REFERENCE MAP 

tOO toO lOO

TERRAIN FACTORS 

In The 

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 

o BUCHARE8T 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET NO. 20-290 

This pamphlet supersedes MS #T-34, "' Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign", 

published by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Special Staff, U. S. Army, 

in November 1950. 

TERRAIN FACTORS
 

IN THE
 

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN
 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY JULY 1951
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 26 July 1951 

DA Pamphlet 20-290 is published for the information and guidance 

of all concerned. 

[AG 385 (14 Jun 51)] 

By ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: 

OFFICIAL: J. LAWTON COLLINS 

'VM. E. BERGIN Ohief of Staff, United States Arm;y 

Major General, USA 

The Adjutant General 

DISTRIBUTION: 

GSUSA (5); SSUSA (5) exc NGB (15); Tech Svc (25); Bd 

(10); AFF (25); AAComd (2); OS Maj Comd (50); Log 

Comd (5); A (10); CHQ (10); D (8); R (3); Fe (5); 

P~{S & T (1) MAAG (2); Special Distribution. 

For explanation of distribution formula, see SR 310-90-1. 

Facsimile Edition 

Center of Military History
 

United States Army
 

Washington, D.C., 1982
 
PREFACE 

This pamphlet was compiled from a series of reports written especially for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by several former German 

generals. All of these officers had extensive combat experience during 

World War II, especially on the eastern front. The principal author, 

for example, was successively chief of staff of a corps in France and 

Holland (1939-40), commander of an infantry division in northern 

and central Russia (1941-43), instructor at a school for division commanders in Berlin (1943), commander of a corps in southern Russia 

(1943-44), and acting commander of an army in southern Russia 

(1944). 

Te1'1'ain Factor's in the Russian 0 ampaign describes only the salient 

geographic features of areas in European Russia actually entered by 

German troops during World War II, the terrain problems encountered, and German methods of dealing with those problems. Corresponding Russian methods have already been described to a 

considerable extent in DA Pamphlet 20-230, Rwssian Oombat Metlwds 

in W or'ld War' I I. The effect of climate upon terrain is dealt with 

here only in general terms. Arctic warfare is excluded. 

In its original form, this study consisted of a treatise on Russian 

terrain by the principal author and eleven tactical narratives by other 

officers, illustrating the effect of various types of terrain upon combat. 

The description of Russian terrain by the principal author and his 

observations on the strategic significance of these geographic factors 

are carefully preserved and find the same expression in the followi.ng 

translation as in the original German. The subsidiary tactical examples have been screened for pertinence to the main subject, for 

clarity and brevity, and for interest to the American reader. The 

editors have made every effort to retain the method of presentation, 

the expressions, and even the prejudices of the principal author. The 

reader is reminded that all publications in the GERMAN REPORT 

SERIES were written by Germans and are, therefore, from the German point of view. 

iii 
CONTENTS 

Section	 Page 

I. INTRODUCTION- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - __ - __ - - ______________ 1 

II. EUROPEAN RUSSIA: A NATURAL FORTRESS--------__________ 4 

III. PRE.INVASION PROBLEMS- - - - - - - _- - - - - - __ - _- - - - - - ___________ 6 

The Invasion Controversies in Germany _____________________ 6 

Limitations of the Blitzkrieg - - _- _- - - ______________ 6 

German Mistakes in Preparing the Invasion__ - - ______________ 8 

IV. OPERATIONS AT RIVER L1NES--- ~______________ 16 

V. OPERATIONS IN WOODS AND SWAMPS---__________________ 28 

VI. DEFENSE AND WITHDRAWAL IN HEAVILY WOODED SUBALPINE 

TERRAIN-------------------------------------------------_ 45 

Military Topography of the East Carpathians_ _______________ 45 

The Tactical Situation in Spring 1944_ ______________________ 46 

The Defensive Mission of XVII Infantry Corps____ ___________ 47 

The Defense of the Carpathians - _- ______________ 50 

The WithdrawaL - - - - - - ______________ 51 

Summary________________________________________________ 52 

VII. COMBAT IN THE STEPPES----________________________________ 55 

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS-______________________________ 58 

MapsGeneral Reference Map	 ,.. Frontispiece 

Map No. 

1. Sudost Crossing: The Blockading Operations at Kletnya - _____ 18 

2. Dnepr Crossing - - __ - _- - - - - - - - - - ______________ 22 

8. Operations at Maloryta and P::.:z:.;:,ny - - _- --- _____________ 32 

4. Lines of Communication in the Southeastern Carpathians__ ______ 44 

5.	 Defense Lines and Terrain Features in the Southeastern 

Carpathians______________________________________________ 48 

IIIustrations 

German Truck Marooned After Crossing a Bridge_ ________________ 10 

German Half-Track Pulling Three Vehicles_______________________ 12 

Panje Wagon: Mainstay of German Transportation in the East _____ 14 

Typical Russian Wooden Bridge Across the Drut River ____________ 26 

Machine Gun Squad Goes Into Position in Swampy Forest _________ 41 

German Supply Column in the Nogayskaya Steppe_:.. ___________ ___ 54 

[The first five illustrations are U. S. Army photos from captured German films. The last one is a 

captured german combat painting now in the custody of the Historical Properties Branch, Office of the 

Chief of Military History, SIJecial Staff, U. S. Army.] 

iv 
Thi8 pamphlet 8upersede8 MS #T-3-,!, "Terrain Factor8 in the Rus8ian Cam· 

paign," published by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Special Staff 

U. S. Army, in N o'Vember 1950. 

SECTION I 

INTRODUCTION 

The influence of rivers, forests, swamps, and steppes on the conduct 

of military operations is as old as war itself. Ever since wars have 

been waged, every commander, of high and low echelons alike, has logically utilized natural terrain features to his own advantage and the 

enemy's disadvantage. The defender, as the weaker party, entrenched 

him~el:f behind natural lines of resistance which would hamper the 

enemy's approach and conduct of operations as much as possible. By 

preference, the defender anchored his exposed flanks on the formidable 

natural obstacles presented by watercourses or forests. The attacker, 

on the other hand, sought out terrain favorable for approach marches 

find combat. He avoided large forest and swamp areas; he outflanked 

the enemy who sat behind natural or artificial obstacles; he, so to 

speak, maneuvered the enemy out of position. 

A study of military history reveals that prior to World War I very 

few river crossings were forced in the face of the enemy. The explanation is easy enough. Before World War I armies were relatively small. In most instances, there was no reason for forcing a 

crossing against any enemy who had chosen a watercourse as his natural line of resistance. The watercourse could be crossed much more 

l'apidly and with less trouble at a place which the enemy had chosen 

not to hold at all, or at best with only a handful of troops. A similar 

situation prevailed in the case of large forest and swamp areas. As 

long as armies were relatively small, exceptional circumstances had 

to arise before the commander decided. to join combat in those terrain obstacles. 

With the evolution of armies comprising millions of men, the picture changed overnight. Even the initial stages of military operations are completely different from those of bygone days. An army 

assembles. on a continuous front at its frontier; the enemy can no 

longer be outflanked and maneuvered out of position. Freedom of 

action must be gained forcibly by breaking through the enemy front. 

In the further course of operations, an army of millions needs space 

in which to maneuver. Whenever part of the army is confronted 

by an extensive terrain obstacle, the simple expedient of sweeping 

around it, as in~ the days of the smaller army, will usually prove to 

he impossible because adjacent forces occupy all available space on 

1 
2 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

both flanks. If natural terrain obstacles in most instances prompted 

the small army of the past to skirt a particular area, the modern army 

faces an entirely different problem: The space factor now compels 

that, immense military machine to fight its way through natural 

(\bstacles. 

For this reason the forced river crossings of World Wars I and II 

belong; as it were, to the commonplaces of modern military operations. 

Prior to 1914 no one would have believed that sustained warfare was 

possible on glaciers, in swamps, or in dense forests. Grim reality 

proved otherwise. The Argonne Forest and the swampy lowlands 

of Flanders witnessed 4 years of fighting. The swamps lining the 

Pripyat area and those along Lake Narocz could no more be bypassed 

than could the rocks and glaciers of the Dolomite Alps. 

World War I showed that modern armies are capable of fighting in 

any terrain and can hurdle almost any type of natural obstacle during 

the course of combat··operations. One accomplishment alone they 

found impossible : Neither size nor materiel enabled them to bring the 

war to a quick conclusion with a succession of rapid blows. The 

stumbling block was the defe:q.sive fire power of modern weapons. 

Soon after the outbreak of World War I, fire power forced the armies 

into the ground, and military operations degenerated into a war of 

position. In the final analysis, trenches are ~o more than artificial 

terrain obstacles. 

During the interwar period military experts all over the world 

racked their brains for a way out of that quandary. Some saw the 

answer in armor, some in the further development of aviation, and 

others in a combination of armor and aviation. Aviation appeared to 

be particularly well adapted to the end desired since the airplane is 

seldom hampered by ground obstacles. Conflicting views on the subject continuedup to the outbreak of World War II. 

Hitler advocated the solution which later was to be labeled the 

"blitzkrieg." The idea is very simple and, at the outset, logical: The 

only way of avoiding a war of position is to stay on the offensive from 

the first to the last day of hostilities, thereby robbing the enemy of 

all freedom of action. However, the ability to stay on the offensive 

throughout a campaign presupposes a massing of forces at few, but 

well-chosen points. Therefore, there can be no splitting up of armor 

among the infantry, which must fight its own way, but instead the 

most thorough concentrations of armored divisions into a few strategic 

formations which are able to brush every bit of enemy resistance. 

There must be no dissipation of air power, but a commitment en masse 

of aviation at a few decisive points in close coordination with ground 

operations, mostly in conjunction with the armored units. Two additional factors become indispensable if the offensive is to be success­
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 3 

fully maintained throughout the war: uninterrupted supply andabove all-an unrelenting forward drive by the entire armed forces. 

The so-called blitzkrieg brought nothing but success during the 

first part of the war. The Polish and French Armies, as well as the 

forces of the Balkan states, were defeated in short order. In no 

instance did the defending forces succeed in disrupting the continuity 

of the German offensive. Natural obstacles sometimes had a retarding 

effect and, on occasion, gave rise to local crises,but on the whole they 

were surmounted by the momentum of the advance. and the skill of 

command. 

It seemed a$ though natural obstacles no longer played any material 

role in the conduct of military operations. The great riddle of how 

to wage war in modern times appeared to have been solved with the 

blitzkrieg. There can be little doubt that Hitler harbored this same 

train of.thought in embarking on the war against the Soviet Union. 
SECTION II
 

EUROPEAN RUSSIA: A NATURAL FORTRESS
 

The western ramparts of the Soviet Union, that is to say, the area 

between central Europe and the Ural Mountains, encompass a tremendous expanse by European standards. Yet, those ramparts comprise only a part of the USSR; its expanse beyond the Urals is even 

vaster. True enough, western Russia is a geographic subdivision of 

the Continent, but no other European country can boast the size and 

number of natural obstacles that protect even such a fraction of the 

Soviet realm. Any attack from the west must hurdle those very 

obstacles, and, at the same time, overcome the military resistance of 

the Soviets. In all that great expanse, only one major river, the 

Pripyat, flows from west to east and appears to provide access to the 

interior. But, of all the freaks of nature, just that river and its 

tributaries form such a maze of swamps that the watershed- of the 

Pripyat constitutes an obstacle rather than a gateway to the interior of 

the USSR. Practically all other streams and rivers of the Soviet 

Union flow from north to south, though a few flow in the opposite 

direction. An attacker approaching from the west thus faces one 

natural obstacle after the other. As one proceeds toward the east, 

those obstacles become more and more formidable. The Dniestr, the 

Bug, the Neman, and the Dvina conform reasonably well to the usual 

concept of natural obstacles in the form of watercourses, although they 

are the very rivers that are peculiarly treacherous. The watersheds of 

the Dnepr, the Don, and the Volga constitute barriers of extreme difficulty. Moreover, the tributary streams of those watersheds combine 

with the main rivers to form what amounts to a perfect defense system. 

A look at the tributaries of the Dniestr on a 1 : 300,000 map, for example, shows that no military architect could have laid them out to any 

better advantage. . 

In central and western Europe and on the Balkan Peninsula, not 

Inany swamplands have been left in their primitive state. Western 

Russia, however, still abounds in them. At one place or another, a 

high embankment may carry one of the strategic railroads through 

these swamps (in most instances in an unerringly straight line over 

every obstacle) . Some stretches are crossed by a hard-surfaced road, 

but aside from these few man-made structures the picture remains as 

nature first painted it. Since the swamplands are part of the river 

4 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 5 

systems, they form a double obstacle. Natural obstacles like the Prip­

~yat area, which blocks the approaches to central European Russia, 

and swamp and water barriers like those formed by the Volkhov or the 

lower course of the Volga are not to be found in central and western 

Europe. 

Then there are the Russian forests, most of which merge with the 

swamplands. Northern European Russia is a woodland interspersed 

with swamps; the central part of European Russia abounds in forests; 

the southern part of European Russia is practically devoid of woods. 

As a matter of fact, European Russia is the only region of the Continent that has arid steppes and sand flats of typical desert character. 

Northern European Russia proper, that is to say the swampy woodland north and northeast of the Valdai Hills, is not suitable for mobile 

warfare, particularly not for large armored formations. The cr~cial

blows of an offensive, therefore, have to fall in central and southern 

European Russia. In central European Russia lies the SmolenskMoscow Ridge, a low glacial moraine whose western extension is 

known to the Germans as the Orsha Corridor (Landbruecke von 

Or8cha). This is the watershed between the Black and Caspian Seas 

in the south, and the Baltic and White Seas in the north. Here are 

the sources of the Dnepr, the Dvina, the Lovat, and the Volga. Access 

to this ridge is of paramount importance for any conduct of military 

operations in the western part of European Russia. But the western 

approaches to the Orsha Corridor are protected by a wide belt of 

swamps and forests which extends from the Pripyat Marshes past 

Velikiye Luki and up to Leningrad. After breaking through this 

belt, an attacker still faces the watersheds of the Don and the Volga. 

Even if he has reached the Volga, an enemy coming from the west will 

find himself only in the outer ramparts of the Soviet domain; before 

him lie the Ural Mountains, and beyond them, Siberia. 
SECTION III
 

PRE-INVASION PROBLEMS
 

The Invasion Controversies in Germany 

The Germans have very naturally tried to find some explanation of 

their overwhelming defeat at the hands of the Russians. Quite a few 

books have been written by former high-ranking German generals 

and the subject has also been discussed, with considerable bitterness 

and widely divergent views, in the German press. There are, however, 

three controversies, not products of hindsight, which were the subject of impassioned debates within the German armed forces both 

before and after the beginning of the Eastern campaign. These 

controversies concerned the following questions: 

a. Was the war against the USSR necessary 

b. ""Vas the German top command correct in its combat estimate of 

the Soviet enemy 

c. Was it possible and justifiable to postulate the experiences of the 

Polish, French, and Balkan campaigns in dealing with the much 

vaster expanses of the Soviet Union, with their much more numerous 

and variegated natural obstacles? In other words, do the size and 

topography of the Soviet Union not preclude continuity of offensive 

operations from the first to t)le last day of the campaign-the blitzkrieg~

The question of whether or not the war with the USSR was necessary goes beyond the scope of this study, which deals only with the 

influence of Russia's topography on the conduct of military operations. The second question has been answered by Hitler's public 

statement in the Reichstag: He confessed that the magnitude of the 

Soviet war potential had surprised him. In other words, he had militarily underestimated the Russians. This admission itself contributes 

part of the answer to the third question: Can the expanses of Russia 

and the Soviet forces defending them be quickly conquered by means 

of one sweeping offensive 

Limitations of the Blitzkrieg 

The distance from the line of departure of the German offensive 

on the Bug River to the Orsha Corridor measures about 300 air miles. 

The distance from the same jump-off line to the lUiddle course of the 

6 
TERRAIN FACTORS 7 IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 

Volga measures at least 1,100 miles. Since the attack on the Soviet 

Union could be launched from only one quarter, namely the west, 

the Russians were in a position gradually to throw their entire armed 

might into the contest for the western ramparts of their motherland. 

The population of the USSR outnumbered that of Germany by more 

than two to one. While Germany was able to raise an army of roughly 

10 million men, part of whom had to be- kept in France, Holland, 

Belgium, Nonvay, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Africa, the Red armed 

forces comprised at least 20 million. Thus, the Germans faced not only 

the vast expanse of European Russia with its numerous and difficult 

natural obstacles but also an enemy doubly superior in numbers. 

A sober consideration of those factors should have revealed the 

impossibility of overrunning the great area of European Russia and 

its defenders in one fell swoop. A sustained, uninterrupted offensive 

had not even been possible in the campaign against France, despite 

the fact that in that instance neither the area involved nor the enemy's 

numerical war potential even remotely approached those of the Soviet 

Union. After the first great battles 'on the Franco-German frontier 

the German advance had been forced to halt for about 10 days on 

the Somme. In dealing with Russia, just a simple and rough estimate of logistical problems made it evident that merely the distance 

factor, not to speak or Soviet military resistance, would or necessity 

require protracted breathing spells. Even the single lO-day stop in 

France had offered the French Army an opportunity for consolidation. There ,vas no reason ror assuming that the Red Army would 

be unable to take advantage or a similar situation. Moreover, should 

the German rorces suffer reverses, a possibility in any war, the very 

vastness or the Russian land mass held the dire threat that the initiative, which previously had been with the attacker, would be seized 

by the enemy. Limited as the number or German rorces at hand was, 

they could gain control over the Russian spaces only if they succeeded 

in continuously carrying the fight to the enemy. 

But what ir the Soviet command would resort to the venerable and 

traditional tactics' or fighting only a delaying action in the western 

ramp~rts or the country and would purposely retire into the depths 

or the tremendous expanse or the interior? A course or action along 

those lines, since the Soviets raced an enemy on only one rront, might 

lead to a vicious circle or never-ending hostilities. The situation was 

reminiscent or that which prompted Bismarck's ,classic remark to the 

King or P)'ussia when, arter the victory of Koeniggraetz in 1866, the 

king wanted to march on Vienna. "Why stop at Vienna?" Bismarck 

inquired. "Your Majesty might as well go right on to Constantinople 

and leave Prussia to its own rortunes I" 
8 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

German Mistakes in Preparing the Invasion 

Hitler was sure that he had found the key to a successful attack 

upon the Soviet Union. IIis premises of reasoning seem to have been 

formulated primarily on emotional and political grounds. The fate 

of the Soviet UIiion was sealed. The Communist system was doomed, 

and he, Hitler, was destined by Providence to ring the death knell 

of that abomination. He was unshakable in his belief that the very 

first onslaught would topple the whole Soviet structure like a house'of 

cards. After having annihilated the Red Army in gigantic battles 

at the Soviet frontier, the right wing of the German Army was to 

reach the lower Dnepr region (industry and raw materials), the center was to occupy the western half of the Smolensk-Moscow Ridge, 

and the left 'wing was to reach Leningrad (direct contact with Finland). From this point on, the only remaining task would consist 

of launching armored and motorized raids into the depth of the 

USSR in order to assist the native population in crushing the last 

strongholds of the Communist regime. 

Whether or not Hitler's military entourage shared his views on 

the war with the Soviet Union is immaterial in the final analysis. 

Vie\vs contrary to his went unheeded. Hitler could point to victorious 

campaigns in Poland, France, Norway, and the Balkans; he had, up 

to now, always proved to be right, notwithstanding the warnings 

and apprehensions of the so-called experts, and he posted the successes 

to his own personal credit. Never before nor afterward did Hitler's 

prestige and mystic spell attain the heights that they reached in 

early 1941. 

One fact of far-reaching consequence remains to be pointed out. 

The campaigns in Poland and France were carefully thought out 

from beginning to end. The campaigns in Norway and on the Balkan 

Peninsula were improvisations, but both aimed at definite objectives: 

The crushing of military resistance and the occupation of the entire 

country. The campaign against the USSR was neither an improvisation nor had its broad strategic outlines been established as in the case 

of France. Hitler's belief in the collapse of the Communist regime 

in the interior of the Soviet Union had the effect that the planning stage 

never progressed to mapping a German advance beyond the previously 

mentioned regions: The lm,ver course of the Dnepr, the region \vest 

of Smolensk, and the Leningrad area. In the actual course of events, 

the German operations which took up where the planning had left 

off \vere improvisations born on the spur of the moment, without being fitted into the pattern of a large-scale plan, and without a clear, 

or perhaps even a limited objective. Events took precisely that course 

which had to be avoided in the vast expanses of Russia if the cam­
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 9 

paign were to be brougbt to a successful conclusion: The initiative 

slipped from the hands of the German forces and was seized by the 

enemy. 

It is a safe conjecture that Hitler had made a thorough study of the 

topography of European Russia. However, in tune with his entire 

disposition he saw many things not as they actually were but as he 

wanted them to be. Then, too, he had become spoiled by the successes of the previous campaigns. On several occasions the momentum of an advance had far exceeded his expectations. Natural obstacles seemed· to have lost most of their meaning ; like difficulties, 

they were there to be overcome. He simply did not wish to acknowledge the military might of the Soviet Union, even tho~gh it was called 

to his attention by the German military attache in Moscow and other 

well-informed persons. 

In his ignorance of the Soviet land and people, Hitler was not alone 

in Germany. This lack of knowledge was common throughout the 

entire country, even in the top echelons of the armed forces. That 

particular fact can only be acknowledged, not explained. The Germans have lived near the Russians for centuries. After the partitions 

of Poland the two nations had a common frontier for 140 years; they 

have been allies and have fought one another. Nevertheless, that vast 

country to the east and its people have forever been and remained a 

sealed book to the Germans. The so-called Iron Curtain had been a 

fact long before the phrase was coined. 

The best example of the lack of knowledge about Russia was the 

ignorance of the tremendous difficulties resulting from the muddy 

season. Twice in the course of every year, prior to the onset of winter 

and again in early spring, the soil of Russia is softened by rain and 

thaw. The roads become bottomless, and the countryside turns into 

a morass. In some regions, the boat rather than the Panje cart [Ed.: 

horse-dra\vn peasant cart] becomes the means of conveyance for travel 

from village to village. Every Russian peasant is familiar with the 

situation and prepares himself accordingly. The design of Red Army 

equipment, in point of ground clearance of military vehicles for example, takes into account these very conditions. Yet the Germans 

had never learned of that elementary natural phenomen:on. Neither 

the military leaders nor the intelligence agencies were aware of its 

implications. The field forces were taken completely by surprise by 

the first muddy season in the late fall of 1941 and encountered, in the 

fullest sense of the word, bottomless difficulties. Military operations 

that had been planned or had actually gotten under way became delayed or were foiled altogether. On the highway between Smolensk 

and Vyazma in late October 1941, for example, 6,000 supply trucks 

piled up, most of them loaded with ammunition, rations, and fuel for 
GEHMA.N TRUCK marooned after crossing a bridge near Chndovo (L
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 11 

the forces advancing on Moscow. Not that the pile-up was caused by 

a failure to promptly replace demolished bridges with close-by emergency bridges; it was simply a case of the short approach roads to the 

emergency bridges disappearing time and again into the mud. 

Combat units were no less vulnerable to such difficulties than supply 

units. For example, after the conclusion of the battle for Kiev, 

Second Panzer Army was concentrated in the Roml1y-Glukhov-Novgorod Severskij area in preparation for a thrust and break-through in 

a northeastern direction toward Orel and Bryansk. As the operat,ion 

progressed, the right boundary of its zone of advanc(jwas marked 

successively by the Seym, Svapa, ~nd Oka Rivers; the left boundary 

by the Desna, Nerussa, and Navlya. The Desna Basin is heavily 

wooded and very marshy. 

If the attack was to be successful, it was essential that the bulk of 

the army reach the firm ground and the railway near Orel before the 

start of the rainy season. A failure to integrate those traffic arteries 

into the German supply system m.ight have spelled disaster. Second 

Panzer Army. therefoFe; decided to take advantage of the short dryweather period during the last days of September and launch the 

attack on 30 September 1941---:2 days in advance of the general ofl:e.l1~

sive by the rest of Army Group Center. This timing made possibl~

ndditional support by the Lufbvaffe, the bulk of which was to be tied 

down elsewhere hy 2 October. 

At first the attack progressed favorably. The 4th Panzer Division 

captured Karachev on 7 October and Bryansk on 8 'October. Then it 

started to r'ain. Within a few hours the roads became bottomless. 

To continue the advance at the previous rate of speed was no longer 

possible; all movements of wheeled vehicles became extremely difficult. The river valleys and forests ,vere transformed into impassable 

obstacles which could not be surmounted or bypassed by lateral 

detours. 

The only solution was to gradually tow the army out of the swamps 

with the help of tracked vehicles and to reach the firm road leading 

back toward Bryansk via Fatezh-Kromy-Orel. 

The only advantage derived from this muddy season of four weeks' 

duration was that the Russians ,vere equally hampered. despite the 

fact that with their light equipment, and especially their vehicles. 

they were better prepared than the Germans to overcome this natural 

phenomenon they knew so well. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Russian 

units in the two pockets of Trubchevsk and Bryansk lack~d sufficient 

mobility and strength to escape annihilation. Similarly, the Russian 

concentration of forces near Yefremov was unable to seriously threaten 

the exposed right flank of Second Panzer Army. 
GERMAN HALF-TR.'1CK pulling three vehicles uphill on mu
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 13 

A critique of the German intelligence agencies in their procurement 

of data on the Soviet Union lies outside the realm of this study. The 

so-called Handbook on the USSR, which was issued to the field forces 

shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, probably represented a digest of the information collected by that organization. If we are to 

believe that this han.dbook was the authoritative source for estimates 

of all things Russian, even on the part of the top commanders; then 

German intelligence did a poor job. The handbook contained little 

or nothing about the great military significance of the muddy season, 

which limits conventional wa.rfare in the USSR to very definite 

periods and thereby influences every phase of the planning and conduct of operations. Instead, it contained blatant examples of false 

logic and many misleading statements. The Red Army, for example, 

was supposed to be particularly vulnerable to threats against its flanks 

and rear. In actual practice, the very first days of combat were to 

prove exactly the opposite. Other statements went in a similar vein: 

The Russians are a people with no mechanical aptitude; they are poor 

organizers; a weak point of the Soviets is their transportation system. 

The difficulties lurking in the size and complexity of the Soviet 

Union, that is to say, the rivers, streams, extensive forests, swamplands, sand, and road conditions, were not omitted from the book. 

In tune with the times, however, the high command as well as the 

combat forces tended to underestimate those difficulties. In this connection it might be appropriate to note that terrain intelligence, like 

any other form of intelligence, requires discriminating and objective 

evaluation. To report all the facts is not enough; there are too many 

facts for proper assimiliation unless their relative importance is 

clearly indicated. Although career officers must make the final decisions, they are not the most suitable people to render such judgments. 

Even the most able of them suffer from a certain narrowness of professionaloutlook. The guidance of military hi'Storians can save them 

from dangerous mistakes, and the open-minded attitude of intelligent 

civilian travelers will sometimes lead to valuable suggestions. The 

most useful information to reach the troops prior to the initial engagements on the frontier came not from the printed descriptions of the 

terrain, from agents, or from the largely outdated maps, but from 

aerial photographs. They were issued relatively late, probably for 

security reasons. 

Training in the Germany Army for combat under Russian conditions of terrain could by no means be termed uniform or systematic. 

A specialized training program was impossible for many reasons. 

Plans for the war against the Soviet Union were long kept a closely 

guarded secret. There ,vere division commanders who, even a ,veek 

before the beginning of the campaign, regarded their transfer to the 
PANJE WAGON: Mainstay ot German transportation in 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 15 

East and the assembly of German forces at the frontier as a precautionary measure or a bluff. Other units were pulled out of, the 

Balkan campaign and shipped directly to the East; they had no time 

for special training. Then, too, there were no suitable training 

grounds. Normandy, Champagne, and the Netherlands provide no 

opportunity for the practice of combat in deep forests, and neither the 

Jura Mountains nor, for that matter, the whole of central Europe is 

suitable for training in the l!J.nusual aspects of warfare in extensive 

Rwamplands and sandy areas. Training in stream-crossing procedure 

under combat conditions left little to .be desired; a high standard of 

thoroughness in that department was traditional in the Germany 

Army. 

\Vherever the training was actually attuned to Russian conditions 

of terrain, it was instituted on the initiative of individual army, corps, 

or elivision commanders. Since only suggestions but no binding 

regulations came down from higher levels, any kind of special training program bore the personal stamp of the initiating commander. 

There was no uniformity of procedure. In only one respect did the 

German top echelon take uniform and systematic action for coping 

with the special problems of Russian terrain: The combat forces were 

equipped with light vehicles, and impedimenta were reduced toa 

minimum. German-issue transportation mostly cnmprised Polish 

Panje carts drawn by native horses-Russia's conventional means of 

conveyance. All unnecessary baggage and every bit of the nonessential ballast that soldiers are wont to lug along was left behind at large 

collecting depots. One measure designed specifically for warfare in 

the East was the organization of a few so-called light divisions. The 

infantry and artillery components of these divisions had a table of 

organization different from that of the standard infantry division. 

Their equipment consisted in part of pack animals and small, twowheeled carts. Two battalions of the artillery regiment carried mountain howitzers loaded on pack animals. One disadvantage was that 

the light division had only two instead of three i.nfantry regiments. 

The reduction in the net weight of vehicles affected only horsedrawn vehicles. The design of motorized equipment was not modified 

to conform to the unique conditions of terrain in the East. The prerequisites for a project of that nature were lacking. German industry 

was unable to satisfy even a fraction of the demand for cross-country 

vehicles. It was unable to replace even current losses, as improbable 

as that may seem in this age of motorization. Of course, Hitler 

thought a radical change-over in the automotive industry just as unnecessary as a conversion of over-all industry to total war. In his 

armament policy, as in all other respects, Hitler had committed 

himself to a short campaign against the Soviet Union. 
SECTION IV
 

OPERATIONS AT RIVER LINES
 

Every river is a military obstacle that exercises some degree of 

influence on offensive as well as defensive operations. This influence 

is particularly pronounced in Russia, where rivers and streams have 

a number of unusual characteristics. Earlier pages have mentioned 

that Russia's principal rivers with their numerous tributaries form a 

succession of natural obstacles to any attack from the west. Forced 

crossings thus belonged virtually to the daily bread of the German 

soldier. At the start of the Russian campaign, the German Army 

was able to commit a body of field forces and an officer corps with 

peacetime training in the technique of forced river crossings. That 

picture changed as the campaign exacted its toll of casualties. The 

raw replacements were a far cry from the thoroughly trained and 

self-assured fighting men of the peacetime army. In 1941 all major 

river crossings succeeded, many of them with surprising speed. Later, 

the crossings no longer went .off with the precision of 1941. The 

reason lay not in the nature of the watercourses, but in the composition 

of the troops. 

vVhile the rivers of Germany and France are more or less similar 

in nature, each Russian river has its special characteristics. One river 

provides no yardstick for the next; experiences gained on the Dvina do 

not automatically apply to the Lovat. One characteristic, though, is 

common to nearly every Russian stream: The west bank is higher than 

the east bank. The most notable case in point is the Volga. The advancing German troops thus enjoyed a considerable advantage: 

Whenever they approached a river, they were on dominating ground. 

The Russian rivers, with few exceptions, are not regulated. But 

lack of regulation is not in itself a hindrance to forced crossings. In 

many instances it is even an advantage for the attacker. Dense vegetation on the near shore facilitates the approach to the watercourse 

proper, provjdes concealment, and permits surprise of the enemy whose 

visibility and field of fire are limited. 

A different situation is presented by a typical feature of Russian 

terrain; namely, the broad, swampy lowlands that line one or both 

banks of a river and afford no cover at all. These lowlands are exceedingly common in European Russia. They pose unusually difficult 

problems for the attacker. A crossing is difficult enough under those 

16 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 11 

circumstances; it exacts a high toll of casualties and consumes a great 

amount of time. Even more difficult, however, is the construction of 

bridges and approach roads after a forced crossing. The standard 

military floating bridge equipage must be freed for the crossing of 

the next watercourse and a semipermanent bridge constructed. Moreover, a bridge that merely spans the stream itself is rarely sufficient. 

All or part of the swampy lowland must likewise be bridged by structures high enough to clear the spring floods and strong enough to resist 

battering by cakes of floating ice. Since construction on such a scale 

involves enormous expenditures of labor, the German forces tried their 

best to seize permanent bridges in flying column actions and coups de 

main. 

Many such ,attempts met with success. For example, at the end 

of August 1941, Second Panzer Group received orders to thrust southward from the Roslavl-Smolensk area. Two panzer corps, in conjunction with Second Army advancing on the right, were to encircle 

and annihilate the Russian army group in the Kiev area. The first 

objective was to be Nizhin, the next 011e, Romny. This meant that the 

Desna and the Seym, as well as a number of smaller rivercourses, had 

to be crossed. The Desna flows through a primeval river valley which 

is covered by meadows with marshy subsoil. The river itself presents 

no insurmountable obstacle. But every rainfall turns the banks into 

such a quagmire that a crossing would have become impossible unless 

a bridge and its long approach roads could be captured intact. A 

wooden bridge spanned the Desna near Novgorod Severskij, south of 

Bryansk. The actual bed of the Desna at that point is only 100 yards 

'wide, yet the bridge was over 600 yards long. Several tanks of Second Panzer Group not only succeeded in getting across that bridge in 

broad daylight but also caught the Russian antitank gunners on the 

far shore completely off guard. The bridge, the only one for miles 

around, fell undamaged into German hands. Had the bridge been 

blown and a forced crossing, as well as the construction of a new 

bridge, become necessary, it is doubtful whether Second Panzer Group 

could have closed the east side of the Kiev pocket in time. As things 

turned out, half a million Russian prisoners were taken in that pocket. 

The major rivers, of course, were the pbjects of primary attention 

for the German higher command. Even the map showed them to be 

the best-defined phase lines for the advance and, at the same time, the 

most obvious obstacles. In 1941 those rivers were frequently crossed 

with surprising ease. The wide lower course of the Dnepr, for example, promised serious difficulties. Aerial photographs showed a 

formidable stream, dotted with islands, and flowing through a wide 

valley. In actual practice the crossing was a speedy operation. It 

turned out that the reservoir near Dnepropetrovsk makes the Dnepr 
18 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

SUDOST. . Map J 

BLOCKADINGCROSS ING 

AT OPERATION
 

KLETNYA
 

SCALE o, 10 

MILES 

eSGS 2758 - H H3. 

LEGEND 

GERMAN FORCES 

RUSSIAN FORCE 

ENTANGLEME S MINE FIELDS NTS AND 

~:d C~SS ROADS 

OTHER~~;OADS RAILROADS' S =-­ MULTIPLE TRACK --== • SINGLE TRACK = 
TERRAIN FACTORS 19 IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 

relatively shallow and creates several ford-like passageways. The 

Dvina, on the other hand, which looked like a much less serious obstacle, presented far greater difficulties. Finally, a river such as the 

Volkhov, which is nothing more than a flowing swamp amidst a 

marshy wilderness of woods and brush, presented almost insurmountable problems. The difficulties were not solely due to enemy resistance, but also to the fact that the velocity of current and the nature 

of the banks differed greatly from one place to another. The problem was greatly simplified whenever, as in the following example, a 

period of static warfare allowed time for a thorough terrain reconnaissance. 

During the major offensive that began on 2 October 1941, a German 

infantry corps was given the mission of breaking through the belt of 

field fortifications in front of Bryansk from the southwest and capturing the city proper. The first phase of this operation was the 

crossing of the Sudost River, which for several weeks had been the 

last natural obstacle separating the German forces from those of the 

Russians (map 1). All necessary terrain intelligence about the river 

line had been obtained. Patrols of the various arms and services had 

done a thorough job of reconnaissance. As a result, it was known 

that the river was not very wide; that it had a firm bed and solid 

banks, partly formed of clay; that several fords existed; and that a 

number of cliffs on the far shore were ,fortified against tank attacks. 

In addition, deep tank traps had been observed. According to statements obtained from prisoners, the enemy fortifications consisted 

mainly of well-covered earth bunkers,·in some places even of concrete 

pillboxes, and extended to a depth of several miles. Reconnaissance 

by captive balloons and by aircraft served to complete the picture. 

Although a relatively unimportant river, the Sudost barred access 

to an enemy system of field fortifications. For several weeks the 

two divisions of the corps had been in position along the river. The 

mission of the corps was, therefore, primarily a matter of effecting 

a break-through on a wide front in an enemy fortification system, the 

small river in front of it merely representing the first obstacle. Both 

divisions were to cross the river simultaneously in many spearheads. 

Regimental and battalion assault teams were formed and liberally 

provided with stream-crossing and emergency bridging equipment. 

Engineer troops were assigned to them to facilitate the crossings and 

carry out demolitions. It was hoped that some of these teams would 

quickly succeed in gaining a foothold on the far bank of the river 

and then immediately push on into the fortified enemy lines. The 

attack was to be launched from fixed positions, and no special deployment was necessary. Auxiliary crossing equipment, primarily foot 

bridges floated on plleumlltic boats, could be prepared almost to 
20 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

measure and was made ready directly behind the crossi.ng points. 

Other equipment included log rafts for heavy weapons and wooden 

bridge sections designed to get motor vehicles across narrow parts 

of the river and over tank traps on the far shore.. The Germans dispensed with artillery preparation directly before the attack. Instead, 

a fire for destruction was initiated well in advance against enemy 

installations on the other side of the river. The divisions were 

ordered to launch a surprise attack at dawn, cross the river in several 

spearheads, and then continue through the enemy zone of fortifications in a deep thrust toward Bryansk. Since there was no contact 

with other German forces to the right or to the left, the task could 

be carried out with complete·freedom of action. What actually mattered in this instance was that at least one of the spearheads should 

be able to advance steadily. 

The very first thrust carried the troops across the Sudost River 

and past the enemy antitank ditches. The enemy bunkers, however~

were stubbornly defended. Some of them had been bypassed by the 

assault teams and held out with great tenacity for another 2 to 3 

days. For this reason little ground was gained during the first 3 days. 

On 5 October a Russian tank brigade comprising about 40 tanks 

attempted a counterattack against the division on the left. Stukas 

and antiaircraft artillery quickly moved in and successfully opposed 

the attack. The thorollgh preparations which had been made for 

crossing the Sudost .proved worth while. The river offered no major 

difficulties and caused no particular delay in operations. Neither· 

strategic plans nor tactical developments were in any way inft.uenced 

by it, nor did it have any effect on the performance of the various 

combat arms. 

The air force was not brought into play until after the breakthrough.of the enemy system of fortified positions was accvrnplished. 

It was plainly demonstrated that the most significant 'obstacles during 

and immediately after any river crossing are the enemy's will to fight 

and the use which he makes of the river as an integral part of his 

plan of battle. 

In Russia there was no way of gaging the prospective difficulties 

of a forced crossing by the size of the river alone. Insignificant 

branches of tributaries, mere incidental features on the map, were frequently the very obstacles that brought the advance to a standstill. 

At one place a half-day's summer rain may ineffectually soak into the 

ground; hut at another it may be enough to transform the stream 

valley into a spongy swamp and coat the roads with a slippery, soaplike surface. Under such conditions, motor vehicles will slide wildly 

down into a valley if they do not overturn. But they will be absolutely unable to negotiate the upward grade on the far side. The 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 21 

result is all too familiar: an insignificant, small, and moderately steep 

slope which defies the most skillful driver; marooned prime movers; 

long lines of mired vehicles in the valley and on the approach roads. 

In many instances only the sun can remedy such a situation. Sunshine restores the slope and roads to usable condition just as quickly 

as the brief rainfall had made them impassable. 

There simply are,no pat formulas for resolving the many unknown 

quantities in the equation that is Russia. Surprises are on each 

day's bill of fare. In the end, the German Army of 1941 always 

managed to get the situation under control. Not only did every 

unit have its share of well-trained men, but, above all, these men were 

led by energetic and self-reliant officers and noncommissioned officers. 

The following example illustrates several of these unexpected factors. 

Late in July 1941, LIII Infantry Corps was ordered to cross the 

Dnepr between Zhlobin and Rogachev (p. 22). Specific information 

about the river, even its width, was lacking. Equally sparse was information about the Drut, a smaller river \vest of the Dnepr near 

Rogachev. Ground observation was impossible, since the enemy still 

held the last five miles west of the river. The corps headquarters, 

therefore, had to obtain the necessary information in the course of 

the action. Air reconnaissance and the interrogation of pri~oners

and local habitants were conducted as usual. Liaison with other 

nnits, especially the engineer railway troops, provided much useful 

information. 

By D-day it was known that the Dnepr had a swift current; that 

the river bed was partly swampy; and that, in case of rain, there 

\vere impassable stretches along the banks. The width of the river 

was assumed to be between 150 and 200 yards; an unfortunate error 

because the Dnepr turned out to be considerably wider in the Zhlobin 

area. As a result, the bridge equipage provided for in the original 

plan proved to be insufficient. Partly submerged·floating bridges 

across the Drut and the Dnepr had not been spotted in advance. They 

were to prove very valuable later on. Prisoners had mentioned their 

existence; but since the German forces were unfamiliar with bridges 

of that type, they had failed to pay any attention to the reports. 

Strong enemy forces, entrenched in hasty field fortifications 5 miles 

west of the Dnepr, had to be thrown back before the corps could cross 

the river. The main attacks of the three divisions-the 267th, 255th, 

and 55th-were to hit enemy sectors that were directly in line with 

the prospective crossing sites. It was hoped that the momentum of 

the attack would carry the divisions across the river, close on the 

heels of the fleeing enemy. Considerable resistance ,vas to be expected. 

There could be no question of a surprise attack. 
22 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Mop 2 

CROSSING OF THE DNEPR 

SCALE
 

10 o 10 20
 

MILES 

GSGS 2758- N35, N36 

LEGEND GERMAN FORCES 

RUSSIAN FQRCES 

1st CLASS ROADS 

2nd CLASS ROADS 

OTHER ROADS 

RAILROAD, MULTIPLE TRACK 

RAILROAD, SINGLE TRACK 

Z. Zhlobin 

-....­ d • 

.L.U. 

... ""­ -"Ill 

""­

P r .,. 

uJu 

.M. Swamps 
TERRAIN FACTORS 23 IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 

The German forces did not succeed in crossing the river while the 

enemy was being thrown back. Therefore, a planned river crossing 

had to be carried out on the following day. The three divisions of 

the corps had reached the Dnepr at the selected crossing sites in the 

course of the attack. Strong spearheads had taken the objectives 

along the river line and were located at the following points: at 

Zhlobin, the 467th Infantry Regiment of the 267th Division; in the 

center, the 465th Infantry Regiment and behind it the 475th Infantry 

Regiment of the 255th Division; and at Rogachev, two infantry regiments of the 55th Division. This disposition of forces was not 

changed for the crossing. All three divisions committed the bulk 

of their artillery in close support of the assault forces. Since earthworks had been spotted on the far shore of the river, especially at 

Zhlobin, strong air support by Stukas was arranged for. Increased 

air reconnaissance became necessary since any ground reconnaissance 

was out of the question as long as the enemy was still holding the near 

shore of ':;he river. Preparations in the vicinity of the, river were 

equally impossible, and for this reason pneumatic boats and auxiliary 

equipment were loaded on trucks and kept in readiness to be brought 

forward quickly to the points where the troops would reach the river 

Because of the discovery that the available bridging material was insufficient for the construction of a military bridge across the Dnepr 

at Zhlobin, an additional bridge train was requested from Army and 

arrived in time. This was a fortunate decision; precisely the length 

of the extra bridge train would have been lacking otherwise. 

The two divisions on the flanks-the 267th Division at Zhlobin and 

the 55th Division at Rogachev-each concentrated their attacks on 

a single objective. The 255th Division, rather widely spread out in 

the center, formed two points of main effort, one toward the east and 

the other toward the southeast. To free troops for the attack, extensive use had been made of mines during the last few days. At one 

point, in the case of the 55th Division, an entire infantry regiment was 

detached from the front, leaving only one company on line to deceive 

the enemy. 

By afternoon of 14 August 1941. Zhlobin had been captured by the 

467th Infantry Regiment of the 2G7th Division, the western hank of 

the Dnepr had been reached by the 465th Infantry Regiment of the 

255th Division, and the 55th Division had crossed the Drut River 

and captured Rogachev. At that point the various moves preliminary to the Dnepr crossing 'were completed. Very heavy fighting 

still raged around Zhlobin and Stukas repeatedly had to go into action 

against the railroad embankment west of that town, which commanded 

the entire area. 
24 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

On 15 August ID41, as XII Infantry Corps east of the Dnepr maintained st<:>ady pressure on the enemy to the south, the 55th Division 

sueceeded in erossing the Dnepr ahead of schedule since enemy resistance was weak at this point. However the enemy defended himself 

that much more stubbornly north and east of Zhlobin. Not until the 

afternoon of 15 August, and only after repeated Stuka attacks, was it 

possible in that area to gain a foothold on the eastern bank of the river. 

The Dnepr presented a natural obstacle in the path of the advance 

only in the southern seetor of LIII Infantry Corps, and there only 

to a eertain extent. By the time the corps had reached the Dnepr, 

the push of XII Infantry Corps in the northern part of the zone of 

advance had beeome so effeetive that the enemy offered no further 

decisive resistance at that point. This experience demonstrated anew 

that the effect of rivers depends largely upon the enemy's dispositions 

and his determinntion to fight. 

On the southern sector the enemy at first offered stubborn resistanee. 

The swiftly flowing river, 150 to 200 yards wide, proved a difficult 

obstacle. An insufficient amount of equipment was available for the 

crossing, and even the effect of massed artillery did not shake the 

enemy. Stnka attacks had to be made repeatedly. Th~ retarding 

effect of the Dnepr was enhanced by the enemy's will to resist. But 

if the struggle for the river was unduly prolonged, the German troops 

were partly to blame. Even after reconnaissance pat.rols of the 

engineer railway forces had gone across at Zhlobin, the infantry along 

the river was still trying to decide whether this was the right time 

to make a crossing. This hesitancy brought about a delay of half 'a 

day and made it possible for parts of the enemy forces to be withdrawn from the Gomel pocket. 

The longer the war lasted and the higher the toll of casualties 

mounted, the smaller became the proportion of well-trained, professional soldiers in the German fighting machine. This fact cannot be 

ignored in looking at the lat'er stages of the campaign when the tide 

turned and the enemy seized the initiative. In the defensive actions 

and withdrawals to follow, the numerous successive river lines could 

have become the backbone of the German defense. However, they 

were not utilized to that advantage because the troops had beeome 

numerically too weak. Here ,,-as an objeet lesson of the dire consequences threatening any army that innldes a large country in which 

it must fight successive battles with a numerically superior enemy. 

The very moment that the offensive grinds to a halt and cannot be 

resumed full-scale, the previolls attacker is compelled to follow the 

dictates of the enemy. In a narrowly delimited area there always 

remains the possibility that a certain equilibrium can be maintained 

in the give-and-take of battle; in a region as tremendous as European 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 25 

Russia, however, such a turn of events may- result in a catastrophe for 

the numerically inferior army. 

Previously, it had been the German forces and the German command ,vho had carried the fight to the enemy, bypassed forests, and 

skirted swamplands. Now the Russians were doing it, but with ,far 

superior forces. And when air reconnaissance fails in such a situation, the defender gropes in the dark. He has no way of knowing from 

which side the enemy is coming. He should be strong everywhere, so 

as to be ready for any eventuality. But where was the German Army 

to get the necessary manpower? In order to maintain any kind of an 

unbroken line over a long defensive front, individual units were forced 

to hold wider and wider sectors. By 1944 a frontage of 30 miles for 

an infantry divIsion no longer caused even a raised eyebrow. In terms 

of men per yard of frontage, this amounted to one defender for every 

30 yards. A river sector with a defense no more adequate than that 

('onstitutes hardly more than a water obstacle for a strong enemy. 

This will explain why, during the German withdrawals in the last part 

of the war, the watersheds of the Russian rivers no longer played the 

role for ,vhich nature had typed them and which the German top 

command had expected them to play. 

The German Army now had to pay for the fact that not one of the 

Russian river lines had been turned into a fortified rearward wall. 

The Dnepr and, as a northern continuation, the Dvina or Lake Peypus, fairly begged utilization to that advantage. During the course of 

the war the field forces time and again clamored for the establishment 

of such a fortified zone. The underlying idea was not to set up a mere 

defensive river line, but rather to create a rearward buttress that 

Eil1lultaneously would serve as an advance base for all military operations in the East. That no steps were ever taken toward establishing 

such a line was allegedly due to the shortage of labor and materials. 

The establishment of temporary rearward positions behind river lines 

Was likewise a little-used expedient in the Russian campaign. The 

tremendous distances caused manpower shortages everywhere, above 

all at the front. Hasty field fortifications of the conventional type, 

like machine-gun and artillery emplacements or foxholes, are little 

more than useless in Russia. If a position is to be held through the 

severe Russian winter, heated personnel shelters are indispensable. 

But the construction and maintenance of a large number of personnel 

shelters requires a great amount of manpower, and Inanpower was 

invariably in short supply. 

During winter the watercourse loses its value as a natural obstacle 

because it freezes over. The Russian streams are generally icebound 

from December into April and will even bear the weight of tanks. 

l\{any experiments were conducted toward neutralizing that disad­
1Tl'ICAL Rt.if3f:3IAN 11"OOD.£X BH1])(J.£ aer088 the ])rllt 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 27 

Yantage. Attempts were made to let wire obstacles freeze into the ice 

in the middle of the river or near one of the banks. A single snowfall 

or blizzard, however, is apt to nullify the effect of such an obstacle, not 

to speak of the fact that defense works of that nature are feasible only 

in rearward positions and can never be set up in the face of hostile 

forces occupying the far shore. All mines except those equipped with 

extension trip rods (Stabminen) are neutralized by deep snow. Demolition charges in a variety- of shapes were -used for blasting at least 

nurrow channels into icebound streams. If a Russian cross-river 

attack was known to be imminent, German artillery tried training its 

fire on certain points of the ice cover, so that the resulting ribbons of 

open water might help to canalize the enemy forces into predetermined 

seetors. In the final analy.sis, however, all those were fruitless efforts. 

The cold was always the victor in the unequal struggle. There was no 

getting around the fact that nothing can be done about the ice, and that 

a river, once it is frozen, loses all value as a natural opstacle. 

In the spring of 1942, when warm weather began to thaw the unusually deep snow cover, the German Army faced yet another surprise. 

Since the winter had been very severe, the rivers carried heavy ice 

floes which simply crushed the newly built emergency bridges. That 

surprise could have been guarded against by a mere look at whatever 

Russian wooden bridges were still intact. As flimsy as their superstructure might be, their substructure was invariably solid and protected by strong, sharp-nosed ice fenders. Well-anchored underwater 

bridges also rendered excellent service even under flood conditions. 

They were widely used by the Russian Army. 

Fording is impossible during floods, except in the case of small 

creeks; river crossings by boat are very dangerous. Even skilled 

boat crews were sometimes lost. Mechanically the German assault 

boat with shallow-draft outboard motor gave good service in flood 

waters; other types of marine engines were clogged by the sand and 

sediment in the water. Such difficulties were of particular importance for the establishment and retention of bridgeheads. Failure to 

take the necessary precautions entailed the risk of having bridgeheads 

completely cut off from all supplies. For this reason, both Germans 

and Russians repeatedly evacuated small bridgeheads before the onset 

of floods. 
SECTION V
 

OPERATIONS IN WOODS AND SWAMPS
 

World War I clearly proved the German need for training in forest 

fighting. Early in that struggle the French 0 hasseuTs Alpins demonstrated their superiority over German infantry in the close terrain 

of the Vosges forests. But the period between wars saw that technique of combat treated as the same stepchild it has always been. The 

authoritative German field manual on operations bears witness to that 

fact. Whereas the tactical principles governing combat in open terrain are clearly and unmistakably worked out, the sections dealing 

with the technique of combat in woods have somehow a flavor of mere 

theory. The authors of the manual simply lacked the necessary flair 

for forest fighting. 

This reason, if no other, helps to explain why the German higher 

and lower command had a tendency toward avoiding forests and forest 

fighting during the Russian campaign. But since northern European 

Russia-the region north of the Valdai Hills-is one vast woodland 

interspersed with numerous swamps and since central European Russia is likewise heavily wooded, the war could not be waged without 

much forest figh~ing.

Large, continuous forests that are frequently and extensively interspersed with swamps are characteristic of Russia in general. Those 

'woodlands actually begin as far west as Poland. The large forests 

of Augustow and the Carpathians are remembered for their role in 

1Vorld War I. The forest of Byalovizh, formerly a hunting preserve 

of the Czars and later of the Polish Government, differs from the 

other woodlands to the extent that, 1lecause of its special use, it has 

been made accessible in all parts by an adequate network of roads and 

paths. Farther to the east there follows the large and deep forest 

and swamp zone of the Pripyat region. .Prominent among the contiguous, heavily wooded areas are the wide belts around Minsk, 

Borisov, Orsha, Vyazma, Bryansk, and Gomel, and north of the Smo~

lensk-Moscow Ridge, there are forests surrounding Polotsk and Veli­

.kiye Luki. The Ukraine, which was still steppeland during Mongol 

times, and the adjacent part of southern Russia are, except for the 

spurs and the subalpine ranges of the western Caucasus, distinguished 

by their singular lack of woods. 

28 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE. RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 29 

No universally applicable description can be written of these forests 

which usually merge with stretches of marshland. Soil and terrain 

differ from place to place and are subject to seasonal and climatic 

influences. Maps often give a distorted picture. The Pripyat area, 

for example, not only contains patches of sandy soil with tall stands 

of timber, but also well-populated stretches of cultiyated land with 

country roads built on dikes. Surrounding those islands of civilization are all types of marshes and swamps: bare, mile-long reed flats 

and weed-covered bogs which are completely impassable even on foot; 

wet birch and alder swamps through which man can barely wade; 

treacherous, meadow-like flats, whose short, dark turf yields to the 

slightest pressure and swaJlows a motor vehicle to its very top. Whatever the map shows to be marshland mayor may not ijecome perfectly 

passable after a long spell of hot weather. A sudden summer storm 

can wreck all plans. The countless large and small watercourses 

require an infinite number of bridges. 

In the summer of 1941 many parts of the large forests of Minsk, 

Borisov, and the Smolensk-Moscow Ridge were completely dry. 

During weeks of marching through those forests, the.German armor 

and infantry columns were enveloped in clouds of dust. Water for 

men and horses could be obtained only with difficulty. Each of the 

few improved roads was designated a Rollbahn [main axis of motor 

transportation from which all animal transport and marching columns 

were normally barred] and as such was reserved for armored and 

motorized units. The inevitable result was that certain stretches of 

those traffic arteries were soon completely plowed up. The infantry 

divisions, which had to depend on forest trails during part of their 

advance, were brought to the verge of exhaustion by marches through 

the deep, powdery sand. The large forests around Vyazma and 

Bryansk are nearly impenetrable during summertime because'of their 

dearth of roads and their stretches of swampy soil. 

The characteristics of the forests around Lake Tlmen, on the Crimea, 

and in the Caucasus are entirely different from those of the previously 

mentioned woodlands. Lake Ilmen feeds and is fed by streams which, 

except for the Msta, all flow from south to north. Some of the principalwatercourses of this area are the Lovat, the Pola, and the Volkhov. Villages are to be found along the rivers, because these are the 

primary sources of water supply. Since wells must be drilled through 

a layer of clay and have to be sunk very deep, in some places more than 

150 feet, they are scarce in that part of the country. Wet woodlands interspersed with swamps cover the areas between the rivers. 

Short and tall stands of timber cast their reflections in stagnant pools 

of ground water. Roads, most of them worse than poor, generally 

follow the river lines. East-west roads through the woodlands are 
30 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

few and rar betw€'en. After military operations north and south of 

Lake lImen degenerated into a \var of position and after a German 

thrustjn the spring of 1942 during the high point of the thaw had 

blasted a connecting corridor to the forces caught in the Demyansk 

pocket, the construction or cordnroy roads became imperative. The 

most widely known was the so-called Reich Corduroy Road whichled 

from sontheast of Staraya Russa through the connecting corridor 

(at its narrowest point only 2 miles wide) into the pocket or Demyansk. 

Countless honrs of toil went into the construction and maintenance 

or the arterial corduroy roads and their extension up to the very 

front-line companies. The job was all the more difficult because the 

uninterrupted defensive actions had reduced the companies to a 

strength or 30 or 40 men. 

The Yaila l\fonntains in the Crimea bear fine, tall stands of timber, 

and some woodlands in the heart or the Caucasus region are equally 

beantiful; but parts of the rorests in the Caucasus foothills, particularly in the vicinity of the coast, are impenetrable thickets that grow 

to twice or three times the height of a man. The crucial drive on 

Tuapse during the German Cancasus offensive failed not only for 

want of adequate forces but also because of the difficult terrain. The 

area is peculiar in that, although the rivers have cut deep valleys, 

this erosive action has brought no rocks to the surface anywhere. 

Consequently, in wet weather the few roads become chutes of slippery 

clay wherever th€'re is a gradient and hopeless bogs where they pass 

throngh river bottoms. 

Vast, uninterrupted swamplands are relatively scarce in southern 

Russia. They may be found in the partially wooded lowlands of the 

Dnepr at Nikopol and Kakovka and in the treeless lagoons at the 

mouths of the Kuban, Don, Terek, and Volga Rivers. The lower 

Volga region is entirely covered with marshes. 

Central and northern European Russia abound with swamps which, 

in this instance, merge with extensive woodlands. The forests and 

marshes of the Pripyat watershed rise like a bastion to protect the 

gateway to central European Russia. An attacker approaching from 

the west must of necessity split his forces into two parts. The offshoots of the Pripyat region reach as far as the east bank or the Dnepr. 

Toward the southeast they extend into the Kiev area, and toward the 

east they stretch to Gomel. Two strips of marshland adjoin the Pripyat region in the north: a western strip rrom Molodeczno (northwest 

of l\finsk) through Polotsk to Lake Peypus and an eastern strip from 

Velizh through Velikiye Luki to Lake Ilmen and Lake Ladoga. The 

eastern strip of marshland, over which German forces never gained 

full control, played an important and fatal role in the campaign 

against the USSR. From the very outset it separated Army Group 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 31 

Center from Army Group North. This great gap was never completely closed. The swamps prevented any coordinated effort by the 

two army groups, and only because of that circumstance, were the 

Soviets able to launch their later operations at Rzhev and Vitebsk 

against the left.wing,of Army Group Center. In the final analysis the 

\vhole of Army Group North bogged down in that belt of marshes and 

forests ·which guards the approaches to the strategic Valdai Hills. 

Today it is useless to ponder what the result might have been if that 

belt had been successfully pierced. The mere existence of this great 

swampland was a decisive factor in the late war. 

During the German advance of 1941, the German higher and lower 

commands revealed a tendency toward bypassing the large forests and 

skirting around the swamps. In a country as rich in forests and 

swamps as western European Russia, however, such tactics are possible only to a limited extent. The lack of open space soon forced 

the troops to engage in forest fighting. The spearheading armored 

divisions hugged the improved roads in breaking through the forests 

and sought battle in open terrain. The result was that, having been 

outflanked and his lines having been pierced, the enemy retired laterally into the depth of the woods. While the immediate vicinity of 

trails and improved roads had thus been cleared of hostile forces, the 

German armor had no sooner surged past than the Russians once more 

emerged from the forests and reformed their lines. The infantry divisions, whi.ch trailed a considerable distance behind the tanks, subsequently came up against the same, at times quite sizable, Soviet 

forces. In the haste of their advance the infantry divisions were likewise unable to do a thorough job of mopping up the enemy in the 

extensive woodlands. Not that an attempt of that sortpromised any 

success; the cut-off Russians never thought of laying down their arms. 

They merely fought rear guard actions and withdrew deeper and 

deeper into the woods. These scattered enemy elements and the large 

quantities of equipment that had been left in the forests were soon to 

become the backbone of the partisan units. Events took a similar 

turn in sectors in which no armored units had been committed. The 

infantry spearheads were likewise unable to clear the large forests 

completely of the enemy. After their lines had been pierced, the 

Soviets simply retired into the depths of the forests and swamps and 

continued to fight. The following examples illustrate two different 

methods of dealing with such a situation. 

LIII Infantry Corps entered large forest areas at the very beginning of the Russian campaign. Within a few days two different divisions of the corps received precisely similar missions-the protection 

of main highways against flank attacks launched from deep forests. 

The first attack at Maloryta was liquidated with great difficulty and 
____ 

32 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

LEGEND ,c:=:::::::> RUSSIA" FORCES 

~RMAH FORCe 

1 at c:.LA8S ROAD 

.... CLA8S ROAD 

3 ..4 eLAse ROAD 

IltAILROI'O, MULTIPLe. T_ 

.....1l,ftOAO. alN_ TRACK 

Pinak:-",,\ 

SCALE 

1t:0==-.....O===~IO;..._...,;j20

MILES 

Mc;p 3 

OPERATIONS AT 

MALORYTA 

PRUZHANY 
TERRAIN FACTORS 33 IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 

many German casualties. Four days later, an attack at Pruzhany was 

blocked and frustrated by the use of entirely different tactics. (See 

p.34.) 

At Maloryta the mission of the 255th Division (later, because of 

enemy opposition, reinforced by the 267th Division) was to open up 

the Vlodava-Maloryta-Kobrin highway and to protect the right flank 

of Fourth Army (map 3). Because the area of Maloryta was marked 

on the map as part of the Pripyat Swamp, the 255th Division had 

expected to find a very swampy forest. Actually, this is an area of 

old, uncultivated, high forest, with much underbrush and no swampy 

characteristics. The operation developed out of a meeting engagement ·with an enemy division that ·was advancing on Maloryta from 

the southeast. No spe.:ial measures of any kind for reconnaissance or 

security had been taken. A prearranged deployment was therefore 

impossible and German units went into action whereyer they happened 

to encounter the enemy. 

On 23 June 1941, the reconnaissance battalion of the 255th Division 

was sent out to·ward Mokrany. At Melniki the battalion came upon 

enemy scout tanks, which were driven off. During the evening hours 

the 465th Infantry Regiment occupied the entire forest of Melniki. 

Meanwhile the 475th Infantry Regiment was stopped outside Malaryta. On 24 June near Lyakhovtse, various enemy attempts to break 

out toward the east and southeast were broken up, mainly by artillery, 

which had come up in the meantime and now fired from the route of 

march. By that time the 465th Infantry Regiment had reached the 

scene. Since no progress was being made at Maloryta, the commander 

of LIII Infantry Corps went personally to Melniki and ordered an \ 

immediate attack from the east and southeast on Maloryta to be 

executed by the 465th Infantry Regiment. Elements of the 455th 

were to take part in this action. He then continued on to the 475th 

Infantry Regiment \yhich was preparing to launch another attack on 

l\1aloryta from the southwest. This attack encountered little resistance and was continued through the town up to the crossroads 8 

miles northeast of it. By 2100 the whole of the main road was firmly 

in German hands. 

During the same night the regiments of the 255th Division occupied 

the other roads formi ng a triangle northeast of Maloryta. The 

enemy was trapped in the forest within this road triangle. The 

artillery of the 267th Division was then moved up and committed in 

support. On the evening of 25 June the enemy broke out toward Melniki, launched a surprise attack on two batteries of the 267th Division 

which had come up into the forest without proper security precautions~

and wiped out most of the gun crews. 
34 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

By 26 June the enemy's resistance seemed to weaken. Therefore, 

one battalion of the 45Mh Infantry Regiment was sent out from 

Lyakhovtse, on a broad front, to comb the forest toward the north. 

In the heart of the. forest the battalion was suddenly attacked from 

all sides. The Russians had permitted the leading German elements 

to pass and then fired out of the trees. The battalion found itself in 

a critical situation and had to withdraw from the forest with very 

heavy losses. 

On 27 June the entire forest was systematically raked with strong 

artillery fire; then the whole of the 475th Infantry Regiment was sent 

in to comb it from north to south. Enemy resistance was broken. 

Several thousand prisoners were taken and many guns and vehicles 

were captured. The Maloryta operation had required six days before 

it could be brought to a successful conclusion, and it was evident that 

a lesson had been learned. 

At Pruzhany the mission of the 167th Division was to protect the 

highway to Ruzhana and Slonim against attack by Russian forces 

operating from the forest of Bialystok to the northwest and to guard 

the left flank of Fourth Army (map 3). Since the Russians were 

already very close to the highway, the entire 167th Division was 

ordered into the forest to relieve the situation quickly. Similar efforts 

at Ruzhana and Slonim soon caused a reduction in strength of the 

division at Pruzhany. In the initial ac60n, the division v~ered off 

to the left of its route of advance in spearheads of regimental strength. 

There was no time for preliminary deployment. 

As early as 2H June 1941, the enemy had appeared in the immediate 

vicinity of the highway near Pruzhl1ny and had taken the road under 

machine-gun fire. Advance elements of the 167th Division were just 

barely able to halt the enemy west of Pruzhany. On 27 June the entire 

167th Division was turned against him and \vassoon engaged in heavy 

defensive combat against a battle-worthy enemy division that emerged 

from the forest. In a stubborn battle to move the German flank 

protection farther to the west and away from the Ro17bahn, the ellemy 

\-vas driven back to the edges of the forest. As soon as the first 

. phase of this operatioll was sliccessfully concluded, howeYer, the 

lessons learned in the battle of Maloryta were applied and the pursuit 

of the enemy was carried no farther into the forest than was necessary 

to protect the Rollbahn. A planned regrouping of forces was then 

carried out. All elements of the division no longer required for purely 

defensive purposes, and a considerable portion of its artillery, were 

withdra\\'n while heavy lllUchine-gull units were moved forward in 

their place. 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 35 

In this case corps did not pursue the battle to a final decision, but 

halted the attack when its mission appeared to be accomplished. In 

the meantime weaker enemy forces were pressing toward the Rollbahn 

near Ruzhana, and signs of enemy activity were noticed near Slonim. 

Ag-ainst these threats, elements of the 167th Division, mostly heavy 

machine-gun units, were at once moved by truck to Ruzhana and 

Slonim, where they succeeded in keeping the enemy off the Rollbahn. 

The preceding example illustrates the' German tendency to bypass 

forests wherever possible. As the commander of LIlI Infantry Corps 

observed, "It is better to exercise discretion in the selection of objectives than to incur avoidable risks in forest fighting." This corps, 

at least, abandoned the practice of mopping up the enemy in forest 

areas and instead adopted as a standing operating procedure the practice of sealing' off such areas. The following example shows how 

that technique had been elaborated and refined four months later 

as a result of combat experience. 

Early in October 1941, LIII Infantry Corps was confronted with 

a security problem in the swampy reg-ion of Kletnya. Having been 

bypassed in the advance on Bryansk, the enemy in this area now 

constituted a threat to the left flank and rear of the corps, which was 

preparing to break through the fortified zone along the Sudost River 

(map, p. 18). Several weeks of position warfare allowed time for a 

thorough reconnaissance of the region, about which nothing was 

previously known. It was thickly forested, with fairly large, scattered patches ofswamp, and was accessible along a number of narrowgauge railways used for transporting peat. Numerous drainage 

ditches and high railroad embankments, some of the latter abandoned 

and with the tracks torn up, were characteristic of the region. 

Part of the same swampy forest extended along the BryanskRoslavl Rollbahn. and here the rather weak front line security forces 

of LIII Infantry Corps were opposed by three Russian divisions. The 

possibility of a Russian advance from that area, supported by the 

enemy forces that were cut off in the swamps around Kletnya, represented a constant threat, especially as all combat troops were committed elsewhere. 

On the basis of previous experience,LIII Infantry Corps decided 

that a mopping-up of the enemy in the Kletnya area would not be 

attempted. Instead, the whole region was to be sealed off. Two 

battalions of combat engineers and three of construction engineers 

were assigned this mission. Split into small task forces, each consisting of one construction battalion and one combat engineer company, these units proved capable of defending themselves as they 

performed their task. They blocked every stretch of dry g-round 

around the edges of the swampy forest with mines and other obstacles 
36 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

and laid a triple mine belt along the Rollbahn opposite the enemy 

front. These mine fields were covered by engineer detachments placed 

at wide intervals. The mines, of which there were 40,000, proved very 

effective. Soon the construction troops were again free to take part 

in the preparations for the Sudost crossing while the combat engineer force, which remained in the swampy forest, proved of sufficient 

strength to keep the enemy in check. Two attacks in the direction 

of Kletnya by one of the three Russian divisions mentioned above 

bogged down in"the mine fields, and the Russians were forced to withdraw. The enemy located in the swamps around Kletnya did not 

leave that area. As the corps' attack on Bryansk continued to make 

progress (see p. 19), the engineers could be withdrawn, and no further 

measures were taken there. The area was no longer of any 

importance. 

Once the corps had succeeded in eliminating any active threat to 

its flank from the Russian forces located in the swampy forest, the 

terrain itself ceased to have any influence upon the over-all situation 

or the tactical operations of the corps. Neither the various arms-with 

the exception of engineers and construction troops:-nor the air force 

or even the corps' supply operations were in any way affected. The 

engineers and construction troops alone had to cope with the difficult problem, both tactical and technical, which they proved capable 

of solving to complete satisfaction. It was a valuable experience to 

realize that the engineers could also be entrusted with minor combat 

and security missions. Schooled primarily for mobile warfare, they 

had to acquaint themselves now with the problems of defensive installations and the construction of obstacles. The chief engineer officer of LIII Corps personally conducted the tactical and technical 

operations in the swampy forest around Kletnya. He was also instrumental in obtaining the great number of mines needed. 

The very first days of the campaign brought home the fact that 

the Red Army soldier bore little resemblance to the Russian soldier 

of 1914-17. The Bolshevist regime certainly understood how to imbue the Soviet soldier with a new spirit over the course of twenty 

years. This revelation was another of the surprises of the RussoGerman war. The Russian soldier has always been brave and steadfast. But the new masters of Russia have succeeded in rousing the 

soldier from his passive stupor, in giving him a strong sense of responsibility toward state and nation, and even in turning him into 

a fanatic. The experiences and practices of the savage civil wars, 

in which the end justified any and all means, undoubtedly had much 

to do with molding the new Russian soldier and commander. In 1916 

two German cyclists, one at the head of the column and one bringing 

up the rear, could easily march 500 newly captured prisoners 5 miles 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 37 

to the nearest enclosure. In 1941 this was out of the question. The 

Russian soldier of World War I was a tenacious fighting man but 

once the fortunes of war had turned against him, he resigned himself 

to his fate. The Russian soldier of 1941 kept right on fighting. By 

the fall of that year, the resurgence of dismembered enemy forces 

in forests and swamps behind the German·front had assumed serious 

proportions. During the first part of the campaign, the German 

soldier was able to surmount such difficulties, but the longer the fighting lasted, and the poorer the quality of the ever-necessary replacements became, the greater were the effects of this situation. 

The Soviet Union with its difficult terrain and its numerically 

well-nigh inexhaustible manpower potential, which moreover comprises an exceptionally high percentage of young age groups, can 

only be brought to its knees by a superlatively well-wrought instrument of war. That instrument Germany had at the beginning of 

the war, subject, of course, to the limitations that necessarily accompanied the rapid expansion of the army after 1935. But whatever 

the German units might have lacked in organic cohesiveness was partially set off by practical experience in four successful campaigns. 

Now that the 'sword had been forged and honed, the test lay in wielding it without blunting its fine edge. That its handlers failed to 

accomplish. Since the highest command steadfastly believed that the 

outcome of the campaign would be decided within eight or ten weeks, 

It was logical to hit the enemy from the very start with every ounce 

of Germany's military resources. But when the course of events had 

proved that belief a grave fallacy, the time had come for drawing 

the proper conclusions, not only with regard to the broader aspects 

of strategy but also with regard to economy of manpower. If defensive or offensive actions cost the Germans about the same toll of 

casualties as the Russians, the result in the long run had to be an 

exhaustion of Germany's war potential merely in terms of human 

lives. All the more inevitable was that final result if Germany's 

quantitative inferiority in manpower could not be offset by a qualitative superiority in materiel. 

The Russians appeared to be well aware of these considerations. 

They chose for their most determined efforts swampy, forested terrain where superiority in materiel is least effective. For example, 

north of Gomel in the autumn of 1941 they attempted to establish 

a continuous line of strong points in the very thickest parts of the 

forest. Many of these strong points consisted of disabled tanks dug 

in and arranged for mutual support. They opened surprise fire on 

the approaching German infantry from thick underbrush or hollows 

in the terrain, and at first even assault units had great difficulty in 

getting close enough to deal with them. Finally, antitank weapons 
38 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

were brought up to close range and some of the defensive positions 

were captuNld. The fighting then resolved itself into numerous 

separate actions, and the enemy's resistance was broken in a comparatively short time. 

Combat in forests has always been known as a costly type of warfare. The Russo-German war was no exception. The fact that the 

opponents clash in close terrain and come to grips in point-blank and 

hand-to-hand encounters leads by itself to numerous casualties. For 

this reason the very first day of the war saw the beginning of a search 

for new ways to support the infantry in the unavoidable forest fighting. Armor can nearly always be discounted as a supporting arm 

in dense forests; it is tied to the trails and open parts of woods. In 

addition, many of the large woodlands in Russia are interlaced with 

swamplands. As soon as armor encounters swampland, it is stymied 

and unable to support the infantry. Thus, only artillery and aviation are left to support infantry in forest fighting. 

In the case of artillery, the difficulty lies in fire direction. In dense 

woods it is far from easy to identify and to fire at the enemy forward line. Even more difficult is the task of bringing effective fire 

to bear on the depth of the enemy position, because the targets are 

concealed from ground as well as air observation. An almost insoluble problem confronts the artillery if the attacking infantry has 

bogged down close to the enemy line; the· enemy mounts a counterattack, and the battle see-saws back and forth in the woods. These 

are the very situations in which fire concentrations on the front line 

of the enemy would be particularly necessary and effective. In many 

instances, however, such a concentration is out of the question since 

:friendly infantry stands in the zone of fire. Area fire was found to 

have the drawback of expending large quantities of ammunition 

1",ithout any certainty of success. As a result, many combined units 

resorted once more to observed and individually directed fire, although 

followinga different procedure than in open terrain. 

The difference in firing procedure lay in the fact that. numerous 

forward observers accompanied the advance elements of the infantry 

and transmitted firing data to their batteries no longer by wire but only 

by radio. This procedure likewise has its disadvantages; it entails numerous casualties among forward observers and radio operators and 

causes the loss of a large number of radio sets. It furthermore 

requires extremely well-trained observers and gunnery personnel. 

Just as essential are immediately available reserves of observers and 

equipment. If these prerequisites are met, the infantry can be supported in a much more effective manner than in the case of. area fire, 

which always remains more or less stereotyped in nature. The second 

procedure is much more flexible and more easily adaptable to the re­
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 39 

quirements of the moment. With proper training it is possible to 

coordinate the fire of an entire artillery regiment, and in a matter of 

minutes the fires of every battalion can be concentrated on one single 

point: a most effective procedure in preparing a breach of the enemy 

lines or in anticipating an imminent counterattack. If the artillery 

is properly schooled in its supporting mission, the infantry can even 

be withdrawn a short distance before fire for ,effect commences on the 

enemy forward lines. So long as infantry and artillery function 

as a smoothly coordinated team, the enemy will be unable to utilize 

that opportunity for a follow-up thrust or an advance of his forward 

line. 

Successful artillery support in forests requires intensive special 

training and presupposes certain favorable conditions. The .terrain 

must allow a reasonable minimum of mobility to the guns, and survey 

personnel must have time to plot the positions of the guns precisely 

before they are required to fire. But since German troops avoided 

combat in forests whenever possible, the typical forest operation was 

a mopping-up of dispersed Russian forces. This was normally carried 

out. as speedily as possible by units in the strength of regimental 

combat teams. If the forests were at all swampy, the artillery had 

great difficulty in keeping up with such units. Moreover, in this type 

of fighting, artillery support was needed quickly or not at all. It 

was seldom possible to locate the target and begin effective fire in time. 

From repeated experience the Germans came to the conclusion that, 

except in unusual circumstances, artillery in thick forests was just an 

impediment and should be left behind. They much preferred heavy 

mortars such as the Russians used in large quantities and with great 

effect. These could be hand-carried over even the most difficult terrain and, being comparatively short-range weapons, they involved 

only minor problems in fire control. 

The infantry's task in forest fighting was considerably facilitated 

whenever the artillery was augmented by combat aviation support. 

As spotty as reconnaissance data were and had to be by the very 

nature of wooded terrain, particularly in the case of an enemy as proficient in camouflage as the Russian, the commitment of combat aviation against the depth of enemy positions produced excellent results. 

To be sure, supporting aircraft must be able to identify with absolute 

certainty at least the friendly if not the hostile forward line of a 

forest position. Mere designation of that line on the map is not 

enough; the bombardier must have a VIsual reference point. Thus, 

the only sure-fire methods of identification are ground signals, magnesium flares, incendiary markers, smoke pots, signal beacons, and 

similar visual aids. 
40 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

As long as the Stuka units had an their excellently trained personnel, they could be committed for knocking out enemy resistance 

in the forward lines of forest positions. However, the use of Stukas 

for that purpose necessitated minute briefing and target designation, 

as well as the arrangement of a precisely timed plan of attack. A 

serious disadvantage lay in the fact that the ground forces could not 

establish radio contact with the approaching Stukas. Nevertheless, 

the Stukas performed excellent service. Friendly infantry usually 

approached to within 100 yards of the enemy forest position. The 

Stukas then laid their heavy-caliber bombs with astounding precision 

directly in front of the infantry. The assault got under way as soon 

as the last bomb had hit the ground. 

Relatively heavy-caliber missiles were employed against forest positions. In the spring of 1942, for example, Stukas dropped 1,OOO-pound 

bombs on the Soviet main line of resistance in the woods south of 

Lake Ilmen. The whine of diving Stukas, the explosions of heavy 

bombs, and the crash of toppling trees had a great moral effeot, particularly if hostile forces were experiencing their first Stuka attack. 

The physical effect, on the other hand, was negligible in most instances. 

An enemy entrenched in a forest position usually suffered few casualties. Even the moral effect decreased noticeably as time went on. 

Thus, in the final analysis it was still the -infantryman who bore the 

brunt of the forest fighting. 

The same was trne in the case of combat in swamps. The effect of 

artillery fire is largely nullified by swampy soil. Aerial bombs must 

be equipped with extension-rod fuzes (VoT8atzzuender) to produce 

any sort of result. Aboye all, however, combat in swamps puts the 

infantry to unusually severe physical tests. In summertime the men 

constantly live among dampness and moisture. Boots and uniforms 

begin to rot; myriads of mosquitoes never cease to make·lifemiserable; 

drinking water is a rare and precious commodity ; proper body hygiene 

is impossible; epidemics of diarrhea, dysentery, and typhoid spread 

like wildfire. Among the principal reasons for the high casualty rates 

in swamp fighting is the impossibility of digging field foi'tifications. 

Every cut of the spade immediately fills up \vith water. Cover can 

only be built with logs. 'which frequently have to be hauled a long 

distance, and with sandbags. 

In wintertime some of the swamps free7,e over and others remain 

open. The swamps around Lake Ilmen normally remain open during 

the winter, or so the inhabitants claimed. Toward the end of December 1941, however. not only the swamps but also the lake itself was 

covered \vith a thick layer of ice. The Russians attacked across Lake 

Ilmen and the swamps and split the German Sixteenth Army into two 
MACHINE GUN SQUAD goes into position in swampy f
42 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

parts, the larger of which eventually became completely encircled (the 

Demyansk pocket). 

The influence of forest and swamps on military operations in Russia 

plays a crucial role particularly in one respect; namely, partisan warfare. Partisan warfare dates back to the earliest days in Russian 

history and appears to be a universal characteristic of all Slavic peoples. The Serbs and Bulgars take to the hills, as during the years of 

fighting by the Comitadjis in Macedonia; the Poles and Russians take 

to the forests. An account of partisan organization and tactics in the 

USSR lies'outside the scope of the present manuscript. Those subjects 

are properly part of a study on the Soviet conduct of operations. See 

DA Pamphlet No. 20-230, Russian Oombat Methods. 

Only a future' history based on irrefutable primary sources will be 

able to assess the long-range effect which the painstakingly organized 

partisan operations had on the German campaign against Russia. The 

immediate repercussions were serious. Partisan warfare was a festering, ever-spreading cancer. Anyone flying over occupied Russia in 

1943 or 1944 got an excellect picture of how far the disease had spread. 

Pilots were issued maps on which partisan-infested areas were circled 

in red. There was an amazing number of these red circles. Within 

each circle was a number, stating the minimum altitude for crossing 

the particular area. RoVDo, Borisov, Gomel, Bryansk, Vinitsa, and 

other places were marked 2,500 meters (8,300 feet), which meant that 

partisans in those territories had antiaircraft artillery. 

In the wooded and swampy regions between Velikiye Luki and Lake 

Peypus the guerrillas conducted full-fledged conscription drives behind the German front. Under cover of darkness the conscriptees 

were funneled through gaps in the German front, which north of 

Kholm consisted only of strong points, and subsequently received military training in the Soviet rear areas. In other regions the partisans 

are said to have conducted winter maneuvers, including firing practice 

with live ammunition by heavy weapons and even artillery. 

Antipartisan operations required a substantial number of forces 

that otherwise might have fought at the front. Guarding rear lines 

of communication, particularly railroad lines and operating facilities, 

airdromes, ammunition and ration dumps, etc., absorbed hundreds of 

thousands of men. Despite the gu.ard details, however, the rail lines 

were blown up with clocklike regularity. At times the demolitions 

assumed such proportions that the supply of the front became seriously 

endangered. There were times when night traffic on vital feeder lines 

had to be completely shut down. The trains, with sand cars ahead of 

the locomotives, ran only during daytime, one train following within 

sight of the preceding one. Of course, the trains did not run at all it, 

despite increased security patrols, the rails had been blown to pieces 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 43 

during the previous night. In several instances of impending German offensives,a host of partisan units launched joint, large-scale 

operations against rights-of-way and other railroad facilities. Prior 

to the German Kursk offensive in the summer of 1943, for example, 

the strategic Desna bridge at Bryansksuddenly blew sky-high, and a 

series of unusually numerous demolitions, set off as if by prearranged 

signal disrupted the Roslavl-Bryansk railroad. 

A field day for the partisans came when the Germans had to withdraw. The German units had to fight on two fronts. The partisans 

anticipated the routes of withdrawal and systematically destroyed 

every bridge in the rear area. This wholesale destruction of bridges 

gave rise to extremely critical situations. With the main enemy hard 

at their heels, German forces were frequently compelled to send flying 

columns to the rear for the purpose of capturing the destroyed bridge 

sites in enemy hands and building new bridges. 

Among the multitude of difficulties which partisan warfare caused 

in matters of personnel and materiel, one salient outgrowth of that 

particular struggle must not be overlooked. Today, there is no longer 

any need to prove that the partisans fought their war with unusual 

cruelty. And if warfare in the East became more and more bitter, the 

partisans contributed no small share toward that end. 
44 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Map 4
 

LINES OF OOMMUNICATION 

IN THE SOUTHEASTERN CARPATHIANS 

LEGEND 

5INCI.£ TRACK RR --...­

HARD eURFAC~ Fl.OA.O 

NARROW OAUO£ 

I.OOOINO RR 

~~. ~~

~\

S&I.tin__~.-:,
SECTION VI 

DEFENSE AND WITHDRAWAL IN HEAVILY WOODED
 

SUBALPINE TERRAIN
 

(Fighting in the East Carpathians in 1944)
 

Military Topography of the East Carpathians 

Although the East Carpathian Mountains are outside of Russia 

proper, they were the scene of Russian operations in both world wars 

and part of the territory has now been annexed by the USSR. The 

geographic location and terrain features of these mountain ranges give 

them a certain strategic significance, especially today when the whole 

area constitutes an outer defense zone for the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Carpathians have local political significance as a region 

where several national frontiers meet. 

Wherever there are heavily forested mountains of medium height, 

the defender is afforded a variety of tactics in conducting his operations. Active defense, delaying actions, the establishment of a system 

of protected road blocks, and flanking attacks against enemy forces 

bypassing the mountains or against front lines anchored upon them 

are some of the methods he may employ. On the other hand, the 

attacker may conceal his forces during the assembly prior to offensive 

operations. These conditions apply not only to the Carpathians but 

also to similar terrain in other parts of the world. 

This section is concerned only with that area in the southeastern 

Carpathians north of Piatra Neamt-Kuty, west of Chernovtsy, and 

east of Sighet-Bistrita-Mures Oroszfalu (map 4). This region is 

characterized by a scantier population and fewer communications 

facilities than similar areas in Western Europe. Here the Carpathians show the characteristics of a subalpine mountain range: They 

are covered with tall stands of timber extending cleal~ to the mountain 

tops. The average elevation of the mountains is 2,000 to 3,500 feet 

in the east, 4,000 to 5,500 in the central sector, and 3,500 to 7,500 feet 

in the west. The Caliman Mountains southwest of Vatra Dornei, the 

Rodnei Mountains south of Borsa, and the Czarnohora east of Sighet 

are the only massifs which rise to approximately 7,000 feet and have 

the alpine features of rocky, bare peaks. 

The valley of the Bistrita extends from Carlibaba (southwest of 

Vatra Dornei) via Vatra Dornei toward Piatra Neamt. Along this 

general line, the region is divided into two parallel mountain ranges 

stretching from northwest to southeast. A defender facing east will 

45 
46 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

establish his main line of resistance along the course of these mountain 

ranges. The depth of the defense sector is therefore considerable, a 

factor which accounts for its particular strength. An attacker who 

intends to penetrate the eastern Carpathians from the east will not 

direct his strategic main effort toward this· area in which he has to 

overcome two successive mountain ranges. He will atempt a thrust 

farther to the north, for instance, across the well-known Tartar Pass 

near Jablonica toward the area northeast of Sighet, where the mountain range is shallower from east to west. 

The network of highways, dirt roads, and railroads is adequate; 

but a permanent road maintenance service, as well as snow clearing 

detachments in winter, is needed for all roads, especially where they 

extend through defiles and across passes. The main traffic arteries 

and through roads' can be kept open even in winter. Most of the 

bri~ges are constructed of wood. Half-tracked and armored vehicles 

must bypass them and use the fords which have firm, stony bottoms 

and can be found in the vicinity of every bridge. The railroads are 

not capable of very high performance; their daily average capacity 

varies between 8 and 12 trains. The numerous narrow-gage logging 

railroads may be used for supply and minor troop movements. 

The population is composed of very frugal farmers, lumbermen, 

and herdsmen in the rural districts. and tradespeople in the cities. As 

a frontier people who have been forced to change their political allegiance several times during the last 30 years, they distrust all strangers. 

The climate in this elevated forest region is healthy throughout the 

year. Warm clothing should be kept on hand at all times, even during 

the summer, because the nights are generally.cool, especially at high 

elevations. The winters are usually very cold and snowy; but if the 

troops are properly equipped, climatic conditions will be tolerable. 

The Tactical Situation in Spring 1944 

In March 1944, the Russians made an offensive thrust toward Bessarabia and openeda gap between Army Group South and the German 

army group adjacent to the north. The Soviets now faced the extensive forests of the Carpathians which, in parts, were still covered 

with snow~

A temporary defense of the Carpathians was attempted by commiting replacement units hastily brought up from the rear, Romanian 

formations, and so-called Carpathian battalions. The latter were 

improvised,units composed of miscellaneous troop elements which had 

become detached in the course of the withdrawal. All these troops 

were inexperienced in forest and mountain fighting, and lacked the 

special equipment needed for this type of combat. If they succeeded 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 47 

in stopping the enemy advance intothe mountains, it was only because 

the Russians initially employed weak forces and the wooded terrain 

was particularly suitable for defense. For the moment the Russian 

command was intent on capturing Bessarabia and showed no intention 

of penetrating the eastern Carpathians with strong forces. In any 

event, these mountains had assumed a singular importance and significance in the eyes of the German command. The Carpathian front, 

even though it was only weakly held, constituted a potential threatto 

the flank of the Russians whose main forces had penetrated northern 

Bessarabia. The creation of that front forced the enemy to provide 

flank protection. 

At the end of April 1944 the general in command of XVII Infantry 

Corps was assigned to that sector of the Carpathian front which extends from north of Piatra Neamt to south of Kuty. The corps was 

subordinate to Eighth Army. A few weeks later the replacement 

units and so-'called Carpathian battalions were relieved by the 3d 

Mountain and 8th Jaeger [Light Infantry] Divisions. These two 

units, which had hitherto performed well in combat against the Russians and had received appropriate training and equipment for forest 

and mountain fighting, subsequently proved very effective. 

The Defensive Mission of XVII Infantry Corps 

Upon taking over the sector, XVII Infantry Corps was given the 

following mission: . 

a. To secure and defend the gateways to the Carpathians against 

enemy reconnaissance and attacks with limited objective. 

b. To defend the passes situated behind the gateways should the 

enemy launch an offensive with the objective of penetrating the Carpathians. There are six well-defined passes in this area. They are 

located northeast of Borca and Borsteni, southeast and east of Vatra 

Dornei, northeast of Iacobeni, and east of Izvorul (map 5, p. 48). 

To accomplish this mission, the corps made the following 

dispositions: 

a. Security and defense of the gateways: The main defensive efforts 

were to be made at the approaches to the Carpathians. Openings for 

flanking movements were to be eliminated. Control of the intermediate terrain was to be achieved by establishing a system of strong 

points from which intensive reconnaissance patrols were to be initiated. Special security detachments were to protect supply routes. 

Finally, strong reserves were to be held back at central points to 

eliminate delays in shifting them to danger spots. Each division was 

to constitute a reserve of two to three battalions and provide it with 

all the truck transportation available. 
48 GERMAN REPORT- SERIES 

Map !l 

De:P'£NSe: LIN EoS S 

RAIN FEATURE AND TER UTHE.AaTEAN N THE SO 

I CARPATHIANS 

SCALE 

o 

LEGEND 

""••IAtt fIOelTlo,..a 

O&fIll~ PQe,ITION. 

",.,.

AtN, [Icwtione in m.tere 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 49 

o. Defense of the passes: The defensive forces were to be concentrated at the passes. Strong reserves were to be held back for counterattacks. Active reconnaissance patrols were to observe the intermediate terrain. 

This mission was to be accomplished by two German divisions and 

Romanian units to a total strength of one and a half regiments. These 

were all the forces available along a front extending over 80 miles 

as the crow flies. At first, the Russian troops facing these forces 

amounted to approximately three and a half divisions which were also 

deployed for defense. Ordinarily, much stronger forces would have 

been needed for such a wide sector; for the time being, however, no 

Russian offensive was anticipated along this front. Moreover, the 

terrain favored the defender. Thus, from the point of view of Army 

Group South and Eighth Army, the strategic significance of the Carpathian front was twofold: It saved forces for the main defensive 

effort in Bessarabia, where the next major Russian offensive was ~xpected, and it contained enemy forces. 

The alinement of the positions destined to serve the defense of the 

passes was relatively easy to determine 'because most of the Carpathian passes are situated in very dominant positions. Fortifications 

erected during World War I were discovered along the passes 3 miles 

northeast of Iacobeni, twelve miles southeast of Vatra Dornei (on the 

road to Brosteni), and in the intermediate mountains. These were 

integrated into 'the course of the main line of resistance and incorporated into the construction program. 

Openings for outflanking the positions were eliminated wherever 

possible. This problem deserved special attention in the area around 

Borca and Brosteni, where the extremely important communication 

road in the Bistrita Vailey was exposed to being cut off by an enemy 

thrust from Stulpicani via Ostra and the mountains. Another danger 

area was east of Vatra Dornei, where a'surprise thrust from the east 

might eliminate this crucial communications junction. Finally, the 

area around Izvorul and north of Rasca was particularly vulnerable 

to premature enemy thrusts toward the Pojorata-Seletin-Straja road 

or in direction of Carlibaba toward the Borsa-Iacobeni highway. 

Subsequent combat actions during the retreat corroborated this 

estimate. 

Defensive positions were anchored on natural obstacles which were 

difficult to penetrate or surmount. This resulted in savings of manpower, troops, and time required for the construction of fortifications. 

The forward area of the western sector in former Hungarian territory 

had all the necessary prerequisites. Here the positions were supported 

by the Caliman and Rodnei Mountains and by the southern spurs of 

the Czarnohora. 
50 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Suitable lines of supply and communication leading to the positions 

were selected and provided with all possible protection. This was 

important because no position in a forest or on a mountain can be 

held without such lines. Even tactical considerations had to be 

subordinated to this factor. 

Field-type fortifications were erected in the eastern and central part 

of the sector; in the western, most of the construction work consisted 

of improving the permanent fortifications along the passes and the 

positions barring the valleys, with field-type structures filling the gaps 

Priorities in the construction program were determined in accordance 

with the prevailing tactical situation and the terrain conditions~ The 

defensive positions along the passes and across the valleys were ready 

within a relatively short time. The main emphasis of the construction effort was subsequently placed on strengthening the lateral positions on the adjacent heights. The highest priority was given to clearing fields of fire. 

The Defense of the Carpathians 

During the entire phase of position warfare, which lasted from 

April to mid-August, and the subsequent withdrawal up to the beginning of September 1944, the terrain had the anticipated effect on the 

conduct of operations. The eastern security line in the area around 

the gateways was considered capable of defense, thanks to the relentless construction efforts of the combat troops. In the intermediate 

terrain, the sparsely occupied line of strong points, with intervals up 

to 2 miles separating the individual installations, continued to be of 

value only for purposes of surveillance and security. Reconnaissance, 

security, and defense were conducted very actively during the period 

of position warfare. 

Friendly and hostile reconnaissance, notably long-range patrols 

across the lines into the rear areas, were conducted with particular intensity in the northern half of the corps sector. There, the terrain 

was very close and the strong points were separated by wide intervals. 

German reconnaissance and combat patrols penetrated as far as the 

eastern foothills of the Carpathians, brought back useful intelligence, 

and disrupted enemy supply and communication very effectively. The 

Russian patrols were unable to penetrate equal distances into the German rear areas. . In this terrain, the specializ~d troops of the 3d 

Mountain and 8th Jaeger Divisions proved superior to the soldiers of 

the Russian rifle divisions. Romanian soldiers were used as guides by 

the Germans because they were familiar with the terrain. 

Pack columns with mules were used to bring up supplies to the 

troops in the· strong points on top of the mountains. Since only the 

3d Mountain Division had mules, some of its animals were turned 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 51 

over to the 8th Jaeger Division. The supply columns took security 

measures on their way to the front and, when passing through particularly dangerous areas, were accompanied by security detachments 

provided by the combat units. 

In mid-August 1944 the Russians began their large-scale offensive 

in Bessarabia. Because of the lack of strategic reserves and the surprise caused by the defection of the Rom,anian units, that offensive 

finally led to the conquest of Romania by the Russians. The major 

part of the Sixth German Army, which was committed in the eastern 

sector of Bessarabia, was cut off and encircled. The Eighth Army, in 

spite of the defection of the Fourth Romanian Army, succeeded in 

pivoting its right wing from the western part of Bessarabia toward 

the Carpathians. The army was able to reestablish a continuous front 

in conjunction with XVII Infantry Corps which was holding the Carpathian front on its left. It effected a very difficult but nevertheless 

orderly retreat across the Carpathians and held off the Russians, who 

were following closely although they were hampered in their conduct 

of operations. In this instance, the Carpathians had, therefore, assumed once again a great strategic significance by virtue of their geographic location and terrain features. 

When the Russian offensive began, the Romanian units under XVII 

Infantry Corps deserted as they did elsewhere. The defection of the 

Romanian regiment deployed along the Moldava southeast of Gura 

Humorului opened a dangerous gap in the vicinity of this extremely 

important gateway into the mountains. However, reserves of the 3d 

Mountain Division were moved up quickly and formed a defense line 

southeast of Stulpicani and south of Gura Humorului, and they prevented the Russians from advancing in the direction of the Campulung-Gura Humorului road. Eighth Army issued an order widening 

the XVII Infantry Corps sector for the duration of the ~ithdrawal.

It now reached .up to the Targu Neamt-Bistricioara-Toplita-Mures 

Oroszfalu road; two divisions held a front of 100 air miles (map 4). 

The Withdrawal 

Two factors determined the plan the corps drew up for the retreat: 

the available roads and the defensive positions protecting them against 

enemy interference. Though the latter had been fully reconnoitered, 

they were only partly constructed. 

Russian intentions could be recognized at an early stage. One division was committed at each gateway as a first assault wave; thus, the 

corps was faced by four to five divisions. The main attack aimed, as 

expected, in the direction of the Bistrita Valley, at a point between 

Bistricioara and Vatl'a Dornei. This constituted the most obvious 
52 GERMAN REPORT· SERIES 

plan of operations considering the terrain conditions. In the southern 

and central sectors. the direction of the highways and alternate approach roads was favorable; in the northern sector, most roads, except 

for the main routes of advance, cut right across the direction of 

attack. In addition, the main routes of advance in the southern and 

central sectors were closer together which guaranteed better opportunities for nlutual coope.ration. A thrust following the course of 

the Bi~trita would have presented the enemy with too many difficulties becHllse of the defiles and defensive positions northeast of Vatra 

Dornei. 

Both German divisions exploited the favorable terrain of the mountain forests and employed active defense tactics in all instances. 

Although the retreat came as a complete surprise and was fraught 

with numerous difficulties, its first stage was carried out without disrupting the continuity of the front. In view of the small forces 

available, this was a notable performance. Its successful accomplishment was the prerequisite for the continuation of the retreat. 

The corps held the positions west of the Bistrita Valley and northeast of the Vatra Dornei-Carlibaba road for several days. It then 

withdrew to the well-prepared Hungarian border positions without 

giving the enemy any opportunities to interfere with its movement. 

Tactical and strategic considerations motivated the accelerated withdraw~l of the units adjacent to the south. As a first result, the right 

wing of corps was withdrawn to the exit from the Carpathians east of 

Mures Oroszfalu. The 3d Mountain Division once again had to engage 

in very heavy fighting in this sector. During the further course of the 

retreat of the German Eighth Army, XVII Infantry Corps withdrew 

entirely from the Carpathians in mid-September 1944. 

Summary 

The 4ecisive superiority of specially trained and equipped mountain 

divisions over conventional rifle divisions, when both are employed in 

mountainous terrain, has been amply demonstrated in the preceding 

pages. The tactics of defensive mountain warfare as illustrated here 

are fairly well known. An aggressive attitude on the part of both 

command and troops is of primary importance. Otherwise the difference from conventional infantry tactics is a matter of emphasis 

rather than of basic principles. Patrols, for example, are a feature 

of all infantry tactics, but close mountainous terrain makes long-range 

reconnaissance patrols deep into enemy rear areas a practical possibility. Aggressive and well-trained troops can exploit this opportunity with good effect, especially if they have been trained in the 

advance recognition of enemy intentions. 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 53 

Prepared defenses along mountain ranges and the use of specialized 

troops can effect important economies in manpower; defensive sectors 

may even be twice as wide as those assigned to units in normal terrain. 

In the Carpathians, German units were under strength and were not 

given sufficient time and materiel to prepare satisfactory defensive 

positions. Nevertheless, they were able to hold out until events 'in 

other areas dictated a strategic decision to withdraw from the 

mountains. 
GERMAN SUPPLY COLUMN in the Nogayskaya Stepp
SECTION VII
 

COMBAT IN THE STEPPES
 

The term steppes implies untilled wasteland and can be applied to 

large areas of the USSR, especially in Asia. In the Middle Ages the 

whole of southern European Russia, including the Ukraine, was steppeland. Since that time the Ukraine has become the granary of Russia, 

and all the steppelands west of the Volga are being used more and 

more for agricultural purposes. The Soviet Union has accomplished 

much in this field of reclamation. 

During World War II, the German forces penetrated only the western edges of this area. There were extensive military operations 

on the Nogayskaya Steppe, between the lower Dnepr and the Sea of 

Azov, but this is now a flourishing agricultural region that hardly 

merits the name of steppe. The steppes on the Crimean Peninsula were 

found to be interspersed with cotton plantations and even fruit orchards, and the steppes along the Don have also been partially reclaimed. Of all the territory reached by the Germans during World 

'Var II, only the Kalmyk Steppe, between the Don and the Terek 

Rivers, has retained the character of treeless grazing land. 

During the temperate seasons of late spring, summer, and early 

fall, the steppe is the ideal battleground for armored and motorized 

units. The vast flatland is accessible in all its· parts and harbors 

only one natural obstacle-the so-called Balkas. These are ravines, 

in many instances with high and steep slopes, overgrown with brush 

and thickets. But the Balkas can be reconnoitered and avoided. The 

much more serious threat in the steppe comes from hostile aviation 

because the Balkas, some isolated clumps of trees, and a few human 

settlements are literally the only features. to afford cover. During 

the early fighting in the Russian steppes, the Germans had air superiority. At that time the lack of cover placed the withdrawing enemy 

forces at a decided disadvantage. 

Later the tables were turned, and the disadvantage was felt just as 

keenly on the German side. In its retirement through the steppes 

of the Kerch Peninsula in the spring of 1944, V Infantry Corps had 

not one single tank. The steppeland on that eastern l~ndspit of the 

Crimea is hilly, with full-fledged mountains rising in the immediate 

vicinity of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The weak elements of 

German combat aviation were committed against the Russian break55 
56 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

through on the narrow isthmus that joins the northern Crimea with 

the mainland. As a result, the very strong Red Air Force had absolutely free rein over the peninsula. The Soviet air and armored 

forces arrived at a very simple division of labor: while the tanks 

proceeded to put German infantry out of action, the air force swooped 

down on the prime movers of heavy weapons and artillery, as well as 

on vehicles in general. The outcome was that V Infantry Corps had 

soon lost the bulk of its artillery. In that completely open terrain, 

every horse- 91' tractor-drawn gun was plainly visible over a considerable distance. Horses and motorized equipment were blown 

to bits by strafing aircraft, and the last few prime movers only succeeded under cover of darkness in towing away some of the guns. The 

rest had to be blown up. A few squadrons of German fighter aircraft could have saved a substantial part of the artillery, prime 

mov~rs, and motor vehicles from destruction at the hands of Russian 

combat aviation. 

The school solution, of course, would be to conduct major retrograde movements across steppeland only at night. In theory that 

solution sounds fine but in practice itis only possible if the defend~r

succeeds in holding his position throughout the entire day until nightfall. If the attacker gains ground during the day, or if a breakthrough becomes imminent or actually succeeds, the defender is unable to avoid large-scale movements during daylight hours. If the 

retiring defender lacks equality of airpower, not even the bestorganized dispersal of his units or the most artful camouflage will save 

him from his fate. The individual can always conceal himself with 

steppe grass, the sole but abundant camouflage material in that terrain. A moving gun, a prime mover, or a column of trucks earrying 

reserves, however, cannot be concealed in the open steppeland. not 

even with a multitude of camouflage nets. 

One of the major problems during combat in the arid steppe is a 

proper supply of drinking water. Each unit must have its own water 

truck. No less important are a number of other factors peculiar to 

that type of terrain. Except for the Balkas, the steppe offers no 

natural cover against air attack or artillery fire, so that bombs and 

shells have a particularly serious fragmentation effect. During 

prolonged halts motor vehicles had to be dug in. But some of the 

most severe hardships in the steppe result from the shortage of wood. 

'Vithout wood, no fires can be built in the field kitchens and no shelters constructed. In the steppe, wood becomes a highly treasured 

commodity, above all in the winter. 

Winters in the steppe are rigorous. Neither forests nor mountains 

break the icy east wind or bank the snow. The wind whips the snow 

across the plains and into the only large depressions, the Balkas. 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 57 

The Balkas, however, are the only places that offer shelter for men 

and vehicles. The result is a never-ending struggle against the drifting snow. Without well-regulated and ample shipments of heating 

fuel, a military force cannot survive a winter in the steppe. White 

camouflage clothing and white paint for vehicles are indispensable. 

The thaw radically changes the face of the steppe. The Balkas 

churn with swelling streams. Small depressions are transformed into 

ponds, and large areas of flatland are covered with water. The 

thawed ground becomes soggy; the muddy season begins. Fora period of weeks neither troop convoys nor individual vehicles can move 

for any but the shortest distances. Only tracked vehicles are able 

to drag themselves through the mire. 

Summertime in the steppe exposes a military force to yet another 

hazard-deliberately set fires. In the summer of 1942 the Russians 

repeatedly put the dry steppes to the torch. Fortunately, the fires 

never assumed such proportions that the troops were in bodily danger; 

they only ",ere forced to a rapid change of position. Nevertheless, 

the flames jestroyed ammunition and equipment that could not be 

promptly evacuated. There is room for doubt, though, whether the 

Russians ever were bent on starting full-fledged conflagrations, even 

at places at which their aircraft dropped phosphorus. These scatterings of incendiaries were more iIi the nature of local, uncoordinated 

nuisance raids, but the possibility of setting large-scale steppe fires 

with wholly different results is not to be ignored. 

Finally, the steppe is ideally suited for p~rachute and air landing 

operations on even the largest scale. The terrain offers completely 

nnobstructed landing facilities for glider and transport aircraft. 

But neither the Germans nor the Russians took advantage of that 

opportunity during World War II. 
SECTION VIII
 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 

Never in history has a one-sided attack from the West succeeded in 

subjugating Russia. The record cites the abortive attempts of the 

Poles, the Swedes, Napoleon, and lastly the Germans. Are these 

failures to be attributed to the terrain of western Russia, the tough 

fiber of the USSR's inexhaustible manpower potential, or perhaps the 

faulty strategy of the invader from the West 

The Teutonic Knights, the Poles, and the Swedes waged most of 

their wars against Russia during winter, the season in which ice and 

snow neutralize many of the natural obstacles. Everyone of the 

campaigns follow the monotonous pattern: The attacking armies 

achieve initial successes (the Poles carried Moscow), the Russians 

withdraw into the interior of their domain, and finally they crush 

the attacker by sheer weight of numbers. 

Napoleon postponed his campaign against ,Russia until summer; 

he overlooked the fact that the Russian summer is short. Like his 

predecessors, he scored brilliant successes at the outset; but before he 

reached Moscow his army suffered extremely high casualties from 

disease and exhaustion. He lost half of his horses, not as the result 

of enemy action, but because of the heavy footing in the rain-soaked 

countryside. It is no secret that Napoleon fervently wished for the 

decisive battle. The Russians refused to do him that favor; they 

retired into the depth of their country. Those elements of the Grand 

Army that finally did reach Moscow were no longer a match for the 

ever-increasing numbers of the enemy. The deciding factor, however, 

was not the huge losses of men and materiel in the Russian terrain, 

but the fact that Napoleon had not succeeded in annihilating the 

Russian Army. This army and the early winter delivered the death 

blo·w. Napoleon failed because all he had left in Russia by October 

1812 was a shrunken army in a burned-out capital and an overextended 

and unsafe supply line. Wherever he looked he saw nothing but 

enemy forces. 

These dangers of the vast Russian land masses were to be countered 

in 1941 by the German assault along a wide, continuous front from the 

Black Sea to the Barents Sea. German strategy promised to eliminate the factors responsible for the downfall of Napoleon: the threats 

58 
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 59 

to the flanks and rear inherent in the immense territory of Russia. 

And yet, the invasion ended in complete failure. 

The Russian terrain had profound effects on the German Army. 

Although casualties from sickness and exhaustion were astonishingly 

few, the losses in materiel were serious. Heat, dust, poor roads, 

marshy terrain, and too few stops for repairs wreaked such havoc with 

German armored and motorized equipment that no amount of subsequent effort could undo the damage. The theory that all limitations of distance have been conquered by the internal-combustion 

engine proved to be false. Difficult terrain imposes a performance 

limit on tanks and· motor vehicles in general; thereafter they must be 

overhauled or replaced. Since German industry was not equal to that 

task, the German Army, whose equipment was much too heavy for 

warfare in Russian terrain, lost more and more of an essential part 

of its striking power; namely, its mobility. The terrain took its toll 

not only of the motorized equipment but also of the horses. As 

early as 1943 a distinction in status had to be made between mobile 

divisions and those that were virtually without transportation. 

Despite the ravages of the terrain, however, the German Army--in 

contrast to the Grand Army of Napoleon-reached the Don and the 

outskirts of Moscow and Leningrad with its striking power unshattered and its morale unbroken. It therefore appears that the influence 

of terrain upon the conduct of operations was not the decisive factor 

that brought about the defeat of the German forces in Russia. After 

this observation, it hardly seems profitable to pursue this subject any 

further, all the more since the controversy about the primary cause 

of Germany's defeat in the struggle with the Soviet Union is still far 

too intimately affected by recent events to allow a lucid and wholly 

objective judgment. Such judgments must be derived from exhaustive 

study of all the pertinent data in the light of historical perspective. 

One preliminary phase of such a study would be a critical examination of the grand strategy underlying the Russian campaign, in itself 

a tremendous undertaking that cannot even be outlined here. But a 

few of the themes to be developed in the course of such an investigation can at least be mentioned, and these inevitably lead back to a 

consideration of terrain, but on the level of strategy rather than 

operations. 

Many another country would have collapsed under the blows that 

the German Army dealt Soviet Russia in 1941. Many serious errors 

were committed by the German command, the most serious of them 

perhaps the supposition that the entire structure of the Soviet regime 

would topple after the first defeats of the Red Army. Like Napoleon 

before them, the Germans were unable to destroy the Russian Army. 

The Russian Colossus could afford to withdraw his troops and sacrifice 
60 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

whole regions. In the final analysis, the loss of the Caucasus and the 

Don severed only a part, even though a valuable part, of the western 

ramparts of the Russian heartland. 

The very moment, however, in which it became obvious that the 

attempt to crush the Russian armed forces had failed and that the 

Red Army was about to continue the war from the depth of its motherland, the Russo-German war had entered a new phase. The view was 

widely accepted, and not based on hindsight either, that the time had 

come for a radically new strategy: to hold as many of the occupied 

territories as necessary, to take full advantage of seasonal difficulties, 

to allow the Russians to butt their heads against deeply echeloned 

defensive systems, and, finally, to deliver the counterblow. Whether 

such a conduct of operations was feasible at that particular time is 

difficult to determine today; Germany was at war with almost the 

entire world, and was fighting not only in Soviet Russia but also in 

North Africa. 

Was it the Red Army which prevailed over the German Army 

despite its gallant fighting spirit Yes. Was it the highest German 

political and military command which brought about the defeat? 

Again, yes. But if at this early time a would-be analyst wanted to 

determine unequivocally which of the two was most instrumental in 

causing Germany's defeat, he would lack the necessary historical 

perspective as well as the requisite insight into a variety of events 

on both sides. 

The recent war has reaffirmed only one fact: In anyone-sided 

assault from the west, even the best of military forces will find it 

more than difficult to bring about the collapse of Russia. 

* u. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1986 491-421/21758