The Depa rtment orig inally

broug ht this action to terminate the par ental rig hts of Phelps,as 1 to all eig ht of her children; Manning, as the father of J.M.; and three other men who we re f

ather s of the other c hildren. P helps first ag ree d to permane nt placeme nt of the three oldest children in anothe r home. Subsequently , Phelps voluntarily relinquished her rig hts to J .M. and the four other re maining children on the second da y of trial. Manningdoes not asser t any rig hts to Phelps’s other

children. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00451- CV

Ar ne ll R ona ld M anni ng, Jr ., App e lla nt

v. Texas Depart m ent of Fam ily and P rote ctive Service s, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. FM 3-0 0781 , HO NORAB LE CHARLES CAMP B ELL, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N This is an appea l from a final order terminating appellant Ar nell Manning ’s par ental ri g hts to a ch ild , J .M ., he fathe re d w ithL y ne ll Ph e lps
. See Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 161.001(1), ( 2)

1 (West 2002). J .M. and seve n other c hildren of Phelps wer e re moved af ter the e ighth c hild was found to have c ocaine in her sy stem at birth. Manning , the o n l y p ar t y on appea l, presents nine issues including due proce ss deprivations, violation of section 107.013 of the family code, a nd ineffe ctive
a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l r e la te d to a te n- mon th de lay in ap po intme nt of his tr ia l atto rn e y ; er ro ne ou s u se of a br oad-f

orm submission of termination gr ounds; leg al and fac tual insufficienc y of the e vidence ;The De partment be g an re ceivingref err als related to Phelps and her c hildren in 1992. 2 B e fo re J.M.’ s b ir

th, Phe lps ha d b e e n a

rr e ste d f ive tim e s f

or oth e r a lle g e d c ri me s. J.M. w a s o ve r f

our y e ars old

a t th e tim e of

tr ia l. 3 2 fa ilure to r e mov e the a tto rn e y a d li te m and

g ua rd ian a d li te m f

or fa ilure to p e rf

or m st a tut or y du tie s; and fa ilure t o disqualify the attorney ad li tem due to an allege d conflict of interest. We will affir m the de c re e of

the tr ia l c ourt
. BACK GR OUND L y nell Phelps met Arnell Manning in October 1997 while t hey wer e in diffe rent drug treatment prog rams. I n Marc h 1998, Manning was a rre sted for possession of coca ine and plac ed 2
on defe rre d adjudication. See Tex. He alth & Saf ety Code Ann. § 481.115 (West 2003). Manning
a nd P h e l p s b e g an l i v i n g t o g e t h e r i n t h e s u m m e r o f 1 9 9 8
. J. M
. w a s b o r n i n F e b r u ar y 1 9 9 9 w ith
coca ine in her sy stem. At the termination trial, Phelps testified that Manning purcha sed coc aine f or her a nd smoked it with her while she was preg nant with J.M. Although Manning testified he wa s
unawa re that Phelps used coca ine and de nied that he use d coca ine with her, he was arr ested in Mar ch 1999 for possession of a controlled substance, dihy drocode ine. At the time of arr est, Manning had with him J .M., who was then one month old. The arr esting office r testified that Manningsmelled of alc ohol and possessed pills, a cr ack pipe, and a dia per ba g with nothing in it other than liquor. After Manning was re lease d from jail in J une 1999, he did not r eturn to J.M . and Phelps but instead went to live with his mother in Chicag o. I n Aug ust 1999, Phelps and three of her c hildren, including J.M., mov e d to Chi c a g o to liv e wi th Ma nn ing and his mot

he r. Ma nn ing re tur

ne d to Te xas a lon e in Dec ember

or January

2000. Phelps and the children returne d in late J anuar y . Manning ’s last contac t with Phelps or J .M. was in April 2000, whe n J .M. was 14 months old. 3Manning was not the presumed fathe r of J .M. beca use Phelps was mar

ried to anothe r man 4 at the time J .M. was born. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann § 160.102 ( West 2002). 3 Whe n M ann ing re tur

ne d to Te xas in Janu ary 20 00 , he wa s arr e ste d and se nte nc e d to ten day s in jail for a 1998 thef t by chec k. See Tex. P en. Code Ann
. § 31.03 (West 2003 & Supp. 2 0 0 4

- 0 5 )
. H e w a s r e l e a s e d t o a dr u g r e h a b i l i t a t i o np r o g r a m b u td i d n o t c o mp l e t e t h e p r o g r a m . In Aug u s t 2 0 0 0 , h e w a s ar r e s te d an d s u b s e qu e n tl y

p le a d e d g u il ty to p o s s e s s io no f

a c o ntrolled substance. I n J anuar

y 2002, Manning was c onvicted of r obbery afte r beingarr ested whe n an off icer saw him holding a

scalpe l to the throat of anothe r man. See Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. § 29 .02 (We st 2003). The De partment re ceive d at least ten r efe rra ls reg arding P h el p s an d her c hildren betwee n October

1992 and Oc tober 2002. In October 2002, t he De partment re ceive d a re fer ral alleg ing phy sical neg lect of Phelps’s then-seven children, including J .M. The re fer ral a lso included alleg ations of neg lectful super vision of J .M. and anothe r sibling. Phelps was alleg edly using c rac k
coca ine, and he r home wa s filthy . At a subsequent visit, the house was clea ned up, and Phelps later pa sse d a dr ugte st. Th e De pa

rtme nt r e c e ive d a dd iti onal referr als on fo ur dif fe re nt o c c a sio ns in Janu ary 20 03 , a nd a g a in o n F e br

ua ry 3, 20 03 , r e po rtin g that th e c hil dr e n h a d li c e and ri ng wo rm . Additionally , one of J.M.’s sibli ng s alleg ed phy sical abuse by another adult living in the home. These pr ocee dings wer e initiated in Febr uary 2003 afte r the De partment wa s notified that Phelps’s newbor

n eig hth c hild ha d tested positive f or coca ine. The De partment filed its orig inal petition on Febr

uary 3, 2003, seekingtermination of parental rights t o Phelps’s eig ht children. The petition lis ts Manning a s the alleg ed father of J.M. The pe tition also i ncludes a “Notice of Right 4 to C ou ns e l.” Th e no tic e state s th a tManning testified that he a lso sent a letter to the D epar tment r equesting that his mother be 5 g iven custody

of J.M . Howeve r, the De partment disputes re ceivingthat letter. Manning rec eived f

our or f ive family

service plans wh i ch he sig ned and r eturne d to the 6 case worke r. 4 I f y ou are indige nt and wish to oppose P etitioner’s a ction, y ou should appea r at the above indicated hea

ring prepa

red to show proof to the Court of y our indig ency and inability to hire an attorney . I f y ou cannot a ppear at the hea ring y ou should notify

the District Clerk at the County Courthouse that y o u wi sh to have a court-a ppointed a t t o r n e y. Manning was still incarc erated at the time he r ece ived the orig inal petition. On Februa ry 24, 2003, t h e t r i a l c o u rt s i g n e d an o r d e r a p p r o v i n g t e mp o r ar

y r e m o v a l o f

t h e c h i l dr e nan d

a p p o i n t i n g a t t o r

n e ys fo r b oth Phe lps and

ano the r m an invo lve d in

the te rm inatio n p ro c e e din g s. Manning first reque sted a c ourt-appointed attorney on Fe bruar y 26. I n a letter

to the district clerk, Ma

nning stated that he was the incar cer ated fathe r of J .M. and re quested leg al custody and a c ourt-appointed attorney
. No attorne y was a ppointed at that time. On Marc h 2 8 , the cour t 5 held a status hea

ring . The c ourt found, among other things, that Manning “has revie wed and does
un de rs tand

the se rv ic e pla

n. ” On Ap ri l 29 , 2 00 3, the c a se wa s se t fo r tr ia l on the me ri ts i n A ug us t 6 of that y ear . The De partment filed a n amende d petition on May 22. On J une 12, in response to the amende d petition, Manning se nt the district clerk a nother re quest for a

court-a ppointed attorney . On June 24 , b y

le tte r t o th e dis tr ic t c le rk , M ann ing ’s mot he r r e qu e ste d c usto dy of J .M
. and a c ourt
appointed attorne y

for Ma nning. O n Aug ust 11, 2003, the district court g rante d a mo t i on for continuance filed by

Phelps and another

responde nt fathe r. On De cembe r 9, the De partment filed
a m o t i o nr e qu e s t i n g t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rte x t e n d t h e d i s m i s s a l d a t e b y 1 8 0 d ays b e c a u s e i t“ r e c e n t l y” beca me awa re that Manning had filed a n answe r and r eques t ed a cour t-appointed attorney . TheManning was still inc arc erated for this cr ime at the time of the te rmination trial, but 7 a p p e ar e d t o t e s t i f y. Mann ingde nie s th a t he wa s p hy sic a lly a bu siv e to J.M . o r P he lps
. 8 5 De pa rtme nt r e qu e ste d th a t the dis tr ic t c ourt fi nd Ma nn ing ind ig e nt and a

pp oin t an atto rn e y

fo r h im. On Dec ember 15, the district c ourt g rante d the motion to appoint Manning an attorne y and extended the dis mis sa l date by

18 0 d ay s. Ho we ve r, the a tto rn e y wa s not ap po int e d unti l Jan ua ry 20 04 , a lmo st a y ear afte r Manninghad first re quested o n e fr o m “t he District Clerk at the County Courthouse,” pursuant to the instructions he ha d rec eived.

Manning was re lease d from prison on J anuar y 31, 2004. Two day s later, he appea red in court for

his “Emerg ency

Motion to Appoint Respondent [Manning] Permanenc y Manag ing Conservator” and sig ned a fa m i l y s ervic e plan. Ma nning did not see J .M. at that time beca use he
a lle g e dly pla

nn e d to re tur

n to Chic a g o to visit his mot he r t hat da y . H ow e ve r, on

F e br ua ry 5, on ly three day s afte r si g ning the service plan and r equesting manag ing c onservatorship of J .M., Manning
c o m m i t t e d t h e f

t i n T r a v i s C o u n t y, w a s ar r e s t e d a g a i n , an d s u

b s e qu e n t l y p l e a d e d

g u i l t y. See T e x.

7 Pen. Code Ann. § 31.03.

At a pre -trial hea

ring , Manning was a djudi ca t ed to be the father of J.M. The termination trial was to a jury ; Phelps testified t hat throug hout their relationship, Manning wa s ph y sic a lly a

bu siv e to bot

h he r an d J.M. and

that he dr ank , s mok e d c ra c k c oc a ine , a nd sto le fr om h is mother to support his drug habit. Manning testified about his c riminal history and claimed to have 8 been r ehabilitated from narc otics and alc ohol abuse. He also conc eded that he did not think he had6

been a g ood fathe r to J .M. Thomas Wasden, a supe rvisor at Child Protective Service s, testified that he believe d Manning had enda ng ere d J .M. and that it would not be in the best interest of J.M. to li ve with Manning ’s mother.

The issue of termination was submitt ed in a single broad- form question in which the jury was inst ru ct ed reg ardingtwo statutory g rounds for te rmination—endang erme nt and abandonme nt—and best intere st. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001 (1)( D), (E) (N), (2) (West 2002);

see Tay lor

v . Te x as De p’ t of Pr ote c tiv e an d R e

gu lator ySe rv s. , N o . 0 3-03-00467- CV , 2 0 0 5 T e x. App. L EXI S 1793, at *12 (Tex. App.—Austin M ar ch 1 0 , 2005, no pet.); Comm. on Pattern J ury Charg es, State Ba

r of Tex., Tex as Pattern Jury Charg es: Fa

mily PJ C 218.1B (2003) . The jury found that Manning ’s par ental rig hts to J .M. should be terminated. A nsweringthe sec ond question, the jury found that Manning ’s mother should not be appointed manag ing conser vator. The district cour

t then enter ed an or der te rminating Manning ’s pare ntal rig hts to J.M. and denying Ma nning’ s mother
mana g ingc on se rv ator sh ip o f J.M . T his a pp e a l f oll ow s.
DI SCU SSIO N I n Manning ’s first three issues, he complains that the ten-month delay in appointing his trial attorney violated his statutory and constitutional rig hts, or constituted ineffe ctive assistanc e of counse l. I

n his f ourth issue, he argues that the trial c ourt err ed by submitt ing the issue of whe ther his pa re nta l r ig hts sh ou ld b e te rm inate d in br oa d f or m. I n h is f if th a nd sixthiss ue s, Ma

nn inga sse rt s that the e vid e nc e is le g a lly and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the te rm inatio n o f h is p are nta l r ig hts
. Mann ingargue s in

his se ve nth and e ig hth iss ue s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by fa ili ng to re mov e bo th7

the attorne y

ad litem and guar dian ad litem for sta tutory violations. Finally , in his nint h issue, Manning argues that the trial c ourt err ed by denying his motion to disqualify the attorney ad litem i nl i gh to f a nal l ege d

co n fl i ct o f i n t er es ti nh i s d u al re p re s en t at i o no f J
. M
. an d an o t h er s i b l i n g. Delay in app ointm ent of attorney

I n M ann ing ’s fi rs t is su e , h e c omp la ins that the tr ia l c ourt vio la te d h is s ta tut or

y ri g hts becau s e i t did not appoint him an attorney until ten months afte r his first written re quest and five months be fore trial on the merits. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.013 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004- 05). Texas law requires a court-a ppointed attorney for indigent parents oppos ing the termination of t h ei r parental rig hts. Id .; se e als o id . § 107.011 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004-05) ( requiring appointment of g uardia

n ad litem for c hild “immediately afte r the filing of the petition, but before the fu ll a dv e rs ary

he ari ng ” ); 10 7. 01 2 ( re qu ir inga pp oin tme nt o f atto rney ad lite m f or c hil d “immediately

afte r the filing , but before the full adver sary hear ing, to e nsure a dequate repr esentation of the child”). The leg islature did not mandate a specific deadline f

or the a ppointment of an attorne y for the pa rent, a nd the t iming of the appointm ent of counsel is left t o the t rial court’s discretion. See Sa lin as v . Te

x as De p’ t of Pr ote c tiv e & Re

gu lator yServs

. , No. 03-04-00065- CV, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 7640, at *9-10 (Te x . App.—Austin Au gust 26, 2004, no pet.) (not desig nated f or pu bli c a tio n) ; se e als o I

n r e J .M .C. , 109 S
. W.3d 591, 598 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); In re J .R.P. , 55 S.W .3d 147, 149-50 (Te x . App.—Corpus C h ri s t i 2 0 01, pet. denied) . Be cause an attorney was a ppointed pursuant to sec tion 107.013, ther e wa s no statutory violation. See Te x. F a m. Code Ann. § 107.013. We overr ule Manning ’s first issue.Although the y prese nt discrete le g al questions, the two issues wer e ar g ued tog ether
. 9 I f there was no c onstitut io n al er ro r, i t cannot be a structura l error
. See Ne der v. U nited 10 States , 5 27 U. S. 1 , 1 4 ( 19 99 ) ( “ Un de r o ur c a se s, a c on sti tut ion a l e rr or

is e ith e r st ru c tur a l or

it i s not.”). 8

I n his second and third issues, M an n i n g argues that due pr ocess violations, or a 9 structura l e r

r o r , o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e it w a s f u n d a me n ta ll y

u n f a ir th a t h e ar in g s w e r e h e ld

a t “ c r it ic al stag es” w ithout the appointment of an attorne y despite hi s re p ea t ed reque sts. See G ardner v. Florida , 4 30 U. S. 3 49 , 3 58 (1 97 7) ; Fuller v . S tat e , 829 S.W .2d 548, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Alternatively , he alleg es that the late appointment resulted in ineffec tive assistance of counse l. See U. S. Co ns t. a

me nd s. V, VI , X I V, § 2 . F e de ra l du e -p ro c e ss r ight s do no t a lw ay s r e qu ir e a c ourt
appointed attorney for indige nt pa rents in par ental-te rmination proce eding s. Lassit er v. D epartment of S oc . S e rv s. , 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981). Instead, due proce s s re q u i res the application of “funda mental fa irness,” w hich depends on the fac ts of eac h particula r situation. Id . at 24 -2 5; see

10 M.L.B. v. S.L.J. , 51 9 U.S. 102, 117 (1996) (a ppointment due when wa rra nted by char acte r and difficulty of ca se). More over, e ven if due p ro ce s s we re implicate d in this case, the e rror must be deeme d harmful f

or the orde r to be re verse d on appea l. Ar izo na v . F ulm ina nte , 499 U.S. 279 (1991); In re M .S. , 1 15 S.W. 3d

53 4, 54 9- 50 (T e x. 20 03 ) (i ne ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e c la im su

bje c t to “ ha

rm le ss
e rr or ” ana ly sis ); see I

n re K.R. , 63 S.W .3d 796, 80 0 (T ex . 2001) (e rror in shackling incar cer ated fathe r dur ing pa

re nta l te rm inatio n tr ia l su bje c t to “ ha

rm le ss e rr or ” ana ly sis ); see also Tex. R. App. P. 44.1. Th e tim ingof the a tto rn e y ’s a

pp oin tmen t in rela tio n to Mann ing ’s tw o r e qu e sts is pr ob le ma tic
. I nit ia lly , Mann ing c ou ld no t a pp e ar a t the he ari ngto c on te st t he te rm inatio n d

ue to h isThe re cord e stablishes that all parties we re a war e that Manningwas inca rce rate d. 11 The trial judg e admonished the Depa rtment that “ten months is just simply too long
. And 12 that, fra nkly , border s on deprivation of due proce ss that he [sic] being locked up that longand not have an a tto rn e y a

pp oin te d. No w, I thi nk , g ive n the natur e of the c a se and the fa c t that y ou a ll complied with all of the discovery that the law require s y ou to comply with, that they

would not be able to show ha

rm in this case. B ut at some point, when y ou start t al k i ng about constitutional deprivation, harm is goingto be pre sumed.” 9 inc arc e ratio n. Th e te rm inatio n pe tit ion wa s fi le d F e br ua ry 3, 20 03 , a

nd se nt v ia c e rt if ie d ma il t o 11 Manning . Manning ’s first re quest for a n attorney

was dated Fe bruar

y 21 and filed by

the district cler k on Fe bruar

y 26. As direc ted by

the Depa rtment, his letter wa s addre ssed to the district cler k and spec ifically

reque sted a c ourt-appoint ed attorney . Manning ag ain re quested a n attorney

in a letter sent to the district cle rk, filed Ju n e 1 2
. Fi n al l y , on J une 20, Manning ’s mother sent a letter reque sting a

n attorney for him to a deputy

district clerk. The letter wa s file stamped June 24. The Depa rtment’s attorne y

told the trial court that she “ had no knowledg e of this letter until August whe n Ipulled the district cler

k’s fil e.” Howeve r, t he De partment did not reque st an attorney for Ma nning until Decembe r 15. His court-a ppointed trial attorney , who is also his attorney on appea l, filed an
answe r on his behalf

in J anuar y 2004. Assuming without dec iding that th e d el ay in this case constituted fundamental
un fa ir ne ss, we fi nd

tha t any e rr or wa s h arm le ss. Al tho ug h th e de lay la ste d a lmo st a y e ar a ft e r h is 12 ini tia l r e qu e st, his a

pp ointe d atto rn e y sti ll ha d fiv e mon ths to p re pa re fo r t ri a l. I n th os e fi ve mon ths , she re prese nted Manning at hear ings, serve d sever al discovery reque sts, a nd filed more tha

n twelve motions, including a m otion for continuance. I n the written motion for c ontinuance f iled May 10, 2004, Manning did not argue that the t rial shoul d be continued due to the dela y in appointment of his attorney . Rather, the c ontinuance w as base d on the timing of the Depa rtment’s supplementationThere is confl ic tin g e vid e nc e a bo ut w he the r h e r a

bs e nc e wa s d

ue to i nd e c isi ve ne ss, 13 fi na nc ia l r e str ic tio ns , o r h e a lthre a so ns . Although one month before trial Manning ’s attorne y serve d a pro se plea in interve ntion 14 for Ma nning’ s mother, the attorne y stated at a hear ing that she di d not repr esent Manning’ s mother.

10 of the re cord a

nd discovery

response s. The continu an ce wa s g rante d, and trial wa s delay ed by approximately

one month. Fur therm o r e , a lt

h o u gh M a nn in g a s s e r ts h a r mful err or bec ause he did not have counse l pr e se nt t o a

rgue tha t J.M. sh ou ld be pla c e d w ithMa nn ing ’s mot

he r, the re c or d in dic a te s th a t bo th the district court a

nd the Depa

rtment we re made a

war e that his mother wa s interested in having
c us tody of J .M
. Mannin g ’s mot he r p art ic ipate d in

a ho me stu dy

and int e rv e ne d in

the tr ia l c ourt
. She did not, howeve r, appear at trial or appe al the jury ’s finding that she should not be appointed 13 manag ing c onservator of J.M.

Mo re ov e r, Mann ingc la ims tha t th e a bs e nc e of a c ourt -a pp oin te d att or

ne y , af te r h is reque st, in the init ial hear ings r eg ardingthe place ment of J .M. constituted ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel. See I

n re M.S. , 1 15 S.W. 3d

a t 54 4- 45 (r ig ht t o e ff

e c tiv e a ssi stance of

c ouns e l in p ar en t al

- ri gh t s t erm i n at i o np ro ce ed i n gs ) ( ci t i n g Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Assu mi ng wi tho ut d e c idi ngthat Ma nn ingis c or

re c t, t he e rr or wa s h arm le ss i n th is c a se . F ir st, Manning had the bur den of pr oof to show that the absence of an attorney in the ear ly

stag es of the termination proce ss prejudice d his case. Se e id . Manning ’s only claim of harm or pre

judice re lates to t he a bs e nc e of an a tto rn e y to a dv oc a te his po sit ion th at J .M
. sh ou ld h a ve be e n p la c e d w ith M an n i n g’s mother. Howe ver, Ma nning ha d the bene fit of an attorney to argue that Manning ’s mot he r s ho uld

be g ra nte d s ome ty

pe of c us tod y . Th e De pa

rtme nt, the tr ia l court , an d the jur y a ll 14I n the five months i n which she repre sented Manning , Manning ’s attorne y filed, among 15 other thing s, an eme rg ency motion to pl ace J .M. with Manning or his m o t h er , supported by an aff idavit from his mother; an orig inal answe r; specia l exceptions; a reply to the Depa

rtment’s motion to strike his special exceptions; a moti o n to appoint Manning ’s mother tempora ry manag ing c onse rv a tor

wi th b ri e f i n s up po rt ; a

jur y de mand ; a

fi rs t ame nd e d o ri g ina l ans we r; a mot ion in lim ine ; r e qu e sts fo r a dmi ssi on s; a mot ion fo r a c ounty -f

un de d c on su lti ngand

/or te sti fy inge xpe rt ; a motion for continuanc e; an amended motion in limine; another motion for continuance unrelated to the timing of a

ppoi n t ment; a motion to ex clude e vidence relating to a c hild other than J.M .; motion for leave to serve inter rog atories ( with attache d interrog atories and a re quest for pr oduction); motion for appointment of second- chair counsel; addendum to Ma nning’ s motion in limine; moti on to remove attorney

ad litem a

nd g uardia

n ad litem a

nd reply to the ir response s; motion to disqualify attorney ad litem; motion t o leave to serve se cond re quest for pr oduction; a sec ond amende d orig inal answe r; reply to the Depa

rtment’s motion to strike Manning ’s mother’s plea in inter vention; motion for r econside ration of or der striking discovery ; motion t o deem the D epar tment’s answe rs admitted; mot i o n for special instructions, proposed jury questions (including a g ranulated issue on te rm inatio n) ; and

mot ion fo r n e w tri a l. The district court held a perma nency hear ing Marc h 26, 2004. Manning was re prese nted 16 b y c o u n s e l, an d th e d is tr ic t c o u rt f o u n d th a t t h e D e p artm e n t h a d

“ ma d e r e a s o n a

b le e f f o rts to f in a li ze the per manenc y plan in eff

ect f or the c hild.” 11 considere d whether

J .M. should be place d with Ma nning’ s mother and the y

expli citly found that the best interest of J .M. would be serve d by terminating Manning ’s rig hts and placingJ .M. in a diffe rent ho me . M ann ing ’s att orn e y fi le d s e ve ra l pl e a din g s, se rv e d r e qu e sts fo r d isc ov e ry , s e t he a ri ng s, reque sted the appointment of a n expert, and wa s even g rante d sec o n d chair counsel. Severa l

15 he ari ng s w e re he ld w he re Mann ing wa s re pr e se nte d by c ouns e l, and he ha d th e op po rt un ity to f ull y prese n t h is c a s e , in c lu d in g h is r e qu e s t t o a p p o in t e it h e r h im o r h is mo th e r

p e r ma n e n t ma nag ing
conser vator. Considering the zealous eff orts Manning ’s attorney undertook on his be half and the 16 fac t that all parties we re a

war e of the possibili ty of placing J .M. with Ma nning’ s mother, the dela

y ed pr ov isi on of c ouns e l w a s n ot h arm fu l e rr or . We ov e rr ule Ma nn ing ’s se c on d a

nd thi rd iss ue s.12

Br oa d for m subm iss ion of t e r m ina ti on i ssu e

I n his fourth issue, Manning challeng es the d istrict court’s submission of the termination issue to the jury . Specifica lly , he complains that the court submitt ed multiple statutory g rounds for te rmination in a single question. Manning urg es t hat the broa d-for m submiss ion enabled the jury to find that his pare ntal rig hts should be terminated even if less than the re quisite ten jurors ag ree d as to any

one statutory

termination g round. He asser ts that this resu l t v i o l at es state a nd fede ral lawreg ardingthe Department’s burde n of proof and his rig ht to appeal the jur y finding
. See In re C.H. , 89 S.W. 3d 17 , 2 5 ( Te x. 20 02 ); but see Tex as Dep’t of Human Se rvs . v. E.B. , 802 S.W .2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990). The supreme court has approve d this e x act form of submissi on in termination
case s. E.B. , 8 02 S.W. 2d

a t 64 9. We h a ve no te d th a t E.B. wa s d e c ide d in 19 90 , b e fo re the su pr e me
c ourt ’s mor e re c e nt j ur isp ru de nc e lim iti ng the su bmi ssi on of va lid

and inv a lid lia bil ity the or ie s in a sing le broa d-for

m question. Taylor , 2 00 5 T e x. App. L EX I S, at *1 2; see Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel , 2 2 S. W.3 d 3 78 , 3 87 -9 0, (T e x. 20 00 ); see al so Ha rri s Co un ty v . S mi th , 96 S.W .3d 230, 232-34 (Te x . 2002) ( Casteel err or to submit, in sing le question, multipl e damag e elements, some of which ar e not supported by evidenc e). H oweve r, we are compelled to follow E.B. , w hic h s qu a re ly
a dd re sse s th e iss ue be fo re us , unle ss a nd un ti l the su

pr e me c ourt

ho lds oth e rw ise . We ov e rr ule Manning ’s fourth issue.
Suf fi ciency of the evidence

I n his fifth and six th issues, Manning challeng es t he lega l and factual sufficiency of the e vid e n c e s u

p p o rt i n g t h e j u r

y ’ s f i n d i n g s o f

t e r m i n a t i o no nt h e b a s i s t h a th e e i t h e r kn o w i n g ly place d or allowe d J .M. to remain in conditions or surrounding s that endang ere d her w ell-beingor13

knowing ly

allowed he r to rema in with persons who en gage d i n conduct that e ndang ere d her. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001( 1)(D) , (E).

The c ourt was authorized to terminate Ma nning’ s pare ntal rig hts if the Depa rtment proved a nd the cour

t found that (1) Ma

nning eng ag ed in c onduct constituting a statutory g round for termination and (2) term i n at i o n wa s in the child’s best intere sts. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 1 61 .0 01 ; In re C.H. , 89 S .W .3 d at 2 3 ( Te x. 20 02 ); Taylor , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 1793, at *7. Although sever al statutory g rounds for termination wer e submitt ed to the jury , the Depa rtment was require d to establish only one to satisfy the first element of the termination standar d. See G reen v . Texas De p’t of Protective & Regulatory Serv s ., 25 S.W .3d 213, 219 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.); In re J

.M .T. , 39 S. W.3 d 2 34 , 2 37 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 1 99 9, no pe t.) ; In re D.G

. , 5 S.W .3d 769, 77 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 19 99 , n o p e t.) . T o te rm inate pa re nta l r ig hts , th e De pa

rtmen t must prove e ach e lement by

clea r and c onvincing ev i d en ce. “Clear a nd convincing ” evide nce is that deg ree of proof

which will produce in the mind of the trier of fac t a firm belief or convic tion in the tr uth of the a lle g a tio ns su

pp or tin g te rm inatio n. Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 01 .0 07 (We st 2 00 2) ; In re C.H. , 89 S.W .3d at 23 (quoting State v. Addington , 588 S.W .2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979)).

I n revie wing the leg al suffic iency of the e v i d en ce under the c lear and convinc ing standard, w e conside r all of t h e evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the finding and dete rmine whether a re asonable trier of

fac t could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the findi ng was true. In re J

.F .C. , 96 S.W .3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). W e review the fa ctual suff iciency of the evidenc e under

the clea r and c onvincing s t an d ar d b y viewing all of the e vidence and dete rmining whether a rea sonable fac t-finder could have resolved disputed evidenc e in f avor of its finding
. Id
.14

I f t he dis pu te d e vid e nc e is su c h that a re a so na ble fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld have fo rm e d a fi rm be lie f a s to the truth of the De partment’s a lleg ations, the evidenc e is fac tual l y s u ff i ci ent. Id .; In re C.H. , 89 S.W. 3d a t 25 . T he se sta

nd ard s o f r e vie w ma int a in the a pp ro pr ia te de fe re nc e to t

he fa c t- fi nd e r’ s r ole by a ssumin g that it

re so lve d e vid e nti ary

c on fl ic ts i n f

a vo r of its fi nd ing wh e n it wa s re a so na ble to do so and by

disreg ardingevidenc e that it could have disbelieved. In re J .F .C. , 96 S.W .3d at 266-67.
Termi nation groun ds

To prove e ndanger m en t u nder subse ction D, the De partment ha d to prove that Manning (1) knowing ly (2) place d or allowe d J .M. to remain (3) in conditions or surrounding s that endang ere d her phy sical or emotional we ll-being
. Id . § 161.001(1)( D). The deg ree of enda ng erme nt
re qu ir e d f or inv olu nta ry te rm inatio n is “ mor e tha

n a thr e a t of

me ta ph y sic a l in

jur y or the po ssi ble ill eff ects of a less-than-ide al family environment,” but the child does not nee d to suffer actua l phy sical injury
. In re M. C. , 9 1 7 S.W .2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996); Texas De p’t of Human Serv

s. v. Boyd , 727 S.W .2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). I nstead, “ endang er” means to“e x pose to loss or injury ; to jeopardize.” Boyd , 727 S.W .2d at 533. Moreove r, the pa rent ne ed not have actua l kn o wl ed ge o f an injury or
cer tain knowledg e that an injury to the child will result; it i s enoug h that the parent is awa re of the potential dang er to the c hild a nd that the pare nt disre g ards the r isk. In re S.G.S. , 130 S.W .3d 223, 238 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2004, no pet.).

Un de r s ub se c tio n E , the Dep art ment ha d to pr ov e that Ma

nn ing(1 ) e ng a g e d in conduct or

knowing ly

place d J .M. with persons who eng ag ed in conduct ( 2) which e ndang ere d her phy sical or emotional well-be ing. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)( E). Under subsection D, the dang er to the c hild results from the child’s e nvironment, but under subsec tion E the pare nt’s conductSe e als o He rn an de z v . Te x as De p’ t of Pr ote c tiv e & Re gu lator ySe rv s. , No.. 17 03-04-00284- CV, 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 1815, at *19-20 (Te x . App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (not desig nated f

or publication). 15 is the source of the da

ng er to the c hild. In re D. C. , 12 8 S. W.3 d 7 07 , 7 15 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 20 04 , n o p e t.) ; Robinson v

. Texas Dep’ t of Protective& Regulatory Serv s . , 8 9 S. W. 3 d

6 7 9 , 6 8 6 ( T e x. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). 17

I mprisonment alone does not c onstitut e eng ag ing i n co n d uct which e ndang ers the emotional or phy sical we ll-being of a c hild. See B oyd , 727 S.W .2d at 533-34. How ever , a par ent’s repe ated c riminal acts may constitute sufficient e vidence of conduc t that e ndang ers the w ell-being of a c hild. In re J

.N.R. , 982 S.W .2d 137, 143 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Di s t
. ] 1 9 9 8 , n o pet.), dis a p p r o ved on othe r grounds by In re C.H. , 89 S.W .3d at 24-25; see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann § 1 61 .0 01 (1 )( E) ; In re A. W .T. , 61 S.W .3d 87, 89 (Tex. A pp.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.). I lleg al drug use in the child’s household c onstitut es surrounding s that endang er the well-be ing of the child under subsection D. In re D. C. , 1 28 S.W. 3d a t 71 5- 16 ; In re S.D. , 980 S.W
. 2 d 7 5 8 (T ex . App.—San An t o n i o 1 9 9 8 , p e t
. d e n i e d )
. V i o l e n t o r a b u s i v e c o n d

u c t b y s o m e o n e w i t h i n t h e h o u s e h old a lso constitutes an environme nt that endang ers c hi l dren. In re K.A.S. , 1 3 1 S. W. 3 d 2 1 5 , 2 2 2 ( T e x. Ap p. —Fo rt

Wor th 2 00 4, pe t. d e nie d) ; In re D. C. , 128 S.W .3d at 715; Di re c tor of D all as Cou nty Child Prot ectiveServs. Unit v . Bowling , 833 S.W .2d 730, 733 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no wr it). I f the e vidence , including the imprisonment, shows a cour s e of c onduct that has the e ffe ct of
en d an ger i ng the phy sical or e motional well-being of the c hild, it can support a finding of endang erme nt. See B oyd , 727 S.W .2d at 534.Phelps testified that Manning choked he r one month bef ore J.M. was born, hit her in front 18 of oth e r c hil dr e n, and

that hi s su

bs e qu e nt p hy sic al abu se of J.M. l e ft mark s a nd br uis e s o n J.M. M an n i n g d e n i e d

P h e l p s ’ s c l a i m s i nh i s t e s t i m o n y. Manning testified that he did not ac tually have a n active dr

ug probl em but lived at the 19 reha bilitation center for

four to five months merely beca use it provided shelter

and employ

ment. 16 Phelps testified that Manning repe atedly phy sically abused both he r and J .M. and that he “is a dang er to a

lot of people, not just to” J .M. Manning ’s criminal history is well documented, 18 including the fac t that he was a rre sted once while with J.M., a nd once only

a fe w day s after

signing the family

serv i ce plan. I n the first five y ear s and four months of J .M.’s life, Manningwas incar cer ated f

or two y ear s and four

months. I n J anuar

y 2000, Manning enter ed a dr ug reha bilitation
ce n t er “t o co n t i n u e r ec o v ery . ” T h e l as tt i m e M a n n i n g s a w J
. M
. wa s Ap ri l 2 0 0 0
. Al t h o u gh 19 Mann ing int

ro du c e d e vid e nc e that he ha s c omp le te d re ha bil itatio n pr og ra

ms, the jur

y fo un d th a t hi s rig hts should be terminated. The jury could have rea sonably formed a firm conviction or be lief that Manning ’s ac tions constitut ed enda ng erme nt. Se e id
. Fur

thermore , the jury

could have resolved the disputed ev i d ence in favor of the Depa

rtment and for

med a f irm belief that the f

inding of
e nd ang e rm e nt w a s tr

ue . B e c a us e we have fo un d th e evi den c e le g a lly and fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o sustain the termination on the statutory g round of e n d an ger m en t , we ne ed not re ach the issue of abandonme nt. See Schex nider v. Tex as Dep’t of Family &ProtectiveServs ., No. 03-03-00298- CV, 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 2648, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin April 7, 2005, no pet. h.) (memo op.)
Be st i nte re st o f J .M . Ne xt, Mann ing c ha lle ng e s th e fi nd ingthat te rm inatio n o f h is r ig hts wa s in the be st interest of J.M. S ome of the c ommon factors use d to e valuate the best interests of a child are : (1)J .M. and her sibling we re pla ced in the sa me foster home. 20 17 the emotional and phy sical nee ds of the child now a nd in the future; ( 2) any emotional and phy sical d an g e r t o t h e c h i l d

n o w an d i n t h e f

u tu r e ; ( 3 ) t h e p ar e n t a l a

b i l i t i e s o f t h e i n d i v i d

u a l s s e e k i n g c u s t o dy; (4) the pr og rams available to assist those individuals to promote t he best interest of the child; (5) the plans for the child by

those individuals or by

the ag ency

seekingcustody ; (6 ) t he stability of the home or propose d p l ac em ent; (7) the a cts or omissions of the pare nt which may indicate that the exis ting parent-c hild relationship is not a proper one; and (8) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the pare nt. See H

olley v. A dams , 5 44 S.W. 2d 36 7, 37 2 ( Te x. 19 76 ); Leal v. Texas De p’t of Pr ote c tiv e & Re

gu lator ySe rv s. , 2 5 S. W.3 d 3 15 , 3 21 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 00 , n o p e t.) ; Taylor , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 1793, at *7-8. This i s n o t an ex h au s tive list; other fa ctors also may be considere d wher e appr opriate. Holley , 544 S.W .2d at 372.

Manning asser

ts that it would be in the best interest of J.M. to l ive with Manning ’s mot he r. Th oma s Wa sd e n, De pa rtme nt s up e rv iso r, te sti fi e d th a t th e De pa rtme nt re qu e ste d a

ho me study on Manning ’s mother in Jul y 2003 and conc luded that place ment with he r would not be in the b es t i ntere st of J .M. Specifica lly , Manning ’s mother wa s not awar e of w hy her son wa s in prison or of the circumstanc es t hat l ed to re moval of the c hildren fr om the home. Fur thermore , Wasden was
conce rned that th e m o ther may have be en aw are of domestic violence and alleg ed druguse whe n Manning and Phelps lived with his mother in Chica g o but did not r eport that to a ny one or follow up to e nsure J .M.’s safe ty
. Finally , Wasden testified that J .M. had a strong bond with another sibling and i t w o u ld b e in J. M
. ’ s b e s t in te r e s t to b e c lo s e to th a t s ib li n g in T e xa s r a th e r th an with a g randpa rent she ne ver kne w in Chica g o. The jury could have rea sonably

formed a firm conviction 20The De partment a nd attorney ad litem a

rgue that Manning lacks standing to challeng e the 21 attorney ad litem and g uardia

n ad litem beca

use the De partment ha d temporar y con s er v at orship. Howeve r, we do not rea ch that issue bec ause w e find that the trial court did not abuse its discre tion in refusingto remove or

disqualify

the ad litems.

18 or belief that terminating Manning ’s pare ntal rig hts w as in J.M.’s be st inter est and res o l v ed t he disputed evidenc e in favor of the D epar tment. See I

n re C.H. , 8 9 S. W. 3 d

1 7 , 2 7 ( T e x. 2 0 0 2 )
. We
ov e rr ule Mann ing ’s fi ft

h a nd sixthiss ue s.
Rem oval or disq ualif

ication of th e att orney ad litem and gu ardian ad litem I n his se venth and eig hth issues, Manning argues that the trial court e rre d in denying his mot ion

to r e mov e the a tto rn e y a d lit e m and g ua rd ian a d li te m ba se d o n th e ir fa ilure to s uf

fi c ie ntl y int e rv ie w him an d his m oth e r. We r e vie w the de nia l of the mot ion s to dis qu a lif

y un de r a n a bu se 21 of discretion standa

rd. See I n re Chu , 1 34 S.W. 3d

45 9, 46 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 4, no pe t.) ; In re J.N.F. , 116 S.W .3d 426, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2003, no pet.). A tria l court abuses its discretion when it acts without ref ere nce to a

ny g uiding r ules or princ iples. Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp. , 98 S.W. 3d 68 2, 68 7 (T e x. 20 02 ). An a pp e llate c ourt

may re ve rs e a trial c ourt for a

buse of discr etion only

if, afte r sea

rchingthe re cord, it is clea r t hat the trial c ourt’s decision wa s arbitra

ry and unre asonable
. Simon v. Y ork C rane & Rigging Co. , 739 S.W .2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987). The c ompl ai n ing pa rty has the burde n of proof

. Id .; see Englande r Co. v. Kennedy , 428 S.W .2d 806, 807 (Tex. 1968) . I n the abse nce of proof in the r ecor d, there is a presumption that the evidence before the t rial j udg e was adequate t o support the dec ision. Id .; see Mays v. Pierc e , 281 S.W .2d 79 (1955).Manning argues that he and his mother had sig nificant knowle dg e of J.M.’s history and 22 c on di tio n a

nd sh ou ld h a ve be e n in te rv ie we d b y the a tto rn e y

a d li te m and

g ua rd ian a d li te m. Ho we ve r, a t th e tim e of tr ia l, ne ith e r Ma nn ing no r his mot

he r ha d s e e n o r o the rw ise ha d c on ta c t w ith J .M. for ove r two y ear s. 19

The orig inal petition in this c ase was filed in F ebrua ry 2003, when the pr ocedur e for objection to and re moval of an attorney ad li tem was g overne d by former family code se ction 107.006. See Act of Ma

y 28, 1999, 76th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1515, § 1, 1999 Tex. Gen. L aws 5237, 5237 (re peale d 2003). Unde r the for mer provision, a pa

rty to the proce eding filed a w ritten objection, and upon a finding t hat t he objection was just ifiable, the judge order ed re moval. Se e id
. F or me r f a mil y code section 107.014 require d an attorney ad litem repre senting a child to interviewall parties to the suit and individuals with s ignif icant knowledg e o f the c hild’s history and condition within a 22
rea sonable time af

ter the a ppointment. Se e id
. (cur

rent ve rsion at Tex. Fam. Code Ann §§ 107.002- .003 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004-05).

Th e a t t o r n e y a d l i t e m n o t i f

i e d M an n i n g ’ s a t t o r

n e y t h a th e h a d

n o tp e r s o n a lly int e rvi ewed Mann ingand of fe re d to se t up an in te rv ie w. A s tud e nt atto rn e y a d li te m sp ok e wi th M an n i n g a

b o u tt h e c a s e , a n d

i na h an dw r i t t e nn o t e s e n t w i t h t h e r e s p o n s e t o t h e m o t i o nt o d i s qu a l i f y, the attorney ad li tem offe red to “ further interview” Manning if reque sted. Ther e is no indication that Mann ing e ve r a c c e pte d that of fe r. We ho ld that the a tto rn e y a d lit e m pe rf or me d his statut or

y du ty by int e rv ie wi ngMann ingand of fe ri ngto s pe a k wi th h im a g a in. Th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in de nying the mot ion to r e mov e the a tto rn e y

a d li te m. We ov e rr

ule Mann ing ’s se ve nth issue.20 Simi la rl y , M ann ingte sti fi e d th a t he sp ok e wi th t he g ua rd ian a d li te m, C ASA Supervisor Ker

ri Smit h. I n an aff

idavit, Smith stated that she interviewe d Manning in the prese nce
o f h i s at t o rn ey an d ex p l ai n edh er ro l e i nt h e c as e a tt h e c o u rt h o u s e f o l l o wi n g a s ch edu l edh ea ri n g. Smit h and Manningdiscussed topics such a s his living arrang ements and if he planne d to meet the
case worke r to discuss the service plan. Manning told Sm ith that he planned to move to Chicag o, and Smit h provided him with her business c ard a nd told him t o call if he had questions. Manning stated that he understood and would call if he had questions. Fur thermore , the g uardia

n ad litem testified reg arding conver sations w ith Ma nning’ s mother. I n light of evidenc e that Manning and his mother
we re int e rv ie we d by the g ua rd ian ad lit e m, the tr ia l court did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n b y

re fu sin g to
remove her. We ove rrule Ma nning’ s eig hth issue. I n his ninth i ssue, Manning argues that the trial court err ed by failing to disqualify

the
a tto rn e y a d li te m du e to a

n a lle g e d c on fl ic t of int e re st ari sin g fr om his du a l r e pr e se ntatio n o f J.M
. an d an o t h e r s i b l i n g b e c a

u s e J
. M
. h a d f

a m i l y r e qu e s t i n g c u s t o dy , w h i l e t h e o t h e r s i b l i n g d i d

n o t
. In the a lte rn a tiv e , Mannin g a sse rt s tha t th e du a l r e pr e se ntatio n w a s in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Disqualification is a seve re r emedy which should not b e grante d based on me re a lleg ations of unethical c onduct or a

remote possibility

of violation of the disciplinary rules. Se e In re Sa nd

e rs , 15 3 S. W.3 d 5 4, 57 (T e x. 20 04 ). Ev e n if a dis c ipl ina

ry ru le wa s v iol a te d, Mann ingmus t de mon str a te that the attorney ad litem’s c onduct cause d actua l pr ejudice that require s disqualification. In re B.L.D. , 113 S.W .3d 340, 347 (Tex. 2003)
. We reviewa trial c ourt’s dete rmination of whethe r there21

was a conflict of interest for an abuse of discre tion. Id .; see M etro. Life Ins. Co. v. Syntek Fin. Corp. , 88 1 S. W.2 d 3 19 , 3 21 (T e x. 19 94 ). Stand inga lon e , th e fa c t th a t J.M. ’s fa mil y is i nv olv e d in

thi s su it while the other

sibling’s father is unidentified doe s n o t s h o w ac t ual pre judice ca used by the dual
re pr e se ntatio n. Mann ingof fe rs no e vid e nc e of

pr e jud ic e to s up po rt

his c lai m. T he tr ia l c ourt did
no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in re fu sin g to d isq ua lif y the a tto rn e y

a d li te m. We ov e rr

ule Ma nn ing ’s nin th issue. CO NC LU SION

Havingoverr

uled Manning ’s issues on appea l, we af firm the dec ree of termination.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: May

12, 2005