DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

SHERRY CROSSLEY-ROBINSON,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-1393

[June 5, 2019]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Thomas M. Lynch, V, Judge; L.T. Case No. 16-

13124CF10A.

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marc B. 

Hernandez, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GROSS, J.

The State appeals a downward departure sentence imposed on Sherry 

Crossley-Robinson after she entered an open plea of no contest to one 

count of attempted robbery and four counts of robbery (no weapon). The 

plea encompassed five cases involving four victims; the defendant was 

accused of robbing and attempting to rob four different banks in the Fort 

Lauderdale area over a six-month period.

We reverse the sentence in lower court case number 16-13124CF10A 

because the record fails to support the statutory factor the trial court relied 

upon to downwardly depart.1

1 As the State concedes, we have jurisdiction over only the one case mentioned 

in this paragraph. A notice of appeal was filed only in that case. No notices of 

appeal were filed for the other four cases, which were separately filed in the circuit 

court.
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At a plea conference, the trial court advised the defendant that she 

faced a maximum of 15 years in prison for each count of robbery and a 

maximum sentence of 5 years for the attempted robbery. The court also 

told the defendant that the lowest permissible sentence under the 

scoresheet was 50.55 months in prison. The defendant stated that she 

understood and entered an open plea of no contest to all five counts, which 

the court accepted.

Next, the court addressed the defendant’s motion for a downward 

departure sentence. One of the grounds raised for a downward departure 

was that the offenses were committed in an unsophisticated manner and 

were isolated incidents for which the defendant had shown remorse. See 

§ 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (2018). Another ground raised for a downward 

departure was that the defendant cooperated with the state to resolve the 

current offense or any other offense. § 921.0026(2)(i). After hearing 

testimony and argument, the circuit court determined that these grounds

constituted valid statutory reasons to downwardly depart.2 The court 

sentenced the defendant to 364 days in jail, followed by two years of 

community control and ten years of probation on each of the four robbery 

counts. For the single count of attempted robbery, the court sentenced 

the defendant to 364 days in jail, followed by two years of community 

control and two years of probation. All counts on all cases were ordered 

2 We agree with the State that the trial court did not decide to depart because the 

“defendant cooperated with the state to resolve the current offense.” § 

921.0026(2)(i) (emphasis added). Rather, it appears that the court followed the 

case law which holds that “[a] departure sentence is not warranted where a 

defendant merely cooperated after [the] offense was discovered because that 

cooperation did not solve a crime.” State v. Johnson, 193 So. 3d 32, 35 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also State v. Coleman, 

780 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (cooperation not supported where 

defendant “did not cooperate with the police until after he was arrested and only 

after being confronted with incriminating evidence”); State v. Wheeler, 180 So. 3d 

1117, 1120 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (defendant did not cooperate with the State 

to resolve the current offense where “[a]t the time the police questioned him, they 

were already aware of his crimes”); State v. Bleckinger, 746 So. 2d 553, 555-556

(Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (confessing after arrest and entering a guilty plea is not 

sufficient to constitute cooperation as a mitigating factor). Regarding the court’s 

apparent finding that an incident regarding the defendant’s child was a valid 

reason to depart, we hold that the defendant’s telephonic reporting of a 

molestation of her child, a crime which she did not witness or participate in, and 

which predated some of her offenses, was insufficient to establish “cooperation” 

with the State under section 921.0026(2)(i).
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to run concurrently. The State timely objected to the downward departure 

sentence and renewed its arguments for the record.

As we explained in DeSantis v. State, 240 So. 3d 751, 752-53 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2018):

We apply a mixed two-part review when analyzing a downward 

departure sentence. In the first step, the trial court must 

determine whether it can depart, i.e., whether there is a valid 

legal ground and adequate factual support for that ground in 

the case pending before it. In reviewing the first step, we must 

determine whether competent substantial evidence supports 

the trial court’s ruling.

In the second step, the trial court must decide whether to 

depart, i.e., whether departure is indeed the best sentencing 

option. This requires the trial court to weigh the totality of the 

circumstances, including aggravating and mitigating factors. 

We review this decision for an abuse of discretion, which 

occurs where no reasonable person would agree with the trial 

court’s decision.

(Internal citations omitted).

The offenses committed were not “isolated incidents” within the

meaning of section 921.0026(2)(j)

“A departure sentence may be imposed where the trial court finds that 

the ‘offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an 

isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.’” Staffney 

v. State, 826 So. 2d 509, 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting § 921.0026(2)(j), 

Fla. Stat. (2001)). “Thus, in order to support the downward departure 

based on this statutory factor, there must be competent substantial 

evidence that: (1) the offense was committed in an unsophisticated 

manner, (2) it was an isolated incident, and (3) the defendant had shown 

remorse.” Id. at 511-12. All three factors must be established to justify a 

departure under subsection 921.0026(2)(j).

The State does not dispute that the defendant has shown remorse for 

her crimes. Because we concluded that the offenses in this case were not 

isolated incidents, we do not reach the issue of whether the crimes were 

committed in an unsophisticated manner.
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“Neither the legislature nor the courts have established a bright-line 

rule for determining whether an offense is an isolated incident.” State v. 

Waterman, 12 So. 3d 1265, 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). “Instead, the courts 

have set forth the standard that [a] defendant’s extensive prior criminal 

record precludes a showing that an offense was an isolated incident.” Id. 

(internal quotations and citation omitted). “An offense is not isolated if a 

defendant has an extensive prior criminal record.” Bellamy v. State, 199 

So. 3d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Crucial to this case, “[a]n offense 

also is not isolated if it involves multiple incidents.” Id. (citing State v. 

Strawser, 921 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“We recognize that, as 

there were multiple incidents involving one of the victims over a period of 

several months, the isolated incident aspect . . . has not been met.”)).

In this case, there were multiple bank robberies during a six-month 

period. Nevertheless, the defendant argues that these incidents were 

isolated, citing State v. Randall, 746 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), and 

State v. Merritt, 714 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010), where the fifth 

district found the offenses to be isolated even though there were multiple 

criminal incidents. However, Randall and Merritt are distinguishable from 

the present case because in those cases, the incidents took place within a 

short period of time. See Randall, 746 So. 2d at 552 (four separate sales 

of cocaine within a thirteen-day period to the same person were “isolated 

incidents, close in time.”); Merritt, 714 So. 2d at 1153 (three sex acts 

involving a single victim were “isolated” because “they were something the 

defendant had never engaged in before, in his 25 year lifetime, and they 

took place in a relatively short span of time.”).

Here, the incidents took place over a six-month period and involved 

four different victims, so they could not be considered “isolated incidents” 

within the meaning of the statute. See Strawser, 921 So. 2d at 707 

(multiple incidents involving one of the victims over a period of several 

months not an isolated incident); State v. Walters, 12 So. 3d 298, 301 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2009) (fifty separate money laundering transactions over the 

course of more than six months not isolated); State v. Munro, 903 So. 2d 

381, 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (three incidents of molestation over a threeweek span not isolated); State v. White, 894 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2005) (multiple sales of cocaine during a fourth-month time frame not 

isolated).

Because the criminal offenses here at issue were not “isolated 

incidents” under the statute, the trial court was precluded from relying on 

section 921.0026(2)(j) as the basis for a downward departure sentence.
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We reverse the sentence in case number 16-13124CF10A and remand 

to the circuit court for resentencing.

TAYLOR and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.