Office of Inspector General | United States Postal Service

Audit Report

Use of Postal Service Network to 

Facilitate Illicit Drug Distribution

Report Number SAT-AR-18-002 | September 28, 2018 
Table of Contents

Cover

Highlights......................................................................................................................................1

Objective..................................................................................................................................1

What the OIG Found..........................................................................................................1

What the OIG Recommended........................................................................................2

Transmittal Letter .....................................................................................................................3

Results............................................................................................................................................4

Introduction/Objective......................................................................................................4

Background............................................................................................................................4

A Growing Problem.............................................................................................................5

The Origin of Opioid Addictions.............................................................................5

The Internet and Illicit Drugs....................................................................................6

The Flow of Illicit Drugs Through the Postal Service Network..................7

Current Efforts to Combat Illicit Drugs................................................................10

Finding #1: Limited Ability to Open and Inspect

Suspected Packages ..........................................................................................................11

Recommendation #1....................................................................................................12

Finding #2: Penalties for Mailing Illicit Drugs...........................................................12

Recommendation #2...................................................................................................12

Finding #3: Need for a Unified, Organization-Wide Strategy .........................12

Recommendation #3...................................................................................................13

Finding #4: Enriching Data Analytics to Identify

Suspect Mailpieces .............................................................................................................14

Recommendation #4...................................................................................................14

Finding #5: Enhancing the Security and Isolation of

Suspected Packages...........................................................................................................14

Recommendation #5...................................................................................................15

Finding #6: Risk of Employee Collusion with Drug Traffickers........................15

Recommendation #6...................................................................................................16

Finding #7: Oversight of Commercial Mail Receiving Agencies.....................16

Recommendation #7...................................................................................................18

Management’s Comments...............................................................................................18

Evaluation of Management’s Comments...................................................................19

Appendices .................................................................................................................................22

Appendix A: Additional Information ...........................................................................23

Scope and Methodology............................................................................................23

Prior Audit Coverage...................................................................................................25

Appendix B: The Law Regarding Package Inspection in the Mail..................26

Current Law.....................................................................................................................26

History of the Warrant Requirement....................................................................27

Regulatory and Legislative Efforts to Combat Drug

Trafficking Through the Mail.....................................................................................28

Appendix C: Management’s Comments ....................................................................30

Contact Information................................................................................................................37

Use of Postal Service Network to Facilitate Illicit Drug Distribution

Report Number SAT-AR-18-002
Highlights

Objective

This report responds to a request from Senator Claire McCaskill, Ranking 

Member, U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. 

Based on the request, our objectives were to examine the role of the U.S. 

Postal Service network in facilitating illicit drug distribution, explore associated 

risks and vulnerabilities in the system, and identify opportunities to mitigate 

those risks.

The growth of ecommerce in the last 10 years has dramatically increased the 

volume of packages arriving in and traveling throughout the U.S. The internet 

has increased the availability of illicit drugs in the U.S. because it offers drug 

traffickers and buyers a degree of anonymity and ease of access.

The Postal Service has long used the U.S. Postal Inspection Service’s (USPIS) 

narcotics program to detect and deter against illicit drugs in the postal network 

by investigating individuals attempting to use the mail to traffic drugs. USPIS 

drug seizures have been on the rise since fiscal year (FY) 2014, with over 

40,000 pounds seized in FY 2017.

Online drug traffickers typically send packages via a shipping provider, including 

the Postal Service, and have become familiar enough with the postal network 

to exploit it. Advantages to using the Postal Service as a shipper rather than 

a private carrier include the inability of the Postal Service to open packages 

without a search warrant and its obligation to accept inbound international mail, 

regardless of the package information provided before a shipment arrives in 

the U.S. This makes it more difficult for the Postal Service to identify and track 

packages suspected of containing illicit material. By comparison, private carriers 

operate their networks from beginning to end and collect the information related 

to all packages they process. 

What the OIG Found

The Postal Service has made efforts to combat the use of its network to facilitate 

illicit drug distribution, but vulnerabilities in the network remain, as evidenced by 

the continued use of the Postal Service network to deliver illicit drugs. 

International and domestic drug traffickers have identified, in their marketing to 

customers, that they use the Postal Service to distribute illicit drugs. In fact, of 

104 illicit drug websites we searched on the dark web that identified a shipper, 

92 percent (96) indicated they used the Postal Service. On the clear web, 

80 percent (16) of the 20 sites we visited provided guidance on how to ship illicit 

drugs instructed traffickers to use the Postal Service.

Continued vulnerabilities needing attention to deter the use of its network to 

facilitate illicit drug distribution include:

■ Private carriers are able to open and inspect packages they ship into the 

U.S., and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is authorized to 

open and inspect almost all international inbound packages. However, the 

Postal Service is generally prohibited from opening international and domestic 

mail, including packages.

■ Current federal sentencing guidelines do not require a distinct penalty for 

using the postal network to facilitate illicit drug distribution. 

■ Although many organizational efforts to address illicit drugs in the mail 

are underway, the Postal Service 

Use of Postal Service Network to Facilitate Illicit Drug Distribution

Report Number SAT-AR-18-002

1
■ Opportunities exist for the USPIS to enhance its data analytics to identify 

mailpieces for inspection that may contain illicit drugs. For example, the 

USPIS data model could be enhanced by integrating the results of package 

inspections to further refine its metrics.

■ The USPIS’s process for capturing packages from the mailstream is resourceintensive,

■ The amount of narcotics-related arrests by the Office of Inspector General 

. 

This indicates a need for the Postal Service to educate employees about the 

dangers of colluding with drug traffickers.

■ Commercial Mail Receiving Agencies (CMRA) are private businesses that 

enter into an agreement with the Postal Service to provide private mailbox 

services. In each of the 12 post offices and 20 CMRAs we judgmentally 

selected in states with high per capita drug overdose rates, Postal Service 

officials did not adhere to CMRA oversight policies and procedures. 

Specifically, postal employees at these locations did not review and maintain 

necessary documentation to verify and track CMRAs and their customers. 

Drug traffickers’ use of the Postal Service network to distribute illicit drugs 

domestically and internationally undermines the public’s trust, puts employees 

in harm’s way, and erodes the Postal Service brand.

What the OIG Recommended

We recommended management: 

■ Work with Congress to develop legislative changes that would authorize the 

USPIS to open and inspect packages suspected of containing illicit drugs.

■ Work with relevant executive agencies, such as the Department of Justice, 

and Congress to develop legislative changes that would establish separate 

and enhanced criminal penalties for using the postal network to distribute 

illicit drugs.

■ Designate an officer to consolidate existing efforts and lead the 

implementation of a unified, comprehensive strategy to combat the use of the 

postal network in facilitating illicit drug distribution.

■ Enhance USPIS’s data model to include integration of package 

inspection results. 

■ Establish a process to more efficiently divert packages suspected of 

containing illicit drugs to centralized inspection locations for evaluation in an 

isolated and secure environment. 

■

.

■ Institute a comprehensive, centralized, and automated program to increase 

adherence to existing CMRA procedures and improve existing policies. 

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Report Number SAT-AR-18-002

2
Transmittal 

Letter

September 28, 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR: MEGAN J. BRENNAN, POSTMASTER GENERAL

RONALD A. STROMAN, DEPUTY POSTMASTER 

GENERAL AND CHIEF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 

OFFICER

GUY COTTRELL, CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR

DAVID E. WILLIAMS, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER AND 

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

JEFFREY WILLIAMSON, CHIEF HUMAN RESOURCES

OFFICER AND EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT 

KELLY SIGMON, VICE PRESIDENT OF RETAIL AND 

CUSTOMER SERVICE 

 E-Signed by Inspector General

VERIFY authenticity with eSign Desktop

FROM: Darrell E. Benjamin, Jr.

Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Planning and 

Operations

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Use of the U.S. Postal Service

Network to Facilitate Illicit Drug Distribution –

(Report Number SAT-AR-18-002)

This report presents the results of our audit of the Use of the U.S. Postal Service’s 

Network to Facilitate Illicit Drug Distribution (Project Number 18POG003SAT000).

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff. If you have any 

questions or need additional information, please contact Lisa M. Nieman, Director, 

Strategic Assessment, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Corporate Audit Response Management

Use of Postal Service Network to Facilitate Illicit Drug Distribution

Report Number SAT-AR-18-002

3
Results

Introduction/Objective

This report presents the results of our audit on the role of the U.S. Postal Service 

network to facilitate illicit drug distribution (Project Number 18POG003SAT000). 

The report responds to a request from Senator Claire McCaskill, Ranking 

Member, U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. 

Our objectives were to examine the role of the network in facilitating illicit drug 

distribution, explore associated risks and vulnerabilities in the system, and identify 

opportunities to mitigate those risks. Specifically, the congressional request 

asked us to:

■ Review current efforts to screen packages for illicit drugs shipped through 

the Postal Service, including how the Postal Service and other organizations 

share data and any challenges they face; 

■ Address differences in laws, regulations, and procedures governing the 

Postal Service that may make it more susceptible than private carriers are to 

illicit drug trafficking; and

■ Describe limitations and vulnerabilities in the Postal Service network and 

postal policies, including:

● Constraints on the quantity, reliability, and use of data to detect illicit drugs; 

● Employee involvement and collusion in drug trafficking, as well as efforts to 

mitigate this vulnerability; and

● Requirements associated with Commercial Mail Receiving Agencies 

(CMRA),1 along with the Postal Service’s oversight of CMRAs.

1 CMRAs are private companies, such as UPS, that accept mail on behalf of its customers and make that mail available to customers via a private mailbox.

2 U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales, May 17, 2018.

3 Worldwide Retail and Ecommerce Sales: eMarketer’s estimates 2016-2012, July 18, 2017.

4 International Trade Administration, China – eCommerce.

5 United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities In International Mail,” (PSI Report), 

January 23, 2018.

Background

The growth of ecommerce in the last 10 years has dramatically increased the 

volume of packages shipped to and within the U.S. Ecommerce sales made up 

nearly one-tenth of all retail sales in the U.S. in the first quarter of fiscal year (FY) 

2018.2 Internationally, ecommerce is also growing, with worldwide sales expected 

to reach $4.5 trillion by 2021.3 China is now the world’s largest ecommerce 

market, contributing over 40 percent of global ecommerce spending.4

The growth in ecommerce includes more than the sale of household items. 

Buying and selling illicit substances is increasingly a digital transaction. The 

internet has significantly increased the availability of illicit drugs directly to 

consumers in the U.S. because it offers drug traffickers and buyers a degree of 

anonymity and ease of access.5 Drug traffickers, particularly those who use the 

internet to run their businesses, are also increasingly using package shipping 

providers to transport their products.

The Postal Service continues, as it has done for more than 200 years, to play a 

vital role in American commerce and bind the nation together through secure, 

reliable, affordable, and universal mail delivery. In FY 2017, the Postal Service 

delivered 150 billion mailpieces through over 34,000 facilities to nearly 157 million 

addresses. The Postal Service has consistently been ranked as the country’s 

most trusted government agency.

However, drug traffickers have familiarized themselves with and exploited 

vulnerabilities in the Postal Service network. Some of these vulnerabilities 

are unique to the Postal Service and do not apply to private carriers. The 

Postal Service has worked for decades to combat the use of its network to 

facilitate illicit drug distribution, but the nature and associated risks of drugs in the 

mail have evolved in recent years.

Use of Postal Service Network to Facilitate Illicit Drug Distribution

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A Growing Problem

In 2016, over 63,0006 Americans died from drug overdoses. Driving the increase 

in drug overdose deaths is the increasing prevalence of synthetic opioids.7

The death toll from these lethal drugs rose 525 percent (3,105 to 19,413) from 

2013 to 20168 (see Figure 1 for an overview of the number of deaths by drug). In 

response to this dramatic increase, President Trump declared the opioid epidemic 

a Public Health Emergency on October 26, 2017.9

Figure 1. U.S. Overdose Deaths by Drug, 2007-2016

Natural and Semisynthetic Opioids

Methadone

Cocaine

Heroin

Synthetic Opioids Other Than Methadone

Cannabis Derivatives

Number of Overdose Deaths

20000

15000

10000

5000

0

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Year

19413

15469

14490

10375

3373

526

Source: Data compiled from CDC WONDER, December 2017.

6 CDC annual drug overdose data for 2017 will be available in December 2018.

7 Synthetic opioids are lab-created drugs that either are or have effects similar to opiates.

8 U.S Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) analysis of CDC WONDER data. CDC WONDER is available at https://wonder.cdc.gov/.

9 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, October 26, 2017.

10 The White House’s Council of Economic Advisors created a cost estimate for the cost of fatal and non-fatal opioid abuse in America. Council of Economic Advisors, The Executive Office of the President, “The 

Underestimated Cost of the Opioid Crisis,” November 2017, p 7.

11 National Institute on Drug Abuse, “Opioid Overdose Crisis”.

12 Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, “Department of Justice Awards Nearly $59 Million to Combat Opioid Epidemic, Fund Drug Courts,” September 22, 2017.

13 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vital Signs, “Opioid Overdoses Treated in Emergency Departments”.

14 Generations United, “Raising the Children of the Opioid Epidemic,” State of Grandfamilies 2016.

15 CDC, “Opioid Basics”.

The opioid epidemic has devastated communities across the nation. In 2015, 

opioid addiction was estimated to have cost the U.S. economy $504 billion – 

2.8 percent of the U.S.’s total gross domestic product (GDP).10 Between 21 and 

29 percent of people prescribed opioids for chronic pain misuse them.11 Rural 

America has been especially impacted by the opioid epidemic.

Problems related to the opioid crisis strain community resources as well. The U.S. 

Department of Justice invested nearly $59 million in grant programs to strengthen 

drug court programs and address the opioid epidemic.12 Emergency rooms 

across the country saw a 30 percent increase in the number of overdose visits 

from July 2016 to September 2017.13 The opioid crisis has also put a significant 

strain on families, as nearly 2.5 million children are being raised by grandparents 

or extended family because of this struggle in the home.14

The Origin of Opioid Addictions

Opioids are a class of drug used to treat 

pain. The Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC) classifies opioids into three 

categories: prescription opioids, fentanyl, and 

heroin.15 The progression of addiction might 

include more than one of these categories. 

The starting point for the opioid crisis likely 

originated in the healthcare system. According 

to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 

pharmaceutical companies in the 1990’s 

reassured the medical community that patients 

would not become addicted to opioid pain 

Fentanyl, a 

Synthetic Opioid

Perhaps the most well-known 

and increasingly prevalent 

synthetic opioid is fentanyl. 

Fentanyl is legally used to 

manage severe or post-surgery 

pain. It is 50 to 100 times more 

potent than morphine, and 

30 to 50 times deadlier than 

heroin. Its chemical relatives are 

numerous, with the most potent, 

commercially used variety 

being carfentanil – an elephant 

tranquilizer over 10,000 times 

stronger than morphine. 

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relievers and healthcare providers began to prescribe them at greater rates. 

Increased prescription of opioid medications led to widespread misuse before 

it became clear that these medications could indeed be highly addictive. Now, 

opioids — prescription and illicit — are the main driver of drug overdose deaths.

The stories of opioid addiction often begin the same way. A person is injured or 

faces chronic pain and seeks medical attention from a doctor, who prescribes an 

opiate to reduce the pain, which serves its purpose for a certain amount of time.16

As the user’s body develops a tolerance, the patient needs to take more pills to 

attain the same effect, often leading to dependence on the opiate to feel “normal,” 

which can easily turn into prescription painkiller abuse. Nearly 80 percent of 

heroin users reported misusing prescription opioids first. Heroin is a stronger drug 

that achieves a similar effect. Fentanyl is sometimes cut with heroin to produce 

a stronger effect. While fentanyl can be prescribed legally, it can also be ordered 

online illegally and shipped to a user’s home or bought on the street.

Illicit synthetic opioids come primarily from China and Mexico, either by being 

sent directly into the U.S. using the services of a package shipping provider 

or trafficked by land across the northern or southern U.S. borders. While large 

volumes of fentanyl have been seized at the southwest border, these seized 

drugs are typically low in purity. Fentanyl seized in the mail, primarily from China, 

is in smaller quantities but with a much higher purity – making it more valuable 

and more dangerous than the less potent, overland-trafficked drug.

17

The Internet and Illicit Drugs

Individuals can now order nearly any type of illicit drug online and have it 

delivered to a location of their choosing, all from the comfort of their own home. 

Drug traffickers have found that dealing through the internet is safer because they 

do not have to personally interact with buyers. The internet – specifically the 

evolution of the dark web – has changed those transactions and dramatically 

reduced the risks of being detected.18 Drug trafficking websites on both the dark 

16 Opioids are substances that produce morphine-like effects and are primarily used for pain relief. There are both legal and illegal opiate varieties. For instance, a doctor can prescribe morphine, but heroin is 

an illicit drug.

17 Drug Enforcement Agency, Report Number DEA-DCT-DIR-040-17, “2017 National Drug Force Assessment,” October 2017, p.vi and 65, (hereinafter 2017 NDTA).

18 The dark web is an intentionally concealed internet location that is only accessible to users who download special software that anonymizes their computer’s location.

19 A cryptocurrency is a digital currency in which encryption techniques are used to regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the transfer of funds, operating independently of a central bank.

20 Allison Schrager, Quartz, “The Safe, User-Friendly Way to be a Little Drug Lord: Economic Secrets of the Dark Web,” September 16, 2015.

web and publicly accessible websites provide shopping experiences similar to 

popular digital stores. Instead of credit cards, buyers and sellers use 

cryptocurrencies19 to ensure anonymity. With the click of a few buttons, buyers 

can order their drug of choice and schedule delivery to their home or, as one 

website suggests, the Post Office Box or address of an inattentive neighbor.

Dark Web Sellers Using the Postal Service

An Ohio couple was criminally charged after allegedly using the Postal Service to send 

shipments of fentanyl from their dark web business. Federal law enforcement officials, 

including the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, bought fentanyl from their dark web shop 

and tracked the package of drugs being sent from a post office in Kentucky. Subsequent 

investigations showed the markings on the delivered drug package matched those of at 

least 40 other packages sent through the Postal Service. The U.S. attorney said the drugs 

seized from the couple were enough to kill “a football stadium full of people.”

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Currently, the dark web has online marketplaces that host webpages, allowing 

traffickers to sell a wide variety of products. Instead of clothes, collectibles, 

and other items that customers shop for on clear web marketplaces, dark web 

vendors sell illicit drugs, guns, stolen identities, and pornography. The dark web 

ensures the anonymity of purchases by employing untraceable Internet Protocol 

(IP) addresses and requiring cryptocurrencies to make purchases. The federal 

government has shut down some of these online bazaars, but more have sprung 

up in their wake.20 Dark web buyers can be large operations buying a drug in 

bulk for redistribution or individual users buying for their personal use. These illicit 

purchases often rely on mail shipment companies, including the Postal Service, to 

deliver products to customers as they provide greater opportunities for anonymity 

than other delivery options, such as human couriers.
The Flow of Illicit Drugs Through the Postal Service Network

The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) identified six illicit drug types being shipped 

into the U.S. from overseas through the mail or private carriers: synthetic opioids 

(especially fentanyl), ecstasy, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and 

synthetic psychoactive substances.21 These drugs are in addition to the drugs 

that are grown or produced within the U.S. and shipped domestically to drug 

dealers and customers. The Postal Service processes and delivers 47 percent 

of the world’s mail and delivers hundreds of millions of private carriers’ ground 

packages.

The growing reliance of drug traffickers on shipping organizations to deliver their 

products has major implications for the Postal Service. The presence of packages 

containing illicit drugs in the mailstream puts Postal Service employees in harm’s 

way and jeopardizes its brand. Every story about drugs being shipped through the 

postal network erodes the public’s trust in the postal system.

The flow of illicit drugs through the postal network depicted in Figure 2 begins with 

an individual in the U.S. ordering illicit drugs through a web-based marketplace 

from a drug trafficker, either domestic or international. Dealers on the dark web 

describe how they ship the drugs, 

 Once the drug trafficker prepares an order, they may bring 

it to a postal operator or private carrier, either domestically or internationally, for 

transport to the dealer. The paths of domestic and international packages differ.

21 2017 NDTA, pgs. 14, 77, 94, 114, 121.

22 Drug traffickers also ship drugs into the U.S. on cargo ships and by land over the border. However, this report is focused on illicit drugs coming in through the postal network. For example, drug traffickers also ship 

drugs into the U.S. on cargo ships and by land across the border, some of which are entered into the mailstream while others do not.

23 EMS was created by the Universal Postal Union to deliver goods internationally through member postal providers.

24 By Advanced Electronic Data, the OIG is referring to Item Attribute Pre-Advice Message Data (ITMATT), which includes information about sender, addressee, and item content, as well as Pre-Advice of Dispatch 

Prepared Data (PREDES), which includes information about the number and weight of items shipped together in a container. This report primarily discusses ITMATT.

25 Beginning September 1, 2018, the Postal Service will require countries to provide AED on EMS, a subset of packages destined for the U.S. While this expectation has been communicated to all countries that are

members of the Universal Postal Union, .

International Package Flow

International traffickers use several means of transporting drugs to the U.S., 

including in packages sent via a private carrier, such as UPS or FedEx, or through 

their country’s postal operator.22 Many foreign postal operators ship internationally 

using an international postal express network called Express Mail Service, or 

EMS.23 When the drug trafficker ships a package destined for the U.S., the 

trafficker will provide information about the package, including a customs form. At 

this point, control over the package is with the foreign postal operator.

Generally, the foreign postal operator delivers 

the package to an international airport for 

shipment to the U.S. The U.S. 

Information collected about 

international packages and 

the screening process varies 

between the Postal Service 

and private carriers. Private 

carriers accept international 

packages at their offices in the 

country of origin, so they are 

able to collect the information 

they need directly from the 

customer. This closed network 

makes it easier for private 

carriers to get package data 

than the Postal Service, which 

only has data it is provided by 

the country that accepted the 

package.

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While the Postal Service has no control over 

these international inbound packages prior to 

their arrival in the U.S., they are responsible 

for accepting and processing them when they 

arrive.

While the mailpiece is in transit to the U.S., 

some foreign postal operators provide 

information about individual mailpieces, based 

on data sharing agreements. This information, called Advance Electronic Data 

(AED)24, can include details such as the recipient’s name and address, the 

sender’s name and address, and package contents. While some countries 

have agreed to provide AED, many have not, and the Postal Service is bound 

by international standards to accept mail from all countries.25 As of June 2018, 

the Postal Service received AED for 45 percent of international mail containing 

goods. 
Figure 2. Illicit Drug Flow through the Mailstream From Drug Traffickers to Buyers

Source: OIG analysis. This figure is a general depiction of illicit drug flows through the Postal Service network, and does not reflect every possible source of drugs entering the country.

Residential

PO Box Address

Business

Address

USPS Workforce May

Be Compromised.

ILLICIT DRUG FLOW THROUGH THE MAILSTREAM FROM DRUG TRAFFICKERS TO BUYERS

INTERNATIONAL PACKAGE FLOW DOMESTIC PACKAGE FLOW

Drug Traffickers Int’l Post Int’l Post > USPS > CBP USPS USPS

2 3 4 5 7 9 13

International Drug

Traffickers

2

Dealer/Buyer

Receives

14

Purchased

Online

3

International

Post Accepts

Package for

Shipment

4

Package Arrives

at the International

Service Center

7

USPS Holds

Flagged

Packages

for CBP

Inspection

8

CBP Inspects

Packages

9

11 U.S. Mailstream

12 CMRAs

Dealer/Buyer

Receives

14

Package Sent

to Other

CMRAs

13

Timeline of

Oversight 14

CBP

6 8 11 12

Package Shipped to U.S. 5

A. Data Goes to USPS

B. USPS Sends It to CBP

C. CBP Flags Packages

 for USPS to Hold

6

Domestic Drug

Traffickers

10

10

Drug Traffickers

Dealer/Buyer in the U.S. 

Searching for Drugs Online

1

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.

International mail generally arrives at a U.S. airport in large containers and 

ground handlers26 transport it to one of five Postal Service International Service 

Centers (ISC). ISCs received about 498 million international packages in 

2017, an average of over 1.3 million packages each day.27 Once at the ISC, 

the Postal Service processes the international mail and prepares it for delivery 

through its domestic network. During this time, CBP has the primary responsibility 

to inspect inbound international mail. CBP officers have authority, with limited 

exception, to open and examine packages and sealed letter class mail that 

appears to contain matter other than correspondence, provided they have 

reasonable cause to suspect the presence of merchandise or contraband.28

CBP identifies packages for additional inspection based on 

International inbound 

mail volume has grown 

over the past five years, 

creating challenges for the 

Postal Service and CBP 

in inspecting mail while 

ensuring timely delivery.

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After CBP has completed its inspections, cleared international mailpieces are 

entered into the Postal Service mailstream. International mail is transported to 

processing facilities where it is commingled with domestic mail and processed 

and delivered in the same manner.

26 Ground handlers are aviation employees that service the plane while it is on the ground.

27 OIG Report Number CP-AR-18-004, Inbound International Parcel Volume Variance, April 20, 2018. This count includes ePackets, Express Mail Service, Parcels, and Letter Class Untracked Packets. ePackets are 

small packages weighing up to 4.4 pounds with tracking and delivery confirmation features.

28 Exceptions are official documents of the U.S. government; mail addressed to ambassadors and ministers of foreign countries; and mail sent to international organizations designated by the president as public 

international organizations pursuant to the International Organizations Act.

29 Approved shippers are established when agreements are made with existing independent shipping and mailing companies. Postal Service, “Approved Postal Provider Program”.

30 Publication 146, A Law Enforcement Guide to the U.S. Inspection Service, p. 25.

Domestic Package Flow

Drug traffickers in the U.S. can send their packages like any other customer 

— dropping them in a blue collection box, or presenting them at a post office 

or through a third-party approved shipper.29 The Postal Service transports 

packages from any of these origins to sorting facilities, where processing 

equipment scans and routes them to the delivery unit that will deliver the 

package to its final destination.

Once a mailpiece arrives at the destination delivery unit, a letter carrier will deliver 

it to a business, a residence, a P.O. Box, or a CMRA. These letter carriers are 

With regards to CMRAs, they are private businesses that enter into an agreement 

with the Postal Service to provide private mailbox services. Under this agreement, 

letter carriers deliver all customers’ mail in one delivery to the CMRA, which 

then distributes it to the private mailboxes of individual customers. Once mail 

is delivered to a CMRA, control of the mail passes from the Postal Service to 

the CMRA to sort and hold the mail for pickup by the recipient. According to the 

USPIS, persons conducting illegal activity frequently rent private mailboxes at 

CMRAs to disguise their identity, location, or business name.30
Investigations have identified instances involving drug traffickers 

The OIG has worked cases where drug traffickers have used CMRAs to distribute 

and receive illicit drugs. 

.

Current Efforts to Combat Illicit Drugs

By shipping drugs through the Postal Service network, drug traffickers are using 

government resources to perpetuate a crime. The Postal Service has made 

efforts to combat the use of its network to facilitate illicit drug distribution. The 

United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is a law enforcement agency 

within the Postal Service and its mission includes protecting Postal Service 

employees from the dangers of handling packages containing illicit drugs and 

ensuring public trust in the mail. The Postal Service has long used the USPIS’s 

narcotics program to detect illicit drugs being shipped through the mail and deter 

this practice by investigating drug trafficking organizations attempting to use the 

mail to distribute its products. Because of its efforts, USPIS drug seizures have 

been on the rise since FY 2014, with over 40,000 pounds seized in FY 2017. 

The USPIS continues to coordinate its efforts with federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies and is incorporating analytics of postal operational and 

human resources data into its model.

Along with the USPIS’ investigative efforts, the Postal Service is negotiating datasharing agreements with foreign postal operators to increase the amount of AED 

it receives. Their efforts have resulted in an increase from countries 

sending AED between January 2017 and April 2018.

31 United States House of Representatives, Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee, Statement of Robert Cintron, Vice President, Network Operations, United States Postal Service, April 5, 2018.

In November 2015, the Postal Service initiated a pilot program at one ISC to 

process CBP

. The Postal Service has improved its operational 

response to CBP requests to hold and present suspected inbound international 

mail. By January 2018, the Postal Service expanded the program to all five 

ISCs and reported that it increased the percentage of CBP-requested packages 

retrieved from percent in May 2017 to percent in June 2018. In addition, 

the Postal Service enhanced network equipment at the ISCs by deploying 

mobile scanners at all ISCs to improve the receipt scans of CBP hold requests. 

Finally, CBP and the Postal Service agreed to memorandums of understanding 

that dictate the correct flow of flagged packages at each ISC. In April 2018, a 

Postal Service executive testified before the U.S. House of Representatives that 

collecting more AED “has been and remains one of the highest priorities for the 

Postal Service.”31

Despite the Postal Service’s efforts, vulnerabilities in the network remain. 

International and domestic drug traffickers have identified in their marketing to 

and communications with customers that they use the Postal Service to distribute 

illicit drugs. In fact, of 104 drug product sites we searched on the dark web that 

identified a shipper, 92 percent (96) indicated they used the Postal Service 

to distribute drugs. Furthermore, 54 percent (56 of 104) of the traffickers that 

identified a shipper were located in the U.S. and shipped domestically, and all 

but one of these advertised using the Postal Service. The OIG did not make any 

purchases on the dark web, so as to not put Postal Service employees at risk of 

exposure to illicit drugs.

Some traffickers also claimed that very few of the packages they sent through 

the Postal Service network containing illicit drugs were seized. For example, 

a cocaine trafficker claimed to have used the Postal Service to successfully 

distribute nearly 4,000 shipments, stating that they had a 100 percent delivery 

success rate. In addition, of the 96 traffickers who indicated they used the 

Postal Service as their shipping provider, 43 percent (41) offered free, partial, or 

full reshipment if the package did not arrive to the buyer’s address because it was 

confiscated, stolen, or lost.

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“Taking a chance of mailing 

weed in the USPS has proven 

for many to have its upsides. 

For one, it can seem safer 

than purchasing marijuana 

(or other drugs) off the street 

from unknown persons. 

For two, it can become a 

somewhat “anonymous” 

process, especially with the 

uprising of the automated 

shipping clerk machines 

popping up in 24/7 access 

USPS lobbies.” 

– Drugs and Bad Ideas Website

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On the clear web,32 80 percent (16) of the 

20 sites we visited that provided guidance on 

how to mail illicit drugs instructed traffickers 

to use the Postal Service for shipments. Over 

half (11) of the sites also offered instructions 

on how to package drugs to avoid detection, 

and nine sites specifically suggested using the 

Postal Service instead of private carriers. These 

how-to websites often cited the Postal Service’s 

limited ability to open and search packages and 

its higher mail volume, which they assumed 

lessened the risk of detection, as reasons for 

preferring the Postal Service to distribute illicit 

drugs.

Continued vulnerabilities make the Postal Service network susceptible to 

use by drug traffickers. Congressional action could help mitigate some of the 

vulnerabilities, while the Postal Service could mitigate others on its own. 

The Postal Service could inform Congress of existing laws that create 

vulnerabilities to its network. For example, the USPIS is currently prohibited from 

opening packages suspected of containing illicit drugs without first acquiring a 

search warrant. Criminals realize this and prefer to use the Postal Service for this 

reason. Also, there is not a distinct penalty in the federal sentencing guidelines for 

using the Postal Service network to facilitate illicit drug distribution. 

Aside from Congressional action, there are a number of vulnerabilities in the 

Postal Service network it could address on its own. The Postal Service has 

taken some measures to combat the flow of illicit drugs, but it does not have a 

cohesive and comprehensive organization-wide strategy to address this problem. 

Vulnerabilities include the need for USPIS to enrich its data analytics and 

enhance the security and isolation of suspected packages.

32 The clear web refers to the region of the internet most people are familiar with, including publicly accessible web pages indexed on search engines.

Finding #1: Limited Ability to Open and Inspect Suspected 

Packages 

Laws, regulations, and procedures applicable to the Postal Service compared 

to those applicable to CBP and private carriers make the Postal Service more 

susceptible to illicit drug trafficking. While both private carriers and CBP are 

authorized to search and open almost all international inbound packages, 

the Postal Service is generally prohibited from opening any sealed U.S. mail, 

including packages.

The Postal Service has limited ability to open and inspect packages to determine 

if they contain illegal material. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution and 

postal regulations protect sealed mail from inspection, as opening it without a 

federal search warrant would be considered an illegal search and seizure. The 

Fourth Amendment and postal regulations do allow postal law enforcement 

to open a package if they obtain a federal search warrant based on probable 

cause, or briefly detain a package if they have reasonable suspicion the package 

contains contraband. However, private carriers, such as UPS, FedEx, and DHL, 

have the authority to open packages because they enter into individual contracts 

with their customers that include a stipulation allowing them to open and inspect 

packages at any time. Criminals realize this and prefer to use the Postal Service 

for this reason.

A combination of legislation and action by the Postal Service could help minimize 

the use of the postal network to facilitate illicit drug distribution. Specifically, 

Congress could pass legislation clarifying that the sanctity of mail sealed against 

inspection applies only to letters, and that all packages sent by mail are subject to 

inspection without a warrant, based on reasonable suspicion. In conjunction with 

such legislation, the Postal Service could put the public on notice of the reduced 

expectation of privacy in packages. Any such changes to statutes and postal 

procedures would be subject to review by the courts, and could be struck down 

as unconstitutional if drafted or implemented too broadly. For a discussion of the 

law in this area, see Appendix B. 
Recommendation #1

We recommend the Chief Government Relations Officer work with 

Congress to develop legislative changes that would result in the Postal 

Inspection Service being authorized to open and inspect domestic 

packages suspected of containing illicit drugs.

Finding #2: Penalties for Mailing Illicit Drugs

Drug traffickers identified the perceived lower risks of being caught by maintaining 

their anonymity as one of the reasons for using the Postal Service network. This 

benefit is attractive to drug traffickers, as is the fact that the use of the postal 

network to facilitate illicit drug distribution does not carry a harsher or additional 

penalty. The penalties for an in-person drug deal and those for using the postal 

network for drug distribution are the same.

Federal law makes it a crime for people to use a “communication facility” (any 

type of communication instrument including the phone, mail, etc.) to cause or 

facilitate a felony drug distribution transaction.33 The communication facility 

charge appears designed to act as a plea-bargaining chip for use on indirect 

players in a drug transaction. The maximum penalty for this crime for a first 

offense is four years and/or a fine. While the sentencing guidelines provide a 

separate range for using any means of communication, a sentence for using 

the mail can run concurrently with any underlying controlled substance felony. 

For example, distributing any amount of illicit fentanyl has a maximum sentence 

of 20 years. A trafficker willing to take the risk in distributing this drug can avoid 

any face-to-face transaction by using the Postal Service and not receive any 

additional jail time if caught.

Imposing a mandatory minimum sentence for each drug package sent by 

mail (or aiding and abetting the sending of drugs through the mail) could act 

as a deterrent to drug traffickers. The Postal Service could work with relevant 

executive agencies, such as the Department of Justice, to present the enhanced 

33 21 U.S.C. §843(b).

34 21 U.S.C. §860.

35 Postal Service, Future Ready Fiscal Years 2017-2021. 

penalty for drug distribution in school zones34 (doubling maximum punishment 

for distributing drugs within a specific proximity to a school, playground, etc.) 

as a model to Congress for proposed legislation. This would help deter postal 

employees and drug traffickers from utilizing the Postal Service network.

Recommendation #2

We recommend the Chief Government Relations Officer work with 

relevant executive agencies, such as the Department of Justice, and 

Congress to develop legislative changes that would establish separate 

and enhanced criminal penalties for using the U.S. mail system to 

distribute illicit drugs.

Finding #3: Need for a Unified, Organization-Wide Strategy 

While the Postal Service has taken measures to combat the flow of illicit 

drugs, it 

 Multiple departments throughout 

the Postal Service, including USPIS, Operations, and Human Resources, 

have initiatives underway to tackle the illicit drug problem in a myriad of ways. 

 A single entity could 

oversee the success of each department’s efforts, identify areas where more 

resources might be necessary, and assess how to coordinate initiatives across 

departments. A centralized strategy would further enable the Postal Service to 

proactively fight the use of its network to distribute illicit drugs and meet emerging 

challenges as they arise. 

In its FY 2017 to FY 2021 Five-Year Strategic Plan,35 the Postal Service stated 

that it will continue developing an international platform to enhance solution 

capabilities, streamline processes, and improve visibility to meet the rapidly 

changing needs of the growing cross-border market and the evolving challenges 

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related to export compliance and security. However, it does not include tactics to 

fight the use of its network to distribute illicit drugs.

Continued use of the Postal Service network to distribute illicit drugs, coupled 

with the expanding drug crisis, requires the Postal Service to strategize with all 

departments, establish measurable goals, and record associated costs. With 

an overarching strategy, the Postal Service could help combat drugs entering 

and traveling throughout the U.S., keep postal employees safer, reduce brand 

erosion, and make well-informed decisions about the future impact these efforts 

will have on its financial status, business operations, and the American public. 

Rather than initiatives beginning and ending within individual departments, a 

unified strategy would ensure a broader view of the problem and could enable 

collaboration, when appropriate.

Other agencies have developed organization-wide strategies to ensure that 

personnel are working toward the same goals. For example, CBP released an 

ecommerce strategy in March 2018 that addresses its security plan in response to 

the unprecedented growth in inbound international packages. The strategy notes 

an increase in shipments of illicit goods, including illicit drugs, via small packages, 

due to a perceived lower interdiction risk and less severe consequences if the 

package is interdicted.36 The strategy lays out where the agency has room for 

improvement and what techniques remain successful. It then describes strategic 

goals with sub-objectives and plans for how it will measure success. The strategy 

acknowledges that CBP operations are currently optimized for high-value, 

containerized shipments, as well as a necessary shift in focus due to ecommerce 

growth. In addition, the President’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction 

and the Opioid Crisis report, dated November 1, 2017, supported comprehensive 

strategies across government agencies to address the opioid crisis and 

suggested the Postal Service give top-level attention to the crisis.

Individual Postal Service departments have taken steps to stop the flow of illicit 

drugs through the mail, but the efforts have been reactive and vulnerabilities 

in the network remain. For example, the USPIS has increased its narcoticsdetection efforts and coordination with other agencies, especially with regard 

to sharing parcel seizure data. The Postal Service has also developed specific 

36 Customs and Border Protection, E-Commerce Strategy, February 2018.

objectives related to the collection of AED and hold-request coordination with 

CBP. 

Strategic planning helps assure that an organization remains relevant, 

proactive, and responsive to the needs of its community. It provides a basis 

for monitoring progress; facilitating new program development; and assessing 

results, costs, and impact. It enables an organization to look into the future in 

an orderly and systematic way. Vulnerabilities in the Postal Service network 

create an environment where drug traffickers perceive lower interdiction 

risks and less severe consequences if a package is targeted. A 

 This cost estimate could be used as a planning 

tool to assist in prioritizing next steps and a way to increase awareness about the 

resources needed to protect the postal network and the public. The cost estimate 

could also be used as a tool to educate and potentially support international 

mailing rate negotiations.

Recommendation #3

We recommend the Postmaster General designate an officer to 

consolidate existing efforts and lead the implementation of a unified, 

comprehensive organizational strategy to combat the role of the postal 

network in facilitating illicit drug distribution. 

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Finding #4: Enriching Data Analytics to Identify 

Suspect Mailpieces 

Opportunities exist for the USPIS to enhance its data analytics to identify 

and remove suspected mailpieces containing illicit drugs from its domestic 

mailstream. The USPIS uses multiple sources of information to identify packages 

that may contain illicit drugs, such as coordination with federal, state, and local 

law enforcement agencies. The USPIS also relies on a data model it developed 

through analytics of postal retail, delivery, mail processing, and human resources 

data, as well as information from historical drug seizures to identify suspicious 

packages in the mailstream.

The data model is based on historical data that compares attributes of mailpieces 

that were known to contain illicit drugs in the past with mailpieces currently in the 

postal network. In applying the model to key attributes about existing mail, the 

Postal Service is able to identify for inspection in near real-time mailpieces that 

may contain illicit drugs. Under the existing process, Postal Inspectors at various 

locations throughout the country receive a spreadsheet daily listing packages that 

may contain illicit drugs, based on the data model. The Postal Inspectors at the 

local postal facilities use that information, which includes key attributes about the 

packages, along with their experiences and other law enforcement intelligence, to 

assess whether to pursue a search warrant.

Elements of the USPIS’s dynamic model change as new seizure data and 

criminal intelligence become available, allowing USPIS to better forecast and 

target both international and domestic parcels. However, USPIS does not have 

a formal process to determine whether the packages the model identified as 

potentially containing illicit drugs did, in fact, result in a seizure. Incorporating 

information about past successes could strengthen the model by allowing USPIS 

to see which indicators were most likely to result in a seizure. 

Although the model can be a helpful tool for inspectors to supplement other 

data about potentially suspect packages, there is not systemic communication 

between USPIS headquarters and field personnel regarding the use and 

outcomes of this system. The Postal Inspectors use data from this model as a 

37 POM Issue 9, Section 139.117

tool for identifying packages for inspection, but do not report back on whether 

any of the potentially suspect packages actually contained illicit drugs. The model 

is not currently designed in a way to allow this type of feedback as a source 

of information. Automatically, or at least systemically, feeding the results of the 

package inspections back into the model could improve its accuracy.

The identification and inspection process is also limited by the amount of 

information it has about attributes of mailpieces that contain illicit material. 

Currently, the historical drug seizure data consists mainly of marijuana information 

because the bulk of USPIS’s past drug seizures have been from marijuana 

violations. Since implementing the model in FY 2017, the USPIS achieved a 

significant increase in domestic and international seizures related to opioids. 

The number of opioid seizures increased almost seven and a half times between 

FY 2016 and FY 2017.

Recommendation #4

We recommend the Chief Postal Inspector enhance USPIS data 

analytics, including routine integration of the results of package 

inspections to further enrich its data model. 

Finding #5: Enhancing the Security and Isolation of 

Suspected Packages

When Postal Service employees encounter a suspicious package, they are 

required to remove it from the mailstream, inform a supervisor, and contact 

the USPIS for guidance.37 The supervisor is required to secure the suspected 

package until Postal Inspectors respond. Postal Inspectors have discretion to 

decide whether to seize the suspected package from a postal facility or have it 

mailed to them for further review. Based on the USPIS’ assessment, location of 

the package, and Postal Inspector availability, the inspector will either pick up the 

package or request that it be mailed to the USPIS.

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There is currently no process in place to automatically locate and redirect 

suspected packages in the mailstream for inspection. Instead, USPIS inspectors 

must physically go to a postal facility to retrieve a potentially suspect package 

for inspection. The process is labor intensive, thereby limiting the number 

of packages the USPIS is able to inspect. Quickly identifying, isolating, and 

inspecting packages that may contain illicit drugs is crucial to prevent use of 

the postal network to distribute illicit drugs and protect postal employees from 

potentially dangerous exposure. This process becomes even more of a challenge 

with the increasing potency of illicit drugs and volume of packages in the mail.

To reduce the time and risks associated with handling packages that may contain 

illicit drugs, there is an immediate need for the Postal Service and USPIS to 

automate the process of retrieving packages. The Postal Service’s current efforts 

to increase its automation of processing packages at the ISCs and processing 

and distribution centers create an opportunity for USPIS to automate this 

process. For example, an electronic redirection of potentially suspect packages 

could increase the efficiency of the process, allowing for more mailpieces to be 

inspected, while decreasing exposure of fatal illicit drugs to employees. This could 

prevent harm or danger, deter criminal activity, affect drug investigations and 

prosecutions, and positively impact the Postal Service’s brand and the integrity of 

the mail.

Recommendation #5

We recommend the Chief Postal Inspector coordinate with the 

Postal Service Chief Operating Officer to establish a process to 

more efficiently divert packages suspected of containing illicit drugs to 

centralized inspection locations for evaluation in an isolated and secure 

site.

Finding #6: Risk of Employee Collusion with Drug 

Traffickers

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38 October 1, 2017 to May 3, 2018.

39 Department of Justice, Northern District of Georgia, Sixteen U.S. Postal Service Workers Charged with Accepting Bribes to Deliver Cocaine, August 30, 2017. The cases are being tried individually and are at different 

stages of completion. All parties are presumed innocent until proven guilty.

40 Department of Justice, Northern District of Ohio, Richmond Heights Man Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Receiving Four Pounds of Methamphetamine and Postal Service Letter Carrier Sentenced to Eight Years in 

Prison For Diverting and Delivering Packages of Drugs, May 9, 2018. 

Finding #7: Oversight of Commercial Mail Receiving 

Agencies

The Postal Service’s lack of oversight of CMRAs make them vulnerable to drug 

traffickers using them as part of the Postal Service network to facilitate illicit 

drug distribution. According to the USPIS, persons conducting illegal activity 

frequently rent private mailboxes at CMRAs to disguise their identity, location, or 

business name.

.

Postal Service officials did not adhere to oversight policies and procedures at 

each of the 12 post offices and 20 CMRAs we visited. We chose these facilities 

based on a judgmentally selected sample from states with high per capita drug 

overdose rates (see Table 2, Appendix A). Postal employees at these locations 

did not review and maintain necessary documentation to verify and track CMRAs 

and their customers. Specifically, post office officials had none of the required 

documentation for 11 of the 20 CMRAs serviced (55 percent), which includes an 

application for the private business to act as a CMRA and separate applications 

for each of its customers that allow CMRAs to receive mail on behalf of their 

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customers.41 Post offices had incomplete documentation for 40 percent (8) of 

CMRAs, and only one post office had complete documentation for one CMRA 

(see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Amount of CMRA Documentation Post Offices Maintained

Incomplete

Documentation

40%

No

Documentation

55%

All

Documentation5%

Incomplete Documentation No Documentation All Documentation

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Source: OIG analysis.

At the seven post offices that maintained some form of CMRA documentation for 

the nine CMRAs, we found officials did not have records for 66 percent (770) of 

the 1,169 customers renting private mail boxes.42

41 Postal Service policy requires post offices maintain and update quarterly a list of customers renting private mailboxes at each CMRA, as well as an application for each of the CMRA’s customers, known PS Form 1583, 

Application for Delivery of Mail Through Agent. Postal Service policy also requires post offices delivering to CMRAs collect and maintain a Postal Service (PS) Form 1583-A, Application to Act as a Commercial Mail 

Receiving Agency to establish the CMRA as a delivery point.

42 We reviewed all CMRA customer applications on file at the post offices; however, a statistical sample of applications was reviewed for three CMRAs and we projected the results.

43 One form of identification must contain a photograph of the addressee(s). Acceptable identification includes: valid driver’s license or state non-driver’s identification card; armed forces, government, university, or 

recognized corporate identification card, passport, alien registration card or certificate of naturalization; current lease, mortgage or Deed of Trust; voter or vehicle registration car, or a home or vehicle insurance policy. 

Social security cards, credit cards, and birth certificates are unacceptable forms of identification. 

44 AMS data is used to deliver mail to every address in the country and assist in identifying and tracking mail.

Further, we reviewed 232 applications available at these post offices that allow 

CMRAs to receive mail on behalf of their customer, and found:

■ Sixty-nine percent (161) were incomplete. For example, the date on the form, 

the applicant’s name, or home address was incomplete, or the form was 

missing either the applicant’s or the CMRA representative’s signature.

■ Fifty-six percent (129) did not include acceptable forms of identification to 

confirm the applicant was who they claimed to be and verified the applicant’s 

address.43 For example, CMRA representatives accepted credit cards 

and cards from stores like Costco and Sam’s Club as acceptable forms of 

identification. In addition, when the address on a customer’s application did 

not match the identification address, no one validated the information with 

another acceptable source document, such as a utility bill or a current lease.

In addition to reviewing applications that post offices maintain for CMRAs and 

their customers, we also reviewed mailpieces destined for CMRAs. We found that 

48 of 145 mailpieces (or 33 percent) were addressed to individuals who were not 

listed as current CMRA customers.

Headquarters retail management did not maintain an accurate or complete listing 

of CMRAs. Instead, local post office officials were required to maintain a list of 

those CMRAs that they serviced and enter CMRA delivery information into the 

Address Management System (AMS).44 However, local postal officials did not 

consistently update CMRA business and location information in AMS. Specifically, 

AMS indicated there were 21 CMRAs registered to the 12 judgmentally selected 

post offices. During our site visits, we identified three of the 21 CMRAs were no 

longer in business and identified two additional CMRAs that were not included in 

AMS. One CMRA was in business for at least three years and the other CMRA 

was in business for about seven months.
Of the CMRAs no longer in business, one had been closed for at least two years 

and the remaining two were closed for more than a year. The facility management 

at both delivering post offices had recently certified existence of the closed 

CMRAs in the Facilities Database (FDB).45

Lack of proper oversight of CMRAs and their customers occurred because the 

Postal Service does not have a sufficient CMRA program to ensure consistent 

compliance with and knowledge of CMRA policies and procedures at local post 

offices. The Postal Service does not have a centralized program or organizational 

emphasis on managing CMRAs. Postal headquarters, area, and district officials 

do not play a role in overseeing CMRA processing at the facilities.

Post office management did not properly oversee the CMRA process due to a 

lack of knowledge of the requirement, turnover in post office management, and 

the higher priority of delivering mail leading to less of a focus on maintaining 

documentation. For example, one post office had not had a permanent supervisor 

for almost four years. The newly appointed supervisor could not locate either 

the CMRA or customer applications but was familiar with the forms from a 

previous assignment. Further, post office management did not complete periodic 

compliance reviews because they were unaware of the requirements, and were 

focused on other priorities that involved mail delivery and carrier timeliness.

Providing centralized oversight of compliance with CMRA documentation is 

also difficult because the forms are collected and maintained in paper form; 

the Postal Service does not allow for electronic completion and submission of 

the forms. Relying on manual collection, maintenance and review makes the 

oversight process more time consuming and difficult to manage.

In 2014, headquarters retail officials and representatives from the USPIS 

conducted site visits to understand the CMRA process. Based on these 

observations and interviews, they considered converting the manual CMRA 

process to an electronic process. A Lean Six Sigma project was drafted in 

2017, three years after the site visits. However, neither department completed 

the Lean Six Sigma process, nor could a leader of the project be identified. 

45 FDB contains characteristics associated with Postal Service operations for all facilities. Data within FDB goes through a certification process at least once a year.

46 Our estimate used the Product Tracking and Reporting System (PTR). PTR is the system that records all delivery status information for mail and parcels with trackable services and barcodes. However, PTR does not 

include shipment information for standard mail or address data for all international inbound tracked mail. Because of this, our estimate is conservative

The Postal Service initiated a new Lean Six Sigma project to review CMRAs in 

April 2018.

The volume of tracked mail to CMRAs grew nearly 4 percent from FY 2016 to 

FY 2017, going from about 24.8 million to 25.8 million pieces.46 We found clear 

web sites with instructions to rent a private mailbox from a CMRA to receive 

drug shipments.

. 

Recommendation #7

We recommend the Vice President of Retail and Customer Service 

Operations institute a comprehensive Commercial Mail Receiving 

Agencies (CMRA) program to increase adherence to existing CMRA 

procedures and improve existing policies. Specifically, the program 

should be centralized and automated to ensure postal employees are 

following CMRA documentation requirements and conducting oversight 

of CMRAs.

Management’s Comments

Management disagreed with recommendations 1 through 6, and agreed with 

recommendation 7. Management did not specifically indicate agreement or 

disagreement with our findings, but stated the report is incomplete and makes 

inaccurate assertions. Management also specifically disagrees with aspects of 

the report related to finding and recommendation 3.

Regarding recommendation 1, management disagreed stating they do not 

consider that actively pursuing legislative change is necessary at this time 

because Postal Inspectors work with local U.S. Attorney’s offices to obtain search 

warrants where probable cause exists and have the ability to present international 

parcels to CBP, which is authorized to open them.

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Regarding recommendation 2, management disagreed stating the 

recommendation addresses a matter of federal criminal sentencing policy and the 

decision to pursue any changes to the criminal code and criminal penalties is the 

province of other authorities.

Regarding finding 3, management stated our report is inaccurate to state the 

Postal Service lacks a unified, comprehensive organization-wide strategy to 

combat the flow of illegal drugs through the mail and that Postal Service efforts 

have been reactive. Management responded that they are, in fact, pursing a 

collaborative, cross-functional, and proactive strategy. Specifically, management 

stated they have an organizational-wide commitment to combating the distribution 

of opioids through the mail and that the USPIS – as the law enforcement, crime, 

and security arm of the Postal Service – plays a central role in their efforts to 

prevent the flow of illicit drugs through the mail. Management further stated the 

UPSIS works closely with other Postal Service functions, including Operations 

and Human Resources, as well as other law enforcement agencies and maintains 

an aggressive and collaborative program to prevent and interdict drug parcels. 

Regarding recommendation 3, management disagreed stating they would not 

designate a single officer to oversee all efforts concerning this issue. They also 

stated they already have a comprehensive, cross-functional, and organizationwide strategy to combat the use of the postal network to distribute illicit drugs that 

is coordinated and supervised at the Executive Leadership Team level, although 

many of these efforts are the direct responsibility of the USPIS and Chief Postal 

Inspector. However, management agreed to publish a document discussing their 

comprehensive strategy for the benefit of Postal Service stakeholders and will 

incorporate a specific discussion on this issue in their next update of the FiveYear Strategic Plan.

Regarding recommendation 4, management disagreed stating there was no need 

to make the recommendation because the USPIS is already enhancing its data 

analytics and has been continually developing and deploying analytic tools for 

interdiction. 

Regarding recommendation 5, management disagreed stating the 

recommendation is operationally unsound and does not consider the various 

techniques used in these types of investigations. The investigations are timesensitive and would be hindered by using a centralized approach. Additionally, 

management stated they already have processes in place to temporarily detain 

and divert suspect packages to a centralized location when feasible.

Regarding recommendation 6, management disagreed stating that this 

recommendation was not needed because of their ongoing efforts 

Regarding recommendation 7, management agreed and stated they will develop 

a detailed timeline of actions to increase adherence to CMRA policies and 

procedures to include employee support materials, validation of existing data, and 

a process for automated oversight. The target implementation date is December 

31, 2018. Management further stated that although they do not have a centralized 

means of overseeing CMRAs and did not maintain a complete listing of CMRA 

locations, they do have access to the Address Management System (AMS) and 

the Facilities Data Base (FDB) which can track CRMA information to local post 

offices and individual CMRAs. 

See Appendix C for management’s comments in their entirety.

Evaluation of Management’s Comments

The OIG considers management’s comments unresponsive to recommendations 

1, 2, 4, and 5; partially responsive to recommendation 3; and responsive to 

recommendations 6 and 7.

Regarding management’s disagreement with recommendation 1, we maintain 

that working with Congress to develop legislative changes authorizing the 

USPIS to open and inspect domestic packages suspected of containing illicit 

drugs could create a deterrent effect on drug traffickers considering using the 

Postal Service. Working with Offices of U.S. Attorneys across the country to 

reach the probable cause standard can be time-consuming, inhibiting the ability 

for the USPIS to be able to efficiently search and seize packages containing illicit 

drugs. The Postal Service’s inability to open packages without a warrant was 

consistently cited by drug traffickers online as a reason to use the Postal Service 

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to ship illicit drugs. Furthermore, the recommendation only speaks to domestic 

packages, so management’s inclusion of their international protocol is unrelated 

to the recommendation.

Regarding management’s disagreement with recommendation 2, we agree 

that this is a matter of federal criminal sentencing policy, but contend that the 

Postal Service has a role to play in such a change. While the decision does not 

lie with the Postal Service, it would benefit from educating decisionmakers on 

the impact the change could have on its network. The OIG’s recommendation is 

meant to assert that it is appropriate for the Postal Service to pursue coordination 

with the Department of Justice and Congress, as well as other channels, such 

as Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the U.S. Sentencing 

Commission, to effectuate change to the sentencing guidelines.

Regarding management’s disagreement with recommendation 3, we dispute 

management’s assertion that they already have a “comprehensive, crossfunctional, and organization-wide strategy to combat the use of the postal 

network to distribute illicit drugs.” We acknowledged in the report that the 

Postal Service has taken several steps to address use of its network to facilitate 

illicit drug distribution, including many efforts within the USPIS and with regards to 

gathering AED. These efforts, while necessary, do not constitute an organizationwide strategy. 

Despite several requests, in person and in writing, Postal Service management 

did not produce or communicate a comprehensive, organization-wide strategy 

to address this issue. During one meeting, specifically designated to discuss the 

Postal Service’s strategy, the OIG met with representatives from five departments, 

including a member of the Executive Leadership Team. We specifically asked 

for a strategy and were informed that one did not exist. Based on our attempts to 

understand the strategy, it appears that any existing organization-wide strategy is 

not well understood or known. The OIG continues to assert that having a single 

officer lead implementation of the strategy would be an appropriate measure to 

efficiently coordinate the efforts of the various groups involved in the strategy. 

We do consider management’s plan to formally publish their strategy and include 

a discussion of the issue in its next update to the Five-Year Strategic Plan to be 

partially responsive to our recommendation.

Regarding management’s disagreement with recommendation 4, we 

dispute management’s assertion that they have already implemented this 

recommendation. In meeting with the USPIS, the OIG received a demonstration 

of an analytical tool that could be used as an indicator of potential drug parcels. 

In that meeting, we discussed that while this information was pushed to postal 

inspectors in the field, the usefulness and accuracy of the tool was not routed 

back to data analysts from agents in the field. The analytical tools that are 

based on previous interdictions are only as strong as the data surrounding those 

previous interdictions; to date, most of USPIS seizures have been of marijuana 

so the data on other types of drugs are limited. Providing information about the 

success of the tool in identifying packages containing an array of drugs would be 

helpful in strengthening the tool’s predictive ability for the deadlier drugs flowing 

through the mailstream. 

Regarding management’s disagreement with recommendation 5, we dispute 

management’s assertion that the processes in place are adequate. We reaffirm 

that interdiction of suspect packages is a resource-intensive, manual process 

that hinders the USPIS from being able to inspect mailpieces that may contain 

illicit drugs. The OIG reiterates that to reduce the time and risks associated with 

handling packages that may contain illicit drugs, there is an immediate need for 

the Postal Service and USPIS to automate the process of retrieving packages. 

Automation may come in various forms, including adoption of technology or 

other ways to electronically identify and redirect suspect packages earlier in 

the mailstream – before the package arrives at the delivery unit. This could 

prevent harm or danger, deter criminal activity, affect drug investigations and 

prosecutions, and positively impact the Postal Service’s brand and the integrity of 

the mail.

Regarding management’s disagreement with recommendation 6, we 

dispute management’s assertion that they have already implemented 

this recommendation because 

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.

Regarding management’s agreement with recommendation 7, we appreciate 

the Postal Service’s planned steps to implement this recommendation. However, 

we want to clarify the purpose of the recommendation. The list of CMRAs in 

AMS was not accurate or complete, as demonstrated by our visits, wherein 

three CMRAs listed in AMS were no longer in business, and two CMRAs were in 

business, but not in the AMS system. Further, neither the AMS nor FDB systems 

currently act as a repository for the documentation required for CMRAs. Ninetyfive percent of the CMRAs for which we checked for documentation did not have 

all the required forms completed appropriately. These forms are currently retained 

at the local level.

All recommendations require OIG concurrence before closure. Consequently, 

the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. 

Recommendations should not be closed in the Postal Service’s follow-up tracking 

system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can 

be closed.

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Appendices

Click on the appendix title below to 

navigate to the section content.

Appendix A: Additional Information................................................................................23

Scope and Methodology...................................................................................................23

Prior Audit Coverage..........................................................................................................25

Appendix B: The Law Regarding Package Inspection in the Mail.......................26

Current Law............................................................................................................................26

History of the Warrant Requirement...........................................................................27

Regulatory and Legislative Efforts to Combat Drug

Trafficking Through the Mail...........................................................................................28

Appendix C: Management’s Comments.........................................................................30

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Appendix A: Additional Information

Scope and Methodology

The report responds to a request from Senator Claire McCaskill, Ranking 

Member, U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 

to review the use of the Postal Service’s network to facilitate illicit drug 

distribution. Specifically, the congressional request asked us to:

■ Review current efforts to screen packages for illicit drugs shipped through 

the Postal Service, including how the Postal Service and other organizations 

share data and any challenges they face;

■ Address differences in laws, regulations, and procedures governing the 

Postal Service and private carriers that may make it more susceptible to illicit 

drug trafficking; and

■ Describe the limitations and vulnerabilities in the Postal Service network and 

postal policies, including:

● Constraints on the quantity, reliability, and use of data to detect illicit drugs;

● Employee involvement and collusion in drug trafficking, as well as efforts to 

mitigate this vulnerability; and

● Requirements associated with CMRAs, along with the Postal Service’s 

oversight of CMRAs.

To accomplish our objectives, we:

■ Reviewed laws, regulations, and procedures governing the Postal Service.

■ Reviewed the shipping path and screening processes for international and 

domestic packages that may contain illicit drugs.

■ Reviewed the limitations and vulnerabilities in the Postal Service network 

including constraints on the quantity, reliability, and use of data to detect illicit 

drugs.

■ Reviewed OIG investigative records and interviewed OIG and Inspection 

Service investigative management to determine the nature and extent of 

employee involvement and collusion in drug trafficking, as well as efforts to 

mitigate this vulnerability.

■ Reviewed the requirements associated with CMRAs included in DMM Chapter 

508, Recipient Services; and the Postal Operations Manual Issue 9, Chapter 

612, Delivery of Addressee’s Mail to Another.

■ Conducted site visits to selected post offices and CMRAs from states with 

high per capita overdose deaths as shown in Table 2.

■ At the selected sites, interviewed Postal Service and CMRA management and 

personnel and reviewed associated CMRA documentation for completeness.

■ Sampled mailed destined for delivery to each of the selected CMRAs and 

determined if the addressee was a current customer and the mailpiece was 

addressed properly.

■ Reviewed and analyzed prior OIG audit reports.

■ Reviewed and analyzed the U. S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs 

staff report Combating the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in 

International Mail.

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Table 2: Post Office Selected for Site Visits

Post Office

Number

Associated

CMRA(s) Area District

Post Office #1 CMRA #1 Eastern Northern Ohio

Post Office #2

CMRA #2 

CMRA #3 

Southern Suncoast

Post Office #3

CMRA #4 

CMRA #5

Southern Suncoast

Post Office #4 CMRA #6 Great Lakes Gateway

Post Office #5 CMRA #7 Northeast New York

Post Office #6 CMRA #8 Northeast Northern New Jersey

Post Office #7

CMRA #9 

CMRA #10 

Southern Oklahoma

Post Office #8 CMRA #11 Southern Suncoast

Post Office #9 CMRA #12 Eastern Ohio Valley

Post Office #10

CMRA #13 

CMRA #14 

CMRA #15

Capitol Metro Capital

Post Office #11

CMRA #16 

CMRA #17 

Northeast Northern New Jersey

Post Office #12

CMRA #18 

CMRA #19 

CMRA #20

Eastern Ohio Valley

Source: OIG analysis.

We conducted this performance audit from February through September 2018, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and 

included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the 

circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We discussed our observations and conclusions 

with management on July 26 and August 2, 2018, and included their comments 

where appropriate.

We assessed the reliability of Address Management System data by comparing 

it to the Facilities Database. Although we identified inconsistencies between the 

two databases as discussed in the report, we determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

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Prior Audit Coverage

Report Title Objective Report Number Final Report Date Monetary Impact

Inbound ePackets Cost Attribution Assess whether all cost associated with ePackets were accurately 

captured and aggregated.

CP-AR-18-003 1/23/2018 None

Inbound International Mail 

Operations – 

International Service Center

Assess inbound international mail operations and safety and security 

concerns at the ISC.

MS-AR-17-003 12/30/2016 None

Inbound International Mail 

Operations –

International Service Center

MS-MT-16-004 9/28/2016 None

Inbound International Mail 

Operations International 

Service Center 

Assess inbound international mail operations and safety and security 

concerns at the International Service Center.

MS-MT-16-003 9/21/2016 None

International Inbound Mail 

Verification

Highlight significant international inbound mail verification weaknesses 

at the and ISC.

MR-MT-16-001 1/28/2016 None

Handling of Inbound International 

Mail – 

International Service Center

Address non-compliance with CBP inspection requirements for inbound 

international mail and lack of accurate data for inbound mail presented 

for inspection at the ISC.

NO-MA-15-006 9/15/2016 None

Inbound International Parcel 

Volume Variance

Evaluate the accuracy and completeness of financial and operational 

inbound international parcel volume data.

CP-AR-18-004 4/20/2018 None

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Appendix B: The Law Regarding Package Inspection in the Mail

Current Law

International Mail

The Fourth Amendment protects Americans against unreasonable search and 

seizure, but there is a border search exception that authorizes appropriately 

designated government officials to perform searches of inbound international mail 

without a warrant.47 This constitutional authority extends to sealed letter class 

mail.48

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has statutory authority to conduct 

border searches.49 Thus, under the border search exception, CBP has the 

authority to search all inbound international mail without a warrant. Customs 

and postal regulations, however, condition CBP’s authority to open “sealed letter 

class mail”50 on reasonable suspicion that the mail contains items that are illegal 

or subject to customs duties.51 Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than 

probable cause, but requires more than a hunch or generalized suspicion.52 By 

contrast, customs regulations require a federal search warrant, which must be 

based on probable cause, to open sealed letter class mail that appears to contain 

only correspondence,53 or to read correspondence in any letter class mail.54

47 See U.S. v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977).

48 See id. at 619-22.

49 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1467, 1496; 19 C.F.R. §§ 145.2, 162.6. See also U.S. v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 696-98 (9th Cir. 1986) (border search authority limited to officials specified by Congress); U.S. v. Soto-Soto, 

598 F.2d 545, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); U.S. v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77, 81-84 (1st Cir. 1990) (border search authority may be delegated by statutorily authorized officials); 19 U.S.C. § 1401(i) (statutory 

authority for delegation of border search authority).

50 Customs regulations define “sealed letter class mail” as “letter class mail sealed against postal inspection by the sender.” 19 C.F.R. § 145.1(c). The regulations in turn define “letter class mail” as “any mail article, 

including packages, post cards, and aerogrammes, mailed at the letter rate or equivalent class or category of postage.” Id. at § 145.1(b).

51 See 19 C.F.R. § 145.3(a); Administrative Support Manual (ASM) § 274.911. Similarly, CBP officials may only open sealed outbound international mail weighing more than 16 ounces without a warrant if they have 

reasonable suspicion of illicit contents. See 19 U.S.C. § 1583(c)-(d); ASM § 274.912.

52 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-27 (1968).

53 See 19 C.F.R. § 145.3(b).

54 See 19 C.F.R. § 145.3(c). See note 4 supra for the definition of “letter class mail.”

55 See ASM § 274.23.

56 ASM § 274.231(a).

57 ASM § 274.231(b).

58 ASM § 274.232.

59 See U.S. v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970) (First-Class mail, such as letters and sealed packages, is protected from inspection except in the manner provided by the Fourth Amendment).

60 See U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983); 

61 See Administrative Support Manual (ASM) § 274.31.a, 274.31.d.

In summary, inbound international mail is subject to inspection by CBP. If the mail 

reasonably appears to contain dutiable or illicit items, then CBP officers may open 

it without a warrant. If the mail is a sealed letter class envelope that appears to 

contain only correspondence, then a warrant is required to open it.

Domestic Mail

For purposes of searching domestic mail, a distinction must be made between 

mail sealed against inspection or “sealed mail,” and mail not sealed against 

inspection or “unsealed mail.”55 Sealed mail is “mail on which appropriate postage 

is paid, and which, under postal laws and regulations, is included within a class 

of mail maintained by the Postal Service for the transmission of letters sealed 

against inspection.”56 Sealed mail includes First-Class Mail and Priority Mail, 

among others.57 Unsealed mail is all other types of mail, including, for example, 

Periodicals, Marketing Mail, Parcel Select, and Retail Ground.58

The Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches, applies 

to sealed mail.59 Under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement may detain 

sealed mail for a brief period of time to obtain a search warrant, provided there is 

reasonable suspicion the item contains contraband.60 Postal regulations likewise 

allow law enforcement to briefly detain sealed mail upon reasonable suspicion.61

To open and inspect sealed mail, the Fourth Amendment and postal regulations 

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generally require either a federal search warrant or one of the few exceptions to 

the warrant requirement.62

Unsealed domestic mail is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, because 

the mailer’s choice to use such a type of mail is deemed to imply consent to 

search under postal regulations.63 Thus, law enforcement may open and inspect 

unsealed mail without a warrant, based merely on a reasonable suspicion of illicit 

contents.

In summary, unsealed mail is subject to warrantless search by law enforcement 

upon reasonable suspicion. Sealed mail may be detained briefly upon reasonable 

suspicion; however, a federal search warrant is generally required to open and 

inspect sealed mail.

History of the Warrant Requirement

In the seminal 19th Century case, Supreme Court in ex parte Jackson, stated that 

in the enforcement of postal laws, “a distinction is to be made between different 

kinds of mail matter – between what is intended to be kept free from inspection, 

such as letters, and sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open 

to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed 

matter, purposely left in a condition to be examined.”64 The Court reasoned: 

“Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from 

examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if 

they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The 

62 See Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 251; 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(g)(1); see also Place, 462 U.S. at 701; ASM 274.21.c, 274.61. Postal regulations do give certain postal employees the authority to detain and inspect some mail 

under certain conditions; however, this authority is limited to matters affecting postal operations and does not extend to law enforcement. Compare ASM § 274.21 with § 274.22, and § 274.31 with § 274.32. Another 

option for law enforcement is to use the Postal Service’s abandonment regulations. As discussed below, however, this option is only available for suspected drug packages and has limited utility.

63 See, e.g., U.S. v. Riley, 554 F.2d 1282, 1283 (4th Cir. 1977); see also Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual §§ 153.2.2, 243.3.2.5. While the principle in the text applies broadly to 

law enforcement’s search authority under the Constitution, postal employees may only open unsealed mail without a warrant to make a mailability or postage determination, or as expressly permitted by federal law. See 

ASM § 274.22.

64 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).

65 Id.

66 See id. (“Whilst in the mail, [sealed mail] can only be opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are 

subjected to search in one’s own household.”).

67 U.S. v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970).

68 39 U.S.C. § 404(c).

69 Id. (emphasis added). The statute contains an exception to the warrant requirement for “an officer or employee of the Postal Service for the sole purpose of determining an address at which the letter can be delivered, 

or pursuant to the authorization of the addressee.” Id.

70 Compare 39 U.S.C. § 404(c) (2006) with 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d) (1970).

71 See Anuj C. Desai, Can the President Read Your Mail? A Legal Analysis, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 315, Part II.B (2010). One notable exception is the 1960s version of the statute quoted above, which prohibited the 

warrantless opening of “any letter or parcel of the first class.” 39 U.S.C. § 4057 (1964). This statute was part of the 1960 recodification of the Postal Code. As a recodification of existing law, this legislation was expressly 

not intended to change or restate the law. See Desai at 342. Thus, given the prior history of statutes of this kind, which protected only letters, the inclusion of parcels in the protected class appears to have been a 

mistake by Congress, especially considering their exclusion from subsequent statutes. See id. at 342-43.

constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers 

against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed 

against inspection, wherever they may be.”65 Accordingly, the Court held that the 

government must obtain a warrant to search sealed mail.66

In modern times, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the central holding of ex 

parte Jackson. In United States v. Van Leeuwen, the court observed: “It has long 

been held that first-class mail such as letters and sealed packages subject to 

letter postage – as distinguished from newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and 

other printed matter – is free from inspection by postal authorities, except in the 

manner provided by the Fourth Amendment.”67 Thus, sealed mail is subject to the 

warrant requirement. The question, then, centers around which types of mail is 

considered sealed.

Congress has historically applied the protection of the seal only to letters. By 

statute, the Postal Service is required to “maintain one or more classes of mail 

for the transmission of letters sealed against inspection.”68 The statute further 

mandates: “No letter of such a class of domestic origin shall be opened except 

under authority of a search warrant authorized by law.”69 The text of this provision 

dates back to the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970.70 Since the late nineteenth 

century, when Congress first enacted prohibitions on inspecting mail without 

a warrant, such statutory prohibitions have almost universally been limited to 

letters.71

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What accounts for the fact that courts have included sealed packages in the 

constitutional warrant requirement, while Congress has not applied the statutory 

seal to them? There is abundant case law holding that packages sent by means 

other than sealed mail are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.72 Even 

though packages, by their nature, hide their contents from view, that does 

not automatically give them Fourth Amendment protection. Rather, it is the 

classification of mail as sealed that gives it Fourth Amendment protection.73

As one scholar has observed, “Fourth Amendment protections are ... deeply 

intertwined with those postal statutes and regulations that determine the senders’ 

and recipients’ expectations of privacy.”74

Regulatory and Legislative Efforts to Combat Drug 

Trafficking Through the Mail

Recent Postal Regulations

In November 2015, the Postal Service amended its regulations to enhance postal 

law enforcement’s ability to detain and open suspected drug packages without a 

warrant.75 The new regulations allow Postal Inspectors and OIG agents to detain 

a suspected drug package based on reasonable suspicion, under the theory that 

illegal drugs are non-mailable. Notice must be given to the sender and addressee 

that the package has been detained as non-mailable, and they must be given 

a reasonable opportunity to contest this determination. If not contested, the 

package is deemed abandoned and is subject to being opened and inspected. 

Because these regulations require reasonable suspicion to detain a suspected 

package,76 and provide administrative due process for the sender and intended 

recipient, the regulations should withstand judicial scrutiny.77

72 See id. at 360, note 258.

73 See id. at 360.

74 Id. at 360-61.

75 See ASM §§ 274.21.f, 274.31.d; Postal Operations Manual (POM) § 691.584. The Inspection Service proposed the changes, which became effective November 12, 2015. The ASM and POM have the force of federal 

regulations under 39 C.F.R. § 211.2(a)(2).

76 Federal courts have routinely upheld temporary seizures of sealed mail based on reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., U.S. v. Allen, 990 F.2d 667, 671 (1st Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Alexander, 540 F.3d 766, 768-69 (6th Cir. 2008); 

U.S. v. Huerta, 655 F.3d 806, 809-11 (8th Cir. 2011); U.S. v. Lozano, 623 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Ramirez, 342 F.3d 1210, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Banks, 3 F.3d 399, 402 (11th Cir. 1993).

77 The Supreme Court has held that a warrant is not required to search abandoned property. See Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960). Further, at least one federal appeals court has upheld the warrantless search of 

a sealed mail package that was deemed abandoned. See U.S. v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 456-57 (7th Cir. 2003) (warrantless search of Express Mail package valid because sender used false return address and had no 

way to retrieve package, and addressee refused to accept delivery of package); see also People v. Opheim, No. D056183, 2011 WL 135800 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Jan. 18, 2011) (warrantless search of Express Mail 

package upheld because sender’s and recipient’s names were false, sender’s address was false, sender had not provided contact telephone numbers, and residents at recipient address disavowed any knowledge of 

or interest in package).

78 Congress could also make CBP’s authority to search inbound international mail upon reasonable suspicion, which currently is based principally on customs and postal regulations, an explicit statutory grant of authority. 

Cf. 19 U.S.C. § 1583 (authorizing customs searches of outbound international mail).

While these regulations provide a useful tool for postal law enforcement, this tool 

has limited utility. That is because the notice process – which alerts suspects 

that law enforcement is investigating them and eliminates the opportunity for 

controlled deliveries of suspect packages – makes this tool unworkable for many 

drug investigations.

Potential Legislation

Members of Congress have expressed interest in legislation to help law 

enforcement combat drug trafficking through the mail. One possible solution 

would be a combination of legislation and a public awareness campaign designed 

to reduce the public’s expectation of privacy in packages sent through the mail. 

For example, Congress could amend 39 U.S.C. § 404(c) by adding language 

clarifying that the warrant requirement applies only to sealed letters and does 

not apply to packages of any class. Further, Congress could expressly provide 

that the seal does not apply to packages, thereby authorizing any packages 

sent through the mail to be detained and inspected by law enforcement upon 

reasonable suspicion.78 Essentially, Congress would be expressly removing 

packages from the classification of sealed mail. Further, Congress could direct 

the Postal Service to establish a nationwide program to put the public on notice of 

the changes, including public awareness messages and notices at post offices.

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Ultimately, courts will need to decide the constitutionality of this issue. It may 

be argued that the language used by the Supreme Court in ex parte Jackson 

precludes any legislative or regulatory attempt to lessen Fourth Amendment 

protection for sealed mail.79 However, it is the expectation of privacy that underlies 

the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area.80 The classification of mail as 

sealed creates that expectation of privacy.81 By effectively removing packages 

from the sealed mail classification, and notifying the public that all packages sent 

through the mail are subject to inspection without a warrant, the actions outlined 

above should reduce the expectation of privacy to the point where warrantless 

searches of mail packages will be deemed constitutional.

79 See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (“No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and 

all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.”).

80 See Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 253 (“The significant Fourth Amendment interest [in this case] was in the privacy of this first-class mail.”); Desai at 360 (“Fourth Amendment protections are thus deeply intertwined with 

those postal statutes and regulations that determine the senders’ and recipients’ expectations of privacy.”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-41 (1979) (articulating the reasonable expectation of privacy 

test based on Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and its progeny).

81 See Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 251 (“It has long been held that first-class mail such as letters and sealed packages subject to letter postage ... is free from inspection by postal authorities, except in the manner 

provided by the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis added); see also Desai at 360.

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Appendix C: 

Management’s 

Comments

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