*

 We granted Smith’s unopposed motion to waive oral argument, and thus

the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 20, 2006*

Decided December 21, 2006

Before

 Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

 Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

No. 05-4378

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LARRY D. SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois 

No. 04-20072

Michael P. McCuskey, 

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Larry Smith, a fugitive, was hiding out in a hotel when federal authorities

finally arrested him. Almost immediately after his arrest—but before the officers

gave him Miranda warnings—they asked Smith where he kept his gun. Smith told

them, then received and waived his Miranda rights, and consented to a search of

his hotel room. The officers found the gun in Smith’s room just where he had

indicated and he was later charged with illegal firearm possession. The district

court refused to suppress Smith’s statement about the gun’s location and the gun

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-4378 Page 2

itself, and after a jury trial Smith was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 41 months. On appeal he argues

that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

The district court found the following facts after the suppression hearing,

none of which are claimed to be clearly erroneous, the applicable standard of

review. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006). Federal

authorities received a tip that Smith—wanted on several outstanding

warrants—was armed and hiding out at a hotel. Five officers went to the hotel and

staked out the room next to Smith’s. When officers saw Smith come out of his room,

they ran into the hall—outfitted in riot gear and brandishing guns—and yelled that

Smith was under arrest. Smith resisted. Investigator Kendall, who could tell from

Smith’s light clothing that he wasn’t armed, tackled him. Smith’s head hit the door

frame. Because Smith continued to resist, the officers tasered him in the leg. 

Smith then relaxed his arms, and he was handcuffed. 

Kendall and a U.S. Marshal immediately asked Smith if he had a gun; Smith

replied that there was a gun back in his room in a footlocker. Before this

questioning, other officers had already performed a twenty-second, protective sweep

of Smith’s room and secured it but saw no weapons. Kendall didn’t know about this

protective sweep before he questioned Smith about the gun. 

After Smith acknowledged that a gun was in his room, Kendall told him to

relax, and cleaned the minor abrasion Smith received after he hit his head on the

door frame. Kendall then read Smith his Miranda rights, and asked if he would

consent to a search of his hotel room. Smith answered yes, and an agent obtained a

waiver of rights and consent form. Smith was read his rights for a second time

before he signed the form. When Smith consented, no weapons were pointed at him

and nobody threatened or hit him. After Smith waived his Miranda rights and

consented to the search, Kendall asked Smith where the key to the footlocker was. 

Smith told him and the officers found the gun.

The district court denied the motion to suppress Smith’s initial answer about

the location of his gun, relying upon the public safety exception to Miranda

articulated in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-59 (1984). This exception

allows police to question an arrestee without first giving Miranda warnings if the

police reasonably believe doing so will protect them or the public from an immediate

danger, like a nearby concealed weapon. Id. at 659.

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress we review questions of 

law de novo. See Mendoza, 438 F.3d at 795. On appeal, Smith again argues that

the district court should not have admitted into evidence his pre-Mirandized

statement about the gun under Quarles. Specifically, Smith argues that when
No. 05-4378 Page 3

Kendall and the Marshal asked him if he had a gun they had no objectively

reasonable need to protect themselves or the public because they had already

handcuffed Smith, believed he did not have a weapon on his body, and other officers

had already gone into Smith’s room—which they secured from the public—to

perform a protective sweep.

Following Quarles, we have held that when arresting officers have reason to

believe that a suspect has concealed a weapon near the place of arrest, they may

ask about the weapon to protect themselves or the public “from the immediate

danger that a weapon would pose” even after the suspect is handcuffed and

searched. United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989); see also

United States v. Knox, 950 F.2d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 1991) (police were not required to

give Miranda warnings before asking arrestee where his gun was; even though patdown indicated arrestee did not have a gun, police had reason to believe it could be

close by or in a public area). 

Here, the officers had reason to believe Smith had a concealed gun nearby. 

He was wanted on weapons charges and the tipster had told police that Smith was

recently armed. The officers could tell that the gun was not on his body, so there

was reason to believe Smith had hidden or disposed of it somewhere else close by. 

Even though Smith was handcuffed and his hotel room was secured, the gun could

be elsewhere nearby and thus might pose a threat either to members of the public

who could discover it, or even to the officers should Smith again resist arrest. 

Reasonably believing that Smith had a concealed gun but having not yet seen it, the

officers properly invoked the public safety exception to ask Smith where it was.

Smith’s second argument—that his waiver and consent to search were

involuntary so that the gun itself should have been suppressed—is also meritless. 

He says that he “consented” only after being tackled and tasered by police, and

hitting his head on the door frame. We initially note that Smith “signed a consent

form, which weighs heavily toward finding that his consent was valid.” United

States v. Taylor, 31 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1994). Moreover, the district court

determined that under the totality of the circumstances, Smith’s waiver and

consent were not coerced, a factual finding we review for clear error. See

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); Mendoza, 438 F.3d at 795. 

The record shows that the officers did not use weapons or any kind of force to obtain

the waiver and consent (only the arrest), and that any physical injury Smith

sustained during his arrest was insignificant. We have found that arrest-related

injuries do not necessarily vitiate valid consent, see Watson v. DeTella, 122 F.3d

450, 454 (7th Cir. 1997) (consent voluntary even though defendant had been kicked

in the head by police at the time of his arrest), particularly when arresting officers

inflict injuries solely to bring suspects into compliance with police orders and not as

a form of interrogation. See id. (suspect was kicked in the head during his arrest
No. 05-4378 Page 4

not to make him confess but because he refused to raise his hands). That is the

case here, so the district court’s consent finding was not clearly erroneous. 

AFFIRMED.