## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
NO. P D-1205-08

THE ST AT E OF TEX AS

v . ROBERT L EAHY P OWELL , Appellee
ON STA TE’ S P ETIT ION F OR DI SCRETIO NA RYRE VI EW F RO M THE SEC ON D CO UR T OF AP P EA LS

TA RR AN T CO UN TY
H ERV EY , J. , de liv e r e d t he opi nio n of t he Co ur t i n whic h K ELLER , P .J., M E YE RS , K E AS L E R and H O L C O MB , JJ., jo ine d. W OM ACK , J., fi led a concurring opin ion in wh ich J OHN S ON and C OCH RAN , JJ., jo ine d. P RI CE , J., fi led a dis senting opi nion . O P I N I O N Th is c a se inv olv e s a

lawf ul s e arc h o f t

wo sa fe s p re c e de d b y

a se izur e of

the se sa fe s. Appellee is charg ed with possession with intent to deliver more than 4 but less than 200 g rams of methamphetamine. The events leading up to this charg e beg an whe n the police r ece ived information that appellee was makingforg ed che cks in his home. The police obt ai n ed a war rant to sea

rch appellee ’s home and to se ize, among othe r thing s, “che cks and materials to make f org ed che cks.” Whil e executing this searc h war rant at appellee ’s home, the police found two saf es which no onePowell--2

1 Se e, e.g ., Unite d S

tat es v . R os s , 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982) ( “A law ful sear ch of f ix ed pr e mis e s g e ne ra lly

e xten ds to the e nti re are a in wh ic h th e ob je c t of the se arc h ma

y be fo un d a

nd is not limited by

the possibilit y

that separ ate a cts of entr

y or openingmay

be re quired to complete the sear ch. Thus, a w arr ant that authorizes an of fice r to sear ch a home for ill eg al weapons also provides authority to open closets, c hests, draw ers, a nd container s in which the we apon mig ht be found.” ) (F ootnote omitted). disputes the police could ha ve lawf ully sear ched sinc e the sa fes c ould have c ontained “c hecks a nd materia ls for making forg ed che cks.” The police seized these two saf es and took them to the police 1 station w here they sear ched them the next day and found in one of the sa fes the me thamphetamine that is the subject of this prosec ution. T h e t ri al court a nd the cour

t of appe als dec ided that the seizure of these two safe s violated appellee’s F ourth Amendment rig hts beca use these sa fes we re not “par ticularly descr ibed” in the se arc h war rant as items to be seized. Acc ording ly , the trial cour t and the cour t of appe als dec ided that the methamphe tamine had to be suppr essed. We will reve rse. Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts that H ur st Po lic e of fi c e r Jame s H ob bs de ve lop e d inf or ma tio n f ro m a person named L isa L ower y that appellee and another person named L eia McGee wer e makingforg ed chec ks in a home whe re a p p el l ee and McG ee lived w ith McGee ’s 83-y ear -old g randmother (R ob e rt a ). B a se d p ri mari ly on inf or ma tio n p ro vid e d b y

L ow e ry , Hobb s p re pa

re d a n a ff ida vit in support of an a

pplication for a war

rant to sear ch the home. Hobbs prepare d this affidavit on January 29, 2004, and it rec ites: (1) that L ower y was at the home when a

ppellee a nd McGe e g ave he r for g ed chec ks to purchase variou s items, (2) that appe llee and Mc Gee had stolen some customer chec ks from Cing ular Wireless, (3) that appellee and McGe e wer e making forg ed chec ks on a computer at the home whe re L o we ry also saw dr ug s, g uns and counte rfe it money , (4) that L ower y had used forg ed che cks fur

nished by appellee and McG ee to buy a big- scre en television at a Sam’s fur niture store and a s a fe a t a

Ho me De po t, ( 5) that th is b ig -s c re e n te le vis ion and thi s s a fe wer e in the home,Powell--3

2 I t is no t c le ar w he the r t

his re fe rs to so me tim e in t he pa st o r w he the r M c Ge e wa s a lso in j a il wh e n H ob bs pr e pa

re d th e se arc h w arr ant a ff ida vit

. 3 The saf e that L ower

y boug ht at a Home Depot with a f org ed che ck is not listed in thi s part of the sea rch- war rant a ffidavit, althoug h the big -scr een t el ev i s i o n that she boug ht with a forg ed chec k at a Sam’s f

urniture store is list ed. (6) that appellee was “cur

rently in c ustody at Tarr ant County J ail and no long er” at the home, ( 7) that McGe e “ha s been a

rre sted for The ft and DWI ,” and (8) that Roberta “ was not involved.” 2 Another se ction of the sea rch- war rant a ffidavit desc ribed “ proper ty conce aled a

nd kept [at the ho me ] in v iol a tio n o f t he laws of

Te xas” a s f

oll ow s: THERE I S AT SAI D SUSPEC TED P L AC E AND PREMI SES P ROPERTY CONCEAL ED AND KEPT I N VIOLA TI ON OF THE L AWS OF TEXAS AND DE SCRI B ED AS F OL L OWS: Nume ro us c us tom e rs ’ c he c ks sto le n f ro m Cin g ula

r Wi re le ss. Che c ks and

ma te ri a ls t o ma

ke fo rg e d c he c ks

. Com pu te rs , p ri nte rs and

sc ann e rs fo r f

or g ingc he c ks

. BigScree n J VC 32 inch flat scr een T elevision Serial Number 16837227 J VC TV Stand model #RKC32DF4AS purc hased w ith a counterfe it check D ated 01-22-04 f

or $974.15 F rom [si c] Sam’s Furniture

. L exmark Print Trio color jet printer pur chase d on J an u ar y 24, 2004 for $99.99 with counterf

eit chec k # 4957 from Express Computer Repair. 3 On J anuar

y 29, 2004, a mag istrate issued a se arc h war rant for the hom e “to there sear ch for the prope rty

descr ibed in said Aff

idavit, an d t o seize the same.” That same da y , Hobbs and other police off icer s executed t he search warr ant and searc hed the home. T he police se ized two safes that

we re so me wh e re in the ho me . T he y too k th e se sa fe s to the po lic e statio n. Th e ne xt day a loc ks mith

“ dr ill e d o ut t

he sa fe s. ” Th e po lic e fo un d me tha mph e tamin e in o ne of

the sa fe s.Powell--4

4 The suppre ssion-hear ing r ecor d also ref lects that the police found “c heck s ” i n at least one o f t h e s af es . Ho b b s t es t i fi edat t h e s u p p re s s i o nh ea ri n g: Q. [S TATE]: And is a safe a plac e, in y our experienc e, whe re pe rsons who ar e committing these of

fense s might hide some of the evi d ence like extra chec ks or wh a tno t? Appellee was c harg ed with possession with intent to deliver more than 4 but less than 200
g rams of me thamphetamine. Appellee filed a written motion to s uppress. This motion stated that in “one of the safe s [s eized from the home] the methamphe tamine made the basis of this case wa s found.” This motion further stated that “the re w as insufficie nt p robable cause on the fa ce of the aff idavit to just ify

the sea rch w arr ant and that the sc ope of the war rant wa s exceede d.” The trial c ourt held a s u p p re s sion hearingat which the se arc h war rant a nd Hobbs’ sea

rchwar rant aff idavit w ere introduced into e vidence

. Hobbs, who was the only witness to testify

at the

su pp re ssi on he ari ng , tes tif

ie d tha t Robe rt a wa s the on ly a du lt at the ho me wh e n the po lic e “ or ig ina lly

arr ive d” to e xec ute the se arc h w arr ant. Q. [S TATE]: And was there a g randpa rent that wa s stay ing the re at the time? A. [HOBB S] : Roberta McG ee, the g randmother , was ther e whe n we a rrived. Q. Any other pe rsons that wer e–we ll, was she the only owner of [the home] t hat was there at the time, the g randmother ? A. As far as we k n ew, whe n we or igina lly arr ived, she wa s the only one ther e, the adult there . She met us outside. The suppre ssion-hear ing rec ord is silent on why the police took the safe s to the police station
to s e arc h th e m th e re . T his re c or d is a lso sil e nt o n w he the r o ne of the tw o s a fe s se ize d f

ro m th e ho me was the sa fe that L ower

y boug ht at a Home Depot with a forg ed chec k. This r ecor d is also silent on which saf e conta ined the methamphe tamine. 4Powell--5

A. [HOBB S] : Yes, sir, and that’s what I believed on this occas i o n an d that that’s wh e re we fo un d c he c ks

. Appellee claimed in fina l arguments to the trial court at the suppression h ea ri n g t h at the police excee ded the sc ope of the war rant when “they g rabbe d two safe s, went back t o Hurst, let them sit overnig ht, and then opene d them . . . .” The State responde d that “[i] f they could have looked at it out there at the sc ene, the y could have seized it and broug ht it back into the police depa rtment.” [S TATE]: Secondly , as fa r as the sa fe g oes, I

mean, t h i s d etective testified that’s wh e re the se pe op le hid e thi s st uf f. Th e y ha d a ri g ht t o s e arc h w he re ve r t o f ind the se sorts of things, w hether

it’s in a s af

e, a wa l l s afe , a floor sa fe, or a saf e that they remove d. I f they

could have look ed at i t out there at the scene , they could have se ize d it and br ou g ht i t ba c k in to t

he po lic e de pa

rtme nt. Ad dit ion a lly , th e State wo uld argue that’ s st ole n p ro pe rt y , a nd that’ s n ot a

n in te re st, a leg itimate expectation of privac y that society

is prepar ed to re cog nize. [THE COURT] : You want one mor e time, too? [DE F EN SE]: Y our H on or , th e re ’s no thi ngin t hat a ff ida vit that show s both

of tho se safe s were stolen proper

ty

. They took two safe s. They mention one , they took two, le t th e m si t ov e rn ig ht a

nd dr ill e d th e m out. Th e tr ia l c ourt

su bs e qu e ntl y

sig ne d a n o rd e r g ra

nti nga pp e lle e ’s mot ion

to s up pr e ss. This order rec ites that the trial cour t made its ruling a ft er “[ h ] aving considere d the evidenc e and the

c re dib ili ty

of the wi tne sse s. ” On

the State ’s d ir ect a

pp e a l f ro m th is r

uli ng , th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls decide d that the seizure of the two safe s exceede d the scope of the war rant, be cause these saf

es we re not “par ticularly descr ibed” in the wa

rra nt as items to be seized result i n g i n t h eir seiz ure to have been “ war

rantless, ” and that the evidence , viewed in the lig ht most favorable to the trial court’ s ruling g ranting appellee ’s motion to suppress, supports a ruling that this wa rra ntless se izure of the safe s cannot be justified under the “plain-vie w” e x ception to the wa rra nt require ment. See State v

.Powell--6

5 See Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (warr antless sea rche s and seizures ar e pe r seunrea sonable unde r F ourth Amendment subject to specific ally established and w ell delineate d e xce pti on s) ; see also Minnesota v. Dicke rson , 5 08 U. S. 3 66 , 3 75 (1 99 3) (“ pla in- vie w” e xce pti on to war rant re quirement pe rmits police to seize an object if the police are l aw fully in a position from wh ic h th e y

vie w the ob

je c t and its inc ri min a tin g c ha ra c te r is “ imm e diate ly

a pp are nt” ); Coolidge v. Ne w H am ps hir e , 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (e x amp l e of “pla in-view” exception to warra nt require ment “is the situation in which the pol ice have a warr ant to sear ch a g iven ar ea f or spec ified objects, and in the c ourse of the sear ch come acr oss some other a rticle of inc riminating c hara cter ”); Ke e hn v . S

tat e , 279 S.W .3d 330, 335 (Tex.Cr.App. 2009).
6 We express no opinion on whether the sear ch war rant was supported by

probable cause as the court of appeals di d not addre ss that issue. Se e Po we ll , 268 S.W .3d at 627 (noting that State’s first two points of err or pertained to the issue of pr obable c ause to support the se arc h war rant) a nd at 634 (findingit unnecessa ry to addre ss State’s first two points of err or).
7 Article 18.02, subse ctions (1), (8) , (9) and (12), provide that a sear ch wa rra nt may be issued to s e arc h f

or and se ize : ( 1) pr op e rt

y a c qu ir ed by thef

t or in a ny oth e r m ann e r w hic h ma ke s it s acq u i s i t i on a pena l offense ; (8) any proper ty the possession of which is prohibited by law; (9) imp le me nts or

ins tr ume nts us e d in

the c omm iss ion

of a c ri me ; or

(1 2) c on tr aban d subje c t to forf eiture under Chapter 59 of this Code. We further note that Article 18.01(d), T EX . C ODE C R IM
. P R OC ., provides that “[o]nly the spec ifically

descr ibed prope rty

or items set forth in a sea

rch w arr ant issued under Subdiv i s ion (10) of A rticle 18.02 of this code or prope rty , items or contra band enumer ated in Subdivisions ( 1) throug h (9) or in Subdivision ( 12) of Article 18.02 of this c ode may Po we ll , 268 S.W .3d 626, 630-32 (Te x .App.–For t Worth 2008). We gr anted the State’ s petition for 5 discretionar

y revie w which pr esents the f ollowing f

our g rounds for r eview. 1. Did the Court of Appea ls err by holding that the se arc h and seizure of the locked safe (s) found on A

ppellee’ s premises wa s not within t he scope of the sea rch w hich was supporte d by

a sea rch w arr ant base d on probable cause ? 6 2. Did the Court of Appe als err in concluding that a locke d s afe (s) c ould not be seized, notwithstanding it could be r easona bly conclude d that it wa s a repository for forg ed che cks and othe r fr uits which were l i s t ed to be seized pursuant to a se arc h war rant ba sed upon proba

ble ca use? 3. Did the Court of Appe als err in fai l i n g t o u tiliz e the c orre ct ana ly tical construc t appropr iate to items seized and not listed to be seized in a sear ch war rant based on probable cause and issued pursua nt to T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 18.02(1) , (8), ( 9) and ( 12)? 7Powell--7

be seized.”

8 We believe this to be a que stion o f l aw b ased on an examination of the war rant a nd the a ff ida vit in s up po rt

of the wa rr ant.
9 See M arron , 275 U.S. at 196 (the re quirement that wa rra nts shall part i cu l ar l y

descr ibe the things to be se ized makes g ener al sea rche s under them impossible and pre vents the seizure of one 4. Di d th e Court

of Ap pe a ls impl ic itl y ho ld the pla in- vie w d oc tr ine wa s in a pp lic a ble beca use the off

icer executing the sear ch warr ant s eized “mer e evide nce,” i.e. , the locked sa fe( s), not listed as an it em t o be searche d or seiz ed in the war rant supporte d by probable cause . I. Th e F ourt h Ame ndme nt pr ov ide s tha t the “ ri g ht o f t he pe op le to b e se c ur e in t he ir pe rs on s, houses, pape rs, and e ffe cts, ag ainst unrea sonable sea rche s and s ei z u res, shall not be violated, and

no War ra nts sh a ll iss ue , bu t up on

pr ob a ble c a us e , s up po rt e d b y

oath o r a ff

ir ma tio n, and

pa rt ic ula rl y descr ibing the pla ce to be sear ched, and the pe rsons or thing s to be seized.” U.S. Const., amend. I V. The F ourth Amendment’s “ particula rity ” requirement is primarily meant to preve nt g ener al sea rche s and the se izure of one thing under a war rant that descr ibes another thing to be seized. See M arron v. United States , 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). Appellee argues that the saf es we re not pa

rticularly descr ibed in the war rant a s items to be seized and that their se izure, t h er ef o re , ex cee ded the sc ope of the war rant re nderingtheir seizure

war rantless which, on this rec ord, ca nnot be justified by

any exigenc y . Appellee argues that 8

“ [w]hi le it w ou ld h a ve be e n p ro pe r f or the po lic e to o pen th os e sa fe s w hil e sti ll o n th e pr e mis e s, actua lly seizing the saf

es for future ope ning of

f of the pr emises was imprope r.” The g ener al Four

th Amendment rule is that the police cannot s ei ze property that is not particula rly descr ibed in a sea

rch w arr ant. This ge nera l rule i s subject t o “limited exception[ s]” for

9Powell--8

thing unde r a w arr ant desc ribing another ).

10 See also United States v . Hargus , 128 F.3d 1358, 1363 (10 Cir. 1997) (wholesa le seizure th of file c abinets and misce llaneous pape rs and pr operty not specified in the se arc h war rant did not “g rossly exceed” the war

rant whe n the offic ers’ conduct “was mot ivated by the imprac ticability

of on-site sorting and the time constraints of ex ecuting a day time searc h war

rant” and the “ ten broa d cate g ories of r ecor ds” descr ibed in the war rant “we re prese nt in every draw er of

the file c abinets”) ; United States v. Blake ney , 942 F. 2 d 1 0 0 1 , 1 027-28 n.13 (6 Cir. 1991) (seizure of suitcase not th descr ibed in war ra n t u p h el d beca use it included items that wer e desc ribed in the wa rra nt among ite ms n ot d e sc ri be d in

the wa rr ant; thu s, “ wh e re c ir c ums tanc e s, su c h a s the se , ma ke it i mpr a c tic a

ble to inventory

and re cord at t h e s i t e o f t h e sea rch the numerous conte nts of the suitcase w hich contained inc riminating e vidence , the seizure of irrele vant items w ithin the suitca se alongwith the re le va nt i te ms d oe s n ot vio la te the fo ur th am e ndme nt, pr ov ide d the ir re le va nt i te ms a re re tur ne d to B lake ne y ” ); United States v. Shilling , 826 F.2d 1365 ( 4 Cir. 1987) (over broad se izure of re cords th prompted by

leg itimate prac tical conc erns of keepingdocuments intact a nd preve nting loss, rather than by g overnme ntal intent to e ng ag e in fishing expedition) overruled on othe r grounds by Staples v. United States , 511 U.S. 600 (1994) as stated in United States v. Starke s , 32 F.3d 100, 101 ( 4 Cir. th 19 94 ); L AF AVE , su

pra , §4.6(a) (

Marron is misleading “to t he ex tent that it sugg ests that the police may never seize an objec t unless it is named in the wa rran t ”) and §4.11(a ) (de scribing situations wher e police ma

y “over seize” or se ize an object not par ticularly descr ibed in a wa

rra nt). various exige ncies that require or make it re asonable for the police to seize this not -desc ribed-in- thewar rant prope rt y (e.g ., the owner of a not-de scribed- in-the-wa rra nt locked saf

e, which the police

ma y la w f u ll y s e ar c h p u r s u an t t o a

s e ar c h w ar

r an t, r e f u s e s to u n lo c k

th e s a f e ). See W AYNE R. L AF AVE , S EA RCH & S EI ZURE : A T RE A T I SE O N T HE F OU R TH A MENDME NT §4.11(a) (4 ed. 2004) th (t he re are c a se s in

wh ic h it wi ll b e qu ite re a so na

ble fo r p oli c e to r e mov e a c on ta ine r, su c h a s a computer or

a file c abinet conta ining voluminous documents, from the sc ene of the sear ch so that opening it and examining it can be more re adily acc omplished elsewher e b u t t his is “a limited exception to the ge nera l rule that a se arc h war rant doe s no t g ive police lice nse to se izepersona l
p r o p e rt y n o td e s c r i b e d

i nt h e w ar

r an to nt h e g r o u n d

t h a ts u c h p r o p e rt y might

contain items that the

war rant does descr ibe; it only allows police to search such prope rty at the plac e whe re the war rant is being executed”) (empha sis in original, interna l quotes om itted); see also United States v

. 10Powell--9

11 21 F.3d 297 ( 8 Cir. 1994). th Johnson , 709 F.2d 515, 516 (8 Cir. 1983) (while executing a sear ch war rant authorizing seizure of th

wea pons, po l i ce s ei z edn o t -d es cr i b ed -i n -t h e- wa rr an tl o ck edfl o o r safe af ter de fenda

nt refuse d to open it). The State ne verthe less claims, as it did at the suppre ssion hearing , that “[o] ffice rs sea rching the pre mises for che cks and materials to make f org ed checks . . . proper ly seized and sea

rche d the safe s discovere d at the premises beca use it wa s rea sonable for the office rs to believe that the safe s

c ou ld c on tain the ite ms s ou g ht. ” Th is a rgume nt i s c on tr ary

to t he pla in l angua g e of

the F ourt

h Amendment that author izes police to se ize only the items descr ibed in a sea rch w arr ant. I t does not

au t h o ri z e, i nt h e u s u al ca s e, t h e p o l i ce t o s ei z e n o t -d es cr i b ed -i n -t h e- wa rr an tco n t ai n er s ev en t h o u gh the po lic e may

lawf ull y se arc h th e se c on ta ine rs on the pr e mis e s p ur su ant t o th e wa rr ant. The Eig hth Circ uit Court of Appeals’ de cision in United States v. Robbins ill us tr a te s th is. 11
InR o b b ins , th e polic e se ize d, duri nga se arc h o f t

he de fe nd ant’ s b us ine ss, the de fe nd ant’ s n otde sc ri be d- in- the -w arr ant w a lle t th a t th e po lic e c ou ld h a ve lawf ull y se arc he d o n

t h e pr e mis e s b e c a

us e i t could have c ontained desc ribed-in- the-wa rra nt items. See R obbins , 21 F.3d at 298-301. The wallet wa s not searc hed unti l the m iddle of t he def endant’ s trial and found to c ontain descr ibed-inthe-wa rra nt items. Se e id . The Eigh t h C i rcuit dec ided that the seizure of the wallet violated the F ourt h A me ndme nt a

nd c ha ra c te ri zed an argume nt, ve ry sim ila

r to t he on e ma de by

the State in t

his

case that the police prope rly seized the wallet be cause they could have sear ched it, as “ a funda mental misapprehe nsion of Four th Amendment law.” See R obbins , 2 1 F .3 d at 30 0. Th e Ei g hth Cir c uit
wrote:Powell--10

12 Wit h the State havinglost in t he trial c ourt, we f urther note that whateve r re cord e vidence I n e s sence , the g overnme nt’s argument is that beca use the wa

rra nt authorized office rs to search inside the wallet, it also authorized them to se izethe wallet. This ar g ument is a fundame ntal misapprehe nsion of Four th Amendment law. The rec ord shows that the g ov e rnme nt d id n ot d isc ov e r t he no te s unti l it se arc he d the wa lle t in th e mid dle of Rob bin s’ tr ia l, m on ths a ft e r it se ize d the wa lle t fr om his bu sin e ss. Th e thr e sh old issue is whether of

fice rs wer e entitled to seize the wa llet in the fi rs t p l ace. The g ener al rule, of co u rs e, i s that police may only seize items described in the se arc h war rant, a bsent an ex ception to the warrant requireme nt. Simpl y put, we believe that office rs did not have authority to se ize the wallet beca use the wallet itself wa s not an ite m de sc ri be d in

the se arc h w arr ant. That items descr ibed in t h e wa rra nt were ult im ate ly

found in the wa llet does not justify the i nitial seizure. A s ear ch warra nt does not g ive the police lice nse to se ize p e r s o n a l p r o p e rt y n o t d e s c r i b e d i n t h e w ar r an t o n t h e g r o u n d t h a ts u c h p r o p e rt y might contain items that the wa rra nt does d escribe; it only

allows police to search such pr op e rt y a t th e pla c e wh e re the wa

rr ant is be ing e xec ute d if the pr op e rt y “ le g iti ma te ly might conta in the [i tems] spec ified in the war rant,” and then to seize the descr ibed ite ms the y

fi nd ins ide or , und e r c e rt a in c ir c ums tanc es, th e pro per ty its e lf on c e it i s found to contain de scribed items, see United States v. Beusc h , 596 F.2d 871, 876- 77 (9 Cir. 1979) (holding that office rs could seize entire ledg ers once they discovere d th that some of the individu al p ag es matche d war rant de scription; office rs nee d not examine the entire le dg er on the spot and then re move re levant individual pag es). See id. (empha sis in original, footnotes a nd citations to other authorities and to r ecor d omitted). The suppression-he aringrec ord re flec ts that the State made no attempt to establish a “limited

e xc e p t i o n ” t o t h e g e n e r a l F o u rt h A m e n d m e n t r u l e t h a t t h e p o l i c e m ay n o t l aw f u l l y se ize no tdescr ibed-in-the- war

rant prope rty

and it appar ently

litigated the issue conce rning the leg ality of the police seizure of

the safe s based solely

on its interpre tation of Fourth Amendment law that “[i] f they could have looked at it out there at the scene , they could have seized it and broug ht it back into the police depa

rtment.” This mig ht expl ain why the re cord is si lent on why the pol ice seiz ed the sa fes and whe ther the se izure of the saf es wa s justified by

some exigenc y

such as, for example, that there

wa s n o o ne a t a

pp e lla nt’ s h ome wh o c ou ld h a ve op e ne d th e loc ke d s a fe s. 12Powell--11

there might b e t h at woul d support a finding that the seizure of the safe s fell within a “limited exception” to the g ener al rule would have to be viewed in the light most favor able to the tria l court’s ruling in favor of appellee. Se e Sta te v . Ke lly , 2 0 4 S

. W

. 3 d 8 0 8 , 8 1 8 n . 1 9 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 0 6 )

. It ha s b e e n s ug g e ste d th a t the e vid e nc e that the po lic e dr ill e d ou t the sa fe s a t th e po lic e statio n p e rm its an infe renc e that they could not ha ve opened the safe s until this time a nd that their seizure, ther efor e, falls within a “limited exception” to the g ener al rule. A ppellee claimed during oral argument that it might be per

missibl e for

this Court and the court of appea ls to supply such an infe renc e had the State won in the trial cour t. But, with the State havi n g lost in t he trial c ourt, we be lieve that supply ing suc h an infe renc e would not be view ing the evidenc e in the l ight most favor able to the trial court’s r uling in fa

vor of a ppellee.
13 The State a lso appea

rs to argue that t h e s afes could have been se ized as descr ibed-in-thewar rant items bec ause they are the “func tional equivalent” of the desc ribed-in- the-wa

rra nt “che cks and mater ials to make forg ed chec ks.” We disa g ree that these items ar e func tionally equivalent since we do no t be lie ve that e ve n a br oa d c on str uc tio n of “ c he c ks and ma te ri a ls to make fo rg e d c he c ks ” would include “sa fes.” See United States v. Re yes , 798 F.2d 380, 382- 83 (10 Cir. 1986) (“se izure th Notwithstanding the fore g oing, w e do not ag ree with the court of a ppeals’ de cision and the State’s conc ession that the safe that L ower y boug ht at a Home D epot with a for g ed check wa s not particula rly descr ibed in the war

rant a s proper

ty to be seized. Se e Po we ll , 268 S.W .3d at 631 (“A safe is mentioned i n t h e [ sear ch wa rra nt] aff idavit, not as proper

ty to be seized, but as par t of Hobbs’s basis for probable c ause: ‘L isa L ower y also told me that [appellant] and [McGee ] gave her

ano the r c he c k # 49 61 in t

he name of

Au g us tin e Te rr e ll f

or $1 99 .1 4 to g o to Ho me De po t to purc ha se a saf e for them. L isa L ower

y advised that the sa fe is at [the Premises].’”). The sear ch wa rra nt that was issued by

the mag istrate author ized the police to enter appellee ’s home “to there sear ch for th e property desc ribed in th e aff idavit, and to sei ze the same a nd bring the same be fore me.” (Emphasis supplie d ). The sa fe that L ower y boug ht at a Home D epot with a for g ed che ck wa s “prope rty descr ibed in the af

fidavit.” The police, ther efor e, could have seized the two sa fe s they found in the home be cause they could have rea sonably believed that one of the s afe s was the one that L ower y boug ht at a Home D epot wit h a forg ed check a nd that L ower

y said was in the home. See 13Powell--12

of a sp e c if ic ite m c ha

ra c te ri sti c of

a g e ne ri c c la ss o f i te ms d e fi ne d in the wa rr ant d id n ot c on sti tut e an im permissible g ener al s ear ch”)

. I n addition, the ca ses cited by the State do not support construing “che cks and materia ls to make f org ed che cks” to include “saf es.” Se e, e .g ., Un ite d S

tat es v . H ill , 19 F.3d 984, 986- 88 (5 Cir. 1994) (che ck st ubs were functional e quivalent of de scribed- in-the-wa rra nt th c a shdis burs e me nt j ourn a ls) ; United St a t es v. M eriwether , 917 F.2d 955, 957- 58 (6 Cir. 1990) th (seizure of pa ger , co n taining de fenda nt’s telephone numbe r, within scope of war rant a uthorizi ng se izur e of te le ph on e nu

mbe rs of c us tom e rs and

su pp lie rs ); Un ite d Sta te

s v . W or d , 806 F.2d 658, 661 (6 Cir. 1986) (day

sheets, spiral patient-sign- in notebooks, patient hospital-admission rec ords, and th patie nt- e nc ounte r fo rm s we re fu nc tio na l e qu iva le nt of de sc ri be d- in- the -w arr ant pa y ment re c or ds , appointment books, medical rec ords, and other information reg arding billing, patient diag nosis and tr e a tme nt h ist or

y ); Rey es , 798 F.2d at 382-83 (seizure of casse tte tape c o nta in in g

c o nv e r s ations about dr ugtr a ff ic kin g fu nc tio na l e qu iva le nt of de sc ri be d- in- the -w arr ant dr ugtr a ff ic kin g re c or ds , le dg e rs , or wr iti ng s id e nti fy

ingc oc a ine c us tom e rs ); Un ite d S tat es v . G om e

z- So to , 723 F.2d 649, 652- 54 (9 th Cir . 1 98 4) (c a sse tte ta

pe fu nc tio na l e qu iva le nt of descr ibe d- in- the -w arr ant i te ms s uc h a s b oo ks , rec ords, pape rs, documents a nd notations relating to o r d i s cussi ng drug transac tions). We further note th a t H o b b s p r o v id e d n o te s ti mo n y a t th e s u p p r e s s io n h e ar in g th a t h e in te r p r e te d “ c h e c k s and materia ls to make forg ed che cks” to include the safe s. See U nited States v. Stiver , 9 F.3d 298, 302 (3 Cir. 1993) (off

icer s executing a

sear ch warra

nt are “re quired to interpr et it” and a re “ not obliged rd to interpret it nar

rowly ”) ( internal quotes omitted).
14 Se e Hor to n v . Ca lif

or nia , 496 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1990) ( discussing diff ere nce be tween “sea rche s” and “seizures” and noting that a “searc h” compromises the i ndividual interest in privac y while a “ seizure” c ompromises an owne r’s possessory interest). Article 18.02. This de cision on this question of law as to what items t he search warr ant authorized to be seized does not have the eff ect of conver

ting the se arc h in this case into a g ener al sea rch a nd it does not have the e ffe ct of a uthorizi ng the seizure of one thing unde r a w arr ant desc ribing another

. See M arron , 2 75 U. S. at 19 6 ( F ourt h A me ndme nt r e qu ir e me nt t hat w arr ants sh a ll p art icu lar ly descr ibe the thing s to be seized makes ge n er al s earche s under them impossible and pre vents the seizure of one thing unde r a w arr ant desc ribing another). II. I n a dd iti on , a ssumin g tha t th e se izur e of

the sa fe s b y

the poli ce vi ol ate d a

pp e lle e ’s F ourt

h Amendment possessory

rig hts in these safe s, we believe that the “massive” remedy of exclusion 14 of the methamphetami n e in t his case is not re quired unde r the United States Supre me Court’sPowell--13

15 We n ote that Hudson was de cided a fter the suppression hea ring in this case.
16 We note that the sea

rch w arr ant in this case ha d no exp i ra t i o n d ate. The ref ore, unde r the version of A rticle 18.07 in ef fec t at the time of the sea rch in this case , t h e ti me allowed f or the execution of t he search warr ant was “ three whole day s, exclusive of the day of its issuance a

nd the day of its e x ecution.” U nder the se circ umstances, the se arc h of the saf es at the police station was a continuation of the initial lawful searc h. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . S qu illac ote , 221 F.3d 542, 557- 58 (4 Cir. 2000) (F BI

ag ents’ re turning to searc h home on six consec utive day s pursuant to a wa rra nt th wa s “ re a so na

ble c on tin uatio ns of the or ig ina l se arc h” ); United States v. Carter , 854 F.2d 1102, 1107 (8 Cir. 1988) (upholding under sing le war rant a second sear ch occur ring sever al hours afte r initial th sear ch: “The authority

of the wa rra nt had not expired and there fore the return sear ch wa s not bey ond the sc op e of

the F ourt h A me ndme nt. ” ); Sta te v . Ne esly , 196 S.W .3d 356, 364 (Tex.App.–Houston [1 Di st. ] 200 6) (d isc us sin g c a se s w ho se ov e rr idi ngthe me “ is t hat e a c h su

bs e qu e nt se arc h is up he ld st on the same g rounds that lawf ully permitted the initial sear ch,” a nd “if the initial sear ch wa s based on a warra

nt, the court found t hat t hat warrant carr ied over to the second se arc h”) overruled on othe r grounds Sta te v . Ne esly , 239 S.W .3d 780 (Tex.Cr.App. 2007). d e c ision in Hudson v. Mic higan , which dec ided that the violation by the police of

the knock- andann ounc e F ourt

h Ame ndme nt ru le tha

t pr e c e de d a

n o the rw ise lawf

ul s e arc h o f t

he de fe nd ant’ s h ome pursuant to a se arc h war

rant did not requir e exclusion of evidenc e that wa s found during the sea rch. See H udson v. Michigan , 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (“ What the knock-a nd-announc e rule has neve r protec ted, howeve r, is one’s inter est in preve nting the g overnme nt from seeing or taking evidenc e de sc ri be d in

a wa rr ant. Sin c e the int e re sts that we re violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidenc e, the exclusionary rule is ina pplicable.” ) (empha sis in orig inal). Appellee ’s 15 interests that we re a lleg edly violated in this case ( his posse ssory and not his priva cy interests in the safe s) have nothing to do with the otherwise lawful sear ch of the safe s that resulted in the acquisition of the methamphetamine. Se e id .; Horton , 496 U.S. at 133-34. The police could have lawfully sear ched the safe s pursuant to the wa rra nt before and af

ter any unlawful seizure of them by the police. I t thus cannot be said that the timing of the sea rch of 16Powell--14

17 We also note that the invasion of a ppellee’ s privacy interests in the safe s by the police se arc h of the saf es wa s exactly the same whether the police sear ched these safe s at the home or at the police station. See H

orton , 496 U.S. at 133- 34 (a “ sear ch” c ompromises the individual interest in privacy wh ile a “ se izur e ” c omp ro mis e s an o wn e r’ s p os se sso ry int e re st) ; see also Hudson , 547 U.S. at 593-94 (discussing Four

th Amendment intere sts vindicated by knock-a nd-announc e re quirement).
18 Absent a “ but-for ” ca u s al connec tion between a ny unlawful seizure of

the safe s and the discovery of the me th a

mp h etamine, our

state exclusionary

rule in Article 38.23(a) , T EX . C ODE C R IM
. P R OC ., also would not require exclusion of the methamphetamine.

19 I nstead of taking the safe s to the pol ice station, the pol ice and the s afe s could have rema ined at appe llee’s home until such time as the police could have had a locksmith come there a nd drill out the sa fe s. the safe s violated appe llee’s pr ivacy interests in the saf

es. Se e id

. I t also cannot be said that the

17 police sear ched the safe s and discovere d the methamphetamine a s a re sult of expl oiting any unlawful

se izur e of the sa fe s o r t

hat any un lawf ul s e izur e of

the sa fe s w a s e ve n a

“ bu t- fo r” c a

us e that le d to
t h e poli ce se arc hing the safe s and discover ing the methamphetamine. See H udson , 5 47 U.S. at 18 59 2- 93 (“

. . . e xclu sio n may no t be pr e mis e d on the me re fa c t th a t a c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n w a s a b u t

- f o r c a u s e o f o b t a i n i n g t h e e v i d e n c e . O u r c a s e s s h o w t h a tb u t

- f o r c a u s a l i t y i s o n l y a

n e c e s s a r y, not a suffic i en t , co ndition of suppression. . . .Whether [the violation of the Fourth Ame ndment knock-a nd-announc e rule] had occ urre d or not , the police would have executed the war rant they had obtained, and w ould ha

ve discovere d the g un and drug s inside the house.”) (empha sis in original a nd internal quotes omitted) a nd at 601 (“ Whil e ac quisiti on of the gun and drug s was the product of a

sear ch pursua

nt to a war

rant, it wa s not the fruit of the fa ct that the entr y was not pre cede d by

knockand-a nnounce.” ). We believe that this recor d, viewed in the light most favora ble to the trial cour

t’s ruling in f avor of appellee , fairly demonstrates that the police would have sear ched the safe s whether or not they

took them to the police station. I n this c ase, there fore , we are unable to conc lude that 19Powell--15

20 We note that Part I V of Hudson is a plurality opinion which J ustice Ke nnedy declined to join. See H udson , 5 47 U. S. at 60 5 ( Ke nn edy , J ., con c ur ri ngin p art

and c on c ur ri ngin t he jud g me nt) (j oin ingpa

rt s I thr ou g h I I Iof

Justi c e Sc a lia ’s le a d o pin ion and c on c ur ri ngin t he jud g me nt w ith respe ct to part I V).

21 468 U.S. 796 (1984). there is any

causa l connec tion betwee n any unlawful seiz ure of the s afe s and the other wise lawf ul

se arc h of the sa fe s re su lti ng in the a c qu isi tio n of the me tha mph e tamin e by the po lic e . Th is o the rw ise lawf ul s e arc h o f t

he sa fe s w a s “ wh oll y

un re la te d” to a

ny pr ior un lawf ul s e izur e of

the se sa fe s. The followingdiscussion from Part I V of Hudson of the Supreme C o urt’s prior de cision 20 in Segura v. U

nited States further illust rate s why the re medy of exclusion of the methampheta mine 21 is not required in this case as a r esult of any unlawful seizure of

the safe s that may

have oc curr ed. L ike today ’s ca se, Se

gu ra i n v o l v eda c o n ce d ed l y i l l ega l en t ry . P o l i ce co n d u ct i n g a drug crime inve stigation waited for Segura outside a n apar tment building; when he arr ived, he de nied living ther e. The p o l i ce a rre sted him and broug ht him to t he apar tment where they

suspected illeg al activity

. An officer knocked. W hen someone inside opened the door, the police enter ed, ta k i ng Seg ura w ith them. They had neither a war rant nor c onsent to enter, and they did not announce the mselves as police–an e ntry

as illeg al as c an be. O ffice rs then s t ay ed in t he apa rtment for 19 ho ur s awa iting a se arc h war

rant. Once alerted that the sea rch w arr ant had be en obtai n ed, the police–still inside, having secur ed the pr emises so that no evidenc e could be r emoved–c onducted a sear ch. We re fused to exclude the resulting e vidence

. We rec og nized that only

the evidenc e g ained f

rom the par

ticular violation could be e xclu de d, and

the re fo re dis tin g uis he d th e e ff e c ts of the ill e g a l e ntr

y fr om t he e ff e c ts of the leg al sea

rch: “ None of

the information on which the war rant was secur ed wa s derive d from or r elated in a ny way to the initial entry

into petitioner’s apa

rtment . . .” I t w a s th e re fo re “ be y on d d isp ut e th at th e inf or ma tio n p os se sse d b y

the a g e nts b e f o r e they enter ed the a

partment c onstitut ed an inde pendent sourc e for the discover

y and seizure of

the evidenc e now c halleng ed.” I f the sea rch in Se gu ra c ou ld b e “ wh oll y

un re la te d to the pr ior

e ntr y ,” wh e n th e on ly e ntr y wa s w arr antl e ss, it would be biza rr e to t re a t mo re ha

rs hly the a c tio ns in t

his c a se , w he re the on ly

e ntr y wa s with a w arra n t

. I f t h e p ro b ab l e c au s e b a c k i n g a war rant that wa s issued later in time could be an “independent sourc e” f or a se arc h that p r o c e e d e d

a f te r th e o f f ic e r s il le g a ll y

e n te r e d an d w a it e d , a

s e ar c h w ar

rantPowell--16

obtained be

for e g oing in must have at least this much ef fec t.” See H udson , 5 4 7 U. S

. at 6 0 0 -0 1 (d i s cu s s i n g Se gu ra ) (c itations omi tted and empha sis in original). I n th is c a se , th e me tha

mph e tamin e wa s n ot o bta ine d b e c a us e the po lic e may

have un lawf

ull y seized the s afe s but “bec ause of a subsequent sear ch pursuant to a lawf ul warr ant.” See H

udson , 547 U.S. at 592 (but-for causa lity is a nec essar

y condition for application of exclusionary rule) a nd at 605 (Ke nnedy , J ., concur

ring in part and c oncurr ing in the judg ment) (“I n this case the relevant evide nce was discove red not be cause of a f ailure to knock and announce , but beca use of a subsequent sea

rch pursuant to a law ful war

rant.” ). We, there fore , decide that the “massive” reme dy of exclusion of the methamphetamine is not require d in this case. We believe that, as the de fenda nt’s reme dy

in Hudson

wa s a c ivi l su it f

or dama g e s f

or his br ok e n doo r, any re me dy that app e lle e mig ht have is a lso a c ivi l suit for damag es for

his alleg ed unlawf

ully seized safe s. See H

udson , 547 U.S. at 596-99. The judg ment of the c ourt of appe als is reve rsed, and the case is remande d there for f urther
proce eding s not inconsistent with t his opinion.

H e r v e y , J.

Deliver ed: Marc h 3, 2010 Pub lis h