Air University

Steven L. Kwast, Lieutenant General, Commander and President

Air Command and Staff College

Thomas H. Deale, Brigadier General, Commandant

Robert J. Smith, Jr., Colonel, PhD, Dean

Thomas G. McGuire, Colonel, PhD, Director of Research

Dennis P. Adams, Lieutenant Colonel, Series Editor

Michael Ivanovsky, Essay Advisor

Please send inquiries or comments to

Editor

The Wright Flyer Papers

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Air Command and Staff College 

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E-mail: acsc.der.researchorgmailbox@us.af.mil
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Nontraditional Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Making the Most of Airborne Assets

Michael S. Cornelius

Major, USAF

Wright Flyer Paper No. 50

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
ii

Project Editor

James S. Howard

Published by Air University Press in October 2015

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed 

or implied within are solely those of the author and do 

not necessarily represent the views of the Air Command 

and Staff College, the Air Force Research Institute, Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department 

of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared 

for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the AU Press website: 

http://aupress.au.af.mil/

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AFRI

Air Force Research Institute
iii

Contents

List of Illustrations v

Foreword vii

About the Author ix

Acknowledgments xi

Abstract xiii

Nontraditional Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

 Making the Most of Airborne Assets 1

Abbreviations 17

Bibliography 21

v

Illustrations

Figure

1 Notional ISR synchronization matrix 6

2 Sample ATO sortie flow showing planned XCAS/convoy 

 escort sorties 6

3 VDL-equipped Sniper XR/ATP 7

4 PED management team organization 9

vii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another issue of The Wright Flyer 

Papers. Through this series, Air Command and Staff College presents a 

sampling of exemplary research produced by our residence and distancelearning students. This series has long showcased the kind of visionary 

thinking that drove the aspirations and activities of the earliest aviation 

pioneers. This year’s selection of essays admirably extends that tradition. As the series title indicates, these papers aim to present cuttingedge, actionable knowledge— research that addresses some of the most 

complex security and defense challenges facing us today.

Recently,The Wright Flyer Papers transitioned to an exclusively electronic publication format. It is our hope that our migration from print 

editions to an electronic-only format will fire even greater intellectual 

debate among Airmen and fellow members of the profession of arms as 

the series reaches a growing global audience. By publishing these papers 

via the Air University Press website, ACSC hopes not only to reach 

more readers, but also to support Air Force–wide efforts to conserve 

resources. In this spirit, we invite you to peruse past and current issues 

of The Wright Flyer Papers at http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/papers_all

.asp?cat=wright.

Thank you for supporting The Wright Flyer Papers and our efforts to 

disseminate outstanding ACSC student research for the benefit of our Air 

Force and war fighters everywhere. We trust that what follows will stimulate thinking, invite debate, and further encourage today’s air, space, and 

cyber war fighters in their continuing search for innovative and improved 

ways to defend our nation and way of life.

THOMAS H. DEALE

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

ix

About the Author

Maj Michael Cornelius is a 2012 graduate of Air Command and Staff 

College. He has operational experience in the B-1 weapons system and 

operational-level planning experience within the air operations center. 

He is an instructor weapons system officer in the B-1 and a graduate of 

the United States Air Force Weapons School.

xi

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my extreme gratitude to Mr. Michael Ivanovsky 

for his expert advice and guidance during this project. His help was fundamental to the success of this paper. I would also like to thank my wife 

for her support through this endeavor. 

MICHAEL S. CORNELIUS

Major, US Air Force

xiii

Abstract

This paper uses nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (NTISR), now known in tactics, techniques, and procedures as 

operations reconnaissance, as a case study to increase combat capability 

across multiple weapon systems within the Air Force. NTISR demonstrates how one capability can flex to bridge gaps across several doctrinal 

functions and mission sets. It also provides an argument for the development of future technologies within extant fiscal constraints, revealing a 

requirement to shift the acquisition weight of effort away from traditional 

niche assets to those that support true multirole capabilities. 

1

Nontraditional Intelligence, Surveillance,

and Reconnaissance

Making the Most of Airborne Assets

Desperate times call for desperate measures, which is exactly what 

happened when the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA) mandated $487 billion in cuts across the Department of Defense (DOD) over the next 10 

years. The drastic measures call for an equally massive review of strategy, 

force structure, readiness, and modernization across all services.1

 The Air 

Force, at a 60-year low in personnel strength, plans to trade size for quality 

in an effort to become a more agile and responsive force.2

 Part of this 

trade requires a migration from traditional niche platforms to ones that 

support multirole capabilities. Fortunately, the Air Force has an excellent 

case study it can use to actually accomplish these goals: nontraditional 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (NTISR). NTISR is a combatproven capability that epitomizes agility and flexibility. Strike aircraft 

have been adapted to meet the increasing demands placed on niche ISR 

aircraft for the last decade, modifying their tactics to fill increasing gaps 

in ISR capacity. Unfortunately, NTISR is far from perfect because it employs relatively limited capabilities; the information gathered is fleeting, 

and it suffers from organizational and ownership issues that only hinder its 

usage. In order to gain the flexibility and agility required to migrate from 

niche to real multirole capabilities, the Air Force must learn from and 

address these issues with NTISR. Despite its flaws, NTISR is an overlooked and often untapped capability that could change future operations across almost every flying platform. 

As a case study, NTISR forces the Air Force to reevaluate its ability to 

prepare for the next conflict, especially considering the acquisition of new 

platforms and capabilities.3

 In general, the military has a poor historical 

record when it comes to predicting who the adversary will be, what it is 

we will fight about, and even when and where the conflict will occur. This 

is especially important when investing large sums of money in technologies designed specifically with these anticipated conflicts in mind. Because the Air Force cannot realistically predict the future, it behooves its 

leaders to plan for a certain amount of flexibility and multirole capability 

with respect to their invested platforms and related capabilities. NTISR is 

a gap-fill, yet multirole, capability, using nontraditionally designed platforms to service shortfalls in ISR sensor coverage. The flexibility of 

NTISR reveals possibilities beyond specific platforms. The Air Force has 
2

an opportunity to capitalize on lessons learned from NTISR, and it 

should not wait until the next conflict erupts to start implementing it.

NTISR is priority number six on the Secretary of the Air Force’s 

(SECAF) ISR review task list. The task list addresses the potential for 

tactical NTISR capabilities by each platform and includes other possibilities 

including capabilities not currently in production.4

 While the office of 

primary responsibility (OPR) is Air Combat Command (ACC), this task 

supports several other major Air Force commands. The lead agency 

tasked to develop the NTISR road map is AF/A2 (USAF Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), not AF/A3/5 

(USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements)—

or a combination of the two. Their challenge is to develop a road map that 

includes potential platform and sensor mixes, requirements for communication pathways, personnel training requirements, and a concept of 

operations (CONOPS) development.5

 This enormous undertaking is of 

paramount importance if the Air Force is to truly fulfill its goal of becoming a more agile and responsive force, especially in these fiscally constrained times. 

Although NTISR is not a new concept to military operations, it formally evolved to fill an operational gap between the available and required ISR capability to hunt SCUDs in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).6

Because of the low-density/high-demand (LD/HD) nature of traditional 

ISR platforms, ad hoc means were implemented to provide a gap-fill 

capability. Various sensors on different aircraft were employed to hunt 

the mobile SCUDs, from electrooptical/infrared (EO/IR) targeting pods 

on fighter aircraft to ground moving target indicator (GMTI) and synthetic 

aperture radar (SAR) systems on the F-15E and B-1 bomber.7

 SCUD 

hunting was a difficult mission and one that had limited success, but it 

did prove that traditional niche air assets could successfully flex to support NTISR roles.8

When hostilities kicked off in 2001, several targeting pods were available 

that provided varying qualities of EO/IR data to the relatively new NTISR 

capability. These included the first-generation forward-looking infrared 

(FLIR) low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) pod, and Litening advance targeting pod (ATP). LANTIRN utilized 

first-generation technology originally developed in the 1980s.9

 Though Litening was newer technology from 1999, the capability was originally only 

available on Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command 

(AFRC) aircraft. The pod was eventually distributed to a wider range of 

systems and users, such as the B-52 and the AV-8B as well as the Royal 

Australian Air Force and Israeli Air Force, to name a few.10 In 2002 some 

active and Guard strike aircraft were upgraded to utilize the third–generation 
3

Sniper extended range (XR) ATP for support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and eventually OIF. Not only was the picture quality better with 

the Sniper XR but also the quality of data derived was much better, such as 

accuracy of coordinates.11 However, all of these capabilities were still locked 

into individual pieces of ISR.

As an ad hoc capability, NTISR provides only a fraction of the sensor 

coverage that traditional ISR aircraft perform. This is a limitation of the 

sensors employed by the vast majority of aircraft that support NTISR, 

which are mostly via EO/IR pods. NTISR supports imagery intelligence 

(IMINT) when employing EO/IR pods such as Litening or Sniper.12

While strike aircraft such as the B-1 and F-15E can use onboard GMTI or 

SAR to support ground operations, the majority of joint tactical air strike 

requests (JTAR) by ground units are for some sort of EO/IR sensor.13 The 

emphasis on an EO/IR capability came about because of a growing need 

for nonkinetic reconnaissance and surveillance support demanded by 

current counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This leans very heavily 

on the EO/IR capability that the various pods provide. 

Though these EO/IR pods are highly capable sensors, they are still 

pigeonholed into support of IMINT. Their capabilities were designed primarily for ground targeting, but are now used for nontraditional purposes. For example, the IR marker on the Sniper XR has the ability to 

provide situational awareness (SA) to other aircraft and the ground commander during night operations, as well. Its onboard laser allows the aircraft to obtain highly accurate coordinates not only for employment of 

ordnance, but to provide locations of different points of interest (POI) for 

the ground commander. Current tactics also allow aircraft to buddy lase, 

which involves one aircraft releasing a laser-guided munition while the 

other aircraft guides it in with the laser on its targeting pod. The laser 

spot search (LSS) and laser spot tracker (LST) functions allow one aircraft to essentially drag the other aircraft’s pod onto a specific POI. 

Though originally designed for targeting, their unique capabilities provided built-in flexibility. 

While most Air Force strike aircraft now employ the Sniper XR targeting pod with similar tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), their capabilities can differ. For most fighter aircraft, the Sniper XR integrates with 

onboard avionics, providing quick and easy access of data derived from 

the pod. Some aircraft, such as the B-1 bomber, did not get that capability 

until recently. Even then, this capability was integrated through an onboard laptop computer (LCTP or laptop controlled targeting pod) and an 

additional track handle, which only added to the human factors problems. Because the pod integrates with onboard aircraft systems, such as 

an inertial navigation system (INS), accuracies in coordinates derived 
4

from the sensor can vary significantly across different platforms. Finally, 

loiter time of the platform and whether or not there are multiple aircraft 

(such as a two-ship of fighters) can affect employment and overall capability. Strike aircraft, though employing the same sensor, may produce 

different levels of effects to the ground commander. 

Ground units often request effects-based capabilities. A requirement 

for something other than an EO/IR capability can automatically limit the 

options. This results from a combination of limited traditional ISR assets 

and the narrow capabilities NTISR assets employ. Even if they only require full motion video (FMV) through a platform such as the MQ-9, 

their request still depends on where it falls on the priority list. The same 

is true for other types of intelligence. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) and 

communications intelligence (COMINT) are additional capabilities 

ground units routinely request for operations, though they are unsupportable via an EO/IR pod. Onboard systems, such as an aircraft’s radar 

warning receiver (RWR), were not designed to support these types of 

requests, especially for support of COMINT. Therefore, the ground unit 

must obtain access to a traditional ISR asset. The ground unit may try to 

piece together capabilities from different sensors on various aircraft in 

order to get some semblance of a complete picture if the unit is low on the 

priority list. This could involve using an RC-135 for COMINT and a 

Sniper-equipped F-16 for pseudo-FMV. Unfortunately, this is difficult to 

achieve at the operational level because of problems with priority, availability 

of assets, and the overall construct of NTISR itself. 

As a capability, NTISR has the potential to provide unmatched agility 

and flexibility to the air and ground commander. However, this was not 

due to deliberate planning by the Air Force. Instead, the scramble to support LD/HD ISR assets with a gap-fill capability resulted in a new capability: 

NTISR. Unfortunately, little thought is given to actual integration of 

NTISR because of some limitations of the capability in its current form. 

Though there is an EO/IR capability, the pseudo-FMV that NTISR 

provides is not persistent. Most strike aircraft cannot loiter as long as 

smaller remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). GMTI and SAR capabilities exist 

on strike aircraft such as the B-1 and F-15E, but these capabilities are of 

limited use to the ground commander for relatively small amounts of 

time, or unless weather negates use of an EO/IR capability. Plus, there is 

no consistent way to exploit that data once the aircraft returns from the 

mission. Therefore, narrowly defined capabilities result in limited use by 

ISR planners and the ground commander. This limits integration at the 

operational levels unless gaps exist that require immediate attention 

based on priority, which usually happens in a dynamic instead of a 

planned fashion.
5

NTISR is more of a capability than a mission, which does not lend it easily 

to structured planning.14 Close air support (CAS) and ISR are missions that 

are routinely planned. As such, these missions get both apportionment and 

allocation of assets. Conversely, NTISR is a capability that strike aircraft normally execute within the confines of on-call CAS (XCAS). Even then, NTISR 

divides further into subsets commonly labeled as armed overwatch and 

armed surveillance. Armed overwatch is direct support of ground commanders 

by strike aircraft providing situational awareness for a maneuver, such as 

convoy escort. Armed surveillance is a bit different, with strike aircraft providing real-time information during inactive periods on the ground.15 Regardless of whether the strike aircraft executes the NTISR subset of armed 

overwatch or armed surveillance, it is usually labeled as XCAS on the air 

tasking order (ATO). This lack of formal processes resembles the current best 

practices recommended by the Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-3.AOC, Operational Employment—Air Operations Center 

12 March 2012, which does not include deliberate planning for NTISR 

(fig. 1). Interestingly, this involves creating and posting an NTISR collection 

spreadsheet to the AOC web page and e-mailing it to various flying units.16 It 

is supposed to be updated for each ATO day and list assignments in priority 

order, providing a way to determine not only available assets for tasking, but 

also their proximity to supported ground units. This highlights how NTISR is 

a “just in case” capability, something that is not deliberately planned for yet 

has detrimental effects on the battlefield if not properly utilized.

NTISR can fill gaps in traditional ISR coverage so long as assets are 

available. If assets are reroled, it could potentially involve multiple players 

and processes within the AOC (fig. 2). The senior intelligence duty officer 

(SIDO) is responsible for execution of ISR missions and therefore has 

first-hand knowledge as to whether or not gaps exist in requested coverage. On the other hand, the senior operations duty officer (SODO) is responsible for execution of all strike missions, which often include XCAS. 

Though the majority of US strike aircraft employ the Sniper XR or Litening 

pods, coalition or other joint aircraft may not have this particular or 

similar capability. The liaison officer (LNO) could also get involved in 

questions about specific capabilities. Though this is not particularly complex, it does involve multiple actors. Comparison of priorities must occur 

between intelligence and operations, which may result in ISR coverage 

gaps that do not get serviced. These processes at the operational level get 

complicated due to ownership issues. This forces ground units that do 

not get priority for ISR to circumnavigate the red tape in order to get the 

support they require.
6

CT / ULT / DV

ALERT

AIR REFUELING

6:00 6:15 6:30 6:45 7:00 7:15 7:30 7:45 8:00 8:15 8:30 8:45 9:00 9:15 9:30 9:45 10:00 10:15 10:30 10:45 11:00 11:15 11:30 11:45 12:00

FALCON 21 (1221) 2 F16

COUNTER ROCKET

(0600-0800) A1ABC123 KB1

HOG 11 (1011) 2 A10

XCAS/CONVOY ESCORT

(0700-(0830)1000) A1JAP123

KB3

STRIKE 01 (1101) 2 F15E

XCAS/CONVOY ESCORT

(0700-(0830)1000) A1JAP123

KB3

LANCER 41 (1441) 2 B1B

COUNTER TERRORIST

(100-1100) A1E00123 MUTT

CAS

(1200-(1430)1500) A1RRC345

SHANIA

ISR/HVAA

BUFF 31 (1331) 1 B52

XATK

(0600-1200) KB2, 12, 22

EXXON 56 (9556) KC-135 COLTS/PATRIOTS

RADAR 54 (6554) JSTARS (0100-0800)

DRONE 25 (7525) MQ-1 PREDATOR (0700-0000)

REMOTE 24 (7524R) RQ-1 PREDATOR (0200-2200)

SNOOPY 60 (5160) RJ (0300-1300)

CITGO 21 (9921)

TEXACO 61 (9961) KC-10 EAGLES/PANTHERS

ALERT OCA/INT KI/SCAR CAS/FAC XATK SEAD ESC C2 ES REC QRS AR

ATO Sortie Flow

0600-1200

Figure 1. Notional ISR synchronization matrix. Displays lack of overlap for 

notional assets such as the RC-135 (RJ), EP-3, U-2, and COBRA BALL; no 

integration of NTISR. (Reprinted from Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures 3-3–AOC, Operational Employment Air Operations Center, 12 

March 2012, 6–100.)

03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 00 01 02 03

Non-Photo Light

Sunrise/Set

Thermal X -Over

SENIOR SCOUT

COBRA BALL

RJ

JSTARS

MQ-1

U-2 ETP SYERS

U-2 ETP ASARS U-2 ETP SYERS

RJ

RJ

MQ-1

MQ-1 MQ-1

MQ-1

EP-3

EP-3

EP-3

COBRA BALL

COBRA BALL

U-2 ETP ASARS

Figure 2. Sample ATO sortie flow showing planned XCAS/convoy escort 

sorties—likely NTISR candidates. (Reprinted from Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-3–AOC, 4-42.)
7

The issue of ownership is something the NTISR capability needs to 

overcome to ensure true joint operations, even within the Air Force. Currently, most NTISR assets “belong” to operations, not intelligence. This is 

contrary to traditional ISR assets, which belong to intelligence and not 

operations. Pulling a strike asset from a mission such as XCAS to operate 

in an NTISR capacity is usually not that difficult, mainly because XCAS is 

a capability placeholder for an aircraft that does not have an assigned JTAR. 

However, it becomes more difficult when that strike asset is supporting an equal-or-higher priority JTAR. If the strike asset is involved with a 

troops-in-contact (TIC) situation, that possibility is nil.17 In any case, the 

strike asset must get cleared to transition from its primary assigned mission to pick up an alternate mission such as XCAS.

Similar to the JTAR for strike requests, requests for ISR emphasize the 

importance of specific required effects. Some of the ISR effects include 

signals intelligence (SIGINT), GMTI, FMV, and any combination of EO, 

IR, and SAR.18 The request for these required effects clearly points each 

capability toward specific platforms. For instance, GMTI, unless it comes 

from an NTISR asset such as the B-1 or F-15E, is a capability that only the 

E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) brings to the 

fight. Traditional FMV is a capability the MQ-1 and MQ-9 offer, yet a 

pseudo version is available with the platform employing the Sniper XR 

equipped with video downlink (VDL) (fig. 3). 

Figure 3. VDL-equipped Sniper XR/ATP. (USAF photograph by SSgt Darnell 

Cannady.)
8

Additionally, EO, IR, and SAR capabilities exist on the MQ-1, MQ-9, 

and U-2. Requests help to narrow required effects to specific ISR platforms, but they do not take into account the capabilities of NTISR. Assigning a strike asset to an ISR primary mission will not happen.

Very few, if any, of OEF combat sorties over the last decade were originally planned as NTISR.19 NTISR is actually a capability executed within 

XCAS, either as armed overwatch or armed surveillance.20 Ground units 

routinely request CAS and then use the aircraft in a nontraditional role, 

such as scanning lines of communications (LOC) for improvised explosive devices (IED), convoy escort, or tracking suspect individuals with a 

targeting pod. Sometimes ground units are not even outside the wire for 

these requests, viewing the aircraft’s VDL feed through a remotely operated 

video enhanced receiver (ROVER) from the inside of the tactical operations center (TOC), which is how armed surveillance came about. Combat strike aircraft effectively turn into ISR platforms for the supported 

ground unit, providing a kind of pseudo-FMV through its VDL feed to 

the ROVER. This identifies how ground units figured out how to circumnavigate the red tape involved at the higher coordination levels, finding 

ingenious ways to get the desired effect they require while also preserving 

an adequate kinetic option.21 It is just the nature of the current beast as 

LD/HD platforms are unable to fulfill 100 percent of requests for traditional ISR.

Transitioning between traditional and nontraditional ISR roles is a 

prime example of flexibility, a tenet of airpower the Air Force understandably embraces. As demands for ISR increased by approximately 

3,000 percent over the last decade, the Air Force had to find ways to increase supply.22 While this sends the Air Force on the path of achieving its 

goal of 65 combat air patrols (CAP) by 2013, it does not necessarily embody flexibility. The Air Force reacted to the additional CAPs with increased acquisitions of the MQ-1 and MQ-9. August of 2011 finally saw 

the full complement of 268 MQ-1s reached, with 79 of a planned 400 

MQ-9s also acquired. 23 Increased demands for the persistent coverage 

that remotely piloted aircraft offer have caused the Air Force to become 

unnecessarily shortsighted. These aircraft, while filling an operational requirement, currently enjoy a threat-permissive environment and are not 

especially agile. 

Unfortunately, the data NTISR collects are usually fleeting. The images 

and weapon system video (WSV) obtained from the aircraft are usually 

not included in processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED). They 

are used for that operation and then they are gone, unless incorporated 

into a larger requirement such as the location of IEDs. Necessity drove 

invention with reporting specific data following NTISR operations. This 
9

process was a result of the increased IED activity in both OIF and OEF 

and the inability of LD/HD ISR assets to fulfill the requirement. Named 

an EYELID report, it was something an aircraft conducting XCAS or 

NTISR provided the operations center either immediately or upon completion of its vulnerability period in Iraq or Afghanistan.24 It involved 

EO/IR-capable aircraft scanning LOCs for suspicious activity or locations 

of IEDs. As with the SCUD hunt during the early parts of OIF, EYELID 

reports were not particularly effective. Though initially a good concept, 

finding IEDs using EO/IR capabilities fell short because of the combining 

of the EO/IR capabilities, the high false alarm rate, and the processes involved with PED. Duplication of effort was common because the data 

gleaned from EYELID reports rarely made it back to the aircrew supporting the mission, which increased the amount of similar information 

coming into the AOC.25 The potential increases in data that NTISR provides lead to questions of PED because of potential increased personnel 

requirements to accomplish this feat, not just a deconfliction of effort.

The larger amounts of data mean nothing if there is not an equally 

large number of personnel for PED. There was a 1,500 percent increase in 

the volume of data associated with traditional ISR with a minuscule 

increase in the ability of PED since combat operations began in 2001.26

The inclusion of data from NTISR could potentially overwhelm the system 

if it is deemed worthy of analyzing. Currently there are multiple teams responsible for roughly the same product when it comes to PED, although 

the PED management team within the ISR division (ISRD) is specifically 

assigned the task (fig. 4).27

AOC Director

Strat Div

ISR Ops

Strategist*

Combat Plans

Div

ISR Ops

Planners*

ISRD

Combat Ops

Div

ISR Ops Duty

Officer

Air Mobility

Div

PED

Management

Team

*Embedded ISR Ops team personnel

Figure 4. PED management team organization. (Reprinted from AFTTP 

3-3–AOC, 6-121.)
10

Duplication of effort does not help the Air Force toward its goal of cost 

efficiency. The Air Force cannot afford to have a smaller force executing 

the same functions; something has to give.

Automation is one area the Air Force should consider to solve the 

problem of increased data bogging down the ability of PED. The current 

primary source of potential intelligence within NTISR involves IMINT, 

specifically static images and WSV. Plenty of data is available to support 

PED, like coordinates (latitude, longitude, and elevation), slant range, 

type of image (IR/TV), observed object type (building, individuals, etc.), 

orientation (relative to true north), and even an object’s relative size. Tagging or embedding this data into each image or video helps ease the organization of information and search process once it is posted into a 

common database. This is similar to new processes implemented within 

the RPA fleet for tagging FMV.28 Once each image is tagged with the appropriate information and sent forward for possible PED, automation 

could take over to help analysts determine whether or not the data deserves more study.29

A single database with a more powerful search engine for submitting 

and distributing acquired ISR data is required. There are several opportunities to input the same data into various systems, increasing the likelihood 

for duplication of effort. Unit intelligence personnel should imbed appropriate information the data obtained from NTISR assets before submitting it for further PED, such as the aforementioned data available 

from current targeting pods (coordinates, elevation, etc.). Key imbedded 

and searchable information will help determine whether that data is useful for further PED. There must be a streamlining of effort that also allows technology to work for the various users, not against them. If not, 

there is a risk of suffering from the autonomy paradox, which states that 

the systems designed to reduce the need for human operators will require 

more manpower to support them, much like the support structure required for each RPA CAP.30

Currently, both the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) 

and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) are working toward integration of data into a shared cloud architecture. This migration makes accessing the data more secure and faster, plus adds an extra benefit: mobility. 

Over 7 million pieces of information technology (IT) infrastructure are 

within both the National Security Agency (NSA) and the DOD. Moving 

this infrastructure to a cloud environment with shared databases enables 

the intelligence community (IC) to perform deeper analysis.31 Moving 

data gathered from both traditional and nontraditional ISR assets to a 

cloud architecture has the potential to increase capability and streamline 

operations. 
11

Technology can assist the Air Force in becoming a more agile, flexible, 

and ready force in the face of looming manpower and budget cuts. With 

each RPA CAP requiring 120 personnel, this seems like a tall order, especially with the goal of attaining 65 CAPs by 2013.32 Current Air Force 

priorities favor multirole platforms over those with narrowly focused 

capabilities.33 Interestingly, a large amount of its budget and effort is 

geared toward supporting platforms that will not deliver that multirole 

capability for several years. Platforms such as the F-35, the long-range 

strike bomber, and the KC-46 tanker still resemble those with traditional 

niche capabilities. In fact, the United States Air Force Posture Statement

gives the KC-46 top priority followed by the F-35; ISR systems are third 

followed by the long-range strike system and space capabilities.34 This 

makes the case for a cheaper multirole alternative extremely appealing to 

a fiscally constrained force. 

Promoting multirole capabilities and executing this plan are two different things the Air Force must bring together. Though NTISR currently 

suffers from a lack in breadth of capability, it still provides a potential 

launching point for future multirole ideas. The Sniper XR is a very capable 

system and is transferrable between different types of aircraft, adding not 

only a capability, but multiple roles. This same concept could be applied 

to an entirely new collection pod with additional capabilities (multispectral, 

hyperspectral, light detection, and ranging [LIDAR], etc). This collection 

pod requires standardization, similar to the Sniper XR, but also to how 

combat aircraft utilize standard weapons. For instance, the GBU-38 

(guided bomb unit), a 500 lb class weapon, is easily transferrable between 

different combat aircraft. The lug spacing required to attach it to the aircraft is the same at 14 inches, with the addition of a fuze and an umbilical 

connecting to the aircraft. The only difference is how the GBU-38 reaches 

its target; the delivery method changes. The same is true for a possible 

collection pod, whether that delivery method is low, high, fast, persistent, 

and so forth. However, developing such a pod would require commitment of time and money by the Air Force. It certainly would be time and 

money well spent. A new collection pod would increase capability, provide more flexibility, and make the Air Force much more agile than it is 

in its current form. 

Though the advisability of investing time and money into a new system 

may seem flawed, it is quite the opposite. The Air Force’s budget specifically protects science and technology funding.35 Being agile, flexible, and 

cost-effective is the way ahead, and a new collection pod will benefit the 

Air Force across all of these goals. The Air Force is already cutting 280 

aircraft across a wide range of capabilities, such as the A-10, F-16, RQ-4 

Block 30, E-8, and multiple airlift/tanker assets.36 Personnel are also seeing 
12

reductions, with 9,900 active-duty, Guard, and Reserve Airmen being cut 

based on a new force restructuring. These are the first of many sacrificial 

lambs the Air Force must abandon in order to continue funding other 

programs, such as the F-35, MQ-9, modern radars, precision munitions, 

and contributors to the new Air-Sea Battle Concept.37 Adding a collection 

pod would not only help fill a capability that is currently LD/HD, but also 

would provide a sensor that is well worth the investment for future conflicts.38

ISR assets will always be in high demand because information is what 

drives military decision making. Finding a commander that requests the 

least amount of information possible would be a difficult task in today’s 

military. The Air Force reacted to increasing ISR requests with a nearequal increase in assets that could support the mission and fill the requirement. Fortunately, there is a way ahead. An additional collection 

pod would not only help augment the LD/HD assets in the current fight, 

but provide an undeniably beneficial capability to any current or future 

combatant commander, no matter what the area of responsibility (AOR). 

This collection pod should also be considered for Air Mobility Command 

(AMC) aircraft, such as the C-130 and KC-135. Having a highly adaptable 

and modular force is the essence of flexibility. Instead of spending an 

enormous amount of money on capability-specific aircraft, the Air Force 

should focus on augmenting current aircraft with multiple capabilities. 

This would help realign the Air Force to its goal of becoming more responsive, agile, and cost-effective. 

The additional capability a collection pod brings to the current and 

future fight is worth rigorous examination. A total of 522 pods have been 

produced at $1.6 million each for a total of $835.2 million.39 The low-rate 

initial production (LRIP) batch cost of a single F-35 is currently at $203.4 

million. This will only increase in the short term, with the F-35C variant 

estimated at $235.8 million per aircraft.40 The total production of Sniper 

pods is the equivalent of four F-35As or three and one-half F-35Cs. 

Though these prices will likely decrease once the aircraft enters full-scale 

production in a few years, this is a prime example of how the Air Force 

potentially could refocus its financial efforts to a new collection pod. 

Adding this collection pod to existing combat aircraft increases flexibility 

and agility not only in today’s fight, but future fights as well.

The threat-permissive environment currently enjoyed by ISR assets 

today cannot be relied upon for future operations. This will make the 

majority of RPAs incapable of delivering on their ISR mission, causing 

commanders to rely more on other sources for ISR, such as stand-off ISR 

from the RC-135, P-3, E-8, or U-2. Unfortunately, a nonpermissive environment may preclude these high-value airborne assets (HVAA) from 

penetrating too deeply into contested airspace. This would cause a heavy 
13

reliance on ISR support from other means, such as satellites. Satellite assets may or may not be available or provide the necessary fidelity or even 

amount of information to the commander. A collection pod strapped to 

any strike asset (independent of service) would help to resolve this conundrum, provided it is a capability that is integrated in the same manner 

as the Sniper XR. However, the capability needs to be taken one step further.

Any targeting, sensor, or jamming pod can provide instant flexibility 

and modularity. It provides flexibility, much in the same manner that the 

Sniper XR augments onboard sensors. In a contested environment, the collection pod could serve as an additional RWR to the host aircraft while 

collecting information. This data could transfer via a link similar to, yet 

separate from, something such as Link-16. The various pods would share 

information on this link and transfer this data to the aircraft (plus additional assets), such as SIGINT from one geographic area and COMINT 

from another. Cross cueing of these sensors could provide the host aircraft (or flight of aircraft) with additional threat information, but also the 

ability to rapidly target these enemy systems and significantly reduce the 

time involved with the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess kill chain 

(F2T2EA). 

In addition to reducing the kill chain, a collection pod benefits both 

ISR planners and operations. Currently, there is a discrepancy between 

Air Force doctrine and the way it conducts ISR operations. Despite a 

January 2012 rewrite, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-0, Global 

Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance Operations, still 

separates ISR from the rest of Air Force operations. For example, the Air 

Force has eliminated references to “in direct support of . . . operations” 

from its definition of ISR, something that the joint definition still includes.41 Instead, the Air Force opted for a “global integrated ISR” posture, arguing it is a “cross-domain synchronization and integration of the 

planning and operation of ISR assets” and sensors.42 There are several 

references to global and more traditional ISR platforms, such as the U-2, 

RQ-4, and MQ-9. However, the Air Force’s perspective on global integrated ISR claims that it is “domain, service and platform neutral.”43 In 

fact, there is not a single reference to NTISR in the current publication. 

An integrated ISR pod would help bring the “in direct support of operations” piece back into the definition, providing a capability that is truly 

domain, service, and platform neutral.

While the actual non-ISR asset may not be available for retasking, its 

sensor may be available. This could be accomplished through various 

means: reprogramming, data link, satellites, and so forth. Ownership of 

the actual platform is not required. Instead, the platform (A-10, F-16, 

B-52, etc.) acts as a sensor bus for the collection pod, gathering data as 
14

part of its originally planned mission or through dynamic tasking. For 

larger aircraft, such as the B-1, use of the extra external hardpoint allows 

it to carry not only the Sniper XR but the additional collection pod. If this 

is not possible, the advantage of flying in formation (two-ship or more) 

allows use of both the Sniper XR and collection pod, depending on the 

configuration and aircraft load out; this holds true for fighter aircraft as 

well. The added benefit of the collection pod far outweighs the cost of 

removing one weapon from a fighter or a Sniper XR from a two-ship of 

bombers (where the load out is not affected).

Integration into an established aircraft system provides a certain 

amount of control, but a predetermined amount of automation makes 

this capability more viable in a semi- or nonpermissive threat environment. Automating the collection pod precludes any added work for the 

aircrew, something that causes issues in a semi- or nonpermissive environment. If the collection pod were integrated with the aircraft systems, especially the INS and Global Positioning System (GPS) feeds onboard all 

military aircraft, it could know its position at all times and be able to 

“sniff ” for different types of information (ELINT, COMINT, etc.) at predetermined geographical points. It could also be fitted with a separate 

GPS antenna that has selective availability antispoofing module (SAASM) 

abilities, similar to that currently used on equipped joint direct attack 

munitions (JDAM).

In addition to communicating between pods for real-time data, these 

collection pods could store information on board for later processing. 

This would not only provide redundancy in between different collection 

pods, but provide a sound system of information distribution in case the 

pod link fails. Data storage onto the pod itself and downloading the data 

postmission are options. While this would not necessarily add to the current fight, it could prove beneficial for future operations later in the ATO 

cycle. Parametric data, location, emission times, and other data could 

also be brought back and exploited through ground-based systems. This 

is not impossible considering the potential for contested electronic warfare (EW) environments.

While the concept of a new collection pod seems reasonable but 

highly unrealistic, it deserves consideration for integration in today’s Air 

Force arsenal. NTISR, through the use of externally mounted pods such 

as the Sniper XR, is a proven combat capability. However, it is often overlooked because it does not deliver the same level of effects that traditional 

ISR assets provide. Bridging these gaps through a modular sensor with 

potential link and data storage / transfer capabilities helps solve the issues 

of restricted capabilities and fleeting data. Organization and ownership 

issues begin to dissolve because a collection pod redefines what non-
15

traditional assets bring to the ISR fight, providing the potential to collect 

additional data not normally associated with a traditional strike asset. 

Becoming a more agile and flexible Air Force in the wake of looming 

budget cuts depends on creative use of decreasing platform and personnel strengths. If the Air Force is serious in pursuing true multirole capabilities and sacrificing niche ones, it must consider options that further 

its ability to conduct operations not only in the current fight and with 

current platforms but future fights as well. 

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

1. “Air Force Priorities for a New Strategy with Constrained Budgets,” White paper, 2. 

2. “Active Duty Military Personnel, 1940–2011,” Infoplease. 

3. The term platform is not exclusive to aircraft but is focused primarily on those that 

support operations (aircraft, satellites, operations centers, and so forth).

4. Briefing, General James.

5. Ibid. Other commands supported include Air Force Special Operations Command, 

United States Air Forces Europe, Pacific Air Command Air Forces, Air Mobility Command, Air 

Force Materiel Command, and Air Force Reserve Command.

6. Hill, “Airman’s View of NTISR,” 5. 

7. Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets, 33–4.

8. Ibid., 40–42.

9. “Air Force Fact Sheet: LANTIRN.”

10. “AN/AAQ-28(V) LITENING Targeting Pod,” Northrop Grumman. 

11. Sniper XR uses image-processing algorithms to enhance displayed images. The XR 

(extended range) feature of the Sniper XR digitally combines four magnified frames around 

the crosshairs to enhance the image, but can be influenced by range to the viewed target as 

well as relative motion. 

12. IMINT (imagery intelligence) “involves the collection and analysis of images that are 

recorded and stored.” Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-0, Global Integrated Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations, 39.

13. This is based on personal experience. 

14. Hill, “Airman’s View of NTISR,” 6. 

15. Hinote, Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution, 41.

16. Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-3–AOC, Operational 

Employment, Air Operations Center, 4-44. While I have planned and flown a plethora of 

missions, I have never actually seen this spreadsheet.

17. A troops-in-contact (TIC) situation is the highest-priority mission at a given time. 

Strike assets can get pulled from relatively high-priority joint tactical air requests to support a 

TIC because friendly troops are in direct contact with the enemy. While these situations do not 

always require a kinetic option, it is a possibility. 

18. 505th Operations Squadron Joint Integration Team, “Step-by-Step Guide.” 

19. While several missions were labeled as NTISR on the Mission Analysis Tool, they were 

usually labeled that after an aircraft conducting on-call close air support was reroled to NTISR.

20. Hill, “Airman’s View of NTISR,” 5.

21. While the MQ-9 may carry both AGM-114 and GBU-12, its load out is significantly 

smaller than even the smallest strike aircraft.

22. Schanz, “New Normal for RPAs,” 52.

23. McCullough, “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Fleet Nears Combat Milestone.”
16

24. 480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Wing Instruction 14-101, 

Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations.

25. I personally flew several missions in OEF where the same data was reported several 

times to a specific Army or Marine unit without ever making it to the aircrew. Therefore, we 

duplicated our efforts quite often when conducting XCAS or NTISR in support of ground 

units. Often the same LOC would be scanned with the same potential improvised explosive 

devices’ locations gathered by different aircrew on different air tasking order days. 

26. Costlow, “Kehler Raises Trial Balloon.”

27. Other teams involved include the imagery support element, processing, exploitation, and 

dissemination (PED) liaison officers (LNO), ISR operations duty officers, senior intelligence duty 

officers, ISR division LNOs, specific platform LNOs, and other PED nodes.

28. Schanz, “New Normal for RPAs,” 53.

29. Costlow, “Kehler Raises Trial Balloon.”

30. Blackhurst, Gresham, and Stone, “The Autonomy Paradox,” 21.

31. “GEOINT Community Hammers Out Integration Strategies,” Semantic Community.

32. Fulghum, “Afghan War Demands Flexible Weaponry.”

33. “Air Force Priorities for a New Strategy with Constrained Budgets,” white paper. 

34. Department Of the Air Force, Fiscal Year 2012 Air Force Posture Statement, 1. 

35. “Air Force Priorities for a New Strategy with Constrained Budgets,” White paper, 4.

36. Ibid., 3.

37. Ibid., 4.

38. This pod would not include integration on “stealth” aircraft for obvious reasons.

39. “Sniper XR,” Deagel.com. 

40. Briganti, “Analysis: F-35 LRIP [low-rate initial production] 5 Contracts.”

41. AFDD 2-0, Global Integrated ISR Operations, 1; and Joint Publication 1-02, Department 

of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 139.

42. AFDD 2-0, Global Integrated ISR Operations, 1.

43. Ibid., 3.
17

Abbreviations

ACC Air Combat Command

AF/A2 USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

AF/A3/5 USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

Plans, and Requirements

AFRC Air Force Reserve Command

AMC Air Mobility Command

ANG Air National Guard

AOC air operations center

AOR area of responsibility

ATO air tasking order

ATP advance targeting pod

BCA Budget Control Act

CAP combat air patrol

CAS close air support

COIN counterinsurgency

COMINT communications intelligence

CONOPS concept of operations

DNI Director of National Intelligence

DOD Department of Defense

ELINT electronic intelligence

EO/IR electrooptical/infrared

EW electronic warfare

F2T2EA find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess kill 

chain

FLIR forward-looking infrared

FMV full motion video

GBU guided bomb unit

GEOINT geospatial intelligence

GMTI ground moving target indicator

GPS Global Positioning System

HVAA high-value airborne asset

IC intelligence community

IED improvised explosive device

IMINT imagery intelligence

INS inertial navigation system
18

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

ISRD intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

division

IT information technology

JDAM joint direct attack munition

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

JTAR joint tactical air strike request

LANTIRN low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared 

for night

LCTP laptop controlled targeting pod

LD/HD low-density/high-demand

LIDAR light detection and ranging

LNO liaison officer

LOC line of communications

LRIP low-rate initial production

LSS laser spot search

LST laser spot tracker

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSA National Security Agency

NTISR nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance 

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OPR office of primary responsibility

PED processing, exploitation, and dissemination

POI points of interest

ROVER remotely operated video enhanced receiver

RPA remotely piloted aircraft

RWR radar warning receiver

SA situational awareness

SAASM selective availability antispoofing module

SAR synthetic aperture radar

SECAF Secretary of the Air Force

SIDO senior intelligence duty officer

SIGINT signals intelligence

SODO senior operations duty officer

TIC troops in contact

TOC tactical operations center
19

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

VDL video downlink

WSV weapon system video

XCAS on-call close air support

XR extended range

21

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