Friendly Force

Dilemmas in Europe

Jose Luis Calvo Albero

Kirk Gallinger

Klaus Klingenschmid

Jose De Meer Madrid

Angus McAfee

Stefano Messina

Markus Meyer

Michael Mineni

Darryl Rupp

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Challenges Within and Among Intergovernmental 

Organizations and the Implications for the U.S. Army

i

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v

Strategic Studies Institute

and 

U.S. Army War College Press

FRIENDLY FORCE DILEMMAS IN EUROPE

CHALLENGES WITHIN AND AMONG INTERGOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

Jose Luis Calvo Albero

Kirk Gallinger

Klaus Klingenschmid

Jose De Meer Madrid

Angus McAfee

Stefano Messina

Markus Meyer

Michael Mineni

Darryl Rupp

May 2018

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy 

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ISBN 1-58487-783-9
vii

Foreword ..................................................................................................................................ix

About the Authors ..................................................................................................................xi

Summary..............................................................................................................................xiii

Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1

The Security Environment.......................................................................................................2

The Challenge from Moscow ............................................................................................2

Terrorism..............................................................................................................................3

Climate Change ...................................................................................................................4

Access to Energy Trade ......................................................................................................4

Demographic Hurdles........................................................................................................5

Weakened European Identity............................................................................................6

A Changing Information Space.........................................................................................6

Institutions to the Rescue? .......................................................................................................8

Political Divisions within the EU......................................................................................8

Lack of Shared Threat Perceptions ...................................................................................9

Inadequate Decision-Making Capability.........................................................................9

Lack of Consistently Strong Resourcing........................................................................10

Limited Capacity...............................................................................................................10

Lack of Capabilities...........................................................................................................11

Insufficient Interoperability.............................................................................................11

Incomplete Operational Picture ......................................................................................12

Inadequate Maneuverability ...........................................................................................12

Addressing the Problems.......................................................................................................12

Refocus Security Cooperation and Weapons Sales .....................................................12

Strengthen EU and NATO Capacity for Disaster Relief..............................................13

Streamline NATO Decision-Making ..............................................................................13

Encourage a Division of Labor between NATO and EU.............................................14

Station Additional Forces in Eastern Europe................................................................14

Develop Additional Infrastructure in Europe ..............................................................15

Plan for Early Deployment..............................................................................................15

Add Teeth to the Defense Planning Process ................................................................15

Reframe the Classification Process .................................................................................16

CONTENTS
Promote the Right PESCO ...............................................................................................16

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................16

Endnotes...................................................................................................................................19

viii
ix

FOREWORD

Friendly Force Dilemmas in Europe comes at an opportune time. Europe is in a period 

of significant transition, and the region faces its greatest security challenges since the end 

of the Cold War. The list of challenges is certainly sufficient to make national security 

practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic shudder—a revisionist Russia, terrorism, climate change, access to energy, demography and migration, weakening European identify and the rise of nationalism, and a changing information space. Within this precarious 

environment, the present monograph assesses the most important and most relevant 

shortcomings of security-related intergovernmental organizations in Europe. A range of 

potential solutions are offered to foster greater capability and drive a more coherent security response.

The security of the United States and Europe are interdependent. As the 2017 National 

Security Strategy reconfirms, a strong and free Europe remains of vital importance to the 

United States. Similarly, the 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the critical role 

for the United States of its alliances and partners—one area where near-peer competitors 

like China and Russia are unable to compete. At the same time, and despite concerns 

over burden sharing, United States conventional and strategic forces continue to serve as 

the main guarantor of European security. To borrow from United States European Command’s tagline, we are truly “Stronger Together.”

I would be remiss if I did not draw attention to the unique composition of this integrated research team. As part of its core curriculum, the U.S. Army War College encourages broad perspectives, cross-cultural savviness, and constant challenge of any and all 

assumptions. In this spirit, the research team comprised academics, U.S. students, and 

international students and faculty from Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the 

United Kingdom. The end result is analysis that covers an array of transatlantic security 

perspectives.

Friendly Force Dilemmas in Europe answers a priority research topic for the Chief of Staff 

of the U.S. Army. In some cases, particular shortcomings may seem beyond the impact of 

the Army or the Department of Defense (DoD). However, both the Army—through the 

role the Chief of Staff of the Army plays on the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and DoD play critically influential roles in shaping U.S. strategy and policy through the interagency. Moreover, both the Army and DoD have an array of policy tools under their direct authority 

that could address challenges at the level of intergovernmental institutions. Finally, even 

for those issue areas where the Army and DoD cannot shape strategy or wield policy 

tools, having awareness of particular institutional hurdles and shortcomings is nonetheless useful and important.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

xi

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

JOSE LUIS CALVO ALBERO, Colonel, Spanish Army, is a faculty instructor at the U.S. 

Army War College (USAWC). He received his commission as infantry officer in 1984. His 

previous assignments include the European Union (EU) Military Staff in Brussels, the 

Spanish Joint Staff, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Rapid Deployment 

Corps in Italy, and the Spanish Army War School. His operational experience includes 

deployments to Bosnia Herzegovina (1995, 2002, and 2010), and Afghanistan (2005-2006).

Colonel Calvo is a frequent contributor to academic and military publications in Spain, 

with more than 100 articles and book chapters from 1996 to the present.

KIRK GALLINGER, Colonel, Canadian Army, joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 1989 

and commissioned as an infantry officer in 1993. His operational experience includes 

deployments to Croatia and Bosnia and company command in Afghanistan. He commanded the Infantry School from 2011 to 2013. Key staff appointments include Deputy 

Commander of the Combat Training Centre and Chief of Staff of 3rd Canadian Division. 

He holds a baccalaureate in honors history, a master of arts in war studies, and a master 

of arts in public administration.

KLAUS KLINGENSCHMID, Lieutenant Colonel, Austrian Army, was commissioned as 

an infantry officer from the Theresian Military Academy in 2001. He is a graduate of the 

Austrian National Defense Academy and holds a master degree from the Joint Program 

National Defense-Executive Management of the University of Vienna. His assignments 

include deployments to Afghanistan and Kosovo. Prior to his arrival at Carlisle Barracks, 

he was assigned to the Austrian Ministry of Defense, where he served as Head of Department in the Office of the Chief of Defense.

JOSE DE MEER MADRID, Lieutenant Colonel, Spanish Army, received his commission 

from the Spanish Army Military Academy in Zaragoza in 1993. His command assignments have been in the Spanish Airborne Brigade and in the Spanish Legion. His last 

assignment was in J5 Plans, in the Spanish Operational Command. He has been deployed 

to Bosnia Herzegovina with the Implementation Force in 1996, Kosovo with the Kosovo 

Force in 2000 and 2001, Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Force in 

2004 and 2012, and Lebanon with the United Nations Interim Force in 2007, 2010, and 

2015.

ANGUS MCAFEE, Colonel, British Army, is a British armour officer and was commissioned into the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst 

in 1990. He is a graduate of the United Kingdom’s Joint Services Command and Staff 

College and holds a master’s degree in military studies from Cranfield University. In 

addition to four tours serving in Germany, he has deployed operationally to Northern 

Ireland, the Balkans, and Afghanistan.

STEFANO MESSINA, Colonel, Italian Army, joined the Italian Military Academy in 1991, 

and he was commissioned in the engineer branch. He graduated in transport engineering, 
and he attended the Italian Staff Officers Course, the U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, and the Italian Joint Staff College. He served four tours of duty abroad in 

Kosovo, Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. He also served in the Army General Staff and 

the Cabinet of the Minister of Defence, and his last appointment was Executive Assistant 

to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army. He also has a degree in strategic military studies 

and a master of arts in strategic sciences.

MARKUS MEYER, Lieutenant Colonel, German Army, is a 2001 graduate of the University of the German Armed Forces Hamburg with the equivalent of a master’s degree 

in political science. He entered the German Army in 1994 as a parachute infantry officer 

cadet and was selected for the General Staff Course in 2007. Since then he held a variety of positions in the fields of operations and military policy. Lieutenant Colonel Meyer’s deployments include International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the 

Kosovo Force in Kosovo.

MICHAEL MINENI, Colonel, U.S. Army, began his 30-year career enlisting in the Army 

in 1988. He achieved the rank of staff sergeant prior to attending Officer Candidate School 

at Fort Benning, GA, where he earned his commission in 1997. Colonel Mineni has multiple combat deployments spanning Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM 

to his most recent deployment in support of Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE as the 

4th Infantry Division, Chief of Staff, (Forward) for the Mission Command Element, in 

Poznan, Poland. He has served in numerous staff positions and has commanded at all 

levels including battalion command. Colonel Mineni holds a master’s degree in public 

administration with a concentration in strategic leadership.

DARRYL RUPP, Colonel, U.S. Army, is a military intelligence professional commissioned 

by West Point in 1993. He served as an all source intelligence officer from battalion to division levels, in the Joint Intelligence and Operations Center for U.S. Africa Command, on 

the Army Staff G2, and commanded the 163d Military Intelligence Battalion, 504th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade at Fort Hood, TX. Most recently, he served as the Chief of J2 

Operations and Deputy J2 in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and will 

return to a position in NATO Headquarters, following his graduation from the USAWC.

xii
xiii

SUMMARY

Over the last several years, European security has confronted major new challenges. 

Russia’s land grab in Ukraine and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-inspired transnational terrorism are two of the most obvious, but climate change, destabilizing migration, 

insufficient energy resources, a weakened European identity, and manipulation of the 

information space greatly complicate an already threatening security environment. 

Two of the most powerful, most successful intergovernmental security institutions—

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)—have 

each taken steps to ameliorate insecurity in Europe. NATO’s Readiness Action Plan and 

the EU’s Action Plan for Military Mobility are just two examples of how the transatlantic 

community and the countries of Europe have sought to leverage their collective strength 

to achieve security gains for all. 

Although these and other initiatives that were undertaken to date have been necessary, 

they have nonetheless proven insufficient in mitigating the aforementioned security challenges. This monograph identifies political divisions, a lack of shared threat perceptions, 

inadequate resourcing, insufficient capabilities and capacity, tedious decision-making 

procedures, insufficient interoperability, an incomplete operational picture, and inadequate maneuverability as the most problematic of the institutional shortcomings that 

collectively frustrate the ability of NATO and the EU to meet their security-related goals.

These institutional shortcomings are critically important to the United States, given 

how prominently Europe sits within the United States’ vital national security interests. 

The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy is clear on how a strong and free Europe is vital 

to the United States, on how NATO in particular forms one of America’s great advantages over its competitors, and on how a fractured NATO and a weakened EU only benefit U.S. adversaries. 

Unfortunately, several of the institutional challenges identified in this monograph 

seem stubbornly persistent—for instance, disagreements over adequate resourcing of 

NATO are nearly as old as the alliance itself. Moreover, many of these problems might 

appear to sit beyond the influence of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. 

Army. 

Nevertheless, this paper makes a number of recommendations in four broad areas 

where DoD and Army engagement can help to overcome the thorny problems identified 

in this monograph and thereby drive a more coherent security response from NATO 

and the EU. First, the monograph identifies needed improvements in NATO and wider 

European capability development, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, the monograph recommends that the United States refocus foreign military sales, 

reinforce EU defense consolidation, and build capacity in both the military sphere and in 

Europe’s ability to respond to natural and man-made disaster relief operations. 

Second, the monograph recognizes the key role that the Chief of Staff of the Army 

plays on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, encouraging Army leadership to use its influence to 

press for structural and policy changes within NATO. Specifically, this monograph recommends the Army and DoD use their influence in the interagency to address NATO’s 

unwieldy decision-making process, foster greater commitment to the NATO Defense 
xiv

Planning Process (NDPP), and promote the development of a division of labor strategy 

that would reduce duplication of effort between Europe and the United States.

Third, the monograph identifies critical improvements necessary in European infrastructure that would improve mobility and a rapid reinforcement in the event of a crisis in 

Europe. Here the United States should continue to pressure European countries toward 

implementing the initiatives already put forward in the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) and the extant Readiness Action Plan. Washington should also consider earmarking more European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funding for infrastructure projects 

to improve redundancy and resilience in European transport networks, especially those 

that connect ports and airports with pre-positioned stocks.

Fourth, the monograph recommends that Washington consider a number of steps 

that would reduce risk, generate a more robust deterrence, and enable greater cohesion 

among its European partners. Additionally, the monograph suggests the United States 

should reframe the intelligence classification process to emphasize sharing among allies, 

station additional forces in Europe to strengthen deterrence, and prepare to unilaterally 

deploy forces forward in advance of any decisions made by the North Atlantic Council 

(NAC).

Throughout, what sets this monograph apart from other analyses produced for senior 

Army and DoD leadership is that it is largely based on the informed assessments, research, 

and analysis of America’s allies and partners. The team that authored this monograph 

includes military officers from some of America’s closest security and foreign policy partners—Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The officers that 

comprise the research team collectively offer a unique perspective on the topics examined 

in this monograph, a perspective from which senior DoD and Army leadership do not 

typically hear. Given the importance that the United States has long placed on leveraging 

its alliance and partner relationships to address the most pressing security challenges of 

the day, it is vital to consider and heed the perspectives of those allies and partners.
1

INTRODUCTION

In the past few years, Europe has witnessed a variety of security crises across 

the spectrum of operations from Russia’s 

conventional operations in Ukraine to 

hybrid war to Islamic State-directed plots 

and attacks to domestic “lone wolf” terrorism. In response to these challenges, the 

principal intergovernmental organizations 

charged with safeguarding European security—the European Union (EU) and North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—

have implemented changes in strategy, 

operations, and posture. Despite this, there 

is evidence that these same organizations 

have struggled to assure member states, 

muster sufficient resources, and ameliorate the aforementioned security challenges. These shortcomings have tested 

the viability of previously held assumptions and raised questions about the role 

and efficacy of collective, intergovernmental instruments.

At the same time, the political environment may be shifting. The Trump 

administration has placed nearly singular 

emphasis on transatlantic burden-sharing and questioned NATO‘s relevance. In 

Europe, Brexit and recent elections in the 

Netherlands, France, Germany, and Italy 

have had major impacts on the EU’s institutional strength and its military, diplomatic, and foreign assistance capabilities. 

All of this adds further complexity to the 

political environment facing members of 

the transatlantic community. On the other 

hand, these factors might be the trigger 

for increasing defense efforts of America‘s European allies as well as a deeper 

European integration leading to more strategic independence.

With domestic politics and the security environment providing context at the 

state and system levels, intergovernmental 

institutions like NATO and the EU find 

themselves on shifting ground. Whether 

and how they respond to this is critically 

important to the United States, given its 

vital role in European security today, a 

role that is arguably no less important now 

than it was during the Cold War. For the 

U.S. Army, the effectiveness and efficiency 

with which intergovernmental organizations—especially NATO but also the EU—

respond to the new environment matter a 

great deal.

This monograph will critically assess 

the most important and most relevant 

shortcomings of security-related intergovernmental organizations in Europe. 

What makes this approach unique from 

others that have sought to address similar issues of the last several years is that 

it is largely based on the informed assessments, research, and analysis of America’s allies. The team that authored this 

monograph includes military officers 

from some of America’s closest security 

and foreign policy partners—Austria, 

Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the 

United Kingdom. The officers from these 

countries offer experiences, backgrounds, 

and expertise that collectively provide a 

unique perspective on the topics examined in this monograph. For over a quarter 

century, U.S. national security strategies 

have emphasized how the United States 

prefers to address the major security challenges of the day in coalitions of willing 

FRIENDLY FORCE DILEMMAS
2

and capable partners, and more specifically that the United States prefers to do so 

with allies and partners from Europe and 

North America. For this reason, it is vital 

to consider and heed the perspectives of 

those allies and partners, if only to ensure 

Washington does not succumb to a kind of 

beltway myopia.

This monograph first outlines the most 

pressing salient aspects of the security 

environment confronting the transatlantic community. It will then examine the 

major shortcomings of security-related 

intergovernmental institutions in managing or eliminating the security challenges. 

The monograph will do so with the goal of 

identifying critical implications for the U.S. 

Army and Department of Defense (DoD), 

as well as identifying potential means by 

which the U.S. Army and DoD might support and assist U.S. allies and partners in 

overcoming the institutional shortcomings to strengthen collective defense and 

security.

In some cases, particular shortcomings 

of NATO and the EU may seem beyond the 

impact of the Army or DoD. However, both 

the Army—through the role the Chief of 

Staff of the Army plays on the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff—and DoD play critically influential roles in shaping U.S. strategy and 

policy through the interagency. Moreover, 

both the Army and DoD have an array of 

policy tools under their direct authority 

that could address challenges at the level 

of intergovernmental institutions. Finally, 

even for those issue areas where the Army 

and DoD cannot shape strategy or wield 

policy tools, having an awareness of particular institutional hurdles and shortcomings is nonetheless useful and important.

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

According to the NATO Communiqué released after the Warsaw Summit in 

2016, the alliance faces today “an increasingly diverse, unpredictable, and demanding security environment,” that provokes 

instability.1

 This section will identify the 

most salient challenges facing the transatlantic community.

The Challenge from Moscow

The most significant military threat 

in Europe is that posed by a resurgent 

Russia, as evidenced by an array of hostile 

military, economic, political, and covert 

actions directed against the West over the 

last decade, reaching a pinnacle with the 

2014 invasion of Ukraine. Russia perceives 

NATO enlargement as a threat and engagement with the West as largely futile.2

 The 

result is open security competition with 

the prospect of war, either by design or by 

accident, increasing each year.3

Many Russians view the Soviet decision to end the Cold War struggle as altruistic and beneficial to both Russia and the 

West, a move that was not appreciated 

nor reciprocated by the West. The Kremlin 

had wanted Russia to be treated qualitatively different from other non-members of 

the NATO alliance in its relations.4

 It also 

demanded that its relationship should be 

one of strategic dialogue, with Russia on 

equal footing with the West.5

 However, 

the initial agreements between NATO 

and Russia fell far short of Russian expectations.6

 Even the formal agreements to 

institutionalize relations between NATO 

and Russia sought to limit the influence of 
3

Russia while maintaining NATO’s freedom of action. In these cases, the strategy 

was to provide symbolic equality with no 

substance.7

The invitation by NATO to seven applicant states, including the three former 

Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and 

Estonia, as well as two Balkan countries 

and two central European states, greatly 

exacerbated tensions between NATO and 

Russia. For the first time in post-Soviet history, the society and the elite saw NATO 

as aggressive as it approached Russia’s 

borders.8

From the Russian perspective, Moscow 

is countering and balancing against a 

more powerful, expansive, and aggressive 

West.9 This interpretation of present-day 

international relations is part of a broader 

historical pattern, in which there is a “traditional and instinctive Russian sense of 

insecurity,” driving Russia to view other 

states as threatening without determining 

intent.10 In many ways, this is the same 

phenomenon observed over 70 years ago 

by U.S. diplomat George Kennan in the 

Long Telegram.11 As such, Russia and the 

West may be in an unavoidable security 

dilemma, one that will require a significant 

effort to reverse.

Terrorism

In the past several years, a string of 

attacks has brought terrorism to the forefront of the European mindset. The attack 

on the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris on 

January 7, 2015; the complex series of 

attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, that 

killed 130 people and wounded hundreds 

more; and the attacks in Brussels on March 

22, 2016, that killed 33 people (including 

the 3 attackers) and wounded over 300 

additional people have raised the awareness of the terrorist threat within Europe 

to new heights.

That this new awareness of the threat 

within Europe coincides with a massive 

refugee crisis has led to at least a cursory 

linkage between the two stressors on 

European stability in much of the public 

perception. There have in fact been some 

legitimate linkages between these two factors, with at least one of the attackers in 

the Paris November 13th attack traveling 

on a fake Syrian passport with the refugee 

flow into France, with Frontex (the border 

agency of the EU) identifying a number 

of individuals requesting refugee status 

based on false Syrian passports. Although 

the actual amount that refugee flows will 

contribute to the movement of terrorist 

elements is difficult to assess with precision, the conclusion that some radicalized elements will penetrate into Europe 

is a surety. Additionally, personnel who 

have fought in Syria or Iraq who return 

to Europe will continue to pose a terror 

threat.12 Arguably, a significant proportion 

of the refugee population is unlikely to be 

radicalized, and many are well-educated 

professionals from Syria who fled after the 

Islamic State created an authoritarian proto-state. The results in the public perception though are colored by the few who are 

linked to terrorism.13

European states have identified a lack 

of assimilation of some in the Muslim communities found within Europe as a potential path toward radicalism. Countries in 

Europe have adopted different approaches 

to increase assimilation, with mixed success. Some have tried to force assimilation, 

while others have attempted a soft power 

approach to encourage assimilation.14
4

However, in the wake of the recent 

terrorist attacks, some European governments have turned from the more inclusive 

liberal approach to Muslim immigrants 

and have begun to adopt more hard power 

approaches to counterterrorism within 

their own territory. Following the Charlie 

Hebdo attack in 2015, France added nearly 

2,700 personnel to its military and intelligence agencies, and later the parliament 

authorized wiretapping without a judge’s 

ruling. France is not alone, with similar 

approaches taking place across Europe to 

counter the increased terrorist threat.15

Climate Change

Terrorism and the Russian threat to 

European and transatlantic security are 

obvious and acute. However, there are 

other significant threats to European security that will also impact American interests, some in the short run, but many in the 

medium and long terms. Foremost among 

these from Europe’s perspective is the 

threat of climate change. European governments, as well as U.S. agencies, agree 

that there is unambiguous scientific data 

to establish a long-term warming trend 

in global temperatures. Over the coming 

decades, climate change will become more 

noticeable as temperature and precipitation extremes become more common,16

resulting in rising sea levels, increased risk 

of coastal flooding, increased droughts, 

heatwaves, and land degradation.17

Decreasing ice coverage of the Arctic sea, 

increased accessibility, and the resulting opportunities for trade and resource 

exploitation of permafrost areas will lead 

to an increasing strategic importance of 

the region.18

Europe acknowledged the effects of climate change on international security in 

a report to the European Council nearly a 

decade ago.19 Compared to global trends, 

the foreseeable effects of climate change 

on Europe itself remain limited, though 

Europe’s Mediterranean region will face 

large increases in heat extremes resulting 

in droughts, forest fires, and loss of crop 

yields.

An increase in natural disasters will be 

the most direct effect on European security. 

European countries differ, but they generally maintain a wide array of capabilities 

to manage and mitigate natural disasters.

Although Europe may not feel significant direct effects of climate change, 

regions nearby most certainly will. For 

example, the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan 

Africa, the Near and Middle East, as well 

as Central Asia, will all be affected by 

decreasing water sources and food scarcity. Rudimentary infrastructure, local 

conflicts, and weak governance will prevent effective redistribution of food and 

water. Given the proximity and relative 

stability of Europe, mass migration from 

each of these regions is likely, resulting 

in potentially destabilizing political, economic, and even diplomatic outcomes.

Access to Energy Trade

With a projected population of about 

9 billion people and an average rate of 3.4 

percent growth of the global economy, 

current studies expect an increase of global 

energy demand of 30 percent until 2040. 

Most of this new demand will come from 

India and developing South-East Asian 

countries. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) 

is projected to supply 90 percent of the 

growth in long-distance gas trade. Russia’s 
5

dependence on energy based revenues, an 

increasingly interconnected energy network in Europe as well as the rise of the 

United States as an exporter for oil and 

LNG will decrease the potential of Russia 

to use energy supply as a coercive tool.

However, other energy trade-related 

challenges will arise. For example, transportation of LNG deemphasizes the importance of pipelines in favor of large-scale 

LNG terminals and transport on the sea 

as well as inland waterways.20 This, combined with the increased local availability 

of efficient renewable energy sources, will 

decrease the global importance of individual energy sources while increasing 

the importance of the maritime transport 

routes through the global commons.

A more highly interdependent European energy network comes at the price 

of increased vulnerability of the system 

to cyber threats. The 2015 attack on the 

Ukrainian power grid that resulted in a 

power outage for 80,000 customers was 

one of several incidents that have already 

proven the potential of catastrophic 

impacts on the energy security.21 Threats 

can affect the generation, transmission, 

and distribution of energy, process technologies, confidential strategic energy 

infrastructure data, as well as energy 

market services.22 Cyber risks concerning 

the energy sector have an especially high 

potential to cross into the physical domain, 

as disruptions will affect supply chains, 

individual households, and could cause 

additional environmental effects through 

attacks on oil and nuclear infrastructure.

Demographic Hurdles

Although environmental trends may 

push more migrants toward Europe, 

domestic political and socio-economic 

conditions are the most important “push”-

factors.23 More specifically, conflict is the 

strongest incentive for migration. International wars—including national wars 

fought with foreign military intervention—trigger more migration than civil 

wars without foreign involvement. Human 

rights violations cause fewer movements 

than physical conflict, and ethnic rebellions usually result in bigger internal refugee movements, whereas population 

movement remains low.24

Actual and expected wage differentials 

and differences in living standards are 

the most important economic incentives.25

Analyzed in conjunction with the skilllevel of migrants, employment opportunities in the destination country are triggers 

of deliberate migration.26 These considerations largely explain EU internal migration from Central and Eastern Europe to 

the west and, to a lesser extent, from South 

to North-West European countries.

Migration causes second and third 

order effects on security. Examples include 

the perceived relationship between immigration and terrorism, fueling nationalistic 

populism with negative ramifications for 

collective security. A situation of mutual 

fear can accompany high levels of migration, which promotes a chain of self-protective actions and reactions between the 

native population and foreigners, ultimately leading to a threat to national 

security, and even conflict.27 Uncontrolled 

immigration in 2015 had only moderate 

effects, but further migrant inflow could 

finally reach the important level of 10 percent foreigners among overall domestic 

populations, which research suggests is 

a critical threshold for increased tensions 

between migrants and the extant domestic 

population.28
6

Eastern European countries—which 

have been particularly hostile to migrant 

flows from outside of Europe—will see a 

considerable population decrease until 

2050. In Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, 

Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine, the total 

population decrease will likely exceed 15 

percent.29 A decrease of ethnic Latvians 

while ethnic-Russian population levels 

remain stagnant could lead to increased 

Russian influence based on a higher share 

in the overall population.30 Finally, the 

population decrease through net emigration is nothing less than a threat to the 

viability of smaller states like Latvia or 

Lithuania. 31

Weakened European Identity

The history of Europe has been a continuous clash of identities. The continent 

has been subject to periodic and frequently 

violent migrations, as well as a seemingly permanent struggle for hegemony 

among the different European nations. 

The final outcome of such a history has 

been a plethora of national identities. All 

large European countries are the result of 

a union, by will or force, of different historical communities. In some cases, one of 

those communities maintained a situation 

of real or perceived political and economic 

privileges to the detriment of the rest. 

This was the situation of England in the 

United Kingdom, Castile in Spain, or the 

Walloon community in Belgium. Ethnicity 

and religion also play a role as instruments 

wielded by nationalist leaders to incite tension and conflict, especially in regions like 

the Balkans.

European collective identity, symbolized most obviously by the EU, reinforces the commonality of interests 

that modern Europe represents. This European common identity is hampered by a 

growing Euroscepticism and a return to 

previous national identities as a shelter 

against some of the more negative consequences of the 2008 economic crisis and 

increased immigration.

Eventually, the existence of a common 

European identity with associated common 

interests and threat perceptions may benefit transatlantic solidarity, simplify collective decision-making, and make building 

and sustaining interoperability easier. 

For now, though, the momentum toward 

a common European identity is still too 

weak to undergird a unified European 

security and defense policy and strategy 

effectively.

A Changing Information Space

European societies are fully immersed 

in the information age, which presents 

both opportunities and vulnerabilities. 

European citizens have easy access to 

ideologically diverse press and media. 

The level of education suggests an intellectually sophisticated population, capable of using critical thinking to evaluate 

the information products they constantly 

receive. Theoretically, European citizens 

should not be especially vulnerable to disinformation, but actually, there are several 

indicators showing a different reality.

In 2014, 80 percent of European citizens 

used the internet every day and 30 percent 

had access through a broadband connection. This amount is less than other developed countries such as the United States 

(87 and 31 percent, respectively) or Japan 

(91 and 30 percent), but still much higher 
7

than most developing countries like China 

(49 and 14 percent).32

Europeans also enjoy excellent access 

to print, online, and television journalism. 

For instance, half of the EU countries have 

access to more than 400 television channels, while the typical consumer has access 

to an average of 127 on-demand audiovisual media services.33 In many European 

countries, television is considered a public 

service, and there are many state-broadcasted television (TV) channels.

However, the tendency toward concentration and the creation of “global media 

empires” has been a decrease in the quality 

and reliability of the information received 

by the average European citizen. The main 

two foreign sources of disinformation and 

manipulation of information in Europe 

over the last decade have been the Russian 

Federation and the Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant (ISIL).

Russia’s original main tool for strategic communication was Russia Today 

(RT) TV channel, initially conceived as a 

vehicle for Russian promotion abroad.34

Currently, RT includes seven different 

channels broadcasting in English, Arabic, 

and Spanish from Moscow, Washington, 

and London. From its initial goal of praising and promoting Russia in foreign countries, the channel has evolved toward a 

more aggressive tone, especially after the 

crisis in Ukraine in 2014, highlighting negative aspects of European societies, culture, and politics.

Just after the crisis in Ukraine, Moscow 

launched a new communication tool, 

Sputnik News, a complex network of sites 

that intends to broadcast in 30 languages. 

Russia also owns a diversity of websites 

and news agencies all around the world.

It has even established partnerships with 

Western media outlets.

Probably the best-known Russian 

instrument for disinformation is the 

cyber networks apparently composed of 

thousands of automated accounts (bots) 

and human operators. This network contributes to the disinformation campaign 

launched from channels that are more conventional, and carries out operations that 

are more offensive like hacking e-mails, 

phones, stealing data, or blocking web 

pages and databases.35

Russian offensive cyber capabilities are 

well known since the crippling cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 

2008. Currently, Moscow combines a more 

sophisticated mixture of complementary 

and mutually reinforcing cyber and disinformation campaigns. The main targets 

are the former Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics and countries under the Soviet 

umbrella during the Cold War. The central 

message is to show how Western societies 

are aggressive, decadent, and on the verge 

of collapse, as the Soviet Union was in the 

1980s.36

ISIL disinformation campaigns primarily target Muslim communities around 

the world, and the primary objective of 

its strategic communication campaigns 

is recruitment and support for its cause. 

Social networks are the main communication tool for ISIL, although they also use 

tools like web pages, magazines, declarations, and even printed publications that 

are more traditional.

The success of Russian and ISIL strategic communications in Europe is difficult to 

evaluate. Russia’s image in Europe has not 

improved and, even if the campaign has 

been more successful in Eastern Europe, 

the impact on governance and political 

decisions has been limited. It is more likely 

that Russian disinformation has achieved 

more success internally in Russia than 
8

externally in Europe. However, even if the 

rise of radical parties and the deterioration 

of the EU’s image are more the results of 

the economic crisis than Russian disinformation, Moscow also had some influence 

on it.

ISIL’s information campaigns have 

obtained moderate success recruiting 

fighters in Europe and inspiring terrorist 

attacks. The number of attacks has been 

limited, even if some of them were quite 

costly in human lives. Public alarm after 

the attacks has been considerable, but still 

has not attracted a significant number of 

Muslim militants in Europe, nor provoked 

widespread violence against Muslim communities living in European countries.

European institutions are not well 

suited to combat information wars. In 

European democracies, the principles of 

freedom of opinion and expression make 

it difficult to react against messages that 

are often considered as covered by those 

rights. Additionally, the virulence and 

sophistication of some disinformation 

campaigns have been a surprise. 

The EU External Action established 

the East Stratcomm Taskforce in 2015, 

specifically aimed to counter Russia disinformation and propaganda. NATO has 

two Centers of Excellence (CoE) working 

on doctrine and procedures against hostile cyber and information actions: the 

Cyberdefense CoE in Tallinn and the Strategic Communications CoE in Riga.

INSTITUTIONS TO THE RESCUE?

The countries of Europe and North 

America have developed an array of institutional arrangements to cope with problems that are too large or too complex for 

any single country to handle alone. The 

most important of these from a security 

perspective is NATO, largely because it 

links the United States and Canada with 

Europe. The EU has also come to play an 

increasingly important role in security, 

not least because its governing documents 

include a mutual assistance clause similar 

to the NATO treaty’s Article 5.

These intergovernmental institutions 

help to ameliorate the security dilemma, 

lessen the security burden on individual 

countries, and facilitate more efficient and 

more effective collective action. NATO 

and the EU face challenges in adapting 

to the evolving security environment and 

dealing effectively and efficiently with the 

security threats outlined above. This section will examine in greater detail the most 

significant of these hurdles. 

Political Divisions within the EU

The EU has long had a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but disagreements among member states limit 

its effectiveness to relatively small, shortlived, and low-intensity crisis management missions outside Europe. The CSDP 

currently suffers from a lack of commitment and a lack of resources, with its scope 

shifting increasingly toward border monitoring and training activities.

Although the EU’s strategy recognizes 

NATO’s relevance for collective defense, it 

nonetheless makes clear that the “EU needs 

to be strengthened as a security community” to enable the EU to act more autonomously when necessary.37 This implies a 

division of labor that could realize Washington’s current goals of maximum influence under minimum force presence. 

However, most EU military efforts have 
9

been focused on international security 

beyond the EU’s borders.

Among EU members, there has been a 

critical mass eager to press the accelerator 

on European security and defense. Other 

member states, while keen on security and 

defense in general, want to ensure the EU’s 

approach to security and defense in no way 

challenges NATO’s supremacy on collective defense, in order to avoid duplication 

of effort and the wasting of resources. Still, 

other EU member states, particularly those 

that are not members of NATO, are uneasy 

about excessive deference paid to NATO’s 

prerogatives. 

Lack of Shared Threat Perceptions

A study of NATO’s Communiqué 

from the 2016 Summit clearly indicates 

a common threat picture that is comprehensive and touches on all of the potential 

threats that NATO nations must confront 

or at least consider. However, NATO’s process is consensus-driven, and all member 

nations have a part in drafting the communiqué. Ultimately, the text of the communiqué is written to the lowest common 

agreed upon language and contains every 

interest of importance across the range of 

member states.

A European state’s geographic location 

is the primary—but not the only—driver 

of threat perception. The closer a state is 

situated to Moscow, the more prominently 

Russia figures into national threat perceptions. Latvia has some of the most forceful 

language of all the allies within its National 

Security Concept of 2015, stating, “the 

aggression in Ukraine fuelled by the Russian Federation has been an unprecedented 

attack on the basic principles of the international rights since the end of WWII.”38

Similarly, Lithuania’s National Security 

Strategy of 2017 clearly states, “the main 

threat for the security of the Republic of 

Lithuania is posed by aggressive actions of 

the Russian Federation violating the security architecture based on universal rules 

and principles of international law and 

peaceful co-existence.”39 Norway—who 

also shares a border with Russia—recognizes that Russia has increased its capabilities in the north in order to become more 

coordinated, flexible, and mobile.40

The threat perceptions of the more 

dominant European states vary more significantly in terms of focus. The 2016 White 

Paper on Germany’s defense describes 

Russia as challenging the European order 

by use of force, rejecting a partnership 

with the West, and trying to establish itself 

as an alternate power. However, Germany’s threat perception is equally balanced between extremist terrorism and 

the potential threat posed by Russia.41

Meanwhile, in Italy’s 2015 White Book for 

National Defense, the clear focus is on the 

instability in the south with the rise of terrorism and domestic political instability in 

the Middle East and North Africa.42 This 

view is shared by officials in both France 

and Portugal.43

Inadequate Decision-Making Capability

NATO enlargement has added complexity to the alliance’s organizational 

and bureaucratic processes. Political 

decision-making remains state and consensus-based, which ultimately affects 

whether and how the alliance responds to 

crises.

NATO’s decision-making culture 

has not evolved sufficiently to meet the 

demands of conventional deterrence in 
10

the contemporary security environment. 

As Russia’s Ukraine operation highlights, 

security challenges arise and evolve rapidly, and time is therefore of the essence. 

While NATO has taken measures to 

improve its ability to react in a time of 

crisis with high readiness joint forces, 

these elements require a unanimous vote 

of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). As 

it presently stands, the Supreme Allied 

Commander Europe’s standing authorities over NATO’s Very High Readiness 

Joint Task Force (VJTF) extend only to 

staging and preparation.44 While a culture of consensus is a strength for overall 

NATO cohesion, the time required to seek 

political consensus does not correlate well 

to a fast-moving security crisis.

Lack of Consistently Strong Resourcing

Debates over the resourcing of collective defense are nearly as old as the alliance itself. The collapse of the Soviet Union 

and the subsequent drive by many European countries to secure a peace dividend 

led to a broad-based reduction in capabilities and capacity during the 1990s.45 Since 

2008, the global financial crisis, burgeoning levels of public debt, internal domestic fiscal challenges, recession, and slow 

growth have all led to further downward 

pressure on European budgets.46 The inevitable result has been a general decline 

in defense spending across the alliance 

with only a handful of members meeting 

goals for overall spending and acquisition 

spending. Recently, some Americans have 

accused NATO of being a one-sided relationship where the United States absorbs 

much of the cost while their European 

allies derive all the benefits.47

The threat of a resurgent Russia 

appears—at least on the surface—to have 

galvanized many European nations into 

action with promises at the NATO Summit 

in 2014 to reverse the downward trend 

and meet spending commitments by 2024. 

It remains unclear though whether the 

largest, most capable allies—especially 

Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 

and Italy—will find or continue to have 

the wherewithal to realize these goals 

and hence enable allied operations across 

Europe and beyond.

Limited Capacity

While the drive to improve military 

mobility must be sustained, attention must 

now turn to the underlying issue of NATO 

mobilization and defense planning. If the 

ability to move is critical to conventional 

deterrence, it only follows that NATO 

must have sufficient numbers of troops to 

move and enough transportation assets to 

move them. Moreover, all alliance forces 

must be prepared to conduct operations 

once they arrive in the theater of operations. Anything less detracts from credible 

deterrence and risks strategic instability.

NATO’s current posture relies too 

much upon the VJTF alone being able to 

achieve the desired effect of deterring 

Russian aggression and opportunism. 

Assuming the VJTF deploys, it is still only 

a brigade, albeit joint and well enabled. 

While a multi-national brigade is a useful 

tool to signal alliance resolve, it does not 

have the combat power to deter decisive 

Russian aggression nor can it deter across 

a wide frontage.48 The focus, therefore, 

should turn to NATO’s follow-on forces in 

order to reinforce the deterrent effect.
11

As presently envisioned, NATO’s 

next tier of readiness forces—the Initial 

Follow-on Forces Group of the NATO 

Response Force (NRF)—largely comprises 

light forces that probably require 30-45 

days to deploy.49

Recently, NATO members agreed to 

establish two NATO Commands in the 

U.S. and in Europe (Germany) to improve 

logistic support and strategic mobility in 

Europe. It has yet to be seen how effective 

these two commands in the NATO Force 

Structure will be at supporting movements 

from North America to Europe, as well as 

in Europe to the east and to the south.

Lack of Capabilities

Securing sufficient funding for defense 

is only half of the problem. Money alone 

will not ensure capability development, 

interoperability, and integration. These 

problems have increased in complexity 

as NATO has expanded from 12 original 

members to 29.

There have been a number of attempts 

in the last few decades to overcome the 

capability gaps between the various 

NATO members, including the Defense 

Capabilities Initiative of 1999, the Prague 

Capabilities Commitment of 2002, the 

Smart Defence initiative of 2012, and the 

Framework Nations concept of 2014. None 

of these initiatives has been particularly 

successful in overcoming the significant 

national sovereignty and budgetary challenges, or in enabling European allies to 

keep pace with an American military that 

seems to be perpetually reinventing or 

transforming itself with advanced technology or new concepts. Some countries that 

are investing in new programs focus on 

capabilities to counter hybrid threats and 

terrorism, at the expense of conventional 

capabilities.50 With inertia and impasse 

plaguing the alliance, the deterrence posture has leaned toward training and military exercises rather than investing in 

major capability programs.

The EU recently breathed life into an 

initiative known as Permanent Structured 

Cooperation (PESCO). This initiative 

should more easily enable EU member 

states to jointly develop military capabilities, invest in shared projects, and enhance 

their respective armed forces. EU officials have identified 17 joint projects, but 

it remains to be seen whether they can 

overcome domestic political imperatives 

to protect defense manufacturing and the 

jobs that come with them.51

Insufficient Interoperability

NATO’s posture today places interoperability at center stage. During the Cold 

War, the alliance’s defensive plans divided 

the inner-German border into nine NATO 

Corps operating areas, limiting the need 

for interoperability, except for minor coordination across corps boundaries. However, given NATO’s new strategic depth, 

the downsizing of most member states’ 

military forces, and the lack of a coherent defensive plan, the alliance requires a 

higher level of interoperability.

Interoperability requirements increasingly include civilian-military shared 

domains and resources. Examples include 

technical limitations of the Trans-European Transportation Network, required 

procedures, and standards for the future 

integration of remotely piloted aerial systems in the “Single European Sky” air 

traffic management, or—pending results 

of ongoing negotiations—mutual access 
12

to encrypted global navigation satellite 

systems for increased performance and 

resilience.

Incomplete Operational Picture

The divergence in threat perception 

that exists across the alliance can manifest 

itself in the inability of NATO to recognize 

gathering storm clouds. Volatility and 

unpredictability in the European theater 

place a newfound emphasis on continuous strategic awareness, enhanced indicator and warning capability, and the rapid 

sharing of intelligence between allies.

U.S. Army Europe has a supporting role to play in aiding the alliance to 

improve its speed of recognition, although 

U.S. rules and culture on information sharing remains a barrier.52 Of greater concern 

for the United States regarding the speed 

of recognition is that its NATO allies do 

not agree on the nature or extent of the 

threat posed by Russia.53

Inadequate Maneuverability

Managing one of the most densely 

inhabited regions on the globe with a 

correspondingly high volume of traffic, 

Europe’s comprehensive transport policy 

seeks to establish a competitive, safe, 

secure, and sustainable transportation 

system. However, the strong policy-focus 

on civilian user groups does not necessarily reflect military requirements, thus 

preventing the military from taking full 

advantage of the existing transportation 

network.

The ability to move and deliver forces 

and effects to a crisis area is a key dimension of successful conventional deterrence.54 Quick, accurate recognition of a 

threat and subsequent timely decisions 

to act against that threat will matter little 

if forces cannot move quickly and easily 

across national boundaries.55 To its credit, 

the European Commission recognizes 

these challenges and pledges to develop 

a military mobility action plan by March 

2018.56 Similarly, NATO’s recent decision 

to create a support command focused on 

logistics and military movement is also a 

promising development.57 Nonetheless, 

military capability and capacity gaps still 

exist among NATO and EU member states 

in terms of planning, executing, and monitoring military transports in and around 

the European theater.58

ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS

These challenges represent a complex 

array of issues that the transatlantic community must address together in order to 

better position itself vis-à-vis Russia and 

other security challenges. From the perspective of the U.S. DoD or the U.S. Army, 

not all of these challenges may appear 

readily or easily solved. Nonetheless, there 

are a number of steps the U.S. Army and 

DoD can take to enable a more coherent 

response on the part of NATO and the EU 

to better promote Western interests.

Refocus Security Cooperation and 

Weapons Sales 

Security cooperation and foreign military sales can bolster the capability and 

capacity of in-place forces in Central and 

Eastern Europe. These measures should 

include both traditional conventional 

capabilities (such as anti-armor and air 

defense) as well as tailored capabilities to 

counter Russia’s hybrid means that fall 
13

below the threshold of armed conflict.59

Security cooperation and capacity building are certainly critical in the Baltic States 

and Poland.

Additionally, U.S. Army units stationed in or on deployment to Europe can 

help build capacity within Headquarters 

Multinational Corps Northeast, located in 

Szczecin, Poland. This headquarters needs 

assistance augmenting its knowledge and 

experience as its aperture expands beyond 

VJTF scenarios to more comprehensive 

and integrated collective defense contingencies across the breadth of NATO’s eastern front.

Strengthen EU and NATO Capacity for 

Disaster Relief

In 1998, NATO created the small 

Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre within NATO’s headquarters. Two years later the EU created its 

own center, which in 2013 grew into the 

Emergency Response Coordination Center 

(ERCC).60 Besides the EU member states, 

6 further European countries are part of 

the program, which is able to draw upon a 

voluntary pool of 90 capacities.61

In November 2017, the EU announced 

plans to invest an additional 280 million 

Euros to establish a dedicated reserve of 

operational capacities and to strengthen 

preparedness and prevention measures.62

Unlike NATO’s non-standing Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit, the EU aims to 

develop permanent, dedicated, high-readiness forces at its level to bolster national 

capabilities.

The EU’s pool of civil and military 

capabilities encompasses a wider range 

of response options to natural- and 

man-made disasters than NATO. Therefore, the EU is the actor of choice to develop 

further disaster relief capacities in a European framework. NATO’s role will be to 

support efforts in Europe and its periphery with military means.

U.S. military forces in Europe can support EU and NATO capabilities by addressing specific shortfalls such as tactical and 

operational air-mobility. The United States 

can more effectively facilitate these kinds 

of support by creating a liaison capacity to 

the ERCC.

Streamline NATO Decision-Making

The Defense Department should use its 

influence in the U.S. interagency to advocate for NATO to adopt different voting 

procedures for certain issues. Modifications the EU has made to its voting procedures may provide a useful model. When 

the EU Council votes on certain proposals 

of the Commission or the High Representative, it does so under a qualified majority 

voting, instead of seeking consensus.63 This 

new voting model means that certain decisions now only require the approval of 55 

percent of EU member states, which must 

represent at least 65 percent of the EU’s 

total population. Qualified majority voting 

has helped the EU to overcome some gridlock and to move beyond proposals of limited ambition.64

It is important to note that qualified 

majority voting is not applied to all issues 

confronting the EU—for instance, decisions regarding the CSDP still require 

consensus. Nonetheless, the EU’s modified voting procedures may provide 

a useful starting point for discussions 

among NATO allies on modifying consensus-based decision-making.
14

Critics might argue that if NATO 

moved away from consensus procedures, 

it would place the organization’s interests 

above those of its members. However, 

changes in voting procedures are absolutely vital if the alliance hopes to retain 

any semblance of efficiency and effectiveness, and it could therefore implement initiatives that otherwise might be opposed 

by a single ally.

Encourage a Division of Labor between 

NATO and EU

The DoD should push the U.S. interagency toward encouraging greater 

cooperation between NATO and the EU, 

especially in the form of a division-of-labor strategy that would benefit both sides 

of the Atlantic and avoid duplication 

of effort.65 A properly coordinated division-of-labor could even solve the problem 

dual members currently have of having 

to contribute to both organizations in a 

zero-sum game.66 The EU could assume 

the management of small-scale operations 

focused on the threats along its near borders. This would allow the EU to use its 

leverage as an economic institution with 

its neighbors. It would also enable NATO 

to focus its main effort on deterrence in the 

east. However, in the foreseeable future 

European allies will not be able to conduct 

major military operations like Operation 

Unified Protector or Operation Inherent Resolve without U.S. support. More 

effective coordination of EU and NATO is 

essential to successfully face the challenges 

in the south and the east.

A division of labor could also include 

theater-specific services and enablers that 

either could be part of a calibrated U.S. 

force posture in Europe or exclusively 

provided by NATO Europe for all NATO 

forces. Certain areas such as drone operations in controlled airspace will require 

comparable standards. Finally, a smart 

combination of diverse resources, such 

as combining Navstar-Global Positioning 

System (GPS) and Galileo in a multi-global 

navigation satellite system, could increase 

performance and resiliency.

Of course, the major impediment to 

increased cooperation between the EU and 

NATO—including negotiation of a greater 

division of labor—is the Cyprus-Turkey 

issue.67 Turkey leverages its membership in NATO—which does not include 

Cyprus—to prevent Cyprus from joining the alliance’s Partnership for Peace, 

which subsequently prevents increased 

cooperation between NATO and the EU. 

Ankara does this as a means of reminding 

Europe that it must solve the challenge of 

a divided Cyprus. Until this issue is overcome, any more significant cooperation 

between NATO and the EU is unlikely.

Station Additional Forces in Eastern 

Europe

Through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), U.S. forces in Europe will 

soon total four brigade combat teams, one 

of them airborne, with the equipment for 

an additional fifth team pre-positioned.68

However, to ensure timely deployment, 

until the infrastructure is updated in 

Europe, the U.S. Army ought to shift more 

of its forward presence to Poland and the 

Baltic States.69
15

Develop Additional Infrastructure in 

Europe

The EU currently has a military mobility initiative, but it may not necessarily 

deliver the infrastructure priorities desired 

by the United States. Moreover, most projects in that initiative, if approved and 

adequately resourced, are not likely to be 

completed before 2025.

As with the EU’s infrastructure initiative, the U.S. Army should also be concerned with NATO’s capacity to improve 

existing infrastructure and develop new 

capabilities through the NATO Security 

Investment Program (NSIP).70 The United 

States has input into the NSIP at several 

levels, and ultimately no NATO infrastructure project is approved without U.S. 

agreement (and funding). The flipside, 

however, is that NSIP budget decisions 

also require the agreement of all 29 NATO 

allies. Just to implement NATO’s extant 

2014 Readiness Action Plan as well as new 

capability packages for air basing (air-toair refueling and bulk fuel installations) is 

expected to cost NATO $200 to $300 million per year for the next several years.71

NATO’s limited resources and the need 

for a 360-degree approach to security for 

both practical and political reasons mean 

that Army priorities face stiff competition.

While the EU and NATO continue to 

shoulder some of the defense infrastructure burdens, the United States should 

do more on its own. Out of the $4.8 billion allocated to EDI for 2018, only $337.8 

million is earmarked for infrastructure 

improvements like airfields.72 EDI infrastructure spending should be expanded to 

address more of the most significant infrastructure priorities. Based on the threat 

and anticipated tasks, U.S. Army Europe 

requires redundant and resilient transportation networks that connect airports and 

seaports and Army pre-positioned stock-2 

locations (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands) with Central and Eastern European 

states. Any short-term reduction in presence or exercise tempo caused by devoting 

more EDI funds to infrastructure is ultimately offset by the longer-term contribution to credible conventional deterrence.

Plan for Early Deployment

As a hedge against a lag in NATO 

decision-making as well as the inability of 

European allies to share the same threat 

perceptions, the U.S. Army must prepare 

to deploy its assigned and rotational forces 

to vulnerable allied countries before NAC 

consensus.73 However, it is important to 

note that this posture places a significant 

staff demand, not currently resourced on 

Army command structure in Europe. In 

addition to restoring more robust staffing of U.S. Army command structure in 

Europe, a full complement of high-quality 

multi-national liaison officers will help to 

facilitate bilateral deployments in advance 

of any delayed NATO decision-making.

Add Teeth to the Defense Planning 

Process 

For the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) to be effective, it needs to 

evolve from identifying and promoting 

to identifying and assigning capabilities 

through a carefully selected set of incentives and disincentives.74 The U.S. DoD 

should use its influence to develop and 

encourage the adoption of limited but 

impactful incentives for NATO member 

states to comply with the NDPP outcomes 
16

as well as disincentives for member states 

to deviate from the NDPP. This will not be 

an easy task for it may imply that members lose a certain amount of national 

sovereignty in relation to defense issues. 

However, a more robust NDPP would 

help to ensure that the alliance has available the capabilities that it actually needs, 

not simply those developed for reasons of 

prestige, tradition, or inertia.

Incentives might include awarding 

general and flag officer billets in NATO 

command positions or awarding NATO 

summits to those countries that are achieving their targets. Disincentives might 

include naming and shaming of those allies 

that are not accepting or meeting their 

capability targets. The alliance does this 

to some degree already through annual 

release of defense spending figures, but 

those figures do not identify which countries are accepting and meeting their capability targets and which are not.

Reframe the Classification Process

Much of the challenge in getting all 

allies to perceive threats similarly has to 

do with the inability to share intelligence 

adequately. Recent research shows that 

shared threat perceptions among elites and 

decision-makers are an important variable 

in explaining recent increases in NATO 

member state defense spending.75 For this 

reason, the U.S. military should reframe 

the intelligence classification process by 

emphasizing first the sharing of information with allies. At present, there is little 

incentive to declassify information to the 

lowest level, and so U.S. military security 

classifications have limiting effects upon 

allies’ ability to perceive threats and often 

to operate together. Reframing intelligence 

classification as a process designed to promote and facilitate the sharing of information with allies will help NATO and the 

EU to overcome problems associated with 

recognizing when a crisis is unfolding.

Promote the Right PESCO

To ensure that PESCO fulfills its objective of building European capabilities 

while also strengthening collective defense 

and deterrence in Europe and beyond, 

the United States should support projects 

such as the European Medium Altitude 

Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft 

System, which could be integrated within 

the U.S. Global Hawk system. Moreover, 

the United States should promote the 

development of strategic enablers such as 

Special Forces, airlift, helicopters, naval 

assets, and others capabilities beneficial to 

future EU and NATO task forces.

CONCLUSION

Europe is facing a number of complex, 

concurrent challenges. A resurgent Russia 

is attempting to counter-balance the perceived threat of an expanded NATO by 

conducting largely low-risk spoiling operations in the gray zone just below the 

threshold that might provoke an Article 

5 response from NATO. Russia has ruthlessly exploited opportunities presented 

by the rapidly developing cyber and information spaces to undermine democratic 

elections, spread propaganda, intimidate 

its former allies, and threaten the vulnerable web of European national infrastructure. As NATO grapples with these 

challenges, the long-running tensions over 

burden sharing continue to create internal 

fissures in the trans-Atlantic relationship.
17

The threat posed by Islamic terrorist 

organizations, or “lone wolf” attacks by 

homegrown radicalized individuals, dominates the internal security agenda in many 

European countries. This threat has been 

exacerbated by the challenge of absorbing the mass migration of people from 

the Middle East and North Africa fleeing 

war, famine, and poverty. In its wake has 

followed a continuing political shift away 

from the center to more radical nationalist 

movements, and a concomitant weakening 

of European identity. It is a challenge that 

may only increase as the long-term effects 

of climate change—and the ongoing instability in Europe’s “near-abroad”—continues to drive large numbers of migrants 

toward the relative safety of Europe.

The European security institutions of 

NATO and the EU face a myriad of challenges that have plagued them since the 

end of the Cold War. The enlargement of 

NATO has led to problems with timely 

decision-making, and there is little consensus over the priority of the threats facing 

Europe. There is the ongoing dilemma 

over the EU’s role in European security 

and defense, and how it might affect the 

balance of resources and capabilities also 

assigned to NATO. There continues to be 

a lack of political will to resource defense 

despite a string of initiatives designed to 

improve interoperability, reduce the growing capability gap between the United 

States and its allies, and address some of 

the major capability shortfalls. Europe 

and the United States cannot avoid dealing with these fundamental problems for 

much longer.

Many of these seemingly interminable problems sit outside the influence of 

the DoD or the U.S. Army. Nevertheless, 

this paper has identified a number of recommendations in four broad areas where 

DoD and U.S. Army engagement can 

help to build greater capability and drive 

a more coherent security response from 

NATO and the EU.

First, we have identified much-needed 

improvements in NATO and wider European capability development, particularly 

in Central and Eastern Europe. The United 

States could refocus its efforts in terms of 

foreign military sales, lending rhetorical 

and other forms of support to PESCO, and 

strengthening capacity building in both 

the military sphere and in Europe’s ability to respond to natural and man-made 

disaster relief operations. 

Second, there are opportunities for the 

DoD to use its influence to press for structural and policy changes within NATO. 

These efforts should focus on NATO’s 

unwieldy decision-making process; on 

developing initiatives to encourage NATO 

members to comply with the NDPP; and 

on encouraging a division of labor strategy 

that would reduce the duplication of effort 

from both within Europe and the United 

States.

Third, there are critical improvements 

needed in European infrastructure that 

would improve mobility and a rapid reinforcement in the event of a crisis in Europe. 

Here the United States should continue 

to pressure European countries toward 

implementing the initiatives already put 

forward in the NSIP and the extant Readiness Action Plan. Washington should also 

consider earmarking more of the enhanced 

EDI allocation for infrastructure projects to 

improve the redundancy and resilience in 
18

the transport networks connecting airports 

and seaports of debarkation with pre-positioned stocks across Europe.

Finally, the United States should consider a number of internal changes that 

would reduce risk, generate a more robust 

deterrence, and enable greater cohesion 

among its European partners. There is 

considerable benefit in reframing the 

intelligence classification process to facilitate greater intelligence sharing and promote a better understanding of the threats 

facing NATO. At the same time, Washington should consider stationing additional 

forces in Europe until such a time as the 

infrastructure could support a more rapid 

reinforcement from the continental United 

States, while also being prepared to unilaterally deploy forces forward early and 

in advance of any decisions made by the 

NAC.

Individually, none of these initiatives 

can address the myriad of complex difficulties facing the trans-Atlantic alliance. 

The powerful, cumulative effect of these 

developments taken forward over a broad 

front will bolster NATO and EU capability 

and help provide the credible deterrence 

necessary to face the increasing threats 

from Russia and elsewhere.
19

ENDNOTES

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Russia as well as NATO allies, and Russia’s National Security Strategy specifically identifies the threat that 

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