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SECURING OUR COMMUNITIES: FEDERAL SUPPORT 

TO HIGH-RISK URBAN AREAS 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 23, 2018 

Serial No. 115–61 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

RON ESTES, Kansas 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

STEVEN S. GIAIER, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND 

COMMUNICATIONS 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York, Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

KERRY A. KINIRONS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

MOIRA BERGIN, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. William F. Sweeney, Jr., Assistant Director in Charge, New York Field 

Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

Mr. Brian Murphy, Acting Principal Deputy Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

Mr. Thomas DiNanno, Assistant Administrator, Grant Programs Directorate, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16 

Mr. Chris P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 21 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

PANEL II 

Mr. John Miller, Deputy Commissioner, Intelligence and Counterterrorism, 

New York Police Department, City of New York, New York: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 40 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 37 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 42 

Mr. Joseph W. Pfeifer, Chief, Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness, 

New York City Fire Department, City of New York, New York: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 45 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 37 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 48 

Page

IV 

Mr. Joseph J. Esposito, Commissioner, New York City Emergency Management Department, City of New York, New York: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 50 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 37 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 52 

Mr. John Bilich, Chief Security Officer, The Port Authority of New York 

and New Jersey: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 53 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 56 

Mr. Jared M. Maples, Director, Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, State of New Jersey: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 59 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 61 

APPENDIX 

Questions From Ranking Member Donald M. Payne for Thomas DiNanno ....... 73 

(1) 

SECURING OUR COMMUNITIES: FEDERAL 

SUPPORT TO HIGH-RISK URBAN AREAS 

Monday, April 23, 2018 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Staten Island, NY. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., at the 

Recital Hall, Center for the Arts, College of Staten Island, 2800 

Victory Blvd, Staten Island, NY, Hon. Daniel M. Donovan [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Donovan [presiding], King, and Payne. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine Federal counterterrorism support to high-risk urban areas. I appreciate the effort 

taken on behalf of all those involved to have this important field 

hearing take place, and I want to thank the College of Staten Island for hosting us. 

This is an official Congressional hearing, so you must abide by 

certain rules of the Committee on Homeland Security and the 

House of Representatives. I kindly wish to remind our guests today 

that demonstrations from the audience, including applause and 

verbal outbursts, as well as any use of signs or placards, are in violation of the rules of the House of Representatives. It is important 

that we respect the decorum and the rules of this committee. 

I have also been requested to state that photography and cameras are limited to accredited press only. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

When I first met then-Speaker John Boehner as a newly-elected 

Congressman in 2015, I made one request: I wanted a seat on the 

Homeland Security Committee. I wanted to serve on a committee 

that addressed so many topics near and dear to my constituents 

and my city. I was later honored when Chairman Michael McCaul 

approached me to become the Chairman of this subcommittee. 

Every day, I get to work on homeland security issues and advocate 

for resources to help our first responders and strengthen New York 

City’s and our Nation’s preparedness. It has been a challenging but 

fulfilling responsibility. 

My subcommittee has made great progress in giving our first responders a voice on Capitol Hill. But the work is never done, and 

that is why we are here today, to meet and discuss an important 

2 

topic that not only affects our constituents, but the entire Nation, 

Federal support to high-risk metropolitan areas. 

On September 11, 2001, the Nation watched as al-Qaeda attacked New York City and Washington, DC by turning planes into 

weapons. Fast-forward to the present day and New York City and 

all that it represents remains the No. 1 terrorist target in the 

world, having experienced five additional attacks since that time. 

I would be remiss if I didn’t mention the hard work of our Federal, 

State, and New York City officials who have thwarted over a dozen 

other serious plots against our city. 

Just last year, first responders acted bravely as terrorists attacked our city with a pipe bomb and a truck. We are forever grateful to the fine men and women at the New York City Police Department, FDNY, and the Port Authority Police that ran toward these 

situations without giving it a second thought and saved countless 

lives. It is because of them and the dedicated and tireless professionals of New York City’s Emergency Management that New York 

City has become a stronger, more resilient, and secure place. 

New York City’s finest and bravest, and other first responders 

across the Nation, arrive first at a disaster scene. Several Federal 

initiatives provide instrumental support to ensure our first responders can handle whatever threat they approach. The Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, through grants, intelligence information sharing, and joint 

task forces, have become the primary Federal agencies that interact with first responders. We are thankful for both these agencies’ 

work to help our first responders. In most cases, DHS and the FBI 

stand right behind our first responders during and after a terrorist 

incident. 

DHS, through the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the 

FBI have attempted to create an information-sharing environment 

in which authorities disseminate accurate information in a timely 

manner and to the appropriate Federal, State, and local partners. 

We have made great progress in breaking down the informationsharing stovepipes that existed and have haunted us after September 11, but there seems to be reoccurring challenges regarding 

terror-related information sharing. 

Information sharing is a two-way street, and I believe that the 

enhancements at both I&A and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task 

Force have helped tremendously in creating a better flow of terrorism information between the Federal Government and State and 

local law enforcement. I am interested in learning from our witnesses more about what needs to be done to create a fully integrated information-sharing environment. 

Ensuring first responders have information on the most recent 

terrorist attacks and other intelligence is only one part of the equation in protecting our homeland. The Homeland Security Preparedness Grants allow first responders to enhance and sustain their capabilities to protect their communities from the evolving terrorist 

attacks that we face. 

Vital grant programs include the State Homeland Security Grant 

Program, Urban Area Security Initiative, Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program. Our committee has 

repeatedly heard from first responders about the importance of 

3 

these programs and the capabilities they have helped their jurisdictions attain. In fact, just last week, on the 5th anniversary of the 

Boston Marathon bombings, we held a hearing concerning those 

bombings and the recent Austin serial bombings. Law enforcement 

representatives from Boston and Austin repeatedly emphasized 

how Federal Homeland Security Grant Programs aided in their response efforts to these attacks, and I am certain we will hear similar sentiments from witnesses on our second panel today. 

This committee fully supports these programs, and the committee’s DHS authorization bill includes provisions from my legislation, the PREPARE Act, which authorizes robust funding for these 

programs. I am pleased the House overwhelmingly passed this legislation last year, and I urge the Senate to take action on it without further delay. 

In the nearly 17 years since September 11, 2001, we have made 

great progress in hardening our defenses against terrorists who 

wish to do us harm. Unfortunately, they are not giving up, and neither can we. 

I want to thank all of the witnesses for coming to Staten Island, 

and I look forward to our discussion about how we can continue to 

secure our great Nation. 

[The statement of Chairman Donovan follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL M. DONOVAN

APRIL 23, 2018 

When I first met with then-Speaker John Boehner as a newly-elected Congressman in 2015, I made one request—I wanted a seat on the Homeland Security Committee. I wanted to serve on a committee that addressed so many topics near and 

dear to my constituents and my city. I later was honored when Chairman Michael 

McCaul approached me to become the Chairman of this subcommittee. Every day, 

I get to work on homeland security issues and advocate for resources to help our 

first responders and strengthen New York City’s and our Nation’s preparedness. It 

has been a challenging but fulfilling responsibility. 

My subcommittee has made great progress in giving our first responders a voice 

on Capitol Hill. But the work is never done and that’s why we are here today to 

meet and discuss an important topic that not only affects our constituents, but the 

entire Nation—Federal support to high-risk metropolitan areas. 

On September 11, 2001, the Nation watched as al-Qaeda attacked New York City 

and Washington, DC by turning planes into weapons. Fast-forward to the present 

day and New York City and all that it represents remains the No. 1 terrorist target 

in the world, experiencing 5 additional attacks. And I would be remiss if I didn’t 

mention the hard work of Federal, State, and New York city officials to thwart dozens of other serious plots. 

Just last year, first responders reacted bravely as terrorists attacked our city with 

a pipe bomb and a truck. We are forever grateful to the fine men and women at 

the NYPD, FDNY, and the Port Authority Police that ran toward these situations 

without giving it a second thought and saved countless lives. It is because of them 

and the dedicated and tireless professionals of NYC Emergency Management that 

New York City has become a stronger, more resilient, and secure place. 

New York City’s finest and bravest, and other first responders across the Nation, 

arrive first to a disaster scene. Several Federal initiatives provide instrumental support to ensure our first responders can handle whatever threat they approach. The 

Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, through 

grants, intelligence information sharing, and joint task forces, have become the primary Federal agencies that interact with first responders. We are thankful for both 

agencies’ work to help our first responders. In most cases, DHS and the FBI stand 

right beside our first responders during and after a terrorist attack. 

DHS, through the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and the FBI have attempted to create an information-sharing environment in which authorities disseminate accurate information in a timely manner and to the appropriate Federal, State, 

and local partners. We have made great progress in breaking down the informationVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:59 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18EP0423\18EP0423.TXT HEATH
4 

sharing stovepipes that haunted us after 9/11, but there seem to be reoccurring 

challenges regarding terror-related information sharing. 

Information sharing is a two-way street, and I believe that the enhancements at 

both I&A and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces have helped tremendously in 

creating a better flow of terrorism information between the Federal Government and 

State and local law enforcement. I’m interested in learning from our witnesses more 

about what needs to be done to create a fully integrated information-sharing environment. 

Ensuring first responders have information on the most recent terrorist tactics 

and other intelligence is only one part of the equation in protecting our homeland. 

The homeland security preparedness grants allow first responders to enhance and 

sustain their capabilities to protect their communities from the evolving terrorist 

threats we face. 

I am disappointed that the fiscal year 2019 budget once again proposes to cut 

vital grant programs, including the State Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban 

Area Security Initiative, Port Security Grant Program, and Transit Security Grant 

Program. Our committee has repeatedly heard from first responders about the importance of these programs and the capabilities they have helped jurisdictions attain. In fact, just last week, the committee held a hearing on the 5th anniversary 

of the Boston Marathon bombings and the recent Austin serial bombings. Law enforcement representatives from Boston and Austin repeatedly emphasized how grant 

programs like SHSGP and UASI aided in their response efforts to these attacks. 

And I am certain we will hear similar sentiments from witnesses on our second 

panel today. 

This committee fully supports these programs, and the committee’s DHS Authorization bill includes provisions from my legislation, the PREPARE Act, which authorize robust funding for these programs. I am pleased the House overwhelmingly 

passed this legislation last year and I urge the Senate to take action on it without 

further delay. 

In the nearly 17 years since 9/11, we have made great progress in hardening our 

defenses against terrorists who wish to do us harm. Unfortunately, they are not giving up and neither can we. 

I want to thank all of the witnesses for coming to Staten Island and I look forward to our discussion about how we can continue to secure our great Nation. 

Mr. DONOVAN. At this point, the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of this committee, my friend, the gentleman from New 

Jersey, Mr. Payne, for any opening remarks he may have. 

Mr. PAYNE. Good morning. I want to thank Chairman Donovan 

for holding today’s hearing to examine the Federal support to highrisk urban areas. 

Everyone here understands that protecting the Nation from bad 

actors is of the utmost importance. September 11 and subsequent 

terrorist acts and thwarted plots have taught us that there are people who constantly look for ways to exploit our vulnerabilities. 

Those bad actors’ methods of attack have evolved over time in an 

attempt to stay ahead of our security enhancements. It is more important than ever before to ensure our first responders have the 

proper resources to plan for, train, and respond to emerging threats 

effectively. 

In my district, the 10th Congressional District of New Jersey, we 

know very well the important role that FEMA’s preparedness 

grants play in keeping our citizens safe and secure. My district is 

home to Newark Liberty International Airport, the New Jersey 

Transit Authority, the Port of Newark and Elizabeth Main Terminal, and a dense area of industrial facilities that have been referred to as the two most dangerous miles in America. In recent 

years, events such as the pipe bombs found in Elizabeth, New Jersey, which is a neighboring district, serve as a reminder that there 

are those with intent and means to do harm. 

Of course, we are also situated close to one of the most targeted 

cities in America, New York City. Time and time again, we have 

5 

seen where investing in first responders has helped thwart a response to these attacks. Such incidents underscore the importance 

of FEMA’s funding to State and locals. For these reasons, I have 

been troubled by the fact that the last two Trump administration 

budget proposals would make significant cuts to these critical funding streams. 

Fortunately, Congress has rejected these misguided cuts, and my 

hope is that we will continue to reject any proposals that will 

weaken preparedness and security for those on the ground protecting the public day in and day out. Moreover, Federal first responders funding should be robust and predictable so that our 

State and local governments can effectively plan for future investments. It is important that I point out that in 2011, we saw FEMA 

grant funding fall significantly. It is my hope that we can see those 

funding levels restored. That is what Democrats on the House 

Homeland Security Committee have worked to do. I intend to continue to fight for preparedness funding as I know that it has been 

a lifeline to the State and local governments who are already struggling to stretch their budgets. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today. I look forward to 

hearing from them about the importance of the Federal funding to 

their respective organizations and how we can help support them 

in their vital missions. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. 

APRIL 23, 2018 

Everyone here understands that protecting the Nation from bad actors is of the 

utmost importance. September 11 and subsequent terrorist acts and thwarted plots 

have taught us that there are people who constantly look for ways to exploit our 

vulnerabilities. Those bad actors’ methods of attack have evolved over time in an 

attempt to stay ahead of our security enhancements. 

It is more important than ever before to ensure our first responders have the 

proper resources to plan, train, and respond to emerging threats effectively. In my 

district, the 10th Congressional District of New Jersey, we know very well the important role that FEMA’s preparedness grants play in keeping our citizens safe and 

secure. 

My district is home to Newark Liberty International Airport, the New Jersey 

Transit Authority, the Port Newark-Elizabeth Marine Terminal, and a dense area 

of industrial facilities that has been referred to as ‘‘the most dangerous two miles 

in America.’’ 

In recent years, events such as the pipe bombs found Elizabeth, New Jersey, 

which is a neighboring district, serve as a reminder that there are those with intent 

and means to do harm. Of course, we are also situated close to one of the most targeted cities in America, New York City. 

Time and time again, we have seen where investing in first responders have 

helped thwart or respond to these attacks. Such instances underscore how important FEMA’s funding is to State and locals. 

For these reasons, I have been troubled by the fact that the last two Trump administration budget proposals would make significant cuts to these critical funding 

streams. 

Fortunately, Congress has rejected these misguided cuts, and my hope is that we 

continue to reject any proposals that will weaken preparedness and security for 

those on the ground protecting the public day in and day out. 

Moreover, Federal first responder funding should be robust and predictable, so 

that our State and local governments can effectively plan for future investments. 

In 2011, we saw FEMA grant funding fall significantly. It is my hope that we can 

see those funding levels restored, and that is what Democrats on the House Homeland Security Committee have worked to do. 

6 

I intend to continue to fight for preparedness funding, as I know that it has been 

a lifeline to State and local governments, who are already struggling to stretch their 

budgets. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Long Island who 

was an original Member of the Homeland Security Committee 

when this was formed back in 2002, served as the distinguished 

Chairman of the entire Homeland Security Committee, my good 

friend from Long Island, Mr. Pete King. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the fact 

that you are holding this hearing. It is absolutely vital because 

there is no doubt in my mind that New York, northern New Jersey, 

and Long Island are the No. 1 terrorist targets in the country. The 

combined Federal, State, and local efforts are absolutely essential 

if we are going to remain safe, because we have an enemy that will 

never stop coming at us. Also, it is essential that we receive the 

funding that we need. 

It is a full-time process here in this entire region to protect ourselves, and like Mr. Payne, I have real issues with the cuts by the 

Trump administration. But before that, I had just as much concern 

with the cuts proposed by the Obama administration. It appears 

that too often the administration, no matter who is in power, 

doesn’t quite realize how significant this is. Under the Obama administration, Congress restored the cuts. Under the Trump administration, Congress has as well. I am confident we will do it again 

this year. 

But I also want to make it clear that the men and women of the 

Department of Homeland Security do an outstanding job, and I 

look forward again to working with them as we go forward. 

Dan, I just want to thank you for the work you have done with 

this subcommittee. There is probably no subcommittee and no part 

of the Homeland Security Committee that is more important to the 

security of New York than Emergency Preparedness. You deal on 

a day-to-day basis with those who are on the front lines, those who 

have to protect us while the rest of us are home sleeping. It is the 

men and women of the NYPD, FDNY, Port Authority Police, and 

also working with departments of the Federal Government, especially the FBI and Homeland Security, that keep all of us safe. 

So I want to thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to the witnesses, two expert panels of witnesses. I look forward to it, and I yield back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields. Other Members are reminded they may submit statements for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

APRIL 23, 2018 

Like all Americans, I remember the shock and horror of September 11, 2001, as 

we watched the tragedy unfold. 

As a Member of Congress, I knew that we had to do everything in our power to 

provide first responders and State and local governments with resources to respond 

to the threat of terrorism around the Nation. 

Congress established the Department of Homeland Security and charged it with 

administering new homeland security grant programs, also commonly referred to as 

7 

preparedness grants, to provide critical resources to help protect communities from 

threats. 

While New York City has long been a terrorist target, the threat of terrorism is 

not exclusive to any one type of town or city, unfortunately. 

In June of last year, then-Secretary John Kelly testified before the committee that 

the threat of terrorism ‘‘has metastasized around the country, whether it’s New 

York City, the largest municipality in the country, or some little town in the middle 

of Arkansas, the potential is about the same in my view for a lone-wolf attack.’’ 

Whether it is a truck bomb in Times Square or ISIS threats on a college campus 

in Mississippi, State, and local agencies need Federal assistance to detect and disrupt those who would seek to do us harm. 

Therefore, we must continue to help these agencies build the capacity to respond 

to threats. 

Given the variety and complexity of threats to our Nation, one would think that 

the Trump administration would understand that Federal spending on preparedness 

grants needs to be increased or at a very minimum maintained. 

Unfortunately, President Trump’s fiscal year 2018 and 2019 proposed budgets recommended cutting more than $900 million in preparedness grant funding. 

The proposed drastic cuts, if enacted, would have devastated the progress made 

to address capability gaps in our preparedness. 

Further, cuts to preparedness grants would have created tremendous hardship for 

many towns and cities across the country who would struggle to find the resources 

to prevent and respond to threats. 

Congress has flatly rejected the Trump proposals and, in the case of many preparedness grants, increased funding in the recent omnibus appropriations bill. 

As Ranking Member of the Committee on Homeland Security, I have always done 

my part to make sure State and locals have the resources they need to prepare for 

and respond to threats. 

Ensuring that investments made by the Federal Government in developing response capabilities are not undermined by misguided budget priorities has never 

been more important, and you will continue to have my strong support in that effort. 

Mr. DONOVAN. We are now pleased to have two distinguished 

panels with us this morning, witnesses who will testify about this 

important topic. 

Our first panel consists of Mr. William Sweeney, Jr., assistant director in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigations’ New York 

field office. Welcome, Bill. 

Mr. Brian Murphy is the acting principal deputy under secretary 

for intelligence and analysis for the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Brian, thank you for attending today. 

Mr. Thomas DiNanno is the assistant administrator for FEMA’s 

Grant Programs Directorate. Thank you very much, Tom, for appearing today before us. 

Mr. Christopher Currie is the director of homeland security and 

justice issues at the Government Accountability Office. 

I thank you all for being here. The witnesses’ full testimony and 

their statements will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Sweeney for any opening remarks 

he may have. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. SWEENEY, JR., ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE, NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. SWEENEY. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking 

Member Payne, and Representative King. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the FBI’s efforts to secure our communities. 

The FBI’s mission is to protect and defend the United States 

against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:59 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18EP0423\18EP0423.TXT HEATH
8 

force the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to Federal, State, municipal, and 

international agencies and partners. 

The area of responsibility for the FBI’s New York Field Office 

covers nearly 5,000 square miles, with a population of more than 

13 million people. We also have an extra-territorial responsibility 

in the New York office where we cover issues from Canada, the 

United Kingdom, Europe, Western Europe, and all of Africa. We 

have over 2,000 employees here in New York, with almost an equal 

percentage of special agents and professional staff on board. 

In order to address the threats we face, we know one of the most 

significant factors that will drive our success is the emphasis we 

have placed on developing relationships and information-sharing 

abilities. In a city and region as large as New York, we could not 

expect to thrive without the support of our local, State, and Federal 

agency partners. The leadership of those agencies and the men and 

women that make up the agencies in this region are second to 

none, from the NYPD, the New York State Police, the Port Authority Police Department, the FDNY, the New Jersey State Police, to 

name a few. Almost everything we do in the FBI is in partnership 

with another agency. 

Perhaps one of the best examples of that is the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. The first JTTF was established here in New 

York City in 1980, and the second was formed shortly thereafter 

in Newark, New Jersey. Prior to 9/11, there were about 1,000 members of JTTFs Nation-wide. Today, there are over 4,000. The total 

number of JTTFs Nation-wide has also increased since 9/11, to 184. 

The mission of the New York JTTF is to enhance communications, coordination, and cooperation between Federal, State, and 

local government agencies representing the law enforcement, intelligence, defense, diplomatic, public safety, and homeland security 

communities by providing a point of fusion for terrorism investigations and National security matters. 

Thanks to our extensive list of partner agencies and the relationships we share, the JTTFs in New York and in New Jersey are 

uniquely situated to respond to critical incidents without immediate assistance from other FBI field offices. As the terrorism 

threat continues to evolve, it is crucial that we maintain this level 

of capability. 

Should a critical incident occur within our area of responsibility, 

myself or one of my designees is responsible for initiating an appropriate crisis response plan. In most cases, including the recent 

truck attack carried about by Sayfullo Saipov along Manhattan’s 

West Side Highway in October 2017, executive management can be 

on scene within minutes. We will begin communicating almost immediately with first responders—in most cases in the city, that is 

the NYPD and the FDNY—to determine our next steps. 

In addition to our 24/7 operations command center, our Joint Operations Center will become operational almost immediately. Here 

we pool together our resources and partnership abilities made possible through the JTTF, as described above, and we remain in constant communication with FBI headquarters by way of secure video 

teleconferencing capability. 

9 

Components of the FBI’s specialized crisis response team will 

surge resources where necessary to mitigate any immediate threat 

to the public as we work together with our law enforcement partners to determine what information is necessary to disseminate to 

the community in the interest of public safety. 

In summary, the FBI continues to effectively engage with our 

local, State, Federal, and international law enforcement partners 

and intelligence partners to confront the threats we face and protect the communities we serve. Combatting terrorism in all forms 

remains our No. 1 priority. For this reason, we will continue to 

draw upon the relationships we have established with our partners, both here at home and abroad, to understand the threats we 

face, disrupt plots to harm our homeland, and dismantle the potential networks behind them. 

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Representative 

King, thank you again for the opportunity to discuss our efforts to 

secure our communities. Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for the 

leadership that you and this committee have provided to the FBI, 

and we thank you for your continuing support. I look forward to 

answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sweeney follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. SWEENEY JR. 

APRIL 23, 2018 

Good morning. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the 

committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the FBI’s efforts to secure our 

communities. 

The FBI’s mission is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and 

foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United 

States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to Federal, State, 

Tribal, municipal, and international agencies and partners. 

There are 56 field offices in cities across the United States and Puerto Rico; about 

380 smaller offices, called resident agencies, in cities and towns across the Nation; 

and more than 60 international offices, called legal attache ́s, in U.S. embassies 

world-wide. 

The area of responsibility for the FBI’s New York Field Office covers nearly 5,000 

square miles with a population of more than 13 million people. We have over 2,000 

employees here in New York, with an almost equal percentage of special agents and 

professional staff. 

After the 9/11 attacks, the FBI, overall, had to improve the way we analyzed and 

shared intelligence, and we had to use intelligence to drive our investigations, not 

the other way around. 

We hired hundreds of new translators and surveillance specialists, and we nearly 

tripled the number of new intelligence analysts. 

We integrated our intelligence program with other agencies in the intelligence 

community, under the director of national intelligence. We stood up the FBI’s National Security Branch, the Directorate of Intelligence, and the Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Directorate. In short, we improved the Bureau’s National security capabilities across the board. 

Before the September 11 attacks, we collected intelligence principally for the purpose of prosecution. Today, we are collecting intelligence to better understand all 

threats—those we know about, and those that have not yet become evident. Our 

mission is not merely to disrupt an isolated plot, but to dismantle the potential network behind it. 

Director Wray has recently stated that the FBI currently has approximately 1,000 

open ISIS-related investigations, approximately 1,000 open investigations of suspected home-grown violent extremists inspired by various global jihadist movements, and approximately 1,000 open investigations into domestic terrorism. 

In order to address these threats, and others, we know one of the most significant 

factors that will drive our success is the emphasis we have placed on developing relationships and information-sharing abilities. In a city as large as New York, we 

10 

could not expect to thrive without the support of our local, State, and Federal agencies. No one agency, working alone, can defeat terrorism or any other of today’s 

threats. 

We continue to strengthen relationships with our international law enforcement 

partners as well. Today, we have 64 legal attache ́ offices—commonly known as 

legats—and more than a dozen smaller sub-offices in key cities around the globe, 

providing coverage for more than 200 countries, territories, and islands. 

Each office is established through mutual agreement with the host country and 

is situated in the U.S. embassy or consulate in that nation. 

We work with a host of intelligence community agencies at the National Counterterrorism Center and other fusion centers around the country. 

We have also expanded our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, or JTTFs, which were 

first established here in New York City in 1980. Prior to 9/11, there were about 

1,000 members of JTTFs Nation-wide; today there are over 4,000. The total number 

of JTTFs Nation-wide has also increased since 9/11 to 184. 

The mission of the New York JTTF is to enhance communications, coordination, 

and cooperation between Federal, State, and local government agencies representing 

the law enforcement, intelligence, defense, diplomatic, public safety, and homeland 

security communities by providing point of fusion for terrorism investigations and 

National security matters and efforts. 

Currently, the New York JTTF is composed of over 450 personnel, to include law 

enforcement, analysts, and professional staff, representing over 40 member agencies, and 16 non-member liaison agencies. The NY JTTF area of responsibility encompasses metropolitan New York and extends internationally to Africa, Western 

Europe, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Thanks to our extensive list of partner 

agencies and the relationships we share, the JTTF in New York is uniquely situated 

to respond to critical incidents without immediate assistance from other field offices. 

As the terrorism threat continues to evolve, it’s crucial that we maintain this level 

of capability. 

Additionally, as part of the JTTF, New York has a dedicated Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (‘‘WMD’’) investigative squad, which is composed of special agent subject-matter experts in WMD, special agent bomb technicians, and a special agent 

Hazardous Evidence Response Team leader. The squad is supplemented by several 

task force officers with WMD expertise, and they’re tasked with emergency response, investigation, and WMD preparedness to include training, exercises, liaison 

outreach, and tripwire development and implementation. All components of the 

squad actively train and respond with subject-matter experts from our local partner 

agencies. 

It is through partnerships like this that we continue to explore a comprehensive 

approach to fighting crime. By collaborating on joint investigations and sharing resources and information, we are seeing successes in spite of the threat that remains 

a top priority for all of us. 

CRISIS RESPONSE

Should a critical incident occur within our area of responsibility, the assistant director in charge, or equivalent designee, is responsible for initiating an appropriate 

crisis response plan. In most cases, including the recent truck attack carried about 

by Sayfullo Saipov along Manhattan’s West Side Highway in October 2017, executive management can be on scene within minutes. We will begin communicating almost immediately with first responders, in most cases the New York City Police Department (‘‘NYPD’’), to determine our next steps. In addition to our 24/7 operations 

command center, our Joint Operations Center (‘‘JOC’’) will become operational almost immediately. Here we will pool together our resources and partnership abilities made possible through our JTTF, as described in detail above, as we remain 

in constant communication with FBI Headquarters by way of secure video teleconferencing capabilities. Components of the FBI’s specialized crisis response team 

will surge resources where necessary to mitigate any immediate threat to the public 

as we work together with our law enforcement partners to determine what information is necessary to disseminate to the community in the interest of public safety. 

In summary, the FBI continues to effectively engage with our local, State, Federal, Tribal, and international law enforcement partners to confront the threats we 

face and protect the communities we serve. Combatting terrorism, in all its forms, 

remains our top priority. For this reason, we will continue to draw upon the relationships we’ve established with our partners, both at home and abroad, to understand the threats we face, disrupt plots to harm our homeland, and dismantle the 

potential networks behind them. 

11 

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the committee, 

thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the FBI’s efforts to secure our communities. Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for the leadership that you and this committee have provided to the FBI, and we thank you for your continuing support. I 

look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you for your remarks, Mr. Sweeney. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Murphy for any remarks he may 

have. 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN MURPHY, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member 

Payne, Representative King. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today along with my colleagues from the FBI, FEMA, and 

GAO. In my testimony today, I will describe the current threat environment and how I&A shares intelligence with our State and 

local partners to support their important work of keeping our local 

communities safe. 

Each year, I&A works with FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate 

to support the Department’s annual Homeland Security Grant Programs’ counterterrorism grant programs to provide threat analysis 

and data to inform their homeland counterterrorism risk assessments. I&A reviews shared intelligence reporting produced by the 

intelligence community along with State and local threat reporting 

and other sources to provide FEMA with a relative threat ranking 

for the top 100 Metropolitan Statistical Areas and States and territories in the homeland. This threat ranking allows FEMA to ensure 

limited funds are allocated to the cities with the highest risk and 

informs the Secretary’s decisions regarding funding allocations. 

The State Homeland Security Program Grants are important 

components in supporting State and local efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and other catastrophic events, and helps our State 

and local partners prepare for and respond to significant threats to 

our Nation. 

The threats we face from terrorism today are much more diverse 

than in the time immediately following the September 11 attacks. 

We face a serious, persistent, and varied terror threat which will 

not diminish in the near future. While we have made it harder for 

terrorists to execute complex, large-scale attacks, changes in technology have made it easier for our adversaries to plot attacks generally, to radicalize new followers to commit acts of violence, and 

to recruit beyond our borders. The problem is further compounded 

by the use of simple, do-it-yourself terrorist tactics conveyed via 

highly sophisticated terrorist marketing campaigns to a global audience. 

Similarly, the threat from transnational criminal organizations 

has and continues to grow. These organizations are highly mobile, 

maintain sophisticated cross-border networks, and are involved in 

a wide range of criminal activities including human smuggling and 

the trafficking of drugs and firearms. These criminal organizations 

will likely continue to employ and improve their intelligence capabilities through a variety of methods including human, technical, 

and cyber means. These activities all have a significant impact on 

the safety, security, and health of citizens in our homeland. 

12 

The Department is overhauling its approach to integrating intelligence with operations, changing how we proactively address 

threats. Success in proactively addressing threats depends on support between and collaboration with our partners, which is the lifeblood of all DHS components. 

One of the Department’s top priorities to address this evolving 

threat environment is to more effectively integrate intelligence equities into our operational mission. DHS is utilizing valuable information uncovered by the intelligence community and our law enforcement professionals to adapt quickly to an ever-evolving threat 

at home and abroad. Driving multi-directional information exchanges with our State and local partners to fill credible information and intelligence gaps is a unique part of I&A’s mission. We are 

the only member of the IC explicitly charged in statute to share intelligence and threat information with State and local partners, 

and are also responsible for developing intelligence from those partners for DHS and the IC. 

In support of this mission, we work closely with all of our components within DHS. I&A deploys intelligence professionals dedicated 

to providing intelligence and information sharing to our partners. 

These professionals in the field are one of our most unique and valuable assets. We deploy them across the country to enable regular, 

direct engagement with our State and local partners, producing 

timely and actionable intelligence. Their involvement spans the 

spectrum of activities, from the development of joint intelligence 

products and reporting locally generated information that we share 

with the IC. For example, our intelligence professionals covering 

the New York City area work closely with the NYPD and the New 

York Fire Department to provide intelligence related to the IC. At 

least bi-weekly, our intelligence officers brief the NYPD on cyber 

threats and threats specific to New York. 

The collaboration I have discussed is enhanced through FEMA’s 

Homeland Security Grants Program. While only a portion of fusion 

centers’ budgets and other State and local entities are supported 

through homeland security grants, this grant program plays a crucial role. In fact, those receiving the funds from either the grants 

program or other areas received a total of $300 million over the 

past 5 years. The Homeland Security Grants Program has also 

been an instrumental tool in driving consistency and standardization in the way in which we share intelligence. 

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Representative 

King, thank you for this opportunity to speak in front of you today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN MURPHY

APRIL 23, 2018 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today—along with my colleagues 

from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The men and women of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) work diligently to produce timely, actionable 

intelligence and information to help keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient, 

and I am proud to speak to you on their behalf. 

13 

In my testimony today, I will describe the current threat environment and how 

I&A shares intelligence with our State and local partners to support their important 

work of keeping local communities safe. Each year, I&A works with FEMA’s Grant 

Programs Directorate to support the Department’s annual Homeland Security Grant 

Programs (HSGP) counterterrorism grant programs to provide threat analysis and 

data to inform their homeland counterterrorism risk assessments. I&A reviews 

shared intelligence reporting produced by the intelligence community (IC) along 

with State and local threat reporting and other sources to provide FEMA with a relative threat ranking for the top 100 Metropolitan Statistical Areas and States and 

territories in the homeland. This threat ranking allows FEMA to ensure limited 

funds are allocated to the cities with the highest risk and informs the Secretary’s 

decisions regarding funding allocations. The State Homeland Security Program 

(SHSP) and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), grant programs within HSGP, 

are important components in supporting State and local efforts to prevent terrorist 

attacks and other catastrophic events, and helps our State and local partners prepare for and response to significant threats to our Nation. 

PROTECTING THE NATION IN AN EVOLVING THREAT ENVIRONMENT

The threats we face from terrorism today are much more diverse than in the time 

immediately following the September 11 attacks. We face a serious, persistent, and 

varied terror threat, which will not diminish in the near future. 

While we have made it harder for terrorists to execute complex, large-scale attacks, changes in technology have made it easier for our adversaries to plot attacks 

generally, to radicalize new followers to commit acts of violence, and to recruit beyond our borders. The problem is further compounded by the use of simple, ‘‘do-ityourself’’ terrorist tactics conveyed via highly-sophisticated terrorist marketing campaigns to a global audience. 

Similarly, the threat from transnational criminal organizations has and continues 

to grow. These organizations are highly mobile, maintain sophisticated cross-border 

networks, and are involved in a wide range of criminal activities including human 

smuggling, and the trafficking of drugs and firearms. These criminal organizations 

will likely continue to employ and improve their intelligence capabilities through a 

variety of methods including human, technical, and cyber means. These activities 

all have a significant impact on the safety, security, and health of citizens in our 

homeland. 

The dangers we face as a people are becoming more dispersed with threat networks proliferating across borders. This shifting landscape constantly challenges our 

security; as such, we must move past traditional defense and non-defense mindsets. 

For this reason, the Department is overhauling its approach to integrating intelligence with operations—changing how we proactively address threats. Success in 

proactively addressing threats depends on support between and collaboration with 

our partners, which is the lifeblood of successful intelligence efforts. 

One of the Department’s top priorities to address this evolving threat environment 

is to more effectively integrate intelligence equities into our operational mission. 

DHS is utilizing valuable information uncovered by our warfighters, the IC, and law 

enforcement professionals to adapt quickly to an ever-evolving threat at home and 

abroad. Driving multi-directional information exchanges with our State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners to fill critical information and intelligence gaps 

is a unique part of I&A’s mission. We are the only member of the IC explicitly 

charged in statute to share intelligence and threat information with SLTT partners, 

and are also responsible for developing intelligence from those partners for DHS and 

the IC. In support of this mission, we work closely with our DHS operational components, including the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); as well as interagency partners, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Counterterrorism Center to support the integration of 

SLTT partners into the overall National capability. We also share intelligence that 

helps front-line operators identify, disrupt, and respond to known and unknown 

threats. We are committed to continuing our efforts, along with our colleagues in 

the intelligence community, to ensure that our partners have the threat information 

they need to protect our communities. 

I&A deploys intelligence professionals dedicated to providing intelligence and information sharing support to SLTT partners. These professionals in the field are one 

of our most unique and valuable assets. We deploy them across the country to enable regular, direct engagement with SLTT partners for collaboration, production, 

and dissemination of timely, actionable intelligence. Their involvement spans the 

spectrum of activities, from the development of joint intelligence products with 

14 

SLTT partners, to the collection and reporting of locally-generated information that 

we share with Federal partners and the IC. For example, our intelligence professionals covering the New York City (NYC) area work closely with the New York 

City Police and Fire Departments to provide timely intelligence and access to IC capabilities. At least bi-weekly, our intelligence officer briefs the NYPD on cyber 

threats and threats specific to New York. 

The collaboration I have discussed is enhanced through FEMA’s Homeland Security Grants Program. While only a portion of fusion centers’ budgets are supported 

through homeland security grants, the HSGP plays a critical role in helping build 

and sustain fusion centers and our decentralized information sharing capability. In 

fact, Fusion Center investments from the UASI and SHSP have totaled more than 

$300 million over the past 5 years. The HSGP has also been an instrumental tool 

in helping drive consistency and standardization in the way in which fusion centers 

operate. For example, the annual HSGP guidance identifies a suite of requirements 

for fusion centers as a requirement for receiving funding. This criteria-based approach allows DHS to influence the operations of the fusion centers, which are 

owned and operated by State and local entities. Driving toward common and consistent operation of fusion centers across the country will provide long-term, and 

sustainable benefits, to our collective homeland security efforts. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you again for your continued oversight, support, and the opportunity 

to testify today. In collaboration with our State and local partners, we will continue 

to adapt to meet the current threat environment and prepare for the future. I look 

forward to your questions. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Murphy. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. DiNanno for any remarks that he may 

have. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS DI NANNO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, GRANT PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. DINANNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Representative King. 

My name is Thomas DiNanno. I am the assistant administrator for 

grant programs at FEMA in the Department of Homeland Security. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss how the Department’s 

Preparedness Grant Programs support the Nation’s high-risk urban 

areas. 

In recent years, Americans have been called upon to respond to 

and recover from a number of devastating events ranging from natural disasters to terrorist attacks. In 2017, Americans withstood 

several unprecedented acts of violence and terrorism. Here in New 

York, the October 2017 truck attack at the Hudson River Greenway left 8 dead and 11 injured. The 2017 attack at the New York 

Port Authority’s bus terminal is the first known terrorist attack on 

the U.S. transit system. Both events were supported by DHS-funded assets. 

These attacks also indicate a new and emerging threat that we 

must prepare for and confront. In New York, as in Las Vegas in 

2017 and Paris in 2016, public gatherings and crowded places have 

become a target of terrorism and extreme violence. Also, as recent 

history has shown, cyber threats are a clear and present danger to 

our Nation’s security. This past month, a ransomware attack 

against Atlanta virtually paralyzed the city’s municipal functions 

for over a week. Also in March, a similar attack temporarily shut 

down Baltimore’s 9–1–1 system. 

15 

Since 2002, DHS has provided more than $50 billion in preparedness grant funding to State and local partners. In 2017, $580 million in Urban Area Security Initiative funds funded 33 high-risk 

urban areas. 

Today we sit between two of the Nation’s major UASIs, the New 

York City UASI and the Newark/Jersey City UASI. Both are examples of Federal support provided to high-risk urban areas through 

DHS. 

Since 2002, the New York City urban area has received over $2.3 

billion in UASI funds, while Newark has received over $400 million 

in UASI funds. High-risk urban areas also benefit from funding allocated to mass transit systems under the Transit Security Grant 

Program, managed at FEMA, in partnership with the Transportation Security Administration. In 2017, the Transit Security Grant 

Program provided $88 million to 26 urban transit systems Nationwide. This included over $38 million to transit systems in the New 

York and New Jersey urban areas. 

Also providing essential resources to the New York and New Jersey urban areas is the Port Security Grant Program. In 2017, the 

New York and New Jersey port area received over $20 million 

through the Port Security Grant Program, and over $145 million 

in funds over the last 10 years. 

FEMA also manages the Non-Profit Security Grant Program. 

From 2007 through 2017, over $182 million were awarded to over 

2,500 non-profit organizations Nation-wide. Over that same period 

more than $20 million was awarded to non-profit organizations 

within Newark. Similarly, over $45 million was awarded to nonprofits in the New York City urban area. 

To ensure limited UASI funds are allocated to the cities with the 

highest risk, DHS conducts a yearly risk assessment of the Nation’s 100 most populous metropolitan statistical areas, with the 

support of our colleagues from I&A and the FBI here with us 

today. 

Over the past year the Department, recognizing that threats 

shift and evolve, has conducted a comprehensive review of the risk 

assessment process and has instituted several modifications which 

will take effect this coming grant cycle. Intelligence community 

analysis of the current threat has highlighted the interests of terrorists to strike soft targets including public events and mass gatherings. Analysis also indicates the use of simple tactics and an increasingly disperse threat. 

Based on this information, as well as the lessons learned following recent attacks, the Department will continue to emphasize 

efforts to enhance security at soft targets and mass gatherings. Our 

programs must evolve and be flexible as our adversaries continue 

to try to exploit our weaknesses. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, Members of the committee, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the Homeland Security Grant Programs. I am happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. DiNanno follows:] 

16 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS DINANNO

APRIL 23, 2018 

INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the 

subcommittee. I am Thomas DiNanno, and I serve as the assistant administrator 

for grant programs at the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). On behalf of Secretary Nielsen and Administrator Long, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the critical role of the Department’s homeland security grant programs in assisting the Nation, particularly the 

Nation’s high-risk urban areas, in preventing, preparing for, and responding to terrorist attacks. 

Over the past 10 years, the American people have been called upon to respond 

to and recover from a number of devastating, if not catastrophic, natural disasters 

and terrorist attacks: Hurricane Sandy in 2012, which affected much of New Jersey, 

New York City, and Staten Island; the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing; the 2015 

shooting in San Bernardino, California; and the 2016 pipe bomb attacks in New 

York City’s Chelsea neighborhood and Seaside Park, New Jersey. 

More recently, Americans have endured the natural devastation of Hurricanes 

Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and man-made acts of violence, including the October 

2017 Las Vegas shooting; this year’s recent school shootings in Parkland, Florida 

and St. Mary’s County, Maryland; the October 2017 truck attack in New York City’s 

Hudson River Greenway; and the December 2017 detonation of a pipe bomb in New 

York’s Port Authority Bus Terminal. Out of deference and respect, we must also acknowledge that we are only a few miles from the site of the September 11, 2001 

attacks on the World Trade Center. 

Last December, the President released his ‘‘National Security Strategy,’’ which 

provides a road map to better protect the homeland, including guidance on responding to the needs of the American people in the event of a natural disaster or terrorist attack. The Strategy aims to build a national culture of preparedness and resilience in conjunction with State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners and jurisdictions to enable them to prepare and respond to whatever hazards they may encounter. Fostering preparedness and building resilience is also at the heart of FEMA’s 

2018–2022 Strategic Plan. 

During any type of incident, State and local first responders play critical roles in 

keeping our communities safe. In the face of various hazards and threats, FEMA 

is committed to ensuring that our communities have the resources needed to prevent, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to a wide range of incidents. 

Since its inception, DHS, through the Preparedness Grant Programs, has provided 

funding to State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, as well as transportation 

authorities, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector, to improve the Nation’s 

readiness in preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks. 

These grant funds address the Nation’s immediate security needs, enhance public 

safety, and protect lives and property. 

HOMELAND SECURITY PREPAREDNESS GRANT PROGRAMS

Since 2002, DHS has provided more than $50 billion in preparedness grant funding to State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, non-profits, and other community organizations. In fiscal year 2017 alone DHS distributed over $1.6 billion 

in preparedness grant funds—with more than $1 billion in funding provided under 

the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), which includes the State Homeland 

Security Program (SHSP), the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and Operation 

Stonegarden (OPSG). 

In addition to the HSGP, other FEMA preparedness grant programs, including 

the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP), the Port Security Grant Program 

(PSGP), Intercity Passenger Rail (Amtrak) Program, and the Intercity Bus Security 

Grant Program (IBSGP) support efforts to protect the traveling public, secure critical infrastructure and key resources and enhance the security of transportation 

routes, transit systems, and port facilities. 

Together, these programs support the development, sustainment, and delivery of 

core capabilities essential to achieving the National Preparedness Goal of a secure 

and resilient Nation. 

Among these preparedness grant programs, several have provided significant assistance to high-risk urban areas. These include: 

• The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), which includes both the State 

Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and the Urban Area Security Initiative 

17 

(UASI). Since fiscal year 2002, the SHSP has provided over $11.2 billion to the 

various States and territories to build and enhance preparedness and response 

capabilities. Similarly, since fiscal year 2002, UASI has provided more than 

$9.4 billion to designated high-risk urban areas. 

• The Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) which, since fiscal year 2002, has 

provided over $2.1 billion to the Nation’s largest urban mass transit systems 

to enhance the security of these systems and better protect the traveling public. 

• The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) which, since fiscal year 2002, has provided more than $2.6 billion to enhance the security of the Nation’s major ports 

and maritime trading and commercial centers. 

• The Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP) which, since fiscal year 2007 

(the first year in which the program was funded), has provided over $182 million to individual nonprofit organizations located in designated urban areas and 

determined to be at particular risk of terrorist attack. This funding is used to 

enhance the security of their facilities and their members. 

URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE (UASI)

Although the Nation’s high-risk urban areas may benefit from a number of the 

preparedness grant programs, the principal preparedness grant program supporting 

high-risk urban areas is the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). Under UASI, 

funds are provided to address the unique planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas. UASI funds assist 

in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. In fiscal year 2017, $580 million in UASI funds were allocated to the 33 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 

identified as high-threat, high-density urban areas. 

As mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, and to ensure 

limited UASI funds are allocated to the cities with the highest risk, the Department 

conducts yearly risk assessments of the Nations’ 100 most populous MSAs. These 

risk assessments are based on three major factors: The relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences from acts of terrorism faced by each MSA. Threat scores 

are derived from intelligence data compiled by the DHS Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis. Vulnerability scores take into consideration information regarding targeted infrastructure that terrorists are deemed more likely to attack, as well as border crossings by air, land, and sea. Finally, consequence scores consider an MSA’s 

population, economic, National infrastructure, and National security indices. The results of these risk assessments, including the scores and relative ranking, inform 

UASI eligibility and the Secretary’s funding allocation decisions. 

Over the past year, the Department has conducted a comprehensive review of this 

risk assessment process to ensure it is keeping pace with evolving threats. Of note, 

the intelligence community has highlighted the interest and intent of terrorists, including Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs), to strike soft targets, including public events, mass gatherings, and other locations where large crowds congregate. The 

intelligence community assesses that the threat is more dispersed and not necessarily limited to large urban areas. To address the current threat to soft targets, 

including crowded places and large public gatherings, FEMA has worked with the 

Department’s Office of Operations Coordination to better incorporate Special Events 

Assessment Rating (SEAR) data, which is processed to attribute events to each participating State, territory, and MSA, into the vulnerability component of the methodology. The modifications to the fiscal year 2018 risk assessment methodology are 

driven by the emerging threat environment, as identified by the intelligence community, and from extensive stakeholder feedback, to ensure that the resulting risk 

scores most accurately reflect a State or urban area’s relative risk. 

Today, we are situated in the midst of two of the Nation’s major UASIs. New York 

City, along with Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties in New York, comprise 

the New York City Urban Area. Newark and Jersey City, along with Bergen, Essex, 

Hudson, Middlesex, Morris, Passaic and Union Counties in New Jersey, comprise 

the Newark-Jersey City Urban Area. Since fiscal year 2002, the New York City 

Urban Area has received over $2.3 billion in UASI funds. And, since fiscal year 

2002, the Newark-Jersey City Urban Area has received over $404 million in UASI 

funds. 

Both of these urban areas have used these funds to secure and protect their citizens, as well as critical assets and resources. Using UASI funds, the Newark-Jersey 

City urban area has undertaken the Newark-Jersey City Business District Infrastructure Protection Initiative. This initiative is securing critical areas of Newark’s 

and Jersey City’s business and downtown districts through increased monitoring 

and surveillance, enhanced lighting and security fencing at critical sites, and 

18 

bollards to regulate traffic and protect structures. Similarly, the New York City 

urban area has used UASI funds to initiate a Domain Awareness System, which utilizes a variety of means, including physical barriers and enhanced surveillance, to 

better secure key areas of Manhattan, including the financial district, Times 

Square, Grand Central Station and Penn Station. 

The Newark-Jersey City urban area has also used UASI funds to secure and protect the region’s drinking water and water treatment facilities. In 2016, the NewarkJersey City urban area embarked on and completed a project to harden 13 water 

treatment and 12 wastewater treatment facilities located within the UASI region 

against attack. Many of these facilities lacked basic physical protective equipment 

and were therefore vulnerable. Utilizing UASI funds, all 25 sites have received 

funding to harden their facilities, including fencing, video assessment systems, and 

access card systems. 

Further, New York City deployed numerous UASI-funded assets in response to 

the October 31, 2017, terrorist attack in Manhattan’s Hudson River Greenway, including a Bell 429 helicopter utilized by the New York Police Department’s Special 

Operations Division to provide aerial video surveillance. This asset enabled realtime assessments that assisted command-and-control coordination. Other UASIfunded assets deployed in the Hudson River Greenway response included cameras, 

sensor equipment, mapping systems, and aviation life support equipment worn by 

responding aircrews. 

During the December 11, 2017, pipe bomb attack at New York’s Port Authority 

Bus Terminal, preparedness grant funds contributed to the successful response and 

apprehension of the suspected bomber. The Port Authority Police Department’s 

counterterrorism teams, as well as members of the New York National Guard’s Task 

Force Empire Shield apprehended the suspect and quickly controlled the situation. 

Both units, as well as their patrol activities, were supported with UASI funds, as 

well as funds from the SHSP. 

TRANSIT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM (TSGP)

High-risk urban areas also benefit from funding allocated to mass transit systems 

under the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP). Under the TSGP, funds are used 

to enhance the physical security of transit systems as well as provide ‘‘on the 

ground’’ law enforcement patrols. TSGP funds are awarded on a competitive basis 

directly to the Nation’s highest-risk transit systems. 

In fiscal year 2017, the TSGP provided $88 million to 26 urban transit systems. 

This included over $16 million to New Jersey Transit, $2.3 million to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and $20.9 million to New York’s Metropolitan 

Transportation Authority. 

In the New York and New Jersey urban areas, TSGP funds have been well-used. 

Using $2 million of fiscal year 2014 TSGP funds, the Port Authority of New York 

and New Jersey upgraded security at New York’s Port Authority Bus Terminal by 

installing 35 surveillance cameras. This camera installation was the second phase 

of a larger, multi-year TSGP funded project that enhanced the terminal’s security 

by, among other things, upgrading the Port Authority Bus Terminal’s Operations 

Center with enhanced video monitoring systems and state of the art video management systems. 

Using $1.8 million in fiscal year 2013 TSGP funds, the New Jersey Transit Corporation established and continued directed law enforcement patrols, including canine units, throughout the system. TSGP funding enabled New Jersey Transit to 

continue proactive efforts in advancing its terrorism prevention and detection programs, which are critical to the protection of the mass transit systems serving the 

New York/New Jersey metropolitan region. 

Also providing critical support to the New York and New Jersey urban areas is 

the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). The Port of New York-New Jersey is the 

largest port on the east coast of the United States and receives 12 percent of the 

international goods arriving into the United States, which equates to 85 million 

metric tons of general cargo that ultimately reaches an estimated 35 percent of the 

American population. The Port of New York-New Jersey consists of 240 miles of 

shipping channels as well as numerous anchorages and port facilities. Maintaining 

the security of the Port of New York-New Jersey is an essential part of maintaining 

the overall security of the New York-New Jersey urban area. 

In fiscal year 2017, the New York-New Jersey port area received over $20 million 

in PSGP funding. From fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2017, over $145 million 

in PSGP funds have supported security enhancements throughout the port area. 

These security enhancements have included increased surveillance systems, installation of security barriers such as fencing and traffic and entry control devices, and 

19 

specialized training in security awareness and specialized response, including response to incidents involving improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers. In 

fiscal year 2017, the New York City Police Department utilized PSGP funds to establish a Unified Command Center to serve port facilities and deployed six specialized Radiation Detection Launches for port patrols. 

NONPROFIT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM

A smaller, but nonetheless significant program for its recipients, is the Nonprofit 

Security Grant Program (NSGP). The NSGP competitively awards grant funding to 

assist nonprofit organizations that are considered to be at high risk of terrorist attack and located within one of the specific UASI-designated urban areas. NSGP provides up to $75,000 to nonprofit organizations for training and physical security enhancements, including fencing, surveillance systems, security systems, and lighting. 

It is also designed to promote coordination and collaboration in emergency preparedness activities among public and private community representatives, as well as 

State and local government agencies. 

From fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2017, over $182 million in NSGP funds 

was awarded to 2,591 nonprofit organizations across the Nation. Over that same period, more than $20 million has been awarded under the NSGP to 291 nonprofit organizations within the Newark-Jersey City urban area. Similarly, from fiscal year 

2007 through fiscal year 2017, over $45 million has been awarded under the NSGP 

to nonprofit organizations within the New York City urban area. 

A prime example of NSGP funding put to use locally is the fiscal year 2017 grant 

awarded to the Beth Rachel School for Girls, located in Brooklyn, New York. The 

Beth Rachel School is a day school with an enrollment of nearly 1,000 students. 

NSGP funds enabled the school to improve its overall security by enhancing its surveillance system with upgraded closed circuit television capabilities, and new motion 

sensors, facial recognition software, and automatic alarms. The School also utilized 

NSGP funds to replace windows with shatter-resistant glass and reinforced frames. 

Also in fiscal year 2017, NSGP-funded security enhancements at Beth Medrash 

Govaha in Lakewood Township, New Jersey. Unfortunately, Lakewood Township 

was the site of several acts of anti-Semitic vandalism in 2017, including the defacing 

of a holocaust memorial. With an enrollment of over 6,000, Beth Medrash Govaha 

is one of the Nation’s largest Yeshivas. The installation of a NSGP-funded surveillance system not only enhanced the facility’s overall security, but led to the identification of an intruder who was observed committing an act of vandalism. 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TERRORISM PREVENTION AND SUPPORT FOR FUSION CENTERS

Per Section 2006 of the Homeland Security Act, FEMA ensures that at least 25 

percent of grant funding appropriated for State Homeland Security Programs and 

UASI is used for law enforcement terrorism prevention activities, including support 

for State and local fusion centers. 

Fusion centers, a critical component of our Nation’s homeland security and 

counterterrorism architecture, provides grassroots intelligence and analytic capabilities within the State and local environment. Fusion center investments represent 

approximately 7 percent of the total annual funding made available under UASI 

and SHSP. Fusion center funding is reported by the States, and based on recent reporting over $60 million dollars in UASI and SHSP funds were dedicated to fusion 

center support Nation-wide in fiscal year 2016. For the fiscal years 2012 through 

2016, this total amounts to more than $309 million. 

Under both the SHSP and the UASI, States and urban areas are required to invest preparedness grant dollars into activities supporting their designated fusion 

centers. States and urban areas must submit a consolidated investment justification 

describing the performance areas the funding is intended to support based on the 

Fusion Center Assessment administered annually by the Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). Each proposed project included in the fusion center 

investment justification must align to, and reference, specific performance areas of 

the Assessment that the funding is intended to support. In working with States and 

urban areas on fusion center support, FEMA maintains a collaborative relationship 

with I&A. I&A is the Government’s executive agent for coordinating engagement 

with and support to fusion centers and serves as the subject-matter experts on fusion center-related priorities and activities. In turn, FEMA administers and manages preparedness grant programs that make funding available to State and local 

authorities to increase and sustain the operational capabilities and performance of 

their designated fusion centers. 

20 

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

The most important lesson from the challenging disasters of 2017 is that the most 

successful system is Federally-supported, State-managed, and locally-executed. Particularly over the past year, grantees have tested many practices, programs, and 

ideas that are more appropriately implemented at the State and local level. These 

experiences have informed FEMA’s 2018–2022 Strategic Plan, which seeks to: (1) 

Build a Culture of Preparedness; (2) Ready the Nation for Catastrophic Disasters; 

and (3) Reduce the Complexity of FEMA. 

Each of these goals represents a major undertaking, and FEMA will not be able 

to accomplish them without the help of the entire community. While FEMA plays 

an essential role in achieving this vision of a prepared and resilient Nation, meaningful improvements will occur only when we work in concert across Federal departments and agencies, as well as with leaders from State, local, Tribal, and territorial 

governments, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. 

Build a Culture of Preparedness 

Resilience is the backbone of emergency management, and the most successful 

way to achieve disaster resiliency is through preparedness. Building a ‘‘Culture of 

Preparedness’’ within our communities and our governments will support a National 

effort to be ready for the worst disasters—at the individual, family, community, 

State, local, Tribal, territorial, and Federal levels. 

Everyone should be prepared when disaster strikes. To be prepared, however, we 

must all understand our local and community risks, reflect the diversity of those 

we serve, and foster partnerships that allow us to connect with a diverse Nation. 

People who are prepared will be able to act quickly and decisively in the face of disasters, thereby preventing death and injuries, minimizing loss of property, and allowing for a more rapid and efficient recovery. 

Ready the Nation for Catastrophic Disasters 

Catastrophic disasters, including low- and no-notice incidents, can overwhelm 

Government at all levels and threaten National security. They are life-altering incidents for those affected, causing a number of fatalities and wide-spread destruction. 

Catastrophic disasters, whether natural or man-made, disrupt lives and hurt our 

communities, both economically and socially. Readiness is critical for FEMA and our 

partners to ensure that the response and recovery missions are appropriately executed and successful. 

This goal builds on preparedness and focuses us on enhancing our collective readiness, which is dependent on emergency managers who execute the mission on behalf 

of Federal and State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments. This requires a scalable and capable National incident workforce that can adapt to a changing risk 

landscape, integrate with our partners at all levels, and communicate and coordinate effectively in every situation. 

Reduce the Complexity of FEMA 

FEMA must be a modern agency that can adapt to public and governmental priorities, while creating and using innovative solutions for the emergency management 

mission. A simplified FEMA streamlines survivor experiences, simplifies processes 

and policies for disaster staff, and improves stewardship of Federal taxpayer dollars. 

Connecting with a wide array of experts and stakeholders including academia, religious leaders, and representatives of all types of whole community partners is key 

to this effort. FEMA will focus on identifying ways to weave preparedness into people’s everyday lives, connecting with individuals at places they frequent, and 

incentivizing positive behavior change using tools like grants, training, and exercises. Furthermore, the agency will continue to encourage programs that train and 

empower responders. FEMA will continue to work with its Federal, State, local, 

Tribal, territorial, and other community partners, as well as with Congress, in furtherance of these goals. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, Members of the subcommittee, thank you 

again for this opportunity to discuss the assistance provided through the preparedness grant programs, especially assistance that supports the Nation’s high-risk 

urban areas. It is the local responders who are first on the scene that are the most 

critical partners in preparing for and responding to attacks. FEMA is honored to 

support first responders through the implementation of these programs, and I am 

happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. DiNanno. 

21 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Currie for any remarks that he 

may have. 

STATEMENT OF CHRIS P. CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. CURRIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, 

Congressman King. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. 

It is great to be here in New York. I can’t think of a better place 

to talk about this topic than right here. 

Since DHS was created, as was already mentioned, it has provided about $50 billion to State and local governments and Tribes 

to strengthen preparedness. Billions more have also come from the 

Justice Department as well, to strengthen our law enforcement 

functions. To be clear, this support has made a huge impact. It has 

been used to purchase better radio systems, response vehicles, better surveillance, and other tools to help communities prepare for 

bad things to happen. 

It is also clear the support has been used in real-life events, some 

of which have already been discussed today. Also, the Boston Marathon bombing and numerous active-shooter events around the 

country. So in our view, the question isn’t if this support is useful. 

It is more about are we investing it year in and year out in what 

is needed most? 

Also, these programs need to evolve as the world evolves. For example, right after 9/11 we focused a lot on investing in radio systems for first responders because it was a huge capability gap. 

However, threats and technologies have evolved. As we build one 

capability, we have to assess other capabilities where we may fall 

short. For example, now, how do we adapt this support to better 

secure our IT systems, or our local election systems? 

This brings me to the focus of our work, which really falls into 

two main areas: No. 1, how do we better assess capability gaps Nation-wide and target our support; and No. 2, how can DHS better 

manage their grants and oversee how they are used? 

First, assessing gaps and targeting funding accordingly has been 

a long-standing challenge for DHS and a concern for you all in 

Congress. Most recently, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, your 

committee, through the PREPARE Act and then the DHS Reauthorization Act, emphasized the importance of better assessing 

gaps and evaluating the impact of these funds. 

FEMA has taken some steps to do this, such as requiring States 

to complete preparedness reports and communities to self-assess 

their risks and needs. This makes a lot of sense. Communities are 

in the best position to assess what they need and how much of a 

risk they face. 

However, when it comes to grant allocation, we think that FEMA 

can do a little bit more across the country to assess the information 

that they get to better understand the total capabilities that they 

need and where we need to focus our money, and developing a 

more quantitative standard of preparedness. Without doing this, it 

is really difficult to ensure that the data from each jurisdiction are 

accurate and comparable across the country. It also makes it hard 

22 

1The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109–295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006). 

to understand which capabilities have been developed versus those 

that have been underfunded. 

We recommended that FEMA complete a more quantitative assessment of capability gaps and direct funding accordingly. In the 

past, FEMA has disagreed with this approach, but it seems that 

may be changing. For example, in their fiscal year 2019 budget, 

they are proposing a new grant program that will require grantees 

to measure results in reducing capability gaps. This is a step in the 

right direction and likely reflects years of legislation on Congress’ 

part and our past recommendations. 

I also want to talk about grant management. It is not an exciting 

topic to talk about, but managing more than 10 fragmented preparedness grant programs and IT systems to go with it, some dating back to the 1990’s, has been another major challenge at FEMA. 

These grants go to the same jurisdictions for many of the same 

purposes, at the same time. We have reported that the lack of a 

consolidated system to manage them makes them susceptible to 

overlap and potential duplication. It also makes it difficult to even 

track what investments we are making across all these programs 

over time. 

To its credit, FEMA has taken some action to better manage the 

grants, but the solution really hinges on a multi-million-dollar IT 

system that is under development, so implementing this will be a 

huge challenge at the agency, and we have on-going work assessing 

that as well. 

This concludes my statement. I look forward to the discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Currie follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRIS P. CURRIE

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to provide an update 

on the efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—a component 

of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—to manage preparedness grants 

and measure and assess National preparedness capabilities. Our work over the last 

7 years has focused on FEMA’s efforts to coordinate Federal interagency preparedness and manage and assess the impact of FEMA’s preparedness grants on State 

and local preparedness. As described in more detail below, our recommendations 

have identified additional steps FEMA can take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these efforts, including enhancing coordination and providing guidance 

on preparedness. FEMA has taken actions to address some of these recommendations, but more fully addressing all of them could lead to additional savings, better 

services to the public, improved program performance and accountability, and, ultimately, a better-prepared Nation. 

Following the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Congress enacted 

the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act).1

In response to the act, among other things, DHS centralized its preparedness grants 

under FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) to better integrate and coordinate 

grant management. The act also requires that FEMA develop a National preparedness system and assess preparedness capabilities to determine the Nation’s preparedness. GPD provides preparedness grants to State, local, Tribal, and territorial 

governments, as well as transportation authorities, nonprofit organizations, and the 

private sector, to improve the Nation’s readiness in preventing, protecting against, 

responding to, recovering from and mitigating terrorist attacks, major disasters and 

other emergencies. In fiscal year 2017, DHS announced the availability of 10 preparedness grant programs totaling more than $1.6 billion for fiscal year 2017. According to DHS, from fiscal years 2002 through 2017 the Department has awarded 

over $49 billion to a variety of DHS preparedness grant programs to enhance the 

23 

capabilities of State, local, Tribal, and territorial grant recipients to carry out the 

above activities related to terrorist attacks and other disasters. 

My testimony today covers our prior work on FEMA preparedness efforts from 

March 2011 through February 2016 and selected updates conducted in December 

2017 and February 2018. This statement specifically addresses FEMA’s efforts to 

manage preparedness grants and our prior recommendations. 

To conduct our prior work, we reviewed relevant Presidential directives, laws, regulations, policies, strategic plans, and key program documents; and interviewed Federal, State, and local officials, among others. More detailed information on our scope 

and methodology can be found in each of the reports cited throughout this statement. To update our work, we interviewed relevant FEMA officials to obtain updates on efforts to improve coordination among preparedness grant programs. The 

work upon which this testimony is based was conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

BACKGROUND

Over the past decade, the Federal Government has expanded financial assistance 

to public and private stakeholders for preparedness activities through various grant 

programs administered by DHS through its component agency, FEMA. Through 

these grant programs, DHS has sought to enhance the capacity of States, localities, 

and other entities, such as ports or transit agencies, to prevent, respond to, and recover from a natural or man-made disaster, including terrorist incidents. Two of the 

largest preparedness grant programs are the State Homeland Security Program and 

the Urban Areas Security Initiative. 

• The State Homeland Security Program provides funding to support States’ implementation of homeland security strategies to address the identified planning, 

organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs at the State and local levels to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism 

and other catastrophic events. FEMA allocated $402 million for the program in 

fiscal year 2017. 

• The Urban Areas Security Initiative provides Federal assistance to address the 

unique needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas, and assists the areas in 

building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect, respond to, 

and recover from acts of terrorism. FEMA allocated $580 million for the program in fiscal year 2017. 

The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), awarded to the Nation’s 56 States 

and territories, and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), awarded to urban 

areas based on DHS’s risk assessment methodology, are the largest of the preparedness grant programs, accounting for about 60 percent of fiscal year 2017 grant funding. See figure 1 for a history of funding levels for these programs. Eligible candidates for the fiscal year UASI program are determined through an assessment of 

relative risk of terrorism faced by the 100 most populous metropolitan statistical 

areas in the United States, in accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 

as amended. 

24 

2GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Strengthening Regional Coordination Could 

Enhance Preparedness Efforts, GAO–16–38 (Washington, DC: Feb. 4, 2016). 3GAO, FEMA Has Made Progress in Managing Regionalization of Preparedness Grants, GAO– 

11–732R (Washington, DC: July 29, 2011). We reported, for example, that FEMA established 

a task force as an oversight and evaluation mechanism and developed an implementation plan, 

which includes a phased approach to piloting and delegating specific grants administration functions for preparedness grants to the regions and delineates an approach, including roles and responsibilities, for key implementation activities such as training and communications. On the 

basis of the results of our review of GPD’s plans and efforts to regionalize grant management 

functions, we did not make recommendations at that time. 4 Ibid, GAO–16–38. 

FIGURE 1: STATE HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM AND URBAN AREA SECURITY

INITIATIVE: ANNUAL ALLOCATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 2003 THROUGH 2017

Note: Amounts presented are actual funding amounts, not adjusted for inflation, 

and are rounded. 

FEMA HAS STRENGTHENED ITS COORDINATION, OVERSIGHT, AND ASSESSMENTS OF

GRANTS BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEMA’S GRANT MANAGEMENT

FEMA Has Taken Some Steps to Address Coordination Challenges Between Headquarters and Regional Offices, But Some Challenges Still Remain 

In February 2016, we reported that FEMA has taken some steps, but has not fully 

addressed long-standing preparedness grant management coordination challenges 

between its headquarters and regional offices.2 We found that for several preparedness grant programs, FEMA headquarters staff in GPD and regional staff share 

management and monitoring responsibilities. For example, we found that assessments by GPD and others since 2009 had recommended that regional offices, rather 

than headquarters offices, be responsible for managing and monitoring preparedness 

grants to avoid confusion and duplication, and to strengthen coordination with State 

and local grantees. Further, in July 2011, we found that GPD had efforts under way 

to regionalize grant management responsibilities and improve coordination of preparedness grants, and that these efforts were consistent with internal control standards.3 However, GPD officials reported that in 2012 it changed course and decided 

to continue sharing grant management roles between headquarters and regions, referred to as a hybrid grant management structure. GPD officials told us that they 

changed course because, among other things, estimates that the costs of regionalization would be greater than the annual savings FEMA identified in an earlier study 

and concerns that inconsistent program implementation would occur across the regions, and outweighed the potential benefits. GPD officials at that time said they 

had taken steps to address coordination challenges associated with this hybrid grant 

management structure. 

However, we found in February 2016 that these challenges continue.4 For example, States and FEMA regional officials told us that GPD staffs in headquarters and 

regions did not always coordinate their monitoring visits, which can be disruptive 

to the State emergency management agency’s day-to-day operations. FEMA regional 


h:\seals\115611.eps
25 

5GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information and Coordination Among 

Four Overlapping Grant Programs, GAO–12–303 (Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012). 6GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, 

Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO–12–342SP (Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012). 

officials also reported that GPD staffs in headquarters and regions sometimes provided inconsistent guidance to grantees. Further, while GPD officials identified 

some steps they plan to take to address the challenges, we found that GPD lacked 

a plan with time frames and goals for addressing them. We recommended that 

FEMA develop a plan with time frames, goals, metrics, and milestones detailing 

how GPD intends to resolve long-standing challenges associated with its existing hybrid grants management model, which divides responsibilities between regional and 

headquarters staff. FEMA, however, did not concur with our recommendation, stating that it disagreed with our characterization of long-standing challenges in managing preparedness grants. As we stated in the report, multiple assessments dating 

back to 2009 have reported challenges with the hybrid model. As also noted in our 

report, officials from four FEMA regional offices and officials from three States within those regions provided various examples of a lack of coordination between headquarters and regional staff in managing preparedness grants, including instances 

that took place in 2014 and as recently as September 2015. 

In October 2017, FEMA developed a plan—the Milestone Action Plan—to track 

efforts aimed at improving coordination issues associated with its hybrid grants 

management model, as we recommended in February 2016. The plan divides responsibilities for the management of preparedness grants between regional and headquarters staff and describes completed, on-going, and planned efforts taken by 

FEMA to improve grants management coordination along with steps taken, goals, 

and time frames, among other things. For example, the plan shows that FEMA developed and finalized the Monitoring Actions Tracker in August 2016, a tool shared 

by GPD in FEMA headquarters and staff in regional offices. Through the tracker, 

GPD headquarters and regional staffs are able to view planned and completed monitoring activities related to grants management, as well as the status of any open 

corrective actions. In addition to developing the Milestone Action Plan, FEMA officials described other efforts taken to improve coordination issues. For example, 

FEMA officials told us they increased the use of an on-line collaboration tool, which 

allows for instant information sharing between GPD and the regions. By taking 

these steps, FEMA should be better-positioned to track and evaluate efforts to improve regional coordination, as we recommended in 2016. 

FEMA Has Taken Steps to Increase Oversight Across Preparedness Grant Programs 

FEMA has been delayed in addressing the need for improved coordination among 

grant programs identified in our prior work. Specifically, we found in February 2012 

that multiple factors contribute to the risk of duplication among four FEMA preparedness grant programs—the State Homeland Security Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative, Port Security Grant Program, and Transit Security Grant Program—as these programs share similar goals, fund similar projects, and provide 

funds in the same geographic regions.5 Further, we found that DHS’s ability to 

track grant funding, specific funding recipients, and funding purposes varies among 

the programs, giving FEMA less visibility over some grant programs. Also, DHS’s 

award process for some programs-based allocation decisions on high-level, rather 

than specific, project information, which could further contribute to the risk of duplication. Although our February 2012 analysis identified no cases of duplication 

among a sample of grant projects, the above factors collectively put FEMA at risk 

of funding duplicative projects. As a result, in 2012, we included these challenges 

in our annual report on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation in Federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives. FEMA has not yet taken action to fully address our concerns.6

We recommended in February 2012 that as FEMA developed its new grants management information system (the Non-Disaster Grants Management System, or ND 

Grants at that time), that the agency collect project information with the level of 

detail needed to better position the agency to identify any potential unnecessary duplication within and across the four grant programs. In December 2012, FEMA officials reported that the agency intended to start collecting and analyzing project-level 

data from grantees in fiscal year 2014. Further, in December 2017, FEMA took actions to identify potential unnecessary duplication across four preparedness grant 

programs, as we recommended in February 2012. Although the development of 

FEMA’s grants management information system is on-going, FEMA issued guidance 

and adopted interim processes to help identify potential duplication across these 

preparedness grant programs until the system’s capabilities are upgraded over the 

26 

7GAO, Grants Performance: Justice and FEMA Collect Performance Data for Selected Grants, 

but Action Needed to Validate FEMA Performance Data, GAO–13–552 (Washington, DC: June 

24, 2013). 

next several years. For example, in fiscal year 2014, FEMA modified a legacy grants 

data system to capture more robust project-level data—such as project budget 

data—for the Homeland Security Grant Program, which includes the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative. 

In addition, in fiscal year 2017, FEMA procured a software visualization tool and 

developed a set of standard operating procedures to assist staff in identifying potentially duplicative projects. Specifically, the visualization tool will use grants award 

data from the Port Security Grant Program, the Transit Security Grant Program, 

and compare the grant programs named above to highlight ZIP codes that contain 

multiple projects. These projects will then be analyzed by FEMA officials. According 

to the standard operating procedure, if duplication is suspected within a particular 

geographic area, further collaborative reviews should be conducted in coordination 

with the Office of Chief Counsel to determine appropriate remedies. Using an interim approach to collect more specific project-level data during the grant application process and utilizing the new software visualization tool should help FEMA 

strengthen the administration and oversight of its grant programs until FEMA implements its long-term solution for the agency’s grants management information 

system. 

FEMA Is Validating Grant Performance Data 

In the area of performance assessment, we reported in June 2013 on limitations 

in FEMA’s ability to validate the performance data it collects.7 Specifically, we 

found that two of FEMA’s preparedness grant programs—Emergency Management 

Performance Grants (EMPG) and Assistance to Firefighters Grants (AFG) programs—collect performance information through a variety of reporting mechanisms 

but face challenges in identifying verifiable program outcomes. These reporting 

mechanisms collect performance data used by FEMA regional offices and headquarters for different purposes. For example, headquarters focuses on the development of future program priorities and on reporting progress toward the National 

Preparedness Goal, while regions use program information to monitor primary grant 

recipients for compliance. DHS developed agency priority goals that reflect agencywide, near-term priorities. According to FEMA officials, the EMPG and AFG programs have an indirect link to a DHS agency priority goal, as well as the National 

Preparedness Goal, because they support States’ level of preparedness for disasters. 

According to FEMA officials, neither program has a standardized tool with which 

to validate the performance data that are self-reported by recipients; additionally, 

the regions are inconsistent in their approaches to verifying program performance 

data. We concluded that the absence of a formal established validation and 

verification procedure, as directed by the Office of Management and Budget’s Circular No. A–11, could lead to the collection of erroneous performance data. 

In our June 2013 report, we recommended that FEMA ensure that there are consistent procedures in place at the headquarters’ office and regional level to ensure 

verification and validation of grant performance data that allow the agency to attest 

to the reliability of EMPG and AFG grant data used for reporting progress toward 

goals. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that FEMA would explore effective and affordable ways to verify and validate EMPG and AFG grant performance data. In April 2015, FEMA officials reported that FEMA was in the process of developing the data verification and validation checks of EMPG grantee performance reporting. For example, according to FEMA officials, they have revised reporting templates and uniform table definitions to make it easier for grantees to 

submit accurate, complete, and consistent information on programmatic activities 

such as the completion of training and exercise requirements. However, these processes have not yet been fully implemented, and FEMA officials have not yet provided similar tools and checklists for the AFG program. In March 2017, FEMA 

grants management staff provided us with documentation on the process FEMA 

uses to verify and validate grantee data from the EMPG and AFG grant programs, 

as we recommended. As a result of having a consistent approach to verifying data, 

FEMA’s efforts should reduce the collection of erroneous performance data. 

In addition, as part of our September 2016 review of FEMA Fire Assistance Grant 

program, we reported that FEMA officials said they planned to develop and implement a consolidated grant management system to integrate data used to manage 

fire grant programs with the data gathered for FEMA’s other preparedness grants, 

and ultimately better measure the impact of fire grants on National preparedness 

27 

8GAO, Fire Grants: FEMA Could Enhance Program Administration and Performance Assessment, GAO–16–744 (Washington, DC: Sep 15, 2016). 9 GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax 

Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO–11–318SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 1, 2011). 10 GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress in Improving Grant Management 

and Assessing Capabilities, but Challenges Remain, GAO–13–456T (Washington, DC: Mar. 19, 

2013). 

efforts.8 Specifically, as we reported in May 2016, FEMA plans to develop and implement a new Grants Management Modernization system to provide agency-wide 

management for all of FEMA’s disaster and preparedness grants. Further, we are 

currently performing an on-going review of FEMA’s consolidated grant management 

system and plan to report on this effort later this year. 

FEMA Has Made Progress Assessing Its Grant Preparedness Capabilities, but Continues to Face Challenges Developing a National Preparedness System 

We also reported in March 2011 that FEMA needed to improve its oversight of 

preparedness grants by establishing a framework with measurable performance objectives for assessing urban area, State, territory, and Tribal capabilities to identify 

gaps and prioritize investments.9 Specifically, we recommended that FEMA complete a National preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level based on 

tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant 

funding. With such an assessment, FEMA could identify the potential costs for establishing and maintaining capabilities at each level and determine what capabilities Federal agencies should provide. We reported in March 2013 that FEMA has 

made some progress in assessing its preparedness capabilities, but continued to face 

challenges developing a National preparedness system that could assist FEMA in 

prioritizing preparedness grant funding.10 For example, in March 2012, FEMA 

issued the first National Preparedness Report, which describes progress made to 

build, sustain, and deliver capabilities. In April 2012, FEMA issued guidance on developing Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) to facilitate the self-assessments of regional, State, and local capabilities. FEMA requires 

State, territory, Tribal, and urban area governments receiving homeland security 

funding to annually complete THIRAs and use the results to determine the resources required to achieve the capability targets they set for their jurisdiction. 

However, we found in March 2013 that FEMA faced challenges that may reduce the 

usefulness of these efforts. For example, the National Preparedness Report noted 

that while many programs exist to build and sustain preparedness capabilities, challenges remain in measuring their progress over time. According to the report, in 

many cases, measures do not yet exist to gauge the performance of these programs, 

either quantitatively or qualitatively. 

FEMA has taken some steps to address our recommendation. Specifically, FEMA 

reported in February 2018 that the agency has developed capability-specific performance objectives that will enable a National preparedness assessment of capability gaps, but no such report has been issued at this time. FEMA reported that 

it plans on implementing new methodology for some core capabilities in December 

2018 and for all core capabilities by December 2019, and will be able to provide complete results in 2020. In addition, FEMA reported that they are developing a new 

Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) methodology that 

will assist in measuring the effectiveness of State and urban areas’ grant projects 

in reducing risk. According to FEMA, the new methodology will measure changes 

in State and urban area preparedness through the use of standardized capability 

targets and key indicators that will show how FEMA preparedness grants are being 

used to address gaps in capability targets. This should also lead to a better understanding of the Nation’s overall preparedness. Regardless, as of February 2018, 

FEMA had taken steps to assess preparedness capabilities, but had not yet completed a National preparedness assessment with clear, objective, and quantifiable 

capability requirements against which to assess preparedness, as we recommended. 

Developing such an assessment would help FEMA to identify what capability gaps 

exist at the Federal level and what level of resources are needed to close such gaps. 

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee, 

this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions 

you may have. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Currie. 

The Chair thanks all of our witnesses for their remarks. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. 

28 

I would like to ask Director Sweeney and Mr. Murphy, if you 

could just talk about the new threats. Since September 11, we have 

gotten very good, you have gotten very good, the first responders 

have gotten very good at protecting our hard targets. I tell people 

if you want to visit the Empire State Building, please go. If you 

want to come to the Capitol, please bring your family down to 

Washington to visit the Capitol. It is very safe. 

The evolving threats have come over recent times to soft targets, 

different methods. We spoke about computer attacks, cyber attacks. 

When we see these new, evolving threats, many times our Federal 

agencies will see them maybe before the locals, besides the task 

force, how do we drill down and get that information to those folks 

that are going to have to respond, or, in fact, may be able to prevent some of these attacks from occurring? When we are looking 

at these new, emerging attacks, your availability of having people 

overseas, I know our local responders have people assigned overseas as well, but a lot of these things occur and come on your radar 

screen before others’ radar screens. Those new, emerging efforts by 

our enemies, how are we getting that down to our folks on the 

ground? 

Mr. SWEENEY. So your premise is correct, the tactics have certainly shifted over time. I think you could easily argue that the soft 

target is the No. 1 threat now. The tactics are more simplified, so 

an individual looking to be part of a terrorist group or a terrorist 

ideology basically has everything at their fingertips now, a ton of 

messaging through social media, techniques that are available online that you can pull and resource yourself, and the simplicity of 

the technique and the cheapness of some of the means to do it. 

We do have an advantage, as you discussed, of having folks stationed overseas. We have officers, and I know the NYPD has folks 

overseas, and with our extra-territorial jurisdiction, this region gets 

to see a lot of things first. Those pieces of intel and the pieces of 

information are put into intelligence bulletins. So where that really 

has an impact is on those agencies that are not part of a JTTF and 

that don’t have the resources to staff somebody into a Federal task 

force. Through the Fusion Centers around the country and this 

State, New York State, the CT regions, I think there are 14 regions, those bulletins are pushed to the Fusion Center and then to 

those regions run by the State police. Each of those regions has a 

chief that chairs it, and you will see those bulletins get pushed out 

to all those local agencies, sometimes on a weekly basis. 

Enhancements like that and the information sharing that occurs 

like that I think gives everybody an advantage to see some of those 

threats that they might not get to experience if they are not sitting 

on a JTTF and seeing the information firsthand in real time. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. So, in complement to that, the Department owns the Homeland Security Intelligence Network, or HSIN, 

which has undergone a lot of technical upgrades in the last couple 

of months and years. We are now driving all Federal intelligence 

reporting to that, in partnership with the FBI, ATF, as well as our 

own component, so that we have a one-stop shop where our State 

and local colleagues can find the relevant intelligence there. 

29 

Its functionality as a search component has vastly increased, 

where one now has the capability to sort out intelligence products 

to better inform all of us, both at the Federal Government level as 

well as the State and local levels. So in terms of pushing the information out, we have tried to make strides in partnership with our 

colleagues in the State and local world. 

Then if I can shift gears to the Suspicious Activity Reporting Program, which has over the years, over the last more recent years 

trailed off a little bit, we are refreshing that program now. We are 

becoming a whole lot smarter and more agile to address the wide 

array of threats that are out there, from cyber transnational organized crime as well as terrorism. 

With that, sir, I will take any questions. Thank you. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. 

In the short period of time I have, Mr. DiNanno, Mr. Currie, both 

of you are so intricately involved with our grant programs that 

allow our locals to use Federal funding to protect the citizens of 

their municipalities. Are those grants flexible enough to address 

what Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Murphy spoke about? When they see 

something that is emerging, they push that information down to 

the police department, the fire department, OEM, but their grant 

parameters may not allow them to use funds for that new, emerging threat or that new piece of information. Are the grants flexible 

enough that they can divert funds to where they need them? 

Mr. DINANNO. Thank you for that question. I will take the first 

whack at it. 

Given the nature of the grant programs, they are an annual allocation, so in and of themselves, because it is once a year, they may 

not be flexible in that sense. However, once the dollars reach the 

stakeholder, I know that I personally have signed many requests 

from State and local jurisdictions to be able to move funds around, 

and every single person that works for me knows that they work 

for all the folks here in New York and out here in the audience and 

the country to try to do exactly that. 

That being said, it is, again, an annual process that we have to 

continue to try to make better and faster. But I have not turned 

down a request, nor would I see one to support any operational requirement. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Currie. 

Mr. CURRIE. Yes. This has been an issue for 15 years. I know in 

the early days, when we were buying lots and lots of equipment, 

the States and locals just didn’t have the capability. Over time, 

equipment needs to be maintained, and you need to have someone 

to operate it, and that was a flexibility that was built in in the 

later years, that some of the funds could be used to actually maintain and operate that equipment, because it becomes a huge cost. 

But I think Congress plays a huge role in that, too, in making 

it clear what these grant funds can be used for year in and year 

out, and I don’t think it is easy for them to be as flexible sometimes 

as they need to be without specific direction sometimes from Congress, which you all have provided in legislation recently for certain things, like cybersecurity, for example, and local election assistance. It has been a real grey area about what specific things 

30 

can be actually purchased and used in those areas because they are 

emerging and evolving every day. 

So I think there could probably be some more flexibility built into 

them as well. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you for that information. 

My time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DiNanno, the fiscal year 2018 and 2019 budget proposals, 

the President has proposed massive cuts to FEMA’s preparedness 

grants by more than $900 million. Did FEMA engage stakeholders 

about the impacts of such cuts? What would they have for the planning, training, and execution of their missions? 

Mr. DINANNO. Thank you, Ranking Member Payne, for that 

question. I am unsure of the exact number that you are referring 

to. The fiscal year 2019 President’s request is approximately $2.3 

billion. That includes, as one of my colleagues on the panel referred 

to earlier, $522 million new grant program that would allow us the 

flexibility to try to meet the emerging threats that my colleagues 

in the intelligence community here have pointed out, and to also 

identify those National priorities that we may have seen emerge, 

for example, after this past storm season and terror season that 

would be able to focus on priority areas such as gaps in communication, emergency management, information sharing, and that 

would be in a competitive grant program. 

So we think the President’s request does adequately reflect the 

need. Yes, sir, we do talk all the time with our stakeholders. 

Mr. PAYNE. They have elaborated on what these cuts would do 

in terms of their ability to be prepared? 

Mr. DINANNO. Well, sir, it is a constrained budget environment. 

I think we all know that. Again, I would reiterate to you that we 

think the President’s request does provide the flexibility and the 

ability to target the priority areas that we would work with our 

State and local, again whether it is emergency management, police, 

fire, even cyber. We would be able to address those emerging gaps 

and put the resources into the hands of the operators as soon as 

possible. 

Mr. PAYNE. I get very concerned from time to time in reference 

to the cuts that are made to the grants and the funding for homeland preparedness when we always see the military budget escalated. I believe that the homeland budget is as important as the 

military budget because it defends us here in the homeland. So I 

tend to try to couple the two with respect to having administrations and people understand that it is just as important as the 

military budget to defend us here in the homeland. 

So I would just really try to keep that in perspective. I think the 

two are linked, I think the two are important, and we should address the homeland budget in the same manner as the administration looks at the Defense budget. 

The President’s proposed budget recommended a 25 percent cost 

match for Urban Area Security Initiative, the State Homeland Security Grant Programs and Transit Security Grant Program, which 

were already slated for significant cuts. Did the administration conVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:59 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18EP0423\18EP0423.TXT HEATH
31 

sider whether the State and local governments could absorb this 

cost match? 

Mr. DINANNO. Thank you for that question, sir. Yes. I would 

point out as I answer this question that cost matches have been 

successfully implemented in other grant programs. I would point 

out the Emergency Management Performance Grant, the EMPG 

program, which is a one-to-one hard match, dollar for dollar, I 

think that has been very successfully implemented, and I think the 

success and the cost match comes from that emergency management community really feeling ownership of the program. We administer it. We run it, if you would. 

However, the EMPG program is very much a shared responsibility, and any changes that we make to that program have to be 

done in close consultation with those emergency managers, and 

part of that I believe comes from the cost match that is included. 

We also have implemented cost matches in the Fire Grant Program. Those are also what would be considered a hard match, dollar for dollar, as well as the Port Security Grant Program. Again, 

I think it gives the stakeholders a real sense of ownership in the 

program and very much a robust dialog with the folks that work 

for us, the grant managers, on what is being bought, how it meets 

the requirements. 

So it has been successfully implemented in the past. Any discussions that we have had about the homeland security program 

match has been in a soft match, not at dollar-for-dollar. 

Mr. PAYNE. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back in the interest of time. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. King for questions. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sweeney, it has been no secret that years ago there was a 

breakdown in cooperation and coordination between the FBI and 

the NYPD in certain areas. Certainly there was a difference in personalities. Since you have come, and probably before that, it seems 

the situation has improved. Can you tell us what that level of cooperation is now? 

Mr. SWEENEY. The level of cooperation, in my opinion, is awesome, seamless. There is zero daylight between the agencies. I 

think, obviously, a lot of that has to do with the leadership, but it 

is also the men and women who have come up through the organizations over time are now in different levels. So we all started at 

a much more junior level. I had the privilege of being on the Jersey 

task force first, and now on this one. It is seamless. 

The NYPD in particular has a command structure that comes 

with it embedded on the JTTF. So in addition to our special agent 

in charge, there is an NYPD chief, 4 lieutenants, 9 sergeants, and 

100-something detectives that are embedded in every squad. My 

personal belief is you should not be able to differentiate between 

the agent, the detective, the trooper, the analyst, the linguist, and 

when you walk into one of our squad areas, I don’t think you would 

notice the difference. I joke sometimes that usually the NYPD detective has a tie on. 

[Laughter.] 

32 

Mr. SWEENEY. But other than that, in my opinion it is pretty 

seamless. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. I appreciate that very much. It is encouraging to hear. 

Mr. DiNanno, at the outset let me thank you for the work you 

have done. I am fully aware of that, and I appreciate it. 

As far as overall, I look at the UASI budget, the last three budgets, the Obama budget and the two Trump budgets, and in both of 

them there is significantly less requested than is needed. For instance, going back to the last Obama request, there was $330 million requested in UASI funding. Congress ended up authorizing 

and appropriating $605 million. Under the first Trump budget, he 

requested $450 million, and Congress ended up appropriating $630 

million. This year it is $448 million requested. 

Now, obviously there is a breakdown between both administrations and the Congress as to what is needed, and I know you said 

that even as far as local contributions, it gave the locals more of 

a sense of ownership. Well, if you take the NYPD, they have well 

over 1,000 officers already. They certainly have an ownership over 

what is going on, and whatever they get from the Federal Government is not going to match their expenditures. It seems to me that 

the threats in many ways are greater than before 9/11. At least on 

9/11, they were coming out of Afghanistan. Now we have a multiplicity of terror groups. They can be doing it from their basement. 

You have ISIS, you have al-Qaeda, you have al-Shabaab, you have 

Boko Haram, you have al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. So in 

many ways the threats are maybe not as great as 9/11, but they 

are more than 9/11. 

Yet, for me to even be talking about these types of cuts when the 

threats are increasing, and certainly the commitment in New York 

City, Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Rockland, which comprises this 

zone, this area, I don’t know why one administration after another 

continues to propose these cuts. To me, it can actually be undermining the effort that we need. 

I am saying this in a bipartisan way. I agree with Don Payne as 

far as the Trump budgets, but I felt the same with the Obama 

budgets. They seem to be always short-changing us when the 

greatest local effort is being made right here where the greatest 

threats are. 

Mr. DINANNO. Thank you, Congressman King, for that question. 

Again, I would point out the $2.3 billion in the President’s budget 

we think is a substantial commitment and very close to the enacted 

budget, fiscal year 2018 enacted. But I would also like to point out 

that specifically with New York and New Jersey, New York has 

consistently been No. 1, the highest-ranked risk in the country, 

New Jersey and Newark I think ranked as high as 6 this past year. 

I recall their draft risk assessment that has recently been sent out 

perhaps moved it up to 5th. I am unsure exactly. Any risk analysis 

that we do, ultimately the Secretary does have the discretion when 

it comes to resource allocations, and again this year we will defer 

to her when we make recommendations around risk. 

So again, specific to the budget, we think the President’s request is robust this year at $2.3 billion, that we can continue to buy 

down risks Nationally and to build capabilities both locally here in 

33 

New York and New Jersey, as well as throughout the rest of the 

Nation. 

Mr. KING. I would just say, not that Mr. Payne needs any defending, but God forbid an attack does come, northern New Jersey 

and New York City are going to be working together. It is basically 

going to be one battle zone, one evacuation zone, and one response 

zone. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Many of you came some great distances to be 

here, so if we could have a lightning round where we each ask just 

one more question. 

I would like to again ask Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Murphy, with 

these new emerging threats—drones, cybersecurity—do you see any 

obstacles in your capability as Federal law enforcement officers 

having capabilities that maybe NYPD and FD and OEM don’t 

have? Are there things that prevent them from doing what they 

would be able to do better because of the position they are in? Are 

there clearance problems in disseminating information? A lot of the 

information we get is Classified, it is Secret, it is Top Secret, some 

of the stuff is over-classified. 

What obstacles do you see in your dealing with our local first responders that you think maybe Congress can clear up? I am going 

to ask the same to both of you as far as grants and funding of their 

efforts. What obstacles do you see? Mr. Currie pointed out some of 

them already. What do you think we could do to help make this 

situation better? 

Mr. SWEENEY. Sir, on the issue of clearances, everybody who is 

on the JTTF has a clearance through Top Secret, in most cases a 

sensitive compartmented side of that house as well. 

On the issue of passing information to State and local agencies 

that are not on those JTTFs or not part of the task force where 

there is a clearance, I don’t know if it is something Congress can 

do. Certainly, the agencies could ensure that they write those products as intelligence products in such a manner that there is no 

issue with classification, you can push it as easily as possible, and 

a lot of that is done through analytical writing courses we now put 

people through that include Fusion Centers. So there are things 

that could be done that you can speed up that information sharing. 

On the threat side, I am not sure I can get into technical capability on some things, especially drones, but certainly the issue of 

drones is something we all need to look at and how we address 

those, especially if you are at a large-scale event, what authorities 

do you have or not have, and what capability do you have to disrupt that? But I don’t think I want to get into techniques or tactics. 

Mr. DONOVAN. I certainly understand that. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MURPHY. Also with drones, in partnership with our State 

and locals, I have written a number of products on some of the 

challenges faced by drones. I will submit those for the record. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. You will notice in the product line a couple of what 

we call FARs or Field Analytical Reports that our officers in the 

field help generate with our State and local partners and add value 

to the rest of us back in the District of Columbia and the other 

Federal partners throughout the country. 

34 

So with drones, though—I will go back to that—there are a lot 

of challenges there with how we look at those and the authorities 

in place. DHS is a leader in the intelligence world, working with 

all of you to look at this from a protective standpoint as well. We 

certainly don’t want to interfere with commerce, but at the same 

time there is a lot that can be done with respect to regulation and 

working through the threats we face. I will just touch on a couple 

to illustrate my point. 

The number of reports coming back substantially increases, 

whether it is from our State and locals or other Federal colleagues. 

We actually track that back in DHS. The interference with aviation, commercial aviation, military sites, et cetera, is laid out in 

some of these pieces, and it is on the rise and will continue to go 

in that direction. 

The last thing I will address, sir, is just with respect to information sharing. We, along with our other Federal colleagues, continue 

to strive in that direction. We thank you for lifting the cap on our 

field personnel that we can deploy. We think nothing replaces faceto-face engagement, so we have three people locally here, and we 

plan on exploring ways to increase that enhancement so we can 

bring a full range of DHS equities and intelligence that we for the 

Department sit on to aide in all these diverse threats to our State 

and locals and understanding these diverse threats that we all 

face. Thank you. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. 

On the grants side, is there anything that Congress could be 

doing to make your job easier and help those folks be more effective? 

Mr. DINANNO. I think you raised an important point. When I 

talked in my Statement about just letting the grants be able to 

evolve with the threat, I think it is just a huge challenge because 

the threat changes so much. It is one of the reasons we focus so 

much on trying to quantitatively assess capabilities, like what a jurisdiction has built versus what it hasn’t built. I think you also 

mentioned the Federal Government having the information that 

sometimes the States and locals don’t. I think injecting that into 

the grant justifications and the whole local risk assessment process 

to make sure they understand what their biggest risks are so they 

can allocate their grant funding to those places is the most important thing here. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. 

Mr. CURRIE. Mr. Chairman, thanks for that question. I would 

like to address the drone issue first. 

I have had several mayors and Governors raise this issue with 

both myself as well as our Secretary. There are, as I understand, 

some policy impediments that perhaps we could work on together 

to ensure that the people that our dollars hire and the equipment 

that our dollars buy, that the policy and the authorities are in 

place for them to use that effectively against an adversary. Our adversaries are not waiting. We are seeing that in the reporting, and 

this is, I think, precisely the type of flexibility we need in the program. 

Second, to your point on cyber, there is an emerging consensus 

again among mayors and Governors that that is an emerging 

35 

threat, the events that I pointed out in my opening statement, in 

Atlanta and Baltimore, to highlight that, and we are going to try 

to address that in the grant programs, and it is all about capacity 

building, sharing information. I think this is where the Federal 

Government can and should lead, and I think our programs should 

be able to support that effort. So, thank you. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you all. 

Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Murphy, quickly, if you can describe to the 

committee whether or not you think that the preparedness grant 

funding is keeping pace with the threats posed by bad actors, very 

quickly. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Sir, I actually am not up to speed on how the 

grant funding dollars work, so I probably don’t have the best answer for that. 

Mr. MURPHY. Sir, as you probably know, we work with FEMA to 

assess the intelligence risk to the cities. That makes up about 25 

percent of the FEMA calculation. I think it has been talked about 

here that flexibility in terms of how that money is used at the local 

level is very important, and certainly in certain locations terrorism 

may not be the primary threat that they face, and having that 

specificity to be where they need to be with those dollars is important to continue to work on that risk with everybody. 

I will yield the rest of my time. Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. In terms of the flexibility, we know with the evolving 

threat it needs to be nimble. But sometimes what we find is members of the legislature, the House of Representatives, is that if 

there is not specificity in the language in the grant, then the 

money kind of goes wherever it will at the point in time that whoever is sitting in that seat decides where it will go. So that is the 

one issue with the matter of specificity, although we understand 

with an evolving threat that we need to be nimble. So we have to 

try to figure out a balance and how to make sure we really can do 

both, whichever is most important at the time. 

Mr. Currie, sometimes it is difficult to connect the dots on why 

something like preparedness grants management would be important to a program. Would you talk about the impact that 

unaddressed management challenges would have over the lifetime 

of a grants program as big as the preparedness grants and describe 

your findings if unaddressed could have long-term impacts? 

Mr. CURRIE. Sure. Well, there are two areas that we focused on 

that I talked about. One is assessing capabilities so we know where 

the grants are going, what they need to be used for. Then two is 

just internally how you are managing all those different grants. 

On the first, on assessing capabilities, not to sound academic 

about this but I think one of the reasons it is a quantitative assessment of what capabilities you are buying down year in and year 

out is so important for trying to make these decisions that you just 

talked about and helping Congress make these decisions. When 

FEMA and the administration go forward with their proposals, it 

is like, well, what capabilities have we bought down? What risk 

have we bought down? Why do we need this funding? What are we 

going to focus on next? 

36 

I think it is critical. Without that, like you said, the money is 

going out and you are hoping it is being used for the highest risk. 

The second piece is just internal management. I talked about 

that a lot of these programs date back to before DHS existed. Old 

IT systems’ inability to look across the grant programs at any given 

time and spit out how much money is going out to what jurisdiction, and what is it being used for, that has been pretty much impossible up to this point. So without doing that, how can you look 

across all the grant programs and figure out what you are buying? 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. King. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to ask really one question for the panel, and it is more 

of a statement than a question because I wouldn’t want you to give 

any specifics on the record. 

But I am very concerned about the whole issue of mass transit 

security, specifically rail. Just take New York City. They have millions of passengers every day, a thousand entrances and exits. The 

Long Island Railroad, Metro North, Amtrak, Penn Station, Grand 

Central—how much concern is there within the Homeland Security 

community, the Federal law enforcement community, as to what 

we can do to provide more protections for mass transit? 

Again, I am not looking for any specifics here, but is that an area 

of concern which you feel is being addressed? 

Mr. SWEENEY. Absolutely I feel mass transit is an area of concern. People are obviously addressing it. My personal opinion is 

there is plenty to do, but definitely an area of concern, especially 

in this jurisdiction. 

Mr. KING. Suppose you compare it, let’s say, to an airport, where 

in many ways it is so easy to secure airplanes. Everyone has to go 

through certain entrances, leave through certain exits. They have 

the magnetometers at TSA. They have everything, and really none 

of that is practical when it comes to mass transit and rail. 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. I mean, we would place it as a very high 

concern. What I can say in this context, in this environment, is the 

potential to weaponize such things as fentanyl has been well discussed, but that is just an example of how in an enclosed space environment you could cause a lot of damage. 

So from our perspective it remains a high-level concern. That is 

just one illustration where in a confined space an adversary could 

produce a lot of casualties very quickly. 

Mr. DINANNO. Congressman King, yes, it absolutely is a concern 

of mine. I actually had ridden Amtrak up here. Every time I go into 

a transportation system I am always doing my own personal red 

team of what you see and what you don’t, a lot that you don’t see. 

But in this threat environment, what you do see matters as well. 

I would point out that, particularly in the New York urban area, 

the way this jurisdiction manages their homeland security and 

urban area grants is like no other. They don’t look at strictly the 

transit problem through the Transit Security Grant Program. They 

leverage all of their grant programs. 

37 

The other point I would make to that is what Mr. Currie said, 

a couple of terms that he used, and that is about focus. If we don’t 

focus and prioritize the limited dollars that we do have and we do 

need to work with, I think we absolutely have to do that so that 

we can drive down on these priorities that seem to be emerging as 

consensus from the intelligence community. Thank you. 

Mr. CURRIE. I agree with you. At GAO we have been raising this 

concern since you were Chairman of this committee. It is a huge 

concern. In many ways, mass transit passenger rail is the same 

issue as you have at a concert, huge numbers of people just in open 

spaces. So it is a huge issue to address. 

Frankly, over the years we have been a bit perplexed about— 

TSA handles a lot of this on the transportation security side—a little perplexed at the percentage of funding dedicated and programs 

dedicated to surface transportation versus aviation. It is dwarfed. 

So grants are a very important part, and they are used by those 

operators too. It is a huge issue. 

Mr. KING. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Well, I would like to thank our witnesses for your 

testimony, thank my colleagues for their questions. Some of our 

colleagues who couldn’t come today or some of us who may have 

some other questions may request that you submit answers to 

those in writing. 

We are going to take about a 5-minute break to change over our 

panel, bring our second panel on. So we will take a 5-minute recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. DONOVAN. We are pleased to welcome our second panel of 

witnesses. 

Our second panel includes NYPD deputy commissioner of 

counterterrorism and intelligence, John Miller. Thank you for coming today, John. 

Chief of FDNY counterterrorism and emergency preparedness, 

Joe Pfeifer. Thank you, Joe, for coming. 

Commissioner of New York City emergency management, Joe 

Esposito. Joe, welcome. 

Chief of security for the Port Authority of New York and New 

Jersey, John Bilich. Chief, thank you for coming. 

The director of New Jersey’s Office of Homeland Security and 

Preparedness, Jared Maples. Jared, welcome. 

I want to thank you all for being here today. 

The witnesses’ full written statements will be appearing in the 

record. A joint statement from some members of this panel will 

also be submitted for the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Miller, Mr. Pfeifer, and Mr. 

Esposito follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN MILLER, JOSEPH W. PFEIFER, AND JOSEPH J. 

ESPOSITO

APRIL 23, 2018 

Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Congressman King, 

and Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications. We are pleased to testify before you today as representatives of 

the New York City Department of Emergency Management (NYCEM), the New 

York Police Department (NYPD), and the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) 

38 

to discuss how essential Federal funding is to support efforts to secure New York 

City, the surrounding region and high-risk urban areas across the Nation. 

To begin, let us provide a sense of the scale and complexity of the mission in New 

York City. Homeland security in an urban setting is an immense challenge for first 

responders. With a population of over 81⁄2 million people, New York City has the 

highest population density of any major city in the country. Our region also includes 

a large number of high-profile locations. The most recent addition, the Trump 

Tower, aside from a Presidential residence was recently was the site of a fire. The 

greater Tri-State region faces an ever-evolving landscape of security and disaster 

threats. 

This post-9/11 environment has greatly expanded the role that the city’s police, 

fire, and emergency management agencies do each day to keep people safe. For example, the mission of the FDNY is not only to respond to fires, but also respond 

to medical emergencies, public safety incidents, natural disasters, and acts of terrorism. For the NYPD, this means constant vigilance given that New York City remains in the crosshairs of violent terrorists, more so than any other place in the 

world. In 2017 alone, NYCEM activated the City’s Emergency Operations Center 14 

times for a total of 107 days. That includes five winter weather events, two building 

vacates due to fires, two flash floods, an active shooter at Bronx Lebanon Hospital, 

a heat emergency, the Port Authority explosion, and Hurricanes Jose and Maria. 

In the past 15 years, there have been approximately two dozen terrorist plots 

against New York City, with targets such as Times Square, the Brooklyn Bridge, 

John F. Kennedy Airport, the New York Stock Exchange, the subway system, as 

well as major synagogues and other sites. In most cases, they have been thwarted 

by the efforts of the NYPD and our local and Federal partners. Tragically, in the 

last 2 years, 4 attacks have succeeded in striking our city; an explosion in Chelsea 

in which no one was killed; a white supremacist who murdered an African-American 

man with a sword as a ‘‘practice run’’ to a larger plot; a terrorist who drove a van 

into the West Side Highway Running Path which sadly killed 8 individuals; and an 

ISIS-inspired suicide bomber who set off a home-made explosive device at the Port 

Authority Bus Terminal subway station that injured 3 individuals and himself. 

Working with our Federal, State, and local partners, we meet these challenges 

through a matrix of specialized training, planning, equipping, preparedness programming, and information and intelligence sharing, all of which are made possible 

by Federal Homeland Security funding. We have worked diligently to build and execute a protective strategy that has kept this city safe while protecting and upholding 

the Constitutional rights and liberties accorded to those who live, work, and visit 

New York City. 

September 11 forever changed how NYCEM, NYPD, and FDNY view their missions and the world around us. Following that tragedy, NYPD recognized that we 

could not defer the responsibility of protecting this city from terrorist attacks to others, and we have continued to prioritize this ever-evolving peril. Soon after 2001, 

the NYPD became the first police department in the country to develop its own robust counterterrorism capacity. We have expanded our efforts to include international events, gathering intelligence far beyond our borders. Our work, however, 

cannot happen without the assistance and aid of the Federal Government. 

Following the recommendations of a 9/11 Commission Report, the Fire Department leveraged Homeland Security grant funds to create and staff a state-of-theart Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at FDNY Headquarters. Today, this EOC 

serves as part of a network to manage complex emergencies and to share information by connecting with local partners like the NYPD and NYCEM, as well as the 

National Operations Center. Members of FDNY’s Rescue operations train with fire 

departments and first responder agencies from around the country, passing along 

specialized knowledge that we’ve developed here in New York. Urban Search and 

Rescue Team Task Force–1 and FDNY’s IMT have provided mutual aid after a number of natural disasters, including New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, Broome 

County, New York after Hurricane Irene, Florida after Hurricane Irma, Texas after 

Hurricane Harvey, and Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria. 

Federal grant funding represents roughly 50 percent of NYCEM’s annual operating budget and is vital to our ability to run many of our finest initiatives, including the Ready New York public education program, CERT program, Continuity of 

Operations Program, Geographic Information Systems, Training and Exercises, 

Watch Command and Response, and City-wide Incident Management Systems planning. It also funds the Emergency Supply Stockpile, which provides supplies and 

services to support emergency sheltering for adults, people with special medical 

needs, people with disabilities and accessibility and functional needs, children, infants, and companion animals. During a coastal storm, the stockpile can meet the 

39 

needs of 70,000 individuals in designated evacuation shelters across NYC for up to 

7 days. 

Over the years, the caliber of people we have been able to attract has played a 

major role in our ability to protect New York. We have hired civilian analysts who 

are experts in intelligence and foreign affairs. They study terrorist groups, trends, 

and methods of attacks. One of our most important institutional strengths is the remarkable diversity in our ranks. The NYPD is fortunate to have a deep pool of foreign-speaking officers. This has allowed us to build a foreign linguist program with 

more than 1,200 registered speakers of 85 different languages—Arabic, Dari, Farsi, 

Mandarin, Pashto, Russian, Spanish, and Urdu, to name just a few. 

Before concluding, we would like to briefly discuss potential Federal actions that 

would impact our emergency communications. As you know, the NYPD is the Nation’s largest police agency with law enforcement responsibility across the five boroughs. The Department receives nearly 10 million 9–1–1 calls annually and patrols 

approximately 306 square miles—which accounts for some of the most densely-populated geography in the Nation. 

Since September 11, we have greatly improved our radio communications for our 

personnel, many of whom are responding to crimes in progress. Losing the T-band 

spectrum would require significant financial investments to replace our existing 

radio infrastructure. Moreover, alternative spectrum has not been identified to facilitate this relocation, and it is not clear as to whether there is enough spectrum 

available to accommodate the largest metropolitan areas. The continuity for interoperable and operable communications is essential, and changes to the T-band system will impact Department operations and the risk of disruption will endanger 

public safety. 

Additionally, while we certainly are encouraged by steps taken by the FCC to improve the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system, we urge the FCC to adopt rules 

that better allow us to respond to the full range of 21st Century emergencies. When 

the city issued a wireless emergency alert regarding the Chelsea Bomber in 2016 

to every phone in the five boroughs, the millions of New Yorkers who wanted to help 

were given several lines of text with no picture. In this age of instant access to visual information via social media applications, we need to enhance our country’s ability to rapidly, efficiently, and securely deliver comprehensive emergency information, including images, to the public. Pictures provide instant recognition and speak 

a universal language. They enable rapid response from every potential witness who 

could save countless lives through fast action. The lack of photographs and other 

multimedia highlights a weakness in the system and, in the face of emerging 

threats, the city needs to remain on technology’s cutting edge by using public information systems to their fullest capacity to advance its emergency services and capabilities. 

In closing, it cannot be emphasized enough how critically important Federal 

grants are to empowering cities across the Nation, New York City included, to 

evolve and stay ahead of emerging threats. Preparedness is a race against time to 

be ready for the next attack or extreme event. For context, understand that the 

events of 9/11 took place in 102 minutes, less time than this hearing. Every Federal 

dollar that flows to New York City improves our response so we can save the greatest number of people and pays dividends across the United States. We look forward 

to a continued partnership with Members of this committee and the Congress so 

that we are able to sustain existing capabilities and continue to adapt to new 

threats in order to protect the people of the New York City Urban Area. 

Our philosophy is simple: We have to develop the best intelligence available, expand our partnerships, take protective measures to defeat whatever our adversaries 

might be planning next, react to neutralize all threats and prevent the loss of life. 

New York enjoys the distinction of being the safest big city in America. It is also 

commercially vibrant, culturally diverse, and free. We can claim these successes are 

due, in no small measure, to the uniformed and civilian members of the New York 

City Department of Emergency Management (NYCEM), the New York Police Department (NYPD) and the New York City Fire Department (FDNY), and the assistance we have received from the Federal Government, which has been a vital partner 

in the face of an ever-present threat. 

We look forward to a continued partnership with Members of this committee and 

Congress so that we are able to sustain existing capabilities and continue to adapt 

to new threats in order to protect the people of the New York City Urban Area. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify today. We are happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

I now recognize Commissioner Miller for his opening remarks. 

40 

STATEMENT OF JOHN MILLER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM, NEW YORK POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Representative Donovan, and to the 

committee. I am John Miller, deputy commissioner of intelligence 

and counterterrorism for the New York City Police Department. On 

behalf of Police Commissioner James P. O’Neill, I am pleased to 

testify before your subcommittee today to discuss Federal funding 

that has supported the NYPD’s efforts to secure New York City. 

More than any other place in the world, New York City remains 

in the crosshairs of violent terrorists. It is not speculation; it is imperative data, the consensus of the global intelligence community 

as well. Since September 11, there have been approximately two 

dozen terrorist plots against New York City with targets such as 

Times Square, the Brooklyn Bridge, John F. Kennedy Airport, the 

New York Stock Exchange, the subway system, as well as major 

synagogues and other sites. In most cases, these plots have been 

thwarted by the efforts of the NYPD and the FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

Tragically, in the last 2 years, four attacks have succeeded in 

striking our city: An explosion in the Chelsea section of Manhattan 

in which dozens were injured; a white supremacist who murdered 

an African American man with a sword allegedly as a practice run 

to a larger plot; a terrorist who drove a pick-up truck down the 

West Side Highway which sadly killed 8 individuals and injured 

others; and an ISIS-inspired suicide bomber who set off a homemade explosive device at the Port Authority bus terminal in the 

subway station below that injured three individuals, as well as 

himself. 

We have worked long and diligently to build a deterrent that has 

kept this city safe while protecting and upholding the Constitutional rights and liberties accorded those who live, work, and visit 

New York City. But the specter of another terrorist attack is always present. 

September 11 has changed how the NYPD views its mission and 

the world around us forever. That work, however, cannot happen 

without the assistance and aid of the Federal Government. Following the tragedy, the NYPD recognized we could not defer the 

sole responsibility of protecting this city from terrorist attack to the 

Federal Government, and we have continued to prioritize this everevolving effort. 

Soon after 9/11, the NYPD became the first police department in 

the country to develop its own robust, sophisticated counterterrorism capability. We have expanded efforts to include international events, gathering intelligence far beyond our borders, with 

police officers staged in 14 posts around the world. Federal funding 

is critical to our efforts. Over the last 5 years, the NYPD has received an average of $156 million a year in Federal funding. Notably, on average, $113 million of that funding each year comes from 

the Department of Homeland Security, that in the form of DHS 

grants. 

Much credit and much thanks goes to you, Chairman Donovan, 

Representative King, Representative Payne, and the Members of 

41 

this committee. The entire New York Congressional delegation, in 

fact, has helped us over the years to secure these funds. 

The NYPD relies on this funding to protect New Yorkers against 

terrorist attacks and to strengthen homeland preparedness, including the security of critical transportation and port infrastructure. 

Over the years, the caliber of people that we have been able to attract into the NYPD has played a major role in our ability to protect this city. We have hired civilian analysts who are experts in 

intelligence and foreign affairs. They study terrorist groups, terrorist trends, methods of attacks. One of our most important institutional strengths is the remarkable diversity of the ranks of the 

NYPD. The NYPD is fortunate to have a deep pool of foreignspeaking officers. This has allowed us to build a foreign linguist 

program with more than 1,200 registered speakers of 85 different 

languages—Arabic, Dori’o, Farsi, Mandarin, Pashtu, Russian, 

Spanish, Urdu, just to name a few. 

Our personnel also includes trained vapor wake dogs. Not all talent comes on two legs. Our vapor wake dogs are deployed for largescale events in the city. They are adept at sensing mobile threats 

and explosive particles. They are trained to avoid the distractions 

of large crowds and loud noises. They are an invaluable component 

in our policing strategy. But at $40,000 to $60,000 per animal, they 

are an expensive commodity. But imagine their ability to screen 

large crowds during an event like the Christmas tree lighting, New 

Year’s Eve, Thanksgiving Day Parade, the New York City Marathon. They have become an integral and invaluable part of our ability to prevent terrorist attacks. 

The NYPD provides comprehensive training to our officers responding to explosive, chemical, biological, and radiological incidents. There are a multitude of possible forms that a terrorist attack could take. The Department has to be ready for any scenario 

at any time. 

Federal funds have been vital in training officers to respond to 

active-shooter scenarios, allowing them to engage and end a coordinated terrorist attack such as the Mumbai attack, or the attack on 

the Bataclan Theater in Paris. It also provides critical instruction 

to officers for life-saving techniques that can be implemented before 

it is safe enough for medical personnel to enter an active crime 

scene. In a few minutes you will hear from Chief Pfeifer about a 

lot of the direction we have been going in that vein so that we don’t 

just stop the killing but also stop the dying. 

This all comes together in a carefully woven set of programs: 

3,000 radiation detectors that our officers are armed with in the 

streets looking for a radiological threat before it presents itself; 

10,000 cameras integrated into our informational systems that can 

be pushed to NYPD smart phones like this, where officers can access all forms of Department data holdings, and soon we will have, 

beyond the pilot program, the ability to push video to those phones 

so that at a crime scene an officer would literally have the ability 

to take his finger, rewind that camera backward, and see what actually occurred at the time the event was there if it is in an area 

covered by the camera, and as the network expands we hope that 

is more areas. 

42 

These are growing programs. Take the active-shooter piece that 

is 11,606 officers who have been currently trained in active-shooter 

tactics. That is regular patrol officers in addition to the nearly 

1,800 specialized officers we now have from the Strategic Response 

Group, the Critical Response Command, and the Emergency Service Unit with specialized long weapons and heavy vests and helmets for their protection. I daresay that no other municipality in 

the world, no municipal police department, has the ability to deploy 

that many specialized people with specialized training and equipment in that field anywhere else in the world. 

In the intelligence bureau, our motto is intelligence interdiction 

to stop the thing before it happens, and prevention. In the counterterrorism bureau, they pick up where intel left off with prevention, 

but preparedness and the ability to respond with the maximum of 

effectiveness if the event does occur. We treat every day as if that 

is the day when the attack that we are not expecting is going to 

happen, and that is a posture that in a police department where 

85 percent of our expenses are personnel-related, the additional 

funds provided by the Department of Homeland Security and supported by the Members of this committee are essential. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN MILLER

APRIL 23, 2018 

Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Congressman King, 

and Members of the subcommittee. I am John Miller, deputy commissioner of intelligence and counterterrorism for the New York Police Department (NYPD). On behalf of Police Commissioner James P. O’Neill, I am pleased to testify before your 

subcommittee today to discuss how Federal funding has supported the NYPD’s efforts to secure New York City. 

More than any other place in the world, New York City remains in the crosshairs 

of violent terrorists. That is not speculation—it is the consensus of the global intelligence community. Since September 11, 2001, there have been approximately 2 

dozen terrorist plots against New York City, with targets such as Times Square, the 

Brooklyn Bridge, John F. Kennedy Airport, the New York Stock Exchange, the subway system as well as major synagogues and other sites. In most cases, they have 

been thwarted by the efforts of the NYPD and the FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorist Task 

Force. Tragically, in the last 2 years, four attacks have succeeded in striking our 

city; an explosion in Chelsea in which no one was killed; a white supremacist who 

murdered an African-American man with a sword as a ‘‘practice run’’ to a larger 

plot; a terrorist who drove a van into the West Side Highway Running Path which 

sadly killed 8 individuals; and an ISIS-inspired suicide bomber who set off a homemade explosive device at the Port Authority Bus Terminal subway station that injured three individuals and himself. 

We have worked diligently to build a deterrent that has kept this city safe while 

protecting and upholding the Constitutional rights and liberties accorded to those 

who live, work, and visit New York city, but the specter of an attack is forever 

present. 

This work, however, cannot happen without the assistance and aid of the Federal 

Government. 

September 11 forever changed how the NYPD views its mission and the world 

around us. Following that tragedy, the Department recognized that we could not 

defer the sole responsibility of protecting this city from terrorist attacks to the Federal Government, and we have continued to prioritize this ever-evolving peril. Soon 

after 2001, the NYPD became the first police department in the country to develop 

its own robust counterterrorism capacity. We have expanded our efforts to include 

international events, gathering intelligence far beyond our borders. 

Federal funding is critical to our efforts. Over the last 5 years, the NYPD has received an average of $156 million a year in Federal funding. Notably, on average, 

$113 million of that funding each year comes from Department of Homeland SecuVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:59 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18EP0423\18EP0423.TXT HEATH
43 

rity (DHS) grants. Much credit and thanks goes to you, Chairman Donovan, and the 

entire New York Congressional delegation for their advocacy over the years to secure these funds. The NYPD relies on this funding to protect New Yorkers against 

terrorist attacks and strengthen homeland preparedness, including the security of 

critical transportation and port infrastructure. 

Over the years, the caliber of people we have been able to attract has played a 

major role in our ability to protect New York. We have hired civilian analysts who 

are experts in intelligence and foreign affairs. They study terrorist groups, trends, 

and methods of attacks. One of our most important institutional strengths is the remarkable diversity in our ranks. The NYPD is fortunate to have a deep pool of foreign-speaking officers. This has allowed us to build a foreign linguist program with 

more than 1,200 registered speakers of 85 different languages—Arabic, Dari, Farsi, 

Mandarin, Pashto, Russian, Spanish, and Urdu, to name just a few. 

Our personnel also includes our trained vapor wake dogs. Our vapor wake dogs 

are often deployed at large-scale events in the city. They are adept at sensing mobile 

threats and explosive particles, and they are trained to avoid the distractions of 

large crowds and loud noises. They are an invaluable component to our policing 

strategy. 

The NYPD provides comprehensive training to our officers in responding to explosive, chemical, biological, and radiological incidents. There are a multitude of possible forms a terror attack could take, and the Department has to be ready for any 

scenario. Federal funds are vital in training officers to respond to active-shooter scenarios, allowing them to engage and end a coordinated terrorist attack like the 

Mumbai attack. It also provides critical instruction to officers in life-saving techniques that can be implemented before it is safe enough for medical personnel to 

enter an active crime scene. 

In addition to staffing our counterterrorism and intelligence units and training 

our officers, this funding has helped the NYPD create the security infrastructure 

that has prevented potential attacks. For instance, in an initiative supported by 

DHS, we have installed radiation detection equipment in neighboring jurisdictions 

and at key points of entry into the five boroughs so that the city is virtually ringed 

with an alarm system. This program, called Securing the Cities, includes 150 law 

enforcement agencies in dozens of nearby cities and towns. 

Across the city, we have distributed approximately 3,000 radiation pagers to units 

throughout the department and nearly 4,000 radiological dosimeters to each Patrol 

Borough’s counterterrorism post. We continue to invest heavily in acquiring and 

maintaining state-of-the-art equipment to identify, prevent, or disrupt threats. We 

have installed highly-sensitive detection equipment on the boats and helicopters we 

use to patrol New York Harbor, as well as vehicles we use to patrol our streets. 

Our Domain Awareness System (DAS), a centralized network of security cameras, 

license plate readers, and chemical and radiological detectors is only possible thanks 

to help from the Federal Government. DAS makes it possible to scan recorded footage for specific objects and behaviors; an unattended bag; a car driving against the 

flow of traffic, or a person walking through a restricted area. Using an advanced 

graphical interface and mapping capability, the DAS retrieves and displays information, providing real-time alerts and the means to quickly utilize relevant information to prevent incidents from occurring or guide our response once an attack has 

been complete, enabling the NYPD to quickly identify attackers and stop them before they can strike again. The program receives data from more than 14,000 cameras, nearly 700 license plate readers, and strategically placed chemical and radiation detectors throughout the city, providing instant alerts on possible threats in 

the city. Since it is available as an application on their Department smart phone, 

the features of the DAS are available at the fingertips of all of our officers. 

We place particular emphasis on the subway system in light of its attractiveness 

as a target and because it is a vital artery that keeps this city running. In excess 

of 5 million New Yorkers use the subways every day. Protecting this system is one 

of our top priorities and greatest challenges. The strength of the system, open, 24 

hours a day, every day of the year, makes it an appealing target for attackers. After 

the bombing of the London transit system in 2005, we began screening the bags and 

backpacks of subway passengers. We maintain posts at each of the 14 underwater 

subway tunnels. We have expanded uniformed patrols underground and regularly 

conduct security sweeps in subway cars. 

Federal funding also helps ensure that each officer responding to a terror incident 

has the proper equipment so that they can respond to active shooters or radiological 

attacks in as safe a manner as possible. The support we receive from the Federal 

Government in the form of funding and our relationships with our Federal law enforcement partners has been and continues to be invaluable. However, we continue 

to seek greater funding levels that are commensurate with the severity of the everVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:59 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18EP0423\18EP0423.TXT HEATH
44 

present threat to our city, which unfortunately consistently finds itself atop the terror target list. With additional funding above and beyond the current levels, the 

NYPD would further increase deployments in critical areas of the city as well as 

continue to expand the DAS in order to retrieve critical information and elevate situational awareness. 

On the topic of Federal Government support of information sharing, I would like 

to note that the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (‘‘I&A’’) certified a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) at 

NYPD Headquarters which supports Classified information sharing integral to the 

NYPD mission. We also have three I&A personnel assigned to New York City to 

support NYPD in addition to a DHS Special Security Officer (SSO) assigned full 

time to manage SCIF operations. The DHS intelligence analyst assigned to NYPD 

sits with our Intelligence Division and he proactively shares DHS and intelligence 

community information with NYPD that has resulted in leads for existing investigations, new investigations being opened, and two joint finished intelligence products 

over the past year. 

We are also eager to engage with our Federal partners on possible legislation. 

Federal and local law prohibit the recreational use of drones, or unmanned aircraft 

systems (UAS), but most drone owners either do not know or do not abide by those 

restrictions. Consequently, there has been an increase in illegal drone usage in the 

city, especially at high-profile, mass gathering events. While hobbyists are often 

times using drones for photography and filming, more evidence is found daily that 

terrorist groups are encouraging active members and lone wolves to embrace drones 

as a mass casualty tool. Currently, Federal law prohibits State and local governments from purchasing, owning, or operating technology that would jam any form 

of authorized radio communications and provides no pathway for State or local governments to apply to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for an exception from this prohibition. Working with our partners in Congress, the Department 

recommends amending Title 47 of the Federal Code to allow State and local governments to purchase jamming technology to use against unmanned aircraft systems 

in select circumstances with proper oversight. 

Our philosophy is simple: We have to develop the best intelligence available, expand our partnerships, take protective measures to defeat whatever our adversaries 

might be planning next, react to neutralize all threats and prevent the loss of life. 

Before concluding, I would like to briefly discuss potential Federal actions that 

would impact our emergency communications. As you know, the NYPD is the Nation’s largest police agency with law enforcement responsibility across the five boroughs. The Department receives nearly 10 million 9–1–1 calls annually and patrols 

approximately 306 square miles—which accounts for some of the most densely populated geography in the Nation. 

Since September 11, we have greatly improved our radio communications for our 

personnel, many of whom are responding to crimes in progress. I want to comment 

on the potential relocation of public safety land mobile radio systems from the ‘‘Tband.’’ Losing the T-band spectrum would require significant financial investments 

to replace our existing radio infrastructure. Moreover, alternative spectrum has not 

been identified to facilitate this relocation, and it is not clear as to whether there 

is enough spectrum available to accommodate the largest metropolitan areas. The 

continuity for interoperable and operable communications is essential, and changes 

to the T-band system will impact Department operations and the risk of disruption 

will endanger public safety. 

Additionally, while we certainly are encouraged by steps taken by the FCC to improve the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system, we urge the FCC to adopt rules 

that better allow us to respond to the full range of 21st Century emergencies. When 

the city issued a wireless emergency alert regarding the Chelsea Bomber in 2016 

to every phone in the five boroughs, the millions of New Yorkers who wanted to help 

were given several lines of text with no picture. In this age of instant access to visual information via social media applications, we need to enhance our country’s ability to rapidly, efficiently, and securely deliver comprehensive emergency information, including images, to the public. Pictures provide instant recognition and speak 

a universal language. They enable rapid response from every potential witness who 

could save countless lives through fast action. The lack of photographs and other 

multimedia highlights a weakness in the system and, in the face of emerging 

threats, the city needs to remain on technology’s cutting edge by using public information systems to their fullest capacity to advance its emergency services and capabilities. 

Over 16 years after 9/11, New York enjoys the distinction of being the safest big 

city in America. It is also commercially vibrant, culturally diverse, and free. We can 

claim these successes are due, in no small measure, to the 50,000+ uniformed and 

45 

civilian members of the New York City Police Department, and the assistance we 

have received from the Federal Government, which has been a vital partner in the 

face of an ever present threat. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. Thank you, Commissioner. 

Chief. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. PFEIFER, CHIEF, COUNTERTERRORISM AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, NEW YORK CITY 

FIRE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK 

Mr. PFEIFER. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Congressman King. Thank you for having me here 

today. I am the chief of counterterrorism and emergency preparedness for the New York City Fire Department. 

Homeland security in an urban setting is immensely challenging 

for our first responders. Our population of over 8.5 million people, 

New York City has the highest density population of any city in the 

country. Expand that out to our region of New Jersey and the triState area, we have a tremendous amount of responsibility for a 

mega-city of 20 million people. This includes the United Nations, 

Trump Tower where just recently there was a serious fire, but this 

landscape in the tri-State area of an evolving threat involving security and involving disaster management is what we are about. 

The post-9/11 environment has greatly expanded the role of the 

city’s fire, police, emergency management agencies to save people, 

to make it safe for people that come to our area every day. The 

mission of the New York City Fire Department is not only about 

responding to fires, but it is also responding to medical emergencies, public safety incidents, natural disaster, and acts of terrorism. 

In the last 6 months alone we responded to two separate terrorist attacks, the first in lower Manhattan where the terrorist 

drove a pick-up truck down a bike lane and killed 8 people, injuring 11; and the second took place in the subway near the Port Authority commuter bus terminal where a terrorist set off a pipe 

bomb strapped to his body during rush hour. 

Working with our Federal, State, and local partners, we need to 

meet this challenge through a matrix of specialized training, planning, equipping, preparing, information and intelligence sharing, 

all of which are made possible through Federal homeland security 

funding. I would like to highlight some of these programs. 

Following the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, the Fire 

Department leveraged homeland security grant funds to create a 

state-of-the-art emergency operations center. Today, the emergency 

operation center at FDNY serves as part of a network of managing 

complex emergencies and to share information by connecting the 

local partners like NYPD and OEM, as well as the National Operations Center down in the District of Columbia. Let me give you 

an example. 

When U.S. Airways Flight 1549 had an emergency landing in the 

icy waters of the Hudson River, not only did we have to coordinate 

rescue operations from the operations center, but we had to share 

critical information, like comparing the manifest from LaGuardia 

Airport of the plane, of who was on the plane and comparing that 

46 

to the people who had to go through our hospitals. We learned first 

that all 155 passengers and crew were alive and rescued. That information was placed on the Homeland Security Information Network and immediately provided this fact to all of government, including the President of the United States. Information is power if 

we share it, and if we share it in real time. 

In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, we developed an instant management team to manage and coordinate complex emergencies. DHS grant funding paid for the extensive funding of the IMTs, as well as full-scale exercises which the teams participated in with partners within New York City and outside of the 

city. As a matter of fact, just last week the IMT ran a full-scale 

exercise in up-State New York in a training facility, partnering 

with NYPD New York State IMT, to practice simultaneous largescale events involving building collapse and active shooters. 

We also created a Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness to develop strategies, emergency response plans, intel products, educational programs, and scenario-based exercises to improve the Department’s response to terrorist acts, to natural disasters, and to large-scale incidents. 

The work of CTDP has been on the front lines preparing the Department, the city, and the Nation for new and emerging threats. 

Working with NYPD, we developed multi-agency plans outlining 

the roles and responsibilities to respond to major incidents. 

The Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness has been 

working with multiple agencies to address the growing threat of 

vertical terrorism. This is an event where terrorists attack highrise buildings using semi-automatic weapons, explosives, and the 

use of fire and smoke as weapons. CTDP conducted a recent study 

on this topic which I have provided the committee. 

To prepare for such an attack, FDNY hosted a vertical terrorism 

preparedness workshop which we held on the 63rd floor of the new 

One World Trade Center, with NYPD, with NYSUM, with the Port 

Authority of New York and New Jersey, with the FBI, with DHS, 

FEMA, building managers, and trauma center doctors. 

As the threat environment changes, we must have first responders also change. This type of research that we are doing at FDNY 

at our center is preparing our first responders and agencies across 

not only the city but across the country. We learn together, and we 

share this information about vertical terrorism. 

We also use homeland security grant funding to make smart investments in the core competencies such as building collapse, 

CBRN, mass casualty incidents. These funds allow us to develop 

enhanced capabilities in search and rescue, hazardous material 

mitigation, rescue medic hospital skills, marine operations, and 

swift water rescues. 

A key innovation in the Department’s response to mass casualty 

incidents was the formation of a rescue task force which is made 

up of first responders who receive specialized training for triage 

treatment and transport of victims during an active-shooter incident. They are part of the response matrix and are proactive in deploying in high-profile special events like Times Square New Year’s 

Eve and the Thanksgiving Day Parade. 

47 

The rescue task force is dependent upon our partners in NYPD 

for force protection so FDNY medical responders can go into these 

dangerous areas, go into a war zone to provide triage and to stop 

the bleeding. What John mentioned before is what we do. Law enforcement goes in to stop the killing, and FDNY goes in to stop the 

dying. 

To do that, each member has ballistic protection and has completed hands-on training in tourniquets and clotting agents. But 

what is so important for us are these joint exercises that we do between FDNY and NYPD and working with OEM. These things are 

important. If we don’t practice it, it doesn’t become real. Only by 

working together as a team will we be ready for the next extreme 

event. 

These resources were developed with homeland security funding, 

working in concert with one another to provide a fast and thorough 

response to mitigate these threats and incidents. I will give you an 

example. 

During the pipe bombing at the Port Authority, what we had to 

respond to that incident was a rescue task force. We had our medical resources. We brought in our breather units so that if things 

got bad we would be able to operate with self-contained breathing 

apparatus for a long period of time. Our rescue and squad companies drew from special training. We had a compressor unit if there 

was collapse, and mass casualty pods we brought into the scene. 

Our hazardous material units were dispatched so we could take radiological readings. Even our marine companies that were on the 

waterways stepped up patrol. The resources that we have developed and maintained using homeland security funding is critical in 

saving not only the people of New York but the population in the 

entire region. 

One of our marine units is a regional asset. We respond to incidents on the waterway both on the New York and the New Jersey 

side. We even have a pressurized cabin in case there was an attack 

with chlorine on the city or the area. We can disperse that cloud 

through using water because this pressurized cabin can go into an 

area of contamination. 

But working with our security partners, we are preparing for the 

next type of active-shooter attack, one which could occur on the 

many ferries that bring thousands of people to work each day. Our 

workshop focuses on not only stopping the killing by law enforcement and stopping the dying by our medical personnel, but also 

about stopping the drowning, because we know if there is an active 

shooter on a boat, on one of our ferries, that people will jump in 

the water to escape the shooting. Such a comprehensive approach 

of preparedness cannot be done without this grant funding. 

Members of our rescue operation are trained to these high levels, 

and we work with our urban search-and-rescue teams, our IMTs, 

not only to protect the city of New York and the region but also 

to be an asset for the rest of the country. 

During Hurricane Katrina, we sent our team down to New Orleans. During Hurricane Irene, we sent our teams up to Broome 

County in up-state New York. Just recently we sent our teams of 

urban search-and-rescue and management teams to Texas for HurVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:59 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18EP0423\18EP0423.TXT HEATH
48 

ricane Harvey, Florida for Hurricane Irma, and Puerto Rico for 

Hurricane Marie. 

Preparedness is a race against time, to be ready for the next attack or the next extreme event. The events of 9/11 took place in 

102 minutes, which is less time than this hearing today. Every 

Federal dollar that flows to the FDNY improves our response so we 

can serve the greatest number of people and pay dividends across 

the United States. We are looking forward to continuing to partner 

with this committee and with Congress, and to adapt to the newer 

threat environment so we can protect the urban area of New York 

City and the tri-State area. 

Thank you so much for allowing me to share the experiences of 

FDNY and for your support in high-risk urban areas. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pfeifer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. PFEIFER

APRIL 23, 2018 

Good afternoon Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Congressman King, 

and Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications. My name is Joseph Pfeifer and I am the chief of counterterrorism 

and emergency preparedness for the New York City Fire Department. Thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss the importance of Federal support to High-Risk Urban 

Areas. 

Homeland security in an urban setting is an immense challenge for first responders. With a population of over 81⁄2 million people, New York City has the highest 

population density of any major city in the country. Our region also includes a large 

number of high-profile locations, including the United Nations and Trump Tower, 

which was the site of a fire very recently. The greater Tri-State region faces an everevolving landscape of security and disaster threats. This post-9/11 environment has 

greatly expanded the role that the city’s police, fire, and emergency management 

agencies do each day to keep people safe. The mission of the New York City Fire 

Department (FDNY) is not only to respond to fires, but also respond to medical 

emergencies, public safety incidents, natural disasters, and acts of terrorism. 

In the last 6 months alone, we’ve had to respond to two separate terror attacks. 

The first occurred in Lower Manhattan when a terrorist drove a pickup truck down 

a bike path killing 8 people and injuring 11 others, and the second took place at 

the subway near the Port Authority commuter bus terminal when a terrorist set off 

a pipe bomb strapped to his body during the morning rush hour. 

Working with our Federal, State, and local partners, we meet this challenge 

through a matrix of specialized training, planning, equipping, preparedness programming, and information and intelligence sharing, all of which are made possible 

by Federal Homeland Security funding. I’d like to highlight a few of the key programs today. 

Following the recommendations of a 9/11 Commission Report, the Fire Department leveraged Homeland Security grant funds to create and staff a state-of-theart Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at FDNY Headquarters. Today, this EOC 

serves as part of a network to manage complex emergencies and to share information by connecting with local partners like the NYPD and NYCEM, as well as the 

National Operations Center. 

When US Airway Flight 1549 crashed in the icy waters of the Hudson River, not 

only did we coordinate rescue operations from the Operations Center, but we also 

shared critical information. By comparing the manifest we received from LaGuardia 

Airport with everyone taken off the plane going through our medical triage and hospitals, we were the first to learn that all 155 passengers and crew were alive and 

rescued. That information was placed on the Homeland Security Information Network and immediately provided this fact to all in government including the President of the United States. Information is power if it is shared and delivered in real 

time. 

In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, we developed an Incident 

Management Team (IMT) to manage and coordinate complex emergencies. DHS 

grant funds pay for the extensive training of IMT members, as well as full-scale exercises, which the team participates in with partner agencies including NYPD and 

New York State Police. Last week, the IMT ran a Full-Scale Exercise at an up-State 

49 

training facility, partnering with the NYPD and the NYS IMT to practice managing 

simultaneous large-scale incidents involving a building collapse and an Active 

Shooter. 

We also created the FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness 

(CTDP) to develop strategies, emergency response plans, intelligence products, educational programs and scenario-based exercises to improve the Department’s response to terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other large-scale incidents. The 

work of CTDP has been on the front lines of preparing the department, the city, 

and the Nation for new and emerging threats. Working with the NYPD, we developed a multi-agency plan outlining roles and responsibilities to respond to an Active-Shooter Incident. 

CTDP has also been working with the NYPD to address the growing threat of 

Vertical Terrorism, where terrorists attack high-rise buildings with semi-automatic 

weapons, explosives, and the use of fire as a weapon. CTDP conducted a recent 

study on this topic, which I have provided to the committee. To prepare for such 

an attack, FDNY hosted a Vertical Terrorism Preparedness Workshop last year on 

the 63rd floor of the new 1 World Trade Center, with NYPD, NYCEM, the Port Authority of NY/NJ, the FBI, DHS, FEMA, building managers, and Trauma Center 

doctors. As the threat environment changes so must first responders. This is the 

type of research and preparation that other first responder agencies across the country can learn from and use to improve their own response to Vertical Terrorism Incidents. 

We also use Homeland Security grant funds to make smart investments in other 

core competencies such as building collapses, CBRN, and Mass Casualty Incidents. 

These funds have allowed us to develop and enhance our capabilities in search and 

rescue, hazardous material mitigation, Rescue Medic treatment skills, Marine Operations, and Swift Water rescues. 

A key innovation in the Department’s response to mass casualty incidents was our 

formation of the Rescue Task Force, which is made up of first responders who have 

received specialized training to triage, treat, and transport victims during an ActiveShooter incident. They are part of our response matrix and are proactively deployed 

at high-profile events such as New Year’s in Times Square and the Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade. 

The Rescue Task Force depends upon NYPD for force protection so that FDNY 

medical responders can triage and stop the bleeding in order to save lives in a warm 

zone. Each member of the team is outfitted with ballistic protective equipment for 

protection and has completed hands-on training to apply tourniquets and clotting 

agents. But what are vital to this initiative are the joint full-scale exercises between 

FDNY and NYPD that are conducted by CTDP. Only by working together as a team 

will we be ready for the next extreme event. 

The resources that we’ve developed with Homeland Security funding work in concert with one another to provide a fast, thorough response and mitigation to threats 

and incidents. To give one example, when the pipe bomb went off at the Port Authority during rush hour, the Rescue Task Force was mobilized and responded to 

the scene. FDNY Re-breather units responded wearing a specialized Self-Contained 

Breather Apparatus, allowing them to operate underground for much longer than 

with standard issued equipment. FDNY Rescue and Squad Companies responded, 

drawing on their specialized training to respond to incidents underground and in 

confined spaces, and carry rescue equipment and tools. FDNY Compressor Unit and 

Mass Casualty Incident pods were staged at the scene. HazMat and Tech Engine 

Units responded to conduct atmospheric testing for radiation and HazMat/WMD 

materials at the scene. Marine Operations ran on-going stepped-up patrols of the 

harbor after the attack to conduct a survey of ships docked in the Port. 

The resources that we have developed and maintain using Homeland Security 

funding are critical in serving not only the people of New York City, but the population of the entire region. Our Marine Unit is a regional asset that works with the 

United States Coast Guard to responding to incidents in waterways in and around 

New York. They respond to incidents in other jurisdictions, such as responding to 

massive fires in New Jersey. They have a pressurized cabin that allows the fireboats 

to disburse a chlorine vapor cloud or respond to the nuclear power plant at Indian 

Point. 

Working with our Port Security Partners, we are preparing for a new type of active-shooter incident, one of which could occur on the many water ferries that bring 

thousands of people to work each day. Our workshops have focused on not only of 

‘‘Stopping the Killing’’ by law enforcement and ‘‘Stopping the Dying’’ by our medical 

personnel, but also on ‘‘Stopping the Drowning,’’ because we know people will jump 

in the water to escape from being shot. Such a comprehensive approach prepares 

us for the unthinkable. 

50 

Members of Rescue operations train with fire departments and first responder 

agencies from around the country, passing along specialized knowledge that we’ve 

developed here in New York. Urban Search and Rescue Team Task Force–1 and our 

IMT have provided mutual aid after a number of natural disasters, including New 

Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, Broome County, New York after Hurricane Irene, 

Florida after Hurricane Irma, Texas after Hurricane Harvey, and Puerto Rico after 

Hurricane Maria. 

Preparedness is a race against time to be ready for the next attack or the next 

extreme event. The events of 9/11 took place in 102 minutes, less time than this 

hearing. Every Federal dollar that flows to the FDNY improves our response so we 

can save the greatest number of people and pays dividends across the United States. 

We look forward to a continued partnership with Members of this committee and 

the Congress so that we are able to sustain existing capabilities and continue to 

adapt to new threats in order to protect the people of the New York City Urban 

Area. 

Thank you for allowing me to share FDNY’s experience on the topic of Federal 

Support to High-Risk Urban Areas and I am happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Chief. For a community so dependent 

on ferry service, your testimony was compelling. 

John, not that yours wasn’t compelling either. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DONOVAN. The Chair now recognizes my good friend, the 

commissioner of OEM, Joe Esposito. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH J. ESPOSITO, COMMISSIONER, NEW 

YORK CITY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT, CITY 

OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK 

Mr. ESPOSITO. I am not going to be compelling. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ESPOSITO. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking 

Member Payne, Congressman King, Members of the Subcommittee 

on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications. I am 

Joe Esposito, the commissioner of New York City Department of 

Emergency Management. It is my honor to be here to talk about 

the importance of homeland security grant funding for our city. 

To begin, allow me to give you a sense of the scale of our work, 

the mission of emergency management in New York City. We had 

a busy year in 2017. We activated the city’s Emergency Operations 

Center 14 times, for a total of 107 days. That includes five winter 

weather events, two building vacates through major fires, two flash 

floods, an active shooter at Bronx Lebanon Hospital, a heat emergency, the attack on the Port Authority, and Hurricanes Jose and 

Maria. 

We were activated for 73 days for Hurricane Maria, and during 

that time we helped coordinate the operations of a hurricane reception center at the Julia de Burgos Latino Cultural Center in Spanish Harlem that assisted over 2,000 households. We deployed almost 300 city staff to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to 

assist in recovery operations. In addition, the New York City 

Urban Search and Rescue team, which is managed by my shop, we 

deployed 190 members to Texas and Puerto Rico over the course 

of three hurricanes to assist in water rescue, evacuations, and 

wellness checks. The team brought in food, water, and medical supplies, as well as repairing generators for hospitals in isolated areas 

of Puerto Rico. 

In 2017, we monitored more than 3,000 incidents and sent our 

city-wide incident coordinators to 759 incidents such as water main 

51 

breaks, fires, suspicious packages, and power outages. Our Notify 

NYC sent out more than 1,500 messages. In September we 

launched a Notify NYC mobile application that, in addition to 

growth in our traditional subscribership, now puts us at almost 

725,000 registrants. 

We held and participated in 91 interagency exercises to make 

sure that plans are understood, and this is our protocols for these 

plans, ready to be implemented as needed. 

Our community outreach and engagement activities continue to 

grow as we participated in almost 1,000 Ready New York events, 

with more than 110,000 people attending, and we distributed more 

than 1 million emergency planning guides. 

We graduated 12 new classes from our Community Emergency 

Response Teams, our CERT teams. These are volunteers. They are 

taking our total to just about 1,300 volunteers throughout the city. 

We hosted the Disaster Volunteer Conference in June, and a Disabilities Access and Functional Needs Symposium in December. 

All of this is accomplished with the support of the Federal Government through various grants. We work with City Hall Office of 

Emergency Management and Budget, the city’s Congressional delegation, and our partner agencies to push for full homeland security 

funding which supports our critical operations. 

In the past year New York City Emergency Management secured $25 million in Federal funding preliminarily from the Urban Area 

Security Initiative grant. That grant provided $139 million in total 

to the city last year. 

I chair the New York City Urban Area Working Group made up 

of New York City, Nassau and Suffolk Counties on Long Island, 

Westchester County, Yonkers, and the Port Authority of New York 

and New Jersey. The working group is instrumental in linking and 

coordinating regional activities, including joint training and exercises, public education and outreach, and the development of response protocols. This summer, New York City will host the National Homeland Security Conference. This is an annual meeting of 

local homeland security and emergency manager professionals from 

the Nation’s largest metropolitan areas. It has become the best-attended and most highly anticipated homeland security and emergency management conference of the year, and it focuses on emergency response principles at all levels of the government. 

We recommend the Members of the subcommittee consider coming, maybe addressing the conference. We have a number of different venues. We would love to see you come and be some of our 

keynote speakers. 

Federal grant funding represents 50 percent of the budget at 

Emergency Management. That is our annual operating budget of 

$50 million, and it is vital to our ability to run many of our finest 

initiatives, including the Ready New York public education program, our CERT, our volunteer program, our continuity of operations program, our geographic information system, our training 

and exercises which both gentlemen talked about, our watch command and response, and the city’s incident management system 

planning. 

It also funds the emergency supply stockpile, which provides supplies and services to support our emergency sheltering for adults, 

52 

people with special medical needs, people with disabilities and accessibility and functional needs, children, infants, and companion 

animals. 

During a coastal storm or any emergency, the stockpile can meet 

the needs of 70,000 individuals in designated evacuation shelters 

across the city, up to 7 days, and once that system goes in place, 

we have a back-up system where contractors will come in and resupply as the need arises. 

So thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward 

to continue working with Congress on the issues pertaining to 

emergency preparedness and response, and I am happy to answer 

any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Esposito follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH J. ESPOSITO

APRIL 23, 2018 

Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Congressman King, 

and Members of the Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications Subcommittee. I am Joe Esposito, commissioner of the New York City Department of 

Emergency Management (NYCEM), and it is my honor to be here to talk about the 

importance of homeland security grant funding to our city. 

To begin, allow me to give you a sense of the scale of our work and mission in 

New York City. Our agency just had a busy year. In 2017, we activated the city’s 

Emergency Operations Center 14 times for a total of 107 days. That includes five 

winter weather events, two building vacates due to fires, two flash floods, an active 

shooter at Bronx Lebanon Hospital, a heat emergency, the Port Authority explosion, 

and Hurricanes Jose and Maria. 

We were activated for 73 days for Hurricane Maria and, during that time, helped 

coordinate the operation of a Hurricane Reception Center at the Julia De Burgos 

Latino Cultural Center that assisted more than 2,000 households. We deployed 299 

city staff to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to assist in recovery operations. 

In addition, the New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team, which is managed 

by NYCEM, deployed 190 members to Texas and Puerto Rico over the course of 

three hurricanes to assist in water rescues, evacuation, and wellness checks. The 

team brought in food, water, and medical supplies, as well as repaired generators 

for two hospitals in isolated areas of Puerto Rico. 

In 2017, we monitored more than 3,000 incidents and sent our city-wide incident 

coordinators to 759 incidents, such as water main breaks, fires, suspicious packages, 

and power outages. Notify NYC sent out more than 1,500 messages. In September, 

we launched the Notify NYC mobile application that, in addition to growth in our 

traditional subscribership, now puts us at almost 725,000 registrants. We held or 

participated in 91 interagency exercises to make sure plans are understood and necessary protocols for plans are ready to be implemented as needed. 

Our community outreach and engagement activities continue to grow as we participated in almost 1,000 Ready NY events with more than 110,000 people attending 

and distributed more than 1 million emergency planning guides. We graduated 12 

new classes of Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) volunteers, taking 

our total to 1,300 volunteers throughout the city. We hosted a disaster volunteer 

conference in June and a Disabilities, Access, and Functional Needs Symposium in 

December. 

All of this is accomplished with the support of the Federal Government through 

various grants. We work with City Hall, OMB, the city’s Congressional delegation 

and our partner agencies to push for full homeland security funding which supports 

critical operations. In the past year, NYCEM secured $25 million in Federal funding, primarily through the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant, which provided 

$139 million in total to the city last year. I chair the New York City Urban Area 

Working Group, made up of New York City, Nassau and Suffolk counties in Long 

Island, Westchester County, Yonkers, and the Port Authority of New York and New 

Jersey. The Working Group is instrumental in linking and coordinating regional activities, including joint training and exercises, public education and outreach, and 

the development of response protocols. This summer, New York City will host the 

National Homeland Security Conference, an annual meeting of local homeland security and emergency management professionals from the Nation’s largest metropoliVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:59 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18EP0423\18EP0423.TXT HEATH
53 

tan areas. It has become the best attended and most highly anticipated homeland 

security and emergency management conference of the year as it focuses on emergency response disciplines at all levels of government. We recommend the Members 

of this subcommittee consider attending and would be happy to discuss this more 

with you. 

Federal grant funding represents roughly 50 percent of NYCEM’s annual operating budget of $50 million, and is vital to our ability to run many of our finest initiatives, including the Ready New York public education program, CERT program, 

Continuity of Operations Program, Geographic Information Systems, Training and 

Exercises, Watch Command and Response, and City-wide Incident Management 

Systems planning. It also funds the Emergency Supply Stockpile, which provides 

supplies and services to support emergency sheltering for adults, people with special 

medical needs, people with disabilities and accessibility and functional needs, children, infants, and companion animals. During a coastal storm, the stockpile can 

meet the needs of 70,000 individuals in designated evacuation shelters across NYC 

for up to 7 days. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to continue working 

with Congress on issues pertaining to emergency preparedness and response. I am 

happy to take your questions. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Commissioner. 

The Chair now recognizes Chief Bilich. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN BILICH, CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER, THE 

PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY 

Mr. BILICH. Thank you and good morning, Chairman Donovan, 

Ranking Member Payne, and Congressman King. My name is John 

Bilich. I am the chief security officer of the Port Authority of New 

York and New Jersey. Thank you for inviting me to speak about 

this critical topic of securing our critical infrastructure assets and 

our strong partnership with State, local, and Federal stakeholders. 

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey conceives, 

builds, operates, and maintains infrastructure critical to New York 

and New Jersey’s transportation and trade network. The assets we 

protect include 5 airports, including JFK, Newark, and LaGuardia, 

the largest aviation system in the country; 2 tunnels; 4 bridges, including the GWB, the world’s busiest bridge; the Port Authority 

bus terminal, of which 8,000 buses pass through on a weekday 

Monday to Friday; the PATH rail system; the ports of New York 

and New Jersey; and, of course, the World Trade Center Complex. 

We utilize a robust, multi-layered security approach to protect 

the Port Authority’s customers, the general public, employees, and 

critical infrastructure. The layers in this methodology include intelligence; measuring risk through a layer assessment process to drive 

investment in capital security and deployment; police prevention 

and interdiction methods; operational security measures to include 

contract security resources; the deployment of available and developing technologies; engineer-hardened solutions; Office of Emergency Management to include response and recovery; Federal, 

State, and regional partnerships; and, of course, we measure effectiveness off audit and revise; and training, training, and training. 

The multi-layered security approach is applied to all our facilities. 

Human assets. Our policing strategy is intelligence-led as the 

Port Authority Police Department has presence in 28 Federal, 

State, and local law enforcement task forces to include the FBI, 

JTTF in both New York and New Jersey. We are confident that we 

are connected to receive important and actionable intelligence and 

information. Our PAPD is a highly competent, professional police 

54 

agency. It has a police command assigned 24/7 at each Port Authority critical infrastructure facility. Our policing methods include 

patrols, high-visibility emergency service units, dedicated counterterrorism teams, as well as the assignment of explosive detection 

canine and radiation detection capabilities. 

Our police presence is supplemented by a contract security guard 

force of over 1,400 security officers who are trained in behavioral 

recognition techniques and counterterrorism awareness. These security officers are posted at critical locations throughout the system, and also staff a 24/7 security operation center. 

In addition to our human assets, we have made significant investments in our capital security projects as directed by our periodic program of risk assessments that inform our investments to 

further strengthen our facilities. Since 2002, the Port Authority has 

spent over $1.4 billion in hardening its critical infrastructure, and 

for the coming years we plan to spend nearly another $700 million 

to protect these assets. 

The use of technology is also of paramount importance. In addition to CCTV, we have robust control systems, intrusion detection 

systems, detection devices to help protect against CBRN threats 

and, of course, extensive background and criminal history checks of 

anyone having access to a Port Authority facility, including outside 

contractors. In addition, we have created a new cybersecurity program to better monitor and respond to suspicious activities occurring on our network, therefore strengthening our capability to protect our critical information and our important industrial control 

systems. 

The Port Authority operates a 24/7 cyber security operation center that can receive and respond to threats to our network and 

equipment at any time, day or night. 

The Port Authority has its own Office of Emergency Management 

that is vital to this multi-layered protection approach. They lead 

our agency’s Business Continuity Program. They manage and administer agency-wide security grants. 

I know the very important role for OEM is to plan and execute 

agency-wide training and full-scale exercises. These remarkable 

training programs, exclusively funded by grants that we receive 

from the Federal Government, involve both agency personnel and 

our regional first responders. To date, over 30,000 Port Authority 

staff and regional partners received emergency response training 

focused on active-shooter response, rail emergencies, aircraft emergencies, active terrorism, and other natural and man-made hazards. 

Grant funding. The Port Authority maintains as a top priority, 

as evidenced by our investments in resources to make that purpose. 

Currently agency-wide, 24 percent of all personnel and 22 percent 

of the operating budget are allocated to security. 

The Federal grant funding programs are vital to the continuation 

of our security programs, which can never remain static or, even 

worse, fall behind against the backdrop of an ever-evolving threat 

landscape. A critical resource in this fight against those who wish 

to do us harm is this grant program. The funding source is essential to help us continue the security mission. Grant programs including but not limited to the Transit Security Grant Program, the 

55 

Urban Area Security Initiative, and the Port Security Grant Program have long supported Port Authority security initiatives, including our counterterrorism initiatives, our police training and 

equipment, our World Trade Center Transportation Hub Security 

Initiatives, our cybersecurity programs, protection of our PATH underwater tunnels, protection of columns at the Port Authority bus 

terminal, our bollard protection, our installation of CCTV, and our 

maritime resiliency planning. 

Reducing the funding levels for these programs will have a direct 

and negative impact on the Port Authority’s financial ability to 

maintain security at the necessary levels to meet the threat. Additionally, an increase in the period of performance from grant 

awards from 3 years to 5 years would allow us to plan larger-scale 

and more effective security programs. 

Also, eliminating caps on the number of projects an agency can 

apply for would be extremely beneficial. Currently, the Port Security Grant Program only allows for the application of three to five 

projects. 

I would also like to highlight the importance of Federal funding 

for canine teams. By screening the traveling public for explosives 

and explosive residue, canine teams provide a necessary layer of 

protection and are a critical element to the Port Authority counterterrorism program. As funding for these teams was recently called 

into question, we ask that the Federal Government reconsider reducing funding. 

The importance of information sharing and collaboration with 

our Federal partners. We have a strong working relationship with 

various Federal agencies and programs to include DHS Office of 

Science and Technology, DHS Office of Health Affairs with the 

Biowatch Program, the TSA Office of Requirements and Capability, 

DOD, DARPA’s Radiation Detection Program, the DHS Safety Act 

Office. These partnerships are critical to the information sharing 

regarding emergency security technology and have led to the development and piloting of a variety of programs at the Port 

Authority’s vast array of multi-modal facilities. 

These research arms of the Federal Government also need adequate funding to support the development and testing of future 

technologies which aim to increase the efficiency and effectiveness 

of detection devices, screening devices, police personal safety devices, and so on. Additionally, the ability for Federal entities to provide guidance on product capabilities will greatly aid agency decision makers in their selection of effective and proven technologies 

and equipment that would best protect the public and the infrastructure they depend upon. 

In closing, I would like to thank the Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications and our Congressional delegation for their continuing 

support that allows us to better serve our employees and customers, and better protect our regional critical transportation infrastructure. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bilich follows:] 

56 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN BILICH

APRIL 23, 2018 

ABOUT THE PORT AUTHORITY

The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey conceives, builds, operates, and 

maintains infrastructure critical to the New York/New Jersey region’s transportation and trade network. These facilities include America’s busiest airport system, 

including: John F. Kennedy International, LaGuardia, and Newark Liberty International airports, marine terminals and ports, the PATH rail transit system, six 

tunnels and bridges between New York and New Jersey, the Port Authority Bus 

Terminal in Manhattan, and the World Trade Center. For more than 90 years, the 

Port Authority has worked to improve the quality of life for the more than 18 million people who live and work in New York and New Jersey metropolitan region. 

PORT AUTHORITY NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY TRANSPORTATION ASSETS

The Port Authority builds, operates, and maintains critical transportation and 

trade assets that fall under our 5 lines of business: 

• Aviation 

• Rail 

• Tunnels, Bridges, and Terminals 

• Ports 

• Commercial Real Estate 

Our aviation assets include 5 airports: John F. Kennedy International Airport, 

LaGuardia Airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, Teterboro Airport, and 

Stewart International Airport. The Port Authority airports move an estimated 125 

million passengers annually. 

Our rail and surface transportation assets include the: Trans-Hudson Rail System 

(PATH), George Washington Bridge, Bayonne Bridge, Goethals Bridge, Outerbridge 

Crossing, the Port Authority Bus Terminal, George Washington Bridge Bus Station, 

Journal Square Transportation Center, Holland Tunnel and Lincoln Tunnel. Over 

115 million vehicles travel over PA’s bridges and tunnels annually. 

Port Authority also manages ports that transport vital cargo throughout the New 

York and New Jersey region. The Port of New York and New Jersey is the largest 

on the East Coast and the third-largest port in the United States and moves over 

3.6 million cargo containers annually. 

The Port Authority also owns and manages the 16-acre World Trade Center site, 

home to the iconic One World Trade Center. 

OUR MULTI-LAYERED APPROACH TO SECURING OUR ASSETS AND PROTECTING THE

PUBLIC

To protect the Port Authority’s customers, the general public, employees, and critical and iconic infrastructure, the Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO) utilizes a robust multi-layered security approach which allows for the development, implementation, and management of programs that preserve life and property, increase safety and security, and support the agency’s business objectives by strengthening our resilience and continuity of operations. With these measures in place— 

there is no single point of failure. Our multi-layered approach is explained in detail 

below. 

Intelligence-Led 

The Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) implements intelligence-led policing to ensure our resources are effectively deployed to prevent potential threats to 

our customers, employees, and facilities. The PAPD has presence in 28 Federal, 

State, and local law enforcement task forces, to include: The Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI JTTF) in New York and New Jersey 

which allows for shared intelligence across many agencies; the New York and New 

Jersey High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) task force and the New Jersey State Police Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) that allows for the 

immediate exchange of important, timely, and actionable intelligence for both sides 

of the Hudson. 

Additionally, we have a dedicated Intelligence Unit that is responsible for preparing and distributing intelligence bulletins related to transportation and security, 

producing daily reports specific to domestic and global transportation issues, and 

participating in the New York Police Department’s Lower Manhattan Security Initiative, which is a key provider of day-to-day actionable intelligence relative to rouVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:59 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18EP0423\18EP0423.TXT HEATH
57 

tine conditions like large events and demonstrations to current and emerging 

threats. 

These combined resources result in the agile, flexible, effective, and efficient deployment of security and law enforcement resources that are responsive to current 

and developing threats and conditions. 

Risk Assessments 

The protection of critical infrastructure is driven by all-hazards risk assessments 

which are performed on a regular basis to better understand changes in threats and 

vulnerabilities related to our facilities. Our periodic multi-hazard assessments look 

across all agency assets and prioritize our risk so we can guide our security investments accordingly. This risk-based approach allows for efficient and effective allocation of human assets and financial resources. 

Police Interdiction Activities 

The PAPD is comprised of over 1,900 uniformed police officers operating across 

13 Port Authority facilities. The department also includes a Criminal Investigations 

Bureau, Special Operations Division, which includes an Emergency Services Unit 

and a Canine Unit (K–9), and an Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting component at the 

Port Authority airports. 

Through visible uniformed police presence and in partnership with other law enforcement agencies, the PAPD suppresses crime and utilizes counterterrorism measures to thwart potential adversaries seeking to cause harm or disruption by way of 

an attack. PAPD also deploys high visibility patrols (THREAT Teams) and specialized services to enhance basic patrol functions utilizing intelligence-led policing concepts. 

Operational Security Measures and Security Agents 

The Port Authority implements civilian security programs to supplement our police department activities and increase the levels of protection at our facilities. 

These programs safeguard Port Authority facilities from threats to physical infrastructure, unauthorized access to restricted areas, cybersecurity attacks, and 

breaches of protected security information. 

Additionally, the Port Authority employs over 1,400 unarmed Uniformed Contract 

Security Agents to guard our facilities and keep our employees and customers safe. 

Technology 

A critical element of a robust multi-layered approach is the development and 

maintenance of advanced technology systems to support both security and resiliency. Significant investments have been made in the areas of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), access control systems, and our perimeter intrusion detection system 

(PIDS). We are engaged with several Federal agencies to develop and pilot new and 

emerging technologies that show promise in addressing the security challenges of 

today. 

In addition, we have created a new cybersecurity program to better monitor and 

respond to suspicious activities occurring on our network, therefore strengthening 

our capability to protect our critical information and industrial control systems. The 

Port Authority operates a 24/7 cybersecurity operations center that can receive and 

respond to threats to our network and equipment. 

Engineered Hardening Solutions 

Since September 11, 2001, we have made over $1 billion in asset hardening investments. Although faced with the challenge of retrofitting security features into 

existing facilities, we have implemented a multitude of hardening solutions such as 

bollard placement, fencing installation, tunnel and guard post hardening, floating 

barriers, facade glazing, flood mitigation systems and no trespassing signage. Prospectively, these protective measures are built into new developments or the renovations of existing assets. 

Office of Emergency Management 

The Port Authority enhances resiliency, response, and recovery through our Office 

of Emergency Management (OEM). The OEM champions programs that provide the 

Port Authority with the resources, support, and capabilities to prepare for, respond 

to, recover from, and mitigate against all-hazards. The OEM is organized into three 

core mission areas: 

Emergency Management.—Supports the Incident Command response structure at 

Port Authority during events or incidents. Additionally, responsible for all-hazard 

planning and training for agency personnel and regional partners who will support 

our response activities to emergencies at our facilities located in New York and New 

58 

Jersey. Through the use of tabletop and full-scale exercise, over 30,000 Port Authority staff and regional partners have been trained on such topics as Active Shooter 

response, PATH rail emergencies, terror attacks and other hazards. 

Grant Management.—Administers and manages all Federal and State Homeland 

Security Grants that allows us to harden our assets, invest in technology, initiate 

new programs, and provide for enhanced police protective services. 

Risk Management and Resiliency.—Responsible for coordinating and implementing the agency-wide all-hazard risk assessment and oversees the Port Authority Business Continuity program. 

These programs are regularly adapted to meet the needs of the Port Authority 

with an impact range that stretches from individual employee preparedness to agency-wide, corporate-level resiliency. 

TERRORISM REMAINS IN THE FOREFRONT

With battlefield victories abroad, it is easy to think the war on terrorism is over 

and yet, we are reminded by acts of violence every day in this country and abroad 

that the fight goes on. In just a 2-month period in late 2017, New York City experienced 2 terrorist events that are emblematic of the changing nature of the threat— 

from large-scale, organized attacks to lone-wolf, self-initiated ones often using crude 

and/or hand-made weapons. 

On October 31, 2017, a person drove a rented pickup truck into cyclists and runners for almost a mile of the Hudson River Park’s bike path in Lower Manhattan, 

New York City. This vehicle-ramming attack killed 8 people and injured 11 others. 

After crashing the truck into a school bus, the driver exited, apparently wielding 

2 guns (later found to be a paintball gun and a pellet gun). A flag and a document 

indicating allegiance to the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 

were found in the truck. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) charged 29-yearold Sayfullo Saipov, who had immigrated to the United States from Uzbekistan in 

2010, with providing material support for a terrorist organization. 

Roughly 6 weeks later, on December 11, 2017, a pipe bomb partially detonated 

in the subway station adjoining the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Midtown Manhattan, New York City, injuring 4 people including the suspect. This event occurred 

in a passageway roughly 100 feet from the Port Authority Bus Terminal, a building 

through which roughly 250,000 commuters traverse daily. It was the courageous 

acts of our Port Authority police officers who subdued the suspect, Akayed Ullah, 

preventing him from causing further harm to our city. We are all extremely proud 

of their courage and dedication. 

These acts are an ever-present reminder that we must always continue to maintain a strong security posture. 

THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS AND PROGRAMS

The Port Authority maintains security as a top priority as evidenced by the investments in resources it makes to that purpose. Currently, agency-wide, 24 percent 

of personnel and 22 percent of the operating budget are allocated to security. Additionally, since 2002, more than $1.4 billion dollars has been spent on capital security projects and another $700 million in capital security projects have been identified for the coming years. 

The Federal grant funding programs are vital to the continuation of our security 

programs, which can never remain static or, even worse, fall behind against the 

backdrop of the ever-evolving threat landscape just described. 

A critical resource in this fight against those who wish to do us harm is the Federal grant program. This funding source is essential to help us in continuing the 

security mission. 

Grant programs including but not limited to the Transit Security Grant Program 

(TSGP), Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and the Port Security Grant Program have long supported Port Authority security initiatives, including: 

• Counter Terrorism Initiatives 

• Police Training and Equipment 

• WTC Transportation Hub Security Initiatives 

• Cybersecurity Programs 

• Protection of the PATH Under-River Tunnels 

• Protection of Columns at the Port Authority Bus Terminal (PABT) 

• Bollard Protection Initiatives 

• Installations of CCTV and Access Control Systems at PATH, Ports, and the 

PABT 

• Maritime Resilience Planning 

59 

Reducing the funding levels for these programs will have a direct and negative 

impact on the Port Authority’s financial ability to maintain security at the necessary 

levels to meet the threat. 

Additionally, an increase in the period of performance for grant awards from 3 

years to 5 years would allow us to plan larger-scale and more effective security 

projects. 

Also, eliminating caps on the number of projects an agency can apply for would 

be extremely beneficial. Currently, the Port Security Grant Program only allows for 

applications of 3 to 5 projects. 

I would also like to highlight the importance of Federal funding for canine teams. 

By screening the traveling public for explosives and explosive residue, canine teams 

provide a necessary layer of protection and are a critical element to the Port Authority counterterrorism program. As funding for these teams was recently called into 

question, we ask that the Federal Government reconsider reducing funding. 

THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION SHARING AND COLLABORATION WITH OUR FEDERAL

PARTNERS

The Port Authority understands the importance of maintaining strong relationships with our Federal partners, to include: 

• DHS Office of Science and Technology (DHS S&T) 

• DHS Office of Health Affairs (BioWatch Program) 

• TSA Office of Requirements and Capabilities Analysis (TSA–ORCA) 

• DOD Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 

These relationships are critical to information-sharing regarding emerging security technologies and have led to the development and pilot of a variety of programs 

at Port Authority’s vast array of multi-modal facilities. 

These research arms of the Federal Government also need adequate funding to 

support the development and testing of future technologies which aim to increase 

the efficiency and effectiveness of detection devices, screening devices, police personal safety devices, and so on. 

Additionally, the ability for Federal entities to provide guidance on product capabilities will greatly aid agency decision makers in their selection of effective and 

proven technologies and equipment that would best protect the public and the infrastructure they depend upon. 

CLOSING REMARKS

In closing, I would like to thank the Members of the Emergency Preparedness, 

Response and Communications subcommittee for inviting me to testify on behalf of 

the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey regarding this critical topic of protecting our passengers. 

The Port Authority operates the busiest and most important transportation facilities in the region; as such, we take on the tremendous responsibility of maintaining 

safety and security. The Port Authority will continue to make enhancements to its 

policing and security programs and systems in an effort to stay current and adapt 

to the ever-changing threat landscape. I would like to thank our Congressional delegation for their continuing support that allows us to better serve our employees and 

customers and better protect our regional critical transportation infrastructure. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Chief. 

The Chair now recognizes Director Maples. 

STATEMENT OF JARED M. MAPLES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS, STATE OF NEW 

JERSEY 

Mr. MAPLES. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and 

Representative King, thank you for the opportunity to testify before 

you today. I am honored to speak on behalf of the dedicated professionals of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, who are working tirelessly to ensure the safety and security of the State of New Jersey, with responsibility to lead and 

coordinate New Jersey’s counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and emergency preparedness efforts. 

60 

Today my remarks will focus on the work we are doing in New 

Jersey under Governor Murphy’s leadership to reflect national priorities while building local capabilities to address risk and protect 

our communities. I will also discuss the resources necessary to 

maintain our ability to meet a constantly-evolving threat landscape, our preparedness needs, and the importance of partnerships, 

vertical integration, and continuous improvement. 

DHS has prioritized identifying and mitigating National systemic 

risk. As we prioritize our efforts, we must look to the essential 

functions and systems that are vital to the safety and security of 

our communities. At all levels of government, we must work together in partnership and continue to evolve our focus. In doing so, 

we must ensure that resource investments reflect National trends 

and priorities and not rely on constrained methods of analysis and 

allocation. 

States continue to build capabilities that address their distinctive 

risk factors. Those factors contribute to the Nation’s risk profile. In 

New Jersey, we have a number of risks inherent to the region that 

make its security important not only for its residents and visitors, 

but also to the entire country. Our geographic location, involvement 

in financial markets, transportation infrastructure, and population 

density are all characteristics vital to the State, region, and National profile. 

As threats evolve, so do tactics. Recently we have seen an evolution toward the use of unsophisticated methods to cause mass 

harm. This paradigm shift requires a move to rethink priorities at 

the strategic level to ensure the right capabilities are built to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts that are 

difficult to predict but easy to execute. Such ease of operation highlights a need for first preventers, as well as first responders. 

In New Jersey, we have established cyclical programs founded in 

risk management principles to identify missing capabilities, triage 

and build the capabilities we need, teach and test them with our 

partners, and evaluate the process to begin again. We do this in 

all 21 counties of New Jersey. These programs build relationships, 

a holistic understanding of interdependencies and common 

vulnerabilities, and an awareness of capabilities available to identify and mitigate risk. However, these programs can only go as far 

as the resources available to them. 

My office serves as the administrator of all Homeland Security 

Grant Program funding for the State of New Jersey, the principle 

purpose of which is to build, sustain, and deliver National preparedness capabilities essential to achieving the National Preparedness Goal at the local level. Aside from financial support to 

buy down risk, DHS and FEMA have provided support to our efforts through both technical assistance and piloted programs. 

Of course, the most tangible support to States from the Federal 

Government to buy down risk is funding. In Federal fiscal year 

2017, New Jersey was allocated approximately $8 million in State 

Homeland Security Grant Program funding and approximately $20 

million in Urban Area Security Initiative funding for the Jersey 

City/Newark area. We understand that resources are finite; thus, 

we strive to leverage funding both efficiently and effectively, knowVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:59 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18EP0423\18EP0423.TXT HEATH
61 

ing that spending the funds we are provided in a strategic, 

prioritized way can substantially buy down risk. 

Looking toward the future, our efforts to enhance capabilities 

through strategic planning and proper stewardship of grant funds 

will continue to support our dynamic risk environment. 

The threats we face are not static, so the methods we use to 

evaluate them and allocate resources cannot be either. We must be 

forward-leaning to create cyclical programs that continuously improve upon our preparedness. 

Over the past 14 years, the stream of funding has created some 

reliance among the States. While initially designed to provide a 

capital infusion of funding for target capabilities after September 

11, 2001, Federal Homeland Security Grant funds are now a resource on which many States and urban areas rely to sustain core 

capabilities. This reliance, combined with any downward variation 

in funding levels, creates a significant impact not only on a State’s 

ability to pursue new capabilities, but simply the ability to maintain current ones. 

DHS and FEMA have prioritized strengthening grants management, increasing transparency, and improving data analytics. We 

welcome continued discussions on current funding allocation methods and innovative ways to incentivize further capability building 

among States. 

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. By acting together, and with the necessary 

resources available, we will continue to adapt to meet the current 

threat environment and effectively prepare for the future. I look 

forward to your questions and yield back to the Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maples follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JARED M. MAPLES

APRIL 23, 2018 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to speak 

on behalf of the dedicated professionals of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, who are working tirelessly to ensure the safety and security 

of the State of New Jersey. 

My office develops policies, analyzes trends, shares information, and enhances capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from natural and manmade incidents. Our strategic activities observe the tenets of the National Preparedness System, while our implementing activities strive to build capabilities identified 

in the National Preparedness Goal. We undertake our mission in steadfast cooperation with other State agencies, including the New Jersey State Police, and with our 

many local government partners, including those in the Jersey City-Newark Urban 

Area. 

Today, my remarks will focus on the work we are doing in New Jersey under Governor Murphy’s leadership to reflect National priorities, while building local capabilities to address risk and protect our communities. I will also discuss the resources 

necessary to maintain those programs and continue to meet a constantly-evolving 

threat landscape, our preparedness needs, and the importance of partnerships, 

vertical integration, and continuous improvement. 

REFLECTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has prioritized identifying and 

mitigating National systemic risk. As we prioritize our efforts, we must look to the 

62 

essential functions and systems that are vital to the safety and security of our communities. 

At all levels of Government, we must work together in partnership and continue 

to evolve our focus. In doing so, we must ensure that resource investments reflect 

National trends and priorities, and do not rely on constrained methods of analysis 

and allocation. 

Partnerships, both vertical and horizontal, are a foundational component of securing our communities, the essential functions contained within, and our collective infrastructure systems. They allow for formalized mechanisms of information sharing, 

coordination, and deconfliction of efforts. Our partnerships provide beneficial leverage for limited resources and ensure investment through coordination. 

DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have prioritized 

building a culture of preparedness and readying the Nation for catastrophic incidents. In New Jersey, we have adopted several Federal initiatives, like the Hometown Security Initiative, to strive for these goals, empowering whole communities 

to build their own capabilities and strengthen resilience from the bottom up. 

BUILDING CAPABILITIES

States continue to build capabilities that address their distinctive risk factors. 

Those factors contribute to the Nation’s risk profile. In New Jersey, we have a number of risks inherent to the region that make its security important not only for its 

residents and visitors, but also to the entire country. Our geographic location, involvement in financial markets, transportation infrastructure, and population density are all characteristics vital to the State, region, and National profile. 

As threats evolve, so do tactics. Recently, however, we have seen an evolution toward the use of unsophisticated methods to cause mass harm. This paradigm shift 

requires us to rethink priorities at the strategic level to ensure the right capabilities 

are built to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts that are difficult to predict, but easy to execute. Such ease of operation highlights a need for 

first preventers, as well as first responders. 

In New Jersey, we have established cyclical programs founded in risk management principles to identify missing capabilities, triage and build the capabilities we 

need, teach and test them with our partners, and evaluate to begin the process 

again. We do this in all 21 counties of New Jersey. 

Through New Jersey initiatives such as the Domestic Security Preparedness Task 

Force, we have created and manage programs that address risks, recognizing inherent risk factors that may cause cascading effects across the State, region, and Nation. The Task Force is a statutory body that was created after September 11, 2001 

to coordinate emergency preparedness efforts across agencies, industries, and disciplines in New Jersey. 

These programs build relationships, a holistic understanding of interdependencies 

and common vulnerabilities, and an awareness of resources available to identify and 

mitigate risk. Together, these programs are designed to reach private and publicsector decision makers as well as local stakeholders. 

Since I began serving as director, we have created a number of new capabilitiesbased programs. We focus significant efforts toward helping the private sector build 

the capabilities it needs to contribute to the strength and resilience of the State. 

We recognize that common vulnerabilities exist across multiple sectors of the State’s 

economy and infrastructure, and we strive to leverage resources to most efficiently 

increase capabilities to mitigate these common risks. 

Other capability efforts, like the supply chain resilience program, which was developed in partnership with FEMA to identify vulnerabilities in individual supply 

chains, single points of failure across supply chains, and the consequences of those 

systems failing, were developed to ensure vertical integration of New Jersey into 

National priority risk areas. This integration will help New Jersey mitigate risk to 

nodes vital to both local and National supply chains. 

Still others, like our mass gathering resilience program, address common 

vulnerabilities at locations where people gather, and recommend resource investment strategies to reduce risk. With shared, common vulnerabilities, mass gathering 

locations are often unfortunately the primary target for actors looking to cause as 

much harm as possible. Which is why we are looking for ways to demonstrably reduce the risk of successful attacks on soft targets, by taking a whole-of-Government 

approach to engage with the private sector and develop solutions. 

However, these programs can only go as far as the resources available to them. 

63 

BUYING DOWN RISK

My office serves as the administrator of all Homeland Security Grant Program 

funding for the State of New Jersey. The principle purpose of which is to build, sustain, and deliver National preparedness capabilities essential to achieving the National Preparedness Goal established under Presidential Policy Directive 8. 

We also prepare the State’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and the State Preparedness Report (SPR), which are recurring requirements from FEMA. The THIRA/SPR process helps the State assess core capabilities and ensure that resources, such as trainings and exercises, are provided 

based on priorities and the areas of greatest need. This effort presents a unique opportunity for the State to identify, analyze, and manage the risks we face based 

upon the 32 core capabilities, but also allows us to ensure vertical integration and 

awareness with Federal, State, and local partners. 

Aside from financial support to buy down risk, DHS and FEMA have provided 

support to our efforts through both technical assistance and piloted endeavors. For 

instance, FEMA’s National Training and Education Division shared its National 

Training and Education System (NTES) tool with New Jersey, allowing us to replicate their systematic, data-driven methodology to measure and focus training programs. This tool helps analyze the training programs used to build identified capabilities, summarizing progress and highlighting capability areas that may need attention while validating what is reported in the SPR. 

Of course, the most tangible support to States from the Federal Government to 

buy down risk is funding. In Federal fiscal year 2017, New Jersey was allocated approximately $8 million in State Homeland Security Program funding and approximately $20 million in Urban Area Security Initiative for the Jersey City—Newark 

area. We understand that resources are finite; thus, we strive to leverage funding 

in the most efficient and effective ways, knowing that spending the funds we are 

provided in a strategic, prioritized way can substantially buy down risk. 

We use our grant funding in a variety of ways to support activities including the 

State’s fusion center, equipment for first responders, cybersecurity, and planning 

personnel. When the opportunity arises, we pursue competitive initiatives such as 

the Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks program to build capabilities for these 

very focused and specific risk areas. Looking toward the future, our efforts to enhance capabilities through strategic planning and proper stewardship of grant funds 

will continue to support our dynamic risk environment. 

CONTINUING TO INNOVATE

The threats we face are not static, so the methods we use to evaluate them and 

allocate resources cannot be either. We must be forward-leaning to create cyclical 

programs that continuously improve upon our preparedness. 

However, over the past 14 years, the stream of Federal funding has created some 

reliance among States. While initially designed to provide a capital infusion of funding for target capabilities after September 11, 2001, Federal homeland security 

grant funds are now a resource on which many States, and urban areas, rely to sustain core capabilities. This reliance, combined with any downward variation in funding levels, creates a significant impact not on States’ ability to pursue new capabilities, but simply the ability to maintain current ones. 

As we move forward in partnership, at all levels of government, toward the same 

goal of security, we in New Jersey are committed to continued innovation to build 

capabilities and reduce risk. DHS and FEMA have prioritized strengthening grants 

management, increasing transparency, and improving data analytics. We welcome 

continued discussions on current funding allocation methods and innovative ways to 

improve and incentivize further capability building among States. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. By acting together, and with the necessary resources available, we will continue to adapt to 

meet the current threat environment and effectively prepare for the future. I look 

forward to your questions. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you very much, Director. 

I say this at every hearing that we conduct, that we don’t waste 

witnesses’ time. This committee, every hearing that we have held, 

we have had a product come out of it from the testimony of all witnesses. 

64 

Chief, Don hosted us in a field hearing back last year when we 

talked about transit grants, and one of the issues that came up was 

the ability to perform within the 3-year time period of the grant, 

and I passed legislation in the House that extends that now to 4 

years, and we are waiting for the Senate to act on that. So your 

testimony is invaluable to us, and we will act on it. 

I would like to ask all of you—I have specific questions, but I 

would like to ask all of you how can we help better? What are the 

obstacles that you see in dealing with the Federal Government? 

What are the regulations, the things that are in place, that are obstructing you from doing your job better? What are the things that 

we don’t have in place that you would like to see come to fruition 

to allow you to protect our city and, in turn, our entire Nation better than you already do? You do an incredible job already. 

Mr. ESPOSITO. I will start. The cooperation that I see with the 

Federal Government, the State, the city, it has never been better, 

and keeping that funding going would be the most important thing. 

But the funding that we do get, again, it is 50 percent of my operating budget, very important to maintain it. If we were to lose part 

of that, I would have to close some of my doors. I mean, as I said 

earlier, 70,000 people we can supply for 7 days. That is something 

directly related to the grants. 

Originally when those grants came out, a lot of the agencies 

bought a lot of new equipment, the maintenance of that. But there 

was a limit on the percentage of money to be spent on personnel. 

At this point in the grant process, I think it would be helpful, I 

know for my agency, if we could stretch that a little bit, instead 

of keeping it at 50 percent, be able to spend a little more on personnel. We do the maintenance of the equipment, so we would like 

to maybe hire some more people. We are doing more, and we need 

people to do some of those things. So if we could adjust that a bit, 

we would appreciate that. 

Also, maybe be able to put some of the money to capital projects. 

My agency, and I know their agencies, are always growing. We 

could use more space. A lot of times the city does not have the 

money to expand our buildings, our facilities. I maintain three 

warehouses, one in Long Island, one in Jersey, and one in Brooklyn. If we could use some of that money for capital projects, extending my building or some of these factories, that would be very helpful. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. 

Mr. BILICH. I would just like to add a little different than the 

funding stream, more of a formalized relationship with DHS 

science and technology and the TSA as it relates to emerging technology, what works. We go through a very time-consuming process 

of looking to identify technology, and then we go through the very 

cumbersome process of procuring it, and then, of course, implementing it. 

As Congressman King had mentioned earlier, the whole notion 

that we have tremendous throughput through open transportation 

facilities, we have a multi-layered approach in looking to safeguard 

folks, but detection types of capabilities that are now being developed, while maybe not at light speed, is something that we would 

like to be in front of. Frankly, I think the vetting of that and the 

65 

trial and error should be done at the Federal level and then identified to the locals to implement, rather than all of us individually 

looking at all the different types of things that are out there. 

Mr. MILLER. I would like to pick up on the shoulders of both of 

my colleagues, which is I don’t want to spend too much time on 

money because it always boils down to grant funding, but our grant 

funding has been reduced a little bit at a time every year, and our 

threat picture has not been reduced. It is actually more changed 

and increased in many measures. 

Aside from the funding, we are facing additional challenges that 

call for increased research, development, technology, all of which 

costs money, but also potentially legislation. One area which I do 

not need to introduce the committee Members in detail to is 

encryption. We are in a place where we are increasingly finding 

that we are going darker and darker, to the point where we are already dark on communications between terrorist groups, because 

communications providers and hardware manufacturers who make 

the telephones have designed them in such a way that no legal 

process, no order from a New York State Supreme Court justice, 

or a Supreme Court justice of the United States, can grant the access that for over 250 years in this country has been available to 

judicial process from an independent court with probable cause. 

This is an increasing factor in investigations where we have come, 

possibly as a victim of our own success, to be expected to prevent 

these terrorist acts before they happen. 

Another area is the area of drones. Increasingly, we are seeing 

terrorist groups overseas not only experiment with but execute 

deadly operations using drones or unmanned aerial vehicles. There 

are increased numbers of civilian sales across the country, and 

while in New York we have laws because of the type of air space 

we are in between three airports that govern the use of drones, we 

have few paltry tools to prevent the use of drones in a terrorist attack. Legislation that would allow for that has not been forthcoming. 

Right now, if we had the technology, say working with DHS 

science and technology, to develop ways to take over a drone—disable it, land it, or otherwise control it—that would be considered 

air piracy under the current statutes, even if executed by a legitimate law enforcement agency like the New York City Police Department. 

So I think we need to take a hard look at these things. It will 

be easy to pass this law, to focus on this legislation, to develop this 

technology after an incident using a drone as a weapon occurs on 

U.S. soil. We have already seen it overseas. I think it would be 

worth all of our time to focus on this while it is still hard on the 

idea that, in the long run, that may be easier. 

Mr. PFEIFER. The value of grant money is that we can think 

about the next attack. Too often, when we think about grants, it 

is how do you maintain what you have, how do you do what everybody else is doing. But that is not enough. As John talked about, 

about drones, what does that next type of attack look like? By 

maintaining the grants, it allows us to think that way and share 

that information across other jurisdictions. 

66 

One of the areas that we are thinking about at great length and 

working with the partners at this table is cyber attack. Too often 

we think of a cyber attack as just a bunch of people on a keyboard 

causing havoc. Well, what we are considering now is a cyber attack 

with physical consequences, physical effects. So as we move forward, that is our next challenge and why we need support from the 

Federal Government, that we are able to not only manage the 

cyber side of the attack but also the physical effects. 

I think, Congressman Payne, your comments earlier that homeland security is just as important as military budgets, I think that 

moving forward, as we think about the value of grant funding, it 

is protecting the homeland, and the budgets also protect our military folks overseas. 

Mr. BILICH. Just one other thing I wanted to add. The importance of the continuation of funding, many have spoken about the 

evolving threat. We have spent over $100 million on bollards, but 

it was all about the VBIT threat. Then, of course, after the most 

recent events have happened both abroad and just at the doorstep 

of the World Trade on the West Side Highway, we had to take another look and we initiated three additional projects, because it is 

the new threat, and that is going to continue to happen. So the continuation of what is available and the nimbleness in that money to 

be able to adjust is paramount. 

Mr. MAPLES. I would put a fine point on all these gentlemen’s 

comments and just say I think providing incentives for innovation, 

which I mentioned in my comments, as far as ability to create and 

enhance those programs to get out ahead and prevent are going to 

be vital going forward. That is the flexibility in how grant guidance 

goes out, what we can do within the grant programs themselves 

with DHS and FEMA I think are going to be huge pieces, and I 

would echo that partnership from Jersey’s perspective. It really is 

regional. Any of the attacks that have been referenced have had 

some nexus to New Jersey. Sayfullo Saipov, for example, rented the 

truck in New Jersey for the West Side Highway. 

So we want to make sure we have the ability to work within the 

region and coordinate directly. We have fantastic partnerships from 

the Federal to the local level. Commissioner Miller and I were together just a couple of days ago, actually, on Friday, and those 

partnerships get us through these issues. But we can do more to 

focus the funding innovation together on the front end to get out 

ahead of them. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Director. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just to piggyback on Mr. Maples’ point just now, we are just 

linked by commonality between the two areas. It is just a fact of 

life. With the first attempt to take down the Towers from the bottom, the terrorists that perpetrated that were living in Maplewood, 

New Jersey, in my district, before they attempted that attack. So 

we are always going to be linked in this commonality around security. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Maples, the grants under the Urban Area 

Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security Grants Program are determined, in part or in whole, by FEMA’s risk assessVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:59 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18EP0423\18EP0423.TXT HEATH
67 

ment. Do you believe that the risk assessment formula and the 

methodology provided an accurate assessment of the risk in New 

Jersey? 

Mr. MAPLES. I would say for the most part, yes, but there is definitely room for improvement. You mentioned the word ‘‘transparency,’’ and when I look at the qualitative measurement of the 

risk inherent to the algorithm, I think there is probably some more 

room for transparency, and also inclusion of those regional issues 

we talked about. 

We really can go down the list of all these incidents that have 

happened, and there has been a nexus—whether they be planned, 

trained for, attacked from, rented, whatever the issue may be—in 

New Jersey, and I think it would definitely be more beneficial to 

have a little bit more transparency into that problem itself, the 

computation of those risks and how we actually approach them. 

So I think while our threat level has remained somewhat static— 

Tom DiNanno mentioned that we went from 7 to 6, or 6 to 5 on 

that last draft—I would say I don’t know that that is fully represented in what we are risking or what we are dealing with in 

New Jersey. We are members of the executive and also to the detective level of the JTTFs in Newark, New York, and Philadelphia. 

So we actually have this broad brush across this region that is a 

little bit different and very unique across the country, and I think 

it would be beneficial to show that regional approach in the funding allocation as tied to the risk assessment. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Ranking Member, I think just to expand on 

that—and far be it from me as the representative from the NYPD 

to lobby for money for New Jersey—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DONOVAN. You are always welcome to. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MILLER. Well, my real point is it is an important partnership, because the partnership between New Jersey’s Office of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, as well as the 

Newark JTTF, and New York City is seamless. As you point out, 

the 1993 World Trade Center bombers operated from New Jersey, 

built the bomb in New Jersey, lived in New Jersey, leveraged a 

New Jersey chemical company to buy the components to make that 

bomb. 

But if you look at the 9/11 attackers, a full cell of 9/11 pilots and 

operators lived and trained in New Jersey, having apartments in 

Patterson. Mr. Almonte and Mr. Alessa, both of whom tried to join 

a designated foreign terrorist organization, al-Shabaab, were right 

across the river in New Jersey while discussing and plotting attacks there, and in New York City. The West Side attacker who 

drove that pick-up truck, Sayfullo Saipov, lived in Patterson, New 

Jersey as well. The Chelsea bomber, Ahmed Rahimi, came out of 

the Perth Amboy/Linden area, where he was captured in a shootout with Linden, New Jersey police officers who knew of his description. 

So I think when we factor the New Jersey piece in, in terms of 

targets, it may not be as rich a target environment as New York 

City in some ways, though it has public transportation and urban 

areas, but you cannot separate it within this UASI from the New 

68 

York threat. History has told us that over and over again, which 

is the attack may be more likely in New York City, but it is also 

more likely that the plotting and the planning of that attack may 

not be. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

I will yield in the interests of time and maybe come back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Certainly. The gentleman yields. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. King. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Seeing Mr. Miller, Mr. Pfeifer, Mr. Esposito, it is like old home 

week, except that the threats are still there. They are different 

threats after all these years. Mr. Bilich, you are with the NYPD. 

So I guess I would ask how receptive you find the Federal Government to listening to what you have to say. The reason I ask that 

is every year, when we say $300 million cut from UASI and all 

these numbers, it seems like we are going through the same motions every year. 

Do you have an audience down there? Do you have people who 

are receptive? I am not saying they have to agree with you on everything, but do you have an on-going dialog as these threats are 

changing? I mean, the threats today, there is still al-Qaeda, ISIS, 

those threats, but the nature of the threats are changing every 

month, every year certainly. Do you have an audience? 

If I could go to Mr. Miller, I will call him by his first name. 

Commissioner. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MILLER. I am glad we are so informal. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MILLER. We have always had a hotline to DHS under successive secretaries. We have been able to meet personally with the 

DHS Secretary. The DHS Secretary will be in New York this week 

at the Leadership and Counterterrorism Conference, where we will 

have a separate audience with her to pass on those concerns, although typically, as I am sure you are aware, our communications 

with DHS are crystal clear, and because of their intelligence and 

analysis function, they are read into the threat. It is not that they 

don’t understand the threat. 

To us, the hazard can always be when that leaves DHS and goes 

into the Office of Management and Budget, sometimes it doesn’t 

come out the same way it went in. 

Mr. KING. If I could just interrupt you there, if I would, and I 

am not trying to create a feud. I already have one with Mulvaney. 

How much of this problem comes from Management and Budget as 

opposed to Homeland Security? I am not trying to put you on the 

spot with them. But, I mean, Mulvaney is out to screw New York 

whenever he can, and is this another manifestation of it? 

Mr. MILLER. Well, this has always been a challenge for us, and 

it started with the first discussions about reimbursing New York 

City for the extraordinary efforts around the protection package for 

Trump Tower before the election and after the election. 

So, from where I sit, I do not fully understand the internecine 

battles or the strange machinations that occur between an Executive branch agency, the Office of Management and Budget, and our 

appropriators, but I do appreciate this committee’s understanding 

69 

of those and their voice for us in those discussions to fight to keep 

those appropriations where they should be, because you as well understand the dynamics of this threat environment, which are extreme. 

Mr. KING. Since we are on a first-name basis, Chief? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. PFEIFER. Just to follow up with John, the relationship with 

DHS, and particularly intelligence and analysis, we have this back 

and forth collaboration. We actually do a secure CVIT on a regular 

basis, and that is important. 

I think what you are seeing here is that, with the people at the 

table, with the people down in the District of Columbia, that we 

are creating this network fusion of information. It is no longer this 

one agency and they do all the work. It is this fusion that comes 

among the people at this table, some of the people from the last 

panel with the FBI. It is sharing information, sharing intelligence, 

and challenging each other to look at the problem from different 

perspectives. 

Now, when it comes to the Office of Management and Budget, 

that is a little different. That is more of a political fight or a political challenge between the city and the Federal Government which 

we are always looking to limit those cutbacks, because the work we 

have to do is tremendous, and it is not stopping. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Esposito. 

Mr. ESPOSITO. Look, I think we will see what comes out of this 

committee to see if we are heard or not. But I think we are being 

heard, for the most part. Just to give you an example, we use the 

wireless emergency alert system. It has only been in place since 

2012, but we only used it in New York 8 times. We used it during 

a couple of snowstorms, during Hurricane Sandy, but most recently 

during the Chelsea bombing, and it worked well, but we had some 

limitations to it. We brought those limitations to your attention, 

and we made some changes. 

So we are being heard. We think there are more changes that 

could be done with that. We are going to be a lot more effective. 

But I think the work of this committee goes a long way in having 

us being heard in the District of Columbia, so I want to thank you 

for that. 

Mr. KING. I think last year the committee did almost double the 

amount of UASI funding that was requested by the administration. 

Mr. Bilich. 

Mr. BILICH. Yes, sir. I would say that the relationship with DHS 

is very strong, very receptive to our needs, particularly as it relates 

to our concerns with both the sharing of information related to security technology and so on. When it comes to the actual grants, 

the question that you posed, I am always a bit perplexed at how 

we don’t get things. I mean, I think all our applications are datadriven. They are based on risk. I think we have the highest risk 

in the Nation in our area. So anytime we get less than what we 

ask for, I think that they are not using the same methodology that 

we are. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Maples. 

Mr. MAPLES. First of all, my background, I came from CIA, spent 

most of my career there, and one of my mentors said to me when 

70 

I first started that you should build relationships like your life depends on it, because it does. I would say in New Jersey, certainly, 

we are bringing that to the table, and that goes from the Federal 

down to the local level. 

In my experience over the last 9 months that I have been the director, our relationship with DHS has been good. We definitely 

don’t always agree on everything, but I have noticed some reception. We are having the engagement and conversation, and that is 

a big start in addition to being able to appear before you distinguished gentlemen to have this conversation and let us voice our 

concerns, but then also open our arms and let us say we are here 

and want to make sure we participate in partnership as well. 

Mr. KING. If I could just say in closing, I have been with the committee now the whole 15 or 16 years, whatever it is. I think Don 

and Dan would agree with me, that when you look at the rest of 

the country, nothing compares to New York and New Jersey. You 

take the whole New York region, the Jersey region, they are doing 

together probably more than the rest of the country combined as 

far as local and State efforts. So I want to thank all of you and 

your agencies and departments for the work you do. Thank you. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Maybe do a lightning round, one question each, 

and I think I know the answer to this, but I would love to get it 

on the record. 

In 2012, Congress created FirstNet, which would require emergency responders to get off the T-Band by 2020 so they could auction off the T-Band. I understand this is an incredible risk doing 

this, to our public safety. It is an incredible expense and effort that 

would have to be undertaken by our emergency responders. 

Can you just, in 30 seconds each, tell me how this requirement 

of your communications, getting off of T-Band and onto FirstNet, 

will affect the public safety? 

Mr. MILLER. I think, first of all, getting off of T-Band, we have 

nowhere to go that offers that same capability. FirstNet isn’t ready. 

FirstNet isn’t capable of delivering what we have on T-Band now. 

It can deliver other things, but picture it as if somebody said your 

headquarters is decrepit and not up on technology and we are 

going to move you into a brand-new building, and then they said 

this will be the date you will move out, and the brand-new building 

wasn’t there and it wasn’t ready and it didn’t have anything in it. 

That is the position we are being put in by the idea that there is 

this impending deadline coming up where we are going to have to 

leave this real estate within the radio band where there is no guarantee on the other side that there is anything capable for a major 

urban area like New York City, or even smaller major urban areas, 

that can handle the kinds and types and volume of radio traffic, 

push to talk, voice communications, and so on. 

The new system would rely on things like Wi-Fi, things like 

fiber, but things that have failed in multiple disasters. If you look 

at everything from 9/11 to the Northeast blackout, pick your disaster, the one thing that has always held up in New York City, 

when everything else broke down, was our radio system. Until we 

see something that has equal or greater capability, we need to stick 

with what we have. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. 

71 

Chief, quickly. 

Mr. PFEIFER. I would second that, too. Our communications is 

critical. We need to be able to talk to each other, and to go to a 

system that is not proven is not only very difficult but it is a great 

risk. So we are skeptical on making that transition unless we can 

prove it out. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Esposito. 

Mr. ESPOSITO. I mean, look, I was involved with this in my prior 

life with the FirstNet a long time ago, and not much was said 

about giving up T-Band back then. It was a great system. It is 

going to let us communicate Nation-wide, all the emergency responders. It is a terrific piece of equipment, but we just can’t give 

up the T-Band. That is how we communicate now, especially with 

these folks, and they wouldn’t be able to communicate properly if 

we give up the T-Band. So we just can’t do that. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Effect on public safety, Chief? 

Mr. BILICH. Not much more I could add. We have the same concerns. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ranking Member. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Really quickly, even with your organizations receiving grant 

funding, we know that there are still quite a few unmet needs. 

What are the security-related needs that currently go unmet, and 

what are the funding gaps in FEMA’s preparedness grants? If you 

could quickly give one example. 

Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. I think one of the critical areas we face has already 

been covered by the discussion today in the earlier panel and here, 

which is we have a massive transit system that carries 5.6 million 

people a day. If it were a major city, it would be a huge American 

urban area. Yet, it is extraordinarily safe in that we have about 

one index crime there a day, so very safe from crime, very wellpoliced. 

But mass transit has been a favorite target of terrorists. I don’t 

need to enumerate the plots. I know you all know those from your 

work. It is a place where we are always looking to build capability. 

But because of the size and complexity of the system, it would require additional assistance. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Chief. 

Mr. PFEIFER. The concern that I have is mass transit because it 

is always a concern with such large amounts of people. But the 

concern that was brought up earlier is our high-rise buildings, because they hold massive amounts of people, and that is what we 

are really concerned about, that this could be the next 9/11 type 

of attack. So we need support from the Federal grants to look into 

it, develop procedures, and to share those procedures across the 

country. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Mr. ESPOSITO. I said it earlier, just some of the restrictions that 

are on some of the spending of the money. We have the equipment. 

We can always use new equipment when new things come up, but 

72 

a little bit of flexibility in how we can spend it with the personnel, 

and maybe some money to go to some capital improvements. 

Mr. BILICH. Our facilities are—we have this mix of both new and 

old, and the area itself is old, and there is a lot of aging infrastructure. The ability to sort of continually harden that, we have made 

a tremendous investment in doing that, but there is still a ways 

to go. As it relates to the new facilities that we are building, the 

capital security elements are baked into the design, and that also 

probably ups the cost by about 30 percent. So the recognition that 

we have these older types of facilities that we have to secure, and 

it is going to be—our region is an older region than other areas of 

the country. So I think that is an important part of it. 

Mr. MAPLES. I would just continue to emphasize the point of innovation. So we need to maintain the capabilities but then also the 

ability to innovate as threats emerge and evolve, cyber being a 

huge one that was mentioned in the last panel as well. There are 

emerging threats that are out there that we have to be able to invest in up-front to try to get ahead of those problems, items like 

mass gatherings, vehicles ramming soft targets, those kinds of 

issues. We want to make sure we hit head-on, up-front, and be able 

to innovate into those areas—training, exercise, awareness. 

I want to make sure we mention the Suspicious Activity Reporting System. It has been very effective in New Jersey. I want to do 

more. I want to innovate throughout that process. 

That is where I would finish up. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

I will yield back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Payne. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. King. 

Mr. KING. All of you heard enough from me over the years. I just 

want to thank you for your testimony today, thank you for the 

great work you do, and ask you to continue to do it. Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. DONOVAN. That is why he is the distinguished former Chair. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DONOVAN. I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony 

and the Members for their questions. 

The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional 

questions for our witnesses that we will ask you to respond to in 

writing. 

Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(D), the hearing record will be 

held open for 10 days. 

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(73) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER DONALD M. PAYNE FOR THOMAS DINANNO

Question 1a. In March, we saw two substantial cyber attacks on public infrastructure in major urban areas. Atlanta experienced a wide-spread ransomware attack 

that impacted the Atlanta Police Department and even the wireless network of Atlanta International Airport. The second attack saw impacts to Baltimore’s ability to 

dispatch emergency calls—this is especially alarming when you consider Baltimore’s 

9–1–1 system receives more than 1 million calls each year. 

With these types of events occurring, are there new priorities that you are looking 

to fund? 

Question 1b. Particularly, are you looking at areas to help improve cyber capabilities to avoid what we saw in Baltimore and Atlanta? 

Answer. Cyber threats are a significant concern for our Nation’s security and 

must be vigorously addressed. Beginning with the fiscal year 2018 preparedness 

grant cycle, FEMA will provide additional guidance in the Homeland Security Grant 

Program (HSGP) Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) regarding cybersecurity 

and will require recipients under the State Homeland Security Grant Program 

(SHSP) and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) to submit one investment in support of the State, territory, or urban area cybersecurity efforts. 

Grant-funded cybersecurity investments must support or otherwise be associated 

with the systems and equipment that are considered allowable costs under HSGP. 

When requesting funds for cybersecurity, applicants are encouraged to propose 

projects that would aid in the implementation of all or part of the Framework for 

Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (‘‘The Framework’’) developed by 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The Framework provides a common organizing structure to help organizations understand, communicate, and manage their cyber risks. 

Additionally in fiscal year 2018, SHSP and UASI recipients must include their 

chief information security officer (CISO) and chief information officer (CIO) on their 

senior advisory committee and urban area working group. 

Question 2. In the ‘‘Budget in Brief’’ document submitted along with the President’s budget proposal, there was an all-hazards ‘‘Competitive Preparedness Grant 

Program’’ described in fewer than 30 words. The grant program would cost $522 

million. My staff still has not seen details about the grant program, which is especially troubling given that the budget proposal included so many cuts to current 

grant programs. Please provide an in-depth explanation of the Competitive Preparedness Grant Program, including what the program would accomplish and the 

eligibility criteria. 

Answer. The new grant program which FEMA is now referring to as the Emerging Threat Competitive Grant Program is envisioned as an emerging threats/all-hazards preparedness grant program that would require grantees to measure results 

in reducing preparedness capability gaps and would also require robust evaluation. 

The Emerging Threat Competitive Grant Program legislative proposal is undergoing 

DHS and OMB review and will be shared with Congress once completed. 

The reasons underlying the need for the Emerging Threat Competitive Grant Program are based on the Nation’s need to meet the challenges of a changing and 

evolving threat environment. The preparedness grant programs must evolve to meet 

new and evolving risks. The emerging threats facing the Nation today have significantly changed since the inception of the current preparedness grant programs. The 

proposed Fiscal Year 2019 Emerging Threat Competitive Grant Program would help 

address the dynamic risk environment by introducing an agile program informed by 

lessons learned from catastrophic disasters, terrorist incidents, and other incidents. 

The new program would allow applicants to competitively apply for funding that 

would reduce capability gaps and address emerging threats from acts of terrorism, 

natural disasters, and all other hazards. 

74 

The key difference envisioned between the proposed program and current programs is that FEMA would create a set of National priorities to drive innovative 

solutions and investments that address emerging threats, while States continue to 

use traditional funding sources to maintain existing preparedness capabilities. In 

addition, this grant will address all hazards as opposed to current grant programs 

which require a terrorism nexus. Finally, since this program will be fully competitive, a robust evaluation process will be used to ensure that projects have effective 

outcomes. To ensure the program reflects the current risk landscape, FEMA will 

have the ability to shift the program’s priorities to address emerging threats. 

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