In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-2046 

PEGGY JO SMITH, individually and on behalf of 

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PROFESSIONAL TRANSPORTATION, INC., and RONALD D.

ROMAIN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division. 

No. 3:13-cv-00221-RLY-MPB — Richard L. Young, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 9, 2020 — DECIDED JULY 16, 2021 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

WOOD, Circuit Judge. Between November 2011 and August 

2013, Peggy Jo Smith worked for Professional Transportation 

Inc. (PTI), a company that transports railroad crews to and 

from their places of work. Believing that her position was misclassified for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“the 
2 No. 20-2046 

Act”) and that she was not receiving proper overtime wages, 

she filed this action “individually and on behalf of similarly 

situated individuals” on December 26, 2013. The Act permits 

both individual actions and collective proceedings. See 29 

U.S.C. § 216(b). Unlike the better-known class action under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), however, which includes everyone in the class who does not opt out, the FLSA 

collective action requires group members affirmatively to opt 

into the collective action in order to participate. 

At first, it seemed that Smith’s effort to serve as a named 

representative of a collective action under the Act was proceeding well. Her initial filing was well within the two years 

that the Act provides for the commencement of litigation. See 

29 U.S.C. § 255(a). (Indeed, the Act has a three-year limitation 

period for allegations of willful conduct. Id.) The parties filed 

a joint case management plan on March 25, 2014, three 

months after the case was filed, and the district court 

promptly approved it. Docs. 15, 16. Part IV of that plan addressed “class certification matters.” And the district court’s 

docket sheet shows numerous putative group members consenting to opt into the litigation.1 

The case went off the rails, however, when PTI pointed out 

that Smith herself had not filed anything in addition to her 

1 Some of the docket entries represent one person’s act of opting in, 

while others represent multiple people. The number of people is indicated 

in parentheses. See Docs. 5 (1), 11 (1), 12 (1), 17 (1), 18 (1), 19 (1), 36 (1), 37

(1), 38 (1), 39 (1), 40 (1), 41 (1), 53 (1), 75 (1), 93 (2), 94 (4), 96 (2), 99 (6), 101

(8), 103 (9), 106 (3), 108 (2), 110 (1), 112 (12), 114 (5), 116 (2), 118 (3), 120 (3), 

122 (2), 124 (1), 128 (4), 130 (1), 132 (5), 134 (3), 136 (7), 138 (6), 140 (6), 142

(2), 144 (3), 146 (1), 148 (1). This was a healthy rate of opt-ins: 118 people 

in addition to Smith herself, whose status we discuss below.
No. 20-2046 3

complaint indicating that she herself wished to participate in 

the group action. Relying on our decision in Harkins v. Riverboat Services, Inc., 385 F.3d 1099 (7th Cir. 2004), the district 

court deemed this a fatal flaw for the collective action. It held 

that Smith’s group action could not “commence” until such a 

consent was filed. 29 U.S.C. § 256. Moreover, by the time the 

court reached this conclusion, both the two-year and the 

three-year statutes of limitations had run. The court then concluded that Smith’s complaint also failed to allege timely individual claims, and on that basis it dismissed the case in its 

entirety. 

Aside from some stray references to the underlying putative collective action, Smith’s appeal contests only the district 

court’s refusal to allow her individual action to move ahead. 

We thus do not have before us the difficult question whether 

every member of a collective action, including the named 

plaintiff(s), must file a separate document entitled a Consent, 

or if it is enough for the named plaintiff(s) to indicate in the 

complaint that they affirmatively wish to proceed in that capacity. We conclude, however, that the court erred by refusing 

to allow Smith to proceed on her individual claims, and so we 

vacate that part of its judgment and remand for further proceedings. 

I 

PTI is an Indiana-based corporation that provides ground 

transportation to the people who service the nation’s railroads. By providing 24-hour shuttles and drivers, PTI helps

railroad crews and train workers get to their destinations and 

back home after their shifts’ end. Peggy Jo Smith began her 

career there as a driver. Two years later, she was promoted to 

an administrative role. But a few months into this new 
4 No. 20-2046 

position, Smith began to suspect that PTI was not paying her 

what she was due. Unable to secure what she perceived to be 

her proper wages—particularly her overtime wages—she resigned on August 20, 2013. On December 26, 2013, Smith filed 

this lawsuit. 

The Fair Labor Standards Act authorizes a worker to sue a 

noncompliant employer on “behalf of [her]self or themselves 

and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C § 216(b). 

Tracking this authorization, Smith stated in the opening paragraph of her second amended complaint that her suit was 

brought by “plaintiff, Peggy Jo Smith, individually and on behalf of similarly situated opt-in persons who are current or 

former [PTI] employees.” Doc. 87 (emphasis added).

In contrast to the more familiar mechanisms for class action contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, collective 

actions under the Act require putative group members affirmatively to opt into the action by giving their “consent in writing to become such a party.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “Such consent” must be “filed in the court in which such action is 

brought.” Id. In addition to evincing consent to become a 

party to a collective action, the filing itself “commences” the 

action for statute of limitations purposes: 

In determining when an action is commenced 

for the purposes of section 255 of this title [i.e., 

the statute of limitations], an action commenced 

on or after May 14, 1947 under the Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938, as amended ... shall be 

considered to be commenced on the date when 

the complaint is filed; except that in the case of a 

collective or class action instituted under the Fair 

Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended ..., it 
No. 20-2046 5

shall be considered to be commenced in the case 

of any individual claimant— 

(a) on the date when the complaint is filed, if he 

is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the 

complaint and his written consent to become a 

party plaintiff is filed on such date in the court 

in which the action is brought; or

(b) if such written consent was not so filed or if 

his name did not so appear—on the subsequent 

date on which such written consent is filed in 

the court in which the action was commenced.

29 U.S.C. § 256 (emphasis added). The Act has a two- or threeyear statute of limitations, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), which means 

that, if the written consent requirement applies, plaintiffs 

seeking to be represented in the collective action need to file 

the written consent within that time. 

Over one hundred current and former PTI employees 

opted into Smith’s collective action by filing timely written 

consent forms. But Smith herself, having already filed her 

complaint, did not submit an additional written consent form 

indicating her desire to join her own suit. As we indicated, the 

district court regarded this as the kiss of death for both her 

collective and her individual actions, and it dismissed the 

case, paving the way for this appeal. 

II

Before turning to Smith’s individual claim, we think it 

prudent to say a few words about our decision not to address 

the collective aspect of her case. The question whether a 

named plaintiff, or plaintiffs, must file a separate written consent form in addition to indicating their desire to proceed 
6 No. 20-2046 

collectively in the pleadings turns out to be a complex one. 

Some things, however, are clear. Congress chose the opt-in 

format for FLSA collective actions because it wished to “prevent the filing of claims on behalf of a large group of unnamed 

and nonparticipating plaintiffs.” Anderson v. Montgomery 

Ward & Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir. 1988). The written consent forms assure the court that the signers “want to 

have their rights adjudicated in [a collective] proceeding or be 

represented by counsel chosen by other plaintiffs.” Harkins v. 

Riverboat Servs., Inc., 385 F.3d 1099, 1101 (7th Cir. 2004). A filed 

written consent is “important” because it protects plaintiffs 

from binding judgments obtained by counsel whom they may 

not fully trust. Id. 

The named representative, however, differs in certain 

ways from the other members of the group. Note, for example, the somewhat awkward language of section 256(a) of the 

statute, reproduced above, and compare it to the language of 

section 256(b). Section 256(a) establishes a rule for specifically 

named plaintiffs whose written consent to become a party 

plaintiff is filed with the complaint, while subpart (b) addresses the unnamed members of the group. We leave for another day the question whether the statute requires that written consent to be in a separate document, or if instead it is 

enough if the complaint itself clearly indicates the intent of 

the plaintiff to proceed collectively. Complaints, after all, are 

either signed by the plaintiff’s attorney or personally, if the 

litigant is unrepresented. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). It is impossible for a named plaintiff to be surprised with an unwanted 

collective action, and she herself selected her lawyer.

But the language of section 256(a), which admittedly addresses not the processing of a collective action, but instead 
No. 20-2046 7

the statute of limitations, can be read otherwise. Our caselaw 

is somewhat inconsistent on the question whether a separate 

form must be filed. We have held that in a representative action brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment 

Act—a statute that follows the FLSA opt-in model, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 626(b)—the filing of a “routine written consent” is not necessary when the named plaintiffs “hired a lawyer to file a 

complaint on their behalf and had thus clearly indicated their 

consent to suit.” Anderson, 852 F.2d at 1018–19 (cleaned up).

On the other hand, in Harkins we did not follow Anderson’s

approach to written consents. It is difficult to reconcile these 

two cases, even though nothing in Harkins indicates that the 

panel invoked Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e) to overrule or modify Anderson. 

Our sister circuits also appear to be split on this issue. The 

Eighth Circuit has followed the Harkins approach and has 

thus required even the named plaintiff to file a separate consent form, in order to be entitled to proceed as a party in the 

collective action. Gomez v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 799 F.3d 1192, 

1194 (8th Cir. 2015). Other circuits have apparently taken a 

different path, although to be fair, the question has not always 

been squarely presented and thus the analysis has been somewhat thin. That said, in decisions from the Fourth, Fifth, 

Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, named plaintiffs were not required to file a separate written consent. See Mickles v. Country 

Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that 

named plaintiffs need only “file [a complaint] on behalf of 

herself and ‘other “similarly situated” employees’” to become 

a proper plaintiff, whereas only ‘the opt-in employee’ ‘must 

give’ her written consent to become a party to the action”); 

Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 758 

(4th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n a collective action under the FLSA, a 
8 No. 20-2046 

named plaintiff represents only himself until a similarly-situated employee opts in as a ‘party plaintiff’ by giving ‘his consent in writing.’”); Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 

913, 916–17 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n a FLSA collective action, the 

statute of limitations for a named plaintiff runs from the date 

that the plaintiff files the complaint, while the limitations period for an opt-in plaintiff runs from the opt-in date.”); see 

also Partlow v. Jewish Orphans' Home of S. Cal., Inc., 645 F.2d 

757, 758 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Under the FLSA, a member of the 

class who is not individually named in the complaint is not a 

party to the lawsuit unless he affirmatively ‘opts in’ by filing 

a written consent with the court.”); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 

564 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977) (same). 

The state of the law on this issue is thus far too unsettled 

for us to reach out and decide an issue that the appellant herself has barely briefed. Collective actions under the FLSA are 

relatively common, and we are confident that this issue will 

return to us in a fully briefed form at some point. 

III

We turn, then, to the heart of the present case: whether the 

district court erred by dismissing Smith’s individual claim 

along with her collective claims. The question is whether section 216(b) authorizes “dual capacity” suits, in which a plaintiff sues simultaneously as a group representative and as an 

individual. The answer is yes, for a number of reasons. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to 

“join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as 

it has against an opposing party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a). It is the 

federal pleading rules—not section 216(b)—that determine 
No. 20-2046 9

whether multiple claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act

may be joined together. 

To determine whether Smith has stated individual claims 

in her complaint against PTI, we must conduct a de novo review to determine whether she has included enough facts to 

put PTI on notice of her individual claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In contrast, when reviewing a decision rendered on summary judgement, we need not limit ourselves to the pleadings. We may look at the full record that 

was developed on summary judgment, taking it in the light 

most favorable to Smith, to see if a trier of fact could rule in 

her favor. Moreover, to the extent that materials that were 

added to the record later show that PTI was aware of Smith’s 

intention to pursue her individual claims, we also may rely 

on those materials.

The district court thought that the facts alleged in Smith’s 

second amended complaint related only to the collective action and not to her individual claims. This was error. While it 

is true that Smith captioned the two substantive sections of 

her complaint “Collective Action Allegations” and “National 

Collective Action Pursuant to the FLSA,” the very first paragraph of the complaint said that she was also proceeding in 

an individual capacity. We should be long past the point 

when the label attached to a group of allegations in a complaint displaces the content taken as a whole. 

Read in the light most favorable to Smith, we conclude 

that the second amended complaint contained sufficient factual allegations related to her individual claims to put PTI on 

notice that she intended to sue it both in an individual and a 

representative capacity. She explicitly stated as much in the 
10 No. 20-2046 

caption of both her original complaint and in her second 

amended complaint, which was the operative pleading. 

Paragraphs 21 through 33 of Smith’s second amended 

complaint further demonstrate the district court’s error. There 

the complaint describes with specificity Smith’s role at PTI, 

her duties, and her pay and time allocations. Several of these

allegations are unique to Smith and are not incorporated into 

the parts of the complaint that refer to the group. 

For example, Paragraph 25 alleges that Smith “was encouraged to make over-the-road trips to supplement” any 

shortfall in her wages but was “forbidden from working as a 

driver so that she would be working over 40 hours in any 

week.” Paragraph 29 alleges that Smith was “paid $375 per 

week on a salary basis, for the performance of executive or 

managerial duties, regardless of the number of hours she was 

actually required to work to accomplish her duties.” Paragraph 33 explains how, after PTI began requiring more extensive time logging, Smith “was told not to submit claims for 

overtime, as that was what caused her predecessor to be terminated [sic], and that she would not be paid for such overtime.” And in the complaint’s prayer for relief, it is “plaintiff 

Peggy Jo Smith, and all other similarly situated [employees]” 

that request a favorable judgment (emphasis added). The second amended complaint sufficed to put PTI on notice that 

Smith was, among other things, pursuing her personal claim 

against the company. But there’s more. 

On August 14, 2014, defendant’s counsel deposed Smith 

and obtained the following clarification: 
No. 20-2046 11

Q: At the top of Exhibit 1, Ms. Smith, on the very 

first page, on the top left, it says Peggy Jo Smith, 

in capital letters. Do you see that?

A: Yes.

Q: It says individually. What do you understand that means? That you’re individually suing the defendants? 

A: Yes.

Q: And then it says, and Peggy Jo Smith on behalf of similarly situated individuals. Do you 

see that?

A: Yes. 

Dkt. 210:6 at 18. Then a few years later, when moving to decertify the class, defendant’s counsel implored the district 

court to “grant PTI’s motion to decertify this collective action, 

dismiss the Opt Ins without prejudice, and allow Smith’s 

claims to proceed individually.” Dkt. 217 (Jan. 20, 2017). 

Nothing more need be said. The operative complaint and 

later developments in the case indicate that PTI was under no 

illusions about Smith’s intentions to bring individual claims.

Regardless of what happens to the collective action, she is entitled to proceed individually.

IV

We VACATE the district court’s summary judgment order 

in part and REMAND with instructions to permit Smith’s individual claims to proceed. Each side is to bear its own costs on 

appeal.