www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 276 1 

The government of President Bashar al-Asad in Syria faces strong pressure from its neighbors and the Western powers. In the background is the fall in 2011 of longstanding governments in Tunisia and Egypt 

to popular protests and, of course, the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar 

Qaddafi in a civil war backed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

military action. It is not clear if Asad will fall or if he will hold on to power. It 

is fair to say that because his hold on power is sufficiently in doubt, it is well 

worth examining what would be the strategic consequences if he fell and what 

would be the strategic implications if he is able to muddle through Syria’s current difficulties. Moreover, given the many sudden and unpredicted Middle East 

developments in 2011, such an examination should note which low-probability 

developments might have major impacts on the region and on U.S. interests.

Would Asad’s Fall Be Good for Syria?

It is not clear how disordered the process of Asad’s overthrow might be or 

what would be the character of a post-Asad government.

To start with the transition, there is the risk of a violent civil war. Asad 

seems determined to rally Syria’s Alawite minority to support him by exploiting the real risk that if he is overthrown, the more than 40 years of Alawite 

dominance over the state will end.1 Although the Syrian government prevents 

the collection of information on the ethnic breakdown of the Syrian army, it is 

believed that the Alawites dominate the officer corps while Sunnis comprise 

a much larger rank and file. If provoked, Sunnis could exact revenge on the 

Alawites, who make up about 12 percent of Syria’s population.2 Thus, although 

the Alawites may not like the Asad regime, they feel compelled to stick with it 

because of sectarian identity.3

The majority of soldiers in the key units being used for repressing protestors—

namely, the Republican Guard and the 4th Mechanized Division—have proved 

Post-Asad Syria: Opportunity 

or Quagmire?

by Patrick Clawson

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Author

Patrick Clawson is Director of 

Research at the Washington Institute 

for Near East Policy. He is the author 

or editor of more than a dozen books 

on the contemporary Middle East 

and U.S. policy toward the region.

Key Points

◆ U.S. policy toward the continued 

rule of Syrian President Bashar alAsad is partly based on the impact 

his rule has had in Syria. Asad’s 

fall might not bring improvement 

for the Syrian people. But the 

argument that Asad, odious as he 

may be, provides stability now 

looks less and less convincing.

◆ Whether Asad stays or falls, the 

current Syrian unrest could have 

profound implications on the 

Middle East in at least four ways: 

the impact on Iran, Asad’s closest 

strategic partner; the perception of 

the power of the United States and 

its allies; the stability of neighboring states; and the impact on Israel.

◆ The more Asad falls on hard times, 

the more Tehran has to scramble 

to prevent damage to its image 

with the “Arab street” and to its 

close ally, Lebanese Hizballah.

◆ Asad’s overthrow is by no means 

assured, and U.S. instruments to 

advance that objective are limited. The U.S. Government decision 

to call for his overthrow seems to 

have rested on a judgment that 

the prospects for success were 

good and the payoff in the event 

of success would be high.

February 2012

Center

f

o

r Strategic R

eSEARCH
2 SF No. 276 www.ndu.edu/inss

willing shock troops against ordinary Syrians. In the rest 

of the military, a few breaks have appeared: defections have 

been largely by individual soldiers rather than whole units.4

Asad is also playing to anxieties about Sunni extremism 

among the Christian community; Christians make up 

about 10 percent of the population and are important to 

the economy. If Asad successfully exacerbates sectarian tension, then his downfall might come only through serious 

intersectarian strife. Indeed, by November 2011, sectarian 

tensions in Homs, Syria’s third-largest city, were leading 

to multiple deaths each day and to increasing population 

movements out of ethnically mixed neighborhoods.5

Perhaps the best way to minimize potential sectarian violence is to encourage a split between Asad and 

key military officials including Alawites, such that he is 

overthrown from within and the old system continues, 

presumably with at least some reforms and greater openness. Nevertheless, the prospects for splitting the existing 

security elite from Asad do not look promising, which 

some take as an argument for why Asad’s rule, unpleasant as it has become, is better than the alternative. Just 

how a transition could take place is uncertain; equally 

unclear is what Syria would look like under a new government. Who would rule under these circumstances? 

One possibility would be a coup d’état from within, 

preserving Alawite rule. That could lead to a new Syria 

that does not look especially different from the old one. 

The new rulers might well continue Asad’s long-established practice of promising reforms when pressured by 

popular protests, only to back away once the heat is off. 

Even if the change in government brought new freedoms, so long as the extensive security apparatus remains 

in place, the new authorities would be well-positioned to 

reintroduce the old controls quietly and steadily. Since 

a coup from within would continue Alawite rule, the 

old Alawite elite presumably would block any genuine 

popular voice in the government and exploit Alawite and 

Christian fears that democracy means Sunni rule that is 

oppressive toward minorities.

If Asad’s overthrow leads immediately or ultimately 

to the collapse of the existing system, Syria will become 

a fragile state, which might not be much of an improvement for the Syrian people. An International Crisis 

Group (ICG) report calling for Asad’s overthrow was 

blunt about post-Asad risks:

If and when . . . the regime falls, Syrians will 

have no option but to start almost entirely from 

scratch. A weak and demoralised army, whose 

role in the current crisis has earned it no respect, 

cannot constitute the backbone of an emerging state. 

The police are notoriously corrupt and unpopular, 

as is the justice system as a whole. . . . Ethnic and 

sectarian fault lines run deep in a highly divided 

society. With powerful and, so far, determined 

security services, feeble state institutions, and fragile 

social structures, Syria offers a stark contrast with 

Egypt and Tunisia, where weak regimes coexisted 

with relatively strong states—in terms of their 

institutions—and relatively strong societies—in 

terms of their degree of cohesion and organisation.6

There are strong counterarguments to the realist thesis 

that Asad’s continued rule, unpleasant as it is, is the only 

way to prevent calamity inside Syria. It is hard to argue that 

Asad’s rule provides stability when his forces are shelling 

more and more Syrian cities, with little discernible effect 

on protests, which resume at full force once the military 

shifts its attention elsewhere. Asad is already playing the 

sectarian card and the longer he stays, the more likely it is 

that sectarian tensions will grow. Furthermore, the protests 

are increasingly accompanied by armed conflict. The armed 

opposition operating under the name Free Syrian Army 

has launched some audacious attacks and appears to be 

gaining strength.7

 If the choice is between certain bloodshed while Asad rules and prospective bloodshed if he 

goes, that alone is a good reason to call for his overthrow.8

Furthermore, even if Asad were able to reassert control, it is by no means clear how long he could maintain it. 

Later, if not sooner, the same popular demands for freedom and political say might well resurface. Suppressing 

the current protest wave might bring only temporary stability, with instability returning at some point. A similar 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 276 3 

argument can be made about any coup that would keep 

the old system of Alawite rule in place; perhaps it would 

temporarily restore order, but its long-term prospects look 

poor. In short, it is not clear how to minimize bloodshed 

and sectarian tensions in Syria, nor is there any guarantee 

that a post-Asad government would better serve the Syrian people.

The August 18, 2011, decision by the major Western powers to call on Asad to leave office was explained 

as necessary because he had become a force for instability, as well as because of identification with the goals 

of protestors.9 To quote the opening lines of President 

Obama’s statement:

The United States has been inspired by the 

Syrian peoples’ pursuit of a peaceful transition to 

democracy. They have braved ferocious brutality at 

the hands of their government. They have spoken 

with their peaceful marches, their silent shaming 

of the Syrian regime, and their courageous 

persistence in the face of brutality—day after 

day, week after week. . . . We have consistently 

said that President Assad must lead a democratic 

transition or get out of the way. He has not led. 

For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has 

come for President Assad to step aside.10

As Obama’s statement suggests, what tipped 

the scale is U.S. identification with protestors’ goals. 

Washington interpreted the protests as showing “the 

strong desire of the Syrian people . . . for a Syria that 

is democratic, just, and inclusive,” in Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton’s words.11 The support of those objectives for decades has been not only U.S. policy, but an 

important national security interest. Successive U.S. 

administrations have argued that democratic governments provide the best hope for a peaceful and prosperous world.12

In short, the danger of chaos in a post-Asad Syria 

is real; only when it appeared that the chaos would be 

greater if Asad stayed did the U.S. Government decide to 

support his overthrow. This was not an easy call to make, 

given the risks that the transition could be messy and the 

outcome not an improvement for the Syrian people. 

Asad’s Fall Could Have Profound 

Implications for the Middle East 

Besides the issue of what is in the best interests of 

the Syrian people, another concern to the United States 

is the international impact of Asad’s fall. The record to 

date of Asad’s rule is an important indicator of what may 

happen if he remains president, but the changed circumstances owing to the 2011–2012 tumult might cause a 

shift in his government’s capabilities and intentions. 

Whether Asad stays or falls, the current Syrian unrest could affect the Middle East in at least four ways:

◆ impact on Iran, Asad’s closest strategic partner

◆ perception of the power of the United States and 

its allies, particularly including Turkey

◆ stability of neighboring states, especially Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan

◆ impact on Israel.

What happens in each of these areas could depend 

both on how events occur as much as on what events occur—on how Asad falls or how he reestablishes control, 

not only on whether he falls or stays. Running through 

all the permutations would be a lengthy and not necessarily fruitful exercise. It is more useful to note the interests at stake and the range of possibilities.

An important variable will be the extent to which a 

future Syrian government, under Asad or not, would concentrate on the country’s domestic problems, rather than its 

foreign policy. It seems likely that a post-Asad government 

would concentrate its attention at home. If Asad reasserts 

control, then perhaps he will also seek to focus on the home 

front, but perhaps he will lash out at those he sees as having 

exacerbated his problems, namely, the United States and its 

regional allies, including Turkey and friendly Arab League 

states. Asad also may see tensions with Israel as a way to 

rally popular support. Most likely, even if Asad wishes to 

be active on some foreign policy front, his ability to be so 
4 SF No. 276 www.ndu.edu/inss

would be more limited than before the recent troubles. For 

one thing, Syria’s finances are in much worse shape.

The Asad Record

Like his father Hafez al-Asad, who ruled Syria from 

1970 to 2000, Bashar al-Asad promoted the image of 

Syria as a force for stability because it did not attack Israel or allow terrorist attacks against Israel from its territory. The reality did not correspond to that image. Asad 

has frequently violated Syria’s international obligations 

in order to promote instability and threaten peace. Consider just a few of the many examples:

◆ Syria engaged in clandestine nuclear activities, which 

led the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

board of governors to notify the United Nations 

(UN) Security Council about Syrian noncompliance 

with its international treaty obligations.13 The IAEA 

concluded, “the Agency assesses that it is very likely 

that the building destroyed at the Dair alzour site was 

a nuclear reactor which should have been declared 

to the Agency.”14 The only other countries reported 

by the IAEA board to the UN Security Council are 

North Korea and Iran.

◆ Adopted to end the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war, 

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 mandates that governments prevent the 

sale or transfer of weapons, ammunition, equipment, 

and training to “entities or individuals” in Lebanon.15

Within a month of its adoption, Turkish authorities 

intercepted a Syrian aircraft carrying weapons from 

Iran to Hizballah. UN follow-up teams report that 

arms regularly cross the Syria-Lebanon border, presumably en route to Hizballah. 

◆ The March 2007 UNSCR 1747, one of several imposing sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, 

mandates that “all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items [arms or related materiel] from 

Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or 

aircraft.”16 Syria regularly violates this mandate by facilitating the shipment of Iranian arms to Hizballah. 

Several shipments of Iranian arms have been intercepted at sea while bound for Syria, most notably 

the MV Monchegorsk, which was intercepted in the 

Red Sea by the U.S. Navy in January 2009. Cyprus, to 

which the vessel was diverted, wrote to the Security 

Council committee responsible for monitoring UNSCR 1747; the committee’s report showed the ship 

left Bandar Abbas, a strategic port in southern Iran, 

bound for Latakia, Syria, laden with several tons of 

shells, bullets, and explosives.17 Turkey has forced several planes to land that were reportedly carrying arms 

from Iran to Syria, most recently in April 2011 and 

then again in August 2011.

◆ Despite repeated promises to American secretaries 

of state—most explicitly to Colin Powell—Syria 

continues to allow Hamas to maintain unimpeded 

its international headquarters in Damascus.18 All 

major industrial countries categorize Hamas as 

a terrorist group. The Middle East peace process 

“Quartet”—the United States, the European Union 

(EU), Russia, and the UN—warned against assistance to Hamas until it meets a set of conditions, 

including renouncing violence.19 The irony is that 

rather than Syria moving away from the terrorist 

group Hamas, it is Hamas that is reducing its reliance on Syria because of Hamas’s concern about 

Syria’s negative image among its target audience.20

◆ Since 2003, Syria has facilitated the flow of insurgents into Iraq, destabilizing its neighbor and 

providing material support to the terrorists who have 

killed so many Iraqi civilians and American Soldiers. These actions have not only been detrimental 

to U.S. and Iraqi interests, but they have also flouted 

the repeated Security Council calls for countries to 

assist the new Iraqi authorities.21 During his September 2003 testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Paul Wolfowitz held up the passports of foreign 

fighters encountered by U.S. forces in Iraq to show 

that they had gone through Syria.22 In September 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 276 5 

2007, General David Petraeus gave an interview to 

Lebanese magazine al-Watan al-Arabi in which he 

described how Syria allowed thousands of insurgents to land at Damascus International Airport 

and then cross into Iraq. The flow continues: In December 2010, U.S. counterterrorism officials noted 

an increase in the number of insurgents crossing 

through Syria into Iraq.

Moreover, Syria in effect occupied its neighbor Lebanon for decades until 2006. While the Lebanese government was coerced into acquiescing to the Syrian military 

presence, that arrangement was a transparent violation of 

Lebanese sovereignty. In its September 2004 UNSCR 

1559, the Security Council “call[ed] upon all remaining 

foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.” Syrian forces 

did not leave until forced to do so by the combination 

of a million Lebanese protesting and a concerted international campaign led by France and the United States, 

with strong Saudi support.

Both Bashar al-Asad and his father, former president 

Hafez al-Asad, have had a false reputation for being forces 

for stability and de facto peace with Israel. The reality was 

quite different. They did not take on Israel in the domain 

where Israel is strongest and Syria is weak—namely, conventional war. That was not out of any conviction that 

international disputes should be settled peacefully, but 

instead out of necessity. After the 1978 Camp David Accords, Hafez al-Asad learned a painful lesson from his unsuccessful effort to reach strategic parity (his term) with 

Israel. Despite massive funding from Arab states in the 

1980s and free delivery of advanced weapons from the 

Soviet Union, Syria could not match Israel militarily. The 

effort drove Syria into an economic crisis from which it 

was rescued only by rising oil revenue and renewed Arab 

generosity once Syria joined the U.S.-led coalition in 1990 

against Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.23

In other words, it was Israeli effort, with support 

by the United States, to maintain a strategic deterrent 

that kept either Hafez al-Asad or Bashar al-Asad from 

pursuing the use of force. Israel has deterred Syria by 

sustaining a massive military effort for a small country. 

According to The Military Balance 2011 from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Israel has more 

combat-capable aircraft, and its army has more activeduty soldiers, than either Britain, France, or Germany.24

Upon mobilization of reserves, Israel’s army would have 

more soldiers than Britain, France, and Germany combined, and Israel has more than twice as many tanks as 

those three countries taken together. It is no surprise that 

Asad refrains from taking on such a force.

Meanwhile, Asad has supported Hizballah, which 

has launched attacks on Israel. The 2006 Israel-Hizballah 

war provided graphic proof about extensive Syrian arms 

shipments to Hizballah including both Syrian-made and 

foreign-made weapons.25 During that war, Syria played 

a provocative role, as it often did in the past when Israel 

took retaliatory action against terrorists in Lebanon.26

The frequent Hizballah attacks on Israel, mostly by mortar and rocket fire, continued until Hizballah was bruised 

in the 2006 war. In the last 5 years, not one bullet or 

rocket from Hizballah has been fired on Israel.27 There is 

no evidence that Syria played a role in halting the Hizballah attacks on Israel.

In short, Asad’s Syria has sponsored terrorism, interfered in the affairs of its neighbors, pursued weapons of mass 

destruction, and flouted its international treaty obligations. 

Those are not the actions of a government that promotes 

regional stability. A more accurate reading is that Asad did 

much to undermine the stability of the Middle East. 

Impact on Iran

Iran has been described as a “strategically lonely” 

country with few close friends on the international 

scene.28 Iran’s relationship with Syria has been the great 

exception: the Islamic Republic and the Asad government have been close strategic allies for more than 30 

years.29 Adjusting to Asad’s fall would pose a great challenge to the Islamic Republic.

It would be a great challenge for Iran to sustain the 

support of the “Arab street,” which it has highly prized, 

if Tehran is seen as backing a brutal dictator, rather than 
6 SF No. 276 www.ndu.edu/inss

a champion of opposition to Western domination. Indeed, Iran’s popular image in the Arab world rises and 

falls depending on how well its radical policies are faring. In 2006, when the United States was mired in Iraq, 

and Israel had conducted unpopular military campaigns 

against the Hizballah movement in Lebanon, Iran was 

riding high. In a June 2011 poll, James Zogby found 

Iran’s negative rating in Morocco to be 85 percent compared to 92 percent positive in 2006; in Egypt, Iran was 

63 percent negative compared to 82 percent positive in 

2006; in Saudi Arabia, 80 percent negative compared 

to 85 percent positive in 2006; and in the United Arab 

Emirates, 70 percent negative compared to 68 percent 

positive in 2006.30 Zogby attributed these changes to the 

impact of the Arab spring, Iran’s repression of protests in 

2009, and the continuing nuclear impasse. Presumably 

Iran’s support for Asad was not yet a major factor, since 

protests in Syria had not turned so bloody in June when 

the poll was taken. Nevertheless, the poll shows the challenge Iran faces when its radical stance, such as support 

for Asad in face of popular protests, does not look so 

successful or important.

Asad’s problems fit poorly with Iranian leaders’ 

“resistance narrative” that radical Islam is the wave of 

history and is supported by the region’s peoples, while 

the United States and its allies—Israel and the moderate Arab states—are on the wane and lack popular 

support. Iran’s leaders interpret world developments 

in light of their conviction that Western liberalism is a 

failed system destined to be replaced by radical Islam. 

They see U.S. problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, as 

well as Israel’s problems in the 2006 war with Hizballah, as proof that the American way of war can be successfully countered by sustained resistance, which, in 

their view, can lead to America eventually withdrawing from the region. They have interpreted the “Arab 

spring” as proof that Arab peoples are inspired by 

the example of Iran’s Islamic revolution, overthrowing authoritarian pro-Western governments to install 

Islamist democracies. This narrative has been used to 

justify the hardline revolutionary stance at home and 

to belittle the democratic opposition as stooges of a 

failing West.31

For many months after the protests in Syria started, 

Iran vigorously defended Asad and denounced the protests, 

which were presented as a Western plot that good Muslims 

should reject. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has warned, 

“In Syria, the hand of America and Israel is evident.”32 Majlis Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi expounded, “In regard to Syria, we are confronted with 

two choices. The first is for us to place Syria in the mouth 

of a wolf named America. . . . The second choice would be 

for us to contribute to the termination of the clashes in 

Syria. The interests of the Muslim people command that 

we mobilize ourselves to support Syria.” Both the United 

States and the EU have said that Iran sent elements from its 

Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force to Syria to assist in the 

repression.33 The Iranian state and hardline media give little 

attention to developments in Syria, but for many months, 

what mention they gave was to strongly support the Asad 

regime and belittle the protestors.

Asad’s fall would be a particularly difficult blow 

for hardliners who have interpreted Asad’s troubles as 

a Western plot similar to that which they think caused 

the protests in Iran after the contested 2009 presidential 

elections. Ahmad Mousavi, former Iranian ambassador 

to Syria, put it most clearly: “Current events in Syria 

are designed by the foreign enemies and mark the second version of the sedition which took place in 2009 in 

Iran.”34 Khamenei has for years warned that Iran is at 

great danger of a sudden “color revolution”—what Iranian hardliners call a “soft overthrow”—whipped up by 

Western agents.35 If Asad is overthrown in the aftermath 

of Western governments calling for him to step down, 

that may increase Khamenei’s worries that he may face a 

similar fate. Already in February 2011, thousands of protestors took to the streets in Tehran and other major Iranian cities, chanting slogans such as, “Ben Ali, Mubarak, 

it’s Sayid Ali’s [that is, Sayid Ali Khamenei’s] turn.”36

On the other hand, if Asad emerges from his current 

troubles, Khamenei may well interpret this as confirmation of the wisdom of a tough, uncompromising stance 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 276 7 

such as he took in the face of the 2009–2010 protests in 

Iran—a stance that he presents as having prevailed over 

the worst that the West could do against Iran.

If Asad’s fall seems imminent, Iran will presumably 

hedge its bets, in line with Tehran’s general practice of 

“betting on all horses in the race”—a phrase used by U.S. 

officials to describe Iran’s policy of simultaneously supporting the Iraqi government and the insurgents fighting that government.37 Already in autumn 2011, some 

mild criticism was directed at the Asad regime by President Mahmood Ahmadinejad and his foreign minister, 

Ali Akbar Salehi; the former spoke of “needed reforms” 

and the latter said Asad should “be accountable to his 

people’s legitimate demands.”38

If Asad did in fact fall, Iran would presumably seek 

to cultivate good relations with the successor government. 

Indeed, important Iranian advisor Mohammad Javad 

Larajani (whose brothers are head of the judiciary and 

speaker of the Majlis) has argued that if Asad falls, “the 

future relations of Iran and Syria will be as strong as they 

are right now” because the successor government would 

be dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood.39 While the 

successor government might be dominated by the Muslim 

Brotherhood, that movement has been defined by its opposition to the Alawite clan of the Asad family, who are 

seen as Shi’ites. It would be quite a challenge for the Iranian regime, which presents itself as the protector of the 

world’s Shi’ites, to be an ally of such a government. The 

problem would be exacerbated if Asad’s fall is preceded by 

worsening ethnic tensions between Sunnis and Alawites.

Iran’s regional influence would also be hurt if Asad’s 

troubles—whether or not he stays in power—hurt the 

Hizballah movement in Lebanon, which has been Iran’s 

closest international partner. Hizballah’s military might is 

an important Iranian instrument of deterrence against an 

Israeli attack. That may be difficult to sustain if Asad falls. 

As the ICG puts it, “The effect [of Asad’s fall] on Hizbollah arguably would be most visible and immediate. Iran 

might well continue to supply the resistance movement 

with arms by air or by sea, but the flow inevitably would 

be curtailed, making it more difficult for Hizbollah to sustain its current military posture, deter an Israeli attack or 

restock in the event of an actual armed confrontation.”40

A further complication for Iran is that its stance 

about Syria has shaken the Turkish establishment’s view 

that Turkey and Iran could strategically cooperate. As recently as June 2010, Turkey and Brazil brokered a highprofile agreement with Iran about nuclear matters, which 

infuriated the United States. In the aftermath of the Syria 

protests, Ankara is now cooperating closely with Washington and has become much more suspicious of Tehran.41

Were Asad to fall, it would be interesting to see if the new 

Syrian authorities replace their strategic partnership with 

Iran with an even closer partnership with Turkey, in what 

would presumably sideline Iran from the Syrian theater.

The ICG nicely summarized the impact of Asad’s 

fall on Iran as “possibly auguring a profound shift in the 

regional strategic balance of power—far more significant 

than a policy of sanctions or pressure against Tehran 

could possibly bring about.”42

Perception of the Power of the 

United States and Its Allies

A strong argument can be made that U.S. prestige and 

influence around the world suffer if the United States issues a call for Asad’s overthrow and yet he stays in power. 

The United States has a compelling interest in ensuring 

that any time the President of the United States says something must happen, then it does happen. Indeed, a serious 

argument for the U.S. military commitment in Libya was 

that President Obama had said publicly that Qaddafi must 

go. Talk is not cheap; staking out a position without being willing to act undermines the credibility of every U.S. 

statement. One might note the costly ramifications of alleged U.S. encouragement to the Hungarians to rise against 

the Soviet imposed regime in 1956. The advancement of 

U.S. vital interests is inextricable from the credibility of U.S. 

pledges. So it is worth weighing carefully what would be the 

practical impact of a U.S. call for Asad’s overthrow.

It is quite clear that Washington has no intention of 

leading or supporting a military effort to depose Asad. 

Such a military effort might come in three ways: coup, 
8 SF No. 276 www.ndu.edu/inss

support for an insurrection, or military invasion. It is hard 

to see the United States playing a role in any of these 

options. The United States has few contacts and little 

leverage with the Syrian military, which makes implausible any U.S. effort to split the military from Asad along 

the lines of how Washington encouraged the Egyptian 

military to break with President Hosny Mubarak. The 

dynamic of any such split would be different from that 

in Egypt, since the Syrian army is a sectarian institution 

dedicated to perpetuating Alawite rule. A military coup 

could reflect a decision by the Alawite elite that Asad 

was endangering the Alawite community.

It is not clear if there will be a Libya-style armed resistance that might benefit from external assistance. The 

current armed actions by the opposition may turn into a 

full-scale insurrection. If so, neither the United States, 

NATO, nor Arab League states seems interested in another 

Libya-style military action. Humanitarian buffer zones (on 

the Turkish border, for instance) are a much more plausible 

option. As for open U.S. military intervention, America 

has no interest in invading Syria, an action which would be 

widely condemned at home, around the world, and in Syria.

Without military action, the debate about how 

Washington can contribute to Asad’s overthrow turns on 

the question of what impact U.S. actions have on the protestors and on the Sunni business elite, which has been 

largely sitting out the regime-protestor confrontation. The 

question is whether Washington can galvanize European, 

Turkish, and Arab sanctions and condemnation; whether 

such actions embolden the opposition and raise doubts 

among the regime’s supporters; and, most especially, 

whether Asad is likely to fall in any case. It is quite possible that these conditions will be met. Important European 

countries immediately echoed the August 18, 2011, U.S. 

call for Asad’s overthrow, and the EU has moved with uncharacteristic speed to place biting sanctions, culminating 

in a ban on imports of oil from Syria.43 The Arab League 

has suspended Syrian membership; Jordan’s King Abdullah II has called for Asad to step down;44 Turkey has imposed a variety of restrictions on Syria, and Ankara openly 

allows the Syrian opposition to operate in its territory;45

and respected observers say the tide has turned against 

Asad.46 The U.S. call for Asad’s overthrow may provide an 

opportunity for Washington to claim credit for something 

that is going to happen anyway; in geopolitics, it is always 

good to be credited for making the sun rise in the east.

Were Asad to muddle through, Washington would 

face some difficult quandaries. So long as Asad is in 

power, it will be hard to walk back the sanctions imposed 

on Syria, yet it will be difficult to sustain economic and 

political isolation of the Asad regime if that government 

looks like it will be in power for the foreseeable future. If 

that isolation lessens, then the United States and its allies 

will look like they lost a confrontation with Asad, which 

would reduce their perceived clout. 

Asad’s overthrow is by no means assured, and U.S. 

instruments to advance that objective are limited. The U.S. 

Government decision to call for his overthrow presumably 

rested on a judgment that the prospects for success were 

good and the payoff, if successful, would be high.

Stability of Neighboring States

Some worry about the impact of the end of the 

Asad dynasty on stability in neighboring states. The 

Washington Post reported as a flat fact that “the fall of 

President Bashar al-Assad would unleash a cataclysm 

of chaos, sectarian strife, and extremism that spreads 

far beyond its borders” in an article with the headline 

“‘Doomsday Scenario’ if Syria Falls.”47

Indeed, chaos in Syria would create a space in which 

various radical nonstate actors could operate; in particular, it would give a safe haven to Iraqi insurgents and to 

Kurdistan Workers’ Party fighters targeting Turkey. The 

spillover effects of Syrian chaos on Jordan and Lebanon 

could also be considerable. But such spillover is not guaranteed. Most of the neighboring states are quite resilient. 

Consider that the chaos in Iraq in 2005–2008 had relatively little impact on the stability of its neighbors.

Furthermore, the problem of spreading chaos and 

sectarian strife may be greater if Asad continues to rule. 

The longer the protests and vicious repression continue, 

the more likely that violence and hatred will spread. It 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 276 9 

becomes harder and harder to make the argument that 

Asad, unpleasant as he may be, delivers stability.

Were Asad to fall, that could contribute to the stability of at least one neighbor, namely, Lebanon. Arguably the greatest challenge to Lebanon’s stability has 

been Hizballah’s armed might, which it has at times used 

to impose its will on the Lebanese government. Any Syrian government that follows Asad is unlikely to be as 

supportive as he has been of Hizballah. Asad has made 

no secret of his admiration for Hizballah’s leader Hasan 

Nasrallah, who has reciprocated by strongly supporting 

Asad during the current crisis. Protestors have responded 

by burning pictures of Nasrallah and chanting against 

Hizballah. The loss of active Syrian support would gravely complicate the situation of Hizballah’s armed forces. 

U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice explains, “Hezbollah remains the most significant and most heavily 

armed Lebanese militia. It could not have done so if 

not for Syria’s aid and facilitation of Syrian and Iranian 

arms.”48 Without armed might to back it up, Hizballah 

would pose a reduced threat to Lebanese democracy.

Impact on Israel

It is difficult to see how Asad’s overthrow would 

make Syrian-Israeli peace less likely. During the 40 years 

of Asad family rule, repeated efforts to resolve the Syrian-Israeli conflict have come to failure. Long-time U.S. 

Middle East peace negotiator Dennis Ross, known for 

his optimism, writes:

Between Arabs and Israelis the worst always 

seems to happen. . . . The history of peacemaking, 

especially between Israel and Syria, suggests that 

opportunities are fleeting and fragile. . . . For Arab 

leaders—and no one more clearly epitomizes this 

attitude than Asad—peace with Israel is a favor, 

not a necessity. . . . Arab leaders are easily put on 

the defensive by charges that they have surrendered 

their rights when compromising with Israel.49

Israel’s leading Syria expert Itamar Rabinovich, 

who is both an eminent academic and a prominent 

diplomat, argues that, for Syrian leaders, peace with Israel is a “risky adventure” that they will consider only 

when their domestic position is strong—something 

which not will happen soon, whether Asad stays in 

power or falls.50 He notes the alternative, more pessimistic view: “The failure of the [2000] Geneva Summit [between Syrian President Hafez al-Asad and U.S. 

President Bill Clinton] provided fresh ammunition to 

those who had argued since the early and mid-1990s 

that Asad had never intended to consummate the negotiations with Israel, and that he was merely interested 

in the political dividends accruing to participants.”51

There is much to support the cynical view that a minority Alawite regime wants continued confrontation 

with Israel so as to use a national security justification 

for continued repressive rule over the Sunni majority.52

To be sure, it is hard to see a post-Asad government 

agreeing anytime soon to a peace treaty with Israel, which 

could be characterized by some, including Palestinians, 

as selling out to Jerusalem. The most likely scenario—

whether Asad stays or goes—is continued stalemate on 

the Syria-Israel peace track. However, a good case can 

be made that, in the long run, the prospects for SyrianIsraeli peace may be better if the Syrian government rests 

on a firm foundation of domestic legitimacy, hence not 

needing continued conflict with Israel to justify its rule.

Conclusion

Surprisingly, there is little if anything in the extensive public record, extending over months of comments 

to the media and testimony to Congress, to suggest that 

considerations about the regional impact of Asad’s future were a major part in the deliberations about what 

U.S. policy to adopt.53 Perhaps behind closed doors the 

arguments made were different from those put out to 

the public. Instead, the focus of the policy debate as 

reported to the public has been about what is best for 

the Syrian people.

Again, the ICG captured the most likely impact 

Asad’s overthrow would have on the regional strategic balance: “For Israel and the U.S. in particular, 
10 SF No. 276 www.ndu.edu/inss

the stakes are huge. The regime’s collapse would significantly hurt its allies, whether Iran, Hizbollah or 

Hamas, possibly auguring a profound shift in the regional strategic balance of power—far more significant 

than a policy of sanctions or pressure against Tehran 

could possibly bring about. . . . The ripple effects across 

the region would be vast.”54

Perhaps that is too optimistic a view, although it is 

difficult to see how the geopolitical complications from 

promoting Asad’s overthrow outweigh the strategic advantages. Nevertheless, there is strong reason to suspect 

that the ICG is correct that Asad’s fall would have profound repercussions across the Middle East. Similarly, 

were he able to reassert control, that too would have 

much impact—on Iran’s confidence that it and its allies 

can stand up to Western pressure, on regional perceptions of what the West is able to accomplish, and on the 

future of democratic forces in the region’s authoritarian 

states, including Iran.

Notes 1 The sectarian nature of Asad’s rule and of his response to 

protests, as well as the risks that creates of Sunni backlash, is laid out 

in detail in International Crisis Group (ICG), Popular Protest in North 

Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People’s Slow-motion Revolution, Middle East/North Africa Report No. 108, July 6, 2011, available 

at <www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa.aspx>.

2 Andrew Tabler, interview, October 28, 2011; “It is assumed 

that most of the rank-and-file are Sunni while the officers are mostly 

Alawite, some Druze, and a few Christians.”

3 ICG, The Syrian People’s Slow-motion Revolution, 28; “The security services’ decision to close ranks behind the regime in the course of 

the uprising is less a function of loyalty than it is a result of the sectarian prism through which they have viewed the protest movement.”

4 Jeffrey White, “A Willingness to Kill: Repression in Syria,” 

PolicyWatch No. 1840, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 

August 16, 2011, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3393>.

5 Anthony Shadid, “Sectarian Fighting in Syrian City Bodes Ill 

for All of the Country,” The New York Times, November 20, 2011, 1, 7.

6 ICG, Popular Protest in North Africa and The Middle East (VII): 

The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide, Middle East/North Africa 

Report No. 109, July 13, 2011, available at <www.crisisgroup.org/en/

regions/middle-east-north-africa.aspx>, 31.

7 On the increasing armed opposition, see Martin Chulov, “Free 

Syria Army Gathers on Lebanese Border,” The Guardian, November 

18, 2011, available at <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/18/freesyria-army-lebanese-border>; and Nour Malas, “Syria Rebels Vow to 

Guard Civilians,” The Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2011, available 

at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702045172045770

44421058621062.html>.

8 For an eloquent argument that the longer Asad stays, the worse 

the violence is, see Robert Malley and Peter Harling, “How the Syrian 

Regime Is Ensuring Its Demise,” The Washington Post, July 2, 2011.

9 UK [United Kingdom] Representation to the EU [European 

Union], “UK, Germany and France Call for President Assad to Stand 

Down,” August 18, 2011. The key passage in the joint statement from 

British Prime Minister David Cameron, French President Nicolas 

Sarkozy, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel was, “Our three 

countries believe that President Assad, who is resorting to brutal 

military force against his own people and who is responsible for the 

situation, has lost all legitimacy and can no longer claim to lead the 

country. We call on him to face the reality of the complete rejection of 

his regime by the Syrian people and to step aside in the best interests 

of Syria and the unity of its people,” available at <http://ukeu.fco.gov.

uk/en/news/?view=PressS&id=645689682>.

10 The White House, “Statement by President Obama on the 

Situation in Syria,” August 18, 2011, available at <www.whitehouse.

gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/statement-president-obama-situation-syria>.

11 Hillary R. Clinton, “Remarks on the Situation in Syria,” State 

Department, August 18, 2011, available at <www.state.gov/secretary/

rm/2011/08/170673.htm>.

12 “IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] Reports 

Syria to UN [United Nations] Security Council over Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty Violations,” Board of Governors Resolution, 

World Tribune (Washington), June 12, 2011. “[The agency’s board of 

governors] decides to report, as provided for in Article XII.C of the 

statute, through the director-general, Syria’s non-compliance with 

its Safeguards Agreement to all members of the agency and to the 

Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations,” 

available at <www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2011/

me_syria0715_06_12.asp>.

13 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” GOV/2011/30 

report, May 24, 2011, 8. The report also complains, “Syria’s statements . . 

. are limited in detail, are not supported by documentation and have not 

allowed the Agency to confirm Syria’s assertions,” 2.

14 The record of Syrian violations is laid out in Nicholas Blanford, “UN Resolution 1701: A View from Lebanon,” PolicyWatch 

No. 1414, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 21, 

2008, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.

php?CID=2940>.

15 UN Security Council Resolution 1701, SC/8808, August 11, 

2006, available at <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm>.

16 UN Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007), S/RES/1747, 

March 24, 2007, available at <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.

asp?symbol=S/RES/1747(2007)>.

17 UN Security Council, S/PV.6090, “Non-proliferation briefing by the chairman of the Security Council Committee established 

pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006),” March 10, 2009, New York. 

Although the report was not released, the speakers in the Security 

Council discussion of it described its conclusions in detail; available 

at <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-

4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Iran%20S%20PV%206090.

pdf>. An indication of the amount of explosives involved is that when 

the poorly stored explosives blew up in July 2011, the blast killed 

the Cypriot defense minister and navy commander and destroyed 

the country’s largest electric power station, causing such extensive 

economic repercussions that Cyprus has had to consider asking the 

EU for a financial bail-out.

18 The State Department’s explanation of this episode is set 

out in Alfred B. Prados, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, 

Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress, July 2, 2003, 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 276 11 

available at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/22422.pdf>. 

A fuller account is Daniel Pipes and Gary Gambill, “Signal to Syria: 

Straighten Up,” The New York Post, May 13, 2003.

19 After Hamas did well in the 2006 Palestinian elections, the 

Quartet agreed on what are generally referred to as “the Quartet 

conditions,” namely, “The Quartet concluded that it was inevitable that 

future assistance to any new government would be reviewed by donors 

against that government’s commitment to the principles of nonviolence, 

recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap,” available at <www.consilium.europa.eu/

ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/88201.pdf>.

20 Ethan Bronner, “Tensions Rise as Hamas Refuses to Take 

Sides in Syria,” The New York Times, May 2, 2011, available at <www.

newyorktimes.com/2011/05/03/world/middleeast/03hamas.html>. 

In reaction, Iran is said to have reduced or cut off funding for Hamas: 

Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Foreign Funds for Hamas Hit by Syria Unrest: 

Diplomats,” Reuters, August 21, 2011, available at <www.reuters.

com/article/2011/08/21/uk-palestinians-hamas-finance-idUSTRE77K19120110821>.

21 For instance, UN Security Council Resolution 1790 calls 

“upon the international community, particularly countries in the 

region and Iraq’s neighbours, to support the Iraqi people in their support of peace, stability, security, democracy, and prosperity,” available at 

<www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9207.doc.htm>.

22 Details in this paragraph are from David Schenker, “Damascus on Trial,” Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2011), 59–66. 

23 Patrick Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria’s Military 

Build-Up and Economic Crisis (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989).

24 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), 104–107, 111–112, 156–159, 

and 313–314. The number of combat-capable aircraft is shown as 

Britain, 334; France, 238; Germany, 318; and Israel 460. The number 

of army soldiers is shown as Britain 102,600; France, 130,600; 

Germany, 105,291; and Israel, 133,000. The number of army soldiers 

including reserves is shown as Britain, 175,190; France, 149,100; Germany, 121,642; and Israel, 633,000. The number of main battle tanks 

is shown as Britain, 325; France, 254; Germany, 768; and Israel, 3,501.

25 Andrew Exum, “Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment,” 

Policy Focus 63, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006, 

5–8; David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, “Lessons and Implications 

of the Israel-Hizballah War,” Policy Focus 60, Washington Institute 

for Near East Policy, 2006, 39–41.

26 Michael Eisenstadt and David Schenker, “Syria’s Role in the 

War in Lebanon,” PolicyWatch No. 1139, Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy, August 8, 2006, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2505>.

27 One Israeli soldier was killed in 2011 from shots fired across the 

border by a Lebanese Armed Forces soldier, but that was not by Hizballah.

28 The phrase appears to have originated with Shireen Hunter; 

see Barbara Slavin, “‘Strategically Lonely’ Iran Exploits Opportunities 

for Regional Influence,” Iran Task Force brief, The Atlantic Council, 

March 25, 2011, available at <www.acus.org/publication/strategicallylonely-iran-exploits-opportunities-regional-influence>.

29 The strategic importance of the relationship to both Syria and 

Iran is laid out in Jubin Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance 

and Power Politics in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006) and, 

in shorter form, in Abbas William Samii, “Syria and Iran: An Enduring Axis,” Middle East Monitor 1, no. 2 (April/May 2006), available at 

<www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0604/06064_4.htm>.

30 Dan Murphy, “A stunning shift of Iran’s image in the Arab 

world,” Christian Science Monitor, September 7, 2011, available at 

<www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0907/A-stunningshift-of-Iran-s-image-in-the-Arab-world>.

31 Perhaps the most articulate exposition of these views is found 

in the columns of Keyhan, Iran’s largest circulation newspaper, which is 

often described as semi-official; its editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, is a 

close confidant of Khamenei. In a 2-week period selected at random, 

Keyhan ran at least four editorials on the theme that the Arab Spring 

is yet more proof of Western decline in face of Iranian success (all translations by the author from the original Persian): “Political Islam Has 

Returned,” Keyhan, October 27, 2011, arguing “Iran is becoming the 

model” for the people of the Middle East in rejecting Western domination and reinstating political Islam after centuries of failed secularism, 

available at <www.kayhannews.ir/900805/2.htm#other200>; “End of 

the West’s Military Operations in Islamic World,” Keyhan, October 30, 

2011, arguing that the people of Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt are 

rejecting the West, which has had to abandon its failed military efforts 

throughout the region as evidenced by Iraq and Afghanistan, available 

at <www.kayhannews.ir/900808/2.htm#other200>; “13th of Aban 

[Iranian date corresponding to November 4], An Obvious Shift in International Power,” Keyhan, November 3, 2011, arguing that the West’s 

failure in Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq plus Israel’s failure against Hizballah has “transformed the global equation,” available at <www.kayhannews.ir/900812/2.htm#other200>; and “America Will Be Reduced 

to Dust,” Keyhan, November 6, 2011, contending that the asymmetrical 

war by Middle Eastern peoples has and will defeat America’s plan for 

dominating the region, available at <www.kayhannews.ir/900815/2.

htm#other201>. As the frequency of these editorials attests, the theme 

of Western failure in the face of popular resistance inspired by political 

Islam is a major component of Iranian propaganda.

32 Quoted in Geneive Abdo, “How Iran Keeps Assad in Power 

in Syria,” Foreign Affairs, available at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68230/geneive-abdo/how-iran-keeps-assad-in-power-in-syria>. 

The Boroujerdi quote is from Robin Pomeroy, “Analysis: Iran Sees Ally 

Syria Surrounded by U.S., Arab ‘Wolves,’” Reuters, August 15, 2011.

33 In May 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department took action 

against Mohsen Chirazi, third-ranking leader of Iran’s Quds Force, 

and cited that force’s role in Syria. In August, the EU imposed 

sanctions on the Quds Force for its role in Syrian repression. For a 

detailed account of Western allegations about Iranian involvement 

in suppressing Syrian protests, see Henry A. Ensher, “Iran-Syria 

Relations and The Arab Spring,” Iran Tracker, July 12, 2011, available 

at <www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/iran-syria-relations-andarab-spring>.

34 Quoted in Abdo, “How Iran Keeps Assad in Power in Syria.” 

Interestingly enough, when Mousavi quit in August 2011, the Arab 

press speculated that he left because he opposed how actively Iran was 

helping Asad repress protestors.

35 Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s 

Most Powerful Leader (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, 2008).

36 Brian Murphy, “Egypt Echoes Across Region: Iran, Bahrain, 

Yemen,” Associated Press, February 14, 2011.

37 For instance, the unnamed “senior U.S. official in Baghdad” 

quoted in Simon Tisdall, “Iran’s Secret Plan for Summer Offensive 

to Force U.S. Out of Iraq,” The Guardian, May 21, 2007, available at 

<www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may22/iraq.topstories3>.

38 “Syria Crisis: Iran’s Ahmadinejad Criticises Killings,” BBC 

News–Middle East, October 22, 2011, available at <www.bbc.co.uk/

news/world-middle-east-15416410>. However, the president and his 

foreign minister are on the losing side of intense political infighting 

in Iran, and their statements about Syria are part of their pattern of 

trying to appear as the more reasonable interlocutors of the West, 

though that was certainly not how Ahmadinejad acted when he had 
12 SF No. 276 www.ndu.edu/inss

greater power. In any case, they are not now the ones setting foreign 

and security policy, which increasingly comes directly from Khamenei.

39 Quoted in Bret Stephens, “The Ayatollahs’ Consigliere,” The 

Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2011, A15.

40 ICG, The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide, Middle East/

North Africa Report No. 109, 27. 

41 Soner Cagaptay, “Turkish-Iranian Rivalry Redux,” Hürriyet 

Daily News, October 17, 2011, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.

org/templateC06.php?CID=1733>; and Soner Cagaptay, “Obama, 

Erdogan Find Shared Interests,” The Washington Post, November 11, 

2011, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-erdogan-find-shared-interests/2011/11/11/gIQARNOoDN_story.html>.

42 ICG, The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide, Middle East/

North Africa Report No. 109, 27. 

43 About one-third of Syrian government revenue comes from its 

oil exports, 90 percent of which goes to EU countries. On September 

2, the EU banned imports of oil from Syria, in Council Regulation 

EU 878/2011, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=

OJ:L:2011:228:SOM:EN:HTML>.

44 Ian Black, “Syria’s Assad Should Step Down, Says King 

Abdullah of Jordan,” The Guardian (UK), November 14, 2011, available at <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/14/syrian-presidentassad-urged-to-quit>; John Leyne, “Arab Spring Revolution at the 

Arab League,” BBC News, November 13, 2011, available at <www.

bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15714771>. 

45 Asli Aydintasbas, “Turkey’s New Policy on Syria,” PolicyWatch No. 1856, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 

5, 2011, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.

php?CID=3406>.

46 “Syria: The Tide Turns Against Bashar Assad,” The Economist, 

November 19, 2011, 49–50.

47 Liz Sly, “‘Doomsday Scenario’ if Syria Falls,” The Washington 

Post, May 2, 2011. To be fair, the sentence quoted ended with the 

phrase “analysts and experts say,” though note that the formulation 

implies all analysts and experts agree on this point.

48 “U.S. Blasts Iran, Syria over Lebanon,” CBC News, October 

28, 2011, available at <www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/10/28/unlebanon-rice.html>.

49 Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for 

Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 589.

50 Itamar Rabinovich, The View from Damascus: State, Political 

Community and Foreign Relations in Twentieth-Century Syria (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008), 335. He argues that Hafez al-Asad, 

knowing in 2000 his death was imminent, did not want to take the 

risks inherent in a deal with Israel. Rabinovich was president of Tel 

Aviv University, Israeli ambassador to the United States, and lead 

Israeli negotiator with Syria.

51 Rabinovich, 335. A prominent exponent of that view about 

Syrian motivations is Tony Badran, “Peace Talks, Bashar’s War by 

Other Means,” April 13, 2010, available at <www.nowlebanon.com/

NewsArchivesDetails.aspx?ID=160312>. 

52 The most forceful statement of that view is Daniel Pipes, Syria 

Beyond the Peace Process (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy, 1996), available at <www.danielpipes.org/books/

syriabeyond.php>. A less forceful way of stating the relationship is 

Ross’s argument that the more legitimate the government, the easier 

it is to make Arab-Israeli peace; see Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace, 

589–590.

53 Efforts to show that considerations about the regional impact influenced U.S. policy have been unpersuasive. In April, Karen 

DeYoung and Scott Wilson wrote in The Washington Post, “Escalating anti-government demonstrations in Syria have put the Obama 

administration in a quandary as it tries to protect a range of wider 

U.S. interests while supporting what it has called the legitimate 

aspirations of the Syrian people.” Yet when they came to list the reasons for hesitation, they cited “a palpable sense of weariness among 

policymakers buffeted by months of crisis across the Middle East . . 

. ; a reluctance to add further uncertainty to the tenuous Israeli-Palestinian peace process; an unwillingness . . . to readily trade a known 

quantity in Assad for an unknown future; and a latent belief among 

some that the Syrian leader can be persuaded to adopt real reforms.” 

Karen DeYoung and Scott Wilson, “Growing Unrest in Syria Puts 

U.S. Officials in a Bind,” The Washington Post, April 22, 2011, A1, 

A9. Only one of those four factors can be called a “wider U.S. interest,” namely, the impact on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 

54 ICG, The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide, Middle East/

North Africa Report No. 109, 27. 

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Francis G. Hoffman

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Studies

Center for Strategic Research