[Cite as State v. Hsu, 2024-Ohio-2584.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 113392

v. :

CHIH-WEI HSU, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 3, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-23-682421-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Melissa Riley, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Edward M. Heindel, for appellant.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

Appellant Chih-Wei Hsu (“appellant”) brings this appeal challenging 

his convictions for promoting prostitution and possession of criminal tools. After a 

thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.
I. Factual and Procedural History

In June 2023, the Northeast Ohio Human Trafficking Task Force 

(“Task Force”) observed an ad from Adultlook.com, which is a website where sex 

providers advertise services to potential customers. The ad stated as follows:

Nude Japanese and Russian girls, full of VIP service, two sexy young 

girl [sic], big boobs, fun, shower, sex with many positions, BBBJ, doggy 

style, f*ck, enjoy, oral, 69 position, passionate kissing, penis massage, 

penis suck, specially f*ck your own style, waiting for [sic] have fun with 

you, come and check us out, our number one goal is to make you leave 

happy and refreshed

The ad noted a cell phone number along with hours of operation and 

stated that it was in Parma. Task Force Investigator Scott Moran texted the number 

and attempted to set up a date for the following day. He requested two “girls” for 

VIP service and was quoted a price of $600. He agreed to the price and arranged to 

meet up the next morning. He was told to go to an address on North Church Drive 

in Parma Heights, Ohio. 

The next day, Investigator Moran went to the location, which was an 

apartment building, and texted the telephone number from the ad when he arrived. 

He was directed to Unit 130, where he headed along with other assisting detectives 

and Parma Heights police officers following at a distance. He knocked on the door,

and a woman dressed in lingerie answered. She gestured for him to be quiet. 

Investigator Moran then identified himself as law enforcement, and he 

and the assisting officers cleared and secured the apartment. 
When the woman opened the door, she had a cell phone in her hand 

and Investigator Moran was able to observe that it was open to an app called 

WeChat, which was the chat he had engaged in when he arranged the date.

Officers observed an additional person in the apartment, who was later 

identified as appellant. He was located in the furthest corner of the kitchen area of 

the apartment. According to Investigator Moran, it did not seem as though any food 

was being prepared in the kitchen.

Photographs were taken of the apartment unit by the officers. There 

was no furniture in the living room, but there was a Nest Camera in one upper corner 

that faced the living room. A corner of the carpet in the living room was disturbed, 

and when it was pulled up, there were dozens of condoms hidden underneath. 

In one of the bedrooms was a bed and a nightstand. On the nightstand 

were more condoms, KY Jelly, Johnson’s Baby Oil, and other forms of lubricant. 

Another bedroom also contained a bed and nightstand and was illuminated with a 

pink light. On this nightstand was a hairbrush, flushable cleansing wipes, food, 

glasses, and Johnson’s Baby Oil.

Appellant was in possession of a Chinese passport, and the woman 

had a passport from Romania. When asked why he was there, appellant stated that 

he had just moved in a day or two ago and was there to provide cooking for the 

residence.

Appellant was arrested, and officers seized $400 that was found on his 

person. Three cell phones were located in the apartment. One cell phone was a 
Samsung Galaxy phone that required a passcode to open, which appellant provided. 

When officers used the passcode, the phone opened to the same WeChat 

conversation that the woman had had on her phone when Investigator Moran 

entered. All three phones were seized as evidence.

An extraction was performed on the Samsung phone that appellant 

had assisted the officers in opening. On the phone were pictures of a number of 

items that had been observed in the apartment unit, including the Nest Camera, 

flushable wipes, and a mattress. There was also a picture of the woman who had 

answered the door, a table from the apartment unit, and pink LED lights.

In addition, the phone held videos from the Nest Camera. Multiple 

videos depicted women allowing unknown males to enter the apartment unit. 

Another video showed appellant leaving the kitchen area and going to the living 

room closet. 

The phone also contained group texting chats where terminology 

related to prostitution was used. Text messages were extracted from the cell phone, 

including one from appellant to another woman that stated:

Trip in 11 minutes? You promised your VIP service when you came.

Now you’re disappointing me with your performance. He won’t come 

back when you’re done with these guests. Now the manager has 

received the complaint. Please change your VIP service must be 

maintained for more than 45 minutes. Thanks.

When officers spoke with management of the apartment, they learned 

that the unit was leased by a person named Tao Yan. The day after appellant was 

arrested, an eviction notice was issued to Tao Yan and “all other occupants.”
Appellant was indicted on charges of (1) promoting prostitution, a 

felony of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.22(A)(1); (2) promoting 

prostitution, a felony of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.22(A)(2); and 

(3) possession of criminal tools, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 

2923.24(A). 

The matter proceeded to a jury trial where the State presented the 

testimony of Investigator Moran, Cleveland Police Department Detective Kevin 

Navratil, who performed the cell phone extraction, and Chad Tibbits, a crime analyst 

for the Task Force. Appellant did not present any witnesses or evidence.

The jury found appellant guilty of all three counts. Appellant was 

sentenced to 12 months in prison on each count to be served concurrently, and he 

was labeled a Tier I sex offender. Appellant then filed the instant appeal, raising 

three assignments of error for our review:

I. The convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence.

II. The guilty verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

III. The trial court erred when it failed to merge Counts 1 and 2 as these 

were allied offenses of similar import.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that his convictions 

were not supported by sufficient evidence. In particular, with regard to the 

promoting prostitution charges, appellant contends that there was no evidence that 

appellant managed or supervised any prostitution and that he was merely present 
in the apartment when the officers arrived. He asserts that there was no money 

exchanged and sexual activity was never offered. Further, as it relates to the criminal 

tools conviction, appellant argues that he was not engaging in any criminal purpose 

while he was standing in the kitchen. He maintains that he was at the apartment 

solely to cook and, therefore, his cell phone was not a criminal tool.

A sufficiency challenge requires a court to determine whether the 

State has met its burden of production at trial and to consider not the credibility of 

the evidence but whether, if credible, the evidence presented would sustain a 

conviction. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). The relevant inquiry 

is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991), citing 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

A defendant is entitled to an acquittal of one or more offenses under 

Crim.R. 29 “[i]f the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” State v. 

Macalla, 2008-Ohio-569, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.). In order to satisfy the burden of 

production, a party is required to furnish ample evidence to establish a prima facie 

case. See State v. Petway, 2020-Ohio-3848, ¶ 47 (11th Dist.). The role of an 

appellate court is not to determine whether the evidence presented by the State 

should be accepted as true, but rather to ascertain if the evidence, when accepted as 

true, would sustain a conviction against the defendant. State v. Nelson, 2014-Ohio2189, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380. We are precluded 
from setting aside a conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence unless we 

conclude “that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier 

of fact.” State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484 (2001).

“‘Proof of guilt may be made by circumstantial evidence, real evidence, 

and direct evidence, or any combination of the three, and all three have equal 

probative value.’” State v. Rodano, 2017-Ohio-1034, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.), quoting State 

v. Zadar, 2011-Ohio-1060, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). Although circumstantial evidence and 

direct evidence have obvious differences, those differences are irrelevant to the 

probative value of the evidence and circumstantial evidence carries the same weight 

as direct evidence. Id., citing State v. Cassano, 2012-Ohio-4047, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). 

Further, circumstantial evidence may not only be sufficient “‘“but may also be more 

certain, satisfying, and persuasive than direct evidence.”’” Id. at ¶ 36, quoting State 

v. Hawthorne, 2011-Ohio-6078, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting Michalic v. Cleveland 

Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330 (1960).

In the instant matter, appellant was charged with promoting 

prostitution under two subsections of R.C. 2907.22(A), which prohibits a person 

from knowingly (1) establishing, maintaining, operating, managing, supervising, 

controlling, or having an interest in a brothel or any other enterprise for facilitating 

engagement in sexual activity for hire; and (2) supervising, managing, or controlling 

the activities of a prostitute in engaging in sexual activity for hire.

The State presented evidence that appellant maintained, operated, 

managed, supervised, or controlled a brothel or any other enterprise that facilitated 
engagement in sexual activity for hire and also supervised or managed the activities 

of a prostitute. First, the State demonstrated that the activities being conducted in 

the apartment constituted a brothel or an enterprise that was facilitating 

engagement in sexual activity for hire and that the woman who answered the door 

in lingerie and others that appeared in the pictures on appellant’s phone were 

prostitutes engaging in sex for hire. The apartment contained sparse furnishings 

but had beds and nightstands that contained products used for sexual activity, 

including condoms and lubricants. Moreover, the ad to which Investigator Moran 

responded clearly set forth that sexual activity was available for hire.

In addition, appellant had pictures on his phone of supplies that were 

purchased in order to facilitate the sex acts and kept surveillance of the women 

working at the apartment and the men coming and going. Evidence showed that the 

Nest Camera was purchased several days after the apartment was leased. There was 

a picture of the receipt on appellant’s phone, and the credit card used was the same 

card that was tied to appellant’s PayPal account. In addition, appellant’s phone had 

videos from the Nest Camera. 

Appellant contends that his cell phone was not being used for any 

criminal purpose. However, the State presented evidence demonstrating that 

appellant’s cell phone was, in fact, used as part of his criminal conduct. There are 

photos on the phone of men coming and going from the apartment unit; appellant 

was engaged in a group chat on the phone that used prostitution terminology; and 
he was texting one of the women to tell her that she needed to provide VIP service 

for longer than 45 minutes.

After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we 

conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 

that appellant had promoted prostitution and possessed criminal tools. Appellant’s 

convictions were therefore based upon sufficient evidence, and his first assignment 

of error is overruled.

B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his 

convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant presents 

the same argument as he did with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence, to wit: 

he was simply present in the apartment and there was no evidence that he was 

involved in compelling prostitution.

When reviewing a manifest weight challenge, an appellate court 

“‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of 

witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Virostek, 2022-Ohio1397, ¶ 54 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 

1983). A reversal on the basis that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence is granted “‘only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs 
heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin

at 175.

As this court has previously stated:

The criminal manifest weight of-the-evidence standard addresses the 

evidence’s effect of inducing belief. State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 

2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio 

St.3d at 386, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Under the manifest 

weight-of-the-evidence standard, a reviewing court must ask the 

following question: whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or 

the defendant’s? Wilson at id. Although there may be legally sufficient 

evidence to support a judgment, it may nevertheless be against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Thompkins at 387; State v. Johnson, 

88 Ohio St.3d 95, 2000-Ohio-276, 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000).

When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis 

that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the 

appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the fact 

finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Wilson at id., quoting 

Thompkins at id.

State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-269, ¶ 86-87 (8th Dist.).

In its role as the “thirteenth juror,” an appellate court must review the 

entire record, weigh the direct and circumstantial evidence and all reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom, and consider the credibility of the witnesses to 

determine “‘whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly 

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction 

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting Martin. 

Appellant does not provide any separate reasoning as to why his 

convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence and simply reiterates 

the same assertions he raised in his sufficiency argument. Notwithstanding his 

failure to develop his manifest weight challenge, we find that appellant’s convictions 
for promotion of prostitution and possession of criminal tools were not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.

As discussed above, the State’s case relied on circumstantial evidence 

that “requires ‘the drawing of inferences that are reasonably permitted by the 

evidence.’” State v. Wachee, 2021-Ohio-2683, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.), quoting Cassano, 

2012-Ohio-4047, at ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). “‘Circumstantial evidence is proof of facts by 

direct evidence from which the trier of fact may infer or derive by reasoning other 

facts in accordance with the common experience of mankind.’” Id., quoting State v. 

Hartman, 2008-Ohio-3683, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.). “Circumstantial evidence and direct 

evidence inherently possess the same probative value.” Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, at 

paragraph one of the syllabus. 

Having reviewed the entire record, we cannot say the jury in this case 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that appellant’s 

convictions must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Based upon the evidence 

discussed in the prior assignment of error, appellant has not demonstrated that his 

convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence and his second 

assignment of error is overruled.

C. Merger

In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court 

erred by failing to merge Counts 1 and 2 as allied offenses of similar import. He 
contends that the promoting prostitution convictions should have merged because 

there were no identifiable separate acts that could constitute two crimes. 

R.C. 2941.25 prohibits the imposition of multiple punishments for the 

same criminal conduct and provides:

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 

constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment 

or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the 

defendant may be convicted of only one.

(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of 

dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses 

of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate 

animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts 

for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.

The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, 

established that the test for determining whether offenses are allied offenses of 

similar import requires the trial court to consider three separate factors: import, 

conduct, and animus. Convictions do not merge and a defendant may be sentenced 

for multiple offenses if any of the following are true: (1) the conduct constitutes 

offenses of dissimilar import, (2) the conduct shows that the offenses were 

committed separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed 

with separate animus. Id. at ¶ 25. Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist 

“when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if 

the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable.” Id. at 

paragraph two of the syllabus.
As it relates to the merger argument, appellant was convicted of two 

offenses of promoting prostitution. The elements of the two separate offenses of 

promoting prostitution in this case are (1) knowingly establishing, maintaining, 

operating, managing, supervising, controlling, or having an interest in a brothel or 

any other enterprise for facilitating engagement in sexual activity for hire; and 

(2) knowingly supervising, managing, or controlling the activities of a prostitute in 

engaging in sexual activity for hire.

With regard to the first factor under Ruff, we find that the two offenses 

of promoting prostitution are dissimilar in import. Establishing, maintaining, or 

operating a brothel is distinct from supervising, managing, or controlling the 

activities of a prostitute that is engaged in sexual activity for hire.

Under the second Ruff factor, we find that the two offenses of 

promoting prostitution were committed separately. The first offense involved 

obtaining supplies related to sexual activity and the Nest Camera for the apartment, 

which was being used as a brothel. The second offense was committed when 

appellant kept surveillance on the women in the apartment and sent a text message 

to one of the women to tell her to perform VIP service for at least 45 minutes. 

Finally, with regard to the third Ruff factor, the two offenses of 

promoting prostitution were committed with a different animus. One required the 

motivation to establish, maintain, or operate a brothel while the other involved the 

motivation to supervise, manage, or control a prostitute. 
The offenses were not allied offenses of similar import, and the trial 

court was therefore not required to merge the two separate offenses of promoting 

prostitution. Appellant’s final assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. In addition, the trial court did not err 

in declining to merge Counts 1 and 2 for purposes of sentencing. All of appellant’s 

assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case 

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_______________________________

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR