UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

FLORENTINO RODRIGUEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

LABORATORY CORPORATION OF 

AMERICA HOLDINGS, d/b/a 

LabCorp, 

Civil Action No. 13-675 (GK) 

Defendant. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Plaintiff Florentino Rodriguez (~Rodriguez" or "Plaintiff") 

brings this action against Laboratory Corporation of America 

Holdings ( "LabCorp" or "Defendant") for declaratory judgment, 

fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, 

negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing. 

This matter is before the Court on LabCorp' s Motion to 

Dismiss [Dkt. No. 16]. Upon consideration of the Motion, 

Opposition [Dkt. No. 17], and Reply [Dkt. No. 19], the entire 

record herein, and for the reasons stated below, Defendant's 

Motion is granted. 
I . BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background1 

Rodriguez was employed by the District of Columbia as an 

Urban Park Ranger. FAC ~ 6. During his eleven years of 

employment in this capacity, he had "an exemplary record with no 

history of disciplinary problems or personal involvement with 

illegal drugs." FAC ~~ 6, 7. 

In or about April 2010, Rodriguez was randomly selected to 

submit a urine sample for drug testing pursuant to the District 

of Columbia's Mandatory Drug and Alcohol Testing Program for 

Safety-Sensitive Positions ("Drug Testing Program") . FAC ~ 8; 

see 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3901 et seq. Rodriguez's test results were 

positive for the presence of marijuana metabolites, and he was 

subsequently terminated from his employment. FAC ~~ 21, 23. 

Rodriguez does not allege that his test results were 

inaccurate, or that he had not used marijuana prior to providing 

his urine sample. Instead, he alleges that LabCorp, who tested 

his urine and reported the result, failed to follow governmentmandated procedures in doing so, thereby improperly causing his 

positive result to be reported to his employer. Id. ~~ 9-23. 

Rodriguez relies on certain provisions in Title 6 of the 

District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, and the United 

1 Except where otherwise noted, the facts set forth herein are 

taken from the First Amended Complaint ( "FAC") [Dkt. No. 15] and 

accepted as true. 

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States Department of Transportation regulations incorporated 

therein, which the District of Columbia has adopted in 

connection with its Drug Testing Program (collectively, 

"regulations" or "quality control regulations"). See 6-B 

D.C. M. R. § 3 9 01 et seq. ; 4 9 C. F. R. Part 4 0. The regulations 

require a testing laboratory to conduct both an initial screen 

and a confirmatory test before reporting a drug test as 

positive. 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3906.4; see also 49 C.F.R. § 40.87. 

To conduct the initial screen, the laboratory must use an 

enzyme-multiplied immunoassay technique ("EMIT") test. 6-B 

D.C.M.R. § 3906.4. If the initial screen is positive, the 

laboratory must then use a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry 

("GCMS") test to confirm the positive result and quantify the 

precise concentration of drug metabolites. Id. 

The regulations set "cutoff concentrations," which 

determine whether the initial screen and confirmatory test 

should be reported as positive. See 49 C.F.R. § 40.87(a). If a 

test result is below the cutoff, the laboratory must report it 

as negative. Id. § 40.87(b)-(c). If a test result is at or 

above the cutoff concentration, the laboratory must report it as 

positive. Id. § 40.87(b)-(c). In the case of a marijuana test, 

the relevant cutoff concentrations are 50 ng/mL for the initial 

screen and 15 ng/mL for the confirmatory test. Id. § 40.87 (a). 

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Rodriguez contends that "there is absolutely no evidence or 

information in the report provided to the District of Columbia 

indicating that he had a positive initial urine screen, i.e. 

over 50 ng/mL." FAC ~ 12. Therefore, he argues LabCorp was not 

legally permitted to conduct a confirmatory test, or to report 

his test results as positive to the District of Columbia's Human 

Resources Department. FAC ~~ 13, 14, 21. 2 Rodriguez also claims 

that LabCorp performed the wrong type of testing because it 

administered a "qualitative test," and not the test specified in 

6-B D.C.M.R. § 3906. FAC ~~ 15-16. On these grounds, Rodriguez 

maintains that he "was denied a fair test in compliance with 

District of Columbia government procedures." FAC ~ 17. 

B. Procedural Background 

On April 19, 2 013, Rodriguez filed his original Complaint 

in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, bringing 

claims against LabCorp for negligence, gross negligence, and 

breach of contract. On May 10, 2013, LabCorp removed the case 

to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. 

2 LabCorp did not report Rodriguez's result directly to the 

District of Columbia's Human Resources Department. Instead, it 

first forwarded the results to Dr. Charles Moorefield, a Medical 

Review Officer ( "MRO"), whose responsibility it was to "verify 

that the testing procedure was conducted properly." FAC ~ 20; 

see also 49 C.F.R. § 40.123. Rodriguez alleges that Dr. 

Moorefield failed to properly review LabCorp's testing 

procedures. FAC ~ 21. However, he has not named Dr. Moorefield 

as a defendant in the case. 

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[Dkt . No . 1] . LabCorp then moved to dismiss Rodriguez's 

Complaint [Dkt. No. 9] , but subsequently withdrew its motion 

after the parties stipulated to permit Rodriguez to file an 

amended complaint. [Dkt. No. 13]. 

On August 2, 2013, Rodriguez filed his FAC, asserting 

claims against LabCorp for declaratory judgment, fraud, 

negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of contract, and 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

See generally FAC [Dkt. No. 15]. The FAC also includes claims 

against "John Doe" Defendants for intentional interference with 

prospective economic advantage and intentional interference with 

business relations. FAC ~~ 64-85. 3 

On August 23, 2013, LabCorp moved to dismiss the FAC 

pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. [Dkt . No. 16] . On September 5, 2 013, Plaintiff 

filed his Opposition. [Dkt. No. 17] . On September 24, 2013, 

LabCorp filed its Reply. [Dkt. No. 19]. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

3 The "John Does" are described as employees of LabCorp who were 

involved in the testing and reporting of Rodriguez's drug test 

results. See FAC ~ 5. Although Rodriguez identifies one of 

these individuals in his Opposition as Kamlesh Patel, Pl.'s 

Opp'n at 3, there is no indication that Rodriguez has attempted 

to serve Mr. Patel, or any person other than LabCorp, with his 

complaint. 

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To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint "must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 u.s. 544, 570 (2007)). "The plausibility standard is not 

akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. 

A pleading that offers mere "labels and conclusions" or a 

"formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will 

not suffice; nor will "naked assertions devoid of further 

factual enhancement." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) 

(internal punctuation omitted). The factual allegations "must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and to permit the Court "to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

"In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the 

court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents 

attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters of which 

it may take judicial notice." Stewart v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 471 

F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). A court may 

also consider documents of undisputed authenticity that "are 

referred to in the complaint and are integral to" the 

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plaintiff's claims. Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 

The court is required to accept the complaint's factual 

allegations as true and give a plaintiff "the benefit of all 

inferences that can reasonably be drawn from such allegations." 

Kaempe, 367 F.3d at 963 (citation omitted). However, the court 

need not accept plaintiff's legal conclusions couched as factual 

allegations. Jacobs v. Vrobel, 724 F.3d 217, 221 (D.C. Cir. 

2013). Nor must it accept "inferences drawn by plaintiffs if 

such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the 

complaint," or by other documents properly considered in 

connection with the motion to dismiss. 

(citations omitted) . 

III. ANALYSIS 

Kaempe, 367 F.3d at 963 

A. Materials Considered in This Motion to Dismiss 

In support of its Motion, LabCorp has submitted excerpts of 

the Report it prepared in connection with Rodriguez's test. 

These excerpts, the authenticity of which Rodriguez does not 

dispute, include pages labeled "Specimen Test Results," 

"Specimen Summary," "Initial Test Data Section," and 

"Confirmation Test Data Section." See Decl. of Robert I. 

Steiner in Support of LabCorp' s Reply ("Steiner Decl. ") , Ex. A 

[Dkt. No. 19-1]. Rodriguez refers to these pages repeatedly in 

his FAC; indeed, they provide the sole factual underpinning for 

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his contention that LabCorp failed to comply with the quality 

control regulations. See FAC ~~ 12, 15, 16, 18 & n.1. 

Accordingly, they are both incorporated by reference in the FAC 

and central to Rodriguez's claims. 

consider them in deciding the Motion. 

B. Declaratory Judgment 

In Count 1, Rodriguez asks 

The Court may therefore 

the Court to enter a 

"declaratory judgment that defendant LabCorp was under a duty 

and obligation to fully comply with federal and District of 

Columbia government drug testing procedures pursuant to its 

contract with [the] District of Columbia government and failed 

to do so." FAC ~ 35. 

LabCorp seeks to dismiss this claim on the grounds that it 

is duplicative of Rodriguez's other claims. Def.'s Mot. at 8-9. 

Rodriguez contends that dismissal is improper because the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "permit[] parties to 'set forth 

two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or 

hypothetically,' and to 'state as many separate claims or 

defenses as the party has regardless of consistency. '" Pl. Is 

Opp'n at 14-15 (citing Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 

U.S. 795, 805 (1999) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (e) (2))). 

The Declaratory Judgment Act, 2 8 U.S. C. § 2 2 01, provides 

that "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction 

any court of the United States, upon the filing of an 

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appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal 

relations of any interested party seeking such a declaration, 

whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2201 (a). This language "has long been understood 'to confer 

on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding 

whether to declare the rights of litigants.'" Medimmune, Inc. 

v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007) (quoting Wilton v. 

Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)); see also Green v. 

Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72 (1985) ("[T]he declaratory judgment 

statute is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the 

courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.") 

(citation omitted) . 

Although Rodriguez is correct that he is allowed to plead 

in the alternative, he has not articulated any reason to 

maintain the declaratory judgment claim as a separate cause of 

action. The claim does not present any legal or factual 

theories that are not already subsumed in his other claims. See 

Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F. 3d 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2007) ("To the 

extent [plaintiff] seeks a declaration of defendants' liability 

for damages sought for his other causes of action, the claim is 

merely duplicative and was properly dismissed.") Further, 

Rodriguez does not identify any way in which his future actions 

are likely to be affected by the declaratory relief he seeks. 

See Schulman v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt., Inc., 35 F.3d 799, 812 

-9-
(3d Cir. 1994) ("Even if a declaratory judgment would clarify 

the parties' legal rights, it should ordinarily not be granted 

unless 'the parties' plans of actions are likely to be affected 

by a declaratory judgment. 11 ) • Accordingly, Count 1 shall be 

dismissed. 

C. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 

In Count 2, Rodriguez brings a claim for fraudulent 

misrepresentation. To plead a prima facie claim for fraudulent 

misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege " ( 1) a false 

representation (2) in reference to a material fact, (3) made 

with knowledge of its falsity, (4) with intent to deceive, and 

(5) action taken in reliance upon the representation. 11 

Atraqchi v. GUMC Unified Billing Servs., 788 A.2d 559, 563 (D.C. 

2002) . 4 A false representation "is an assertion that is not in 

accord with the facts. 11 Saucier v. Countrywide Home Loans, 64 

A.3d 428, 438-39 (D.C. 2013) (citations and internal punctuation 

marks omitted) . 

Because fraud claims are subject to a heightened pleading 

standard under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, a plaintiff "must state the time, place and content 

of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and 

4 The parties agree that District of Columbia substantive law 

applies to Plaintiff's claims. See Def.'s Mot. at 10 (citing 

District of Columbia law as source of applicable standard); 

Pl.'s Opp'n at 5 (same). 

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what was obtained or given up as a consequence of the fraud." 

United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385 

(D.C. Cir. 1981). However, "intent, knowledge, and other 

conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 9(b). 

Rodriguez's fraud claim is deficient in several respects. 

First, he fails to identify any particular misrepresentation by 

LabCorp. His sole allegation pertaining to this element is that 

LabCorp's employees "failed to disclose accurate information and 

made false representations to the District of Columbia and the 

plaintiff regarding results and procedures used in [his] drug 

test." FAC ~ 39. This allegation is too generalized and 

conclusory to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading 

requirement. It fails to specify the time, place, or content of 

LabCorp's employees' misrepresentations. As previously noted, 

Rodriguez does not allege that his test results were factually 

inaccurate. 5 Instead, his theory is that LabCorp used improper 

testing procedures. However, as discussed below, this 

contention is premised entirely on LabCorp's own Report. 

5 In its Motion to Dismiss Rodriguez's original Complaint, 

LabCorp pointed out that "Plaintiff does not allege that his 

test results were inaccurate or that he had not engaged in 

marijuana use prior to providing his urine sample; he simply 

claims that LabCorp should not have performed the confirmatory 

test arid then reported the results to the MRO." See Def.'s Mot. 

to Dismiss [Original Compl.] at 2 [Dkt. No. 9]. Rodriguez had 

the opportunity to address this point in his FAC, but did not do 

so. 

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Accordingly, it is entirely unclear what specific statement or 

other communication by LabCorp was false or misleading. 

Second, " [a] plaintiff may recover for a defendant's 

fraudulent statement only if the plaintiff took some action in 

reliance on that statement." Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 

2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F. 3d 8, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 

(citing Va. Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v. Grp. Hosp. & Med. 

Servs., Inc., 878 A.2d 1226, 1237-38 (D.C. 2005)). Rodriguez 

does not claim that he himself relied on LabCorp's Report. 

Instead, he contends that he may recover for fraud based on the 

District of Columbia's reliance. However, he cites no District 

of Columbia case to support this contention, and our Court of 

Appeals has rejected the argument that a third party's reliance 

satisfies the reliance element of common-law fraud. See id. at 

23 (affirming dismissal of common-law fraud claim because 

"[r] ather than suggesting its own reliance, [plaintiff] says the 

PTO relied on [defendant's] alleged misrepresentation") 

The~efore, Rodriguez has not made out the element of reliance. 6 

6 Plaintiff cites Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 

639, 655-57 (2008) for the proposition that third-party reliance 

satisfies the reliance element of fraud. Pl.'s Opp'n at 17-18. 

In Bridge, the Supreme Court considered third-party reliance in 

the context of a civil RICO claim premised on violations of the 

federal mail fraud statute. The Court observed that "it may be 

that first-party reliance is an element of a common-law fraud 

claim," but emphasized that the case before it concerned a 

"statutory offense that is distinct from common-law fraud." Id. 

at 656 (both emphases added) . Since Rodriguez brings a claim 

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Third, beyond a formulaic recitation of the elements of 

fraud, Rodriguez has not alleged any facts suggesting that 

LabCorp or any of its employees knew or believed the Report was 

inaccurate, or intended to deceive Rodriguez, or anyone else, by 

providing false information. 

For each of these reasons, Rodriguez fails to state a claim 

for fraudulent misrepresentation. Count 2 shall be dismissed. 

D. Negligent Misrepresentation 

In Count 3, Rodriguez brings a claim for negligent 

misrepresentation. The elements of negligent misrepresentation 

are similar to the elements of fraud, but do not include the 

element of fraudulent intent. Thus, "[t] o establish negligent 

misrepresentation by a defendant, a plaintiff must show that: 

1. 

2. 

3 . 

The defendant negligently 

information [,] 

The defendant intended or should 

the plaintiff would likely be 

taken in reliance upon [the] 

[and] 

communicated false 

have recognized that 

imperiled by action 

misrepresentation[,] 

The plaintiff reasonably relied upon 

information to his [or her] detriment. 

the false 

Hall v. Ford Enters., Ltd., 445 A.2d 610, 612 (D.C. 1982) 

(citing Restatement of Torts 2d § 311 (1965); W. Prosser, Torts, 

§ 107, at 704-10 (4th ed. 1971)). 

for common law fraud under District of Columbia law, not a claim 

under the civil RICO provisions, Bridge is inapposite. 

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Rodriguez fails to make out the elements of negligent 

misrepresentation for largely the same reasons that he fails to 

state a claim for fraud, namely, that he has not identified any 

false information communicated by LabCorp, and does not claim 

that he himself relied on such information. 

shall be dismissed. 

E. Negligence 

Therefore, Count 3 

In Count 4, Rodriguez brings a claim for negligence. The 

elements of negligence are the existence of "a duty of care, 

breach of that duty, and injury proximately caused by that 

breach." Odemns v. Dist. of Columbia, 930 A.2d 137, 143 (D.C. 

2007) (citation and quotations marks omitted) . 

The parties address a significant portion of their papers 

to the issue of whether LabCorp owed Rodriguez a duty of care. 

See Def.'s Mem. at 12-14; Pl.'s Opp'n at 6-14; Def.'s Reply at 

3-7. Whether a defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care is a 

question of law to be decided by the court, with an eye to 

whether "injury to [the plaintiff] was reasonably foreseeable to 

the defendant" at the time of the accident. Haynesworth v. D.H. 

Stevens Co., 645 A.2d 1095, 1098 (D.C. 1994). The court must 

also consider whether any 

create such a duty. Odemns, 

applicable statutes or regulations 

930 A. 2d at 143 (citing Jarrett v. 

Woodward Bros., Inc., 751 A.2d 972, 980 (D.C. 2000)). 

-14-
Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not 

addressed whether a commercial laboratory owes a duty of care to 

drug-testing subjects, many other courts have recognized the 

existence of such a duty. See, e.g., Cooper v. Lab. Corp. of 

Am. Holdings, Inc., 150 F.3d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1998) ("The 

overall trend is for courts to recognize the existence of a 

limited duty on the part of the laboratory to employees who are 

the subject of the tests.") ; Quisenberry v. Compass Vision, 

Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1230 (S.D. Cal. 2007) ("To [decline 

to recognize such a duty] would mean to deprive thousands of 

individuals from an opportunity to challenge or receive any 

recourse for the repercussions they may suffer due to 

negligently performed laboratory tests producing erroneous or 

inaccurate test results."); Chapman v. LabOne, 460 F. Supp. 2d 

989, 1001 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (finding a duty because defendant 

laboratory "was aware it was testing employee samples, and 

accordingly, could anticipate that harm could come to the 

employee as a result of [its] negligent behavior in processing 

the sample"). 

In fact, although LabCorp contends that it did not owe 

Rodriguez a duty of care, .at least two of the cases it cites to 

support its position hold that drug testing laboratories do owe 

such a duty. See Nehrenz v. Dunn, 593 So. 2d 915, 918 (La. Ct. 

App. 1992) (sustaining negligence claim of terminated employee 

-15-
against laboratory); Elliott v. Lab. Specialists, Inc., 588 So. 

2d 175, 176 (La. Ct. App. 1991) ("The risk of harm in our 

society to an individual because of a false-positive dr:ug test 

is so significant that any individual wrongfully accused of drug 

usage by his employer is within the scope of protection under 

the law."), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 415 (La. 1992). 

As these cases have recognized, it is entirely foreseeable 

that an employee who submits a specimen for drug testing will 

suffer adverse effects to his or her employment if the 

laboratory erroneously reports a positive result. The District 

of Columbia's regulations expressly provide for termination of 

employment following a positive drug test. See 6-B D. C. M. R. § 

3907.1 ("The following shall be grounds for termination of 

employment . (a) A confirmed positive drug test result . 

. ") . Moreover, the District of Columbia and the United States 

Department of Transportation have both enacted regulations 

requiring drug testing laboratories to implement quality control 

procedures, presumably to protect against the danger of a false 

positive. See 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3901 et seq.; 49 C.F.R. Part 40, 

Subpart F. Thus, it is fully consistent with general tort 

principles and the tendency of the courts to hold, and this 

Court does hold, that commercial laboratories, such as LabCorp, 

owe a duty of care to drug testing subjects, such as Rodriguez. 

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However, as discussed, Rodriguez has not alleged that his 

test results were inaccurate, only that LabCorp' s violation of 

certain procedural requirements caused the results to be 

erroneously reported to his employer. Whether LabCorp's duty to 

Rodriguez included strict compliance with these procedural 

requirements, and whether a plaintiff, such as Rodriguez, can 

demonstrate proximate causation where he does not allege that 

his test results were inaccurate, are open questions. 7 However, 

the Court need not reach these questions because there is a more 

fundamental problem with Rodriguez's negligence claim, namely 

that the FAC does not support the "reasonable inference," Iqbal, 

556 u.s. at 678, that LabCorp violated any procedural 

requirement. 

As previously discussed, Rodriguez alleges that LabCorp 

breached its duty to comply with the quality control regulations 

in two respects, first, by not obtaining a positive initial 

screen prior to conducting a confirmatory test, and second, by 

not using the immunoassay methodology required by 6-B D.C.M.R. § 

3906. With respect to the first theory, the sole factual 

7 The Court notes that the quality control regulations require a 

laboratory to store a urine specimen, and if the specimen is 

confirmed positive, to notify the employee of his or her right 

to send the stored sample to another certified laboratory for 

confirmation of the positive result. See 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3906.5. 

There is no evidence Rodriguez ever availed himself of this 

right. 

-17-
allegat.ion to support it is in paragraph 12 of the FAC, which 

contends: 

[T] here is absolutely . no evidence or information in 

the report provided to the District of Columbia 

indicating that [Rodriguez] had a positive initial 

screen, i.e., over 50 ng/mL. No where [sic] in the 

report from LabCorp is it indicated that the initial 

test met or exceeded the 50 ng/mL cutoff level. 

FAC ~ 12. 

However, the Report states in two separate places that 

LabCorp did conduct an initial screen of Rodriguez's specimen, 

and that such screen exceeded the concentration cutoff of 50 

ng/mL. First, on a page titled "Specimen Test Results," the 

Report lists both a "screening" and a "confirm" test, defines 

the "Screening Cutoff" as 50 ng/mL, and indicates that the 

collective results of the "screening" and "confirm" tests 

conducted on Rodriguez's specimen were "POSITIVE." See Steiner 

Decl., Ex. A at 6. Second, on a page titled "Specimen Summary," 

the Report states: 

Initial Test Results (Immunoassay) 

positive for Cannabinoid 

Confirmation Test Results (GC/MS) 

Marijuana Metabolite: 48 ng/ml 

Id. at 1. 

In short, Rodriguez's contention 

Presumptive 

Positive for 

that "[t]here is 

absolutely no evidence or information in the report" that his 

specimen had a positive initial screen is squarely contradicted 

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by the Report itself. Consequently, the Court cannot accept the 

allegations in Paragraph 12 of the FAC as true. 

With respect to Rodriguez's second theory as to how LabCorp 

breached its duty of care, he contends: 

It is clear that LabCorp performed the wrong 

kind of test, i.e., it did not administer the enzyme 

multiple immunoassay technique (EMIT) test as required 

by D.C. municipal regulation 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3906. The 

test administered by LabCorp, in its own words, was a 

'qualitative' test which 'should not be used to 

determine the concentration of drug or drug metabolite 

present in specimens.' 

FAC ~ 16. Rodriguez quotes directly from the "Initial test Data 

Section" of the Report to support this allegation. See FAC ~ 

16, n.l. 

Again, Rodriguez's allegations about the Report are 

directly contradicted by the Report itself. The Report states 

in at least three different places that LabCorp first used an 

immunoassay test, which is a qualitative test, to conduct the 

initial screen, and then used a GCMS test, which is a 

quantit'ative test, to confirm the positive result and measure 

the precise concentration of drug metabolites present in 

Rodriguez's sample. See Steiner Decl., Ex. A at 1, 2, 7, 16. 

This is what the regulations require. See 6-B D.C.M.R. 3906.4 

("[T]he vendor shall split each sample and perform enzymemultiplied immunossay [sic] (EMIT) testing A positive 

EMIT test shall be confirmed using the gas 

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chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS) methodology."); see also 

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 610 (1989) 

("While drug screens may be conducted by immunoassays 

positive drug findings are confirmed by gas chromatography/mass 

spectrometry. These tests, if properly conducted, identify the 

presence of drugs in the biological samples tested with 

great accuracy.") (quoting United States Dep' t of Transp. Field 

Manual: Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in Railroad Operations 

B-12 (1986) (quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Nat'l 

Treasury Employees Union v. U.S. Customs Serv., 27 F.3d 623, 625 

(D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The laboratory to which specimens are sent 

will first employ an immunoassay test; any sample identified as 

positive will then be tested using gas chromatography/mass 

spectrometry (GC/MS) techniques.") (citation omitted) . 8 

While the Court would ordinarily be required to accept 

Plaintiff's factual allegations as true at this stage of the 

proceedings, his allegations rely on a document that expressly 

contradicts the conclusions he draws from it. Therefore, the 

Court is not required to accept such allegations as true. See 

Kaempe, 367 F.3d at 963 (citing Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 

730 (4th Cir. 2002)). Further, without any other factual 

8 The Report does not specify that LabCorp used an "enzymemultiplied" immunoassay technique, as opposed to a different 

type of immunoassay. However, Rodriguez does not allege that 

LabCorp performed the wrong type of immunoassay test, and the 

Report does not suggest as much. 

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allegations to support his claim that LabCorp breached its duty 

of care, or any contention that the test result was erroneous or 

inaccurate, Rodriguez's negligence claim does not satisfy the 

plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal. 

4 shall be dismissed. 

F. Intentional Interference Claims 

Accordingly, Count 

In Counts Five and Six, Rodriguez brings claims for 

intentional interference with prospective advantage and 

intentional interference with business relations. 

LabCorp did not address these claims in its moving papers, 

and Rodriguez contends, therefore, that such claims may not be 

dismissed. P l . ' s Opp' n at 5-6 . LabCorp counters in its Reply 

brief that it was not required to seek dismissal of Counts 5 and 

6 because the FAC brings them against the "John Doe" Defendants 

only, and not against LabCorp. Def. 's Reply at 12. LabCorp 

further argues that even if it was named as a defendant in 

Counts 5 and 6, the claims should be dismissed for failure to 

state a cause of action. Id. at 13-15. The Court agrees. 

LabCorp is correct that the intentional interference claims 

state that they are brought against the "John Does" and do not 

mention LabCorp. Rodriguez now contends (in his Opposition to 

LabCorp' s Motion) that LabCorp is vicariously liable for the 

conduct of the John Does, none of whom have been served with the 

FAC. Pl.'s Opp'n at 5-6. The FAC does not assert this theory 

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in Counts 5 and 6, and therefore LabCorp was not required to 

address those counts in its moving papers. 

Even if Rodriguez had named LabCorp as a defendant in 

Counts 5 and 6, he has not stated a cause of action for 

intentional interference with prospective economic advantage or 

intentional interference with business relations. To establish 

either claim, a plaintiff must allege facts setting forth: (1) 

the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy; 

(2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship or expectancy; 

( 3) the defendant's intentional interference with the 

relationship or expectancy; and (4) resulting damages. See 

NCRIC, Inc. v. Columbia Hosp. for Women Med. Ctr., Inc., 957 

A.2d 890, 900 & n.l8 (D.C. 2008); Casco Marina Dev., L.L.C. v. 

D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 834 A.2d 77, 84 (D.C. 2003). 

There is not a single factual allegation in the FAC 

plausibly suggesting that LabCorp (or anyone else) intended to 

interfere with Rodriguez's employment relationship with the 

District of Columbia. The mere awareness that Rodriguez could 

be adversely affected by a positive test result is insufficient. 

As our Court of Appeals has observed: 

As its name would suggest; intentional 

requires an element of intent. 

intent to interfere or knowledge that 

injure the plaintiff's business 

insufficient to impose liability. 

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interference 

[A] general 

conduct will 

dealings is 
Bennett Enterprises, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d 493, 

499 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted) . Because there are no facts suggesting 

that LabCorp, or any of its employees, acted with a desire or 

purpose to interfere with Rodriguez,s employment, the Court 

shall dismiss the intentional interference claims at Counts 5 

and 6. 9 

G. Breach of Contract 

In Count 7, Rodriguez brings a claim for breach of 

contract. A claim for breach of contract includes four 

elements: "(1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an 

obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of 

that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach. 11 Tsinolas Realty 

Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009) (citation omitted). 

Rodriguez contends that LabCorp 1 s contract with the District of 

Columbia required compliance with the quality control 

regulations. He further claims that he has standing as a thirdparty beneficiary to enforce this aspect of the contract, which 

LabCorp disputes. See Def. 1 s Mot. at 14-17; Pl. 1 s Opp 1 n at 20-

22. 

9 Having so concluded, the Court does not reach LabCorp,s 

alternate contention that an "at-will 11 employment contract, such 

as the one between Rodriguez and the District of Columbia, 

cannot, as a matter of law, satisfy the first element of an 

intentional interference claim. Def., s Reply at 14 (citing 

Zelaya v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 587 F. Supp. 2d 277, 286-87 (D.D.C. 

2008)) . 

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Whatever the merits of Rodriguez's third-party beneficiary 

theory, his breach of contract claim, like his other claims, is 

predicated on the contention that LabCorp violated the quality 

control regulations. As already noted, he pleads no facts 

plausibly suggesting LabCorp violated any of these provisions. 

Accordingly, even assuming that the contract between LabCorp and 

the District of Columbia required compliance with the 

regulations, and that a drug testing subject has standing to 

enforce this requirement, Rodriguez still would not state a 

claim for breach of contract. 

dismissed. 

Therefore, Count 7 shall be 

H. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

Finally, at Count 8, Rodriguez brings a claim for breach of 

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. "Under District of 

Columbia law, every contract contains within it an implied 

covenant of both parties to act in good faith and damages may be 

recovered for its breach as part of a contract action." 

Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 A. 2d 1080, 1087 

(D.C. 2008) (citation omitted) . This covenant means that 

"neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of 

destroying or injuring the right of the other party to_ receive 

the fruits of the contract." Allworth v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 

194, 201 (D.C. 2006) (citations omitted). "To state a claim for 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a 

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plaintiff must allege either bad faith or conduct that is 

arbitrary and capricious." Wright v. Howard Univ., 60 A.3d 749, 

754 (D.C. 2013) 

Rodriguez was not a party to the contract between the 

District of Columbia and LabCorp. The mere fact that he may 

have been one of thousands of beneficiaries of a specific 

quality control provision contained in that contract does not 

mean that LabCorp generally owed him a contractual duty of good 

faith and fair dealing. Further, there are no facts in the FAC 

suggesting that LabCorp or any of its employees operated in bad 

faith or in an arbitrary and capricious manner at any time. 

Accordingly, Count 8 shall be dismissed. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion is granted, 

and the FAC shall be dismissed. An Order shall accompany this 

Memorandum Opinion. 

February 4, 2014 

United States District Judge 

Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF 

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