alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. CON. RES. 398 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 

2 concurring), That when the House adjourns on the legisla3 tive day of Thursday, July 31, 2008, Friday, August 1, 

4 2008, or Saturday, August 2, 2008, on a motion offered 

5 pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its Majority 

6 Leader or his designee, it stand adjourned until 2 p.m. 

7 on Monday, September 8, 2008, or until the time of 
2 

•HCON 398 EH 

1 any reassembly pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent 

2 resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when the Sen3 ate recesses or adjourns on any day from Friday, August 

4 1, 2008, through Friday, September 5, 2008, on a motion 

5 offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its Ma6 jority Leader or his designee, it stand recessed or ad7 journed until noon on Monday, September 8, 2008, or 

8 such other time on that day as may be specified in the 

9 motion to recess or adjourn, or until the time of any re10 assembly pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolu11 tion, whichever occurs first. 

12 SEC. 2. The Speaker of the House and the Majority 

13 Leader of the Senate, or their respective designees, acting 

14 jointly after consultation with the Minority Leader of the 

15 House and the Minority Leader of the Senate, shall notify 

16 the Members of the House and the Senate, respectively, 

17 to reassemble at such place and time as they may des18 ignate if, in their opinion, the public interest shall warrant 

19 it. 

Passed the House of Representatives July 30, 2008. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. CON. RES. 398 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Providing for a conditional adjournment of the 

cess or adjournment of the Senate House of Representatives and a conditional re-
Case No. 8,636.

#### LYNCH v. ASHTON.

[3 Cranch, C. C. 367.] 1

Circuit Court, District of Columbia.

Dec. Term, 1828.

Orphans — Justice of the Peace — Power — Contract — Part Performance — Specific Performance.

1. Justices of the peace have no power to bind out orphan children on a day in which tile orphans’ court is in session.

2. It is only where there is a contract in part executed that the court can compel the parties to execute it in an equitable manner, under the seventh section of the Maryland act of 1793. c. 45.

Petition, by an apprentice, to be discharged from the indentures, because not bound by the orphans’ court, but by two justices of the peace, on a day in which the orphans’ court was in session; in which case this court decided, in October last, in the ease of May v. Bayne [Case No. 9,331]. that the justices had no power to bind out an apprentice.

THE COURT (nem. con.) was of opinion, in this case, that there was no contract, for want of jurisdiction in the justices of the peace, who undertook to bind out the boy.

And

CRANCH, Chief Judge,

said, the boy has no power to bind himself; nor has the mother alone, or with his assent, a right to bind him out, without the authority of some tribunal. The two justices had no authority to bind him out, as the orphans’ court was in session on that day. There was, therefore, no contract; and it is only where there is a contract in part executed, that this court can compel the parties to execute it in an equitable manner, under the Maryland act of 1793, c. 45, § 7.
#### Draeger Shipping Co., Inc. *v.*United States

No. 6804.

Entry No. 727337, etc.

Invoices dated London, England, September 26, 1941, etc.

Certified October 5, 1941, etc.

Entered at New York, N. Y., December 1, 1941, etc.

(Decided January 23, 1947)

*Barnes, Richardson & Colburn (Hadley S. King*of counsel) for the plaintiff.

*Paul P. Rao,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Cole, Judge (Abstract):

These appeals for reappraisement of various items ■of merchandise concern the so-called British purchase tax, described in the law of the United Kingdom entitled, “Finance (No. 2) Act 1940 3 & 4 Geo. 6 Ch. 48.” The said tax was held not to be an item to be included in foreign value as defined in section 402 (c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended by the Customs Administrative Act of 1938 (19 U. S. C. § 1402 (c)). *United States*v. *Wm. S. Pitcairn Corp.,*33 C. C. P. A. 183, C. A. D. 334.

Undisputed facts establish that the proper basis for appraisement of the instant merchandise is export value, section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1402 (d)), and that such statutory values for the articles in question are the appraised values, less the additions made by the importer on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases.
February 20, 1942

No. 46978.

Suit 4347.

#### *White Lamb Finlay, Inc.*v. *United States.*

Reap. Dec. 5113. C. A. D. 192.
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Home                 > Browse by Title > Problems in Measurement of Expenditures on Selected Items of Supplementary Employee Remuneration: Manufacturing Establishments, 1953

              																	United States. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 						*Problems in Measurement of Expenditures on Selected Items of Supplementary Employee Remuneration: Manufacturing Establishments, 1953 : Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 1186*,												Washington: 								U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 										January 1956,									https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/4482,			accessed on September 25, 2024.						    

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Exhibit 32.1   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002    In connection with the Report of Competitive Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Johnnie D. Johnson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:  1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.   /s/ Johnnie D. Johnson Johnnie D. Johnson Chief Executive Officer  August 15, 2011  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Competitive Technologies and will be retained by Competitive Technologies and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EX-31 Rule13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications.

 

 

I, Leah Nivison,certify that:

 

1. I have reviewedthis report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed inrespect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of the GS MortgageSecurities Trust 2016-GS2 (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");

 

2. Based on myknowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not containany untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

 

3. Based on myknowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required tobe provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is includedin the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4. Based on myknowledge and the servicer compliance statements required in this report underItem 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Actperiodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under theservicing agreements in all material respects; and

 

5. All of the reportson assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securitiesand their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance withservicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in thisreport in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except asotherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliancedescribed in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K. 

 

In giving thecertifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me bythe following unaffiliated parties:

 

Midland LoanServices, a Division of PNC Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer,Torchlight Loan Services, LLC, as Special Servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, NationalAssociation, as Trustee and Certificate Administrator, Wells Fargo Bank,National Association, as Custodian, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as OperatingAdvisor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Primary Servicer for theVeritas Multifamily Pool 1 Mortgage Loan, Wells Fargo Bank, NationalAssociation, as Special Servicer for the Veritas Multifamily Pool 1 MortgageLoan, Wilmington Trust, National Association, as Trustee for the VeritasMultifamily Pool 1 Mortgage Loan, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, asCertificate Administrator for the Veritas Multifamily Pool 1 Mortgage Loan,Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Custodian for the VeritasMultifamily Pool 1 Mortgage Loan, CoreLogic Commercial Real Estate Services,Inc., as Servicing Function Participant for the Veritas Multifamily Pool 1Mortgage Loan, and National Tax Search, LLC, as Servicing Function Participantfor the Veritas Multifamily Pool 1 Mortgage Loan.

 

 

 

Dated: March 25, 2019

 

 

/s/ Leah Nivison

 

 

Chief ExecutiveOfficer

(seniorofficer in charge of securitization of the depositor)
Exhibit 10.13


January 27, 2000

{name}
{address]

     Re: Promissory Note dated as of [____________] for $[______]

Dean [name]:

     The books and records of CNF Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") indicate
that you have provided us with a loan in the principal amount of One Hundred
Thousand Dollars (US $100,000), as evidenced by a note dated [________] (the
"Note"). In order to induce an equity investment in the Company, this letter
will constitute your formal agreement to extend the "Maturity Date" of the Note
(as the term Maturity Date is defined with the Note) to January 30, 2001, and
such date shall hereafter be referred to as the "Maturity Date" of the Note, as
amended hereby.

     All other terms and conditions of the Note shall remain in full force and
effect.

     Would you kindly indicate your intention to be legally bound by the terms
set forth herein as a formal amendment to the Note, by placing your name and
signature on the line provided below. Thank you for your consideration and
cooperation in this matter.


                                             Very truly yours,


                                             CNF Technologies, Inc.


                                             By:
                                                 ----------------------
                                                 David G. Thompson, CFO

Acknowledged and Agreed to by:


-----------------------------------
Signature
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43188

STATE OF IDAHO ,

Plaintiff

- Respondent ,

v.

MICHAEL LAWRENCE CONLEY ,

Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 367

Filed: February 2, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Timothy Hansen , District Judge.

Appeal from order revoking probation, dismissed

.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy , Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________
Before MELANSON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and HUSKEY, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM
Michael Lawrence Conley pled guilty to burglary . I.C. § 18

- 1401

. In exchange for his

guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. The district court sentenced Conley to a unified

term of eight years, with a minmum period of confinement of two years . However, the district

court suspended the sentence and placed Conley on probation. Thereafter, Conley admitted to

violating the terms of his probation. The district court revoked probation, but retaine d

jurisdiction and sent Conley to participate in the rider program. Conley appealed. While this

appeal was pending, Conley successfully completed his retained jurisdiction. The district court
again suspended Conley’s sentence and placed him on probation . On appeal, “mindful that the2

district court has placed him back on probation, ” Conley continues to assert that the district court

erred in revoking probation and retaining jurisdiction.

A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the defendant lacks

a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982);

Bradshaw v. State , 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991). Even where a question is

moot, there are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) when there is the possibility of

collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged

conduct is likely to evade judicial r eview and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an

otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public interest. State v. Barclay , 149 Idaho 6,

8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010). The only relief Conley has requested on appeal cannot be granted

bec ause Conley has been placed back on probation . Therefore, any judicial relief from this

Court would have no effect on either party. See id.

Accordingly, Conley’s appeal from the order revoking probation is dismissed

.
## 42

. .

OFFICEOF'I-HE A'l7ORNEY GENERAL OFTEXAS AUSTIN

Ilonorablo

P. U. **mUmtar** County Attorney din Hoge cotmt iI Bebbranrille, ewa
Dear Sir; : Provlfng i3romd~ttle premisea Or **others, maaoompanled**  **bywcts** a **E** OifioLllyd@AOUAWd by.ttiPeAmP hd# Of 'fbX83,i3AOt AbO@SS~~y a.~oio*tlon~~~

of law, Replying to your raoeAttiettsrwu bate to advise that OAR "I&Oprowls arauad the prealsea~ofa~6ther at about the uauaL hour of retlremeAt~8~ni&hte and,.poarlbly peers into the windows Of the **tMOU~t,~~OfmOh $WSiSSa,**  does AOt AeOeSSSFily ooamlt SA aot that Is deAouAaedaa 4~or&e tythe Penal Code of' !i?exas

. Such oaoduct, s~+~picious or re~&malbls as It nury be, must be a~ooa~paAle&by~.&uae aat that la peoltioallyQnoaAoed by the PeAeL Code b$'o&e it e&a iom the bash of a 

### orimfnsl proaeoutioA, " '5 '. , ., W%~~briei‘a~bx&t& uith yaw? *Airy, you referred to oirermq agPir@t the **$iublio** 

### psaoe, **~lrrls~ d&mncy**  aud chaatity, aad,,the,./bfjshsea of t&spars and aralioioua mUah?&. These statutes 8ad otherw eovec l +sat varLety or prohibited acts deslgaed to protect the prima? of **the** home. But, as you conoludcd,AQZL6‘-Ff

them,coverthe situatfanyou have desolibed. whils‘yq~r atateamntdoes not indiaate thatthe of

### fending perso&vas masked OY disguised, we call your attention to Artialea 454a,*454band 4540,VerAonga Panal Code ot Texas, making it SA OmASe ror a masked or disguised peraao to go into or near any private houae or disturb any or the lnhabltants tharoor.

2H:db
#### Esperanza Cristina BERNARDO MONTERROSA, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-73390.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*750Submitted July 11, 2005.*

Decided July 22, 2005.

Walter Rafael Pineda, Esq., Law Offices of Walter Rafael Pineda, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Regional Counsel, Western Region Immigration & Naturalization Service, Laguna Niguel, CA, Jennifer Lightbody, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, RAWLINSON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Esperanza Cristina Bernardo Monterrosa, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) summary affirmance of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for cancellation of removal. We dismiss the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to consider Bernardo’s challenge to the IJ’s extreme hardship determination because it is a discretionary, nonreviewable determination. *See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft,*327 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir.2003) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)).

We also lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary determination that Bernardo did not establish good moral character. *See Moran v. Ashcroft,*395 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir.2005) (indicating that a good moral character determination is only reviewable where it falls under or is based upon one of the *per se*statutory exclusions contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)).

*751PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### The State *versus*Jackson and Haskell.

Ail indictment cannot lawfully be found in tie District Court for an offence, which, can be tried in this court only, unless the accused had been previously committed or bound over to the District Court upon recognizance.

An indictment was found in the District Court against two persons for an offence, which could be tried only in this court, into which the indictment was transferred. One of the persons had neither been committed to prison, nor recognized for his appearance. The other had been bound over ; *Sold,*the indictment was irregular as to the former, but that that circumstance did not impair its validity as to the latter.

An indictment found in the District Court, charging an offence of which this court alone has jurisdiction, is not invalidated, merely because the recognizance, which preceded it, did not specify the offence, charged in the indictment.

Indictment, found in the District Court, against the two defendants for having counterfeit money with fraudulent intent, &c.

One of them had recognized to appeal’ there, hut the recognizance did not specify for what offence he was to answer.

The other defendant had neither recognized nor been committed. The indictment had been transferred to this court. The counsel for the defendants now moves that it be quashed.

Shepley, C. J.,

orally.—The defendants’ counsel contends that the offence, charged against them, was not cognizable before the grand jury of the District Court, and also, that because only one of them had been bound over to that court, the indictment was unauthorized and void as to both.

The fact thus stated is admitted to be true. The form of *41a recognizance is of no consequence, except as to the liability of the conusors, in an action upon it. It cannot take away the right of the grand jury to inquire freely into all offences. The objection is untenable.

*Webster,*for the defendants.

*Coburn,*County Att’y, for the State.

Note.—The prosecuting officer afterwards entered a *nol. pros,*as to the defendant who had neither recognized or been committed; and the action was continued for the trial of the other.

For matters which can be tried in this court alone, the grand jury of the District Court cannot indict, unless the accused has been committed, or bound over. Stat. 1842, chap. 27, sect. 1. The indictment was therefore unauthorized, as to that defendant who had neither been recognized or committed, and he must be discharged, but that irregularity cannot impair the validity of the indictment as to the defendant who was under recogniz anee.
No. 47618.

#### Protests 808719-G, etc., of T. M. Duche & Sons, Inc., et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Cline, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
Exhibit 32.1

                            Certification Pursuant to
                             18 U.S.C. Section 1350
                             as Adopted Pursuant to
                  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of China BAK Battery, Inc. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-QSB for the period  ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the
Securities  Exchange  Commission  on the  date  hereof  (the  "Report").  I,  Li
Xiangqian,  Chief  Executive  Officer of the  Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted  pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in
                  all material respects,  the financial  condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.





By: /s/ Li Xiangqian
    -----------------------
    Li Xiangqian
    Chief Executive Officer
    August 30, 2005
Exhibit
32.1











CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350)








In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Walgreen Co., an Illinois corporation
(the "Company"), on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended February 29, 2008 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Jeffrey A. Rein,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge:





(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.














/s/ Jeffrey A.
Rein


Jeffrey
A. Rein


Chief
Executive Officer


Dated:  April
1, 2008





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Walgreen Co. and will be retained by Walgreen Co. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.