(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

SCOTT v. HARRIS 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 05–1631. Argued February 26, 2007—Decided April 30, 2007 

Deputy Timothy Scott, petitioner here, terminated a high-speed pursuit

of respondent’s car by applying his push bumper to the rear of the 

vehicle, causing it to leave the road and crash. Respondent was rendered quadriplegic. He filed suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983 alleging, inter alia, the use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court denied 

Scott’s summary judgment motion, which was based on qualified

immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal, 

concluding, inter alia, that Scott’s actions could constitute “deadly 

force” under Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1; that the use of such 

force in this context would violate respondent’s constitutional right to

be free from excessive force during a seizure; and that a reasonable

jury could so find. 

Held: Because the car chase respondent initiated posed a substantial 

and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others, Scott’s attempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the road was 

reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judgment. Pp. 3–13.

(a) Qualified immunity requires resolution of a “threshold question:

Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do 

the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional 

right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201. Pp. 3–4.

(b) The record in this case includes a videotape capturing the 

events in question. Where, as here, the record blatantly contradicts

the plaintiff’s version of events so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes

of ruling on a summary judgment motion. Pp. 5–8.

(c) Viewing the facts in the light depicted by the videotape, it is

clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
2 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

Syllabus 

Pp. 8–13.

(i) Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers 

rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute “deadly 

force.” The Court there simply applied the Fourth Amendment’s 

“reasonableness” test to the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation. That case has scant applicability to this one, which

has vastly different facts. Whether or not Scott’s actions constituted 

“deadly force,” what matters is whether those actions were reasonable. Pp. 8–10. 

(ii) In determining a seizure’s reasonableness, the Court balances 

the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests allegedly justifying the intrusion. United States v. Place, 462 

U. S. 696, 703. In weighing the high likelihood of serious injury or 

death to respondent that Scott’s actions posed against the actual and 

imminent threat that respondent posed to the lives of others, the

Court takes account of the number of lives at risk and the relative 

culpability of the parties involved. Respondent intentionally placed

himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in reckless,

high-speed flight; those who might have been harmed had Scott not 

forced respondent off the road were entirely innocent. The Court 

concludes that it was reasonable for Scott to take the action he did. 

It rejects respondent’s argument that safety could have been assured 

if the police simply ceased their pursuit. The Court rules that a police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase

that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the 

Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk

of serious injury or death. Pp. 10–13. 

433 F. 3d 807, reversed. 

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO, 

JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., and BREYER, J., filed concurring opinions. 

STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–1631 

TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR HARRIS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007] 

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 

We consider whether a law enforcement official can, 

consistent with the Fourth Amendment, attempt to stop a 

fleeing motorist from continuing his public-endangering

flight by ramming the motorist’s car from behind. Put 

another way: Can an officer take actions that place a

fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death in order 

to stop the motorist’s flight from endangering the lives of 

innocent bystanders? 

I 

In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked respondent’s vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road 

with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The deputy activated

his blue flashing lights indicating that respondent should 

pull over. Instead, respondent sped away, initiating a 

chase down what is in most portions a two-lane road, at

speeds exceeding 85 miles per hour. The deputy radioed 

his dispatch to report that he was pursuing a fleeing

vehicle, and broadcast its license plate number. Petitioner, Deputy Timothy Scott, heard the radio communication and joined the pursuit along with other officers. In 

the midst of the chase, respondent pulled into the parking 
2 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

Opinion of the Court 

lot of a shopping center and was nearly boxed in by the

various police vehicles. Respondent evaded the trap by

making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott’s police car, 

exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a 

two-lane highway.

Following respondent’s shopping center maneuvering, 

which resulted in slight damage to Scott’s police car, Scott 

took over as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six minutes and 

nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott decided to 

attempt to terminate the episode by employing a “Precision Intervention Technique (‘PIT’) maneuver, which 

causes the fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop.” Brief for 

Petitioner 4. Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told to “‘[g]o ahead and take him out.’” 

Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F. 3d 807, 811 (CA11 2005). 

Instead, Scott applied his push bumper to the rear of

respondent’s vehicle.1 As a result, respondent lost control

of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned, and crashed. Respondent was

badly injured and was rendered a quadriplegic.

Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others

under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging, inter 

alia, a violation of his federal constitutional rights, viz.

use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure

under the Fourth Amendment. In response, Scott filed a 

motion for summary judgment based on an assertion of

qualified immunity. The District Court denied the motion, 

finding that “there are material issues of fact on which the

issue of qualified immunity turns which present sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Harris v. 

—————— 

1Scott says he decided not to employ the PIT maneuver because he 

was “concerned that the vehicles were moving too quickly to safely

execute the maneuver.” Brief for Petitioner 4. Respondent agrees that 

the PIT maneuver could not have been safely employed. See Brief for 

Respondent 9. It is irrelevant to our analysis whether Scott had 

permission to take the precise actions he took. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Coweta County, No. 3:01–CV–148–WBH (ND Ga., Sept. 

23, 2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a–42a. On interlocutory 

appeal,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to allow 

respondent’s Fourth Amendment claim against Scott to

proceed to trial.3 Taking respondent’s view of the facts as 

given, the Court of Appeals concluded that Scott’s actions 

could constitute “deadly force” under Tennessee v. Garner, 

471 U. S. 1 (1985), and that the use of such force in this 

context “would violate [respondent’s] constitutional right 

to be free from excessive force during a seizure. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that Scott violated 

[respondent’s] Fourth Amendment rights.” 433 F. 3d, at 

816. The Court of Appeals further concluded that “the law 

as it existed [at the time of the incident], was sufficiently 

clear to give reasonable law enforcement officers ‘fair 

notice’ that ramming a vehicle under these circumstances

was unlawful.” Id., at 817. The Court of Appeals thus

concluded that Scott was not entitled to qualified immunity. We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. __ (2006), and now 

reverse. 

II 

In resolving questions of qualified immunity, courts are

required to resolve a “threshold question: Taken in the 

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do 

—————— 

2Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere 

defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost 

if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 

472 U. S. 511, 526 (1985). Thus, we have held that an order denying

qualified immunity is immediately appealable even though it is interlocutory; otherwise, it would be “effectively unreviewable.” Id., at 527. 

Further, “we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving 

immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter 

v. Bryant, 502 U. S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam). 3None of the other claims respondent brought against Scott or any

other party are before this Court. 
4 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

Opinion of the Court 

the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a 

constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.” 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, 

the court finds a violation of a constitutional right, “the

next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was 

clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the 

case.” Ibid. Although this ordering contradicts “[o]ur

policy of avoiding unnecessary adjudication of constitutional issues,” United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 

U. S. 454, 478 (1995) (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 

288, 346–347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)), we have 

said that such a departure from practice is “necessary to 

set forth principles which will become the basis for a 

[future] holding that a right is clearly established.” Saucier, supra, at 201.4 We therefore turn to the threshold 

inquiry: whether Deputy Scott’s actions violated the 

Fourth Amendment. 

—————— 

4Prior to this Court’s announcement of Saucier’s “rigid ‘order of battle,’” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 201–202 (2004) (BREYER, J., 

concurring), we had described this order of inquiry as the “better 

approach,” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 841, n. 5 

(1998), though not one that was required in all cases. See id., at 858– 

859 (BREYER, J., concurring); id., at 859 (STEVENS, J., concurring in 

judgment). There has been doubt expressed regarding the wisdom of 

Saucier’s decision to make the threshold inquiry mandatory, especially 

in cases where the constitutional question is relatively difficult and the 

qualified immunity question relatively straightforward. See, e.g., 

Brosseau, supra, at 201 (BREYER, J., joined by SCALIA and GINSBURG, 

JJ., concurring); Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U. S. 1019 (2004) (STEVENS, J., 

joined by GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., respecting denial of certiorari); 

id., at 1025 (SCALIA, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also 

Lyons v. Xenia, 417 F. 3d 565, 580–584 (CA6 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring). We need not address the wisdom of Saucier in this case, however, because the constitutional question with which we are presented 

is, as discussed in Part III–B, infra, easily decided. Deciding that 

question first is thus the “better approach,” Lewis, supra, at 841, n. 5, 

regardless of whether it is required. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

III 

A 

The first step in assessing the constitutionality of Scott’s

actions is to determine the relevant facts. As this case 

was decided on summary judgment, there have not yet

been factual findings by a judge or jury, and respondent’s

version of events (unsurprisingly) differs substantially 

from Scott’s version. When things are in such a posture,

courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable 

inferences “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.” United States v. 

Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam); 

Saucier, supra, at 201. In qualified immunity cases, this 

usually means adopting (as the Court of Appeals did here) 

the plaintiff’s version of the facts.

There is, however, an added wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape capturing the events in 

question. There are no allegations or indications that this

videotape was doctored or altered in any way, nor any

contention that what it depicts differs from what actually

happened. The videotape quite clearly contradicts the

version of the story told by respondent and adopted by the 

Court of Appeals.5 For example, the Court of Appeals

adopted respondent’s assertions that, during the chase, 

“there was little, if any, actual threat to pedestrians or

other motorists, as the roads were mostly empty and

[respondent] remained in control of his vehicle.” 433 F. 3d, 

at 815. Indeed, reading the lower court’s opinion, one gets 

—————— 

5 JUSTICE STEVENS suggests that our reaction to the videotape is

somehow idiosyncratic, and seems to believe we are misrepresenting 

its contents. See post, at 4 (dissenting opinion) (“In sum, the 

factual statements by the Court of Appeals quoted by the 

Court . . . were entirely accurate”). We are happy to allow the 

videotape to speak for itself. See Record 36, Exh. A, available at 

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/video/scott_v_harris.rmvb and 

in Clerk of Court’s case file. 
6 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

Opinion of the Court 

the impression that respondent, rather than fleeing from

police, was attempting to pass his driving test: 

“[T]aking the facts from the non-movant’s viewpoint, 

[respondent] remained in control of his vehicle, slowed 

for turns and intersections, and typically used his indicators for turns. He did not run any motorists off 

the road. Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in the 

shopping center parking lot, which was free from pedestrian and vehicular traffic as the center was closed. 

Significantly, by the time the parties were back on the 

highway and Scott rammed [respondent], the motorway had been cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly because of police blockades of the nearby intersections.” Id., at 815–816 (citations omitted). 

The videotape tells quite a different story. There we see 

respondent’s vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads

in the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. We 

see it swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cross 

the double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in both

directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit.6 

We see it run multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods of time in the occasional center left-turn-only

lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to engage in 

—————— 

6 JUSTICE STEVENS hypothesizes that these cars “had already pulled to

the side of the road or were driving along the shoulder because they

heard the police sirens or saw the flashing lights,” so that “[a] jury

could certainly conclude that those motorists were exposed to no 

greater risk than persons who take the same action in response to a

speeding ambulance.” Post, at 3. It is not our experience that ambulances and fire engines careen down two-lane roads at 85-plus miles per 

hour, with an unmarked scout car out in front of them. The risk they 

pose to the public is vastly less than what respondent created here.

But even if that were not so, it would in no way lead to the conclusion 

that it was unreasonable to eliminate the threat to life that respondent

posed. Society accepts the risk of speeding ambulances and fire engines 

in order to save life and property; it need not (and assuredly does not)

accept a similar risk posed by a reckless motorist fleeing the police. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up. Far from 

being the cautious and controlled driver the lower court

depicts, what we see on the video more closely resembles a 

Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort,

placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at 

great risk of serious injury.7 

At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if

there is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts. Fed. Rule 

Civ. Proc. 56(c). As we have emphasized, “[w]hen the 

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its 

opponent must do more than simply show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . .

Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is

no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Industrial 

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 586–587 (1986) 

(footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged 

factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of 

material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 

242, 247–248 (1986). When opposing parties tell two 

different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by

the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a

court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 

That was the case here with regard to the factual issue

whether respondent was driving in such fashion as to 

endanger human life. Respondent’s version of events is so 

utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury 

—————— 

7This is not to say that each and every factual statement made by the

Court of Appeals is inaccurate. For example, the videotape validates 

the court’s statement that when Scott rammed respondent’s vehicle it 

was not threatening any other vehicles or pedestrians. (Undoubtedly

Scott waited for the road to be clear before executing his maneuver.) 
8 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

Opinion of the Court 

could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not 

have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed 

the facts in the light depicted by the videotape. 

B 

Judging the matter on that basis, we think it is quite

clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. Scott does not contest that his decision to 

terminate the car chase by ramming his bumper into

respondent’s vehicle constituted a “seizure.” “[A] Fourth

Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through

means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 

489 U. S. 593, 596–597 (1989) (emphasis deleted). See 

also id., at 597 (“If . . . the police cruiser had pulled alongside the fleeing car and sideswiped it, producing the crash, 

then the termination of the suspect’s freedom of movement 

would have been a seizure”). It is also conceded, by both 

sides, that a claim of “excessive force in the course of 

making [a] . . .‘seizure’ of [the] person . . . [is] properly 

analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 

388 (1989). The question we need to answer is whether 

Scott’s actions were objectively reasonable.8 

1 

Respondent urges us to analyze this case as we analyzed 

Garner, 471 U. S. 1. See Brief for Respondent 16–29. We 

—————— 

8 JUSTICE STEVENS incorrectly declares this to be “a question of fact

best reserved for a jury,” and complains we are “usurp[ing] the jury’s 

factfinding function.” Post, at 7. At the summary judgment stage,

however, once we have determined the relevant set of facts and drawn 

all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable 

by the record, see Part III–A, supra, the reasonableness of Scott’s 

actions—or, in JUSTICE STEVENS’ parlance, “[w]hether [respondent’s] 

actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force,” post, at 7—is a 

pure question of law. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

must first decide, he says, whether the actions Scott took 

constituted “deadly force.” (He defines “deadly force” as 

“any use of force which creates a substantial likelihood of 

causing death or serious bodily injury,” id., at 19.) If so, 

respondent claims that Garner prescribes certain preconditions that must be met before Scott’s actions can survive 

Fourth Amendment scrutiny: (1) The suspect must have 

posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the

officer or others; (2) deadly force must have been necessary to prevent escape;9 and (3) where feasible, the officer

must have given the suspect some warning. See Brief for 

Respondent 17–18 (citing Garner, supra, at 9–12). Since 

these Garner preconditions for using deadly force were not 

met in this case, Scott’s actions were per se unreasonable. 

Respondent’s argument falters at its first step; Garner 

did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid

preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute

“deadly force.” Garner was simply an application of the 

Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” test, Graham, 

supra, at 388, to the use of a particular type of force in a

particular situation. Garner held that it was unreasonable to kill a “young, slight, and unarmed” burglary sus-

—————— 

9Respondent, like the Court of Appeals, defines this second precondition as “ ‘necessary to prevent escape,’ ” Brief for Respondent 17; Harris 

v. Coweta County, 433 F. 3d 807, 813 (CA11 2005), quoting Garner, 471 

U. S., at 11. But that quote from Garner is taken out of context. The 

necessity described in Garner was, in fact, the need to prevent “serious 

physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Ibid. By way of 

example only, Garner hypothesized that deadly force may be used “if

necessary to prevent escape” when the suspect is known to have “committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 

physical harm,” ibid., so that his mere being at large poses an inherent 

danger to society. Respondent did not pose that type of inherent threat

to society, since (prior to the car chase) he had committed only a minor 

traffic offense and, as far as the police were aware, had no prior criminal record. But in this case, unlike in Garner, it was respondent’s flight

itself (by means of a speeding automobile) that posed the threat of

“serious physical harm . . . to others.” Ibid. 
10 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

Opinion of the Court 

pect, 471 U. S., at 21, by shooting him “in the back of the 

head” while he was running away on foot, id., at 4, and 

when the officer “could not reasonably have believed that 

[the suspect] . . . posed any threat,” and “never attempted

to justify his actions on any basis other than the need to

prevent an escape,” id., at 21. Whatever Garner said 

about the factors that might have justified shooting the 

suspect in that case, such “preconditions” have scant

applicability to this case, which has vastly different facts. 

“Garner had nothing to do with one car striking another or

even with car chases in general . . . . A police car’s bumping a fleeing car is, in fact, not much like a policeman’s 

shooting a gun so as to hit a person.” Adams v. St. Lucie 

County Sheriff’s Dept., 962 F. 2d 1563, 1577 (CA11 1992) 

(Edmondson, J., dissenting), adopted by 998 F. 2d 923

(CA11 1993) (en banc) (per curiam). Nor is the threat 

posed by the flight on foot of an unarmed suspect even

remotely comparable to the extreme danger to human life 

posed by respondent in this case. Although respondent’s

attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth

Amendment context is admirable, in the end we must still 

slosh our way through the factbound morass of “reasonableness.” Whether or not Scott’s actions constituted 

application of “deadly force,” all that matters is whether

Scott’s actions were reasonable. 

2 

In determining the reasonableness of the manner in 

which a seizure is effected, “[w]e must balance the nature 

and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 

Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” 

United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 703 (1983). Scott 

defends his actions by pointing to the paramount governmental interest in ensuring public safety, and respondent 

nowhere suggests this was not the purpose motivating 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

Scott’s behavior. Thus, in judging whether Scott’s actions 

were reasonable, we must consider the risk of bodily harm 

that Scott’s actions posed to respondent in light of the 

threat to the public that Scott was trying to eliminate.

Although there is no obvious way to quantify the risks on

either side, it is clear from the videotape that respondent 

posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any 

pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian 

motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase. See 

Part III–A, supra. It is equally clear that Scott’s actions 

posed a high likelihood of serious injury or death to respondent—though not the near certainty of death posed

by, say, shooting a fleeing felon in the back of the head, 

see Garner, supra, at 4, or pulling alongside a fleeing 

motorist’s car and shooting the motorist, cf. Vaughan v. 

Cox, 343 F. 3d 1323, 1326–1327 (CA11 2003). So how does

a court go about weighing the perhaps lesser probability of 

injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger probability of injuring or killing a single person? We think it appropriate in this process to take into 

account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their 

relative culpability. It was respondent, after all, who

intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by

unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that

ultimately produced the choice between two evils that 

Scott confronted. Multiple police cars, with blue lights 

flashing and sirens blaring, had been chasing respondent 

for nearly 10 miles, but he ignored their warning to stop.

By contrast, those who might have been harmed had Scott 

not taken the action he did were entirely innocent. We 

have little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable for 

Scott to take the action that he did.10 

—————— 

10The Court of Appeals cites Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 

595 (1989), for its refusal to “countenance the argument that by continuing to flee, a suspect absolves a pursuing police officer of any 
12 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

Opinion of the Court 

But wait, says respondent: Couldn’t the innocent public

equally have been protected, and the tragic accident entirely avoided, if the police had simply ceased their pursuit? We think the police need not have taken that chance 

and hoped for the best. Whereas Scott’s action—ramming 

respondent off the road—was certain to eliminate the risk 

that respondent posed to the public, ceasing pursuit was 

not. First of all, there would have been no way to convey

convincingly to respondent that the chase was off, and

that he was free to go. Had respondent looked in his rearview mirror and seen the police cars deactivate their

flashing lights and turn around, he would have had no

idea whether they were truly letting him get away, or

simply devising a new strategy for capture. Perhaps the 

police knew a shortcut he didn’t know, and would reappear down the road to intercept him; or perhaps they were

setting up a roadblock in his path. Cf. Brower, 489 U. S., 

at 594. Given such uncertainty, respondent might have 

been just as likely to respond by continuing to drive recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his brow.11 

Second, we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the 

—————— 

possible liability for all ensuing actions during the chase,” 433 F. 3d, at

816. The only question in Brower was whether a police roadblock 

constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In deciding that 

question, the relative culpability of the parties is, of course, irrelevant;

a seizure occurs whenever the police are “responsib[le] for the termination of [a person’s] movement,” 433 F. 3d, at 816, regardless of the

reason for the termination. Culpability is relevant, however, to the 

reasonableness of the seizure—to whether preventing possible harm to 

the innocent justifies exposing to possible harm the person threatening

them. 

11Contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS’ assertions, we do not “assum[e] that

dangers caused by flight from a police pursuit will continue after the

pursuit ends,” post, at 6, nor do we make any “factual assumptions,” 

post, at 5, with respect to what would have happened if the police had

gone home. We simply point out the uncertainties regarding what 

would have happened, in response to respondent’s factual assumption 

that the high-speed flight would have ended. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they 

drive so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in 

danger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule 

would create: Every fleeing motorist would know that

escape is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90

miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times,

and runs a few red lights. The Constitution assuredly

does not impose this invitation to impunity-earned-byrecklessness. Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A 

police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous highspeed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even 

when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury

or death. 

* * * 

The car chase that respondent initiated in this case

posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical

injury to others; no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Scott’s attempt to terminate the chase by forcing

respondent off the road was reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judgment. The Court of Appeals’ decision 

to the contrary is reversed. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1 

GINSBURG, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–1631 

TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR HARRIS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007] 

JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring. 

I join the Court’s opinion and would underscore two

points. First, I do not read today’s decision as articulating 

a mechanical, per se rule. Cf. post, at 3 (BREYER, J., concurring). The inquiry described by the Court, ante, at 10– 

13, is situation specific. Among relevant considerations: 

Were the lives and well-being of others (motorists, pedestrians, police officers) at risk? Was there a safer way,

given the time, place, and circumstances, to stop the fleeing vehicle? “[A]dmirable” as “[an] attempt to craft an

easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context 

[may be],” the Court explains, “in the end we must still 

slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’” Ante, at 10. 

Second, were this case suitable for resolution on qualified immunity grounds, without reaching the constitutional

question, JUSTICE BREYER’s discussion would be engaging. 

See post, at 1–3 (urging the Court to overrule Saucier v. 

Katz, 533 U. S. 194 (2001)). In joining the Court’s opinion, 

however, JUSTICE BREYER apparently shares the view that,

in the appeal before us, the constitutional question warrants an answer. The video footage of the car chase, he

agrees, demonstrates that the officer’s conduct did not 

transgress Fourth Amendment limitations. See post, at 1. 

Confronting Saucier, therefore, is properly reserved for

another day and case. See ante, at 4, n. 4. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1 

BREYER, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–1631 

TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR HARRIS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007] 

JUSTICE BREYER, concurring. 

I join the Court’s opinion with one suggestion and two

qualifications. Because watching the video footage of the

car chase made a difference to my own view of the case, I

suggest that the interested reader take advantage of the 

link in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 5, n. 5, and watch it. 

Having done so, I do not believe a reasonable jury could, in

this instance, find that Officer Timothy Scott (who joined

the chase late in the day and did not know the specific 

reason why the respondent was being pursued) acted in

violation of the Constitution. 

Second, the video makes clear the highly fact-dependent 

nature of this constitutional determination. And that factdependency supports the argument that we should overrule the requirement, announced in Saucier v. Katz, 533 

U. S. 194 (2001), that lower courts must first decide the

“constitutional question” before they turn to the “qualified

immunity question.” See id., at 200 (“[T]he first inquiry 

must be whether a constitutional right would have been 

violated on the facts alleged”). Instead, lower courts 

should be free to decide the two questions in whatever 

order makes sense in the context of a particular case. 

Although I do not object to our deciding the constitutional 

question in this particular case, I believe that in order to 

lift the burden from lower courts we can and should reconsider Saucier’s requirement as well. 
2 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

BREYER, J., concurring

 Sometimes (e.g., where a defendant is clearly entitled to

qualified immunity) Saucier’s fixed order-of-battle rule 

wastes judicial resources in that it may require courts to 

answer a difficult constitutional question unnecessarily. 

Sometimes (e.g., where the defendant loses the constitutional question but wins on qualified immunity) that 

order-of-battle rule may immunize an incorrect constitutional ruling from review. Sometimes, as here, the orderof-battle rule will spawn constitutional rulings in areas of 

law so fact dependent that the result will be confusion

rather than clarity. And frequently the order-of-battle 

rule violates that older, wiser judicial counsel “not to pass 

on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. 

McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105 (1944); see Ashwander v. 

TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 

(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question

although properly presented by the record, if there is also

present some other ground upon which the case may be

disposed of”). In a sharp departure from this counsel, 

Saucier requires courts to embrace unnecessary constitutional questions not to avoid them. 

It is not surprising that commentators, judges, and, in

this case, 28 States in an amicus brief, have invited us to 

reconsider Saucier’s requirement. See Leval, Judging 

Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 

N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1275 (2006) (calling the requirement “a puzzling misadventure in constitutional dictum”); 

Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dept., 315 F. 3d 65, 69–70 

(CA1 2002) (referring to the requirement as “an uncomfortable exercise” when “the answer whether there was a 

violation may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not yet 

fully developed”); Lyons v. Xenia, 417 F. 3d 565, 580–584 

(CA6 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring); Brief for State 

of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae. I would accept that 

invitation. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

BREYER, J., concurring 

While this Court should generally be reluctant to overturn precedents, stare decisis concerns are at their weakest here. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 

(1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis” are at 

their weakest in cases “involving procedural and evidentiary rules”). The order-of-battle rule is relatively novel, it 

primarily affects judges, and there has been little reliance

upon it.

Third, I disagree with the Court insofar as it articulates 

a per se rule. The majority states: “A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that

threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate 

the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing 

motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Ante, at 13. 

This statement is too absolute. As JUSTICE GINSBURG 

points out, ante, at 1, whether a high-speed chase violates 

the Fourth Amendment may well depend upon more circumstances than the majority’s rule reflects. With these 

qualifications, I join the Court’s opinion. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–1631 

TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR HARRIS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007] 

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 

Today, the Court asks whether an officer may “take

actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk of serious 

injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from

endangering the lives of innocent bystanders.” Ante, at 1. 

Depending on the circumstances, the answer may be an

obvious “yes,” an obvious “no,” or sufficiently doubtful that 

the question of the reasonableness of the officer’s actions

should be decided by a jury, after a review of the degree of 

danger and the alternatives available to the officer. A 

high speed chase in a desert in Nevada is, after all, quite

different from one that travels through the heart of Las

Vegas.

Relying on a de novo review of a videotape of a portion

of a nighttime chase on a lightly traveled road in Georgia

where no pedestrians or other “bystanders” were present,

buttressed by uninformed speculation about the possible

consequences of discontinuing the chase, eight of the 

jurors on this Court reach a verdict that differs from the

views of the judges on both the District Court and the 

Court of Appeals who are surely more familiar with the 

hazards of driving on Georgia roads than we are. The 

Court’s justification for this unprecedented departure from

our well-settled standard of review of factual determinations made by a district court and affirmed by a court of 

appeals is based on its mistaken view that the Court of 
2 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

Appeals’ description of the facts was “blatantly contradicted by the record” and that respondent’s version of the 

events was “so utterly discredited by the record that no

reasonable jury could have believed him.” Ante, at 7–8. 

Rather than supporting the conclusion that what we see 

on the video “resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the 

most frightening sort,” ante, at 7,1 the tape actually confirms, rather than contradicts, the lower courts’ appraisal 

of the factual questions at issue. More important, it surely 

does not provide a principled basis for depriving the respondent of his right to have a jury evaluate the question

whether the police officers’ decision to use deadly force to

bring the chase to an end was reasonable. 

Omitted from the Court’s description of the initial 

speeding violation is the fact that respondent was on a 

four-lane portion of Highway 34 when the officer clocked

his speed at 73 miles per hour and initiated the chase.2 

More significant—and contrary to the Court’s assumption 

that respondent’s vehicle “force[d] cars traveling in both

directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit” 

ante, at 6—a fact unmentioned in the text of the opinion 

explains why those cars pulled over prior to being passed 

—————— 

1 I can only conclude that my colleagues were unduly frightened by

two or three images on the tape that looked like bursts of lightning or

explosions, but were in fact merely the headlights of vehicles zooming 

by in the opposite lane. Had they learned to drive when most highspeed driving took place on two-lane roads rather than on superhighways—when split-second judgments about the risk of passing a slowpoke in the face of oncoming traffic were routine—they might well have

reacted to the videotape more dispassionately. 2According to the District Court record, when respondent was clocked

at 73 miles per hour, the deputy who recorded his speed was sitting in 

his patrol car on Highway 34 between Lora Smith Road and Sullivan 

Road in Coweta County, Georgia. At that point, as well as at the point

at which Highway 34 intersects with Highway 154—where the deputy

caught up with respondent and the videotape begins—Highway 34 is a 

four-lane road, consisting of two lanes in each direction with a wide

grass divider separating the flow of traffic. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

by respondent. The sirens and flashing lights on the

police cars following respondent gave the same warning

that a speeding ambulance or fire engine would have

provided.3 The 13 cars that respondent passed on his side

of the road before entering the shopping center, and both 

of the cars that he passed on the right after leaving the

center, no doubt had already pulled to the side of the road

or were driving along the shoulder because they heard the

police sirens or saw the flashing lights before respondent 

or the police cruisers approached.4 A jury could certainly

conclude that those motorists were exposed to no greater

risk than persons who take the same action in response to 

a speeding ambulance, and that their reactions were fully 

consistent with the evidence that respondent, though

speeding, retained full control of his vehicle.

The police sirens also minimized any risk that may have

arisen from running “multiple red lights,” ibid. In fact, 

respondent and his pursuers went through only two intersections with stop lights and in both cases all other vehicles in sight were stationary, presumably because they 

had been warned of the approaching speeders. Incidentally, the videos do show that the lights were red when the

police cars passed through them but, because the cameras 

were farther away when respondent did so and it is difficult to discern the color of the signal at that point, it is not

entirely clear that he ran either or both of the red lights.

In any event, the risk of harm to the stationary vehicles 

—————— 

3While still on the four-lane portion of Highway 34, the deputy who 

had clocked respondent’s speed turned on his blue light and siren in an 

attempt to get respondent to pull over. It was when the deputy turned 

on his blue light that the dash-mounted video camera was activated

and began to record the pursuit. 4Although perhaps understandable, because their volume on the 

sound recording is low (possibly due to sound proofing in the officer’s 

vehicle), the Court appears to minimize the significance of the sirens

audible throughout the tape recording of the pursuit. 
4 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

was minimized by the sirens, and there is no reason to

believe that respondent would have disobeyed the signals 

if he were not being pursued.

My colleagues on the jury saw respondent “swerve

around more than a dozen other cars,” and “force cars 

traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders,” 

ante, at 6, but they apparently discounted the possibility 

that those cars were already out of the pursuit’s path as a

result of hearing the sirens. Even if that were not so, 

passing a slower vehicle on a two-lane road always involves some degree of swerving and is not especially dangerous if there are no cars coming from the opposite direction. At no point during the chase did respondent pull into

the opposite lane other than to pass a car in front of him; 

he did the latter no more than five times and, on most of 

those occasions, used his turn signal. On none of these 

occasions was there a car traveling in the opposite direction. In fact, at one point, when respondent found himself 

behind a car in his own lane and there were cars traveling

in the other direction, he slowed and waited for the cars 

traveling in the other direction to pass before overtaking

the car in front of him while using his turn signal to do so.

This is hardly the stuff of Hollywood. To the contrary, the 

video does not reveal any incidents that could even be

remotely characterized as “close calls.” 

In sum, the factual statements by the Court of Appeals 

quoted by the Court, ante, at 5–6, were entirely accurate. 

That court did not describe respondent as a “cautious” 

driver as my colleagues imply, ante, at 7, but it did correctly conclude that there is no evidence that he ever lost

control of his vehicle. That court also correctly pointed out

that the incident in the shopping center parking lot did 

not create any risk to pedestrians or other vehicles because the chase occurred just before 11 p.m. on a weekday 

night and the center was closed. It is apparent from the

record (including the videotape) that local police had 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

blocked off intersections to keep respondent from entering 

residential neighborhoods and possibly endangering other 

motorists. I would add that the videos also show that no 

pedestrians, parked cars, sidewalks, or residences were

visible at any time during the chase. The only “innocent

bystanders” who were placed “at great risk of serious 

injury,” ante, at 7, were the drivers who either pulled off 

the road in response to the sirens or passed respondent in

the opposite direction when he was driving on his side of 

the road. 

I recognize, of course, that even though respondent’s

original speeding violation on a four-lane highway was

rather ordinary, his refusal to stop and subsequent flight 

was a serious offense that merited severe punishment. It 

was not, however, a capital offense, or even an offense that 

justified the use of deadly force rather than an abandonment of the chase. The Court’s concern about the “imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have

been present,” ante, at 11, while surely valid in an appropriate case, should be discounted in a case involving a

nighttime chase in an area where no pedestrians were 

present.

What would have happened if the police had decided to

abandon the chase? We now know that they could have

apprehended respondent later because they had his license plate number. Even if that were not true, and even 

if he would have escaped any punishment at all, the use of

deadly force in this case was no more appropriate than the 

use of a deadly weapon against a fleeing felon in Tennessee 

v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985). In any event, any uncertainty about the result of abandoning the pursuit has not 

prevented the Court from basing its conclusions on its own

factual assumptions.5 The Court attempts to avoid the 

—————— 

5 In noting that Scott’s action “was certain to eliminate the risk that 

respondent posed to the public” while “ceasing pursuit was not,” the 
6 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

conclusion that deadly force was unnecessary by speculating that if the officers had let him go, respondent might

have been “just as likely” to continue to drive recklessly as

to slow down and wipe his brow. Ante, at 12. That speculation is unconvincing as a matter of common sense and 

improper as a matter of law. Our duty to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 

would foreclose such speculation if the Court had not used

its observation of the video as an excuse for replacing the

rule of law with its ad hoc judgment. There is no evidentiary basis for an assumption that dangers caused by

flight from a police pursuit will continue after the pursuit 

ends. Indeed, rules adopted by countless police departments throughout the country are based on a judgment 

that differs from the Court’s. See, e.g., App. to Brief for 

Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., as Amicus 

Curiae A–52 (“During a pursuit, the need to apprehend 

the suspect should always outweigh the level of danger

created by the pursuit. When the immediate danger to the

public created by the pursuit is greater than the immediate or potential danger to the public should the suspect 

remain at large, then the pursuit should be discontinued 

or terminated. . . . [P]ursuits should usually be discontin-

—————— 

Court prioritizes total elimination of the risk of harm to the public over

the risk that respondent may be seriously injured or even killed. Ante, 

at 12 (emphasis in original). The Court is only able to make such a 

statement by assuming, based on its interpretation of events on the 

videotape, that the risk of harm posed in this case, and the type of 

harm involved, rose to a level warranting deadly force. These are the 

same types of questions that, when disputed, are typically resolved by a 

jury; this is why both the District Court and the Court of Appeals saw 

fit to have them be so decided. Although the Court claims only to have

drawn factual inferences in respondent’s favor “to the extent supportable 

by the record,” ante, at 8, n. 8 (emphasis in original), its own view of the

record has clearly precluded it from doing so to the same extent as the 

two courts through which this case has already traveled, see ante, at 2– 

3, 5–6. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

ued when the violator’s identity has been established to 

the point that later apprehension can be accomplished

without danger to the public”). 

Although Garner may not, as the Court suggests, “establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions” for the use of deadly force, ante, at 9, it did set a 

threshold under which the use of deadly force would be 

considered constitutionally unreasonable: 

“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that 

the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, 

either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly 

force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a

weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he

has committed a crime involving the infliction or 

threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly 

force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and 

if, where feasible, some warning has been given.” 471 

U. S., at 11–12. 

Whether a person’s actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force is a question of fact best reserved for a 

jury.6 Here, the Court has usurped the jury’s factfinding

function and, in doing so, implicitly labeled the four other 

judges to review the case unreasonable. It chastises the 

Court of Appeals for failing to “vie[w] the facts in the light 

depicted by the videotape” and implies that no reasonable 

person could view the videotape and come to the conclusion that deadly force was unjustified. Ante, at 8. However, the three judges on the Court of Appeals panel ap-

—————— 

6 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly noted: “We reject the 

defendants’ argument that Harris’ driving must, as a matter of law, be

considered sufficiently reckless to give Scott probable cause to believe

that he posed a substantial threat of imminent physical harm to 

motorists and pedestrians. This is a disputed issue to be resolved by a 

jury.” Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F. 3d 807, 815 (CA11 2005). 
8 SCOTT v. HARRIS 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

parently did view the videotapes entered into evidence7 

and described a very different version of events: 

“At the time of the ramming, apart from speeding and

running two red lights, Harris was driving in a nonaggressive fashion (i.e., without trying to ram or run 

into the officers). Moreover, . . . Scott’s path on the

open highway was largely clear. The videos introduced into evidence show little to no vehicular (or pedestrian) traffic, allegedly because of the late hour 

and the police blockade of the nearby intersections.

Finally, Scott issued absolutely no warning (e.g., over 

the loudspeaker or otherwise) prior to using deadly 

force.” Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F. 3d 807, 819, 

n. 14 (CA11 2005). 

If two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently about 

the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree with this Court’s characterization of events. Moreover, under the standard set forth in 

Garner, it is certainly possible that “a jury could conclude

that Scott unreasonably used deadly force to seize Harris

by ramming him off the road under the instant circumstances.” 433 F. 3d, at 821. 

The Court today sets forth a per se rule that presumes

its own version of the facts: “A police officer’s attempt to

terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens 

the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at 

risk of serious injury or death.” Ante, at 13 (emphasis 

added). Not only does that rule fly in the face of the flexible and case-by-case “reasonableness” approach applied in 

Garner and Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), but it 

—————— 

7 In total, there are four police tapes which captured portions of the 

pursuit, all recorded from different officers’ vehicles. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 9 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

is also arguably inapplicable to the case at hand, given

that it is not clear that this chase threatened the life of 

any “innocent bystande[r].”8 In my view, the risks inherent in justifying unwarranted police conduct on the basis 

of unfounded assumptions are unacceptable, particularly 

when less drastic measures—in this case, the use of stop

sticks9 or a simple warning issued from a loudspeaker—

could have avoided such a tragic result. In my judgment,

jurors in Georgia should be allowed to evaluate the reasonableness of the decision to ram respondent’s speeding

vehicle in a manner that created an obvious risk of death 

and has in fact made him a quadriplegic at the age of 19.

I respectfully dissent. 

—————— 

8 It is unclear whether, in referring to “innocent bystanders,” the 

Court is referring to the motorists driving unfazed in the opposite

direction or to the drivers who pulled over to the side of the road, safely 

out of respondent’s and petitioner’s path. 9 “Stop sticks” are a device which can be placed across the roadway 

and used to flatten a vehicle’s tires slowly to safely terminate a pursuit.