TWICE

the Citizen

A History of the United States

Army Reserve, 190&-1983

RICHARD B. CROSSLAND

Lieutenant Colonel. USAIi

JAMES T. CURRIE

Major, USAR

Accesion For

NTIS CRA&I

DTIC TAB

Unannounced

Justification

By

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Availabi'.'ty Codes

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Avail and /or

Special

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve

Washington, DC

1984

19950228 059
Acknowledgments

The authors of this study owe debts of gratitude to numerous individuals who helped with what has been by

history-writing standards a whirlwind project. Special support was offered from the beginning by Maj. Gen. William

R. Berkman, Chief, Army Reserve, and after he joined

OCAR, by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Mott, III, Deputy Chief,

Army Reserve.

Our immediate supervisor, Lewis C. Brodsky, Director

of Public Affairs, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, has

given the entire project his complete and whole-hearted support. We are grateful that amidst the more glamorous fanfare that accompanied the Seventy-fifth Anniversary celebrations for the USAR, he never lost sight of the usefulness

and importance of the history project. We owe you a lot,

Lew.

The people who helped us locate and collect materials

for this study were many. Personnel in the Modern Military

Branch of the National Archives were always helpful, particularly Will Mahoney. At the Army's Center of Military History, Hannah Zeidlik and Karl Cocke guided us to documents we might otherwise have missed, and Mr. Cocke and

Col. Bettie Morden spent considerable time and effort reviewing the manuscript for us. Within the Army Library at

the Pentagon, Patricia Tugwell was always ready to assist us

in locating an obscure first name or resolving an inconsistency. Bill Hauser at the US Forest Services Audio-Visual

Archives furnished pictures of the CCC, while the Defense

Audiovisual Agency Archives were a treasure trove of old

photographs for the book.

DTJC QUÄLET INSPECTED 44 iH
IV TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Other individual historians who shared with us their

knowledge and comments were the Chief of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Historical Office—Willard Webb—and some of his

staff members, specifically Walter Poole, Helen Bailey, and

Truman Strobridge. Capt. Leonid Kondratiuk, Historian for

the National Guard Bureau, was critical, but perceptive in

what he had to say. To all of you, we offer our heartfelt

gratitude. We absolve you, however, from any remaining

differences or errors of fact or interpretation, for we were

sometimes too stubborn to take your well-thought suggestions, or our own research led us to different conclusions

from yours.

To Lynda Poole, who alone bore the typing load for

this project in addition to her many other duties, we give

our thanks.

Finally, we want to recognize our families. The spouses

of military personnel always put up with so much, and our

wives—Maryanna Crossland and Janis Rabbitt Currie—have

endured this project with the greatest of patience and understanding. We have enjoyed researching and writing this

book, and we hope that it may prove useful and interesting

to the reader.

RICHARD B. CROSSLAND JAMES T. CURRIE

Lieutenant Colonel, USAR Major, USAR

United States Army Training Washington, DC

and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Va.

September 1983

Da Pam 140-14
Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS III

LIST OF TABLES VU

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS IX

FOREWORD xiH

1 Before There Was an Army Reserve 1

2 The Early Years 17

3 Between the World Wars, 1919-1939 33

4 Mobilization and War, 1940-1945 63

5 Peace—and War Again, 1946-1953 79

6 The Eisenhower Years, 1953-1961 115

7 The Berlin Mobilization 133

8 Reorganizations Lay the Groundwork

for the Total Army Policy 149

9 The Army Reserve and Vietnam 193

10 Toward Greater Partnership 211

Epilogue 267

Appendix A Chiefs of the Army Reserve 271

Appendix B Army Reserve (Organized Reserve Corps)

Appropriations 273

Appendix C Army Reserve Units Mobilized in 1968 277
TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Appendix D Post-Vietnam Emergency Use of the Army Reserve 291

Appendix E Strength of the Army Reserve Prior to World War II

295

Appendix F Strength of the Army Reserve after World War II 297

Appendix G Army Reservists on Active Duty—1948-1982 299

Appendix H Examples of USAR Units as Percentage of the Total

Army 301

Index 317

Photographs follow Chapters Three, Five, and Eight
List of Tables

Table 2-1 Number of Physicians in the US Army, 1908-1916 19

Table 3-1 ROTC Appointments in the ORC, 1920-1937 39

Table 3-2 ROTC and CMTC, FY's 1925-1928 40

Table 3-3 Active Duty Training (15 Days or less) of ORC Members,

1924-1930 41

Table 3—4 Active Duty Training (14 Days or Less) of ORC Members,

1931-1940 48

Table 3-5 Extension Course Enrollment, 1923-1931 50

Table 4-1 Percentage of Organized Reservists in Officer Cadres 71

Table 5-1 ORC Strength, December 31, 1947 88

Table 8-1 Comparison of Present and Proposed Reserve Component

Structure (1965) 166

Table 8—2 Force Structure and Organization (Three Brigade Plan—

1967) 178

Table 9-1 Units Mobilized 203

Vll
Acronyms and

Abbreviations

ACS Assistant Chief of Staff (Army)

ADT Active Duty for Training

AEF American Expeditionary Force

AGF Army Ground Forces

AGI Annual General Inspection

AGR Active Guard and Reserve

AIT Advanced Individual Training

Amb Ambulance

AMOPS Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System

AMSA Area Maintenance Support Activities

ARCOM Army Commendation Medal; Army Reserve Command

ARMC Army Readiness and Mobilization Command

ARNG Army National Guard

ARR Army Readiness Region

ART Army Reserve Technician

ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program

ATT Army Training Test

AUS Army of the United States

AW Automatic Weapon

AWOL Absent without leave

Bn Battalion

Brig. Gen. Brigadier General

BUT Basic Unit Training

Capt. Captain

CAR Chief, Army Reserve

CASP Civilian Acquired Skills Program

CCC Civilian Conservation Corps

Cdr Commander

CG Commanding General
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

C&GSC US Army Command and General Staff College

CMH Center of Military History (Army)

CMTC Citizens' Military Training Camps

CNGB Chief, National Guard Bureau

Co. Company

Col. Colonel

COMUS MACV Commander, United States Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam

CONARC US Army Continental Army Command

CONUSA Continental United States Army

DA Department of the Army

DAMPL Department of the Army Master Priority List

DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

DCSPER Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Det Detachment

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

DoD Department of Defense

DS Direct Support

EO Executive Order

Equip Equipment

ERC Enlisted Reserve Corps

ERRA Executive for Reserve and R.O.T.C. Affairs

Evac Evacuation

FDR President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Fin Finance

Fltg Cft Floating Craft

FORSCOM US Army Forces Command

FY Fiscal Year

G-l General Staff (Personnel)

G-2 General Staff (Intelligence)

G-3 General Staff (Plans and Operations)

GAO General Accounting Office

Gen General

GOCOM General Officer Command

GPO Government Printing Office

GS General Support

General Staff

HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Hosp Hospital

HQ Headquarters

H.R. House of Representatives

IADT Inactive Duty Training (drill)

IDT Inactive Duty Training

IMA Individual Mobilization Augmentee

Inf Infantry

IRR Individual Ready Reserve
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS XI

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

L&LD Legislation and Liaison Division

Lt. Lieutenant

Lt. Col. Lieutenant Colonel

Lt. Gen. Lieutenant General

M16 Standard Vietnam-era military rifle, caliber 5.56 mm

Maint Maintenance

Maj. Major

Maj. Gen. Major General

MCAR Military Construction, Army Reserve

M-Day Mobilization Day

Med Medical

MI Military Intelligence

MOBDES Mobilization Designee

MOBEX Mobilization Exercise

MOBPERS Mobilization Personnel Processing System

MOS Military Occupation Specialty

Msg Message

MSP Mutual Support Program

MTCA Military Training Camps Association

MUSARC Major United States Army Reserve Command

NG National Guard

OCAR Office of the Chief, Army Reserve

OER Officer Evaluation Report

OERRA Office of the Executive for Reserve and R.O.T.C. Affairs

OMA Operations and Maintenance, Army

OMAR Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve

OR Organized Reserve [Corps]

ORC Office of Reserve Components

Officers' Reserve Corps

Organized Reserve Corps

Ord Ordnance

Ortho Orthopedic

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

Pers Personnel

Petr Petroleum

PIO Public Information Officer

PL Public Law

PMP Protective Mobilization Plan

POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

POM Program Objective Memorandum

PX Post Exchange

QM Quartermaster

RA Regular Army

RAR Regular Army Reserve

RDF-A Rapid Deployment Force—Army
TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

RDJTF Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

REP-63 Reserve Enlistment Program—1963

RFA Reserve Forces Act of 1955

RG Readiness Group

Record Group (National Archives)

ROA Reserve Officers Association

ROAD Reorganization Objective Army Division

ROPA Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954

ROTC Reserve Officers Training Corps

RPA Reserve Personnel, Army

RRMRP Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool

RROTC Reserve and ROTC Affairs

RTU Reinforcement Training Unit

RVN Republic of [South] Vietnam

SARCA Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association

Sec Section

SGLI Servicemen's Group Life Insurance

SP Self-propelled

Spt Support

SRF Selected Reserve Force

SRIP Selected Reserve Incentive Program

SSAA Senior Staff Administrative Assistant

STRAF Strategic Reserve Army Forces

Sup Supply

Surg Surgery, Surgical

Svc Service

TAG The Adjutant General, US Army

TAGO The Adjutant General's Office

T/O Table of Organization

TOA Total Obligation Authority

TOE Table of Organization and Equipment

Trans Transportation

Trk Truck

USAR United States Army Reserve

USAREC US Army Recruiting Command

VHA Variable Housing Allowance

WAC Women's Army Corps
Foreword

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) had its official

birth on April 23, 1908, in an act "To Increase the

Efficiency of the Medical Department of the United States

Army." From this modest beginning and limited mission,

the Army Reserve has grown into a force of almost a million

men and women who are very much a part of today's Total

Army. The roots of the Army Reserve go back much further

than 1908, however, for the concept of the citizen-soldier

was an old one even at the time of the American Revolution.

The idea of writing a history of the Army Reserve originated in November 1982 during the early stages of planning for the USAR's Seventy-fifth Anniversary celebration in

1983. It became evident to Major (now Lieutenant Colonel)

Richard B. Crossland and to Lewis C. Brodsky, Director of

Public Affairs for the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve,

that there was no readily available source of historical data

about the Army Reserve. There were bits and pieces of

USAR history scattered about, and there were legends

enough to fill a file cabinet, but there was no comprehensive, book-length history of the Army Reserve. Major

Crossland was thereupon assigned the task of writing such a

book. Given the time frame in mind for the project (less

than one year), it was soon obvious that this was not a oneperson job. Permission was therefore secured to bring in an

Army Reserve officer on a special tour of six months or so to

work on the book.

The Reserve Components Personnel and Administration

Center in St. Louis was given the task of locating an individual to do the job, and the name of James T Currie

xui
xiv TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

popped up. Major Currie was at that time (January 1983)

serving in a civilian capacity as Historian for the United

States Department of Education, and he accepted the assignment. Lieutenant Colonel Crossland and Major Currie coauthored this volume, which is the only existing history of

the Army Reserve. The authors have of necessity worked

rapidly, researching and writing a draft manuscript of 450

pages in less than 6 months. The authors realize that in any

pioneering study there are almost certainly going to be errors, both of omission and of commission. They have attempted, however, to be as accurate as possible, and every

statement of fact is based upon the most credible sources

available. They have drawn conclusions from these facts

where such seemed justified, but the conclusions are purely

their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the

Chief, Army Reserve, the Department of the Army, or the

Department of Defense.

The title of the book is taken from Winston Churchill's

statement that "The Reservist is twice the citizen," a phrase

that also figured in the Seventy-fifth Anniversary High

School Essay Contest co-sponsored by the Army Reserve and

the Reserve Officers Association. Indeed, since 1908, members of the Army Reserve have taken on responsibilities

greater than those required of most citizens, for they have

given of their weeknights and weekends and summertime

leisure to learn and train and prepare for the day when their

country might call upon them in time of war or national

emergency. From 1908 until 1948, Army Reservists received

no pay except for the time they were on active duty; the

many hours devoted to inactive duty drills and training

went unrewarded financially. Since 1948 Army Reservists

have qualified for an increasing list of benefits, including

limited post exchange and commissary privileges and, if

they serve long enough and live long enough, for retirement

pay. As the citizen-soldier concept has matured and become

an integral part of the Army, the United States has gradually given tangible recognition to the value of the Army

Reserve. This belated reward does not in any way, however,

diminish the fact that the Army Reservist is indeed "twice

the citizen."

Within this volume, LTC Crossland was responsible for

Chapters I, II, VII, VIII, and X and Appendixes G and H.

Major Currie prepared Chapters III, IV, V, VI, and IX and

Appendixes A through E The authors hope that publication

of this book will stimulate a greater interest in the United

States Army Reserve and that their study will serve as a
FOREWORD XV

reference work for persons whose position calls for them to

understand the Army Reserve.

Readers who have corrections, suggestions, or additions

are urged to send such to the following address:

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve

Attn: DAAR-PA (History Project)

Washington, DC 20310
1

Before There Was An

Army Reserve

The United States Army Reserve, the largest component

of the Department of Defense with nearly one million

men and women,1 was officially created in 1908. However,

the heritage of the volunteer or "citizen-soldier" goes back

to colonial America and has its roots in the enrolled militia

of Anglo-Saxon England.

The idea of supplementing Regular or full-time forces

with Reserve or part-time forces is even older than the Middle Ages. The Roman Empire of the late fourth and early

fifth centuries depended upon the Comitatus, a full-time,

regular Army that was backed by the limitanei of part-time

soldiers living on the land along the Empires long frontiers

and charged with defense in time of emergency.2

Likewise, the basic 13th century medieval military

organization had the standing army of the king or overlord—a highly trained professional army equipped with the

finest weapons available—backed by the enrolled militia or

select fyrd.3 While the King's full-time professionals were

available for service anywhere, the enrolled militia was a

1. As of March 31, 1983, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

for Personnel in its DCSPER Report-46 listed the strength of the Army

Reserve at 943,396 encompassing the Ready, Standby and Retired Reserves. On December 31, 1982, the active Army, the largest of America's

active duty forces, stood at 778,577 men and women.

2. Louis A. Zürcher and Gwyn Harris-Jenkins, editors,

Supplementary Military Forces—Reserves, Militias, Auxiliaries, (Beverly

Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 91-92.

3. Michael Powicke, Military Obligation in Medieval England, A

Study of Liberty & Duty, (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 6-7.

1
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

minimally-trained and individually-equipped force of citizensoldiers normally employed within a few miles of their

homes. Except in times of emergency, they carried on their

civilian pursuits as farmers, merchants and craftsmen.

Below the enrolled militia was its unenrolled counterpart, the great fyrd or levees en masse, which consisted of all

reasonably healthy men. This large body of unorganized, undisciplined and generally untrained men was the last-ditch

force used to defend the homeland from invasion.4

Modified and formalized by the 1181 Assize of Arms,

the Statute of Winchester of 1285 and the Instructions for

General Muster of 1572, the fyrd became the militia of

Elizabethan England. This militia tradition was among the

English institutions carried to the American colonies in the

early 17 th century at a time when militias were falling into

disuse in an age of professional armies.

However, in the words of historian Russell F. Weigley,

"The American colonies in the seventeenth century were

much too poor to permit a class of able-bodied men to devote themselves solely to war and preparation for war."5

Manpower was scarce, and every colony except Quaker Pennsylvania solved the problem of military protection by turning to the traditional English practice of relying upon a

militia.

Even though tradition and the law called upon every

able-bodied man to provide his own weapon and be prepared

for militia duty, few emergencies required the entire population to rally to arms. As early as 1643, the Massachusetts

Bay Colony reorganized its militia by calling for 30 volunteers from each company of the common militia to be ready

for service upon 30-minutes notice. The remainder of the

company, 65 to 200 men, was exempt from the militia call

except under the most dire circumstances.

Other colonies adopted similar provisions, and more or

less permanent formations of persons willing to volunteer for

duty soon developed. This in effect created an elite, enrolled

militia reminiscent of medieval England.

While this arrangement was more than adequate as

long as a colonial community remained a frontier community, the prowess of the colonial community militia faded as

4. James B. Whisker, The Citizen-Soldier and U. S. Military Policy,

(North River Press, 1979), pp. 4-5.

5. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, (New York:

The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 3—4.
BEFORE THERE WAS AN ARMY RESERVE

the frontier receded. By the time of the French and Indian

War, Col. George Washington of the Virginia militia reported that the militia was no longer a match for the Indians.6

This reality, and the inability of the colonies to muster

sufficient forces against the French, led London to send regular British regiments to America.

Although accustomed to European warfare with its

highly disciplined maneuvers and point-blank volleys of

musketry on open, rolling plains, the British soldiers

adapted to the wooded American environment. They did

most of the fighting, won the war and set the standard of

soldiering for the Americans. Washington was impressed,

and his fondest hope was that his militia might pattern

themselves after the British regulars.7

THE REVOLUTION

A decade later, Washington was fighting a revolution with

troops that were essentially the same as his French and Indian War militia. Washington remembered well the weakness of his Virginia militia and urged the Congress to create

a large, standing army that he could turn into a professional

force. Indeed, Washington wrote that "no Militia will ever

acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force."8

Although Washington was able to build an effective

force with which victory was ultimately achieved, he was

consistently denied a standing army of the size he deemed

necessary. Weigley suggests that the Congress was "acutely

mindful that the Parliamentary Army of 17th Century England had turned upon its legislative creator and erected the

military dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell."9 On the other

hand, it has generally been established that the Revolutionary leadership was by and large conservative and very much

inclined to rely upon the traditional militia.

In addition, Revolutionary propagandists had emphasized that a large standing army was an example of tyranny

and had used the presence of British regulars in the Colonies

to whip up support for the Revolution. This very useful

propaganda theme would have been undercut if the Revolu6. Ibid., p. 11.

7. Ibid., p. 28.

8. Robert K. Wright, Jr., Army Lineage Series, The Continental

Army, (Washington: Center of Military History: 1983), p. 156.

9. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 30.
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

tionaries had established a large, permanent force of their

own.10

Eighteenth century military practices also worked

against establishing a large, full-time Army. In the 1700's,

military campaigns began in the spring and lasted until

winter brought a halt to operations. As a rule, the American

Revolution followed this pattern, with the battles of Trenton

and Quebec being December exceptions to the norm.11

It made little sense to the Continental Congress to

maintain a large force over the winter with the need to pay,

provision and generally care for soldiers who would not be

needed until spring. It was far more economical, they

thought, to disband most of the Army when the snow

started to fall and to later call out the volunteers and militia

after the spring planting was done.

Throughout the war, economic factors and the practical

impossibility of raising a large, long-term army that Washington wanted caused him to rely upon the militia to build

up his forces for major campaigns.12

The militia also made the Revolutionary Army ubiquitous. Any victory by the British was immediately diminished because a force of Minutemen seemed always to spring

from the countryside and harrass the British columns and in

general make life difficult for the British. This added an

element of guerrilla warfare to the Revolution that would

not have been possible if the Americans had relied totally

upon a regular army to prosecute the war.

In American Military History, Robert W. Coakley makes

the point that both the Continental Army and militia forces

10. Wright specifically makes this point, writing that "the rhetoric

of protest against British policy had strongly denied the need for a large

'standing army' of regular soldiers in America on the grounds that the

colonial militia forces, composed of virtuous citizens-soldiers, were perfectly adequate for local defense. The outbreak of hostilities in Massachusetts did not change this attitude. Lexington, Concord and Bunker

Hill only seemed to confirm the validity ofthat assumption." See Wright

Continental Army, p. 43. It should also be noted that "quartering of large

bodies of armed troops among us" was one of Thomas Jefferson's themes

as early as 1774, and this grievance is included in the 1776 Declaration

of Independence.

11. Erna Risch, Special Studies Series, Supplying Washington's Army,

(Washington: Center of Military History, 1981), p. 416.

12. Wright, Continental Army, p. 127. The consistent economic

woes which plagued the Revolution are detailed in Risch's Supplying

Washington's Army, particularly on pages 17 and 20. Today's situation

where Reserve Components provide an economical means of rounding out

regular forces in time of emergency is analogous to the manpower solutions achieved by the Continental Congress during the Revolution.
BEFORE THERE WAS AN ARMY RESERVE

were necessary to win the Revolution. More importantly, in

Coakley's words, "the Revolutionary experience provided ammunition for two diametrically opposed schools of thought

on American military policy: one advocating a large Regular

Army, the other reliance upon the militia as the bulwark of

national defense."13

These two schools of thought remain in 1983, even

though the issue of large regular forces versus heavy reliance

upon reserve or militia forces was apparently resolved with

the announcement of the Total Force policy in August 1970.

This policy, which states that the Reserve Components

would be the principal augmentation of active forces in

emergency, has not been proven in wartime, and it is quite

likely that the debate will continue after our next mobilization experience.14

THE PEACETIME ARMY

The question of the peacetime Army was one of the first

issues addressed in 1783 prior to the Sept. 24 signing of the

Treaty of Paris that formally ended the Revolution. The

handicaps of short enlistments, over-reliance upon volunteers

and militia and the lack of standardized training among the

part-time forces were recognized by the Revolutionary leadership. 15 A Congressional committee was formed under Alexander Hamilton to study and recommend a military establishment. In the tradition of such committees, witnesses

were heard and particular attention was paid to the views of

Washington,16 who recommended a small Regular Army and

13. Robert W. Coakley, "The Winning of Independence," in

Maurice Matloff (Gen. Ed.), American Military History (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1969), pp98-100. See also Wright, Continental Army, pp. 3-20.

14. The Total Force policy was not adopted without dissent. Military leaders, including Gen. William C. Westmoreland, thought that the

Total Force decision placed too much reliance upon part-time Reserve

Component soldiers. This issue is addressed in Chapter 10, and much of

this book is devoted to the struggle to develop an effective Reserve Component policy to meet America's world-wide military responsibilities.

15. The lessons learned from the Revolution are summarized in

Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945, (Washington: Department of

the Army, 1955), p. 22.

16. Morris J. McGregor, Jr., "The Formative Years, 1783-1812,"

in Matloff, American Military History, pp. 103-105.
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

a militia of all citizens 18 to 50, modeled after the Swiss

militia.17

Washington's proposals, however, came to naught, as

the Confederation was burdened with war debts and did not

have the resources to enact his recommendations. The debate

over the military question continued throughout the period

of the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution

emerged in 1787 with two military clauses reflecting a compromise on the issues.

Specifically, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution

granted to Congress the power to raise and support armies,

to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia and to provide for calling forth the militia to "execute

the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." Reserved to the states were the powers to appoint

officers and train the militia.18

After establishing the Department of War and continuing the small Regular Army in 1789, Congress was faced in

1790 with a detailed proposal for regulating the militia.

Drafted by Secretary of War Henry Knox, the plan featured

the division of all able-bodied white male citizens, aged

18—60, into three classes:

Those 18—20 to be called the Advanced Corps and to be trained

in state camps for thirty days per year and clothed and fed and

armed by the United States at a cost of about $400,000 per year;

those 21—45 to be called the Main Corps and to be mustered and

trained for four days per year; those 40—60 to be called the Reserve Corps and to be mustered twice a year.19

A bill containing the main features of this plan was

introduced, debated and tabled in 1790 and again in 1791.

Finally, in 1792 a weaker bill passed calling for all ablebodied white male citizens, aged 18—45, to be enrolled in a

general militia. This Militia Act of 1792 required each man

to furnish his own musket, bayonet, belt, and cartridges.

Thus, $400,000 was saved—a considerable amount in that

day—and the tradition of underfunding Reserve Components began.

17. Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought

from Washington to Marshall, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1962),

pp. 10-12.'

18. The literal interpretation of these provisions in 1912 by Attorney General George W. Wickersham was a strong argument for a

federal reserve force.

19. William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States, (Washington: Public

Affairs Press, 1957), p. 18.
BEFORE THERE WAS AN ARMY RESERVE

THE WAR OF 1812

The 1792 act became the permanent military policy of

the United States at a time when European military leaders

were turning to massed, conscript armies. While Napoleon

was dominating Europe with his conscripts, grand tactics

and superior logistics, the United States was rejecting conscripted service and relying upon a militia system obsolete

by European standards for 200 years.20

The American militia system was faced with its first foreign

challenge in the War of 1812, and it was found wanting.

When Congress voted for war with Great Britian on June

18, 1812, the Regular Army contained fewer than 7,000

men.21 A call for the states to raise 100,000 men generally

went unheeded, and the governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island opposed the call completely,

maintaining that it was unconstitutional and illegal.

During the war itself, militia under Maj. Gen. Henry

Dearborn refused to invade Canada, a failure which was remembered a century later when arguments were presented

for a federal reserve force.22 Historically a home defense

force, the militia's leaders claimed that the Constitution provided no clear authority for their use outside of the United

States. The Madison administration, uncertain of its public

support, balked at sending reluctant citizen-soldiers into

Canada and skirted the issue.23In the future, calling the

militia into United States service was handled by regarding

militia companies as volunteers for federal duty, serving under the general authority of Congress to raise armies.

THE EXPANSIBLE ARMY

Following the War of 1812, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun produced a pivotal document in the history of American military thought when he prepared his Dec. 12, 1820,

"Report on the Reduction of the Army." Building upon ear20. Weigley, Towards an American Army, pp. 20-24.

21. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, p. 46.

22. Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp. 119-20.

23. In fairness to the militia and volunteer forces, McGregor states

that the militia fared as well as the Regular Army in victory and defeat.

While the refusal of New York and Vermont soldiers to enter Canada

scuttled Dearborn's planned 1812 march on Montreal, militia forces

served well in the defense of Baltimore and were the key to Jackson's

success in the South. See McGregor, "Formative Years," pp. 129-47.
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

lier proposals, Calhoun emphasized the Regular Army and

discounted the militia by calling for an expansible army as

the basis for future mobilization. Calhoun wanted to form in

peacetime all of the regiments which the Army would require in war. The companies were to be manned at approximately half strength and were to be expanded to full

strength for war.24

Calhoun thought that the militia might be relied upon

to garrison forts and act as skirmishers and raiders if supported by good artillery and some regular infantry; but he

wrote, "To rely upon them beyond this, to suppose our militia capable of meeting in the open field the regular troops

of Europe, would be to resist the most obvious truth, and

the whole of our experience as a nation."25

A more obvious truth in Calhoun's time was that the

militia had fallen into disrepair. The Militia Act of 1792

had contained no provision for federal enforcement of the

militia system, but had relied upon the states to do the job.

This did not always occur. In 1816, for example, Delaware

abolished fines for men who did not attend "days of parade;"

and by 1820, many other states had stopped enforcing annual muster laws. Liberal exemptions from service also

abounded, until few states retained an effective militia system on the eve of the War with Mexico.26

MEXICO

According to Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry in

their History of Military Mobilization in the United States

Army, 1775-1945, the militia system had so deteriorated by

1846 that many states did not know how to mobilize the

militia, and many did not even appoint officers. When President James K. Polk called for volunteers to fight in Mexico, the normal procedure was for governors to issue a proclamation directing militia officers to assemble their men. In

cases where militia officers did not exist, county sheriffs

called out the militia. Once assembled, the militiamen were

asked to volunteer for federal service. Those who volunteered

were enrolled into companies, battalions and regiments. In

many cases, where the militia system still functioned, entire

24. This cadre concept dominated military thinking until 1912

when the "Report on the Organization of Land Forces of the United

States," principally authored by John McAuley Palmer, called for a great

army of citizen-soldiers organized into their own units.

25. Weigley, Towards an American Army, p. 31.

26. Riker, Soldiers of the States, p. 29.
BEFORE THERE WAS AN ARMY RESERVE

CIVIL WAR

units volunteered;27 and units such as the First Mississippi

Rifles under Col. Jefferson Davis served with distinction.28

By the time of the Civil War, the militia was still theoretically in existence, and the Militia Act of 1792 was still

the law of the land. However, as a practical matter, the

militia did not exist as an effective, well-equipped military

force.

Acting under the authority of the 1792 law, President Abraham Lincoln called 75,000 militiamen for three months

service on April 15, 1861. When it came time to raise a

more permanent army, however, Lincoln called for 42,000

volunteers. Congress subsequently seconded his call on July

22, 1861, by authorizing up to 500,000 volunteers for

three years' duty.

As a practical matter during the Civil War, the Secretary of War assigned manpower quotas to states based upon

their population, and the governors administered the volunteer system. The individual soldier was drawn from the

ranks of volunteers; he was not being mobilized from a previously existing militia unit.29

Following the Civil War, the public attitude toward the

militia was indifferent. Despite the pride exhibited by veterans' organizations such as the Grand Army of the Republic, this pride was not translated into functioning militia

units. Citizen-soldiery, in the opinion of William H. Riker,

was at its lowest ebb because the Regular Army was sufficient to control the Indians and because there was no threat

of a foreign war.30The growing militancy of the labor movement in the 1870s, however, helped revive the state militia.

There was a direct relationship between labor unrest31 in a

state and that state's appropriation for the militia which was

now more commonly called the National Guard.32

27. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, pp.

75-82.

28. Lida Mayo, "The Mexican War and After," in Matloff, American

Military History, pp. 168—72.

29. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, pp.

90—98. The National Guard has a different interpretation of this point,

and Civil War unit histories give evidence to both points of view.

30. William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States, pp. 41-66.

31. Ibid.

32. National Guard Officials were quick to down play the strikebreaking role of the militia. The police function was de-emphasized by
10 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

WAR WITH SPAIN

EMORY UPTON

By the time of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the regiments and companies of the National Guard were units of

citizen-soldiers available for mobilization, but once again

Guard units were not called directly into federal service. Instead, a Volunteer Army was formed. As in the past, the

militia provided volunteers for the new army, and National

Guard units were encouraged to volunteer en masse. In addition, the Secretary of War was authorized to form 16 special units recruited by the federal government from the nation at large. The 1st Regiment of United States Volunteer

Cavalry, the "Rough Riders" of Lt. Col. Theodore Roosevelt,

was one of these units.

Even though the National Guard provided most of the

manpower for the 125,000-man Volunteer Army, the combat actions of the Spanish-American War were primarily a

Regular Army affair. Except for the Rough Riders and two

former militia regiments, the 17,000 troops of the Cuban

Expeditionary Force were from the old Regular Army. And,

when National Guard units performed well in the Philippines, they were characterized as volunteer units by the

Army establishment.33

The reason for this characterization was that the officers

of the Regular Army were in the late 1800s contemptuous

of part-time soldiers, whom they considered to be incompetent in military matters. This attitude had been exhibited

by many post-Civil War senior officers including Generals

Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman, and these attitudes were clearly expressed in Brevet Maj. Gen. Emory

Uptons book, The Military Policy of the United States.34

A West Point graduate who was only 26-years-old at the

end of the Civil War, Upton was an innovative thinker who

has influenced generations of professional soldiers. After the

war he wrote a text on infantry tactics and was subsequently

named Commandant of Cadets at West Point. While at

West Point, Upton continued to write on tactics, and in

promoting the social aspects of the Guard and giving greater attention to

military maneuvers.

33. Weigley, Towards an American Army, p. 168.

34. Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, 4th Edition, (Washington: 1916).
BEFORE THERE WAS AN ARMY RESERVE J 1

1875 he was sent on a world tour as an official observer for

the United States Army. Upon his return in 1876, Upton

began writing The Military Policy ofthe United States. He had

been impressed by the military achievements of Prussia with

its general staff and mass army that was made possible by a

federal system of reserve soldiers. To adapt the Prussian system to American military traditions, Upton proposed the

maintenance of a Regular Army of not more than 25,000

men.

This army was to be made up of skeletonized battalions

that could be expanded in wartime by a federal reserve

which Upton called "National Volunteers."35 Upton advocated leaving the militia to the states to execute the laws of

the states and called "the employment of militia and undisciplined troops commanded by generals and officers utterly ignorant of military art" the first and greatest weakness

in the American military system.36

Uptons disdain for the militia was not unique. Maj.

Gen. John A. Logan in his The Volunteer Soldier of America,

published in 1887, asserted that the West Point system

crushed the aspirations of volunteers and that the majority

of regular officers would do anything to prevent a volunteer

officer from being successful.37It should also be pointed out

that militia officers often showed great antipathy toward

Regulars. It is in light of this animosity that the Army

attempted reforms following the Spanish-American War.

Weigley states that the US Army was on the verge of

seeking a federally-sponsored volunteer force under Regular

Army control on the eve of the Spanish-American War and

that following the war Secretary of War Elihu Root was

strongly influenced by Uptons writings.38 Vincent P. Jones

seconds Weigley on the latter point, stating that Root took

the lead in reorganizing the Army and reforming the National Guard.39

35. Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army, (Baton Rouge- LSU

Press, 1964), pp. 54-135.

36. Upton, Military Policy, p. XIII.

37. "The Dangerous West Point Monopoly" by John A. Logan as

republished from The Volunteer Soldier in America in Russell F. Weigley's

The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American

Society (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969) p.

83.

38. Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp. 296, 320.

39. Vincent P. Jones, "Transition and Change, 1902-1917," in

Matloff, American Military History, pp. 45-46, 52.
12 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

ELIHU ROOT'S PLAN

In his Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, Root stated that

the regular establishment of the United States would never

by itself be the whole machine with which wars would be

fought. He further wrote that the Regular Army would

form but a part of a great wartime body.40 Root then proposed that a homogeneous body of regulars and volunteers

"using the same arms, familiar with the same drill, answering to the same ideas of discipline, instilled with the same

spirit, and capable of equal and even performance" be

formed.41

By 1901 Root was calling for some means by which

young men seeking volunteer commissions might spend

their vacations in military study preparing them for commissions in the volunteer army. Root wrote that "it is particularly desirable that a large number of young men should be

made competent to perform the duties of volunteer officers

in the staff and supply departments. Without such a class at

the outbreak of war, with a large volunteer force being

called into being, there will always be confusion, waste, delay and suffering . . . ."42 This creation of a source of volunteer officers was in addition to National Guard officers and

was the germ of the idea later espoused by Maj. Gen.

Leonard Wood and his allies in the Military Training Camps

Association.43

In 1902 Root proposed the creation of two categories of

Volunteer Reserve to augment the Regular Army and National Guard in wartime. Root's First Volunteer Reserve was

to be such companies and regiments of the organized militia

as had volunteered for unlimited service during war. The

Second Volunteer Reserve was to be composed of men with

prior National Guard, Regular Army or Volunteer Army

training and would be led by officers whose fitness for commissions had previously been proven.

Root wanted to be able to expand the standing 60,000-

man Army to a force of 250,000 well-trained men instantly

upon declaration of war. Root asserted that the effectiveness

40. Elihu Root, Report of the Secretary of War, 1899, (Washington:

War Department, 1899), PP- 45-46, 52.

41. Ibid., p. 53. „, ^

42. Report of the Secretary of War, 1901 (Washington: War Department, 1901), pp. 23-24.

43 The issue of commissioning volunteer officers in reserve is covered in Chapter 2, but credit can certainly be given to Root for recognizing the need to train volunteer officers in advance of hostilities.
BEFORE THERE WAS AN ARMY RESERVE 13

of militia or volunteer units depended largely upon the aid

which they received from the national government.44

As much as Root may have favored Uptons idea of a

federally controlled and commanded Reserve,45he was a realist. The creation of a federal Reserve force conflicted with

the fact that the National Guard already constituted a reserve of manpower, and, to a lesser degree, of equipment.

As Weigley puts it, the National Guard "was a force in

being, while any other kind of reserve was only hypothetical."46

Therefore, Root supported legislation in 1903 to fundamentally upgrade the National Guard while retaining its

historical state militia functions. Working with Ohio Congressman Charles W. Dick, a National Guard major general,

Root helped draft Public Law 57—33, commonly known as

the Dick Act.47

THE DICK ACT

This legislation clarified the concept of a universal militia.

The militia was divided into two groups. The first was the

organized militia, known as the National Guard, which was

defined as the regularly enlisted, organized and uniformed

active militia of the several states and territories. The second

44. Report of the Secretary of War, 1902 (Washington: War Department, 1902), pp. 34-38.

45. In Upton and the Army, Ambrose states that Root's reforms of

the War Department contain most of Upton's specific proposals. It would

appear that Root thought enough of Upton's work to take Upton's unpublished manuscript of The Military Policy of the United States, then in

the possession of Sen. Henry duPont of Delaware, have it edited by two

Army officers and finally published in 1904 under War Department

sponsorship. It is clear that Root did read Upton's earlier book, The Armies of Asia and Europe, and that Root consistently wrote of the Volunteer

Army—not the National Guard per se—as the ultimate Army of the

United States. See Root's Report of the Secretary of War for the years 1899,

1900, 1901 and 1902. Also, see Ambrose, cited above, pages 151-57

for an assessment of the overall impact of Upton's ideas.

46. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 321.

47. In "Elihu Root and the National Guard," published in the

Spring 1959 issue of Military Affairs, Elbridge Colby sets forth the thesis

that Root preferred to create a federally-controlled, nationwide Volunteer

Army as a Reserve along the European model but that he was compelled

for political reasons to upgrade the National Guard as a partial solution

to the need for a national reserve force. Colby also contends that Root

was strongly influenced by Upton and that Root saw the National Guard

as serving state functions and being useful nationally only as a training

ground for the Volunteer Army.
14 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

group was the Reserve Militia, which consisted of all ablebodied male citizens 18 to 45. Resident aliens who had declared their intent to become citizens were included in the

two militias. For the first time, the Dick Act provided that

general military stores, as well as arms and equipment, were

to be offered to militia units that drilled at least 24 times a

year and maintained a summer encampment of not less than

five days. The militia units were to be periodically inspected

by Regular Army officers, and Regular officers were detailed

to the militia. Additionally, National Guard officers were

declared eligible to attend Regular Army schools, and

Guardsmen were to receive full pay and allowances while on

maneuvers with the Regular Army.48

In addition, the Dick Act reaffirmed the principles of

federal funding, federal inspections, and federal standards

for training upon which todays Reserve Components are

built.49The Act was the first of a series of bills from the

establishment of an enlisted Army Reserve in 1912 through

the sweeping National Defense Act of 1916 and its 1920

amendments that laid the groundwork for the Army's contemporary Reserve Components.

Following the January 21, 1903, passage of the Dick

Act, Root achieved another of his objectives when Congress

created the General Staff Corps on February 14, 1903. With

the new General Staff of 45 officers, the Army was able to

formulate cohesive, continuing military policies for the first

time and take those planning steps which are essential for a

successful mobilization.30

Root's ideas for a reserve corps soon grew into concrete

form with a 1908 act "to increase the efficiency of the Medical Department of the United States Army."31 The new

corps was believed necessary to overcome serious wartime

shortages of physicians, which had been apparent during the

Spanish-American War; and there was no thought at the

time that the commissioning of a few hundred Reserve doctors would lead to a force that numbers more than 3,000

units plus an Individual Ready Reserve of almost 250,000.

Root's General Staff creation was also important for the

Army Reserve, for the General Staff provided a place where

John McAuley Palmer could think and write and produce in

48. 32 Star. 775.

49. Ibid.

50. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, pp.

177-79.

51. 35 Scat. 66-69.
BEFORE THERE WAS AN ARMY RESERVE 15

1912 a document entitled "The Organization of the Land

Forces of the United States." This remarkable work had a

considerable influence upon the establishment of a Federal

reserve force prior to World War I. The impact of Elihu

Root was indeed far-ranging.
THE MEDICAL RESERVE

2

The Early Years

Behind the regular army must always stand the great reserve army consisting of the able-bodied men of the nation, so trained as to be

promptly available for military service if needed, but following their normal occupations in time of peace.

MAJ. GEN. LEONARD WOOD, 1916'

The passage of Senate Bill 1424 on April 23, 1908, authorized the Army to secure a reserve corps of medical

officers who could be ordered to active duty by the Secretary

of War during time of emergency. These reserve doctors were

to be commissioned as first lieutenants and to rank below

all other officers of like grade in the United States. The act

also provided for the commissioning of contract physicians

in either the Regular Army or the Medical Reserve Corps,

depending upon their age.2This latter provision generated

the only serious opposition to the bill, with Representative

1. Leonard Wood, Our Military History, Its Facts and Fallacies,

(Chicago: Reilly and Britton, 1916), pp. 226-27.

2. On March 22, 1967, Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison, Chief of Military History wrote Maj. Gen. William J. Sutton, Chief, Army Reserve

that "although the National Defense Act of 1916 is viewed as providing

for the immediate ancestor of our Reserve system in its present form, it

is considered appropriate that 23 April 1908 be established as the official

birth date of the United States Army Reserve. The Act of Congress on

that date which created the Medical Reserve Corps, for the first time in

Army history, provided for the establishment of a reservoir of trained

officer personnel in a reserve status." Copy in OCAR Historical Files.

17
\g TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

James R. Mann of Illinois predicting that it would allow

contract surgeons to enter the Army and ultimately flow to

the retired list after a short period of time. Manns objections notwithstanding, the act passed the House 126 to 15,

and the nations first federal military reserve force was established.3

The first candidates for reserve commissions were certified on May 4, 1908, and by the end of the fiscal year on

June 30, 160 contract physicians had been recommended for

commissions in the Medical Reserve Corps. Their commissions would date from July 7, 1908. A year later, Surgeon

General R. M. Reilly reported that "in order to build up

the Reserve Corps with desirable material, a strong effort

has been made to induce prominent physicians, surgeons,

hygienists and laboratory workers to head it."4 By June 30,

1909, 364 men had been commissioned in the Medical Reserve Corps, including 160 former contract physicians, and

184 such men were on active duty.5

In his 1909 report, Surgeon General George H. Torney

spoke glowingly of his Medical Reserve Corps physicians,

noting that "when it was necessary to assemble a board to

investigate the important subject of inoculation for typhoid

fever, it was possible to do so without going outside of the

Medical Reserve Corps."6Torney stated that it would have

been difficult to find a more qualified board anywhere. He

also praised the Reserve doctors for aiding the Army in locating suitable physicians for commissions in the Army

Medical Service.

3. The full text of Senate Bill 1424, as enacted, can be found on

pages 66-69 of Part 1, Volume 35, The Statutes at Large of the United

States of America. Representative Mann's voluminous objections are recorded on pages 3402-06 of Volume 42 of the Congressional Record.

4. R. M. O'Reilly, Report of the Surgeon General, 1908 (Washington:

War Department, 1908), pp. 131-32.

5. According to the New York Times of Nov. 30, 1908, the original

364 Medical Reserve Corps doctors included Dr. Roswell Park, the Buffalo, N.Y., surgeon who attended President McKinley after he was shot;

Drs. Wyeth and Bryan, ex-Presidents of the American Medical Association; Dr. Souchin, a New Orleans, La., yellow fever expert; and Dr.

Frank Billings, a respected surgeon with Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Md. The Times also reported that the War Department commissioned Drs. William T Bull and Andrew J. McCosh, "New York surgeons, both of whom are now critically ill in this city." Apparently, the

standards for commissioning were somewhat vague.

6. Report of the Surgeon General, 1909 (Washington: War Department, 1909), p. 173.
THE EARLY YEARS 19

Table 2-1 Number of Physicians in the United States Army.

Medical Reserve Corps

Regular Army

As of June 30 . . Not On Active Duty On Active Duty Medical Officers

1908 0* 0 301

1909 180 184 283

1910 245 175 345

1911 784 138 381

1912 990 115 414

1913 1,100 105 424

1914 1,163 91 426

1915 1,340 86 433

1916 1,757 146 443

*As of June 30, 1908, 160 surgeons had been recommended for appointment in the Medical Reserve Corps. Their commissions would date from

July 7, 1908.

Source: Reports of the War Department (1908-1916).

By June 30, 1910, Torney was pleased to report that

the "Medical Reserve Corps has now passed the experimental

stage."7 Within two years, the strength of the Medical Reserve Corps exceeded one thousand; and in 1913, Reserve

officers manned the Army's garrisons to allow Regular Army

physicians to deploy to the field. In July 1913, Reserve doctors provided medical care to aging Civil War veterans during their Gettysburg encampment, and Torney recommended placing Reserve physicians on active duty at

maneuver camps.

In 1914, a number of Medical Reserve Corps officers

were appointed as special professors to the Army Medical

School to deliver lectures ranging from "prevention and control of infectious diseases" to "cardia arythmia and circulatory efficiency." The Medical Reserve Corps grew to

1,903 officers in 1916 and outnumbered Regular Army doctors four to one.

By virtue of the National Defense Act of 1916, the

Medical Reserve Corps ceased to exist on June 3, 1917,

when its members were commissioned in the Officers' Reserve Corps as members of the Medical Officers Reserve

Corps. The Act of 1916 also allowed the Surgeon General to

appoint officers in the Veterinary Officers' Reserve Corps and

7. Report of the Surgeon General, 1910 (Washington: War Department, 1910), p. 456.
20 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

the Dental Officers' Reserve Corps. Together, these three

corps contained 9,223 officers at the end of the 1917 fiscal

year—a growth of twenty-five hundred percent in a decade.

While the officers of the Medical Reserve Corps were

proving the value and desirability of a federal reserve force, a

growing debate over the future of Americas citizen-soldiers

was beginning. In 1908, Congress had been intent upon

clarifying the status of the National Guard and enacted legislation on May 27 to require the War Department to call

the organized militia into service ahead of volunteer units

when it was necessary to "execute the laws of the Union,

suppress insurrection or repel invasion."8The Secretary of

War was authorized to issue arms, equipment, clothing and

military stores in general to the militia—provided that the

United States retained title to the property.

When the Army General Staff realized that this act,

which amended the Dick Act, required the War Department

to use all militia, no matter how poorly organized,

equipped or trained, before volunteer units, there was a

strong desire to find another alternative reserve force.9This

desire was expressed by John McAuley Palmer in his 1912

"Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the

United States."

ENTER JOHN MCAULEY PALMER

Palmer was the grandson of Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer, a

volunteer Civil War officer who achieved high command

with the Army of the Cumberland. A graduate of West

Point, the younger Palmer was well acquainted with the capabilities of citizen-soldiers such as his grandfather. He was

relatively uninfluenced by the anti-militia views of Emory

Upton. Upton's The Military Policy of the United States had

been posthumously published, and a distrust of the militia

was very much in vogue among Regular Army officers in the

early 1900s.10

8. Senate Bill 4316, enacted May 27, 1908, entitled 'An Act to

Further Amend the Act entitled An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the

Militia of 1903,'" also divided the militia of the United States into the

organized militia, known as the National Guard, and the Reserve Militia, which was otherwise undefined.

9. William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), pp. 74-75.

10. Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army, Military Thought

from Washington to Marshall (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1962),

pp. 228-29.
THE EARLY YEARS 21

Palmer had for some time had the opinion that John C.

Calhoun's idea of an expansible army "could have no congenial place in the American political system."11 When Palmer assumed a peacetime Regular Army nucleus large

enough to make a real foundation for effective expansion for

war, he realized that the American people would be saddled

with a prohibitively expensive standing Army. When he assumed a nucleus small enough to be acceptable to Congress,

the expanded wartime force was insufficient for war on the

European scale. This dilemma led Palmer to conclude that

the only rational alternative was to rely upon the citizenarmies that had served Washington, Grant and Lee so well.

He further reasoned that by organizing and training such

armies in peacetime, these citizen-soldier armies would be

preferable to any expansible army scheme.12

In the fall of 1911, Palmer was assigned to the War

College Division of the new General Staff. Palmer's desire for

a pre-trained reserve of citizen-soldiers coincided with the

thoughts of Chief of Staff Leonard Wood. Indeed, Wood had

written in his 1910 Report of the Chief of Staff that it was

"imperatively necessary that steps should be taken to organize a proper reserve from which the regular and militia

organizations can be properly filled with instructed men.13

Palmer was thereupon given the task of drafting a major

reorganization of the land forces of the United States. When

Palmer was ready to outline his proposals, Wood arranged a

meeting with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. The

meeting took place during a long train ride to Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and Stimson and Wood listened to Palmer's

ideas at great length.

Palmer proposed that American military policy should

move away from the Regular Army as its central focus. Primary emphasis should be placed instead on "the citizen

army and its relation to the permanent establishment." In

Palmer's words, the "most important military problem is to

devise means of preparing great armies of citizen soldiers to

meet the emergency of modern war."14Stimson and Wood

agreed with Palmer; and once the fundamental principle of a

11. John McAuley Palmer, America in Arms, (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1941), p. 135.

12. Ibid., pp. 136-37.

13. Report of the Chief of Staff, 1910, as found in War Department

Reports, 1910 (Washington: War Department, 1910), Vol. I, p. 131.

14. I. B. Holley, Jr., General John M. Palmer, Citizen-Soldiers, and

the Army of A Democracy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp.

200-04.
22 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

citizen reserve was agreed upon, Palmer was free to develop

the details of the reorganization.15

Even though it was late in 1911, Palmer influenced the

1911 Report of the Secretary of War, which Stimson forwarded to the President on December 4. Stimson wrote that

"it is absolutely imperative that provision should be made,

by an adequate system of regular reserves, to fill up and

maintain this first line of defense during the necessary time

that must elapse while we are preparing and mobilizing our

Militia and Volunteers."16

In the same report, Stimson stated that one of the

main functions of a modern army is to train citizen-soldiers,

who after training go back to their normal lives, ready to be

called upon in an emergency.17 Wood seconded Stimson by

writing that "in view of the small size of the Regular Army

and the small number of instructed militia, it is imperatively necessary that steps should be taken to organize a

reserve of men . . . ."18 Wood recommended a small

monthly pay and 10-days annual maneuver or instruction

with full pay for the members of this reserve. Wood also

observed that 10 "Reserves" could be maintained for the cost

of one Regular Army soldier—a ratio not very different

from the cost of Reservists versus Regular Army soldiers in

1983.19

The Palmer plan, which was proposed to Congress in

detail in 1912, organized the mobile land forces of the

United States into three distinct parts. The first was a Regular Army ready for immediate use as an expeditionary force

15. When discussing his memoirs nearly 30 years later, Palmer

summarized his beliefs thusly: 'A government by the people must rest its

defense upon Washington's army of the people and not upon Upton's

expansible standing army. We must build strength into the democratic

state without creating an exclusive samurai caste. We must have military

power without militarism." (Letter of Palmer to Grenville Clark, Sept.

14, 1940.)

16. Report of the Secretary of War, 1911 (Washington: War Department, 1911), pp. 22-23.

17. Ibid., p. 21.

18. Report of the Chief of Staff 1911, in War Department Reports,

1911 (Washington: War Department, 1911), Vol. I, pp. 151-52.

19. A Reservist receives approximately one-sixth of the pay of an

active-duty soldier, and lower operational and maintenance costs are likewise associated with Reserve units. A member of the Individual Ready

Reserve (IRR) frequently receives only two weeks pay a year, or in many

cases, no pay at all. Overall, the cost of maintaining the nearly 500,000

Reservists of the Ready Reserve is approximately one-tenth of that of

maintaining a like number of men and women on active duty.
THE EARLY YEARS 23

or for the first stages of a defensive war while the citizensoldiery was being mobilized.

The second force was an army of citizen-soldiers organized into units and ready to reinforce the Regular Army in

time of war. In 1912 this was the National Guard. Third

was the army of volunteers, trained citizen-soldiers. Essentially, the 1912 plan was what the Army finally secured

under the National Defense Act of 1920.20"

The proponents of a federal reserve force were strengthened in February 1912 when Attorney General George W.

Wickersham ruled that "the militia while in U.S. service

might pursue an invading force beyond the U.S. boundary

as part of repelling an invasion, but in general the militia

cannot be employed outside of the United States."21

In arguing for an Army Reserve, Stimson pointed out

that a reserve system was in effect in practically every nation

of the world except the United States.22 He pointed out that

when the Spanish-American War broke out, many regiments

were "greatly injured by the necessity of throwing into them

a large number of perfectly raw recruits."23 A trained federal

reserve force of citizen-soldiers would prevent this problem,

Stimson said.

In light of the Wickersham opinion, and persuaded by

the exhortations of Stimson and Wood, Congress created an

Army Reserve under provisions of Section 2 of the Army

Appropriations Act of Aug. 24, 1912. This was accomplished by changing the term of Regular Army enlistment

to seven years, with three or four years to be served with the

colors and the balance to be a furlough to the Army Reserve.24

This was the first provision for a federal reserve outside of the Medical Department.

Although pleased by the creation of the Army Reserve

through the Act of 1912, Wood continued to press for a

20. Palmer, America in Arms, pp. 142-43.

21. Letter, Attorney General George W. Wickersham to Secretary

of War Henry L. Stimson, Feb. 17, 1912.

22. According to the 1912 War Department Annual Reports, the

United States had no Army Reserve, while the reserves of Great Britain

stood at 215,000, and Japan counted one million reservists. The reserve

strength of Italy was 1.5 million; Austria, 2.5 million; France, 3 million; Germany, 4.7 million; and Russia, 5.4 million.

23. Report of the Secretary of War, 1912 (Washington: War Department, 1912), p. 20.

24. The portion of House Resolution 25531 pertaining to the new

Army Reserve can be found on pages 590 and 591 of Part 1, Vol. 37,

Statutes at Large of the United States of America.
24 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

more comprehensive federal reserve force. By August 31,

1913, the Army Reserve consisted of only eight men, and

Wood observed that men would not enlist in the Army Reserve under present conditions. He sought pay for Reservists, noting that "we cannot secure valuable service for nothing!"25

In his 1914 report to the President, Secretary of War

Lindley M. Garrison stated that "present legislation with respect to a reserve has proven utterly useless for the purpose."26 Noting that the Army Reserve had doubled to 16

men, Wood repeated his previous sentiments and asked for

authority to commission 400 provisional lieutenants each

year. These officers would serve one year in training with the

Regular Army and then leave active duty to form a reserve

of officers.

Wood's term as Army Chief of Staff ended in 1914,

and he was assigned to command the First Military District

at Governors Island, NY. This reduction in responsibility

gave him ample time for writing and speech-making. Wood

wrote profusely for magazines, and his short books were eloquent and forceful in pleading for an Army Reserve. Wood

also became involved in the Plattsburg camps and the Military Training Camps Association.

CIVILIAN TRAINING

As Chief of Staff, Wood had been successful in starting two

experimental camps of military instruction for college students during their 1913 summer vacation. The camps had

been the idea of Lt. Henry T Bull, a cavalry officer detailed

as professor of military science at Cornell University. Students paid their own transportation to the camps at Pacific

Grove, Calif, and Gettysburg, Penn., and paid approximately $27.50 for uniforms and food..

Despite an arduous course of instruction, which began

at 5:15 a.m., the 159 young men at the initial camps became so enthusiastic that officers occasionally had to order

them to stop drill in order to swim or play ball. Later, 84 of

these 159 received Reserve commissions and served in World

War I.27

25. Report of the Chief of Staff, 1913, in War Department Reports,

1913 (Washington: War Department, 1913), pp. 150-51.

26. Reports of the Secretary of War, 1914 (Washington: War Department, 1914), p. 11.

27. John G. Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1972), pp. 11-16.
THE EARLY YEARS 25

The camps made a strong impression on several college

presidents, including Henry Drinker of Lehigh University.

Drinker accompanied his son to Gettysburg, and when the

students formed the Society of the National Reserve Corps of

the United States, Drinker was elected president.28

Drinker formed the Advisory Board of University Presidents for the National Reserve Corps and successfully rallied

academic support for additional camps in 1914. Wood was

able to arrange the detail of additional Army officers to instruct at the camps, and 667 students attended the second

summer—again at their own expense.29

After the beginning of war in Europe on July 28,

1914, the General Staff began an update of the 1912 "Report on the Organization of the Land Forces in the United

States" in order to overcome this country's military weakness. The result was the "Statement of a Proper Military

Policy for the United States."

The statement recommended "more than doubling the

size of the Regular Army, from 100,000 to 230,000; continued support of the Organized Militia; a Regular Army

reserve; a reserve of trained citizen-soldiers; a reserve of officers; and a reserve of essential supplies."30 To translate the

statement into reality, Secretary Garrison devised his Continental Army proposal, which can be reduced to three main

points:

1. A Regular Army large enough to meet immediate military needs while training other military forces.

2. A volunteer, trained federal reserve force—the Continental Army—to immediately augment the Regular Army

in emergencies.

3. Retain the National Guard under state control, but with

increased federal assistance.31

Garrison also proposed to recruit officer cadets from the

National Guard for his Continental Army, but ruffled National Guard feathers when he said that "strictly speaking,

28. The constitution of the National Reserve Corps is found on

page 587 of the Dec. 18, 1913, edition of Leslie's Illustrated Weekly as part

of an article written by Wood entitled "How to Have a Bigger Army."

29. Clifford, Citizen Soldiers, pp. 18-24.

30. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1955), p. 190.

31. Report of the Secretary of War, 1915 (Washington: War Department, 1915), pp. 22-27.
26 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

nothing less than Regular Army training makes an efficient

soldier.32 Garrison also irritated Guardsmen by writing the

1915 convention of the National Guard Association that

Guard units would be "permitted" to transfer from the National Guard to the Continental Army. A speech by Assistant Secretary of War Henry Breckenridge to that same

convention left many Guardsmen with the impression that

the National Guard would no longer have any federal sanction, and its future would be left up to the states.

Meanwhile, stunned by the sinking of the Lusitania in

May 1915, law partners Grenville Clark and Elihu Root,

Jr., son of the former Secretary of War, determined to do

something to demonstrate a firm national policy against

Germany. Enlisting the aid of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.,33

they approached Wood with the idea of adapting the youth

summer camps to camps for men in their twenties and thirties.

The general was supportive. If Clark and the others

could sign up at least 100 professional and business men for

the camps, Wood would provide the officers and equipment.

When recruiting for the businessmen's camps went well,

Wood was able to have the adult camp included under War

Department General Order No. 38, June 22, 1915, which

authorized that summers college camps.

Approximately 1,200 men assembled at Plattsburg,

NY, for the first businessmen's camp. Compressing the fiveweek student program into four weeks, the men started

their day with 5:45 a.m. calisthenics, followed by drill until

noon. After lunch, there was specialized instruction in the

arms of the service—cavalry, signal, engineering. As with

the student camps, the participants at Plattsburg tackled

the training with great enthusiasm. Just as the students at

Gettysburg organized at camp's end, the men at Plattsburg

formed the First Training Regiment.

Determined that Plattsburg should not be a flash-inthe-pan, Clark worked with members of similar busi32. Ibid., p. 35.

33. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., went on to earn a commission before

World War I. After a distinguished peace-time public service career, he

was recalled to active duty in 1941. He served in the North African,

Sicilian and Corsican landings and established a reputation for courage

under fire. As a 57-year old brigadier general, he was the only general

and the oldest man to go ashore in the first wave of the Normandy

assault upon Utah Beach. He was the assistant division commander of

the 4th Infantry Division.
THE EARLY YEARS 27

MEXICO

nessmen's camps and with the Advisory Board of University

Presidents of the National Reserve Corps to form the Military Training Camps Association of the United States

(MTCA). The stated purpose of the MTCA was to encourage

reasonable military training for citizens through federal

training camps, and the groups efforts later played an

important role in the "90-day-wonder" commissioning

camps of World War I.34

In 1915, preparedness was a major issue in America;

and the MTCA was an ideal apparatus for spreading the

word on preparedness. The MTCA had a number of active

committees staffed with well-known personalities, and the

movement was national in scope. It was strongly influenced

by ex-President Theodore Roosevelt and by Wood," who saw

his citizen-army gospel enhanced by the MTCA's enthusiasm

for citizen's military training.36

In Lindley Garrison's mind, preparedness was his Continental Army plan. To the National Guard and Representative James Hay, Chairman of the House Military Affairs

Committee, it was a stronger National Guard with increased

federal support. This made for a collection of semi-allies

with divergent interests operating under the general banner

of increased preparedness.

While these divergent interests agreed that it was necessary to improve the national defense, it was impossible to

reach a consensus on what should be done. In fact, in the

opinion of historian Russell F. Weigley, the sweeping legislation of the 1916 National Defense Act could never have

been achieved except for problems with Mexico.37

The United States had been involved in the internal affairs

of Mexico following the 1911 overthrow of dictator Porfirio

Diaz, the details of which are not relevant to this narrative.

It is sufficient that displeasure with U.S. policies led peasant leader Francisco "Pancho" Villa to retaliate by raiding

Columbus, New Mexico, on March 9, 1916. Within a

week, the War Department sent 5,000 troops under Brig.

Gen. John J. Pershing across the border in pursuit of Villa.

34. Clifford, Citizen Soldiers, pp. 116-17, 150.

35. Holley, General John M. Palmer, pp. 249-50.

36. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New YorkMacmillan Co., 1967), p. 343.

37. Ibid., p. 347.
28 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Villa made a mockery of the campaign, and the Mexican

government demanded that Pershing be withdrawn. Villa

continued to menace American towns, while war with Mexico seemed almost inevitable. On May 9 the War Department called out the Texas, New Mexico and Arizona National Guards, but this force did not appear to be enough.

On May 17, because of the conditions along the

border, all furloughs to the Army Reserve were suspended

except'for furloughs from the Coast Artillery.39 On June 28,

the War Department ordered the first mobilization of the

Army Reserve. The military departments were directed to

order Reservists to active duty for service with Regular

Army regiments on the Mexican border, and approximately

3,000 Reservists answered the call.40

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1916

Under pressure from events along the border, the Congress

acted on compromise legislation proposed by Hay, which

passed the Senate on May 17 and the House May 20. This

was the comprehensive National Defense Act of 1916 that

was signed into law by President Wilson on June 3, 1916.

More than 100 pages long, with 128 sections, the National Defense Act of 1916 defined the Army of the United

States as the "Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and

such other land forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law." As a military omnibus bill, it provided something for everyone.

38 Ibid p 348; according to the 1917 Report of the Adjutant General, approximately 3,000 members of the Regular Army Reserve subsequently responded to a mobilization call of June 28, 1916, and were

assigned to Regular Army units along the Mexico border. See page 193,

Report of the Adjutant General, 1917.

39. Report of the Adjutant General, War Department Reports, 1916

(Washington, DC: War Department, 1917), p. 255.

40 Report of the Adjutant General, War Department Reports, 1911

(Washington: War Department, 1918), p. 193. In contrast to the official

War Department reports, the July 7, 1916, New York Times reported on

page 4 that the War Department was going to summon approximately

5 000 Reservists to the colors. According to The Adjutant General, this

would have been impossible, since there were only 4,626 Reservists including the Coast Artillery. According to the National Guard Bureau,

158,664 National Guardsmen were also mobilized.
THE EARLY YEARS 29

The National Guard received federal pay for drills,41

which were set by the act at 48 per year. On the other

hand, the carrot of federal pay was used to counterbalance

the stick of federal recognition and standards for Guard officers, the authority of the President to prescribe the kind of

units to be maintained by the states, and the requirements

that enlistment qualifications for the Guard be the same as

the Regular Army. Guardsmen were also required to take a

dual oath to their State and the United States.

The Regular Army was authorized an increase to

175,000 men over a period of five years, and the number of

general officers was increased. The Officers Reserve Corps,

the Enlisted Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officers Training

Corps were also established statutorily. The comprehensive

federal reserve force so ardently espoused by Root, Wood,

Stimson and Garrison was finally authorized.

The MTCA had been instrumental in keeping a training camps provision intact during the legislative process

that hammered out the National Defense Act of 1916. The

lobbying of Clark and Drinker, with the assistance of Sen.

Henry A. duPont of Delaware, resulted in the 16,000 men

who took Plattsburg training in the summer of 1916 being

the first to do so under federal statute.42

According to John G. Clifford in his book, The Citizen

Soldiers, the 1916 camps were the product of hard work and

cooperation between the MTCA and the War Department.

The camps gave increased publicity to preparedness and the

idea that citizens had a universal military obligation. These

camps, called Regular Army Instruction Camps, augmented

the country's trained military personnel as MTCA personnel,

called Plattsburgers, flocked by the hundreds to join the

new Officers' Reserve Corps (ORC) and Reserve Officers

Training Corps (ROTC).43

By February 1917, approximately 500 Reserve Officers

had been commissioned, in addition to nearly 2,000 in the

still-separate Medical Reserve Corps. As United States intervention in World War I became more likely, the Army and

the MTCA stepped up their recruiting efforts. As of March

1, 939 Reserve Officers had been commissioned and another

565 commissions were pending. The MTCA had 70,000 applicants for the 1917 Regular Instruction Camps. On April

1, 1917, the Regular Army, including the Philippine

41. Riker, Soldiers of the States, pp. 76-80.

42. Clifford, Citizen Soldiers, pp. 116-17.

43. Ibid., pp. 152-53.
30 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Scouts, had a strength of 133,111. There were 80,446 National Guardsmen in Federal service, plus 101,174 members

of the Guard still in State service.44

WORLD WAR I

There was an obvious need for more Army officers following

US entry into World War I on April 6, 1917, and the

MTCA sent Secretary of War Newton D. Baker a telegram

proposing to open the instruction camps as early as May to

serve as a professional training ground for men being offered

commissions in the ORC.

Baker agreed. The staggering task of recruiting 40,000

officer candidates in just three weeks began. The camps

opened May 15 using the recently published Plattsburg Manual^ as their basic text. Meanwhile, the commissioning process was accelerated, with 7,957 Reserve Officers appointed

by May 15. These officers, as well as the new candidates,

were required to attend the training camps in order to retain

their commissions.46

Including officers transferred from the Medical Reserve

Corps when it was merged with the ORC on June 3, 1917,

the ORC on June 30, 1917, consisted of 21,543 officers.47

It was with this nucleus of trained reserve officers and reserve enlisted men with specialized skills that the United

States Army entered World War I.

The Enlisted Reserve Corps had been created by the

National Defense Act of 1916 for the expressed purpose "of

securing an additional reserve of enlisted men for military

service with the Engineer, Signal and Quartermaster Corps

and the Ordnance and Medical Departments of the Regular

Army."48 The purpose was to obtain a reserve of pretrained

specialists who would augment the Regular Army upon call

44. Marvin A. Kriedberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1955), p. 374.

45. The Plattsburg Manual, first published in March 1917 and indorsed by Wood, was designed to be a first textbook for those who

desired an ORC commission. In 336 pages, it covered a wealth of military subjects from physical training to patrolling and trench warfare. It

went through 10 printings in 14 months.

46. Kriedberg, op. tit., pp. 224-225.

47. Report of the Secretary of War, 1917 (Washington: War Department, 1917), pp. 193-94.

48. See Section 55, PL 64-85, 134 U.S.C. 195.
THE EARLY YEARS 21

of the President; and this Enlisted Reserve Corps49 was in

addition to the Regular Army Reserve, which had been established in 1912 and continued under the 1916 act.50

Furloughs from the active Army to the Regular Army

Reserve (RAR) were suspended on April 19, 1917, and virtually all members of the RAR were ordered back to active

duty in May. Meanwhile, the Enlisted Reserve Corps was

growing rapidly, reaching 35,000 men on June 30, 1917,

and 55,000 by October 1 of the same year. According to

the Adjutant General, nine Engineer regiments, were organized for railway work abroad, and 27 field Signal battalions, 12 telegraph battalions and six depot companies

were formed from this Reserve.

In addition, the Enlisted Reserve Corps provided the

men for 235 wagon companies, 106 auto-truck companies,

20 bakery companies and 24 pack-train companies, plus

nearly 15,000 men who served in the Medical Department

in World War I.51In all, approximately 80,000 Enlisted

Reserve Corps or Regular Army Reservists served in World

War I.52

The Officers' Reserve Corps provided a total of 89,476

officers during World War I,53of whom 57,307 were commissioned through the 90-day Officers Training Camps. Included in the larger figure were 639 "colored" officers commissioned at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, in 1917. Two schools

in Puerto Rico produced 433 officers.54

The Reserve Officers Training Corps produced 3,364

ORC officers, and 23,261 former enlisted men were commissioned through Officers Training Schools operated by the

49. A particularly popular Enlisted Reserve Corps option was in the

Aviation Section, Signal Enlisted Reserve Corps. A number of the Army's

early aviators came out of this corps including Edward V. "Eddie"

Rickenbacker, who won the Medal of Honor and the Distinguished Service Cross with six Oak Leaf Clusters as a World War I flying ace. The

Enlisted Reserve Corps was also a holding status for potential officers

with special skills such as medical students.

50. The Regular Army Reserve was never a large force. This body

of soldiers furloughed from the Regular Army stood at 4,648 on June

30, 1916, and grew to 8,355 before furloughs were suspended on April

19, 1917. F

51. Report of the Secretary of War, 1917.

52. "Report of the Adjutant General," in War Department Annual

Reports, 1919 (Washington: War Department, 1919) Vol I DD

500-01. ' '

vv'

53. Ibid.

54. Report of the Chief of Staff, 1919, in War Department Annual Reports, 1919 (Washington: War Department, 1919), pp. 299-301.
32 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

various corps and divisions before all distinctions between

components were ended on August 7, 1918. After that

date, the appellations "Regular Army," "Officers' Reserve

Corps," "National Guard," and "National Army" were

dropped and all commissions were granted in the Army of

the United States.

The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) commander

in Europe was General John J. Pershing, a Regular Army

man who had previously commanded the US forces on the

Mexican border. Pershing was greatly concerned about the

short period of training that the American draftees and volunteers received, and he devoted many months to training

the men who reached Europe in 1917 and early 1918.55Pershing's insistence on additional training was vindicated, for

American units gave a good account of themselves in places

like St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne,56and Pershing

himself was apparently convinced that a large standing army

was unnecessary in time of peace.

As in subsequent wars, the divisions of World War I

did not remain pure Regular Army, National Army or National Guard divisions even prior to August 7. Officers of

all components and men from the Enlisted Reserve Corps

served in every division, making the Army Reserves contribution to World War I a contribution to the total war

effort.57

55 Weigley History of the United States Army, p. 372.

56' Charles B MacDonald, "World War I: The U.S. Army Overseas " in Maurice Matloff (Gen. Ed.), American Military History

(Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States

Army, 1969), pp. 396-403.

57. Report of the Chief of Staff 1919, p. 280.
3

Between the World

Wars 1919-1939

Demobilization proceeded rapidly after the war, and by

June 30, 1919, 2,608,218 enlisted men and 128,436

officers had been discharged. Six months later the US Army

consisted of only 130,000 Regular troops, about the same

number as in April 1917.' There were no special plans for

strengthening the reserve forces of the Army, and in fact

Army Chief of Staff Peyton C. March proposed to Congress

in 1919 a plan for an expanded Regular Army of over

500,000 men, filled out in time of war by a horde of conscripts backed up by the National Guard.2

Congress was in no mood, however, to provide for such

a substantial increase in the standing army, and both houses

resisted the blandishments of the War Department. Congress

sought a reasonable alternative to March's proposal, and in

October 1919 it found a man who was willing to offer such.

Colonel John McAuley Palmer had been one of Pershing's

proteges in the AEF, and he had returned to Washington

after the war as a member of the War Plans Division of the

General Staff. Palmers experience in France had strengthened his existing belief in the values of the citizen-soldier,

and when Senator James J. Wadsworth invited him to testify

before the Committee on Military Affairs, Palmer was ready

to offer his opinions.3

1. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York

and London: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and Collier Macmillan

Publishers, 1967), p. 396.

2. Ibid. pp. 396-97.

3. Jonathan M. House, "John McAuley Palmer and the Reserve

33
34 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

By the end of Palmer's two days as an expert witness,

Sen. Wadsworth was convinced that the outspoken colonel—who had castigated the proposals of Chief of Staff

March—was just the man to work on a Senate proposal for

amending the National Defense Act of 1916. Palmer was

thereupon loaned to the Committee, and he worked for

eight months on the project. After much compromising

with the House of Representatives, which had developed its

own bill, many of Palmer's ideas (except his plans for universal military training) were enacted into law in 1920.

Usually called the National Defense Act of 1920,4this

piece of legislation was far-reaching in its impact on the

organization of the United States Army. The Army was now

defined as consisting of the Regular Army, the National

Guard, and the Organized Reserves; and the entire country

was divided into corps areas. In each corps was to be at least

one division of Organized Reserve troops. The Regular Army

reserve was abolished by the 1920 statute, and its members

were relieved of further military obligations.5

Of primary interest to reservists were a re-statement of

the 1916 Defense Act provisions creating the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and the

Enlisted Reserve Corps and the statutory regulation of the

Citizens' Military Training Camps that had developed out of

the pre-war Plattsburg movement.6Because of the small inter-war size of the Enlisted Reserve Corps, this chapter is

restricted almost totally to the Officers' Reserve Corps.

On July 21, 1921, General Pershing succeeded General

March as Chief of Staff of the Army, and under him the

reserves received greater attention than ever before.7The instrument of this attention was none other than Brig. Gen.

John McA. Palmer, who was a member of Pershing's personal staff. During Pershing's tenure as Chief of Staff, wrote

Palmer, "my principal duty was to advise him in questions

of policy relating to reserve and other 'citizen army' affairs."

He acted purely in an advisory capacity, said Palmer, and

when his advice "pointed to administrative action, he {General Pershing] ordered the proper agency of the War Department to take that action."8

Components," Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, Vol. XII

(September 1982), pp. 14-15.

4. Public Law 66-242.

5. Ibid., Sees. 3, 30.

6. Ibid., Sees. 37, 40, 47 and 55.

7. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 560.

8. Letter, John McA. Palmer to Col. E. S. Hartshorn, Executive for
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1919-1939 35

The problems of the Army's Organized Reserve forces

after World War I were numerous, even after passage of the

National Defense Act of 1920. Lack of an institution for

providing guidance at the Army Staff level, poor opportunities for training, and—given these two problems—an

unrealistic view of mobilization were endemic. The Army

Staff did not have any ready solution in any of these areas,

but Chief of Staff Pershing decided that the first priority

was to insure that someone at the Army Staff level would

have a continuing responsibility for reserve affairs after he

and Gen. Palmer were gone.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A RESERVE OFFICE

In a March 1, 1923, memorandum, Pershing directed the

Deputy Chief of Staff to study the question of "establishing

an agency in the War Department whose express function

will be to handle questions pertaining to the Reserves, that

is, an agency to which reserve officers seeking information

or with recommendations to make, or any business relating

to the reserves could go and receive a cordial welcome and

thoughtful consideration. I think no such agency now exists

in the department."9

As a result of Pershing's memorandum, a Reserve Officers' Section was established on June 12, 1923, under the

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Maj. C. F. Thompson was

given temporary responsibility for the section, as an additional duty. Thompson's tenure, however, lasted only until

July 2, at which time he was succeeded by Maj. Walter O.

Boswell.10

The position of "Chief of the Reserve Section, G-2" did

not accord enough importance to the role of the Officers

Reserve Corps during the inter-war period.11In March 1927,

Reserve Affairs, July 1, 1935, in National Archives, Record Group 319

(Army Staff), Entry #343 (Records for Reserve and ROTC Affairs), Box

100. Hereinafter cited by RG #, Entry #, and Box #.

9. Memorandum, General John J. Pershing to Deputy Chief of

Staff, March 1, 1923, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 97.

10. Memorandum, H. C. McCormick to Col. E. S. Hartshorn,

June 27, 1935, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 97. Major Thompson returned

later as Brig. Gen. Thompson and served as Executive for Reserve Affairs, September 16, 1938-June 9, 1940. A complete listing of the

Chiefs of the Army Reserve—by whatever title they were known—is in

Appendix A.

11. The Enlisted Reserve Corps, created by the National Defense

Act of 1920, was of very minor importance between World Wars I and

II. It consisted of only 6000 men in 1928, and by 1936 its ranks num-
36 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

therefore, Colonel David L. Stone was transferred to the

Army Chief of Staffs Office from the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of War and was assigned as "Executive for Reserve

Affairs."12This reporting relationship lasted only ten days,

for on March 15, 1927, The Adjutant General suspended

"until further notice" the transfer of the position to the

Chief of Staffs Office.13 Col. Stones successor, Col. (later

Brigadier General) Charles D. Herron, took over the position in May 1930, and he, too, reported to the Assistant

Secretary of War. In November 1930, however, Col. Herron

was transferred to the Office of the Chief of Staff, where the

status of the Executive for Reserve Affairs was "analogous to

that of the Legislation Branch." Col. Herron was soon informed that the office, which as late as September 1936

consisted only of the Executive and a secretary, would "be an

adjunct to, and will function directly under, the Deputy

Chief of Staff."14

The Office of the Executive for Reserve Affairs remained at this small staffing level until April 16, 1941,

when it was allocated two additional officer positions: a lieutenant colonel and a captain. The title was officially changed

at almost the same time to the "Office of the Executive for

Reserve and ROTC Affairs," a title that was used until

1954."

bered less than 4000. "Organization of the Army, 1928," RG 319, Entry

343, Box 97; "Strength of the O.R.C. and E.R.C., June 30, 1936," RG

319, Entry 343, Box 100.

12. Special Orders No. 53, Par. 24, March 5, 1927, cited in "Digest of War Department Policies," Subject: "Supervision of Reserve Affairs," November 7, 1930, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 98.

13. Letter from TAG, March 15, 1927, cited in "Digest of War

Department Policies," Subject: "Supervision of Reserve Affairs,"

November 7, 1939, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 98.

14. "Digest of War Department Policies," Subject: "Supervision of

Reserve Affairs," November 7, 1930, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 98;

Memorandum, Gen. C. P. Summerall to The Adjutant General,

November 1, 1930, Subject: "Executive for Reserve Affairs," RG 319,

Entry 343, Box 98; Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Edwin S. Hartshorn to

Mr. Murray, Investigator, Civil Service Commission, September 8, 1936,

RG 319, Entry 343, Box 100; Memorandum, Lt. Col. Clement H.

Wright, Secretary of the General Staff, to Col. Charles D. Herron, Executive for Reserve Affairs, November 7, 1930, RG 319, Entry 343, Box

98.

15. Letter, TAG to Executive for Reserve Affairs, April 16, 1941,

Subject: 'Allotment of Additional Officers to the Office, Chief of Staff,

War Department Overhead," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 104; Order of the

Secretary of War, June 16, 1941, reported in TAG letter, AG 008 ORC

(6-11-41), RG 319, Entry 343, Box 104.
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1919-1939 37

BUILDING THE ORC

The head of the Reserve office during the inter-war period had no direct authority over anyone except his own

clerk. Brig. Gen. Palmer, whose position was purely unofficial, had described his role as "solely . . . advisory," and

this was the pattern for the men who were later given the

title of "Reserve Executive." In 1936, for example, Brig.

Gen. E. S. Hartshorn informed an investigator for the Civil

Service Commission that "The Chief of Staff retains to himself the supervision and control of the Reserve Component of

the Army of the United States. The Executive for Reserve

Affairs is the assistant to the Chief of Staff and his immediate adviser in all matters relating to the administration of

the Reserve Component. It is the duty of the Executive for

Reserve Affairs to maintain contact with the personnel of the

Officers Reserve Corps and, speaking for the Chief of Staff,

to render decisions upon such matters as are delegated to

him by the Chief of Staff. All instructions issued by the

Office of the Executive for Reserve Affairs are given in the

name of the Chief of Staff."16Though his authority was not

very great, the presence of a general officer whose full-time

job was that of looking after the interests of Reservists in

the Army meant that Gen. Pershing had at least partially

succeeded. The Officers' Reserve Corps, the Reserve Officers

Training Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps finally had a

spokesman, and they would need that and more during the

coming year.

National defense policy during the years between World

Wars I and II was that of maintaining a relatively small

Regular Army, supplemented by a much larger force of

trained reservists. Philosophically, this was what the nation

desired; fiscally, however, it was not prepared to support

even this modest level of military activity.

"During the past year," wrote Secretary of War John W.

Weeks in 1923, "I have heard a few criticisms of our defensive measures, on the basis of their cost. It is apparently a

matter of astonishment for some of our citizens to discover

that national defense consumes an appreciable part of the

Federal Budget." During Fiscal Year 1923, continued

Weeks, the War Department appropriation was

16. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. E. S. Hartshorn, Executive for Reserve Affairs, to Mr. Murray, Investigator for the Civil Service Commission, September 8, 1936, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 100.
38 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

$340,884,122, of which $256,415,470 was for "military

purposes. These are tremendous sums," he wrote, "but ours

is a great nation. The total Federal Budget for this period

was over $4,000,000,000. The War and Navy Departments

consumed, roughly, 14 percent of the total Federal Budget,

and purely military activities 6 percent .... The per capita cost is slightly more than $2 annually."17

There were two major interrelated problems for the Officers' Reserve Corps during the inter-war years: first, increasing the size of the ORC and second, providing adequate

training opportunities for its members. Officers could be

commissioned through ROTC and the Citizens' Military

Training Camps (CMTC), but unless regular opportunities

for training were provided, it would be difficult to sustain

motivation, effectiveness, and even membership. Fiscal constraints, however, were a real problem.

World War I had created a large pool of combat veterans from which members of the ORC could be obtained.

During the fiscal year that ended on June 30, 1920, there

were a total of 35,060 new appointments to the Corps,

some 83 percent of which were in the rank of captain and

below. Slightly over 12,400 officers left the ORC during the

year, so the Officers' Reserve Corps ended FY 1920 with a

strength of 68,232.18"By means of expert instruction in

time of peace," wrote the Secretary of War in 1926, "the

Reserve Officers' Training Corps is gradually building up a

most valuable complement of junior officers .... Without

this source of replacement the Officers' Reserve Corps . . .

would become ineffective."19Indeed, the ROTC was the

largest source of new officers for the ORC. Table 3—1 shows

the gains from ROTC for the years 1920 through 1937 and

indicates for the years 1931-37 the accumulated losses

through resignations, dismissals, and other causes. As of

1937" the Army had a goal of 120,000 active members of

the Officers' Reserve Corps. The average annual increase in

ORC strength was 11,633, of which 6535 came from

ROTC. The second largest source of new ORC members was

17. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1923," in

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1923

(Washington: GPO, 1923), pp. 2-3.

18. "Report of the Adjutant General, 1920" in War Department Annual Reports, 1920 (Washington: GPO, 1921), p. 257.

19. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1926" in

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1926

(Washington: GPO, 1926), p. 55.
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1919-1939 39

Table 3-1 ROTC Appointments in the ORC, 1920-1937.

Accumulated Accumulated

Fiscal Year # Appointments Total Loss

1920 135 945

1921 811 2,977

1922 2,031 5,851

1924 3,317 9,168

1925 4,153 13,321

1926 4,842 18,163

1927 5,018 23,181

1928 5,685 28,866

1929 5,752 34,618

1930 6,514 41,132

1931 5,989 47,121 12,935

1932 6,530 53,651 16,935

1933 6,770 60,421 20,179

1934 6,347 66,768 23,649

1935 6,780 73,548 27,410

1936 5,722 79,270 31,927

1937 5,704 84,974 36,601

direct commissioning of civilians, and the third largest

source was the Citizens' Military Training Camps.21

The CMTC's had grown out of the pre-World War I

"Plattsburg idea" promoted by Army Chief of Staff Leonard

Wood. The camps were given statutory authority in the National Defense Act of 1920, and they enjoyed the patronage

and support of influential members of the political and social hierarchy through the Military Training Camps Association.22 The CMTC provided a certain amount of military

training to the young men who participated, but they consumed a disproportionate share of the War Departments Reserve Officer procurement funds. Table 3-2 compares the

appropriations and officer production for the ROTC and the

CMTC for the fiscal years from 1925 through 1928.

20. "Analysis of Gains and Losses in ROTC Appointees Since

1920," found in RG 319, Entry 343, Box 102.

21. Memorandum, Lt. Col. J. H. Woodberry, Chief, Statistics

Branch, Army General Staff, to Brig. Gen. E. S. Hartshorn, Executive

for Reserve Affairs, February 24, 1927, Subject: "Reserve Officer Objective," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 101.

22. Lt. Col. R. A. Hill, "Reserve Policies and National Defense,"

Infantry Journal, XLII (January-February 1935), p. 61; See also Ralph

Barton Perry, The Plattsburg Movement (New York: Dutton, 1921) and

John G. Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1972).
40 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Table 3-2 ROTC and CMTC, FY's 1925-1928."

1925 1926 1927 1928 Total

#$#$#$#$#

ROTC 3 8 4153 3.8 4842 3.9 5018 2.6 5685 14.1 19,698

CMTC 2.3 487 2.8 71 2.8 59 2.8 24 10.7 641

"All dollar figures are in millions; # refers to number commissioned.

TRAINING THE ORC

Regardless of the source from which the commissions

came, the ORC grew too slowly, for projections in 1937

indicated that the Army would not meet its ORC strength

objective until sometime in 1944. There was some doubt,

moreover, that the training received by this group of officers

would prepare them for their wartime roles, because training, indeed, was the Achilles heel of the ORC during the

inter-war period.24

The lessons of World War I, as assimilated by the Army

General Staff and the Congress, did not include the necessity for extensive training for members of the Officers Reserve Corps. From 1920-1940 ORC members were typically

under-trained; what training they did receive generally fell

into five categories: active duty training with the Regular

army, active duty training with Citizens Military Training

Camps, active duty with the Civilian Conservation Corps,

inactive duty training with a Reserve unit, and correspondence courses. Many Reservists benefited from several of

these methods of training, but few people would maintain

that the ORC was ever the recipient of enough training during the inter-war years.

Members of the ORC were lucky if they received a two

week active duty training tour every four or five years during the 1920s. Table 3-3 shows the number of individuals

23. Figures are taken from "Reports of the Secretary of War" for

Fiscal Years 1925-28 and from 'Analysis of Gains and Losses in ROTC.

Appointees since 1920," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 102.

24. Memorandum, Lt. Col. J. H. Woodberry, Chief, Statistics

Branch, Army General Staff, to Brig. Gen. E. S. Hartshorn, Executive

for Reserve Affairs, Subject: "Reserve Officer Objective," RG 319, Entry

343, Box 101. It should be pointed out that producing Reserve officers

was not the primary purpose of the CMTC "Instilling citizenship" was its

paramount objective.
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1919-1939 4l

Table 3—3 Active Duty Training (15 Days or Less) of ORC Members,

1924-1930.-'

Cost of Training

Fiscal Year # Trained # Days (Per Capita)

1924 7,926 15 (*)

1925 10,859 15 (*)

1926 14,883 15 $143.83

1927 16,173 15 $141.27

1928 16,789 14 $123.94

1929 19,608 14 $126.75

1930 21,270 14 $121.89

* Unknown.

who received such training, and the per capita cost of the

training.

Table 3-3 does not, however, tell the entire story. In

FY 1930, for example, 1,123 Reserve Officers received active duty training in excess of 15 days. The problem from

the standpoint of readiness, however, was that there were

79,285 active Reserve Officers at the time, meaning that

slightly over 28 percent of the ORC was able to train during that fiscaJ year.26

A member of the 306th Infantry Regiment, 77th Division, recalled that the officers in his unit did not have two

weeks of annual training each year. "We went most years,"

he stated, "to either Fort Dix [New Jersey], or Plattsburg

[New York]. Our unit didn't have any vehicles, so we carpooled to camp, or got there on our own. When we got

there, they had to issue equipment to us, like rifles and

machine guns, because we didn't have anything of our

own."27

Another ORC member in Chicago remembered

monthly meetings during the 1920s. "We had RA [Regular

Army] instructors, and we went on occasional field trips. I

went to Carlisle Barracks [Pennsylvania], once and spent

most of that time studying general military subjects. I

25. Memorandum, Lt. Col. Karl Truesdell, Chief, Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, Army General Staff, to Col. C. D. Herron,

Executive for Reserve Affairs, August 14, 1931, RG 319, Entry 343,

Box 98.

26. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1930," in

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1930

(Washington: GPO, 1930), pp. 317, 6.

27. Interview of Capt. Kenneth Carson (USAR—Ret.) by Maj.

James T. Currie, April 1, 1983. Notes in OCAR Historical File.
42 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

didn't get any pay except for those two weeks." Shortly before World War II, this particular ORC member became

commander of a Training Unit of Sanitary Reserve Officers.

"We were active, then," he said. "We had monthly dinner

meetings, followed by lectures, illustrations, and slide

shows. We studied water supply treatment, waste treatment,

and field sanitation."

A third ORC Member recalled that "Prior to World

War II, reserve training was rather hit or miss, at least in

the area of Minneapolis .... [We had] space in the Wesley

Temple, a church-owned office building. Each fall a schedule of classes was drawn up—September through May—and

officers volunteered to instruct one or more sessions. Some

subjects were required, and some dates were open for the

instructor to pick his own topic. Some officers came wellprepared and gave excellent presentations. Some officers

came with no preparation—they spoke 'off the cuff with

no outlines or notes, relying on experience, and these sessions were poor and uninteresting."28

Limited funds for Reserve training and the limited

number of Regular Army officers available for duty in the

CMTC convinced the War Department to use Organized Reserve officers as instructors in the Camps. The individual

Organized Reservists showed a high level of competence,

and in 1928 the War Department General Staff decided to

use some Organized Reserve units to assist with CMTC

training.

The Organized Reserve units performed well during the

1928 training year, and in December 1928 Secretary of War

Dwight F. Davis directed that Organized Reserve units be

used in at least one camp in each of the nine Corps areas.

"Reserve organizations assigned to this work," stated Davis,

"should be those which are, in the judgement of the Corps

Area Commander, best qualified. It should be the objective

of Corps Area Commanders to qualify all Reserve units for

this work to the end that they may become competent to

perform this type of training."29

The public reaction was immediate—and unfavorable.

The Hearst newspapers editorialized against the use of Orga28. Interview of Col. A. S. Behrman, (USAR-Ret.) by Maj. James

T. Currie, April 11, 1983. Notes in OCAR Historical File; Letter, Col.

Stan W. Carlson (USAR-Ret.) to Maj. Dick Crossland, July 4, 1983,

OCAR Historical File.

29. Letter, TAG to All Corps Area Commanders, February 9,

1929, Subject: "Training Reserve Regiments through the use of

C.M.T.C." RG 319, Entry 343, Box 98.
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1919-1939 43

nized Reserve units at the Camps, and Horace C. Stebbins,

a wealthy textile merchant and leader in the Military Training Camps Association, sent a protesting telegram to the

Secretary of War. On February 18, 1929, Charles B. Pike,

Chief Civilian Aide to War Secretary Davis, forwarded copies of letters protesting the use of Organized Reserve officers

in the CMTC.30The underlying reason for the protest

against the Reserve officers probably was less with doubts of

their effectiveness than with a perception that the prestige of

the CMTC was diminished by not having a cadre of Regular

Army personnel only.

The protests were to no avail, however, and the Army

continued to use Organized Reserve officers to train the

young men of the CMTC. Considering the small number of

men who received their commissions through the Camps,

the only way to justify Army expenditures on the CMTC is

that the men of the ORC received valuable leadership experience.

The Citizens' Military Training Camps continued to

function during the 1930s, and the ORC received just over

4700 new lieutenants from the Camps from 1929 through

1940.31 As a source of strength for the ORC, the Citizens'

Military Training Camps were not terribly important; as a

way of providing training for the Reserves, the CMTC was

rapidly eclipsed by the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).

The New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt began on March 20, 1933, and one of Roosevelt's innovative

ways of giving jobs to unemployed men was the Civilian

Conservation Corps. The CCC was established almost immediately after FDR took office, and the Army was initially

charged only with immunizing the enrollees, issuing them

clothing and equipment, and organizing them into companies of 200 men each. The Departments of Interior and

Agriculture were given control of all other functions, including that of commanding the camps.32

30. Telegram, Assistant Secretary of War Charles B. Robbins to

Horace C. Stebbins, February 11, 1929 and Letter, Charles B. Pilse to

Dwight F. Davis, February 18, 1929, both in RG 319, Entry 343, Box

97; New York Times, June 3, 1947, p. 25.

31. Reports of the Secretary of War, 1934-41.

32. "Report of the Secretary of War, 1933," in Annual Reports, War

Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1933 (Washington: GPO, 1933),

p. 4. A recent article on the subject is Terence J. Smith (Col., USARRet.), "The Army's Role in the success of the CCC," The Retired Officer

(July 1983), pp. 30-34.
44 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

The Army handled its role without difficulty, and on

April 10, 1933, the President directed the Army to assume

"complete and permanent control" of the CCC. To supplement available Regular Army personnel, the President authorized members of the ORC to work in the CCC Camps.

By July 1, 1933, there were a total of 1315 camps in

operation. "With few exceptions," stated Secretary of War

George H. Dern, "each camp comprised 2 Regular officers,

1 Reserve officer, 4 enlisted men of the Regular Army, and

about 200 men of the Civilian Conservation Corps." By the

end of the fiscal year a total of 1774 ORC members were on

CCC duty, a number that would swell significantly in the

next few years.33

Thousands of members of the ORC were unemployed

during the Great Depression years, and many of these men

leaped at the chance for active duty with the CCC. The War

Department regarded the CCC as an opportunity for the Reservists to receive some needed training in "practical leadership, "but the main benefit of using the ORC members

was that the Regular Army officers could go back to their

previous military assignments.34

The replacement of Regular Army officers with Organized Reservists continued apace, and by the end of fiscal

year 1934 the number of Regulars on duty in the CCC

camps had dwindled to 498, while the number of Reservists

had risen to 5,035.35 The number of Officers Reserve Corps

members had reached 5,853 by September 30, 1934, a figure that included 1120 medical officers and 164 chaplains.36

A further incentive to the use of ORC members in the

CCC Camps was provided by the camp enrollees themselves.

The CCC was not intended to be a military experience, and

the Regular Army CCC camp commanders were often regarded by the enrollees as "too military" in their attitudes.

Relations with the enrollees improved greatly, wrote one student of the CCC experience, once Organized Reservists were

placed in command of the camps.37

Black ORC members, too, shared the opportunity presented by the CCC, which was racially segregated. There

were separate black and white encampments (except for a

few camps in California), and the Army initially assigned

33. "Report of the Secretary of War, 1933," p. 6.

34. Ibid., p. 10.

35. "Report of the Secretary of War, 1934," p. 197.

36. "CCC Facts," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 99.

37. John A. Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1945:

A New Deal Case Study (Durham, N.C.: Duke University, 1967), p. 86.
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1919-1939 45

white Regular Army officers as commanders of the all-black

camps. This policy changed in 1934, however, and black

ORC members thereafter commanded the black CCC camps.

This policy was especially encouraged by President Roosevelt

until after the 1936 election, following which he apparently

lost interest in the matter.38

The War Department continued to regard CCC duty as

a valuable training experience for the officers in the ORC,

and in 1937 it proposed an 18-month limit on the length of

a CCC tour, so that more ORC members could benefit from

the experience. The outcry from the ORC members, who

had come to regard their CCC jobs as permanent, was vociferous, and the War Department quickly backed down on

its idea.39

Overall, the CCC experience was valuable for the ORC,

members of which served on active duty with the camps

until December 31, 1939- By that date, "pursuant to Executive directive," all of the ORC members were placed in a

civilian status.40The total number of Corps members who

enjoyed active duty with the CCC was reportedly in excess

of 30,000,41 and it is probable that for many of these men

their interest in the Officers' Reserve Corps and their determination to maintain their Reserve status were enhanced by

the experience. Given the paucity of incentives for Organized Reserve members during the inter-war period, this was

no small accomplishment.

Members of the ORC could not count on two weeks of

active duty each year, as could members of the National

Guard, and there was no pay at all for inactive duty drills.

As was indicated in Table 3-3, the number of Reservists

who were given two weeks of active duty training each year

varied from under 8,000 in 1924 to over 21,000 in 1930.

The strength of the active Reserve grew from 62,000 in the

earlier year to 80,000 in the latter, meaning that by 1930

the "average" Reservist had a 1 in 4 chance of getting active

duty training in a given year.42

38. Ibid., p. 190.

39. Ibid., p. 172.

40. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1940," in

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1940

(Washington: GPO, 1940), p. 66.

41. "How Far We Have Accomplished Our Objectives," in RG

319, Entry 343, Box 101. Although the figure of 30,000 ORC members

is given, this seems awfully high.

42. Reports of the Secretary of War for 1924 and 1931.
46 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

In actuality, however, the odds were not really as favorable as 1 in 4, because some officers were given training

almost every year, to the detriment of others who were

forced to wait seven or eight years between tours. Harry S.

Truman, for example, a member of the Field Artillery, Officers' Reserve Corps, performed active duty training on ten

occasions between 1920 and 1933-43 Truman was not

unique, either, for Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley reported that during FY 1928, 16 percent of all Reserve officers placed on active duty for training were on their third

consecutive tour; during FY 1929 the figure rose to almost

23 percent; and for FY 1930 the figure was 34 percent.

Hurley thereupon ordered "that the number of Reserve officers who have been placed on active duty year after year be

materially reduced and that effort be made to expend available funds upon Reserve Officers who have had active duty

training less recently. A minimum of Reserve officers should

be placed on active duty for more than two consecutive

years, and where this policy is not adhered to, Corps Area

Commanders should be sure that the interests of the Service

are being thoroughly considered."44

The problem continued, however. As Col. Charles D.

Herron, Executive for Reserve Affairs, explained almost a

year later, "The argument is between those who believe in a

Reserve Corps with a few highly trained officers and a majority practically untrained, as opposed to those who believe

that all should have some training. The War Department,"

stated Herron, "takes the latter stand." The "principal restrictions" in effect at the time, said Herron, were as follows:

"(a) Not more than 10% of the trainees will be field

grade officers.

"(b) Not more than 20% will be staff.

"(c) Officers of organizations ordered to unit training

are given preference over officers of those not ordered to unit

training.

"(d) Officers who have prepared themselves for active

duty during the winter through inactive training have preference.

43. "Statement of Military Service of Harry S. Truman, 0 129

869," National Archives and Records Service, National Personnel Records

Center (Military Personnel Records), St. Louis, Mo.

44. Letter, TAG to Corps Area Commanders, Department Commanders, and Chiefs of Arms and Services, January 10, 1931, Subject:

"Training of Organized Reserves," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 98.
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1919-1939 47

"(e) Only key men (regimental commanders, etc.) are

placed on duty for more than two consecutive years."45

Congressional leaders too, displayed a keen interest in

the status of ORC training, though the Congress never apparently considered appropriating enough money to allow

yearly training for all ORC members. On April 20, 1934,

Sen. Royal S. Copeland and Rep. Ross A. Collins, Chairs of

the Senate and House Appropriations Conferees, respectively,

sent to the Secretary of War a letter explaining the conference committee's intentions. Trainees, wrote the Congressional leaders, should be a maximum of 45 years old.

Ninety percent of them should be company grade officers,

and 90 percent should serve in the combat arms. They almost wrote these provisions into the Military Appropriations

Bill, said the authors of the letter, but they finally decided

against placing an "unconditional age restriction" on Reserve

training.46

Secretary of War George H. Dern's response, which was

prepared by Reserve Executive Herron and revised by a General Staff Major named Eisenhower, informed Copeland and

Collins that the War Department's policy in many cases was

almost identical to what they were suggesting. Indeed, the

policies expressed in Dern's response do not appear to be

much different from those enunciated by Col. Herron over

two years earlier.47

The suggestion that 90 percent of all trainees be combat arms officers, however, rather than the 80 percent specified by War Department policy, met with resistance from

the Secretary. "With an appropriation for an annual quota of

20,000, the average staff officer [is] trained once in six

years. With adoption of a 90 percent policy and a 16,500

quota, training would occur only once in fifteen years. This

means that the trained Reserve staff officer, indispensable to

prompt mobilization, would cease to exist." Because of the

inadequacy of funds, concluded Dern, "training of the Officers' Reserve Corps has never been carried out on a scale

45. Memorandum, Col. Charles D. Herron to Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur, December 10, 1931, Subject: 'Active Duty Training for

Reserve Officers," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 98.

46. Letter, Sen. Royal S. Copeland and Rep. Ross A. Collins to

Secretary of War George H. Dern, April 20, 1934, RG 319, Entry 343,

Box 99.

47. Letter, Secretary of War George H. Dern to Sen. Royal S.

Copeland, April 30, 1934 (with pencilled notations indicating authorship), RG 319, Entry 343, Box 99- An identical letter was sent to

Rep. Collins.
48 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

sufficient to insure requisite efficiency. Aside from inactive

instruction, each combat officer should be required to undergo two weeks' training annually, while others should be

called out sufficiently often to insure their familiarity with

assigned duties. This is the standard that has been fixed by

law for the National Guard, and should apply with equal

force to the Officers' Reserve Corps."48

The number of Reservists who received two weeks of

training rose steadily from a low of 14 percent in 1934 to

over 30 percent as mobilization neared in 1940, as can be

seen in Table 3—4.

Table 3-4 Active Duty Training (14 Days or Less) of ORC Members

1931-1940.49

Fiscal Year # Trained # Active ORC* % Trained

1931 20,998 80,399 26

1932 21,527 83,808 26

1933 20,948 86,338 24

19.34 11,944 88,107 14

1935 16,785 91,955 18

1936 22,175 95,619 23

1937 22,595 96,545 23

1938 26,089 100,116 26

1939 30,705 104,575 29

1940 31,741 104,228 30

* Includes only those eligible for active duty.

Increasing the number and percentage of ORC members who received two weeks of training each year was only

one of the readiness questions facing the War Department

during the years prior to World War II. The National

Guard had received in the National Defense Act of 1916 a

guarantee of Federal pay for 48 drill periods per year for

each member, but there was no comparable compensation

provision for the members of the Officers' Reserve Corps.

"We met once a week," during the 1930s recalled an ORC

member of the 306th Infantry Regiment, 77th Division,

"and it seems to me that all we ever did was disassemble,

clean, and reassemble our machine guns. I did this every

week for nine years in a non-pay status."50 By 1937, mem48. Ibid.

49. Compiled from "Reports of the Secretary of War" for the fiscal

years 1931-1940.

50. Interview of Col. Milton Barall, (USAR-Ret.), by Maj. James

T. Currie, February 4, 1983. Notes in OCAR Historical Files.
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1919-1939 49

bers of the ORC, through their lobbying group, the Reserve

Officers Association, mounted a campaign to receive pay for

inactive duty training (IADT).

H. R. 9503, a bill "To amend the National Defense

Act of June 30, 1916, as amended, with respect to the pay

and allowances of certain Reserve Officers," was the legislative means through which the inactive duty training change

was proposed. The measure contained a $75 per year maximum on the amount of drill pay a member could receive,51

but the Department of War opposed even this modest proposal. Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring spoke out vigorously against the bill, though he admitted that National

Guard officers received pay for inactive duty training. The

comparison with the Guard, said Woodring, was "in no

sense complete," because the National Guard officers "are

required to perform definitely prescribed duties such as armory drills, field exercises, target practice, etc." Why similar duties could not have been required of ORC members as

a precondition of receiving IADT pay, the Secretary did not

indicate.

Woodrings final argument against IADT pay for the

Reservists was a disingenuous statement that the members of

the ORC themselves opposed this bill because they maintained their "amateur standing" as a "cherished possession."52 This specious line of reasoning was repeated from

time to time by the War Department, but the issue would

not die.

A bill calling for IADT pay and allowances for uniforms and equipment was introduced into the Seventy-Sixth

Congress, and it, too, was opposed by the War Department.

By the time the bill reached FDR's desk, the IADT provision had been taken out, but Roosevelt vetoed the measure

anyway.53The level of frustration continued to rise among

ORC members, and in March 1940, Col. Edward S. Bres,

National President of the Reserve Officers Association,

sought to find out why the War Department continued to

oppose drill pay for Organized Reservists. Col. Bres was unable to get an official answer to his question, but Brig.

Gen. Charles F. Thompson, Executive for Reserve Affairs,

told him unofficially that it would simply cost too much—

51. Copy of H. R. 9503 in RG 319, Entry 343, Box 101.

52. Statement of Secretary of War Harry F. Woodring, April 25,

1937, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 101.

53. Message to Congress, August 1, 1939, RG 319, Entry 343,

Box 102.
50 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908^1983

$5 million per year. Furthermore, wrote Thompson, ORC

members in the Judge Advocate General, Chaplain, and

Medical branches gained their commissions because of their

professional qualifications. "It would be of questionable propriety," stated Thompson, "to provide an annual retainer fee

..." to such officers. Furthermore, said the Reserve Executive, "Many Reserve Officers are concerned with possible detraction from the unselfishness and patriotic motives which

heretofore have typified the ORC."54 The ROA's reaction to

Thompson's letter is unknown.

Correspondence courses were an important means of

ORC training during the years between the two World

Wars. Such courses began in fiscal year 1921, stated Secretary of War John W. Weeks, "to supplement the limited appropriation for the training of the Organized Reserve."

Through these courses, wrote Weeks, it was hoped that

"much instruction can be given to officers and candidates in

the National Guard and Organized Reserve, at the same

time meeting the demand for economy in cases when field

training is not absolutely necessary."55

By 1931 the Secretary of War was able to report that

"extension courses continue to be the least expensive means

... for the dissemination of military knowledge," with a

cost per student of approximately $1.85 per year. Table 3-5

shows enrollment data for the years 1923-1931.

Table 3-5 Extension Course Enrollment, 1923-1931."'

Total Organized

Year ORC ERC Reserves

1923 10,719 613 11,332

1924 10,696 523 11,219

1925 15,939 538 16,477

1926 18,492 639 19,131

1927 22,446 913 23,359

1928 24,204 1,216 25,420

1929 26,356 1,037 27,393

1930 24,120 1,222 25,342

1931 27,505 1,596 29,101

54. Letter, Brig. Gen. Charles F. Thompson to Col. Edward S.

Bres, March 11, 1940, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 103. The debate over

IADT pay for Reservists did not end until the enactment of Public Law

80-460 on March 25, 1948.

55. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1921," in

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1921

(Washington: GPO, 1921), p. 26.

56. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President 1931," in
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1919-1939 51

By March 31, 1940, ORC enrollment in extension

courses totaled 63,675, while Enlisted Reservists involved in

the courses numbered 1,056. The cost per student had

dropped to $1.52 per year, and 66,675 students—a figure

that includes more than just the Organized Reservists—

completed a total of 168,887 subcourses during the year.

Mobilization of Organized Reservists and National Guardsmen soon cut into extension course enrollments, but the

Army had found a way to keep a sizable number of Reservists active and interested at a very low cost.57 There were

not, however, very many other things the War Department

did to reward and encourage the members of the ORC during this period, but two actions do stand out.

REWARDING MEMBERSHIP

By 1932, reported the Secretary of War, "the march of time

has so changed the character of the Officers' Reserve Corps

that an organization which was in the beginning made up

entirely of World War officers has now but one-third of that

class." The new officers coming in, reported the Secretary,

were almost exclusively the product of the ROTC and

CMTC.58The need to give additional training to these new

officers was obvious, and the Army's way of accomplishing

such has already been discussed. What the Army did not

anticipate, however, was that these non-war veterans would

soon ask for medals and ribbons to dress up their uniforms

and reward their service in the ORC.

The Reserve Officers Association first broached the idea

to Brig. Gen. Charles D. Herron, Executive for Reserve Affairs, in December 1934. Lt. Col. Frank E. Lowe, ROA

President, suggested a ribbon denoting five years of service

as a Reserve Officer. Herron was not in favor of the idea,

believing that only war-time service should be honored in

this manner, but he told Lowe that he would look into the

suggestion. Herron's official response was that the War Department did not favor the proposal.59

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1931

(Washington: GPO, 1931), pp. 223-24.

57. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1940," in

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1940

(Washington: GPO, 1940), p. 64.

58. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1932," in

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1932

(Washington: GPO, 1932), p. 7.

59- Letter, Brig. Gen. Charles D. Herron to Lt. Col. Frank E.

Lowe, January 26, 1935, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 99.
52 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

By August 13, 1935, however, the War Department

had changed its mind, and on that date it authorized members of the Officers' Reserve Corps to wear as part of their

uniform a new "Minute Man" badge. The design was a

drawing of Captain John Parker (the Minute Man) superimposed on an eagle and bearing the inscription "Officers' Reserve Corps." A bar showing length of service—five years,

ten years, etc.—was to be worn suspended from the badge.

ORC members who had received "certificates of capacity"

would receive a badge with a red background. The number

of ORC members who received this award is unknown, but

apparently the ROA was satisfied.60

Of considerably more substance and importance to the

inter-war Reservists was the passage of Public Law 74-67 on

June 15, 1936. This act extended certain benefits to members of the Organized Reserve, National Guard, ROTC and

CMTC who were injured in line of duty while undergoing

military training. If injured under these circumstances the

member was entitled to medical and surgical care, hospitalization, transportation, and pay and benefits during treatment. If the ultimate misfortune occurred, the Army would

pay burial expenses.61

PREPARING FOR MOBILIZATION

All of the recruitment, training, rewards, and benefits given

members of the Officers' Reserve Corps was designed to

reach one end: preparation and retention of a trained group

of Army officers who could assume leadership roles during

any future mobilization and war.

Army planners during the early 1920s envisioned an

initial mobilization of 66 divisions: 11 Regular Army, 22

National Guard, and 33 Organized Reserves.62 By the close

of fiscal year 1924, the 27 Organized Reserve infantry divisions were at 73.9 percent of their authorized officer

60. War Department Immediate Release, "Badge for Reserve Officers," August 16, 1935, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 100. Active Reservists are eligible today for both the Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal and the Armed Forces Reserve Medal; the "Minute Man"

Badge is no longer awarded. See Army Regulation 672-5-1.

61. Cited in "Report of the Chief of Staff, 1936," in Annual Reports,

War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1936 (Washington: GPO,

1936), p. 40.

62. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington: GPO,

1955), pp. 401-402.
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1919-1939 53

strength, and the 6 Organized Reserve cavalry divisions had

reached 83.5 percent of their officer strength.63 Because of

the insignificant number of enlisted Reservists, however,

these divisions were never more than cadre units during the

inter-war period.

By 1933 the Secretary of War reported that there

would be 80,000 officer vacancies "in the early weeks of an

emergency" in existing Regular Army and National Guard

units. Seventy thousand of these vacancies, stated the Secretary, would be filled by Reserve officers, and additional Reservists would be needed for "Reserve units that might be

called to the colors during the subsequent stages of a mobilization."64 By mid-1936 the number of active, eligible

members of the Officers' Reserve Corps had reached 95,619,

but activation of the first Reserve units was not anticipated

until M + 60.65

The number of Reserve officers, as has been indicated

earlier, grew slowly during the inter-war years, but Organized Reserve units themselves remained only skeletons, having few enlisted personnel and only minimal equipment.

The individual members of the ORC were destined to play a

major role in any mobilization, but there was some doubt

that Organized Reserve units would ever be activated as

such.66In an article prepared in mid-1939, as threats of war

loomed in Europe and war actually raged in the Far East,

the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations

(G—3) wrote that "Many units of the Organized Reserves—

most of them in fact—are of late mobilization priority. But

the Officers' Reserve Corps is quite another matter." Members of the ORC, stated the ACS/G-3 in a remarkably accurate prediction, would become "inextricably mingled" with

63. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1924," in

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1924

(Washington: GPO, 1924), p. 10.

64. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1933," in

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1933

(Washington: GPO, 1933), p. 14.

65. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1936," in

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1936

(Washington: GPO, 1936), p. 72; memorandum, Brig. Gen. John H.

Hester to ACS/G-3, November 7, 1940, Subject: "Source of Units for

Activation," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 103.

66. The cadre units of the Organized Reserve Corps were not in the

Initial Protective Force listed in the Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP).

For a discussion of the PMP see Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military

Mobilization, pp. 476-92.
54 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Regular Army and National Guard personnel in RA and

NG units.67

As the 1930s drew to a close, it became more and

more apparent that the Army would soon be placed into the

position of testing its carefully-developed mobilization planning. The question was whether the ORC would be ready,

and in enough numbers.

67. Article, untitled, prepared by ACS/G-3, June 20, 1939,

RG 319, Entry 343, Box 102.
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 55

Drs. Charles H. (left) and

William J. (right) Mayo

were among the many

prominent physicians who

joined the Officers' Reserve

Corps. They both achieved

the rank of Brigadier General after the First World

War. (Photo courtesy of the

Mayo Clinic, Rochester,

Minnesota)

i>* i

m*j-?~

V,d HffK*

MT' "?

^i>c

Members of the 80th Infantry Division receive bayonet training from a

British NCO at Boque Maison, France, April 1918. The 80th Division

today is an Army Reserve Training Division headquartered in Richmond,

Virginia. (Photo courtesy of the National Archives)
56 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

"iSStat-1

^sr

Captain Edward V. "Eddie" Rickenbacker

was one of the most decorated American

flyers during WW I. Rickenbacker joined

the Signal Enlisted Reserve Corps on May

25, 1917, and was commissioned a First

Lieutenant, Signal Officers' Reserve Corps,

on October 4, 1917. Rickenbacker received

the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross with six Oak Leaf Clusters, the

French Legion of Honor, and two Croix de

Guerre with Palm. He was appointed a

Colonel in the Officers' Reserve Corps in

June 1929. (Photo courtesy of the Fort

Meade, Maryland Museum)

IDENTIFICATION PASS

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

U. S. A.

1 V/ M*ut.uX.JaU..,LJUwJt2 ÜJ, ÄLi^L.

FROHC&V-.14.19IS... .*«---——i91 _

BY

cunt or oitBHAjpefe

Prior to August 7, 1918, when the distinctions between "Regular

Army," "National Guard," and "National Army" were discontinued,

Army Reserve officers wore "USR" collar insignia, rather than just "US."

The Reserve insignia shows clearly on this identification pass photo of

Captain James S. Smyset, ORC. (U.S. Army photo)
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 57

Company A, 306th Machine Gun Battalion, 77th Infantry Division,

trains with the Vickers gun in France, May 1918. The 77th Division was

formed from citizen-soldiers in the New York City area. The 77th U.S.

Army Reserve Command, Flushing, NY, is today the inheritor of the

77th Divisions heritage. (Photo courtesy of the National Archives)

Surgeons attend to shrapnel wounds at Base Hospital No. 6, Sebastopol, France, May 1918.

More than 15,000 members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps served in medical units during WW

I, and medical officers of the Officer's Reserve

Corps numbered 29,299 on November 11, 1918.

The number of Regular Army medical officers on

that date was 920. (Photo courtesy of the National Archives)
58 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Soldiers from the 78th Division's

305th Machine Gun Battalion fire at

German positions near St. Juvin,

Ardennes, France, November 1,

1918—just ten days before the Armistice. Todays 78th Division is an

Army Reserve Training Division

headquartered at Camp Kilmer, NJ.

(Photo courtesy of the National Archives)

American Coast Artillerymen pound the German lines opposite Baleycourt Woods, Meuse, France, September 1918. (Signal Corps photogtaph)
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 59

Harry S. Truman was an Army Reservist. Following his

active service in the Army during World War I, Truman

joined the Organized Reserve Corps and rose to the rank

of Colonel as Commander of the 379th Artillery (horse

drawn). He also founded the Kansas City, Missouri,

chapter of the Reserve Officers Association. Truman's request for active duty at the beginning of World War II

was turned down by Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, who felt that Truman could be of more use in the

U.S. Senate. After stepping down as Commander-inChief, Truman retired from the Army Reserve and began

drawing his retirement pay of $111.92 per month.

(Photo courtesy of the Truman Library, Independence,

Missouri)
60 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Charles A. Lindbergh was one of many Army Reservists

awarded the Medal of Honor. On December 14, 1927,

Congress awarded the medal to Lindbergh for his heroic

solo crossing of the Atlantic Ocean. (Photo courtesy of

the National Archives)

Drill, chemical mortar, column of squads. These members of the ORC

are shown at their training site, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, on July

23, 1931. The mortars may well have been a loan from the active Army,

since Organized Reserve units had very little equipment of their own.

(Signal Corps Photo)
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 61

Members of the ORC performed important duty as Commanders of Civilian Conservation Corps camps during the Depression. Some 30,000

ORC members received valuable leadership training through service in

the camps. Here, the Commander of the CCC camp in Lassen National

Forest (Calif.), presents a meritorious flag to the enrollees with the cleanest barracks. (Photo courtesy US Forest Service)

Training opportunities were limited, and

equipment was often primitive for Organized Reserve units during the period between World Wars I and II. ORC members and units trained with the Regular

Army whenever possible. Shown is a coordinated infantry-tank assault at Pine

Camp, NY, August 1935. (National Archives photo)
62 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Organized Reserve units between the two World Wars usually consisted

only of officers. Pictures here is the entire 61st Battalion, 100th Infantry

Division during its annual training at Fort Knox, Ky., in July 1934.

The battalion commander was Lt. Col. D. Y. Dunn, bottom row, third

from left. (Photo courtesy of D.Y. Dunn)

Most members of the Officers' Reserve Corps were called to active

duty even before Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, and began an intensive training program with Regular Army and National Guard

units. Shown here are the 2nd Army

maneuvers in Arkansas, September

1941. (Signal Corps photo)
4

Mobilization and War

1940-1945

Hitler's invasion of Poland began on September 1, 1939,

and a week later President Roosevelt authorized a

17,000-man increase in the Regular Army, to bring it up to

a total of 227,000 men. The Army General Staff did not

believe this strength level would suffice for very long, and it

began to plan for a Regular Army of, successively, 242,000,

280,000, and 330,000 men. As the Regular Army increased

in strength, it became necessary to bring more Organized

Reserve officers onto active duty to supplement the 14,000

Regular Officers.1

Isolationist sentiment in the Congress was still a

powerful force, however, even after the German invasion and

conquest of Poland. Throughout the last months of 1939

and on into 1940, there was a marked Congressional reluctance to acknowledge the worsening situation in Europe by

appropriating enough funds to modernize the Army and significantly increase its state of readiness. The ORC received

very little attention from the Army's planners, and by the

time war resumed in Europe the Organized Reserves were

little better prepared than they had been a year earlier.2

The pace of war in Europe quickened on April 9,

1940, when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway, followed the next day by the NAZI invasion of the

1. Marvin A. Kriedberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington: GPO,

1955), pp. 536-66.

2. Mark S. Watson, United States Army in World War II, The War

Department, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington: US

Army, 1950), pp. 164-65.

63
64 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. By June 22 all of

these countries, plus France, had fallen before the German

onslaught, and public and Congressional opinion in the

United States had swung decidedly in the direction of

greater defense preparedness.3

CALLING-UP THE ORC

War Department planners soon began to realize that there

might be a mobilization without an M-day. The Regular

Army was gradually expanded, and on August 27, 1940,

the 76th Congress, by joint resolution, gave to the President

the authority to call the Organized Reserve (officers and enlisted men) and the National Guard to active federal service

for a period of twelve months.4

The Officers Reserve Corps consisted in mid-1940 of

some 104,228 members who were eligible for active duty,

while the ERC consisted of only 3233 men.5In a memorandum of September 5, 1940, The Adjutant General directed

Corps Commanders to establish rosters for ordering ORC

members to active duty, based upon the following priorities:

1. The extent of deferment proposed by the officer and the

reasons therefor;

2. The officer's personal obligation to his dependents;

3. The officers professional attainments and value to the

service, together with his age and physical condition;

4. The need for the officer's service in the community as a

civilian.

These rosters were confidential, and separate rosters were to

be established for medical officers.6

The first peace-time conscription in this country's history passed the Congress on September 16, 1940, and draftees began entering the Army in large numbers by the following January. As Kreidberg and Henry expressed it, "The

immediate need for large numbers of additional officers was

filled by extending the active duty tours of capable Reserve

officers already in the service and by calling still more Re3. Kriedberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization p. 570.

4. Ibid., pp. 575, 579-80.

5. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1940," Annual

Report, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1940 (Washington:

GPO, 1940) p. 95.

6. Memorandum, TAG to Corps Commanders, September 5, 1940,

in RG 319, Entry 343, Box 103.
MOBILIZATION AND WAR 1940-1945 65

serve officers to active duty." On June 30, 1940, there had

been only 2,710 Reserve officers on active duty; by May 15,

1941, there were over 46,000.7

Not all ORC members who wanted active duty in

1941, however, were able to obtain such, for field grade

officers who were "somewhat old for the grades they hold"

were being turned down for active duty by the War Department. This policy drew a sharp protest from Morris Sheppard, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, but Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson assured

the Senator that "in the event of any enlargement of our

present program this age restriction would almost certainly

be lifted."8Problems of active duty for field grade officers

did not end even after Pearl Harbor, but ORC company

grade officers never experienced such difficulty. By June 30,

1941, the number of ORC members on extended active

duty had reached a total of 57,309, and on that same date

more than 90 percent of the company grade officers on duty

with the Regular Army were Organized Reservists.9

ORC unit members, naturally enough, were more than

a little curious about their fate. National Guard units,

which contained both officers and enlisted men, had begun

entering active federal service in September 1940, but no

mention had yet been made of the units of the ORC, skeletal though they were. Brig. Gen. Frank E. Lowe, Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, was on the receiving end

of a constant stream of inquiries from members of the ORC,

and on July 30, 1941, he asked the ACS/G-3 for a statement as to the War Department's policy on Reserve unit

mobilization. The reply from Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle

7. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, p. 605.

The Army had a total active strength of 1,320,500 on May 15, including 14,000 RA officers, 20,500 NG officers, and 46,000 ORC officers

on active duty. War Department Press Release, May 15, 1941, in RG

319, Entry 343, Box 104.

8. Letter, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to Senator

Morris Sheppard, June 9, 1941, RG 315, Entry 343, Box 104. Commissioned officers are divided into "Company Grade" (lieutenants and

captains), "Field Grade" (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels) and

"General Officers."

9. "Report of the Secretary of War, 1941," p. 95; War Department

Study, October 20, 1942, entitled "The Organized Reserve in the War,"

RG 319, Entry 343, Box 106. Two weeks earlier the percentage of ORC

members on active duty, by rank, had been as follows: Col.—31%,

Maj.—49%; Capt.—60%, lLt.—49%, 2Lt.—43%. Memorandum,

Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle, ACS/G-3, to Executive for Reserve and

ROTC Affairs, June 19, 1941, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 104.
55 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

was unequivocal: "Present plans do not contemplate the

mobilization of Organized Reserve units prior to the Declaration by Congress of a national emergency and an attendant

authorization for a material augmentation of the Army."10

The scenario contemplated by Twaddle, however, never did

occur, for as a War Department study described it, "The

nature of the pre-war mobilization—a state neither of war

nor of peace—made it impracticable to activate the units of

the Organized Reserve ... ."" Individual Organized Reservists, however, continued to be called to active duty, and

the pre-war ORC units themselves, stated Brig. Gen. Edward S. Bres, "were completely disintegrated."12

Active duty training tours of 14, 21, and 28 days were

largely eliminated during 1941 because there were many opportunities for longer training on an extended active duty

basis. Field grade officers were not in as great demand by

the regular components, however, as were those of company

grade, and in March 1941, the War Department announced

plans to give 28-day training tours to 50 colonels, 200 lieutenants colonels, and 250 majors. These officers were attached to Regular Army and National Guard divisions for

training.13

There were many Organized Reserve officers, however,

who received neither orders to active duty nor opportunities

for training, and many of them wrote to the Executive for

Reserve and ROTC Affairs with their complaints. Brig.

Gen. Lowe forwarded these concerns to the Chief of Staff of

the Army in early November 1941 and emphasized his

opinion that "first priority should be given to combat training of all Promotion List Reserve Officers who are eligible,

available, and physically qualified for not less than thirty

months service with troops . . . ." Lowe's memorandum was

never directly answered, however, because by the time it had

made its way through the Army's bureaucracy and received a

recommendation from the ACS/G-1, the date was December

17, 1941. "In view of the proposed augmentation of the

army and the probability that all available Reserve officers

10. Memorandum, Brig. Harry L. Twaddle, ACS/-3, to Brig.

Gen. Frank E. Lowe, August 16, 1941, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 104.

11. "The Organized Reserve in the War," RG 319, Entry 343, Box

106.

12. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Edward S. Bres, Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, to ACS/G-3, Subject: "Mobilization Plan," RG

319, Entry 342, Box 9.

13. War Department Press Release, "500 Reserve Field Officers to

be Given 28 Days Training," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 104.
MOBILIZATION AND WAR 1940-1945 67

will be called to duty within the next few months," wrote

Brig. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, "it is believed that no action

is necessary on this paper."14

By December 1941 over 80,000 ORC members were

on active Army duty, and on December 13 Congress removed the pre-war prohibition that restricted the geographical area in which Reservists could be used.15 On February

6, 1942, President Roosevelt ordered into "active military

service of the United States, effective on dates to be hereafter announced by the Secretary of War, for the duration of

the present war and for six months after the termination

thereof, . . . each of the organizations and units and all of

the personnel of the Organized Reserves not already in such

service."16

President Roosevelt's Executive Order, together with the

fact that the Order of Battle list for World War II contains

numerous units that were in the Organized Reserve, has led

some people to give the Organized Reserve credit for furnishing 26 infantry divisions during the war.17

This credit is

in error, however. "When the decision was taken to activate

the divisions and other units of the Organized Reserve early

in 1942," explained the War Department, "few of the Reserve officers originally assigned to these units were available

for duty with them. Consequently, the units as activated

bore small resemblance to those of peacetime . . . . "

18

It

would be misleading, then, to allege that Organized Reserve

units served during World War II. While it is true that

Organized Reserve infantry divisions like the 77th, 79th,

81st, 83d, 90th, 94th, 102d, and others were activated in

1942, very few of the pre-war members of these divisions

were available for assignment to them by that time. As a

1965 study of the Army's force structure put it, "The OR

divisions of World War II were not reserve divisions in any

real sense of the word." This is not to say, of course, that

14. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Frank E. Lowe, Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, to Chief of Staff, November 4, 1941, Subject:

"Extended Active Duty for Reserve Officers," and memorandum, Brig.

Gen. Wade H. Haislip, ACS/G-1 to Chief of Staff, December 17, 1941,

same subject, both in RG 319, Entry 343, Box 104.

15. "The Organized Reserve in the War," RG 319, Entry 343, Box

106; Public Law 77-338, December 13, 1941.

16. Executive Order No. 9049, February 6, 1942.

17. Order of Battle, United States Army, World War II, European Theater of Operations, Divisions (Paris, 1945), p. 571.

18. "The Organized Reserve in the War," RG 319, Entry 343, Box

106.
68 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

the Organized Reserve was unimportant during the WW II

mobilization. As Chief of Staff George C. Marshall put it in

1941, "The procurement of suitable officer personnel was

fortunately solved by the fact that during the lean, post-war

years over 100,000 Reserve officers had been continuously

trained .... These Reserve officers constituted the principal available asset which we possessed at this time. Without their assistance the program could not have been carried

out except in a superficial manner, as is evidenced by the

fact that today they [Reserve officers] constitute 75% to

90% of the officer strength with Regular Army units."19

Even after Pearl Harbor, individual members of the

ORC were not always ordered to active duty, even when

they requested such. Col. W. R. Frost, the Acting Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, told Col. Porter P. Wiggins in an "informal memorandum" that the chances were

"very remote indeed" that any Reserve officers over the age

of sixty would be ordered to active duty. "Only in rare

cases," wrote Frost, "has an exception been made to [this]

policy."20 By May 1942, the War Department sought

to order to active duty all colonels under 53 years old and

lieutenant colonels under 51 years old who were physically

qualified and who desired active duty.21

By the end of 1942 there were over 140,000 Reserve

officers on active Army duty, while 12,100 ORC members

had not received such orders.22 Of these Reserve officers who

had not been placed on active duty, 1,214 were medical

students or interns and 422 were deferred for other academic

reasons; 878 were Air Corps Reservists, and 2284 were de19. See compilation by R. L. Thompson, February 16, 1962, in

Reserve Components History, 1916 to present, in Center of Military History

files; see also memorandum, TAG to Commanding Generals, All Armies, Army Corps and Corps Areas, June 9, 1942, Subject: "Ordering

into Active Service Certain Organized Reserve Divisions During August

and September, 1942," in AG 320.2 (5-26-42), copy in CMH files.

Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Historical

Resume, Division Force Structure, Active and Reserve, 1935-1963, copy in

CMH Files. Report on the Army, July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1943, Biennial

Reports of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States

Army to the Secretary of War (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1943), pp.

11-12.

20. Letter, Col. W. R. Frost to Col. Porter P. Wiggins, March 26,

1942, RG 319. Entry 343, Box 105.

21. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. J. H. Hilldring, ACS/G-1 to Brig.

Gen. Frank E Lowe, May 14, 1942, Subject: "Bringing Reserve Officers

to Active Duty," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 105.

22. "The Organized Reserve in the War," RG 319, Entry 343, Box

106.
MOBILIZATION AND WAR 1940-1945 69

ferred because of their status with the Veterans Administration or various branches of the Army. In addition, 92 ORC

members had not been called to duty "due to request of

G-2;" 46 were "not ordered due to nationality"—"Japs;" 35

were "Congressmen, Judges, Senators, etc.;" and 268 were

not available because they were in enemy territory. Other

categories included 29 "Colored officers," 7 brigadier generals, 174 colonels, and 427 lieutenant colonels for whom no

vacancy could be found. A total of 3,741 Reservists were 59

years old or older, 1962 had over 15 years of service and

were considered permanently physically disqualified, and

51.3 others fit into such categories as "Deferred by Directive

G—1," "No Vacancy-Veterinary," and "Resignation Pending."2

'

The war-time files of the Executive for Reserve and

ROTC Affairs contain numerous letters from Reserve officers—particularly colonels—who were literally begging for

active duty assignments. Many of these men had served fifteen or more years in the ORC, had participated actively in

every training opportunity that presented itself, and had

been promoted to such a high level that the Army no longer

had a place for them on active duty, even in war-time. It

was embarrassing, said these officers, to have to explain to

their neighbors that they had done everything in their

power to get into the active Army. The accusing stares from

their fellow citizens were almost more than they could bear,

and any attempt by them to justify the Army's policy toward high-ranking Reserve officers only made matters worse.

Brig. Gen. Edward W. Smith, Executive for Reserve

and ROTC Affairs, explained the War Department's policy

in this area to Col. Philip S. VanCise, an Organized Reservist from Denver who had attempted without success to get

active duty orders:

It has been a problem with the War Department to place on duty

all of our high-ranking Reserve officers. As you probably know,

23. List signed by Col. H. N. Sumner, Chief, Appointment and

Induction Branch, TAGO, December 17, 1942, RG 319, Entry 343,

Box 105. According to Maj. Gen. Harry Vaughan, one ORC member

whose request for active duty was not granted was Colonel (Senator)

Harry S. Truman, commander, 379th Field Artillery Regiment (horsedrawn). When Truman went to Chief of Staff George Marshall and requested active duty, Marshall told him he was too old and said he would

be of more value in the Senate The story is recounted in John T. Carlton

and John F. Slinkman, The ROA Story: A Chronicle of the First 60 Years of

the Reserve Officers Association of the United States (Washington: ROA,

1982), pp. 141-42.
70 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

the age-in-grade of full colonels is 55 but very few colonels who

have passed their fiftieth birthday, either Regular or Reserve, are

used with troops for overseas duty. Therefore, officers who have

passed their fiftieth birthday are not primarily considered for troop

duty but are considered for administrative work. Each Service

Command is allotted a certain number of officers of each grade.

Naturally, their allotment of full colonels is rather limited and

many times the services of these officers cannot be utilized because

of the fact that there is no vacancy in their grade existing in the

Service Command.24

Brig. Gen. Smith went on to say that The Adjutant

General's Office was doing its best to put Reserve officers on

active duty and that TAGO was "hopeful for results." This

effort, reported Smith, was limited to officers who had not

reached their fifty-ninth birthday.25 The effort to put Reserve

officers on active duty never met with total success, however, and as late as mid-December 1944 there were almost

as many non-active duty Organized Reservists—11,386—as

there had been two years earlier.26The number of active

duty Organized Reserve officers continued to increase

throughout the war, reaching a peak of almost 200,000

early in 1945,27and ORC members were well-represented in

Regular Army and National Guard combat units.

A War Department analysis of officers in an unidentified Regular Army infantry division overseas showed that

as of March 31, 1944, the percentage of Organized Reserve

officers by rank was as follows:

Colonel—0%

Lieutenant Colonel—42.9%

Major—95.9%

Captain—83.8%

First Lieutenant—56.3%

Second Lieutenant—10.9%

In addition, 62.5 percent of the battalion commanders,

84.5 percent of the company commanders, and 30.3 percent

24. Letter, Brig. Gen. Edward W. Smith to Col. Philip S. Van

Cise, January 1, 1943, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 105.

25. Ibid.

26. "Reserve and Deferred AUS Officers not on Active Duty," December 15, 1944, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 112. It should be pointed

out that the number of Reserve Officers had increased by more than 50

percent during that time. See memorandum, Col. C. M. Boyer to Btig.

Gen. Edward W. Smith, October 2, 1944, Subject: "Strength of Reserve

Officers as of 31 July 1944," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 112.

27. Letter (drafted, but unsent), Brig. Gen. Edwatd W. Smith to

Cedric Fostet, no date, but probably April 1945, RG 319, Entry 343,

Box 112.
MOBILIZATION AND WAR 1940-1945 71

of the platoon leaders in this particular division were Organized Reserve officers.28

In a more extensive study a few months later, the War

Department examined the 1st, 4th, and 90th Infantry Division, the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions, and the 29th, 34th

and 37th Infantry Divisions (National Guard). The percentage of ORC members of each rank was as given in Table

4-1.

Table 4—1 Percentage of Organized Reservists in Officer Cadres.2'

1st, 4th, 90th Infantry Divisions 29th , 34th, 37th Infantry

1st and 2d Armored Divisions Divisions (NG)

BG 12.5% BG 0

COL 0 COL 0

LTC 52.0% LTC 21.5%

MAJ 82.5% MAJ 56.6%

CPT 70.0% CPT 45.7%

1LT 26.1% 1LT 16.0%

2LT 9.3% 2LT 8.9%

Total 37.4% Total 22.2%

The number of Organized Reservists who were decorated for heroism is unknown, but it is certain that ORC

members were in the forefront of combat activity. From September 1, 1943, to May 31, 1944, 28.7 percent of the

officers in the active Army were ORC members. During this

same period, ORC officers constituted 52.4% of the officers

killed-in-action, 27.7% of those missing-in-action, and

27.4% of officers captured by the enemy.30

Reserve officer strength was concentrated in the middle

ranks—captain, major and lieutenant colonel—but there

were a number of Organized Reservists who achieved general

officer rank during the war. As ofJune 30, 1943, there were

1,065 general officers in the Army. Of these, a total of 18

were from the Officers' Reserve Corps. One Organized Reservist who achieved three-star rank in 1944 was James H.

Doolittle, while another well-known ORC general was Maj.

Gen. William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan of the Office of Strategic Services—the forerunner of the CIA. Brig. Gen. The28. "Chart 3—Infantry Division," RG 319, Entry 342, Box 6.

29. "Composition of Officer Strength," RG 319, Entry 324, Box

9.

30. "Chart 4—Proportion of All Officer Battle Casualties Suffered

by Reserve Officers, 1 September 1943-31 May 1944," RG 319, Entry

342, Box 6.
72 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

odore Roosevelt, Jr., an ORC member, received a Medal of

Honor for his actions in the first assault wave on D-Day as

Assistant Commander of the 4th Infantry Division.31

INCREASING THE CORPS

In addition to its general officers, the ORC numbered, at

its peak in 1945, about 200,000 commissioned officers of

lower grades. Almost 100,000 of these individuals had been

commissioned in the Reserves after the beginning of the war,

mostly through ROTC, Air Corps Cadet School, or by direct

appointment from civilian life. This last category had never

been a large source of ORC members, because the Army

resisted attempts to commission civilians with little or no

military training. There had always been a certain number

of individuals, however, particularly in the fields of medicine

and religion, who received such direct commissions. The

Army's desire to avoid politicization of the commissioning

process within the ORC was emphasized in a letter that

Brig. Gen. Charles D. Herron, Executive for Reserve Affairs, sent to the Reserve Officers Association almost nine

years before Pearl Harbor:

There are undoubtedly many prominent citizens whose appointments in the Officers Reserve Corps would conduce to the cause of

preparedness . . . .But [this] . . . course has the very great disadvantage that in the event of war many of the holders of such

commissions would demand, often with great political influence,

employment commensurate with their rank. This could only be

obtained by wresting such employment from active officers of

demonstrated qualifications.32

This policy was generally observed until the immediate

pre-war period, when many prominent civilians sought Reserve commissions. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson

31. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July

1, 1941 to June 30, 1943 to the Secretary of War (Washington: Infantry

Journal, 1943), p. Ill; "General Officer Appointments in the Organized

Reserve," The Officer, June 1947, pp. 16-17, 22; Gordon A. Harrison,

United States in World War II; The European Theater of Operations; CrossChannel Attack (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951), p. 304n; Omar N. Bradley (Gen. of the

Army) and Clay Blair, A General's Life: An Autobiography (New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 347-48.

32. Letter, Brig. Gen. Charles D. Herron to Maj. Bennett A. Molter, March 15, 1983, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 99.
MOBILIZATION AND WAR 1940-1945 73

thereupon set forth in writing the three criteria that would

be applied when considering such requests:

1. No ORC Commission would be given to men who were

subject to the draft unless they had completed Army

courses leading to a commission;

2. "All political or personal considerations should be rigidly

excluded;"

3. A commission was to be given only where the individual

had special qualifications required for a particular branch

of the service.33

Under War Department regulations, officers in the

ORC were commissioned for five-year terms. If a Reservist

wanted to continue as an active member of the ORC, he

had to participate regularly in such training opportunities as

were offered, and he had to request reappointment in the

ORC at the end of each five-year period. The discouraging

lack of training opportunities has already been discussed,

and the attrition rate of ORC members, even in the years

immediately preceding mobilization in 1940 and 1941, was

quite high. During fiscal year 1939, for example, the ORC

lost 6,784 active, assignable officers, while 8,956 inactive

ORC members had their appointments terminated. By comparison, the ORC gained only 10,682 officers during the

year.34

This yearly drain of trained Reserve officers meant that

when mobilization began in 1940 there were not enough

ORC members to fill the Army's needs. By the spring of

1941 the War Department had decided to allow the reappointment of former Reserve officers commissioned after

1933 who had been in an eligible status at the time they

had terminated their ORC membership.35

The Army, however, rejected the idea of having the

ROTC increase its production of lieutenants. With a singular

33. Memorandum from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, October 14, 1940, Subject: "Memorandum in Re Appointment of Officers'

Reserve Corps from Civil Life," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 103.

34. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1939,"

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1939

(Washington: GPO, 1939), pp. 66-67.

35. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, ACS/G-1 to

Chief of Staff, April 21, 1941, Subject: "Policy with Respect to Reappointment in the Officers' Reserve Corps of Former Reserve Officers,

Who are Within the Selective Service Ages (21-36)," RG 319, Entry

343, Box 104.
74 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

lack of foresight, Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle, ACS/G-3,

scorned the idea of increasing the quota for advanced course

ROTC cadets, because he said, the number of lieutenants

produced by the ROTC each year "more than meets the contemplated needs of the Army. "

36 General Twaddle's thoughts

on this subject after December 7, 1941, are not recorded,

but a stop-and-go pattern of officer procurement was characteristic of the Army during the war.

On January 12, 1942, Secretary of War Stimson admitted that "there will be a need for the commissioning of a

substantial number of men from civil life for administrative

and other positions in order to relieve officers qualified for

combatant service."37 A week later minimum age for appointment as an officer was reduced from 21 years old to 18

years old, and a month later the War Department announced the suspension of ROTC summer camps. Cadets

would henceforth be sent to basic training courses before

commissioning, and the requirement of a college degree

could be waived "in special cases."38

On February 19, 1942, the Secretary of War announced

a more flexible standard for reappointing former ORC members. This policy was more lenient than the previous one in

that it applied to officers commissioned after 1931 (as opposed to 1933), and it did not require an officer to have

been in an "eligible" status when his appointment in the

ORC terminated.39This relaxation of policy meant that

thousands of officers who had simply let their ORC appointments lapse could now be ordered to active duty in a commissioned status.

36. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle to Chief of Staff,

October 23, 1941, Subject: "Increase in Advanced Course Quota,

ROTC," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 104.

37. Memorandum, Henry L. Stimson, January 12, 1942, Subject:

"In re Appointment of Officers From Civil Life," RG 319, Entry 343,

Box 105. Before the war was over, some 100,000 civilians received direct

commissions without any military training. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I.

Wiley, and William R. Keast, United States Army in World WAr II, The

Army Ground Forces, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

(Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948), pp.

91-92.

38. War Department Radiogram, January 20, 1942, RG 315, Entry 343, Box 105; War Department Press Release, 'Army Suspends

R.O.T.C. Camps until Six Months after War Ends," February 12, 1942,

RG 319, Entry 343, Box 107.

39. Memorandum, TAG (by order of the Secretary of War), February 19, 1942, Subject: 'Appointment of Former Officers in the Army of

the United States," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 105.
MOBILIZATION AND WAR 1940-1945 75

Even these measures could not meet the Army's needs

for commissioned officers during its rapid expansion in

1942, so standards for officer procurement were lowered. By

the next year, when mobilization of the ground forces had

slowed, the Army had a surplus of junior officers; by 1944

demand exceeded supply again.40

WAR-TIME POLICIES

Despite Chief of Staff Marshall's praise of the ORC for

providing 100,000 trained officers during the pre-war mobilization,41

the best interests of Reservists were regarded only

lightly—if at all—when personnel policies were implemented during the war.

For example, before May 1942 a Reserve officer who

was physically disqualified from active duty was placed in

the Inactive Reserve, where he was not subjected to the

draft. Beginning in May 1942 the War Department began

discharging all physically disqualified Reserve officers who

had less than fifteen years of service. These individuals were

then subject to being drafted into the Army as enlisted

men, because the physical standards for draftees were lower

than those for commissioned officers.42

Several Reserve officers sent letters of protest to the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, and on December 4,

1942, he took up the issue with the ACS/G-1. He did not

think the policy was fair, stated Col. Edward J. Smith, and

he believed that these officers should be reappointed in the

ORC or other component if they were physically qualified

for even limited service. The next day he discussed the matter in detail with Col. Jenkins of the G—1 staff, and they

reached an agreement along the lines that Col. Smith suggested. The physical standards continued to differ for officers and enlisted personnel, however, with the result that

men like James P. Chapman continued to be discharged,

then drafted. The agreement with Col. Jenkins had not been

carried through as War Department policy.43

40. See Palmer, Wiley and Keast, Procurement and Training of Ground

Combat Troops, p. 159.

41. "Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1941,"

Annual Reports, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1941

(Washington: GPO, 1941), p. 53.

42. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Edward W. Smith to Chief of Staff,

September 28, 1945, Subject: "Report of Activities of this Office During

My Tenure of Office," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 116.

43. Memorandum, Col. Edward W. Smith to ACS/G— 1, December
76 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Additional Reserve officers were trapped in this

"Catch-22" situation during 1943, and their continuing

protests finally led to the announcement of an official

change of policy. On October 20, 1943, Maj. Gen. W. G.

White, the ACS/G-1, informed the Secretary of War's Personnel Board of the new two-part policy. If a commissioned

officer who was discharged for physical reasons after satisfactory active service was subsequently inducted as an enlisted

man, he would be reappointed in the grade formerly held. If

a commissioned officer who was not serving on active duty

was discharged for physical reasons and was later inducted,

he would be reappointed to his former grade, // a vacancy

existed and he was otherwise qualified.44 This policy still

left the possibility that an ORC member could be drafted as

an enlisted man, and it was not until May 24, 1944, that

War Department Circular 206 eliminated this possibility.45

The Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs had been instrumental in effecting this new policy, but the Army's antipathy toward ORC members was indicated in the time

that elapsed after it was brought to the attention of the

ACS/G-1 in early December 1942. In disability retirement,

too, the Army did not treat the Organized Reserve equitably.

From June 30, 1940, to August 31, 1944, stated the

Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, 3864 non-Regular

Army officers were relieved from active duty because of

physical disability. Of these, only 68 were retired with pay

under the Retirement Act, a minuscule percentage that

Brig. Gen. Smith thought was evidence of unfair treatment

of Organized Reservists. Smith called this discrepancy to the

attention of the ACS/G-1, and War Department Circular

205, "Determination of Line of Duty," was changed to make

it easier to find "in line of duty" when judging disability.46

4, 1942, Subject: "Induction of Former Reserve, National Guard and

Other Officers Discharged for Physical Disability" and attached Memorandum for Record, December 5, 1942, RG 319, Entry 343. Box 105;

letter, Brig. Gen. Edward Smith to Col. Joseph K. Nicholls, January 1,

1943, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 105.

44. Memorandum, Maj. Gen. W. G. White, ACS/G-1, to Secretary of War's Personnel Board, October 20, 1943, Subject: "Reappointment of Officers Discharged for Physical Disability," RG 319, Entry

343, Box 107.

45. Brig. Gen. Edward W. Smith to Chief of Staff, September 28,

1945, Subject: "Report of Activities of this Office During My Tenure of

Office," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 116.

46. "Report on Activities of the Office of the Executive for Reserve
MOBILIZATION AND WAR 1940-1945 77

EXECUTIVE OPERATIONS

It is evident that members of the ORC needed someone to

represent them—to serve as a sort of ombudsman for

them—at the Army Staff level during the war. The Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs (ERRA) had long performed this function, and the entrance of the United States

into World War II caused no immediate change in the status, activities, or personnel of the office. In March 1942,

however, the ERRA was placed under The Adjutant General, and in June it was given independent status under the

Chief of Administrative Services, TAG. During that same

month the ERRA was designated a member of the "PostWar Planning Board of the War Department."47

Brig. Gen. Frank E. Lowe was the first Organized Reserve general officer to serve as ERRA. He had been on the

job for a little over one year, and the United States had been

at war for some eight months, when he recommended that

the office • functions "which pertain to the Organized Reserves be suspended for the duration of the present emergency . ..." He further suggested that the office be transferred to the Legislation and Liaison Branch of the War

Department General Staff, a suggestion that was adopted in

September, 1942.4S

The OERRA functioned during the war with a

strength of one brigadier general, one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, one major, and four clerical civilians. In addition to aiding individual ORC members with their problems, the ERRA worked with Brig. Gen. John McAuley

Palmer, who was putting together a suggested structure for

the post-war Reserve components.49

By the spring of 1945 the Organized Reserve had become more important, and the OERRA was placed on the

War Department Special Staff. The Executive for Reserve

and ROTC Affairs for period 1 October 1942 to 31 August 1944 " RG

319, Entry 343, Box 111.

47. "Historical Summary," November 9, 1942, RG 319 Entry

343, Box 106.

48. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Frank E. Lowe to Secretary of the

General Staff, August 13, 1942, Subject: "Office of the Executive for

Reserve and ROTC Affairs," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 106; Memorandum, Col. Edward W. Smith to Army HQ Commandant, November 5,

1942, Subject: "Transfer of Office of Executive for Reserve and ROTC

Affairs to the Pentagon Building," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 107.

49. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Frank E. Lowe to Secretary of the

General Staff, August 13, 1942, Subject: "Office of the Executive for

Reserve and ROTC Affairs," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 106.
78 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

CONCLUSION

and ROTC Affairs gave up his additional duties with the

Legislation and Liaison Btanch and began to devote fulltime to the transition to a peace-time reserve force.50

The officers of the ORC had served well during World War

II, furnishing almost one-fourth of the Army's total officer

strength during the conflict. Because of pre-war neglect, the

units of the Organized Reserve were not prepared to mobilize in 1940 or even 1941, and by the time the units were

called to duty after that time, they were ORC in name

only.51,

The future of the Organized Reserve Corps was problematical, for no one knew for sure how many officers had

gotten their fill of military duty during the war and

whether demobilization would mark the end of their military affiliation. The War Department had been planning the

post-war Army fox years, but Congress might not accept

these plans. The public outcry for a rapid demobilization

could not be resisted, but Soviet ambitions loomed large in

the minds of the War Departments planners. It was obvious

to most military leaders that Reserve forces were going to be

needed in years to come and that the neglect of the postWorld War I years simply could not be allowed. The question was whether Army plans, Congressional desires, and

public will would fit together in a coherent fashion, sufficient for the National defense.

50 War Department General Orders No. 39, May 17, 1945.

5L From July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1946 some 902,0001 men

served on active duty as commissioned officers. Of this total.204,000

were members of the ORC; memorandum, TAG to ERRA, November

26 1946, Subject: "Data on Commissioned Officers, Regular and NonRegulars for Reserve Officers Association of the United States, RG JU

Entry 343, Box 126 (320.2).
5

Peace—And War

Again, 1946-1953

PLANNING FOR THE POST-WAR

Even before Pearl Harbor, the Army had begun planning for

the post-war, and the services of Brig. Gen. John McAuley

Palmer were a valuable part of that effort. General Palmer's

service as a member of the War Plans Division of the General Staff immediately after World War I made him a logical

and valuable resource, as did his friendship with George

Marshall. "I have some personal knowledge of our government's past experience with this problem," wrote Palmer in

November 1942. "Some serious mistakes were made at that

time [post-WWI]. If we can avoid them after World War

II, in my opinion, the whole problem will be greatly simplified."1

Palmer and his committee, formed by Chief of Staff

Marshall to develop plans for the post-war, worked diligently, and on August 25, 1944, the War Department issued Circular No. 347, a philosophical blueprint for the

post-war military establishment that was developed out of

Palmers life-long study of the Army. The military organization envisioned in this document was based upon two stated

assumptions: (1) that the United States would maintain

"such temporary military forces ... as may as necessary

... to lay the foundations for a peaceful world order" and

1. Letter, Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer to Frederic A. Delano,

Chairman, National Resources Planning Board, November 9, 1942, RG

319, Entry 343, Box 107. For a good account of Palmer's work see

Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar

Defense, 1941-45 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977).

79
80 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

(2) that Congress would provide for universal male military

training. The Circular also emphasized—perhaps more than

had any official pronouncement in the past—the role of the

reserve forces in this nations military establishment.2The

"professional peace establishment," stated Circular No. 347,

should be "no larger than necessary to meet normal

[emphasis added] peacetime requirements." The regular

army would be reinforced in wartime by a "properly organized citizen army reserve," a proposal described in the circular as a way of "perfecting a traditional national institution to meet modern requirements which no longer permit

extemporization after the outbreak of war."'

The tradition of the United States had never been that

of maintaining a large standing army, or even a large reserve

force, in peacetime; mobilization of the untrained civilian

community had long been the US response to the need for a

large military force. During the two World Wars the United

States was given by its allies the luxury of time—time to

induct and train men and time to produce the weapons necessary to arm them. At the close of World War II, however,

it was evident that the burden of Western defense would fall

increasingly on the United States. It was similarly evident—

and the authors of Circular No. 347 were quite aware of

it—that if a major war were to occur in Europe there would

no longer be the luxury of time, for the Soviet Union could

overrun Europe long before the first US draftees reached the

front lines.

Though the Soviet Union was very much one of the

Allies at the time Circular No. 347 was issued, assumptions

about Soviet post-war ambitions may well have been on the

minds of the War Department's planners. Understood in this

light, Circular No. 347 was an ambitious, yet realistic, approach to US military organization. That it did not prove to

be an accurate prediction of the future was not so much the

fault of the War Departments planners as it was a reflection

of the political realities of the time.

The War Department sought a "cautious demobilization" after the defeat of Japan, largely out of respect for the

ambitions and military strength of the Soviet Union, as well

as in anticipation of worldwide occupation duties. Such a

course, however, was politically impossible. The United

States Army stood at over 8 million personnel in 1945, and

2. War Department Circular No. 347, August 25, 1944.

3. Ibid.
most of these individuals demanded nothing less than a

prompt and complete release from active service.4

Plans for an Army strong enough to deter possible Soviet aggression ran squarely up against powerful opposition:

the normal post-war economy moves in the federal Government and an idea that "the bomb"—the atomic weapons

monopoly enjoyed by the US—would prove the ultimate deterrent to an aggressor. The United States had not questioned the financial cost of winning World War II, but the

immediate post-war political reaction was that of cutting

back drastically on the military part of the federal budget.

President Truman himself set the pattern for military

spending during the years from 1946-1950 by using a "remainder method" of calculating the military budget. The

federal budget would be balanced, he said, by taking total

revenues, subtracting from that total all domestic spending,

and giving the rest to the military.

This frugality was complemented nicely by the idea

that the US monopoly of the atomic bomb was a cheap,

effective, and absolutely fail-safe deterrent. The idea that the

next major conflict might not be a nuclear one was given

some thought by the War Department, but Congress and

the President preferred the economy route.

The years between World War II and Korea were characterized by a not-unprecedented desire to achieve national

security at the least possible cost, and one cost-effective way

of reaching this goal was to build-up a strong reserve force.

In theory this idea worked quite well, but in reality the

President and the Congress created a military shell and a

false sense of security that was nearly as hollow as were the

divisions of the Organized Reserve in the years after World

War I.

TERMINAL LEAVE PROMOTIONS

Rebuilding the Organized Reserve was an important assumption of War Department Circular No. 347 and of post-war

military strength planning. The Army had very little to offer as an inducement, however, to veterans who were invited

to join the Corps. One of the few things the Army did in

fact offer its veterans was not even tied to their continued

membership in the ORC, and this was the "terminal leave

4. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York

and London: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and Collier Macmillan

Publishers, 1967), pp. 486, 569.
82 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

promotion" that became such a bone of contention with the

Regulars. Reserve promotions had been frozen during the

war, while Regular Army promotions had not. The only way

an ORC member could receive a promotion during WWII

was by being on active duty and in line for a vacancy of the

next higher grade. He .was then eligible to be considered for

an Army of the United States (AUS) promotion. Without

the vacancy, there could be no promotion. As Colonel

Charles M. Boyer, Executive Director of the Reserve Officers

Association, explained it, "... Promotions became the

luck of assignment, and if a man was lucky in assignment,

he went up rapidly, and if he was assigned to a position

where there were no vacancies, he stood still."5Figures compiled by ROA indicated that by June 1944—over 2 1/2

years after Pearl Harbor—some 21 percent of the ORC

members on active duty had not received even one promotion.6 A plan was therefore devised to correct some of the

inequities of the system, and there was some hope that this

would encourage continued participation in one of the Reserve components of the Army.

The rules for receiving a terminal promotion were simple and mechanical and applied to all non-Regular Army

officers. Any non-Regular Army officer would be given a

one-grade promotion effective the day he went on terminal

leave, providing he met the following requirements:

1. Below the grade of 0-6 (Colonel);

2. At least two years active duty after September 16, 1940;

3. An efficiency index of at least 35;

4. No promotion while on active duty;

5. Requisite time-in-grade; i.e., 18 months to First Lieutenant or Captain, 24 months to Major or Lieutenant

Colonel, and 30 months to Colonel. In computing timein-grade, overseas service prior to May 1, 1946, counted

an additional 50 percent.7

There was, of course, no requirement that the officer be

promoted into a vacant position, and this was the key to the

5. "Reserve Officer Personnel Act," Hearings before the Committee on

Armed Services, House of Representatives, Eighty-third Congress, First Session,

p. 1676. Hereinafter cited as "ROPA."

6. "Your Association Wins Promotions for Officers Reverting to Inactive Status," The Reserve Officer (November 1945), p. 4.

7. Major W. K., Whichard, 'Administering the Reserve," The Reserve Officer (December 1946), pp. 10—11.
terminal leave promotion. The system was completely inflexible, and an officer who was only a few days short of the

required time-in-grade or a few hundredths under the efficiency index level was not promoted.8

The elimination of

the vacancy requirement was the only relaxation of the wartime promotion system, and as a result only about 40,000

officers—not all of whom were ORC members—received a

terminal leave promotion.9This was only about 5 percent of

the 800,000 Army officers on active duty in 1945, but this

small percentage was multiplied again and again in the public mind until it was commonly believed that all reserve

officers had received a promotion upon their release from

active duty.10

These terminal leave promotions were important, however, to the officers who received them. It is likely that

many of these men did join the Officers' Reserve Corps or

continue their affiliation with it after their discharge from

active service, in part because the terminal leave promotion

removed a source of great and continuing frustration for

them. It should be clearly understood, however, that the

terminal leave promotions were not per se connected with

either past or future membership in the ORC. These promotions, in all probability, were of value in ORC recruiting,

but only in an indirect way.

REBUILDING THE ORGANIZED RESERVE CORPS

The only appeal the Army could actually make, given the

paucity of membership benefits in the ORC, was an appeal

to patriotism, and when General George C. Marshall addressed a letter to All members of the Army" in August

1945, that was the heart of his appeal. "We owe it to our

country," he wrote, "and to the comrades who have made

the great sacrifice, to insure that never again will Americans

be drawn into a war unprepared."11These were brave and

ambitious words from the Army's Chief of Staff, but the

next five years did not demonstrate a national commitment

to achieving the goal of military preparedness through the

8. ROPA, p. 1676.

9. Ibid.

10. See, for example, the statements of Rep. Leroy Johnson (R-CA)

and Maj. Gen. Boniface Campbell, DCS/G-1, during hearings on the

Reserve Officer Personnel Act. ROPA, pp. 1676, 2038.

11. Letter, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, August 23, 1945,

copy in "Office History, 1916 to Present," Center of Military History.
84 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

creation of a strong, effective Organized Reserve and National Guard. One example of this was the national response

to proposals for universal military training.

Universal military training was an integral part of the

planning for the post-war Organized Reserve Corps. "Without it," wrote the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs

(ERRA), "it is our considered opinion that the development

and maintenance of any material strength within the ORC is

improbable."12 Universal military training was not, however,

enacted by the post-war Congress, and recruitment for the

Organized Reserve depended entirely upon voluntary enlistments and commissionings.

Given the pre-war participation of men in the Officers

Reserve Corps, it was probably not unexpected that many

officers would continue their Army affiliation by joining the

post-war ORC. By January 1946 some 52.5 percent of all

demobilized officers had accepted commissions in the

ORC.13

Medical officer recruitment was a problem, however,

and even men who had been in the pre-war ORC were refusing any further military affiliation. The war-time experience

of Capt. E. H. Phillips is a good illustration of the way the

Army alienated ORC doctors. Capt. Phillips had been a

member of the Officers' Reserve Corps and had volunteered

for active duty in 1942. He was a board certified

otolaryngologist—an ear, nose, and throat specialist—but

he was never promoted, because there were no higher level

vacancies in the command. There were no vacancies, stated

Capt. Phillips, because his civilian contemporaries, men

who had no military background and no better medical credentials than he had, were commissioned directly from civilian life as majors and lieutenant colonels. Capt. Phillips was

angry about the way he had been treated, and Brig. Gen.

Edward W. Smith, the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, sympathized with him. "Civilians could be offered

high commissions," stated Smith, "and Reserve Officers

12. Memorandum, ERRA to Director of Operations and Training,

December 6, 1946, Subject: "Clarification of War Department Policies

Pertaining to the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps," RG

319, Entry 342, Box 14 (370.01).

13. Memorandum, Lt. Col. J. L. Ballard, Jr., Chief, Sttength Accounting and Statistics Office, to Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, February 4, 1946, Subject: "Respective Ratios to Latest Date of (a)

New Commissions in Officers Reserve Corps to Total Eligible for Commission, and (b) New Appointments in Enlisted Reserve Corps to Total

Eligible fot Appointment," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 124 (210.8).
PEACE AND WAR AGAIN, 1946-1953 85

could only be promoted under the slow process of regular

promotion."14

Despite the problem of medical officer recruitment, the

Officers' Reserve Corps reached a strength of 274,839 by

June 1947, less than two years after the end of the war.

Enlisted recruitment, however, did not go as well. The War

Department had anticipated that 10-12 percent of the enlisted personnel would join the Enlisted Reserve Corps

(ERC), but only 1.3 percent of those discharged (35,578 of

2,700,000) had joined by November 1945. The percentage

of enlisted veterans who joined the ERC had increased to

3.2 percent by January 31, 1946, and the number of enlisted members of the ERC reached 467,608 by June 30,

1948.15

MISTER BREGER —By Dave Breger

The Organized Reserve was generally a recognizable organization following World War II, as is indicated by this 1946 cartoon by Dave Breger.

14. Letter, Brig. Gen. Edward W. Smith to Capt. E. H. Phillips,

September 20, 1945, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 118 (330.14). See confirmation of this policy in memorandum, ACS/G—1 to Chief of Staff, May

14, 1946, Subject: "Officers Separation Point," RG 319, Entry 343, Box

124 (210.8).

15. "Subsection II f—Civilian Components (2)—Organized Reserve

Corps," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 127 (326.2).
86 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

This latter figure, impressive as it is when compared

with the 1941 ERC strength of 2149, was not nearly up to

the levels desired by the War Department; One problem was

that there were few units of the Organized Reserve to which

the men of the ERC could be assigned.

The War Department's initial plans called for a total of

twenty-five Organized Reserve Corps divisions and almost

2400 non-divisional units. For the post-war period, there

were four classifications of Reserve units: A—1, A-2, B, and

C. A—1 units were service units organized with their full

complement of officers and enlisted men. Combat units with

their full strength of officers and enlisted personnel were

designated A-2. Class B consisted of combat and service

units that had their full officer strength plus a cadre of enlisted men, and Class C units had only an officer cadre. The

War Department's official position was that All Organized

Reserve Corps units will initially be organized as C units,

with officers only."16This meant that post-World War II

Organized Reserve units would, at least initially, resemble

the ORC units of the years after World War I. Enlisted

men, stated the War Department, would be assigned to an

Active Reserve reservoir.17

This policy stemmed largely from the fact that in the

years of parsimony between World War II and Korea, the

Organized Reserve Corps and the National Guard were in

competition—conscious or unconscious—for an inadequate

pool of dollars. The fact was that the Organized Reserve

fared quite badly in this competition. Though the individual members of the Officers Reserve Corps had achieved

an enviable record of service during the war, the Organized

Reserve Corps as an organization suffered by comparison

with the National Guard. The small number of ORC units

that were designated for Class "A" status was a reflection of

the Organized Reserve-National Guard competition. This

situation did not go unnoticed at the White House, however.

"It has come to the President's attention," wrote President Harry S. Truman's military aide, ORC member Harry

Vaughan, to Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower, "that

there is some controversy largely sponsored, I understand,

by the National Guard Association against the creation of

16. Memorandum, Lt. Gen. C. P. Hall, Director of Org. and Tng.

to Army Chief of Staff, July 10, 1946, Subject: "Inactive Duty Pay for

Organized Reserve Corps Units," RG 319, Entry 342, Box 10.

17. 'Approved War Department Policies Relating to Postwar National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps," October 13, 1945, RG

319, Entry 343, Box 117 (326.2).
any A—2 Reserve units for the Organized Reserve. The President directed me to advise you that he thinks these units

should be created; in fact, he is of the opinion that there is

no use in having a Reserve without them."18This part of the

question of Organized Reserve versus National Guard was

quickly resolved, when less than a month later the Secretary

of the General Staff informed Vaughan that Chief of Staff

Eisenhower "has asked me to advise you now that a decision

has been reached, and organization of units of this type is

being directed."19

The Organized Reserve divisions were not, however, the

Reserve units that the War Department had in mind for

A-2 status. Priority for divisional organization at the A-2

level of readiness was clearly given to the National Guard.

War Department policy, for example, even after the exchange between Vaughan and Eisenhower, was that "until

such time as it is clearly demonstrated that requirements

cannot be met by the National Guard, Reserve divisions

will not be organized beyond class 'B' status."20 Reserve divisions were to be organized initially as Class "C" units (60

percent of authorized commissioned officer strength) and

would advance to "B" status only when they achieved 80

percent of their authorized commissioned and non-commissioned officer strength. To reach Class 'A", a unit needed its

complete authorized cadre, plus 40 percent of its authorized

enlisted strength.21

Activation of the first post-war units of the Organized

Reserve began on July 1, 1946, and by the end of January

1947 a total of 1141 Organized Reserve units had reached

Class C status. The number of such units rose steadily

throughout 1947, reaching 3,973 by May 23, 4,479 by

June 19, and 6,343 by December 5.22 By the end of December, the strength of the Organized Reserve Corps was as

given in Table 5—1.

18. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Harry H. Vaughan to Gen. Dwight

D. Eisenhower, March 29, 1946, RG 319, Entry 342, Box 10.

19. Memorandum, Col. J. W. Bowen to Harry H. Vaughan, April

18, 1946, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 125 (240).

20. Letter, Gen. Jacob L. Devers, CG, Army Ground Forces, to

CG's, Armies, May 13, 1947, Subject: "Clarification of War Department

Policies Pertaining to the National Guard and the Organized Reserve

Corps," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 147 (370.01).

21. 'AGF Initiates Reserve Training Mobilization in Six Army

Areas," The Reserve Officer (August 1946), pp. 7—8.

22. Ibid., p. 7; War Department Press Releases, January 24, May

23, June 6, June 19, and December 5, 1947, RG 319, Entry 343, Box

141 (322).
88 TWICE THF CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Table 5-1 Organized Reserve Strength, December 31, 1947. M

Unassigned

Composite

Groups A B c Total

Units

Officers

Enlisted

62,250

325,008

167,059

90,717

59 887

158 6,233

422 2,382

5,897

43,133

21,927

6,843

278,833

450,456

What these figures mean is that fewer than 600 members of the Organized Reserve Corps were in units that

would be ready for active duty on M-Day. The implication

of these figures had not escaped Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover, the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs. He had

earlier informed the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff that "current and mobilization plans are NOT realistic, since they

have produced, from 8 May 1945, to date no Reserve force

in being. Today, we have in this country less than eighty

(80) Class (A) Reserve units, none of which are adequately

manned, equipped, and trained; further, most of them are

small and of relatively little importance, such as affiliated

laundry units, battalion medical sections, and bomb-disposal

squads."24

The Organized Reserve Corps, wrote Brig. Gen. Westover several months later, only had 355,000 men actually

available for use, compared with an authorized strength of

949,000. The "primary difficulties encountered to date," he

wrote, "[are a] deficiency of facilities, equipment, and funds

. . . traceable to a large degree to the low priorities afforded

the ORC and reluctance to accord it requisite support."^

The reason for these deficiencies was simple: a lack of

determination on the part of the President and the Congress to

give the Organized Reserve the financial support it needed.

"Economy" was the watch word of the time, and it often

seemed as if the legislative and executive branches were trying

to outdo each other in cheeseparing. Indeed, the economy

measures were so severe that an officer in The Adjutant Gen23. Staff Study, Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover, ERRA, to Army

Chief of Staff, April 6, 1948, RG 319, Entry 343 (CAR), Box 26

(326.2).

24. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover, ERRA, to Deputy Chief of Staff, March 17, 1948, Subject: "Immediate Program," RG

319, Entry 342 (CAR), Box 26 (326.2).

25. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover to Chief of Staff,

October 13, 1948, Subject: "Draft of Secretary of Defense Letter Relating

to Proposed Presidential Directive," RG 319, Entry 342 (CAR), Box 2

(031.1).
PEACE AND WAR AGAIN, 1946-1953 89

eral's Office indicated that because of a lack of funds, "an administrative] restriction has been placed on the enlistments

authorized] in certain Class A units .... "

26

This failure to support the Organized Reserve Corps

was nowhere more evident than in the paucity of training

opportunities afforded its members during the immediate

post-war years. Without proper and continuing training, the

members of the Organized Reserve Corps would in the long

run be little better than conscripts, though the fact that

most of the Corps members from 1945-1950 were World

War II veterans was a decided advantage. Proper training,

however, was non-existent in the first three years after World

War II, and lack of funds was the primary limiting factor.

There would be no Organized Reserve Corps unit training

until Fiscal Year 1949, wrote Army Under Secretary

William H. Draper in late November 1947, because "...

the unit training of all Battalions would cost more than the

entire appropriation in FY 1949 for all Reserve activities .... "

27

Even the training that was provided was often reminiscent of the years between the World Wars, particularly for

Class C units of the Organized Reserve. The 98th Infantry

Division (ORC) conducted its first post-World War II training during the summer of 1948 at Pine Camp (now Fort

Drum), New York. The Division had a summer camp

strength of 300 men, of whom 75 percent were officers. In

the words of an attached public information officer, "Regiments were of platoon size; battalions and companies were

represented by squads, sometimes attenuated .... The

MOS distribution bore only a faint resemblance to any T/O"

The total divisional artillery consisted of two 105mm

howitzers, which were provided to the unit without sights.

Not until the Cornell University ROTC—150 miles away—

agreed to loan sights for the weapons were the howitzers

anything more than decorative. The division had no organic

vehicles, so "the Division walked to work." Lt. Col. George

F. Havell, the PIO who wrote about the 98th Divisions

training, concluded his account with the following observation: "To point out that the 98th Division has a long way to

go before it can be welded into an effective fighting unit is

26. Memorandum for the Record, Maj. Frey, July 23, 1948, RG

407, Box 1613 (353-Org Res Corps 4/1/48-12/31/48). See Appendix B

for a tabulation of ORC funding during this time.

27. Letter, William H. Draper, Jr., to Lt. Col. Robert B. Fentress,

November 21, 1947, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 127 (326.2).
90 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

to state the obvious. That will take mote manpower, equipment, long training, and—above all—time."28

CHANGES IN THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

The Organized Reserve Corps, of course, operated in neither

a political nor an organizational vacuum, and in fact the

future of the Corps was intimately related to the post-war

organization of the military establishment of this country.

War-time proposals for unification of the military services

resulted in the National Security Act of 1947, which created

the National Military Establishment headed by a Secretary

of Defense. There were also created three military Departments: Army, Navy and Air Force.29

Following the passage of this act, Secretary of Defense

James Forrestal appointed on November 20, 1947, a Committee on Civilian Components, headed by Army Assistant

Secretary Gordon Gray, to make a "comprehensive, objective

and impartial study" of the Organized Reserve and the National Guard.30

President Harry S. Truman supported the

unification of the Organized Reserve and the National

Guard, and his military aide, Maj. Gen. Harry H.

Vaughan, had previously published an article arguing that

military efficiency would be enhanced by unification of the

Guard and Reserve and suggesting that there was no longer

any real need for a federally-supported state militia.31

The "objective and impartial study" required of the

Committee was submitted to the Secretary of Defense on

June 30, 1948, and its recommendations stirred immediate

controversy. The "Gray Board Report," as the study came to

be known, proposed that the Organized Reserve and the National Guard be transformed into a federal "National Guard

of the United States." The National Guard should remain in

existence, suggested the Gray Board, but it "must be directly under Federal control." The Committee members were

"convinced that the same forces can no longer be expected

to perform both local and national functions and that a

28. Lt. Col. George F. Havell, 'A Fighting 98th Division Will Be

Built," The Reserve Officer (November 1948), pp. 14-15, 22.

29. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 493.

30. Eilene Galloway, History of United States Military Policy on Reserve

Forces, 1775-1957'. Prepared for the use of the Committees on Armed

Services, (Washington: GPO, 1957), p. 465.

31. Harry H. Vaughan, "National Guard and Reserve Must Be

Unified," The Reserve Officer (October 1947), pp. 4-5.
PEACE AND WAR AGAIN, 1946-1953 91

modern Federal striking force cannot be prepared adequately

under State control."32

The lengthy report drew immediate opposition from

the National Guard Association, which labeled the unification proposal as "just another effort over a long period of

time by the War Department and the Regular establishment

to supplant the National Guard system with a Federal Reserve or Militia."33 Despite the support of President Truman,

the idea of merging or unifying the Guard and Reserve was

dropped for the time, and it did not surface again as a serious proposal until the 1960s. In another area, however,

the Organized Reserve finally caught up with the Guard,

and that was in the matter of compensation for inactive duty

training (IADT).

The War Department had long been opposed to inactive duty pay for members of the Organized Reserve, for

reasons that were explained in Chapter Four. The post-war

need to encourage Organized Reserve membership, however,

finally caused a change in the attitude of the War Department. It is quite likely, too, that the Executive for Reserve

and ROTC Affairs was instrumental in effecting this change.

Col. John V. Rathbone, for example, wrote to the ACS/G—1

on behalf of the ERRA in mid-April 1946. Without pay for

IADT, he stated, "It will be impossible to provide the units

and personnel in the desired quantity and quality." A month

later, Lt. Col. Jay W Doverspike, Acting Executive Officer

of the OERRA, advised that it was "not considered possible

to develop the required units within the Organized Reserve

Corps unless some provision is made for pay to members of

these units, for training other than active duty."34

With Defense Department support, the provision of inactive duty pay for members of the Organized Reserve Corps

became law on March 25, 1948, though the first payments

under this statute were not made until October 1, 1948.35

Because of limitations on funds, the Department of the

Army established four priorities for payment of IADT:

32. Report of the Committee on Civilian Components, pp. 10—11.

33. Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, "One Federal Force? No," The Reserve Officer (June 1949), p. 6.

34. Memorandum, Col. John V. Rathbone to ACS/G-1, April 17,

1946, Subject: "Legislation for the Organized Reserve Corps," RG 319,

Entry 343, Box 117 (326.2); memorandum, Lt. Col. Jay W. Doverspike

to Chief, L & LD, May 14, 1946, no subject, RG 319, Entry 343, Box

125 (240).

35. Public Law 80-460; Department of the Army Press Release,

October 23, 1948, "Drill Pay Regulations Issued for Army Reserve," RG

319, Entry 343 (CAR), Box 37 (240).
92 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

1. Organized Reserve Corps personnel in units that were in

direct support of the 18-division Army;

2. Individuals with mobilization assignments as "filler personnel" for Regular Army and National Guard divisions;

3. Members of the Class B Organized Reserve Corps divisions; and

4. Remaining Organized Reserve Corps personnel.36

Another legislative battle that was fought and won by

the Organized Reserve during the years immediately following World War II was that of retired pay. Pre-World War II

proposals for such had run into solid opposition from the

War Department, including the Office of the Executive for

Reserve and ROTC Affairs. Even late in the war, Brig. Gen.

Edward W. Smith, the ERRA, wrote that "The military is

an avocation of the Reserve officer, prompted by patriotic

motives while employed in a gainful civilian pursuit which,

presumably, provides for his own retirement from the active

business world."37

The difference that a change in Organized Reserve leadership can make is exemplified by the response of Brig.

Gen. Edward S. Bres, successor to Brig. Gen. Smith as

ERRA. When asked to comment on a similar piece of retirement legislation, the response was quite positive—but

for officers only. "This office is firmly of the opinion," wrote

Bres, "that provision for retirement pay in some form should

be made for Reserve officers. Retirement pay should include

credit for both active Federal service as well as inactive duty

service. It is believed retirement pay will insure the continued interest of future officers."38

The proposal for non-disability retirement pay for reservists—both officers and enlisted personnel—was finally

enacted by the provisions of Public Law 80-810 (June 29,

1948). The law provided for payment beginning at the age

of 60 to reservists who had served at least twenty years in

the reserve and active components. Retired reservists were

not yet, however, permitted to use the commissaries or post

36. Department of the Army Press Release, "Drill Pay Regulations

Issued for Army Reserve," RG 319, Entry 343 (CAR), Box 37 (240).

37. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Edward W. Smith to ACS/G-1,

January 18, 1944, Subject: "Comments on H. R. 3946, providing for

'retirement pay for certain members of the armed forces,'" RG 319, Entry 343, Box 115.

38. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Edward S. Bres, ERRA, to Chief,

Legislation and Liaison Division, March 4, 1946, Subject: "H. R. 5204,

79th Congress," RG 319, Entry 343, Box 124 (210.85).
PEACE AND WAR AGAIN, 1946-1953 93

exchanges, despite a concerted campaign by the Reserve Officers Association.'9

WOMEN IN THE RESERVES

The question of how to increase the strength of the Organized Reserve Corps had plagued War Department planners

since the end of World War II. The same questions, of

course, had confronted the active Army during the war, and

one source of high quality personnel had been the women of

this country. Women had served in American armies, sometimes clandestinely, at least as early as the Revolutionary

War. There had been no women in the Organized Reserves,

however, before World War II, and there was no legal authority for them to join the Organized Reserves after the

war.

This situation changed in 1947 when Congress authorized members of the Army Nurse Corps and Women's Medical Specialist Corps to serve in the Regular Army and the

Officers Reserve Corps.40The following year it authorized

Women's Army Corps (WAC) members to serve in the Regular Army and the Organized Reserves under the provisions

of the "Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948."4I

A restriction, however, was that only prior service personnel were eligible to join the Organized Reserve Corps.

This proviso meant that only members of the World War II

Women's Army Corps, the Army Nurse Corps, or the

female component of one of the other services, could join

the Organized Reserves. Despite this restriction, within two

years after passage of PL 80—625 the number of women in

the Organized Reserve Corps had reached 4000. By May

1950 membership in the Organized Reserve Corps was

opened to non-prior service women between the ages of 18

and 34, and a waiver to age 45 was allowed.42 Women, of

39. Letter, Maj. Gen. Edward F. Witsell, The Adjutant General, to

Brig. Gen. E. A. Evans, Reserve Officers Association, December 3,

1947, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 137 (210.85).

40. Public Law, 36-80, April 1947.

41. Public Law 80-625, June 12, 1948.

42. Department of Defense Press Release, May 25, 1950, Subject:

"Women Without Prior Military Service now Eligible for WAC Reserve,"

RG 319, Entry 343, Box 2 (000.7); for a good account of the Women's

Army Corps during World War II, see Mattie E. Treadwell, The Women's

Army Corps (Washington: Department of the Army, 1954). The restriction that only veterans could join the Organized Reserves was partially lifted in 1947, when enlistment of a non-veteran was permitted if
94 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

course, formed only a small percentage of the active Army

during World War II, and by law they could not be used in

combat. This combat restriction on women also applied to

the Organized Reserve Corps, so what the Army and the

Organized Reserves really needed was a large and steady

source of men.

SELECTIVE SERVICE AND RESERVE ORGANIZATION

Universal military training would provide a source of manpower, but UMT had been rejected immediately after the

war. It was revived, however, in the Gray Board Report in

1948. Congress was still unwilling to embrace the idea

completely, but the 80th Congress did pass a new selective

service act, which became law on June 24, 1948. This statute provided that men from 19 to 26 years old could be

inducted for up to 21 months of active service. They would

thereafter serve in a Reserve component for five years, an

obligation that could be reduced to three years by service in

a unit of the Organized Reserve Corps or the National

Guard.43

Individuals who were members of Organized Reserve

Corps or National Guard units as of the date of the act were

exempt from the draft for as long as they continued to participate satisfactorily, as were World War II veterans with

more than 90 days of active service. This legislation was of

little immediate value in Organized Reserve Corps recruiting, but it did hold forth the promise of funneling men

into the Reserves and Guard once they had performed their

active duty.44 As a practical matter, however, the Selective

Service Act of 1948 was not immediately effective even at

providing soldiers for the active Army, for only 300,000

men were drafted in the first two years after its passage.45

President Truman was dissatisfied with the progress—

or lack of progress—being made in putting together an effective Army reserve organization, and he undoubtedly realized that the Selective Service Act of 1948 would have only

a minimal immediate effect on the Organized Reserve Corps

and the National Guard. In October 1948, not quite four

months after the Gray Board had submitted its report, he

the individual agreed to assignment to and training with a troop program unit. AR 150-5, Ch.3, December 11, 1947.

43. Public Law 80-759, June 24, 1948.

44. Ibid.

45. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 501.
PEACE AND WAR AGAIN, 1946-1953 95

KOREA

'46

issued an Executive Order calling upon the Secretaries of the

Army, Navy, and Air Force to "proceed without delay, utilizing every practicable resource of the regular components

of the armed forces, to organize all reserve component units,

and to train such additional individuals ... as may be

required for the national security; and to establish vigorous

and progressive programs of appropriate instruction and

training for all elements of the reserve components . . . ."46

Under the provisions of the Executive Order, Army

Secretary Kenneth C. Royall asked the Committee on Civilian Components, headed by former Secretary of State James

F. Byrnes, for a report of recommendations for the Organized Reserve and the National Guard.

The Byrnes Committee submitted its report to the Secretary on February 21, 1949, and recommended that the

strength of the Organized Reserve be set at 579,300. Included in this total would be 96,900 members of 25 Class

"B" Organized Reserve divisions (1,876 officers and 2,000

enlisted men per division); 149,400 members of combat

support units; 242,000 members of combat service support

units; and 91,000 officers and enlisted men who would be

used as fillers during the early phases of mobilization. The

Committee also recommended that paid administrative assistants be provided for units of the Organized Reserve

Corps.47

The Organized Reserve Corps did not, however, achieve the

strength goals outlined by the Byrnes Committee prior to

the Korean War. On June 30, 1950, the Corps consisted of

217,435 officers and 291,182 enlisted men, of whom only

68,785 officers and 117,756 enlisted men were participating

in paid drills.48

The parsimony of the years after World War II was not,

of course, restricted to the reserve components of the Army,

for the active forces had not fared much better. Some efforts

were made in 1948 and 1949 to improve Army readiness

and to make the Organized Reserve a force upon which the

46. Executive Order 10007, October 15, 1948. It should be noted

that fiscal frugality was not thereafter abandoned by the President.

47. Department of the Army Press Release, February 21, 1949.

48. Study of the Functions, Organization, and Procedures of the Department of the Army; OSD Project 80 (Army), Part VII, Reserve Components

(Washington: Department of the Army, 1961), p. VII-B-7.
96 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

United States could depend, but it was a case of too little,

too late.

The official history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff puts it

this way:

The outbreak of the war was to reveal that these forces were suffering from severe defects, largely stemming from the Administration's efforts to hold military expenditures to a minimum. President Truman had laid down this economy objective in 1948 [there

really was not much of a change from earlier], and had held to it

in the preparation of the budgets for fiscal years 1950 and 1951.

Its effect was to force the services to abandon the plans they had

drawn, following the hasty and ill-considered demobilization at

the end of World War II, to expand their forces to levels judged

necessary for the 'cold war.' Thus the Army, which in 1947 had

set a goal of 25 divisions, cut this back to 10 and maintained the

lower figure only with some difficulty.49

When the North Koreans struck across the 38th parallel on June 15, 1950, the US Army was not in any condition to resist. Five years of neglect had taken its toll, and

the weakness of depending for security upon an atomic umbrella was demonsttated by the inability of the Army to

respond to anything short of all-out mobilization. General

Douglas MacArthur had an immediate need for additional

American combat forces for Korea, and it soon became obvious that the active Army was not prepared to offer the

required level of support. President Truman quickly received

Congressional authorization to order members and units of

the Otganized Reserve Corps to active setvice. A call for

volunteets had yielded few positive results, so in July 1950

the Army turned to what Army Secretary Frank Pace described as "our sole immediate source of manpower"—that

is, to the members of the Organized Reserve Corps and the

National Guatd.50

The first membets of the Organized Reserve Corps to

be called to active duty were 7,862 captains and lieutenants

who were not assigned to units of the ORC. By the end of

August 1950 a total of 404 units of the Organized Reserve,

plus 10,584 individual Organized Reserve officers, had been

49. James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff; The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III—The

Korean War, Part I (unpublished, 1978), p. 45.

50. Frank Pace, Jr., "The Reserve Forces of the Army," The Reserve

Officer (March 1952), p. 7.
PEACE AND WAR AGAIN, 1946-1953 97

called to active duty.51 Unlike World War II, the Army's

policy for Korea was that officers and enlisted personnel

would not be stripped out of organized units and sent to

Korea as replacements.52The justification for this policy was

that coherent units of the Organized Reserve would be

needed in the event that a more general war broke out elsewhere in the world.

A tremendous problem of equity ensued from this decision, however, for two reasons. First, non-unit members of

the Organized Reserve Corps had not been receiving inactive

duty pay, and might well have received no active duty training, either, since their demobilization after World War II.

Since they had received few benefits from their Organized

Reserve Corps membership, they felt they should not receive

the first call to duty. Second, there were by 1950 many

millions of young men who had never served in the military

at all. Since most Organized Reserve Corps members were

also World War II veterans, the ORC men did not think

this double jeopardy call-up was fair.53

In September 1951 the ACS/G-1 suggested six priorities for ordering reservists to active duty:

1. Qualified volunteers from the Organized Reserve Corps

and the National Guard;

2. Members of Organized Reserve Corps units;

3. Members of the active reserve with less than 12 months

of WW II service;

4. Members of the inactive reserve with less than 12

months WW II service;

5. Other members of the active reserve;

6. Other members of the inactive reserve.

The Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs non-concurred in the proposed list and suggested that the number 2

51. Msg, G-l, WCL 37558, August 10, 1950, RG 319, Entry

343 (CAR), Box 35 (210.4); letter, Hubert E. Howard, Chairman, Munitions Board, to Secretary of Defense, August 28, 1950, Subject: "Recall Requirements of Reservists," RG 319, Entry 342, Box 15 (CAR)

(210.4); Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,

Problems Encountered in Bringing Units Up to Strength and Condition of Readiness for Korea. p. 2.

52. Presentation by Col. George E. Butler before the Section 5

Committee, September 25, 1950, RG 319, Entry 342 (CAR), Box 38

(334).

53. Study of the Functions. Organization, and Procedures of the Department of the Army: OSD Project HO (Army). Part VII. Reserve Components, p

VII-B-5.
98 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

priority—members of units—be moved to the bottom of

the list. "To order into the active military service members

of Organized Reserve Corps units," wrote Brig. Gen. Hugh

M. Milton, echoing a familiar line, "would seriously affect

the capabilities of these units to perform their training mission and to assume their planned role in the event of full

mobilization."54

By the next month—barely a year after the United

States had gotten into the fighting in Korea—the ACS/

G-l, Lt. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, announced the officer recall program for Fiscal Years 1952 and 1953. Because

the active Army had a shortage of some 11,000 officers,

wrote McAuliffe, it would be necessary to call additional

men to active duty. These men, he stated, would be those

who had been in a pay status in the reserve. He recognized

the danger this posed to overall US readiness, but he said,

"This calculated risk is necessary since it is not politically,

nor militarily, practical to order additional members of the

Inactive and Volunteer Reserve into active service."55

Secretary of the Army Frank Pace soon expanded upon

McAuliffe's statements in a memorandum to the Army Chief

of Staff. "The Department is limited in its ability," wrote

Pace, "to utilize the Volunteer and Inactive Reserve in that

it is the desire of Congress that paid reservists be utilized in

lieu of those who have not received pay for reserve activity.

However, in implementing this Congressional intent, reservists who at any time since the beginning of the Korean conflict have been paid for reserve activity will be considered as

available for recall and will be utilized to the maximum

extent practicable. This will be without regard to the length

of time in pay status," concluded Pace, "whether currently

in a pay status, or whether currently in the Organized, Volunteer, or Inactive Reserve."56

Although the priority and liability for service varied

somewhat among the different groups of the organized Reserve Corps, the fact remains that large numbers of ORC

54. Memorandum, ACS/G-1 to RROTC, September 26, 1951,

Subject: "Involuntary Ordering into Active Service of Reservists," RG

319, Entry 342 (CAR), Box 15 (210.4); and memorandum, RROTC to

ACS/G-1, October 1, 1951, same subject, ibid.

55. Memorandum, Lt. Gen. A. C. McAuliffe to addressees, October 26, 1951, Subject: "Recall Program, FY 52 and FY 53," RG 319,

Entry 342 (CAR), Box 15 (210.4).

56. Memorandum, Frank Pace, Jr., to Chief of Staff, January 14,

1952, Subject: "Ordering into the Active Military Service Officers of the

Organized Reserve Corps," RG 319, Entry 342 (CAR), Box 15 (210.4).
PEACE AND WAR AGAIN, 1946-1953 99

members were called to active Army service. By the end of

the first full year of fighting in Korea, more than 200,000

members of the Organized Reserve and 95,000 National

Guardsmen had been called to duty. During this same period, the Army received 550,000 draftees and 175,000 volunteers.57

The number of Organized Reserve Corps members who

served in Korea has not been determined, though 240,500

ORC members were called to active duty. Fourteen separate

ORC battalions and 40 separate ORC companies, plus an

unknown number of individuals, actually went to Korea.

Many ORC members were in combat units, and with the

general lack of combat preparedness on the part of the

United States Army, opportunities for heroism were far too

numerous. Members of the Organized Reserve received a fair

share of recognition for their actions against the enemy.

Seven Medals of Honor—five posthumously—were awarded

to ORC members, as were approximately 10 percent of the

other top combat decorations.58

Even reservists who were not called to active duty were

subjected to the inequities of the Korean mobilization. Unlike World War II, when the entire country, broadly speaking, was involved in and united behind the war effort, Korea

was never even dignified by being a declared war. It was a

"police action," and the conduct of the war was not of intimate concern to a large percentage of the American population. Only a fraction of the 2,500,000 members of the reserve components was ever called to active duty, but all

Reservists lived, and worked under the daily threat of mobilization.

Although membership in the Reserves carried with it

the ultimate responsibility and hardship of responding to a

mobilization order, Reservists discovered in 1950 that hardship could occur without their being mobilized. Indeed,

within two months of the initial outbreak of war in Korea,

57. Dr. Robert W. Coakley, "Highlights of Mobilization, Korean

War, Prepared in Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of

the Army, 10 March 1959," p. 2 (copy in CMH files).

58. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,

1953 (Washington: GPO, 1953), pp. 67-68. The 40 ORC units contained 8651 enlisted personnel. The number of Organized Reserve officers in Korea was undoubtedly substantial, because only 15% of the

officers in the Eighth Army were Regulars. For a good discussion see

Office, Chief of Military History, Problems Encountered, pp. 1—4. Statistics

on combat decorations were compiled from Department of the Army

General Orders. The percentage is based on a sample.
100 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

reports were reaching the Department of the Army that Organized Reserve and National Guard members, because of

the uncertainty surrounding their possible mobilization,

were having trouble finding permanent employment. This

situation did not improve, and in October 1950, Rear Adm.

I. M. McQuiston, a member of the Secretary of Defense's

Civilian Components Policy Board, addressed the matter in

a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and

Air Force:

There is evidence of serious deterioration in the morale of reservists—a deterioration that is progressive and is expanding at an

alarming rate. Indications are prevalent that a growing attitude in

a large proportion of the members of the Civilian Components is

their intent to resign their commissions or terminate their enlisted

status at the first opportunity. This is not because of any unwillingness to serve their country in time of war, but because the

reservist finds himself unduly penalized in time of limited mobilization.59

ARMED FORCES RESERVE ACT OF 1952

The lessons learned from the Korean War mobilization led

to renewed Congressional interest in the reserve components,

the result being the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952.60

This statute brought together in one place many of the existing laws that related to the reserve components, and it

established in much greater detail than ever before the composition, responsibilities, and regulation of the reserves. The

reserve components were redefined by this law, which provided that each of the seven reserve components would have

a Ready Reserve, a Standby Reserve, and a Retired Reserve.

The Officers' Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps

were legally eliminated, and the Organized Reserve Corps

was renamed the Army Reserve.61

59. Memorandum, Rear Adm. I. M. McQuiston to the Secretaries

of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, October 1950, Subject: "EmployerEmployee Relationship under Current Expansion Program," RG 319, Entry 342 (CAR), Box 15 (210.4). Some twenty years after Korea the Department of Defense established the National Committee for Employer

Support of the Guard and Reserve in an effort to prevent problems similar to those of the Korean War era. This committee has been of immense

help to reservists, but there are continuing instances of employer discrimination. For a recent discussion of this question see Capt. Art

House, "Defense Honors Four-Decade Backer of Reserve and Guard,"

Army Reserve Magazine (Spring 1983), pp. 33—34.

60. Public Law 82-476.

61. Ibid.. Sees, 202 and 302.
PEACE AND WAR AGAIN, 1946-1953 ^ J^l

A ceiling of 1,500,000 was set for the Ready Reserve,

the members of which would be liable for active duty during wartime or any national emergency declared by Congress

or the President. Members of the Standby and Ready Reserves were only liable for active duty under a Congressional

declaration.62 One useful change effected by the act was that

reserve commissions would henceforth be given for an indefinite term, rather than for five years.63 By the end of fiscal

year 1953 a total of 247,500 Army Reserve officers had accepted the indefinite-term commissions, while 68,000 had

declined them.64

Another provision of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of

1952 established within the Office of the Secretary of Defense a Reserve Forces Policy Board of eighteen members.

This board provided advice at the Department of Defense

level similar to the way the "Section 5" committees did for

the Department of the Army.65

The Korean War mobilization experience was not ignored by the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. In a

strongly-worded section of the act, Congress required that

consideration be given to the "duration and nature of previous service, with the objective of assuring such sharing of

hazardous exposure as the national security and the military

requirement will reasonably permit . . . ."66 The law further required that "Insofar as practicable, in any expansion

of the active Armed Forces of the United States which requires that units and members of the reserve components be

ordered into the active military service of the United States,

members of units organized and trained for the purpose of

serving with a unit shall be ordered involuntarily into active

duty only with their units."67

As practical matter, neither this law nor any law since

1952 has completely addressed the question of equity. Members of the USAR serve with the idea that they may be

called to fight if this country goes to war, and only a political decision—to be discussed in Chapter Nine—kept the

Army Reserve from having a large presence in Vietnam.

62. Ibid., Sees. 205-207.

63. Ibid., Sec. 224.

64. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,

1953, p. 71.

65. PL 82^76, Sec. 257.

66. Ibid., Sec. 23.3 (b)(2).

67. Ibid., Sec. 233 (g).
102 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

CONCLUSION

The Korean War Armistice was signed in July 1953, just six

months after Dwight D. Eisenhower had assumed the Presidency. Korea was over, though the country remained divided. Its legacy, however, would be an important one. The

most comprehensive Congressional history of the reserve

forces of the United States concluded that the Korean War

had caught the Department of Defense largely unprepared.68

Indeed, the belated efforts to strengthen the Army's reserve

components that began in 1948 had barely begun to show

results two years later. The extreme frugality of the postWorld War II period—a historically typical US reaction—

had created what to any reasonable observer was not even an

illusion of military strength. The idea that any future war

would be an unlimited one, with an exchange of nuclear

firepower, had led inexorably to the belief that conventional

armed forces were not as important as they once had been.

Korea had revealed the flaws in this line of reasoning, and

the first American fighting men in that conflict had suffered

too certainly the deadly results of this error. Research and

development had been neglected; equipment modernization

had been delayed; active military strength had been drawn

down below safe levels; and the Army's neglect of its own

Organized Reserve Corps had created not only inequities and

injustices, but also deadly inefficiency. The United States

finally achieved a sort of peace in Korea, but the fighting

men there paid a terrible price for the parsimony and neglect of the post-war years. Talleyrand was not speaking of

military matters when he said it, but he could well have

been describing this period in American history: "It [was]

. . . worse than a crime; it [was] ... a blunder."

68. Galloway, History of the United States Military Policy on Reserve

Forces, 1775-1957.
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 103

Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.,

was the only general officer who

stormed ashore with the first wave on

D-Day, June 6, 1944. Shown here

with his ever-present cane, Brig. Gen.

Roosevelt was awarded the Medal of

Honor for his actions that day. The

citation read as follows: "After two

verbal requests to accompany the

leading assault elements in the Normandy invasion had been denied,

General ROOSEVELT'S written request for this mission was approved

and he landed with the first wave of

the forces assaulting the enemy-held

beaches. He repeatedly led groups

from the beach over the sea wall and

established them inland. His valor,

courage, and presence in the very

front of the attack and his complete

unconcern at being under heavy fire

inspired the troops to the heights of

enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. Although the enemy had the beach under constant direct fire, General

ROOSEVELT moved from one locality

to another and rallying men around

him, directed and personally led them

against the enemy. Under his seasoned, precise, calm, and unfaltering

leadership, assault troops reduced

beach strong points and rapidly

moved inland with minimum casualties. He thus contributed substantially to the successful establishment

of the beach-head in France." Brig.

Gen. Roosevelt, who was serving as

Assistant Commander of the Fourth

Infantry Division, died of a heart attack the day this photograph was

taken, July 12, 1944. (Signal Corps

photo #ETO-HQ-44-7576-A)

i s'W. ;i-mi

.. ~,...

A ^jf^wrV

,*AjP|.

(W- V, -

«* • *,

(

" '*

iß
104 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Bp 465V • ■■&,% *i - ' iJL>- ä?. Ife^m -*

H&ss'^ % -TSS \ *Pk-W^^H£3PLJJL

HHBI

Army infantrymen hit an unidentified beach in Italy in 1944. The Officers' Reserve Corps furnished almost one-fourth of the Army's officers

during WW II, mostly in the middle grades (captain, major, and lieutenant colonel). (Signal Corps photo, #229080)

•••••• 'l^

s

^m^^-,^^^^lm.i<i^ii,riff _„ ..- w. - - .~. _ ^ __.*__, « _

aBBSBai

Tank crew members of the 2nd Armored Division await the signal to

move out in pursuit of retreating Germans near Champ Du Bouet,

France, August 10, 1944. Some 37 percent of the officers in this division were ORC members at this time. (Signal Corps photo)
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 105

i-aSH

Pictured here is Maj. Gen. William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, member of

the ORC and head of the Office of Strategic Services (forerunner of the

Central Intelligence Agency) during WW II. Donovan had received the

Medal of Honor for his heroism during World War I. (Photo courtesy of

Veterans of the OSS)
106 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Sergeant Hiroshi H. Miyamura is shown here receiving a Medal of Honor

from President Eisenhower in 1953. Miyamura, who entered the active

Army from the Enlisted Reserve Corps early in the Korean War, was

serving as squad leader of a machine gun platoon in Korea when the

Chinese attacked his position in April 1951. According to the citation

for his award, Miyamura "killed more than 50 of the enemy before his

ammunition was depleted and he was severely wounded. He maintained

his magnificent stand despite his painful wounds, continuing to repel the

attack until his position was overrun. When last seen he was fighting

ferociously against an overwhelming number of enemy soldiers

Miyamura spent over two years in a Chinese POW camp and was released

in August 1953. At least six other Army Reservists received Medals of

Honor for their heroism in Korea. (Signal Corps photo #427741-S)
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 107

Members of the Eighth Army

move across a Chinese-made

bridge in the Chugyong-san

area of Korea, March 1951.

Members of the Organized Reserve were very much in the

thick of fighting in Korea, especially during the first year of

the war. (Signal Corps photo) isllllliil^

Summer training continued for members of the Organized Reserves, even

as the first ORC members were on their way to Korea. Shown here firing

the .50 caliber machine gun at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, are members of the

18th FA Battalion in August 1950. (Signal Corps photo)
108 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Members of the 240th Port Co. (ORC), from

Miami, Florida, review the proper handling of the

carbine. They are undergoing their summer training at Camp Leroy Johnson, New Orleans, Louisiana, in July 1950. (Signal Corps photo)

Crouched beside a tank at Fort Ord, California, members of the 418th

Military Police Escort Guard Company plan their attack in June 1951.

(Signal Corps photo)
TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 109

wm '^''***&**%.

Enlisted reservists undergo the same basic training as members of the

active Army. These men of the ERC are completing the final part of the

confidence course at Fort Hood, Texas, in November 1950. (Signal Corps

photo)

Learning to climb poles is a necessary part

of learning to be a lineman. These ORC

members from the 494th Signal Construction Company of Birmingham, Alabama, are

at their training site at Fort Gordon, Georgia, in August 1951. (Signal Corps photo)
110 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

On their second day of summer training at Camp Leroy Johnson, Louisiana, members of the 817th Transportation Truck Battalion of Albuquerque, New Mexico, learn about the assembly of a vehicle engine. (Signal

Corps photo, July 12, 1950)

*£.-.

I, fell/ 4il ITU- y to

LllIIMr

Officers of the 3027th ASU, Organized Reserve Corps, are shown the

latest model flame thrower by instructors from the Army's Chemical Corps

Training Center, Fort McClellan, Alabama, June 1951. (Signal Corps

photo)
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 111

"A smart, well-groomed appearance

and esprit de corps influence each

other. . . . Todays uniform, sold in

war surplus stores as work clothes and

worn by a legion of displaced persons

and ex-prisoners of war, hardly

achieves this purpose."—Sec. of the

Army Robert T. Stevens, introducing

the new Army uniforms in 1954.

These members of the 808th Engr.

Petr. Distr. Co. (ORC), shown here

with a Bailey bridge panel during

their 1951 annual training at Camp

Polk, La., bear eloquent testimony to

the truth of the Secretary's remarks.

The ORC received hand-me-downs in

virtually every category. (Signal Corps

photo, #381379)

The crew of a 90 mm anti-aircraft gun prepares to fire during summer

training at Yakima, Washington, Training Center in June 1954. These

men are members of the 405th AAA Bn, USAR. (Signal Corps photo)
112 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

-A

v*Sj

=5- ^"*3M

« ^i'^

The Army Reserve today has about one-tenth of the Army's field artillery

strength. Shown here twenty-five years ago is a crew of the 446th Field

Artillery Battalion, an Army Reserve unit from Lakeland, Fla., firing

their 8-inch howitzer during a field problem. (Signal Corps photo,

#529549)

Armies have to be fed, and the USAR

has a lot to do with feeding of the US

Army. Members of the 394th QM Recovery and Disposition Co. are preparing

food during two weeks of training at

Fort Knox, Ky., during the summer of

1959. (Signal Corps photo, #566606)
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 113

Learning the proper techniques for deactivating a

land mine are members of

the 308th QM Salvage Co.

of Chattanooga, Tenn., during their summer training

at Fort Campbell, Ky.,

1959- (Signal Corps photo,

#566601)

'^tcc<

*$^&i' *:&»?~^.

Learning to keep one's weapon clean is an important part of soldiering.

These men from an Army Reserve unit seem to be having fun as they

clean .30 caliber carbines at Fort McClellan, Ala. (Signal Corps photo,

#589772)
114 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

."', ^ Waiting for the green light. Members of the Army

gP'^fc Reserve's 12th Special Forces Group prepare to jump

\ ,*' i during an exercise near Chicago on November 11,

W - " 1961. (Signal Corps photo, #588714)

Army Reservists also plunge beneath the surface of the sea. Here getting

ready for a dive at the San Juan, P.R., Naval Station is SP5 Jesus Peres

Felix, a member of the 428th Engr. Diving Det., USAR, on June 17,

I960. (Signal Corps photo, #591126)
6

The Eisenhower

Years: 1953-1961

The Organized Reserve Corps emerged from the Korean

War with a new name—the Army Reserve—and a significantly enhanced reputation. Thousands of individual

members of the Organized Reserve (or Army Reserve) served

with distinction in non-Reserve units, and the 14 separate

USAR battalions and 40 separate USAR companies that

fought with the Eighth Army were described by the Secretary of Defense as "uniformly excellent."1

There were, however, significant problems that were

highlighted by the war. Certain problems such as the creation of a statutory system of promotion consideration for

reserve officers were dealt with through the legislative process. Others, such as the number of organized units, drill

participation, quantity of equipment on hand in the units,

physical facilities, and the number of full-time personnel

were affected both by new statutes and by the new administration's policies toward the Army Reserve. The verbal support was tremendous.

"Confronted with the possibility of direct attack,"

wrote Eisenhowers Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson,

"our Nation faces the alternative of either maintaining over

the years ahead substantially larger active forces than at present or supplementing existing forces with a well-trained,

readily available reserve of adequate size. It is the latter

course which has been approved by both the President and

1. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,

1953 (Washington: GPO, 1953), p. 68.

115
11£ TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

the Congress."2 Despite this rhetoric, however, the

Eisenhower administration's main reliance was on a strategic

policy of "massive retaliation," which was simply an updated

version of Truman's reliance on "the bomb."3

This policy combined quite well with the President's

fiscal conservatism, and as a result the Army Reserve was

never given support sufficient to correct the neglect of earlier years. Largely because of Congressional support, however, the USAR proportion of the Army budget rose from

0.93 percent in 1953 and again in 1954 to 1.7 percent in

1955. It then rose to 2.9 percent ($211 million) in 1956

and jumped to 4.5 percent ($344 million) in 1957. The

percentage and the dollars declined slightly in 1958,

dropped significantly in 1959, and rose again in I960.

Compared with the 1960s, the Eisenhower years saw a

larger percentage of the Army budget going to the USAR

than was the case during the tenure of either John F. Kennedy or Lyndon B. Johnson. It was not until 1965, for example, that the I960 USAR budget total was surpassed,

even though dollars were certainly cheaper by the latter

year.4

Congress, too, showed an increased interest in the

Army Reserve and the other reserve components in the years

after Korea. One direct result of this interest was the Reserve

Officer Personnel Act of 1954 (ROPA), which is the basic

law on the subject today.5

ROPA

The existing statutory provisions pertaining to reserve officers prior to ROPA were largely contained in the Armed

Forces Reserve Act of 1952. This law required the various

service Secretaries to establish "an adequate and equitable

system for the promotion of members of the reserve components in an active status."6

The Army, in fact, had issued

2. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,

1955 (Washington: GPO, 1956), pp. 18-19.

3. James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization

and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington: Center of Military History,

1975), p. 216; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New

York and London: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and Collier Macmillan

Publishers, 1967), pp. 525-26.

4. See Appendix B for budget data.

5. Public Law 83-773; 'Address by Senator Margaret Chase Smith

to the 29th National Convention, Reserve Officers Association," The Reserve Officer (August, 1955), p. 13.

6. Public Law 82-476, Sec. 216.
THE EISENHOWER YEARS: 1953-1961 117

the required regulations within six months of the passage of

this act, but Army Reserve officers were not satisfied.7

The Reserve Officers Association lobbied hard for new

legislation, and ROA representatives spent a great deal of

time testifying before the House Armed Services Committee. The principal witness for ROA was Maj. Gen. Melvin

Maas a Marine Corps Reserve officer, former Congressman,

and Chairman of the association's Legislative Committee.

Maas pointed out the primary difference between the desires

of reserve officers and the official position of the Department

of the Army. Reserve officers, stated Maas, would "no longer

... be satisfied with merely saying it is in the regulations.

They know regulations can get changed. We know that for

years now, every time they come up with a new plan this is

going to be fine. This is going to give you a fair break. But

they have not found it so. They no longer believe in the

regulations. They want to see it in the law now."8

This was the very issue on which the Department of

the army opposed the bill. "The Army view," stated Lt. Col.

A. H. Parker, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, "is

that regulations, which have only recently gone into effect

and have not yet been thoroughly tested by operating experience, should provide the basis for drafting appropriate legislation on this subject when all the 'bugs' have been worked

out of the new system."9 Reserve officers, however, were not

willing to be left to the tender mercies of the regulatory

process of the Department of the Army, and their lobbying

groups pushed the legislation through the Congress over the

objections of the Pentagon.

ROPA was of tremendous importance to officers in the

Army Reserve, because it gave to them and other Reservists

a statutory basis for promotion and service comparable to

that given Regulars by the Officers Personnel Act of 1947.

Under ROPA, for example, Reserve officers were not subject

to mandatory removal until they had reached a certain

number of years of service. For officers in the grades of 0-2

through 0-5, the cut-off was twenty-eight years; for 0-6

and 0-7 it was thirty years; and for Reserve 0-8's it was

thirty-five years.10The top three grades could, however, re7. See Army Regulations 135-155, 135-156, and 135-157.

8. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Eighty-third Congress, First Session, Pursuant to H. R. 122. Reserve

Officers Personnel Act (Washington: GPO, 1953), p. 1616. Hereinafter

cited as "ROPA Hearings."

9. Ibid., p. 1559.

10. Public Law 83-773, Section 327.
Hg TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

main active until they had five years time-in-grade. The

maximum age for active Reservists was set at sixty-two years

for major generals and sixty years for all those of lower

rank.11

Mandatory consideration for promotion was also statutory guaranteed by ROPA. First lieutenants had to go

before a promotion board their fourth year in grade, while

captains and majors had to be considered for promotion by

their seventh year. All of these officers also had to meet

time-in-service criteria. Unit members of the reserve components were given an additional promotion possibility

through "unit vacancy" promotions.12

Female Army Reserve officers were subject to the same

promotion procedures as were male officers, with one important exception: promotion opportunities for women were

considerably more limited than were those for men.

Women's Medical Specialist Corps officers could not be promoted above the rank of major, while Women's Army Corps

and Army Nurse Corps officers could only make it to lieutenant colonel.13

ROPA authorized 275,000 active Army Reserve officers, a total well above the 145,382 who were actually

members of the Ready Reserve on June 30, 1955.14The

number of active Reserve officers, however, could not exceed

the following percentages in each grade:15

Colonel 2P

ercent

Lieutenant Colonel 6 percent

Major 13 percent

Captain 35 percent

One of the most important provisions of ROPA was its

correction of an anomaly that had plagued the Army Reserve

since 1920. Under the National Defense Act of 1920, the

time-in-grade of a commissioned officer was determined by

taking his date of rank and adding to it his total active duty

service. Inactive duty Reserve participation did not count for

precedence purposes, and discussion of proposals to change

this system for the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and

11. Ibid., Sec. 326.

12. Md., Sees. 310 and 309-

13. Ibid., Sec. 304.

14. Public Law 83-773, Sec. 304.

15. Public Law 83-773, Sec. 307; Semiannual Report of the Secretary

of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1955 (Washington: GPO, 1956), p 68.
THE EISENHOWER YEARS: 1953-1961 119

the National Guard occupied a considerable portion of the

time devoted to hearings on the proposed legislation.

Col. Charles M. Boyer, the Executive Director of the

Reserve Officers Association who worked closely with the

members of the House committee as they considered H.R.

1222, delivered the sentiments of ROA on the question.

"The Reserve Officers Association," he stated, "strongly recommends that date of rank and date of commission be the

same." Former South Carolina Governor (and colonel in the

Army Reserve) Strom Thurmond sent a letter to the Committee echoing the same conclusion. "Under the present

Army and Air Force policy," wrote Thurmond, "a competent, experienced Reserve officer may, upon mobilization,

become junior to a Regular officer who is actually junior in

age, experience, and judgement. The sheer inefficiency of a

system which requires wholesale revising of dates of rank for

thousands of Reserve officers each time they serve a tour of

active duty (for as little as two weeks in most cases) is deplorable."16 Maj. Gen. Melvin Maas, also representing the

ROA, called the existing date of rank system "an unworkable monstrosity." "There is not an IBM machine conceived,"

stated Maas with no small amount of hyperbole, "that could

tell you the relative seniority of a Reserve officer at any

time, let alone when he is mobilized."17

The Navy and the Marine Corps had long since

adopted for their reserve components a system like the one

proposed by the ROA; the Army and Air Force Reserves and

the National Guard, however, used only active duty in determining seniority. Although the Navy and Marine Corps

experience had been a positive one, both the Army and the

Air Force resisted any change in their own procedures, and

the National Guard was ambivalent.18

The ranking Army witness was Maj. Gen. Boniface

Campbell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, who testified that

"The Department of the Army favors continuation of its present concept that seniority on active duty be based on active

military experience. It is of the firm opinion," continued

Campbell, "that the Reserve Officers Association proposal

that seniority on active duty be based on date of appointment is not in the best interest of the Reserve Officers

themselves, and certainly not of the service as a whole."19

16. Public Law 83-773, Sec. 307.

16. ROPA Hearings, pp. 1600-1602.

17. Ibid., pp. 1613-14.

18. Ibid., passim.

19. Ibid., p. 2037.
120 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Campbell then raised the spectre of thousands of inexperienced Army Reserve officers being mobilized and assuming their places on active duty. "The impact," stated Campbell, would be " ... overwhelming under the most

favorable conditions. If thousands of the least experienced

officers must assume command of and responsibility for the

training of our new forces," he warned, "inefficiency would

almost certainly result. And the results might be extremely

serious, if not disastrous."20

Maj. Gen. Campbell was, of course, using the most

extreme scare tactics with the committee and was completely

ignoring the fine combat record established by reserve officers during World War II and Korea. He was "not familiar

with the detailed working" of the Navy and Marine Corps

system, stated Campbell, but he speculated that "had the

Navy followed the system currently used and advocated by

the Army, ... it is conceivable that they might be as

happy with it as they are said to be with their present system."21

The original of the bill under consideration—H.R.

1222—proposed to give one day of precedence for each retirement point earned through inactive duty training and

each point earned through correspondence course completion. The Department of the Army favored this proposal, as

did the Department of the Air Force.22

The members of the House Committee adopted in

large part, however, the ROA proposal. Under the new formula for computing date of rank, Army Reserve officers received a year's credit for each good retirement year, plus one

day for each point earned in a year that was not credited for

retirement.2" ROPA was quite a significant step for the

Army Reserve, but it did not purport to address every problem confronting the USAR.

THE RESERVE FORCES ACT OF 1955

On January 12, 1954, President Eisenhower asked Arthur

Flemming, Director of Defense Mobilization, to prepare a

plan for the development of an improved reserve system.

Even before Flemming made his recommendation,

20. Ibid.. p. 2039.

21. Ibid., p. 2040; see Chapter Four for an account of the Army's

reserve officers during WW II.

22. Ibid., pp. 2047-52.

23. Public Law 83-773, Sec. 702.
THE EISENHOWER YEARS: 1953-1961 121

Eisenhower pledged that the "establishment of an adequate

reserve . . . will be a number one item submitted to the

Congress next year."24

Eisenhower, like many American Presidents before him,

had long expressed support for a strong Army Reserve.

Writing as Army Chief of Staff, he had stated: "There is no

component of more importance to the security establishment

than the Organized Reserve Corps .... The new Reserve

Corps can and must become the well-trained citizen Army

Reserve required to supplement immediately, in an emergency, our small Regular Army and our National Guard."25

Eisenhower as President realized that the creation of a strong

Army Reserve was both politically and fiscally desirable, and

he quickly adopted the recommendations of the Flemming

study, which became known as the National Reserve Plan.

Eisenhower submitted his National Reserve Plan to Congress

in a special message on January 13, 1955. He pointed out

the need for an improved Reserve force and suggested five

areas for legislative attention.

First, he recommended that a Reserve group of unspecified size be maintained at a high state of readiness to meet

immediate mobilization requirements.

Second, he proposed that young men from 17 to 19

years old be permitted to volunteer for 6 months of basic

training, to be followed by 9 1/2 years of service with the

Reserves. He also proposed a Reserve forces draft, if there

were not enough volunteers.

Third, Eisenhower proposed that enlistees in the National Guard be required to undergo six months of training

before joining their units. Additionally, he requested the authority to assign prior-service personnel to National Guard

units, if these units were unable to recruit enough personnel.

Fourth, he asked Congress to accept the concept that

honorable military service included both active duty and

statutory Reserve participation, the idea being that men

24. Study of the Functions, Organization and Procedures of the Department

of the Army, OSD Project 80 (Army), Part VII, Reserve Components

(Washington: Department of the Army, 1961), p. VII-B-6; "Strong Reserve to Be Number One Item for Next Congress-Eisenhower," The Army

Reservist (November 1954), p. 15.

25. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Reserve Component and

Our Future Security," The Reserve Officer (July 1946), pp. 9-10;

Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January I to June 30, 1955

(Washington: GPO, 1956), pp. 20-21.
122 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

who failed to complete their Reserve requirements would be

given less than an Honorable discharge.

Fifth, Eisenhower suggested that the States be permitted to organize militia forces in addition to their National

Guard units, so that there would be someone to take over

local security missions when the National Guard was

federalized.25

Both the House and the Senate conducted extensive

hearings on the Administrations proposal. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm.

Arthur Radford, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Matthew Ridgway and others—a veritable who's who among the DoD hierarchy—all testified in favor of the President's plan.

Witness after witness told the Subcommittee about the

need for a stronger reserve system, and Secretary of the

Army Robert T. Stevens hit particularly hard on the need

for changes in the status quo. "Our Reserve at the present,"

stated Stevens, "is inadequate to meet our needs. Its inadequacy is due primarily—yes, I can say almost solely—to

the failure to procure the participation of enlisted personnel

in adequate numbers in organized units. All other problems

associated with the Reserve," concluded Stevens, "are subordinate thereto. Therefore the keystone to a truly Ready Reserve is the procurement of the basically trained personnel

who can be integrated, further trained, and retained for a

reasonable period of time."26

During World Wars I and II, stated Stevens, "we were

fortunate in having friends who were able to hold the enemy

in check until our forces could be mobilized, trained, and

deployed ... ." The Administration's proposal for the

Army Reserve, said Stevens, "is designed to fill the gap between the commitment of the Active Army, and the time

when the rawest recruit can be trained to confront the aggressor. "

27

Carter Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, then told the House Subcommittee

that "The plain fact is that our Reserve Forces are not in

line with current conditions and requirements." There were

not adequate provisions under the current law, stated Burgess, to rectify the situation, and he recommended the Pres26. "National Reserve Plan," Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1

of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Eightyfourth Congress, First Session, p. 1282; hereinafter cited as "National

Reserve Plan Hearings."

27. National Reserve Plan Hearings, pp. 1282-83.
THE EISENHOWER YEARS: 1953-1961 123

ident's plan as a comprehensive system for supplying men to

the Ready Reserve.28

Despite the vehement opposition of temperance organizations that did not want the young men of America subjected to the temptations of beer drinking in the Army29

and of religious and quasi-religious groups that feared the

universal military training implications of the National Reserve Plan,30

the Congress finally enacted a modified version

of Eisenhower's proposal. As signed on August 9, 1955, it

differed somewhat from the Administration's proposal, but it

did hold out the promise of substantial improvements in the

Army Reserve.

The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 (RFA) took the form of

amendments to the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, just

as the National Defense Act of 1920 was written as amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916. The RFA first

raised the Ready Reserve ceiling from 1,500,000 to

2,900,000, then it set forth provisions by which these additional reservists would be forthcoming.31

After enactment of the RFA, a man had four ways in

which he could fulfill his military obligation through some

form of service in the Army Reserve:

1. Enlist in the active Army for three, four, or five years,

then go into the Ready Reserve. There was a total of five

years active duty and Ready Reserve obligation, with an

additional year in the Standby Reserve.

2. Enlist in the Army Reserve for six years, two years of

which would be spent on active duty. The obligation

after that two years was three years in the Ready Reserve

and one year in the Standby Reserve. This option was

only available before receiving induction orders.

3. Wait for induction into the Army. This would entail two

years of active duty, three years in the Ready Reserve,

and one year in the Standby Reserve.

4. Enlist prior to age I8V2 in a unit of the Army Reserve.

This would result in an eight-year military obligation,

six months of which would be spent on active duty for

training (ADT). Payment during the ADT phase was set

28. Ibid., pp. 1407-10.

29. Ibid., pp. 1856-73.

30. Ibid., pp. 1876-86, 1941-46, 1949-62, and passim.

31. Public Law 84-305, Sec. 2(a).
124 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

at $50 per month, which was $28 per month less than a

draftee received.32

Option four was the immediate hope for increasing the

strength of the Army Reserve, though in the long run the

USAR stood to gain considerable numbers of men who had

completed their active duty obligation under one of the

other options. The Army Reserve was once again at a disadvantage when competing with the National Guard, however,

because enlistees in the Guard had to perform no active duty or

active duty for training, though the Guardsman was required

to participate satisfactorily in unit training to age 28.3'

President Eisenhower did not approve of this feature of

the RFA, because it impaired the readiness of the National

Guard. The President was also disturbed that members of

the National Guard who volunteered for six months ADT

would receive $78 per month for their efforts, compared

with the $50 that Army Reservists were paid during the

same training. He approved, however, of the provision of the

RFA that gave him the authority to order to active duty up

to 1,000,000 Ready Reservists—not just Army Reservists—

in any Presidentially-proclaimed emergency.'4 The RFA also

provided that Army Reserve units would have forty-eight

drill periods (inactive duty training) per year and up to seventeen days of active duty for training.1

'

USAR MEMBERSHIP PROBLEMS

One of the long-term problems of the Army Reserve, however, was that it always looked much stronger on paper than

it was in reality. As the Reserve Forces Policy Board had put

it, "The Ready Reserve as a whole is not ready in fact or by

statutory definition."'6There were entirely too many mem32. "Choices Available to Fulfill Enlisted Service Obligation," Army

Information Digest (February 1956), pp. 36-37.

33. Ibid. New National Guard enlistees after April 1, 1957, had to

take the six months of ADT.

34. "President Eisenhower's Reserve Statement, August 9, 1955,"

The Reserve Officer (August 1955), p. 2; In April 1956 Congress amended

the Reserve Forces Act to provide the same pay and disability and death

benefits for both Army Res'"-vists and National Guardsmen taking the

six months of training. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January

1 to June 30. 1956 (Washington: GPO, 1957), p. 19-

35. Public Law 84-305, Sec. 2(b).

36. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense. July 1 to December 31,

1954 (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 13.
THE EISENHOWER YEARS: 1953-1961 125

bers of the USAR who did not take part in inactive duty

training, particularly enlisted men with prior service. There

was not much incentive for them to devote their weekends

to Army Reserve duty, because military pay at the time was

hardly enough to serve as a motivator. The non-participation

problem was truly substantial. As of June 30, 1953, only

117,323 of 798,026 members of the Army Reserve (14.7

percent) were in a drill-pay status, and a year later the percentage had fallen even further (136,918 of 1,108,967 or

12.3 percent). By June 30, 1955, shortly before passage of

the RFA, membership in the Army Reserve had grown to

1,648,626, and drill participation had risen to 163,137.

These figures meant, however, that participation in inactive

duty training had fallen to less than 10 percent of the total

Army Reserve strength."

There was not in the mid-1950s—and, in fact, there is

not today—any particularly effective way to compel Army

Reserve participation among men who have completed their

military obligation. For men who chose one of the RFA options involving a specified term in the Ready Reserve, however, Public Law 84-305 provided a tool for enforcing the

Reserve obligation. Participation in forty-eight inactive duty

training drill periods and up to seventeen days annual training was required of all obligated members of the Ready Reserve. Failure to participate satisfactorily could result in an

obligated Reservist's being ordered to active duty for training for up to forty-five days. If he attempted to slack off in

his last year in the Ready Reserve, his time could be extended for up to six months.38

Although the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 did eventually prove beneficial to Army Reserve recruitment, there

was initial disappointment with its lack of effect. From August 10, 1955, to June 30, 1956, only 13,012 men chose

the two year active duty—three year Ready Reserve—one

year Standby Reserve option, and only twice that number—

27,272—chose the six months ADT—7 V2 year Ready

Reserve program. According to Defense Department estimates, the latter program was expected to produce some

90,000 enlistments per year, so it was evident that the

37. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,

1954 (Washington: GPO, 1955), pp. 64, 333; Semiannual Report of the

Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1955 (Washington: GPO, 1956)

p. 296.

38. Public Law 84-305, Sec. 2(b).
!26 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

young men of America were nor exacrly falling over each

orher rrying ro join rhe Army Reserve.39

For rhe nexr six months recruirs under the 2-3-1 and

6-month ADT options numbered only 12,850 and 17,934,

respecrively. The Reserve Forces Policy Board offered its

analysis of the problem: "Experience has shown that voluntary enlistments in reserve components have been high when

the draft rate is high and conversely low when the draft rate

is low."40 This reasoning has become almosr a rruism in

Army Reserve recruiting, for during rhe Vietnam War, the

young men of America were falling over each other rrying ro

join rhe USAR. The Defense Department, however, rejecred

the solution recommended by the Board, which was ro draft

men direcrly into the Reserve components. It decided to

conduct instead "an unprecedented peacetime recruiting

campaign ... to secure voluntary enlistments under Section 262 [the six-month ADT option] of the [Reserve

Forces] Act ... ." Despite the recruiting campaign, the

number of men who chose rhe six-month ADT option grew

very slowly. Nor unril the recession of 1957-58, in fact,

did enlistments begin to pick up at all. By the end of fiscal

year I960 only 177,712 men had enlisted under Section

262, and paid drill srrengrh in the Army Reserve had only

reached 276,992.41

The disappoinring lack of enlistments in the Army Reserve was reflected, naturally enough, in the organizarional

srarus of USAR units. Of some 7200 company-size units

authorized for the Army Reserve on June 30, 1956, only

5284 were in an active status; of the 618,000 personnel

required for rhese units, only 180,000 (29 percenr of requirements) were acrually assigned. Six months later the

Army Reserve had activated 5439 units, to which 210,679

Reservists belonged (32 percent of requirements).42 The

Army Reserve, as discussed later in this chapter, soon re39. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,

1956 (Washington: GPO, 1957), p. 66.

40. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to December 31,

1956 (Washington: GPO, 1957), p. 11.

41. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,

1957 (Washington: GPO, 1958), p. 69; Annual Report of the Secretary of

Defense, July 1, 1959, to June 30, I960 (Washington: GPO, 1961), p.

101. Recessions always seem beneficial to Army recruiting generally.

42. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,

1956 (Washington: GPO, 1957), pp. 66-67; Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to December 31, 1956 (Washington: GPO, 1957),

p. 13.
THE EISENHOWER YEARS: 1953-1961 127

duced the number of units to 4350 under the Pentomic

division structure. Accurate comparisons of unit strength

and numbers are therefore impossible to make. It can be

said, however, that although Army Reserve units in the

mid-1950s were more fully-manned than were the ORC

units of twenty years earlier, they still did not possess the

degree of readiness that would allow them to fulfill their

role in the event of a sudden mobilization of the US Army.43

MATERIEL READINESS AND TECHNICIAN SUPPORT

Questions about personnel strength, however, were only one

of the issues that faced the post-Korea Army Reserve. There

were significant problems, for example, in the area of materiel readiness. The Organized Reserve units had never had

much equipment, and equipping Army Reserve units was a

slow process. Although the Reserve Forces Policy Board was

able to say in July 1954 that "The Reserve forces are perhaps the best equipped that they have been in their history,"

this statement does not really mean much. The Board went

on to say, however, that "The chief limitation at present lies

not in the unavailability of equipment but rather in the lack

of facilities and storage space in which to adequately safeguard the equipment."44

The extent of the facilities problems in the USAR was

indicated a year later when the Board reported that of the

2570 locations where Army Reserve facilities were needed,

only 355 were considered "adequate." Over the preceding

four years the Army had spent only $33 million on USAR

training centers, and there was a shortfall of some $400 million. As an idea of the priority attached to correcting this

deficit, the Army requested for FY 1956 a total of only

$31,611,000, to be used for 17 Army Reserve Training

Centers, 243 National Guard Armories, and 124 non-armory

projects for the National Guard.45 By the end of fiscal year

1957 the Army Reserve had received facilities appropriations

totaling $70 million; the Reserve Forces Policy Board estimated a need for an additional $348 million in the future.46

43. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1959, to June 30,

1960 (Washington: GPO, 1961), p. 103.

44. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,

1954 (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 66.

45. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 3

r

1955 (Washington: GPO, 1956), pp. 74-75.

46. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to Decerr'

1956 (Washington: GPO, 1957), p. 17.
128 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

The question of adequate facilities was tied closely with

questions relating to equipment issue and full-time USAR

maintenance personnel. Until June 1956 equipment pools

served all of the Army Reserve units in a given area. This

policy changed at the end of FY '56, and USAR units began to receive their own equipment. "This new policy,"

wrote the Reserve Forces Policy Board, "is being implemented as rapidly as storage and maintenance facilities and

the necessary personnel can be provided."47 The immensity

of the problem confronting the Army Reserve is shown in

the fact that by June 30, 1957, USAR units had only about

4 percent of their authorized Table of Organization and

Equipment (TOE) allowances on hand. "Most of the equipment issued to Army reserves," reported the Secretary of Defense, "is standard, limited standard, or serviceable substitute type items and is adequate, along with equipment

available in Army Reserve equipment pools, for training

purposes."48

By the end of Fiscal Year I960 the units of the USAR

had received 41 percent of their overall TOE equipment allowances. "The majority of the US Army Reserve units,"

stated the Reserve Forces Policy Board, "can now conduct

platoon-level basic unit training with the quantities of

equipment on hand." The Board concluded, however, that

"Maintenance of all levels continues to be a pressing problem." The primary cause of the maintenance problem in

I960 was the same one as in 1953—too few full-time personnel in the units.

The Army Reserve Technician Program was established

in 1950, but it did not experience rapid growth during its

first decade. Although President Eisenhower gave lip-service

to the need for increasing the readiness of the Army Reserve, his administration was unwilling to give the USAR

the number of full-time support personnel required to overcome the maintenance deficit. Eisenhower prided himself on

his prudent fiscal management, and part of this management was that of cutting back on the number of civilian

employees of the Department of the Army.49 By fiscal year

I960 the USAR had a requirement for 5,100 technicians,

47. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July I to December 31,

1956 (Washington: GPO, 1957), p. 18. The Army «instituted equipment pools for the USAR in the mid-1970s.

48. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,

1957 (Washington: GPO, 1958), p. 81.

49. See, for example, the proud statement of how he reduced DA

Civilian employment by 13 percent during his first full year in office.
THE EISENHOWER YEARS: 1953-1961 129

but only 3,046 were authorized by the Department of the

Army.50

REORGANIZATION

One of the other things that made it difficult for the Army

Reserve to attain a high state of readiness was a major structural reorganization, comparable in scope to the pre-World

War II change from square to triangular divisions. This time

the change was brought about by theories as to the effects of

nuclear weapons on the battlefield. In 1957 the Army decided to reorganize and re-equip its combat units into a

"Pentomic" divisional structure, an awkward arrangement

that combined the latest in nuclear weaponry with the "circle the wagons" mentality of Indian Wars days. The three

brigades of the triangular division were replaced under this

doctrine by five "highly mobile combat groups organically

supported by 5 batteries of light artillery and 1 battery of

HONEST JOHN rockets . . . ."51 The task of reorganizing

the active Army's infantry, airborne, and armored divisions

into the Pentomic configuration was completed by the end

of calendar year 1957, and the number of active divisions

was reduced from 18 to 15.52

Reorganization of the ten USAR combat divisions to

the Pentomic structure was completed by the end of December 1959, one year ahead of schedule.53 The irony of this

accelerated conversion was that the active Army was ready to

abandon the configuration because it simply did not work.

By fiscal year 1961 the Army, in an attempt "to make our

combat divisions more flexible and mobile," embraced the

Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD). Under

the ROAD concept the Army's combat divisions could be

tailored to meet a specific battlefield need by adding and

subtracting different types of battalions.54 Conversion of the

Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1954

(Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 97.

50. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1959, to June 30,

I960 (Washington: GPO, 1961), p. 104.

51. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,

1957 (Wishington: GPO, 1958), pp. 3-4.

5 2. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to December 31,

1957 (Washington: GPO, 1958), p. 23.

"" Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1959, to June 30,

:PO loAn n ir«

53.

1960 (Washington: N B GPO, „. J, 1961), iyoi; p. iu.->.

54. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 1961

(Washington: GPO, 1962), p. 60.
130 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Army Reserve to the ROAD division structure would wait,

however, until the 1960s.

Other organizational changes during the Eisenhower

years were not detrimental to Army Reserve readiness. On

December 7, 1954, for example, the Executive for Reserve

and ROTC Affairs became the Chief, Army Reserve and

ROTC Affairs. This title change, however, had little effect

on the operations of the office, though it held out a promise

that the CAR would assume more responsibility for the

USAR. In July 1956 the Headquarters, Continental Army

Command, (CONARC) established the office of Deputy

Commanding General for Reserve Forces. This person had

the mission of coordinating and supervising the CONARC

General Staff in the development of plans and directives for

Reserve Component programs in the Zone of Interior Armies. Then on November 1, 1956, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve components was established

at the DA Staff level.55

CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION

The Eisenhower years were in many ways a time of tremendous growth for the Army Reserve, but in most instances

the progress of the USAR was achieved despite the President's policies instead of because of them. In each year from

1958 through I960 the Eisenhower administration put forth

budget proposals calling for a 10 percent reduction in the

paid drill strength of both the Army Reserve and the Army

National Guard. The first of these proposed reductions was

announced on March 31, 1958, by Army Secretary Wilber

M. Brucker, who coupled the reductions to the Pentomic

structure conversion. Under this proposal the number of

Army Reserve combat divisions would be reduced from 10

to 6 by converting 4 infantry divisions to training divisions.

The National Guard under this proposal would drop from

27 divisions to 21.56 Concurrently, the paid drill strength of

the Army Reserve was to be reduced from 300,000 to

55. James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization

and Administration. 1900—1963 (Washington: Center of Military History,

United States Army, 1975), p. 400; Semiannual Report of the Secretary of

Defense. July 1 to December 31, 1956, p. 12.

56. William F. Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen-Soldier: Legislative Policy-making for the Federal Armed Forces Reserve (Columbus: Ohio State

University press, 1967), p. 97; Department of Defense News Release,

"Fact Sheet on Reorganization of U. S. Army Reserve Components," July

8, 1958, copy in Center of Military History files.
THE EISENHOWER YEARS: 1953-1961 131

270,000, while the National Guard was to be reduced from

400,000 to 360,000."

Congressional reaction to these plans was immediately

unfavorable, and the outraged cries from the Congress

caused the Department of Defense to back down quickly.

"The Secretary of Defense has modified his previous guidance," said a DoD News Release, "so that the Army has

been authorized to develop a plan looking toward the retention of the present 37 divisions in the Reserve Forces Structure . . . provided that this troop structure is maintained

with no increase of cost or personnel beyond current programmed levels."58 Under the "revised guidance," the Army

Reserve would consist of 10 Pentomic infantry divisions, 13

training divisions, 2 maneuver area commands, and several

hundred supporting companies. Simultaneously, the Army

consolidated 46 military districts into 13 US Army Corps

(Reserve) Headquarters.59

Additional Eisenhower administration attempts to reduce the Army Reserve's budget and paid drill strength in

1959 and I960 met with similar opposition in the Congress. The primary impetus for cutting the budget of the

USAR seems to have come from the Department of Defense

level, and not from the Department of the Army. Congressional lobbyists for the Reserve Officers Association attempted in both the House and the Senate to put into the

DoD appropriations bill language placing a floor on paid

drill strength for the Army Reserve. The move was unsuccessful in the House, but Strom Thurmond was able to accomplish this maneuver on the floor of the Senate. As a

result, funds for both the Army Reserve and the National

Guard were increased, and a minimum paid drill strength

was established.60

President Eisenhower was not pleased with this turn of

events, which he labeled "an unprecedented departure from

past policy." Though he was technically correct, the President was not apparently willing to admit that this latest

action on the part of Congress was simply the next logical

step in the progression of Congressional oversight of the Reserve Components.61

57. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1959, to June 30,

1960 (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 100, 62.

58. Ibid.

59. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1958, to June 30,

1959 (Washington: GPO, I960), p. 57.

60. Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen Soldier, pp. 110—11.

61. Ibid.. pp. Ill, 98.
132 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

What the President did not realize—or perhaps did not

plan for—was that the Army Reserve had developed into a

potent political force and that the Reserve Officers Association had honed its political clout with the Congress. The

Executive branch had on many occasions surrendered to

Congress the initiative on the National Guards budget, and

by the 1950s the same thing was happening with respect to

the Army Reserve.62

CONCLUSION

The entire Eisenhower era was one of tremendous importance to the Army Reserve. Largely because of the influence

and leadership of the Congress, the Army Reserve was

strengthened immeasurably by the Reserve Officer Personnel

Act of 1954 and the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. Reserve

officers finally had a statutory guarantee of promotion consideration paralleling that of the Regulars, and the Army

Reserve was provided with a dependable source of manpower

for as long as the draft was in operation.

President Eisenhower, though a distinguished soldier

and verbal supporter of the reserve components, was overcome by his own fiscal conservatism. The reserves were a

convenient concomitant of this conservatism because they

were cheaper than active forces, but when he turned to a

policy of massive retaliation to the near-exclusion of all other

levels of deterrence, the reserves, as well as the active forces,

were a logical and convenient place to reduce. That he failed

in his efforts to reduce the reserves was not so much a measure of his weakness or lack of resolve as they were an indication of the increasing role of the Congress. The Army Reserve was getting stronger in every way, and the Kennedy

and Johnson eras would provide it with the opportunities to

demonstrate whether it was a paper tiger or a responsive,

effective part of this country's defense.

62. For a good discussion of this entire period see Ibid., pp.

97-124, passim.
7

The Berlin

Mobilization

The 1960s were a decade of major accomplishments for

the Army Reserve. More than 60,000 Army Reservists

were called to active duty for the 1961 Berlin Crisis in what

has generally been termed the most efficient American mobilization up to that time,1

and nearly 6,000 Army Reservists were mobilized for Vietnam in 1968.

The Berlin Crisis, which lasted roughly from June

1961 to June 1962, occurred at a time when American defense policy was undergoing a fundamental change. The

1950s strategy of massive retaliation had been severely criticized by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor in his I960 book The

Uncertain Trumpet, and Presidential hopeful John F. Kennedy

adapted Taylor's thesis of flexible response as a major campaign issue.

Kennedy campaigned hard upon the theme that the

Eisenhower Administration had neglected national defense

by placing undue reliance upon massive retaliation. Shortly

after assuming office, Kennedy set the theme for his administration when he directed Secretary of Defense Robert S.

McNamara to reorganize the Defense Department to create a

more flexible deterrent.

Early on, McNamara concluded that the Army's Reserve Components were improperly structured and burdened

with hundreds of unnecessary units. His conclusions led him

to propose a succession of reorganization plans for the Army

Reserve, plans that met considerable opposition within and

without the Congress.

1. Department of Defense Annual Report, 1962, p. 66.

133
134 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Nevertheless, McNamara won a partial victory. The

Army Reserve was reorganized along the Army Reserve

Command (ARCOM) structure found today, and major

changes were made in the force structure. For the first time,

Reserve requirements were tied directly to contingency

plans,2and equipment and manning levels were increased

for Army Reserve units. The groundwork was thus laid for

the "Total Army" concept of the 1970s.

Army Reserve units were deliberately understrength,

based upon the planning assumption that three-quarters of

all Reserve Component divisions would have six months or

more to build up and train after mobilization.3The 10

Army Reserve infantry divisions were manned at 53 to 60

percent of combat strength, and the 4,353 company-sized

units of the Army Reserve were manned at 53 percent or

less, even though the majority of them would be needed in

the early stages of mobilization.4

Across the board, Army Reserve units were equipped at

less than 50 percent of full combat requirements, and the

equipment that was available was generally obsolete material

of Korean War or even World War II vintage.5Readiness was

further hampered by a shortage of full-time employees, and

the Army Reserve had only one-third of its required 1,103

reserve centers.6

Even so, Maj. Gen. Frederick M. Warren, the Chief,

Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, testified before Congress

on May 10, I960, that the Army Reserve was at its highest

state of readiness ever and was basically sound and ready to

complement existing ground forces. In less than 18 months,

the accuracy of Warren's testimony was tested in the Berlin

Crisis call-up.

2. On page 114 of his 1968 testimony before the Senate Armed

Services Committee regarding the 1969 Defense budget, McNamara

stated that for the first time the materiel and personnel requirements of

the reserve components necessary to support contingency plans had been

included in Defense programs. Also, units for which no military requirement existed in contingency plans had been eliminated and other units

which were needed had been added to the force structure.

3. Karl Cocke, The Reserve Components, undated manuscript, Center

of Military History, p. VIII—4.

4. Maj. Gen. Frederick M. Warren, Posture Statement Presentation

before House Armed Services Committee, May 10, I960. Copy in

OCAR Historical File.

5. Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, June 30, 1961,

p. 4.

6. Annual Historical Supplement, Office of the Chief U.S. Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, I960, pp. 13, 28.
THE BERLIN MOBILIZATION 135

BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS

The Berlin Crisis was not an isolated incident, but was instead part of a challenge to the position of the United States

as a world power.7Since World War II, US-Soviet relations

had been tense; and the Kennedy Administration came to

office during a period of wary maneuvering for advantage.8

By 1961, recent Soviet space successes had bolstered Soviet

confidence., and US failure to support the Cuban Freedom

Fighters following their Bay of Pigs landing on April 17,

1961, cast doubt upon the willingness of the United States

to employ arms against communist forces.

These circumstances tempted Soviet Premier Nikita S.

Khrushchev to pressure the United States to accept a longstanding Soviet proposal for turning Berlin into a "free city."

The city had remained under Four Power control following

World War II, and the Western sector of Berlin under

French, British and US rule had become an island of democracy in East Germany. This island was a haven for refugees

fleeing from East Germany and had thereby become an uncomfortable thorn in the sides of the Soviet Union and its

allies.

Meeting with Kennedy in Vienna, Austria, on June 3

and 4, Khrushchev told the President that the status of

Berlin would be resolved during 1961 with or without the

cooperation of the United States. Khrushchev's remarks to

Kennedy included a clear implication that the Soviets were

prepared to employ military force to achieve their end.9

Kennedy was unprepared to give in to such an ultimatum. He had come to office pledging to strengthen

American military power to the point where no aggressor

would dare challenge US interests. On May 25, he had delivered an address on "Urgent National Needs" to Congress

and requested a Defense budget increase of $237 million to

expand America's conventional war capability. Kennedy had

also directed a realignment of active and reserve forces to

improve responsiveness and combat readiness. The

Khrushchev ultimatum stimulated an urgent review of

American military capabilities in Europe.

7. Henry L. Trewhitt, McNamara (New York: Harper and Row,

1971), p. 101.

8. Robert W. Coakley, et al., U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-62, undated manuscript, Center of Military History, p. I—11.

9. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1961

(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 22, 35, 37-38.
136 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

On June 27, McNamara requested a Joint Chiefs of

Staff study to improve the force structure under conditions

of a partial mobilization. His guidance was that the active

services were to be increased by approximately 500,000

men, with initial emphasis placed upon the use of Ready

Reserve personnel and Reserve Component units.

On July 6, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a

declaration of national emergency and a mobilization of

559,000 men. The active forces were to be increased by four

divisions, and Reserve combat support units were to be mobilized to provide a logistics back-up to the Active Army.10

Two days later, Khrushchev asserted that the bellicose attitude of the United States over Berlin was forcing the Soviet Union to increase its military expenditures." By July

12, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations had been

pared down to a mobilization of 285,500 men, and on July

19 the President decided on a more limited call-up without

the declaration of national emergency. The plan was to send

six additional divisions to Europe from the stateside strategic reserve by early 1962 while ordering a partial mobilization to reconstitute the depleted strategic reserve.12

With his basic plan decided, Kennedy appealed to the

nation in a special televised address on the evening of July

25. Citing Khrushchev's grim warnings about the future of

the world, Kennedy asserted that "the immediate threat to

free men is in West Berlin." He reminded the American

people that the fortunes of war and diplomacy had left West

Berlin an island of free people 110 miles behind the Iron

Curtain and that the United States had a basic right to be

in Berlin as a result of victory over NAZI Germany. As 50

million Americans watched, Kennedy called West Berlin the

"great testing place of Western courage" and asked for sacrifice on the part of all citizens. He firmly announced his

intention to fight over Berlin if necessary.13

MOBILIZING THE RESERVES

The next day, Kennedy requested Congressional authority to

order to active duty up to 250,000 Ready Reservists—units

and individuals. The Congress responded quickly, and Public Law 87-117 was enacted on August 1 by a vote 403 to

10. Coakley, U.S. Army Expansion 1961-62, pp. II-1 through

II—4.

11. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs. 1961, p. 40.

12. Coakley, U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-62.

13. New York Times, July 26, 1961, p. 10.
THE BERLIN MOBILIZATION 137

2 in the House and 75 to 0 in the Senate. The authority

was in effect until July 1, 1962, and allowed the President

to call the Reservists to duty for up to 12 months. The

President could also extend all terms of active military service.

On August 13, communist forces sealed the borders to

West Berlin, halting the flow of refugees which had reached

thousands a day. As construction on the Berlin Wall started,

there was a renewed sense of urgency in the Pentagon.

McNamara pushed for an earlier reinforcement of Europe,

and on August 15, he accepted the idea of sending regular

units to Europe while replacing them stateside with Reserve

units.14

The next day, the Army alerted 113 Guard and Reserve

units for possible active duty and extended 84,000 active

duty enlisted men beyond their normal release date. Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr. then announced a 12-

month extension for Reserve officers presently on active duty

for six-month training tours. Ready Reserve obligations were

also extended for one year. In all, a dozen measures were

taken to allow the United States to reinforce its units in

Europe while doubling from three to six the number of

combat-ready divisions in the Strategic Reserve of the stateside active forces.15

On August 23, the Army staff proposed calling 46,519

Reserve Component soldiers to active duty—the 23,626 in

the units previously alerted, 4,396 members of the USAR's

100th Training Division who would open a training center

at Fort Polk, La., and 18,497 soldiers to man non-divisional

units for the Strategic Reserve Army Forces (STRAF).

McNamara obtained Kennedy's approval and on August 25

announced a call-up of 210 units, including the 100th

Training Division. All except the 100th were to report for

duty on October 1. The 100th was ordered into service on

September 25.'6

Intensified combat readiness training was ordered for

479 units of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve

on September 6, with four Guard divisions and 146 smaller

units being told to add another weekend drill to their

monthly training schedules. These units were alerted for

possible call-up. Meanwhile, Stahr told an Association of the

14. Coakley, U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-62, p. 11-27.

15. Press Release 57, Army News Service, August 17, 1961.

16. Coakley, U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-62, p. 11-37.
138 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

US Army convention that the build-up would soon permit

reinforcement of Army units in Europe.17

In less than two weeks, the warning order had become

an active duty call as the Army told two National Guard

divisions—the 32nd Infantry Division from Wisconsin and

the 49th Armored Division from Texas—and 248 non-divisional • Reserve Component units to report by October 15.

The 49th was sent to Fort Polk, which in turn forced the

100th Training Division to mobilize at Fort Chaffee, Ark.,

and establish a new training center there. The 4009th US

Army Garrison was told to help the 100th get ready for its

first shipment of 1,000 trainees on October 17. The 100th

Training Divisions mission was to turn out 60,000 new soldiers over the next year.I8

Morale appeared to be high among the recalled Reservists. According the the New York Times, attitudes ranged

from a patriotic sense of duty to eagerness to engage the

Russians, the latter feeling personified by Sgt. Nikolai

Klinkowski. Klinkowski, a member of New York's Company

B, 101st Signal Battalion, was a 25-year-old refugee from

communist-controlled Poland, and he wanted very much to

"go right now, fight right now and even die right now" to

free his country.19

A week later, the Times reported that a Yankee Stadium

souvenir vendor, PFC Marvin Belsky would be losing a

small fortune—$35 to $50 a day—by missing the World

Series. In Belsky s words, he was now earning peanuts—

$99.10 a month—instead of selling them. Other members

of the Bronx, N.Y, 920th Transportation Company gave

the call-up mixed reviews.20

PROBLEMS OF THE CALL-UP

Most reserve units reported to active duty without all of the

equipment authorized by their Tables of Organization and

Equipment (TOE). This was due in part to the reduced allowances authorized for training purposes. More importantly,

17. New York Times, Sept. 7, 1961, p. 1.

18. Army Information Digest, July 1962, pp. 2-14. The 100th

Training Division was warmly praised by the Army leadership for doing

an outstanding job. Special mention is made of the 100th in 1961 and

1962 annual historical supplements, and Chief of Staff Gen. George H.

Decker made special mention of the 100th as well as the 301st Logistical

Command in a March 1962 article in Officer magazine.

19. New York Times, Sept. 24, 1961, p. VI-32.

20. New York Times, Oct. 2, 1961, p. 16.
THE BERLIN MOBILIZATION 139

many items were in short supply nationally, highlighting

the common complaint that the Army had been neglected

during the later Eisenhower years.

For years, austere funding had not kept pace with the

consumption of Army equipment through wearout and obsolescence. For four of the six years prior to 1961, the appropriation for Army materiel did not cover day-to-day

losses and likewise failed to provide for modernization. Consequently, by June 30, 1961, the materiel readiness of the

Army was substantially below that required for a modern,

combat-ready force.21

In addition, much of the equipment on hand was approaching the end of its useful military life and was of little

value except in training new soldiers. The unsatisfactory situation was made worse by the fact that Operation and

Maintenance (OMA) appropriations had been constrained in

the 1950s, leading to an impressive maintenance and rebuild backlog. The result was that the Army entered the

Berlin build-up handicapped by past neglect and forced to

take expedient measures.

Among the measures quickly adopted by the Army was

to withdraw equipment from those Army Reserve units not

mobilized. Mobilized units did receive additional equipment

to aid in training, but the bulk of the equipment efforts

were directed toward Europe in support of the planned

build-up there.22

Equipment was not the only problem. Guard and Reserve units were deliberately undermanned and required the

recall of some 38,827 individual Reservists to bring them to

full strength. Of these, 15,734 were sent to the 444 mobilized Army Reserve units, and 23,053 filled out Army National Guard units.23

The selection and call-up of individual Reservists was

not fully satisfactory either. According to McNamara, "The

lack of adequate information on the status of individual Reservists recalled as 'fillers' and the urgent requirement for

men with special skills requiring long training combined to

produce some inequities and some misassignments."24 The

Army was in the midst of a changeover from manual to

21. Coakley, U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-62, pp. VII-1 and

VII-2.

22. Ibid., pp. VII-2 through VII-4.

23. Summary of Major Events and Problems, Office of the Chief, Army

Reserve and ROTC Affairs, 1 July 1961 to 30 June 1962, p. 1-2.

24. Department of Defense Annual Report, 1962, p. 22.
140 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

machine-processed Reserve personnel records, and the recently reorganized command structure for the Army Reserve

magnified the problems associated with a rapid call-up of

individuals.25 The objective of the call-up was to produce

additional operational units as quickly as possible. Although

the lack of equipment and the infusion of filler personnel

delayed the start of training in some cases, Reserve units

began an intensified, five-phased training program.

Phase One, lasting three weeks, was devoted to a general shakedown, receipt of filler personnel, and cadre training. During the next two-week phase, units concentrated on

squad, section and crew Training. Weeks six and seven,

comprising Phase Three, were for small unit and team training. The fourth phase, weeks eight through ten, covered

platoon and company training, essentially basic unit training. The final phase lasted another three weeks. This was for

battalion, battle group and division field exercises. Units

also participated in command post and logistical exercises.26

The last of the 68,883 Army Reservists mobilized for

the crisis had hardly been on duty two weeks when

McNamara gave indications that additional recalls would not

be necessary. In a November 17 press conference, McNamara

expressed confidence in the build-up and said that 300,000

men had been added to the armed forces in recent months

while 45,000 had been sent to Europe to reinforce combat

units there. He said that the build-up was ahead of schedule

and that there was no need to call additional Reservists.27

DISCONTENT AMONG RESERVISTS

This announcement cheered those Reservists alerted for additional recalls, but it did little for the rapidly growing mood

of discontent among some mobilized Reservists. The honeymoon of the first few weeks was coming to a close, and by

the end of November the press was questioning Kennedy

about the rumors of discontent and low morale among Reservists.

Kennedy responded that the stories were "wholly

wrong" and that it should be clearly explained to all Reservists that they were performing valuable service. Kennedy

25. Irving Heymont, Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilization,

U.S. Reserve Components (General Research Corporation, 1972), pp. 4-5.

26. Summary of Major Events and Problems, p. 1-3.

27. New York Times, Nov. 18, 1961, p. 1.
THE BERLIN MOBILIZATION l4l

added that he intended to release the Reservists from active

duty as soon as possible.28

Four days later, the front page of the New York Times

proclaimed "Why Us?". It appears that Kennedy's effort to

explain to Reservists why they were in uniform again had

about the same effect as a peashooter on a tank.

Aside from classic gripes about food and housekeeping

details, Reservists were questioning the call-up procedures.

Some, called as individual fillers, wanted to know why they

were recalled when men who had never served were not

being drafted. Others complained about a lack of work; and

one young man, SP5 Willard M. Miller, wrote a letter of

complaint to the Boston Herald, receiving an Article 15

(non-judicial punishment) for being so bold as to complain

about being recalled from his college classes. He had violated a standing order about writing for publication without

prior approval, and he also stirred up quite a bit of controversy. '

Army Secretary Stahr immediately cancelled Millers

punishment of two weeks' restriction and extra duty, but the

Secretary had to answer to the Pentagon press corps. Stahr

called a December 4 news conference to explain the Miller

situation and to counter the impression fostered by newspaper articles that the Army had received a landslide of

complaints from Reservists and National Guardsmen. Stahr

explained that the regulation was misapplied to Miller and

was meant to cover speeches and articles, not letters to

editors. He also said that letters of complaint represented

less than one percent of the Reserve Component soldiers recalled, which was about the normal complaint rate for the

Active Army.30

In his prepared statement, Stahr said that "It is recognized that many individual reservists were not happy to

leave families ?;id civilian pursuits and opportunities for

military service? However, the individual obligor and volunteer, with rare exception, had accepted the call of his country and has displayed admirable spirit, willingness and 'can

do' attitude."

While admitting to equipment shortages and problems

in identifying individual replacements, Stahr said that the

call-up had proven that the Reserve system would work and

work very well. He referred to a special investigation made

28. Transcript of Nov. 29, 1961, news conference as reported in

the Neu-' York Times, Nov. 30, 1961, p. 14.

29. New York Times, Dec. 4, 1961, pp. 1 and 19.

30. New York Times, Dec. 5, 1961, pp. 1 and 29.
142 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

by Gen. James A. Van Fleet on behalf of the Chief of Staff.

Van Fleet reported that the spirit of the citizen-soldier was

truly magnificent and reflected the readiness of America to

answer the call of the President. In short, Stahr concluded

that the 1961 call-up was "far superior to any previous mobilization in this country."31

Stahr's opinion was seconded by seasoned journalist

Hanson W. Baldwin, who called many of the complaints

"cry-baby" and recalled the far more serious problems of the

Korean War when many who fought in Korea had undergone the "double jeopardy" of serving in two hot wars. The

inconveniences of a cold war were minor by comparison.32

Nevertheless, in a move to reduce complaints from the

field, the Army issued on December 15 a pamphlet entitled

"Why Me." More than two months after recalling Reservists

to active duty, the Army finally explained to the troops that

a call-up was the only way to immediately increase strength

and that larger draft calls would not provide the needed

strength in time. In general, the pamphlet answered the

most serious questions on Reservists' minds, but it did not

end the controversy surrounding some aspects of the callup.33

MCNAMARA AND THE ROA

The issues of mobilization and recall had become entangled

in a debate over the future of the Army's Reserve Components. Early in his administration, Kennedy had directed

McNamara to reorganize the Defense Department to maximize capabilities while increasing flexibility. This reorganization naturally affected the Reserve Components

when McNamara concluded that "not only did the reserve

structure make very little sense in terms of size, [but that]

its mission was obscure to say the least."

McNamara wanted the reserve components to be ready

to replenish the strategic reserve in a timely manner, and he

set about to reorganize the Reserves with this thought in

mind.34 The serious discussion of alternative Army National

31. Secretary Stahr's remarks are reported in Army News Service

Release, No. 100, dated Dec-. 5, 1961.

32. New York Times, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 8.

33. The text of the pamphlet is contained in Army News Service

Release, No. 107, dated Dec. 15, 1961, as well as several major newspapers.

34. William W. Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy (New York:

Harper and Row, 1964), p. 65.
THE BERLIN MOBILIZATION 143

Guard and Army Reserve force structures was underway

when the Berlin Crisis overwhelmed all other planning. The

crisis and subsequent mobilization put reorganization plans

on hold, but in some quarters any discussion of the 1961

mobilization was inextricably linked with the threat of Reserve reorganization.35

The matter was made worse by the perception within

the Reserve Officers Association (ROA) that McNamara had

deliberately failed to defend Reserve Component honor

against criticism in the press. The organization's membership also concluded that the Pentagon hierarchy didn't

know very much about its Reserve Components.36 On December 21, these smoldering feelings broke into the open

when the ROA accused McNamara of "a national libel"

against the Reserves. The Association charged that

McNamara had failed to heed Congressional advice on how

to carry out a mobilization.37

The ROA claimed that "there is no secret about the

desire on the part of some authorities in the Defense Department to undermine and eliminate from the National Defense complex the Reserve programs .... [This has been]

reflected in the continuing efforts during the post-Korea period to substantially reduce—and actually to phase out over

a period of several years—the Reserve Forces."38

It would be difficult to fully substantiate the ROA

charges, but the Association's outburst stimulated Congressional interest in the 1961 mobilization. Subsequently, Rep.

Carl Vinson (D-Ga.), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, directed Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), to

head a comprehensive inquiry into the defense posture of the

Reserve Components. Vinson wrote Hebert that the "desirability of such an inquiry was significantly heightened by

the recent partial mobilization of Reserve Components under

PL 97-117."39

The newspaper reports of poor use of Reservists and the

accusations by the ROA coincided with demobilization plan35. The McNamara reorganization plans will be discussed in detail

in the next chapter.

36. John T. Carlton and John F. Slinkman, The ROA Story: A Chronicle of the First 60 Years of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States

(Washington: ROA, 1982), pp. 455-62.

37. New York Times, Dec. 22, 1961, p. 1. Additional details are

also found in the Army-Navy-Air Force Register, Jan. 13, 1962,

pp. 14-15, and the Officer, Feb. 1962, Vol. 38, pp. 12-13.

38. Army-Navy-Air Force Register, op. cit.

39. Letter, Vinson to Hebert, reprinted in Military Reserve Posture,

House Committee on Armed Services, Aug. 17, 1962.
144 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

ning and served to make the national leadership sensitive to

the public relations impact of demobilization.40

DEMOBILIZATION

Once the Reservists had been called to active duty, the balance of staff planning actions for the call-up shifted from the

problem of getting Reservists into uniform to that of returning them to civilian status. As early as the first week of

December, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

(DCSOPS) proposed releasing some individual fillers by January 6, 1962, with a proposed release schedule for mobilized Army Reserve units later in the month. The two Army

National Guard divisions would be released in March and

May.

On December 28 and 29, the Army proposed releasing

32 units with 7,426 personnel because they could not be

used effectively, mainly because of equipment shortages.

Emphasis was placed upon having enough time to develop

an effective public relations plan to explain the demobilization.

The President was reluctant to release units until two

new active Army divisions could be organized and trained,

and McNamara was unwilling to accept shortages of equipment, lack of useful mission or long lead-time training requirements as reasons to release Reserve units. It would be

difficult to explain why the units had been mobilized if they

had no mission or could not be trained.41

Later, potentially adverse public reaction and the unpredictable reaction of Reservists themselves influenced a decision not to deploy Reserve units overseas. When the rumblings of discontent by some Reservists continued, Army

Chief of Staff Gen. George H. Decker recommended on

March 2 that overseas deployment of the Reserve Components should not be considered unless there were overriding

changes in the situation.42

40. This particular aspect of demobilization planning is covered in

historical conrext in DA Pamphlet 20-210, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army and is cited in Marvin A. Kreidberg and

Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States

Army, 1775-1945 (Washington: Dept. of the Army, 1955), p. 377.

41. Coakley, U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-62, pp. VIII—67 through

VIII-81.

42. Memorandum, Decker to Under Secretary of the Army, March

2, 1962, Subject: "Overseas Utilization of RC Units/Personnel."
THE BERLIN MOBILIZATION 145

Decker took the discontent seriously. Artillerymen at

Fort Bragg, NC, had boycotted their mess hall March 1—4

demanding an early release. Approximately 30 wives had

demonstrated in front of the main gate of Fort Devens,

Mass., calling for their husbands' release; and members of

the 49th Armored Division at Fort Polk, La., had held a

two-hour demonstration on March 5.

On March 13, Decker sent a message to the field emphasizing that commanders down to the company and battery level must fully explain the problems facing the United

States and emphasize the need to retain Guardsmen and Reservists on active duty. In part, Decker stated that the

United States was in a very real sense at war and that the

threat against Berlin had not disappeared.43

The memo was made public on March 21, and on

March 22, Kennedy told a news conference that he would

release Reserve Component soldiers "at the first possible date

consistent with national security." He noted that the two

new Regular Army divisions intended to replace the Army

National Guard divisions would be ready in August or September.44

By early April, McNamara was ready to release Reserve

units as the US military posture improved. On April 6, he

proposed to the President that the Reserve Components

should be released about August 1 and that a minor degree

of risk could be accepted while the two new divisions

achieved full combat capability.

Kennedy agreed. His decision was made public on

April 12.45 The next step was to plan the release.

Detailed demobilization instructions were issued by

Department of the Army and supplemented by a Continental Army Command (CONARC) letter of instruction. Units

could be released from readiness mission as early as July 15,

but none could depart for home until August 1. All units

had to leave their mobilization station by August 11, and

all mobilized Reservists had to return to civilian status by

August 31.

The demobilization was not accomplished very

smoothly. For example, Army Reserve garrison commands

had to outprocess other Reserve Component units while try43. Coakley, U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-62, pp. VIII-81 through

VIII-83.

44. Army News Service, Release No. 25, March 22, 1962.

45. Army Neivs Service, Release No. 30, April 12, 1962.
146 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

ing to clear post themselves.'6 Also, as the Reserve units

were released, critical items of equipment such as generators, trucks and communications equipment had to be

turned in before departure for home station.47

ANALYSES OF THE MOBILIZATION

The last Reservist had barely left for home when the first

official post-mortem of the 1961 mobilization was published. For months, the Hebert subcommittee had been delving into the problems and accomplishments of the call-up.

On August 17, the subcommittee made its findings public,

and these findings were not very complimentary.

The subcommittee zeroed in on the chronic problems of

the Reserve Components—not enough equipment, not

enough men and not enough training. The Army was scored

for allowing Reserve policy matters to "rock and stumble

along without any imaginative or aggressive effort to resolve

them."4"

However, the subcommittee saved its greatest concern

for the Army's lack of information about the Reserve Components. Specifically, "for reasons the subcommittee was unable to ascertain, the Department of the Army did not have

available to it records and reports which should have reflected the essential facts relating to the readiness of Reserve

units".49 Additionally, the Congressmen pointed out that the

"military departments had not prepared contingency plans

which contemplated a partial mobilization and hence were

unable to properly select units for recall."50 This was a major

lesson that the Army should have learned from the confused

Korean War mobilization.

The lack of knowledge and inability to partially mobilize was highlighted by the problems faced by the individual

Ready Reserve members who had to fill out the understrength Guard and Reserve units. The overwhelming majority of these Reservists were veterans who the Army said had

"hard skills" not found in the Reserve units. Nevertheless,

the subcommittee estimated that less than half of these for46. Fifth US Army, after-action report: Subject: "Release of Reserve

Component Units."

47. Coakley, U.S. Army Expansion. 1961-62, p. VIII-92.

48. Report of Subcommittee No. 3 on Military Posture, p. 6640.

49. Ibid., p. 6657.

50. Ibid.
THE BERLIN MOBILIZATION 147

CONCLUSION

mer Active Army soldiers served in their primary Military

Occupation Specialty (MOS) during the call-up. Clearly, in

the subcommittee's opinion, the Army didn't know whom

to recall and where to send them once they were recalled.

The Defense Department seconded the subcommittees

findings when McNamara wrote in his 1962 Annual Report

that "equipment shortages existed in many units and had to

be met by redistribution from other Army assets. The assigned personnel strengths of the recalled units averaged 70

percent of full active duty strength, making it necessary to

fill existing vacancies with individual reservists".51

McNamara promised to prevent future inequities and

misassignment of individual Reservists and asked for increased procurement in his 1962 and 1963 budgets to improve Army Reserve readiness. He also promised to raise the

authorized manning level of Reserve units and stated his intent to match units with current contingency plans.

In summary, he said that the recall of Reservists during

the summer of 1961 made it possible to meet urgent readiness requirements. Despite their problems, 'Army Reserve

units and individuals were in a higher state of readiness than

ever before."52 McNamara's conclusion begs the question:

Did the mobilization of 1961 achieve its purpose?

The 1961 mobilization was a demonstration of national will

(or more likely, a demonstration of Presidential will) and

was intended to prevent a war rather than fight one. Because

the Berlin Crisis did not deteriorate into a hot war and because Berlin was saved as a democratic symbol in the heart

of East Germany, the mobilization has to be rated as a

qualified success.

On the other hand, the active forces were not much

strengthened by the call-up. In his contemporary SECRET

report, Robert W. Coakley concluded that the mobilization

bought time for the Army to add two divisions to its strategic reserve while increasing the number of combat ready divisions in the United States.53

51. Department of Defense Annual Report, 1962, pp. 22-23.

52. Ibid.

53. Coakley, U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-62, pp. VIII—199

through VIII-200.
148 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

In 1972, a Research Analysis Corporation study concluded that the mobilization had achieved its purpose but

that the greatest failings were severe weakness in the management of the individual Reservists and the lack of planning for partial mobilization. The study argued that the Reserve system in effect in 1961 was inadequate.5

'

1

McNamara had made the same argument in 1961

when he first proposed a revamping of the Army's Reserve

Components. The Berlin mobilization experience strengthened his resolve and placed him in direct conflict with the

Congress and the professional associations of the Reserve

Components. The battle over Reserve reorganization was

ready to begin in earnest—a battle which did not end until

1967.

54. Hcymont, Review and Analysis, pp. 4-10 and 4—11. Heymont's

criticism of the Berlin mobilization is essentially the same as for the

Korean War call-up. This opinion is also evident in the Hebert report as

well as Coakley's analysis. A review of previous chapters in his work will

show that the Berlin and Korean mobilizations suffered from nearly identical problems—haphazard recall of individuals, undermanned and underequipped units, lack of partial mobilization plans and the misuse of mobilized units. Essentially, if the Army had learned anything at all from

the Korean effort, those lessons had yet to be effectively applied by the

time of the Berlin mobilization nearly a decade later.
8

Reorganizations Lay

the Groundwork for

the Total Army Policy

J-y ■■

For a full decade, from the announcement of the One

Army concept in 1958 to the establishment of the twostar US Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) in 1968, the

Army Reserve was in a constant state of turmoil and reorganization. As previously discussed, the USAR changed

from the triangular division structure to the Pentomic structure to the ROAD structure.1

Likewise, it was a time for new strategic choices, with

the massive retaliation policy of the Eisenhower era giving

way to the Kennedy emphasis on counterinsurgency and

limited, "brush fire" wars. More importantly, the national

leadership recognized that the Reserve Components must be

linked to specific contingency plans in order to be a costeffective military asset.

To increase flexibility and reduce costs, the Army's Reserve Components were weaned from an outdated, inflexible,

full-mobilization mission and given discrete responsibilities

in support of specific war plans. However, this was not accomplished easily. Although the Kennedy administration was

determined to streamline the Army Reserve, their efforts

were initially blocked by a Congress jealously protecting its

Defense prerogatives.

The reorganization tactics of Secretary of Defense

Robert S. McNamara were heavy-handed and angered the

Congress as well as the politically powerful Reserve Officers

Association. The result was seven years of vicious in-fighting, during which the Army Reserve was left to muddle

1. See Chapter Six for a discussion of these changes.

149
150 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

along without firm guidance or clear prospects for the future.

A reasonable compromise was reached in 1967, and the

Army's Reserve Components achieved a mix of units that has

remained substantially unchanged into the 1980s. The reorganizations of the 1960s eliminated low-priority units

from the Army Reserve and gave the Army Reserve a clearer

role in national defense. The stage was thus set for the Total

Force policy of the 1970s and 1980s.

As stated previously in Chapter Seven, Kennedy had

campaigned upon the theme that the Eisenhower Administration had neglected national defense by placing undue

reliance upon the nuclear strategy of massive retaliation.

Like Truman before him, Eisenhower subordinated military

needs to a conservative fiscal policy that placed first priority

upon balancing the federal budget.

Because it was impossible to be ready for a wide range

of conflicts and still balance the budget, the nuclear deterrent was given first priority as a cost-effective way of achieving more bang for the buck. Even so, the United States did

retain a conventional, non-nuclear capability and was able to

project its power when inclined to do so—such as during

the 1958 intervention in Lebanon.

THE KENNEDY STRATEGY

What Kennedy did was to remove the fiscal strait jacket of

the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. By placing defense needs ahead of a balanced budget, Kennedy allowed

Defense planners to seek flexible solutions to potential

threats.

In keeping with his desire to be able to respond to a

wide range of threats, Kennedy directed McNamara to reappraise Americas entire defense strategy. McNamara was told

to develop the force structure necessary to meet foreign policy objectives without regard to budget ceilings. Once the

force structure was decided upon, McNamara was told to

produce it at the lowest practical cost.2

McNamara in turn emphasized America's ability to respond in the "gray areas" of the world—the Far East, Southeast Asia and Latin America. This emphasis led to the increased importance of conventional forces, with the Reserve

Components being responsible for significantly augmenting

2. William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York:

Harper and Row, 1964), p. 47.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 151

the Active Army. The Reserves were also to provide a base

for large-scale mobilization in the event of general war.3

Consistent with its desire to strengthen conventional

forces, the Kennedy administration moved swiftly to improve readiness by reorganizing the Reserve Components.

The groundwork for the 1962 Army Reserve reorganization

was laid in mid-May 1961 when the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Manpower, Personnel and Reserves, Carlisle P.

Runge, directed the Secretary of the Army to submit a plan

to streamline the Army's Reserve Components.

The Army was given ten days to propose a reorganization that would significantly improve the Reserves responsiveness and combat readiness for conventional, limited-war

contingencies. Runge imposed no restrictions on the composition or size of the Reserve force structure. However, an

earlier review in March 1961 indicated a need for a total

Army force of 42 divisions, with 14 or 15 divisions in the

active Army.4

Based upon the March review, the Army proposed a

reduction in the Reserve Component combat force from the

existing 37 divisions to 29 divisions. While the number of

divisions was being reduced, the manning levels for the remaining divisions and their support units were to be increased. The remaining divisions were to be reorganized

along ROAD lines, and the amount of equipment procured

for training would be increased. There would also be an

increase in the number of technicians, and provisions were

made for up to 100,000 men of the Ready Reserve Reinforcement Pool (today's Individual Ready Reserve) to receive

two weeks of Annual Training a year.

Overall, the proposal would increase the Army's Reserve

Component budget by 43 percent, to $1.1 billion in 1962.

The intent was to have two high-priority Reserve divisions

available for emergency combat operations on three-week's

notice, with two more Reserve Component divisions available with five-weeks' notice. Six additional divisions and

their support forces were to be ready to fight on eightweeks' notice or less.

On May 22 and 23, this ten-division plan was presented to the General Staff Committees on Army National

Guard and Army Reserve Policy (otherwise known as the

Section 5 Committees, from their authorization by Section 5

3. Ibid., pp. 97-98.

4. Karl Cocke, The Reserve Components (undated manuscript, Center

of Military History), pp. VIII—3 through VIII-4.
152 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

of the 1920 amendments to the National Defense Act of

1916).5The Committees agreed with the plan in principle,

and McNamara concurred on May 25.6That evening, Kennedy made a special address to Congress in which the tendivision plan was made public. Kennedy announced a complete reorganization of the Army's division structure to increase its non-nuclear firepower while improving flexibility

and tactical mobility.

With regard to the Reserve Components, Kennedy

said, "The Army is developing plans to make possible a

much more rapid deployment of a major portion of its

highly-trained reserve forces. When these plans are completed, and the reserve is strengthened, two combatequipped divisions, plus their supporting forces, a total of

89,000 men, could be ready in an emergency for operations

with but three weeks' notice." He explained that "these new

plans will allow us to almost double the combat power of

the Army in less than two months, compared to the nine

months hithertofore required."7

Kennedy's statement was expanded upon on June 13

when the Army issued a fact sheet saying that a realignment

of the Reserve Component structure was necessary to make

the Reserve Components more responsive to strategic plans.

Although the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve

had achieved the best readiness posture in the peacetime history of the nation, the fact sheet said that it was necessary

to close the gap between the readiness posture of active

Army units and top-priority reserve units.8

On June 21, Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr.

explained the reorganization in an address to the 35 th Annual Conference of the Reserve Officers Association (ROA) in

San Antonio, Tex. Stahr, who was a former Reserve Officer

and an ROA member, said that the Kennedy defense policy

was geared to the belief that American forces were more

likely to have to fight limited wars than a "no-holds-barred"

global war.

Stahr emphasized that the Reserve Components would

assume an increasingly important role in the 1960s. He illustrated his point by noting that the "forward strategy" of

the United States placed seven Army divisions overseas—

5. 10 U.S.C. 3033.

6. Cocke, Reserve Components, pp.VIII—5 through VIII-8.

7. New York Times, May 26, 1961, p. 12.

8. Army News Service Fact Sheet, 'Army Plan for Realignment of

Reserve Component Structure," Release No. 40, June 13, 1961.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 153

five in Europe and two in Korea. This left six active divisions in the United States, three—including the two airborne divisions—in the Strategic Army Corps, and three

devoted to training new soldiers. The fourteenth Army division on active duty was split between Hawaii and Okinawa.

According to Stahr, the three training divisions could not be

deployed without the extensive use of Reserve Component

combat and combat support units.

Beyond this augmentation role, the Reserve Components maintained seven divisions for strategic Army forces,

and the Army Reserve itself had 10 divisions to meet the

deployment requirements of a truly major war. In addition,

the Army Reserve had 13 training divisions, for a total

USAR force structure of 4,338 company-sized units and an

average paid drill strength of approximately 300,000. In all,

the reinforcement echelon of the Ready Reserve was 748,000

strong, with 330,000 of these men dedicated to bringing

the active duty divisions to full strength.9

Stahr said that the Reserves were organized, trained

and equipped on the assumption that units would have up

to six months to be prepared for combat. However, this assumption was no longer valid as the United States and the

Soviet Union moved toward conflict over Berlin. In Stahr's

words, "in view of the critical world situation, it is imperative that measures be taken promptly to improve the deployment readiness posture of our Reserve Components and

make them more responsive to strategic plans. The pace and

nature of modern warfare require that reaction time be measured in weeks rather than months."10

Summarizing the argument for Reserve Component reorganization, Stahr said that "the proposed realignment of

the Reserve Component structure was developed to meet a

changed world situation. Unless such a realignment is accomplished, it is difficult to justify reliance on Reserve

Forces, most of which could not be used until several

months after an emergency arose."

The implication was that the Reserve Components had

to reorganize in order to justify their existence. As Stahr put

it, the Army staff was enthusiastic about the reorganization,

9. Strength figures cited in Stahr's text can be confirmed in

Summary of Major Events and Problems, Office of the Chief, U.S. Army

Reserve and ROTC Affairs, 1 July I960, to 30 June 1961, pp. 12-16.

10. To place Stahr's remarks into perspective, the Vienna summit

between Kennedy and Khrushchev was June 3 and 4. See the previous

chapter for the details of increasing international tensions.
154 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

and it was up to the individual Reservists to assume an

overriding personal responsibility to make it work.11

The groundwork had been laid for the first McNamara

reorganization of the Reserve Components, but the reorganization did not occur because the Berlin Crisis, as described in the previous chapter, diverted attention from reorganization to partial mobilization. The crisis and

mobilization also changed the Administration's attitude toward the Reserve Components.

The Berlin call-up had raised questions in the minds of

President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara over the value

of Reserve Components. Defense officials decided on September 22 to hold Reserve Component drill strength at

700,000, while reducing previously planned Reserve budget

increases.12The reorganization plan had been through 19 revisions by November 1961,13

and the Army staff had to

make further revisions as DoD reduced the combined

Guard and Reserve paid drill strength by 30,000, to

670,000. Finally, by mid-November, the action was shifted

to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, where Dr. Merton J. Peck took the lead.

THE PECK PLAN

The resulting "Peck Plan" called for 670,000 Ready Reservists (Guard and Army Reserve) in a paid drill status—a 27

division force. Ten excess divisions would be reduced to operational headquarters. Six new ROAD combat brigades

would be formed, and 100,000 members of the Ready Reserve Reinforcement Pool would receive two weeks' training

annually. The plan also called for a 4,000-man increase in

the number of Army Reserve technicians, a cost which was

to be offset by converting 160,000 paid drill slots to 24

paid drills a year status, a decrease from the customary 48

paid drills.14

Before the Peck Plan could win final Administration

approval, the New York Times reported on the plan to cut the

Army's Reserve Components. Citing unhappy experiences

with the Berlin call-up, the Times said that "the Pentagon

11. The Stahr address is quoted extensively in The Army Reservist,

Sept.-Oct. 1961, pp. 3-6.

12. Cocke, Reserve Components, p.VIII—8.

13. Ibid., p. VIII-9.

14. Ibid., p. VIII-10.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 155

has all but abandoned plans to place increased reliance upon

the Reserve forces for emergency use."15

The Times article recalled the Eisenhower attempts to

cut 70,000 slots from the combined Army Guard and Army

Reserve strength, thus reducing the total to 630,000, and

predicted that the latest idea to reduce the Army's Reserve

Components would mean political trouble for the Administration. A key stumbling block was predicted to be a law

which required the consent of a state's Governor before a

National Guard unit could be transferred.

On December 14, Hanson W. Baldwin reported in the

New York Times that Defense officials thought that expenditures for Reserve Forces were too high and that the existing

troop basis was too large. Baldwin pointed out that Defense

thinking had reversed itself since the Berlin Crisis. Prior to

the Crisis, the idea was to increase Reserve Component

strength while keeping the active Army strength steady.16

Now, wrote Baldwin, the Army was going to increase its

active force to 16 divisions, a gain of two divisions.17

On December 17, the New York Times quoted Deputy

Defense Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric as saying that the

President had profound second thoughts about the call-up of

Reservists. According to the Times, the move to reduce the

strength of the Army's Reserves was caused by a reluctance

to support sizeable reserve forces in an era of possible nuclear war. The argument was that hostilities might well be

over before Reserve units could be brought into combat service.18 On the other hand, the hostilities over the Army's

Reserve Component reorganization were just beginning.

As was discussed in Chapter Seven, the Reserve Officers

Association objected strenuously to McNamara's reorganization attempts.19

It was evident that the issues of the Berlin

call-up and the reorganization of the Army's Reserve Compo15. "Pentagon Maps Cut In Army's Reserves," New York Times, Dec.

3, 1961, pp. 1 and 11.

16. "Reserves Facing Ten-Division Cut," New York Times, Dec. 14,

1961, p. 1.

17. This is, of course, exactly what happened. The active Army was

increased by two divisions during 1962, and the two mobilized Army

National Guard divisions—the 32nd Infantry Division and the 49th Armored Division—were released from active duty along with all of the

other mobilized Army Reserve Component units by Aug. 31, 1962.

18. "Fight Is Brewing On Reserve Role," New York Times, Dec. 17,

1961, p. 17.

19- "Reserve Officers Accuse Pentagon of Call-Up Libel," New York

Times, Dec. 22, 1961, pp. 1 and 11.
156 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

nents were intertwined,20and on January 13, 1962, The

Army-Navy-Air Force Register called for a "dispassionate survey

of what has been gained or lost by the recent emergency

call-up."2'

The result of this call was the Hebert committee, also

discussed in the preceding chapter. This subcommittees August 17, 1962, report devoted most of its attention to the

Peck reorganization plan which had eclipsed the readiness

posture issue by the summer of 1962.

The General Staff Committees on Army National

Guard and Army Reserve Policy, the Section 5 committees,

were briefed on the Peck Plan on January 26, and they objected to it. The Section 5 committees endorsed a counterproposal calling for the retention of all 37 Reserve Component divisions and an increase in paid drill strength to

716,000—a net gain of 16,000 instead of the loss of

30,000 under Peck. The Reserve Forces Policy Board concurred with the Section 5 committees on February 1, 1962.

Ignoring the proposals of these two statutory bodies charged

with advising the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of

Defense, respectively, on reserve matters, the Army moved

ahead with its realignment plans.22

On April 4, 1962, the Army announced its plans for

Reserve Component realignment. These included reducing

four National Guard and four Army Reserve divisions to

headquarters status, with the simultaneous activation of

eight brigades as non-divisional units. The brigades were to

be formed under the ROAD concept using the personnel of

the "realigned" divisions. At the same time, the top-priority

Reserve Component divisions would be maintained at 75 to

80 percent of TOE strength as compared with 52 to 78

percent in the past.23

The realignment also cut 58,000 paid drill positions

from the Army's Reserve Components, reducing them to a

20 Jonn T. Carlton and John F. Slinkman, The ROA Story, A History of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, (Washington:

ROA 1982) pp. 456-63. This work sheds considerable light upon ROA

attitudes during this period, but it is unfortunately without footnotes

and frequently omits dates from its narrative.

21. "Reserve and Guard Hassle," Army-Navy-Air Force Register, Jan.

13, 1962, p. 14.

22. Cocke, Reserve Components, VIII-11 to VIII-13. An excellent

contemporary explanation of the organization, responsibilities and authority of the Section 5 committees can be found in the Nov. 1963 issue of

Army Reservist, pp. 8 & 9-

23. 'Army Announces Plan for Reorganization of Reserve Components," Army News Service, Release No. 29, April 5, 1962.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 157

total drill strength of 642,000—a level 28,000 below the

670,000-man force proposed in the Kennedy fiscal year

1963 budget.24 The reduction would allow a savings of

$53.1 million that year, according to testimony before the

Hebert subcommittee on May 11.

In addition to the divisional realignment, the 1962 reorganization plan called for the modernization of non-divisional Reserve Component units. In the words of a May 21,

1962, press release, the reorganization was "the result of a

thorough study of the actual needs of the Army." The goal

was to make the Reserve Components "more responsive to

the needs of the Army in the event of rapid mobilization."

Among the changes proposed were the elimination of

90 mm anti-aircraft gun battalions, air observation detachments, and special services companies, the latter being the

units designed to provide entertainment and recreation programs for troops overseas. In turn, the reorganization proposed to add corps and army-level aviation companies, armored cavalry squadrons, and armored medical companies to

the Reserve Components. There was also to be an increase in

Nike-Hercules air defense battalions at the expense of the

older Nike-Ajax units, an increase in self-propelled artillery,

and a reduction in towed artillery.25In all, approximately

800 units would be eliminated from the Army's force structure.

REACTIONS TO THE PLAN

The reorganization plan was not well received outside of the

Pentagon. According to one study, "The Army plan for realigning the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve

received a cool reception on Capitol Hill, where it came

under the close scrutiny of the Armed Service and Appropriations Committees of both the Senate and House of Repre24. "Pentagon Revamps Reserves: 58,000 Pay Spaces, 8 Divisions

Go," Armed Forces Register, April 7, 1962, pp. 1 and 46.

25. "Fact Sheet on Reserve Realignment," Army News Service,

Release No. 34, May 21, 1962. It should be noted that while some of

these force structure decisions have stood the test of time, such as increasing the ratio of self-propelled artillery to towed artillery, the decision

to abandon air defense guns in favor of complex missile systems can be

faulted. Lessons learned from Vietnam combat showed that a combination

of conventional air defense artillery and missile systems to be more effective against jet aircraft than either system alone. Also, the Army invested

heavily in the Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules missile systems only to

abandon stateside missile defense sites in the early 1970s.
158 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

sentatives." Congressional resistance forced a compromise on

the number of ready reservists to be maintained in a paid

status, and the fiscal year 1963 appropriations act established a paid drill strength of 700,000 for the Army Reserve

Components.26

The Reserve Officers Association and the National

Guard Association opposed the reorganization. Articles in

The National Guardsman derided the idea that a 58,000 cut

in strength could actually result in greater readiness,27and

the Stackpole Company rushed into print a volume entitled

Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy, which plainly stated

that it was impossible to grow stronger by cutting muscle.

This book made the observation that "in any case, money is

the key to more readiness. If we want a truly ready reserve,

keyed to forseeable requirements of a strategy of freedom of

action and adaptable either to general or limited emergencies, we are going to have to pay for it. More drill-pay

spaces, more full-time technicians, higher schedules of annual drills, higher levels of equipment, speed-up of weapons

procurement, an increased flow of six month trainees—all

these things cost money."28 All of these solutions have been

applied with success since the advent of the Total Force policy in 1970, but McNamara was not prepared in 1962 to

accept solutions that increased the cost of the Army's Reserve

Components.29

More important than the opposition of the Reserve

Component professional associations was the reluctance of

state governors to accept any cutback in National Guard

strength. In an attempt to win support for his reorganization plan, McNamara spoke before the July 2, 1962, National Governors Conference at Hershey, Penn. McNamara

stated that the revised structure would increase readiness by

matching the Reserve Component structure to the "detailed,

time-phased, unit requirements established by our military

26. Cocke, Reserve Components, pp. VIII-16 and VIII-17.

27. See "The Big Slice," The National Guardsman, May 1962, pp.

6-7 among others.

28. George F. Eliot, Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy,

(Harrisburg, Penn.: Stackpole Co., 1962), pp. 39-52 and 68-69.

29. For FY 1961, the Army Reserve's share of the Army's Total

Obligation Authority (TOA) was 3.1 percent. McNamara reduced this

share to 2.4 percent in 1964, 2.0 percent in 1966 and 1.6 percent for

FY's 1967 and 1968. Under the later Total Force concept, the Army

Reserve's share of the Army's TOA rose to 2.6 percent in 1971 and 2.8

percent in 1972 and then stabilized in the 3.2 to 3.5 percent range for

the fiscal years 1973 through 1983.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 159

planners." Even though 1,700 obsolete units would be eliminated, more than 1,000 other units would be added to the

force structure. The result, McNamara promised the governors, would leave approximately the same dispersion of units

as before the reorganization. He claimed that only 16 National Guard armories would lose all of their units and that

the Guard would be left with 4041 units, which he contended was sufficient to meet state responsibilities.30

McNamara did not succeed, however, in winning the state

chief executives to his side, and their opposition was seconded by the August 17 report of the Hebert subcommittee.

The subcommittee came down four-square against the

McNamara reorganization, finding it "difficult to comprehend how a reduction of 58,000 men in Reserve drilling

units would result in an increased mobilization capability."

The subcommittee unanimously opposed the Peck plan because it would lower morale, would not increase readiness,

would hurt retention of trained enlisted personnel, and

would offer no solution to the Reserve Component equipment shortages.31 Unable to win Congressional or statehouse support, Defense planners went back to the drawing

boards.32

By mid-November, a reorganization plan which retained a drill strength of 700,000 was developed, and on

December 3, after a personal briefing, Hebert informed

McNamara that the plan was acceptable. Although Defense

spokesmen had denied as recently as November 30 that any

concessions would be made on reorganization,33the Army

announced that it would go ahead with a 700,000-man reorganization on December 4 and dropped any hint of reducing paid drill strength.34

Gov. Albert D. Rosellini of Washington, Chairman of

the National Governors Conference, immediately announced

his opposition to the December 4 plan, while the Reserve

Officers Association quickly withdrew its opposition. Not30. "Proposed Army Reserve Component Reorganization," Speech

File Service, No. 7—2-62.

31. See report on "Military Reserve Posture," Aug. 17, 1962,

(Washington: GPO), pp. 6644 and 6667-76.

32. The extent of the governors' opposition is chronicled on pages

3-5 of the Aug. 1962 issue of The National Guardsman. Additional details are found in the Oct. 1962 issue of The National Guardsman.

33. See New York times, Nov. 30, 1962, p. 30.

34. 'Army's Revision of Reserve Units and Guard Begins," New

York Times, Dec. 5, 1962, pp. 1 and 25.
160 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

ing that the December plan contained many concessions to

the positions maintained by Congress and the ROA, the association's spokesman, Col. John T. Carlton, summed up the

ROA position by saying that "it's hard to be against proposals for modernization."15

COMPROMISE

The Pentagon immediately set about to convince Gov. Rosellini and several other governors who were still opposed to

the December plan. By early January 1963, a Defense concession to convert Army National Guard divisions to the

ROAD organization was apparently sufficient to obtain the

necessary state-level support, and the reorganization moved

ahead.

Approximately 1,850 company or detachment size

units were dropped from the force structure, and approximately 1,000 new units added. This represented a 10 percent drop in the 8,807 unit structure of the Army's Reserve

Components. The 700,000 drill strength—400,000 for

Army National Guard and 300,000 for Army Reserve—was

retained, while McNamara was able to drop four divisions

each from the Guard and Reserve and replace them with

separate brigades. Meanwhile, higher recruiting standards

were set for the Reserve Components to bring them up to

active Army levels. The civilian full-time technician force

was expanded, and the manning levels for top-priority Reserve units were increased.36

McNamara did achieve his basic goal of bringing the

Army's Reserve Components into closer alignment with mobilization requirements. The remaining 23 Army National

Guard divisions and the six Army Reserve divisions were

reorganized at higher levels of authorization, and the entire

process was completed by May 1, 1963." The important

point is that the Army Reserve ended the 1963 fiscal year

better able to support the new Kennedy strategy of flexible

response. There was also increased emphasis upon the development of early-deploying Reserve forces in accordance with

contingency plans.38

35. "Reserve Drop Fight on Revision," New York Times, Dec. 6,

1962, p. 25.

36. Cocke, Reserve Components, VIII-20; also, see Army Reservist,

Jan. 1963, pp. 3-4.

37. 'Army Reserve Components Complete Reorganization," DOD

News Release, No. 665-63. May 10, 1963.

38. Cocke, Reserve Components, p. VIII—22.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 161

Along with the reorganization, the Reserve Component

priority system was changed to reflect a dichotomy within

the force structure. Those units which would be needed

promptly for reinforcing the active Army, deploying overseas

or expanding the mobilization base were designated as Priority I and Priority II and were called the Immediate Reserve. The remaining Reserve units, Priority III, were

needed for full mobilization and were identified as the Reinforcing Reserve. The Immediate Reserve met the requirements for rapid response and flexibility. The Reinforcing Reserve met the needs of a broad-based mobilization. In

addition to dividing Reserve Component units into an Immediate and Reinforcing Reserve, the reorganization subdivided the Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool

(RRMRP) of individual Ready Reservists.

The higher priority individual pool of the RRMRP was

preassigned to the units of the Immediate Reserve—both

Army National Guard and Army Reserve. The Army National Guard was given the authority to recruit volunteers

for an Inactive National Guard, while the Priority III units

of the Army Reserve were prohibited from recruiting men

who had a Ready Reserve obligation. The idea was to channel obligated Reservists into the Immediate Reserve while

staffing Reinforcement Reserve units with non-obligated volunteers. The result was to reduce the need for fillers in

high-priority units. This would reduce one of the glaring

problems of the Berlin mobilization when large numbers of

filler personnel created problems for mobilized units.

REORGANIZATION AND REALIGNMENT

At the same time, the Army staff was being reorganized.

The change having the greatest influence upon the Army

Reserve was the creation on January 2, 1963, of the Office

of Reserve Components. For the first time, the responsibility

for policy, direction and the control of the Reserve Components was under a single three-star officer. The Chief, National Guard Bureau and the Chief, Army Reserve were

placed under the general supervision of the Chief, Office of

Reserve Components (CORC). This ended the situation

where the Chief, National Guard Bureau was essentially independent while the Chief, Army Reserve was a relatively

minor official on the Army staff.39

39. Details of the reorganization of the Immediate Reserve and the

Reinforcing Reserve may be found in the Annual Historical Supplement,
162 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Two other problems identified by the 1961 mobilization were also addressed at this time. Starting in July 1962

the records of the Standby and Retired Reserve were removed

from the 14 corps and centralized in St. Louis. On February 20, 1963, the decision was made to centralize non-unit

Ready Reserve records in St. Louis to prevent a repeat of the

confused call-up of Individual Ready Reservists during the

Berlin Crisis.

REP-63

Another problem unearthed during the Berlin call-up was

the lack of a uniform obligation among Ready Reservists,

with Guardsmen and Reservists having different obligations.

The Army sought a single six-year obligation for all Ready

Reservists in the summer of 1962, and this was ultimately

achieved by means of Public Law 88-110. This law created

a new Reserve Enlistment Program, commonly called

REP-63, still in effect today.

Specifically, the REP-63 program established a single

six-year Ready Reserve obligation, ending the eight-year obligation which had existed under a 1955 amendment to the

Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. The National Guard

lost exclusive recruiting rights to non-prior service personnel

ages 17 to I8V2, and prior service personnel could now

complete their Ready Reserve obligation by joining either

the Guard or Reserve. The act required a minimum initial

active duty training period of at least four months while

permitting as much active duty training as was necessary to

become military occupation specialty (MOS) qualified. Reserve Component enlistees were no longer limited to a fixed,

six month initial active duty training. The result was that

many MOSs were now open to non-prior service Army Reservists.40 Despite the gains achieved by the 1962-63 reorganization, the improvements provided only a foundation

for changes to come.

Office of Reserve Components, July 1, 1962—June 30,1963. Similar information is presented in the May and June 1963 issues of The Army Reservist

and on pages 62—63 and 120 and 124 of the Department of Defense Annual

Report, 1963.

40. See the sources cited above as well as "Building the Strength of

the Army Reserve," Army Reservist, Nov. 1963, pp. 3 and 4. This conclusion is specifically drawn on page 28 of The Department of Defense Annual

Report for Fiscal Year 1964.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 163

FORCE STRUCTURE PLANNING

A hint of events to come was clearly given in the Department

of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1964. The report

states that "despite the gains of 1964, further assignment of

manpower and materiel to high priority units, particularly

to those of the Army reserve components, is required to

provide on short notice a properly balanced reserve for the

augmentation of our general purpose forces .... This progress provides the foundation for further advances being

planned."41

As a matter of fact, the new 29-division Reserve Component force structure had already become outmoded, because new Army analysis indicated that a total active-Reserve

24-division force was adequate for the limited war situation

anticipated over the next decade. With the active force set at

16 divisions, this left a Ready Reserve requirement for only

8 divisions—21 less than what was being carried in the

force structure.

A basic problem facing Army force structure planners

at this time was the hard, cold reality that equipping a 29-

division force in the Reserve Components plus fully supporting a 16-division active Army was a fiscal impossibility.

Throughout the two previous administrations, the Army had

been unable to obtain sufficient funds to adequately equip

the active force. There was a modernization backlog for the

entire Army, and the situation was exacerbated by the fact

that the Army had never programmed funds to equip fully

its Reserve Components.

Army planners estimated that at best they could equip

29 division equivalents—24 divisions plus 16 brigades—

without resorting to new procurement. To equip the other

21 divisions—all Reserve Component—would cost an estimated $10 billion at a time when the entire Army budget

was running only $11 to $12 billion a year. Furthermore,

once the low-priority Reserve divisions were equipped, the

equipment would have to be maintained and modernized at

regular intervals.42

Through the expedient of limiting contingency plans to

limited war situations, planners were able to balance the

force that could be equipped and sustained at present fund41. Ibid., p. 24.

42. The logic of this argument is found on pages 3616 through

3626 of the Hearings on the Merger of the Army Reserve Components, March

25, 1965, through Sept. 30, 1965.
164 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

ing levels with the force required. The 45-division requirement for waging general war could be ignored on the assumption that such a general war would require total

mobilization on the level achieved for World War II. In

such an all-out war, peacetime budget restraints would be

abandoned, and the issue of Defense costs would become

moot. This intellectual drill was nothing more nor less than

balancing the benefits and costs of a limited war capability

versus the risks and costs of an extensive conventional capability short of general war.

Although the risk analysis technique is routine today, it

created considerable anxiety in 1964 when individuals refused to believe that there was ever justification for reducing

the size of forces.43 Realizing this, it is easier to understand

why the December 12, 1964, proposal to reduce again the

Army's Reserve Components raised so much furor—a situation which created much heat of controversy without shedding much light upon the problem.

The impetus for the 1964 proposals came when Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes recommended to McNamara

in July that consideration be given to "bringing manpower,

equipment and war plans into consonance," and that a single management system be developed for the Reserve Components. Responding to McNamara's request to expand upon

his recommendation, Ailes appointed a small group under

Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Kenan on October 6, 1964, to find

ways the Reserve Components could achieve better balance,

readiness and management."

MERGER PROPOSED

The Kenan committee studied the deficiencies of the Reserve

Components, the costs of maintaining two separate Reserve

systems, the impact reorganization would have upon the

states, and the related political ramifications. Despite the

43. A consistent argument made by opponents of the teorganization

and merget plans announced on Dec. 12, 1964, was that any reduction

in forces automatically reduced America's defense capability. These individuals failed to see that maintenance of undeployable and ineffective

units was actually a drain upon resources which in turn lowered the

capability of the rest of the force. Maintenance of a large force, which

appears stronger on paper than it actually is in reality, creates a false

sense of security. This is akin to the pre-World War II days when the 27

ORC divisions represented very little real military power.

44. Hearings, ibid., pp. 3601, 3628 and 4158.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 165

political hazards involved, the committee recommended the

merger of all Army Reserve units into the National Guard,

while the Army Reserve would consist solely of individual

Reservists.45

Two weeks later the recommendations were tentatively

approved by Ailes and sent to the Army Staff for comment.

The staff coordination was completed in approximately three

weeks, with Maj. Gen. William J. Sutton, the Chief, Army

Reserve (CAR) first learning of the plan on November 4.

The Section 5 committees had not yet been consulted on

Ailes' proposal, and this fact, combined with the late involvement of the CAR, gave Reservists the impression that

the plan to abolish Army Reserve units was being concocted

in secret.46

The failure to include the CAR and the Section 5 committees in the planning process subsequently angered many

Congressmen who were more upset over the failure to follow

the policies enacted by Congress than by the particulars of

the merger plan. The Section 5 committees had been specifically created by Congress to insure that Reserve Component

interests were fully considered before the Army took any action affecting the Reserves.

On December 11, McNamara approved the merger

plan to transfer all Army Reserve units to the National

Guard while reducing the Army's Reserve Component drill

strength by 150,000. By this time, reports were appearing

in the newspapers of a forthcoming merger, and Defense officials later contended that "leaks" had forced a premature

announcement on December 12, 1964. This was one day

before the planned December 13 meeting of the Section 5

committees—a date when they were supposed to be informed of the merger.47

MCNAMARA AND THE CONGRESS

McNamara's December 12 press conference contained some

tactical errors which in all probability contributed to Congress' ultimate rejection of the merger. When asked if the

merger could be handled without Congressional approval,

45. Cocke, Reserve Components, p. VIII—25.

46. Hearings, pp. 3678 and 4058.

47. Hearings, pp. 3632 and 4234. For an example of articles in the

press, see "Plan to shift Reservists Faces a Fight at Capitol," New York

Times, Dec. 11, 1964.
166 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Table 8-1 Comparison of Present and Proposed Reserve Component Structure.

Present Structure Realigned Structure

Army US Army

National Army Manning National Manning

Unit Category Guard Reserve Total Level(%) Guard Level(%)

UNITS FOR WHICH THERE IS

A MILITARY REQUIREMENT:

Air Defense 7,400 — 7,400 85 7,400 85

Units to Round Out Active

Army & Reserve (units

will be added) 76,500 78,600 155,100 80 160,020 80

Bdes (now 11 to be increased to 16 bdes) 25,000 16,300 41,300 75-80 69,614 80

Mobilization Base 2,600 66,600 69,200 75-100 69,200 75-100

6 Div Forces 118,000 64,100 182,100 75-80 189,860 80

2 Special Purpose Div.

Forces 25,600 2,600 28,200 70 33,520 80

Support to Other Svc 1,900 9,300 11,200 70 11,200 70

State HQ 4,000 — 4,000 100 8,500 100

Total 261,000 237,500 498,500 549,314

UNITS FOR WHICH THERE IS

NO MILITARY REQUIREMENT:

Other Div. (21 div—15

Guard & 6 Reserve) 122,800 45,600 168,400 55-60 —

Non Divisional Units 15,450 16,300 31,750 55 —

Comd Hq's, Divisional 750 600 1,350 —

Total 139,000 62,500 201,500 —

TOTAL 400,000 300,000 700,000 549,314

* Equipment procurement now authorized for on site Air Defense; Round Out units; support to

other SVCS; Part of Mobilization Base; 6 Div Forces; and 11 Bdes. Equipment will be authorized for

these forces plus 2 Special Purpose Divs and 5 Bdes.

t Unit composition will change in a number of instances.

Source: The Army Reserve Magazine, January 1965, p. 12.

McNamara replied "Yes, it can be." He also announced that

he was ending the practice of offering Reserve commissions

to Congressmen, and he hurt his case when he said that he

intended to transfer to the Standby Reserve the 100 or so

Congressmen who were Reservists. This was in addition to

an earlier McNamara decision to abolish the special Congressional training detachments where Congressmen were
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 167

able to earn enough retirement points to give them a "good"

year toward retirement.48

The merger proposal was also prejudiced by being presented as & fait accompli. A December 12 memorandum from

the Secretary of the Army to Army Reserve commanders

told the Reservists that their positions were being abolished

because the Army needed a "quick reaction force." Ailes explained that he couldn't abolish the National Guard because

it was needed on the state level for natural disaster and civil

disturbance missions. Since he was determined to have only

one Armed Reserve Component, he was left with no choice

but to abolish the Army Reserve units.

The arguments about economy, simplified command,

and faster reaction time did little to assuage Reservists who

would have to join the National Guard if they wanted to

continue in a troop unit. The problem was particularly acute

for senior Army Reserve officers who had understandable

doubts about their ability to obtain corresponding positions

within the National Guard structure.

ROA AND OTHER OBJECTIONS

The reaction by senior Reservists and their professional association, the Reserve Officers Association, was swift and predictable. They had suspected that the merger plan was

forthcoming,49 and McNamara had no sooner made the merger public than the ROA fired off a telegram to President

Johnson asking him to hold off any action on the merger

until public hearings could be held. Johnson refused the

ROA requests, citing the need to take Defense economies

wherever possible.

As the organization most actively opposed to the merger, the ROA encouraged its membership and friends to express opposition to the plan. While the ROA drew up a 30-

point rebuttal to the merits of the merger, the basic strategy

48. In order to count a year toward the 20-year requirement for a

Reserve Component retirement at age 60, a Reservist must earn 50 retirement points a year. Retirement points are earned at the rate of one

point for every day of active duty and one point for every drill (of at least

2 hours length) attended. Reservists may also earn points by taking correspondence courses and by performing certain specific equivalent duties.

By far the easiest way to earn points is by attendance at drills or meetings with a unit, and the abolition of the Congressional detachments

made it much harder for Congressmen with their busy schedules to earn

points. The "good" year term applies to any year in which 50 points are

earned.

49. See the New York Times, Nov. 25, 1964, Section C, p. 10.
168 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

was to agitate for Congressional hearings. This was a sound

strategy, because McNamara had strained relations with several key Congressional committees. Furthermore, his attitude and the unfortunate handling of the merger announcement gave the impression that McNamara was being

contemptuous of Congress.50

While the political storm clouds gathered, the Army

moved ahead on the merger proposal. A steering committee

was formed in the Office of Reserve Components, and representatives of the National Guard and Army Reserve were

asked to compile troop lists for the merger. At the Department of Defense level, the Reserve Forces Policy Board voted

6 to 6 on the merger; and at the Army level, the General

Staff Committee on the National Guard and Reserve Affairs

approved of the merger,51over the unanimous dissent of its

Army Reserve members. The USAR members prepared several alternative plans, which were rejected out-of-hand by

the Army staff because they all called for the retention of

both Army Reserve and Army National Guard units.52 The

assumption apparently made by the Army staff was that the

Army Reserve and the Army National Guard would have to

contain identical units to be independent of each other and

totally self-sufficient. The concept of mutually supporting

and mutually dependent components making up a Total

Army as we have it today was totally incomprehensible to

the Army in early 1965.

Meanwhile, ROA had been effective in mounting a

grass roots movement against the merger. ROA chapters and

individual members had been vigorous in contacting their

Congressmen to demand public hearings on the merger.

Their efforts were also having an impact upon editorial

opinion. Although initial reporting had been generally favorable to the merger, the attitude changed in January and

February.

Probably one of the more damaging articles to appear

was Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall's piece in the January 23,

1965, New Republic entitled, "McNamara's Latest Reform:

Why His National Guard Merger Scheme Won't Work."

Marshall referred to the unsuccessful 1948 attempt by the

Gray Board to merge the Reserve Components, a move

50. William F. Levantrosser, "Army Reserve Merger Proposal,"

Military Affairs, Fall, 1966, pp. 137-39-

51. Ibid., p. 139.

52. Details of the alternative plans are found in pages 3714 to

3784 of the Hearings cited above.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 169

which floundered when the Guard opposed tighter federal

control over its operations. Marshall exhumed every traditional criticism of the National Guard, from incompetent

training and political generals to the interference of governors in national defense matters. He argued that only a

federal reserve could attract the specialists and uniquely

skilled individuals needed on a standby basis. Whether Marshall was right or wrong, his opinions received national circulation and were later quoted in hearings against the merger.51

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

A significant factor in the debate over the merger was the

attitude of Congress. In general, veteran lawmakers sensed a

challenge to Congressional prerogatives in Defense matters.

The new chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,

Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C), felt a need to assert Congressional authority over Defense policy; and Sen. John Stennis (D—Miss.) led opposition to the merger. Another outspoken critic was Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C), who was

a retired Army Reserve major general and a former president

of the Reserve Officers Association.54

Hearings were called by subcommittees of both the

House and Senate Armed Services Committees, with the

hearings before an Hebert House subcommittee being particularly hostile toward McNamara and Army Secretary

Ailes. What was developing was a confrontation between the

Executive and Legislative Branches over authority to merge

the Reserves.

McNamara refused to concede a need for Congressional

approval, except that he would require an increased appropriation for a larger National Guard. Hebert directly challenged this contention. Another key point in the hearings

was whether the Defense Department had made proper use

of the statutory groups created to advise on Reserve Component matters. Considerable time and effort were expended to

53. Hearings, p. 3642.

54. Thurmond was not the only Reserve general in Congress. Sen.

Barry Goldwater, R—Ariz., was an Air Force Reserve major general; and

Sen. Howard W. Cannon, D—Nev., was an Air Force one-star. In all, 83

members of Congress were members of the Ready Reserve; and the ROA

counted 170 members on the Hill. See page 84 of the Dec. 13, 1964,

New York Times for a complete listing of Congressional Ready Reservists

by grade and service.
170 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

establish the fact that these committees had not been consulted until after McNamara had decided to move ahead

with a merger.

Defense officials were hard pressed to deny that they

had circumvented the intent of Congress. One particularly

notable verbal blunder was made by Ailes when pressed by

Hebert on authority of the Section 5 committees. Ailes conceded that legislative language gave the committees the authority to oversee Reserve-related matters. In Ailes words,

"That is what the language literally says, but I never assumed it means that."55

The Army was also embarrassed to admit that on October 22, 1964, Army General Counsel Alfred B. Fitt had

rendered the legal opinion that the Secretary of the Army

was utterly lacking in authority to compel the merger. Fitt

opined that Army policy would be thrown upon the mercies

of the governors.56

Hearings on the merger, which continued through

March and April, temporarily ended with a joint press conference May 15, 1965, between Hebert and McNamara. The

conference announced a face-saving compromise in which

McNamara indicated that he would seek legislation to clarify some of the aspects of the merger, and Hebert expressed

satisfaction that the Congress had reached full partnership

with the administration in discussing the merits of the merger.57

The merits of the merger from the Department of Defense point of view can be summarized as follows:

1. The merger would create a single chain of command

through the National Guard Bureau, as opposed to separate Army Reserve and National Guard chains.

2. Approximately 200,000 paid drill spaces in unnecessary

units would be eliminated with a concurrent cost savings.

3. The manning level of the remaining units would be increased, with these units going from 498,500 troops

prior to the merger to 549,314 troops afterwards.

4. Because of reduced drill strength, future retirement costs

would be reduced. McNamara made this point at his

December 12, 1964, press conference.

55. Hearings, p. 3697.

56. Hearings, pp. 4320-36.

57. Levantrosser, 'Army Reserve Merger Proposal," p. 142.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 17 1

5. Equipment levels in the retained units would be increased as equipment was transferred from abolished

units.

6. Concurrently, personnel assets in the full-time support

force of the Reserve Components would be redistributed

among fewer units, thereby increasing Reserve readThe case against the merger was made by ROAs Carlton in testimony on April 8, 1965, before the Hebert subcommittee. Describing the plan as "not militarily sound,"

Carltons lengthy arguments can be summarized thusly:

1. The claim of increased manning levels is false. Most

units would not receive increased manning levels, while

the strength of state headquarters would be doubled.

2. The command structure would not be simplified. Instead

of having the units of the Army Reserve under a single

commander, the merger would place these assets under

50 different commanders—state governors.

3. Readiness would be decreased while the Reserve Components go through the transition from one chain of command to another and while new senior personnel are assigned under National Guard leadership. Carlton

contended that this readiness loss would take several

years to reverse.

4. A 29 division-equivalent force would be inadequate to

meet the threat. According to the ROA, the fact is that

our mobilization base should be structured to counter

enemy capabilities, and not what some economy-minded

comptrollers may conceive the enemy's intentions to be.59

5. It is imprudent to reduce the strength of our Reserve

Components at a time of increased troop commitments

in Vietnam.60

58. The entire DoD position is found in the January 1965 issue of

The Army Reservist which reprints Ailes' letter to commanders of Dec. 12,

1964, the DoD press release on the merger, the press questions and

answers from that date and a detailed chart showing how the force structure would change. The plan for the execution of the merger is found on

pages 7 and 8 of the March 1965 issue of The Army Reservist.

59. This particular argument is found on page 11, March 1965

issue of The Officer.

60. For Carlton's entire testimony, see Hearings, ibid., pp.

4189-4219. The ROA's case for the Army Reserve is explained in detail

in the May 1965 issue of The Officer and runs nearly 30 pages.
172 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

The issue of Vietnam was a serious one. By mid-April

1965, the United States had 33,500 troops in Vietnam,

with the combat role of 5,000 Marines there openly acknowledged. In late April, McNamara obtained a strength

increase to 75,000 Americans; and the United States forces

in Vietnam reached 50,000 by the end of May.61

Gen. William C. Westmoreland has since written that

he had come to the conclusion that some sort of a national

mobilization would be required.62In any case, the decision

to commit a larger segment of the active forces to Vietnam

made clear the need to maintain a continental reserve. Even

though the President subsequently chose to bolster manpower levels through the draft rather than by calling up

Reserve units, the very fact that a call-up of Reserve forces

had been under consideration was instrumental in convincing many Congressmen that the merger and reduction in

Reserve Component strength was unwise.

Amidst signs of increasing Congressional opposition to

the merger, the Hebert subcommittee resumed House hearings in early August. Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus

R. Vance, the principal pro-merger witness, restated the

same arguments previously made before the committee. He

insisted that the merger would strengthen the national defense, but most of the subcommittee remained highly critical of the plan. The subcommittee shelved the merger by a

vote of 8 to 1 on August 12 with Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi

(D-Mich.), being the sole McNamara supporter.

In announcing the subcommittee decision, Hebert said

that the full committee would oppose any effort to destroy

the Army Reserve by merging it with the National Guard.

Committee Chairman Russell supported Hebert's position;

and the ranking minority member of the House Armed

Services Committee, Rep. William H. Bates (R-Mass.), seconded the chairman. However, the committee held open the

door for compromise by saying that it would not rule out a

reorganization of the Reserves as long as an Army Reserve

structure was retained.63

61. Donald C. Odegard, Non-Mobilization and Mobilization in the

Vietnam War, (Carlisle Barracks, Perm.: Army War College, 1980), pp.

11-13.

62. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY:

Doubleday and Co., 1976), pp. 140-141. The subject of Reserve Component mobilization for Vietnam will be covered in detail in the next

chapter.

63. Cocke, Reserve Components, pp. VIII-39 & VIII-40.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 173

The House Appropriations Committee and its Senate

counterpart had already recommended separate funding for

the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The Senate

committee had even inserted restrictive language into the

1966 Department of Defense Appropriations bill to prohibit

the merger. The language was modified in conference committee, with the subsequent September 29 appropriations

act stating that a realignment of reorganization of the Army

Reserve Components could take place only with the approval

of the Congress.64 This act also had a proviso that the Army

Reserve be programmed for a paid drill strength of 270,000

and that the Army National Guard attain an end strength of

380,000. This was 50,000 less than previous legislation.

MCNAMARA ACTS

On November 13, McNamara ignored the Congressional rebuff of the merger and announced that he would inactivate

751 Army Reserve units containing 55,000 Reservists. He

contended that there was no further use for these units. The

directive to the Chief, Army Reserve to abolish the units

was accompanied by an authority to establish Reinforcement

Training Units (RTU) to replace deactivated units.65 The

RTUs allowed Reservists to earn retirement points in a nonpaid status through weekly meetings or work on special projects. Within a year, the number of RTUs rose from 364 to

526, and their membership increased from 6,675 to

11,346. Altogether six divisions, 19 battalions and 126

smaller units were chosen for a December 31, 1965, phaseout.

At the same time, McNamara announced the formation

of a Selected Reserve Force (SRF). Consisting of 976 Army

Reserve and Army National Guard units, the SRF would be

a 150,000-man force to quickly back up active forces in case

of disturbances outside of Vietnam. The SRF consisted of

three divisions and six independent brigades from the National Guard and 232 combat support and combat service

support units of 31,519 men from the Army Reserve.

The SRF units were authorized 100 percent of their

combat strength instead of their former 70 to 80 percent

manning levels, and the number of unit training assemblies

was increased by 50 percent, to 72 a year. All of these as64. Sec. 639, 79 U.S.C. 879. (Public Law 89-213).

65. Army Reserve Magazine, Dec. 1965, p. 27; Levantrosser, 'Army

Reserve Merger Proposal," p. 143.
174 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

semblies had to be four hours long, as compared with the

two-hour minimum then allowed other Reserve Component

units.

In addition, battalion-sized units and larger commands

were authorized up to 96 drills a year to update plans and

SOPs as well as to conduct exercises. The SRF units received

top priority on active duty training quotas for new enlistees,

and they were alerted for a special, more rigorous period of

active duty during 1966.66 Although the formation of the

SRF was said to be only precautionary, there were ample

reasons to be concerned about Reserve Component Readiness

at this time.

The proposed merger had thrown the Army Reserve

into turmoil. The Army Reserve had just begun to recover

from the Berlin Mobilization, which had resulted in a severe

post-mobilization personnel loss. When its future was placed

in doubt, all Army Reserve construction was terminated and

the recruitment of non-prior service personnel virtually

stopped in early 1965. The number one concern of the

Army Reserve leadership was for its own future.67

The uncertain Army Reserve situation was made worse

by developments within the active force. The build-up of

active forces for Vietnam taxed the training base to the extreme, making it virtually impossible for even SRF units to

obtain training. Despite increased priority for equipment,

SRF units did not see substantial gains in their equipment

posture, and some SRF units even lost equipment to active

forces.68 A drawdown of Army Reserve equipment for Vietnam had begun.

CONGRESS AND THE MERGER

Meanwhile, the main battle between McNamara and the

Congress over the future of the Army's Reserve Components

continued. Several reasons, which also seem to have currency

today, help explain why such a clash of wills occurred between the Executive and Legislative branches.

According to one study, the merger was an attractive

arena for Congress to exert its prerogatives in Defense policy-making, because force levels and organization charts are

easily understood in layman's terms. Many Congressmen had

66. Army Reserve Magazine, Dec. 1965, pp. 4—6.

67. Odegard, Non-Mobilization and Mobilization, pp. 9 and 10.

68. Based on author's own observations while assigned to the 198th

Artillery, Delaware Army National Guard.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 175

first-hand knowledge of the military through active or Reserve service, and quite a few were members of military professional organizations. There was no widespread organized

opposition among the general public to Reserve forces, and

the citizen-soldier tradition allowed legislators to discard any

worry about offending constituents. On the contrary, because the Reservists were only part-time soldiers, their unrestricted political activity was a very positive political benefit

to their Congressional supporters.69

When McNamara submitted his 1967 budget to Congress in January 1966, he kept the merger issue alive by

again proposing no expenditures for Army Reserve units.

Once more, Congress opposed McNamaras plans, and the

Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee unanimously recommended against the merger. The subcommittee was piqued by the December 31, 1965, deactivation of

751 Army Reserve units, including all six of the Army Reserve's remaining combat divisions.

The full Armed Services Committee declared that any

future Army Reserve or Army National Guard deactivations

of the 1965 magnitude should be taken only after consultation with the Congress.70

In response, Defense officials countered that there was no military requirement for the 751

units and that it made no sense to spend money on them.

Officials said that 25,400 of the 55,000 men affected did

transfer to other units and that nearly all of the remaining

men were assigned to the Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool (RRMRP). A Defense statement also said

that the Reserve Components were in excellent condition

and that the merger proposal of the previous year was still

valid.71

The protests of Defense officials notwithstanding, Congress once more blocked the merger. The 1967 Defense Appropriations Act required a minimum Army Reserve paid

drill strength of 260,000, and the House went so far as to

pass a bill requiring a permanent Army Reserve unit

strength of at least 260,000.72

It was rapidly becoming evident that the merger would

never gain Congressional approval, and the latest House ac69. Levantrosser, 'Army Reserve Merger Proposal" p. 143.

70. "Senate Preparedness Committee Blasts Merger," The Officer,

June 1966, pp. 5 and 6.

71. DOD News Release, No. 417-66, May 14, 1966.

72. The bill passed the House by a 332 to 6 vote on Sept. 21,

1966.
176 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

tion implied that Congress would legislate strict strength

and organization guidelines unless McNamara dropped his

proposal to abolish all Army Reserve units. Without formally conceding the fight, McNamara announced that alternative approaches were being taken to alleviate the Army's

Reserve Component problems.

The moderation of McNamara's stance came in his January 23, 1967, statement on the 1968 budget before a joint

session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the

Senate Preparedness Subcommittee. It was the only rational

option open to him, because declining Army Reserve readiness demanded an end to the struggle between McNamara

and Congress.

While the merger debate had raged, the condition of

the Army Reserve deteriorated. Because the future was uncertain, the Army had not converted the Army Reserve units

to the more modern Tables of Organization and Equipment

(TOE) then in the active Army. The Army also deferred

reorganizing Reserve combat service support units to the

new COSTAR (Combat Support to the Army) concept,

where the old technical service units were functionalized

into combat service support units. Active Army and Army

Reserve units were no longer compatible. They were not organized and equipped in such a manner as to allow rapid

integration into the active Army upon mobilization, and

this defeated the "One Army" concept and reduced readMCNAMARA ACQUIESCES

McNamara accommodated Congressional desires by proposing a 1968 end strength of 400,000 drilling Army National

Guardsmen and 260,000 Army Reservists. He contended

that there were still unnecessary units in the force structure

but that it would be possible to bring the Reserve Components into line with Defense needs.74

The decision by Defense leaders to work within Congressional guidelines rather than trying to push a merger

past Congress lessened the conflict over policy prerogatives.

73. These points were made in a February address to the ROA Midwinter Conference, 1967, by Lt. Gen. C. W. G. Rich, Chief, Office of

Reserve Components. The address is reprinted on pages 4-6 of the April

1967 issue of The Army Reserve Magazine.

74. McNamara's address is reprinted in the March 1967 issue of The

Army Reserve Magazine.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 177

Army planners were finally able to draft a proposal to bring

the Reserve Components in line with mobilization requirements.

On May 24, 1967, Lt. Gen. C. W. G. Rich, Chief of

the Office of Reserve Components, signed a plan to realign the

Reserve force structure. The plan had been approved by the

Chief of Staff on April 21 and endorsed in an 11-10 vote by

the Section 5 committees on May 4. Despite the non-concurrence of the Chief, Army Reserve, the plan was approved by

Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor on May 31.

NEW RESERVE COMPONENTS PLAN

Basically, the plan called for a Reserve Component of

698,100 men in eight divisions and 16 independent brigades complete with the appropriate support increments. In

addition, the Reserve Components would include 6

l

A

support increments (Combat Support and Combat Service

Support) to round out active Army organizations. The command structure of the Army Reserve would be modified.

Although Army Reserve units would still be commanded

through the Continental Army Command (CONARC), the

14 corps would be eliminated. The Reserve units would be

commanded by new two-star Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) that would answer to CONARC through the numbered Continental US Armies (CONUSAs). The goal was to

convert Reserve units to the new "G" series TOEs and the

COSTAR organization starting Sept. 30, 1967, and to have

the entire process, including the creation of the ARCOMs,

finished in time for Annual Training in the summer of

1968.74

On June 2, 1967, McNamara announced the approval

of the above plan with the only major difference being a

reduced paid drill strength of 640,000—400,000 in the

Army National Guard and 240,000 in the Army Reserve.

According to McNamara, 92 percent of the units in the new

structure would come from the old structure with little or

no change in unit organization.

The Army National Guard would be composed of

mostly combat units while the Army Reserve would have

only combat support and combat service support units. The

Army Reserve would retain its 13 training divisions.

This latest plan met little opposition in Congress, except that the Committee on Armed Services insisted that

some combat units be retained in the Army Reserve. The

result was a compromise by Army officials and the develop-
178 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Table 8-2 Force Structure and Organization—Three Brigade Plan.

Structure, End FY1967 Future Structure 2

ARNG USAR

Units IR/RR' IR Total ARNG USAR Total

Combat Divisions 8/15 0 23 8 0 8

Training Division 0 13 13 0 13 13

Command Hq Divisional 0/5 0 5 0 0 0

Combat Brigades 7/0 4 11 18 3 21

Maneuver Area Cmds 0 2 2 0 2 2

Air Defense Bns 44/0 0 44 31 0 31

Field Army Supt Comd 0 0 0 0 1 1

Support Brigades 0 3 3 1 4 5

Adjutant General Units 36/0 96 132 40 120 160

Civil Affairs Units 0 77 77 0 51 51

COSTAR Units 0 38 38 122 134 256

Finance Units 1/0 18 19 1 26 27

JAG Units 0 196 196 0 226 226

Hospital Units 15/0 107 122 15 106 121

Military Police Bns 6/0 4 10 7 4 11

Public Info Units 34/0 25 59 34 24 58

PSYOPS Units 0 8 8 0 6 6

Garrison Units 0 18 18 0 9 9

Terminal Units 0 19 19 0 19 19

Total Companies and

Detachments 2,520/1,480 3,575 7,575 2,900 3,450 6,350

Paid Drill Strength (000) 307.9/110.6 260.0 678.5 400 260 660

1 IR—Immediate Reserve: Manned at 80% or higher of full wartime strength; necessary equipment

being procured. RR—Reinforcing Reserve: Manned at 50% of full wartime strength; no equipment

being procured.

2 Manned at 90% or higher of full wartime strength; to be fully supported with equipment, technicians, spare parts.

ment of the "three brigade" plan whose unit structure is

shown in Table 8—2.

The three brigade plan was outlined by Resor in a July

12, 1967, letter to Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Three

separate brigades would be dropped from the National

Guard and given to the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve

would also have 10 infantry battalions, 15 separate artillery

battalions and 16 combat engineer battalions, while increasing in strength from 240,000 to 260,000.

To balance this, units originally planned for the Army

Reserve were placed in the National Guard. These included

13 hospitals, 52 composite service companies, 6 construction engineer battalions and 8 ordnance companies. The Na-
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 179

tional Guard paid drill strength would stay at 400,000.

There was a net decrease in the number of Reserve Component units, but this loss was offset by increasing the manning levels to an average of 92 percent of full wartime

strength—up from the former average of 75 percent.75

The acceptance of the three brigade plan allowed the

Army to finally reorganize the Army Reserve. The concept

for the new ARCOM organization was made public in July

1967, with the target date for the change-over from the

corps structure being December 1968.

The locations of the 18 new ARCOMs were announced

on December 21, 1967. Their mission was to insure attainment and maintenance of mobilization readiness of attached

and assigned units. By commanding units within their geographical area of responsibility, the ARCOMs were to supervise and coordinate training, supervise materiel readiness,

coordinate public and troop information programs and supervise the preparation of unit mobilization plans.76

This is

essentially the mission performed by the ARCOMs today.

The reorganization was completed by May, 1968. The

elimination of the Corps, which had been staffed by active

Army personnel, was a basic revision in the command concept for the Army Reserve. For the first time, all Army

Reserve units were under the command of an Army Reserve

general officer, and this implied substantially greater responsibility for Reserve commanders.77

RESERVE FORCES BILL OF RIGHTS AND VITALIZATION ACT

Army Reservists also gained a formal voice at the Department of the Army level as a result of the reorganization

controversy. Although there had been a full-time officer on

the Army Staff responsible for Army Reserve matters since

1927, this position, known today as the Chief, Army Reserve, was not statutory until the passage of Public law

90-168.

This law resulted ultimately from the 1965 hearings on

McNamara's reorganization proposals. At that time, the

75. See CORC, 24 May 1967, "Proposed Plan for Reorganizing the

Army's Reserve Components," signed by Lt. Gen. Rich. Copies are in

the possession of US Army Center of Military History and the Public

Affairs Office, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve.

76. Testimony, Army Secretary Stanley R. Resor, Senate Committee

i on Appropriations, July 12, 1967.

i 77. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, 1968,

p. 9.
180 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

House Committee on Armed Services expressed serious reservations about Reserve readiness. On October 23, 1965, the

Committee announced its intention to prepare comprehensive legislation early in the next Congressional session to

clarify and resolve the future status of the Reserve Components.

This legislation, H.R. 16435, the "Reserve Forces Bill

of Rights and Vitalization Act," was introduced in July

1966. In addition to setting minimum drill strengths for

the Reserves, the bill provided for statutory Chiefs of the

Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve. The bill passed the

House 322 to 6 on September 21, 1966, but the Senate was

unable to act on the legislation because it was too late in

the session. Meanwhile, one of the objectives of H.R.

16435 was temporarily achieved in the 1967 Department of

Defense Appropriation Act, which established a minimum

drill strength for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

Subsequently, Hebert introduced substantially the same

legislation into the 90th Congress on January 10, 1967,

with H.R. 2. The bill moved quickly through the House,

receiving passage February 20, 1967, by a vote of 324 to

13. The Senate began hearings in June and passed an

amended version on November 8, 1967. After a conference

committee reconciled differences, the two chambers agreed

to the conference committee report on November 16, and

the measure became Public Law 90-168 on December 1,

1967.

Also entitled the "Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and

Vitalization Act," H.R. 2 and the debates surrounding it

reflected the very essence of the struggle between the legislative and executive branches over defense policy prerogatives.

The House, according to Hebert, had a fundamental responsibility for raising armies and supporting a Navy, and this

responsibility extended to the Reserve Components.

While the Defense Department agreed that the Congress had prerogatives in the defense arena, the executive

branch contended that Congressional prerogatives were

limited to broad oversight responsibilities. These responsibilities, in the eyes of DoD officials, did not include setting exact requirements for the force structure or dictating

the internal organization within an agency of the Army.78

78. Report No. 13, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 1st

Session, Feb. 13, 1967, p. 2. Levantrosser suggests that the extreme

interest in the Reserve Components was a departure from the norm and
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 181

The House version of the legislation was far more detailed than the final Senate version and reflected a distrust of

the Defense Department. The House bill established a minimum drill strength for each of the seven Reserve Components and established the Chief, Army Reserve as the commander of the Army Reserve. The legislation even went so

far as to describe how the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve

was to be organized. Similar guidance was given for the Air

Force.

The House also wanted to create an Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Reserve Affairs, while the Senate preferred to

have a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to serve within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The House acceded to the Senate's desires on this point.

Both bodies were concerned about the role of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. The purview of the board was

expanded by allowing any member of the board to bring

matters forward for consideration. Previously the board

could consider only matters referred to it. The individual

service secretaries were given the authority to appoint board

members, a right which formerly belonged to the Secretary

of Defense. Some modifications were also made in the Army

Reserve Forces Policy Committee—the Section 5 Committee—and its Air Force counterpart.

The final legislation also contained benefits for National Guard technicians and an authority for the Air Force

Reserve and the Air National Guard to exceed temporarily

former limitations on field grade officers.

The final version of the bill resolved House-Senate differences over drill strength policy by providing that authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve Component would be set by Congress each year as part

of the appropriations process. This satisfied the desire of

House members to include some minimum strength provision or other language which would prevent the Secretary of

Defense from making drastic cuts in the Reserve Components without Congressional consent. The role of the Chief,

Army Reserve was subject to somewhat more debate.

Testifying before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor said on September 27, 1967, that the Army had no objection to creating a statutory Chief of an Office of Reserves since it

was more of a reaction to McNamara's perceived arrogance than a desire

to dictate detailed policy. See Levantrosser, ibid., p. 144.
182 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

paralleled the present law which had established the National Guard Bureau. Resor did object, however, to provisions which set forth that offices organization in great detail. He felt that such matters were properly the

responsibility of his office or the Army Chief of Staff.

Resor also objected to language which made the Reserve office an operating agency responsible for preserving

the integrity of the Reserve Component. He believed that

this would establish two chains of command. The Defense

Department objected to the provision which made it mandatory for the Chief, Army Reserve to be a Reserve officer.

Defense officials believed that such a requirement would restrict them from appointing the best possible officer to the

position.79

In the end, the Senate Committee on Armed Services

agreed with Resor that the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR)

should be an advisor to the Chief of Staff on Army Reserve

matters. But, the CAR was to come from the officers of the

Army Reserve and had to have at least 10 years commissioned service in the Army Reserve. The CAR was to be

appointed by the President to a four-year term, with the

advice and consent of the Senate. The Chief was to be a

major general and was eligible to succeed himself.

Maj. Gen. William J. Sutton, who was already serving

as the Chief, Army Reserve under the Chief, Office of Reserve Components, became the first statutory Chief, Army

Reserve. Subsequently, the CAR became the appropriations

director for the Reserve Personnel Army (RPA) and Military

Construction Army Reserve (MCAR) appropriations80 with

responsibility for testifying annually before Congress. This

in effect gave the Army Reserve a national spokesman.

Although the Congress has retained a high degree of

interest in the Reserve Components, the passage of Public

Law 90-168 put an end to the acrimonious debate over Reserve Component policy. The Army was able to turn its attention to the 1968 reorganization. Assured that their component would continue to exist, Army Reservists were able

79- Resor's testimony is found on pp. 124—137 of "Reserve Components of the Armed Forces and National Guard Technicians," Hearings,

Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, June 26 to Oct. 3,

1967.

80. At this time Army Reserve Operations and Maintenance funds

were a sub-account of the Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA)

appropriation. The Operations and Maintenance Army Reserve (OMAR)

appropriation was not created until 1973.
REORGANIZATIONS LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE TOTAL ARMY POLICY 183

to concentrate on repairing the damage inflicted by years of

uncertainty; and the Army Reserve began to make real progress toward readiness goals.

While the 1968 reorganization was taking place, fortytwo Army Reserve units were mobilized in April. Most were

sent to Vietnam, but a few reinforced the strategic reserve

forces on active duty in the United States.

A second Selected Reserve Force (SRF) was organized

on May 1, 1968, allowing the first SRF to be relieved of its

expanded mobilization responsibilities. Experience with the

first SRF showed that Reserve units could achieve full TOE

strength with notable increases in readiness. On the negative

side, officials learned that drills at the rate of 72 per year

over a sustained period would cause drop-outs by non-obligated Reservists.81

The SRF continued until August 1, 1969, when it was

relieved of its mission. Personnel pressures had forced the

number of drills to be reduced to 58, 10 more than required

for other Reserve units; and equipment shortages remained

until the end. It was easy to assign higher priorities to Reserve Component units, but it was not always so easy to

sustain them or to provide adequate training facilities. The

active Army came first.82

CONCLUSION

In summary, the Army Reserve changed significantly from

I960 to 1969- The Army Reserve began the decade with

4,338 company-sized units with a drill strength of approximately 300,000. By 1970, the Army Reserve had 3,478

company-sized units with a membership of 260,000. The

number of Individual Ready Reservists increased from

748,000 in I960 to 931,000 in 1970.

The manning levels of Army Reserve units increased

from the 55-70 percent level in I960 to 93-100 percent as

the decade ended. Despite the equipment drains of Vietnam,

the Army Reserve did make modest equipment gains. Unit

TOEs were modernized, and Reserve units were able to replace their World War II rifles and trucks.83

81. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, 1968,

p. 13.

82. Cocke, Reserve Components, p. VIII—55.

83. When the author enlisted in the early 1960s, his Reserve Component unit was firing Ml rifles, two generations behind the active

force. These weapons were collected and Ml4s were issued in 1965. The

older Mis were eventually issued to irregular forces in Vietnam.
184 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

More important, the Army Reserve force structure was

modified to meet contingency plans. Low-priority units were

abolished, and the three components were no longer a mirror image of each other. They had started to take on todays

structure of mutually dependent and mutually supporting

parts of the Total Army.

Army Reservists gained greater control of their component. Reserve generals took command of all Army Reserve

units under the supervision of the Continental US Armies

(CONUSAs); and the Army Reserve gained a national focus

and spokesman in the person of the Chief, Army Reserve.

These events did not occur without considerable debate and

anguish along the way, but these birth pains were necessary

to set the stage and make possible the Total Army concept

of the 1970s and 1980s.
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 185

*M*f

The third and final tier of a 3000 barrel water tank is put into place by

the 461st Pipeline Co. of Cody, Wyo. This USAR unit built the water

tank during two weeks of training in June 1961. (Signal Corps photo,

#591581)

LAnM.

Most of the Army's smoke

generator units are in the

USAR. Reservists from the

375th Chemical Co., 472nd

Chemical Bn (USAR), create

a smoke screen during summer training at Camp McCoy, Wise, in 1961. (Signal Corps photo, # 585646)
186 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

The Army Reserve contains

all of the Army's railroad assets. This USAR maintenance team is working on

the boiler of a steam locomotive at Fort Eustis, Va.,

in 1962. (Signal Corps

photo, #596511)

Mm

w SP*"

Army Reservists also learn to destroy things. Shown here is a member of

an Army Reserve Special Forces Group as he instructs a class in demolition at Fort McClellan, Ala., in 1966. (Signal Corps photo)
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 187

When Hurricane Agnes swept through Pennsylvania in the

summer of 1972, over 1000 Army Reservists were called

to duty to help with rescue and clean-up operations.

Shown here are members of the 469th Engr. Bn, of Caven

Point, NJ, who are constructing a Bailey bridge in

Schickshinny, Penn. (US Army photo)

Women have helped defend this country since before the American Revolution. It was not until after World War II, however, that women were

allowed to join the Army Reserve. In 1982, women comprised approximately 14 per cent of the Ready Reserve of the USAR. Shown here is

the change of command ceremony (September 1973) by which Capt.

Ruth Glaspey, WAC, became the first woman to take command of an

Army Reserve Transportation Unit. (US Army photo)
188 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Thirty-five USAR units were sent to Vietnam in 1968, including the

513th Maintenance Bn, from Boston, Mass. Members of the Direct Support Platoon of the 513th are shown here as they work on a 5-ton truck.

(US Army photo)

US soldiers on patrol near Hue, South Vietnam, 1971. Over 100,000

individual members of the USAR served on active duty each year from

1967 through 1971, and many of these men and women did serve in

Southeast Asia. (US Army photo)
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 189

Long Binh, Republic of Vietnam, was an incredible complex built up by

the United States to support its effort in Southeast Asia. Several of" the

USAR units that went to Vietnam in 1968 operated out of Long Binh.

(US Army photo)

Army Reservists of the 737th Transportation Co. present arms during

welcome home ceremony on August 13, 1969, in their home town of

Yakima, Wash. This USAR unit was one of 35 that was sent to Vietnam

in 1968. It served with the 1st Log. Command near Chu Lai and was

awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its service. (US Army

photo)
190 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

A public affairs specialist with the 1209th US

Army Garrison, Mattydale, NY, conducts a field

interview during her unit's annual training at Fort

Drum, NY, May 1982. (US Army photo)

.> * ' Va

The ROTC cadet shown here is typical of the

young men and women who have taken advantage

of the Army Reserve's Simultaneous Membership

Program, which allows a Senior ROTC cadet to

enlist in an Army Reserve unit at the same time

he or she is attending college. The cadet receives

both Army Reserve drill pay and pay for Annual

Training, in addition to cadet allowances. (US

Army photo)

^ü*
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983 191

An Army Reserve orthopedic specialist assembles a leg brace during

training at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC. Many

of the skills taught to Army Reservists are directly transferrable to civilian employment opportunities. (US Army photo)

While other crew members watch, the section

chief repairs the firing mechanism of an 8-inch

self-propelled howitzer during his unit's annual

training at Fort Drum, NY, in 1982. (US Army

photo)
192 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

i

^^^^^

The Army Reserve celebrated its 75th Birthday on April 23, 1983, with

a cake-cutting ceremony at the Pentagon. Shown here is Lt. Col. D. Y.

Dunn, 92-year old retired Army Reservist, who represented the oldest

group of those who have served in the USAR. Behind Dunn is Eric

Heginbotham, whose swearing-in at the ceremony made him the newest

Army Reservist. (US Army photo)
9

The Army Reserve

and Vietnam

Ti

c

THE 1965 DECISION

1

he 1968 decision to mobilize units of the Army Reserve

came three years after Secretary of Defense Robert

McNamara first raised the idea with President Lyndon Johnson. In May and June of 1965 South Vietnamese forces suffered a string of defeats, and in July the Defense Secretary

went to Vietnam on a fact-finding mission. McNamara returned with a recommendation that the number of US personnel in Vietnam be raised immediately from 75,000 to

175,000, with an increase to 275,000 early in 1966. A

large part of this increased strength in Vietnam would come

from the Army's Reserve Components, from which

McNamara wanted to call up 125,000 men.1

The question of calling up the reserves was only a part

of the much broader debate that went on with the Johnson

administration. Indeed, the critical decision in July 1965

was whether to pull out of Vietnam entirely, to maintain the

current level of involvement, or to "give our commanders in

the field the men and supplies they say they need."2

In examining the various options, wrote Lyndon Johnson in his autobiographical account of his Presidency, "I realized what a major undertaking it [McNamara's proposal]

would be. The call-up of a large number of reserves was part

1. Col. Donald C. Odegard, Non-Mobilization and Mobilization in

the Vietnam War (Draft Report of the Study Group) 10 January 1980 (Carlisle

Barracks, Perm.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College), pp.

13-15.

2. Ibid., p. 16.

193
194 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

of the package. This would require a great deal of money

and a huge sacrifice for the American people."3Johnson

thereupon summoned a group of what he called his "top

advisors" to the White House on July 21, 1965, the day

after McMamaras return from Vietnam.4 After a series of

meetings that included General Earl C. Wheeler, Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Johnson had made his

decision.

I had concluded that the last course [expanding the number of

men and amount of materiel in Vietnam] was the right one. I had

listened to and weighed all the arguments and counter-arguments

for each of the possible lines of action. I believed that we should

do what was necessary to resist aggression but that we would not

be provoked into a major war. We would get the required appropriation in the new budget, and we would not boast about what

we were doing. We would not make threatening noises to the

Chinese or the Russians by calling up reserves in large numbers.5

After what amounted to a perfunctory discussion with

Congressional leaders, Johnson made part of his decision

public in a July 28 press conference at the White House. "I

had asked the Commanding General, General [William C]

Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting

aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs." Johnson went on to say that he was increasing the number of

troops in Vietnam from 75,000 to 125,000. 'Additional

forces will be needed later," he said, "and they will be sent

as requested." He was raising the monthly draft calls from

17,000 to 35,000 men, stated the President, but he had

concluded that it was "not essential to order Reserve units

into service now. If that necessity should later be indicated,

I will give the matter most careful consideration and I will

give the country—you—an adequate notice before taking

such action, but only after full preparations."6

Johnson was doing everything he could to minimize

the impact of his decision, even to the extent of not revealing the full measure of it. He said he had rejected the idea

3. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency,

1%3-1969 (New York, Chicago, and San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart,

and Winston, 1971), pp. 146-47.

4. Ibid., p. 147.

5. Ibid., p. 149.

6. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Lyndon B. Johnson,

Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, 1965,

11 (Washington: GPO, 1966), p. 795.
THE ARMY RESERVE AND VIETNAM 195

of declaring a national emergency—which was a necessary

prerequisite to calling up the Reserves—because he saw no

reason for it. In answer to a question from the press, the

President indicated that he did not want to choose between

guns and butter, but would have the government do all it

could to continue the "unparalleled period of prosperity. "

7

There was at the press conference no discussion of why

the Reserve components were not being called up for Vietnam, and Johnson did not mention the subject in his autobiography. As mentioned previously, General Earl C.

Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was present

for at least one of the White House meetings in late July.

Research conducted by the Historical Division of the Joint

Chiefs has not, however, discovered any evidence that the

topic of Reserve mobilization was discussed at the July

meeting from the standpoint of military efficacy.8

The best historical judgment of the decision not to employ Reserve Component units—particularly the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard—in Vietnam is that

Johnson had made an almost purely political decision. Lyndon Johnson was gradually involving the United States in a

land war in Asia, yet he was disguising his every move. The

short-range success with which he accomplished this goal

was exemplified by a front page headline in the next day's

New York Times: "Most in Congress Relieved by the President's Course."9

There was "general satisfaction" in the Congress, reported E. W. Kenworthy for the Times, "that the

President had decided to increase the draft and postpone a

decision on calling up reserve units." The President had become "increasingly sensitive," reported the Times, "to the

possible political effects of a reserve call-up." Thirty-three

House Democrats confirmed the political repercussions of

Reserve forces mobilization, saying that they had been getting '"heavy flak' from families that would be affected by a

reserve call-up."10

Calling-up the Reserve Components, stated one study

of this period, would not have been consistent with John7. Ibid., p. 800.

8. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the War in Vietnam, 1960-1968, Part II. (Top Secret). (Unpublished

work: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 July

1970). See especially Chapter 22, "Growth of Forces in RVN to End of

1965."

9. New York Times, July 29, 1965, p. 1.

10. Ibid., pp. 1, 11.
196 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

son's attempts to portray Vietnam as "a limited war of short

duration which could be fought with little domestic dislocation and without interfering with his administration's war

on poverty."11 Another author described the process somewhat more cynically:

He was using force but using it discreetly, and he was also handling the military. They were moving toward war, but in such

imperceptible degrees that neither the Congress nor the press

could ever show a quantum jump. All the decisions were being

cleverly hidden; he was cutting it thin to hold off opposition. If

there were no decisions which were crystallized and hard, then

they could not leak, and if they could not leak, then the opposition could not point to them. Which was why he was not about

to call up the reserves, because the use of the reserves would blow

it all. It would be self-evident that we were really going to war,

and that we would in fact have to pay a price. Which went

against all the Administration planning: this would be a war

without a price, a silent, politically invisible war.12

Whether a substantial mobilization of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard—McNamara had suggested

125,000 men—in 1965 would have made any difference in

Vietnam is certainly open to debate. McNamara's attempt to

merge the two components had been squelched by the Congress, but the Army Reserve was still in a state of

McNamara-induced turmoil; the Army National Guard was

undoubtedly in better condition for mobilization.13From a

purely military point of view, 125,000 men could have been

sent to Vietnam much quicker by mobilizing the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard than was possible

through the long, slow process of the draft. No one knows

whether this would have made any significant difference in

the military outcome in Vietnam, but a Reserve forces callup would almost certainly have precipitated a closer public

and Congressional scrutiny of the war itself. As Baskir and

Strauss put it, "Reservists and guardsmen were better connected, better educated, more affluent, and whiter than

their peers in the active forces, and the administration

11. Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 50.

12. David Halberstam, The Best and The Brightest (New York: Random House, 1969, 1971, 1972), p. 593.

13. Odegard, Non-Mobilization and Mobilization, pp. 9-10, 15.
THE ARMY RESERVE AND VIETNAM 197

feared that mobilizing them would heighten public opposition to the war."14

The US role in Vietnam grew ever-broader in the 2

l

/>

years following the July 28, 1965, announcement. The

number of Army troops in Vietnam rose steadily all during

this period, but the increase in active duty strength came

almost exclusively from draftees and draft-motivated volunteers. In 1966 and 1967—as in 1965—the Johnson administration was unwilling to admit publicly that Vietnam was

anything other than a limited war of short duration. That it

had been going on for years before the US ever thought of

getting involved was not considered relevant by Johnson and

his advisors.

In the years from 1965 to 1968 it became even more

politically difficult to consider a Reserve call-up, because the

Reserve components had become havens for those who

wanted to avoid active military duty—and Vietnam. According to Baskir and Strauss, who wrote what is perhaps

the most comprehensive book on the draft and its effects

during this time, 'A 1966 Pentagon study found that 71

percent of all reservists were draft-motivated," and anyone

who was associated with any of the Reserve Components

during those years can remember the long lists of men who

wanted to join the unit.15

THE RUSSELL AMENDMENT

Even as it became more politically difficult to call-up the

Reserves, however, it became legally easier. Under the

Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, a Presidential declaration of emergency was required before Reserve components

could be ordered to active duty. To the Fiscal Year 1967

Department of Defense Appropriation Act, however, Senator

Richard B. Russell (D-Ga) added the "Russell Amendment," which gave the President the authority, until June

30, 1968, to "order to active duty any unit of the Ready

Reserve of an armed force for a period of not to exceed

twenty-four months."16 A June 1967 amendment to the

Universal Military Training and Service Act gave the President authority to order non-unit members of the Ready Re14. Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, p. 50.

15. Ibid., p. 51.

16. Public Law 89-687, October 15, 1966.
^98 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

PUEBLO AND TET

serve to active duty until they had completed a total of

twenty-four months service.17

This expanded legal authority for the President did not

make the political decision any more palatable, however, so

all through 1965, 1966, and 1967 Reservists sat at home

and draftees went to Vietnam. This was almost the exact

opposite of the first year in Korea, when Army Reservists

and National Guardsmen had borne the burden with the

members of the active components. This is not to imply

that Army Reservists were not fighting in Vietnam during

these three years, because most of the officers on active duty

with the Army held Reserve commissions, the product of

the Army's ROTC programs. Members of Army Reserve

units, however, as well as members of the Individual Ready

Reserve, were not sent to Vietnam during these three

years.18

The next year—1968—was to prove different, however,

though not as different as it might have been. The year

began most inauspiciously for the United States when the

North Koreans seized the U.S.S. Pueblo, a Navy spy ship, off

the coast of North Korea on January 23. Two days later

President Johnson used the authority given him by the Russell Amendment (Public Law 89-687) to mobilize twentyeight units of the Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard,

and Naval Reserve. This mobilization had nothing directly

to do with Vietnam, though some of these men were eventually sent to Southeast Asia.19

Less than a week after the Pueblo incident the North

Vietnamese launched their Tet Offensive. Tet was a military

defeat for the North Vietnamese, but it was a psychological

17. Public Law 90-40, June 30, 1967.

18. In a unique exception to the usual pattern, thirteen second

lieutenants with USAR commissions were called to active duty in 1966

from the 4th Bn, 198th Artillery (AW) (SP), Delaware National Guard.

These individuals had incurred an active duty obligation as a result of

their ROTC commissioning, and they were called-up as individual Army

Reservists, despite their being in the National Guard. One of these men

was 2Lt. Richard B. Crossland, co-author of this study.

19. Odegard, Non-Mobilization and Mobilization, pp. 43-44;

"Where Are They Now? Activated Reservists Just Waiting Around," Wall

Street Journal, March 15, 1968, p. 1; Major John D. Williams, "Public

Affairs Aspects of the 1968 Reserve Mobilization," Air University Review!

Air Force Review, November-December 1971, pp. 59, 63.
THE ARMY RESERVE AND VIETNAM 199

defeat for the United States, coming as it did when US

officials were proclaiming that the Viet Cong and North

Vietnamese were on the verge of military collapse.20

According to General William C. Westmoreland, the

US Commander in Vietnam, the Tet Offensive "had at last

presented the right opportunity" for calling-up the Reserves.

Westmoreland, who states in his autobiography that he had

earlier opposed a Reserve mobilization, now felt that "with

additional strength and removal of the old restrictive policy,

we could deal telling blows—physically and psychologically—well within the time frame of the reservists' one-year

tour. The time had come to prepare and commit the RePLANNING FOR MOBILIZATION

US forces in Vietnam at the time numbered about 500,000

of the 525,000 approved to that point by the President.

General Westmoreland wanted 10,000 more troops sent to

Vietnam immediately. In response to a request from Secretary of Defense McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began

to look at various possibilities for reinforcing Westmoreland,

including Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps assets in

their deliberations. The Army Staff worked feverishly to develop force structure packages in support of overall JCS

goals, but the Army planners were severely handicapped by

several factors. First, time pressures were enormous. During

the eleven-week planning period the Assistant Chief of Staff

for Force Development (ACSFOR) issued some seventy-five

different force packages, generally under such short suspenses that there was often no time to coordinate them with

anyone outside the DA staff.22

Coordination was effected, however, with the Office of

Reserve Components (ORC), the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR),

and the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB). Because of

what was described as "the need to maintain security," however, ORC was not allowed to contact the Continental United

States Armies, US Army Reserve Commanders, or State Adjutants General. Data on which to base the various force packages, then, had to be compiled from information on hand in

20. Odegard, Non-Mobilization and Mobilization, p. 44.

21. General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden

City, NY: Doubleday Co., Inc., 1976), pp. 193, 354.

22. Department of the Army, After Action Report: Mobilization of Reserve Forces, 1968 (Declassified from Secret), pp. 1—1, 1—2.
200 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

the Army Staff offices. A further problem, which aggravated

the situation at the Department of the Army level, was that

the Army's Reserve Components had begun a major reorganization on December 1, 1967, a reorganization that was not completed until May 31, 1968.23

All of this frenetic activity at the Army Staff level was

in turn being driven by political and other decisions being

made higher up. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, was

busily considering three different overall plans for the mobilization, with a total strength mix ranging from 90,000 to

126,000 men.24

The question of mobilizing the Reserve Components

was top-most in the minds of the JCS, because only through

such a mobilization could the United States maintain any

sort of strategic reserve, if additional active forces were sent

to Vietnam. The JCS had long been urging a Reserve forces

mobilization, and the JCS recommendation, which General

Wheeler offered in a February 12 meeting with the President, was that "Deployment of emergency reinforcements to

Vietnam should not be made without concomitant call up of

Reserves sufficient at least to replace those deployed and provide for the increased sustaining base requirements of all

services."25

Defense Secretary McNamara, however, had done a

turnaround from his 1965 advocacy of a Reserve call-up.

McNamara had gotten his knuckles rapped for his earlier

position, and he now opposed mobilization of the Reserves

for Vietnam duty. President Johnson asked McNamara and

Wheeler to "study the problem further and to agree on a

recommendation."26 The Secretary of Defense was not prepared to wait for JCS agreement with his position. Instead,

he immediately recommended, and President Johnson ordered, the deployment to Vietnam of one brigade of the

82nd Airborne Division and a Marine regimental landing

team—a total of 10,500 men.27 The Joint Chiefs thereupon

urged on February 13 the call-up of 32,000 Army Reserve

23. Ibid., p. 1-2.

24. Ibid., p. 1-5.

25. Quoted in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Vol 5,

Printed for the use of the House Committee on Armed Services (Washington: GPO, 1971), iv.c.6.(c), p.3. The twelve volumes of this set comprise the "Pentagon Papers."

26. Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 386.

27. JCS Msg 9926, 130218Z Feb 68, Subject: "Deployment of

Brigade Task Force of 82nd Airborne Division to SVN (S)," cited in

United States-Vietnam Relations, Vol. 5, iv.c.6.(c), p.6.
THE ARMY RESERVE AND VIETNAM 201

Component, 12,000 Marine Corps Reserve, and 2,300

Naval Reserve personnel. The Army personnel were needed,

stated the JCS, "to replace the forces deployed from the strategic reserve, to provide support units to meet anticipation

requirements in I CTZ and to provide a wider rotation base

of requisite ranks and skills."28

According to President Johnson's account, McNamara

and Wheeler continued to disagree on the question of a Reserve forces call-up.29 McNamara s tenure ended on February

28, however, and he was replaced by Clark Clifford, who

was believed at the time to be more inclined to mobilize the

Reserves. At the same time, General Wheeler returned from

a trip to Vietnam and presented Westmoreland's request for

206,000 additional troops.30

For the next month the President and his advisors considered various levels of reinforcement for Vietnam, and with

every change of nuance a new force structure package had to

be developed by the Army Staff. On March 31, President

Johnson announced in a nation-wide television address that

he would not run for re-election.31 The last real political

obstacle to a Reserve-forces call-up for Vietnam had now

been removed. The final troop list was submitted to the JCS

on April 2 and was based on the mobilization of 54,000

men in three increments, a total far short of the number

Westmoreland had said he needed. The total of 54,000 men

was modest enough in itself, but even this figure would not

stand for long. Just two days later, Secretary of Defense

Clifford stated that this option was too expensive, and he

pared the call-up to only the first increment. A final revised

troop list was prepared by April 8, calling for the mobilization of seventy-six Army Reserve Component units with a

total of 20,034 personnel, not all of whom would go to

Vietnam. It was this list that the Secretary of Defense announced in an April 11 press conference.32

28. JCSM 96-68, 13 Feb 68, Subject: "Emergency Reinforcement

of COMUSMACV (C)." quoted in United States-Vietnam Relations. Vol.5,

iv.c.6.(c), pp. 7-8.

29- Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 387.

30. Odegard, Non-Mobilization and Mobilization, pp. 44-45.

31. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson. Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President,

1968-69, Book I (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 476.

32. After Action Report: Mobilization of Reserve Forces. 1978, p. 1-5;

OSD Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments and

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 4, 1968, Subject: "Reserve

Recall," cited in Odegard, Non-Mobilization and Mobilization, p. 46.
202 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

The final selection of types of Reserve units was based

on specific requirements set forth by the US commander in

Vietnam, plus units needed to reconstitute the Strategic

Army Forces. The threat of civil disturbances was a major

factor in the elimination of particular National Guard units

from consideration, though it had no bearing at all on the

units of the Army Reserve. The DA goal was to select Army

Reserve and National Guard units based upon the proportional strengths of the two components, and the final mixture of 31.9 percent USAR to 68.1 percent ARNG compared with actual force percentages of 40 percent to 60

percent. Units were spread geographically as much as possible, the final troop list representing thirty-four states. Every

attempt was made at Department of the Army level to select

the most operationally ready units of each type required, but

a lack of up-to-date information hindered this effort. Of the

seventy-six Army Reserve Component units in the final

troop list, fifty-nine were current or former members of the

Selected Reserve Force (SRF); two units had no SRF counterpart. The other fifteen units were selected after considering

such factors as readiness status, location (for geographic balance), civil disturbance role, command and control requirements, and length of time the unit had been organized.33

The irony was that after all the planning and changing

and revising and considering of the proper mix of units

needed for support of the war in Vietnam, the total of seventy units mobilized was decided in the end by financial

considerations. "The major factor governing the final decision on the size of the force in the 1968 Partial Mobilization," concluded the Army's official after action report, "was

. . . the financial support required for such a force and not

operational requirements for additional forces to cope with a

worsening world military situation."34 Lyndon Johnson had

apparently concluded that the American people could not

continue to have both guns and butter, and he was therefore

cutting back on the rate of procuring the guns.

THE USAR MOBILIZATION

Regardless of the reasons that went into their selection,

forty-two units of the Army Reserve were mobilized in this

relatively-small call-up. The types of units are shown in

Table 9-1.

33. After Action Report: Mobilization of Reserve Forces, 1968, pp. 1—6

to 1-8.

34. Ibid., p. 1-5.
THE ARMY RESERVE AND VIETNAM 203

Table 9-1 USAR Units Mobilized.'

Inf Bn 1

MI Det 2

AG Units 4

Composite Svc Units 8

Med Units 11

Fin Units 1

Ord Units 2

QM Units 3

Trans Units 10

Type Unit Number Total Auth Strength

782

64

190

1,552

667

40

313

457

1,814

Total 42 5,869

Most of the members of these units first learned of

their call to duty through the media, rather than through

official Army notification channels. According to the Army's

after action report, the Department of Defense had prohibited DA from following the procedures developed and prescribed after the 1961 mobilization. "This action," concluded the report, "caused confusion, embarrassed field

commanders and contributed to a general feeling of consternation among many reservists."36

Nevertheless, over 5000 Army Reservists reported to

their home stations (see Appendix C) on May 13, 1968, and

within a week they were on their way to active Army mobilization stations. There was considerable local publicity

given the mobilized units, and in at least one instance there

were special ceremonies to mark the mobilization. When the

737th Transportation Co (Med Truck Petr) left Yakima,

Washington, for Fort Lewis on the morning of May 14, the

town of Yakima was ready. From 8:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.

the men of the 737th were treated to a special "send-off

party by the Greater Yakima Chamber of Commerce, attended by "mothers, wives, children, relatives, girl friends,

and citizens." Music was provided by the Davis High School

Band.37 Other Army Reserve units may not have received

35. Annual Historical Summary, RCS-CSHIS—6 (RZ), Office of the

Chief, Army Reserve, 1 July 1961 to 30 June 1968, Part I, p. 3. A complete listing of these units, with their home stations, is at Appendix C.

The figure of forty-five USAR units mobilized is sometimes seen. This

figure refers to "company/detachment" size units and as such counts the

100th Bn, 442nd Inf as four units (HHC and three line companies).

36. After Action Report: Mobilization of Reserve Forces, 1968, p. 2—1.

37. "737th Mobilizes at Center" and "737th Earns Proud Sendoff

from Yakima," both in Yakima Herald-Republic, May 14 and 15, 1968.
204 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

such fanfare, but they convoyed to their mobilization stations nevertheless, and for the next three to seven months

underwent the training needed to make them of maximum

value in Vietnam.

Few of these Army Reserve units had 100 percent of

their authorized strength, so the Department of the Army

had to find filler personnel for them. There had been no

national emergency declared in conjunction with the call-up,

so there were in reality few options within the Army Reserve

system. One primary source of fillers for the mobilized units

was to be found among certain Reserve Enlistment Program—1963 (REP-63) personnel in the Individual Ready

Reserve (IRR). Some 4,132 of these men had enlisted for a

six-year hitch in the Army Reserve, and after their initial

active duty for training, they were obligated for V/i years of

satisfactory unit membership. For one reason or another,

however, they had been transferred to the IRR, and they

were fair game for a call-up.

Of the 4,132 REP-63 personnel who were screened for

active duty orders, 1,380 were exempted from call-up for

reasons ranging from hardship and dependency (371) to inability to locate them (325). Eventually, 1,692 IRR personnel were assigned to the mobilized USAR units, and 1,060

were given assignments with the active Army. Over 1,800

enlisted vacancies in the Army Reserve units were filled with

active Army personnel, as were any officer vacancies.39

Army Reserve units—even those in the SRF—had

never received all of the equipment required by their TOE,

and the forty-two mobilized units were no exception. By

July 12, however, all mobilized units had received equipment necessary to bring them to a C-l Readiness Condition. According to the after action report, "No significant

[equipment] problems occurred after that date."40

The standard training week for the mobilized units was

forty-four hours long. General training guidance was provided by DA for all units, while the thirty-five Vietnambound units were given additional training, including a

minimum of sixteen hours with the M16 rifle.41 There were

few complaints from Army Reservists who claimed they

were not being given meaningful training or things to do,

38. After Action Report: Mobilization of Reserve Forces. 1968. p. 3-10.

39. Ibid.. pp. 3-11, 3-3, 4-7.

40. Ibid.. p. 3-4.

41. Ibid.. p. 3-6.
THE ARMY RESERVE AND VIETNAM 205

in marked contrast to many such complaints from the Air

Force and Navy Reservists who had been mobilized earlier in

the year.

CHALLENGES TO MOBILIZATION

This is not to say, however, that there were no complaints

from the Army Reservists. When Rep. Charles A. Vanik visited the Fort Meade, Maryland, training site of the 1002d

Supply and Service Company from Cleveland, Ohio, members of the unit complained to him about "the lack of combat training, pass policies, laxity in the conduct of physical

training tests, and low morale."42

Other major Congressional interest in the mobilization

came from the Senate delegation from Massachusetts, composed of Edward Kennedy and Edward Brooke. As early as

May 27, barely two weeks after reporting for duty, eightyeight enlisted members of the HHC, 513th Maintenance

Battalion, signed a letter of complaint to Sen. Brooke.

These men charged that the 513th was not prepared for active duty, much less for deployment to Vietnam, and should

not have been mobilized. The Army response was that At

the time of selection the 513th was the best qualified unit

of the six available in the US Army Reserve."45

Controversy surrounding the 513th continued later,

however, when sixteen members of the unit filed suit in US

District Court in Baltimore charging that they had not received all of their mandatory training.44

Senator Kennedy

asked the Army to postpone the 513th's deployment after

sixty-seven additional units members corroborated the complaints of the sixteen men who had filed the suit. Kennedy

asked Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor to "conduct a

full and prompt investigation" of the claims and to "keep

this unit available until an appropriate inquiry is satisfactorily completed." Resor declined Kennedys request, and a

spokesman stated that the Army had investigated "as far as

42. Ibid.. p. 3-16.

43. DF, CAR to CORC, June 12, 1968, Subject: "Mobilization of

the 513 CS Bn," with enclosutes, found in Records of the Chief, Army

Reserve, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, Accession No. 71A-3109, 402—05, "Congressional Correspondence, 68,

A-G."

44. "Boston Reservists Fight Viet Duty," Boston Herald-Traveler,

October 4, 1968, p. 1.
206 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

they're going to and as far as they are concerned, it's a

closed case."45

Both political and legal challenges failed, however, as

the US Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision from which Justice William O. Douglas dissented, turned down the plea

from members of the 513th and five other Army Reserve

units. A total of 256 plaintiffs had joined in the suit, which

had two major claims: (1) that in being called-up for

twenty-four months they were not given credit for active

duty time already served and (2) that they could only be

called up after a declaration of national emergency. The

plaintiffs were thus challenging the constitutionality of the

Russell Amendment.46

THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE

The 513th—all 251 members of it—did go to Vietnam, as

did the members of thirty-four other units of the Army Reserve. In December 1982 Lewis C. Brodsky, Chief of Public

Affairs for the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, sent letters to each of these units, asking for their help in compiling the story of the Army Reserve in Vietnam.47 Many units

responded to this request with newspaper clippings, letters

of commendation, general orders, unit lineages, after action

reports and other documents generated during or immediately after their tour of duty in 1968-69. Together with

information gleaned from other sources, this material has

allowed at least a paragraph or two to be written about

many of the Army Reserve units that went to Vietnam, and

these narratives are contained in Appendix C. There are

many common threads of experience that run throughout

the record of these units, and the author does not believe

that focusing on the particularly units about which information could be obtained will lead to an erroneous impression

45. "Ted Pleads for Boston Reservists," Boston Herald-Traveler,

October 8, 1968, p. 1.

46. "Dissidents in Uniform: Supreme Court Rejects Challenge,"

Boston Herald-Traveler, October 8, 1968, p. 1; other units which had

members who joined the suit were the 1002d Sup and Svc Co.

(Cleveland, Oh), 448th Army Postal Unit (New York, NY), 1018th Sup

and Svc Co. (Schenectady, NY), 74th Field Hospital (New York, NY),

and the 173d Petr Co (Greenwood, Miss.). These cases were styled Morse

et al. v. Boswell et al.; Berke et al. v. MacLaughlin; Felberbaum et al. v.

MacLaughlin; and Looney et al. v. MacLaughlin (393 U.S. 802) (1968).

47. Letter, Lewis C. Brodsky, Chief, Public Affairs Office, to thirtyfive addressees, December 10, 1982, Subject: "Request for Historical Information," copies in OCAR Historical Files.
THE ARMY RESERVE AND VIETNAM 207

of the role and performance of the Army Reserve in Vietnam.

The stories of the Army Reserve units in Vietnam are

varied, but they offer a number of common elements. First,

the units themselves were not nearly ready for active participation in the Vietnam War when they were mobilized in

May 1968. It required months—sometimes up to six or

seven months—of intensive training before the thirty-five

units were ready to go to Vietnam. Many of the Army Reserve units that were chosen for the 1968 mobilization had

only recently undergone TOE changes, and some of them

had changed from one branch of the Army to another.

The maturity of the individuals in the USAR units and

the esprit of the unit personnel were major factors in making up for the lack of long-term technical expertise. Most of

the men and women in the Army Reserve were older than

the typical draftee, and the Army Reservist, if the fragmentary statistics on discipline, AWOL, and courts martial are

representative, was less likely to become involved in criminal activities than was the draftee. The personnel of the

Army Reserve units were likewise determined to prove to

the active Army—and perhaps to themselves as well—that

they were as good as anyone in uniform. And they did just

that in Vietnam, for Army Reserve units were constantly

being lauded and decorated by the men under whom they

served.

Members of the thirty-five USAR units in Vietnam received 277 Certificates of Achievement and the following

other awards:

Silver Star 1

Legion of Merit 5

Bronze Star 384

Air Medal 7

Army Commendation Medal 779

Purple Heart 20

Additionally, the 231st Transportation Company, Fltg

Cft, from St. Petersburg, Florida, was selected as the Army's

outstanding transportation unit in Vietnam and received the

National Defense Transportation Award. Two Army Reserve

units were recommended for the Presidential Unit Citation,

thirteen for the Meritorious Unit Citation, and one for the

Unit Cross of Gallantry (Vietnam).48

48. "Awards for Vietnam Service," The Army Reserve Magazine,

January 1970, p. 7.
208 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

There were some problems with Army Reserve units in

Vietnam, but they were not problems caused by the units

themselves. The biggest gripe from unit personnel was the

Army's policy of "infusion," i.e., of taking members out of

USAR units and replacing them with non-unit personnel.

As the French military thinker Ardant Du Picq stated:

Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to

attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure

of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid will attack resolutely. There is the science of the organization of armies in a

nutshell.49

One of the primary sttengths of the Army Reserve

units in Vietnam was that the men and women in the units

knew each other well. Indeed, through years of training togethet they had developed the highest possible level of esprit, and they were not afraid to "attack a lion" once they

got to Vietnam. "Fusion," however, whatevet its merits as a

means of distributing the individuals with particular Special

Skill Identifiers among units or of preventing home-town

tragedies, was a destroyer of the esprit built up among the

Army Reservists.

The US Army could well have learned a lesson from

the British in this regard, for the British Army has long

recognized the value of unit integrity and unit identification

as a motivator, and even as a means of enhancing combat

effectiveness. The US Atmy now seems with its active Army

unit identification system to have taken a step in this direction. The Army Reserves experiences in Vietnam should

serve to confirm and strengthen this ttend.

CONCLUSION

The final question that can be asked about the Army Reserve's role in Vietnam is whether it made any difference ot

not. The individuals and the units mobilized did an "outstanding" job, to use that over-worn Army phrase. The

Army Reservists in Vietnam, however, were only a small

fraction—less than 5 petcent—of the total Army force involved there. They did their jobs, and they did them well.

49. Col. Ardant Du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle.

Translated by Col. John N. Greely and Maj. Robert C. Cotton (New

York: Macmillan Company, 1921), p. 110.
THE ARMY RESERVE AND VIETNAM 209

But whether they made any real difference in the war is

debatable.

As this chapter is being written (1983), the United

States has just passed through a major transition period on

the subject of Vietnam. The Vietnam Memorial has become

one of the must-see places on the Mall in Washington, and

Vietnam veterans are getting some belated recognition and

attention and help. Although the individual members of the

Army Reserve who went to Vietnam may have done their

duty in anonymity, the men and women of the units mobilized in 1968 and returned from Vietnam in 1969 generally

experienced a reception much more akin to that following

World War II, when Johnny and Jane came marching home

to a hero's or heroines reception.

If some Army Reservists were subjected to scorn and

hostility, most received welcomes like those in Yakima,

Washington, or Provo, Utah. Their communities greeted

their return as American towns and cities have long greeted

returning veterans: with bands and flags and parades. If the

public had turned against the war in Vietnam by 1969, the

communities where there were Army Reserve units had not

turned against their men and women in uniform, just because the War was an unpopular one. It had been a long

time in happening, but the Army Reserve unit had become

an integral part of the community in much of small-town

America, and these true citizen-soldiers were very much in

the mainstream of community life and consciousness.

Indeed, the growing involvement of the Army Reserve

could well have been the key to what might have been a

different course for the Vietnam War. Hindsight is always

speculative, of course, but if in 1965 President Johnson had

decided to fight the Vietnam War with Reserve Component

forces, rather than draftees, he would have been forced to

ask for explicit Congressional authorization. The Gulf of

Tonkin Resolution, which provided the legal basis for Johnson's actions on Vietnam, would not have given him sufficient authority to call up the Reserve Components without

declaring a national emergency. The whole question of our

involvement in Vietnam might have been subjected to the

sort of public and Congressional debate that never really occurred. Such a debate might well have revealed the painfully

learned truth that there was not a deep and enduring national resolve on the question of Vietnam, and it might have

foreshortened the US involvement in the war. It would not

have been as easy to call up the Reserves as it was to increase the draft calls, and in the history of the Vietnam War,
210 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

the decision not to mobilize the Army's Reserve Components

in 1965 may have been Lyndon Johnson's key decision. Indeed, the Army Reserve ought not to be too easy to mobilize, lest it be used before the crisis has been properly considered. Once a national consensus is reached, however, and

the Congress and the President agree on US objectives, the

Army Reserve should be ready and able to do its part. Vietnam proves both the truth and the tragedy of this thesis.
lO

Toward Greater

Partnership

The Army's ability to fight a war without the Reserves is

zero. This sums up Lt. Gen. William R. Richardson's

remarks to the Association of the United States Army in

October 1982 and illustrates the vital role of the Army Reserve in the early 1980s.1 Only a few years earlier, in spite

of the fine performance of duty in Vietnam by the 35 Army

Reserve units that were sent to Southeast Asia in 1968, it

would have been more accurate to say that the Army Reserve's ability to go to war was near zero.

The Army Reserve ended the 1960s in disrepair and

disarray. The Reserve leadership, with the substantial aid of

the Reserve Officers Association (ROA), had just fought off

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's attempt to

merge the Army Reserve with the National Guard. The Reserve had been stripped of essential materiel for the Vietnam

War, and Reservists were characterized as summer soldiers—

draft-dodgers in the eyes of some Regulars—who had

avoided Vietnam combat through Reserve membership. This

innuendo was directed at the Army Reserve even though

more than 130,000 Army Reservists were serving on active

duty in 1969 at the peak of America's involvement in Viet1. Faith Faircloth, 'AUSA Panelists Focus on Reserve Readiness,"

ARNEWS, Release No. 407, Department of the Army, Washington, DC,

1982.

2. Department of Defense Selected Manpower Statistics, Fiscal Year 1982,

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1983), pp. 199-200.

211
212 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

In addition, more than 70 percent of the Army's Reserve Centers were inadequate,3

and proper facilities for field

training were few and far between. The Army Reserves share

of the Army's budget had fallen to 1.6 percent in 1967 and

1968, the lowest share since the Korean War.4

In little more than a decade, from 1969 until today,

the Army Reserve underwent a major transformation and

emerged as an essential partner in the Total Army. The precipitating event for this transformation was the decision to

end the draft in favor of an all-volunteer force, while the

event leading up to the formation of the Rapid Deployment

Joint Task Force (RDJTF) hammered home the need for a

strong Army Reserve.5

The policy responsible for the recent enhancement of

the Army Reserve—the Total Force Policy—was publicly

announced on September 8, 1970, but the genesis of the

Total Force Policy came earlier from the decision to achieve

an all-volunteer military force. According to a comprehensive study of this subject, "The failure of Congress and the

Johnson Administration to reform the draft in 1967 was

important to the evolution of the All Volunteer Force. That

failure, continued high draft calls, and increased opposition

to the war and draft assured that the draft would be a major

issue during the 1968 presidential campaign."6

Sensing a winning issue, Richard M. Nixon campaigned on the theme of ending the draft, and Nixon's election brought to the White House a man who favored draft

reform and a volunteer military.7 On March 27,1969, two

months after assuming office, President Nixon appointed an

Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force under the chairmanship of Thomas S. Gates, Jr., a former Secretary of Defense.

Nixon directed the commission to develop a comprehensive plan to eliminate conscription and move toward an

3. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, Fiscal Year

1970, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), p. 20.

4. Annual Historical Supplements, Chief Office of Reserve Components (CORC) for 1967 and 1968. Also, OSD Project 80 Report, Chart 10.

5. For an expansion upon this point, see "RDJTF: Can It Get

There Without the USAR?", Army Reserve Magazine, (Spring 1982), pp.

8-10.

6. Gus C. Lee and Geoffrey Y. Parker, Ending the Draft: The Story of

the All Volunteer Force, (Alexandria, Va.: Human Resources Research

Organization), p. 29-

7. Ibid., p. 31.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 213

all-volunteer force. The commission was asked to study a

broad range of incentives to make military careers more attractive, and the entire issue of a voluntary military was

given a high priority within the Nixon administration.8

One important point to remember is that Nixon directed the commission to study how the All-Volunteer Force

was to be achieved, and not whether it should be achieved.

On February 20, 1970, Gates reported to the President that

the commission unanimously believed that the nation's interests would be better served by an All-Volunteer Force than

by a mixed force of conscripts and volunteers. The commission was satisfied that such a volunteer force would not

jeopardize national security.9

In making detailed recommendations to the President,

the commission made little mention of the Reserve Components. The emphasis was upon the active forces, where substantially increased pay for junior members was supposed to

make the military competitive with civilian industry. The

commission recommended that the draft authority be terminated by July 1, 1971, and that $3-3 billion in military

pay increases be placed in the 1971 Defense budget.10

In its February 1970 report, the commission recognized

that the Reserve Components would need special attention

in an all-volunteer era but that a lack of data made it difficult to assess the impact of the volunteer army upon the

Reserves. The general problem of future Reserve Component

strength was dismissed by the committee when it concluded

that pre-Vietnam strength levels would not have to be required in the future." The committee thought that the Reserves would be substantially enhanced by the large flow of

active duty servicemen being separated between 1970 and

1973.u While the move toward an All-Volunteer Force was

a political decision stimulated by the civil unrest of the late

1960s, the Total Force policy developed more in response to

fiscal realities.

8. Statement by the President, March 27, 1969, included on page

vii in Report, The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force,

(Washington, DC, 1970).

9. Letter, Gates to Nixon, Feb. 20, 1970, in Report, President's Commission.

10. Recommendations summarized by Lee and Parker, Ending the

Draft, p. 59.

11. Report, President's Commission, p. 99.

12. Ibid., p. 117.
214 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

DOLLARS DICTATE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

By mid-1969, with the Nixon emphasis upon Vietnamization, it was obvious to the military leadership that the postVietnam Army would be reduced in size. Because the Vietnam build-up had been accomplished by adding to the active forces instead of mobilizing the Reserves, there was a

redundancy between the active force and Reserve force in

certain types of units. As the Army scaled down upon withdrawal from Vietnam, the attractive solution to the force

structure duplication was to remove units from the active

force. By placing support capabilities in the Reserve Components, money could be saved for the modernization of the

active force—a modernization that had been postponed

when Vietnam placed a heavy strain upon the Defense budget.

With the visibility of the Reserve Components expected

to increase in the near future, the Army's Chief of the Office

of Reserve Components initiated a ten point improvement

program for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve in

August 1969, and in November 1969 he directed a special

study of resource allocations to the Reserve Components.13

On December 22, 1969, the Chief of Staff of the Army

presaged Secretary of Defense Melvin Lairds Total Force Policy by issuing a memorandum establishing that the Reserve

Components must be considered the initial and primary

source of additional units and individuals in any future rapid

mobilization. He directed that Army planning be predicated

on this concept.14

Lairds Total Force Policy simply formalized what Army

leaders had already anticipated. The economic link between

the need to hold down Defense costs and the cost effectiveness of the Reserve Components was very clearly made by

Laird. This policy was enunciated in an August 21, 1970,

memorandum to the service Secretaries in which Laird wrote

that the Selected Reserves of the Guard and Reserve, rather

than draftees, would in the future be the initial and primary

source of augmentation in any emergency requiring rapid

13. Army Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland claims

that he foresaw Laird's shift in emphasis to the Reserve Component problems in 1969. Westmoreland states that despite the reduction in active

forces, the Army's basic responsibilities did not change. This required

increased emphasis upon Reserve Components. See Westmoreland's Report

of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1968, to June 30,

1972. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army), pp. 35-39.

14. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, Fiscal

Year 1970, p. 6.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 215

and substantial expansion of the active forces. The military

departments were directed to consider the Reserve Components as part of the Total Force available to meet security

needs.15This was a return to traditional reliance on the Reserve Components and a forceful renunciation of the Johnson

Administration's failure to mobilize the Reserves in 1965.

SUPPORT WAS NOT UNANIMOUS

The memorandum was made public on September 8 and

generated front page stories in major newspapers.16The

Washington Post quoted Laird as saying that "in many instances the lower peacetime sustaining costs of reserve units,

compared to similar active units, can result in a larger total

force for a given budget, or the same size force for a lesser

budget."17The New York Times pointed out that continued

reduction in defense budgets would mean fewer troops on

active duty and that an Army Reserve unit could be maintained for one-sixth to one-half of the cost of an active duty

unit.18The Associated Press said that Laird was reversing

President Lyndon B. Johnsons policy on the use of Reserve

forces, and that the Total Force Policy was directly linked to

Nixon's goal to reduce the budget.19

Laird said as much himself on March 9, 1971, while

testifying on the 1972 Defense Budget before the House

Armed Services Committee:

Lower sustaining costs of non-active duty forces, as compared to

the cost of maintaining larger active duty forces, make possible a

greater flexibility in planning the Total Force structure. This lower

cost of non-active forces allows more force units to be provided for

the same cost as an all-active force structure, or the same number

of force units to be maintained for lesser cost.

Despite the economic advantages associated with the

Total Force Policy, support for the Policy was not unan15. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, Fiscal

Year 1971, p. 1.

16. Ironically, the Army Times did not address the Total Force issue

in the weeks immediately following Laird's announcement, and internal

Army publications such as Soldiers were likewise mute on the subject.

17. "Reserves, Guard Get Buildup Role," Washington Post,

September 9, 1970, p. 1.

18. "Pentagon to Cut Use of Draftees in Fast Build-ups," New York

Times, September 9, 1970, p. 1.

19- The Associated Press Story, "Laird Reverses Johnson Policy on

Reserve Use," was carried in the September 9, 1970, issue of the

European Stars and Stripes.
216 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

imous. On June 30, 1972, in his final report to the President on the status of the US Army, Gen. William C. Westmoreland wrote that "only Regular Army forces in being can

achieve the levels of readiness required." Westmoreland recommended that the Regular Army be considered a cadre

that could be expanded rapidly in an emergency. This expansible army would "serve as a hedge against the high risk

associated with the heavy reliance on the Reserve Components."20 The expansible army of John C. Calhoun had been

rejected in 1916 and 1920 when the Army took firm steps

toward establishing a federal reserve force as a means of expanding the active establishment, but the cadre concept still

seemed to enjoy some popularity.

Writing in the August 1972 issue of Army, Gen. Hamilton H. Howze proposed that the U.S. Army follow the

Israeli Army and establish a 25 percent cadre of Regular

Army troops to hold key positions in Reserve Component

units.21 On September 4, 1972, David R. Boldt disputed

the value of the Total Force in a Washington Post article entitled "Reserve: Force or Farce?" Boldt questioned the value

of spending so much on Army Reservists when their training was disorganized, their equipment inadequate, and their

cooperation with the active component only minimal.22

On February 27, 1973, Col. David R. Hampton concluded that "today's Army Reserve cannot fulfill the requirements imposed by the total force concept." Hampton believed that using Regular Army officers and noncommissioned officers as a cadre for Reserve units was the first

change to be made in a system desperately in need of

change.23

20. Letter, Westmoreland to President Nixon, dated June 30,

1972 and included as Appendix D to Report of the Chief of Staff of the

United States Army, July 1, 1968, to June 30, 1972. It should be noted

that Gen. Westmoreland's knowledge of the Reserve Components may be

somewhat confused. In his 1976 book, A Soldier Reports, he consistently

refers to being able to mobilize Reservists for only one year during the

Vietnam era, when the operative act of the time, Public Law 69-305

carried no such restriction. Westmoreland also refers to the Army Reserve

as US Army Organized Reserves—a term that went out of official use in

1952.

21. Hamilton H. Howze, "Toward Real Reserve Readiness: The

Case for the Cadre System," Army (August 1972), pp. 12-16.

22. David R. Boldt, "Reserve: Force or Farce," Washington Post,

September 4, 1972, p. 1.

23. David R. Hampton, Society and the Army Reserve, (Army War

College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1973), pp. ü and 39.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 217

The cadre concept proposed by Hampton, Howze and

Westmoreland is inherently attractive to some individuals

because a cadre provides the essential nucleus of an organization without the costs of maintaining the full combat

strength of a unit in peacetime. The cadre concept was successful for Prussia in the 19th century, and to a large degree

the American divisions of World War I and World War II

were built upon cadres of Regulars and previously-trained

Organized Reservists and Guardsmen. Following World War

II, many US divisions were in effect cadre units, a fact that

became evident when they were suddenly thrust into combat

at the start of the Korean War. The same situation applied

to Vietnam when new units were built around a cadre of

veterans and fleshed out with new recruits recently graduated from Advanced Individual Training.

TECHNICIANS FORM A CADRE

As attractive and logical as they are to some, the cadre proposals for the Reserve Components overlooked the fact that a

cadre system was already in effect for the part-time forces.

This cadre system consisted of technicians and advisors to

Reserve units. The role of these technicians and active component advisors, their numbers, and how they were to be

organized were greatly debated in the 1970s and early

1980s. The expansion of the full-time support force behind

the Army Reserve has been one of the major changes of the

last 15 years.

The technician programs as they exist today had their

beginnings in the National Defense Act of 1916, which

provided for caretakers to feed the Federally owned horses

issued to the National Guard. When the Guard became

motor-drawn, maintenance personnel were added to the caretaker force and clerks were added to the force just before

World War II. After World War II, Reserve Component

units became larger and more complex. There was a great

emphasis upon training and property accountability, and as

a result, administrative personnel were authorized down to

the company level. Staff assistant positions were established

at battalion and higher.

During the 1950s and 1960s the technician program

expanded, and the concept of having technicians carry out

essential functions between weekly or weekend training assemblies (drills) became firmly established. By 1971, the

Army Reserve was authorized more than 6,400 technicians.

By the mid-1970s the whole concept of a technician work-
218 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

force was under review as greater reliance was being placed

upon the Reserve Components.

The October 1976 'ART Study" by the US Army

Forces Command (FORSCOM), for example, concluded that

the technician force was necessary and that the force should

be expanded.24Two years later, however, the civilian technician program was under fire. In a May 24, 1978, memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary

for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics John P. White

stated that the Army Reserve had the least effective fulltime force of any Reserve Component. White criticized the

management of the technician program and the fact that

many technicians were not mobilization assets because they

could not deploy with their units.25 White contended that

readiness is directly linked to the percentage of full-time

personnel in a Reserve Component and noted that the Army

Reserve's technician force represented only four percent of

USAR strength, while the Air Force Reserve had 22 percent

full-time personnel. He recommended that the percentage of

full-time personnel in the Army Reserve be increased to improve readiness.26

The next month, White's office issued an even more

critical report on the full-time training and administration

of the Reserve Components. The report concluded that the

civilian technician force of the Army Reserve was almost unmanageable, mainly because it was administered under competitive civil service rules. White wanted the technician

24. Army Reserve Technician Study (ART), (Fort McPherson, Ga.:

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, 1976), p. 2.

25. Since I960, Army Reserve Technicians (ART) had been required to be members of the unit which they supported. If a technician

lost his or her Reserve status he had to be placed in a non-technician

civil service position. This requirement to meet both civil service and

Army Reserve standards became known as dual-status, and dual-status

was deemed essential if a technician were to be able to mobilize with a

unit and help ease the unit through its transition to active duty. The

flaw in this system was that a technician did not lose his or her job if

the Selected Reserve status was lost through no fault of the technician.

Examples of no-fault loss of military status include retirement from the

Ready Reserve upon 20 years of qualifying service or denial of continued

military status because of medical disqualification. By 1978, 20 percent

of the Army Reserves technicians had lost their dual status through no

fault of their own. They were no longer mobilization assets and were

referred to as "status quo" technicians.

26. Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of Defense to Deputy Secretary of Defense, May 24, 1978, p. 4.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 2 19

force to be either all military or administered under excepted civil service rules.27

Although there was no cost saving in converting the

technician force from civilian to military, White recommended that this conversion be considered. His argument

was that the civil service status of the technician force did

not recognize its essentially military nature.28 He noted that

a full-time military force would be available 24 hours a day

and that the military considerations of the job must be paramount. White's report and memorandum seconded the December 1977 "Stroud Study", which had recommended excepted status for civilian technicians.29 However, White went

further in suggesting a conversion of the technician force to

military status, thereby raising an issue which is unresolved

today.

As early as 1975, the United States Defense Manpower

Commission had recommended creating a special category of

full-time Guardsmen and Reservists on active duty to replace civilian technicians,30

but the idea of such an active

duty force did not gain support until 1978.

In June 1978, the House Armed Services Committee

asked the Army to begin a 15-month "Technician Conversion Test" to see if it was desirable to phase out the Army

Reserve's civilian technician program. During the test,

which ended in June 1980, the Army Reserve brought

1,276 Army Reservists on active duty in an Active

27. Under excepted service rules, a civil service employee serves at

the pleasure of his employer and literally accepts the requirements laid

down by the employer as a condition of continued employment. This is

the status of Army National Guard technicians. A civil servant hired

under competitive rules has formal, relatively immutable requirements

for hire and promotion and a relatively fixed job description. It is also

impossible under competitive service to make a military rank and occupation specialty a prerequisite for promotion or selection.

28. Report on the Study of the Full-Time Training and Administration of

the Selected Reserve, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1978), p

11.

29. Ansel M. Stroud, Study on the Full Time Personnel Requirements of

the Reserve Components, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army,

1977), p. Ill—37. Stroud also concluded that the Army Reserve had insufficient full-time personnel to meet the workload at the company level

and that assigning active duty personnel to augment the civilian force

was the least desirable option open to the Army.

30. United States Defense Manpower Commission, The Total Force

and Its Manpower Requirements, Including Overviews of Each Service, Volume

II, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. G-ll.
220 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Guard-Reserve (AGR) status to fill vacant civilian technician positions. In December 1980, even though the conversion test caused considerable distress among the civilian

force, the Army concluded that conversions should continue

through attrition and that nearly 3,000 more positions

should be converted to AGR status in the next few years.31

As a result of the discontentment, however, the conversion program was slowed considerably. By the end of the

1982 fiscal year, only 1,540 civilian positions had been converted to AGR status,32

and action on the 1983 Defense

Budget restricted further conversion. Specifically, the House

Appropriations Committee objected to FORSCOM plans to

convert the 43 Senior Staff Administrative Assistant

(SSAA)33 positions to full-time colonel positions; and that

same committee insured that the continuing resolution

which funded the Defense Department for 1983 contained

language prohibiting the SSAA conversion. It also limited

the total number of converted positions to the number already converted. This put a temporary halt to Army plans to

phase out civilian technicians.

FULL-TIME SUPPORT EXPANDS

The Congressional action did not halt, however, the expansion of full-time support to the Army Reserve provided under the AGR program. This expansion, which began in the

1970s and which is projected to increase in the years ahead,

is one of the most important steps taken by the Army in

the Total Force era to improve Army Reserve readiness.

Historically, there have always been a limited number

of Reservists on active duty in support of Reserve Component programs and interests. Starting with the June 4,

1920, amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916,

Congress has authorized a minimum of five Reserve officers

31. Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Press Release 81-3, "Technician Conversion Report," January 12, 1981.

32. Maj. Gen. William R. Berkman, Chief, Army Reserve, The Posture of the U.S. Army Reserve, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,

1983), p. 25.

33. The Senior Staff Administrative Assistant, GS-13, is the highest Army Reserve technician position. As the senior technician for an

Army Reserve general officer command (GOCOM), the SSAA supervises

the daily operations of a command of up to 12,000 men and women.

The SSAA has ultimate supervision over hundreds of technicians and is

frequently called upon to make important decisions on urgent matters

when the commanding general cannot be reached. It is a position of

considerable responsibility.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 22 1

to be on duty with the Army's General Staff to insure the

proper consideration of Reserve-related matters.

Subsequently, Section 265, Chapter 11, Title 10 US

Code, authorized each service to have reserve officers on active duty in a status other than training, for the purpose of

preparing and administering policies and regulations affecting the Reserve Components.34

These positions are primarily

in Washington, DC, and at major headquarters having responsibility over Reservists. Until the early 1970s, the

number of such officers on active duty was limited.35

The first major expansion of the 265 program occurred

with the Army's 1973 reorganization, known as the STEADFAST program. Under STEADFAST, 200 Reserve Officers

were to be brought on active duty to assist in improving

Army Reserve readiness, although the Commander of the

Continental Army Command (CONARC) doubted that such

a large number of qualified Reserve officers could be found.

On the enlisted side, the first move toward an increase

in Reservists on active duty came in January 1972. At that

time 27 in-service recruiters were stationed at active Army

installations to recruit active duty soldiers for Army Reserve

units before they were automatically transferred to the Individual Ready Reserve upon separation from active duty. In

1973, 64 Reserve non-commissioned officers were placed at

US Army Recruiting Command main stations as liaison

NCOs to help with referral of prospective soldiers between

the active component and the Army Reserve. Further expansion of efforts took place in 1976, when 654 Army Reserve

non-commissioned officers were called to active duty to expand the Army Reserve's recruiting force that had been composed of civil service, dual-status technicians. In July 1977,

the recruiting force was expanded to 1,030; and on January

1, 1978, 97 non-commissioned officers were called to active

duty to serve as full-time unit training managers.

With the use of full-time enlisted and commissioned

Reservists showing positive results, the Army planned a major increase in Reservists on active duty. Reservists were to

be added at the company level in maintenance, supply and

training, while at battalion level and above, the emphasis

34. 10 U.S.C. 265.

35. According to the 1971 Annual Historical Supplement of Office of

the Chief Army Reserve, as of June 30, 1971, there were 26 Chapter 265

officers on active duty with the Army. This was an increase from 17 the

year before.
222 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

was on management and planning. The Department of the

Army, FORSCOM, and the Continental US Armies (CONUSAs) were authorized additional mobilization planners and

coordinators, and active duty installations and service

schools were to be assigned full-time Reservists to coordinate

Reserve Component support and to support the Total Force

concept.

On February 26, 1980, Maj. Gen. William R.

Berkman, the Chief, Army Reserve, testified to the Senate

Armed Services Committee that the "assignment of full-time

military to positions in Army Reserve units has the greatest

potential for improving unit readiness." He pointed out that

the Army Reserve had historically the lowest percentage of

full-time personnel of all of the Reserve Components, and he

requested funds to bring the number of full-time Reservists

to 5,400 by September 30, 1981.

What had begun as a very minor program was first

expanded to solve urgent recruiting problems and to assist

with mobilization planning. The divergent active duty statutes for Reservists were combined in February 1979 into a

career program commonly known as the Active Guard-Reserve (AGR) Program. Reservists in the AGR program are

competitively selected for active duty after a minimum

number of years in Reserve status, selectively retained and

promoted, reassigned under centralized personnel management and offered an opportunity for retirement after 20

years active duty. The number of Army Reserve AGR personnel is expected to surpass 7,400 by 1984,36

and a special

Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) study

group is expected to make recommendations for additional

AGR and full-time support positions in late 1983. In addition to AGR personnel and civilian technicians, the fulltime support to the Army Reserve includes active component soldiers. Traditionally, this has been in the form of

advisors, evaluators and trainers.

ADVISOR QUALITY QUESTIONED

Regular Army officers were assigned as a skeleton full-time

staff to the Organized Reserve divisions prior to World War

II. After World War II, full-time advisors were assigned to

Reserve Component units down to the battalion level. Although some of the officers assigned to Reserve Component

36. Ibid., pp. 24-27.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 223

duty before and after World War II were outstanding professionals,37

a general feeling developed in the 1960s that Reserve Component duty was not career-enhancing.

By 1970, the CONARC had become concerned about

the quality of officers assigned as Reserve Component advisors. Although CONARC determined that the advisor

program was sound in concept, it published an advisor

handbook in June that year and instituted a 40-hour course

for advisors to familiarize them with their duties. The command also recommended to DA that all advisors in the

grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel be Command and

General Staff College graduates.38

The next year, CONARC continued to complain about

the quality of advisors and the lack of Army guidance in

their use. On July 31,1970, CONARC recommended

changes in the advisor chain of command and higher standards for advisors. In December the Army approved more

stringent criteria for assignment to Reserve advisor positions

and raised the priority of advisor assignments, thus increasing the advisor fill from 74 percent to 92 percent of authorized strength.39

A few months later, Lt. Gen. Walter T Kerwin, Jr.,

the DCSPER, admitted to the Under Secretary of the Army

that the advisor program had problems. Not only were the

Reserve Components lacking in advisors, but it was common

for officers to be assigned to positions requiring an officer

two or more grades higher. It was not unusual for first lieutenants to be advising Reserve Component colonels.

In addition, Kerwin admitted to educational deficiencies in the advisor force. For example, only 29 percent of

the captains assigned to Reserve Component duty were college graduates, while 49 percent of captains on active duty

possessed a college degree. For colonels assigned to the Re37. Future General-of-the-Army and Chief of Staff George C. Marshall was assigned to Reserve Component duty in the 1930s by Chief of

Staff Douglas MacArthur. The assigning of full-time RA advisors to Reserve units was confirmed in an interview with D. Y. Dunn (Lt. Col.,

USAR-Ret.) on April 22, 1983.

38. Continental Army Command Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal

Year 1970, (Fort Monroe, Va.: CONARC, 1971), pp. 226-29. By contrast, in 1983, an Army Reserve officer is required to have completed

Command and General Staff College for promotion to colonel, and half

of the Command and General Staff Officer Course must be completed for

promotion to lieutenant colonel.

39- Continental Army Command Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal

Year 1971, (Fort Monroe, Va.: CONARC, 1972), pp. 188-92.
224 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

serve Components, less than half had college degrees at a

time when 97 percent of all active Army colonels were college graduates. Another indicator was that 37 percent of

lieutenant colonels in Reserve assignments were Command

and General Staff College graduates. Army-wide, 59 percent

of the lieutenant colonels were C&GSC graduates in 1971.40

For senior officers, Reserve Component assignments were terminal assignments and a transition to the civilian world

upon retirement.

In December, under pressure from the Army's civilian

leadership, Maj. Gen. George W. Putnam, Jr., the Director

of Military Personnel Policies, conceded that the demand for

quality officers exceeded the supply. Rather than assign

command credit for senior advisor duty as was done for advisors to the Vietnamese, Putnam suggested better housing

as a way to induce high quality officers to apply for Reserve

Component duty. He suggested that Reserve Component

tours be stabilized at 30 months, but he resisted the idea

that Reserve Component duty was equal in any way to overseas service.41 The opportunity to upgrade the advisor program came in the Army reorganization that was pending in

1972.

By January 1972, the Army had concluded that outside

pressures, particularly from the Department of Defense and

the Congress, made a reorganization of CONARC particularly inevitable. The octopus-like CONARC span of control

had to be reduced.

A March 31, 1972, Army staff study concluded that

the only reasonable course of action was to divide CONARC

into a training and doctrine command and a forces command. A project group was appointed under Maj. Gen. J.

G. Kalergis to work out the details of the reorganization,

and by July 19, 1972, they had accomplished their task.

The principal impact upon the Army Reserve was a

complete revision in the manner by which the active Army

advised, evaluated and assisted the Army Reserve. While the

Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) established in the

1968 reorganization remained unchanged, the relationship

between the ARCOMs and Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs) was strengthened. The CONUSAs would be relieved

40. Letter, Lt. Gen. Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., Army Deputy Chief of

Staff for Personnel, to the Under Secretary of the Army, July 16, 1971.

41. Letter, Maj. Gen. George W. Putnam, Jr., Director of Military

Personnel Policies, to the Under Secretary of the Army, December 9,

1971.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 225

of all responsibility for active forces and installations and

would concentrate upon command of the Army Reserve and

the readiness of both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.

A series of seminars between August 8 and August 15,

1972, refined the concept, which called for three CONUSAs

assisted by nine Readiness Assistance Regions. The Regions

were not in the Army Reserve chain of command, but instead consisted of branch teams to assist Reserve units. The

Regions would command the advisors dedicated to Army

Reserve general officer commands and the National Guard

State Adjutants General, and the dedicated advisors at the

battalion level would be eliminated to provide the manpower for the regions and their subordinate Readiness Group

(RG). The regions and the Readiness Groups were the

doers—hands-on workers who were responsible for improving Reserve Component readiness.42 On August 21, 1972,

the Chief, Army Reserve strongly endorsed the region and

Readiness Group concept,43and on September 21, Chief of

Staff Gen. Creighton W. Abrams approved the Readiness

Regions and Groups as part of the CONARC reorganization.44

The Readiness Assistance Region concept changed

slightly before the Regions were finally formed on July 1,

1973. They were renamed Army Readiness Regions (ARRs),

and the advisory/assistance functions of the ARR were organized in three echelons:

1. Dedicated advisors at major levels such as Army Reserve

Commands, divisions and brigades;

2. Readiness Groups with mobile teams to assist units

within specific geographical areas; and

3. Readiness Coordinators who coordinate ARR-wide assistance efforts and who act as a staff for the ARR Commander.

It became Army policy that the best qualified personnel available were assigned to the ARRs and RGs. Such

42. Continental Army Command Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal

Year 1972, (Fort Monroe, Va.: CONARC: 1973), pp. 57-87. See also,

U.S. Army Forces Command Annual Report of Major Activities, Fiscal Year

1974, (Fort McPherson, Ga.: FORSCOM: 1976), pp. 1-75.

43. Letter, Maj. Gen. D. V. Rattan, Deputy Chief, Office of Reserve Components, to Lt. Gen. Harris W. Hollis, Chief, Office of Reserve Components, September 20, 1972.

44. Memorandum for Record, Lt. Gen. Harris W. Hollis, Chief,

Office of Reserve Components, September 27, 1972.
226 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

assignments were equated with the best branch assignments

when comparing personnel of similar grade for personnel actions, and ARR and RG personnel were exempt from such

duties as casualty assistance officer and line of duty investigations 45 The Department of the Army seconded the CONARC and subsequent FORSCOM emphasis by instructing

promotion boards that Reserve Component assignments were

important assignments for active component officers.

Although some Reserve Component commanders were

unhappy about losing their battalion-level advisors, the reorganization completely revamped the advisor program and

upgraded the quality of active component assistance rendered the Army Reserve. As a result, the Army Reserve began to receive intensive training management.

The Army Readiness Region approach worked well initially and was a drastic improvement over the past. Reserve

commanders were able to obtain help from knowledgeable

personnel outside of the chain of command, and the dedication of the assistance teams worked some minor miracles in

the mid-1970s.47

Even though the ARRs and RGs were effective in improving the readiness of many Army Reserve units, there

were negative connotations to the reorganization. The 37

new ARRs and RGs had no post-mobilization mission; and

when added to the 19 ARCOMs and two Maneuver Area

Commands in the Army Reserve structure, there were a total

of 8,170 soldiers who had no post-mobilization assignments.48

The assumption was that these soldiers would become

available as individual replacements, but this assumption

45. Army Readiness Region Concept of Operations, (United States Army

Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Va., 1973), pp. 1-6.

46. Annual Historical Review, July 1, 1975 to Sept. 30, 1976, (U.S.

Army Forces command, Fort McPherson, Ga., 1976), p. 483-

47. In April 1975, one particular Adjutant General Replacement

Regulating Detachment was widely reputed to be one of the worst units

in the Army Reserve. The unit had flunked three consecutive Annual

General Inspections (AGI), failed three straight periods of Annual Training, had no technician support, and had retained a satisfactory strength

level only because of the influence of earlier draft-induced enlistments.

Personnel, mess and property records were a shambles; however, with the

assistance of teams from Readiness Group Meade and hard work by a

majority of the unit's members, the unit passed its 1975 Annual Training

evaluation.

48. Comptroller General, Report to the Congress of the United

States, LCD-79-404, Can the Army and Air Force Reserve Support the Active

Forces 'Effectively, (General Accounting Office, Washington, DC, 1979),

pp. 76 & 82.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 227

was somewhat tarnished when critics began to ask if the

Army could really use 28 major generals who had no postmobilization assignments—the 9 ARR commanders and 19

ARCOM commanders. The generals became the personification of criticism that the Army had created duplicate levels

of management in establishing the active Army ARRs to

oversee the readiness of Army Reserve units commanded by

ARCOMs.49

As a result of criticism from the Congress, Department

of Defense, and the General Accounting Office, the Army

in late 1978 established a task force to identify problems in

the Army command and control system. The result was the

Army Command and Control Study—82 (ACCS-82) that

presented several alternatives for maintaining the necessary

peacetime management while providing an orderly and rapid

transition to wartime.50

The alternative favored by the ACCS-82 study group

would have eliminated the ARCOMs and ARRs and combined them into 11 Army Readiness and Mobilization Commands (ARMC). These ARMCs would be commanded by an

active Army major general and would report directly to the

CONUSAs. There would be a Reserve Component deputy

commander, and the staff of the ARMCs would be a mix of

active Army officers, dual-status technicians and part-time

Reservists and Guardsmen.51

Before the ARMC concept could be tested, FORSCOM

proposed an alternative that modified the ARRs by giving

them additional mobilization responsibilities. The Office of

the Chief, Army Reserve concurred in the FORSCOM alternative which retained the ARCOMs while enhancing the

49. The issue of excess major generals presented the Army with a

very delicate problem. Many in the Army's senior leadership were concerned about the proper role of these generals after mobilization. For

example, while an Army Reserve major general whose background was

Civil Affairs was suitable for an ARCOM command, there was a debate

as to what role could be assigned him after mobilization. The same question was also addressed to officers with backgrounds in logistics and

other combat service support specialities when mobilization designees of

their grade and experience were already assigned to the Army staff.

50. Point Paper, DAAR-OT, Army Command & Control Study-82,

as presented to the Reserve Component Coordination Council, February

1980.

51. Information is based upon the authors experience as a dualstatus technician on the staff of an ARCOM that was selected to be

included in a test merger of an ARCOM and an ARR. The staffing mix

of the ARMC went through several versions before the ARMC idea was

dropped in favor of Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (ARMRs).
228 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

role of the ARRs. The FORSCOM alternative was approved

in late 1979, and the transition from ARRs to ARMRs was

completed in the summer of 1980.

Meanwhile, the issue of excess levels of management

did not go away. On December 11, 1979, the Senate Appropriations Committee and House Appropriations Committee conference report on the 1980 Defense Appropriations

Act stated that "the Conferees agree that significant savings

should be available beginning in FY 81 from eliminating

unproductive management layers in the Army Reserve Component support structure."52 The conferees requested a realignment to reduce excess levels of management be started by

September 30, 1980. The Army did not meet the deadline

requested by the Congress, but it did continue to work on

the problem.

After the Reagan Administration took office, Kenneth

P. Bergquist, the new Deputy Assistant Secretary of the

Army for Reserve Affairs and Mobilization, proposed sweeping revisions in the Army Reserves command and control

structure. An Army Reservist with a background as a Senate

staffer, Bergquist wanted to organize the Army Reserve in

peacetime for the way it would fight in wartime. He also

wanted to upgrade the management of the Individual Ready

Reserve, which he characterized as inadequate and ineffective. Specifically, Bergquist proposed transferring Reservists

in the Training Divisions, Reception Stations and Army Reserve Schools to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and transferring non-deploying Army Reserve medical units to the Health Services command—

moves that would affect 75,000 drilling Reservists.

Bergquist wanted to place Army Reserve units under

the peacetime command of the ARMRs. Some ARCOMs

would be merged with ARMRs, while others would be

given post-mobilization missions. The Bergquist ideas were

opposed by the Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association (SARCA) and were little supported by the Army staff.

They did, however, stimulate additional thought on the

organization of the Army Reserve.53

52. Point Paper, DAAR-OT.

53. Interview between the author and Secretary Bergquist at the

time of the proposal. See also Washington Update, Senior Army Reserve

Commanders Association, Riverdale, Md., December 1981 issue. The

issue of placing training divisions, reception stations, and Army Reserve

schools under TRADOC remained alive and was still being pursued by

TRADOC in September 1983-
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 229

Meanwhile, the Congress continued to press the Army

to eliminate one level of the Army Reserves management

structure. There were also particular concerns over the fact

that the Chief, Army Reserve did not command the Army

Reserve in the manner that his Air Force counterpart enjoyed authority over the Air Force Reserve. In latter 1981,

the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee asked the Army to

take action to enhance the authority of the Chief, Army

Reserve and indicated that legislation to that end would be

proposed if the Army failed to act.

A year later, the Army announced that the Army Reserve command and control structure was being reorganized.

The ARMRs would be eliminated, and the role of the ARCOMs would be enhanced. The FORSCOM span of control

would be increased from three armies to five, and the CONUSAs would assume many of the responsibilities of the disbanded ARMRs. Concurrently, the Army promised to enhance the role of the Chief, Army Reserve.54

In March 1983, the Army announced that the Chief,

Army Reserve would soon establish an Army Reserve Personnel Center as a field operating agency of OCAR. This center

would provide career management to AGR, IRR and Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) personnel. On May

2, came a report that the Army had told FORSCOM to

increase the responsibility of major Army Reserve Commands over training force modernization and mobilization

planning. According to a story in Army Times, FORSCOM

was told to give the ARCOMs significant, well-defined,

meaningful, post-mobilization missions.55

The published plans were explained to the Executive

Committee of the Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association on May 5 and 6. Following the briefing, Brig. Gen.

Raymond M. Jacobson, SARCA's Executive Director, wrote

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edward Meyer, expressing concern

that the ARCOMs would not be given sufficient additional

assets to carry out additional responsibilities under the

planned reorganization.56 Meyer's June 8, 1983, reply to Jacobson emphasized that "a key objective of this reorganiza54. "Reorganization Planned," CARNotes, Office of the Chief, Army

Reserve, Washington, DC (Jan.-Feb. 1983), pp. 1 and 6.

55. Larry Carney, "FORSCOM Told to Increase Reserve Command's

Control," Army Times, May 2, 1983, p. 3-

56. Letter, Brig. Gen. Raymond M. Jacobson to Gen. Edward C.

Meyer, May 25, 1983, as reprinted in the June 1983 issue of Washington

Update, Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association, Washington,

DC.
230 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

tion is to invest Major US Army Reserve Commands (MUSARCs) with more responsibility and authority for their own

management. This is appropriate recognition of both the increasingly critical role of the Army Reserve in the national

defense, and its increased capability."

Meyer also wrote, however, that the need to reduce

overall Army manpower spaces, and the need to add two

new CONUSAs to the command structure meant that no

additional resources would be given to the ARCOMs to

carry out their added responsibilities. Meyer suggested that

ARCOMs should re-evaluate the manner in which they

intended to employ the added full-time personnel planned

for them in 1984 under the AGR program.57 The emphasis

upon reducing manpower requirements was seconded in July

1983 when CARNotes announced that the elimination of the

ARMRs would mean a reduction of 125 military and 75

civilian spaces. According to CARNotes, the changes were

designed to increase the efficiency of the Total Army.58The

implication is that the reorganization has more to do with

saving dollars and manpower spaces that it does with enhancing the authority of the Chief, Army Reserve or the

ARCOMs.59 However, with the final decision not firm by

mid-1983, the net effect of the announced reorganization

cannot be predicted.

As important as the full-time support structure is to

the Army Reserve, the cadre and support forces and their

organization was but one of several major issues facing the

Army Reserve in the post-1968 timeframe. Immediately

after the 1968 reorganization, the principal Reserve Component concern was materiel readiness. Once the Army entered

the All-Volunteer Force era, the concern shifted to personnel

strength. After the strength picture improved in the 1980s,

the principal concern became materiel readiness and the potential block obsolescence of Army Reserve equipment.

57. Letter, Gen. Edward C. Meyer to Brig. Gen. Raymond M.

Jacobson, June 8, 1983, as reprinted in the June 1983 issue of

Washington Update, Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association, Washington, DC.

58. 'Army Trims Command Structure," CARNotes, Office of the

Chief, Army Reserve, Washington, DC, (July-August 1983), p. 1.

59. The reorganization is expected to produce annual savings of

$5.5 million. See Army News Service Release No. 103, "Reserve Component Command and Control," Department of the Army, Washington,

DC, May 26, 1983.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 231

THE AVF BRINGS STRENGTH PROBLEMS

One of the first effects of the All-Volunteer Force policy and

the ending of the draft was a drastic reduction in Ready

Reserve strength. The paid drill strength of the Army Reserve fell from 263,299 on June 30, 1971, to 239,715 on

June 30, 1973. The next year Army Reserve units had a net

loss of 14,000 members and the paid drill strength dropped

to 191,919 on June 30, 1976. By September 30, 1978, the

drill strength was down to 185,753 and it stayed around

that total until a steady increase began in 1981.

Concurrently with the unit losses, the Individual Ready

Reserve dropped from 1,059,064 on June 30, 1972, to

143,882 on January 30, 1978. The combined effect was

that the Ready Reserve, which stood at 1,192,453 men and

women when the Total Force Policy was announced in 1970,

was down to 338,847 seven years later. The Standby Reserve, which consisted mostly of soldiers in the last year of

their six-year military obligation, dropped by more than

300,000 between 1970 and 1977.

The precipitous decline in the Army's Ready and

Standby Reserves was a cold, hard reality that threatened the

success of the Total Force Policy. Improvements in materiel

readiness, training, and mobilization planning were hollow

accomplishments when the Army Reserve simply lacked the

manpower necessary to carry out its responsibilities to the

Total Force.

One of the great ironies of the All-Volunteer Force era

and the Total Force Policy is that the net effect of ending

the draft was increased Reserve Component responsibilities,

and hence greater numerical strength requirements, while

the capability to fill the Reserve Component ranks was decreased.60 This inherent conflict between personnel requirements and the ability of the Reserve Components to obtain

volunteers gave rise to a decade of handwringing as the

Army attempted to make the Volunteer Army concept work

for the Army Reserve.61

60. This paradox is one of the conclusions drawn by a National

War College research group in April 1982. See: James W. Browning II,

et al., The U.S. Reserve System: Attitudes, Perceptions, and Realities,

(Washington, DC: The National War College, 1982), p. 40.

61. Much of what is said here about the Army Reserve applies

equally to the Army National Guard. However, the history of the Army

National Guard is not the main thrust of this book, and specific policies

and examples will be addressed to how they affect the Army Reserve.
232 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

The Volunteer Army concept was based upon the assumption that if soldiers were paid a competitive wage the

military could attract enough manpower to sustain a volunteer active Army in the range of 800,000 to 1,000,000 men

and women. The incentive of higher wages worked reasonably well for the active force, especially when coupled with

relaxed personnel policies. The wage incentives, however,

failed to maintain Reserve Component strength in the

1970s.

The wage incentives failed because the motivation for

joining the Reserve Components was not the same as for

joining the active forces. The active components offered a

complete benefit package that the Reserve could not offer.

The benefits ranged from travel and medical care to paid

vacations and a change of lifestyle. This was in addition to

providing a wage that allowed a young person to quickly

satisfy material wants. Although both the active and Reserve

forces could offer initial job training and work experience,

the Reserve Components could not meet a young person's

day-to-day needs. The fact that the Reserve Components

were essentially viewed as a part-time job by their junior

personnel and potential enlistees was not recognized until

the Reserve Compensation System Study was complete in June

1978. In addition to the Defense Departments belated recognition that the Reserve Components required unique incentives to maintain strength without the inducement of a

draft, the Reserves entered the 1970s with several handicaps.

THE LEGACY OF VIETNAM HURTS THE ARMY RESERVE

The greatest handicap faced by the Army Reserve in 1970

was the failure of the Johnson Administration to mobilize

the Reserve Components to an appreciable degree for Vietnam. This allowed the Reserves to become a haven for individuals seeking to avoid combat duty. While this situation

may have allowed the Reserves the luxury of waiting lists

and the ability to choose whom they wanted, it also created

a Reserve peopled with over-educated and affluent junior enlisted men who had absolutely no motivation to reenlist

once their initial tour was over. As a result, there was a mass

exodus of first-term Reservists in the early and mid-1970s,

and waiting lists disappeared as draft calls were reduced in

1970 and 1971.

Second, the Army Reserve was handicapped by a lack

of equipment and adequate training facilities. Because of

equipment drawdowns, the supply of equipment to Reserve
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 233

units was so diminished that it became impossible to train.

As a result, Reserve commanders were forced to turn to

movies and classroom lectures to fill inactive duty training

time. It was quite common for NCOs to read lesson plans

to masses of sleepy, bored, college-educated first-termers

while the officers and full-time technicians wrestled with administration—which incidentally included drafting detailed

lesson plans.62

Third, the surfeit of potential enlistees and the practical restraints against realistic training made the Reserve

leadership lazy. Commanders, who were responsible for their

own recruiting, forgot how to recruit; training officers, who

were responsible to their commanders for realistic training,

forgot how to plan field training; and the active Army

leaders responsible for overseeing or advising Reserve training came to accept poor performance as the norm.63

These handicaps created in the public's mind an impression that the Army Reserve could offer very little to

prospective enlistees and that there was little to be proud of

62. The author's own experience followed this pattern.

63. In May 1973, Maj. Gen. Edward Bautz, Jr., described Army

Reserve training this way during an Army and Army Readiness Region

Commanders conference:

One of my first IDT visits was to a thousand-bed fixed hospital. When I

asked where they stood in their training program I was advised, 'the

fourth week of BUT'. When I asked what this really meant for a thousand-bed fixed hospital, there was a fair amount of conjecture among the

commander and his principal staff officers. Investigation showed that

there was no precise ATP for a thousand-bed fixed hospital .... I

observed a POL company engaged in a week-long exercise hauling empty

5,000-gallon tankers on a 150-mile turn-around. The men obviously

were not getting much out of it . ... On observing an infantry company ATT, I learned that the company had attacked, withdrawn, and

attacked over the same 4 to 5 kilometer stretch of ground—and this was

soon to be followed by a helicopter extraction. According to the tactical

scenario, a helicopter extraction would have been disastrous .... (but)

the CONARC Infantry Company Test required a helicoptet extraction as

the last event.. . . In visiting a POL supply point during AT, I found

a very well laid out arrangement. In talking to three men—all college

graduates—their primary mission for two weeks was to pump gas into a

vehicle fuel tanker whenever one rolled up. The skill level required is

equal to that needed in a self-service gasoline station. ... If this gives

you the impression that most Reserve Component units do not know

how to train properly, I would have to agree—but I hasten to point out that

in almost every instance I was accompanied by a senior Active Army officer who

bore some responsibility for this training. In at least half of these examples the

Active Army officer was a general officer. Quoted from a cleared transcript of

remarks in possession of the First US Army Historian.
234 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

in Army Reserve membership. This created a difficult hurdle

to overcome at a time when the Army Reserve had to compete against the active forces and the civilian employment

and education market for volunteers. The Army Reserve has

had a difficult time overcoming this hurdle.64

THE ARMY TACKLES STRENGTH PROBLEMS

In spite of the handicaps and a negative public perception of

the Army Reserve, the Army took a four-pronged approach

to solving Army Reserve strength problems in the 1970s:

1. Establish and then increase the size of the recruiter force.

2. Add low-cost incentives to the Reserve benefits package.

3. Take administrative actions to include changing Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) regulations while offering a

variety of Reserve enlistment options.

4. Institute a Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP).

The first three approaches, which were relatively low

cost, were started as soon as it became apparent that the

Army Reserves strength problems were not going to be

solved by wishful thinking. Bonuses, with their relatively high cost, were tried last, even though the Army

has continued with low-cost initiatives such as asking

Congress to extend the total military obligation to eight

years.

With enlisted strength dropping rapidly and waiting

lists all but gone, 1972 marked the start of Army initiatives

to maintain Army Reserve strength. A separate recruiting

and retention branch was established within the Office of

the Chief, Army Reserve to coordinate the recruiting and

retention programs. On January 3, 1972, a 42-man, in-service recruiting force was established at 27 active Army installations to encourage soldiers to join Reserve Component

units upon release from active duty.

Aided by an early release program for those joining a

Reserve Component unit, the in-service recruiters signed up

64. After the Iranian Crisis began in the fall of 1979, Reserve recruiters received a large number of calls from parents wanting to know if

their sons could join the Army Reserve so that they would not have to

serve in the Army. It appears that the Vietnam legacy of the Army

Reserve as a refuge from combat service died slowly. A major finding of

the November 1974 Gilbert Youth Survey was that only 13 percent of

young men were at that time favorably disposed toward Army Reserve

service. See Attitudes of Male Civilian Youth Toward Military Service,

Manpower Research and Data Analysis Center, 1975, p. ii.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 235

25,000 active duty soldiers for the Army Reserve by March

29, 1972.65 The Army Reserve backed unit recruiters and

in-service recruiters with a national print media advertising

campaign starting in January; and unit recruiters were given

full-time help starting on July 1, 1972, when the Army

Reserve started hiring 365 GS-7 Recruiting Specialists.

In 1973, 64 Army Reserve liaison non-commissioned

officers were placed in active Army recruiting main stations

to coordinate referrals between the components, and in 1976

the dual-status technician recruiting force was augmented by

654 Reserve non-commissioned officers in an active duty status. In July 1977, the number of Army Reserve Recruiters

on active duty was expanded to 1,030, marking a 300 percent increase in the full-time recruiting force in a little over

four years.66

In August 1978, the Vice Chief of Staff decided to

make Army Reserve Recruiting a responsibility of the US

Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). The transition of

the recruiting mission for FORSCOM to USAREC began

October 1, 1978, and was completed in May 1979. Meanwhile, the advertising budget in support of recruiting grew

from $2 million in 1972 to $11.1 million in 1979.

Today, USAREC remains responsible for the Army Reserve's recruiting mission, although Reserve unit members

are still an important source of leads for recruiters. Army

Reserve recruiters and active Army recruiters share recruiting

station space. They have similar incentive programs for high

production and parallel management structures under the

District Recruiting Command. Recruiters commonly share

referrals, but proposals to give active Army recruiters full

credit toward their monthly enlistment quotas for Army Reserve accessions and vice versa have not been accepted.

BENEFITS ARE INCREASED

No-cost and low-cost benefits to improve recruiting and retention were tried as early as 1972. In that year, the active

duty retirees Survivor Benefit Plan was extended to retirees

from the Army Reserve, and drilling Reservists were ex65. Department of the Army Annual Historical Summary, FY 1972,

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1976), p. 108.

66. Prior to the second expansion of the full-time recruiting force,

units were still responsible for recruiting. They were assisted by the fulltime recruiters, but units still had to have trained recruiting teams. A

considerable share of the Army Reserve's discretionary active duty for

training funds were expended for training and subsequent recruiting duties.
236 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

tended unlimited post exchange (PX) privileges during their

periods' of inactive duty for training (IDT)—the formal

name for weekend drills. The first of these incentives would

incur no expense until years in the future, and the PX benefit was of value only if the Reservist's unit trained on or near

an active installation.

Effective May 24, 1974, members of the Ready Reserve

were authorized full time Servicemen's Group Life Insurance

(SGLI), with the normal monthly premiums charged active

Army soldiers being deducted from the Reservists' drill pay.

This benefit did not appreciably add to the cost of the Army

Reserve.

Four days later, Public Law 93-292 made Army Reservists eligible for a burial flag, provided they died while

in a Ready Reserve status or after achieving the years of

service necessary for a Reserve retirement. The extra cost of

this benefit cannot be computed, but it is not thought to be

substantial. On September 30, 1978, the Survivor Benefit

Program was liberalized for Reservists. Under Public Law

95-397, a Reservist who attained 20 years of creditable

service could make a survivor annuity option that would pay

benefits to a survivor if the Reservist died before age 60.

Under earlier law, there was no survivor benefit if the Reservist died before actually beginning to receive retired pay

at age 60. This was a substantial and valuable incentive for

Reservists to stay in an active status for at least 20 years.

The gradual enhancement of low-cost or no-cost benefits to Reservists continued even as Army Reserve unit

strength improved in 1980. In 1981, Reservists were given

a Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) based upon their Annual Training site or location of additional active duty for

training, if they were eligible for a housing allowance.

In March 1981, it was announced that Reservists could

receive cash awards under the Army suggestion program.

Previously, awards were permitted only to full-time military

and civilian employees of the Army. Also in 1981, Reservists were authorized payment for use of their personal vehicle

if they were required to perform inactive duty for training at

a duty station other than their unit's normal place of duty.

In September 1981, Reservists were authorized to take advantage of the toll-free Army Family Life Communication

Lines as a way of obtaining immediate answers to routine

questions. This proved very helpful to spouses who were unsure of their benefits when the Reservist was away on Annual Training and there was no one at the Reserve Center to

answer questions.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 237

In March 1982, officials clarified the PX privileges of

Reservists. Post Exchange officials effectively doubled the

PX shopping privilege by ruling that a Reservist receives

one day of shopping for each period of drill performed, or

four days per weekend drill. Earlier, the rule had been one

day's shopping for each day of inactive duty performed. Officials also ruled that Reservists could take guests to post exchange theaters and purchase uniforms at post exchanges at

any time, without regard to privileges earned through inactive duty or active duty for training.67

As with earlier low-cost incentives, the more recent

benefits do not mark a major advance in overall Reserve

benefits if taken individually. However, when combined over

a period of years, the low-cost incentives have appreciably

enhanced the Reserve compensation package.

In addition to low-cost incentives, the Army quickly

turned to administrative actions to fill the Reserve ranks.

After a 1972 early release program encouraged soldiers to

join Army Reserve units, the Army adopted the Civilian

Acquired Skills Program (CASP), which permitted a nonprior service enlistee to gain credit for Advanced Individual

Training because of civilian skills or education. Started as a

test program on July 17, 1973, the CASP program was

made permanent on June 30, 1974. It was especially attractive to women, who were required to take only a two-week

basic training orientation under CASP enlistees. By 1975,

CASP was producing 60 percent of Army Reserve female

enlistments.68

In 1974, the Army Reserve was authorized to offer

4X2 and 3X3 enlistments to non-prior service men in the

top three mental categories. The 4X2 meant that the Reservist served four years in an Army Reserve unit and two

years in the IRR. The 3X3 option allowed three years in

each part of the Ready Reserve.

On May 24, 1978, the Army Reserve was permitted to

start a split-training option, which remains very popular today with high school and college students. Under splittraining, a young man or woman takes basic training one

summer and returns 12 months later for Advanced Indi67. A full description of the sweeping changes in Post Exchange

privileges can be found in the March 1982 issue of CARNotes, Office of

the Chief, Army Reserve, Washington, DC.

68. Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1975, Office of the

Chief, Army Reserve, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, p. 17.
238 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

vidual Training. In between the two training phases, the

Reservist earns IDT pay.69

When it became obvious that low-cost enhancements

were not effective in increasing Army Reserve unit strength,

Congress took the initiative and passed Public Law 95-79

on July 30, 1977. This act authorized enlistment bonuses of

up to $1,800, or educational assistance of up to $4,000, for

soldiers enlisting in selected critical skills or designated

units after October 1, 1977. In 1978, Congress dropped the

education assistance part of the program, but it included

reenlistment bonuses.

The educational assistance provisions were reinstated in

1980, and the present program (1983) pays up to $1,000

per year for books, fees and tuition for postsecondary education. There is, however, a $4,000 maximum payment for a

six-year enlistment. The present enlistment bonus ranges

from $1,500 to $2,000, and the reenlistment bonus is $900

to $1,800, depending upon the length of the reenlistment.

Between October 1, 1978, and September 30, 1982,

the Army Reserve spent $37 million on the bonuses and

educational assistance incentives for the 43,000 USAR

members who took advantage of the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP). Congress has extended the program

through 1985, and it is estimated that the program will

cost over $15 million in 1983-70 According to Maj. Gen.

William R. Berkman, the Chief, Army Reserve, "the incentives have a two-fold effect: an increase in Army Reserve

paid drill strength each year since initiation in FY 79; and

the channeling of new members into high priority units."71

Berkman stated that the SRIP has contributed substantially

to Army Reserve strength improvement.72 Berkmans enthusiasm for SRIP is not shared by the GAO, but it is sup69. When combined with the Simultaneous Membership program,

the split-training option provides a way for a young person to receive up

to six years of part-time employment and four summers of paid training

while in high school and college. In 1983, this package was estimated to

be worth $14,000 to an enlistee who goes on later to take ROTC and

receive a commission after his or her sophomore year in college.

70. Data is taken from official questions and answers prepared for

the press on Dec. 9, 1982, regarding the SRIP. Memoranda supporting

these data are on file in the Public Affairs Office, Office of the Chief,

Army Reserve.

71. Testimony, Maj. Gen. William R. Berkman, Chief, Army Reserve, before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Committee

on Armed Services, US Senate, Mar. 11, 1982.

72. Berkman, Posture of the U.S. Army Reserve, FY 1984, p. 12.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 239

ported by the 1981 tracking study of Reserve Component

attitudes. This study found that bonuses such as SRIP double the propensity of middle class youths to join the Army

Reserve and that the educational assistance aspect of the

SRIP is a strong incentive for high school graduates to enlist.73

Beginning October 1, 1980, the Army added an Affiliation Bonus to the Reserve Components incentive arsenal.

This bonus pays members of the Individual Ready Reserve

and soldiers leaving active duty $25 a month to complete

the remainder of their military obligation in a Reserve Component Unit. By the end of 1982, more than 3,000 soldiers

had taken advantage of the bonus, receiving an average of

$325 each. The benefit of this program is that it creates

immediately available troop unit mobilization assets rather

than more theoretical assets for Ready Reserve.74

The Army also took action, however, to strengthen the

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR is the primary

source of pretrained individuals which the Army depends

upon to augment the active forces and Reserve Component

units in the event of war or national emergency. As such,

the IRR figures prominently in mobilization planning. The

number and mix of specialities required early in a mobilization has been the subject of considerable debate both inside

and outside the Defense Department. Estimates of IRR

needs during the first 90 to 180 days of a conflict range

from 200,000 to over a half-million. The latest unclassified

figures estimate a need for 400,000 IRR soldiers to flesh

out units and to replace casualties during the first 90 days

73. In the fall of 1982, the General Accounting Office prepared a

draft report on the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP). The GAO

made three basic findings: the Army allowed overstrength Military Occupation Specialities (MOS) to benefit from the program, some low-priority units were allowed to award the bonuses, and the Army failed to

manage SRIP. Because the GAO was working with data over a year old,

the report was overcome by events prior to its final publication in January 1983. Beginning October 12, 1982, the Army paid SRIP bonuses by

MOS instead of the broader career field, which allowed a few individuals

in overstrength MOSs to receive bonuses. Also, the unit priority for

SRIP payments was tied directly to a unit's resource priority—which in

turn is almost directly linked to its mobilization priority. Reserve Component Attitude Study, 1981 Tracking Study, (Philadelphia, Penn.: Associates

for Research in Behavior, Inc., 1982), pp. vi and vii.

74. Data is taken from official questions and answers prepared for

the press on December 9, 1982, regarding the SRIP. Memoranda supporting these data are on file in the Public Affairs Office, Office of the

Chief, Army Reserve.
240 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

after mobilization.75It should be pointed out that this figure is consistent with the manpower needs that were projected in the mid-1970s.

Manpower for the IRR comes from individuals with

prior service in the active and Reserve Components who

have a remaining service obligation. IRR strength is therefore almost totally dependent upon the number of soldiers

leaving active duty or Reserve Component units. As long as

a draft was in effect, there was a constant source of manpower for the IRR as draftees left the active force following

their two years of active duty. They were then available to

the IRR for three years before being transferred to the

Standby Reserve for the last year of their six-year military

obligation. When the United States scaled down its involvement in Vietnam in the early 1970s and reduced the size of

the active Army, the IRR shrank. With fewer men entering

the active force, there were fewer men to be transferred to

the IRR following their initial period of service.

The IRR, which stood at 1,059,064 on June 30,

1972, had dropped to a low of 143,882 by January 31,

1978. It had fallen below the critical 400,000 figure as

early as 1975, and IRR strength suddenly became a matter

of serious concern within DoD.76The Army did little, however, to enhance the IRR until 1978.

On February 1, 1978, the Army extended the six-year

military obligation to women who joined the military. Previously, women could join the active force or a Reserve unit

for three years and then be discharged. The new policy required women to remain in the IRR for three years following their active duty or Reserve Component service. A few

months later, the Army stopped transferring soldiers to the

Standby Reserve during the sixth year of their military obligation. This policy became law on October 20, 1978, with

the signing of Public Law 95-485. In May 1979, the Army

began to enlist soldiers directly into the IRR, where they

would remain mobilization assets for six years following a

short period of active duty for training. Since the IRR direct

enlistment option carried few benefits with it, very few

young men and women chose this option.

75. Fiscal Year 1984 Defense Manpower Requirements Report, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1983), p. Ill—3 1-

76. By 1976, the projected IRR shortfall was 321,000, and this

shortage was considered critical. See Secretary of Defense's Annual Report on

Reserve Forces, FY 1976, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,

1976), p. 24.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 24 1

On October 1, 1979, the Army stopped discharging

soldiers for hardship, pregnancy or dependency. Instead, individuals qualifying under these categories were released

from active duty or Reserve units and placed in the IRR

until the end of their six-year obligation. Members of the

Trainee Discharge Program and Expeditious Discharge Program were also sent to the IRR if their command thought

they might be of value in a full mobilization.77

In 1981, the Army tested an IRR reenlistment bonus

which paid soldiers in selected skills $600 to reenlist in the

IRR for three years following the end of their six-year obligation. This was a modest success, with 3,815 soldiers reenlisting in the IRR in 1981, but the Congress declined to

continue the bonus in 1982.78The Army is again proposing

direct IRR enlistment and has also sought legislation to extend the basic military obligation of all service personnel to

eight years instead of six. Another step to increase IRR

strength was taken in 1983 when the Army tacked a twoyear IRR obligation on the end of all reenlistments, even if

the soldier had already served more than six years.

Faced with severe IRR shortages, the Army has turned

to its retirees as a source of mobilization manpower. Soldiers

who retire from the active Army after 20 years of service

become members of the Retired Reserve and remain mobilization assets. Starting in October 1981, the Army began

issuing pre-mobilization orders to selected members of the

Retired Reserve. These individuals would be ordered to

stateside duty in case of mobilization. These older soldiers

have typically been given training, planning, and administrative assignments which would free younger servicemen

for field duty.

The Army has assumed that 100,000 recent retirees

could be recalled promptly. The use of retirees and an assumed increase in IRR strength over the next few years has

enabled the Army to reduce its predicted IRR shortfall to

15,000 by the mid-1980s.79These assumptions have not

been universally accepted.

77. The Trainee Discharge Program permitted the discharge, without bias, of enlistees during Basic Training and Advanced Individual

Training if it appeared that they would be unable to succeed in the active

force. The Expeditious Discharge Program allowed for quick telease of

individuals who were unable to adapt to military life following the successful completion of their initial training.

78. Berkman, Posture of the U.S. Army Reserve, FY 1984, p. 20.

79. A change of planning assumptions has also enabled the Army

to reduce its IRR requirements. The peak demand for IRR members is
242 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

The General Accounting Office has been critical of the

Retiree Recall Program and the overall status of the IRR.

On October 15, 1982, the GAO called the Army's plan for

recalling retirees unreliable;80 and on January 31, 1983, a

GAO report stated that the Army has less than one-half of

the IRR members needed in wartime.81 Additionally, the

1982 Military Manpower Task Force Report to the President

on the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Force also

expressed reservations about the Retiree Recall Program and

the IRR.82It would appear that current incentives may not

be adequate to meet the Army's IRR needs.

WOMAN-POWER INCREASE

As effective as incentives and administrative enhancements

have been in building Army Reserve unit manpower in the

1970s and early 1980s, a key to Army Reserve strength

improvement has been womanpower.

Women won a permanent place in the American military through the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of

1948 and other legislation at about the same time, but the

former act restricted the number of women to two percent of

the enlisted force and the number of female officers to 10

percent of female enlisted strength. The strength limitations

were removed by Congress in 1967, but female strength in

the Army Reserve remained low throughout the early

1970s.

On July 1, 1972, there were 483 members of the

Women's Army Corps (WAC) in Army Reserve units and

281 in the IRR. There were also a number of women in a

Reserve status in the Medical Corps, Army Nurse Corps,

Medical Service Corps, and Medical Specialist Service Corps.

At the urging of Maj. Gen. William J. Sutton, then Chief,

Army Reserve, Reserve recruiters began a drive to substantially increase the number of women in the Army Reserve.

In the first year of that drive, nearly a thousand women

now assumed to occur at M+120 instead of M + 90. See Fiscal Year

1984 Defense Manpower Requirements Report, p. III-31

80. The Army's Ability to Mobilize and Use Retirees as Planned is

Doubtful, Report FPCD-83-6, (Washington, DC: General Accounting

Office, 1982).

81. Personnel Problems May Hamper Army's Individual Ready Reserve in

Wartime, Report FPCD-83-12, (Washington, DC: General Accounting

Office, 1983).

82. Casper W. Weinberger, Report to the President on the Status and

Prospects of the All-Volunteer Force, (Washington, DC: Military Manpower

Task Force, 1982).
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 243

were added to the Army Reserve's rolls, and the number of

women in Army Reserve units skyrocketed to 6,669 by June

30, 1974.83

To a substantial degree, the rapid increase in female

numbers was made possible by the previously-mentioned Civilian Acquired Skills Program (CASP), which allowed an

individual to enlist for three years in a civilian-related skill

at an advanced grade.84 A liberal policy allowed the appointment to grade E4 or E5 after completion of a two-week

familiarization course, which was supposed to be the equivalent of basic training. (Men, as mentioned, had to undergo

eight weeks of training.) Reserve units were supposed to

augment the two-week training with a series of mandatory

classes, but units frequently skipped these classes and put

women to work immediately.

Specialities in the administrative and medical fields

were the most popular areas for women joining the Army

Reserve under the CASP program as well as under other

enlistment options. The CASP criteria were gradually made

more strict over the years, and the two-week basic training

option was eliminated. Nevertheless, CASP gave the USAR

a substantial boost and helped it recruit a substantial

number of women in rapid fashion. The program remains on

the books today.

After 1974, female membership in the USAR grew

steadily, reaching 38,961—16.4 percent of unit strength—

by June 30, 1982. The opening of the Reserve Officers

Training Corps to women in 1972 dramatically increased the

number of female Reserve officers, and there are approximately 5,000 female officers—exclusive of the medical specialities—in Army Reserve units in 1983-

Recruiting statistics released on October 8, 1982,85

show that women accounted for 28 percent of first-time

Army Reserve enlistments during the 1982 fiscal year end83. These figures and subsequent personnel figures, unless otherwise noted, are from the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Annual

Historical Summary for the year indicated. Prior to 1972, the Office of the

Chief, Army Reserve did not record female and minority strength figures.

84. The provisions of the CASP program are outlined in AR

140-111. The criteria for awarding grade changed over the years, but

initially a person was given E4 rank for one year's experience and E5 rank

for two year's civilian experience. In some specialities, such as Social

Worker, post-high school education could be substituted for work experience. Men were also eligible for CASP enlistments, but had to take

eight-weeks of training before being granted accelerated rank.

85. Selected Reserve Manpower Strength Assessment and Recruiting Results,

News Release 443-82, Department of Defense, Oct. 8, 1982.
244 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

ing September 30, 1982. The Army Reserve had 64,388

women in the IRR and Army Reserve units on August 31,

1982, and Army Reserve units are expected to add another

1,000-12,000 women in the next few years.86

THE ARMY RESERVE SEEKS MINORITIES

In addition to recruiting more women in the 1970s, the

Army Reserve turned to another almost untouched source of

manpower—minority group members. Although minorities

had been part of the Army Reserve since the first World

War, the percentage of black and Hispanic soldiers in the

Army Reserve was small. In the mainland United States, the

overwhelming majority of Army Reserve units were overwhelmingly white. This practice of de facto segregation

abruptly changed in 1973-

In 1973 the Army Reserve's official policy became one

of recruiting minority groups so that units would reflect the

ethnic characteristics of the community. As a result, the

number of blacks in Army Reserve units doubled from

6,869 to 13,099 during fiscal year 1973, and the number

of black unit members reached 24,998 two years later. The

number of blacks in the Selected Reserve of the Army Reserve (unit strength plus Individual Mobilization Augmentees) was 59,216—23 percent of the force on June 1, 1983.

Other minorities accounted for 5.8 percent of the force at

that time. Blacks accounted for 26 percent of 1982 enlistments but remain underrepresented in the Army Reserve

commissioned ranks, for only 6.2 percent of Selected Reserve officers are black.87

In a final effort to improve unit strength, the Army

Reserve relocated units. Between July 1, 1975, and September 30, 1976, the Army Reserve relocated 88 units to

improve their recruiting base. Every major metropolitan area

was carefully examined, and there was a deliberate effort to

match unit types to the interests and skills of potential enlistees in the area.88

Today, the ability of an area to sustain a

Reserve unit is one of the principal criteria considered when

the Army looks at potential unit locations.

86. Source: Maj. Margaret Novak, Human Resources Action Officer, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve. Women equalled 16.7 percent

of the Selected Reserve on June 1, 1983, and are expected to increase to

18.1 percent by 1988.

87. Ibid.

88. USAR Paid Drill Strength Capped at 231',000, Press Release

82-88, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, July 12, 1982.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 245

Army Reserve unit strength problems are minimal in

1983- Although there are some units which are understrength enough to affect their readiness, seriously understrength units are few.

The principal constraint on Army Reserve unit strength

is money. On July 12, 1982, the Army Reserve announced

that it was holding unit strength at 237,000 for the rest of

fiscal year 1982 because there was not enough money to pay

for any more members.89

On April 6, 1983, Maj. Gen. William R. Berkman

testified to the Subcommittee on Preparedness of the Senate

Armed Services Committee that the 1984 Army Reserve

budget request reflects the Army's decision to hold down

personnel costs. According to Berkman, the 1984 paid drill

strength of the Army Reserve is being held to the 1983

level and the fiscal year 1983 end strength of 251,500 represents an increase of only four percent over the previous

year's authorization. Berkman also testified that Army Reserve unit strength was approximately 50,000 short of wartime requirements.

EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES CONTINUE

Fiscal constraints are also evident in the Army Reserve's

equipment posture. As satisfying as recent strength improvements have been, personnel cannot fight effectively if they

lack weapons and support equipment. The Army Reserve

has traditionally had equipment problems. This was clearly

recognized under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara

when he decided to abolish the ten Army Reserve divisions

which he could not equip. The issue of insufficient equipment for low-priority divisions could be dismissed as de minimis in 1964, but a lack of Reserve Component equipment is

serious in the Total Force era.

The equipment status of the Army's Reserve Components had been allowed to deteriorate under McNamara, as

first priority went to Vietnam and second priority went to

NATO. The Reserves were not permitted to requisition major items of equipment in the late 1960s because these requisitions were not going to be filled and the paperwork

would only clog the requisition system.90

89. Ibid.

90. Study: Resource Allocations to Reserve Components, Chief, Office of

Reserve Components (CORC), Washington, DC, 1969, p. 54.
246 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Major items remained unavailable to the Army Reserve

through 1970, but an unprecedented issue of equipment was

begun in 1971. Issuing $134 million worth of equipment

to the Army Reserve that year was made possible when the

active Army withdrew from Vietnam. It was made necessary

by the Total Force policy.91

Considering the technology available and the state of

the art of military equipment in 1971, the 1971 equipment

issue only serves to underscore the woeful neglect of the

Army Reserve under McNamara. Reservists, for example,

were still training with M-l rifles and older weapons that

were two or three generations behind the active force. These

venerable weapons, veterans of World War II and Korea,

were replaced with Ml4s and Ml6s. The slush box M211

2Vz ton trucks were replaced with M35s, and the Army Reserve started receiving the M151 quarter-ton truck to replace

the Korean War-era M38 jeeps. The Army Reserve was issued M60 machine guns to replace the Browning 1919A1

.30 calibre machine guns, and M48A3 tanks began to replace the M48A1 tanks in Army Reserve armor battalions.

The Army also started to replace the vacuum tube radios in

Army Reserve units.92

In 1972, the equipment issue was also $134 million,

and in 1973, $105 million was given to the USAR. As a

result, the Chief, Army Reserve reported that USAR units

had on hand 56 percent of the equipment they needed in

wartime.93Issues of $71 million, $79 million, and $64 million in the three following years brought the Army Reserve

to 71.1 percent of its wartime equipment requirements by

1976.94

However, starting in 1978, equipment intended for the

Army Reserve was diverted to Europe to build up NATO

stocks. As a result, the Army Reserve equipment availability

fell to 61 percent of peacetime authorization and only 50

percent of wartime requirements by September 30, 1979-

The lack of sufficient modern equipment prevented a substantial number of Army Reserve units from meeting their

91. Melvin R. Laird, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, Fiscal Year 1971, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,

1972), p. 40.

92. Ibid.

93. Annual Historical Summary, 1973, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, (Washington, DC, 1974), p. 6.

94. Annual Historical Summary, 1976, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, (Washington, DC, 1977), p. 18.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 247

readiness objectives. These problems were particularly acute

for Army Security Agency, Data Processing, and Engineer

units. Equipment shortages delayed force structure actions at

a time when the Army was trying to align more closely its

mix of Reserve units and its war plans.95 On February 1,

1980, the Chief, Army Reserve reported to the Reserve

Components Coordinating Council that 48 percent of Army

Reserve units could not meet their mobilization objectives

because of a lack of mission-essential equipment. More than

60 percent of Army Reserve units were rated as not combat

ready (C4) as of October 15, 1979.%

Admittedly, personnel shortages were also a major readiness problem at this time. The Army Reserve was turning

the corner on meeting its strength requirements, however,

much faster than it was in the equipment area. A 1980

issue of $44 million in equipment improved the situation

slightly to 52 percent of wartime requirements,97but the

over-riding problem was a lack of money for Army Reserve

equipment. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edward C. Meyer

spoke of this on February 3, 1981, when he told the Senate

Armed Services Committee that the lack of equipment in

the Reserve Components was not being addressed as rapidly

as necessary because of a lack of money.98

The equipment issue cannot be ignored if Army Reserve units are to meet their mobilization objectives as a

vital part of the Total Force. The Association of the United

States Army expressed the urgent equipment needs of the

Reserve Components this way in 1980:

There must be a major increase in early acquisition of current

generation equipment right off of the production lines for the

Guard and Reserve if our early deploying units are to be compati95. Annual Historical Summary, 1979, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, (Washington, DC, 1980), pp. 14 and 46.

96. Information Paper, Overview of USAR Readiness Ratings and

Trends, (Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, DAAR-OT, Washington,

DC, February 1, 1980).

97. Information Paper, USAR Equipment Status, (Office of the Chief,

Army Reserve, DAAR-LO, Washington, DC, December 18, 1980). The

information paper stated that "lack of sufficient quantities of modern,

first-line equipment continues to prevent the Army Reserve units from

attaining their prescribed readiness objectives. Acute major item shortages continue to exist in data processing, heavy engineer, cryptologic and

communications and electronic equipment."

98. Transcript of Authorization Hearings on Army Programs, reprinted as Speech File Service, No. 5, Office of the Chief Public Affairs,

Department of the Army, 1981. p. 23.
248 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

ble with the Active force already deployed or currently deployable.»

Citing the House Armed Services Committee report on

the Fiscal Year 1981 Defense Authorization Act, the Association explained the cause of the Reserve Component equipment shortages as follows:

Over the years, the political requirements of budget-making have

overruled the real needs of the military. We now find ourselves

with a backlog of requirements that are essential to national defense and security. Each requirement is urgent in a world becoming more dangerous each day. This backlog of requirements is,

itself, a product of the claim of "unaffordability" in past years.100

In 1981, the US Army Forces Command reported favorable increases in Army Reserve deployability because of

an increase in personnel and improved training. Equipment

improvements did not keep pace, however, and FORSCOM

reported that "it was obvious that if DA could match growing personnel strengths with increased issues of now short

items of equipment, there could be a major improvement

recorded over the next several years."101

On December 1, 1981, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Reserve Affairs) Edward J. Philbin testified before

the Senate Armed Services Committee that the shortages of

Reserve Component equipment were a reflection of overall

shortages of equipment in the Total Force. He admitted that

Reserve forces had obsolete equipment and that much of it

was not deployable, but Philbin stressed that Reserve units

could still effectively perform a variety of missions.102

On February 8, 1982, Secretary of the Army John O.

Marsh, Jr., told the House Armed Services Committee that

he intended to place special emphasis upon the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve and that the committee

would see the results of this emphasis in the current and

99. A Status Report on the Army National Guard and the United States

Army Reserve, Association of the United States Army, Arlington, VA,

1980, p. 19.

100. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

101. Annual Historical Review, Oct. 1, 1980-Sept. 30, 1981, U.S.

Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA, 1982, pp. 305-330.

102. Testimony, Hon. Edward J. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Preparedness Subcommittee, Senate

Armed Services Committee, December 1, 1981, pp. 10 and 18.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 249

coming years.103 The Army Secretary's 1982 emphasis may

produce some materiel gains in future years. On February

25,1983, Chief of Staff Meyer testified that $750 million

worth of equipment would be delivered to Guard and Army

Reserve units in 1984, and he projected that $1 billion of

the active Army's 1984 procurement would be distributed to

the Reserve Components in the years ahead.101 Shortly thereafter, Lt. Gen. Richard H. Thompson, Army Deputy Chief

of Staff for Logistics, gave the following data for the Army's

Reserve Component share of future procurement dollars:

FY 1984 $ 906,900,000

FY 1985 885,000,000

FY 1986 769,400,000

FY 1987 1,885,200,000

FY 1988 2,46l,700,000105

This is a total of $6.9 billion over the next five years.

When it is considered that estimates of the Army Reserves

equipment shortages ranged from $3.9 to $5.6 billion106

early in 1983, it would appear that even $6.9 billion will

not cure all Army National Guard and Army Reserve equipment problems. Such a sum, however, would be a major

step toward achieving materiel readiness.

There are, however, two problems in anticipating major

real gains in Army Reserve equipment status by 1990. First,

two-thirds of the billions shown above are planned for the

"Out" years of the budget cycle. Procurements planned that

far ahead are often revised downward when budget priorities

are developed.

Second, the 1983 Army Reserve shortage figures do not

consider potential force structure changes. As the Total

Force structure is refined each year to meet evolving contingencies, it is quite likely that new units will be added to

the Army Reserve and lower priority Reserve units dropped

103. Testimony on the Posture of the Army, reprinted as Speech

File Service, No. 3, Office of the Chief Public Affairs, Department of

the Army, Washington, DC, 1982, p. 1.

104. Statement, Gen. Edward C. Meyer, before the Committee on

Armed Services, United States Senate, February 25, 1983, p. 7.

105. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Project ALARM,

DALO-PLM, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1983, p. 2.

106. Berkman, Posture of the U.S. Army Reserve, p. 20. The difference of $1.7 billion between the two figures depends on whether

Army Reserve armored battalions are issued the M-l Abrams tank. If

Army Reserve units are equipped with the M60 tank, the value of 1983s

equipment shortage is $3-9 billion.
250 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

from the force structure. The new units will require equipment that is not on hand today and which cannot be anticipated today. This will add to overall Army Reserve equipment needs as we approach 1990.

As severe as some equipment shortages may be, the

clear facts remain that the Army leadership is well aware of

the Army Reserves equipment deficiencies and is attempting

to solve the most serious deficiencies within the limits imposed by the Army budget. Equally important is the very

substantial progress made in the quality and quantity of

equipment on hand between the beginning of the Total

Force policy in 1970 and today—1983.

MAINTENANCE IMPROVES

Two subjects closely related to equipment on hand and

strongly influenced by the quantity of Army Reserve equipment are maintenance facilities and programs in general and

the overall adequacy of Army Reserve facilities. The increased issue of equipment to the Army Reserve in the early

1970s presented problems of maintenance, storage, and

training. At the beginning of the decade, units were responsible for their own maintenance, and upper echelon maintenance for Army Reserve equipment was performed by active

Army facilities on a space-available and time-available basis.

This system worked when Reserve units possessed only a few

of their major pieces of equipment, but it broke down under

increased equipment issue.

The solution was to increase the number of maintenance facilities operated directly by the Army Reserve. By

June 30, 1972, the Army Reserve was reaching maintenance

self-sufficiency with 203 maintenance shops and 2,175

maintenance technicians. These shops were known as Area

Maintenance Support Activities (AMSAs), and their work

was supplemented by assigning Army Reserve direct support

units the mission of supporting other Army Reserve units.

In 1977, the Chief, Army Reserve reported that the

212 AMSAs were keeping Army Reserve materiel readiness

up to active component standards. In general, the Army

Reserve's maintenance capability has not been a negative factor on unit training or readiness. There is still, however, a

maintenance backlog for Army Reserve units estimated at

$61.2 million in 1981. "" 107

107. Annual Historical Review, Oct. 1, 1980-Sept. 30, 1981, U.S.

Army Forces Command, p. 451.
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INADEQUATE FACILITIES

The chronic nature of inadequate facilities was evident in

1969 when a resource allocation study determined that at

the current rate of construction—$25 million a year—the

construction requirements could be met by the year 2016.108

In 1971, only 287 of 1019 centers were considered adequate, generating total construction requirements of

$338,400,000. The unfinanced construction requirement

had expanded to $399 million by 1974, at which time the

Army declared a 10-year Army Reserve Construction Program to eliminate most of the major problems by 1980.

This plan called for spending $54 million a year on

Military Construction Army Reserve (the MCAR appropriation). This figure was approached only once in the next decade—$53.8 million in 1977—and fell to $30 million in

1980. By the time $65 million was available in 1982 and

$53 million was requested for 1984, inflation had halved

the value of such a sum. As a result, the Army Reserves

construction backlog stood at $848 million in 1982.109 Even

though the Army Reserve possesses many fine, modern Reserve Centers well-equipped with maintenance facilities and

training areas, the majority of Army Reserve centers are inadequate. Some centers are inadequate because they are old

or too small, while others are inadequate because they are

rented facilities that were not designed to house Army Reserve units. There has not been enough money appropriated

to replace or upgrade all of the inadequate facilities, and

there are Army Reserve units in 1983 training in former

automobile showrooms and unused portions of bowling alleys.

The USAR must also build and maintain maintenance

facilities and certain training areas. The Army Reserve is

responsible in part for the training areas of a number of

installations such as Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. and Fort

Pickett, Va., where MCAR monies have been spent on

training ranges and other facilities used by Reserve units.110

108. Resource Allocation to Reserve Components, p. 68.

109. The $848 million dollar backlog figure comes from The Posture

of the Army and Department of the Army Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year

1983, p. 55; other construction figures are found in the Annual Historical Summaries of the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and The Posture

of the U.S. Army Reserve, previously cited.

110. Sometimes the planned use of facilities by Reservists can lead

to some decisions of dubious long-term value. For example, when the

Army Reserve funded the construction of an encampment area on Fort
252 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

The adequacy of training areas has a direct impact upon the

ability of a unit to train for its mobilization mission, and

when a unit must travel several hours to reach a suitable

facility for field training, the amount of time remaining for

training is seriously reduced. Although there has been an

upgrading of training areas in recent years, many units cannot meet their full potential because of a lack of ranges or

maneuver areas.

Despite budget constraints which have placed limits on

training facilities, equipment issues and personnel strength,

the Army Reserve has made considerable progress since 1970

in the critical area of training. In the past 10-12 years,

training has become more imaginative, training has become

better managed, training-support personnel have been increased, training flexibility has been achieved, and training

standards have been upgraded. In addition, the Army has

instituted affiliation programs between the active and Reserve Components, and the long-standing Mutual Support

Program has enhanced training and readiness.

In 1970, the Army Reserve had two major training

problems. The first was an extensive backlog of new Reserve

enlistees who had been unable to obtain their initial active

duty training. Since the establishment of the REP-63 enlistment program on September 3, 1963, Army Reserve enlistees were guaranteed as much initial active duty as was

necessary to complete basic training and become qualified in

their military occupation specialty. When the Army was expanded in the mid-1960s, priority for training went to active Army draftees, and Army Reservists were unable to obtain basic training and technical schooling.

Basic training delays of up to two years were not uncommon in the 1960s. By July 1, 1969, 21,652 Reservists—approximately 10 percent of the USAR enlisted

force—were awaiting training. The inability to obtain initial training was particularly acute in medical specialities,"1

and this problem was not alleviated until 1971. As the

number of new soldiers entering the active Army decreased,

Pickett in 1982, the Army denied funds to install heating in the barracks and administrative areas. The rationale was that these facilities

would only be used by Reservists on weekends and in the summer during

Annual Training. The Fort Pickett commander's entreaties that there just

might be a winter mobilization someday were rejected so that a relatively

few dollars could be saved.

111. Annual Historical Summary, July I, 1970 to June 30, 1971,

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Washington, D.C., pp. 7-8.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 253

Reservists were able to obtain training. The REP-63 backlog was down to 1,904 by June 30, 1972, and it ceased to

be a problem the next year.

The second major problem in 1970 was that the entire

Army Reserve training philosophy and approach seemed to

be inadequate. Ever since the Korean War, Reserve units had

concentrated on basic unit training (BUT), with the attainment of company-level proficiency as the objective. Once the

unit had achieved company-level proficiency, it would take

the standard Army Training Test (ATT). Once all of the

companies of a battalion passed their ATT, the battalion

would start on battalion-level training. This latter, however,

rarely occurred.112

In theory, units were supposed to be able to progress

three weeks along the training cycle toward battalion and

higher level proficiency each year. Such progress was in reality almost impossible, because units would have a 20 percent turn-over among their junior enlisted personnel each

year. After two or three years, it became necessary to stop

company-level training and start over on squad and platoonlevel training.

This endless cycle of training was exacerbated in the

1960s by inadequate training facilities, curtailment of Reserve operations and maintenance funds, reduction in advisor

support, and the REP-63 backlog. Something had to be

done.

In January 1970, following the Chief of Staffs December 22, 1969, memo reaffirming the Reserve Components as the principal source of mobilization expansion, the

Department of the Army directed the Continental Army

Command (CONARC) to improve Reserve Component

training and readiness.113 After studying the problem, CONARC determined that improvements in the advisor system,

an affiliation between active and Reserve units and more

mutual support between the components would lead to major improvements in training and readiness.

112. In 1970, 31 percent of Army Reserve companies had achieved

company-level training. There was little progress though. That year, 11

percent of Army Reserve battalions reported that they had moved from

squad-level to platoon-level training and seven percent reported progress

from platoon-level to company-level training. See Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1971, Continental U.S. Army Command, Fort Monroe,

Va, 1972, p. 187.

113. Annual Historical Summary. Fiscal Year 1970, Continental U.S.

Army Command, Fort Monroe, Va, 1971, pp. 226-29.
254 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

MUTUAL SUPPORT, AFFILIATION, AND CAPSTONE

Mutual support between the components had been in effect

in an informal manner for several years. Specialized Reserve

units such as Medical, Judge Advocate General or Civil Affairs would provide services to an active Army installation or

command in return for physical support during Annual

Training or weekend field training.

This beneficial relationship had come to the attention

of the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Bruce Palmer, who

encouraged Gen. James L. Woolnough, the CONARC Commander, to formalize the program. Woolnough agreed, and

CONARC forwarded a draft program to Palmer in December 1970.ll4

This program gave 23 examples of how active units could support Reserve units and 18 examples of

Reserve support to the active force.

The CONARC draft was accepted, and the Mutual

Support Program was made official in July 1971 with the

publication of Army Regulation 11-22. Although a lack of

funds restricted mutual support to units located near each

other, the Mutual Support Program (MSP) was well received. Within a year, more than 40 percent of Army Reserve units had formal MSP agreements, and virtually every

Reserve unit was involved in MSP by the 1980s.

Affiliation and Roundout programs were also started in

1970. The two differ in that a Roundout Reserve unit replaces an active component unit in an active Army brigade

or division, while an Affiliation is a working relationship

where the Reserve unit augments rather than replaces an active component unit.115

The Army Reserves Roundout relationship began in

1970 when the 8th Battalion, 40th Armor was assigned as a

Roundout battalion of the 1st Armored Division. This was

expanded in February 1973 with the 100th Battalion,

114. For correspondence, between Palmer and Woolnough, see

Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1971, pp. 184-86. Palmer initiated the cotrespondence, but when Woolnough agreed and asked for a

formal program, Palmer replied that the current fiscal situation did not

allow expenditures for mutual support programs.

115. Roundout is not without risk. The FORSCOM Annual Report of

Major Activities, Fiscal Year 1975, summarizes Roundout risks and benefits this way: "On paper, the Roundout concept seemed to offer a method

of increasing Active Army mobilization deployment combat strength at

an attractively low cost. The only problem was whether or not these

Reserve units could ever be brought to a combat readiness condition

which would allow them to function . . . effectively and responsively in

a sudden mobilization." See page 396 of that report.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 255

442nd Infantry in Hawaii being named to roundout the

25th Infantry Division. By September 30, 1978, every

stateside active Army division had Army Reserve or National Guard Roundout units assigned, although by and

large this is a National Guard role as opposed to one for the

Army Reserve.116

Affiliation as a formal program developed in the

mid-1970s. Affiliation as a concept had been approved in

1973 and studied in detail in 1974. As with Roundout,

Affiliation was very attractive because of its cost effectiveness. The Army concluded that Affiliation was preferrable to

keeping additional units on active duty.117This led to an

adjustment of the Department of the Army Master Priority

List (DAMPL) and a major restructuring of the Army Reserve's forces in 1976, 1977 and 1978.

During those three years, 782 Army Reserve units underwent a realignment of some nature—activation, deactivation or reorganization. Seventeen Army Reserve units were

brought into Affiliation in 1978, and 50 more were added

in 1979.U8

In 1980, the Affiliation concept was expanded to include every unit in the Army Reserve, and a new program

was coined. This was the CAPSTONE program which

aligned Reserve units with the active and Reserve Component units with which they are likely to be deployed. CAPSTONE relationships were formalized into discrete mobilization packages based upon NATO requirements in the D to

D + 90 timeframe and the Total Force.

116. Ibid.

117. See Robert A. Gessert, Problems of Implementing Reserve Component—Active Army Augmentation!Affiliation, (McLean, Va.: General Research Corp., 1974). This study asserts that formal Affiliation became

necessary because the Army had a 40 percent manpower shortfall in the

active Army and was unable to meet JSOP planning objectives without

extensive use of Reserve Components in the D to D + 90 time-frame of a

NATO contingency. In supporting Affiliation as a solution, according to

Gessert, the Army made several assumptions. These include assumptions

of company-level proficiency for Reserve units, four weeks lead time for

mobilization, equipment compatibility between active and Reserve Components, and strength figures that would allow a deployment strength of

86 percent TOE. Affiliation as a formal program was authorized by Chief

of Staff Memorandum 73-135—132, dated November 21, 1973.

118. Realignment and Affiliation data is from the OCAR Annual

Historical Summaries for 1976 through 1979.
256 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

CAPSTONE created a training and planning relationship that focused upon wartime missions and left no

doubt as to the wartime organization of every unit in the

total peacetime force. CAPSTONE thereby became the basis

for much mobilization planning. This planning is an extraordinarily complex task involving manning, equipping,

training and deploying more than 4,000 separate military

units to more than 50 different installations."9

Mutual Support Programs have proven beneficial, and

Roundout and Affiliation solved an Army force structure

problem. Roundout and Affiliation led to CAPSTONE, but

Roundout and Affiliation did not alter the fact that Army

Reserve unit training did not seem to progress very quickly.

Unit commanders were given more flexibility in training in 1972 when the number of mandatory and general

subjects was reduced to allow more emphasis upon missionrelated training. In 1974, the Army started to move away

from the Army Training Test and began to develop the

Army Training and Evaluation Programs—ARTEPs. The

ARTEPs defined unit training status by the ability of a unit

to perform a number of mission-related tasks. The ARTEP

was different for each type of unit and gave the commander

a guide by which to tailor his training program. More importantly, the ARTEP concept made it easier to define training readiness. The ARTEP concept abolished the practice of

estimating how many weeks a unit had progressed during

the year. Instead, a unit's training readiness was measured by

the proportion of major and minor training tasks the unit

could or did accomplish. Thus, the training portion of the

overall readiness equation became more objective and less

subjective.

FORSCOM EMPHASIZES REALISTIC TRAINING

At the same time the Army was developing the ARTEPs,

the Steadfast reorganization was having an effect upon Army

Reserve training and readiness. The new FORSCOM emphasized field exercises, the use of aggressor forces for realistic

training, field skills such as camouflage, cover and conceal119. Testimony, Maj. Gen. William R. Berkman, Chief, Army Reserve, before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Feb. 26,

1980. See also, Department of the Army Historical Summary, FY 1980,

(Draft), Department of the Army, Washington, DC, pp. II—6 and

VIII-28.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 257

ment, adventure training, and the realistic use of training

aids. In 1974, FORSCOM's second year, the new command

emphasized mission-related training for Army Reserve units

during weekend IDT. Reserve combat support and combat

service support units were urged to perform actual support

missions on weekends. The next year, FORSCOM required

Army Reserve units to conduct at least two weekend field

training exercises, and units were told to minimize parades,

details and fatigue work during IDT. Looking carefully at

typical Reserve unit training, FORSCOM personnel concluded that half of IDT was not directed toward mission

training. Two weekends each year were devoted to preparation for the Annual General Inspection (AGI); two went

into recruiting; one was lost to ceremonies and parades; and

one was spent in MOS testing. Annual Training (AT) time

was also lost to administration, weekend passes, parties, PX

visits, issue and turn-in of equipment and travel. It was

estimated that only 8 to 9 days of useful training were

being accomplished during the 14-day AT period.120

The problem was that many of the diversions from mission-related training were either justifiable or desirable. In

the mid-1970s, the Army Reserve was having tremendous

recruiting and retention problems. Reserve commanders recognized that benefits such as making use of the PX and

active Army recreation facilities during AT were inducements for Reservists to remain in the Army Reserve. Commanders realized that having the middle weekend off reduced family objections to Annual Training, and a final

night party was good for morale.

The administrative problems were a fact of life. This

was before the Army Reserve started to receive additional

help under the full-time manning program. Paperwork requirements—generated by the active Army—had exploded,

and the increased administrative workload was a direct result

of the Total Force policy. With the increased reliance upon

the Reserve Components, Reserve units were subjected to

the full weight of active Army requirements with little or

no change in the full-time manpower to support this workload.121

120. Annual Report of Major Activities, Fiscal Year 1975, U.S. Army

Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA, 1976, pp. 423 and 424.

121. C. F. Briggs, 1980 Reduction of Administrative Workload at the

Reserve Component Unit Level, final report, RCCC Task Force, Department

of the Army, Washington, DC, 1980, p. 4-2.
258 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

There simply was not time enough in 280 training

hours a year to achieve all desirable training objectives while

accomplishing all required administrative tasks. When faced

with a choice between looking good on an AGI, which concentrated on administration, or improving training readiness, which was still very subjective, unit commanders

chose to pass their AGIs.122

Although recognizing the dilemma that strict training

policies created, FORSCOM continued to demand more realistic training. In 1978, Reserve commanders were required

to conduct 88 hours of mission-related training during AT.

This mission-related time could not include travel, equipment issue and turn-in, pay call, physical training testing,

marksmanship, or even clearing of post at the end of AT. As

a result, unit commanders began to schedule evening and

overnight training to achieve the mandatory 88 hours. The

increased night-time training was what the Reserve units

needed, and the end result was an improvement in field

training.

In 1979, Reserve units were told to emphasize night

training and to concentrate upon mission essential training—those tasks which had to be done to perform the wartime mission. Since then, mission-essential training has

been the watchword, and units have concentrated on likely

wartime missions, in contrast to achieving every capability

identified for their type of unit. Army Reserve training

readiness thus made major improvements between 1970 and

1983 because of stricter standards, increased active Army

assistance, the adoption of the ARTEP system, and a clearer

identification of wartime responsibilities as defined by CAPSTONE relationships. An increase in the number of fulltime personnel has helped reduce the administrative problems faced by commanders, and advances in mobilization

planning have more clearly identified the tasks that units

need to accomplish in peacetime.

122. The Briggs report urged the army to reduce the administrative workload at the unit level. A watchdog organization was set up

within The Adjutant General's (TAG) Office, but by 1983 its accomplishments have been more form than substance. Probably the two biggest changes which have slightly reduced unit administrative requirements are the lengthening of the minimum Officer Evaluation Report

(OER) time to 120 days and dropping the monthly serial number check

of weapons. Weapons are now counted monthly, and the serial number

check is done quarterly.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 259

MOBILIZATION

Estimates of readiness aside, the key to Army Reserve unit

usefulness is the ability to mobilize. At least one-half of the

Army's war-making capability is in the Ready Reserve, and

the entire Total Force policy is predicated upon the ability of

the Reserve Components to mobilize quickly. Mobilization is

a complex process requiring that people and equipment be

brought together in the right proportions at the right time.

Mobilizing a Reserve unit means assembling all of its members, separating them from their families and civilian jobs,

gathering all of their personal gear and unit equipment,

moving this assemblage in a few days to a mobilization station, performing last minute training, perhaps going overseas, and, finally, arriving at the wartime destination able to

perform the unit mission. Obviously, much can go wrong

with this process.123 It is an undertaking fraught with opportunities for failure and confusion. Experience with Reserve Component mobilization for World War II, Korea,

123. The stark necessity for mobilization exercises is vividly illustrated by the experience of the 3397th US Army Garrison during

MOBEX 78. This Chattanooga, Tenn., Army Reserve unit was assigned

to operate Camp Shelby, Miss. At the time, the press described Camp

Shelby as a swampy, mosquito-ridden camp, some 45 miles north of

Biloxi, Miss., which had not been used by active units since the end of

World War II. It was one of some 15 semi-active or state-operated installations which would have to be used for mobilization purposes in

cases of full mobilization.

The garrison's mission in MOBEX 78 was to prepare Camp Shelby

to receive five Reserve Component combat brigades that were coming to

Shelby for final training before overseas deployment. The garrison's first

problem was that Camp Shelby had only enough barracks for one brigade, and even these were wooden, temporary World War II buildings.

The garrison attempted to requisition tents, but the requisition was cancelled by an improperly-programmed computer. The computer problems

proved meaningless anyway, because the Army did not have enough tents

for four mechanized brigades. Actually, however, the garrison didn't need

tentage for four brigades, because the units coming to Shelby were 4,000

men understrength.

The garrison tried to requisition trained men to flesh out the brigades. However, at the time, the Army had three different personnel

requisitioning systems in effect—one each for active Army, National

Guard and Army Reserve. These systems could not be made compatible.

In the end, there was a 40 percent error rate on the personnel assigned as

fillers.

According to outside observers at the time, it was difficult to see

how the troops could have been given final training at Camp Shelby.

There was no ammunition available for firing, and Shelby had no place

to store the diesel fuel needed for maneuvers. There was no way to get

the M60 tanks and armored personnel carriers to Camp Shelby because of
260 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Berlin, and Vietnam has shown that it is very easy for the

process to break down.

Though each mobilization has gone more smoothly

than the previous one, even the small Vietnam mobilization

was far from perfect. This tendency was recognized in the

early 1970s, so the Army decided to practice mobilization.

The result has been a series of mobilization exercises

(MOBEXs) in 1976, 1978, 1980 and 1982 which have led

to changes in Army Reserve administration and training

while fine-tuning mobilization planning.

The first exercise, MOBEX 76, was the first large-scale

test of mobilization plans since the Berlin mobilization provided a real world practical exercise in 1961. The 1976 exercise was a free-play command post exercise representing a

deliberate full mobilization for general war in Europe.

Nearly 300 Army Reserve units participated in the exercise,

which simulated alert, mobilization at home station, and

movement to the mobilization stations. Even though

MOBEX 76 was only a paper exercise, the Army learned

from it. As a result, mobilization and deployment plans

were revised, and the Army took steps to correct the deficiencies it revealed.

MOBEX 78 was code-named "Nifty Nugget". The

crisis situation portrayed in Nifty Nugget involved a short

warning, fast breaking attack on NATO forces in Europe. In

such a crisis, the United States would have to use the forces

in being, and there would be little time to improve the

readiness of the Reserve Components. This exercise was

DoD wide and involved several other departments of the

federal government. As in 1976, Reserve personnel and

equipment did not actually move, but took part through

representative player cells who provided real-world data for

the exercise. As in 1976, Nifty Nugget showed that the

United States had severe mobilization problems. First, existing mobilization plans were a hodgepodge of old and unconnected Presidential emergency orders, policies, regulations

and procedures. Second, although contingency plans asa shortage of flatcars. Further, even if the necessary 300 heavy-duty flat

cars could be found, the one decrepit rail line leading to Shelby was

incapable of handling them. In addition, the telephone system at Camp

Shelby did not work. The entire mobilization at Shelby would have been

a disaster.

In the end, FORSCOM concluded that there was nothing grieviously wrong at Camp Shelby that couldn't have been cured by the efficient application of sufficient resources. (Adapted from pp. 402-404 of

FORSCOM's Annual Historical Review, Oct. 1, 1980 to September 30,

1981).
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 261

sumed that units would be at their desired levels of personnel and equipment, Reserve Component units were seriously

short of personnel and equipment in 1978. On the civil

side, the federal government was in disarray. Civil emergency planning had concentrated only upon natural disasters

and nuclear attack. There was no coordination on the industrial base, and the public health sector was unprepared for

mobilization.124 Following Nifty Nugget, the Federal Emergency Management Agency was formed to coordinate government-wide emergency planning.

The next MOBEX, in 1980, was known as "Proud

Spirit". Like its predecessors, Proud Spirit revealed that the

mobilization preparation of the United States was woefully

inadequate.125 From the Army Reserve's point of view, Proud

Spirit confirmed the inability of active Army installations to

support a rapid influx of Reserve units. The exercise did

identify problems to be attacked by the Army Readiness and

Mobilization Regions (ARMRs). The exercise was carried out

during the Iranian Crisis and after the decision to form the

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). As a result,

the exercise gave valuable clues as to the steps required to

make the RDJTF a true rapidly-deployable force.126

The most recent such exercise, MOBEX 83, took place

in the fall of 1982, and was actually three exercises in one.

Three different warplans were played in successive weeks,

and officials reported very extensive improvements in mobilization capabilities. The exercise focused on the Army's Reserve and National Guard and found them able to deploy

despite continued equipment shortages.127

MOBEX-83, moreover, confirmed the results of an earlier exercise that dealt with accessions. This exercise, Grand

Payload, indicated that TRADOC would have difficulties in

124. July 23, 1980, the Department of Defense released an unclassified 24-page report on Nifty Nugget. The findings of this report

are summarized in "Exercise Reveals Defense Problems," Pentagram News,

Washington, DC, July 31, 1980, pp. 1-4.

125. See John J. Fialka, "The Pentagon's Exercise Proud Spirit: Little Cause for Pride," Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Vol.

XI, No. 1, pp. 38-41. See also, Maj. Richard B. Crossland, "Suppose

the Balloon Goes Up: Then What," Army Reserve Magazine (Winter

1981), pp. 24-27.

126. See John J. Fialka, "U.S. Again Fails Test of Ability to Mobilize," Washington Star, Dec. 21, 1980, pp. A-l and A-6.

127. "U.S. Crisis Exercise Reports Major Gains in Ability to Mobilize," New York Times, Dec. 12, 1982. Also, Capt. Robert Pratt, "Mobilization: No Straight A Report Card," Army Reserve Magazine (Summer,

1983), pp. 22-23.
262 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

expanding the training base upon mobilization. For example, Army Reserve reception stations did not possess the automatic data processing equipment required to rapidly process new soldiers into the Army. The Army Reserve training

divisions were not fully prepared to expand the training base

because of a lack of equipment, and the Army's training

requirements and resourcing systems were unable to cope

with a partial mobilization.128

By taking part in these exercises, Reservists gained valuable experience in the mobilization process. On a larger

scale, the federal Government gained an appreciation of the

need for better mobilization planning. Although changes

have come slowly, the federal Government in general and

the military departments in particular have placed greater

emphasis upon mobilization planning in recent years. For

the Army Reserve, the increased emphasis upon mobilization

has made mobilization capabilities a top consideration in

day-to-day decisions. Training activities and administration

are now being conducted in light of how these actions will

enhance mobilization.

On the practical level, mobilization planning was

clearly defined for Army Reservists with the August 1982

publication of the Reserve Component Commanders Handbook for

Mobilization. For the first time, every peacetime action that

a unit commander must take to prepare for mobilization is

indicated.

The Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS) has been compiled out of the experiences of the

MOBEXs. These exercises have finally helped the Army

achieve the ability to swiftly and smoothly mobilize the Reserve Component, including the Retired Reserve. The Army

has also established the Army Mobilization and Operations

Planning System (AMOPS) as the single, integrated mobilization and deployment planning system for the Army.

The new systems and procedures they represent have

been a quantum leap ahead for Army Reserve readiness. Because a sturdy framework of mobilization concepts has been

established and because additional personnel assets have been

devoted to mobilization planning in recent years, the Army

Reserve is better able to mobilize in 1983 than at any other

time in its history.

128. For the results of Grand Payload, see Evaluation Report, Exercise

Grand Payload (Arlington, Va.: Systems Research and Applications,

Corp., 1982). Proud Saber Reports are outlined in After Action Reports,

HQ, TRADOC, MOBEX—83.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 263

THE IMPACT OF THE IRANIAN CRISIS

Finally, any history of the Army Reserve in the 1970s and

early 1980s would be incomplete without an overview of the

impact caused by the Iranian Crisis and the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan. The November 4, 1979, seizure of the

American embassy in Tehran underscored this country's inability to project conventional forces into the Middle East,

while the December 27, 1979, Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan raised the issue of American capability to counter Russian threats in the Persian Gulf region. President

Jimmy Carter committed the United States to the defense of

the Persian Gulf in his January 23, 1980, State of the

Union Address. The RDJTF was officially established on

March 1, 1980, with the mission of executing that commitment.

As soon as planners began to draw up contingency

plans, it became obvious that Reserve units were going to

be key elements of the Rapid Deployment Force—Army

(RFD-A) troop list. A decision to employ the task force

would require a call-up of Reserve units in excess of the

50,000-man authority that had been in the law since May,

1976.mDefense officials immediately sought an increase in

the 90-day call-up authority. Congress responded quickly,

and in December 1980, Carter signed Public Law 96-584

giving him authority to mobilize up to 100,000 members

of the Selected Reserve without a declaration of war or national emergency. Concurrently, the Army revised its former

Mobilization Designee (MOBDES) program and instituted

the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program.

These individuals were included in the Selected Reserve,

thus making them eligible for the 100,000 call-up.

The 100,000 figure had a direct relationship to the

number of Reservists of all services that would be needed to

sustain the RDJTF. In answering questions from the floor

during the convention of the Association of the US Army in

October 1981, Lt. Gen. Robert C. Kingston, the RDJTF

commander, said that he would need almost the entire callup authority to move and sustain a corps-sized RDJTF in

the Middle East.

129. On May 14, 1976, the Reserve Forces Call-Up Authority, became Public Law 94-286. It permitted the President to mobilize a maximum of 50,000 Selected Reservists for a period of up to 90 days without declaring a national emergency. This authority was necessary to add

teeth to the Total Force policy of heavy reliance upon the Reserve Components.
264 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

A few months later, Kingston told the midwinter conference of the Reserve Officers Association that "the Rapid

Deployment Joint Task Force is one of the foremost 'customers' of the Reserve Components. If this force is ever deployed

in anger, a sizable portion of my forces—particularly combat support and combat service support forces—will come

from the Reserve and the National Guard."

Kingston stated that the Army Reserve was absolutely

critical to the success of the RDJTF, pointing out that 80

percent of his psychological operations capability came from

the Army Reserve. He told the ROA that Army Reserve

units would be among the first of those deployed with the

RDJTF and that Reserve commanders had to do everything

within their capability to get their units ready for immediate deployment.li0

The exact number of Army Reserve units earmarked for

the RDJTF—now called the US Central Command—in

1983 is classified. However, in March 1981, Maj. Gen.

Berkman testified before Congress that "the importance of

the Army Reserve continues to grow. An increasing number

of reserve units have been assigned high priority because of

the essential combat service and logistical support needed

early upon mobilization and deployment, and for support of

the Rapid Deployment Force. Recently, 83 Army Reserve

units have been identified for inclusion in the Army's portion of the Rapid Deployment Force because of the essential

combat support and combat service support they represent."1

"

Following their inclusion in the RDJTF, Army Reserve

units came under intensified management. The RDJTF

units went to the top of FORSCOM's Intensified Management Force List, which had previously been led by Roundout units. These USAR RDJTF units had their mobilization

plans updated and their equipment priority adjusted upward. 132

130. Prepared remarks, Lt. Gen. Robert C. Kingston, for delivery

to the Reserve Officers Association Midwinter Conference, Feb. 15,

1982.

131. Testimony, Maj. Gen. William R. Berkman, Chief, Army Reserve, before Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation,

House Armed Services Committee, March 11, 1981.

132. For details on the increased priority of USAR units and crossleveling of assets, see Maj. Richard B. Crossland, "RDJTF: Can It Get

There Without the USAR?," Army Reserve Magazine, (Spring 1982), pp.

8-10.
TOWARD GREATER PARTNERSHIP 265

Despite the fact that Army Reserve units moved higher

on the Army's resource list, it would be naive to assume

that all of the Army Reserve's RDJTF—identified units are at

full readiness. Many of these units are in doubtful condition

for immediate deployment because of severe equipment

shortages.

There is a hard core of shortage items for these priority

units, and many of these pieces of equipment will not be

available until at least 1985. There are unique units with

unique equipment needs for which equipment has not even

been type-standardized, let alone procured. In other cases,

funds are not available to buy needed items such as landing

craft and lighterage.133

Defense guidance and projections reveal that equipment

problems will continue in future years. Unclassified portions

of the 1983-87 Program Objective Memorandum (POM)

state that a significant portion of the RDJTF combat support package will remain in the Reserve Components, even

while those components remain underequipped. The Army

leadership has consistently testified that the Reserve Components will remain a vital part of the Army for the foreseeable future, and there has been no mention of a diminished

RDJTF role for the Army Reserve. It would appear that the

Army Reserve will have high-priority contingency missions

for a long time to come.

In summary,the Army Reserve's integration into immediate deployment plans is an indication of how far the Total

Force policy progressed between 1970 and 1983- In this

short span of time, the Army's Reserve Components have

changed from being back-up forces to be deployed 90—150

days into a crisis, to being a part of the first units to deploy

in case of an emergency. Since 1970, the training and equipping of the Army Reserve have improved more than in any

similar period of American history. The citizen-soldier concept has matured in late 20th century America, and the

blending of the traditional American reliance upon Reserve

Components with the practical military needs of today's

risky world represents an evolution of the citizen-soldier

concept and a triumph for American democracy.

133. The problem of lighterage and watercraft is discussed in the

November—December issue of Army Loghtician and is included in Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr.'s 1983 Army posture statement.
Epilogue

The days when this country could be defended by men

who put down their plows, picked up their rifles, and

went off to meet the enemy are gone forever. Warfare today

is simply too complicated, and weapons systems are too sophisticated for the United States to depend upon an ad hoc

system like the one that served so well in the colonial period. Today, few people lay down their plows and march off

to war, but the Army Reservist may well shut down an

eighteen-wheeler, turn off a computer console, or leave an

assembly line to answer the call of duty. The tools of war

have changed, and the jobs we hold are different, but the

selflessness that characterized the Minutemen is still a vital

part of the forces that defend our country today.

As we researched this book and talked with scores of

individuals whose entry into the Army Reserve in 1917 or

1918 coincided with the "War to end all wars," we became

convinced that the Reservist is indeed "twice the citizen."

The dual responsibility is shown clearly in the history of the

Army Reserve, as, indeed, it is in that of the other Reserve

Components of this nation. Especially among the earliest

Reservists, men who received little pay and often less encouragement, one is struck by the patriotism they display.

This was not, we found, a blind chauvinism or mindless

xenophobia, but rather a well-reasoned belief that the

United States—whatever its flaws—was worth fighting for.

We have been impressed by the Reservists who served

in the early years of this century, men like D. Y. Dunn of

267
268 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Murray, Kentucky, who at the age of ninety-two was selected

to represent these early Reservists. Lt. Col. Dunn has been

an educator all his life, and in an interview with the staff of

the US Department of Education's American Education

magazine, he expressed the idea that he served in the Army

Reserve to help preserve his right to educate. As Dunn put

it, "If we cannot defend America, we will lose our way of

life. Someone else will be coming over here and telling us

what to teach, say, and think." Men like Dunn were the

heart of the Army Reserve between World Wars I and II,

and after WWII they were joined by women who did their

part as Reservists defending this country. They all sacrificed

mightily, perhaps more than do those who serve in 1983.

Being an Army Reservist today, however, while maintaining a civilian career is not easy. Reservists are expected

to retain the skills gained through their active duty training

while learning additional skills as they advance in the Army

Reserve. For officers, many years of night classes and summer training are required to complete military education

courses ranging from officer basic branch courses to Command and General Staff College to Army War College. For

enlisted personnel, the Army Reserve is a constant series of

courses designed to improve technical knowledge and leadership skills.

Though the Army Reserve receives additional full-time

support every year, career (non-active duty) Reservists must

devote extra evenings and days to the Army Reserve beyond

the weekend drills and Annual Training time. This extra

time is demanded because Army Reserve units and members

must meet the same standards as the active Army, and there

simply is not enough training time to perform all of the

work necessary to meet these high standards.

As we have shown in this volume, support for the

Army Reserve has not always been strong where it was

needed. There are those today who doubt the wisdom of the

Total Force policy. Gen. William C. Westmoreland's fears of

over-reliance on Reserve Components in 1973 have been seconded even by Reserve Component officers who fear that

America may be expecting more of part-time soldiers than

they can reasonably achieve. In addition, there are critics of

the Total Force policy who contend that budgetary considerations more than anything else are behind the reliance

upon the Reserve Components. At the same time, however,

the Reserve Components are unable to meet their defense

obligations because of insufficient funding.
EPILOGUE 269

There is some truth to this argument. Looking at Defense trends since the time of Secretary of Defense

McNamara, funding increases concomitant with increased

Army Reserve responsibility have not been forthcoming. Despite increased Reserve Component emphasis during the

1970s, the Army Reserve's share of the Army budget has

not changed appreciably in 15 years, though the Army Reserve today is described as "vital" to the national defense. A

look at the Army's future plans for the Army Reserve, too,

shows its increased responsibility as a part of the Total

Force. Increased budgetary support and desperately needed

equipment replacement are indicated.

Looking toward Defense plans for the 21st century,

nothing indicates a diminishing dependence upon the Army

Reserve for a substantial portion of the Army's combat support and combat service support. If anything, this dependence may increase. It is likely that the Army Reserve will

play an even greater role in day-to-day Army plans. A few

months ago, for example, it was revealed that the number of

Army Reserve units on the Rapid Deployment Force—Army

(RDF-A) list had doubled to 189 in less than two years,

and for the first time, Army Reserve Military Police, Military History, Public Affairs and Signal Corps units are included on this list. Army Reserve units are also being prepared for a wider range of contingencies. Recent exercises

have for the first time indicated major Army Reserve responsibilities outside of NATO, Korea and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (US Central Command).

Reservists will continue to be a bridge between the

government, the Army and the people, that Trinity of War

that Clausewitz described as so essential for military

strength. A reasonable guess for the future is that the Army

is going to have to reconcile its Total Force policy with its

fiscal priorities. As Chief of Staff Gen. Edward C. Meyer

said, Army leaders need to sit down and decide what great

leap they can take over a period of time to improve the

readiness of the Army Guard and Army Reserve." It is evident that the issue of Reserve Component readiness is growing more acute. The irony of the present situation, however,

is that as the capabilities of the Reserve Components have

increased, the perceived need for improvement has accelerated at a far greater pace.

Regardless of how the Army addresses Army Reserve

needs in the future, we believe that the citizen-soldier tradition will endure. The heavy dependence upon Reserve Com-
270 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

ponents is basic to American military policy and is a part of

this country's grand heritage. Reservists will continue to

serve and will gladly bear an added burden to preserve

America's freedoms. The only question is whether the American people will provide the resources necessary for the

Army Reserve to fulfill its responsibilities to today's citizens

and to generations of Americans yet to come.
AppendixA

Chiefs of the Army

Reserve1

* MAJ. c. F. THOMPSON, Chief of Reserve Section, G-2,

June 12-July 1, 1923.

* MAJ. WALTER o. BOSWELL, Chief of Reserve Section, G-2,

July 2, 1923-July 31, 1924.

* COL. DOUGLAS POTTS, Chief of Reserve Branch, G-2, August 1, 1924-December 30, 1925.

* LT. COL. j. c. PEGRAM, Chief of Reserve Branch, G-2,

December 31, 1925-August 14, 1926.

* LT. COL. FRED B. RYONS, Chief of Reserve Branch, G-2,

August 15, 1926-September 30, 1926.

* COL. STANLEY H. FORD, Chief of Reserve Branch, G—2,

October 1, 1926-February 10, 1927.

COL. DAVID L. STONE, Executive for Reserve Affairs, March

5, 1927-June 30, 1930.

BRIG. GEN. CHARLES D. HERRON, Executive for Reserve Affairs, July 1, 1930-June 30, 1935.

1. Memo, War Department General Staff, G—2 to Col. Hartshorn,

June 27, 1935, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 97; War Department Order,

AG 008 O.R.C. (6-11-41), dated June 16, 1941, RG 319, Entry 343,

Box 104; Memorandum, (with additions in pen) The Adjutant General

to Executive for Reserve Affairs, May 1, 1941, Subject: Data re Tenure of

Office of Executives for Reserve Affairs, RG 319, Entry 343, Box 104;

James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and

Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington: Center of Military History,

United States Army, 1975), p. 400; Files of the Chief, Army Reserve, the

Pentagon.

* Performed function in addition to other duties.

271
272 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

BRIG. GEN. EDWIN s. HARTSHORN, Executive for Reserve

Affairs, July 1, 1935-September 15, 1938.

BRIG. GEN. CHARLES F. THOMPSON, Executive for Reserve

Affairs, September 16, 1938-June 9, 1940.

BRIG. GEN. JOHN H. HESTER, Executive for Reserve Affairs,

June 21, 1940-March 23, 1941.

BRIG. GEN. FRANK E. LOWE, Executive for Reserve and

R.O.T.C. Affairs, June 5, 1941-August 10, 1942.

BRIG. GEN. EDWARD w. SMITH, Executive for Reserve and

R.O.T.C. Affairs, September 16, 1942-October 14, 1945.

BRIG. GEN. EDWARD s. BRES, Executive for Reserve and

R.O.T.C. Affairs, October 15, 1945-November 30, 1947.

BRIG. GEN. WENDELL WESTOVER, Executive for Reserve and

R.O.T.C. Affairs, December 1, 1947-November 14, 1949.

MAJ. GEN. JAMES B. CRESS, Executive for Reserve and

R.O.T.C. Affairs, January 1, 1950-January 31, 1951.

BRIG. GEN. HUGH M. MILTON, Executive for Reserve and

R.O.T.C. Affairs, February 24, 1951-November 18, 1953.

BRIG. GEN. PHILIP F. LINDEMAN, Executive for Reserve and

R.O.T.C. Affairs, November 19, 1953-December 6, 1954,

and Chief, Army Reserve and R.O.T.C. Affairs, December

7, 1954-July 31, 1957.

MAJ. GEN. RALPH A. PAi.LADiNO, Chief Army Reserve and

R.O.T.C. Affairs, August 1, 1957-May 31, 1959.

MAJ. GEN. FREDERICK M. WARREN, Chief, Army Reserve and

R.O.T.C. Affairs, September 1, 1959-February 12, 1963,

and Chief, Army Reserve, February 13, 1963—August 31,

1963.

MAJ. GEN. w. j. SUTTON, Chief, Army Reserve, September

1, 1963-May 31, 1971.

MAJ. GEN. J. MILNOR ROBERTS, Chief, Army Reserve, June

1, 1971-May 31, 1975.

MAJ. GEN. HENRY MOHR, Chief, Army Reserve, June 1,

1975-May 31, 1979.

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM R. BERKMAN, Chief, Army Reserve,

June 1, 1979—present.

NOTE: BRIG. GEN. JOHN MCAULEY PALMER is sometimes

regarded as the "Father of the Army Reserve." Though his

influence on the evolution of the Army Reserve cannot be

over-emphasized, Palmer was never in an official position

within the Army Reserve structure.
AppendixB

Army Reserve

(Organized Reserve

Corps) Appropriations

Army Reserve Appropriations (in millions of dollars)

Army Reserve Total Army (War Dept.) % Army

Fiscal Year Appropriation Appropriation Reserve

1917 $ 11.5 $ 2,864.4 0.4

1918 10.3 5,730.9 0.2

1919 7.0 1,406.3 0.5

1920 4.2 1,622.0 0.3

1921 3.4 1,118.1 0.3

1922 3.9 457.8 0.9

1923 4.9 397.1 1.2

1924 7.3 357.0 2.0

1925 9.4 371.0 2.5

1926 10.3 364.1 2.8

1927 10.4 369.1 2.8

1928 9.6 401.0 2.4

1929 11.1 425.9 2.6

1930 11.5 464.9 2.5

1931 13.4 486.1 2.8

1932 13.3 476.3 2.8

1933 13.0 434.6 3.0

1934 12.3 408.6 3.0

1935 8.4 488.0 1.7

1936 12.8 618.6 2.1

1937 15.4 628.1 2.5

1938 16.2 644.3 2.5

1939 18.3 695.3 2.6

1940 20.5 907.2 2.3

1941 136.5 3,939.0 4.1

1942 7.6 14,325.6 0.01

1943 5.5 42,525.6 0.01

1944 2.1 49,438.3 <0.01

1945 (*) 50,490.1 <0.01

1946 (*) 27,986.8 <0.01

273
274 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Fiscal Year

Army Reserve

Appropriation

Total Army (War Dept.)

Appropriation

% Army

Reserve

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

RPA

£• 338.7

374.5

431.5

461.6

465.5

489-9

478.8

479.8

532.6

566.8

659.3

865.5

1,071.0

1,247.0

>• 72.8

92.9

146.2

140.0

154.9

132.8

123.1

121.5

133.9

211.3

344.0

339-6

314.8

349.8

321.5

309.9

313.7

305.3

346.6

344.6

415.1

397.4

400.4

OMAR

129.3

140.7

171.3

203.0

253.9

284.0

323.5

364.7

391.5

420.3

440.4

520.7

666.0

705.0

MCAR

$ 10.0

10.0

33.5

38.2

40.7

43.7

50.3

53.8

50.5

37.1

30.0

43.2

65.0

42.0

$ 9,172.1

7,698.6

7,862.4

5,789.5

8,635.9

17,452.8

17,054.3

13,515.4

9,450.4

9,274.3

9,704.8

9,775.9

10,284.1

10,294.0

11,102.6

12,425.9

11,499.0

12,050.0

13,999-3

20,919.1

24,810

25,290

26,684

USAR Tot. Army Tot.

478.0 $ 23,580

525.2 20,300

636.3 22,480

702.8 21,820

760.1 21,650

817.6 21,580

852.6 24,040

898.3 26,810

974.6 28,770

1,024.2 31,570

1,102.7 34,580

1,429.4 44,030

1,802.0 53,040

1,994.0 57,220

* Organized Reserve Corps funding was only $200.00 each for the years 1945 and 1946.

RPA Reserve Personnel, Army

OMAR

MCAR

Operations, Maintenance, Army Reserve

Military Contruction, Army Reserve

0.8

1.2

1.9

2.4

1.8

0.6

0.9

0.9

1.8

2.3

3.5

3.5

3.1

3.4

2.9

2.5

2.7

2.5

2.5

1.6

1.7

1.6

1.5

% Army

Reserve

2.0

2.6

2.8

3.2

3.5

3.8

3.5

3.4

3.3

3.2

3.2

3.2

3.4

3.5

Note: There were apparently no separate appropriations for the Medical

Reserve Corps and the Organized Reserve during the years 1908-1916.

During the years 1917-1969 the figures given for the Army Reserve

appropriation include funds for the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted

Reserve Corps, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and the Citizens'

Military Training Camps.
APPENDIX B 275

Sources: Chart 10, OSD Project 80 Report, Part VII (Reserve Components),

pp. VII-B-24 and VII-B-25; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United

States Army (New York and London: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and

Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1967), p. 561; Annual Historical Supplement, Department of the Army (various years); Annual Report of the Secretary

of the Army (various years); and from the files of the Comptroller Division, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve.

It should be understood that other figures purporting to represent the

same information are available from other sources. Budget figures may

vary substantially, depending upon whether one is talking about appropriations, total obligation authority, or actual spending for a given year.
Appendix c

Army Reserve Units

Mobilized in 19681

Unit Home Station

277th MI Det

*978th Army Postal Unit (Type U)

*HHC 336th Ord Bn (Ammo) (DS)

*231st Trans Co., Fltg Cft (SRF)

*3 19th Trans Co. (Light Truck)

*4l3th Fin Sec (Disbursing)

100th Bn, 442d Inf

*482d Med Det (Equip Maint)

724th Trans Co. (Medium Trk Petr)

890th Trans Co. (Medium Trk Cargo)

* 101 lth Sup & Svc Co. (DS) (-)

*842d QM Co. (Petr Dep)

*950th Army Postal Unit (Type F)

*472d Med Det (Amb) (SRF)

*HQ & Main Spt. Co., 513th Maint

Bn (DS)

241st MI Det

*424th Pers Svc Co. (Type B)

*452d Gen Spt Co (-)

* 173d Petr Co. (Oper) (Type B)

* 172d Trans Co. (Med Trk Cargo)

*295th Ord Co. (DS/GS) (SRF)

* 1018th Sup & Svc Co. (DS)

*448th Army Postal Unit (Type Z)

Phoenix, Ariz.

Ft. Smith, Ark.

Little Rock, Ark.

St. Petersburg, Fla.

Augusta, Ga.

Atlanta, Ga.

Ft. DeRussy, Hawaii

Aurora, 111.

Forest Park, 111.

Ft. Wayne, Ind.

Independence and Emporia,

Kans.

Kansas City, Kans.

Lexington, Ky.

Rockville, Md.

Boston, Mass.

Boston, Mass.

Livonia, Mich.

Worthington & Winthrop,

Minn.

Greenwood, Miss.

Omaha, Neb.

Hastings, Grand Island &

New York, Neb.

Schenectady, N.Y.

Garden City, N.Y.

1. 'Army Reserve Units Respond to Call-Up," Army Reserve Magazine, (May 1968), pp. 6-7; News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), January 23, 1969, Subject: "Final Army

Reserve Component Unit Arrives in Vietnam."

277
278 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Unit Home Station

*237th Maint. Co. (DS)

* 316th Med Det (Blood Dist)

*74th Field Hosp

203d Trans Co. (Light Truck)

*312th Evac Hosp (Semi-mobile)

* 1002d Sup & Svc Co. (DS)

*311th Field Hosp

*630th Trans Co. (Med Truck Cargo)

*357th Trans Co. (Aircraft Maint) (DS)

*305th Med Det (Ortho)

*378th Med Det (Neurosurgical)

*238th Maint Co. (DS)

*HHC, 259th QM Bn (Petr)

304th Med Det (Equip Maint) (SRF)

*313th Med Det (Surg)

*889th Med Det (Surg)

*737th Trans Co. (Med Truck Petr)

*377th Light Maint Co. (DS)

*826th Ord Co. (Ammo) (DS/GS) (-)

Ft. Hamilton, N.Y.

New York, N.Y.

New York, N.Y.

Garden City, N.Y.

Winston-Salem, N.C.

Cleveland, Ohio

Sharonville, Ohio

Washington, Penn.

Greencastle, Penn.

Philadelphia, Penn.

Memphis, Tenn.

San Antonio, Tex.

Pleasant Grove, Utah

Richmond, Va.

Richmond, Va.

Richmond, Va.

Yakima, Wash.

Manitowoc, Wise.

Madison & Baraboo, Wise.

Units identified by an asterisk were deployed to Vietnam. The other

Army Reserve units were assigned to the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF).

NARRATIVE HISTORIES OF CERTAIN USAR UNITS IN VIETNAM

HHC, 336th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) (DS)—Little

Rock, Arkansas

Following its activation on May 13, 1968, this unit went to

Fort Carson, Colorado, where it underwent four months of

intensive training. The unit was augmented by an Explosive

Ordnance Disposal Unit upon its arrival at Fort Carson. The

training ended on September 25, 1968, when HHC, 336th

Ord Bn was deployed to Vietnam. The unit was assigned to

Da Nang, where the men of the unit constructed their own

buildings for billeting and operational functions. The battalion supplied Class V (ammunition) for all Army units in

the I Corps area, and it received the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its performance on duty.2

2. Letter, Cdr, HHC 336th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) (DS/GS)

to Lewis C. Brodsky, Chief of Public Affairs, OCAR, January 15, 1983,

Subject: "336th Ordnance Battalion Historical Information," OCAR Historical Files; General Orders No. 783, Headquarters, United States

Army Vietnam, March 30, 1970, 'Award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation."
APPENDIX C 279

319th Transportation Co. (Light Trucks)—Augusta,

Georgia

The 319th was mobilized on May 13, 1968, and convoyed

to Fort Lee, Virginia. Upon arrival at Fort Lee the unit TOE

was reorganized from 55-17F to 55-17G; it was further

reorganized on May 25 when it gave up one truck platoon.

The "G" series reorganization resulted in an equipment

change from 2Vi ton "slush box" trucks to 5 ton multifuel

trucks, but the unit met the challenge and was fully prepared when it arrived in Vietnam on September 26, 1968.3

While in Vietnam the 319th achieved an enviable record while operating from "TC Hill," Long Binh. The unit

drove a total of 1,073,641 miles and hauled 92,375 tons of

supplies. It supported the 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Air

Cavalry, the 9th Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, the 11th Armored

Cavalry Regiment, the Royal Thai Volunteer Force, and the

1st Australian Task Force. The 319th had anything but a

boring tour in Vietnam, for its convoys were ambushed on

seven occasions.4

The men of the 319th had gone to Vietnam, they

stated proudly in a Public Information Release, without "unfavorable Congressional Inquiries or Court Injunctions .

initiated . . . prior to or after arrival in Vietnam." Once in

Vietnam, however, they were subject to something described

by the unit as "one of the most demoralizing [situations]

the unit faced." This was the "infusion" policy initiated by

the Army for Reserve units in Vietnam. Infusion was accomplished by pulling men out of the Reserve units and sticking them into similar units elsewhere, while simultaneously

putting non-unit personnel into the Reserve unit. "The infusion policy," stated the 319th, "severely hampers the unit

morale, efficiency, and esprit." The reasons given for the

infusion policy were two: (1) to prevent a local tragedy in

the event of severe casualties and (2) to reduce the effects of

having an entire unit pull-out at once. One of the real

strengths of the Army Reserve, however, is the esprit de

corps and the sense of unit integrity and teamwork that is

3. Letter, Cdr, 319th Transportation Company (LT) (5T) to Cdr,

544th S&S Bn (GS) (FWD), September 10, 1968, Subject: "Operational

Report of the 319th Transportation Company (LT) (5T) for Period Ending

26 August 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R-l)), copy in OCAR Historical

Files.

4. Public Information Release, 319th Transportation Company (LT)

(5T), July 31, 1969, copy in OCAR Historical Files
280 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

built up over the years, and infusion was not conducive to

these qualities. The 319th, like many other Reserve Component units, was out "to overcome the stigma of the citizen

soldier fighting the professional man's war."5It definitely

overcame that stigma, but infusion did not help the process.

The 319th received a Meritorious Unit Citation for its

work in Vietnam, and individual unit members received 2

Bronze Star Medals with "V", 8 other Bronze Stars, 3 Army

Commendation Medals with "V", 62 other ARCOMs, and

3 Purple Heart Medals.6The members of the unit received a

rousing welcome when they came home from Vietnam, too,

for more than 300 wives, children, parents, and friends were

on hand when the unit landed in Augusta.7

HQ and Main Spt Co, 513th Maintenance Bn (DS)—

Boston, Massachusetts

The 513th Maintenance Battalion, as already related, was a

hot-bed of opposition to the Vietnam mobilization. Despite

the protests that had accompanied the departure of the

513th for Vietnam in October 1968, however, there was no

protest from the unit after that time. "We supported 77

tactical units and worked seven days a week. Once we got

out of the United States the morale was good. We had a job

to do," said the commander of the 513th, Lt. Col. Eugene

Martinez.8

In Vietnam the 513th was assigned to the 26th General Support Group at Phu Bai and provided maintenance

services to non-divisional units in the supported area, which

reached north from the Hai Van Pass to LZ Nancy and from

Laos to the sea. The battalion participated in four campaigns while in Vietnam and returned to Boston in October

1969, almost a year after it had left the United States.

5 Public Information Release, 319th Transportation Company (LT)

(5T) July 31, 1969, copy in OCAR Historical Files. Letter, Commander 81st US Army Reserve Command, to Commanding General

Third US Army, March 4, 1970, Subject: 'After Action/Lessons Learned

Report_319th Transportation Company (Lt Trk), WSZ0AA, for Period

11 April 1968 through 19 September 1969, RCS CS FOR-65 (RZ),

copy in OCAR Historical Files.

— • — " T*'-- "—-*- Chronicle, 6. "Citations Go To 319th at Ceremony," The

August 20, 1969, copies of both in OCAR Historical Files.

7 'Army Reservists Welcomed Home from Vietnam Tour Th

State, August 15, 1969, Section C, p. I, copy in OCAR Historical Files.

8. "Boston Unit Returns from Viet," Sunday Herald-Traveler,

October 5, 1969.
APPENDIX C 281

Upon its return the members received a tremendous welcome from some 450 relatives and friends.9

452d General Spt Co—Worthington and Winthrop, Minnesota

The 452d spent four months at Fort Riley, Kansas, training

and preparing for deployment to Vietnam. In Vietnam the

unit was stationed at Da Nang, where it operated Class II

(Individual equipment, general supplies) and Class IV (construction materials) supply sites. After a month in Da Nang

the Class I (rations) Platoon moved to Phu Bai and operated

the subsistence supply point there. The 452d left Vietnam

in August 1969 and returned to Fort Riley.10

172d Transportation Co (Medium Truck Cargo)—

Omaha, Nebraska

After four months of training at Fort Lewis, Washington,

the 17 2d left for Vietnam and arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on

October 10, 1968, with its trucks and other equipment.

The unit became fully operational within seven days and

began running convoys to the Central Highlands. Convoy

destinations were Ban Me Thuot (154 miles one-way; two

day round-trip), Bao Loc (169 miles one-way; four day

round-trip), and Dalat (119 miles one-way; two day round

trip). During the period from October 10, 1968, to August

18, 1969, the 172d participated in thirty-six convoy operations, hauling 79,977 tons a total of 659,051 miles. There

were no incidences of AWOL during the time the 172d was

in Vietnam, a total of only twenty-four punishments under

Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and

only two court martial convictions. Both of the latter were

men who had been assigned to the 17 2d as a result of the

Army's infusion program. No original member of the unit

was ever court martialed.11

9. Unsigned memorandum, HQ, 513th Maintenance Battalion

(DS), December 9, 1968, Subject: "Summary of Unit History 5 Jan 66

to 31 Nov 68," copy in OCAR Historical Files; Department of the

Army Lineage and Honors, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment,

513th Maintenance Battalion, copy in OCAR Historical Files; "Boston

Unit Returns from Viet," Sunday Herald-Traveler, October 5, 1969.

10. Unit History, 452d General Supply Co. (GS), copy in OCAR

Historical Files.

11. Letter, Lt. Col. Edward Honor, Cdr, 36th Transportation Battalion (Ttuck) to Cdr, US Army Support Command, August 18, 1969,

Subject: "Nomination for Meritorious Unit Commendation," copy in

OCAR Historical Files.
282 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

The 172d was the only unit in the 36th Transportation

Battalion to receive a Meritorious Unit Commendation. According to Lt. Col. Edward Honor, the 36th Bn Cdr,

The Unit's enthusiasm was immediately apparent. In many instances, drivers made twice as many runs per shift as compared

with regular drivers from other units. The unit was determined to

prove itself .... The unit passed its Annual General Inspection

(AGI) with a rating of excellent. It also passed its CMMI with a

rating of satisfactory and the best overall score in the battalion.

The Inspector General made a point of praising the unit for its

high caliber of administration in the orderly and supply rooms.

This can be attributed, in part, to the mature attitude of most of

the reservists in the unit as well as in the innate ability of the

high caliber individuals called to duty.I2

The men of the 172d sent word from Vietnam that

they did not want any parades when they returned home,

and that they wanted to be treated "like guys returning with

lunch buckets after a hard day's work." Their families and

friends would not accept the idea of an austere homecoming,

however, and the 172d was greeted with a full-fledged ceremony, complete with the Strategic Air Command's band.n

237th Maintenance Co (DS)—Fort Hamilton, New York

The 237th Maintenance Company (DS) performed its preVietnam training at Fort Meade, Maryland, though individual members of the unit were sent to Army service

schools at Forts Dix, Gordon, Monmouth, Belvoir, and Lee.

The 237th reached Vietnam on October 21 and 22, 1968,

and was assigned to provide maintenance support to the

108th Artillery Group and electronics maintenance support

to the Third Marine Division. Company Headquarters with

service and evacuation sections soon moved to Quang Tri,

and the electronics, maintenance, and armament sections

moved to Dong Ha. These locations were within a few miles

of the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ), and the unit came under

enemy fire on numerous occasions.14

12. Ibid., letter, SSG Armand K. Gibbons, Unit Historian, 172d

Transportation Co. to Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, December 24,

1982, in OCAR Historical Files.

13. "Like It or Not, 172d Greeted as Heroes," Sunday World-Herald, October 5, 1969, p. 1.

14. Letter, lLt. George H. Wills, Cdr., 237th Maintenance Co and

CW4 Louis E. Lorenzo, Unit Historian, 237th Maintenance Co, to
APPENDIX C 283

The 237th was responsible for all armament, electronics, and motor maintenance support in the area from

Quang Tri north to the DMZ, east to the South China Sea,

and west to the Laotian border. Unit personnel constructed

their own air conditioned repair shop to assist in their electronics repair work and each day sent repair teams to remote

fire bases. Tube changes on 175 mm guns and 8 inch

howitzers, repair of hydraulic leaks, welding of cracked

spades, and similar repair operations were all routinely accomplished with the weapon in firing position. This procedure minimized down-time and resulted in maximum

availability of the weapon.15

The 237th Maintenance Company distinguished itself

as one of the top outfits of its type in Vietnam, and it was

awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its fine

work. Unit personnel received 5 Bronze Star Medals, one

Air Medal, and 7 Army Commendation Medals.16The

237th was greeted with an elaborate welcoming ceremony

upon its return from Vietnam, and John V. Lindsay, Mayor

of New York City, sent the unit a letter of congratulations

and thanks.17

316th Medical Detachment (Blood Distribution)—New

York, New York

This unit was organized in January 1968 and mobilized in

May of the same year. The 316th moved to Vietnam in October 1968 and was attached to the 9th Medical Laboratory.

Personnel from this unit were widely dispersed throughout

Vietnam, where they did an outstanding job of blood distribution. This particular Army Reserve unit was unusual in

that it had no officers authorized. The 3l6th, like all of the

units in the 77th US Army Reserve Command, received an

elaborate welcome home upon its return from Vietnam. The

ceremony for the 316th was combined with that of the 74th

Field Hospital, also a 77th ARCOM unit.18

OCAR Public Affairs Office, January 28, 1983, Subject: "Historical Information," in OCAR Historical Files.

15. Ibid.

16. General Orders No. 288, HQ, US Army Vietnam, February 1,

1970; "Awards and Decorations," in "Historical Information," 237th

Maintenance Company, copies of both in OCAR Historical Files.

17. Welcome Home Ceremony, 237th Maintenance Company and letter,

Mayor John V. Lindsay, October 10, 1969, copies of both in OCAR

Historical Files.

18. Welcoming Home Ceremony for 74th Field Hospital and 316th Medical Detachment, copy in OCAR Historical Files.
284 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

74th Field Hospital—New York, New York,

Members of the 74th Field Hospital were among the individuals who participated in court action in an attempt to

avoid being sent to Vietnam. Nevertheless, the entire unit

was shipped to Southeast Asia, where its primary mission

was caring for wounded prisoners of war. The 74th was stationed at Long Binh, where it was the only prisoner of war

hospital in the III Corps and IV Corps Tactical Zones.19

The 74th met every medical challenge that came its

way, from high velocity wounds of the chest to amputations

to grafts of the femoral vein. The one problem it never

could overcome, however, was the excessive temperature of

the wards. There were days when ward temperatures reached

118°F and weeks when they did not go below 90°F at any

time of the day or night. Nevertheless, the quality of care

given by this Army Reserve unit was impressively high. A

Swiss representative of the International Red Cross visited

the 74th and remarked that the level of professional medical

treatment given the prisoners was "equal to and perhaps

even better than" that given civilians in many Western nations.20

While in Vietnam the 74th, as Army units have done

in every war, "adopted" a local orphanage as its own civic

action project. In addition to providing medical support to

the Tan Lap Orphanage, the men and women of the 74th

Field Hospital contributed money and school supplies to the

orphans.21 The men and women of the 74th were not ignored when they returned from Vietnam, either, for the

77th ARCOM staged an impressive ceremony to welcome

them back to New York.22

312th Evacuation Hospital (Semi-mobile)—WinstonSalem, North Carolina

In April 1968 Sue Walker was working as Assistant Director

of Nurses in a civilian hospital in Winston-Salem, North

19. Letter, Maj. Gen. Victor J. Mc Laughlin, Cdr, US Army Quartermaster Center and Fort Lee to Maj. Joseph P. Cillo, Cdr, 74th Field

Hospital, October 14, 1968, Subject: "Letter of Commendation," copy

in OCAR Historical Files; "Welcoming Home Ceremony for 74th Field

Hospital and 316th Medical Detachment."

20. "Welcoming Home Ceremony for 74th Field Hospital and

316th Medical Detachment."

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.
APPENDIX C 285

Carolina, when a friend called to tell her that her Army

Reserve unit was being called up for Vietnam. Lt. Col.

Walker checked with her unit commander, but he had not

heard the news. The 313-member hospital unit was mobilized in 1968, however, and after three months training at

Fort Benning, it was off to Southeast Asia. The 312th was

based at Chu Lai, on the South China Sea coast, and it

provided medical support to US and allied forces in the

Northern I Corps Tactical Zone.23

The unit arrived while Chu Lai was under rocket attack, but this did not deter the men and women of the

312th and its attached units (889th Medical Detachment,

USAR; 378th Medical Detachment, USAR; and 305th

Medical Detachment, USAR) from taking over existing hospital facilities without any disruption in patient care. After

only one month the 312 th had expanded the hospital's capacity from 120 beds to 400 beds. On several occasions

when the hospital came under direct, heavy fire, the hospital's personnel refused to take cover and continued to provide

medical services to the massive number of wounded. The

men and women of the 312th also participated in numerous

civic action programs in which they provided surgical instruction and consultation to local Vietnamese health care

centers.24

Lt. Col. Walker also spoke of the Army's infusion program, which she said they referred to in Vietnam as the

"confusion" program. "They seemed to take our best quality

personnel," said Walker, "and send us ones who were not so

good." It hurt morale in the 312th, said the Chief Nurse,

to have friends and co-workers, with whom a real team

spirit had been developed, transferred to some other unit in

Vietnam.25

The 312th received the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its performance of duty in Vietnam. When the

members of the 312th returned to Winston-Salem, however,

it was anything but a warm homecoming. There was a brief

official ceremony, recalled Lt. Col. Walker, but when the

ceremony was over "we were afraid to wear our uniforms. It

23. "At 48 She Answered Call to Vietnam War," Messenger

(Madison, NC), March 30, 1983; General Orders No. 206, HQ, United

States Army, Vietnam, January 24, 1970; copies in OCAR Historical

Files.

24. Ibid.

25. Interview of Lt. Col. Sue Walker (USAR-Ret.) by Maj. James

T. Currie, June 27, 1983, notes in OCAR Historical Files.
286 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

hurt a lot at first," she said, "but then you realized they

[people who did not approve of her going to Vietnam] just

didn't know any better." The hostility soon ended, however,

and what has remained with Walker was the knowledge that

she and the other members of the 312th had done their job

when they were called upon. As an Army Reservist, she said

in an interview, "we had something to prove, and we proved

it."26

357th Transportation Co (Aircraft Maintenance) (DS)—

Greencastle, Pennsylvania

The 357th spent five months at Fort Benning after its mobilization in May 1968, after which the 186-member unit

went to Vietnam. The 357th was headquartered at Bien

Hoa, where it performed direct support aircraft maintenance

for such units as the 11th Armored Cavalry. The unit was

recognized by award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation

and Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm. Individual unit

members received a Legion of Merit, 2 Bronze Star Medals

with "V", 5 other Bronze Star Medals, 19 Army Commendation Medals, and 2 Purple Heart Medals. The unit returned to the United States on September 29, 1969, and on

October 9 it was honored with a welcome home ceremony

attended by some 400 people.27

378th Medical Detachment (Neurosurgical)—Memphis,

Tennessee

This small unit of seven members (four officers and three

enlisted personnel) spent AVi months at Fort Carson, Colorado, before going to Vietnam in October 1968. The 378th

was immediately attached to the 312th Evacuation Hospital,

and the personnel of the 378th became regular members of

the operating room team. The 378th received the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its performance of duty in

Vietnam, and upon its return to Memphis in August 1969,

the returnees were met by Mayor Henry Loeb, Brig. Gen.

Leonard S. Woody (Cdr, 121st ARCOM) and other digni26. 'At 48 She Answered Call to Vietnam War;" General Orders

No. 206; Interview, Lt. Col. Walker and Maj. Currie.

27. "357th Transportation Company (DS) Vietnam," copy in OCAR

Historical Files.

28. Movement Orders No. 17, HQ, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Carson, Colorado, July 24, 1968; General Orders No.
APPENDIX C 287

259th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum)

HHC, 259th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum)—

Pleasant Grove, Utah

The questionable process by which Army Reserve units were

chosen for duty in Vietnam is brought into focus when the

HHC, 259th is considered. This unit was mobilized in May

1968 after being converted from Infantry to Quartermaster

on February 12. The unit trained at Fort Leonard Wood for

four months, then it departed for Vietnam. HHC, 259th

QM Bn was first located at Quang Tri, then moved to Phu

Bai in November 1968.29

The 259th was assigned to the 26th General Support

Group, Da Nang Support Command, 1st Logistical Command. The battalion was formed from four Army Reserve

units that were mobilized in 1968: HHC, 259th QM Bn;

173d Petr Co (Oper); 737th Trans Co. (Med Trk); and 842d

QM Co (Petr Dep). The battalion operated 73 miles of 6-

inch pipelines: Quang Tri-Dong Ha; Colco Island-Phu Bai;

and Colco Island-Quang Tri. It also operated two bolted

steel tank farms with a combined capacity of 390,000 gallons and two packaged product yards. Line haul by 5000

gallon tank trucks delivered fuel from the bulk storage areas

to the using units in the field.50

HHC, 259th went to Vietnam with a total strength of

91 personnel. Shortly after January 1, 1969, the unit was

alerted for personnel infusion, and the first members left the

259th in April. Additional unit personnel were transferred

out in May and June, but the infusion process stopped in

July. The unit was thereafter stabilized, with some members

getting an early release from Vietnam to return to school or

accept seasonal employment. Unit personnel received one

Legion of Merit, 16 Bronze Star Medals, 19 Army Commendation Medals, and 43 Good Conduct Medals. Upon

their return from Vietnam, the members of HHC, 259th

QM Co were met at Salt Lake City Airport on September 16

by a welcoming party that included Utah Governor Calvin

L. Rampton. This was followed on September 18 by a

motor parade through Pleasant Grove, Orem, and Provo,

Utah. At a ceremony in Provo awards were presented to in206, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, January 24, 1970;

Press Release, HQ, 121st United States Army Reserve Command, August 2, 1969; copies in OCAR Historical Files.

29- "Historical Supplement, HHC, 2

=

>

f

)!h Quartermaster Battalion

(Petroleum)," copy in OCAR Historical I

7

iks.

30. Ibid.
288 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

dividual members of the unit. The quality of personnel in

the 259th was exemplified by the fact that members of the

battalion won the 1st Logistical Command's Soldier of the

Month competition three times in a row. The 259th received

a Meritorious Unit Commendation for its service in Vietnam.31

173d Petroleum Company (Oper)—Greenwood, Mississippi

Personnel from this unit were among the Army Reservists

who filed suit to prevent their being sent to Vietnam. The

suit, as previously discussed, was unsuccessful, and the unit

went to Southeast Asia on schedule. The company was headquartered at Phu Bai and operated pipelines between Phu

Bai and Camp Evans and the Phu Bai Tank Farm. The company operated a pump station in Hue and one at Camp

Evans.32

842d QM Co (Petr Dep)—Kansas City, Kansas

This unit operated the pipeline from Camp Evans to Quang

Tri and one from Quang Tri to Dong Ha. It also operated a

59,000 barrel tank farm at Quang Tri and line-hauled bulk

fuel to combat bases as far south as Camp Evans and northwest to Camp Vandergrift near Khe Sanh.r33

737th Transportation Co (Med Truck Petr)—Yakima,

Washington

The 737th was mentioned in Chapter Nine in connection

with the fine send-off it received from citizens in the

Yakima area. After several months of training at Fort Lewis,

Washington, the unit left for Vietnam in September. The

unit with its equipment landed at Da Nang and transferred

to Quang Tri, where it immediately began convoy operations. The 737th supported the 1st Air Cavalry Division

(Airmobile) with POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) for

two months, after which the 101st Airborne Division moved

31. Ibid.; General Orders No. 205, Headquarters, United States

Army Vietnam, January 24, 1970; The Northern Log, March 15, 1969,

p. 5; copies in OCAR Historical Files.

32. "Historical Supplement, HHC, 259th Quartermaster Battalion

(Petroleum)," p. 5, copy in OCAR Historical Files.

33. Ibid.
APPENDIX C 289

in. On January 6, 1969, the Company, minus the 3d Platoon, was moved to Chu Lai and assigned to the 57 th Transportation Battalion. The 3d Platoon remained in Phu Bai

until the unit returned to the US in August 1969.34

The 737th received the Meritorious Unit Commendation, and individual unit members won one Bronze Star

Medal with "V", 6 other Bronze Star Medals, and 2 Purple

Hearts. Upon returning to Yakima, the men of the 737th

were given a "welcome home" ceremony by a crowd of 1000

people. Yakima Mayor Jack Larson proclaimed a day of

honor for the returnees, and everyone dined on roast beef

dinners.35

377th Light Maintenance Co (DS)—Manitowoc, Wisconsin

The 377th began calendar year 1968 as the 377th Ordnance

Company (DAS). It was redesignated the 377th Light Maintenance Co (DS) on January 31, 1968, and in April it was

notified that it was going to be mobilized. The post-mobilization training period at Fort Riley was not without problems. The 377th was first placed under a supply and service

battalion, but it did not receive adequate training in this

arrangement. On July 15, therefore, the unit was put under

a maintenance battalion, and the quality and type of its

training immediately improved. The change and confusion

at Fort Riley resulted, however, in the 377th having the

longest time between mobilization and arrival in Vietnam—

seven months—of any Army Reserve unit.36

In Vietnam the 377th was assigned to the 69th Maintenance Battalion (GS), US Army Support Command, Cam

Ranh Bay. The unit provided direct support maintenance to

sixty-seven units of the 1st Logistical Command in the II

Corps area. The unit's primary repair responsibilities were in

the area of wheeled and tracked vehicles, towed and selfpropelled artillery, small arms, refrigeration equipment, office machines, and chemical equipment. The 377th was

awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its service

34. "Unit History of Mobilization," 737th Transportation Company

(MDM TRK) (PTRL), copy in OCAR Historical Files.

35. General Orders No. 408, HQ, U.S. Army Vietnam, February

4, 1971; "Unit History of Mobilization;" "Long, long trail ends—737th

home," Yakima Herald-Republic, August 14, 1969, p. 1; copies in OCAR

Historical Files.

36. 377th Light Maintenance Company (DS), "Unit History—

1968," copy in OCAR Historical Files.
290 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

in Vietnam, and individuals in the unit were awarded 7

Bronze Star Medals and 34 Army Commendation Medals.37

826th Ord Co (Ammo) (DS/GS) (-)—Madison and Baraboo, Wisconsin

The 826th performed five months of post-mobilization

training at Fort Knox, Kentucky» from May 16, 1968, to

October 13, 1968. Upon arriving in Vietnam the company

was assigned to the 3d Ordnance Battalion (Ammo), Long

Binh Ammunition Supply Depot. After a short period of

orientation, the 826th took over Sub-Depots I and III at

Long Binh and worked a two-shift, twenty-four hour day.

The unit established a ten-month record of 450,000 short

tons of ammunition lifted, as well as a twelve-hour lift record of 2250 short tons. The United States Army Support

Command, Saigon, awarded the 826th its Certificate of

Achievement. Personnel of the 826th received 14 Bronze

Star Medals with "V", 12 other Bronze Star Medals, 2

Army Commendation Medals with "V", 58 other ARCOMs,

and one Purple Heart. The unit left Vietnam for Fort Riley,

Kansas, on October 2, 1969.38

37. "Unit History (Annual Supplement) 377th Light Maintenance

Company (DS), 1969;" General Orders No. 752, Headquarters, United

States Army Vietnam, March 25, 1970; copies in OCAR Historical

Files.

38. "826th Ordnance Company (Ammo) (DS/GS) Annual Historical

Supplement (1968)," 'Annual Historical Supplement, 1969" and copy of

Certificate of Achievement, all in OCAR Historical Files.
Appendix D

Post-Vietnam

Emergency Use of

the Army Reserve

In the fourteen years since the last Army Reserve unit returned from Vietnam, units of the USAR have been used

during at least four emergencies, none of which were directly related to national defense. These four occasions were

the following: (1) the Postal Strike of March 1970,

(2) Tropical Storm Agnes, June 1973, (3) the Vietnamese

refugee influx of 1975, and (4) the Cuban refugee operations in 1980. Each of these episodes was unique, and each

one of them provided mobilization, training, and perhaps

command experience for individuals involved.

1. Postal Strike—Operation Graphic Hand

On March 17, 1970, postal employees in New York City

began a wildcat strike that soon spread to cities in nine

other states. A Federal judge's injunction was ignored in

New York City, as was President Richard M. Nixon's March

21 plea to the strikers. On March 23, Nixon declared that a

"national emergency" existed as a result of the strike and

thereafter some 28,100 Army personnel were ordered to

duty in New York City. Army Reservists comprised almost

exactly half (14,000) of the force, while the National Guard

(11,600), the active Army, and other reserve components

supplied the remainder.

The 77th Army Reserve Command, a major USAR

headquarters, was mobilized on March 24 to provide com1. History, First United States Army, Annual Supplement, Calendar Year

1970, p. 66; see also Ibid., pp. 43—66.

291
292 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

mand and control of particular USAR units, as well as certain Marine Corps Reserve and Navy Reserve units. Other

USAR commands involved in the operation were the 11th

Special Forces Group, 301st Support Brigade, 411th Engineer Brigade, 353d Civil Affairs Area (A) and 818th Hospital Center.

Military personnel served in the New York City Post

Office until June 30, providing what were described as "essential postal services," including certain mail collection and

processing activities, limited deliveries, and limited window

service. Postmaster General Winston M. Blount was lavish

in his praise for the job done by the Reservists and others

during Operation Graphic Hand. The Reservists themselves

seemed to have few complaints about being called to duty,

the biggest gripe centering about the cold "C" rations they

were served at noon. The exercise was generally considered a

successful use of Reserve Component forces in an unusual

situation, and according to the official First United States

Army History, it "appeared to justify the conclusion that

the military forces, both active and reserve, are prepared on

very short notice to perform any conceivable assigned mission."

2. Tropical Storm Agnes—Operation Noah II

Tropical Storm Agnes, which originated off the Yucatan

Peninsula in the Gulf of Mexico in mid-June 1972, reached

the Virginia coast on the afternoon of June 21. The storm

took the scenic route up the Virginia and Maryland coasts,

causing rainfalls of one inch per hour. It passed Delaware

and New Jersey, swept through New York City, and then

looped back down through Pennsylvania on what might be

called a "Honeymooners Tour" of the Poconos and

Williamsport. Agnes then visited Niagara Falls and followed

the St. Lawrence River to the ocean.

The greatest damage was in central Pennsylvania, where

residential property losses were estimated at $570 million,

and industrial, commercial, and public property damage was

placed at $2 billion. From June 22 to September 15, 1972,

a total of 28 Army Reserve units with 1466 men took part

in disaster relief efforts in Pennsylvania and adjoining states.

2. Col. John F. McElhenny, Ajter Action Report: Tropical Storm

Agnes-Operation Noah 11; Col George H. Russell, DCSOT to various addressees, Subject: 'After-Action Report—Tropical Storm Agnes."
APPENDIX D 293

Joining the unit members were some 3000 individual Army

Reservists.

Seventeen USAR units served in Pennsylvania, performing such tasks as cleaning debris from streams and rivers,

building bridges, transporting food and water, and providing medical and law enforcement support. Most of the work

of disaster assistance fell naturally to the National Guards of

the states concerned, but the Army Reserve also played a

vital and well-appreciated role.

3. Vietnamese Refugees—Project New Arrivals

With the collapse of the South Vietnamese government in

the spring of 1975, the United States was soon on the receiving end of what appeared to be a nearly-inexhaustible

stream of refugees. The United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) was soon given responsibility for the refugee operations at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. Active Army personnel did most of

the work with the refugees, but in the civil affairs area the

Army Reserve had to become involved. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was the only such unit in the active Army, so

FORSCOM sought volunteers from USAR personnel who

were qualified civil affairs specialists.

Thirty volunteer Army Reservists at Fort Chaffee were

organized into the Directorate of Civil Military Affairs,

while the twenty-five USAR members at Fort Indiantown

Gap comprised the Civil Affairs Support Battalion (Composite/Provisional). According to a story that appeared in

Army Reserve Magazine, USAR personnel "set up English,

American customs, and history classes. Several WACs are

giving classes on the women's liberation movement and how

it differs from the traditional role of the Vietnamese

woman."

Finally, it should be pointed out that the operations at

Fort Chaffee and Indiantown Gap were funded under Army

Reserve Operation and Maintenance (OMAR) appropriations.

This was apparently the only source of flexible funding

available to the Army at the time, though one would be

hard-pressed to show how the refugee operations were of di3. Frank W. Pew, The Role of the U.S. Army Forces Command in Project New Arrivals: Reception and Care of Refugees from Vietnam (Fort McPherson, Georgia: Historical office, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Forces Command, 1981), pp. 20-21, 173-75, 212; "The New Arrivals,"

Army Reserve Magazine (November-December 1975), pp. 16-18
294 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

rect benefit to more than the few Army Reservists who volunteered for duty.

4. Cuban Refugees

Barely four years after the Vietnamese refugee camps at Forts

Chaffee and Indiantown Gap were emptied and closed, the

Army had to reopen them, plus Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, to

take care of thousands of refugees from Fidel Castro's Cuba.

Army Reserve units, which operated under FORSCOM,

were involved in refugee operations from the beginning. At

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, the 369th Station Hospital, a

USAR unit from Puerto Rico, was particularly effective because its members were Spanish-speaking. Three Army Reserve Military Police units from Indiana—the 222d MP Co,

396th MP Co, and 496th MP Co—were also used at

Chaffee.

At Fort McCoy, Army Reservists from the 4 3 2d Civil

Affairs Group worked with the refugees, as did members of

the 432d PSYOP Battalion, USAR.

More Army Reservists served at Fort Indiantown Gap

than anywhere else. Army Reserve Civil Affairs units in the

First Army area were especially active at the "Gap," spending their two weeks of annual training, plus many weekend

drills, working with the refugees there.

According to the after action report on activities at the

Gap, "The performance of individual Reservists ranged from

outstanding to unsatisfactory. For the first months of the

operation, Reserve Civil Affairs personnel augmented by Reservists from other branches ran the seven alien compounds.

. . . Generally speaking, their performance was more than

satisfactory .... The most serious drawback to the use of

Reservists was the necessity for changing Area Commanders

every two weeks ... ."

4. Jean R. Moenk, Frank W. Pew, and Maj. Charles Bishop,

Annual Historical Review, United States Army Forces Command, United States

Army forces, Readiness Command, 1 October 1980-30 September 1981 (RCS

CSHIS-6 (R-3)) (U) (Fort McPherson, Georgia: Historical Office, Office

of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Atmy Forces Command, 1981), pp. 342-54;

"Fitst Army Reservists Find Themselves 'Doing Real Thing' at Fort Indiantown Gap," The Officer, August 1980, p. 12; Task Force, Fort Indiantown Gap After Action Report, Vol II, p. 3.
Appendix M—-^

Strength of the Army

Reserve (Medical

Reserve Corps,

Organized Reserve)

Prior to World War II

End of Med. Res.

Fiscal Year Corps Army Reserve1

1909 364

1910 420

1911 922

1912 1105

1913 1205 8

1314 1254 16

1915 1426 17

1916 1903 27 46212

ORC ERC Total

1917 4855 21,543 35,000 61,398

1918 20,855 86,262 80,000 187,117

1919 45,573 none 45,573

1920 68,232 none 68,232

1921 66,905 1 66,906

1922 67,390 480 67,870

1923 76,923 1557 78,480

1924 81,706 3400 85,106

1925 95,154 5115 100,269

1926 103,829 5775 109,604

1927 110,014 5735 115,749

1928 114,824 5464 120,288

1929 112,757 5192 117,949

1930 113,523 4721 118,244

295
296 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Active Inactive

ORC ORC ERC Total

1931 80,399 27.811 4837 113,047

1932 83,808 31,028 4872 119,709

1933 86,338 33,147 5028 124,513

1934 88,107 26,250 4646 119,003

1935 91,955 20,635 4323 116,913

1936 95,619 19,550 3897 119,066

1937 96,545 14,624 3189 114,358

1938 100,116 18,796 2998 121,910

1939 104,575 12,144 3054 119,773

1940 104,228 12,408 3233 119,869

1941 110,931 22,028 2149 135,1083

1 Created by the Army Appropriation Act of August 24, 1912.

2 Consists of individuals furloughed to the reserve from the Regular

Army under the provisions of the Army Appropriation Act of August

24, 1912.

* Includes 57,309 Officers' Reserve Corps members on extended active duty.

ORC Officers' Reserve Corps of the Organized Reserve

ERC Enlisted Reserve Corps of the Organized Reserve

All figures are taken from the reports of the Secretary of War, The

Adjutant General, and The Surgeon General for the appropriate years.
AppendixF

Strength of the Army

Reserve (Organized

Reserve Corps) after

World War II

Total Total

End of Paid Ready Standby Retired Army

Fiscal Year Drill IRR Reserve Reserve Reserve Reserve

1946 none none

1947 (Dec. 31) none 729,289

1948 none 752,271

1949 196,427 588,972

1949 (Dec. 3D 245,585 580,459

1950 186,541 613,526

1951 154,816 278,327

1952 135,003 340,580

1953 117,323 798,026

1953 (Dec. 3D 127,613 883,820 23,463 38,320 945,603

1954 136,918 1,108,967

1954 (Dec. 31) 153,932 1,290,833 9,828 43,584 1,344,245

1955 163,137 1,593,419 1,648,626

1955 (Dec. 3D 173,196 8,209

1956 197,340 1,917,250 1,975,559

1956 (Dec. 3D 225,345 1,814,333

1957 260,377 1,008,438 1,839,474

1958 272,683 955,462 2,034,598

1959 314,173 1,008,837 2,282,550

1960 301,081 1,024,549 2,217,472

1961 301,796 1,028,168 772,543 93,036 1,893,747

1962 261,456 580,034 841,490 496,762 107,649 1,445,901

1963 284,182 382,899 667,081 293,283 132,470 1,092,834

1964 268,524 453,485 722,089 255,592 154,180 1,131,782

1965 261,680 456,758 718,438 233,916 176,212 1,128,566

1966 250,794 546,845 797,819 233,683 190,663 1,222,165

1967 261,957 444,204 706,161 312,503 199,320 1,217,984

1968 244,239 629,237 873,476 230,875 230,879 1,335,230

297
298 TWICE THE CITIZEN! A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Total Total

End of Paid Ready Standby Retired Army

Fiscal Year Drill IRR Reserve Reserve Reserve Reserve

1969 261,322 818,471 1,079,793 262,000 1,304,000

1970 257,490 931,715 1,192,453 344,00 1,386,000

1971 262,299 991,039 1,254,338 335,000 1,605,000

1972 235,192 1,059,064 1,294,256 382,215 327,189 2,003,660

1973 235,499 757,675 993,174 415,268 344,457 1,752,989

1974 239,715 532,575 772,290 340,481 357,591 1,470,362

1975 225,057 355,099 580,156 282,696 365,489 1,228,341

1976 191,919 217,621 409,540 184,478 376,037 970,055

1977 189,420 149,427 338,847 152,784 386,368 877,999

1978 185,753 168,607 354,360 82,677 391,304 828,341

1979 189,990 201,783 391,773 30,544 400,825 823,142

1980 195,146 215,810 410,946 19,047 413,431 843,784

1981 225,003 212,925 437,928 5,014 449,406 892,348

1982 256,659 218,991 475,650 357 464,634 940,641

1983 (Jan. 3D 256,379 223,904 480,283 614 466,936 947,833

Strength figures in this appendix are based upon the reports of the

Secretary of Defense. Because the reports varied in format from year to

year, there are some unavoidable gaps in the chart. There was no paid

drill in the Organized Reserve Corps prior to FY 1949. The ORC did

not exist at all in 1946, and figures for 1947 reflect only the most

tenuous of military connection for the members of the Corps.
AppendixG

Army Reservists on

Active Duty—

1948-1982 (excluding

active duty for

training)

End of Fiscal Year Number End of Fiscal Year Number

1948 39,090 1966 74,373

1949 54,149 1967 100,115

1950 44,107 1968 127,513

1951 205,338 1969 134,025

1952 118,444 1970 121,575

1953 115,119 1971 102,592

1954 107,791 1972 71,905

1955 102,688 1973 66,507

1956 106,016 1974 55,798

1957 124,779 1975 53,373

1958 104,773 1976 51,432

1959 74,976 1977 51,636

1960 63,018 1978 52,307

1961 58,762 1979 52,924

1962 128,884 1980 53,078

1963 64,897 1981 53,252

1964 67,976 1982 49,071

1965 68,808

Source: Department of Defense Selected Manpower Statistics, Fiscal Year 1982,

pages 199 and 200.

299
u

Appendix K m.

Examples of US Army

Reserve Units as a

Percentage of the

Total Army Unit

Structure

The Army Reserve's

Type of Unit Percentage of All Army Units

Training Divisions 100

Training Brigades 100

Strategic Military Intelligence Detachments 100

Civil Preparedness Support Detachments 100

Army Reserve Schools 100

Maneuver Area Commands 100

Maneuver Training Commands 100

Railway Units 100

Judge Advocate General Detachments 98

Civil Affairs Units 97

Psychological Operations Units 89

Smoke Generator Companies 86

Petroleum Supply Companies 72

Petroleum Operating Companies 63

Hospitals 61

Terminal Transfer and Service Companies 58

Conventional Ammunition Companies 51

Chemical Decontamination Units 47

Watercraft Units 45

Pathfinder Units 43

Medical Units other than Hospitals 40

Source: Berkman, William R., The Posture of the U.S. Army Reserve, Office

of the Chief, Army Reserve, Washington, D.C., 1983, p. 3.

301
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303
304 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORTS

The Army's Ability to Mobilize and Use Retirees as Planned Is

Doubtful (Report No. FPCD-83-6, 1982).

Can the Army and Air Force Reserve Support the Active Forces

Effectively? Report No. LCD-79-404, 1979).

Critical Manpower Problems Restrict the Use of National Guard

and Reserve Forces (Report No. FPCD-79-71, dated 20

August 1979).

Personnel Problems May Hamper Army's Individual Ready Reserve

in Wartime. (Report No. FPCD-83-12).

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ARTICLES

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312 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Pratt, Robert (Capt.). "Mobilization: No Straight A Report

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314 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

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The Authors

LT. COL. RICHARD B. CROSSLAND is a professional Reservist

with over twenty years of service in the three Army components. After enlisting in the Delaware National Guard, he

was commissioned in 1965 and served as a Guard officer

until he was called to active duty in late 1966. He served in

the active Army in field artillery, air defense artillery, infantry, and intelligence until he became a full-time Reservist in

1975. He served in Vietnam and was wounded twice. He is

a graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff College and the Army's Advanced Public Affairs Course at the

University of South Carolina. He has a B.A. degree in history from the University of Delaware and has done graduate

work in journalism and political science. He is currently

assigned to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

His awards include the Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Purple

Heart with Oak Leaf Cluster, Combat Infantryman Badge,

and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry.

MAJ. JAMES T. CURRIE is a military historian and member of

the Army Reserve. Currie received his B.A. degree Summa

cum Laude from the University of Mississippi and his M.A.

and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Virginia. He has

been a college professor and was the first historian for the

United States Department of Education. Currie is a prolific

writer, and his articles have been published in Prologue: The

Journal of the National Archives, The Journal of Negro History,

Military Review, The Journal of Mississippi History, American

315
316 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Education, and elsewhere. He received the Charles Thomson

Prize from the National Archives in 1978, and his first

book (Enclave: Vicksburg and Her Plantations, 1863-1870)

was nominated for the Frederick Jackson Turner Prize. Currie served three years on active duty and four years with a

troop unit of the USAR. He is an Individual Mobilization

Augmentee at the US Army Center of Military History and

is Associate Historian in the Office for the Bicentennial of

the US House of Representatives.
Index

MILITARY UNIT INDEX

1st Air Cavalry Division, 279, 288

1st Armored Division, 254

1st Australian Task Force, 279

1st Logistical Command, 288, 289

1st United States Army, 292

2d Armored Division, 104

2d United States Army, 62

3d Marine Division, 282

3d Ordnance Bn, 290

8th Army, 99n

8th Bn, 40th Armored Division, 254

9th Infantry Division, 279

9th Medical Laboratory, 283

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 279, 286

11th Special Forces Group, 292

12th Special Forces Group, 114

18th Field Artillery Bn, 107

25th Infantry Division, 255, 279

26th General Support Group, 280, 287

36th Transportation Bn, 282

57th Transportation Bn, 289

69th Maintenance Bn, 289

74th Field Hospital, 206, 283, 284

77th Army Reserve Command, 283, 284,

77th Infantry Division, 57

78th Infantry Division, 58

80th Infantry Division, 55

82d Airborne Division, 200

96th Civil Affairs Bn, 293

100th Bn, 442d Regimental Combat Team

100th Infantry Division, 62

100th Training Division, 138

101st Airborne Division, 288

108th Artillery Group, 282

291

254

121st Army Reserve Command, 286

172d Transportation Company, 281, 282

173d Petroleum Company, 206n, 287, 288

199th Light Infantry Brigade, 279

222d Military Police Company, 294

231st Transportation Company, 207

237th Maintenance Company, 282, 283

240th Port Company, 108

259th Quartermaster Bn, 287, 288

301st Support Brigade, 292

305th Medical Detachment, 285

308th Quartermaster Salvage Company, 113

312th Evacuation Hospital, 284, 285, 286

316th Medical Detachment, 283

319th Transportation Company, 279, 280

336th Ordnance Bn, 277, 278

353d Civil Affairs Area (A), 292

357th Transportation Company, 286

369th Station Hospital, 294

377th Light Maintenance Company, 289

377th Ordnance Company, 289

378th Medical Detachment, 285, 286

394th Quartermaster Recovery and Disposition Company,

112

396th Military Police Company, 294

405th AAA Bn, 111

411th Engineer Brigade, 292

418th Military Police Escort Guard Company, 108

428th Engineer Diving Detachment, 114

432d Civil Affairs Group, 294

432d PSYOP Bn, 294

446th Field Artillery Bn, 112

448th Army Postal Unit, 206

452d General Support Company, 281

317
318 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

461st Pipeline Company, 185

469th Engineer Bn, 187

469th Military Police Company, 294

494th Signal Construction Company, 109

513th Maintenance Bn, 188, 205, 206, 280

737th Transportation Company, 203, 287, 288, 289

808th Engineer Petroleum Distribution Company, 111

817th Transportation Truck Bn, 110

818th Hospital Center, 292

826th Ordnance Company, 290

842d Quartermasrer Company, 287, 288

889th Medical Detachment, 285

1002d Supply and Service Company, 205, 206n

1018th Supply and Service Company, 206n

1209th US Army Garrison, 190

3027th ASU, 110

3397th US Army Garrison, 259n

I Corps (Vietnam), 278, 285

II Corps (Vietnam), 289

III Corps (Vietnam), 284

IV Corps (Vietnam), 284

ALPHABETICAL SUBJECT INDEX

Active Guard-Reserve (AGR), 219, 220, 222, 229

Adjutants General, 199

Advisory Committee on an All-Volunteer Armed

Force, 212

Advanced Individual Training, 237, 241

Advisor program, 223, 224

Afghanistan, 263

Affiliation Bonus, 239

Affiliation Program, 254, 255, 256

Ailes, Army Sec. Stephen, 164, 167, 170

Air Force Reserve, 198, 205, 218

Air Medal, 283

Air National Guard, 198

Albuquerque, N.M., 110

All-Volunteer Army, 230, 231, 232

All-Volunteer Force, 213, 231

American Education magazine, 268

American Expeditionary Force, 32

Annual General Inspection, 257

Area Maintenance Support Activities, 250

Armed Forces Policy Board, 126

Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, 100, 116, 197

Armed Forces Reserve Medal, 52

Army Command and Control Study, 82, 227

Army Commendation Medal, 207, 280, 283, 286,

287, 290

Army, expansible, 7, 8, 216

Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System,

262

Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, 225, 226,

227, 228, 229, 261

Army, Regular, 29, 30, 33, 57, 62, 63, 99

Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal, 52

Army Reserve Centers, 212, 251

Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs), 134, 179,

199,^224, 226, 227, 230

Army Reserve Magazine, 293

Army Reserve Personnel Center, 229

Army Reserve Readiness Regions, 228

Army Reserve Technicians, 128, 129, 217, 218

Army Reserve benefits, 236, 237

Army, Revolutionary, 4

Army Security Agency, 247

Army Times, 215, 229

Army Training Test, 253

Army Training and Evaluation Program, 256, 258

Army War College, 268

Assize of Arms, 2

Associated Press, 215

Association of the US Army, 247, 248, 263

Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components, 130

Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development, 199

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 181

Atlanta, Ga., 277

Atomic bomb, 81

Augusta, Ga., 277, 280

Aurora, 111., 277

Baldwin, Hanson W, 142, 155

Baleycourt Woods, Meuse, France, 58

Ban Me Thuot, Vietnam, 281

Bao Loc, Vietnam, 281

Baraboo, Wise, 278, 290

Basic Training, 237, 241

Basic Unit Training, 253

Baskir, Lawrence M., 196, 197

Bates, Rep. William H., 172

Bautz, Maj. Gen. Edward, Jr., 233

Belsky, PFC Marvin, 138

Bergquist, Kenneth P., 228

Berke et al. v. MacLaugblin, 206

Berkman, Maj. Gen. William R., iii, 222, 238,

245, 272

Berlin Crisis, 139, 148

Bien Hoa, Vietnam, 286

Billings, Dr. Frank, 18

Black officers, 69

Blount, Winston M., 292

Boldt, David R., 216
INDEX 319

Boque Maison, France, 55

Boston, Mass., 188, 277, 230

Boswell, Maj. Walter O., 35, 271

Boyer, Col. Charles M., 82, 119

Bres, Brig. Gen. Edward S., 49, 92, 272

Briggs Report, 258n

Brodsky, Lewis C, iii, xiii, 206

Bronze Star Medal, 207, 280, 283, 286, 287, 290

Brooke, Sen. Edward, 205

Brucker, Sec. Army Wilbert M., 130

Bryan, Dr., 18

Bull, Dr. William T., 18

Bull, Lt. Henry T, 24

Burgess, Asst. Sec. of Def. Carter, 122

Byrnes Committee report, 95

Byrnes, James E, 95

Cadre concept, 217

Calhoun, John C, 7, 216

Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, 281, 289

Camp Evans, Vietnam, 288

Camp Kilmer, N.J., 58

Camp Leroy Johnson, La., 108

Camp McCoy, Wise, 185

Camp Shelby, Miss., 259n, 260n

Camp Vandergrift, Vietnam, 288

Campbell, Maj. Gen. Boniface, 119, 120

Cannon, Sen. Howard, 169

CAPSTONE program, 255, 256, 258

Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 41

Carlton, John F., 160, 171

Carter, President Jimmy, 263

CARNotes, 230

Castro, Fidel, 294

Caven Point, N.Y., 187

Central Highlands, Vietnam, 281

Central Intelligence Agency, 71

Certificate of Achievement, 207, 290

Chapman, James P., 75

Chattanooga, Tenn., 113

Chicago, 111., 114

Chief of Reserve Components, 214

Chief, Army Reserve, 130, 179, 182, 199, 227,

234, 238, 247, 250, 271

Chief, National Guard Bureau, 199

Chu Lai, Vietnam, 189, 285, 289

Circular 347 (Aug. 25, 1944), 79, 80

Citizens' Military Training Camps, 39, 40

Civil War, 9

Civilian Acquired Skills Program, 237, 243

Civilian Components Policy Board, 100

Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), 43, 44, 45, 61

Civilians, training of, 24, 25

Clark, Grenville, 26

Class II, 281

Class IV, 281

Class V, 278

Clausewitz, Carl von, 269

Cleveland, Ohio, 205, 278

Clifford, Sec. of Def. Clark, 201

Coakley, Robert W., 4, 5, 147

Cody, Wyo., 185

Colco Island, Vietnam, 287

Collins, Rep. Ross A., 47

Comitatm, 1

Command and General Staff College, 224, 268

Committee on Civilian Components, 90

Confederation, Articles of, 6

Congress: and the militia, 3; interest in training of

ORC, 47; passes conscription act, 64; rejects

universal military training, 84; supports increased

USAR budget, 116; objects to USAR reductions,

131; and authority to call up Reserves, 136;

investigates Reserve call-up, 146, 147; and

consideration of Peck plan, 156; and opposition to

merger proposal, 169; and minimum USAR

strength, 175; and reaction to Johnson's policies,

195; and opinion on unit mobilization, 205; and

Vietnam, 209; General Accounting Office of, 227,

238, 239; Senate Appropriations Committee, 228;

House Appropriations Committee, 228; and levels

of command, 229

Constitution, 6

Continental Army Commands, 145, 184, 199, 223,

224, 225, 230, 254

Continental Army proposal, 25

Copeland, Sen. Royal S., 47

COSTAR, 1976

Cress, Maj. Gen. James B., 272

DA Master Priority List, 255

Da Nang Support Command, 287

Da Nang, Vietnam, 278, 281, 288

Dalat, Vietnam, 281

Davis, Jefferson, 9

DCSOPS, 144

De-Militarized Zone (Vietnam), 282, 283

Dearborn, Maj. Gen. Henry, 7

Decker, Gen. George H., 144

Defense Authorization Act, 248

Delaware, 292

Dental Officers' Reserve Corps, 20

Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Forces, 130

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 222, 223

Dern, Sec. War George H., 47

Dick Act of 1903, 13, 14

Director of Military Personnel Policies, 224
320 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Distinguished Service Cross, 56

DoD Appropriations Act of 1967, 197

Dong Ha, Vietnam, 287

Donovan, Maj. Gen. William J., 71, 105 (photo of)

Doolittle, Lt. Gen. James H., 71

Douglas, Justice William O., 206

Draper, Army Under Sec. William H., 89

Drinker, Henry, 25

Du Picq, Col. Ardant, 208

DuPont, Sen. Henry A., 29

Dunn, Lt. Col. D. Y., 62, 192, 267, 268

Edgewood Arsenal, Md., 60

Educational assistance, 238

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: drafts answer on ORC

training, 47; and controversy over ORC status, 86,

87; reliance on atomic weapons, 116; plans for

improving reserves, 120; and National Reserve

Plan, 121; opposes provisions of RFA, 124; and

reductions in Reserve Components, 130; and

reductions m USAR budget, 131

Emporia, Kans., 277

Enlisted Reserve Corps, 30, 31, 35, 56, 57, 85,

100, 106, 295, 296

Enlistment bonuses, 238

Equipment, 245, 246, 249

Excepted service, 219

Executive for Reserve Affairs, 77, 91, 130

Expeditious Discharge Program, 241

Federal Emergency Management Agency, 261

Felberbaum et al. v. MacLaughlin, 206

Felix, SP5 Jesus Peres, 114 (photo of)

First Mississippi Rifles, 9

Fitt, Albert B., 170

Flemming, Arthur, 120

Ford, Col. Stanley H., 271

Forest Park, 111., 277

Fort Belvoir, Va., 282

Fort Benning, Ga., 285, 286

Fort Bragg, N.C., 145

Fort Carson, Colo., 278, 286

Fort Chaffee, Ark., 294

Fort DeRussy, Hawaii, 277

Fort Devens, Mass., 145

Fort Dix, N.J., 41, 282

Fort Drum, N.Y, 89, 190, 191

Fort Eustis, Va., 186

Fort Gordon, Ga., 109, 282

Fort Hamilton, N.Y, 278, 282

Fort Hood, Tx., 109

Fort Indiantown Gap, Penn., 251, 294

Fort Knox, Ky., 62, 112, 290

Fort Lee, Va., 279, 282

Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., 287

Fort Lewis, Wash., 203, 281, 288

Fort McClellan, Ala., 110, 113, 186

Fort McCoy, Wise, 294

Fort Meade, Md., 282

Fort Monmouth, N.J., 282

Fort Ord, Calif., 109

Fort Pickett, Va., 251, 252

Fort Polk, La., 145

Fort Riley, Kan., 281, 289, 290

Fort Smith, Ark., 277

Ft. Wayne, Ind., 277

Fyrd, 1, 2

Garden City, N.Y, 277, 278

Garrison, Sec. War Lindley, 25, 26

Gates Commission, 212, 213

Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 212

General Accounting Office, 227, 238, 239, 242

General Staff, 14

General officers, ORC, 71, 72

Germany, 63

Gettysburg, 25

Gilpatric, Dep. Sec. of Def. Roswell, 155

Glaspey, Capt. Ruth, 187

GOCOM, 220

Goldwater, Sen. Barry, 169

Good Conduct Medal, 287

Grand Army of the Republic, 9

Grand Island, Neb., 277

Grand Payload, 261

Grant, President U. S., 10

Gray Board Report, 90, 91

Gray, Army Asst. Sec. Gordon, 90

Greencastle, Penn., 278, 286

Greenwood, Miss., 277, 288

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 209

Hai Van Pass, Vietnam, 280

Haislip, Brig. Gen. Wade, 67

Hamilton, Alexander, 5

Hampton, Col. David R., 216

Hartshorn, Brig. Gen. Edwin S., 272

Hastings, Neb., 277

Havell, Lt. Col. George E, 89

Hebert, Rep. F. Edward, 143, 146, 159, 169, 170,

172, 180

Heginbotham, Eric, 192

Herron, Brig. Gen. Charles D., 36, 46, 51, 72, 271

Hester, Brig. Gen. John H., 272

Honor, Lt. Col. Edward, 282

House of Representatives, 18, 195
INDEX 321

House of Representatives Appropriations Committee,

220, 228

House of Representatives Armed Services Committee,

169, 177, 180, 215, 219, 248

Howze, Gen. Hamilton, 216

Hue, Vietnam, 188

Hurley, Sec. War Patrick J., 46

Immediate Reserve, 161

Inactive duty training, 49

Independence, Kans., 277

Individual Mobilization Augmentee, 229, 263

Individual Ready Reserve: management of 228, 229;

strength of, 1978, 231; recruiting of, 240; effect of

Vietnam upon, 240; reenlistment bonus for, 241;

additional obligation for, 241; problems with,

242; strength of, 298; mentioned, 198, 204

Infusion policy, 208, 279, 281, 285, 287

Iranian crisis, 234n, 261, 263

Israeli Army, 216

LZ Nancy, Vietnam, 280

Laird, Sec. of Def Melvin, 214, 215

Lakeland, Fla., 112

Larson, Mayor Jack, 289

Lebanon, 150

Legion of Merit, 207, 286, 287

Lexington, Ky., 277

Limitanei, 1

Lincoln, Abraham, 9

Lindbergh, Charles A., 60 (photo of)

Lindeman, Brig. Gen. Philip F., 272

Lindsay, Mayor John V., 283

Little Rock, Ark., 277

Livonia, Mich., 277

Loeb, Mayor Henry, 286

Logan, Gen. John A., 11

Long Binh Ammunition Depot, 290

Long Binh, Vietnam, 189, 279, 284, 290

Looney et al. v. MacLaugblin, 206

Lowe, Brig. Gen. Frank E., 51, 65, 66, 272

Lusttania, 26

Jacobson, Brig. Gen. Raymond M., 229

Johnson, President Lyndon B.: and 1965 decision on

Vietnam, 193; and decision on Reserve call-up,

194; increases troops in Vietnam, 194; raises draft

calls, 194; and war in Vietnam, 195, 196; and

mobilization of Reserves, 198; and sending troops

to Vietnam, 200; decides not to run for reelection, 201; and decision on Reserve call-up,

202; and Congressional authorization for Vietnam,

209; and the draft, 212; policies of reversed by

Nixon, 215

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 136, 199, 200, 201

Kalergis, Maj. Gen. J. G., 224

Kansas City, Kans., 277, 288

Kenan Committee report, 165

Kenan, Brig. Gen. Thomas A., 164

Kennedy, President John F., 133, 135, 136, 140,

145, 150, 152, 153

Kennedy, Sen. Edward, 205

Kenworthy, E. W., 195

Kerwin, Lt. Gen. Walter T., Jr., 223

Khe Sanh, Vietnam, 288

Khrushchev, Premier Nikita S., 135, 136, 153

Kingston, Lt. Gen. Robert C, 263, 264

Klinkowski, Sgt. Nikolai, 138

Knox, Henry, 6

Korea, 198, 259

Korean War, 96, 253

Maas, Maj. Gen. Melvin, 117, 119

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 96

Madison, President James, 7

Madison, Wise, 278, 290

Maneuver Area Commands, 226

Manitowoc, Wise, 278, 289

Mann, Rep. James R., 18

March, Gen. Peyton C, 33

Marine Corps Reserve, 201, 292

Marsh, Army Sec. John O., Jr., 248

Marshall, Brig. Gen. S. L. A., 168, 169

Marshall, Gen. George C, 68, 69, 83

Martinez, Lt. Col. Eugene, 280

Maryland, 292

Mayo, Dr. Charles H., 55 (photo of)

Mayo, Dr. William J., 55 (photo of)

McAuliffe, Lt. Gen. Anthony C, 98

McCosh, Dr. Andrew J., 18

McKinley, President William, 18

McNamara, Sec. of Def. Robert S.: proposes

reorganization of USAR, 133; seeks mobilization

of reservists, 136; and success of Berlin call-up,

140; and Reserve reorganization, 143, 144; and

the Reserve Officers Association, 144; proposes

Reserve release, 145; analyzes Berlin call-up, 147;

emphasizes conventional forces, 150; speaks to

National Governor's Conference, 158; and merger

proposal, 1964, 165; alienates Congress on merger,

165, 166; agrees to compromise on merger, 170;

reorganizes the USAR, 173; urges troops be sent

to Vietnam, 193; and call-up of Reserves for

Vietnam, 193, 196, 200, 201; considers
322 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

McNamara, Sec. of Def. Robert S. (continued)

reinforcement troops, 199; recommends

deployment of troops, 200; attempts to merge

Guard and Reserve, 211; proposal to abolish

divisions, 245; and failure to give equipment to

USAR, 245

McQuiston, Rear Adm. I. M., 100

Medal of Honor, 56, 60, 72, 105, 106

Medical Reserve Corps, 14, 17, 18, 19, 295

Medical officers in the Organized Reserve, 84, 85

Memphis, Tenn., 278, 286

Meritorious Unit Citation, 207, 280

Meritorious Unit Commendation, 189, 278, 283,

285, 286, 289

Mexican War, 8

Mexico, 27

Meyer, Gen. Edward C, 229, 230, 247, 249, 269

Middle East, 263

Military Construction, Army Reserve, 25 1

Military Training Camps Association, 27, 29

Militia, 7, 9, 10

Militia Act of 1792, 6, 8

Miller, SP5 Willard M., 141

Milton, Brig. Gen. Hugh, 98, 272

"Minute Man" badge, 52

Miyamura, Sgt. Hiroshi H., 106

MOBEX 76, 260

MOBEX 78 (Nifty Nugget), 260

MOBEX 80 (Proud Spirit), 261

MOBEX 83, 261

Mobilization Personnel Processing System, 262

Mobilization exercises, 259, 260, 261

Mohr, Maj. Gen. Henry, 272

Morse et al. v. Boswe/I et al., 206

Mott, Brig. Gen. Harry J., Ill, iii

Murray, Ky., 267

National Committee for Employer Support of the

Guard and Reserve, lOOn

National Defense Act of 1916, 28, 29, 220

National Defense Transportation Award, 207

National Guard: after the Civil War, 9; performance

in the Philippines, 10; called out for Mexico crisis,

28; number of members of in federal service,

1917, 30; and the Gray Board Report, 90, 91;

and Selective Service Act, 94; and Berlin call-up,

138; and Vietnam, 195, 196, 202; and the Total

Force Policy, 214; personnel requisitioning system

of, 260; and the Postal Strike, 291; relief efforts in

Pennsylvania, 293; mentioned, 62, 198

National Guard Association, 158

National Guard, Delaware, 198

National Military Establishment, 90

National Reserve Plan, 121, 122, 123

National Security Act of 1947, 90

NATO, 246, 255, 260, 269

Naval Reserve, 198, 205, 292

Nedzi, Rep. Lucien N, 172

New Jersey, 292

New York Times, 138, 154, 195, 215

New York, N.Y., 57, 278, 283, 284, 291

New York, Neb., 277

Nifty Nugget (MOBEX 78), 260

Nixon, President Richard M., 212, 213, 214, 291

North Vietnamese, 199

Office of Reserve Components, 161, 199

Office of Strategic Services, 71

Officers' Reserve Corps: size of in 1917, 30; service in

World War I, 31; black officers in, 31; problems

of after WW I, 38; new officers in, 38; ROTC as a

source of, 38; CMTCs as source for, 39; training

of, 40; training of after WW I, 42; use of in

CMTC, 42, 43; training opportunities for, 45, 66;

restrictions on training of, 46; training problems

of, 47; number of members trained, 48; type of

training received by, 48; correspondence courses

used by, 50, 51; rewarding membership in, 51,

52; medical benefits provided for members of 52;

death benefits provided for members of, 52; need

for during mobilization, 53; training of, 61;

members of ordered to active duty, 64; attached to

RA and NG divisions, 66; number on active duty

in 1942, 68; value in early mobilization during

WW II, 68; policies on duty for members of, 68;

members of not ordered to active duty, 68; reasons

for deferment of members of, 69; members of not

on active duty, 70; percentage of in command

positions, 70; percentage of on active duty, 70;

percentage of in overseas divisions, 71; percentage

of who became casualties, 71; number of general

officers in, 71; peak size of during WW II, 72;

civilians commissioned in, 72; attrition rate of

during 1940-1941, 73; reappointments in

allowed, 73, 74; discrimination against members

of, 75; contribution of to WW II victory, 78;

strength of in 1947, 85; legal elimination of, 100;

strength of (table), 295-96, mentioned, 55, 56,

57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 104, 105

Officers, commissioned, 75

Omaha, Neb., 277, 281

Operation Graphic Hand, 291

Operation Noah II, 292

Operation and Maintenance, USAR, 139, 293

Orem, Ut., 287

Organized Reserve: divisional structure of, 52, 53,

81, 87; percentage of required full achieved by,

52; members of ordered to duty, 64;
INDEX 323

Organized Reserve (continued)

impracticability of mobilizing, 66; divisions of

during W II, 67; and Circular 347, 81;

competition of with National Guard, 81; strength

of, 1947, 88; lack of organization of, 88; lack of

training for, 89; training 98th Division of, 89;

lack of equipment for, 89; members of receive pay

for IADT, 91; priorities for payment of IADT to,

92; retirement pay to members of, 92; members of

not affected by Selective Service, 94; Byrnes

Committee proposals concerning, 95; units and

members of go to Korea, 96; units of held in

reserve in US, 97; members of subject to double

jeopardy, 97; priorities for ordering to duty, 97;

members of who were liable for Korean duty, 98;

number who served in Korea, 99; Medals received

by, 99; difficulties caused by mobilization of, 99;

number of officers of in Korea, 99; renaming of,

100; appraisal of service of in Korea, 115; strength

of, 295-96; mentioned, 60, 61

Plattsburg, N.Y., 41

Plattsburg Manual, 30

Plattsburg camps, 26

Pleasant Grove, Ut., 278, 287

Poconos, 292

Post exchange, 236, 237, 257

Postal Strike, 291

Potts, Col. Douglas, 271

Presidential Unit Citation, 207

Program Objective Memorandum, 1983-87, 265

Proud Spirit (MOBEX 80), 261

Provo, Ut., 209, 287

Pueblo, USS, 198

Purple Heart Medal, 207, 280, 286, 289, 290

Putnam, Maj. Gen. George W., Jr., 224

Quang Tri, Vietnam, 282, 283, 287

Quebec, Battle of, 4

Pace, Sec. Army Frank, Jr., 96, 98

Palladino, Maj. Gen. Ralph A., 272

Palmer, Gen. Bruce, 254

Palmer, John McAuley: Report on Land Forces, 8;

service on General Staff, 14-15; Upton's lack of

influence upon, 20; and the expansible Army, 21;

and Leonard Wood, 21; and Henry Stimson, 21;

and John J. Pershing, 33; testifies before Senate

committee, 34; disagrees with Chief of Staff, 34;

helps draft National Defense Act of 1920, 34;

advises on Reserve matters, 34; and post-war

planning efforts, 79; and Circular 347, 79; as

"Father of the Army Reserve," 272

Palmer, Maj. Gen. John M., 20

Paris, Treaty of, 5

Park, Dr. Roswell, 18

Parker, Lt. Col. A.H., 117

Pattison, Brig. Gen. Hal C, 17n

Peck Plan, 154

Peck, Dr. MertonJ., 154

Pegram, Lt. Col. J. C, 271

Pennsylvania, 292

Pentagon Papers, 200

Pentomic divisions, 127, 129, 149

Pershing, Gen. of the Armies John J., 27, 32, 34,

35

Philadelphia, Penn., 278

Philbin, Edward J., 248

Phillips, Capt. E. H., 84

Phoenix, Ariz., 277

Phu Bai, Vietnam, 280, 281, 287, 288, 289

Physicians, contract, 17

Pike, Charles B., 43

Radford, Adm. Arthur, 122

Rampton, Gov. Calvin L., 287

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), 212,

261, 263, 264, 265, 269

Rapid Deployment Force—Army, 263, 269

Readiness Assistance Regions, 225

Readiness Group, 225, 226

Readiness Group Meade, 226

Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool, 161,

175

Ready Reserve, 100, 101, 197, 237, 239

Regular Army Reserve, 31, 34

Reinforcement Training Units, 173

Reinforcing Reserve, 161

"Remainder method" of budgeting, 81

Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act,

179, 180, 181

Research Analysis Corporation, 148

Reserve Compensation System Study, 232

Reserve Component Commanders Handbook, for

Mobilization, 262

Reserve Enlistment Program—1963, 162, 204, 252

Reserve Forces Act of 1955, 123, 124

Reserve Forces Call-Up Authority, 263

Reserve Forces Policy Board, 101, 156, 168

Reserve Officer Personnel Act, 116, 117, 119

Reserve Officers Association: Kansas City chapter of,

59; and terminal leave promotions, 82; and ROPA,

117; opposes USAR reductions, 131; and Defense

Secretary McNamara, 143, 155; and Stahr address

to, 152; and reorganization, 158; and merger

proposal, 167, 168, 171, 211; and the RDJTF,

264
324 TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE USAR, 1908-1983

Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), 29, 31, 73,

74, 198, 238, 243

Resor, Army Sec. Stanley R., 181, 182, 205

Retired Reserve, 100, 162, 241, 298

Retiree Recall Program, 242

Rich, Lt. Gen. C. W. G., 177

Richardson, Lt. Gen. William R., 211

Richmond, Va., 55, 278

Rickenbacker, Capt. Edward V., 3 In, 56 (photo of)

Ridgway, Gen. Matthew, 122

Rivers, Rep. L. Mendel, 169

ROAD Divisions, 129

Roberts, Maj. Gen. J. Milnor, 272

Rockvüle, Md., 277

Roosevelt, Brig. Gen. Theodore, Jr., 26, 103

Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 67

Roosevelt, Lt. Col. Theodore, 10

Root, Elihu, 11, 12, 13, 14

Rosellini, Gov. Albert D., 159, 160

Rough Riders, 10

Roundout Program, 254, 255, 256

Royal Thai Volunteer Force, 279

Royall, Sec. Army Kenneth C, 95

Runge, Asst. Sec. of Def. Carlisle P., 151

Russell Amendment, 197, 198, 206

Russell, Sen. Richard B., 178, 197

Ryons, Lt. Col. Fred B., 271

Salt Lake City, Ut., 287

San Antonio, Tx., 278

San Juan, PR., 114

Schenectady, N.Y., 277

Selected Reserve, 173, 174, 183, 202, 204, 214,

218n, 263

Selected Reserve Incentive Program, 234, 238, 239n

Selective Service Act of 1948, 94

Senate Armed Services Committee, 175, 176, 182,

222, 247

Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, 175

Senate Appropriations Committee, 228

Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association, 228,

229

Senior Staff Administrative Assistant, 220

Sharonville, Ohio, 278

Sherman, William T, 10

Shickshinny, Penn., 187

Silver Star Medal, 207

Simultaneous Membership Program, 190, 238

Smith, Brig. Gen. Edward W., 69, 70, 76, 272

Smith, Col. Edward J., 75

Smyser, Capt. James S., 56

Souchin, Dr., 18

South China Sea, 283

Soviet Union, 80, 135, 263

Spanish-American War, 10, 14

St. Petersburg, Fla., 277

Stahr, Sec. Army Elvis J., Jr., 137, 141, 152

Standby Reserve, 162, 231, 298

Statute of Winchester, 2

STEADFAST, 221

Stebbins, Horace C, 43

Stennis, Sen. John, 169

Stevens, Army Sec. Robert T., 111, 122

Stimson, Sec. War Henry, 22, 72, 73

Stone, Col. David L., 36, 271

Strategic Air Command, 282

Strategic Reserve Army Forces, 137

Strauss, William A., 196, 197

Stroud Study, 219

Stroud, Ansel M., 219

Supreme Court, 206

Survivor Benefit Program, 236

Sutton, Maj. Gen. William J., 17n, 165, 182, 242,

272

Talleyrand, 102

Tan Lap Orphanage (Vietnam), 284

Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 133

"TC Hill," 279

Technician Conversion Test, 219

Technicians (USAR), 217-22

Terminal leave promotions, 81, 82, 83

Tet Offensive (Vietnam), 198

Thompson, Brig. Gen. Charles F., 35, 49, 50, 271,

272

Thompson, Lt. Gen. Richard H., 249

Thurmond, Sen. Strom, 119, 131, 169

Torney, Surgeon General George H., 18, 19

Total Force Policy, 5, 212, 231, 247, 248

Trainee Discharge Program, 241

Trenton, Battle of, 4

Trinity of War, 269

Tropical Storm Agnes, 292

Truman, President Harry S., 46, 59, 69, 86, 95, 96

Twaddle, Brig. Gen. Harry L., 65, 66, 74

US Army Forces Command: and mobilization

planning, 222; and alternatives to ARCOMs, 228;

span of control enhanced, 229; and USAR

recruiting, 235; and USAR deployability, 248;

emphasis on realism, 256; and USAR training,

257, 258; and mobilization exercises, 260; and

USAR units in the RDJTF, 264; and Vietnamese

refugees, 293; and Cuban refugees, 294;

mentioned, 218, 220

US Army Recruiting Command, 221, 235
INDEX 325

US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 228,

261, 262

US Central Command (see Rapid Deployment Joint

Task Force)

US Continental Army Command (see Continental

Army Commands)

US Department of Education, 268

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 281

Unit Cross of Gallantry (Vietnam), 207

United States Army Support Command, 290

Universal Military Training and Service Act, 197

Universal military training, 84, 94

Upton, Emory, 10, 11

Van Fleet, Gen. James A., 142

VanCise, Col. Philip S., 69

Vance, Cyrus R., 172

Vanik, Rep. Charles A., 205

Variable Housing Allowance, 236

Vaughan, Maj. Gen. Harry, 69, 86, 90

Veterinary Officers' Reserve Corps, 19

Viet Cong, 199

Vietnam, 172, 197, 199, 232, 278

Vietnam Gallantry Cross, 286

Vietnam Memorial, 209

Vietnamese refugees, 293

Villa, Pancho, 27, 28

Vinson, Rep. Carl, 173

Virginia, 292

Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 191

War Department, 6, 75, 76

War of 1812, 7

Warren, Maj. Gen. Frederick M., 134, 272

Washington Post, 215, 216

Washington, DC, 221

Washingron, George, 3, 5, 6

Washington, Penn., 278

Weeks, Sec. Army John W., 37, 38, 50

Weigley, Russell, E, 27

Westmoreland, Gen. William C, 5, 172, 199, 201,

216, 268

Westover, Brig. Gen. Wendell, 272

Wheeler, Gen. Earl C, 194, 195, 200, 201

White, John P., 218, 219

Wickersham, George, 6, 23

Williamsport, Penn., 292

Wilson, Sec. of Def. Charles E., 115, 122

Winston-Salem, N.C., 278, 284

Winthrop, Minn., 277, 281

Women, 93, 94, 187, 237, 242

Women's Army Corps, 242

Wood, Maj. Gen. Leonard, 12, 17, 21, 23, 24, 26

Woodring, Sec. War Harry H., 49

Woody, Brig. Gen. Leonard S., 286

Woolnough, Gen. James L., 254

Worthington, Minn., 277, 281

Wright, Robert K., Jr., 4

Wyeth, Dr., 18

Wadsworth, Sen. James J., 33

Walker, Lt. Col. Sue, 284, 285, 286

Yakima, Wash., Ill, 189, 203, 209, 278, 288, 289

Yucatan Peninsula, 292