AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 

REGIONAL 

STABILIZATION STRATEGY

Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Updated February 2010
MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

I have made it a top priority to elevate the role of diplomacy and development alongside defense 

in our national security strategy. Nowhere is this more urgent than in our efforts to disrupt, 

dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To meet this core goal, President 

Obama has outlined a strategy that includes supporting the Afghan and Pakistani governments’ 

efforts to defeat the extremist threat. As President Obama made clear at West Point on 

December 1, our civilian engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan will endure long after our 

combat troops come home. While our military mission in Afghanistan is not open-ended, we are 

committed to building lasting partnerships with Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

The challenges in both countries are immense. The Afghan government is under assault from the 

Taliban and struggling to provide security, jobs, and basic justice to a society devastated by 30 

years of war. Across the border, the Pakistani people are victim to regular suicide bombings 

despite their military’s increasingly determined efforts against extremist elements. And while alQaeda’s safe-haven in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area is increasingly disrupted, its senior 

leaders are still planning attacks against our homeland and our Allies.

We shaped our political, economic, and diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan with 

these realities in mind. Far from an exercise in ―nation-building,‖ the programs detailed here 

aim to achieve realistic progress in critical areas. They are aligned with our security objectives 

and have been developed in close consultation with the Afghan and Pakistani governments, as 

well as our international partners. And they reflect our national values, including our 

longstanding committing to promoting universally recognized human rights for women and other 

marginalized groups. When combined with U.S. combat operations and efforts to build Afghan 

and Pakistani security capacity, these programs constitute an innovative, whole-of-government 

strategy to protect our vital interests in this volatile region of the world.

We have no illusions about the challenges ahead of us. Achieving progress will require 

continued sacrifice not only by our military personnel, but also by the more than 1,500 U.S. 

government civilians serving in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But for the first time since this 

conflict began, we have a true whole-of-government approach. The Afghan and Pakistani 

governments have endorsed this strategy and are committed to achieving our shared objectives. 

And as I was reminded during recent visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan, our civilian and military 

personnel are working together as never before. 

For these reasons, I believe this strategy offers the best prospect for stabilizing Afghanistan and

Pakistan. I look forward to working with Congress to secure the non-military resources needed 

to achieve our mission and to signal our commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan. I am 

committed to doing everything possible to ensure that those resources are well spent advancing 

our national interests.
MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

As the President re-emphasized in December 2009, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies, and to prevent 

its return to both countries. 

This goal cannot be completed through military efforts alone, but must be accompanied by the 

political, economic, and diplomatic efforts outlined in this plan. The recent increases in civilian 

expertise to work alongside the Afghan and Pakistani governments, and our military forces in 

support of the people of both countries, have already shown demonstrable gains. As efforts 

progress, our civil-military coordination is growing even stronger.

The Department of Defense endorses the Department of State’s Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Regional Stabilization Strategy and remains committed to working with all U.S. Government 

departments and agencies to implement the strategy. It is essential that the resources – personnel 

and funding – be provided to achieve the President’s goals.

Robert M. Gates

Secretary of Defense
TABLE OF CONTENTS

OVERVIEW........................................................................................................................................ I

SUMMARY OF KEY INITIATIVES......................................................................................................VI

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS.........................................................................................................VIII

OVERHAULING AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE................................................................................... 1

DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL CIVILIAN EXPERTISE................................................................................ 3

REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN’S AGRICULTURE SECTOR ................................................................... 5

STRENGTHENING AFGHAN GOVERNANCE ..................................................................................... 7

ENHANCING AFGHAN RULE OF LAW ............................................................................................ 12

SUPPORTING AFGHAN-LED REINTEGRATION............................................................................... 15

COMBATING THE AFGHAN NARCOTICS TRADE ............................................................................ 17

BUILDING AN ECONOMIC FOUNDATION FOR AFGHANISTAN’S FUTURE..................................... 19

ADVANCING THE RIGHTS OF AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS ........................................................ 22

AN ENHANCED PARTNERSHIP WITH PAKISTAN............................................................................ 25

ENHANCING PAKISTAN’S COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITIES.................................................. 29

DISRUPTING ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS TO EXTREMISTS.............................................................. 31

COUNTERING EXTREMIST VOICES ................................................................................................ 33

MOBILIZING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT....................................................................................... 35
-iOVERVIEW

As President Obama reiterated during his December 1, 2009 speech at West Point, the core U.S. 

goal remains to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to 

prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan. 

While our combat mission in Afghanistan is not open-ended, we will remain politically, 

diplomatically, and economically engaged in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the long-term to 

protect our enduring interests in the region.

AFGHANISTAN

In Afghanistan, our focus is building the capacity of Afghan institutions to withstand and 

diminish the threat posed by extremism, and to deliver high-impact economic assistance –

especially in the agricultural sector – to create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives 

from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off the battlefield. 

We are focusing our support at the national level on Afghan ministries that can have the most 

direct impact on service delivery, particularly in the geographic heart of the insurgency – the 

South and East. Consistent with the President’s recently completed policy review, we are also 

adapting our programs to account for local realities, and broadening our support and engagement 

at the provincial and district levels to enhance the visibility, effectiveness, and accountability of 

the institutions that impact Afghan lives the most. The provinces and districts are where our 

most consequential programs will be delivered, where we must help the Afghan government 

provide economic opportunities that increase stability and reduce the strength of the insurgency –

and where we are most visibly expanding our civilian commitment. 

President Karzai’s inaugural address set forth an ambitious agenda, focusing on: reintegration;

economic development; improving relations with Afghanistan’s regional partners; and steadily 

increasing the security responsibilities of Afghan security forces. Rapid progress on this agenda 

is important, and will require international support. Toward this end, we are encouraging the 

Afghan government to take strong actions to combat corruption and improve governance, and to 

provide better services for the people of Afghanistan – while maintaining and expanding on the 

important democratic reforms and advances in women’s rights that have been made since 2001. 

We will work with the Afghan government to implement a system for evaluating progress and 

adapting programs as the situation on the ground evolves.

Our focused strategy reflects the urgency President Obama has directed to reverse negative 

trends in Afghanistan. It consists of the following key elements, which are integrated and 

synchronized with military activities to achieve short, medium, and long-term objectives. The 

success of civilian programs depends on an improving security environment in Afghanistan.

Reconstruction and Development: Job creation is critical to undermine extremists’ appeal in 

the short-term and for sustainable economic growth in the long-term. Our top reconstruction 

priority is implementing a civilian-military (civ-mil) agriculture redevelopment strategy to 

restore Afghanistan’s once vibrant agriculture sector. This will help sap the insurgency of 
-iifighters and of income from poppy cultivation. Creating links to cross-border trade, while also 

increasing the Afghan government’s capacity to better secure its borders and increase customs 

revenue, will support sustainable long-term economic growth and job creation in the agricultural 

and other sectors. Simultaneously, we will sustain our successful efforts to build the Afghan 

government’s capacity to provide improved health services and education to the Afghan people. 

Improving educational opportunities and health for all Afghans, and especially for women, is a 

top priority for the Afghan people. It is also a necessary step for diminishing the influence of 

extremists, improving the pool of qualified individuals who can serve in Afghanistan’s security 

forces, and improving Afghanistan’s long-term economic potential. Improved rural healthcare is 

both a social benefit and a positive linkage between the Afghan people and their government.

Improving Governance: Our governance efforts will help develop more responsive, visible, 

and accountable institutions in Kabul, particularly at the provincial, district, and local level, 

where most Afghans encounter their government. We will increase the number of civilian 

technical advisers in key central government ministries, as well as in provincial capitals and 

district centers, to partner with Afghans in this capacity building effort. We will support the 

Afghan government’s reinvigorated plans to fight corruption, with measures of progress toward 

greater accountability. 

Rule of Law: Justice and rule of law programs will focus on creating predictable and fair 

dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that the Taliban have exploited with their 

own brutal form of justice. Our rule of law efforts complement ISAF’s expanded emphasis on 

training capable Afghan National Police and support Afghan-led anti-corruption efforts. 

Reintegration: Our new strategy recognizes the political dimensions of the conflict and that 

only the Afghan people can secure their own country. A key element of our political strategy will 

be supporting Afghan-led efforts to reintegrate Taliban who renounce al-Qaeda, cease violence, 

and accept the constitutional system, including its protections for all Afghans.

Advancing the Rights of Afghan Women: Investing in women will help advance our focused 

civilian stabilization efforts and strengthen Afghan communities’ capacity to withstand the threat 

posed by extremism. Sustaining and expanding critical gains in women’s rights and empowering

Afghan women is also critical to unleashing the full economic potential of the Afghan people. 

Integrated into our programming are key initiatives focused on: women’s security; women’s 

leadership in the public and private sector; women’s access to judicial institutions, education, 

and health services; and women’s ability to take advantage of economic opportunities, especially 

in the agricultural sector. 

Regional Diplomacy: Regional diplomacy will focus on shifting the calculus of Afghanistan’s 

neighbors from competition in Afghanistan to cooperation and economic integration. The 

Afghanistan-Pakistan-United States Trilateral Dialogue will continue, providing a venue for 

advancing cooperation on issues such as transit trade, agriculture, interior issues, and 

intelligence.

Communications: All of our efforts in Afghanistan will be supported by a new communications 

strategy that will empower Afghans to directly challenge the extremists’ narrative and articulate 
-iiian alternative vision for Afghanistan’s future.

Focused Civilian Assistance: The President’s resource request for his new strategy includes a 

sizable amount for civilian assistance to implement our programs. Aligned with our national 

security objectives, civilian assistance will help build Afghan capacity in key areas and also

reassure Afghans that our commitment is long-term. To maximize effectiveness, we have 

overhauled how we deliver assistance. We are decreasing reliance on large contractors and 

increasing our direct assistance to select Afghan ministries which we have certified for 

transparency and accountability. Recognizing that we cannot abandon Afghanistan as we did in 

1989 following the Soviet withdrawal, our civilian effort must be sustained beyond our combat 

mission so that Afghanistan does not become a failed state and safe haven for al-Qaeda.

Expanded Civilian Presence: Accompanying an increase in civilian assistance will be a 

significant increase in civilian experts – beyond the tripling of deployed U.S. civilians that 

occurred over the past year, from 320 civilians on the ground in Afghanistan in January 2009 to 

nearly 1,000 on the ground today. Civilian experts come from a range of U.S. government 

departments and agencies – including the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Drug Enforcement Agency 

(DEA), Department of Justice (DoJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of the 

Treasury, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – and bring specific expertise. They 

contribute to the mission in the field, especially in the East and South where a majority of U.S. 

combat forces are operating and where many of the additional 30,000 forces announced by 

President Obama on December 1, 2009 will deploy. Civilians partner with Afghans to enhance 

the capacity of government institutions and help rehabilitate Afghanistan’s key economic sectors.

PAKISTAN

A major focus of the President’s policy review was the importance of Pakistan to our efforts in 

Afghanistan, to regional stability, and to our national security and foreign policy interests. There 

remains mistrust between our two countries, but we see a critical window of opportunity created 

by the recent transition to democratic, civilian rule and the broad, sustained political support 

across Pakistan for military operations against extremists. We seek to lead the international 

community in helping Pakistan overcome the political, economic, and security challenges that 

threaten its stability, and in turn undermine regional stability. And we seek to build a long-term 

partnership with Pakistan based on common interests, including a recognition that we cannot 

tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear. 

New Assistance Program: The United States is making a sizable, long-term commitment of 

economic assistance, consistent with the landmark Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation that 

authorized $7.5 billion in U.S. civilian assistance over five years, with the following objectives: 

 Helping Pakistan address immediate energy, water, and related economic crises, thereby 

deepening our partnership with the Pakistani people and decreasing the appeal of extremists; 

 Supporting broader economic and democratic reforms that are necessary to put Pakistan on a 

path towards sustainable job creation and economic growth, which is necessary for long-term 
-ivPakistani stability and progress; and

 Helping Pakistan build on its success against militants to eliminate extremist sanctuaries that 

threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, the wider region, the United States, and people around the 

world.

Additional U.S. assistance will help Pakistan build a foundation for long-term development, and 

will also strengthen ties between the American and Pakistani people by demonstrating that the 

United States is committed to addressing problems that affect the everyday lives of Pakistanis. 

As in Afghanistan, the security environment, particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province and 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas, will impact the success of some assistance programs. A 

particular emphasis in those areas is strengthening Pakistani communities against extremism in 

part by assisting marginalized citizens, including women and youth.

Security Assistance: The United States will sustain its counterinsurgency support and other

assistance to Pakistan’s military and police to help them fight insurgents, as well as make greater 

civilian investments to meet the needs of people in areas most affected by militancy. 

Communications: This expanded U.S. commitment to Pakistan will be supported by a new 

communications effort. Innovative programs will empower Pakistanis to discredit extremist 

propaganda and increase support for the Pakistani government’s efforts to roll back the 

insurgency. We will also work aggressively to alter misperceptions regarding U.S. policy.

Strengthening People-to-People Ties: We are expanding our bilateral relationship beyond 

military-to-military and government-to-government ties by reaching out directly to the Pakistani 

people, through more frequent and direct contacts, putting forward an ambitious public 

diplomacy campaign, addressing the social and economic needs of Pakistani people, and building 

relationships with a wide array of Pakistani civil society groups. These efforts will foster greater 

understanding in Pakistan for U.S. policies and reinforce our long-term partnership.

Enhanced Bilateral Engagement: Secretary Clinton will convene a new Strategic Dialogue at 

the foreign minister level. The dialogue will provide a framework for engaging Pakistan on 

bilateral security, political, social, and economic issues of mutual interest. The first meeting is 

anticipated by mid-2010.

MOBILIZING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

To achieve our objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan in support of our core goal, we are 

working to build the broadest possible global coalition to help Afghanistan and Pakistan become 

more stable and prosperous so that they can withstand the extremist threat and meet the most 

important needs of their people. This coalition of nations will contribute increased civilian and 

military resources, pursue efforts to build legitimate trade and economic activity, curb illicit 

financial flows, and provide critical political support.

Our objectives are shared by the people and governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan and by 

people around the world, from Europe to Australia, from Russia to China to India, and across the 
-vMiddle East where Muslim countries face a common threat from al-Qaeda. There are now 43 

ISAF Allies and partners and more than 84,000 U.S. and international troops working together in 

Afghanistan. Similarly, over 60 countries and international organizations are now providing 

assistance to Pakistan. Almost 30 Special Representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan

coordinate policies in regular meetings. 

All of Afghanistan’s neighbors and friends have a legitimate and important role to play in 

stabilizing Afghanistan. Their actions must reinforce and respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty and 

territorial integrity. No country should use its position in Afghanistan against others. Because 

improved security and enhanced cooperation are mutually reinforcing goals, we will encourage 

Afghanistan’s neighbors to begin removing barriers to trade and redouble our efforts to achieve 

greater regional cooperation. Toward this end, we encourage flexible frameworks for regional 

dialogue driven by cooperation in specific areas. Additionally, to build confidence and reduce 

mistrust, we will encourage all of Afghanistan’s neighbors and friends to be transparent in all 

that they do to support Afghanistan. 
-viSUMMARY OF KEY INITIATIVES

AFGHANISTAN

 Increasing significantly the number of civilian technical advisers in key central government 

ministries and in the provinces and district centers to help make Afghan government 

institutions more visible, effective, and accountable. Additional ministries and Afghan 

institutions will be certified to receive direct U.S. assistance, enhancing ministerial capacity, 

improving the effectiveness of our assistance, and decreasing reliance on contractors.

 Implementing a new civilian-military agriculture redevelopment strategy that will sap the 

insurgency not only of foot soldiers, but also of income from the narcotics trade.

 Expanding sub-national capacity building efforts, focused mainly in key population centers 

in the East and South, through new civ-mil initiatives, such as the District Development 

Working Groups and District Support Teams, and supporting programs that give Afghans a 

greater stake in their own government, such as the National Solidarity Program. A key emphasis 

will be assisting Afghan efforts to reduce corruption.

 Creating space for traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, which uphold Afghanistan’s 

constitution, to re-emerge in areas cleared of the Taliban, while also strengthening the formal 

justice system across Afghanistan.

 Reducing the drug trade by interdicting drug traffickers and disrupting their networks, 

instead of targeting poor Afghan farmers through eradication.

 Supporting Afghan government efforts to re-integrate Taliban who renounce al-Qaeda, cease 

violence, and accept the constitutional system.

 Redoubling international efforts to target illicit financial flows to the Taliban. 

 Advancing the rights of Afghan women and girls across all areas of effort, with particular 

focus on expanding economic opportunities; improving access to justice, improving basic service 

delivery in education and health, and increasing women’s participation in the political process.

 Countering al-Qaeda and Taliban propaganda, while also empowering Afghans to challenge 

the insurgents’ narrative by improving access to mobile phones, radio, and television.

 Improving coordination of international assistance. We are consulting with Allies and 

partners to strengthen the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and to 

enhance civilian coordination among ISAF partners.

PAKISTAN

 Committing sizable resources – including fully funding the landmark Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill –

toward high-impact projects addressing the challenges that most affect the Pakistani people 

(e.g., energy and water). We will increase direct assistance through Pakistani institutions to 

enhance their capacity and to bolster economic and political reform. 

 Sustaining and expanding counterinsurgency assistance to support Pakistan’s military, police, 

and intelligence operations against militant groups.
-vii-

 Leading international humanitarian assistance efforts to help displaced Pakistanis with 

recovery as they return to their homes and rebuild their lives.

 Expanding our public diplomacy effort to build increased people-to-people contacts, convey our 

policies effectively, and challenge the extremists’ narrative.

 Ensuring that women’s needs are met through assistance activities in health, education, 

economic development, civil society, rule of law/human rights, and political participation. 

MOBILIZING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

 Reinvigorating our engagement with Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s neighbors, to encourage 

increased regional cooperation and economic integration.

 Reaching out to Muslim countries to coordinate assistance and political support for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan.

 Increasing international support for Pakistan’s people and democratically elected 

government, including supporting the United Nation’s expanded role in coordinating assistance.

 Enhancing civilian coordination in Afghanistan to maximize the effectiveness of international 

assistance, including by supporting the newly appointed NATO Senior Civilian Representative 

and reinforcing the United Nations’ lead role in coordinating civilian efforts.
-viiiRESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

AFGHANISTAN 

FY 2009- FY 2011

($ millions)

Function* FY 2009 Total

FY 2010

Estimate

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

Request

FY 2011

Request

Rebuilding the Agricultural 

Sector 125 260 215 240

Strengthening Governance 977 744 976 1,760

Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

/ Local Governance 253 218 216 620

Democracy, Governance** 724 526 760 1,140

Enhancing Rule of Law 221 186 225 248

Rule of Law (USAID) 33 25 50 50

Rule of Law (INL) 188 161 175 198

Combating Narcotics 462 467 160 437

Alternative Development 165 208 135 185

Interdiction, Demand Reduction, 

Communications 297 259 25 252

Building a Foundation for 

Afghanistan’s Future 807 875 200 1,152

Roads 129 207 - 230

Power 134 139 - 230

Vertical Structures - - - 65

Economic Growth and Private 

Sector 271 288 100 373

Education 94 104 50 95

Health 124 105 50 154

Other Social 55 32 - 5

Other 123 92 - 87

Military Education and Training 

(IMET ) 1.4 1.5 - 1.5

Other Civilian Military 

Assistance (NADR) 49 58 - 69

Food Aid (PL 480, FFE, FFP) 73 16 - 16

Program Support - USAID - 16 - -

TOTAL 2,714 2,624 1,776 3,924

* In FY 2009 the United States provided roughly $153 million in assistance to women and girls and 

expects to provide over $175 million in FY 2010. These resources are spread across all functions.

** Includes Communications.
-ixPAKISTAN 

FY 2009- FY 2011

($ millions)

Function FY 2009 Total

FY 2010

Estimate

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

Request

FY 2011

Request

Democracy and Governance 117.1 164.0 4.0 

 

190.1 

Rule of Law (INCLE) 1.5 2.0 4.0 3.1 

Rule of Law (ESF) 9.7 22.0 - 37.3

Democracy/Governance 97.4 60.0 - 70.0 

Political Competition 6.5 15.0 - 15.2

Civil Society 2.0 15.0 - 15.2

Strategic Communications 50 50

Investing in People and 

Economic Growth 897.6 885.5 244.0 

 

1,185.5 

Health 120.6 181.5 65.0 176.0

Education 205.0 335.0 - 260.0

Social and Economic Services 

and Protection for Vulnerable 

Populations

129.0 95.0 50.0 -

Infrastructure 240.8 55.0 64.0 450.0

Agriculture/ Food 112.6 81.0 65.0 123.6

Economic Growth 79.6 138.0 - 176.1

Cross Border Initiative 10.0 - - -

Humanitarian Assistance 189.6 15.3 - 15.3

Non-Military Security

Assistance 99.3 150.2 36.0 161.7

Border Security 38.2 52.0 - 42.5

Law Enforcement / Police 44.3 69.0 36.0 84.5

Counternarcotics 3.5 7.0 - 9.9

Counterterrorism 13.3 22.2 - 24.8

Military Assistance 1,002.3 243.0 60.0 1,500.0

Foreign Military Financing 300.0 238.0 60.0 295.9

International Military and 

Educational Training 2.3 5.0 - 4.1

Pakistan Counterinsurgency 

Capability Fund 700.0 - - 1,200.0

TOTAL 2305.9 1,458.0 344.0 3053.5
-1-

Overhauling Afghanistan Assistance

Since announcing our strategy in March 2009, we have undertaken an extensive transformation of 

U.S. civilian assistance activities in Afghanistan. The result is a more focused and effective 

assistance effort that is fully integrated across civilian agencies, increasingly implemented by 

Afghans, more tightly bound to our civ-mil strategy in Afghanistan’s East and South, and has the 

dual benefit of helping the Afghan people while also directly contributing to achieving our core goal 

of defeating al-Qaeda. Short-term assistance aims to deny the insurgency foot soldiers and popular 

support by focusing on licit job creation, especially in the agriculture sector, and improving basic 

service delivery and the provision of justice at the national, and provincial, and local level. Longterm reconstruction efforts aim to provide a foundation for sustainable economic growth. The pace 

and reach of civilian program implementation depends on a security environment permissive enough 

to allow civilian efforts to proceed. 

Key Initiatives

 Increased Direct Assistance: We are decreasing our reliance on large international contractors 

and building Afghan institutional capacity by increasing our direct assistance through Afghan 

government mechanisms, such as the National Solidarity Program. To receive direct assistance, 

Afghan ministries must be certified as having improved accountability and transparency. Support 

to the Afghan Civil Service Commission increases the professional skills and leadership within 

the Afghan government, enabling Afghans to increasingly assume responsibility for their 

country’s economic development. 

 Improved Accountability: Recognizing that the substantial international assistance to 

Afghanistan has the potential to contribute to corruption, we have deployed dozens of additional 

direct hire personnel to enhance oversight of programs. We have also introduced performancebased implementation mechanisms and significantly decreased the number of multi-year contracts 

to U.S. entities. The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and 

Embassy Kabul strongly support the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction’s 

(SIGAR) expanded role in evaluating implementation of assistance programs, as well as the 

Regional Inspector General’s expanded role in influencing program design and implementation.

 Decentralization: USAID officials posted to regional civ-mil platforms bring with them funding 

and flexible authorities to enhance the responsiveness of programs and better coordinate projects 

that address local Afghan priorities. 

 Afghan First: The U.S. Mission’s new approach to implementing the President’s strategy is to 

support Afghan leadership, Afghan capacity-building efforts at all levels, Afghan sustainability, 

and local procurement initiatives. Therefore, we have introduced a civilian-military policy to 

maximize our hiring of local staff and to procure an increasing percentage of our supplies locally, 

instead of relying on expensive imports of supplies.

 True Partnership: We are engaging Afghans in all aspects of our assistance programs – from 

design, to procurement, to implementation. More than 55 advisors across core Afghan ministries 

will work in direct partnership with Afghan counterparts. Programs are aligned with Afghan 

priorities, including the Afghan National Development Strategy. Programs are implemented by 

more than 26,000 Afghans working with our implementing partners.
-2-

Milestones

 Six Afghan ministries certified to receive direct U.S. assistance by December 2010.

 40 percent of assistance delivered through local entities (Afghan government or local NGO) 

systems by December 2010.

 Decrease overhead and related costs for assistance programs, increasing the amount per dollar of 

U.S. assistance directly benefiting the Afghan people and Afghan institutions.

 Deployment of dozens of additional USAID and other personnel by early 2010 to enhance 

oversight of contracts and improve management of programs.

 Increase by 20 percent local procurement of supplies by July 2011.

 Expand core Afghan ministries’ capacity to assume lead responsibility for overseeing and

implementing programs, over time (e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock 

leads all aspects of its programs, to include design, program implementation, and oversight) 

 Successful implementation and monitoring of new flexible funding authorities being provided to 

civilians deployed to the field (e.g., the Performance Based Governors Fund) in 2010.

 Development and implementation of a U.S. Government action plan to mitigate the indirect 

effects on corruption resulting from a growing U.S. military and civilian presence.
-3-

Deploying Additional Civilian Expertise

In March 2009 President Obama announced ―a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground...to 

advance security, opportunity, and justice – not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the 

provinces.‖ Hundreds of civilian experts have answered that call to service, and we are now in the 

midst of the most significant deployment of U.S. civilian expertise to a war zone in decades. The 

increase, coordinated by the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and 

Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew, includes some of the top experts from 10 different U.S. 

government departments and agencies. Many have previous experience in Afghanistan or other 

conflict environments. U.S. civilian experts contribute to the mission in field, especially in the East 

and South where a majority of U.S. combat forces are operating and many of the additional 30,000 

forces announced by President Obama will deploy. They work alongside our military forces in the 

critical districts where ISAF is focusing its efforts in 2010, partnering with Afghans to enhance the 

capacity of national and sub-national government institutions and to help rehabilitate Afghanistan’s 

key economic sectors. When their tours are complete, permanent civilian experts are encouraged to 

continue service on Afghanistan or Pakistan, in Washington or abroad, as well as to help in training 

their successors. Our goal is to create a cadre of civilian expertise on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Key Initiatives

 Enhanced Civilian Presence: The vast majority of civilian experts deploy to Afghanistan for a 

minimum of one year. Under the first phase of this uplift, the civilian footprint in Afghanistan 

tripled from roughly 300 personnel on the ground in January 2009 to nearly 1,000 on the ground 

in early 2010. We anticipate further increasing our civilian staffing in 2010 by another 20 to 30 

percent, concentrating experts in the field and at key ministries that deliver vital services to the 

Afghan people. Additional civilian deployments for 2010 will be phased and closely linked to 

military deployments. Each U.S. civilian hires or works with an average of 10 Afghans and other 

implementing partner personnel. Additionally, civilians act as force multipliers for military 

personnel, helping build relationships with local community leaders and coordinate military civil 

affairs projects with civilian programs. Civilian personnel will remain deployed in significant 

numbers even after the security situation improves and our combat troops come home. 

 Expanded Presence in Ministries and Outside of Kabul: Responding to the Afghan 

government’s request for targeted technical assistance, we are placing more than 50 additional 

civilian advisors in core Afghan ministries. Outside of Kabul, we are deploying several hundred 

additional personnel to more than 50 locations. In addition to staffing 26 PRTs, civilians are 

leading 28 District Support Teams (DSTs) located in key districts where we are working with 

Afghan government partners to jumpstart service delivery. More than a dozen additional DSTs 

will come online in 2010 focused on the same districts where ISAF is working to reverse Taliban 

momentum and improve security. Civilians will also extend our permanent diplomatic presence 

outside of Kabul by staffing new consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, which will serve as 

assistance platforms for the North and West and also symbolize our long-term, increasingly 

normal relationship with Afghanistan.

 Enhanced Training: All civilians now complete a minimum standard training curriculum, prior 

to deploying, including an Afghanistan familiarization course and a personal security course 

(Foreign Affairs Counter Threat). Personnel deploying outside of Kabul to Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and other civ-mil platforms are required to complete a classroom 
-4-

course covering the unique environment in which they will operate. These field-bound personnel 

then report to Camp Atterbury in Indiana, where they undergo an intensive, weeklong field 

training experience with U.S. military personnel that exposes them to situations that they will 

encounter in Afghanistan. Many State Department personnel also undergo intensive language 

training prior to deploying to Afghanistan.

 Enhanced Leadership: All U.S. government civilians report to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul 

through a unified chain of command with new senior civilian representatives at each Regional 

Command and at every civ-mil platform. The result is improved civ-mil coordination at all levels 

of effort. At the embassy, personnel have also been reorganized by function instead of by agency. 

An Ambassadorial-level Coordinator oversees the whole-of-government civilian assistance 

program for Civilian Assistance.

Milestones

 Nearly 1,000 civilian experts deployed by early 2010.

 Expansion of civilian footprint throughout 2010 in conjunction with the arrival of additional U.S. 

military units in key Afghan districts (estimated 20-30 percent increase over early 2010 levels).

 Increased percentage of civilians serving back-to-back tours related to Afghanistan and Pakistan 

and completing additional relevant language and cultural training.

 Sustainment of increased civilian levels in Afghanistan beyond July 2011, with a continued 

emphasis on matching expertise to specific missions on the ground.

 Accelerated timeline for responding to Afghan government requests to provide civilian experts in 

critical ministries.

Resource Requirements

Resources available to meet requirements from FY 2010 and prior year appropriations:

approximately $400 million.
-5-

Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Agriculture Sector

Job creation is among our most urgent tasks. It is critical to undermine extremists’ appeal in the 

short-term and for sustainable economic growth in the long-term. Our top reconstruction priority is 

implementing a civilian-military agriculture development strategy to restore Afghanistan’s once 

vibrant agriculture sector with support from USAID, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 

and the Army National Guard Agri-business Development Teams. Agriculture is the quickest way to 

create jobs for men and women that will help sap the insurgency of fighters as well as income from 

poppy cultivation. This effort stresses Afghan leadership at all programming levels and was 

developed in close coordination with the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock 

(MAIL). Our objectives are:

1. Increase agricultural sector jobs rapidly and also income from agriculture. Specifically:

 Increase agricultural productivity by increasing farmers’ access to inputs and effective 

extension services; 

 Regenerate agribusiness by increasing linkages between farmers, markets, credit, and trade 

corridors; and 

 Rehabilitate watersheds and improve irrigation infrastructure through labor-intensive 

erosion control and reforestation activities, irrigation infrastructure repair and rebuilding, and 

training.

2. Increase Afghans’ confidence in their government by increasing MAIL’s capacity to deliver 

services, as well as promote the private sector and farmers associations, through technical 

assistance and direct budget assistance.

Key Initiatives:

 Deployment of Additional Civilian Experts: 89 agricultural experts (64 from USDA, 25 from 

USAID) will be on the ground in Afghanistan by early 2010. They will work in the South and 

East on Provincial Reconstruction Teams, District Support Teams, Regional Commands and Task 

Forces, and partner with MAIL staff to build Afghan capacity to deliver extension services.

 Agriculture Rapid Response: USAID is issuing vouchers to farmers in 18 provinces,

particularly in Helmand and Kandahar, for inputs offering long-term, profitable alternatives to

poppy (e.g., fruit and nut saplings, grape vines and trellises). The effort helps tens of thousands 

of farmers, and provides local employment and grants for value-added enterprises.

 High Impact Irrigation Initiative: Enhancing water management is key to increasing licit 

agricultural output and also helps increase energy production. The United States built significant 

Afghan irrigation infrastructure in the 1960s, and our new irrigation infrastructure projects will 

increase the area of arable land, as well as farmers’ access to water, through linkages to large 

irrigation systems. This program will improve quality assurance and monitoring for water 

engineering projects by building a team of Afghan technical irrigation experts to monitor 

irrigation projects implemented by quick impact programs, such as Local Governance and 

Community Development (LGCD) and the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP).
-6-

 Agribusiness Development: This civ-mil effort invigorates agribusiness by increasing linkages 

between farmers and markets via support to trade corridors and the Afghan private sector and 

associations. Efforts will focus on: (1) agribusiness market promotion and trans-border 

facilitation; (2) transportation and storage; (3) food safety; (4) pest risk management; (5) 

opportunities for contract farming; and (6) packaging, post-harvest handling, and processing for 

sales. This program will also be facilitated by increased credit availability. Since women 

constitute a significant portion of small farmers and face additional barriers to success, we are 

providing specialized training and assistance to women in the agriculture sector (see p. 23).

 Extension services delivery to farmers: Provide technical assistance for the development of 

extension policy, procedures, and effective delivery of extension services. 

 Watershed rehabilitation: Labor-intensive methods to rehabilitate degraded watersheds that 

will support improved irrigation. 

Milestones

 Significantly and rapidly expand employment opportunities in the agricultural sector quarter by 

quarter.

 Increased numbers of agricultural extension agents deployed to a majority of key districts in the 

South and East, expanding Afghan farmers’ access to technical assistance and agricultural inputs 

(e.g., seeds, fertilizer). 

 Implementation of an agricultural credit system in advance of the 2010 planting season.

 Increased licit crop production, especially in the Helmand River Valley, sustaining the current 

drop in poppy cultivation beyond July 2011. 

 Rehabilitation and expansion of key irrigation infrastructure, especially in the Helmand River 

Valley, with Afghan MAIL extension agents assuming increased responsibility for maintenance.

 Foundation for high-value crop production solidified, with an increased number of Afghans 

generating licit income from fruits, nuts, and other high-value food products for export to foreign 

markets by 2012.

 Expansion of cold storage, food processing, and related infrastructure to support export of food 

products to neighboring countries.

Resource Requirements

FY 2009 – FY 2011

($ millions)

Function FY 2009 

Total

FY 2010

Estimate

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

Request

FY 2011

Request

Agricultural Development 125 260 215 240

TOTAL 125 260 215 240
-7-

Strengthening Afghan Governance

Improving the Afghan people’s confidence in their government requires improved service delivery, 

greater accountability, and more protection from predatory practices, particularly in communities

where the Taliban is providing its own brand of brutal but efficient governance. Recognizing that 

security is a precondition for governance, our principal objective is to help make local government 

more visible, accountable, and responsive, focusing on the South and the East. Early progress will 

most likely be attainable in reform-oriented service delivery ministries and at the sub-national level, 

where Afghan government officials are in closer contact with, and therefore more responsive to, their 

constituents. We will continue to work with core ministries in Kabul. But we are also broadening 

our support and engagement at the provincial and district levels, where our most consequential 

programs will be delivered. One size does not fit all; consequently, our programs are increasingly

aligned with the priorities of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and other 

Afghan government entities, while also being tailored to address the circumstances in the particular 

province, district, or municipality where they are being implemented. A crosscutting element of all 

governance programs is support for reinvigorated Afghan plans to fight corruption, with concrete 

measures of progress toward greater accountability.

Key Initiatives

 Reducing Corruption: President Karzai’s inaugural address highlighted the need to significantly 

reduce corruption by improving the legitimacy, transparency, and accountability of government 

officials and institutions. His words must now be matched with action. In partnership with the 

Afghan government, we will: (1) reduce corruption by strengthening institutions that can provide 

checks on government power and (2) communicate the Afghan government’s anti-corruption gains. 

Challenges to progress that our programs aim to address, include: low pay for Afghan government 

officials, lack of oversight, powerful patronage networks; and untrained bureaucracy. Major efforts

will include: improving financial oversight; building judicial capacity to investigate, prosecute and 

remove corrupt officials; and education and empowerment of the Afghan public to participate in 

transparent and accountable governance. There will be a renewed international effort to encourage

prosecutions for narcotics and corruption-related crimes and also expanded support for the 

following efforts:

o Afghan Independent Anti-Corruption Tribunal: The Afghan government has already 

appointed 11 justices to this new body, which is designed to combat abuse of power, while 

also encouraging and supporting Afghan efforts to remove and prosecute corrupt officials. 

We will provide technical assistance and related support.

o Major Crimes Task Force: Located in the Afghan Ministry of Interior, the task force is a

partnership with the Afghan government, the United States, and the United Kingdom. It is

conducting preliminary investigations of Afghan officials’ links to illicit activities.

o Afghan Attorney General’s Anti-Corruption Unit: We will strengthen the audit and 

oversight capabilities of the Attorney General’s office, which recently announced 

investigations of several current and former Afghan ministers.

o High Office of Oversight: The High Office is the primary Afghan government anticorruption body, and oversees prevention, planning, implementation, investigations, and 
-8-

prosecutions. We support President Karzai’s plans to empower this Afghan entity that is 

responsible for identifying corrupt and fraudulent activities in the government. The High 

Office convened a national anti-corruption conference December 15-17, 2009.

o Expanding Mobile Finance: A pilot mobile payment program provides Afghan police 

full salaries on time and will be extended to additional provinces, the Afghan National 

Army, and other key ministries, reducing opportunities for graft and diversion of funds. 

 Enhancing Sub-National Governance: We are sharpening our focus on sub-national actors and 

institutions, with the goal of making local government more visible, accountable, and capable. 

We will motivate service delivery ministries to increase their official presence in targeted 

Provinces and Districts through insertion of ministry representatives. Significant challenges to 

improving sub-national governance include: local officials’ lack of education, experience, and 

limited resources; and obstruction from local powerbrokers whose actions are sometimes 

inconsistent with the Afghan constitution. While encouraging immediate passage and 

implementation of the Afghan Sub-national Governance Policy, which will clarify and strengthen 

roles of sub-national institutions and actors, we are also expanding support for Afghan programs 

and launching several new programs with the Afghan government: 

o District Development Plan: This new program partners Afghan officials from critical 

service delivery ministries (e.g., the Ministries of Finance, Public Health, Education, 

Agriculture, and Rural Rehabilitation and Development) with U.S. civilian experts and 

ISAF to deliver an integrated package of basic services in areas recently cleared by ISAF. It 

is being piloted in six districts in the East and South, with an eye towards expansion in 2010 

dependent on performance. 

o Local Governance and Community Development: Similar to the National Solidarity 

Program, this effort provides community cash grants to provincial-level and district-level 

shuras in less secure provinces in Afghanistan’s South, East, and West. 

o Afghanistan Social Outreach Program: We are expanding our support for this Afghan 

initiative which bridges the gap between communities and district authorities through the 

creation of temporary district-level shuras, the establishment of local community councils, 

and performance-based funds for governors. We will ensure that disenfranchised groups, 

including Afghan women, are included in this outreach.

o Afghan Municipality Support Program: Mayors of 42 municipalities, including Kabul, 

will be provided block grants to improve service delivery. 

o Performance-Based Governors Fund: Provincial governors will be provided a monthly 

budget to strengthen contact with their population and more quickly respond to their needs.

 Enhancing Afghan Capacity: We have launched targeted capacity development programs and 

are supporting Afghan government initiatives (e.g., the Afghan Civilian Technical Assistance 

Plan and the Afghan Civil Service Commission Support Program) to build stronger, more 

transparent, and accountable institutions. The Civil Service Commission has established an 

ambitious goal of training 16,000 civil servants, most of who work in provincial and district 
-9-

centers, within the next 12 months. We will also help expand opportunities for women in the 

Afghan civil service by providing specialized training programs (see p. 24).

 Encouraging Merit-Based Appointments: Ministers and governors can help or hinder reform. 

We will work closely with the Senior Appointments Board, IDLG, and the Civil Service 

Commission to enforce merit-based appointments in the critical ministries, provinces, and 

districts. We will also encourage institutions to remove incompetent officials. 

 Leveraging Our Assistance: We will use our assistance not only to empower sub-national 

government, but also to incentivize improved performance, accountability, and transparency. 

 Ensuring Effective Representation: We are working with the United Nations in support of 

Afghan efforts to reform Afghanistan’s electoral system and nascent democratic machinery. We 

are also encouraging greater participation by women in Afghan electoral politics in advance of 

Parliamentary elections scheduled for the second half of 2010.

Milestones

 Service Delivery and Capacity Building: 

o Improved service delivery at the sub-national level in the critical areas of health, 

education, and security (e.g., expanded access to basic healthcare and schooling at the 

district level; expanded vocational training opportunities at the provincial level). (See 

page 12 for milestones related to provision of justice.)

o Key service delivery programs in core ministries increasingly Afghan-led, with sustained 

but decreasing levels of international support over the long-term.

 Sub-national Governance:

o Afghan Sub-national Governance Policy approved and implemented, including provision 

of additional resources to provincial officials.

o Critical ministries actively strengthening provincial and local capacity by linking to and 

supporting key local bodies (e.g., MAIL extension offices).

o Expanded presence of core ministries (e.g., Education, Health, MAIL, Interior) in key 

provinces and districts in the South and East in the form of increased numbers of 

permanently fielded official personnel and increased visits by government ministers.

o Governors viewed as more visible and responsive in the provinces as a result of the 

Performance-Based Governors Fund. 

o Afghanistan Social Outreach Program-funded councils begin to close the gap between 

formal local government institutions and community elders on a range of issues, including 

reintegration of former Taliban and the informal justice system. 
-10-

 Corruption: 

o Appointment of competent, reform-minded leaders of critical ministries (e.g., Finance, 

MAIL, Health, Education, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Defense, Interior, and 

Women’s Affairs), and also to key provincial and district positions in the South and East.

o Concrete action by the Afghan government against corrupt officials and known criminals

(e.g., increased investigations by the Major Crimes Task Force resulting in criminal 

charges; public prosecutions of corrupt officials).

o Enhanced oversight of ministries, especially police (e.g., creation and strengthening of 

inspector general functions in core ministries; increased audits of major programs).

o Expansion of electronic payment systems to pay all Afghan National Army, all Afghan 

National Police units, and other government ministries no later than December 2010.

o Decreased evidence of political interference with Afghanistan’s Chief Prosecutor and 

other Afghan law enforcement bodies, and more generally in anticorruption enforcement.

 Democratic Representation: 

o Political agreement on the way forward for elections scheduled for 2010 and beyond. 

o Implementation of agreed reforms to elections and related laws.

o Continued progress in ensuring that Afghanistan’s elected government is representative of 

all Afghans, including women.
-11-

Resource Requirements

FY 2009 – FY 2011

($ millions)

Function FY 2009 

Total

FY 2010

Estimate

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

Request

FY 2011

Request

Provincial Reconstruction Teams 253 218 216 620

Afghanistan Reconstruction 

Trust Fund

225 200 450 600

Budget Support - 40 115 200

National/Sub-national 

governance, Anti-corruption

264 149 195 210

Civil Society 22 22 - 30

Elections 177 25 - 50

TOTAL 941 654 976 1,710
-12-

Enhancing Afghan Rule of Law

Alongside efforts to train more capable police, we are also focusing our rule of law effort on helping 

the Afghan government and local communities develop responsive and predictable dispute resolution 

mechanisms that offer an alternative to brutal Taliban justice. Those dispute resolution systems must 

be linked to a more efficient corrections system that offers offenders rehabilitative opportunities

instead of a path towards radicalization. The limited, unresponsive, and unreliable nature of the 

Afghan justice system is a central source of Afghans’ grievances with their government and has 

opened the door to Taliban ―shadow governance.‖ As long as the population views the government 

as weak or predatory, Taliban approaches to security and justice will continue to be accepted. We are 

committed to helping the Afghan government reverse this trend. 

The U.S. Rule of Law Strategy for Afghanistan, through USAID’s new Rule of Law Stabilization 

Program (RLS) and State INL’s Administration of Justice programs (AOJ), supports Afghan efforts 

to strengthen their justice sector by focusing on: the formal state justice system; traditional dispute 

resolution; and the civilian corrections system. Our objectives are to: 

1. Improve and expand access to the formal justice sector by increasing capacity and reducing 

corruption in key state justice institutions.

2. Partner with the Afghan government to build a safe, secure, and humane corrections system to 

reduce the radicalization of prisoners and stop the spread of the insurgency in Afghan prisons. 

3. Assist Afghan efforts to stabilize the traditional justice system, with an emphasis on informal 

dispute resolution councils in areas cleared of the Taliban to ensure dispute resolution needs in 

communities are being met.

4. Build the leadership capacity of the Afghan government’s justice sector, and civil society. 

5. Strengthen public legal outreach and awareness through strategic communications.

Key Initiatives

 Strengthening Traditional Justice: We will help create space for traditional dispute resolution 

mechanisms, which will help uphold the rule of law and Afghanistan’s constitution, to re-emerge 

in areas cleared of the Taliban. A USAID pilot project will focus on re-establishing dispute 

resolution mechanisms through shuras and jirgas in cleared areas initially focused on the South. 

The program will be assessed after six months to determine if it should be expanded. We will 

also continue to fund NGO efforts to assist the Ministry of Justice with establishing a national 

policy on traditional dispute resolution and will support expansion of traditional justice 

mechanisms as a top priority. This is based on the recognition that at the sub-national level

Afghans predominantly resolve their disputes through traditional means. We will start by 

selecting NGO-implemented traditional dispute resolution programs from two new areas, for a 

total of six pilot projects. Over time, traditional justice mechanisms will be increasingly linked to 

the evolving formal justice sector. Consistent with protections provided under the Afghan 

constitution and international standards, these mechanisms will play a larger role in expanded 

enforcement of the rights of women and other traditionally marginalized groups. 
-13-

 Capacity Building for Formal Justice Sector:

o Courts: Provide professional training to judges and strengthen the capacity of the courts 

in management and budgeting. We are increasing capacity and reducing corruption in the 

courts through the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP), and also including training on 

women’s rights and the laws that protect women.

o Attorney General’s Office (AGO): Technical and advisory support to strengthen 

capacity and provide training to all prosecutors and criminal investigative police.

o Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU)/Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF): Maintain and 

enhance technical, material and advisory support to the ACU and assist establishment of 

the special prosecutorial unit of the MCTF. New activities include support to the attorney 

general's publications department to develop an anti-corruption awareness campaign.

o Ministry of Justice (MOJ): Sustain technical, material and advisory support, focusing on 

training Legal Aid attorneys and legislative drafting support. Assistance will help 

establish a Public Affairs Office as required by the National Justice Plan.

o Afghan Court Administration System (ACAS) and National Case Management 

System: Continue USAID-developed computerized system for tracking cases within the 

court system. Judges and administrators throughout the country have been trained on the 

system, improving caseload management. Support the Afghan Government’s commitment 

through a signed memorandum of understanding to implement nationally the Case 

Management System developed by INL and piloted in Kabul. 

 Corrections Sector Support: We are helping the Afghan government expand the reach of its 

corrections system, with a focus on the South and East. New efforts include a de-radicalization

team, reintegration efforts, and rehabilitation programming for prisoners. We will continue 

training officials in Afghanistan’s Central Prison Directorate (emphasizing women’s rights as 

appropriate), construct and renovate Afghan corrections facilities, and support the Corrections 

System Support Program.

 Enhanced Access to Formal Justice: We will dedicate additional resources to improving

Afghans’ access to formal justice at the district and provincial levels, with an emphasis on legal 

aid, gender and juvenile justice issues. We will also continue to host provincial justice 

conferences and training, which bring national and local justice professionals together.

 Enhanced and Focused Outreach: Activities will highlight alternatives to the Taliban shadow 

justice system by publishing and distributing legal-awareness print publications and broadcasting 

new radio and television legal-awareness-programs. We also will help develop the capacity of 

the Supreme Court, Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 

Commission to conduct their own public legal outreach programs and lobby on behalf of human 

rights, including the rights of women. 

Milestones

o Increased appropriate use of the traditional justice system in ways that are consistent with the 

Afghan constitution (e.g., land dispute cases handled through traditional structures; serious 
-14-

criminal cases, like murder, through the formal system) in key districts in the South and East. 

o Enhanced capacity of Afghan courts to process criminal cases – especially anticorruption—

including increased case load and a decreased, more normalized processing timeline for cases. 

o Measurable reduction in the Taliban recruitment in Afghanistan’s prisons, as well as Taliban 

command and control from prisons. 

o Transition of U.S. detainee operations to Afghan control, when appropriate conditions are met. 

Resource Requirements

FY 2009 – FY 2011

($ millions)

Function FY 2009 

Total

FY 2010

Estimate

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

Request

FY 2011

Request

Rule of Law (USAID) 33 25 50 50

Rule of Law (INL) 188 161 175 198

TOTAL 221 186 225 248
-15-

Supporting Afghan-led Reintegration

Reintegration is the absorption back into Afghan society of the local insurgent commanders and their 

followers, most of whom have no links to al-Qaeda or any extremist political agenda and have sided 

with the Taliban because of money, expedience, or coercion. Many Afghan districts are under neither 

Taliban nor government control. Others, while nominally influenced by the Taliban, are animated 

largely by local disputes. Consequently, our aim is to enhance security by supporting political 

arrangements that prevent al-Qaeda’s return and that allow the Afghan government to expand service 

delivery and establish non-violent politics.

President Karzai announced the broad parameters of an Afghan government reintegration program in 

January 2010. We joined our international partners at the London Conference in reiterating our 

support for Afghan-led efforts to reintegrate individuals and communities who renounce al-Qaeda, 

cease violence, and accept the Afghan constitution. The Afghan program will: reach out to 

communities, individuals, and groups; coordinate protection, amnesty, and support (such as 

employment) to those who reintegrate; and support monitoring and de-radicalization mechanisms. 

Reintegration will not cede political authority or territory to insurgents, and is more complex than 

simply paying insurgents to stop fighting. Rather, successful reintegration will require providing 

security against reprisals to individuals and communities; creation of sustainable economic 

opportunities; de-radicalization programs tailored to local communities; and skills training and

conflict-resolution programs that offer a more promising future to marginalized individuals.

A joint ISAF-U.S. Embassy cell will coordinate U.S. efforts in the field to support Afghan-led 

reintegration, working closely with Afghan officials and our international partners. U.S. support will 

be shaped by the following principles:

 The Afghan government will take a strong political lead on the process, with U.S. military

personnel in the field playing a supporting role. 

 Groups as well as individuals will be identified for reintegration. 

 Adequate resources will be provided for the livelihood of former combatants and their families; 

the availability of funds for this purpose is essential. 

 Commanders contemplating reintegration will receive credible security guarantees so that they 

need not fear that while they negotiate with one entity (e.g. the Afghan government) they will be 

detained or killed by another (e.g. counter-terrorist operatives). 

Enabling factors will vary depending on local conditions and draw on civilian programs, including:

 Targeted economic development and licit job creation (emphasis on agriculture) funneled through 

USAID and DoD funds (the Afghanistan Reintegration Program Authority), as well as 

international contributions;

 Enhanced dialogue and cooperation between Kabul and local political actors; and 

 Improved local governance and provision of basic justice.
-16-

We will strongly encourage women’s involvement in Afghan conflict-resolution and post-conflict 

processes. Additionally, our Embassy in Kabul is working with ISAF to ensure that reintegration 

efforts incorporate elements of these programs and continue to advance all Afghans’ rights as 

guaranteed under the Afghan constitution. As the President emphasized in his 2010 State of the 

Union Address, our policies in Afghanistan will reflect our national values, including support for 

universally recognized human rights. We will not compromise our values on this issue.

Milestones

 Afghan government reintegration plan approved and launched, with close international 

coordination and consultation with key stakeholders in Afghan society – including women – by 

mid-2010.

 Limited numbers of groups and individuals reintegrated by December 2010, reducing the size of 

the security problem.

 Number of key Afghan districts under Taliban control/influence decreases on a quarter-by-quarter 

basis.

 Senior Afghan Taliban leadership increasingly isolated.

 Reintegration efforts are gaining traction in areas clear of Taliban control for more than six

months. 

Resource Requirements

 Funding requirements will likely exceed $100 million per year for several years. Congress 

recently authorized the use of the Department of Defense’s FY 2010 funds for reintegration. 

Japan, the U.K., and other partners have also pledged money to a newly created international trust 

fund to support Afghan-led reintegration efforts.
-17-

Combating the Afghan Narcotics Trade

The narcotics trade has a corrosive effect on Afghan governance, contributing to official corruption 

and also providing an important source of funding to the Taliban. For years, the United States 

supported eradication efforts that did not sizably reduce the size of the regional narcotics trade. U.S. 

supported eradication also undermined the counterinsurgency effort by targeting Afghan farmers 

instead of the narco-traffickers. Our new whole-of-government approach emphasizes interdiction, 

instead of eradication, and has two core goals: (1) to counter the insurgency-narcotics nexus and 

reduce funding to the Taliban and other anti-Afghan government forces; and (2) to alleviate the 

corruption-narcotics nexus and strengthen ties between the Afghan people and their government. 

We are using our military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement assets to target insurgents 

and those who undermine the legitimate government and economy of Afghanistan. We are also 

assisting Afghan government efforts to target individuals involved in the drug trade, including 

government officials and criminal networks. This includes utilizing all available legal extradition 

vehicles, including multilateral conventions. Complementing focused efforts are demand reduction 

activities, public information campaigns, and our new civ-mil agriculture strategy, which creates licit 

jobs and income and provides farmers with sustainable alternatives to poppy cultivation. 

Key Initiatives:

 Interdicting Drug Traffickers, Precursor Chemicals, and Financial Flows: We have shifted 

from ineffective, large-scale poppy eradication to: disrupting (1) the flow of drugs out of 

Afghanistan, and (2) the flow of precursor chemicals and illicit funds necessary for the production 

of those drugs into the country. We are also targeting narco-insurgency networks and shutting 

down drug bazaars – an approach that is already showing results. Local Afghan officials will 

continue their independent eradication efforts, as appropriate, and we will reinforce progress in 

reducing opium cultivation through successful programs like the Good Performers Initiative 

(GPI) which rewards poppy free provinces with additional agricultural and economic support. 

 Additional Personnel and Enhanced Civ-Mil Coordination: We have significantly increased

DEA personnel in Afghanistan, from 13 positions in January 2009 to 81 permanent positions by 

December 31, 2009, plus additional temporary personnel. New coordination structures, including 

the Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC) in London, the Interagency Operations and 

Coordination Center (IOCC) in Kabul, the Border Management Task Force (BMTF) in Kabul, 

and the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) in Kandahar, enhance civ-mil 

coordination.

 Increased Agricultural Assistance for Farmers: We are enhancing assistance to farmers 

through: agricultural voucher programs like the Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Productive 

Agriculture (AVIPA)-Plus; extension services; technical advice on critical sectors including 

irrigation, watershed and rangeland management; and efforts across agricultural value chains 

(e.g., from planting to harvest, to transport and storage, to marketing inside and outside 

Afghanistan). Promotion of high-value licit crops such as fruits and nuts to move farmers away 

from growing poppy and other illicit crops is an equal priority.

 Supporting Afghan Counternarcotics Institutions: We are enhancing our capacity building 

and support for Afghan institutions at the center of the counternarcotics effort. DEA has 

expanded efforts to train the Afghan Counternarcotics Police’s (CNP-A) specialized units. We 
-18-

are also helping build the counternarcotics capacity of the Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics; 

the Ministry of Interior; the Counternarcotics Judicial Task Force; the Major Crimes Task Force; 

and the Counternarcotics Tribunal, which is responsible for prosecuting narco-traffickers. 

 Regional Outreach: The Afghan drug trade has negative repercussions for regional security, and 

several of Afghanistan’s neighbors have a stated interest in helping the Afghan government’s 

counternarcotics efforts. A significant new initiative is our work with Russia, through the

Bilateral Presidential Commission and its working groups, to stem regional drug flows, promote 

information exchange on threat finance, and reduce demand for heroin that sustains the 

Afghanistan drug trade. More generally, we will enhance regional and international community 

support by: (1) coordinating our counternarcotics assistance to Pakistan so that it reinforces U.S. 

efforts in Afghanistan; (2) expanding our counternarcotics engagement with Afghanistan’s 

neighbors and regional actors including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime; (3) strengthening 

cross-border cooperation between Afghanistan and neighboring countries; and (4) working with 

Gulf States to enhance their international threat finance capabilities. 

Milestones

 Increased interdiction and prosecution of narco-traffickers cooperating with the insurgency, as 

well as destruction of precursor chemicals and drug bazaars. 

 Increased number of GPI-recipient provinces, demonstrating an overall reduction in poppy 

cultivation and a sustainable shift by farmers to licit agriculture.

 Increased capacity on the part of Afghan counternarcotics institutions to carry out operations, and 

to treat and rehabilitate addicts, with decreasing foreign operational assistance over time.

 Increased coordinated action by Afghanistan’s neighbors to stop drug and related flows.

 Increased licit crop production, especially in the Helmand River Valley, sustaining the current 

drop in poppy cultivation beyond July 2011. 

Resource Requirements

FY 2009 – FY 2011

($ millions)

Function FY 2009 

Total

FY 2010

Estimate

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

Request

FY 2011

Request

Counternarcotics 

(Alternative Development)

165 208 135 185

Counternarcotics 

(Interdiction, Demand 

Reduction, Communications)

297 259 25 252

TOTAL 462 467 160 437
-19-

Building an Economic Foundation for Afghanistan’s Future

As President Obama stated in his December 1 address, the United States is committed to ―a lasting 

partnership‖ with Afghanistan. Though our military mission is time limited, our civilian assistance 

effort will continue long after the security situation improves and our combat troops come home. In 

short: the United States will not abandon the Afghan people.

More than 30 years of war have left Afghanistan’s economic and social sectors devastated. 

Recognizing ―nation-building‖ is best left to the Afghan people, our stabilization and economic 

development programs are narrowly focused on helping Afghans begin to repair this damage, rebuild 

critical infrastructure, and provide a foundation for sustainable economic growth. Our objectives are 

to: (1) create sustainable jobs in the private sector; (2) increase the Afghan government’s capacity to 

deliver public services to support sustainable growth and development, especially health and 

education; (3) expand and improve energy and infrastructure sectors, including telecommunications, 

large-scale water and power projects and continue work on provincial road projects; and (4) pursue 

Afghan government fiscal sustainability. Alongside ISAF’s population-focused security strategy, we 

are focusing primarily on population centers and key economics corridors while reinforcing and 

supplementing the efforts of our agricultural strategy. Support for regional economic integration will 

help accelerate economic renewal. Over the long-term, we will help the Afghan government 

diversify Afghanistan’s private sector, improve infrastructure, and improve fiscal sustainability. 

Key Initiatives

 Enhancing Health Services and Educational Opportunities: Since 2001, significant 

improvements have been made in the availability of basic health services and reducing the spread 

of infectious disease. Equally significant gains have been made in training teachers, building 

schools, and ensuring educational opportunities for all Afghans, regardless of gender. We will 

sustain our efforts to build the Afghan government’s health and education systems. Not only is 

education a top priority for the Afghan people, but it also diminishes extremist influence. 

Alongside further advances in healthcare, U.S. social sector programs will build Afghanistan’s 

human capital, and long-term economic potential, while connecting Afghans to their government. 

 Enhancement of Core Value Chains: Support to entrepreneurs in five value chains – rugs, 

grapes, gems, marble, and cashmere – will create licit jobs and economic opportunity. Our 

programs promote increased market information and access to domestic and international 

markets, build organizational capacity, and further develop Afghanistan’s workforce, including 

women. One area of emphasis is the mining sector, which has the potential to generate 

significant additional jobs and government revenue in the mid- to long-term. Programs will 

support the ―mines to market‖ value chain for marble and gemstones through mining safety, 

cutting and testing trainings on-site, equipment supply, public-private partnerships, market 

linkages, and industry infrastructure strengthening. An initial assessment of the mining sector 

conducted by US Geological Services shows promise in the areas of oil and gas, coal and mineral 

exploration as well. We have begun conversations with the Afghan government on how to 

further explore these sectors that are key to Afghanistan’s future economy. We have identified 

five advisors to provide expert technical assistance to the Ministry of Mines and are supporting 

development of the Afghan government’s new mining regulations.
-20-

 Financial Sector Development: We are working with Afghan organizations to extend lending to 

non-permissive areas and vulnerable groups – especially women – through support to credit 

unions, commercial banking systems, and non-bank financial systems. This includes credit 

initiatives to promote the rural economy through agro-processors, distributors, buyers, 

agricultural cooperatives, traditional lending, and mobile banking. 

 Increasing Border Security and Customs Revenue: Increasing the capability of the Afghan 

government to control its borders is critical to long-term economic growth. In coordination with 

our international partners, we will assist Afghan efforts to develop a sustainable border 

management program that facilitates trade and improves customs revenue, while also 

strengthening the Afghan government’s capabilities to interdict drug traffickers, precursor 

chemicals, and illicit financial transactions.

o Border Management Task Force (BMTF): This civ-mil initiative is directed by 

personnel from the Department of Homeland Security. It helps the Afghan government 

coordinate its border institutions, assist in the harmonization of international projects, 

improve border crossings at official points of entry, and encourage the Afghan 

government to develop a cohesive border strategy. The BMTF is also responsible for 

helping Afghanistan coordinate the training of customs and border entities, and 

deconflicting customs and border issues by working closely with the Afghan-led Border 

Issues Working Group. Separately, the BMTF’s support for the Informal Customs 

Network coordinates international donor efforts on customs, including development of 

infrastructures at Afghanistan’s principal border crossing points. 

 Infrastructure development: Increased access to power will enable job creation and economic 

growth. Our emphasis is on major energy infrastructure rehabilitation (e.g., the Kajaki Dam, 

Darunta Dam, and Sheberghan gas generation plant) and expanding use of renewable energy 

systems for over 300 communities. District and provincial road construction projects in the East 

and South will connect farmers and entrepreneurs to internal and external markets.

Milestones

 Significantly enhanced full-time employment opportunities in focus sectors by December 2011.

 200,000 farmers and entrepreneurs have access to credit.

 Approximately 1,500 MW of additional electricity generation and transmission capacity online by 

2013 (from 389 MW in April 2009).

 Channel at least 40 percent of the USG’s development assistance budget through Afghan 

government and local Afghan NGOs. 

 Afghanistan qualifies for $1 billion in debt relief by July 2011 as a result of meeting IMF and 

World Bank requirements.

The Afghan National Customs Academy (ANCA) trains at least 200 students by December 2010, 

with operational management for the ANCA transferred to the Afghan government by late 2011.
-21-

Resource Requirements

FY 2009 - 2011

($ millions)

Function FY 2009 

Total

FY 2010

Estimate

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

Request

FY 2011

Request

Roads 129 207 - 230

Power 134 139 - 230

Vertical Structures - - - 65

Economic Growth and Private 

Sector

271 288 100 373

Education 94 104 50 95

Health 124 105 50 154

Other Social 55 32 - 5

TOTAL 807 875 200 1,152
-22-

Advancing the Rights of Afghan Women and Girls

Women’s empowerment is inextricably linked to the achievement of our objectives in Afghanistan –

including improvements in Afghanistan’s security, economic opportunity, governance, and social 

development. Afghanistan cannot prosper if half of its citizens are left behind. Consequently, the 

President’s strategy for Afghanistan includes assistance to women to build their capacity to 

participate fully in Afghan society. This is a key component of efforts to strengthen Afghan 

communities against the reach of extremists. Our goals are to help the Afghans:

 Improve the security of women and institutions that serve women;

 Support women’s leadership development in the public, private, and voluntary sectors;

 Promote women’s access to formal and informal justice mechanisms;

 Enforce existing law and Constitutional rights of women;

 Improve women’s and girls’ access to education and healthcare;

 Strengthen and expand economic development opportunities for women, especially in the 

agriculture sector; and

 Increase women’s political empowerment and participation.

Support for these goals is integrated throughout all U.S. programs in Afghanistan detailed in this 

Stabilization Plan, including programs in education, health, security, rule of law, and economic 

development. Additionally, our Embassy in Kabul is working with ISAF to ensure that reintegration 

efforts incorporate elements of these programs and continue to advance women’s rights. This is a 

comprehensive, forward-looking agenda that stands in stark contrast to al-Qaeda’s recently 

announced agenda for Afghanistan’s women: attempting to send female suicide bombers to the West. 

Recognizing that women’s issues are not confined to government-to-government ties, we are 

collaborating closely with partners in the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 

and individuals in the United States who have come together through the U.S.-Afghan Women’s 

Council to support Afghan women. 

As President Obama emphasized in his 2010 State of the Union Address, our policies in Afghanistan 

will also reflect our national values and ―support the rights of all Afghans – men and women alike.‖ 

Safeguarding women’s rights, while also ensuring women have a voice in critical discussions about 

Afghanistan’s future, is a priority. We will not compromise our values on this issue. 

Key Initiatives

 Education: Investing in girls’ education is the single most effective development decision a 

country can make. U.S. efforts are increasing recruitment and training for women teachers, 

raising the female literacy rates, and improving access to education at all levels. Our assistance 

focuses on 25 provinces benefitting more than one million women and girls. 

 Health: Progress on women’s health has been substantial since 2002, though health indicators, 
-23-

particularly in reproductive health, remain low. We will expand existing programs to further 

increase women’s access to: health services; essential medicine; family planning, pre- and 

postnatal care; and drug treatment centers for women.

 Economic Development: U.S. programs help eliminate barriers to Afghan women’s full 

participation in economic activity. Assistance expands women’s access to credit and provides 

training to improve women’s ability to compete in local/regional markets. We are also exploring 

uses of mobile credit systems to expand access for women. Major sectoral efforts are focused on:

o Agriculture: As part of our agricultural redevelopment effort (see p. 5), we are training 

women in: agricultural production and animal husbandry; veterinary medicine; poultry 

breeding; and skills for using farm machinery. We also have specialized programs aimed 

at helping women build small businesses linked to agriculture. More broadly, women are 

active participants in and major beneficiaries of U.S. programs that are expanding access

to financial services for micro-enterprises and small to medium sized agri-businesses.

o Artisanal Industries: U.S. assistance will strengthen women-led traditional artisanal 

industries – such as handicrafts and clothing production in silk, cotton, cashmere, and 

suede – through enhanced training and access to foreign markets. 

Other economic development programs focused on women include the:

o Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Development Program: Operating in 

Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Balkh, and Nangarhar provinces, this program increases women’s 

opportunities for trade, employment, and investment in Afghanistan. 

o Support to the Afghan Women’s Business Federation: USAID provides technical and 

financial support to the Afghan Women’s Business Federation, an umbrella organization 

for approximately 87 women’s associations. Separately, USAID has helped established 

27 women business associations to provide advocacy services. 

o Small Grants to Support Gender Equality: A three-year, $26.3 million program, this 

initiative provides small grants to women-led NGOs in wide array of areas. Grant 

recipients have facilitated: computer training; English language training; radio 

programming for women; and provision of inputs for women’s agricultural initiatives.

 Security: We continue to urge the Afghan government to protect women leaders and to take 

seriously threats against women and girls by extremists who try to discourage school attendance 

by destroying schools or throwing acid on young school girls. Towards that end, U.S. programs 

help protect women’s health facilities and girl’s schools. We are also expanding women’s 

participation in the security sector through recruitment and promotion of women, as well as 

training on gender-related issues for the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army. 

Specialized training, funded by the State Department, will support expansion of Family Response 

Units (FRUs) devoted to domestic violence case and encourage Afghan women to increasingly

take advantage of their services. Separately, we will continue programs that provide counseling 

and shelter services to women affected by domestic violence. We will also continue to encourage 

women’s involvement in Afghan conflict-resolution and post-conflict processes.
-24-

 Political Process: We are committed to expanding Afghan women’s involvement in the political 

process, and expanding female leadership development initiatives including through professional 

exchange programs and technical assistance. Specific initiatives include:

o Electoral Education and Training: With National Assembly elections scheduled for 

2010, we are focused on: encouraging women’s electoral participation as candidates;

training female Afghan Parliamentarians and leaders elected at the grassroots level; and 

emphasizing to all Parliamentarians the importance of equal rights principles enshrined in 

the Afghan Constitution. U.S. election assistance will also help facilitate women’s voting.

o Expanding Women’s Civil Service Opportunities: We will expand the number of 

internships for women in Afghan ministries. A new State program will provide 

diplomatic training to emerging leaders from the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

 Rule of Law and Human Rights: U.S. programs will help translate legal recognition of 

women’s rights into real improvements in the lives of Afghan women by ensuring rights are 

promoted and protected by Afghan justice systems. U.S. support for traditional justice will 

provide a platform for improving women’s rights. Other programs will build civil society’s 

capacity to advocate for women and monitor enforcement of laws protecting women, including 

the Elimination of Violence Against Women law. We will encourage re-establishment of the 

Afghan Women Judges Association and development of an Afghan women lawyers network. 

Finally, we will support Afghan enforcement efforts and legislation expanding rights.

Milestones

 Improvements in educational indicators for women (e.g., literacy, school attendance).

 Continued reduction in maternal and child mortality.

 Increased training, recruitment and deployment of female health workers, facilitating increased

use of health services by women. 

 Growth in the number of women receiving credit, agriculture, and other income opportunities.

 Increased convictions in crimes against women investigated/prosecuted by Afghan institutions.

 Gender training full integrated into Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) training, with a 

majority of ANSF having completed the training by December 2010. 

 Increased number of functioning women’s outreach centers and shelters across the country. 

 Increased number of women actively participating in National Assembly elections, peace 

processes, and promoting peace, justice, and human rights in their communities. 

 More Afghan leaders are sensitized to women’s issues and advocate on their behalf. 

Resource Requirements

In FY 2009, we provided approximately $153 million in assistance to Afghan women. We expect to 

provide over $175 million in assistance to women in FY 2010.
-25-

An Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan

President Obama declared on December 1 that ―in the past, we too often defined our relationship with 

Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over.‖ Today, it is clearer than ever before that we must expand 

our relationship with Pakistan beyond security issues, and lead the international community in 

helping the Pakistani people overcome political, economic, and security challenges that threaten 

Pakistan’s stability, and in turn undermine regional stability. Consistent with the President’s pledge 

of a long-term partnership with Pakistan, we are making a sizable, long-term commitment of nonmilitary assistance and redirecting it towards priorities identified by Pakistan’s democratically elected 

government and people. Assistance will:

 Help address immediate energy, water, and related economic crises, thereby deepening our 

partnership with the Pakistani people and decreasing the appeal of extremists; 

 Support broader economic and political reforms that are necessary to put Pakistan on a path 

towards sustainable job creation and economic growth, which is necessary for long-term Pakistani 

stability and progress; and

 Help Pakistan build on its success against militants to eliminate extremist sanctuaries that threaten 

Pakistan, Afghanistan, the wider region, and people around the world.

High-impact projects – identified through an extensive consultation process with the Pakistani 

government – will underscore the partnership between our countries, and demonstrate U.S. 

commitment to Pakistan in a concrete, public way. Short-term humanitarian assistance will help 

Pakistanis affected by extremism. Over time, U.S. assistance will strengthen ties between the 

American and Pakistani people by demonstrating that the United States is committed to addressing 

problems that most affect the everyday lives of Pakistanis. Development objectives will reflect the 

Administration’s core development principles. They will be achieved in partnership with Pakistani 

institutions and help build a foundation for sustainable growth and economic prosperity, enabling the 

great potential of Pakistan’s people to be unleashed. Full funding of the landmark Kerry-LugarBerman authorizing legislation over the next five years is crucial. The State Department and USAID 

will consult closely with Congress on the expenditure of these funds, providing regular updates on 

the evolution and implementation of the new assistance program. USAID will more clearly elaborate 

an implementation strategy, in close coordination with the State Department.

Women are critical to the stability of Pakistani civil society. Their representation in the political 

process, role in the media, economic participation, and access to justice must be enlarged. 

Consequently, we integrate development and advancement of women’s rights into all of our 

assistance to Pakistan and will build on our successful programs throughout the country. 

Key Initiatives

 Energy: U.S. engagement in the energy sector will respond to the urgent need for more power 

that is essential to business activity, job creation, and political stability. Secretary Clinton 

announced the first phase of the high impact energy program with a contribution of $125 million 

aimed at increasing electricity output and conserving wasted energy and money. The funding will 

be aimed at repairing generation facilities, improving overall effectiveness of local utilities, 
-26-

replacing inefficient tube well pumps, and promoting energy efficiency. U.S. assistance will 

complement ongoing multilateral energy sector projects.

 Agriculture: High impact investments in agriculture will likely include rehabilitation and/or 

expansion of irrigation and cold storage infrastructure, as well as expansion of links to markets to 

help make Pakistan’s agricultural industry more stable and profitable. 

 Water: High impact projects to help Pakistan make better use of its water resources, particularly 

agricultural watersheds and potable drinking water, will be implemented across several sectors.

 Health and Education: High impact projects, such as a state of the art trauma center in a 

vulnerable area or a center of excellence in a major university will serve acute needs, reduce

popular support for extremists, and demonstrate long-term U.S. commitment to help improve the 

lives of the Pakistani people. 

 Assistance to Displaced Pakistanis: The United States is the largest international supporter for 

Pakistanis displaced by fighting. We will also continue to help displaced persons with recovery 

as they return to their homes and rebuild their lives.

 Strengthening Pakistan’s Democratic Institutions: Assistance to build capacity in Pakistani 

government institutions at the national, provincial and local level will reinforce the government’s 

ability to provide security and economic opportunities for the Pakistani people, particularly in 

vulnerable areas. U.S. assistance and policy engagement also will help the Pakistani government 

address some of its most vexing social and macro-economic policy issues, such as the need for 

greater revenue collection, so that the tangible benefits of U.S. assistance efforts can be sustained. 

Governance programs will build local government capacity in vulnerable districts, promote the 

rule of law, support civil society including for women and minorities, help national and provincial 

Parliaments build oversight capacity of the executive branch, and strengthen the electoral system 

and political parties. U.S. assistance will be supported by bilateral and multilateral diplomacy 

aimed at encouraging appropriate reforms.

 Empowering Pakistan’s Women: We will continue ensure women’s needs are met through 

assistance activities in health, education, economic development, civil society, rule of law/human 

rights, and political participation. Toward that end, we are supporting the Benazir Bhutto Income 

Support Program to benefit Pakistan’s most impoverished families, many of which are headed by 

widows or single women. We will also continue to work closely with the Pakistani government 

and Pakistani organizations to promote women’s rights. Particular emphasis will be placed on 

expanding women’s access to justice, broadening awareness of and respect for women’s rights, 

combating gender-based violence, and advocating for gender equality. Our programs will also 

support the integral role that Pakistani women play in strengthening communities against the 

spread of violent extremism.

Milestones

 General:

o Improvements in key economic indicators over the next two to three years, which will 

reinforce Pakistani economic and political stability.
-27-

o Pakistan continues implementation of its IMF Stand-By Arrangement and increasingly 

invests in its future development.

o Certification process for national and provincial Pakistani government institutions 

implemented to enhance transparency and accountability.

o Increased percentage of U.S. assistance delivered through Pakistani entities (Pakistani 

government systems or local NGOs) by December 2010.

o Decreased overhead and related costs for assistance programs, increasing the amount per 

dollar of U.S. assistance directly benefiting the Pakistani people and Pakistani institutions.

o Deployment of dozens of additional USAID and other personnel by the end of 2010 to 

enhance oversight of contracts and improve management of programs.

 Energy: Implementation has begun for six energy projects announced by Secretary Clinton, 

which include:

o Replacing or repairing 11,000 agricultural irrigation tube well pumps, a major 

component of electricity consumption used by many farmers across Pakistan.

o Rehabilitating, refurbishing, and upgrading targeted components of the Jamshoro, 

Muzaffargarh, and Guddu Thermal Power Stations, as well as the Tarbela Dam, to 

recapture significant amounts of their lost capacity and reduce the incidence of daily 

power outages.

o Electricity Distribution Company Performance Improvement: The United States will 

work closely with four of the nine public electricity distribution companies over the next 

three years, aiming to lower levels of electricity loss so they are comparable to those of 

well-run distribution companies in developed countries. Every one percent of systemwide loss reduction represents $97 million in savings to Pakistani consumers and 

additional power for economic development.

Milestones for additional focus areas will be developed as new high-impact projects are 

announced.
-28-

Resource Requirements

FY 2009- FY 2011

($ millions)

Function FY 2009 Total

FY 2010

Estimate

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

Request

FY 2011

Request

Democracy and Governance 117.1 164.0 4.0 190.1

Rule of Law (INCLE) 1.5 2.0 4.0 3.1 

Rule of Law (ESF) 9.7 22.0 - 37.0 

Democracy/Governance 97.4 60.0 - 70.0 

Political Competition 6.5 15.0 - 15.0 

Civil Society 2.0 15.0 - 15.0 

Investing in People and 

Economic Growth 897.6 885.5 244.0 1,185.5

Health 120.6 181.5 65.0 176

Education 205.0 335.0 - 260.0

Social and Economic Services 

and Protection for Vulnerable 

Populations

129.0 95.0 50.0 -

Infrastructure 240.8 55.0 64.0 450.0

Agriculture/ Food 112.6 81.0 65.0 123.5

Economic Growth 79.6 138.0 - 176.0

Cross Border Initiative 10.0 - - -

Humanitarian Assistance 189.6 15.3 - 15.3

TOTAL 1,204.3 1,064.8 248.0 1,390.9
-29-

Enhancing Pakistan’s Counterinsurgency Capabilities

Consistent with President Obama’s commitment to strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target extremist 

groups that threaten our countries, we will sustain and focus our security assistance, with the aim of 

assisting Pakistan’s efforts to eliminate safe-havens for terrorists that threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, 

the region, and the world. Pakistan’s military operations in 2009 helped reverse insurgent 

momentum. Pakistan’s military and police require significant additional training and support to build 

on improvements made over the past year. U.S. security assistance programs will improve Pakistan’s 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operational capacities, enhance the two militaries’ 

interoperability, deepen our bilateral relations, and reduce the trust deficit between the United States 

and Pakistan. Our robust mil-to-mil relationship with Pakistan also underscores our long-term 

commitment to remain engaged in the region, as well as our commitment to regional stability. 

Key Initiatives

 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCF/PCCF): FMF and PCCF help Pakistan improve 

its counterinsurgency capabilities and modernize equipment. Specifically, FMF builds our longterm security relationship with Pakistan, including its will to fight violent extremism, while PCCF 

provides Pakistan with focused capabilities to support immediate counterinsurgency operations 

along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. FMF has provided Pakistani security forces with air 

mobility and enhanced communication capabilities, and increased border security capacity. 

 International Military Education and Training (IMET): IMET enhances the quality and 

professionalism of officers and enlisted Pakistani military personnel and helps restore contacts 

between the U.S. and Pakistani officer corps that collapsed as a result of sanctions imposed from 

1990-2001. Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of International Military Education and 

Training funding. Some 100 Pakistani military officers receive training in the U.S. each year. 

The Administration’s 2010 IMET request is a significant increase over previous years and would 

be one of the largest IMET accounts globally.

 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE): Administered by the State 

Department, these funds build the capacity of Pakistan’s civilian law enforcement officers. Since 

2003, the United States has trained more than 8,000 Pakistani police officers, including the NorthWest Frontier Province’s Police Elite Force and other law enforcement entities.

 Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA): The Anti-Terrorism Assistance program manages police 

assistance efforts and in-country training programs. Recent ATA programs focus on building the 

North West Frontier Province and Balochistan police forces’ counterinsurgency capabilities.

 Coalition Support Funds (CSF): Pakistan is the largest recipient of the Department of 

Defense’s Coalition Support Funds, which provide reimbursement for expenses in support of U.S. 

troops engaged in counterterrorism operations.
-30-

Milestones

 The number of Pakistani police trained with U.S. funded assistance is doubled by December 

2012.

 The Pakistani military sustains current operations against extremists, increasingly implementing 

counterinsurgency principles including ―holding‖ and ―building‖ in areas cleared of insurgents.

 The U.S.-Pakistan mil-mil relationship is deepened through more frequent exchanges and by 

Pakistan taking advantage of expanded professional training opportunities. 

 The State Department assumes full responsibility for administration of PCF/PCCF by FY 2011. 

Resource Requirements

FY 2009 – FY 2011

($ millions)

Function FY 2009 

Total

FY 2010

Estimate

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

Request

FY 2011

Request

Military Assistance 1,002.3 243.0 60.0 1,500.0

Foreign Military 

Financing

300 238 60 295.9

International Military and 

Educational Training

2.3 5.0 - 4.1

Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency 

Capabilities Fund

700 - - 1,200

Non-Military Security 

Assistance

99.3 150.2 36.0 161.7

Border Security 38.2 52 - 42.5

Law Enforcement / Police 44.3 69 36 84.6

Counternarcotics 3.5 7 - 9.8

Counterterrorism 13.3 22.2 - 24.8

TOTAL 1101.6 393.2 96.0 1661.7

Note: This does not include Coalition Support Funds, which are administered by the 

Department of Defense and determined based on actual costs incurred throughout the year by 

the Pakistani military in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. In addition to this level, 

Congress appropriated $700 million in the FY 2009 Supplemental for the Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund that was available on October 1, 2009.
-31-

Disrupting Illicit Financial Flows to Extremists

Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups receive significant income from both the regional 

narcotics trade and outside funding sources. To weaken the extremist threat, we are redoubling 

efforts to reduce illicit financial flows and disrupt support networks by pursuing a whole-ofgovernment, three-pronged counter threat finance strategy: 

1. Engaging countries that are sources of external funding for terrorist and insurgent groups; 

2. Using targeted sanctions against terrorist financiers and facilitators; and 

3. Providing technical assistance to strengthen Pakistan and Afghanistan's counter-terrorist 

financing, legal, regulatory, and enforcement capacity.

This strategy emphasizes the role of international partners in disrupting illicit financial flows, as well 

as stronger partnership with the Afghan and Pakistani authorities. 

Key Initiatives

 Illicit Finance Task Force (IFTF): The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan recently launched an interagency Illicit Finance Task Force chaired by the Treasury 

Department to coordinate the whole-of-government threat finance effort. The task force is 

divided into several working groups that each focus on specific objectives: 

o The Enhanced Bilateral Engagement Working Group's mission is to partner more 

effectively with allies in combating illicit finance.

o The Capacity Building Working Group aims to build Afghanistan's and Pakistan's 

ability to detect, disrupt, and deter illicit finance.

o The Financial Services Working Group is assisting Afghan and Pakistani efforts to 

expand access to the formal financial system and develop a licensing and regulation 

strategy for hawalas in order to create an environment less conducive to illicit financing.

o The U.S.-Russia Counternarcotics/Financial Intelligence Working Group's mission is 

to disrupt illicit financial flows relating to Afghan/Taliban heroin trafficking by increasing 

the exchange of information between the United States and Russia. An initial meeting 

was convened in Moscow in early December 2009 and steps are underway to implement 

the Joint Statement agreed by President Obama and President Medvedev in July 2009.

 Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (AFTC): This interagency, civ-mil cell is working to identify 

and disrupt Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other insurgent financial networks in Afghanistan, utilizing the

full spectrum of U.S. tools and authorities – including diplomatic, law enforcement, military, and 

targeted financial measures/actions. 
-32-

Milestones

 Afghan Threat Finance Cell becomes fully operational during the first half of 2010.

 The flow of illicit funds to al-Qaeda and the Taliban from third parties outside of the region is 

notably reduced by July 2011.

 The flow of illicit funds from the narcotics trade to the Taliban is further reduced on a quarter-byquarter basis.

 International cooperation – particularly with Russia and the Gulf States – is strengthened (e.g., 

increased information sharing and coordination of related law enforcement efforts), leading to 

enhanced success in reducing illicit finance. 

 Oversight of traditional financial systems improved outside of Kabul by December 2010 through 

increased reporting by licensed hawalas in Heart, Jalalabad, Kunduz, and Mazar-e-Sharif, as well 

as licensing of hawalas in Helmand and Kandahar.

Resource Requirements

The Department of State and Department of Treasury are coordinating a whole-of-government action 

plan to significantly expand U.S. government efforts. This plan is expected to be completed in March

2010.
-33-

Countering Extremist Voices

The Taliban and al-Qaeda use information as a weapon, dominating the information space. While 

our previous strategy focused largely on traditional public diplomacy and communications tools, we 

are now elevating our communications efforts in importance and innovation. New programs will 

empower Afghans and Pakistanis to challenge the extremist narrative and offer their own vision for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan’s future. A sustained media and outreach strategy will set the record 

straight, highlight key civilian efforts, and explain our larger strategic rationale for the fight in 

Afghanistan, as well as our strategic support for Pakistan, to the Afghan and Pakistani peoples. 

Key Initiatives

 Expanded Media Outreach: We will respond more quickly to misinformation, serve as a source 

of credible information for journalists, conduct polls on key issues, and expand training of 

Afghan and Pakistani journalists in the United States. We will actively build our partnerships with 

all parts of Afghan and Pakistani society, including youth, civil society and nongovernmental 

organizations, and political actors and institutions at all levels.

 Building Communications Capacity: Our support will help the Afghan and Pakistani 

governments communicate effectively with their people, and help people better communicate 

with one another. We will also leverage new technologies to support people with SMS services,

mobile banking, telemedicine, and mobile micro-finance. And we will help build media 

infrastructure (radio, television, and cell towers) to carry communications into underserved areas 

dominated by extremist voices.

o In Afghanistan, we are supporting the expansion of the Government Media Information 

Center in Kabul and an additional 16 provincial satellite offices. We will also enhance 

communications capabilities in core ministries by providing mentoring, public affairs training,

and exchange opportunities for communications personnel. 

o In Pakistan we have helped launch Humari Awaz, Our Voice, the first mobile-based social 

network empowering Pakistan’s 95 million mobile users with a voice. Our Voice mobile users 

harness mobile phones to instantly share news and information with a network of friends and 

followers via SMS messages. In five weeks, 20 million messages were sent and over 150,000 

people enrolled, with an average of 3,000 new followers joining daily. 

 Taking Back the Airwaves: We are empowering indigenous voices to drown out extremist 

propaganda. We will expand local radio coverage and support creation of public, private and 

university radio stations. Using local partners, we will support distribution of content on all 

media, and use cell technology to help people build communities and get critical information.

 Strengthening People to People Ties: Strengthening ties between all aspects of American, 

Afghan, and Pakistani society will deepen our long-term partnership. In Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, we are enhancing educational opportunities, including teacher training and English 

language training. Secretary Clinton’s three-day visit to Pakistan in October 2009, much of 

which was covered live on Pakistani television, underscored our new approach by engaging broad 

segments of Pakistani society in honest dialogue. This approach will be reinforced with a new 

public diplomacy and communications effort that will feature: greater engagement with Pakistani 

media; increased academic and business exchanges; and more robust outreach to the Pakistani-
-34-

American community through the American Pakistan Foundation and similar organizations. We 

are also increasing professional, educational, and cultural exchanges. 

Milestones

 24-hour cell coverage is restored in areas of the South and East of Afghanistan.

 Afghans and Pakistanis utilize radio and other media platforms to criticize extremists and hold 

government officials accountable.

 Enemy propaganda is significantly decreased – in quantity and effectiveness – by July 2011.

 The number of people-to-people exchanges is doubled by 2012. 

 U.S. disapproval ratings in Pakistan decrease, with Pakistanis increasingly convinced that the 

United States is committed to a long-term partnership on an array of issues, not just 

counterterrorism. 

Resource Requirements

FY 2009 – FY 2011

($ millions)

Function FY 2009 

Total

FY 2010

Estimate

FY 2010 

Supplemental 

Request

FY 2011

Request

Communications –

Afghanistan (ESF)

50 90 - 50

Communications –

Pakistan (ESF)

- 50 - 50

TOTAL 50 140 - 100

Note: This does not include Public Diplomacy Funds in State Operations.
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Mobilizing International Support

As President Obama said, the future stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan affects ―the security of our 

allies, and the common security of the world.‖ We are building the broadest possible global coalition 

in support of these efforts. Our objectives are shared not only by our ISAF Allies and partners, but 

also by Russia, China, India, and Muslim countries across the Middle East which all face a common 

threat from al-Qaeda. There are now 43 ISAF Allies and partners and more than 84,000 U.S. and 

international troops working together in Afghanistan. Since 2001, our international partners have 

pledged $24 billion to Afghanistan and international financial organizations, including the World 

Bank, have committed an additional $2 billion in grants and credits for more than 30 significant 

development and reconstruction projects. Similarly, over 60 countries and international organizations 

are now providing assistance to Pakistan, with the United States and other countries pledging over 

$5.6 billion in 2009 for relief and development in Pakistan and supporting the International Monetary 

Fund’s provision of an $11.35 billion Stand-By Arrangement. We are working to expand and better 

coordinate this international support in several important ways.

Key Initiatives

 Reinvigorated Regional Diplomacy: All of Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s neighbors have a 

legitimate and important role to play in stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our regional 

diplomacy is expanding, with a sharpened focus on shifting the focus of Afghanistan’s neighbors 

from competition in Afghanistan to cooperation and economic integration. Above all, our 

diplomacy will encourage Afghanistan’s neighbors to respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty, 

encourage greater transparency in assistance to Afghanistan, and discourage Afghanistan’s 

neighbors from attempting to use their positions in Afghanistan against others. Toward that end, 

we will build on bilateral discussions with Russia, China, India, and Afghanistan’s neighbors. The 

Afghanistan-Pakistan-United States Trilateral Dialogue is a proven framework for advancing 

cooperation on issues such as transit trade, agriculture, interior issues, and intelligence. Bilateral 

dialogues with Afghanistan and Pakistan will provide an opportunity to reduce challenges and 

strengthen our long-term partnerships.

 Contact Group of Special Representatives: Roughly 30 countries and international 

organizations, including the most active diplomatic, financial, and military actors in the region, 

have appointed Special Representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan. They meet regularly to 

coordinate the international community’s financial and political support to Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. Regular meetings in Washington and Kabul between embassy personnel help facilitate 

real-time coordination as the international community increases its support. 

 Enhanced Civilian Coordination: Maximizing the effectiveness of international assistance to 

Afghanistan requires enhanced coordination of assistance on the ground. The Office of the 

Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy in 

Kabul, is engaging the more than 50 nations contributing assistance to Afghanistan to focus their 

efforts in priority areas. We are working with our international partners to strengthen the role of 

the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), including by supporting the 

request from the United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) that the 

international community supply his office with additional experts in priority areas. Additionally, 

we are working closely with NATO to enhance civilian coordination among International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Allies and partners’ non-security programs, including 
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Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

 Muslim Outreach: Building on the vision for cooperation that President Obama outlined in his 

June 2009 speech in Cairo, we are engaging several Muslim countries to coordinate assistance 

and political support to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

 Marshaling Support for Pakistan: The United States has played a key role in organizing forums 

to support the democratically elected Pakistani government. We will sustain our leadership role 

in the Friends of Democratic Pakistan, which provides a forum for Pakistan to collaborate on 

strategic development plans with supporting countries. We will also support the United Nations 

expanded role in Pakistan, especially its new Special Envoy for Assistance to Pakistan.

Milestones

 ISAF Allies and partners deliver on recent commitments of troops, trainers, and contributions to 

trust funds – and in some cases, expand their sizable contributions in 2010. 

 Afghanistan’s neighbors begin to shift their policies to reinforce increased cooperation, over time. 

 International assistance to Pakistan increases sizably by July 2011 – at least matching U.S. 

assistance levels – and is increasingly coordinated (e.g., decreased overlap in projects; assistance 

projects are mutually reinforcing maximizing aid effectiveness).

 International assistance to Afghanistan is better managed and coordinated, with overlap in 

projects increasingly eliminated and corruption resulting from the international presence reduced. 

 The United Nations’ role in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is strengthened.