i

The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP

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at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

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iii

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The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

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The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct 

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The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

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v

Strategic Studies Institute

and 

U.S. Army War College Press

THE LAND, SPACE, AND CYBERSPACE NEXUS: 

EVOLUTION OF THE OLDEST MILITARY 

OPERATIONS IN THE NEWEST MILITARY 

DOMAINS

Jeffrey L. Caton

March 2018

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

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of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public 

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101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
vi

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ISBN 1-58487-779-0
vii

FOREWORD

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations predicts 

that space and cyberspace will become increasingly 

important to joint operations and “will become both а 

precursor to and integral part of armed combat in the 

land, maritime and air domains.”1 How are U.S. military operations in the newest domains of space and 

cyberspace being integrated with operations in the 

traditional domain of land? In this monograph, Mr. 

Jeffrey Caton explores various aspects of this question 

by examining existing doctrine, operations in multiple 

domains, and future operations. His work was completed before the April 2017 release of the U.S. Army 

Field Manual (FM) 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations. He argues that the current state of military doctrine in the relatively new domains of space 

and cyberspace includes adequate means to support 

land-based joint operations. Further, he contends that 

knowledge of the nature of these new domains is not 

intuitive and understanding their unique characteristics and capabilities is still a challenge for the military 

force writ large. To address some of the challenges 

facing cross-domain operations, Mr. Caton provides 

recommendations in the areas of domain definitions, 

command relationships, and military theory. This 

monograph should inform the current work of the 

Army and Marine Corps in their exploration of the 

multi-domain battle concept.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press
ENDNOTES - FOREWORD

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 

September 10, 2012, p. 2.

viii
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JEFFREY L. CATON is President of Kepler Strategies LLC, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, a veteran-owned 

small business specializing in national security, cyberspace theory, and aerospace technology. He is also 

an Intermittent Professor of Program Management 

with Defense Acquisition University. From 2007 to 

2012, Mr. Caton served on the U.S. Army War College 

(USAWC) faculty, including Associate Professor of 

Cyberspace Operations and Defense Transformation 

Chair. Over the past 7 years, he has presented lectures 

on cyberspace and space issues related to international 

security in the United States, Sweden, the United 

Kingdom, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and the Czech Republic, supporting programs such as the Partnership 

for Peace Consortium and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of 

Excellence. His current work includes research on the 

nexus of cyberspace, space, and landpower doctrine 

issues as part of the External Research Associates Program of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). Mr. Caton 

is also a member of the Editorial Board for Parameters

magazine. He served 28 years in the U.S. Air Force 

working in engineering, space operations, joint operations, and foreign military sales including command 

at the squadron and group level. Mr. Caton holds a 

bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering from the 

University of Virginia, a master’s degree in aeronautical engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a master’s degree in strategic studies from 

the Air War College.

xi

SUMMARY

Over the last century, the domains of air, space, 

and cyberspace have joined the traditional warfighting 

domains of land and sea. While the doctrine for land 

operations is relatively mature, the doctrine for space 

and cyberspace continue to evolve, often in an unstructured manner. This monograph examines the relationships among these domains and how they apply to 

U.S. Army and joint warfighting. It concentrates on 

the central question: How are U.S. military operations 

in the newest domains of space and cyberspace being 

integrated with operations in the traditional domain of 

land? This inquiry is divided into three major sections: 

• Existing Doctrine: This section explores the 

current state of joint and U.S. Army doctrinal 

development for each of the domains of land, 

space, and cyberspace. The discussion assumes 

the reader is familiar with the doctrine of land 

operations, and thus it focuses more on the 

newer and lesser-known domains of space and 

cyberspace.

• Operations in Multiple Domains: This section 

explores the concept of cross-domain synergy 

and its ability to enhance globally integrated 

operations. It also examines the existing processes and entities defined in doctrine that 

provide expertise and support to joint force 

commanders.

• Future Operations: This section explores probable future operating environments as well as 

the resulting implications for U.S. Army and 

joint force development. It also identifies operational challenges that cut across all domains. 

It includes recommendations for policymakers 
xii

and senior leaders regarding the future development and integration of space and cyberspace doctrine.

The scope of this monograph extends from current doctrine toward the anticipated operational environment over the next 20 years. Material considered 

and presented here is limited to unclassified and open 

source information; therefore, any classified discussion must occur via another venue. This monograph 

provides cursory summaries and observations of over 

a thousand pages of official joint and service documentation. Thus, it serves as a synopsis with analysis 

of the important issues related to joint operations in 

land, space, and cyberspace. This information should 

allow senior policymakers, decision makers, military 

leaders, and their respective staffs to gain common 

understanding and professional appreciation for the 

wide array of frameworks and concepts as well as their 

interconnections. Of course, the reader should always 

defer to the full text for details and context.
1

THE LAND, SPACE, AND CYBERSPACE NEXUS: 

EVOLUTION OF THE OLDEST MILITARY 

OPERATIONS IN THE NEWEST MILITARY 

DOMAINS

Over the last century, the domains of air, space, 

and cyberspace have joined the traditional warfighting 

domains of land and sea. While the doctrine for land 

operations is relatively mature, the doctrine for space 

and cyberspace continue to evolve, often in an unstructured manner. This monograph examines the relationships among these domains and how they apply to 

U.S. Army and joint warfighting. It concentrates on 

the central question: How are U.S. military operations 

in the newest domains of space and cyberspace being 

integrated with operations in the traditional domain of 

land? This inquiry is divided into three major sections: 

examination of existing doctrine in the three domains; 

analysis of operations in multiple domains; and analysis of the anticipated future joint operating environment (JOE) and the resulting implications for Army 

and joint operations and force development.

EXISTING DOCTRINE

joint doctrine—Fundamental principles that guide 

the employment of United States military forces in 

coordinated action toward a common objective and 

may include terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures 

[emphasis added].1

In January 2012, President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta endorsed new strategic guidance for 21st-century defense priorities. 

Operations in cyberspace and space were among the 

10 mission areas explicitly identified for additional 
2

investment as the guidance asserted: “Modern armed 

forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations 

without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace and space.”2

Put simply, doctrine documents the best way to 

conduct military operations based on experience of 

the past, capabilities of the present, and expectations 

of the future. This section explores the current state of 

doctrinal development for each of the domains of land, 

space, and cyberspace. First, it identifies the foundations for current joint operational doctrine. Next, it 

focuses on the domain-specific joint doctrine publications, and finally, it considers U.S. Army doctrine for 

the domains. The discussion assumes the reader is 

familiar with the doctrine of land operations, and thus 

it focuses more content and details on the newer and 

lesser-known domains of space and cyberspace. Let 

us begin with a look at the overarching tenets of joint 

doctrine.

Joint Doctrine for Operations in Traditional 

Domains

Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint 

forces and those Service forces employed in specified 

command relationships with each other, which of 

themselves do not establish joint forces [emphasis in 

original].3

Military doctrine has been evolving for centuries. 

During most of this time military forces consisted of 

armies and navies, but within the last century U.S. 

military forces have formally adopted a construct that 

added three new domains—air, space, and cyberspace—to those of land and sea. With the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff following World War II, 
3

doctrine has become increasingly complex to address 

coordinated operations in multiple domains that may 

include actions from other U.S. Government entities as 

well as those of other nations.4

At the top of the current doctrine hierarchy is the 

capstone document Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for 

the Armed Forces of the United States, which provides the 

theory and foundation for subsequent doctrine publication.5

 Inspired by scholars such as Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, JP 1 places joint operations within 

the larger context of the nature of war that involves 

many potential instruments of national power as well 

as introduces the enduring principles of war and joint 

functions that are covered in greater detail in capstone 

publications.6 It also introduces the joint force structure 

with dedicated components for land, air, maritime, and 

special operations components as well as outlines command and control (C2) structures and authorities.7

 As 

its title implies, the final chapter of JP 1 addresses joint 

force development, which includes the fundamentals 

of joint concepts, doctrine, education, and training. It is 

interesting to note that in JP 1 cyberspace is not listed 

as a domain, but rather as part of the information environment. In fact, JP 1 refers to “physical domain(s)” 

only three times, and it fails to explicitly identify these 

domains in the document.8

The next level in the joint doctrine hierarchy is the 

keystone publications that include JP 3-0, Joint Operations. In addition to describing the fundamentals and 

art of joint operations, it devotes a chapter to the six 

functions:

grouped together to help JFCs [joint force commanders] 

integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. 

. . . C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, 

protection, and sustainment [emphasis in original].9
4

JP 3-0 also discusses the nine enduring principles of 

war identified in JP 1—objective, offensive, mass, 

maneuver, economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity—plus the three additional 

ones of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.10 Like 

JP 1, JP 3-0 lists cyberspace as part of the information 

environment rather than in the list of domains, which 

it specifies as “air, land, maritime, and space.”11 Potentially adding to the confusion in discussing joint operations is the fact that “domain” is not defined in joint 

doctrine.

Doctrine publications comprise the final level of 

the joint hierarchy and these include documents that 

address the C2 for the joint operations of land, maritime, and air forces.12 These are the most mature 

doctrine in terms of compiled experience, and they 

each have firm foundations in military theory, such 

as those of Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini for 

land; Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett for maritime; and Hugh Trenchard and William 

Mitchell for air. Space and cyberspace operations (CO) 

each have joint publications as well, but generally lack 

the benefit of developed military theory as their foundation and often devolve to technical descriptions of 

their operation. Let us now examine how well space 

and cyberspace are incorporated into the current doctrine for land operations.

Joint Doctrine for Operations in the Land Domain

land domain. The area of the Earth’s surface ending at 

the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime 

domain in the landward segment of the littorals [emphasis 

in original].13
5

JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations is centered on the concept of the joint force land 

component commander (JFLCC) as key link between 

the JFC and the C2 of joint land operations. Assigning 

a JFLCC provides the JFC with “the ability to enhance 

synchronization of operations not only between US 

ground and component forces, but also with multinational land forces [emphasis in original].”14 The current JP 3-31 (February 2014) identifies five major forms 

of land operations that the JFLCC may accomplish: 

offensive, defensive, stability, homeland defense, and 

defense support to civil authorities. It also discusses 

how the six joint functions apply to land operations. 

JP 3-31 finishes with three appendices that provide 

additional details on the organization and planning of 

a JFLCC.15

To tackle complex operational and threat environments, JP 3-31 states up front “commanders at 

all levels should consider how space, cyberspace, 

and EMS [electromagnetic spectrum] capabilities 

enhance the effectiveness and execution of joint land 

operations.”16 Appendix I of this monograph provides verbatim excerpts of space- and cyberspace-related material contained in JP 3-31, but several items 

merit discussion here. Space operations can provide 

the JFLCC with “ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance]; missile tracking; launch detection; 

environmental monitoring; satellite communications 

[SATCOM]; position, navigation, and timing; and navigation warfare.”17 JP 3-31 emphasizes the benefits of 

global positioning system (GPS) and satellite imagery 

that provide valuable terrain information and personnel situational awareness for land-based operations 

as well as the communications that “may provide a 

critical link in the C2 architecture.”18 It is interesting 

to note that the JFLCC may also serve as the space 
6

coordinating authority (SCA), but would most likely 

delegate this responsibility to the senior space officer 

on their staff.19 The SCA will be covered in more detail 

under space doctrine discussions.

With regard to CO, JP 3-31 asserts that many 

advances in joint land operations “have been realized 

through the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic 

spectrum (EMS), which has enabled the US military 

and allies to communicate and reach across geographic 

and geopolitical boundaries.”20 The JP advises the 

JFLCC to fully integrate CO capabilities into their plans 

with the purpose to “conduct CO to retain freedom of 

maneuver in cyberspace, accomplish objectives, deny 

freedom of action to adversaries, and enable other 

operational activities.”21 The C2 for such CO is accomplished via the JFC’s Joint Cyberspace Center (JCC), 

which should include a JFLCC representative. In its 

chapter on operations, JP 3-31 explicitly distinguishes 

between CO, information operations (IO), and communications synchronization.

The inclusion of space and CO into JFLCC doctrine 

thus far appears to be appropriate, especially considering how recent the joint doctrine was introduced for 

cyberspace (12 months prior) and updated for space 

(8 months prior). The JFLCC notional headquarters 

includes both space and cyberspace sections aligned 

under the J-33 current operations. Also, the notional 

joint land operation plan explicitly includes these capabilities in its annexes—appendix 16 to annex C (Operations) covers CO; annex K (Communication Systems) 

includes cyberspace defense; and annex N focuses 

on space operations. Finally, a cursory review of the 

current doctrine for the joint force air and maritime 

component commanders (joint force air component 

commander via JP 3-30 and joint force maritime component commander via 3-32) reveals that they contain 
7

much less detail when compared to JFLCC doctrine 

with regard to how space and CO are integrated in the 

other traditional domains. The joint doctrine for special operations (JP 3-05), which includes details on the 

C2 accomplished by the joint force special operations 

component commander’s incorporation of space and 

CO, is on par with that of JP 3-31.

Joint Doctrine for Operations in the Space Domain

Space is a domain enabling many joint force-essential 

capabilities. These capabilities derive from exploitation of 

the unique characteristics of space, among which include 

a global perspective and lack of overflight restrictions, as 

well as the speed and persistence afforded by satellites.22

JP 3-14, Space Operations was first released in August 

2002, and it addressed space operations focused on 

the combatant command (CCMD) of U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) that was established in 1985. 

Ironically, after 17 years of waiting for joint space 

doctrine, large portions of JP 3-14 were obsolete only 

months later when USSPACECOM was disestablished 

and its missions moved under the new U.S. Strategic 

Command (USSTRATCOM) under changes mandated 

by the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).23 JP 3-14 

was updated in 2009 to reflect the new organization of 

space forces under USSTRATCOM and updated to its 

current version in May 2013.

From the start, the JP 3-14 portrays space as a domain 

to support operations in the terrestrial domains, noting, 

“space capabilities have proven to be significant force 

multipliers when integrated into military operations 

[emphasis added].”24 It emphasizes that space capabilities are sought by friendly nations and adversaries as 

well as commercial entities, making the space domain 

a “congested, contested, and competitive environment.”25 JP 3-14 asserts four unique characteristics of 
8

the space domain: no geographical boundaries; orbital 

mechanics; environmental considerations of space 

weather and orbital debris; and EMS dependency. 

While it claims “international law does not extend a 

nation’s territorial sovereignty up to Earth orbit,” JP 

3-14 also includes a section on critical legal considerations regarding obligations to international law for 

U.S. space operations.26 However, the publication does 

not mention the crucial role of the United Nation’s 

(UN) International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 

allocating SATCOM orbits and radio spectrum.27

The current JP 3-14 identifies five joint space mission areas: space situational awareness (added in this 

revision); space force enhancement; space support; 

space control; and space force application. The mission of space force enhancement provides the most 

direct benefits to forces in other domains by providing 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; missile 

tracking; launch detection; environmental monitoring; 

SATCOM; positioning, navigation, and timing; and 

navigation warfare.28 Since the 2002 UCP change, joint 

space operations are conducted by USSTRATCOM, 

with the bulk of daily activities managed by the Joint 

Functional Component Commander for Space (JFCC 

SPACE), who provides “unity of command and unity 

of effort in the unimpeded delivery of joint space capabilities to supported commanders and, when directed, 

to deny the benefits of space to adversaries.”29 Two 

other authorities of interest in JP 3-14 are the designation of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) as the 

supported command for SATCOM and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) as the only authorized 

provider of SATCOM for the Department of Defense 

(DoD).30
9

For joint operations, the space coordinating 

authority (SCA) has the responsibility for planning 

and integrating space capabilities. The SCA may be 

delegated to the JFC for a specific operation who in 

turn may designate a component command or other 

individual to serve as the SCA.31 For land operations, 

JP 3-14 states that the U.S. Army integrates space capabilities into their units using space support elements 

(SSEs), which coordinate with the SCA.32 All space 

operations integration into joint planning includes 

the use of Annex N of a standard operational plan to 

describe space forces and capabilities relevant to the 

specific nature of the plan. JP 3-14 emphasizes that 

planners need to grasp the high-demand/low-density 

nature of some space capabilities as well as the challenges of space force augmentation or reconstitution.33

To provide overt connections to the joint tenets, 

JP 3-14 includes an overview of the 12 principles of 

joint operations from the perspectives of employing 

and enabling operations in the space domain, offering examples but no in-depth discussion.34 Finally, to 

improve awareness of these limited resources, almost 

one-third of JP 3-14 is in the form of appendices that 

provide further detail into certain space capabilities as 

well as the technical “rocket science” nature of space 

operations.35

Although it got off to a slow start, the publication 

of joint space doctrine has evolved steadily since its 

introduction in 2002. However, there is still no widely 

accepted theory for military space operations and no 

definition for the space domain codified in joint doctrine. Both of these situations will be addressed in 

more detail later in this monograph.
10

Joint Doctrine for Operations in the Cyberspace 

Domain

cyberspace. A global domain within the information 

environment consisting of the interdependent networks 

of information technology infrastructures and resident 

data, including the Internet, telecommunications 

networks, computer systems, and embedded processors 

and controllers [emphasis in original].36

Although military operations in cyberspace have 

been occurring for decades, it was not until 2010 that 

the DoD publicly codified cyberspace “as relevant a 

[man-made] domain for DoD activities as the naturally occurring domains of land, sea, air, and space.”37

In July 2011, this pronouncement was further clarified as the inaugural DoD cyberspace strategy made 

its first of five strategic initiatives to “treat cyberspace 

as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip 

so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s 

potential.”38 This strategy followed 6 months after the 

establishment of the initial operational capability of 

USCYBERCOM.

Initially released in February 2013 as a secret document, JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations was published in 

its current unclassified format as JP 3-12 (R) in October 

2014.39 The publication establishes a conceptual framework of cyberspace as three layers: a physical network 

layer that enables a logical network layer upon which 

operations are initiated by entities in the cyber-persona 

layer.40 The intent of CO is to: 

enhance operational effectiveness and leverage various 

capabilities from physical domains to create effects, which 

may span multiple geographic combatant commanders’ 

(GCCs’) AOR [area of responsibility].41
11

As with space operations, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM), has overall 

responsibility for CO, most of which are carried out 

by the sub-unified USCYBERCOM. The JP identifies three types of CO missions: offensive CO (OCO), 

defensive CO (DCO), and DoD Information Network 

(DODIN) operations; it also defines related cyberspace 

actions that may be employed to accomplish the CO 

missions.42 To help clarify these missions and actions, 

JP 3-14 (R) discusses in considerable detail how the six 

joint functions apply to CO.43

With regard to authorities, roles, and responsibilities, JP 3-12 (R) includes not only the U.S. Code Title 

10 duties for joint cyberspace forces, but also potential support to other U.S. Government departments 

for national responses to cyberspace incidents as well 

as the protection of critical infrastructure and key 

resources (CIKR).44 The publication identifies cyberspace support elements (CSEs) as the deployed units 

that integrate USCYBERCOM capabilities to CCMDs. 

CSEs help to achieve situational awareness in cyberspace as well as to develop target lists and synchronize 

joint fires in part through their coordination with the 

CCMD JCC (see Appendix II of this monograph for 

depiction of cyberspace C2 structure).45

Finally, JP 3-12 (R) considers how joint operations 

in cyberspace should mesh with joint, interorganizational, and international planning and coordination. 

It makes a crucial caveat regarding the complexity of 

cyberspace, noting, “second and higher order effects 

in and through cyberspace can be more difficult to 

predict, necessitating more branches and sequels in 

plans.”46 For the integration and synchronization of 

joint fires, use of cyberspace capabilities will follow 

an existing coordination apparatus, such as working 
12

groups and prioritized target lists. Importantly, the JP 

clarifies that cyberspace capabilities may be not only a 

viable option for engaging joint targets, but also may 

be the best choice.47

Compared to joint space doctrine, the publication 

of the first joint cyberspace doctrine came soon after its 

designation as a warfighting domain. As with space, 

there is no widely accepted theory for military CO 

yet, and there remain significant uncertainties regarding how CO relates (or should relate) to IO and EMS 

constructs.48

Table 1 summarizes the major missions areas identified in joint publications for land, space, and CO. It 

also indicates whether a joint publication addressed 

the joint functions and principle of joint operations. 

Given this basic understanding of the key elements of 

the joint doctrine for these domains, let us now examine how U.S. Army doctrine treats them.
13

Table 1. Comparison of Land, Space, and 

Cyberspace Joint Operations Doctrine.49

Army Land Operations Doctrine

Following the establishment of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), doctrine 

for Landpower has evolved from the venerable Field 

Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (1976, 1982, 1986, 1993 

versions), to the new designation of FM 3-0, Operations (2001, 2008 versions), and finally to the current 

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) No. 3-0, Unified 

Land Operations.

50 Published in October 2011 as part 

of the Doctrine 2015 initiative, ADP 3-0 is the latest 

evolution of the capstone document that provides a Domain Joint Doctrine and Operational Missions Specified Therein Joint Functions Addressed? Principles of War/ Joint Operations Addressed?

Land JP 3-31 (February 2014)

•	 Offensive operations

•	 Defensive operations

•	 Stability operations

•	 Homeland defense

•	 Defense support of civil authorities

Yes No

Space JP 3-14 (May 2013)

•	 Space situational awareness

•	 Space force enhancement

•	 Space support

•	 Space control

•	 Space force application

No Yes

Cyberspace JP 3-12 (February 2013)

•	 OCO

•	 DCO

•	 DODIN operations

Yes No
14

common operational concept for U.S. Army forces that 

must “operate across the range of military operations, 

integrating their actions with joint, interagency, and 

multinational partners as part of a larger effort.”51 The 

main focus of U.S. Army units in this team effort is 

to “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and 

maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained 

land operations to create conditions for favorable conflict resolution.”52

ADP 3-0 recognizes that the dynamic operational 

environment includes interactions with other domains. 

It identifies the foundations of unified land operations 

as initiative, decisive action, U.S. Army core competencies (combined arms maneuver and wide area security), and mission command. It also presents the tenets 

of unified land operations as flexibility, integration, 

lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. 

ADP 3-0 discusses six warfighting functions consistent 

with those of joint doctrine, except that the U.S. Army 

replaces C2 with mission command. A concise document by design, ADP 3-0 refers to space and cyberspace as domains in the operational environment, but 

does not include any other specific details with regard 

to how the domains affect land operations.53

Army Space Operations Doctrine

In 2006, TRADOC published Pamphlet 525-7-

4, Space Operations Concept Capability Plan (CCP), in 

part to “Systematically and deliberately evolve Army 

space support operations over time to provide dedicated, responsive theater focused support to operational and tactical commanders.”54 The CCP stresses 

the joint interdependency of military operations, and 

asserts that “space operations are inherently joint, and 

joint interdependence is essential for the conduct of 
15

all space operations.”55 Pamphlet 525-7-4 identifies the 

Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army 

Forces Strategic Command as the Army Service component to joint space operations that provides support for SATCOM, theater missile warning, blue force 

tracking, and situational awareness.56 The CCP uses 

a detailed operational vignette to demonstrate how 

space capabilities would support the Army Modular 

Force construct and concludes, “space power must 

be viewed in the larger construct of joint operations. 

Army space operations depend on the successful Army 

and joint transformation and exploitation of the space 

domain.”57

The U.S. Army published the first FM 3-14, Space 

Support to Army Operations in 2005, which superseded 

FM 100-18 (1995) under the older doctrine system. 

FM 3-14 was updated in 2010 and again updated in 

August 2014 to its current version, Army Space Operations.

58 This latest version added a distribution restriction, therefore its content cannot be discussed in detail 

herein.59 In general terms, FM 3-14 remains very consistent with the content of JP 3-14, echoing the five joint 

mission areas for space. FM 3-14 also discusses how the 

foundations and tenets of unified land operations from 

ADP 3-0 apply to space operations. It then provides 

details regarding how the U.S. Army organizes space 

units as well as how SSEs support different U.S. Army 

echelons. For practical application, FM 3-14 includes an 

appendix that provides a detailed template for Annex 

N to joint plans and orders.

U.S. Army Cyberspace Operations (CO) Doctrine

In February 2010, TRADOC released the Cyberspace 

Operations Concept Capabilities Plan (Pamphlet 525-7-8), 

with its central idea of:
16

prevailing in the cyber-electromagnetic contest means 

making progress at the same time along three lines of 

effort: gaining advantage, protecting that advantage, and 

placing adversaries at a disadvantage.60

Pamphlet 525-7-8 emphasizes the interrelated nature 

of cyberspace operations (CyberOps or CO), electronic 

warfare (EW), and IO, and proposes that the U.S. 

Army address these complex notions at three levels: a 

psychological contest of wills, a strategic engagement, 

and a cyber-electromagnetic contest.61 The Cyberspace Operations CCP offers a CyberOps framework 

comprised of four components: cyber situational

awareness (CyberSA), cyber network operations 

(CyNetOps), cyber warfare (CyWar), and cyber support (CySpt).62 The pamphlet appendices use three 

operational vignettes to help identify and propose

many required capabilities for CyberOps. As 

intended, the CCP provides the conceptual foundation upon which subsequent U.S. Army 

cyberspace doctrine—FM 3-38 and FM 3-12—is built.

Published in February 2014, FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, is the first attempt by the U.S. 

Army to produce an FM focused on integration and 

synchronizing of the new concept of cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA).63 FM 3-38 provides an overview of the CEMA concept and the commander’s role 

in CEMA operations (see Appendix III of this monograph for a graphic depiction of the CEMA concept). It 

then dedicates a chapter to the tactics and procedures 

for three areas: CO, EW, and spectrum management 

operations. The FM closes with discussion on how 

CEMA is planned, integrated, and executed in unified 

land operations.

FM 3-38 was released a year after the release of the 

classified JP 3-12, and its description of CO are consistent with details of the releasable version of JP 3-12 
17

(R) that followed 8 months later. The FM echoes the 

three-layer depiction of cyberspace (physical, logical, 

cyber-persona) as well as the three missions of cyberspace forces (OCO, DCO, and DODIN) and Cyberspace Operational Preparation of the Environment 

(C-OPE). It also provides details on the interfaces 

between CEMA and LandWarNet (the U.S. Army’s 

portion of the DODIN) in CO and DODIN planning 

and operations.

There are many favorable aspects of the content 

in FM 3-38. First, the FM embraces the cross-domain 

nature of cyberspace. Next, it explicitly spells out the 

soldier’s role in CEMA to help them better “understand 

the relationship between cyberspace and the EMS and 

maintain the necessary protection measures when 

using devices that leverage this relationship between 

capabilities.”64 The FM presents the CEMA element as 

the part of a commander’s staff that “integrates CEMA 

into the operations process from theater Army through 

brigade”65 as well as a CEMA working group to coordinate with internal and external units and centers.66

Finally, FM 3-38 provides a practical and detailed template for documenting CEMA as appendix 12 to annex 

C (Operations) in a standard joint operations plan or 

order.

Attempts to develop U.S. Army cyberspace doctrine 

have been in work for years, but the proposed FM 3-12, 

Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations had not yet 

been published at the conclusion of the research for 

this monograph.67 Despite the delay in the completion 

of this FM, the U.S. Army is doing well with incorporating space and cyberspace into traditional land operations. To apply this information to the education of 

its senior leaders, the U.S. Army War College’s Center 

for Strategic Leadership released a Strategic Cyberspace Operations Guide in June 2016.68 However, there 
18

remains much to do as land-based operations adapt to 

space and cyberspace domains that continue to evolve 

and grow in their significance to operations across 

multiple domains.

OPERATIONS IN MULTIPLE DOMAINS

Having reviewed the basic joint and U.S. Army 

doctrine for land, space, and cyberspace, let us now 

explore how operations in the domains interact. This 

section explores the concept of cross-domain synergy 

and its ability to enhance globally integrated operations. It also examines the existing processes and entities defined in doctrine that provide expertise and 

support to JFCs. Do joint forces in these three domains 

have existing means available to facilitate cross-domain synergy?

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)

To support the President’s and Secretary of 

Defense’s 21st-century defense priorities, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff published the new Capstone Concept 

for Joint Operations for Joint Force 2020 (CCJO) in September 2014. Its central concept is globally integrated 

operations that embody eight key elements.69 The 

CCJO predicts that space and cyberspace will become 

increasingly important to joint operations and “will 

become both а precursor to and integral part of armed 

combat in the land, maritime and air domains.”70 Space 

and cyberspace forces also present “flexible, low-signature or small-footprint capabilities” that are:

rapidly deployable, largely able to operate independently 

from logistically intensive forces, have operational reach, 

and can be persistent. Perhaps most significantly, their 
19

use does not always constitute an irreversible policy 

commitment.71

The CCJO also asserts that cyberspace capabilities 

enable global agility necessary to support “swift and 

adaptable military responses.”72 Further, it considers that adversaries may also find such operational 

advantages attractive and opt to attack exclusively in 

cyberspace.73

In its prognosis of future threat environments, the 

CCJO expects adversaries to obtain advanced capabilities that can be applied across multiple domains. 

To help posture joint forces for success, the globally 

integrated operations concept includes the key element of cross-domain synergy that will allow an integrated joint force “to exploit even small advantages in 

one domain to create or increase advantages in others, 

compounding those mutually reinforcing advantages 

until they overwhelm an enemy.”74

Cross-Domain Operations

In January 2016, the Joint Staff J-7 published the 

Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations Planner’s 

Guide in part to address this element of the CCJO’s goal 

of globally integrated operations. The guide defines 

cross-domain synergy as “the complementary vice 

merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness 

and compensates for the vulnerabilities of others.”75

The Planner’s Guide stresses that cross-domain synergy 

“is not an end in itself, but a by-product of effective 

joint planning.”76 It avers that the major challenge of 

achieving such synergy is for the JFC to access and 

utilize diverse domain expertise; hence, the guide 

provides a brief primer of how existing support and 

liaison elements can provide support within the joint 
20

operation planning process (JOPP).77 In turn, effective 

joint planning is dependent in part upon the planners’ 

knowledge of each domain’s strengths and vulnerabilities. While cross-domain operations have been an 

integral part of U.S. military operations for decades, 

the incorporation by planners of capabilities from the 

new domains of space and cyberspace is in its infancy.

Unique Domain Characteristics and Capabilities

The Planner’s Guide provides an overview of capabilities, characteristics, and operations for each of the 

traditional domains, plus space and cyberspace. It is 

useful to explore how the guide views the individual 

domains before looking at how it discusses cross-domain operations. Much of the guide’s material appears 

in joint doctrine, but it includes some new commentary as well. Let us examine how the guide portrays 

the domains for land, space, and cyberspace.

Land Domain. Table 2 presents an analysis of 

aspects of the land domain presented as unique by the 

Planner’s Guide. Although the proposed traits may be 

consistent with joint doctrine, collectively they are misleading. Certainly, land is not the only domain to have 

significant operational environment variations—all 

domains have such factors that help define the domain 

itself. Also, noncombatants are present in all physical 

domains, and their safety must be a consideration in 

joint operations. The two most distinctive characteristics of the land domain are: the ability to assemble 

large supply stores for sustained operations, and the 

slower movement of forces across land when compared to movement in other domains.
21

Note: *The text from this column is from the Cross-Domain 

Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner’s Guide.

78

Table 2. Assessment of Land Characteristics and 

Capabilities.

Land Domain

Proposed Unique Characteristic 

or Capability*

Critical Assessment

(a) Extreme variations in climate and 

terrain—urban, forest, desert, jungle, 

mountain, and arctic—present dramatically different operational environments.

(a) Not unique. Climate and topography also have significant 

implications for the design and operation of maritime, air, and space 

forces.

(b) Presence of people, especially 

non-combatants, effects options for use 

of military force.

(b) Not unique. Although the vast 

majority of Earth’s population lives 

on land, people are present in the 

sea domain for extended periods 

of time as well. Also, the presence 

of non-combatants must be considered in all domains. 

(c) The ability to sustain operations over 

long periods of time.

(c) Unique. One can argue that 

extended sea and air operations 

ultimately depend upon landbased assets through ports and 

airfields for long-duration sustainment.

(d) The speed and duration of movement on land is slower and more arduous than movement by air and sea.(d) Unique (on average). Movement of large land forces over unfamiliar terrain may be a limiting 

factor of a given operation.

(e) With respect to non-lethal effects, 

only land forces have directly useful 

capability that can be precisely applied 

in complex, human terrain. Non-lethal 

effects work through example and the 

potential threat of violence rather than 

the execution of that threat. Although 

all services have the ability to affect 

their counterparts through security assistance activities, only land forces can 

achieve the position (close to the population dispersed in complex land clutter) and duration (persistence) that permits sustained non-lethal effect.

(e) Inaccurate. The topic of this 

paragraph is unclear, but it contains several elements that are not 

necessarily tied to land. One can 

argue that cyberspace can also have 

long-term and persistent contact with 

dispersed populations to achieve 

non-lethal effects using means such 

as social media.
22

Space Domain. Table 3 shows the assessment of 

how the space domain is depicted in the Planner’s 

Guide. Upon examination, none of the characteristics 

or capabilities listed is truly unique. Indeed, operations 

in all domains must consider the environment, utilize 

EMS, and obey the laws of physics. The Planner’s Guide

defines space as “a medium like the land, sea, and air 

within which military activities shall be conducted to 

achieve US national security objectives,”79 however, 

this definition in not included in official joint doctrine. 

Despite the lack of a clear demarcation for space by 

the United States and many other countries, there are 

still many international treaties and conventions that 

attempt to govern its use.80

Space Domain

Proposed Unique Characteristic or 

Capability*

Critical Assessment

(a) There are no geographical 

boundaries in space. As a Global 

Commons, space overcomes the international law aspect of a nation’s 

territorial sovereignty [emphasis in 

original].

(a) Not unique. One can argue that 

geosynchronous orbit spots have 

some equivalence to sovereignty 

based on the location and frequency use of the satellite.**

(b) Satellites are subject to the laws 

of orbital mechanics. Adjustments to 

orbits expend fuel and reduce asset 

life span.

(b) Not unique. All physical domains are subject to the laws of 

physics.

(c) Environmental considerations 

place demands on satellites’ characteristics to include size, weight, and 

power, further hindering the spacecraft’s performance and life span.

(c) Not unique. Recall that the land 

domain section also tried to claim 

the environment as its unique trait 

(see Table 2). Again, each domain 

must consider environmental factors in operational planning.

(d) Though space is infinite in expanse, certain altitudes and orbital 

patterns are advantageous. These 

portions of space are becoming 

crowded.

(d) Not a characteristic or capability. The statement is an observation 

about the current construct and 

population of space objects.

Table 3. Assessment of Space Characteristics and 

Capabilities.
23

Notes: *The text from this column is from the Cross-Domain 

Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner’s Guide.

81

 **For more on this topic, see Iulia-Diana Galeriu’s “‘Paper 

satellites’ and the free use of outer space.”82

Table 3. Assessment of Space Characteristics and 

Capabilities. (cont.)

Cyberspace Domain. Table 4 summarizes the analysis of how the cyberspace domain is described in 

the Planner’s Guide. Like the descriptions of land and 

space, the portrayal of cyberspace is fraught with inaccuracies, the most egregious of which are those that 

infer that activities in cyberspace are almost magic in 

that they are not subject to the limitations of time and 

space. In fact, the transmission of information must 

comply with the laws of physics, albeit on a much 

smaller scale than those of the traditional domains. 

The Planner’s Guide includes a table taken from a scholarly work that compares “Cyberspace vs. Traditional 

Warfare Domain Characteristic,” but the table contents 

do not match those in the guide’s text.83 Curiously, 

the guide omits the one unique aspect of cyberspace 

(e) Electromagnetic spectrum access 

is vital to space operations because it 

is the sole medium for space-based 

assets to transmit and receive information and/or signals [emphasis in 

original]. Therefore, JFCs must sufficiently control the EMS to interact 

with space systems.

(e) Not unique. Certainly use of the 

EMS enables space operations, but 

the EMS supports operations in all 

domains (this will be discussed in 

more detail in the implications section of this monograph).

(f) Space is no longer a domain exclusively transited by state actors. Many 

non-state actors maintain assets in 

orbit and often military capabilities 

(Iridium satellite phones, Virgin 

space tourism, etc.) employ these 

non-state assets.

(f) Not unique. Space has been 

used by nonstate actors since 1961, 

4 years after Sputnik 1. The evolution and proliferation of commercial and other nonstate space assets 

has evolved with military use.
24

explicitly noted in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 

Report: 

The man-made nature of cyberspace distinguishes it from 

other domains in which the U.S. armed forces operate. The 

Administration will continue to explore the implications 

of cyberspace’s unique attributes for policies regarding 

operations within it.84

FM 3-38 provides a much better rendering of 

cyberspace for those unfamiliar with the domain. 

The manual’s discussion on the characteristics of the 

cyberspace domain includes many concepts that merit 

attention, such as cyberspace as a system of systems; 

its dynamic and evolving nature; its lack of confinement to a physical site; and the continued maintenance 

required for its existence.85 FM 3-38 also includes an 

alternative definition that may provide better insight 

to planners: “Cyberspace is an environment created 

and maintained for the purpose of facilitating the use 

and exploitation of information, human interaction, 

and intercommunication.”86
25

Cyberspace Domain

Proposed Unique Characteristic or 

Capability*

Critical Assessment

(a) Cyberspace is a global enabler for 

expedient, dynamic information exchange impacting all aspects of life 

[emphasis in original]. It allows instantaneous information flow across 

the globe for financial transactions as 

well as the movement and tracking of 

products and goods. However, it also 

allows adversaries to access this information and disrupt vital operations 

from any location. Cyberspace is difficult to regulate due to ease of accessibility. From a military perspective, 

cyberspace activities rarely require 

movement of forces, allowing engagement from extended stand-off ranges. 

It also enables the influence of populations that are inaccessible through the 

other domains.

(a) Inaccurate. These characteristics 

appear to be more appropriate for 

describing a commons rather than 

a domain. Also, the use of “instantaneous information flow” is misleading since transmission of data 

through cyberspace takes a finite 

amount of time that has great relevance on the scale of timing for CO.** 

(b) Can be reverse engineered: Unlike 

munitions, which are normally destroyed upon use, cyberspace activities include code that can be saved, 

analyzed, and recoded for use against 

allies or friendly nations [emphasis in 

original]. Planners must account for 

the possibility of a “boomerang effect” 

in which cyber activities are turned 

against the originator through reverse 

engineering.

(b) Inaccurate. This proposed trait 

confuses the domain of cyberspace 

with the potential weapons used 

therein. It may not be possible to recreate all aspects of cyberspace for forensics or reserve engineering due to 

the nature of complex adaptive systems. Also, physical weapons may 

not detonate as intended and may be 

used in an improvised manner by an 

adversary or may leave behind remnants that are subject to forensics.

(c) No Single National/International 

Ownership: While someone owns each 

physical component of cyberspace, the 

whole of cyberspace is not under any 

single nations’ or entities’ complete 

control [emphasis in original]. The infrastructure is a disparate combination 

of public and private networks without standardized security or access 

controls. This arrangement enables 

free information flow, but the lack of 

controls hinders global accountability, 

standardization, and security.

(c) Not unique. No single nation or 

entity owns all of the land, maritime, 

air, or space domains either.

Table 4. Assessment of Cyberspace Characteristics 

and Capabilities. 
26

Cyberspace Domain

(d) Lack of Cooperation/Collaboration: The lack of international laws and 

regulations governing the environment complicates responses to actions 

in this domain [emphasis in original]. 

The difficulty in tracing the source of 

a cyberattack makes them easily deniable, especially if conducted by individual “hackers.” Further hindering 

collaboration is the tendency to deny 

that a cyberspace attack has occurred 

to prevent loss of trust in an organization’s cyber security measures.

(d) Inaccurate. While the processes 

are far from perfect, there is significant cooperation and collaboration 

in cyberspace through such organizations as the UN, European Union, 

International Criminal Police Organization, and the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO).*** 

In fact, one could argue that the Internet would not exist and function 

without ongoing cooperation and 

collaboration in cyberspace.

(e) Low Cost: Cyberspace is the most 

affordable domain through which to 

attack the United States [emphasis in 

original]. Viruses, malicious code, and 

training are readily available over the 

Internet at no cost. Adversaries can 

develop, edit, and reuse current tools 

for network attacks. Inexpensive tools 

and training allow an adversary to 

compete without costly ships, aircraft, 

or missiles. Furthermore, an adversary can impose significant financial 

burdens on nations that rely heavily 

on cyberspace by forcing them to invest in cyberspace defense. Currently, 

“military-grade” cyberspace capabilities remain too expensive for most malign actors, but they can buy relatively 

inexpensive services of professional 

hackers.

(e) Inaccurate. This characteristic 

would benefit from a more complete context. As stated, it reflects 

popular beliefs that readily available 

computer code can rival the power 

of sophisticated weapons systems. 

The concept of affordability here is 

misleading in that low-cost access 

to cyberspace does not equal capabilities of a nation state. One could 

argue that, given the same analogy, 

perhaps an assassin’s rifle is equal to 

the power of an army.

(f) Volatile: Successful cyberspace attacks depend on vulnerabilities within 

the adversary’s network [emphasis in 

original]. Identifying these vulnerabilities and creating cyberspace capabilities sometimes require great expense. 

If an adversary discovers the targeted 

network’s vulnerability and closes it, 

the cyberspace attack technique is rendered immediately and unexpectedly 

useless despite the development expense. For this reason, great care must 

be taken to prevent alerting adversaries to vulnerabilities in their networks.

(f) Inaccurate. The term “volatile” 

may apply to activities in cyberspace, 

but one can argue that such volatility 

also exists in land operations (e.g., 

the fog and friction of war). Perhaps a more useful characterization 

would be to model cyberspace as a 

complex adaptive system. It is interesting to note that there seems to be 

conflicting perspectives promulgated within this entry “(f)”and previous entry “(e)” regarding the cost of 

cyberspace attacks.

Table 4. Assessment of Cyberspace Characteristics 

and Capabilities. (cont.)
27

Cyberspace Domain

(g) Speed: Cyberspace operations [CO] 

occur quickly [emphasis in original]. 

However, preparation for those operations is often extensive. An intense 

study of the adversary’s network may 

be required to learn system specifications and understand patterns of life. 

Therefore, a cyberspace unit operating 

on one adversary’s networks may not 

be able to shift focus to another target 

without substantial preparation.

(g) Inaccurate and not unique. This 

entry mingles speed of operations, 

operations tempo, and C-OPE. Operations in other domains may also 

occur quickly after extended ISR and 

planning. As with characteristic entry “(a),” use of the word “quickly” 

is vague and of little use without a 

time scale for CO. 

(h) Unintentional cascading effects:

Another unique characteristic of cyberspace is the potential for unintended cascading effects [emphasis in original]. Capabilities and munitions in the 

natural domains lose momentum the 

greater distance from impact. However, physical distance means very 

little in cyberspace. While cyberspace 

capabilities are developed and evaluated in computer labs and cyberspace 

ranges, there can never be complete 

assurances as to how a capability will 

behave or where it might spread when 

introduced to the great expanse of cyberspace.

(h) Not unique and inaccurate. 

Physical weapons may also experience “unintended cascading effects.” 

Also, the assertion that “physical 

distance in cyberspace means very 

little” propagates an ignorance of the 

timescales of cyberspace activity. Information traveling through cyberspace is still subject to finite speeds 

that may affect their integration and 

synchronization with other operations.

(i) Layers: Cyberspace consists of three 

layers: Physical Network, Logical Network, and Cyber-Persona [emphasis 

in original].**** 

Adversaries might attack any of these 

layers to disrupt, degrade, or destroy 

cyberspace capability. Conversely, 

each of these layers presents a means 

to attack adversaries’ use of cyberspace [emphasis in original].

(i) Inaccurate. While this is useful 

information, it is one of many artificial constructs used to analyze 

cyberspace rather than an intrinsic 

characteristic. 

Notes: *The text from this column is from the Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner’s Guide.

87

 **For more on this topic, see the Internet Traffic Report.

88

 ***For more on this topic, see the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report 10-606.89

 ****For more on this topic, see the Planner’s Guide.

90

Table 4. Assessment of Cyberspace Characteristics 

and Capabilities. (cont.)
28

Some readers may find the assessments in Tables 

2 to 4 to be a bit pedantic; however, accuracy matters 

in the quest to equip joint planners with a full and 

common understanding of what a domain of military 

operations comprises. As an inaugural document to 

encourage cross-domain synergy, the Planner’s Guide

has considerable merit. It is reasonable to assume that 

the sections for specific domains were written or influenced by practitioners who may unwittingly advocate 

their domain vice merely describe it. Perhaps such bias 

may be addressed in future versions by comparing an 

impartial set of characteristics amongst the domains 

vice trying to argue for “unique” attributes. Surely, 

the development and acknowledgment of basic theory 

for military operations in space and cyberspace could 

provide the necessary foundation upon which to build 

better doctrine.

Support Relationships Among Domains

Having assessed the individual domain interpretations for land, space, and cyberspace, let us now 

consider how doctrine incorporates the means advocated in the Planner’s Guide to achieve cross-domain 

synergy. Table 5 is a composite of excerpts from doctrine covered in the first section of this monograph that 

are organized to illustrate how these three domains 

support each other’s missions. Note that this is not to 

be confused with a discussion of roles for supported 

versus supporting commanders. Clearly, there are 

ample examples in existing doctrine to demonstrate 

how the domains enable or enhance joint operations. 

Most of these examples would remain the same if sea 

or air substituted for land.
29

Domain 

with 

Capabilities

Supporting 

Domain with Supported Capabilities

Land Space Cyberspace

Land

Plan for and provide force protection for space infrastructure 

and forces assigned, deployed, 

and operating in their [CCMD] 

AOR.91

Operations in cyberspace rely 

on the links and nodes that exist in the natural domains. . . .

Operations in the other domains create effects in and 

through cyberspace by affecting the EMS, the data, or the 

physical infrastructure.92

Space

GPS plays a key role in military 

operations by enabling precise 

location and navigation in all four 

physical domains (land, maritime, 

air, and space).94

Space provides a key global 

connectivity option for CO.93

The inherent precision of GPS 

allows precise site surveys, 

emplacement of artillery, target 

acquisition, and navigation. GPS 

establishes a “common reference 

grid” within the operational area, 

enables a “common time,” helps 

establish “common direction,” 

and facilitates synchronized operations.96

[T]he linkages between space 

and cyberspace are of particular importance as space 

provides a global connectivity 

option for CO.95

The space support element [SSE] 

. . . Supports the G-2 (S-2) during 

intelligence preparation of the 

battlefield.98

Space capabilities provide cyberspace with a global reach.97

GPS plays a key role in military 

operations . . . by providing 

precise timing

in cyberspace.99

The space support element 

[SSE] . . . Provides space-based 

expertise and services that 

enhance CEMA. . . . Integrates 

space-related capabilities into 

CEMA planning. . . . Analyzes 

and recommends the potential 

employment of additional 

space-related capabilities to 

support CEMA.100

Table 5. Mutual Support Relationships Among Land, 

Space, and Cyberspace.
30

The bottom portion of Table 5 focuses on areas 

of operational interdependence between space and 

cyberspace, most of which deal with signal transmission. Further, JP 3-12 (R) provides insight into the complex interactions between space, cyberspace, and the 

EMS, as well as the effects they can collectively realize:

Cyberspace

The physical domains (air, land, 

maritime, and space) and information environment rely on 

cyberspace for instant communications.102

CO provide a means by which 

space support is executed.101

[O]perations in cyberspace enable 

freedom of action for operations 

in the four natural domains and 

the EMS.103

[C]yberspace provides the 

means by which space control 

and transmission of space sensor data are conducted.104

Using OCO, commanders can 

mass effects through the employment of lethal and nonlethal 

actions leveraging all capabilities 

available to gain advantages in 

cyberspace that support objectives on land.106

Operations in the space domain depend on cyberspace 

and the EMS to execute space 

support.105

Mutual Space and Cyberspace

The relationship between space and cyberspace is unique in that 

virtually all space operations depend on cyberspace, and a critical portion of cyberspace can only be provided via space operations. . . . These interrelationships are important considerations 

across the spectrum of CO, and particularly when conducting 

targeting in cyberspace.107

These interrelationships are critical, and the linkages must be 

addressed during all phases of joint operation planning.108

The cyberspace and space domains are uniquely interrelated 

primarily because of their current role in telecommunications 

and networks. . . .These interrelationships are important considerations when planning for CEMA.109

CO produces NAVWAR [navigation warfare] effects by assuring friendly access and/or denying enemy access to positioning, navigation, and timing information transmitted by global 

navigation satellite system (GNSS) or other radio navigation 

aid signals. Creation of global and theater NAVWAR effects is 

attained through the coordinated employment of CO, EW, and 

space operations.110

Table 5. Mutual Support Relationships Among 

Land, Space, and Cyberspace. (cont.) 
31

Domain Overlap. CO enhance operational effectiveness 

and leverage various capabilities from physical domains 

to create effects, which may span multiple GCCs 

AOR. Some of the capabilities the JFC may employ in 

conjunction with, or to enable CO, include significant 

portions of electronic warfare (EW), EMS management, 

C2, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 

navigation warfare (NAVWAR), and some space mission 

areas. Advancements in technology have created an 

increasingly complex OE [operational environment]. CO, 

space operations, and EW operations can be conducted 

against targets using portions of the EMS. They can be 

integrated with other information related capabilities 

as part of IO. CO, space operations, and EW operations 

are often conducted under specific authorities. Likewise, 

some information-related capabilities supported by CO, 

such as MISO [military information support operations], 

MILDEC [military deception], and special technical 

operations (STO), have their own execution approval 

process [emphasis in original].111

The evolving interplay of space, cyberspace, information, and EMS operations at times resembles a doctrinal 

Gordian Knot that can frustrate planners and warfighters pursuing mission command necessary to conduct 

unified land operations.112 What support elements are 

available to help the JFLCC cope with this situation?

Domain Support to JFLCC

Table 6 recaps the key elements of space and cyberspace forces from joint doctrine and organizes them by 

the type of integration they may provide for the JFLCC 

to achieve cross-domain synergy. If properly implemented, the existing arrangements appear to provide 

an acceptable framework for integrating and synchronizing space and CO into the JFLCC. As per the routine development of doctrine, the tactical details from 

actual experience should be captured and documented 
32

in media such as joint and service lessons learned and 

tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Notes: *The Missile Warning Support Request.113

 **Cyberspace Effects Request Form.114

Table 6. Space and Cyberspace Cross-Domain 

Elements in JFLCC Doctrine.

Joint force development and the refinement of doctrine also require the consideration of new concepts 

driven by strategic insights from DoD and the joint 

staff.115 Having now explored the cross-domain tenets 

and nominal applications of land, space, and cyberspace means to achieve synergy in JFLCC operations, 

let us now investigate two derivative documents of 

Integration Means Space Cyberspace

Depiction of notional 

organizational 

structure?

No

Yes 

(JP 3-12 (R) Figure 

IV-1)

Link to JOPP plans 

and orders? Annex N Annex C (Appendix 16) and Annex K

Enduring support 

element? SSE CSE

Operational support 

elements?

•	 Space Operations Section 

in J-33 Current 

Operations

•	 Space Tasking 

Order

•	 Missile Warning 

Support Request*

•	Cyberspace Operations Section 

in J-33 Current 

Operations

•	Cyberspace Cell 

in J-5

•	Joint Cyberspace 

Center (JCC)

•	Cyberspace 

Effects Request 

Form**
33

the CCJO that further address the future challenges of 

operational access to domains.

Operational Access

In January 2012, the DoD released the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) to describe “how joint 

forces will operate in response to emerging antiaccess 

and area-denial security challenges.”116 It focuses on a 

central theme of cross-domain synergy and it “envisions a greater degree and more flexible integration of 

space and cyberspace operations [CO] into traditional 

air-sea-land battlespace than ever before.”117 The concept argues that one of the three key trends affecting 

future joint force projection is “the emergence of space 

and cyberspace as increasingly important and contested domains.”118 The JOAC supposes that operations 

in these new domains will precede those in the traditional domains, perhaps even to the degree that “even 

in the absence of open conflict, operations to gain and 

maintain cyberspace superiority and space control will 

be continuous requirements.”119

To guide the planning of joint access operations, 

the JOAC proposes 11 Operational Access Precepts, 

the last of which is to “protect friendly space and cyber 

assets while attacking the enemy’s space and cyber 

capabilities” since these domains “are now essential to 

all joint force projection.”120 Further, the JOAC infers 

that the success of space and CO may leverage the 

combat power from the traditional domains.121 In general, this shift to focus on space and cyberspace is a 

theme throughout the JOAC. Several of the precepts 

favor reduced use of land forces that is offset in many 

cases by increased space and CO. One precept specifically cautions against over-committing forces into 
34

hostile territory, especially major land forces.122 The 

precept to “seize the initiative by deploying and operating on multiple, independent lines of operations,” 

predicts a reduced presence in the land domain, as it 

“suggests smaller units and platforms that are rapidly 

deployable yet lethal.”123 Also, the precept aimed at disrupting enemy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities notes that “large land forces generally will be 

the last to penetrate within range of an enemy’s antiaccess and area-denial weapons because of the potential 

for catastrophic loss.”124 Finally, with regard to basing 

options, the JOAC suggests a minimized dependence 

on forward bases with more dependence on capabilities such as long-range strike, cyberspace, space, and 

EW.125 The JOAC avers that space and cyberspace 

capabilities may be used in advance of other forces to 

facilitate operational access.126 In addition, the JOAC 

alleges that cyberspace capabilities may help to maximize operational surprise and complicate enemy targeting processes.127

Entry Operations

In April 2014, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Martin Dempsey released the Joint Concept for 

Entry Operations (JCEO) as his “vision for how joint 

forces will enter onto foreign territory and immediately employ capabilities to accomplish assigned missions.”128 The JCEO was written to support the JOAC 

with a central idea of “full integration of force capabilities across domains.”129 The concept calls for the use 

of “mission-tailored joint forces that are organized, 

trained, and equipped with unique capabilities.”130

The JCEO lists seven operational characteristics that 

are mostly enduring considerations with the exception 

of the relatively new characteristic of “social media, 
35

cultural factors, and commercial capabilities” which 

has ties to CO and IO.131

Consistent with JOAC, the JCEO calls for earlier 

use of cyberspace capabilities, and explicitly calls for 

pre-crisis activities to include C-OPE that is “clearly 

integrated and synchronized with operations in other 

domains.”132 Cyberspace may also be used to enable 

operational deception efforts to gain surprise, complicate the enemy’s targeting process, and reduce collateral damage.133 Also, space and cyberspace can enable 

joint fires as well as enhance joint and allied C2 interoperability for cyberspace.134 Finally, the JCEO contends 

that properly integrated cyberspace and space capabilities may enhance land maneuver.135

It appears that the inculcation of cross-domain synergy into the joint force remains a work in progress. 

Fortunately, existing concepts and doctrine provide 

the necessary foundation upon which to build and 

hone joint capabilities that span domains as required 

by circumstance. Joint concepts such as the CCJO, 

JOAC, and JCEO anticipate increased contributions 

from capabilities in the space and cyberspace domain 

to enable the success of future military operations, 

especially those faced with A2/AD challenges. How 

will this future unfold for the joint force?

FUTURE OPERATIONS

Armed with knowledge of how activities in the 

individual domains of land, space, and cyberspace 

may intersect and integrate to enhance joint force operations, let us now explore how such operations may 

change in the future. This section explores probable 

future operating environments as well as the resulting implications for the U.S. Army and joint force 
36

development. It also identifies operational challenges 

that cut across all domains and makes recommendations to help prepare for the envisioned future.

Future Environment

Joint Operating Environment (JOE)

In July 2016, the joint staff released Joint Operating Environment, JOE 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World, to convey future security 

contexts and implications to aid the joint force development. In its view of the evolving world order, 

JOE 2035 contends that regional powers will pursue 

competitive space and cyberspace capabilities that 

enable their global reach.136 These capabilities may be 

enhanced by the proliferation of technologies, such as 

high-powered radio frequency (HPRF) weapons and 

non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons 

that may counter U.S. strengths in space and cyberspace.137 JOE 2035 weaves this trend into two of its six 

Contexts of Future Conflict. The context of “Disrupted 

Global Commons” centers on the “denial or compulsion in spaces and places available to all but owned by 

none.”138 The context assumes an enduring land-centric nature of conflict, noting that much of the conflict 

in commons is intended to influence events on land.139

Also, this context predicts very intense rivalry for EMS 

usage as well as increasingly fierce military activities 

in the space domain that may include intentional interference from other satellites or ground-based systems 

as well as anti-satellite weapons (ASAT).140

The JOE 2035 purposefully excludes cyberspace 

from the global commons context, instead giving it 

an exclusive context on “A Conflict for Cyberspace,” 
37

where it suggests, “conflict and war are likely to occur 

as states struggle to define and credibly protect sovereignty in cyberspace.”141 In addition to direct military conflict at the tactical and operational levels as 

well as attacks on homeland critical infrastructure, JOE 

2035 foresees the conflict expanding to all elements 

of national power, noting that “the competition may 

involve disrupting data, networks, and the physical 

systems of competitors to gain economic, military, 

and political advantages.”142 Finally, this context infers 

that cyberspace capabilities are paradoxical in that the 

strengths provided by the vast and complex connectivity of the domain may also introduce substantial 

weaknesses:

Where land and naval power intersect in two dimensions, 

air and space in three, cyberspace intersects with other 

domains in thousands, or even millions of ways. This 

presents many new vulnerable points through which 

weapons systems, and the circuitry and software upon 

which they rely, will be directly engaged.143

To address such threats and challenges, JOE 2035

proposes a series of 24 evolving joint missions organized by 4 groups of enduring military tasks. While all 

of these missions may utilize support from space and 

cyberspace capabilities, the missions connected with 

the two contexts described above have explicit and significant expectations for space and cyberspace forces. 

Table 7 provides some excerpts from JOE 2035 in each 

of these mission areas to provide the reader with an 

appreciation for the depth and diversity of capabilities 

required for the joint force should these projections 

come to fruition.
38

Table 7. Evolving Joint Missions for Space and 

Cyberspace from JOE 2035.

144

Enduring Military Tasks Space and Cyberspace-Related Missions

Shape or contain to assist the 

United States with coping and 

adapting to changed international security conditions [emphasis in original].

Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. . . . Specifically, the Joint Force may conduct ambiguous actions and deception operations with 

low-signature assets to avoid direct confrontation with a competitor, while still demonstrating U.S. resolve to use and keep open the 

commons for military and civilian purposes 

[emphasis in original].

Military Support to Cyber Resiliency. This mission will require cyber support to U.S. Government and civilian organizations, allied 

nations, and other international partners that 

credibly reinforces the resilience of cyber-dependent systems and infrastructure. This 

includes a capacity to reliably communicate, 

compute, store, and retrieve critical data that 

outpaces adversary efforts to deny these capabilities [emphasis in original].

Deter or deny to manage the antagonistic behavior of competitors or to impose costs on competitors or adversaries taking 

aggressive action [emphasis in 

original].

Global Commons Stabilization. . . . Joint Force 

must be capable of protecting national objectives in the global commons despite the use of 

asymmetric, unconventional, and hybrid approaches by competitors to assert new claims 

and exercise more control in the commons. 

This will require operations that impose costs 

on adversaries who impede free use of the 

commons, such as targeted electromagnetic 

and space denial measures, the enforcement 

of sanctions, or the establishment of electromagnetic exclusion zones [emphasis in original].

Network Defense. These missions will require 

steady-state information operations [IO] in 

support of national cyber deterrence strategies that communicate the resiliency of critical 

U.S. systems and infrastructure, while protecting their vulnerabilities. Key actions may 

include the development of a Department of 

Defense [DoD] cyber umbrella; the creation 

of a national ‘cyber border patrol;’ more comprehensive intelligence sharing efforts; contributions to national level cyber exercises; 

the development of hardened networks; and 

reinforced coordination with domestic law 

enforcement [emphasis in original].
39

Enduring Military Tasks Space and Cyberspace-Related Missions

Disrupt or degrade to punish aggressive action by an adversary 

or to force an adversary to retreat from previous gains [emphasis in original].

Global Commons Defense. . . . the Joint Force 

must maintain the ability to conduct targeted 

command and control [C2] warfare, counter 

ISR operations, and discriminate sensor interdiction and spoofing in all commons. Furthermore, the Joint Force should be capable of responding to the threat of adversaries creating 

debris fields in important orbits [emphasis in 

original].

Cyberspace Disruption. . . . Additionally, 

the Joint Force may conduct proportional 

cross-domain operations to physically damage an adversary’s cyber infrastructure, using 

weapons operating in other domains to suppress enemy cyber defenses and specifically 

strike their critical cyber infrastructure. Furthermore, these operations should be coupled 

with defensive cyber efforts to block adversary responses, and might include the use 

of autonomous or semi-autonomous cyber 

defense systems or the activation of war reserve networks when peacetime networks are 

unavailable [emphasis in original].

Compel or destroy to impose 

desired changes to the international security environment and 

subsequently enforce those outcomes [emphasis in original].

Global Commons Exclusion. . . . This will likely 

include multi-domain offensive operations 

using coordinated and simultaneous electronic, cyber, space, and kinetic actions to eradicate adversary capabilities that can influence 

or affect the commons [emphasis in original].

Cyberspace Control. . . . Cyberspace control operations will frequently integrate cyber and 

non-cyber capabilities. In coordination with 

law enforcement agencies, offensive operations may be required to identify, target, and 

capture or kill adversary cyber operatives. Offensive operations will also be used to eradicate an adversary’s cyber infrastructure and 

capabilities, which might include an array of 

kinetic strikes combined with simultaneous 

electronic, cyber, and space warfare actions 

[emphasis in original].

Table 7. Evolving Joint Missions for Space and 

Cyberspace from JOE 2035. (cont.)
40

A complete evaluation of JOE 2035 is beyond the 

scope of this monograph, but clearly in it the joint staff 

foresees military roles and cross-domain operations 

for the space and cyberspace domains that far exceed 

those of the present day. But is this view shared by 

other similar examinations of the future?145

Global Risks 2035

The Atlantic Council report Global Risks 2035: The 

Search for a New Normal echoes many of the themes of 

the JOE 2035, also through the perspective of changing 

demographics, international governance, and technology advancement.146 For the global commons of space, 

the commentary envisions increased dependence and 

competition for space systems that may tempt state 

and nonstate actors to disrupt space operations. Escalation of conflict may occur and:

if an arms race in space does get under way among the 

United States, China, Russia, India, Brazil, Japan, and 

other countries, these countries are likely to employ 

symmetric and asymmetric measures to counter the 

threats in space and coming from space.147

The study treats cyberspace issues with more 

imminent concern. The author lists the task to “Stop 

the slide towards a segmented internet. There is [sic] 

needs to be rules governing offensive cyber” as part 

of 11 items in a recommended “100-Day Checklist for 

the New Administration.”148 From a global commons 

framework, the report projects that cybersecurity costs 

may eventually outweigh the benefits for advanced 

economic countries like the United States.149 From 

a domain framework, the author asserts, “Cyber is 

now transforming the nature of conflict and war.”150

Expanding on this theme, the study warns against 

possible disruption by cyberattacks without warning 
41

from a variety of state and nonstate actors. However, 

the discussion focuses on critical infrastructure attacks 

and crime in cyberspace; the report does not address 

any roles of cyberspace in warfare.

Implications for the Army and the Joint Force

Anticipated future trends favor the decreased 

emphasis on traditional large-scale land operations 

and increased frequency and intensity of conflict in 

space and cyberspace. What are the implications and 

challenges that may result from these trends?

LandCyber

The U.S. Army’s concept for achieving its cross-domain synergy is LandCyber, a transformational convergence of land and CO similar to the U.S. Army’s 

AirLand Battle concepts to address challenges in the 

European theater in the 1980s. The central idea of 

LandCyber is for the U.S. Army to:

think globally and act locally in the cyberspace domain 

in conjunction with land forces to shape the physical and 

virtual security-related behavior of humans and their 

machines to gain opportunity and advantage.151

The path to achieve LandCyber is described in a September 2013 white paper from the Army Cyber Proponent of U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCY)/2nd U.S. 

Army. It identifies eight aspects of convergence and 

nine guiding principles as the foundation for LandCyber.152 The white paper provides an overview of the 

U.S. Army roles and responsibilities in cyberspace that 

include C-OPE, critical infrastructure protection, integration into exercises, and CCMD support. It also gives 

near, mid, and long-term projections of cyberspace 
42

evolution.153 Although it discusses emerging CO similar to joint cyberspace doctrine, the LandCyber white 

paper lists U.S. Army mission areas as cyberspace 

control; cyberspace forces enhancement; cyberspace 

support; and cyberspace force application—a mission 

set similar to that in joint space doctrine.154 The white 

paper includes an insightful discussion of how the 

LandCyber capabilities are related to the traditional 

warfighting functions.155 Overall, the LandCyber concept adopts an approach that is holistic and forward 

leaning in scope.

FM 3-38 appears to embody many of the tenets of 

LandCyber, although there the FM contains no reference to the concept. At the conclusion of the research 

for this monograph, the highly anticipated U.S. Army 

document FM 3-12, Cyberspace and EW Operations, was 

not complete.156 Recent status briefings indicate that 

FM 3-12 will include fundamentals of cyberspace and 

EW operations as well as CEMA considerations. It may 

also tackle the issue of addressing the relationships that 

cyberspace operations have on space operations, IO, 

intelligence, and targeting. Finally, it should include 

appendices that cover organization for CO, cyberspace 

information required for operations orders, and standard formats for cyber effects or EA requests.157

Joint Force Development

When considering the type of cross-domain operations that the United States may encounter in the near 

future, it is important to note that potential adversaries 

may be working along similar lines of effort. Although 

a detailed exploration of potential adversaries is 

beyond the scope of this monograph, the vignette from 

the cross-domain Planner’s Guide on Russian actions 
43

in Georgia (August 2008) captures the realm of the 

possible:

The war between Georgia, Russia, and the Russianbacked self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia saw some 35,000-40,000 Russian and allied 

forces, augmented by significant air and naval forces, 

confront some 12,000-15,000 Georgian forces with little 

air and minimal naval capability. Although a short and 

limited conflict, it was historic and precedent setting. 

This appears to be the first coordinated cyberspace 

attacks synchronized with major combat actions in the 

other warfighting domains, primarily land and air. . . . 

In summary, Russian planners tightly integrated CO 

with their kinetic, diplomatic, and strategic messaging 

operations. The Russo-Georgian war provides a case 

study for joint planners preparing for a future conflict, 

involving the new domain of cyberspace.158

The CCJO identifies 23 explicit force development 

implications to enable globally integrated operations. 

Five of these implications directly address force development required for space and cyberspace forces in 

the joint functional areas of C2, fires, movement and 

maneuver, and protection (see Table 8). The JOAC 

and JCEO provide more detailed force development 

goals focused on capabilities to enhance entry operations; these include significant requirements for space 

and cyberspace capabilities (see Appendix IV of this 

monograph).
44

Table 8. Force Development Priorities for Space 

and Cyberspace from CCJO.159

Command and Control: Enhance our ability to operate effectively in а 

degraded environment. Given dramatic increases 

in the ability of adversaries to disrupt, degrade or 

destroy cyberspace and space systems, it is essential that Joint Forces be able to operate effectively 

despite degradation to those systems. Greater resilience must be built in to technical architectures, and 

the force must regularly train to operate in “worst 

case” degraded environments [emphasis in original]. 

Fires: Provide а fire support coordination capability that 

integrates all fires, including cyber. Key to maximizing cross-domain synergy will be fielding а system 

for planning, requesting and directing all available 

fires so any element of а Joint Force can access the 

most appropriate supporting arm. In particular, 

realizing the global potential of Joint Forces will require that previously niche capabilities, such as offensive cyber weapons, are available to Joint Force 

commanders [emphasis in original].

Movement and 

Maneuver:

Rapidly employable on а global scale. As а nation 

with global responsibilities, the forces of the United 

States must be able to operate effectively anywhere 

in the world on short notice. This can be achieved 

through multiple means. Massed force, deployed to 

the scene, is certainly one way. Low-signature and 

low-footprint capabilities, such as cyber and global 

strike, саn also project force quickly. Versatility, too, 

plays а role. Forces suitable for а variety of missions, 

if smartly positioned, maximize the chance of being 

prepared for а crisis [emphasis in original]. 

Protection: Improve cyber defense capabilities. Given the heavy 

reliance of Joint Forces on military computer networks and civilian critical infrastructure, it is essential that Joint Forces be able to defend key systems 

and ensure the continuity of critical network functions in the face of disruption [emphasis in original].

Continue to improve defensive space capabilities. 

Given the heavy reliance of Joint Forces on space 

systems and the rapidly increasing proliferation of 

counterspace systems, it is essential that Joint Forces 

be able to protect friendly space capabilities, including defensive space control and space situational 

awareness capabilities [emphasis in original].
45

The efforts described in Table 8 reflect the premise that space and cyberspace will be hotly contested 

domains, and thus their defenses must be improved. 

Also, the CCJO makes it clear that other force development efforts should carefully deliberate over their 

dependence on space and cyberspace capabilities as 

well as ponder how to compensate for disruption of 

activities in these domains. Finally, some of these force 

development efforts may push beyond the limits of 

technical feasibility and affordability.160

Other Operational Challenges

There are several themes of operational challenges 

common to many of the documents examined in this 

monograph. While beyond the scope herein to explore 

these themes, they merit serious study and incorporation into the general dialogue of future joint forces.

Dealing with Disruption. The CCJO and JOE 2035 

stress that commanders should be prepared to deal with 

disrupted and degraded space and cyberspace capabilities that may be attacked using advanced weapons 

(HPRF and EMP). Such disruptions should be studied not only for tactical and operational impacts, but 

also for strategic implications. For example, interfering 

with certain on-orbit assets, such as GPS and missile 

warning satellites, may evoke greater consequences 

than the local SATCOM jamming.

Cross-domain Deterrence. The refinement of 

cross-domain synergy can help to clarify the intentions 

of deterrence measures as well as enhance their effectiveness. The traditional strategic deterrence anchored 

with nuclear weapons may evolve to incorporate space 

and cyberspace means due to their growing utility and 

value.161
46

The Leadership Dimension. Concepts such as 

LandCyber that are enabled by space and cyberspace means hope to provide unprecedented situational awareness and connectivity at the lowest 

echelons. While such a construct offers great promise 

for enhancing unified land operations, it also creates 

challenges for effective mission command such as the 

increased potential for commanders to micromanage 

their troops.162

Autonomous Systems. The JOE 2035 addresses 

the evolution of autonomous and robotic technologies 

and weapon systems. Such capabilities have the potential to enhance joint operations, but they will likely be 

used by adversaries as well for applications in the battlespace and against the U.S. homeland.163 For current 

operations, the legality and ethics surrounding remotely-operated weapon systems are contentious issues in 

international venues such as the UN.164

Electromagnetic Spectrum. Within U.S. military 

doctrine, EMS is generally viewed as a critical enabler 

to operations in all domains.165 Current U.S. Army 

doctrine provides useful codification of EMS within its 

CEMA construct. However, the status of EMS within 

the body of doctrine remains muddled as do related 

terms such as EW and EA.166 Many practitioners and 

scholars argue that EMS is worthy of being named as 

the sixth warfighting domain; this remains an open 

dialogue.167

Recommendations

Physical Limitations in Cyberspace

Time and Distance in Cyberspace. Recommend 

that the parameters of time and distance be considered 

as significant parameters for CO, and that the transfer 
47

of information never be characterized as being instantaneous. Rather, they are governed by the laws of physics and, therefore, cyberspace capabilities are affected 

by the distance that they traverse (despite to JOAC’s 

assertion to the contrary).168 Many large U.S. brokerage 

firms have applied this fact to their economic advantage by locating their servers as close as possible to the 

Wall Street servers to reduce the transmission times 

of their high-speed trading. In addition to the distance traveled, planners should note the existence and 

potential effects of “cyberspace weather/traffic” in 

the commons that may impede the delivery of “cyber 

payloads.” Like terrestrial weather, these phenomena 

may be difficult to predict in such cases as the flood 

of social media surrounding unforeseen events such as 

the death of Michael Jackson or Prince.

Limits of Human Cognition in Cyberspace. Current concepts and doctrine infer that human operations 

can exercise effective C2 in the cyberspace domain. 

However, much of the activity in cyberspace occurs 

at speeds well beyond the human ability to comprehend. Recommend that the joint community add the 

realm of “ultra-tactical operations” to the traditional 

tactical-operational-strategic spectrum.169 This concept 

could also be of great utility for applications of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapon systems.

Command Relationships

USCYBERCOM as CCMD. Recommend that 

USCYBERCOM remain as a sub-unified command. 

The vision of future operations articulated in the 

JOAC and JOE 2035 support the wisdom of consolidating the global-reaching capabilities, such as strategic 

nuclear strike, missile defense forces, and cyberspace 

forces, under the unified command of USSTRATCOM. 
48

Historians will recall the push in the late 20th century 

for the unified command of space to be elevated to its 

own service. Its reduction from CCMD to the JFCC 

under USSTRATCOM did not significantly hamper 

joint space operations.

Space C2 Structure. Recommend that the next version of JP 3-14, Space Operations, clarify the notional C2 

relationships between USSTRATCOM, CCMD and its 

service components, and combat support agencies by 

adding a diagram and supporting text. Figure IV-1 of 

JP 3-12 (R) should serve as the model, thus enhancing 

cohesion between the two JPs.

Domain Definitions

Define Domain. Recommend that the DoD and 

the joint staff develop an official definition of military 

domain. Common usage in joint doctrine may infer the 

ability to apply sovereignty or the ability to achieve 

dominance or local superiority; or it may merely refer 

to physical characteristics. Regardless, theory and 

doctrine should include the establishment of precise 

language that can eliminate pedantic arguments and 

facilitate intellectual dialogue on such topics. The definition could include a set of parameters common in 

concept but not in application. For example, domain 

parameters such as boundaries, seams with other 

domains, and environmental disruptors may be useful 

for comparison and enhancing cross-domain operations. Also, representation of land, space, and cyberspace domains should be refined in future versions 

of the Cross-Domain Planner’s Guide to address issues 

identified in Tables 2 through 4 of this monograph.

Domain versus Commons. In many joint documents the term “commons” (or “global commons”) is 
49

used interchangeably with certain domains. In addition to codifying a definition for domain, recommend 

that the DoD and the joint staff not only provide a definition for commons (or global commons) but also provide discussion for when it is appropriate to use the 

term. A starting point may be the JOAC description 

of a global commons as “areas of air, sea, space, and 

cyberspace that belong to no one state.”170

A suggested distinction to consider and refine is for 

“domain” to be used for applications focused on military activities (e.g., organize, train, equip, and operate) 

and for “commons” to be used for applications that 

explicitly include other instruments of national power 

(e.g., diplomatic and economic).

Define the Space Domain. Recommend that the 

DoD and the joint staff develop an official definition 

for the space domain. Granted, the seam between air 

and space domains may not be significant to current 

cross-domain operations. However, future space operations may include more routine traversing of vehicles 

to and from space as well as more airborne systems 

operating at extremely high altitudes.

Discuss Domain-Specific Terrain. Recommend 

future versions of domain-specific joint doctrine publications include a discussion on the notion of “key 

terrain” in the domain. Such discussion could address 

whether the terrain is transient, enduring, or a mixture; how it can be influenced by blue or red forces; 

what lines of communication and choke points exist; 

and what factors influence movement in and through 

the given domain.
50

Supported and Supporting Roles

Space and Cyberspace in the Lead. Current joint 

doctrine makes mention of the possibility that space or 

CO may be designated as the supported activities, but 

does not address how this might occur. Recommend 

future joint doctrine include examples of how the supporting efforts in traditional domains may support 

main efforts in the space or cyberspace domains.

Priorities for Cyberspace Resources. The CCJO 

and JOE 2035 set high expectations for future U.S. military cyberspace forces with little regard of the feasibility of these forces to be able to cover all the tasks. In 

turn, this may foster unrealistic expectations for U.S. 

Government, commercial, and international entities 

with regard to the support they may receive for “cyber 

resiliency” efforts.171 Recommend that future DoD and 

joint staff publications strive to emphasize the high-demand/low-density aspects of cyberspace capabilities 

as well as a realistic evaluation of military cyberspace 

support outside of military operations during periods 

of intense and widespread conflict.

Enduring Military Theory

Discussion of Joint Functions and Principles. Recommend that future versions of joint doctrine publications for domain operations include a brief discussion 

on the 12 principles of joint operations as well as the 

8 joint functions. This will enhance understanding of 

how common theories and principles of military operations apply to specific domains as well as provide a 

common lexicon and topics for comparison amongst 

domains. The use of vignettes in these discussions may 

enhance understanding for the joint community.

Military Theory for Space and Cyberspace. 

One can argue that military activities in space and 
51

cyberspace are the least intuitive to comprehend and 

the least understood by military planners and operators. Recommend that the DoD and the joint staff 

actively support the development of military theory 

to help provide a foundation for increased knowledge 

in the joint force. Such efforts should be promulgated 

throughout the spectrum of military professional 

education.

Summary

By their very nature, military doctrine and operations are works in progress. In general, the current 

state of military doctrine in the relatively new domains 

of space and cyberspace include adequate means to 

support land-based joint operations. However, knowledge of the nature of these new domains is not intuitive, and understanding their unique characteristics 

and capabilities is still a challenge for the military 

force writ large. Anticipated future trends favor the 

decreased emphasis on traditional large-scale land 

operations and increased frequency and intensity of 

conflict in space and cyberspace, perhaps even where 

these newer domains may become preeminent for 

a given operation. The joint staff’s pursuit of achieving cross-domain synergy in planning and operations 

offers a credible method to face some of the challenges 

of the future joint force, but this will likely remain an 

evolutionary vice revolutionary endeavor.

ENDNOTES

1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department 

of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, 

DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, as of August 2017, p. 123, available from 

http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.

pdf, accessed February 12, 2018.
52

2 Department of Defense (DoD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Defense, January 2012, p. 5, available from http://

archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, accessed 

November 7, 2016. The full text regarding this mission area is:

Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space. Modern 

armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective 

operations without reliable information and communication 

networks and assured access to cyberspace and space. 

Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure 

face a range of threats that may degrade, disrupt, or destroy 

assets. Accordingly, DoD will continue to work with domestic 

and international allies and partners and invest in advanced 

capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and 

resiliency in cyberspace and space [emphasis in original].

3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, Washington, DC: 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2011, p. I-1, available from http://

www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.

pdf, accessed September 19, 2016.

4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 15, 1997, p. v-vi, 

available from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/

Monographs/JMO.pdf, accessed November 3, 2016.

5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine Hierarchy Chart,”

February 6, 2016, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, available 

from http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Hierarchy-Chart/, accessed February 12, 2018.

6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of 

the United States, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 

2013, Incorp. Change 1, July 12, 2017, pp. I-3, I-17–I-19, available 

from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_

ch1.pdf?ver=2017-12-23-160207-587, accessed September 19, 2016.

7 Ibid., p. IV-3. In JP 1, Figure IV-1, “Possible Components in 

a Joint Force,” depicts the notional relation of the joint force components to the joint force commander (JFC). Chapter V describes 

in detail the command relationships and command and control 

(C2) of joint forces.

8 Ibid., pp. x, I-5, and IV-4.
53

9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, p. III-1.

10 Ibid., Appendix A.

11 Ibid., p. IV-1.

12 The following joint publications are available on the Joint 

Electronic Library: Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

February 10, 2014, available from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/

Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf; Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-31, 

Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, Washington, DC: 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 24, 2014, p. GL-6, available from 

http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_31.pdf; 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 

7, 2013, available from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/

Doctrine/pubs/jp3_32.pdf.

13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-31, p. GL-6.

14 Ibid., p. II-1.

15 Ibid. JP 3-31 Chapter IV describes the forms of land operations as well as the six joint functions that apply to them. The 

topics of the appendices are: Appendix A: Notional Headquarters 

Organization; Appendix B: Theater-Level Land Component Planning Considerations; and, Appendix C: Joint Land Operation Plan 

and Order Development.

16 Ibid., p. I-4.

17 Ibid., p. IV-10.

18 Ibid., pp. IV-10–V-11.

19 Ibid., p. II-3.

20 Ibid., p. I-3–I-4.

21 Ibid., p. IV-28.

22 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, Space Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 29, 2013, p. G-1, available from 

http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_14.pdf.
23 DoD, Department of Defense Key Officials 1947-2014, Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

June 2014, pp. 22, 106. USSPACECOM was disestablished on 

October 1, 2002.

24 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. I-1.

25 Ibid., p. I-1. See also DoD, National Security Space Strategy: 

Unclassified Summary, Washington, DC: Department of Defense 

and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 2011, 

p. 1. The description of space as “congested, contested, and competitive” first appeared in this document.

26 Ibid., p. I-8.

27 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), “About 

International Telecommunication Union (ITU),” n.d., available 

from https://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx. The website 

describes ITU as:

ITU is the United Nations [UNs] specialized agency for 

information and communication technologies—ICTs 

[emphasis in original].

We allocate global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, 

develop the technical standards that ensure networks and 

technologies seamlessly interconnect, and strive to improve 

access to ICTs to underserved communities worldwide. 

ITU is committed to connecting all the world’s people—

wherever they live and whatever their means [emphasis 

in original]. Through our work, we protect and support 

everyone’s fundamental right to communicate.

28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. II-6.

29 Ibid., p. IV-3.

30 Ibid., pp. IV-4, IV-9.

31 Ibid., p. III-2. Per this joint publication, the space coordinating authority (SCA) roles and responsibilities are:

(1) Integrating space capabilities.

54
55

(2) Planning, coordinating, and synchronizing space 

operations in the operational area and ensuring inputs from 

the joint force staff and components are incorporated.

(3) Maintaining situational awareness of theater space 

operations, and coordinating with the CCMD [combatant 

command] SCA or Commander, JFCC SPACE [Joint 

Functional Component Commander for Space], to integrate 

theater space operations into DOD space operations.

(4) Providing consolidated space requirements through the 

JFC for coordination as required.

32 Ibid., pp. III-3-III-4. The joint publication’s description of 

the space support elements (SSEs) follows:

The Army integrates space capabilities at the army, corps, 

division, special forces groups, and fires brigade levels using 

space support elements (SSEs). SSE organic space experts are 

resident on the headquarters . . . staff as an integral part of the 

staff and are directly involved in the staff planning process 

from the beginning. The element is responsible for identifying 

opportunities to employ space force enhancement or space 

control, and then coordinating the required support. When 

deployed, the SSE establishes and maintains contact with 

the SCA. It also coordinates with the SCA on procedures 

for space support requests and reachback support. The 

SSE participates in the conduct of mission analysis to 

determine which space-based capabilities are applicable to 

the particular operation and then coordinates and makes 

recommendations for the allocation and use of space services 

and capabilities. The mission analysis performed by the SSE 

forms the basis of the staff’s space running estimate, as well 

as annex N (Space Operations), for all orders and plans. 

33 Ibid., p. V-5. Challenges facing the space planner include:

Space presents unique planning and operational considerations that affect friendly, adversary, and neutral space forces 

alike. Space capabilities require extensive and advanced 

planning. Space assets are sufficiently capable and robust; 

however, operational planners must understand the limited 

number of resources available and the distinct challenges 

with space force reconstitution. Numerous resource and 
56

legal considerations impact planning and affect mission 

success.

34 Ibid., pp. I-3–I-6.

35 Ibid., pp. A-1–G-8. The subjects of the seven appendices 

are: A: Space-Based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; B: Missile Warning; C: Space-Based Environmental Monitoring Capability; D: Satellite Communications [SATCOM]; E: 

Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing; F: Operationally Responsive Space; and, G: Space Fundamentals.

36 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R), Cyberspace Operations, 

Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, original release February 

5, 2013, updated (unclassified) October 21, 2014, p. GL-4, available from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/

jp3_12R.pdf, accessed February 14, 2018.

37 DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2010, p. 37.

38 DoD, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 2011, p. 37.

39 Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, Compendium of Key Joint 

Doctrine Publications, Washington, DC: Deputy Directorate, Joint 

Staff, J-7, January 3, 2014, p. iii.

40 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R), pp. v-vi and I-2–I-4 states 

that, “Cyberspace can be described in terms of three layers: physical network, logical network, and cyber-persona” and is summarized as:

The physical network layer of cyberspace is comprised 

of the geographic component and the physical network 

components. It is the medium where the data travel. . . . 

The logical network layer consists of those elements of 

the network that are related to one another in a way that 

is abstracted from the physical network, i.e., the form or 

relationships are not tied to an individual, specific path, or 

node. A simple example is any Web site that is hosted on 

servers in multiple physical locations where all content can 

be accessed through a single uniform resource locator. . . . 

The cyber-persona layer represents yet a higher level of 
57

abstraction of the logical network in cyberspace; it uses the 

rules that apply in the logical network layer to develop a 

digital representation of an individual or entity identity in 

cyberspace. The cyber-persona layer consists of the people 

actually on the network [emphasis in original]. 

41 Ibid., p. vii.

42 Ibid., pp. II-2–II-5. JP 3-12 (R) distinguishes between cyberspace operations (CO) missions and cyberspace actions as follows:

e. Cyberspace Actions. While the JFC’s military missions 

in cyberspace (OCO [offensive CO], DCO [defensive CO], 

and DODIN [DoD Information Network] operations) are 

categorized by intent, as described above, these missions 

will require the employment of various capabilities to 

create specific effects in cyberspace. To plan for, authorize, 

and assess these actions, it is important the JFC and staff 

understand how they are distinguished from one another. 

Cyberspace actions include cyberspace defense, cyberspace 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 

cyberspace operational preparation of the environment 

[C-OPE], and cyberspace attack. 

43 Ibid., pp. II-6–II-12.

44 Ibid., p. III-3. Figure III-1 of this publication summarizes 

the roles in cyberspace for six major sections of U.S. law as follows:

Title 6 . . . Domestic Security . . . [Role] Security of US 

cyberspace . . . Title 10 . . . Armed Forces . . .[Role] Man, 

train, and equip US forces for military operations in cyberspace . . . Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure . . . [Role] 

Crime prevention, apprehension, and prosecution of 

criminals operating in cyberspace . . . Title 32 . . . National 

Guard . . . [Role] Domestic consequence management 

(if activated for federal service, the National Guard is 

integrated into Title 10 . . . [U.S. Code], Armed Forces) . . . 

Title 40, Public Buildings, Property, and Works, [Role] Establish 

and enforce standards for acquisition and security of 

information technologies . . . Title 50 . . . War and National 

Defense . . . [Role] Secure US interests by conducting military 

and foreign intelligence operations in cyberspace [emphasis 

in original].
58

45 Ibid., p. III-6. Cyberspace support element (CSE) deployed 

to CCMDs provide the following:

CSEs are organized from USCYBERCOM forces and 

deployed to CCMDs for full integration into their staffs. 

CSEs resources are provided by USCYBERCOM to provide 

the CCMDs with joint CO planners and other subject matter 

experts on CO. These personnel facilitate development of 

cyberspace requirements and coordinate, integrate, and 

deconflict CO into the command’s planning process.

1. The CSE provides CCMDs an interface and reachback 

capability to USCYBERCOM to synchronize cyberspace fires 

with the commander’s scheme of maneuver, develop SA, 

and facilitate acquiring timely threat information.

2. USCYBERCOM retains operational control [OPCON] of 

the CSE, and the CSE is in direct support to the JCC [Joint 

Cyberspace Center]. 

46 Ibid., p. IV-1.

47 Ibid., p. IV-3. With regard to joint targeting, the publication 

notes that:

However, three aspects of CO should be included in the 

JFC’s targeting processes: recognizing that cyberspace 

capabilities are a viable option for engaging designated joint 

targets; understanding that a CO option may be preferable 

in some cases; and first, second, and third order effects on 

joint targets may involve or affect elements of the DODIN. 

48 For a discussion of potential elements of a military cyberspace theory, including how the principles of joint operations 

apply to cyberspace, see Jeffrey L. Caton, “On the Theory of 

Cyberspace,” in J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War 

College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I: Theory of War 

and Strategy, 5th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, June 2012, pp. 325-343.

49 For the land domain, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-31, pp. 

IV-1–IV-7. For the space domain, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14. 

In this publication, Chapter I includes a discussion of how the 

principles of joint operations apply to the space domain; Chapter 
59

II addresses the Space Mission Areas. For the cyberspace domain, 

see Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R).

50 Benjamin King, Victory Starts Here: A Short 40-Year History 

of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, May 2013, pp. 31-37, available from https://usacac.army.mil/Cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/

VictoryStartsHere_40yr.pdf, accessed November 11, 2016.

51 Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 

No. 3-0, Unified Land Operations, Washington, DC: Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, October 2011, Foreword, available from 

https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/ADP_3-0_

ULO_Oct_2011_APD.pdf, accessed February 13, 2018.

52 Ibid., p. iii.

53 Ibid., p. 2.

54 Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-7-4, The United States Army’s Concept Capability Plan (CCP): Space Operations 2015-2024, Version 1.0, 

Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 15, 2006, p. ii. The other 

imperatives of this CCP are: 

• Facilitate the integration of space capabilities across the 

full spectrum of Army and joint operations.

• Improve the Army’s ability to exploit existing space 

capabilities.

• Deliver space capabilities that address Army needs 

(capability requirements) and priorities by influencing 

the design of space-based systems and payloads. 

55 Ibid., p. 15.

56 Ibid., p. 16.

57 Ibid., p. 37.

58 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 

(FM) 3-14, Army Space Operations, Washington, DC: Department 

of the Army, August 2014. Although this document is unclassified, its distribution is limited to DoD and DoD contractors in 
60

order to protect certain technical data. Thus, details of its contents 

are not included in this monograph.

59 For a detailed examination of Army space capabilities, see 

Jeffrey L. Caton, Evolving Army Needs for Space-Based Support, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 

2015. See also Institute of Land Warfare, U.S. Army Space Capabilities: Enabling the Force of Decisive Action, Torchbearer National 

Security Report, Arlington, VA: Association of the United States 

Army, May 2012, available from https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/

files/TBNSR-2012-US-Army-Space-Capabilities-Enabling-the-Forceof-Decisive-Action.pdf.

60 Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-8, The 

United States Army’s Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 

2016-2028, Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 22, 2010, p. 16.

61 Ibid., pp. 15-18. The three dimensions of cyber electronic 

warfare (EW) and information operations (IO) are described as:

(a) First dimension. The first dimension is the psychological 

contest of wills against implacable foes, warring factions, 

criminal groups, and potential adversaries. This dimension 

involves influencing desperate and creative people “to do 

what they really don’t want to do” and requires an acute 

understanding of human behavior.

(b) Second dimension. The second dimension is strategic 

engagement and involves keeping friends at home, gaining 

allies abroad, and generating support or empathy for the 

mission in the area of operations. This dimension includes 

the general public, key actors, and third party validators 

who are the ultimate arbiters of success or failure of military 

operations in the current operational environment. Gaining 

and maintaining their support or empathy for the mission is 

an imperative of 21st century operations.

(c) Third dimension. The third dimension is the cyberelectromagnetic contest. Trends in wired, wireless, and 

optical technologies are setting conditions for the convergence 
61

of computer and telecommunication networks. A significant 

advantage will go to the side that is able to gain, protect, 

and exploit advantages in the highly contested cyberspace 

and electromagnetic spectrums [EMS]. [Footnote for this 

paragraph: The use of the term cyber-electromagnetic is not 

meant to equate the terms cyberspace and EMS, but rather 

to highlight there is significant overlap between the two and 

future technological development is likely to increase this 

convergence.] 

62 Ibid. Descriptions of the four elements of CyberOps 

include:

CyberSA is the immediate knowledge of friendly, adversary 

and other relevant information regarding activities in 

and through cyberspace and the EMS [electromagnetic 

spectrum]. It is gained from a combination of intelligence and 

operational activity in cyberspace, the EMS, and in the other 

domains, both unilaterally and through collaboration with 

unified action and public-private partners. Discrimination 

between natural and manmade threats is a critical piece of 

this analysis. (p. 18)

 CyNetOps is the component of CyberOps that establishes, 

operates, manages, protects, defends, and commands 

and controls the LandWarNet, critical infrastructure and 

key resources (CIKR), and other specified cyberspace. 

CyNetOps consists of three core elements: Cyber enterprise 

management (CyEM), cyber content management (CyCM), 

and cyber defense (CyD), including information assurance, 

computer network defense (to include response actions), 

and critical infrastructure protection. CyNetOps uses CyEM, 

CyCM, and CyD in a mutually supporting and supported 

relationship with CyberWar and CyberSpt. (p. 19)

CyberWar is the component of CyberOps that extends 

cyber power beyond the defensive boundaries of the GIG 

[global information grid] to detect, deter, deny, and defeat 

adversaries. CyberWar capabilities target computer and 

telecommunication networks and embedded processors 

and controllers in equipment, systems and infrastructure. 

CyberWar uses cyber exploitation (CyE), cyber attack 

(CyA), and dynamic cyber defense (DCyD) in a mutually 

supporting and supported relationship with CyNetOps and 

CyberSpt. (p. 21)
62

CyberSpt is a diverse collection of supporting activities which 

are generated and employed to specifically enable both 

CyNetOps and CyberWar . . . These activities are called-out 

in this unifying category due to their unique and expensive 

nature as high-skilled, low-density, time-sensitive/intensive 

activities requiring specialized training, processes, and 

policy. Additionally, several of these activities also require 

specialized coordination, synchronization, and integration to 

address legal and operational considerations. It is because of 

these considerations and their overall importance that these 

activities are addressed as a CyberOps core component. (p. 

22)

63 Department of Army, FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of Army, February 2014, p. v. For additional background and history of the U.S. 

Army CO, see Jeffrey L. Caton, Army Support of Military Cyberspace 

Operations: Joint Contexts and Global Escalation Implications, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2015.

64 Department of Army, FM 3-38, pp. 2-8–2-9. The full context 

of the Soldier’s role in cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA) is:

Routine uses of cyberspace, such as sending e-mail, using 

the Internet to complete an online training course, and 

developing a briefing document, may occur in cyberspace, 

but they do not amount to what is defined as CO. However, 

it is through these routine uses of cyberspace that most of the 

vulnerabilities on U.S. networks are exposed to, and exploited 

by, adversaries. This includes communications that enter the 

EMS. By following accepted operations security procedures, 

every Soldier contributes to CEMA. Commanders, leaders, 

and non-commissioned officers educate Soldiers on threats 

in cyberspace and the EMS. Soldiers understand the 

relationship between cyberspace and the EMS and maintain 

the necessary protection measures when using devices that 

leverage this relationship between capabilities. 

65 Ibid., p. 2-2.

66 Ibid., p. 2-7. With regard to CEMA coordination, FM 3-38 

notes:
63

The CEMA element collaborates internally with subordinate 

units and externally with supported, supporting, and 

adjacent units and centers. The CEMA element neither 

owns nor controls any of the unit’s CO or EW assets, but 

it must coordinate with many who do. Therefore, CEMA 

staff personnel cannot support the element’s mission by 

themselves. To plan, integrate, and synchronize successfully, 

the CEMA element, in coordination with the G-2 (S-2), 

collaborates via several means both internally to its unit 

and externally to its supporting units. The organization’s 

knowledge management section can assist in establishing 

mechanisms to facilitate collaboration and reachback. (See 

table 2-1 on page 2-8.) [Note: table 2-1 is titled “Functions of 

the cyber electromagnetic activities working group.”] 

67 The new version of FM 3-12 was released 5 months after 

the research for this monograph was concluded. See Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic 

Warfare Operations, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department 

of Army, April 11, 2017, available from http://armypubs.army.

mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN3089_FM%203-12%20

FINAL%20WEB%201.pdf, accessed February 19, 2018.

68 U.S. Army War College, Strategic Cyberspace Operations 

Guide, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. 

Army War College, June 1, 2016, available from https://archive.org/

details/USAWCStrategicCyberOpsGuide, accessed November 14, 

2016.

69 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: 

Joint Force 2020, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 

10, 2012, p. 4. The elements of globally integrated operations are:

• Mission command

• Seize, retain and exploit the initiative

• Global agility

• Partnering

• Flexibility in establishing Joint Forces

• Cross-domain synergy

• Use of flexible, low-signature capabilities

• Increasingly discriminate to minimize unintended 

consequences 

70 Ibid., p. 2.
64

71 Ibid., p. 7. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) 

includes special operations, global strike, and ISR as part of flexible, low-signature or small-footprint capabilities.

72 Ibid., p. 5.

73 Ibid., p. 2.

74 Ibid., p. 7.

75 Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), Cross-Domain 

Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner’s Guide, Washington, DC: 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 14, 2016, p. 1, available from http://

www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/cross_domain_

planning_guide.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-161956-230, accessed February 

14, 2018.

76 Ibid., p. 1.

77 Ibid., Chapters 2 and 3.

78 Ibid., pp. 37-38. The text for Proposed Unique Characteristics and Capabilities in Table 2 are verbatim from this reference.

79 Ibid., p. 5. The Planner’s Guide cites JP 1-02 as the source for 

its definition of space, but there is no definition of “space” in the 

current version (August 2017) of JP 1-02.

80 See Air Command and Staff College, Space Research Electives Seminars, AU-18 Space Primer, 2nd Ed., Maxwell Air Force 

Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, September 2009. 

Chapter 3 addresses Current Space Law and Policy.

81 Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), pp. 46-47. The text 

for Proposed Unique Characteristics and Capabilities in Table 3 

are verbatim from this reference.

82 Iulia-Diana Galeriu, “‘Paper satellites’ and the free use of 

outer space,” New York: New York University School of Law, 

January/February 2015, available from http://www.nyulawglobal.

org/globalex/Paper_satellites_free_use_outer_space.html, accessed 

February 14, 2018. This paper examines the claims by nations and 

commercial entities for specific space orbit positions:
65

Abstract: The International Telecommunication Union 

[herein after: ITU] is the United Nations [UNs] specialized 

agency for information and communications technologies, 

that allocates global radio spectrum and satellites orbits and 

develops the technical standards which ensure that networks 

and technologies seamlessly interconnect. [1] As the satellite 

industry is the most profitable space business at the moment, 

the demand for slots in the geostationary orbit [herein after: 

GSO] has been growing and the mandated institution to 

allocate these slots amongst States is the ITU. Due to the high 

value of the orbital positions and their scarcity, the GSO is 

slowly becoming saturated, despite the fact that many States 

have not yet placed a satellite into orbit due to technological 

or economic constrictions. This impairment of the States in 

their capability to participate has triggered a speculative 

phenomenon known as ‘overfiling’. Overfiling consists of 

registering unneeded uses of orbit resources and has the 

effect of foreclosing others, who have near-term needs, 

from achieving access and conflict-free registrations. As a 

consequence of this practice, some States risk being denied 

their right to use outer space freely, a right which has been 

generally recognized in the international space legislation. 

83 Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), p. 52. Table TIV-2 

of the Planner’s Guide is taken from Table 1 of Sean Brandes, “The 

Newest Warfighting Domain: Cyberspace,” Synesis: A Journal of 

Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy, Vol. 4, 2013, pp. G:90-G:95.

84 DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 37.

85 Department of Army, FM 3-38, p. 1-5. FM 3-38 lists the 

characteristics of the cyberspace domain as:

1-13. Cyberspace has characteristics that significantly differ 

from the land, air, maritime, and space domains. Cyberspace 

is a system of systems in that many small and diverse systems 

comprise the structure as a whole. These systems exist 

throughout each of the four natural domains. Changes in 

cyberspace are often driven by private industry research and 

development, making the domain dynamic and continually 

evolving as information technology capabilities continue 

to expand and evolve. Because cyberspace is man-made, it 

is only through continued attention and maintenance that 

cyberspace persists.
66

1-14. Cyberspace reinforces the fact that an operational 

framework is not confined to a physical place. Traditional 

battlefields were confined to physical space. While the 

repercussions of what happens on the traditional battlefield 

can create social and political effects around the world, the 

actual physical impact is limited to the physical battlefield. 

The inclusion of cyberspace and the EMS greatly expands 

and complicates the operational framework, transforming a 

limited physical battlefield to a global battlefield. A computer 

virus executed in cyberspace may strike its intended target 

and also indiscriminately strike other systems in several 

nations around the world, including the United States (U.S.). 

Collateral damage from this type of attack is not always 

predictable.

1-15. Cyberspace is an environment created and maintained 

for the purpose of facilitating the use and exploitation of 

information, human interaction, and intercommunication. 

This domain co-exists with the EMS through 

telecommunications systems. These systems utilize the EMS 

and have converged into a worldwide network to create 

cyberspace. Effective CO holistically address the physical 

infrastructure, data networks, and the EMS. 

86 Ibid., p. 1-5.

87 Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), pp. 50-51. The text 

for Unique Characteristics and Capabilities in Table 4 are verbatim for this reference.

88 “Internet Traffic Report,” continuously updating, available 

from http://internettrafficreport.com/, accessed November 28, 2016. 

This website “monitors the flow of data around the world. It then 

displays a value between zero and 100. Higher values indicate 

faster and more reliable connections.” It also provides statistics 

on the average response times for information package to traverse 

servers in the continents of Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, and South America. These values varied between 39 to 137 

milliseconds on the day of access for this endnote. For more discussion on physical factors in cyberspace, see Caton, in Bartholomees, Jr., ed., pp. 333-334.

89 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), United 

States Faces Challenges in Addressing Global Cybersecurity and 
67

Governance, GAO Report 10-606, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 2010. Figure 1 of this report, “U.S. 

Government Involvement in Key Entities and Efforts Addressing 

Global Cyberspace Security and Governance,” includes 24 different fora with which U.S. Government departments participate 

(e.g., Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, 

and Commerce).

90 Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), The description of 

the three layers of cyberspace in the Planner’s Guide—originally 

from Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R)—is included on p. 52.

The physical layer includes all hardware assets—computers, 

servers, routers, satellite links, etc.—enabling the movement 

of information in and through cyberspace. Related to the 

physical layer is cyberspace’s reliance on the electromagnetic 

spectrum (EMS), where much of cyberspace’s code moves 

and is, therefore, vulnerable to jamming or manipulation. 

The logical layer is the abstract portion of the physical layer. 

This layer reflects information represented and accessible in 

multiple locations through Internet Protocol and uniform 

resource locator (URLs). The cyber-persona layer is an 

extension of the logical layer and represents the users, 

entities, and organizations on the network. This layer applies 

the same rules that govern the logical layer [emphasis in 

original].

91 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. IV-2.

92 Department of Army, FM 3-38, pp. 1-4–1-5.

93 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R), p. I-2.

94 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. E-2.

95 Ibid., p. IV-18.

96 Ibid., p. E-1.

97 Department of Army, FM 3-38, p. 1-5.

98 Ibid., p. 2-7.

99 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. E-2.
68

100 Department of Army, FM 3-38, p. 2-7.

101 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R), p. I-2.

102 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. IV-18.

103 Department of Army, FM 3-38, pp. 1-4–1-5.

104 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. IV-18.

105 Department of Army, FM 3-38, p. 1-5.

106 Ibid., p. 3-3. FM 3-38 provides an example of CO support 

to opposing land commanders:

For example, cyberspace capabilities and other informationrelated capabilities may be directed at an enemy weapons 

system consisting of the targeted platform and its operators. 

The cyberspace capability could create degrading effects 

on the platform while an information-related capability 

influences, disrupts, corrupts, or usurps the decisionmaking 

of the operator. 

107 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R), p. I-2.

108 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. IV-18.

109 Department of Army, FM 3-38, p. 1-5.

110 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R), p. IV-12.

111 Ibid., p. II-1.

112 Department of the Army, ADP No. 3-0, p. 13. Mission 

Command is described as:

62. The mission command warfighting function develops 

and integrates those activities enabling a commander to 

balance the art of command and the science of control. 

This fundamental philosophy of command places people, 

rather than technology or systems, at the center. Under 

this philosophy, commanders drive the operations process 

through their activities of understand, visualize, describe, 

direct, lead, and assess. 
69

113 For details, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, p. B-2, Figure 

B-1 “Missile Warning and Support Request Procedures.”

114 Department of Army, FM 3-38, p. 3-12. The Cyberspace 

Effects Request Form is described as follows:

3-50. The cyber effects request format is a format used to 

request effects in support of CO. The cyber effects request 

format contains baseline information for coordinating and 

integrating cyberspace capabilities and associated authorities 

to create effects outside and inside of the DODIN including 

LandWarNet. Commanders and staffs ensure cyber effects 

request formats are developed and submitted throughout 

the operations process to facilitate planning. Also, the 

cyber effects request format facilitates the achievement 

of operational and tactical objectives by leveraging the 

employment of cyberspace capabilities. 

115 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02D, 

Guidance for Development and Implementation of Joint Concepts, 

Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 22, 2013, p. A-3.

While concepts indirectly guide the other elements of 

force development, the relationship between concepts and 

doctrine is more direct: both concepts and doctrine focus on 

ideas for how the Joint Force should operate. As concepts 

gain institutional acceptance and requisite capabilities 

are developed, validated elements of the concepts may bе 

incorporated in doctrine. 

116 DoD, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Version 

1.0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 17, 

2012, Foreword, available from https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/

Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf, accessed November 3, 2016.

117 Ibid., Foreword.

118 Ibid., p. 12. The other two trends are “dramatic improvement and proliferation of weapons and other technologies capable of denying access to or freedom of action within an operational 

area” (p. 9) and “the changing U.S. overseas defense posture 

[emphasis in original]” resulting from decreased support abroad, 

severely contracting resources, and force protection. 
70

119 Ibid., p. 12.

120 Ibid., p. 26.

121 Ibid., p. 27. The JOAC vision includes the use of traditional domain forces to support space and CO: 

Gaining space and cyberspace superiority when and where 

needed is not necessarily a symmetrical effort—that is, 

cyberspace operations [CO] to gain cyberspace superiority 

and space operations to gain space superiority—but often 

can be achieved more effectively, like superiority in the 

other domains, through the cross-domain application of 

combat power. 

122 Ibid., p. 18. Operational Access Precept number 1, “Conduct operations to gain access based on the requirements of the 

broader mission, while also designing subsequent operations to 

lessen access challenges” considers a reduced use of land forces:

Since operational access does not exist for its own sake, joint 

forces should conduct access operations in accordance with 

the broader objectives and ideally in conjunction with the 

other elements of national power. Importantly, a joint force 

commander [JFC] should avoid over-committing forces or 

projecting combat power deeper into hostile territory than is 

required by the objective. This is especially true of major land 

forces, which can be difficult to withdraw once committed. 

123 Ibid., pp. 20-21.

124 Ibid., p. 22.

125 Ibid., pp. 19-20. Operational Access Precept number 3, 

“Consider a variety of basing options [emphasis in original],” 

includes use of space and cyberspace capabilities to help offset 

forward-based forces:

One other option is to emphasize capabilities with minimal 

dependence on forward bases, such as amphibious, longrange strike, cyber, electronic, or space capabilities, either in 

primary or supporting roles. 

126 Ibid., pp. 18-19. Operational Access Precept number 2, 

“Prepare the operational area in advance to facilitate access
71

[emphasis in original],” emphasizes the early use of operations in 

the space and cyberspace domains:

Operations in space, cyberspace, and across the 

electromagnetic spectrum [EMS] likewise will be continuous 

to ensure that support to navigation, command and control 

[C2], targeting, sustainment, and intelligence are in place 

when needed. Moreover, computer network operations 

[NETOPS], both offensive and defensive, likely will 

commence long before lethal combat begins and even before 

combat forces begin to deploy. 

Operational Access Precept number 5, “Exploit advantages in 

one or more domains to disrupt enemy antiaccess/area-denial 

capabilities in others [emphasis in original],” (pp. 21-22) also 

calls early space and CO:

The decision on which domains to operate in initially will 

depend on the mission and the enemy’s capabilities and 

vulnerabilities in the various domains; there is no universal 

sequence. That said, joint force projection almost always will 

include the early conduct of information operations [IO] 

and operations in space and cyberspace, since freedom of 

action in those latter domains is increasingly important to all 

joint operations. Moreover, those operations rarely require 

the additional risks incurred in deploying forces to the 

operational area. In fact, information, space, and cyberspace 

operations [CO] generally should commence well before the 

need for combat, as part of efforts to shape the operational 

area. 

127 Ibid., p. 25. Operational Access Precept number 10, “Maximize surprise through deception, stealth, and ambiguity to 

complicate enemy targeting [emphasis in original],” includes:

In the context of future opposed access, forms of deception 

that could prove especially useful include electromagnetic 

deception and cyber deception, which could provide 

intentionally erroneous information on the location and 

activities of deploying joint forces to enemy intelligence 

networks. 

128 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Entry Operations, 

Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2014, p. iii, available 
72

from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/jceo

.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162000-837, accessed February 13, 2018.

129 Ibid., p. vi. The purpose of the Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO) is summarized in this passage as:

The idea is to employ opportunistic, unpredictable 

maneuver, in and across multiple domains, in conjunction 

with the ability to attain local superiority at multiple entry 

points to gain entry and achieve desired objectives. 

130 Ibid., p. vii.

131 Ibid., p. 6. The other six operational characteristics are: 

• Purposes for entry operations

• Geographic and infrastructure challenges

• Capacity for entry operations

• Evolving threats

• Whole-of-government approach

• Multinational and coalition interface and interoperability

132 Ibid., pp. 11-12.

133 Ibid., pp. 12-13. Regarding the use of cyberspace and 

space to support military deception (MILDEC) operations against 

enemy forces, the JCEO includes: 

One method the Joint Force may use to confound the enemy 

is to create either a dearth or overabundance of targets for 

the enemy to process. Social media and other cyber-enabled 

deception methods may be valuable contributors to gaining 

surprise. Where surprise is not possible due to the nature 

of the operating area or the duration of the operation, the 

Joint Force will seek to overwhelm the enemy’s targeting 

capability. This could be done, for example, through a 

combination of cyberspace efforts and the use of numerous 

autonomous decoys employed in one or more of the other 

domains. 

Regarding the use of cyberspace and space support of MILDEC 

operation to reduce collateral damage, the JCEO states:
73

Additionally, information operations, [IO] including those 

enabled by cyberspace employed in either a clandestine or 

overt manner, may be able to move populations away from 

potential points of entry in order to minimize collateral 

damage concerns.

134 Ibid., pp. 13, 15. With regard to joint fires, the JCEO 

suggests:

In a hostile environment, fires will be mutually supporting 

across all domains to develop local superiority by 

suppressing threats to air and maritime operations. For 

example, information operations [IO], cyberspace, and 

space operations may be used to help a special operations 

unit to target, track, and conduct a direct action strike on an 

adversary’s anti-ship system, permitting naval surface fires 

to engage enemy air defense assets. In turn, this engagement 

would allow global strike assets to eliminate key short range 

area denial assets that would otherwise impede the entry 

force.

135 Ibid., p. 20. The JCEO notes how maneuver is enhanced 

by space and cyberspace capabilities:

Regardless of the type of maneuver, mobility and flexibility 

are critical and enhanced when fully integrated with 

cyberspace and space capabilities. Entry operations require 

the ability to build up capabilities as quickly as possible. 

Forces must be able to disperse to seize key terrain or for 

self-preservation, and to concentrate rapidly to exploit 

opportunity. 

136 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Environment, JOE 2035: 

The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World, Washington, DC: 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 14, 2016, p. 7, available from http://www.

jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joe_2035_july16.

pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162059-917, accessed September 19, 2016. The 

Joint Operating Environment (JOE) suggests regional power trends 

that include:

Emergence of new spacefaring nations and military 

competition in space. Many capabilities previously 

reserved to superpowers are now available to other states 

on a commercial basis, to include Earth observation, optical 
74

sensing, space-based Internet, and communications services. 

A range of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) able to disrupt or 

destroy the space, electromagnetic, and ground segments of 

these constellations will also become more common.

Growth of state-sponsored cyber forces and capabilities. 

The next decades will see the further emergence of statesponsored actors and associated organizations with more 

advanced cyber warfare capabilities. Like strategic airpower 

before it, state-based cyber advocates will develop strategies 

that attempt to “leap over” traditional U.S. military forces 

and directly influence the decision calculations of political 

and military leadership. 

137 Ibid., p. 17.

138 Ibid., pp. 21, 30-33.

139 Ibid., pp. 30, 33.

140 Ibid., pp. 32-33. JOE 2035 predicts a potentially hostile 

space domain:

Competition in orbit (even during peacetime) will be 

intense, highlighted by satellites maneuvering to hinder 

the operations of other satellites, co-orbital jamming, and 

the use of ground-based lasers to dazzle or destroy imaging 

sensors. Future adversaries will also have the capability to 

deploy blockers and grapplers to impede the free operation 

of commercial and military satellites, and they will use 

ASAT weapons launched at space assets from the ground as 

well as from other satellites. Ultimately, this may generate 

space debris leading to a runaway chain reaction which 

destroys other satellites and threatens the integrity of many 

important orbits. 

141 Ibid., p. 34.

142 Ibid., p. 35. The context of conflict in cyberspace includes:

A growing number of states will have extensive offensive 

cyber forces at their disposal to disrupt the smooth and 

efficient functioning of cyber-connected systems. In the 

future, state military and security organizations will 

increasingly use cross-border network and web-site 
75

disruptions to cause social unrest. Attacks will work to 

undermine the trust and data integrity that are central to 

advanced societies, particularly financial, legal, and technical 

infrastructure. This competition may also feature strategic 

surveillance as well as industrial and scientific espionage. 

143 Ibid., p. 36.

144 Ibid., pp. 40-50.

145 For additional reports on future security environments, 

see National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, Report NIC 2012-001, Washington, DC: Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, available from https://www.dni.

gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf, accessed November 18, 

2016. For additional views on the need for space and cyberspace 

capabilities to address increasing anti-access/area denial (A2/

AD) challenges, see Jason D. Ellis, Seizing the Initiative: Competitive 

Strategies and Modern U.S. Defense Policy, Report LLNL-TR-680128, 

Livermore CA: Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 2016, available from https://

cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/J_Ellis_Seizing_the_Initiative_1_16.

pdf, accessed November 18, 2016. To explore challenges presented 

by China’s increased military forces, see Peter Dombrowski, 

America’s Third Offset Strategy: New Military Technologies and Implications for the Asia Pacific, Policy Report, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam 

School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, June 2015, available from https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/

uploads/2015/06/PR150608_Americas-Third-Offset-Strategy.pdf, 

accessed November 18, 2016.

146 Mathew J. Burrrows, Global Risks 2035: The Search for a 

New Normal, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, September 2016, 

available from http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/

global-risks-2035, accessed October 6, 2016. The report is organized 

into nine chapters that address changing demographics, international governance, and technology advancement: Ch. 1. Individual Empowerment with More Unintended Consequences; Ch. 2. 

Growing Demographic Crunch for Everybody Except Sub-Saharan Africa; Ch. 3. A Malthusian World of Scarcities Increasingly 

Likely for the Poorest; Ch. 4. Technology with Downsides; Ch. 

5. Conflict Risk Increasing; Ch. 6. Middles East: High Risk of 

Continuing Conflict; Ch. 7. China’s linchpin in the Global Order; 
76

Ch. 8. The Difficult Transition to a Post-Western Order; and, 

Ch. 9. The Big Picture.

147 Ibid., p. 40. Regarding a future contested space environment, the report projects that: 

The space powers will continue to develop quantitative and 

qualitative space-based missile attack early warning systems, 

intelligence, navigation, communications and broadcasting, 

and military command-and-control systems.

The likelihood of space incidents (such as the collision 

of Russian and US satellites in 2009) might increase. Such 

incidents also include the possibility that authoritarian and 

irresponsible regimes will attempt to disrupt the operation 

of space systems, with unpredictable socioeconomic and 

military consequences.

The only way to prevent an arms race in space would be to 

improve the legal basis for activity in outer space, particularly 

by expanding restrictions and bans on weapons deployment 

in orbit and development of land-, air-, and sea-based means 

of destroying objects in space.

148 Ibid., p. ii.

149 Ibid., p. 8. The original source of this information was 

cited as Atlantic Council, Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, and Zurich, Risk Nexus: Overcome by Cyber Risks? 

Economic Benefits and Costs of Alternate Cyber Futures, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, September 2015, available from http://

publications.atlanticcouncil.org/cyberrisks//risk-nexus-september2015-overcome-by-cyber-risks.pdf, accessed November 4, 2016. The 

original reports consider this cost-benefit inflection to be an ongoing global phenomena: 

A future where the annual costs of being connected 

outweigh the benefits is not only possible, it is happening 

now. According to our project models, annual cybersecurity 

costs in high-income economies like the U.S. have already 

begun to outweigh the annual economic benefits arising 

from global connectivity.
77

For all economies, the inversion of costs and benefits 

is expected to occur within the next five years. In Latin 

America, it is expected before the year 2030, as the region 

bridges the digital divide. In the Asia-Pacific region, the 

inversion is expected sometime after that. (p. 2)

150 Burrrows, p. 29.

151 Army Cyber Proponent, The U.S. Army LandCyber White 

Paper 2018-2030, Fort George G. Meade, MD: U.S. Army Cyber 

Command/2nd U.S. Army, September 9, 2013, p. 9, available 

from http://dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a592724.pdf, accessed November 6, 2013.

152 Ibid., p. viii. The foundation of the LandCyber concept 

includes:

153 Ibid., p. 4-6. Per the white paper, the following are the 

Army’s roles and responsibilities in cyberspace as an operating 

force:

(1) Support prevent, shape, and win roles with cyberspace 

capabilities. This requires supporting intelligence operations 

and conducting cyberspace operational preparation of the 

environment (OPE) [sic] to plan and prepare for military 

operations. Building, operating and defending all Army 

Eight Aspects of Convergence: 

1. Time and space 

2. Threat and technology 

3. Land and cyber domains 

4. Cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum [EMS] 

5. Defensive and offensive cyber 

operations

6. Information environment and 

cyberspace domain 

7. Information management and 

knowledge management

8. Operational and institutional 

Nine Guiding Principles:

1. Unified cyberspace operations 

[CO]

2. Integration

3. Localized cyberspace effects 

to the tactical edge

4. Enhanced understanding

5. All networks are operational 

warfighting platforms and 

functions

6. Combined arms approach

7. Achieve cyberspace domain 

superiority

8. Ensure mission command

9. Empowered LandCyber units 

and Soldiers
78

networks as an end-to-end enterprise ensures its availability 

to the Army.

(2) Provide critical infrastructure protection for the Army 

and U.S. Northern Command national systems, and provide 

Army-wide indications and warning against threats and 

attacks.

(3) Integrate cyberspace operations [CO] capabilities into 

joint and Army planning and exercises, facilitate security 

cooperation to create defense in depth (under the direction 

of COCOMs [combatant command-command authority] 

and subject to the limitations of National Foreign Disclosure 

Policy), develop shared indications and warning, and 

leverage combined cyberspace operations [CO] strengths. 

Plan and integrate world-class cyber opposing forces 

(WCCO) in concert with USCYBERCOM and provide 

representative adversary command, control, and networked 

systems into training, testing, experiments, and exercises. 

This integration develops Army forces that can detect 

and respond to adversary cyber attacks and operate in a 

degraded cyberspace environment.

(4) Integrate cyberspace operations [CO] into combatant 

command [CCMD] planning and targeting processes 

to broaden the range of options. Deliver offensive and 

defensive cyber effects, if approved and directed, planned 

and integrated through cyber electromagnetic activities 

(CEMA). Conduct information operations (IO) in or through 

the cyberspace domain for the Army and support inform 

and influence activities (IIA) in or through the cyberspace 

domain.

154 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

155 Ibid., pp. 17-22.

156 The new version of FM 3-12 was released 5 months after 

the research for this monograph was concluded. See Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-12.

157 Malcom Martin, “Cyber Support to Corps and Below – 

Concepts and Doctrine,” briefing at the TechNet Augusta 2016 

conference sponsored by the Armed Forces Communications 
79

and Electronics Association, Fort Gordon, GA: U.S. Army Cyber 

Center of Excellence, August 2, 2016.

158 Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), p. 4.

159 The excerpts in Table 8 are verbatim from Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, pp. 8-12.

160 Ibid., p. 14. The CCJO addresses the practical realities of 

force development:

The pursuit of advanced technology may prove unaffordable. 

This concept envisions Joint Forces enabled by advanced 

technologies in global communications, networked 

operations, space, cyberspace, robotics, platforms and lift. 

Such technologies, especially in а time of restricted budgets, 

may prove prohibitively expensive to develop and deploy. 

161 See R. J. Vince, “Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar Summary Notes,” report LLNL-ABS-670206, Livermore CA: Center for 

Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 1, 2015, p. 2, available from https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/

assets/docs/SummaryNotes.pdf, accessed November 18, 2016. This 

report defines cross-domain deterrence as:

The act of deterring an action in one domain with a threat 

in another domain, where the domains are defined as land, 

under the land, at sea, under the sea, in the air, in space, and 

in cyberspace, and may use economic sanctions and other 

diplomatic and political tools. 

162 See John L. Rafferty, Jr., LandCyber Operations: A Double 

Edged Sword or a Dream Team? Strategy Research Project, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2013, abstract, this 

Strategy Research Project explores the questions: “Will LandCyber enable micro-managing leaders to be the ‘wet blanket’ of 

mission command? Or will it open new doors for more effective 

maneuver and influence operations?”

163 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOE 2035, pp. 17-20, 26-27. Regarding 

potential adversary use of autonomous systems, the JOE notes:

The development of small, smart, cheap, autonomous, longrange, and highly-capable systems operating in the air, land, 
80

sea, and undersea environments may further complicate the 

homeland defense mission by providing relatively cheap 

strategic attack options to both state and non-state actors. 

(pp. 26-27)

164 See Jeffrey L. Caton, Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Brief 

Survey of Development, Operational, Legal, and Ethical Issues, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

December 2015.

165 Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), pp. 46, 52. For 

details of the space and cyberspace references to EMS, see Tables 

3 and 4 of this monograph.

166 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R), p. IV-9. An example of 

a potentially confusing interaction between cyberspace, space, 

EMS, and EA [electronic attack]:

Planners should maintain awareness of the EMS and its 

impact on mobile devices and wireless networks, including 

cellular, wireless local area network, Global Positioning 

System, and other commercial and military uses of the EMS. 

CO and EA, to include offensive space control, must be 

deconflicted. Uncoordinated EA may significantly impact 

OCO utilizing the EMS. Depending upon power levels, the 

terrain in which they are used, and the nature of the system 

being targeted, unintended effects of EA can also occur 

outside of a local commander’s AOR just as second order 

effects of CO may occur outside the AOR. 

167 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “DoD CIO Says Spectrum May 

Become Warfighting Domain,” Breaking Defense, December 9, 

2015, available from https://breakingdefense.com/2015/12/dod-ciosays-spectrum-may-become-warfighting-domain/, accessed October 

28, 2016. The article includes the text of a statement by DoD Chief 

Information Officer (CIO) Terry Halvorsen:

The Department understands that EMS Superiority is a 

crucial enabler to achieving superiority in all other domains 

and must be considered a prerequisite to all successful 

operations. In response to the pressing need to implement 

both the DoD EMS Strategy and JCEMSO [Joint Concept 

for Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations], the Department 

has taken steps that strive to establish policy and assign 
81

responsibilities to achieve EMS Superiority through efficient 

and effective Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO), 

which will enable the optimization of EMS access and use/

maneuver throughout the full range of military operations, 

and defines EMSO as all spectrum dependent (SD) activities 

occurring within the EMS.

As part of this guidance, the Department will investigate all 

requirements and ramifications of its enactment, to include 

the potential recognition of the EMS as a domain. As the EMS 

transcends all domains the Department must systematically 

evolve its capabilities to ensure effective EMS operations. As 

the Primary Staff Assistant (PSA) to the Secretary of Defense 

for spectrum, the Office of the DoD Chief Information Officer 

(CIO) will be the Departmental lead for these efforts in close 

cooperation and coordination with the all appropriate DoD 

Components.

Also, see Martin C. Libicki, “Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting 

Domain,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 

Vol. 8, No. 2, Fall 2012, pp. 325-340, available from https://www.

rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP51077.html, accessed October 28, 2016. Libicki states that the argument for cyberspace as a 

domain should also apply to EMS. (p. 366)

168 DoD, JOAC, p. 7. The JOAC inaccurately asserts that 

“Advances in airpower and long-range weapons have mitigated 

the degrading effects of distance to some extent but have not eliminated them, while cyber capabilities are unaffected by distance.”

169 For details on the concept of ultra-tactical operations, 

see Jeffrey L. Caton, “Complexity and Emergence in Ultra-Tactical Cyberspace Operations,” in Karlis Podins, Jan Stinissen, and 

Markus Maybaum, eds., Proceeding of 5th International Conference 

in Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, Estonia: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence Publications, June 2013, pp. 299-312.

170 DoD, JOAC, p. 1.

171 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOE 2035, p. 43. With regard to cyber 

resiliency, JOE 2035 includes:
The future security environment will continue to feature a 

range of adversaries attempting to shape political behavior 

by conducting damaging or disruptive cyber-attacks. The 

Joint Force must minimize the consequences of threatened 

or successful cyberattacks against the United States, its 

allies, and partners by conducting Military Support to Cyber 

Resiliency. Furthermore, the Joint Force should develop the 

capacity to work with a range of nontraditional partners such 

as private companies or cyber activists to offset adversary 

operations in cyberspace, for example, by identifying and 

interdicting adversary cyber operatives. 

82
83

ACRONYMS

A2/AD anti-access/area denial

ADCON administrative control

ADP Army Doctrine Publication

AFCY Air Forces Cyber Command

AOR area of responsibility

ARCY Army Cyber Command

ASAT anti-satellite weapons

C2 command and control

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear

CCDR combatant commander

CCJO Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

CCMD combatant command

CCP Concept Capability Plan

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

CEMA cyber electromagnetic activities

CF Conventional Forces

CIKR critical infrastructure and key resources

CIO chief information officer

CO cyberspace operations

COCOM combatant command-command 

authority

C-OPE cyberspace operational preparation of 

the environment

CSE cyberspace support element

CyEM cyber enterprise management

DAL defended asset list

DCO defensive cyberspace operations or 

defensive CO

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DNC DISA network center
84

DoD Department of Defense

DODIN DoD Information Network

EA electronic attack

EMP electromagnetic pulse

EMS electromagnetic spectrum

EMSO electromagnetic spectrum operations

EW electronic warfare

FLTCY Fleet Cyber Command

FM Field Manual

GAO Government Accountability Office

GCC geographic combatant commander

GIG global information grid

GPS global positioning system

GSO geostationary orbit

HPRF high-powered radio frequency

IADS integrated air defense systems

IIA inform and influence activities

IO information operations

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance

ITU International Telecommunication Union

JCC Joint Cyberspace Center

JCEMSO Joint Concept for Electromagnetic 

Spectrum Operations

JCEO Joint Concept for Entry Operations

JFC joint force commander

JFCC SPACE Joint Functional Component 

Commander for Space

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JNCC joint network operations control center

JOAC Joint Operational Access Concept

JOE Joint Operating Environment

JOPP joint operation planning process 
85

JP Joint Publication

MAR4CY Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace 

Command

MILDEC military deception

MISO military information support operations

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVWAR navigation warfare

NETOPS network operations

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NOSC network operations and security center

NSA National Security Agency

OCO offensive CO

OE operational environment

OPCON operational control

OPE operational preparation of the 

environment

PED processing, exploitation, and 

dissemination

PNT position-navigation-timing

PSA primary staff assistant

SAM surface-to-air missiles

SATCOM satellite communications

SCA space coordinating authority

SD spectrum dependent

SOF Special Operations Forces

SSE space support element

STO special technical operations

TACON tactical control

TNC theater network center

TNCC theater network coordination center

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

UCP Unified Command Plan

UN United Nations 
86

USCYBERCOM U.S. Cyber Command

USSPACECOM U.S. Space Command

USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command

WCCO world-class cyber opposing forces

WMD weapons of mass destruction
87

APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF SPACE- AND 

CYBERSPACE-RELATED EXCERPTS FROM 

JOINT PUBLICATION (JP) 3-31

JP 3-31 excerpts related to the space domain.

2. Joint Land Operations

f. It is important to understand that in today’s complex operational environment [OE], adversary actions can be delivered on, from, within, and outside 

of the operational area, all with potentially global impacts and influence. To 

negate those threats, commanders at all levels should consider how space, cyberspace, and EMS [electromagnetic spectrum] capabilities enhance the effectiveness and execution of joint land operations. Furthermore, joint staffs should 

seek out experts who and capabilities that can enhance the effectiveness of land 

operations.1

2. Roles and Responsibility

u. Performing the duties of the space coordinating authority (SCA), if 

designated. The individual designated to be the JFLCC [joint force land component commander] may also be designated to be the SCA within a joint force 

to coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. The SCA 

has primary responsibility for joint space operations planning, to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint force. The SCA gathers operational 

requirements that may be satisfied by space capabilities and facilitates the use 

of established processes by joint force staffs to plan and conduct space operations.2

8. Command and Control [C2]

f. Space Capabilities for C2

(1) Space systems may be employed to monitor land areas before 

friendly forces are established. If the individual designated to be the JFLCC is 

also designated to be the SCA, he will normally designate a senior space officer 

who facilitates coordination, integration, and staffing activities for space operations on a daily basis.

(2) Space systems provide ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]; missile tracking; launch detection; environmental monitoring; 

satellite communications [SATCOM]; position, navigation, and timing; and 

navigation warfare [NAVWAR]. Considering the difficulties in communications in and around land areas, space systems offers the JFLCC the ability to 

exchange information inside the operational area, between elements of the joint 

force, and also facilitates intertheater and intratheater communications. Space 

systems may form a critical link in the C2 architecture that rapidly passes data 

and information. This can enable taskings and warnings to forces, as well as 

critical situational awareness and location information. Space systems face simultaneous demands from many users and require prioritization.
88

(3) The space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) provides a critical capability during joint land operations. GPS can provide position, location, 

and velocity for weapon accuracy, ingress and egress, location, silent rendezvous coordination, and improved personnel situational awareness. The ability 

of space systems to provide real time terrain information that, enhanced by imagery data, can be used by all components of the joint force is especially crucial 

to the success of ground forces.3

11. Movement and Manuever

c. The JFLCC makes recommendations to the JFC [joint force commander] on the following:

(9) Space support to the land force.4

Figure A-4. Notional Joint Force Land Component Operations Staff Directorate.5

JP 3-31 excerpts related to the cyberspace domain.

2. Joint Land Operations

a. In the 20th century, joint and multinational operations have encompassed the full diversity of air, land, maritime, and space forces operating 

throughout the operational area. Advances in capabilities among all forces 

and the ability to communicate over great distances have made the application 

of military power in the 21st century more dependent on the ability of commanders to synchronize and integrate joint land operations with other components’ operations. Many of these advances have been realized through the 

use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which has enabled 

the US military and allies to communicate and reach across geographic and 

geopolitical boundaries. However, these advances have also led to increased 

vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on cyberspace and the EMS for the 

US and its allies.6

f. [see excerpt in space domain section above in this table.]

2. Roles and Responsibility

p. Integrating cyberspace operations (CO) into plans. Offensive cyberspace operations [OCO] will typically be conducted in direct support of the 

JFC. The JFLCC conducts defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) and DODIN 

[DoD Information Network] operations throughout all phases of the operation.7

Figure II-5. Joint Force Land Component Commander [JFLCC] Interface with 

Other Joint Force Command and Control [C2] Mechanisms [This figure includes the following information about CO].8
89

C2 Mechanism Role/Function JFLCC Interface

JFC’s Joint Cyberspace 

Center [JCC]

Combines input from United 

States Cyber Command and 

combatant commands [CCMD] 

to provide a regional/functional 

cyberspace situation awareness/

common operational picture. 

Facilitates the coordination and 

deconfliction of combatant commander [CCDR] directed cyberspace operations [CO].

JFLCC’s representative participates to provide/request cyberspace operations [CO] products.

11. Cross-Functional Staff Organizations

c. Operations

(4) The IO [information operations] cell and cyberspace support element [CSE] works with the JFLCC and key components of the JFLCC’s staff to 

determine the cyberspace component of the JFLCC’s defended asset list (DAL). 

Once the DAL has been determined, the IO cell and cyberspace support element [CSE] focuses available capabilities to safeguard DAL assets.9

14. Communications Support Systems

The CCDR, through the JFC and functional/service components, ensures 

effective, reliable, and secure communications system and cyberspace defense 

services are consistent with the overall joint campaign plan. As driven by the 

mission, the foundation of the communications system is laid by the C2 organization of forces assigned to the JFC.10

Figure III-1. Joint Force Land Component Commander [JFLCC] Joint Planning Group Representation.11

8. Command and Control [C2]

e. Communications.

(2) Joint network operations (NETOPS) are the means by which 

communications are established and maintained throughout the DODIN. 

Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) is 

the supported commander for global CO to secure, operate, and defend DODIN. CDRUSSTRATCOM cyberspace efforts are coordinated by US Cyber 

Command who in turn coordinates with the GCC [geographic combatant commander] at the GCC’s joint cyberspace center [JCC]. As the JFLCC’s single control agency for the management and operational direction of the joint communications network, the joint network operations control center (JNCC) must be 

knowledgeable concerning the requirements of communications in the land 

environment, especially in the specific operational area. The JNCC should be 

aware of the capabilities present in the urban area, their potential use, and any 

problems associated with that use. Vital to communications management is the 

need to support planning and execution to include information exchange requirements, radio frequency spectrum allocation, communications equipment 

dispersion, and assessment of communications effectiveness.12
90

12. Protection

h. DODIN Operations and DCO. DODIN operations are operations to 

design, build, configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustain DOD [Department of Defense] networks to create and preserve information assurance on the 

DODIN, and DCO are passive and active CO intended to preserve the ability 

to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect DOD data, networks, and 

capabilities and other designated systems.13

15. Cyberspace Operations [CO]

CO are conducted across the range of military operations and CO capabilities should be considered during JOPP [joint operation planning process], 

integrated into plans, and synchronized with other operations during execution. Commanders conduct CO to retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace, 

accomplish objectives, deny freedom of action to adversaries, and enable other 

operational activities. The importance of CO support in all military operations 

has grown as the joint force increasingly relies on cyberspace for C2 and other 

critical operations and logistics functions.14

Figure A-4. Notional Joint Force Land Component Operations Staff Directorate.15

8. Communications Systems Staff Section

The J-6 staff coordinates voice, video, data, and message connectivity, 

cyberspace defense, and DODIN operations supporting JFLCC operations, 

and gives needed guidance to ensure synchronization between all components 

and/or subordinate commands. A notional J-6 staff organization is depicted in 

Figure A-7. The following actions are the responsibility of the J-6:

aa. Conducts information assurance and NETOPS as part of cyberspace 

defense support of JFLCC networks.

ee. Develops a list of critical cyberspace assets so that they can be properly protected to support JFLCC operations.16

5. Command and Control [C2]

b. Communications Systems (annex K). Communications and cyberspace 

defense procedures and priorities such as location of key nodes, spectrum management, communications-electronics operating instructions, codes, and interface with joint or multinational forces.17

ENDNOTES – APPENDIX I

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-31, Command 

and Control for Joint Land Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, February 24, 2014, p. I-4, available from http://www.jcs.mil/

Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_31.pdf.
91

2. Ibid., p. II-3.

3. Ibid., pp. IV-10–IV-11.

4. Ibid., pp. IV-18–IV-19.

5. Ibid., p. A-5. The figure includes a Space Operations section 

aligned under J-33 Current Operations.

6. Ibid., pp. I-3–I-4.

7. Ibid., p. II-3.

8. Ibid., p. II-20.

9. Ibid., pp. II-17–II-21.

10. Ibid., p. II-25.

11. Ibid., p. III-6. The figure includes a Cyberspace representative for the Cyberspace Cell included in the J-5 planning group. It 

also includes an electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) representative 

for the EMS Cell as well as the J-39/ information operations (IO) 

Officer for the IO Cell.

12. Ibid., pp. IV-8–IV-10.

13. Ibid., pp. IV-20–IV-23.

14. Ibid., p. IV-28.

15. The figure includes a Cyberspace Operations (CO) section 

that is aligned under J-33 Current Operations; Ibid., p. A-5.

16. Ibid., pp. A-9–A-11.

17. Ibid., pp. C-6–C-7.

93

APPENDIX II: CYBERSPACE COMMAND AND 

CONTROL ORGANIZATIONAL 

CONSTRUCT PER JOINT PUBLICATION 3-12 (R)1

ENDNOTES – APPENDIX II

1. Image modified from “Figure IV-1. Cyberspace Command 

and Control Organization Construct,” in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-12 (R), Cyberspace Operations, Washington, DC: 

Cyberspace Command and Control Organizational Construct

Legend

COCOM

OPCON

TACON

ADCON

supporting

direct support

ADCON administrative control

AFCY Air Forces Cyber Command

ARCY Army Cyber Command

CCDR combatant commander

CCMD combatant command

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DNC DISA network center

FLTCY Fleet Cyber Command

JCC joint cyberspace center

MAR4CY Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace 

Command

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NOSC network operations and security center

TNCC theater network coordination center

NSA National Security Agency

OPCON operational control

TACON tactical control

TNC theater network center

USCYBERCOM United States Cyberspace Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

Joint Task Force

*Representational of JCC’s relationship with DISA’s sub-element.

24th

Air

Force

10th

Fleet

2nd 

Army

ARCY AFCY FLTCY MAR4CY

MAR4CY

Services

USS7RATCOM

CCDR and 

Headquarters

Staff DIA, NSA,

NGA, etc.

Service Cyberspace 

Components

CCMD Joint 

Cyberspace

Center

Cyberspace

Support

Element

Services

NOSC

Joint Task Force

Components

TNCC*

DISA

DNC

(TNC)

USCYBERCOM

Global Steady-State

Contingency

Combat Support 

Agencies
94

Joint Chiefs of Staff, original release February 5, 2013, updated 

(unclassified) October 21, 2014, p. IV-8, available from http://www.

jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_12R.pdf, accessed 

February 14, 2018.
95

APPENDIX III: CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC 

ACTIVITIES CONSTRUCT PER 

FIELD MANUAL 3-381

ENDNOTES – APPENDIX III

1. Image from “Figure 1-1. Cyber electromagnetic activities,” 

in Department of Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department 

of Army, February 2014, p. 1-2.

97

APPENDIX IV: SUMMARY OF SPACE- AND 

CYBERSPACE-RELATED FORCE DEVELOPMENT 

REQUIREMENTS FROM SELECTED JOINT 

CONCEPT DOCUMENTS

Excerpts from Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)1

Command and 

Control [C2]

JOA-004. The ability to integrate cross-domain operations, to include at lower echelons, with the full 

integration of space and cyberspace operations [CO].

Intelligence JOA-006. The ability of operational forces to detect 

and respond to hostile computer network attack in 

an opposed access situation.

Fires JOA-011. The ability to conduct electronic attack 

[EA] and computer network attack against hostile 

antiaccess/area-denial [A2/AD] capabilities.

Movement and 

Maneuver

JOA-014. The ability to “maneuver” in cyberspace to 

gain entry into hostile digital networks.

Protection JOA-022. The ability to protect friendly space forces 

while disrupting enemy space operations.

JOA-023. The ability to conduct cyber defense in the 

context of opposed access.

Excerpts from Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO)2

Command and 

Control [C2]

Required Capability 3: The ability to command and 

control [C2] forces in austere or degraded environments, including communications, intelligence, cyberspace and space force enhancement degraded 

environments.

b. Develop procedures for operating without 

some or all Space Force Enhancement capabilities (combat support operations and force 

multiplying capabilities delivered from space) 

or with degraded capabilities for extended periods. Space Force Enhancement capabilities 

may include ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance], launch detection, missile tracking, environmental monitoring, satellite communications (SATCOM), and position-navigation-timing capabilities (PNT).
98

c. The ability to maintain operational access to 

key portions of the electro-magnetic spectrum 

during entry operations.

d. Develop procedures for rapidly identifying, operating during, and recovering from significant 

cyberspace attacks. Effects of some attacks, such 

as denial of service, may be more obvious than 

others.

f. The ability to provide operationally responsive 

space capabilities to augment or reconstitute existing space capabilities.

Required Capability 4: The ability to execute effective and complementary Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) and Conventional Forces (CF) integration, 

where SOF or CF can be the supported force (depending on the nature of the entry operation).

e. Consider expanding the integration and synchronization of space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare [EW] capabilities that CF and SOF 

units can leverage across the spectrum of operations.

Intelligence Required Capability 7: The ability to provide Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (PED) intelligence capabilities in degraded or austere environments during entry operations.

a. Space-enhancement based and reachback PED 

capabilities must be able to support or be augmented in order to sufficiently meet entry operations’ intelligence requirements en route, 

during initial entry, and even under degraded 

or austere conditions.

b. When space-based and reachback support is interdicted, entry forces must be able to carry with 

themselves tailored PED capabilities sufficient 

to support intelligence requirements in such 

communications denied environments.
99

ENDNOTES – APPENDIX IV

1. DoD, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Version 

1.0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 17, 

2012, pp. 33-35, available from https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/

Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf, accessed November 3, 2016.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Entry Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2014, pp. 23-33, available 

from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/

jceo.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162000-837, accessed February 13, 2018.

c. Ensure all data dissemination methods and 

voice communications required by PED activities are sufficiently interoperable between services and allocated with sufficient redundancies 

to ensure continuation of data dissemination 

in contested environments, including loss of 

space-enhancement or reduced access to the 

electromagnetic spectrum [EMS].

Fires Required Capability 10: The ability to continue to 

operate against A2/AD threats such as increasingly capable enemy subsurface and surface maritime 

threats, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and integrated air defense systems (IADS) capabilities, precision 

guided ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, 

small boat swarms, landmines and maritime mines, 

complex obstacles, WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and related CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials, and enemy aerial 

systems.

c. The ability to deny an enemy’s access to space.

d. The ability to create denial effects within an enemy’s networks.

e. The ability to fully integrate offensive, reactive, 

and defensive cyberspace capabilities to protect 

and project force in support of entry operations.

f. Ensure the joint force has the mechanism to 

employ appropriately delegated authority to 

use all non-kinetic fires assets, to include cyberspace capabilities.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General John S. Kem

Commandant

∗∗∗∗∗

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

AND

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Mr. Jeffrey L. Caton

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Denise J. Kersting

∗∗∗∗∗

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

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