NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY

CAPT Erich M. Telfer, USCG

Unlimited 

Impossibilities:

Intelligence Support to the

Deepwater Horizon 

Response

Unlimited Impossibilities: 

Intelligence Support to the 

Deepwater Horizon Response

by CAPT Erich M. Telfer, USCG

National Intelligence University

Washington, DC

January 2014
In Unlimited Impossibilities: Intelligence Support to the

Deepwater Horizon Response, CAPT Erich M. Telfer of 

the U. S. Coast Guard examines the Intelligence Community and Coast Guard response to the 2010 BP oil explosion on Deepwater Horizon, which spilled tons of oil 

into the Gulf of Mexico. Telfer points out problems that 

hampered the response and suggests approaches for better communication 

and coordination in future responses. 

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the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This publication is subject to 

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Editor, NI Press

Office of Research

National Intelligence University

Defense Intelligence Agency

Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling

Washington, DC 20340-5100
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ABSTRACT

In April 2010, when BP’s DEEPWATER HORIZON rig exploded and 

spilled millions of barrels of oil in the Gulf of Mexico, the United States 

had no national-level plan for intelligence support to guide the process of 

conducting intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination. 

The intelligence effort lacked unity of command, and took over a month and 

a half to develop a functioning system that served strategic- and operationallevel decisionmakers well. Even then, it was of less help to tactical responders. 

A considerable amount of data was collected during the response (primarily 

by remote sensing), but analyzing, producing, and disseminating the subsequent intelligence proved difficult. The lack of an air tasking order directing 

and deconflicting all flights above and around the spill resulted in near air-toair collisions and hampered intelligence collection. In addition, no imagerybased common operating picture existed to display the spill, the impacted 

areas, and the response effort.

To prevent these problems from happening again, the Coast Guard should 

develop a plan for future spills of national significance that describes the organization, command relationship, function, and goal of intelligence support. 

The Coast Guard also should establish a system to manipulate and share imagery of the spill among federal, state, local, tribal, private, and public organizations. An air tasking order should guide obtaining this imagery, to ensure 

flight safety and intelligence collection. Finally, a system for developing a 

common operating picture should be used to share information and manage 

intelligence across the spectrum of responders and response activities. 

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It would be a fool’s errand to attempt a work such as this without the dedicated assistance of many people. I would like to acknowledge them. First, I 

wish to thank Dr. Cathryn Thurston, who was my faculty chair at the Center 

for Strategic Intelligence Research at the National Intelligence University. Dr. 

Thurston served as a guide, mentor, editor, and champion throughout my 

many months of research, writing, and editing. This project is exponentially 

better because of her steady insights and suggestions (most of which I heeded). However, I heeded all the suggestions of my editor, “George,” and his 

team, whose skill and patience uncovered errors great and small, and turned 

this from a project into a worthwhile endeavor. 

Thank you to those who participated in the interviews. These professionals 

gave their time, support, and perspectives freely. In some cases, they spent 

hours explaining their experiences and observations about intelligence and 

the Deepwater Horizon response. Without their cooperation, my work would 

have been impossible.

To CDR Kim Nettles, USCG (ret.), I offer grateful appreciation. A veteran 

of reviewing my writing, CDR Nettles encouraged this topic and then bravely agreed to read and edit my project in anticipation of publication. CDR 

Nettles also provided the strategic vision to help me better understand my 

audience and the impact of this work.

A special thanks goes to my good friend LTC Mike Trevett, USA, author 

of the book Isolating the Guerrilla. Mike’s 20-plus years of leadership and 

encouragement have motivated me not only to look at what is not working 

properly, but to try and fix it as well. 

Most importantly, I thank my wife, Jenn, and our children, Lauren, Daniel, 

and Savannah. They have had the courage and love to steadfastly follow me 

from coast to coast, and from the U.S. heartland to Mexico City. I couldn’t 

be more proud of them and grateful for their support, love, and good humor 

during it all. 

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PREFACE

The story of the Deepwater Horizon actually begins on March 24, 1989, when 

the oil tanker EXXON VALDEZ struck the Blight Reef in Prince William 

Sound, Alaska, spilling up to 750,000 barrels of oil.1 This was the most significant maritime oilspill since the 1969 blowout of the Union Oil Company platform in the Santa Barbara channel off the coast of California. As had become 

the practice, the federal government and the oil industry worked together to 

review safety procedures and practices used on the EXXON VALDEZ.2 From 

the Valdez collision and spill came the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 

In addition to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the U.S. Congress gave the U.S. 

Coast Guard additional funding to increase the size of the officer corps to be 

better staffed and prepared to respond to future spills of national significance 

(SONS).3 The Coast Guard added an entire Officer Candidate School class 

in 1991 using this additional Congressional funding. (I know this because I 

was among those 59 newly commissioned officers.)

On April 20, 2010, an explosion erupted on the deep-sea drilling rig DEEPWATER HORIZON that required the largest oilspill response in the history 

of the nation.4 The spill was the first environmental disaster officially designated as a spill of national significance. In addition to the tens of thousands 

of people who responded to the spill from dozens of agencies, intelligence 

officers from several organizations deployed to the Gulf Coast in order to 

support the response effort. But out of all the coverage of the explosion and 

spill, few, if any, of the thousands of media pieces even mention the intelligence support effort. The official reports are nearly silent on the topic, and 

the books published in early 2011 do not mention the intelligence support 

to the spill response. Judging by the reporting, it is almost as though there 

was no intelligence support to the Deepwater Horizon response. But intelligence officers and their parent agencies did respond to the spill by supporting 

strategic, operational, and tactical decisionmakers in battling the spill. They 

coordinated intelligence among multiple federal and state agencies and departments. They managed and guided multiple satellite and aircraft systems 

providing hundreds of images of the spill. Unfortunately, nothing has been 

written about intelligence support to the Deepwater Horizon response.

This book documents the Intelligence Community response to the spill, and 

assesses the successes and failures of its efforts.

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Contents

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Chapter 1—Intelligence and Disaster Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

To the “Right of Boom”: U.S. Government Response to 

Deepwater Horizon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Defining Intelligence for Disaster Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Role of Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Intelligence Support to Disaster Response—Past and 

Current Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Graduate Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Much Has Been Written about Deepwater Horizon, Just Not about 

Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Books—Recent and Detailed (Except about Intelligence) . . . . . . . . . . 29

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Chapter 2—Methodology: Authentic Answers to Authentic 

Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Conduct of the Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Chapter 3—Insufficient Intelligence Plans Hampered Response . . . . . 43

Lack of Imagination Hampered Planning and Preparation . . . . . . . . . 43

Lack of Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and Human Intelligence 

Support to Deepwater Horizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Reactive Intelligence Slowed the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Chapter 4—The Deepwater Horizon Intelligence Cycle: 

Spinning But Off Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

xii

Step 1: Establishing Intelligence Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Step 2: Intelligence (Dis)organization: Collection Planning . . . . . . . . 67

Step 3: Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Step 4: Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Chapter 5—The Common Operating Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Production and Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Chapter 6—Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Chapter 7—Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Lessons Experienced Are Not Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Appendix—SONS Priority Intelligence Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

About The Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Contents (continue)
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Chapter 1

Intelligence and Disaster Response

“The contemporary has no perspective; everything is in the 

foreground and appears the same size. Little matters loom big, 

and great matters are sometimes missed because their outlines 

cannot be seen.”5

—Barbara Tuchman

To the “Right of Boom”: U.S. Government Response to 

Deepwater Horizon

The crew of the oil rig DEEPWATER HORIZON was conducting exploratory drilling on the Macondo 252 well on April 20, 2010, when the rig 

exploded, killing 11 men and releasing an estimated 53,000 barrels of oil per 

day into the Gulf of Mexico for 87 days.6 After the Coast Guard completed 

the initial search and rescue, the U.S. government launched an environmental response unparalleled in U.S. history. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano declared the situation to be a spill of 

national significance on April 29. It was the first spill to officially carry this 

designation, and was the largest spill since the Exxon Valdez disaster.7 On 

the same day, Secretary Napolitano directed Admiral Thad Allen, U.S. Coast 

Guard commandant, to be the National Incident Commander (NIC), and 

the Coast Guard to be the lead agency. As Rear Admiral Peter Neffenger detailed in his September 22, 2010, testimony before the House Committee on 

Homeland Security, “At its peak, we deployed more than 47,000 responders, 

over 3,000 of which were Coast Guard members; 4 million feet of boom; 

more than 7,000 vessels, including 835 specialized skimmers; over 3,000 vessels of opportunity; 120 aircraft; and hundreds of public and private organizations and volunteers.”8 The Coast Guard alone mobilized 14 percent of its 

total workforce, active duty and reserves, to respond to the spill.9 Admiral 

Allen stayed on as the NIC until October 2010, even after Admiral Robert 

Papp took over as Coast Guard commandant on May 25. Admiral Allen has 

said that the response effort he led should not be thought of as an isolated 

incident, commenting to Eugene Robinson of the Washington Post that “it 

would be adding a crime to a crime if we didn’t make this one of the great 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

2

learning laboratories in the history of this country.”10 In that spirit, this book 

reviews what has been learned about the Deepwater Horizon incident so far 

and, more specifically, what role, and to what degree of success, intelligence 

played in supporting the response effort. 

Decisionmakers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels needed timely 

intelligence from the moment the Macondo well exploded until after it was 

capped in July.

Decisionmakers at the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels needed timely intelligence from the moment the 

Macondo well exploded until 

after it was capped in July. 

They needed to know the location of the oil, where the oil was going, where their response personnel and 

assets were, and what efforts were being made to fight the spill. 

Intelligence and Disaster Response: A Review of Literature

Intelligence has a role in disaster response, and it definitely played a role in 

Deepwater Horizon, yet a review of U.S. government plans, “lessons learned” 

documents, academic work, media coverage, and books shows little attention 

has been paid to this topic. National disasters of the magnitude of Hurricane 

Katrina or Deepwater Horizon share the attributes of being unexpected, chaotic, and requiring national-level assistance to the local response. When the 

federal, state, and local responders arrive at a disaster and begin their work, 

the most pressing and important requirement is that of managing information and providing intelligence to decisionmakers at all levels. 

Intelligence enables decisionmakers to apply resources and people in the most 

efficient, timely manner to save lives and property. In the area of disaster response, though, the term “intelligence” is not well understood, even though 

many U.S. government publications discuss disaster response and intelligence 

to varying degrees. There are a few graduate papers that speak directly to the 

role of intelligence in disaster response based on the experience of Hurricane 

Katrina. Several federal agencies deployed intelligence officers to the Deepwater Horizon response to assist strategic, operational, and tactical decisionmakers. These officers used several intelligence functions in their work and Rear 

Admiral Neffenger used the word “superb” when remarking on their effort.11

Presidential and U.S. government “lessons learned” reports on the Deepwater 

Horizon response barely touch on the issue of intelligence support. And media 
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reporting and recently published books speak sparingly, with a few notable 

exceptions, about the contribution of intelligence to managing the disaster. 

Defining Intelligence for Disaster Response

The term “intelligence” is not well defined in relation to disaster response 

and so a description will aid in focusing the discussion. This section broadly 

describes intelligence and then, more specifically, delineates intelligence from 

operational information used during tactical actions.

First of all, the word “intelligence” carries a weighty, broad, and ill-defined 

connotation not at all appropriate when talking about natural disasters. Television shows and movies abound with the derring-do of “intelligence officers” who often behave as well-armed, reckless saboteurs who do little or 

nothing resembling actual intelligence work.12 “Intelligence,” too, is often 

confused with “information.” A good example of this confusion is shown in 

the National Geographic Explorer documentary Can the Gulf Survive?, when 

the narrator said that “intelligence” from a command post directed the U.S. 

Coast Guard cutter Elm to an oil slick.13 What the documentary should have 

said was simply that the command post directed the cutter to the oil. “Intelligence” does not direct operations, although a commander may use intelligence to those ends. This may appear a fine distinction, but it is an important 

one to the Intelligence Community. A definition of “intelligence” for the 

scope of this project is therefore warranted. 

Coast Guard Publication 2-0, Intelligence, puts it this way, “Intelligence is 

the development and analysis of raw material in order to determine what the 

information means and to identify the implications for decisionmaking.”14 

“In other words,” Pub 2-0 goes on to say, “intelligence is the analysis and 

synthesis of information into knowledge.”15 Information is material that has 

not been evaluated. “The purpose of intelligence, therefore,” the Coast Guard 

publication says, “is to inform commanders and decisionmakers by providing accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about adversaries, threats, and 

the surrounding environment.”16 Based on my professional experience in 

Coast Guard intelligence and graduate study on the topic, I suggest a further 

refinement when discussing intelligence, even though the definitions from 

Coast Guard Publication 2-0 are perfectly fine. My refinement deals with the 

collection and analysis of information and the purpose of intelligence within 

disaster response.
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

4

Information must be collected (i.e., gotten from somewhere) before a person 

may analyze it. This means someone must develop and implement a plan to 

collect the information. It has been my experience that the term “analysis” in 

the definition of intelligence is often over-thought. Analysis means reflection 

and perhaps study on the collected information based on one’s experience 

and understanding. A commanding officer of a Coast Guard cutter may analyze a piece of information during a tactical situation and use his judgment 

to make a decision based on that analysis. If the outcome of the analysis is of 

greater breadth and depth than the initial information, then the commanding 

officer has turned the information into intelligence. Coast Guard cutter commanding officers did this during the Deepwater Horizon response when Air 

National Guard aircraft passed live video feeds directly to the cutter. Another 

example would be the integration of the Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA) within the various command posts in July 2010 

into a common operating picture (COP). Raw images and data points about 

oil and weather information are not intelligence. However, when ERMA 

pulled that data (and a great deal more), placed it on a geospatial information 

system, and made it available to federal, state, local, and private company decisionmakers who then took the data ERMA had contextualized, that moved 

closer to a more traditional understanding of intelligence.

A Note on the Difference between Operations and Intelligence

The collection and analysis of intelligence should be understood as different 

from operations, which include observing, orienting, deciding, and acting (also 

known as the acronym “OODA Loop”), as shown in Figure 1. The U.S. Air 

Force developed the OODA Loop after the Korean War to describe the process a fighter pilot uses during operations. Other communities within the military services adopted the OODA Loop description to explain the operational

information process. The Coast Guard teaches and practices a variation of the 

OODA Loop consisting of the steps surveil, detect, classify, identify, and prosecute (SDCIP), shown in Figure 2. The SDCIP does essentially the same thing 

as the OODA Loop in terms of describing a process of prosecuting a mission 

or action. Both methods begin with observation and end with action. They are 

loops because the commander continually reassesses the situation and makes 

decisions based on his observations. But these are “operational information” 

methods, not intelligence.
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Orient

Observe

Act

Decide

Figure 1: An operational information process: The “OODA Loop”.
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

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Surveil

Identify Classify

Prosecute Detect

Figure 2: The Coast Guard version: The “SDCIP” Loop.

The Role of Intelligence

Intelligence has two purposes: to warn decisionmakers, and to aid decisionmakers in making better decisions. That is all. The intelligence cycle is complete when the decisionmaker actually makes a decision, even if that decision 

is to do nothing. The great parade of intelligence agencies that manage the 

nation’s collection capabilities and personnel largely guide themselves based 

on those two purposes. It is 

therefore important to understand that decisionmakers, 

whether at the local, state, or 

national level, drive the intelligence cycle. They do this 

Intelligence has two purposes: to 

warn decisionmakers, and to aid 

decisionmakers in making better 

decisions. That is all. 
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by telling the intelligence officers assigned to them what the decisionmaker 

needs to know. These are called intelligence requirements. 

Intelligence also has a kind of OODA Loop all its own. In this case, the 

following response functions adhere to what is called the intelligence cycle: 

requirements, planning, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination. 

First, a decisionmaker has a need for expanded knowledge to prosecute a 

response (requirement), and then the intelligence officer develops a way to 

get that information (organization).17 Next, an asset is directed to obtain the 

information (collection) and the collected information is studied for meaning 

(analysis).18 Lastly, the intelligence is put in a format useable for the decisionmaker (produced) and presented to the decisionmaker in a timely understood 

medium (dissemination).19 Figure 3 shows this classic, basic intelligence cycle, which is generally depicted in a circle. The intelligence cycle is immutable 

whether searching for Iranian nuclear sites or oil gushing up from the ocean 

floor. It is an ordered, iterative process used to focus the intelligence staff on 

providing the decisionmaker with what he or she needs to warn and assist in 

making a decision. 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

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Requriements

Analysis Collection

Production &

Dissemination Organization

Figure 3: The basic intelligence cycle, from Intelligence 101.

An Argument for Applying the Intelligence Cycle to the 

Deepwater Horizon Response

I include those Deepwater Horizon response personnel and certain functions 

that meet the preceding description under the “intelligence” umbrella: remote 

sensing, geospatial information systems, satellite imagery collection, airborne 

imagery collection, and shoreline cleanup assessment teams (SCATs). 

I understand that this is an expanded view of intelligence within the context 

of environmental response and a spill of national significance. It is true that 

those Coast Guard members who work in environmental response generally 

do not use the term intelligence in this context. Most Coast Guard members 

whose careers center on environmental protection and oilspill response (the 
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“M” community, as the Coast Guard still refers to it) generally do not practice the intelligence cycle in their normal operations. 

Perhaps, in routine response operations, there is not a pressing need to define intelligence support so specifically. However, at the national response 

level during declared disasters and spills of national significance, the Coast 

Guard response community has an insufficient understanding of intelligence 

support—or even the need for it. As an illustration, a senior Coast Guard 

captain who both spent a career in the maritime (environmental) response 

community and responded to the Deepwater Horizon spill commented to me 

that intelligence had no place in environmental response.20

This study intends to explain the role traditional intelligence practice played 

in the Deepwater Horizon response. Although few environmental response 

operations may necessitate intelligence support, the Deepwater Horizon spill 

clearly illustrates that a spill of national significance does require a robust 

intelligence presence that is properly organized. 

The Role of Intelligence in a Federal Disaster Response Context

A good place to begin the discussion is with a review of U.S. government documents that guide disaster response and try to outline the role of intelligence 

within that context. The U.S. government struggles with defining the role of 

intelligence in disaster response at the federal level. This struggle is reflected 

in the various plans and frameworks that were developed for disaster response 

where the importance of intelligence is described in various levels of detail. In 

short, the plans and frameworks outline some intelligence responsibilities, 

and encourage intelligence and information sharing. But the documents do 

not establish clear unity of command in describing where the intelligence 

function should reside in disaster response. The guides give too much latitude 

to senior decisionmakers regarding where to place the intelligence function, 

especially considering that these decisionmakers generally have little to no 

understanding of the capabilities or the 

role of intelligence. The guides neither 

establish a principal intelligence officer within the response construct, nor 

do they distinguish if the intelligence 

function should operate differently for 

... documents do not establish 

clear unity of command in describing where the intelligence 

function should reside ...
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

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a spill of national significance than for other responses. There has been some 

thoughtful work done by graduate students to address these issues, but considering the substantial role intelligence support played in the response to 

Deepwater Horizon, the topic has been grossly understudied.21

Intelligence Support to Disaster Response—Past

and Current Plans

Going back as far as the early 1990s, the Federal Response Plan discussed 

intelligence, as did the subsequent National Response Plan. The current National Response Framework also touches briefly on the role of intelligence. 

Two other current federal documents, the National Incident Management System and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, also mention intelligence 

as it relates to disaster response. 

The Stafford Act and the Federal Response Plan of 1992

The first of these models, the Federal Response Plan (FRP), incorporated the 

efforts of 27 federal agencies to implement the Stafford Act, which included 

intelligence support to law enforcement and other agencies during a disaster 

response. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 

Act22 authorized most federal disaster response activities under the U.S. 

Federal Emergency and Management Agency (FEMA), the lead agency for 

federal disaster response. The Stafford Act defines a major disaster as “any 

natural catastrophe . . . or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in 

any part of the United States” that the President determines requires federal 

assistance to the states to alleviate damage, loss, and suffering.23 The FRP is 

federal support to state and local response efforts where they have the lead 

and the federal government provided assistance. The FRP is the methodology 

the federal government uses when the President declares a major disaster. 

Intelligence in the FRP

Within the FRP, intelligence is described in law enforcement terms and for situational awareness. Regarding intelligence and law enforcement, intelligence 

may be used by the federal government to assist state governments that face a 

law enforcement emergency during which the collection and preservation of 

evidence is required for further investigation and prosecution.24 For example, 

the response to a bomb detonation would include evidence gathering, referred 
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to as “intelligence” in parts of the FRP, as law enforcement authorities search 

for the people responsible. Regarding situational awareness, the plan lists intelligence as a support function of response planning and daily briefings.25

The FRP defines intelligence functions as components of disaster response, 

which is more important for our purpose here, including remote sensing and 

situational awareness. Embedded in the FRP are also the Emergency Support Functions, which are annexes that delineate and organize the type of 

help the federal government may provide to the states. Emergency Support 

Function 5, the Information and Planning Annex, describes the role and organization of intelligence regarding remote sensing. Within the Information 

and Planning Section resides the Technical Service Branch, which includes 

a remote-sensing specialist, geospatial information systems (GIS) coordinator, GIS specialist, and technical specialists. The role of the Technical Service 

Branch includes coordinating remote-sensing reconnaissance requirements, 

establishing and maintaining a geographic information system, providing 

hazard-specific technical advice to operational planning, and using other experts (e.g., meteorologists) as required. 

The FRP also addresses the role of intelligence and situational awareness. The 

FRP includes assumptions for the Planning Section such as the “immediate 

and continuous demand by officials” for information that provides operational 

and strategic decisionmakers with information and intelligence. This demand 

for continual information by senior leaders, described by Admiral Allen as 

“insatiable,” was much in evidence during Deepwater Horizon. Also listed 

in the Information and Planning Appendix is a potential need to “rapidly 

deploy field observers” to collect information. 

National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan

The National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency 

Plan (40 CFR Part 300), or National Contingency Plan (NCP), was 

established in 1968 as the U.S. blueprint for responding to both oilspills 

and hazardous substance releases.27 The NCP authorizes the authorities of 

the federal government to organize for and respond to maritime oil and 

hazardous material spills. The main tenets of the NCP are that the On Scene 

Coordinator directs all federal, state, and private response activities. Congress 

has modified the NCP since 1968, most recently in 1994 to encompass the 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

12

Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The NCP directs that the federal government 

have the lead in responding to a spill of national significance. This is different 

from Stafford Act federal responses activity where the states take the lead role 

and the federal government supports them. The Deepwater Horizon response 

was managed under the NCP with the federal government in the lead. This 

was to cause confusion among the impacted state governments, all of whom 

were accustomed to the practices of the Stafford Act. While the NCP does 

not discuss intelligence specifically, it does promote unity of command and 

unity of effort in the response operations.

The National Response Plan of 2003 

In February 2003, President George W. Bush issued a Homeland Security Directive (HSPD-5) ordering the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to draft a National Response Plan.28 The National Response Plan (NRP) 

superseded the Federal Response Plan and was enacted “to align Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, 

and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. This approach is 

unique and far-reaching in that it, for the first time, eliminates critical seams 

and ties together a complete spectrum of incident management activities to 

include the prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from 

terrorism, major natural disasters, and other major emergencies.”29

Intelligence in the NRP

Included in the section on Incident Management Activities is the idea that 

incidents of national significance may have results “far beyond” the immediate area; then, the NRP provides a framework to manage the additional 

impacts.30 But the only intelligence function discussed in this section is 

counterintelligence (also known as counterespionage), which is included 

among a list of possible countermeasures that may be required after a disaster 

to safeguard personnel and classified material. Intelligence is also discussed as 

a role authorized under the attorney general when used “to detect, prevent, 

preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States.”31

The Homeland Security Operations Center

The NRP’s description of the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) 

is much more useful. The HSOC is the hub for operational coordination 
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and strategic awareness in response to a domestic incident. Specifically, the 

Intelligence/Information Analysis subsection describes DHS as “responsible 

for interagency intelligence collection requirements, analysis, production, 

and production dissemination” (the intelligence cycle).32 The plan outlines 

the intelligence tasks for DHS including coordinating and disseminating 

threat warnings, coordinating with other federal agencies regarding counterterrorism, providing analytical support, providing threat awareness, and 

maintaining “real-time” communication with other intelligence organizations. The NRP also lists and describes several other federal organizations 

that conduct intelligence as part of homeland security, including the FBI’s 

Strategic Information and Operations Center and the National Counter Terrorism Center.

The Joint Field Office and Intelligence Support 

The Joint Field Office is an organization used to support on scene responders. The NRP explains that the Joint Field Office Coordination Group would 

determine the placement of the intelligence function based on the incident 

and the situation. The NRP says that the intelligence function at the operational level may be placed within the planning or operations sections of a joint 

field office (JFO) or as a standalone section. The JFO sections include operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration (comptroller), and, 

if needed, a sixth section, intelligence. However, the common practice during 

a response is to place intelligence within the staff sections of either planning 

or, less frequently, operations. Just like the Federal Response Plan, the NRP includes a geospatial information systems function within the Planning Section 

for Emergency Support Function #5, the Emergency Management Appendix. 

The Failure of the NRP When Used during Hurricane Katrina

Although the National Response Plan expanded the role of intelligence when 

compared with the Federal Response Plan, the NRP still did not fully meet 

U.S. government needs. The plan failed the test of Hurricane Katrina because it went neither far enough nor broadly enough in detailing what was 

really needed in response to a disaster of this magnitude. According to James 

J. Carafono and Richard Weitz’s critique of the Katrina response, Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis, the NRP was not a doctrine, strategy, system, or plan as commonly understood.33 It was, instead, a 
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practice. Traditional planning consists of five parts: mission statement, situation description, tasks for subordinate elements, logistics and administration, and command and communications. The NRP lacked these elements as 

well as national-level direction on intelligence support to the response effort. 

Intelligence was directed and described on a basic level, but it appears the 

organizations contributing to the response, the individual agencies, were left 

to their own understanding and practice of intelligence support. In other 

words, the NRP listed the intelligence ingredients, but not how to mix and 

prepare them for success. Consequently, the NRP was scrapped in favor of 

the National Response Framework of 2008.

National Reflection on the Role of Intelligence: 

The National Response Framework

The 9/11 attacks, combined with insufficient federal responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, motivated significant reflection and study about 

how the government should address intelligence support to disaster response.34 Congress intimately involved itself, observing, in 2003, that 

there was a lack of information and intelligence sharing among intelligence 

agencies and responders, and calling for formal, written intelligence-sharing 

agreements.35 The culmination of this third iteration since the early 1990s 

was the National Response Framework (NRF). 

The stated goal of the framework is to guide how the nation conducts allhazard response. The NRF “explains the common discipline and structure” 

of response as opposed to being a response plan. The NRF is built on the 

National Incident Management System (described later). 

Intelligence in the NRF

Within the NRF, intelligence is split into two general function areas: support to law enforcement for investigations and prosecutions, and the more 

traditional role of intelligence as support to national-level decisionmakers. 

The DHS secretary is designated as the federal official for domestic incident 

management. The NRF defines the Director of National Intelligence as the 

lead federal officer responsible for implementing the National Intelligence 

Program in the event of a response. The NRF goes on to list how important intelligence is in planning and how mechanisms must be established to 

share intelligence with local, tribal, and state actors. In describing the Inci-
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dent Command System (ICS), upon which the National Incident Management System is built, intelligence is mentioned as a possible function area if 

deemed appropriate. This remains unchanged from the description in the 

National Response Plan. Further descriptions of intelligence in the National 

Response Framework mimic those in the rest of the National Response Plan.

36

With the NRF being a general guide, the U.S. government implements disaster response via the National Incident Management System. 

Implementation of the NRF: The National Incident 

Management System

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is the companion document to the National Response Framework and exists to “provide a consistent 

nationwide template” for federal, state, local, nongovernmental organization, and private-sector response to incidents with an “expanded intelligence 

function.”37 The NIMS describes intelligence as it relates to disaster response 

with greater detail than the National Response Framework. The cover letter 

by then-DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff explains that the latest iteration of 

the NIMS expands “the intelligence/investigations functions” of response. It 

does this by including intelligence sharing as a mitigating factor in reducing 

damage and loss of life, arguing for a standard incident reporting system to 

better share intelligence, and explaining the value of geospatial information 

systems in disaster response. NIMS outlines the value of GIS to a common 

operating picture, intelligence support to decisionmakers, and operational 

decisionmaking. The NIMS wisely cautions that the products of GIS require analysis by trained specialists since the misinterpretation of imagery 

may cause “inconspicuous [but] serious errors.”38 The NIMS contains 14 

“management characteristics” that contribute to the strength and efficiency 

of the response, including information and intelligence management, which 

requires the organization to set up and use the intelligence cycle to assist during the incident response. 
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Intelligence Function may reside in:

Single Resources

SupplyUnit LeaderFacilitiesUnit LeaderGround Support

Unit Leader

TimeUnit LeaderProcurementUnit LeaderDomobilizationUnit LeaderTechnicalSpecialists

Air SupportGroupSupervisorAir TacticalGroupSurpervisor

Incident

Commander

Public Information OfficerSafety OfficerLiaison Officer

Command

Staff

TimeUnit LeaderProcurementUnit LeaderDomobilizationUnit LeaderDemobilizationUnit LeaderTechnicalSpecialists

General

Staff

Logistics

Section Chief

}

} Operations Section Chief Finance/ Administration Section Chief Intelligence Section Chief Planning Section Chief

Air Operations

Branch

Director

Branch

Staff

Strike Team/Task ForceLeader

Division/GroupSupervisor

Service

Branch

Director

Support

Branch

Director

CommunicationUnit LeaderMedicalUnit LeaderFoodUnit Leader

Figure 4: Organizational Terminology: ICS Organizational Chart

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, “ICS 200—Lesson 3: ICS Organization,” file 

titled “Organizational Terminology: ICS Organizational Chart,” accessed March 1, 

2011, http://www.usda.gov/documents/ICS200Lesson03.pdf. Additions in red and “Intelligence Section Chief ” box added by author.
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The NIMS, therefore, helpfully characterizes the intelligence/investigation 

function in detail and where it resides in various sections of the Incident 

Command System. Intelligence as a function normally resides within the 

planning section, where it is responsible for the status of situations, resources, 

and anticipated incidents. Varying definitions of “intelligence” again lead to 

some misunderstanding, since the word “intelligence” is really referring to 

situational awareness, describing the events as they are and not traditional intelligence analysis. Situation awareness is a key factor in decisionmaking, but 

it is not intelligence as earlier discussed. However, when situational awareness 

is combined in a format that provides greater depth of understanding and 

adds meaning to the information (such as a GIS-based common operating 

picture should), then “intelligence” moves closer to the Intelligence Community’s understanding of the term.

The NIMS goes on, however, to explain that the response organization must 

establish “a system for the collection, analysis, and sharing of information 

developed during intelligence/investigation efforts.”39 Now, the word intelligence is contributing to prosecuting criminal activities or in determining 

cause and impact of an incident. This level of intelligence support to the 

NIMS should be set up within the Incident Command System, “when there 

is a significant intelligence/investigations component to the incident.”40

Confusion over Function and Role in the NRF

The dual role of intelligence support to disaster response as well as disaster 

investigations is an important point to keep in mind as this discussion moves 

forward, because the functions are quite different, they are not well defined, 

and it is unclear where their functions should lie within the National Response Framework. The response organization to Deepwater Horizon did not 

establish a separate intelligence/information function, nor was intelligence 

support ever well defined. The NIMS underscores that the intelligence/investigations function “has responsibilities that cross all interests of departments 

involved during an incident” even if certain functions remain specific to law 

enforcement.41 (Emphasis added.) However, the NIMS discussion offers too 

much latitude in the organization of that function. 
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Implementing the Framework: The National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan

While the NIMS focuses on disaster response, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) aims to address deliberate manmade attacks against the 

country’s critical infrastructure. The NIPP includes the use of intelligence as 

“one of the essential elements needed” to guard the country.42 The NIPP is 

focused on the threat and response to terrorist attacks specifically (as opposed 

to natural disasters), but a spill of national significance could also be the goal 

or result of a terrorist attack. 

Intelligence in the NIPP—More Robust Discussions

The NIPP includes access to “robust information-sharing networks that include relevant intelligence and threat analysis” as one of the four major goals 

toward which agencies must strive to protect critical infrastructure.43 In fact, 

the NIPP mentions and addresses “intelligence” 126 times throughout the 

almost 200-page document. The NIPP argues that the new, post-9/11 terrorist threat requires “intelligence-driven analysis, information sharing, and unprecedented partnerships between the government and the private sector at 

all levels.”44 The NIPP describes an “all-hazards” approach to defining disasters and, specifically, lists natural and manmade events (including the Exxon 

Valdez oilspill) within the scope of the plan.

Intelligence sharing is a key theme in the NIPP. The NIPP highlights how 

multiple agencies at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels will respond to 

an attack or incident and why this necessitates information and intelligence 

sharing to ensure unity of effort. The NIPP goes so far as to stress a networked 

approach to bringing in state, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners into the “intelligence cycle,” including the development of intelligence requirements.45 The NIPP discusses intelligence as it relates to evaluating “threat 

analysis and real-time incident reporting,” such as a common operating picture.46 The following discussion describes the many agencies and organizations 

that contribute some manner of intelligence function to protecting the nation’s 

critical infrastructure. The discussion focuses on intelligence sharing, intelligence collaboration (including with geospatial information systems), and threat 

and risk analysis. Out of all the national disaster plans reviewed, the NIPP 
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contains the most expansive and detailed approach to the role of intelligence in 

supporting disaster response.

Confusion in Function and Role in All Federal Plans

To summarize, the function and role of intelligence is not well defined within 

federal disaster response guides and plans. Intelligence sharing and coordination is promoted, but the plans establish neither unity of effort nor unity 

of command within the intelligence function. The plans do not discuss an 

intelligence methodology, the intelligence cycle, and give no direction as to 

how intelligence should support decisionmakers across the response effort. 

Incident leadership is given too much leeway in where to place the intelligence function and, historically, the leadership has most often placed the intelligence function within the Planning Section subordinate to the Situation 

Unit. This was the case during Deepwater Horizon. With the shortcomings 

of the U.S. government response plans in defining and guiding intelligence 

support to disaster response listed here, we will now turn to graduate-level 

academic work on the topic.

Graduate Papers

Two excellent papers about previous disaster response intelligence support 

stand out in the field. Major Jennifer Sovada’s “Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance Support to Humanitarian Relief Operations within the 

United States: Where Everyone Is in Charge” critically examined the need 

for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)47 during domestic 

disaster relief.48 Major Sovada looked at ISR in two case studies: the 

Hurricane Katrina response in September 2005 and the California wildfire 

response in October 2007. Major Sovada found that the efforts lacked unity 

of command and unity of effort. She is critical of the domestic Department 

of Defense (DoD) ISR effort, in addition to the interagency effort. Sovada 

argues that while DoD has improved domestic ISR since Hurricane Katrina 

and the California wildfires, many problems remain. Specifically, she writes 

that domestic ISR support to disaster relief requires an integrated, preestablished ISR plan.49 Sovada also argues that ISR command relationships 

must be established before starting the response and that a robust liaison 

officer effort among the ISR entities will support unity of effort.50 She says 
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that legal issues regarding U.S. military domestic intelligence operations 

slowed and hampered ISR support during Hurricane Katrina and the wildfire 

responses, and that ISR must be included in domestic response exercises and 

practiced during those exercises. 

Lieutenant Commander Joyce Dietrich, U.S. Coast Guard,51 examined the 

relationship between intelligence dissemination and the emergency response 

after Hurricane Katrina in her thesis, “The Eyes of Katrina: A Case Study 

of Incident Command System (ICS) Intelligence Support during Hurricane 

Katrina.” Dietrich found that the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

(NGA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Coast Guard, and private companies provided 

intelligence products that “contributed to significant (tactical) successes during the Hurricane Katrina response.”52 Dietrich singles out NGA for specific 

praise, noting that the agency not only “was very creative in declassifying 

national asset imagery” for consumers, but that NGA was a large part of 

“what went right” during the intelligence support to the response.53 She goes 

on to argue, however, that much of the imagery that NGA and the other organizations produced was not made available to the responders. Instead, the 

imagery was made available to strategic- and operational-level decisionmakers, but not those at the tactical level.54 Dietrich highlights the role of private 

industry in supporting imagery, especially Google, which enabled hundreds 

of employees and private citizens to use its Google software to build imagery 

sets of New Orleans and overlay those sets on maps of the city. This assisted 

tremendously in assessing the storm’s impact and damage. 

But Dietrich observes that Admiral Thad Allen, the principal federal officer 

of the response, said that “communication between tactical responders and 

intelligence collectors was ad hoc” and that information was shared based on 

personal relationships, not on doctrine and planning. Successful intelligence 

sharing took place informally, crudely, and via liaison officers.56 Intelligence 

was underutilized in part, Dietrich mentions, because the tactical responders 

had little knowledge and no training on the capabilities of national intelligence 

systems. Dietrich summarizes the key challenges her work uncovered like this:

Despite . . . forward leaning actions of multiple intelligence 

agencies, many first responders never gained critical access 

to intelligence products that would have helped them save 
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additional lives. Communications between intelligence 

providers and field operators were scarce. A disproportionate number of senior individuals interviewed for this study 

identified a high level of interaction with the [Intelligence 

Community], while field level operators reported minimal 

to no open communication with intelligence components.

Dietrich could have been writing her conclusion about Deepwater Horizon, 

which again raises the question, what have we learned about intelligence support to national disasters?

Much Has Been Written about Deepwater Horizon, 

Just Not about Intelligence

A great deal has been written about the explosion, sinking, and subsequent 

oilspill of the Deepwater Horizon, but it rarely deals directly with intelligence 

support to the response. However, a review of what has been produced will 

frame the subsequent discussion. The coverage was voluminous, from the 

daily print and online sources to the weekly periodicals, and in early 2011, 

the first hurriedly published books appeared. Media and print publications 

detailed technical, environmental, and human stories about what took place, 

why it took place, and what responders did in addressing the situation. Many 

publications included diagrams depicting Deepwater Horizon, the wellhead, 

the drilling equipment, and the drilling process to educate readers on the 

specifics of deepwater drilling. To this, add the official reports, the most substantive of which was the 385-page report to the President by the National 

Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 

(hereafter, the Oil Spill Commission): Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and 

the Future of Offshore Drilling.

57

The majority of what has been written from all sources attempted to describe 

the technical aspect of the explosion, spill, and recovery; tried to explain the 

impact of the spill on Gulf residents, businesses, and the oil industry; or editorialized the spill’s actors into one of three categories: hero, victim, or villain. 

Unfortunately, little of what has been written discussed intelligence support 

to the Deepwater Horizon response.
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Lots of Daily Reporting, Little about Intelligence

Journalists largely ignored the intelligence-support aspects of the spill response. National and international daily newspapers published, and placed 

online, volumes of stories about Deepwater Horizon, illustrating the magnitude of the spill and reflecting the interest expressed by the public. Newspapers prominently reported the Deepwater Horizon story, from the explosion 

until BP stopped the oil flow in mid-July. The Times-Picayune of New Orleans had 585 articles on this topic between April 20 and July 15, 2010, when 

BP capped the well. In that same time period, the Washington Post posted 166 

articles and the Los Angeles Times printed 135 pieces. Compare this with a 

search for articles on Afghanistan and the U.S. military efforts there, and the 

numbers are 42, 624, and 351 for each paper, respectively. The Guardian of 

London carried 144 articles about Deepwater Horizon. Closer to home, the 

Mexican daily paper Reforma included 36 articles between April 20 and July 

15, 2010, with the term “Deepwater Horizon” in the piece. Despite the 1,066 

pieces written about Deepwater Horizon from just these sources, very few of 

them discussed intelligence support to the response effort.

Online Sources

Online sources also reported widely on the spill. The Coast Guard Digest, an 

unofficial website that aggregates links to reports and comments on stories 

and issues involving the U.S. Coast Guard, carried 381 items pulled from 

media sources from when the Deepwater Horizon explosion first occurred until July 15, 2010. Out of the 381 pieces, just four of them touched on intelligence support issues and only six mentioned the lack of proper plans for 

such an explosion and spill. 

Periodicals—Touching on Intelligence

By examining the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill in greater depth, 

some weekly magazines brought the reader closer to matters touching on intelligence support to the response effort. The New Yorker, Fortune, Newsweek, 

and Economist ran several articles about Deepwater Horizon between April 

20 and July 15, 2010. 

New Yorker Article

The definitive periodical piece on the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill 

is Raffi Khatchadourian’s article in the New Yorker titled, “The Gulf War,” 
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which not only dissects the incident, but describes in depth the complete lack 

of preparation at the federal, state, local, and business levels for a spill of this 

magnitude. If one could read only a single article about the Deepwater Horizon incident to gain the broadest understanding, Khatchadourian’s article 

would be it. 

In his 24-page article, Khatchadourian describes the spill, the response, and, of 

special interest here, some aspects of intelligence support to the spill response. 

In particular, he describes the difficulties the responders had in finding where 

the oil drifted away from the wellhead, which impacted their ability to collect 

information on the oil and then skim it. Khatchadourian also discusses the 

shoreline cleanup and assessment teams who were disbursed daily to impacted 

areas to report on the oil they observed there. 

Members of the SCATs described themselves to Khatchadourian as “intelligence officers for the cleanup.”58 In the parlance of the Intelligence Community (IC), the SCATs were conducting human intelligence (HUMINT), 

although this is a term not used in environmental response. Khatchadourian 

also talked about the lack of a plan to respond to the spill, an absence that 

extended to intelligence support. He wrote that the responders recognized the 

Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill as the worst-case scenario (for which 

there was no plan), and they began the tactical and operational response planning from that point forward. 

Khatchadourian also addressed intelligence more directly. He quoted Ed 

Lavine, a chief federal scientist and oilspill responder going back to the 1970s, 

on how he viewed his key knowledge requirements: “Our mantra was: What 

got spilled? Where is it going? What’s in its path?” In the language of the 

Intelligence Community, these are “priority intelligence requirements” (PIR) 

that the decisionmakers must have answered to prosecute the response. Again, 

“PIR” was not the term used, but the functionality—the form—is the same. 

Fortune’s Favor

Fortune’s investigative piece, “BP: ‘An Accident Waiting to Happen,’” describes 

how the wrong safety focus led to poor planning and incident response by 

BP.59 The authors, Peter Elkind, David Whitford, and Doris Burke, told how 

a culture of individual versus process safety resulted in the Deepwater Horizon

explosion and spill. Published in late January, 2011, the article described BP’s 
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history of safety challenges, the explosion and spill, the reaction of the public 

and the government, and the changes BP initiated in response to the incident. 

The article contains an illustration that compares the depth of the Macondo 

well to that of other wells, Mount Everest, and several skyscrapers. This illustration underscores the incredible distance covered by the Deepwater Horizon

operation under water and earth, and why that complicated the response effort. In intelligence terms, this is also a priority information requirement.

Newsweek’s Contribution

Newsweek’s most thoughtful article about the explosion and spill, “Black Water Rising,” by Evan Thomas and Daniel Stone, described the explosion, spill, 

and government response, but was also open to misunderstanding. First, the 

authors claim that, when DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano declared this to be 

“a spill of national significance,” this was “authorizing federal assistance to the 

region.”60 As will be explained shortly, a spill of national significance does not 

authorize federal assistance as is the case with a Stafford Act response (e.g., the 

response to Hurricane Katrina), but instead places a federal agency in charge 

of the response, as directed in the National Contingency Plan. In this case, 

the U.S. Coast Guard was given the role of the federal agency put in charge 

of making certain the responsible party, BP, covered the expenses and adhered 

to its legal responsibility to clean up the spill. Second, the article suggested 

that the oil was everywhere and coming ashore almost everywhere. This was 

not true, as the oil was actually rather difficult to find, away from the wellhead.61 This highlights another priority information requirement mentioned 

in many of these articles: finding the oil. Remote sensing played a prominent 

role in locating, tracking, and classifying the oil, so responders could skim it 

and lay boom. By suggesting that the oil was everywhere, Thomas and Stone 

ignored the efforts and challenges of remote sensing in finding the oil. Finally, 

the piece reported that BP had an insufficient, poorly written response plan, 

despite the plan’s approval by the federal government. This highlights another 

function of intelligence—support to planning.

The Economist’s Take

The Economist’s coverage of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill focused 

on lessons to be learned from the spill, and the spill’s impact in environmental, political, and economic circles. The May 6, 2010, edition included an 
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article titled, “The Politics of Disaster,” which speaks specifically about how 

government policy and regulation must gain better insight and understanding of what happened for the future. The magazine argues that disasters can be 

instructive, but that it is also easy to learn the wrong lessons.62

Despite the significant newspaper and weekly magazine coverage of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill, almost no space was devoted to intelligence 

support, with the exception of Khatchadourian’s piece in the New Yorker.

Official Reports—Thin Soup on Intelligence

The U.S. government agencies involved in the response began publishing 

their after-action reports and “lessons learned” pieces in late fall 2010, including the official Presidential and U.S. Coast Guard studies.63 The majority of 

these official reports focus on the lack of planning for a spill of the magnitude 

of Deepwater Horizon, and the absence of proper preparation in responding 

to such a spill. 

The National Incident Commander’s Report

Admiral Allen authored this 27-page report focused on “the critical strategic 

issues associated with the response.”64 The Admiral calls out a few items germane to the discussion here about intelligence support to disaster response. 

He describes his primary responsibility as promoting unity of effort across the 

entire governmental response. He also praises the Pollution Contingency Plan 

as giving him the discretion and freedom of action to respond to the spill. 

Additionally, however, Admiral Allen observes that the response constructs 

of the NCP and the NRF are different, and should be reconciled to improve 

federal effectiveness after an incident. He also comments on the challenges in 

establishing control of the airspace above and adjacent to the spill, and recommends that the example of the Air Operations Center established to support 

the DWH response be memorialized in doctrine for future spill response. This 

report was submitted to the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, the first day of October 2010, and is one of the earliest official reports. 

The Oil Spill Commission’s Report 

The Oil Spill Commission’s report, titled Deep Water, is a lengthy, wellorganized piece, published in January 2011, that covers many aspects of 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

26

the explosion and spill, but is thin on addressing intelligence support to the 

response. As the foreword states, the report aims “to determine the cause 

of the disaster, and to improve the country’s ability to respond to spills,” as 

well as to recommend changes to the drilling industry to improve safety.66

The commission members reached several conclusions, and pointed out that 

the ability of the federal government to respond to spills lags behind the risks 

associated with deepwater drilling, and that the government “must close” this 

gap by working with industry. Although not stated in the report, included 

in this “lag” is intelligence support to the responders. In addition, the report 

says that “neither BP nor the federal government was prepared to deal with a 

spill of the magnitude and complexity of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.”67

The report goes on to recommend that the “EPA and the Coast Guard should 

establish distinct plans and procedures for responding to a ‘spill of national 

significance,’” and those should be based on industry’s worst-case estimates of 

a spill.68

The Coast Guard’s Unofficial (Official) Review

The Coast Guard chartered an interesting report about the Deepwater Horizon explosion, entitled BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Incident Specific

Preparedness Review (ISPR), that touches on intelligence support. This Incident Specific Preparedness Review is not the official Coast Guard after-action 

report. The team that drafted the ISPR represented federal and state agencies, 

in addition to industry members. However, the Coast Guard commandant 

chartered the ISPR, endorsed it, and included an official cover memorandum 

directing Coast Guard service members to read it. One could be forgiven, 

perhaps, for taking the ISPR as a “Coast Guard view” of the incident, despite 

Admiral Papp’s protestations in his cover memorandum. The authors of the 

report speak frankly, at one point criticizing the DHS for “severely restricting” the ability of the Coast Guard to release “timely, accurate information” 

to the public.69 This drew the attention of Fox News’s Mike Levine, who, in 

his March 28, 2011, article, “While Slowing BP Oil Spill, Administration 

Slowed Flow of Information Too, Claims Coast Guard Report,” appeared 

confused about the focus of the ISPR.70 In the article, Levine quotes an unnamed Coast Guard spokesman as telling Fox News that the ISPR “does not 

reflect the views of the Coast Guard.”71 Fair enough, but what do the authors 

of the review say about intelligence support to the Deepwater Horizon response effort? They do not say much—but they do say more than most.
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The ISPR Outlines Problems with the Common 

Operating Picture

The Incident Specific Preparedness Review speaks to intelligence support mainly 

when describing the challenges of developing the common operating picture 

(COP) and the lack of knowledge management. A COP provides accurate, 

timely, and relevant information to assist operational and strategic decisionmaking.72 In terms of the intelligence cycle, the COP would fit into production and dissemination, because a COP gets the information (and intelligence) 

to the decisionmakers in a useable form. Initially, no unified COP existed, 

and information was fragmented over many systems with “approximately 10 

different GIS databases being used to track spill response information.”73 The 

bandwidth at the Unified Area Command (UAC) complicated matters, with 

responders struggling even to send e-mails.74

In the end, the responders at the Incident Command Posts (ICP) developed 

their own COPs, as did BP and other nongovernmental responders. No national-level COP existed for more than a month, according to the ISPR. 

(My research suggests it was closer to two months, as will be described later.) 

The lack of a single, accessible COP frustrated Admiral Allen’s call for unity 

of effort, including intelligence support. That support consisted, in part, of 

NGA providing imagery enhancing the “tactical decision making of critical resources movements on a real-time basis.”75 Proprietary information, 

information-handling caveats (such as “For Official Use Only”), and agency 

firewalls delayed the use of a single COP. 

Ultimately, the federal, state, local, and private responders settled on a University of New Hampshire product used by NOAA, called the Environmental 

Response Management Application (ERMA). A GIS-based system, ERMA 

permitted the UAC to organize and display information from multiple systems 

onto one product with layered strata. The genesis and use of ERMA during the 

Deepwater Horizon response will be described in Chapter 5. 

The Coast Guard ISPR outlines the necessity of a standard, exercised COP 

before an incident. Such a COP would permit responders from multiple government and private organizations to manage and share information quickly 

within a commonly understood construct. 
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28

The review also highlights the deficiencies in knowledge management systems, which would include the ability to produce and share intelligence, and 

information management systems shortfalls. Recommended is a standard 

report template that “captures the oil spill response essential elements of information and other key metrics” to meet responders’ information needs.76

Essential elements of information (EEIs) would be part of a properly managed and led planning process and intelligence cycle. They define what the 

decisionmakers (tactical, operational, and strategic) need to know. The EEIs 

then shape the intelligence-collection plan by defining requirements, and so 

on. The authors of the review made an insightful point here, but they did not 

go far enough in describing the lack of intelligence plans and functions. 

Lest the reader suppose that the ISPR engages intelligence support to the 

Deepwater Horizon response thoroughly, I draw attention to the third page 

in Admiral Papp’s cover memo. Following Coast Guard protocol, the last 

portion of the memo contains the distribution list: the major headquarters 

offices and operational commands that are to receive the memo for action. 

The Coast Guard office of intelligence (CG-2) is not listed. Staff officers put 

considerable thought into memorandums for the commandant’s signature, 

and the omission of CG-2, while perhaps unintentional, may signify a gap 

in understanding that intelligence even has a role in disaster response— and, 

even worse, that CG-2 might not be cognizant of the ISPR and its findings. 

On Scene Coordinator Report 

In September 2011, the On Scene Coordinator Report was published by the 

U.S. Coast Guard to document the response to the spill. The federal on scene 

coordinator is the lead federal authority for conducting the response to a spill 

of national significance under the direction of the national incident commander. This report is the Coast Guard’s most comprehensive Deepwater Horizon after-action report promulgated since the spill. It is well organized and 

thorough, and includes an expanded executive summary that briefly describes 

the content of each chapter. While the report does not address intelligence 

directly, it does comment on several topics discussed in this work. Chapter 

2, “Command and Control,” highlights the misunderstanding among state 

and local governments over the authorities that the federal government exercised during a response to a spill of national significance. Chapter 3, “Operations,” describes the challenge in locating and tracking the oil, especially that 

which had moved away from the well sight, as well as deployment and use 
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of the boom. Chapter 3 also discusses skimming operations, Department of 

Defense support to the response, and the shoreline cleanup assessment techniques. Chapter 6, “Logistics,” covers the vessels of opportunity, including 

command and control issues, aviation safety, aviation coordination, aviation 

tasking, and the Air Force Aviation Operations Center at Tyndall, Florida. 

This chapter praises the joint and interagency efforts run out of the Air Force 

base at Tyndall, especially in integrated remote sensing, strategic planning, 

and mission support liaisons. Chapter 10, “Communications,” discusses in 

great detail the common operating picture concept and ERMA, which the 

responders adopted to manage and lead response operations. Despite the excellent organization of this report and the wealth of details it contains, the 

report is often written in the passive voice. For example, one passage reads, 

“During the early states of the spill, determining who collected what data 

in what formats, and how to access it, was challenging.”77 The passive voice 

permits a point to be made without directing fault. I suspect this writing style 

was pragmatically used to avoid offense.

Books—Recent and Detailed (Except about Intelligence)

The comparative recentness of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill 

means authors have had little time to study, put into perspective, and write 

about this event of national significance. Much has been studied and written about the disaster, but the field of thoughtful work narrows considerably, if not completely, when searching for literature specifically about 

intelligence support to disaster response. This author was neither surprised 

nor dismayed by the paucity of books focused specifically on intelligence 

support to unanticipated events of national significance. However, a brief 

examination of some texts that describe disasters and chaos may assist in 

appreciating the nature of a response to an event of national significance. 

The publishers began selling the first books about the Deepwater Horizon

explosion, spill, and response in early 2011. 

Disaster Books—The Value of Being Prepared

There are a considerable number of books that examine disasters and disaster 

preparation. This author discovered no books focused specifically on intelligence support to disaster response. Of all the books on disasters, a recurring 

theme is how the unexpectedness of a disaster (whether manmade or natural) 

complicates and confounds the response efforts. As there was no plan in place 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

30

for how intelligence would support a spill of national significance, a few of 

these books are worth mention. 

The Black Swan

Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s 2007 philosophy book The Black Swan: The Impact 

of the Highly Improbable discusses man’s inability to comprehend the inevitability of disasters and therefore to plan for them.78 For the purpose of this 

study, the interesting material in The Black Swan concerns an inability of 

individuals and organizations to plan and prepare for catastrophes. Instead, 

Taleb explains, individuals and organizations expect and plan for what most 

often occurs. Events do occur outside of the “normal” spectrum; worst-case 

scenarios do take place, but humans do not sufficiently expect them. 

The Unthinkable

Intelligence professionals at the tactical level supporting disaster responders must also understand that people, including the responders, do strange 

things in a catastrophe. People can act bravely, stupidly, with compassion, 

or with malaise when terrible events happen around them or to them. This 

is the theme of Amanda Ripley’s book The Unthinkable: Who Survives When 

Disaster Strikes—and Why.

79 Ripley studied several cases of disaster—from 

the 9/11 attacks to Hurricane Katrina—in an attempt to understand people’s 

reaction to catastrophe. She argues that professionals are not immune to the 

effects of an unanticipated disaster and may still exhibit strange reactions after 

a disaster. Finally, Ripley suggests that government agencies have a duty to 

consider and make plans to address worst-case scenarios.

Perils of Progress

In his book Perils of Progress: Environmental Disasters in the 20th Century, Dr. 

Andrew Jenks describes how large-scale, manmade disasters are normal and 

recurring in modern times.80 This book will be examined in greater detail 

later in this work.

The Deepwater Horizon Books

October 2010 saw the first of what will likely be a gaggle of books about Deepwater Horizon. However, publication of these books may have been too close to 

when the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill happened to give the material 

a balanced treatment. Some words of caution are warranted, especially when 

reflecting on Barbara Tuchman’s warning that writing about an event too soon 
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after its occurrence may sacrifice detachment. But Tuchman preceded this by 

writing that “facts are history whether interpreted or not” and the authors of 

the newly published books illustrate many facts of interest.81

Disaster on the Horizon

Bob Cavnar’s book Disaster on the Horizon: High Stakes, High Risks, and the 

Story Behind the Deepwater Well Blowout (published October 2010) critically 

examines the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill, and argues that the incompetence of BP and the federal government set the conditions for the catastrophe and then prevented a proper response. In his description of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and the initial weeks following it, Cavnar explained 

the panic and lack of certainty about what had happened in the explosion and 

the extent of the oilspill. His discussion of the dispersants Corexit 9500 and 

Corexit 9527, which BP “sprayed almost indiscriminately”82 and introduced 

under water at the leak site, raises the question of what impact, if any, the 

dispersant had on the ability of remote sensing to detect oil for the response 

effort. Cavnar also faults the U.S. government for its lack of preparation and 

planning for worst-case scenarios of oilspills when responders use dispersants, 

booming, and skimming. This lack of planning may have extended into intelligence support to such a spill, although Cavnar does not say as much. 

The oil industry likely will not care for Cavnar’s work, however, which 

ends on a sour note. (See Steve Mufson’s February 13, 2011, Washington 

Post review of Cavnar’s book, as well as the two other books discussed in 

this section.83) Cavnar’s book is anti–oil industry and anti-BP. He speaks 

of BP as a global business tyrant focused on making money, eschewing 

transparency, and ruining lives. Cavnar goes so far as to suggest that the U.S. 

government “has become dependent on oil royalties to fund its mammoth 

expansion and war fighting” overseas.84 Cavnar also suggests that Admiral 

Allen did not comprehend the complexity of the disaster and that he was 

merely a mouthpiece for BP.85 While he raises some interesting points and 

speaks with experience and authority, his bias taints the reader as to Cavnar’s 

motivation and brings into question his judgment on the complicated matter 

of the Deepwater Horizon spill and response. Unfortunately, Cavnar neither 

addresses nor directly discusses remote sensing, imagery, and geographic 

information systems in his description of the spill response. 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

32

In Too Deep

Stanley Reed and Alison Fitzgerald’s book In Too Deep: BP and the Drilling 

Race That Took It Down describes BP’s “meteoric rise” and then its sudden fall. 

The authors focus on BP and its senior leaders, drawing parallels between the 

avarice, ambition, success, and decline of the company with those qualities in 

the senior leaders. In closing, the authors discuss suggested changes to the oil 

industry and deep-sea drilling to avert another event such as Deepwater Horizon. Some of the suggestions include better preparation for responding to 

oilspills, which would certainly (although the authors do not say so) include 

intelligence. 

Blowout in the Gulf

In their book Blowout in the Gulf: The BP Oil Spill Disaster and the Future 

of Energy in America, William R. Freudenburg and Robert Gramling look 

at how the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill occurred. By drilling and 

operating in “increasingly dangerous waters” without adequate vigilance and 

forethought, BP set the conditions for the Macondo well blowout and spill.87

The authors also describe the inadequate “fantasy documents” that pass for 

response and contingency planning for accident and spill response.88 This 

is important because the authors condemn not only BP and industry, but 

the federal government for approving these inadequate plans. As my work 

argues, in part, the lack of intelligence planning in these response plans bears 

examining. 

Summary

The U.S. government response guides, “lessons learned” documents, academic work, media reporting on the spill, and recently published books are 

insufficient to address the performance of intelligence during the Deepwater 

Horizon response. At best, they point to a lack of understanding about the 

definition, role, and function of intelligence in responding to a spill of national significance. The federal response plans give too much autonomy to 

decisionmakers in the organization of intelligence within a response, and pay 

too little attention to the true goals of intelligence: warning decisionmakers 

and helping them make better decisions. Two graduate papers highlighted 

the shortcomings of ISR support to disaster response and stated that, even 

though intelligence contributed to the response to Hurricane Katrina, tactical 
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responders were not well served. Deep Water was detailed, but very little of the 

discussions touch on intelligence support to the spill response. Newspapers 

extensively covered the spill, but rarely, if ever, mentioned intelligence. A 

few periodicals did discuss the role and function of intelligence in response 

to Deepwater Horizon, but most recently published books do not. Available 

after-action reports say little about intelligence, but do discuss the general 

unpreparedness of the federal government in reacting to a spill of national 

significance. 

In summation, very little literature exists that focuses on intelligence support to disaster response, and even less to supporting a spill of national significance. To answer whether and to what degree intelligence supported the 

Deepwater Horizon spill, I therefore sought out those who participated in the 

intelligence effort, and the decisionmakers served by intelligence.

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Chapter 2—

Methodology: Authentic Answers to 

Authentic Questions

“The historian must make do with what he can find.” 

—Barbara Tuchman

The purpose of this project is to understand the process of intelligence support 

to the Deepwater Horizon response. What happened? Instead of attempting 

to describe national-level intelligence systems (satellite imagery) in terms of 

capabilities and collection, I sought to understand the relationships between 

the decisionmakers at the strategic and operational levels and the intelligence 

supporters. I concerned myself, as well, with the tactical responders and their 

perception of intelligence support to their mission of finding and skimming 

oil. What did intelligence support do? And, more importantly, what did intelligence support not do? 

The methodology of this project involved systematically collecting data on 

the intelligence gaps and vulnerabilities in the support to the Deepwater Horizon response. I mainly accomplished this task with a thorough review of 

publicly available documents (highlighted in Chapter 1) and interviews with 

participants in the crisis response. After this initial data collection, I took the 

results and made inferences regarding a potential plan for intelligence support 

to future spills of national significance. 

Data Collection 

Because of the paucity of available writing on the Deepwater Horizon response, 

I determined that interviews would be the most valid means of data collection 

for learning about intelligence support to the Deepwater Horizon response. By 

early 2011, the existing literature included several government and official 

reports, in addition to a growing volume of commercially published material. 

These works proved highly instructive about the history of deepwater drilling, 

the events leading up to the explosion, the explosion itself, and the following 

containment and cleanup. As described in Chapter 1, however, even as the 

U.S. government and publishers printed and released this material, little of it 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

36

engaged the issue of intelligence performance and support to the Deepwater 

Horizon responders. 

So, in order to collect the information needed for the study, I decided to seek 

out those individuals most involved in intelligence support to the response effort. I wanted to hear authentic voices from firsthand experience. Ultimately, 

I conducted 34 interviews. I focused my interviews and questions around the 

time from the explosion on April 20, 2010, until mid-July, when the well was 

capped. Intelligence officers continued to support Coast Guard and cleanup 

operations after BP stopped the oil leak, but, as will be described later, these 

intelligence functions changed little, if at all. 

Interviews by Organizational Role

I organized the interviews into groups based on the role the interviewee 

played during the response effort. By organizing the interview subjects into 

groups, I could customize the interview questions to best address the groups’ 

experience and understanding of the intelligence support to the response. 

The groups were liaisons, tactical responders, Incident Command Post staff, 

senior decisionmakers, academics, and imagery analysts. The interviewees 

were U.S. Coast Guard members (active and reservists), Air National Guard 

members, civilians, and academics. 

Liaisons

Liaisons work as their service’s representative within or as part of another 

organization’s functions. Out of the liaisons with whom I spoke, few had 

specific direction as to their role vis-à-vis their parent and supporting organization. Mostly, the liaisons served as communications conduits between their 

parent and supporting organization, in addition to working as part of the 

staff. Liaisons were often brokers or handlers of intelligence, but usually not 

formally trained intelligence officers.

Tactical Responders

Tactical responders consist of U.S. Coast Guard cutter commanding officers who were skimming oil or controlling other surface and air assets or 

both. These commanding officers constitute a core customer group for intelligence, in that their mission included locating skimmable oil. Oil proved 

very difficult to locate from the surface (i.e., from the deck of a ship). Because 
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of this, the Unified Area Command, the operational-level command, and the 

Incident Command Posts (the tactical-level commands) used “remote sensing” or satellites to help direct the skimming operations. 

Incident Staff

The Incident Command Post staff comprises personnel assigned from many 

agencies. Out of the hundreds of people who worked in the ICPs, those I interviewed were Coast Guard members who worked from the level of deputy 

incident commander to within the cutter task force under the Field Support 

Element. These Coast Guard staffers were uniquely positioned to observe and 

experience how intelligence supported the spill response. 

Decisionmakers

Three senior decisionmakers, Coast Guard admirals all, accommodated me for 

interviews regarding their experience with intelligence support to the spill response. They were Admiral Thad Allen, Rear Admiral Paul Zukunft, and Rear 

Admiral Peter Neffenger. Admiral Allen served as the national incident commander from April 29, 2010, while he was still the U.S. Coast Guard commandant. Admiral Allen retired in June 2010, but remained the national incident 

commander until Rear Admiral Zukunft took over the spill response on October 1, 2010. Admiral Zukunft assumed the role of the federal on scene coordinator (FOSC) on July 10, 2010, where he led the collaboration of the many 

federal, state, and local responders to the spill. Finally, Rear Admiral Neffenger 

served as the deputy national incident commander directly under Admiral Allen. I sought the perspective of these senior-level decisionmakers because the 

Department of Homeland Security designated the Coast Guard as the lead 

agency in the Deepwater Horizon response, and these officers led that response. 

These men were also key customers of the intelligence support effort. 

Academic Researchers 

I was fortunate to visit with and receive the assistance of seven academics during 

my research. I met professors of history and geology, as well as professional educators in the fields of geospatial information systems and disaster management. 

I sought a broader perspective from these interviewees based on their research 

and time in their fields. Louisiana State University and the Earth Scan Laboratory were particularly helpful in guiding my understanding of GIS and the 

limitations of satellite imagery in responding to a spill of national significance.
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

38

Imagery Analysts

Imagery (including remote sensing, geospatial information systems, and satellite and airborne collection) made up the largest portion of the intelligence 

response effort. I conducted interviews with several personnel who participated in the imagery support. I found these interviews valuable in understanding 

what initiatives enhanced the spill response, as well as what frustrated this 

response. The vast majority of the information garnered from imagery analysts during the interviews was for attribution, but some was not. Regarding 

information passed to me “not for attribution,” the reader should understand 

that I made certain that the interviewee had placement and access to comment professionally on the matter at hand. While a researcher must weigh the 

value of information “not for attribution” against the protocols for citation, 

I determined that, in most instances, I could include the information and 

honor the interviewee’s request for anonymity. 

Conduct of the Interviews

I contacted 42 people and asked to speak with them about their experiences 

regarding Deepwater Horizon. Out of this group, I conducted 34 interviews. I 

held interviews both in person and via phone. I met with several interviewees 

in Washington, DC, and also traveled to Portsmouth, Virginia, Tyndall Air 

Force Base in Florida, and Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to research and meet with interview subjects. Eight people whom I contacted were unable to discuss their experiences regarding intelligence support 

to Deepwater Horizon. Out of those eight, one was on assignment away from 

her work office and could not be reached; four set up multiple appointments 

with me, but failed to follow through with the meeting; and three subjects 

would not speak with me. The shortest interview lasted about 35 minutes and 

the longest went for several hours, over an entire afternoon. 

I captured all interview data via literal transcriptions from digital recordings 

or typed interview notes. I digitally recorded four of the interviews, including 

those of each flag officer, and wrote direct transcripts from those conversations. For the balance of the interviews, I typed my notes. In all cases, I sent a 

copy of the transcript or typed notes to the interviewee and asked him or her 

to examine my work for clarity and completeness. Some interviewees did not 

respond to the request for review of my notes, and I have accepted their lack 
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of a response as agreement with the material. After receiving the interviewees’ 

responses, I included the information in my research material. 

One Question Can Elicit a Thousand Words

I developed the interview questions to seek out information unavailable from 

the literature review. The questions were open-ended and intended to encourage the interviewee to speak with candor about his or her understanding and 

experience with intelligence support to the Deepwater Horizon response. I did 

not use a standardized questionnaire for academic interviews, as I tailored 

those discussions specifically toward the subject and his or her area of expertise. Likewise, I customized each leader’s questionnaire based on the position 

of the interviewee. Despite using tailored questions, I weaved some similar 

themes throughout for consistent data collection, and to compare and contrast responses among the groups. 

A brief explanation behind the methodology of the common questions will 

underscore the data-collection plan.

Question 1: Please briefly summarize your career background, experience, 

and education.

I asked this question to understand the perspective of the interviewee regarding the response effort, and as a way to get the interviewee talking. Firsthand 

accounts of any incident possess inherent problems, including tunnel vision 

(overemphasis on one issue to the exclusion of other issues), misremembering 

(i.e., forgetting), and cultural perspective (responders with different backgrounds and professional experiences view events differently). By asking the 

interviewees to describe themselves, I was able to adjust “on the fly” for these 

problems, and also was able to weigh the interview responses. For example, 

an interviewee with years of disaster response experience likely will have a 

perspective that is different from that of responders whose first incident was 

Deepwater Horizon. Even in informal, conversational settings, interviewees 

may be nervous, especially when discussing the greatest oilspill in U.S. history. I found that by asking the interviewees about themselves, they were put 

at ease and spoke more comfortably.

Question 2: When did you arrive and depart from the response 

operations?
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

40

The timeframe of most interest to me was from the Deepwater Horizon

explosion until BP capped the well: April 20–July 15, 2010. Some 

interviewees supported the response after July 15, and I included their input 

in my research.

Question 3: What role did you play in the Deepwater Horizon response?

In some interviews, I framed this question differently by asking interviewees 

for their title in the response position. The idea here was to find out if the interviewee actually did the job or filled the role that the interviewee thought he 

or she had been detailed to do (as opposed to having a title and job description, but being tasked to do other missions). Also, I felt it was important to 

know how the interviewee viewed his or her contribution to the response.

Question 4: What were the information needs of the responders/decisionmakers you supported?

This question sought to elicit a key point about intelligence support—what 

did your customers need to know? For the tactical responders, I asked them 

to identify their information needs and to explain how they communicated 

those needs and to whom they communicated them.

Question 5: How were those needs met?

For intelligence support personnel, I asked how they or their organization 

performed in supporting decisionmakers with intelligence. For decisionmakers, I asked how intelligence supported them as a decisionmaker. This question also addressed the functionality of the intelligence and the performance 

of the intelligence cycle. 

Question 6: If those needs were not met, how did you communicate that 

up the chain?

Here, I wanted to know how responsive intelligence was in addressing the 

gaps when the decisionmakers did not receive the intelligence they had requested. What was the interaction between intelligence officers and decisionmakers? How well did that interaction work?

Question 7: What information/intelligence needs remained unanswered?
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Intelligence is not a magic “all-knowing” answer box. No matter how well 

intelligence performs, decisionmakers will rarely, if ever, have all the information they want and need. However, I felt it was important to map the outer 

edges of what intelligence was ultimately unable to answer during the Deepwater Horizon response. The natural follow-on question therefore would be, 

“Should intelligence have been able to provide that information? And if yes, 

how so?” As an aside, I found in my interviews with intelligence professionals 

that few senior-level decisionmakers knew how to ask for intelligence. 

Question 8: About what are you most proud of in your support of

Deepwater Horizon?

I also asked about what went well during the response. Again, giving interviewees the opportunity to reflect on their hard work and contribution to the response proved quite fruitful in data collection. When I first formulated these 

questions, I felt this question was not going to be very successful. Instead, I 

learned valuable information by asking interviewees to describe things that 

went well. I often asked them to tell me the good news they shared with their 

family and friends upon returning from the Deepwater Horizon response. 

Question 9: What area or issue gave you the most friction and frustration in 

your support of Deepwater Horizon?

This question is the corollary to the pride question. My initial research before 

conducting the interviews indicated that many intelligence efforts did not 

yield success, or yielded limited success, and I wanted interviewees to tell me 

what had vexed them the most. This forced interviewees to categorize and 

prioritize their frustrations and gave me the data to compare responses against 

a single measure—what was the most significant failure of intelligence in the 

spill response?

Question 10: What recommendations would you make, based on your experience, regarding the information/intelligence support you received?

I wrote this question to solicit ideas on improving intelligence support to 

future spills of national significance. This question is cheating, a little bit, 

because I asked the interviewees to tell me how they would fix the frustrations 

they had just described. I found the answers to be enlightening, however, 

because those who participated in the intelligence support effort were keenly 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

42

aware of the limitations of intelligence during Deepwater Horizon, and all 

agreed that intelligence could have performed better. The interviewees 

provided concise advice on how to improve intelligence support to future 

spills of national significance. 

Question 11: On a scale of one to ten, with ten being the best, how would 

you rate the performance of intelligence in support of the Deepwater Horizon response?

This question forced the interviewees to rate intelligence support from their 

perspective. This question is an oversimplification of a complicated matter, 

and several of the interviewees expressed frustration in trying to answer it. I 

did not think this was a particularly strong question, but the findings proved 

interesting. For example, strategic and operational decisionmakers had a 

much different opinion of the performance of intelligence, compared with 

the opinions of the tactical responders. In addition, several interviewees did 

not give a single number as a response, but qualified their answers to span periods of time during the disaster or between different intelligence functions. 

These numbers hardly constitute a scientific set, but they do offer an interesting insight into their overall perceptions of intelligence performance. 

Question 12: Are there any other matters regarding your role in the Deepwater Horizon response that you would like to discuss that we may not have 

covered?

This was a catchall question to afford the respondents a chance to speak generally about Deepwater Horizon. Several interviewees were interested in making strong points to me regarding their experience with Deepwater Horizon. 

Had the earlier questions not permitted them to address these points, I found 

they did so for this last question. 
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Chapter 3—

Insufficient Intelligence Plans Hampered 

Response

“Pause for serious thought is not a habit of governments.”90

—Barbara Tuchman

It is safe to say, based on the many interviews I conducted, that the lack of 

an existing intelligence plan to support a spill of national significance hampered the Deepwater Horizon response effort. This chapter reviews the main 

findings from the literature review and interviews, and includes a discussion 

of the lack of preparation for an event of the magnitude of Deepwater Horizon. There was no plan because the government and private organizations 

involved in the Deepwater Horizon response had failed to envision the actual 

“worst-case” spill scenario. Thus, the plans that did exist were insufficient to 

deal with a deepwater blowout and did not contain sufficient discussion and 

guidance for intelligence support. This chapter also underscores the absence 

of command and control of the intelligence effort that hampered the work of 

the intelligence officers who deployed to support the response effort. Finally, 

I recommend actions to address the shortcomings identified in this chapter.

Lack of Imagination Hampered Planning and Preparation

None of the organizations studied for this research were prepared for a worstcase scenario spill in deep-sea drilling, and this lack of preparation extended 

to intelligence support plans. Government and BP contingency plans barely 

mentioned intelligence support to a spill, including geospatial information 

systems or satellite tracking of the spill. In addition, the U.S. government 

practice of reviewing those plans did not include key responders, such as 

the Coast Guard, in reviewing the plans. Because BP did not envision a true 

worst case, the company failed to develop methods to track the spill, including the flow rate of oil from the blown-out well.

BP’s “Worst Case” Was Not Bad Enough

Organizations do not plan well for large-scale, manmade disasters even though 

they are reoccurring events, according to Andrew Jenks, the author of Perils 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

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of Progress.

91 In the case of oilspill planning, both the U.S. government and 

the oil companies it regulates develop plans to respond to spills. The primary 

planning methodology for that response is the National Incident Management System. For an oilspill, the responsible party pays for the response as 

directed by the Oil Pollution Act, but the U.S. government directs that response. In actuality, the response is more of a partnership or “alliance,” as Joel 

Achenbach, author of A Hole at the Bottom of the Sea: The Race to Kill the BP 

Oil Gusher, described it regarding Deepwater Horizon.

92 When a spill occurs, 

the U.S. government and the responsible party come together and implement 

the plans they have written. 

Dr. Jenks argues that some institutions lack “disaster imagination,” a concept 

Jenks uses to describe the lack of ability to plan for a worst-case scenario, or 

even to envision what may occur.93 While the past may be instructive, Jenks 

comments that governments and organizations display “historic amnesia” 

about what took place in previous disasters, and fail to pull out the pertinent 

facts and conclusions to influence planning.94 When governments and organization fail to plan for the worst-case scenarios, then they also fail to plan the 

intelligence support to assist in the response to the catastrophe. 

“Get Ready . . . !”

Nobody was prepared for a deep-sea well blowout. Media, literature, and government after-action reports have all cited a lack of preparation and planning 

for a spill of national significance resulting from deep-sea drilling. The Oil Spill 

Commission said that “neither BP nor the federal government was prepared to 

deal with a spill of the magnitude and complexity of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.”95 According to Bob Cavnar, the federal government and industry were 

poorly prepared and failed to procure and properly deploy dispersants, boom, 

and oil-skimming assets.96 The Oil Spill Commission’s report also adds that 

“oil spill response planning across the government needs to be overhauled.”97

(Emphasis added.) As mentioned previously, William Freudenburg and Robert Gramling, in their book Blowout in the Gulf, called the BP and government 

response plans written before the explosion “fantasy documents.”98 The U.S. 

government guides on disaster response do not address intelligence, at least 

not in a meaningful manner, and neither did BP’s response plan.
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BP’s Spill Response Plan 

The Regional Oil Spill Response Plan—Gulf of Mexico, written by BP, addresses intelligence sparingly. This 582-page plan was written as a set of “easy-tofollow instructions . . . in the event of a release of a product” in the Gulf of 

Mexico.99 The plan does list geospatial information systems within the duties 

and responsibilities of the situation unit leader, but the focus is on understanding or tracking the current status of units (ships and aircraft) responding to the 

spill. The BP plan is not a traditional intelligence cycle. Later in the plan, GIS 

is listed within the organization of the incident management team.

Page 7 of the plan, however, stresses the importance of tracking the movement 

of an oilspill and predicting its trajectory. While this may seem to be a normal 

engineering task, it could also be considered a classic intelligence mission: 

finding something, determining what it is, and figuring out what it is doing. 

Satellite imagery is included as a tool for tracking the spill. This is important, 

because a large spill, contrary to the media reporting with Deepwater Horizon, 

is difficult to track. Unfortunately, in addition to its intelligence gaps, the Oil 

Spill Commission’s report says (on page 84) that the BP plan lacked detail 

and was not serious.100

U.S. Failure to Review BP Plan

In addition to an insufficient BP contingency plan, U.S. government inaction prevented better review of that plan. The federal government directs 

that oil industries include, among other things, a plan for determining the 

trajectory of the spilled oil. Even when these plans were current, which BP’s 

were not before the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the Mineral Management 

Service (MMS) rarely shared them with other federal agencies with expertise 

in oilspill response—including the Coast Guard.101 The lack of exposure to 

the plans meant that the Coast Guard, as the key response agency, was caught 

flat-footed and unaware of what contingencies BP expected and what they 

planned to employ, assuming the contingencies accurately anticipated the 

magnitude of a spill.

Lack of Command and Control

U.S. government disaster guidelines for spills of national significance do not 

detail a single agency as the intelligence lead. Because of this, no one agency 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

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effectively stepped forward to lead the intelligence effort in supporting the 

Deepwater Horizon responders. Despite several federal agencies deploying 

intelligence officers to support the spill, unity of command among the 

intelligence responders remained elusive. Frustrating the work of the 

intelligence officers was the absence of an intelligence plan to support a spill 

of national significance. Problems with command and control persisted even 

after Admiral Allen tasked the 601st Air and Space Operations Center in 

mid-June 2010 to manage the airspace and the remote-sensing operation.

The First Rule of “Having a Plan” is Having a Plan

The U.S. government disaster response guides do not establish unity of command within the intelligence function. As discussed in Chapter 1, the intelligence function may reside in the planning or operational sections, or as a 

standalone section within the Incident Command System, at an Incident 

Command Post, or at a Unified Area Command. The Federal Emergency 

and Management Agency (FEMA) conducts remote sensing (imagery) and 

collection management (writing and validating priority intelligence requirements) during Stafford Act responses. In such a case, FEMA would direct and 

manage the intelligence support effort wherever it may be placed within the 

Incident Command System. 

No Intelligence Plan for SONS

However, a spill of national significance does not require a Stafford Act response, because it is governed under the National Contingency Plan, and 

FEMA did not take a role in the intelligence support to the Deepwater Horizon response. Instead, several agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Coast Guard, 

and the Department of Defense, sent intelligence officers to support the effort 

and to lead the intelligence operations. Unfortunately, because the national 

disaster guidance is silent on the matter of how intelligence support should 

aid in a spill of national significance, the intelligence responders had difficulty 

determining who was supposed to drive the intelligence effort. One responder 

commented that, “going into the fight,” there was no government-wide plan 

for integrating imagery into a planning process and operational support for 

a spill of national significance.102 Neither DHS nor the Coast Guard had a 

plan for using intelligence to support the spill responders.103 When a remote-
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sensing concept of operations (CONOPS) was needed, intelligence staffers 

used the Stafford Act Remote Sensing CONOPS as a model. 

Another participant in the Deepwater Horizon response, Stan Gold of the 

Coast Guard, explained how the National Response Framework lacks 

guidance on where to place remote sensing within the organization.104 He 

went on to say that “we don’t have a national response plan, we have a national 

response framework. So it’s all coalition.”105 Coalitions are tricky things. It 

can be difficult to determine who is in charge, especially when responding 

to a crisis. Coalitions are also difficult to manage when the intelligence 

officers come from numerous and disparate agencies (i.e., U.S. Coast Guard, 

NGA, NOAA, and DoD) that do not regularly train for intelligence support 

post-crisis. Add to this the incredibly complex, multilayered, geographically 

diverse nature of the Deepwater Horizon spill, and building and maintaining 

an intelligence support “coalition” became an exceedingly difficult task.

Figure 5: USCG, “Building ICS Organization”

Source: Captain Meredith Austin, USCG, “Building ICS Organization During the 

Deepwater Horizon Response,” National Fire Protection Association, undated, 

accessed September 1, 2011, www.nfpa.org/assets/files/metro%20chiefs/MetroAustin2011.

ppt, slide 3. 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

48

Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and Human 

Intelligence Support to Deepwater Horizon

Federal agencies deployed intelligence officers to the Unified Area Command and liaisons to the Incident Command Posts (ICPs) to support the 

spill response. For example, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano directed the 

entire DHS Interagency Remote Sensing Coordination Cell (IRSCC) to lead 

that agency’s intelligence support effort to the Deepwater Horizon response. 

On May 1, 2010, the IRSCC first deployed a handful of staff members to 

Roberts, Louisiana, and then to New Orleans when the Unified Area Command (UAC) relocated there. Once in New Orleans, the IRSCC members 

took direction from Coast Guard staff at the UAC on behalf of the National 

Incident Commander and in coordination with the responsible party, BP. The 

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration also had staff in 

the UAC who contributed to the intelligence effort by suggesting the priority 

intelligence requirements.106 The Department of Defense contributed as well 

when staff from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and Air Force 

North sent liaisons to the UAC and the ICPs. 

The majority of intelligence support personnel worked in imagery, remote 

sensing, or geospatial information systems. The Coast Guard sent intelligence 

officers to assist in coordinating the intelligence processes, intelligence production, and tactical intelligence support to the skimming task forces. The 

shoreline cleanup and assessment teams (SCATs) also served an intelligence 

function, although employment of the SCATs is a specific part of oilspill response doctrine, and its members are not traditional intelligence officers.107

Not including the SCATs, no fewer than 100 intelligence professionals took 

part in supporting the full range of the spill response.108

Department of Defense GIS Operations

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Oceanographic 

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA), the Department of Defense (DoD), and BP 

all sent members to conduct imagery and remote-sensing work in support 

of the response. In early May 2010, the U.S. Air National Guard 601st Air 

and Space Operations Center entered the fight also, to assist in imagery and 

remote-sensing management. NGA representatives arrived in early May as 
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well. During a Stafford Act response, the DHS Interagency Remote Sensing 

Coordination Cell leads imagery intelligence as the collection manager. In this 

capacity, imagery planning, collection, analysis, and production are coordinated 

through IRSCC. This creates unity of effort and unity of command during a 

chaotic incident response. However, U.S. government guidance is silent on 

what agency is designated as the collection manager in response to a spill of 

national significance, which is one reason why so many imagery and remotesensing intelligence officers deployed. 

Lots of Staff, But No One in Charge

Lieutenant Colonel Remso Martinez, USA, described a leadership vacuum 

within the UAC in early May regarding intelligence.109 This occurred even 

though there was sufficient staff at the UAC, and the main intelligence function, the IRSCC, was nominally in charge of the intelligence effort by direction of the DHS secretary. Stan Gold described the sincere desire of the 

intelligence professionals to do their work well and contribute to the response 

effort.110 However, interviews with 15 ICP and UAC staff who worked in 

and around the intelligence 

section clearly indicate that 

a leadership vacuum did exist. Martinez said, “I saw a lot 

of good people doing good 

work. But I saw a lot of people 

doing busy work that didn’t 

yield success.”111 Intelligence 

professionals with good intentions and work could not overcome the lack of 

a scheme on how to successfully support the response effort.

Attempts Were Made to Develop Command and Control

According to information gathered in interviews, several unsuccessful attempts 

were made to establish unity of command among the intelligence responders. 

Just as nature abhors a vacuum, military members abhor the absence of unity 

of command. The first two weeks after the explosion on April 20, 2010, were 

chaotic. No organization existed among the intelligence agencies responding 

and no agency was designated to lead. The Coast Guard Eighth District out 

of New Orleans, led by Rear Admiral Mary Landry, attempted to provide the 

intelligence support to the spill response, but the Eighth District intelligence 

Intelligence professionals with 

good intentions and work could 

not overcome the lack of a scheme 

on how to successfully support the 

response effort.
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

50

staff was quickly overwhelmed by the scope of the problem and the burdens 

of trying to maintain their regular, non-spill intelligence work.112

The intelligence effort shifted to the Unified Area Command. According to 

Stan Gold, “All hell broke loose on about the 26th or 27th [of April] . . . when 

we realized how bad things were.”113 Gold also explained that nobody within 

the Intelligence Community preparing to support the response in late April 

and early May 2010 knew who was in charge, who was to be supported, and 

who was supporting the effort. Among the intelligence agencies and responders, Gold added that “everybody blew it in the beginning.” 

Reactive Intelligence Slowed the Response

The lack of an intelligence support plan meant that intelligence staffs were 

reacting to data calls, as opposed to driving the intelligence cycle. Even 

worse, this lack of sufficient unity of command contributed to several nearcatastrophes as aircraft saturated the space above and around the spill site. 

With No Command and Control, There Is Only Reaction

The intelligence staffs were reacting. For example, within the planning section 

of the UAC, the intelligence officers prepared weather briefs and answered 

short-fuse data calls in the first month and a half after the explosion, instead 

of driving an iterative intelligence cycle to support strategic, operational, and 

tactical decisionmakers. Admiral Allen said that his staff, including the intelligence element in the planning section, had difficulties in answering the data 

calls coming in from the White House and the Department of Homeland 

Security. “The number one driver [of information] was an insatiable demand 

for instant data by the [DHS] Secretary and the Deputy Secretary that was 

just driving everybody crazy,” said Admiral Allen.114 This was especially the 

case regarding inconsistent facts reported by the media and federal agencies 

to Washington about the flow rate of the spill and the amount of boom deployed. As previously discussed, determining the flow rate proved extremely 

difficult. Determining how much boom had been deployed also became a 

daily data point in briefings and information passed back to Washington. 

Failure to Develop Priority Intelligence Requirements

The intelligence personnel tried to develop intelligence requirements, but the 

lack of command and control hindered their efforts.115 In early May, the 
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IRSCC members drafted priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), but they 

were unable, initially, to have the UAC validate the requirements (i.e., confirm that those requirements were the information needs of the UAC).116 

The PIRs were not developed in an iterative process, where the decisionmakers explained their information and intelligence needs to the staff. Instead, a 

member of the IRSCC was told by a Coast Guard captain, “Whatever NOAA 

wants [for imagery], that is our requirements.”117 The IRSCC wrote the priority intelligence requirements with input from NOAA staff members, but 

without UAC guidance. The UAC did not approve the PIRs in May, although 

their use became the practice for intelligence collection. The PIRs were approved in late June, but they were not disseminated to the ICPs.118

BP Confounds Efforts to Collect Intelligence

From an intelligence-planning and command-and-control perspective, the 

constant presence of BP representatives as the responsible party confounded 

unity of effort. In the case of the Air Force 601st, the unit is used to control 

incident awareness and assessment (IAA) assets in both domestic and overseas 

combat operations, and tasking those assets as required by the intelligence 

collection plan. In a SONS response, however, the responsible party pays for 

all operations, which essentially amounts to approval authority. If BP refused 

to pay for a flight, then the parent agency was unlikely to conduct the flight. 

According to Captain Colin Washburn, USAF, 601st AOC, this added an 

additional layer to all decisionmaking regarding IAA tasking, and made the 

601st liaison officers and staff feel they lacked sufficient control to address the 

priority intelligence requirements.119 BP had to be consulted on every issue 

involving intelligence collection by government assets.

Conclusion: The Requirement for a Plan and Command

and Control 

As is certainly obvious in hindsight, an intelligence plan to support a spill 

of national significance likely would have helped address several of the issues 

raised in this chapter. “An intelligence plan is necessary,” observed Rear Admiral Neffenger, the deputy incident commander. “It can’t eliminate the fog, 

but [intelligence] gives you a better grasp of the situation.”120 A plan to coordinate intelligence, establish intelligence unity of effort, and manage the intelligence cycle across the response effort was necessary. When I asked Lieutenant 

Colonel Martinez why an intelligence plan was lacking, he responded, “People 
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seemed comfortable reacting. Planning requires hard, careful thought.”121

Even though the intelligence agencies and staff that supported Deepwater Horizon lacked a plan, they responded nonetheless to provide information and 

intelligence to the strategic, operational, and tactical decisionmakers. 

Findings and Recommendations

1. DHS should direct the Coast Guard to develop an intelligence support 

plan for a SONS scenario.

The DHS should develop an intelligence support plan for the next spill of national significance. DHS should require that the response to a spill of national 

significance contain an intelligence section that stands apart and is independent from the other sections (operations, planning, logistics, and administration). Since the Coast Guard would likely be the lead agency in responding to 

such a spill, the Coast Guard commandant should be responsible for developing the intelligence plan. The plan should envision a worst-case spill, regardless 

of the cause. A worst-case planning scenario would help prepare a more sufficient intelligence response and, at the same time, acclimate senior decisionmakers to the scope of the potential catastrophe. In developing the plan, the 

Coast Guard should seek input and support from the academic community 

and coordinate the plan with the applicable federal agencies that likely will 

provide intelligence support in the spill response, including NOAA and the 

Department of Defense. This intelligence support plan should be incorporated 

into overarching spill response plans and tested, as the On Scene Coordinator 

Report recommends, in order to prove useful during an actual spill.122

2. Parameters of an Intelligence Support Plan

The intelligence support plan for a SONS should detail the command relationship within the Incident Command System. The intelligence section 

would report to and receive guidance from the incident commander. (See 

Chapter 1, Figure 4.) The intelligence section of the plan should establish 

direct lines of command and control and of relationships among the intelligence agencies supporting the response. The plan should be flexible and 

written to accept the participation of state, local, tribal, and private groups in 

responding to a spill.123 
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The intelligence component should anticipate a significant GIS/remote-sensing role in the response, most likely provided by a Department of Defense 

entity, and include mechanisms on how GIS will support the incident commander and the response. The stakeholders should periodically review the 

plan for accuracy and relevance to make certain it remains appropriate and 

useable, and addresses changes in technology. Finally, the plan must be practiced during SONS exercises. It must include the participation of the intelligence officers and staff who would respond to an actual spill.

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Chapter 4—

The Deepwater Horizon Intelligence Cycle: 

Spinning But Off Balance

“No one is so sure of his premises as the man 

who knows too little.”124

—Barbara Tuchman

The intelligence cycle used in the Deepwater Horizon response evolved over 

two months from simple reaction to managing day-to-day intelligence challenges. In other words, no intelligence support design or standard operating 

procedures existed before, during, or after the crisis. First of all, responders at 

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels knew what they wanted to know, 

but they communicated those requirements only informally. Despite the informality and disorganization, a significant amount of data was collected, 

primarily through remote sensing. However, analyzing those data streams 

turned out to be more difficult because of hardware and software deficiencies. Finally, producing and disseminating the intelligence proved ineffective 

at the tactical level, although decisionmakers at the operational and strategic 

levels gave higher marks to intelligence support to their efforts. 

Missing from the Beginning: A Basic Intelligence Cycle

To briefly review from Chapter 1, the intelligence cycle is a process that describes the basic functioning of intelligence. The cycle consists of determining the intelligence requirements, organizing a plan to collect those requirements, collecting the information, analyzing the information to add value 

and context, and then producing and disseminating the intelligence. 

Step 1: Establishing Intelligence Requirements

From the strategic to operational and down to the tactical levels, decisionmakers 

involved in responding to the Deepwater Horizon disaster knew what they 

wanted to know. They wanted to know where the oil was, where the oil was 

going, where the boom was that had been laid out to intercept the oil, and 

where the ships were in responding to the spill. Admiral Allen described 

these requirements as the “vital signs” that the DHS secretary and White 
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56

House officials wanted to know daily.125 The federal on scene coordinator, 

Admiral Zukunft, echoed Admiral Allen’s information requirements, as 

did the Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, and National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency staff working in the Incident Command Posts. 

Intelligence requirements were developed by the staffs, but not via a formal 

process, and the requirements were not validated in an orderly manner. (In 

fact, some requirements were never validated.) According to Commander 

Robert Jensen, USCG, the tactical responders (i.e., the commanding officers 

of the Coast Guard cutters who were skimming oil and directing the hundreds 

of “vessels of opportunity”) wanted to know “where is the oil now and where 

will it be tomorrow?”126

Response Structure Hindered Intelligence Requirements

The nature of the response structure to a spill of national significance hindered the development of intelligence requirements. A SONS intelligence 

and remote-sensing response, unlike a Stafford Act response, has neither a 

designated location nor function within the Incident Command System, as 

discussed in Chapter 3.127 Because of this, the initial intelligence staffers who 

arrived from the Coast Guard and the Department of Defense to assist at the 

Incident Command Posts (operational level) and the Unified Area Command 

(strategic level) to support the response could not easily be integrated into the 

overall staff model. No location existed into which the intelligence staff could 

coalesce. Moreover, the function of the staff was in question. In early May, 

BP worked alongside the incident command staff to drive the information 

and intelligence requirements. According to Captain Caesar Kellum, USAF, 

601st Air and Space Operations Center, while this appeared to be “fairly successful,” there was little overarching collaboration among the intelligence staff 

and agencies participating.128 One participant described the confusion that 

existed within the UAC staff, especially regarding the BP employees, about 

how intelligence and remote sensing could assist in the response effort.129

In addition to a lack of clear location and function for the intelligence staff, 

there was no script for developing intelligence requirements—those things 

the decisionmakers needed to know. The first DHS intelligence officer working for the Interagency Remote Sensing Coordination Cell arrived at the Unified Area Command in Roberts, Louisiana, on May 1. Throughout the spill 

response, the IRSCC maintained an intelligence officer in Roberts, and then 
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in New Orleans, to help coordinate intelligence prioritization and the intelligence cycle. Along with Coast Guard and NOAA staff, the IRSCC officer 

wrote the first set of commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) 

for the federal on scene coordinator (FOSC) during the first week of May. But 

those CCIRs were neither universally understood nor even acknowledged at 

the UAC. As late as early June, several senior staff at the UAC did not even 

know about the intelligence requirements.130 At a level below the FOSC, the 

four Incident Command Posts131 coordinated, developed, and managed their 

own intelligence, primarily remote sensing, by building requirements that 

were neither validated nor tied to the requirements of the FOSC.132 Even 

though they were never formally validated, these requirements still drove planning and collection throughout the response operation.133

Early PIRs Developed by the IRSCC

The priority intelligence requirements listed in Figure 6 were developed by 

members of the DHS IRSCC during the first week of May 2010, about 10 

days after the Deepwater Horizon explosion. The intent with the initial PIRs 

was to link collection platforms (aircraft, satellites, etc.) to the intelligence 

needs to collect the information decisionmakers wanted. 

PIR 1: Location depth, thickness, density, total volume, fprward edge, and projected movement of the British Petroleum Oil spill. Report current and projected 

locations, encroachment on shoreline, and estuaries, impact to waterways, fisheries, and wildlife.

PIR 2: Locate and quantify the active oil containment booms off the coast 

deployed in reponse to British Petroleum oil spill.

PIR 3: Locate and quantify and displaced oil containment booms off the 

coast deployed in response to British Petroleum oil spill.

PIR 4: Provide baseline overhead imagery depicting the US coast, its estuaries, 

and coastal waterways pior to the encroachment of oil from the British Petroleum oil spill for the purposes of change detection. Imagery should be collected 

since May 8, 2009 (no more than one year oil).

Figure 6: Unified Area Command Priority Information Requirements 

(PIRs) from May 18, 2010.134

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, daily brief, “Federal Remote Sensing 

Situation Report – British Petroleum Oil Spill Response, May 18, 2010,” slide 5. 
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By early July, the UAC had expanded the PIRs from Figure 6 and added 

detailed essential elements of information to the list. Identifying and articulating the PIRs was a valid first step in determining the information needs of 

the decisionmakers. 

Figure 7: Operations Center photo

Source: USAF 601st Air and Space Operations Center photo taken by and courtesy of 

Maj Collin Washburn, ISR Operations Team Chief.

An officer in the Air Force 601st Air and Space Operations Center provided 

the photo in Figure 7, the “On-Water Offshore Ops” taken on May 17, 2010. 

The white board depicts the various task forces (listed as “TF”) and subordinate units that were searching for and skimming oil. On the upper-right section of the board was written “For Planning Purposes Only.” The May PIRs 

previously listed were designed to focus efforts in finding and describing the 

oil, as well as determining where the oil was going. Once obtained, that information was to be used to plan skimming operations and to direct the government, contract, and privately owned ships. But the oil was not easy to find.
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Locating and Describing the Oil

Locating the oil proved challenging. Although this may seem impossible with 

thousands of barrels of oil gushing out of the wellhead daily, finding and 

tracking the oil four or five miles away from the wellhead was “a huge issue,” according to Stan Gold.135 Gold also reported several instances when 

a Coast Guard cutter was within 10 yards of an oil slick, but still could not 

see it.136 Oil coverage was not uniform and did not cover a large area “as was 

perceived,” according to the On Scene Coordinator Report.

137 A significant 

observation effort was needed to locate the oil. This required aircraft at altitudes of at least 500 feet all the way up to satellites. Once the oil was found, 

the information had to be communicated to the incident command posts 

and the Coast Guard cutter commanders, so that they could direct surface 

skimmers, apply dispersants, track the oil’s movement toward ecologically 

sensitive areas, and keep the public informed of the spill. 

Coast Guard cutter crew members are not uniformly trained and practiced 

in looking for oilspills. As Commander Robert Jordan, USCG, put it, “Oil 

does not act like a person in the water,” meaning the Coast Guard knows 

how to search for people (and boats and aircraft) in the water, but the oil 

proved more difficult.138 Oil patches broke away from the main slick, 

streamers developed where the oil would float along like long red-orange 

ribbons, and oil also traveled under the surface and came up a dozen miles 

from the wellhead.139

Graphics built by NOAA and NGA that were passed to strategic decisionmakers in Washington and the media did not depict the broken-up, unpredictable movement of oil. Instead, as shown in Figure 8, the graphic depicted 

a large, solidly shaded area where any oil may have been located. Even with 

a key at the bottom of the graphic, this gave the impression that the entire 

shaded area of the Gulf of Mexico was covered with oil—a fact later lamented 

by Rear Admiral Peter Neffenger.140 In his comments to me, Neffenger explained that the depiction left a false impression with the public and White 

House staff members that oil was easily located and covered an area exponentially larger than it did. PIR 1 indicated what information the decisionmakers 

wanted regarding the oil, but the intelligence effort could not deliver on the 

tasking. 
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Figure 8: Trajectory Forecast Mississippi Canyon

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Trajectory Forecast 

Mississippi Canyon 252,” accessed June 4, 2011, http://deepwaterhorizon.noaa.gov/

bookshelf/1963_TMF72-2010-05-10-1700.pdf.
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Locating and Determining the Status of the Boom

Locating and tracking the boom deployed to intercept the oil became a critical 

intelligence requirement, because it became a measure of the effectiveness of 

government response. “Boom was the coin of the realm,” Commander Richard Timme, USCG, observed.141 BP, the federal government, and state governments all deployed thousands of miles of boom during the response. At its 

height, there were 13 million feet (2,462 miles) of boom deployed.142 Boom 

was a means of showing the public that the government was responding. In 

particular, the deployment and location of boom was extremely important to 

parish presidents in Louisiana.143 By early July 2010, tracking the boom became just as important, if not more so, as tracking the oil.144 Unfortunately, 

in the confusion and chaos of the first six to eight weeks after the explosion 

and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, the federal and state governments, in 

addition to BP, had no method of tracking the boom once deployed. Rear 

Admiral Neffenger, the deputy incident commander, explained that “much 

of that boom, at any given moment, was off station.”145 “Off station” means 

the boom was not where the ICPs wanted it because wind, tides, and currents 

had moved the boom after it had been placed. The On Scene Coordinator 

Report echoes Neffenger’s comment that “most of the booming was counterproductive” but viewed as “necessary as oil approached the shore.”146 The On 

Scene Coordinator Report does not, however, answer my question, “necessary 

to whom?” I suspect that the boom placement was necessary to manage public opinion and perception of the spill response.

Oil-containment booms are floating lines used to contain, deflect, or corral 

oilspills. Boom is not normally used on the open ocean. It is best used in a 

confined area, such as a harbor, as opposed to being deployed for miles in 

open water. Almost any weather (e.g., wind and waves) will disrupt the integrity of the boom and move it, permitting oil to pass through the barrier.147

Not surprisingly, the wave and wind action in the Gulf often moved the 

boom from its initial deployment locations. This is why a critical information 

requirement became finding and tracking the boom.
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Figure 9: Containment boom during Deepwater Horizon response, Pensacola, 

Florida.

Source: Photo by U.S. Coast Guard.

Locating and Tracking Vessels of Opportunity

While not included as a PIR in the IRSCC list, locating and tracking the 

volunteer and contracted surface response ships was another critical information requirement. The incident command posts organized all of the surface 

ships into task forces, with a Coast Guard cutter in the lead. The cutter directed subordinate cutters, skimmers, and vessels of opportunity (VOOs). 

The Coast Guard cutters and other federal vessels, such as NOAA ships, were 

easily tracked because they have systems onboard that monitor and transmit 

their locations. However, in order to direct skimming operations, the Incident Command Posts and the commanding officers of the Coast Guard cutters needed to know where all the other ships were as well.

Unfortunately, tracking the thousands of vessels of opportunity that BP and 

the states employed to spot and skim oil proved extremely difficult.148 These 

VOOs were a diverse and plentiful flotilla that included more than 10,000 
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vessels.149 The ships ranged from thousand-ton offshore supply vessels with 

state-of-the-art dynamic positioning equipment, to shrimp boats, and all the 

way down to canoes.150 The expanded after-action report, “Deepwater Horizon Response Surface Operations: A Case Study Prepared by Participating 

WLB Commanding Officers,” edited by Commander John Kennedy, USCG, 

explained that communicating with the VOOs generally occurred via VHFFM radios. However, the bandwidths were crowded and most of the surface 

task forces ended up developing their own communication plans on the fly, 

using channels not normally employed.151 The basic problem was that few 

of the VOOs had transponders that would enable the Coast Guard cutters 

to track their location and movement. The eight Coast Guard 225-foot buoy 

tenders (WLBs) and multiple patrol boats tried to “loosely coordinate” the 

VOOs, but the span of control and communications “slowed information 

flow and the fusion of data for tactical decision-making.”152 

Tracking the VOOs was also important for conducting Coast Guard skimming operations. About 1.5 million gallons of oil were recovered by Coast 

Guard cutters from early May to late July 2010. Ninety-five percent of that 

oil was recovered by the eight seagoing buoy tenders. The buoy tenders153 

could fill their oil storage tanks in a matter of hours if the oil encountered was 

thick. To continue skimming, however, the WLBs needed to tow tank barges 

alongside in which to store the skimmed oil, or they needed to offload the oil 

to a contracted VOO barge. If the cutters could not offload the oil, the Coast 

Guard crews would be unable to work.154 The ability to track, locate, and 

contact the contracted VOO barges was also a critical information requirement for the WLBs and the ICPs.

The ICPs also had significant challenges in managing the VOOs. As Haley 

Barbour, then Mississippi’s governor, testified at the House Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform’s June 2, 2011, hearing, he learned that 

the ICPs and the Unified Command could neither communicate with the 

VOOs, nor track their location when a “significant amount” of oil reached 

his state’s barrier islands in early June without warning.155 Since there was 

no command and control system to effectively share information with and 

direct the VOOs, there was no way to efficiently use the VOOs to report 

on the location of oil and assist in skimming. To address this, the state of 

Mississippi purchased radios in June and established a system that facilitated 
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communication among the VOOs, the ICPs, the Coast Guard surface forces, 

and patrolling aircraft. 

Baseline Imagery: Before the Spill

NOAA provided pre-spill imagery to the UAC in response to PIR 4, as did 

commercial imagery sources and some academic labs, including Louisiana 

State University’s Coastal Studies Institute. The UAC used the pre-spill imagery as a baseline to observe the impact of oil by studying the differences in imagery of the shores, coasts, and estuaries. NOAA’s pre-spill imagery was from 

early June. However, that imagery had gaps and “skips” (areas not covered by 

the pre-spill imagery catalog) that NOAA addressed through government and 

commercial imagery suppliers even as oil approached the shoreline in early 

May, according to David Gisclair, technical assistance program director of the 

Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator’s Office.156

Evaluation of PIRs

The absence of a system to gather and process intelligence requirements hampered the spill response, even though the decisionmakers from Admiral Allen 

down to the commanding officers of the Coast Guard cutters knew what 

information they needed to do their work. Even when intelligence officers 

from the Coast Guard, NOAA, and the IRSCC drafted priority intelligence 

requirements, those requirements were not disseminated across the response 

effort. 

The first PIR (finding the oil) was more difficult than anticipated. This was 

exacerbated by misleading graphics passed to the media and senior decisionmakers in Washington depicting oil covering the entire northern Gulf of 

Mexico. If oil was present everywhere, why search for it? Next to the oil, locating boom and tracking the vessels of opportunity were also top priorities. 

Locating the boom showed effort in the spill response and was relatively successful. On the other hand, efforts to locate and track the VOOs to support 

skimming operations were less successful. 

But determining and agreeing on priority intelligence requirements was just 

the first step. The next step was to develop a remote-sensing concept of operations to answer the PIRs. This was done, but not fully implemented. 
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The Remote-Sensing CONOPS

Just a week after the oilspill, the IRSCC staff in Washington, DC, drafted a 

remote-sensing concept of operations for the Deepwater Horizon response. 

The object of the draft CONOPS was to formalize remote-sensing planning 

and operations. The IRSCC staff used the existing remote-sensing concept of 

operations for Stafford Act catastrophes as a model in developing the Deepwater Horizon remote-sensing CONOPS. 

Write It and They Will Sign It (or Not)

Receiving formal validation of the early draft of the remote-sensing CONOPS, 

however, proved more difficult, according to a memo written by the UAC’s 

remote-sensing coordinator (RSC). As detailed by Lieutenant Chris Lucero, 

USCG, in his August 3, 2010, memo, “USCG Remote Sensing Coordinator 

Statement: Non-BP Signature and Loss of Deepwater Horizon Remote 

Sensing Concept of Operations Document,” the intelligence staff successfully 

conveyed to Rear Admiral James Watson, the federal on scene coordinator 

(FOSC), the importance of approving the CONOPS. Watson signed it 

on July 9, 2010. From there, the staff forwarded the signed CONOPS to 

Douglas Suttles, the FOSC’s BP counterpart, for his review and signature. 

The UAC staff also forwarded the CONOPS to the IRSCC on July 13 for 

use on an interim basis because the RSC expected BP’s approval without 

delay. However, despite assurances from Coast Guard and BP legal staff that 

the CONOPS was sound and no legal issues were impeding the approval, 

Suttles refused to sign the document. Then, on July 27, David Randall, a 

BP executive, explained to the UAC staff that, since the Deepwater Horizon 

well had been capped on the 15th and the amount of oil found in the water 

was significantly reduced, BP did not need to sign the CONOPS. When 

the UAC staff attempted to retrieve the CONOPS, Randall explained in an 

e-mail on August 3 that BP had lost the original CONOPS signed by Rear 

Admiral Watson.157 The originally signed document was never recovered. 

This was an unfortunate event because the remote-sensing CONOPS was 

the first formalized attempt at organizing remote-sensing intelligence support 

to a spill of national significance. Had the document been signed and 

implemented, it would have set a precedent for naming the Coast Guard as 

the lead agency and the business (BP) as the responsible party. Moreover, the 
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CONOPS would have set a model for future remote-sensing collaboration in 

response to a spill of national significance.

BP Refusal to Sign

According to Lieutenant Lucero in a follow-up phone interview, Douglas 

Suttles’s refusal to approve and sign the CONOPS may have had less to do 

with plugging of the well than with what the CONOPS would have meant 

to BP autonomy.158 BP maintained its own remote-sensing coordinator, who 

managed a parallel effort to those of the IRSCC, the UAC staff, and the Air 

Force 601st Air and Space Operations Center. The BP remote-sensing coordinator directed surveillance flights that were collecting imagery to support 

BP needs. BP did not coordinate these flights with the IRSCC or the 601st. 

In addition, BP did not consistently share the imagery collected from its contracted remote-sensing flights. Had Suttles signed the CONOPS, BP would 

have been bound to coordinate its remote-sensing flights along with the larger 

effort overseen by the IRSCC and the 601st. This would have decreased BP’s 

autonomy and increased its requirement to share information. 

Failure to Establish a Formal CONOPS

As explained in the Deepwater Horizon Unified Area Command’s document, 

“Remote Sensing CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Deepwater Horizon Response,” the goal of the remote-sensing CONOPS was “to provide information to contain the spread of oil and recover the spilled oil,” which would also 

mitigate the environmental impact.159 The purpose of the plan was to define 

the capabilities of remote-sensing operations to facilitate the response, to build 

the Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA, or ISR in DoD terms) structure 

within the UAC, and to define the UAC remote-sensing management team 

(RST) processes. The RST would be an interagency body of remote-sensing 

professionals that would enable the UAC “to plan, coordinate, acquire, analyze, publish, and disseminate situational knowledge.”160 In addition, each 

ICP involved in remote sensing would have an RST assigned to its planning 

section. According to the CONOPS, the UAC would establish overall remotesensing requirements, but would delegate the development and planning of 

remote sensing to the 601st Air and Space Operations Center. The UAC could 

then task remote sensors that fell under UAC command, and request that tasking be assigned to remote sensors not under UAC command. 
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Step 2: Intelligence (Dis)organization:

Collection Planning

Intelligence organization was haphazard in the initial weeks after the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon. When the intelligence cycle is running 

smoothly, decisionmakers validate intelligence requirements, and then staff 

members develop a plan to collect, analyze, produce, and disseminate the 

intelligence. Deepwater Horizon was not an optimal situation, however, and 

intelligence organization suffered. While Admiral Allen had a general idea 

of his information needs, “it was four to six weeks to get everything down 

and nailed” with an organized process for planning collection.161 Admiral 

Allen was so concerned about overburdening and duplicating information 

and intelligence planning and collection that he instructed his staff officers 

to question and challenge him if they perceived he was imposing additional 

intelligence requirements on them.162

Never as Bad as the First Time

Intelligence organization for a spill of national significance was a unique 

event. Deepwater Horizon was the first designated spill of national significance since the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, when the state of domestic intelligence capabilities and support was much less. “We were plowing new ground 

here,” Stan Gold explained. In particular, no one knew how to integrate all of 

the information coming in from national-level remote-sensing assets; BP remote sensing; or state, local, and foreign-contracted imagery collection of the 

spill.163 Prosecuting the intelligence cycle in the initial weeks after the explosion was therefore the result of largely informal information sharing among 

participants, not the result of executing predetermined intelligence plans.164

One DHS intelligence officer explained that the most challenging aspect 

of supporting the response was coordinating and planning imagery collection.165 According to Commander Russell Dash, USCG, even as aircraft and 

satellites were detailed to collect imagery of the spill, there was neither a plan 

nor a system for matching flights with collection sensors on the aircraft and 

satellites.166

Moreover, several interviewees said there was a bureaucratic fight at the UAC 

over who was in charge of imagery collection and platforms. Several agencies 

jockeyed for position in early May to be designated as the lead in remote 
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sensing, including the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Coast 

Guard, NOAA, and the Defense Department. As a result, none of their efforts were in concert.167 In the absence of an integrated intelligence plan, 

as previously described, agencies acted parochially and sought out the information their staffs needed to respond to the agencies’ decisionmakers. 

For example, Lieutenant Colonel Martinez described how a senior BP official flew around of his own volition visually searching for oil in a contract 

aircraft. The BP official argued that this was the best way to find the oil, by 

simple air searches and reporting the oil via voice communications.168 A 

more thoughtful, ordered approach to planning intelligence would likely 

have helped build a more efficient means of collecting the information that 

the BP executive wanted.

The intelligence organization finally materialized in early July 2010. Up until 

this point, the Coast Guard intelligence liaisons at the 601st Air and Space 

Operations Center, the intelligence staff at the Unified Area Command, and 

the Interagency Remote Sensing Coordination Cell staff worked long hours to 

ensure more efficient remote-sensing operations. The IRSCC deployed staff to 

the Deepwater Horizon response from May 1 until August 19 (110 days), working 16 or more hours a day, seven days a week. Many of the intelligence liaisons, 

BP staff, and ICP staff had worked hundreds of hours together and were better 

acquainted by early June. This familiarity, based on personalities and personal 

interaction, enhanced intelligence planning and coordination and helped address some of the shortcomings caused by lack of a formal intelligence planning 

structure.169 (As documented in Lieutenant Commander Dietrich’s “The Eyes 

of Katrina,” this was also the case during Hurricane Katrina.)170

Step 3: Collection

The story behind intelligence collection for Deepwater Horizon is largely 

about airspace control. Since the majority of intelligence required and collected to support the Deepwater Horizon response was done via remote sensing, airspace control became the central issue. Unfortunately, organizing and 

managing the collection platforms was haphazard through May and early 

June 2010. When flight safety became an issue, Admiral Allen asked the Air 

Force to take over airspace control, and this greatly increased flight safety as 

well as intelligence collection. 
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Flight Safety Issues 

Several near air-to-air collisions motivated a change in the airspace management over the spill area. Despite the fact that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established temporary flight restrictions days after the spill and 

enlisted a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) P-3 to help monitor air traffic, flight safety remained a paramount concern.171 On June 16, Admiral Thad 

Allen asked the Department of Defense for an air tasking order, so that the Air 

Force could take control of the airspace over the spill. The order was effective 

in bringing some order to the airspace, and it also improved intelligence collection, even though several agencies did not participate in the tasking order. 

The aircraft that saturated the Deepwater Horizon response area after the spill 

created a dangerous situation. Federal, state, local, BP, and media aircraft 

combed the area around the spill site, along the shores, and the area in between. 

Even after the Air Force took control of the flights, from mid-July to mid-August, U.S. government aircraft alone flew 390 missions covering 1,048 hours. 

Most of these aircraft flew according to visual flight rules (VFR), meaning the 

pilots conducted their own flight avoidance. The helicopters often flew “see and 

avoid,” meaning the pilot managed his own detection and avoidance of other 

aircraft. In addition, the aircraft searching for oil and supporting media coverage did not fly in predictable patterns and did not follow predictable routes. 

Not all of the aircraft reported back to, or even coordinated with, the ICPs, as 

recounted by Captain Kellum in his unclassified brief, “Incident Awareness and 

Assessment (IAA) Support to Deepwater Horizon (DWH).”172

So many aircraft operating in close proximity to each other without centralized control created a dangerous situation. There were eight near midair collisions involving aircraft responding to and supporting the Deepwater 

Horizon effort in late May and early June.173 Despite this, senior-level Coast 

Guard decisionmaker Rear Admiral Peter Neffenger argued that still more 

aircraft were needed, especially from the shoreline to about 20 miles out, in 

order to spot oil.174 But the absence of control over the airspace caused more 

than just safety problems.

Negative Impact on Remote-Sensing Capability

The lack of flight coordination across the response effort hampered intelligence 

collection. According to Stan Gold, “There was absolutely no coordination 
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at the [operational] level or at the [tactical] level of the various aircraft and 

satellites that were used to provide information in support of planning efforts” 

to support the response.175 This lack of flight coordination meant that there 

was no systematic method for collecting information about the location, 

type, and extent of the oil. This resulted in decentralized control, execution, 

and (unorganized) intelligence collection. When asked about the lack of a 

plan to support airborne intelligence collection, Admiral Allen commented, 

“This gets back to us not having a structure” to incorporate intelligence into 

remote sensing.176 According to Commander Dash, inefficiencies existed 

until mid-June 2010 in matching aircraft with sensor packages along with 

priority information requirements.177 Because aircraft and sensors were not 

coordinated across the response effort, different flights overlapped the same 

area multiple times in a brief period, while there was a “complete lack of 

coverage” in other areas.178 Because the PIRs were not well understood, 

agencies tasked and dispatched flights to collect data supporting their own 

information needs and requirements. Admiral Allen not only needed to 

control the aircraft above and around the spill to prevent a collision, but he 

also needed control to better collect information about the spill. By midJune, Admiral Allen realized that he needed an air tasking order.

Implementing the Air Tasking Order

The U.S. military uses an air tasking order (ATO) as part of a greater plan to 

guide air operations. An ATO is tactical direction promulgated every 48 to 

72 hours, and encompasses the specific aircraft, missions, flight paths, and 

timelines. Only aircraft listed on the ATO are authorized to fly. Supporting the ATO are the Airspace Control Order (ACO) and any Special Instructions (SPINS). The ACO defines the operational area, communications 

plans, flight routing, radio contact procedures, and identification friend/foe 

(IFF) codes. The SPINS include guiding principles of the operation, such 

as the commander’s intent, the mission objectives, and the rules of engagement. Most importantly, a single entity (usually the Combined Air Operations Center) controls these plans and enjoys complete unity of command. In 

addition to flight safety, the ATO designates intelligence-collection missions 

in support of the priority information requirements or the collection plan, 

and designates aircraft and sensor packages to most efficiently and effectively 

collect the information. 
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From the Deepwater Horizon explosion until early June, the response effort 

lacked an ATO. There simply was no coordination of aircraft across the response. According to interviews, the near collisions took place because no 

air tasking order was in place. And another interviewee suggested the ATO 

would not have been developed save for the near collisions.179

“I Need to Take Control”

On Tuesday, June 15, President Obama returned to Washington, DC, from 

a visit to the Gulf Coast. Flying on Air Force One along with the media, 

security, and staff was Admiral Allen. As recounted by Joel Achenbach in A 

Hole at the Bottom of the Sea, the former Coast Guard commandant sat chatting with an Air Force steward when the President sat down and asked Allen, 

“How’s it going?”180 “I need to take control,” Allen replied.181 He asked 

Obama’s permission to take over the airspace above the spill. The President 

directed Admiral Allen to do what he thought needed to be done. “There are 

no do-overs,” the President said, and Admiral Allen understood exactly what 

he meant.182 “I got the idea [to take control of the airspace] from Haiti,” 

Admiral Allen said, referring to his experience in the Coast Guard response to 

the Haiti earthquake. He made the comments to me in a March 2011interview.183 Regarding Deepwater Horizon, Admiral Allen commented that after 

his discussion with President Obama, he called the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, and the chief of staff of the Air Force, 

General Norton Schwartz, as well as the United States Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM) commander, Admiral James “Sandy” Winnefeld, to ask 

about the Air Force taking control of the airspace. Admiral Allen was told 

that it would be done the following day. 

A Pivotal Point: The Air Force Steps In

Admiral Allen described the establishment of the ATO as the “pivotal point” 

in responding to the spill.184 Many of the federal, state, and local responding agencies flying remote-sensing aircraft had been “doing their own thing 

for 20 years” and had never worked in a coordinated manner.185 The following day, as part of taking over the airspace, Admiral Allen informed the 

responders in a lengthy e-mail that they would now manage the response as 

a “three-dimensional battle space” and move away from a traditional spill response approach.186 Admiral Allen’s observation indicates that, in addition 

to overwhelming BP and the nation’s ability to respond, Deepwater Horizon
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also stymied the Coast Guard’s own methodology for disaster response. Fortunately, the 601st Air and Space Operations Center was able to inject process into the remote-sensing intelligence collection, and this finally yielded 

success. 

Issues Resolved: Enter the 601st 

The 601st Air and Space Operations Center conducts both overseas and domestic intelligence support. Staff of the 601st are trained in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), which, according to U.S. Air Force’s 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations: Air Force Doctrine 

Document 2-9, is designed “to provide accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence to decisionmakers.”187 “ISR” is the term used in Department of Defense missions, especially combat support operations, but when supporting 

U.S. domestic disaster response, the same mission is usually described as “incident awareness and assessment.” The function is essentially the same, but 

several interviewees were insistent that the term “ISR” should not be used in 

conjunction with domestic operations. 

The 601st Air and Space Operations Center became the Aviation Coordination Command within the Incident Command Structure, and, as such, 

received guidance from the UAC and in return supported both the UAC and 

the ICPs. But the Deepwater Horizon response was not a military operation, 

so the 601st did not enjoy full unity of command. Even when the ATO was 

in place in mid-July, the 601st was able to control only a few flights.188 Some 

non-military agencies—NOAA in particular—did not participate in the formal ATO, choosing instead to inform the 601st about flights, as opposed to 

subordinating or even coordinating their flights and missions. 

Even though it is a Department of Defense unit, the 601st was the perfect 

outfit to establish an ATO because, as Lieutenant Colonel Susan A. Romano 

wrote in her Air Force Print News Today article “Deepwater Horizon Airspace 

Activity Now Coordinated at 601st AOC,” it was “no stranger to responding 

to natural disasters. In the wake of the earthquake that devastated Haiti in 

January 2010, the 601st AOC was tasked to assist with airspace deconfliction 

and air flow in and out of the Port-au-Prince airport, while maximizing the 

efficient use of inbound and outbound air traffic.”189 (Previously, the 601st 
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AOC supported the response to the California wildfires in fall 2007.) The 

601st was also able to transfer some combat experience to Deepwater Horizon. For example, in Deepwater Horizon, the 601st used traditional imagery 

practices and platforms to find and categorize oil, just as it had done in Iraq 

when looking for improvised explosive devices.190

The staff of the 601st also incorporated important lessons from their Haiti 

earthquake experience into planning the intelligence support to Deepwater 

Horizon. For example, the priority intelligence requirements and the daily 

intelligence collection plan, developed with Coast Guard liaison officers, were 

modeled after the Haiti collection plan.191

Even though the staff of the 601st had never used remote-sensing platforms to 

respond to a spill of national significance, its members were anxious to support 

the effort. “We don’t know anything about oil, but we can sure as hell put one 

hundred sensors on one thousand targets a day,” Stan Gold quoted Colonel 

Greg Keach, First Air Force J2, as saying during the first week of May.192 The 

601st was the right unit to help alleviate airspace safety issues and support 

intelligence planning, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination.

Collection Rigor Established

The control of the airspace via the air tasking order improved intelligence collection. Before mid-July, the use and implementation of the ISR planning and 

execution cycle was not evident in any understood fashion. By directing the 

601st AOC to be the sole coordinator of remote sensing and the manager of 

the priority intelligence requirements (both airborne and satellite), Admiral 

Allen effectively centralized the remote-sensing effort. Admiral Allen’s intent 

was not only to create unity of command to avoid possible mid-air collisions, 

but also to improve his awareness of the air picture. He accomplished both.

Another benefit of the ATO was that the 601st AOC conducted the first inventory of all air assets and sensors being used to support the spill response. 

The IRSCC had started an inventory in early May, but had not completed 

it. The July 2010 inventory by the 601st AOC was the first comprehensive 

look at all remote-sensing platforms. Even though the 601st AOC did not 

have the authority to prioritize information requirements, it did manage 

the requirements and coordinated remote sensing with the weather, aircraft, 
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and sensor platforms. For example, the 601st AOC requested re-tasking of 

a Coast Guard C-130J from a lower-priority patrol off the Florida coast to 

cover the leading edge of the oilspill in the Gulf of Mexico when a NOAA 

aircraft could not complete that flight because of maintenance.193 Before the 

601st AOC receiving the ATO, it is unlikely another aircraft would have been 

reassigned to cover the gap. It is important to underscore here, however, that 

the 601st asked the ICP to re-task the C-130J. Though it was positioned in 

the ICS as the ACC, the 601st AOC did not have the authority to directly

re-task the aircraft. 

The 601st “brought rigor” to the aircraft flight scheduling by cajoling, requesting, and coordinating response flights.194 As said earlier, even when the 

daily ATO was in place in mid-July, the 601st was able to directly control 

only a few flights.195 Many aircraft legitimately operated in the impacted 

area for reasons wholly unrelated to Deepwater Horizon, such as commercial 

aircraft ferrying passengers. In any federal response effort, be it a spill of national significance or a Stafford Act response, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) maintains authority over the airspace for flight separation. 

Even though the FAA has authority over the airspace, however, there is no 

legal mechanism for incorporating non-response aircraft into the ATO or for 

requiring response aircraft to participate in the ATO. In other words, the only 

requirement for aircraft operating in and above the response area is to meet 

FAA regulations. All other aircraft operation is by cooperation. 

Responsible Party Issues and Need for Airspace Control

Another issue that makes airspace control for a federal response different from 

control for a Stafford Act response is the addition of the responsible party. 

BP executives were becoming increasingly concerned about the disorganized, 

uncoordinated nature of the aircraft remote-sensing effort, especially considering that they were paying for these flights.196 These same BP executives 

argued that better remote-sensing coordination would be more efficient in 

locating skimmable oil. 

Lesson Learned: Airspace Control Is Critical for 

Collection and Safety

The work of the 601st staff was to control and manage the remote-sensing 

efforts for the response aircraft, as Admiral Allen and BP wanted, but at the 
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same time the 601st could not direct the compliance of all participating 

agencies. Despite this, Admiral Allen realized that assigning a Department 

of Defense command like the 601st, which was practiced in airspace management and remote sensing, was late in coming. In his National Incident 

Commander report, Admiral Allen recommended that DHS “memorialize in 

doctrine the use of the Aviation Coordination Center . . . as a matter of course 

for any national-level response.”197 “If I had to do the whole thing over again, 

I would’ve taken the airspace on the first day and set the [601st Air and Space] 

coordination center up,” Admiral Allen later commented.198

How It Worked in Practice: 601st Operations in Deepwater Horizon

By mid-June 2010, regular intelligence-collection practice was in place to support the response effort. Until that point, Lieutenant Colonel Martinez observed “lots of work, little collaboration, and no staff direction” regarding intelligence.199 By the third week of June, a daily remote-sensing “battle rhythm” 

had developed among the 601st AOC, the UAC, and the ICPs. The staff at 

the 601st developed the collection plan by midday out of informal conversations and discussions with intelligence liaisons from DHS, NGA, USCG, and 

other participants at the UAC. The Coast Guard liaison to the 601st would 

approve the collection plan against the requirements, while the commanding 

officer of the 601st Intelligence & Reconnaissance Division (IRD) approved 

the collection sensor. Commander Rainey described the relationship with the 

staff of the 601st IRD as professional and positive.200 The 601st would then 

task the assets under its control and have its liaisons at the other ICPs request 

the coordination of the assets of other agencies not under DoD control. 

Satellite Collection Systems: Necessary for SONS Response

Collecting imagery via satellite systems to support a spill of national significance (SONS) response was a new undertaking, but one that ultimately 

proved helpful. Satellite systems have been used to detect and locate oil on 

the surface of water, but this was traditionally done for longer-term studies 

and research. Using satellites to collect imagery to assist tactical oil-skimming 

operations, however, was a new application that helped primarily to narrow 

search areas. Multiple commercial satellite systems used a variety of sensors 

to spot, track, and attempt to identify the oil. The U.S. government also 

used classified satellite systems to collect imagery about the spill. The satellites 
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proved adept at locating boom, and they were successful in identifying oil, 

but the sensors were not able to determine if that oil was skimmable. 

Several commercial satellite sensors collected imagery in support of the oilspill response. Dr. Nan Walker of the Louisiana State University Earth Scan 

Laboratory explained that “there are many, many satellite systems and all of 

them are a little different” when trying to collect information and intelligence 

on oilspills.201 The differences between the satellite platforms are in their 

frequency of passage over the area to be observed (imaged), the type of satellite, the different companies, and the different sensors carried by the satellite. 

Frequency of imaging depends on the satellites’ orbits, which can vary greatly 

based on the function of the satellite. 

Issues with Commercial and Government Systems: 

Contracting Concerns

Other important factors in SONS imagery (and disaster response imagery in 

general) are the specifications of the U.S. government and responsible party 

(BP, in this case) contracts and arrangements with the satellite companies. 

These contracts determine with great specificity what, when, and how imagery 

will be shot, when that imagery will be delivered, and to whom. In addition to 

the contracts, just interacting with the various GIS companies and countries 

can be problematic. Each company (and each country) that sells imagery 

maintains its own processes for data mining and for requesting and obtaining 

imagery. According to DeWitt Braud, director, academic area, of the Louisiana State University Coastal Studies Institute, some are relatively easy to work 

with, such as Earth Resources Observation and Science Center, while others, 

such as the Indian government, typically require a labyrinth of processes in 

order to obtain imagery.202

International Charter on Space and Major Disasters 

Facilitates Cooperation

Fortunately, an international mechanism exists to streamline imagery collection and processing after a disaster. The International Charter on Space and 

Major Disasters is an agreement among 16 agencies and countries that have 

agreed to speed imagery support after a natural or manmade catastrophe. The 

purpose of the charter is 
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promoting cooperation between space agencies and space 

system operators in the use of space facilities as a contribution to the management of crises arising from natural or 

technological disasters, the Charter seeks to . . . supply during periods of crisis . . . data providing a basis for critical information for the anticipation and management of potential 

crises.203

At the request of the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Geological Service (USGS) 

activated the charter shortly after the Deepwater Horizon explosion. This activation streamlined the request and approval process for satellite imagery to 

support the spill response.

European-, Canadian-, and American-owned commercial satellites took imagery during the Deepwater Horizon response. These satellites used radar, measurements of sea temperatures, the reflection of sunlight off the Earth, and 

high-resolution imagery (photos) to identify and map the oil. The companies 

discovered that oil “calms” or “settles” ocean waves, permitting synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to detect the presence and extent of the oil.204 SAR can 

work through cloud cover, which proved an advantage in hunting the spill. 

However, SAR created “false positives” when looking at calm water because 

it indicated that oil might be present there. Tracking temperature anomalies 

did not prove successful in finding the oil, but high-resolution photo imagery did find the oil.205 The Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer 

(MODIS) sensors on the Terra and Aqua satellites captured photographic 

imagery of the spill, as shown in Figure 10. MODIS works by capturing the 

image based on the reflection of the sun’s light off the surface of the water, and 

works best when that reflection is closest to 90 degrees. MODIS, and other 

photo-imagery sensors, does not work through cloud cover, however, which 

concerned Rear Admiral Zukunft, as hurricane season moved forward in the 

Gulf of Mexico.206
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Figure 10: A MODIS image (top) and SAR image (bottom) from May 17, 

2010. 

Source: Image used with permission and courtesy of Louisiana State University Earth Scan Laboratory. 
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Commercial satellite imagery was helpful in determining the extent of the 

spill even though there are myriad sensors and systems available. U.S. government agreements with domestic and international businesses facilitated the 

collection of satellite imagery, which complemented federal satellite systems.

U.S. Government Sensors

The scope and classification of this paper preclude a deeper technical discussion of the U.S. government noncommercial satellite systems used to support the spill response. Several of these sensors were used to map the oilspill, 

and NGA and Department of Defense analysts reviewed this data. While the 

deputy national incident commander, Rear Admiral Neffenger, praised the 

quality and value of these images, he said that their usefulness was tempered 

by their classification.207 The majority of the U.S. government noncommercial images were classified, which meant that all but a few members of the 

Incident Command Posts and the Unified Area Command could view the 

images. Other important participants, such as BP, contract, state, and local 

responders (owing to the lack of a clearance and access), were prohibited from 

viewing the imagery. U.S. government imagery analysts did produce unclassified text products based on the classified imagery, and these text products 

contributed to the planning of surface search areas for oil skimming using 

classified products. But, in the end, the dissemination of the classified imagery was severely limited.
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Figure 11: Planned commercial synthetic aperture radar (SAR) collection for 

May 18–19, 2010.

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, daily brief, “Federal Remote Sensing 

Situation Report—British Petroleum Oil Spill Response, May 18, 2010,” slide 16.

Satellite Imagery Cannot Determine If Oil Is Skimmable

What satellite imagery could not do well was indicate whether oil could be 

skimmed. This was the case across the contracted commercial satellite collection. The various sensors (radar, photographic, multispectral) could determine the presence of oil, but could not determine if that oil was a light 

sheen or was thick and goopy. MODIS images could delineate thinner oil 

from thicker oil, but trained and experienced imagery analysts were needed 

to review the data.208
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A deficiency of imagery analysts trained in interpreting MODIS and other 

imagery of the spill further hindered locating skimmable oil from satellite 

data.

What Is “Skimmable”?

“Skimmable oil” was a subjective determination. Whether oil could be skimmed 

was neither a scientific nor a commonly understood definition. The skimmer crews 

determined if oil was “skimmable” based on their experience and the equipment 

available on their ship. Thicker oil was more easily skimmed, but wave and wind 

action reduced the ability to skim oil. Tactical responder Commander Edward 

“Teddy” St. Pierre, USCG, commented that he observed the crew of some skimmers claim a patch of oil was not skimmable, while the crew of another ship would 

skim oil of the same thickness.209

In the end, satellite imagery was most useful in helping planners refine search 

areas for others using aircraft and surface vessels. Once the oil was found, 

based on this data and weather predictions, including sea state and currents, 

the ICP staff in Houma, Louisiana intelligence liaisons, and staff at the 601st 

AOC could plan aircraft patrols to support the priority intelligence requirements, skimming operations, and individual agencies’ information needs. 
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RGB/Near IR – Red, Green, Blue (standard color)/ Near infrared.

EO – electro optical.

Figure 12: The Airborne Remote Sensing Coverage for May 18, 2010, to June 

1, 2010. This was part of the actual briefing slide from Federal Remote Sensing Situation Report, also showing the aircraft assets and flight times. These 

flights were based in part on the satellite imagery from Figure 11. 

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, daily brief, “Federal Remote Sensing 

Situation Report—British Petroleum Oil Spill Response, May 18, 2010,” slide 12. 
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Finding the Oil: Tactical Aircraft and Visual Searches Worked Best

Aircraft used different sensors to find the oil, but visual searches proved the 

most effective for skimming support. Figure 13 lists a sampling of the aircraft 

that flew and collected imagery in support of the spill. These planes included 

Air National Guard RC-26s, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, NOAA, Customs and Border Protection, and other federal aircraft. Although not listed in 

Figure 13, state, local, and BP contract flights also searched for and collected 

information on oil. In addition to the aircraft scheduled to fly on July 16, a 

variety of other sensors were also used, including full-motion video, synthetic 

aperture radar, electro-optical (EO), side-looking aperture radar, multispectral imaging (MSI), and infrared. EO produces black-and-white images, while 

MSI produces color images. These systems also provided ICP staff and other 

analysts with additional information, so they could calculate when and where 

oil might impact marshes, beaches, and other sensitive shoreline areas. 

In addition, pilots and flight crews used visual observations (i.e., looking out 

the window) to find oil. Out of the many sensor platforms used, visual observations offered the best success in supporting tactical skimming operations. Helicopters launched from Coast Guard cutters or shore searched for 

oil under the direction of the cutters, thus enabling coordinated support for 

skimming operations. 

Tactically, aircraft—including helicopters—were most vital in keeping the 

Coast Guard cutters and skimmers “on oil.”210 But these visual searches sometimes produced false positives, with aircrews occasionally identifying sargassum seaweed as oil. Searching for and classifying oil is not a core competency 

of Coast Guard helicopters or crews, and they receive no formal training 

in this area.211 In addition, the Coast Guard aircraft lacked real-time video 

capability to downlink the imagery to surface assets. As explained by Commander Mike Fisher, USCG, the helicopters, plus the RC-26s, flew patrols 

that searched out and tracked the “leading edge” of the oil approaching the 

shore.212 For the tactical responders, the Air National Guard RC-26s were 

the most useful and successful collection platforms. The RC-26s could provide real-time, downlinked video images to the cutters. These were the only 

aircraft with this capability.
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Key: FMV – full motion video

Vis OBS – visual observation

SAR – synthetic aperture radar

EO – electro optical 

SLAR – side looking aperture radar

MSI – multi-spectral imagery

IR – infra red

Figure 13: A single day’s aerial collection plan, July 16, 2010. In addition to 

the map graphic, the graph lists which asset would fly, when it would fly in 

both “Zulu” (Greenwich Mean Time) and Central Daily Time (CDT), and 

the type of sensor the aircraft possessed. The right box again lists the aircraft 

and which 601st PIR the flight was collecting against. 

Source: Capt Caesar Kellum, U.S. Air Force, 601st Air and Space Operations Center/

ISRD AFNORTH, “Incident Awareness & Assessment (IAA) Support to Deepwater 

Horizon,” briefing presentation, undated but prepared post-summer 2010, slide 8.
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Despite the many aircraft and sensors listed in Figure 13, visual observation 

by pilots and aircrews proved the most successful. One airframe, however, 

proved its utility above all the others in finding and tracking oil.

Air National Guard Key Asset: RC-26 Aircraft

The Air National Guard contributed to the spill response with their RC-26s. 

The first RC-26 began working in early June. The Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact (EMAC) funded and supported the RC-26s. This compact exists between the Air National Guard and the states. Under the EMAC, 

the locations of the RC-26s among the states change from year to year, but, 

fortunately, one was stationed in Mississippi at the time of the Deepwater Horizon response, and was the first such aircraft on the scene. The success of the 

RC-26 from Mississippi led to a second plane deployed from West Virginia. 

Then, a third Air National Guard crew was added, which permitted two 3.5-

hour flights per day. The RC-26s gave the tactical responders a tool that they 

had never used before. 

Happy Accident: How the RC-26s Were Requested in the First Place

According to Captain Kellum, the acquisition of the RC-26s was “the single 

most valuable, important resource request made” in response to the spill.213

But the initial request came out of a casual conversation during a work break, 

instead of through careful planning. Two officers in the 601st were taking 

a short break from the response effort when one of them came up with the 

idea of real-time streaming video support.214 The air boss drafted an official 

Resource Request Message on June 1 following the discussion. 

The two RC-26s provided real-time video data to the Coast Guard cutters 

that were skimming or directing skimming operations. Coast Guard buoy 

tender Commander Jeff Randall described relying more and more heavily in 

June and July 2010 on the direct video images provided by the RC-26.215

Commander St. Pierre said that the RC-26s directly supported skimming 

operations 85 percent of the time they were flying, while other aircraft only 

supported the ships 20 percent of the time they flew.216 Obtaining and 

using tactical air patrols to support skimming operations was the “most difficult” battle St. Pierre fought.217 This was the first time that RC-26s had 

ever been deployed to support U.S. Coast Guard assets and the subordinate 

vessels of opportunity (VOO).218 Captain Kellum also praised the work of 
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the RC-26s, commenting that they performed extremely well in supporting 

tactical skimming.219

Figure 14: An April 30, 2010, image taken of the Deepwater Horizon spill. 

Source: Incident News, “Imagery from 30 Apr 2351 UTC,” accessed February 16, 

2012, http://www.incidentnews.gov/entry/526479.

Other Successful Planes 

One other aircraft and sensor used imagery to tactical success. NOAA flew 

a Twin Otter aircraft with an Ocean Imaging sensor onboard. Ocean Imaging is a company that specializes in GIS and satellite imagery analysis and 

production. The Twin Otter used an MSI-like spectral imager, which could 

detect skimmable oil based on its thickness. After the aircraft landed, the crew 
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quickly downloaded the images and e-mailed them to the ICPs, intelligence 

liaisons, and other support staff. This process worked fairly well. In one case, 

on July 29, 2010, an image was taken at 10:10 CDT, and it was e-mailed to 

the ICPs at 12:02 CDT, only two hours later. Also, the Icelandic Coast Guard 

contributed a Bombardier Dash-8 aircraft to serve as a command and control 

asset, in addition to spotting oil.220 

Figure 15: The Resource Request Message dated June 1, 2010, for the 

RC-26 aircraft. One Intelligence Staff Officer called this “the single most 

valuable, important resource request made” during Deepwater Horizon. 

Source: USAF 601st Air and Space Operations Center photo taken by and courtesy 

of Maj Caesar Kellum, PED Team Chief.

Using Self-Locating Data Marker Buoys

Coast Guard aircraft and cutters attempted to track the oil during darkness 

by using self-locating data marker buoys (SLDMBs). The Coast Guard 
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usually uses these buoys in search-and-rescue cases. During Deepwater 

Horizon, aircraft crews dropped the buoys out of the aircraft into oil slicks 

to drift with the wind and current, so that the skimming forces could follow 

the oil overnight for immediate skimming in the morning.221 According 

to Commander Jordan, this method of dropping buoys was “only somewhat 

effective” because there were not enough of them.222

The Coast Guard buoy tenders also used SLDMBs that proved “extremely 

effective” in relocating skimmable oil and getting surface assets to that oil.223

This freed aircraft to search other areas because the SLDMBs were “on” the 

oil. In one day, a Coast Guard cutter recovered over 3,000 barrels (120,000 

gallons) of oil because the crew followed an SLDMB that had floated with a 

slick. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard logistic support centers lacked a sufficient number of these data marker buoys for all of the cutters to use them 

in tracking oil.224

Using People Ashore: Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment Teams

The ICPs also collected information via shoreline cleanup and assessment 

teams (SCATs). These groups traveled to impacted shore and marsh areas to 

observe where—and to what extent—oil washed up from the spill. The oil 

was not easy to find, and these teams had to really hunt for it, often driving an 

hour or more from the ICPs.225 The SCATs also performed well in collecting 

information about boom; specifically, whether it was in the proper location or 

“off station.” The members of the SCATs considered themselves “intelligence 

officers for the cleanup,” and each evening they brought their reports back to 

ICP Houma, where they passed their observations to a team of analysts.226 

Collection by Surface Assets (Ships) Proved Least Effective

As mentioned earlier, oil is difficult to observe from the surface, even from 

the bridge wing of a ship 30 feet above the water. Surface searches by Coast 

Guard cutters and other skimming vessels without the aid of overhead imagery or aircraft flights proved very difficult.227 In 1- to 2-foot seas, the crews 

of the 225-foot Coast Guard buoy tenders had to be as close as 1,000 feet 

to spot a moderate oil slick consisting of 500–1,500 barrels. Such a slick 

would be 30–50 feet wide and 1–2 nautical miles long.228 Mid-morning and 

mid-afternoon were the best times of the day to spot oil because of the angle 

of the sun. Spotting oil at night by visual observation was impossible. The 
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Coast Guard cutter crews did have some success in using shipboard forwardlooking infrared to identify oil based on temperature differences, especially in 

early evening and early morning.229

Summary of Collection Challenges and Successes

Intelligence collection, once up and running, went well, but it was initially 

disorganized and uncoordinated. And after the information was collected 

to support the Deepwater Horizon response, what did the collectors think 

happened to the information they obtained? Stan Gold was unsure and said, 

“I don’t know. It goes into ‘the [intelligence] pool.’”230 But a “pool” would 

suggest a common repository for this information where analysts could evaluate it. This was hardly the case.

Step 4: Analysis

While responders collected a considerable volume of information about the 

spill, the mismanagement of that data confounded analysis. In particular, 

an absence of sufficient IT system support prevented timely cataloging and 

production of imagery. Despite this, tactical responders interviewed for this 

project understood the inherent need for intelligence within their decisionmaking process and suggested a model for future spill response.

Staffing Issues: Trained Imagery Analysts Required

The ICPs lacked a methodology for using the analyzed imagery even when 

the data was available.231 However, even though the ICPs had intelligence 

liaisons practiced in imagery analysis, those analysts were neither trained nor 

experienced in exploiting imagery to find skimmable oil. However, they examined the imagery nonetheless. DHS and NGA intelligence representatives 

were imbedded in the UAC in early May, and in the ICPs by early June. During this timeframe, there was little interaction among the intelligence staffs of 

the ICPs and the UAC. No one quite knew what to do with the intelligence 

analysts. In one instance, Lieutenant Colonel Martinez was placed in the operations section as a shift lead, which completely disregarded his experience 

and value to the remote-sensing effort.232 Martinez also noticed that members of the operations and planning staff would go for days without reviewing 

the daily IRSCC situation picture.233
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Analysis Issues: Deriving Meaning, Need for IT Systems

Deriving meaning from the data turned out to be more difficult than collecting the information. There was no shortage of data. “We were swimming in 

sensors and drowning in data,” commented Captain Kellum.234 Identifying 

and classifying oil based on imagery requires skill and practice. “You don’t 

just look at the image and know what you’re seeing,” DeWitt Braud explained 

during an interview.235 Still, NGA and IRSCC analysts impressed the senior 

response decisionmakers. “NGA was superb,” Rear Admiral Neffenger commented, and added that he was “astonished” at how well satellite imagery could 

find and track boom.236 Neffenger also relayed a story about an NGA analyst 

quipping that he did not care if he was searching out foreign tanks or oil; he 

just liked analyzing and deriving information from imagery. But viewing and 

understanding the images were not the only challenges to analysis; challenges 

existed with computer systems supporting the remote-sensing data.

In particular, the intelligence effort was hampered by insufficient hardware 

and software. The responders lacked computer networks and systems to exploit the remote-sensing imagery. The amount of data proved overwhelming. 

Neffenger described it as like a library without a card catalog; the responders 

knew imagery had been captured, but they did not know how to retrieve, view, 

and manage the imagery.237 The systems that were being used by BP, NOAA, 

NGA, the Department of Defense, and the Coast Guard could neither share 

information nor collaborate. This motivated Stan Gold to comment, “The 

problem was that [the intelligence support] was being done in a vacuum.”238

According to GIS professionals Andrew Stephens and Devon Humphrey in 

their June 9, 2010, open letter posted on the Internet, BP-employed contractors recognized this deficiency, as did the U.S. government responders. 

Geospatial information systems are essential to oilspill response, to depict 

and predict the location and the movement of the oil.239 Unfortunately, as 

David Gisclair explained to me in an e-mail, “During the first four weeks 

of the Deepwater Horizon spill, the responders lacked the proper geospatial 

mechanism (system design and operational hardware and software) to acquire, catalog, store, analyze and display the multitude of data streams that 

decisionmakers needed to execute a well-coordinated response.”240 In one 

example, NOAA convinced the NGA, BP, and the Coast Guard to use a file 

transfer protocol that Commander Dash described as “1975 technology.”241 
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This protocol served well for academic and strategic oil-flow modeling, but 

it completely failed to handle the amount of data required to make it useful 

as a response tool.

Real-Time Oil Locations Not Known

NOAA predicted the flow and future location of the oil. Using aircraft remote-sensing flights and satellite imagery, NOAA scientists accurately predicted the location of the oil in the coming 48 to 72 hours. NOAA staff used 

an intelligence cycle (planning, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination) in this process, and integrated that process into the ICP staff. Senior 

staff members at the UAC and ICP Mobile, Alabama, were pleased with this 

product.242 Unfortunately, this practice was not real-time collection, analysis, production, and dissemination for response operations, but a forecasting 

model developed for long-term scientific research. In the end, this NOAA 

product lacked the detail needed by the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct skimming operations.243

The ICPs rarely put real-time information regarding skimmable oil into the 

hands of the surface responders.244 Ironically, the intelligence support staff 

could accurately predict where the oil could be found in the coming days, but 

not where the skimmable oil was located at that instant. The tactical responders searching out and skimming the oil, along with the contracted vessels, 

were keenly aware of the lack of intelligence from the ICPs supporting the 

skimming operations.

After-Action Study Suggests Integrated Model

Tactical responders understood the inherent need for a functioning logic 

model, including an intelligence cycle, to better accomplish skimming operations. Coast Guard cutter commanding officers spoke to this need in their 

after-action case study written in December 2010. The study suggests using the surveil, detect, classify, identify, and prosecute (SDCIP) framework 

for future SONS and for other incidents involving “significant tactical asset 

employment requirements.”245 The SDCIP is a systematic model, taught by 

the Coast Guard for operational planning, that fuses remote-sensing information. Figure 16 shows the model the commanding officers included in their 

after-action case study.
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SDCIP Tactics & Fusion

Assign

Skimmer

1100-1200

PM Sorties

Validate battleSpace & Reacquire 

AM Sightings

1200-1400

Fuse Satellite & PM 

Sortie data for

Next Day Recon

Next Day Air

Recon to find oil for

Skimmers to set up on

Overnight 1500-1800

Fuse Next Day

Sighting data & mark

With SLDMR’s

Information Fusion,

Situational Awareness,

Risk Assessment,

Force Allocation

Same Day Air

Recon Surge

0700

Same Day Recon

Data Furion

1000-1100

Reposition select skim

Assets overnight to

SLDMB posp’s For 

next day ops 

Figure 16: SDCIP Tactics and Fusion Cycle as described in the “Deepwater 

Horizon Response Surface Operations: A Case Study Prepared by Participating WLB Commanding Officers, page 43.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, John Kennedy, ed., “Deepwater Horizon Response Surface 

Operations: A Case Study Prepared by Participating WLB Commanding Officers,” 

expanded after action report, unpublished, December 2010.

The intelligence organizations that responded to the spill lacked the hardware, 

software, and methodology capable of sharing the collected imagery. Rarely 

during the response were tactical responders provided real-time intelligence 

about the location and extent of the oil. This gap was so prevalent that Coast 

Guard commanding officers developed their own methodology to explain 

how information and intelligence should be used to support spill response. 
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Looks Like Oil, I Think

The lack of a protocol for spotting oil and classifying information across 

the dozens of remote-sensing platforms resulted in misidentification of oil. 

The Coast Guard, NOAA, and, later, the airborne collectors working for the 

601st AOC became practiced in observing and classifying oil from aircraft. 

But this was not the case with dozens of other agencies and contractors flying 

over the spill and searching for skimmable oil. In addition, inexperience on 

the part of some imagery analysts led to false positives in locating skimmable 

oil. Analysts repeatedly misidentified satellite- and aircraft-collected imagery 

that they concluded showed skimmable oil. When surface assets arrived in the 

location, the crews observed seaweed and other surface anomalies where the 

analysts (and some aviators) reported skimmable oil.246 In their case study, 

the commanding officers of the Coast Guard buoy tenders recommended 

that imagery analysts observe skimming operations from the surface to better 

compare imagery data with on scene oil sightings. This, the case study recommended, would improve analysis.247

BP’s Firewalls

BP developed a GIS-based system to manage the remote-sensing information, but controversy followed. In their open letter, Stephens and Humphrey 

described their work to build a “GIS-based Common Operation Picture capability for ICP Houma.”248 Stephens and Humphrey, collectively, have 40 

years of work experience, academic study, and GIS development, according 

to their résumés, and (according to a source who worked very closely with 

them during the Deepwater Horizon response, but asked to not be identified) 

they are well known and respected within the GIS community. In the open 

letter, they explained that their work was completed in the almost record 

time of about one month, late April through May 28, and provided mapping 

products for the incident commander, BP, military, ICP/UAC staff, and political appointees in Washington, DC. 

According to the open letter, members of BP’s IT staff placed this COP behind firewalls, which prevented open and unfettered access to the information, contrary to ICS principles. The authors explained how information 

and imagery collected by the Louisiana National Guard and U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service were placed directly on the BP server behind the firewalls. 
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BP subsequently denied access to the information to the agencies responding to the spill, including the Louisiana National Guard and U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife.249 Lieutenant Colonel Martinez and another source for this project 

corroborated the claims about the BP firewalls discussed in the open letter, 

and further added that BP was reticent to share information and intelligence 

that its staff and contractors produced.250 This duplicity in not sharing information and exerting control over information collected by other agencies 

may have been grounded in BP’s litigation concerns, Martinez suggested, but 

it was not in keeping with the direction and spirit of the National Incident 

Management System. The deputy incident commander, Rear Admiral Neffenger, complained that getting access to data in a useable fashion during the 

response was frustrating.251 It is reasonable to conclude that BP’s firewalls 

contributed to the already uncoordinated, poorly managed remote-sensing 

practices. 

Stephens and Humphrey continued to push for an “open, yet secure” GIS 

system using the best practices from universities, research, and industry.252 

But it appears they pushed too hard. In late May 2010, BP instructed the subcontracted company that employed Stephens and Humphrey that they were 

no longer welcome on the project. They had been sacked. Regardless of the 

emotion, the assertions in the open letter appear sound, and underscore the 

real intelligence challenges of the U.S. government working alongside a private company, the responsible party, during the response to a spill of national 

significance, while simultaneously directing that operation and the responsible party. Lieutenant Colonel Martinez commented on the organizational 

difficulties in working with a private company during disaster response. He 

opined that the chain of authority between the government and the responsible party must be established early and, while the responsible party participates in the effort, the responsible party should not lead that effort.253

“There were so many problems with imagery analysis,” DeWitt Braud summed 

up in a follow-up interview.254 Included in this complaint were system interface problems among agencies using imagery, and the inability to share images in a timely, consistent manner. What the decisionmakers wanted was a 

GIS-based common operating picture, such as Stephens and Humphrey had 

attempted to build, but one that was accessible, unclassified, and available to 

all responders.
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Findings and Recommendations

1. The intelligence support plan recommended at the end of Chapter 3 

should use the intelligence cycle to provide decisionmakers with the information outlined in the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs, below).

The intelligence cycle remains a valid method for planning, collecting, analyzing, producing, and disseminating intelligence to strategic, operational, and 

tactical responders. Although the Incident Command System does not use 

the intelligence cycle, the Department of Defense intelligence staffs do practice the intelligence cycle. Because of this, the intelligence cycle also should be 

practiced during SONS exercises—especially when remote-sensing and GIS 

operations are used.

2. The Coast Guard should create priority intelligence requirements for 

a spill of national significance (SONS) and have them validated. I recommend the following PIRs, which are taken from a July 7, 2010, 

Federal Remote-Sensing Information Report, as a starting point. 

(See the appendix for the essential elements of information that give 

more detail to the PIRs.)

PIR 1: Where is the extent of the oil?

PIR 2: Where are the actionable oil patches? 

PIR 3: Where is the boom and what is its status (effectiveness)? 

PIR 4: What sensitive areas are threatened or impacted by oil? 

PIR 5: Where is the affected shoreline (beach, marsh, estuary)? 

PIR 6: What environmental factors will affect the movement of

oil (12, 24, 48, 72 hours)?

3. After a SONS, the President should immediately delegate complete 

control of the airspace to the U.S. Air Force above and around the spill 

site for flight safety and intelligence collection.

The Deepwater Horizon response underscores that the Department of Defense 

is the sole federal entity with the experience, systems, and trained personnel 
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capable of controlling the airspace above and around a SONS. However, in 

current practice, other departments and agencies are not bound by DoD 

air tasking orders. It is therefore incumbent upon the executive branch 

to direct all of the aircraft (government and private sector) operating in a 

defined response area to comply with the relevant DoD tasking order. In 

other words, aircraft operating in the response areas must do so with the 

permission of and in coordination with the DoD entity controlling all of the 

flights. The Defense Department (U.S. Air Force), along with the Federal 

Aviation Administration, would determine the appropriate extent, altitude, 

and rules governing the airspace to maximize safe flight, response operations, 

and intelligence collection.

4. A remote-sensing concept of operations (CONOPS) should be developed as part of the intelligence support plan that incorporates the federal, 

state, commercial, and international geospatial information systems that 

will be used in response to a spill of national significance.

The remote-sensing CONOPS would define information and intelligence 

capabilities to respond to the spill. The CONOPS also would establish unity 

of effort and command among the remote-sensing agencies and delineate the 

structure of the remote-sensing teams within the UAC and the ICPs. The 

CONOPS would require enough flexibility to be customized for use in a 

SONS response, depending on the location and the type of spill. 

The CONOPS also should include a remote-sensing methodology based 

on the intelligence cycle, with particular attention to providing timely, accurate imagery and analysis to tactical responders. The surveil, detect, classify, identify, and prosecute (SDCIP) model developed by the Coast Guard 

cutter commanding officers combines a decision cycle with a remote-sensing 

support plan to execute operations. Including such a model in the remotesensing CONOPS would standardize the practice among the spill responders 

and set clear expectations for intelligence support to the skimming forces.
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Chapter 5

The Common Operating Picture

“Failure of communications appears to be endemic to the human condition.”255

—Barbara Tuchman

In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon spill, decisionmakers and staff 

officers interviewed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels reported 

that they needed accurate, timely information and intelligence to respond to 

a spill of national significance. Specifically, decisionmakers said they needed 

a common operating picture to answer their questions, and the intelligence 

staff officers said they needed a method to share their analysis. The Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA) was eventually adopted 

as a kind of common operating picture after the initial weeks of the spill. 

ERMA received high marks from strategic-level decisionmakers, but less so 

from the actual responders. The need for a government-wide common operating picture remains.

Production and Dissemination

Strategic, operational, and tactical decisionmakers first wanted to know what 

was going on with the spill. They wanted to know the situation. Specifically, 

the decisionmakers wanted to know where the oil was, where the oil was 

going, where their ships and planes were, and where the boom was located. 

Moreover, the strategic-level decisionmakers wanted that information and 

intelligence to be unclassified and readily available. In short, they wanted 

a common operating picture. As discussed in Chapter 4, and affirmed by 

Lieutenant Commander Tabitha Schiro, USCGR, in an interview, there was 

no shortage of assets collecting images and data, but the timeliness and completeness of those images and information was lacking.256

How to best communicate that information to the decisionmakers? Despite 

the thousands of images taken of the spill to support the response effort, there 

was no mechanism to organize, display, or manage those images during the 

first month and a half after the spill.257 In intelligence parlance, packaging 

the analyzed information and getting it to the decisionmaker is known as 
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production and dissemination. As Captain Kellum put it, “All the remote sensing in the world isn’t going to help unless you can get the data to the right 

people in the right form.”258 That was not done in an efficient manner and, 

as it turns out, was never fully accomplished. 

A common operating picture was the first—and, arguably, most important—

need of strategic and operational decisionmakers. Rear Admiral Neffenger, 

the deputy incident commander, relayed his displeasure that a structure was 

unavailable to drive information/intelligence management and display this 

information. He explained how he was frustrated with too many sources of 

data in addition to unconnected data sources, no commonality in display, 

and no means of aggregating and sorting that information. According to Neffenger, Admiral Allen said in early May: “I need a platform to display information and I want it to be GIS-based.”259 Neffenger in turn said that he 

needed to know where the “oil, people, and resources” were. He wanted an 

application to “clear the fog out and tell me what the picture looks like.”260

The COP had to do more than display information; it needed to contextualize that information and be able to provide meaning.

This need for a common operating picture actually “drove” the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency coming on board to support the spill response, 

according to Rear Admiral Neffenger. He and Rear Admiral Zukunft, the 

second federal on scene commander at the operational level, wanted a single, 

GIS-based system for tracking the extent of the oil, identifying skimmable 

oil, and displaying the surface forces, including the thousands of vessels of 

opportunity. Allen told Neffenger the display must not only serve the Incident Command Post staffs and tactical responders, but must also display the 

government’s response effort. Allen wanted to communicate to government 

leadership and the public, via the common operating picture, the work being 

done to fight the spill. Finally, Admiral Allen wanted the common operating 

picture fully available to the public in real time. This, he argued, would address many of the common questions posed daily, if not hourly, to the leaders 

of the response and their staffs. 

Several GIS-based systems were used throughout the ICPs as common operating pictures. The Department of Homeland Security used a system to manage situational awareness, but it was not used as a common operating picture. 

BP built a common operating picture, but its limited access prohibited its 
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usefulness to the responders. “It appeared [that] every contractor had their 

own version” of a GIS-based COP, according to Lieutenant Commander 

Fisher.261 And lastly, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration used the Environmental Response Management Application, which by 

mid-July had developed into the common operating picture Admiral Allen 

wanted adopted throughout the response effort. According to interviewees, 

ERMA appears to have offered the best common operating picture during the 

response, even though it was not widely used until later in the summer and 

had some shortcomings.

The following sections will review each system in turn and discuss findings 

and recommendations for a way forward in responding to spills of national 

significance.

Homeland Security Information System—Capable But with

Limited Access

The Homeland Security Information System (HSIN) was designed to serve 

many purposes, including as a common operating picture. The Department 

of Homeland Security describes HSIN as “a national secure and trusted webbased portal for information sharing and collaboration between federal, state, 

local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and international partners engaged in 

the homeland security mission.”262 HSIN is federally funded and operated 

by the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning within DHS. HSIN 

contains information and communication tools, including after-action reports of events, a library of reference documents, web links, event schedules 

for meetings and exercises, a chat function, mapping tools, and a common 

operating picture. For the COP, HSIN uses a GIS-based application called 

GeoPlatform.gov, which represents the response and several categories of data 

with submenus that the user may turn on to display on the map. 

Access to HSIN is limited, however. Although HSIN is unclassified, many 

of the products placed on the network, including most of the common operating pictures, are marked “For Official Use Only” (FOUO). FOUO is a 

handling caveat that prohibits dissemination of that material for purposes 

other than government operations. In other words, FOUO material may not 

be disseminated to the public or made available via the Internet on an open 

system. 
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HSIN is a permission-only network. There are two layers of security a person 

must pass through before initially gaining access to HSIN. When a person 

applies for access to HSIN, his or her organization must sponsor that person 

on a particular “community” or particular “communities” within HSIN. That 

is, a person cannot gain access to communities within HSIN merely by having access to the site. For example, Deepwater Horizon was a “community,” 

as was the Hurricane Irene response and national-level contingency exercises. 

Within each “community” may be found a COP, documents, information 

regarding the response, and so forth. This is the first layer of vetting. In addition, the HSIN administrators limit access to those individuals determined to 

have a need to use the information available on HSIN. 

The story of HSIN revealed an important requirement for a common operating picture; in addition to the information needed by decisionmakers, access 

to such a system played a part. For example, BP built a common operating 

picture, as discussed in Chapter 4, but it was behind BP’s firewalls. Therefore, 

only BP had access to the information, even though many other organizations and agencies contributed data to the BP COP. Like BP’s COP, HSIN 

was available and widely used during the Deepwater Horizon response, but 

it was behind U.S. government firewalls, preventing industry and other responders from having untrammeled access. The public could gain access to 

neither of these common operating pictures, despite Admiral Allen’s wishes 

to the contrary. 

The Story of ERMA: Selected As the COP

The Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA), developed 

by the University of New Hampshire (UNH), is a web-based GIS program 

that pulls and displays data from other systems. In 2006, UNH’s Coastal 

Response Research Center, led by Dr. Nancy Kinner and Dr. Amy Merten, 

studied how other academic disciplines graphically described and displayed 

complex environmental systems with multiple data inputs.263 The researchers wanted to understand how the other disciplines captured and showed the 

data, especially when the information rested in unconnected databases. For 

example, a tidal region is affected by the wind, air temperature, sea temperature, wave action, moon phase, location, and other geographic factors. The 

most current information for these vectors may be maintained with different 

agencies in different systems. Yet to have a current, real-time understanding 
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of the tidal region, all of the information must be culled from the disparate 

databases and then displayed in a way that is easy to understand. Kinner and 

Merten understood this, and created the application that became ERMA. 

In 2006, the UNH team demonstrated its prototype application to Kent 

Barton, the NOAA Director of the Office of Response and Restoration, who 

helped secure approval and funding for further development. In the spring 

of 2006, the team invited representatives from NOAA Region 1 (in New 

England), the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, and 

state representatives of New Hampshire and Maine to view the ERMA prototype. According to Kinner, this “generated a good deal of excitement,” and 

UNH subsequently sought and included user input from these federal and 

state representatives to guide ERMA development.264 Federal, state, and local responders then agreed to use ERMA during spill drills in and around 

Portsmouth, New Hampshire. These practical exercises helped Kinner and 

Merten improve and refine ERMA by placing real-world constraints and parameters around the use of the application. This garnered further support 

from NOAA, which Kinner described as “critical” to the growth of ERMA. 

Once developed, the UNH team turned ERMA over to NOAA to manage.

How ERMA Works

ERMA was designed to cull data from different databases and display it 

graphically on top of maps and charts. Figure 17 shows the design and architecture of ERMA. ERMA should not, however, be considered a map-making 

program. The application can store, query, and display spatially referenced 

data by continually assembling information from other sources.265 The information ERMA displays is as accurate and current as the information provided by the parent organization in its own database. ERMA can link users 

to documents, data tables, and live vessel traffic information. In addition, it 

can incorporate this information onto maritime charts and maps that include 

weather and navigation data, and create interactive search functions.266

The concept and initial research on ERMA appeared promising, but the creators of the application had yet to see if it would work during an actual 

response.
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Figure 17: ERMA architecture, as described by the University of New 

Hampshire’s Coastal Response Research Center.

Source: Nancy Kinner, Michele Jacobi, and Amy Merten, “ERMA: Environmental 

Response Management Application,” University of New Hampshire, Coastal Response Research Center, accessed August 15, 2011, http://www.crrc.unh.edu/erma/

erma_presentation.pdf, slide number 12.
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ERMA: Toward Real-World Applications

ERMA moved quickly from a tested concept to an operational reality. According 

to Dr. Amy Merten, of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 

Administration, NOAA took ERMA from the UNH development team in 

2007 and created a working application for the Environmental Protection 

Agency in the Caribbean.267 The Caribbean ERMA has been used to display 

groundings of small vessels near sensitive areas and for oilspill response drills, and 

was used during the response to the Haiti earthquake in January 2010. 268 After 

the earthquake, ERMA integrated imagery of the damage to assist responders 

and to keep decisionmakers informed of the incident and the international 

effort to provide assistance. NOAA also created an ERMA site for Puget Sound, 

Washington, to support a climate-change initiative and to prepare for possible 

chemical spills in that environment. 

Just before the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill, NOAA tested ERMA 

during the 2010 spill of national significance exercise in March. The exercise 

scenario envisioned a collision between a large car carrier and an oil tanker in 

the Gulf of Maine during a severe winter storm, with subfreezing temperatures 

and reduced visibility.269 The exercise simulated oil impacting the coastlines 

of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. This was the first time ERMA 

was exercised on a national level as a situational tool; UNH and NOAA, 

however, envisioned using ERMA to eventually take on the role of a common 

operating picture.270

NOAA described ERMA during the SONS 2010 exercise as “a web-based open 

source mapping tool designed to capture and share geographic information used 

in science decisionmaking, both on scene and remotely.”271 (Emphasis added.) 

And this point bears repeating: NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration 

envisioned and supported ERMA’s development as a decisionmaking tool, not 

merely as a research application. Figure 18 shows the ERMA display during 

the SONS 2010 exercise and the real-time information available to exercise 

participants and decisionmakers.

The response to ERMA at the SONS exercise in 2010 was positive. The Shell 

Oil Company was very interested in using ERMA in response to SONS exercises and in real-world scenarios. Coast Guard planners and responders who 

took part in the spill exercise argued for adoption of ERMA for broader use 
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Figure 18: An example of ERMA New England from the SONS 2010 exercise, with NOAA raster charts and buoy locations displayed, in conjunction 

with the ESI Shoreline Classification layer. The ESI shoreline layer indicates 

how sensitive the shorelines are to oil. Areas in red are the most sensitive.

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), “It’s a Drill: 

SONS 2010,” accessed September 6, 2011, http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/topic_subtopic_entry.php?RECORD_KEY(entry_subtopic_topic)=entry_id,subtopic_id,topic_

id&entry_id(entry_subtopic_topic)=808&subtopic_id(entry_subtopic_topic)=2&topic_

id(entry_subtopic_topic)=1

during response operations.272 The response community would not have 

long to wait to see ERMA in action.

ERMA Arrives in Response to Deepwater Horizon

While ERMA was set up shortly after the Deepwater Horizon spill, it took weeks 

before it served as a common operating picture. Merten and her NOAA staff 

arrived a week and a half after the explosion of the Macondo well. Sponsored 
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by the NOAA scientific support coordinator and assigned to assist the Coast 

Guard with situational awareness, some members of the ERMA team set up 

shop in the Unified Area Command (UAC) at Roberts, Louisiana, with the 

rest working in the Incident Command Post in Houma. The initial challenge, 

and a critical component in using ERMA, was determining the information 

needs of the decisionmakers and understanding their requirements. Merten’s 

team quickly worked to gain consensus from all participants, including BP, 

to coordinate information needs across the spectrum of responders.273 This 

proved challenging because each federal agency, along with the state and local 

governments and the private-sector responders, was interested in different sets 

of information to answer questions from the respective chains of command. 

Complicating this challenge, there was no comprehensive IT system available to manage the volume of data needed.274 In early June, the staff at the 

UAC was producing 37 different graphic reports a day to answer data requirements in the different formats wanted by the requesting agencies. This effort 

consumed considerable staff hours and Stan Gold derided its inefficiency.275

Decisionmakers responding to the spill needed an easier way to view data and 

pull meaning from the massive amount of information available. 

ERMA Rises to the Challenge

ERMA could help make sense of the massive amount of available data, but 

it would take a serious discussion between the President and Admiral Allen. 

That discussion happened almost two months after the explosion, when the 

response effort appeared to be struggling. Admiral Allen had a “come-to-Jesus talk,” as described by the Washington Post’s Eugene Robinson, with President Obama onboard Air Force One on June 15 about the spill response.276

The following day, Admiral Allen issued new guidance on the prosecution 

of the spill response (as described in Chapter 4). At the same time, he also 

gave straightforward, unambiguous direction to the ERMA team on what he 

wanted to see.277 Admiral Allen wanted to know where the surface response 

ships were, including federal, state, local, and private vessels. He also wanted 

the vessels of opportunity tracked. The admiral asked that the positions of 

these vessels be updated every 15 minutes. He wanted to see where the oil was 

located on the surface and where it was headed. Admiral Allen asked to see the 

surface and aerial dispersant operations. He wanted all of this data layered on a 

geospatial information system, and he wanted it on ERMA. In addition to using ERMA as an information and decisionmaking tool, Admiral Allen wanted 
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to use ERMA as the briefing tool for visiting VIPs, media, and the public. He 

wanted the COP to be unclassified and available online to the general public. 

Finally, the UAC staff had clear requirements and they worked quickly.

ERMA: Problem Solved, But at What Cost?

In less than 24 hours, Merten’s team had adjusted ERMA’s code to present the 

majority of the information in the manner asked for by Admiral Allen. Some 

of the datasets took longer to create, but within a week the team had met 

all of the admiral’s taskings.278 Had Merten’s team known the requirements 

made by senior decisionmakers sooner, the team could have been providing 

the desired support all along. And this raises two important points about 

ERMA, even though Deepwater Horizon was just its first real trial as a common operating picture during a crisis: ERMA was flexible and responsive. 

ERMA Worked Well for Strategic Decisionmakers

Even though ERMA achieved ultimate success, its usefulness varied depending on the users’ place within the response. The more senior a decisionmaker was in the response to Deepwater Horizon, the more positively he or she 

viewed the application. “ERMA was terrific, just terrific,” Admiral Allen commented. Rear Admiral Neffenger spoke about how valuable the ERMA team’s 

efforts were in translating data into displayable information.279 And Rear 

Admiral Zukunft lauded the diversity of information that NOAA piled onto 

ERMA for a common operating picture, even including telemetry readings 

from U.S. Navy unmanned, underwater gliders.280 As mentioned in Chapter 

4, the senior-level decisionmakers wanted to know what was going on at any 

given moment, and ERMA provided that information to them. ERMA also 

displayed the response effort being executed against the spill, something Rear 

Admiral Neffenger underscored during his interview. 

The use of ERMA eliminated the need for staffs to provide individual briefs 

on the status of the spill, which took up a lot of time because decisionmakers, 

from the White House to state governors, had an almost-constant demand 

for information about the spill and the response. For example, during the first 

two months of the response, the UAC produced 37 separate briefs per day to 

provide situational information. Admiral Allen and Stan Gold described the 

process of preparing the 37 briefs as cumbersome and time consuming.281
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But when ERMA matured in the later part of July, the decisionmakers who 

had previously received the 37 briefs could instead be directed to the ERMA 

COP, which contained all of the current information. ERMA, therefore, removed the requirement to prepare the many briefs, saving valuable time, effort, and resources. 

In addition to reducing work, ERMA helped the strategic-level decisionmakers present information. ERMA excelled as a briefing tool for visiting VIPs. 

Admiral Allen described what he called a “fiasco” during the crisis, when his 

staff at the UAC spent “two or three hundred” man-hours preparing a PowerPoint presentation for the DHS secretary just before ERMA came online 

in July.282 A very senior official in DHS complicated this effort by becoming 

intimately involved in the design and production of the presentation to the 

level of detail of the background colors of the slides. Three days later, Admiral Allen reviewed the ERMA COP with his staff for 15 minutes, and then 

briefed Vice President Joseph Biden from the COP for 30 minutes. “That’s 

the difference,” said Admiral Allen, in the value of using a common operating 

picture to present information, as opposed to a static brief that displays only 

one moment in time. ERMA had challenges for other users, though, despite 

Admiral Allen’s praise. 

ERMA: Operational and Tactical Responders Less Pleased

Responders working at the operational level in the ICPs and the tactical level 

both on and over the water found less value in ERMA. “I never found [ERMA] 

to be a very useful tool,” Lieutenant Commander Fisher mentioned during an 

interview.283 Part of the problem stemmed from the newness of ERMA and 

the lack of familiarity with the application. For example, Lieutenant Commander Schiro commented that the ICP spent a great deal of time trying to 

determine what data ERMA was capturing, what the decisionmakers in the 

ICP wanted ERMA to capture, and how to extract data (and meaning) from 

ERMA.284 This criticism seems one of process as opposed to substance, since 

the ICP staff received little to no training on using ERMA. A good tool improperly applied in response to a catastrophe will reduce effectiveness. 

Another complaint leveled at ERMA was its lack of information about skimmable oil. With a few exceptions, noted in Chapter 4, a paucity of information 

about skimmable oil was a common issue during the cleanup, regardless of the 

system used. There existed no information or intelligence system (common 
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operating picture) that provided timely, accurate data on the location of skimmable oil, including the data in ERMA. This lack of information severely impacted the tactical responders, especially the Coast Guard cutters, which lacked 

the computers and software to support ERMA.285 In other words, the Coast 

Guard cutters conducting the skimming and directing some of the VOOs could 

not access ERMA. To address this, laptop computers were provided to the cutters to make ERMA available, but the computers met with mixed success.

In particular, the tactical responders were less well-served by ERMA. According to Lieutenant Commander Fisher, the tactical responders became “very 

frustrated” with the flow of information and intelligence from the ICPs.286

The remote-sensing images were not easily shared with the tactical responders 

because the files proved too big for e-mail. Because of bandwidth restrictions, 

the Coast Guard cutters could not view ERMA either, even after it was adopted as the common operating picture. When the tactical responders provided 

feedback on problems with ERMA, they saw no change in the application to 

address their concerns.287

Toward a “Common” Common Operating Picture?

Despite the criticisms of ERMA, its use during the Deepwater Horizon response proved its worth and sped its exposure and acceptance as a common 

operating picture.288 In July 2011, David M. Kennedy, the assistant administrator of NOAA, in his written statement before the Senate Subcommittee 

on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, said that the ERMA 

team was named a finalist for the Homeland Security Medal for its assistance 

to responders reacting to the Deepwater Horizon spill.289 In further response 

to questions by subcommittee members, Kennedy said ERMA proved so successful in response to the Deepwater Horizon spill that he would like to see 

support and funding for an “Arctic ERMA.”290

While NOAA is enthusiastic about ERMA, the Department of Homeland 

Security does not appear as anxious to adopt it. For example, during the week 

of August 22, 2011, with Hurricane Irene pushing up the U.S. East Coast, 

DHS asked NOAA to stream the data from ERMA to the DHS system, because it did not want to use ERMA’s application to depict the data.291 It may 

be that DHS has another common operating picture application in use, such 

as the Homeland Security Intelligence Network (HSIN). However, I used the 
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HSIN during a U.S. national-level disaster contingency exercise in May 2011 

and found it a slow, cumbersome tool that lacked the comparative refinement 

and ease of use available with ERMA.

Findings and Recommendations

1. The Coast Guard should designate a system (hardware and software) to 

view, analyze, and share remote-sensing imagery during SONS responses 

among federal, state, local, tribal, and commercial responders.

One of the most important requirements highlighted by the strategic, operational, and tactical responders to Deepwater Horizon was for a GIS-based 

architecture that can rapidly and accurately display the common operating 

picture. The vastness of the Deepwater Horizon response, coupled with a 24-

hour news cycle and a near-insatiable demand for information from the public and senior government officials, required an easily accessible, web-based 

system to share information in an open manner. Admiral Allen encouraged 

transparency during the Deepwater Horizon response and asked that ERMA 

be viewable to all. 

2. The common operating picture should be built on an existing system, such as

 ERMA, that has proven its usefulness during exercises and real-world response 

operations.

While other systems are available, ERMA has shown its utility in managing 

and displaying layered data in a GIS format. The On Scene Coordinator Report

also recommended that ERMA be adopted as the COP for oilspill response. 

Using ERMA presents challenges, however, such as the difficulty Coast Guard 

cutters have in accessing the web page because of bandwidth restrictions for 

ships that are underway. 

3. The Coast Guard should acquire a system that permits cutters and VOOs to

use whatever remote-sensing application the service settles upon. 

Information is the medium of response. Getting the right assets to the right 

locations when they are needed can be best accomplished through information sharing. This system should be lightweight—and possibly even portable—to permit unclassified Internet use and support of a GIS-based mapping 

protocol, such as ERMA. 

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Chapter 6—Conclusion

“The fact of being reported multiplies the apparent extent of 

any deplorable development by five to tenfold.”293

—Barbara Tuchman

This chapter captures the recommendations made throughout this work. Although many of my sources would likely find these recommendations obvious, the epilogue to this work suggests that the organizations responsible for 

disaster-response planning do not. At the risk of being too obvious, I submit 

the following.

Intelligence in Disaster Response

The role of intelligence in disaster response is the same as in all other national 

endeavors: to warn decisionmakers and to help them make better decisions. 

This was particularly true in the response to the Deepwater Horizon explosion 

and spill of national significance in April 2010. Decisionmakers at all levels, 

including the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, needed information 

(and, therefore, intelligence) in a timely, easy-to-use format so that they could 

deploy personnel and assets to fight the spill. 

However, the intelligence support to the Deepwater Horizon was uncoordinated and insufficient because of the lack of federal guidance on supporting 

spill response, a lack of understanding of a worst-case scenario, the absence of 

a plan for intelligence support (command and control, priority intelligence 

requirements, intelligence production cycle), and an initial lack of a common 

operating picture. 

On the positive side, strategic decisionmakers praised the efforts of the intelligence staffs in the response effort, and, in the end, despite the handicaps 

identified in this project, they praised the support that intelligence provided. 

The support grew steadily throughout the response, and was mature by the 

time the Macondo well was capped in mid-July.

Standard Organization Required for Intelligence Support to 

Disaster Response

A SONS response, by its very definition of “national significance,” should have a separate intelligence section chief who 
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reports to the incident commander and supports the other response sections. 

Current disaster response guidance, namely the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS), do not 

adequately address the role and purpose of intelligence in disaster response. 

The NRF and the NIMS are purposefully vague to allow, in part, some operational autonomy by the response effort. However, where intelligence support is concerned, there is too much autonomy and too little direction. Even 

the location of the intelligence effort within the Incident Command System 

is open for interpretation. This slowed the coordination of intelligence support and the ability of intelligence to provide accurate, timely, and “finished” 

information, which ultimately hampered unity of effort and command. Intelligence should not be buried within the planning sections as it was in Deepwater Horizon. 

The Coast Guard Should Have Several Intelligence Support Plans

 for National Response Efforts

The Coast Guard should develop several intelligence support 

plans that encompass a range of possible maritime events and 

responses where the service would be the lead agency. These 

plans should clearly delineate intelligence authorities and responsibilities and especially include a remote-sensing concept of 

operations.

Without an understanding of what a worst-case spill could be, the federal 

government and the Coast Guard were not prepared to respond to a SONS 

of the magnitude of Deepwater Horizon. Participants interviewed for this 

book repeatedly said the Deepwater Horizon response was new territory and 

a never-before-experienced event. Admiral Allen explained that they were 

making up the response as they went along.294 This is hardly encouraging, 

and stems from a lack of strategic intelligence and vision. From an intelligence 

perspective, it is perfectly conceivable to develop worst-case scenarios for a 

range of possible natural or man-induced disasters. The lack of vision extends 

to a lack of planning and, specifically, an absence of an intelligence plan to 

support a SONS. Several after-action reports from Deepwater Horizon have 

highlighted the lack of adequate operational planning in preparation for the 
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Deepwater Horizon spill (or any spill of that size), but the subject matter 

expert after-action reports are nearly silent on the need for better intelligence

planning and integration in spill response. 

Training and Education

In its intelligence training courses, the Coast Guard should develop and implement a track on intelligence support to disaster 

response.

Neither Coast Guard enlisted nor officer intelligence training courses contain 

material about intelligence support to disaster response. Yet this report and 

other works have shown the critical intelligence requirements of decisionmakers at all levels after a disaster. These decisionmakers would be better 

served if the cadre of Coast Guard intelligence officers responding to a national disaster understood and could implement intelligence support to the 

National Incident Commander and the NIMS after an event. 

Airspace Control a Critical Necessity

The national incident commander should have complete authority to control the airspace above and around the disaster area.

In this study, I highlight the use of the Air Force in managing airspace for 

Deepwater Horizon. In reality, lessons from Hurricane Katrina, Deepwater 

Horizon, the Haiti earthquake response, and the National Level Exercise 

2011 all suggest that the President should direct all response agencies using aircraft to fly in coordination with and under the permission of a single 

authority. Furthermore, that authority should be determined as early in the 

response as possible, and they should report directly to the national incident 

commander. 

A Common Operating Picture

A common operating picture that is accessible to all responders 

should be developed and agreed upon for use across the disaster 

response.

In this study, I recommend building on the Environmental Response and 

Management Application (ERMA) to develop a common operating picture 
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that includes a web-based GIS capable of layering data to depict the extent of 

the disaster and the response effort. The COP can be used to develop response 

actions, inform the public of the progress of the response, and incorporate 

information and intelligence about the incident. Regarding a maritime response, the COP must be accessible by Coast Guard cutters and other surface 

response elements. Bandwidth challenges in using web-based applications 

prevented the Coast Guard cutters from using the ERMA-based COP that 

was developed during the Deepwater Horizon response when the cutters were 

underway searching for and skimming oil. 
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Chapter 7

Epilogue

“In this sphere, wisdom which may be defined as the exercise 

of judgment acting on experience, common sense, and available information, is less operative and more frustrated than it 

should be.” 

 —Barbara Tuchman

Lessons Experienced Are Not Lessons Learned

The Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard experienced 

the intelligence lessons of the Deepwater Horizon response, but they did not 

necessarily learn some of those lessons. This observation is based on my participation in National Level Exercise 2011 (NLE 11) in May 2011. NLE 

11 was hosted by DHS and was conducted to gauge a response to a natural 

catastrophe in the Midwest. 

The exercise envisioned two large earthquakes that impacted several states 

with casualties, significant infrastructure damage, and no communication. 

The Coast Guard wanted to test situational awareness within the service and 

DHS. I participated in the exercise, acting as the deputy commandant for 

intelligence and investigation.

When That Old Man River Shakes

The exercise envisioned two massive earthquakes in the U.S. Midwest that 

caused thousands of fatalities and injuries, significant power outages, infrastructure damage, and maritime transportation system disruptions in Iowa, 

Illinois, Missouri, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Arkansas. Hundreds of 

miles of these rivers were closed to commercial traffic and impassable because of damage to the locks and dams. The western river system, including the Mississippi, Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois rivers, is a federal waterway, 

and during the exercise Janet Napolitano, the DHS secretary, designated the 

Coast Guard as the lead agency in restoring the maritime transportation system on these rivers. 
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A focus of the exercise was to test situational awareness, coordination within 

the National Response Framework, support to public messaging and warning, 

and logistical support to a large-scale natural disaster. The most important objective of the exercise, from an intelligence perspective, was to test situational 

awareness. 

Proper situational awareness requires timely, accurate information and, on 

this count, the Coast Guard and the exercise failed to deliver. First of all, the 

Coast Guard exercise plan did not build in what some planners called “traditional intelligence play.” Instead, intelligence was included and assessed under 

“situational awareness.” But the exercise evaluators (who judge the success or 

failure of the exercise) wanted to evaluate how well Coast Guard intelligence 

could support a catastrophic natural event. This was confusing because it 

focused on only one aspect of intelligence, a common operating picture. To 

my mind, the lack of broader intelligence play also demonstrated a lack of 

understanding about intelligence functions in support of disaster response. 

The Missing Common Operating Picture

No common operating picture was employed to display and share information among the agencies responding to the exercise. Neither the National 

Operations Center nor the Coast Guard designated a COP. The National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency used an operating picture, but it was placed 

on Goggle Earth Pro, which is a proprietary system that includes layered, 

GIS-based data that can be mined and organized for myriad displays. Unfortunately, if an organization had not purchased the Google Earth Pro application, NGA’s operating picture was not accessible. 

As mentioned in Chapter 5, the Department of Homeland Security manages 

a system called the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). HSIN 

is an access-controlled, web-based portal for information sharing among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private-sector, and international subscribers. During the exercise NLE 11, the DHS National Operations Center produced a daily COP and posted it on the exercise page. While this operating 

picture depicted some information regarding the exercise, including updates 

on casualties, power outages, and earthquake damage, it was not a true COP. 

Instead, it was a static “snapshot” with limited data as opposed to an active, 

continually updated common operating picture with layered data. 
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The lack of a common operating picture was a deficiency that senior Coast 

Guard leadership had experienced before. Rear Admiral Zukunft, one of the 

Coast Guard admirals who participated in NLE 11 and the Deepwater Horizon response, commented how helpful the ERMA COP, once established, 

had been in managing and depicting information.296 Throughout the fourday exercise, the exercise Coast Guard commandant (played by a three-star 

admiral) commented on the absence of a graphic, geospatial-based product 

to depict the earthquake impact and the response effort. As previously noted 

in this work, the Coast Guard Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) 

of Deepwater Horizon highlighted the concerns of responders who were frustrated with the absence of a single, geospatial-intelligence system–based COP. 

Ironically, the ISPR argued for a standard, exercised COP before an incident 

occurs.297

No Remote-Sensing Coordination

The exercise did not designate an overarching remote-sensing coordination 

cell (RSCC) to coordinate imagery collection for the exercise. Imagery, from 

both airborne and satellite collection, would be an obvious tool in assessing 

the earthquakes’ damage, especially considering the communication disruptions throughout the impacted area. Additionally, imagery would have contributed to a common operating picture (had one existed). In the exercise, the 

Coast Guard National Command Center and the Coast Guard Atlantic Area 

Command drafted imagery collection requests and routed them to the Coast 

Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) in Suitland, Maryland, when 

no other RSCC could be identified. It was thought that the ICC would be 

the most effective Coast Guard unit to coordinate the requests. Even though 

testing remote sensing was not a goal of the exercise, testing the ability to 

maintain situational awareness was the first objective of the exercise. Imagery 

would have helped to maintain awareness for strategic, operational, and tactical decisionmakers.

The exercise also failed to designate an authority to coordinate and control 

aircraft responding to the earthquakes. After the mock earthquakes on 

May 16, 2011, when the exercise began, federal, state, and local agencies 

simulated the deployment of hundreds of aircraft into the impacted area. For 

example, on the first day of the exercise, the Coast Guard simulated flying 

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft to staging areas in Arkansas and East St. Louis. 
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The Coast Guard also flew damage-assessment operations to determine the 

impact of the earthquake on infrastructure. Unfortunately, these flights were 

not centrally coordinated by the exercise for information collection, and it 

appeared the Coast Guard conducted these mock assessments of its own 

initiative. As with the Deepwater Horizon response, flight safety became a 

concern with so many aircraft operating above the impacted area without 

coordination. As I recommended in Chapter 4, the exercise response needed 

an air tasking order or equivalent mechanism to ensure flight safety and to 

coordinate information collection via remote sensing. 

Validated Intelligence Requirements 

The exercise did include the important first step of the intelligence cycle, 

which is the validation of information requirements. This helped to meet the 

Coast Guard’s first objective of exercising situational awareness. By presenting the information requirements to the Coast Guard strategic decisionmakers early in the response, information and intelligence collection could be 

focused on the needs of the decisionmakers. In a real-world response, the 

requirements would have driven subordinate coordination and collection, especially regarding the extent of the earthquake damage.

The validation of information requirements during the exercise worked in 

the following way: the USCG NCC intelligence staff drafted Commander’s 

Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) within an hour after the exercise earthquakes struck at 1000 EDT. The exercise commandant reviewed and 

validated the CCIRs at the first meeting of the Coast Guard senior leadership, 

two hours after the earthquakes. The CCIRs consisted of priority intelligence 

requirements and friendly forces information requirements. Next, DHS Secretary Napolitano endorsed the CCIRs when she listed her information requirements at the conclusion of the exercise’s first DHS senior-leadership group 

video teleconference. The secretary wanted to know about reestablishing communications in the impacted area and the status of search and rescue. 

The following day of the exercise, the Coast Guard operational-level command played by the Coast Guard Atlantic Area in Portsmouth, Virginia, validated its own CCIRs, which were almost identical to those of the exercise 

commandant and the DHS secretary. The Atlantic area commander increased 
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unity of effort in intelligence collection by reviewing and modeling his CCIRs 

on those of the exercise commandant. 

The following table graphically displays the similarities and differences in 

intelligence support between Deepwater Horizon and National Level Exercise 2011. A green bullet indicates the intelligence function took place successfully throughout the event. A yellow bullet shows that the intelligence 

function took place successfully for only a portion of the event, and a red 

bullet denotes that the intelligence function never happened successfully in 

response to the event.

Event Intel Supt. 

Plan

PIR’s ID/

Validated 

Remote 

Remote

Sensing

Coord. 

COP Air Tasking

Order

DWH • • • • •

NLE 11 • • • • •

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APPENDIX

SONS Priority Intelligence Requirements298

PIR 1: Where is the extent of the oil?

EEI 1.1

EEI 1.2

EEI 1.3

EEI 1.4

EEI 1.5

EEI 1.6

EEI 1.7

EEI 1.8

Report and identify the forward edge of the oil slick.

Report and identify composition of oil in leading edge.

Report direction of movement.

Identify leading edge of oil plume in the northeast

Gulf of Mexico.

Report estimated time of landfall.

When will the oilspill arrive on the coast?

What are the current locations, trajectory, and make-up 

of oil deposits that could impact the Gulf Coast?

Area of Interest coverage for Indications and Warning to 

detect oil for popup areas off Florida coasts with revisit 

rate to support operations.

PIR 2: Where are the actionable oil patches?

EEI 2.1

EEI 2.2

EEI 2.3

EEI 2.4

EEI 2.5

EEI 2.6

EEI 2.7

Report size and location of oil concentrations suitable for 

skimming operations.

Report oil type (sheen or heavy crude).

Identify patches of mousse or brown oil larger than 100ft by 

200ft in the near-shore zone.

Identify patches of mousse or brown oil larger than .5 

nautical miles (nm) by .5 nm in the off-shore zone.

Report any information containing the depth and composition

of the oilspill.

Locate and report areas of burnable/dispersible oil.

Within 2 hours of collection, report and identify forward edge of 

oil plumes (not sheen) in the northeast Gulf of Mexico that are 

of interest (ICP Mobile).
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

122

PIR3: Where is the boom and what is its status (effectiveness)?

EEI 3.1

EEI 3.2

EEI 3.3

EEI 3.4

EEI 3.5

EEI 3.6

EEI 3.7

Identify the gaps in boom coverage.

Report areas of displaced/beached booms.

Report areas of improper boom placement.

Report booms being washed ashore.

Any significant compromise or loss of barrier emplacements 

or material requiring more than 24 hours to repair or requiring

increased personnel activation?

Report degraded booms, to include submerged booms and

broken booms.

Any boating activity or individuals damaging or stealing

booms or barricades.

PIR 4: What sensitive areas are threatened or impacted by oil?

EEI 4.1

EEI 4.2

EEI 4.3

EEI 4.4

Identify any fisheries, wetlands, and wildlife refuges that are

threatened/impacted by oil.

Credible reports of oil in or near environmentally sensitive areas.

Species, numbers of, and location of dead or injured wildlife 

resulting from oil spill.

Any critical environmental areas or geographic protected areas not 

protected by mitigation booms. 

PIR 5: Where is the affected shoreline (beach, marsh, estuary)?

EEI 5.1

EEI 5.2

EEI 5.3

EEI 5.4

Identify affected beaches, marshes, and estuaries.

Report cumulative length (miles) or shoreline oiled since beginning of release—by region, state, and affected county/parish sector.

Report length (miles) of shoreline currently oiled—current 

total (by region, state, and affected county/parish sector).

Report width and area of shoreline impact and encroachment into 

marshes and coastal estuaries (as available at unclassified level).
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PIR 5: Where is the affected shoreline (beach, marsh, estuary)?

EEI 5.5

EEI 5.6

Report and locate areas containing large concentrations of tar ball

substances and areas where substances are most likely to make

landfall.

Report degree of shoreline contamination.

PIR 6: What environmental factors will affect the movement of oil (12, 24, 48, 

72 hours)?

EEI 6.1

EEI 6.2

EEI 6.3

EEI 6.4

EEI 6.5

EEI 6.6

Formation or movement of a tropical storm into the

Caribbean Basin.

Changes to tides, winds, or currents that might cause the oil slick

to shift toward the coast.

Weather forecast of winds from north to south.

Observed or predicted off-shore winds greater than 10 knots.

Seas of the gulf coast greater than 3 feet.

Any changes in the Gulf of Mexico loop current that may produce

a new eddy current?

Findings and Recommendations

Findings

Few government or academic works focus on intelligence support to disaster 

response, and even fewer focus on supporting a spill of national significance. 

Current federal government after-action reports contain little to no discussion of the intelligence support to Deepwater Horizon.

● The lack of an existing intelligence plan to support a spill of national 

significance hampered the response effort in Deepwater Horizon.

The intelligence function was not optimally organized during the Deepwater 

Horizon response because it was placed within the planning sections of the 

Unified Area Command (UAC) and Incident Command Posts (ICPs) even 

though intelligence had responsibilities across all interests and departments. 
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

124

Therefore, the intelligence response to Deepwater Horizon lacked unity of 

command.

● Strategic, operational, and tactical decisionmakers knew their information

requirements, but did not properly communicate those requirements to

the intelligence officers.

● A significant amount of data was collected (primarily via remote sensing),

but analyzing, producing, and disseminating the subsequent intelligence

proved difficult.

● Decisionmakers at the strategic and operational levels were more pleased

with the intelligence support provided than the tactical-level decisionmakers were.

The absence of an air tasking order that included all flights operating above 

and around the spill site led to eight near air-to-air collisions and frustrated 

intelligence collection.

The initial lack of a geospatial information systems (GIS)–based common 

operating picture (COP) hampered the sharing and flow of information. 

Eventually, the Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA) 

was adopted as the COP, but was never fully embraced by all responders. 

Therefore, the need for a federal-level COP for use in disaster response 

remains.

Recommendations

● The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should direct the Coast

Guard to develop intelligence support plans for a spill of national significance (SONS) scenario with the following objectives:

❍ Ensure that the intelligence section stands apart and supports the other 

 sections (operations, planning, logistics, and administration). 

❍ Clearly detail command relationships within ICS.

❍ Incorporate a significant GIS/remote-sensing role.

❍ Ensure that the plan is exercised and reviewed regularly.
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● Coast Guard intelligence training and education for enlisted members, 

officers, and civilians should include a track on the role and function of

intelligence support to disaster response.

● The Coast Guard should designate a system (hardware and software) to

view, analyze, and share remote-sensing imagery during SONS responses 

among federal, state, local, tribal, and commercial responders.

● An air tasking order (ATO) should be developed and implemented to

manage complete control of the airspace above and around the event. 

Only aircraft authorized to fly, according to the ATO, will operate in support of the response effort.

● The common operating picture should be built on an existing system, 

such as ERMA, that has proven its usefulness during exercises and realworld response operations.

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127

NOTES

1 The actual spill amount remains disputed, and 750,000 barrels is considered the 

upper end of the estimates.

2 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 

Drilling (hereafter Oil Spill Commission), Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and 

the Future of Offshore Drilling (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

2011), 30. This is the official U.S. government report on the Deepwater Horizon 

explosion and spill.

3 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.5: “Spill of national significance (SONS) means a spill that 

due to its severity, size, location, actual or potential impact on the public health 

and welfare or the environment, or the necessary response effort, is so complex that 

it requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local, and responsible party 

resources to contain and clean up the discharge,” http://cfr.regstoday.com/40cfr300.

aspx#40_CFR_300p5.

4 I follow the standard format of capitalizing the name of a vessel throughout this 

work. When writing of the drilling rig itself, treated as a vessel by the U.S. Coast 

Guard, I use “DEEPWATER HORIZON.” References to the event and subsequent related activities appear as “Deepwater Horizon.” 

5 Barbara Tuchman, “In Search of History,” in Practicing History: Selected Essays 

(New York: Ballantine Books, 1982), 28. I use excerpts from Tuchman’s outstanding work to introduce the chapters. In addition to her excellent study and analysis 

of history, Tuchman did not shrink from examining the truly difficult aspects of 

history. I first read Tuchman in graduate school, and her collected essays, titled 

Practicing History, should be required reading for new historical researchers. While 

The Guns of August and Stilwell and the American Experience in China earned her 

Pulitzer prizes, her work The March of Folly speaks more clearly for my research 

here. In The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam, Tuchman takes a thoughtfully 

critical view of what happens when governments and organizations make decisions 

contrary to their best interest. It should be required reading for all government and 

military decisionmakers.

6 Bob Cavnar, Disaster on the Horizon: High Stakes, High Risks, and the Story behind 

the Deepwater Well Blowout (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 2010), 93. 

It is important to note that estimates on the amount of oil released vary considerably and likely will never be definitively known, according to the author’s interview 

with Admiral Thad Allen, as there was no flow-estimate device on the blowout 

preventer to measure oil moving through. The amount cited here comes from BP 

estimates on dispersant calculations and the rate of oil flow released daily.
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

128

7 The EXXON VALDEZ spill in Alaska was the first SONS and motivated Congress to pass the subsequent Oil Pollution Act.

8 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, 

DHS Planning and Response: Preliminary Lessons from Deepwater Horizon, Testimony of Rear Admiral Peter Neffenger, U.S. Coast Guard, 111th Cong., 2d sess., 

September 22, 2010, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg66030/pdf/

CHRG-111hhrg66030.pdf.

9 U.S. Coast Guard, On Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 

Washington, DC, September 2011, http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf, xiii.

10 Eugene Robinson, “Adm. Thad Allen on What Can Be Learned From the Gulf 

Oil Spill,” Washington Post, August 10, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/09/AR2010080904869.html.

11 Peter Neffenger, Rear Admiral, USCG, interview by author, February 10, 2011; 

interview transcribed, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC. 

Senior Decisionmaker.

12 Of a more humorous note is the occasional actual intelligence officer who fancies himself a Hollywood character from a movie. These people are to be avoided 

if one can manage it. 

13 National Geographic Explorer, “Can the Gulf Survive?,” September 28, 2010, 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6n_RptcxsUs.

14 U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard: Intelligence (Publication 2-0) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2010), 1, http://www.uscg.mil/doctrine/

CGPub/CG_Pub_2_0.pdf.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid, 2.

17 Intelligence organization is sometimes referred to as “planning.” To avoid confusion with the earlier discussion about the lack of an intelligence plan, “organization” will be used.

18 Some describe “intelligence” as information that has been analyzed and had 

valued added to it. Analysis should help to answer the question “so what?” about 

information. Analysis should not only better explain the information, but be able 

to explain why the information matters within the construct of the situation.

NOTES (continues)
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19 Some notional intelligence cycles includes feedback as a final step in the process.

20 USCG senior officer discussion. “Maritime response” is a legacy term. The current term is “prevention,” but the functionality is the same. The missions of this 

portion of the Coast Guard are maritime safety, security, and stewardship. Included 

in these are environmental protection and responding to oil and chemical spills.

21 A note on the word “intelligence”: starting with the Federal Response Plan 

and continuing on, the various federal disaster plans introduce an interesting, and 

potentially confusing, dichotomy regarding the word “intelligence” that exists 

throughout subsequent U.S. government publications on disaster response. On the 

one hand, “intelligence” refers to information that may assist federal law enforcement in prosecuting criminal cases; that is, information used to build cases, establish warrants, and seek criminal or civil redress. On the other hand, the word is also 

used to mean an ongoing, iterative process expressed in the intelligence cycle. The 

latter understanding is the one used throughout this paper.

22 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 

93-288, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207, and Related Authorities.

23 Ibid.

24 U.S. Federal Emergency Management Administration, Federal Response Plan

(April 1992), 16.

25 Ibid., ESF 5.

26 Thad Allen, Admiral, USCG (ret.), interview by author, March 11, 2011; interview transcribed, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC. 

27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) Overview,” http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm.

28 U.S. President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-5), “Management of Domestic Incidents” (February 28, 2003), paragraph 16, http://www.fas.

org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html.

29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (December 

2004), i, http://www.scd.hawaii.gov/documents/nrp.pdf.

30 Ibid., 4.

31 Ibid., 9.

32 Ibid., 25.

NOTES (continues)
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

130

33 James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, eds., Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 

229.

34 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-5), paragraph 2.

35 Carafano and Weitz, Mismanaging Mayhem, 254.

36 Discussion of intelligence within the NRF is built on the National Response 

Plan and the Federal Response Plan. However, intelligence is only sparsely described 

in the National Response Framework, mentioned just 20 times compared with the 

153 times in its predecessor, the National Response Plan. The Federal Response Plan

mentions intelligence only 12 times. Frequency, however, does not always indicate 

breadth and understanding. 

37 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System

(December 2008), i–ii, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf.

38 Ibid., 28.

39 Ibid., 59.

40 Ibid., 60.

41 Ibid.

42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan

(2009), 13, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.

43 Ibid., 9.

44 Ibid., 11. The “new” terrorist threat described here is hardly new and certainly 

not novel. See, also, Andrew C. McCarthy, Willful Blindness: A Memoir of the Jihad 

(New York: Encounter Books, 2008), 176. McCarthy argues that counterterrorism 

investigations by U.S. federal agencies in the 1980s and 1990s, if not foretelling, 

certainly forewarned that a 9/11-type incident was in the planning stages. The 9/11 

attacks were novel in their magnitude, not in their occurrence, just as Deepwater 

Horizon was novel in its scope and impact but not that it occurred.

45 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 57.

46 Ibid., 9.

47 Domestically, ISR is often referred to as Incident, Awareness, and Assessment 

(IAA), a term that the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) developed to remove the specter that the government is collecting intelligence against 

NOTES (continues)
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U.S. citizens. The meaning of IAA, however, is identical to that of ISR, and I use 

“ISR” here as Major Sovada uses ISR throughout her work.

48 Remote sensing is “the science of obtaining information about objects or areas 

from a distance, typically from aircraft or satellites.” http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/

facts/remotesensing.html.

49 Major Jennifer P. Sovada, “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support to Humanitarian Relief Operations within the United States: Where Everyone 

Is in Charge” (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2008), 14, http://www.dtic.

mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA484486.

50 Ibid., 15.

51 Ibid., 16–17.

52 Lieutenant Commander Joyce Dietrich, “The Eyes of Katrina: A Case Study of 

Incident Command System (ICS) Intelligence Support during Hurricane Katrina” 

(Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2009), 7. While this 

work is unclassified, the National Intelligence University (formerly National Defense Intelligence College) maintains all students’ thesis work on a classified system 

if a reader wishes to access Dietrich’s work.

53 Ibid., 27.

54 Ibid., 30.

55 Ibid., 51.

56 Ibid., 56.

57 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 

Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011).

58 Raffi Khatchadourian, “The Gulf War,” New Yorker, March 14, 2011, http://

www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/03/14/110314fa_fact_khatchadourian.

59 Peter Elkind, David Whitford, and Doris Burke, “BP: ‘An accident waiting to happen,’” Fortune, January 24, 2011, http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/01/24/

bp-an-accident-waiting-to-happen/.

60 Evan Thomas and Daniel Stone, “Black Water Rising,” Newsweek, June 7, 2010, 

http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/05/29/black-water-rising.html.

61 Khatchadourian, “The Gulf War.” 

NOTES (continues)
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

132

62 Lexington, “The Politics of Disaster,” Economist, May 6, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16060073.

63 Other government reports, including those from the Department of Homeland 

Security, are classified and were unavailable for this paper.

64 Thad Allen, “National Incident Commander’s Report: MC252 Deepwater Horizon” (Washington, DC: National Incident Command, October 1, 2010), cover 

letter. 

65 Ibid., 3.

66 Oil Spill Commission, Deep Water, vi.

67 Ibid., 265.

68 Ibid., 267.

69 Roger Rufe et al., BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR), Final Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

2011), 67, http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/DWH/BPDWH.pdf.

70 Mike Levine, “While Slowing BP Oil Spill, Administration Slowed Flow of Information Too, Claims Coast Guard Report,” Fox News (March 28, 2011), http://

www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/03/28/slowing-bp-oil-spill-administration-slowedflow-information-claims-coast-guard/.

71 Ibid.

72 Rufe et al., ISPR, 52. When Coast Guard publications use the term “operational,” the equivalent term in a Department of Defense understanding would be 

“tactical,” if referencing the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.

 73 Ibid., 53.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid., 54.

77 U.S. Coast Guard, On Scene Coordinator Report, 31.

78 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable

(New York: Random House, 2007).

79 Amanda Ripley, The Unthinkable: Who Survives When Disaster Strikes—and Why

(New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2008).

NOTES (continues)
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133

80 Andrew L. Jenks, Perils of Progress: Environmental Disasters in the Twentieth Century (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2011).

81 Tuchman, Practicing History: Selected Essays, “When Does History Happen?,” 

26.

82 Cavnar, Disaster on the Horizon, 102.

83 Steve Mufson, “Three Books on the Gulf Oil Spill,” Washington Post (February 13, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/11/

AR2011021107065.html.

84 Cavnar, Disaster on the Horizon, 79.

85 Ibid., 97.

86 Stanley Reed and Alison Fitzgerald, In Too Deep: BP and the Drilling Race That 

Took It Down (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011), 2.

87 William R. Freudenburg and Robert Gramling, Blowout in the Gulf: The BP 

Oil Spill Disaster and the Future of Energy in America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 

2011), 1.

88 Ibid., 158.

89 Tuchman, Practicing History: Selected Essays, “History by the Ounce,” 39.

90 Barbara Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (New York: Knopf, 

1984), 196.

91 Andrew L. Jenks, phone interview by author, January 25, 2011; interview notes 

summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC.

92 Joel Achenbach, A Hole at the Bottom of the Sea: The Race to Kill the BP Oil 

Gusher (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 77.

93 Jenks interview.

94 Ibid.

95 Oil Spill Commission, Deep Water, 265.

96 Cavnar, Disaster on the Horizon, 102.

97 Oil Spill Commission, Deep Water, 265.

98 Freudenburg and Gramling, Blowout in the Gulf, 158.

99 BP, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response Plan (Houston, TX: Response Group, June 

30, 2009), 481, 4.

NOTES (continues)
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

134

100 Oil Spill Commission, Deep Water.

101 Ibid., 266. The MMS is now the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE).

102 DHS employee, interview by author, March 2011; interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC. Imagery.

103 Greg Rainey, Commander, USCG, interview by author, November 15, 2010; 

interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, 

DC. Liaison.

104 Stan Gold, USCG, interview by author, December 15, 2010; interview transcribed, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC. Liaison.

105 Ibid.

106 DHS employee interview.

107 Or “Shoreline clean up and assessment technique”; I have seen it designated 

both ways.

108 I extrapolated this number based on my data collection, interviews, and secondary sources. I think 100 is a conservative number and the actual number of 

intelligence officers deployed is likely higher.

109 Remso Martinez, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency, interview by author, March 25, 2011; interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC. Imagery.

110 Gold interview.

111 Martinez interview.

112 Gold interview.

113 Ibid.

114 Allen interview.

115 DHS employee interview.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Martinez interview.

NOTES (continues)
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119 Captain Colin Washburn, USAF, 601st AOC, interview by author, February 22, 2011; interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, 

Washington, DC. Imagery.

120 Neffenger interview.

121 Martinez interview.

122 U.S. Coast Guard, On Scene Coordinator Report, 109.

123 FEMA implemented an Intelligence and Investigative Function within the 

incident command system subsequent to the research and writing of this piece. 

See http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1382093786350-411d33add2602da9c867a4fbcc7ff20e/NIMS_Intel_Invest_Function_Guidance_FINAL.pdf.

124 Tuchman, March of Folly, 319.

125 Allen interview.

126 Robert Jensen, Commander, USCG, interview by author, January 4, 2011; 

interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, 

DC. Tactical Responder.

127 Gold interview.

128 Caesar Kellum, Captain, USAF, interview by author, February 22, 2011; interview notes transcribed, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC. 

Imagery.

129 DHS employee interview.

130 Martinez interview.

131 They were Houma, Louisiana; Mobile, Alabama; Florida Peninsula; and Galveston, Texas. 

132 Rainey interview.

133 Washburn interview.

134 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, daily brief, “Federal Remote Sensing 

Situation Report—British Petroleum Oil Spill Response, May 18, 2010,” slide 5. 

This list should not be viewed as the universally agreed-upon requirements, but 

instead as the requirements the IRSCC staff and other intelligence liaisons and 

staffs understood to be the information needs of the strategic and operational decisionmakers. 

NOTES (continues)
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

136

135 Gold interview. 

136 Ibid.

137 U.S. Coast Guard, On Scene Coordinator Report, 31.

138 Robert Jordan, Commander, USCG, interview by author, January 20, 2011; 

interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, 

DC. Tactical Responder.

139 Achenbach, A Hole at the Bottom of the Sea, 184.

140 Neffenger interview.

141 Richard Timme, Commander, USCG, interview by author, January 31, 2011; 

interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, 

DC. ICP Staff.

142 Paul Zukunft, Rear Admiral, USCG, interview by author, February 15, 2011; 

interview transcribed, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC. 

Senior Decisionmaker.

143 Gold interview.

144 DHS employee interview.

145 Neffenger interview.

146 U.S. Coast Guard, On Scene Coordinator Report, 78.

147 Cavnar, Disaster on the Horizon, 112–13.

148 U.S. Coast Guard, On Scene Coordinator Report, 121.

149 Zukunft interview.

150 Ibid.

151 John Kennedy, ed., “Deepwater Horizon Response Surface Operations: A 

Case Study Prepared by Participating WLB Commanding Officers,” expanded 

after-action report, unpublished (December 2010), 51. 

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

154 John Kennedy, Commander, USCG, interview by author, January 4, 2011; 

interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, 

DC, 7. Tactical Responder.

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155 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, Testimony of Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi, 

112th Cong., 1st sess., June 2, 2011, 2, http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Haley_Barbour_Testimony.pdf.

156 David Gisclair, technical assistance program director, Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator’s Office, e-mail message to the author, October 7, 2011.

157 Chris Lucero, Lieutenant, U.S. Coast Guard, “USCG Remote Sensing Coordinator Statement: Non-BP Signature and Loss of Deepwater Horizon Remote 

Sensing Concept of Operations Document” (Unified Area Command, Deepwater 

Horizon MC-252, Memo 16470 to File, August 3, 2010), Enclosure 4. LT Lucero’s 

memo contains the subsequent e-mails detailing the CONOPS to the IRSCC, the 

legal questions, and Randall’s final response that the signed CONOPS had been 

lost.

158 Chris Lucero, Lieutenant, U.S. Coast Guard, follow-up phone interview, 

handwritten notes, June 2, 2011. The information in the balance of this paragraph 

is derived from this phone interview.

159 Deepwater Horizon Unified Area Command, “Remote Sensing CONCEPT 

OF OPERATIONS: Deepwater Horizon Response” (New Orleans, LA, July 5, 

2010), 2.

160 Ibid., 3.

161 Allen interview.

162 Ibid.

163 Gold interview.

164 Ibid.

165 DHS employee interview.

166 Russell Dash, Commander, USCG, interview by author, January 28, 2011; 

interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, 

DC. ICP Staff.

167 Dash interview.

168 Martinez interview.

169 Rainey interview.

170 Dietrich, “The Eyes of Katrina,” 51. 

NOTES (continues)
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

138

171 U.S. Coast Guard, On Scene Coordinator Report, 123.

172 Caesar Kellum, Captain, USAF, 601st Air and Space Operations Center, “Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA) Support to Deepwater Horizon (DWH),” 

unclassified brief, undated.

173 Dash interview.

174 Neffenger interview.

175 Gold interview. 

176 Allen interview.

177 Dash interview.

178 Ibid.

179 DHS employee interview.

180 Achenbach, A Hole at the Bottom of the Sea, 172.

181 Ibid.

182 Ibid.

183 Allen interview.

184 Robinson, “Adm. Thad Allen on What Can Be Learned from the Gulf Oil 

Spill.”

185 Allen interview.

186 Ibid.

187 U.S. Air Force, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations: Air 

Force Doctrine Document 2-9 (July 2009), vi, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/

afdd2-9.pdf.

188 Washburn interview.

189 Lieutenant Colonel Susan A. Romano, “Deepwater Horizon Airspace Activity Now Coordinated at 601st AOC,” Air Force Print News Today (July 13, 2010), 

http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?id=123213296, 1.

190 Gold interview.

191 Ibid.

192 Ibid.

193 Ibid.

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194 Ibid.

195 Washburn interview.

196 Rainey interview.

197 Allen, National Incident Commander’s Report, 23.

198 Allen interview.

199 Martinez interview.

200 Rainey interview.

201 Nan Walker, director of the Louisiana State University Earth Scan Lab, interview by author, March 1, 2011; interview notes retained by author, Washington, 

DC. Academic.

202 DeWitt Braud, director academic area of the Louisiana State University Coastal Studies Institute, interview by author, March 1, 2011; interview notes retained 

by author, Washington, DC. Academic.

203 International Charter Space and Natural Disasters, Charter on Cooperation to 

Achieve the Coordinated Use of Space Facilities in the Event of Natural or Technological 

Disasters, Revision 3, April 25, 2000, Article II, http://www.disasterscharter.org/web/

charter/charter#AII.

204 Braud interview.

205 Ibid. 

206 Zukunft interview.

207 Neffenger interview.

208 Walker interview.

209 Edward “Teddy” St. Pierre, Commander, USCG, interview by author, January 24, 2011; interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, 

Washington, DC, 2. Tactical Responder.

210 Kennedy, ed., “Deepwater Horizon Response Surface Operations,” 21.

211 Timme interview.

212 Mike Fisher, Lieutenant Commander, USCG, interview by author, January 

12, 2011; interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, 

Washington, DC. ICP Staff.

213 Kellum interview.

NOTES (continues)
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

140

214 Ibid.

215 Jeff Randall, Commander, USCG, interview by author, January 11, 2011; 

interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, 

DC. Tactical Responder.

216 St. Pierre interview.

217 Ibid.

218 Washburn interview.

219 Kellum interview.

220 U.S. Coast Guard, On Scene Coordinator Report, 115.

221 Kennedy interview.

222 Jordan interview.

223 Kennedy, ed., “Deepwater Horizon Response Surface Operations,” 44.

224 Kennedy interview.

225 Khatchadourian, “The Gulf War.” 

226 Ibid.

227 St. Pierre interview.

228 Kennedy, ed., “Deepwater Horizon Response Surface Operations,” 20.

229 Ibid.

230 Gold interview.

231 Dash interview.

232 Martinez interview. 

233 Ibid.

234 Kellum interview. 

235 DeWitt Braud, director academic area of the Louisiana State University Coastal Studies Institute, follow-up interview by author, June 7, 2011; interview notes 

retained by author, Washington, DC. Academic.

236 Neffenger interview. 

237 Ibid.

238 Gold interview.

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239 Andrew Stephens and Devon Humphrey, “Letter Addressing Deepwater Horizon GIS Data Concerns” (open letter published online), posted June 9, 2010. The 

letter was subsequently taken down from its original site.

240 David Gisclair, e-mail message to the author, June 17, 2011.

241 Dash interview. 

242 Timme interview. 

243 Gold interview.

244 Ibid.

245 Kennedy, ed., “Deepwater Horizon Response Surface Operations,” 40.

246 Ibid., 19.

247 Ibid.

248 Stephens and Humphrey, “Letter Addressing Deepwater Horizon GIS Data 

Concerns.”

249 Ibid.

250 Martinez interview, 4. The other source provided this information not for 

attribution. The BP staff the author contacted for interviews regarding the GIS 

system firewalls and other intelligence topics related to this project declined to 

speak on the matters.

251 Neffenger interview.

252 Stephens and Humphrey, “Letter Addressing Deepwater Horizon GIS Data 

Concerns.”

253 Remso Martinez, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency, interview by author, March 23, 2011; typed responses to written questions, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC. Imagery. 

254 Braud, follow-up interview by author, June 7, 2011.

255 Barbara Tuchman, March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam, 218.

256 Tabitha Schiro, Lieutenant Commander, USCGR, interview by author, January 26, 2011; interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, 

Washington, DC. ICP Staff.

257 Neffenger interview. 

258 Kellum interview. 

NOTES (continues)
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

142

259 Neffenger interview. 

260 Ibid.

261 Fisher interview. 

262 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Information 

Network (HSIN),” http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1156888108137.shtm.

263 Nancy Kinner, University of New Hampshire, interview by author, July 29, 

2011; interview notes transcribed, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC, 1. Academic.

 264 Ibid. 

265 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of Response and 

Restoration, “Environmental Response Management Application,” Information 

Sheet, July 2011, http://archive.orr.noaa.gov/book_shelf/1869_ORR-ERMA-07-11.

pdf.

266 University of New Hampshire, Coastal Response Research Center, “ERMA 

Presentation,” http://www.crrc.unh.edu/erma/erma_presentation.pdf.

267 Amy Merten, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, interview by author, August 19, 2011; interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC. Academic.

268 NOAA, “Environmental Response Management Application.”

269 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “It’s a Drill: SONS 

2010,” accessed August 1, 2011, http://archive.orr.noaa.gov/topic_subtopic_entry.

php?RECORD_KEY%28entry_subtopic_topic%29=entry_id,subtopic_id,topic_

id&entry_id%28entry_subtopic_topic%29=808&subtopic_id%28entry_subtopic_

topic%29=2&topic_id%28entry_subtopic_topic%29=1.

270 Amy Merten, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, 

follow-up interview by author, August 25, 2011; interview notes summarized, National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC. Academic.

271 NOAA, “It’s a Drill: SONS 2010.” 

272 Merten follow-up interview. 

273 Ibid.

274 Dash interview.

275 Gold interview. 

NOTES (continues)
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276 Robinson, “Adm. Thad Allen On What Can Be Learned from the Gulf Oil 

Spill.”

277 Merten follow-up interview. 

278 Ibid.

279 Neffenger interview. 

280 Zukunft interview. These U.S. Navy gliders were basically unmanned UAVs 

that operate underwater. 

281 Gold interview.

282 Allen interview. 

283 Fisher interview. 

284 Schiro interview. 

285 U.S. Coast Guard, On Scene Coordinator Report, 192.

286 Fisher interview. 

287 Ibid.

288 Kinner interview. 

289 U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, Looking to the Future: 

Lessons in Prevention, Response, and Restoration from the Gulf Oil Spill, 112th Cong., 

1st sess., July 20, 2011, 18, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg72820/pdf/

CHRG-112shrg72820.pdf.

290 Ibid., 29. 

291 E-mail to author, not for attribution. The source had firsthand knowledge of 

this information.

292 U.S. Coast Guard, On Scene Coordinator Report, 202.

293 Barbara Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century (New York: 

Ballantine Books, 1978), xviii.

294 Allen interview.

295 Barbara Tuchman, March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam, 4.

296 Rear Admiral Paul Zukunft’s comment to the author during an NLE 11 brief, 

USCG Headquarters, Washington, DC, May 16, 2011.

NOTES (continues)
CAPT Erich M. Telfer

144

297 Rufe et al., Incident Specific Preparedness Review, 54.

298 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Federal Remote Sensing Situation 

Report—Deepwater Horizon Response July 7, 2010,” presentation, slides 5–7.

NOTES (continues)
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

CAPT Erich M. Telfer is a 1991 graduate of the 

Pennsylvania State University. His Coast Guard assignments include an equal mix of operations and 

intelligence. Operationally, he has served both afloat 

and ashore and, most recently, as the commanding officer of the Pacific Tactical Law Enforcement Team, a 

countersmuggling unit comprising part of the Coast 

Guard’s Deployable Specialized Forces. His intelligence experience includes tours as a tactical and strategic watchstander, three years as the assistant Coast Guard attaché in Mexico 

City, a tour as the Deputy Director of Coast Guard Counterintelligence, and 

service as the Executive Assistant to the Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal Investigations (CG-2). He has earned a Master’s of 

Military Studies from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and a 

Master’s of Intelligence Studies from American Military University. In 2010, 

CAPT Telfer was selected to serve as a research fellow at the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research in the National Intelligence University, where he 

authored this piece, completing his final research in March 2013. Currently, 

CAPT Telfer commands the Coast Guard Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Atlantic in Virginia Beach, Virginia. He lives in Virginia Beach with his 

wife and children.
“The role of intelligence in support of natural disaster and 

other non-military activities is an under-researched area of 

inquiry. Erich Telfer’s research into the role of intelligence 

during the response to the Deepwater Horizon explosion and 

sinking and the subsequent loss of control of the Macondo 

Well provides insight into the art of the possible and the need 

for doctrine. It is an important contribution to the maturation of disaster preparedness and response planning in this 

country.”

Admiral Thad W. Allen, USCG (Ret.)