Part I of III

Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation

JOINT STAFF REPORT

Prepared for 

Rep. Darrell E. Issa, Chairman

United States House of Representatives

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

&

Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member

United States Senate

Committee on the Judiciary

112th Congress

July 31, 2012
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Table of Contents

Table of Contents............................................................................................................................ 2

Preface............................................................................................................................................. 5

I. Executive Summary..................................................................................................................... 6

II. Table of Names ........................................................................................................................ 10

III. Findings................................................................................................................................... 15

IV. The Story of Operation Fast and Furious ............................................................................... 19

1. New Strategy...................................................................................................................... 19

2. Initiation of Fast and Furious............................................................................................. 23

3. The DEA Wiretap .............................................................................................................. 34

4. Early Concerns Expressed ................................................................................................. 41

5. Formalization of Strategy and ICE Involvement............................................................... 45

6. OCDETF Approval and ATF Wiretap............................................................................... 53

7. U.S. Attorney’s Office Responsibility............................................................................... 55

8. Headquarters Concerns and Exit Strategy Discussed ........................................................ 56

9. Additional FBI Connection to Fast and Furious................................................................ 76

10. Operation Wide Receiver............................................................................................... 81

11. Fast and Furious Exit Strategy and Impact .................................................................... 87

12. Continuation of Fast and Furious................................................................................... 90

A. Federal Firearms Licensees......................................................................................... 90

B. The Operation Continues............................................................................................ 96

C. Manuel Celis Acosta Detained.................................................................................. 100

D. Additional Concerns ................................................................................................. 106

13. Delay of Indictment...................................................................................................... 114

14. High Profile Casualties of Fast and Furious................................................................. 127

A. The Death of Mario Gonzalez........................................................................................ 127

B. The Death of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry.............................................................. 128
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15. The End of Operation Fast and Furious....................................................................... 136

V. Assessing Culpability............................................................................................................. 140

1. Special Agent in Charge of the Phoenix Field Division William Newell ....................... 140

A. Earlier Operations..................................................................................................... 140

B. Cartel-Based Strategy ............................................................................................... 146

C. Initiation of Operation Fast and Furious................................................................... 149

D. Strategy and Execution of Fast and Furious............................................................. 150

E. Death of Agent Terry................................................................................................ 157

2. Deputy Assistant Director for Field Operations William McMahon............................... 161

A. Position and Role ...................................................................................................... 161

B. Progression of Fast and Furious................................................................................ 165

C. Wiretap Authorization .............................................................................................. 167

D. Delay in Requesting Exit Strategy and Subsequent Delays in Indictment ............... 176

E. Allegations of Gunwalking....................................................................................... 178

F. Congressional Inquiry............................................................................................... 181

3. Assistant Director for Field Operations Mark Chait........................................................ 182

A. Position and Role ...................................................................................................... 182

B. Briefed Weekly ......................................................................................................... 183

C. Exit Strategy and Similar Operations ....................................................................... 185

D. Failure to Act ............................................................................................................ 187

E. New ATF Strategy .................................................................................................... 188

4. Deputy Director William Hoover .................................................................................... 189

A. Early Concerns Raised.............................................................................................. 189

B. Asking the Right Questions About Fast and Furious ............................................... 191

C. Decision to Pursue a Larger Case ............................................................................. 195

D. Delay in Takedown................................................................................................... 196

5. Acting Director Kenneth E. Melson ................................................................................ 200

A. Background and Mission .......................................................................................... 200

B. Melson and DOJ Learn of Operation Fast and Furious............................................ 201
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C. Concerns About Guns Flowing South and a Desire to Shut Down the Case ........... 203

D. Whistleblowers and Congressional Inquiry.............................................................. 205

E. Discovering the Truth ............................................................................................... 207

VI. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 210

Appendix I: Exhibits 

Appendix II: Correspondence

Appendix III: The Whole Truth about the Fast and Furious Scandal – Fortune’s “Investigation” 

Exposed
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Preface

This report is the first of three completing the investigative work of the House Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. This report 

chronicles the fundamentally flawed firearms trafficking case from the perspective of the United 

States Attorney’s Office and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Part 

two will look at the devastating failure of supervision and leadership by officials at Justice 

Department headquarters, principally within the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, and 

within the Criminal Division. Part three will address the unprecedented obstruction of the 

investigation by the highest levels of the Justice Department, including the Attorney General 

himself. Part two will be released shortly, and part three can only be prepared after the Justice 

Department fulfills its obligations to cooperate with the Congress and produce documents. Soon, 

the U.S. House of Representatives will commence legal proceedings to enforce its prerogatives 

following the June 27, 2012, vote holding Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. in criminal and 

civil contempt.
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I. Executive Summary

A new policy revives an old tactic.

During the summer of 2009, the Obama Administration created a new strategy to stem 

the flow of illegal weapons from the United States to Mexican drug cartels. Operation Fast and 

Furious was born from this strategy. The Administration’s plan shifted the emphasis in

combating Mexican drug cartels from “merely seizing firearms” to identifying the networks that 

traffic them.

Since 2006, William Newell, the Special Agent in Charge of the Phoenix Field Division 

for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), had already been 

experimenting with various new tactics. However, his efforts met with only mixed success. The 

U.S. Attorney’s Office declined to prosecute one case because of the number of weapons ATF 

allowed to “walk” during the investigation. Yet the Justice Department under the new 

Administration began efforts in 2009 to resurrect and prosecute this case. The Department sent a 

prosecutor to Phoenix to revive this dormant case at the exact same time ATF began Fast and 

Furious. There had also been criticism of ATF’s primary focus on gun dealer inspections and 

straw purchaser investigations rather than reaching into the higher levels of trafficking rings. 

These factors, along with the new Administration’s change in policy, may have emboldened 

Newell. In Operation Fast and Furious, he saw an opportunity to run a large scale operation 

intended to bring down an entire gun trafficking network—now with the support of the upper 

echelons of the Justice Department in Washington, D.C. 

As part of its new strategy, the Justice Department authorized the opening of an 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (“OCDETF”) Strike Force office in Phoenix. 

This office would allow ATF to coordinate with other law enforcement agencies in 

implementing the Department’s new strategy. ATF Phoenix Group VII, dedicated to firearms 

trafficking investigations, was housed at the Strike Force office. The Group Supervisor, David 

Voth, was a first-time supervisor who had recently moved to Phoenix from Minnesota.

Gun dealers become unwitting partners with ATF in walking guns.

In the fall of 2009, the Phoenix Field Division opened an investigation into a suspected 

firearms straw purchasing ring. As part of the investigation, ATF relied heavily on support from 

cooperating Federal Firearms Licensees (“FFLs”). Sometimes, these gun dealers would inform 

ATF when suspected straw purchasers entered their stores to acquire weapons. On other 

occasions, ATF would alert the FFLs in advance that straw purchasers were heading to their 

stores and requested that the FFLs stock up on certain models of firearms.

These FFLs became increasingly worried about selling firearms to obvious straw 

purchasers. ATF Group Supervisor Voth assuaged their fears by arranging meetings with the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office and promising them that ATF was closely monitoring and ultimately 
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interdicting the purchased weapons. Since the FFLs depended on ATF’s regulatory arm for their 

livelihood, they agreed to make these sales.

In reality, ATF agents in Phoenix had no intention of interdicting these firearms, even 

though Group VII agents often received contemporaneous, or even advance, notice of illegal 

firearms purchases. In some cases this was because ATF believed due to instruction from the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office that sufficient legal grounds didn’t exist. In other cases it was because 

ATF refused to “compromise the bigger case” by taking any steps that might allow the straw 

purchasers to become aware ATF was watching them—even if that meant the straw purchasers 

were allowed to transfer the guns to traffickers. Group VII abandoned the traditional law 

enforcement techniques of disruption and deterrence by failing to confront or question the vast 

majority of the straw purchasers in Fast and Furious, preferring instead to watch and wait. 

Agents would often follow the firearms to a parking lot or stash house where they would be 

transferred into another vehicle or simply deposited for later pickup. Group VII continued 

merely monitoring the illegal activity even after it believed it could arrest the most prolific straw 

purchasers.

ATF used flawed legal advice from the U.S. Attorney’s Office as an excuse to allow the 

transfer of weapons to take place. ATF could argue that its hands were tied by prosecutors, who 

would not let it seize weapons from straw purchasers early on in the case. Moreover, both ATF 

and the U.S. Attorney’s Office wanted to focus on identifying the entire trafficking network 

rather than arresting straw purchasers. ATF stockpiled all of the intelligence it obtained by 

watching both the straw purchases as well as through the eventual recovery of guns in Mexico, 

hoping to establish a direct link between the drug cartels and the straw purchasers. Group 

Supervisor Voth directed the agents in Group VII to try to link weapons recoveries in Mexico to 

a cartel or drug trafficking organization. Special Agent in Charge Newell quickly forwarded

information about such recoveries to ATF headquarters, where ATF senior officials became fully 

informed of the early “successes” of the operation.

The “big case” strategy leads to big problems with coordination and information sharing.

In February 2010, just a few months after ATF discovered the straw purchasing ring that 

this investigation centered on, the operation received a coveted OCDETF Strike Force 

designation from the Justice Department and officially became Operation Fast and Furious. This 

meant it would be multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency, and prosecutor-led, allowing for greater 

cooperation among law enforcement agencies. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) became heavily involved in the operation. 

ATF believed early in the case that the head of the straw purchasing ring was an 

individual named Manuel Celis-Acosta. As part of identifying the entire trafficking network 

being supplied by the straw purchasing ring, the Strike Force sought to identify the individuals to 

whom Celis-Acosta was providing weapons. ATF was hoping to use federal wire intercepts, a 

tool rarely used in firearms trafficking investigations, to accomplish this goal. The DEA, 

however, already knew who these individuals were. The DEA had acquired their names and 
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monitored their interactions with Celis-Acosta by using an Arizona state wire intercept in a 

separate investigation. The DEA began a separate joint investigation with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (“FBI”) into these individuals, and provided all of their information to the ATF. 

Despite the inter-agency cooperation, however, ATF failed to understand the connection to these 

individuals until a year later. Meanwhile, Fast and Furious suspects continued to acquire 

weapons under ATF surveillance at an alarming rate.

In the spring of 2010, concern was mounting among ATF leadership in Washington about 

the large volume of weapons being sold under Fast and Furious. The case became so large that 

the ATF Deputy Director, William Hoover, requested an exit strategy for the case—something 

he had never done before. Despite Hoover’s request, the drafting of the exit strategy was 

delayed for more than a month.

In May 2010, Group VII agents caught a break. Manuel Celis-Acosta was stopped 

attempting to cross the border from Lukeville, Arizona into Mexico, and law enforcement agents 

found ammunition in the vehicle. Fast and Furious case agents were summoned to the scene. 

During the subsequent interrogation, Celis-Acosta promised to call the lead case agent later and 

cooperate. The case agent allowed Celis-Acosta to continue his trip to Mexico. He never called.

During the summer of 2010, Strike Force agents continued observing known straw 

purchasers illegally acquiring weapons, only to then terminate surveillance. By the fall and 

winter of 2010, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona continued to drag its feet 

on an indictment of the straw purchasers, even though prosecutors had likely acquired enough 

evidence to get an indictment months earlier.

A tragic death ends the case as the search for answers and accountability begins.

Fast and Furious finally came to a close in January 2011, one month after guns from Fast 

and Furious were found at the scene of the fatal shooting of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian 

Terry. Many people up and down the chain of command in ATF share the blame for the case’s

tragic failures.

Bill Newell was a major promoter of the strategy in Fast and Furious. Though he had 

been the Special Agent in Charge in Phoenix for several years, he somehow failed to understand 

the basic legal standards needed for interdicting firearms and questioning potential suspects. 

According to testimony of the other ATF agents, Bill Newell did not have significant experience 

as a case agent or working street operations. His inexperience at the field agent level may have 

been a contributing factor to his ignorance of legal thresholds. Instructing his agents to abide by 

incorrect standards was a costly mistake that prevented interrogation, disruption, and possible 

arrest of straw purchasers.

In the ATF organizational hierarchy, Newell reported to Deputy Assistant Director 

(“DAD”) William McMahon, whose supervisory responsibilities included the field offices along 

the Southwestern border. McMahon served as the main link between the Phoenix Field Division 
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and ATF Headquarters, and therefore should have played an important role in relaying 

information both up and down the chain of command. McMahon knew that no operational 

safeguards were in place to prevent the firearms from traveling to Mexico. However, he did not 

make any effort to stop the flow of guns, believing that it was not his job to interfere in Bill 

Newell’s investigations.

Assistant Director Mark Chait and his superior, Deputy Director Hoover, had several 

opportunities to put an end to the operation but failed to do so. Hoover knew that Newell had 

employed risky tactics in the past as SAC yet failed to monitor him closely. Either Hoover did 

not ask the right questions or simply turned a blind eye to the unavoidable reality that reckless 

gunwalking tactics were being used again in Fast and Furious.

Though he had a distinguished background, knew little of the operational details of Fast 

and Furious, and was committed to full cooperation with Congress, ultimately Acting Director 

Kenneth Melson, as head of ATF, still bears a significant measure of responsibility for failing to 

ensure that ATF headquarters personnel adequately supervised the Phoenix Field Division.

Extensive evidence informs this review despite hurdles and stonewalling.

This report presents an extensive, detailed narrative to aid in assessing the culpability of 

each of the aforementioned individuals. This narrative is based on transcribed interviews with 

24 individuals, some covering multiple days; informal interviews with more than 50 individuals; 

and the review of more than 10,000 pages of documents, 6,989 of them produced by the Justice 

Department pursuant to subpoena.

It must be noted, however, that the Committees’ access to information has been 

incomplete. The Justice Department has withheld tens of thousands of pages of documents and 

denied access to numerous witnesses, including ATF Case Agent Hope MacAllister, ATF CoCase Agent Tonya English, and AUSA Emory Hurley—the central individuals running the case. 

As of January 2012, the Justice Department had produced 80,000 pages to its Office of the 

Inspector General (“OIG”), which also has virtually unfettered access to Department employees, 

and interviewed them on multiple occasions. In fact, of the small number of documents the 

Justice Department produced to the Committees, a substantial portion were heavily redacted, and 

many pages related to investigations other than Fast and Furious, including approximately 1,200 

pages on other operations. Accordingly, the reasonable inferences drawn from the available 

evidence in this report could be viewed differently if critical information has been concealed in 

the documents and testimony withheld from Congress. Nevertheless, this report—the first in a 

series of three—presents the best information available as of now.
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II. Table of Names

Brian Terry

U.S. Border Patrol Agent

Brian Terry was an agent with the U.S. Border Patrol’s Tactical Unit, known as BORTAC. He 

served his country as a United States Marine and was a Border Patrol agent for three years. On 

December 14, 2010, during a routine patrol, Terry was confronted by armed bandits. He was 

shot once and killed. Two weapons found at the scene traced back to Operation Fast and 

Furious.

ATF Phoenix Field Division

William Newell

Special Agent in Charge, ATF Phoenix Field Division

As Special Agent in Charge, William Newell had a history of using reckless gunwalking tactics 

during his investigations. Newell still believes that he did nothing wrong in Fast and Furious, 

other than failing to conduct “risk assessments” to measure the possibility of harm to public 

safety.

George Gillett

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, ATF Phoenix Field Division

George Gillett was the Assistant Special Agent in Charge supervising Fast and Furious at the 

inception of the case. He was out of the office from mid-April 2010 until the beginning of June

2010.

James Needles

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, ATF Phoenix Field Division

James Needles was the Assistant Special Agent in Charge supervising Fast and Furious from 

mid-way through Fast and Furious until its conclusion.

David Voth

Phoenix Group VII Supervisor

David Voth was the former supervisor of the Phoenix Group VII, which conducted Operation 

Fast and Furious. As Group VII Supervisor, Voth controlled many operational aspects of Fast 

and Furious. Voth is no longer in Phoenix. He is now assigned to ATF headquarters.
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Hope MacAllister

Special Agent, ATF Phoenix Field Division

Hope MacAllister was the lead case agent for Fast and Furious.

John Dodson

Special Agent, ATF Phoenix Field Division

John Dodson is the original whistleblower who exposed Operation Fast and Furious. A sevenyear veteran of ATF, Dodson also worked in the sheriff’s offices in Loudoun County and other 

Virginia municipalities for 12 years. Agent Dodson was removed from Phoenix Group VII in 

the summer of 2010 for complaining to ATF supervisors about the dangerous tactics used in 

Operation Fast and Furious.

Gary Styers

Special Agent, ATF Dallas Field Division

Gary Styers was temporarily assigned to Phoenix Group VII and worked on Fast and Furious. 

On February 3, 2011, he wrote a memo documenting dissension among Group VII agents and his 

personal knowledge of agents being ordered off of surveillance resulting in illegally purchased 

guns being transferred rather than interdicted. Styers’ memo was shared with ATF leadership 

and officials at the Justice Department.

ATF Headquarters

Kenneth Melson

Acting Director, ATF

Kenneth Melson was concerned about the size of Fast and Furious but never ordered it shut 

down. Melson grew frustrated with how the Department of Justice was responding to the 

congressional investigation into Fast and Furious, but Department officials instructed him not to 

discuss the case with Congress.

William Hoover

Deputy Director, ATF

Realizing that Fast and Furious had become an enormous case, William Hoover ordered an exit 

strategy for the investigation. It was never followed. Hoover was also instrumental in briefing 

Department of Justice personnel about the status of Fast and Furious, and had previously 

discussed gunwalking concerns in another case with Bill Newell.
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Mark Chait

Assistant Director for Field Operations, ATF

Mark Chait had several opportunities to put an end to the operation but failed to do so. He 

ultimately played a passive role during Fast and Furious, allowing those above him to make 

decisions and those below him to implement those decisions. Chait supervised William 

McMahon.

William McMahon

Deputy Assistant Director for Field Operations – West, ATF

William McMahon was Bill Newell’s supervisor at ATF headquarters. He received a wealth of 

information about Fast and Furious, but did not view it as his role as supervisor to ask questions 

about events in the field. He has publicly admitted to having failed in his duty to read 

information presented to him about the case. McMahon was the highest official in ATF to 

authorize the use of wire intercepts in Fast and Furious.

Steve Martin

Deputy Assistant Director, ATF Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information

Steve Martin and his team would brief ATF leadership each week about weapons seizures and 

Fast and Furious. Over time, ATF leadership ignored the concerns expressed by Martin, and his 

office eventually stopped briefing management about the case because of those concerns.

Ray Rowley

Southwest Border Coordinator, ATF

Ray Rowley was the ATF Southwest Border Coordinator who worked at ATF headquarters. In 

December 2009 he became alarmed at the size of Fast and Furious and wanted to know when the 

operation was going to be shut down. His concerns were ignored.

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona

Dennis Burke

U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona

Dennis Burke was the U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona during Fast and Furious. He 

frequently met with Bill Newell and received updates on the case. In the early stages of Fast and 

Furious, instead of arresting the straw purchasers and closing the investigation, Burke wanted to 

hold out for a bigger case. Burke resigned on August 30, 2011, as a result of the fallout from 

Operation Fast and Furious.
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Patrick Cunningham

Criminal Division Chief, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona

Patrick Cunningham was the Criminal Division Chief in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. When 

issued a subpoena to testify in front of Congress about his role in the operation, he invoked his 

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to avoid answering any questions.

Michael Morrissey

National Security Section Chief, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona

Michael Morrissey was Emory Hurley’s supervisor at the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Morrissey 

reported to Patrick Cunningham.

Emory Hurley

Assistant United States Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona

Emory Hurley was the lead federal prosecutor in Fast and Furious. ATF supervisors allowed 

Hurley to dictate when ATF agents were allowed to interdict weapons during the case. Hurley 

delayed the indictments in Fast and Furious for months, frustrating ATF officials.

Fast and Furious Suspects

Manuel Celis-Acosta

Leader of Fast and Furious Straw Purchasing Ring

Manuel Celis-Acosta was the leader of the straw purchasing ring Operation Fast and Furious was 

targeting. As the leader of the ring, Celis-Acosta acquired over 2,000 firearms at a cost of over 

$1 million. Celis-Acosta provided at least some of these firearms to two associates of the 

Sinaloa Cartel. Celis-Acosta was arrested on April 2, 2010, and October 9, 2010. He was also 

detained in Lukeville, Arizona on May 29, 2010, crossing the border into Mexico with 

ammunition and an illegal alien. However, he was never charged on any of the three occasions 

and was released each time. Not until January 19, 2011, was Celis-Acosta finally indicted on 42 

counts of conspiracy and straw purchasing.

Jaime Avila

Straw Purchaser

Jaime Avila was the straw purchaser who bought the two AK-47 variant weapons that were 

found at the murder scene of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry. Avila bought the weapons 

on January 16, 2010. ATF, however, began conducting surveillance of Avila as early as 

November 25, 2009. Avila was arrested the night of December 15, 2010, as soon as ATF agents 

realized the guns found at the scene of Terry’s death had been purchased by Avila. On January 

19, 2011, Avila was indicted on three counts of “lying and buying” for weapons purchased in 

January, April, and June 2010.
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Jacob Chambers

Straw Purchaser

Jacob Chambers was one of the earliest individuals identified in the straw purchasing ring. Fast 

and Furious was originally known as the “Jacob Chambers” case. Chambers had been arrested in 

2008 for felony burglary and trafficking stolen property, yet no criminal complaint was issued 

until December 17, 2009. On January 19, 2011, Chambers was indicted on 4 counts of 

conspiracy, dealing in firearms without a license, and “lying and buying.”

Uriel Patino

Straw Purchaser

Uriel Patino was the most prolific straw buyer in the Fast and Furious straw purchasing ring, 

purchasing over 700 weapons. On January 19, 2011, Patino was indicted on 22 counts of 

conspiracy, “lying and buying” and aiding and abetting.

Department of Justice

Lanny Breuer

Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division

As head of the Criminal Division, Lanny Breuer’s office decided to resurrect Operation Wide 

Receiver although guns were allowed to walk in that case. Breuer dedicated staff resources to 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona to help in Operation Fast and Furious. His 

staff also authorized at least six wiretap applications on his behalf.
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III. Findings

The Committees’ 18-month investigation into Operation Fast and Furious has included 

four Full Committee hearings, 24 transcribed interviews, two prior interim staff reports, 

approximately 74 letters sent to the Justice Department, ATF, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the 

Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigrations and 

Customs Enforcement, the White House, and other parties, several briefings, telephone 

conversations with confidential witnesses, and review of thousands of documents received from 

the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and other sources, including 

whistleblowers. Importantly, while the Department of Justice has provided many more 

documents to its internal Inspector General’s (IG) office, the Committees are in receipt of 

materials received confidentially which the IG may not have received. 

These findings are based on the information learned by the Committees.

 A new policy: The Deputy Attorney General’s 2009 draft “Strategy for Combating the 

Mexican Cartels” guided the ATF Phoenix Field Division’s strategy in Operation Fast 

and Furious.

 A new investigation: In the fall of 2009, ATF opened an investigation into a group of 

straw buyers. ATF began receiving contemporaneous notice from cooperating FFLs of 

the straw buyers’ firearms purchases. The pace of the straw purchases quickly escalated 

as the straw buyers bought hundreds of firearms in a short period of time. Many of these 

firearms turned up in Mexico shortly thereafter.

 A missed hand-off: DEA believed there was probable cause to arrest Manuel CelisAcosta for gun crimes based on evidence it had collected from its state wire intercept in a 

December 2009 drug case. DEA does not have jurisdiction over gun crimes. Though 

DEA shared all of its evidence with ATF, ATF “dropped the ball” by failing to review or 

act on any of it.

 Concerns dismissed: Both cooperating FFLs and some ATF officials expressed 

concerns about the growth of Fast and Furious as early as December 2009. Senior ATF 

officials, however, refused to heed these concerns as they allowed the straw purchasers to 

continue to arm the Sinaloa Cartel. ATF reassured cooperating FFLs and encouraged 

them to continue selling.

 Going for the “big fish”: When faced with an opportunity to end Fast and Furious in its 

early stages, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona and ATF deliberately 

decided to hold out for a bigger case. At this point, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement became heavily involved, assigning a dedicated co-case agent to the 

operation.
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 A costly mistake: Fast and Furious became an OCDETF multi-agency task force case, 

giving it additional clout and funding. Yet ATF was struggling to find out for whom the 

straw purchasing ring was acquiring weapons. The FBI began identifying two of these 

individuals as early as January 2010 in conjunction with DEA, but did not directly 

coordinate with ATF. ATF obtained at least seven wire intercepts while attempting to 

identify the same targets FBI and DEA had already identified. Wiretaps are incredibly 

expensive, resource-intensive, and rare for a firearms trafficking case. Senior Justice 

Department officials authorized submitting these applications to the court for wire 

intercepts.

 A blank page: The full extent of the responsibility of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 

District of Arizona in directing Operation Fast and Furious has yet to be discovered 

because the Department of Justice has stonewalled the congressional investigation.

 Red flags ignored: Senior ATF officials became concerned about the number of 

weapons purchased under Fast and Furious and requested an exit strategy for closing

down the case. The drafting of the exit strategy was severely delayed, and the strategy 

itself was ultimately ignored.

 Mistakes compounded: In the spring of 2010, FBI and DEA positively identified the 

two individuals for whom the straw purchasing ring had acquired weapons. However, 

FBI and ATF missed another opportunity to share information and coordinate their 

cases. Later, the FBI targets—drug kingpins with a long history of violence—became 

FBI informants. Questions about inadequate coordination remain unanswered, and the 

Committees will need to further pursue the role of classified matters related to Fast and 

Furious.

 An outrage concealed: In April 2010, senior Justice Department officials told ATF 

about gunwalking in Operation Wide Receiver, a case that ended in 2007. However, the 

Justice Department’s focus was on press implications instead of accountability. As a 

result, ATF’s response was that it was “nothing terrible.” The Justice Department 

prosecuted the case and ATF continued to use similar reckless tactics in Fast and Furious.

 Arrests delayed: The Fast and Furious exit strategy acknowledged that enough evidence 

existed to arrest the key straw buyers, but argued that doing so would not cripple the

organization. The straw purchasers continued to buy hundreds of additional firearms.

 Gun dealers misled and the ring-leader released: The Fast and Furious exit strategy 

was ignored as the case dragged into the summer of 2010. ATF continued to mislead 

FFLs about the interdiction of weapons, and ATF investigative agents acted recklessly by 

crossing the line into ATF’s regulatory function. Manuel Celis-Acosta was stopped and

interviewed at the border, but was still allowed to cross into Mexico.
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 Risk without reward: ATF’s wire intercepts failed to reveal anyone “up the chain” for 

whom the Fast and Furious straw buying ring was acquiring weapons. Thus, ATF only 

obtained charges against the straw purchasers, most of whom were known to ATF from 

the beginning of the case. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona was 

irresponsible and negligent in delaying the indictment of the straw purchasers for so 

long. In December 2010 the lead federal prosecutor was still contemplating novel ways 

of charging the suspects even though enough evidence had been gathered for an 

indictment at least six months earlier.

 “Ugh...things will most likely get ugly”: ATF knew that any deaths tied to Fast and 

Furious weapons would cause an immediate public outcry. ATF tried to minimize this 

fallout by limiting access to information and avoiding discussions of links between any 

deaths and firearms associated with the case.

 A pre-planned defense: Even before allegations of gunwalking were made public in the 

media, ATF officials knew that the risky gunwalking tactics in Operation Fast and 

Furious would be criticized and prepared to respond to that criticism.

 Repeatedly risky: When he became a SAC, Bill Newell consistently pushed the 

envelope of permissible investigative techniques. He had been reprimanded by William 

Hoover before for crossing the line, but under a new Administration and new Attorney 

General he reverted back to the use of risky gunwalking tactics. 

 Rubber stamp signatures and false denials: Though he served as the crucial link 

between ATF headquarters and the Phoenix Field Division, Bill McMahon admittedly

rubber stamped critical documents that came across his desk without reading them. In 

McMahon’s view, it was not his job to ask any questions about what was going on in the 

field. McMahon gave false testimony to Congress about signing applications for wiretap 

intercepts in Fast and Furious.

 A failure to supervise: Though he was a senior ATF official and got frequent updates

on Fast and Furious, Mark Chait played a surprisingly passive role during the operation. 

He failed to provide the supervisory oversight that his experience should have dictated 

and his position required.

 Danger signs ignored: Though he ordered the Fast and Furious exit strategy, William 

Hoover failed to make certain the strategy was executed. Hoover knew that Bill Newell 

had employed the use of risky gunwalking tactics in the past, but simply allowed Newell 

to continue to conduct Operation Fast and Furious. Hoover was derelict in his duty to 

ensure that public safety was not jeopardized during Operation Fast and Furious.
18

 Where the buck stops: ATF Acting Director Ken Melson was concerned that Fast and 

Furious did not end sooner. He even offered to travel to Phoenix and write the 

indictments himself. Still, he never ordered it be shut down. Once the scandal broke in 

the media, despite Melson’s desire to cooperate with Congress, Justice Department 

headquarters muzzled him.

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
19

IV. The Story of Operation Fast and Furious

1. New Strategy

FINDING: A new policy: The Deputy Attorney General’s 2009 draft “Strategy 

for Combating the Mexican Cartels” guided the ATF Phoenix Field 

Division’s strategy in Operation Fast and Furious.

The genesis of the strategy employed in Operation Fast and Furious goes back to the 

summer of 2009. On August 19, 2009, Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney General for the 

Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, sent a memorandum to the attention of the 

Attorney General that reported recommendations of the Firearms Trafficking Working Group

(“FTWG”).

1

The FTWG’s mission was to formulate a plan to improve the U.S. government’s 

efforts in stemming the illegal flow of weapons, which was fueling escalating violence along 

both sides of the Southwestern border. The working group’s first recommendation was that the 

“Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security should form an interagency Southwest 

Border (“SWB”) firearms trafficking strategy group.”2 According to the Justice Department, 

“the Deputy Attorney General responded to the specific proposals in this memorandum by 

forming the Southwest Border Strategy Group, which he chaired.”3

On October 22, 2009, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden disseminated a draft of a 

new “Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels.”

4

The Southwest Border Strategy group was 

tasked with executing this strategy. The strategy focused on targeting key cartel leaders by 

“mov[ing] past merely addressing the symptoms of our problems along the Southwest Border 

and attack[ing], instead, the underlying causes.”5 The plan also advocated fighting criminal 

organizations through the creation of intelligence-based, prosecutor-led task forces composed of 

agents from ATF, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Marshals Service, and other federal agencies.6 The official strategy 

was formally released on January 7, 2010.7

While Deputy Attorney General Ogden proposed a new intelligence-based approach, he 

did not dispense with the established law enforcement framework entirely. The new strategy still 

 

1 Memorandum for the Attorney General from Lanny A. Breuer (Aug. 19, 2009) [HOGR 6706-6717] [Exhibit 1].

2

Id.

3 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weich to Chairman Darrell E. Issa (Apr. 3, 2012). (All 

correspondence cited is contained in Appendix II).

4 Draft Department of Justice Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels (Oct. 22, 2009) [HOGR 001451-001459]

(Exhibit 2).

5

Id. at 3.

6

Id.

7 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy Implementation 

Update (2010), at 13, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-andresearch/swb_implementation10_0.pdf.
20

claimed to support the efforts of law enforcement and prosecutors in “stopping and seizing the 

flow of massive amounts of narcotics, firearms, and bulk cash from flowing across the border in 

both directions.”8 Nevertheless, the new strategy urged law enforcement to focus its resources 

on identifying networks of drug traffickers rather than interdicting weapons from individual, 

low-level straw buyers: 

[M]erely seizing firearms through interdiction will not stop firearms 

trafficking to Mexico. We must identify, investigate, and eliminate the 

sources of illegally trafficked firearms and the networks that transport 

them.9

This strategy was disseminated throughout the ATF Phoenix Field Division, with Special 

Agent in Charge (“SAC”) William Newell telling his Assistant Special Agents in Charge

(“ASACs”) to read the strategy.10 It would become the blueprint applied in Operation Fast and 

Furious, a specific firearms trafficking case. As ASAC George Gillett, who supervised Voth,

testified:

A. The content of that plan specifically addressed wanting ATF not 

to focus on straw purchasers, but to focus on cartels and larger 

complex conspiracy type investigations.

Q. How did that initiative trickle down to the agents in the Phoenix 

field office?

A. Well . . . ATF here was not able to get any straw purchase 

prosecutions at the time because of an interpretation of the law by 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office here in the District of Arizona. So this 

strategy in October 2009 handed down by the [Deputy 

Attorney General]’s office, actually from the Phoenix 

perspective, was well timed and provided us with direction on 

how to proceed in these types of firearms trafficking 

investigations.11

The new strategy came against the backdrop of ATF’s difficulty in working with the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona, which raised numerous excuses to avoid

prosecuting straw purchase cases. All firearms purchasers are required to fill out an ATF Form 

4473 (“4473”) and swear to the fact that the gun is for their own use, rather than on behalf of 

someone else. “Straw purchasing” is when a buyer lies about this fact. Federal law provides that 

 

8 Draft Department of Justice Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels (Oct. 22, 2009) [HOGR 001451-

001459], at 5 (Exhibit 2).

9

Id. at 7.

10 E-mail from William Newell to George Gillett, Nancy Cook, and James Needles (Oct. 27, 2009) (Exhibit 3).

11 Transcript, Interview of George Gillett by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (May 17, 2011), at 12-13 [hereinafter Gillett Transcript] (Exhibit 4).
21

whoever “knowingly makes any false statement or representation with respect to the information 

required . . . to be kept in the records”12 of an FFL can be fined $250,000, imprisoned up to five 

years, or both.13 Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) makes it unlawful “for any person in 

connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition of any firearm . . . knowingly to make 

any false or fictitious oral or written statement . . . intended or likely to deceive [an FFL] with 

respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale . . . .”14 It is punishable by up to ten 

years, a fine of $250,000, or both.15 The prison term accompanying the violation of either 18 

U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A) or 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) may in some instances be stacked for each time a 

straw purchaser lied.

ATF’s Phoenix Field Division allegedly faced two primary hurdles in making straw 

purchase cases. First was the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office requirement that ATF have 

possession of the gun even though it had often already been trafficked to Mexico. Second was 

that some believed ATF had to show the straw purchaser transferred the gun directly to someone 

who wasn’t legally allowed to possess it. Neither of these hurdles, however, are actually 

imposed by the law.

First, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona believed that in order to 

prosecute a straw purchasing case, ATF had to have possession of the straw purchased firearm as 

the corpus delecti (“body of the crime”)—even if the whole reason for the prosecution was that 

the gun had been trafficked to Mexico following a straw purchase. This analysis arose from an 

erroneous reading of a case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, of which the 

District of Arizona is a part, which merely held that when the government relies on a defendant’s 

confession to meet its burden of proof, it must also introduce sufficient independent evidence 

that the criminal conduct at the core of the offense has occurred and that the confession is 

trustworthy.16 ATF Counsel Thomas Karmgard sent a memo to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for 

the District of Arizona in February 2010 pointing out that such independent evidence need not 

include the gun itself, and that the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office was imposing unnecessary

requirements on gun trafficking cases.

17

 In response to questions from Congress about the 

corpus delecti issue, the Justice Department stated that based on an informal survey of Arizona

U.S. Attorney’s Office cases between January 1, 2010, and July 11, 2011, only three of the 

hundreds of cases presented were subsequently declined due to concerns about possession of the 

trafficked firearm.

18

Second, due to an apparent misreading of case law, some officials in Arizona believed 

that in order to bring a straw purchase prosecution for lying under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), the 

 

12 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(a) (2006).

13 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) (2006).

14 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (2006).

15 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2006).

16 See United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1992).

17 See Memorandum from ATF Phoenix Field Division Counsel Thomas Karmgard to U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 

District of Arizona (Feb. 24, 2010) (Exhibit 5).

18 Department of Justice Responses of Jul. 22, 2011, Questions for the Record from S. Comm. on the Judiciary 

Hearing, Oversight of the Department of Justice, 112th Congress (May 4, 2011), at 8.
22

straw purchaser had to be buying for a prohibited possessor rather than for someone who also has 

a clean record and could have legally purchased the firearms directly.

19

 However, the statute 

simply says that the false statement has to be intended or likely to deceive an FFL with respect to 

any fact “material to the lawfulness of the sale.” In Fast and Furious, the straw buyers were 

being paid to lie on the form by individuals intent on trafficking the gun to Mexico. Thus, the 

lies by the straw buyers were clearly material. They were part of a scheme to thwart the purpose 

of the federal regulation of firearms dealers. Regardless, another portion of the law, 18 U.S.C. § 

924(a)(1)(A), makes it a crime to simply lie on the 4473.20 This portion imposes no materiality 

requirement, and the Ninth Circuit has recently rejected any attempt to read one in to the 

statute.

21

 Although this section of the law has a lower penalty, the U.S. Attorney’s Office could 

use it to prosecute straw purchasers.

22 The Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office ultimately charged 

the defendants in Fast and Furious with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A).

23

Nevertheless, these two issues had historically resulted in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 

Arizona giving little attention to prosecuting straw purchase cases. Yet, rather than focusing on 

disruption and deterrence of straw purchases that ATF could accomplish without the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office, ATF’s Phoenix Field Division viewed the Deputy Attorney General’s draft

strategy as representing approval from the highest levels of the Department of Justice to allow 

known straw buyers to continue to acquire weapons without attempting to disrupt the trafficking

network and interdicting the guns. In doing this, ATF hoped to be able to identify, as outlined in 

the draft Justice Department “Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels,” the network of 

traffickers who transported weapons across the border and sold them to drug cartels.

This new strategy was similar to an approach that had been tried in ATF’s Phoenix Field 

Division before under SAC Newell. From the summer of 2006, around the time that Newell 

became the SAC of the Phoenix Field Division, until mid-2007, a case called Operation Wide 

Receiver allowed known straw purchasers to acquire guns for transport to Mexico. In Wide 

Receiver, ATF was working with a cooperating FFL who provided contemporaneous notice of 

purchases by the suspected straw purchasers, yet still failed to interdict the guns. When ATF 

subsequently wrapped up the case and prepared for indictments, the Assistant U.S. Attorneys 

responsible for the case became aware that ATF had not been forthcoming with them about the 

level of cooperation with the FFL in the case.24 The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of 

Arizona refused to prosecute the case. As one prosecutor concluded: “I don’t like the case. I 

 

19 United States v. Moore, 109 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 836; Arizona v. lknadosian, Case 

No. CR2008-006471-001 DT (Sup. Ct. Az., Maricopa Cty., Mar. 18, 2009).

20 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(a) (2006).

21 United States v. Johnson , 680 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[U]nder the ordinary rules of statutory 

construction, we presume that Congress acted intentionally when it chose to include the word ‘material’ in § 

922(a)(6) but to omit it from § 924(a)(1)(A), which is part of the same Act. We should give meaning to that 

difference in congressional intent.”)

22 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) (2006).

23 Indictment, United States v. Avila, United States District Court, District of Arizona, Case No. 2:11-cr-00126-JAT 

(Jan. 19, 2011) (Exhibit 6).

24 E-mail from [FFL4] to Laura Gwinn (Sep. 22, 2011) [HOGR 006278] (Exhibit 7).
23

think it is wrong for us to allow 100s of guns to go into Mexico to drug people knowing that is 

where they are going.”25

Later, under the Obama Administration, the Justice Department’s Criminal Division in 

Washington, D.C., reached out to U.S. Attorney’s offices along the southwest border in the 

summer of 2009 with an offer to assist with gun trafficking cases as “part of the Department’s 

SWB gun trafficking strategy. . . .”26 When ATF’s Phoenix Field Division carried out the search 

for “lingering prosecutions,” it identified Operation Wide Receiver, although it also noted 

internally, “AUSA was also pushing back w/ moral dilemma w/ the G allowing the targets to 

traffic 300+ firearms to Mexico.”27 The case was subsequently proposed to the Justice 

Department, which sent a prosecutor to Arizona to review the case.28 Although the prosecutor 

quickly realized that “a lot of those guns ‘walked,’”29 the Justice Department nevertheless 

accepted the case on September 30, 2009.30 SAC Newell and ASAC Gillett e-mailed each other 

about a Justice Department official wanting, “to see if they [the Justice Department] were 

missing something” because the Justice Department believed the case was straightforward and 

did not understand why it hadn’t been prosecuted.31 Thus, the Justice Department’s acceptance 

of the case may have been interpreted by ATF’s Phoenix Field Division as a signal that using 

such tactics was no longer an obstacle to getting the cases prosecuted in the future. 

2. Initiation of Fast and Furious

FINDING: A new investigation: In the fall of 2009, ATF opened an investigation 

into a group of straw buyers. ATF began receiving contemporaneous 

notice from cooperating FFLs of the straw buyers’ firearms 

purchases. The pace of the straw purchases quickly escalated as the 

straw buyers bought hundreds of firearms in a short period of time. 

Many of these firearms turned up in Mexico shortly thereafter.

On October 31, 2009, the newly formed Group VII in the ATF Phoenix Field Division 

opened an investigation into five suspected straw purchasers.32 The case, named after suspected 

straw purchaser Jacob Chambers, would eventually be renamed Operation Fast and Furious. 

Another suspected straw purchaser was Uriel Patino. Patino drew ATF investigative attention in 

November 2009 because cooperating Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs) had advised ATF that 

 

25 E-mail from [Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona] to [Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona] (Dec. 

19, 2008) [HOGR 005430] (Exhibit 8).

26 E-mail from [Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys] to [Southwest Border U.S. Attorney’s Offices] (Jul. 22, 2009) 

[HOGR 003369-003370] (Exhibit 9).

27 E-mail from James Small to George Gillett (Aug. 3, 2009) [HOGR 005432] (Exhibit 10).

28 E-mail from [Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys] to James Trusty (Aug. 12, 2009) [HOGR 003371] (Exhibit 11).

29 E-mail from Laura Gwinn to James Trusty (Sep. 3, 2009) [HOGR 003377] (Exhibit 12).

30 E-mail from Kevin Carwile to William Newell (Sep. 30, 2009) [HOGR 003389] (Exhibit 13).

31 E-mail from George Gillett to William Newell (Sep. 26, 2009) [HOGR 005441] (Exhibit 14).

32 CHAMBERS Trafficking Case IN#785115-10-[redacted] (Dec. 2, 2009) (Exhibit 15).
24

he had purchased numerous AK-47 rifles and pistols within a relatively short amount of time.

33

FFLs provided ATF with Patino’s purchase history as documented in “Firearms Transaction 

Records” (4473s).34 

Group Supervisor Voth arrived in Phoenix in early December 2009. By that time, the 

investigation was already underway. When he was first informed a month prior to that of the 

facts surrounding Patino’s early firearms purchases, Voth sent the following e-mail to the case 

agent, Hope MacAllister, on November 9, 2009:

35

As agents from the Phoenix Field Division began conducting surveillance on Patino, they 

quickly identified associates of Patino who appeared to be part of a straw-buying ring. By 

November 16, 2009, the Phoenix Field Division had identified seven such associates of this 

ring.

36

 At the same time, several cooperating FFLs began faxing 4473s detailing these suspected 

straw purchasers’ gun purchases. These FFLs would also call ATF when one of the ATF targets 

 

33 Operation Fast and Furious, OCDETF Proposal Narrative (Jan. 26, 2010) (Exhibit 16).

34 CHAMBERS Trafficking Case IN#785115-10-[redacted], “INVESTIGATIVE STEPS 

TAKEN/INVESTIGATIVE PLAN” (Dec. 2, 2009), at 2 (Exhibit 15).

35 E-mail from David Voth to Hope MacAllister (Nov. 9, 2009) (Exhibit 17).

36 Supplemental Statement of William Newell (Sept. 21, 2011), H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Hearing, 

Operation Fast and Furious: The Other Side of the Border, 112th Cong. (Jul. 26, 2011), at 2 (Exhibit 18).

“I am not even 

in the State of 

Arizona yet but 

this one screams 

actions . . . !”
25

was in their respective stores.

37

 The FFLs usually faxed the 4473s to ATF within a couple of 

days; often, the faxes arrived immediately after the purchases.

38

Although not legally required to send in these forms, some FFLs continued this 

arrangement throughout the duration of Fast and Furious. The 4473s included serial numbers of 

all purchased firearms, and ATF added these serial numbers into its Suspect Gun Database. The

advantage of the Suspect Gun Database to ATF is that when firearms are recovered, ATF can 

instantly compare the serial numbers against those in the Suspect Gun Database. This process 

saves ATF the effort of having to go through the full manual tracing process, which can take 

weeks. The contemporaneous notice from FFLs of alleged straw purchases allowed ATF to stay 

current on the activity of its suspects.

ATF kept the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona closely informed of its 

investigative work in Fast and Furious from the very beginning. On November 20, 2009, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) Emory Hurley reported up his chain of command: “ATF S/A 

Hope MacAllister is working on a trafficking case involving multiple straw purchasers (“hub and 

spokes conspiracy”). This case is just starting out and she will be looking for GJ subps. and pen 

& trap orders next.”39

That same day, November 20, 2009, marked the first known recovery of weapons 

purchased by Fast and Furious straw purchasers. ATF and U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (“ICE”) agents recovered 42 weapons in Naco, Sonora, Mexico. Although trace 

results from the seizure were not officially completed until November 30, 2009,40 ATF had 

entered some of the recovered weapons into the Suspect Gun Database two weeks before the 

seizure, since suspected Fast and Furious straw purchasers had bought them.

41

 This allowed 

ATF agents to learn almost immediately that the weapons seized in Naco were connected to the 

Chambers straw-purchasing ring. 

On November 24, 2009, SAC Newell informed Dennis Burke, the U.S. Attorney for the 

District of Arizona, of the large weapons recovery in Mexico a few days earlier.

42

 Burke 

responded, “Wow, frickin-A. They were already across the Border heading south?”43 That 

morning Newell also e-mailed William McMahon, Deputy Assistant Director for Field 

Operations, and Steve Martin, Assistant Director for Strategic Information and Intelligence:

 

37 See, for example, e-mail from [FFL2] to David Voth (Jun. 11, 2010) (Exhibit 19).

38 Id.

39 E-mail from Emory Hurley to Michael Morrissey (Nov. 20, 2009) [HOGR 002954] (Exhibit 20).

40 ATF Firearms Trace Summary (Nov. 30, 2009) (Exhibit 21).

41 ATF Suspect Gun Summary, Uriel Patino (entered Nov. 13, 2009) (Exhibit 22).

42 E-mail from William Newell to Dennis Burke (Nov. 24, 2009) [HOGR 002344] (Exhibit 23).

43 E-mail from Dennis Burke to William Newell (Nov. 24, 2009) [HOGR 002344] (Exhibit 23).
26

Friday’s Agua Prieta, Sonora (across from Douglas, AZ) gun seizure. 45 

semi-auto rifles, mags, ammo, etc. Woman and juvenile from Florida. 

Mexican Customs dog alerted. Curious to see if it was one of our dogs.44

Following up on his e-mail to McMahon and Martin, Newell e-mailed ASAC George Gillett: “I 

know you’re off but I don’t want to cut you out of the loop on this since this seizure has the 

potential of being a ‘hot’ issue in many ways.”45

The Fast and Furious case management log is the Phoenix Field Division’s internal 

summary of all significant actions in the case. According to the log, Newell reviewed the Fast 

and Furious case file the same day he was informing others of the Naco recovery.

46

That same day Uriel Patino and Jacob Chambers showed up at the store of a cooperating 

gun dealer with an associate of theirs name Jaime Avila. After this FFL called ATF to alert them 

to the presence of the three individuals, agents rushed to the scene but arrived after the suspects 

had left. Nonetheless, the management log shows that ATF immediately obtained the 4473s 

from their purchases.47

Had ATF agents decided to utilize the traditional law enforcement method of a “knock-and-talk,” 

going to the home of Avila to inquire about the firearms he’d just purchased, they would have 

discovered that the address on his 4473 was false, an offense for which he could be arrested. In 

fact, Avila hadn’t lived at the address for 1-2 years at that point, a fact he would admit a year 

later in his post-arrest interview.

48

The next day, Newell e-mailed U.S. Attorney Burke and AUSA Emory Hurley:49

 

44 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon and Steve Martin (Nov. 24, 2009) [HOGR 002023] (Exhibit 

24).

45 E-mail from William Newell to George Gillett (Nov. 24, 2009) [HOGR 002023] (Exhibit 24).

46 ATF Management Log, Case 785115-10-[redacted] (Nov. 24, 2009) (Exhibit 25).

47 Id.

48 See Memorandum from Emory Hurley to Dennis K. Burke, “Jaime Avila, Jr.” (Jan. 28, 2011), at 2-3 [HOGR 

002348-002351] (Exhibit 26).

49 E-mail from William Newell to Dennis Burke and Emory Hurley (Nov. 25, 2009) [HOGR 002957] (Exhibit 27).
27

Later that afternoon, Burke e-mailed Hurley about the case, asking, “Thoughts?”50 Hurley’s 

response was an early indication of the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s desire to turn Fast and Furious 

into a big case by avoiding any interaction with the straw purchasers that might deter them from 

continuing to illegally acquire weapons. Hurley wrote:

I spoke with the ATF case agent this am and suggested calling ICE SA 

Hamel (at the meeting yesterday) to fend off any premature interview 

attempts by other ICE agents[.] This is associated with several straw 

purchasers ATF is investigating[.] The greatest risk to the larger 

investigation will be tipping our hand to the suspects too soon[.] I 

think that this will be an excellent opportunity for the agencies to make 

good on what they have been telling us about cooperating and doing 

what’s best for the case[.] This case will take time to build into an 

indictable case[.] We will not be able to see the purchasers arrested 

immediately[.] But its [sic] a great case for ATF and ICE collaboration[.]51

That same afternoon, ATF Assistant Director for Field Operations Mark Chait e-mailed Newell

about the November 20 seizure, stating, “In light of how hot this info is I just wanted to make 

sure we pull all resources on this and get a solid interview with the transporter.”52 Eleven

minutes after receiving Chait’s e-mail Newell responded, “On it, it’s part of an active Phoenix 

case belonging to SA Hope MacAllister, OCDETF Strike Force.”53 Two weeks later Chait 

forwarded Newell’s response to ATF Deputy Director William Hoover, explaining, “Phoenix 

was already on two of the straws and have an ocdetf case open [sic] prior to the event.”54 These 

e-mail exchanges indicate that Phoenix ATF knew about the Fast and Furious straw purchasers 

even before some of the weapons they purchased were first recovered in Mexico.

As indicated in AUSA Hurley’s e-mail above, ATF and the U.S. Attorney’s Office

sought to prevent ICE from stopping suspects in the case even in the early stages of the 

 

50 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Emory Hurley (Nov. 25, 2010) [HOGR 006805] (Exhibit 28).

51 E-mail from Emory Hurley to Dennis Burke (Nov. 25, 2010) [HOGR 006805] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 28).

52 E-mail from Mark Chait to William Newell (Nov. 25, 2009) [HOGR 001983-001984] (Exhibit 29).

53 E-mail from William Newell to Mark Chait, et al. (Nov. 25, 2009) [HOGR 001983] (Exhibit 29).

54 E-mail from Mark Chait to William Hoover (Dec. 9, 2009) [HOGR 001983] (Exhibit 29).

“Due to traces ‘pinging’ off our Suspect 

Gun system we just discovered Friday’s 42 

gun seizure in Naco directly links to an 

ongoing ATF Phoenix case by SA Hope 

MacAllister, OCDETF Strike Force.”
28

investigation. In Newell’s November 25, 2009, e-mail to Burke and Hurley, he wrote: “We are 

advising ICE to stand down on their current proactive activity in Arizona in order not to 

compromise our case. We are meeting with them on Monday to discuss.”

55

 On November 30, 

2009, Newell met with ICE Agent Ed Hamel regarding Fast and Furious. In that meeting, Hamel 

agreed to serve as the ICE point of contact for the case.56 

That same day, Newell e-mailed his ASACs:

57

At the same time, the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office continued to work closely with 

ATF’s Phoenix Field Division on the case. On December 1, 2009, U.S. Attorney Burke followed 

up with AUSA Hurley on the case, asking: “Where are we w/ this one?”58 Hurley responded:59

 

55 E-mail from William Newell to Dennis Burke and Emory Hurley (Nov. 25, 2009) [HOGR 002957] (emphasis 

added) (Exhibit 27).

56 ATF Management Log, Case 785115-10-[redacted] (Dec. 2, 2009) (Exhibit 25).

57 E-mail from William Newell to George Gillett (Nov. 30, 2009) [HOGR 001956] (Exhibit 30).

58 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Emory Hurley (Dec. 1, 2009) [HOGR 002958] (Exhibit 31).

59 E-mail from Emory Hurley to Dennis Burke (Dec. 1, 2009) [HOGR 002958] (Exhibit 31).

“Due to the high-profile nature of this event and 

all the info/intel out there . . . showing the 

known potential links between suspects, straws, 

etc and an investigative plan of action – one 

involving ICE . . . . I will then fwd to HQ.”
29

Burke responded: “Excellent, excellent and excellent. Whatever you need to keep this moving 

forward, let me know.”60

On December 2, 2009, Newell sent Deputy Assistant Director McMahon a 

comprehensive briefing paper on Fast and Furious:61

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

60 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Emory Hurley (Dec. 1, 2009) [HOGR 002958] (Exhibit 31).

61 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Dec. 2, 2009) (Exhibit 15).

“The odds are that this will be a hub-and-spokes 

conspiracy and we will need to indict and secure the 

cooperation of the straw buyers before we are able 

to indict trafficker(s).”
30

The attached briefing paper identified the investigative steps taken as of that date. One 

investigative step stated, “Surveillance conducted on several purchases identifying a stash 

residence and involved business.”62 The document also discussed the early cooperation of FFLs: 

“Received all known video of purchases from FFLs. . . . Working relationship established with 

FFL’s [four FFLs redacted], notifying ATF of suspect purchases/orders.”63 Finally, the 

document stated, “All known purchased firearms have been entered into ATF suspect gun 

database.”64

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

62 CHAMBERS Trafficking Case IN#785115-10-[redacted], “INVESTIGATIVE STEPS 

TAKEN/INVESTIGATIVE PLAN” (Dec. 2, 2009), at 2 (Exhibit 15).

63 Id.

64 Id.

“This is a good overview of the efforts of SA Hope 

MacAllister and crew to date on her case which 

directly relates to the recent seizure in Naco, 

Sonora, Mexico of 42 AK-47 type firearms.”
31

By December 2009, the FFLs already knew the names of most of the suspected straw 

purchasers ATF was surveiling. The FFLs had initially told ATF about several of the straw 

purchasers, and ATF agents shared the names of other purchasers they were following with these 

FFLs. Accordingly, not only did ATF frequently receive contemporaneous notice of many straw 

purchases, but sometimes FFLs even gave ATF advance notice of the straw purchasers’ 

activities.

65

By December 2009, ATF also had developed reasonable suspicion to stop and question 

straw purchasers. For example, on December 8, 2009, agents watched as straw purchaser Sean 

 

65 See, for example, e-mail from [FFL2] to David Voth (Jun. 15, 2010) (Exhibit 19).

“Working relationship established with 

FFL’s [redacted], [redacted], 

[redacted], and [redacted] notifying 

ATF of suspect purchases/orders.”
32

Steward dropped firearms off at two different locations—neither of which was his home.66 Later 

that day, Steward showed up at another FFL with two unidentified individuals and loaded 

firearms into a truck.67 Steward left the FFL as a passenger in the truck. ATF agents from 

Group VII did not question the suspects. Instead, ATF instructed the Phoenix Police

Department to stop the truck for a speeding violation.68 The other passenger in the truck was an 

individual by the name of Manuel Celis-Acosta. Unsurprisingly, when questioned about the 

firearms in the bed of the truck, Steward stated that he had purchased the firearms and that they 

belonged to him.69 Steward, however, had not been confronted about the fact that he had been 

seen dropping off firearms. ATF Agents did not even question Steward, which might have made 

him more concerned about the consequences of his actions.

ATF also knew the guns were making their way to the Mexican border in extremely short 

periods of time. On December 10, 2009, Voth wrote to another agent about to join Group VII: 

“On Tuesday we followed a guy who purchased 40 AK-47s, 9 of them were already recovered 

near the border in Douglas, AZ on Wednesday night... 24 hours!”70 ATF knew the weapons 

being purchased by the straw purchasers were ending up in Mexico shortly after the transactions 

were completed, yet these straw purchasers were neither stopped nor questioned. On December 

8, 2009, an ATF official in Tucson wrote to ASAC Gillett:

I would only recommend that some action is taken in attempts to slow 

down the purchasing and exportation of the firearms and ammunition. 

Our agents have now been involved in two incidents that have had major 

seizures relating to this case. We are being told that they have 

documented over 300 firearms being purchased by this group. Our 

investigative efforts reflect that the suspect in this recent seizure is 

responsible for purchasing over $25,000 in ammunition. Only $10,000 

worth of ammo was seized.71

Instead, the pace of the case continued to escalate. By December 13, 2009, ASAC Gillett 

informed SAC Newell that 175 firearms had been purchased in just one week.72

 

66 ATF Management Log, Case 785115-10-[redacted] (Dec. 8, 2009) (Exhibit 25); ATF Suspect Gun Summary, 

Sean Christopher Steward (entered Dec. 17, 2009) (Exhibit 32).

67 Report of Investigation, CHAMBERS, Jacob, et al., Report #36, at 5 (Exhibit 33).

68 Id.

69 Id.

70 E-mail from David Voth to Mark Sonnendecker (Dec. 10, 2009) [HOGR 002277] (Exhibit 34).

71 E-mail from Sigberto Celaya to George Gillett (Dec. 8, 2010) [HOGR 000885] (Exhibit 35).

72 E-mail from George Gillett to William Newell (Dec. 13, 2009) [HOGR 001461] (Exhibit 36).
33

Rather than confronting the straw purchasers, the Phoenix Field Division made plans to expand 

the case. As the above e-mail indicates, on December 12, 2009, Phoenix ATF drafted a proposal 

to submit Fast and Furious to become an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

(OCDETF) program. The Justice Department created OCDETF to provide additional funding 

for cases aimed at disrupting and dismantling major drug trafficking and money laundering 

organizations. If Fast and Furious were to become an OCDETF case, it would no longer be just 

an ATF case, but rather a multi-agency task force case run by ATF. Such a designation would

provide additional clout in the form of increased funding and enhanced reputation for ATF.

Meanwhile, on December 17, 2009, a criminal complaint for Jacob Chambers was issued 

for offenses he committed in November 2008.73 Both counts, burglary in the second degree and 

trafficking in stolen property, were Class 3 felonies. Chambers was not sentenced until 

September 2010.74 The Committees, however, have no record of him purchasing firearms after 

December 2009.

 

73 Criminal Complaint, Arizona v. Chambers, Case No. CR2009-177644-003 DT (Sup. Ct. Az., Maricopa Cty., Dec. 

18, 2009) (Exhibit 37).

74 Suspension of Sentence, Arizona v. Chambers, Case No. CR2009-177644-003 DT (Sup. Ct. Az., Maricopa Cty., 

Sep. 3, 2010) (Exhibit 38).
34

3. The DEA Wiretap

FINDING: A missed hand-off: DEA believed there was probable cause to arrest 

Manuel Celis-Acosta for gun crimes based on evidence it had collected

from its state wire intercept in a December 2009 drug case. DEA does 

not have jurisdiction over gun crimes. Though DEA gave ATF access 

to this evidence, ATF “dropped the ball” by failing to review or act on 

any of it.

On November 28, 2009, the ATF case agent for Fast and Furious, Special Agent Hope 

MacAllister, e-mailed the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) with twelve telephone 

numbers to deconflict.75 Deconfliction is the process by which one agency checks its target

phone numbers against target phone numbers from other agencies to determine if there is any 

overlap. On December 14, 2009, DEA special agents contacted MacAllister and her co-case 

agent, Special Agent Tonya English.76 DEA advised that one of the telephone numbers ATF had 

submitted for deconfliction was related to Operation Flaco Feo, an ongoing DEA investigation in 

which DEA had an active state wiretap.77 An internal DEA e-mail from December 14, 2009

illustrates the level of detailed information available to DEA and ATF:

78

The following day, ATF Group Supervisor Voth and Special Agents MacAllister and 

English attended a meeting in which DEA agents shared information they had acquired on one of 

ATF’s targets, Manuel Celis-Acosta.79 DEA provided ATF with a packet of the wire intercepts 

DEA had gathered to date on Celis-Acosta.80 According to DEA, it also agreed to thereafter

provide ATF agents access to the DEA wire room, where live wiretap intercepts from the state 

 

75 E-mail from Hope MacAllister to [DEA] (Nov. 28, 2009) (Exhibit 39).

76 Briefing by Justice Department staff to Senate Judiciary Committee and House Oversight and Government 

Reform Committee staff (Oct. 5, 2011) [hereinafter October 5 Briefing].

77 See Operation Fast and Furious, OCDETF Proposal Narrative (Jan. 26, 2010), at 3 (Exhibit 16).

78 E-mail from [DEA] to [DEA] (Dec. 14, 2009) (Exhibit 40).

79 DEA Report of Investigation (ROI) 50, “Deconfliction Meeting with DEA Personnel on December 15, 2009” 

(Exhibit 41).

80 Id.
35

wiretap were received and archived for analysis.

81

 An internal DEA e-mail from December 16, 

2009, recounted the meeting with ATF:

82

According to multiple law enforcement sources both in ATF and in other agencies, ATF 

could have and should have employed additional investigative techniques to disrupt the targets’ 

illegal activities based on information in the DEA wire intercept. In mid-December 2009, DEA 

wire intercepts may have even provided probable cause for ATF to make arrests of Fast and 

Furious suspects. According to a later ATF document, “On December 21, 2009, an intercepted 

telephone call between CELIS-ACOSTA and an Operation FLACO FEO target revealed that 

firearms recently purchased in Phoenix were going to be driven to El Paso, TX and trafficked 

into Mexico.”83 Specifically, the DEA wire intercepts showed that Celis-Acosta was receiving 

money to traffic the weapons, and that although they were destined for Juarez, Mexico, he did

not want to be asked to take them there in person. These intercepts were stronger than any of the 

evidence on ATF’s targets that had been gathered to date, and DEA officials have told 

congressional investigators they believe this evidence constituted probable cause for arrests by 

ATF.84 

Yet, Group VII apparently failed to act on these more specific intercepts. Voth has 

claimed that DEA did not share that evidence with ATF “when the information was actionable,” 

although he acknowledged that he himself was out of the office from December 19 to December 

27, 2009.85 Still, the Case Management Log states that ATF received the information on 

December 21, 2009, the morning of the intercept:

86

 

81 October 5 Briefing (supra note 76).

82 E-mail from [DEA] to [DEA] (Dec. 16, 2009) (Exhibit 42).

83 Operation Fast and Furious, OCDETF Proposal Narrative (Jan. 26, 2010), at 3 (Exhibit 16).

84 Drug Enforcement Administration Briefing of the Majority Staff of the House Oversight and Government Reform 

Committee and Minority Staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Oct. 20, 2011).

85 Letter from Joshua Levy to Chairman Darrell Issa and Ranking Member Grassley (Mar. 14, 2012), Attachment 3, 

Declaration of David Voth at 5 (other attachments omitted) (Exhibit 43).

86 ATF Management Log, Case 785115-10-[redacted] (Dec. 23, 2009) (Exhibit 44).

“On[] the plus side, we 

have the conspiracy 

through the wire . . .”
36

The Glendale detective whose name is redacted was a DEA Task Force Officer (TFO) who had 

also provided ATF with wire intercept information on December 16, 2009.

87

 Based on the 

TFO’s December 21, 2009, phone call, Group VII should have had enough actionable 

information to intercept the firearms on their way to El Paso, as well as connect the trafficking 

with evidence of intent from the DEA wire. ATF agents apparently squandered this information. 

ATF continued to press forward, prolonging the case even though, according to DEA, ATF

already had enough evidence to charge the suspects with conspiracy.

DEA continued to communicate and share materials with ATF. The Case Management 

Log indicates that someone in Group VII talked to DEA on December 24, 2009.88

Later, DEA says it provided ATF with a thumb drive of wire intercepts from December 15 to 

December 29, 2009.

89

 DEA also provided the materials a third time in mid-January after Voth 

requested that all the call summaries and transcripts be provided to him in order to assist with the 

writing of Group VII’s federal wiretap application. In a January 14, 2010, e-mail, DEA 

personnel wrote to Voth about getting him the materials again:

90

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

87 ATF Management Log, Case 785115-10-[redacted] (Dec. 16, 2009) (Exhibit 44).

88 ATF Management Log, Case 785115-10-[redacted] (Dec. 24, 2009) (Exhibit 44).

89 October 5 Briefing (supra note 76).

90 E-mail from [DEA] to David Voth (Jan. 14, 2010) (Exhibit 45).
37

A January 17, 2010 FBI document provides more detail of what had been gathered through the 

DEA wire by that point:

 “The guys [Target A] had there were ready to start working hard at the beginning of 

the year. . . . [Target B’s] guy Acosta is coming over. Acosta is source of supply for 

guns.”

 “[Target C] asked [Target A] about the toys (guns). [Target C] has 32 Romanian 

assault rifles, with folding stocks—new in the box. ‘1 buck each’ ($1000).”

 “[Target A] has third party interested in the guns. Wants them transported to El Paso. 

[Target A] will wire money in the morning. Set up transport of guns in trailer.”

 “[Target C] has guy who will transport guns to [Target A] in El Paso. $1300 each 

gun. Acosta and [Target C’s] cousin will bring the guns. Sending them in morning. 

[Target A] will wire money via Western Union Right now.”

 “More conversation regarding the guns and wire transfer. The guns are ready to go 

via transport. . . .”91

 

91 FBI Form FD-302, at 4 (Jan. 17, 2010) (Exhibit 46).

“[B]een try to e-mail all the call 

summaries and transcripts but there 

are over one hundred calls.”
38

 “Guns en route. Acosta doesn’t want to be asked to take the guns into Juarez.”

 “[Target A] sending $2200 for guns to Bank of America account . . . .”92

 

92 Id. at 5.
39

 “[Target C] and [Target A] discuss the price and availability of the .50 caliber rifles. 

They can be sent to [Target A]. Further discussion about the amount of profit they 

will make on the rifles.”93

As these summaries show, the DEA wiretap information available to ATF provided 

detailed information about Celis-Acosta and several other suspects. Target A, the trafficker who 

was purchasing firearms from Celis-Acosta and transporting them to Mexico, was one of the 

main targets of Fast and Furious. The DEA wire intercepts identified Target A by the January 

17, 2010 document, if not sooner.

DEA says that only after January 14, 2010, did ATF start showing up to the joint wire 

room on a daily basis.94 Later that month ATF recognized the significance of the earlier 

intercepts. According to one document Group VII put together that month:

During a Deconfliction [sic] meeting with the DEA on December 15, 2009, the 

[DEA agents] advised that numerous telephone calls had been intercepted 

involving [redacted] and the [DEA] targets. [Redacted] is believed to be in Agua 

Prieta, Mexico, and has been intercepted orchestrating different amounts of US 

currency being illegally brought into the US for the purpose of purchasing 

firearms via the [DEA] targets. Those targets were intercepted making 

arrangements with telephone numbers utilized by CELIS-ACOSTA, 

CHAMBERS, and STEWARD to obtain the firearms for [redacted]. On 

December 21, 2009, an intercepted phone call between CELIS-ACOSTA and 

a [DEA] target revealed that firearms recently purchased in Phoenix were 

going to be driven to El Paso, TX and trafficked into Mexico.95

Inexplicably, ATF failed to make use of the most critical information DEA shared. Instead of 

focusing on individuals above Celis-Acosta in the firearms trafficking network, ATF continued 

to focus on the straw purchasers below Celis-Acosta.

ATF would spend the next eight months trying to establish a connection between CelisAcosta’s straw purchasing and Mexican drug cartels. Yet the DEA wire intercepts had already 

established this connection by January 2010. The DEA wire would later be thrown out of 

court.96 However, ATF didn’t know in early 2010 that that would happen. If ATF had bothered 

 

93 Id. at 6.

94 October 5 Briefing (supra note 76).

95 Operation Fast and Furious, OCDETF Proposal Narrative (Jan. 26, 2010), at 3 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 16).

96 October 5 Briefing (supra note 76).
40

to conduct a thorough review of all the information contained in the DEA wire intercepts, Fast 

and Furious might have concluded a year earlier than it did. According to former ATF Deputy 

Director Hoover, ATF simply “dropped the ball” during this crucial time in the investigation.97 

Celis-Acosta would not be indicted until January 19, 2011.

There appears to have been a greater level of communication and coordination with ATF 

by the DEA than by the FBI. The DEA actively shared information repeatedly. It made the gun 

trafficking information gleaned from its state wiretap available to ATF on multiple 

occasions. Since it lacks jurisdiction over gun cases, DEA had no incentive to hoard information 

about gun trafficking from any other agency. Conversely, the FBI had cooperated with DEA in 

another operation, but did not aggressively push gun trafficking information to ATF. Unlike 

DEA, the FBI shares concurrent jurisdiction over gun trafficking cases with ATF, which creates

a disincentive to share information and may have had an impact on the effectiveness of 

coordination between the two agencies.

 

97 Id.

ATF

DEA FBI

Operation 

Fast and 

Furious

Operation 

Flaco Feo

Operation Head Shot

 ?
41

4. Early Concerns Expressed

FINDING: Concerns dismissed: Both cooperating FFLs and some ATF officials 

expressed concerns about the growth of Fast and Furious as early as 

December 2009. Senior ATF officials, however, refused to heed these 

concerns as they allowed the straw purchasers to continue to arm the 

Sinaloa Cartel. ATF reassured cooperating FFLs and encouraged 

them to continue selling.

On December 18, 2009, the bi-weekly update from the ATF Phoenix Field Division’s 

Intelligence Group supplied considerable data about the case:

Jacob Chambers et al: This case is a large scale conspiracy of over a

fifteen [sic] interconnected straw purchasers. Thus far in the investigation 

(September through present) the group has purchased over 500 firearms; 

most of which are the AK-47 variant 7.62 assault rifles and or [sic] the 

F.N. Herstal 5.7 mm pistols. Of those 500 firearms purchased by the 

group approximately 50 have been recovered in Mexico or near the 

Mexican Border (the serial numbers are continually being updated and 

changed thus affecting the trace results) with a short time-to-crime; some 

as little as one day.98

A short “time-to-crime,” the time between purchase of a gun and its use in a crime, is a typical

indicator of firearms trafficking. Thus, the update illustrates that, even in the early stages of Fast 

and Furious, ATF was aware that the guns the straw buyers purchased from cooperating FFLs—

transactions which ATF allowed to proceed—were ending up in Mexico and in the hands of 

violent criminals.

As indicated above, Case Agent Hope MacAllister somehow learned in early December 

that there would be a spike in purchasing activity. Accordingly, she told one FFL that “you can 

expect to see an increase of purchases of AK-47 type rifles.”

99

 The upswing in firearms 

purchases occurred almost immediately, and the FFL was eager to cooperate with ATF and send 

them the 4473s to aid their investigation. He testified:

What occurred immediately, within five days, four to five days, of my 

conversation with Agent MacAllister in which she is giving me a heads-up 

to expect purchases to begin occurring, Caucasian males . . . came in and 

began to purchase in lots of 10, 15, sometimes 20 initially AK-47s

 

98 E-mail from Kevin Simpson to David Voth (Dec. 18, 2009) [HOGR 001189] (Exhibit 47).

99 Transcript, Interview of [FFL1] by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (May 18, 2011), at 18 [hereinafter FFL1 Transcript] (Exhibit 48).
42

without ammunition, strictly the guns. The denomination was done in 

cash, being it 20s, 50s, 100s. Generally it was in 20s.

Now, when somebody would enter my store in this manner I would 

telephonically contact Agent MacAllister right away. Her instructions 

were as follows:

Okay. Take your time boxing these weapons up. Try and stall them. We 

will get somebody out to the parking lot as fast as possible so we can 

surveil these people. We will text you or call you at the store when we are 

in position.100

Yet as the number of firearms bought by these suspicious individuals continued to 

increase, this cooperating FFL expressed uneasiness about the large number of firearms being 

bought by the suspected straw purchasers ATF was watching. The FFL asked to speak with a 

superior who could verify that the operation in which he was being asked to participate was 

legitimate. The FFL stated:

Q. Had you balked with MacAllister and Voth that, hey, guys, I am 

going to have to ask –

A. I told them unless I had something definitive to go by, you know, I 

don’t feel comfortable with this so I need to speak to the 

supervisor.101

On the morning of December 17, 2009, MacAllister brought both Voth and District of 

Arizona AUSA Emory Hurley to the FFL’s store to assuage the FFL’s concerns.

102

 The FFL

testified:

And in my office, I voiced my concerns over several subjects, one of 

which primarily was the amount of weapons that were being purchased at 

my store.

* * *

I was instructed in that meeting in no uncertain terms by the agents 

and the Assistant United States Attorney himself to continue to stock 

these weapons, second, to keep working and inform the Phoenix field

 

100 Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added).

101 Id.

102 Transcript, Interview of David Voth by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Jun. 30, 2011), at page 97-98 [hereinafter Voth Transcript] (Exhibit

49).
43

office and their agents and keep them apprised of all developments with 

regard to these types of purchases.103

David Voth later testified that he couldn’t remember whether the FFL had raised concerns about 

the number of guns. However, he testified, “I remember our meeting was whether or not he was 

doing anything illegal . . . .”

104

 Similarly, AUSA Emory Hurley would later write: “[The FFL]

had expressed concerns about the cooperation he was providing and whether he was endangering 

himself or implicating himself in a criminal investigation.”105

Individuals outside of Phoenix also expressed concern over the large number of firearms 

involved in Fast and Furious. Unaware of the short time-to-crime and lacking access to the DEA 

wire room, many people learning about the case found the sheer number of weapons alone to be 

staggering. For instance, Ray Rowley, Southwest Border Initiative Coordinator for ATF, voiced 

his anxiety over the number of weapons in Fast and Furious early in the investigation.106 After a 

mid-December 2009 briefing on the case, an intelligence officer from ATF’s Office of Strategic 

Information and Intelligence (“OSII”) told Group VII Supervisor David Voth that at the briefing,

Rowley “mentioned the possibility of needing to shut the investigation down due to the large 

number of guns that have already been trafficked.”107 Upon hearing this, ASAC Gillett spoke 

with Rowley on December 17, 2009, the same day as Voth and AUSA Hurley had their meeting 

with a cooperating FFL. In an e-mail to Newell about the conversation with Rowley, Gillett 

wrote:

I spoke with Ray Rowley today and explained that even though the 

identified straw purchasers bought approximately 175 guns last week 

alone, we have slowed down the FFL on future purchases and are

obtaining intelligence directly related to this investigation from [redacted]. 

Ray did express some concern regarding the total number of guns that 

have been purchased by this straw-purchase scheme.108

Whether in response to Rowley’s concerns or the concerns expressed by the cooperating FFL in 

his meeting with Voth and AUSA Hurley in the morning, that afternoon Gillett wrote to Voth,

forwarding a copy of the ATF order discussed in the first staff report.

109 ATF relied on this order

to allow the guns to walk without interdicting them:

110

 

103 [FFL1] Transcript at 20-22 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 48).

104 Voth Transcript at 100 (Exhibit 49).

105 Memorandum to Dennis Burke from Emory Hurley, “Jaime Avila, Jr.” (Jan. 28, 2011), at 1 [HOGR 002349]

(Exhibit 26).

106 E-mail from George Gillett to William Newell (Dec. 17, 2009) [HOGR 002491] (Exhibit 50).

107 Id. 

108 Id.

109 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform and S. Comm. on the Judiciary Joint Staff Report, The Department of 

Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Accounts of ATF Agents , 112th Congress (June 14, 2011), at 11.

110 E-mail from George Gillett to David Voth (Dec. 17, 2011) [HOGR 000903] (Exhibit 51).
44

Agents testified that the intent of Order 3310.4B is to allow the transfer of firearms for a short 

period of time, under close surveillance, in order to arrest both the straw purchaser and the 

transferee.

111

 The intent of the order was not to allow ATF to fail to interdict weapons for an 

unspecified amount of time. During Fast and Furious, however, ATF supervisors in Phoenix 

used this order as justification to allow the transfer of weapons while breaking off surveillance 

altogether. Then-ATF Acting Director Kenneth Melson would later testify:

So this case was done very—was investigated closely with the U.S. 

Attorney's office. Remember we have David Voth who became a 

supervisor and entered on duty in Phoenix on December 6, 2009. He is an 

inexperienced agent. MacAllister is a relatively new agent. I am sure that 

they were influenced by the direction they were given both by the ASAC 

George Gillett and by the U.S. Attorney's office. Nevertheless, they should 

 

111 See, e.g., Voth Transcript at 10-12 (Exhibit 49).

“Anticipatory mi amigo. . . . 

Below is an excerpt from 

ATF Order 3310.4B.”
45

have had perhaps other views as to the propriety of what they were 

doing.112

The day after Gillett’s conversation with Rowley and the ATF/U.S. Attorney’s Office 

meeting with the cooperating FFL, Deputy Assistant Director Steve Martin e-mailed SAC 

Newell. Martin wrote:

Great stuff—aiming for those cartels! It is painful trying to get the powers 

to be to see that the target is the top in the cartel and not the straw 

purchase urchin (whose brain should be sucked dry for intel). Good luck 

and let us know how we can help.113

Newell responded: 

George Gillett had to have a long talk with one Mr. Ray Rowley yesterday 

because we heard he was one of the “hand wringers” on this deal and 

asking why we weren’t shutting this deal down now. I had Gillett call him 

and “counsel” him on why we weren’t going to do that and if he had 

anymore concerns to contact us directly and not worry so much about 

those things he has absolutely no control over, or say in for that matter.114

Newell’s response illustrates the extent to which the Phoenix Field Division successfully resisted 

supervision and support from ATF headquarters.

5. Formalization of Strategy and ICE Involvement

FINDING: Going for the “big fish”: When faced with an opportunity to end Fast 

and Furious in its early stages, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 

District of Arizona and ATF deliberately decided to hold out for a 

bigger case. At this point, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement became heavily involved, assigning a dedicated co-case 

agent to the operation.

At the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010, ATF and the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s 

Office were debating whether to allow Fast and Furious to develop into a bigger case. ATF had 

already decided on its strategy. On January 4, 2010, ATF Group VII Supervisor Voth sent his 

supervisor a briefing paper on the case. The briefing paper detailed the investigative strategy 

 

112 Transcript, Interview of Kenneth Melson by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (July 4, 2011), at 55 [hereinafter Melson Transcript] 

(Exhibit 52).

113 E-mail from Steve Martin to William Newell (Dec. 18, 2009) [HOGR 002395] (Exhibit 53).

114 E-mail from William Newell to Steve Martin (Dec. 18, 2009) [HOGR 002395] (Exhibit 53).
46

employed in Fast and Furious, including the language of ATF Order 3310.4B that Gillett had 

sent Voth two weeks prior:

Currently our strategy is to allow the transfer of firearms to continue to 

take place in order to further the investigation and allow for the 

identification of additional co-conspirators who would continue to 

operate and illegally traffic firearms to Mexican DTOs [drug trafficking 

organizations] which are perpetrating armed violence along the Southwest 

Border.

The ultimate goal is to secure a Federal T-III audio intercept to 

identify and prosecute all co-conspirators of the DTO to include the 20 

identified straw purchasers, the facilitators of the distribution cell centered 

here in Phoenix, the transportation cells taking firearms South, and 

ultimately to develop and provide prosecutable information to our 

Mexican law enforcement counterparts for actions.115

On January 5, 2010, MacAllister, Voth, and ASAC Gillett met with AUSA Emory 

Hurley from the U.S. Attorney’s Office to discuss the case.116 After the meeting, Newell emailed McMahon seeking additional resources:

117

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

115 Phoenix Group VII, Phoenix Field Division, ATF, Briefing Paper on 785115-10-[redacted] (Jan. 8, 2010) 

[HOGR 001144-001146] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 54); see also e-mail from George Gillett to William Newell 

(Jan. 8, 2010) [HOGR 001143] (Exhibit 55).

116 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Jan. 5, 2010) [HOGR 002107] (Exhibit 56).

117 Id.
47

That day, AUSA Hurley sent a memorandum to National Security Section Chief Michael 

Morrissey, his first-line supervisor.

118

 The memorandum explicitly describes the tactical 

decision to forgo prosecuting or even contacting straw buyers: 

Today I met with ATF regarding their investigation centered around 

Manuel Celis-Acosta, suspected of trafficking firearms to Mexico. He is 

the center of a hub-and-spokes conspiracy involving [redacted] or more 

straw purchasers. . . .

In the past, ATF agents have investigated cases similar to this by 

confronting the straw purchasers and hoping for an admission that might 

lead to charges. This carries a substantial risk of letting the members of 

the conspiracy know that they are the subject of an investigation . . . . 

Even when the straw buyers make admissions and can be prosecuted, they 

are easily replaced by new straw buyers and the flow of guns remains 

unabated.

In this case, ATF has discovered that the central target of their 

investigation is linked to a state wire case being run out of the DEA wire 

room. They have reviewed a number of “dirty” calls from the Celis 

 

118 Memorandum from Emory Hurley to Mike Morrissey, “Manuel Celis Acosta Trafficking Investigation” (Jan. 5, 

2010) [HOGR 002960-002961] (Exhibit 57).

“I need help though . . . this case 

has progressed so fast, much 

quicker than any other case 

we’ve been involved with.”
48

Acosta [sic] regarding gun trafficking and believe they could pursue a 

federal T-III. . . .

ATF believes that there may be pressure from ATF headquarters to 

immediately contact identifiable straw purchasers just to see if this 

develops any indictable cases and to stem the flow of guns. Local ATF 

favors pursuing a wire and surveillance to build a case against the leader 

of the organization.119

This memorandum identifies the dichotomy between the two possible strategies for ATF and the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office to pursue—either surveil straw purchasers and seek a federal wire 

intercept, or contact the straw purchasers and try to stem the flow of guns. Hurley concluded: “I 

concur with Local ATF’s decision to pursue a longer term investigation to target the leader of the 

conspiracy.”120

Later that day, Morrissey forwarded the memo to U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke for a 

decision. Morrissey also worried about ATF headquarters wanting to do a smaller purchase 

case:

121

Since congressional investigators have not been allowed to interview Morrissey or Hurley to ask 

them about their statements, it’s difficult to know whether ATF or the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

proposed this approach first. It is clear, however, that both ATF leadership and the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office quickly agreed , and each seems to have had an independent desire to pursue 

the “big case” strategy.

 

119 Id.

120 Id.

121 E-mail from Mike Morrissey to Dennis Burke (Jan. 5, 2010) [HOGR 002960] (Exhibit 57).

“ATF headquarters may want to do a smaller 

straw purchaser case. We should hold out for 

the bigger case, try to get a wire, and if it fails, 

we can always do the straw buyers.”
49

Burke’s response to Morrissey simply said to hold out for the bigger case:122 

This decision to hold out for a bigger case was a critical juncture. It was a green light—by the 

U.S. Attorney himself—for ATF agents to continue surveiling straw purchasers instead of 

disrupting and deterring their activities.

On January 8, 2010, the briefing paper Voth had drafted a few days earlier was sent by 

ASAC Gillett to SAC Newell.123 Before forwarding it to ATF headquarters two and a half hours 

later, Newell edited the briefing paper.

124

 He revised the document to address the rapid pace at 

which firearms were purchased by the suspects in the case: “It should also be noted that the pace 

of firearms procurement by this straw purchasing group from late September to early December, 

2009 defied the ‘normal’ pace of procurement by other firearms trafficking groups investigated 

by this and other field divisions.”125 Newell also included the phrase “albeit at a much slower 

pace” after “allow the transfer of firearms to continue to take place.”126

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

122 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Mike Morrissey (Jan. 7, 2010) [HOGR 002960] (Exhibit 57).

123 E-mail from George Gillett to William Newell (Jan. 8, 2010) [HOGR 001143] (Exhibit 55).

124 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Jan. 8, 2010) [HOGR 001914] (Exhibit 58).

125 Phoenix Group VII, Phoenix Field Division, ATF, Briefing Paper on 785115-10-[redacted] (Jan. 8, 2010) 

[HOGR 001915-001918] (Exhibit 59).

126 Id.; see also e-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Jan. 8, 2010) [HOGR 001914] (Exhibit 58).

“Hold out for bigger.”
50

The briefing paper also stated: 

This investigation was briefed to United States Attorney Dennis Burke, 

who concurs with the assessment of his line prosecutors and fully supports 

the continuation of the investigation. Furthermore, Phoenix Special Agent 

in Charge Newell has repeatedly met with USA Burke regarding the ongoing status of this investigation and both are in full agreement with the 

current investigative strategy.

127

ATF’s strategy to “allow the transfer of firearms to continue to take place” affected the 

agency’s interactions with ICE. In addition to the November 20, 2009, Naco recovery, when

ATF asked ICE to stand down, ATF reiterated its request for ICE to stand down during a second 

recovery of weapons in December 2009.

128

 ICE was interested in pursuing the Celis-Acosta 

case, however, so a joint ATF/ICE case was opened on January 12, 2010.129

 

127 Phoenix Group VII, Phoenix Field Division, ATF, Briefing Paper on 785115-10-[redacted] (Jan. 8, 2010) 

[HOGR 001916] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 59).

128 See e-mail from [Office of Congressional Relations, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement] to [Senate 

Judiciary Committee staff] (Oct. 18, 2011) (Exhibit 60).

129 E-mail from Alice Rojas to Alex Kruthaupt (Jan. 13, 2010) [HOGR 001962-001964] (Exhibit 61).

“Currently our strategy is to allow 

the transfer of firearms to 

continue to take place . . .”
51

ATF apparently resented ICE’s attempts to contact straw buyers and potentially deter or 

disrupt the illegal purchases. SAC Newell wrote on January 14, 2010: “[W]e have asked ICE 

several times to stand down on the Naco case because they were briefed here that this seizure 

ties into a much bigger ATF case which relates directly to a Phoenix DEA case with an active TIII.”130

 Newell concluded: “They think this is an attempt to do an ‘end around’ on them—not 

true, they just don’t understand our system or how we conduct firearms trafficking 

investigations. Last time I checked this was our expertise.”131 

ATF wanted to develop as big a case as possible without having other agencies intruding 

on its jurisdiction or contacting straw buyers. On January 15, 2010, ATF held another 

deconfliction meeting, this time with both ICE and DEA.132 AUSA Emory Hurley was also 

present.133 As a result of that meeting, ICE detailed an agent, Layne France, to be a co-case 

agent on Operation Fast and Furious—a position he would hold for the next fourteen months.

134

Fast and Furious continued to intersect with other law enforcement agencies. On January 

13, 2010, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) stopped someone in El Paso, Texas 

trying to cross into Mexico with two firearms which traced back to Fast and Furious straw buyer 

Christopher Sean Steward.135 The next day, on January 14, 2010, Newell e-mailed McMahon:

Yesterday El Paso PD hit a “stash house” on information that it had 

dope/money/guns, etc. They found 40 AK-47s from our “Fast and 

Furious” case that were in Suspect Guns and were purchased by our most 

prolific purchaser—Christopher Sean Steward. CBP also busted a guy 

trying to cross into Mexico with two of “our” AK-47s from the same case 

 

130 E-mail from William Newell to Darren Gil (Jan. 14, 2010) [cf. HOGR 001962-001963] (emphasis added) 

(Exhibit 62).

131 Id.

132 Phoenix Group VII, Phoenix Field Division, ATF, Briefing Paper on 785115-10-[redacted] (Jan. 8, 2010) 

[HOGR 001145] (Exhibit 54).

133 See e-mail from [Office of Congressional Relations, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement] to [Senate 

Judiciary Committee staff] (Oct. 18, 2011) (Exhibit 60).

134 Department of Homeland Security Responses of Apr. 25, 2012, Questions for the Record from S. Comm. on the 

Judiciary Hearing, Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security, 112th Congress (Oct. 19, 2011), at 19.

135 U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Firearms Not Seized With Legible Serial Numbers (FY2009 – FY2011TD 

through June) (Exhibit 63).
52

and purchaser. As I said they were all purchased by our main straw 

purchaser, Chris Steward. . . . We are working this “fast and furious”, [sic] 

good news being we got another 42 off the street and can keep our case 

going. Hopefully the big bosses realize we are doing everything possible 

to prevent guns going into Mexico while at the same time trying to put 

together a phenomenal case. Good news too is we now have another 

Federal venue should the office here decide to punt.136

Newell’s claim that “we got another 42 off the street” is misleading at best. Many of the 

recoveries Newell took credit for were made by other agencies, often with no tip or information 

provided by ATF in advance. 

Also on January 14, 2010, U.S. Border Patrol agents stopped a vehicle in Columbus, New 

Mexico, near the U.S.-Mexico border, and found weapons inside.

137

 Border Patrol ran database 

searches on the individuals in the vehicle and the weapons, including a National Crime 

Information Center (“NCIC”) search on the weapons’ serial numbers.138 Border Patrol did not 

run a search on the weapons using eTrace since the agency only had limited access to the system 

and used it only to follow up in certain situations.139 E-Trace is a “web-based, bi-lingual 

(“English and Spanish”) firearms tracing system,” “available to accredited domestic and 

international law enforcement agencies to assist in the tracing of U.S.-sourced firearms.”

140

The Suspect Gun Summary shows that two of the weapons in the vehicle had been 

purchased by Jaime Avila just five days earlier, on January 9, 2010.

141

 On January 16, 2010, two 

days after the Border Patrol vehicle stop, Avila purchased three more firearms at the same FFL, 

two of which would be recovered months later at the murder scene of Border Patrol Agent Brian 

Terry on December 15, 2010.142

 

136 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Jan. 14, 2010) [HOGR 001436] (Exhibit 64).

137 Indictment, U.S. v. Villalobos et al., Case 2:11-cr-00487, Filed Mar. 8, 2011, U.S. District Court for the District 

of New Mexico, at 3.

138 E-mail from [Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Homeland Security] to [Senate Judiciary Committee 

staff] (Oct. 25, 2011) (Exhibit 65).

139 Id.

140 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Fact Sheet, ATF’s National Tracing Center (Mar. 2010), 

http://www.atf.gov/publications/factsheets/factsheet-national-tracing-center.html.

141 ATF Suspect Gun Summary, Jaime Avila Jr. (entered Jan. 14, 2010) (Exhibit 66).

142 ATF Suspect Gun Summary, Jaime Avila Jr. (entered Jan. 19, 2010) (Exhibit 67).
53

6. OCDETF Approval and ATF Wiretap

FINDING: A costly mistake: Fast and Furious became an OCDETF multiagency task force case, giving it additional clout and funding. Yet 

ATF was struggling to find out for whom the straw purchasing ring 

was acquiring weapons. The FBI began identifying two of these 

individuals as early as January 2010 in conjunction with DEA, but did 

not directly coordinate with ATF. ATF obtained at least seven wire 

intercepts while attempting to identify the same targets FBI and DEA 

had already identified. Wiretaps are incredibly expensive, resourceintensive, and rare for a firearms trafficking case. Senior Justice 

Department officials authorized submitting these applications to the 

court for wire intercepts.

On January 26, 2010, ATF’s Fast and Furious OCDETF proposal was presented to the 

local Phoenix OCDETF Committee. The Committee passed the proposal unanimously.

143 On 

February 5, 2010, the Southwest Region OCDETF Coordinator for ATF contacted the case 

agents in the Phoenix Field Division to notify them that the proposal also had received the 

necessary regional approval and had become an official OCDETF case.

144

The narrative ATF provided in support of the case acknowledged that Fast and Furious

overlapped with the DEA state wire case.

145

 Indeed, one of the categories required for OCDETF 

approval was “Connections with Other Investigations.” The ATF proposal stated:

ATF and ICE agents in this investigation are sharing information with 

investigators from Operation FLACO FEO, an active T-III investigation. 

Firearms purchased by Uriel PATINO were recovered in Nogales, 

Arizona. Firearms purchased by straw purchaser Sean STEWARD were 

recovered in El Paso, Texas and Douglas, Arizona. Two additional 

firearms were recovered in El Paso, Texas, by CBP. It is expected that 

this investigation will divulge both domestic and international firearms 

trafficking connections. As a result, it is foreseeable that other divisions 

will have opportunities to investigate facets of this organization and 

related illegal drug organizations and the ultimate dismantlement of [3 

names of drug trafficking organizations redacted].146

This information should also have alerted another agency involved in the OCDETF approval 

process that Fast and Furious overlapped with one of its investigations: specifically, the FBI. In 

 

143 E-mail from George Gillett to William Newell (Jan. 26, 2010) [HOGR 002217] (Exhibit 68).

144 E-mail from Chong Gee to Tonya English and Hope MacAllister (Feb. 5, 2010) [HOGR 002962] (Exhibit 69).

145 Operation Fast and Furious, OCDETF Proposal Narrative (Jan. 26, 2010), at 3 (Exhibit 16).

146 Operation Fast and Furious, OCDETF Proposal Narrative (Jan. 26, 2010), at 7 (Exhibit 16).
54

early December 2009, the FBI had opened a case in Las Cruces, New Mexico involving the 

interstate transportation of stolen property.147 The FBI knew the case also involved firearms. 

Since the potential subjects of the FBI case were already targets of a concurrent DEA case, in 

January 2010, FBI and DEA opened a joint case on the subjects entitled Operation Head Shot.148

With the initiation of Operation Head Shot, the FBI obtained information from the DEA 

wire regarding the targets of the investigation and their contacts with Fast and Furious targets. 

The targets in Operation Head Shot were arranging for the purchase and delivery of weapons 

from the Fast and Furious straw buying ring with the intent to traffick the guns to Mexico. 

Although the FBI had participated in the OCDETF approval process, FBI officials apparently did 

not recognize that ATF’s proposed OCDETF case had targets associated with targets in 

Operation Head Shot. Further, the FBI never pursued weapons trafficking charges or followed 

up with ATF on such charges against its drug trafficking targets in the months to come. The FBI 

therefore bears partial responsibility for some of the failures of Fast and Furious. ATF would 

spend the next seven months allowing guns to walk in order to identify the firearms traffickers 

ultimately receiving the weapons acquired by the straw purchasers—yet the FBI and DEA, 

through Operation Head Shot, already knew who these individuals were.

In Operation Fast and Furious, ATF had a more ambitious goal than just disrupting straw 

purchasing activity. ATF sought a federal wiretap. On January 27, 2010, Fast and Furious CoCase Agent Tonya English e-mailed DEA about obtaining a copy of DEA’s state wiretap 

affidavit that related to Celis-Acosta.149 DEA was preparing to take down its own wire in 

February 2010.150 DEA Special Agent in Charge of the Phoenix Field Division, Elizabeth 

Kempshall, told congressional investigators that after ATF made this decision, she encouraged 

ATF SAC Newell to consider pursuing a state wiretap because state wires were generally much 

quicker and easier to obtain than federal wires. According to Kempshall, however, Newell’s 

response was that he wanted to pursue a federal wire because “it’s never been done before” for a 

gun trafficking case.151

Throughout January 2010, ATF worked with AUSA Hurley and the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office to prepare the wiretap application. Finally, on February 5, 2010, SAC Newell e-mailed 

Deputy Assistant Director McMahon a cover memorandum, written by David Voth, requesting

authorization to seek a T-III intercept “on the main suspect in our on-going OCDETF Strike 

Force firearms trafficking case out of Phoenix entitled ‘The Fast and Furious.’”152

 

147 October 5 Briefing (supra note 76).

148 Id.

149 E-mail from Tonya English to [DEA] (Jan. 27, 2010) (Exhibit 70).

150 October 5 Briefing (supra note 76).

151 Telephone interview of Elizabeth Kempshall (Sep. 22, 2011) (emphasis added).

152 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Feb. 5, 2010) (Exhibit 71).
55

The e-mail stated that Newell would send McMahon the actual wiretap affidavit along with the 

original memo via FedEx.

153

 This e-mail and the FedEx package from Newell are the only link

known between the wiretap affidavits and ATF headquarters. 

The Justice Department approved the first wiretap application on March 10, 2010. ATF 

submitted at least six applications in support of seven wire intercepts during Fast and Furious. 

All of these wiretap applications were authorized by the Assistant Attorney General for the 

Criminal Division, Lanny Breuer, and signed by three of his deputies in March, April, May, 

June, and July 2010. The applications contained extensive and detailed information about the 

operational tactics used during Fast and Furious. The nature of the wiretap authorization process 

meant that senior officials in the Justice Department had information about the reckless tactics in 

Fast and Furious through the wiretap applications, while the applications were not provided to 

anyone higher than McMahon at ATF headquarters.

7. U.S. Attorney’s Office Responsibility

FINDING: A blank page: The full extent of the responsibility of the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona in directing Operation 

Fast and Furious has yet to be discovered because the Department of 

Justice has stonewalled the congressional investigation.

The Department of Justice has failed to turn over countless documents pursuant to the 

October 12, 2011, subpoena regarding the U.S. Attorney’s Office, including all documents 

prepared after the Department’s arbitrary February 4, 2011, cutoff date. These documents are 

necessary to investigate Fast and Furious because, once it became an OCDETF case, Fast and 

Furious was prosecutor-led.

 

153 Id.
56

Many ATF agents testified that they often deferred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for 

guidance when determining whether to interdict firearms or take other investigative 

action. Several individuals within the U.S. Attorney’s Office share the blame for their roles in 

Fast and Furious, from the U.S. Attorney himself down to the line prosecutor directing the dayto-day operations of the case.

The Justice Department, however, refused to produce the line attorney, Emory Hurley, 

for an interview in this investigation. Justice Department officials even told congressional 

investigators that if Hurley were to receive a subpoena, he would be directed by the Department 

not to appear. In lieu of Hurley, the Department offered Criminal Division Chief Patrick 

Cunningham, who the Department said was in the best position to explain the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office’s role in Fast and Furious. Cunningham, however, refused to appear after being 

subpoenaed, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Immediately 

thereafter he promptly resigned from government service.

Congressional investigators were able to obtain some pertinent documents relating to the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office from sources outside the Department. Investigators also spent two days 

interviewing former U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke. Some conclusions about the culpability of the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office during Fast and Furious have been able to be drawn from that material. 

However, the Department of Justice’s refusal to produce all of these documents ultimately 

resulted in Attorney General Eric Holder being held in contempt of Congress by the U.S. House 

of Representatives.

8. Headquarters Concerns and Exit Strategy Discussed

FINDING: Red flags ignored: Senior ATF officials became concerned about the 

number of weapons purchased under Fast and Furious and requested 

an exit strategy for closing down the case. The drafting of the exit 

strategy was severely delayed, and the strategy itself was ultimately 

ignored.

Throughout February 2010, U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke continued to be interested in 

Fast and Furious and knew the main target of the case. On February 16, 2010, Burke e-mailed 

AUSA Hurley:154

 

154 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Emory Hurley (Feb. 16, 2010) [HOGR 002966-002970] (Exhibit 72).
57

Hurley responded: “An AK variant with a GPS device [redacted] was sold to a conspirator and 

will be tracked until the battery goes dead.”155 Two days later Hurley again updated Burke:156

After each of these updates, Burke responded, “thanks” and “helpful.”157

On February 22, 2010, Newell updated Burke, coping Emory Hurley:

42 AK-47 rifles we seized this past Saturday west of Tucson and a mile 

from the border. . . . The two cars carrying these firearms were about to 

cross into Mexico. This is from the ATF “Fast and Furious” OCDETF 

case. The suspects stopped at an address in Tucson before heading south 

and as it turns out this residence is a main target residence in our “Wide 

Receiver” OCDETF case out of Tucson.158

 

155 E-mail from Emory Hurley to Dennis Burke (Feb. 16, 2010) [HOGR 002966-002970] (Exhibit 72).

156 E-mail from Emory Hurley to Dennis Burke (Feb. 18, 2010) [HOGR 002966] (Exhibit 72).

157 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Emory Hurley (Feb. 17, 2010) [HOGR 002966] (Exhibit 72); e-mail from Dennis 

Burke to Emory Hurley (Feb. 18, 2010) [HOGR 002966] (Exhibit 72).

158 E-mail from William Newell to Dennis Burke (Feb. 22, 2010) [HOGR 002968-002969] (Exhibit 72).
58

Burke responded to Hurley: “Talk to [Criminal Division Chief Patrick] Cunningham. I would 

like a briefing from you and him on Fast and Furious when I get back to Phoenix. Thanks. This 

is great stuff!”159

Newell also responded separately to Burke that morning, specifically informing him that 

the suspects purchased over 800 weapons and that they were under surveillance:

160

Later that morning, Newell e-mailed Group Supervisor Voth and ASAC Gillett, stating that 

Burke had been surprised by some of the details:

161

 

 

159 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Emory Hurley (Feb. 22, 2010) [HOGR 002970] (Exhibit 72).

160 E-mail from William Newell to Dennis Burke (Feb. 22, 2010) [HOGR 002968] (Exhibit 72).

161 E-mail from William Newell to David Voth, et al. (Feb. 22, 2010) [HOGR 001339] (Exhibit 73).

“He was taken aback by some of 

the facts I informed him about 

(including the fact that we are up 

to approx. 800 guns) . . .”
59

Burke, like Ray Rowley before him, appeared to express concerns about the number of weapons 

involved in the case.

That afternoon, Hurley gave Burke a further update, emphasizing the efforts to avoid 

alerting these traffickers that ATF was watching them :

This episode seems to corroborate what DEA agents had communicated to each other, namely 

that in their December 15, 2009, meeting, ATF agents “said the best way is to try to stop the load 

as it goes across into Mexico which adds in a whole bunch of charges.”162 In response to 

Hurley’s e-mail, U.S. Attorney Burke e-mailed his assistant: “Need a briefing on this from 

Emory, Mike Morrissey, and Pat Cunningham. Soon as we can.”163

ATF SAC Newell continued to inform Burke and Hurley about weapons ending up in 

Mexico. On February 26, 2010, he wrote :

164

 

162 E-mail from [DEA] to [DEA] (Dec. 16, 2009) (Exhibit 42).

163 E-mail from Dennis Burke to [U.S. Attorney’s Office Assistant] (Feb. 22, 2010) [HOGR 002972] (Exhibit 74).

164 E-mail from William Newell to Dennis Burke and Emory Hurley (Feb. 26, 2010) [HOGR 002974] (Exhibit 75).

“[O]ptimistic that there was a 

pretext stop so the drivers and the 

traffickers are not too hinked up.”
60

Similarly, the next day he wrote:

Not only was ATF receiving contemporaneous notice from cooperating FFLs of the 

purchases, by this time Group VII was also receiving contemporaneous e-mail notification from 

the FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) for certain purchasers. 

As ASAC Jim Needles would later explain how ATF was able to start seizing weapons 

immediately after their purchase in the fall of 2010, “We have flagged these individuals in NICS 

and are notified if they make a purchase.”165 Yet, documents show Fast and Furious suspects 

had at least been flagged in NICS since February 2010.166 A typical notification was this one, 

which indicated Uriel Patino had purchased a firearm the night before:167

 

165 E-mail from James Needles to William Newell (Oct. 29, 2010) [HOGR 001912] (Exhibit 76).

166 See e-mail from David Voth to Group VII (Mar. 1, 2010) (Exhibit 77).

167 E-mail from David Voth to Group VII (Mar. 11, 2010) (Exhibit 78).
61

ATF received these notifications for a list of individuals that at least included Jaime Avila and 

the five purchasers who would buy 90% of the guns in Fast and Furious: Patino, Sean Steward, 

Joshua Moore, Alfredo Celis, and Jacob Montelongo.168

Around this time, ATF headquarters asked Voth to brief ATF leadership in Washington, 

D.C.169 Voth provided a detailed PowerPoint presentation on March 5, 2010, to much of ATF’s 

top brass, as well as a prosecutor from the Justice Department’s Criminal Division.

170

 The 

presentation detailed all the guns bought by known straw purchasers that appeared at crime 

scenes in Mexico and that the number of firearms purchased by Fast and Furious targets had 

risen to 1,026 as of February 27, 2010.171 One slide from the presentation detailed the firearms 

purchases:

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

168 See e-mail from Marc Chamberlain to David Voth (Mar. 16, 2010) (Exhibit 79); e-mail from David Voth to Eric 

Moore (Mar. 25, 2010) (Exhibit 80); e-mail from Marc Chamberlain to David Voth (May 24, 2010) [HOGR 

002691] (Exhibit 81).

169 E-mail from David Voth to William Newell and George Gillett (Feb. 25, 2010) [HOGR 001420] (Exhibit 82).

170 E-mail from Lorren Leadmon to Mark Chait, et al. (Mar. 5, 2010) [HOGR 002091] (Exhibit 83).

171 PowerPoint briefing, Mar. 12, 2010, “Operation the Fast and the Furious” [HOGR 002819-002823] (Exhibit 84).
62

On March 10, 2010, the Justice Department approved ATF’s first wiretap. Acting ATF 

Director Kenneth Melson and Deputy Director Hoover did not attend the March 5, 2010 briefing,

but in the wake of the wiretap application, they asked detailed questions about the case and 

techniques that were being utilized. On March 11, 2010—apparently in preparation for a 

briefing of Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary Grindler the next day—the Phoenix Field 
63

Division worked to answer some of Acting Director Melson’s questions about pole cameras, 

money transfers, and seizures in Fast and Furious:172

In addition to pole cameras, ATF shortly installed two video cameras on either side of the 

counter in the main cooperating FFL that could be also accessed through an IP address on the 

Internet to watch purchases live.173

On March 12, 2010, Melson and Hoover briefed Grindler on Fast and Furious.

174 Other 

members of the Deputy Attorney General’s office were also present, including Associate Deputy 

Attorney General Ed Siskel and Special Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General Mark 

Michalic.175

Over in the U.S. Attorney’s Office, having obtained a federal wiretap in a firearms 

trafficking case was cause for celebration:

176

 

 

172 E-mail from David Voth to George Gillett (Mar. 11, 2010) [HOGR 001981] (Exhibit 85).

173 Telephone interview of [ATF Technical Operations Agent] (Apr. 14, 2011). 

174 ATF Monthly Meeting with the Acting Deputy Attorney General (Mar. 12, 2010) [HOGR 002817-002823] 

(Exhibit 86).

175 Transcript, Interview of Gary Grindler by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Dec. 14, 2011), at 43 (Exhibit 87).

176 E-mail from Emory Hurley to Michael Morrissey (Mar. 10, 2010) [HOGR 002990] (Exhibit 88).
64

At this same time, however, ATF Group VII Supervisor David Voth was attempting to 

quell dissension in the group over the fact that ATF was pursuing such an unusual technique 

while agents in Group VII were instructed to avoid conducting the most basic step of confronting 

the straw purchasers. ATF Special Agent John Dodson would later tell congressional 

“Good job by Emory – a T-3 in a 

gun case is unusual, and 

aggressive. Hopefully we’ll do it 

more in the future, but Emory is 

the trailblazer.”
65

investigators, “You can’t go up on a wire and sit back and push the TiVo button and have your 

case solved for you. You need to be out there and do these bread and butter things that as cops, 

as case agents, as law enforcement, we have to do.”177 Group VII was receiving NICS 

notifications of purchases and could remotely watch footage from video cameras at FFLs. Yet,

with the posting of the wiretap, all of the Group VII agents were being pulled off of surveillance 

in order to work the wire room, leaving only out of town agents unfamiliar with the area to 

conduct critical surveillance work.178

Nevertheless, in a March 12, 2010, Voth sent Group VII an e-mail defending the pursuit 

of the wire: “I am thrilled and proud that our Group is the first ATF Southwest Border Group in 

the country to be going up on a wire. . . . Whether you care or not people of rank and 

authority at HQ are paying close attention to this case and they also believe we (Phoenix

Group VII) are doing what they envisioned the Southwest Border Groups doing.”

179

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

177 Transcript, Interview of John Dodson by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Apr. 26, 2011), at 110 [hereinafter Dodson Transcript] (Exhibit 93).

178 E-mail from David Voth to Brent Quinn (Mar. 11, 2011) (Exhibit 89).

179 E-mail from David Voth to Phoenix Group VII (Mar. 12, 2010) [HOGR 001159] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 90).
66

In the e-mail, Voth denounced the differences of opinion occurring within the Group VII

regarding Operation Fast and Furious. He further stated:

If you don’t think this is fun you’re in the wrong line of work—period! 

This is the pinnacle of domestic U.S. law enforcement techniques. After 

this the tool box is empty. Maybe the Maricopa County Jail is hiring 

detention officers and you can get paid $30,000 (instead of $100,000) to 

serve lunch to inmates all day.180

 

180 Id.
67

On Sunday, March 14, 2010—two days after the “schism” e-mail—Voth sent another email to Group VII:181

Even though ATF had known since December 2009 that its targets were “related to a Cartel or 

DTO” from the DEA wire, Group VII was still trying to link the Fast and Furious straw 

purchases to recoveries in Mexico for intelligence purposes.

By this point, in March 2010, agents had complained within Group VII that only focusing 

on getting a wire and on subsequent recoveries in Mexico, while refusing to confront known

straw purchasers buying from cooperating FFLs, amounted to walking guns. At the Monday 

morning staff meeting of Group VII on March 15, 2010, Voth asked ASAC Gillett, who didn’t 

normally attend the meeting, to come down and address the group.182 Special Agent Dodson

testified about that encounter:

When ASAC George Gillett came down to our office, he really didn't --

and this happened a lot in Phoenix, is that most of our concerns or 

questions weren't addressed directly. The attitude and the mentality was

that they didn't need to be addressed. We just needed to do what we were 

told.

And so when ASAC Gillett came down, we were told you don't know 

what walking is, we are not walking guns. And that's pretty much the 

 

181 E-mail from David Voth to Phoenix Group VII (Mar. 14, 2010) [HOGR 001681] (Exhibit 91).

182 Voth Transcript at 205 (Exhibit 49); see also Transcript, Interview of Larry Alt by the Joint Staff of the House 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Apr. 27, 2011), at 23 

[hereinafter Alt Transcript] (Exhibit 92).

“You never know when/where one of 

these numbers is going to pop up and 

then our straw purchasers are 

suddenly related to a Cartel or DTO 

which is exactly where we want to be.”
68

extent of the debate, because in Phoenix there is very little debating one of 

the ASACs or the SAC. So it was, you know, a declaration, you don't 

know what walking guns is, we are not walking guns, this is all okay.183

Voth’s second attorney has stated that this e-mail and the subsequent meeting of Group 

VII addressed only personnel conflicts in Group VII over scheduling shifts to work in the wire 

room, rather than differences of opinion over the tactics of the case.184 The testimony of several 

other agents in Group VII, including Special Agents Larry Alt, Lee Casa, John Dodson, and 

Mark Sonnendecker, however, contradicts the version advanced by Voth’s attorney.

185

 Though 

Voth’s attorney stated that “the rest of the group [other than Dodson and Casa] did not 

complain”186 about the reckless tactics used in the case, Agent Sonnendecker told congressional 

investigators that he had concerns as well at the time of the meeting but thought that Dodson and 

Casa had made the point.187

Voth’s attorney also maintained that “the plain language of the e-mail establishes that the 

‘schism’ refers to a misperception of inequitable working conditions by certain agents and not a 

fight about investigative strategy or methods.”188 The e-mail, shown in its entirety above, clearly 

attempts to justify the use of a wiretap, calling it “the pinnacle of domestic U.S. law enforcement 

techniques” and “the biggest tool in our law enforcement tool box.”189

An additional memo prepared by another ATF agent further demonstrated the type of 

divisions that existed within ATF regarding Fast and Furious. Special Agent Gary Styers, who 

was detailed to the Phoenix Field Division during Fast and Furious, wrote about the effect of

Fast and Furious on agents within ATF. According to the document:

Special Agent Styers stated that the case had systematically divided and 

isolated agents from the group. The case agent had solicited the advice 

of numerous experienced agents, including Special Agent Styers, 

regarding how to conduct and end the wiretap operations and case overall. 

. . . Special Agent Styers felt that his advice and opinions, as well as other 

agents’ advice and opinions were widely disregarded.190

 

183 Dodson Transcript at 92 (Apr. 26, 2011) (Exhibit 93).

184 Voth Transcript at 201-202 (Exhibit 49); see also letter from Joshua Levy to Chairman Darrell Issa and Ranking 

Member Charles Grassley (Mar. 14, 2012), at 4-5 (attachments omitted) (Exhibit 43).

185 Alt Transcript at 29 (Exhibit 92); Transcript, Interview of Lee Casa by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Apr. 28, 2011), at 39-41 (Exhibit 94); 

Dodson Transcript at 44-45 (Exhibit 93); telephone interview of Mark Sonnendecker (Mar. 1, 2012).

186 Letter from Joshua Levy to Chairman Darrell Issa and Ranking Member Charles Grassley (Mar. 14, 2012), at 4 

(attachments omitted) (Exhibit 43).

187 Telephone interview of Mark Sonnendecker (Mar. 1, 2012) .

188 Letter from Joshua Levy to Chairman Darrell Issa and Ranking Member Charles Grassley (Mar. 14, 2012), at 5 

(attachments omitted) (Exhibit 43).

189 E-mail from David Voth to Phoenix Group VII (Mar. 12, 2010) [HOGR 001159] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 90).

190 Memorandum from Gary Styers to Robert Champion, “Contact with Congressional Investigators” (Feb. 3, 2011), 

at 2 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 95).
69

When asked what in particular he felt was incorrect about the way Fast and Furious was 

conducted, Styers elaborated: “[I]t is unheard of to have an active wiretap investigation without 

full time dedicated surveillance units on the ground. . . . [N]o agents in the group were assigned 

to surveillance on the Fast and Furious case.”191 Styers also gave a specific example of the type 

of scenario which caused the dissent within the group:

Special Agent Styers was asked to describe the operations and relayed that 

one of the operations was a suspected transaction that was to occur at a gas 

station and detailed agents were asked to cover the transaction. While 

positioning to observe the suspects, Special Agent Styers and other 

detailed agents were told by Special Agent McAllister that agents were too 

close and would burn the operation. Special Agent McAllister told all 

the agents to leave the immediate area. While the agents were 

repositioning, the transaction between the suspects took place and the 

vehicle that took possession of the firearms eventually left the area 

without agents following it.

192

Group Supervisor Voth’s March 12, 2010, e-mail, however, signaled disregard for the concerns 

of agents like Styers, and instead attempted to intimidate ATF agents into acquiescing to the 

strategy approved by “people of rank and authority at HQ.”193 

On March 19, 2010, Group Supervisor Voth wrote to ASAC Gillett that in just the 

previous four days, “[O]ur targets have purchased 105 firearms from local FFLs. This includes 3 

Barrett .50 caliber rifles. On one occasion surveillance followed Patino and Moore from [FFL] 

to [FFL] to Acosta’s location . . . . At Acosta’s location firearms were transferred into 3 separate 

waiting vehicles.”194 By that date, approximately 150 weapons had been recovered in Mexico or 

near the Mexican border.195 

On March 28, 2010, Voth e-mailed the FBI to add some additional purchasers to the list 

ATF had already asked to be flagged in NICS:

196

 

191 Id. at 3.

192 Id. (emphasis added).

193 E-mail from David Voth to Phoenix Group VII (Mar. 12, 2010) [HOGR 001159] (Exhibit 90).

194 E-mail from David Voth to George Gillett (Mar. 19, 2010) [HOGR 001480] (Exhibit 96).

195 Phoenix Group VII Bi-Weekly Update, 785115-10-[redacted], Jacob Chambers et al (Mar. 19, 2010) [HOGR 

002795] (Exhibit 97).

196 E-mail from David Voth to Eric Moore (Mar. 25, 2010) (Exhibit 80).
70

Voth’s March 25, 2010, e-mail raised concerns for FBI legal counsel, who questioned the 

inclusion in NICS of individuals who had ended their association with the straw purchasing 

ring:197

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

197 E-mails between David Voth and William Finch (Mar. 25, 2010) (Exhibit 80).
71

Notwithstanding Voth’s threat to “forgo any further inquiries into this matter,” he and Group VII 

continued to receive NICS notifications.198

On March 28, 2010, Voth sent senior ATF attorney Brian Kenrick and Phoenix Field 

Division counsel Thomas Karmgard an affidavit in support of a second wiretap in Fast and 

 

198 See, i.e., e-mail from Marc Chamberlain to David Voth (May 24, 2010) [HOGR 002691] (Exhibit 81).
72

Furious.199 Voth stated that the affidavit had been provided to AUSA Emory Hurley and that the 

Phoenix Field Division was hopeful Hurley would “submit it up the chain to OEO this upcoming 

week.”200 Kenrick sent a response on March 31, 2010, suggesting he shorten the affidavit in 

order to expedite the process for senior Department officials to review. He wrote: “[E]very time 

I read this case I am amazed at the amount of firearms we are talking about . . . . OEO is 

currently swamped with T3 applications and as you know they need to read each affidavit a 

couple times (and so does the DAG) before approval.”

201

Although Kenrick’s e-mail identified the same factors that caused DEA SAC Kempshall 

to warn ATF SAC Newell about the time required to obtain and renew federal wiretaps, Voth 

was impatient about the pace of the wiretap approval process. On April 2, 2010, two days after 

Kenrick’s e-mail, Voth sent an e-mail to AUSA Hurley and ASAC Gillett to report that the

statistics of murders in Mexico in March 2010 made it the “[m]ost violent month since 2005”—

and the perhaps related fact that subjects of Fast and Furious had “purchased 359 firearms during 

the month of March alone, to include numerous Barrett .50 caliber rifles.”

202 Voth still agreed 

that ATF should refrain from arresting any of the straw purchasers:203

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

199 E-mail from David Voth to Brian Kenrick and Thomas Karmgard (Mar. 28, 2010) (Exhibit 98).

200 Id.

201 E-mail from Brian Kenrick to David Voth (Mar. 31, 2010) (emphasis added) (Exhibit 99).

202 E-mail from David Voth to Emory Hurley and George Gillett (Apr. 2, 2010) [HOGR 001423] (Exhibit 100).

203 Id.
73

Voth and others at ATF fully understood the extent of the violence in Mexico. The agency’s 

strategy to allow the transfer of guns to continue to take place undoubtedly made it worse. Yet,

rather than “rush in to arrest any one person,” and in spite of the “urgency” Voth stressed, the 

Phoenix Field Division still wanted to wait and “tak[e] into account the entire scope of the 

conspiracy.”204

That very night, on April 2, 2010, Phoenix police officers noticed a vehicle traveling the 

wrong direction with its headlights off.205 After they turned around and began following the 

vehicle, the officers observed a silver handgun being thrown out the passenger-side window of 

 

204 Id.

205 Phoenix Police Department Report 2010-00481598 (Apr. 2, 2010) (Exhibit 101).

“[W]ithout being dramatic, we 

have a sense of urgency with 

regards to this investigation. . . . 

I believe we are righteous in our 

plan to dismantle this entire 

organization and to rush in to 

arrest any one person . . . would 

be ill advised to the overall good 

of the mission.”
74

the moving vehicle. A subsequent traffic stop revealed that the vehicle had three occupants, one 

of whom was Manuel Celis-Acosta.206 

Upon searching the vehicle, officers found casings from the discarded handgun all over 

the back seat of the vehicle, an additional two firearms—including a semiautomatic Glock 

handgun—and a small bag of cocaine. The silver handgun that had been thrown out the window 

had been purchased one week earlier—by Uriel Patino, a prolific purchaser in Fast and 

Furious.207 Celis-Acosta was arrested that night for possession of narcotics, but inexplicably, he 

was never charged.208 The incident was one of several which contradicted ATF’s claim that it

could not have arrested the straw buyers sooner than it did because it lacked evidence to do so. 

As Voth’s e-mail above suggests, ATF was interested in pursuing larger charges, not pulling 

individuals off the street—even though stopping the straw buying ring in April 2010 by indicting 

Celis-Acosta would have prevented hundreds of guns from going to Mexico. 

One week later, on April 9, 2010, AUSA Emory Hurley wrote as part of an update on 

Fast and Furious sent around his office: “This case sucks up a tremendous amount of AUSA time 

consulting with agents.”209 Just a week after Hurley’s e-mail, Voth’s supervisor ASAC George 

Gillett, who had been closely involved with the case from the beginning, began a leave of 

absence that would last until the beginning of June.210 Gillett later testified that he transitioned 

oversight of the case to ASAC Jim Needles at the time the leave of absence began.211 However, 

Needles testified that he didn’t take over responsibility for the case until the first week of June,

when Gillett returned.212 Although SAC Newell had already been heavily involved in Fast and 

Furious, it appears that he did not ensure ASAC Needles was managing the case during that sixweek period, allowing direct oversight to be severed at a critical time.

On March 26, 2010, ATF sent a memorandum on long gun demand letters to Justice 

Department headquarters. The purpose of the memorandum was to “[o]btain concurrence for 

ATF to issue demand letters to FFLs requiring multiple sales information for certain rifles as a 

pilot project.”213 ATF cited Fast and Furious as an example of the potential benefit of the 

demand letter program. The volume of guns in the case was used to bolster the argument for the 

letter:

214

 

206 Id.

207 ATF Suspect Gun Summary, Uriel Patino (entered Mar. 30, 2010) (Exhibit 102).

208 Id.

209 E-mail from Emory Hurley to Joe Koehler (April 9, 2010) [HOGR 003003] (Exhibit 103).

210 Gillett Transcript at 41 (Exhibit 4).

211 Gillett Transcript at 35 (Exhibit 4).

212 Transcript, Interview of James Needles by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Nov. 4, 2011), at 7 (Exhibit 104).

213 Memorandum for the Attorney General from Kenneth Melson, “Issuing demand letters to Federal firearms 

licensees (FFLs) in selected states requiring them to submit multiple sales information concerning certain types of 

rifles” (Mar. 26, 2010), at 3 [HOGR 004972-004976] (Exhibit 105).

214 Id.
75

The memo also illustrated just how unusual a volume 1,130 firearms was, since the next-highest 

cases cited involved “several hundred,” “19,” “five,” and “69,” respectively.215 The memo failed 

to acknowledge that the demand letter would not have aided ATF in Fast and Furious, as ATF 

knew contemporaneously of long gun sales and yet encouraged FFLs to continue those sales.

 

215 Id.

“Case agents 

identified 25 

individuals 

that 

purchased in 

excess of 1130 

firearms in 

the Phoenix 

area with 

over-the 

counter cash 

transactions.”
76

9. Additional FBI Connection to Fast and Furious

FINDING: Mistakes compounded: In the spring of 2010, FBI and DEA positively 

identified the two individuals for whom the straw purchasing ring had 

acquired weapons. However, FBI and ATF missed another 

opportunity to share information and coordinate their cases. Later, 

the FBI targets—drug kingpins with a long history of violence—

became FBI informants. Questions about inadequate coordination 

remain unanswered, and the Committees will need to further pursue 

the role of classified matters related to Fast and Furious.

On March 29, 2010, ATF identified an additional phone number for deconfliction. The 

deconfliction revealed that the phone number was connected with the DEA/FBI Operation Head 

Shot.216 Hope MacAllister contacted DEA in a March 30, 2010, e-mail to inquire about the 

connection. DEA responded the next day:

217

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

216 October 5 Briefing (supra note 76).

217 E-mail from [DEA] to Hope MacAllister (Mar. 31, 2010) (Exhibit 106).
77

On April, 9, 2010, ATF submitted more phone numbers for deconfliction, and, on April 

19, 2010, an intelligence analyst from ATF’s OSII contacted the FBI’s New Mexico office to 

inquire about the targets of Operation Head Shot.

218

 When the ATF analyst asked the FBI agent 

if he knew about Fast and Furious, the analyst got the impression that the FBI case agent was 

aware of it. When the ATF analyst asked further about the overlap between Fast and Furious and 

Operation Head Shot, the FBI agent simply told the ATF analyst that the FBI “has a gun case 

and a DTO case.”219 

 

218 October 5 Briefing (supra note 76).

219 Telephone interview of [ATF intelligence analyst] (Oct. 25, 2011).

“[W]e think they may 

have received 

weapons from Acosta 

as well.”
78

Documents show that by March 2010, the FBI knew about a stash house run by one of 

Operation Head Shot’s targets, and that the target was purchasing weapons from Celis-Acosta.220 

The ATF analyst did not ask further questions. The ATF analyst, like most of ATF, was

completely unaware that the FBI’s case was focused on the very traffickers buying weapons 

from Celis-Acosta and his straw purchasing ring—the same cartel associates ATF sought to 

identify through Fast and Furious.221 This lack of effective information-sharing contributed to 

the failure to shut down Fast and Furious. However, ATF’s failure to act on the information it 

was given contributed to the failure to shut down Fast and Furious.

After the investigative phase of Fast and Furious had largely wrapped up, Operation Head 

Shot concluded when the FBI signed up the above weapons trafficker, “Target A,” as a paid 

confidential informant. Target A pled guilty to a one-count violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) 

and 924(a)(2), being an Alien in Possession of a Firearm. Target A was not prosecuted for his 

role in trafficking weapons from the Fast and Furious straw purchasing ring to Mexico.222

 

220 FBI Form FD-302, at 1 (Mar. 26, 2010) (Exhibit 107).

221 Id.

222 Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Final Report, Operation Head Shot (Feb. 3, 2011) (Exhibit 

108).
79

The Committees have received further information on Operation Head Shot that cannot 

be made public due to its sensitive nature. Many questions still remain. Of the over $1,000,000 

straw purchasers spent on weapons in Fast and Furious, it is unclear how much Target A 

provided. The transactions detailed above may have been one-time events or may be examples

of extensive gun trafficking activities throughout Fast and Furious. The FBI refused to provide 

enough information to know one way or the other.223 If Target A was the source of a significant 

amount of the straw purchasing funds used in Fast and Furious, the FBI’s decision to sign him up 

as an informant and failing to prosecute him raises many questions. It is unclear what exactly the 

FBI knew about Target A’s involvement in gun trafficking with the Fast and Furious suspects at 

the time it decided to forgo prosecution in favor of cooperation. It is also unclear what valuable

information, if anything, the FBI obtained as a result of the cooperation agreement. Accordingly, 

further examination of agencies’ procedures for signing up confidential informants is necessary.

Additionally, Operation Fast and Furious may have involved classified information. On

January 11, 2010, Kevin O’Keefe, the Chief of ATF’s Criminal Intel Division, wrote to a 

prosecutor at the Justice Department:

The Arizona case continued to progress—info coming in from the 

investigation, a DEA wire that intersects a common player, and from the 

intel community (at the classified level).224

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

223 October 5 Briefing (supra note 76).

224 E-mail from Kevin O’Keefe to Joseph Cooley (Jan. 11, 2010) [HOGR 003408-003409] (emphasis added) 

(Exhibit 109).
80

Similarly, on December 7, 2009, Group VII Supervisor David Voth’s very first day in Phoenix, 

he e-mailed his supervisor, ASAC George Gillett:225

SOD stands for Special Operations Division, but it is unclear which agency’s SOD was being 

referenced. Gillett responded:226

“High side info” is a term usually used to refer to classified information from the FBI. Because 

questions still remain, the Committees will need to pursue the role of classified information in 

Fast and Furious.

 

225 E-mail from David Voth to George Gillett (Dec. 7, 2009) [HOGR 002273] (Exhibit 110).

226 E-mail from George Gillett to David Voth (Dec. 7, 2009) [HOGR 002273] (Exhibit 110).
81

10. Operation Wide Receiver

FINDING: An outrage concealed: In April 2010, senior Justice Department 

officials told ATF about gunwalking in Operation Wide Receiver, a 

case that ended in 2007. However, the Justice Department’s focus was 

on press implications instead of accountability. As a result, ATF’s 

response was that it was “nothing terrible.” The Justice Department 

prosecuted the case and ATF continued to use similar reckless tactics

in Fast and Furious.

In April 2010, the Department of Justice informed ATF of a prior case in which ATF’s 

Phoenix Field Division had walked guns: Operation Wide Receiver. In an April 19, 2010,

meeting, James Trusty, Acting Chief of the Gang Unit at the Department of Justice, brought the 

issue of gunwalking to the attention of Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, the head of the 

Department’s Criminal Division.

227

 Trusty subsequently noted Breuer’s instruction from the 

meeting to a colleague: “Wants us to meet with Ken [Melson] and Billy [Hoover] at some point 

so they know the bad stuff that could come out.”228

Jason Weinstein, Deputy Assistant Attorney General (“DAAG”) in the Criminal 

Division, contacted Deputy Director Hoover to set up the meeting. Weinstein wrote to Hoover

about the “media challenges” posed by gunwalking:

229

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

227 Meeting between Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General and 

Chief of Staff Mythili Raman, Steve Fagell, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jason Weinstein, Deputy Chief of 

Staff and Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General Amy Pope, Acting Gang Unit Chief Jim Trusty, Capitol Case 

Unit Chief and former Gang Unit Chief Kevin Carwile (Apr. 19, 2010) [HOGR 003450] (Exhibit 111).

228 E-mail from James Trusty to Kevin Carwile (Apr. 19, 2010) [HOGR 003451] (Exhibit 111).

229 E-mail from Jason Weinstein to William Hoover (Apr. 20, 2010) [HOGR 003452] (Exhibit 111).
82

Later that day, ATF representatives on the Justice Department’s Southwest Border Working 

Group e-mailed an analyst within ATF’s Office of Field Operations: “Per discussion this date, 

requesting supplemental documentation, if any, issued by HQ and/or Field Divisions reflecting 

the requirement of supervisory/SAC approval for ‘Weapons Transfers,’ which is not addressed in

ATF O[rder] 3310.48.”230 Stuart Lowrey, Chief of ATF’s Firearms Operations Division, was 

copied on the e-mail.231 ATF headquarters seemed to be doing its homework to find out the 

regulations applicable to instances in which guns might be walked, and, in particular, whether 

SAC approval was required for weapons transfers as outlined by ATF Order 3310.4B, Section 

148.

On April 26, 2010, DAAG Weinstein e-mailed Hoover, “[D]o you have time this week to 

talk about that tricky gun traff. case in AZ?”232 Hoover, along with McMahon, scheduled a 

meeting with Weinstein for later that week.

233

 The day before the meeting, ATF’s Office of 

Field Operations responded to the Southwest Border Working Group’s request. The e-mail from 

Field Operations staff stated:

I’ve checked several resources . . . and not been able to find any 

supplemental policy regarding weapons transfer. It seems the information 

in ATF O 3310.4B is the only policy that exist[s].234

In other words, Order 3310.4B apparently did not require supervisory approval in order to allow 

firearms to be transferred to further an investigation. The Southwest Border Working Group 

 

230 E-mail from [ATF Southwest Border Working Group staff] to [Program Analyst, Office of Field Operations, 

ATF] (Apr. 20, 2010) [HOGR 002077-002079] (Exhibit 112).

231 Id.

232 E-mail from Jason Weinstein to William Hoover (Apr. 26, 2010) [HOGR 003460] (Exhibit 113).

233 E-mail from William Hoover to Anjanette Walker (Apr. 27, 2010) [HOGR 003469] (Exhibit 114).

234 E-mail from [Program Analyst, Office of Field Operations, ATF] to [ATF Southwest Border Working Group 

staff] (Apr. 27, 2010) [HOGR 002077-002079] (Exhibit 112).

“The reason we wanted to 

meet with you before 

charging is that the case has 

2 aspects that could create 

media challenges and we 

wanted to talk through 

them first.”
83

staff forwarded the response from ATF Field Operations to ATF Southwest Border Initiative 

Coordinator Ray Rowley.235

In preparation for the April 28, 2010, meeting with ATF, Weinstein e-mailed Trusty: “If 

ok with you, I figured you could do for Billy what you did for Lanny in terms of describing the 

case and the issues, and then we can spend the rest of the time talking messaging.”236 Weinstein 

appeared interested in minimizing the embarrassment to ATF over the gunwalking in Wide 

Receiver instead of holding anyone accountable for gunwalking, or ensuring it did not happen 

again. Weinstein also invited a press aide from the Office of Public Affairs in the Deputy 

Attorney General’s office to attend the meeting. Her notes indicate Operation Wide Receiver 

was not the only case discussed at the meeting—Operation Fast and Furious was as well:237

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

235 E-mail from [ATF Southwest Border Working Group staff] to Raymond Rowley (Apr. 27, 2010) [HOGR 

002077] (Exhibit 112).

236 E-mail from Jason Weinstein to James Trusty (Apr. 28, 2010) [HOGR 003477] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 115).

237 Notes of Alisa Finelli, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department (Apr. 28, 2010) [HOGR 006989] (Exhibit 

116). The Justice Department produced these notes on June 19, 2012 – just as Attorney General Eric Holder was 

negotiating a settlement proposal with Congress. The Committee voted to recommend the House hold him in 

contempt 2 days later. The e-mail was the only document that the Justice Department had produced in a month and 

one of only thirty pages produced in two months.
84

After the meeting, Weinstein e-mailed Lanny Breuer, again focusing on the press strategy 

for announcing the case rather than correcting the problem with gunwalking:

238

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

238 E-mail from Jason Weinstein to Lanny Breuer (Apr. 30, 2010) [HOGR 003485] (Exhibit 117).

“Fast and Furious”
85

Project Deliverance was the name given to an umbrella project to announce various cases from 

around the country to the public all at once. By proposing to include Wide Receiver as part of 

Project Deliverance, the Justice Department apparently hoped to bury the case among others to 

minimize the media attention and fallout.

Given the focus of Breuer and Weinstein on damage control rather than accountability, it 

is not surprising that ATF left the April 28, 2010, meeting with the Criminal Division with the 

“[T]he best way to announce 

the case without highlighting 

the negative part of the story 

and risking embarrassing ATF 

is as part of Deliverance.”

“ATF let a bunch of guns walk”
86

impression that the tactics used in Wide Receiver were no big deal. McMahon characterized the 

meeting for Chait as “[s]ome surprises but nothing terrible.”239

These contemporaneous e-mails stand in stark contrast to the outrage Weinstein 

professed to congressional investigators that he felt over Wide Receiver. Weinstein testified:

I was stunned by those tactics which were unlike anything I had 

encountered in my career as a prosecutor; and, although the tactics had 

been used years earlier, I was sufficiently troubled by them that I raised 

them with Mr. Breuer and at his direction with top officials at ATF. I 

made clear to ATF my concerns about the tactics, and I was satisfied that 

ATF leadership shared those concerns and viewed those tactics as 

unacceptable.240

Breuer took a similar stance when documents subpoenaed from the Justice Department revealed 

his awareness of gunwalking in a case prior to Fast and Furious. Breuer issued a public 

statement claiming he had taken strong action:

When I learned of the unacceptable tactics used in Operation Wide 

Receiver, I instructed one of my Deputy Assistant Attorneys General to 

schedule a meeting with ATF’s Acting Director and Deputy Director to 

bring these issues to their attention. The next day, my Deputy contacted 

ATF leadership to arrange a meeting, and approximately one week later, 

my Deputy met with the ATF Deputy Director and others to discuss this 

matter.241

The claims of Breuer and Weinstein that these tactics were “unacceptable” are inconsistent with 

McMahon’s contemporaneous report of the meeting as “nothing terrible.” McMahon’s attitude 

about the Wide Receiver meeting spread throughout ATF. ATF did not get the supposedly clear 

message that guns were not to be walked again. If it had, Fast and Furious might have been shut 

down sooner.

 

239 E-mail from William McMahon to Mark Chait (Apr. 28, 2010) [HOGR 005455] (Exhibit 118).

240 Transcript, Interview of Jason Weinstein by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Jan. 10, 2012), at 10 [hereinafter Weinstein 

Transcript] (Exhibit 119).

241 Public Statement, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer (Oct. 31, 2011).
87

11. Fast and Furious Exit Strategy and Impact

FINDING: Arrests delayed: The Fast and Furious exit strategy acknowledged

that enough evidence existed to arrest the key straw buyers, but 

argued that doing so would not cripple the organization. The straw 

purchasers continued to buy hundreds of additional firearms.

After receiving a detailed briefing about Fast and Furious in mid-March 2010, ATF 

Deputy Director Hoover tasked Deputy Assistant Director McMahon with crafting an exit 

strategy for Fast and Furious.242 This request for an exit strategy was unique for Hoover,

something he had never asked for before,243 and represented an effort to obtain a roadmap for 

Fast and Furious to be shut down.244 On April 13, 2010, McMahon visited the Phoenix Field 

Division and met with David Voth a mere 45 minutes after his plane landed.

245

 Yet by the end of 

April, McMahon had still not communicated the request for an exit strategy to the Phoenix Field 

Division.

On April 27, 2010, the day before McMahon and Hoover met with the Department 

regarding Wide Receiver, McMahon finally e-mailed Bill Newell to request the exit strategy in 

Fast and Furious:

246

Newell wrote back to McMahon and complained once again to headquarters about being 

accountable for the conduct of his cases:

247

 

 

242 Transcribed Interview of William McMahon, at 85 (June 28, 2011) [hereinafter McMahon Transcript] (Exhibit 

120).

243 Transcribed Interview of William Hoover, at 72 (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter Hoover Transcript] (Exhibit 121).

244 Id. at 60-61; Transcript, Interview of Mark Chait by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (July 20, 2011), at 33-35 [hereinafter Chait Transcript]

(Exhibit 122).

245 Id.

246 E-mail from William McMahon to William Newell (Apr. 27, 2010) [HOGR 002416] (Exhibit 123).

247 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Apr. 27, 2010) [HOGR 002416] (Exhibit 123).
88

Newell sent this message just one day before the Criminal Division met with ATF about 

gunwalking in Operation Wide Receiver, a case he had also supervised. Given the context and 

timing of the e-mail, Newell’s reference to “sensitivities” may suggest that he was aware that 

Fast and Furious raised the same concerns about gunwalking that occurred in Wide Receiver.

Later that day, Acting ASAC David Palmer asked David Voth to draft an exit strategy

within 24 hours.248 Voth sent a draft of the exit strategy to Palmer later that evening,

249 and 

Palmer forwarded it to Newell two hours later.250 Within ten minutes, Newell sent the exit 

strategy to both McMahon251 and Dennis Burke.252 Despite the Phoenix Field Division’s quick 

turnaround, however, McMahon did not send the exit strategy to his boss Mark Chait until May 

3, 2010.

253

The exit strategy acknowledged that the Phoenix Field Division was seeking to do more 

than just get enough evidence to take Patino and others off the street: “[A] straw purchase 

prosecution requires different evidence and burden of proof than an international firearms 

trafficking conspiracy.”254 The document again argued against arresting straw purchasers:

255

 

248 Letter from Joshua Levy to Elijah Cummings (Mar. 14, 2012), at 16 (Exhibit 124).

249 E-mail from David Voth to Douglas Palmer (Apr. 27, 2010) (Exhibit 125).

250 E-mail from Douglas Palmer to William Newell (Apr. 27, 2010) [HOGR 1178] (Exhibit 126).

251 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Apr. 27, 2010) [HOGR 001178] (Exhibit 126).

252 E-mail from William Newell to Dennis Burke (Apr. 27, 2010) [HOGR 002588] (Exhibit 127).

253 E-mail from William McMahon to Mark Chait (May 3, 2010) [HOGR 001178] (Exhibit 126).

254 “Operation Fast and Furious Exit Strategy” (Apr. 27, 2010), at 1 [HOGR 001179-001181] (Exhibit 126).

255 Id.

“As for Fast and Furious I have already discussed 

an exit strategy and will have that today . . . . I 

don’t like HQ driving our cases but understand 

the ‘sensitivities’ of this case better than 

anyone.”
89

While the exit strategy attempts to offer a justification for refusing to arrest Uriel Patino, the 

document also acknowledges that there was, in fact, sufficient evidence to arrest Patino at that 

time:

256

Voth later testified that arresting Patino in April 2010 “was a discussion we had with the U.S. 

Attorney and amongst ourselves, and that was the general consensus, that taking him down 

wouldn’t have brought the organization to an end or to a close.”257 By the date of the strategy, 

Patino had purchased over 475 firearms—at least 440 of them after he had been entered as a 

target in Fast and Furious—and would go on to purchase at least another 169 more.258 In fact, 

70% of the 1,880 Fast and Furious guns that would eventually be added to ATF’s Suspect Gun 

Database were bought by just five straw purchasers.259 Had ATF simply arrested those five 

individuals, it could have significantly reduced the overall number of guns illegally purchased in 

the case.

Instead, ATF wanted to tie Patino in with Celis-Acosta and a drug trafficking 

organization (DTO) in Mexico. The exit strategy concluded with its goals:260

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

256 Id.

257 Voth Transcript at 233 (Exhibit 49).

258 ATF Suspect Gun Database, Uriel Patino.

259 Those five purchasers were Uriel Patino, Sean Steward, Josh Moore, Alfredo Celis, and Jacob Montelongo. ATF 

Suspect Gun Database.

260 “Operation Fast and Furious Exit Strategy” (Apr. 27, 2010), at 3 [HOGR 001179-001181] (Exhibit 126).
90

According to the document, as of April 2010, ATF planned to have Fast and Furious finished

with arrests and search warrants, by the beginning of August 2010. Instead, while waiting on the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office to return indictments, ATF failed to arrest anyone until almost five 

months later—after the death of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry. They would not get 

anyone higher than the ringleader initially targeted over a year earlier, Manuel Celis-Acosta.

12. Continuation of Fast and Furious

FINDING: Gun dealers misled and the ring-leader released: The Fast and Furious exit 

strategy was ignored as the case dragged on into the summer of 2010. ATF 

continued to mislead FFLs about the interdiction of weapons, and ATF 

investigative agents acted recklessly by crossing the line into ATF’s 

regulatory function. Manuel Celis-Acosta was stopped and interviewed at 

the border, but was still allowed to cross into Mexico.

Although ATF management became aware of the use of gunwalking in Operation Wide 

Receiver, that same investigative technique continued unabated for months on end in Fast and 

Furious. The Department of Justice’s Criminal Division kept approving wiretap applications for 

Fast and Furious, and ATF continued using the same gunwalking tactics, watching straw 

purchasers illegally purchase firearms from FFLs cooperating with ATF which were then 

trafficked into Mexico. The lessons supposedly learned from Wide Receiver deterred neither the 

Justice Department nor ATF from continuing down the same path with the same investigative 

techniques in Fast and Furious.

A. Federal Firearms Licensees

Federal Firearms Licensees in Arizona became unwillingly embroiled in ATF’s 

recklessness. A general update on ATF investigations at the end of April 2010 added a new 

development: “Additionally, agents [redacted] consensually record calls to/from a friendly FFL 
91

[Federal Firearms Licensee] and one of the suspects for the purpose of ordering and discussing 

large-scale firearms purchases.”261 

Earlier that month, another FFL had expressed concerns to Group Supervisor Voth, 

writing: “[W]e were hoping to put together something like a letter of understanding to alleviate 

concerns of some type of recourse against us down the road for selling these items. We just want 

to make sure we are cooperating with ATF and that we are viewed as not selling to bad guys.”262 

Voth reassured the FFL, claiming that ATF was “continually monitoring” the suspects using 

methods he supposedly could not disclose:

263

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

261 ATF Investigations, Operation: Fast and Furious (CHAMBERS, et al) [HOGR 002407-002408] (Exhibit 128).

262 E-mail from [FFL2] to David Voth (Apr. 13, 2010) (Exhibit 129).

263 E-mail from David Voth to [FFL2] (Apr. 13, 2010) (emphasis added) (Exhibit 129).
92

Voth’s reassurances were hollow, since ATF was not “continually monitoring these 

suspects” and agents were only interdicting a fraction of the guns. In a subsequent meeting on 

May 13, 2010, between Voth, AUSA Hurley, and the FFL, Hurley told the FFL that it was very 

important for the FFL to participate and that the participation was leading to arrests.264 ATF did 

“not go into detail” on just how much it knew about these straw purchasers, namely, the 

conversations from the DEA or federal wires, the recovery of the guns in Mexico, and the short 

times-to-crime. Instead, ATF officials encouraged cooperating FFLs to sell guns to suspected 

straw purchasers, sometimes even giving the FFLs a list of individuals to whom they wanted 

them to sell guns.265 And so the FFLs did. As a result, the same straw purchasers kept on 

acquiring more and more guns. One buyer alone, Uriel Patino, bought the vast majority of his 

 

264 Telephone interview of [FFL2] (Apr. 5, 2011).

265 Telephone interview of [FFL3] (May 17, 2011).

“[I]f it helps put you at ease 

we (ATF) are continually 

monitoring these suspects 

using a variety of 

investigative techniques 

which I cannot go into 

detail.”

“I understand that the 

frequency with which 

some individuals under 

investigation by our office 

have been purchasing 

firearms from your 

business has caused 

concerns for you.”
93

guns—661 in all—after ATF identified him as a target in the investigation. In total, Patino

purchased 720 weapons.

In testimony to the Committees, one FFL described the representations that ATF made in 

encouraging the FFL to go through with extremely suspicious transactions: 

Q. Was it your understanding they (ATF) were watching the camera 

so they could surveil some of these straw purchase suspects?

A. That is the purpose they told me, yes.

Q. Was it your understanding they were going to interdict these 

weapons shortly after?

A. Absolutely. I was assured all the way through this program that 

they would be stopped before they would ever harm anyone or get 

below the border.

Q. So ATF made affirmative representations to you that these 

weapons would be interdicted?

A. The entire time.

Q. Did they make any representations to you that other FFLs were 

participating in a similar type of arrangement?

A. They did.266

These FFLs continued to voice their concerns to ATF. Yet not only were the FFLs 

assured that the weapons were being interdicted, but, as discussed earlier, they were also 

pressured to provide weapons to the straw purchasers. Since ATF also oversees the licensing 

and regulation of FFLs, FFLs were in a difficult position to turn down requests from the ATF. 

Group Supervisor Voth promised one cooperating FFL that the renewal of their federal license—

which the ATF’s federal firearms licensing center oversees—would not be a problem. One 

exchange between Voth and one cooperating FFL follows:267

 

266 [FFL1] Transcript at 63-64 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 48).

267 E-mail from [FFL2] to David Voth (Exhibit 130).
94

Voth responded a few minutes later, promising to accomplish “compliance through previous 

disclosure.”268

The FFL provided the information of the identity of the compliance investigator:269

 

268 E-mail from David Voth to [FFL2] (Exhibit 130).

269 E-mail from [FFL2] to David Voth (Exhibit 130).
95

Shortly thereafter, Voth took care of the matter, writing: “I spoke with Ben Richardson and I 

think we have come to an agreement. I will however speak with his supervisor but I don’t 

anticipate any problems.”270

ATF headquarters frowned upon Voth’s conduct in this matter, namely blurring the line 

between ATF’s regulatory and investigative functions. As Bill McMahon testified:

Q. This is an email from [FFL] notifying Voth that their annual check 

is occurring, and they were requesting extensive documentation. 

And so [FFL] tells Voth about this. And over the course of the 

next couple pages, Voth confirms that . . . he essentially can help 

[FFL] out with this . . . with their regulatory -- on the regulatory 

side of things. 

So the concern here is, if [FFL] doesn't go through with the 

transaction it discussed with Voth, they might be worried about 

getting jammed up on the regulatory side of things. You can see 

here with these emails that there was a discussion about the 

regulatory side of things, and it looks like Voth hooked him up. 

Is that concerning to you? 

A. Very much. Very much. 

* * *

Q. Okay. So this is a problem. 

 

270 E-mail from David Voth to [FFL2] (Exhibit 130).
96

A. Absolutely. 

Q. Okay.

A. We have to keep that balance. We license the industry. That is our 

job. And then we also conduct criminal investigations. They 

can't bleed into one another.271 

Even into the summer of 2010, six months after FFLs began cooperating with ATF on Fast and 

Furious and ATF told them they were providing an invaluable service, David Voth and other 

Group VII agents still failed to give the FFLs any indication that the guns they were being 

encouraged to sell under ATF’s watchful eye were ending up on the other side of the border.

B. The Operation Continues

On May 5, 2010, the Criminal Division in Justice Department headquarters asked ATF to 

provide case summaries for a briefing with Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer in 

anticipation of an upcoming trip to Mexico to meet with the U.S. Ambassador and the Mexican 

Attorney General.272 ATF did not want to send a summary of Fast and Furious to Breuer. David 

Booth in ATF’s International Affairs Office wrote to Stuart Lowrey, Chief of ATF’s Firearms 

Operation Division discouraging a discussion of the case with Mexican officials:

273

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

271 McMahon Transcript at 190-191 (Exhibit 120).

272 E-mail from [DOJ Criminal Division] to [Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys] (May 5, 2010) [HOGR 002568] 

(Exhibit 131).

273 E-mail from David Booth to Stuart Lowrey (May 5, 2010) [HOGR 002565] (Exhibit 132).
97

Lowrey responded: “Yeah – anything sensitive should be held back.”274

ATF continued to try to trace the guns straw purchasers were buying to recoveries in 

Mexico. On May 21, 2010, Voth e-mailed Group VII agents reminding them to document such

recoveries:275

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

274 E-mail from Stuart Lowrey to David Booth (May 5, 2010) [HOGR 002575-002579] (Exhibit 133).

275 E-mail from David Voth to Ali Berisha, et al. (May 21, 2010) [HOGR 005007] (Exhibit 134).

“We don’t want to use fast and furious 

(chambers, et. al) [sic], as that case, for a few 

reasons, is not the best one to trumpet in 

front of the Mexicans right now.”
98

Special Agent John Dodson testified that around this time, he continued warning about the 

possible consequences of this strategy:

[I]n May as the GRIT team or gunrunner initiative team was coming out

. . . I was having a conversation with Special Agent McAllister about the

case in which the conversation ended with me asking her are you prepared 

to go to a border agent's funeral over this or a Cochise County deputy's 

over this, because that's going to happen. And the sentiment that was

given back to me by both her, the group supervisor, was that, or along the 

lines of, if you are going to make an omelette, you need to scramble some 

eggs.276

Although Group Supervisor Voth’s second attorney claims that there is no evidence that agents 

complained to Voth about the tactics of Fast and Furious, the Committees are aware of no one 

who has denied that Agent Dodson made this comment to Case Agent MacAllister.277

ATF leadership was also soon explicitly discussing the issue of gunwalking. On June 1, 

2010, Southwest Border Initiative Coordinator Rowley forwarded the April 27, 2010, e-mail he 

 

276 Dodson Transcript at 136 (Exhibit 93).

277 Letter from Joshua Levy to Chairman Issa and Ranking Member Grassley (Mar. 14, 2012), at 3-4 (attachments 

omitted) (Exhibit 43).

“[I]f your case has firearms 

recovered in Mexico . . . document 

that people were killed, drug[s] were 

recovered, it was Cartel related etc. 

This will help us down the road . . .”
99

had received regarding ATF Order 3310.4B to Assistant Director Chait and Deputy Assistant 

Director McMahon. Implying that one of them had made a request on the issue, Rowley wrote:

This is what we’ve come up with regarding the transfer of firearms during 

the course of an investigation. This issue came up during the recent 

firearms trafficking seminar I attended in El Paso. Specifically, it appears 

that agents in the field are of the opinion that they can transfer or 

permit the transfer of firearms to further an investigation without HQ 

knowledge or approval. The language below would seem to support that 

position. Given that our Firearms Enforcement Order has not been 

updated for 21 years and much has changed during the intervening period 

I recommend that we develop policy to address this issue immediately, 

followed by an effort to update the Order.278

Firearms Operations Division Chief Lowrey responded:

279

 

278 E-mail from Raymond Rowley to Mark Chait and William McMahon (Jun. 1, 2010) [HOGR 002077] (emphasis 

added) (Exhibit 112).

279 E-mail from Stuart Lowrey to Raymond Rowley (Jun. 1, 2010) [HOGR 002077] (Exhibit 112).

“The question you raised 

before was what volume 

of firearms is acceptable 

to allow to ‘walk’ before 

we intervene, 5, 10, 50?”
100

The “immediate work ahead,” the subject of the meeting that day that ATF leadership had 

previously discussed, is unclear. It does not appear that ATF headquarters took any steps to 

address the issue or clarify its understanding of ATF Order 3310.4B as Rowley had suggested

until much later, after the Fast and Furious scandal erupted.

Just two days before this discussion took place, the Phoenix Field Division had its most 

significant development to date in the Fast and Furious investigation. 

C. Manuel Celis Acosta Detained

On May 29, 2010, CBP stopped a vehicle at an Arizona point of entry for an outbound 

inspection. According to an ATF Report of Investigation (“ROI”) of the incident, an inspection 

of the vehicle revealed “an AK type high capacity drum magazine loaded with 74 rounds of 7.62 

ammunition underneath the spare tire in the trunk.”280 The driver of the vehicle was Manuel 

Celis-Acosta, the main target in Fast and Furious. CBP learned that Acosta was the principal 

target of a firearms investigation through a database search.281 CBP notified ICE, which in turn 

notified ATF.282 ATF Case Agent MacAllister and ICE Special Agent Layne France drove four 

hours from Phoenix to the Lukeville, Arizona point of entry where Celis-Acosta had been 

temporarily detained.283

In his interview with MacAllister, Celis-Acosta first denied that he knew anything about 

the magazines and ammunition found in the car.

284 He subsequently admitted that it was possible 

his fingerprints were on the magazines and ammunition and that he knew which FFL they had 

been purchased from.

285

 MacAllister had asked Celis-Acosta to prepare a written statement 

regarding the events that led to his detention, but after Celis-Acosta’s companions in the vehicle 

produced a contradictory statement, he began to divulge more information.286 Celis-Acosta went 

into great detail about his relationship with a cartel figure, supposedly cartel leader Chapo 

Guzman’s right hand man.287 By the end of the interview, Celis-Acosta admitted that his venture 

to Mexico was for the purpose of starting up a drug trafficking business.288 

One section of the ROI states:

CELIS-ACOSTA stated that the cartels like the AKs more than the ARs 

because the AKs never jam. CELIS-ACOSTA stated that the AR jam 

frequently and the AK’s are more reliable explaining a person can dip a 

 

280 Report of Investigation, CHAMBERS, Jacob, et al., Report #292, at 2 (Exhibit 135).

281 Id. at 1-2.

282 Id. at 2.

283 Id.

284 Id. at 3.

285 Id. at 5.

286 Id. at 3.

287 Id. at 4.

288 Id.
101

shoe lace in oil and run it through the barrel and the AK would never jam. 

He stated they also like the FiveSeven and Colt 38 Super “El Jefe”. 

CELIS-ACOSTA stated the FivenSevens [sic] (FN Herstal model 

FiveSeven, 5.7 caliber pistols) are referred to as “cop killers”. He also 

said the “El Jefe” is famous in Mexico and that they are seen as a status 

symbol. He said he did not like the “El Jefe”, but they were desired in 

Mexico.289

MacAllister asked Celis-Acosta to prepare a new written statement based on everything he had 

said in the interview.290 The ROI then describes Celis-Acosta being let go after asking

MacAllister to write her contact information on a ten dollar bill and promising to call her when 

he returned to Mexico:

291

 

On June 3, 2010, a few days after MacAllister’s interview with Acosta, ATF Phoenix 

SAC Newell wrote to McMahon at ATF Headquarters:

Acosta never called SA McAllister back on Tuesday, not a big surprise, 

but we are aware of his whereabouts. He met with one of the main straw 

purchasers (Stewart) yesterday regarding a purchase of 9mm handguns. 

 

289 Id. at 5.

290 Id.

291 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).

“CELIS-ACOSTA then asked S/A MacAllister to 

write the contact information on a ten dollar 

bill and told her he would call her upon his 

return from Mexico.”

“S/A MacAllister . . . warned CELIS-ACOSTA not to participate 

in any illegal activity unless under her direction.”
102

GRIT personnel are being used to maintain surveillance of Acosta and 

Stewart.292

Two weeks later the ROI noted, “As of June 16, 2010, CELIS-ACOSTA has not initiated any 

contact with S/A MacAllister.”293 The fact that the main target in ATF’s most important 

investigation never contacted the case agent after this encounter with law enforcement should not 

have come as a surprise to ATF and the Department. Without charging him with anything, 

Celis-Acosta had no incentive whatsoever to cooperate. Celis-Acosta was not arrested for seven 

more months.

By June 15, 2010, 179 guns had been recovered at crime scenes in Mexico and another 

130 in the U.S.—all tied to Fast and Furious.294 The gun trafficking ring Fast and Furious 

targeted had already spent more than $1 million and was still buying weapons from FFLs 

cooperating with ATF.295 And when the case agent had an opportunity to arrest the main target, 

she simply let him cross the border into Mexico.

ATF continued to receive contemporaneous and even advance notice of purchases from 

cooperating FFLs. For example, the same FFL who expressed concerns in April and met with 

Group Supervisor Voth and AUSA Hurley in May continued to cooperate with ATF. On June 

14, 2010, an FFL employee e-mailed ATF advanced notice of another purchase by Jaime 

Avila—the same straw buyer who purchased the guns later found at the Brian Terry murder 

scene:

296

Avila ended up not coming in to the FFL for the .50 caliber rifle until the next day, June 15, 

2010.297 It was his second in two weeks.298 Just two days later, the same FFL e-mailed Voth

again about his concern in continuing to sell to the straw buyers:

299

 

292 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Jun. 3, 2010) [HOGR 001417] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 

136).

293 Report of Investigation, CHAMBERS, Jacob, et al., Report #292 (Exhibit 135).

294 E-mail from Lorren Leadmon to Louis Quinonez (Jun. 15, 2010) [HOGR 002162-002163] (Exhibit 137).

295 Id.

296 E-mail from [FFL2] to [ATF Group VII Agent] (Jun. 15, 2010) (Exhibit 19).

297 Suspect Gun Summary, Jaime Avila Jr. (entered Jun. 16, 2010) (Exhibit 138).

298 Suspect Gun Database, Jaime Avila Jr.

299 E-mail from [FFL2] to David Voth (Jun. 17, 2010) (Exhibit 139).
103

Again, the FFL received assurances that cooperating was the right thing to do.

300

 According to 

the FFL, Hurley re-emphasized that it was extremely important for the FFL to participate and

falsely claimed that this participation was leading to arrests.301

As discussed previously, Avila could have been arrested that day, since that he no longer 

lived at the address he was swearing to on the 4473s. From June 10-15, 2010, Avila swore to the 

same false address in five 4473s, three at the cooperating FFL where ATF had video cameras 

above the counter.302 ATF had been aware of Avila since November 2009 and was clearly still 

monitoring him, as evidenced by the fact that the FFL knew to e-mail ATF about him. However, 

like Patino and others, ATF’s Group VII chose to allow these straw purchasers to continue to 

operate. Six months later, when guns purchased by Avila were found at the scene of Border 

 

300 Telephone interview of [FFL2] (Apr. 5, 2011).

301 Telephone interview of [FFL2] (Apr. 5, 2011).

302 Suspect Gun Database, Jaime Avila Jr.

“I wanted to make sure that none of the 

firearms that were sold per our conversation 

. . . could or would ever end up south of the 

border or in the hands of the bad guys . . .”

“I want to help ATF with its investigation but not 

at the risk of agents [sic] safety because I have 

some very close friends that are US Border Patrol 

agents in southern AZ . . .”
104

Patrol Agent Brian Terry’s death, Avila was finally arrested—for swearing to a false address on 

the June 15, 2010, purchase.303 ATF SAC William Newell was later questioned about whether 

or not ATF learned of the false address before the night of Agent Terry’s death. He stated:

A. [T]here was evidence that was gathered later in the case to be able 

to arrest [Avila] on a complaint.

Q. Surely you're not suggesting that you learned of the address change 

and the falsehood about the address on the form, you happened to 

learn about that on December 14th, the same night that Agent 

Terry was killed? That's not what you are suggesting, is it?

A. No. I'm not suggesting it at all.

Q. So you had the information that allowed you to make the complaint on him long 

before you actually did it, right?

A. I don't think it was long -- as I recall, the complaint lists purchases that were made 

in -- it was June or July.304

David Voth’s testimony contradicted Newell’s. Voth testified that ATF only bothered to check 

Avila’s address the night of Agent Terry’s death, when there was a much greater incentive to 

find a charge to hold Avila on.

305

 It’s unclear which of them is telling the truth.

ATF supervisors claim that sometime in June 2010, the U.S. Attorney’s Office finally 

gave authorization to begin seizing firearms in Fast and Furious.306 Because the Justice 

Department withheld documents subpoenaed from the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office and did 

not permit an interview of AUSA Emory Hurley or others at the office, it is difficult to assess 

this claim. It is clear that throughout the case, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of 

Arizona held ATF to meeting a higher threshold than necessary to begin seizing weapons.

Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office Criminal Chief, Patrick Cunningham, would later state in 

a memorandum specifically referring to whether guns should have been seized sooner in Fast and 

Furious: 

 

303 See Memorandum from Emory Hurley to Dennis K. Burke, “Jaime Avila, Jr.” (Jan. 28, 2011), at 2-3 [HOGR 

002348-002351] (Exhibit 26).

304 Transcript, Interview of William Newell by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Jun. 8, 2011), at 111 [hereinafter Newell Transcript] 

(Exhibit 140).

305 Voth transcript at 183-184 (Exhibit 49).

306 Letter from Joshua Levy to Chairman Darrell Issa and Ranking Member Grassley (Mar. 14, 2012), Attachment 3, 

Declaration of David Voth at 4-5 (other attachments omitted) (Exhibit 43); see also Letter from Paul Pelletier to 

Chairman Darrell Issa and Ranking Member Charles Grassley (Mar. 14, 2012), at 4 (Exhibit 141).
105

[U]ntil agents observe illegal conduct they cannot treat [straw purchasers] 

as anything other than ordinary buyers. At the time of transfer of the 

firearms from the FFL to the straw purchaser based upon the facts available to 

the FFL at the time of the sale, the sales to the “straw purchasers” are lawful

. . . .

307

In fact, sales to straw purchasers are not lawful at the time of the sale if a purchaser is violating 

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)—making any false or fictitious oral or written statement to deceive an 

FFL—or 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A)—knowingly making any false statement or representation 

with respect to the question on the 4473 of whether guns are for an individual’s own use. 

Second, “the facts available to the FFL at the time of the sale” are not the same as the facts that 

were available to ATF at the time of these sales. ATF had significantly more evidence indicating 

criminality than the FFLs did.

Cunningham continued:

In these investigations, there may come a point over the course of an 

investigation where ATF believes, though it is well short of proof beyond 

a reasonable doubt required in criminal cases, that they can prove that a 

particular person only buys guns for the purposes of illegal trafficking. 

However, seizure of the guns at that point may not be legal because 

purchasing multiple long guns in Arizona is lawful, transferring them to 

another is lawful and even sale or barter of the guns to another is lawful 

unless the United States can prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the firearm is intended to be used to commit a crime.308

Cunningham cites for authority of the above statement to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d). However, that 

statute does not say the government has to prove “that the firearm is intended to be used to 

commit a crime.” Rather, it states: “Any firearm or ammunition involved in or used in any 

knowing violation of [§ 922(a)(6)] . . . where such intent is demonstrated by clear and 

convincing evidence, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture . . . .”2In other words, ATF 

agents didn’t need evidence of a future crime, but merely evidence that the purchaser had 

already intended to commit a crime by “making any false or fictitious oral or written statement to 

deceive an FFL”—lying on the 4473. Many purchasers met that standard well before June 2010. 

ATF and the U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed they could have arrested Uriel Patino and others as 

early as April 2010 for straw purchasing, yet chose not to in order to make a bigger case.

Regardless of what legal restrictions ATF may have labored under, it is clear that ATF 

should not have been encouraging FFLs to continue selling firearms prior to this period if ATF’s 

hands were tied when it came to interdicting the weapons. Newell would later point to the fact 

 

307 E-mail from Patrick Cunningham to William Newell and James Needles (Mar. 6, 2011) (Exhibit 142).

308 Id.
106

that in June 2010, ATF would seize 40 guns, along with 100 or so in July.309 Yet these seizures 

were too little, too late. Even after June 2010, straw-purchased guns of which ATF had 

contemporaneous notice were flowing to Mexico.310 Further, ATF could have confronted straw 

purchasers at any earlier point and attempted to disrupt or deter straw purchasing activity. 

Instead, guns were still only interdicted when it could be done in such a way as to not 

“compromise the bigger case.”311

D. Additional Concerns

In the summer of 2010, ATF’s National Tracing Center, the country’s only crime gun 

tracing facility, stopped providing information to ATF personnel in Mexico requesting traces. 

When the trace request submitted links to an ongoing case, ATF’s eTrace system automatically 

sends an e-mail to the case agent asking whether releasing information about the firearm will 

jeopardize the case in question.312

 

309 Letter from Paul Pelletier to Chairman Darrell Issa and Ranking Member Charles Grassley (Mar. 14, 2012), at 4 

(Exhibit 141).

310 For instance, guns seized by ICE on August 5, 2010, which had been purchased by two main Fast and Furious 

straw purchasers in late June 2010.

311 E-mail from William Newell to Kevin O’Reilly (Jul. 28, 2010) [NSS F&F 000020-000026] (Exhibit 143); e-mail 

from William Newell to William McMahon (Dec. 21, 2010) [HOGR 001935] (Exhibit 144).

312 See, e.g., e-mail from [National Tracing Center] to Hope MacAllister (May 6, 2010) [HOGR 002608] (Exhibit 

145).
107

In mid-2010, Case Agent Hope MacAllister began instructing the National Tracing Center not to 

release trace data to requestors. Instead, trace requestors would receive the following notice:313

Once this happened, other agencies—and even ATF’s Attaché Office in Mexico City—were no 

longer able to receive information about where or when recovered firearms had been purchased, 

making time-to-crime calculations for those outside of Group VII impossible.

A June 28, 2010, weekly report from the National Drug Intelligence Center reminded 

Attorney General Holder and his Deputy Attorney General that Fast and Furious, which had been 

active since the fall of 2009, involved over 1,500 firearms:314

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

313 See, e.g., ATF Firearms Trace Summary (Aug. 16, 2010) (Exhibit 146).

314 Memorandum to the Attorney General from Michael F. Walther (Jun. 28, 2010) (Exhibit 147).
108

The mention of the large number of weapons that had been “supplied to Mexican drug 

trafficking cartels” raised serious concerns. In Mexico, guns from a drug cartel shootout in early 

July 2010 traced back to Fast and Furious. On July 14, 2010, ATF Attaché to Mexico Carlos 

Canino e-mailed Newell: “[A]t least one gun recovered in this shootout comes back to Hope’s 

case. What’s the status. I anticipate questions from [Government of Mexico] . . .”315 Newell 

forwarded Canino’s e-mail to Group Supervisor Voth, writing: “This related to the big shootout 

two weeks ago in Sonora. Two rival DTOs went at it, Sinaloa and Juarez I believe. . . . I told 

Carlos we were within 45-50 days of taking this down IF the USAO goes with our 846/924(c) 

conspiracy plan.”316 But Canino received no answers.

 

315 E-mail from Carlos Canino to William Newell (Jul. 14, 2010) [HOGR 002454] (Exhibit 148).

316 E-mail from William Newell to David Voth (Jul. 14, 2010) [HOGR 002454] (Exhibit 148).
109

Acting Director Melson also had concerns over the volume of weapons ending up in

Mexico. In response to an e-mail from Chait about a seizure, Melson asked Chait and Hoover on 

July 14, 2010: “When will be taking Fast and Furious down? An awful lot of guns seem to 

be flowing south.”317 People at Justice Department headquarters were concerned, too, but for 

other reasons. Upon receiving information about the recovery of weapons from the shootout in 

Sonora, Associate Deputy Attorney General Ed Siskel inquired about the media implications: 

“How much longer is the GRIT going to be operating in AZ? At what point will we know the 

total results of the operation and be in a position to do some public roll out [sic] along the lines 

of what we did in Texas?”318

On July 28, 2010, Kevin O’Reilly, the Director of North American Affairs on the White 

House’s National Security Staff, e-mailed his colleagues asking, “Have we gotten any readout on 

ATF’s GRIT surge in Phoenix & in Arizona?”319 O’Reilly forwarded the correspondence to 

Newell, asking: “Just an informal ‘how’s it going?’”320 Newell promptly responded:

[W]e are on target to . . . eliminate our backlog of “leads.” A ‘lead” [sic] 

is where we have solid information regarding firearms trafficking activity 

but not enough manpower to work it. The best part about the GRIT for me 

has been the influx, albeit temporary (100 days), of Special Agents, 

Inspectors, Support Staff, etc. They have allowed us to catch up on the 

backlog of leads as well as follow up on newer information. They have 

been instrumental in supplying much needed ground-level support to 

several large-scale firearms trafficking investigations with direct links to 

Mexican DTOs. As an example I have had 10 Special Agents working 

exclusively in support of a very large OCDETF case involving firearms 

trafficking by the Sinaloa DTO. These agents have been so busy that they 

have expressed a desire to extend past the GRIT deadline due to the 

amount of work still needed on this case, a very good thing. One agent on 

detail from Miami . . . told me recently . . . [h]e’s never seen this level of 

illegal firearms trafficking activity before and wants to stay another 

30 days just to help out with this case.321

When O’Reilly asked for permission to share the documents with other White House staff, 

Newell responded: “Sure, just don’t want ATF HQ to find out, especially since this is what they

should be doing (briefing you)!”322 Newell continued to update O’Reilly, stating:

323

 

317 E-mail from Kenneth Melson to Mark Chait and William Hoover (Jul. 14, 2010) [HOGR 002084] (Exhibit 149). 

318 E-mail from Edward Siskel to Mark Chait (Jul. 14, 2010) [HOGR 002847] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 150).

319 E-mail from Kevin O’Reilly to Gregory Gatjanis and Sarah Kendall (Jul. 28, 2010) [HOGR 002667] (Exhibit 

151).

320 E-mail from Kevin O’Reilly to William Newell (Jul. 28, 2010) [NSF F&F 000001/HOGR 002666] (Exhibit 151).

321 E-mail from William Newell to Kevin O’Reilly (Jul. 28, 2010) [NSF F&F 000006/HOGR 002665] (Exhibit 151).

322 E-mail from William Newell to Kevin O’Reilly (Jul. 28, 2010) [NSS F&F 000013/HOGR 002664] (italics 

added) (Exhibit 151).

323 E-mail from William Newell to Kevin O’Reilly (Jul. 28, 2010) [NSF F&F 000020/HOGR 002664] (Exhibit 151).
110

Such seizures, however, were too little, too late. Hundreds of firearms had been sold to 

the straw purchasers under ATF’s watchful eye and distributed into communities in an 

uncontrolled manner. On July 28, 2010, Canino told Fast and Furious Co-Case Agent Tonya 

English that Fast and Furious guns were being used in murders in Mexico.324 Rather than 

express alarm at Canino’s statement, English requested reports of the homicides to which Canino 

had referred. English stated, “We were not aware of any firearms related to our case being used 

in any homicides. If this has occurred, would you please forward or send the reports because this 

is information we do not have.”325

Despite the optimism expressed in the April 2010 exit strategy, no significant efforts to 

disrupt straw purchasing in Fast and Furious took place by mid-summer 2010. In fact, ATF still 

made no move to “step to”—or confront and question—individuals or make arrests. Group VII 

Special Agent Olindo Casa, one of the agents upset about the tactics used in Fast and Furious,

made his frustration about this inaction known. In a July 27, 2010, e-mail exchange between 

Casa and another ATF Special Agent, the other agent revealed the flaw in the strategy of 

Operation Fast and Furious. He stated, “I am [on] duty and having to deal with all this gun crime 

because there are groups that don’t arrest anybody.”326 Casa replied that Group VII had not 

made a single arrest since December:

327

 

324 E-mail from Carlos Canino to Tonya English (Jul. 28, 2010) [HOGR 002448] (Exhibit 152).

325 E-mail from Tonya English to Carlos Canino (Jul. 28, 2010) [HOGR 002448] (Exhibit 152).

326 E-mail from Terry Besta to Olindo Casa (Jul. 27, 2010) [HOGR 001706] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 153).

327 E-mail from Olindo Casa to Terry Besta (Jul. 27, 2010) [HOGR 001706] (Exhibit 153). 

“These pics are just an 

example of some of the guns, 

ammo and magazines seized 

within the past week in 

Phoenix related to the ‘large 

OCDETF case’ I mentioned.”
111

Such e-mails corroborate the testimony of the ATF whistleblowers that they had concerns about 

Fast and Furious long before Agent Terry was killed, and contradict those, including Voth, who 

have recently attacked the whistleblowers and labeled them liars.

As weapons recoveries continued into the month of August, other people began to take

notice that ATF was not arresting the individuals involved or making any effort to stop the actual 

purchases. On August 3, 2010, an ICE investigation called Operation Too Hot to Handle

revealed that an illegal alien in Phoenix named Jose Beltran-Bermudez was in the possession of 

80 firearms, which he was seeking to move to Texas for eventual transportation to Mexico.

328

 

ICE was working with no prior tip-off from ATF in Phoenix. On August 5, 2010, ICE seized the 

firearms in San Antonio, Texas and submitted them to ATF for tracing.329 The trace results 

showed that 57 of the guns tied back to Fast and Furious.330 The guns had been purchased in late 

June, just five weeks before they were seized331—and after the period when ATF Phoenix 

supervisors say they were authorized by the U.S. Attorney’s Office to start seizing guns.332 

Alfredo Celis had purchased 30 of the firearms at an FFL cooperating with ATF. Celis had been 

a Fast and Furious target since December 2009.333 Sean Steward, who had also been a target 

since December 2009, had purchased another ten firearms at the same time.

334

 

328 Indictment, U.S. v. Beltran-Bermudez, Case No. 2:11-cr-00245-ROS, District of Arizona, United States District 

Court (filed Feb. 9, 2011), at 2.

329 Briefing by ICE to Senate Judiciary Committee Staff (Apr. 27, 2012) [hereinafter ICE Briefing].

330 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Briefing of the Minority Staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee 

(Apr. 27, 2012).

331 Id.

332 Letter from Joshua Levy to Chairman Darrell Issa and Ranking Member Grassley (Mar. 14, 2012), Attachment 3, 

Declaration of David Voth at 4-5 (other attachments omitted) (Exhibit 43).

333 ATF Suspect Gun Summary, Alfredo Celis (Jun. 24, 2010); ATF Suspect Gun Summary, Alfredo Celis (Jun. 28, 

2010); ATF Suspect Gun Summary, Alfredo Celis (Jun. 29, 2010); Operation Fast and Furious Recoveries, 

08/05/2010, ICE Case File (Dec. 7, 2010) [DHS OGR FF 000220-000224] (Exhibit 154); Operation Fast and 

Furious Recoveries, 08/05/2010, ICE Case File (Dec. 7, 2010) [DHS OGR FF 000220-000224] (Exhibit 155).

334 ATF Suspect Gun Summary, Sean Christopher Steward (Jun. 23, 2010) (Exhibit 156); Operation Fast and 

Furious Recoveries, 08/05/2010, ICE Case File (Dec. 7, 2010) [DHS OGR FF 000220-000224] (Exhibit 155).
112

On August 9, 2010, Group Supervisor Voth asked if the Texas ATF had gotten more 

information from ICE on Beltran-Bermudez, writing: “Just checking in to see if there are any 

updates or reports that can be forwarded to us here in Phoenix.”335 Voth inquired again a week 

later: “Any luck we have not heard anything here locally? Obviously we are interested as 63 of 

the 80 firearms were part of open/active ATF Phoenix cases, especially the 57 as part of 

Operation Fast and Furious.”336 The ICE agent asked what ATF’s plan was:

337

Voth responded, claiming that ATF had “stopped ‘some’ of these guys and seized 

hundreds (plural) of firearms in this case to date.”338 Yet ‘hundreds’ was but a fraction of the 

guns that had been purchased, and ATF had never taken any steps to stop the biggest purchasers,

such as Patino. No arrests would be made for four to five more months. Although BeltranBermudez was an illegal alien, making his possession of firearms a felony, the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office requested that ICE delay arresting him, purportedly to avoid tipping off the Fast and 

Furious straw purchasers from whom he was receiving firearms.

339

 Beltran-Bermudez was not 

indicted until February 9, 2011, shortly after the Fast and Furious indictments in January 2011.340

Voth’s statement—that ATF had only “seized hundreds of firearms” in Fast and 

Furious—is also puzzling. Even as late as August 2010, it appears that ATF was not seizing all 

of the weapons bought by some of the earliest Fast and Furious targets, such as Uriel Patino. 

Instead, ATF agents were only seizing a fraction of the weapons that had been purchased. 

Without revealing this fact, ATF continued encouraging FFLs to make the sales. On August 25, 

2010, one FFL e-mailed Voth advance notice of another purchase by Patino:

341

 

335 E-mail from David Voth to Juan Herrera and Francisco Arredondo (Aug. 9, 2010) [HOGR 002012] (Exhibit 

157).

336 E-mail from David Voth to Juan Herrera and Francisco Arredondo (Aug. 15, 2010) [HOGR 002011] (Exhibit 

157).

337 E-mail from Francisco Arredondo to David Voth (Aug. 15, 2010) [HOGR 002011] (Exhibit 157).

338 E-mail from David Voth to Francisco Arredondo (Aug. 15, 2010) [HOGR 002011] (Exhibit 157).

339 ICE Briefing.

340 “17 indicted for weapons trafficking following ICE investigation,” ICE News Release (Feb. 17, 2011), available 

at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1102/110217phoenix.htm.

341 E-mail from [FFL2] to David Voth (Aug. 25, 2010) (Exhibit 158).

“Are you just letting these guns 

walk?”
113

Voth replied:

Thank you very much for contacting us regarding Mr. Patino and this 

order/inquiry. We (ATF) are very much interested in this transaction . . . . 

In summary our guidance is that we would like you to go through 

with Mr. Patino’s request and order the additional firearms he is 

requesting, and if possible obtain a partial down payment. This will 

require further coordination of exact details but again we (ATF) are very 

much interested in this transaction and appreciate your willingness to 

cooperate and assist us.342

This transaction apparently never went through, but these e-mails corroborate the accounts of 

FFLs who say this was exactly the type of interactions they were having with ATF throughout 

the case.

 

342 E-mail from David Voth to [FFL2] (Aug. 25, 2010) (emphasis added) (Exhibit 158).

“I am requesting your guidance as to weather 

[sic] or not we should perform the 

transaction, as it is outside of the standard 

way we have been dealing with him.”
114

13. Delay of Indictment

FINDING: Risk without reward: ATF’s wire intercepts failed to reveal anyone 

“up the chain” for whom the Fast and Furious straw buying ring was 

acquiring weapons. Thus, ATF only obtained charges against the 

straw purchasers, most of whom were known to ATF from the 

beginning of the case. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of 

Arizona was irresponsible and negligent in delaying the indictment of 

the straw purchasers for so long. In December 2010 the lead federal 

prosecutor was still contemplating novel ways of charging the suspects 

even though enough evidence had been gathered for an indictment at 

least six months earlier.

The Fast and Furious exit strategy that had been distributed among ATF leadership called 

for the case to be taken down at the end of July 2010, with multiple arrests and search 

warrants.343 The strategy was based on Deputy Director Hoover’s request (not conveyed to the 

Phoenix Field Division until the end of April 2010) that the case come down within 90 days. As 

Hoover would later testify: “It was contingent upon that time limit and that time limit only. We 

had what we had at the end of that 30, 60, 90 day plan, and that was when I wanted this 

investigation to be taken down.”344

Instead, as the end of July 2010 approached, ATF’s Phoenix Field Division was only 

barely beginning to reach out to the U.S. Attorney’s Office about indictments. It was clear that 

the case would not be coming down in the time frame Hoover had called for. On July 14, 2010, 

SAC Bill Newell e-mailed Group Supervisor David Voth that he was telling others “we were 

within 45-50 days of taking this down IF the USAO goes with our 846/924(c) conspiracy 

plan.”345 Five days later, on July 19, 2010, Group VII Supervisor David Voth e-mailed AUSA 

Emory Hurley:346

 

343 “Operation Fast and Furious Exit Strategy” (Apr. 27, 2010), at 3 [HOGR 001179-001182] (Exhibit 126).

344 Hoover Transcript at 81 (Exhibit 121).

345 E-mail from William Newell to David Voth (Jul. 14, 2010) [HOGR 002454] (Exhibit 148).

346 E-mail from David Voth to Hope MacAllister, et al. (Jul. 19, 2010) (Exhibit 159).
115

It is clear from Voth’s later testimony that the exit strategy was not foremost on the 

Phoenix Field Division’s mind. Voth testified:

Q. Now, I believe you mentioned that the case began to wind down in 

July and August of 2010? 

A. Well, I don't know if the case began to wind down. We made the 

decision to not go after another wire, to take the evidence we had 

amassed thus for and charge the people that we could charge thus 

far with the crimes and the charges we thought we had at that time. 

We still had the loftier goal of going after . . . the cartels or the 

DTO in Mexico. We hadn't got there at that time, but we made the 

decision not to go further. And that was essentially the, kind of, 

end date or end time of the investigation. 

Q. Why did you make that decision at that point in time? 

A. Because we were having so much trouble with the phones and the 

flipping of phones and maybe the inability to get a roving wire or 

something. We felt the only way to get the evidence needed to 

charge somebody in Mexico or in a DTO with them being in 

Mexico and not hands-on buying guns and transporting guns by 

having straws buy the guns and having, I guess just for easy safety, 

mules transport the guns, that to get evidence on the person 

actually doing it we would have to have their word, their 

intercepted communication directing these activities. We hadn't 

gotten there. 

* * *
116

But it seemed we had given it a good try and gotten where we had 

gotten. And, certainly, we were going to charge people. Maybe not 

the ultimate goal that we had started with.347

These problems with straw buyers flipping phones were the very same obstacles DEA SAC 

Elizabeth Kempshall had warned ATF SAC Bill Newell about. Kempshall stated that DEA 

preferred seeking state wires because it was much quicker to reauthorize them when phones were 

flipped.348

The Department of Justice was also preparing for the indictments in Operation Fast and 

Furious. On July 29, 2010, Laura Gwinn, an attorney assigned to the case from the Criminal 

Division in Washington, D.C., reported:

I am still trying to “learn” the case through review of wire-tap 

applications, a running log of overt acts and discussions with the lead 

attorney. A strategy session was held to determine the cause of action 

over the next couple of months. . . . It is hoped that we would be in a 

position to consider indictment approximately early to mid-fall.349

On July 30, 2010, Newell described to McMahon his understanding of the upcoming 

timeframe:350

The day after the August 5th meeting with Case Agent MacAllister, ASAC Jim Needles, and 

AUSA Emory Hurley, Newell wrote to McMahon, “as per the USAO, Fast/Furious will be ready 

for indictment in early October.”351

 

347 Voth Transcript at 235-236 (Exhibit 49).

348 Telephone interview of Elizabeth Kempshall (Sep. 22, 2011).

349 E-mail from James Trusty to Kevin Carwile (Jul. 29, 2010) [HOGR 003503] (Exhibit 160).

350 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Jul. 30, 2010) [HOGR 002028] (Exhibit 161).
117

Newell was also updating the White House on the timeline. On August 9, 2010, he wrote 

to Director O’Reilly: “Got another one last week, a .50 caliber semi-auto. Headed for Sinaloa 

DTO. Part of the same ‘large OCDETF case’ I mentioned previously. We should be indicting in 

early October.”352 A few days later, in response to O’Reilly’s offer to involve Newell in an arms 

trafficking conference in Mexico City in late September or early October, Newell responded: 

“Timing would be good because we should indict our Phoenix case in late Sept/early Oct.”353

On August 16, 2010, the day before the meeting between the U.S. Attorney’s Office and 

ATF, Hurley e-mailed his prosecution memorandum on Fast and Furious to his supervisor,

National Security Section Chief Michael Morrissey. Upon receiving the memo, Morrissey 

replied, copying Cunningham and Burke:

354

The August 16, 2010, memo stated that the U.S. Attorney’s Office anticipated taking Fast and 

Furious down in October 2010.355 In the memo Hurley explicitly anticipated the gunwalking 

controversy months before the first news stories or Internet postings about the issue:

“Investigating agents have pursued interdiction of the firearms transferred to conspirators where 

possible. Agents have not purposely let guns ‘walk.’ Interdiction in some cases has been 

hampered by counter-surveillance used by the targets.”

356

 It is unclear whether this statement 

reflected an attempt by Hurley to mask the fact that, as ATF argues, he had not permitted them to 

make seizures. Either way, it is clear from the overwhelming body of evidence and testimony 

that counter-surveillance used by the targets was not the main reason ATF did not interdict the 

vast number of guns in Fast and Furious. Hurley’s statement also masks the fact that ATF was 

receiving contemporaneous notice of the sales from cooperating FFLs. Either way, it is 

remarkable that Hurley, the lead federal prosecutor on the case, discussed gunwalking as early as 

August 2010.

 

351 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Aug. 6, 2010) [HOGR 002527] (Exhibit 162).

352 E-mail from William Newell to Kevin O’Reilly (Aug. 9, 2010) [NSS F&F 000027] (Exhibit 163).

353 E-mail from William Newell to Kevin O’Reilly (Aug. 9, 2010) [NSS F&F 000049-000050] (Exhibit 164).

354 E-mail from Mike Morrissey to Patrick Cunningham (Aug. 16, 2010) [HOGR 003026] (Exhibit 165).

355 Memorandum from Emory Hurley to Dennis K. Burke, “Fast and Furious Overview” (Aug. 16, 2010) [HOGR 

003027] (Exhibit 166).

356 Id. (emphasis added).
118

On August 17, 2010, Group Supervisor Voth briefed Burke, Cunningham, Morrissey, and 

Hurley for two hours at ATF’s Phoenix offices.

357

 Apparently frustrated as a result of that 

meeting, the next day Newell e-mailed Director O’Reilly at the White House:

We have some “straw” purchasers who had purchased several hundred 

“weapons of choice” and made good money doing it but in reality may 

never get prosecuted. In trying to satisfy the Arizona USAO’s request to 

have the firearms inspected in Mexico in order to be able to introduce that 

in US Federal court we need Mexico’s help but as you can guess it’s a 

major pain to get access to these guns. . . . As an example and regarding 

the August 4th seizure in Nogales, Sonora [sic]. Several of the firearms 

in that seizure are directly linked to a case we are ready to indict here 

in the Federal system. We had these guns entered into our “Suspect 

Guns” system so when they were traced in eTrace they “pinged” off this 

“Suspect Guns” list and our case agent was immediately notified.358

When these e-mails became public, the White House claimed the communications were “not in 

relation to Fast and Furious.”359 Yet this e-mail illustrates the methods ATF used to benefit from 

recoveries in Mexico. Because ATF entered the serial numbers of firearms into the Suspect Gun 

Database as soon as they received the 4473s from FFLs, frequently at the same time the firearms 

were being purchased, recoveries in Mexico provided ATF with instant intelligence about where 

the guns were going.

On September 3, 2010, Newell e-mailed Kevin O’Reilly at the White House again:

360

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

357 See e-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Aug. 6, 2010) [HOGR 002527] (Exhibit 162); see also email from Dennis Burke to [Executive Assistant, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona] (Jul. 14, 2010) 

[HOGR 005964] (Exhibit 167).

358 E-mail from William Newell to Kevin O’Reilly (Aug. 18, 2010) [NSS F&F 000055-000056] (Exhibit 168).

359 Richard Serrano, Emails to White House didn’t mention gun sting, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jul. 28, 2011), available 

at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/28/nation/la-na-fast-furious-emails-20110729.

360 E-mail from William Newell to Kevin O’Reilly (Sep. 3, 2010) [NSS F&F 000073/HOGR 002559] (Exhibit 169).
119

What Newell describes is what many of the ATF whistleblowers believed ATF should have been 

doing all along in Fast and Furious. As some ATF agents have stated, the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

may have hampered ATF’s efforts, even though there were clearly other steps ATF could have 

taken. However, despite what Newell told O’Reilly, ATF waited until January 2011, after the 

death of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry, to confront straw purchasers or attempt to “work . . . 

up the ladder.”

ATF claims that it was waiting to take further action until the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

returned indictments. Group VII Supervisor Voth would later say that he called AUSA Hurley 

on a monthly basis after July to ask whether the indictments had been drafted and approved, and 

that Hurley never mentioned that he needed anything additional.361 U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke 

testified that ATF did not formally hand the case over to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, complete 

 

361 Letter from Joshua Levy to Chairman Darrell Issa and Ranking Member Grassley (Mar. 14, 2012), Attachment 3, 

Declaration of David Voth at 4 (other attachments omitted) (Exhibit 43).

“You didn’t 

get these 

from me . . .”
120

with the formal cover and the full case file, until September or October.362 Contemporaneous 

evidence seems to support this conclusion. In a September 16, 2010, e-mail, AUSA Hurley 

stated that he was still waiting for materials from ATF:

363

By this point, Dennis Burke was ready wrap up Fast and Furious, though he and Criminal 

Division Chief Patrick Cunningham’s focus appears to have been on the opportunity for press 

coverage from the case:

364

At the end of September and beginning of October, ATF’s Phoenix Field Division clearly 

believed Fast and Furious had the attention of senior Justice Department Officials. Following up 

on an October 5, 2010, briefing paper that he requested, Newell wrote to ASAC Gillett: “Have 

[Voth] put into a [briefing paper] format, will most likely go to DAG [Deputy Attorney 

General].”

365

 

362 Transcript, Interview of Dennis Burke by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Aug. 18, 2011), at 91-92 (Exhibit 170); Transcript, Interview of 

Dennis Burke by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and Senate 

Committee on the Judiciary (Dec. 13, 2011), at 75 [hereinafter Burke December Transcript] (Exhibit 171).

363 E-mail from Emory Hurley to Laura Gwinn (Sep. 16, 2010) [HOGR 005979] (Exhibit 172).

364 E-mails between Dennis Burke and Patrick Cunningham (Sep. 20, 2010) [HOGR 003031] (Exhibit 173).

365 E-mail from William Newell to George Gillett (Oct. 5, 2010) [HOGR 001349] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 174).

“ATF is working on putting together 

binders for each defendant . . . , but 

we don’t have any of these yet.”
121

This is apparently also the period when the U.S. Attorney’s Office finally received all of 

the wire intercepts from ATF. On September 30, 2010, Morrissey reported to Burke: “F and F 

. . . is also wrapping up (down on all wires) but tons of reports to read as Emory plans the 

indictments.”366 Burke responded:367

Burke later testified:

Q. [S]o are you saying that there are things that you didn't know, that 

your office didn't know until October of 2010 because it hadn't 

been formally -- you hadn't formally been provided all of the case 

documents?

A. Of the ones I'm aware of, yes. I don't know that for an actual fact. I 

do know that in October 2010 our office was provided over 3,000 

documents, and a lot of those documents were ROIs that our office 

had not seen before. . . . [T]here was a huge data dump, file dump 

on our office in October of this case. 

* * *

Q. So there was no other maybe more informal handing over of 

information or no other milestone that might have been in August? 

A. I'm not aware -- well, I do recall we had a meeting in August, but it 

wasn't with regards to now you have everything you need, you 

know, start drafting the indictment.

 

366 E-mail from Mike Morrissey to Emory Hurley and Dennis Burke (Sep. 30, 2010) [HOGR 003038] (Exhibit 175).

367 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Emory Hurley and Mike Morrissey (Sep. 30, 2010) [HOGR 003038] (Exhibit 175).

“The ‘War and Peace’ 

equivalent of a T--III!”
122

Because these documents have not been produced by the Justice Department and the Committees 

have not been able to interview AUSA Hurley, the conflicting accounts of ATF and the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office as to when the case was turned over are difficult to assess.

Nevertheless, since Justice Department headquarters had authorized seven federal wire 

intercepts in the case, it appears that the U.S. Attorney’s Office had underestimated the amount 

of work required to review the evidence gathered from the wiretaps. By mid-October, they were

still months away from the indictment. On October 19, 2010, Newell requested an early 

November meeting with Burke, again to discuss plans for the Fast and Furious indictment.368 

Newell specifically requested that the meeting take place at ATF’s Phoenix offices so that he 

could “show [Burke] the evidence.”369 In response to Newell’s meeting request, National 

Security Section Chief Michael Morrissey e-mailed others in the U.S. Attorney’s Office on 

October 22, 2010:370

Morrissey’s supervisor, Criminal Division Chief Patrick Cunningham, responded:371

 

368 See e-mail from [ATF Phoenix Field Division] to [U.S. Attorney’s Office] (Oct. 22, 2010) [HOGR 005986] 

(Exhibit 176).

369 Id.

370 E-mail from Michael Morrissey to [U.S. Attorney’s Office] (Oct. 22, 2010) [HOGR 003049] (Exhibit 177).

371 E-mail from Patrick Cunningham to [U.S. Attorney’s Office] (Oct. 22, 2010) [HOGR 003049] (Exhibit 177).
123

The resulting meeting would be 11 1⁄2 months after ATF received detailed wire information from 

DEA on Celis-Acosta and his activities trafficking the guns from his straw purchasing ring.

One week after Newell made the initial meeting request, ATF Assistant Director Chait emailed Newell on October 29, 2010, to inquire about the indictment. Newell responded that the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office had pushed the indictment to December 7 and that Burke had cancelled 

their meeting to discuss it.372 Chait responded that the straw buying activity needed to be shut 

down:373

Later that day, Newell sent his supervisor McMahon (also cc’d on Chait’s e-mail) an e-mail that 

was a reminder of the same contemporaneous notice ATF’s Phoenix Field Division had almost 

throughout the case:374

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

372 E-mail from William Newell to Mark Chait (Oct. 29, 2010) [HOGR 001912] (Exhibit 76).

373 E-mail from Mark Chait to William Newell (Oct. 29, 2010) [HOGR 001912] (Exhibit 76).

374 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Oct. 29, 2010) [HOGR 001912] (Exhibit 76).
124

In early October 2010, the activity from the straw purchasing ring appears to have 

slowed. Several months later, ATF would try to take credit for this development, writing: 

“[F]irearms purchasing and trafficking activity by this organization has subsided significantly 

since early October of this year. This is due to several factors not the least of which are 

proactive measures taken by the agents assigned to Phoenix Group VII.”375 Given that ATF did 

little, if anything, to thwart these traffickers, it is more likely that firearms purchasing and 

trafficking activity subsided for two very different reasons. First, unbeknownst to Newell or the 

ATF, the individual Celis-Acosta was working with to traffic the guns to Mexico had become an 

FBI informant. 376 Second, as Newell acknowledged at the end of October: “[T]he purchases 

have slowed significantly. Several reasons for this main one being [redacted] (Acosta) is in 

some trouble with the Glendale PD . . . .”377

 

375 Phoenix Group VII, Phoenix Field Division, ATF, Briefing Paper, Operation: Fast & Furious, at 1 (Dec. 3, 

2010) [HOGR 001408-001411] (Exhibit 178).

376 Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Final Report, Operation Head Shot (Feb. 3, 2011) (Exhibit 

108).

377 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Oct. 29, 2010) [HOGR 001912] (Exhibit 76).

“We have been very successful over the past several 

months in seizing guns before they head south by 

quickly responding to calls from cooperating FFLs . . .”

“We have flagged these 

individuals in NICS and are 

notified if they make a 

purchase.”
125

On October 9, 2010, Phoenix police officers responded to a call about a burglary at what 

turned out to be the home of Celis-Acosta’s father. The police officers observed and temporarily 

seized Celis-Acosta’s Taurus .45 handgun, which he had fired through the door in an attempt to 

scare off the burglars.378 Just five days later, on October 14, 2010, Phoenix police again arrived 

at the Celis-Acosta home, this time in response to an emergency radio call that shots had been 

fired there. Celis-Acosta’s mother had seen two vehicles outside and screamed. Celis-Acosta’s 

brother and father both ran outside and began firing at the vehicles. Celis-Acosta grabbed his 

Taurus .45 handgun and ran outside to join his brother and father. According to a police report:

[O]nce outside, he closed his eyes and began firing his handgun onehanded in the same direction that [his brother and father] were firing. 

When I asked . . . what he was aiming at, he stated, “Nothing,” and that he 

just closed his eyes and began shooting. . . . When he opened his eyes, he 

observed that what they were all firing at was a dark-colored 

vehicle. . . .379

As it turned out, Celis-Acosta’s handgun had been purchased by Fast and Furious straw buyer

Sean Steward on June 2, 2010.380

Just as he had been in April 2010, Celis-Acosta was arrested after the October 9, 2010, 

event, this time for discharging a firearm within the limits of a municipality.381 As part of the 

case, the Phoenix Police Department learned that ATF had “surveillance video footage involved 

in an unrelated investigation of the front of [Celis-Acosta’s] residence.”382 Fast and Furious CoCase Agent Tonya English provided Phoenix police with a compact disc of the footage, which 

was forwarded to the Maricopa County Attorney’s office.

383

 This October 9, 2010, arrest

marked the third time in 2010 that Celis-Acosta had been in law enforcement custody, including 

his arrest on April 2, 2010, and his detainment with ammunition and an illegal alien on May 29, 

2010, in Lukeville, Arizona. Nevertheless, it appears that Celis-Acosta was inexplicably once 

again not charged.

In the fall of 2010, AUSA Emory Hurley prepared a briefing paper that continued to 

attempt to re-write what actually took place in Fast and Furious. The October 21, 2010, briefing 

paper Hurley forwarded to his superiors again included the language about ATF agents “not 

purposely let[ting] guns walk” and “interdiction . . . be[ing] hampered.”384 Notwithstanding his 

review of the ROIs in the case, it is possible Hurley was ignorant or had been misinformed on 

this front by ATF. Hurley, however, added a line that he would have known was misleading: 

 

378 Phoenix Police Department Report 2010 1435239 (Oct. 9, 2010) (Exhibit 179); see also Phoenix Police 

Department Report 2010 1466578 (Oct. 14, 2010), at 16 (Exhibit 179). 

379 Phoenix Police Department Report 2010 1466578 (Oct. 14, 2010), at 16 (Exhibit 179).

380 ATF Suspect Gun Summary, Sean Christopher Steward (entered Jun. 3, 2010) (Exhibit 180).

381 Id. at 8.

382 Phoenix Police Department Report 2010 1466578 (Oct. 14, 2010), at 30 (Exhibit 179).

383 Id. at 31.

384 Memorandum from Emory Hurley to Carol Stachan-Noonan, “Fast and Furious” (Oct. 21, 2010) [HOGR 

003047] (Exhibit 181).
126

“By looking at firearms transaction records historically, it is believed that the organization has 

acquired more than 1800 firearms.”385 This observation implied that ATF had only learned of all 

the purchases historically, rather than only a small fraction, as Hurley knew full well. He had 

first-hand knowledge because he had visited two of the cooperating FFLs himself to encourage 

them to keep cooperating with the investigation by sending ATF contemporaneous notice of 

illegal purchases by known straw buyers.

In light of the delays at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, ATF Deputy Director Hoover 

contacted Ed Siskel in the Deputy Attorney General’s office sometime in the fall of 2010 in an 

attempt to accelerate the indictments.

386

 Similarly, on November 8, 2010, Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General Jason Weinstein in the Criminal Division at the Justice Department conveyed 

ATF’s frustrations about the delay to his colleagues:

Ken [Melson] is also frustrated by the pace of the USAO in AZ bringing 

charges in the “Fast and Furious” gun-trafficking case (multiple wires, 

huge # of guns)—the AUSA has apparently told the agents that it will take 

a couple of months to draft the indictment; it appears that the AUSA on 

the case is not the fastest worker, and Laura Gwinn, our prosecutor on 

the case, is going to try to push things along, including by offering to draft 

the indictment.387

A month later, in early December 2010, AUSA Emory Hurley was still contemplating novel 

charging theories including using a money laundering statute which would require gun dealers to 

be considered “financial institution(s)” in order to charge the suspects.

388

By the end of 2010, one of the final briefing papers on Fast and Furious summarized the 

total cost of the operation as follows: “From October 2009 to October 2010 agents have 

documented that this organization spent approximately 1.25 million dollars in cash at various 

Phoenix area Federal Firearms Licensees to acquire in excess of 1,900 firearms.”389 Despite this 

vast amount of money being spent by straw buyers, some of whom were on public assistance, 

ATF failed to confront the vast majority of them.

 

385 Id. (emphasis added).

386 Hoover Transcript at 74-76 (Exhibit 121).

387 E-mail from Jason Weinstein to Amy Pope (Nov. 8, 2010) [HOGR 003533-003534] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 

182).

388 See e-mail from Emory Hurley to Joe Koehler (Dec. 6, 2010) [HOGR 005988]; e-mail from Tonya English to 

Emory Hurley (Nov. 29, 2010) [HOGR 005987-005988] (Exhibit 183).

389 Phoenix Group VII, Phoenix Field Division, ATF, Briefing Paper, Operation: Fast & Furious, at 1 (Dec. 3, 

2010) [HOGR 001408] (Exhibit 178).
127

14. High Profile Casualties of Fast and Furious

FINDING: “Ugh...things will most likely get ugly”: ATF knew that any deaths 

tied to Fast and Furious weapons would cause an immediate public 

outcry. ATF tried to minimize this fallout by limiting access to 

information and avoiding discussions of links between any deaths and 

weapons associated with the case.

Despite mounting evidence of the volume of guns reaching Mexico and the damage they 

were causing, the U.S. Attorney’s Office did not move any faster with the indictments, nor did 

ATF leadership insist that Group VII agents apprehend the straw purchasers. As the 

Committees’ second joint staff report and the July 26, 2011 hearing before the House Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform demonstrated, the situation in Mexico deteriorated further 

with the high-profile killing of Mario Gonzalez.

A. The Death of Mario Gonzalez

On November 5, 2010, drug cartel members murdered Mario Gonzalez, brother of 

Patricia Gonzalez, then-Attorney General of the State of Chihuahua in Mexico. A subsequent 

shootout between police and the murder suspects resulted in the recovery of sixteen weapons, 

two of which traced back to Operation Fast and Furious. Though ATF quickly became aware of 

the connection between Fast and Furious guns and the high-profile murder of Gonzalez, which 

dominated the news in Mexico, ATF declined to inform Mexican government officials about the 

link—or about Fast and Furious.

On November 15, 2010, Co-Case Agent Tonya English e-mailed David Voth and Hope 

MacAllister regarding the recovery of these two Fast and Furious weapons.390 She revealed that 

at least two of the 16 firearms recovered were Fast and Furious guns. She also urged Voth and 

MacAllister not to disclose this information:

391

 

390 E-mail from Tonya English to David Voth (Nov. 15, 2010) [HOGR 001792] (Exhibit 184).

391 Id.
128

MacAllister responded that evening with the names of the two purchasers of the firearms found 

at the scene: Patino and Steward.392

It was not until the spring of 2011, after Fast and Furious had become a public scandal, 

when ATF first informed Mexico about the link between Fast and Furious and Mario Gonzalez’s 

death. Unfortunately, his murder would not be the only one tied to Fast and Furious.

B. The Death of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry

Tragically, Fast and Furious also cost a U.S. Border Patrol agent his life. U. S. Border 

Patrol Agent Brian Terry was murdered on December 14, 2010. The Los Angeles Times reported 

on the circumstances of his murder:

Late in the night on Dec. 14, in a canyon west of Rio Rico, Ariz., Border 

Patrol agents came across Mexican bandits preying on illegal immigrants.

 

392 E-mail from Hope MacAllister to David Voth (Nov. 15, 2010) [HOGR 006700] (Exhibit 185).
129

According to a Border Patrol “Shooting Incident” report, the agents fired

two rounds of bean bags from a shotgun. The Mexicans returned fire. One 

agent fired from his sidearm, another with his M-4 rifle.

One of the alleged bandits, Manuel Osorio-Arellanes, a 33-year-old 

Mexican from Sinaloa, was wounded in the abdomen and legs. Agent 

Brian Terry — 40, single, a former Marine — also went down. “I’m hit!”

he cried.

A fellow agent cradled his friend. “I can’t feel my legs,” Terry said. “I 

think I’m paralyzed.” A bullet had pierced his aorta. Tall and nearly 240 

pounds, Terry was too heavy to carry. They radioed for a helicopter. But 

Terry was bleeding badly, and he died in his colleague’s arms.

The bandits left Osorio-Arellanes behind and escaped across the desert, 

tossing away two AK-47 semiautomatics from [FFL cooperating with 

ATF].

393

The fallout from Agent Terry’s murder was broad and dramatic. Following his death, on 

December 15, 2010, ATF requested an urgent trace of the two weapons found at the scene of the 

crime. Both were Fast and Furious guns. Ironically, ATF also held a firearms trafficking 

seminar in Mexico City on that same day.394 At the seminar, ATF touted Fast and Furious as a 

model case to the seminar participants.395

Meanwhile, U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke was apparently working with the Justice 

Department on having Attorney General Eric Holder attend the takedown press conference 

scheduled for January 2011. On December 14, 2010, Burke sent an e-mail to his staff with the 

subject “Fast and Furious”:396

 

393 Richard Serrano, Gun store owner had misgivings about ATF sting, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2011 

(http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/11/nation/la-na-atf-guns-20110912).

394 E-mail from Karine Taxman to [U.S. Department of State] (Dec. 16, 2011) [HOGR 006722-006723] (Exhibit 

186).

395 See e-mail from Josh Parecki to Karine Taxman (Jan. 31, 2011) [HOGR 006755] (Exhibit 187).

396 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Patrick Cunningham (Dec. 14, 2010) [HOGR 003070] (Exhibit 188).
130

According to Burke, “Monty” was Monty Wilkinson, Attorney General Holder’s Deputy Chief 

of Staff.397 Burke testified Wilkinson “was someone you would contact if the Attorney General 

were doing any travelling in your area. He would coordinate through him.”398

At 2:14 am the next morning, Burke e-mailed Wilkinson:399

Yet Burke and Wilkinson apparently never spoke on December 15, 2010. Within hours on that 

early morning of December 15, 2010, Burke received an e-mail notifying him of Agent Terry’s 

death.400 Burke and Wilkinson exchanged e-mails throughout the day as Burke updated 

Wilkinson on the developments related to the Terry’s murder.401

That evening, after attending the press conference in Tucson that night announcing Agent 

Terry’s death, the Assistant U.S. Attorney in charge of the Tucson field office e-mailed Burke:

402

 

397 Burke December Transcript at 86 (Exhibit 171).

398 Id. at 45.

399 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Monty Wilkinson, Deputy Chief of Staff and Counselor, Office of the Attorney 

General, DOJ (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 003073] (Exhibit 189).

400 E-mail from Marco Lopez to Dennis Burke (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 005872] (Exhibit 190).

401 See, for example, e-mail from Dennis Burke to Monty Wilkinson (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 005872]; e-mail from 

Monty Wilkinson to Dennis Burke (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 005876]; and e-mail from Monty Wilkinson to Dennis 

Burke (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 005888] (Exhibit 190).

402 E-mail from Shelley Clemens to Dennis Burke (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 003076] (Exhibit 191).
131

Two hours later, at 7:21 pm, Burke responded: “Thanks. I just talked to Bill Newell about it. 

The guns tie back to Emory’s Fast and Furious case.”403 Burke almost immediately updated 

Wilkinson:404

In response, Wilkinson e-mailed back that he would call the next day.405

Meanwhile, word of the connection to Fast and Furious was spreading within ATF. At 

6:49 pm, Group Supervisor Voth sent Case Agent MacAllister an e-mail with the subject: “[N]o 

more rose colored glasses.”406

Fifteen minutes after his first e-mail, Voth sent MacAllister another, this time with just one 

sentence in the subject line:407

 

403 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Shelley Clemens and Ann Scheel (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 003076] (Exhibit 191).

404 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Monty Wilkinson (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 005917] (Exhibit 192).

405 E-mail from Monty Wilkinson to Dennis Burke (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 005917] (Exhibit 192).

406 E-mail from David Voth to Hope MacAllister (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 002346] (Exhibit 193).

407 E-mail from David Voth to Hope MacAllister (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 002783] (Exhibit 194).

“The trace came back to Fast 

and Furious . . . Call as soon 

as you can, things will most 

likely get ugly!”

“[N]o more rose colored glasses”
132

According to Voth’s testimony: “When they determined that the two guns found at the 

scene were purchased by Jaime Avila I got a phone call from ASAC George Gillett, and he said 

that he wanted Mr. Avila arrested 15 minutes ago, expressing to me a sense of urgency.”408 ATF 

and the U.S. Attorney’s Office immediately realized the implications, as evidenced by how Avila

was charged. At 11:41 pm that night, Group Supervisor Voth e-mailed SAC Newell and ASACs 

Needles and Gillett: “We are charging Avila with a standalone June 2010 firearms purchase 

where he used a bad (old) address on the 4473. . . . This way we do not divulge our current 

case (Fast & Furious) or the Border Patrol shooting case.”

409

 The next morning, on 

December 16, 2010, Voth again e-mailed SAC Newell and ASAC Gillett: “After speaking with 

Emory he saw the wisdom in not charging the AK-47 rifles in question so as to not complicate 

the FBI’s investigation. As such we are back to our original plan to charge the June guns 

purchased by Jaime AVILA.”

410

 

For the first time, ATF was making an arrest in Fast and Furious, but only because a 

Border Patrol agent was dead. The arrest was not tied to the straw purchase of the guns found at 

the scene, but rather to a different straw purchase in June 2010. ATF had observed hundreds of 

similar straw purchases over the previous year, but only after a federal agent was murdered did 

ATF do what they should have been doing all along—make arrests. A tragedy of precisely this 

sort had been predicted months earlier, both by a cooperating FFL in an e-mail to ATF411 and by 

whistleblower ATF Agent John Dodson in a confrontation over gunwalking tactics with Case 

Agent Hope MacAllister and Group VII Supervisor David Voth.412

On December 16, 2010, Special Agent John Dodson, who had worked on Fast and 

Furious for nearly a year and made his concerns with the case known, suddenly found that Fast 

and Furious was no longer on the list of ongoing investigations to which he had case file 

 

408 Voth Transcript at 183 (Exhibit 49).

409 E-mail from David Voth to William Newell, et al. (Dec. 15, 2010) [HOGR 002017] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 

195).

410 E-mail from David Voth to William Newell and George Gillett (Dec. 16, 2010) (Exhibit 196).

411 E-mail from [FFL2] to David Voth (Jun. 17, 2010) (Exhibit 139).

412 Dodson Transcript at 136 (Exhibit 93).

“GAG order in place per Division!”
133

access.

413 That same day, Voth responded to a request from Newell to tally the number of guns 

that had been recovered in Fast and Furious. Voth’s e-mail read:414

Voth added ten minutes later, “For what it’s worth our numbers did not reflect the guns 

recovered yesterday [at Agent Terry’s murder scene] so actually the USA recovered are 352.”415 

Like other “recoveries” Voth and Newell are taking credit for, the recovery of the guns at Brian 

Terry’s murder scene were obviously not the result of ATF interdicting weapons from straw 

buyers—quite the opposite.

The discovery of these two weapons at the Terry crime scene represented a watershed 

moment for Fast and Furious. For Glen Cook, Resident Agent in Charge of the ATF Dallas 

Field Division, it was immediately apparent that ATF had a big problem on its hands. Cook 

made a suggestion to his supervisor, ASAC Charles Smith:

416

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

413 Telephone interview of Michael Chapman (Apr. 3, 2012).

414 E-mail from David Voth to William Newell (Dec. 16, 2010) [HOGR 001935] (Exhibit 144).

415 E-mail from David Voth to William Newell (Dec. 16, 2010) [HOGR 005471] (Exhibit 197).

416 E-mail from Glen Cook to Charles Smith (Dec. 17, 2010) [HOGR 001941] (Exhibit 198) .
134

Cook’s e-mail shows that ATF personnel in other field divisions were acutely aware of the likely 

consequences of the fatalities caused by Fast and Furious.

Even SAC Newell, who had been an ardent proponent of the strategy in Fast and Furious, 

became nervous almost immediately about potential charges that his group had permitted guns to 

“walk”—even though such accusations were not yet in the public realm. Just as AUSA Hurley 

had anticipated the gunwalking controversy months earlier, Newell seemed to be aware of the 

risks ATF had been taking and started building a defense before the charges were even known. 

Just a week after Terry’s death, on December 21, 2010, Newell wrote to McMahon:417

 

417 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Dec. 21, 2010) [HOGR 001935] (Exhibit 144).

“I advised AUSA . . . to provide me with a Grand Jury 

Subpoena for RAC David [V]oth . . . ATF Phoenix 

refuses to provide us with the evidence.”

“They should probably hire a media expert . . . to assist them 

in explaining the 2000 firearms and the possible connection to 

the murder of the Border Patrol Agent.”
135

As discussed previously, notwithstanding Newell’s e-mail, many of the guns seized in the U.S. 

were not seized based on information from the Phoenix Field Division, much less “almost all” of 

them.

Despite Newell’s efforts, the “perception that [ATF] allowed guns to ‘walk’” was 

widespread and had other consequences. Later in the same day as Newell’s e-mail, U.S. 

Attorney Dennis Burke e-mailed Monty Wilkinson in the Attorney General’s office:418

Wilkinson responded, “Ok . . . . I’ll call tomorrow.”419 Both Burke and Wilkinson, however,

denied having any recollection of this communication or any subsequent conversation they may 

have had.

420

 Wilkinson also denied having any indication from any source as to why Burke gave 

the advice that the Attorney General Holder not announce Fast and Furious.421 Wilkinson’s 

denial that the decision about having the Attorney General attend wasn’t linked to Fast and 

Furious is simply not credible.

On December 22, 2010, the day after the above e-mails, the gunwalking allegations 

appeared on Internet message boards primarily used by ATF agents. That same day, Acting Intel 

Group Supervisor Marjorie Zicha sent an e-mail within the ATF’s Phoenix Field Division stating 

that access to the Fast and Furious folder should be limited only to a select list of personnel, 

including herself, Case Agent MacAllister and Co-Case Agent English, Group Supervisor Voth, 

ASACs Needles and Gillett, and SAC Newell.422

In Newell’s December 21, 2010, e-mail, he defended ATF’s decision not to “burn the 

wire or compromise the bigger case.”423 The “bigger case,” however, never materialized. 

Instead, when the Fast and Furious suspects were finally indicted on January 19, 2011, nineteen 

of the twenty defendants were exactly the kind of low-level straw purchasers that the ATF 

Phoenix Field Division and U.S. Attorney’s Office avoided arresting early on in favor of 

 

418 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Monty Wilkinson (Dec. 21, 2010) [HOGR 006614] (Exhibit 199).

419 E-mail from Monty Wilkinson to Dennis Burke (Dec. 21, 2010) [HOGR 006614] (Exhibit 199).

420 Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, DOJ, to Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform (Mar. 16, 2012), at 4; see also Transcript, Interview of Monty Wilkinson by the 

Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary

(Apr. 13, 2012), at 35-36 [hereinafter Wilkinson Transcript] (Exhibit 200).

421 Wilkinson Transcript at 39-42 (Exhibit 200).

422 Telephone interview with Jose Medina (Apr. 17, 2012).

423 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Dec. 21, 2010) [HOGR 001935] (Exhibit 144).
136

pursuing the larger case. Sadly, the individuals who purchased the vast majority of the guns had 

been identified as straw purchasers as early as December 2009, more than one year earlier.

15. The End of Operation Fast and Furious 

FINDING: A pre-planned defense: Even before allegations of gunwalking were made 

public in the media, ATF officials knew that the risky gunwalking tactics in 

Operation Fast and Furious would be criticized and prepared to respond to 

that criticism.

By January 5, 2011, ATF Acting Director Ken Melson was apparently inquiring about 

the allegations that gunwalking occurred in Fast and Furious. On January 5, 2011, ATF Chief 

Counsel Steve Rubenstein e-mailed ATF Acting Director Ken Melson:

This is in response to your request regarding information posted on “Clean 

Up ATF.” Specifically, on December 22, 2010, “1desertrat” stated that 

“word is” that Phoenix FD ASAC George Gillet [sic] “[a]llegedly 

approved more than 500 AR-15 type rifles from Phoenix and Tucson cases 

to be ‘walked’ into Mexico.” The post further states that “[o]ne of those 

rifles is rumored to have been linked to the recent killing of a Border 

Patrol Officer in Nogales, AZ.”424

Melson responded, “Thanks, Steve. I am going to forward this to [Internal Affairs].”425

That same day, Cunningham wrote to others in the Arizona USAO: “Mr. Melson has 

advised Bill he still wants to attend our F and F rollout. . . . Have we heard from the New DAG 

that he is not attending?”426

 

424 E-mail from Steve Rubenstein to Kenneth Melson (Jan. 5, 2010) [HOGR 001571] (Exhibit 201).

425 E-mail from Kenneth Melson to Steve Rubenstein (Jan. 5, 2010) [HOGR 001572] (Exhibit 201).

426 E-mail from Patrick Cunningham to Dennis Burke, et al. (Jan. 5, 2011) [HOGR 003087] (Exhibit 202).
137

A few days later, on January 11, 2011, Newell e-mailed the Chief of ATF’s Public 

Affairs Division at headquarters, Scot Thomasson: “Just heard Melson’s coming for the 

Fast/Furious press conf on the 25th. I hope he realizes how politically charged Arizona is right 

now especially regarding gun issues, was that way even before the Tucson shooting.”427 

By the next day, the Public Affairs Division had prepared internal talking points that 

specifically anticipated the issue of gunwalking would come up.

428

 The sample questions in the 

internal document included:

Some media reports, referencing an anonymous ATF official, claim that 

ATF knowingly “walked” about 1,900 firearms across the U.S.-Mexico 

border as part of this operation. What can you tell me about that?

***

We understand that a firearm bought in connection with this ATF 

investigation was used to murder Border Patrol Agent Brian A. Terry. 

Can you please comment on this information?429

After over a year of allowing hundreds of weapons to be purchased by straw purchasers, 

ATF and the U.S. Attorney’s Office indicted twenty defendants on January 19, 2011, charging 

them mainly with straw buying for the Mexican drug cartels.430 The indictment was to be 

unsealed and accompanied by a press conference the following week. The indictment was 

named after Jaime Avila, the straw purchaser who had purchased the two guns found at the Terry 

murder scene on January 16, 2010. However, the media plan regarding the takedown avoided 

any mention of the link between Fast and Furious and the death of Agent Terry. As Patrick 

Cunningham wrote to his colleagues in the U.S. Attorney’s Office on January 19, 2011:

431

 

427 E-mail from William Newell to Scot Thomasson, ATF (Jan. 11, 2011) [HOGR 005479] (Exhibit 203).

428 ATF Official Statements, “Operation: Fast and Furious and Corresponding Investigations” (Jan. 12, 2011) 

[HOGR 005543-005546] (Exhibit 204).

429 Id. at 2.

430 Press Release, Dennis K. Burke, Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Arizona, Grand Juries 

Indict 34 Suspects in Drug and Firearms Trafficking Organization (Jan. 25, 2011).

431 E-mail from Patrick Cunningham to Mike Morrissey, et al. (Jan. 19, 2011) [HOGR 006016] (Exhibit 205).
138

On January 20, 2011, the day after the indictments, Hoover, Chait, and McMahon 

received an e-mail from their legal counsel office stating:432

Two days before this e-mail, the Phoenix Field Division was still expecting Acting Director 

Melson to attend the press conference for the takedown.433 However, apparently in the same 

time period as Orlow’s January 20, 2011, e-mail, Melson decided not to attend. The day after 

Orlow’s e-mail, Deputy Assistant Director McMahon e-mailed the January 12, 2011, press 

documents denying gunwalking to the Deputy Chief in the Public Affairs Division, writing: 

“With the Director not going to Phoenix for the press conference, could you please make sure the 

 

432 E-mail from Barry Orlow to William Hoover, et al. (Jan. 20, 2011) [HOGR 001583] (Exhibit 206).

433 E-mail from William Newell to Matthew Allen, et al. (Jan. 18, 2011) [HOGR 003575] (Exhibit 207).

“As I understand it we 

plan to make no 

connections between 

the two cases in our 

public statements . . .”
139

Field Division still gets a copy of the press book you guys put together. I think there are some 

very good things in that book that Newell would be able to use.”434

On January 25, 2011, the Department of Justice issued a press release announcing the 

unsealing of the 53-count indictment.

435 At the press conference that day, when a reporter asked 

SAC Newell whether ATF had purposely allowed firearms to enter Mexico as part of an 

investigation, Newell answered, “Hell, no!”436 Two days later, ATF received its first letter from 

Senator Grassley inquiring about whistleblower allegations of gunwalking.437

As previously discussed, Special Agent Gary Styers, assigned to Group VII for a portion 

of Fast and Furious, detailed his experience in a February 3, 2011, memo.438 He wrote the memo 

to document his interview with congressional investigators on February 2, 2011. The Justice 

Department produced documents in January 2012 showing that the memo was sent to Deputy 

Director Hoover and ATF’s General Counsel, Joel Roessner.

The memo, which the Department has made available only for an in camera review 

apparently due to its embarrassing contents rather than concerns about sensitive law enforcement 

information, includes a clear example of cessation of the surveillance of weapons in Fast and 

Furious. It also highlights the lack of agents in the group assigned to surveillance.

439

 Yet the 

Justice Department, in its now-infamous February 4, 2011, letter to Senator Grassley, stated in 

no uncertain terms:

At the outset, the allegation described in your January 27 letter—that ATF 

“sanctioned” or otherwise knowingly allowed the sale of assault weapons 

to a straw purchaser who then transported them into Mexico—is false. 

ATF makes every effort to interdict weapons that have been 

purchased illegally and prevent their transportation to Mexico.440

Many officials within ATF and the Justice Department could have, and clearly should have, put 

an end to this case long before the indictments were handed down. Those responsible for failing 

to do so are examined in the next part of this report.

 

434 E-mail from William McMahon to Drew Wade (Jan. 21, 2011) [HOGR 005537] (Exhibit 208).

435 Press Release, Dennis K. Burke, Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Arizona, Grand Juries 

Indict 34 Suspects in Drug and Firearms Trafficking Organization (Jan. 25, 2011).

436 Dennis Wagner, Phoenix-area gun store, ATF sting may be linked to border shootout, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb. 1, 

2011), available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2011/02/01/20110201phoenix-gunstore-atf-sting-border-shootout.html.

437 Letter from Ranking Member Charles Grassley to ATF Acting Director Kenneth Melson (Jan. 27, 2010).

438 Memorandum from Gary Styers to Robert Champion, “Contact with Congressional Investigators” (Feb. 3, 2011) 

(Exhibit 95).

439 Id. at 2-3.

440 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weich to Ranking Member Charles Grassley (Feb. 4, 2011) 

(emphasis added).
140

V. Assessing Culpability

This report assesses only the culpability of ATF officials. The following report will assess the 

culpability of Justice Department Officials including U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke, Assistant 

Attorney General Lanny Breuer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jason Weinstein, Associate 

Deputy Attorney General Edward Siskel, Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary Grindler, and 

Deputy Chief of Staff Monty Wilkinson.

1. Special Agent in Charge of the Phoenix Field Division William Newell

FINDING: Repeatedly risky: When he became a SAC, Bill Newell consistently 

pushed the envelope of permissible investigative techniques. He had 

been reprimanded by William Hoover before for crossing the line, but 

under a new Administration and new Attorney General he reverted 

back to the use of risky gunwalking tactics. 

As Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the ATF Phoenix Field Division, William Newell 

oversaw all ATF operations in both Arizona and New Mexico, including 552 miles of the U.S.-

Mexico border.441 Under Newell’s leadership, the strategy of Operation Fast and Furious was 

conceived and implemented. With his approval, Operation Fast and Furious lasted over a year as 

hundreds of weapons flowed into Mexico and found their way into the possession of the 

increasingly violent Mexican drug cartels.442

A. Earlier Operations

Newell became SAC of ATF’s Phoenix Field Division in June 2006.443 Around that 

same time, ATF began walking guns in a case in the Tucson Field Office of the Phoenix Field 

Division called Operation Wide Receiver. In Operation Wide Receiver, ATF agents worked 

with a cooperating FFL to obtain real-time data regarding weapons sales to known straw 

purchasers. Yet despite having the legal authority to do so, agents did not use this information to 

conduct arrests or interdict weapons.444 As one internal e-mail from a Resident Agent in Charge 

in Tucson to a Resident Agent in Charge in San Diego detailed, “[W]e believe at this point there 

is more value in the surveillance, identification of locations, persons, and asset[s] rather than 

making sight arrests.”445 Later, the Phoenix Field Division discussed coordinating with the 

 

441 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on 

Appropriations, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of William Newell, Special Agent in Charge, ATF Phoenix Field 

Division).

442 See Firearms Trafficking to the United Mexican States Thorough Arizona: “Project Iron River,” ATF Phoenix 

Field Division (Sept. 2005) [HOGR 001356 – 001394] (Exhibit 209).

443 Newell Transcript at 9 (Exhibit 140).

444 Memorandum to Jason Weinstein from Laura Gwinn, “Operation Wide Receiver (Tucson, AZ USAO)” (Oct. 1, 

2009) [HOGR 003391-003393] (Exhibit 210).

445 E-mail from Chuck Higman to Shawn Hoben (Jun. 15, 2006) [HOGR 005189] (Exhibit 211).
141

Mexican government to arrest these straw purchasers across the U.S.-Mexican border.446 The 

idea was to conduct a controlled delivery in which ATF agents would follow the weapons to the 

border and watch them cross over into Mexico, where Mexican authorities would be waiting to 

pick up the surveillance.447 Once the straw purchasers crossed the border with the weapons, 

Mexican authorities would follow the firearms to their final destination in Mexico.448 

However, a controlled delivery was apparently never attempted.

449 The straw purchasers 

simply continued to traffic to Mexico. Only in June 2007, over a year into the case, did one ATF 

official finally write: “We have reached that stage where I am no longer comfortable allowing 

additional firearms to ‘walk,’ without a more defined purpose.”450 Altogether, approximately 

350 weapons went to Mexico.451 ATF seized approximately 50 of these firearms, and 20 of them 

had been recovered in connection with crimes in Mexico as of early 2010.452 

Prosecutors in the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office refused to prosecute the straw 

purchasers from Wide Receiver because they believed ATF had misled them about the level of 

coordination among the Phoenix Field Division, the cooperating FFL, and the Mexican 

government. According to one e-mail: “[T]he first AUSA that was on Wide Receiver [said] the 

reason he chose not to prosecute it was because ATF lied to him and said that the guns were 

being followed/interdicted by the Mexican authorities on the other side of the border. . . . The 

next AUSA chose not to prosecute it for the same reason.”453 Others within ATF also had moral 

objections to such tactics.454

Another fall 2007 case conducted out of Newell’s Phoenix Field Division was known by 

its main suspect, Fidel Hernandez, and just like Operation Fast and Furious, had Special Agent 

Hope MacAllister as the case agent. In the Hernandez case, ATF agents actually communicated 

with Mexican authorities in order to try to set up a controlled delivery. The idea was for 

Mexican authorities to arrest straw purchasers once they crossed the border.455 One internal 

 

446 ATF Operational Plan, Operation Wide Receiver (Oct. 7, 2006) [HOGR 003367-003368] (Exhibit 212).

447 E-mail from [ATF Tucson Office] to Chuck Higman (Apr. 10, 2007) [HOGR 5315] (Exhibit 213).

448 ATF Operational Plan, Operation Wide Receiver (May 31, 2007) [HOGR 006279-006280] (Exhibit 214).

449 Phoenix Field Division, ATF, Briefing Paper, Operation WIDE RECEIVER #785085 06 0051 (Aug. 21, 2006) 

[HOGR 005243-005246] (Exhibit 215).

450 E-mail from Chuck Higman to [ATF Southwest Region OCDETF Coordinator] (Jun. 26, 2007) [HOGR 005412-

005413] (Exhibit 216). 

451 S. Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism Hearing, Combating International Organized Crime, 112th Congress 

(Nov. 1, 2011), at 9; see also e-mail from James Small to George Gillett (Aug. 3, 2009) [HOGR 005432] (Exhibit 

10).

452 “Project Gunrunner Investigations with a Nexus to Mexico Cartels,” Phoenix Field Division (Feb. 25, 2010) 

[HOGR 004993-004997] (Exhibit 217).

453 E-mail from [FFL4] to Laura Gwinn (Sep. 22, 2011) [HOGR 006278] (Exhibit 218).

454 See Memo from Jennifer Maldonado to U.S. Att’y Paul Charlton (July 13, 2006) [HOGR 003365] (Exhibit 219).

455 ATF Operational Plan, Case Number 785045-07-[redacted] (Sep. 26, 2007) [HOGR 006330-006331] (Exhibit 

220).
142

Phoenix Field Division briefing paper characterized the operation as “part of an experimental 

effort to prosecute firearms trafficking cases in Mexico through an International agreement.”456

All did not go according to plan, however. When traffickers crossed the border with 19 

firearms,

457 Mexican authorities, waiting on the other side of the border, missed the surveillance 

handoff.458 The next week, Newell reported:

We are potentially going to give it another shot . . . . They have already 

purchased another dozen or so firearms since returning from Mexico last 

weekend. They are up to about 250 of the “weapons of choice” so if this 

goes we’ll be able to cement our role as the lead firearms trafficking 

agency on this side of the border and score some major points with the 

Mexicans, thus ensuring that they clearly understand we are willing and 

able to do these very sorts of things to address their very vocal 

concerns.459

Upon learning about this case and the missed surveillance handoffs, Newell’s supervisors 

at ATF headquarters were worried. Then-Assistant Director for Field Operations William

Hoover had many questions for Newell:

Have we discussed the strategy with the US Attorney’s Office re letting 

the guns walk? Do we have this approval in writing? Have we discussed 

and thought thru the consequences of same? Are we tracking south of the 

border? Same re US Attorney’s Office. Did we find out why they missed 

the hand off of the vehicle? What are our expected outcomes?460

Hoover continued: “Also, did the Mexico Country Office speak to anyone in Field Op’s prior to 

briefing the Ambassador? What exactly did we tell him? Why was this necessary at this time in 

the Inv?”461

Twenty minutes after receiving these questions from Hoover, Newell responded: “[J]ust 

got notified that the subjects are heading south with another load of guns—right now.”462 In an 

effort to placate Hoover and allow his operation to continue, Newell responded:

 

456 Weekly Activity Report for the Phoenix II Field Office, August 25-August 31, 2007 [HOGR 006303] (Exhibit 

221).

457 E-mail from Carson Carroll to Robert Champion (Sept. 28, 2007) [HOGR 006350-006352] (Exhibit 222).

458 E-mail from Carson Carroll to William Hoover (Sep. 28, 2007) [HOGR 002269] (Exhibit 223).

459 E-mail from William Newell to Carson Carroll, et al. (Oct. 2, 2007) [HOGR 006364-006368] (emphasis added) 

(Exhibit 224).

460 E-mail from William Hoover to William Newell and Carson Carroll (Oct. 4, 2007) [HOGR 002243-002246] 

(Exhibit 225).

461 E-mail from William Hoover to William Newell and Carson Carroll (Oct. 4, 2007) [HOGR 002253-002256] 

(Exhibit 226).

462 E-mail from William Newell to William Hoover (Oct. 4, 2007) [HOGR 002253-002256] (Exhibit 226).
143

I know you have reservations but please rest assured that this will go 

down as planned . . . and will have big payoffs for us and the Department 

in addressing Mexico’s concerns that we (US) aren’t doing enough to 

address their concerns. Trust me, I’m with Gov’t.463

However, the operation did not go down as planned. Newell summarized the next morning: 

As you might know this deal did not go down last night. Unfortunately 

the Mex Feds overreacted to their embarrassing loss of the vehicle last 

week at the border by sending way too many people last night and word 

must have gotten out that crossing the border last night with contraband 

was not a good idea. This caused the subjects to drop off a large portion 

of their load of firearms at a previously unknown residence in Nogales 

(U.S. side) and then head back to Phoenix. . . . Lessons learned.464

Ironically, Newell also suggested to another colleague, “It might be worth our while to prepare a 

[sic] ‘International Firearms Trafficking 101’ briefing paper outlining the ins and outs of 

working a case to Mexico, focusing on the legalities.”465

That day, Hoover made it clear to then-Deputy Assistant Director Carson Carroll that he 

did “not want any firearms to go South until further notice.”466 He also stated, “I expect a full 

briefing paper on my desk Tuesday morning from SAC Newell with every question 

answered.”467 Newell’s briefing paper for Hoover again laid out his rationale for the case:

Taking off this “straw purchasing” ring would only create a situation in 

which another ring would need to be put together by the . . . drug 

trafficking organization. Doing this would never give us the opportunity 

to find out who the middle-men in Mexico are . . . .

[W]e in the division started discussions about using this investigation as a

“test case” to pursue something we had never tried before but something 

that would be in line with one of the key elements of “Gunrunner” which 

is establishing a closer working and trusting relationship with our Mexican 

law enforcement counterparts.468

Even if Hoover did not accept Newell’s argument for not “taking off” the straw purchasing ring 

was not accepted, Hoover must have accepted the merits of coordinating with Mexico, because 

 

463 E-mail from William Newell to William Hoover (Oct. 4, 2007) [HOGR 002243-002244] (Exhibit 225).

464 E-mail from William Newell to Anne Marie Paskalis (Oct. 5, 2007) [HOGR 006777] (Exhibit 227).

465 E-mail from William Newell to Davy Aguilera (Oct. 5, 2007) [HOGR 006777] (Exhibit 227).

466 E-mail from William Hoover to Carson Carroll (Oct. 5, 2007) [HOGR 001907] (Exhibit 228).

467 Id.

468 Responses to Questions by ADFO Hoover RE: Phoenix to Mexico Firearms Trafficking Case, at 2-3 (Oct. 9, 

2007) [HOGR 002759-002763] (Exhibit 229).
144

in preparation for a November 16, 2007, meeting between brand new Attorney General Michael 

Mukasey and Mexican Attorney General Medina Mora, ATF contributed to a portion of the 

memo to the Attorney General which read:

ATF has recently worked jointly with Mexico on the first-ever attempt to 

have a controlled delivery of weapons being smuggled into Mexico by a 

major arms trafficker. . . . [T]he first attempts at this controlled delivery 

have not been successful . . . . To that end, it is essential that a Mexican 

vetted unit be assigned to work with ATF in this regard. ATF’s 

attaché in Mexico City has briefed Attorney General Medina Mora on 

this attempted controlled delivery, and stressed the importance of a 

vetted unit being assigned.469

The targets in Hernandez were arrested in the U.S. on November 26, 2007.470 Ultimately, the 

case appears to have lasted only a few months, and the cooperation issues raised by the Attorney 

General with Mexico seem to be an example of fruitful collaboration with Mexico.

Hoover had been given notice that Bill Newell was willing to push the envelope. At one 

point, Newell indicated to Deputy Assistant Director Carroll that he was done taking such 

approaches:

I think we both understand the extremely positive potential for a case 

such as this but at this point I’m so frustrated with this whole mess I’m 

shutting the case down and any further attempts to do something similar. 

We’re done trying to pursue new and innovative initiatives – it’s not 

worth the hassle.471

However, just a few months later, on January 2, 2008, Carroll e-mailed Newell with a request: “I 

was wondering if you could have someone do a powerpoint [sic] on the recent case where you 

tried to walk the guns to Mexico.”472 Newell forwarded the e-mail to his ASACs, writing: 

“We’re back in business.”

473

Later that year, Newell again attempted a similar approach to Wide Receiver and 

Hernandez in a case involving a straw purchasing network led by Alejandro Medrano.474 

According to one description of the case, Medrano involved a “plan to let firearms walk to 

Mexico with the agreement that the Mexican authorities would conduct surveillance of the 

 

469 Meeting of the Attorney General with Mexican Attorney General Medina Mora (Nov. 16, 2007) [HOGR 003239-

003240] (Exhibit 230).

470 Phoenix Field Division, ATF, After Action Report (Nov. 26, 2007) [HOGR 006494] (Exhibit 231).

471 E-mail from William Newell to Carson Carroll (Oct. 6, 2007) [HOGR 001906] (Exhibit 228).

472 E-mail from Carson Carroll to William Newell (Jan. 2, 2008) [HOGR 001895] (Exhibit 232).

473 E-mail from William Newell to James Needles and Thomas Mangan (Jan. 2, 2008) [HOGR 001895] (emphasis 

added) (Exhibit 232).

474 ATF Operational Plan, Case Number 785085-08-[redacted] (Aug. 9, 2008) [HOGR 006600-006602] (Exhibit 

233).
145

subjects once they crossed into Mexico in an attempt to locate the ‘drop house’ and possibly the 

‘money guy’ in Agua Prieta Mexico [sic].”

475

 The Phoenix Field Division again received 

complaints that the tactics used by ATF agents in the Medrano case were unacceptable. The 

Resident Agent in Charge of the Tucson field office, who had also been involved in Operation 

Wide Receiver, informed ASAC George Gillett on August 12, 2008 that “ICE would not support 

the concept of letting guns ‘walk’ to Mexico.”476 That same day, a SAC at ICE e-mailed 

Newell:

[O]ur agents left that meeting with the understanding that any weapons 

that were followed to the border would be seized. On Friday night, 

however, our agents got an op plan that stated that weapons would be 

allowed to go into Mexico for further surveillance by LEAs there.

This would be a very sensitive undertaking if this were to be done. Since 

this hadn’t been discussed in advance and we had not had an 

opportunity to coordinate with our Attache in Mexico, we balked at the 

plan.

477

Newell responded that the ICE SAC “was told that your folks were aware of the plan to allow the 

guns to cross, in close cooperation with both our offices in Mexico as well as the Mexico 

Feds.”478 This defiance by Newell in the face of opposition to his plan typified Newell’s attitude 

as SAC of the Phoenix Field Division. 

Newell later admitted that his attempt to use controlled deliveries in the Medrano and 

Hernandez cases had not been successful:

Q. But to your knowledge, in each instance there was a -- there was a 

control on the delivery such that there were authorities on the other 

side of the border that then were responsible? 

A. Of the ones I'm aware of, yes. 

Q. And the guns were actually interdicted or seized after -- at the end 

of the operation of operations?

* * *

[A]re you aware of that occurring in multiple other cases and that 

in each case, that that was successful, that the handoff to the 

 

475 E-mail from Brandon Garcia to George Gillett (Aug. 12, 2008) [HOGR 006656-006660] (Exhibit 234).

476 E-mail from Chuck Higman to George Gillett (Aug. 12, 2008) [HOGR 006656] (Exhibit 234).

477 E-mail from Matthew Allen to William Newell (Aug. 12, 2008) [HOGR 001195-001196] (emphasis added) 

(Exhibit 235).

478 E-mail from William Newell to Matthew Allen (Aug. 12, 2008) [HOGR 001195] (Exhibit 235).
146

authorities on the other side was successful and the guns were 

actually interdicted, is that what happened?

A. In the instances I'm aware of, it was not successful.

Q. And how many instances are we talking about approximately? 

A. I believe it was just a couple that I'm aware. 

Q. So 2 or 3? 

A. 2 or 3, yes. 

Q. And none of them were successful? 

A. To my knowledge, no.

479

When others raised concerns about Newell’s strategy, he sought to assuage their worries about 

these dangerous operations by assuring them that he had obtained the necessary approvals and 

insisting appropriate safeguards were in place. Though Newell genuinely believed his use of 

innovative techniques would yield strong results, his superiors within ATF and peers outside of 

ATF were well aware of the dangers of such tactics.

B. Cartel-Based Strategy 

Newell apparently began to believe that the new political leadership in the Justice 

Department in 2009 might welcome the use of the previously eschewed investigative tactics. 

Two early efforts by the new Department leadership sent such signals. One was that Assistant 

Attorney General Lanny Breuer, head of the Criminal Division at Justice Department 

headquarters, assigned a prosecutor to Arizona to resurrect and prosecute the Wide Receiver case 

despite its use of gunwalking tactics. The U.S. Attorney’s Office had not previously prosecuted 

Wide Receiver because ATF had not been forthcoming about the use of these controversial 

tactics. As one individual in ATF’s Phoenix Field Division summarized on August 3, 2009, 

when proposing that the Criminal Division consider the case, the “AUSA was . . . pushing back 

w/ moral dilemma w/ the G[overnment] allowing the targets to traffic 300+ firearms to 

Mexico.”480 Breuer’s Criminal Division found no problems with prosecuting the case and 

formally accepted it at the end of September 2009.481 It may have appeared to Newell that 

gunwalking tactics were no longer a bar from prosecution. 

 

479 Newell Transcript at 103-104 (Exhibit 140).

480 E-mail from James Small to George Gillett (Aug. 3, 2009) [HOGR 005432] (Exhibit 10).

481 E-mail from George Gillett to William Newell (Sep. 26, 2009) [HOGR 005441]; e-mail from Kevin Carwile to 

William Newell (Sep. 30, 2009) [HOGR 003389] (Exhibit 13).
147

The next signal from Department leadership that the tactics might be welcomed came in 

the form of the Department’s fall 2009 draft “Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels.”482 

Distributed throughout the Department and ATF, the strategy aimed to shift focus to building 

large, complex cases against organizations rather than prosecuting straw purchasers. 

The new Justice Department strategy encouraged the use of “prosecutor-led, multiagency task forces, specifically using the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces 

(OCDETF) Program.”483 The strategy noted that “OCDETF has established actual, brick-andmortar Co-Located Strike Forces, for the pursuit of the highest level traffickers of drugs, guns, 

and money.”484 Phoenix, Arizona was one of the locations where a Strike Force was established. 

The strategy noted in several places that the task force model should be “prosecutor-led,” 

indicating the need to have the local U.S. Attorney’s Office on board. 

The strategy also stated:

[M]erely seizing firearms through interdiction will not stop 

firearms trafficking to Mexico. We must identify, investigate, 

and eliminate the sources of illegally trafficked firearms and the 

networks that transport them.485

Newell and his agents in Phoenix may have viewed this statement as the green light they had 

been waiting for. Arresting straw purchasers was not enough to stop the flow of weapons to 

Mexico, and new strategies were needed. To develop a bigger case under this new strategy, ATF 

leadership in Phoenix believed that agents could watch the straw purchasers, not interdict, and 

gather intelligence for long periods of time in order to work their way up the hierarchy of a straw 

purchasing organization. This was the essence of Fast and Furious.

The Assistant Special Agent in Charge in Phoenix, George Gillett, testified that he 

believed the Justice Department’s draft strategy provided the direction for Fast and Furious:

Q. Was it your understanding that at that time DOJ was looking to 

ATF to focus on cartels and more of an organized crime level 

rather than straw purchasers?

A. Yes, sir. The content of that plan specifically addressed 

wanting ATF not to focus on straw purchasers, but to focus on 

cartels and larger complex conspiracy type investigations.

 

482 Draft Department of Justice Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels (Oct. 22, 2009) [HOGR 001451-

001459] (Exhibit 2).

483 Id.

484 Id.

485 Id. (emphasis added).
148

Q. How did that initiative trickle down to the agents in the Phoenix 

field office?

A. Well, to kind of paint the picture, there was the IG reports that 

addressed the ineffective nature of straw purchasers. The drug 

enforcement for the office here in Phoenix was looking to stand up 

an organized crime drug enforcement task force strike force, 

OCDETF. And the special agent in charge of the DEA office was 

asking for ATF's participation in this joint multi-agency strike 

force. ATF here was not able to get any straw purchase 

prosecutions at the time because of an interpretation of the law by 

the U.S. Attorney's Office here in the District of Arizona. So this 

strategy in October 2009 handed down by the DAG's office, 

actually from the Phoenix perspective, was well timed and 

provided us with direction on how to proceed in these types of 

firearms trafficking investigations.486

Newell agreed with Gillett’s comments. Newell testified:

Q. The Department level strategy was communicated to you and you 

had to implement it. 

A. Right. 

Q. And was there any guidance as to specifically how down at the 

agent level? 

A. It was -- we received instruction, but we wanted to focus on 

firearms trafficking networks, organizations as per the 

strategy that the Department had pushed out, yes. 

Q. And was there a goal to not merely focus on straw buyers? 

A. The goal was to go after the infrastructure, the organizations 

themselves; and straw buyers are considered the low rung and one 

part of a larger organization, yes.487

The new cartel-focused strategy promulgated by the Department of Justice provided 

Newell justification to go forward with another gunwalking operation—the fourth during his 

tenure as SAC. This one would be bigger and riskier. One week after Justice Department 

headquarters announced the new strategy, Fast and Furious began. According to Newell, Fast 

and Furious aimed to reach the highest levels of a gun trafficking operation. He stated:

 

486 Gillett Transcript at 12-13 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 4).

487 Newell Transcript at 11 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 140).
149

The goal of the investigation . . . is using the straw purchasers, 

identifying the straw purchasers, to get, using information we gleaned 

from them in a sense of where they're going, where they're dropping the

guns off, to identify the middlemen, to identify the decision makers and 

seize assets when appropriate, and we have the ability to do that, identify 

bank accounts, identify transporters, identify anything so that when we 

make the arrests, do the takedown, that we take down the whole 

organization.488

C. Initiation of Operation Fast and Furious 

From the outset, Newell was aware of the investigative tactics in Operation Fast and 

Furious. He suggested strategy, got updates about significant gun recoveries in Mexico as soon 

as they occurred, and frequently met with the U.S. Attorney to apprise him of the case’s 

progress. The very first recovery of Fast and Furious weapons, in Agua Prieta, Sonora, Mexico, 

just days after the inception of Fast and Furious, piqued Newell’s interest. Newell e-mailed 

ASAC Gillett to alert him to the significance of the recovery, stating: “[T]his seizure has the 

potential of being a ‘hot’ issue in many ways.”489 That very day, Newell reviewed the Fast and 

Furious case management log.490 A few days later, Newell wanted to create a chart 

demonstrating the links between Fast and Furious and the gun recoveries in Sonora.

491

 Newell 

knew from the very first Fast and Furious briefing paper that he sent to ATF headquarters on 

December 2, 2009, that cooperating Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs) were notifying ATF’s 

Phoenix Field Division of suspicious purchases as those purchases occurred.492

In the very first Fast and Furious briefing paper Newell sent to ATF headquarters on 

December 2, 2009, he stated in no uncertain terms that Jacob Chambers was one of the 

individuals whose purchases the cooperating FFLs were reporting to ATF. Newell later testified, 

however, that “ATF did not knowingly allow Mr. Chambers to continue to purchase firearms 

after becoming a target of the investigation.”

493

 According to an internal Phoenix Field Division 

document prepared at Newell’s request, however,494 after becoming a target in the investigation,

 

488 Newell Transcript at 92-93 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 140).

489 E-mail from William Newell to George Gillett (Nov. 24, 2009) [HOGR 002023] (Exhibit 24).

490 ATF Management Log, Case 785115-10-[redacted] (Nov. 24, 2009) (Exhibit 25).

491 E-mail from William Newell to George Gillett and James Needles (Nov. 30, 2009) [HOGR 001956] (Exhibit 30).

492 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Dec. 2, 2009) (Exhibit 15); CHAMBERS Trafficking Case 

IN#785115-10-[redacted], “INVESTIGATIVE STEPS TAKEN/INVESTIGATIVE PLAN” (Dec. 2, 2009), at 2 

(Exhibit 15).

493 William Newell Responses of Sept. 9, 2011, Questions for the Record, Operation Fast and Furious: The Other 

Side of the Border, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (Jul. 26, 2011), at 8.

494 E-mail from William Newell to James Needles and George Gillett (Mar. 16, 2011) [HOGR 001477-001478] 

(Exhibit 236).
150

Chambers purchased 37 more firearms from cooperating FFLs, which were giving ATF

contemporaneous notice.

495

In the early stages of Fast and Furious, Newell closely monitored the case management 

log. He reviewed it three times between November 24 and December 11, 2009.496 Newell also 

frequently inquired about the case’s status. For example, on December 13, 2009, Newell sent an 

e-mail to Gillett entitled “Hope’s case status?”497 Gillett responded:

At least 17 of the guns recently recovered in [Tijuana] are from Hope’s 

purchasers. The OCDETF proposal was drafted yesterday. Total 

purchased last week (including yesterday) were [sic] approximately 

175.498

Newell even suggested specific operational tactics to use. For instance, on January 6, 2010, he 

asked: “Have we explored using LPRs [License Plate Readers] in Hope’s case? Possibly outside 

the auto body shop . . . ?”499

Newell was also aware that ATF personnel had expressed reservations about Fast and 

Furious in the early stages. He knew about ASAC Gillett’s discussion with ATF Southwest 

Border Coordinator Ray Rowley over Rowley’s concerns.500 Newell, however, bristled at the 

intrusion of someone from ATF headquarters into his operation, calling Rowley a “hand 

wringer” with “no control over, or say in,” Newell’s case.501

D. Strategy and Execution of Fast and Furious

Because Fast and Furious was a direct result of the cartel-based strategy, Newell relied on 

guidance from the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Phoenix regarding strategy, legal issues, and 

investigative techniques, including interdiction. Due to Newell’s reliance on federal prosecutors 

in the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office, ATF did not interdicted weapons until the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office believed there was enough evidence to successfully prosecute. Newell later recalled of 

this time period:

And we were doing everything we could because we saw that there 

was a lot of purchases going on and we still didn't have enough 

evidence to stop this legally, we felt, in conjunction with, as we read in 

the briefing paper earlier with the Attorney General's Office, we had 

minimal evidence at that point. Now, this is December 17th [2009]. The 

 

495 ATF Phoenix Field Division chart, purchases by indicted targets before and after entered in Operation Fast and

Furious (Jun. 149, 2011) [HOGR 001479] (Exhibit 237).

496 ATF Management Log, Case 785115-10-[redacted] (Nov. 24, 2009; Dec. 2, 2009; Dec. 11, 2009) (Exhibit 25).

497 E-mail from William Newell to George Gillett (Dec. 13, 2009) [HOGR 001461] (Exhibit 36).

498 E-mail from George Gillett to William Newell (Dec. 13, 2009) [HOGR 001461] (Exhibit 36). 

499 E-mail from William Newell to George Gillett (Jan. 6, 2010) (Exhibit 238).

500 Id.

501 E-mail from William Newell to Steve Martin (Dec. 18, 2009) [HOGR 002395] (Exhibit 53).
151

briefing paper from earlier is January 8th [2010], so we're talking 3 weeks 

later. And at that point we, in conjunction with the U.S. Attorney's 

Office we still felt we had minimal evidence. So that's just a step that 

was taken to try to develop more information on these individuals.502

It was not Newell’s job, however, to wait until there was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to 

order the interdiction of weapons. Newell’s position required him to balance public safety 

interests against building a case.

Newell demonstrated a poor understanding of the fundamental legal standards involved 

in law enforcement. He testified that ATF’s Phoenix Field Division believed they had not met 

the legal standards required for anticipated prosecution. However, he repeatedly conflated that 

standard with the standard required for merely questioning suspected straw purchasers, which is 

the much lower “reasonable suspicion” standard. At one point during his transcribed interview, 

Newell miraculously managed to use all three legal thresholds for questioning, interdicting, and 

prosecuting in a single sentence:

Again, when you're conducting an investigation like this . . . you don't 

want to show your hand. I mean, if you suspect something is occurring, 

but you're well short of probable cause to be able to prove something 

beyond a reasonable doubt, especially in a jury in a place like Arizona, a 

State that has a lot of guns, and that is okay, you want to be able to say, 

okay, this purchase just occurred, okay?503

Yet this statement from Newell also reveals a bigger problem. Rather than questioning straw 

purchasers, Newell was of the opinion that ATF shouldn’t “show [its] hand.” Therefore, so as to 

avoid tipping off the straw purchasers, Newell and others in ATF’s Phoenix Field Office favored 

avoiding all contact with straw purchasers so as not “compromise the bigger case.”504

Newell’s lack of experience as an actual street agent may have hampered his 

understanding of how to approach straw purchasers. When questioned about what agents should

have done in Fast and Furious, Newell testified:

Q. Going back to my hypothetical, you're at the FFL, your badge is 

displayed, and the buyer looks over to you, acknowledges that 

you're with the ATF, and initiates conversation with you and says, 

do you have any questions? What other types of questions would

you ask that potential buyer who initiated the conversation with 

you and wants to be completely open and honest with you? 

 

502 Newell Transcript at 66 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 140).

503 Newell Transcript at 37 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 140).

504 E-mail from William Newell to Kevin O’Reilly (Jul. 28, 2010) [NSS F&F 000020-000026] (Exhibit 143); e-mail 

from William Newell to William McMahon (Dec. 21, 2010) [HOGR 001935] (Exhibit 144).
152

A. . . . I would guess I would ask, how come you like AK-47s so 

much? You seem to like AK-47s. You must have a niche for 

AK-47s.505

Newell later stated: “There are a number of ways to initiate contact with ‘straw’ purchaser 

suspects, many of which were used in this investigation.”506 Yet much to the dismay of many of 

his field agents, Newell believed that they needed more than reasonable suspicion simply to 

confront a suspected straw purchaser and ask him some basic questions.507 

Newell’s desire to not “show [ATF’s] hand” or “compromis[e] the case” played a large 

role in Fast and Furious. When Deputy Assistant Director Steve Martin suggested to Newell in 

December 2009 that “the target is the top in the cartel and not the straw purchase urchin (whose 

brain should be sucked dry for intel),”508 Newell responded, “Amen brother.”509 However, the 

“straw purchase urchin” could only have their “brain . . . sucked dry for intel” if ATF agents 

confronted or arrested them. Instead, Newell wanted to identify the whole network before taking 

action:

The arrest of the suspected “straw” purchasers, before the organizers 

and financiers of the criminal network could be detected and identified,

would have allowed the conspirators to continue to traffic guns unabated, 

as the arrested purchasers, facing negligible jail time, have both little 

incentive and little helpful information to offer law enforcement. 

Experience dictates that they would have been quickly replaced by new 

“straw” purchasers unknown to law enforcement. This literally would 

have empowered the organization to continue to operate and illegally 

traffic firearms in virtual anonymity; an irresponsible situation we sought 

to avoid in seeking OCDETF approval.

510

Newell wanted to wait and make the arrests—top to bottom—all at once. Rather than merely 

working his way up the chain by flipping cooperating witnesses at each stage, which did not win 

headlines, Newell seemed to like the idea of taking down a cartel in spectacular fashion.

Later, in testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 

Newell attempted to synthesize his goals in Fast and Furious:

 

505 Newell Transcript at 36 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 140).

506 William Newell, Responses of Sep. 9, 2011, Questions for the Record, Operation Fast and Furious: The Other 

Side of the Border, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (Jul. 26, 2011), at 6.

507 Newell Transcript at 43-45 (Exhibit 140).

508 E-mail from Steve Martin to William Newell (Dec. 18, 2009) [HOGR 002395] (Exhibit 53).

509 E-mail from William Newell to Steve Martin (Dec. 18, 2009) [HOGR 002395] (Exhibit 53).

510 William Newell, Responses of Sept. 9, 2011, Questions for the Record, Operation Fast and Furious: The Other 

Side of the Border, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (Jul. 26, 2011), at 7.
153

(1) [T]he desire to establish to the satisfaction of the USAO that the 

suspects were indeed unlawful “straw” purchasers and members of the 

criminal enterprise;

(2) [T]o identify the breadth, scope and methodologies of the criminal 

enterprise; and

(3) [T]o seize firearms and arrest the criminally culpable members of the 

organization when lawfully permitted to do so.511

Even if the U.S. Attorney’s Office had not required ATF to meet a burdensome legal standard, 

accomplishing the second goal would come at the expense of the third. AUSA Emory Hurley’s 

contemporaneous memo summarizing the January 5, 2010, meeting with ATF identified this 

tradeoff, stating ATF wanted to “pursue a longer term investigation to target the leader of the 

conspiracy,” instead of succumbing to “pressure from ATF headquarters to immediately contact 

identifiable straw purchasers just to see if this develops any indictable cases and to stem the flow 

of guns.”512 The Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office supported ATF’s Phoenix Field Division in this 

decision.

Newell later told the Committees: “[C]ontact was made with Mr. Patino . . . during the 

course of this investigation.”

513

 ATF Deputy Director Hoover, however, provided testimony to 

the contrary:

A. [T]he choice that the folks on the ground make between the 

strategy deployed by the strike force and the U.S. Attorney's Office 

was, we cannot step to Patino. 

Q. What about arresting him and flipping him? 

A. That's -- well, you can either -- you can step to him and do several 

different things. You can approach him and give him the 

opportunity to flip and work for you. You can approach him, and 

if he doesn't do that, then you can arrest him and then see if he will 

work for you. You can approach him and arrest him and then take 

him completely out of the picture. Those are the options you have 

at that time. 

Q. But none of those options were employed. They let him sit. They 

didn't touch him. They didn't talk to him. 

 

511 William Newell, Supplemental Statement of Sep. 21, 2011, Operation Fast and Furious: The Other Side of the 

Border, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (Jul. 26, 2011), at 4-5.

512 Id.

513 William Newell, Responses of Sep. 9, 2011, Questions for the Record, Operation Fast and Furious: The Other 

Side of the Border, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (Jul. 26, 2011), at 3.
154

A. That's correct. 

Q. They didn't step to him. 

A. That's correct. . . . [T]hey did not step to him, period. And I 

think that was a mistake that we made.514

The “mistake” in not confronting Patino was a deliberate strategy resulting from ATF’s January 

5, 2010, meeting with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Shortly after that meeting, Newell added a 

new line to a Fast and Furious briefing paper that went to ATF headquarters: “Phoenix Special 

Agent in Charge Newell has repeatedly met with USA Burke regarding the on-going status of 

this investigation and both are in full agreement with the current investigative strategy.”

515

 

ATF’s Phoenix Field Division could have taken steps to confront straw purchasers and 

disrupt the trafficking network in the interests of getting guns off the street, as they “believe[d] 

that there [might] be pressure from ATF headquarters” to do.516 Instead, Newell followed the 

new October 2009 strategy that stated, “merely seizing firearms through interdiction will not stop 

firearms trafficking to Mexico. We must identify, investigate, and eliminate the sources of 

illegally trafficked firearms and the networks that transport them.”517

Since ATF already knew that Manuel Celis-Acosta was the head of the straw purchasing 

ring, there is no reason why ATF could not have disrupted the straw purchasers while it worked 

its way from Celis-Acosta up through the traffickers and to the cartel. ATF even had 

information about the higher-ups from the DEA wire. As previously discussed, ATF Deputy 

Director William Hoover admitted that Newell’s Phoenix Field Division “dropped the ball” with 

regard to this information. Instead, Group VII focused entirely on the straw purchasing ring 

under Celis-Acosta—a body that even without disruption from ATF was constantly changing, 

with the exception of the few main purchasers ATF had identified by December 2009. Five of 

the straw purchasers bought 90% of the guns in Fast and Furious.

518

 ATF supervisors later 

testified that there were always new people being added. While at the time it may have been 

unclear whether each of these new individuals was a part of Celis-Acosta’s ring, Group VII 

failed to work up the ladder from individuals they knew were tied to Celis-Acosta. 

 

514 Hoover Transcript at 70-71 (Exhibit 121).

515 Phoenix Group VII, Phoenix Field Division, ATF, Briefing Paper on 785115-10-[redacted] (Jan. 8, 2010) 

[HOGR 001916] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 59); compare Phoenix Group VII, Phoenix Field Division, ATF, 

Briefing Paper on 785115-10-[redacted] (Jan. 8, 2010) [001144-001146] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 54).

516 Memorandum from Emory Hurley to Mike Morrissey, “Manuel Celis Acosta Trafficking Investigation” (Jan. 5, 

2010) [HOGR 002960-002961] (Exhibit 57).

517 Draft Department of Justice Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels (Oct. 22, 2009) [HOGR 001451-

001459] (Exhibit 2).

518 Those five purchasers were Jacob Montelongo, Alfredo Celis, Joshua Moore, Sean Steward, and Uriel Patino. 

See ATF Suspect Gun Database. 
155

Newell should have recognized the limitations of Phoenix Group VII’s surveillance 

capability would have seriously hindered his goal of identifying the trafficking network. 

Newell’s January 5, 2010, e-mail to McMahon stated:

I need help though, in the form of detailees to conduct surveillance. I was 

hoping to wait until the GRIT but this case has progressed so fast, much 

quicker than any other case we’ve been involved with, that I need bodies 

asap. If it’s OK with you I’ll start reaching out to non-SWB [Southwest 

Border] SACs tomorrow to feel them out about letting us have some 

bodies to assist with surveillance.519

Newell later acknowledged that, in hindsight, he would have “ensured a more effecting [sic] flow 

of information, between the field and ATF headquarters regarding . . . the need for additional 

resources in support of the investigation.”520 

One month later, in February 2010, Newell knew that the case was still understaffed. At 

that point, ATF deployed a GPS firearms “tracker” since it did not have the manpower to surveil 

Fast and Furious weapons after the straw purchases took place. The Phoenix Field Division 

attempted to place a tracker in one of the hundreds of guns that it knew the cooperating FFLs

were selling to known straw purchasers. In a February 14, 2010, e-mail to ASAC Gillett, Newell 

stated:

Any movement on the gun with the tracker? I told HQ we had plenty of 

surveillance (loosely the truth) but that we may end up losing the tracker 

if the battery runs out before it goes south. After that we’ll have to wait 

for the gun to get seized before we can potentially track it back.521

Without functional trackers, the only way to determine where weapons ended up was when they 

were recovered at crime scenes in Mexico or the United States.

Though the use of a tracker had potential, Newell knew that many other weapons bought 

by straw purchasers had successfully entered Mexico. He was also well aware ATF was not 

monitoring or tracking the vast majority of the guns. When the U.S. Attorney’s Office expressed 

doubts on February 22, 2010, Newell reassured them:

Also, I talked to the USA this morning about this case and advised him of

the seizure and link to the Tucson OCDETF case. He was taken aback 

by some of the facts I informed him about (including the fact that we 

are up to approx 800 guns) so I am setting up a briefing for him (alone 

 

519 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Jan. 5, 2010) [HOGR 002107] (Exhibit 56).

520 William Newell Responses of Sep. 9, 2011, Questions for the Record from H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 

Reform Hearing, Operation Fast and Furious: The Other Side of the Border, 112th Congress (Jul. 26, 2011), at 3.

521 E-mail from William Newell to George Gillett (Feb. 14, 2010) [HOGR 001467] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 57).
156

no USAO “posse”) about this case and several other cases I feel he is 

being misled about.522

Shortly thereafter, Newell knew the case involved 900 firearms and that “ATF is continuing to 

receive data [redacted] which overwhelmingly shows the connection amongst these straw 

purchasers and the FFLs.”523

Although ATF had sufficient evidence to indict the straw purchasers by late April 2010, 

Newell was evidently determined to make the bigger case. In his April 27, 2010, e-mail to 

McMahon, after McMahon had asked for an exit strategy, Newell mentioned his desire for a 

larger case that would gain national media attention:

524

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Though the exit strategy itself acknowledges that enough evidence existed for Patino’s arrest, 

ATF Phoenix, under Bill Newell’s leadership, chose not to pursue this course.525

 

522 E-mail from William Newell to David Voth and George Gillett (Feb. 22, 2010) [HOGR 001339] (emphasis 

added) (Exhibit 73).

523 E-mail from William Newell to Tanya Young, et al. (Feb. 26, 2010) [HOGR 004992-004997] (Exhibit 74).

524 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Apr. 27, 2010) [HOGR 002416] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 

123).

525 “Operation Fast and Furious Exit Strategy” (Apr. 27, 2010), at 1 [HOGR 001179-001181] (Exhibit 126).

“Once we establish that link we can hold this case up 

as an example of the link between narcotics and 

firearms trafficking which would be great on a national 

media scale but if the Director want this shut down 

then so be it.”
157

E. Death of Agent Terry

Not until the tragic murder of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry on December 14, 2010,

did law enforcement officers finally arrest one of the straw buyers. After Agent Terry’s murder, 

ATF traced two of the weapons recovered at the scene to straw purchaser Jaime Avila, who 

bought the weapons in January 2010. Immediately, law enforcement set out to arrest Avila. The 

guns recovered at the scene of Terry’s murder were the only new evidence allowing for Avila’s 

arrest. Although scores of similar Fast and Furious weapons had already turned up at violent 

crime scenes in both the U.S. and Mexico, ATF had not arrested any straw purchasers. 

Brian Terry’s murder did not present any additional evidence of the straw purchasing 

scheme that Newell was after. The rapid arrest of Avila after Terry’s death belies the claim that 

a lack of legal authority to intervene caused the months of delay by ATF. Additionally, the 

initial basis of charges against Avila was a weapon purchased in June 2010—not the weapons 

found at the scene, which he purchased in January 2010. 

Newell was unable to explain what changed between the morning of December 14, 2010, 

when Avila was a known straw purchaser, and the evening of December 15, 2010, when Avila 

was arrested. He was unable to point to any additional evidence discovered during that 

timeframe that established probable cause to arrest Avila and was unable to explain what 

additional evidence ATF had on Avila that they did not on the other straw purchasers:

Q. If these defendants hadn't been identified yet shortly after the Brian 

Terry incident, where a border patrol agent was killed, 

immediately Avila was arrested and that is different than the rest of 

the defendants, what was unique about that? Was it the specific 

tragedy that changed things? 

A. I mean, what was different there was additional evidence later 

on in the case concerning Avila. That gave us the ability to 

charge him with using a false address which is what we 

charged him in the complaint.

Q. But you had 40 suspects at that point that you weren't going after 

their house. 20 of them were indicted subsequently?

A. 20, right. 

Q. But you had 40 or so suspects. And the moment these firearms 

are found at the Terry scene traced back to Jaime Avila, boom, 

he is arrested, which is different than everything else that has 

been described to us with the other suspects in the case. So we 

are asking why. 
158

A. One of the guns was traced back to him, he was a suspect.

Q. But there is guns being traced back that are found in Mexican 

crime scenes that are being traced back, there is guns that are 

found in El Paso, there are guns that are found in Naco and that 

arrest didn't happen. 

A. Well, again, at that point in time, we were still proceeding toward 

doing one indictment against . . . the whole series of people. And 

that incident happened and then there was evidence that it was 

gathered later in the case to be able to arrest him on a 

complaint.

Q. Surely you're not suggesting that you learned of the address change 

and the falsehood about the address on the form, you happened to 

learn about that on December 14th, the same night that Agent 

Terry was killed? That's not what you are suggesting, is it?

A. No. I'm not suggesting it at all. 

Q. So you had the information that allowed you to make the 

complaint on him long before you actually did it, right? 

A. I don't think it was long -- as I recall, the complaint lists 

purchases that were made in -- it was June or July.

Q. 6 months earlier, right?

A. Sure. Okay. 526 

ATF did not arrest the straw purchasers because the crimes related to the guns they 

purchased were lower profile in nature, or shamefully because the crimes occurred in Mexico. 

ATF allowed suspected straw purchasers to continue arming criminals. ATF had enough 

information to arrest Avila and the other straw purchasers months earlier, yet it chose not to 

make the arrests. Newell and his agents wanted to build a bigger case. When Brian Terry was 

killed, ATF was forced to act. Since Avila’s straw purchases were connected to a high-profile 

crime, ATF felt pressure to arrest him immediately—“15 minutes ago,” in the words of ASAC 

George Gillett.

527

 Other straw purchasers were tied to crimes that had occurred throughout 2010. 

Those crimes, however, did not motivate ATF to make arrests, likely because they did not 

generate any media attention or public awareness. In fact, ATF agents had gathered little new 

evidence against the suspected straw purchasers for months. The fundamental change in the case 

 

526 Newell Transcript at 109-111 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 140).

527 Voth Transcript at 183 (Exhibit 49).
159

involving Avila was that the murder U.S. Border Patrol agent was inextricably linked to Fast and 

Furious. 

Newell also testified that he was not aware of complaints from agents about ceasing 

surveillance in Fast and Furious:

I became aware of that when some of the documents were released that I 

saw. And I want to say it was probably February, early February, 

something like that, of this year [2011]. . . . To the best of my recollection, 

the first time I became aware that agents were being -- disagreed with the 

surveillance tactics was I believe the beginning of this year when the 

documents that I saw were released.528

The day after Terry’s death, six weeks prior to the February 2011 timeframe, Newell ordered 

Group Supervisor Voth to compile the number of Fast and Furious weapons that were seized in 

the case—whether by ATF or otherwise.529 In a follow-up e-mail to Deputy Assistant Director 

McMahon, Newell stated:530

For Newell, not compromising “the bigger case” was of paramount importance. 

On January 27, 2011, Senator Grassley sent his first letter to ATF regarding Fast and 

Furious. That night, Newell e-mailed McMahon:531

 

528 Newell Transcript at 57 (Exhibit 140).

529 E-mail from David Voth to William Newell and George Gillett (Dec. 16, 2010) [HOGR 001935] (Exhibit 144).

530 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Dec. 21, 2010) [HOGR 001935] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 

144).

531 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Jan. 27, 2011) [HOGR 003735] (Exhibit 239).

“For what it’s worth and since I don’t like the perception 

that we allowed guns to “walk”, I had David Voth pull the 

numbers of the guns recovered in Mexico . . .”
160

Information about Avila’s role in the straw purchasing organization, which Newell had reviewed 

in the Case Management Log a year earlier, contradicts Newell’s e-mail to McMahon.

Recognizing that intense scrutiny of Fast and Furious was imminent, Newell apparently 

did not want to shoulder the blame for the entire operation. According to DEA’s Special Agent 

in Charge in Phoenix, Elizabeth Kempshall, as the congressional investigation expanded in the 

spring of 2011, Newell told her: “I’m not taking the fall alone. If I go down, I’m taking 

Dennis Burke with me.”

532

On July 26, 2011, in testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, Newell admitted a failure to assess the risks of Fast and Furious 

adequately: 

[I]t was incumbent upon me to have more risk assessments throughout the 

investigation. I acknowledge that. I acknowledge the fact that one of the 

things I should have done was more frequently throughout the 

investigations conduct risk assessments to ensure whether this was still a 

prudent strategy to occur.

533

When asked in Congressional Questions for the Record (“QFRs”) when he actually did conduct 

risk assessments, Newell backpedaled: “Because public safety is always our concern we 

routinely evaluated the efficacy of the investigative techniques being used throughout the course 

of the operational phase of this investigation.”534

Newell also acknowledged that the Phoenix Field Division should have interdicted more 

firearms:

[W]ith 20/20 hindsight I now see that I should have conducted more 

frequent assessments during the course of the investigation in order to 

 

532 Telephone interview of Elizabeth Kempshall (Sep. 22, 2011) (emphasis added).

533 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Hearing, Operation Fast and Furious: The Other Side of the Border,

112th Congress Cong. (Jul. 26, 2011), at 85.

534 William Newell, Responses of Sep. 9, 2011, Questions for the Record, Operation Fast and Furious: The Other 

Side of the Border, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (Jul. 26, 2011), at 2.

“Buying 3 AKs does not rise to the level 

of initiating a criminal investigation 

especially when at that time we were not 

aware of Avila’s role.”
161

determine whether our surveillance and seizure efforts were effective in 

those instances where we had advance knowledge of an attempt by a 

suspected member of the firearms trafficking organization to 

purchase weapons.535

When asked specifically what he would have done differently under Fast and Furious, Newell 

again shifted focus back to the criminal prosecutions in the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office, over 

which he had no control: “I would have communicated a greater sense of urgency to my staff and 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office as to the need for the return of expeditious charges addressing the 

criminal violations of the organization.”536 

As the Special Agent in Charge of the Phoenix Field Division, Bill Newell had the ability 

and the duty to end Operation Fast and Furious much sooner than it did. Instead, it ended as a 

reaction to a foreseeable tragedy. Newell authorized, endorsed, and even encouraged this 

investigation, and allowed it to continue for over a year after the scope of the trafficking ring was 

known and even after sufficient evidence against the straw buyers had been garnered.

But Newell was not the only senior ATF official to share blame for the failures of Fast 

and Furious. Another senior ATF official in Washington could have put a stop to Fast and 

Furious: William McMahon.

2. Deputy Assistant Director for Field Operations William McMahon

FINDING: Rubber stamp signatures and false denials: Though he served as the 

crucial link between ATF headquarters and the Phoenix Field 

Division, Bill McMahon admittedly rubber stamped critical 

documents that came across his desk without reading them. In 

McMahon’s view, it was not his job to ask any questions about what 

was going on in the field. McMahon gave false testimony to Congress 

about signing applications for wiretap intercepts in Fast and Furious.

A. Position and Role

A 24-year ATF veteran, William McMahon served as the DAD in charge of Western

Field Operations during Fast and Furious. As DAD for Western Field Operations, McMahon 

had seven ATF supervisors reporting directly to him—including SACs along the Southwest 

Border, the Southwest Border Coordinator, and ATF’s Chief of International Affairs. McMahon 

 

535 William Newell Supplemental Statement of Sep. 21, 2011, Operation Fast and Furious: The Other Side of the 

Border, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (Jul. 26, 2011), at 4 (emphasis 

added).

536 William Newell Responses of Sep. 9, 2011, Questions for the Record, Operation Fast and Furious: The Other 

Side of the Border, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (Jul. 26, 2011), at 3.
162

served as the chief liaison between ATF’s Phoenix Field Division and ATF headquarters, and

had significant supervisory duties during Fast and Furious.

McMahon was briefed on and aware of Fast and Furious from its earliest stages. He was 

among the first to be notified of the first large recovery of weapons in Naco, Sonora on 

November 20, 2009—just four days after ATF officially opened the Fast and Furious case.537 He 

learned that this large recovery traced back to an ongoing case out of Phoenix.

538

 McMahon also 

received a detailed briefing paper about Fast and Furious as early as December 2, 2009.539 That 

briefing paper explained that the Phoenix Field Division was working with four FFLs to receive 

contemporaneous notice of suspect purchases or orders and enter them into ATF’s Suspect Gun 

Database.540 

ATF personnel in Phoenix knew that McMahon was closely monitoring Fast and Furious

from the launch of the operation. In mid-December 2009, McMahon ordered ATF’s Criminal 

Intelligence Division to perform a link analysis on Fast and Furious.541 ASAC George Gillett 

invoked his name and authority to prevent the case agent, Hope MacAllister, from temporarily 

leaving her duties for medic tactical recertification.542

Phoenix SAC Bill Newell reported directly to McMahon. Newell had a reputation as an 

“overreporter” at headquarters, an assessment with which McMahon agreed: 

Q. We have heard some testimony that he [Newell] had a tendency to 

over report to you, always wanting to keep you in the loop about 

what was going on in Phoenix? 

A. Bill was pretty good at that, yeah. 

 

537 E-mail from William Newell to Mark Chait, et al. (Nov. 25, 2009) [HOGR 001983] (Exhibit 29).

538 Id.

539 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Dec. 2, 2009) (Exhibit 15).

540 CHAMBERS Trafficking Case IN#785115-10-[redacted], “INVESTIGATIVE STEPS 

TAKEN/INVESTIGATIVE PLAN” (Dec. 2, 2009), at 2 (Exhibit 15).

541 E-mail from Kevin O’Keefe to George Gillett (Dec. 14, 2009) [HOGR 002275-002276] (Exhibit 240).

542 E-mail from George Gillett to Joshua Knapp (Dec. 4, 2009) [HOGR 000884] (Exhibit 241).
163

Q. That was not necessarily just phone calls but written product, 

whether it is briefing points or memorandum or things like that? 

A. That’s correct. 

Q. So as a result, you probably had a pretty good idea of what was 

going on in Phoenix? 

A. I did.543

Newell often wrote long and thorough e-mails and prepared detailed briefing papers for 

McMahon. These updates kept McMahon fully informed about what was happening on the 

ground in Phoenix during Fast and Furious.

After Southwest Border Coordinator Ray Rowley expressed concern in December 2009 

to Gillett about the number of guns involved in Fast and Furious, Gillett contacted Newell, who 

in turn relayed Rowley’s comments to McMahon. McMahon later recalled Newell’s principal 

complaint was that someone from headquarters was attempting to interfere in the case:

Q. Okay. Can you describe some more about that conversation with 

Mr. Newell?

A. Sure. It was some concerns that Ray was dictating things from 

headquarters to the field which was not his job. I agreed. I 

said I would speak to Ray. That is about what I remember 

from this.544

When pressed, however, McMahon finally acknowledged that he had been informed of the 

substance of Rowley’s concerns:

Q. And again, did he [Newell] express Mr. Rowley’s specific 

concerns about this to you? 

A. I believe he did. 

Q. You believe he did. And what did you do with that information 

knowing that Mr. Rowley was concerned about this?

A. I would explain to Ray what was going on in Phoenix at the 

time, about this is not Virginia where Ray spent most of his 

 

543 McMahon Transcript at 17-18 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 120).

544 Id. at 35.
164

career, or New York, where I spent most of my career. This 

was Phoenix, Arizona.

Q. Okay. And was he satisfied with that explanation? 

A. I don’t remember whether Ray was satisfied or not.

Despite the fact that two of the individuals reporting to him were bickering, McMahon did 

nothing to adequately address Rowley’s concerns . 

McMahon was also present at the January 5, 2010, Fast and Furious briefing in which 

Rowley and OSII Deputy Assistant Director Steve Martin brought up the subject of the volume 

of guns involved.

545

 McMahon remained silent. After this meeting, Martin met with McMahon 

and asked if he planned to shut down Fast and Furious. McMahon again remained silent.546

Newell e-mailed McMahon a Fast and Furious briefing paper on the evening of January 

8, 2010. The briefing paper stated that the Phoenix Field Division’s strategy was to “allow the 

transfer of firearms to continue to take place, albeit at a much slower pace, in order to further the 

investigation and allow for the identification of additional co-conspirators who would continue to 

operate and illegally traffic firearms to Mexican DTOs.”547

Yet McMahon testified that he did not receive this briefing paper. This statement is part of a 

pattern whereby McMahon claimed that he did not remember e-mails he received:

Q. So you didn't receive this briefing paper in January of 2010?

A. Not this briefing paper, no.548

Despite having received this briefing paper, which laid out the Phoenix Field Division’s 

investigative strategy, McMahon did not order the implementation of any operational controls in 

 

545 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform and S. Comm. on the Judiciary Joint Staff Report, The Department of 

Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Fueling Cartel Violence, 112th Congress (July 26, 2011), at 20.

546 Id.

547 Phoenix Group VII, Phoenix Field Division, ATF, Briefing Paper on 785115-10-[redacted] (Jan. 8, 2010) 

[HOGR 001915-001918] (emphasis added) (Exhibit 59); see also e-mail from William Newell to William 

McMahon (Jan. 8, 2010) (Exhibit 58).

548 McMahon Transcript at 73-74 (Exhibit 120).
165

Operation Fast and Furious. Instead, he believed that ATF could rely on ICE or the Border 

Patrol to stop weapons from flowing south:

Q. And what -- what I guess operational safeguards were in place to 

ensure that the guns weren't going to go to Mexico, weren't going 

to end up at crime scenes in Mexico? What safeguards were in 

place? 

A. Well, I mean, every individual in this case was put into the 

[Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS)]. So if 

they ever had a border crossing that would be checked, if ICE -- if 

CBP was doing the check southbound.

All the guns that we suspected being purchased by this group were 

put into our suspect gun database. We were obtaining a wiretap to 

help us identify when and if people are buying weapons and who is 

orchestrating that. So all of those safeguards and all of those 

techniques were put in place during this investigation.549

Although ICE Agent Layne France was receiving case management reports through the TECS 

investigation management system when Fast and Furious targets crossed the border, ATF was 

not using that information to interdict weapons.

550

 Further, the information contained within 

ATF’s Suspect Gun Database was of no use to other agencies that would be conducting 

southbound searches, such as CBP. As detailed above in Part II of this report, the Department of 

Homeland Security stated that when U.S. Border Patrol agents encounter weapons, they only run 

National Crime Information Center database searches—not eTrace searches. A U.S. Border 

Patrol intelligence office would only conduct an eTrace search in certain situations.551 ATF case 

agents in Phoenix strictly controlled the flow of information about Fast and Furious in the 

Suspect Gun Database. They even prevented ATF personnel in Mexico from having access to 

certain information in eTrace, let alone personnel from other agencies. McMahon should have 

been aware that ATF’s Suspect Gun Database had very little value in ensuring guns were not 

moving to Mexico. His apparent misunderstanding of these systems and their capabilities was a 

crucial error in Fast and Furious, akin to Newell’s misunderstanding of the legal standards of 

reasonable suspicion and probable cause.

B. Progression of Fast and Furious

McMahon testified that he did not review ATF’s Fast and Furious OCDETF proposal in 

January 2010 because “[i]t is not something that comes up to my level.”552 When the Phoenix

 

549 McMahon Transcript at 47-48 (Exhibit 120).

550 In camera review of documents, the Department of Homeland Security (July 3, 2012).

551 E-mail from [Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Homeland Security] to [Senate Judiciary Committee 

staff] (Oct. 25, 2011) (Exhibit 65).

552 McMahon Transcript at 71 (Exhibit 120).
166

Field Division’s OCDETF proposal was approved on January 26, 2010, however, Newell sent a 

copy of the proposal to McMahon.553 McMahon continued to receive several Fast and Furious 

updates per week from the Phoenix Field Office.

554

 By February 26, 2010, McMahon was aware

that Fast and Furious straw purchasers had bought over 900 firearms.555

By February 2010, ATF personnel in Mexico alerted McMahon as to the number of guns 

ending up in Mexico.556 McMahon later acknowledged this. He testified:

A. Oh, I mean, yeah, we have talked about it, at some point during the 

case, about the number of guns ending up in Mexico, Dan [Kumor]

would usually express his concern from the concern he was getting 

from his people in Mexico. 

Q. And what concern was that? 

A. That there was a large number of guns being recovered in Mexico. 

Q. And what was your response to that? 

A. My response to—

Q. To Mr. Kumor's concern. 

A. That it is our concern as well. We are working this investigation 

the best we can to take down this group of individuals and stop 

them from putting the guns in Mexico.557

These firearm recoveries should have signaled to McMahon that operational safeguards, such as 

entering firearm serial numbers into the Suspect Gun Database and CBP’s southbound checks,

were not stemming the flow of weapons. Instead of instituting better safeguards, McMahon did 

nothing, letting the operation continue unabated. While his words after the fact reflect a concern 

over the number of weapons involved and desire to shut down Fast and Furious, his actions, or 

lack thereof, at the time tell a different story.

Complaints were streaming in from various parts of ATF about Fast and Furious, 

including some voiced by Assistant Director Chait. Even so, McMahon failed to intervene, even 

when he saw a problem:

 

553 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Jan. 26, 2010) [HOGR 002217] (Exhibit 68).

554 See, e.g., e-mail from William McMahon to George Gillett (Feb. 10, 2010) [HOGR 001418] (Exhibit 242); see 

also e-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Feb. 13, 2010) [HOGR 002523] (Exhibit 243).

555 E-mail from William Newell to Tanya Young, et al. (Feb. 26, 2010) [HOGR 004992-004997] (Exhibit 74).

556 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform and S. Comm. on the Judiciary Joint Staff Report, The Department of

Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Fueling Cartel Violence, 112th Cong. (July 26, 2011), at 33-37.

557 McMahon Transcript at 39-40 (Exhibit 120).
167

Q. Well, what would be done normally? What was not done in this 

case? And as the Deputy Assistant Director for the Western Field 

Operations, you know that this is occurring over and over and over 

again. So what steps did you take to make sure that, for example, 

Uriel Patino and other suspects in this case do not continue to buy 

weapons, do not continue to illegally transfer them to prohibited 

third parties, and they did continue to end up in Mexico? 

A. Sure. Again, when you have a large group of people buying a 

large number of weapons, that is an issue. So there is constant 

communication between me – what are we doing to slow this 

down? What are we – what is our endgame? What is our plan? 

That is the direction I give.

I mean, I don’t ever, in this position, dictate how someone 

conducts an investigation. That is not what this position is. 

My position is to monitor, to support, to provide assistance to 

the people under my position.558

Contrary to McMahon’s testimony, it is precisely the responsibility of the Deputy Assistant 

Director to provide guidance, oversight, and supervision to a SAC in the field. Such instruction 

and guidance are especially important in a large operation such as Fast and Furious. McMahon, 

along with Chait, exemplified the hands-off attitude towards Fast and Furious at ATF 

headquarters. With more active involvement of senior ATF officials such as McMahon, Fast and 

Furious might have ended a year earlier. McMahon and Chait both knew full well that Fast and 

Furious jeopardized public safety. Straw purchasers were acquiring large numbers of guns from

cooperating FFLs and distributing them in an uncontrolled fashion. Somehow, high-ranking 

ATF officials did not feel compelled to intervene. 

Even after he was given extreme details of the public safety hazard that Fast and Furious 

created, McMahon still did not intervene. Those details came in the form of wiretap 

applications.

C. Wiretap Authorization

The Office of Enforcement Operations (“OEO”), part of the Justice Department’s 

Criminal Division, is “primarily responsible for the Department’s statutory wire intercept 

authorizations.”559 Lawyers in OEO review these wiretap packages to ensure that they “meet 

statutory requirements and DOJ policies.”560 When OEO completes its review of a wiretap 

package, federal law requires that the Attorney General or his designee—in practice, a Deputy 

 

558 McMahon Transcript at 49 (Exhibit 120).

559 Letter from Deputy Attorney General James Cole Chairman Darrell Issa et al., at 6 (Jan. 27, 2012).

560 Id.
168

Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division—authorizes it.561 Each wiretap package 

includes an affidavit which details the factual basis upon which the authorization is sought. 

The wiretap application must show that the federal law enforcement agents cannot 

achieve the investigative goals they seek in spite of having exhausted all traditional law 

enforcement techniques, such as consensual encounters, pretext stops, and Terry stops, or that 

such techniques are too dangerous.562 Applications must also lay out probable cause for an 

intercept through an affidavit provided by a law enforcement agent. This statement of probable 

cause typically contains rich detail, including—in the case of a firearms trafficking 

investigation—relevant weapons purchases, significant recoveries, and specific details about the 

suspects. Given their intrusive nature, the use of the wiretaps requires the approval of a federal 

judge. In Fast and Furious, the Justice Department authorized at least six applications to the 

court in 2010. 

Generally, the use of federal wiretaps is rare in ATF cases. It is exceedingly rare in 

firearms trafficking cases. Obtaining authorization for these wiretaps represented a significant 

achievement for ATF and the Phoenix Field Division. According to documents and testimony, 

McMahon was the highest ranking ATF official who received the Fast and Furious wiretap 

affidavits. He approved them before they went to OEO at Justice Department headquarters. 

McMahon inexplicably claims he never signed any memorandum, never saw the affidavits, and 

does not remember ever reading them. McMahon testified:

Q. So this is dated February 5, 2010, a memorandum to Deputy 

Assistant Director, West Field Operations. I assume that is you? 

A. That is. That is my title. 

Q. Through the Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Field Division, 

from Group Supervisor, Phoenix Group 7.

Subject: Request for Authorization to Seek Title 3 Intercept of 

Telephonic Communications. 

So this is a memo to you requesting authorization to seek Title 3 

intercept. There is some good detail in here. Not as strong detail 

as the actual wiretap applications themselves. Are you saying that 

you never read this, that you just approved it and sent it up to the 

next level? 

A. If I – if I – if I had read this, I would have signed it and dated it. I 

don’t believe I have ever read this. 

 

561 See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).

562 18 U.S.C. § 2518(c).
169

Q. You don’t believe you have ever read this. So what is the point of 

even sending it to you then? 

A. I’m not sure if it was sent to me.563

Documents show that Newell sent the memo to McMahon on February 5, 2010.564 In that email, Newell told McMahon that he would send the actual affidavit along with the original memo

to him via FedEx.

565

 

McMahon adamantly denied receiving the package and blamed his secretary for his 

having not received it. He testified:

Q. Okay. This email was sent to you from Mr. Newell, talking about 

how attached is the memo requesting the authorization, which is 

Exhibit 4. He also said that he could not scan the actual affidavit 

due to its size, that he was FedExing that to you, along with the 

original memo. 

A. Okay. 

Q. So I presume, based on your testimony, you never received that 

FedEx package. Is that right? 

A. Not that I recall. 

Q. So how many FedEx packages get delivered to your office on a 

daily, weekly, monthly basis that you don’t even see? Especially 

 

563 McMahon Transcript at 53 (Exhibit 120).

564 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Feb. 5, 2010) (Exhibit 71).

565 Id.
170

ones that you are aware that they are going to show up? 

A. Well, most of the times, the secretaries open up the FedEx 

packaging and then put, like, a pink envelope in my box. 

Q. Okay.

A. So I don’t know how many things come in on –

Q. So the secretary probably did it, put the pink envelope in your box 

for this one? 

A. I don’t know. I don’t recall seeing this memo. 

Q. Okay. And even though Mr. Newell clearly sent it to you on a 

Friday afternoon, you never asked about the memo or the affidavit 

that he was sending? 

A. Correct. 

Q. Okay. 

Q. How frequently did Mr. Newell send you FedEx packages?

A. Very infrequently. . . But, you know, I don’t actually get a 

FedEx. The secretary gets the FedEx. And then it is broken 

down from there and then passed out to whoever needs to sign 

things.566

McMahon said he did not read any of the wiretap affidavits in Fast and Furious. He offered the 

following explanation:

Q. Seven. So there were seven wiretaps and you never bothered to 

read any of them?

A. Absolutely not. And there was no way I could. Some of these 

wiretaps would be up for, like, 2 days; and then we would be 

applying for another one. 

Q. But you never bothered to read any of the applications –

A. I knew that –

 

566 McMahon Transcript at 167-169 (Exhibit 120).
171

Q. – rich in detail? 

A. I knew that we were applying for wires and that was what was 

important for me.567

Applying for the wiretaps was important to McMahon—the contents of the applications were 

not. McMahon made no effort at even a cursory review of the detailed wiretap applications 

before they went to the Department of Justice.

McMahon further testified that he had never signed an authorization for a Title III wire 

intercept:

Q. Okay. So, just to be clear, you never—you’ve never seen this 

document before? 

A. Not that I recall, no. 

Q. Okay. 

Q. Feel free to take some time to review it, just to make sure. 

A. Sure. Some of the facts in here I am familiar with, but, again, this 

memo does not – I don’t recall seeing this memo. I don’t recall 

ever signing a memo of request for authorization to seek Title 

IIIs in any of my divisions.568

Next, McMahon claimed that he was not part of the process to authorize the affidavits at ATF. 

He testified:

Q. The first sentence here, “this memorandum serves to request 

authorization” – the memorandum is to you – “to initiate a Title 3 

cellular telephone intercept.” So if you never approved this, if you 

never saw it in the memorandum request authorization, how was 

this authorized? 

A. By a judge signing the order. I mean, that’s how wiretaps work. 

Q. [Group VII Supervisor] Mr. Voth can’t simply sign it in – sign it 

by himself and submit a wiretap application to a Federal judge. 

A. No. It has to go through the process I just described.

 

567 McMahon Transcript at 52 (Exhibit 120).

568 McMahon Transcript at 54 (Exhibit 120).
172

Q. It seems as though you’re a part of the process here. 

A. Not the process I described, no.569

McMahon’s supervisor, Assistant Director Chait, clearly identified McMahon as part of 

the process.570 Before the Department of Justice submits the wiretap application to a federal 

judge for approval, the Criminal Division requires an approval memorandum from ATF to 

complete the application process. This memorandum calls for the signature of a senior ATF 

official. As Chait explained, that official is usually the Deputy Assistant Director:

Q. Let me ask real quickly about the Title IIIs. So what is the process 

for getting the Title III approved? How does that work? 

A. The field works with the assistant U.S. attorney to prepare an 

affidavit for a Title III. It goes through – I think it was dual 

tracked, and I think the process may have changed recently. We 

actually send one version through our house. We have an 

attorney that reviews it, a DAD. At the same time I believe –

Q. Who is the DAD that reviewed that?

A. Well, DAD in this case of the West, Bill McMahon.

Similarly, Acting Director Melson confirmed that McMahon would have been involved 

in the wiretap approval process, and that the authorization would not rise above the DAD level in 

ATF’s management structure:

I would assume that the authority to authorize these types of things 

should be pushed down to the DAD because everything can’t come up 

to Chait, and certainly Hoover can’t handle another thing. I mean, he 

is just overwhelmed with things that are going on in the agency. So 

whether – so I wouldn’t be surprised either if it should stay at the DAD 

level unless there is something extraordinary about it that raises a question 

that you need the Assistant Director’s approval on.571

When asked directly if he was the individual who signed off on forwarding a memo for a wiretap 

application, McMahon stated he was not:

Q. [A] memo for a wiretap application, isn’t that your job to sign off 

on that? 

 

569 McMahon Transcript at 55 (Exhibit 120).

570 Chait Transcript at 37-38 (Exhibit 122).

571 Melson Transcript at 172 (Exhibit 52).
173

A. No, I never signed off on a memo for a wiretap application.

572

Contrary to his initial testimony, documents confirm that McMahon did in fact sign at least 

four approval memos on behalf of Assistant Director Mark Chait. One such document shows 

McMahon’s signature on behalf of Mark Chait:

573

[INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

 

572 McMahon Transcript at 52-53 (Exhibit 120).

573 Memorandum to Julie Wuslich, Electronic Surveillance Unit Chief, DOJ, from Assistant Director (Field

Operations), “Wire Communications Intercept Authorization,” Mar. 31, 2010 (Exhibit 244).
174
175

When confronted at a congressional hearing about the evidence contradicting his prior 

testimony, McMahon maintained his denials:

A. The last slide that you put up that had my signature for Mark 

Chait –

Q. Yes. 

A. – that would transmit the actual application for wiretap, yes. 

Q. Okay. Now, in your interview, were you asked about this? 

A. Not this specifically, no. 

Q. Okay. Did you volunteer it? 

A. Not that I recall, no. 

Q. Okay. Any reason why not? 

A. I am trying to figure out what I need to volunteer. I think I did 

tell the staff when I was interviewed that I don’t recall – I 

did[n’t] recall receiving applications. 

It was not until Chairman Issa pressed McMahon that he finally admitted that failing to review 

the wiretap applications was a mistake:

Q. So if I am to understand, just as a lay person, I am one of the 

nonlawyers up here, so that is why I introduced the qualified 

people early on. But as a lay person, it looks to me like you had an 

intimate part in the wiretap request. Your signature was part of a 

request process. And yet when we asked you about your being 

involved in them, you did not volunteer to tell us about this part. 

You simply relied on you didn’t actually sign the affidavit. Is that 

what you are saying? The truth was you didn’t sign the affidavit, 

even though you signed this document and saw other documents 

and were sent other documents that you may not remember? 

A. I signed this document that transmitted the application for the 

wiretap to our counsel’s office for them to review. 

Q. But you never looked at it? 

A. No, I did not. Again, I think I said earlier on mistakes were made. 
176

And one of the first questions you asked me, sir, is what mistakes. 

And that mistake is not doing a thorough enough review of the 

documents that were coming across my desk. I accept full 

responsibility for that.574 

Failing to review wiretap applications thoroughly was a critical error made by both McMahon 

and Criminal Division leadership in the Justice Department during Fast and Furious. Acting 

Director Melson later noted that when he finally read one of the wiretap affidavits after the 

public uproar over Fast and Furious, “the affidavit certainly caught my attention.”575 Had 

McMahon read the wiretap affidavits that he received, he would have undoubtedly become 

aware of red flags and could have taken appropriate action. 

Office of Enforcement Operations lawyers in the Criminal Division did read the 

affidavits. Three Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, under the authority of the Assistant 

Attorney General, Lanny Breuer, signed the applications. That a Deputy Assistant Director was 

the most senior ATF official to sign off on the Fast and Furious wiretap applications created a 

counterintuitive result: the Criminal Division actually knew more about the specifics of the case 

than ATF’s senior management. 

D. Delay in Requesting Exit Strategy and Subsequent Delays in Indictment

The blame for delaying the request for an exit strategy from the Phoenix Field Division 

lies directly with William McMahon. Although McMahon visited the Phoenix Field Division in 

mid-April,576 he apparently did not ask for an exit strategy until April 27, 2010.577 The resulting 

document McMahon received that night indicated that ATF’s Phoenix Field Division could 

arrest Uriel Patino, but wanted to pursue bigger charges.578 Just one day later, McMahon was in 

the meeting where Weinstein raised the issue of gunwalking in Operation Wide Receiver. It is 

unclear who raised Fast and Furious in that meeting, since notes indicate the case was 

discussed.579 As previously indicated, McMahon described the meeting to Chait as having 

“[s]ome surprises but nothing terrible.”580

It does appear that ATF leadership, including McMahon and Chait, subsequently had an 

extended discussion in late May and early June 2010 regarding “the transfers of firearms during 

the course of an investigation” and “what volume of firearms is acceptable to allow to ‘walk’ 

 

574 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Hearing, Operation Fast and Furious: The Other Side of the Border,

112th Congress (Jul. 26, 2011), at 136-137 (emphasis added).

575 Id. at 173.

576 Id.

577 E-mail from William McMahon to William Newell (Apr. 27, 2010) [HOGR 002416] (Exhibit 123).

578 E-mail from William Newell to Dennis Burke (Apr. 27, 2010) [HOGR 002588] (Exhibit 127).

579 Notes of Alisa Finelli, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department (Apr. 28, 2010) [HOGR 006989] (Exhibit 

116).

580 E-mail from William McMahon to Mark Chait (Apr. 28, 2010) [HOGR 005455] (Exhibit 118).
177

before we intervene . . . .”581 However, the Committees have seen no documentation of 

McMahon addressing this issue with ATF’s Phoenix Field Division.

McMahon later claimed that the number of guns that had reached the street upset him. 

He testified: 

Q. So was your concern that they were purchasing it in ways that –

was your concern that they were purchasing it in ways that you 

didn’t know about or –

A. No, my concern was that we had enough to arrest these 

individuals and we can’t allow them to continue making these 

purchases that we know are illegal at that point because we have 

indictable suspects at that point. That is the concern. We have 

made our case against these individuals, it is time to shut them 

down.

582

His communications at the time, however, did not convey any such sense of urgency. The exit 

strategy does not appear to have been deeply discussed between McMahon and Newell in June 

or July 2010. On August 6, 2010, Newell told McMahon that Fast and Furious would not be 

ready for indictment until early October.583 Despite the exit strategy in place that called for an 

end to Fast and Furious by the end of July and McMahon’s supposed concerns about the number 

of guns on the street as a result of the case, McMahon response to Newell asked simply, “[W]hat 

are our plans between now and October on Fast/Furious?”584

In response, Newell offered to include McMahon via videoconference in a briefing of U.S. 

Attorney Burke on August 17, 2010.

585

 McMahon responded that he might do just that.586

McMahon also testified that ATF was interested in having a major press event on Fast 

and Furious as soon as possible: 

Q. And why did you want [the indictments] as soon as possible? 

 

581 E-mail from Stuart Lowrey to Raymond Rowley (Jun. 1, 2010) [HOGR 002077] (Exhibit 112).

582 McMahon Transcript at 83-84 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 120).

583 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Aug. 6, 2010) [HOGR 002527] (Exhibit 162).

584 E-mail from William McMahon to William Newell (Aug. 6, 2010) [HOGR 002739] (Exhibit 245).

585 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Aug. 6, 2010) [HOGR 002739] (Exhibit 245).

586 E-mail from William McMahon to William Newell (Aug. 6, 2010) [HOGR 002739] (Exhibit 245).
178

A. Well, it was time to take this case down. It was time to . . . round 

everybody up and –

Q. Because you didn't want them buying any more guns. 

A. Well, it was also, we wanted to show everybody what great 

work we have done. And that was key. There was a lot of 

discussion about that. You know, can we take it down right 

around the end of GRIT, because then we could have a bigger 

press conference.587

Thus, McMahon’s supposed desire to bring Fast and Furious to a close was based as much on the 

timing of a large press event as on the public safety hazard created by the mounting number of 

walked weapons.

E. Allegations of Gunwalking

McMahon testified that he first learned of allegations of gunwalking in Fast and Furious 

in late January 2011:

Q. All right. When did you first become aware of allegations that gun walking might 

have occurred in the Fast and Furious case? 

A. Shortly after a takedown in January of 2011.

* * *

Q. So shortly after the takedown in January 2011?

A. [Nods.] 

Q. How did that come to your attention? 

A. I think there was some media reports or blog reports that that sort 

of thing were on our news clippings that we get every day. 

Q. So you weren’t aware of that before January 25 or the press 

conference or –

A. Correct.588

 

587 McMahon Transcript at 199-200 (Exhibit 120).

588 McMahon Transcript at 13 (Exhibit 120).
179

The December 21, 2010 e-mail McMahon received from Newell over a month earlier, however, 

suggests that he became aware of gunwalking allegations shortly after Brian Terry was killed. 

The e-mail, which was produced to the Committees after McMahon’s transcribed interview so he 

was unable to answer questions about it, specifically mentions gunwalking allegations, so he was 

aware of the allegations about gunwalking at least by December 21, 2010.

589

Given the gravity of such allegations and the connection to the Terry murder, McMahon 

should have informed his superiors. He had testified that he probably would if he were aware of 

such allegations:

Q. So if, for example, Mr. Newell called and said hey, we got a 

problem with gun walking in Phoenix, that would go . . . straight to 

Mr. Chait and then you would just leave it at that? 

 A. If that happened, yes. I would bring it to Mr. Chait’s attention. 

And I’m sure we would have a meeting after that.590

Upon receiving Newell’s e-mail, however, McMahon did no such thing. Newell’s e-mail 

suggests that the two men, who communicated frequently, had discussed the subject before. In 

light of Newell’s e-mail, McMahon’s testimony that he did not learn about allegations of 

gunwalking until after the takedown is not credible. 

Finally, on January 21, 2011, a week before the takedown press conference and Senator 

Grassley’s January 27 letter, McMahon directed the Deputy Chief of ATF’s Public Affairs 

Division to forward a press book to Newell that explicitly addressed allegations of 

gunwalking.591 McMahon took no further action.

McMahon testified about his actions once he learned about the allegations of gunwalking: 

Q. Did you do anything in your capacities as Deputy Assistant 

Director to investigate those allegations? 

A. Investigate, I mean I have talked to the individuals involved and 

tried to figure out where this was all coming from. 

Q. Who were those individuals that were involved at that point? 

A. Usually it was just Bill Newell. 

Q. Bill Newell?

A. Right.

 

589 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Dec. 21, 2010) [HOGR 001935] (Exhibit 144).

590 McMahon Transcript at 20 (Exhibit 120).

591 E-mail from William McMahon to Drew Wade (Jan. 21, 2011) [HOGR 005537] (Exhibit 208).
180

Q. So Bill Newell had an allegation that gun walking occurred? Is 

that what I’m understanding? 

A. No. When I read these reports I would talk to Bill and say what 

are they talking about here? And we just had a discussion about 

that, that . . . it was not true and that sort of thing. 

Q. But you didn’t go and reach out to the actual agents who were 

making these reports? 

A. There were no agents identified until a month or two later.592

Other e-mails, provided to the Committees by confidential sources, call into question 

McMahon’s statement that “there were no agents identified until a month or two later.” The emails show that McMahon directed the Phoenix Field Division to contact one whistleblower the 

day after ATF received Senator Grassley’s January 27, 2011, letter detailing whistleblower 

allegations of gunwalking. Specifically, on Friday, January 28, 2011, Newell sent McMahon an 

e-mail saying that Newell “might have to go pay [Special Agent John Dodson] a visit” at his 

house, late on a Friday night, to find out what he told Senator Grassley’s staff.593

 

McMahon responded nine minutes later, authorizing Newell to take the highly unusual step of 

visiting an agent at his home. McMahon also wrote:

594

For the next three days, McMahon ordered Newell and Gillett to get the complete details 

about Special Agent Dodson’s interactions with Senator Grassley’s staff. It was not until 

 

592 McMahon Transcript at 13-14 (Exhibit 120).

593 E-mail from William Newell to William McMahon (Jan. 28, 2011) (Exhibit 246). 

594 E-mail from William McMahon to William Newell (Jan. 28, 2011) (Exhibit 246).

“We need details of what he 

has done tonight.”
181

Senator Grassley wrote a letter regarding retaliation against Dodson on January 31, 2011, that 

McMahon finally rescinded his order to Newell and Gillett. McMahon’s actions at the time 

stand in stark contrast to his congressional testimony.

F. Congressional Inquiry

After McMahon’s testimony at a hearing before the House Oversight and Government 

Reform Committee on July 26, 2011, the Committee sent him a series of QFRs. These QFRs are

a standard practice of congressional committees seeking to obtain further information from 

witnesses regarding questions and topics that may not have been fully addressed during a 

hearing. Questions for the Record also give Congress a chance to probe additional topics not 

covered at the hearing due to time constraints. McMahon, like SAC Newell, was given a month 

to answer the QFRs that the Oversight Committee sent to him. Although the Committee made 

inquiries as to whether he planned to provide responses in a timely fashion, McMahon provided 

none. Instead, six weeks later, on September 8, 2011, he wrote a terse letter to Chairman Issa:

Over the past few weeks, I have attempted to answer these questions but I 

have found that impossible without unfettered access to the transcripts of 

both my interview and the hearing testimony. I have also conferred with 

agency counsel and we both believe that to ensure I accurately and 

thoroughly respond to your questions, I require the official transcript of 

both of these events.595

Contrary to the misleading implication in his letter, the Committee had accommodated 

McMahon’s request before the July 26, 2011, hearing to review his transcribed interview 

transcript on multiple days accompanied by agency counsel. But not once during the intervening 

six-week period did McMahon request the opportunity to review transcripts of his hearing or 

transcribed interview. His actions signaled bad faith and thinly-veiled contempt for the 

Committee’s investigative work.

Despite the Oversight Committee’s repeated requests in the fall of 2011, McMahon did 

not provide his answers to the QFRs until January 26, 2012—six months after they were issued 

to him.596 Prior to that, no one at the Department of Justice instructed him to cooperate with the 

Committee’s inquiries. The dialogue between Committee staff and ATF officials regarding 

McMahon’s responses revealed a disorganized, bureaucratic agency, more interested in 

stonewalling the investigation than cooperating with Congress. Above all, there were no 

consequences for McMahon’s stonewalling.

Bill McMahon acted as the chief liaison between the Phoenix Field Division and ATF 

headquarters. He frequently acquired detailed information from Bill Newell about Fast and 

 

595 Letter from William McMahon to Chairman Darrell Issa (Sept. 8, 2011).

596 William McMahon, Responses of Jan. 26, 2012, Questions for the Record, Operation Fast and Furious: The 

Other Side of the Border, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (Jul. 26, 2011).
182

Furious, and McMahon often passed this information up the chain to his boss, Assistant Director 

for Field Operations Mark Chait.

3. Assistant Director for Field Operations Mark Chait

FINDING: A failure to supervise: Though he was a senior ATF official and 

received frequent updates on Operation Fast and Furious, Mark 

Chait played a surprisingly passive role during the operation. He 

failed to provide the supervisory oversight that his experience should 

have dictated and his position required.

A. Position and Role

On November 25, 2009, ATF Assistant Director for Field Operations Mark Chait learned 

that 20 firearms recovered in Mexico had been purchased in two transactions. Chait learned that 

the firearms had times-to-crime of as little as one day.597 Chait immediately recognized “how 

hot this is” and wrote to Bill Newell “to make sure we put all resources on this.”598 Chait wanted 

ATF to start working its way up the straw purchasing chain by interviewing the transporter of the 

guns, the exact steps the Phoenix Field Division should have been taking.599 Newell informed 

Chait that the firearms recovery was already part of an active Phoenix case—Operation Fast and 

Furious.600

Two weeks later, on December 6, 2009, Acting Director Ken Melson designated Chait as 

the ATF point-of-contact for a new initiative between ATF and the Justice Department’s 

Criminal Division.601 The arrangement called for a Criminal Division attorney to “help 

coordinate weapons seizure investigations.”602 Shortly thereafter, Chait forwarded Deputy 

Director Hoover his prior e-mail correspondence with Newell regarding the significant weapons 

recovery in Sonora, Mexico. Chait apparently believed that ATF should cooperate with the 

Department’s Criminal Division on Fast and Furious.

603

In preparation for a meeting with the Criminal Division in mid-December 2009 as part of 

this coordination, Chait ordered his subordinates to prepare an i2 chart of the Phoenix 

suspects.604 This intelligence analysis tool generated a visual chart linking all of the suspected 

straw purchasers into a single network. Chait wanted to show the Criminal Division how much 

 

597 E-mail from Mark Chait to William Newell (Nov. 25, 2009) [HOGR 001983-001984] (Exhibit 29).

598 Id.

599 Id.

600 E-mail from William Newell to Mark Chait (Nov. 25, 2009) [HOGR 001983] (Exhibit 29).

601 E-mail from Kenneth Melson to Lanny Breuer and Mark Chait (Dec. 6, 2009) [HOGR 001985] (Exhibit 247).

602 E-mail from Jason Weinstein to Kevin Carwile and James Trusty (Dec. 6, 2009) [HOGR 003405] (Exhibit 248).

603 See e-mail from Mark Chait to William Hoover (Dec. 9, 2009) [HOGR 001983] (Exhibit 29).

604 E-mail from Lorren Leadmon to David Voth and Hope MacAllister (Dec. 17, 2009) [HOGR 001887] (Exhibit 

249).
183

progress ATF had made in identifying Fast and Furious suspects. According to Jason Weinstein, 

Lanny Breuer was “very eager” for somebody from the Criminal Division to work with Chait on 

this initiative.605 Chait reciprocated this interest by delivering a detailed briefing on Fast and 

Furious to the Criminal Division on December 17, 2009. At this briefing, Chait was able to 

explain the chart in detail.606

B. Briefed Weekly

Assistant Director Chait received weekly briefings on Fast and Furious. Even so, during 

his transcribed interview he claimed to have little knowledge of the investigative tactics used in 

Operation Fast and Furious during its pendency:

Q. I mean you have admitted that there was a massive number of guns 

here. Did you ever call Bill Newell and say what are the techniques 

that you are using? Are we doing any knock and talks? Are we 

doing any aerial surveillance? Are we doing any trackers? 

A. I don’t believe I did. I think probably the first briefing we had 

around the – what was somewhat happening was with Dave Voth. 

Most of these things never rose to my level. It is easy to see now 

things very differently, but at that time what we were seeing wasn’t 

exactly the same thing as what we see now. We see a very 

different perspective today.607

The facts contradict Chait’s testimony. ATF’s OSII division held a briefing every Tuesday to 

discuss firearms recoveries and some of ATF’s major cases. Nearly every week, starting in 

December 2009 until April 2010, Fast and Furious was a topic of discussion at these meetings.

Chait attended, but remained silent.

608

During a January 5, 2010 briefing, Chait learned that Fast and Furious straw purchasers 

had bought 685 firearms in the preceding two months. Several individuals present reacted 

strongly to the mounting weapons count. In a private meeting after the briefing, Steve Martin 

confronted Chait as to whether he actually had a plan in place to stop the flow of weapons. 

Martin testified:

A. From my notes, I asked Mr. Chait and Mr. McMahon, I said, 

what’s your plan? I said, what’s your plan? And I said, hearing 

none, and I don’t know if they had one. I said . . . there are some 

 

605 E-mail from Jason Weinstein to Kevin Carwile and James Trusty (Dec. 6, 2009) [HOGR 003405] (Exhibit 248).

606 Melson Transcript at 76 (Exhibit 52).

607 Chait Transcript at 138-139 (Exhibit 122).

608 After April 2010, OSII simply stopped briefing Fast and Furious. Congressional investigators were told that 

OSII believed that nobody was paying attention anymore to their concerns, so there was no longer a point in briefing 

the case since it had gotten so big.
184

things that we can do. Ray Rowley, who was the [S]outhwest 

[B]order czar at the time, asked, how long are you going to let 

this go on?

 

* * *

Q. You said this to who again, Mr. Chait? 

A. Mr. Chait, Mr. McMahon, Mr. Kumor. My boss was there, Jim 

McDermond, who agreed with me because we talked probably 

daily. 

Q. Did any of those folks step up at that time and say, “Oh, no, no, 

no. We’ve got another great plan in place”?

A. No. No. 

Q. They were silent?

A. Yes. And I don’t know if they had one. I mean, they could 

have. I don’t know.609

Chait had come to the ATF briefing immediately after a meeting with Assistant Attorney General 

Lanny Breuer. The meeting with Breuer focused on weapons seizures in Mexico—seizures 

subsequently discussed in detail at the ATF meeting.610

In February 2010, Chait received notification that Fast and Furious had become so big 

that it had intersected with a separate investigation in ATF’s Dallas Field Division.

611

 Chait 

found the correlation between the two cases so significant that he wanted to keep Deputy 

Director Hoover fully informed. He requested the preparation of maps so that he could link the 

cases. In his transcribed interview, Chait stated:

[A]t any given time we have about 40-plus-thousand open investigations 

across field operations, and I certainly don’t have the ability to know 

enough about every one of those cases.612 

 

609 Transcript, Interview of Steven Martin by the Joint Staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Jul. 6, 2011), at 43-45 [hereinafter Martin Transcript] (Exhibit 

250).

610 Meeting on Weapons Seizures in Mexico, Jan. 5, 2010, 10:00 AM, Required Attendees Lanny Breuer, William 

Hoover, Mark Chait, Sam Kaplan [HOGR 001987] (Exhibit 251).

611 E-mail from Robert Champion to Mark Chait, et al. (Feb. 25, 2010) [HOGR 001424-001428] (Exhibit 252).

612 Chait Transcript at 71 (Exhibit 122).
185

Yet of the more than 40,000 open investigations at ATF, Fast and Furious was so important that 

Chait updated Acting Director Melson on it and requested updated bullet points to brief Deputy 

Director Hoover.613

When questioned further about Fast and Furious, Chait claimed that he was not even 

sufficiently aware of the details of Fast and Furious to have been concerned:

I have to rely on my people. I rely on the [D]eputy [A]ssistant [D]irector, 

I rely on the SACs, I rely on ASACs, I rely on group supervisors, and I 

rely on AUSAs to work with us closely. And I don’t get in the weeds. I 

really, I have too many other things going. I just, I don’t feel that is 

my role as the assistant director.614

Chait knew that Melson and Hoover were concerned about Fast and Furious. He seemed to 

share their concerns. His failure to intervene was not the result of a lack of information about 

Fast and Furious. Rather, his view of his position as Assistant Director for Field Operations 

made him reluctant to step in and confront McMahon, his deputy, or Newell, the head of the 

Phoenix Field Division, about Fast and Furious. Chait let the operation continue because he 

believed that his role as Assistant Director did not call for him to intervene. This attitude mirrors 

McMahon’s attitude that it was not his job to intervene in the affairs of his SACs in the event 

things were going poorly.

Mark Chait had enough information about Fast and Furious to ask the right questions. 

There were ample warning signs for him to do so. He did not.

C. Exit Strategy and Similar Operations

Along with Deputy Director Hoover, in March 2010, Assistant Director Chait requested a

Fast and Furious exit strategy. Chait testified that at that time, ATF leadership saw the need for 

the case to be shut down.

615

 No one complied with the request for an exit strategy, however, 

until May 3, 2010—nearly two months later.

616

 Chait did not do anything during those two 

months to speed up the process:

Q. So there was a significant time lag between your request as 

[A]ssistant [D]irector and your receipt of the exit strategy? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. Did you receive any explanation for that timeline? 

 

613 E-mail from Mark Chait to Ken Melson (Feb. 24, 2010) [HOGR 001424-001428] (Exhibit 253).

614 Chait Transcript at 71 (Exhibit 122).

615 Chait Transcript at 26-27 (Exhibit 122).

616 E-mail from William McMahon to Mark Chait (May 3, 2010) [HOGR 001178] (Exhibit 126).
186

A. I really don't recall if there was. 

Q. Did it concern you that -- that a request like that had taken over, 

well over a month to provide to you and the deputy director? 

A. I really don't remember at the time. I mean obviously, you know, 

we would have liked to have it sooner.617

This lack of oversight and lax attitude was typical of ATF leadership during Fast and Furious. 

No one seemed particularly intent on shutting down the operation. It is difficult to understand 

why.

After finally receiving the Fast and Furious exit strategy on May 3, 2010, Chait and 

Hoover monitored the Phoenix Field Division’s timeliness. Chait testified about their strategy:

Q. And were you engaged in the close-out of Operation Fast and 

Furious in monitoring the performance of the exit strategy between 

when you received the document and the closure of the case in 

January of 2011? 

A. I think I would say this. We – I was monitoring it as far as 

timeliness. As far as the specifics, I would leave that for my 

deputy and really the command on the ground to carry it out. And 

I think there are probably some e-mails and things of me asking 

why we – as far as closure, because I was under the impression we 

would be able to get this thing closed, I was hoping, in the July 

time frame, end of July, possibly August was my impression at the 

time.

Q. And did you have discussions with Deputy Director Hoover about 

-- about that timeline about the exit strategy? 

A. I believe -- I believe I did.618

With McMahon, Chait was part of a discussion in late May and early June 2010 

regarding “the transfers of firearms during the course of an investigation” and “what volume of 

firearms is acceptable to allow to ‘walk’ before we intervene . . . .”619 However, like McMahon, 

Chait does not appear to have addressed this issue with ATF’s Phoenix Field Division.

 

617 Chait Transcript at 62-63 (Exhibit 122).

618 Chait Transcript at 64 (Exhibit 122).

619 E-mail from Stuart Lowrey to Raymond Rowley (Jun. 1, 2010) [HOGR 002077] (Exhibit 112).
187

D. Failure to Act

Chait testified that he wanted to adhere to the exit strategy and bring the case to a close. 

He apparently understood the importance of taking the suspects off the street given the public 

safety risk they posed. But Chait failed to ensure that Phoenix Field Division executed the exit 

strategy. Although he gave his superiors the impression he was conducting effective oversight of 

Fast and Furious, he was actually doing little, if anything, to end it. 

Chait became aware of several large recoveries of Fast and Furious weapons during the 

summer of 2010. While he alerted Deputy Director Hoover, Acting Director Melson, and the 

Office of Deputy Attorney General Gary Grindler of various seizures, he did not take decisive 

action. This inaction contradicts his insistence that he wanted the case shut down:

Q. So you wanted the operation shut down, you know, much earlier 

than it did. Did you want to get these folks off the street because 

they were dangerous? Is that what you were hoping, to get them 

behind bars? 

A. I wanted to stop the activity. 

Q. Stop the activity?

A. Once – you know, sometimes there is a point where it is just 

time.620

Contrary to the view of the Phoenix Field Division, which believed that the exit strategy came at 

the expense of building a bigger case, Chait only wanted the case to be taken down. He testified: 

I would be concerned about evidence. I am less concerned about how far 

an investigation can go. When it is time to take a case down, it is time to 

take a case down.621

***

It was clear it was time to close the case. Whatever law, whatever charges 

they could make at the time – because I know was other conspiracy [sic] 

and what have you, but bottom line is I was not looking for moving it 

further. It was time to exit.622

Chait’s actions at the time did not live up to these later words. It was not until July 2010, when 

Acting Director Melson began asking Chait when the operation was going to be shut down that 

 

620 Chait Transcript at 143 (Exhibit 122).

621 Chait Transcript at 76 (Exhibit 122).

622 Chait Transcript at 77 (Exhibit 122).
188

Chait began to make these inquiries. According to documents produced by the Department, 

Chait sent just one single e-mail to SAC Newell to ask when Fast and Furious was going to be 

shut down.623

Like McMahon, Chait was also interested in media attention for the case. On July 14, 

2010, Chait sent two e-mails to Associate Deputy Attorney General Ed Siskel, alerting him to 

two recoveries of weapons linked to Fast and Furious. One recovery totaled 73 firearms,624 and a 

second recovery included 20 weapons.625 Chait wanted to use these recoveries to “plan a media 

event . . . that would highlight the initiative like Fast and Furious [sic].”626 

Like Hoover, Chait demanded an exit strategy, but took no action when the 90-day period 

set forth in the strategy expired. Acting Director Melson testified that beginning in August 2010, 

he began asking Chait at the weekly staff meeting when Fast and Furious was going to be taken 

down.627 In spite of Melson’s inquiries, Chait still did not believe it to be his role to bring the 

failed operation to an end.

Only in late October 2010, three months after the takedown date proposed in the Fast and 

Furious exit strategy, did Chait finally raise the issue of continuing gun purchases with ATF

Phoenix leadership. On October 29, 2010, Chait e-mailed SAC Newell to ask: “Any news on a 

quicker indictment?”628 When informed that the indictment had again been pushed back another 

six weeks, Chait responded, “I’m concerned that we are not shutting down the activity waiting 

on an indictment.”629 Once again, Chait expressed his concern without ordering any concrete 

action. 

E. New ATF Strategy

In September 2010, Mark Chait disseminated ATF’s own “Cartel Focused Strategy.” 

This document, a year in the making, drew inspiration from the Deputy Attorney General’s 

October 2009 draft Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels. The ATF strategy was 

designed to focus specifically on the Sinaloa cartel—the same cartel ATF allowed to arm itself 

with thousands of guns through Fast and Furious.

630

 The new ATF strategy stated:

However, straw purchasers should more frequently be viewed as persons 

whose conduct should be investigated as part of a larger conspiracy and as 

persons whose information, cooperation, and assistance should be 

exploited to the extent possible in furtherance of the ultimate goal of 

 

623 E-mail from Mark Chait to William Newell (Jul. 10, 2010) [HOGR 001167-001169] (Exhibit 254).

624 E-mail from Mark Chait to Ed Siskel (Jul. 14, 2010) [HOGR 001175-001177] (Exhibit 255).

625 E-mail from Mark Chait to Ed Siskel (Jul. 14, 2010) [HOGR 002847] (Exhibit 150).

626 E-mail from Mark Chait to William Newell (Jul. 26, 2010) [HOGR 001991] (Exhibit 256).

627 Melson Transcript at 82 (Exhibit 52).

628 E-mail from Mark Chait to William Newell (Oct. 29, 2010) [HOGR 001912] (Exhibit 76).

629 E-mail from Mark Chait to William Newell (Oct. 29, 2010) [HOGR 001912] (Exhibit 76).

630 Martin Transcript at 111-112 (Exhibit 250).
189

identifying key members of the trafficking enterprise and disrupting or 

dismantling the trafficking operation.631

This language mirrored the controversial language that appeared in a January 2010 

briefing paper on Fast and Furious, discussed in detail above in section IV.5. Despite his 

professed concerns about Fast and Furious, Chait did not add any safeguards to the September 

2010 strategy in order to prevent gunwalking.

Mark Chait was passively involved in supervising Operation Fast and Furious from the 

beginning of the case. It appears that he appreciated the significance of Fast and Furious to ATF, 

valuing the end result over the tactics used to achieve it. Although he was briefed on the details 

of the investigation, he did not step in at critical junctures to the provide supervision and 

leadership consistent with his title and position. 

4. Deputy Director William Hoover

FINDING: Danger signs ignored: Though he ordered the Fast and Furious exit 

strategy, William Hoover failed to make certain the strategy was 

executed. Hoover knew that Bill Newell had employed the use of risky 

tactics in the past, but simply allowed Newell to continue to conduct 

Operation Fast and Furious. Hoover was derelict in his duty to 

ensure that public safety was not jeopardized during Operation Fast 

and Furious.

Deputy Director William Hoover played a hands-on role during Fast and Furious—

curiously, more so than Assistant Director Chait. Hoover ordered the exit strategy, failed to 

ensure its implementation, briefed senior Justice Department officials on the operation, and knew 

that Bill Newell had employed the use of risky tactics in the past. Due to his position as Deputy 

Director, Hoover had the ability to order Fast and Furious to be shut down without delay. 

However, he did not do this.

A. Early Concerns Raised

William Hoover was aware of key details and events of the Fast and Furious investigation

from its earliest stages. When weapons tracing back to Fast and Furious were recovered in 

Sonora, Mexico, on November 20, 2009, Hoover received notification that the Phoenix Field 

Division knew about these straw purchasers prior to their recovery in Mexico.632 For the Deputy 

Director to receive such detailed information about a specific investigation in its infancy 

demonstrates the importance of Fast and Furious to ATF leadership from the beginning.

 

631 “PROJECT GUNRUNNER: A Cartel Focused Strategy,” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Tobacco, 

September 2010, at 11.

632 E-mail from Mark Chait to William Hoover, Deputy Director, ATF (Dec. 9, 2009) [HOGR 001983] (Exhibit 29).
190

In mid-December 2009, Southwest Border Initiative Coordinator Ray Rowley brought his 

concerns about Fast and Furious to Hoover.

633

 Hoover testified:

Q. What do you recall about Ray Rowley's concerns? 

A. He -- I remember running into Ray in headquarters. And I'm trying 

to think what the -- I don't remember where -- I don't remember if 

we just passed each other in the hallway and we had a discussion. 

. . . I don't remember exactly how the conversation came up. And 

he asked me if I was aware of the case out of Phoenix, and I said, 

yes, I had heard. And he said, you know, there is some significant 

movement of firearms in that case. And I go, I understand that. 

And this was -- and, as I recall, I think I said, well, I'm getting 

ready to have a briefing on that case, or be briefed on that case. 

And that was what I recall of Ray raising concerns about Fast and 

Furious.

Q. When people are raising concerns like Ray Rowley did and like a 

lot of other people did when they first learned about the numbers 

of guns . . . is there sort of an unspoken undertone to that, that, you 

know, why aren't we doing more to stop these, or can we be doing 

more to stop the flow? 

A. I think the prudent thing to do, in my opinion, is to get all the 

information about what's going on and what's taking place. 

I mean, at that time, I believe -- don't hold me to this, but I believe 

Ray was what we call our southwest border coordinator. And he 

was looking at not only Phoenix but all of our southwest border 

divisions and helping develop strategies and trying to determine if 

there were cases that crossed division boundaries and those types 

of things. And he would have had the ability to go hopefully talk 

to Bill Newell or Mark Chait -- or, Bill Newell or Bill McMahon 

and discuss those types of concerns.634

Hoover apparently took no immediate action in response to Rowley’s concerns.

 

633 E-mail from George Gillett to William Newell (Dec. 17, 2009) [HOGR 002491] (Exhibit 50).

634 Hoover Transcript at 112-114 (Exhibit 121).
191

B. Asking the Right Questions About Fast and Furious

Deputy Director Hoover was briefed on Fast and Furious in January 2010. At that time, 

he learned that a large number of firearms from Fast and Furious were being recovered in 

Mexico.635 According to Hoover:

A. I knew that we had a large number of straw purchasers purchasing 

firearms. I knew that -- didn't know the specific numbers of 

firearms. I knew that there was a lot of money involved and it 

involved all cash transactions. 

Q. Which is suspicious, correct? 

A. It would be for that number of firearms, that's absolutely correct. 

Q. And you knew that some of these weapons were showing up in 

Mexico? 

A. We did know that.636

Hoover also learned from the January 2010 briefing that Fast and Furious involved cooperating 

FFLs in the Phoenix area.

637

 Hoover, however, did not inquire further as to the details of the 

cooperation:

Q. So did you have an understanding then, in January of 2010, that 

there was an ongoing relationship of cooperation with not only that 

FFL but other FFLs? 

A. I did not inquire as to the level of the relationship. I didn't ask that 

question.638

Hoover testified that he didn’t recall being informed in the spring of 2010 that “we weren’t 

looking at the major players in that investigation and maybe going to them and trying to flip 

them or otherwise utilize the information.”639 Hoover stated that his inquiry as to what agents in 

the Phoenix Field Division knew about the sales of firearms to straw purchasers in Fast and 

Furious and when they knew it resulted in the briefing he received in late March 2010. Hoover 

stated:

 

635 Id. at 9.

636 Id.

637 Id. at 99-100.

638 Id. at 100-101.

639 Id. at 58.
192

A. I knew that we had made some seizures of firearms that we 

believed to be headed south or destined for the border. 

I also knew that there were firearms that were being recovered in 

Mexico; did not know how those were moving. And I understood 

it to be the case that we were trying to determine how they were 

moving those firearms. Did we know, you know, we were trying 

to find out the information of when we knew about the sale, what 

we knew about the sale, and those kinds of questions. 

That's, kind of, the things that led up to the briefing I received in 

March that called for me to ask for the exit strategy. 

Q. In March of 2010? 

A. March of 2010, that calls for me to ask for that exit strategy, that I 

want a 30-, 60-, 90-day plan to end this investigation.640 

The answers to those questions—that the Phoenix Field Division was receiving 

contemporaneous notice of purchases from cooperating FFLs and had even installed pole 

cameras to monitor sales in real time—should have been warning signs to Hoover. They 

revealed that weapons recovered in Mexico after the Phoenix Field Division began receiving 

such notices were the result of either a complete failure of surveillance after the purchases, or a 

conscious strategy to let the weapons walk. 

Hoover was briefed in late March 2010 about operational details of Fast and Furious. At 

the briefing, he received the latest statistics on the weapons purchased. This briefing led Hoover 

to request an exit strategy. Hoover testified:

[T]here was a slide that popped up about our headquarters' Intelligence 

Division, and it listed the straw purchasers, the amount of firearms that 

they had purchased, and, I believe, the value of money that would have 

been placed on each one of those firearms. And I was concerned about the 

top echelon of that chart and the number of firearms that they had 

purchased and the fact that we had not stepped to them.641

Hoover’s undated notes, produced to the Committees by the Justice Department, may be from 

the meeting in which he requested the exit strategy. The notes read:642

 

640 Id. at 57.

641 Id. at 60.

642 Handwritten notes of William Hoover [HOGR 001589] (Exhibit 257).
193

Hoover testified that after requesting the exit strategy, he followed up repeatedly with his 

deputies Chait and McMahon regarding its status:

Q. After you asked for the exit strategy in March of 2010, what did 

you do to ensure that that was going to be implemented?

A. We have staff meetings twice a week. I would continually ask. If I 

would see Mr. McMahon I would say, hey, Bill, you know, we're 

developing the exit strategy, and he would tell me that Phoenix is 

working on it. And I would continually ask questions about how 

the case was progressing. I knew that they were also into a [T]itle 3 

stage and that they were obtaining information from that. And I 

would just ask questions when I would see Mr. Chait or Mr. 

McMahon.643

It does not appear that Hoover did anything beyond asking for updates. He stated:

Q. And at that time did you request, in addition to the exit strategy, 

did you request any specific actions on the part of the Phoenix 

folks to make sure these guns didn't get out of their control? 

 

643 Hoover Transcript at 20 (Exhibit 121).
194

A. I did not specifically request that. I allowed field operations to run 

that investigation. I did not make any specific request. Obviously, 

that's a concern anytime firearms get out of our control.644

* * *

Q. And during this lengthy wiretap process --

A. Yes. 

Q. -- you wanted a way out. But the question is, were there any other 

operational controls put in place that gave you personal comfort 

that fewer guns -- or that ATF was going to get control of this?

A. I did not get any specific instruction. I remember having 

conversations with -- actually, the day of that briefing when I 

asked for the strategy, I had discussions with Mark Chait and also 

Bill McMahon around that strategy and how we needed to ensure 

that we were taking steps to interdict as many firearms as possible 

and to move to close that investigation down.645

Hoover understood the significance of the number of firearms involved in Fast and Furious. He 

testified:

A. I was concerned about the number of firearms that were being 

purchased in this investigation, and I decided that it was time for 

us to have an exit strategy and I asked for an exit strategy. It was a 

conversation that was occurring between Mark Chait, Bill 

McMahon and myself. And I asked for the exit strategy 30, 60, 90 

days, and I wanted to be able to shut this investigation down. 

Q. And by shutting the investigation down, you were interested in 

cutting off the sales of weapons to the suspects, correct? 

A. That's correct.

Q. And you were worried, is it fair to say, that these guns were 

possibly going to be getting away and getting into Mexico and 

showing up at crime scenes? 

 

644 Id. at 11.

645 Id. at 64-65.
195

A. I was concerned not only that that would occur in Mexico, but also 

in the United States.646

C. Decision to Pursue a Larger Case

The fact that at least as early as April 2010 Hoover learned that weapons had walked in 

Operation Wide Receiver compounds his failure to recognize the warning signs in Operation 

Fast and Furious. Hoover knew Wide Receiver had been run out of ATF’s Phoenix Field 

Division, and the discussion with Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jason Weinstein about 

guns being walked in that case should have set off warning bells for Hoover more than anyone 

else in ATF, since Hoover had already had concerns about Newell’s use of such tactics. Since 

Weinstein raised these issues with Hoover directly, Hoover should have exercised the leadership 

expected of the Deputy Director.

Hoover understood the dangers of the lack of interdiction in Fast and Furious. He took 

no action, however, to prevent the uncontrolled distribution of the weapons once they left the 

FFLs. Although the Fast and Furious exit strategy he received in May 2010 reported that ATF 

had sufficient evidence to arrest Patino, it also clearly documented that the Phoenix Field

Division was most likely delaying Patino’s arrest in order to hold out for bigger charges:

Q. On the bottom page -- on the bottom paragraph of the first page of 

the exit strategy, not the email, it reads, "If we arrest Uriel Patino 

the firearms he has straw purchased thus far, we will only 

minimally impact the organization before Patino is replaced by 

another member of the organization." 

That would seem to read to me like they had the evidence to arrest 

Uriel Patino at that time. Is that fair? Was that your reading at the 

time? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. But what? Uriel Patino is the single largest purchaser, the person 

that you were principally concerned about --

A. Right. 

Q. -- in the March briefing. 

A. Yes. 

 

646 Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added).
196

Q. They have enough evidence to arrest him. And yet this details a 

90-day strategy until he might ever be arrested. 

A. Right.647

Hoover said he believed that Field Operations at ATF headquarters was asking the 

Phoenix Field Division to do everything it could to interdict the firearms being illegally 

purchased.648 If that was the case, Hoover should have followed up to ensure that the Phoenix 

Field Division immediately began interdicting weapons. In the interest of public safety, he also 

could have discarded the 90-day exit strategy and immediately shut the case down. Instead, 

Hoover did neither.

D. Delay in Takedown

Hoover was not willing to risk extending the risky strategy of building a bigger case

beyond the 90-day timeframe the Phoenix Field Division identified in its exit strategy. He 

testified:

[W]e were talking about a significant number of firearms, and I didn't feel 

comfortable with that. And I wanted us to have an exit strategy that 

allowed us to get to a point and we were going to wrap this investigation 

up, whether we were able to move up the chain or not.649

Still, as of August 2010—the end of the 90-day time frame as outlined in the exit strategy—

approached, ATF was taking few steps to shut the operation down other than handing the case 

off to the U.S. Attorney’s Office. In mid-July 2010, Acting Director Melson e-mailed Hoover 

and Chait to ask when Fast and Furious would be taken down.650 Hoover testified:

Q. Were you ever told in July or any point leading up to July that the 

case was not being brought down potentially because they hadn't 

yet perfected a 924(c) charge? 

A. No, sir. . . . 

Q. If Bill Newell or Mr. McMahon had come in and said, Well, but 

we're still working to perfect bigger and bigger charges, what 

would you have said to them at that point? 

A. I would have allowed them to have a discussion with me. It's hard 

to speculate at this time based on what they would tell me, but I do 

 

647 Id. at 68.

648 Id. at 69.

649 Hoover Transcript at 58 (Exhibit 121).

650 E-mail from Kenneth Melson to Mark Chait and William Hoover (Jul. 14, 2010) [HOGR 002084] (Exhibit 149). 
197

not believe -- it would have had to have been an extraordinary 

circumstance for me to want to extend this beyond my original 

request for that 30, 60, 90 day exit strategy.651

Nevertheless, when 90 days came and went at the end of July 2010, Hoover did not step in to 

shut down the case. Hoover did not exert any pressure on or express any disappointment at the 

Phoenix Field Division that the case was still ongoing. Hoover did, however, continue to receive 

updates on Fast and Furious weapons recoveries, including the seizure of a .50 caliber rifle on 

August 3, 2010.652 But Hoover never intervened.

Hoover acknowledged that he raised the issue of the indictments with the Deputy 

Attorney General’s office, with little effect. Hoover spoke to Ed Siskel frequently about Fast 

and Furious. Hoover testified:

Q. Did you ever put any pressure on the U.S. Attorney's Office or 

Department of Justice to get this going? 

A. We had conversations with -- I had field ops have conversations 

with Bill Newell to get to the U.S. Attorney's Office to imply the 

importance of this. There were -- I'm trying to think -- there were 

conversations -- we had conversations with Ed Siskel, I had 

conversations with Ed, speaking to the possible delay of the 

indictment. I do not recall that I ever called the Phoenix U.S. 

Attorney's Office directly.

Q. Did he take any action? 

A. I don't recall right now. 

Q. What did you tell him? 

A. I just told him that we were hoping to have this case indicted much 

more quickly than it is being indicted. The information we were 

getting back through field ops was that it's the normal process 

through the indictment stage, and that they needed this to be able 

to run, or draft the indictments on 20 individuals, and we were 

obviously concerned about the time it was taking. 

Q. Did you ask Ed Siskel to take action within the Department of 

Justice to expedite this? 

A. No. 

 

651 Hoover Transcript at 80-81 (Exhibit 121).

652 E-mail from William Hoover to Kenneth Melson, et al. (Aug. 4, 2010) [HOGR 002688] (Exhibit 258).
198

Q. Put command pressure down that chain? 

A. I don't recall asking Ed specifically to do that, no. 

Q. So you were –

A. Just gave him my concerns.653

Hoover never ordered the Phoenix Field Division to make any arrests to get the straw purchasers 

off the street. 

E. Failure to Properly Monitor SAC Newell

Perhaps Hoover’s biggest failure as Deputy Director of ATF was his lack of close 

supervision of SAC Newell. Several years before Fast and Furious began, dating back to 2006, 

Hoover knew that Bill Newell was willing to employ risky tactics in his investigations. SAC 

Newell oversaw multiple cases during his early days as Phoenix SAC that utilized either 

gunwalking or controlled deliveries across the border as investigative techniques.

Hoover knew about Newell’s prior operations, and he did not condone them. Upon 

learning about the Hernandez case in 2007, Hoover, then Assistant Director of Field Operations, 

demanded answers from Newell about the operation. Newell first reassured Hoover by stating 

that Newell had conducted similar operations “all the time in Colombia.”654 Newell finally 

recognized that Hoover had serious concerns about the Hernandez operation. He wrote to 

Hoover in an e-mail:

OK, I know you have reservations but please rest assured that this will go 

down as planned, as allowed per MLAT (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty) 

with Mexico, with full approval of the USAO (confirmed again late this 

afternoon), and will have big payoffs for us and the Department in 

addressing Mexico’s concerns that we (US) aren’t doing enough to 

address their concerns. Trust me, I’m with Gov’t.655

At that time, Hoover did not rely on Newell’s assurances. He sought clarification from ATF 

Counsel as to whether Newell was operating within the bounds of the law.656

When Hoover learned that the Mexican authorities had missed one of the loads of 

weapons crossing the border during a controlled delivery in the Hernandez case, he was furious. 

As Assistant Director for Field Operations, Hoover gave unambiguous orders. He stated:

 

653 Hoover Transcript at 74-75 (Exhibit 121).

654 E-mail from William Newell to William Hoover (Oct. 4, 2007) [HOGR 002244] (Exhibit 225).

655 E-mail from William Newell to William Hoover (Oct. 4, 2007) [HOGR 002243] (Exhibit 225).

656 E-mail from William Hoover to Anne Marie Paskalis (Oct. 5, 2007) [HOGR 002243] (Exhibit 225).
199

I do not want any firearms to go South until further notice. I expect a full 

briefing paper on my desk Tuesday morning from SAC Newell with every 

question answered. I will not allow this case to go forward until we have 

written documentation from the U.S. Attorney’s Office re full and 

complete buy in.657

Hoover admitted to “frustration” with Bill Newell and the Phoenix Field Division, and he

expressed his dissatisfaction with Newell regarding the lack of information he received about 

Newell’s operation: “SAC Newell should understand that I will need complete answers to every 

question I have had to this point.”

658

Hoover did not ask Newell questions about Operation Fast and Furious similar to the 

ones he asked of him back in 2007 upon learning of the Hernandez operation. Hoover believed 

that Newell had learned his lesson. Hoover testified:

Q. And so, based on this experience, don't you think Newell, being 

the head of -- you know, the SAC, still had the obligation to alert 

headquarters of all the specific things that were going on here? 

A. Well, again --

Q. Aren't you angry that they didn't? 

A. I think what needs -- that would be a life's lesson for Bill Newell: 

Make sure you have these things in place as you move forward. 

Q. But he had the life's lesson back in '07. 

A. That's what I'm talking about. 

Hoover believed issues with Newell had been resolved after the 2007 issue. Hoover stated:

I think the 2007 issue – subsequent to that email, I had an opportunity to 

talk to Bill and Carson, and I think we came to a pretty clear 

understanding of what was expected. I did not have any issues after that 

with allowing Bill to run his field division.659 

Yet when a large gun trafficking case emerged from the Phoenix Field Division in 2009, a case 

where senior officials in ATF headquarters, including Hoover, were concerned about the number 

 

657 E-mail from William Hoover to Carson Carroll (Oct. 5, 2007) [HOGR 001905-001911] (Exhibit 228).

658 Id.

659 Hoover Transcript at 193 (Exhibit 121).
200

of weapons, Hoover apparently trusted that his instructions to Newell from two years earlier 

were sufficient. They were not. 

Hoover had a responsibility to ensure that the largest gun trafficking case in ATF at the

time was operating according to ATF and Justice Department guidelines. Knowing that the SAC 

of the field division overseeing the case had problems with investigations in the past, Hoover 

should have asked the tough questions of Newell and obtained the information he required—just 

as he did back in the 2007 Hernandez case.

As Deputy Director, Hoover was ATF’s chief operating officer. He came up through the 

ranks as a field agent and was well respected throughout ATF. He understood the ATF, having 

spent the bulk of his professional career there, but fell short in his duty to protect public safety 

during Fast and Furious.

5. Acting Director Kenneth E. Melson

FINDING: Where the buck stops: ATF Acting Director Ken Melson was 

concerned that Fast and Furious did not end sooner. He even offered 

to travel to Phoenix to write the indictments himself. Still, he never 

ordered it be shut down. Once the scandal broke in the media, despite 

Melson’s desire to cooperate with Congress, Justice Department 

headquarters muzzled him.

Acting Director Ken Melson was a career prosecutor appointed to head ATF on an 

interim basis by President Obama. He often stayed above the fray with respect to individual 

investigations and focused more on managing the ATF and improving its efficiency. Melson 

delegated many of the day-to-day duties of running the ATF to Deputy Director Hoover.

A. Background and Mission

Kenneth E. Melson became Acting Director of ATF in April 2009. Melson’s prior law 

enforcement experience consisted of two years as head of the Executive Office of United States 

Attorneys, and 21 years as the First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia.

When he became Acting Director, Melson quickly realized that ATF was a troubled 

agency. It had operated without a Senate-confirmed director since Congress first required Senate 

confirmation for the post in 2006. When Melson came in, ATF was suffering from significant 

internal divisions. According to Melson, ATF was “very stove-piped at the time with its various 

directorates. They weren’t communicating with each other or among each other and decisions 

were being made that were contrary to decisions being made in other parts of the directorate.”660

 

660 Melson Transcript at 17 (Exhibit 52).
201

Melson aimed to revamp the dysfunctional agency, in part, because he was concerned 

about its standing within the Department of Justice.

661

 The changes Melson instituted were 

intended to establish greater efficiency within ATF. Many of the day-to-day operations, 

including oversight of investigations, were left to Deputy Director William Hoover, who in his 

24-year tenure at ATF ascended the ranks of Field Operations. 

One way Melson aimed to promote efficiency in ATF was to use outside experts to assist 

with cases. Melson wanted to take a new approach to large firearms trafficking cases with 

assistance from the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. This approach was consistent with 

the draft Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels that the Deputy Attorney General

distributed in October 2009, as discussed above. 

On December 3, 2009, less than a month after Fast and Furious had officially been 

opened as a case, Melson e-mailed Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal 

Division, regarding seizures of multiple weapons in Mexico. Melson wanted to “coordinate and 

monitor” seizures of multiple weapons “as if the seizure was one case.”662 In other words, if 35 

weapons were recovered at the same time, but were bought by 10 different purchasers, the 

recovered weapons would become the subject of one large investigation instead of 10 individual 

ones. As Melson wrote to Breuer:

Using the traces as intelligence, and compiling the information from each 

trace investigation, we can connect the purchases, identify the traffickers

and use more serious charges against them. The intelligence analysis and 

linking of trace data and investigation results will be done at HQ out of 

our intelligence directorate. I would like to see if you have any interest in 

assigning a criminal division attorney to work with that group to 

develop multi-division/district cases and perhaps to the district with the 

best venue to indict the case.663

Breuer wrote back to Melson the next morning, stating: “We think this is a terrific idea and a

great way to approach the investigations of these seizures. Our Gang Unit will be assigning an 

attorney to help you coordinate this effort. . . . I would love to see you to discuss this further.”664

B. Melson and DOJ Learn of Operation Fast and Furious

The resulting cooperation became an important initiative for both ATF and the Criminal 

Division. Lanny Breuer wrote a memorandum to Attorney General Holder that discussed this 

new initiative, and Breuer prepared notes about this new coordination with ATF in preparation 

 

661 Id. at 23.

662 E-mail from Kenneth Melson to Lanny Breuer (Dec. 3, 2009) [HOGR 003403] (Exhibit 259).

663 Id. (emphasis added).

664 E-mail from Lanny Breuer to Ken Melson (Dec. 4, 2009) [HOGR 003403] (Exhibit 259).
202

for a personal meeting with the Attorney General.665 As a result of this initiative, the Criminal 

Division assigned one of its lawyers to assist with the Fast and Furious case. This attorney was 

briefed on Operation Fast and Furious shortly thereafter. Given the importance of the case, the 

attorney was forced to alter his holiday plans just to get up to speed.666 

One week after his e-mail exchange with Lanny Breuer, Acting Director Melson learned 

of Operation Fast and Furious for the very first time. On December 9, 2009, a meeting took 

place in Melson’s office with three top ATF officials: William Hoover, the Deputy Director; Bill 

McMahon, the Deputy Assistant Director for Field Operations; and Steve Martin, the Deputy 

Assistant Director for OSII. In the meeting, Melson learned of two large seizures of weapons 

purchased by Fast and Furious suspects that had occurred in Mexico. This meeting led to a 

detailed briefing with Criminal Division lawyers the following week.667

Over the next several months, Melson received notification of weapons recoveries tying 

back to Fast and Furious. For example, in January 2010, Melson was informed about one 

particularly large recovery connected to the case. 668 Agents seized forty weapons from a stash 

house in El Paso, Texas, on January 13, 2010, that had been purchased by Fast and Furious straw 

buyers. This recovery was significant for two reasons. First, it represented a potential shift in 

the geographic movement of Fast and Furious weapons from the gun stores in Phoenix to the 

Sinaloa cartel in Mexico. Second, it was also connected to a separate case run by ATF’s Dallas 

Field Division.

The same week that Melson received information about this El Paso seizure, he was 

briefed on a separate seizure of 41 weapons that occurred on the Tohono O’odham Nation, an 

Indian reservation that stretches from southern Arizona into Mexico. The seizure resulted from a 

GPS tracker which was inserted into one of the 41 weapons—one of only two known instances 

in which ATF used such a technique in Fast and Furious. The episode illustrates that ATF could 

have used trackers on a larger scale to interdict more suspicious purchases in conjunction with 

the contemporaneous knowledge of the purchases that ATF received from cooperating FFLs. 

Since this was the first time ATF employed a tracker Melson included the information about the 

tracker and the seizure—including the fact that the suspects intended to take the firearms to 

Mexico—in his weekly report to Attorney General Holder.

669

After ATF senior management had received information about specific seizures and 

recoveries, Acting Director Melson participated in a detailed briefing on Fast and Furious on 

 

665 Memorandum to the Attorney General from Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, “Weekly Report for the 

Week of January 4, 2010 – January 10, 2010” [HOGR 003249-003250] (Exhibit 260); Notes from Lanny Breuer, 

Assistant Attorney General, DOJ [HOGR 003358-003362] (Exhibit 261). 

666 E-mail from Kevin Carwile to Jason Weinstein (Mar. 16, 2010) [HOGR 002832] (Exhibit 262).

667 Melson Transcript at 76-77 (Exhibit 52).

668 Melson Transcript at 194 (Exhibit 52).

669 Memorandum to the Attorney General from Kenneth Melson, “Weekly Report for Mar. 1-5, 2010” [HOGR 

003271] (Exhibit 263).
203

March 12, 2010.670 This briefing, given by Deputy Director Hoover, also included Gary 

Grindler, then the Acting Deputy Attorney General. It was one of the monthly meetings that 

ATF had with the Deputy Attorney General. Melson testified as to the purpose of these 

meetings:

[W]e have a monthly meeting with the DAG [Deputy Attorney General], 

which is usually a half an hour to 45 minutes, and we brief him on the 

issues that are coming to the top at ATF. . . so that they were not caught by 

surprise if an issue pops out in the press.671

During the meeting, Hoover informed Melson and Grindler that 1,000 weapons had been sold in 

conjunction with Fast and Furious, and that just a handful of straw purchases had bought most of 

them. Hoover also showed them maps of Mexico and Arizona, pinpointing all the seizure 

locations—some of which occurred through interdiction in the U.S., but others merely through 

recovery at crime scenes in Mexico. 

C. Concerns About Guns Flowing South and a Desire to Shut Down the Case

In the summer of 2010, Acting Director Melson, like those below him in the chain of 

command, worried that Fast and Furious was not being shut down fast enough. On July 14, 

2010, Melson was informed of a recovery of 73 weapons, many of which traced back to Fast and 

Furious.672 Melson asked his top two lieutenants, Deputy Director Hoover and Assistant 

Director for Field Operations Chait, “When will we be taking Fast and Furious down? An awful 

lot of guns seem to be flowing south.”673 Melson deemed this recovery important enough to alert 

the nation’s top law enforcement officer by including this information in a memo to Attorney 

General Holder. The memo stated that many of the guns were purchased by “known straw 

purchasers.”674 

 

670 ATF Monthly Meeting with the Acting Deputy Attorney General, Mar. 12, 2010 [HOGR 002817-002823] 

(Exhibit 86).

671 Melson Transcript at 24 (Exhibit 52).

672 E-mail from Mark Chait to Kenneth Melson (Jul. 14, 2010) [HOGR 002084] (Exhibit 149).

673 E-mail from Kenneth Melson to Mark Chait and William Hoover (Jul. 14, 2010) [HOGR 002084] (Exhibit 149).

674 Memorandum for the Attorney General from Kenneth Melson, Weekly Report for Jul. 19-23, 2010 [HOGR 

002081-002082] (Exhibit 264).
204

Melson was concerned about the large number of weapons that had been recovered in 

Mexico. Yet, the case continued. The slow progress of indictments frustrated Melson so much 

that he proclaimed that he would travel to Arizona and write the indictments himself. He 

testified:

After it got into July or so and the exit strategy had been completed, 

almost every Monday when we had our staff meetings, I asked Chait 

what’s the status of the case? Now it’s the end of August, now it’s the 

beginning of September, now it’s the middle of September. They told us 

they were going to get an indictment. Now it’s November and now it’s 

December. And it keeps getting pushed. I offered to send our own 

lawyers out there to get this case indicted. In fact, I offered to go out 

and do the indictment myself.

675

Melson claims that he did everything in his power to alert his staff that Fast and Furious needed 

to be taken down as soon as possible. He stated, “All I know is, yes, I asked time and time again, 

when that case was going to be indicted.”

676

 

Nevertheless, the case remained unindicted for many more months. In the meantime, as 

late as mid-November 2010, Melson was still referring to Fast and Furious as a “fantastic” 

case.677

 

675 Melson Transcript at 82 (Exhibit 52).

676 Id.

677 E-mail from Dennis Burke to Emory Hurley (Nov. 19, 2010) [HOGR 003062] (Exhibit 265).
205

D. Whistleblowers and Congressional Inquiry

On January 5, 2011, ATF Chief Counsel Steve Rubenstein e-mailed Melson:

This is in response to your request regarding information posted on “Clean 

Up ATF.” Specifically, on December 22, 2010, “1desertrat” stated that 

“word is” that Phoenix FD ASAC George Gillet [sic] “[a]llegedly 

approved more than 500 AR-15 type rifles from Phoenix and Tucson cases 

to be ‘walked’ into Mexico.” The post further states that “[o]ne of those 

rifles is rumored to have been linked to the recent killing of a Border 

Patrol Officer in Nogales, AZ.”

The disclosure of this information has a potential deleterious effect on 

ATF’s undercover operations. . . .

If “1desertrat” is an ATF employee, then he/she is subject to our Orders 

and Standards of Conduct.678

Melson responded, “Thanks, Steve. I am going to forward this to [Internal Affairs].”679 It is 

unknown whether Melson took any actions at that point to investigate whether there was any 

truth to the public allegations.

The day after Senator Grassley sent him a letter on January 27, 2011, expressing concern 

over alleged gunwalking and its possible relationship to the death of Border Patrol Agent Brian 

Terry, Melson sent an e-mail to Hoover and Chait stating, “I would like to see tomorrow 

afternoon all the material (documents) including all reports tantamount to the case record on the 

defendant who sold the weapons involved in the shooting with the CBP. Also, I think we need to 

call over to the higher levels of the FBI and find out the results of the forensic testing on the 

guns that came from our guy.”680 

According to his testimony, Melson wanted to be very proactive in responding to the 

congressional inquiry into Fast and Furious, and says he told the Justice Department he wanted

to come to Capitol Hill to brief Senator Grassley’s office on the case personally. He stated:

And after receiving that letter, our first instinct and intuition was to 

directly march over to Senator Grassley’s office and brief him on 

what Fast and Furious was for purposes of explaining the concept and 

the role it played and how it got there, and where ATF was going in it. 

 

678 E-mail from Steve Rubenstein to Kenneth Melson (Jan. 5, 2010) [HOGR 001571] (Exhibit 201).

679 E-mail from Kenneth Melson to Steve Rubenstein (Jan. 5, 2010) [HOGR 001572] (Exhibit 201).

680 E-mail from Kenneth Melson to William Hoover and Mark Chait (Jan. 27, 2011) [HOGR 003709] (emphasis 

added) (Exhibit 266).
206

And we expressed that desire to the DAG’s [Deputy Attorney General’s] 

office.681

Instead, the Justice Department’s Office of Legislative Affairs sent an attorney who was 

apparently more knowledgeable about Fast and Furious than Melson to brief Senate staff—

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jason Weinstein. Weinstein was well-acquainted with the 

operation. In fact, he had authorized and signed wiretap applications for Fast and Furious.

682

 

Though Weinstein told congressional investigators that Fast and Furious was an ongoing 

criminal investigation and that the Department would not be able to comment on it, Melson 

immediately understood why this case was unique:

The pushback from the Department was that it pertained to an ongoing 

criminal case, and certainly concerns about releasing information on an 

ongoing criminal case is a serious concern and has to be treated with 

sensitivity, but we thought that we could go over and brief [Senator 

Grassley]. . . This case is a little different, because you are actually 

investigating looking at an investigation, as opposed to looking at subject 

matters which might tangentially impact an investigation. This was about 

an investigation itself and you can hardly investigate or discuss that 

without getting into some issues that impact the case.683

Melson testified that Weinstein’s briefing marked the beginning of a pattern of Justice 

Department responses centering on damage control:

I might characterize it, and I hope I’m not going too far abroad, but I 

think they were doing more damage control than anything.

My view is that the whole matter of the Department’s response in this 

case was a disaster. That as a result, it came to fruition that the 

committee staff had to be more aggressive and assertive in attempting to 

get information from the Department, and as a result, there was more 

adverse publicity towards ATF than was warranted if we had cooperated 

from the very beginning. And a lot of what they did was damage control 

after a while. Their position on things changed weekly and it was hard for 

us to catch up on it, but it was very clear that they were running the 

show.684

 

681 Melson Transcript at 29 (Exhibit 52).

682 Weinstein Transcript at 86 (Exhibit 119).

683 Melson Transcript at 30-31 (Exhibit 52).

684 Id. at 31.
207

E. Discovering the Truth

Over the next several months, Melson became increasingly frustrated with the Justice 

Department’s response to Congress. He believed the Department was not being sufficiently 

forthcoming with Congress, and he decided to study all facets of Fast and Furious himself. 

Melson testified:

I decided to have confidence that we’ve looked at everything, that I would 

read them all. So sitting on the plane, reading the wiretap affidavit and 

one of the wiretap affidavits – in fact, I think more than one, there was a 

statement in there prepared by the agents – the AUSA and reviewed by 

the Criminal Division that suggested there was probable cause to 

believe that straw purchasers were taking guns across the border. 

Because they set out in the affidavit the various – the various border 

crossings of the straw purchasers.685

Melson warned Justice Department headquarters that the information he had reviewed 

contradicted earlier claims that the Department had made to Congress. Melson testified:

But it was apparent to me that they were suggesting that there was 

probable cause to believe that this information – that these straw 

purchasers were taking guns across the border. So while on the plane, I 

drafted an e-mail to our people, and said, you know, you better back 

off, you better back off this statement, because – the statement in this 

letter, this February 4th letter to Senator Grassley, because I don’t 

believe we can say that in light of the information that our agent was 

swearing to before a federal district court judge to get the wiretap.686

The Department failed to heed his warnings. 

Melson acknowledged that if he had been properly informed about the case early on, he 

would have approached the response to Senator Grassley differently. Melson claims he was 

unaware of all the facts of Fast and Furious until the scandal broke in the media, but he was 

proactive in quickly learning them. He testified:

I think early on, if there had been an awareness of not just the number of 

guns, but the number of guns that a single person purchased, and that we 

were watching the guns being purchased by them, I think we would have 

taken a different approach on it, and would have approached Patino and at 

the risk of putting the investigation in danger at least stopped his multiple 

 

685 Id. at 36.

686 Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
208

purchases that continued on and on and on for a significant period of 

time.687

The Department—particularly its Criminal Division—was aware of the startling facts of 

Operation Fast and Furious early on. Melson stated:

But I had e-mailed Lanny Breuer, on December 6, 2009, the day that 

Voth came on the job in Mexico – I mean, in Phoenix, and asked him to 

come over and be briefed on some of these cases, so that perhaps his 

people, his prosecutors could help us develop a case . . . . Then on 

December 17th, there was a briefing again by our intel section on the 

Reynoso seizure and the Phoenix Fast and Furious case. Now, this was 

just December 17, so it was early in the investigation. But Kevin 

Car[wi]le, who is the supervisor in the Criminal Division, I think he 

was in charge of gang cases, I think – I’m not 100 percent sure and Joe 

Cooley who was one of the trial attorneys came over to be briefed on it 

as well, in anticipation of them working this whole spectrum of 

seizures that were across the border.

688

Put plainly, the Criminal Division failed to do what Ken Melson claims he would have done if he 

possessed the knowledge that officials in the Criminal Division did pertaining to Fast and 

Furious. Melson explained:

So we ought to be developing a multi-division, multi-U.S. Attorney 

district case on all this. Get the intel from all these seizures, bring it 

together, develop the case and take it down. So I obviously couldn’t do it, 

so I wanted Lanny Breuer to do it. Lanny Breuer became very active in 

the Southwest border plans and implementation. He worked on the 

Merida initiative, with the four pillars of the Merida initiative. We briefed 

him on what we were doing in Mexico. We have briefed him on Fast and 

Furious. So he was a partner with us in a lot of what we were doing along 

the Southwest border as well as in Mexico.689

As the congressional investigation into Fast and Furious progressed, the Department 

hindered Melson from talking about Fast and Furious. Deputy Attorney General James Cole 

prohibited Melson from even talking to ATF personnel about the case even though Melson 

wanted to inform the entire ATF what was going on. Melson set out to remedy internal ATF 

processes in order to prevent Fast and Furious-type cases from happening in the future. He 

explained:

So we have changed the way we supervise major cases from the way it 

 

687 Id. at 64.

688 Id. at 76-77.

689 Id. at 75-76.
209

was before, where it was just if major case funds were being expended, 

then apparently field ops would look at it, now we are coming up with a 

guideline as to when a case is a case that needs to have more direct 

headquarters supervision, and more headquarters awareness of these cases, 

so that we can stop some of this stuff if there is an errant approach to 

investigations.690

From Melson’s perspective, if other Justice Department components had been more 

forthcoming with information they had about Fast and Furious suspects, the operation would 

have ended much sooner than it did. He believed that during Fast and Furious, the Department 

possessed additional information that would have led to the operation’s timely conclusion had it 

shared this information with ATF. He stated:

I think if [ATF] had been in it, and we had known and therefore had 

access to the information that perhaps other agencies had, we could have 

either shut the operation down because we know already who the end 

game is, or we could have dramatically facilitated reaching that goal and 

then stopping, and I think this case would not be what it looks like now.691

Melson believed that if ATF had had access to the same information about Manuel Celis-Acosta 

as other Department components, such as the FBI, Fast and Furious would have ended

differently:

Q. It would seem to us that at whatever point in time that deportation 

and reentry into the United States [of FBI’s target in Operation 

Head Shot] happens would have been an ideal time to loop ATF 

into this network, and this network’s relationship to the firearms 

trafficking folks?

A. It would have made it unnecessary to continue the case.692

Though Ken Melson did not have the detailed knowledge of Fast and Furious that senior political 

appointees in the Justice Department did, the Department has made Melson be the scapegoat for 

the reckless tactics used in the investigation. On August 30, 2011, the Justice Department 

announced that Melson would be removed as Acting Director of ATF. Melson became a senior 

adviser in the Office of Legal Policy in Department headquarters. Not coincidentally, this 

occurred after Melson provided a transcribed interview to Committee wherein in stated, “The 

Department is really trying to figure out a way to push information away from its political 

appointees at the Department.”

 

690 Id. at 72.

691 Id. at 110.

692 Id. at 118.
210

VI. Conclusion

Operation Fast and Furious was the largest firearms trafficking case involving the U.S.-

Mexico border in the history of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. The 

case began in the fall of 2009 in ATF’s Phoenix Field Division under the leadership of Special 

Agent in Charge William Newell, an agent with a history of sanctioning the dangerous 

investigative technique known as gunwalking. Newell had been reprimanded before by ATF 

management for pushing the envelope with discredited tactics. But Newell had an audacious 

goal. He intended to dismantle the U.S.-based gun trafficking network that supplied the 

formidable Mexican Sinaloa Cartel. When the Obama administration resurrected an earlier case 

in which his division used reckless gunwalking tactics, Newell saw his opportunity. David Voth 

was brought to Phoenix to assist Newell, and to serve as the first-line supervisor for Fast and 

Furious. Voth was a novice supervisor who lacked experience with complex firearms trafficking 

cases. Together, Newell with his penchant for gunwalking, and the untested Voth, embarked on 

a risky—and ultimately deadly—path.

From the outset, the case was marred by missteps, poor judgments, and an inherently 

reckless strategy. In the summer of 2009, the Deputy Attorney General at the Department of 

Justice in Washington, D.C. promulgated a “Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels.” The 

new aim was to zero in on the firearms trafficking networks. Agents were advised that “merely 

seizing firearms” purchased illegally by straw buyers should take a back seat to gathering 

information in hopes of dismantling entire firearms trafficking networks. To effectuate the new 

plan, ATF agents in Phoenix convinced local gun dealers to cooperate by supplying ATF with 

real-time information on the straw purchases, even though ATF knew the buyers were illegally 

obtaining firearms destined for the Mexican drug cartels. The gun dealers were reassured that 

ATF was closely monitoring the transactions, and interdicting the weapons. That was false. In 

total, nearly two thousand firearms got away, and fell into the hands of associates of known 

criminals, including those affiliated with the dangerous Mexican cartels. 

Shortly after Fast and Furious began, ATF applied for and received the coveted OCDETF

designation. The task force was arranged as a Strike Force, which meant that the United States 

Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona would lead it. Other Justice Department 

components were added to the case, including the FBI and DEA, as well as DHS’s investigative 

arm, Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

With each step in the investigation, the U.S. Attorney’s Office and ATF had opportunities 

to inform and seek approval from senior officials in the Justice Department’s Office of the 

Deputy Attorney General, and in the Criminal Division. A Federal statute requires designated 

senior officials in the Justice Department to authorize wire taps. ATF’s senior leadership in 

Washington was updated regularly on the progress of its signature investigation. These same 

leaders in Newell’s chain of command knew about the incredible number of guns in Fast and 

Furious but failed to provide proper supervision.
211

Shortly after the case began, in December 2009, DEA supplied ATF with extensive 

information on what would become ATF’s prime target. At that point, ATF should have shut 

Fast and Furious down, but it failed to recognize the significance of the information the DEA had 

shared. Instead, ATF continued with its plan to identify all the players in the trafficking network 

rather than disrupt or deter them through confrontation and arrest. So, hundreds of guns flowed 

to criminals while two of the trafficking network’s customers, who were its connection to the 

Mexican drug cartels, were already known to U.S. law enforcement. Both the FBI and DEA had 

key information on the network’s connection drug cartels in Mexico by the time ATF’s wiretaps 

were approved.

As the number of firearms involved in the case continued to escalate, at last, senior 

officials at ATF headquarters started to ask questions about when the case was going to be taken 

down. ATF Deputy Director William Hoover, in particular, demanded an exit strategy in March 

2010. But, it took another nine months and the tragic murder of a U.S. Border Patrol Agent 

Brian Terry in the Arizona desert in December 2010, before the U.S. Attorney’s Office and ATF 

finally took meaningful steps to bring the case to a close. 

Operation Fast and Furious is the third major scandal in ATF history following the 

tragedies at Ruby Ridge and Waco in the mid-90s. It is tied to the death of a U.S. Border Patrol 

agent and countless Mexican citizens. Almost three years after the case began—and 18 months 

after it was first publicly exposed—no one from ATF has been held accountable and not one has 

lost even a single day’s pay. Though Attorney General Holder testified that the case was 

“fundamentally flawed” and President Obama has stated that mistakes may have been made, all 

responsible ATF officials still work either at the ATF or within the Department of Justice. The 

two men most closely identified with the failed strategy of the case and who bear the brunt of 

responsibility for supervising the operation on a day-to-day basis, William Newell and David 

Voth, have both kept their jobs at ATF. 

Strong leadership is needed at ATF to overcome the deep scars left by Operation Fast and 

Furious. Such leadership requires the full-time attention of individuals devoted to ensuring ATF 

becomes an effective organization known throughout the country for protecting communities 

from violent criminals and ensuring public safety. Greater accountability within ATF would 

underscore that ineffective supervision and recklessness both have consequences.

This report is not intended to imply in any way that the mistakes and responsibility for 

Operation Fast and Furious are limited to ATF and other federal officials who were based in 

Arizona. While mistakes by figures in Arizona were immense, the joint Congressional 

investigation into Operation Fast and Furious will issue a second report detailing the mistakes 

and culpability of Department of Justice officials based in Washington, D.C.