### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00 069 -CV

Le e sbo r o C or por at ion , A ppe lla nt

v. Claude Hend rickson , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF MI LAM COUNTY , 20 TH JUDI CIAL DISTRICT

NO. 3259 4 , HO NORAB LE ED MAGRE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
I n this int erloc utory

appea l, appellant L eesbor o Corp o ration challeng es the tr ia l c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f a pp e lle e Cla

ud e He nd ri c ks on ’s sp e c ia l a

pp e ara nc e . L e e sb oro su ed Dixie Demolition, He ndrickson, who is the owner and manag er of Dix ie Demolition, a nd sever al o ther de fe nd ants on

va ri ou s c la ims rel a te d to a

sa lva g e op e ratio n at a

po we r p lant i n Ro c kd a le , T e xas. L eesbor o broug ht tort claims ag ainst Hendric kson based on an allege d fra udulent misrepre sentation Hendr ickson made while in Texas. Hendrickson f iled a spec ial appea

ranc e, asse rt i n g that he wa s not amenable to personal j u ri s d i cti on beca use he w as a r esident of Ala bama a nd did not have suf ficient minimum contacts with Texas. The trial cour t gr ante d h i s s pecia l appea ranc e and dis mi s s e d

a ll c la im s a g a in s t h im

f o r la c k o f p e r s o n a l j ur is d ic ti o n . We w il l a f f ir m t h e tr ial court’s or der.2 BACK GR OUND Hendr icks o n o wn s and oper ates Dixie Demolition, L L C (“Dixie”), a pow er pla nt demolition company

that operates out of Birming ham, Alabama . In September 2007, D ix ie’s par ent
c o m p an y , D i xi e E qu i p m e n t , e n t e r e d i n t o a c o n tr a c t w i th A l c o a , In c . , t o p ur c h a s e an d d e mol ish
c e rt a in p ow e r p lants a t A lc oa ’s a lum inum pl ant i n Roc kd a le , T e xas. Di xie E qu ipm e nt a ssi g ne d it s ri gh t s i nt h e A l co a c o n t ra ct t o Di x i e, wh i ch l at er en t er ed i n t o a co n tra ct t o s el l m o s to f t h e s al v age from the plant t o Ai rwa y s Recycling Group. Airw ay s then enter ed into a contr act with JNS Enterpr ises to sell it som e of the salvag e fr om the Alcoa plan t
. Fi n al l y , L eesbor o, a Te x as
c or po ratio n, e nte re d into a

c on tr a c t w ithJNS to purc ha se sa lva g e mate ri a ls f ro m th e Al c oa

pla nt. L e e sb or o, ho we ve r, wa s nev e r ab le to pur c ha se any of the sa lva g e fr om t

he Roc kd a le plant b ec ause, a ccor ding to Dixie, Airway s defa ulted on its contract with Dixie, and Dix ie made other a rra ng ements to sell the s alvag e mater ials. As a re sult, the subsequent contra cts flowingdown fr om t he def a ult e d c on tr a c t, i nc lud ingL e e sb or o’ s, we re ne ve r c omp le te d. B a se d o n th e fa ilure to perf orm these c ontrac ts, L eesbor o sued Dixi e, Airw ay s, and JNS for br eac h of contra ct. L eesbor o
a lso su e d D ixie , H e nd

ri c ks on , a nd Ai rw ay s f

or fr aud in the ind

uc e me nt, fr a

ud ule nt c on c e a lme nt, int e rf e re nc e wi th c on tr a c tua l r e latio ns , c on ve rs ion , a nd vio latio ns of

the Te xas T he ft

L ia bil ity Ac t. L eesbor o’s fra

ud claims ag ainst Hendric kson were based on its a l l ega t ion that Hendr ickson had re prese nted that he ha d signe d, on behalf of Dixi e, an ag ree ment g uara nteeingthat L eesbor o would rec eive its salvag e mater ials from t he Rockda le plant re g ardle ss of the status of the interveningcontra cts (“pe rfor mance g uara

ntee” ). Specific ally , L eesbor o alleg ed that Hendr ickson, in order to induce L eesbor o to enter into an a g ree ment wi t h J NS t o p u rcha se salvag e rig hts and3

deposit money

under th at purcha se agree ment, told L eesbor o’s re prese ntative that he—i.e., He nd ri c ks on —h a d s ig ne d the p erfo rm anc e g ua ra nte e and that L e e sb or o w ou ld s tart re c e ivi ngits
c on tr a c te d s a lva g e sh ipm e nts on c e L e e sb or o p a id t he re qu ir e d d e po sit
. I n response to L eesbor o’s claims ag ainst him, Hendr ickson filed a spe cial appe ara nce
a sse rt ingtha

t he was no t su

bje c t to the pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o f T e xas c ourt s b e c a us e he wa s a
re sid e nt o f A la

bama and did no t ha ve su ff ic ie nt min imu

m c on ta c ts wi th T e xas t o e sta bli shsp e c if

ic jurisdiction over him. Hendric kson also filed an aff idavit and cor

roborating de position t estimony to support his assertion that he neither signe d the perf ormanc e g uara

ntee nor repr esente d that he had sig ne d th e pe rf

or manc e g ua

ra nte e . L e e sb or o r e sp on de d b y of fe ri ngthe de po sit ion

te sti mony

of its repr esentative stating that Hendric kson had m ade the repr esentation. L eesbor o also objecte d to the admission of Hendric kson’s aff idavit on the g rounds that it c ontained inadmissible evidenc e. Af ter
a he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt

g ra nte d th e sp e c ia l a

pp e ara nc e and dismis se d L e e sb or o’ s c la ims a g a ins t He nd ri c ks on fo r l a c k o f j ur isd ic tio n. L e e sb or o a pp e a ls.
DI SCU SSIO N Personal Juri

sdiction L eesbor o’s first four

issues on appea l challeng e the tria l co u rt ’s dec ision to gra nt Hendr ickson’s spec ial appea ranc e and its findingthat i t d id not have per sonal jurisdiction over He ndri c ks on . Sp e c if

ic a lly , L e e sb or o a

rgue s th a t ( 1) the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d a s a

matte r o f l aw i n g rantingHendr ickson’s spec ial appea ranc e, (2) the evidenc e esta blished as a matter of law that the trial court had specific jurisdiction ove r Hendr ickson, (3) the trial cour t erre d in impli edly

finding and conc luding that He ndrickson neg ated the e x istence of persona l jurisdiction, and (4) the evidenc e4

was leg ally

and fa ctually

insufficient to support the trial c ourt’s im p lied finding that Hendr ickson
ne g a te d th e e xiste nc e of

pe rs on a l jurisd ic tio n. B e c a us e the se iss ue s a

re c los e ly re late d, we wi ll addre ss them toge ther. ( i) Standard of Review

Whether a tria l court has persona l jurisdiction over a defe ndant is a question of law that we r eview de novo. Moki MacRiver Ex peditions v. Drugg , 221 S.W .3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007). The plaintiff be ars the initial burde n of plea ding suf ficient a lleg ations to invoke jurisdiction under the Texas long- arm statute. American TypeCulture Col lection, Inc . v. Coleman , 83 S.W .3d 801, 807 (Tex. 2002). Once the pl aintiff has pleade d sufficie nt jurisdictional alleg ations, the defe ndant filing a spec ial appea

ranc e then a ssumes the burden of neg ating all bases of

persona l jurisdiction alleg ed by the plaintiff. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W .3d 7 8 9 , 7 9 3 (T ex. 2002). “B eca use t h e p l ai n t i ff de fines the sc ope and nature of the lawsuit, the defe ndant’s cor responding burden to ne g ate jurisdiction is tied to the alleg ations in the plaintiff’s plea ding.” Kelly v. Ge neral Interior Constr., Inc. , 301 S.W .3d 653, 658 (T ex . 2 0 1 0 ). However, the plaintiff’s plea dings a re not disposit ive of the jurisdictional dispute, thus, both parties c an pre sent evidenc e either proving or disproving the alleg ations. Id. at 658-59. The de fenda nt can a lso ne g ate jurisdiction on a leg al basis. Id. at 659.

I n making its jurisdictional deter mination, the t rial court must, if nece ssary , resolve questions of jurisdictional fac t. BM C So ftwa re , 83 S.W .3d at 794. When the trial cour t does not issue finding s of fact and c onclusions of law with its special-a ppear ance ruling , as in this case, w e infer a ll fact finding s nece ssary to support the trial court’ s jurisdictional determination and a ny leg al5

theory that i s s u p p o rt ed by

the evidenc e. GJ

P, In c . v . G ho sh , 251 S.W .3d 854, 870 (T ex . Ap p . —

Au s t i n2 0 0 8 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g BM C So ftwa re , 83 S.W .3d at 795). F urt h er , wh en the appellate rec ord i n cl u d es t h e reporter ’s and c lerk’s r ecor ds, as it does in this case, a ny implied finding s are not c onclusive and may be cha lleng ed for leg al and f

actua l sufficienc y . BM

C So ftwa re , 83 S.W .3d at 795. Evidenc e is leg ally sufficie nt if there is more than a mer e scintilla of evide nce to support the finding
. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner , 953 S.W .2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). More than a scintilla of evidence ex ists when the evidenc e supportingthe finding , as a whole, “r ises to the level that would ena ble re asonable and fa ir-mi n d ed people to differ in their conc lusions.” Burroughs W

ellcomev. Crye , 9 0 7 S
. W
. 2 d 4 9 7 , 4 9 9 (T ex . 1 9 9 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Tra ns po rta tio n I

ns . Co. v. Moriel , 879 S.W .2d 10, 25 (Tex. 1994) ). Evidence is f actua lly insufficient only

if, in light of the entire rec ord, a f

inding is so ag ainst the g reat w eig ht a nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e as to be
manif e stl y e rr on e ou s o r u

nju st. Cai n v. Ba in , 70 9 S.W. 2d 17 5, 17 6 (T e x. 19 86 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt is the s ole j udg e of witness cre dibilit y and the weig ht to be g iven to testimony , and we “will not disturb a trial c ourt ’s re s o l u tion of conflictingevidenc e that turns on the c redibility or we ight of

the evidenc e.” Ennis v. Loiseau , 1 6 4 S
. W
. 3 d 6 9 8 , 706 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.). I f we deter mine that the trial cour

t’s finding s of jurisdictional fac t are supported by sufficie nt evidence , we de cide a s a matter of

law whe ther those f

indings ne g ate all bases for personal jurisdiction. GJP, Inc. , 2 51 S.W. 3d

a t 87 1. I n c on du c tin g our fact ual and le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y inq uir y , w e re vie w a ll rele vant evidenc e that wa s befor e the tria l court. Id.6

( ii) Gene ral Principles

A Texas court may

exercise persona l jur isdiction ove r a nonre sident if (1) the T exas lon g -a rm statut e a uth or ize s th e e xercise of jur isd ic tio n, and

(2 ) t he e xer c ise of

jur isd ic tio n is consistent with constitutional due-proc ess guara ntees. Moki Mac , 221 S.W .3d at 574. The Te x as lon g -a rm statut e a uth or ize s th e e xer c ise ofjur isd ic tio n ove r nonre sid e nts wh o do b us ine ss i n T e xas. S c h l o b o h m v . S

c ha pir o , 7 8 4 S.W .2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990). “In addition to other ac ts that may
c on sti tut e do ing bu sin e ss, a no nr e sid e nt do e s bu sin e ss” in T e xas i f h e “ c omm its a tor t in wh ole or in par t i n[T e xa s ]. ” T e x. Ci v . Pr a c . & Re m. Co d e A n n . § 1 7
. 0 4 2 ( 2 ) ( We s t 2 0 0 8 )
. T h e lo n g - arm statute’s broa d “doi n g business” languag e allows the statute to r eac h as fa r as the f

eder al constitutional requireme nts of due proc ess will allow. Guardian Royal Exc h. Assurance, Ltd. v. En gli sh Chi na Cla

y s, P. L.C. , 815 S.W .2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). For purposes of a ssertingpersona l jurisdiction over a n o n re s i dent who does not consent to jurisdictio n , fe d er al co n s t i tu t i o n al d u e- p ro ce s s re qu i re m en t s ar e m et wh en th e n o n re s i dent defe ndant has e stablished “minimum conta cts” with the forum state and the e x erc ise of jurisdiction is c onsistent with “tra ditional notions of fa ir play and substantial justice.” Moki Mac , 221 S.W .3d at 575. A “minimum-contac ts a naly sis f ocuses solely on the ac tions and rea sonable e x pectations of the def endant.” Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, I nc. v. H olten , 168 S.W .3d 777, 790 (Tex. 2005). Minimum contac ts are suf ficient for

persona l jurisd i ct i o n when the nonr esident def endant “‘pur posefull y av ai l s i tself of the pr ivilege of conduc ting a ctivities within t he for um State, thus invoking the be nefits and pr otections of i t s l aw s.’” Moki Mac , 221 S.W .3d at 575 (quoting Ha ns on v . D e nc k

la , 3 5 7 U. S
. 2 3 5 , 2 5 3 ( 1 9 5 8 ) ( qu o t i n g International Shoe Co. v. State of W ashington , 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945))) . In deter mining whe ther a

nonresident de fendant has7

purposef ully availed itself of t he privil eg e of c onducting activities in Texas, “only the def endant’ s contac ts with Tex as ar e re levant, not the unilater al a ctivity of anothe r par

ty or third per son.” Id. Fur ther, “ the contac ts relied upon must be purposeful, rathe r t han ra ndom, fortuitous, or attenuate d,” and the “ ‘def

enda n t must seek some bene fit, advanta g e, or pr ofit by “ava iling” itself of

the jurisdiction.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Michiana , 168 S.W .3d at 785).

A n o n r e s id e n t’ s c o n ta c ts w it hT e xa s ma

y g iv e r is e to tw o ty

p e s o f p e r sonal jurisdiction—ge nera l jurisdiction and specific jur i s d iction. BM C So ftwa re , 83 S.W .3d at 795. Gene ral jurisdi ction is established when a nonresident de fenda

nt’s contac ts with Tex as ar e

“ c on tin uo us and sy ste matic ,” re g ard le ss o f whe the r t he a lle g e d li a

bil ity ari se s f ro m th os e c on ta c ts. Id. at 796. In contra st, specific jurisdiction, which is the only g round for

persona l jur i s d i ct ion
a lle g e d a g a ins t H e nd

ri c ks on in t he pr e se nt c a se , f

oc us e s o n “ the re latio ns hip amon g the de fe nd ant, th e f o r u m[ , ] an d th e litigation.” Moki Mac , 2 21 S.W. 3d a t 57 5- 76 . “ Spe c if

ic jur isd ic tio n is
e sta bli sh e d if the de fe nd ant’ s a lle g e d li a bil ity ari se s f ro m or is re late d to an a c tiv ity c on du c te d w ith in the forum.” BM

C So ftwa re , 83 S.W.3 d at 7 96 . T hu s, fo r a Te xas c ourt

to p ro pe rl y

e xer c ise sp e c if

ic jurisdic t ion over He ndrickson in the pre sent ca se, (1) Hendr ickson must have made minimum contac ts with Texas by purposef ully availing himself of t he privil eg e of c onducting activities here , and (2) Hendr ickson’s contacts with Texas must be subst antially connec ted t o the oper ative fa cts of this li tigation. See Moki Mac , 221 S.W .3d at 576, 585. I f bot h of t hese require ments are met, we the n mu st d e te rm ine if

the e x erci se of spe c if

ic jur isd ic tio n o ve r H e nd ri c ks on c omp or ts w ith “tra ditional notions of fa ir play and substantial justice.” Id. at 5 7 5 (q u o t i n g International Shoe , 326 U.S. at 316).8

( iii) H endrick son’s Spec ial Appearance L eesbor o satisfied its ini tial jurisdictional burden by pleadingsufficie nt alleg ations to come within the T ex as l o n g-arm statute. Se e BM C So ftwa re , 8 3 S
. W
. 3 d

a t7 9 3
. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, L ee s b o r o a ll e g e d

th a t H e n d r ic kson “committed fra

ud, fra udulent conce alment, conve rsion, and other torts in Tex as” when He ndrickson made “materi al repr esentations to pl aintiff in J une 2008, at meeting s in Rockdale, Te x as, that Hendr ickson [had sig ned a] perfor mance g uara

ntee a g ree ment.” I n response , Hendr ickson filed a spe cial appe ara nce a sserting that he was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas beca use he was a resident of A labama, not Te x as, does not have rea l estate, a bank ac count, or pe rsonal re cords in Te x as, and ha s never enter ed into a contr act or conducte d any

business with any

Texas business, citizen, or resident. Hendr ickson also asser ted that he did not sign the perf

ormanc e guara

ntee a s alleg ed by

L eesbor o. He n d ri ckson later filed an aff idavit in support of his special appe ara nce attesting to those same fa cts and a dditionally asser ting that he neve r re prese nted to L eesbor o’s ag ent that he ha d signe d the p er fo rm an ce g uara ntee. Hendr ickson also offe red the deposition testimony of Conrad B ar, a

nother pa rticipant in the Rockdale me eting , who cor roborated Hendr ickson’s af fidavit testimony
. L eesbor o responde d to H endric kson’s specia l appea ranc e and e vidence by

asser ting that th e tr ia l c ourt

ha d p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r H e nd ri c ks on fo r t he fo llo wi ngre a so ns :

• Hendr ickson attende d meeting s in Rockdale, Te x as and ma de re prese ntat ions reg ardingthe per formanc e guara ntee;

• Hendr ickson committed torts in Tex as; and

• Given He ndrickson’s numer ous, su bstantial contac ts with Tex as, the a ssertion of pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r h im w ou ld n ot o ff e nd tr a dit ion a l no tio ns of

du e pr oc e ss.9

As evidenc e, L eesbor o relied on H endric kson’s admission that he attende d the Rockdale meeting and also on the deposition te stimony of Daniel L ee, L eesbor o’s repr esentative to wh o m L ee s boro
a lle g e s H e nd

ri c ks on ma de the mis re pr e se ntatio ns a t is su e in t his c a se . L eesb oro als o obje c te d to portions of Hendr icks on’s af fidavit on the g rounds that they wer e impermissible fac tual and leg al
c o n c lu s io n s . A f

te r r e v ie w in g th e p le a d in g s , e v id e n c e , an d ar g u me n ts o f c o un s e l, th e trial court sustained Hendrickson’s special appea ranc e and dismiss ed the claims ag ainst Hendric kson for lac k of per sonal jurisdiction.

I n g ra nti ngHe nd

ri c ks on ’s sp eci al app e ara nc e , th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t make e xplic it fi nd ing s o f f

a c t or c on c lus ion s o f l aw. However, to ho ld t hat H e nd ri c ks on wa s n ot a

me na ble to sp e c if ic jur isd ic tio n in

Te xas, the tr ia l c ourt

imp lie dly

de te rm ine d t hat e ith e r ( 1) He nd ri c ks on did not have minimum contacts with Texas by purposef ully availinghimse l f of the privileg e of
c on du c tin g a c tiv iti e s in

Te xas, (2 ) H e nd

ri c ks on ’s c on ta c ts w ithTe xas w e re no t su bs tant ially
connec ted t o t h e o p er ati ve fa cts of the litigation, or (3) that its exercise of jurisdiction over Hendr ickson would offe nd traditional notions of fair p l ay an d substantial justi ce. We must infer all finding s of jurisdictional fac t nece ssary to support the trial court’ s ruling. B M C S o f t war e , 83 S.W .3d at 795. ( iv ) He nd ric k so n’ s Co nta c ts We b e g in o ur

jur isd ic tio na l ana ly sis by e xami nin g He nd

ri c ks on ’s a lle g e d c on ta c ts with Texas. See G

JP, Inc

. , 251 S.W .3d at 868. L ees b o ro all eg es that He ndrickson made the fo llo wi ngc on ta c ts w ithTe xas:10

• “[S] ubstantial business activity ” for Dix ie i n Pasadena , Texas and Rockdale , Te xas;

• F re qu e nt t

ra ve l to and fr om T e xas o n D ixie ’s bu sin e ss;

• Attendanc e a

t a b u s in e s s meetingin Rockdale, Te x as re g ardingDix ie’s Alcoa plant contra ct; and

• A R e pr e se ntatio n to Da nie l L e e , L e e sb or o’ s re pr e se ntativ e , at th e Roc kd a le meeting , that Hendr ickson has sig ned the pe rfor mance g uara

ntee. Only the last of these alleg ed conta cts could provide a basis for asser

ting specific jurisdiction over Hendr ickson individually beca use it alleg es that He ndrickson committed fra ud while in Texas. See Niehaus v . Cedar Bridge, Inc

. , 208 S.W .3d 575, 581 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (e x plaining that individual acting in corpor ate capac ity may be subj ect to persona l jurisdiction for f raudule nt or tor tio us a c tio ns ). I n c on tr a st, the fi rs t thre e of the se a lle g e d c on ta c ts ( c oll e c tiv e ly , “ g e ne ra l bu sin e ss contac ts”) provide no basis for a sserting specific jurisdiction o v er H endric kson beca use they are Di xi e’s contac ts with Tex as, not Hendr ickson’s. See, e .g. , International Shoe , 326 U.S. at 316 (“ S i n ce t h e co rp o ra t e pe rs o n al i t y i s a fi ct i o n , al th o u gh a fi ct i o n i n t en d ed t o b e a ct edu p o nas th o u gh it were a fa ct, . . . it is clear that unlike an individual its ‘presenc e’ w ithout, a s we l l as wi t h in, the state of its orig in can be manifested only by activities ca

rried on in its beha lf by t h o s e who a re authorize d to a c t f

o r it
. ” )
. A c o r

p o r a te r e p r e s e n tati v e ’ s a c ts o n th e c o r p o r a ti o n ’ s b e h a lf

are considere d acts of the corpor ation itself, Latcher v. Gratty, I nc. , 107 S.W .3d 543, 545 (Tex. 2007),
and , th us , a c or po rate re pr e se ntativ e ’s no n- tor tio us a c ts o n th e c or

po ra tio n’ s beh a lf do no t c on sti tut e a conta ct for pur

poses of pe rsonal jurisdiction over the corpor ate r epre s en t ative, see, e .g. , W olf v. Summers- W

ood, L.P. , 214 S.W .3d 783, 792 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (c oncluding that no11

specific j u ri s d i ct i o nex i s t edwh er e o ff i ce r c o n tra ct edi nco rp o ra t e c ap ac i ty ). L ee s b o ro d o es not

asser t that Hendr ickson individually conducte d business in Texas. According ly , Hendr ickso n ’s g ener al bu sin e ss c on ta c ts w ithTe xas a s a re pr e se ntativ e of

Di xie cann ot prov ide a ba sis fo r s pe c if

ic jurisdiction over He ndrickson.

I n c on tr a st, L e e sb or o’ s all e g a tio n that He nd ri c ks on c omm itt e d fr a

ud in T e xas c ou ld provide a basis for ex erc ising specific jurisdi ction over Hendrickson be cause tortious or fra udulent contac ts by

a cor porate repr esentative are attri b u t ab l e t o that repr esentative individually
. See Niehaus , 2 08 S.W. 3d

a t 58 1; se e als o Ke lly , 301 S.W .3d at 660 (e x plaining that specific jur isdiction
over c orporation’s office rs for a lleg ed wr ong doing r equire s that plaintiff “plea d and, whe n
c ha lle ng e d b y

the de fe nd ant[], pr e se nt e vid e nc e that th e Of fi c e r[’ ]s[] re le vant act s (i. e ., tho se
connec ted to [pl aintiff’s] claims) occ urre d, at least in par t, in Tex as”) . Fur

th er, Hendrickson’ s
a l l e g e d c o nt a c t

— i
. e . , t h e a lle g e d mi sr e pr e se ntatio n— is s ub sta nti a lly c onne c te d to the op e ra

tiv e fa c ts of L eesbor o’s fra

ud claim. See M

oki Mac , 221 S.W. 3d at 58 5; see also In reFirstMerit Bank, N.A. , 52 S .W .3d 7 49 , 7 58 (T e x. 20 01 ) ( e le me nts of fr a ud ). F ina lly , if

He nd ri c ks on c omm itt e d a

tor t in Texas, the exercise of specific jurisdiction ove r him would not nor mally offe nd traditional notions of fa ir play

and substantial justice. S e e M o rr i s v . K o hls -York , 1 6 4 S. W. 3 d

6 8 6 , 6 9 4
- 9 5 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2005, pet. dism’d) (conc luding that the “a lleg ation that the [defenda nts] committed torts while in Texas leads us to conclude that the exercise of s p ec i fi c j u ri sdiction over the [de fe nd ants ] doe s n ot o ff e nd ‘t ra dit ion a l no tio ns of

fa ir pla y and su bs tanti a l ju sti c e ’” ). Thus , L eesbor o’s alleg ation that Hendr ickson committed a tort at the Rockda le meetingis the only contac t
asser ted by L eesbor o that can pr ovide a ba sis for exercisingspecific jurisdiction over He ndrickson.12 Hendr ickson, howeve r, disputed that he made the alleg ed misrep rese ntation and provided e vidence to the trial court supportinghis contention. This p re s en t ed a jur isdictional question of fact t hat t he trial court had to re solve, se e BM C So ftwa re , 83 S.W .3d at 795 (“ [T] he trial
c ourt fr e qu e ntl y mus t r e so lve qu e sti on s o f f a c t be fo re de c idi ngthe jur isd ic tio n q ue sti on .” ), be c a

us e it involved He ndrickson’s a lleg ed conta cts with Texas, see M ichiana , 168 S.W .3d at 785 (holdi ng t h a to n l y d e f

e n d an t ’ s c o n t a c t s w i t h T e x a s ar e c o n s i d e r e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g p ur

p o s e f u l av a i l m e n t )
. It
was ne cessa

ry for the trial court to resolve this question of fact because if Hendr ickson did not make
a mis re pr e se ntatio n to L e e sb or o, he ind ivi du a lly did no t con ta c t Texa s f or jur isd ic tio na l pu

rp os e s. Wit hout a Texas contac t, Texas courts cannot assert per sonal jurisdiction over a nonr esident defe ndant. See W

orld-W ide Volkswagen Corp. v. W oodson , 444 U.S
. 2 8 6 , 297 (1980) ( “[T] he fore seea bility that is critical to due pr ocess a naly sis . . . . is t h at t h e d ef en d ant’s conduc t and
connec tion with the forum S tate are such that he should rea sonably anticipate be ing ha led into court there .”). The ref

ore, be cause He n d rickson’s a lleg ed conta ct with Texas is the only jurisdictional inquiry at issue her e and be cause the trial cour t found that it lacked pers o n al j u ri s d iction over Hendr ickson, we must infer that the trial cour

t found that Hendr icks o n d i d n o t have suff icient minimum contac ts w it

h T exas beca

use He ndrickson did not make the a lleg ed misrepr esentation. See GJP, I nc. , 251 S.W .3d at 870. Havingdeter mined that the t rial cour

t made that implied finding , we must now determine if that implied finding is supported by leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence
. Se e Ke lly , 301 S.W .3d at 659 n.7. ( v) Legal and Factual Sufficiency13 I n s up po rt of his c on te nti on

tha t he did no t mak e a mis re pr e se ntatio n at th e Roc kd a le meeting , Hendr ickson offe red into evide nce h i s own af fidavit and the de position t estimony of Conrad B ar, who also participated in the Rockdale meeting
. Hendr ickson’s af fidavit states “I

have
never repres en t ed to [ L eesbor o’s re prese ntative] or any one else that Isigne d the [performa nce gu arantee].” B ar c orrobor ated He ndrickson’s a ffidavit by confirmingthat he did not hear He nd ri c ks on make any

re pr e se ntatio ns re g ard ingthe pe rf or manc e g uarant ee duri ngthe Roc kd a le meeting . At deposition, Bar testified: Q: Wer e y ou

the re fo r t

hat w ho le me e tin g , the wh ole —th e re ’s a fi rs t me e tin g in the trailer ? A: Yes, sir. Q: W er e y o ut h er e f

o r t h at wh o l e m ee t i n g? A: Ibelieve so. Q: W er e— d i d

y o u ev er s ee M r. He n dri ck s o nan d

[ L ee s b o ro ’s re p re s en t at i v e] go off f or a pr ivate mee ting outside your pre sence ? A: Idid

no t. Q: Did that occur ? A: Not that Isaw. Q: Were you there for the disc ussions that Mr. Hendrickson w as involved in? A: Ye s. Q: And did Mr. Hendrickson m ake any statement to [L eesbor o’s re prese ntative] th a t i n d ic a te d

th a t h e h a d

in an y w ay s ign e d [th e p e r f o r ma n c e g u ar an te e ]?

. . . . A: Idid

no t he ar o f a

ny state me nts . I

have no kn ow le dg e of

that.14

Q: Yo uwe re t h er e f

o r t h e w h o l e m ee t i n g? A: Yes, sir. Q: And y ou wer e ther e for the whole dinner

at the piano ba

r? A: Yea

h, y es, sir. Q: And did Mr. Hendr ickson s ay any thing to [L eesbor o’s re prese ntative] or an y b o dy th a t i n d ic a te d

th a t h e h a d

s ign e d th e [p e r f o r ma n c e g u ar an te e ]?

. . . . A: Not to my

knowledg e.

. . . . Q: Did y ou ever

hear Mr. Hendr ickson say

any thing that indicated that he ha d s ign e d o r a g r e e d to th e
—th e [p e r f

o r ma n c e g u ar an te e ]? A: No. Q: Did y ou have a

ny rea son to believe that he had? A: No.
L e e sb or o o ff

e re d th e de po sit ion

te sti mony

of Da nie l L e e (L e e sb or o’ s r e pr e se ntativ e ) t o s up po rt its
co n t en t i o nt h at He n dri ck s o nm ad e t h e a l l ege d re p re s en t at i o nat th e R o ck d al e m ee t i n g: Q: Aside f

ro m [t he per formanc e guara ntee], do y ou have a

ny writing that [Hendrickson] has signe d g uara nt[ ee]ing any

thing to L eesbor o? A: Actually , I tried, but he —he denied it. He said he alre ady s i gn ed one g uara nt[ ee], he is not g oing to sig n another one. Q : [H e n dr ic k s o n ] t o ld y o uh e s ign e d

a g u ar an t[ e e ]? A: Ye s. Ye s. Q: And what guara

nt[ ee] was he ref

err ing to?15

A: This one (indicating)
. Q : [T h e p e r f

o r ma n c e g u ar an te e ]? A: Ye s. Q : [H e n dr ic k s o n ] t o ld y o uh e s ign e d

[th e p e r f o r ma n c e g u ar an te e ]? A: Ye s. Q: Whe n d id h e te ll you that? A: On our fir st meeting , on or about the f irst week of

J une. Considering the evidenc e in the l ight most favor able to the judg ment and indulg ing
e ve ry re a so na ble inf e re nc e that w ou ld s up po rt the tr ia l c ourt ’s imp lie d f ind ing , w e c on c lud e that a
rea sonable a

nd fair- minded person c ould conclude that Hendric kson made no misrepr esentation at the Roc kd a le me e tin g re g ard ingthe pe rf or manc e g ua

ra nte e . A c c or din g ly , th e evi de nc e is l e g a lly sufficie nt to support the trial court’s implied f inding. Ba sed on our r eview of all the evidenc e, we also conc lude that the t ri al court’s impli ed findingthat Hendr ickson made no r epre sentation reg ardingthe per formance gua rante e wa s not ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. While there w as testimony from L eesbor o’s re prese ntative that He ndrickson made the repr esentation to him at the Ro ck dale mee ting, ther e is conflictingtestimony sug g esting that Hendr ickson made no misreprese ntation at t hat meeting . I t is for the trial cour t, however , to resolve such conf licts. M c G a ll ia rd v . Ku h lm a nn , 72 2 S .W .2d 6 94 , 6 96 -9 7 ( Te x. 19 86 ). Th e c ourt c ou ld have c redited the testimo n y o f He n d rickson and B ar to c onclude that He ndrickson made no16

repr esentation. Accor dingly , we c onclude that the tr ial court’s implied findingwas supporte d by fac tually sufficie nt evidence
. ( vi) Jurisdictional Questions of Fact

L eesbor o argues that the question of whether Hendr ickson made the repr esentation is not a jurisdictional fac t that the t rial court can resolve at a spec ial-appe ara nce he aringbeca

use the
e x i s t e n c e o f

a m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o ni s an“ e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t ” o f L e e s b o r o ’ s f

r a u d c l a i m s . S p e c i f

i c a l l y, L e e sb or o c on te nd s th a t Michiana held that a judg e should dec ide pe rs o nal jurisdiction based on “phy sical fa cts” a

nd not on whether

tort liabilit y

exis ts, and, there fore , a trial c ourt ca nnot determine any jurisdictional fac ts that may ultimately implicate the mer its of the plaintiff’s cla im. L eesbor o bases this asser

tion on the following la

ng uag e in Michiana :
B us ine ss c on ta c ts a

re g e ne ra lly

a matte r o f p hy sic a l f

a c t, whil e tor

t li a bil ity (espe cially

in misreprese ntation case s) turns on what the part i es thought, sa id, or intended. F ar be tter that judg es should l imit t heir jurisdictional dec isions to t he former rathe r than involving themselves in trying the latter.
Mi chiana , 1 6 8 S. W. 3 d a t 7 9 1
. L e e s b o r o c o n te n d s th a t th e o n ly r e le v an t ju r is d ic ti o n a l f

a c t in the prese nt case is that Hendrickson at t ended the meetingin Rockdale, Te x as whe re the alleg ed misrepre sentation occur

red. There fore , L eesbor o argues, the trial court err ed if it made a fac t finding t h at Hendr ickson did not make the re prese ntation and then used that finding to de termine jurisdiction. W e disag ree with L eesbor o’s interpre tation of Michiana
.

First, the que stion of whether Hendr ickson uttere d

th e wor ds in the Rockdale mee ting involves a “phy sical” f

act. Reg ardle ss, however , and c ru ci al t o our dec ision here, Michiana does17

no t st and fo r t he pr op os iti on

tha t a tr ia l c ourt

may ne ve r c on sid e r f

a c ts th at may

a ff e c t ul tim a te liabili t y when determining specific jurisdiction. Michiana sta nd s f or the pr op os iti on

that a minimu m -c o n t ac ts analy sis must focus only on the ac tions and rea sonable e x pectations of the de fe nd ant, and

tha t sp e c if ic jur isd ic tio n d e pe nd s o n w he the r t he de fe nd ant h a d s uf

fi c ie nt c on ta c ts with Texas, not on whet h er t h o s e co ntacts we re tortious. Id. at 790-92. F urther, Michiana
rec og nizes that a trial court may have to r esolve questions of fact i n deciding persona l jurisdiction issues, but cautions ag ainst unnec es s ar y inquiries into liabili ty

issues. See id. Thus , w hil e it i s pref era ble to av o id f

a c tu a l in qu ir ie s inv o lv in g un d e r ly in g li a b il it y , a tr ia l c o urt mu s t an a ly ze the de fe nd ant’ s c on ta c ts wi th Te xas, if any , and re so lve any ne c e ssa ry fa c tua l qu e sti on s re latin g to t ho se contac ts even if those que stions may relate to liability
. Her e, He ndrickson’s only individual contact wi th Texas was the disputed mis re pr e se ntatio n to L e e sb or o’ s a g e nt. As dis c us se d pre vio us ly , all of the oth e r c on ta c ts w ithTe xas, including his attendanc e at the meeting and any non-tortious acts or statements on be half of D ix ie,
wer e Dixie’s jurisdiction al contac ts with Tex as bec ause H endric kson made them a s Dix ie’s repr esentative. Se e W

olf , 214 S .W.3d at 792. I n other wor ds, as long as He ndrickson wa s conductingDix ie business, he wa s surrounded by a prote ct i v e “cocoon” that insulated him from making jurisdictional contact with Te x as. B ut he co u l d s t ep out of that cocoon, and thus make jurisdictional contact with Te x as, by , for e x ample, committing a tort. So, although He ndrickson wa s phy sically

prese nt in Tex as whe n he was conductingbusiness for Dixie, his presence here did not satisfy jurisdictional contac t require ments unless and unti l he made the allege d misrepre sentation.18

Acc ording ly , the alleg ed ac tion by Hendr ickson that g ave r ise to L eesbor o’s fra ud claims is also the only basis for a sserting specific jurisdiction over He ndrickson individually
.

Be cause the par

ties provided conf

licting e vidence reg ardingwhether the misrepre sentation occ urre d, the trial cour t was required to resolve whether Hendr ickson made the alleg ed stateme nt in order to make its jurisdictional deter mination. Thus, the trial court had to make a fa ctual dete rmination or re solve a c redibility issue reg ardinga matter

that related to liability . To do oth e rw ise —i. e ., to re fu se to c on sid e r wh e the r He nd ri c ks on ma de the a lle g e d c on ta c t be c a us e it is a lso the basis for the under ly ing liability —would mean that He ndrickson’s “ purposef ul availment depends o n the form of

[t he] claim selecte d by

the plaintiff.” See M

ichiana , 168 S.W .3d at 791 (re jectingsuch a standa

rd). Under

that standard, a

plaintiff could esta

blish specific jurisdiction over
a corpor ate repr esentative conducting corpor ate business in T exas by simply alleg ing th at t he
re pr e se ntativ e c omm itt e d a tor t w hil e in T e xas. B ut Michiana e xp r e s s l y r e j e c t s an y sp e c if ic jurisdictional analy sis that is depende nt on the plaintif f’s actions or c hoices. Id. a t 79 1- 92 ; se e als o Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 475 ( 1 985) (“ J urisdiction is proper . . . whe re the
c on ta c ts p ro ximate ly

re su lt f ro m a c tio ns by

the de fe nd ant him se lf

that cre ate a

substantial connec tion with the forum State.”). Acc ording ly , we hold that if the nonr esident def endant’ s only

jurisdictional contac t with Tex as is an alleg ed misre p re s en tation and the nonre sident defe ndant denies that the mis re pr e se ntatio n o c c ur

red a nd pr ov ide s e vid e nc e to s up po rt his de nia l, t

he n th e tr ia l c ourt

mus t decide for jurisdictional purpose s whether the misrepre sentation—and ther efor e the nonr esident’s contac t—occur red, reg ardle ss of whethe r that conta ct is also an ele ment of liability
. Se e Ke lly ,19

30 1 S. W.3 d at 65 9 ( “ F a c tua lly , th e de fe nd ant c an p re se nt e vid e nc e that it h a s n o c on ta c ts w ithTe xas, eff ectively disproving the plaintiff’s alleg ations.”). Havingdeter

mined that it was proper

for the trial court to resolve the question of fa ct reg ardingHendr ickson’s conta cts with Texas and havingdeter mined that there i s l ega l ly and fac tually sufficie nt evidence to supp o rt t h e t ri al cour t’s implied finding that He ndrickson did not make the alleg ed re prese ntation, we conc lude that, as a matter of la

w, Hendr ickson lacke d sufficie nt minimum contac ts with Tex as t o support the assertion of specific j urisdiction. Acc ording ly , the trial
c ourt did no t e rr in g ra

nti ng He nd

ri c ks on ’s sp e c ia l app e ara

nc e and dis mis sin g a ll c la ims a g a ins t hi m. We o ve rr ule L e e sb or o’ s f

ir st f our i ssu e s.
Ob je c tio ns to He ndric ks on’ s Af fi da v it I n it s fi na l iss ue on

a pp e a l, L e e sb or o a

rgue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in ov e rr uli ngits objections to c erta in statements in H endric kson’s aff idavit be cause those statements are v ague,

“ c on c lus or

y ,” and fa ile d to se t fo rt

h fa c ts a dmi ssi ble in e vid e nc e . Spe c if ic a lly , L e e sb or o ob

je c ts t o the fo llo wi ngstate me nts :

• “I have ne ver, in my individual capa city , enter ed into a contr act or conducte d any business with any

Texas businesses, citizen or resident.”

• “I did not sign, nor did I have any involvement with the document attached as Exhibi t ‘A’ to L eesbor o’s Third Amende d Petition.”

• “I did not rece ive or a cce pt pay ments from JNS Enterpr ises or its ag ents.” Assuming without deciding that the t rial court err ed by not striking these statements, that er ror wa s harmless be cause these stateme nts do not affe ct the ana ly sis of whether specific jurisdiction is proper20

in this case. See Te x. R. Ap p. P. 4 4. 1; see also G ee v . Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 765 S.W .2d 394, 39 6 (Tex. 1 98 9) . T o s ho w h arm fr om a n e vid e nti ary

ru lin g , th e c omp la ini ngpa rt y us ua lly mus t demonstrate that the judgme nt turns o n t h e p articular evidenc e excluded or a dmitted. City of Brownsville v. Alvarado , 897 S.W .2d 750, 753-54 (Tex. 1995)
. A jurisdictional analy sis turns on the nonre sident defe ndant’s conta cts with Texas. See M ichiana , 168 S
. W
. 3 dat 791-92. He re, L eesbor o did not a lleg e that Hendr ickson conducte d business in Texas. I nstead, L eesbor o alleg ed that Hendr ickson was subjec t to specific jurisdiction base d on Dix ie’s g ener al business contac ts and beca use H en d ri ck son committed a tort in Texas by making a misrepr esentation about signingthe perf ormanc e guara

ntee. The statements to which L eesbor o objects do not dir ectly relate to either of those contentions. R ather , they addre ss whether Hendr ickson conducte d business in Texas or had any “involvement” w ith the perfor mance g uara

ntee. F urther, assuming that “involvement” with the pe rf or manc e guara

nte e a lso e nc omp a sse s ma kin g the a lle g e d mi sr e pr e se ntatio n, any e rr or in
a dmi tti ngthi s st a te me nt i s h arm le ss bec a us e the inf

or matio n w a s c umu lativ e of ano the r a ff

ida vit statement to which L eesbor o did not object. See R eina v. Ge neral Acc ident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., Lt d. , 611 S.W .2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1981) (holding that the “e x clusion of cumulative e vidence is not rever sible err or”) ; M au zy v . S utl iff , 125 S.W .3d 71, 80 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2003, pet. denied) (d e te rm ini ngtha

t c umu lativ e natur e of

te sti mony re nd e rs e rr or

ha rm le ss) ; see also Volkswagen of Am., Inc . v. Ramirez , 159 S.W .3d 897, 907 (Tex. 2004) (“The g ener al rule is er ror in the a dmission of te sti mony

is d e e me d h arm le ss a

nd is w a ive d if the ob

je c tin g pa rt y su bs e qu e ntl y pe rm its the same or similar evidenc e to be introduc ed without objection.”)

. Thus , any e rr or in a dmi tti ngthe a ff

ida vit testimony was ha rmless bec ause it could not have re s u l t ed i n an improper jurisdictional deter mination. Accor dingly , we ove rrule L eesbor o’s fifth issue.21 CO NC LU SION We hold that the trial court prope rly g rante d Hen d ri ckson’s special appe ara nce beca use He ndrickson succ essfully neg ated spe cific jurisdiction by establishing that he had no ind ivi d u a l c o n t a c t s w i t hT e xa s s u f f i c i e n tt o m e e tth e m i n i mu mc o n t a c t s r e qu i r e d b y d u e - p r oc e ss
conce rns. We aff

ir m the order

of the trial c ourt g rantingHendr ickson’s spec ial appea ranc e and dismiss ing the claims ag ainst him for lack of persona l jurisdiction.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Oc tober 1, 2010