBA - 8A HA MA S - BARBADOS - ECUADOR - FIJI - GUYANA - JA MA ICA - 

PHILIPPINES - GRENADA - MEXICO - PANAMA - PERU - TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO - NEW ZEALAND - AUS TRA LIA - AFGHAN ISTAN - BANGLADESH - BHUTAN

- BURMA - IND IA - INDONESIA - LAOS - MALAYSIA - MONGOLIA - NEPAL - 

PAKISTAN - SINGAPORE - SRI LANKA - THAILAND.

A B S TE N TIO N S :

SENEGAL - IVORY COAST - GAMBIA - GABON - CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. - 

ZAIRE - CAMEROON - TOGO - TUNISIA - EGYPT - SUDAN - JORDAN - IRAQ - 

IRAN - SAU DI AR AB IA - BAHREIN - AR A3 IAN EMIRATES - OMAN - QA TAR - 

CA NA DA - U.S.A. - ARGENTINA - BRAZIL - BOLIVIA - CHILE - COLOMBIA - 

COSTA RICA - SANTO DOMINGO - SALVADOR - GUATEMALA - HAITI - HONDURAS - NIC ARAGUA - PARAGU AY - URUGUAY - VENEZUELA - PORTUGALSPAIN - TURKEY - PAPUA NEW GUINEA - ISRAEL.

N O N -P A R T IC IP A N T S AND ABSENTEES:

LIBERIA - CAPE VERDE - SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE - MAURITANIA - MOROCCO

- YEMEN - LIBYA - SYRIA - M ALTA - CHINA - AL BANIA - CAMBODIA - MALDIVES

- SURINAM - SOUTH AFRICA.

3458 8

Y ES: 56 N O : 42 A B S T E N T IO N S : 34

YES:

SENEGAL - GAMBIA - LIBERIA - TOGO - ZAIRE - CAMEROON - GABON - CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC - RWANDA - MAURITIUS - MOROCCO - MAURITANIA

- TUNISIA - SUDAN - LEBANON - JORDAN - IRAQ - IRAN - KUWA IT - SAUDI 

AR AB IA - OMAN - QATAR - BAHREIN - ARABIAN EMIRATES - INDONESIA - 

PAKISTAN - BANGLADESH - MALAYSIA - NEPAL - THAILAND - BOLIVIA - 

CHILE - COSTA RICA - SAN TO DOMINGO - SALVAD OR - GUATE MALA - HAITI

- HONDURAS - NIC ARAGUA - PANAMA - PHILIPPINES - PARAGUAY - URUGUAY - FRANCE - ITA LY - BELGIUM - LUXEMBOURG - NETHERLANDS - GERMANY, FED. REP. OF - UNITED KINGDOM - IRELAND - ICELAND - SPAIN - 

DENMARK - MA LTA - JAPAN - U.S.A.

NO :

NIGER - SIERRA LEONE - GUINEA - GUINEA-BISSAU - EQUATORIAL GUINEA - 

BENIN - GHA NA - CONGO - CHAD - COMOROS - MAD AGASCAR - MOZAMBIQUE 

- TAN ZA NIA - ZAMBIA - KENYA - ETHIOPIA - LESOTHO - BOTSWANA - MAL AWI - SWAZILAND - ALGERIA - YEMEN, DEM. REP. - LAOS - MONGOLIA - SRI 

LAN KA - BAR BAD OS - CUBA - FIJI - GRENADA - GUYANA - JA MAICA - TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO - CYPRUS - BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R. - UKRAINIAN S.S.R.- 

U.S.S.R. - BULGAR IA - CZECHOSLOVAKIA - HUNGARY - POLAND - GERMAN 

DEM. REP. - YUGOSLA VIA.

A B S TE N TIO N S :

MALI - UPPER VOLTA - IVORY COAST - NIGERIA - BURUNDI - UGA NDA - 

EGYPT - SOMALIA - IND IA - AFGHANISTAN - BHUTAN - BURMA - SINGAPORE

- COLOMBIA - ARGENTINA - BRAZIL - BAHAMAS - ECUADOR - MEXICO - PERU

- VENEZUELA - PAPUA NEW GUINEA - TURKEY - NEW ZEALAND - AUSTRALIA

- PORTUGAL - AUSTRIA - ICELAND - NORWAY - SWEDEN - GREECE - C AN AD A

- ISRAEL.
186

3 1 /4 5 . Q ue stio n o f W es tern Sahar a

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting 

of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Considering the decision of the Assembly of Heads 

of State and Government of the Organization of African 

Unity at its thirteenth ordinary session, held at Port 

Louis from 2 to 6 July 1976, to hold an extraordinary 

session devoted to the question of Western Sahara,

Taking note of that part of the Political Declaration 

adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or 

Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, relating to Western 

Sahara,

Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the 

Territory,

Recalling also its resolution 3412 (XXX ) of 28 November 1975 regarding co-operation between the United 

Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1. Reaffirms its commitment to the principle of selfdetermination of peoples in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 

Countries and Peoples;

2. Takes note of the decision taken by the Assembly of Hea ds of State and Government of the Or­ ganization of African Unity to convene an extraordinary j 

session with a view to finding a just and lasting solution ■* 

to the problem of Western Sahara;

3. Decides to postpone consideration of the question^ 

of Western Sahara until its thirty-second session; 7

4. Req uests the Administrative Secretary-General 

of the Organization of African Unity to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the progress 

achieved in the implementation of the decisions of the 

Organization of African Unity concerning Western 

Sahara, and invites the Secretary-General of the United 

Nations to repo rt on that information to the General 

Assembly at its thirty-second session.

85th plenary meeting

1 December 1976
187

• T h ir ty -s e c o n d , s e s s io n 

A ge nd a it e m 24

RES OLU TION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

• (o n th e r e p o r t o f th e F o u rth C om m it te e A /3 2 /3 5 6 )

C fr ie st io n o f W est ern S a h a ra

Th e G e n e ra l A sse m b ly ,

H avin g c o n s id e r e d th e q u e s ti o n o f W est ern 

S a h a ra ,

R e c a llin g i t s r e s o l u t i o n 15 14 (AV) 14 

D ec em be r 19 ^0 c o n ta in in g th e D e c l a r a t i o n on th e 

G ra n ti n g o f In d e p e n d e n c e t o C o lo n ia l C o u n tr ie s an d 

P e o p le s ,

R e c a llin g th e r e l e v a n t r e s o l u t i o n s o f th e 

G e n e ra l A ss em bly an d th e O r g a n iz a tio n o f A f r ic a n 

U n ity c o n c e rn in g t h e T e r r i t o r y ,

T ak in g n o te o f th e p a r t o f th e P o l i t i c a l 

D e c la r a tio n a d o p te d by th e F i f t h C o n fe re n c e o f 

H eads o f S t a t e o r G ov er nm en t o f N o n -A li g n ed 

C o u n tr ie s h e ld a t Co lom bo fr o m 16 t o 19 A ugust 

1976, r e l a t i n g t o W este rn S a h a ra

H avin g h e a rd a l l th e s ta te m e n ts made on th e 

s u b je c t b e f o r e th e F o u rth C o m m it te e,

• R e c a llin g th e d e c is i o n o f t h e A ss em bly o f 

H ea ds o f S t a te an d G ov er nm en t o f th e O r g a n iz a tio n o f 

A f r ic a n U n it y a t i t s t h i r t e e n t h o r d in a r y s e s s i o n , 

h e ld a t P o r t L cuis 'H 'rom 2 t o 6 J u l y 1 9 7 6 , to h o ld 

a n e x tr a o r d i n a r y sf eb sio n d e v o te d t o th e q u e s tio n

o f W est ern S a h a r a , 75 ‘

R e c a llin g a l s o i t s r e s o l u t i o n 34 12 (XXX) o f 

28 Nov em be r 19 75 r e g a r d in g c o - o p e r a ti o n b e tw e en th e 

U n ite d N a tio n s a n d "the O r g a n iz a tio n o f A f r ic a n U n i t y ,
1. R eai'fi rn ib i t s co m m itm en t to th e p r i n c i p l e 

o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p e o p le s i n a c c o rd a n c e w it h 

th e D e c la r a tio n on th e G ra n tin g o f In d e p e n d e n c e to 

C o lo n ia l C o u n trie s an d P e o p le s ;

2 . E x p re s s e s th e ho pe t h a t a j u s t an d l a s t i n g 

s o l u t io n to th e pro ble m o f W e ste rn S a h a ra w i l l be 

s p e e d ily a c h ie v e d , m a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e p r i n c i p l e s 

o f th e C h a rte r o f th e U n it e d N a tio n s , a t th e e x t r a ­

o rd in a r y s e s s io n o f th e O r g a n iz a tio n o f A f r ic a n U n it y 

d e v o te d t o t h i s q u e s tio n , to be h e ld s h o r t l y i n 

a c c o rd a n c e w it h th e d e c is i o n s ta k e n a t th e t h i r t e e n t h 

an d f o u r te e n t h o r d in a r y s e s s i o n s o f th e A ss em bly o f 

H ea ds o f S ta te an d Gov er nm en t o f th e O rg a n iz a tio n

o f A fric a n U n ity ;

3 . D e c id e s to re su m e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f th e 

q u e s tio n o f W est ern S a h a ra a t i t s t h i r t y - t h i r d , s e s s io n ;

4* R e o u e s ts th e S p e c ia l C om m itte e on th e 

S i t u a t i o n w ith re g a r d to th e Im p le m e n ta ti o n o f th e 

D e c la r a tio n on th e G ra n ti n g o f In d e p e n d e n c e t o C o lo n ia l 

C o u n trie s and P e o p le s to k e e p d e v e lo p m e n ts i n t h i s 

m a tte r u n d e r re v ie w an d to r e p o r t th e r e o n to th e 

G e n e ra l A ss em bly a t i t s t h i r t y - t h i r d s e s s io n ;

5* R e q u e s ts th e A d m in is tr a tiv e S e c r e t a r y - 

G e n e ra l o f th e O rg a n iz a tio n o f A f r ic a n U n it y to in fo rm 

th e S e e r e ta r y - O e n e r a l o f th e U n it e d N a ti o n s o f th e 

p r o g r e s s a c h ie v e d in th e im p le m e n ta ti o n o f th e 

d e c is io n s o f th e O rg a n iz a tio n o f A fr ic a n U n it y c o n c e rn ­

in g W est ern S a h a ra , an d i n v i t e s th e S e c r e ta r y - G e n e r a l 

o f th e U n it e d N a ti o n s to r e p o r t on th e q u e s tio n to 

th e G e n e ra l A ss em bl y a s so on a s p o s s i b le an d n o t 

l a t e r th a n a t i t s t h i r t y - t h i r d s e s s i o n .

8 3 rd p le n a ry m eeti n g

2& Nov em be r 1977
189

A P P E N D I X 6

Most R ecent and P revious O A U Resolut ions on the W estern

Sahara

AH G/DE C.1 14(XVI)

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

The A ss em b ly o f H eads o f S t a t e and G overn m ent o f th e 

O r g a n iz a tio n o f A f r ic a n U n ity m e e ti n g i n i t s S i x t e e n t h O rd in a ry 

S e s s io n i n M o n ro v ia , L i b e r i a , fr om 17 t o 20 J u l y 1 9 7 9 ,

H av in g h e a rd th e i n t r o d u c t i o n by th e o u tg o in g C hair m an and 

C h air m an o f th e Ad-Hoc C om m it te e o f H ea ds o f S t a t e on W e ste rn 

S a h a ra on th e C o m m itte e 's r e p o r t on th e Q u e s tio n o f W e ste rn S a h a r a ,

H av in g d i s c u s s e d th e q u e s t io n o f W e ste rn S a h a r a ,

H av in g e x h a u s t i v e l y c o n s id e re d th e r e p o r t o f i t s Ad -H oc 

C o m m it te e c o n ta in e d i n Doc .A HG/93( XVI) w h ic h in c lu d e d r e p o r t s o f 

th e S u b -C o m m it te e o f th e Ad- Hoc C om m it te e on i t s m is s io n t o A l g e r i a , 

M a u rita n ia and M o ro cco , and t h a t o f th e OAU S e c r e ta r y - G e n e r a l i n 

th e co m pa ny o f t h e A m b assad o rs o f M a li and N ig e r ia t o S p a in ,

C o n s id e r in g th e f a c t t h a t a l l th e p a r t i e s c o n c e rn e d e x c e p t 

M oro cc o a g r e e t h a t t h e r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r th e p e o p le 

o f S a h a ra h a s n o t b e e n f u l f i l l e d ,

A ls o c o n s id e r in g t h a t t r i p a r t i t e a g re e m e n t b e tw e e n S p a in , 

M oro cc o an d M a u r ita n ia t r a n s f e r r e d o n ly a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f th e 

t e r r i t o r y t o M or occ o an d M a u r ita n ia and n o t s o v e r e ig n ty ,

Aware o f th e f a c t t h a t M or oc co m a in ta in s t h a t th e r i g h t 

o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n h a s b e e n e x e r c is e d b y th e S a h a r a o u is th ro u g h 

th e A sse m bly kn ow n a s th e D je m aa :

DECIDES t h e f o llo w in g :

1 . The p r e p a r a t i o n o f a p r o p e r a tm o sp h e re f o r p e a c e i n th e 

a r e a th ro u g h a g e n e r a l an d im m e d ia te c e a s e f i r e ;

2 . Th e e x e r c i s e o f th e r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y th e 

p e o p le o f W e ste rn S a h a ra i n a g e n e r a l an d f r e e re fe re n d u m w h ic h 

w i l l e n a b le th em t o c h o o s e o n e o f th e f o llo w in g o p t i o n s ;

(a ) T o ta l in d e p e n d e n c e

(b ) M a in te n a n c e o f t h e s t a t u s quo

3 . The c o n v e n in g o f a m e e tin g o f th e p a r t i e s c o n c e rn e d

* i n c lu d in g th e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f W e ste rn S a h a ra to r e q u e s t t h e i r

c o o p e r a tio n f o r th e im p le m e n ta tio n o f t h i s d e c i s i o n .

4 . The e s t a b l is h m e n t o f a S p e c ia l C om m it te e o f F iv e OAU 

Member S t a t e s com p o sin g o f G u in e a , M a li, N i g e r i a , Sud an and 

T a n z a n ia t o w or k o u t th e m o d a l i t i e s an d to s u p e r v is e th e o r g a n iz a ­

t i o n o f a re fe re n d u m w ith th e c o - o p e r a tio n o f th e U n ite d N a tio n s 

on th e b a s i 6 o f o ne p e r s o n o n e v o t e . Th e S p e c i a l C om m it te e s h a l l 

b e c h a ir e d b y L i b e r i a , t h e C u r r e n t C hair m an o f th e O r g a n iz a tio n

o f A f r ic a n U n ity .
190

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY •

a) Council of Ministers Resolutions

RESOLUTION ON THE TERR ITO RIES UNDER SPAN ISH DOMINATION 

(A dd is Ab aba, 1^ 66 )

The C ounci l o f M in is te r s , m ee ti n g i n i t s Se ve nt h. 

O rd in ary S e ssio n , h e ld i n A ddis A ba ba, E th io p ia , fr om 

31 O cto ber to 4 Novem ber 19 66 ,

C o n sid eri n g A r tic le 2 o f t h e OAU C h a rte r , which 

la y s down th e e r a d ic a tio n o f a l l fo rm s o f c o lo n ia lis m 

from our c o n tin e n t a s one o f o u r O rg a n iz a tio n s ’ s g o a ls ,

U jn ds i t s f u l l s u p p o rt to a l l e f f o r t s ai m ed a t th e 

im m ed ia te an d u n c o n d itio n a l l i b e r a t i o n o f a l l 

A fric a n t e r r i t o r i e s u n d e r S p a n is h d o m in ati o n 

( I f n i , th e s o - c a lle d "S p a n is h S a h a ra " , E q u a to ria l 

Gui ne a an d F er nando P o )$

A ppeal s to S p ain to i n i t i a t e r e s o lu t e l y a p ro c e s s 

g iv in g fr ee dom an d in d ep en d en ce to a l l th e s e 

re g io n s , an d to r e f r a i n fr om a l l s te p s w hi ch 

m ig ht c r e a te i n them a s i t u a t i o n je o p a r d iz in g 

pea ce an d s e c u r ity i n A f r ic a .

CM /Re s. 82 (V II )
191

RESOLUTION ON DECOLONIZATION aND apar theid

(A duis Aba ba , 1969)

The C ouncil o f M in is te rs o f th e O rg a n iz a ti o n o f 

A fric a n U n it y , m eeti ng in i t s T h irte e n th O rd in a ry 

S e3 3 io n , in A dd is Aba ba , E th io p ia , from 27 A ug us t 

to 6 Sep te m be r 19 69 ,

R e c a ll in g r e s o lu tio n s CM/150 to CM/155 a d o p te d 

by th e Assem bly o f He ad s o f S ta te an d Go ve rnmen t a t 

i t s F if t h S e ssio n h e ld in A lg ie r s , an d in p a r t i c u l a r 

p a ra g ra p h 3 o f r e s o lu t i o n CM/15 5,

Hav ing c lo s e ly ex am in ed th e r e p o r t s su b m it te d 

by th e A d m in is tr a ti v e S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l on th e t e r r i ­

t o r i e s s t i l l u n d e r c o lo n ia lis m an d s u b je c t to th e 

h a te f u l d o c trin e o f a p a r th e id ,

N oti ng w it h co n c e rn t h a t n o t o n ly has th e re 

bee n no im pr ov em en t i n th e s i t u a t i o n o f th e p o p u la tio n s , 

b u t t n a t on th e c o n tra ry c o n d itio n s ha ve w ors en ed in 

th e s e t e r r i t o r i e s ,

Con vi nc ed t h a t th e su p p o rt g iv e n in v a r io u s 

fo rm s by NATO Member S ta te s e n a b le s th e s e r a c i s t 

re g im e s to i n t e n s i f y t h e i r war of c o lo n ia l d o m in ati o n 

an d th e r e f o r e c o n s t i t u t e s a m ajo r o b s ta c le to th e 

l i b e r a t i o n s tr u g g le o f th e A fric a n p e o p le s c o n c e rn e d ,

R e c a ll in g th e d e fia n c e o f w orl d o p in io n by th e 

South A fric a n re gim e i n i t s p e r s i s t e n t r e f u s a l to 

im pl em en t U n it e d N a ti o n s r e s o lu t i o n s on N am ib ia ,

N oti ng t h a t P o rtu g a l h as p e r s is t e d in th e 

in tr a n s ig e n t a t t i t u d e to w ard s th e a s p i r a ti o n s to 

in dependence o f th e t e r r i t o r i e s u n d e r i t s d o m in a ti o n ,

Condem nin g th e i l l e g a l r a c i s t m in o rit y re gim e 

o f Ia n Sm ith w hi ch h a s im po se d an obnoxio us c o n s t i ­

t u t io n on Zimbabwe in o rd e r to c o n s o lid a te o o lo n ia li s m 

an d ra c is m ,

193

th e u l t i m a t e ai m o f th e l i b e r a t i o n o f

* A fric a ;

( f ) T hat w orl d o p in io n be aw ak en ed an d co ns i s t e n t l y k e p t a liv e to th e cri m es

* p e r p e tr a te d a g a in s t a s e c tio n o f A fric a 

by th e c o lo n ia l an d r a c i s t re g im es o f 

South A fr ic a , P o rtu g a l an d th e U n it e d 

Kingd om;

(g ) T hat OAU Member S ta te s c o n tr ib u te , a s f a r 

a s t h e i r re s o u rc e s p e rm it to th e U n it e d 

N a ti o n s Fu nd f o r t e r r i t o r i e s u n d er c o lo ­

n i a l an d r a c i s t d o m in a ti o n i n S o u th e rn 

A fr ic a ;

(h ) T hat an u rg e n t a p p e a l be a d d re sse d to th e 

g r e a t pow ers , w hi ch a re per m an en t me mb ers 

o f th e S e c u rit y C o u n c il , to meet t h e i r 

o b lig a tio n s in r e s p e c t o f th e pro ble m s o f 

c o lo n ia lis m an d a p a r th e id w it h a vi ew

to sa fe g u a rd in g i n t e r n a t i o n a l pea ce an d 

s e c u r i ty ;

( i ) T hat S p ain be u rg e d to im pl em en t r e s o l u t i o n

24 28 (X X III) o f th e U nited , N a ti o n s

G e n era l Assem bly on th e s o - c a lle d S p an is h

S ah ara ;

(3 ) T hat F ra n ce be c a lle d upo n to meet th e

a s p i r a ti o n s to in d ep en d en ce o f th e p e o p le s 

o f th e s o - c a lle d F re n c h S o m ali la n d 

(D jib o u ti) an d th e Comoro I s la n d s ;

(k ) That th e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f th e U n it e d

* Kingdom, a s a d m in is te rin g pow er , f o r th e 

d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f th e s i t u a t i o n in 

Zimbabwe be re a ffir m e d ;
( l) T hat OAU Member S t a t e s sh ould , e x e r t e v e ry 

p o s s ib le e f f o r t t o hav e th e S o u th A f r ic a n 

re g im e w h ie h , a c c o r d in g to th e U n ite d 

N a ti o n s C h a r te r , h a s no l e g a l b a s i s , 

e x c lu d e d fr om th e U n ite d N a tio n s and fr om 

o th e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s .

CM /R es .2O6 ( i l l l )

RESOLUTION ON DECOLONIZATION AND APARTHEID 

(A d d is A bab a, F e b ru a ry -M a rc h 197 0)

The C o u n c il o f M in is te r s o f th e O r g a n iz a tio n o f 

A f r ie a n U n ity , m eeti n g i n i t s F o u r te e n th O rd in a ry 

S e s s io n , i n A d dis A bab a, E t h i o p i a , fr o m 27 F e b ru a ry 

t o 6 M arch 1970,

G ra v ely c o n c e rn e d o v e r tu e p e r s i s t e n c e o f th e 

r a c i s t an d m in o r ity re g im e s i n S o u th A f r i c a , N a m ib ia , 

Zim bab we and T e r r i t o r i e s u n d e r P o r tu g u e s e , S p a n is h 

and F re n c h d o m in a ti o n s^

N o ti n g t h a t th e S o u th A f r ic a n an d P o rtu g u e s e 

re g im e s ha ve s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e j e c t e d o u t r i g h t th e 

L usa ka M a n if e s to on S o u th e rn A f r ic a i n s p i t e o f i t s 

a d o p tio n by th e U n it e d N a tio n s ;

N o ti n g f u r t h e r t h a t th e S o u th A f r ic a n r a c i s t 

re g im e i s c o n tin u in g i t s i l l e g a l o c c u p a tio n o f 

N a m ib ia , i t s in c r e a s i n g m i l i t a r y in v o lv e m e n t i n 

Zim ba bw e, i t s s u p p o rt o f P o rtu g u e s e c o lo n ia lis m 

and th e i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n o f i t s b r u t a l r e p r e s s i v e 

m e a su re s a g a i n s t th e p a t r i o t s i n S o u th Af-ri m »
195

Dee ply co nc er ne d, a t tn e s tre n g th e n in g o f th e 

unholy a l l i a n c e among t i e r a c i s t re g im e s o f P r e t o r i a , 

S a lis b u ry , L is bon an d t h e i r c o lla b o r a tio n w it h o th e r 

i m p e r ia lis t po w er s a s ev id enced, in p a r t i c u l a r by 

th e p la n s f o r th e C ab or a £ .s e a Lam P r o je c t d e sig n e d 

to im pede th e armed s tru g g le an d p e r p e tu a te f o r e ig n 

d o m in a ti o n , e x p l o i t a t i o n a id ex p a n sio n ;

C o n sid e ri n g th e m a s s iv ) s u p p o rt g iv e n by NATO 

Member S ta te s an d o th e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l ec on om ic an d 

f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s to th e r a c i s t re g im e s o f P r e t o r i a , 

S a lis b u ry an d L is bon in th e in te n s iv e r e p r e s s io n o f 

A fric a n p e o p le s an d in th w a rti n g t h e i r le g itim a te 

armed s tr u g g le ,

1. REAFFIRMS t h a t any fo rm o f m i li t a r y an d o th e r 

c o -o p e ra ti o n w it h th e s e m in o rit y re g im e s 

c o n s t i t u te s a H o s ti le a c t a g a in s t a l l 

A fric a n S ta te s an d t h e i r p e o p le s;

2 . REAFFIRMS i t s f u l l su p p o rt f o r tn e l i b e r a t i o n 

mo veme nts in Zim bab we, Moz am biqu e, A ngola , 

G ui ne a B is s a u , N am ib ia , South A f r ic a , s o - 

c a lle d F re n ch S o m ali la n d (D jib o u ti) an d th e 

Comoro I s la n d s a g a in s t c o lo n ia l r u l e . As 

f a r a s th e s o - c a lle d S p a n is h S ah ara i s

co n c e rn e d , th e OAU r e a f f ir m s th e U n it ed

N a ti o n s r e s o lu tio n NoT 24 28 (KX IV);

3 . APPEALS u r g e n tly to a l l Member S ta te s to 

in c re a s e t h e i r a s s is ta n c e to th e l i b e r a t i o n 

mo veme nts tn ro u g h th e OAU;

4« APPEALS FURTHER to a l l S ta te s an d O rg a n iz a ti o n s 

su p p o rti n g th e l i b e r a t i o n o f th e A fric a n 

c o n tin e n t to make c o n tr ib u tio n s th ro u g h th e 

OAU f o r a s s is ta n c e to th e p eo p le s tru g g lin g 

a g a in s t ra c is m an d c o lo n ia lis m , an d i n s t r u c t s 

th e G e n era l S e c r e t a r i a t to make th e n e c e s s a ry 

a rr an g e m e n ts to re c e iv e su ch c o n tr ib u tio n s ;
196

STRONGLY DENOUNCES t n e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e •

C ab ora B assa Dan P r o j e c t and. p la n s f o r

b r in g in g f o r e ig n s e t t l e r s i n t o M oz am biqu e

and. u r g e n tly a p p e a ls to a l l G overn m ents an d

f o r e ig n co m p an ie s to r e f r a i n fr o m p a r t i c i — <

p a tin g i n t h i s p r o j e c t ; an d e x p r e s s e s

a p p r e c i a t i o n to Sw ed en f o r i t s s t e p s to en d

an y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t n i s P r o j e c t ;

6 . CONDEMNS th e c o u n t r i e s t h a t c o n tin u e t o s u p p ly 

m i l i t a r y eq u ip m en t to So ut h. A f r ic a and P o r tu g a l 

an d m a in ta in a l l fo rm s o f c o - o p e r a t i o n w ith 

th e s e re g im e s ;

7 . REQUESTS th e A f r ic a n G ro up a t th e U n ite d 

N a ti o n s to dr aw th e a t t e n t i o n o f th e S e c u r i t y 

C o u n c il to th e c o n tin u e d v i o l a t i o n o f i t s 

d e c is io n s on th e ar m s em bar go and c a l l f o r 

e f f e c t i v e m easu re s t o en d th e s e v i o l a t i o n s ;

8 . REQUESTS th e G e n e ra l S e c r e t a r i a t t o p r e p a r e a 

d e t a i l e d r e p o r t on th e c o l l a b o r a t i o n by 

G overn m ents an d f o r e i g n econom ic an d o t h e r 

i n t e r e s t s w it h th e r a c i s t and c o l o n i a l 

re g im e s i n A f r ic a f o r s u b m is s io n to th e n e x t 

S e s s io n o f th e C o u n c il o f M in i s t e r s so t h a t 

A f r ic a n S t a t e s c an c o n s id e r d e c i s i v e m e a su re s 

to end su c h e o l l a b o r a t i o n ;

9* RE VE ST S FURTHER th e G e n e ra l S e c r e t a r i a t to 

t r a n s m it t n i s r e s o l u t i o n to th e U n ite d 

N a ti o n s and ta k e s t e p s t o dra w th e a t t e n t i o n 

o f o r g a n iz a tio n s a l l o v e r th e w o rld i n o r d e r 

to e n c o u ra g e w o rl d o p in io n to i n t e n s i f y 

a c t i v i t i e s a g a in s t th e o x im es p e r p e t r a t e d by 

th e r a c i s t an d c o l o n i a l re g im e s a g a i n s t th e 

p e o p le s o f A f r ic a ;
197

10 . COMMENDS t«ie a n ti- a p a r th e id , mov em en ts and. 

o rg a n iz a tio n s o f s tu d e n ts , y o u th an d o th e rs 

a l l o v er th e w orl d w hi ch ^a ve a c ti v e ly 

su p p o rt e d th e s tru g g le o f th e A fric a n p e o p le s 

f o r lib e r a tio n }

11, APPEALS to a l l o rg a n iz a tio n s an d p e o p le s in 

A fric a to c e le b r a te th e A fric a n L ib e ra tio n 

Day on 25 May 1970 a s w id e ly a s p o s s ib le in 

f u l l s o l i d a r i t y w it h th e A fric a n p e o p le s 

s tr u g g lin g a g a in s t a p a r th e id , c o lo n ia lis m an d 

r a c i a l d is c r im in a tio n in th e A fric a n 

c o n tin e n t an d make g en e ro u s c o n tr ib u tio n s 

f o r t h e i r le g itim a te s t r u g g l e .

CM /fie s. 209 (XIV)

RESOLUTION ON DECOLONIZATION 

(A ddis Aba ba , A ug us t 1970)

The C o u n cil o f M in is te rs o f th e O rg a n iz a ti o n o f 

A fric a n U n it y , m eeti n g in i t s F if t e e n t h O rd in a ry 

S e s s io n , in A ddis Aba ba , E th io p ia , from 25 to 31 

A ug us t 19 70 ,

Tak in g n o te o f th e R ep o rt o f th e A d m in is tr a ti v e 

S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l re g a rd in g th e dev elo pm ent o f th e 

s i t u a t i o n in t e r r i t o r i e s u n d e r c o lo n ia l d o m in a ti o n , 

c o n ta in e d in Docum ent CM/3351

R e c a ll in g i t s v a r io u s r e s o lu tio n s on th e s i t u a t i o n 

i n th e t e r r i t o r i e s u n d er P o rtu g u e s e , S p an is h an d 

F re nch d o m in a ti o n s ;

5 1 -3 0 3 0 - 7 9 - 1 3
198

R e c a ll in g f u r th e r th e UN D e c la ra ti o n on D ec ol on iz a tio n and. th e re le v a n t UN G e n e ra l Assem bly *

R e so lu ti o n s on th e r i g h t o f a l l p e o p le s to in dependence;

N oti ng w it h in d ig n a tio n t h a t th e P o rt u g u ese 

re gim e i s em pl oy in g we apons su ch a s n ap alm , to x ic g a s 

an d d e f o li a n t, a g a in s t th e fr ee dom f i g h t e r s an d th e 

A fr ic a n p o p u la ti o n in th e t e r r i t o r i e s u n d e r i t s 

dom in ati on in f la g r a n t v i o l a t io n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l 

c o n v e n ti o n s;

R e a li z in g t h a t th e P o rt u g u ese re gim e i s a b le to 

c o n ti n u e an d i n t e n s i f y i t s C o lo n ia l war o f g en o cid e 

bec au se of c o n ti n u e d m as si ve a s s is ta n c e from NATO 

Member S ta te s , e s p e c ia lly th e U n it e d S ta t e s , West 

Ge rm any, F ra nce an d th e U n it e d Kin gdo m;

Dee ply concern ed w it h th e in c r e a s in g ec on om ic 

an d m ilita r y in volv em ent o f th e S outh A fric a n re gim e 

in Zimbabwe a s w e ll a s in Ang ol a an d Mozam biq ue;

G ra vel y concern ed over th e a g g ra v a tio n o f th e 

s i t u a t io n in Zimbzbwe an d th e p ro c la m a ti o n o f a so - 

e a lle d R e p u b li c , base d on r a c i a l d is c r im in a tio n , by 

th e m in o rit y r a c i s t re gi m e o f S a lis b u ry ;

N oti ng t h a t ec on om ic s a n c tio n s , i n s t i t u t e d by th e 

U n it ed N a ti o n s , ha ve n o t bee n e f f e c t i v e b ecau se o f 

th e su p p o rt o f Sou th A fric a an d P o rtu g a l to th e 

Sm ith re gi m e an d th e v i o l a t io n s o f s a n c tio n s by 

im p e r i a l i s t po w er s;

Aga in g ra v e ly concern ed o v e r th e c o n ti n u e d 

i l l e g a l o c c u p a ti o n o f Nam ibia by th e South A fric a n 

r a c i s t re gi m e an d th e i n t e n s i f i e d o p p re s s io n o f th e 

A fric a n people i n t h a t t e r r i t o r y ; ’

Tak in g n o te o f th e S e c u rit y C o u n cil R e s o lu ti o n s 

283 an d 28 4, ad o p te d on 29 J u ly 197U;
199

1. 'o ti n ,; w it h s a t i s f a c t i o n th o p ro g re s s o f th e 

li b e r a ti o n s tr u g g le in th e t e r r i t o r i e s u n d er c o lo n ia l 

d o m in ati o n ;

1 . CONGRATULATES th e l i b e r a t i o n mo vem ent s in th e 

t e r r i t o r i e s u n d er f o r e ig n d o m in ati o n f o r tn e 

su c c e ss a c h ie v e d in t h e i r v a l i a n t l i b e r a t i o n 

s tru g g le f o r l i b e r a t i o n , an d r e a f f ir m s i t s 

f u l l s u p p o rt;

2. CONDEMNS th e Member S ta te s o f th e A tla n tic 

A llia n c e , e s p e c i a l l y th e U n it e d S ta t e s , West 

Ge rm any, F ra n ce an d th e U n it e d Kingdom, w hi ch 

c o n ti n u e to a s s i s t th e P o rt u g u ese re g im e;

3• STRONGLY URGES S pain to co mply w it h o u t d e la y

w it h tn o r e le v a n t UN R e s o lu ti o n s co n c ern in g

th e le g itim a te r i g h t s o f th e p o p u la ti o n o f

th e c o - c a lle d S p an is h S ah ara to s e l f - d e t e r ­

m in a ti o n ;

4« NOTES w it h s a t i s f a c t i o n th e w it h d ra w al o f

Sw ed ish an d I t a l i a n fir m s from th e C ab or a B as sa 

Dam P r o je c t;

5» DEPLORES th e d e c is io n o f West Germany an d 

F ra nce to a ll o w t h e i r m onopoli es to p a r t i c i ­

p a te in t h i s p r o je c t w it h South A fric a n 

Com pa nies ;

6 . DECLARES i t s fir m o p p o s itio n to an y fo rm o f 

gove rn m en t in Zimbabwe w hi ch i s not b ase d on 

th e p r i n c i p l e of A fric a n m a jo rity r u le ;

7. CONDEMNS th e South A fric a n an d P o rt u g u ese 

a u t h o r i t i e s f o r f a i l i n g to oomp ly w it h th e 

UN S e c u r ity C o u n cil d e c is io n s re g a rd in g 

ec on om ic s a n c ti o n s a g a in s t R hodes ia ;
200

0 . INVITES th e S eo tv i+ .y C ounci J to e n s u re s t r i c t 

im p le m e n ta ti o n o f eco n o m ic s a n c tio n s a g a i n s t 

R h o d e sia by a l l c o u n t r i e s ;

9 . REQUESTS th e U n ite d N a tio n s o rg a n s and s p e c i a l ­

iz e d a g e n c ie s to g iv e u tm o s t a t t e n t i o n to a l l 

e f f e c t i v e m e a su re s to s e c u r e c o m p li a n c e by tn e 

S o u th A fric a n re g im e w ith t h e i r d e c i s i o n on 

Kami t i a ;

1 0 . CONDEMNS th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l econom ic an d f i n a n ­

c i a l i n t e r e s t s w hic h c o l l a b o r a t e w ith th e 

P o rtu g u e s e c o l o n i a l i s t s and i n s t r u c t s th e 

A d m in is tr a tiv e S e c r e ta r y - G e n e r a l o f th e 

O r g a n iz a tio n o f A f r ic a n U n ity to f o llo w t h e i r 

a c t i v i t i e s so t h a t th e OAU may ta k e 

a p p r o p r ia te m e a s u re s ;

1 1 . COMMENDS G o v ern m en ts , M ov em en ts an d O r g a n iz a tio n s 

a l l o v e r th e w o rl d w h ic h s u p p o rt th e l e g i t i m a t e 

s t r u g g l e o f th e A f r ic a n P e o p le s a g a i n s t f o r e i g n 

d o m in a tio n .

C M /R es .2 34 (XV)

r
201

, RESOLUTION ON THE SI TU ATI ON IN TERRIT ORIE S UNDER

PORTUGUESE DOMINATION 

( R a b a t , 1 9 7 2 )

• The C o u n cil o f M in is te rs o f th e O rg a n iz a ti o n

o f A fric a n U n it y m eeti ng in i t s N in e te e n th O rd in ary 

S essio n in R ab at, M or oc co , from 5 to 19 Ju ne 19 72 ,

...................................... (c o n c e rn in g t e r r i t o r i e s u n d er

P o rt u g u ese d o m in ati o n an d s o - c a lle d F re nch S o m ali la n d 

o r D jib o u ti)

I I THE SO-CALLED SPANISH SaHAR A:

Hav in g h eard th e A d m in is tr a tiv e S e c r e ta r y - 

G e n e ra l's r e p o r t on th e s i t u a t i o n p r e v a ilin g in th e 

S p an is h S a h a ra ,

T ak in g in to a c c o u n t th e d e te rm in a ti o n o f Member 

S ta te s co n fi rm ed d u rin g th e p re s e n t d e b a te to 

a c h ie v e th e t o t a l l i b e r a t i o n o f th e A fric a n c o n tin e n t 

w ith in th e s h o r te s t p o s s ib le tim e ,

D e p lo ri n g S p a in 's slo w n ess in p ro c e e d in g w it h 

th e d e c o lo n iz a tio n o f t h a t t e r r i t o r y ,

The c o u n c il o f M in is te r s :

1 . EXPRESSES i t s s o l i d a r i t y w it h th e p o p u la ti o n 

o f th e S ah ara u n d e r S p an is h d o m in ati o n ;

2 . CALLS on ce a g a in on S pain to c r e a te a f r e e 

an d d e m o c ra ti c atm osp here in w hi ch th e people 

o f t h a t t e r r i t o r y can e x e r c is e t h e i r r i g h t

3 to s e lf - d e te r m in a tio n an d in dependence w it h ­

o u t d e la y i n a c co rd a n ce w it h th e C h a rte r o f 

th e U n it e d N a ti o n s;

*
202

3 . REQUJSi'S Mem ber S t a t e s d i r e c t l y c o n c e rn e d to 

i n t e n s i f y t h e i r e f f o r t s v i s - a - v i s th e 

S p a n is h G ov er nm en t t o in d u c e i t to im ple m ent 

r e s o l u t i o n 2711 o f th e UN G e n e ra l A ss em bly 

a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , i t s p r o v is io n s r e l a t i n g 

to th e h o ld in g , a s so o n a s p o s s i b l e , o f a 

re fe re n d u m d e s ig n e d to e n a b le th e p o p u la tio n 

o f th e S a h a ra u n d e r S p a n is h d o m in a ti o n to 

f r e e l y e x e r c is e t h e i r r i g h t t o s e l f - d e t e r ­

m in a tio n , i n a c c o rd a n c e w it h th e p r i n c i p l e s 

o f th e U n it e d N a ti o n s C h a r te r , u n d e r th e 

a u s p ic e s an d w ith th e f u l l g u a r a n te e s o f 

t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n iz a tio n .

CM /H es .2 72 (XIX)

r
RESOLUTION OK Til.J SAIIARp. Hl! DEL. SPANISH DOMINATION 

(A du is A ba ba , 197 3)

The C o u n cil o f M in is te rs o f th e OAU m eeti ng in 

i t s T w e n ty -F ir st O rd in ary S e ssio n in A dd is Aba ba , 

from 17 to 24 May, 19 73 ,

Hav ing n o te d th e R ep ort o f th e A d m in is tr a ti v e 

S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l on th e q u e s tio n o f th e S ah ara u n d e r 

S pan is h d o m in ati o n (C li/ 50 2 P a rt I I I ) an d r e f e r r i n g 

to r e s o lu tio n CI4/272 (XIX) un an im ou sl y’ ad o p te d by 

th e Rab at Su mm it,

R e a ffi rm in g th e d e te rm in a ti o n o f Member S ta te s to 

ac h ie v e th e t o t a l l i b e r a t i o n oi' th e A fric a n c o n tin e n t 

in th e s h o r t e s t p o s s ib le ti m e ,

Hav ing d ir e c te d i t s s p e c ia l a t t e n t i o n to th e 

e v o lu ti o n o f th e s i t u a t i o n in th e S ah ara s t i l l u n d e r 

S panis h d o m in a ti o n ,

D e m o n str a ti n g i t s co n c ern re g a rd in g th e a t t i t u d e 

an d i n t e n t io n s o f th e S panis h Gov ernm en t in r e s p e c t 

o f th e d e c o lo n i a li z a t io n o f th e S ah ara u n d e r S p an is h 

d o m in ati o n ,

1. DENOUNCES th e d i l a t o r y m an oe uv re s o f th e 

S p an is h Gov ernm en t by w hi ch i t see k s to 

a v o id th e o b lig a tio n s in cu m ben t up on i t an d 

th e r e le v a n t d e c is io n s o f i n t e r n a ti o n a l 

b o d ie s in o r a e r to p ro lo n g a s i t u a t i o n f r a u g h t 

w it h r i s k s o f te n s io n to th e re g io n ;

2. EXPRESSES i t s co m ple te s o l i d a r i t y w it h th e 

p eo p le o f th e S ah ar a u n d e r S p an is h 

a d m in is tr a tio n ;

3 . CALLS ONCE AGAIN UPON S p ain to c r e a te th e 

c l i n a t e o f p o l i t i c a l fr ee dom n e c e s s a ry f o r
20 4

g e n u in e e x p r e s s io n o f th e w i l l o f th e p e o p le ;

4* REAr’FIR IlS i t s d e te r m in a tio n to ta k e s te p s 

e n e r g e t i c a l l y w ith in tu e U n ite d N a tio n s 

O rg a n iz a tio n so t n a t th e l a t t e r may s h o u ld e r 

i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w hic h a r e c le a rly " s e t 

f o r t h in s e v e r a l r e l e v a n t r e s o l u t i o n s 

s u p p o rte d by th e O r g a n iz a tio n o f A f r ic a n 

U n it y an d th e ?T on -A lign ed C o u n tr ie s ;

5 . REQUESTS b o r d e r in g S t a t e s d i r e c t l y c o n c e rn e d 

to c o n tin u e t h e i r c o n s u l t a t i o n s and to 

c o n c e r t an d i n t e n s i f y t h e i r a c t i o n to 

im ple m ent R e s o lu tio n 2^ 83 (X XV II) o f th e 

U n ite d N a ti o n s G e n e ra l A ss em bly an d 

e s p e c i a l l y th e p r o v is io n s c o n c e rn in g th e 

sp eed y h o ld in g o f a re fe re n d u m w ith a vie w to 

e n a b lin g th e in d ig e n o u s p e o p le t o f r e e l y 

e x p r e s s t h e i r w i l l , in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e 

p r i n c i p l e s o f th e UN C h a r te r , u n d e r th e 

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and w ith th e g u a r a n te e s o f

th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ;

6 . URGES th e U n it e d N a tio n s O r g a n iz a tio n to 

as su m e w ith o u t d e la y i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 

w ith r e g a r d t o t h i s p ro b le m , by e n s u r in g 

th e r a p i d a p p l i c a t i o n o f th e p ro c e d u re l a i d 

down i n th e r e l e v a n t r e s o l u t i o n s f o r th e 

t o t a l d e c o lo n iz a tio n o f t h i s r e g i o n .

CM/Res3O1 (XXI)

C

<
205

RESOLUTIO N ON THE TE RR ITO RY OP THE SAHARA UNDER 

SP AN ISH DOM INAT ION 

(M o g ad is cio , 197 4)

The C o u n cil o f M in is te rs o f th e O rg a n iz a ti o n o f 

A fric a n U n ity , m ee ti ng in i t s Tw en ty -T hi rd . O rd in a ry 

S e ssio n in M ogadis cio , S o m a li a , fr om 6 - 11 Ju ne 

19 74 ,

H av in g ta k e n n o te o f th e A d m in is tr a ti v e 

S e c r e ta r y - G e n e r a l's r e p o r t on th e t e r r i t o r y o f S ah ara 

u n d er S p a n is h d o m in ati o n r e f e r r i n g to R e s o lu ti o n 

CIl/301 (XX I) ad o p te d unan im ousl y by th e 10t h 

Summit in A ddis Aba ba ,

R e a ffi rm in g th e d e te rm in a ti o n o f Member S ta te s to 

a c h ie v e a s so on a s p o s s ib le th e t o t a l l i b e r a t i o n o f 

th e A fric a n c o n t i n e n t ,

C o n sid e ri n g th e p re s e n t p o l i t i c a l d ev elo p m en ts in 

th e A fric a n t e r r i t o r i e s u n d e r P o rt u g u ese d o m in a ti o n 

w hi ch w i l l so on le a d in e v ita b ly to th e d e c o lo n iz a tio n 

o f t a a t p a r t o f o u r c o n tin e n t,

H av in g p a id p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to th e d e v e lo p ­

m en ts i n th e s i t u a t i o n in th e t e r r i t o r y o f Sqh q-rq u nd e r 

S p an is h d o m in a ti o n ,

C once rn ed ab o u t th e a t t i t u d e an d i n t e n t io n s o f 

th e Go ve rnmen t o f S p ain w it h re g a rd to th e d e c o lo n iz a tio n o f S ah ara u n d e r S p an is h d o m in a ti o n ,

1. DENOUNCES th e S p an is h G ov er nm en t’ s e lu s iv e 

a t t i t u d e to w ard s i t s o b lig a tio n s an d i t s 

f a i l u r e to ap p ly th e r e le v a n t r e s o lu t i o n s o f 

i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n an a tt e m p t to 

m a in ta in a s i t u a t i o n fr a u g h t w it h s e r io u s 

r i s k s o f te n s io n in th e re g io n ;
20 6

2 . HARA ASSES i t s l u l l s o l i d a r i t y w ith th e p e o p le 

o f S a h a ra u n d e r S p a n is h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;

3 . IL-hiUESi’S S p a in once & ,, ain t o c r e a t e th e 

n e c e s s a r y a tm o sp h e re o f p o l i t i c a l fre e d o m 

f o r th e t r u e e x p r e s s io n o f th e p e o p l e ’ s 

w i l l ;

4 - iiLh-r'j Iit iS i t s d e te r m in a tio n to w ork h a r d a t 

g e t t i n g th e U n ite d R a tio n s to assu m e i t s 

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a s c l e a r l y o u t l i n e d i n i t s 

num ero us r e l e v a n t r e s o l u t i o n s s u p p o r te d by 

th e O r g a n iz a tio n o f A f r ic a n U n ity a n d th e 

N o n -A li g n ed C o u n tr ie s ;

5* REQUESTS tn e n e ig h b o u rin g S t a t e s d i r e c t l y 

c o n c e rn e d to p u rs u e t h e i r c o n s u l t a t i o n s 

aim ed a t i n t e n s i f y i n g t u e i r c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t s 

f o r th e a p p l i c a t i o n o f R e s o lu tio n 3 1 6 2 (X X V II l) 

o f th e U n ite d N a tio n s G e n e ra l A sse m b ly , p a r t i ­

c u l a r l y th e p r o v is io n s on th e c o n d u c t o f a 

re fe re n d u m a s e a r l y a s p o s s i b l e t o e n a b le tn e 

in d ig e n o u s p e o p le to e x p r e s s t h e i r w i l l f r e e l y 

i n a c c o rd a n c e w ith tn e p r i n c i p l e s o f th e 

U n ite d N a ti o n s C h a r te r , u n d e r th e s u p e r v i s i o n 

an d w ith th e s a f e g u a r d s o f th e I n t e r n a t i o n a l 

O r g a n iz a tio n ;

6 . EARNESTLY REQUESTS th e U n ite d R a tio n s 

O r g a n iz a tio n to ass um e w ith o u t d e la y i t s 

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a s f a r a s t h i s p ro b le m i s 

c o n c e rn e d by s e e in g to i t t h a t th e p ro c e d u r e 

o u t l i n e d i n th e r e l e v a n t r e s o l u t i o n s a r e 

q u ic k ly fo llo w e a f o r th e c o m p le te d e c o l o n i ­

z a t i o n o f t h a t r e g i o n .

f
207

01; aESTj RR a? RI CA 

( j 'o r t L o u is , 197 6)

The C o u n cil o f M in is te rs o f th e O rg a n iz a tio n o f 

A fric a n U n it y m eeti n g a t i t s 2 7 th o r d in a r y s e s s io n 

a t P o rt T o u ic , M a u r itiu s , from 24 to 29 Ju n e 19 76 ,

Havi.i.-; c o m p re h en siv ely ex am in ed th e r e p o r t o f 

th e C o -o rd in a ti n g Com mitt ee f o r th e l i b e r a t i o n o f 

A f r ic a , p a r t i c u l a r l y p a ra g ra p h s 73 , 74 an d 76 

r e l a t i n g to W es te rn S a h a ra ,

D ee pl y co n cern ed by th e w ors enin g o f tu e 

s i t u a t i o n p r e v a ilin g i n W est ern S a h a ra ,

R e c a lli n g th e p r i n c i p l e s an d o b j e c t i v e s o f th e 

OAU an d U n it e d N a ti o n s ,

R e c a lli n g th e U n it e d R a ti o n s R e s o lu tio n I9 I4 (XV) 

o f 14 De cembe r 1^60 on s e l f - d e te r m in a tio n an d 

in d ep en d e n ce of p e o p le s an d c o u n tr ie s u n d e r 

f o r e ig n d o m in a ti o n ,

R e c a lli n g th e OAU R e s o lu tio n s r e l a t i n g to th e 

d e c o lo n iz a tio n o f w e ste rn S a h a ra ,

1. REAFFIRMS th e in a l i e n a b l e r i g h t to s e l f - 

d e te r m in a tio n an d n a tio n a l in d e p e n d e n c e in 

ac co rd a n c e w it h th e OAU an d UN C h a r te r s ,

2 . REQUESTS th e S e c r e ta ry - G e n e r a l o f th e U n it e d 

R a ti o n s to p u rs u e h is m is sio n w it h a vi ew

to e n a b li n g th e S a h a ro u i p eo p le to e x e r c is e 

f r e e l y t h e i r r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,

3 . UNCONDITIONALLY SUPPORTS tn e r i g h t s tr u g g le 

o f th e S a h a ro u i p eo p le f o r th e r e c o v e r in g o f 

t h e i r n a tio n a l r i g h t s ,
208

•I. D S haj-BS tn e im m e d ia te w ith d r a w a l Ox a l l 

fo r e ig n o c c u p a ti o n f o r c e s an d th e r e s p e c t 

of th e t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f W est ern 

S an ar a and. th e n a t i o n a l s o v e r e ig n ty o f th e 

S aharo ui p e o p le ,

>. REQUESTS tn e a d m in is tr a tiv e S e c r e ta ry - G e n e r a l 

ox" th e OAU to r e p o r t to th e f o r th e offlines e s s io n o f th e OAU C o u n c il o f i- iin is te r s J 

on th e im p le m e n ta ti o n o f t n i s r e s o l u t i o n ,

6. 1NV1TJ3 a l l th e p a r t i e s in v o lv ed , i n th e

w est ern S ah ara c o n f l i c t in c lu d in g th e S ah aro u i 

peo ple to ta k e th e n e c e s s a ry s t e p s l i k e l y to , 

le ad to an a c c e p ta b le s o lu tio n f o r a l l an d \ 

p a r ti c u la r l y f o r th e S a h a ro u i p e o p le w ith in 

th e c o n te x t o f A fric a n u n i t y an d i n th e

i n t e r e s t o f p e a c e , f r ie n d s h ip an d f r i e n d l y 

r e la t io n s h i p s bet w een th e n e ig h b o u rin g c o u n tr ie s 

o f th e re g io n .

»

CM /Doc.36 (X V II)

r
209

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

b) Assembly of Heads of State and 

Government Resolutions

RBSOWTiOli Uh TK?: SO -C A L LpJL SP Ah IS H u a HAR a

(Karn pci l a , 19 /9 )

The As sembly o f Reacts o f S ta te an d Go ve rnment 

o f th e O rg a n iz a ti o n o f A fric a n U n it y , m eeti n g in 

i t s T w elf th O rd in ary S e ssio n from 28 J u ly to 1 Aug us t 

197 5 in Ka mpa la, U ga nd a,

Ha ving n o te d th e R ep ort o f tie T w e n ty -fifth 

O rd in ary S e ssio n o f th e C o -o ra in a rin g Com mitt ee f o r 

th e u ib e ra tio n o f A fr ic a ,

Ha ving re g a rd f o r th e re co m m en dat io ns o f th e 

T w e n ty -fif th O rd in ary S e s s io n o f th e OAU C o u n cil o f 

M in is te rs ,

C o n sid eri n g th a t th e T w e n ty -fifth S e s s io n o f 

th e C ounci l o f M in is te rs a f t e r le n g th y d e b a te , was 

u n a b le to pr od uc e an a c c e p ta b le r e s o lu t i o n o f 

re co m m en da tion on th e q u e s tio n o f th e s o - c a lle d 

S p an is h S ah ara ,

C o n sid eri n g th a t th e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C ourt o f 

J u s t i c e a t The Hag ue h a s b e fo re i t th e q u e s tio n o f 

th e s o - c a lle d S p an is h S a h a ra ,

I

1» BBCIDiSS to a w a it th e o p in io n o f th e I n t e r ­

n a tio n a l C ourt o f J u s t i c e ,

1 2 . CALLS UPON S p a in , th e A d m in is te ri n g Po wer ,

u n t i l th e o p in io n o f th e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C ou rt 

o f J u s t ic e i s know n, to a b s ta in fro m a l l 

a c ts wh ioh m ig ht p re ju d ic e th e d e c o lo n iz a tio n 

p ro c e ss o f t h i s t e r r i t o r y .

AH G/Res.75 (X II )

o