NO. 4-05-0053 Filed: 1/26/06

 IN THE APPELLATE COURT 

 OF ILLINOIS 

 FOURTH DISTRICT 

CONSUMERS IL WATER COMPANY, 

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

THE VERMILION COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW 

and THE ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL 

BOARD, 

 Respondents-Appellees. 

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 Direct Administrative 

 Review of the 

 Illinois Property Tax 

 Appeal Board 

 No. 02-00059.001-C-3 

 

_________________________________________________________________ 

PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the 

court:

Petitioner, Consumers IL Water Company, owns a 117.23-

acre tract of land in Vermilion County that contains a waterretention dam and lake. In December 2001, petitioner filed an 

application for an open-space valuation for the 2002 tax year 

under section 10-155 of the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 

200/10-155 (West 2002)) for the entire 117.23 acres with the 

Vermilion County Supervisor of Assessments' office. That office 

denied the application, and petitioner filed an assessment 

complaint with respondent, the Vermilion County Board of Review 

(Board of Review). In December 2002, the Board of Review denied 

petitioner's request for the open-space valuation, and petitioner 

filed a complaint with respondent, the Property Tax Appeal Board 

(PTAB). After an August 2004 hearing, PTAB found the land 

qualified for an open-space valuation but not the dam. 

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335) 
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and section 16-195 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/16-195 (West 2002)), 

petitioner seeks direct review of PTAB's decision, contending the 

dam should not be assessed separately. We reverse and remand 

with directions. 

 I. BACKGROUND 

The evidence submitted at the August 2004 hearing shows 

the Vermilion County Supervisor of Assessments' office gave the 

117.23 acres an assessed value of $58,953 and the improvements on 

the land $1,437,411. In reviewing petitioner's assessment 

complaint, the Board of Review did not make any changes to the 

above assessed values. The photographs submitted by petitioner 

and the parties' witnesses' testimony indicate the 117.23-acre 

property contains a lake created by a large, man-made dam. A 

fence surrounds the dam, and buoys are in the water with warnings 

to stay away from the dam. Petitioner leases the lake to the 

Vermilion County Conservation District for public purposes. The 

public uses the lake for recreational purposes such as boating 

and fishing. 

Michael Lipowsky, a local real estate appraiser, 

testified for petitioner. He described the physical characteristics of the property and was the one who took the photographs of 

the land submitted by petitioner. Lipowsky stated the land was 

not used for residential purposes. 

Don Crist, Vermilion County Supervisor of Assessments, 
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testified on behalf of the Board of Review. He testified the 

primary purpose of the lake was to provide a water supply for 

petitioner to make a profit. Crist further noted golf courses 

were the only type of property in Vermilion County that received 

an open-space valuation. In the case of golf courses, the land 

got the open-space valuation but not the clubhouse. The openspace valuation for golf courses in Vermilion County was around 

$400 to $500. 

In its December 2004 decision, PTAB awarded petitioner 

an open-space valuation for the entire 117.23 acres of land only 

and thus reduced the Board of Review's assessed value for the 

land from $58,953 to $19,536. Specifically, PTAB found (1) the 

land had to satisfy only one of subsections (a) through (f) of 

section 10-155 (35 ILCS 200/10-155(a) through (f) (West 2002)) 

and (2) the 117.23 acres met subsection (c) (35 ILCS 200/10-

155(c) (West 2002)) and all of the other requirements of section 

10-155. However, PTAB disagreed with petitioner's argument that 

once the land qualifies for an open-space valuation, the additional ground improvements cannot be taxed separately. This 

appeal followed. 

 II. ANALYSIS 

 A. Standard of Review 

The Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 through 

3-113 (West 2002)) governs our review of PTAB's decision. 35 
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ILCS 200/16-195 (West 2002). Our review extends to all questions 

of law and fact presented in the record. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 

2002). With questions of law, the agency's decision is not 

binding on this court, and thus our review is de novo. 

Illini Country Club v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 263 Ill. App. 

3d 410, 416, 635 N.E.2d 1347, 1353 (1994), overruled on other 

grounds by Peacock v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 339 Ill. App. 3d 

1060, 1071, 792 N.E.2d 367, 376 (2003). As to questions of fact, 

we will not reverse them unless they are against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Illini Country Club, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 

417, 635 N.E.2d at 1353. A finding is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly 

evident. Peacock, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 1068, 792 N.E.2d at 373. 

If a case presents a mixed question of law and fact, we 

review the agency's ruling under a clearly erroneous standard. 

Lake Point Tower Garage Ass'n v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 346 

Ill. App. 3d 389, 392, 804 N.E.2d 717, 720 (2004). Under that 

standard, a reviewing court will not reverse the agency's decision unless the court has a definite and firm conviction the 

agency was mistaken. Lake Point Tower Garage Ass'n, 346 Ill. 

App. 3d at 392-93, 804 N.E.2d at 720. 

Here, the parties disagree as to the appropriate 

standard of review. Our resolution of the case requires us only 

to address questions of law, and thus our review is de novo
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(Illini Country Club, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 416, 635 N.E.2d at 

1353). 

 B. Open-Space Valuation 

Ordinarily, property is valued based on its fair cash 

value (also referred to as fair market value), "meaning the 

amount the property would bring at a voluntary sale where the 

owner is ready, willing, and able to sell; the buyer is ready, 

willing, and able to buy; and neither is under a compulsion to do 

so." Illini Country Club, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 418, 635 N.E.2d at 

1353; see also 35 ILCS 200/9-145(a) (West 2002). An exception to 

that rule is section 10-155 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/10-155 (West 

2002)), which provides an alternative valuation if certain 

criteria are met. Additionally, county assessment officials 

generally value property and its improvements separately since 

they must list the assessed value of the property in one column, 

the assessed value of improvements in another, and the total 

valuation in a separate column. See 35 ILCS 200/9-155 (West 

2002). 

At issue in this case is whether a dam, an improvement, 

located on property that qualifies for an alternative valuation 

under section 10-155 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/10-155 (West 2002)) 

can be separately assessed. Petitioner contends that property 

satisfying the section 10-155 criteria can receive only a single 

assessment. Conversely, PTAB and the Board of Review contend the 
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dam can be separately assessed because section 10-155 applies 

only to the land itself, not improvements. Thus, we first 

address whether section 10-155 of the Code applies only to the 

land itself. 

Section 10-155 of the Code provides as follows: 

"In all counties, in addition to valuation as otherwise permitted by law, land 

which is used for open[-]space purposes and 

has been so used for the 3 years immediately 

preceding the year in which the assessment is 

made, upon application under [s]ection 

10-160, shall be valued on the basis of its 

fair cash value, estimated at the price it 

would bring at a fair, voluntary sale for use 

by the buyer for open[-]space purposes. 

Land is considered used for open[-]space 

purposes if it is more than 10 acres in area 

and: 

(a) is actually and exclusively used for maintaining or 

enhancing natural or scenic resources, 

(b) protects air or streams or 

water supplies, 
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(c) promotes conservation of 

soil, wetlands, beaches, or 

marshes, including ground cover or 

planted perennial grasses, trees 

and shrubs and other natural perennial growth, and including any body 

of water, whether man-made or natural, 

(d) conserves 

landscaped areas, such as 

public or 

private golf 

courses, 

(e) enhances the value to the 

public of abutting or neighboring 

parks, forests, wildlife preserves, 

nature reservations, sanctuaries, 

or other open spaces, or 

(f) preserves historic sites. 

Land is not considered used for open 

[-]space purposes if it is used primarily for 

residential purposes." 35 ILCS 200/10-155 

(West 2002). 
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Section 10-160 (35 ILCS 200/10-160 (West 2002)) sets forth the 

application process for obtaining the section 10-155 valuation, 

and section 10-165 (35 ILCS 200/10-165 (West 2002)) describes 

what takes place when the land is no longer used for open-space 

purposes. 

In interpreting statutes, courts seek to ascertain and 

give effect to the legislature's intent. They begin by examining 

the statute's language. The words are given their plain and 

commonly understood meanings as viewed, not in isolation, but in 

light of the statute's other relevant provisions. When a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect 

without resort to statutory-construction tools. State Board of 

Elections v. Shelden, 354 Ill. App. 3d 506, 512, 821 N.E.2d 698, 

704 (2004). 

In this case, some of the parties have cited legislative history. However, that statutory-construction tool is not 

necessary since section 10-155 is not ambiguous. Illini Country 

Club, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 418, 635 N.E.2d at 1354. 

Sections 10-155 through 10-165 of the Code consistently 

use the term "land." 35 ILCS 200/10-155 through 10-165 (West 

2002). Section 1-130 of the Code defines the term "land" (as 

well as property, real property, real estate, tract, and lot), in 

pertinent part, as follows: 

"The land itself, with all things contained therein, and also all buildings, 

structures and improvements, and other perma-
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nent fixtures thereon, including all oil, 

gas, coal[,] and other minerals in the land 

and the right to remove oil, gas[,] and other 

minerals, excluding coal, from the land, and 

all rights and privileges belonging or pertaining thereto, except where otherwise specified by this Code." 35 ILCS 200/1-130 (West 

2002). 

The open-space valuation provisions do not set forth a 

different definition of "land" or indicate improvements should be 

treated differently. Conversely, the provisions addressing 

farmland valuation (35 ILCS 200/10-110 through 10-147 (West 

2002)) expressly set forth different valuation formulas for 

"farmland," "farm dwellings," and "other improvements." Accordingly, we find that when sections 10-155 through 10-165 of the 

Code state "land," they refer to the land itself and improvements. 

Since "land" includes the ground and improvements, both 

the ground and the improvements must meet the requirements of 

section 10-155 of the Code. If any portion of the land included 

in a section 10-160 application is not used for open-space 

purposes, then all of the land is not entitled to the valuation. 

 See 35 ILCS 200/10-165 (West 2002). In this case, PTAB 

expressly found both the lake and the dam met the section 10-155 

requirements. 

We next must address whether the dam and land are to be 
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assessed separately or as a single assessment. We agree with 

petitioner that section 10-155 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/10-155 

(West 2002)) provides a single assessment value, and thus improvements do not have their own assessment value. 

As stated earlier, the statute expressly requires the 

land and its improvements to be for open-space purposes. Therefore, the improvements and land together are fulfilling a purpose 

the legislature found valuable. "Open space" is defined as 

follows: 

"'Any parcel or area of land or water 

essentially unimproved and set aside, dedicated, designated[,] or reserved for public 

or private use or enjoyment or for the use 

and enjoyment of owners and occupants of land 

adjoining or neighboring such open spaces.'" 

 (Emphasis added.) Illini Country Club, 263 

Ill. App. 3d at 419, 635 N.E.2d at 1355, 

quoting Black's Law Dictionary 984 (5th ed. 

1979).

Thus, while the land has improvements, those improvements are 

contributing to the open-space nature of the land. 

Our interpretation of section 10-155 of the Code is 

consistent with the Third District's interpretation in Knox 

County Board of Review v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 185 

Ill. App. 3d 530, 541 N.E.2d 794 (1989). There, the court 

concluded the Code contemplated a single assessment for open-
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space land. Knox County, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 535, 541 N.E.2d at 

797. 

The Board of Review suggests the Third District's 

conclusion was inconsistent since it also sustained the improvement assessments for a house and building. However, the facts 

indicate the petitioner applied for an open-space valuation for 

the 76.5-acre golf course, not the other acre of the tract that 

contained the house and building. Knox County, 185 Ill. App. 3d 

at 532, 541 N.E.2d at 795. Thus, the open-space land did receive 

only one assessment. 

The Board of Review further asserts Knox County's 

holding should be limited to golf courses because tees, fairways, 

and greens are inseparable components of the golf course. Yet, 

in this case, the man-made lake would not exist but for the dam. 

 Accordingly, the Board of Review's distinction is meritless. 

PTAB also asserts Knox County's holding should be 

limited to golf courses because golf courses are "land that has 

been configured in specialized ways." However, we have already 

concluded the statute refers to "land" as the land itself and its 

improvements. Thus, this distinction is also meritless. 

Additionally, we note that where a statute has been 

judicially interpreted, considerations of stare decisis weigh 

heavily since the legislature is free to change its legislation 

in response to such interpretations. Lake County Board of Review 

v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 192 Ill. App. 3d 605, 617, 548 

N.E.2d 1129, 1137 (1989). With section 10-155 of the Code, the 
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legislature has made only one major change in the criteria for 

receiving an open-space valuation since the Knox County decision. 

 Compare 35 ILCS 200/10-155 (West 2002) with Ill. Rev. Stat. 

1987, ch. 120, par. 501g-1. In that amendment, it removed the 

requirement that the county in which the land was located have a 

population of less than 200,000. See Pub. Act 89-137, '5, eff. 

January 1, 1996 (1995 Ill. Laws 2120). 

Last, we recognize the paradox our interpretation 

yields. While it is hard to conceive of land improved with a 

large structure as being assessed like unimproved land, the 

language of the Code provides for such a result. 

 III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated, we reverse PTAB's judgment and 

remand the cause to PTAB to remove the improvement assessment for 

the dam. 

Reversed and remanded with directions. 

STEIGMANN and KNECHT, JJ., concur.