# Official Journal C 225/2009

| | ISSN 1725-2423
  doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2009.225.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 225 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5218 September 2009 |

ISSN 1725-2423

doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2009.225.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 225

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5218 September 2009

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 225/01 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2009/C 225/02 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.5570 — Platinum Equity Group/Delphi Corporation) (
  1
  ) | 4 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

2009/C 225/01

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  )

1

1

2009/C 225/02

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.5570 — Platinum Equity Group/Delphi Corporation) (
  1
  )

1

4

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 225/03 | Euro exchange rates | 5 |
| 2009/C 225/04 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 17 July 2008 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M.4874 — Itema/BarcoVision — Rapporteur: Austria (
  1
  ) | 6 |
| 2009/C 225/05 | Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case COMP/M.4874 — Itema/BarcoVision (
  1
  ) | 8 |
| 2009/C 225/06 | Summary of Commission Decision of 4 August 2008 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.4874 — Itema/BarcoVision) (notified under document C(2008) 4065 final)
   (
  1
  ) | 9 |
| | NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
| 2009/C 225/07 | EU-27 ethyl alcohol balance for 2008 (Established on 10 July 2009 in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2336/2003) | 13 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

2009/C 225/03

Euro exchange rates

5

2009/C 225/04

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 17 July 2008 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M.4874 — Itema/BarcoVision — Rapporteur: Austria (
  1
  )

1

6

2009/C 225/05

Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case COMP/M.4874 — Itema/BarcoVision (
  1
  )

1

8

2009/C 225/06

Summary of Commission Decision of 4 August 2008 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.4874 — Itema/BarcoVision) (notified under document C(2008) 4065 final)
   (
  1
  )

(notified under document C(2008) 4065 final)

1

9

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

2009/C 225/07

EU-27 ethyl alcohol balance for 2008 (Established on 10 July 2009 in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2336/2003)

(Established on 10 July 2009 in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2336/2003)

13

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 225/08 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.5626 — Adecco/Spring) (
  1
  ) | 14 |

V   Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY

Commission

2009/C 225/08

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.5626 — Adecco/Spring) (
  1
  )

1

14

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

| 18.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 225/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 225/1

---

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty

Cases where the Commission raises no objections

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 225/01

| Date of adoption of the decision | 3.6.2009 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | N 319/08 |
| Member State | Portugal |
| Region | PT300 — Região Autónoma da Madeira |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Taxa reduzida do imposto especial sobre o consumo de rum e de licores produzidos e consumidos na Região Autónoma da Madeira |
| Legal basis | — |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | Regional development |
| Form of aid | Tax rate reduction |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 5,28 million |
| Intensity | 75 % |
| Duration (period) | until 31.12.2013 |
| Economic sectors | Manufacturing industry |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Região Autónoma da Madeira |
| Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças |
| Avenida Arriaga |
| 004-528 Funchal |
| PORTUGAL |

Date of adoption of the decision

3.6.2009

Reference number of State Aid

N 319/08

Member State

Portugal

Region

PT300 — Região Autónoma da Madeira

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Taxa reduzida do imposto especial sobre o consumo de rum e de licores produzidos e consumidos na Região Autónoma da Madeira

Legal basis

—

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Regional development

Form of aid

Tax rate reduction

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 5,28 million

Intensity

75 %

Duration (period)

until 31.12.2013

Economic sectors

Manufacturing industry

Name and address of the granting authority

Região Autónoma da Madeira

Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças

Avenida Arriaga

004-528 Funchal

PORTUGAL

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

| Date of adoption of the decision | 3.6.2009 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | N 320/08 |
| Member State | Portugal |
| Region | PT200 — Região Autónoma dos Açores |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Aplicação de uma taxa reduzida do imposto especial de consumo sobre os licores e aguardentes produzidos e consumidos na Região Autónoma dos Açores |
| Legal basis | — |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | Regional development |
| Form of aid | Tax rate reduction |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 3,07 million |
| Intensity | 75 % |
| Duration (period) | until 31.12.2013 |
| Economic sectors | Manufacturing industry |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Região Autónoma dos Açores |
| Other information | — |

Date of adoption of the decision

3.6.2009

Reference number of State Aid

N 320/08

Member State

Portugal

Region

PT200 — Região Autónoma dos Açores

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Aplicação de uma taxa reduzida do imposto especial de consumo sobre os licores e aguardentes produzidos e consumidos na Região Autónoma dos Açores

Legal basis

—

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Regional development

Form of aid

Tax rate reduction

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 3,07 million

Intensity

75 %

Duration (period)

until 31.12.2013

Economic sectors

Manufacturing industry

Name and address of the granting authority

Região Autónoma dos Açores

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

| Date of adoption of the decision | 4.8.2009 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | N 426/09 |
| Member State | Germany |
| Region | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Bundesrahmenregelung zur Herstellung „grüner Produkte“ |
| Legal basis | Regelung zur vorübergehenden Gewährung von niedrigverzinslichen Darlehen zur Herstellung „grüner Produkte“ im Geltungsbereich der Bundesrepublik Deutschland während der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise sowie die Haushaltsregelungen auf Bundes-, Landes- und kommunaler Ebene. |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | Environmental protection |
| Form of aid | Soft loan |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 500 million |
| Intensity | — |
| Duration (period) | 8.2009-12.2012 |
| Economic sectors | Manufacturing industry |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Diverse Stellen im Bund, in den Ländern und in den Kommunen |
| Other information | — |

Date of adoption of the decision

4.8.2009

Reference number of State Aid

N 426/09

Member State

Germany

Region

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Bundesrahmenregelung zur Herstellung „grüner Produkte“

Legal basis

Regelung zur vorübergehenden Gewährung von niedrigverzinslichen Darlehen zur Herstellung „grüner Produkte“ im Geltungsbereich der Bundesrepublik Deutschland während der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise sowie die Haushaltsregelungen auf Bundes-, Landes- und kommunaler Ebene.

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Environmental protection

Form of aid

Soft loan

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 500 million

Intensity

—

Duration (period)

8.2009-12.2012

Economic sectors

Manufacturing industry

Name and address of the granting authority

Diverse Stellen im Bund, in den Ländern und in den Kommunen

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

| Date of adoption of the decision | 5.8.2009 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | N 436/09 |
| Member State | Sweden |
| Region | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Förlängning av det svenska kapitaltillskottsprogrammet |
| Legal basis | Förordning om kapitaltillskott till solventa banker m.fl. |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | Aid to remedy serious disturbances in the economy |
| Form of aid | Other forms of equity intervention |
| Budget | Overall budget: SEK 50 000 million |
| Intensity | — |
| Duration (period) | 18.8.2009-17.2.2010 |
| Economic sectors | Financial intermediation |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Riksgäldskontoret |
| SE-103 74 Stockholm |
| SVERIGE |

Date of adoption of the decision

5.8.2009

Reference number of State Aid

N 436/09

Member State

Sweden

Region

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Förlängning av det svenska kapitaltillskottsprogrammet

Legal basis

Förordning om kapitaltillskott till solventa banker m.fl.

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Aid to remedy serious disturbances in the economy

Form of aid

Other forms of equity intervention

Budget

Overall budget: SEK 50 000 million

Intensity

—

Duration (period)

18.8.2009-17.2.2010

Economic sectors

Financial intermediation

Name and address of the granting authority

Riksgäldskontoret

SE-103 74 Stockholm

SVERIGE

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

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| 18.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 225/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 225/4

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.5570 — Platinum Equity Group/Delphi Corporation)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 225/02

On 5 August 2009, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32009M5570. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32009M5570. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

| 18.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 225/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 225/5

---

Euro exchange rates (1)

17 September 2009

2009/C 225/03

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,4712 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 134,38 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4414 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,89050 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 10,1134 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,5187 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 8,6265 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 25,094 |
| EEK | Estonian kroon | 15,6466 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 270,61 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvian lats | 0,7032 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,1245 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,2600 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,1650 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,6863 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,5672 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 11,4021 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 2,0708 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 2,0832 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 772,13 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 10,8334 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 10,0431 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,2883 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 14 265,77 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 5,1058 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 70,247 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 44,6026 |
| THB | Thai baht | 49,602 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 2,6568 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 19,4178 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 70,8460 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,4712

JPY

Japanese yen

134,38

DKK

Danish krone

7,4414

GBP

Pound sterling

0,89050

SEK

Swedish krona

10,1134

CHF

Swiss franc

1,5187

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

8,6265

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

25,094

EEK

Estonian kroon

15,6466

HUF

Hungarian forint

270,61

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,4528

LVL

Latvian lats

0,7032

PLN

Polish zloty

4,1245

RON

Romanian leu

4,2600

TRY

Turkish lira

2,1650

AUD

Australian dollar

1,6863

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,5672

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

11,4021

NZD

New Zealand dollar

2,0708

SGD

Singapore dollar

2,0832

KRW

South Korean won

1 772,13

ZAR

South African rand

10,8334

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

10,0431

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,2883

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

14 265,77

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

5,1058

PHP

Philippine peso

70,247

RUB

Russian rouble

44,6026

THB

Thai baht

49,602

BRL

Brazilian real

2,6568

MXN

Mexican peso

19,4178

INR

Indian rupee

70,8460

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

---

| 18.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 225/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 225/6

---

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 17 July 2008 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M.4874 — Itema/BarcoVision

Rapporteur: Austria

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 225/04

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the EC Merger Regulation and that it can be deemed to have a community dimension pursuant to Article 4(5) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the EC Merger Regulation and that it can be deemed to have a community dimension pursuant to Article 4(5) of that Regulation.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that this is essentially a vertical merger comprising the following relevant product markets:






  — | Winder sensors — Upstream market |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that this is essentially a vertical merger comprising the following relevant product markets:

—

Winder sensors — Upstream market

| — | Winders — Downstream market |
| --- | --- |

—

Winders — Downstream market

| — | Open-end spinning sensors — Upstream market |
| --- | --- |

—

Open-end spinning sensors — Upstream market

| — | Open-end spinning machines — Downstream market — the question whether open-end spinning machines and ring spinning machines form part of the same market can be left open in the present case |
| --- | --- |

—

Open-end spinning machines — Downstream market — the question whether open-end spinning machines and ring spinning machines form part of the same market can be left open in the present case

| — | Weaving sensors — Upstream market |
| --- | --- |

—

Weaving sensors — Upstream market

| — | Weaving machines (rapier looms, projectile looms and air-jet looms) — Downstream market — the question whether these markets should be further sub-segmented (negative/positive rapier looms, projectile/air-jet looms) can be left open in the present case |
| --- | --- |

—

Weaving machines (rapier looms, projectile looms and air-jet looms) — Downstream market — the question whether these markets should be further sub-segmented (negative/positive rapier looms, projectile/air-jet looms) can be left open in the present case

| — | MES for the textile industry — the exact product market definition for these products can be left open in the present case. |
| --- | --- |

—

MES for the textile industry — the exact product market definition for these products can be left open in the present case.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that:






  — | the market for winder sensors is worldwide in scope, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that:

—

the market for winder sensors is worldwide in scope,

| — | the market for open-end spinning sensors is worldwide in scope, |
| --- | --- |

—

the market for open-end spinning sensors is worldwide in scope,

| — | the market for weaving sensors is worldwide in scope, |
| --- | --- |

—

the market for weaving sensors is worldwide in scope,

| — | the market for winders is worldwide in scope, |
| --- | --- |

—

the market for winders is worldwide in scope,

| — | the market for open-end spinning machines is at least EEA-wide in scope, |
| --- | --- |

—

the market for open-end spinning machines is at least EEA-wide in scope,

| — | the market for weaving machines is at least EEA-wide in scope, |
| --- | --- |

—

the market for weaving machines is at least EEA-wide in scope,

| — | the market for MES for the textile industry is worldwide in scope. |
| --- | --- |

—

the market for MES for the textile industry is worldwide in scope.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the merged entity would have no incentive to stop supplying, either partially or totally, one or all of its competitors on the market for winders with winder sensors. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the merged entity would have no incentive to stop supplying, either partially or totally, one or all of its competitors on the market for winders with winder sensors.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the proposed concentration is not likely to result in any anti-competitive impact to the detriment of consumers on the market for winders and winder sensors. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the proposed concentration is not likely to result in any anti-competitive impact to the detriment of consumers on the market for winders and winder sensors.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the proposed concentration is not likely to result in any anti-competitive impact to the detriment of consumers on the market for open-end spinning machines and open-end spinning sensors. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the proposed concentration is not likely to result in any anti-competitive impact to the detriment of consumers on the market for open-end spinning machines and open-end spinning sensors.

| 7. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the proposed concentration is not likely to result in any anti-competitive impact to the detriment of consumers on the market for weaving machines and weaving sensors. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the proposed concentration is not likely to result in any anti-competitive impact to the detriment of consumers on the market for weaving machines and weaving sensors.

| 8. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the proposed concentration is not likely to result in any anti-competitive impact on the market for MES. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the proposed concentration is not likely to result in any anti-competitive impact on the market for MES.

| 9. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the proposed concentration will not result in a significant impediment of effective competition in the common market or a substantial part of it. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that the proposed concentration will not result in a significant impediment of effective competition in the common market or a substantial part of it.

| 10. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified concentration should therefore be declared compatible with the common market pursuant to Article 8(1) of the EC Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

10.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified concentration should therefore be declared compatible with the common market pursuant to Article 8(1) of the EC Merger Regulation.

| 11. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

11.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

---

| 18.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 225/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 225/8

---

Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case COMP/M.4874 — Itema/BarcoVision (1)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 225/05

On 20 February 2008, Itema Holding S.p.A., Italy, submitted a notification to the Commission of its intended acquisition of control within the meaning of Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 over the whole of BarcoVision Division of Barco NV (Belgium) by way of purchase of shares.

Upon examination, the Commission concluded that the notified operation raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market. On 14 April 2008, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into this proposed concentration.

Upon request, access to key documents was provided to the notifying party on 16 April 2008, in accordance with paragraph 45 of Competition DG's Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger control proceedings.

The Commission stopped the clock in the in-depth investigation on 3 June 2008, effective as from 26 May 2008, after the target company failed to respond adequately to an information request. The clock was re-started on 9 June 2008.

On the basis of the additional evidence gathered during the in-depth phase of the investigation, the Commission services concluded that the proposed transaction would not significantly impede effective competition in the common market, and is therefore compatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement. Accordingly, no statement of objections was sent to the notifying party.

No queries or submissions have been made to me by the merging parties or any third party. The case does not call for any particular comments as regards the right to be heard.

Brussels, 22 July 2008.

Karen WILLIAMS

---

(1)  Pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of Hearing Officers in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21).

1

---

| 18.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 225/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 225/9

---

Summary of Commission Decision

of 4 August 2008

declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement

(Case COMP/M.4874 — Itema/BarcoVision)

(notified under document C(2008) 4065 final)

(Only the English version is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 225/06

On 4 August 2008, the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, and in particular Article 8(1) of that Regulation. A non-confidential version of the full decision can be found in the authentic language of the case and in the working languages of the Commission on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address:

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html

I.   THE PARTIES

| (1) | Itema Holding S.p.A. (‘Itema’) is an Italian group controlling companies mainly active in the textile industry. The four main realms of activities of Itema are the manufacturing of machinery for (i) weaving, (ii) spinning, (iii) knitting, and (iv) electronics. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Itema Holding S.p.A. (‘Itema’) is an Italian group controlling companies mainly active in the textile industry. The four main realms of activities of Itema are the manufacturing of machinery for (i) weaving, (ii) spinning, (iii) knitting, and (iv) electronics.

| (2) | The BarcoVision Division (‘BarcoVision’) of Barco NV (Belgium) is active in the markets of optical detection (sensors), inspection systems, and computerized production management, mainly for the textile industry. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The BarcoVision Division (‘BarcoVision’) of Barco NV (Belgium) is active in the markets of optical detection (sensors), inspection systems, and computerized production management, mainly for the textile industry.

II.   THE OPERATION

| (3) | On 20 February 2008, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration by which Itema acquires over the whole of BarcoVision by way of purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 20 February 2008, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration by which Itema acquires over the whole of BarcoVision by way of purchase of shares.

III.   ARTICLE 4(5) REFERRAL

| (4) | The notified concentration does not have a Community dimension. However, on 26 November 2007, the notifying party informed the Commission in a reasoned submission pursuant to Article 4(5) of the Merger Regulation that the concentration was capable of being reviewed under the national competition laws of at least three Member States, namely Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, and requested the Commission to examine it. No Member State objected to the referral of the proposed transaction to the Commission. The proposed transaction is therefore deemed to have a Community dimension. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The notified concentration does not have a Community dimension. However, on 26 November 2007, the notifying party informed the Commission in a reasoned submission pursuant to Article 4(5) of the Merger Regulation that the concentration was capable of being reviewed under the national competition laws of at least three Member States, namely Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, and requested the Commission to examine it. No Member State objected to the referral of the proposed transaction to the Commission. The proposed transaction is therefore deemed to have a Community dimension.

IV.   THE RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS

| (5) | The proposed concentration does not give rise to any horizontal overlaps. However, the two parties are active in vertically affected markets: essentially, Itema produces machinery for the textile industry, while BarcoVision markets sensors integrated in this machinery. In addition, BarcoVision sells software systems (MES) used in the monitoring of textile production in mills. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The proposed concentration does not give rise to any horizontal overlaps. However, the two parties are active in vertically affected markets: essentially, Itema produces machinery for the textile industry, while BarcoVision markets sensors integrated in this machinery. In addition, BarcoVision sells software systems (MES) used in the monitoring of textile production in mills.

1.   Upstream markets (sensors sold by BarcoVision)

| (6) | BarcoVision manufactures sensors for winders and sensors for open-end (‘OE’) spinning machines, which essentially detect and cut out defects in the yarn. It also sells sensors for weaving machines that check the proper insertion of yarn on weaving machines. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

BarcoVision manufactures sensors for winders and sensors for open-end (‘OE’) spinning machines, which essentially detect and cut out defects in the yarn. It also sells sensors for weaving machines that check the proper insertion of yarn on weaving machines.

| (7) | As submitted by the parties and confirmed by the market investigation, a first distinction should be made between sensors for winders and for OE spinning machines on one hand, and sensors for weavers on the other hand. Indeed, both categories of products perform different functions and thus rely on different technologies. Within sensors for weaving machines, no further delineation is necessary (e.g. based on the technology of the weaving machine). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

As submitted by the parties and confirmed by the market investigation, a first distinction should be made between sensors for winders and for OE spinning machines on one hand, and sensors for weavers on the other hand. Indeed, both categories of products perform different functions and thus rely on different technologies. Within sensors for weaving machines, no further delineation is necessary (e.g. based on the technology of the weaving machine).

| (8) | With regard to sensors for winders and sensors for OE spinning machines, the notifying party argues that they are part of the same product market based on supply-side substitutability considerations: the core detection technology would be the same for both types of sensors, and suppliers would be present in both segments. The market investigation has not confirmed this view. Although both types of sensors rely on similar technologies, sensors for OE spinning machines are technologically less advanced products than sensors for winders. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

With regard to sensors for winders and sensors for OE spinning machines, the notifying party argues that they are part of the same product market based on supply-side substitutability considerations: the core detection technology would be the same for both types of sensors, and suppliers would be present in both segments. The market investigation has not confirmed this view. Although both types of sensors rely on similar technologies, sensors for OE spinning machines are technologically less advanced products than sensors for winders.

| (9) | Consequently, the draft decision concludes that (i) the market for weaving sensors, (ii) the market for winder sensors and (iii) the market for OE spinning sensors are distinct markets. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Consequently, the draft decision concludes that (i) the market for weaving sensors, (ii) the market for winder sensors and (iii) the market for OE spinning sensors are distinct markets.

2.   Downstream markets (textile machines sold by Itema)

| (10) | Itema is active in the manufacturing and marketing of the following textile machines: OE spinning machines, winding machines, and weaving machines. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Itema is active in the manufacturing and marketing of the following textile machines: OE spinning machines, winding machines, and weaving machines.

| (11) | The Commission had the opportunity to review cases involving winders and spinning machines (e.g. M.4432 Oerlikon/Saurer). While the precise market definition was left open, the Commission noted that the parties considered that winding machines, ring spinning machines, and OE spinning machines constituted three separate product markets. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The Commission had the opportunity to review cases involving winders and spinning machines (e.g. M.4432 Oerlikon/Saurer). While the precise market definition was left open, the Commission noted that the parties considered that winding machines, ring spinning machines, and OE spinning machines constituted three separate product markets.

| (12) | Given that Itema produces only OE spinning machines, the question whether OE spinning machines and ring spinning form part of the same product market can be left open. In the draft decision the transaction is assessed considering the narrower market for OE spinning machines. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Given that Itema produces only OE spinning machines, the question whether OE spinning machines and ring spinning form part of the same product market can be left open. In the draft decision the transaction is assessed considering the narrower market for OE spinning machines.

| (13) | As regards weaving machines, the Commission identified in M.2698 Promatech/Sulzer several product markets within weaving machines based on the technology of the machine. For the purpose of the assessment of the present case, the product market definition can be left open as under any possible option the transaction does not raise competition concerns. In the decision the transaction is be assessed on the basis of the following possible product market definitions:






  — | separate markets for (i) negative rapier looms and (ii) positive rapier looms; single market including all rapier looms, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(13)

As regards weaving machines, the Commission identified in M.2698 Promatech/Sulzer several product markets within weaving machines based on the technology of the machine. For the purpose of the assessment of the present case, the product market definition can be left open as under any possible option the transaction does not raise competition concerns. In the decision the transaction is be assessed on the basis of the following possible product market definitions:

—

separate markets for (i) negative rapier looms and (ii) positive rapier looms; single market including all rapier looms,

| — | separate markets for (i) projectile looms and (ii) air-jet looms; single market for projectile and air-jet looms. |
| --- | --- |

—

separate markets for (i) projectile looms and (ii) air-jet looms; single market for projectile and air-jet looms.

3.   Software

| (14) | MES for the textile industry are software solutions to monitor the knitting, weaving, tufting, and/or spinning machinery present in the mill. The exact product market definition can be left open for the present case. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

MES for the textile industry are software solutions to monitor the knitting, weaving, tufting, and/or spinning machinery present in the mill. The exact product market definition can be left open for the present case.

V.   THE RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS

| (15) | The notifying party submits that all the markets under scrutiny are worldwide. This view has been largely confirmed by the market investigation for the upstream markets (sensors for weaving machines, sensors for winders, sensors for OE spinning machines) and the market for MES. With regard to the downstream markets (textile machines), some respondents to the market investigation claimed that there was a specific European market. As regards OE spinning machines and weaving machines, the question is left open in the draft decision. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The notifying party submits that all the markets under scrutiny are worldwide. This view has been largely confirmed by the market investigation for the upstream markets (sensors for weaving machines, sensors for winders, sensors for OE spinning machines) and the market for MES. With regard to the downstream markets (textile machines), some respondents to the market investigation claimed that there was a specific European market. As regards OE spinning machines and weaving machines, the question is left open in the draft decision.

| (16) | With regard to winders, the in-depth investigation revealed that EEA textile mills tend to order more sophisticated, less labour intensive machines, which overall leads to higher average prices in this area. However, there is also a strong demand for these machines in other parts of world where some textile mills choose to focus on high quality textile (e.g. India). Taking into these differences in product mix, and as confirmed by most of the market participants, the EEA market does not present marked distinguishing features. The draft decision concludes that the market for winders is worldwide in scope. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

With regard to winders, the in-depth investigation revealed that EEA textile mills tend to order more sophisticated, less labour intensive machines, which overall leads to higher average prices in this area. However, there is also a strong demand for these machines in other parts of world where some textile mills choose to focus on high quality textile (e.g. India). Taking into these differences in product mix, and as confirmed by most of the market participants, the EEA market does not present marked distinguishing features. The draft decision concludes that the market for winders is worldwide in scope.

VI.   ASSESSMENT

| (17) | The investigation focussed on the risks of input foreclosure on the markets for winders and sensors for winders. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The investigation focussed on the risks of input foreclosure on the markets for winders and sensors for winders.

1.   Sensors for winders and winders

| (18) | As it appears from the diagram below, both the upstream and downstream markets are highly concentrated: |
| --- | --- |

(18)

As it appears from the diagram below, both the upstream and downstream markets are highly concentrated:

Image

| (19) | A key peculiarity of this market is that end-customers (textile mills) choose both the upstream and the downstream products: currently all the winder manufacturers offer the choice between the main brands of sensors. BarcoVision sells its sensors under the brand name Loepfe, Itema its winders under the brand name Savio. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

A key peculiarity of this market is that end-customers (textile mills) choose both the upstream and the downstream products: currently all the winder manufacturers offer the choice between the main brands of sensors. BarcoVision sells its sensors under the brand name Loepfe, Itema its winders under the brand name Savio.

| (20) | Savio’s main competitors have expressed strong concerns of input foreclosure. They expect that, following the merger, Loepfe would stop supplying them with sensors. As a result, Murata and Schlafhorst could only rely on Uster for their sensor supplies. Absent the competitive constraint currently exerted by Loepfe, Uster could then increase prices charged to Murata and Schlafhorst, in line with paragraph 38 of the non-horizontal merger guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Savio’s main competitors have expressed strong concerns of input foreclosure. They expect that, following the merger, Loepfe would stop supplying them with sensors. As a result, Murata and Schlafhorst could only rely on Uster for their sensor supplies. Absent the competitive constraint currently exerted by Loepfe, Uster could then increase prices charged to Murata and Schlafhorst, in line with paragraph 38 of the non-horizontal merger guidelines.

Ability to foreclose access to sensors

| (21) | Sensors for winders are clearly an indispensable input for winders. However, Loepfe's specific sensors are not technically required by some end-customers. For most applications, either Loepfe's or Uster's technologies can be used. This means that in a foreclosure scenario, only very few end-customers would have to strictly follow one or the other sensor supplier for technical reasons. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Sensors for winders are clearly an indispensable input for winders. However, Loepfe's specific sensors are not technically required by some end-customers. For most applications, either Loepfe's or Uster's technologies can be used. This means that in a foreclosure scenario, only very few end-customers would have to strictly follow one or the other sensor supplier for technical reasons.

| (22) | Today, only two companies, Loepfe and Uster, are capable of supplying large volumes of winder sensors of quality to winder manufacturers. This suggests that both companies enjoy a significant degree of market power. Nevertheless, there are some indications that potential competition is putting downwards pressure on both Loepfe's and Uster's prices. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Today, only two companies, Loepfe and Uster, are capable of supplying large volumes of winder sensors of quality to winder manufacturers. This suggests that both companies enjoy a significant degree of market power. Nevertheless, there are some indications that potential competition is putting downwards pressure on both Loepfe's and Uster's prices.

| (23) | The draft decision examines the potential alternative supply sources upstream which could materialize in the short term. Although several such sources have been identified, it appears from the investigation that none of them are able to exercise full competitive pressure in the sensor market in the immediate future. However, the market investigation revealed that vertical integration from Murata and Schlafhorst could happen in 3 to 5 years. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The draft decision examines the potential alternative supply sources upstream which could materialize in the short term. Although several such sources have been identified, it appears from the investigation that none of them are able to exercise full competitive pressure in the sensor market in the immediate future. However, the market investigation revealed that vertical integration from Murata and Schlafhorst could happen in 3 to 5 years.

| (24) | Savio’s competitors have argued that it would be extremely difficult for them to continue to source sensors from Loepfe after the merger for they fear that Loepfe would pass on sensitive technical information about winders to Savio. The draft decision analyzes in detail these concerns and concludes the confidentiality concerns will become fully effective only with the development of the next generation of winders (i.e. in about 5 years from now). In-between, it could lead to a delay in the release of new features. Therefore, in line with the expectations of the main upstream competitor, ‘passive’ foreclosure, i.e. occurring without action from the merged entity, is very unlikely to happen in the next few years. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Savio’s competitors have argued that it would be extremely difficult for them to continue to source sensors from Loepfe after the merger for they fear that Loepfe would pass on sensitive technical information about winders to Savio. The draft decision analyzes in detail these concerns and concludes the confidentiality concerns will become fully effective only with the development of the next generation of winders (i.e. in about 5 years from now). In-between, it could lead to a delay in the release of new features. Therefore, in line with the expectations of the main upstream competitor, ‘passive’ foreclosure, i.e. occurring without action from the merged entity, is very unlikely to happen in the next few years.

| (25) | Uster will have limited incentives to exploit its increased market power in a total foreclosure scenario. Uster repeatedly stressed that it does not expect to be in a position to increase its prices post-merger because (i) this would trigger vertical integration from Murata/Schlafhorst and/or expansion from smaller upstream competitors and (ii) it will be constrained by competition on the downstream markets (Uster expects that the merger will lead to a reduction in prices for Savio's winders coming with Loepfe's sensors). |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Uster will have limited incentives to exploit its increased market power in a total foreclosure scenario. Uster repeatedly stressed that it does not expect to be in a position to increase its prices post-merger because (i) this would trigger vertical integration from Murata/Schlafhorst and/or expansion from smaller upstream competitors and (ii) it will be constrained by competition on the downstream markets (Uster expects that the merger will lead to a reduction in prices for Savio's winders coming with Loepfe's sensors).

| (26) | In conclusion, the merged entity will have a significant degree of market power upstream, and no alternative sources of sensors supplies in the short term are available, which speaks in favour of the ability to foreclose. On the other hand, there are indications that the merged entity is unlikely to have the ability to raise competitors’ costs. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

In conclusion, the merged entity will have a significant degree of market power upstream, and no alternative sources of sensors supplies in the short term are available, which speaks in favour of the ability to foreclose. On the other hand, there are indications that the merged entity is unlikely to have the ability to raise competitors’ costs.

Incentives to foreclose and effects on downstream customers

| (27) | As set out in the non-horizontal guidelines, the incentive for a company to foreclose its competitors will depend on the profitability of such a strategy. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

As set out in the non-horizontal guidelines, the incentive for a company to foreclose its competitors will depend on the profitability of such a strategy.

| (28) | Several qualitative elements indicate in this case that the critical price increase by Uster that would make a total input foreclosure profitable for Itema is likely to be large. First, sensor prices represent a small share of the total price of a winder (approximately [10-20] %). Second, the percentage margins are relatively small downstream and much higher upstream, which, all other things being equal, makes the gain of downstream winders less likely to compensate for upstream losses than if in a situation where downstream margins are high and upstream margins are small. Third, the critical price increase depends on the extent to which Itema's competitors would pass through changes in their costs into their final price. In considering this factor, it is necessary to take into account that an increase in sensor costs for Murata and/or Schlafhorst is not an industry-wide cost change since Itema would not in any case be faced with a cost increase. In fact, there are strong indications that Itema would decrease its prices to reflect its lower marginal costs. To continue competing with Itema, downstream competitors are therefore unlikely to pass the entirety of their cost increase, which further limits the downstream effects of an input foreclosure scenario. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Several qualitative elements indicate in this case that the critical price increase by Uster that would make a total input foreclosure profitable for Itema is likely to be large. First, sensor prices represent a small share of the total price of a winder (approximately [10-20] %). Second, the percentage margins are relatively small downstream and much higher upstream, which, all other things being equal, makes the gain of downstream winders less likely to compensate for upstream losses than if in a situation where downstream margins are high and upstream margins are small. Third, the critical price increase depends on the extent to which Itema's competitors would pass through changes in their costs into their final price. In considering this factor, it is necessary to take into account that an increase in sensor costs for Murata and/or Schlafhorst is not an industry-wide cost change since Itema would not in any case be faced with a cost increase. In fact, there are strong indications that Itema would decrease its prices to reflect its lower marginal costs. To continue competing with Itema, downstream competitors are therefore unlikely to pass the entirety of their cost increase, which further limits the downstream effects of an input foreclosure scenario.

| (29) | This interaction between these three elements, together with the other factors that affect the profitability of an input foreclosure, can be illustrated with a very simple model of downstream demand. Such a model indicates that Itema's would pass significantly less than 100 % of costs increases. Under the assumption that Uster increases prices by [25-50] % as a result of a total input foreclosure by the merged entity, foreclosure would not be profitable for Itema and the impact on downstream customers would be very limited. In fact, this simple model indicates that for a total foreclosure strategy to be profitable, a price increase by Uster of more than [120-180] % would be required. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

This interaction between these three elements, together with the other factors that affect the profitability of an input foreclosure, can be illustrated with a very simple model of downstream demand. Such a model indicates that Itema's would pass significantly less than 100 % of costs increases. Under the assumption that Uster increases prices by [25-50] % as a result of a total input foreclosure by the merged entity, foreclosure would not be profitable for Itema and the impact on downstream customers would be very limited. In fact, this simple model indicates that for a total foreclosure strategy to be profitable, a price increase by Uster of more than [120-180] % would be required.

| (30) | There are strong indications suggesting that Uster is unlikely to increase prices by such an extent. In particular, Uster itself does not expect to be in a position to raise prices post-merger. On the contrary, it expects that it would have to decrease prices to allow Murata and Schlafhorst to compete with lower prices by Itema. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

There are strong indications suggesting that Uster is unlikely to increase prices by such an extent. In particular, Uster itself does not expect to be in a position to raise prices post-merger. On the contrary, it expects that it would have to decrease prices to allow Murata and Schlafhorst to compete with lower prices by Itema.

| (31) | The draft decision also considers a strategy whereby Itema would stop supplying sensors only to one of its downstream competitor, either Murata or Schlafhorst. It can be shown that under reasonable assumptions, such a strategy is not profitable. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The draft decision also considers a strategy whereby Itema would stop supplying sensors only to one of its downstream competitor, either Murata or Schlafhorst. It can be shown that under reasonable assumptions, such a strategy is not profitable.

| (32) | The draft decision examines incentives and effects of a partial foreclosure strategy for the merged entity and concludes that it is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The draft decision examines incentives and effects of a partial foreclosure strategy for the merged entity and concludes that it is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects.

| (33) | It is also considered whether possible reduction in fixed costs by the merged entity in a foreclosure scenario could make this strategy profitable. The draft decision concludes that the conclusion of lack of incentives is robust also in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

It is also considered whether possible reduction in fixed costs by the merged entity in a foreclosure scenario could make this strategy profitable. The draft decision concludes that the conclusion of lack of incentives is robust also in this respect.

| (34) | The draft decision explores the impact of the threat of vertical integration by downstream competitors (Murata, Schlafhorst) on Itema's incentives to foreclose and finds that this further reduces the profitability of a foreclosure strategy. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The draft decision explores the impact of the threat of vertical integration by downstream competitors (Murata, Schlafhorst) on Itema's incentives to foreclose and finds that this further reduces the profitability of a foreclosure strategy.

| (35) | In view of the significant additional profits the merged entity could make by not foreclosing downstream competitors, it can be concluded that Itema will have a strong financial incentive to solve the confidentiality issues so as to not lose upstream business. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

In view of the significant additional profits the merged entity could make by not foreclosing downstream competitors, it can be concluded that Itema will have a strong financial incentive to solve the confidentiality issues so as to not lose upstream business.

| (36) | Consequently, the merged entity will not have an incentive to engage into a foreclosure strategy, which, in any event, would have negligible effects on winder prices. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Consequently, the merged entity will not have an incentive to engage into a foreclosure strategy, which, in any event, would have negligible effects on winder prices.

Conclusion

| (37) | Considering that a foreclosure strategy would be unprofitable and with marginal effects on downstream customers, the draft decision concludes that risks of input foreclosure can be excluded in this case. Given that Itema's purchases of sensors represent a limited share of the total market, the transaction does not present risks of customer foreclosure. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Considering that a foreclosure strategy would be unprofitable and with marginal effects on downstream customers, the draft decision concludes that risks of input foreclosure can be excluded in this case. Given that Itema's purchases of sensors represent a limited share of the total market, the transaction does not present risks of customer foreclosure.

2.   Other markets

| (38) | With regard to sensors for OE spinning machines and OE spinning machines, in view of the limited market share of Itema in the downstream market (WW: [0-5] %; EEA: [0-5] %), the transaction does not raise anticompetitive concerns. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

With regard to sensors for OE spinning machines and OE spinning machines, in view of the limited market share of Itema in the downstream market (WW: [0-5] %; EEA: [0-5] %), the transaction does not raise anticompetitive concerns.

| (39) | With regard to sensors for weaving machines and weaving machines, the draft decision examines the vertical relationship created by the transaction under the different market definition options for the upstream markets and concludes that the proposed transaction will not significantly impede effective competition on these markets, essentially due to a lack of market power upstream. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

With regard to sensors for weaving machines and weaving machines, the draft decision examines the vertical relationship created by the transaction under the different market definition options for the upstream markets and concludes that the proposed transaction will not significantly impede effective competition on these markets, essentially due to a lack of market power upstream.

| (40) | With regard to MES, there are no affected markets; the concerns raised in the course of the market investigation have been proved to be unfounded. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

With regard to MES, there are no affected markets; the concerns raised in the course of the market investigation have been proved to be unfounded.

VII.   CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL

| (41) | The Commission concludes in the draft decision that the proposed concentration will not give rise to any competition concerns as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it. Consequently, the draft suggests to declare the concentration compatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The Commission concludes in the draft decision that the proposed concentration will not give rise to any competition concerns as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it. Consequently, the draft suggests to declare the concentration compatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.

| (42) | The Commission invites the Advisory Committee, on the basis of Article 19(6) of the Merger Regulation, to deliver an opinion on the attached draft decision. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Commission invites the Advisory Committee, on the basis of Article 19(6) of the Merger Regulation, to deliver an opinion on the attached draft decision.

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NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

| 18.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 225/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 225/13

---

EU-27 ethyl alcohol balance for 2008

(Established on 10 July 2009 in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2336/2003)

2009/C 225/07

| | EU-27 ethyl alcohol balance for 2008


  (Established on 10 July 2009 in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2336/2003 (1)) | Hectolitres of pure alcohol |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | Initial stock






  — | Agricultural origin |

EU-27 ethyl alcohol balance for 2008

(Established on 10 July 2009 in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2336/2003 (1))

Hectolitres of pure alcohol

1.

Initial stock

—

Agricultural origin

| — | Non-agricultural origin |
| --- | --- |

—

Non-agricultural origin

8 913 486

2.

Production

| — | Agricultural origin |
| --- | --- |

—

Agricultural origin

| — | Non-agricultural origin |
| --- | --- |

—

Non-agricultural origin

40 368 240

3.

Imports (2)

| — | 0 % duty |
| --- | --- |

—

0 % duty

| — | Reduced duty |
| --- | --- |

—

Reduced duty

| — | 100 % duty |
| --- | --- |

—

100 % duty

12 887 108

3 979 240

0

8 907 868

4.

Total resources

62 168 834

5.

Exports

391 488

6.

Internal consumption

53 561 592

Agricultural origin

Non-agricultural origin

Total

Food use

Industrial use

Fuel

Other

11 914 766

8 527 575

29 131 475

3 987 777

Total

53 561 592

7.

Final stock

| — | Agricultural origin |
| --- | --- |

—

Agricultural origin

| — | Non-agricultural origin |
| --- | --- |

—

Non-agricultural origin

8 215 754

Sources: Communications from the Member States/Eurostat COMEXT.

---

(1)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2336/2003 of 30 December 2003 introducing certain detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EC) No 670/2003 laying down specific measures concerning the market in ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin (OJ L 346, 31.12.2003, pp. 19-25).

(2)  Includes only products falling within CN codes 2207 10, 2207 20, 2208 90 91 and 2208 90 99.

Sources: Communications from the Member States/Eurostat COMEXT.

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V Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY

Commission

| 18.9.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 225/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 225/14

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.5626 — Adecco/Spring)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 225/08

| 1. | On 11 September 2009, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Adecco S.A. (‘Adecco’, Switzerland) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Spring Group PLC (‘Spring’, United Kingdom) by way of public bid announced on 11 August 2009. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 11 September 2009, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Adecco S.A. (‘Adecco’, Switzerland) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Spring Group PLC (‘Spring’, United Kingdom) by way of public bid announced on 11 August 2009.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | for Adecco: international provision of human resources and recruitment services, including temporary staffing, permanent staffing, consulting and outplacement, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

for Adecco: international provision of human resources and recruitment services, including temporary staffing, permanent staffing, consulting and outplacement,

| — | for Spring: international provision of human resources and recruitment services, including temporary staffing, permanent staffing and managed solutions, with a focus in the United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

—

for Spring: international provision of human resources and recruitment services, including temporary staffing, permanent staffing and managed solutions, with a focus in the United Kingdom.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301 or 22967244) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.5626 — Adecco/Spring, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301 or 22967244) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.5626 — Adecco/Spring, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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