J-A12038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

HEATHER SHARPLES

v.

JAMES P. SHARPLES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2894 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 

2018-01294-CU

HEATHER SHARPLES

v.

JAMES P. SHARPLES

APPEAL OF: DIANE REESER AND 

DOUGLAS REESER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3028 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 

2018-01294-CU

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 1, 2023

James P. Sharples (“Father”) and Diane and Douglas Reeser 

(“Grandparents”) appeal from the modified custody order entered on October 

20, 2022, following a three-day trial. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Father and Heather Sharples (“Mother”) have one daughter (“Child”), 

who was born in 2008. Mother filed a complaint for custody in 2018, which 
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resulted in a stipulated custody order giving the parents equally shared legal 

and physical custody of Child. Grandparents, who are Father’s parents,

1

petitioned to intervene. The court granted them standing and, in October 

2019, granted them physical custody of Child twice a year. The parties entered 

another stipulated custody agreement in March 2020,

2 which modified

Grandparents’ custodial time to one week in the summer and one long 

weekend in the winter, to be exercised during Father’s custodial time. The 

order provided that if Grandparents chose to exercise their summer week 

during one of Mother’s custodial weeks, Father would have to cede custody to

Mother during the preceding week.

Father filed an emergency petition for a custody evaluation in February 

2021, citing concerns about both Mother’s and Child’s mental health. Following 

an evidentiary hearing, the court ordered a custody evaluation and 

psychological assessment of all parties by a forensic psychologist, Dr. Dawn 

Sheehan. Father thereafter filed an emergency petition for primary custody. 

After more conciliation conferences, the court entered a September 2021 

temporary custody order, followed by an October 2021 modified custody 

order. The court granted Father primary physical custody and reduced

Mother’s award to partial physical custody for three hours every Tuesday 

evening and for the duration of alternating weekends. The order specified that 

____________________________________________

1 Paternal Grandfather is Father’s stepfather. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion 

(“1925(a) Op.”), 1/9/23, at 2 n.1.

2 The court adopted the stipulation as an order in April 2020.
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“[d]uring Mother’s overnights, Child shall have her phone and may call 

someone to assist in leaving the house for the purpose of diffusing the 

situation when the conflict escalates. Mother shall permit Child to leave.” 

Custody Order, 10/28/21, at ¶ 7(d). The order directed Mother to continue 

individual therapy and Child to continue therapy with a court-ordered 

counselor. It further stated family therapy could begin at the recommendation 

of Mother’s therapist. It altered Grandparents’ custody slightly, providing that 

they could choose their week of summer custody. It stated that if they chose 

a long weekend in the winter during Mother’s custody time, Father must

provide Mother with makeup time from his schedule within 30 days.

Father and Mother both filed petitions to modify custody in the spring of

2022. The court entered an order in May 2022 stating the October 2021 

custody order would remain in effect. It did modify the order to the extent 

that the new order allowed Child’s counselor to choose to expand Child’s 

individual therapy to include one or more family members, rather than 

allowing for family therapy to commence upon the recommendation of 

Mother’s therapist.3

Father demanded a trial, and the court held hearings from September 

20 to 22, 2022. It heard the testimony of Mother, Mother’s fiancé, Father, and 

Grandmother, and interviewed Child in camera. The court also considered the 

expert testimony of Dr. Sheehan, the results of the court-ordered custody 

____________________________________________

3 By separate order, the court also granted a petition Father had filed to enjoin 

Mother from making disparaging remarks.
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evaluation, dated October 2021, and the testimony of Child’s court-ordered 

counselor, Jennifer Krumenacker (“Counselor Krumenacker”).

The court issued a modified custody order – the order under appeal –

on October 20, 2022.4It eliminated Mother’s custodial weekends. However, it 

retained Mother’s custody times on Tuesdays evenings from 5 to 8 p.m., and 

stated Child “shall not be permitted to refuse to attend or terminate Mother’s 

custodial time, nor request early departure or late arrival, without Mother’s 

express consent.” Final Order for Custody, 10/20/22, at ¶ 3(i).5 The court 

modified Grandparents’ custodial time such that, rather than any specific 

amount or scheduled time, Grandparents could exercise custody “[s]olely 

during Father’s custodial time as may be agreed between Grandparents and 

Father[.]” Id. at ¶ 11(a). Grandparents were not permitted to request custody

“during any part of Mother’s custodial time.” Id. at ¶ 11(b).

The court ordered Child to continue individual therapy with Counselor 

Krumenacker, Mother to continue individual therapy with her own therapist,

and Father to begin individual co-parenting therapy. It also directed Mother 

and Child to participate together in reunification therapy with a different 

therapist. Paragraph 12 of the order prohibited Father and Grandparents from 

giving or lending Child any motorized vehicles, electronics, jewelry, or more 

____________________________________________

4 The order was filed on October 17, 2022, but notice was sent to the parties 

on October 20, 2022. See Pa.R.C.P. 236.

5 The court also gave Mother custody for a few hours on most holidays, and 

for 12 hours on Mother’s Day.
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than $100 of cash or cash equivalents, without Mother’s express written 

consent. It also forbade the parties from disclosing to Child when Mother 

withheld her consent for any gift. By separate order, the court appointed a 

Parenting Coordinator for a 12-month term. See Pa.R.C.P. 1915.11-1(a).

Father and Grandparents moved for reconsideration, which the court 

denied. Father and Grandparents each filed a notice of appeal. This Court 

consolidated the appeals.

Father presents the following issues:

1. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse 

its discretion by inappropriately applying the factors pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a) contrary [to] the weight of the evidence 

presented at trial, in particular, factors 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15?

2. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse 

its discretion by disregarding the opinions of Jenny A. 

Krumenacker (Minor Child’s court-mandated treating therapist), 

Dr. Dawn Sheehan (court-appointed psychologist), and Mother’s 

own testimony all of whom concluded that it would be in the best 

interest of [Child] to have a break in custody with Mother, 

particularly after Mother failed to present any contrary expert 

testimony at trial?

3. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse 

its discretion by disregarding the opinions of Jenny A. 

Krumenacker and Dr. Dawn Sheehan that reunification therapy or 

joint/family counseling was not recommended between Minor 

Child and Mother until both parties made progress with their 

individual therapy efforts?

4. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse 

its discretion by not allowing Minor Child to adequately express 

her feelings, thoughts, and concerns regarding her relationship 

with Mother?

5. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse 

its discretion by removing the provision contained in the October 

28, 2021 Order providing [Child] the ability to terminate visitation 
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with Mother during high-conflict situations, despite expert and 

witness testimony supporting a continued need for this provision 

in Minor Child’s best interest?

6. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse 

its discretion by assuming facts not of record and, sua sponte, 

implementing spending restrictions (by both item and price) on 

Father despite no party asking for such relief and no evidence or 

testimony at trial to justify the same? 

7. Did the Trial Court commit an error as a matter of law or abuse 

its discretion by failing to incorporate adequate provisions 

regarding Father’s ability to vacation or plan extracurricular 

activities with [Child] pursuant to Paragraphs 3(a)(i) & (ii) of the 

October 17, 2022 Order?

Father’s Br. at 4-5 (suggested answers omitted). Grandparents raise the 

following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused 

its discretion by exceeding its adjudicatory authority under 

Section 5323 of the Pennsylvania Child Custody Act by restricting 

Grandparents’ ability to make gifts or loans to the Child where:

a. The evidence did not support a conclusion that such gifts 

caused or would cause an ongoing risk of harm to the Child, 

and the trial court made no finding of ongoing risk of harm 

or need for safety conditions as required by Section 5323(e) 

of the Child Custody Act.

b. Absent evidence of harm to the Child, the spending 

restrictions are an extraordinary invasion into the privacy of 

the Grandparents’ home and relationship with the Child.

2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law, abused its 

discretion, and/or violated the Grandparents’ right to due process 

by restricting their right to make gifts or loans to the Child where:

a. Mother did not request such relief from the Court; 

Grandparents were given no notice that spending 

restrictions might be imposed on them; and Grandparents 

had no warning that they needed to offer evidence about 

financial matters ordinarily irrelevant in child custody cases.
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b. The denial of due process resulted in a factual error that 

the Child’s Father and Grandparents indulge her more than 

Mother; and cause the Child to be too focused on material 

possessions.

3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused 

its discretion by modifying paragraph 5 of the order of October 28, 

2021 relating to vacations, without delineating its reasons 

pursuant to Section 5323(d) of the Child Custody Act, denying the 

Child the ability to join her Grandparents for an annual seven-day 

seashore vacation in a rental property, which has been a family 

tradition for more than a decade.

Grandparents’ Br. at 19-21 (answers below omitted). We have reordered the 

issues raised by both parties in our discussion below, for ease of disposition.

“In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type and our 

standard is abuse of discretion.” D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467, 478 (Pa.Super. 

2014) (quoting J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 650 (Pa.Super. 2011)). We will 

“accept the factual findings of the trial court that are supported by competent 

evidence of record[.]” S.S. v. K.F., 189 A.3d 1093, 1098 (Pa.Super. 2018).

“[W]ith regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must 

defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses firsthand.” D.K., 102 A.3d at 478 (quoting J.R.M., 33 A.3d at 650). We may 

reverse the court’s custody decision only if it “involve[s] an error of law, or 

[is] unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.” Id.

(quoting J.R.M., 33 A.3d at 650).

A trial court must determine custody based on the best interest of the 

child. T.M. v. H.M., 210 A.3d 283, 288 (Pa.Super. 2019). A non-exhaustive 
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list of 16 factors for the court to consider when making a custody decision is 

statutorily prescribed:

§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody

(a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall 

determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant 

factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which 

affect the safety of the child, including the following:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit 

frequent and continuing contact between the child and 

another party.

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household, whether there is a 

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and 

which party can better provide adequate physical 

safeguards and supervision of the child.

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating 

to consideration of child abuse and involvement with 

protective services).

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf 

of the child.

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child's 

education, family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the 

child’s maturity and judgment.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the 

other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where 

reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the 

child from harm.

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent and nurturing relationship with the child 

adequate for the child’s emotional needs.
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(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily 

physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special 

needs of the child.

(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability 

to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one 

another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by 

another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to 

cooperate with that party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or 

member of a party’s household.

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or 

member of a party’s household.

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). The court has discretion to determine the relative 

weight to give each factor. T.M., 210 A.3d at 289. 

When determining whether to award custody to a grandparent with 

standing, the court must consider the foregoing factors in conjunction with 

three additional factors:

(i) the amount of personal contact between the child and the party 

prior to the filing of the action;

(ii) whether the award interferes with any parent-child 

relationship; and

(iii) whether the award is in the best interest of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c)(1). Grandparents bear the burden of demonstrating

that their exercise of custody is in the child’s best interest and not to the 

detriment of the parent-child relationship. D.R.L. v. K.L.C., 216 A.3d 276, 
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279 (Pa.Super. 2019). There is a presumption that custody will be awarded to 

a parent over a nonparent, and that presumption may only be rebutted by 

clear and convincing evidence. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327.

I. Mother’s Partial Custody

Father first argues the court abused its discretion in failing to grant him 

sole custody after weighing the custody factors, and takes issue with the 

weight the court assigned to factors 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15. Father argues 

the court erred in not giving more weight to factor 2 (present and past abuse 

by a party and continued risk of harm), and factor 4 (need for stability and 

continuity). Father asserts that Child does not have safety or stability when in 

Mother’s care. He claims Child suffers from skin and eyebrow picking, 

depression, and anxiety due to conflict when in Mother’s custody. He cites a 

portion of the custody evaluation stating that the Mother-Child relationship is 

“highly maladaptive and chaotic,” and Counselor Krumenacker’s testimony 

that the relationship is “toxic and chaotic.” Father’s Br. at 13, 15-16 (quoting 

Comprehensive Custody Evaluation (“Evaluation”), 10/19/21, at 73, and N.T., 

9/20/22, at 41). 

Father further argues that the court abused its discretion when weighing

factor 7, Child’s preference. Father asserts that the court should have weighed 

the Child’s preference more heavily, pointing out that the previous trial judge, 

Dr. Sheehan, and Counselor Krumenacker all described Child as bright, 

mature, and respectful. Id. at 19. Father claims that the court’s findings that

Child is self-centered, undisciplined, entitled, and overindulged are against the 
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weight of the evidence. Father relatedly argues the court’s questioning of Child 

in camera demonstrated bias against Child and that the court did not foster 

an environment where Child could express her true feelings and concerns. Id.

at 37.6

According to Father, the court also abused its discretion when weighing 

factor 8 (one parent’s attempts to turn the child against the other parent). 

Father argues the evidence demonstrated that Father attempted to encourage 

Child to engage with Mother during her custody periods, whereas Mother made 

false accusations against him to third parties. Id. at 21-23.

Regarding factor 9 (maintaining a loving, stable, consistent and 

nurturing relationship with the child), Father asserts that the Evaluation shows 

that Mother does not provide a stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship

____________________________________________

6 Father offers the following as examples of the court’s inappropriate 

questioning:

• “You said you don't have any interaction with [Mother] when 

you are there so how is your relationship stressing you out 

when you are not interacting with her?”

• “But you sit in your room by choice, correct?”

• “You do have friends in the neighborhood you could go visit, 

correct?”

• “Would you like to fix the relationship with your mom?”

• “Did you ever try talking to your mom?”

• “Do you report back to your dad about what happens at your 

mom’s house?”

Father’s Br. at 38-39 (citations to N.T., 9/22/22, at 53-56 omitted)
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with Child. Id. at 23. Similarly, regarding factor 10 (meeting daily needs), 

Father claims that the record supports a conclusion that Mother cannot 

currently provide for Child’s daily needs. He maintains that Dr. Sheehan 

testified that extended periods of time with Mother produce “adverse 

childhood experiences” which have long-term negative consequences. Id. at 

25-26 (quoting Evaluation at 73).

As for factor 15 (parent’s mental and physical condition), Father asserts 

that Mother suffers from anxiety, complex PTSD, substance abuse (cocaine, 

alcohol, marijuana), and is promiscuous. Id. at 26. Father claims Mother 

testified she does not take her prescribed medications, and that Dr. Sheehan 

opined that Mother cannot regulate her emotions without her medications and 

requires further individual therapy before she can address her relationship 

with Child. Id. at 26-27.

More generally, Father argues that the court abused its discretion in not 

granting him sole custody because he claims Dr. Sheehan and Counselor 

Krumenacker agreed that a complete break in Mother’s custody was 

warranted. Id. at 16-17 (citing R.882a (Evaluation at 78) and N.T., 9/20/22, 

at 41). He contends that Mother did not present any evidence to contradict 

their opinions on these points, and the court abused its discretion in 

disregarding the uncontradicted testimony. Id. at 28, 32-33. Father argues 

the court erred in dismissing Counselor Krumenacker’s opinion on the grounds 

that she is not an expert. Father argues she has a master’s degree and a 

license, possesses knowledge beyond the average lay person, and was
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appointed Child’s counselor by the court and ordered to remain involved. Id.

at 29-31 (citing Pa.R.E. 702). Father claims Mother even agreed a break was 

warranted. Id. at 29 (citing N.T., 9/21/22, at 83-84).

We find Father is due no relief on this issue. First, while Mother testified 

that she agreed with Counselor Krumenacker’s recommendation that some 

break in custody was warranted, she also stated she believed she and Child

were already taking the break during the month preceding trial. Mother stated 

she did not agree with formally taking away custody indefinitely, which she 

anticipated would only spur further litigation. N.T., 9/21/22, at 79, 83-84, 

142. The court also considered that, because Child had not seen Mother for 

the month preceding the hearing, Child had already had a “break” in custody. 

1925(a) Op. at 3-4, 8.

Next, while Father relies heavily on the expert opinion of Dr. Sheehan, 

the court explained that it took the Evaluation and Dr. Sheehan’s testimony 

with a grain of salt, considering that the Evaluation “was produced nearly one 

year ago and is somewhat stale.” Memorandum in Support of Custody Order 

(“Trial Ct. Mem.”), 10/20/22, at 2 n.1. The court further found that the 

Evaluation had “diminished value” in helping it assess the current state of the 

parties and their relationships because Father had allowed Child to read it, 

which, the court found, altered and exacerbated the conflict between Child 

and Mother. See id.; 1925(a) Op. at 6 (citing Father’s Pet. to Modify, 3/8/22,

at ¶ 7).
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Nevertheless, while it did not wholly accept Dr. Sheehan’s opinions, the 

court “agree[d] with Dr. Sheehan’s conclusion that the reports of conflict 

between Mother and [Child], Mother’s maladaptive tendencies and the degree 

of [Child]’s emotional distress should bear significant weight.” Trial Ct. Mem. 

at 12. It acknowledged that “Mother appears to suffer from anxiety, traumarelated symptoms and maladaptive tendencies that negatively impact her 

insight, judgment, coping skills and parenting skills.” Id. at 11. 

At the same time, the court observed that the negative incidents 

between Child and Mother described in the Evaluation had not required any 

intervention by protective services. Id. at 4. It also observed that the 

Evaluation stated Child’s behavioral issues are not caused solely by her 

relationship with Mother, but also by stress due to “peer issues,” custody 

litigation, and Grandparents’ intervention in the custody case. Id. at 11. It 

further observed that the Evaluation did not actually recommend a break in 

Mother’s custody. Rather, the court noted, it stated that a partial custody 

schedule would remain appropriate “so long as Mother engages in appropriate 

treatment recommendations and Child remains in counseling.” 1925(a) Op. at 

8-9 (quoting Evaluation at 77).7 The court noted that Mother is currently

participating in individual therapy and was ordered to continue doing so. Id. 

at 9. Father’s argument that the court failed to give proper consideration and 

weight to Dr. Sheehan’s expert opinion holds no water.

____________________________________________

7 The page of the Evaluation cited by Father does not address a break in 

custody. See R.882a (Evaluation at 78).
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In contrast, the court did not find Counselor Krumenacker’s testimony 

to be credible and that it found her to be biased against Mother. Trial Ct. Mem.

at 3; 1925(a) Op. at 9 n.6. It recounted two times when Counselor 

Krumenacker testified that Mother had behaved inappropriately, which 

contradicted or over embellished Child’s testimony. Trial Ct. Mem. at 3-4. It

also considered that Counselor Krumenacker tells Child Mother “needs more 

work,” which the court found “perpetuate[s] a negative narrative about 

Mother.” Id. at 4; see also 1925(a) Op. at 6-7. The court also acknowledged

that Father did not offer Counselor Krumenacker as an expert witness. 

1925(a) Op. at 9 n.6.

We defer to the court’s credibility finding regarding Counsellor 

Krumenacker and the weight it assigned her testimony. We find no merit to 

Father’s argument that the court committed an error of law when stating that 

Counselor Krumenacker was not an expert witness, as Father did not offer her 

as one. See N.T., 9/20/22, at 39 (counsel objecting to a question posed to 

Counselor Krumenacker on grounds that “she’s not here as an expert”). 

In addition to considering Dr. Sheehan’s opinion, the court found it 

would not be in Child’s best interests to grant Father sole custody because 

doing so would place Child “in the echo chamber of Father and Grandparents’ 

disparaging comments regarding Mother.” Trial Ct. Mem. at 9. The court was 

“not convinced that Father’s over-indulgence of [Child], coupled with his 

undermining of her relationship with Mother, is substantially better than the 

conflict[ed] relationship [Child] has with her Mother.” Id. While the court did 
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not specifically mention the evidence Father claims proves that he encourages 

contact with Mother or that Mother has tried to turn Child against him, the 

court placed great weight on the fact that Father let Child read the Evaluation8

and Child’s own testimony that Father and Grandparents make negative 

statements about Mother. Id. at 8. It also found that “Father and 

Grandparents have increased the level of conflict by empowering [Child] to 

demand to be picked up when she does not get her way with Mother and 

disparaging Mother.” Id. at 10.

Regarding Child’s preference for custody with Father, the court 

acknowledged this preference and noted Child’s intelligence. Id. at 6. 

However, it also found Child was “self-centered, which is not atypical for a 

teenager, undisciplined, entitled, and overindulged.” Id. It considered her 

preference for staying with Father in light of the fact that Child “generally only 

needs to ask for something in order to receive it and she is rarely disciplined,”

which it viewed in contrast with Mother’s home, where she must share a 

bathroom and common living areas. Id. It also considered Child’s preference 

for Father in view of Father’s allowing her to read the Evaluation, which 

____________________________________________

8 The Evaluation stated that “no party should discuss any matters related to 

the legal or evaluative process of this case with the child.” 1925(a) Op. at 5 

(quoting Evaluation at 78). Dr. Sheehan testified that she was concerned that

Father allowed Child to read the Evaluation. Id. (quoting N.T., 9/21/22, at 17-

18). The court found Father did not testify credibly when he stated he had 

only allowed Child to read a few sentences of the Evaluation from the 

computer screen while she looked over his shoulder. Id. at 6.
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“provided a narrative to avoid the more mundane trappings of Mother’s home”

and reinforced Father’s negative statements about Mother. Id. at 7, 8.

The court’s findings have a basis in the record, and we defer to the trial 

court’s credibility determinations and the weight it assigned to the various 

factors. The court considered the evidence on which Father relies. It simply 

did not give it the weight that Father would have liked. Overall, given the 

court’s sustainable findings, we do not conclude that the court’s decision to 

deny a complete break in Mother’s custody and allow Mother to retain three 

hours of custody a week9to be unreasonable or an abuse of discretion.

In addition, we find no merit to Father’s argument that the court abused 

its discretion when conducting the in camera interview of Child. While any 

questioning by an authority may be intimidating to a 14-year old child, the 

transcript shows that the court asked Child objective, impartial questions 

about her perceptions of and interactions with both Mother and Father. It also 

gave Child multiple opportunities to provide supplemental information. See 

N.T., 9/22/22, at 3-57.

Father further argues that the court erred in not including in the custody 

order any language, such as was included in the October 2021 order, that 

would give Child the ability to terminate visitation with Mother during highconflict situations. Father’s Br. at 40-42.

____________________________________________

9 With additional time on holidays.
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We find no merit to this argument. The previous order stated that,

“[d]uring Mother’s overnights, Child shall have her phone and may call 

someone to assist in leaving the house for the purpose of diffusing the 

situation when the conflict escalates. Mother shall permit child to leave.” 

Custody Order, 10/28/21, at ¶ 7(d). However, this language by its terms 

applies only to overnight visits, and the instant order does not include any 

overnights with Mother.

Moreover, while the instant order states Child “shall not be permitted to 

refuse to attend or terminate Mother’s custodial time, nor request early 

departure or late arrival, without Mother’s express consent,” Final Order for 

Custody, 10/20/22, at ¶ 3(i), this provision does not expressly address 

emergency situations. Rather, it serves as a counterbalance to the court’s 

finding that Child regularly uses her ability to terminate visits as leverage and

was intended to prevent any further conflict between the parties. See 1925(a) 

Op. at 12 (“The trial court was and remains unwilling to provide Child with a 

cudgel that can be used whenever it appears that Mother may deny her 

undivided attention, a request, demand, or threaten discipline. Creating or 

permitting such a dynamic is not in the best interests of Child”). Importantly, 

the order provides for Child to contact the non-custodial parent, and viceversa. See Order, 10/20/22, at ¶ 10(a)-(c). The order is not unreasonable or 

an abuse of discretion.
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II. Reunification Therapy

Father contends that the court abused its discretion in ordering Child 

and Mother to participate in reunification therapy. According to Father, both 

Counselor Krumenacker and Dr. Sheehan recommended against joint or 

family therapy until Mother made more progress in her own therapy and 

reunification therapy was recommended by the individual therapists. Father’s 

Br. at 33 (citing N.T., 9/20/22, at 38; N.T., 9/21/22, at 12; Evaluation at 78).

Father cites Counselor Krumenacker’s testimony that reunification therapy will 

not work until Mother understands why her relationship with Child is not 

working. Id. at 34 (citing N.T., 9/20/22, at 45, 62-63). He also cites a portion 

of the Evaluation stating Dr. Sheehan’s belief that “joint/family counseling 

would be counterproductive for both Mother and Child.” Id. (citing Evaluation 

at 73). Father argues that the court erred in disregarding the expert testimony 

and cherry-picking a portion of the Evaluation to justify its decision, while 

simultaneously claiming Dr. Sheehan’s opinion in the Evaluation was stale. Id.

at 35.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court explained that it ordered

reunification therapy because the Evaluation states that Heather Goldner 

Kinsey, JD, LMFT, who mediated a session between Mother and Child in August 

2021, recommended reunification therapy to Dr. Sheehan. 1925(a) Op. at 10 

& 10 n.7.; see also Evaluation at 56. The court also observed that while Dr. 

Sheehan was opposed to joint counseling at the time she authored the 

Evaluation, Dr. Sheehan did not expressly testify she was opposed to 
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reunification therapy at the time of trial. 1925(a) Op. at 10.10 The court also 

considered that Child testified in camera that she does not know much about

Mother. Id. at 10-11 (citing N.T., 9/22/22, at 19).

The decision to require reunification therapy does not involve an error 

of law and is not unreasonable. There is support in the record for the court’s 

decision to order the therapy, even if does not prove to be immediately 

effective.

III. Father’s/Grandparents’ Vacation Custody

Father argues that by allowing Mother to exercise custody every 

Tuesday night, the court has interfered with Father’s ability to plan a weeklong vacation with Child to take place on a calendar week, and in particular,

an annual shore vacation with Grandparents. Father’s Br. at 51-52. 

Grandparents similarly argue that eliminating their dedicated week of 

custody time is not in Child’s best interest and that the court failed to delineate 

its reasons for doing so. Grandparents’ Br. at 84-93. They point out that no 

party petitioned the court to modify the provisions regarding their exercise of 

custody. They also claim the court committed an error of law in concluding 

that Section 5328(a) is not applicable to their request for custody. Id. at 89 

(quoting 1925(a) Op. at 22).

____________________________________________

10 Father cites Dr. Sheehan’s testimony that at the time she authored the 

Evaluation, she recommended Mother “needed pretty intensive therapy to 

address her issues before she could have a healthy relationship with her 

daughter[.]” N.T., 9/21/22, at 12. Dr. Sheehan testified she had not received 

any further information that could put her in the position to alter her previous 

recommendation. Id. at 12-13.
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We find Father is due no relief. As the trial court pointed out, Father has

custody of Child roughly 98% of the time, which provides him “more than an 

adequate amount of time to take a vacation.” 1925(a) Op. at 4, 14. Indeed, 

nothing in the custody order prevents Father from taking Child on vacation 

from Wednesday morning through Tuesday morning. The court did not abuse 

its discretion.

Regarding Grandparents, the court found that their intervention in the 

custody matter for purposes of their annual vacation “is a source of stress” for 

Child. Trial Ct. Mem. at 5, 12; see also 1925(a) Op. at 24 (citing N.T.,

9/20/22, at 174). The court observed that in the past, Grandparents’ requests

to exercise custodial time during Mother’s time have resulted in conflict. Trial 

Ct. Mem. at 13. The court recounted that Dr. Sheehan recommended that if 

Mother’s custody remains limited, Grandparents can negotiate their custody 

time with Father; the court also found that Grandparents “have unfettered 

access to [Child] during Father’s custodial time.” Id.; 1925(a) Op. at 5 n.5

(citing Evaluation at 78). 

Given these findings, which are supported by the record, we see no 

abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that Mother may exercise 

custody every Tuesday night, at the expense of Grandparents’ ideal weekendto-weekend shore vacation. The court found that Grandparents have unlimited 

access to Child during the 98% of the time that Father exercises custody, and 

that scheduling Grandparents’ custody as a separate week was an 

unnecessary source of conflict. Its decision to remove that source of conflict 
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was not unreasonable. Grandparents can take Child on a nearly week-long 

vacation, from Tuesday night to the following Tuesday afternoon, or can take 

a vacation during the calendar week if they return Child to Mother for her visit 

on Tuesday evening.

The court did err in stating the factors under Section 5328(a) are not 

relevant when determining Grandparents’ custody. Those custody factors are 

to be considered in conjunction with the factors specific to grandparents under 

Section 5328(c). See D.R.L., 216 A.3d at 280.

Nonetheless, we do not find the error warrants reversal in this case, as 

none of the factors of Section 5328(a) would render the court’s decision an 

abuse of discretion. Grandparents have not carried their burden to prove their 

calendar-week-long exercise of custody is in Child’s best interest and not to 

the detriment of the parent-child relationship, and we therefore affirm the 

court’s decision to relegate their custody time to that which Father shares with 

them.

IV. Spending Restrictions

Both Father and Grandparents contest the court’s decision to limit their 

spending on Child, and the court’s authority to do so. Father asserts that the 

court’s conclusion that he provides Child with a lavish lifestyle and buys Child’s 

affection is not supported by the record and disregards the evidence of the 

actual reasons for the poor relationship between Child and Mother, which 

Father asserts are “Mother’s inability to effectively convey . . . love, attention, 

and affection.” Father’s Br. at 45.
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Father also argues that the spending restriction is impractical and 

unworkable. See id. at 48-50. For example, Father queries whether he can

contribute more than $100 per month to Child’s education fund without 

Mother’s approval, and what he will tell Child regarding her birthday gifts, for 

example, as the order prohibits him from disclosing when Mother has withheld 

consent for a given purchase. He also points out that he would have to involve 

the court in every purchase to which Mother does not consent, and that Mother 

does not need to give any reason for withholding consent. Father also stresses

that Mother did not request a cap on spending, and that the spending issue 

was not central to the custody issue.

Grandparents argue the trial court did not have authority to impose a 

spending restriction because it did not find there was a risk of safety or harm 

to Child. Grandparents’ Br. at 45-46 (citing Section 5323(e)). According to 

Grandparents, the best-interest standard does not grant the court unlimited 

power, and due process prohibits the court from micromanaging child-rearing 

decisions. Id. at 48-49 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000)). 

They further contend the court lacked authority to restrict spending sua 

sponte, and quote Mother’s testimony that she does not feel the need to 

compete with Grandparents’ spending. Id. at 55-56 (quoting N.T., 9/21/22,

at 153).

Grandparents also argue the record does not support the trial court’s 

decision. They assert Child does not receive excessive gifts, and that she 

testified that Father and Grandparents occasionally refuse when she asks for 
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something. They point out Child did not testify as to how frequently she asks 

for something, or how extravagant her requests are. Grandparents echo 

Father’s argument that the order is broad and vague, and question whether 

they can lend Child their car for a trip to the grocery store, and what they 

would be allowed to tell Child if, for example, Mother did not give consent to 

buy Child a graphing calculator for school. Id. at 65-66.

Grandparents also argue the court’s imposition of a spending restriction 

deprived them of procedural due process. They assert that because no party 

petitioned the court to intervene on this issue, Grandparents had no notice 

that it would be decided by the court. They claim that although their spending 

is mentioned in passing in the 78-page Evaluation, it is not among the 

“Relevant Findings and Impressions,” the custody factors, or the 

recommendations. Id. at 69-70. They argue that parties’ spending is typically 

only evaluated in custody cases where there is poverty, relocation, or 

attempts to influence a child’s testimony – none of which was present here. 

They further claim that because they did not know they needed to 

present evidence on this issue, they had no opportunity to be heard.

Grandparents assert that had they had proper notice, they would have 

presented evidence to rebut the factual conclusions the trial court drew solely 

from Child’s in camera testimony, such as the respective sizes of the parties’ 

homes, the cost of the treehouse, which Grandparents claim Grandfather built 

himself, or the dress Child wore to court, which Grandparents claim was from 

a sales rack at Macy’s and purchased by Father. Id. at 73-74. Regarding any 
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assertions of overindulgence of the Child on their part, Grandparents assert 

they would have presented rebuttal evidence of their house rules for Child, 

including chores and discipline.

The trial court found that Grandparents have no substantive due process 

rights in relation to custody of Child. 1925(a) Op. at 15-16. It found that 

Grandparents were not deprived of procedural due process because they had 

notice of the trial and an opportunity to be heard and call witnesses. Id. at 

16. It stated Grandparents had “notice that their spending on Child may be at 

issue based on the [Evaluation].” Id. at 17.11

Factually, the court found “[Child] is very oriented towards the material” 

and that Grandparents “overindulge [Child] with material benefits,” based on 

Child’s in camera statements to the court. Trial Ct. Mem. at 5, 6. It recounted,

At Father’s house [Child] enjoys her own bedroom, bathroom, a 

basement set up as an art studio and a “she shed” in a livingquarters over the garage. She generally only needs to ask for 

something in order to receive it and she is rarely disciplined. The 

same is true of Grandparents’ home, which is larger than her 

Father’s home and includes a treehouse. Grandparents do not 

discipline [Child], and she generally need only ask for something 

to receive it. During her interview with the Court, [Child] made a 

point of informing the Court that her Grandmother bought her the 

new dress she was wearing the night before, because she “didn’t 

have anything to wear to court.” Mother does not provide this level 

of material indulgence to [Child].

____________________________________________

11 The court also found Grandparents waived their due process claims by 

failing to make specific allegations to support their due process argument in 

their Rule 1925(b) statement. However, as Grandparents raised the issue in 

their motion for reconsideration, and the court addressed its merits in its Rule 

1925(a) opinion, we find waiver inappropriate. 
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Id. at 6-7. The court similarly recalled Child’s in camera statement that she 

need only ask Father for something to receive it. 1925(a) Op. at 13. 

In addition to Child’s in camera statements, the court made factual 

findings on this issue, based on the Evaluation and Grandmother’s testimony: 

• Friends of Grandparents informed Dr. Sheehan “Child is a bit 

overindulged at times by her grandparents, but that this is not 

excessive.” 

• Mother told Dr. Sheehan, “[A]s long as I was spending money, [Child] 

was fine. As soon as I said no, she rejects, refuses to participate, or take 

pictures; then she calls [Grandparents] and they attack me.” 

• Grandmother testified that “maybe, we’re Switzerland. We are the ones 

that say for breakfast if you want a piece of chocolate, that’s fine. It’s 

that kind of comfort where she just feels safe always,” and told Dr. 

Sheehan that Child “likes to have undivided attention at times.” 

• Grandfather told Dr. Sheehan that “we decide what to do in life based 

on [Child].” 

• Dr. Sheehan concluded that Grandfather is preoccupied with Child and 

that Child sees Grandmother as a mother figure. 

Id. at 17-19.

From these findings, the court concluded that imposing a spending 

restriction on Father and Grandparents would be in Child’s best interest. It 

relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s statement in Colonna v. 

Colonna, 855 A.2d 648, 651 n.5 (Pa. 2004), that “the temptation for the well-
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off parent to buy the affection of the children, and the tendency of the children 

to favor the parent who provides them with a more attractive lifestyle are 

factors that do not serve the best interests of the children.” Id. at 19.

We find the trial court abused its discretion in restricting Father’s and 

Grandparents’ spending. The parties had insufficient notice that the court 

would be entertaining a cap, and the imposition of a cap was unreasonable.12

Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard “at a 

meaningful time in a meaningful manner.” Everett v. Parker, 889 A.2d 578, 

580 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Notice is required to ensure “that 

each party is provided adequate opportunity to prepare and thereafter 

properly advocate its position, ultimately exposing all relevant factors from 

which the finder of fact may make an informed judgment.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Where facts are at issue, due process almost always “requires an 

opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses.” E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 

451, 463 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “[A]bsent adequate notice or 

opportunity to prepare, neither [this Court] nor the trial court can assume that 

the parties have either sufficiently exposed the relevant facts or properly 

argued their significance.” Id. at 464 (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

12 Because we reverse on this basis, we need not address whether the court 

otherwise had authority, in a custody dispute, to impose spending restrictions 

on the parties where the child’s safety was not at issue.
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No one petitioned the court to impose a spending restriction or argued 

for one at trial. When asked whether she was bothered by Grandparents’

expenditures, Mother testified,

Maybe in the beginning because I felt like I had to compete, but 

I’ve accepted that – again, like I said, I can’t control them. I can't 

control what other people have. You know, I'm just going to 

provide what I can provide. If [Child] can't accept that, that's 

something that we can work on. But I'm happy with what I have 

because money doesn't buy love or happiness.

N.T., 9/21/22, at 153. Nor did any witness recommend a spending restriction, 

and the portions of the Evaluation on which the trial court relies were 

insufficient to put the parties on notice that the court might impose a spending 

restriction. See Everett, 889 A.2d at 580-82 (finding Mother was deprived 

due process when court modified custody even though Mother was not served 

with meaningful notice of the hearing and Father’s request for custody was on 

third page of his contempt petition).

Furthermore, there was inadequate support in the record for the 

restriction. The only evidence regarding Father’s and Grandparents’ 

expenditures came from Child’s in camera interview. But even her testimony 

did not address the amount of money Father or Grandparents spend on her.

Child was not subject to cross-examination. The record does not support a 

finding that Child is “spoiled.” 

Moreover, even if Child’s testimony was sufficient to support a 

conclusion that it would be in Child’s best interest if Father and Grandparents 

spent less money on her, the resolution imposed by the court was not 
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reasonable. The record resoundingly supports the conclusion that creating 

conflict between the parties is not in Child’s best interest. This was even part 

of the court’s rationale in forbidding Father and Grandparents from attempting 

to negotiate vacation time with Mother. Yet the court gave Mother exclusive 

control over Grandparents’ and Father’s ability to spend more than $100 on 

Child. This is not a reasonable directive. The likelihood of ensuing conflict is 

high, and the preexisting conflict will likely be exacerbated by requiring Father 

and Grandparents to ask Mother’s permission for expenditures over $100. For 

the foregoing reasons, we vacate this portion of the order.

Order vacated as to paragraph 12. Order affirmed in all other respects.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/1/2023