alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
A98A2434.

#### HEARD v. THE STATE.

(510 SE2d 900)

McMurray, Presiding Judge.

After being indicted for rape, Marquez Heard was convicted of the lesser included offense of sexual battery following a jury trial. Heard appeals, contending in his sole enumeration of error that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial based upon the use of the word “rape” during the testimony of the State’s medical expert.

At trial, Dr. Darlena Monet testified that she performed a physical exam of the victim at DeKalb Medical Center. When the State asked Dr. Monet to tell the jury what she recalled about the victim, Dr. Monet testified “it was very difficult to do the pelvic exam. And, she told us before the exam that she had been a virgin, until the time of the rape.” After defense counsel objected to the use of the term “rape,” the trial court instructed Dr. Monet to refer to it as “the incident.” Dr. Monet complied with this request when she resumed testifying. Later in Dr. Monet’s testimony, the State asked her whether she had completed a “rape kit” and to explain what a “rape kit” includes with no objection from defense counsel.

At the conclusion of the State’s direct examination of Dr. Monet, the defense moved for a mistrial on the grounds that Dr. Monet characterized the incident as a rape. The trial court denied this motion. It did, however, give the following instruction to the jury at the conclusion of Dr. Monet’s testimony: “Ladies and gentleman, the witness has used the word rape, rape exam, rape kit. The word has been used several times and what I am going to suggest to you is that the evaluation that she did in the exam she did was in that context of a charge of rape. That the victim claimed there was rape. Obviously the question of whether it was or was not a rape is something that you are *48going to have to decide, after hearing all of the evidence. I don’t want you to think that this witness has concluded one way or the other, because all she did was respond to what the victim was telling her, and she did the exam. That was her purpose. That’s her function in this proceeding. Okay? The ultimate decision is something that you’ll have to make after I charge you on what the law is and you have had a chance to consider all the evidence. Do you understand? Okay, thanks. You may cross-examine.” Appellant Heard did not renew his motion for a mistrial. *Held:*

Decided January 15, 1999.

*Gayle D. Bacon,*for appellant.

*J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Jeanne M. Canavan, Barbara B. Conroy, Assistant District Attorneys,*for appellee.

Appellant waived his right for this Court to review the denial of his motion for a mistrial by failing to renew it after the curative instruction was given by the trial court. *Woodham v. State,*263 Ga. 580, 582 (3) (439 SE2d 471); *Sing v. State,*217 Ga. App. 591, 592 (2), 593 (458 SE2d 493).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Blackburn and Eldridge, JJ, concur.*
A99A0913.

#### KNAPKE v. THE STATE.

(513 SE2d 765)

Johnson, Chief Judge.

A judge found Brian L. Knapke guilty of the misdemeanor traffic offense of speeding. Knapke challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of laser speed detection results. We affirm.

“On appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and [Knapke] no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court determines evidence sufficiency and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. The verdict must be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Punctuation omitted.) *Barber v. State,*235 Ga. App. 170 (509 SE2d 93) (1998).

On September 27, 1998, a Columbia County Sheriff’s deputy used a laser detection device to determine that Knapke was traveling along Interstate 20 at 85 mph in a 70-mph speed zone. Knapke argues this evidence should have been suppressed because the state failed to lay a proper foundation for its admission. However, in this case, the trial transcript reveals that the judge did not reach his decision based on the laser test results. Rather, the judge found Knapke guilty of “speeding; going 75 miles per hour” because “[Knapke] admitted it on his testimony, said he was going 75 miles per hour.” Knapke’s admission is “probably the most probative and damaging *796evidence that can be admitted against him. The defendant is the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of any incriminating information about his past conduct, and one can scarcely imagine evidence more damaging to his defense than his own admission of guilt.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) *James v. State,*233 Ga. App. 516, 519 (2) (504 SE2d 533) (1998). Therefore, pretermitting any error in admitting the laser test results, Knapke’s testimony alone was sufficient under *Jackson v. Virginia,*443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), to establish that he was speeding in violation of OCGA § 40-6-181 (b) (2). See *James,*supra.

Decided March 5, 1999.

*Duncan & Buff, James B. Duncan III,*for appellant.

*Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Bobby L. Christine, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorneys,*for appellee.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Smith and Eldridge, JJ, concur.*
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

(subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United
States Code), each of the undersigned officers of United Refining Company, a Pennsylvania corporation (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:



The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended November 30,
2006 (the Form 10-Q) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                          |  |                                                 
|----------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ------------------------ |  | ------------------------------------------------
|                        |  |  | 
|Dated: January 16, 2007 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ John A. Catsimatidis
|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                          |  | John A. Catsimatidis Principal Executive
Officer
|                        |  |  | 
|Dated: January 16, 2007 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ James E. Murphy     
|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                          |  | James E. Murphy Principal Financial
Officer     



The foregoing
certification is being furnished solely pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of this Form 10-Q
or as a separate disclosure document.



A signed original of
this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to United Refining Company and will be retained by United Refining Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

Ronorabls B. S. Wyohr 

OOtttd~ Aualtor 

ar4ga 00~~ 

Lo~vlwt, Toram 

Dur Sirt Opirlion No. O-4720 

Rer Son at County 

very truly foura 

ATTOR.WRY ammu OF mms 

Wm. J. Fmnlng 

Aarrl8tatltl
No. 50715.

#### Protests 977470-G, etc., of O. Uyeno et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Kincheloe, J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise is the same in all material respects as that passed upon in *Nippon Import & Trading Co.*v. *United States*(14 Cust. Ct. 35, C. D. 908). In accordance therewith the claim at 35 percent under paragraph 921 was sustained.
No. 53811.

protest 123000-K/687 (Chicago.)

#### Harmar Co. *v.*United States,

*228Opinion by

Johnson, J.

For the reasons stated in *Austin, Nichols & Co., Inc.*v. *United States*(22 Cust. Ct. 33, C. D. 1155), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v HARVEY D. HOWLAND, Jr., Electronics Technician Third Class, U. S. Navy, Appellant

10 USCMA 659, 28 CMR 225

No. 13,309

Decided September 30, 1959

*Lieutenant (jg) Martin Drobac,*USNR, was on the brief for Appellant, Accused.

*Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Stauffer,*USMC, was on the brief for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

ROBERT E. Quinn, Chief Judge:

The decision of the board of review is reversed and the action of the supervisory authority is set aside. United States v Bennie, 10 USCMA 159, 27 CMR 233. The record of trial is returned to The Judge Advocate General of the Navy for reference to a competent supervisory authority for further proceedings under Articles 61, 64 and 65, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 861, 864 and 865.

Judge FERGUSON concurs.

LATIMER, Judge

(dissenting) :

I dissent.

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the staff legal officer, in his post-trial review, advised the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction, inter alia, that in his opinion the competent evidence of record established beyond a reasonable doubt accused’s guilt of the larceny for which he was convicted, and that the findings were correct in law and fact. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth *660in my dissenting opinions in United States v Bennie, 10 USCMA 159, 27 CMR 233; and United States v Clark, 10 USCMA 614, 28 CMR 180, I conclude that the post-trial advice in the case at bar meets the requirements of the Code and the Manual. I must, therefore, disagree with the disposition ordered by the majority.

I would affirm the decision of the board of review.
No. 47612.

#### Protests 84475-K, etc., of Gemsco, Inc., et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J:'

The record-showed that-certain of the items., qonsi^t of woven fabrics wholly or in chief value of one or more of the materials specified in paragraph 385 and are similar in all material respects to those involved in *Meyer*v. *United States*(6 Cust. Ct. 191, C. D. 459). In accordance therewith the items in question were held dutiable at 40 percent under pragraph 385 and T. D. 48316 as claimed.
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 90 (Thursday, May 10, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26611-26612]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-8929]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RP07-422-000]


Canyon Creek Compression Company; Notice of Proposed Changes in 
FERC Gas Tariff

May 3, 2007.
    Take notice that on April 30, 2007, Canyon Creek Compression 
Company (Canyon) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, 
Third Revised Volume No. 1, the following tariff sheets, to become 
effective June 1, 2007:

Seventeenth Revised Sheet No. 6
Eleventh Revised Sheet No. 6A

    Canyon states that copies of the filing are being mailed to its 
customers and interested state commissions.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must 
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). Protests will be 
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of 
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices, 
motions, or protests must be filed in accordance with the provisions of 
Sec.  154.210 of the Commission's regulations (18 CFR 154.210). Anyone 
filing an intervention or protest must serve a copy of that document on 
the Applicant. Anyone filing an intervention or protest on or before 
the intervention or protest date need not serve motions to intervene or 
protests on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an 
original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the 
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's 
Public

[[Page 26612]]

Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription'' link on 
the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail notification 
when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For assistance with 
any FERC Online service, please e-mail <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#266063746569484a4f484375535656495452664043544508414950"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="c88e8d9a8b87a6a4a1a6ad9bbdb8b8a7babc88aeadbaabe6afa7be">[email protected]</span></a>, or 
call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For TTY, call (202) 502-8659.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E7-8929 Filed 5-9-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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</html>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED

January 9, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-40573

Summary Calendar

JAMES E. JENKINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

Lee, Dr.; ET AL.,

Defendants,

Lee, Dr.,

Defendant-Appellee.

----------------------------------------------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-02-CV-191

----------------------------------------------------------

Before SMITH, DeMOSS AND STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

James E. Jenkins, Texas inmate # 599106, appeals the summary-j udgment dismissal, on

grounds of qualified immunit y, of his civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jenkins

claimed that the defendant, Dr. Lee, was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because

Dr. Lee prescribed Verapamil rather than Clonidine for Jenkins’ high blood pressur e. Jenkins

presented evidence showing that Dr. Lee continued to prescribe Verapamil, and to refuse Jenkins’

requests for Clonidine, after Jenkins compla ined o f discomfort, lightheadedness, dizzy spells, and

nausea, and suffered a blackout due to high blood pressure.This court reviews de novo the grant of a motion for summary judgment. S ee United States

v. Lawrence

, 276 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 2001). I n order to preclude summary judgment, there must

be sufficient summary-judgment evidence to raise a fact issue as to the defendant’s deliberate

indifference. S ee Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep’t.

, 86 F.3d 469, 473 n.27 (5th Cir. 1996). A

prison official acts with deliberate indifference “only if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

We have reviewed the briefs and the record on appeal and conclude that the district court did

not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Lee. The undisputed summary-judgment

evidence is that Verapamil is the therapeutic equivalent of Clonidine. Jenkins has not shown that

there is sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Dr. Lee was deliberately indifferent for

treating him with Verapamil rather than with Clonidine. S ee Nerren

, 86 F.3d at 473 n.27. The

summary- j udgm ent evidence and Jenkins’ argument reflect nothing more than mere disagreement with

the care rendered by Dr. Lee, or, at best, malpractice, which are ins ufficient to establish a

constitutional violation. See Varnado v. Lynaugh , 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 23.1

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The Board of DirectorsLiberty Expedia Holdings, Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the following registration statements of Liberty Expedia Holdings, Inc. of our reports dated February 14, 2018, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Liberty Expedia Holdings, Inc. as of December 31, 2017 and 2016, and the related consolidated statements of operations, comprehensive earnings (loss), cash flows, and equity for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2017, and the related notes  (collectively, the “consolidated financial statements”), and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2017, which reports appear in the December 31, 2017 annual report on Form 10‐K of Liberty Expedia Holdings, Inc.

|        |                       |                                                                                                                          |
|-------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Description | Registration Statement No. | Description                                                                                                                   |
| S-8         | 333-214679                 | Liberty Expedia Holdings, Inc. Transitional Stock Adjustment Plan; Liberty Expedia Holdings, Inc. 2016 Omnibus Incentive Plan |

 

 

/s/ KPMG LLP

Denver, ColoradoFebruary 14,  2018

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000101295
<NAME> UNITED-GUARDIAN, INC.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         867,940
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,219,244
<ALLOWANCES>                                    24,430
<INVENTORY>                                  1,449,571
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,827,673
<PP&E>                                       4,322,449
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,787,632
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,198,759
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          760,084
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       487,229
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,919,828
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,198,759
<SALES>                                      6,665,342
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,665,342
<CGS>                                        4,101,482
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,101,482
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              29,140
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,065,454
<INCOME-TAX>                                   399,800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            665,654
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   665,654
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .14
        

</TABLE>
Searched for **https://www.rivers.gov/**

 

19961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024

*Note:* This calendar view maps the number of captures of **https://www.rivers.gov/**, *not* how many times the site was actually updated.

Look Up URL in general Internet Archive web collection.
(V. D. 64)

#### E. Leitz, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 27504.

(Decided February 5, 1958)

*Eugene B. Pickrell*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Olivee, Chief Judge:

This matter is before me on remand from classification proceedings decided by the first division of this court in *E. Leitz, Inc.*v. *United States,*38 Cust. Ct. 428, Abstract 60554, and it has been submitted for decision on a written stipulation, reading as follows:

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the attorneys for the parties hereto that the merchandise covered by the above remand of protest consists of Microscopes and Wooden Cabinets, containers for said microscopes, which were the subject of a judgment and decision by the First Division of this Court in the case of *E. Leitz, Inc. v. United States,*Abstract 60554, on March 7, 1957, wherein it is stated “* * * and remand the matter, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, U. S. C. § 2636 (d), for further proceedings before a single judge sitting in reappraisement for determination of the value of the imported merchandise in the manner provided for by law.”

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, the price at which such or similar merchandise was freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for exportation to the United States was as follows:

> Invoice United States

> Merchandise price Less dollars per each discount each

> 6 Polarizing Microscopes CM $334 04 25% $250.53

> Wooden Cabinets $ 22.96 25% $ 17.22

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that there was no higher foreign value for such or similar merchandise.

*624IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the above remand of protest may be deemed to be submitted for decision upon this stipulation.

On the agreed facts, I find export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for appraisement of the merchandise in question, and I hold such dutiable value for each of the articles to be as hereinabove set forth in the stipulation of submission. Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-50100

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CHARLES CRAIG JOHNSTON,

also known as Jaws,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. SA-97-CR-315-2

- - - - - - - - - -

March 10, 1998

Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Charles Craig Johnston appeals from the district court’s

order denying his motion for review of the magistrate judge’s

detention order and to set conditions of release. The district

court’s decision, which affirmed the magistrate judge’s detention

order, rests upon the conclusion that Johnston has not rebutted

the presumption that no condition or combination of conditions

will reasonably assure his presence at trial. See 18 U.S.C. 
No. 98-50100

-2-

§ 3142(e). This conclusion is supported by the record. See

United States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992). 

Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Johnston’s motion

for review of the detention order is AFFIRMED.