United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted October 15, 2020*

Decided October 21, 2020 

Before 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge 

No. 20-1797 

CRYSTAL HOLTZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ONEIDA AIRPORT HOTEL 

CORPORATION, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

19-C-1682 

William C. Griesbach, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

After she was fired from her job at an Oneida Nation-owned hotel, Crystal Holtz, 

an Oneida Nation member, sued her former employer in state court for various federal, 

state, and tribal law claims. Defendants removed the case to federal court. The district 

court then dismissed the suit based on the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and, 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 20-1797 Page 2 

alternatively, Holtz’s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We 

affirm, though on the alternative basis that Holtz failed to state a claim. 

In her amended complaint, filed in state court, Holtz alleged essentially that the 

defendants, Oneida Airport Hotel Corporation, Aimbridge Hospitality, and two highranking hotel officers, conspired to wrongfully terminate her from her job in violation 

of the Indian Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; id. § 1985; 25 U.S.C. § 1302. She says 

that she was escorted out of the hotel by security personnel who suspected her of 

drinking alcohol based on her “droopy” eyes and “flushed” face. Shortly after the 

incident, she was fired. Holtz believes she was singled out for punishment, since the 

hotel does not set forth the specific protocol for drug-and-alcohol screening in its 

employee handbook. She also asserted that the defendants relocated her job to another 

organization to thwart the hiring and promotion of Oneida Nation members. 

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was 

blocked by tribal sovereign immunity. The defendants argued that Oneida Airport 

Hotel Corporation was a tribal entity and thus “cloaked” with the same immunity of 

the tribe itself. In the alternative, the defendants argued that Holtz failed to state a 

claim. 

Holtz did not file anything in opposition to the motion to dismiss, but she did 

move to overturn the removal order on the grounds that her case had been removed in 

bad faith and that her wrongful termination claim arose under state, not federal law. 

See, e.g., Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443 (Wis. 2000). 

The district court granted the motion to dismiss. At the outset, the court 

dispatched Holtz’s opposition to removal, finding “no doubt” that her amended 

complaint sought to state federal claims under its jurisdiction. Next, the court, noting 

that Holtz’s failure to respond to the motion was itself grounds for dismissal, see E.D. 

Wis. Civ. L. R. 7(d) (“Failure to file a memorandum in opposition to a motion is 

sufficient cause for the Court to grant the motion.”), listed other grounds for dismissal. 

First, her federal and state claims were barred by tribal sovereign immunity: The 

Oneida Airport Hotel Corporation (doing business as Radisson Hotel and Conference 

Center of Green Bay) was owned and operated by the Oneida Nation, a federally 

recognized Indian tribe. Second, even if the defendants were not immune, the court 

added, Holtz’s complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a federal claim. 

 
No. 20-1797 Page 3 

On appeal, Holtz challenges the district court’s sovereign immunity analysis, 

which she faults for not ascertaining Oneida Airport Hotel Corporation’s “true 

identity” through the “arm of the tribe” test. Had the court more thoroughly evaluated 

these factors, Holtz maintains, it would have determined that the defendants were not 

entitled to tribal sovereign immunity because the hotel is in fact a for-profit corporation 

operating under a board of directors. And if the hotel is not entitled to sovereign 

immunity, she continues, it follows that the other defendants—the hotel management 

company Aimbridge Hospitality, Hotel President Robert Barton, and Hotel General 

Manager and Aimbridge employee Steve Ninham—are also not entitled to sovereign 

immunity. 

We have not yet had occasion to consider the application of the “arm of the tribe” 

test, and we decline to apply it here given the thin record and the availability of another 

basis upon which to resolve this appeal. Even if we set aside the question of the 

defendants’ sovereign immunity, the district court set forth a persuasive alternative 

analysis that Holtz’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Holtz says 

nothing about this alternative analysis in her brief on appeal, and an appellant’s failure 

to address a district court’s alternative holding on an issue waives any challenge to that 

holding. United States v. Fuchs, 635 F.3d 929, 933–34 (7th Cir. 2011). 

As the district court explained, Holtz’s amended complaint failed to state a 

federal claim. With regard to Holtz’s § 1983 claim, alleging violations under the Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendments, the court correctly concluded that none of the defendants 

were persons acting under color of state law. When they are enforcing tribal laws or 

managing tribal affairs, neither tribal officers and agents nor private corporations act 

under color of state law. R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982 

(9th Cir. 1983); Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1174 (10th Cir. 2006); West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 55–56 (1988); Spencer v. Lee, 864 F.2d 1376, 1378–82 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc). 

As for Holtz’s § 1985 claim, alleging that the defendants conspired to discharge 

her in order to avoid tribal laws, this too is insufficient. To state a claim under § 1985(3), 

Holtz must allege, among other things, a conspiracy to deprive “a person or class of 

persons of equal protection of the laws.” Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1024 (7th 

Cir. 2000). Holtz’s allegations amount to a conspiracy to wrongfully terminate her 

employment in order to avoid tribal laws. This does not amount to a plausible 

allegation of an equal protection violation. In addition, Holtz did not identify any right 

independently secured by state or federal law to serve as a predicate for a claim under 

§ 1985(3). Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 376 (1979) (“Section 
No. 20-1797 Page 4 

1985(3) ... creates no rights.”). Holtz suggests such a right under the Oneida Nation 

Constitution, but this does not implicate any state or federal right. Holtz also fails to 

state a claim under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302, which prohibits tribal 

governments from passing or enforcing laws that violate certain individual rights. But 

the Act does not create an independent private right of action in federal court. See Santa 

Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978); Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 

486 (1st Cir. 1997) (“With the exception of petitions for habeas corpus relief, Congress 

did not intend in the ICRA to create implied causes of action to redress substantive 

rights in federal court.”). And regarding her claim under the Oneida Nation’s 

Constitution or laws, any asserted violations fall outside the jurisdiction of federal 

courts. See Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347, 352 (8th Cir. 1985); Alto v. Black, 

738 F.3d 1111, 1123 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013). 

We have considered Holtz’s remaining arguments and found them without 

merit. 

AFFIRMED