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18-2677 

Lagueux v. Bridgeport Hospital 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 27th day of June, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

MICHAEL J. LAGUEUX, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 18-2677 

v. 

BRIDGEPORT HOSPITAL, 

Defendant-Appellee.

*

 

 

*

 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set out above. 
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FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Michael J. Lagueux, pro se, Piedmont, SC. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Michael N. LaVelle, Pullman & Comley, LLC, 

Bridgeport, CT. 

Appeal from an August 31, 2018 judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Connecticut (Alvin W. Thompson, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the District Court be and hereby is 

AFFIRMED. 

Michael J. Lagueux (“Lagueux”), proceeding pro se, sued Bridgeport Hospital (the 

“Hospital”), Bridgeport Hospital School of Nursing, and Griffin Hospital under Title IX of the 

Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.), alleging discrimination in connection 

with his dismissal from the School of Nursing and his denial for readmission. After dismissing all 

parties other than the Hospital, the District Court conducted a four-day bench trial in January 2018. 

The District Court awarded judgment to the Hospital. Lagueux appealed, arguing that the District 

Court erred with respect to a single finding of fact. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such 

submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 

F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, despite this latitude, “we need not, and normally will not, 

decide issues that a party fails to raise in his or her appellate brief.” Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 

209 (2d Cir. 1998). Here, Lagueux’s only argument on appeal is “that the Trial Court made an 

honest mistake when it rendered a finding of fact that the Appellant was overly eager to substitute 

his lack of judgment for that of his clinical instructors.” Reply Br. Appellant 3. Because “we need 

not manufacture claims of error for an appellant proceeding pro se,” LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 

F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995), the propriety of that finding of fact is the only issue on appeal. 

We review a district court’s findings of fact after a bench trial for clear error. See Principal 

Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Coassin, 884 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2018). Here, the “finding of fact” to which 

Lagueux objects appears to be the District Court’s characterization of an episode where Lagueux 

disagreed with his instructor regarding the use of a particular syringe. App’x 35. We conclude that 

the District Court’s description of this episode is firmly based on witness testimony. See App’x 641, 

720-21. As we do not generally “second-guess either the trial court’s credibility assessments or its 

choice between permissible competing inferences,” Ceraso v. Motiva Enters., LLC, 326 F.3d 303, 316 

(2d Cir. 2003), we find no clear error here. 
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Moreover, even a finding of clear error “will not warrant reversal if it is harmless.” Latsis v. 

Chandris, Inc., 20 F.3d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, the District Court’s judgment was not simply 

based on a finding that Lagueux “substitut[ed] his judgment for [that of his instructors]” in this one 

instance, but on a myriad of other factors and evidence. See App’x 39-40 (“[T]he plaintiff struggled 

to meet the legitimate expectations of his instructors[,] . . . failed the more difficult course[, and] . . . 

discounted constructive criticism[,] . . . and [the] statements made by his clinical instructor . . . did 

not reflect a discriminatory intent.”). Any error connected with this factual finding was therefore 

harmless. 

CONCLUSION 

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Lagueux on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the August 31, 2018 judgment of the 

District Court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court