alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report
of Chimerix, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Kenneth I. Moch, President and Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, to my knowledge that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2) The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





|By:                | /s/ Kenneth I. Moch |                                      
|------------------ | ------------------- | -------------------------------------
|                   | Name:               | Kenneth I. Moch                      
|                   | Title:              | President and Chief Executive Officer
|                   |                     |                                      
|Date: May 13, 2013 |                    







A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906
has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1431 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1431

 To amend section 242 of the National Housing Act to extend the sunset 
provision for the exemption for critical access hospitals under the FHA 
              program of mortgage insurance for hospitals.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 27, 2011

  Mr. Kohl (for himself, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Thune, Mr. Johnson of South 
  Dakota, Mr. Tester, and Mr. Johanns) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
                           and Urban Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend section 242 of the National Housing Act to extend the sunset 
provision for the exemption for critical access hospitals under the FHA 
              program of mortgage insurance for hospitals.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Rural Health Care Capital Access 
Reauthorization Act of 2011''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION.

    Section 242(i)(1) of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1715z-
7(i)(1)) is amended by striking ``July 31, 2011'' and inserting ``July 
31, 2016''.
                                 <all>
```
No. 16-0738 – State of West Virginia ex rel. Pressley Ridge, et al. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, et al. FILED November 17, 2016 released at 3:00 p.m. BENJAMIN, Justice, dissenting: RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA I join Justice Loughry’s dissenting opinion for the reasons set forth therein. share the concerns of my colleagues about the best interests of children in West Virginia, particularly those with needs currently being served by the respondents. However, I agree with Justice Loughry that mandamus relief is not only unwarranted, but also unwise

in this instance.

I write to expand on the first footnote in Justice Loughry’s dissenting opinion – a footnote focusing on the procedural history of this matter. Initiated in the seeking of extraordinary relief in mandamus before the circuit court, no appeal to this Court was sought by the respondents below from the circuit court’s refusal to issue a writ. As a preliminary matter, the attempt at the circuit court level to force an administrative agency to engage in rule-making in this case is itself legally and constitutionally problematic. As noted in Justice Loughry’s dissenting opinion, the issuance of a writ by this Court requires that the party seeking the writ demonstrate its legal right to the relief being requested. I fail to see that legal right. More importantly, the failure to appeal the matter below in an expedited fashion simply compounds the problem before this Court: petitioners still do not demonstrate their legal right to the relief being requested; the same constitutional problems of having courts require rulemaking in the contract area is still II present; and it appears that petitioners are simply getting another “bite at the apple.” respectfully dissent for these reasons and the reasons set forth in Justice Loughry’s dissenting opinion.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-89,619-01

EX PARTE LARRY CHARLES PERRY, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 58250-A IN THE 30TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM WICHITA COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of evading arrest

or detention and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. 

Applicant, through habeas counsel, contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because counsel failed to timely file a notice of appeal. There is no response from trial counsel or

findings in the habeas record.

Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte Patterson, 993 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Ex parte
2

Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). In these circumstances, additional facts are needed. 

As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial court is

the appropriate forum for findings of fact. The trial court shall order trial counsel to respond to

Applicant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court may use any means set out in

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d).

If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. 

If Applicant is indigent and wishes to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an

attorney to represent Applicant at the hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. 

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether Applicant

was denied his right to a meaningful appeal because Applicant’s counsel failed to timely file a notice

of appeal. The trial court shall also make any other findings of fact and conclusions of law that it

deems relevant and appropriate to the disposition of Applicant’s claim for habeas corpus relief.

This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The

issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all

affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or

deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall

be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time must

be requested by the trial court and shall be obtained from this Court.

Filed: April 17, 2019

Do not publish
No. 48748.

#### Protests 55926-K, etc., of Abercrombie & Fitch Co. (New York).

Opinion by

Cole, J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise consists of croquet sets containing balls, mallets, and other articles used in playing the game of *258croquet, similar in all material respects to the croquet sets the subject of *Abercrombie & Fitch Co.*v. *United States*(10 Cust. Ct. 222, C. D. 758). That record was incorporated herein. In the cited case the court held that the croquet sets were not properly classifiable as entireties for tariff purposes, and that the balls and mallets included therein, being specially provided for in paragraph 1502, were dutiable at 20 percent ad valorem under said paragraph 1502, as amended by the trade agreement with the United Kingdom (T. D. 49753). In accordance therewith the court held the merchandise in question to be classifiable under the said amended paragraph 1502, as claimed.
Case No. 9,376.

#### MATHEWS v. DOUGLASS.

[1 Brunner, Col. Cas. 196; *1*

Cooke. 136.]

Circuit Court. Tennessee.2

1812.

Practice in Equity — Ixjcxctiox—When Grafted.

An injunction will not be granted during the pendency of an action unless the parties asking relief in equity will confess judgment at law.

Douglass brought an action at law against Mathews, and filed his declaration, to which Mathews demurred. During the pendency or the action at law, and indeed before the demurrer had been determined, Whiteside, on behalf of Mathews, and upon a bill filed for that purpose, moved the court for an injunction.

*1096Dickinson, on behalf of the plaintiff at law, objected to an injunction being granted unless the complainant would confess a judgment.

2

 [District not given.]

BY THE COURT.

An injunction generally operates as a release of errors; but if it be granted as this case now stands it will not so operate here. Suppose the injunction is granted to stay the proceedings at law, and ultimately there would be .a decree against the complainant. He may still go on, and if the declaration is defective prevent the recovery of the claim, or at least delay it, without any pretence founded in justice. And besides, should the demurrer be decided against him, he might prosecute a writ of error. We, therefore, will not grant the injunction unless the complainant will confess a judgment at law.

And it was done accordingly.
**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO**

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|   | 1. | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | Information                contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,                the                financial condition and results of operations                of the Company. |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                   |                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date:                December 17, 2007 | By:                                                                              | /s/ Arthur                F.                Trudel                                          |
|                                   | Arthur                F. Trudel                                                            |
|                                   | Senior                Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and                Secretary |

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Lance VAN ALSTYNE, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 02-50027.

D.C. No. CR-98-00118-AHS-01.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Aug. 4, 2005.

Robert McGahan, Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Susan R. Ficcadenti, Kevin E. Smith, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Santa Ana, CA, William S. Harris, Stewart & Harris, South Pasadena, CA, for Defendanf>-Appellant.

Before BEEZER and FISHER, Circuit *46Judges, and ENGLAND, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable Morrison C. England, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM**

In a prior disposition, we affirmed the conviction and sentence of defendant-appellant Lance Van Alstyne. Van Alstyne later filed a petition for certiorari before the United States Supreme Court, which granted the petition, vacated our judgment and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of *United States v. Booker,*— U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Because the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer binding after the Court’s decision in Booker—and we cannot ascertain whether the district court would have imposed a different sentence under a discretionary regime—we remand to the district court for reconsideration of Van Alstyne’s sentence in light of *United States v. Ameline,*409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc). Van Alstyne’s conviction is affirmed for the reasons stated in our prior disposition.

Conviction AFFIRMED; REMANDED for sentence proceedings.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 35.11  LOGO

Commercial Mortgage Servicing
D1050-084, 8th Fl 401 South
Tryon Street Charlotte, NC 28202
1-800-326-1334 ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of April 1, 2016, by and among DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE &
ASSET RECEIVING CORPORATION, as Depositor, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer, MIDLAND LOAN SERVICES, A DIVISION OF PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Special Servicer, WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee,
WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Certificate Administrator, Paying Agent and Custodian and PARK BRIDGE LENDER SERVICES LLC, as Operating Advisor and Asset Representations Reviewer with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2016-C1 (the Agreement). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement. Pursuant to Section 10.11 of this Agreement, I, Leslie Hayton, Managing Director of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:  1.
A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from January 1, 2018 through December 31,
2018 (the Reporting Period), and of its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under my supervision, and  2.
To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations
under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has
executed this Certificate as of the 28th day of February 2019.  LOGOLeslie HaytonManaging DirectorWells Fargo Bank  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.



LOGO
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Union
Carbide Corporation's Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 1998, and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000100790
<NAME> UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                              38
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     1002
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        619
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  1907
<PP&E>                                            8003
<DEPRECIATION>                                    4061
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    7121
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             1315
<BONDS>                                           1705
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           155
<OTHER-SE>                                        2316
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      7121
<SALES>                                           3020
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  3020
<CGS>                                             2248
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     2248
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   266<F1>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  56
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    379
<INCOME-TAX>                                       110
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                260
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       260
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.91<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.86<F2>
<FN>
<F1>Other expenses are equal to research and development of 73 and depreciation and
amortization of 193.
<F2>The EPS-PRIMARY amount represents basic earnings per share and the EPS-DILUTED
amount represents diluted earnings per share, computed in accordance with
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 128, "Earnings Per Share."
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Janet TORRES-ROSALES, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-71671.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 12, 2005.*

Decided Sept. 19, 2005.

Frank P. Sprouls, Law Office of Ricci and Sprouls, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, San Francisco, CA, Greg D. Mack, Esq., Anthony W. Nor-wood, Esq., DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Offiee of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

*885Before: REINHARDT, RYMER, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Janet Torres-Rosales, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) summary affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (“U”) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition and remand.

Petitioner fails to raise claims regarding the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief in her opening brief, and therefore waives those claims. *See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,*94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1996).

Petitioner contends that the BIA abused its discretion by summarily affirming the IJ’s decision and not addressing her motion to remand based on *Matter of R-A-,*22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G.2001, BIA 1999), and the publication of new asylum regulations. Petitioner is correct that the BIA did not address her motion, which was contained in her BIA brief. Because the BIA abuses its discretion if it fails to “indicate with specificity that it heard and considered petitioner’s claims,” we remand to the BIA to consider petitioner’s motion to remand. *See Maravilla Maravilla v. Ashcroft,*381 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir.2004).

Petitioner’s contention regarding *Castillo-Villagra v. INS,*972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.1992) is misplaced because here the BIA did not take administrative notice of any fact.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.

Judge Rymer dissents.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, October 19, 2020. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, October 19, 2020 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A21A0368. TATTNALL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT A/K/A TATTNALL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. JORDAN R. HUERTA.
Upon consideration of the APPELLANT'S motion FOR PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW THE APPEAL in the above styled case, it is ordered that the motion the hereby GRANTED, and jurisdiction is released back to the trial court upon receipt of this order.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-2607

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON )

BEHALF OF THE INTERNAL )

REVENUE SERVICE, )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed March 21, 2018. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas 

County; Karl Grube, Judge.

Adam M. Topel of Liebler Gonzalez & 

Portuondo, Miami, for Appellant.

W. Stephen Muldrow, United States 

Attorney, Holly L. Gershow, 

Assistant United States Attorney, and 

Michelle Thresher Taylor, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

KELLY, LUCAS, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1450 

CA 11-01138 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND SCONIERS, JJ. 

 

CLAY LANGENSIEPEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V ORDER

DAVID KRUML, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

(APPEAL NO. 1.) 

 

LAW OFFICE OF JACOB P. WELCH, CORNING (ANNA CZARPLES OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

LEVENE GOULDIN & THOMPSON, LLP, VESTAL (SARAH E. NUFFER OF COUNSEL),

FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Steuben County (Peter

C. Bradstreet, A.J.), entered February 23, 2011. The order denied the

amended motion of plaintiff for partial summary judgment, granted the

cross motion of defendant for summary judgment and dismissed the

complaint. 

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed

without costs (see Hughes v Nussbaumer, Clarke & Velzy, 140 AD2d 988;

Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v Roberts & Roberts, 63 AD2d 566, 567; see

also CPLR 5501 [a] [1]). 

Entered: February 17, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court