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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

State of West Virginia, 

Plaintiff Below, Respondent 

vs.) No. 21-0034 (Cabell County 19-F-64)

Joseph Chase Hardin,

Defendant Below, Petitioner 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Joseph Chase Hardin, by counsel Abraham J. Saad, appeals from the Circuit 

Court of Cabell County’s October 23, 2020, sentencing order. The State of West Virginia, by 

counsel Patrick Morrisey and Katherine M. Smith, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s 

order. Petitioner filed a reply.

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision affirming the order of the circuit court is appropriate under Rule 21 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Petitioner and R.H. met at a church near Marshall University around August 26, 2018, and 

their relationship developed through their involvement with campus ministries in the Fall of 2018. 

On October 7, 2018, petitioner raped R.H.

Petitioner was indicted by a Cabell County grand jury in June of 2019 on four counts of 

second-degree sexual assault. Counts I and II of the indictment charged petitioner with seconddegree sexual assault of another individual F.C.,

1 while counts III and IV charged petitioner with

second-degree sexual assault of R.H. Although petitioner’s conduct as to R.H. was presented to 

1 Inasmuch as petitioner was not convicted of the counts concerning F.C., and they are not 

relevant to this appeal, details of these counts (including F.C.’s testimony at trial) are not addressed 

herein.

FILED

January 18, 2022

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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the grand jury on two prior occasions, the grand jury did not return an indictment in those earlier 

proceedings.

2

Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine “to prohibit the defense from mentioning at 

trial or questioning any witness at trial as to why there was testimony presented at three separate 

occasions to the grand jury in this case.” Petitioner argued that the fact that there were multiple 

grand juries was relevant. On the first day of trial, August 11, 2020, the circuit court heard 

argument on the State’s motion regarding the multiple grand jury proceedings. At that time, the 

circuit court determined that the defense could “probably” reference the multiple grand jury 

proceedings, and that the court would rule on specific objections raised by the State during trial. 

The defense referenced the multiple grand jury proceedings in its opening statement. On the second 

day of trial, upon a renewed objection by the State, the circuit court restricted references to the 

multiple grand jury proceedings, except for use as impeachment evidence.

Petitioner represents that, at the outset of trial, he filed his own motion in limine and “made 

oral objections” to exclude the State from eliciting testimony about R.H.’s religious beliefs in an 

effort to bolster her testimony.3 At trial, there was considerable testimony about where petitioner 

met R.H. and how their relationship stemmed from their involvement with a campus ministry

group. This testimony was elicited by both defense counsel and the State. In fact, petitioner’s 

counsel stated in opening argument that R.H. and petitioner met at church and that “I think it’s 

very important since it was mentioned that [R.H. was] saving herself for marriage and religion 

came to be a part of the play.” 

R.H. testified that she met petitioner at her church. She testified that religion was important 

to her and that she told petitioner prior to October 7, 2018, that “[b]ecause of [her] faith,” she “was 

waiting until marriage to have sex.” As to the events of October 7, 2018, she testified she had made 

plans to meet petitioner at Ritter Park but they ultimately got in the car to drive around. Thereafter, 

petitioner anally raped her. R.H. testified that she told her Bible study leader, Janna Salyers, about 

the sexual assault. She then told her parents and ultimately reported the incident to law 

enforcement. Defense counsel cross-examined R.H. about how she came to know petitioner and 

their budding relationship. Petitioner’s counsel also cross-examined R.H. about text messages 

between petitioner and R.H. that discussed God and living a Christian life.

At trial, the State called two fact witnesses who knew R.H. through the campus ministry at 

Marshall University, Mikayla Alkire and Ms. Salyers. Consistent with R.H.’s testimony, Ms. 

Alkire also testified that R.H. met petitioner at church. Petitioner’s counsel did not object to any 

of Ms. Alkire’s testimony. Ms. Salyers testified that she was the leader of R.H.’s small Bible group 

with the college ministry. On cross-examination, petitioner’s counsel asked Ms. Salyers about 

2 The earlier two grand jury proceedings were focused only on the crimes against R.H. 

During the third presentation to the grand jury, the State presented the additional crimes against 

F.C.

3 Petitioner fails to provide this Court with any citation to the record as to when the motion 

in limine and objections were made and, importantly, the circuit court’s rulings thereon.
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petitioner’s “level of devoutness.” The State also called Detective Matthew Null who provided 

detailed testimony about his interview of petitioner.

Petitioner testified at trial as to his involvement with the Baptist Campus Ministry, how he 

came to know R.H., and the nature of his relationship with R.H. Petitioner’s counsel also asked 

him about the relationship that both petitioner and R.H. had with God. Further, petitioner testified

that he did not assault R.H., but instead engaged in consensual sexual conduct with her.

The State did not reference religion, religious beliefs, or faith during its closing argument. 

During petitioner’s closing, however, counsel told the jury that petitioner and R.H. “built th[eir] 

relationship up, and they built it on I think their mutual devotion to Christ. I mean, that’s 

undisputed. Some people are more pious, more religious than others. Some aren’t. Just how life 

is.” 

During the State’s rebuttal closing argument, the State discussed portions of Detective 

Null’s interview of petitioner and published portions of this transcript to the jury on an overhead 

projector. Petitioner’s counsel did not object during the argument. Instead, after the State 

concluded the rebuttal, petitioner’s counsel objected that some of the items discussed on rebuttal 

were not in evidence. 

During jury deliberations, the jury asked the court if there was a transcript of Detective 

Null’s interview of petitioner. The court told the jury that they had all of the exhibits, and they 

would only have the transcript if it was introduced as an exhibit. After further deliberations, the 

jury told the court that it had reached an agreement on one count but not on the remaining three 

counts of the indictment. Following discussions with counsel, the court gave the jury an Allen 

charge.4

The jury ultimately returned its verdict of not guilty as to counts I and II (relating to F.C.) 

and guilty as to counts III and IV (relating to R.H.). Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial on 

September 17, 2020, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. 

He also argued that the State’s witnesses lacked credibility and that the State introduced 

impermissible hearsay and religious character evidence. Petitioner then filed a renewed and 

supplemental motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the West Virginia Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, arguing that impermissible evidence was presented to the jury in violation of 

Rule 610 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.5 The circuit court denied both motions and 

sentenced petitioner to not less than ten nor more than twenty-five years on each conviction, with 

those sentences to run consecutively. Petitioner now appeals

4 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1986).

5

 Rule 610 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides that “[e]vidence of the beliefs 

or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible to attack or support the witness’s 

credibility.”
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On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in restricting him from presenting 

evidence about the three separate grand jury hearings. Next, he argues that the court improperly

allowed character evidence as to R.H. in violation of Rule 610 of the West Virginia Rules of 

Evidence. Additionally, he argues that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct that

prejudiced him at trial. Finally, he argues that the circuit court committed cumulative error that 

violated his due process rights. We will address each of petitioner’s arguments below.

In reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit court, we 

apply a two-pronged deferential standard of review. We review the rulings of the 

circuit court concerning a new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of 

reversible error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit 

court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions 

of law are subject to a de novo review.

Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Vance, 207 W. Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000).

Petitioner’s first two assignments of error address the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings. 

We have stated that “[a] trial court’s evidentiary rulings, as well as its application of the Rules of 

Evidence, are subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. 

Rodoussakis, 204 W. Va. 58, 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998).

First, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in limiting his ability to discuss the fact 

that the grand jury did not issue an indictment until after his case was presented to it for a third 

time. Notably, however, the circuit court did not restrict petitioner’s ability to reference the

multiple grand jury proceedings at the outset of the trial despite the State’s motion in limine on 

this topic. Instead, the circuit court determined that petitioner could “probably” reference the 

multiple grand jury proceedings, but the court reserved the right to rule on specific objections 

raised by the State at trial. Accordingly, petitioner’s counsel referenced the multiple grand jury 

proceedings in its opening statement and the State again objected that the three separate grand jury 

proceedings were irrelevant to the case. It was not until the second day of trial, and after the State 

again raised the issue, that the circuit court restricted references to the multiple grand jury 

proceedings, except for use as impeachment evidence.

Initially, we note that petitioner’s argument as to this assignment of error is procedurally 

deficient as he fails to provide a single citation to the record in violation of Rule 10(c)(7) of the 

West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure. Further, he fails to cite any legal authority in support 

of his argument that the circuit court’s restriction of this information was improper. Recently, we 

noted that 

Rule 10 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure was designed to simplify the appeal 

process and to help lawyers file clear, concise, and organized briefs. “Although we 

liberally construe briefs in determining issues presented for review,” State v. 

LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 302, 470 S.E.2d 613, 621 (1996), we have often said that 

“a lawyer has a duty to plead and prove his case in accordance with established 

court rules.” State, Dep't of Health v. Robert Morris N., 195 W. Va. 759, 765, 466 

S.E.2d 827, 833 (1995). Lawyers who fail to follow our appellate rules inevitably 
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generate a disjointed, poorly written, or difficult to understand brief, and they 

should not anticipate that this Court will find or make their arguments for them. 

“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” United States v. 

Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991).

Metro Tristate, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Virginia, 245 W. Va. 495, __, 859 S.E.2d 438, 

445-46 (2021) (footnote omitted). Despite petitioner’s inadequately briefed argument, respondent 

argues that the prior grand jury proceedings where the grand jury did not indict petitioner do not 

make any fact presented at petitioner’s trial more or less probable and is not a “fact of consequence 

in determining the action” as required by West Virginia Rule of Evidence 401. We agree with 

respondent and refuse to disturb this ruling of the circuit court on appeal. 

Next, petitioner maintains that the court erred in permitting evidence of the victim’s 

religious beliefs as a means to support her credibility, in violation of Rule 610 of the West Virginia 

Rules of Evidence. Respondent maintains that petitioner cannot argue error where his own counsel 

made repeated references to the victim’s religious beliefs and, further, where the evidence of 

religion was not used to bolster the victim’s credibility. 

At trial, petitioner did not raise a contemporaneous objection pursuant to Rule 610. 

Accordingly, we undertake a plain error analysis of this assignment of error. “To trigger 

application of the ‘plain error’ doctrine, there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects 

substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the 

judicial proceedings.” Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). In Miller, 

we held that “[h]istorically, the ‘plain error’ doctrine ‘authorizes [an appellate court] to correct 

only ‘particularly egregious errors’ . . . that ‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings[.]’” 194 W. Va. at 18, 459 S.E.2d at 129. 

Upon our review, we refuse to find that petitioner satisfied even the first element of a plain 

error analysis as there was no error and Rule 610 was not violated. Initially, we note that the 

religious beliefs of both petitioner and the victim were brought out by both petitioner6 and the 

State. Further, per the record, the religious beliefs of the victim were not used to support R.H.’s 

credibility. Instead, her religious beliefs were intertwined with the narrative of how the victim

initially became acquainted with petitioner, how their relationship evolved, and to address the 

victim’s testimony that she did not consent to intercourse with petitioner. Accordingly, petitioner 

is entitled to no relief as to this assignment of error.

6 The record reveals that petitioner’s counsel embraced religion as a part of petitioner’s

theory of the case. Counsel inquired into the victim’s church attendance, religious practices, and 

Christian values throughout his cross-examination of the victim and during the testimony of one 

of the witnesses. Petitioner’s counsel also made reference to both petitioner’s and R.H.’s religious 

beliefs during closing arguments.
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Next, petitioner maintains that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during 

closing arguments.

7 We review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct under the following standard: 

Four factors are taken into account in determining whether improper 

prosecutorial comment is so damaging as to require reversal: (1) the degree to 

which the prosecutor’s remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice 

the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the 

remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the 

accused; and (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to 

divert attention to extraneous matters.

Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Sugg, 193 W. Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995). “[T]he long and well-established 

rule [is] that prosecutors are entitled to great latitude in closing arguments and it is only where 

improper remarks are clearly prejudicial or result in manifest injustice that reversal is proper. Syl. 

pt. 2, State v. Brewster, W.Va., 261 S.E.2d 77 (1979), quoting in part, Syl. pt. 1, State v. Dunn, 

W.Va., 246 S.E.2d 245 (1978)[.]” State v. Critzer, 167 W. Va. 655, 658-59, 280 S.E.2d 288, 291 

(1981).

Petitioner complains that the State displayed and discussed inadmissible evidence from 

Detective Null’s interview with him during its rebuttal. Consistent with petitioner’s previous 

assignment of error, counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection to the publication of this 

information, but instead waited until the State had completed its rebuttal to raise the objection.

Even then, the objection was insufficient. Counsel merely stated, “I believe there were some things 

presented that weren’t in evidence. [The State] referenced Null, but that’s all I’m going to - - I just 

wanted to put that on the record.” Likewise, on appeal, petitioner failed to articulate which portions 

of the interview were published to the jury and what portions were deemed “inadmissible” by the 

circuit court.

Although counsel’s objections were inadequate, analyzing this assignment of error 

consistent with the Sugg factors, we note this assignment of error still fails. Detective Null testified 

extensively to the substance of his interview with petitioner. Therefore, the presentation of portions 

of Detective Null’s typed interview with petitioner simply recapped his testimony and did not have 

a tendency to mislead the jury or prejudice petitioner. Additionally, the prosecutor’s remarks were 

isolated to the State’s rebuttal. Further, the strength of the proof to establish petitioner’s guilt was 

strong even absent the State’s remarks during closing arguments. Finally, the comments and typed 

statement did not divert attention to extraneous matters. Therefore, we decline to find that the 

prosecutor’s remarks or use of Detective Null’s typed statement were prejudicial or resulted in 

manifest injustice as to make petitioner’s conviction a denial of due process. 

Finally, petitioner argues there was cumulative error below. Although a conviction may be 

set aside where the cumulative effect of numerous errors prevent a defendant from receiving a fair 

trial, this doctrine only evaluates the effect of matters determined to be error. State v. Walker, 188 

7 Petitioner also claims that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by 

introducing evidence of the victim’s religious beliefs in violation of Rule 610 of the West Virginia 

Rules of Evidence. However, as addressed above, we are not persuaded by this argument.
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W. Va. 661, 425 S.E.2d 616 (1992). Because we find that there was no error in this case, the 

cumulative error doctrine does not apply.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: January 18, 2022

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice William D. Wooton