IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10579

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL; ET AL

Defendants

LAWRENCE J WARFIELD, Receiver

Counter Defendant-Appellee

v.

CHASE BANK NA

Counter Claimant

CHARLES KELLY OLSEN

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:02-CV-605

Before JOLLY, GARZA, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 9, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-10579

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

1 SEC v. Resource Development Int’l, Docket No. 3:02-CV-0605 (N.D. Tex.). Charles

Kelly Olsen, the appellant here, is a non-party to the SEC’s proceeding against RDI.

2

PER CURIAM:*

This case is ancillary to a Securities and Exchange Commission

enforcement proceeding against Resource Development International, LLC, and

numerous other entities (collectively, “RDI”) for violating federal securities laws

by controlling and operating an illegal Ponzi scheme.1 The United States

District Court for the Northern District of Texas created a receivership estate

for RDI’s assets and appointed Lawrence Warfield, an appellee here, as receiver.

In his capacity as receiver, Warfield traced $1,372,680.29 of RDI assets to

Charles Kelly Olsen, appellant here; and the district court demanded that Olsen

turn over these assets to the receivership estate. Olsen refused. The district

court found Olsen to be in civil contempt of court, and he spent twenty-six

months detained in the U.S. Marshals’ custody while he continued to refuse

either to turn over the assets or to provide an accounting of them to Warfield. 

In November 2007, Warfield petitioned the district court to release Olsen

from custody, concluding his incarceration had lost its coercive effect. The

district court ordered Olsen released. Olsen remains in contempt of court, but

no sanction attaches to his continuing contempt. Despite the absence of any

continuing sanction, Olsen appeals from a May 2007 order in which the district

court refused to purge his civil contempt. Olsen also challenges a default

judgment against him that stems from the underlying litigation against RDI.

We lack jurisdiction over both aspects of Olsen’s appeal. Accordingly, we

DISMISS.

I.
No. 07-10579

3

In March 2002, the SEC filed a securities enforcement proceeding against

RDI in which the SEC alleged RDI controlled and operated an illegal Ponzi

scheme. The SEC requested, and the district court granted, that RDI’s assets

be placed in a receivership estate to safeguard them on behalf of the Ponzi

scheme’s defrauded investors. The district court appointed Warfield as receiver.

Warfield assumed control over RDI’s books and records within hours of receiving

the district court’s receivership order, and he used them to investigate the

location of RDI’s assets. 

By July 2003, Warfield had accumulated records indicating that Olsen

received $1,040,381 in RDI assets that originated from defrauded investors. On

Warfield’s motion, the district court ordered Olsen to turn over this sum to the

receivership estate. Olsen did not comply with this order. Warfield continued

to investigate the location of RDI’s assets, and he was able to trace more RDI

assets to Olsen. In May 2004, Warfield obtained a default judgment on behalf

of the receivership estate against Olsen for $1,372,680.29. Warfield v. Byron et

al., Civil Case No. 3:02-CV-1371 (N.D. Tex. May 26, 2004).

Olsen did not pay any of the money due. In March 2005, as part of the

underlying litigation against RDI, Warfield and the SEC jointly filed for Olsen

to show cause why the court should not hold him in contempt. The court granted

the motion, and it scheduled the “show cause” hearing for the next month. Olsen

attended the hearing, but he did not show sufficient cause for not complying with

the court’s orders to avoid contempt. The court remanded him into the custody

ofthe United States Marshals Service,to be detained until he either turned over

$1,372,680.29 to Warfield or provided Warfield with an accounting that traced

“all transfers of Receivership Assets into, between, and out of accounts over

which Mr. Olsen exercises control and provides bank documents showing such

transfers . . . and showing that such funds are no longer in his possession or

control . . . .” 
No. 07-10579

2 Olsen also asks this court to vacate the district court’s April 2005 order finding Olsen

to be in contempt, the district court’s March 2002 temporary restraining order, preliminary

injunction, and order appointing temporary receiver. We will refer to these orders collectively

as the district court’s “past orders.”

4

Olsen arranged a deposition that May to purge himself of contempt, but

his admissions in the deposition fell short ofthe court’s conditions for his release.

He admitted to having received RDI assets, but he neither turned over the funds

nor provided Warfield with a full accounting of them. Over the next seventeen

months, Olsen filed numerous motions to purge himself of contempt. The

district court in each instance found that Olsen had not met either of its

conditions to purge contempt, and it accordingly denied relief.

This appeal arises from a May 2007 contempt status hearing that the

district court held for Olsen. At the hearing, Olsen argued he was unable to

comply with the court’s order to turn over $1,372,680.29 or to provide an

accounting of it. The court issued an order continuing Olsen’s contempt, and it

remanded him back into the U.S. Marshals’ custody. Olsen timely filed a notice

of appeal. He requested, and received, several deadline extensions for filing his

opening appellate brief; and he did not file it until January 2008.

In the meantime, Warfield reported to the district court that Olsen’s

incarceration had lost its coercive effect. The district court ordered Warfield

released from incarceration in November 2007. The court did not purge Olsen

of contempt, but neither did the court attach sanctions to Olsen’s continuing

contempt. Thus, though Olsen continues to be in civil contempt of court, no

sanction attaches to his continuing contempt. Olsen persists in his appeal from

the district court’s May 2007 order continuing contempt despite the absence of

any sanction.2 Olsen appeals pro se.

II.

Because Olsen appeals pro se, we construe his briefs liberally. Johnson v.

Quarterman, 479 F.3d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
No. 07-10579

3

In its entirety, this confused passage of Olsen’s opening appellate brief states, 

To get jurisdiction over Appellant Olsen, a summons is required to bring him

into the court’s jurisdiction. Petitions do not bring individuals into the court’s

jurisdiction. Appellant OLSEN has only been named in a petition. However,

sanctions were imposed and Appellant OLSEN was incarcerated for 26 months,

thereby giving him standing to appeal to this Court.

Though this passage appears on its face to address the district court’s jurisdiction over

5

519, 520 (1972)). Construing Olsen’s briefs liberally, he raises three issues on

appeal: (1) whether the district court’s May 2007 order continuing Olsen’s

contempt was proper, (2) whether several ofthe district court’s past orders in the

underlying litigation were proper, and (3) whether the district court’s May 2004

entry of default judgment against Olsen in the case Warfield v. Byron et al. was

proper. Though Olsen raises many arguments to support the substance of his

challenges, we may not consider those arguments unless we properly may

exercise jurisdiction. 

We may not properly exercise jurisdiction over Olsen’s challenges to the

district court’s past orders or to the default judgment entered against him in

Warfield v. Byron et al., Civil Case No. 3:02-CV-1371 (N.D. Tex. May 26, 2004).

“In a civil case . . . the notice of appeal . . . must be filed with the district clerk

within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.” FED. R.

APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The district court’s entries of the orders from which Olsen

appeals date to March 2002 and April 2005. The district court’s entry of default

judgment in Warfield v. Byron et al. dates to May 2004. Olsen did not file notice

of the present appeal from the orders and defaultjudgment until May 2007. His

appeal is therefore untimely.

We also may not properly exercise jurisdiction over Olsen’s challenge to

the district court’s May 2007 order continuing his contempt. Construing Olsen’s

briefs liberally, he argues this court may exercise jurisdiction because “sanctions

were imposed and Appellant OLSEN was incarcerated for 26 months . . . .”3In
No. 07-10579

Olsen and Olsen’s standing to appeal, to avoid waiver against a pro se litigant we construe the

passage as raising an argument in favor of this court’s jurisdiction over Olsen’s appeal. 

4 Warfield also argues that the district court’s order continuing Olsen’s contempt was

interlocutory and not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We do not need to reach this issue

to hold that Olsen’s appeal is not properly before us, and we reserve judgment on the matter.

6

opposition to this court’s exercise of jurisdiction, Warfield argues Olsen’s appeal

is moot because the district court superseded its May 2007 order continuing

contempt with a contempt order in November 2007 to which no sanction

attaches.4“The latest order, releasing Olsen from incarceration,” Warfield

asserts,“supersedes all prior orders related to Olsen’s contempt and accordingly

moots the prior sanctions.” As authority for this line of argument, Warfield cites

Rosenfeldt v. Comprehensive Serv. Corp., 514 F.2d 607, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1975)

(Stevens, J.). For related support, Warfield also cites Spencer v. Kemna, 523

U.S. 1, 17-18 (1988).

Warfield’s reliance on Rosenfeldt is misplaced, but Olsen’s appeal

nevertheless is moot. In Rosenfeldt, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit considered whether two contempt orders against a party to the

underlying litigation were appealable. The first contempt order involved prison

time and a fine, but the district court vacated the order before the contemnor

served any of the sentence or paid any of the fine. The appellate court held the

contempt order moot. 514 F.2d at 611. The second contempt order, which the

court did not hold to be moot, was non-appealable because the order was civil in

nature and the contemnor was a party to the underlying litigation. Id. at 612

(quoting Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936)). The Seventh Circuit’s

reasoning in Rosenfeldt is inapposite here because Olsen, unlike the appellant

Rosenfeldt, spent twenty-six months in the U.S. Marshals’ custody and is a nonparty to the underlying litigation. 
No. 07-10579

7

Nevertheless, Olsen’s appeal from the district court’s May 2007 order

continuing contemptis moot. Though Olsen spent twenty-six months in the U.S.

Marshals’ custody, no sanction attaches to his continuing civil contempt. Olsen

does not allege thatthe mere continuation of contempt, without sanction, injures

him. Yet such an injury must exist for Olsen’s appeal to present a case or

controversy for this court to adjudicate. Cf. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7

(1988) (“Once [a] convict’s sentence has expired . . . some concrete and continuing

injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole—some ‘collateral

consequence’ of the conviction—must exist if the suit is to be maintained.”).

Because the district court’s sanctions against Olsen have ended and he does not

allege injury from his continuing contempt, we must either presume injury or

dismiss the appeal. 

We decline to presume that the district court’s May 2007 order continuing

civil contempt presents Olsen with “collateral consequences” sufficient to meet

Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement. To hold otherwise would put this court

at odds with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Spencer. In Spencer,the Court

declined to presume that collateral consequences adequate to meet Article III's

injury-in-fact requirement resulted from a court’s revocation of a convicted

felon’s parole. 523 U.S. at 14. As the Court reasoned, though the revocation of

parole might affect an individual’s “employment prospects, or the sentence

imposed . . . in a future criminal proceeding,” such “nonstatutory consequences”

are insufficient to bring an appeal from the revocation of parole within the

courts’ Article III power because the consequences are “dependent upon [t]he

discretionary decisions . . . made by an employer or a sentencing judge, which

are not governed by the mere presence or absence of a recorded violation of

parole. Id. at 13 (quoting Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). The mere presence of a criminal conviction, by

contrast, can disable an individual from engaging in certain business, holding
No. 07-10579

8

certain offices, voting in state elections, and serving as a juror. See, e.g., Carafas

v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968). 

Similar to an order revoking parole, an order continuing civil contempt

does not entail the kind of collateral consequences that a criminal conviction

entails. See Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1985) (conjecturing that,

had criminal contemnors’ contempt been civil in nature and “had confinement

been the only sanction imposed, . . .the controversy would have ended when they

purged themselves of the contempt or, for other reasons, were released from

custody.”). We therefore decline to presume an order continuing civil contempt,

without sanction, yields collateral consequences sufficient to meet Article III’s

injury-in-fact requirement. Olsen’s appeal from the district court’s May 2007

order continuing his contempt is moot.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, Olsen’s appeal is

DISMISSED.