### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Fe bruary9, 200 5 S es sio n PA MEL A C . L ICHTE NWA LTERv. C HRIS ED WAR D L ICHTE NWA LTER

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 91D-575 M uriel Robins on, Jud ge

No. M2003- 03115-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Janu ary 30, 2006
This appea l illus trates the pr o b l em s that befa ll divorcing pare nts when they ag ree , without court approva l, to a child support arr ang ement that is inconsistent with the C hild Support Guidelines. F ive y e ars a ft e r the pa

re nts ’ div or c e , the mothe r fi le d a p e tit ionin the Cir c uit Cou rt fo r D a vid so n Co un ty seeking to incre ase the fathe r’s child support obligation. The trial c ourt approve d a formula devised by the parties that did not complywith the C hild Support Guidelines. The parties later ignor ed that formula and followed another a d hoc ar rang ement for

approximately

ten y ear s. Eventually , the mothe r fi le d a

pe titionin thetria l c ou rt

se e kin g to h oldthefathe r i n c on te mpt fo r f a ili ng to p a y

c hil d support and to collec t the arr ear ag e. The trial court turned the matter over to a substitute judge w ho de te rm ine d th a t th e fathe r wa s no t in c on te mpt be c aus e bo th pa rtie s ha d fo llo we d the ir fo rmula to the best of their

abilities even thoug h it wa s ambig uous. The trial c ourt also set the father’s support for th e re m ai n i n g minor child and direc ted the father to pay $2,375 in additional support for that child. The mother a

ppeale d. We have determined that the fathe r owes $64,529 in bac k child support and that the pa

rties’ thre e childre n areentitled to this arrea rag e. There fo re , we va cate the portion of thejud g me nt r e g ard ing ba c k c hil d s up po rt a ndre ma ndthe cas e for thee ntry of a n a pp ro priate payment plan. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d in P ar t a nd Vacat ed in Par t W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., delivered the opinio n o f t h e court, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL and F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined. Dan R. Alexander, N ashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Pamela C. Lichtenwa lter. Norman E. Solomon, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, Chris Edwa

rd Lichtenwa lter. OP IN ION I. Pamela Lichtenwa lter and Chris Lichtenwa lter had thre e children during their marriag e – Gra nt w h o w a s b o r n inA p r il 1 9 7 8 , G a v inw h o w a s b o r n inD e c e mb e r 1 9 8 0 , a n dK a s e y

w h o w asT h e C h ild S u p p o rt G u id e line s w e re no t i n e ff e c t w h e n this d e c re e w a s e n te re d . T h e y d id no t t a k e e ff e c t un til 1 O c to b e r 1 9 8 9

.

M r . Li ch t en wa l t er w or k ed for t h e U n i v er s i t y of T en n es s ee wh en t h e pa r t i es di v or ce d a n d w as e ar n i n g $20, 184 2 p er y ear. H e l ef

t t he U ni vers i t y and be cam e a sal esma n fo r I nst i t ut i o nal Jo b b ers earni ng ove r $4 8 , 0 0 0 pe r y ear.
T his chil d sup p o rt o rd er w as c o nsist en t wit h the C hil d S up p o rt G uid eli ne s. 3

T hi s fo rmula i s ent i rel y i nco nsi st ent wi t h t he C hi l d Sup p o rt G ui d el i nes. I t did no t est ab l i sh a f i xed am o unt 4

o f chi l d s up p o rt , and i t t o o k t he cust o d i al pa rent ’ s i nco m e i nt o co nsi d erat i o n. -2- born in J une 1986. The parties wer e divorc ed in the Chanc ery Court for Obion County

in October 1986. The decr ee g rante d Ms. Lichtenwa lter sole custody of the three children and di re ct ed M r. Lic hte nw a lte r t o p a y

$5 25 pe r m on th i n c hil d s up po rt

. 1
I n Fe bruary

1991, Ms. L ichtenwa lter filed a petition in the Davidson CountyProbate Court seeking an incre ase in c hild support. She stated that Mr. Lichtenwa lter’s incom e h ad incre ased signific antly and that her s had decre ased. Following a hea ring in J anuary

1992, the probate court 2 incre ased Mr . Lichtenwa lter’s c hild support to $274.76 per wee k. 3
Ms. Lic hte nw a lte r r e turne d to the pr ob a te c ou rt in Oc tob e r 19 91 se e kin g a no the r i nc re a se in c hil d s up po rt . O n th is o c c a sio n, Mr . Lic hte nw a lte r r e sp on de d b y se e kin g c us to dy of

thepa rt ie s’ old e st c hil d. OnNo ve mbe r 12, 19 92 , th e c ou rt e nte re d an o rd e r g ranti ng Mr . Lic hte nw a lte r s ole custody of the pa rties’ oldest child. The court a lso determined t h at t he Child Support Guidelines we re“ ina pp lic ablea s st

ri c tly app lie d” be c aus e Mr . Lic hte nw a lte r’ s salary fl uc tuate d base d o n h is commissions. According ly , the cou rt approve d a formula for de termining child support that had been c reated by

the parties. This formula provided: 41 % of the ne t inc ome of the pa rtie s a s c omp ute d ina c c or danc e wi th the Uniform Child Support Guidelines is pooled, and agree d as the cost of support of the three minor children. This gr oss fig ure sha ll be divided by

three with the Respondent’s support obli g ation to be the payment of one- third of th e gross fig ure to the Petitioner, but in no event shall this figur e be le ss than Five H undred D ollars ($500) pe r month. The child support amount will be computed by the parties on a quarterly

basi s commencing Fe bruary 1, 1993. The Responde nt shall furnish t o the Petitioner a stateme nt of ea rning s for the thre emonth period prec eding the date f or quarterly

revie w. The Respondent’s earning from the pr evious quarte r will be the ba sis for d e te r m i n i n g t h e s u p p o rto b l i g a t i o n o f t h e R e s p o n d e n tf

o r t h e n e xt quarte r. All ch an ges in the support oblig ation shall be prospe ctive on ly a ndre vie we d e a c h q ua

rt e r b y thepa rtie s. 4T en n . Cod e An n . § 34

- 1- 10 2( b) ( 20 01 ) ob l i g a t e s pa r e n t s t o s u pp or t t h e i r c h i l dr e n u n t i l t h e y r e a c h e i g h t e en 5 y ears o f age i f t he chi l d i s i n hi gh s cho o l

. A n ei ght een- y ear- o l d chi l d rem ai ns ent i t l ed t o s up p o rt unt i l hi s o r her hi gh sch o o l class gra d ua t es.

T h i s s ec t i on w as a men ded fol l owi n g t h e en t r y of t h e s u bs t i t u t e j u dg e’ s me mor an du m. T en n . Code An n . § 36- 5- 6 1 0 1 (a)( 2 )( A ) i s no w fo und at T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 5

- 1 0 1 (c)( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 5 ). -3- F or re a so ns no t app are nt in this re c or d, thepa rtie s a g re e d to ig no rethefo rmula c on ta ine d in the Novembe r 12, 1992 orde r and ne ver r eturne d to court to modify or re place it. I n s tead, they simplyag ree d that the amount of support for ea ch chil d should be $500 and that the amount of support they

would be entitled to would be ba sed on the number of children living with them. As a re sult, Mr. L ichtenwa lter beg an paying Ms. Lichtenwa lter $500 per month becausetwo children we reliv ingwi th h e r andon ly on e wi th h im. Af

te r the pa rtie s’ old e st c hil d, Gr a nt, re a c he d ma jority and gra duated from high school in J une 1996, Mr. L ichtenwa lter began paying Ms. Lichtenwa lter $1 ,0 00 per

mon th b e c aus e thepa

rtie s r e ma ini ng tw o mi no r c hil dr e n c on tin ue d to liv e wi th M s. Lichtenwa lter. Afte r Gavin Lichtenwa lter rea ched majority and g raduated from hig h school in J une 1999, Mr. Lichtenwa lter re duced his c hild support pay ments to $500 per month.
I n July 20 03, Ms. Lic hte nw a lte r f ile d a pe tit ionin the Cir c uit

Cou rt fo r D a vid so n Co un ty seeking to hold Mr. L ichtenwa lter i n criminal contempt for failing to pay the child support re quired by the Nov em b er 12, 1992 or der and to order him to pay a $39,600 child support ar rea rag e. Mr. Lichtenwa lter re sponded by denying t h at he had willfullyfailed to pay child support and by reque sting the c ourt to terminate his child support oblig ations fo r t h e p ar ties’ two oldest children who had turne d eig hteen and who had g raduated from hig h school in J u n e 1 9 96 and June 1999 r e s p e c t i v e l y. 5
The matter was hear d on October 20, 2003, and seven day s later, the substitut e judg e filed a memorandum opinion. The judgedeclined to hold Mr. Lichtenwa lter in contempt beca use he ha d complied with his ag ree ment with Ms. L ichtenwa lter that eac h child would be entitled to $500 per month in child support. The judge also determined that the child support formula in the N ovember 12, 1992 order

was “ ambig uous” bec ause it did not provide for a definite amount of child support as re quired by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( a)( 2)(A) (Supp. 2003). Notwithstanding the evidenc e 6 that Mr. Lichtenwa lte r’ s i n co m e wo uld have c alled for a fa r g reater amount of child support, the substit ute judg e dec ided that the parties, by their conduc t over ten y ear s, had ag ree d to limi t the amount of child support to $500 per c hild and, there fore , that Mr. Lichtenwa lter did not owe ba ck child support.
T h e p ar t ies had one remaining minor c hild at the time of the Oc tober 2003 he arin g. Acc ording ly , the substitute judge, using the Child S upport Guideli n es, set Mr. Lichtenwa lter’s su pp ort f or thi s chi ld at $9 75 pe r mon th re tr oa c tiv e to July 20 03 . Be c aus e thene w amou nt o f c hil d support exceede d the amount of support Mr. L ichtenwa lter had been paying by $475 per month, the judge d irec ted Mr. Lichtenwa lter to pay Ms. L ichtenwa lter an a dditional $2,375 to make up theM s . Li ch t en wa l t er doe s not t ake i ss u e wi t h t h e s u bs t i t u t e j u dg e’ s de ci s i on t o a cqu i t M r . Li ch t en wa l t er of 7

cr i mi n al c on t empt or w i t h t h e amou n t of pr os pec t i v e ch i l d s u ppor t for t h e r ema i n i n g mi n or c h i l d.

-4- differ ence . The substitute judgeenter ed a f in al o rd er embody ing the se dec isions on Decembe r 1, 2003. Ms. L ichtenwa lter has a ppeale d. 7
II. T HE C L AI M F OR C HI L D S U PP OR T A RRE ARAGE Th e prima

ry iss ue on thi s a

pp e a l in vo lve s Ms . Lic hte nw a lte r’ s c la im f or ba c k c hil d s up po rt

. She insists that the trial court erre d by failing to enforc e the terms of the November 12, 1992 order

. Mr. Lichtenwa lter re sponds that the trial court c orre ctly excused him from pay ing back c hild support based on the parties’ informal ag ree ment. We have de termined that both parties are mistaken. The parties’ informal child support ag ree ment is une nforc eable beca use pare nts lack the powe r to enter into ag ree ments that circumve nt exi sting c hild support order s. Mr. Lichtenwa lter’s c hild support obligation should be calculated base d on the formula in the N ovember 12, 1992 o rd er u n t i l that fo rmula be c a me un wo rk ablein Jun e 19 96 . T he re a ft e r, it s ho uldbe c a lc ulate d b a se d o n th e Chi ld Sup po rt Gu ide lin e s. A. Parents have “dee ply rooted mora l responsibiliti es” to support their minor c hildren. Boggs v. Boggs , 520 U.S. 833, 848, 117 S. C t. 1754, 1764, 138 L . Ed. 2d 45 (1997) ( quoting Ro se v . R os e , 481 U.S. 619, 632, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 2037, 95 L . Ed. 2d 599 (1987)) ; Sta te De p’ t of Hu ma n S e rv s. ex rel. Y oung v. Y oung , 8 02 S.W. 2d59 4, 60 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 0) ; Bake r v. Bake r , 169 Tenn. 589, 592, 89 S.W .2d 763, 764 (1935). I n addition to their moral re sponsibili ty , Tenne ssee law imposes a leg al obligation o n p ar en ts to support their minor children in a manne r commensur ate with their ow n means and station in life. Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-102( a). This oblig ation does n o t en d when pare nts are divor ced. Brooks v. Brook s , 166 Te nn . 255 , 256 , 61 S. W.2 d 6 54 , 6 54 (1 93 3) ; W ade v. W ade , 115 S.W .3d 917, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Ever sinc e 1989, the process and criteria for ascertaining a par ent’s child support oblig ation has bee n g overne d by

Child S upport Guidelines promulgat ed by the Tenne ssee De partment of Human Servic es in ac cordance w ith Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( e). One pur pose of the g uidelines is to mi nimiz e the impac t of divorce on children. Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.02( 2)(e ) (De c. 2003). T h e g u id e li n e s s e t th e mi n imu m a mo u n t o f s u p p o rt to w h ic h c h il d r e n ar e e n ti tl e d , Tenn. Comp. R. & Re g s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 02 (5 ), a nd the y c on ta in a r e bu tta blepr e su mptionthat c hil d s up po rt wi ll be set using the proc edure s and formulas contained the rein. Te nn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.01 (2) & 1240-2-4- .02(7). Th e prima

ry be ne fi c iari e s o f c hil d s up po rt a rethec hil dren, no t th e pa re nts

. Hopkins v. Hopkins , 152 S.W .3d 447, 449 (Tenn. 2004). A custodial par ent’s conduc t cannot extinguish a noncustodial pare nt’s responsibilityto support his or her c hildren, Ru tle dg e v . B ar re tt , 802 S.W .2d 604, 607 (Tenn. 1991) , and the law does not permit par ents to waive or circ umvent their minor childre n’sA t tha t ti m e, the C hil d S up p o rt G uid eli ne s d i d n o t p erm i t the co m p ara t i ve an alysi s o f t he p are nts’ i nc o m es. 8 G r ay v. G r ay , 78 S.W

. 3 d 88 1 , 88 2 (T enn. 20 0 2 ).

S c h u e tt v . S c h u e tt , N o . W 2 0 0 3

- 0 0 3 3 7

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 20 0 4 W L 6 8 9 9 1 7 , at * 7 (T enn. C t

. A p p . M ar. 31 , 20 0 4 ), 9 per m . app . deni ed (T e n n . N o v . 1 5 , 2 0 0 4 ); Pr i c e v. P r i ce , N o . M 1 9 9 8 -0 0 8 4 0 -C O A -R 3 -C V , 2 0 0 0 W L 1 9 2 5 6 9 , at *8 (T e n n . C t. A p p . F e b . 1 8 , 2 0 0 0 ) (N o T e n n . R . A p p . P . 1 1 a p p lica tio n fi le d ); Stacey v. St acey , N o. 02A01- 9802- CV

- 00050, 1999 W L 1097975, a t * 5 ( T en n . Ct

. App. O ct

. 06, 1999) ( N o T en n . R. App. P. 11 a ppl i ca t i on fil e d ); Q u a rry v. Q u a rry , No

. 0 2 A 0 1

- 9 1 1 1

- C H- 0 0 2 6 2 , 1 9 9 2 W L 1 4 1 7 9 6 , a t * 3 ( T e n n . Ct

. Ap p . J u n e 2 5 , 1 9 9 2 ) ( No T enn. R

. A p p . P

. 11 ap p l i cat i o n f i l ed ). -5- rig ht to support. Berryhill v. Rhode s , 21 S.W.3 d 188 , 192 , 194 (T e nn . 200 0) (h old ing that private a g re e me nts to c ir c umv e nt c hil d s up po rt ob lig atio ns area g a ins t publ ic po lic y ); Huntley v . Huntley , 61 S.W. 3d 32 9, 33 5- 36 (T e nn . Ct. Ap p. 20 01 ); W itt v . W itt , 929 S.W .2d 360, 363 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 96 ). Ac c or din g ly , e ve n w he n p are nts un de rt ake to m ake the ir ow n ch ild su pp ort arr a ng e me nts , the courts have the pow er – and obligation – to set child support consistent with the Child S upport Guidelines unless they

make the r equire d finding s reg arding t h ei r re asons for deviating from the g uidelines. Se e De me nt v . Ki tts , 7 77 S.W. 2d33 , 3 5 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 9) (h old ing that th e c ou rt s have the power

to order a pare nt to pay

child support despite an ag ree ment by the other pa

rent to the c on tr ary ); see also Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.02( 4), 1240-2- 4-.04(5)

. B. Th e fi rs t two or de rs pe rt a ini ng to ch ild su pp ort ent e re d in this c a se do no t f ig ur e pr omi ne ntl y in this app e a l. T he Oc tob e r 1 98 6 d ivo rce decr ee was e nte re d b e fo rethea do pti on of theChi ld Support Guidelines, and the pr obat e court’s first order e ntere d in Febr uary 1992 appea

rs to be entirely consistent with t h e C hild Support Guidelines. The difficulties ar ose whe n the parties devised and the trial court approve d the child support formula in the N ovember 12, 1992 order

. The formula contained in the N ovember 12, 1992 order

is a commendable but uns ucce ssful eff ort to establish the parties’ child support obligations based on what is now re fer red to a s the

“ inc ome sh are s” mod e l. It is c on tr ary to the la w pr e vaili ng a t the tim e in two sig nif ic a nt r e sp e c ts. F ir st, it i s b a se d o n th e inc omeof bo th p are nts rathe r than simply the inc ome of theob lig or pa re nt. 8 Second, it did not set the child support in a specif i c d o l lar amount. I n addition to these two 9 shortcoming s, the formula w as base d on the assumption that the parties wer e supporting three minor children, and it c ontained no intelligible provision for f ewe r than thre e childre n. Thus, the parties could not have use d their formula, even if it wa s permissible, afte r their oldest child bec ame e ighte en a ndg ra du a te d f

ro m hi g h s c ho ol. Despite the shortcomings in the formula, the parties and the tria l court ag ree d to it, and it was incorporated in the Novemb er 1 2, 1992 order . After that order

was e ntere d, the parties were obligated to follow it until the trial cou rtmodified it or until they obtained some other

relief from the court. State ex rel. McAllister v. Goode , 9 68 S.W. 2d83 4, 83 6- 37 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) ; Ra sn ic v. W ynn , 625 S.W .2d 278, 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). Acc ording ly , based on the fac ts of this case, Mr. Lichtenwa lter’s c hild support obligation was de fined by this order a s l o ng as it could beB y t hat t i m e, th e C hi l d Sup p o rt G ui d el i nes cont ai ned pro vi si o ns specif i cal l y dir ect ed at pa rent s l i ke M r. 10 Li ch t en wa l t er w h os e i n come v ar i ed. I n 1994, t h e g u i del i n es w er e ame n ded t o a dd T en n . Comp. R. & Reg s . 1240- 2- 4- .0 3 (3 )( b ) ( D e c . 1 9 9 4 ) w h ic h sta te s: “[v ]a ria b le inc o m e su c h a s c o m m issio n s, b o n u se s, o v e rtim e p a y, d ivid e n d s, e tc ., sh o u ld b e a v e ra g e d a n d a d d e d to the o b ligo r’s fixe d sa la ry.”

T h e p a rtie s’ o ld e st c h ild gr a d u a te d fro m hig h sc h o o l i n J u n e 1 9 9 6 a n d w a s n o lo n g e r e n tit le d to su p p o rt. 11

T h e p a rtie s’ se c o n d c h ild gr a d u a te d fro m hig h sc h o o l i n J u n e 1 9 9 9 a n d w a s n o lo n g e r e n tit le d to su p p o rt. 12
-6- e nf or c ed, and no unilate ral a c t or a g re e me nt b y

Ms. Lic hte nw a lte r c ou ld e xcu se him fr om this obligation. The formula in the November 12, 1992 order became entirely unworka ble in J une 1996 whe n the Lichtenwa lters’ oldest child g raduated from high school afte r becoming eig hteen y ear s of ag e. At that point, the formu l a p ro v i ded no intelligible dir ection for asce rtaining Mr. Lichtenwa lter’s child support obligation for the y oung er two c hildren. Ha d the parties returne d to court in J une 1996, we ha ve no doubt that the t rial court would have jettisoned the formula in the November 12, 1992 order and would have s et M r. L ichtenwa lter’s child support obligation based on the Child S upport Guidelines. Acc ording ly , afte r June 1996, the formula in the Nove mber 12, 1992 orde r would have

10 been r eplac ed by

the formula in the Child Support Guidelines. C. During the Octobe r 2003 hearing, both parties presented evidence reg arding their re spective incomes betwe en 1993 and 2003 and submitt ed calculations of what they owed under the Nove mber 1992 formula. This evide nce undermines the substitut e judge ’s conclusion that the formula in the No ve mbe r 1 2, 19 92 or de r w a s to o v a g ue to f oll ow . It a lso de mon str a te s t hat th e amo un t of c hil d support that

M r . Lic h te n w a lt e r

w a s a c tu a ll y

p a y in g w a s le s s th a n th e a mo u n t th a t h e s h o u ldh a ve been pay ing unde r either

the formula in the N ovember 12, 19 9 2 o rd er or under the Child S upport Gu ide lin e s. Acc ording ly , to calc ulate Mr. Lichtenwa lter’s child support arr ear ag e, we have se parated the time from Fe bruary

1993 throug h J une 2003 int o three periods. The first period, f rom Fe bruary

1993 thr ou g h Jun e 19 96 , sh ou ld be g ov e rn e d by the fo rmula in the No ve mbe r 1 2, 19 92 or de r b e c aus e 11 all three children r emained e ligible f or support. The se cond period, from J u l y 1 996 throug h J une 1999, must be g overne d by the Child S upport Guidelines as the y apply when ther e ar e two minor 12 children entitled to support. The third period, from J uly 1999 throug h J une 2003, must be g overne d by the C hild Support Guidelines as they apply when ther e is one minor child entitled to support. The fo llo wi ng ta

bl e s il lus tr a te theg ro wth o f M r. Lic hte nw a lte r’ s c hil d s up po rt arr e ara g e du ri ng the se pe ri od s.B e c a u se the p a rtie s h a d two m ino r c h ild re n d u rin g this tim e , the a m o u n t o f M r. L itch te n w a lter ’s su p p o rt is 13 b ased o n 32 % of hi s repo rt ed net i nco m e whi ch has been ro und ed up t o t he next do l l ar.

B e c a u se the p a rtie s h a d o n ly o n e m ino r c h ild d u rin g this tim e , the a m o u n t o f M r. L ic h te n w a lter ’s su p p o rt is 14 b ased o n 21 % of hi s repo rt ed net i nco m e whi ch has been ro und ed up t o t he next do l l ar. -7- Mr. Lichte nw alter ’s Child S upp ort Obligation Und e rth e No ve m be r19 92 F or m ula TimeP eriod Due P aid Arr earage Fe bruary - De cembe r 1993 6,655.00 5,500.00 1,155.00 J anuary - De cembe r 1994 7,004.04 6,000.00 1,004.04 J anuary - De cembe r 1995 7,260.00 6,000.00 1,260.00 J anuary - June 1996 4,312.02 3,000.00 1,312.02 Arr earage$4,731.06 Mr. Lichte nw alter ’s Child S upp ort Obligation Under the Child S upp ort G uid elines July 1996 – Ju ne 1999 13 TimeP eriod Incom e Due P aid Arr earage J uly - De cembe r 1996 15,078.00 4,824.96 6,000.00 -1,175.04 J anuary - De cembe r 1997 71,591.00 22,908.67 12,000.00 10,909.12 J anuary - De cembe r 1998 62,334.00 19,946.88 12,000.00 7,946.88 J anuary - June 1999 31,135.00 9,963.20 6,000.00 3,963.20

Arr earage $21,644.16

Mr. Lichte nw alter ’s Child S upp ort Obligation Under the Child S upp ort G uid elines July 1999 – Ju ne 2003 14 TimeP eriod Incom e Due P aid Arr earage J uly - De cembe r 1999 31,135.00 6,538.35 3,000.00 3,538.35 J anuary - De cembe r 2000 69,741.00 14,645.61 6,000.00 8,645.61 J anuary - De cembe r 2001 73,608.00 15,457.68 6,000.00 9,457.68 J anuary - De cembe r 2002 80,992.00 17,008.32 6,000.00 11,008.32 J anuary - June 2003 40,496.00 8,504.16 3,000.00 5,504.16

Arr earage $38,154.12 Total Arre arage $64,529.34I t i s s om ewh at i r oni c t hat M s . Li cht enw al t er woul d mak e t hi s ar gu ment becau s e s he nev er r eques t ed t he t r i al 15

co urt t o r el i eve her s uppo r t ob l i gat i on for t he part i es ’ ol des t chi l d w ho was l i vi ng wi t h M r . Li cht enw al t er . If M s. Licht enwalt er’ s i nt erpret at i o n of T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 5

- 1 0 1 (f )( 1 ) were co rr ect , t he am o unt of her own chil d s up p o rt ar r ea r ag e wou l d a ct u al l y be l ar g er t h an M r . Li ch t en wa l t er ’ s a r r ea r ag e for t h e mi ddl e ch i l d.

T enn . Co de Ann. § 36

- 5- 10 1(f ) ( 1) pr ovi des , i n par t : “ Such j udgment [ for c hi l d s uppo r t ] s hal l not be s ubj ect 16 t o m o d i f i cat i o n as t o any t i m e p eri o d or any am o unt s d ue p ri o r t o t he d at e t hat an act i o n fo r mo d i fica tio n is f i l ed and not i ce of t he act i on ha s been mai l ed t o t he l as t kn own addres s of t he op po s i ng part i es . ” Pri or t o 20 05 , t hi s provi s i on was fo und i n T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 5

- 1 0 1 (a)( 5 ). -8- We need not calculate Mr. Lichtenwa lter’s c hild support bey ond J une 2003 bec ause the trial c ou rt ’s De c e mbe r 1, 20 03 or de r se t a n amou nt f or Mr . Lic hte nw a lte r t o p a y that w e nt i nto e ff

e c t in J uly 2003. As our calculati o n s d emons trate, Mr . Lichtenwa lter’s pay ments of only five hundre d dollars per

child throug hout the y ear s, despite hi s ample salary , fell fa r below the require ments of the Child S upport Gu i d el i nes. Even thoug h the childre n have all since rea ched ma jority , Mr. Lichtenwa lter is still responsible for paying this ar

rea rag e. Kuyke ndall v. W

heele r , 890 S.W .2d 785, 786 (Tenn. 1994)

. The re cord pr ovides no evidenc e reg arding how much, if any , of the child support that Mr. Lichtenwa lter should have paid betwee n 1993 and 2003 was offset by incre ased f

inancial or

other contributions by Ms. Lichtenwa lter. Therefor e, bec ause the children w ould have be en the primary benef iciarie s of the child support had it been paid, we havedetermined that the parties’ threechildren rathe r than M s. Lic hte nw a lte r s ho uld re c e ive a nd be ne fi t fr om the c hil d s up po rt arr e ara g e wh e n it is repaid by

Mr. Lichtenwa lter. On re mand, the trial c ourt is directe d to awar d a $64,529 judg ment ag ainst Mr. Lichtenwa lter and in favor of the pa rties’ thre e childre n, which shall ac crueinterest as permitted by

law. The trial court is a lso dire cted to equitably divide the ar

rea rag e among the three children and to establish a rea sonable repay ment schedule that will r equire Mr. Lichtenwa lter to pay thi s ju dg me nt i n n o mo rethan te n y e ars . III .

T HE E FF ECT O F THE E M A N C I PATI ON OF THE C HILDR EN Ms. L ichtenwa lter also asse rts that the substitute judge e rre d by fac toring in the emanc ipation of thepa rtie s’ tw o o lde r c hil dr e n e ve n th ou g h M r. Lic hte nw a lte r ha d no t mov e d to re du c e his c hil d support based on the fac t that they had re ache d the ag e of ma jority

. Rely ing on this court’s opinion

15 in State ex re l. Parker v . Parker , N o. M2 00 1- 01 23 2- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 2 WL 31 32 25 31 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Oct. 16, 2002) (No Tenn. R. A pp. P. 11 application filed) , Ms. L ichtenwa lter insists that the judgeretroa ctively

modified the Nove mber 12, 1992 de cre e in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5- 101(f) (1) ( 2005). We disag ree . 16 Orde rs and judg ments must be c onstrued in light of the law e x isting whe n they wer e ente red. Du ri ng a ll r e le vant p e ri od s o f time , th e Lic hte nw a lte rs , li ke oth e r p are nts , h a d an o bli g a tio n to support their children until the children be came emanc ipated. Kuyke ndall v. W heele r , 890 S.W .2d a t 78 6; State ex re l. Vaughn v. Kaatrude , 21 S.W .3d 244, 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Tenn. CodeAs f ar a s t h i s r ec or d s h ows , t h e Li ch t en wa l t er s ’ ch i l dr en ar e n ot di s abl ed. Acc or di n g l y , t h i s c as e does n ot 17

a d d re ss th e issu e s tha t ar ise w h e n a d isa b le d c h ild re a c h e s the a g e o f m a jo rity.
Se e Act of

M ar . 12, 1987, c h

. 39, § 1, 1987 T en n . Pub. Act s 47. 18

T he ad o p t i o n of t he C hi l d Sup p o rt G ui d el i nes r end ered t he p ract i ce o f p rorat i ng chi l d s up p o rt ob sol et e. T he 19 ch i l d s u ppor t for mu l a i n t h e g u i del i n es i s ba s ed on pe r ce n t ag es a ppl i ca bl e t o t h e n u mber of c h i l dr en be i n g s u ppor t ed.
T o the e x te n t t h a t S t a t e e x re l

. P a rke r v. P a rke r re q u ire s a d iff e re n t re su lt, w e d e c line to fo llo w it

. 20 -9- Ann. § 34-1-102( b). Howeve r, the pare nts’ duty to support ended by

operation of law either

when 17 the par ent died or when the c hild became emanc ipated. W e ins te in v . H

e im be rg , 490 S.W .2d 692, 69 8 ( Te nn . 1 97 2) ; Garey v. Gare y , 482 S.W. 2d 13 3, 13 5 (T e nn . 1 97 2) ; W allace v. Cox , 136 Tenn. 69 , 7 3, 18 8 S. W. 6 11 , 6 12 (1 91 6) ; W e nd e ll v . S ov ra n B an k

/Ce nt. So uth , 780 S.W .2d 372, 3 7 3-74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). A ccor dingly , a court’s power to r equire pare nts to pay child support extends only as long as they

areunemanc ipated. Bl ac kbu rn v . B lac kbu rn , 5 2 6 S.W .2d 463, 466 (Tenn. 19 75 ); Penland v. Penland , 5 21 S.W. 2d22 2, 22 4 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) ; W hit t v . W hit t , 490 S.W .2d 159, 160 (Tenn. 1973)

. Un til re lativ e ly

re c e ntl y , th e cou rt s c on sis te ntl y re c og nize d th a t pa

re nts c ou ld u nil a te ra lly reduc e their c hild support when a c hild became emanc ipated. Se e , e .g ., Chu rc hil l v . Ch urc hil l , 203 Te nn . 4 06 , 4 12 , 3 13 S.W. 2d43 6, 43 8- 39 (1 95 8) ; Hawkins v. Hawkins , 797 S.W .2d 897, 898 (Tenn. Ct. A p p . 1 9 9 0 )

. T h i s r e d u c t i o n w a s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e p ar e n t ’ s d uty to support had ended by operation of law, and the re ductions wereeff ective w ithout court authorization or appr oval.
I n 1987, the Tenne ssee Gene ral Assembly enac ted Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6 -5 -1 01(f) (1) prohibiting c ourts from modifying c hild support orders re troac tively

. Severa l y ear s later, a 18 c us tod ia l sp ou se arg ue d that thi s statut e pr e ve nte d c ou rt s fr om e xcu sin g a pa re nt f ro m pay ing c hil d support for an emanc ipated child unless the oblig or parent had obtained a modification of the support order on or befor e the date of the child’s emanc ipation. Whi le this court held that Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( f)( 1) did not permit “pror ation” of the child support for an emanc ipated child, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court disag ree d. The c ourt held that

[p] roration . . . is nota re troac tive modification of the child support awa rd and its ap p l i cation does not re quire a petition to, or an order from, the c ourt. I nste ad proration is simpl y a rule of law w hich de ri ve s f ro m th e le g a l princ ipl e that par e nts g e ne rally ow e no du ty to s u p p o rtc h i l d r e n w h o h a v e a t t a i n e dt h e a g e o f m a j o r i t y. Clin ar d v . Cl ina rd , No. 01S01-9502-CV-00021, 1995 WL 563858, at *2 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 1995) , pe t. reh’g de nied (Tenn. N ov. 6, 1995). 19
The Te nnessee Supreme Court’s holding in Clinard v. Cl inard controls this case. Fa ctoring 20 in the rea litythat two of the Lichtenwa lters’ c hildren had be come e m an ci p ated for the purpose of-10-

determining the amount of Mr. Lichtenwa lter’s support arrear ag e was not a re troac tive modification of any earlier child support o rd er. Rathe r, it was an a ppropriate application of the settled leg al principle that a pare nt’s leg al duty to support the ir child ends when the child become s emanc ipated. Acc ording ly , the substitute judge did not run a foul of Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(f) (1). The c ourts must be mindful of the costs of litigation toda y an d s h ould adopt proce dures intended to reduce these costs when possible. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 1 (directing the courts to construe the proc edura l rules to secur e “the just, speedy , and inexpensi v e determination of eve ry action”)

. When pare nts have only

one child, ther e is little nee d to impose upon the pare nts and the courts the burden and expense of obtaining an order that simplyconfirms that the oblig or par ent’s child support obligation has cea sed bec ause the child is no longe r entitled t o support. Howeve r, whe n more than one child is involved and the or der or judgme nt does not specific ally addre ss the eff

ect of emanc ipation on the child support obligation, it may be prudent to r equest a modification of the order to make sure that the par ents and the c ourt have the same unde rstanding of t he oblig or par ent’s pr os pe c tiv e c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio n. Ho we ve r, e ve n in tha t c ir c ums ta nc e , th e c ou rt s may c a lc ulate and asc ertain the obligor

pare nt’s obligation based on the d at e that the child bec ame e mancipate d rathe r than on the date that the petition was filed. IV. We va c a te thepo rtionof

theDe c e mbe r 1 , 2 00 3 o rd e r d e c lin ing Ms. Lic hte nw a lte r’ s r e qu e st for the c hild support arre ara g e. We re mand the ca se with direc tions to enter a judg ment consistent wi t h t h i s o p i n i o n aga i n s tM r . Li ch t en wa l t erfo r $ 6 4 , 5 2 9 an dfo r w h at ev erfu rt h erp ro ce ed i n gs consistent with this opi nion may be re quired. We tax the costs of this a ppeal in equal proportions to Pamela C. L ichtenwa lter and he r sure ty and to Chris Edwar d Lichtenwa lter for which execution, if nec essary , may

issue.

_____________________________ WILL I AM C. K OC H, JR., P. J., M. S.