Our Staff 

Editor In Chief 

Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell 

Series Editor 

Dr. Peter Harris 

Editors 

Major Matthew House. USA 

Mrilyunjaya Dubey 

Captain Christopher Little, USAF 

Art & Design 

Dr. Achala Gunasekara-Rockwell 
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c ifi C

Perspectives 

Introduction 

1 Dr. Peter Harris, editor 

"Rock-solid" 

2 Michael Mazza 

Taiwan's Security in 

3 the Emerging IndoPacific Order 

Dr. Sana Hashmi 

Ir?esistible Trend 

4 Dr. Zuo Xiying 

March 2021 

Taiwan's Security 

5 Dr. Wu S�ang-su 

An Interpretation of 

6 Xi's Taiwan Policy ... 

Dr. Hsiao-chuan Liao 

Status Quo? What 

7 Status Quo? 

Jessica Drun 

OCEAN 

0 'EA 
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 1 

Introduction

The Past, Present, and 

Future of Cross–Taiwan 

Strait Relations

Dr. Peter Harris, editor

rom the vantage point of the 

United States, it is difficult to 

envisage a long-term solution 

to the problem of cross–Taiwan Strait 

relations. Beijing is adamant that Taiwan must one day be incorporated into 

the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC)—ideally through a peaceful process of reconciliation, but via force if 

necessary. According to Chinese leaders, this is a fundamental question of 

national sovereignty and territorial integrity and so there can be no compromise on the idea that, ultimately, both 

sides of the Taiwan Strait will have to 

recognize that they belong to a single 

jurisdiction.

However, in Taiwan there is little appetite for unification if this means absorption into the PRC. Even Taiwanese politicians who have long believed 

in the principle of “One China” cannot 

accept their island becoming just another province of an authoritarian 

hegemon. For Taiwanese who oppose 

unification altogether, the prospect of 

a union with China is nothing less 

than an existential threat to their national identity and democratic system.

Given the intractability of the Taiwan 

Question, it makes sense that US foreign policy is not ordered toward the 

end of encouraging a permanent political settlement between Beijing and 

Taipei—at least not in any meaningful 

sense. Instead, Washington’s priority 

is simply to deter the PRC from using 

military force to impose a settlement 

on its terms. To be sure, the importance of this goal should not be diminished. America’s political and military power has helped foster stability 

across the Taiwan Strait for decades—

arguably averting a military confrontation of catastrophic proportions.

Nevertheless, there are some serious 

questions about the durability of US 

policy toward Taiwan that demand 

consideration. Can the PRC be deterred forever, or will leaders in Beijing one day calculate that taking Taiwan by force is preferable to a neverF

1
Harris

Indo-Pacific Perspective │2 

ending standoff across the Strait? If 

push comes to shove, is the United 

States truly committed to the military 

defense of Taiwan against a Chinese 

invasion? What about military actions 

short of a full-scale invasion? Is there 

any prospect for a peaceful resolution? 

In this second Indo-Pacific Perspectives roundtable, a distinguished 

group of experts suggest some answers 

to these and related questions.

The roundtable begins with two assessments of what Taiwan’s current 

political status means for the United 

States and the wider region. First, Michael Mazza provides a forceful justification for America’s continued commitments to Taiwan. Mazza makes a 

two-pronged argument: (1) Taiwan’s 

political independence generates substantial material benefits for the 

United States in terms of both security and economics; and (2) the survival of democracy on at least one side 

of the Taiwan Strait ought to be considered a moral imperative. Mazza’s 

arguments are clear and compelling, 

an uncompromising rejection of the 

idea that America’s self-interest can 

be secured via retrenchment and restraint in East Asia.

Sana Hashmi goes beyond the USChina-Taiwan trilateral relationship 

to highlight the importance of Taiwan’s political status in a regional 

context. She notes that a growing 

number of states now invoke the concept of a unified “Indo-Pacific” region 

when describing their geopolitical environment. The Indo-Pacific regional 

construct seems to be rooted in the 

idea that states from India to Japan 

share a common set of interests in the 

shadow of China’s rise. Most importantly, Hashmi argues, Indo-Pacific 

states share an interest in preserving 

a rules-based order. Given that Taiwan is a democracy and a reliable follower of international rules, why is 

Taiwan so often excluded from imaginations of the Indo-Pacific? Giving 

Taiwan a formal role in the emerging 

Indo-Pacific order would not be well 

received in Beijing, but Hashmi argues that the benefits of including Taiwan as a responsible Indo-Pacific 

stakeholder should not be overlooked.

Zuo Xiying provides a methodical 

analysis of how the issue of crossStrait relations is viewed from Beijing. 

While Mazza argues that Taiwan 

should be considered a core issue by 

the United States, Zuo points out that 

Taiwan already is treated as a core 

concern by PRC leaders. This will not 

change. While Hashmi argues that 

Taiwan can contribute to a free and 

open Indo-Pacific, Zuo cautions war in 

the Taiwan Strait could easily bring 

the regional security architecture 

crashing down. These are sober observations about PRC strategic thinking 

that demand contemplation in the 

United States and elsewhere. Zuo 

maintains that the United States can 

have a positive role to play in 
Introduction

Indo-Pacific Perspective │3 

resolving the dispute between Beijing 

and Taipei, but he provides a frame 

for viewing cross-Strait relations that 

will be uncomfortable for many USbased analysts.

Turning to the question of the military 

balance across the Taiwan Strait, Wu 

Shang-su gives a masterful overview 

of Taiwan’s ability to withstand military pressure from the PRC. Could 

Taiwan retain control of its airspace in 

the event of a Chinese assault? For 

how long could the island resist a fullscale invasion? Wu gives a clear-eyed 

technical assessment of the military 

situation as it currently exists. He 

makes several conclusions, including 

the argument that Taipei’s defenses 

are currently deficient in some key areas, and that the prospect of US involvement in a cross-Strait confrontation—which, he points out, would 

transform such a conflict into a much 

wider conflagration—is likely critical 

to deterring China from attempting a 

direct assault.

How likely is a military invasion of 

Taiwan? Based on her analysis of public pronouncements by Xi Jinping, 

Hsiao-chuan Liao offers some reasons 

to be skeptical Beijing would resort to 

a military “solution” in the imminent 

future. Liao is pessimistic about the 

current and future state of cross-Strait 

relations. She notes that Xi is committed to the idea of unification between 

the PRC and Taiwan and that his 

rhetoric has become more forceful over 

time. Xi would be an unlikely peacemaker, to say the least. But in Liao’s 

analysis, Xi’s focus remains on achieving the so-called “China Dream”—that 

is, a strong and confident PRC. Xi’s interest in unification is not so urgent 

that he would sacrifice his domestic 

agenda for a costly war over Taiwan.

Finally, Jessica Drun returns the focus to the Taiwanese side of the Strait. 

She points out that political actors inside Taiwan have divergent views over 

the existing cross-Strait relationship, 

let alone the future political status of 

Taiwan. The concept of a “status quo” 

is important, given that parties to the 

dispute often cry foul—and, on occasion, have even threatened war—

whenever the prevailing political settlement between Beijing and Taipei is 

placed in jeopardy. But what if there 

is no agreement over how to describe 

the status quo? According to Drun, the 

absence of an intersubjective agreement over how to interpret the crossStrait status quo has wide-ranging political and diplomatic consequences. 

Drun’s contribution is a fitting conclusion to the roundtable, encapsulating 

just how complex cross-Strait relations 

are—and just how difficult it will be 

for Beijing and Taipei to resolve their 

differences through negotiations.

What advice do the contributors have 

for Taiwan, China, the United States, 

and other regional powers? None 

would disagree with Winston Churchill that “meeting jaw-to-jaw is better 
Harris

Indo-Pacific Perspective │4 

than war,” but they each have different views on how diplomacy can be returned to center stage. All are somewhat pessimistic about the future, 

even if they support the basic idea 

that war can be avoided through 

adroit political leadership and strategic thinking on all sides. That, at 

least, is something for far-sighted and 

peaceable leaders to build upon. Not 

much, but not nothing. ■

Dr. Peter Harris

Dr. Harris is an assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University, 

where his teaching and research focus on international security, international relations 

theory, and US foreign policy. He serves as 

the editor for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs’ new “Indo-Pacific Perspectives” series. 

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied 

in JIPA are those of the authors and should 

not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and 

Training Command, Air University, or other 

agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 5 

“Rock-solid”

America’s Past and 

Present Commitment 

to Taiwan

Michael Mazza

n 23 January 2021, 15 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

aircraft flew into the southwest corner of Taiwan’s air defense 

identification zone (ADIZ). Thirteen 

aircraft repeated the exercise the following day. The US Department of 

State called on Beijing “to cease its 

military, diplomatic, and economic 

pressure against Taiwan” and, in what 

must have been reassuring words to 

leaders in Taipei, described American 

“commitment” to Taiwan as “rocksolid.” Those are strong words from 

the new Biden administration, especially given the lack of a legal obligation to defend Taiwan and the lack of 

formal bilateral diplomatic ties.

That rock-solid commitment has endured for decades, even as the particulars of Taiwan policy have evolved. In 

the Formosa Resolution of 1955, Congress pre-authorized Pres. Dwight D. 

Eisenhower to use force in defense of 

Taiwan, noting that armed attack 

“would gravely endanger the peace 

and security of the West Pacific area” 

and that “the secure possession by 

friendly governments of the Western 

Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa 

is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all 

friendly nations in or bordering upon 

the Pacific Ocean.”1

The American switch in diplomatic 

recognition from the Republic of China 

to the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) in 1979 did not fundamentally 

change that outlook. The Taiwan Relations Act, passed with veto-proof majorities and signed into law by Pres. 

Jimmy Carter, described US policy 

thusly:

2. to declare that peace and stability in the

area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are

matters of international concern; [. . .]

4. to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,

including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat

to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United

States . . .2

Why is the US commitment to Taiwan 

“rock-solid” and why must it remain 

so? The commitment has its origin in 

the aftermath of World War II, as 

American strategists were establishO

2
Mazza

Indo-Pacific Perspective │6 

ing a forward defense perimeter to ensure the events of 7 December 1941, 

would never be repeated. Gen Douglas 

MacArthur, fretting that Taiwan 

might fall into communist hands, in a 

memorandum transmitted to Washington just 11 days before the outbreak of the Korean War, compared 

the island to an “unsinkable aircraft 

carrier and submarine tender ideally 

located to accomplish Soviet offensive 

strategy and at the same time checkmate counteroffensive operations by 

United States Forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines.”3 Seven 

decades later, that logic still holds relevance. 

Were China to one day occupy Taiwan, 

the defense of Japan and the Philippines, both US allies, would become 

far more complicated. China would 

bolster its ability to control the South 

China Sea waterways should it choose 

to do so. Most troubling of all, the PLA 

would for the first time have unimpeded access to the Pacific Ocean, allowing it more easily to threaten 

Guam, Hawaii, and the continental 

United States. PLA ballistic missile 

submarines might ply the waters of 

the Western Pacific, allowing China to 

pose a more potent nuclear weapons 

threat to the United States.

As long as Washington assesses that 

American security is best served by 

defending forward—an approach that 

has served the United States well over 

the past 70 years—Taiwan’s de facto

independence will remain a key US interest and driver of American policy in 

Asia.

The PRC’s annexation of Taiwan 

would, moreover, usher in a new regional order in Asia—one that would 

be conducive to the interests of no one 

but Beijing and its hangers-on. The 

presiding, if currently contested, order 

is marked by widespread (though not 

unanimous) embrace of an understanding of law of the sea grounded in 

both customary law and the United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea, liberal approaches to international trade, and a preference for the 

peaceful settlement of disputes. Some 

in Asia may bristle that the current 

order has long been dominated by the 

United States, but it is hard to argue 

with results: the emergence of several 

high-income countries in the decades 

since World War II, healthy growth in 

several developing economies, and 

more than four decades without greatpower war.

But a successful PRC occupation of 

Taiwan would overturn the norms governing the current regional order. The 

Asia-Pacific would fast become a 

realm in which might makes right; in 

which traditional conceptions of freedom of navigation are likely jettisoned; in which security competitions 

grow in intensity, to the detriment of 

economic prosperity; and in which 

China increasingly sets the terms of 

trade for those inside and outside the 
“Rock-solid”

Indo-Pacific Perspective │7 

region. Such an outcome would not be 

conducive to the national security of 

the United States as it is traditionally 

understood.

Economic wellbeing is another key 

driver of the American commitment to 

Taiwan. US economic interests in Taiwan are significant. Taiwan is consistently a top-10 trading partner. According to the Office of the United States 

Trade Representative, Taiwan was 

America’s 13th-largest goods export 

market in 2019 and the 6th-largest agricultural export market.4

What is more, Taiwan occupies a key 

position in global tech supply chains. 

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 

Company, LTD, the world’s largest 

dedicated semiconductor foundry, is a 

chip supplier for major American companies from Advanced Micro Devices 

to Qualcomm and from Apple to 

Nvidia. Bloomberg News described 

“Taiwan’s grip on the semiconductor 

business” as “a choke point in the 

global supply chain.” Its dominance of 

the industry, moreover, has “helped 

Taiwan form a comprehensive ecosystem around it: ASE Technology Holding is the world’s top chip assembler, 

while MediaTek has become the largest smartphone chipset vendor.”5 Put 

simply, if the United States were to 

lose access to Taiwan’s innovators and 

manufacturers, the American tech industry could be paralyzed.

Last, but certainly not least, Taiwan is 

important to the United States 

because it is a thriving liberal democracy—one whose freedom is threatened by a much larger authoritarian 

neighbor. American leaders have long 

assessed that a world in which democracies are prevalent is a world that is 

conducive to US interests and national 

security. And although a crusading 

impulse has waxed and waned as a 

driver of American foreign policy, it 

has arguably never been absent. Ensuring Taiwan’s survival as a de facto 

independent democratic state, then, is 

critical if Washington wants to shape 

a world in which the United States 

can thrive.

The existence of Taiwan’s democracy 

serves as proof-positive that there is 

nothing incompatible between a Chinese-speaking polity and self-government. Quite the contrary. If democracy 

is one day to come to China—a hope, 

even if not, at this point, an explicit 

aim of American policy—it may be in 

no small part due to dissidents and reformers looking admiringly at, learning from, and drawing inspiration 

from Taiwan’s own experiences with 

one-party rule, liberalization, and 

democratic consolidation.

Taiwan is a country of only 24 million 

people. It lies less than 100 miles from 

the PRC coastline and is separated 

from the United States by the entire 

width of the Pacific Ocean. Its quarrel 

with China has its roots in a civil war 

that ended in 1949 and Cold War conditions that have persisted despite the 
Mazza

Indo-Pacific Perspective │8 

Cold War’s end. With US–China tensions on the rise across multiple facets 

of the bilateral relationship, some may 

question whether Taiwan is worth the 

trouble for Washington. It is. Indeed, 

Taiwan is where various points of friction converge. It is arguably where 

American and Chinese national security concerns, visions of regional order, 

economic and technological interests, 

and core values most directly collide.

Of course, the country is also home to 

freedom-loving people who want nothing more than to live in peace with 

their neighbors. The United States 

has every reason to ensure Taiwan’s 

citizens can continue doing so. ■

Notes

1 See: “Joint Resolution by the Congress,” 29 January 

1955, https://history.state.gov/. 2 For the full text of the Act, see: Taiwan Relations 

Act, 1 January 1979, https://www.ait.org.tw/. 3 See: “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup),” 25 June 1950, https://history.state.gov/. 

Michael Mazza

Mr. Mazza is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and an expert on US 

defense policy, cross-Taiwan Strait relations, 

and Chinese military policy. 

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied 

in JIPA are those of the authors and should 

not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and 

Training Command, Air University, or other 

agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents. 

4 Figures are taken from the Office of the United 

States Trade Representative, “U.S.-Taiwan Trade 

Facts,” https://ustr.gov/. 5 Alan Crawford, Jarrell Dillard, Helene Fouquet, 

and Isabel Reynolds, “The world is dangerously dependent on Taiwan for semiconductors,” Japan 

Times, 26 January 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/. 
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 9

Taiwan’s 

Security in 

the Emerging 

Indo-Pacific 

Order

Dr. Sana Hashmi

he past few years have seen 

dramatic changes taking place 

in Indo-Pacific geopolitics, 

such as China’s rise, Beijing’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, and the 

erosion of American supremacy. As 

the region’s two major powers, the 

changing relationship between China 

and the United States impacts regional and international security dynamics and the affairs of small and 

middle powers. After all, most of the 

small and middle powers of the IndoPacific region are reliant on—and 

have tilted toward—either of the two 

superpowers.

Amid growing competition between 

the United States and China, the 

Indo-Pacific region has gained significant prominence. Interestingly, the 

countries that are trying to avoid entanglement in the US–China confrontation—which are not interested in 

choosing one major power over the 

other—are also supporting the idea of 

the Indo-Pacific. The recently released 

Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN) outlook on the Indo-Pacific region, shows a growing acceptance of the Indo-Pacific construct. 

Several other countries—including 

those of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—have embraced the 

Indo-Pacific as a means to preserve a 

rules-based order in the twenty-first 

century. These developments are 

shaped, in part, by the growing US–

China competition that reached a high 

level during the Trump administration 

and is likely to be continued under 

Pres. Joe Biden.

Taiwan’s security is directly linked 

with the United States and its relations with China. Any major change in 

the regional or bilateral dynamics will 

have a direct impact on Taiwan. Taiwan has been quick in sensing the 

growing importance of the Indo-Pacific 

region on strategic, diplomatic, and 

economic fronts. As a result, Taiwan 

has expressed its willingness to play 

T

3
Hashmi

Indo-Pacific Perspective │10

an active role in shaping the region. 

While Taiwan is yet to devise its own 

blueprint for the Indo-Pacific region, 

such a step will likely materialize 

sooner rather than later. Taiwan’s expression of interest in joining the 

Indo-Pacific region has been sufficiently showcased by Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen, who on several occasions has stated that Taiwan can 

play an instrumental role in the region. Speaking at the 2020 Taiwan–

US–Japan Trilateral Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue on 8 December, Tsai 

urged the Indo-Pacific countries to 

work together toward a resilient and 

peaceful future. She stated, “Leveraging expertise and capabilities, Taiwan 

and its like-minded partners in the region can effectively address the challenges ahead.”1

Taiwan—like other major rule-abiding 

stakeholders—advocates a rules-based 

order, inclusiveness, and transparency; its COVID-19 response is an important example in that context. Taiwan’s emerging response seems 

aligned with the officially declared policies of the US (Free and Open IndoPacific), India (Act East Policy), and 

Japan (Partnership for Quality Infrastructure). So far, only the United 

States has formally included Taiwan 

in its Indo-Pacific strategy; while being open to the idea, other leading 

Indo-Pacific countries have shied away 

from officially mentioning Taiwan as a 

partner country. Nevertheless, the last 

four years of Tsai’s government have 

witnessed a stronger relationship between Taiwan and its Indo-Pacific 

partners.

A key aspect of Taiwan’s strategic ties 

in the region is its relationship with 

the United States. Over the past four 

years, the Taiwan–US relationship 

has gained in considerable strategic 

weight. During the Trump administration, Taiwan became more prominent 

in US foreign policy pronouncements—even though at times Trump 

appeared to use Taiwan as a card in 

his China agenda. The pro-Taiwan initiatives brought forth by the Trump 

administration are, in all likelihood, 

going to be carried forward by the 

Biden administration. At least, recent 

statements by Biden’s advisers are indicative of continuity. There has also 

been speculation that the Biden administration would pay more attention 

to Taiwan, as to give it a greater place 

in the Indo-Pacific deliberations. 

America’s response has been amplified 

by Taiwan’s proactive engagement 

with the Indo-Pacific countries during 

the COVID-19 pandemic.

A region as diverse as the Indo-Pacific 

should not forget the variety of mutual 

concerns and common interests that 

include traditional and nontraditional 

security issues. One such common concern has continued to be the rise of 

China. If the COVID-19 pandemic 

made countries of the region realize 

how interconnected they were on the 
Taiwan’s Security in the Emerging Indo-Pacific Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │11

health front, then the perception of 

unprovoked Chinese aggression has 

led to an increasing realization of vulnerabilities on the security front. Over 

the past year—amid a global pandemic, no less—China’s trade war 

with the United States, border conflict 

with India, trade boycotts of Australian goods, and the encroachment into 

Taiwanese and Vietnamese territories 

has portrayed China in an increasingly aggressive light on the world 

stage. 

The idea of an Indo-Pacific region—

spurred by former Prime Minister of 

Japan Shinzo Abe’s idea of bringing 

together the Indian and Pacific 

oceans—has created anxieties for 

China. China feels threatened by the 

emerging Indo-Pacific order—fearing 

marginalization. While support for the 

notion of an Indo-Pacific region derives from much more than just 

shared concerns over China’s rise, it is 

true that China has played an instrumental role in shaping countries’ respective visions of what the Indo-Pacific region needs to look like. In August 2020, Tsai used her keynote address at the 2020 Ketagalan Forum to 

state:

It is time for like-minded countries, and 

democratic friends in the Indo-Pacific region 

and beyond, to discuss a framework to generate sustained and concerted efforts to maintain a strategic order that deters unilateral 

aggressive actions. We need a strategic order 

that encourages cooperation, transparency 

and problem-solving through dialogue, not 

threats of war. We need a strategy that 

avoids war, yet clearly conveys our resolve to 

protect our democracies. 2

Such statements by world leaders 

were common throughout 2020, as 

they struggled with how to deal with 

the pandemic. Simultaneously, countries such as India, Australia, and 

Canada during this time began to feel 

the brunt of China’s aggression. The 

Indo-Pacific construct has resulted in 

giving countries a platform to deal 

with common challenges in a seemingly intractable situation. The IndoPacific is not premised on an overtly 

anti-China component and is even 

open to including China as a responsible stakeholder in the future. Nevertheless, it is true that growing Chinese 

aggression has been a common concern for those countries advocating for 

a rules-based order. It is somewhat 

puzzling, despite convergent interests 

and shared concern in the face of the 

“China threat,” that Taiwan—a democratic country that is aligned with the 

United States and its other allies—is 

still not often a part of the Indo-Pacific 

official discourse. Protecting Taiwan’s 

integrity is vital to preserving a rulesbased and inclusive order where peace 

and stability are of the utmost important values.

As the Indo-Pacific region evolves, it 

will open new opportunities for Taiwan to diversify its partnerships and 

expand cooperation with countries of 

the extended region. It is equally important for Taiwan to gather support 
Hashmi

Indo-Pacific Perspective │12

from fellow democracies in the IndoPacific region. While Taiwan has been 

able to secure bipartisan support in 

the United States in recent years, the 

Biden administration’s focus, for at 

least the first few months, is likely to

be on containing the pandemic and 

other domestic issues. This does not 

mean the Biden administration will 

lose interest in the Indo-Pacific. The 

appointment of an “Indo-Pacific czar” 

and other renowned foreign policy and 

security experts in the new administration demonstrates that the 

United States is attempting a renewed 

“pivot” to Asia. The Indo-Pacific region 

will continue to remain the top priority in US foreign policy. It will be critical for Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific 

countries to reorient its joint focus. It 

is in the interests of regional powers to 

facilitate Taiwan’s greater participation in collective diplomacy—leading 

to a robust security network against 

common threats. 

In the twenty-first century, countries 

are seeking beyond traditional ways of 

cooperation to elevate relationships. 

New technologies and new challenges 

have led to this novel, yet challenging 

phase in international relations. Some 

countries are opting for “minilateral” 

mechanisms within the Indo-Pacific 

region. The Global Cooperation and 

Training Framework should be expanded beyond its current membership of the United States, Japan, and 

Taiwan, to include more Indo-Pacific 

countries. This will allow more regional powers to learn from Taiwan’s 

best practices and for Taiwan to 

demonstrate its acclaimed “Taiwan 

model.” Like other major stakeholders, 

Taiwan’s policy has been open, transparent, and inclusive. Its participation 

in regional frameworks will only 

strengthen the rules-based Indo-Pacific order. 

Most importantly, Indo-Pacific nations 

must recognize that, if China escalates 

a military conflict with Taiwan, then 

such a move would disrupt the peace 

and stability of the entire region. This 

scenario is not in the best interests of 

the countries of the region. Integrating 

Taiwan more formally into regional 

deliberations and processes would 

make countries more aware about the 

shared risks of a cross-Strait conflict. 

In turn, this might pressure the region 

to find ways to avoid such a situation. 

As far as Taiwan is concerned, a 

clearly articulated Indo-Pacific policy 

would serve its interests better, placing it amid all critical debates of the 

region. ■

Dr. Sana Hashmi

Dr. Hashmi is Visiting Fellow, Taiwan-Asia 

Exchange Foundation. She is the author 

of China’s Approach towards Territorial Disputes: Lessons and Prospects. 
Taiwan’s Security in the Emerging Indo-Pacific Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │13

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied 

in JIPA are those of the authors and should 

not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and 

Training Command, Air University, or other 

agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

Notes

1 “President Tsai Attends Opening of 2020 TaiwanUS-Japan Trilateral Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue”, 

Office of the President of Republic of China (Taiwan), 

8 December 2020, https://english.president.gov.tw/.

2 “President Tsai attends the Ketagalan Forum-

2020 Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue”, Office of the 

President of Republic of China (Taiwan), 8 August 

2020, https://english.president.gov.tw/.
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 14

Irresistible 

Trend

The US–China 

Interest Asymmetry 

and Taiwan’s Future

Dr. Zuo Xiying

aiwan is one of the core issues 

in US–China relations. America’s position on the Taiwan issue has been the weathervane in the 

Western Pacific. This was true during 

the early stages of the Cold War, in 

US–China strategic cooperation after 

the Sino-Soviet split, and in the contemporary context of China’s rise. 

China’s rise after the Cold War.. In 

the past decade, with the deterioration 

of US–China relations, some US analysts have discussed crucial issues concerning Taiwan. Three profound questions needing further thought are 

should the United States abandon 

Taiwan,1 can the United States reach 

a grand bargain with China,2 and does 

US policy toward Taiwan need to be 

unambiguous?3 Behind these discussions lies a core question: Is Taiwan’s 

security a core concern of the United 

States? Like in the United States, 

there are also different views in 

China. This article will try to provide 

an interpretation.

The Taiwan Issue in American 

Foreign Policy

In the context of China’s rapid rise, a 

growing number of US-based analysts 

have endorsed Taiwan as a core concern in the past decade. This trend is 

related to two factors. First, US policy 

toward China has undergone fundamental changes. Since the Obama administration, the United States has 

gradually adjusted its China policy, 

trying to strengthen US–Taiwan relations, while dealing with the unstable 

situation in the Taiwan Strait. Second, 

mainland China’s desire for reunification will be promoted accordingly. 

With Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen’s rejection of the 1992 Consensus, Beijing 

has switched its guideline for promoting reunification from “placing hope on 

the Taiwanese” to “placing more hope 

on the mainland itself.”4

In the United States, analysts debate 

whether Taiwan’s security is a core 

concern or not. Supporters of this idea 

point to the island’s strategic value for 

containing mainland China and to the 

issue of American credibility. 

T

4
Irresistible Trend

Indo-Pacific Perspective │15

Opponents are concerned about the 

worst-case scenario: a showdown between China and the United States. 

This situation will ascertain the high 

costs that the United States will have 

to pay if it is determined to intervene 

to prevent a nonconsensual reunification. However, Taiwan’s status as an 

issue in American foreign policy is dynamic. Whether Taiwan’s security is a 

core concern of the United States depends not only on the historical framework but also on the United States, 

Taiwan, and mainland China. In different periods, the answer will not be 

the same.

To be sure, Taiwan is related to some 

vital interests of the United States, 

and the cost of abandoning Taiwan 

would be high. The United States 

would lose an essential tool with 

which to contain China in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, it would make 

a significant dent in the US commitment to its alliances, arguably weakening America’s reputation in this respect. However, China is politically opposed to the United States regarding 

Taiwan as its core interest and even 

more opposed to the United States regarding Taiwan as part of its sphere of 

influence. Almost all Chinese people 

agree that the Taiwan issue concerns 

China’s sovereignty. As stated in 

China’s white paper, The One-China 

Principle and the Taiwan Issue, “[s]ettlement of the Taiwan issue and realization of the complete reunification of 

China embodies the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.”5 On 

this point, there is a fundamental conflict between China and the United 

States. 

Historically, the United States has 

abandoned and revalued Taiwan several times since World War II. In Chinese interpretations, Taiwan is a vital 

card that the United States can use to 

contain China. However, China and 

the United States have asymmetric interests on this issue.6 For China, Taiwan is related to the nation’s reunification, which is a core issue of sovereignty upon which there can be no 

compromise. Regarded as one of 

China’s constant core interests, Taiwan is at the forefront. For the United 

States, of course, Taiwan is also critical. Still, its significance is much lower 

than for China, which means it is a 

wavering core interest. Under some 

extreme circumstances in China and 

the United States, interests might be 

compromised. The constant core interest is one of the fundamental differences between Beijing’s One-China 

Principle and Washington’s OneChina Policy: policies can change, 

whereas principles do not.

Will the US Intervene in a Future 

Taiwan Strait Conflict?

Another critical issue is whether the 

United States would intervene by 

force if there were a crisis across the 

Taiwan Strait in the future. This question seems easy to answer. In the 
Zuo

Indo-Pacific Perspective │16

Three Communiqués, the United 

States has repeatedly reiterated its interest in the Taiwan issue’s peaceful 

settlement. In the Taiwan Relations 

Act, the United States has also clearly 

expressed its “grave concern” about 

the use of nonpeaceful means.7 However, the United States’ stated intention is one thing, and its realistic 

choice when facing the conflict is another. The tangible answer to this 

question is that it depends on the prevailing US calculation of its benefits 

and costs.

The United States has abandoned its 

allies twice in the Asia-Pacific: Pres. 

Richard Nixon’s withdrawal from 

South Vietnam in 1973 and Pres. 

Jimmy Carter’s establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and disconnection with 

the Republic of China in Taiwan in 

1979. These two abandonment instances have in common that they 

were both high-cost and highly beneficial from the US perspective.

It is unlikely that the United States 

will choose to abandon Taiwan to because it eyes strategic gains. The strategic opportunity that China and the 

United States had to balance against 

the Soviet Union during the Cold War 

jointly will not repeat. Additionally, 

the possibility of a grand bargain between China and the United States in 

the Western Pacific is also very low. 

However, China may impose high 

costs to compel the United States to 

abandon Taiwan. After all, the United 

States has always been ambiguous 

about the form and extent of any interventions it would take in Taiwan’s 

defense; grave concern is a phrase 

with a wide range of policy space. 

Therefore, it is uncertain how the 

United States might intervene in future conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, 

particularly if Washington judged the 

costs of intervention to be high. An intervention could be military in nature, 

but it could also take the form of political isolation or economic sanctions 

against Beijing.

America’s conflicted position on 

whether it would intervene militarily 

in the Taiwan Strait has implications 

for China. According to common sense, 

it is unrealistic for China to formulate 

its strategy and policy to assume that 

the United States would not intervene 

in Taiwan. Instead, China must prepare for the worst-case scenario: a US 

military intervention in China’s reunification. The expectation of US intervention will be a constant in Chinese 

strategic planning. This is not to say 

that China regards the United States 

as an adversary. Rather, the expectation of US intervention is merely unavoidable in the context of US equivocation and ambiguity.

China welcomes the United States to 

play a constructive role in China’s 

peaceful reunification. As Huang 

Jiashu, a professor at the Renmin 

University of China, pointed out, “the 
Irresistible Trend

Indo-Pacific Perspective │17

most ideal choice is to let the United 

States help us in the final peaceful 

settlement of the Taiwan issue. If such 

a goal can’t be achieved, at least we 

should not let the United States become an obstacle. If such a goal still 

can’t be achieved, at least we can let 

the United States play a positive role 

in opposing Taiwanese independence.”8 In the past, China and the 

United States accepted the ambiguity 

of each other’s positions. However, 

with the growing intensity of strategic 

competition, all parties’ policy space is 

getting smaller, and the Taiwan Strait 

crisis is emerging.9

The future conflict between China and 

the United States on Taiwan is a rivalry of strength and a clash of resolve—a contest between China’s determination to uphold its state sovereignty and the United States’ resolve 

to defend its commitment. As the 

power gap between China and the 

United States shrinks, the willpower 

contest will become a decisive factor. 

This historical trend is apparent. The 

strategy of using Taiwan to contain 

mainland China may entangle the 

United States in a disastrous direct 

conflict between China and the United 

States, turning Taiwan into a “strategic high-risk asset” of the United 

States.10

If China becomes determined to start 

the agenda of reunification, its leaders 

will do so prudently but ready to bear 

any costs, including political isolation, 

economic sanctions, and military intervention. For the United States, the 

price is bound to be very high. The final result will most likely be that the 

United States cannot stop China’s reunification process militarily. Washington can only impose costs on China 

through political isolation and economic sanctions to make up for its loss 

in reputation. 

Conclusion

There is a vast asymmetry of interests 

between China and the United States 

on the Taiwan issue, which leads to 

the asymmetry of resolve. That will be 

the crucial factor affecting the situation in the Taiwan Strait in the future. 

If one day, China and the United 

States must make independent decisions on the future of Taiwan, whether 

Taiwan’s security is a core concern of 

the United States will become a simple choice. In this regard, some USbased analysts, such as Barry R. Posen, John J. Mearsheimer, and 

Charles Glaser, have pointed out the 

historical trend. Unfortunately, their 

view is not mainstream in the United 

States, and it is difficult to convert 

into foreign policy. ■

Dr. Zuo Xiying

Dr. Zuo is Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China. 
Zuo

Indo-Pacific Perspective │18

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied 

in JIPA are those of the authors and should 

not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and 

Notes

1 Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for 

U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 

Press, 2014), 102–04; John J. Mearsheimer, “Taiwan’s Dire Straits,” National Interest, no.130 (2014), 

29–39; and John J. Mearsheimer, “RIP Taiwan?” National Interest, 24 July 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/. 2 Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?: 

Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign 

Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 80–91; Nancy Bernkopf 

Tucker and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Should the United 

States Abandon Taiwan?,” Washington Quarterly 34, 

no. 4 (2011): 23–37; Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China 

Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military 

Competition and Accommodation,” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015): 49–90; and Ely Ratner, “There 

Is No Grand Bargain with China: Why Trump and Xi 

Can’t Meet Each Other Halfway,” Foreign Affairs, 27 

November 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/. 3 Richard Haass and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous,” Foreign Affairs, 2 September 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/; and Bonnie S. Glaser et al., “Dire Straits: 

Should American Support for Taiwan Be Ambiguous?,” Foreign Affairs, 24 September 2020, 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/. 

Training Command, Air University, or other 

agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

4 Xin Qiang, “Having Much in Common? Changes 

and Continuity in Beijing’s Taiwan Policy,” Pacific 

Review, 5 June 2020, https://doi.org/. 5 Taiwan Affairs Office and The Information Office of 

the State Council, The One-China Principle and the 

Taiwan Issue, February 2000, http://www.taiwan.cn/. 6 Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 27, no. 2 (2002):48–

85.

7 Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, 10 April 

1979, https://uscode.house.gov/. 8 Huang Jiashu, “Lun heping tongyi zhi lujing zhuanhuan [On the Path Transformation of ‘Peaceful Reunification’],” Taiwan Yanjiu [Taiwan Studies], no. 6 

(2017), 5.

9 Zuo Xiying, “Unbalanced Deterrence: Coercive 

Threat, Reassurance and the US-China Rivalry in 

Taiwan Strait,” Pacific Review, 3 December 2019, 

https://doi.org/. 10 Xin Qiang, “ Zhanlue gaowei zichan: quanli geju, 

zhongmei guanxi yu Taiwan zhanlue juese de shanbian [Strategic High-Risk Assets: Power Structure, 

Sino-US Relations and the Evolution of Taiwan’s 

Strategic Role],” Taiwan Yanjiu Jikan [Taiwan Research Journal], no. 4 (2020): 72–83.
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 19

Taiwan’s 

Security

An Intertwined Knot

Dr. Wu Shang-su

ince 1949, the Taiwan Strait 

has been a potential flashpoint 

for conflict —something especially true in the last decade due to 

the shifting balance of the forces between the militaries on either side. 

Traditionally, Taiwan relies on the geographic barrier of the Strait and support from the United States—through 

arms sales and via the latent threat of 

potential military intervention—to 

balance against strategic pressure 

from China. However, Beijing enjoys 

both asymmetrical and symmetrical 

military advantages. Asymmetrically, 

the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

has expanded the arsenal of standoff 

firepower with ballistic missiles, rockets, cruise missiles, and air-to-surface 

missiles in the last three decades. 

Therefore, the whole island of Taiwan 

is vulnerable to missile strikes from 

China.1 Combined with other capabilities—such as surveillance satellites 

and submarines—these standoff weapons underpin the PLA’s antiaccess/aerial-denial (A2/AD) strategy to counter 

US military deployments in the region.

Symmetrically, Beijing has substantially modernized its conventional military assets; the PLA Navy (PLAN) 

boats new surface and underwater 

fleets could be used to block maritime 

access to Taiwan and establish sea 

control, an indispensable condition for 

amphibious invasion.2 The PLA Air 

Force (PLAAF) and the PLAN Air 

Force have each strengthened their 

fighter wings with new indigenous and 

Russian models, backed by aerial 

warning and command system and 

aerial refueling platforms to achieve 

the air superiority necessary for airstrikes and air cover for a possible invasion of Taiwan.3 Finally, both the 

PLAAF and PLAN have enlarged their 

airborne and amphibious capacities 

for projecting forces across the Strait.4

In contrast, Taiwan’s defenses have 

fallen into inferiority. Air defense, sea 

denial, and antilanding measures 

S

5
Wu

Indo-Pacific Perspective │20

have been the core of Taipei’s island 

defense strategy for decades. Still, related capabilities undermine the developments on the other side of the 

Strait.5 Taiwan’s fighters and surfaceto-air missiles (SAM), and related surveillance facilitates are the backbones 

to prevent airstrikes from China. But 

Taipei’s airbases, radars, SAM batteries, and other air defense facilities 

have become the main targets of 

standoff firepower from the Mainland.

Consequently, the loss of Taiwan’s air 

defense capacity could be demolished 

in the first wave of Chinese attacks.6

If Chinese Special Forces penetrated 

Taiwan in advance of an attack, then 

this would represent another serious 

threat to Taiwan’s air defense. Taiwan’s air defense capabilities—especially the fighters—have come to occupy a significant portion of the country’s defense budget. There are severe 

doubts about the wisdom of military 

spending priorities.7

Regarding sea denial, Taiwan’s fast 

attack craft and onshore launchers of 

antiship cruise missiles are the mainstays to deter the PLAN’s surface vessels, which would be essential for an 

amphibious invasion to capture the island.8 However, these defenses may 

also become the targets of China’s 

standoff firepower, and airstrikes after 

the neutralization of Taiwan’s air defenses. Taipei possesses four destroyers and 22 frigates, but these assets 

could be vulnerable to Beijing’s A2/AD 

firepower and may not have much capacity left for sea denial.9 Antilanding 

may be more realistic to achieve because of Taiwan’s possible quantitative superiority in terms of conventional forces (although the PLAN’s 

amphibious capacity is increasing, for 

the foreseeable future, it will be limited). However, Taiwan’s antilanding 

capability significantly relies on conscription, which is how the island can 

assemble a large reserve of soldiers. 

Yet conscription has been cut to four 

months of basic training without being 

deployed to regular units, raising 

questions about whether such inexperienced reserves could form the adequate mobilized units to accomplish 

antilanding missions. Regular units 

also face a shortage of soldiers due to 

the lack of conscripts.10 Sabotage by 

Chinese Special Forces could further 

disrupt antilanding forces’ preparation, or even paralyze the chain of 

command.

Since 2016, the Tsai Ing-wen administration has pursued a military buildup, with a focus on defensive capabilities. For air defense, Taipei has procured 66 F-16C/B Block 70 fighters, 

Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and 

FIM-92 SAMs, and other equipment 

from Washington, along with indigenous funding projects such as the 

Tien-Kung series SAMs and AT-5 advanced trainers/light fighters.11 Such 

investment certainly strengthens the 

capacity and capabilities of air 
Taiwan’s Security

Indo-Pacific Perspective │21

defense. Additionally, the introduction 

of the indigenous Wan-Chien, American air-to-ground (AGM) missiles such 

as the AGM-154 and AGM-88, AGM84 land-attack missiles, land-based 

Hsiung-Fung 2E cruise missiles, the 

Army Tactical Missiles, and other 

standoff munitions allow Taiwan to attack targets (whether standoff firepower airbases or other military facilities) in Fujian province and even farther inland.12 Such offensive operations lower the pressure on Taiwan’s 

air defense.

However, the airbases’ vulnerability of 

Taiwan is unchanged, meaning that 

Taiwanese fighters may not have a 

chance to take off or return to bases 

after flying their first sorties. Putting 

fighters in the shelters in Eastern Taiwan has been a solution for three decades, but it comes at the cost of reducing air defenses and limiting other 

aerial operations. There is also a risk 

that China may develop bunker-buster 

munitions. Taipei’s offensive capabilities thus present a dilemma: a 

preemptive strike is militarily ideal 

for the most significant impact, but it 

may cause a “troublemaker” label by 

the international community with a 

risk of losing the support of third parties, especially the United States. Suppose Beijing launches the first salvo of 

attacks. In that case, most of Taiwan’s

fighters will be occupied with mere 

survival and air defense— if not entirely neutralized— which would 

result in a missed opportunity to use 

offensive capabilities to relieve pressure on Taiwan’s air defenses.

Taiwan’s naval modernization program is ambitious. It covers a broad 

spectrum of vessels, including Tuo 

Chiang-class stealth corvettes, submarines, frigates, landing platform docks, 

high-speed minelayers, submarine rescue ships, and mine countermeasure 

vessels. These various projects reflect 

the Tsai administration’s intention of 

developing the indigenous defense industry with a balanced naval strategy 

aimed at both sea control and sea denial.13 Although sea control-oriented 

assets, such as frigates and amphibious transport docks, are valuable in 

peacetime, their prospects for survival 

in the face of the Chinese A2/AD firepower are doubtable. As for the sea denial-oriented vessels, their survival 

during wartime would be better but 

far from guaranteed. The limited 

length of the Taiwanese coastlines 

could be studied by the PLAN in advance to know the “hideouts” of Taiwanese vessels, which would be vulnerable to Chinese antiship cruise 

missiles (ASCM) and other weapons.14

The submarines with the highest 

stealth level constitute Taiwan’s strategic reserve, but China’s active deployment of underwater sensors may 

create constraints on their operations.15 Besides, transforming an indigenous project of defense manufacturing into a credible fighting force is 
Wu

Indo-Pacific Perspective │22

expensive, time-consuming, and an 

uncertain endeavor. Considering the 

fast pace of PLAN naval construction, 

time is not on Taipei’s side when it 

comes to maritime projects.

On land, various new procurements 

have added multiple layers of defense. 

These include M1A2T main battle 

tanks (MBT), onshore Harpoon and 

Hsiung-Fung series ASCMs, indigenous infantry fighting vehicles, multilaunch rocket systems, AH-64E and 

AH-1W attack helicopters, FGM-148 

and BGM-71 antitank missiles, and 

UH-60M utility and CH-47D transport 

helicopters.16 The ASCMs, rockets, 

and other munitions can directly sink 

the PLAN amphibious transport 

docks. The attack helicopters would 

engage remaining landing vehicles 

and vessels approaching coastlines 

and any Chinese airborne troops. The 

M1A2T MBTs have better armor and 

firepower than the old M-48Hs and M60A3s. Along with the infantry and artillery firepower, these units would 

thwart attempts to form beachheads 

by Chinese amphibious forces.17 Utility and transport helicopters could 

rapidly deploy troops for reinforcement. Tactically, warfare in this stage 

of fighting would take place under conditions of one side enjoying air superiority, which means that the outcome 

of antilanding operations depend on 

how many Taiwanese SAMs and other 

air defenses remained intact. The issues of conscription and recruitment of 

voluntary soldiers will adversely impact Taiwan’s ability to repel amphibious landings if not adequately addressed.

Although Taiwan’s military modernization in recent years has not entirely 

removed the weaknesses in its national defenses, it is essential to remember that security dynamics in the 

Strait are not just a question of bilateral relations. Given Taipei’s geographic location on Taiwan’s island, 

operations at the north end of the island are unavoidable. Yet US military 

bases in Okinawa would face the north 

flank of any Chinese military operations against Taiwan in this area. If 

Beijing decides to control the conflict 

scale, this exposed northern flank 

would be a potential vulnerability. On 

the other hand, if China attempted to 

neutralize the threat from Okinawa 

with the A2/AD firepower, warfare 

will naturally go beyond the Strait. In 

such a scenario, Taiwan’s enhanced 

defenses would pose a problem for Beijing by prolonging the island’s military 

resistance and allowing a longer time 

for Beijing to succumb to its exposed 

northern flank. Economic, political, 

and other nonmilitary policy tools 

from mainland China would be more 

effective in dealing with Taiwan and 

less likely to provoke an intervention 

from the United States. Threats of the 

use of force are likely to remain useful 

only insofar as they can help set a “red 

line” to deter Taiwan from declaring 
Taiwan’s Security

Indo-Pacific Perspective │23

de jure independence. In this sense, 

threats of military force can be used to 

coerce but not compel. As long as Beijing does not feel desperate, at least, a 

high-cost military option - even with 

some chance of victory – must be 

judged unfavorable in contrast to alternatives such as economic pressure.

If viewed in this wider context, one 

can see that Taiwan’s enhanced military defenses have increased its capacity and capabilities to resist Chinese 

military threats, despite some drawbacks, and has thus contributed to the 

cross-Strait security’s stability. ■

Notes

1 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic 

of China 2020 (Washington, DC: US Department of 

Defense, 2020), 51, 55–59, https://media.defense.gov/. 2 Robert S. Ross, “The Rise of the Chinese Navy: 

From Regional Naval Power to Global Naval Power?” 

in China’s Global Engagement, ed. Jacques Delisle 

and Avery Goldstein (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017), 215–18, 222.

3 Andreas Rupprecht, Flashpoint China: Chinese Air 

Power and Regional Security (Houston: Harpia, 

2016), 33–40; and “The Military Balance 2020,” IISS, 

232–33, 266, https://www.iiss.org/. 4 “Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2019,” 

IISS, 193–94, https://www.iiss.org/; and Military Balance 2020, 263–65.

5 “National Defense Report 2017” (Taipei: Ministry of 

National Defense, 2017), 67.

6 Michael J. Lostumbo, David R. Frelinger, James 

Williams, and Barry Wilson, Air Defense Options for 

Taiwan: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Operational Benefits (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), 1–

20.

7 Lostumbo et al., Air Defense Options for Taiwan, 

23–25.

8 “Military Balance 2020,” 312.

Dr. Wu Shang-su 

Dr. Wu is a research fellow in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 

(RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. 

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied 

in JIPA are those of the authors and should 

not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and 

Training Command, Air University, or other 

agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

9 “Military Balance 2020,” 312.

10 Paul Huang, “Taiwan’s Military Is a Hollow Shell,” 

Foreign Policy, 15 February 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/. 11 “Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2019,” 

55; “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative 

Office in the United States (TECRO) – Repair and 

Recertification of PATRIOT Advanced Capablity-3 Missilse,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 9 July 

2020, https://www.dsca.mil/; “Taipei Economic and 

Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in the United 

States - Block I-92F MANPAD Stinger Missiles and 

Related Equipment and Support,” Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency, 16 December 2015, 

https://www.dsca.mil/; and “TK III Air Defense 

Weapon System,” National Chung-Shan Institute of 

Science and Technology, 10 July 2020, 

https://www.ncsist.org.tw/. 12 “Missiles of Taiwan,” CSIS Missile Threat, 14 June 

2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/; Masao Dahlgren 

and Shaan Shaikh, “US Approves Taiwan ATACMS, 

SLAM-ER, Harpoon Missile Sales,” CSIS Missile 

Threat, 27 October 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/; “Taipei Economic and Cultural 

Representative Office (TECRO) in the United States - 

AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Missiles,” 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 29 June 2017, 

https://www.dsca.mil/; and “Taipei Economic and 
Wu

Indo-Pacific Perspective │24

Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in the United 

States - AGM-88B High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM),” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 

29 June 2017, https://www.dsca.mil/. 13 Xavier Vavasseur, “Taiwan Starts Construction of 

New IDS Submarine for ROC Navy,” Naval News, 24 

November 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/; and 

“National Defense Report 2019,” 106–07.

14 Shang-Su Wu, “No, Stealth Missile Corvettes Won’t 

Help Taiwan,” The Diplomat, 9 January 2015, 

http://thediplomat.com/. 15 H.I. Sutton, “China Builds Surveillance Network 

In South China Sea,” Forbes, 5 August 2020, 

https://www.forbes.com/. 16 “Military Balance 2020,” 312; and SIPRI Arms 

Transfers Database, Stockholm International Peace 

Research Institute, 1 February 2021, https://armstrade.sipri.org/. 17 “Military Balance 2020,” 311–12.
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 25

An 

Interpretation 

of Xi’s Taiwan 

Policy—and 

Taiwan’s 

Response

Dr. Hsiao-chuan Liao

hina’s policy toward Taiwan 

has remained fairly consistent 

since Deng Xiaoping turned it 

from the position of “fight” to that of 

“negotiation” in 1978.1 Specifically, 

peaceful reunification remains the ultimate goal of the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC). Still, reunification by 

force is regarded as a possible outcome 

if a peaceful resolution is unattainable. In 1979, the Standing Committee 

of the fifth National People’s Congress 

adopted its “Message to Compatriots 

in Taiwan,”2 which proposed the termination of cross-Strait military confrontation and called for peaceful reunification. Since then, direct transportation, postal services, and business 

ties have allowed for substantial engagement between both sides of the 

Strait. Other Chinese leaders since 

Deng have proposed their own Taiwan 

policies, but the specific content has 

never shifted substantially. However, 

on the 40th anniversary of the Message, Xi Jinping announced his “Five 

Points” policy, which positions China 

away from the opposition of an independent Taiwan to active promotion of 

reunification.3 In the wider context of 

the PRC’s more assertive diplomacy 

under Xi, this shift in emphasis gives 

cause for pessimism when considering 

the future of cross-Strait relations and 

East Asia’s broader stability.

Continuation and Adjustment of 

China’s Taiwan Policy

When Xi assumed office in 2012, his 

policy toward Taiwan matched that of 

his predecessor, Hu Jintao. However, 

at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi 

revealed his “China Dream,”4 which 

showed his ambitions to revive 

China’s historical glory. Specifically, 

Xi predicted that China would become 

a well-off society and realize the modernization of socialism before 2035. He 

further set up a goal to establish 

China as a country with leading national capabilities and international 

influence by the mid-21st century. As 

C

6
Liao

Indo-Pacific Perspective │26

for cross-Strait relations, Xi insisted

on “One Country, Two Systems” and 

“the 1992 Consensus.”5 Yet, Xi’s 

speech to the 19th Party Congress 

paid more attention to the consolidation of the party and the economic situation in mainland China than it did 

cross-Strait relations.6 When he did 

address the Taiwanese government 

and people, Xi sought to appeal to 

them rather than use the language of 

compulsion. Given that then-President 

of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, recognized 

reunification as the ultimate goal, 

cross-Strait relations did undergo a 

relatively positive and intimate phase. 

An historic meeting between Xi and 

Ma was held in November 2015, the 

first such meeting between mainland 

China and Taiwan since the end of the 

Chinese Civil War.

However, in the 2016 presidential 

election, Taiwan elected Tsai Ing-wen. 

Tsai, a Democratic Progress Party 

member, supports an independent Taiwan, divorced from Xi’s One Country, 

Two Systems. At least at first, Tsai 

tried not to irritate China – for example, by not publicly announcing Taiwan’s independence – and used the 

diplomatic language of “the two sides 

of the Strait” to define Taiwan and 

China. Indeed, Tsai agreed with Xi 

that, in 1992, both sides across the 

Strait had jointly acknowledged that 

they could set aside differences to seek 

common ground.7 But Tsai refused to 

promise that the One China principle 

constituted a consensus between the 

PRC and Taiwan. In return, Beijing 

sought to shrink Taiwan’s diplomatic 

representation overseas by pressuring 

countries to cut ties with Taiwan and 

working to restrict Taiwan’s participation in World Health Assembly meetings. The PRC also suspended the official communications across the Strait.

It is in this context that Xi chose to 

update his policy toward Taiwan in 

2019, the 40th anniversary of the National People’s Congress’ Message to 

Compatriots in Taiwan. It is likely 

that Xi was trying to influence Taiwan’s presidential election, which 

were held in January 2020. The main 

shift detailed Xi’s renewed emphasis 

on unification instead of bilateral cooperation. This updated policy has become an essential part of the PRC’s 

approach to Taiwan. But three subsequent updates are also worth noting.

The First Adjustment: The Content of the 1992 Consensus

In his speech to the 19th Party Congress, Xi portrayed the 1992 Consensus as referring to the One China principle, which describes mutual recognition of both sides belonging to one 

China. This mutual recognition is the 

traditional understanding in mainland 

China. However, in the updated version, Xi redefined the 1992 Consensus 

as an understanding that “both sides 

of the Taiwan Straits belong to one 

China and will work together toward 

national reunification.”8 This 
Taiwan’s Security

Indo-Pacific Perspective │27

statement marked a departure from 

past understandings of the 1992 Consensus by conflating the One China 

principle with the goal of reunification.

This conceptual reformulation led the 

Tsai government to clarify—for the 

first time—that Taiwan cannot accept 

the 1992 Consensus.9 Taiwan’s version 

of the 1992 Consensus is that both 

sides recognize there is only one China 

but agree to differ on its definition. 

This concept is different from Xi’s interpretation, which does not admit 

that the definition of “One China” may 

differ. Since Xi has further added the 

phrase “to achieve national reunification” to the 1992 Consensus, there are 

fears the PRC may continue to add or 

delete content from the concept as 

they wish. Hence, a 1992 Consensus 

based on mutual agreement does not 

exist now—if it ever did.

The Second Adjustment: Customized “One Country, Two Systems” 

for Taiwan

In his 2017 speech, Xi’s Taiwan policy 

was consistent with tradition. He used 

the formulation of “One Country, Two 

Systems” when mentioning Hong 

Kong and Macau. According to PRC 

propaganda, this framework for governance is conducted perfectly in Hong 

Kong and Macau. As such, there is no 

reason that Taiwan cannot be next. 

After 2012, China and Taiwan have 

had more and more substantial engagements. Two million Taiwanese—9 

percent of Taiwan’s population—

stayed in China for business, family 

reasons, or schooling in 2018 alone. 

China further pushed Taiwan to consider political negotiations and to set 

up concrete steps for reunification. 

While most Taiwanese prefer the status quo, Xi has argued that “One 

Country, Two Systems” can be customized to accommodate Taiwan. He further explained that Taiwan’s socio-economic system will be fully respected, 

along with private property, freedom 

of religion, and other lawful rights. 

From this viewpoint, different approaches should not be an excuse to 

suspend progress toward reunification. However, the reliability of “One 

Country, Two Systems” has come under scrutiny given the conspicuous recent events in Hong Kong. For Tsai, 

the model used to incorporate Hong 

Kong into the PRC cannot be accepted—calling instead for a “Taiwan 

consensus.”10

Subsequent events in Hong Kong—especially the mass protests against extradition and national security laws—

have reinforced the perception in Taiwan that incorporation into the PRC is 

unacceptable. Beijing insists the ultimate right of interpreting laws in 

Hong Kong belongs to the central government. Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s 

own government appears to be too 

weak to defend its legislation and has 

dealt with the prodemocracy protestors strictly and violently. These 
Liao

Indo-Pacific Perspective │28

events have revealed the problems 

with trying to preserve a democratic 

system under Chinese autocratic rule. 

In this situation, “One Country, Two 

Systems” is a dead-end for Taiwan. 

Tsai’s decision to rebuff Xi has made 

her the only politician with the confidence to say “no” to the PRC, a status 

that likely contributed to Tsai winning 

a second term as the President of Taiwan.

The Third Adjustment: Gradually 

Unlinking “Reunification” from 

“Peaceful”

In his 2017 speech, Xi mentioned “reunification” only three times and linked 

two of them with the term “peaceful.” 

The implication at hand is while reunification remained a core concern, 

“peaceful reunification” was the preferred means for achieving that goal. 

However, in his 2019 speech, Xi used 

“reunification” 46 times but only included the word “peaceful” as a qualifier 18 times. It appears the overall 

significance of reunification has increased for Xi—but the importance 

that reunification shall be peaceful

has declined.

In response to Xi’s perceived shift in 

emphasis on this point, Tsai has re-asserted the Taiwanese view that interactions between both sides of the 

Strait must be peaceful and equal, not 

characterized by force or threats. Tsai 

has also proposed a security network 

for cross-Strait exchanges: security for 

people’s livelihoods, information 

security, and a standardized democracy monitoring mechanism to prevent 

extreme penetration from the PRC.11

Conclusion: Hot Spot of East Asia

The three adjustments detailed above 

demonstrate that Xi appears to have 

become more urgent in his appeal for 

reunification. He has shifted away 

from cooperation by both sides of the 

Strait to an emphasis of reunification 

as a premise. Some scholars even argue that Xi will try to accomplish reunification while leader of the PRC. 

While reunification is undoubtedly important to Xi, his clear priority is to 

achieve the “China Dream”—something that Xi has explicitly invited 

Taiwanese to share in but regarded as 

a separate and higher-order goal than 

political reunification. Since Xi has so 

far declined to present reunification as 

part of his “China Dream” concept, he 

is unlikely to consider the use of force 

to absorb Taiwan into the PRC.

Finally, it is worth remembering that 

three structural factors influence 

China’s Taiwan policy: trilateral relations among the United States, Taiwan, and China; the bilateral interactions between China and Taiwan; and 

domestic politics in China and Taiwan. Each of these factors is dynamic 

but is moving in the direction of a 

hardened, more hostile policy. For example, China now faces serious competition from the United States. Support for an independent Taiwan has 

increased—alongside more negative 
Taiwan’s Security

Indo-Pacific Perspective │29

feelings toward mainland China. Additionally, Xi’s suspension of cross-Strait 

cooperation has led Taiwan to lean 

more heavily on the United States. In 

Washington, leaders such as Pres. 

Donald Trump have viewed closeness 

with Taiwan as a tool for containing—

or at least irritating—China. This hostile climate is perhaps why Xi’s “Message” to Taiwan is full of anxiety, eagerness, and appeals to the Taiwanese 

people but not the Taiwanese government. On the contrary, China has intensified military maneuvers against 

Taiwan by violating Taiwan’s air 

space with its fighter jets. Together, 

these trends mean that developments 

in cross-Strait relations cannot easily 

Notes

1 Jiann-fa Yan, “The Likely Framework and Contents 

of Xi Jin Ping’s Taiwan Policy, Taiwan International 

Studies Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2020): 39–61.

2 “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the 

Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reunification,” Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council 

(People’s Republic of China), 2 January 2019, 

http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/. 3 See: “Xinhua Headlines: Xi says ‘China must be, 

will be reunified’ as key anniversary marked,” 

Xinhua News Agency, 2 January 2019, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/. 4 “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress,” China Daily Website, 4 November 

2017, https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/. 5 “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress.”

be viewed with optimism, as there are 

grave implications for the wider East 

Asian region. ■

Dr. Hsiao-chuan Liao

Dr. Liao is Assistant Professor of Political 

Science at the National Taiwan University. 

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied 

in JIPA are those of the authors and should 

not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and 

Training Command, Air University, or other 

agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

6 Nathaniel Taplin, “China’s Xi to World: Party First, 

Reform Second,” Wall Street Journal, 18 October 

2017, https://www.wsj.com/. 7 “Inaugural address,” Central News Agency, 20 May 

2016, https://www.cna.com.tw/. 8 “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the

Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reunification.”

9 Chris Horton, “Taiwan’s President, Defying Xi 

Jinping, Calls Unification Offer ‘Impossible’,” New 

York Times, 5 January 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/. 10 Horton, “Taiwan’s President.” 

11 “President Tsai issues statement on China's President Xi's ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan’,” Office 

of the President of the Republic of China, 2 January 

2019, https://english.president.gov.tw/. 
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 30

Status Quo? 

What Status 

Quo?

Jessica Drun

he past year has seen renewed 

attention and emphasis on Taiwan and its place and role in 

the world—from the reelection of Pres. 

Tsai Ing-wen and her administration’s 

almost unparalleled success in handling the COVID-19 pandemic to an 

upsurge in not only contacts with 

Washington but also in Chinese coercive measures against the island. In 

the final months of the Trump administration alone, a stream of policy announcements regarding China and Taiwan sought to embed a more hardline 

policy toward the former and a more 

robust and collaborative relationship 

with the latter. But even without this 

flurry of activity, broader geostrategic 

considerations—namely, China’s growing influence and the shift in the crossStrait military balance—would have 

required debate on the long-term suitability of key elements of US policy toward Taiwan.

These discussions are important and 

necessary. Yet, they often suffer from 

the vagueness surrounding the keywords and phrases used in cross-Strait 

discourse. In some cases, such as that 

of the contentious “1992 Consensus” 

and in US strategic ambiguity on 

whether to come to Taiwan’s defense, 

imprecision is deliberate—to shelve 

contradictions and advance dialogue in 

the former and to preserve policy options in the latter. Arguably, however,

the most inexact concept of cross-Strait 

relations is what constitutes the socalled “status quo.” 

General alignment between Beijing, 

Taipei, and Washington on what the 

status quo encapsulated allowed for an 

era of cross-Strait calm from 2008 to 

2016, spurred in part by Pres. Ma 

Ying-jeou’s policy of rapprochement toward the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) and the adoption of the “1992 

Consensus” formulation that served as 

the baseline for official cross-Strait 

contacts. Since the inauguration of 

President Tsai in May 2016, however, 

this tacit, mutual understanding began 

T

7
Status Quo? What Status Quo?

Indo-Pacific Perspective │31

to unravel. It continues to disintegrate 

to this day—and Taiwan’s domestic 

politics offers no reason to believe that 

this trend will go into reverse. This has 

clear implications for trilateral relations among the PRC, Taiwan, and the 

United States. 

Discussions on cross-Strait relations 

have centered on the idea of a status 

quo and the maintenance thereof. However, there has been insufficient attention to exactly what the status quo entails. Rarely do mentions of the status 

quo seek to explicitly define it, but instead, appear to defer to an obscure notion of a supposed ideal point in time or 

a universally tolerated state of relations—or as a “catchphrase to describe 

the stalemate in the Taiwan Strait” 

that was “convenient for all parties involved.”1

It matters how the status quo is defined, however—not least of all because 

any movement away from this assumedly fixed moment draws consternation 

from the other vested players. Official 

statements out of Beijing and Taipei 

regularly condemn the other for actions 

that challenge the status quo and call 

for a return to sometimes unspecified, 

but often disputed, baselines. Washington has likewise stressed the need for 

balance and dialogue, and for both 

sides to adhere to the status quo, 

though Washington has often itself 

been accused by the PRC of being an 

instigator in ratcheting up cross-Strait 

tensions by disturbing a status quo, 

especially during the four years of the 

Trump administration.

The issue stems, at least in part, from 

a genuine lack of agreement over what 

specific circumstance or set of circumstances make up the status quo. This is 

a fundamental disagreement over denotation and not just connotation. In 

practical terms, the concept of a status 

quo in cross-Strait relations is perhaps 

best understood as a point on a spectrum—a range that, at certain points 

in time, has helped to disguise disagreements among the three sides on 

shared goals and objectives. At one end 

of the spectrum lies “unification,” or 

the merger of the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) into a single polity; 

at the other, “independence,” or formal 

moves to officially separate the two. 

The status quo is an imagined point between these two theoretical extremes—

a way to describe and encapsulate “Taiwan’s ambiguous position as a de facto 

independent state that lacks de jure 

statehood.”2

The views of the major actors in crossStrait relations—Beijing, Washington, 

and two major political parties in Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the 

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—

all exist at various points on this spectrum. The myth of a common status 

quo can be sustained whenever their 

respective views fall within proximity 

with one another. Politics, however, is 

never static, and, as the past four years 

have demonstrated, developments in 
Drun

Indo-Pacific Perspective │32

cross-Strait, US–China, and US–Taiwan relations have prompted shifts in 

each country’s perception of the status 

quo—leading to divergence along the 

spectrum and heightened tensions.

For example, for Beijing, the status quo 

is “One China”—accepted at this point 

under the “1992 Consensus” formulation. In China’s view, Tsai’s unwillingness to acknowledge the “1992 Consensus” constitutes a break from the status quo. This is despite of Tsai’s continued reassurance that she remains committed to the status quo—which, in her 

administration’s view, means building 

on the achievements of her predecessors. This was clear from Tsai’s first inaugural address, which included a nod 

to 1992:

Since 1992, over twenty years of interactions 

and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both 

sides must collectively cherish and sustain; 

and it is based on such existing realities and 

political foundations that the stable and 

peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.3

The Tsai administration’s approach to 

the status quo aligns with the broader, 

longstanding DPP position that Taiwan is already an independent country, as the ROC and thus does not need 

to formally declare itself as such, but 

which also makes any of Beijing’s OneChina demands a nonstarter.4

This incongruence in views on the status quo has prompted policy responses 

that have further exacerbated existing 

differences—driving points on the 

spectrum even further apart. The past 

five years are ripe with examples and 

include China cutting off official channels of communication with Taiwan, 

ramping up its campaign to poach diplomatic allies, restricting Taiwan representatives’ access to international 

forums, and increased military intimidation with the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) aircraft regularly entering Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). In response, Taiwan 

and the United States have both deepened and enhanced their already robust bilateral relationship, to include 

more high-level meetings, more regular arms sales, and inclusion of Taiwan in US-led regional frameworks, 

among other actions.

Further, one of the most critical elements in Taiwan debates is also one of 

the more underexplored—at least in 

English-language discourse. Much like 

the discussions on cross-Strait relations referenced above, assessments 

on Taiwan domestic politics also tend 

to fall back on black-and-white characterizations of key players, especially 

by categorizing the DPP as “pro-independence” and the KMT as “pro-unification.” This type of framing not only 

aligns with how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) labels Taiwan’s 

two main political parties but also 

plays into Chinese discourse control 

efforts—of shaping global narratives 

to better align with Beijing’s narratives and, in the process, help advance 
Status Quo? What Status Quo?

Indo-Pacific Perspective │33

its interests.5

The truth is far more complicated and 

may compel a further downward spiral 

in cross-Strait relations by bringing 

about a domestic convergence of views 

among Taiwanese actors while simultaneously driving collective Taiwanese 

interpretations of the status quo even 

further from that of the Chinese government. The KMT—China’s preferred interlocutor—has been reassessing party priorities and policies 

while in opposition—including the 

party’s approach to cross-Strait relations, which has long centered on the 

“1992 Consensus.” However, there are 

signs that the Chinese leadership may 

no longer accept the vague One-China 

agreement moving forward, and may 

instead demand explicit recognition 

that “China” refers to the PRC.6 At the 

same time, Beijing has seemingly tied 

the “1992 Consensus” with “One Country, Two Systems”—which is vastly 

unpopular in Taiwan and rejected by 

both major political parties. 

Accordingly, the KMT is at a crossroads on whether it will continue pursuing the “1992 Consensus” in its current construct, in a moderated form, or 

to scrap it altogether—a debate that 

will play out in the elections for party 

chair later this year. Whatever 

Notes

1 Chih-Chieh Chou, “Contending Notions of the 

Cross-Strait Status Quo in Taiwan and Across the 

happens, however, both major parties 

in Taiwan will continue to place varying emphasis on the sovereignty of the 

ROC—a trend that will likely gain 

greater traction in the future, as identity politics in Taiwan are skewed 

heavily toward a uniquely Taiwanese 

identity, separate from China. It is 

hard to discern any signs of movement 

toward mainland China’s interpretation of the status quo.

In short, any future confluence of 

views on the status quo is becoming 

increasingly unlikely—and with it, 

any common baseline for cross-Strait 

discourse between the two sides. This 

is an overlooked, yet fundamentally 

important, aspect of cross-Strait relations. ■

Jessica Drun

Ms. Drun is a Non-Resident Fellow at the 

2049 Project. 

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied 

in JIPA are those of the authors and should 

not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and 

Training Command, Air University, or other 

agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

Strait: Impacts on U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” China Review 18, no. 3 (2018): 121–48, at 122.

2 Lev Nachman and Brian Hioe, “No, Taiwan’s President Isn’t ‘Pro-Independence’,” The Diplomat, 23 
Drun

Indo-Pacific Perspective │34

April 2020, https://thediplomat.com/. 3 “Inaugural address of ROC 14th-term President 

Tsai Ing-wen,” Office of the President of the Republic 

of China (Taiwan), last modified 20 May 2016, 

https://english.president.gov.tw/. 4 Nachman and Hioe, “No, Taiwan’s President Isn’t 

‘Pro-Independence’.”

5 Elsa Kania, “The Right to Speak: Discourse and 

Chinese Power,” Center for Advanced China Research, 28 November 2018, https://www.ccpwatch.org/. 6 Jessica Drun, “Taiwan’s Opposition Struggles to 

Shake Pro-China Image,” Foreign Policy, 11 March 

2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/. 

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