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37–308 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–8]

SECURITY AND STABILITY IN

AFGHANISTAN: CHALLENGES AND

OPPORTUNITIES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

JANUARY 30, 2007

(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

PATRICK MURPHY, Pennsylvania

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

DUNCAN HUNTER, California

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

KEN CALVERT, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

ERIN CONATON, Staff Director

JULIE UNMACHT, Professional Staff Member

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant

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C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Tuesday, January 30, 2007, Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Challenges

and Opportunities ................................................................................................ 1

APPENDIX:

Tuesday, January 30, 2007 ..................................................................................... 47

TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2007

SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN: CHALLENGES AND

OPPORTUNITIES

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member,

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1

WITNESSES

Cordesman, Dr. Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 12

Dobbins, Ambassador James, Director, International Security and Defense

Policy Center, Rand National Security Research Division ............................... 4

Inderfurth, Ambassador Karl F., John O. Rankin Professor of the Practice

of International Affairs, The Elliott School of International Affairs, George

Washington University ........................................................................................ 7

Jalali, Ali A., Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies,

National Defense University ............................................................................... 10

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Cordesman, Dr. Anthony H. ............................................................................ 80

Dobbins, Ambassador James ........................................................................... 51

Inderfurth, Ambassador Karl F. ...................................................................... 61

Jalali, Ali A. ...................................................................................................... 73

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Afghanistan: Challenges & The Way Ahead, January 30-31, 2007 ............. 93

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Questions submitted.]

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SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN:

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, January 30, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Are all of our witnesses here?

Gentlemen, thank you for joining us.

Somebody shut the door, please.

Before I begin, I might again recommend to the witnesses that

you confine your statements to four minutes. Automatically, without objection, your written testimony will be placed in the record.

The committee is doing a fine job of staying within the fiveminute rule, so I compliment them and I thank them for that.

Yesterday, I returned from a trip to Kuwait, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Germany, as part of a delegation led by Speaker

Pelosi. Along on this trip were other members who were chairmen

of various committees or appropriations subcommittees that dealt

with national security, including our very own Silvestre Reyes, who

is, as you know, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee.

Speaker Pelosi led the delegation and did a superb job in meeting

with the heads of state of four of the five countries.

I greatly appreciate our meetings with Afghanistan’s President

Karzai, Pakistan’s President Musharraf, and both the American

and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) senior commanders.

It is always wonderful to be with our fighting men and women

who really were the highlight of our trip. These courageous men

and women are serving on the front lines with a very critical mission of patriotism and devotion. We are truly grateful to them. We

are grateful to their families for the sacrifices that they make.

The delegation left this country convinced that this has become

the forgotten war. The war in Afghanistan is the forgotten war. I

have been saying this for some time, and the trip confirmed this.

We must do more to secure Afghanistan while the effort there is

still winnable. Reconstruction, governance, and an economic base

that does not rely on primarily the narcotics trade will be the longterm effort.

2

But the Taliban, the enemy, the Taliban can be destroyed for

good, and the Afghan people will have the hope that their future

lies with a central government, and giving us the confidence that

this country will not again become a harbor for terrorists.

But to do this, the commanders in Afghanistan must have the

adequate troops and the right types of them, particularly through

the spring and the summer months. I believe the recently announced increase in troops, strengthened by extending the third

Brigade of the tenth Mountain Division in Afghanistan for four

months will help. It will be a sacrifice for those troops and their

families, but they can’t do it alone.

While we should consider what else we need to do for Afghanistan, our NATO partners must do more as well. They have made

commitments to this fight in Afghanistan, both in stabilizing the

country, as well as reconstruction. They need to step up their efforts. Their commander, British General David Richards, told the

delegation that the countries of the alliance must contribute more

fighting forces. The whole world stands to gain if Afghanistan succeeds.

I am encouraged by reports of supplemental assistance for Afghanistan to be proposed in the Administration’s budget package.

Speaker Pelosi has made clear that Congress will expeditiously

consider the proposal. We need to look carefully at what must be

done next in terms of training and the equipping of the Afghan security forces, as well as reconstruction.

This committee and others will look at these issues quite carefully.

The challenges in Afghanistan continue to be great. Security in

Afghanistan necessarily involves the border region with Pakistan

and the development of competent security forces. Opium production is at a record level and, unless tackled more aggressively,

could undermine all other efforts to stabilize the country. Corruption is also rampant, and much of the population remains illiterate

and impoverished, without even the most basic services such as

running water and electricity.

But I believe there is great reason to be optimistic about Afghanistan, if we put the right resources there and maintain a consistent

commitment under a consistent long-term strategy that gives that

country the attention that it deserves. It is the forgotten war.

So, gentlemen, I hope you can help us understand the way forward. This will be the first of several hearings we will hold on Afghanistan in the coming months, and you will help us set the

stage. What are the key challenges facing the United States and

coalition military operations, the Afghan government, the security

forces, and counter-narcotics and reconstruction efforts? And how

should these challenges be addressed?

I am pleased to have with us an exceptionally qualified panel of

experts.

We have Ambassador James Dobbins, who served as the president’s first envoy to Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks.

We have Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, who handled matters involving Afghanistan as the assistant secretary of state from 1997

to 2001.

3

We have the Honorable Ali Jalali, Afghanistan’s interior minister

until 2005.

We have Dr. Anthony Cordesman, an old friend, with the Center

for Strategic and International Studies, who is another one of the

country’s top experts on Afghanistan.

Before your testimony, gentlemen, I turn to my good friend and

my colleague from California, the gentleman from San Diego, Duncan Hunter, ranking member.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON

ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for having this hearing, which is very timely.

I also welcome our guests today.

According to all accounts, the 2006 poppy crop was among the

highest, if not the highest, ever produced in Afghanistan. The

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime stated that the amount

of land that is now dedicated to poppy crops increased 61 percent

from 2005 to 2006.

So poppy production in Afghanistan has increased now by more

than 26 percent, and in the relatively violent provinces of Helmand

and Oruzgan, production has increased 132 percent. In looking at

recent planning, some Afghan officials predict that next year’s yield

could easily rival the 2006 crop.

Gentlemen, I know you are going to speak to this issue. I have

talked to a number of our organizations which are involved in trying to offer that substitute economic base to the Afghan people who

are involved right now in poppy production.

It looks to me like one of the most viable, and I would like you

to talk to this, is orchard plantings—that is, almonds and other

cash crops, which take a while to get up but nonetheless they have

a certain permanence that I would think would provide an exclusion of poppy plantings in the future.

If a small farmer has a couple of acres on his little postage-stamp

farms and puts them in orchards and gets the trees up to the point

where they can produce something every year and make cash for

that family, it is probably realistic to expect that they are not going

to cut the trees down in a given year and put poppies in.

I would like you to talk to this plan, if you would.

I looked at our bureaucracy that is trying to put this in place,

lots of great people, well-intentioned folks. Sometimes, I have come

to the conclusion I get out in our farming areas around this country, and you see good old practical, smart, scientific American farmers with kind of a can-do attitude. I wonder if maybe the operations there, that are in charge of these substitute programs, substituting orchards for poppies, our bureaucracy might be better

populated by some tough, old, practical farmers who grow lots of

orchards, who are in that business, and perhaps insert them up

front in the process.

Another aspect of this, I have been educated as to the loya

jirgah, the traditions of Afghan society, and especially the way decisions are made on a local basis, where you have to make a sale

of the substitution to local leadership, get them to buy in, give

4

them something of substance or a light at the end of the tunnel,

a program that they have confidence in, to make the sale, and then

immediately go to work.

I wonder if we are using that traditional system enough, or if we

are simply putting in large contractors in Kabul who have a limited

connection, if you will, with the people on the ground and the communities where the poppies are being produced in the largest numbers.

So if you could address that, this idea of substitution. Because,

in the end, we are going to have to offer these folks an alternative.

It looks to me, especially if you look at the small size of these

farms, wheat, or other cash crops that are relatively low in value

probably aren’t going to pull the train, but orchards could. I know

we have some orchard substitute operations going on out there.

The chairman mentioned that we have, in fact, now 21,000 U.S.

service members now serving in Afghanistan, and that we have

NATO leadership in Afghanistan. If you look at the nations especially who have decided not to participate in bearing the burden in

Iraq, there are a lot of NATO nations with major assets who aren’t

deploying, aren’t volunteering, aren’t moving up in the Afghanistan

program.

I once looked at the formula whereby NATO participants, NATO

members participate in military operations. I looked to see if there

was a formula for burden-sharing, where there is a certain goal,

even if an informal goal, that the membership tries to reach, where

everybody pulls their weight. I discovered there is none. It is basically a potluck, and that means each member of NATO brings what

they volunteer. In many of these NATO operations, the United

States brings the T-bone steaks and others bring the plastic forks.

In this case, there is a compelling interest of all the NATO nations to help carry that burden in Afghanistan. I would like to have

your comments on whether or not you think that they are moving

forth, that they are assuming that burden, or whether they are

pushing away from it with a policy that says, ‘‘Let Uncle Sam do

it. It is going to be expensive, it is going to be tough, it is going

to be politically difficult back home. Let’s let Uncle Sam carry that

burden.’’

If you have any ideas on how we are able to better inspire our

NATO allies to assume that burden, I would certainly be interested

in hearing it.

So thank you for being with us today. I appreciate it.

And, Mr. Chairman, a very timely hearing that you have called,

and I look forward to the statements.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hunter.

Again, if you could limit your presentation to four minutes, we

would certainly appreciate it. Without objection, each of your full

statements will go into the record.

Ambassador Dobbins.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS, DIRECTOR,

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER,

RAND NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you.

5

Afghanistan has been in the midst of civil war for some 25 years

now. The war waxes and wanes. At the moment, it is waxing, and

it is worth asking why it is waxing at the moment.

I think there are two basic reasons. One could be called the sin

of omission and the other a sin of commission.

The sin of omission was the failure of the United States, the

Karzai government and the international community as a whole to

take advantage of the lull in that conflict that followed the collapse

of the Taliban in 2001, in order to strengthen the capacity of the

new Afghan government to project its authority and to provide public services, including particularly security, to the population beyond Kabul.

The sin of commission arises from the fragmentation of the international coalition that the United States put together in late 2001

and the threat to Afghanistan arising from Pakistan.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban, the United States

and the rest of the international community had a golden occasion

to help the Afghans build an effective government, capable of providing its population with the most basic public services. We largely failed to seize this opportunity.

During those early years, the U.S. and international assistance

was minimal. Blame for this failure can be widely shared, but this

minimalist approach did reflect the American Administration’s

then early aversion to nation-building.

Well into 2003, the Administration was quite vocal in touting the

merits of its low-profile, small-footprint alternative to the more robust nation-building efforts that the Clinton Administration had

led in Bosnia and Kosovo. Top Administration officials argued that

generous international assistance had caused those Balkan societies to become inordinately dependent on external funding and

foreign troops, something that they wanted to avoid in Afghanistan

and also in Iraq.

In pursuit of this severely limited vision of nation-building, the

United States initially sought to minimize the size, the geographical scope and the functions of the International Security Assistance

Force. Washington rejected pleas from Karzai and the United Nations (U.N.) to deploy these international peacekeepers outside

Kabul. The Administration discouraged any role for NATO in Afghanistan. It also refused to assign peacekeeping functions to

American forces operating throughout the country.

Economic assistance to Afghanistan was also commensurately

low. In the first year following the collapse of the Taliban, the

United States committed some $500 million in reconstruction aid

to Afghanistan. Compare that figure to the $18 billion that the Administration requested for Iraq in the first year there, a country no

bigger than Afghanistan, much richer and much less destroyed.

Now, by 2004, the Administration began to recognize that these

efforts were inadequate and started to increase the size of its aid

program and of its military forces. Those increases are continuing

today.

Two vital years had been lost, however, years during which little

progress had been made in extending effective governance in the

countryside. As a result, when the Taliban threat did re-emerge,

much of the population had no particular reason to risk their lives

6

for a government that could neither protect them nor advance their

material well-being.

Now, this can explain why the population was somewhat receptive to a resurgent Taliban, but it doesn’t explain why the Taliban

resurgence occurred.

The current insurgency in Afghanistan does not arise from a profound disaffection among large elements of the Afghan population

with their government. This insurgency has been raised in Pakistan by individuals resident in Pakistan, some of whom are refugees from Afghanistan, others of whom are native Pakistanis.

For tens of millions of Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the

border, the distinction between Afghanistan and Pakistan is indeed

somewhat artificial, as they don’t recognize the border. The degree

of Pakistani complicity in this insurgency is a matter of some controversy.

Speaking privately, knowledgeable American, NATO, Afghan and

U.N. officials are nearly unanimous in asserting that the Pakistani

intelligence service continues to collaborate with the Taliban and

other insurgent groups. For its part, the Pakistani government at

the highest level denies any official sanction for these activities.

Now, the United States has complained loudly in recent months

about Iranian support for sectarian support for sectarian violence

in Iraq. At this point, lacking any access to intelligence data, it is

difficult to fully assess the degree of official Iranian support for

civil war in Iraq or official Pakistani support for civil war in Afghanistan.

What does seem indisputably clear, however, is that Pakistani

citizens, residents, money and territory are playing a much greater

role in the Afghan civil war than are Iranian citizens, residents,

money or territory in the Iraqi civil war.

One hears that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 diverted

American manpower and money from Afghanistan. This may be

true, but a more serious charge is that the conflict in Iraq has diverted American attention from the real central front in the war

on terror, which is neither in Iraq nor Afghanistan, but in Pakistan.

Al Qaeda, after all, is headquartered in Pakistan. The Taliban is

operating out of Pakistan, as are several other insurgent groups operating against American forces in Afghanistan. Bin Laden lives in

Pakistan. Mullah Omar lives in Pakistan. It was Pakistan that assisted the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. Potential

terrorists from Western societies still travel to Pakistan for inspiration, guidance, support, and direction.

Yet, if Pakistan is the central front on the war on terror, it is

not one susceptible to a military response. We are not going to

bomb Islamabad or invade Waziristan.

An increase in U.S. military manpower and money for Afghanistan, such as the Administration currently proposes, may well contain the renewed insurgency and prevent the Karzai government

from being overthrown. But U.S. and NATO troops are likely to be

required there indefinitely as long as the Taliban and other insurgent groups are able to recruit, train, raise funds, and organize

their operations in Pakistan.

7

At present, NATO is manning the Afghan frontier but doing little

or nothing to address the threat coming from across the other side

of the border. This is bit akin to NATO having guarded the Fulda

Gap throughout the Cold War for 40 years, but, having had no

agreed policies for dealing with the Soviet Union, in fact, the opposite occurred. Consultation about the Soviet Union occupied 90 percent of every NATO ministerial and summit meeting for 40 years.

It is time that consultations on Pakistan occupied a similarly central place in the transatlantic dialogue.

Now, as I have said, the problem of Pakistan is not one that is

susceptible to a military solution. It is largely going to require

much more positive incentives that persuade the Pakistanis to

begin to assert control of their own society and prevent their territory and their population from being used against a neighboring

state and against NATO and American forces that are operating

there.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins can be found in

the Appendix on page 51.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Inderfurth. Did I pronounce it correctly?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR KARL F. INDERFURTH, JOHN O.

RANKIN PROFESSOR OF THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS, THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member

Hunter, members of the committee, thank you very much for your

invitation.

In my testimony, I will identify five challenges facing Afghanistan and make several recommendations, introduce three cautionary notes for your consideration, and then cite what I consider to

be the most important opportunity the committee and the Congress

have to ensure Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability.

May I begin by calling attention to the first piece of legislation

passed by the new House of Representatives on January 9, H.R. 1,

the ‘‘Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of

2007.’’ That bill focused on the unfinished business of the 9/11

Commission recommendations, including Section 1441 on Afghanistan.

Let me remind you that the 9/11 Commission identified Afghanistan as the incubator for al Qaeda and for the 9/11 attacks, and

recommended that the United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable

Afghanistan.

The commission also warned that failed half-measures could be

worse than useless. Five years after 9/11, half-measures in Afghanistan by the United States and the international community are

failing to provide security, rebuild the country or combat the exploding drug trade. Afghanistan is still very much a nation at risk.

From the outset, the United States went about establishing a

light footprint in Afghanistan. The recent report of the Iraq Study

8

Group identified one of the principal reasons, and I quote: ‘‘The

huge focus of U.S. political, military, and economic support on Iraq

has necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan.’’ But the

international community also joined in that light footprint.

Today, Afghanistan is in need of full measures. The country must

receive the priority, attention, and resources it deserves.

Now, let me briefly cite the five challenges facing Afghanistan

today. I am, of course, prepared to elaborate on any of these in our

discussion after our statements.

Challenge number one, providing greater security. More troops

are needed. NATO’s commanding general says he is 4,000 to 5,000

troops short. Last week, the Pentagon announced that it will keep

3,200 of its troops in Afghanistan for an extra 4 months. This is

a positive response to the NATO troop shortfall, but it will not be

sufficient.

At the upcoming NATO defense ministers’ meeting in Seville,

Secretary Gates should announce that the U.S. is prepared to add

extra forces, but the U.S. should not bear this burden alone. Other

NATO members must come forward with firm troop commitments

and a willingness to join the fight.

Challenge number two, securing the Afghan-Pakistan border. As

long as the Taliban have a safe haven in Pakistan, to use the recent words of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Director John

Negroponte, ‘‘They can continue their insurgency indefinitely, making it virtually impossible to secure and provide a stable Afghanistan.’’

There are several steps, both short-term and long-term, which I

believe can be taken to meet this objective. Secretary Rice should

have this at the top of her agenda when she travels to Pakistan

next month to meet with President Musharraf.

Challenge number three, building up the Afghan security forces.

Greater priority must be given to standing up Afghanistan security

forces, the Afghan National Army, the ANA, and especially the Afghan National Police, the ANP. The recent announcement by the

Bush administration that it is going to request over a two-year period $8.6 billion in additional assistance for these forces is an important step forward and I believe should be supported.

Challenge number four, tackling the drug trade. Afghanistan is

in danger of becoming a full-fledged narco-state. A multi-pronged

approach is needed to combat it, including greater assistance from

U.S. and NATO-led military forces. The Afghan army, police and

counter-narcotics forces are not yet up to this job. Drug revenues

are supporting the Taliban and helping fuel the growing insurgency, placing U.S. and NATO forces at greater risk.

Challenge number five, accelerating reconstruction. One year ago

this month, more than 60 countries and international organizations

gathered in London. That meeting provided the international community another opportunity to match its stated commitment to rebuild Afghanistan with the resources necessary to accomplish that

task. Two previous donor conferences, in Tokyo in 2002 and Berlin

in 2004, fell short. Unfortunately, so did London. Another opportunity will present itself in April, when Italy hosts the next international donors conference. Using Secretary Rice’s words, we

should redouble our efforts.

9

Now, quickly let me turn to three cautionary notes for the committee to consider.

Note number one, don’t open an Afghan front against Iran. Pakistan is not the only neighbor that has a strong stake in Afghanistan, including religious, cultural, and economic ties. So does Iran.

According to recent news reports, the Bush administration is preparing more aggressive moves to undermine Iranian interests

among Shiites in western Afghanistan. This would be ill-advised.

Such a move by the U.S. would certainly complicate and likely

prove counterproductive to President Karzai’s efforts to normalize

and stabilize relations with his western neighbor.

Cautionary note number two, Afghanistan is not Colombia. It

was reported last week that on a trip to Colombia, General Peter

Pace said that country could serve as a template for Afghan efforts

to fight drug production. The U.S. approach in Colombia has invested heavily in chemical eradication of coca fields. Assistance to

farmers to switch to growing legal crops has received far less attention or assistance.

President Karzai favors the exact opposite approach. He has opposed spraying the poppy fields with herbicides, believing that that

would cause further hardship for Afghan farmers, generate a political backlash and undermine his authority.

Cautionary note number three, it is their country. As we examine

the challenges facing Afghanistan today and consider what we can

do about them, it is important to remind ourselves we must listen

to and respect what the Afghans themselves see as their needs and

priorities. It is, after all, their country and they know it best.

For that reason, I have attached to my testimony and would like

to include in the record a copy of the report prepared by the government of Afghanistan for a meeting beginning today in Berlin

with officials of the European Union. The paper is entitled, ‘‘Afghanistan: Challenges and the Way Ahead,’’ remarkably similar to

the topic for today’s hearing.

Let me conclude with what I consider a most important opportunity this committee and the Congress have to ensure Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability. It is this: You have the opportunity to make an important mid-course adjustment in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, to move away from the half-measures the

9/11 Commission warned against and to make Afghanistan a

model—a model—of bipartisan cooperation.

From those terrible days just after the 9/11 attacks, the Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, have supported our nation’s military action and our commitment in Afghanistan. Just two

days ago, Speaker Pelosi told President Karzai in Kabul that Afghanistan continues to have strong bipartisan support in Congress.

Afghanistan’s future is counting on it.

Thank you very much.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on

page 93.]

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Inderfurth can be found

in the Appendix on page 61.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

10

I should have also mentioned that on our trip, it was a bipartisan trip; a ranking member from an appropriations subcommittee

was along with us.

And, Mr. Jalali, please.

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR ALI A. JALALI, NEAR EAST SOUTH

ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Mr. JALALI. Thank you.

Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member Hunter, and members of

the committee, thank you for the invitation to offer my evaluation

of the security situation in Afghanistan. The assessment I offer

today is based entirely on my own views and personal judgment.

Mr. Chairman, recently press guidelines on Afghanistan have

been negative. The country is faced with a revitalized Taliban-led

insurgency, a record rise in drug production, a deterioration of the

rule of law, and a weakening grip of the national government over

many districts in the south and southeast.

But, despite these troubling developments, there is also good

news that unfortunately becomes no news.

Following the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan scored

numerous achievements in its transition to democracy. Afghans are

freer today than they were under the Taliban. Eight of ten Afghans, or 80 percent of Afghans, support the presence of the international force in Afghanistan. More than 80 percent prefer the current government, despite the problems, over the Taliban government.

While this progress is notable, the current troubles are immense,

and they are the result of what was not done, rather than what

was done.

The light footprint that was mentioned before by my colleagues

was not a sufficient response to the immense destruction that Afghanistan suffered for many years. International engagement with

Afghanistan was guided by two contradictory concepts. On the one

hand, it was considered to be the main warfront on the war on terror. On the other hand, the involvement was a light-footprint engagement.

The Taliban were removed from power, but neither the potential

to come back nor their extensive support was addressed. Competing demands for a response to immediate security needs and the

requirements of long-term priorities were not balanced effectively,

even though they were mutually reinforcing.

And inefficient use of insufficient funds, outside of Afghan government control, failed to create economic opportunities, good governance, and the rule of law.

The key to resolving these current problems in Afghanistan is

doing what was not done. This includes ending the insurgency, creating effective governance and indigenous security capacity, establishing the rule of law, and fostering economic development that

can replace the illicit drug trade with legal economic activities.

The process needs renewed international attention, more troops,

sufficient funds, and international political backing of the Afghan

government in making hard decisions to reform.

11

There are three major immediate challenges facing Afghanistan:

ending the insurgency, building security capacity and the rule of

law, and development.

The Taliban-led insurgency is not rooted in a popular ideology.

The people of Afghanistan rejected the leadership, the ideology,

and the political vision of the Taliban and their militant groups

long ago, and it continues.

The insurgents have safe havens in Pakistan and enjoy technical

and operational assistance from transnational extremist groups.

They exploit the lack of development, insecurity, and the absence

of the rule of law in the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. Ending the insurgency requires the removal of both domestic

and external sources of violence.

The external sources of violence in Pakistan, which should be approached on the basis of regional strategy, which will include the

legitimate concerns of all countries in the region, and also removal

of sanctuaries of the Taliban-led insurgency in the Pakistani territory.

Although the insurgents are not yet capable to overthrow the Afghan government, they feel they are winning by not losing. On the

other hand, the counter-insurgency operations can lose, but not

win.

Although there is no military solution to the insurgency, military

action is needed to provide a secure environment for development,

good governance, and the rule of law.

Expecting heated fighting this spring, there is a need for enhanced military capability to face the threat. The need is not only

for more troops, but also for the removal of operational restrictions

imposed on some NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has laid the foundation of security institutions and

the rule of law, but the process has been underfunded, slow, and

uneven. The progress in building the use and support of the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been remarkable, but despite the

use of donated vehicles, small arms, and other equipment, the ANA

suffers from insufficient firepower, the lack of indigenous combat

air support, and the absence of a self-sustaining operational budget. Therefore, it continues to depend on military support from

International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and coalition

forces.

With the main focus on fighting insurgency and militial violence,

police capacity-building was not the pacing element in reform of

the security sector, or nor were broader rule-of-law considerations.

Little international attention has been paid to the development of

the Afghan National Police.

A recent U.S. interagency assistance to Afghanistan police program indicates that the police readiness level to perform conventional police functions and carry out its internal security mission

is far from adequate. The report suggests that long-term U.S. assistance in funding, at least beyond 2010, is required to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program.

Afghanistan cannot achieve peace merely by fighting and killing

the insurgents. Neither are development projects alone likely to

win the hearts and minds of the people, as long as the threats emanating from militia commanders, drug traffickers, corrupt provinVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:24 Mar 18, 2008 Jkt 037308 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-8\030000.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
12

cial and district administrators, as well as government incompetence, remain.

So efforts to defeat the insurgents, build peace and development

should be sought through the establishment of the rule of law that

guarantees human security. This means that security operations by

international forces and the Afghan army and police should be seen

as a subset of the rule of law and not the other way around.

Security and peace are achieved through winning the hearts and

minds of the people, and not only through military operations.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, today there is a feeling of disenchantment at two levels in Afghanistan that dangerously affects the stability in Afghanistan.

At one level, the Afghan government has doubts about the sustainability of foreign assistance and the capacity of the international community’s commitment to face the rising threats and invest in long-term development of the country. This inhibits the government from acting decisively, as it becomes dependent on nonstatutory power-holders, self-serving opportunists and militia commanders.

At the second level, the public is disillusioned with the lack of

government will and capacity to protect the people and deliver

needed services. Such public opinion in the unstable south nourishes support for the Taliban.

Addressing the two levels of the disenchantment is the key to improving the situation. The international community must provide

the Afghan government the means to foster security and development. The Afghan government needs to create an environment of

human security in rural areas for regaining the hearts and minds

of the public.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jalali can be found in the Appendix on page 73.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Minister, thank you so much for your testimony and for being with us.

Dr. Tony Cordesman. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A.

BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. CORDESMAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you bring that a little closer, Tony?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Sorry.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today.

I would like to have my statement read into the record.

And, unfortunately, I also prepared a briefing which showed

what is taking place in terms of changes in the threat, in terms of

maps, public opinion polls and so on. We couldn’t get that copied,

but I would be grateful if it could be read into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Dr. CORDESMAN. And I say this because I have, I think, a much

more negative view of how bad things are in Afghanistan and how

13

much effort is really needed to fix this situation than some of the

previous witnesses.

My impressions, having been there, is we have years of very patient effort and expensive, dedicated effort to make this thing work.

The Afghan government is not ready at the center. It is not

ready at the districts. It is not ready at the local level. There is no

one there with qualifications, integrity and competence in far too

many areas and far too many places. To build up what is needed

is going to take a very serious aid effort, and it is going to take

a lot more people in the field.

One key issue here is it is the quality of governance that people

see in the province and at the local level that matters. The American obsession with elections and with human-rights legislation is

irrelevant if it is not translated into activity and practical experience and services in the field. Today, those tests are not being met

in rural areas and in much of the country. And it is going to take

a long time to build this up.

I think one key test to the committee is, is there a credible fiveto ten-year plan? Are there metrics of success? Can you show the

resources are adequate in any given area?

And that is not money spent or buildings completed. It is, are

you actually accomplishing something? And, far too often, the answer is: We are spending money without accomplishing things. We

have people who are performing symbolic projects at local levels

that do not reach the country. That is not a test of competence.

What will it take? When you look at a map of the effectiveness

of economic aid projects, most of the country, most urban areas do

not have people who see any impact from the aid. Seventy percent

of this country is rural. We have never funded a program which

can reach out to the villages, reach out to the farms. We are talking areas which have had drought for three years. This is partially

relieved, but you do not have roads. Your irrigation systems have

broken down.

You talk about replacing narcotics, but first, that is a relatively

small percentage of the farmers, and second, it would take years

to do it, and these people don’t have years. They live in a matter

of income based on months.

We do not have the beginning of an adequate Afghan police effort. The German effort collapsed in 2005. We are now attempting

to create an Afghan police effort, and the core of the training program is in place. But, as other witnesses pointed out, we will need

the money that has been requested by the Administration, and you

will not have adequate police enter the field until 2008. That is

something very clear from all of the reporting coming on the scene.

The Afghan army is a very weak early structure being rushed

into the field and into completion. One unit I visited had 27 percent of its authorized manning. It had been in combat for three

years. Much of its weaponry, its equipment, was not operational.

The U.S. advisor estimated that about one person in five would reenlist at the end of the three-year term. That is not typical, but we

should have no illusions about what is needed here.

Our troop presence is winning tactically. We do not have enough

people on the ground to deter, to control, to occupy space, hold, and

provide the opportunity for building. In the most threatened provVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:24 Mar 18, 2008 Jkt 037308 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-8\030000.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
14

inces, the British presence is probably about 60 percent of what is

needed, even with the Canadians. As Mr. Hunter pointed out, there

are 37 countries involved here. Most of them have small contingents.

Let me say, the last thing on earth we need are more small contingents of unqualified forces without proper equipment and support. About half of the allies we have in Afghanistan consume resources without serving a purpose. The Italian, Spanish, French,

and German forces are broadly referred to in Afghanistan as standaside forces. If we are going to do anything, they have to be committed, and they have to have aid in the areas that they are in

charge of, adequate personnel, and adequate support.

The final point I would make is it is all very well, we all agree

it would be nice to deny Pakistan as a sanctuary, to have it halt

its support for the Taliban, to end the sanctuaries it provides for

al Qaeda. Let me say the chances of that happening are about one

in ten. We can’t posture our way to victory in Afghanistan by pretending we can put pressure on Pakistan that will change its politics and its regional positions. We can’t afford to. It is too vulnerable, and it is too delicate.

I think this all adds up to one final message. What bothers me

about Afghanistan is what bothers me in Iraq: We don’t have honest metrics of what is happening. We don’t measure the effectiveness of our programs honestly. We have slogan after slogan, interesting idea after interesting idea, but you don’t know where it

works. You don’t know how well it is working. You listen to people

who are outside the country without investigating groups that really survey and measure what is happening on the ground.

We can’t afford that. We can’t afford what the State Department

and the Department of Defense are doing. Part of the solution is

oversight, and it is oversight that really asks, ‘‘Are these programs

working?’’, and does more than ask, which goes there on the ground

and demands the data you need to know.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cordesman can be found in the

Appendix on page 80.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Dr. Cordesman.

As you know, under the rules and by tradition, the ranking member and I have unlimited time for asking questions. I will reserve

my time until later, and I will yield five minutes to the gentleman

from Texas, Mr. Ortiz, and then I will call on Mr. Hunter for his

unlimited time.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much.

I had a lot of questions, but most of the questions that I had

were answered by your statements. They were very, very good.

One of the things that I am bothered with is the sanctuary provided on the Pakistani side. I was asking one of the staff members

how long is the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I guess

it is several hundred miles, isn’t it?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. It is 1,600 miles.

Mr. ORTIZ. And I know there are various mountains and rough

terrain, but if that is the problem, would stationing some of our

troops or a combination of NATO and our troops along the border,

15

would that help? Would that antagonize the Pakistani government?

If this is a serious problem, we need to address this.

My question is, another problem we had during the Vietnam War

is that when a lot of our soldiers came back, they were addicted

to drugs. Is this causing another problem with our soldiers who are

stationed there? Since the Afghanistan government says that it is

going to hurt the farming community if we try to spray or get rid

of the crop.

Maybe each of you can touch on those two questions, the sanctuary in Afghanistan, troops along the border, and whether we are

having problems with our soldiers coming back with serious addiction problems.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Let me just say a bit about the border and

let someone else take the drug problem.

The border is not just a physical problem. It is a political and social problem. The insurgency is a Pashtun insurgency. The

Pashtuns represent 40 to 60 percent of the population of Afghanistan, but most Pashtuns live in Pakistan. Three-fifths of them live

in Pakistan. They have always lived in Pakistan. They believe they

have a hereditary right to rule Afghanistan. So the insurgency

arises within this community.

Now, most Pashtuns don’t support the insurgents, but all the insurgents virtually are from that community. The border is unrecognized. Pakistan has never recognized that border. It is in the odd

position of insisting that Pakistan better police a border that Afghanistan doesn’t recognize.

So we need programs that address the grievances, the aspirations of the Pashtun population on both sides of that border. It

does little good to win the hearts and minds of the Pashtuns living

in Afghanistan if we still face hostility on the part of the Pashtuns

living in Pakistan, who can easily transit that border and sustain

an insurgency indefinitely.

So it is partially a question of a political arrangement between

Afghanistan and Pakistan that regularizes the border. It is partially a problem of social and economic development that begins to

allow Pakistan to project governance and development into these

border regions, which historically have been autonomous and largely ungoverned.

Dr. CORDESMAN. I have to add a point there.

I think, frankly, when you look at the border, there is no way

you can waste people more effectively than deploying them into a

border area this complex, this long, where, to get any kind of density of coverage, you would virtually have to strip the rest of the

country of any military presence or you would need a vast reinforcement. We are talking three to four brigades, not a minor

amount.

At the end of it, you would be in an area without roads, where

they know the terrain, they know the ground. You couldn’t have

even Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) coverage to deal with it, and

you would find yourself alienating the tribes in the border area,

many of which cross the border, almost immediately.

Whatever is done there has to be done on a country-wide basis.

I have seen plans to deal with this. The Pakistani government

claims it is going to seal the major crossings. That will probably

16

be irrelevant, even if it done. All you have to do is look at the success of the border police in Iraq to also realize, if the Afghan police

don’t exist, if officials are corrupt, and we have people trying to secure a border that don’t speak the language, have no area of expertise, and can’t work with the tribes, even if we had the troop density and the technical assets, it couldn’t work.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Congressman, your question about

drug use. We have lost 350 Americans in Afghanistan to date, but

I do not know of any that we have lost to drugs. I do not think,

I have not heard any reports that we have that Vietnam problem

that you referred to.

On the question of the security of the border, everything my colleagues have said I agree with.

There is one hopeful sign. Just recently a joint intelligence and

operations center with Afghan, Pakistan, and NATO forces has

been opened in Kabul. The only way to deal with the border area

that is 1,600 miles and very rugged is to have better intelligence

and better operations capabilities. And hopefully this tripartite

commission that has been sent up and this operations center could

provide that.

But we have to take practical steps to deal with it. Just stationing more troops there will not be the answer.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, for whatever time he may consume.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And following your decision to defer to our other members and give them more time, let

me just ask one question, a quick question here, of the panel.

If you add up the 21,000 NATO troops, of which the U.S. comprises approximately 11,000, and the 10,000 additional American

troops that are in Afghanistan that are not part of the NATO force,

it appears that we, at this point, comprise a majority of the U.S.-

NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Very quickly, could you gentlemen give us your best thoughts on

whether the burden is being shared appropriately, whether it could

be shared, whether the full range of NATO membership has the

ability to field 10,000 or 20,000 more troops, which I would certainly think they should be able to do, and whether you think that

the proportions are right, and what we should do if they are not

right to induce the NATO partners to step up to the plate here?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Congressman, let me suggest that one thing

people don’t do is look at the map and look where those troops are.

The heaviest burden right now is on the British and Canadian

forces, simply because they are the most vulnerable. Quite frankly,

if it wasn’t for the air support they are getting from the U.S. out

of the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) and other air support, they would be in deep trouble, and I am not sure they would

have won tactically this year.

The German forces, the French forces, the Spanish and Italian

forces essentially are stand-aside forces. They will react if they are

attacked, but because they are in the north and the west and also

because they are not properly equipped—the Canadians have been

forced to import tanks into Afghanistan, and many of these forces

use light-armored cars—they are not playing a role.

17

You look at the amount of manpower in those totals you quoted,

and to get these tiny contingents of 150 to 300 people from a wide

variety of countries for symbolic purposes, you see where they are.

They are not doing anything. The problem here is whose order of

battle is actually committed to combat.

Now, having worked in the NATO international staff, I have to

say NATO has the theoretical ability to provide all the troops you

mentioned. Will it? Can it actually deploy it with the helicopters,

the armor, the sustainability? Are those units actually going to

come in with the experience to fight in a mountainous area? Will

they have the people with the language and area skills? Will they

be interoperable and integrated into a NATO command?

The truth is, you have to build on the major national contingents

you have there now. Simply going to a NATO ministerial and asking for more isn’t going to do much. The Poles will be coming in

larger numbers. That is about the only reinforcement I know.

The only country that really could credibly provide significant

combat capability in addition to the ones fighting is France. For the

British to deploy more, they have to move out of Iraq, which they

seem to be planning to do, but the consequences of that I think are

obvious.

Mr. HUNTER. What are the French capabilities that could be

brought to play? And are you sure that the German capabilities are

fully utilized at this time?

Dr. CORDESMAN. They are not being utilized at all, Congressman.

Frankly, I see no chance that Germany will play a significant role.

Their whole posture in Washington is that they are doing simply

splendidly by having a human resource, a humanitarian effort, and

that is where they want to stay.

I cite the French with this point. We are talking really about a

large battalion, some special forces that did fight, but are not, I believe, committed at the moment.

The point is, the French have significant power projection capability of combat troops with the political history of actually fighting. If you take on the German troop issue and the stand-aside

forces of Germany, you take on the German political system.

Mr. HUNTER. I take it that it is your feeling, Dr. Cordesman, that

the German political system will not make a decision to deploy into

what you would call true combat status.

Dr. CORDESMAN. To put it bluntly, they have seized the high

moral ground, and they intend to hide there in safety.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Congressman, of the 26 NATO members, only four—the U.S., the U.K., Canada and the Netherlands—

are actually fighting in Afghanistan, so that burden is not being

shared. Some countries probably can’t, but more should.

Also, the burden of numbers. Again, I think that we should go

beyond extending the tour of duty of the tenth Mountain Division

in Afghanistan, the four months. We should actually bring extra

troops, but I think that the other countries need to step up, and

with troops that have capability.

I think what Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said at a

recent briefing on the package that was offered last week on Afghanistan is accurate. He said NATO needs to do more in the way

18

of troops and the way of money and the way of ridding itself of the

restrictions on the uses of military forces.

So I hope that when Secretary Gates goes to the NATO ministerial meeting in Seville on February 8th and 9th that he will bring

that message. We did not do very well in making that case at the

last NATO meeting in Riga.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. Meehan, five minutes.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of the members of the panel for being here with

us this morning.

I find it interesting that all of you cite almost identical statistics

in your written testimony. You all point to the drastic increase in

the number of suicide attacks, the number of improvised explosive

devices (IEDs), and the number of armed attacks from 2006 to

2007. And most of you have alluded to the expected spring offensive by the Taliban, which is expected to continue and escalate

from the violence we saw in 2006.

All of you advocate for an increased troop presence in Afghanistan. Despite repeated protests by the Department of Defense that

the escalation of our force in Iraq will not affect the situation in

Afghanistan, I just find it hard to believe. There is no doubt to me

that our military has been stretched to the breaking point, so I

have a hard time believing that even the smallest tug in one direction won’t affect our capabilities somewhere else along the line.

Ambassador Dobbins and Professor Cordesman, as the two people on the panel who might best be able to address this, do you believe that any troop increase in Iraq will have a detrimental effect

on the prospects of being able to get more troops for Afghanistan?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Looking at what is going to happen, rotating the

brigade for the tenth Mountain, buys you at most four months, and

it isn’t really a brigade. It is about a battalion-and-a-half you are

plussing-up.

Now, the units we are going to send into Baghdad—and I think

there has been some good unclassified reporting into this, the plusup—cannot be properly equipped with up-armored Humvees or the

vehicles they need. Yes, the force structure is under strain, but I

think we need to be careful about this, because the kind of force

you need in Baghdad and Iraq is not necessarily the kind of lighter

force you need in Afghanistan.

But I think all of us who look at this realize there is going to

be a growing problem because we have a major backlog of heavyequipment repairs. We haven’t reset combat units, active or reserve. We have over-deployed the men and women in the Army and

the Marine Corps. And I think there are preliminary indications

that there is going to be a really serious problem with retention on

junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) beginning

this year, although nobody can predict that. This is a force structure under strain.

Mr. MEEHAN. Ambassador.

Ambassador DOBBINS. I would agree with that. We are obviously

scraping the bottom of the barrel. These troops are limited. They

19

are fungible. If they go one place, they can’t go to the other place.

Our capacity to respond in Afghanistan is, as a result, limited.

I also agree with Tony that flooding Afghanistan with American

troops probably isn’t the right response, although I support the increase that is being proposed. We need to make this a more multinational operation and a more Afghan operation.

As I have suggested, we need to pay more attention to, if not

eliminating, the sanctuary and the threat from Pakistan, at least

beginning to ameliorate it significantly.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Jalali, I am worried about the current situation, as well, along the Pakistan border. It seems to me the entire

reason we went to war in 2001 was to destroy al Qaeda safe havens

so that they could no longer project terror around the world. Despite all of our efforts, and the efforts of our allies from Afghanistan and around the world, it seems, as has been discussed here

this morning, that we are on the verge of creating another such

safe haven.

I don’t pretend to know where bin Laden is, but he is probably

somewhere along the border; I don’t know which side. As you certainly know, the Pakistani government has entered into an agreement with the leaders of the region that gives al Qaeda an amount

of security that they haven’t had since October of 2001.

In your written testimony, you lay out some suggestions about

how to get rid of this safe haven. Are there more drastic measures

required basically that we destroy one base of terror and now have

another one right next-door?

Mr. JALALI. Congressman, it is a very complex situation. Only

sealing the border is not going to solve the problem because that

is a tactical impact.

However, going to the source of the problem, I disagree with the

notion that it is a Pashtun problem on both sides of the border, because Pashtuns are traditionally very secular and moderate people.

Only they were radicalized during the war in the 1980’s. So therefore, it was manipulated.

Now it can be by following a regional policy to address all questions in the region, not one. I think development on both sides of

the border, economic development, and also integration of the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) in the Pakistani administration is a question to be addressed. Otherwise, these FATA are

outside the Pakistani control, and then since the radicalization of

Pashtuns, for other war purposes, for other policy purposes, actually was a source of it.

So the source is not only sealing the border, or the cross-border

attack. The sources, they are sponsoring in accepting and tolerating

the presence of radical forces who can use the territory of Pakistan

for transnational terrorist activity.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHugh, five minutes.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome.

As someone who has the honor of representing Fort Drum, the

home of the tenth Mountain Division, I understand the chairman’s

point about this being called the forgotten war, but it sure hasn’t

been forgotten there. And the families that learned of this just a

few days ago and those soldiers who actually redeployed and had

20

to get back on the plane and go back to Afghanistan understand

the challenge and the importance. And I know they are all in our

hearts and thoughts and prayers.

I don’t know if we have an Iraq problem when it comes to Afghanistan. I would argue we certainly have an end-strength problem. I have been arguing that for a number of years now. I am

pleased that Secretary Gates has decided that that is a challenge

that needs to be met. Chairman Hunter, the Personnel Subcommittee and I will sit down this afternoon in a hearing and hear some

more about end-strength challenges. And I think that is an important part of it.

But borders and the challenge that arise out of those borders almost become irrelevant if there is a reason to be concerned about

the border. And the sanctuaries, it seems to me to be the issue

here, not so much the border issue. And Mr. Jalali was making

some comments, and I think helpful ones, about how you attack the

question of sanctuary and the support that the Taliban and al

Qaeda are finding, particularly in north Waziristan.

And I would be interested if perhaps our other witnesses could

tell us or suggest to us some ways in which we can approach that,

whether it is more pressure on Musharraf. I don’t know if there is

a national leader in the world who has had more attempts on his

life than him. Do we facilitate some more, or other ways? Any suggestions as to how we get to the root cause of that sanctuary would

be very helpful.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, Congressman, I would suggest four

steps with respect to Pakistan.

First, I think the United States should intensify quiet efforts to

encourage both India and Pakistan to resolve the differences over

Kashmir. It is that issue, it is that dispute that is at the real root

of radicalism in Pakistani society and of the Pakistani government’s longstanding support for terrorism as an instrument of national policy. And resolving that particular dispute will go a long

way toward de-radicalizing Pakistani society.

Second, our assistance programs need to address the economic

and social needs of the Pashtun populations on both sides of the

border.

Third, we need to encourage both Afghan and Pakistani governments to establish an agreed border regime and to legitimize the

current frontier and to recognize it.

And finally, the U.S. should encourage Pakistan to move back toward civilian rule via free elections. Fundamentalist parties have

never fared well in such elections in Pakistan, and they are unlikely to do so in the future.

It seems ironic that the U.S. has pushed for democratization in

Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon, all places where the result was likely

to intensify sectarian conflict, but has largely failed to do so in

Pakistan, where the opposite result is more likely.

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think, Congressman, let me say that I would

agree with what Ambassador Dobbins has said, but then my qualification would be the chances of success of some of these initiatives

are maybe one in five, and the time to get them done is probably

two to three years. And that is part of our problem.

21

The other difficulty is, how do you define a sanctuary? It can be

a madrassa. It can be a refugee camp. It can be an area where they

simply lower the profile of what they are doing, which now, often,

is having Taliban people wearing Taliban insignia in Pakistan, as

it is in parts of Afghanistan, and still be very active.

And I think we also need to be very careful about the support

they are getting, because, looking at public opinion polls, it isn’t

just a sanctuary in Pakistan that counts. It is cross-border movements by groups who support the Taliban. According to an ABCBBC poll done in November, if you look at the Paktika and Wardak

provinces, support for the Taliban among the people polled was

around 67 percent, some of it limited. When it came down to

Helmand province, you were talking only about 34 percent.

But we should not simply say these people are an alien group.

And they are only one of three of the Islamist groups operating

there, all of which have sanctuary in Pakistan, not just the

Taliban.

Mr. JALALI. Let me add to this, Congressman, that although in

Afghanistan there are people who believe that they are shortchanged from development and therefore they would somehow support the Taliban.

But the external basis of the assumption, you have economic decline in the north and the west, but you don’t see the problems

with the Taliban there. So therefore, unless you deal with the external sources of this transnational terrorism or insurgency, only

resolving internal problems will not to the job.

Therefore, as I said, both external and internal sources of this insurgency ought to be addressed at the same time.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If you have written comments, Mr. Ambassador, I would appreciate those. But I think the chairman was going to cut off here.

Mr. REYES [presiding]. If you can take, like, 30 seconds, I will

give you 30 seconds.

Mr. MCHUGH. Oh, we have a new regime here. Okay.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Pakistan is in something of a state of

denial about officially recognizing that the Taliban are operating

out of their territory. And we have to deal with that.

But we should also not be in denial ourselves of the fact that

Pakistan is making an effort in those northern areas that they

never get involved in. The writ of the government does not extend

to the tribal areas. They have got 80,000 troops there. They have

taken several hundred casualties dealing with this problem.

So while we press them, let’s also recognize that an effort is

being made there. They need to do more. We need to do more.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. REYES. I thank the gentleman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I will take my time now.

One of the things that surprised me about your testimony here

this morning and the written testimony, unless I missed it, because

I, as the chairman said, was on the trip over the weekend to the

region, which included Afghanistan and Pakistan. We spent a total

of two and a half-hours-plus with President Karzai and about an

hour-and-a-half with President Musharraf.

22

And one of the issues you did not address is this kind of public

feud that is going on between the two presidents that does not help

in trying to find a solution or solutions to the issue of the crossborder challenge that we face.

So I would ask you to comment on that, as well as the fact that

while we are doing a lot of good things, which includes our troops

in there, there are some challenges that we frankly are not doing

a good job at. And I will mention just one, and I would ask you

to comment on that as well.

If we are going to be able to transition them from growing poppies for the drug trade, which, as you all observed, makes it possible to get funding for the Taliban and the insurgency, we are

going to have to find other crops for the farmers to work.

And in the whole country, we have got six people from the

United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) assigned there.

To me, and I mentioned this to our ambassador, that doesn’t make

sense to me.

So if you gentlemen can comment on those two points, the feud

and also the poor job that we are doing in obvious areas that we

need to focus on.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Let me say a word about the feud.

I think it is unfortunate that the burden of highlighting the role

of Pakistani territory and Pakistani residents in the Afghan civil

war falls largely on Karzai and his government. And that is in part

because our government has been largely silent on it, which puts

the burden on the Afghan officials to highlight this problem, and

that exacerbates a poor relationship in unhelpful ways.

It is a bit like it is the good-cop-bad-cop. We are the good cop and

they are the bad cop vis-a-vis Pakistan. But that is really the

wrong balance because they are weak. Afghanistan is weak. It cannot sustain a confrontation with the much larger, more powerful

Pakistan.

It would be a far better relationship if we were being more vocal

and critical and the Afghans could be quiet and try to improve

their relationship with their powerful neighbor. But as long as we

are not saying something about this, I think Karzai feels its incumbent on him to say something about it.

Mr. REYES. Just to make sure I correct the record, we were, over

the weekend, very vocal to both presidents that we have to work

toward finding a solution to this one issue, because it undermines

our ability to work cooperatively in that effort.

Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Well, I would like to, if I could, respond to your question about the number of USDA agents in Afghanistan. I could not agree with you more. And I am sorry that

Congressman Hunter has left, because I wanted to address his

question about the substituting orchards for poppies.

‘‘Alternative livelihood’’ is the term of art used here, to find some

ways to help the rural, poor farmers of Afghanistan have a livelihood. And right now poppy is the best way to accomplish that.

But alternative livelihood and incentives and assistance to create

that is a key element of tackling the drug problem. I mean, that

has to be multi-pronged, as I said. It is law enforcement. It is going

after the drug lords. I think it is getting U.S. and NATO troops

23

more involved in that fight. But it is also about providing an alternative to the farmers for their poppy fields.

It can be done. Unfortunately, I don’t think we are putting

enough money into it. The recent announcement by the Bush Administration that it was increasing economic assistance to Afghanistan by two billion dollars over the next two years, if my calculations are correct, that is about what we have been doing on a yearly basis, about one billion dollars a year. That is not an increase.

And I think we need to be doing more in that area.

I also wish that Congressman Hunter knew that in California

there is a group called Seeds of Peace that is taking out landmines

and putting in vines and orchards and all of that to try to deal with

that. He should be aware that there are people out there trying to

do exactly what he suggested in his remarks.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Congressman, I wonder if I might speak to that.

Mr. REYES. If you can, very quickly.

Dr. CORDESMAN. All right. There was a World Bank study done

in November which should be a warning to every member of this

committee.

I think a lot of this alternative-crop business is nonsense, just as

eradication is. You are dealing with corruption. You are dealing

with insecurity in many of these areas where you cannot send advisors out into the field. You are talking to people who are desperate

simply to survive from month to month, who cannot count on government or aid programs to work them through a year in the field.

And if you look at a map of where the crops are grown and where

you have to go and how many advisors have to be there, you need

a plan, not a noble intention. These groups don’t have plans. They

just have a nice idea.

Mr. REYES. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your taking the tour that you

just identified, of Kuwait and Baghdad and Islamabad and to Germany. We certainly appreciate you going, and I look forward to

hearing a report.

I would like to thank all of you for being here today. It has been

really interesting. I have visited Afghanistan twice. I had the privilege of meeting President Karzai when he was here. I have met

members of the parliament here and also in Kabul. It is really inspiring to me, the efforts that I see being made.

Additionally, I have a personal interest. The 218th Mechanized

Infantry Brigade of the South Carolina Army National Guard is

being mobilized, Professor Jalali, to go to Afghanistan to help train

the Afghan army. This is the largest deployment of members of the

South Carolina Army National Guard since World War II. I am

particularly proud of the unit because I was a member of it for 25

years.

My question to you—and what a background you have, as the interior minister, as a former officer in the Afghan army, as a member, apparently, of the mujahedeen. Wow, what a background you

have.

As I think of my friends and neighbors who are on their way to

Afghanistan to train the Afghan army, what words do you have to

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these guard members as to what should they expect and what can

we do to truly help Afghanistan?

Mr. JALALI. Congressman, I think the problems of Afghanistan

are very complex. You cannot focus on only one area and expect

that to change the situation.

Building the national army is a major project, and I think it will

help. However, in Afghanistan, you have to streamline all the development effects in other areas. If you do not have a good ruleof-law system in Afghanistan, only army is not going to help. I

think we need to have an integrated approach in all areas.

Earlier, we discussed the drug problems. Drug problems are also

complex, unless it is mainstream in the governance, security, development, and alternatives. Alternative livelihood should be a goal,

not a means. Therefore, unless we streamline it in all these areas,

it is not going to solve.

The army is a major impact. I think so far, Afghanistan National

Army has done remarkable things. I think it is one area in the security-sector reform that has a very shining past record.

However, it is not only. I think with the army, if you do not build

a good police force, it is not going to help. In many areas in Afghanistan, police are the front line of fighting the insurgents. It is

on the border, the border police, on the highways, the streets of the

major cities, and the other security force. They take the heat of the

insurgent’s attack first. In the past five years, I think police lost

more men than army, than the ISAF and the coalition forces.

So therefore, you have to build a capacity, not only one element.

I think the security capacity will come through development of the

army, the police, the justice sector, and also other supporting elements that make these forces operate in a very effective way.

Mr. WILSON. And the information we have as to the army itself,

there are currently 36,000 trained and equipped, and the goal is

70,000 in the next 3 years?

Mr. JALALI. Yes, 36,000 now.

However, the problems are not always in the numbers, whether

it is foreign troops or—what is the capacity of it?

I think the equipment they have is not sufficient. Some of the

equipment is from the old Soviet arsenal. And one officer told me

that, ‘‘During the jihad I had better weapons than now in a battalion.’’

So therefore, they need equipment and also mobility. They do not

have indigenous air force or air mobility power.

I think unless we provide this equipment and this capacity to our

army, it will be fine, however it will not be as effective. It will not

be used as an exit strategy for the international forces.

Mr. WILSON. Well, again, I appreciate your encouraging that.

A final point: When I was visiting, I was very impressed by the

provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). I visited one which was

joint U.S.-Korean. I visited, another time, forward-operating Base

Salerno. Again, extraordinary civil action projects.

And I yield——

Mr. JALALI. But still, if I may, the PRTs are not standard, not

the same. It is also like the forces that different countries provide.

They have different instructions. If you use the Coca-Cola language, and we have PRTs-Classic and PRTs-Lite. [Laughter.]

25

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. REYES. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Actually, I just had one question. I will direct it at Ambassador

Dobbins, but if others of you want to add to that, it would be fine.

You had mentioned the problem of Pakistan in your opening remarks. And I apologize, I had to duck out for a meeting. You may

well have addressed some of these issues.

I guess my simple question is, I agree completely with your analysis. What do we do about it? What do we do about Pakistan? How

do we deal with the fact that al Qaeda has carved out what

amounts to a safe haven, ironically, in the middle of what is supposedly one of our allies?

I am deeply concerned with the training bases that are going on

there, that basically it is sort of a smaller, less comprehensive version of what they had in Afghanistan prior to 9/11.

We are doing what we can with Afghanistan, getting cooperation

there, but certainly not getting it from the Pakistanis to the degree

that we would like. So I am curious what your policy outlook is,

in terms of how we approach it.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think, first of all, we have to recognize the centrality of the Pakistani challenge to the whole global

effort against terrorism and not allow ourselves again to become

distracted by secondary challenges.

Second, I think we need to raise the profile of the Pakistan issue

internationally. That doesn’t mean mounting a campaign to ostracize or penalize Pakistan. I think Pakistan needs both firm external pressures, but a good deal of help in solving its internal problems.

If we were spending one-tenth of what we spend every month in

Iraq on the war, on improving the Pakistani educational system,

we would probably be a lot further along in reducing support for

international terrorism, and particularly for cross-border activity in

Afghanistan.

So partially, it is raising the profile of the issue, consulting in

NATO and in other forums with our allies, trying to get a concerted

action plan, largely consisting of incentives, of carrots rather than

sticks, to promote transformations in Pakistani society, to move

away from the fundamentalism and the radicalism and the support

for terrorism that have characterized its official policy over the last

several decades.

Mr. SMITH. Excuse me for interrupting. What is exactly the split

in the population?

There is no question that there is a great deal of violent extremism in Pakistan on both sides of the country and all points in between. On the other hand, it is not necessarily a majority of the

population, and the assumption always is that if we put too much

pressure on Musharraf and he falls, that he will be replaced by a

radical Islamic state.

Is that really the case? Is the population more divided on that?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think it is a risk that one can’t entirely

ignore, but polling data in prior elections suggests that the radical

and Islamist parties do not do particularly well, and that Pakistan,

26

in contrast to some of the other states where we pushed democratization, is one where a move back toward democratic rule would

probably also be a move back toward more nonsectarian and moderate policies.

I will ask Ambassador Inderfurth, who was responsible for relations with Pakistan, to add a bit of depth to that answer.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I am not sure I can add depth, but I

could add to it.

I think, in terms of Pakistan, my written testimony has two suggestions here to deal with the fundamental issues.

One has already been referred to, and it is that we need to urge

the two parties to agree to their border, the Durand line of 1893.

Afghanistan does not accept this. Pakistan says, how can we patrol

a border that is not even recognized? There are problems for President Karzai to do this, but I think the time has passed to get that

border recognized, and I think that would be an important step.

Second, we need to urge Pakistan to try to integrate these tribal

areas into the political mainstream. As I said earlier, the writ of

the government has not extended there in the past. These are economically and politically backward. They have been a breeding

ground area for the Taliban and a sanctuary for al Qaeda.

What we can do about this is to urge it and also to provide some

funding, along with the World Bank and others, to assist in that

effort to integrate these tribal areas into the Pakistan mainstream.

These are longer-term issues, but I think that they would go a

long way.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much.

Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have two questions.

First, Ambassador Inderfurth, either in your remarks or your

written testimony, you stated that we probably should deal differently with Iranian activity within Afghanistan than we plan to

do now in Iraq, realizing that the president has said in Iraq we are

going to end the policy of catch-and-release in regard to Iranian

agents that are creating havoc in Iraq.

I want you to explain that to us and why you feel that we should

treat them differently, accepting the old adage that the enemy of

my enemy is a friend, and that whatever activity Iran is engaged

in in western Afghanistan, it would be in their interest, I would

think, to continue to create havoc in both countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, to divert our attention away, to bog us down, so that

they can continue to progress with their nuclear program.

So, if you could answer that, I would appreciate it.

And then for my second question for any and all, if the time will

permit: The minority leader, John Boehner, recommended to Ms.

Pelosi in a recent letter, to Speaker Pelosi, that the formation of

a bipartisan oversight commission, with Democrat and Republican

members, obviously chaired by the Democratic majority, to look at

the new way forward in Iraq and to have the president report to

this bipartisan commission every 30 days on a series of benchmarks he also very specifically outlined.

27

I would like to know your opinion of that recommendation, particularly as it pertains to this new way forward or, as one of you

mentioned, a mid-course adjustment in Afghanistan.

Certainly, I believe that we have a better opportunity, not just

on this committee but in the House and in the Congress, to have

bipartisan support of a new way forward or a mid-course correction

in Afghanistan, and this type of commission recommended by Minority Leader Boehner I think would be a good thing. And I would

like to know your opinion on that.

So those two questions. Thank you.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Congressman, thank you.

I am not surprised that there wouldn’t be a follow-up to what I

said about opening up an Afghan front against Iran there. As I

said, Iran has interests in Afghanistan. It has interests particularly

in the western part of the country, among the Shiite-Hazara population, longstanding cultural and economic ties.

I also said that President Karzai would not find it helpful, I

think, to have us inject ourselves in doing what The Washington

Post reported of preparing aggressive moves to undermine Iranian

interests among the Shiites. He is trying to stabilize and normalize

his relations with his western neighbor.

But let me add a point that I did not say in my oral testimony,

which is I think that opening an Afghan front against Iran does

not appear at this point either appropriate or necessary.

I say that because, as the Iraq Study Group pointed out, during

the Taliban era, the United States and Iran cooperated in Afghanistan. The cooperation included strong opposition to the Taliban in

the U.N. 6-Plus–2 forum, which I was a part of, quiet American

support to Iran for its supply of military assistance to Ahmad Shah

Massoud of the Northern Alliance.

Also, a joint recognition by our two countries of the need to combat the rising threat of drugs. Iran has been a victim of that and

has taken strong measures to go after the drug traffickers. The two

countries collaborated during the post-Taliban Bonn conference,

something that Ambassador Dobbins can speak to. And more recently, Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan has been described as

one U.S. official as somewhere between helpful and benign.

So I don’t think the case is there for us to take what we have

as legitimate concerns about Iran’s behavior and activities in Iraq,

and transfer it to another front on Afghanistan.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Congressman, I wonder if I could pick up your

second point. I think it would be absolutely vital to have a bipartisan effort to get useful measures of reporting, ones where the Congress could actually see what was happening. And, to be honest, it

would force people who are generating these indicators to provide

numbers that are meaningful.

For example, we just used a figure for trained and equipped people in the Afghan army. That isn’t the number of people there.

That is the number of people trained and equipped. Out of the

300,000 people in Iraq that are supposedly trained and equipped,

maybe about 65 percent are actually left.

We have aid reports which are the number of projects started or

the money is spent, but no reporting on the number accomplished.

If we had real reporting, we might have real solutions.

28

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Loretta Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we have gone over some of these things already, but

it seems to me that the lessons that we have learned from South

America, in particular, with respect to drug eradication and

counter-drug strategy, includes four pieces: the implementation of

a long-term plan for training, equipping and deploying national

and border police and counter-narcotics, to disrupt the higher-value

targets like traffickers and processors; second, to stimulate economic growth so that we decrease the influence that the drug trafficking has on the total economy. That requires infrastructure development and economic aid.

Third, we need to develop an agricultural strategy that would

link the farmers to domestic and to international markets for their

products, or what one of you said, alternative livelihood. And four,

foster political development with respect to the institutions, put in

judiciary transparency, work on disarmament, integration of the

militia.

In 2004, Karzai called for a jihad against the drug trade, but

what we have seen lately is, of course, that opium has become really the economy of this arena.

So I have several questions, and any of you may answer since

you all seem to be pretty up-to-speed on a lot of what is going on

over there.

Where is our counter-drug strategy failing? In each of the above

headings, the four things that I mentioned, how do we improve in

those areas?

Third, do we need more military assets to do this counter-drug

interdiction and eradication and what would that look like, in your

opinion?

And fourth, what evidence, if any, is there between a Taliban or

an al Qaeda link involving the drug trade or trafficking going on?

Dr. CORDESMAN. Let me, if I may, I really think the World Bank

report done in November is a warning that this is not Latin America. When you look at where the areas are, where the drug trade

is taking place, yes, it is one-third of the Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) by its own calculations. It also is about five percent of the

farming area, according to the World Bank and other studies. A lot

of those are in mixed areas, not simply in the Taliban. Many are

in the north and the west, where basically no one as yet is trying

more than eradication.

We don’t have the resources to have aid programs out into the

field, and most of those are defined as high-risk areas, so you

would need to have a civil-military effort to make it work. You also

see, because of the problems in Afghanistan, a very sharp rise in

popular support for drug growing just over the last year, because

people need this.

My caution here is what we have now is an eradication strategy

which virtually everyone in-country agrees is making the people involved hostile, without really affecting the crop. It is just shifting

it around. Substitution requires honest people in the field and time

and money to actually go to individual farmers. From our training

program, the training program for the Afghan national police will

29

begin creation of effective counter-narcotics people for the police in

the course of next year’s training syllabus.

So there is very little to build on locally, and these are not my

estimates. These come directly from the people who act as the advisory team for the ANP.

Mr. JALALI. In my dealings, Congresswoman, with Afghanistan,

I find that the drug production and trafficking is a low-risk activity

in a high-risk environment. You have to change the situation, reverse it, make it a high-risk activity in a low-risk environment,

low-risk both in terms of law enforcement and also in economic opportunities for people.

The current strategy, which was depicted in the Afghanistan

compact actually has four elements. That is, law enforcement going

after traffickers who take most of the revenues from the drug trafficking; helping farmers, and at the same time institution building

infrastructure, to make the alternative livelihood a goal, not a

means.

And therefore, this is the kind of strategy that is not working because not enough investment is made in all these areas. As I said

before, you have to mainstream in all these areas.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

As I recite the rationale for us going into Afghanistan in the first

place, it was simply because they had become a base for terrorist

activity. They harbored al Qaeda. In a sense, I think it is important

for us to step back for a moment and ask ourselves why those

things happened.

One of the principal goals we had going into Afghanistan, especially as we developed a success there, at least to overthrow the

Taliban, was to leave a constitutional religious freedom context

there that could create an internecine pressure against religious

extremism, the Islamist groups that seem to be at the heart of a

lot of the challenges that we face in Afghanistan and many other

parts of the world related to terrorism.

Right now, the Afghan constitution doesn’t really fully protect religious freedom. Have we looked at that carefully? Have we done

enough?

In the opinion of anyone who would like to respond, do you think

in terms of being able to create the will and the capacity, longterm, for free governments to ever exist, if there is any hope for

it, that that shouldn’t be a pretty significant emphasis for us?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think that the Afghan constitution, considering our agenda within Afghan society in the aftermath of a

civil war, is a fairly liberal and progressive document, albeit one

that does establish an Islamic state. The president has also recently replaced members of the supreme court with a more nonsectarian set of judges.

So at this point, I would not be particularly alarmed about the

degree to which the Afghan state apparatus is subject to extremist

or fundamentalist pressures. I think we have some a long way

there.

30

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Congressman, could I call your attention to the statement that I appended to my statement, the one

prepared by the Afghan government for the meeting today in Berlin on challenges and the way ahead. I just want to read one line

in here. It says their task, this is the Afghan speaking, is to build

a pluralist Islamic state governed by the rule of law in which all

Afghans have the opportunity to live in peace, fulfill their economic

potential, and participate politically as full citizens.

We could write those words ourselves. I mean, that is what we

would like to see. That is what they want to see.

Mr. FRANKS. It is tough to make it happen.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. But I think that President Karzai and

those that I know in the Afghan government and others are committed to achieving that. But it will only be achieved if we stick

with them during this difficult time.

Mr. FRANKS. I think that is a wise observation.

Mr. Chairman, my red light has been on since I began, so let me

just ask——

The CHAIRMAN. The clock is going the other way, so we will call

you. Five minutes.

Mr. FRANKS. Okay, I appreciate it. [Laughter.]

Every panel member here in some way or another has alluded

to the importance of not only trying to stabilize Iraq, but preventing it from coming back as a base of operations for terrorism. That

is the great challenge that we have.

Forgive me for any of those that I might be mischaracterizing

here, but it seemed like everyone on the panel has in some manner

emphasized stabilizing the existing government, suppressing the

insurgency, increasing security, even having increased troops on

the part of the United States to do those things and to try to maintain as much as possible, as much as it is possible in that area,

a free society that can create hope for its citizens.

It seems to me that is almost exactly what some of us have been

saying. It is not a challenge. Hopefully when you think about this,

a lot of us have been saying the same thing about Iraq, that the

idea of letting Iraq become a major base of terrorist operations,

with the wealth of the Nation and the freedom that that could afford them, could threaten the entire human family.

If these things of troop increases and suppressing insurgency, increasing the security there, and doing what we can to stand up a

government that can protect itself, were important in Afghanistan,

why is that not important in Iraq? If I could, I would like to ask

you to do that.

But, Ambassador Inderfurth, could you go first and then this

gentleman here, Ambassador Dobbins?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. The situation in the two countries, I

think, are similar to the extent that we have moved to bring our

influence to bear in both.

The way we went to war in Afghanistan was I think quite different than the way we went to war in Iraq. In Afghanistan, we

had the full support of the international community. We have been

working with the United Nations. NATO was a part of this effort.

Fundamentally, the Afghan people have never seen us as occupiers. We have been seen as those coming to assist them. They wish

31

that we had been there many years before. In fact, when we had

departed in 1989 after the Soviets withdrew and we departed, they

feel that that led to what we later saw with the Taliban and al

Qaeda and the rest basically taking the country.

I think the circumstances are different between the two. I think

the one thing that I said in my comment was, this can be a model

for bipartisanship. There are so many differences over Iraq, but on

Afghanistan, I think we all agree. That is a place we need to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to all of you for being here. I certainly appreciate

your testimony today.

Ambassador, you had just mentioned that the focus on Afghanistan can certainly be a bipartisan effort. I wanted just to say, and

I don’t have the quote here with me today, but, Mr. Chairman, just

sitting here realizing that, about, I think it was last week, we

heard some testimony that could suggest that, in fact, Iraq was not

necessarily a distraction; that all the effort that we have put into

Afghanistan, there were some restraints in having done a far more

intensive job there, whether it was the terrain, whether it was

Pakistan, whatever that might be.

There is still a lot of discussion about that. I don’t know whether

you want to comment on that particularly, but I think your testimony has perhaps signified some different direction or different

steps that could have been taken there, certainly at the time that

we chose to go into Iraq.

Is that something that you wanted to comment on directly, Ambassador?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I am not exactly sure of the point. If

you could?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I think there was a sense that there

were obstacles to have gone further in that mission in Afghanistan

at the time. There is a contrast in the testimony today. I will go

back and take a look at that, but I wasn’t sure if you had had an

opportunity to be aware of any of that testimony or wanted to comment on that.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I think that we have all referred to the

fact that although the decision taken to go to war in Afghanistan

after 9/11 was absolutely supported by strong bipartisan support,

that since that time we have witnessed a great degree of, as I put

it from the 9/11 Commission, half-measures, a light footprint. We

now have the opportunity to try to rectify that and have full measures, as opposed to half measures.

I think one contributing factor to that, and I mentioned it in my

oral statement as well as in my written statement, is what was the

diversion of our resources, time and attention, military and financial, from Afghanistan to Iraq. I think that all, including the Iraq

Study Group, called attention to the fact that we simply could not

do what we are doing in Afghanistan that we needed to do, because

of the diversion of resources to Iraq.

Indeed, that report of the Iraq Study Group suggested that as we

begin, which they recommended, bringing out our combat forces

from Iraq in 2008, that we do see Afghanistan as a place to place

some of those. So I trust that that addresses your question.

32

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes, I appreciate that.

Let me just turn really quickly to a quote by Barnett Rubin in

Foreign Affairs. He is referencing Afghanistan and says how a

country that needs decentralized governance to provide services to

its scattered and ethnically diverse population has one of the

world’s most centralized governments.

Could you comment on how that is a factor in whether or not our

efforts there are going to be successful? And whether or not we are

understanding, perhaps, that reality and could be doing some

things differently to address it?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. As a former member and official of

that government, perhaps Minister Jalali can address it.

Mr. JALALI. Traditionally, Afghanistan had a weak central government and a decentralization of power. But that was not because

people wanted that. The geography, the culture, the power of the

central government actually created that kind of situation.

However, it is a strong nation but weak state. After this war, the

situation has changed. This was the will of the people of Afghanistan as expressed in the words of the constitution, the constitution

of the loya jirgah. They wanted a strong central government to reunite the country, to undermine the regional power-holders who actually victimized people during the war. So therefore, this was I

think the overwhelming majority of people during the constitution

loya jirgah wanting a strong central government.

Of course, when the country has stabilized in the future and the

people want to decentralize it, then that will be a different issue.

However, even today I think there is a need for a balance between

a strong central government and delegation of some development

and financial power to the provinces.

Now, it is very strong in the center, but very weak in intervention in to the affairs or providing services——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes, is there anything that we can be

doing?

I think my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Jalali, I am most impressed by your resume. It indicates that you speak some seven or eight languages. I have a hard

time just with English. That is pretty awe-inspiring.

Looking at your written testimony, if I could get you to clarify

a couple of things that I don’t understand fully. And I am just

going to go ahead and read a few things which you can then comment on, if you don’t mind.

You make reference to an over-focus on force protection at the expense of creating durable security. You also reference to an oversecuritization of the rule of law. This subordinates justice to security considerations and turns police into being primarily used in

combating the insurgency instead of protecting law and justice.

You also say that this result, this process, what I just described—well, actually I am just reading your words—results in

compromising the administration of justice, since the rule of law

contributes to security in a major way. It sounds like you see a real

33

tension between applying appropriate concepts of justice and fairness and, at the same time, how we seek to obtain security.

And then you sort of tie this into force protection and oversecuritization. I guess you are referring not to stocks, et cetera, but

could you elaborate a little bit on that?

Mr. JALALI. This has been a problem, reconciling the response to

immediate security concerns, fighting insurgency, and long-term

priorities for nation-building and bringing stability has always

been a problem in Afghanistan.

The international community’s prime reason to go to Afghanistan

was not nation-building. It was defeating the terrorism, the destruction of the terrorist network, and overthrowing the Taliban,

who actually sponsored the terrorists.

And then afterward, of course, strategically building a stable

state in Afghanistan was considered to be the means for a war on

terror, would contribute to the war on terror. However, the initial

motivation continues to cast a long shadow on every aspect of development, including the security.

The expectation of the people of Afghanistan after 9/11, or after

the intervention in Afghanistan, was human security. That is a

very modest expectation. It means freedom from fear, freedom from

want. And that can be provided only by defeating the terrorists or

insurgents.

Mr. MARSHALL. I have to interrupt. I have a very brief period of

time here. I have read your testimony. I want to get back to trying

to clarify those two points specifically.

You are talking about an over-emphasis on force protection and

efforts to obtain security. I guess what you are suggesting is that

in our interests and the allied force’s interests in attacking the

Taliban, we have caused problems.

Can you be very specific in terms of that, and very brief?

Mr. JALALI. For example, in the south, alliance with some groups

in fighting the insurgency actually disappointed people, because

those allies had a very bad record of human rights.

On the other hand, just in the name of security, unwarranted

searches of peaceful villages and taking people in custody who had

no relations to the insurgents create resentment in the area. There

are some tribes in the south, in the Helmand, who were mistreated

and they joined the Taliban.

Mr. MARSHALL. Is it your sense that in our efforts to have force

protection we have caused problems?

Mr. JALALI. Yes.

Mr. MARSHALL. And how have we done that?

Mr. JALALI. Force protection—I mean, in some countries, particularly some NATO countries, they are over-concerned about force

protection and that actually prevents them from intervening in legitimate security situations.

Mr. MARSHALL. Could I just real quickly here, in the Vietnam effort, one of our policies, which appeared to have a substantial

amount of success until we disrupted it because we didn’t really

understand why it was having success, was this village pacification

program. In essence, what we did was we encouraged locals to protect their own space.

34

I saw in today’s Post Selig Harrison talking about a dispute between the British and the Americans now about whether or not in

the southeastern part of Afghanistan we should defer to a tribal

council that has basically come up with a peace agreement between

our side and the Taliban. And the Americans are saying, no,

shouldn’t do that, it pays too little heed to the role of the central

government. And the British are saying, no, realistically here, this

is like—they are not using these terms—village pacification.

Mr. JALALI. Using jirgahs——

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman——

Mr. JALALI. —if I may, is important. However, it should not

mean submission to the people who are the cause of the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I may be a little naive up here. Perhaps some things

have been covered by the Armed Services Committee in the past

that I was not privy to, since I just got here just a few weeks ago.

But, at any rate, I do appreciate having this viewpoint presented

to the American citizens.

And I want to, kind of, go back. I understand that, it is my recollection that when we went into Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks,

it was to, to put it nicely, immobilize Osama bin Laden and to prevent him from undertaking a similar attack in the future.

Three-thousand Americans killed, and he sat back and planned

those attacks using his wealth. I believe he is worth about $300

million, a Saudi Arabian prince, if you will, a man with money, a

man with organizational skills, a man with a vision to destroy

America through terrorism.

And we went into Afghanistan to stop that, to immobilize that

threat. Afghanistan was the place, I think you referred to it, Ambassador Dobbins, as an incubator, a place that spawned this terrorist activity, supported it, nurtured it, and it was the Taliban.

So American went in, routed the Taliban, closed down the incubator, if you will, and the incubator has now moved to another sovereign nation called Pakistan.

I believe you indicate, Ambassador Dobbins, in your statement

that Pakistani intelligence services continue to collaborate with the

Taliban and other insurgent groups, those insurgent groups including al Qaeda.

So, we have got governmental involvement in fostering those

groups. They have not gone away. They have not been immobilized.

I would imagine that Osama bin Laden is preparing for his next

attack, a man who I believe had some kidney problems and was in

need of constant and regular dialysis. I suppose by this point he

has received a kidney transplant. But, at any rate, I am imagining

that he is sitting up in a nicely appointed residence somewhere in

Pakistan, not in the mountains, but in an urban setting, probably

watching old videos of Whitney Houston and planning his next attack.

It seems that we have let him off the hook. We took the attention

off of Afghanistan, and now are in a quagmire in Iraq with no

plans of refocusing the attention on eradicating the threat of

Osama bin Laden.

35

Is Osama bin Laden still a threat to the United States? If so,

what should we do to eradicate that threat?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I agree, Congressman, with most of what

you have said. Bin Laden is still a threat. Al Qaeda is still a

threat. Bin Laden is located in Pakistan. Al Qaeda is

headquartered in Pakistan.

I didn’t want to imply that the Pakistani government was supporting al Qaeda. I think there are numerous reports that Pakistani intelligence continues to have relationships with al Qaeda,

but Pakistan has been more aggressive in rounding up al Qaeda

suspects. They haven’t been entirely successful, but they have been

more aggressive than they have vis-a-vis the Taliban.

I don’t think there are any plausible reports that the Pakistani

government is supporting or has a relationship with al Qaeda. Nevertheless, they have failed to locate bin Laden and to roll up what

remains of the al Qaeda network in Pakistan.

Mr. JOHNSON. Dr. Cordesman, what is your response?

I think I have just been tabled.

The CHAIRMAN. Very quickly.

Dr. CORDESMAN. This is only one threat of a very complex set of

movements. If we got rid of al Qaeda and we got rid of bin Laden

tomorrow, 90 percent of the problem would still be there. We need

to remember this every time we look at this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

My question is directed toward Dr. Cordesman.

I was very, very concerned when you talked about the lack of

NATO help and the fact that Germany took, I believe you said, the

high moral ground on this issue. I wanted to ask you to expand on

that.

Specifically, what I would like to know is, are they reluctant to

get involved now because of the way the administration treated

them at the onset of this war in Afghanistan? Does it also tie in

with the belief of most European nations that we are in the wrong

place in Iraq? And will the escalation in Iraq weaken NATO support and the European nation support for us in Afghanistan?

Dr. CORDESMAN. I suspect everybody at this table has a different

view of how this got started.

Certainly, the people I talked to, who are German, when this

began, were much more involved in the security sector than the

diplomatic one. I think they had, at this point, the same feeling we

did. We underestimated the resurgence, the level of violence that

would occur. We didn’t understand what the mission was going to

be. We saw it as a relatively simple task in terms of nation-building, which we weren’t going to commit large resources to. That was

as true of us as the Germans.

When I watch what happens, when you talk to people in the German military or the German ministry of defense, they would make

roughly the same criticisms of the German military position in Afghanistan that we would. This is not something coming out of people concerned with defense. When you talk to people on the civil

side there who are German, you will get more mixed reactions.

36

But I think the truth is, most of this is driven internally. Germany simply is not prepared yet to use forces in combat. It is not

prepared to commit people to the kind of nation-building task

where there is a significant element where you have to use force.

And you have a weak coalition government that has to deal with

a very difficult internal political problem. So it is very easy to deploy as long as you don’t have to use.

In different ways, you see the same problems for Italy and for

Spain. Again, with France, special forces have been used. The

French contingent is only about half the German.

But we do need to understand these problems are not ones dictated by Iraq. They are dictated by the fact people went into Afghanistan under wrong assumptions about what was going to happen. And politically for many of them, it is one thing to talk about

power projection. It is another thing to become involved in an activity where you take casualties and really have to pay the costs.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

Ambassador Inderfurth, do you think there is any way that we

can get NATO to step up to the plate and be more involved there?

I know that we have what I think you call the standby countries

that don’t want to be in the military part of it. But do you think

they recognize the long-range effects of the instability of Afghanistan and that region? And is there another way to involve them

more in the process?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I think we can get more assistance

from NATO. I think that we will see more fighting troops take

part.

Again, the numbers needed, according to the NATO commander,

are not that large. Our NATO friends, our European friends are

very aware of what is taking place in what I agree is still the central front in the war on terrorism, that Afghan-Pakistan border

and where bin Laden is.

They also are bearing the brunt of the drug problem. Most of the

drug trade that comes out of Afghanistan, which produces 92 percent of the world’s opium supply, goes to Europe. So they understand the stakes.

I think that we can get more assistance from them, both in terms

of troops and in terms of money, reconstruction assistance, and in

terms of their support for all the broad range of activities that need

to be done there.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I am greatly concerned about what is happening in Afghanistan. I think it is a place where we can win. I think

it is a place where we can stabilize the country and allow them to

flourish.

I guess what I am asking is, does NATO see that as well? Or do

they fear that our war with Iraq is also going to somehow entangle

them if they get more involved in Afghanistan?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I don’t think that they are going to be

looking at their commitment in Afghanistan based on what we do

in Iraq. We had a question earlier, which I don’t think I answered

that well, about well, if we are doing this in Afghanistan, what

about Iraq? I think they do separate these out. They see the real

war, the real need in Afghanistan.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

37

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady, Ms. Gillibrand.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Hi. I would like you to address what the current status of women in Afghanistan is today and what we should

be doing as Americans to improve it.

Mr. JALALI. One of the major achievements in Afghanistan during the past five years was improvement in the women’s status in

Afghanistan. I think if you look at the constitution of Afghanistan,

I think you see many areas and many provisions in that constitution that support the participation of women in all aspects of life

in Afghanistan.

Today, the constitution guarantees 25 percent of the parliament

members to be women. However, during the election they did better than that, 27 percent are women in the Afghanistan parliament, both in the national parliament and also in the provisional

councils.

During the Taliban, women and girls were not allowed to go to

school. Today, 35 percent, about 5.5 million children going to school

are women. And women also are doing well in other areas.

However, this country is a conservative country. I think it will

take a long time for the society to provide favorable conditions for

the equal participation of women, and that depends on the development, economic, political and social development, and also the development of civil society. Women are also involved today in the

media, in the free media. There are four or five private T.V. stations in Afghanistan, and women play a major part in those areas.

However, further development, again, depends on development in

all the other aspects of life in the country.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Could I just add, again, looking at the

paper prepared by the Afghan government, there is a section in

here on women. It says, ‘‘While women’s rights in Afghanistan have

made huge strides since 2001, much more needs to be done. We

urge the international community to continue to work with us to

strengthen the voice, capacity, education and above all the leadership of women in Afghanistan.’’

I traveled to Afghanistan during the Taliban era. The draconian

measures taken against women were despicable, as my boss, Madeleine Albright, said as secretary of state. They have changed, but

it is a conservative society. It is not going to be as open and as free

as we see.

But there is so much that they are committed to doing to deal

with women’s issues in Afghanistan. The government of President

Karzai is committed to that. And there are things that we can do.

Mr. JALALI. One of my achievements as minister of interior was

to appoint the first woman governor in Afghanistan. She is still the

governor of Bamiyan province, and she is doing very well.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. The resurgence of the Taliban, what impact is

it having on the progress that has been made? Is there backlash?

Mr. JALALI. I think in the areas where Talibans are active, in the

south and southeast, yes, there are some negative impact on the

women’s situation.

However, it is affecting every other aspect of life of the people.

It is part of the human security there. So therefore, it does not

mean that there is going to be reverse. This is only kind of a reflection of the security situation in that area.

38

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Part of that is education. The Taliban

has targeted schools and teachers. And they have closed down

schools where girls are finally going back. So this is having a broad

impact across all sectors of society.

Dr. CORDESMAN. One point I would raise is the intelligence

maps, which have been declassified, of what is happening. It shows

that there is a more than four-fold area of increase in Taliban influence in Afghanistan in one year.

What is equally important is what are called high-crime areas.

In most high-crime areas there also are problems, in terms of

schools, the functioning of government, and women. And those

areas are sharply increasing.

And they are largely because the aid in the civil effort is simply

not large enough to reach out into the areas, particularly the rural

areas where 70 percent of the population is. It isn’t a matter of

passing the right laws. It is having the resources to help the Afghans make the right transition.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Gillibrand.

Ms. Castor.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to the panel for your expert testimony.

I would like to focus, again, on Pakistan. And could you all summarize for me the types of military assistance the United States

has provided in the past to Pakistan, support for their intelligence

agencies, other types of diplomatic aid?

Especially in the context of the Pakistani prime minister’s comments recently. Mr. Aziz commented last week that people sympathetic to the Taliban were active in the frontier region near the

border, but he insisted that the root of the problem was in Afghanistan and not in Pakistan. He said that three million Afghan refugees were crowded into Quetta, Peshawar, and other Pakistani cities close to the border of the country. And he said that refugee population remains a recruiting pool for the Taliban insurgency.

But questions were raised about the role of the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). He said that it was ridiculous that elements of

Pakistan’s intelligence service, the ISI, might be acting independently in support of the Taliban. Even though there have been many

other reports, evidence that the Pakistani intelligence agencies

were encouraging the insurgency in Afghanistan.

I would like you to meld those concepts, the assistance that the

United States has provided to the ISI and to the government. Are

they different? Are they at odds? Because it would be a cruel irony

that the United States was supporting an intelligence agency that

was encouraging the Taliban.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Let me talk about the ISI briefly. I think that

you would find most people who have worked on this issue would

say it is a somewhat divided organization, and some elements have

tried to deal with this problem more realistically than others. But

that senior officials in the ISI, and particularly retired members of

the ISI, remain a major issue. They have ties not only to the

Taliban and other Islamist parties that have Afghan ties, but to

Islamist hardline parties inside Pakistan.

39

I think that this has not been an area where the United States

military assistance program has had a major impact. One does

need to be careful when one talks about sharing intelligence. You

have to share some intelligence with an organization like this if

you want them to act. You simply cannot put pressure on them.

But this is an organization which, like the intelligence services

of a number of countries in this region, has political clout and leverage very different from the intelligence community in the

United States. It doesn’t need our aid or money to have that power

and function in the way that it is functioning. It hasn’t been built

up by us. You can go back to Field Marshal Zia; you can go back

to the growth of the ISI at the time the Russians were there. It

is a problem, but I don’t think we can be accused of aiding them

in ways which have helped this problem grow.

Mr. JALALI. Pakistan is an ally in the war on terrorism. However, Pakistan looks at it in the context of regional interests.

Pakistan has been very active in going after al Qaeda members

in Pakistan and arrested them in Pakistan, many of them, hundreds of them. However, they fail to contain the Taliban the same

way. Pakistan does not know whether Afghanistan will stabilize,

whether the international community will be in Afghanistan forever. So it keeps its options open.

On the other hand, there is a huge infrastructure of religious

parties in Pakistan who are supporting the Taliban. And then for

Pakistan, it is more convenient to deal with them in a way not only

in Afghanistan but to support other options or other, you know,

issues of this foreign policy, as long as the Kashmir issue is there.

So therefore, Pakistan looks at it in the context of the regional

interests. Therefore, as I suggested, this issue has to be approached

in the context of regional strategy from the United States as well.

And the solution should be sought through regional approach, rather than dealing separately with Pakistan, separately with Afghanistan and other countries.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. A quick answer on assistance. After 9/

11 and all sanctions were removed from Pakistan, President Bush

announced a three billion dollars, five-year package of economic

and military assistance to Pakistan, divided equally over that period. We have also proceeded with the sale of F–16 aircraft. So we

have positive leverage there to use with Pakistan—positive leverage.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

As I mentioned before, I reserved my questions. And I would like

to ask each of you a question.

Ambassador Dobbins, in your opinion, what needs to be done to

head off the so-called anticipated spring insurgency?

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think, in the short term, the measures that the Administration is proposing, an increase in the U.S.

troop strength, an effort to get NATO to increase its troop strength

and increase in the levels of economic assistance to the country, are

probably the right moves to head off or, if not head off, at least deal

adequately with this anticipated spring offensive.

40

As I have suggested, I think we are going to be doing this every

year for a long time, unless we can also better address the situation on the other side of the frontier.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Minister Jalali, the Afghan National Army has a good number of

problems. How do we strengthen that army? Is there a relationship

to the way we are doing things in Iraq to what we may or may not

be doing with the Afghan army?

Mr. JALALI. Mr. Chairman, building a national army in Afghanistan is a very difficult challenge. This is the fourth time in 150

years that Afghanistan is rebuilding its national army after a period of instability.

The current army was actually started in 2002. It was expected

by now that we would have about 60,000 or up to 70,000 in the

army. However, several reasons, you know, several factors contributed to a slow progress of the national army.

First, the long period of war, factionalism in Afghanistan. And,

therefore, local loyalties as opposed to national loyalty has been a

problem in the beginning. Of course, today, the Afghanistan National Army is a multi-ethnic army.

However, the other issue is incentives, the pay system. Although

Afghan soldiers are paid better than police, better than other, you

know, common Afghans; however, it is not an incentive that will

keep many soldiers in the force. So, desertion is rampant in many

areas.

Third, the other thing is training. The training has not been adequate in the beginning. Six weeks or eight weeks of training and

later on with the improvement of coaching and better training, I

think it improved somehow. But still, in some areas, this is a problem.

And third, the equipment. They are not equipped and armed

with effective weapons, and also protection. So therefore, they are

not as effective as it used to be. When they are not effective, this

increases the rates of desertion.

On the other hand, mobility. They cannot move quickly from

place to place.

And the fifth one is the ownership, Afghan ownership. Since the

embedded trainers from the United States and other countries are

there, the deployment of Afghan army is not solely the decision of

the minister of defense of Afghanistan or the general staff. It has

to be coordinated with the coalition forces. Therefore, sometimes

this lack of Afghan ownership causes problems.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Inderfurth, I was intrigued when you earlier said

that the Afghan people have never seen us as occupiers, as obviously is not the case in Iraq. Would you explain to us why that is

correct?

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I will do that. Could I add just one

comment about what Minister Jalali just said?

The Afghan police are in worse shape than the army. And there

is a great deal that needs to be done to make sure that they get

the kind of equipment, training to do their job in the field, which

is probably, right now, more important for security.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they a local——

41

Ambassador INDERFURTH. National army——

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no, no. The police.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. They are local.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. They are the cops on the beat.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. And a lot of them are corrupt, and

they are causing more insecurity than security for the Afghan people, which is turning them against the government.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. All right.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. On the question of non-occupiers, I

mean, the history of Afghanistan is one in which any foreign nation

that has tried to exert its control, whether it be the British or the

Soviets or others, bringing in troops, have been repulsed. That has

not happened to our involvement after 9/11, and we are still not

seen as occupiers.

Sometimes, when things go wrong, including on military strikes

that have civilian casualties, that is going to impact that. But the

Afghan people still appreciate and still speak of the assistance that

we provided them during the Soviet occupation. We did more

through our assistance to the mujahedeen to help liberate their

country from the Soviets. They still appreciate that.

And they appreciate what we are doing now. And, if anything,

they want us to make sure to stay and that we don’t walk away

from Afghanistan again, as we did in 1989 after the Soviets left.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Cordesman, yesterday at lunch I had the opportunity to ask

a question of President Karzai, and I will ask a similar question

of you: What does it take to rout out the heroin and drug problem?

I told him that if there is any one issue that has the potential

of turning the American people against our involvement in Afghanistan, it is the growing of the poppy. And it hasn’t reached that,

of course, at the present time, but I think I am correct that, over

a period of time, if it is not addressed successfully, I think it could

be a major problem toward American public opinion.

Doctor.

Dr. CORDESMAN. You know, I am very reluctant to answer that

question, because I have watched the war on drugs in various

forms since it was started and I was working for the Senate Armed

Services Committee staff. And it has been a very, very popular

thing in Congress.

Its impact on the street price of drugs has been virtually nonexistent. The number of seizures has often gone up; it has sometimes gone down.

When you talk about eradicating narcotics in Afghanistan, you

may reduce the volume, you may shift people to other crops, but

it is too isolated, too complex a society to eliminate this. And the

idea that you can, in this country with this level of rural growing,

lack of central authority, ever achieve a business where you do

more than somewhat reduce the supply within the near future is

simply not practical.

I know that is an answer no one in the Congress wants to hear,

but we really need to be honest about what has happened in our

42

own counter-narcotics programs and the similar ones in Latin

America.

And here we are two years away from the new police program

producing a significant output of people trying to counter narcotics.

We are years away from getting effective aid programs into the

field at the rural level which actually get to the areas which can

change the crops. And most of those require honesty and integrity

we haven’t got.

There are areas in the border areas where it would take so many

troops to actually have eradication that we already have seen these

efforts fail and simply end up alienating tribes without reducing

production.

So, to be perfectly honest, yes, this will be unpopular. Yes, even

though if we got a 50-percent reduction in output in 5 years, which

would be an amazing real-world achievement, it also wouldn’t

make much of a difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Recently, I think yesterday, maybe the day before, the Administration appears to be holding the Colombia, in its

decades-long struggle against narcotic traffickers and insurgences,

as a model for the Afghan government today.

Dr. Cordesman, do you agree with that?

Dr. CORDESMAN. A model of what? As far as I know, if you go

down to northeast Washington, you can get it cheaper than you

could ten years ago in constant dollars.

I find this is sort of like these narcotics seizures where everybody

suddenly says the street price is worth all this vast amount of

money, but these kinds of losses are part of the cost of doing business.

And let me note that, in Europe, which is the main market for

Afghan drugs, what has happened is you have seen heroin displace

the sharp growth of synthetics, which were being produced in Europe. If you solve the Afghan problem, you are not going to solve

the European problem. You will just push them back toward synthetics.

This is a demand-driven problem, not a supply-driven. And, yes,

politically, everybody claims we have made progress in cutting supply. They have been making it ever since the rise of drugs in the

1960’s, but we all only have to look around to know what the reality is here, the United States, and all over the world.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there was a war in China known as the

opium war. Am I not correct?

Dr. CORDESMAN. That is right. And opium won. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Well, gentlemen, you have been a—oh, excuse me.

Jim Cooper, I did not see you come in. Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to you and

the witnesses to have to be in and out, because I had three simultaneous hearings today.

But I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman. It is wonderful

to see our committee return to real hearings. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you for your kindness.

Mr. COOPER. It is an excellent panel.

I was struck by Ambassador Dobbins’s testimony, on page 7,

when he says, ‘‘Afghanistan has never been a self-sufficient state,

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and it probably never will be. It is simply too poor to be able to

raise the revenues necessary to provide security and effective governance.’’

That is the sort of breath-taking clarity that we just heard from

Tony Cordesman on the drug question, but it is something that

people don’t want to acknowledge.

There is a functioning warlord system there, so at least in discrete areas they seem to be able to govern, at least in the warlord

fashion. Have we ever had a relationship with a country without

a central government, where we just dealt systematically with warlords in a successful fashion?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I can’t think of one in which we dealt in

a successful fashion. I mean, Somalia would be an even more extreme case.

I don’t want my statement to suggest that the situation in Afghanistan is hopeless. Afghanistan is going to be a recipient of external assistance indefinitely, and it is going to require it. It has

required it for several hundred years. But in a benign environment

in which all of its neighbors see a common interest in supporting

a moderate, nonthreatening government, I think we have the prospect of helping Afghanistan along and reducing the prospect of conflict, both within it and in its broader region.

There is an impression that the United States formed a coalition

and liberated Afghanistan, whereas the fact is we joined a coalition

that had been fighting the Taliban for a decade, which consisted of

Iran, Russia, India and the Northern Alliance. And with the addition of American airpower and the subtraction of Pakistani support

for the Taliban, that coalition prevailed.

And in the Bonn conference, we were able to build on that coalition and bring all of those neighboring states into the process of nation-building in Afghanistan in a benign and positive way. And we

need to recreate that.

The major outlier and problem, in this case, is not Iran; it is

Pakistan. And if we can recreate a sense of common endeavor with

respect to Afghanistan, then I think the prospects are positive.

Mr. COOPER. I like your focus on Pakistan. And it made me wonder that we shouldn’t concentrate on nation-building, but not so

much in Afghanistan as in Pakistan, your focus on the Kashmir

problem and those situations. It is difficult to call Pakistan an ally

when there are so many ambiguities and troubles and problems.

Dr. Cordesman pointed out how popular the Taliban and several

other Islamic groups are in Paktika province, for example. I visited

there a year or so ago, and it is difficult for Americans to comprehend the remoteness. And we were told that it is the size of

New Hampshire, and in the entire area, there is about one mile of

paved road. That is incomprehensible to the average American.

And with 67 percent popularity for the Taliban in that region,

you know, what can you do about it? And, you know, with a safe

haven offered right across the border by the Pakistanis.

Dr. CORDESMAN. Congressman, if I may suggest, I think that if

you look at the plans that the aid people have that they would like

to be able to implement, we are often talking things like dams,

simple gravel roads, maybe the odd generator, maybe a school

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building or a clinic in a given area. We are not talking vast expenditures.

What we are talking about is something that just isn’t there at

all yet. You don’t have the presence in the field. We have been concentrating in other areas; we haven’t had the resources. In areas

like this, it would take time, but it would make a tremendous difference if you could do very, very little.

And, in many cases, the Afghans can do it themselves if somebody can get them the material, set up the conditions that allow

them to operate. There simply isn’t the structure of governance,

there isn’t the security presence yet to do it.

So I believe, in most of the areas where the Taliban has grown

and gained support, a partnership with the Afghan government,

with Afghan groups, and very, very limited resources could have a

tremendous impact. The difficulty is there is almost nothing now,

just showpiece projects in a few isolated areas, not a campaign, not

a systematic effort.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. Congressman, you talked about the relationship between the United States and Pakistan, and you asked

whether or not we are allies. I want to call your attention to the

best book on the U.S. history of diplomatic relations with Pakistan.

It is entitled, Disenchanted Allies. It goes back over our 60-year period.

And we are in another disenchanted period, unfortunately, because of what is happening along that border. And we need Pakistan’s assistance. And I hope that we can turn this around.

Mr. COOPER. At some point, back to Dr. Cordesman’s point, we

have been in Afghanistan for four or five years. We have troops operating, at least in Paktika. I don’t know about the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. For the Taliban to be 67 percent popular there

today, after 5 years of U.S. presence, indicates 5 years of, perhaps,

wasted effort. Maybe we would have been even less popular if we

hadn’t done the few show projects that we have done.

But we hear that the road from Kabul to Kandahar is being supplied with asphalt from a plant in Pakistan, so the truck has to

drive over the Khyber Pass to produce the asphalt, because there

is not even an asphalt plant. You know, that sounds to the average

American taxpayer like a ridiculous expenditure.

I see that my time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

And Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Sirs, I apologize. I left after the first hour to go to another hearing.

I was on the ground in Afghanistan about two months after the

war began, and then brought a carrier battle group back, because

we flew over it, and then came back and was on the ground again

for a short period of time, 18 months after my first visit.

To some degree, on the first visit, because it was just 60 days

after the war began, over Christmas time, I saw what needed to

be done, I thought. And when I came back and spoke with the general 18 months later, I can remember the comment of, ‘‘We are

keeping our finger in the dike,’’ as civil affairs units and special

forces had been placed into a different war in Iraq.

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The chairman has taken us, and is taking us, through certain set

pieces on our security environment. Afghanistan is today; before,

Iraq; and I am sure there will be other set pieces.

And since most of the questions duly were probably asked, my

question for you all is: Having seen Afghanistan become prey to

terrorists and the Taliban come back into the southern provinces,

and watching what has occurred in Iraq, are we more secure in our

strategic security environment today because of these two pieces?

And, if not, what is the right approach?

And, Mr. Ambassador, if you didn’t mind starting?

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think that, clearly, al Qaeda, bin

Laden have more difficulty operating from their sanctuaries in

Pakistan than they did from their much more unrestrained sanctuaries in Afghanistan. And so, in that sense, we have dispersed

them, we have made operations more difficult, we have put them

under pressure, and of course we have destroyed some of their

leadership.

So, in a narrow sense, the situation is better than it was prior

to 9/11.

The situation is also better for the Afghans. There is a civil war

under way in Afghanistan, but there was a civil war under way in

Afghanistan before 9/11. It was a civil war in which the Taliban

were in Kabul and the rebels were in the northern part of the

country. But the country has been in civil war for 25 years.

So, again, the situation now is probably better than it was for the

Afghans prior to 9/11.

I suspect you are asking a larger question on whether——

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, on a strategic security environment. Because I

think that is where the chairman is taking us in these set pieces.

And you had addressed these issues in the previous questions.

Ambassador DOBBINS. I mean, you know, again, moving beyond

those narrower judgments, the level of hostility to the United

States in Muslim society has risen significantly and creates a pool

from which terrorists can draw support, acquiescence and even recruits that is extremely large.

This has not occurred because of our intervention in Afghanistan

or our inadequate nation-building efforts in Afghanistan, which

are, broadly speaking, popular in the Muslim world, but largely as

the result of the intervention in Iraq and the mishandling of the

post-conflict reconstruction there.

Mr. SESTAK. But, in a strategic sense, are we, in this global war

on terror, more secure there?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I would say, on balance, that there has

been exponential growth in the number and variety of terrorist

groups who are inclined to target American interests and assets.

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. I would simply put it this way: that

we have taken Afghanistan off the table as a base for al Qaeda.

But I believe that our strategic security environment has worsened

overall as a result of our involvement in Iraq.

Mr. SESTAK. Sir?

Mr. JALALI. I agree with both ambassadors that, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, the situation is better than before. HowVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:24 Mar 18, 2008 Jkt 037308 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-8\030000.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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ever, the other threats are not related closely with Afghanistan.

Therefore, there are many other reasons that causes threats to the

security in the United States, including Iraq.

Mr. SESTAK. Dr. Cordesman.

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think one of our great problems is that we

focus on the two countries we see, Iraq and Afghanistan, but this

was a major cultural, political and ideological problem in some 60

to 80 countries before 9/11. It is going to be an enduring problem

for at least another 10 to 15 years, almost regardless of what happens in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a reason people call this a

long war. And we have to accept it, just as we did the Cold War,

as an enduring security issue.

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir, but I was building off your comment earlier, that we need metrics——

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. I assume

there are no additional questions of this panel.

Yes? You have an answer to a question that hasn’t been asked.

Go ahead, Mr. Ambassador. [Laughter.]

Ambassador INDERFURTH. May I have a 30-second correct-therecord remark?

The CHAIRMAN. You bet.

Ambassador INDERFURTH. When we were talking, going back to

Congressman Hunter’s substituting orchards for poppies, I mentioned a group called Seeds of Peace. It is actually Roots of Peace,

in California. That is an important alternative livelihood.

But I also would like just to associate myself with something

that Dr. Cordesman said, that this will take years of effort to make

this effort. Five years in, we have another decade to go.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

This has been a very impressive panel. And, gentlemen, we appreciate your expertise and your time, your being with us. Needless

to say, this is a very challenging issue for our country.

It was a thrill to be with Speaker Pelosi yesterday in Afghanistan and with the long discussion, as well as the long luncheon

with Ambassador Karzai as well as other leaders within the parliament. And I came away, frankly, with a more positive impression than I had had before. I guess, in ordinary terms, I felt there

was some light at the end of the tunnel.

But there are challenges, as you have so aptly pointed out today,

each of you, that we face, different challenges than we face in Iraq.

And it is particularly heartening to know that we are not looked

upon as occupiers. And the attitude there that I felt toward us was

a positive one.

Well, gentlemen, thank you very, very much for this very enlightening and excellent hearing.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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