Filed 5/20/22 In re Savannah J. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re SAVANNAH J., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B312284

 (Los Angeles County Super. 

 Ct. No. 18CCJP01137)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Gelene C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.

Zaragoza Law Office and Gina Zaragoza, under 

appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.
2

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________

Gelene C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order

terminating her parental rights over 13-year-old Savannah J. 

Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the beneficial 

parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights 

did not apply. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Dependency Petition 

On February 21, 2018 the Los Angeles County Department 

of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a dependency 

petition on behalf of then-nine-year-old Savannah alleging Father 

(D.J.) emotionally, physically, and sexually abused Savannah and 

Mother failed to protect Savannah from Father’s abuse. Further, 

Mother had a history of drug abuse and currently abused 

marijuana and alcohol, which rendered her unable to provide 

regular care for Savannah.

B. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing 

At the March 18, 2019 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, 

the juvenile court sustained the amended allegations1 under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), 

1 The petition was amended by interlineation on May 18, 

2019 to add allegations Mother currently abused PCP. 
3

(c), and (d),2 declared Savannah a dependent of the court, and 

removed Savannah from Mother’s and Father’s custody. The 

court ordered Mother to participate in counseling and a drug 

rehabilitation program, and to submit to random or on demand 

drug and alcohol testing every other week. The court granted

Mother monitored visitation up to three times a week. Father 

was incarcerated, and the court ordered that he and Savannah

have no contact. 

C. Mother’s Visitation in 2019

The August 22, 2019 status review report stated Mother 

inconsistently visited with Savannah. On one occasion Mother 

cancelled the visit. On another visit Mother was 45 minutes late. 

In the September 16, 2019 last minute information for the court, 

the Department reported, “Mother continues to struggle with 

visitation . . . . Mother is constantly late for the majority of her 

visits and at times, [M]other is not able to visit because of work 

obligations or for other reasons, such as to stay home to receive a 

package.” 

In the November 12, 2019 last minute information for the 

court, the Department reported as to recent visits Mother was 

late once and cancelled once. During a visit on October 22, 2019,

Mother told the social worker the visit was “‘boring,’” although 

she did not end the visit. Mother admitted to the social worker 

that she had “‘told Savannah the [Father] has an Instagram

[account].’” Mother added, “‘I don’t understand why y’all making 

a big deal about it. It happened so long ago.’” When the social 

2 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
4

worker told Mother that she was not to discuss Father with 

Savannah, Mother stated she did not “see the harm it could have 

done to Savannah.” The caregiver later informed the social 

worker that Savannah had been using Instagram to send 

messages to Father. 

On November 6, 2019 the social worker interviewed Mother 

by phone about her recent visit with Savannah. Mother reported 

Savannah plays on Mother’s phone often during their visits. 

When the social worker asked whether Savannah communicated 

with Father over Instagram during their visits, Mother replied, 

“‘[W]ell I showed her his pictures on Instagram.’” 

At the November 12, 2019 review hearing, the juvenile 

court found Mother had not made substantial progress toward 

alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating Savannah’s 

placement. The court terminated family reunification services for 

Mother and reduced Mother’s visitation to two times per month. 

D. Mother’s Visitation in 2020 

The Department’s October 19, 2020 status report described 

Mother’s visitation with Savannah in 2020. On January 7 

Mother arrived 15 minutes late for her visit with Savannah. 

Mother gave Savannah some Christmas gifts, and the two played 

basketball and talked. Mother ended the visit after two and a 

half hours, although the social worker indicated the visit could 

have been extended. 

On February 14 Mother arrived 30 minutes late for her 

visit with Savannah. Mother explained the bus was late, and she 

apologized. Mother brought Savannah food Mother had 

prepared, and the two played, jumped rope, and took a 

photograph together. On February 28 Mother arrived one hour 
5

late to her visit. Mother brought a new pair of shoes for 

Savannah, and the two jumped rope and talked. The visit lasted 

45 minutes.

On March 13 Mother arrived on time for her visit. Mother 

brought a coloring book and crayons for Savannah. When 

Savannah told Mother she was hungry, Mother bought a 

hamburger for her from a nearby stand. 

The social worker attempted from April to October 2020 to 

contact Mother regarding visitation, but Mother did not respond. 

On April 9 Savannah reported she and Mother were calling each 

other on the phone and the conversations were going well. In 

May Savannah stated “her caregiver is loving, supportive, [and] 

treats her like family, and Savannah sees the caregiver as a 

mother.” Savannah wanted to continue to stay with her 

caregiver. 

On July 15 Savannah reported she visited Mother at the 

caregiver’s beauty shop while the caregiver styled Mother’s hair 

for Mother’s birthday. The social worker asked Savannah to tell 

Mother to contact the social worker. Savannah’s caregiver 

reported that prior to the COVID-19 pandemic Mother was 

consistently visiting with Savannah, but since the pandemic 

started, Mother was having only weekly telephone contact with 

Savannah. Mother told Savannah she wanted to visit, but 

Mother had not contacted the Department or answered the social 

worker’s calls. The social worker again asked Savannah to tell 

Mother to contact her. Savannah told the social worker she “was 

excited about being adopted by her current caregiver.” 

On September 23 Savannah reported she spoke with 

Mother “from time to time,” and she wanted to visit with Mother. 

The social worker explained to Savannah she was not able to 
6

reach Mother. The caregiver stated Mother “calls sporadically,” 

and the caregiver told Mother numerous times to contact the 

social worker. 

On November 9 the juvenile court ordered the Department 

to facilitate birthday and holiday visits between Mother and 

Savannah and to assess more frequent visits for Mother. 

According to the February 5, 2021 last minute information for the 

court, Mother visited Savannah one additional time in November 

2020. Mother did not visit Savannah again prior to the March 

12, 2021 selection and implementation hearing.

E. The Selection and Implementation Hearing 

At the March 12, 2021 selection and implementation 

hearing (§ 366.26), Mother’s attorney appeared on behalf of 

Mother. The Department’s and Savannah’s attorneys requested 

the court find Savannah adoptable and terminate Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights. Savannah’s attorney noted Savannah 

was doing very well in the caretaker’s home and at school. He 

added, “Mother has not had an in-person visit in quite sometime, 

. . . [and Mother] still has not contacted the social worker to set 

up those visits.” Savannah’s attorney noted Mother had not had 

a visit since Savannah’s birthday (in November), and stated, “I 

believe at this time that the court cannot find that any of the 

exceptions to adoption apply and I would ask that the court 

terminate parental rights to [Mother].” Mother’s attorney 

objected to termination of Mother’s parental rights and asserted, 

“While Savannah has gone through a lot, she is much older than 

most of the children we have. My understanding is that 

[Savannah] does want to be adopted; however, I do think that she 

would do best to stay in contact with [Mother] . . . .” 
7

The court found no exception to adoption applied, 

explaining, “I find it would be detrimental to Savannah to be 

returned to the parents. . . . Mother hasn’t been visiting in 

person, although that has been made available to her, and 

Mother was never able to prove herself protective. She couldn’t 

grasp the risks that she had created by encouraging contact with 

the Father and she wasn’t able to progress in understanding how 

to protect her daughter.” The juvenile court found Savannah was 

adoptable by clear and convincing evidence and terminated 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. 

Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

A. The Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception

“At the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away from 

family reunification and toward the selection and implementation 

of a permanent plan for the child.” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th

529, 532; accord, In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630

(Caden C.).) “‘Once the court determines the child is likely to be 

adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show that termination 

of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of 

the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1).’” (In re 

B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224-1225 (B.D.); accord, In re 

Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“court must order adoption 

and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, 

unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling 

reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to the child”].)
8

Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), “the parent 

may avoid termination of parental rights” if the parent 

establishes by a preponderance of the evidence “that the parent 

has regularly visited with the child, that the child would benefit 

from continuing the relationship, and that terminating the 

relationship would be detrimental to the child. [Citations.] The 

language of this exception, along with its history and place in the 

larger dependency scheme, show that the exception applies in 

situations where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but 

where severing the child’s relationship with the parent, even 

when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home,

would be harmful for the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 629-630; accord, B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225.)

A parent has regular visitation and contact when the 

parent “‘visit[s] consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent 

permitted by court orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 632; accord, In re I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201, 212.) 

Whether “‘the child would benefit from continuing the 

relationship’” with his or her parent is shaped by factors “such as 

‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the 

parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction 

between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” 

(Caden C., at p. 632; accord, B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1225.) “‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship would 

deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment 

such that,’ even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, 

termination would ‘harm[]’ the child, the court should not 

terminate parental rights.” (Caden C., at p. 633.) “While 

application of the beneficial parental relationship exception rests 

on a variety of factual determinations properly reviewed for 
9

substantial evidence, the ultimate decision that termination 

would be harmful is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” 

(Id. at p. 630; accord, B.D., at p. 1225.)

 

B. We Decline To Find Forfeiture

The Department contends Mother forfeited her argument 

the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining the 

beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply by failing 

to argue at the selection and implementation hearing that the 

exception applied, instead making only “a general objection” to 

termination of Mother’s parental rights. Although Mother’s 

attorney did not specifically argue the beneficial parental 

relationship exception applied, we decline to find forfeiture.

“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge 

to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in 

the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; accord, 

In re Maria Q. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 577, 590 [“‘A party forfeits 

the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he 

or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court.’”].) Moreover, 

“[g]eneral objections are insufficient to preserve issues for review. 

[Citation.] The objection must state the ground or grounds upon 

which the objection is based.” (In re E.A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 

787, 790; accord, In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 

672.) “‘The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring 

errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be 

corrected.’” (Daniel B., at p. 672.)

At the selection and implementation hearing, Mother’s 

attorney objected to the termination of Mother’s parental rights, 

asserting that because of Savannah’s age she “would do best to 

stay in contact with [Mother] . . . .” As discussed, the age of the 
10

child is a relevant factor in determining whether the child would 

benefit from continuing the relationship with his or her parent. 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632; B.D., supra, 

66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225.) Further, the juvenile court

specifically addressed the beneficial parental relationship 

exception, finding Mother had not been visiting in person despite 

the opportunity and Mother failed to apprehend the danger 

Father posed to Savannah. Although neither Mother’s attorney 

nor the juvenile court uttered the words “beneficial parental 

relationship exception,” the record makes clear the juvenile court 

understood Mother’s attorney to be relying on the exception, as 

shown by the juvenile court’s response to Mother’s objection to 

termination of her parental rights that Mother failed regularly to 

visit, a necessary condition for application of the exception. 

(Caden C., at p. 632.) Under these circumstances, we decline to 

find forfeiture. (See In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293 

[“application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic”]; Unzueta v. 

Akopyan (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 199, 215 [“‘[N]either forfeiture 

nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic.’”].) 

C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding 

the Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception Did Not 

Apply

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

finding the beneficial parental relationship exception did not 

apply because Mother regularly visited Savannah and the court 

failed to analyze the other two prongs of the exception articulated 

in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 629. The Department 

contends substantial evidence supports the court’s finding on 

visitation because Mother failed regularly to visit with Savannah 
11

before Mother’s parental right were terminated, and the court 

was not required to address the other prongs of the exception. 

The Department has the better argument.

Contrary to Mother’s contention, Mother had to show all 

three prongs were met for the beneficial parental relationship 

exception to apply. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 629 [for 

beneficial parental relationship exception to apply, parent must 

show regular visitation, benefit to the child from continuing the 

relationship, and that termination of the relationship would be 

detrimental to the child]; B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225 

[same].) A lack of regular visitation “fatally undermines any 

attempt to find the beneficial parental relationship exception.” 

(In re I.R., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 212 [juvenile court did 

not abuse its discretion in finding beneficial parental relationship 

exception did not apply where it was undisputed “there were 

significant lapses” in mother’s visitation]; accord, In re 

J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 531 [juvenile court did not 

abuse its discretion in finding exception did not apply where the

mother missed five visits in the six weeks preceding the hearing 

and there was a “troubling manner of [m]other’s cancellations 

and pattern of changing her plans last minute”]; In re C.F. (2011) 

193 Cal.App.4th 549, 554 [juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding exception did not apply where “overall 

[mother’s] visitation was sporadic,” including visiting only three 

times in a three-month period despite court order allowing

weekly visitation].) 

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that Mother failed to show regular visitation to the extent 

permitted by court orders. As the juvenile court observed, 

“Mother hasn’t been visiting in person, although that has been 
12

made available to her.” The record shows Mother visited 

Savannah in person only twice in the year proceeding the 

selection and implementation hearing (once in July as the 

caregiver styled Mother’s hair and a second time in November 

2020). On appeal, Mother asserts only that “regular phone 

contact continued” during this period. But even Mother’s phone 

contact was “sporadic[,]” and Savannah stated as of September 

2020 that she spoke to Mother “from time to time.” Regardless, 

regular phone contact does not constitute visitation to the extent 

permitted by the court’s visitation order, which allowed in-person 

visits twice a month. Although Mother may well have been 

limited in her ability to have in-person contact at the start of the 

COVID-19 pandemic, as of July 15, 2020 Mother had an inperson visit with Savannah, yet she only visited Savannah one 

time during the eight months leading up to the March 2021 

selection and implementation hearing.

Moreover, the social worker repeatedly contacted Mother to 

set up visits, but Mother failed to return the calls. The caregiver 

(and likely Savannah) also told Mother to call the social worker 

to arrange visits. Mother provides no explanation for her failure 

to contact the Department to arrange visitation. Given the lack 

of regular visitation during the year leading up to the selection 

and implementation hearing, the juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding the beneficial parental relationship 

exception did not apply.
13

DISPOSITION

The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed. 

FEUER, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.