SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0568-18T3

IL H. RHEE,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DANTE JOA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted September 24, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Fisher and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No. C000131-17.

Tomas Espinosa, attorney for appellant.

Becker, LLC, attorneys for respondent (David J. 

Sprong, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Dante Joa appeals a General Equity Part summary judgment 

order, which granted declaratory relief to plaintiff Il H. Rhee by rescinding a 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 1, 2019
2

A-0568-18T3

stock purchase agreement and returning plaintiff's deposit. Defendant also 

appeals the subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration. Finding no 

merit in defendant's arguments, we affirm.

The genesis of this appeal is the sale of a medical training school, related 

corporate entities, and a medical trade entity from defendant and the estate of 

his deceased mother, Martha Cecilia Martinez (Estate) to plaintiff. The Estate 

was the sole shareholder of the school and related entities; defendant was the 

sole shareholder of the trade entity. 

Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff agreed to pay $550,000 in 

exchange for all shares of the school, the related entities, and the trade entity. 

Plaintiff paid an initial deposit of $150,000 upon signing the agreement; 

$100,000 of that amount was released to defendant, and the remaining $50,000 

was held in escrow by plaintiff's attorney, Jae Y. Young Oh, Esq. The agreement 

provided Young Oh would release the escrowed funds to defendant after Young 

Oh obtained ancillary letters of administration1for the Estate. Inexplicably, 

shortly after plaintiff paid the deposit and defendant paid Young Oh to obtain 

the letters, defendant reversed course and instructed Young Oh "to stop the 

 

1 Before the parties executed the agreement, Martinez died intestate as a resident 

of the Dominican Republic. 
3

A-0568-18T3

process of obtaining the letter of administration for the [E]state" and return the 

$50,000 held in escrow to plaintiff. 

Accordingly, Young Oh released the escrowed funds to plaintiff. Despite 

plaintiff's repeated demands and claims that "[their] agreement was null and 

void," defendant failed to return plaintiff's $100,000 deposit. In May 2017, 

plaintiff filed a verified complaint for legal and equitable relief, primarily 

seeking to rescind the agreement and recover his deposit.2 Defendant filed an 

answer and asserted various affirmative defenses and counterclaims. 

At the close of discovery, plaintiff successfully moved for summary 

judgment. In a detailed statement of reasons accompanying a July 23, 2018 

amended order, the motion judge determined there were no genuine disputes 

about the material facts that would entitle plaintiff to relief. 

In sum, the judge found plaintiff tendered the full deposit; defendant 

instructed Young Oh to cease all efforts to obtain ancillary letters of 

administration for the Estate; and those letters of administration were essential 

to the transaction. The judge elaborated:

 

2 For reasons which are unclear from the record, after plaintiff filed his 

complaint, defendant obtained the ancillary letters of administration from the 

Hudson County Surrogate's Office. 
4

A-0568-18T3

Defendant represented to [p]laintiff that he is the 

executor for his mother's Will in the Dominican 

Republic. Obtaining a letter of administration in order 

for [d]efendant to have legal title to sell shares in the 

[s]chool was a crucial provision of the [agreement]. 

Without such authority, [d]efendant did not have the 

legal right to transfer the [Estate's] shares of stock. 

 

The motion judge also properly rejected defendant's contention that his 

mother's alleged inter vivos gift of her shares of stock in the school obviated his 

failure to obtain ancillary letters of administration. In doing so, the judge cited 

defendant's sworn statements "that the document purported to gift shares of the 

[s]chool to [d]efendant is a power of attorney authorizing . . . [d]efendant to 

'operate' not 'sell' the school." 

On September 18, 2018, another judge denied defendant's motion for 

reconsideration, finding defendant did not demonstrate the first motion judge 

"acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner and [did] not 

substantiate his claim that the [first motion judge] acted irrationally." Notably, 

the second motion judge rejected defendant's renewed claim that the shares of 

the school were an inter vivos gift.

Defendant now appeals, raising the following points for our consideration:

I. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT 

CONSIDERING THAT [DEFENDANT] MET THE 

REQUIREMENTS FOR RECONSIDERATION 

UNDER R[ULE] 4:49-2.
5

A-0568-18T3

II. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN LIGHT OF 

POINT I AND IT SHOULD HA[VE] 

RECONSIDERED ITS DECISION AND SHOULD

HA[VE] DENIED [PLAINTIFF]’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

III. THE MOTHER OF [DEFENDANT] GIFTED 

INTER[]VIVO[S] ALL RIGHTS OVER THE 

SCHOOL, EXISTING AND FOR THE FUTURE TO 

[DEFENDANT] HER SON.

IV. THE COURT BELOW WAS INCORRECTLY 

AND PALPABLY WRONG AND IT APPLIED 

ANCILLARY JURISDICTION TO THE ESTATE

OF [DEFENDANT]’S MOTHER.

V. THE JURISDICTION THAT GOVERN[S] THE 

INHERITANCE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, 

CHOSE[] IN ACTION IS THE DOMICILE OF THE 

DECEDENT.

VI. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

[DEFENDANT] HAD NO[] STANDING TO BRING 

THE DAMAGES MADE AGAINST THE SCHOOL

AND THE [MEDICAL TRADE ENTITY].

VII. THE COURT WAS ALSO WRONG IN NOT 

APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RELATING BACK 

TO THE DATE OF THE AGREEMENT WHEN 

EVENTUALLY AFTER TAKING FROM 

[PLAINTIFF'S] ATTORNEY THE DOCUMEN[]TS, 

BECAUSE THE INACTION OF [PLAINTIFF]'S 

ATTORNEY, THEN, [DEFENDANT] USED 

ANOTHER ATTORNEY TO OBTAIN LETTERS OF 

ADMINISTRATION.

VIII. THE ANCILLARY JURISDICTION WAS 

MISCONTRUED BY THE COURT.
6

A-0568-18T3

We have considered these contentions in light of the record and applicable 

legal principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in our written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the following 

brief remarks. 

Applying our deferential standard of review to the judge's order denying 

reconsideration, Granata v. Broderick, 446 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 

2016), we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in the motion judge's 

cogent rider that accompanied the order. We simply note a motion for 

reconsideration "is not appropriate merely because a litigant is dissatisfied with 

a decision of the court or wishes to reargue a motion . . . ." Palombi v. Palombi, 

414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010). 

When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we apply "the 

same standard governing the trial court . . . ." Oyola v. Liu, 431 N.J. Super. 493, 

497 (App. Div. 2013). We owe no deference to the motion judge's conclusions 

on issues of law. Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 

366, 378 (1995). Even viewing the facts and inferences most favorably to 

defendant in this case, Rule 4:46; Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 

N.J. 395, 406 (2014), we discern no genuine issues of material fact. 
7

A-0568-18T3

As the judge aptly recognized, defendant failed "to provide affidavits 

which not only contradict those submitted by [p]laintiff, but offer credible 

substantive factual disparities." For those reasons, and the extensive analysis 

conducted by the judge, we conclude he correctly granted plaintiff's summary 

judgment motion and affirm for the reasons expressed in his comprehensive 

written decision. 

Affirmed.