RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3340-16T1

IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT L.F.

__________________________________

Argued May 21, 2018 - Decided August 6, 2018

Before Judges Messano, Accurso and O'Connor.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. 

ML-00040043.

Jesse M. DeBrosse, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant 

L.F. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney; Jesse M. DeBrosse, on the brief).

Matthew T. Spence, Assistant Prosecutor, 

argued the cause for respondent State of New 

Jersey (Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Matthew T. Spence, of 

counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3340-16T1

L.F. was convicted of rape1 in Pennsylvania in 1992, 18 Pa. 

Cons. Stat. § 3121, before the Legislature amended the 

registration provisions of Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, 

to add subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g), described more fully

in our opinion in In re G.H. and In re G.A., ___ N.J. Super. ___ 

(2018), also issued today, making the lifetime registration 

requirements "permanent [and] irrevocable" for certain 

offenders. G.H., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op. at 2) (quoting

In re State ex rel. C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 66 (2018)).

Following the completion of his sentence, L.F. moved to New 

Jersey and registered under Megan's Law on June 12, 2001. The 

Camden County Prosecutor's Office classified him as a Tier I 

offender. L.F.'s 1992 convictions represent his sole brush with 

the law. In 2017 he moved to be relieved of his obligation to 

register under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). Although acknowledging L.F.

had been offense-free for more than fifteen years following his 

release from prison, thereby permitting him to apply for relief 

from his registration requirements under subsection (f), the 

trial judge denied the application on the basis of subsection 

 

1 L.F. was also convicted in the same proceeding of simple 

assault, unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, involuntary 

deviant sexual intercourse, indecent assault and indecent 

exposure. The State concedes, "for Megan's Law review 

purposes[,] that [L.F.'s] actions consist of a 'sole sex 

offense.'"
3 A-3340-16T1

(g). Specifically, the court found L.F.'s Pennsylvania rape 

conviction similar to one for sexual assault under New Jersey 

law, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), as both criminalize sexual 

penetration with the use of force, thus rendering him ineligible 

to apply to terminate his registration obligation under 

subsection (g)'s ban for those offenders convicted of sexual 

assault pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1).

L.F. appeals from the court's March 2, 2017 order denying 

his application to terminate his registration requirements. He 

argues the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) applies only to 

convictions for "sexual assault pursuant to paragraph (1) of 

subsection c. of N.J.S.[A.] 2C:14-2" and not to out-of-state 

offenses. 

We deem that argument to be without sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), in 

light of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(3)'s inclusion of out-of-state 

convictions for offenses similar to those enumerated in 

subsection N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2) as sex offenses "[f]or the 

purposes of this act," requiring the offender to register under 

Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1). See In re R.B., 376 N.J. 

Super. 451, 464 (App. Div. 2005) (explaining that "so long as 

the conviction being compared to a Megan's Law enumerated 

offense contains the same essential elements, and the underlying 
4 A-3340-16T1

purposes of the crimes are consonant, the conviction should be 

considered similar to the Megan's Law enumerated offense for 

purposes of requiring sex offender registration in New Jersey"), 

overruled in part on other grounds by In re T.T., 188 N.J. 321, 

334 (2006); see also Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 330 (2009) 

(discussing the maxim of statutory construction calling for 

interpreting sections of a statute included within the same Act 

by reading them in pari materia).

Having concluded, however, in G.H. that the retroactive 

application of subsection (g) to those convicted of sex offenses 

prior to its effective date in 2002 was not the intent of the 

Legislature and would, in any event, be manifestly unfair if 

applied to such offenders,2 slip op. at 28, we reverse the trial 

court's March 2, 2017 order and remand for a hearing on L.F.'s 

application to be relieved of his obligation to register under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).

Reversed and remanded.

 

2 Because the record makes clear that L.F. registered in New 

Jersey prior to the effective date of subsection (g), we need 

not consider whether the holding of G.H. applies to those 

offenders with out-of-state convictions which pre-date enactment 

of subsection (g) who moved to New Jersey after its effective 

date.