In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-3015 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

RANDY SHANE CRAFT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 2:19-cr-20027 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 1, 2023 — DECIDED APRIL 22, 2024 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, ST. EVE, and LEE, Circuit Judges. 

LEE, Circuit Judge. In October of 2019, Randall Craft 

pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute over 

fifty grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Craft 

was sentenced to 150 months in prison followed by five years 

of supervised release. When calculating the guidelines range, 

the district court applied two sentencing enhancements. First, 

it applied a two-level enhancement for maintaining a 
2 No. 22-3015 

premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a 

controlled substance under § 2D1.1(b)(12) of the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines. Second, it applied a two-level enhancement for Craft’s role as a manager or supervisor of the 

scheme under § 3B1.1 of the Guidelines. Because the record 

does not support the conclusion that Craft used his home for 

the primary or principal purpose of manufacturing or distributing drugs, we conclude that the district court erred in applying the premises enhancement. On the other hand, given 

Craft’s extensive role in the conspiracy, we agree with the district court’s application of the two-level role enhancement. 

Thus, we vacate Craft’s sentence and remand his case to the 

district court for resentencing.

I. Background

Craft and his girlfriend, Tracy Christian, lived together in 

Balch Springs, Texas, a suburb of Dallas. In late 2015, Craft 

met Frank Shaffer and started selling him methamphetamine 

that Shaffer would transport to Illinois and sell. At first, Craft 

sold Shaffer two ounces of methamphetamine at a time, but 

the quantity quickly increased to a half pound or full pound 

per transaction. During this period, Shaffer was also in and 

out of prison and house arrest. Thus, to carry on the operation, Shaffer enlisted others to help him obtain and transport 

the drugs, including two individuals named Jacob Burns and 

Austin Carey.

In late May 2018, Shaffer was released on parole, and he 

moved into Craft’s home in Balch Springs, where he lived 

with Craft, Christian, and Craft’s son. While Shaffer lived 

there, Craft supplied him with methamphetamine around 

thirty times, and each time Shaffer would transport the drugs 

to Illinois for distribution. Most of the time, Craft handed the 
No. 22-3015 3

drugs to Shaffer at a nearby gas station, but on several occasions, Craft gave the drugs to Shaffer when they were both at 

Craft’s house. Once Shaffer received the drugs from Craft, he 

usually stored them at Craft’s house until he left for Illinois, 

typically less than twenty-four hours later. 

After distributing the drugs in Illinois, Shaffer returned 

the proceeds from the sales to Craft and Christian, either directly or via wire service. Craft paid the rent and utilities for 

his home with the proceeds, then he split the remainder 

evenly with Shaffer. Craft did not store his supply of drugs at 

the house, nor did he regularly sell to customers from the 

house.

Shaffer left Craft’s house in October 2018 and spent a few 

weeks in Illinois. While in Illinois, Shaffer was arrested for 

possessing a loaded firearm and one ounce of methamphetamine. After waiving his Miranda rights, he admitted to the police that he was distributing drugs and that Craft was his supplier. Burns and Carey also had been arrested in the preceding 

months, and investigations following their arrests revealed to 

law enforcement that Craft and Christian had been supplying 

them methamphetamine as well. 

In April 2019, a grand jury indicted Craft and Christian on 

one count of conspiracy to distribute over fifty grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1), and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Craft pleaded guilty 

in October 2019 without a plea agreement. Shaffer, Burns, and 

Carey were all indicted on the same charge, but in separate 

cases.

In anticipation of Craft’s sentencing hearing, the probation 

officer issued a presentence report (PSR). The PSR placed 
4 No. 22-3015 

Craft’s base offense level at 32, to which it added a two-level 

enhancement for maintaining a premises for the purpose of 

distributing methamphetamine under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) 

and a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for 

Craft’s role in the offense as an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants. After a threelevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Craft’s total 

offense level was 35. With a criminal history score of four, the 

PSR recommended a guidelines range of 210 to 262 months of 

imprisonment.

Craft initially only objected to the application of the premises enhancement, but he added an objection to the organizer 

or leader enhancement during his initial sentencing hearing. 

The district court gave Craft an opportunity to file a written 

objection regarding that enhancement. Meanwhile, the district court heard evidence as to the premises enhancement, 

and the government called Shaffer to testify about his involvement with Craft and Craft’s role within the conspiracy.

After this initial hearing, the parties briefed the application of the leadership enhancement, then they reconvened 

and resumed the sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the district court adopted the factual findings of the PSR. Although 

the court considered it a “very close question,” it overruled 

Craft’s objection to the application of the premises enhancement. In reaching this conclusion, the court credited the fact 

that Craft had used the proceeds of the drug sales to pay for

his rent and utilities. The district court also noted that Craft 

had no other income and that, on several occasions, Craft had

delivered methamphetamine to Shaffer at the house.

As for the leadership enhancement, the district court 

found that the record did not support the PSR’s 
No. 22-3015 5

recommendation to apply a four-level enhancement for 

Craft’s role as an organizer or leader. Nonetheless, the court 

found that the record supported a finding that Craft was a 

manager or supervisor and applied a two-level enhancement 

for Craft’s role in the offense. To support this finding, the 

court observed that Craft played a “critical role” in the conspiracy. The court further noted that Craft had supplied the 

drugs to Shaffer and that Craft knew Shaffer would later sell 

them.

The district court’s findings placed Craft at an offense level 

of 33, which resulted in a guidelines range of 168 to 210 

months of imprisonment. In the end, the district court sentenced Craft to a below-guideline sentence of 150 months to 

be followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Craft 

appeals.

II. Analysis

Craft raises two challenges to his sentence. First, he argues 

that the district court erred when it applied a two-level premises enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). Second, 

Craft maintains that the district court erred by applying a 

two-level enhancement for his role in the offense under 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. We address each of Craft’s arguments in 

turn.

A. Premises Enhancement 

Craft first challenges the district court’s application of the 

premises enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). When 

considering a challenge to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12)’s premises 

enhancement, we review the district court’s application of the 

enhancement de novo and its underlying factual findings for 
6 No. 22-3015 

clear error. United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 530 (7th 

Cir. 2013).

The Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement if 

“the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of 

manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). The application notes to 

§ 2D1.1(b)(12) provide that, for the enhancement to apply, 

manufacturing or distributing drugs need not be the “sole 

purpose” for which the premises was maintained. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1 cmt. n.17. At the same time, manufacturing or distributing drugs must at least be “one of the defendant’s primary 

or principal uses for the premises, rather than one of the defendant’s incidental or collateral uses for the premises.” Id.

The application notes further provide that, to determine 

whether distributing a controlled substance was a primary 

versus collateral use of the premises, sentencing courts should 

ask “how frequently the premises was used by the defendant 

for manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance and 

how frequently the premises was used by the defendant for 

lawful purposes.” Id. However, courts are not required to employ a “simple balancing test” that compares the frequency of 

lawful and unlawful activities. United States v. Contreras, 874 

F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 2017). This is because “such a test would 

immunize every family home that is also used for drug distribution.” Id. (citing Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 533). Instead, the 

sentencing court is to consider “both the frequency and significance of the illicit activities, including factors such as 

quantities dealt, customer interactions, keeping ‘tools of the 

trade’ and business records, and accepting payment.” Id.

(quoting Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 533). 
No. 22-3015 7

As an initial matter, the government does not argue (nor 

is there evidence in the record to suggest) that Craft ever manufactured methamphetamine in the home. Thus, because the 

Guideline requires a defendant to have “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” the district court’s application of the premises enhancement must rest on Craft’s use of the home to distribute methamphetamine. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) (emphasis 

added).

Here, the record is insufficient to support a finding that 

Craft maintained the premises for the “primary or principal” 

purpose of distributing controlled substances. The government has presented no evidence that Craft received or stored 

methamphetamine at his home for later distribution. And besides the “several” occasions when Craft transferred the 

methamphetamine to Shaffer at the home, there is no evidence that Craft sold methamphetamine to anyone else at or 

from the home. Nor did law enforcement officers discover any 

other evidence in the home, such as drug trafficking paraphernalia, that might otherwise indicate that Craft primarily 

used the premises for drug distribution.

We also find it significant that, besides the few occasions 

when Craft handed the drugs to Shaffer when they were both 

at the home, Craft most often transferred the drugs to Shaffer 

at a local gas station. The fact that Craft went out of his way 

to deliver the drugs to Shaffer away from his house (despite 

the fact that they both lived there) strongly indicates that distributing drugs was not a “primary or principal” use of the 

premises. And to the extent that Craft gave Shaffer the drugs 

on only “several occasions” when they were both home, these 
8 No. 22-3015 

transfers were merely incidental to Craft’s (and Shaffer’s) residence there.

Consider our recent decisions in this area. In Flores-Olague,

the defendant sold and stored drugs at his home on a daily 

basis over a three-year period and did not attempt to demonstrate to the court that there were any limitations on these activities. 717 F.3d at 533. And, unlike the present case, “no 

other locations for drug dealing” appeared in the record. Id. 

Based on these facts, we found that application of the twopoint premises enhancement was “clearly warranted.” Id. We 

similarly affirmed the district court’s application of the premises enhancement in Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284. In that case, the 

defendant’s activities were less frequent than in FloresOlague—rather than distributing drugs from the home on a 

daily basis, the defendant distributed drugs at his home on 

eight occasions, most occurring within a two-month period. 

Id. Still, we found that other facts made up for the relative infrequency of the defendant’s sales from the home. For example, the “government also presented evidence that drugs were 

shipped to and stored at Contreras’s home, that Contreras accepted payment for drugs at his home, and that other codefendants met at Contreras’s home to settle a narcotics debt.” 

Id. We also pointed to the large quantities dealt each time in 

upholding the enhancement. Id.

By contrast, the evidence that Craft maintained the home 

for the primary or principal purpose of distributing drugs is 

scant. Craft handed the drugs to Shaffer at the home as few as 

three times over the five-month period Shaffer lived there—

even less frequently than the eight transactions in two months 

in Contreras. And unlike in Contreras, here we lack other evidence that might otherwise make up for the relative 
No. 22-3015 9

infrequency of the transactions. Craft did not ship drugs to his 

home, nor did he personally store his supply there. And most 

of his transactions with Shaffer occurred outside of his home 

at a gas station. Unlike in Flores-Olague and Contreras, there is 

no evidence that Craft used his home for the primary or principal purpose of distributing drugs. 

Pressing its point, the government argues that the district 

court properly applied the enhancement because Craft had no 

other job and made his entire livelihood selling methamphetamine. It is true that, in the past, we have looked to whether a 

defendant makes their livelihood selling drugs when determining whether the premises enhancement should apply. See, 

e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 710 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2013), 

vacated on other grounds, 571 U.S. 801 (2013); Flores-Olague, 717 

F.3d at 534; United States v. Winfield, 846 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 

2017); United States v. Hopper, 934 F.3d 740, 765 (7th Cir. 2019). 

But, while this fact can move the needle somewhat by placing 

a defendant’s home-centered drug trafficking activity in context, we have never relied on it as the primary driver of the 

premises enhancement. 

This issue first came up in Sanchez, 710 F.3d at 731–32. 

There, we pointed to evidence that the defendant “regularly 

sold and stored drugs in his home” over a two-year period. 

Id. at 731. Then, to evaluate whether the activities were significant or frequent enough to consider them a principal use of 

the home, we noted that the defendant “was the largest 

wholesaler in a conspiracy responsible for nearly $2.5 million 

in drug trafficking” and that he “had no legitimate job and no 

source of income beyond his drug sales.” Id. at 732. As a result, we concluded that the activities must have been significant, in part because of the sheer volume of sales and the 
10 No. 22-3015 

defendant’s complete reliance on drug sales for his livelihood. 

And from this, we reasoned that the defendant’s distribution 

must have been a principal use of the premises, thus warranting application of the enhancement.

Our later cases have largely followed the same approach, 

using a defendant’s reliance on drug sale proceeds as one of 

many factors to suss out whether he had used his home for 

the primary or principal purpose of distributing drugs. In 

Winfield, for example, the defendant sold drugs to a confidential informant at his apartment on four different occasions 

over a twelve-week period. 846 F.3d at 241. When law enforcement officers searched his home pursuant to a warrant, they 

found a significant amount of cash, drug paraphernalia, heroin, and methamphetamine. Id. at 242. Later, Winfield admitted that he had flushed any drugs he had down the toilet 

when he realized that police officers were coming to search 

his home. Id. It was against this backdrop that we observed 

that Winfield had made his livelihood selling drugs and, as a 

result, that we thought it reasonable for the district court to 

conclude that Winfield “must have stored or sold additional 

quantities of drugs at his apartment than the relatively modest amounts recovered by police.” Id. at 243. Together, these 

facts supported the conclusion that “Winfield’s drug-related 

uses for his apartment were not merely ‘incidental’ to his residence there.” Id.; see also Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 533–34 

(considering a defendant’s partial livelihood selling drugs 

only to determine the “frequency and significance of illicit activities at the premises”).

These opinions teach that whether a defendant makes his 

livelihood selling drugs is not sufficient, by itself, to support 

the application of the premises enhancement. After all, the 
No. 22-3015 11

fact that a defendant earns his entire livelihood selling drugs 

does not necessarily mean he manufactures or sells those 

drugs at his home. Any other conclusion would be divorced 

from the text of the enhancement, which provides for a twolevel enhancement only if the premises is maintained for the 

purpose of “manufacturing or distributing” a controlled substance. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) (emphasis added). 

Here, the evidence does not leave us guessing as to 

whether distribution from Craft’s home was significant or frequent. To the contrary, the evidence shows (and the government does not dispute) that Craft’s distribution from the 

home was limited in scope—he only transferred the drugs to 

Shaffer there on “several” occasions, while he gave Shaffer 

drugs outside the home on many more. And there is no evidence that he sold drugs to anyone else from the home. In 

these circumstances, Craft’s livelihood selling drugs cannot, 

standing alone, serve as the basis for the district court’s application of the premises enhancement.1

Finally, the government insists that Shaffer’s storage of the 

drugs at the home for up to twenty-four hours before he left 

for Illinois supports the application of the premises enhancement. But we also see Shaffer’s fleeting storage of the drugs 

there as an “incidental” use of the premises—he only stored 

1 The district court also found it important that the proceeds of the 

drug sales were used to pay the household expenses. But for the same reasons just discussed, this evidence cannot by itself support the application 

of the premises enhancement. A defendant might use the proceeds of his 

drug sales to pay rent, but doing so does not suggest that drugs were manufactured in or distributed from the home.
12 No. 22-3015 

them there for less than twenty-four hours before he left for 

Illinois and because he was living with Craft. 

In the end, Craft’s sales of drugs to Shaffer in his home 

were limited to “several” occasions, while most of Craft’s 

sales to Shaffer occurred outside of his home. Thus, the record 

does not support a finding that Craft “maintained a premises 

for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled 

substance,” and the district court erred in applying the twolevel enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). 

B. Craft’s Role in the Offense

Craft next argues that the record does not support the application of a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 

for being a manager or supervisor in the drug operation. 

When considering a challenge to an enhancement under 

§ 3B1.1 of the Guidelines, we review de novo whether the factual findings of the district court adequately support the application of the enhancement. United States v. House, 883 F.3d 

720, 723 (7th Cir. 2018). We review the underlying factual 

findings for clear error. Id.

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 provides for sentencing enhancements 

based on a defendant’s role in the offense. If a crime involved 

five or more participants or was “otherwise extensive,” a defendant receives a four-level enhancement if he is an “organizer or leader” of the scheme under § 3B1.1(a), and a threelevel enhancement if he is a “manager or supervisor” under 

§ 3B1.1(b). If the defendant was an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” but the crime did not involve five or more 

participants and is not “otherwise extensive,” a defendant receives a two-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(c). 
No. 22-3015 13

Although the Guidelines do not expressly define manager 

or supervisor, we have said that “a manager or supervisor 

should be straightforwardly understood as simply someone 

who helps manage or supervise a criminal scheme.” House, 

883 F.3d at 724 (quoting United States v. Grigsby, 692 F.3d 778, 

790 (7th Cir. 2012)). In other words, our primary goal is to 

make a “commonsense judgment about the defendant’s relative culpability given his status in the criminal hierarchy.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Dade, 787 F.3d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir. 

2015)). 

We think there is enough evidence in the record to support 

application of the manager or supervisor enhancement here. 

Several facts indicate that Craft managed or supervised others 

in carrying out the operation and, therefore, is more culpable 

than other members of the conspiracy. For example, once the 

distributors sold the methamphetamine they received from 

Craft, Craft managed the profits, paid the household bills, and 

split the proceeds evenly among himself and Shaffer. See

Grigsby, 692 F.3d at 791 (affirming application of the manager 

or supervisor enhancement where the defendant took custody of the proceeds and divided them among coconspirators); see also House, 883 F.3d at 724 (same). Craft also enlisted 

Shaffer and Burns to the conspiracy. See United States v. Watts, 

535 F.3d 650, 660 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding the application of 

§ 3B1.1(c) because the defendant recruited his wife into a bank 

fraud scheme). In addition, Carey reported to law enforcement agents that Craft and Shaffer had closed-door meetings 

to discuss their drug business, suggesting that Craft and Shaffer were higher on the hierarchy relative to Carey and the others. See United States v. Hawkins, 796 F.3d 843, 872 (8th Cir. 

2015) (citing defendant’s participation in closed-door 
14 No. 22-3015 

meetings as evidence supporting the district court’s application of the manager or supervisor enhancement).

Craft retorts that the enhancement should not apply because he did not direct Shaffer or anyone else where to sell 

drugs. But the district court adopted the PSR’s factual findings without objection, and the PSR found that Craft directed 

Christian, demonstrating that Craft had exercised at least 

some level of control over other participants in the operation. 

We have said that, “[t]o apply the enhancement, a court need 

only find that the defendant directed at least one other person.” United States v. Beechler, 68 F.4th 358, 369 (7th Cir. 2023) 

(citing United States v. Hernandez, 309 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 

2002)). 

In any event, a defendant may still be eligible for the enhancement even without evidence that they controlled others. 

See Dade, 787 F.3d at 1167 (stating that control is “just one 

measure”). Even if we were to disregard the PSR’s finding 

that Craft had directed Christian, we have other evidence sufficient to support a finding that Craft was a manager or supervisor—namely, that Craft managed the proceeds, recruited 

others to the conspiracy, and participated in closed-door 

meetings without other members of the conspiracy.

Finally, Craft insists that his role in the operation was limited to sourcing the methamphetamine, which he says indicates he was not higher on the criminal hierarchy than other 

members of the operation. There is no doubt that, under our 

precedent, “[s]upplying drugs and negotiating the terms of 

their sale do not by themselves justify a Section 3B1.1 increase.” United States v. Weaver, 716 F.3d 439, 444 (7th Cir. 

2013) (quoting United States v. Vargas, 16 F.3d 155, 160 (7th Cir. 

1994)). But, as discussed, here we have additional evidence 
No. 22-3015 15

that Craft was higher on the criminal hierarchy compared to 

the others. Our finding that Shaffer was a manager or supervisor does not solely rest on Craft’s role in supplying the 

drugs.

Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in 

applying the manager or supervisor enhancement to Craft’s 

sentence.2

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of 

the district court and REMAND for resentencing consistent 

with this opinion.

2 We note that the district court applied a two-level enhancement instead of the three-level enhancement provided for in § 3B1.1(b) for managers or supervisors of crimes that involve five or more participants. Since 

the government did not file a cross-appeal, we do not reach this issue on 

appeal. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244–45 (2008).