### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON

Fe br ua ry 17, 200 5 S es sio n

ESTA TE OF CH AR LES T HOMA S M CC RA W, D eceased v. JOA N L IKINS

An Appeal f

romthe Chancer y Court for F ayett e County No. P -3-325 De wey C. Whitenton, Chan cellor

No. W2004-01172-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jun e 24, 2005

Th is c a se inv olv e s cod ic ils to a wil l. Th e de c e de nt d ie d te state . H is w ill inc lud e d o ne ty pe d c od ic il and two handw ritten codicils. The ty ped codicil, pursuant to a marital dissoluti on ag ree ment, g rante d the dec edent’ s former

spouse a life estate in his re al prope rty with the rema inder to their c hildren, and de vis e d a ll o f the pe rs on a l pr op e rt y to the c hil dr e n a s we ll. Th e de c e de nt la te r ha nd wr ote tw o c od ic ils addre ssing the disposition of certain personal property and debts. After his death, the devisee under the handwritten codicils intervene d in the probate proce eding s to enforc e the codicils. The trial c ourt ruled that the ha ndwritten codic il addressing the per sonal property violated the marital dissolut ion ag ree ment and wa s theref ore inva lid. It he ld that the codicil addre ssing the debt did not violate the

mari ta l di sso lut ion a g re e me nt andthat the e state sh ou ld pa y fo r the de bt, a s se t f orth i n th e c od ic il. Other matters rema ined out standing
, and the tria l court, under Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure 54 .0 2, ma de the or de r f

ina l. B e c a us e the ou tst a nd ing ma tte rs c ou ld r e nd e r this Cou rt ’s ru lin g moo t,

we fi ndthat th e or de r w a s impr ov ide ntl y ma de fi na l a nddis mis s th e app e a l.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal is Dismissed and Cause is Rem anded

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J.
, d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J
., W.S. and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Th o ma s M

. Minor, Somerville, for pe titioner/appellant Estate of Charles Thomas Mc Craw, de cea sed, B e ve rl y Mc Cr a w, Exe c utrix

L ee S. Saunder s, Somerville, for re spondent J oAn Likins

OP IN ION

I n 1 96 9, Cha

rl e s Th oma s Mc Cr a w (“ De c e de nt” ) e xec ute d a wi ll le a vin g his e nti re e state to his wife at that time, B everly McCraw (“Mc Craw” ), and naming McCraw executrix of his e state. The Dec edent a nd McCraw divorce d in 1994, and executed a marital diss olution agr eeme nt (“MDA” ). As requir ed under

the MDA, the D ece dent executed a typed codic il to hi s wi l l
, gi ving Mc Craw a nT h e M ar ch 22, 1999 c odi ci l r ea d: 1

H appy B i r t hday In c ase o f

m y de m i se o r i nc ap ac i t y - t his unit b elo ng s t o Jo A n L i kins. 5/ 22/ 99 / s / D r

. Char l es M cCraw

T h e Ju n e 30, 2000 c odi ci l r ea d: 2

D ear John Shel t on an d Lee P l eas e t ake ca r e of

JoA n a nd John a. M y kid s a n d the re [sic ] M o the r w ill no t. P le a se kn o w I lo v e the m w ith a ll m y he a rt. O ur l oans ar e t o be pai d by my es t at e. T h an k y ou / s / D r

. Char l es M cCraw

T

. C

. A

. § 32

- 1- 10 1 et

. s eq. s et s out t he r equi r ement s for v al i d wi l l s i n T enn es s ee. 3

-2- ir re vo c able lif

e e state in h is r e a l pr op e rt y , wi th the re ma ind e r to the ir c hil dr e n, a ndtr a ns fe rring his pe rs on a lty

to the ir c hil dr e n a s w e ll.

Dec edent d i ed o n J uly

6, 2000. A copy

of his will, which included the ty ped codic il, was admitted to pr obate by

order dated Septembe r 29, 2000. The or der na med his former wife Mc Craw as executrix.
On September

8, 2000, J o An Likins (“Likins”), the De cede nt’s fianc é, petitioned the c ourt to admit into probate two holog raphic codicils to Dec edent’ s will, dated May 22, 1999, and June 30, 2 0 0 0

. T h e w r it in g d a te d M a y 2 2
, 1 9 9 9 g r a n te d o w n e r s h ip o f a n A T V ( f

o u r

- w h e e le r ) to L ikin s “ [i ]n

case of my

demise or inca

pacity .” The writing dated J une 30, 2000 stated that “[o] ur loans [t he loans

1 of the De cede nt and Likins] are to be paid by my estate.” Both writin gs we re s i gn ed b y the 2 Dec edent. The loans ref

err ed to in the sec ond codicil wer e joint loans in the name of the Dec edent and Likens, taken out to purc hase r eal e state located in Fay ette County , Tenne ssee.

On Novembe r 1, 2001, McCra w filed a response asserting that the w ritings f ail to meet the

re qu ir e me nt o f T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d § 32 -1 -1 01 , e t se q. , a nd that the y c on fl ic te d w ith the te rm s 3 of the divorc e dec ree , which prohibited the Dece dent from altering the t erms of his will. The re levant portion of the MDA state d that “Husba nd ag ree s and contra cts that he shall immediately re- draf t and

re vis e his L a st Wi ll a ndTe sta me nt t o g ive Wif e a n ir re vo c able lif

e e state in a ll H us ba nd ’s re a lty , w ith fe e ve sti ng ir

re vo c ably in the pa rt ie s’ c hil dr e n, a nd that a ll Hu sb a nd ’s pe rs on a lty sh a ll b e ir

re vo c ably transfe rre d direc tly

to the parties’ children.” The Dec edent incorporated the lang uag e of the MDA into his wil l by

a codic il dated J anuary

17, 1995.

The ha ndwritten codic ils were a dmitted to probate by an order dated April 5, 2002. The orde r stated that the issue of w hether the codicils violated the MDAwas re serve d for a later he aring

.I n addi t i on t o t h e ot h er mot i on s , i n Ju l y 2002, M cCr aw f i l ed a compl ai n t ag ai n s t Li k i n s an d h er mo rt gage 4
h o ld e r, a sk ing the c o u rt to p a rtiti o n the re a l p ro p e rty. M c C ra w late r fil e d a vo lun ta ry n o n -su it, d ism issin g the c la im agai nst Li ki ns and her mo rt gage ho l d er.

T he t r i al cour t decl ar ed t he order a f i nal order pur s uan t t o T enn es s ee R ul e of Ci vi l P r ocedur e 54. 01 i ns t ead 5

o f R ul e 5 4

. 0 2

. T hi s was ob vi o usl y a cl eri cal err o r.
-3- Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, in Jul y

20 02 , McC ra w fil e d a Comp laint to C on te st H olo g ra

ph ic Cod ic ils
, asserting lac k of testamentary capa city and undue influence . McCraw alleg ed that the c odicils were inv a lidbe c a us e the De c e de nt w a s o f u ns ou ndmin d at the tim e of the writi ng a ndwa s u nd uly influence d by

L ikins, the sole benef

iciary of the c odicils.

I n May 2002, L ikins filed a Motion For De clar atory J udg ment and to Quiet Title in Real Pr op e rt y . In th e mot ion , Liki ns a lle g e d tha t Mc Cr a w h a d ta ke n th e po sit ion that th e De c e de nt’ s e state

wa s t h e h a l f o w n e r o f L i k i n s ’ r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n F a y e t t e C o u n t y , T e n n e s s e e

. L i kin s so ug ht a decla ratory judgme nt that she was the sole ow ner of the re al prope rty . I n response , McCraw filed a motion to di smiss L ikins’ claim, asserting that Lik i n s ’ m o t i o n was invalid for failure to join an i n d i s p ensable party , and insuffic iency of proc ess. I n the alternative, McCra w soug ht to clarify the ple a din g s. 4

By o r d e r d ate d Se p te mb e r 6 , 2 0 0 2
, th e c h a n c e r y c o u r t ru le d th a t th e c o d ic il d a te d M ay22, 1999, by attempting to dispose of the Dec edent’ s pers o n al p ro p erty , violated the MDA, a nd that L ikens’ cla im under t h at codicil should be denie d. As to the codicil date d J une 30, 2000, howe ver, the t ri al co u rt h el d that it did not vi olate the MDA . The trial c ourt noted that the MDA ma de no pr ov isi on f

o r t h e D e c e d e n t ’ s d e b t s , a n d
, a s a r e s u l t , t h e s t a t e m e n t “ [o ]u r l o a n s ar e t o b e p a i d b ymy estate” did not con fl i ct wi t h t he MDA. The ref ore Likens’ cla im under that codic il was allowed. L ikins asserted that, pur suant to the 2000 codicil, the De cede nt intended to pay off the two loa ns on the re a l pr op e rt y

ow ne d b y

L iki ns , f or wh ic h Liki ns andthe De c e de nt w e re joi ntl y lia ble . A t so me po int du ri ng the pr oc e e din g s, the De c e de nt’ s e state (“ Es ta te ” ) p a id o ff on e of the tw o lo a ns

. Both pa rties t hen petiti oned the trial court to alter or amend the September 6, 2002 order, a nd Mc C r a w a l s o r e q u e s t e d p e r m i s s i o n f o r a n i n t e r l o c u t o r y

ap p e a l

. T h e tr i a l c o u r td e n i e d b o t h pa rt ie s’ mot ion s to a lte r o r ame nda ndde nie d M c Cr a w’ s r e qu e st f or int e rl oc uto ry app e a l. Th e sa me or de r a lso g rante d the Estate a

lien on L ikins’ property , in order to se cure reimburse ment of the a mount paid on the joint promissory

note if the Estate was later found to be entitl ed to contributi on from Likins on the loan. The or der state d that it was not a final order . L ikins later filed a Motion to Diss olve Lien, asking t h e tr i a l c o u r tt o r e m o v e t h e l i e n f r o mh e r r e a l p r o p e r t y.
Finally , on April 12, 2004, the trial court e ntere d an orde r denying Likins’ Motion t o Dissolve L ie n. F urthe r, the or de r ma de fi na l the Se pte mbe r 6, 200 2 ord e r, pu rs ua nt to Te nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Procedur e 54.02. The Estate now appe als, asserting that the trial court erre d in finding that the J une 5 30, 2000 codicil did not violate the MDA and that the Est ate wa s obligated to pay the promissory

notes sig ne d b y L iki ns a ndthe De c e de nt.R ule 3 st ates: 6

I n c i v i l a c t i on s e v e r y f

i n a l j u dg me n t e n t e r e d by a t r i a l c ou r t f r om w h i c h a n a pp e a l l i e s t o t h e S u pr e me C o u rt o r C o u rt o f A p p e a ls is ap p e a la b le a s o f righ t. E x c e p t as o the rw ise p e r m it te d in ru le 9 a n d in R ul e 5 4

. 0 2 T enness ee R ul es of C i vi l P roce d ures , i f

m ul t i p l e p art i es or mult i p l e cl ai m s fo r r el i ef are i nv ol ved i n a n a ct i on, an y order t hat adj udi cat ed fewer t han al l t he cl ai ms or t he r i gh t s an d l i abi l i t i es of f ewer t h a n a l l t h e pa r t i e s i s n ot e n for c e a bl e or a pp e a l a bl e a n d i s s u bj e c t t o r e v i s i on a t a n y t i me b e fo re e n try o f a fina l ju d g m e n t ad ju d ic a ting a ll the c la im s, rig h ts, an d li a b ili ties o f all p a rtie s.

T e n n . R . A p p . P . 3 (a ) (2 0 0 4 ). S ee a l so Rul e 10 of

t he T enn es s ee R ul es of Ap pel l at e Procedur e.
-4- As a thr e sh oldiss ue , Liki ns a sse rt s th a t th e a pp e a l sh ou ld b e dis mis se d. L iki ns no te s th a t, under the Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edure , this Court m ay hear an appeal only

from a f inal jud g me nt e nte re d by a tr ia l c ou rt

. L iki ns c on te nd s th a t th e or de r f ro m w hic h th e Es ta te app e a ls 6 adjudicate s fewe r than a ll of the claims and thus is not final and not appe alable.

The trial court, in its April 12, 2004 order
, decla red the September 6, 2002 or der f inal, pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e. B y this p rocess, the trial court may make appea lable an or der w hich otherw ise would not be appe alable be cause all of the c laims o r ri gh t s or liabiliti es of the pa

rties have not been a djudicated. Unde r the lang uag e in Rule 54.02, the trial court makes a n express determination “that there is no just rea son for delay .” Howeve r, after a revie w of the re cord, w e find that McCra w’s Jul y 2002 Complaint t o Contest Hologr aphic C o dicils was not resolved b y th e tria l c o u r t. T h is c o mp lain t a ll e g e d th a t th e c o d ic il s w e r e n o t v a li d b e c a u s e the Dec edent wa s of unsound mind at the time of the writing and w as unduly influence d by L ikins. I f the t ri al co u rt we re to find that the codicils were not valid, our ruling in this appeal would be r ender ed

moo t

. M o r e o v e r , t h e tr i a l c o u r t h a s n o t ru l e d o n L i k e n s ’ M o t i o n F o r D e c l ar a t o r y Ju d g m e nt a nd to Qu ie t T itl e in R e a l P rop ert y

. Th e ef fe c t th a t a

ru lin g on thi s mo tio n w ou ld h a ve on thi s a pp e a l is unclea r fr om the rec ord. Unde r these c ircumstance s, it appear s that the trial court e rre d in finding that “ther e is no just cause f

or dela y ,” and that the September 6, 2002 order was improvidently made f inal

u n d er Rule 54.02. See Rec tor v. Hallibu rton , No. M1999-02802-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 535924, at*3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 20003) (noting that the facts of this case , finalizing the judg ment under Rule 54.02 was not prope r bec ause of the nature of the unre solved issues; how ever , the T.R.A.P. 3(a)

re qu ir e me nt that the or de r b e a fi na l or de r w a s su sp e nd e d in the int e re st o f j ud ic ia l e c on omy ); Sc ott

v . Yar br o , No. M2004-00746-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 1412128 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2005).

There fore , this appeal is dismissed. Costs of the a ppeal a re ta x ed to the appe llant, Estate of C h ar l e s T h o m a s M c C r a w , f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE