Filed 11/18/21 In re Sarai P. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re SARAI P. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile

Court Law.

 B310977

 (Super. Ct. No. 

 19CCJP03500C-F)

 Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DAMARY P.,

Defendant and Appellant.
2

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Tamara Hall, Judge. Affirmed.

Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

* * * * * *

Damary P. (mother) allowed her husband, Joel P. (father), 

to have unrestricted access to mother’s four children on 

numerous occasions in violation of court orders restricting 

father’s contact with the children. The juvenile court sustained 

allegations in various petitions as to all four children because 

mother, by violating the court’s orders, “created a detrimental 

and endangering home environment” for the children and thereby 

placed them “at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger, 

and failure to protect.” Mother appealed. Although mother’s 

entire appeal could properly be dismissed as moot, we exercise 

our discretion to consider the merits, and conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

A. The family

Father and mother married in May 2017. They have two 

children together—Sarai P. (born April 2018) and Jared P. (born 

January 2020). Mother also has two older children by another 
3

father—Bryan M. (born December 2006) and Jaime M. (born 

August 2011). 

B. Father’s acts of domestic violence

One night in April 2019, father straddled mother’s body 

while on their bed, strangled her until she lost consciousness, and 

then slapped her 10 times on the cheeks. Sarai was awake and 

on the bed the whole time. When police arrived, they noticed 

redness on mother’s face. Mother told police that this was not the 

first time father had been physical with her. Bryan confirmed 

that this was not the first such incident. 

II. Procedural Background

A. Father’s contact with the children is restricted 

1. As to Sarai, Bryan, and Jaime

On June 3, 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition 

asking the juvenile court to exercise dependency jurisdiction over 

Sarai, Bryan, and Jaime.1 The petition alleged the facts 

underlying the April 2019 incident, and invoked jurisdiction on 

two grounds—namely, that mother and father’s “history of 

engaging in violent verbal and physical altercations in the 

presence of the children” created (1) “substantial risk that [they] 

will suffer[] serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon 

the child[ren] by the child[ren]’s parent or guardian” (thereby 

rendering jurisdiction appropriate under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a)),2 and (2) 

“substantial risk that the child[ren] will suffer[] serious physical 

1 Jared was not yet born at this time. 

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated. 
4

harm . . . as a result of the failure . . . of . . . [their] parent or legal 

guardian to supervise or protect [them]” (thereby rendering 

jurisdiction appropriate under section 300, subdivision (b)). 

In an August 13, 2019 order, the juvenile court sustained 

the allegations as to mother and father. The children were 

removed from both parents; Sarai was placed in a foster home;

and Bryan and Jaime were placed with their father. The court 

ordered father to have only monitored visits with Sarai, and 

mother was not to be present during those visits. The court also 

ordered father to have no contact with Bryan. Father’s case plan 

included a 52-week domestic violence class and individual 

counseling; mother also had to participate in a domestic violence 

support group and counseling. 

Father appealed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, 

and we affirmed in an unpublished opinion. (In re Sarai P. (Apr.

30, 2020, B300024).) Mother did not appeal. 

2. As to Jared

On March 16, 2020, the Department filed a petition asking 

the juvenile court to exercise dependency jurisdiction over then 

two-month-old Jared. The petition made the same allegations 

regarding the April 2019 incident, invoked jurisdiction on the 

same grounds as those asserted in the siblings’ petition (that is, 

under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)), and added an 

additional ground—namely, that Jared’s siblings have been 

“neglected” and “there is a substantial risk that [Jared] will be . . 

. neglected” (thereby rendering jurisdiction appropriate under 

section 300, subdivision (j)). 

Father contested parentage over Jared, and on March 20, 

2020, the juvenile court ordered father not to have any contact
5

with Jared pending paternity results. Jared remained in 

mother’s care. 

Father was not granted monitored visits with Jared until 

October 29, 2020, when his paternity was confirmed. 

B. The children are returned to mother’s care

Sarai, Bryan, and Jaime were returned to mother’s care in 

February 2020. The juvenile court terminated dependency 

jurisdiction over Bryan and Jaime in September 2020. 

C. Father’s dangerous conduct continues 

Throughout the proceedings, father denied the April 2019 

incident, made light of his domestic violence classes, and 

continued to engage in violent conduct. 

Father denied ever touching mother and claimed that the 

“whole case” was a “conspiracy against him set up by” mother. 

During individual counseling sessions, father referred to himself 

as the victim of domestic violence rather than the aggressor. 

Father complained that his domestic violence classes were

“a waste of time” and “money” because, according to father, he is 

an “alpha male” who “will not become submissive to anyone” and 

the classes “take the man away from you.” Father also claimed 

that hearing about other participants’ experiences during the 

classes made him “more violent.” 

Indeed, in April 2020, father was arrested for brandishing a 

firearm when he became “irate” during an argument with 

another man who blocked father’s path while he was driving. 

During his interactions with the Department’s social workers, 

father behaved in a “controlling, argumentative, and defensive”

manner. 
6

D. Mother allows father unrestricted contact with

the children 

Mother ignored the court orders expressly restricting 

father’s contact with the children. 

The Department reported in January 2020 that Bryan and 

Jaime “continue to be extremely fearful” of father and had seen 

pictures of father with Sarai on mother’s phone. The Department 

expressed concern in March 2020 that mother and father were 

“minimizing the no contact order” because mother was allowing 

father to sleep in the family home. Around that time, a person

named “Joe” called the police from mother’s address reporting 

that he was punched by another man; father attempted to 

explain that someone must have falsely used his name, but the 

police call log identified father’s phone number as the caller. In 

summer 2020, mother, father, and the children went on a trip to 

a river. 

On September 24, 2020, father posted photos to his 

Facebook profile of Sarai and father posing on a motorcycle in 

mother’s backyard. When the Department questioned the 

parents about this unsupervised contact between father and

Sarai, they provided inconsistent explanations. Father stated

that he sees the children “every day” and that mother’s neighbor 

is his monitor. Mother denied ever giving father access to the 

children. She explained that her neighbor watches the children 

on the weekends while she works and that, because the neighbor 

and father are friends, the neighbor must have allowed father to 

see Sarai. Mother also stated that when she confronted father 

about the photographs, he told her that he went to visit the 

neighbor to show him the motorcycle father just bought and the 

neighbor happened to be watching the children at mother’s 
7

house. The neighbor provided yet another version of the story—

he stated that he watches Sarai and Jared on the weekends but 

that the children receive no visits and he does not monitor any 

visits in mother’s home. 

Despite telling the Department that she had no plans to 

reconcile with father, mother confirmed in January 2021 that she 

was pregnant with another child by father; that child was born in 

April 2021. 

E. The Department’s further petitions

On October 29 and December 9, 2020, the Department filed 

three separate petitions as to mother’s four children. Each 

petition was based on the same allegation: Mother violated court

orders on “multiple prior occasions” by allowing father to have 

“unmonitored contact and unlimited access to the children,” 

which “endangers the child[ren]’s physical health and safety and 

places the child[ren] at risk of serious physical harm, damage, 

and failure to protect.” However, because each child was 

differently situated, the petitions were procedurally distinct: (1) 

as to Sarai, the Department filed a supplemental petition under 

section 387 asking the juvenile court to change the prior 

disposition and remove Sarai from mother’s care; (2) as to Bryan 

and Jaime, the Department filed an original petition asking the 

juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction under section 300, 

subdivision (b); and (3) as to Jared, the Department filed a first 

amended petition adding another basis for dependency 

jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). 

B. The juvenile court’s orders

On February 24, 2021, the juvenile court held a combined 

adjudication and disposition hearing on the various petitions. 
8

The court made several findings on the petitions: (1) as to 

Sarai, the court sustained the supplemental allegation under 

section 387 that mother’s violation of the court orders restricting 

father’s access to the children endangered Sarai and placed her 

“at risk of serious physical harm, damage and danger”; (2) as to 

Bryan and Jaime, the court sustained the allegation under 

section 300, subdivision (b), that mother “created a detrimental 

and endangering home environment for the children” by violating 

the court orders restricting father’s access to the children, which 

placed Bryan and Jaime “at risk of serious physical harm, 

damage, danger, and failure to protect”; and (3) as to Jared, the 

court sustained the allegation under section 300, subdivision (j), 

regarding the April 2019 domestic violence incident and the 

allegation under section 300, subdivision (b), regarding mother’s 

violation of the court orders restricting father’s access to the 

children; the court did not exert jurisdiction over Jared based on 

subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300 regarding the April 2019 

incident. 

The court explained that mother’s “blatant disregard” for 

the orders restricting father’s visits was “willful.” The court 

emphasized that the orders were “put in place for the very 

serious allegations” regarding father “inflicting domestic violence 

upon the mother,” yet mother “has consistently . . . minimized” 

that “violent conduct” and father “has indicated that he’s not 

going to follow any court orders” because “[h]e is alpha.” The 

court went on to find that mother’s claim that she had no desire 

to reconcile with father was not “credible” because she made the 

same representation before Jared was born and was making it 

again despite being pregnant with her third child by father. 
9

The juvenile court removed all four children from mother, 

placed Sarai and Jared in foster care, placed Bryan and Jaime 

with their father, and granted mother monitored visits. 

C. Mother appeals

Mother filed this timely appeal. 

D. Postappeal events

On May 25, 2021, the Department filed a subsequent 

petition under section 342 requesting that the juvenile court 

exert dependency jurisdiction over Bryan and Jaime based on 

new facts or circumstances—namely, that they were physically 

abused by their father. The juvenile court sustained the 

allegations, but found that mother was a nonoffending parent 

and placed Bryan and Jaime with mother. 

On June 24, 2021, the juvenile court returned Sarai and 

Jared to mother’s care. 

DISCUSSION

Mother challenges the juvenile court’s February 24, 2021 

jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders. Because the 

children have been returned to mother’s care, we previously 

dismissed as moot that portion of mother’s appeal challenging the 

dispositional orders.3 While the remainder of mother’s appeal is 

fraught with defects of nonjusticiability, forfeiture, and mootness, 

we elect to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of 

mother’s challenges to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings 

and conclude that substantial evidence supports those findings. 

 

3 Father also appealed, but we dismissed the entirety of 

father’s appeal as moot in that same order. 
10

I. Defects in Mother’s Appeal

In dependency proceedings, the basic pleading device to 

assert a child falls within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is a 

petition. “‘It may be [(1)] an original petition (§ 332), [(2)] a 

subsequent petition for children who are already dependents 

when there are “new facts” or circumstances that bring them 

within a category of section 300 “other than those under which 

the original petition was sustained” (§ 342), or [(3)] a 

supplemental petition when there are facts which indicate that a 

previous disposition is not appropriate (§ 387).’” (In re A.B. 

(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364 (A.B.).)

Each of these three types of petitions is at issue in this 

case, and their unique functions establish that mother’s appeal is 

not justiciable, is forfeited, or is moot.4

A. Mother’s appeal as to Jared

First, mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s exertion of 

jurisdiction over Jared is not justiciable. 

The court exerted jurisdiction over Jared under

subdivisions (b) and (j) of section 300, based on mother allowing 

father unrestricted access to the children and based on the April 

2019 domestic violence incident, respectively. On appeal, mother 

challenges only the first basis. A single basis for jurisdiction is 

enough to support the exertion of jurisdiction over a child. (In re 

A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 289; In re M.W. (2015) 238 

Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.) Thus, mother’s challenge to the 

jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b), as to 

4 While the Department vaguely alluded to such defects in 

its conclusory, eight-page motion to dismiss, the first time the 

Department clearly articulated its arguments on these threshold 

issues was in its respondent’s brief.
11

Jared is not justiciable because, no matter what we decide on this 

appeal regarding that basis, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction will 

remain valid by virtue of the finding under section 300, 

subdivision (j) that mother does not challenge. (In re Drake M.

(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762 (Drake M.); In re I.A. (2011) 201 

Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492.) Mother belatedly tries to attack the 

subdivision (j) finding in her reply brief, but that comes too late 

to be cognizable on appeal. (In re Luke H. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 

1082, 1090.) 

B. Mother’s appeal as to Sarai

Second, mother raises no cognizable challenge to the 

juvenile court’s order sustaining the section 387 supplemental 

petition as to Sarai because, among other reasons, mother failed 

to appeal from the court’s original exertion of jurisdiction over 

Sarai from which the section 387 petition arises.

When the Department seeks to change the placement of a 

dependent child to a more restrictive placement, such as foster 

care, it must file a section 387 supplemental petition. (In re F.S. 

(2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799, 808.) The petition must allege facts 

establishing that a previous disposition order was ineffective, but 

it does not need to allege any new jurisdictional facts or urge 

additional grounds for dependency. (Ibid.) That is because the 

juvenile court already has jurisdiction over the child based on

jurisdictional findings on the original petition; the section 387 

supplemental petition to modify placement does not affect the 

underlying jurisdiction of the court. (Ibid.; In re Joshua G. (2005) 

129 Cal.App.4th 189, 203; Kimberly R. v. Superior Court (2002) 

96 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1077; In re A.O. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 

103, 110 [“‘The law does not require that a fact necessary to 

establish jurisdiction under section 300 be established to warrant 
12

a change in placement’”].) Here, even if we ignore that mother 

did not offer any reasoned argument as to why the section 387 

supplemental petition was invalid as to Sarai, mother has not—

and, indeed, cannot—attack the underlying basis for jurisdiction 

over Sarai based on the April 2019 domestic violence incident, a 

basis she did not previously appeal.

C. Mother’s appeal as to Bryan and Jaime

Third, the Department argues that mother’s challenge to 

the juvenile court’s exertion of jurisdiction over Bryan and Jaime 

is moot because after mother appealed, the court sustained a 

subsequent petition under section 342 alleging new facts of

physical abuse of Bryan and Jaime by their father. To be sure, 

juvenile dependency jurisdiction attaches to the child, not to the 

parent. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491 (I.A.).) As a 

result, an appeal becomes moot where subsequent events, such as 

the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction based on an 

independent basis (see § 342 [“new facts or circumstances . . . 

sufficient to state that the [child] is a [dependent]”]), render it 

impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief (In re 

Travis C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1224-1225; In re E.T.

(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436 (E.T.); A.B., supra, 225 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1364 [“so long as the jurisdictional finding 

under the subsequent petition is supported by substantial 

evidence, reversal of the jurisdictional finding under the original 

petition would be futile”]). Appellate courts nevertheless review 

whether a dependency appeal is moot on a “‘case-by-case basis’” 

(In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 623) and retain the 

“discretion” to hear the merits of a challenge to a jurisdictional 

finding, even if overturning that finding will have no immediate 
13

effect on the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction (I.A., 201 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1494-1495). 

Here, mother was found to be a nonoffending parent in the 

section 342 petition alleging new facts of physical abuse of Bryan 

and Jaime by their father. Because mother is not implicated in 

that subsequent petition, and because the jurisdictional findings 

at issue in this appeal specifically relate to mother’s conduct and 

could affect the outcome of subsequent proceedings involving 

mother, we exercise our discretion to consider mother’s challenge 

to the juvenile court’s exertion of jurisdiction over Bryan and 

Jaime under section 300, subdivision (b). (E.T., supra, 217 

Cal.App.4th at p. 436; Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp.

762-763.) 

D. The allegation is common to all four children

Ultimately, because that challenged jurisdictional finding—

namely, that by allowing father unrestricted access to the 

children, mother placed the children at substantial risk of 

harm—is a fact common to all four children, we exercise our 

discretion, particularly in service of judicial efficiency, to consider 

the merits of mother’s appeal despite the defects of justiciability, 

forfeiture, and mootness discussed above. 

II. The Merits

The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are supported by 

substantial evidence. We evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting a juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding by asking 

whether there is enough evidence in the record that is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value that a reasonable trier of 

fact could reach the same conclusion as the juvenile court. (In re

K.B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 972, 979-980; see also In re D.D. 
14

(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 985, 990 [substantial evidence review of an 

order sustaining a section 387 supplemental petition].) 

As pertinent here, a juvenile court is empowered to assert 

dependency jurisdiction over a child if “[t]he child has suffered, or 

there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious 

physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of 

his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.”

(§ 300, subd. (b).) Risk of harm means just that: The juvenile 

court “need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to 

assume jurisdiction.” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 

1376, 1383 (Kadence P.); In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 

987, 993 (Yolanda L.) [same].) When it comes to assessing that 

risk, the juvenile court may look to a parent’s past behavior as a 

“good predictor” of whether the child is currently at risk. (In re 

T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133; Kadence P., at pp. 1383-

1384.)

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings 

that all four children were at substantial risk of harm as a result 

of mother allowing father unrestricted access to the children in 

violation of court orders. Father’s reported act of domestic 

violence on mother was severe, and he physically attacked 

mother with Sarai an arm’s length away. This was also not the 

first incident. Father never took responsibility for his abusive

conduct—instead, he admittedly became “more violent” and he 

took pride in exerting his perceived dominance over others. The 

juvenile court restricted father’s visits with mother’s children to 

protect them from this uncontrolled behavior. Yet, mother 

flouted the court’s orders. She allowed father to stay in her home

even though Bryan and Jaime expressed they were fearful of 

father; she took the children on a trip with father even after he
15

was arrested for brandishing a firearm in a fit of road rage; and 

she conceived another child with father even though she 

expressed that she had no intention of reconciling with him.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the court’s

findings (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146), mother’s 

permissive conduct allowing father to have full access to the 

children despite father’s refusal to reform, let alone acknowledge, 

his violent behavior certainly evinces a risk of harm. 

Mother raises what boils down to two arguments in 

response. 

She argues that the children were not at substantial risk of 

harm at the time of February 2021 adjudication hearing because 

the April 2019 domestic violence incident did not pose a current 

risk to the children given no similar incidents occurred in the

intervening two years. Mother minimizes the substantiated 

reasons the juvenile court found the children at risk—besides the 

April 2019 incident itself, mother and father both denied the 

incident occurred (see In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 

594, 598-599 [parent’s denial of domestic violence increases 

risk]), father continued to engage in aggressive behavior with 

others, father trivialized the insight he should have gained from

his domestic violence classes, and mother included father as a 

member of the family despite these clear indicia of risk. The 

court did not need to wait until father’s violent tendencies caused 

harm to any of the children. (Kadence P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1383; Yolanda L., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 993; see also § 

300.2 [purpose of dependency statutes is to ensure “safety” and 

“protection” of children “who are at risk of harm”].) 

Mother also argues that she is not to blame for the “isolated 

incident” when father showed Sarai his motorcycle at mother’s 
16

home in defiance of the court order restricting his visitation. 

Mother misconstrues the record. Mother facilitated father’s 

continuous, unrestricted access to the children—the Department 

merely obtained photographic evidence of one interaction that 

confirmed its months’-long concerns. We must reject mother’s 

invitation to ignore the abundance of evidence indicating this was 

not an “isolated incident.” (See In re Noe F. (2013) 213 

Cal.App.4th 358, 366 [appellate court does not reweigh the 

evidence].) 

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

CHAVEZ