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Air University Press

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00-Inside cover.indd 1 8/5/09 3:17:28 
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Center of Gravity Analysis 

and Operational Design

Ensuring a Logical Linkage among 

National Strategic Objectives;

Diplomatic, Informational, Military, 

and Economic Instruments of Power; 

and the Military Campaign

Jacob Barfoed

Major, Royal Danish Air Force

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 38

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

March 2009

01-Frontmatter.indd 1 8/5/09 3:21:31 
ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.au.af.mil.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other 

US government agency. Nor do they necessarily represent the views of the Royal 

Danish Defence College, the Ministry of Defence, Denmark, or any other Government of Denmark agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

01-Frontmatter.indd 2 8/5/09 3:21:32 
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Flyer Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and 

Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best 

student research projects from the prior academic year. 

The ACSC research program encourages our students to 

move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their own 

professional development and in “advancing air and space 

power.” The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the 

pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. 

Projects selected for publication combine solid research, 

innovative thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war 

at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the 

Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, 

technological, organizational, and operational questions. 

Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar 

problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind 

in pursuing new possibilities. By making these research 

studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes 

to encourage critical examination of the findings and to 

stimulate further research in these areas.

JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR.

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

01-Frontmatter.indd 3 8/5/09 3:21:32 
01-Frontmatter.indd 4 8/5/09 3:21:32 


Abstract

The United States has over the last 16 years demonstrated 

amazing proficiency in winning military campaigns, but 

failure in securing “a better peace” as Basil Liddell Hart 

advocated. There is a need for an interagency analysis 

model, owned by the National Security Council (NSC), that 

can determine how the different instruments of power (IOP) 

can contribute to the achievement of the national strategic 

objectives, including which combination of IOPs is most 

efficient, but it must also bridge the strategic level of war 

to the operational and tactical levels. Therefore, this paper 

proposes an analysis model based on Dr. Joseph L. Strange’s 

center of gravity (COG) model, Robert Pape’s concept of 

coercion, and effects-based operations (EBO). The model 

could create unity of effort in utilization of all national and 

international IOPs and in securing the necessary linkage 

among the three levels of war to affect the adversary’s will 

and his strategy.

First, until there is a Goldwater-Nichols Act II that 

establishes a more permanent strategic-level interagency 

staff or committee structure under the NSC that can be 

custodian of the proposed analysis model, the Joint Staff 

should be the custodian of the proposed model. The Joint 

Staff will be responsible for updating the Joint Operation 

Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the joint 

operation planning process (JOPP) using the model. 

Second, the concept of COGs combined with Pape’s concept 

of coercion provide useful focus points for attacking the 

adversary’s strategy. Third, Strange’s COG analysis model 

shows how to affect the adversary’s COGs most efficiently. 

Fourth, merger of COG analysis and EBO can ensure the 

linkage among the three levels of war.

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01-Frontmatter.indd 6 8/5/09 3:21:32 


Introduction

The United States has demonstrated over the last 16 

years amazing proficiency in winning the military campaign, 

but it has failed to secure “a better peace” as Liddell Hart 

advocated. Consequently, the United States needs an 

interagency analysis model, owned by the National Security 

Council (NSC), that examines which combination of the 

instruments of power (IOP) that would best achieve the 

national strategic objectives (NSO). This model must also 

bridge the political ends to the military campaign. Recent 

updates to joint doctrine publications make clear that unity 

of effort is necessary to achieve the political ends. In order to 

achieve unity of effort, it seems reasonable to suggest that 

first there needs to be a common and shared understanding 

of the strategic environment by all strategic players. As Sun 

Tzu said, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred 

battles you will never be in peril.”1

This shared strategic understanding should guide the 

establishment of the NSOs, that is, objectives that are achievable by the use of the national IOPs and the national resources 

that the government will invest and allocate. This would 

involve US government (USG) departments and agencies other 

than the Department of Defense (DOD) because all diplomatic, 

informational, military, and economic (DIME) IOPs must be 

considered. The NSC is responsible for this interagency coordination at the strategic level, while the geographic combatant 

commanders are responsible at the operational level, assisted 

by their joint interagency coordination groups.2

However, a strategic-level interagency methodology or 

doctrine, which guides the NSC’s strategic analysis of contingencies or crises, does not exist. The DOD publishes Joint 

Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) volumes, 

not the NSC. This makes it hard to achieve the necessary 

level of unity of effort. An NSC policy coordination committee 

(PCC) might agree on a strategic analysis, but the lack of a 

common methodology or doctrine is likely to make it harder 

for higher-ranking officials from the USG departments and 

agencies to accept a JOPES product, since they don’t know 

how or why it was created. 

The USG is working on ensuring unity of effort, though. 

The National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 of 

02-Article.indd 1 8/5/09 3:22:02 
December 2005 has led to the creation of the Interagency 

Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization (RS), which aims at ensuring unity of effort in RS 

operations. The IMS includes PCC-level country reconstruction and stabilization groups created to focus exclusively 

on a single country or regional crisis. The IMS does not 

(yet) include a common crisis analysis methodology or doctrine, and it focuses narrowly on RS operations, rather than 

broader national security issues.3

US joint doctrine does not offer much help, either. Joint 

Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (JP 3-0), describes that the 

president and the secretary of defense (SECDEF) typically 

establish strategic guidance in the form of NSOs and end 

states; no other USG agencies are mentioned.4 However, 

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational Planning (JP 5-0),

does acknowledge that other USG agencies might have a role, 

“The President, SECDEF, and Joint Staff—with appropriate 

consultation with additional NSC members, other USG agencies, and multinational partners—formulate suitable and 

feasible national strategic objectives that reflect US national 

interests.”5 Both formulations, however, place the SECDEF 

and the military in the lead role in establishing NSOs and 

national strategy and seem to neglect the importance of keeping all IOPs in mind when formulating national strategy. 

What makes this even more challenging is that US joint 

doctrine does not focus on “strategic art and design.” Joint 

doctrine only discusses the ingredients of grand strategy 

(ends, ways, and means) and the importance of unity of 

effort. But, then how to find the best combination of DIME 

strategic objectives to achieve the political ends remains a 

mystery. JP 5-0 tries to fill this vacuum by extending the 

definition of operational art and design to the strategic 

level: “In the final analysis, the goals of a sound operational 

design are to ensure a clear focus on the ultimate strategic objective and corresponding strategic centers of gravity 

(COG), and provide for sound sequencing, synchronization, 

and integration of all available military and nonmilitary instruments of power to that end.”6

Unfortunately, JP 5-0 is unclear on how this is accomplished. It offers the joint operational planning process 

(JOPP) that includes tools and concepts, but some of the 

definitions could be more clear and precise. In addition, JP 

02-Article.indd 2 8/5/09 3:22:03 
5-0 does not give much help in exemplifying the concepts. 

As a result, JP 5-0 fails to clearly describe and exemplify 

how operational art bridges grand strategic and strategic 

levels of war to the operational and tactical levels of war. 

This is a significant deficiency. In the words of Sun Tzu, 

“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. 

Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.”7

Clearly, there is a need for a useful analysis model for all

USG agencies that are part of the NSC and its PCCs. This 

model must determine the different IOPs’ contributions to 

the achievement of NSOs including the most efficient combination of IOPs. It must also bridge the strategic level of 

war to the operational and tactical levels. 

Therefore, an analysis model based on Dr. Joe Strange’s 

center of gravity model, Robert Pape’s concept of coercion, and 

effects based operations (EBO) is proposed. The model creates 

unity of effort by affecting the adversary’s will and strategy, 

using all national and international IOPs, as well as securing 

the necessary linkage among the three levels of war.

First, until there is a Goldwater-Nichols Act II that establishes a more permanent strategic-level interagency-staff or 

committee structure under the NSC that can be custodian 

of the proposed analysis model, the Joint Staff should be 

custodian of the proposed model. The Joint Staff will be 

responsible for updating the JOPES and the JOPP with the 

model. Second, the idea of COGs combined with Pape’s concept of coercion can provide useful focus points for attacking the adversary’s strategy. Third, Strange’s COG analysis 

model can be used most efficiently to affect the adversary’s 

COGs. Fourth, the merger of COG analysis and EBO to 

ensure the linkage among the levels of war is discussed. 

Finally, the paper describes the resulting analysis model.

The Joint Staff as Custodian

of the Proposed Model

There are several reasons why the Joint Staff is the logical custodian of the model. First, the chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) normally remains on the NSC after 

a change of administration. Therefore, the Joint Staff 

secures continuity in how the NSC analyzes national security 

matters and creates grand strategy. Next, the military has 

02-Article.indd 3 8/5/09 3:22:03 
a long tradition of analysis models and planning processes 

documented in doctrine. As a result, the military does not 

need to create new procedures, processes, and documents; 

it only needs to update existing ones. Last, since the 

proposed model bridges grand strategy to the military campaign, the JOPES and the JOPP need to be updated with the 

model. As the Joint Staff is responsible for the development 

of joint doctrine, making the Joint Staff custodian of the 

model can ensure this update happens. 

Centers of Gravity and their 

Relationship to Strategy

War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to 

do our will.

—Carl von Clausewitz

On War

Clausewitzian centers of gravity provide useful focal 

points in affecting the adversary’s will and strategy. Unfortunately, excellence in strategy does not seem to be an 

American strength.8 Indeed, as the Vietnam War and Operation Iraqi Freedom have shown, tactical and operational military success does not guarantee achievement of 

national objectives. If the objective of war is a better state 

of peace and not just gaining military victory, then strategy 

must bridge the available means of force with the political 

ends.9 A sound strategy thus orchestrates all national and 

international IOPs in the most efficient way toward achievement of political objectives. This is how the COG concept 

becomes useful.

Centers of Gravity Defined

As a centre of gravity is always situated where the 

greatest mass of matter is collected, and as a shock 

against the centre of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect, and further, as the most 

effective blow is struck with the centre of gravity of 

the power used, so it is also in War.

—Clausewitz

On War

02-Article.indd 4 8/5/09 3:22:03 
First, COGs must be defined and this is where the 

problems start. According to Dr. Joseph Strange, former 

professor at the US Marine Corps War College, COGs are 

“physical or moral entities that are the primary components 

of physical or moral strength, power and resistance. They 

don’t just contribute to strength; they ARE the strength. They 

offer resistance. They strike effective (or heavy) . . . blows” 

(emphasis in the original).10 It falls outside the scope of 

this paper to discuss why Strange does not use the current US joint definition, but he argues convincingly that 

his definition is more faithful to Clausewitz’s COG concept 

and, more importantly, a lot easier to understand and use 

in the subsequent COG analysis.11 JP 5-0 does offer help, 

however, in connecting COGs to objectives and strategy: the 

adversary’s COGs are truly critical for their strategy (as our 

COGs are critical for our strategy).12 “The defeat, destruction, neutralization, isolation, or substantial weakening of a 

valid COG should cause an adversary to change its course 

of action or prevent an adversary from achieving its strategic objectives.”13 COGs are subject to change at any time 

during a conflict; hence, they must be evaluated and reassessed continuously.14 Next, the COG concept is expanded 

by connecting it to Robert Pape’s concept of coercion.

“Will” COGs and “Ability” COGs and How

 They Relate to Strategy

If you want to overcome your enemy you must 

match your effort against his power of resistance, 

which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.

—Clausewitz

On War

By merging Pape’s concept of coercion with Strange’s 

COG definition and the JP 5-0 COG descriptions, this paper 

concludes that at the strategic level, there is usually a “will” 

COG that decides on policy and strategy and at least one 

“ability” COG that is the agency/entity responsible for the 

main strategic effort. While this paper does not discuss 

Pape’s concept in full, his definitions of coercion and 

coercion strategies are useful for the understanding of COGs 

02-Article.indd 5 8/5/09 3:22:04 
and their relations to strategies. USAF doctrine (Air Force 

Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization [AFDD 2]) 

has adopted Pape’s concept, even though AFDD 2 has 

slightly modified the definitions. AFDD 2 uses coercion as 

an umbrella term for compulsion and deterrence, while Pape 

uses coercion in place of compulsion and has no umbrella 

term. For the purpose of this paper, the AFDD 2 terms will 

be used (coercion will be substituted for compulsion when 

paraphrasing Pape). AFDD 2 defines coercion as “persuading 

an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would 

through the threat or use of force.”15 This is too narrow a 

definition, as it insinuates the exclusive use of the military 

IOPs in coercion strategies and excludes the use of the other 

IOPs. Rather, according to Pape, compulsion (coercion) 

and deterrence strategies aim at affecting the adversary’s 

behavior by manipulating costs and benefits. Deterrence 

strategies aim at preventing a specific behavior by the 

adversary, while compulsion (coercion) strategies aim at 

changing the adversary’s behavior.16 According to Pape, the 

logic of [compulsion] can be a simple equation:

 R = B p(B) – C p(C),

where: R = value of resistance

 B = potential benefits of resistance

 p(B) = probability of attaining benefits

 by continued resistance

 C = potential costs of resistance

 p(C) = probability of suffering costs.

Concessions occur when R < 0.17

Pape does not include deterrence in his theory, but since 

the same logic is at work, the equation can describe the 

logic of deterrence as well, by substituting resistance

for aggression. B is the gain or benefits the adversary 

is trying to achieve, whether it is political, economical, or 

other types of gain. In other words, B is the value the 

adversary assigns to their NSOs––the stakes––in the 

conflict. When assessing B, “we must seek to understand 

how the adversary thinks and not ‘mirror-image’—ascribe 

our own thinking, motivation, and priorities to them.”18

Usually B is not open for manipulation by the coercer, 

02-Article.indd 6 8/5/09 3:22:04 
so coercion strategies aim at altering the equation by 

increasing the costs (C), by increasing the probability 

of suffering costs [p(C)], by reducing the probability of 

attaining benefits [p(B)], or a combination thereof. Pape calls 

strategies manipulating the cost side of the equation, punishment

strategies, while strategies manipulating the benefit side of 

the equation are denial strategies.19

Punishment Strategies

Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s 

resistance without fighting.

—Sun Tzu

The Art of War

Punishment strategies aim at following Sun Tzu’s advice 

by affecting what Strange calls the moral strategic COG 

(the “will” COG). Pape defines “punishment strategies” as 

strategies raising the costs or risks to civilian populations, 

but this definition is too limited, since the population might 

not be what the adversary’s political leadership values 

the most. Rather, punishment strategies try to affect the 

adversary’s will and resolve by targeting or threatening 

to target whatever the adversary’s decision-making entity 

values the most (AFDD 2: “attack those things that an 

adversary values”).20 In other words, punishment strategies 

try to affect the adversary’s moral strength, power, and 

resistance—their strategic will COG. The “strategic will 

COG” can therefore be defined as the entity that directly or 

indirectly decides on national strategic ends, the strategy 

pursued, as well as provides the moral strength (the will) for 

carrying out the strategy. 

Identifying the correct will COG is therefore the first 

important step in developing grand strategy. Indeed, when 

considering a strategy that focuses entirely on affecting the 

adversary’s will COG (i.e., punishment), it becomes crucial 

to correctly identify and analyze the will COG. Then one 

must correctly assess the value of what the enemy holds 

to be the stakes in the conflict (the “B” in Pape’s equation). 

From Pape’s equation, if one cannot threaten something 

worth more than what the adversary is trying to achieve 

(B), punishment will not work. This something could be 

on the order of popular support in democracies, the power 

02-Article.indd 7 8/5/09 3:22:04 
base(s) of an oligarchic elite, or personal economic interests 

of the political leadership. A proper assessment requires 

a deep knowledge and understanding of qualities like the 

adversary’s leadership, their culture, how they think, and 

how they have acted historically. Historically, the United 

States has performed poorly in this assessment––mirror 

imaging and ethnocentrism are classic US pitfalls, as 

Vietnam, Operation Allied Force, and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom all show.21

History is full of successful punishment strategies. 

However, the United States has unsuccessfully applied 

airpower as the main punishment effort several times. 

A successful example of a punishment strategy would be 

England’s coercion of Denmark to hand over its navy in 1807. 

Using a devastating naval bombardment against the capital 

Copenhagen, the English were able to ignore the Danish 

army in Holstein and affected the will COG directly by 

holding the survival of Copenhagen at risk.22 Another 

example is the Vietnam War, where the North Vietnamese 

undermined the US domestic support for the war by inflicting 

military casualties using a guerrilla strategy (before 1968) 

together with media coverage to their advantage.23 Allied 

Force in 1999 is the only case of a successful punishment 

strategy using airpower. But in this case, a combined DIME 

punishment strategy was required to coerce Milosevic 

into accepting NATO’s demands, not airpower by itself.24

Failures include the Allied bombing of Nazi Germany,25

the US bombing of Japan,26 and the punishment parts of 

Rolling Thunder in Vietnam.27 In these cases, airpower was 

not able to threaten sufficiently [p(C)] anything worth more 

to the adversary (C) than the stakes in the conflict (B). 

Denial Strategies

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to 

attack the enemy’s strategy.

—Sun Tzu

The Art of War

Denial strategies, on the other hand, aim at affecting 

what Strange calls the physical strategic COGs (the ability 

COGs). Pape defines “denial strategies” as “thwarting the 

[adversary’s] military strategy for controlling the objectives 

02-Article.indd 8 8/5/09 3:22:05 
in dispute.”28 Again, this is too narrow a definition, since 

the adversary might not be pursuing a military strategy; it 

could be a strategy using one or several of the other IOPs. 

AFDD 2 defines denial as “a form of coercion strategy that 

destroys or neutralizes a portion of the adversary’s physical 

means to resist.”29 But this definition is not much better, 

for the same reasons. A useful definition should take the 

adversary’s unity of effort into consideration. Therefore, 

denial strategies work to thwart or threaten to thwart 

the adversary’s DIME strategy. Remembering the JP 5-0 

concepts of COG, then denial strategies work to affect the 

adversary’s strategic ability COG(s)—that is, the entity(s) 

that possesses the most critical capabilities (the ability) for 

carrying out a chosen strategy. As “strategy encompasses 

the ends, ways, means, and risk involved in securing policy 

objectives,”30 ability COGs are the most critical objects of 

the specific ways and means (the main strategic effort) to 

achieve successful ends. 

As mentioned earlier, the ability COGs might change 

from phase to phase of a conflict, bringing main strategic 

effort changes. There might also be multiple strategic ability 

COGs, although Clausewitz writes, “The first principle is 

that the ultimate substance of enemy strength must be 

traced back to the fewest possible sources, and ideally to 

one alone.”31 Clausewitz’s advice is to avoid dividing your 

effort so you can “act with the utmost concentration.”32 This 

remains sound, but there might be cases where it does not 

make sense to identify a single ability COG. Furthermore, 

there is usually both a will COG and at least one ability COG 

controlled directly or indirectly by the will COG. Sometimes, 

the will COG and the ability COG might be merged into one 

single COG. For example, insurgents animated by a cause 

rather than by charismatic leaders—here the insurgent 

group itself is the adversary-strategic COG.33

Keeping Pape’s coercion equation in mind, targeting 

ability COGs is intended to alter the adversary’s political 

calculations by undermining the adversary’s confidence 

[~ p(B)] in its own strategy. Thus, targeting the ability COG 

is a way to target the will COG. Nevertheless, the will COG 

remains the most important COG, since an adversary is 

not defeated until its will is broken. Defeating an ability 

COG might just cause the adversary to change strategy 

02-Article.indd 9 8/5/09 3:22:05 
10

(e.g., from conventional warfare to irregular warfare) as in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Therefore, any strategy focusing 

on the ability COG must consider how this will affect the will 

COG and how to affect the will COG sufficiently “to compel 

our enemy to do our will.”34 It is likely that military actions 

or other actions need to be performed after the ability COG 

is disrupted in order to achieve the political ends (e.g., in 

reconstruction and stabilization operations). “Brute force” 

or annihilation strategies are examples of noncoercion 

strategies that primarily target the strategic ability COG 

in order to achieve decisive military victory and physically 

impose one’s will on the adversary. Additionally, affecting 

the will COG sufficiently will most likely require unity of 

effort, the use of all IOPs in an integrated fashion, since it 

is unlikely that military actions alone will bring a lasting 

peace—as the last 100 years’ conflicts have shown. 

How to Affect the Centers of Gravity Most Efficiently

After clarifying the relationships between strategic COGs 

and strategies, the paper now discusses how to affect the 

adversary’s COGs most efficiently. Strange’s COG analysis 

model does exactly that, but JP 5-0 has not adapted the 

model correctly. It is clear that victory in conflict/war 

requires the United States and its allies to attack their 

adversary’s will and strategy by affecting enemy-strategic 

COGs. Likewise, our own strategic COGs require protection 

since they are crucial to our strategy and the will to carry it 

out. There are different ways of doing that. Clausewitz told 

us to direct all our energies at the COG (strength against 

strength), while other strategists like J. F. C. Fuller and 

Liddell Hart advocated an indirect approach (strength 

against weakness).35

Strange suggests that even strengths have critical 

vulnerabilities that can be exploited to defeat them, and he 

offers a model that permits insightful analysis of COGs.36

He introduces three concepts for that purpose. “Critical 

capabilities” (CC) are what the COG can “do to you that puts 

fear (or concern) into your heart in the context of your mission 

and level of war [or the mission statement of the COG].” 

“Critical requirements” (CR) are conditions, resources, and 

means that are essential for a COG to achieve its CC.37

02-Article.indd 10 8/5/09 3:22:05 
11

“Critical vulnerabilities” (CV) are those CRs, or components 

thereof, that are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization 

or disruption in a way that will contribute to a COG failing 

to achieve its critical capability. “The lesser the risk and 

cost, the better.”38 Strange’s COG analysis model can set 

available IOPs against the adversary’s CRs to find the most 

critical vulnerabilities in a cost/risk/effect analysis. Some 

potential CVs might be vulnerable to one IOP at a specific 

time, while other CV candidates would be vulnerable to the 

use of all IOPs in a timely and integrated fashion. Similarly, 

there could be CRs that are potentially vulnerable, but the 

available ways and means might not be sufficient to exploit 

the weakness. Also, for various reasons, there might not 

be political willingness to apply available ways and means 

against those CRs. Friendly COGs must be analyzed also, 

and vulnerable CRs and CVs must be protected from enemy 

exploitation. The result is a logical and stringent concept for 

bridging available ways and means (DIME IOPs) to political 

ends. In other words, COG analysis is a robust concept for 

developing sound strategy. 

The COG analysis model offered by JP 5-0 begins to apply 

Strange’s concepts, but the definitions of COG-CC-CR-CVs 

are not adequate. The definitions should be changed to reflect 

Strange’s concepts more closely. JP 5-0 clearly states the 

critical role of COG analysis: “a faulty conclusion resulting 

from a poor or hasty [COG] analysis can have very serious 

consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and 

operational objectives at an acceptable cost.”39 However, 

JP 5-0 defines a CC as “a means that is considered a crucial 

enabler for a center of gravity to function as such, and is 

essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed 

objective(s).”40 The JP 5-0 definition confuses CCs with 

Strange’s CRs and leaves Strange’s CCs out of the concept. 

This is unfortunate, since Strange’s CCs are very helpful for 

identifying and understanding COGs—CCs are what a COG 

can do for you or against you. JP 5-0 further complicates 

the situation by not spending enough space to explain the 

CC-CR-CV concepts. The reader is thereby forced to seek help 

from Dr. Strange and Richard Iron as well as other authors 

like Dale D. Eikmeier and Dr. Jack D. Kem who both use 

and understand Strange’s definitions.41 Since the current 

US joint definitions do not seem to contribute any further 

02-Article.indd 11 8/5/09 3:22:05 
12

refinement of the concepts, but rather confusion, it is highly 

recommended that US doctrine adopt Strange’s definitions. 

Changing the US joint definitions is not sufficient. Although 

JP 5-0 states there is an essential relationship between COGs 

and objectives, JP 5-0 fails to make clear how COGs and their 

critical factors might logically link two levels of war and the 

associated objectives.42

Effects Based Objectives and Centers

of Gravity: Logically Linking the 

Levels of War

To be truly effects based, plans must logically 

tie objectives at all levels together and must 

integrate objectives, effects, and actions into a 

logical, coherent whole.

—AFDD 2, Operations and Organization

3 April 2007

Effects based objectives have not been adopted into US 

joint doctrine, but EBO concepts of “effects” and “systems 

perspective” have been adopted.43 The latest AFDD 2 has 

probably the best doctrinal definition and description of EBO 

and its impact on planning, execution, and assessment. 

However, a detailed explanation of the EBO concept falls 

outside our present scope: 

“Effect” refers to the physical or behavioral state of a system that 

results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. Effects are 

parts of a causal chain that consists of objectives, effects, actions, 

and the causal linkages that conceptually join them to each other 

[emphasis in original]. . . . Objectives are the ultimate intended 

(desired) effects in a particular context or situation. Objectives at 

one level may be seen as effects at another, higher level [emphasis 

added]. . . . Effects based planning starts with objectives and works 

down to effects and actions. . . . Objectives start at the national level and 

extend down to the tactical level, at which actions are carried out.44

JP 5-0 is not as clear as AFDD 2 on how effects at one 

level can be objectives at a lower level. Rather, JP 5-0 

states, “The effect [statement] should be distinguishable from 

the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as 

another objective or a task.”45 This consideration seems to 

narrow the use of “desired effects” to the NATO doctrine’s 

criteria for success: 

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13

“Criteria for Success” (CfS). For each objective the Commander 

establishes criteria for success that provide measurable or 

observable requirements with respect to the essential physical, 

cybernetic or moral conditions or effects that must be achieved, as 

well as any conditions or effects that cannot exist for the objective to 

be successfully accomplished.46

AFDD 2 has a similar term, “success indicators” (SI), defined 

as “the conditions indicating attainment of objectives.”47

The CfS definition leaves less room for misunderstanding. 

The proposed analysis model applies a holistic perspective 

on the adversary by trying to identify not only critical nodes 

(COGs, CRs, and CVs) in the adversary’s political, military, 

economical, social, infrastructural, and informational systems 

(PMESII) but also the linkages between enemy systems. The 

COG/CC/CR/CV concept helps integrate objectives, effects, 

and actions/tasks into a logical, coherent whole: 

NSOs

↑

effects in strategic COGs

↑

effects in CVs

↑

DIME tasks/objectives

↑

effects in operational COGs

↑

effects in CVs

↑

operational tasks/objectives

↑

etc.

A clear understanding of objectives is essential. Joint doctrine defines an “objective” as “the clearly defined, decisive, 

and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed.”48

Further, JP 5-0 mentions three primary considerations 

about objectives: “First, they should link directly or indirectly to one or more higher-level objectives; next, they 

should be as unambiguous as possible; finally, they should 

not specify ways or means for their accomplishment.”49

That objectives be unambiguous seems commonsensical, 

but at the political level, ambiguous objectives are often 

preferable, as they leave more political maneuvering room. 

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14

Although the political point of view might be understandable, ambiguous objectives are often what lead to failures 

like Vietnam. The solution is to attach CfS and measures of 

effectiveness (MOE) to each objective that are clear benchmarks indicating actual progress towards the objective.50

A third consideration, the use of passive voice can facilitate stating objectives without inferring potential ways and 

means. Conversely, active voice should be used to state effects 

and tasks which should infer ways and means.51

The Proposed Analysis Model

With a sound understanding of objectives, effects, and 

tasks in place, it is now time for the proposed model. War 

can be viewed as a chess game, to—win—one must analyze 

the adversary’s potential moves and plan to counter them. 

At the same time, one must predict the adversary’s likely 

countermoves. This requires multiple iterations of the analysis, 

as each move produces a number of potential countermoves. 

Every iteration makes incremental refinements to the 

operational design. The best chess players are those that are 

able to look furthest ahead and counter all the adversary’s 

potential moves. In war, however, there are more than 64 

squares, and all the adversary’s chessmen are seldom known. 

In the highly complex and dynamic operational environment 

(OE) of modern warfare, it might even be hard to know who the 

enemy is. This obviously makes war much more complicated 

than chess—but the basic concept is still the same. 

When the plan is executed, it is crucial to look for 

anomalies in the adversary’s behavior—deviations from the 

expected—rather than looking for confirmation. The devil is 

often in the details, and the small anomalies might be the 

tip of an iceberg that could wreck the whole plan if one does 

not recognize them for what they are and adjust the plan 

accordingly. Therefore, looking for anomalies rather than 

for confirmation is a crucial mind-set difference required for 

successfully executing the plan produced by the center of 

gravity analysis model. The process starts by analyzing the 

OE from the perspective of the side with the initiative. For 

the purpose of this paper, this is the adversary. 

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15

Step 1. The Adversary’s Objectives and 

Decision Makers

Part A of this step is to assess the adversary’s presumed 

NSOs comprising a desired national strategic end state. 

Next, for each NSO, develop CfS and MOEs. The NSOs 

and their CfS should broadly describe desired effects and 

conditions in the PMESII systems in the OE.

Part B of this step is to identify and analyze the adversary’s 

will COG. The adversary’s strategic will COG can be 

determined by identifying the entity that possesses the 

following general critical capabilities: directly or indirectly 

deciding on national strategic ends, the strategy to be 

pursued, as well as providing the moral strength (the will) 

for carrying out the strategy. The COG analysis uses the 

COG/CC/CR/CV concept. Assess what value the will COG 

holds for the NSOs (the B in Pape’s equation)—domesticpolitical value, international-political value, economic 

value, et cetera.

Finally, part C of this step is to assess the adversary’s 

desired effects in CRs. The effects must ensure that the 

COG maintains its critical capabilities. The CRs will be 

adversary-strategic decisive points (DP) and will be arranged 

together with their desired effects on the adversary’s strategic 

lines of operation (LOO) to protect the COG.52

Step 2. The Operational Environment as

Seen from the Adversary’s Perspective

Part A of this step, still keeping the adversary’s preconflict 

perspective, is to analyze the PMESII systems of all the 

actors in the OE. Part of this analysis is assessing the 

preconflict NSOs of the actors, thereby identifying potential 

allies, neutrals, as well as opponents to the adversary. For the 

purpose of the model’s illustrations, the analysis is limited 

to the United States and the adversary’s “victim” (the object 

of the adversary’s aggression). Consequently, the US longterm (preconflict) NSOs regarding the region (the OE) and 

the adversary in particular, are now identified.

Part B of this step is to identify and analyze the United 

States’ and the victim’s strategic will COGs. As in step 1B, 

assess what value the friendly will COGs hold in the NSOs.

02-Article.indd 15 8/5/09 3:22:06 
16

Part C of this step is to assess the adversary’s desired 

effects in these will COGs as well as the CVs. The desired 

effects in the COGs must support the adversary’s NSOs. 

Add them as CfS if they do not match existing CfS (from 

step 1A). The CVs become DPs to be arranged together 

with their effects on the adversary’s strategic LOOs. These 

effects must add together to achieve the desired effects in 

the COG.

Step 3. Preconflict Friendly and Victim

Grand Strategies

Part A of this step is to identify the victim’s and the 

United States’ current strategies to achieve the NSOs from 

step 2A. This model does not go further back and analyze 

how the strategies were decided, instead, the strategies are 

described by the preconflict actions/policies the adversary 

could observe. The adversary’s perspective on who decided 

the strategy was determined in step 2B’s analysis of the 

friendly’s strategic will COGs. 

Part B of this step is to identify and analyze the victim’s 

and the United States’ strategic ability COGs supporting 

their strategies. The strategic ability COGs are the agency(s)/

force(s) or component(s), thereof responsible for the main 

effort(s) in the strategy. The COG’s critical capabilities are 

the essential tasks it has in regards to this strategy.

For part C of this step, repeat part C of step 2, except 

for the adversary’s perspective of the identified friendly and 

victim ability COG(s).

Step 4. The Adversary Grand Strategy

Part A of this step is to assess the adversary’s strategy. 

This is the hardest part and requires a deep knowledge 

and understanding of the adversary’s leadership to 

succeed—qualities like their culture, how they think, or 

how they have acted historically.53 Assess the adversary’s 

most likely and most dangerous strategic courses of action 

(COA) by arranging the DPs with desired effects identified 

in steps 1–3, in different strategic LOOs.54 The effects in 

the DPs should combine to achieve the desired effect in 

the COGs. Assess whether any adversary CfSs remain 

unfulfilled when the adversary has achieved the desired 

02-Article.indd 16 8/5/09 3:22:07 
17

effect in the United States’ and the victim’s COGs. Often 

there will be other required effects, like stabilization and 

reconstruction (or ethnic cleansing), before the adversary 

reaches the desired end state. Develop these remaining 

effects into DPs and arrange them as well on the adversary’s 

LOOs—and again, different COAs might require different 

effects. COAs might differ by the COGs and DPs they focus 

on, the means used, the risk involved, and so forth. The 

COAs must include the specified tasks for each relevant 

adversary government agency responsible for achieving 

the desired effect in the DPs.

Part B of this step is to identify and analyze the adversary’s 

strategic ability COG(s) critical to each COA. There might be 

different COGs for different phases of the COAs.

Part C of this step is to assess the adversary’s desired 

effects, for each COA, in the identified ability COGs’ CRs, 

in order to protect the COG(s) (as in step 1C). Update the 

adversary COA with the resulting DPs/effects. 

Step 5. Conflict-specific National 

Strategic Objectives

Part A of this step is to analyze from a US perspective 

and develop US conflict-specific NSOs. Faced with the 

adversary’s presumed intent described in a most likely and 

a most dangerous COA, the United States must establish

NSOs (with CfS and MOEs) that deal with the adversary’s 

aggressions as well as support the preconflict US NSOs 

from step 2A (unless a friendly policy change makes the 

preconflict NSOs obsolete). 

Part B of this step is to validate the US strategic will 

COG, identified in step 2B, as the will COG for these NSOs. 

In other words, might the adversary’s actions in step 4 

result in a change in the US political leadership? Reanalyze the US will COG in relation to impact/effect from 

the adversary’s COAs and assess what value the will COG 

holds for the NSOs established in step 5A (like step 2B). 

Part C of this step is to update the adversary’s desired 

effects in the CVs, as necessary, and use new DPs/updated 

DPs to update the adversary’s COAs from step 4C. Furthermore, establish US desired effect in the US CRs in order 

to protect the US COG. These will be DPs on US strategic 

02-Article.indd 17 8/5/09 3:22:07 
18

LOOs. Last, revisit the adversary’s COGs (steps 1B and 4B) 

and establish the US desired effects in the COGs and the 

CVs. The desired effects in the COGs must support the US 

NSOs. Add them as CfS if they do not match existing CfS. 

The CVs become DPs that will be arranged together with 

their effects on the US strategic LOOs.

Step 6. The US Conflict-specific Grand Strategy

Part A of this step is to develop US strategic COAs by 

arranging DPs in different LOOs, as described in step 4A 

(adversary COAs).

Part B of this step is to identify and analyze the US 

strategic ability COG(s) critical to each COA. 

Part C of this step is to establish the US desired effects 

in the CRs, in order to protect the COG. These will be DPs 

on the US strategic LOOs, consequently, update the US 

LOOs. Additionally, assess the adversary’s desired effects 

in the US ability CVs. The CVs are potential DPs in the 

adversary’s counteraction COA sequels/branches. 

Step 7. The Adversary’s Counteraction

For part A of this step, take the adversary’s perspective 

again and assess the most likely and most dangerous 

adversary counteraction COAs to defeat the US strategy 

(the US reaction) by arranging DPs from steps 5 and 6 in 

LOOs. Update each of the adversary’s main COAs (step 4C) 

with counteraction branches and sequels representing 

the counteraction COAs. 

Part B of this step is to identify and analyze the adversary’s 

strategic ability COG(s) critical to each updated COA. There 

might be different COGs for different branches/sequels of 

the COAs.

Part C of this step is to assess the adversary’s desired 

effects in the CRs. These will be DPs on the adversary’s 

strategic LOOs; as a result, update the adversary’s COAs 

and LOOs from step 7A. Likewise, establish the US desired 

effects in the COG(s) and CVs. The desired effects in the 

COGs must support the US NSOs. Add them as CfS if they 

do not match existing CfS. The CVs are potential DPs in 

new US strategic branches and sequels.

02-Article.indd 18 8/5/09 3:22:07 
19

Step 8. The Friendly Counter-counteraction

This step is the US equivalent of step 7. Time and resources 

will determine how many iterations can be made—the more 

iterations, the higher fidelity of the analyses and the more 

branch and sequel plans will be available.

Step 9. The Operational Level 

The desired effects in the DPs on the US LOOs become 

specified tasks to the USG agencies and coalition partners. 

Develop the specified tasks to the USG agencies into (DIME) 

objectives, mainly by changing from active voice to passive. 

The objectives tasked to DOD are called military strategic 

objectives (MSO). Develop CfS and MOEs for each MSO. The 

other agencies should do the same for their objectives.

There are two kinds of adversary operational COGs 

(OCOG). The first are those critical strengths that the 

adversary can put between you and the achievement of 

the MSOs. They support an adversary branch plan in their 

overall operational strategy that will counter the friendly 

operational strategy. The others are the primary forces 

tasked with the adversary’s main effort at the operational 

level and can/will be different in different phases, branches, 

and sequels. Our OCOGs are determined in the same way. 

OCOGs can be strategic DPs or closely related to them.

Conclusion

Combatant commanders already use the COG concept 

when analyzing their operational environment (OE); however, 

this analysis is normally performed after the president has 

established the strategic objectives for the USG agencies. 

This defies the purpose of analyzing the strategic COGs: 

determining the adversary’s vulnerabilities to available 

instruments of power. This paper recommends that 

strategic COG analysis be done at the NSC level. Therefore, 

the NSC and all USG agencies involved in national security 

should use the proposed model. The model contributes to a 

shared understanding of the OE and provides an analytic 

framework for achieving the national strategic objectives 

with the best combination of the DIME instruments of 

power while ensuring the crucial linkage between NSOs and 

02-Article.indd 19 8/5/09 3:22:07 
20

the military campaign. The analysis model is challenging 

as it incorporates several series of actions, reactions, and 

counteractions, but the model must take into account the 

operational environment of the future which promises to be 

highly complex and dynamic. 

Refining the operational design does not stop when the 

strategy is executed. Rather, it is a continuous, iterative 

process where it is crucial to find the anomalies in the 

adversary’s behavior—deviations from the expected––rather 

than looking for confirmation. The devil is often in the 

details—the small anomalies might be the tip of an iceberg 

that could wreck the whole plan, if one does not recognize 

them for what they are and adjust the strategy and plan 

accordingly. Therefore, looking for anomalies rather than 

confirmation is a crucial mind-set difference required for 

successfully executing the plan produced by the model.

Unity of effort among all USG agencies is not achieved 

by introducing a common analysis model only, but it is an 

important step. Proper training in the concepts and tools 

of operational design will be necessary for all involved 

departments and agencies. It is the final recommendation 

that an interagency NSC level planning exercise test and 

evaluate the proposed model. 

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see appropriate 

entry in the Bibliography.)

1. Sun Tzu, Art of War, 84.

2. Department of Defense (DOD), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint 

Operations, II-9.

3. Herbst, “Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.”

4. JP 3-0, I-16.

5. JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, I-15.

6. Ibid., IV-4.

7. Sun Tzu, The Art of War.

8. Gray, “Irregular Enemies,” 54.

9. Ibid., 51–52.

10. Strange and Iron, “Understanding Centers of Gravity,” part 2, 7.

11. Ibid., 1. “The source of power that provides moral or physical 

strength, freedom of action, or will to act. JP 1-02.”

12. JP 5-0, IV-10.

13. Ibid., IV-15.

14. Ibid., IV-8, IV-15.

02-Article.indd 20 8/5/09 3:22:08 
21

15. Air Force Doctrine Document 2 (AFDD 2), Operations and 

organization, 7.

16. Pape, Bombing to Win, 12.

17. Ibid., 16.

18. AFDD 2, 8.

19. Pape, Bombing to Win, 12–13, 16.

20. AFDD 2, 7.

21. Johnson, Learning Large Lessons, 65, 110–11; Pape, Bombing to 

Win, 178–79, 189–92; and Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower, 125–27.

22. Hinde, George Canning, 175; and Christiansen, “War with England.”

23. Clodfelter, Limits of Air Power, 114–15.

24. Johnson, Learning Large Lessons, 83–86.

25. Pape, Bombing to Win, 2–56, 260–62, 311–13. 

26. Ibid., 89, 134–36. 

27. Ibid., 189, 193–95.

28. Ibid., 10.

29. AFDD 2, 7.

30. Ibid., 5.

31. Clausewitz, On War, 617.

32. Ibid.

33. Read Dr. Joe Strange and Dale C. Eikmeier for a more detailed 

discussion on centers of gravity in Strange and Iron, “Understanding 

Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities,” part 2; and Eikmeier, “A 

Logical Method.”

34. Clausewitz, On War, 75.

35. Ibid., 596; and ACSC WS-510 Lecture, 6 November 2007.

36. Strange and Iron, “Understanding Centers of Gravity,” part 2, 5–7.

37. Ibid., 7.

38. Ibid., 8.

39. JP 5-0, IV-8.

40. Ibid., IV-11.

41. Strange and Iron, “Understanding Centers of Gravity,” parts 1

and 2; Eikmeier, “A Logical Method”; and Kem, Campaign Planning.

42. JP 5-0, IV-15.

43. Ibid., III-12–III-18.

44. AFDD 2, 85–86, 89–90.

45. JP 5-0, III-15.

46. NATO, Allied Joint Publication 5, 3–13.

47. AFDD 2, 95.

48. JP 5-0, GL-18.

49. Ibid., III-11.

50. Ibid., III-60–III-63.

51. United States Joint Forces Command, Commander’s Handbook, 

III-4–III-6.

52. JP 5-0, IV-16–IV-19.

53. Ibid., IV-14.

54. Ibid., IV-22.

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02-Article.indd 22 8/5/09 3:22:08 
23

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