THE WRITT

STEPHEN B. L

bhn D. Hayes and John B.

THE WRITINGS

OF

STEPHEN B. LUCE

THE WRITINGS

of

STEPHEN B. LUCE

Edited with Commentary by

John D. Hayes

and

John B. Hattendorf

Naval War College Press

Newport, Rhode Island

1975
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

HISTORICAL MONOGRAPH SERIES

No.l

Contents may be cited consistent with conventional research

methods. Reprinting in part or whole requires permission of

the President, Naval War College.

U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 02840

First Edition
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

Introduction by Vice Admiral Julien J. LeBourgeois .... v

Preface vii

I THE MAN: Stephen B.Luce (1827- 191 7) 1

II THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE: An Address Delivered at the

United States Naval War College, Narragansett Bay, R.I.,

June Second, Nineteen Hundred and Three 37

III THE INTELLECTUAL FOCUS: On the Study of Naval

Warfare as a Science 45

IV TACTICS AND HISTORY: On the Study of Naval History

(Grand Tactics) 69

V LITERARY CRITIC: Three Book Reviews 99

VI ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: The Fleet 109

VII FLEET CONTROL: Naval Strategy 125

VIII NAVAL BASES: The Navy and Its Needs 147

IX ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LUCE'S WRITINGS,

On Active Duty: 1862-1888 163

X ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LUCE'S WRITINGS,

In Retirement: 1889-1911 201

XI CHRONOLOGY OF LIFE AND WRITINGS 237

APPENDIX-CATEGORY LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

CITED IN CHAPTERS IX AND X 251

INDEX 253
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The publishing of this monograph was made possible by the

generosity of the Naval War College Foundation, Inc. It is this

Foundation that so richly deserves the credit of preserving the

written works of one of the U.S. Navy's most distinguished

officers, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, founding father of the

U.S. Naval War College.
V

INTRODUCTION

Rear Admiral Hayes and Mr. Hattendorf have, through this

detailed study of the works of Stephen Bleecker Luce,

provided us with an excellent portrait of the man and a

timely comment on the intellectual heritage of the U.S. Navy.

Here is a look at the individual perhaps most important in

bridging the gap between the age of sailing ships and that of

steam driven, armored battleships. Indeed, Luce not only

contributed directly to the naval service but provided a focus,

a direction, and a sounding board for the other great naval

thinkers of the day—men like Alfred Thayer Mahan.

While Mahan was the naval strategist, an intellectual who

made a most dramatic impact on maritime strategy in his day,

Luce was the activist who had the greatest influence on his

fellow officers. Rear Adm. Bradley A. Fiske wrote of him,

"Luce taught the Navy to think ... he taught the Navy to

think about the Navy as a whole ... he saw that a Navy in

order to be good must be directed as an entity along a

preconceived and definite line of strategy ..."

Luce and his associates were faced with a changing strategic

environment in which the challenge was to build a Navy

capable of exercising the international potential of the United

States. In today's world the U.S. Navy faces a strong

competitor and potential new challenges. Luce and the

thinkers of his day faced the technological challenge of an

industrial revolution and a world steeped in sociological and

political change. Luce's experience should therefore provide a

useful perspective for the contemporary naval officer concerned with his profession.

How very appropriate, then, that the authors have provided

us with a look at Stephen B. Luce, a man who did so much

to shape our Navy of the 20th century. It has special

significance for the Naval War College for Luce himself once

said with reference to the college: "Let officers who have

completed their terms of sea service in their respective grades,

come here for a two years course of study, not for discussion,

but for study." The need for such study still exists. We at the

Naval War College, like Luce, must focus our attention and

direct our energies to creative thought in dealing with

contemporary maritime problems. But the process does not

stop there. We must articulate these ideas, and here again we

can take a lesson from Luce. He was not only a thinker, but
VI

he was an active professional who was able to express his

ideas in the forum of the day. He was a man true to his

beliefs and committed to his profession; we are deeply

indebted to Rear Admiral Hayes and Mr. Hattendorf for

sharing the works of this outstanding naval officer with us.

JULIEN J. LEBOURGEOIS

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

President, Naval War College
Vll

PREFACE

Stephen B. Luce, certainly one of the U.S. Navy's great

officers, is still chiefly known only for having founded the Naval

War College and for giving Alfred T. Mahan the chance to write his

famous seapower series. As the readers of this volume will soon

learn, these were but two of his many far-reaching contributions

to his profession. The others were in such fields as education and

administration where fame and glory for a military or naval man

are seldom gained.

This is a volume of hero worship. The authors believe that the

man of whom they have written is a hero in American naval

history too long unrecognized. Luce was not the kind of man who

was interested in his own fame and fortune. He found complete

fulfillment in his career and felt little need to search for other

more material rewards. After he retired, several publishers wrote,

encouraging him to write his memoirs for publication. Invariably

Luce refused. Characteristic of these exchanges must have been

that in 1905 with Joseph B. Gilder, founder of The Critic and then

a literary agent, who had written Luce on this subject. Unfortunately Luce's reply has not been found, but Gilder responded.

It would be a national loss if the man who could write your

letter refusing to be an autobiographist, should refrain from

being one! You say you have written yourself out. Is it

possible that the articles in which you have done so might be

gathered together and printed in book form? I don't believe

the Japanese voyage is the only bit of autobiography you

have perpetrated in the process of "writing yourself out." 1 We have taken on the task that Luce himself refused and have

gone a step further in attempting to identify all of Luce's

published writings.

Stephen B. Luce was not a hero in the popular sense, for

although he belonged to the warrior trade, was proud of it, and

spent his life preparing men for it, it was only in the preparation

for war that he achieved his right to fame: in education, training,

and even in those more prosaic seas of endeavor of military

management and naval organization. Luce was, above all, a leader

who knew how to handle men, even to manage them in the less

respected sense of the word.

J.B. Gilder (1858-1936) to Luce, 24 October 1905 in the Luce Papers, Naval

Historical Foundation Collection, on deposit in the Library of Congress. Hereafter

abbreviated as Luce Papers, LC. See bibliography item 126 in chapter X.
Vlll Luce was also a prolific writer. He wrote published material for

50 of his 90 years, but he did so for periodicals and magazines. As

such he has "joined his fellow magazinists in the limbo of the

forgotten . . . The magazines are shifting sands."2 His prepared writings, however, represent only one side of his

literary effort. There are also his letters which portray Luce the

man, but the presentation of these must await another time.

Luce's letters were not so much chronicles as were those of his

respected naval mentor Samuel F. Du Pont, 3 but were letters

written to get things done. In them he was "persistent in his

demands and prolific with his suggestions,"4 and whether his

letter was five lines or five pages, a recipient or a reader today, as then, would seldom put it down before finishing.

To Luce, writing was a means to an end, a direct vehicle for

accomplishing particular purposes. He was an activist, not a

contemplative, little interested in ideas for their own sake.

The authors have endeavored to portray this man through his

prepared writings and have approached this task from three

bearings. They offer:

(1) A brief biographical summary and an essay on Luce.

(2) A half dozen of his most representative and relevant, but

not necessarily his best, professional essays, edited in the current

form of the discipline.

(3) Abstracts of his prepared articles: periodical essays, book

reviews, official reports, and contributions to newspapers with full

bibliographical citations to all of Luce's known writings.

This is the means we have chosen to direct military officers,

maritime people, historians, and writers, as well as practitioners

and students in the areas of management and civil military

relations, even naval buffs, to find what we believe to be excellent

guidance. Here, too, are some fine yarns, many of which came

from the old men-of-warsmen Luce respected and loved.

In the preparation of this volume, we have received the help

and support of many, all of whom should be acknowledged. Space

considerations, however, allow only a few to be mentioned.

Editors will not have it otherwise.

2 Frank L. Mott, A History of American Magazines, 5 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966-1968), vol. Ill, p. 16.

3 J.D. Hayes, ed. Samuel Francis Du Pont, a Selection from His Civil War Letters, 3

vols. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969).

4 Donald N. Bigelow, William Conant Church and the Army and Navy Journal (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 209.
IX

To our editor, Comdr. Robert M. Laske, we make the first

bow. We shall always be in his debt.

We are also deeply indebted to the late Mrs. Philip R. Alger,

that grand lady of Annapolis, Md., whose productive years

exceeded those of Luce and whom the senior partner of this

writing team regarded as a good friend. From the Army family of

Meigs and the Navy family of Rodgers, she was a bridge who

attended the actual opening of the Naval War College in 1884. Her

clear recollections about it and other happenings of those days in

which Stephen B. Luce was involved were an incalculable aid to

our efforts. How short are 90 years. She was the widow of Philip

R. Alger,5 editor of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings

from 1903 until his death in 1912, who we believe to be the

outstanding military and maritime editor in the history of

American service periodicals. We consider the Alger years to have

been the most dynamic in the Proceedings' century of publication.

He controlled the periodical when Luce so needed it in his fight

for line officer direction within the Navy Department.

At the Naval War College, Lt. (jg.) Craig L. Symonds of the

Strategy Department faculty has generously offered sound and

constructive criticism Anthony S. Nicolosi, Curator of the Naval

Historical Collection, has given staunch support and valuable

assistance in a wide variety of ways since the very inception of this

project. Both of these scholars have been thoroughly aware of our

problems and have been personally most helpful. Professor James

E. King, Director, Department of Advanced Research, under

whose cognizance this work was undertaken, generously allowed

our work to be the first in his newly established department.

Doris Maguire of Centerville, Md., who has unearthed so much

new Mahan material, has found for us many Luce letters and leads.

David A. Rosenberg of the University of Chicago helped with

several difficult research problems.

Many naval officers, historians, and graduate students will join

us in our thanks to the Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.

In particular, we thank Dr. Dean Allard, Head, Operational Record

Section; Mr. W.B. Greenwood, Navy Department Librarian; and

Mrs. Agnes Hoover in the Curator's office for their enthusiastic

aid.

We thank the librarians who have helped us, notably at Brown

University, Providence, R.I., and especially at the Naval War

Austin M. Knight, "Professor Philip Rounseville Alger, U.S. Navy-an Appreciation," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. XXXVIII, March 1912, pp. 1-5.
College where Luce's own library is part of the collection. The War

College librarians not only aided us but put up with us and our

clutter blocking their stacks and aisles. We thank the staffs of all

the libraries that have helped us: Redwood Library, Newport, R.I.;

G.W. Blunt White Library, Mystic Conn.; U.S. Coast Guard

Academy Library; U.S. Naval Academy Library; Rice University

Library; Navy Department Library; Rhode Island Historical

Society Library; Newport Historical Society; the Center for

Research Libraries, Chicago, 111.; Peabody Museum, Salem, Mass.;

U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks,

Pa.; Marine Corps Historical Office, Washington, D.C.; and the

Library of Congress.

The job would never have been done were it not for the

editorial, composition, and layout assistance of Miss Leonora

Mello, Mrs. Eleanor Silvia, Mrs. Mary DeMenezes, and Mrs. Helen

LeBlanc of the Naval War College and our principal typists: Mrs.

Sara E. McKee, Mrs. Ruth Saurette and Miss Genevieve Pietraszek

of the Naval War College, Mrs. Audrey Amburgey of Manistee,

Michigan and Mrs. Vernon Wild of Texas City, Texas.

We thank our families for what they have done for us and

which only we can know.

Now we come to the happy, but nevertheless difficult task of

sincerely and enthusiastically thanking Vice Adm. Stansfield

Turner, USN, and the late Rear Adm. Richard W. Bates, USN

(Ret.), President and founder Vice President of the Naval War

College Foundation. Without the personal interest of Turner and

Bates, the writings of Stephen B. Luce would have still remained

unknown.

Finally, we are grateful to the people of the United States

whom, like Luce, we have had the honor to serve and who have

made all this possible through our active and retired pay.

Stephen B. Luce, it has been a joy to know you; we do not

apologize for the rhetoric that you taught us.

JOHN D. HAYES

JOHN B. HATTENDORF

Naval War College

Newport, R.I.

31 August 1973
1

CHAPTER I THE MAN: STEPHEN BLEECKER LUCE (1827-1917)

I

Stephen B. Luce was active in the affairs of the United States

Navy for 75 of his 90 years. He entered the Navy as a midshipman

in 1841, served on active duty through both the Mexican and Civil

Wars, and, after his retirement in 1889, continued to advise, to

write, and to influence naval men until his death in 1917.

Throughout his career he never allowed himself or those to whom

he gave counsel to forget that the primary purpose of a navy was

to wage war, and regardless of how remote the possibility of war,

the professional function of the officers was to study war and to

train their men for it. His insight, zeal, and untiring energy helped

bring about a transformation in American naval thought.

Luce's most productive years were in the decades of the 1870's

and 1880's, an intellectual watershed and material nadir of the

American Navy. The contemporary British writer Oscar Wilde

noted the situation in his satiric short story "The Canterville

Ghost." In this story, Virginia, the American Ambassador's young

daughter, advised the 300-year-old ghost of Sir Simon de

Canterville that he should leave England and emigrate to America

for his self-improvement. The ghost replied to the proposition:

"I don't think I should like America."

"I suppose because we have no ruins and curiosities," said

Virginia satirically.

"No ruins! No curiosities!" answered the ghost, "You have

your Navy and your manners." 1 During the Civil War, the American Navy had achieved a remarkable reputation abroad. The battle between the Monitor

and Merrimac had dramatically reinforced the impulse toward

The story was published in the collection entitled Lord Arthur Savile's Crime and

Other Stories which first appeared in 1890. The quotation is from "Stories," The Works

of Oscar Wilde (London: Collins, n.d.), p. 327. For some recent detailed studies of

defense matters in this period, see Kenneth Hagan, American Gunboat Diplomacy

(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1973); Lane C. Buhl, "Smooth Water Navy," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1969; Stanley

Sandler, "A Navy in Decay: Some Strategic Technological Results of Disarmament

1865-69," Military Affairs, vol. XXXV, No. 4, December 1971, pp. 138-41; R. Seager II, "Ten Years Before Mahan: the Unofficial Case for the New Navy, 1880-1890,"

Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. XL, No. 3, December 1953, pp. 491-512; B.F.

Cooling, Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1973); R.F.

Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan, 1973).
armored steamships among the European navies. In the years after

the war, however, a general disarmament and lack of concern in

Congress led to retrenchment in naval affairs. In general, the

American people turned their eyes and efforts to the development

of the heartland. The rich farmlands of the West and the lure of

the frontier seemed to offer far more potential than the sea which

had been the basis for so much of early American development.

The Navy and the merchant marine were neglected. The golden

age of American sail which Luce had seen in his youth was gone,

and the technological innovation which had been applied during

the Civil War had been suspended in naval affairs.

The complex affairs of the 1870's and the 1880's in America

gave birth to a variety of elements, each of which had their impact

on naval developments. The discovery of rich deposits of gold and

silver in Colorado and the Dakotas, the growth of railroads across

the continent, the rise of scientific agriculture, and the migration

of some 8 million people to the West between 1865 and 1890 led

to the disappearance of the American frontier. The outward

expansion which for 25 years had absorbed the efforts of America

began to move in other directions. Based on more than just a

psychological diversion from the land frontier, the stimulus for

this new expansion involved the growth of great corporations, the

ability to create capital at home and to borrow abroad. It involved

the discovery and large-scale exploitation of such natural resources

as iron ore, coal, natural gas, copper, gold, silver, and oil. The

practical application of science and technology acted as a catalyst

to the processes of industry and transportation. This, in turn, was

aided by the availability of a relatively cheap labor supply, much

of it taken from the rising numbers of immigrants. All these many

factors combined to increase the size of cities and factories, to

stimulate the growth of the population, to modify social patterns,

to widen the American intellectual and political outlook, and to

develop American nationalism

The Navy was very much a part of the general dynamism

sweeping the American scene. Many of the factors seen on the

broader scale had their impact in naval development. Among other

influences, the Navy shared the revived application of technology,

the inspiration of industrial techniques of organization and

construction, the psychology of expansion, and the broadening of

intellectual horizons. While the Navy gave few outward signs of

change before the late 1880's, the years after the Civil War were a time of ferment, preparation, and adaptation.

Stephen B. Luce was an important figure in the Navy's
adjustment to the new age. He was able to carry forward some of

the spirit of the sailing navy and to infuse it into the newly

refurbished fleet. Unlike some of the younger men, he was able to

perceive that the individuals who controlled and directed the new

technology were far more important than the weapons and

machines themselves. This perception provided the basis of his

approach and contributed to the growing professionalism of the

service. Luce was one of the men who formed a dynamic link

between two major periods in our naval history: that of the sail

and wooden ship with the navy of steam and steel.

Stephen Bleecker Luce was born in Albany, N.Y., on 25 March

1827, the second son of Vinal and Charlotte Bleecker Luce. The

original Luce family came from England and settled in Martha's

Vineyard, while his mother was from one of the old Dutch

families of New York. When he was 6, his father moved to

Washington, D.C., to become a clerk in the Treasury Department.

Stephen was appointed a midshipman in the Navy by President

Martin Van Buren in October 1841 at the age of 14. A few weeks

later he left his home and dog, Pontius Pilate, to join the

line-of-battleship North Carolina, then the receiving ship at New

York.2 His first 6 years at sea, as a midshipman, were spent in two of

the finest men-of-war of the day, the frigate Congress and

line-of-battleship Columbus. Two of the very able officers he

served under became lifelong friends, David Dixon Porter and

Percival Drayton. The Congress cruised both the Mediterranean

and the South American stations while Columbus took the young

midshipman around the world, giving him a glimpse of Japan in

the first visit that American men-of-war had made to that

country.3 This was followed by 6 months on the California coast

during the Mexican War.

Like many other officers in the days before the Naval

Academy, Luce received his earliest naval eduation at sea. Although the training was designed as only practical and vocational, the romance and adventure of the sea made a deep

impression on Luce's fertile mind. Today, there is little direct

evidence which remains to document for us the impact of these

early influences, but one small item is striking in its connection

with Luce's later career.

2 See his memoir of this experience in a piece he wrote for Youth's Companion after retirement, "My First Ship," bibliography item 96.

See "Commodore Biddle's Visit to Japan," bibliography item 126.
Midshipman S.B. Luce, ca. 1841

This photograph was taken about the time Luce was

assigned to his first ship, the ship of the line, U.S.S. North Carolina. In 1892, Luce wrote a memoir of his experiences on board that ship for Youth's Companion. After six months on board, Luce was warranted midshipman and assigned to the frigate Congress for a cruise to the Mediterranean. During his first cruise he began to collect the songs which eventually

became the basis for his book, Naval Songs, and to develop a serious interest in history. A painting done

from this photograph hangs at the U.S. Naval

Academy.

Photo: Newport, R.I., Historical Society
This clue to Luce's development was a rather plain book, an

ordinary-looking history of ancient Greece.4 This small volume

had special meaning for a midshipman sailing the Mediterranean

among the very ghosts of ancient Greece and Rome. Recognizing a

historical interest in a younger friend, one of Luce's shipmates

gave him the book so he could better appreciate some of the sights

they had seen together. His shipmate inscribed it:

With this little volume my Dear Luce, you can teach yourself

the history of one of the most important epochs of the

world—when learning was in its infancy—and when education

was the monopoly of a class. In giving it to you, I am

animated by a sincere wish for your welfare, and with a

sincere desire to contribute my all in order to improve you.

It would be gratifying to see you an officer in every sense of

the word, and to accomplish this end, you must exercise your

energy. With a view of leading your mind to a sense of its

duties, this book has been presented to you.

5 The book went with Luce as he sailed around the world in

Congress. He brought it home, and it remained in his library for

the rest of his life. This present from a good friend, in itself, was

nothing unusual but the spirit of the gift had a profound effect on

Luce's own life. The idea of teaching oneself and training the mind

for professional duties stayed with Luce in his later years and

marked his approach to education at the Naval War College.

After spending two 3-year cruises at sea, Luce, with a number

of his contemporary midshipmen, was sent to the newly established Naval Academy. There he became a member of the second

class to be sent to the school. These early classes little expected to

follow a finely prescribed curriculum. For the most part, the

midshipmen were at Annapolis to review the information which

they had learned from their seagoing mathematics professors and

to prepare for promotion examinations. 6 Luce spent the months

between April 1848 and August 1849 studying for his examinations at Annapolis. As a passed midshipman, he then served, from

John Gillies, The History of Ancient Greece, Its Colonies and Conquests, from the

Earliest Accounts Till the Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East, Including the

History of Literature Philosophy, and the Fine Arts (Philadelphia: Wardle, 1835). This

inscribed volume is in the Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, R.I. The inscription is signed, "By Your sincere friend, Robert C. Rogers. Congress,

November 23d. '43."

See Park Benjamin, The United States Naval Academy (New York: Putnam, 1900),

p. 186. The Naval Academy was established at Annapolis, Md., 10 October 1845.

Midshipmen of the 1841 date were promoted to "passed-midshipmen" during the years

1847, 1848, 1849, and 1850.
1849 to 1852, in the sloop-of-war Vandalia on the Pacific station.

Fortunately, part of his personal journal for this period is

preserved among his papers. This ledger-size book gives a good

picture of the young officer in Honolulu, San Francisco, and on

board ship and also provides an insight into his reading habits:

Milton's Paradise Lost, Dickens' Old Curiosity Shop, works of

Shakespeare, and George Grote's 12-volume History of Greece. In

addition, he read the Bible and knew it well. He became familiar

with the writing of Augustin Calmet, a French Biblical scholar, the

sailor-poet Falconer, and authors such as Byron, Mommsen, and

James Fenimore Cooper. While reading these works, Luce provided for his own liberal arts education through broad reading,

travel, and experience. As he became proficient in the practical

skills of his profession, Luce developed a sensitive appreciation for

the type and quality of men that the naval service required.

Understandably, this viewpoint progressed with the scope of his

practical experience. In his early years, the young naval officer

necessarily dealt with the immediate problems around him:

seamanship, gunnery, training, and the education required for

officers to lead and to organize men.

Following his tour of duty in Vandalia came 4 years in the

Coast Survey. For a brief period in 1853 he assisted Lt. James M.

Gillis with calculations made from Gillis' observations of Venus

and Mars between 1849 and 1852. Luce was then assigned to

various survey ships on the Atlantic coast where he continued to

gain experience in the scientific aspects of his profession:

astronomy, oceanography, cartography, and hydrography. On 7

December 1854, Stephen married a childhood friend, Elisa

Henley, daughter of Commodore John C. Henley and a grandniece

of Martha Washington.7 From 1857 to 1860, Luce served as a lieutenant in the

sloop-of-war Jamestown, then on the east coast of Central

America. By this point in his career he had gained a wide variety

of experience from which to draw some sound observations about

his profession and to outline the general direction of his future

career. In 1858 the 31 -year-old officer wrote in his private journal:

It is my opinion . . . that the navy should be re-organized. Let

me commence with the officers and enumerate all that I would do. The present system of education for young naval

cadets is one which will ultimately be serviceable to the Navy

n Three children were born of the marriage: John Dandridge Henley Luce

(1855-1921), Caroline (1857-1933), and Charlotte (1859-1946).
and highly beneficial to the country generally. Therefore, for

the future we entertain no fears at present, but I am sorry to

say that there are now in our service, men who wear the

navy uniform, but who are totally deficient in education,

both as officers and gentlemen, men who are not fit to be

entrusted with the command of the meanest scow, or to

associate with an honest labourer of the lowest order. Let

such as these be either dismissed or "laid upon the shelf"

never again to do duty in any shape or way. It is such men as these who abuse the little authority granted them, causing

greater restrictions placed upon their brother officers, and

gaining for the service an unenviable name. . . . For the

younger officers, as I said before the present system of

education is good, but it is yet imperfect-it would be a good

plan to man a small brig with midshipmen, having some good

officer in command. Let them commence and rig her, stow

her holds, get the guns on board &c. and perform all the

duties of a common sailor, they ought also, at as early an age

as is possible be given the charge of the deck, that they may

learn to have confidence in themselves.

There is too little attention paid to the crews of our ships.

They are not all Americans, this is one very great fault, they

are not allowed enough liberty, and are allow'd too much

grog. Let these two very important items be well considered,

let a system of punishment be arranged, the present is as absurd as it is useless.

Every ship in the service should have the same internal rules

and regulations, the same routine of duty, the same form for

station bills, the same gun exercises and in fact the same

everything, they should differ as little as possible. The

English Navy in some respects is a very good pattern. We only

seem to copy their uniforms. Will nothing less than a war,

effect a change for the better in the Navy?8 These words are significant. They express an early perception of

many of the problems to which Luce would devote his later

career: education, organization, training, and administration.

These fields of interest seem unusual when compared to those of

other officers at the time, but the choice was very much a product

of his own experience.

In the years before the Civil War, he developed a broad

S.B. Luce, "Private Journal," ca. 1858, Luce Papers, LC.
8

perspective which encouraged in him a desire, for further knowledge of literature and history. He developed an understanding of

men and the ways in which they could be sympathetically

handled. Even at this early stage of his career, Luce saw that many

of the problems which confronted the Navy lay basically in an

incomplete system of fleet and shipboard organization. Thus he

developed a deep interest in education and training and, at the

same time, perceived the need for reform.

Orders to the Naval Academy in 1860, as an instructor in

seamanship and gunnery, just before the Civil War, provided his

first opportunity to write and to publish. His initial published

effort was in the area of practical training: the compilation and

revision of textbooks for the Naval Academy.

As part of this work, Luce first revised a small gunnery manual

and further saw the need for a text in seamanship. He realized that

the books on this important subject which were already in print

were inadequate. In recommending to the Commandant of

Midshipmen that a seamanship text be prepared, he noted:

Compared to the Army with their wealth of professional

literature, we may be likened to the nomadic tribes of the

East who are content with the vague tradition of the past.

Does it seem creditable then, Sir, to this Institution that it

should possess no text book on the most important branch

taught within its halls?9 When this textbook finally did appear a year or so later, it was

not an original treatise on seamanship but a compilation from a

wide variety of sources.

1 ° While Luce was teaching at the Academy, the Civil War broke

out, forcing the Luce family to move to Newport, R.I., where the

Naval Academy was transferred for the duration of the war. The

family remained in Newport during the later periods he was at sea

and developed a strong affection for the town. Eventually, in

1880, they settled permanently in Rhode Island.

Luce's service during the Civil War was divided between the

Naval Academy and the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. He

participated in the early bockade, the operations at Hatteras Inlet,

and the Battle of Port Royal, S.C. His most fruitful activity during

9 Luce to C.P.R. Rodgers, Commandant of Midshipmen, 26 February 1861, Luce

Papers, LC.

10

See the London Times, 24 October 1871, p. 6. Here Luce was accused of

plagiarizing the seamanship studies of Vice Adm. George S. Nares (1831-1915), British

explorer and navigator. No evidence has been found which indicates this accusation was

carried further.
this period, however, had nothing to do with the prosecution of

the war. In the summer of 1863, he took his first command, the

midshipman practice ship Macedonian, to Europe, visiting the

naval activities at Portsmouth and Plymouth, England, and

Cherbourg, France. The French Navy at this time was in the midst

of a resurgence. The English met the French challenge, and both

nations were developing efficient maritime administrations and

excellent training systems. Luce compiled a comprehensive report

on European naval training and later used this information as source material in his articles and letters recommending a system

which would be appropriate for the United States. Shortly after

returning from Europe, Luce was ordered to command the

monitor Nantucket.

The poor quality of many of the men in the Union Navy at this

time was painfully evident to him. The situation was no better

than that which he had perceived in 1858. Wartime service in the

Navy held few attractions for enlisted men. Blockade duty was

arduous and boring, liberty ashore was infrequent, and the grog

ration had been stopped in 1862. Even prize money was largely a delusion; only the crews of a few lucky ships received it. The physical environment for naval officers was somewhat

better, and the expansion of the Navy had required them in large

numbers. Drawn from both oceangoing ships and river steamers,

the Union Navy would have been unable to perform its demanding

task without these men, but they did have their limitations.

While in command of Nantucket, Luce resolved to search for a

remedy. He wrote several articles on naval personnel and training

for the Army and Navy Journal at this time, and after the war he

developed a plan that included an apprentice system for the Navy

and a parallel program of maritime schoolships for those aspiring

to be officers in the merchant marine. Reform of the merchant

training system was his first accomplishment. He based it on the

1862 Morrill Act which established land-grant colleges "to

promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial

classes in the several pursuits and professions of life." This act was

the origin of the agricultural and mechanical arts colleges and

many of the country's state universities. Luce expanded on the

original concept and extended it to include the knowledge of

nautical sciences among young men in the coastal states.

He wrote the bill which both extended the Morrill Act to

nautical education and authorized the Secretary of the Navy to

loan ships and to detail officers to public marine schools. This bill

was enacted into law on 4 January 1874, and by January the
10

following year Luce had personally fitted out the sloop-of-war St.

Marys and drafted plans, rules, and regulations for her to function

as the New York State Maritime School. Comdr. Robert L.

Phythian1 l was chosen as the school's first superintendent. Other

schools followed in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, California,

Maine, and Texas. To meet the academic needs of these schools,

Luce wrote a textbook, The Young Seaman's Manual. Taken from

Seamanship, it provided the information needed in the new

curriculum he had designed for merchant marine apprentices.

Once this program was effectively organized, Luce transferred

his energies to naval training and education. He spent the years

from 1877 to 1883 in schoolships fashioning a naval apprentice

program for training afloat. Eventually transferred ashore, it

became the naval training system.

It was during this period that Luce produced his volume of

Naval Songs. l 2 He believed that singing was an effective means of

instilling traditions of the sea and teaching the type of discipline

that stresses dependence on one another.

In the mid- 1 870's, Luce had established himself well enough in

naval circles to receive serious backing in his effort to reform the

Navy Department in Washington. While in command of Hartford

at Norfolk, Va., Luce met Congressman W.C. Whitthorne 1 3 when

the Tennessee Representative was inspecting the Norfolk Navy

Yard in February 1876. Whitthorne, a former Confederate general,

was chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee in the Democratic

controlled 44th (1875-1876) Congress and was the first chairman

of that committee. Although from an inland state which did not

have a navy yard, Whitthorne became one of the Nation's chief

spokesmen for naval preparedness. With other legislators, such as Eugene Hale, Charles Bontelle, Hilary Herbert, and Henry Cabot

Lodge, Whitthorne deserves credit for supporting the new American Navy of the 1880's. Luce's meeting with Whitthorne was the

beginning of a relationship that was nurtured by 15 years of

correspondence. Throughout his letters to Whitthorne, Luce

clearly presented his views on the state of the Navy and his

ideas on the reforms that were needed. In 1878 Luce advocated

1 *Capt. Robert L. Phythian (1835-1917) later served as Superintendent of the Naval

Academy 1890-94. Today the school Luce founded is the State University of New York

Maritime College, Fort Schuyler, N.Y.

1 2 See bibliography items 69 and 116.

1 3 Washington Curran Whitthorne (1825-1891), Tennessee Congressman and U.S.

Senator.
11

reforming the Navy Department so that it would more successfully

carry out government policy, complement the Army, and adequately represent the Nation. To achieve these goals, he recommended to Whitthorne the establishment of a "mixed commission" made up of Congressmen, Army and Navy officers, as well as other prominent citizens. For a time there seemed promise of

success, but in the end the attempt failed. It was to be 30 years

before the Moody Board would consider the basic problems

behind this recommendation. Nevertheless, Whitthorne continued

to listen to Luce's advice while serving in the House of

Representatives and, later, the Senate. In this relationship, Luce

had found an outlet in Congress for his views.

It was during this same fertile period in Luce's thinking that he

came into contact with Col. Emory Upton, 1 4 then at the Artillery

School at Fort Monroe, Va. In 1877 Luce had been giving a

considerable amount of thought to establishing an advanced

school for naval officers. Some years later he wrote to his friend

W.C. Church, "I used to talk to my old and lamented friend Genl.

Upton about it a great deal. He was very enthusiastic and urged me

on to make a move in regard to it. But I have never seen my way

clear till now."1 5 The opportunity came for Luce in 1882 with his

assignment as the senior member of a commission to study and to

make recommendations on the conditions of navy yards and naval

stations. It was during the year that he was engaged in this work,

that he was first able to closely associate with a Secretary of the

Navy and present to him his ideas on naval education, strategy,

and administration.

The beginnings of the Naval War College, its conception, and

the early steps Luce took to get it established are clouded in some

mystery and not a little myth, 16 but on 8 March 1884 Luce

finally presented to the Secretary of the Navy a draft of a general

order establishing the school. Secretary Chandler appointed Luce

14

Col. Emory Upton (1839-1881) held the rank of brevet major-general during the

Civil War. He was the author of A New System of Infantry Tactics and Military Policy of

the United States (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1907).

1

Luce to W.C. Church, 2 November 1882, Church Papers, LC.

The Luce papers for this period are sketchy at best. Better sources exist in Luce's

letters in other collections, especially those of Senator Nelson W. Aldrich (1841-1915) of

Rhode Island and William C. Church (1836-1917) founder-editor of the Army and Navy

Journal. Both collections are in the Library of Congress. Some of Luce's later correspondence relating to this period indicates that he was not clear in his own mind

about events back in 1884. See also Ronald Spector, "Professors at War: The Naval War

College and The Modern American Navy," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale

University, New Haven, Conn., 1967.
12

to head a board which would elaborate on the subject and make

specific recommendations. The board consisted of Luce, his

sympathetic friend, Comdr. W.T. Sampson, and Lt. Comdr. Caspar

F. Goodrich.

The report of the board, submitted 13 June 1884, concisely

made the argument for establishing an advanced school of naval

warfare and went on to consider the curriculum and location.

Washington, Annapolis, New York, Newport, and Boston were all

mentioned, but only the last two were critically examined.

Newport was favored over Boston because in Rhode Island the

college could be located close to a promising fleet base where a

school of application could be established. At the same time the

facility would still be close enough to "the Hub" to ensure that

eminent talent from Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology, and other centers could easily visit the school.

The Naval War College was established by General Order 325 of

6 October 1884, and the first course was presented from 4 to 30

September 1885. The account of the actual opening has become

apocryphal, no doubt blending truth with an element of drama.

According to at least two accounts, before unlocking the door to

the newly acquired building, Luce invoked the blessing of the

Father, Son, and Holy Ghost on the former almshouse and made

the sign of the cross. Whether truth or legend, the call for divine

aid caused some wits in Washington to dub the new institution

"Trinity College."

The Naval War College remains the most important single

contribution made by Luce. For him all parts of the Navy came

together there as a kind of brain for the naval corpus. It was not

an intellectual refuge against technological innovation, but a place

where the burgeoning technology could be effectively harnessed.

At an early time, Luce saw the interrelationship between the fields

of military and naval power and technology and international

politics. While he himself was not equipped to provide the original

theories which could tie these diverse elements together, he

perceived the need to do so. Aside from his central role in

establishing the Naval War College and creating its curriculum,

Luce's crucial task was to choose the men who would carry out his

program. He chose men for his faculty who he believed could

provide the intellectual contribution which he felt the Navy

needed. As the individual who could at once develop new and

improved theories of naval tactics and contribute to the understanding of practical problems found in controlling a rapidly

developing, technically oriented fleet, Luce chose Lt. William
13

McCarty Little. Eventually Little would be the man who adapted

and developed naval war gaming for this purpose. As the theorist

and historian who could elucidate on the interrelationship

between national power and naval capability, Luce chose Capt.

Alfred Thayer Mahan. These men were only two of many, but

they were certainly the most successful in solving the problems

which Luce had set before them.

The Naval War College was conceived as only part of Luce's

larger scheme for the systematic development of the Navy, but in

the latter portion of his lifetime, it became the aspect to which he

devoted the majority of attention. Even after its establishment,

the development of the War College along the lines which Luce

had envisioned was not assured. The history of the Naval War

College is not only the story of a battle for survival, but also an

effort to retain a conception of curricular study which emphasized

the development of naval science, intellectual stimulation rather

than the mere training of officers in already preconceived ideas. In

both these aspects Luce led the effort and advised those who

followed him. 1 7 A year after its opening, Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce turned the

presidency of the Naval War College over to Capt. Alfred T. Mahan

and took command of the North Atlantic Squadron. Although

markedly successful in this important command, Luce experienced

some disappointment. The War College comprised only the

theoretical part of Luce's plan, and it should have been supplemented by a permanent squadron of evolution, a sort of seagoing

laboratory where the theoretical work of the college could

regularly be tested. Luce tried to make the North Atlantic

Squadron fulfill this function, but his hopes were not completely

fulfilled.

There were several factors contributing to this: the poor

condition of the majority of ships which made them unsuited for

such work, unsettled conditions in Caribbean and Canadian waters

which kept the squadron scattered, and an unfortunate feud in

1887 with the Secretary over the difficult Canadian fisheries

question.

Arising from a difference of interpretation concerning American

fishing rights in Canadian waters, Luce's deep interest in international law and politics led him into direct dealings with the

1 7 See Spector, op. cit. Since many of Luce's ideas were derived from Britain and

British experience, it is interesting to compare these developments there in officer

education. See the excellent study by Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff

College, 1854-1914 (London: Methuen, 1972).
14

Commanding Officer of the Dominion Fisheries Service. The

answers which Luce obtained from him regarding the Canadian

position on the issue were distributed by Luce to American

fishermen. By giving the fishermen the opportunity to understand

the Canadian position, Luce believed that he was warning the

fishermen and preventing them from getting into trouble with the

Canadian authorities. Luce's initiative in the matter was widely

reported in the newspapers, but a large segment of public opinion

saw Luce's action as an outright recognition of the Canadian

claims. Luce was reprimanded for not consulting the State

Department on a matter which was under negotiation at the

highest levels. Secretary of the Navy W.C. Whitney ordered Luce

to withdraw his circulars.

Luce further incurred the wrath of the Secretary when

interviewed by a New York journalist shortly after the event.

Deeply embarrassed by the situation and still defensive, Luce

unwisely referred to the Secretary of the Navy in a quotation from

Shakespeare:

"... Behold the great image of authority:

A dog's obey'd in office." 1

Shortly thereafter Luce offered his resignation of the North

Atlantic Squadron. In an interview with Secretary Whitney, Luce

explained that his intention had only been to protect the

well-being of the American fisherman; he had not considered that

it might be interpreted in such a way as to compromise the

American negotiating position. In refusing Luce's resignation,

Secretary Whitney wrote "[I] am satisfied that you should retain

your present command. Your handling of the squadron at sea and

the practice in tactics and fleet movements which you have given

your officers during the last year, are especially to be commended."1 9 The exercises for which the Secretary commended Luce were

indeed the high points of his command. It was on these occasions

that the squadron was used as a squadron of evolution and first

exercised tactically as a fleet. Adapting the theories used on the

war gaming boards at the Naval War College, Luce applied them to

practical tests with real ships and men. Most importantly for the

future development of tactical doctrine, he emphasized coordinaThe newspaper clipping containing the quotation from King Lear, act IV, scene 6, line 63, may be found in the papers of Secretary W.C. Whitney, LC.

19Whitney to Luce, 23 September 1887, Luce Papers, LC. For reports of the

squadron exercises see bibliography items 76 and 83.
15

tion between land and sea forces during amphibious assaults and in

attack on coastal fortifications. Using the entire squadron as a

single tactical unit, Luce was able to demonstrate in practical

terms some of the problems in joint operations. Thus, he

succeeded in contributing to a broader perception of fleet control

and employment.

Required by law to retire from active service on his 62nd

birthday, 25 March 1889, Luce advanced his retirement a month

and a half at his own request. On 16 February 1889, without

ceremonial fanfare on board Galena at Key West, Fla., he simply

had his flag hauled down at sunset. By 23 February he was at

home in Newport, a distinguished retired officer, ready to devote

himself completely to being a writer and adviser on naval affairs.

He plunged directly into naval politics with his campaign to

preserve the unique character and function of the Naval War

College, which had been consolidated with the Torpedo Station on

Goat Island in January 1889. His first letter dealing with this

problem was mailed to Senator Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island

on 4 March 1889, the day the friendly Republican administration

of President Benjamin Harrison took office.

"Permit me," he wrote the Senator,

to congratulate you on the success of your efforts to gain

Congressional recognition of the College. That is a great point

gained. And the appropriating of $100,000 for it is a handsome and substantial evidence of appreciation.

The next important step is to have the site changed from

the location designated by Congress2 ° to where it was first

placed.2 ! On 14 March he mailed a long letter to the new Secretary of the

Navy, Benjamin Franklin Tracy, unequivocally stating the problem

as it related to the Torpedo Station, the Naval War College, Goat

Island, and Coasters Harbor Island. Luce pointed out in the letter

that there had been a measure of congressional misconception in

understanding the character of the two schools. Those who had

supported the consolidation of the Torpedo School on Goat Island

with the War College believed that they were schools of the same

genre which could be economically combined under one principal

and one faculty. Luce, however, pointed out that:

20 The Naval Appropriation Act of 2 March 1889 committed the money for a

building at Goat Island, where Secretary Whitney wanted the Naval War College merged

with the Torpedo School, instead of Coasters Harbor Island. 2 1 Luce to Aldrich, 4 March 1889, Aldrich Papers, LC.
16

Each one was unique, of its kind, and bore little or no

resemblance to any other institution in the land. One had to

do with Materiel the other with Personnel. One had to do

with the manufacture of a single implement of war; the other

with the intelligent uses of all implements of war. The sphere

of the one was limited to mechanical appliances and manual

training; the other was scientific, and embraced the widest

fields of research of the warrior and the statesman.2 2

It is no hyperbole to claim that this letter, in the hands of a

sympathetic Secretary of the Navy, was instrumental in saving the

Naval War College.

In the letter Luce also stressed the success of James R. Soley 's course of lectures in international law, "an indispensable branch of

the great study of war." Soley, the previous summer, had delivered

one of his Lowell Institute lectures on European neutrality during

the American Civil War. When in July 1890 Soley became

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, under B.F. Tracy, Luce was

spared further worries about the college while his friends were in

office. Luce could now turn his attention to other matters such as the Revenue Cutter Service, his duties as Commissioner-General

representing the United States at the Columbian Historical

Exposition in Madrid, and, later, his official orders to duty as a

retired officer, on the faculty of the Naval War College.

In July 1889 Luce published his article "Our Future Navy," one

of his most influential articles. 2 3 In this piece he stressed the great

need for battleships in the American fleet. Despite the popular

interest for the new steel cruisers that had recently been built,

Luce pointed out that the Navy was not yet an effective force for

the application of American national power. The fleet needed

balance in the form of battleships and cruisers. Each type of ship

was designed for separate functions, and they could not effectively

do each other's work. In an era of growing American imperialism,

this article sparked a great amount of interest and enthusiasm

among those who saw the Navy as an essential part of American

power. Predating the publication of Mahan's first Influence of Sea

Power book by 9 months, Luce outlined the course necessary for

America to take in order to construct a fleet which could exercise

power which Mahan had outlined in historical terms.

In this regard it is important to understand the close relation22

Luce to B.F. Tracy, 14 March 1889, Record Group 45, National Archives. Tracy

had taken office as Secretary of the Navy on 6 March 1889.

23

See items 86-87.
17

ship between Mahan and Luce in the publication of this work and

in the similarity of their ideas. In August 1889 Luce wrote to an

old friend for help in getting Mahan's book published. The book

was a collection of the lectures which Mahan had given at the

Naval War College, the first ever offered at the school. Luce

explained that "no one has urged Mahan more than I have to have

the first series of lectures published ..." After searching for a

publisher willing to bring out Mahan's work, Luce felt,

It is desireable now that he should "unload" as it were this

large amount of ms. to enable him to relieve his mind of its care &c &c that he may continue this very valuable work and

bring his history down to the present time. For you must

understand that this is but part of his work. He and his

collaborators are yet to develop from the lessons of the past

the Science of Modern Naval Warfare. In short I am justified

in saying that Mahan is doing for Naval Science what Jomini

did for Military Science. 24

Here is Luce, mentor, promoter, and agent for Mahan, helping to

make connections that would be important for Mahan's success

and encouraging him in a task which that writer found very

unpleasant: the search for favor and money. Luce's motives were

mixed in all this. He saw clearly the importance of Mahan's work

and the need for its publication. He knew as well that success for

Mahan in the wider world would justify his own work at the Naval

War College and help to ensure its perpetuation. Mahan, after all,

was dealing in his "Sea Power" studies with the assignment and

direction which Luce had provided. Luce was continually prodding Mahan to bring his work up to date, to make direct analogies

between history and contemporary problems, to generalize in a way which would have direct impact on the world of the 1890's.

Well acquainted with the substance of Mahan's lectures, Luce

wrote his article "Our Future Navy" in such a way that it made

the quantitative jump between theory and practice. Using history

as his basis, he recommended practical suggestions which would

lead to the development of a strong, versatile Navy.

By direct, active, and effective lobbying during the congressional sessions between 1890 and 1893, Luce devoted himself to

other maritime problems as well. He helped to prevent the

Revenue Cutter Service, later the Coast Guard, from being

24

Luce to J.S. Barnes, 5 August 1889, unsigned draft, Luce Papers, LC. Mahan's

manuscript was finally accepted for publication through another connection by Little,

Brown, and Co. of Boston in October 1889. The first copies came off the press in May

1890.
18

amalgamated with the Navy. At the time this union was being

advocated by both the Revenue Marine and many officers in the

Navy. It had the approval of the Secretaries of the Navy and

Treasury. The fact that Luce was able to organize substantial

opposition from among the Navy's senior grades that was able to

counterbalance the power of those supporting the proposal

demonstrated that his influence and leadership were still strong,

despite his retirement.

"I am afraid I have stirred up a hornet's nest—unwittingly—or

Tut my foot in it,'" he wrote Soley, "But having put my hand to

the Plough, cannot very well turn back-on the subject of Revenue

Marine bill."25

Luce's opposition to joining the two services stemmed from the

dissimilarity between their purpose and the nature of their

activities. The function of the Navy, he held, was military; that of

the Revenue Marine, civilian. The operating area of the first was

the high seas; that of the second, the coastal waters of the United

States. In event of amalgamation, some functions would likely be

neglected, while others were given preference. The sought after

improvement in the Revenue Marine was later achieved through

legislation relating to that service itself and reforms within it

beginning with the Act of 31 July 1894, requiring that a captain

of the Revenue Cutter Service be chief of this division in the

Treasury Department in place of a political appointee. 2 6 At the height of American public interest in overseas expansion,

Luce avidly supported those who wished to obtain American

colonial bases. As Commander in Chief of the North Atlantic

Squadron nearly a decade before, Luce had made many friends

and established numerous contacts in the Caribbean. In 1897 Luce

wrote a letter of introduction for the French consul at St. Thomas

in the Danish West Indies to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, in hopes

that the two men might discuss ways in which the Danish West

Indies could be easily transferred to American control. "The

policy of acquiring outlying territory for our protection," Luce

wrote Lodge, "once entered into, must continue up to a certain

point. The Sandwich Islands coming under the American Flag

must be followed by Cuba-peacefully, let us pray; and later by St.

25

Luce to J.R. Soley, 22 September 1890, Luce Papers, LC.

2 6 The reforms ended in 1915 with the amalgamation of the Revenue Cutter Service

and the Life-Saving Service as the U.S. Coast Guard. See Capt. S.H. Evans, USCG, The

United States Coast Guard, 1790-1915 (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1949).

Its first captain-commandant was Ellsworth P. Bertholf (1866-1921), who resigned in 1883 as a U.S. Naval Academy cadet, class of 1886, entered the USRCS, and was a member of the Naval War College class of 1895.
19

Thomas by purchase, at a very small figure."2 7 Nearly a year later,

shortly after Dewey's victory at Manila Bay, Luce would recommend that Lodge bring to the attention of President McKinley the

opportunity for the United States to seize the Spanish-held

Caroline and Ladrone Islands in the Pacific. 28 Luce was no

solitary voice in these matters, but it is significant that a leading

naval officer was directly encouraging the Government to move

along expansionist lines.

Shortly after the turn of the century, Luce once again turned

his interest toward the U.S. merchant marine and its people. In

1904-1905, an attempt was made to revive the ailing American

merchant marine encouraged to some extent by Winthrop L.

Marvin's 1902 book The American Merchant Marine. Interest

raised by this work resulted in the formation of the Mercantile

Marine Commission by Congress with Jacob H. Gallinger, the

powerful Republican Senator from New Hampshire, as chairman

and Marvin as secretary. Marvin asked Luce's help and invited him

to appear before the commission.

As usual, he went to considerable effort to assist the commission. The conference was held in Newport in the summer of 1904,

and during its proceedings Luce was able to interest several of the

participating active-duty admirals in the problem. Luce, the only

retired officer in the group, prepared a letter to Senator Gallinger

to be forwarded through the Secretary of the Navy. Capt. Charles

S. Sperry, President of the War College, added a strong endorsement, as did the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Both the

Secretary and Capt. A.T. Mahan testified before the commission.

Luce, in his testimony, read the letter. "A navy" he stated,

"may be said to be the offspring of foreign trade . . . Our own

history furnishes a conspicuous example of an extensive commerce

giving birth to a navy."29 He then discussed the contributions

27

Luce to Lodge, 25 June 1897, Luce Papers, LC. The first serious suggestion for

American purchase of the Danish West Indies was made in 1865. A treaty was ratified by

Denmark in 1867 but never approved by the U.S. Senate. A second treaty was concluded

in 1900, but the Danish legislature refused to ratify it. In 1917, after a plebiscite in the

islands and at the height of fears that Germany might establish a naval base in the

Caribbean, as Luce had hoped, the islands passed to the United States at "a very small

figure," $25 million.

28Luce to Lodge, 10 May 1898, Luce Papers, LC. The United States acquired Hawaii

in July 1898. Guam was taken in 1898, but the remainder of the Ladrone or Marianas

Islands with the Caroline Islands were sold to Germany in 1899 by Spain. Following

World War I, they were mandated to Japan in 1920. The two island groups are part of

the United Nations Trusteeship of the Pacific Islands and have been under the

jurisdiction of the United States since World War II. 29

Luce to J.H. Gallinger, 17 November 1904, Luce Papers, LC.
20

made by merchant sailors in all our wars. However, he also

cautioned that the contest with Spain had proved the merchant

marine of 1898 insufficient to provide the reserves needed for

even a brief war with a third-rate power. Luce claimed that there

was still a need for sailing vessels and that even steamships

required sailors, not just men who had acquired the "sea habit."

He contrasted the good records of Japanese fishermen and

merchant seamen against those of the naval conscripts in Russia.

He called attention to the need for schoolships to maintain the

competency of merchant marine officers and then ended with a

plea for the subsidies necessary for that purpose. His efforts had

little immediate effect.

In the same year, 1904, the 77-year-old Luce took on one last

major task: the installation of military direction in the Navy

Department. Having met with little success toward this goal in

earlier years, he vigorously attacked the problem again. Luce's

early articles on naval administration had been primarily directed

toward this goal. Even in the midst of the Spanish-American War,

he had complained to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge that the "Navy

Department is not organized for a state of war."30 In Luce's

opinion, the Navy needed centralized direction by professional

officers for the efficient conduct of naval operations.

In 1902 and 1903, the annual reports by the Chief of the

Bureau of Navigation, Rear Adm. Henry C. Taylor, had pointed

out that the Bureau could not efficiently handle both the

administration of naval personnel and the formulation of war

plans. Secretary of the Navy William H. Moody and President

Roosevelt concurred in Taylor's opinion, and both urged the

Congress to create a naval general staff similar to that which had

been provided for the Army. In April 1904 hearings were held

before the House Committee on Naval Affairs to consider a direct

link between the General Board and the Secretary. There was a great deal of opposition to this proposal. The Bureau Chiefs feared

encroachment on their own departments, while Congressmen

feared a decline in civilian control of the military.

In the midst of this rising controversy, Luce took a radical

position. He proposed not merely an adviser, but an entirely new

office which would have the responsibility for fleet operations. In

a letter to Henry Taylor on 25 June 1904, Luce wrote,

Up to the present time no Secretary has recognized the fact

that naval operations should be included among his duties.

30 Luce to H.C. Lodge, 24 May 1898, Luce Papers.
21

Let this grave oversight be repaired at once by an Executive

Order creating under the Bureau of Navigation the Office of

"Naval Operations." . . . The Office should be placed in

charge of an officer of rank and one of recognized qualifications for its duties. His relations with the Secretary will be

close and confidential. He will be the Secretary's adviser on

all questions of a military nature . . . The duties of the office

will be such as would have gone to the General Staff had one

been created. Thus will the Secretary obtain, under the law,

the substance of a General Staff without the empty shadow

of the name. There is no such thing as spontaneous

generation. Plant the seed now and let it grow.

3 l The seed grew into the Aid for Operations and eventually the

Chief of Naval Operations. Its development, however, was slow,

and at first even Taylor had his doubts. He promised to bring the

suggestion to the attention of Secretary Moody before he left

office, but Taylor did have reservations. "If we plant this other

seed that you suggest," he wrote Luce, "I am afraid the two plants

would not grow together well."3 2 Luce pressed forward and in March 1905 his article "The

Department of the Navy" appeared after having been awarded an

honorable mention in the Naval Institute Prize Essay contest. On

being published, he sent a copy as his latest plea for an improved

naval organization to Admiral of the Navy George Dewey. "The

time for action has come," he wrote Dewey, "I have a plan of

action which I would like to lay before the General Board . . . "3 3 Appearing before the Board on 31 March, he outlined in detail his

proposal and urged the Board to take immediate action in support

of an Executive Order that would activate the plan without

waiting for Congress. Legislative sanction, he believed, would

follow as a matter of course, as it had for the Naval Academy, the

Torpedo Station, the War College, and the naval training service.

The matter was considered, but no action was taken.

On 9 July 1906 Luce wrote a letter to Mahan which was to

eventuate into the latter 's last book Naval Strategy. In it Luce,

after reminding his friend that the Mahan Lectures were still part

of the Naval War College curriculum, also wrote:

I venture to suggest, now, that you should revise these

lectures, and bring them up to date, . . . showing how the

31 Luce to H.C. Taylor, 25 June 1904, Luce Papers, LC.

32

H.C. Taylor to Luce, 29 June 1904, Luce Papers, LC.

Luce to Dewey, 24 March 1905, Dewey Papers, LC.
22

principles you have laid down have been illustrated in actual

practice, and pointing how, and where, those principles have

been ignored or violated. You have made a great reputation

by your work on Sea Power, this last work will be, in effect,

the capstone, as it were, of the great monument you have

reared, .... Mahan did so and Naval Strategy appeared, after 3 years work, in

November 1911, 1 month before Luce published his last essay.

34

In November 1906, the Annual Report of Secretary Charles J. Bonaparte stated that radical reform of the Navy Department was

necessary. However, he soon left it to become Attorney General. In

April 1907, during a visit to Washington, Luce gave the new

Secretary copies of his articles on naval administration and several

papers on naval efficiency, all with little apparent effect. When

Luce returned to Washington 3 weeks later, he found that

Secretary Victor Metcalf intended to rely on the Congress which,

he felt, would certainly take up the matter at the next session.

Luce was not to be put off. In early October he took advantage

of a general order soliciting "suggestions to improve the efficiency

of the Navy" to again propose that an office of "Naval Operation"

be established which would supervise the military operations of

the fleet. Again, no action was taken as politicians and bureaucrats

thwarted the reformers. However, the climate improved in

December 1907 as the Navy reentered the public spotlight. The

Great White Fleet started its well-known cruise around the world,

and the hearts of the Nation sailed with it. With the Navy in the forefront, McClure's Magazine published

an article in January 1908 entitled "The Needs of the Navy" by

Henry Reuterdahl, an American editor for Jane's Fighting Ships.

Written with the encouragement of Comdr. William S. Sims, the

outspoken Inspector of Target Practice and recently appointed

naval aide to President Roosevelt, the article summarized many of

Sims' opinions on naval problems. Repercussions were heard in all

quarters. In February the Senate reacted with an investigation into

the problems brought to light by Reuterdahl and Sims.

Luce quickly saw that much of the trouble to which these men

pointed could have been avoided if the Navy had had more

effective central direction. In the spring Luce took up corre- spondence with Sims. Here was an opportunity to transmit his

views to the President through a sympathetic naval aide. The

34

See also Luce to Mahan, 15 July 1907, both in Luce Papers, LC; W.D. Puleston,

Mahan (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), pp. 97, 268, 290-291; and item 148.
23

Senate committee abruptly ended its investigation without recommendations, and it seemed essential to procure Presidential action.

While the Senate committee was falling into inaction, Sims and his

predecessor as naval aide, Comdr. Albert L. Key,3 5 brought to the

President's attention some serious design faults in the battleship

North Dakota, then under construction. The President appointed a commission at the Naval War College to investigate the matter.

This conference in Newport gave Luce and Sims the opportunity

to talk at length about the basic problems of naval administration.

In the midst of the conference, Luce wrote directly to the

President and suggested the establishment of a commission to

consider and to report upon the reorganization of the Navy

Department. Within 2 days the President replied that he would

carefully consider Luce's "very interesting suggestion."

In October 1908 Luce published his article "The Fleet" in the

widely read North American Review. Interest in naval reform

continued to grow. It appeared that by December a commission

would be appointed to consider the matter. "Hope on hope Ever!"

Luce wrote Sims, "We'll get there some time."36 They did. On 27

January 1909 President Roosevelt appointed a board headed by

former Secretary Moody. It included former Secretary Paul

Morton, Congressman Alston G. Dayton, and retired Rear Admirals Luce, A.T. Mahan, Robley D. Evans, William M. Folger, and

William S. Cowles. Through Luce's urging, the board completed its

work and submitted its recommendations to the President less

than a week before he was to leave office. Roosevelt immediately

forwarded the report to the Senate, but no action was taken.

When the new administration of President William Howard Taft

took office on 4 March, the new Secretary of the Navy, George

von Lengerke Meyer, immediately began to study the matter.

Detailed plans were drawn up by a board headed by Rear Adm.

William Swift, and in November 1909 Meyer ordered, without

congressional authority, the establishment of a system of "aids"

who would act as professional assistants to the Secretary and serve

as an advisory council and general staff. The system was an

improvement, although it did not represent the complete reformation that Luce and others had sought. It was a beginning, but it

would take more than 5 years for Congress to finally authorize a reorganization of the Navy Department and provide for a Chief of

35 Commodore Albert Lenoir Key (1860-1950).

36 Luce to Sims, 29 December 1908, Sims Papers, LC.
24

Naval Operations "charged with the operations of the fleet, and

with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war."3 7 Other men were responsible for bringing this task to fruition,

primarily Rear Adm. Bradley Fiske3 8 and Congressman R.P.

Hobson39 of Alabama.

The effort to obtain strong military direction for the U.S. Navy

was Luce's last great project. Shortly after he published his last

article in December 1911, Luce became quite ill. He never again

wrote another article ; his efforts to influence the administration of

the Navy subsided. The 84-year-old gentleman retired to his home

at 15 Francis Street in Newport. There he died on 28 July 1917

shortly after his 90th birthday. His funeral was conducted in the

simple, but impressive, Episcopalian liturgy amidst the colonial

dignity of Trinity Church. Apprentices from the Naval Training

Station lined the route to St. Mary's Churchyard, on the eastern

side of the island, where Luce was buried beneath a simply

inscribed black stone slab.

II

The contributions of Stephen B. Luce to his profession are

difficult to measure. He was a teacher, a writer, an organizer, and

an administrator, but more importantly he was the leader and the

inspiration for several generations of American naval officers. In

his own time his impact was large, but Luce's major contributions

were for the most part intangible, a legacy for the future. The

opinions of his contemporaries perhaps best intimate the nature of

his impact. John S. Barnes, an able Civil War officer who served

with Luce in two ships and at the Naval Academy and who later

resigned to pursue a successful legal and business career, wrote of

him:

Stephen B. Luce, all through his distinguished career was

one of the most capable officers in our or any navy. Besides

his professional accomplishments, which were great, his

37The Act of 3 March 1915.

38

Rear Adm. Bradley Allen Fiske (1854-1942) held more than 60 patents, including

the stadimeter, gunfire control systems, and torpedo bomber. He served as Aid for

Operations (1913-15) and wrote The Navy as a Fighting Machine (New York: Scribner,

1916).

39

Capt. Richmond Pearson Hobson (1870-1937) graduated at the head of his Naval

Academy class in 1889. He was awarded the Medal of Honor for exploits at Santiago

during the Spanish-American War. He resigned from the Navy in 1903 and served in Congress from 1907 to 1915.
25

scientific and literary knowledge, increased by constant

studying and reading, made him an ideal naval officer, fitted

to fill any office with dignity and power within the scope of

government action. My intercourse with him, then and later,

I regard as one of the most fortunate intimacies of my life.

4 ° A.T. Mahan in the introduction to one of his books credited

Luce entirely for providing him with the direction for his career,

something that he had not been able to find by himself.4 1 Adm. David D. Porter wrote of him to Assistant Secretary Fox:

"He is a straightforward fellow and nature has not given him soft

manners possessed by people who are all smiles to your face and

abuse you behind your back."4 2 Bradley A. Fiske wrote in an obituary in the Proceedings of the

U.S. Naval Institute in 1917:

Luce taught the Navy to think, to think about the Navy as a whole. . . . More clearly than any other man in American

history he saw the relations that ought to exist between the

central government and its military and naval officers

. . . Luce saw strategy as clearly as most of us see a material

object. To him, more than any other officer who ever lived are naval officers of every nation indebted for the understanding they have of their profession.4 3 Robley D. Evans described him as "that master of his trade,"44

and Dudley W. Knox: "I never knew an officer to speak ill of

him."4 5 Luce's biographer, Albert Gleaves, wrote: "To such as he,

there is no successor."4 6 To understand why influential men of his time were so deeply

affected by Luce, the modern day historian must turn to the

letters and published writings which he left behind. Much of his

J.S. Barnes, "My Egotisography, " pp. 112-133, Barnes Papers, Naval Historical

Society Collection, New-York Historical Society.

4

A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire

1793-1812 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1893), p. vi. 42

D.D. Porter to Gustavus Fox, 21 April 1866, Fox Papers, Naval Historical Society

Collection, New-York Historical Society.

B.A. Fiske, "Stephen B. Luce, An Appreciation," United States Naval Institute

Proceedings, vol. XLIII, No. 9, September 1917, pp. 1935-40. In his autobiography

From Midshipman to Rear Admiral (New York: Century, 1919), Fiske dedicated the

volume to the memory of Luce, "who saw the light before others saw it and led the

Navies toward it." 44

R.D. Evans, A Sailor's Log (New York: Appleton, 1902), p. 44.

45

D.W. Knox m a conversation with John D. Hayes, August 1954.

46 Albert Gleaves, Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce (New York:

Putnam, 1925), p. 256.
26

personal correspondence was deliberately destroyed by Luce,

himself, and by his wife after his death. What remains, in the most

part, is what he wanted to be remembered: his professional life.

Luce's thoughts and words on paper over the years fall roughly

into eight categories: (1) practical sea training, (2) youth and the

Navy, (3) officer education, (4) naval history, (5) naval administration and organization, (6) naval warfare, (7) military ethics, and

(8) a few general subjects. Unlike some other writers, the body of

Luce's writing does not demonstrate a readily discernible progression from beginning to end. An analysis of each category,

however, shows the development of his thought on that particular

subject. Because he sometimes thought about these categories

simultaneously and wrote of them at about the same time, a

complex interrelationship developed. This interrelationship can

best be appreciated by briefly examining each category in turn and

then viewing the broad aspect of his writing.

In the area of practical sea training, Luce's major contribution

was his textbook on Seamanship. As each edition appeared, Luce

ensured that the new aspects of shiphandling in steamships were

considered, along with guidelines for the newly popular fore-andaft sailing rig. His attention to these matters demonstrated his

continuing interest in the practical aspects of the art, and as such

his text provided up-to-date information for the Academy

midshipmen.

At the same time, of course, Luce was an advocate of training

under sail as the most appropriate method of teaching practical

maritime skills. Not one to be reactionary or anachronistic, Luce

strongly believed that practical experience under sail would teach

a young man more about the basic nature of ships than experience

in any other type of vessel. This opinion is still shared by

significant portions of the maritime world today.

Luce's other textbooks, his small gunnery book, The Young

Seaman's Manual, and contributions to the naval signal book are fragments of his larger contribution to practical training. However,

all of them are devoted to his effort in obtaining a standard

routine for all drills, maneuvers, and evolutions at sea. Textbooks were only part of Luce's literary contribution to

training. Within a decade after his first text appeared, he had

expanded the scope of his work to the broad problems of a

training system.

Closely connected with Luce's interest in training were his

extensive writings for Youth's Companion. These articles, written

for American youth and designed to arouse an interest in naval
27

careers and sea life, emphasized the romance of the sailing era and

the stalwart character of seamen. Written after his retirement,

these articles carry with them a great feeling of nostalgia for the

"Old Navy" of Luce's youth, yet at the same time, they express a

hope that by thorough training, the future of the new steel navy

will be equally satisfying. The articles underscore his faith in

individual seamen as the greatest strength of the Navy.

The field of education was Luce's strong point. In every sense

of the word, he was a teacher, and he devoted his entire career to

the presentation of his concepts to the naval profession and to the

Nation. In his thinking he drew a sharp distinction between

practical training for specific tasks and the education of the mind

for creative functions. Representative of much that was popular

among the educational circles of his day, Luce's article "On the

Study of Naval Warfare as a Science"4 7 best reveals the substance

of his educational concepts. With Herbert Spencer, he believed

that education was an individual process whereby each person had

to discover for himself the nature of the world around him.

Largely for this reason, he established the methodology of the

Naval War College around individual reading and research.

Teachers were not to be sources of information, but rather to be

guides in a cooperative search for knowledge. For Luce and many

others, truth was something to be found in basic immutable laws

of nature which were fully ascertainable by individual men. At

that time the use of comparative study and analogy was popular in

the arts, as it was among scientists. The scientists had demonstrated that there were basic laws of the physical universe, and it

seemed logical that similar laws could be found in human nature.

These were ideas which Luce brought together and applied in his

own self-education and which he adapted to the Naval War

College. They were not unusual ideas at this time, and they were

not original with Luce. However, the depth of thought and the

successful application of these ideas were unusual in a navy.

Therein lies Luce's contribution.

By natural inclination, Luce endeavored to use history to

explain and solve problems. He accepted Lord Macaulay's dictum

that "no past event has any intrinsic importance; the knowledge of

it is valuable only as it leads to form just calculations for the

future." But he widened Macaulay's conception with his equally

firm belief that "History is philosophy teaching by example."

Luce, however, made no pretense of being a professional

47 Reprinted with commentary in chapter III.
28

historian. First and foremost he was a seaman and a naval officer:

an activist, not a cloistered scholar. The study of history, in his

mind, was merely the best means to an end. Remarkably

broadminded in his approach, Luce was able to select from a

plethora of historical data the evidence which he employed in his

arguments. Every item he used was designed to underscore his

argument and to relate to a current problem. There was no place

in his thinking for historical problems which were unique or which

were circumscribed by the conditions of their own time.

Luce devoted a large part of his writing to the subject of naval

organization and administration. He did so not because he liked

management problems as such, but because he saw this as the

sphere in which there was the greatest need for reform. Having

derived his interest in this subject from reflections on his own

experience during the naval campaign along the South Atlantic

coast in the Civil War, Luce felt that the Union Navy had failed

simply because the Navy Department was not suitably organized

to provide sound naval policy or feasible strategic plans. Appropriately, one of his first periodical articles, written in 1864, and his

last, written in 1911, were both on this subject. His writing at

every stage over this 47-year interval reflects the progress made

within the Navy for improved administration. Throughout, Luce

was highly influenced by the example of British naval administration. Time and time again he returned to the history of the Royal

Navy to search for examples which illustrated the proper

relationship between administration and the application of

strategy.

In considering the subject of naval warfare, Luce recognized a

great similarity between land and naval tactics. Although this

perception was not unusual in contemporary European military

thought, it was new in American professional thinking. Such a

prominent writer as Emory Upton acknowledged Luce's insight in

this regard as early as 1877.4 8 Luce used the close relationship he

saw between naval and military affairs as the foundation for some

of the educational policies which he established at the Naval War

College and promoted for the Navy as a whole. His reading of such

writers as Gen. Sir Howard Douglas and Gen. Sir Edward Hamley

reinforced his thoughts along these lines and encouraged him to

create analogies between the two forms of warfare. In later life he

would draw on the historical work of G.F.R. Henderson, John

48Upton to Luce, 16 October 1877, Luce Papers, LC; and Upton to Luce, 26 August

1878, U.S. Naval Academy Museum.
29

Fiske, and Brooks Adams to illustrate the correlations he found.

Luce's perception started with an analogy between military and

naval tactics, but as time went on it brought him to a broader

understanding of warfare in general. By midcareer he was able to

see beyond the purely naval point of view and to deal with the

interrelationship between naval and military tactics, strategy,

diplomacy, and national power. It was this area which he asked

Mahan to consider in writing his lectures for the Naval War

College.

A devout Episcopalian, he found himself faced, as had been his

mentor, Rear Adm. S.F. Du Pont before him, with the apparent

contradiction between the violence of war and the peaceful nature

of the Christian tradition. He resolved this problem by perceiving

the preparation for war as a means of its prevention, while giving

benefit through strength.

He concluded one of his two essays on this subject:

The flaming sword that guards the way to sinless Eden will

continue to prevail until man enters once more into that

peace which passeth all understanding, when the lust of the

eye and the pride of life shall no more be known. But mortal

man cannot yet discern the coming of that day.

Meanwhile let practical Americans recognize the truth that

war is a calamity that may overtake the most peaceful

Nation, and that insurance against war by preparation for it

is, of all methods, the most business-like, the most humane

and the most in accordance with the teachings of the

Christian religion.4 9 In considering this very difficult subject, Luce was able to

maintain a professional outlook while at the same time giving a sympathetic hearing to the viewpoint of those who opposed

military force, an opinion he found to be impractical.

One small group of writings stands in marked contrast to his

other work. They were the only pieces he ever wrote that did not

concern the Navy or the sea. These were three articles on what

might be called general subjects, 50 one a tribute to an Italian

"bone setter" who treated his son's dislocated hip, another on

extrasensory perception, and a third essay on dreams. He became

interested in these subjects in the mid-1870's when spiritualism

was in vogue. Luce's interest in these matters is not mentioned in

49 "The Benefits of War," p. 683. See items 94 and 124.

50

See items 23 and 42.
30

the biography by Gleaves. 5 1 Perhaps Luce wished to remove these

pieces from the record, as he eventually destroyed the vast portion

of his personal, nonprofessional correspondence. The reason may

never be known, but the articles that remain reveal a great deal

about the author. Each deals with a phenomenon that, on the

surface, seemed inexplicable; however, after careful analysis, Luce

was able to develop an understanding of the basic principles

involved and an appreciation for the problem presented. Here, as in his other writings, Luce examined and stripped away the

nonessential information and reduced the issue to its basic

elements. Dissecting these essentials, he then reached a conclusion

concerning what he saw as the basic nature of the problem. The

same procedure was characteristic of his approach to professional

issues.

Luce's approach to the mysteries of spiritualism was a "scientific" one. Under the influence of an era in American history when

the concept of scientific objectivity had reached a zenith in its

prestige, he believed, like many others, that human events could

be perceived in the same objective and analytical style used in

physics and chemistry. An accumulation of accurately perceived

historical facts could reveal, he thought, generalizations about the

basic nature of man and his activities. A study of naval history,

therefore, could reveal the basic laws which govern naval affairs.

Luce may have fallen victim to a false understanding of the

"scientific method," but neither scientists nor historians are

entirely free of the egocentric problem, and in dealing with the

broadest generalizations, they may both tend to interpret their

observations in terms distorted by their own viewpoints. While the

physical scientist may make fundamental assumptions which are

essentially neutral, those who deal in human affairs cannot. The

basic premises with which Luce and his followers built upon were

subjective, not objective, ones. The very choice of topics, for

example, "The Influence of Sea Power upon Nations" and the

development of "Modern Naval Science" revealed a personal and

professional predilection in an era of national expansion and naval

development. While the modern reader can appropriately criticize

this problem in Luce, it is essential at the same time to understand

sympathetically the nature of "scientific enquiry" as Luce and his

colleagues understood it. The scientific approach is an essential

approach to the naval profession. It is an elementary factor in the

intellectual forces which lead to the growth of professionalization

51

Gleaves, Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce.
31

in the Navy. Despite its basic flaw, this approach allowed men

such as Luce to see the Navy as an interacting system with a

variety of relationships. Through it Luce perceived the Navy as an

entity made up of many complementary elements, and thus he

could define in broad terms the scope of naval science or, in

modern terms, the naval profession. His interest in the comparative study of military history and in the naval history of all periods

led him to see the relationships among tactics, strategy, seamanship, technology, education, training, organization, and administration. A reading of all Luce's writings documents for us the very

direct interrelationship which he found among all the elements of

his profession. Each individual subject is interlocking and complementary with the others. The binding element is his concept of

a navy and the functions implicit in its being. Luce never wrote

down this general concept in its entirety, but it can be pieced

together from each of the parts.

Luce regarded the Navy as a flexible tool for applying force

from the sea in wartime. For a maritime nation, this application

must be closely allied with diplomacy and political purpose. He

saw that a navy, to fulfill its functions successfully, must be

efficiently controlled by men who are not only technically

proficient, but who understand the limitations and the implications in the use of force. With this basic thesis, Luce conceived an

administrative organization by which responsive control could be

maintained. To staff this system effectively, he promoted standardized procedures throughout the service, established a training

program for seamen and an advanced school of higher education

for officers who would establish naval policy, develop strategy,

and manage its functions. In short, Luce was a man with a basic

concept about the nature of a navy, and his lifetime goal was to

provide the structure for the U.S. Navy by which it could operate

under the principles he conceived.

As with many constructive thinkers and activists, the ideas he

built on rarely originated with him. Those on the study of history

came from Macaulay and Buckle, J.K. Laughton, and later, Mahan.

In tactics, his mentors were John Clerk, Paul l'Hoste, Jurien de la

Graviere, Sir Howard Douglas and Foxhall Parker. Ideas about

education came from Herbert Spencer, Henry Barnard, and Emory

Upton. In strategy he was influenced by the expansionists of his

own time, Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, as well as writers such as E.B. Hamley and Jomini.

He appreciated the technological revolution of his age and

adapted to it. He saw changes, accepted them, and rose above
32

them in order to preserve what he considered durable and

essential. The technology of the day caused many others to

become fascinated with its details, but Luce saw the innovations

of ship design and ordnance only as additional reasons for

improvement in education and administrative organization. This

new technology would be a detriment, he believed, unless it was

properly used and controlled. Education and organization were

the key areas from which to achieve these ends.

Luce was a man with an idea and a purpose. He sought to

implant his idea in the Navy and to form the Navy around it. By

writing for periodicals, specifically those journals through which

he could reach a particular audience, he was able to influence the

interest groups essential to his cause. Professional military and

naval officers were reached through the United States Naval

Institute Proceedings and the Army and Navy Journal, as well as the short-lived United Service. Scholars and professional literary

men were addressed in The Critic, and the leaders of the civilian

community were his audience in The North American Review.

Youth's Companion was widely read by youngsters and by their

parents. He chose the columns of the local Newport, R.I.,

newspapers as the best means to influence popular support at

home for his idea of a great naval base in Narragansett Bay. His

contributions to Johnson's Cyclopedia, Funk and W

Jagnail's

Dictionary, and Hamersly's Naval Encyclopedia gave him the

position of an authority and allowed some of his basic ideas to

become entrenched as standard concepts.

He also extensively used another literary means, personal

letters, to achieve his ends. He had a reputation for being the most

articulate and public relations-conscious flag officer of his day. He

had command of the North Atlantic Station when the public was

becoming conscious of its new seagoing arm. In response to this he

made himself readily available to provide comment and information to members of the press. As President of the Naval Institute

for more than a decade, he was the acknowledged leader of the

intellectuals in the service. He influenced a number of rising young

officers who considered him more of an associate than a senior:

Tasker Bliss, Henry C. Taylor, Robley D. Evans, French E.

Chadwick, Richard Wainwright, Bradley Fiske, William S. Sims,

William McCarty Little, and Alfred T. Mahan.

Through his own position and prestige, Luce obtained direct

access to several Secretaries of the Navy. While his ideas were not

always readily accepted, men such as Hilary Herbert, W.C.

Whitney, B.F. Tracy, and W.H. Moody, in particular, listened
33

carefully to what Luce said and read his letters with interest. The

relative degree of acceptance by these men was the measure of

success in Luce's endeavors. Little could be accomplished without

the support of the Secretary and as such the Secretary's office was

always the prime target in Luce's efforts. At times he needed to

employ the pressure of professional opinion, the public, the

Congress, and even the President, but in the end, the ability to

accomplish most of Luce's reforms lay within the power of the

Secretary and needed his approval and support.

Luce's personal contacts outside the Navy were particularly

important to the success of his endeavors. For example, while

serving as senior member of a board inspecting the New York City

reform schoolship Mercury, he came to know the elder Theodore

Roosevelt, then a charities commissioner for the State of New

York. Through this connection Luce met the commissioner's son,

a Harvard student and future President. Later, Luce arranged for

young Roosevelt to meet Mahan and to lecture at the Naval War

College a few years after Roosevelt's The Naval War of 1812 had

been published.5 2 Other useful connections were formed through

the marriages of Henry Cabot Lodge, Brooks Adams, and Luce's

son John, each to one of the three daughters of Rear Adm. Charles

Henry Davis. These personal connections encouraged Luce to

become an avid reader of Brooks Adams' writings, and their

influence may be found in Luce's own articles. Henry Cabot

Lodge, one of the Nation's leading expansionists, became a

receptive correspondent.

His literary works, of course, generated significant contacts in

themselves. Publisher Daniel Van Nostrand helped him get some

early articles into print. William C. Church, founder-editor of the

Army and Navy Journal and The Galaxy, had been with Luce at

Port Royal during the Civil War. A future editor of The North

American Review and Youth's Companion, William H. Rideing,

was launched on a literary career by Luce when he arranged for

the aspiring journalist to write an article for Harper's Monthly53

about the schoolship St. Marys. Others in his literary circle were

Jeannette and Joseph Gilder, founders and editors of The Critic;

Lloyd Bryce, editor of The North American Review; and John

Austin Stevens, author and founder-editor of the Magazine of

American History, as well as a neighbor in Newport, R.I.

52

S.B. Luce to T. Roosevelt, 13 February 1888, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, LC.

53 "Nautical School Ship 'St. Marys,'" Harper's New Monthly Magazine, vol. LIX,

No. 351, August 1879, pp. 340-49.
34

Through his position, his acquaintances, his letters, and his

articles, Luce made his ideas known and took the measures

necessary to implement them.

In evaluating the writings of Luce, one must remember that he

was a subjective thinker, the leader of a reform faction in the U.S.

Navy. He was strongly opposed in many of his plans, particularly

by those Navy Department Bureau Chiefs with vested interests

who saw his proposals as threats to their own power and position.

He was also opposed by officers who saw no need for advanced

education or for the type of theoretical work done by Mahan.

Many of the technicists in the service saw little point in

considering the broad aspects of warfare and preferred, instead,

that all professionals would immerse themselves in the new

technical developments of the era. Others were suspicious of

Luce's interest in the history of the British Navy at a time when

relations with England were strained. Those with opposing

viewpoints often tried his patience and were targets for his barbs.

As a result, Luce's writing often displays a pugnacious quality.

Stephen B. Luce was no theorist such as Clausewitz or Jomini.

Neither was he a Mahan nor a Corbett. Although he never wrote a detailed philosophical statement encompassing his beliefs, Luce's

major contribution to the U.S. Navy lies essentially in his

unwritten concept of a navy. As a leader, it was this vision which

he gave to his professional followers in the Navy. His writings were

a means by which he contributed to the development of a

practical, working framework on which the U.S. Navy could

operate as a coherent entity. In this regard his books and articles

illuminate only portions of his total vision. In each instance,

however, they show only what was necessary to a specific reform

or current problem. Although he took his ideas from a wide

variety of sources, perhaps his most signficant contribution must

be recognized in the transmission of many avant-garde ideas from

contemporary European military thought to the American Navy.

In one sense, Luce's work may be seen as an American naval

extension of the general trend in European military thought,

particularly evident after the Franco-Prussian War, to seek more

effective methods for military control.

Luce's ideas made their greatest impact in the early years of

American expansion. As the Nation moved outward from its

continental base, many could see that the Navy might play an

important role. Among those who were interested in further naval

development, any new idea had an audience. Luce himself brought

additional attention to his ideas by his own political efforts among
35

powerful and influential men, his stubborn insistence on the

veracity of his own opinion, and his effective leadership among

many promising young officers. In his own time, he served as a

catalyst for new ideas, ideas that in the future would be employed

and elaborated upon as fundamental perceptions in the development of American naval education, organization, administration,

tactics, and strategic theory. Taken with an understanding of the

ideological sources, along with an appreciation for the practical

results, the writings of Stephen B. Luce reflect a large part of the

intellectual foundation of the United States Navy in the 20th

century.
36

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37

CHAPTER II AN ADDRESS DELIVERED AT

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

NARRAGANSETT BAY, R.I., JUNE 2, 1903

By Rear-Admiral S.B. Luce, U.S. Navy.

Editors' Introduction

Stephen Luce's most enduring contribution to the U.S. Navy

was the Naval War College. In this address delivered at the opening

of the course in 1903, 18 years after he had founded the college,

Luce made his most succinct statement on the contribution which

he envisaged the college would make in developing more capable

naval officers.

Luce firmly believed that intensive study and intellectual effort

were necessary preparations for conducting successful operations

at sea. In Luce's mind those in command at sea needed to

comprehend more than the technicalities of their profession. They

needed a broad outlook through which their own actions could be

seen in the perspective of national and international affairs.

More than just a broad viewpoint for officers in general, Luce's

address reflects his own opinions on the place of the Navy in the

events of his day. One finds in this address a view of America's

new role in the world and a direct recognition of the shift from

European to global orientation in foreign policies. In this sense the

address is an important example of the understanding which an

influential officer had concerning the Navy's role at the turn of

the century.

This address was published in the United States Naval Institute

Proceedings, vol. XXIX, No. 3, 1903, pp. 1-8.

Mr. President 1 and Gentlemen :—

It is a great compliment to have been asked to welcome to the

College the class of officers who are to attend the course which opens

today, and one I highly appreciate.

At the time this address was given, French Ensor Chadwick (1844-1919) was

completing his term as President of the Naval War College. Chadwick was a strong

supporter of the ideas on historical criticism and the historical lessons of seapower which

were being promoted by Luce and Mahan. Chadwick later published The Relations of

the United States with Spain: the Spanish American War; The Graves Papers and Other

Documents Relating to the Yorktown Campaign, July to October, 1781; and Causes of

the Civil War, vol. XIX in Albert Bushnell Hart's The American Nation: a History.

Chadwick's contributions to the study of naval history are among the most important

made by a naval officer in this period.
38

I perform this duty with pleasure and in behalf of the President and

the faculty extend to you a hearty greeting.

As some members of the class are here for the first time, it will not

be out of place to say something of the aims and objects of the College.

Although called a College, this institution differs from other seats of

learning in having no teachers. A moment's consideration will show

why this must be so. As its name implies the principal object of the

College is the study of the Science and Art of War.

Now, war is a very large and comprehensive subject, and there are no

professors competent to teach it. It would be the height of presumption

on the part of the College to undertake to teach officers of mature

years -such as generally make up the classes in attendance -any branch,

whatever, of their profession, even the most elementary. All that the

College can do; all that it professes to do, is to invite officers to come

to it; and to offer them every facility for pursuing the study of the

highest branches of their profession. All here, faculty and class alike,

occupy the same plane, without distinction of age, rank, or assumption

of superior attainments. All are pursuing one and the same end-the

advancement of their profession. In the beginning I, myself, if you will

pardon a personal allusion, announced myself as one of the class in

attendance, and each succeeding year I have, when practicable, enrolled

myself with the class, and still find I have much to learn.

We speak, habitually, of the Science and Art of War. As a science it recognizes certain general principles which are just as applicable today

as they were in the time of the great Athenian admiral, Themistocles. 2 A strict adherence to those principles has not always insured victory, it

is true; but a violation of them either through ignorance or neglect, has

almost invariably led to defeat. Military writers have been careful to

warn us that although war, in its most extended sense, may be called a

science, yet it is not an exact science.

As an art, war is governed by rules which vary from age to age. Art,

it has been well said, may be learned but it cannot be taught. This is particularly true of the Art of War. It cannot be taught, excepting in so

far as one may teach oneself; and it is to offer to every officer the

opportunity of teaching himself that the College doors are open.

Naval Tactics, for example, is an art, proficiency in which requires

constant practice at sea, under conditions assimilating, as nearly as possible, to those of actual war. The rules of this art are laid down in

the Signal Book. Having mastered these rules, the student finds there is an extension of the subject, on which the Signal Book is silent, viz.: the

formations for battle. Military writers have called the former Minor, or Elementary, Tactics, the latter Grand Tactics, or the Tactics of Battle.

2 Themistocles (ca. 514-450 B.C.) was an Athenian statesman, admiral, and general.

Realizing the danger from Persia, as well as the inability of Athens to match Persian

strength on land, Themistocles encouraged the development of an Athenian fleet and

persuaded the Assembly to use the wealth from a rich new seam of Laurium silver for

the construction of a modern navy. As the dominant leader in Athens at the time of

Xerxes invasion, Themistocles was the main architect of victory at the battle of Salamis

in 480 B.C. As Thucydides wrote, "it may be said that through force of genius and by

rapidity of action this man was supreme at doing the right thing at the right moment."
39

A knowledge of the rules of minor tactics may be acquired in a comparatively short time. But grand tactics, or what may be designated

as the tactics of admirals, present such a variety of conditions as to defy

all rules. The successful conduct of a fleet, in battle, must depend very

largely today, as it ever has done, upon the genius of the commanderin-chief. An admiral may rely, for guidance in battle, upon the

inspiration of the moment, only when that inspiration is due to long

and conscientious self-culture in the line of his profession, not

otherwise.

It is to enable officers to prepare themselves for the hour of conflict

that the College has been opened.

Strategy is based on immutable principles -principles just as applicable today as when illustrated by the campaigns of the great captains

of an ancient civilization. As to naval strategy, in particular, your

attention is called to the fact that some of its most valuable work is that which is accomplished in time of peace. This subject also can be

mastered only by close study and reflection.

To the foregoing subjects must be added the laws of war, as treated

under the head of Marine International Law.

One of the first steps in the establishment of an institution

somewhat novel in its character, was to furnish the facilities for

carrying on these studies and to suggest certain lines that might be

followed to advantage.

The foundation once laid, it was assumed that those who were to

conduct the course, conjointly with those in attendance, would rear the

superstructure. To this end a few officers came together each one of

whom took up a particular branch of study. The results of those studies were given out in the form of lectures, and the freest discussion invited.

Contributions by members of the class in attendance were cordially

invited and gratefully received. Such is the case today. In short the

College is, to borrow a term from political economy, a sort of

cooperative or joint-stock affair, where all work in unison for the

common good.

The next step in the process of development was to get at the

philosophy of navies, to show the reason of their being, their influence

on the destiny of the state, and their true functions in peace as well as

in war. The necessity of a navy to a maritime state having been shown,

then its relative proportions were to be determined, as well as its character due to the position held by the state in the great family of

nations, and the foreign policy sought to be carried out -whether the

attitude of the state was to be purely defensive, or whether it was to be

the offensive-defensive, that is to defend by assuming the offensive. If

the latter then to show the necessity at all times for an advanced state

of preparation. Thus was emphasized the fact that one of the most

important factors of naval strategy belongs essentially to a time of

profound peace.

These and kindred subjects are among the largest and most

important that can engage the attention of the statesman and naval

administrator.

That is the meaning of this College. It is a place of original research
40

on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with

war, or the prevention of war. That "war is the best school of war," is one of those dangerous and

delusive sayings that contain just enough truth to secure currency: he

who waits for war to learn his profession often acquired his knowledge

at a frightful cost of human life. We have often heard of the "Chess-board of European Politics." The

game-board, now, is the great globe itself; and America, by her very

geographical position, between two great oceans, is not the least

important of the several contestants.

It is related that a gentleman living in one of the Eastern States, once

remarked that the flow of the Mississippi was towards the north. His

father's plantation, he said, was on the left bank of the river, and often,

as a boy, he had noticed how the driftwood floated away to the right,

which was to the north. No argument could convince him to the

contrary. He had that evidence of his own senses and that was enough.

Business matters required that he should revisit the home of his

childhood. He sought the old steamboat landing, and there, just as he

remembered it, the waters were carrying the driftwood to the north. He

was right; right, that is, from the point of view of childhood. Watching

still the driftwood he saw it whirled about in an eddy. Looking farther

out he saw it carried by a counter-current beyond the bend of the shore

where he stood, and into the great body of the mighty river which

swept its resistless way to the gulf. This is not an inapt illustration of

the so-called anti-imperialist who looks at the little eddies and

counter-currents at his feet, and is blind to the great stream of human

progress which has been setting in one undeviating way since the world

began. "Westward the course of empire takes its way," can never become, to us, a hackneyed phrase. Its truth is receiving fresh proofs

every day. From the day of the battle of Salamis, when a small, but

highly disciplined Greek fleet beat back the tidal-wave of barbaric

invasion, to the day our flag was planted on the Great Wall of China3is a far cry indeed. But the laws of motion are immutable, in the one case

as in the other -in the flow of the great river, and the ever onward

current of human events. The Mississippi can not give back its waters to

their source; nor will the Star of Empire turn to the East.

Civilization is ever saying to the barbarian, and to the semi-civilized,

"accept the bountiful gifts of nature, or make way for those who will."

Thus there is a continual struggle for supremacy before which

barbarism is constantly retreating. The stream of human progress is still sweeping on; and woe betide those who oppose its course. This means

much for us, here, today.

Glance for a moment at the past and then contemplate the

possibilities of the future. The invention of the Mariner's Compass,4 the

3 Luce is, no doubt, referring to the city walls at Peking where American forces

fought during the Boxer Rebellion in August 1900, not the Great Wall along the

northern border.

Modern scholars place the first general, European use of the magnetic compass at sea in the 12th century. Chinese annals date the use of the compass from the period A.D.

1086-1093.
41

discovery of America, and the Reformation are three events which

mark distinct eras in the world's history -grouped together, in their

order of time, they illustrate in a remarkable manner the unity of

purpose in working out the destiny of man.

The Mariner's Compass enabled the navigator to seek for the lost

Atlantis amid the mysteries of an unknown sea; and led Columbus to a continent of vast proportions. Then came the Reformation when men

fled from their homes across the waste of waters for opinion's sake. In

the virgin soil of the new world new forms of political life germinated

and bore fruit. Colonization followed. Oppression drove the colonies to

rebellion and new states sprung into existence. These United States were still sparsely settled when the tempting bait of gold, in California,

drew the tide of emigration across the mountains and peopled the

Pacific slope. Then came the war with Spain, and Hawaii, Guam and the

Philippines, those stepping stones across the Pacific, followed.

The world is growing impatient for an isthmian canal and will brook

no frivolous excuses for delay.

5 Strategic points in the Caribbean, and

in the Pacific, must be held and strengthened; and coaling stations and

repair shops, under ample protection, must be provided.

The Monroe Doctrine alone demands a careful consideration of these

questions.

Our Mercantile Marine. -An intelligent study of naval policy must

necessarily include our shipping interests. The military marine and the

mercantile marine are interdependent. The navy, while policing the sea, protects our foreign commerce, and in time of war, finds there its greatest reserves. It was once observed that we had "clipped the wings"

of commerce and driven our carrying trade to foreign bottoms. The

same is practically true today. Thus we are not only contributing

indirectly to the support of foreign navies, which may some day be

opposed to our own; but we are depriving ourselves of what would

prove, in time of war, an auxiliary of incalculable value.

The remedy for this deplorable state of affairs must, necessarily be

left to the wisdom of Congress. But the navy, with no other interest in

the question save that dictated by the highest sense of patriotism,

discharges an imperative duty, in urging as a military necessity, the

re-habilitation of our mercantile marine.

These and kindred subjects belong to the strategy of peace, each

topic finding its place in the College course. The imprisonment of American Missionaries, and the massacre of

Christians, by those under Turkish rule,

6 are a constant source of

Serious American interest in building a canal began with explorations which were begun in 1870. Five months after this address was given, the United States obtained

exclusive right to the Panama canal route in the wake of the Panamanian Revolution in

November 1903. The canal was opened in 1914.

Here Luce is referring to the Turkish massacre of Armenians in 1894-95. Until

1901 the major American difficulty with Turkey was the U.S. demand that an indemnity

be paid for damages to missionary property during the Armenian troubles. After

considerable diplomatic effort,\highUghled~by~the appearance of the battleship U.S.S. Kentucky at Smyrna and the call of her captain, Colby Chester, on the Sultan in

Constantinople, Turkey paid approximately $90,000 on the claim. In order to save face,
42

irritation to the people of this country; and may some day strain our

foreign relations to the point of rupture. On the other hand the

preservation in China, of what has come to be known as the "Open

Door,"7 a policy essential to our commercial interests, requires

unremitting attention. With the map of the world constantly before us we must need be ever at the switch-board to keep in touch with

whatever may be affecting our interests, hour by hour, in one quarter

of the world or another.

Change, continual, unremitting change is the law of the universe.

The solid earth itself is in a constant state of flux. Stagnation means

atrophy and death. It is not enough for us to keep abreast of the times.

This College must be in the very front rank of the advance guard of

progress. To obtain some perception, however dim, of the future, we

must study the past. This teaches us that the civilization we now enjoy

was brought about by war. The proud position we, as a nation, now

occupy, was rendered possible only by wars, and future problems in the

destiny of man will be worked out through the instrumentality of the

sword. There is no escaping it. Tears and tirades are here of no avail.

We are no apologists of war. Heaven forbid! We simply regard it, from a common-sense point of view, as one of the many evils flesh is heir to. War is a dreadful scourge we all admit. It is a relic of barbarism.

We admit everything that can be said against war. But after all has been

said, no student of history, however superficial, can deny that through

that same dreadful scourge, ultimate good has been brought about. It has been so in the past, and, as far as human discernment can go, it must be so in the future.

War is not the only scourge man is heir to. Droughts, and resulting

famines, by which thousands of innocent people have perished, as in

India, through the slow torture of starvation, have proved more cruel

than wars, and without their compensations.

The recent war with Spain cost but few lives, and comparatively

little suffering, while Mt. Pele'e, on the Island of Martinique, 8 swept out

of existence an entire community of peaceful people. The war relieved

the Sultan disguised the indemnity payment as an installment on the cost for a new

Turkish cruiser, Medjidie, to be constructed at the Cramp shipyard in Philadelphia. The

ship was delivered to Turkey in early 1 904.

In another incident during September 1901, an American missionary, Miss Ellen

Stone, was kidnapped by Macedonian brigands and held for 5 months. Miss Stone's case became a cause celebre in American church circles. Nearly $70,000 was raised by public

subscription in the United States. This sum was used to secure her release in February

1902.

7 The U.S. "Open Door" policy was stated in a series of diplomatic notes issued by

Secretary of State John Hay in 1899. Basically, the policy was a reflection of the U.S. concern that China might be parceled out into exclusive spheres of influences by other

nations. The United States proposed that China remain territorially intact and

independent but that nations which had special concessions in China should maintain the

5 percent Chinese tariff and, at the same time, allow all nations to trade in China

without discrimination.

8 Mount Pele'e erupted on 8 May 1902 and destroyed the city of St. Pierre. Some

30,000 people died in the disaster.
43

Spain of colonies that had become burdensome, and in a manner that

saved her honor. It was a war in the interest of civilization and human

progress. But what end is served by pestilence and famine, and those

convulsions of nature by which whole populations are swallowed up?

The answer is locked up in the mysteries of an inscrutable Providence.

All the Christian can reverently say is: "Thy will be done."

As between the various scourges inherited by man there is one

marked difference. No human foresight can provide against earthquakes

or volcanic eruptions or pestilence or famine. War, on the other hand,

may in certain instances, be averted. But mark this well: It may be

averted in one way only and that way is to be fully prepared for it. That is the meaning of this College: it is an instrumentality for the

prevention of war by being prepared for it. It is right here where the College joins hands with the Universal

Peace Societies. To be prepared for war is the role of that naval

strategy, which belongs to a period of peace. To be in the right place at

the right time, and with adequate force, means success by checkmating

your adversary in the first few moves. Campaigns have been won

without firing a shot simply by skillful strategic movements. War has

been defined as a question of positions and the most brilliant campaigns

have been worked out on the map. It is the business of this College to

study all the various problems of war as they may affect this country.

The possibilities, indeed the probabilities, of future wars, and our duties

in amply preparing for them, have been dwelt upon for the reason that

contrary doctrines have been publicly proclaimed.

Every right-minded person must unite with the Church in praying to

be delivered "from battle and murder and from sudden death." We all sincerely hope that arbitration may ultimately prove the sovereign

panacea for the great curse of war; and that the doors of the temple of

Janus may be forever closed. But Janus, though represented as a god, is also represented as "two-faced," and not always to be trusted; and

arbitration fails, unhappily, when most sorely needed.

Do we not recall how it was said of old that the Lord sent a lying

spirit to Ahab, King of Israel, that he might go up and fall at Ramoth

Gilead? 9 And how the god of the Greeks sent a spirit in the form of a "deluding dream" to Agamemnon on the plains of Troy? 1 ° "And thus the flattering Dream deceives the King!"

Beware of false prophets ! The race is not extinct.

It is quite unnecessary to explain to such an audience as I have the

honor of addresssing, that the College, itself, has no power, whatever,

to act; nor authority to formulate a naval policy. Its aim, as stated in

the beginning, is simply to invite officers to meet together to discuss

questions pertaining to the higher branches of their profession, and

enable each one, according to his own inclinations, to prepare himself

9

1 Kings 22.

Homer, The Iliad, book II. The quotation is from the translation by Alexander

Pope, book II, line 24.
44

for the highest and most responsible duties that can devolve upon a

naval officer.

One thing must be borne in mind At the firing of the first gun

proclaiming war, the so-called "inspiration of genius" may be trusted

only when it is the result of long and careful study and reflection.

Art is a jealous mistress; most of all so is the art of war.

If attendance here will serve, in any degree, to broaden an officer's

views; extend his mental horizon on national and international

questions, and give him a just appreciation of the great variety and

extent of the requirements of his profession, the College will not have

existed in vain.
45

CHAPTER III

THE INTELLECTUAL FOCUS:

ON THE STUDY OF NAVAL WARFARE AS A SCIENCE

"Science is applied knowledge.

By Rear-Admiral S.B. Luce, U.S.N.

Editors' Introduction

This article was presented as a lecture during the first session of

the Naval War College in 1885. It was revised by Luce for the

opening address at the second session on 6 September 1886. Subsequently, it was published in the United States Naval Institute

Proceedings. * Although the first session of the Naval War College had lasted

less than a month and was presented to only nine students, it had

been a definite success. For the moment, the fledgling school had

friends in Washington who supported Luce's plans for an ex- panded course during the second year. With the conclusion of the

first session on 30 September 1885, Luce and his small staff began

to prepare for the following year. The second course would last

nearly 3 months and have 21 students. Before the opening of the

second session, however, Admiral Luce was reassigned as Commander in Chief, North Atlantic Station.

Departing on 22 June 1886 to take up a command which he

hoped would develop into a squadron of evolution closely connected to the War College, Luce left the new school without a

president. Although Luce had attempted to have Capt. Alfred T.

Mahan assigned to the college staff as early as July 1884, Mahan

did not arrive in Newport until August 1886 to take up his duties

as professor, and now President.

After having arranged to have his flagship U.S.S. Tennessee in

Newport during the new course, Luce delivered the opening address, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science." In this

speech he elaborated on the ideas that he had set down in his

report to the Secretary of the Navy dated 13 June 1884 (bibliography item 75), and further refined the ideas in his article "The

United States Naval War College" (bibliography item 73), published in January 1885, even before the first course had opened.

*"On the Study of Naval Warfare As a Science," United States Naval Institute

Proceedings, vol. XII, No. 4, 1886, pp. 527-46.
46

This address is Luce's most complete expression of the intellectual concept behind the establishment of the Naval War College.

The ideas which he expressed earlier had neither been tempered by

the experience of the first course nor expanded by further reading

and reflection. For Luce, the simultaneous study of the principles

of military science and the opportunity to make comparisons between armies and navies at different points in history allowed

students to classify and to generalize about human experience in

warfare. Through an inductive method of reasoning by which a

person proceeded from thinking about specific events to making

broad generalizations and, at the same time, comparing and modifying these generalizations with tested principles, Luce believed

that a theoretical structure could be developed for naval science.

In the midst of a technological revolution in the world's navies,

Luce was proposing an intellectual method by which professionals

could develop the means to control more adequately the new

capabilities of a steampowered, steel navy. Luce clearly understood that one first had to develop an understanding, a strategy, of

what a navy was to do and why it existed, before one could

properly select the means, the tactics, and the weapons by which

it was to be done.

The article, in particular, emphasizes the complex intellectual

heritage behind Luce's concept. In an era when Great Britain and

France were the leading naval powers, one can clearly understand

the impact which professional developments in those countries

had on smaller navies. Certainly, Luce closely followed the latest

naval thinking in the most prominent professional journals of both

France and England. Luce's horizon was not limited only to the

professional sphere, however. He was a voracious reader of history

and literature as well. With Britain the dominant cultural center in

the English speaking world, much of his reading and writing re- flected a debt to British authors. Like many others in the 19th

century, he followed closely the latest developments in science

and technology. Perhaps something of a dilettante outside his own

profession, Luce did find in his own thinking a close interaction

between literature, science, technology, and education. His broad

reading in the popular literature of the day had a profound impact

on his professional contribution. In developing the theories behind

this article, Luce was profoundly influenced by his reading of men

such as the historian Thomas Buckle, the philologist Friedrich Max

Muller, and the naval writings of Gen. Sir Howard Douglas and

P.H. Colomb.

While this article draws its greatest importance from its elabora-
47

tion on the basis for a new direction in naval education, it is

important, too, for its relationship to the men who helped Luce

implement his ideas. Among the staff who found their general

guidance here were Army Lt. Tasker Bliss, a future President of

the Army War College and Army Chief of Staff; Professor James

R. Soley, international lawyer and future Assistant Secretary of

the Navy; Lt. William McCarty Little, an innovator of tactics and

the inventor of the naval war game; and the college's new President, Captain Mahan. In the course of their own careers, the contributions of each reflected something of the intellectual focus

that Luce expressed in this address. The first to reach fame was

Mahan. In 1886 he began the series of lectures that would be

published 4 years later under the title The Influence of Sea Power

upon History, 1660-1783.

Looking back on the address that had been an introduction for

Mahan's work at the Naval War College, Luce remembered his final

words, "... let us confidently look for the master mind who will

lay the foundations of that science and do for it what Jomini had

done for military science." Thirteen years later Luce would add,

"He appeared in the person of Captain A.T. Mahan."

Under date of May 3, 1884, the Secretary of the Navy appointed a board of three officers 1 to "report upon the subject of a post-graduate course for officers of the Navy."

The board so appointed met, and, after careful deliberation, re- ported, under date of June 13, that there was "not only a reason, but

an absolute necessity," for the establishment of such a school as con- templated by the order, the report dwelling most particularly on the

importance of the study of war and international law. Much stress was

laid upon the subject of war as the leading study of the proposed

school. The board expressed the opinion that "a cogent reason for such

a school was that there might be a place where our officers would not

only be encouraged, but required to study their profession proper

war-in a far more thorough manner than had ever heretofore been

attempted, and to bring to the investigation of the various problems of

modern naval warfare the scientific methods adopted in other professions." And this idea of the study of war according to a certain prescribed method pervades the whole report. It is the central idea of the

plan of operations, the very cornerstone, as it were, of the War College.

The report of the board was adopted, and in October the Navy

Department issued the following order:

The board appointed by Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler consisted of

Commodore Luce, President of the Board, and two members: Comdr. W.T. Sampson and

Lt. Comdr. Caspar F. Goodrich.
48

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49

"General Order No. 325.

"NAVY DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1884.

"A college is hereby established for an advanced course

2 of professional study for naval officers, to be known as the Naval War College. It will be under the general supervision of the Bureau of Navigation. The

principal building on Coasters' Harbor Island, Newport, R.I., will be

assigned to its use, and is hereby transferred, with the surrounding

structures and the grounds immediately adjacent, to the custody and

control of the Bureau of Navigation for that purpose," etc., etc.

3 "WILLIAM E CHANDLER,

Secretary of the Navy."

No immediate steps, however, were taken to carry out the order.

During the Second Session of the Forty-Eighth Congress the Senate

adopted a resolution (Feb. 4th) calling upon the Secretary of the Navy

for information in regard to an advanced course of instruction for naval

officers. In answer the Secretary wrote, under date of February 11,

1885, as follows: "The reasons which have controlled the action of the

Department are to be found in the recognized necessity for an advanced

course of military and naval education in the United States. There are now existing three schools for the purpose in the Army and one in the

Navy. 4 The latter is at the Torpedo Station at Newport, where a class

of officers is assembled for a few months in each year for instruction in

the art of manufacturing and using torpedoes and torpedo explosives.

The constant changes in the methods of conducting naval warfare imposed by the introduction of armored ships, swift cruisers, rams, sea- going torpedo-boats and high-power guns, together with the more rigid

methods of treating the various subjects belonging to naval science,

render imperative the establishment of a school where our officers may

be enabled to keep abreast of the improvements going on in every navy

in the world. The Torpedo School only partially fufils the imperative

requirements. The College is intended to complete the curriculum by

adding to an extent never heretofore undertaken the study of naval

warfare and international law and their cognate branches." (See Senate

The italics used throughout the text of the address are Luce's.

The remainder of the general order outlines the internal organization of the college,

specifies that the course of instruction will be open to all officers above the grade of

naval cadet, and states that Luce has been appointed "president of the college."

The two Army schools were the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Va., and the

Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. Luce published an extensive

commentary on the Artillery School in his article "War Schools." (See bibliography item

68.) The Torpedo Station was located on Goat Island less than a mile south of Coasters

Harbor Island and the Naval War College. The Torpedo Station was established in 1869

for the development of torpedoes, torpedo equipment, explosives, and electrical equipment. Until World War II nearly all torpedoes used by the U.S. Navy were manufactured

there. A practical course of instruction existed from the beginning, but in 1873 an

organized, 10-month-long course was begun.
50

Ex. Doc, No. 68, Forty-Eighth Congress, Second Session)5 From this it would appear that the War College is not, in the estimation of the

Department, for a post-graduate course merely, as that term is generally

understood, but for the higher and much more comprehensive purpose

of a greatly advanced course of professional instruction.

Now, it must strike any one who thinks about it as extraordinary

that we, members of a profession of arms, should never have

undertaken the study of our real business -war. For members of the

naval and military profession it should be not only the principal study,

but it should be an attractive study. War has been called a game, and as a game it possesses great interest to a majority of men, while to a

certain order of minds it has a positive fascination.

We find in civil life men who love to study the campaigns of the great

captains of history ; who read the life of Alexander the Great, made up

wholly of his campaigns, with the eagerness others peruse the pages of

romance, and who follow Caesar through Gaul, and Hannibal across the

Alps, with the keenest interest. No one can read the series of

manoeuvres, the play and counter-play of Turenne and his great

opponent, Montecuccoli; resulting in the untimely death of the former,

without a thrill of admiration for the skill displayed by these two

well-matched adversaries. 6 And, although confined entirely to the land

forces, such campaigns are replete with valuable lessons to the naval

officer. Marlborough, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Wellington, and

many of the great military leaders of our own country, have left us a

rich legacy of many a skillfully played game which furnishes practical

illustrations of great principles. It is for us, here and now, to familiarize

ourselves with those principles, that we too may be ready to apply

them when called upon to take a hand in the game.

Now, science is contributing so liberally to every department of

knowledge, and has already done so much towards developing a truer

understanding of the various arts, including that of the mariner, that it seems only natural and reasonable that we should call science to our aid

to lead us to a clearer comprehension of naval warfare, as naval warfare

is to be practised in the future. Steam tactics and naval warfare under

steam are comparatively new studies, and readily admit of modern and

scientific methods of treatment. The formation of the line-of-battle,

composed of large ironclads, carrying heavy guns and auto-mobile

torpedoes, the use of the ram as an independent arm, and the seagoing

torpedo-boat and its place in the order of battle, are subjects which

require the most careful consideration, and may well excite on the part

of the naval officer, indeed should excite, an intelligent curiosity or

inquisitiveness. Indeed, we may go further, and say that the naval

officer who does not seek to inform himself on these points is

Letter from the Secretary of the Navy Reporting . . . the Steps Taken by Him to Establish an Advanced Course of Instruction of Naval Officers at Coasters Harbor,

Rhode Island, 1885. See bibliography item 75. Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne Turenne (1611-1675) was Marshal General of France,

and fought in the Thirty Years War. He was killed at the Battle of Sasbach on 27 July

1675. Raimondo, Count Montecuccoli (1608-1681) Turenne's opponent at the Battle of

Sasbach, was an Italian-born general who fought in the service of Austria.
51

indifferent to the most important branch of his profession. That the

whole subject is new and fresh and worthy of our most careful study is to be learned from the fact that the great naval powers of Europe still regard steam tactics as an unsolved problem. Thus we have the charm of

novelty in our researches and a stimulant of a happy solution of a great

problem.

What we need is, first, a clear conception of the problem itself, and

then a solution of it so grounded in immutable principles as to admit of

no doubt of its correctness. But it may be asked, "What is science?"

and "How are we to regard as a science naval warfare, with all its various and complicated conditions?" and "How are we to treat such a

subject in a scientific manner?"

In order to answer this very natural question, let us first understand

what is meant by the word "science." Webster defines science to be

"knowledge duly arranged, and referred to general truths and principles, on which it is founded, and from which it is derived." "In point of

form," says Sir William Hamilton, 7 "it has the character of logical

perfection, and in point of matter the character of real truth."

"A science," says Dr. Francis Lieber, 8 "is a branch of knowledge or

collection of ideas systematically developed according to principles

peculiar to the subject-matter itself. A science is independent within its own sphere. Everything is worthy of being scientifically investigated;

that is, worthy of being investigated as to its essentials, separately and

for itself, with a view of arriving at principles and laws. Every principle

and law thus arrived at extends the sphere of knowledge, expands the

human mind, increases the stock of civilization, and is emphatically

useful."

Buckle 9 defines science as "a body of generalizations so irrefragably

true that, though they may be subsequently covered by higher

generalizations, they cannot be overthrown by them; in other words,

generalizations which may be absorbed, but not refuted."

Both of the two last definitions may be illustrated by the history of

the development of the physical sciences. By a series of experiments in

chemistry many interesting and useful facts were discovered; but it was

n

Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856) was a Scottish metaphysician who was influential

in introducing the works of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant to the British

public.

8 Francis Lieber (1800-1872) was a German-born political philosopher and a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. He came to the United States in 1827 and joined what would

become the University of South Carolina. His code of military regulations for the

conduct of the Civil War influenced similar codes in other countries and became the basis

for the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Lieber was the first editor of the

Encyclopedia Americana.

Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862) was an English historian and the author of

History of Civilization in England (New York: Appleton, 1922). Buckle believed that

human progress was regulated by immutable principles similar to scientific laws. He

attempted to determine the nature of these laws by the inductive study of history. For a study of the impact in America of Buckle's ideas and other historians with similar ideas, see W.S. Holt, "The Idea of Scientific History in America," Journal of the History of

Ideas, vol. I, No. 3, June 1940, pp. 352-362.
52

not till the generalizations of Lavoisier 10 linked those facts together

that the laws which govern the properties of matter were brought out.

It was by this inductive method that chemistry was raised to a science.

In its earlier history geology was a crude mass of independent facts.

But Cuvier 1 1 applied to the study the generalizations of comparative

anatomy, and co-ordinated the study of the strata of the earth with the

study of the fossil animals found in them. Thus he was the founder of

the science of geology.

Astronomy furnishes a still more forcible illustration. Hipparchus, 1

Ptolemy, x 3 Copernicus, 1 4 and Galileo, 1 5 each in his own time, made

certain discoveries and demonstrated certain truths in relation to the

movements of the heavenly bodies, and of the earth itself. And Tycho

Brahe, * 6 the Dane, far exceeded them all in the vast accumulation of

observations of the stars. He undertook, in short, to catalogue the fixed

stars, a labor originally essayed, though in a much ruder manner, by

Hipparchus. But while Tycho Brahe himself knew not the real value of

his own work, Kepler, J 7 generalizing from the great mass of observations, was led to the discovery of those three great laws relating to the

planetary system which won for him the proud title of "Legislator of

the Heavens" and opened the way for the final generalizations of

Newton. 18

Taking its rise in the fanciful dreams of astrologers, astronomy has

now become the most exact of all sciences. "By employing the

deductive weapon of mathematics we can compute the motions and

perturbations of the heavenly bodies; and by employing the inductive

weapon by observation the telescope reveals to us the accuracy of our

previous and, as it were, foregone inferences. The fact agrees with the

Antoine Laurent Lavoisier (1743-1794), French chemist. He is considered the

"father of modern chemistry."

Georges Leopold Chretian Frederic Dagobert Cuvier (1769-1832), one of the great

French naturalists and founder of the studies of comparative anatomy and paleontology.

1 2 Hipparchus (fl. 146-127 B.C.), the greatest astronomical observer of antiquity. He

is best known for his discovery of the precession of equinoxes.

1

Ptolemy or Claudius Ptolemaeus (ca. A.D. 90-168). Modern historians believe that

Ptolemy was more of a commentator on the works of his predecessors than an independent observer.

14 Nicolas Copernicus (1473-1543) was the Polish astronomer who laid the

foundation for modern developments in planetary astronomy. The Copernican theory

rejected the Ptolemaic idea of an earth centered universe.

Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) is credited with establishing the modern experimental

method informally stating the principles later used by Newton in his first two laws and

being the first to study the skies with the aid of a telescope.

Tycho Brahe (1546-1601). He was the first to allow for the effect of atmospheric

refraction and instrument error in his observations. His observatory at Uraniborg was the

forerunner of the great modern observatories.

1

• Johann Kepler (1571-1630) was a German astronomer who worked closely with

Tycho Brahe and inherited his collection of observations. Kepler's theories on planetary

orbits were based on Brahe's observations and provided the starting point for Newton's

investigations.

18

Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727), English scientist.
53

idea; the particular event confirms the general principle; the principle

explains the event; and their unanimity authorizes us to believe that we

must be right, since, proceed as we may, the conclusion is the same; and

the inductive plan of striking averages harmonizes with the deductive

plan of reasoning from ideas." 1

Now, naval history abounds in materials whereon to erect a science,

as science has been defined and illustrated, and it is our present purpose

to build up with these materials the science of naval warfare. We are far

from saying that the various problems of war may be treated as rigorously as those of one of the physical sciences; but there is no

question that the naval battles of the past furnish a mass of facts amply

sufficient for the formulation of laws or principles which, once

established, would raise maritime war to the level of a science. Having

established our principles by the inductive process, we may then resort

to the deductive method of applying those principles to such a changed

condition of the art of war as may be imposed by later inventions or

the introduction of novel devices.

For a very simple and obvious illustration we may take the state of

shipbuilding during the early and middle parts of last century. The

French ships-of-war were of superior model and their bottoms were

sheathed with metal. The English ships-of-war were of inferior model

and were not sheathed. 20 The natural result was a constant gain of

advantage in their sea fights of the former over the latter. The English

ships were, on certain momentous occasions, so greatly retarded in their

movements by the accumulation of marine growth, and their indifferent sailing qualities were of such great and manifest disadvantage

to them in battle, and the fact is so often made a matter of historical

record, that, by the method of generalization, we are enabled to lay

down the broad principle that speed is an essential element in naval

warfare -an axiom not needing an elaborate argument, but given as an

illustration. This is the inductive system of proceeding from particulars

to generals.

By reversing the operation and applying the deductive method of

proceeding from generals to particulars, we deduce from the principle

just stated the fact that the modern war ship must be modeled with

special reference to speed, and must have her bottom protected from

the fouling due to vegetable marine growth. Thus we arrive at a fundamental truth; and to disregard such teachings is not merely to

commit a great blunder by shutting our eyes to the lessons of history,

but it is to be unscientific in one's own profession, which, in these days,

is to be culpably ignorant, if not criminal.

Nor are we obliged to go very far back for many important facts in

regard to maritime war, on which we are to generalize. In our own very

Buckle, History of Civilization in England, vol. II, pp. 337-38. This passage is part

of Buckle's contrast between inductive and deductive reasoning.

20

In 1761 the Royal Navy tested copper sheathing and by 1775, 12 ships had been

coppered. By 1783 it had become standard practice to include it on all new British ships. In 1779-80, other European navies followed up on the early success of the English

experiment. See R.J.B. Knight, "The Introduction of Copper Sheathing into the Royal

Navy, 1779-1786," The Mariner's Mirror, vol. LIX, No. 3, August 1973, pp. 299-309.
54

limited experience in war the battle of Port Royal21 furnishes a

valuable illustration of the necessity of possessing a secure base of

supplies within the theatre of war, and few naval conflicts have been so pregnant with results as that in which the monitor bore so conspicuous

a part. As an illustration of that very important military element called

the moral effect of a battle, it stands almost unrivaled.

The grouping together of a number of important facts gathered from

the accounts of naval battles will enable the naval student who has

acquired the habit of generalizing to lay down principles for his own

guidance in war, and that is a work that each one can do for himself

better than another can do for him. The passage from facts to principles

in induction in its highest form is inspiration, says Tyndall. 22

Again, it has been said that the philosophy of method bears the same

relation to science that science does to art. "The progress of every

science is affected more by the scheme according to which it is cultivated, than by the ability of the cultivators themselves." Some

men, like Tycho Brahe, without a Kepler to follow, "have consumed

their lives in fruitless industry, not because their labors were slack, but

because their method was sterile."

Hence, to elevate naval warfare into a science, as we now propose

doing, we must adopt the comparative method; and, as Cuvier

co-ordinated the study of geology with that of comparative anatomy,

so must we co-ordinate the study of naval warfare with military science

and art. That is the theory on which we are now to proceed; and it is desirable that each one of us should comprehend this theory in its length and breadth, its height and depth, for it is on such perfect

understanding alone that success in our present undertaking can be

assured. It is by the comparative method that we have been led to a knowledge of the most important phenomena of the science of life. As

it would be impracticable to study the living action of the various

organs of the human body, the physiologist has recourse to other means

whereby to carry on his investigation. All vertebrate animals, being

constructed on the same general plan of organization, with corre- sponding organs of the same character common to all -their nervous and vascular systems, digestive apparatus, organs of locomotion, and

the rest -can easily be recognized and compared with each other. From

the study of the brain of a pigeon, for example, Dalton23was enabled

to explain the functions of the human brain. From experiments on the

21

Luce participated in the attack on Port Royal, S.C., on 7 November 1861. As a lieutenant he was in charge of a gun deck division in U.S.S. Wabash, the flagship of

Samuel F. Du Pont, flag officer in command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

The flotilla which sailed for Port Royal was made up of 75 ships, 25 of which carried

coal and supplies. After the battle Port Royal became a major supply base for the Union

blockade during the remainder of the war. Union control of Port Royal assured Gen.

W.T. Sherman a secure supply base for his "March to the Sea" in 1864.

22 John Tyndall (1820-1893), British physicist.

23 John Call Dalton (1825-1889) was the first U.S. physician to devote himself to experimental physiology. He was a friend of Luce's who had served as an Army Brigade

surgeon during the Port Royal expedition.
55

horse, Matteucci2 4 demonstrated the rapidity of the circulation of the

blood. Brown-Se'quard2 5 and Velpeau, 26 by experiments on animals,

discovered the functions of the spinal cord. Bidder, 27 and Schmidt, 28

and Dalton illustrated the process of digestion by experiments on dogs

and the action of the heart and the circulation of the blood were, by

the same process, illustrated by Harvey. 29 This gives us a hint pregnant

with possibilities.

We have already referred, in passing, to the splendid results achieved

by Cuvier through his adoption of the comparative method of

investigation. Says Buckle: "By this union of geology and comparative

anatomy, there was first introduced with the study of Nature a clear

conception of the magnificent doctrine of universal change, while at the

same time there grew up by its side a conception, equally steady, of the

regularity with which the changes are accomplished, and of the

undeviating law by which they are governed. "3 ° In his beautiful eulogy on Agassiz, 31 Professor Le Conte, 32 in

explaining the comparative method of investigation (for the more

general introduction of which he gives the great scientist high praise),

says: "Anatomy only becomes scientific through comparative anatomy;

physiology only becomes scientific through comparative physiology";

and we may add, without distorting the parallelism, that naval tactics,

using that word in its more extended sense, becomes scientific only

through comparative tactics. For, having no authoritative treatise on

the art of naval warfare under steam, having no recognized tactical

order of battle, being deficient even in the terminology of steam tactics,

we must, perforce, resort to the well-known rules of the military art with a view to their application to the military movements of a fleet,

and, from the well-recognized methods of disposing troops for battle,

ascertain the principles which should govern fleet formations. Thus,

24

Carlo Matteucci (1811-1868), Italian physicist.

Charles Edouard Brown-Se'quard (1817-1894), French physiologist.

2 Alfred Armand Louis Marie Velpeau (1795-1867), French surgeon.

27Fnederich Heinrich Bidder (1810-1894), Russian-born student of anatomy and

physiology.

2 8 Carl Schmidt (1822-1894) worked with Bidder in demonstrating the composition

of gastric juices.

29

William Harvey (1578-1657), English physician.

30

Buckle, History of Civilization in England, vol. I, pp. 634-635.

3 1 Jean Louis Randolphe Agassiz (1807-1873) was a Swiss-born geologist and

naturalist who studied in Germany and later in Paris under Cuvier. As a professor at Harvard University after 1848, he exerted considerable influence in opposing the Dar- winian concept of evolution.

32Joseph Le Conte (1823-1901), a geologist at the University of California, Berkeley, was one of the first students drawn to Harvard to study under Agassiz at the Lawrence

Scientific School. Le Conte's eulogy, "Agassiz's Work and Method" was part of the

Agassiz Memorial meeting at the California Academy of Sciences held in San Francisco,

22 December 1873. It was published in the Academy's Proceedings vol. V, 1873-74, pp. 220-243.
56

from the known, we may arrive at something like a clear understanding

of what is now mere conjecture. It is by this means alone that we can

raise naval warfare from the empirical stage to the dignity of a science.

It is important that this should be understood. We lay so much stress upon this method of treating our subject that, even at the risk of

overburdening the argument, let us refer once more to the methods of

investigation pursued by the most advanced thinkers of the age. We

have drawn our illustrations so far from the physical sciences. Let us now go to other departments of learning, and we shall see what the

comparative method has done for them.

"It was supposed at one time," says Max Miiller,

33 "that a comparative analysis of the languages of mankind must transcend the

powers of man ; and yet, by the combined and well-directed efforts of

many scholars, great results have been obtained, and the principles that

must guide the students of the science of language are now firmly

established.

"It will be the same with the science of religion. By a proper division

of labor, the materials that are still wanting will be collected and

published and translated; and when that is done, surely man will never

rest till he has discovered the purpose that runs through the religions of

mankind, and till he has reconstructed the true Civites Dei on

foundations as wide as the ends of the world.

It has been by treating the subject of religion in a scientific manner

that deep and hidden truths have been revealed, and passages of the

Holy Scriptures otherwise obscure have been rendered clear and full of

meaning. Thus, as the author says, "the science of religion will for the

first time assign to Christianity its right place among the religions of the

world; it will show for the first time what was meant by 'the fullness of

time'; it will restore to the whole history of the world, in its unconscious progress towards Christianity, its true and sacred character."

Speaking in another place of the science of language, he says:

"People ask, 'What is gained by comparison?' Why, all higher

knowledge is gained by comparison, and rests on comparison. If it is said that the character of scientific research in our age is preeminently

comparative, this really means that our researches are now based on the

widest evidence that can be obtained, on the broadest inductions that can be grasped by the human mind." "What can be gained by

comparison?" he asks again. "Why, look at the study of languages. If

you go back but a hundred years and examine the folios of the most

learned writers upon questions connected with language, and then open

a book written by the merest tyro in comparative philology, you will see what can be gained, what has been gained, by the comparative

33 Friedrich Max Miiller (1823-1900), a German-born philologist and orientalist, was

a leader in promoting the comparative study of both philology and religion in England.

Luce's source for this quotation has not been located; however, the ideas in it are similar to those which Miiller expressed in his Lectures on the Science of Language (New York:

Scribner, 1862), and his Lectures on the Science of Religion (New York: Scribner,

1872). In the first portion of his Lectures on the Science of Language, Miiller makes some of the same points which Luce uses here, with many of the same examples.
57

method." Reasoning thus, he advocates the comparative or scientific

study of the religions of the world.

Lastly, we have the authority of Mr. Hutcheson Macaulay Posnett,

34

who, in his Comparative Literature, says: "The comparative method of

acquiring knowledge is . . . the peculiar glory of our nineteenth cen- tury."

Hence, we have not only comparative anatomy and comparative

physiology, but comparative philology, comparative grammar, comparative religion, comparative literature, and why not, we ask again,

comparative war, or a comparative study of the military operations of a

sea army and a land army? Attention has been called repeatedly by

various writers to the close analogy between military and naval

operations. It has been successfully shown that among the ancients, or what has been termed the "oar period" of naval history, the military

and naval tactics were as nearly identical as the nature of the elements

would admit. The most distinguished soldiers of Carthage, Greece, and

Rome commanded afloat, as occasion required.

Macaulay, 35 in speaking of the English Navy of the time of Charles

II., says: "No State, ancient or modern, had before that time made a complete separation between the naval and military services. In the

great civilized nations of the old world, Cimon and Lysander, Pompey

and Agrippa, had fought battles by sea as well as by land. Nor had the

impulse which nautical science received at the close of the fifteenth

century produced any material improvement in the division of labor. At

Flodden the right wing of the victorious army was led by the Admiral

of England. 36 At Jarnac and Mon-Contour the Huguenot ranks were

marshaled by the Admiral of France. 37 Neither Don John of Austria,

Hutcheson Macaulay Posnett was a lawyer and professor of classics and English

literature in University College, Auckland, New Zealand. The full quotation here is "The

comparative method of acquiring or communicating knowledge is in one sense as old as thought itself, in another the peculiar glory of our nineteenth century," Comparative

Literature (New York: Appleton, 1886), p. 73.

35 Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-1879). The quotation here may be found in

The Works of Lord Macaulay: History of England (London: Longmans, Green, 1914),

vol. I, pp. 314-315.

36The Battle of Flodden was an English victory over the Scots fought near Braxton,

Northumberland, 9 September 1513. The Admiral of England, Thomas Howard, second

Duke of Norfolk, first Earl of Surrey, (1443-1524) commanded 1,000 soldiers and

sailors in the battle. 37The Battle of Jarnac was fought 12 March 1569 and the Battle of Moncontour was

fought 3 October 1569. The French Huguenot forces were commanded by Gaspard de

Charillon, Comte de Coligny (1519-1572), the leader of the French Protestant cause in the first half of the Wars of Religion. Although he never commanded at sea, Coligny was made Admiral of France in 1552. With the death of the Prince de Conde in the Battle of

Jarnac, Coligny was left as the sole experienced leader of the Huguenots. By 1570 he

obtained for them the advantageous peace of St. Germain.
58

the conqueror of Lepanto, 38 nor Lord Howard of Effingham, 39

to

whose direction the marine of England was entrusted when the Spanish

invaders were approaching its shores, had received the education of a

sailor. Raleigh,40 highly celebrated as a naval commander, had served

during many years as a soldier in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland.

"Blake4 1 had distinguished himself by his skillful and valiant defense

of an inland town before he humbled the pride of Holland and of

Castile on the ocean. "Since the Restoration the same system had been followed. Great

fleets had been entrusted to the direction of Rupert42 and Monk43 -

Rupert, who was renowned chiefly as a hot and daring cavalry officer,

and Monk, who, when he wished his ship to change her course, moved

the mirth of his crew by calling out, 'Wheel to the left!' Coligny was a colonel of infantry when, in 1552, he was made Admiral of France, and

distinguished himself at the battles of Dreux44 and Jarnac, and James

II., served in the French army under Turenne, and received a thorough

training as a soldier, before he was called upon to command the

Channel fleet during one of the great Dutch wars."

About 1672 the French began to educate young men of good family

especially for the sea, and England soon followed the example. In the

process of time the two professions, the naval and military, became so

distinct that everything of a military character began to be looked upon

with contempt by those bred to the sea. The very name of "soldier"

became among sailors a term of reproach, and when troops of the line

were first placed on board ship they were made the subjects of endless

ridicule among the rollicking sailors. Even to this day the older class of

3 8 The Battle of Lepanto was a naval victory of Spain, the Pope, and Venice over the

Turks. Fought on 7 October 1571, the battle was an important moral victory for the

Christian forces. As the last battle fought between oared galleys, it marks an important

turning point in the history of naval tactics and technology. Don John of Austria

(1574-1578) was the son of Emperor Charles V.

3 9 Charles, Lord Howard of Effingham, Earl of Nottingham (1536-1624) was made

Lord High Admiral of England in 1584.

40

Sir Walter Raleigh (1552-1618).

4 1 Robert Blake (1599-1657) was the leading sea officer of the Parliamentary forces

under Cromwell. During the first Dutch War he dramatically defeated the Dutch.

42Prince Rupert of the Rhine (1619-1682) was the third son of the Elector

Palatinate, Frederick V, and grandson of King James I of England. The "Mad Cavalier" was a key military figure in the royalist cause during the English Civil War. After serving

as generalissimo of King Charles I's army, he commanded the portion of the English fleet that remained loyal to the crown. He fled to France but returned after the Restoration

to command the fleet with Monk against the Dutch in 1666. A general-at-sea and

Admiral of the Fleet, he served as First Lord of the Admiralty, 1673-79.

43 George Monk, Duke of Albemarle (1608-1670), was persuaded to join the

Parliamentary forces of Cromwell after serving in the Royalist Army during the English

Civil War. After the death of the Lord Protector, Monk was instrumental in bringing

about the restoration of Charles II to the throne. He was a general-at-sea, joint

commander of the navy, and served at sea in both the First and Second Dutch Wars.

Monk was First Lord of the Treasury in 1667.

The Battle of Dreux was a defeat by the Huguenot forces under Coligny and the

Prince de Conde. The battle was fought 19 December 1562.
59

seamen despise "sojering," and look with contempt upon a "musket."

This feeling was not confined to the seamen. It was shared by the

officers, who prided themselves on their practical seamanship, and held

military matters as beneath their notice. We have now reached a stage

of progress which enables us to take such a broad and comprehensive

view of nautical science as to avoid either of these extremes. While

educating officers especially for sea service, they are yet taught the

military character of their profession; and the close analogy between

the operations of a fleet and an army has long been insisted upon, and

is now generally acknowledged.

Even under sail tactics Paul Hoste, 45 and, later, John Clerk, 46 the

author of the "Essay on Naval Tactics," noticed the military character

of fleet evolutions. It is not surprising, therefore, that early in the

history of steam tactics there should have been a number of writers

who called attention to the same fact. Admiral Bowles, 47

R.N.,

remarked that we had "arrived at a new era, in which steam would

enable naval commanders to conduct their operations on military and

scientific principles,"48 and Admiral Dahlgren49 observed that the

principles of military tactics would hereafter enter largely into the

manoeuvres of a fleet. Sir Howard Douglas, 50 referring to these several

authorities, adds that "the celerity and precision with which steam

fleets may execute any evolution whatever will hereafter allow the

45 Father Paul Hoste (1652-1700) was a Jesuit priest and professor of mathematics at the French Naval School in Toulon. In 1697 he published his L'art des armees naveles,

the first recorded work on naval tactics. Hoste developed a system of tactics cased on the

single line ahead and the independent action of squadrons. His influence can be seen in the tactical instructions of many English admirals as well as in later French tacticians. A

second edition of Hoste's work was published at Lyon in 1727. Christopher O'Bryen

published extracts in English from Hoste at London in 1762, but a complete translation

did not appear until Capt. J.D. Boswall published his effort in Edinburgh in 1834.

John Clerk (1728-1812) was a Scottish merchant who retired from a prosperous

Edinburgh business in 1773 to devote himself to the study of naval tactics. The first portion of Essay on Naval Tactics was printed in a private edition of 50 copies in 1782.

An expanded public edition appeared in 1790. Clerk claimed credit for Adm. Sir George

Rodney's successful tactics in the Battle of the Saints, April 1782; however, in spite of

similarities, Clerk's work did not influence Rodney in this battle. Later, his work did

become extremely important to the English and the American navies. Throughout the

19th century the essay was a standard text for officers in the U.S. Navy.

47Admiral of the Fleet Sir William Bowles (1780-1869) was the author of the

pamphlet An Essay on Naval Operations (London: Ridgway, 1849).

48

Luce may have taken this quotation of Bowles' from Sir Howard Douglas, On

Naval Warfare with Steam (London: Murray, 1858), p. 69.

49

Rear Adm. John Adolphus Bernard Dahlgren, USN (1809-1870), was the inventor

of the smoothbore naval gun that bears his name. Dahlgren was responsible for devel- oping the U.S. Navy's ordnance factory at the Washington Navy Yard in the 1860's and

1870's. Luce's reference to Dahlgren's comment appears also to have come from Sir

Howard Douglas, ibid., p. 90.

Sir Howard Douglas (1776-1861) was a British general, the son of Rear Admiral of

the Blue Sir Charles Douglas. Sir Howard served in Canada and the Peninsula. He was

Governor of New Brunswick, 1823-29, where he founded Fredericton University; Lord

High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, 1835-40; and Member of Parliament for

Liverpool, 1842-46.
60

principles of tactics on land to be applied to the movements of ships on

the ocean, with this advantage on the side of naval operations, that the

inequalities of ground which so seriously embarrass the manoeuvres of

troops do not exist at sea." This is quite true. The movements of an

army may be, and very often are, obstructed by the physical conditions

of a country; mountains, rivers, and forests must often be taken into

account in planning a campaign, and the lines of communication with

the bases of supplies, the lines of retreat, and the topography of the

country within the field of operations must necessarily control the

question of the proper distribution of troops for battle. None of these

elements enter into the discussion of the operations of a fleet.

But beginning with the terminology of elementary tactics, and

passing thence through the school of the battalion to grand tactics, and,

finally, to strategy, it will be found that there is so much that is common to both the land and the sea forces, that we may by the

comparative method, readily and intelligently, not only formulate

correct theories in regard to naval warfare under steam, but confidently

lay down unerring principles for our guidance in the conduct of battle.

Commodore Parker's

51 "Fleet Tactics under Steam" is, as he himself

tells us, "simply an adaptation of military to naval tactics." 52 Woods

Pasha, 53 in a recent article on the naval tactics of the future, says: "It

is hardly possible to glance at the development of the modern fighting

ship without being struck by the analogy between military action afloat

and ashore."54 Indeed, it would help very materially in our investigations if we kept prominently in view that word nrilites, signifying

fighting men, and thus have constantly before us the military character

of our profession. We might then consider a fleet as a sea army, as the

Latin races do, and adopt without reserve, as far as applicable, the

tactical movements of the land forces for the management of an

assemblage of ships-of-war. Such a step would have the advantage of

clearing away or disposing of a great deal of useless material left over from the sail period, and enable us to bring to the consideration of our

subject minds unembarrassed by obsolete formularies.

It would far exceed the limits of this paper, which is intended to be

merely introductory, to point out in detail the close analogy between

51 Commodore Foxhall Alexander Parker, USN (1821-1879) was a leader in the

professional development of the U.S. Navy following the Civil War. During the Civil War

he developed systems of naval tactics for steamships, served as Chief Signal Officer of the

U.S. Navy, 1873-76, and drew up a code of signals for steam tactics. Parker was one of

the founders and the first President of the United States Naval Institute. He died while

serving as Superintendent of the Naval Academy.

Commodore Foxhall A. Parker, Fleet Tactics Under Steam (New York: Van

Nostrand, 1879), introduction.

53

Sir Henry Felix Woods (1843-1919) was a British-born admiral in the Imperial

Ottoman Navy. Commonly known as Woods Pasha, he served as naval adviser to the

Sultan. He joined the Royal Navy in 1858 but was allowed to join the Turkish service in

1870. Woods was responsible for buoying the Dardanelles and its approaches. With

Hobart Pasha (Adm. Augustus Charles Hobart-Hampden, 1822-1886), he reorganized the

Turkish Fleet. 54Woods Pasha, "The Naval Tactics of the Future," North American Review, vol. CXLI, September 1885, p. 267.
61

the operations of land and sea forces. Many illustrations will doubtless

suggest themselves to the naval student who reads military history, and

it is especially recommended that the members of the class under

instruction should, each one for himself, as we pass through the course of lectures on military science, note the points of analogy as they come

up and make careful memoranda of those principles of military

movements which are applicable to a floating force.

By way of illustrating our meaning more clearly, we may give a few

examples of the more obvious principles common to both services.

Guibert, 55 an eminent French writer on military science, has said that

the art of fortification and that of field tactics are intimately connected

with each other, and that the latter derives many of its principles from

the art of constructing permanent fortresses. In both the important

object is to dispose the parts, whether works or bodies of troops, so

that they may afford mutual protection. He infers, therefore, that to be

a good tactician a knowledge of military engineering is necessary. Now,

these remarks apply with equal force to the naval tactician, for he too

should so dispose the ships of his fleet that they may mutually support

one another. Ships may be regarded as movable forts, and reasoned

upon accordingly. "The inartifical practice," says Sir Howard Douglas,

"of forming a fleet for battle in one long line, in which the ships are devoid of the power of protecting each other by reciprocal defense, and

without a second line as a reserve, ought to be abandoned, as a corresponding practice with armies in the field has been renounced in

warfare on land."56 The advantages of the echelon formation for an army and its application to a fleet have been so fully and ably set forth

by Sir Howard Douglas as to leave nothing to be added. The most

striking illustration, however, is to be found in that peculiar method of

attack to which Napoleon owed many of his victories on land and

Nelson on the sea. It is expressed in that maxim which teaches the

importance of so conducting a battle as to bring upon the point of

attack a great superiority of force in such a manner that the enemy,

even if numerically superior upon the whole, may be unable to succor

the part so overpowered. The late Captain James H. Ward, U.S. Navy, 5 7 in commenting upon this point, says that this same maxim, so fully

recognized by military writers, was in the contemplation of Byng in

1756; of Hood at Basseterre Roads (St. Kitts), 1782, and was carried

Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert (1743-1790), was a French general

and military writer. His Essai general de tactique (1770) has been considered one of the

best essays by a soldier in the 18th century. Guibert predicted the establishment of

national armies and presaged many of the innovations which occurred during the

Napoleonic era. Napoleon himself was a careful student of Guibert's work.

Douglas, On Naval Warfare With Steam, p. 103.

5 7 Comdr. James Harmon Ward, USN (1806-1861), was killed in action while in

command of the Potomac Flotilla, 27 June 1861. Ward was considered one of the most

scholarly officers in the Navy at the outbreak of the Civil War. Long an advocate of a naval academy, he became the first Commandant of Midshipmen when the U.S. Naval

Academy was opened in 1845. He published An Elementary Course of Instruction on

Ordnance and Gunnery in 1845 and Steam for the Million in 1860. The reference here is to his A Manual of Naval Tactics (New York: Appleton, 1859), sec. II-III, pp. 49-127.
62

out by Rodney in his chase of the French in 1782; by Nelson at the

Nile and at Trafalgar, and in a most remarkable manner by Perry at

Lake Erie.

We have already laid down as a principle in naval warfare, clearly

established by the method we have adopted for our investigations, that

"speed is essential to success in war." This is true also in military

science. Marshal Saxe5 8 declared that "success in war is due to the legs

of the soldiers." The rapid marches which preceded the battles of

Gunzburg and Elchingen, 59 we are told, were the causes of the

successes of Napoleon much more than those combats, brilliant as they

were. To the bold and rapid movements which characterized the

campaigns of Alexander the Great, Caesar, Hannibal, Frederick the

Great, and Napoleon are to be attributed their uniform successes. But there was a certain mobility, as distinct from speed, peculiar to

the troops of Napoleon, which rendered them easily handled by a master of the art of war. This too is an important quality in ships. It was the speed and activity of the Greek triremes that led to their

victory at Salamis. It was to the light, swift, and quick-turning

Liburnian galleys that Octavius owed his victory at Actium. The

Spaniards of the Invincible Armada were astonished by the speed and

handiness of the English ships they encountered in the Channel. The

Duke of Medina-Sidonia said they seemed to leave the Spanish ships

and approach them at pleasure. In one of his plaintive letters to Parma

he wrote: "We cannot bring the English to battle, for they are swift and

we are slow."60 The wretched sailing qualities of the Spaniards and

their unwieldiness put them at a disadvantage for which skill and

courage could not compensate.

Now, speed is a comparative quality. The English ships of that day,

though fast when compared to the Spanish ships of the Armada, were

slow when confronted later on with the superior models of France. It was during the greater part of the eighteenth century that the speed and

handiness of the French ships-of-war enabled the French admirals to

practise those tactics which so long rendered the high fighting qualities

of the English of no avail. To the quality of speed, then, we must add,

58

Maurice, Comte de Saxe (1696-1750), Marshal of France.

59The Battle of Gunzburg was fought 9 October 1805, and the Battle of Elchingen was fought 14 October 1805. Both were part of the Campaign of Austerlitz.

Luce's source for this quotation has not been located; however, it is similar to the

English translation of a letter from the Duke of Medina-Sidonia to the Duke of Parma,

dated 4 August 1588:

The enemy's ships have continued to bombard us, and we were obliged to turn

and face them, so that the firing continued on most days from dawn to dark; but

the enemy has resolutely avoided coming to close quarters with our ships,

although I have tried my hardest to make him do so. I have given him so many

opportunities that sometimes some of our vessels have been in the very midst of

the enemy's fleet, to induce one of his ships to grapple and begin in the fight; but

all to no purpose, as his ships are very light, and mine very heavy, and he has

plenty of men and stores. Gr. Br., Public Records Office, Calendar of Letters and State Papers Relating to English

Affairs Preserved Principally in the Archives of Simancas, vol. IV, Elizabeth, 1558-1603)

(London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1900), p. 360.
63

as another deduction, the quality of mobility, handiness, or the

property of quick turning. The ocean racers of the great Transatlantic

lines, with lengths ten, and often eleven, times their beam, have great

speed, but very limited powers for quick turning.

There is still another quality of speed, or, more properly speaking,

celerity of movement (if we may make the distinction), which is common to both land and sea forces, but which belongs more to the

personal character of the commander-in-chief than to the troops or

ships under his command. "It was not the Roman army which

conquered Gaul, but Caesar," said Napoleon. "It was not the

Carthaginian army which made Rome tremble at her gates, but

Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian army which marched to the Indus,

but Alexander. It was not the Prussian army which defended Prussia for seven years against the three most powerful states of Europe, but

Frederick." The wonderful success of these great captains was due in a very large measure to the continuous celerity of their movements, to

their great energy governed by an intelligent directive force.

In 1781 the English fitted out an expedition to capture the Dutch

Colony at the Cape of Good Hope. DeSuffren sailed shortly afterwards

from Brest (March, 1781), fell upon the English squadron under

Commodore Johnson, at Porto Praya (Cape de Verde Islands), and after a drawn battle hurried on to the Cape of Good Hope, where he arrived

one month in advance of the English, thus fully securing the object of

his mission, which was to thwart the designs of colonization by the

English in that quarter. History is replete with such examples of celerity

of movements both in the land and in the naval service.

Nelson's chase of the French squadron under Villeneuve forms a chapter in itself. In connection with mobility of the units of

organization must be considered still another element of success common to both services, the potency of drill. The talents of the naval

architect and the skill of the marine engineer and the labors of the

ordnance officer will have been put forth in vain, if the squadron of

fighting ships be not in efficient discipline and thorough drill. History

teaches no more important lesson than this, and here again the two

armies stand on common ground. The Romans called an army

exercitus, which also meant exercise. What a history in that one word!

Frederick the Great paid more attention to mere parade drill than any

modern general, to which fact he owed many of his victories, as well as

his escapes from serious disasters.

"Unquestionably," says one military authority, "of two armies equal

in all other respects, and equally handled by their commanders, that

one must win which can manoeuvre with the greatest rapidity and

precision." And one of the most distinguished writers of the day on

naval matters says, in speaking of the necessity of a school of practice

in naval tactics, "The fleet most thoroughly drilled in naval tactics will

have the greatest advantage in war."

To say that "speed," "handiness" and "drill" are elements essential

to success in war, seems to be stating such self-evident truths as to need

no demonstration. That may be true, but it is equally true that the

examples of history which inculcate these lessons are being disregarded

every day by nearly all maritime powers, and by none more than our
64

own. They are of that class of truths which everybody admits, but

nobody heeds. A certain English essayist says that "the best way of

introducing any subject is by a string of platitudes delivered after an

oracular fashion." We have taken the hint.

Captain Maguire, 61

U.S. Army, following Guibert, shows the

analogy between land and sea forces from the point of view of a

military engineer. In speaking of the attack of forts by ships he says:

"This attack by sea may be compared to a land siege. The fleet will first

bombard the sea forts at long range, in order to silence their fire;

thereupon it will approach nearer to the coast forts and batteries, in

order to carry on with favorable chances the decisive fight intended for

the complete subjection of the latter. Finally, it will turn its attention

to those works more retired which bear upon the harbor entrance and

its obstruction. This last act may be considered as entirely identical

with the heavy and rapid fire of the siege batteries, which precedes the

advance of the storming party. In case the obstructions consist of

submarine mines, and the fleet must destroy them by torpedoes, this

operation is identical with the counter-mining operations of a siege.

Finally, as the storming of the breach is the crowning act of the siege, so must, or should, at least, the forcing of the harbor entrance be

regarded as the last stage of the attack.

"This comparison leads us to the conclusion that the general

principles of sieges may be applied to attack by sea. In place of the

ground in front of the works to be attacked lies the sea, which, with its depths and shoals, rocks, islands, wide and narrow channels, represents

the more or less favorable field of operations of the attacking party;

while the powerful ships, in consequence of their armor, are very strong

batteries, which, after being once completely equipped, need no

subsequent aid, and, in consequence of their engines, can constantly

and rapidly change their positions.

"The ammunition supply of the ships will limit their action against a

sea fort to the duration of a few days; and this, in connection with their

great mobility, will give to the attack the characteristics of a short,

rapid engagement. "6 2 But enough has been said to show the close analogy between the

land army and the sea army to render further illustration unnecessary.

Having shown the system by which it is proposed to conduct the course of study in naval warfare, it is but just and proper to state, at the

outset, that we are without instructors or even text-books. This should

be distinctly understood. But we have an instructor in naval history to

tell us some of the great lessons of the past; and we have an instructor

in military science to teach those of us who are willing to learn what he

knows of the general principles of that science. It is our part to learn

what we can of them, to draw our own conclusions and to make our

61 Edward Maguire (1847-1892) was a captain in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

A graduate of the Military Academy at West Point in 1867, Maguire served with the

engineers on the Great Lakes and the western rivers as well as Secretary of the Fortification Board. He published nine articles and books on harbor improvement and technical

subjects and one book on coastal defense.

Edward Maguire, The Attack and Defence of Coast-Fortifications (New York: Van

Nostrand, 1884), pp. 24-25.
65

own deductions, and to apply the principles which they illustrate by

the operations of past wars, both at sea and on land, that we may

formulate our own ideas on the subject of naval warfare. By doing this

we adopt the comparative method.

It is obvious from what has just been said that, while learning naval

history and the military art and science from professors of those

branches, we must be our own instructors in the naval art and science.

Says President Bartlett,

63 of Dartmouth College, in the Forum for

September: "All higher education is essentially self-education. Teachers

do not make the scholar. The impulse comes chiefly from within, and

the student becomes the scholar when he ceases to confine himself to

prescribed tasks or previous limits, and spontaneously reaches out

beyond."64

If we are to learn this highest, noblest branch of our

profession at all, we must be our own teachers, for as yet the science

has no professors. We are the pioneers. Not only is it true that we have

neither instructors nor text-books on naval warfare under steam, but

there are no foreign navies to which we can turn with confidence for

instruction. In many of the essentials of an efficient navy, nearly every

other maritime country has left us all but hopelessly in the rear. But in

the theoretical knowledge of naval tactics under steam, it may be said

that we all stand on common ground, with this advantage in our

favor-that we are untrammeled with the traditions and formularies of an extinct period of tactics, and are, so far, free to prepare ourselves for a new study.

Let us glance for one moment at the state of "naval warfare under

steam" as it was understood in England up to a very recent period. In an article on "Naval Tactics" which recently appeared in one of the

most influential of the English reviews65 occurs the following: "There

appears to be a pretty unanimous agreement, on the part of all those

who have made naval tactics a subject of study, that the art has, in its revived form, scarcely advanced beyond the merest rudimentary

conditions of existence. It is impossible not to be struck by the strange

singularity of such a fact, if fact it be." We may here interject the

remark that it is a fact.

"In an age in which the greatest scientific skill and mechanical

ingenuity have been unreservedly exerted in perfecting the warlike

efficiency of the military marine, the one art needed to develop to its fullest extent that truly wonderful efficiency has been strangely

neglected and overlooked.

"The great tactical revolution caused by the introduction of steam

propulsion has been either quietly ignored, or its extreme significance

has been left to be pointed out by a small company of prophets, who

have not, as yet, succeeded in gaining more than a partial hearing for

63 Samuel Colcord Bartlett (1817-1898) was a Congregational minister and the

eighth President of Dartmouth College. He was a strong advocate of liberal education.

64

S.C. Bartlett, "How I Was Educated," Forum, vol. Ill, September 1886, pp. 18-26.

The following quotations are taken from an unsigned review article on the works

of Hoste, Morogues, Mazarredo-Salazar, Clerk, Ramatuelle, Lullier, Boutakov, Campbell,

Colomb, and Douglas, "The Past and Future of Naval Tactics," Edinburgh Review, vol. CXXXVI, October, 1872, pp. 288-303.
66

the statement of their views." And further on the author remarks: "It is somewhat humiliating to reflect that, as yet, in spite of the immense

progress made in every other branch of the naval art, the very stones

wherewith to raise our tactical structure are, as has been well said, still unhewn. Some malignant fairy appears to have been slighted at the

birthtime of that mighty fleet (the English Channel Squadron and

steam reserve combined in 1872) which has won the admiration and has

become the model of all the navies of the world. It possesses all the

elements of perfection, but lacks one gift-the power to use it with

effect." And the writer concludes: "We have as yet found out no

proper system of tactics, not because the invention of one is impossible,

but because we have neglected to follow the roads which lead to it."

This is certainly very plain language, but we believe it to have been

absolutely true at the time it was written, some fourteen years

ago -1872.

We may now come down to 1880. The Naval Prize Essay of 1880,

by Captain the Honorable Edmund R. Fremantle, R.N. 66is still fresh

in our memory. "If," says that able essayist, "we attempt to derive

inspiration from the numerous naval writers who have studied the

subject of a naval engagement between ironclads of the present day, we

are startled at the wide difference of opinion expressed, not only as to

the strength of various formations, but as to the manner of righting

which will be adopted. As a rule, strong assertions have been made and

decided opinions given, based on necessarily weak arguments and

weaker facts.

"A very general belief, shared apparently by foreign writers, has

been that fleets will clash together in 'line abreast,' and that they will

subsequently pair off to decide the action, forming a series of

independent duels." Some of the best of the English naval essayists

represent the "line abreast," as they term the line, as a very weak

tactical formation. "On the other hand," he continues, "we have

foreign authorities advocating the 'line abreast' as the only effectual

tactical formation, and objecting to the inherent weakness of the 'line

ahead' (column); while the English naval writer who has given most

attention to the subject (Captain Colomb)67 prefers the 'line ahead' to

66 Adm. Sir Edmund Robert Fremantle (1836-1929) was Rear Admiral of the United

Kingdom, 1901 1927. He served as Commander in Chief in the East Indies, in China, and

at Plymouth. A writer on naval subjects in a variety of magazines, he won the Naval Prize

Essay for 1880 with his "Naval Tactics on the Open Sea with the Existing Types of

Vessels and Weapons," The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. XXIV,

No. 104, 1880, pp. 1-60.

67Vice Adm. Philip Howard Colomb (1831-1899) with his brother, Capt. Sir John

C.R. Colomb, laid the groundwork for the reform of the Admiralty at the turn of the

century. He invented a code of flashing light signals for use at sea. The essays on tactics

which Luce refers to here, "The Attack and Defense of Fleets," Journal of the Royal

United Service Institution, vol. XV, No. 64, 1871, pp. 405-437 and vol. XVI, No. 66,

1872, pp. 1-24, are not his best works. Although overshadowed by Mahan's Influence of

Sea Power upon History, Colomb's Naval Warfare (London: Allen, 1891) has been

recognized as the first soundly based British interpretation of naval history. Colomb was

one of the prominent leaders in the movement to promote the professional study of

naval history.
67

any other combination." The group system of Bouet-Willaumez, 68 the

essayist treats with scant favor, though so strongly advocated by others.

"The disagreement," he adds, "is not so much in the end sought for as

in the means of attaining that end, Captain Colomb relying mainly on

the GUN; the French writers mainly on the RAM." Now, as Captain

Freemantie's essay received the prize, and as he exhibits the utmost

familiarity with the Signal Book and the Manual of Drill, for neither of

which he seems to entertain much respect, we may assume that he

fairly represents the state of naval tactics in the English Navy of to-day,

and that, to use his own language, they are still "groping in the dark."

It is plain there is little to be hoped for there. The French Navy is pretty much in the same category. Where, then, shall we look for light

but to ourselves?

The position of our Military Instructor, it is hardly necessary to

explain, is one of extreme delicacy. Entering upon an entirely novel

undertaking, and thrown, I will not say among strangers, but among

officers of another profession, it were singular, indeed, did he find

himself wholly free from embarrassment.

Lieutenant Tasker H. Bliss,

69

1st Artillery, U.S. Army, an officer

who stands deservedly high in his own profession, has kindly consented

to give us his time and his best endeavors to render his department of

this Institution worthy of the profession he represents. He fully

understands the theory on which our studies are to be conducted. He is not here to teach us our profession, as has been vainly imagined.

Knowing little of our profession, he is here to teach us what he knows

of his own profession. Let us co-operate with him, then, and by our

attention and application attain such good results as to prove that

comparative tactics is the true scientific method of studying naval

warfare under steam.

We cannot close this paper without one or two allusions to the

lessons of history which seem most pertinent to our subject. It has

often been observed that the ancient Greeks are our masters in the art of war. The Greeks were so convinced of the necessity of the study of

theory, and of the insufficiency of practice alone, that they instituted

public schools where they taught upon fixed principles and rules the

science of war. The Spartans, we are told, were the first who formed

their tactics into a regular system, to be taught as a part of education.

Other nations imitated the Greeks. Princes and states maintained, at

their own expense, either military academies or skillful professors of

tactics for instructing in the theory those young men who devoted

themselves to the profession of arms. The Greeks reduced the whole of the science to calculation and rule.

This precision carried the military art among them at once to a high

8Vice Adm. Louis Edouard Comte Bouet-Willaumez (1808-1871) commanded the

French Training Squadron, 1864-1866. While in that position, he developed tactics for

steam warships which were published under the title Tactique supplementaire a l'usage

d'une flotte cuirassee (Paris: Bertrand, 1868).

Gen. Tasker Howard Bliss (1853-1930) was Professor of Military Science at the

Naval War College from its opening in 1885 until 1888. Later, he became President of

the Army War College, 1903-05, member of the Supreme War Council at Versailles

during World War I, and Chief of Staff of the Army, 1917-18.
68

degree of perfection. "The Greeks," observes one military writer,

"although they made their tactics the basis of the science of war

according to examples given by their masters in the schools, nevertheless considered this as composing but a small proportion of the

acquirements necessary to a general. The art of commanding an army

was justly considered as a most important part of knowledge, and was

taught accordingly. This embraced all the grand objects connected with

war."

The story has often been repeated of Hannibal having ridiculed one

of those professors of tactics who, with pencil and tablet in hand, had

the assurance to debate with him upon the operations of war. 70 But

the wisdom of the Greeks in establishing a regular system of military

instruction rests upon too solid a foundation to be shaken by any such

anecdote. Besides, Hannibal himself had enjoyed unusual advantages in

respect to military education. He was early trained in arms under the

eye of his father, Hamilcar, and probably accompanied him in most of

his campaigns in Spain. He was certainly with him in the battle against

the Vettones, in which Hamilcar perished, Hannibal being at that time

but 18 years of age.

We do not find in history any mention made of naval schools among

the ancients, but there is every reason for believing that the large fleets

of galleys common to ancient Greece and Rome were fought by

military men according to the military tactics of the times. The rules of

the art of war, as then understood, comprehended both the land and

the sea forces.

Here, then, is the philosophy of history teaching us by great

examples. Inspired by the example of the warlike Greeks, and knowing

ourselves to be on the road that leads to the establishment of the

science of naval warfare under steam, let us confidently look for that

master mind who will lay the foundations of that science, and do for it what Jomini has done for the military science. 7 1

70

Luce's source for this story is an anonymous book by a British author, The

Military Mentor: Being a Series of Letters Recently Written by a General Officer to His

Son, on His Entering the Army: Comprising a Course of Elegant Instruction, Calculated

to Unite the Characters and Accomplishments of the Gentleman and Soldier (Salem,

Mass.: Cushing and Appleton, 1808), vol. II, pp. 69-70.

71

Writing to A.T. Mahan on 15 July 1907, Luce referred to this lecture and

remarked, "Lastly, I say [in the article] we must look for one who will do for naval

science what Jomini did for Military Science. After your lectures on naval strategy, I added to the above 'He is here; his name is Mahan.'"

In the Luce file, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, there is a photocopy

of this article from an unknown source, which has this last sentence annoted in Luce's

handwriting: "He appeared in the person of Captain A.T. Mahan, U.S.N." It is signed

"S.B. Luce, Newport, R.I., July 26th 1899."
69

CHAPTER IV

TACTICS AND HISTORY:

ON THE STUDY OF NAVAL HISTORY

(GRAND TACTICS)

By Rear Admiral S.B. Luce, U.S.N.

Editors' Introduction

Like the last chapter, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a

Science," this essay was initially given as a lecture during the first

session of the Naval War College in 1885, then revised, and

presented again in September of the following year. It was

subsequently published in the United States Naval Institute

Proceedings*

Luce's title for this lecture, "On the Study of Naval History

(Grand Tactics)" is somewhat misleading to the modern reader,

but, in its older form, naval history was a study of tactics, not

strategy, policy, and ideas. Here, Luce is not interested in

presenting the philosophical basis for a study of naval history, as he did in his first lecture, but rather in making a direct and

practical connection between the abstract study of warfare and

the technical, professional knowledge of the day.

As the author of Seamanship, he had been recognized for years

as one of America's great experts in the field of practical

seamanship, but unlike the many naval officers who had become

preoccupied with the new technical developments in the Navy,

Luce saw beyond the engineering problems of steampower, steel

ships, and big guns. In spite of the fact that he was a leading

expert in one area of the naval profession, he was fully aware that

deep, specialized knowledge alone was not sufficient for true

professionalism in the officer corps. He recognized the need for a middle ground between the abstract theoreticians and the technicists who dealt only with the details of equipment. This was the

area of grand tactics. In this sphere the traditional study of naval

historians such as Hoste, Clerk, and Ekins could be used side by

side with the most advanced tactical thinking of the day. The

leading innovators of the day in this tactical thought were

Englishmen such as P.H. Colomb, Fremantle, Noel, and Randolph

*"On the Study of Naval History (Grand Tactics)," United States Naval Institute

Proceedings, vol. XIII, No. 2, 1887, pp. 175-201.
70

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and Frenchmen such as Penhoat, Aube, Bouet-Williamez, and

Jurien de la Graviere. It is significant that in approaching this area

of professional study, Luce was highly influenced by the pioneer

naval historian Sir John Knox Laughton. In the 1870's Laughton

had published two highly influential articles, "The Scientific

Study of Naval History" 1 and "An Essay on Naval Tactics."2 Luce had read both articles, and his writing in this period reflects

the impact of Laughton 's work. Luce's footnote in this article

acknowledging Laughton, "to whom we are indebted for many

valuable lessons," is substantive recognition of the impact which

Laughton had on the U.S. Navy. Later, Laughton would be

instrumental in bringing Mahan before the British public and

serving as both inspiration and critic for his work. In 1890, shortly

after the publication of Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon

History 1660-1783, Laughton wrote to Luce that he would

shortly publish a review of Mahan 's book in the Edinburgh

Review, and he added, "I shall take the liberty of reproducing

some of the sentences in your letter, as to the origin and purpose

of the work-I agree with you . . . that the title is not the best

possible."3 In this article Luce betrays a serious shortcoming in his own

scholarship. Unlike Laughton, who carefully verified his statements with original documents, Luce's quotations are not always

accurate, and occasionally his information is simply incorrect.

Luce's contribution is not derived from the quality and accuracy

of the historical information he presents but from his application

of historical scholarship to the development of naval education

and to his conception of the different intellectual levels within the

naval profession. In addition, this article documents the sources of

many of the important intellectual influences which Luce transmitted to the U.S. Navy, not the least of which was that of Sir

John Knox Laughton.

The term "Naval Tactics" has been used in such a general way as to

lead to some confusion of ideas regarding its true meaning. Some

writers restrict it to the evolutionary movements of a fleet, and such as

ii.

1 Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. XVIII, 1875, pp. 508-527.

2 In G.H.U. Noel, The Gun, Ram, and Torpedo (Portsmouth: J. Griffin, 1874), Essay

3 Laughton to Luce, 3 August 1890, Luce Mss., Naval Historical Collection, Naval

War College, Newport, R.I. Luce's letter to Laughton has not yet been located. Sir John

Knox Laughton (1830-1915) was one of the pioneers in the field of naval history. For an

excellent commentary on Laughton's contribution to British naval thought, see D.M.

Schurman, The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic

Thought 1867-1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 83-115.
72

are to be found in the Tactical Signal Book; others limit it to the

manner of conducting a fleet in battle; while others again use the term

in both senses, and often in such a careless way as to lead themselves

and their readers into no little confusion. It is just as well that we

should, in the very beginning, fully understand an expression which

promises to be of frequent use. Tactics has been well defined as the art of military movements. Naval

Tactics is the art of conducting the military movements of a fleet.

Battle being the chief object and end of a fleet, the order of battle

constitutes the principal formation ; and to bring the vessels composing

a fleet, from any given order, to the order of battle, or any other order,

is to perform an evolutionary or tactical movement. There are, besides

the order of battle, various other orders and movements -such as chasing an enemy's fleet; escaping from a superior force; protecting a convoy; navigating the high seas; anchoring; going in or out of port,

etc., etc. These several orders, or formations, formerly called the "orders of

sailing," etc., etc., were laid down in the Signal Book; and the methods

of changing from one order to another were fully prescribed, a diagram

accompanying each evolutionary signal number, showing the positions

and movements of each individual ship. Thus, when, in 1790, Admiral

Lord Howe4 rearranged the Signal Book of the English Navy, he

introduced "instructions for the conduct of the fleet in the execution

of the principal evolutions which were illustrated by figures."5 These

evolutions may be termed Elementary or Minor Tactics. In thus revising

the Signal Book, Lord Howe rendered a great service to the English

Navy, and the value of his work was generously acknowledged by

Nelson. In his letter to Earl Howe of January 8, 1799, giving some

account of the battle of the Nile, 6 Nelson 7 writes: "This plan" [of

battle] "my friends" [the captains of the several ships composing the

fleet] "readily conceived by the signals, for which we are principally, if not entirely, indebted to Your Lordship. ..." Later on in the same

letter he speaks of Earl Howe as "our great master in naval tactics and

bravery."8 The term "naval tactics," as here used by Nelson, is

4Admiral of the Fleet Richard, Earl Howe (1726-1799).

Howe's 1790 tactical instructions were the last in a series of attempts during his career to reform British naval tactics. Throughout his reforms Howe attempted to develop methods by which captains could do as much injury as possible to the enemy at the least risk to themselves. Howe's work was the first blow against the old system of

naval tactics. As it appeared in its final form in 1790, his work combined the best in current British theory with the best of the French influence that Rear Admiral of the

Blue Richard Kempenfelt (1718-1782) had introduced in his signal book reforms of

1730.

6 The Battle of the Nile was fought between the French and British in Aboukir Bay, 1 August 1798.

7Vice Admiral of the White Horatio Viscount Nelson (1758-1805).

a Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, The Despatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord

Viscount Nelson (London: Colburn, 1845), vol. Ill, p. 230. This was not purely flattery on Nelson's part. He expressed a similar, although more tempered, sentiment in a letter to the Reverend Dixon Hoste, 22 June 1795, Nicolas, ibid., vol. II, p. 45-46.
73

undoubtedly to be taken in connection with the revised Code of

Signals, and refers to the Manual of Fleet Evolutions, which had been

rearranged by Howe. Howe not only revised and greatly improved the

Signal Book of the English Navy, including the Code of Tactical Signals,

but he enjoyed the reputation of being indefatigable in the exercising of

the fleet under his command in tactical evolutions, and the transmitting

of orders by signals. He was, moreover, very exacting, requiring great

precision in the execution of all manoeuvres. But this seems to be the

limit of Howe's claim to be considered a tactician. He was skillful in

Minor Tactics.

While Nelson was giving credit to Howe for a code of Minor Tactics,

he, himself, was developing a system of Fighting Tactics (as it was

formerly termed) till then little known in the English Navy. It was a system based upon sound military principles: that of beating the enemy

in detail. In the letter just quoted, Nelson gives the gist of his plan of

attack at the Nile. He says: "By attacking the enemy's van and centre,

the wind blowing along their line, I was enabled to throw what force I pleased on a few ships." And it is this idea of placing two ships on one

of the enemy, of doubling on him, that constitutes the merit of

Nelson's fighting tactics.

Here, then, we have two celebrated tacticians. First, Howe, constantly exercising the fleet in Minor or Elementary Tactics, and

preparing a school of officers who were subsequently to second Nelson

in the development of the higher school of Grand Tactics; and,

secondly, Nelson, who may be said to have founded a school of Grand

Tactics. For it should be remembered that in Howe's great battle of the

first of June (1794), 9 he exhibited no such fighting tactics as was

afterwards practised by Nelson. With his accustomed exactness he

formed his line with great precision, and stood down for the French

fleet, each ship steering for her opposite, with the intention that all should pass through and haul to the wind, to leeward of the French

line. There is no hint of crushing any one part of the enemy 's force by

overwhelming numbers; no indication of an intention of doubling on

the van, or centre, or of placing the enemy between two fires. It was

simply the old custom of placing ship against ship, and allowing a great

fleet fight to resolve itself into a series of single engagements. The result

was the customary indecisive battle, and consequent popular dissatisfaction. Howe, then, was not a tactician in the sense that Nelson was. These two distinguished officers therefore represent the two different branches: the first Minor, Elementary, or Evolutionary Tactics;

the second Fighting or Grand Tactics, or the Tactics of Battle. ! ° These

two branches, so inseparably connected, and which together with

Strategy form one science, should, for the purpose of our present

In the Battle of the Glorious First of June, Howe's fleet fought against the French

Fleet of Admiral Louis Villaret de Joyeuse (1747-1812) in the Atlantic, some 350 miles

west of Ushant, France. Other historians treat this division as two points in the continuing evolution of a

single branch of study. See Julian S. Corbett, Signals and Instructions 1776-1794

(London: Navy Records Society, 1909), and John Creswell, British Admirals of the

Eighteenth Century (London: Allen and Unwin, 1972).
74

studies, be held separate and distinct. Nelson was also a great strategist;

but this again is a distinct branch, which will be considered further on. At present we have to do with Grand Tactics alone-that is to say, with

Fleet Fighting and its history.

The Signal Book furnishes, as already observed, the necessary

instruction in the evolutions of a fleet. But there is no recognized code

of Grand Tactics. In the early days of sailing tactics the navies of

England and France had their Fighting Instructions, the latter contained in the Ordonnance du Roi. But it is quite safe to say that no

navy of the present day can claim what may be called a satisfactory

system of Fighting Instructions; or, we might go so far as to say, a

satisfactory fleet organization. It is in the hope of obtaining clear ideas

of the latter, so as to enable us to organize a fleet on sound principles,

that one part of our studies is to be directed. Another essential part is to study the great sea fights of history, that we may form clear

conceptions of how to fight the fleet we have organized. This is our

present business.

The plan of attack drawn up by Nelson during his pursuit of the

French fleet to the West Indies 1 1 contains the general principles which

guided him in all his battles; principles which are in perfect harmony

with the Science of War, and just as applicable now as they were then.

In his memoranda he begins by enunciating the broad principle that it is the business of a commander-in-chief "to bring an enemy's fleet to

battle on the most advantageous terms." One of these advantages he

states to be "close action"; in other words, that the enemy is to be

brought within effective range of his guns. He next assumes that the

admirals and captains of the fleet will thoroughly understand his plan

of battle; and, therefore, that few signals will be necessary.

This last expression has been, we may here remark parenthetically,

misapplied and misunderstood.

Nelson closed the Signal Book because, having made his dispositions

with great care beforehand, and fully instructed his captains as to his

plan of battle, signals were no longer necessary. Battle once joined,

every one was trusted to carry out his allotted part of the general plan.

Howe closed the Signal Book because he had no plan of battle

beyond the simple method of the barbarian, to pit ship against ship.

It is easy to understand, therefore, how, when the opponents were

fairly matched in military force, the results could be decisive in the

former case and indecisive in the latter.

Having defined and illustrated the two branches of Naval Tactics, let us now take a cursory view of its history.

In the ardor of pursuit of a new study, such as we have declared

"Naval Warfare under Steam" to be, we must not be unmindful of the

lessons of the past. "History," it has been well said, "is Philosophy

teaching by example." 12 We may add that history admonishes by its

Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, vol. VI, pp. 443-45.

12Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751), On the Study and Use of

History, letter 2. The full quotation is "I have read somewhere or other, in Dionysius of

Halicarnassus, I think, that history is philosophy teaching by examples."
75

warnings. It is by the knowledge derived from the history of naval

battles that we will be enabled to establish a number of facts on which

to generalize and formulate those principles which are to constitute the

groundwork of our new science.

"History, as a means of instruction in the art of war, is obviously of

the highest value," observes one military writer. 13"But, " he adds, "to

make the study of history profitable, the mind ought, in the first

instance, to be prepared so as rightly to distinguish between military

events which may be analyzed and reasoned upon with advantage, and

those which may be regarded merely as events in the world's history

destitute of any important bearing on the art of war." It is only by a

philosophical study of military and naval history that we can discover

those truths upon which we are to generalize. "Thus," as the writer just

quoted states, "the victory at Wagram 14 has been traced to the same

primary cause by which the battles of Cannae 1 5 and Pharsalia 1 6 were

gained, and the existence of fundamental principles, by which all the

operations of war should be conducted, has been placed beyond doubt

by the researches of Jomini 17 and other military writers." What has

been done for military science is yet to be done for naval science. In the

pride of an advanced civilization, we are too apt to look with contempt

upon the old sailing tactics, and the battles fought under them. But

even in these days of steam and electricity we may study with

advantage the works not only of John Qerk and Paul Hoste, but of

Thucydides and Herodotus.

Minor Tactics change with the change of arms or improvements in

naval architecture.

Not so with Grand Tactics. But whether it was Phormio 18 or Agrippa 19

or Russell, 20

a Nelson or a Perry,

21 the victory has

generally been with that leader who had the skill to throw two or more

1

Luce's source for this quotation has not been identified.

14

Napoleon's victory at the Battle of Wagram, 5-6 July 1809, ended the active phase

of the Campaign of 1809 and resulted eventually in the Treaty of Pressburg and the

capitulation of Austria.

The Battle of Cannae was one of Hannibal's victories over the Romans during the

Punic Wars in 216 B.C. It is considered the classic example of double envelopment.

The Battle of Pharsalia or Pharsalus was Julius Caesar's decisive victory over Pompey in 48 B.C. 17

Henri, Baron Jomini (1779-1869) was a Swiss soldier and military theorist. His

best known work is Precis de I 'art de la guerre.

1 8 Phormio or Phormion (? - ca. 428 B.C.) was an Athenian admiral who fought in

the Peloponnesian War.

1

Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa (63-12 B.C.) was a Roman statesman and general who

commanded the victorious naval forces of Octavian at the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C.

2 Admiral of the Fleet Edward Russell, Earl of Orford (1653-1727) commanded the

combined fleet of the English and Dutch in the battle against the French at La Houge in 1692.

Capt. Oliver Hazard Perry, USN (1785-1819), commanded the American Fleet

against the British in the Battle of Lake Erie in 1813.
76

of his own ships upon one of the enemy. That is one of the most

valuable lessons of all naval history, and that, it may be stated here, is one of the fundamental principles of our science. It is the capacity to

carry out that principle that gives evidence of the skillful tactician. It is the ignoring of that principle that serves as one of the most impressive

warnings of naval history.

Strategy is still less affected by the mutations of time and the

advance of learning. Alexander the Great found it impracticable to

reduce Tyre22 without the aid of a fleet. On the appearance of the

Cyprian and Phoenician war galleys, the Tyrians called in their own

vessels and sunk triremes in the channel ways to block the entrance to

their harbors. Twenty-two centuries later the combined fleets of

England and France, co-operating with the armies on shore, compelled

the Russians to resort to the same expedient; that is, to close the harbor

of Sebastopol2 3 by sinking vessels of war in the entrance. The Persian

invasion of Greece taught the Athenians the necessity of having a navy.

A navy was built, and at Salamis proved the salvation of the State.

England taught the United States the same lesson. Great strategic

combinations it was found could not be formed without a navy ; a navy

was created-a navy small in numbers, but great in spirit-and the

victories on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain24 proved its inestimable

value. History is full of such parallels. The invasion of Britain was once

rendered possible by reason of the strength of the Roman fleet. But

from the time of the Invincible Armada to the day of Trafalgar it has

been impossible through the constancy and devotion of the English

Channel Fleet. And although there have been such radical changes in

the means of carrying on naval warfare, yet the same strategy which

enticed Nelson to the West Indies in the vain pursuit of the French

Fleet might be practised again to-day.

There are certain general principles which are just as applicable to the

management of a sea army of the nineteenth century as they were in

the days of Salamis or Actium, of Trafalgar or Lake Erie. Hence, it may

be stated in general terms that, while the principles of the Science of

War remain unchanged, the rules of the Art of War vary with the

implements of war. The introduction of the rules of the military art into the conduct of

a fleet, and the revival of the spur, the rostrum of the galley period, has

not only brought us back to the same general system of tactics in use during the ancient civilization, but has rendered a quasi-military

education indispensable to the naval officer.

The great captains who achieved success at the head of the armies of

Greece and of Rome, carried with them their fighting tactics to the

22 The siege of Tyre was undertaken by Alexander in 332 B.C.

23 During the Crimean War, Sevastopol was besieged by allied forces for 11 months

from September 1854 to August 1855.

The Battle of Lake Erie was fought on 10 September 1813. In the Battle of Lake

Champlain, Capt. Thomas Macdonough, USN (1783-1825), led a small American Fleet

to victory over the British. The two battles prevented the British Army from invading

the United States from Canada during the War of 1812. The victory of Lake Erie also opened up the route to the West.
77

fleet, and on the decks of their galleys won the corona navalis for

victories due to their military skill. 25

It was so in the Middle Ages, King Edward III, who was

distinguished for his military abilities, defeated the French in the great

battle of Sluys2 6 -a battle which, for the skillful manner in which it was fought, was thought worthy to be compared to the masterpieces of

the ancient Athenian navy.

It was so at the dawn of modern civilization. Don John of Austria,

who was essentially a soldier, gained at Lepanto one of the greatest

naval battles of history. 2 7

It was so during the earlier period of English naval history. Blake,

Monk, Popham, 28 Deane, 29 Prince Rupert and the Duke of York, 30

all of whom held the highest commands during those terrible contests

with the Dutch for the mastery of the narrow seas, were all men of

military training. It was absolutely necessary, indeed, that men of

military capacity should control the military movements of those large

fleets on which the very existence of England depended, for the naval

officer of that day knew little beyond the mere rudiments of his calling as a seaman. As the navy of England developed into a distinct profession, the

officers were sent to sea at a very early age and kept actively engaged,

that they might become inured to the hardships and privations of ship

life. With many undoubted advantages, the custom was open to certain

objections. While it made them good, practical seamen, it gave them the

sailor's proverbial distaste for acquiring knowledge through the medium

of books. Thus they came to excel in all the practical details of their

profession, but they knew little of the theory, or general principles, on

which the science of that profession was based. To handle a ship in a seamanlike manner, and to preserve one's station in the fleet, seems to

have been the highest point to which the practical education of that

day aspired. True, that was much-indeed, it was a great deal; the value

of that instruction was scarcely to be overestimated. When we consider

the size of the fleets; their protracted cruises; their long and tedious

blockades through all the changes of seasons; the vicissitudes of

In vol. Ill, No. 1 (April 20, 1876), of the Record of the U.S. Naval Institute, an

attempt was made to show more in detail than is now necessary the formation common

to the fleets and armies of the Oar Period. [This is Luce's footnote. He is referring to his

own article, "Fleets of the World." See bibliography item 41.]

26 The Battle of Sluis or Sluys was fought in what is now the Netherlands on 24 June

1340. The battle secured for England control of the English Channel.

27

For the latest interpretation of Lepanto, see Andrew C. Hess, "The Battle of

Lepanto and its Place in Mediterranean History," Past and Present, No. 57, 1972, pp. 53-73.

2

Edward Popham (1610-1651), General-at-Sea.

29Richard Deane (1610-1653), General-at-Sea.

30

H.R.H. James, Duke of York (1633-1701), served as Lord High Admiral of

England before his accession to the throne as King James II on 6 February 1685. He

commanded the navy in the opening campaigns of the First and Second Dutch Wars. Through such men as Samuel Pepys, he did much to give the navy vitality.
78

weather, and the very poor sailing qualities of many or most of the

ships before copper sheathing came into use, we cannot withhold our wonder and admiration for the skill, the devotion and courage of the

English naval officers during those long naval wars which fill so large a space in the English history. But that severe school of practice,

thorough as it undoubtedly was, proved wholly insufficient. The

constant employment of the officers at sea, and the absence of a higher

school, were an effectual bar to their acquiring even the rudiments of

the military art. Generation after generation of English naval officers

passed without the slightest attempt at methodical instruction in naval

tactics. Such knowledge of the art as was acquired must have been by

the process of absorption through observing the evolutions of the fleet

and the manoeuvres of one's own ship. The Signal Book was the only

manual of evolutions; and that was sedulously guarded from the eyes of

the profane. For fear it might fall into the hands of the enemy, as it did

on one or two notable occasions, or be surreptitiously copied by

traitorous hands, it was heavily weighted with lead; and, when not in

actual use, kept within the sacred precincts of the captain's cabin,

whence none but the elect might take it. In the event of defeat it was to

be cast into the sea. Furthermore, the flag officers of the English Navy

were, for over a century, heavily handicapped by the Fighting

Instructions of 1665, 31 which prescribed certain rules for the conduct

of a fleet in battle -rules which proved to be not of general application,

and not always in harmony with the principles of war. Unfortunately,

these rules, insufficient as they were, received full confirmation by the

mature judgment of two courts-martial which may be numbered among

the causes celebres of the English Navy. The first was that of Admiral

Thomas Mathews32 for his failure in the engagement with the

Franco-Spanish fleet off Toulon in the spring of 1 744. The second was

the trial of Admiral John Byng3 3 for his failure in the battle with the

French fleet off Minorca in May, 1756.

The Instructions, 34

on which, in a great measure, the judgment of

the court in each case turned, were drawn up by the Duke of York in

1665. 35

This was during those severe contests with the Dutch for the mastery

of the narrow seas in which the conflicts took place. The line of battle,

which was then for the first time observed according to Paul Hoste,

though certain authors maintain that it was known previously by the

Dutch, consisted of the close-hauled line ahead, in practice seven points

from the wind. Owing to the limited sea room and the dangerous

3 1 For a detailed discussion of the 1665 fighting instructions, see Julian S. Corbett,

Fighting Instructions 1530-1816 (London: Navy Record Society, 1905), pt. v. 32 Admiral of the White Thomas Mathews (1676-1751).

33 Admiral of the Blue the Honorable John Byng (1704-1757).

The basis for this was the "Act for the establishing articles and orders for the

regulating, and better government of his majesties navies, ships of war, and forces by

sea." 13 Charles II, chapter 9 [ 1661]

35 See "Fleets of the World," No. 1, vol. Ill of the Record of the U.S. Naval Institute,

before alluded to. [Luce's footnote.]
79

coasts, the weather gauge was of the very first importance, and as a consequence it was necessary to preserve the order of battle with some

degree of precision. When the field of operations was transferred to the

broad ocean these conditions became greatly modified; yet, notwithstanding this, the Instructions continued to be binding, and were

blindly observed to the frequent discomfiture of the English Navy.

Thus, in Mathews' fight off Toulon, his vice-admiral, Lestock, 36

accused him of "rashness and precipitation in engaging the enemy

before the line of battle was formed, contrary to the rules of war and

the practice of our best admirals; therefore the sole miscarriage was

chargeable on the admiral, who, by his imprudence in fighting, at first, at such a disadvantage, had endangered the whole fleet; and after, by a

quite contrary conduct, suffered the enemy to escape."

Mathews, though he had exhibited the highest gallantry, was found

guilty and declared to be "incapable of holding any further employ-

[ment] in His Majesty's service."

Byng, on the other hand, failed from a too strict observance of the

line of battle. Warned by the result of the former court-martial, he

declared at the commencement of the battle that he "would not fall into that error with which Mr. Mathews was charged, and which proved

his ruin," that of engaging the enemy before his line of battle was

formed. 37 He was found guilty of the charges brought against him and

condemned to death. He was said to have been "too great an observer

of forms, of ancient rules of discipline and naval etiquette."38

During the Dutch wars the opposing fleets were no sooner out of

port than they sighted each other; nor was it likely that the men who

destroyed the shipping in the Thames, and whose guns were heard in

London, would waste much time in manoeuvring. Battle was joined

with eagerness on both sides, and the fighting was of the most stubborn

character. But on the broad Atlantic, or even in the Mediterranean,

fleets might cruise week after week without falling in with each other.

When they did the English instinctively manoeuvred, as they had done

in the Channel, for a windward position, which the French, committed

to a different policy, and hampered by no such traditions, readily

yielded. If the two fleets were on the same tack, and on parallel lines,

the French would reduce sail, and under easy canvas await the enemy.

If he came up astern, the van division of the English would first engage

the rear of the French. The English could not use the lower-deck

batteries in a fresh breeze, while the French, using their weather guns,

could get all the elevation they needed. Firing high, they cut away the

spars, rigging and sail of the English, which reduced their speed and

3 6 Admiral of the Blue Richard Lestock (1697-1748). Mathews, who had engaged the

French but who had broken the line of battle to do it, was blamed for failing to adhere

to regulations. Lestock had not broken the written rules in the action, but he did

disobey his commander in chief and unnecessarily endangered the fleet. 37Byng was well acquainted with the case. He had been the second senior member of

the court-martial board which tried Mathews.

3 8 Shortly after Byng's execution, Voltaire remarked in his satirical masterpiece

Candide, "In this country it is thought well to kill an admiral from time to time to encourage the others."
80

threw the head of the line into confusion. Or, if the distance between

the two lines was beyond the range of their guns, the English would

stand on till the leading ships were abreast of each other, when they

would run down to engage, each ship selecting her antagonist. But while

they were standing down for the French, the latter would keep up a constant fire, raking their enemies as they approached; the English,

meanwhile, unable to bring but a few bow guns to bear. When the

English "brought by the wind," so as to use their broadsides, the

French would bear up, make sail, and, running to leeward, reform their

line and await another attack; this, the English, by being cut up by the

French fire, were seldom able to make. Or, the two fleets might cross on opposite tacks, firing distant broadsides in passing. Again, the

French Government had early submitted the various problems which

enter into shipbuilding to rigid mathematical discussion at the hands of

their most eminent mathematicians. The French ships, therefore, were

superior to the English in the essential quality of speed, and the French

naval authorities had recognized at the very first the necessity of

sheathing their ships with metal. For these reasons the French admirals

found no difficulty in avoiding a battle when it did not suit their

purpose to fight; and, as the resources of their country did not enable

them to build and fit out ships with the rapidity with which it could be

done in England, it was their policy to avoid decisive actions unless the

chances were greatly in their favor; hence, it frequently occurred that

they declined to bring on a general engagement.

The many indecisive battles which resulted from these several causes gave great dissatisfaction in England, and finally culminated in the

court-martial of Admiral Keppel39 for his failure in the battle off

Ushantin 1778.

As in the case of Mathews the charges were brought by his

vice-admiral (Sir Hugh Palliser),

40 the second in command, and mainly

for the same reason. The first charge declared in effect "that on the

morning of the 27th of July, 1778, having a fleet of thirty ships of the

line under his command, and being in the presence of a French fleet of

a like number of ships of the line, the said admiral (Keppel) did not put

his fleet in the line of battle, or into any order proper for receiving or

attacking an enemy; but, on the contrary, by making signal for several

ships to chase, increased the disorder of his fleet, and whilst in the

disorder he advanced to the enemy and made signal for^ battle, the

enemy's fleet being formed in a regular line of battle on that tack which

approached the British fleet. By this unofficer-like conduct a general

engagement was not brought about," etc., etc. A brief abstract from Admiral Keppel's defense will show the line of

his argument: "On my first discovering the French fleet at 1 P.M., July

23d, I made signal to form the order of battle, which being effected

towards evening, the fleet was 'brought to' till morning, when,

perceiving the French had gained the wind during the night, and carried a pressed sail to preserve it, I discontinued the signal for the time and

39Admiral of the White the Honorable Augustus, Viscount Keppel (1725-1786).

40Admiral of the White Sir Hugh Palliser (1723-1791).
81

made signal to chase to windward. If, by obstinately adhering to the

line of battle, I had suffered the French to have separated from me; if the expected convoys had been cut off, or the coast of England had

been insulted, what would have been my situation? Supported by the

examples of Admiral Russell and other great naval commanders, who in

similar situations had ever made strict order give way to reasonable

enterprise, and particularly of Lord Hawke,4 1 who, rejecting all rules

and forms, grasped at victory by an irregular attack,

42

I determined not

to lose sight of the French fleet by being outsailed, from preserving the

line of battle," etc., etc. The court found the charges malicious and

ill-founded.

In his official report of the battle the admiral had said: "The object

of the French seemed to be the disabling of the King's ships in their

masts and sails, in which they so far suceeded as to prevent many of the

ships of my fleet being able to follow me, when I wore to stand after

the French fleet. They took advantage of the night and made off. The

wind and weather being such that they could reach their own shores

before there was any chance of the King's fleet getting up with them,

the state the ships were in -in their masts, yards and sails -left me no

choice of what was proper and advisable to do." That was to return to

Plymouth. The opinion of D'Orvilliers, 43 the French admiral who had

been opposed to Keppel, is valuable: "During the fight," said he, "the

English had the advantage, but after the firing ceased I out-manoeuvred

Mr. Keppel."

The insignificant result of the battle and the court-martial which

followed created great interest in England. But of the flood of literature

that was poured upon the subject, the only publication that concerns us now is the pamphlet printed for private circulation by the Scotch

country gentleman named John Clerk. 44 Up to his time there had been

so many great battles the results of which were wholly out of

proportion to the numbers engaged, that Gerk was led to believe the

French "had discovered some new system of tactics; and that the

English practice, since it was always unsuccessful, must have been

radically wrong.

"4 5 In his more elaborate treatise, which appeared in 1 790, he states that

"after an examination of the late engagements it will be found that the

French have never shown a willingness to risk making an attack, but

4 Admiral of the Fleet Edward Lord Hawke (1705-1781).

42

Alluding, no doubt, to the battle of Quiberon in 1759. [Luce's footnote.]

Lieutenant General des Armees Navales Louis Guillot, Comte d'Orvilliers

(1708-1792).

44

See "Life of John Clerk" by the eminent Scotch professor, Playfair. Clerk seems to have had a natural capacity for military affairs. Disappointed in his early hopes of

entering the Navy, he gave much time to the study of Naval Tactics. [This is Luce's

footnote. He is referring to John Playfair (1748-1819), "Memoir relating to the naval

tactics of the late John Clerk, esq. of Eldin; being a fragment of an intended account of

his life," Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, vol. IX, 1823, pp. 113-137.]

45 John Clerk, An Essay on Naval Tactics (London: Cadell, 1790), p. 19. Luce is paraphrasing Clerk here.
82

have invariably made a choice of the leeward position; and when

extended in line of battle they have disabled the English fleets in

coming down to the attack. Upon seeing the English fleet disabled, they

have made sail and demolished the van in passing, and upon feeling the

effect of the English fire they have withdrawn, at pleasure, either a part or the whole of their fleet, and formed a new line of battle to leeward.

The French have repeatedly done this. It will be found, on the other

hand, that the English, from an irresistible desire of making the attack,

have as constantly courted the windward position, and have repeatedly

had their ships so disabled, by making the attack, that they have not

once been able to bring them to close with, to follow up, or even to

detain, one ship of the enemy. Therefore there was every reason to

believe that the French had adopted and put in execution some system

which the English either had not discovered, or had not yet profited by

the discovery."

To illustrate his position he cites a number of cases, such as Byng's

unfortunate action, already referred to; Pocock's46battles with M.

D'Ache47

in the East Indies in 1757; Admiral Byron's48 engagement

off Granada in 1779; Arbuthnot's49 off the Capes of Virginia in 1781,

and that of Graves 5 ° about the same time and place. The last instance

in the series is Lord Rodney's51 engagement off Martinique, April 17,

1780: "Notwithstanding the personal gallantry of Lord Rodney the

French fleet bore alternately away and escaped, while the English, from

the damage sustained in hulls and rigging, were unable to continue the

pursuit."

Clerk further undertakes to show that whenever the French kept to

windward, they were careful never to take the initiative and seek a

battle, unless the odds were clearly in their favor.

This is illustrated by Rodney's two engagements on the 15th and

19th of May, 1780, near Martinique; Sir Saml. Hood's52 engagement of

the 17th of April, 1781, near the same place, and by Admiral Keppel's

in 1778 off Ushant, already referred to. In each of these fights the

fleets crossed on opposite tacks, exchanging their fire in passing. In the

last case the French fleet, having the wind, ran down and reformed to

leeward. Subsequently, in Arbuthnot's fight off the Chesapeake, the

French admiral put in practice the same tactics. "It is by such

investigations only," he says, "that it can be explained how two adverse

fleets, amounting to thirty ships of the line each, carrying above 36,000

men, after having been brought in opposition of battle, and sustaining a

46Admiral of the Blue Sir George Pocock (1706-1792).

47Vice Admiral Comte d'Ache (ca. 1700-1775).

48 Vice Admiral of the White John Byron (1723-1786).

49Admiral of the Blue Mariot Arbuthnot (1711-1794). Arbuthnot engaged the

French Fleet off the Chesapeake Capes on 16 March 1781.

50Vice Adm. Thomas Graves (ca. 1725-1802).

5 Admiral of the White George Brydges, Lord Rodney (1719-1792).

52 Admiral of the Red Samuel, Viscount Hood (1725-1816).
83

furious cannonade from 4000 guns, besides musketry, have been

brought to be separated again without effect, without the smallest

apparent decision-that is, without the loss of a ship on either side, and

sometimes without the loss of a man, although the rencounter has often

been said to have been within pistol-shot."

On board the Ramilies, 53 Admiral Byng's flagship, in the fight with

the French off Toulon, no one was even wounded.

Such, says an able English authority, in commenting upon Clerk's

essay, was the state of Naval Tactics at the beginning of 1782. "During

the whole war our fleets had invariably been baffled, disabled, worsted.

Our admirals adhered, invariably, to the established mode of attack,

and endeavored to obtain a windward position before they began to

engage. The French, relying upon our want of penetration to discover, or of skill to counteract, this new system of defense, never failed to

accomplish the object of their expedition, and to disable our ships,

while they preserved their own. Dispirited by the failure of our arms in

the American war, we beheld ourselves uniformly baffled on our own

element, and we began to apprehend a decay of spirit in our officers

and seamen."54 When we consider that this language was used by

McArthur, 55 the author of the well-known treatise on Naval CourtsMartial, and at one time Secretary to Admiral Lord Hood, it will add

not a little to its significance.

Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Ekins remarks of Clerk: "In all his

reasoning he shows with truth and success that our defeats were never owing to a want of spirit, but to a deficiency of tactical knowledge. "s 6 "No lessons in tactics," says one of the ablest naval essayists of the

present day, "can be so valuable as those taught by the experience of

the past .... In no case has a victory been won over a fairly equal force

where the ignorance of the one commander-in-chief, or the skill of the

others, has caused the strength of the fleet to be dispersed and has

spread the attack over the whole, instead of concentrating it against a

part. All the painfully notorious battles of the last century, notorious

by reason of the bitter feeling and angry, tragical courts-martial which

followed their want of success, come distinctly under this category.

From the time of Mathews to the time of Rodney we were trammeled

53 Read the account of the loss of the Ramilies in 1782 with Admiral Graves on

board. She was hove to under the mainsail on the larboard tack. The admiral was saved

and all the crew. [This is Luce's footnote. He probably read the account of the loss in

Robert Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain from 1723 to 1783

(London: Longman, Hurst, Rees & Orme, 1804), vol. V, pp. 496-504.]

Luce's source for this quotation from McArthur has not been located. It does not

appear in McArthur's review of Clerk's Naval Tactics which appeared in the Naval

Chronicle, vol. I, No. I, January 1799, pp. 32-42, and vol. I, No. 2, February 1799, pp. 137-140. The quotation is a paraphrase of Clerk, Naval Tactics, pp. 17-19.

John McArthur (1755-1840) wrote A Treatise on the Principles and Practice of

Naval Courts Martial (London: Whieldon and Butterworth, 1792). With the Reverend

James Stanier Clarke (1765-1834), he edited the Naval Chronicle. In 1809 the two men

jointly authored The Life and Services of Horatio, Viscount Nelson.

56 Adm. Sir Charles Ekins (1768-1855) Naval Battles from Life to the Peace in 1814

(London: Baldwin, Cradock and Joy, 1824), p. xiv.
84

and bound to a false system which, when skilfully opposed, could not,

and did not, lead to any results other than disappointment and loss.

The attack was made in line against line, if possible, ship against ship;

and in no one instance was it attended with success. That the individual

ships were, for the most part, skilfully handled and gallantly fought,

may be conceded; that they were, singly, superior to the ships of the

enemy, may be fairly maintained, but collectively and as a fleet they were unable to accomplish anything."5 7 These are certainly very candid admissions; but they are fully

justified by history.

Coming to us, as they do, from authors of high standing and of

intimate knowledge of the subject, these statements are of the utmost

value to the naval student; and we cannot feel too grateful to those

gentlemen who have had the enlightened spirit, the sense of justice, and

the love of truth, to give the plain facts, though it should not always

redound to the credit of the profession they so worthily represent.

We now come to the true cause of the difficulty under which the

English labored, and to the secret of the so-called "new system" devised

by the French. McArthur goes on to say, "Our officers were eminently

distinguished by their gallantry and seamanship, but they had hitherto

bestowed no adequate degree of attention upon Naval Tactics." And

yet, for the fifty years preceding the treaty of Paris of 1783, the

English naval officers had been constantly engaged in war.

5 8 French officers, on the other hand, seem to have paid great attention

to Naval Tactics. Tourville, 59so highly eulogized by Macaulay,

originated the best work on Naval Tactics (that of Paul Hoste) ever published.

D'Orvilliers,6 ° who fought the drawn battle with Keppel, was the

57

Prof. John Knox Laughton, R.N., Royal Naval College, Greenwich, to whom we

are indebted for many valuable lessons.-S.B.L. [The quotation is from Laughton, "The

Scientific Study of Naval History," pp. 521-522.]

5 8 However fully we may share the incredulity of Lieutenant Hatchway, there is that

about the utterances of Commodore Trunnion which plainly indicates the drift of

popular opinion in his day (1751) in regard to the average sea-fight. In speaking of one

of his exploits the Commodore says: "Finding the Frenchman—the Flower de

Louse—took a great deal of drubbing, and that he had shot away all our rigging, and

killed and wounded a great number of our men, I resolved to run him on board; but

Monsieur, perceiving what we were about, filled his topsails and sheered off, leaving us

like a log upon the water." (Dr. Smollett was a loblolly boy on board the Suffolk,

Commodore, afterwards Admiral Sir Charles Knowles, and was present at the attack on

La Guira in 1743. "Peregrine Pickle" first appeared in 1751.) [This is Luce's footnote.

He is referring to the British novelist Tobias George Smollett (1721-1771). Smollett

served as a surgeon's mate on board the ship of the line Cumberland, 80 guns, commanded by a Captain Stuart.] Smollett was present at the attack on Cartagena in

1741 and recorded his experiences in his novel, Roderick Random. Smollett was

prosecuted for libel in 1759 by Adm. Sir Charles Knowles for remarks made in the

journal Critical Review in May 1758. It is unlikely that Smollett met Knowles in the

Caribbean. See Lewis Melville, The Life and Letters of Tobias Smollett (London: Faber

and Gwyer, 1926), ch. 9. Marshall Anne Hilarion de Contentin, Comte de Tourville (1642-1701). Hoste was

Tourville's chaplain.

Lieutenant-General des Arme'es Navales Louis Guillouet, Comte d'Orvilliers

(1708-1792), was Keppel's opponent in July 1779.
85

author of a work on Tactics; and the Viscount de Grenier6

* proposed a formation for battle and a system of tactics which was certainly a work

of merit. The Viscount Morogues6 2 and others of more or less note had

written on the same subject. Ramatuelle6 3

is worthy of careful study

to-day.

Ramatuelle observes: "The French Navy has always preferred the

glory of securing, or retaining a strategic advantage, or a conquest, to

the more brilliant, perhaps, but really less substantial feat of making

prizes; and in that they approach nearer to the true ends of war. For

what would the loss of a few ships be to the English? The principal aim

is to attack them in their possessions, the source of their vast commerce

and their powerful marine."64

The superiority of the French as tacticians is well illustrated by the

battles fought by Sir George Pocock and Monsieur D'Ache in the East

Indies; and, better yet, by the series of battles between the Bailli de

Suffren65 and Sir Edward Hughes66

on the same station in 1782 and

1783.

Both commanders-in-chief, being remote from their respective

Governments, and beyond the reach of instructions, were thrown upon

their own resources, and obliged to rely solely upon their own

judgment in the conduct of affairs.

De Suffren recovered the Dutch ports of Trincomalee, which the

English admiral had captured a short time before, and after a series of

actions raised the blockade of Cudalore and relieved the garrison. The

conflicts were terminated by tidings of peace, leaving the French, on

the whole, masters of the situation.

In all the higher attributes of a naval officer, save hard and persistent

fighting, De Suffren proved himself to be superior to his adversary.

Still another and more familiar illustration is to be found in our own

early history, when, at one of the most momentous periods of the

Revolutionary War, an English admiral was fairly outgeneraled by his

more skillful adversary. It was when De Grasse67 lured the English

squadron away from the relief of Cornwallis. 68 The late Centennial

Jacques-Raymond Grenier, Vicomte de Giron (1736-1803), hydrographer and

author of L'Art de la Guerre sur Mer (1787).

62 ' Lieutenant General des Armees Navales Sebastien Francois Bigot, Vicomte de

Morogues (1705-1781), founder of the French Naval Academy.

6 3 Audibert Ramatuelle was termed an "ancien capitainne de vaisseau" when his

book appeared in 1802.

64 ' ' Audibert Ramatuelle, Cours Elementaire de Tactique Navale (Paris: Baudouin,

1802), note 2, p. 363.

65 Vice Adm. Pierre Andre' de Suffren de Saint-Tropez (1726-1788), Marshal of

France and Bailli of the Order of Malta.

66Admiral of the Blue Sir Edward Hughes (ca. 1720-1794).

Lieutenant-General des Armees Navales Francois Joseph Paul Marquis de Grasse,

Comte de Tilly (1722-1788).

6 8 Gen. Charles Cornwallis, first Marquis and second Earl Cornwallis (1738-1805).
86

celebration at Yorktown has revived the memory of the historical

incidents of that period. 6 9 At no time has the French Navy received full credit for its share in

bringing a long and trying campaign to a successful termination.

While extensive preparations were being made by Washington in

May, 1781, to capture New York, then occupied by the English, word

was sent to De Grasse, in the West Indies, soliciting his cooperation.

About the middle of May a message from De Grasse reached

Newport, 70 where a portion of the French forces and a French

squadron then lay, saying that he had sailed, not for New York, but for

the Chesapeake. This completely changed the whole plan of operations

and made the army of Comwallis the objective point. Continuing the

demonstration against New York, with a view to misleading the English

commander-in-chief, the combined armies took up their march for

Virginia, distant about four hundred miles, and in about one month's

time came within sight of the English at Yorktown. On the 14th of

September, Washington held a consultation with De Grasse on board

the Ville de Paris, when arrangements were made to prosecute the siege

of Yorktown.

Clinton71 meanwhile, learning that the French squadron under

Count de Barras

72 had sailed from Newport for the Chesapeake,

dispatched Admiral Graves with his squadron to intercept him.

On reaching the Capes of Virginia, Graves was surprised to find the

French squadron at anchor in the Bay. De Grasse, on his part, expecting

to see the squadron of De Barras, was surprised to see the English ships.

It was now that the skill of De Grasse displayed itself in the exercise of

the highest order of strategy. He immediately proceeded to sea, and,

practising the policy so often resorted to by the French, of allowing the

English to gain the much-coveted weather gauge, he commenced a series

of those indecisive actions which, as we have seen, so often characterized the naval battles of that day.

After each partial engagement the French would edge away to

leeward, and, reforming the line of battle in a new position, await the

attack. This manoeuvring was kept up for five days; the English eager

for a general and decisive battle, the French luring them away from the

one objective point in the whole theatre of the war, the key of the

entire plan of operations so laboriously prepared by Washington and his

allies. At the end of about five days, judging the squadron under De

Barras to be safe, De Grasse returned to the Chesapeake.

When Graves reached the Capes, he had the mortification of finding

both French squadrons at anchor in the Bay, their united forces being

much superior to his own. Completely outgeneraled, he returned to

New York. The last avenue of escape left open to Comwallis being thus

See Report of the Commission in Charge of the Yorktown Centennial Celebration,

20 February 1883, Senate Report No. 1003, 47th Congress, 2d session.

70

Newport, R.I., was a French base between July 1778 until August 1781.

71

Gen. Sir Henry Clinton (ca. 1738-1795).

72 ' ' ' Lieutenant-General des Armees Navales Louis, Comte de Barras (ca. 1700-1788).
87

closed by the French fleet, the destruction of the English army became

inevitable.

To estimate the value of the service rendered by the French, and the

full significance of the tactics of De Grasse, we have only to suppose

that Admiral Graves, instead of following the French outside the Cape,

had stood up the Bay for York River and effected a junction with

Cornwallis. Notwithstanding the disparity of forces, the French having

twenty-four ships of the line to nineteen of the English, he could have

rendered his position so strong that the French, exercising their

extreme caution, would not have ventured to attack, even when joined

by De Barras with ten ships of the line. Moreover, Admiral Digby, 73

with a squadron, shortly after arrived at New York, so that when thus

reinforced the fleet of Admiral Graves consisted of twenty-seven ships.

Had the English commander-in-chief succored the besieged army, as a French admiral would have done, had their relative positions been

changed, it would have given an entirely different complexion to the

whole campaign of Washington, if it had not completely frustrated it. The position of Admiral Graves may be likened to that of an army

interposed between the parts of an enemy's extended lines in such a way as to be able to concentrate on either one of those lines before the

other could be brought to its assistance.

Napoleon practised that species of tactics, which enabled him to

beat his adversary in detail with brilliant success. In this case before us, the objective point, Yorktown, was left open,

so that the English admiral, without fighting, had only to sail in

between the two French squadrons, establish himself in an impregnable

position on the York River and render the relief so earnestly looked for

by the English army. That De Grasse, with a numerically superior force,

should have avoided a conflict with the English squadron, leads to the

belief that the French must have been sensible of some inherent

weakness, which is not fully explained by their known inability to refit

their ships or replenish stores with the thoroughness and expedition of

their adversaries. No doubt De Grasse was right in saying, on the

occasion of his subsequent surrender to Rodney, that the English were,

in naval matters, a hundred years ahead of them. We may except, as the

English have so candidly done, the practical knowledge of Naval

Tactics. Their superior skill in handling their fleets was forced upon

them as necessary to their existence: it was the instinct of self- preservation.

The object of Clerk, to refer once more to the "Treatise on Naval

Tactics," was to point out the grave defects of the English Fighting

Instructions and to suggest the remedy. There seems to be no doubt

that the English naval officers profited by the lesson, and, the ice once

broken, there was no longer any hesitation in putting in practice the

principal suggestion thrown out by the author, and one which is conformable to one of the oldest and best-known rules of the art of

war-viz: to inflict upon the enemy a decisive blow by concentrating an overwhelming force upon a given point of his line, thus beating him in

73 Admiral of the Red Robert Digby (1732-1814).
88

detail. It was to just such a manoeuvre that Rodney owed his success on

the 12th of April, 1782. How far Rodney was indebted to Clerk for the

tactics which gave him the battle, it is unnecessary to discuss. Suffice

here to say that in the memoirs of that officer the claim of Clerk is wholly denied; and that Sir Howard Douglas, in an able pamphlet,

claims the honor in behalf of his father, who was Rodney's flag captain.

Moreover, it has been pointed out by Clerk himself that the same

manoeuvre was performed by De Suffren, though not with equal

success, in the battle with Sir Edward Hughes off Ceylon, in the East

Indies, the very same day of Rodney's victory in the West Indies (April

12, 1782). The same tactics were referred to by Paul Hoste long before.

They had been practised by Count d'Estrees74 when, in 1673, he cut

through Prince Rupert's line.

It is quite certain, however, that the essay became an accepted

authority, and led to a change in the Fighting Tactics of the English

Navy. Thus it came that the naval battles of the French Revolution

opened a fresher and brighter chapter in the history of English Naval

Tactics.

Lord Howe, upon whom devolved the labor of reorganizing the

English fleet and the Signal Book, after ten years of peace, led off in

1794 with the victory of the 1st of June. This was followed by the

defeat of the Spanish squadron off Cape St. Vincent in 1797, where

Nelson played so conspicuous a part; and in the same year Duncan, in

two irregular columns, smashed through the centre and rear of the

Dutch line at Camperdown, winning a brilliant victory.

The period culminated in Nelson and Trafalgar.

It is but fair to say here that it is claimed for Hawke, and with

justice, that he founded the school of which Nelson became the most

brilliant exponent. 7 5 The English naval officers had, at last, begun to study Naval Tactics,

leaving no longer to the French the monopoly of that secret of success.

It is interesting to know that Nelson not only studied Clerk's Naval

Tactics, but that it was his custom to give out to his captains problems

in tactics for their solution. This had the tendency of leading their

thoughts into those channels best calculated to prepare them for any

emergency of battle that might arise, thereby laying down in advance

the foundations for victory.

As the history of naval warfare may be divided into the three great

periods of Oars, Sails, and Steam, so it is convenient for our present

purpose to divide the history of Naval Tactics under Sail into three

periods. The first begins shortly after the peace of Westphalia, 1648,

which terminated the Thirty Years War, and includes the three Dutch

wars, when the English and Dutch contended for the sovereignty of the

seas. It was during this time that James, Duke of York, originated the

Naval Tactics of the English Navy and first established a regular order

Jean, Comte d'Estrees (1624-1707), Marshal of France, Vice Admiral of Ponant,

and Viceroy of America. In 1673 d'Estrees commanded a fleet in conjunction with

Rupert against the Dutch in the Channel.

75 Montagu Burrows, The Life of Edward, Lord Hawke (London: Allen, 1883), pp. 497-98.
89

of battle.

76

It ended in 1673 with the defeat of De Ruyter77 by Prince

Rupert. During this period the principal commands in the English fleet were held by officers who had enjoyed the advantages of a military

training, and the battles were of the most decisive character.

The second period includes the times referred to by Clerk: the War

of Succession, beginning in 1712; the war with Spain in 1718; the

Spanish War in 1739; the war with France in 1744; the Seven Years

War, from 1756 to 1763; and the American War, ending with the treaty

of Paris in 1783. During this period the fleets of England were commanded by seamen pure and simple, who, ignoring the science of

their profession, permitted themselves to be hampered by a set of

arbitrary and insufficient rules. The battles fought during this period

were, with few exceptions, indecisive.

The third and last period is characterized by a close attention to

Naval Tactics and decisive battles.

It may be said to begin with Rodney's victory in 1782, and end with

Nelson and Trafalgar in 1805.

The conclusion, which is not at all strained, is that the landsman

with a military training was more capable of conducting the military

movements of a fleet than the mere sailor who knew nothing of the

science of war. Charnock, in speaking of the Earl of Sandwich (Admiral Montague),

78

says that "at the age of 30 (1655), bred to the Army, he was

appointed joint commander of the fleet with Blake, a man undoubtedly

possessed of the highest gallantry, but, like himself, totally un- acquainted with every principle of Naval Tactics; yet under these very

men, even at their first outset in their new profession, the British flag

spread everywhere a terror and commanded a respect which, without

intending to depreciate in the smallest degree the merits of their

successors, we may truly say the greatest professional skill has never yet

enhanced."79

It is evident that their ignorance of "every principle of

Naval Tactics" was amply supplied by their knowledge of Military

Tactics, which enabled them to direct those more extended movements

of a fleet comprehended in the term Grand Tactics, or the Tactics of

Battle.

Prince Rupert and the Duke of Albemarle (Admiral George Monk)

were styled "His Majesty's Generals at Sea." Monk may have excited

the mirth of his sailors by calling out, "Wheel to the right," or "left,"

when he wished to tack ship; but he defeated the celebrated Dutch

admirals, Van Tromp8 ° and De Ruyter, and was one of the best naval

administrators England has ever had. Monk, it should be said, had

enjoyed, during the earlier years of his life, a short experience at sea.

76

Luce, "Fleets of the World," p. 18. 77Adm. Michiel Adriaanszoon De Ruyter (1607-1676).

78 Admiral of the Fleet Edward Montague, first Earl of Sandwich (1625-1672).

79John Charnock (1756-1807), Biographia Navalis (London: R. Faulder, 1794), vol.

I, p. 30

80Adm. Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp (1598-1653).
90

On the other hand, it was said of Sir Edward Hughes, a typical

officer of the middle part of the eighteenth century, that he could

handle his ship to admiration, but knew little about managing a fleet.

Much the same may be said of Admiral Byng. A part of the evidence

given on his trial conveys a valuable lesson. Captain Gardiner, 8 1 of the

Ramilies, 90, the flagship of Admiral Byng, testified that "he advised

Mr. Byng repeatedly to bear down, but without effect; for that on the

day of the action the admiral took entire command of the ship upon

himself"; which means that he had no conception of the duties of his

high office of commander-in-chief of a fleet. So of Mathews: he

understood the practical part of his profession better than the theory,

and "knew better how to fight, himself, than to command others to

fight."

We cannot refrain from giving here a couple of pen-and-ink portraits

of two distinguished officers whose services have been referred to. Of

De Suffren the writer says: "He was cool and daring in action, crafty in

policy, of ready wit, and of singular genius as a tactician, with much

practical skill, added to a vast fund of theoretical skill: the most

illustrious officer, without exception, that had ever held command in

the French Navy." Opposed to him was Sir Edward Hughes: "Brave,

skilled in his profession, of the old school, not fitted to receive new

ideas, opinionated, perverse, with but little idea of tactics and less of

policy, he was still, at all times, ready for battle. He did not know much

about manoeuvring a fleet, but he could handle his own ship to

admiration; he had not much judgment as to the proper time to fight,

but when he did fight, he did so with a courage that was proof against

all odds."82

Sir Charles Ekins, in commenting upon the want of success of

Admiral Graves, remarks that, "unfortunately, the fate of Mathews and

Byng was still fresh in the recollection of our naval commanders; and as

in those cases disgrace or punishment alike awaited both the daring and

the cautious, the conducting of a fleet in the presence of an enemy

became a duty at once perilous and perplexing."83

It is curious to note, as we may here, how the traditions of the

English Navy seem to have completely usurped the place of original

investigation. Keppel justified his conduct as having been formed on

that of Russell, Hawke, and other great commanders, and the sentences

inflicted upon Mathews and Byng affected generations of their successors. The great lesson to be drawn from this cursory review of the history

of Naval Tactics under Sail is, that the highest achievements of a navy

are to be secured when, to the practical training from boyhood in all

81

Capt. Arthur Gardiner (? - 1758).

8 2 J.K. Laughton, "Le Bailli de Suffren," The United Service Magazine, May and June

1867, reprinted in Laughton, Studies in Naval History (London: Longmans, Green,

1887), ch. IV, pp. 125 and 147.

83 Ekins, p. 123.
91

the details of the naval profession, there is added proper instruction in

the science and art of war. 84

We must pause here for a moment to disclaim any intention of

undervaluing the character of those many great seamen whose deeds

embellish and adorn the pages of English naval history.

Drake, 85 Hawkins86 and Frobisher87 (Lord Howard was not a seaman in the sense that Drake was), aided by the elements, scattered

the Invincible Armada; but they lived before any regular system of

tactics had been devised. And Anson, 88 Hawke and Boscawen89 won

their victories for the most part by superior numbers, wherein skill and

tactics had little part. The battle of Quiberon, fought in bad weather,

on a dangerous and unknown coast, must, however, stand out as a

brilliant and exceptional victory.

If history be that "vast Mississippi of falsehood" Arnold90 has called

it, the earnest student in his search for truth must carefully weigh the

evidence, for and against, before concluding on the respective merits of

the Fighting Tactics of the English and the French Navies of the last

period of Tactics under Sail. Much praise is undoubtedly due to Nelson

and his school; but what was the condition of the French Navy during

the Revolution and the Consulate? Says an English naval essayist on

this point: "The French, by their careful study of, and attention to, the

details of naval architecture, of strategy and tactics, held their own

against us for nearly one hundred years-not brilliantly, perhaps, but at

any rate sufficiently -and it was not till the close of the century, when

the study of tactics had been, in a measure, forced upon us, that we

recovered our old superiority. As we improved, the French, victims of

anarchy and internal confusion, deteriorated, and thus, by the happy

combination on our part of tactical study, practical skill, and constant

experience; on the part of the enemy of ignorance and presumption, we

won those great victories which mark the annals of the end of the last

century and the beginning of this." 9 1 These "great victories," then, were not due wholly to the prowess

and skill of the English, but in a measure to the deterioration of the

French; how great a measure that was, English writers themselves tell us. But let us continue our study of English Naval Tactics.

In 1827 was fought, at Navarino, the last great fleet fight under sail; and the year after appeared the second edition of "Naval Battles," by

Rear-Admiral Ekins, from which we make the following extract. He

84This sentence summarizes Luce's view of naval education.

85

Sir Francis Drake (ca. 1540-1596).

86

Sir John Hawkins (1532-1595).

87

Sir Martin Frobisher (ca. 1535-1594).

88 Admiral of the Fleet George, Lord Anson (1697-1762).

89Admiral of the Blue Edward Boscawen (1711-1761).

90Matthew Arnold (1822-1888), English poet and literary critic. 9 ^aughton, "The Scientific Study of Naval History," p. 524.
92

quotes another English admiral of distinction who uses this language:

"If I commanded an English fleet opposed to a French one, I should

not have the least objection to their cutting my line. I should probably

myself break all order of battle, in order to prevent their cutting off

any particular ships, and then, behold! the old story: I have them in

action, ship to ship. This is the great secret of our tactics; that of the

French to prevent it. "I fairly own," he continues, "that I hope close action, ship to ship,

will ever be the first object of a British naval commander-in-chief." And

Admiral Ekins adds, with a burst of fine enthusiasm: "This is bravely

said by the gallant son of a noble chief, and let the British Navy say,

Amen!"92 This may be admirable as a specimen of rhetoric, but,

certainly, very poor tactics. The passage is not without value, however,

as corroborative of one of two theories: Either the English had been

betrayed into over-confidence by the demoralized condition of the

French Navy, and the consequent ease with which victories over it were

gained, rendering skillful tactics unnecessary -and there is much to

support this view-or, that after Trafalgar the English Navy relapsed

into what has been well called the "Dark Age" of Naval Tactics. As late as 1828 two distinguished British admirals coolly tell us that the secret

of their tactics is "close action, ship to ship "-a principle directly

opposite to what their own Nelson and his school taught. His teaching,

and the teachings of all great captains, both on shore and afloat, is to

put two against one. To understand this fundamental principle is to

understand the very root and groundwork of Grand Tactics; and to be

able to carry out this principle in battle, is to exhibit the highest skill as a tactician. What, then, must we say of the Ekins school? Sir Samuel

Hood, with twenty-two ships, when standing in to engage the French

fleet of thirty-three sail of the line under De Grasse (anchored at

Basseterre, St. Christopher, in 1772), designed to throw the whole

weight of the attack on the head of the French column and crush that

before the rear, which would have been thrown out, could possibly

come to its succor. The French, notwithstanding their superiority, as a whole, no doubt escaped an overwhelming defeat by getting under way

and standing out to sea. The same plan of battle was carried out at the

Nile. The head of the French column was doubled upon and crushed,

while the rear was completely thrown out of action. What Nelson

meant by writing to Duncan, after Camperdown, that he [Nelson] had

profited by his [Duncan's] example, is not precisely clear.

93

In the

battle of Camperdown, October 12, 1797, Duncan made signal to form

line; but, not waiting for all the ships to come up, he and his

92

Sir Charles Ekins, The Naval Battles of Great Britain (London: Baldwin and

Cradock, 1828), pp. 19-20. This quotation also appears in the first edition, pp. 8-9. 9 Admiral of the White Adam, Viscount Duncan (1731-1804). This letter is not

included in Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, and it is not referred to in modern studies

of Nelson. By a letter from Duncan to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Julian Corbett

shows that Duncan was not purposefully innovating any new tactical ideas. See J.S. Corbett, ed., Private Papers of George, second Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty,

1794-1801 (London: Navy Record Society, 1914), vol. 2, p. 197, Duncan to Spencer 15

October 1797.
93

vice-admiral, Onslow, 94 led down on the enemy in two irregular

columns, not unlike the manner in which Nelson and Collingwood9 5 led the attack on the allied fleets off Trafalgar. In both cases the entire

English fleet did not cut through the enemy's line, but some "brought

to" to windward, thus placing the enemy between two fires.

Nelson, in his general order, dated on board the Victory off Cadiz,

Oct. 18, 1805, 96 divided the fleet into two lines, sixteen ships in each

line, with an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest-sailing

two-decked ships, which eight ships, added, if wanted, to either of the

two lines (as the commander-in-chief might direct), would swell that

line to twenty-four ships. Those eight ships constituted the reserve. Having made his general disposition, he adds -and here lies the gist of

the whole matter97 -"The impression of the whole British fleet must

be made (with the intention of overpowering it) on that portion of the

enemy's line rearward from the third or fourth ship ahead of its commander-in-chief presumed to be in the centre. I will suppose the

twenty enemy's ships ahead untouched."98 That is to say that, by

doubling on the enemy's centre and rear, he threw the entire van out of

action. 99 And yet, nearly a quarter of a century after Nelson's splendid

Q4Admiral of the Red Sir Richard Onslow (1747-1817).

15 Vice Admiral of the Red Cuthbert, Lord Collingwood (1740-1810).

This is the secret memorandum of 9 October 1805, Nicolas, Despatches and

Letters, vol. VII, pp. 89-92.

97The full quotation is as follows:

The Whole impression of the British Fleet must be to overpower from two or

three Ships ahead of their Commander-in-Chief, supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of their Fleet. I will suppose twenty Sail of the Enemy's Line to be

untouched, it must be some time before they could perform a manoevre to bring

their force compact to attack any part of the British Fleet engaged, or to succor

their own Ships, which indeed would be impossible without mixing with the ships

engaged.

Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, \ vol. VII, p. 90.

98On taking command of the fleet that was destined to operate against the combined

forces of the enemy, Nelson summoned the admirals and captains of the fleet into the

cabin of the Victory."When I came to explain to them the 'Nelson touch,'" he wrote to an intimate friend, "it was like an electric shock. Some shed tears; all approved—'It was new—it was singular—it was simple!' and from Admirals downwards, it was repeated 'It must succeed, if ever they will allow us to get at them.'" Collingwood said the plan of

attack was irresistible. [This is Luce's footnote. Nelson's intimate friend was Emma

Hamilton to whom he wrote on 1 October 1805, Nicolas, Despatches~and~Letters7 vol. VII, p. 60.

99

It may not be out of place to call attention just here to the expression "breaking

the enemy's line," so often met with in naval history. In Capt. Montagu Burrows' "Life

of Lord Hawke," the author says that "Lord Rodney was not the first to whom credit is due for 'breaking the enemy's line,' an operation he put in practice with distinguished

results in his famous battle of Dominica, and which after 1782 became the tactics of the

British Navy."

Now, simply breaking the enemy's line amounts to very little in a tactical point of

view and may, if the opponents are fairly matched, be attended with evil results. But the

author goes on, in tracing the development of fighting tactics, to explain that "the next

step was to cut through the enemy's line and double the force on each ship so cut off. After the time of Nelson any other method seemed inconceivable." [This is Luce's

footnote. The quotations are from Burrows, pp. 69-71.]
94

illustration of a well-known principle of the science of war, we find two

distinguished admirals of the British Navy telling us that the secret of

their tactics is to "place ship against ship."

Leaving the sail period, let us now consider the state of Naval Tactics

at the present day.

In an exhaustive article on the subject, which appeared a few years

ago, the very able writer declared that, in the British Navy, Naval

Tactics "had not been so much neglected as despised." Just think of

that! "Not so much neglected as despised." He says: "In that service no

tactical maxim has ever been held in so much honor as the simple

phrase which asked only for a fair field and no favor."

"Plenty of sea room and a willing enemy," he continued, "was a formula which adequately expressed the aspirations of a body of men

strong in their confidence of their superior seamanship and of their

undoubted valor and endurance." Evidently, for such men, if such

indeed there be in the English Navy, the lessons of Hawke and Nelson

have been given in vain.

As late as 1 872 there were a number of English writers who agreed

in thinking that, notwithstanding their magnificent fleet of ironclads,

they were still "no more than groping after something definite which it was hoped might arise at a future time." They had not yet a perfectly

settled drill to guide them in their fleet evolutions.

Another author, writing about the same time, says: "The naval

student is brought face to face with the great difficulty of modern

Naval Tactics-the choice of weapons. What would be the English

choice, should war come upon us now? It is somewhat painful to note

that we have no choice. We vaguely hope that a wise choice will in some

way be disclosed to us, and we do not take a great deal of trouble to see how things point. The position we hold is dangerous and improper." He

continues: "While each of the four modern naval weapons, the gun, the

ram, the Harvey torpedo, and the Whitehead torpedo, has its advocates,

the great mass of naval men simply look on."

In the English Naval Prize Essay of 1879 100 the author says:

"Evolutions are not tactics. Evolutions are simply fleet drill: the Signal

Book is a drill book." 1 °

* He then proceeds to criticise the Signal Book,

winding up with the remark: "Are there no broad principles which

might be shadowed forth in the Signal Book? At present, it must be

admitted, we are groping in the dark. Our evolutions and manoeuvres

have no direct bearing on battle formations. 102

... Modern naval

warfare has so changed," he says, "and is in such a state of transition,

that, failing a direct order from higher authority to deal with tactics,

modern Signal Book committees have agreed to ignore them, except so

far as an occasional verbal change in an old signal might be adapted to

Luce is referring here to the Naval Prize Essay of 1880, not 1879: Captain, the

Honorable E.R. Fremantle, "Naval Tactics on the Open Sea with the Existing Types of

Vessels and Weapons," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. XXIV, No.

104, 1880.

101

Ibid., p. 33.

102

Ibid., p. 45.
95

modern warfare." Here, then, lies the whole trouble: the English have

made no serious effort to get up a modern Code of Fighting

Instructions. The essayist is not without words of praise, however, for

the Signal Book, deficient as it is. "If," says he, "we turn to the

definitions, we see a great improvement has taken place in recent

editions, the terms 'guide of a fleet,' 'guide of a column,' and others,

being comparatively new. The term 'column' is also new, and is now

used to mean 'any number of ships in a distinct body, whether in line

ahead, line abreast, or otherwise.' The word," he adds, "has been

objected to, with justice, as having a forced meaning, but at least it describes clearly a body of ships in any formation, and this was

previously much required." 1 °

3 Further on he says: "Alluding to the old Signal Book" (and the new

one, he tells us, is a mere transcript with a few extra notes and

observations), "we ask if we are right in supposing that all these signals,

evolutions and manoeuvres are intended as a groundwork for tactics?

And, if so, where are the tactics?" 1 04

Another writer 105 asks the same question: "But are even the

evolutions prescribed for the squadrons sufficient? If battle is their

object, where are their formations or plans of attack which they

recommend?" The former essayist answers the question himself by

saying: "We have been living in peaceable times, and battle and action

signals have been dropping out of the Signal Book. What remains? Just

ten articles of instructions for action which are mostly obsolete." 1 06

It must be admitted that these remarks of English Prize Essayists

hold out small encouragement to hope for much instruction in tactics

from the English Navy. And there is reason to believe that other navies

are pretty much in the same unsettled state as to the best system of

Steam Tactics, both Minor and Grand. Commander Hoff

l ° 7 who has

taken great pains to gather together under one cover all that is latest

and best of the published opinions on the subject, quoting from

English, French, German, Italian, and Russian and Belgian writers,

comes to the deliberate conclusion that "all of them are more or less

unsatisfactory."

The conclusion forced upon us is inevitable -that we must begin de

novo and build up this science for ourselves.

We might very well conclude here, but for one or two remarks of the

distinguished officers just quoted which require a passing notice.

103

Ibid., p. 43.

104

Ibid., p. 45.

Adm. Sir George Granville Randolph (1818-1907), Problems in Naval Tactics

(Portsmouth: Griffin, 1879), p. iv. Fremantle, ibid., p. 45.

107William Bainbridge-Hoff, Examples, Conclusions and Maxims of Modern Naval

Tactics, Office of Naval Intelligence, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, General

Information Series No. Ill, Information from Abroad (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1884). The statement in quotations appears to be Luce's deduction from

Bainbridge-Hoff's concluding remark that he hoped the presentation of this material

would "develop research in a direction at once very interesting and very important."
96

One writer says: "Evolutions are not tactics, though they may form

the basis on which tactics are founded." And again, speaking of the

Signal Book as a manual of drill in fleet evolutions, he asks, "Where are the tactics?" And again, another officer asks, in speaking of fleet

evolutions in the Signal Book, "If battle be their object, where are their

plans of attack?"

To these several remarks we may repeat that "Tactics is the Art of

Military Movements." This applies to the movements of a fleet, or its evolutions. Hence, the evolutions laid down in the Signal Book do

constitute, in themselves, what is known as Minor Tactics. Further, that

the writers quoted have confounded two distinct branches, viz.: Minor

or Elementary Tactics, which is limited to evolutions (see Introduction), and Grand Tactics, or the Tactics of Battle. This distinction is made by military writers, and it would be well for us to adopt it, here

and now, for our Naval Terminology. We will thus avoid any confusion

of ideas. In the English Navy they had for generations of flag officers

the Fighting Instructions, and in France the Ordonnance du Roi, to

both of which reference has been made. These comprised the Grand

Tactics of the Sail Period. The great want now felt in both those navies

are modern Fighting Instructions. That is what they are striving for.

But, as we have said, and say again, nobody, to our knowledge, has

arisen, so far, who has shown himself competent to draw them up.

Now, Elementary Tactics, or the system of fleet evolutions laid

down in the Signal Book; Grand Tactics, or the manner of forming a

fleet for battle, and for conducting it in battle, and Strategy, together

constitute the science of naval warfare; and that is what we are now to

study.

In starting out with a new study, it is not desirable to retain the

terminology of an obsolete system. The English and French have both

fallen into this error. The English still cling to the terms line ahead, line

abreast, and line of bearing; while the French retain the terms used by

Paul Hoste; La Ligne de File, La Ligne de Front, and La Ligne de

Relevement. Now, strictly speaking, the term line of bearing, having

reference to the wind, is inapplicable to steam tactics. It was a line six

points from the direction of the wind, and a fleet was on the starboard, or larboard, line of bearing according as the ships composing it could

fetch, by a simultaneous movement, into the line of battle on the

starboard or larboard tack. The term is a convenient and expressive one,

however, and having been adopted by writers on steam tactics, it should

have a modified and precise definition given it. Unhampered by traditions as we are, let us at once adopt the

shorter, simpler, and equally expressive terms of Line, Column and

Echelon, and their derivatives, to express the various formations of a

fleet. We shall then avoid such clumsy expressions as line ahead in single

column, and many similar ones common to writers of the day.

Our terminology should be precise, our definitions clear. Where old

terms will answer, it is certainly well to retain them, even if the sense must be modified. But when we are actually wanting in terms, we may

be safe in taking such as have passed into the currency of military

literature.
97

Our attention, then, will be first directed to Elementary Tactics;

next, to the Tactics of Battle, and lastly, to Strategy.

1 08

1 08

Luce is referring to the course of study at the Naval War College.
98

Captain Alfred T. Mahan, ca. 1896

Luce selected Mahan to give lectures at the Naval War College on the

subject of the influence of navies on nations. Mahan arrived in 1886 to take up his position as a history professor, and took on additional duties as Luce's successor in the Presidency. He served as President of the Naval War

College, 1886-89 and 1892-93. He was formally connected with the

College again in 1910-12 while preparing some of his lectures for

publication.

Photo: Naval Historical Collection

Naval War College
99

CHAPTER V

LITERARY CRITIC: THREE BOOK REVIEWS

Editors' Introduction

In these three book reviews, one may catch a glimpse of Luce in

the role of a literary critic. All three of the selections for this

chapter were published anonymously during the decade of the

1890's in Joseph B. Gilder's journal, The Critic.

The initial selection is Luce's commentary on Mahan's first

major work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783.

It was the first review of this book to appear in a major American

literary journal. Indeed, The New York Times 1 took no notice of

the work until 9 months later when it published an excellent

two-column review. Shortly after The Critic's review appeared in

print, Luce sent a copy of it to John Knox Laughton in England.

Apparently without knowing that Luce was the author of the

clipping, Laughton replied,

I have to thank you for the cutting from the Critic which you

have been good enough to send me. I hope I shall be able to

do Capt. Mahan justice on this side of the water. His chapters

on strategy & policy are excellent: the details of his history

he has, I think, taken too exclusively from French sources,

and many of them are certainly inaccurate. I see the Critic

refers with disapproval to Clark Russell's Life of Nelson. It is

no doubt a scandalous performance, I took the opportunity

of saying as much in the Atheneum of 31 May . . .?

For Luce the writings of Mahan were another way of

publicizing the work of the Naval War College to the community

of naval scholars. His review and his correspondence with

influential students of naval affairs such as Laughton3 stressed the

connection between Mahan's work and the college. In a letter to

the editors4 of The Critic several years later, Luce noted that it

"was about the only periodical in the United States to review [the

book] . . . and to call attention to its surpassing merits." He

noted, too, that Mahan's work had received far more attention

abroad than it had at home.

1 The New York Times, 19 April 1891, p. 19:1. Theodore Roosevelt's unsigned

review appeared in the Atlantic Monthly, vol. LXVI, No. 396, October 1890, pp. 563-567.

2 Laughton to Luce, 12 August 1890, Luce Papers, Naval Historical Collection, Naval

War College.

See Editors' Introduction to chapter IV.

4 The Critic, vol. XXIII, No. 597, 29 July 1893, p. 77.
100

In his review of Mahan's second seapower book The Influence

of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,

1793-1812, Luce once again lauded his friend's work. Many

historians found this a much more profound work than Mahan's

first but continued to criticize him for his dependence on

secondary sources. In response, Luce points out in his review that

the author had not only consolidated the essence from a mass of

books but had been able to seize the substance from the works

and use it "to fatten his own theme." At the same time that he

appreciated Mahan's skill as a historian, he recognized the

continuing opposition by a significant group within the naval

profession who saw little practical value in the theoretical

abstractions of history. Offering a word of encouragement in the

face of criticism, Luce remarked, "to be sneered at and twitted is

sometimes a spur to a man of mettle." As shown in these reviews,

the public support which Luce gave to Mahan and to his writings

through his many connections emphasized the relationship of

Luce as Mahan's mentor and champion in his early writing career. In the third selection Luce offered enthusiastic praise to the

work of Col. G.F.R. Henderson. The Englishman's' work Stonewall Jackson represented the best then being written by any

military theorist and was designed to illustrate the problems of

strategy, military policy, leadership, and the science of war. Such

books were rarely read in the quarters that needed them the most.

Shortly after the publication of Stonewall Jackson, Henderson

complained to an acquaintance, "... so far from its [Jackson]

having attracted any notice I find that very few of the senior

officers even know of its existence. We are certainly not a literary

army, and the unfortunate soldier with a turn for writing history

does not get much encouragement from the service." 5 The

situation was no different on the western side of the Atlantic, with

a similar attitude in the Navy. Luce was one of the very few men

in the service who saw that the book held many lessons for

Americans in his day. It showed the need for the study of history,

a deeper study of strategy, and the establishment of a general

staff. When Luce viewed Henderson's work in 1899, he saw that it

touched on many of the nascent developments in the American

military, some which had been only recently illustrated in the

Spanish-American War.

Sir Henry Brakenbury, Some Memories of My Spare Time (Edinburgh, 1909), p. 86,

quoted in Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 244.
101

The Influence of Sea Power upon History

By Captain A.T. Mahan, U.S. Navy. $4. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.6

This is an altogether exceptional work: there is nothing like it in the

whole range of naval literature. Prepared originally as part of an

extensive course of lectures on the art and science of naval warfare, to

be delivered at the U.S. Naval War College, before classes of officers of

varied experience, the author took the broadest and most comprehensive view of his subject, looking into the primary causes which have

brought navies into existence, the conditions under which they have

grown in power, and their influence -as the suggestive title of the book

states -on national development. No other author with whom we are acquainted, has ever undertaken to treat the subject in such a liberal,

not to say philosophical spirit, or to weave the story of the navy and its achievements into the affairs of state so as to bring out its value as a

factor of national life. The work is entirely original in conception,

masterful in construction, and scholarly in execution.

Military science, like certain other sciences, has been built upon

precedent. Military writers have recorded, not only the campaigns, but

the dicta, of the great captains of every age of which history gives us any account. Napoleon's maxims might almost be called a compendium

of the art of war; while the general principles illustrated by the

campaigns of Alexander the Great, of Hannibal and Caesar, in ancient

times, and of Napoleon, Wellington, Marlborough, Frederick and Prince

Eugene, in modern times, constitute in themselves the science of war. Thus we have military history the base of military science. Naval

history has never been conceived in this spirit. It is now undertaken, for

the first time, to write such a naval history as may be justly regarded as the foundation of naval science. It is a work that was demanded by the

progressive spirit of our Navy. Called to the Chair of Naval History at

the War College, the author, finding no work which adequately treated

of naval warfare, was obliged to bring forward its leading features and

to discuss them from his own standpoint. Such was the genesis of this

admirable treatise.

Dealing largely with general principles of universal application, the

naval student is led to deduce from the story of past wars lessons for his

guidance in those of the future. In treating of the old French wars, as well as those of a later date, the author is at once just and

discriminating. He views the momentous struggle between the two great

sea-powers for supremacy in the West Indies with the calm eye of

professional criticism, bestowing the need of praise, or bringing under

the rod of reprobation, the great sea-captains of the age ; whether they

fought for the Lilies of France or under the red Cross of St. George.

Each is judged with an inflexible regard for a high standard of

professional ability. Bravery of a personal order is conceded, as well as excellence in practical seamanship; but the admirals of the English and

French fleets stand or fall according as they prove themselves skilled in

the art of war upon the ocean.

6 This review appeared in The Critic, vol. XVII, No. 343, 26 July 1890, pp. 41-42.
102

These are "The Lessons of War as Taught by the Great Masters;"

they are just the lessons to set before professional men. They bring into

prominence the great value of naval history when properly studied; and

they discover a higher and, we might almost say, unsuspected field of

investigation: the problems of modern naval warfare, examined by the

light of history -studies which might well engage the brightest minds of

the profession. They are lessons in naval history which, for obvious

reasons, could not have been so well drawn by writers of either country

immediately concerned: the element of impartiality would have been

wanting. The work itself is just such a one as could have been produced

only by an American free from bias; by an American naval officer who

had made naval and general history the subjects of profound and

exhaustive study; by an American scholar who to elegance of diction

and wealth of illustration could add the charm of narrative style to

render his book instructive to the professional and pleasing to the

general reader. Indeed, it places the former class of readers under a deep

debt of gratitude by dispelling the harmful delusion that everything

that is old in naval warfare is obsolete ; that there is nothing profitable

in the story of the battles of the past, to assist in forecasting those of

the future. Even so clever a writer as W. Clark Russell 7 has fallen into

this error -an error which, uncorrected, would sap the very foundations

of the science of war. In his Life of Nelson, 8 he questions, when

summing up the character of his hero, that "his genius can 'longer be

serviceable in suggestion to a posterity whose hopes are lodged in steel

plates.'" Now the gist of the entire work under consideration is a standing protest against such a fallacy. The principles so ably illustrated

by Nelson are just as applicable in this day of steam, steel plates and

heavy guns as they were in the days of "tacks and sheets." Nor does the

author fail to dissipate the popular delusion that Nelson's tactics

consisted, as Mr. Clark Russell, puts it, in 'dashing at the enemy '. There

certainly was 'dash' in the manner in which Nelson carried his ships into

action; but his plans of battle, carefully matured in advance, were the

result of a deliberate application of well-established military principles.

Such are the lessons as taught by the great masters; and such are the

lessons that, for the three or four years last past, the author has been

laying before successive classes of officers who, in the near future, are to command our ships and squadrons -some of whom, indeed, are even now in command afloat.

But the work takes a still higher range, and furnishes lessons for the

administrator and legislator alike. An English writer thus sketches the

7 William Clark Russell (1844-1911), novelist. After engaging in journalism, he

produced some 60 nautical tales of adventure; his writings led to improved

conditions in the merchant marine. He wrote on the lives of William Damper in 1889, Lord Collingwood in 1891, and with W.H. Jaques, Nelson.

a W. Clark Russell and William H. Jaques, Horatio Nelson and the Naval

Supremacy of England (New York: Putnam's, 1890). What Luce did here was to write a book review within a book review. He does not mention the coauthor, a fellow naval officer, William Henry Jaques (1848-1916). Jaques published short

books on torpedoes ana on modern armor; he resigned from the Navy in 1887 to become an adviser to the Bethlehem Iron Works in the manufacture of heavy

armor.
103

province of a great administrator in time of war. Speaking of the

leading incidents of English history during the period included in the

Seven Years' War, he says:

In Westphalia the English infantry won a great battle which

arrested the armies of Louis XV, in the midst of a career of

conquest; Boscawen defeated one French fleet on the coast of

Portugal; Hawke put to flight another in the Bay of Biscay;

Johnson took Niagara; Amherst took Ticonderoga; Wolfe died by

the most enviable of deaths under the walls of Quebec; Give

destroyed the Dutch armament in the Hooghly and established

English supremacy in the Carnatic. The nation, while loudly

applauding the successful warriors, considered them all, on sea and on land, in Europe, in America, and in Asia, merely as instruments which received their direction from one superior

mind. It was the great William Pitt,

9 the great commoner, who

had vanquished French marshals in Germany and French admirals

on the Atlantic, who had conquered for his country one great

empire on the frozen shores of Ontario, and another under the

tropical sun near the mouths of the Ganges.

The mental horizon of this great man took in vast continents and

boundless seas, while to his genius as a statesman he added the strategy

of an accomplished soldier.

Compare to such an extended field of operations our naval and

military establishments, organized with a single eye to perennial peace,

dwindle into utter insignificance. Small as our navy is, however, we

have yet to learn its true functions, and its value as an exponent of

national power-to learn, in short, the inadequacy of moral influence,

such as this peace-loving country should exert, unsupported by material

force. The work before us is eminently calculated to educate the public

mind as to what that force should be and the limits it should attain. We

have said enough to make clear its raison d'etre, and to show why it must take a high place -the highest of its kind, if it be not absolutely

sui generis-in naval and military literature. Let us hope the author may

be induced to continue his labors so as to include the War of 1812.

We have been unstinting in our praise simply because the work

deserves it. It has its defects, undoubtedly, but they are so far

overshadowed by what is deserving of commendation, as hardly to be

noticed. The book, as already stated, consists of lectures which formed

part of a course on the art and science of naval warfare. That this fact

should be wholly ignored by the author is immaterial to the general

reader. But the student of naval and military history would undertake

its perusal in a far different spirit, were he informed, at the outset, that

the author aimed at something more than the mere showing of how

national life is affected by the sovereinty [sic] of the seas.

9 William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (1708-1788).
104

England and France on the Sea1 °

The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and

Empire: 1793-1812. By Captain A.T. Mahan, 2 vols. $6.

Little, Brown & Co.

To be sneered at and twitted is sometimes a spur to a man of mettle.

In the changed condition of modern naval warfare, and with the vastly

different nature of its materials as compared with earlier days, there

was some ground for the rather discouraging comment of a senior

officer in the United States Navy to Capt. Mahan. When asked to

lecture upon naval history and naval tactics in the United States Naval

War College, the comment was made, "You won't have much to say

about history." Nevertheless, by his two books, Capt. A.T. Mahan has

not only given us a fine exhibition of his powers, but has shown how

out of the nettle of history he has plucked the flower of science. To

him the naval records of the past are not merely masses of archaeology,

but they have a distinct lesson for to-day, notwithstanding that the

ships and powers of offence and defence are something undreamt of a half-century ago.

In the work now before us, a proper continuation of his "Influence

of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783," he begins with a survey of

events in Europe 1783-1793, and then goes on to show what were the

elements in the coming struggle between France and England, and also

to analyze the causes leading to the overthrow of Napoleon. France and

England, like two gladiators, were pitted against each other, and it was

a question which could longest submit to blood-letting and treasurelosing. Sooner or later, one of the combatants must yield through sheer

exhaustion. Had England been Germany or Spain, the long battle would

probably have been fought out on land, and would have been much

more quickly decisive. Great Britain, being insular in situation, soon

found out that the real struggle was to be settled on the waves, and the

great statesman who ruled the destinies of Great Britain was able to

make accurate forecast of the struggle and the results. Capt. Mahan

gives us, even to minute touches of line and color, most interesting

pictures of the ships, men and guns at the opening of the year 1793. He

declares that Great Britain was in a genuine state of naval unpreparedness. He shows what strenuous efforts were put forth, which culminated in the finest navy of Europe, and how the spirit of the nation

became incarnated in such heroes as Nelson and Collingwood. He

penetrates to the real meaning of the mass of books, diplomatic,

political, naval and historical, which have been written to describe the

state of things in Europe during the last decade of the eighteenth

century, and his power of seizing the point in each author in order to

fatten his own theme is very striking. For example, he quotes from

Fyffe's "History of Modern Europe," 1 1 to show that after Trafalgar,

10This review appeared in The Critic, vol. XXII, No. 569, 14 January 1893, p. 17. n

C.A. Fyffe, A History of Modern Europe (New York: Holt and London:

Cassell, 1880), vol. I, p. 282. Charles Alan Fyffe (1845-1892), barrister-at-law,

historian, fellow of University College, Oxford.
105

the campaign of which he describes so brilliantly, Napoleon was forced

"to impose his yoke upon all Europe or to abandon the hope of

conquering Great Britain. Nelson's last triumph left England in such a

position that no means remained to injure her but those which must

result in the ultimate deliverance of the continent." He also demonstrates, by a masterly familiarity with both the detail and principles of

naval equipment and morale, that Nelson, so far from being a mere

bulldog tighter or dashing commander, was thoroughly and unpoetically scientific. Not only was he the chief to lock yardarms in

battle and to sweep decks with grape and cannister, but he was also the

man of foresight who refused to sail from port until the four inches of

flannel had been furnished to the tails of the shirts of his sailors, while

for their stomachs, and what went into them, he was as careful as for

the food of their minds. With the eye of a strategist as well as a

tactician, and in every chapter a critic and appraiser, the author follows

the fortunes of Napoleon, which, seemingly rising to zenith, were all the more hastening to their inglorious setting; while the naval power of

Great Britain was increasing upon the sea and becoming a permanent

force. England having achieved the mastery of the ocean and the

annihilation of the fleets of the only naval powers having any claim to

be considered as such -the Netherlands, France and Spain, -an opportunity arose for the neutral carriers, among them the United States.

Most worthily does Capt. Mahan give credit to Pitt, who was a great

master, not only in finance, but of war. He gave a general direction to

the naval effort, and by his unprecedented naval development he

secured also commercial prosperity. In this he was enabled to make the

question depend upon the ultimate exhaustion of either of the great

contestants, and having control of the sea and of the great pathway to

the British colonies, and being able thus to command the resources of

many parts of the world, the ultimate issue was not long in doubt.

Indeed, in a certain sense, the conflict between 1783 and 1812 in

Europe was in many striking respects like that decided in America a few

years before, in the same eighteenth century. France, though holding

Canada and controlling all the inland of America by line of forts to

Louisiana, was yet unable to hold her own against England, which had

full command of the ocean and constant access to her colonies.

It will be good news to those who admire the author's power to

know that he proposes to devote an entire work to the war between

Great Britain and the United States in 1812-1815.

Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War 1 2 By Lt. Col. G.F.R. Henderson. 2 vols. Longmans, Green & Co.

These volumes fall easily within the category of "books that are books." They are admirable -admirable both as to matter and the

treatment thereof.

Stonewall Jackson was a born soldier, and, as far as mortal man may

be permitted to judge, a true Christian. Indeed, in certain aspects of his

12

This review appeared in The Critic, vol. XXXIV, No. 859, January 1899,

pp. 65-67.
106

character he reminds one of the Cromwellian soldier who "fought so

well because he prayed so well." It is, however, in depicting Jackson as a strategist and tactician, and in describing the campaigns in which he

bore so conspicuous a part, that the author has laid all Americans,

north, south, east, and west, under a deep debt of gratitude.

Colonel Henderson, the author, is singularly well equipped for the

task he has so happily accomplished. An educated soldier himself, and

Professor of Military Art and History at the Staff College, Sandhurst

(England), he has brought to his work a familiarity with the campaigns

of the great captains of every age. This knowledge has enabled him to

form an intelligent estimate of the leaders of our Civil War, both North

and South, and to institute a just comparison between them as masters

of the art of war, and the most noted names of military history. Amid

this galaxy the author places Jackson's resplendent star. Colonel

Henderson's treatment of military questions, whether dealing with the

broad principles of war regarded as a science or with the accepted rules

of the art, brings forcibly to mind the writings of the lamented Colonel

Cornwallis Chesney, whose "Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland" and

"Essays in Military Biography" are well known in this country. Colonel

Chesney was one of the best military critics of his day, and enjoyed a reputation for absolute impartiality. Colonel Henderson, while equally

able as a military writer, is yet possessed of a certain charm of style

which lightens up the dryest details, and makes clear the most

complicated movements on the field of battle. It is this clear and

luminous style that will render the book most attractive to the

non-professional reader.

The similarity pointed out by the author between the various phases

of the campaigns in Virginia and those of the historic battle-fields of

Europe give a very substantial value to the work. So, too, the parallels

drawn between the principal leaders in the American conflict and those

who have become famous in other lands.

"If Jackson's military characteristics are compared with those of so great a soldier as Wellington," observes the author, "it will be seen that

in many respects they run on parallel lines. 'lean do,' said Jackson,

'whatever I will to do"; while the Duke, when a young general in India,

congratulated himself that he had learned not to be deterred by

apparent impossibilities. Both were patient, fighting on their own terms

or fighting not at all. Both were prudent, and yet when audacity was

justified by the character of their opponent and the condition of his

troops, they took no counsel of their fears . . . Both were masters of

ruse and stratagem, and the Virginian was as industrious as the

Englishman.

Although naturally impetuous, glorying in war, they had no belief in a lucky star; their imagination was always controlled by common-sense,

and, unlike Napoleon, their ambition to succeed was always subordinate to their judgment. Yet both, when circumstances were imperative, were greatly daring. The attacks at Groveton and at Chancellorsville were enterprises instinct with the same intensity of resolution as the

storm of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, the passage of the Douro, the

great counterstroke of Salamanca ... It has already been pointed out

that Jackson's dispositions for defence differed in no degree from those

of the great Duke. And much more to the same effect. (Vol. II., p. 603.)
107

Woven in with the texture are threads of discourses on strategy and

tactics, both minor and grand, such as are not to be found even in such

a standard work as "The Operations of War" of General Edward Bruce

Hamley. Speaking of the mighty host put in the field by the North and

the thoroughness of its organization as a fighting machine, one factor

was overlooked- "intelligent control." This was during the earlier days

of the war. "Men," he observes, "who, aware of their own ignorance,

would probably have shrunk from assuming charge of a squad of

infantry in action, had no hesitation in attempting to direct a mighty

army, a task which, Napoleon has assured us, requires profound study,

incessant application, and wide experience."

Many statesmen and even soldiers are ignorant of the fact that

strategy is an art in itself, to attain success in which one must serve a long apprenticeship. "The rules of strategy," he continues, "are few and

simple. They may be learned in a week. . . . But such knowledge will no

more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon, than a knowledge of

grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon." He then draws the

pathetic picture of the great and good Lincoln "poring, night after

night, when his capital was asleep, over the pages of Jomini and

Gausewitz," trying to master the art of war, with the result that, when

Grant was appointed to supreme command in 1864, he said: "'I neither

ask nor desire to know anything of your plans. Take the responsibility

and act, and call on me for assistance.' He had learned at last that no

man is a born strategist."

It is a significant fact, remarks the author, that, during the three

years the control of the armies of the North remained in the hands of

the Cabinet, the balance of success lay with the Confederates. But

"when Lincoln abdicated his military functions in favor of Grant, the

Secretary of War had nothing more to do than to comply with his

(Grant's) requisitions. Then, for the first time, the enormous armies of

the Union were manoeuvred in harmonious combination, and the

superior force was exerted to its full extent." (Vol. I., page 255.)

Farther on (page 503, Vol. I.), he justly observes that "it by no means

follows that because a man has lived his life in camp and barracks, had

long experience in command, and even long experience of war, he can

apply the rules of strategy before the enemy." He may lack the mental

and moral qualities. Again, there are few schools where strategy may be

learned-"the light of common-sense alone is insufficient: nor will a few

months' reading give more than a smattering of knowledge. 'Read and

re-read/ said Napoleon, 'the eighty-eight campaigns of Alexander,

Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick.'"

It has not yet been recognized in this country that if armies are to be

handled with success they must be directed by trained strategists. "No

Kriegsakademie, or its equivalent, existed in the United States, and the

officers whom common-sense induced to follow the advice of Napoleon

had to pursue their studies by themselves." Jackson was one of these.

As a strategist, Napoleon was undoubtedly his model. "If Napoleon

himself, more highly endowed by nature with every military attribute

than any other general of the Christian era, thought it essential to teach

himself his business by incessant study, how much more is such study

necessary for ordinary men?"
108

As one result of his studies the author draws the conclusion that

"the campaigns of the Civil War show how much may be achieved, even

with relatively feeble means, by men who have studied strategy, and

have the character necessary for its successful practice; and what awful

sacrifices may be exacted from a nation ignorant that such a science

exists." "Fabius and Scipio, Wellington, Nelson, and St. Vincent, Grant,

Sherman, and Farragut [and he might have added Porter] have replaced

the mere tacticians; and the superior resources, wielded with strategical

skill, exert their inevitable effect." (Preface, xii.)

As a sequence of his earnest advocacy of a close study of the higher

branches of the military profession such as marked Jackson's ten years

as Professor of Artillery Tactics at the Virginia Military Institute,

Lexington, follows, naturally, the equally earnest plea for a carefully

trained staff. Referring to the deplorable results flowing from the

interference of the civil authorities with the military -both North and

South -one of those results being Jackson's letter of resignation, -the

author states that the organization of the armies was very largely the

work of civilians, and the advice of the higher officers was very

generally disregarded. In the North "cavalry was considered an

encumbrance and a staff a mere ornamental appendage." (Note on the

Evils of Civilian Control, page 264.)

He freely admits the blunders made by the staffs of the three

armies-English, French, and Prussian -in the Waterloo campaign; but

adds, very truly, that the art of war has made great strides since then,

and even since 1870. "Under Moltke's system, "-the careful training of

officers and men to fit them for service in the general staff, -"which has

been applied in a greater or less degree to nearly all professional armies,

the chance of mistakes has been much reduced. The staff is no longer

casually educated and selected haphazard; the peace training of both

officers and men is far more thorough; and those essential details on

which the most brilliant conceptions, tactical and strategical, depend

for success, stand much less chance of being overlooked than in 1815.

It is by the standard of a modern army, and not of those whose only

school in peace was the parade-ground, that American armies must be

judged." (Vol. I., page 530.)

The "Moltke system" is still unknown to our army. We have no

general staff; no system of education of officers for staff duties. The

story of the recent campaign on the southern coast of Cuba, when

compared with the exposition made in these pages of the radical defects

of our military organization in 1862, furnishes abundant proof that we

have failed utterly to profit by the lessons of the Civil War.

Colonel Henderson, we repeat, has accomplished in these volumes a

great work, and one for which every American ought to feel thankful.

They should be read by the statesman, the soldier, and the scholar, in

short, by every one who has at heart the good of his country and the

efficiency of the army.
109

CHAPTER VI

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM:

THE FLEET

By Rear Admiral S.B. Luce, U.S.N. (Retired)

Editors' Introduction

This essay was originally published in the North American

Review* in October 1908. The subject is the establishment of an

effective form of naval administration capable of efficiently

directing the fleet in wartime. Unlike the other selections in this

volume, it was read and discussed in influential places long before

it was published.

The first draft of the article was written in May 1907, about the

same time that Luce was preparing his "Memoranda" to the

Secretary on naval efficiency. It was designed to follow up the

memoranda, to point out general problems in the Bureau system,

and to underline the inherent difficulties in this system for the

proper direction of the fleet. Luce sent the first draft of the article

to the Secretary of the Navy asking permission to publish it. The

Secretary, however, was vehemently opposed to publication on

the grounds that it "might stir up strife." Luce, at that time, felt

dutybound not to publish it without approval.

In October he delivered it as an address on the closing day of

the Naval War College's Summer Conference, but it was still not

heard by the audience that Luce sought. A year later, in April

1908, Luce sent a rough copy of it to Comdr. William S. Sims, the

President's Naval Aide, in hope that he could induce President

Roosevelt to read it and become directly involved in the effort to

reform the naval bureaucracy. In mid-June, Roosevelt gave his

permission to publish the article in any "technical journal" that

Luce desired, but he declined to read it on the grounds that he

might "be held accountable for every little phrase in it." On 17

June, Luce wrote to Sims,

Now the President himself is the audience I desire to reach. If

he does not take enough interest in naval affairs to read a paper in defense of his own policy in regard to naval

*"The Fleet," North American Review, vol. CLXXXVIII, No. 635, October 1908,

pp. 564-576.
110

questions of the highest import there is no use in going anyfurther- 1 do not care to fire in the air. It's the appointment

of a Commission in the Navy Department I am after. 1 At this point Luce nearly gave up his hopes for a commission to

reorganize the Navy, but with encouragement from Sims, Luce

decided to publish his article. With some changes and deletions,

Luce went ahead to "fire off my little guns."2 He submitted the

article to the North American Review, one of the most widely

respected American journals of the day; it was quickly accepted

for publication. As "The Fleet" was going to press, Roosevelt

decided to take the lead. Sims let Luce know that Roosevelt was

about to take action. Luce replied, "I am delighted to know that

M. RACINE [as Luce called the President] will take hold and be

our Standard bearer—that in itself will ensure Victory—One blast

upon his bugle-horn is worth a thousand men."3 Typically, Luce

went on to suggest that Sims have the Navy Library sent up copies

of his previous articles on naval administration. "M. Racine may

perhaps get one or two pointers from them. They, the articles,

date back nearly twenty years."

By January 1909 a board, headed by former Secretary Moody,

was appointed to review the problem of reorganization. Luce

received notification from Secretary Truman Newberry that he

would be ordered to Washington for duty on the Moody Board.

Shortly after he received the news, Luce wrote, "The rift in the

cloud grows wider,"4 His article "The Fleet" had doubtlessly

played a part in the effort to get the President to take the lead in

reforming the Navy. While the article laid out the argument for

Luce's case, in another sense it was a way of prodding the

bureaucracy into action. As he wrote in the postscript of a letter

to Capt. William J. Barnette, the Secretary to the General Board,

"Why do not you Washington chaps get on a hustle? Hey?"5

That the United States has taken a fresh departure from the erstwhile even tenor of her way is now acknowledged and acquiesced in. It is only by looking back a few short years that one can realize the great

changes that have brought this country prominently before the notice

of the world. The year 1898 has been called the year of Europe's

J Luce to Sims, 17 June 1908, Sims Papers, LC. This was a comment about

Theodore Roosevelt's letter to Luce, 16 June 1908, Luce Papers, LC.

2 Luce to Sims, 22 June 1908, ibid.

3 Luce to Sims, 2 November 1908, ibid. 4 Luce to Sims, 7 January 1909, ibid.

5 Luce to Barnette, 13 March 1908, ibid.
Ill

Commander William S. Sims

Sims served as naval aide to President Theodore Roosevelt between 1907

and 1909. In this key position, he was able to transmit many of Luce's

ideas to Theodore Roosevelt, as well as to promote his own. He earned his fame as "the man who taught the Navy how to shoot." Later, he

commanded U.S. Naval Forces in Europe during World War I, and was

President of the Naval War College.
112

discovery of America. 6 The accession of colonies and of battleships was

synchronous. Beginning in a quiet and unobtrusive way, this wide

departure from a traditional policy that had come to be regarded by

many as sacred, attracted little attention. It requires no great

discernment, now, to understand that both our colonial interests and

our fighting ships will continue to increase until there will be an American colonial system7 and a fully organized fleet

8 commensurate

with our territorial expansion and the development of our resources.

9 The colonies will need for their intelligent government a Colonial

Secretary, who will be a member of the Cabinet; and the fleet will need

intelligent government, not only to insure its efficiency, but to keep

within reasonable bounds the great expense its maintenance entails: over one hundred million dollars a year. The question is -and it is a very

grave one for the country -How is the efficiency of the fleet to be kept

up, and an economical disposition of its funds insured? For the days of

prodigal expenditures must soon end. l ° The wisdom of the framers of the Federal Constitution is not to be

questioned; but, with all its advantages, the wide separation between

the legislative and executive branches of the government has, in

practice, certain disadvantages. This separation is not conducive to

harmony. Indeed, it has led at various times to what has savored of

hostility on questions vitally affecting the interests of the country.

Mutual understanding on naval matters is wanting. It is undoubtedly

true that Congress has been extremely liberal in its appropriations for

the navy; but, as far as one can learn, this liberality has not been in

accordance with any well-digested plan of naval development.

To the lay mind it would appear that herein lies one fruitful source of trouble; there seems to be no settled plan of naval development upon

which the Executive and Congress can agree. Were such a plan to be

matured, and accepted, both branches of the government could act in

The published version has been compared with a typed manuscript in the Lecture

Collection, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College. This version is annotated and

signed by Luce. Dated "Newport, R.I., May 16th, 1907," Luce has added in his own

hand. "Read before the Conference of Officers at the Naval War College, Oct. 1st, 1907.

S.B.L." This sentence does not appear in the manuscript.

7 In the 1907 version the remainder of the sentence is, . . .and, for its protection, a fully organized fleet."

o The word "Fleet" is used here in its general sense to signify the total number of

vessels of war available for active service. In England, "Fleet" and "Navy" are synonyms.

[This is Luce's footnote.]

9 The 1907 version adds

This accretion will come about, not because "we, the people," wish it; nor will it be retarded because "we, the people," do not wish it. It will come neither by

accident, nor by design, but through the operation of the law of "manifest

destiny;" a destiny manifest to the student of the philosophy of history and to the political seer. The unity and continuity of purpose apparent in the conduct of

human affairs, bears ample evidence that the Great Lawgiver of the universe, He

who marks the sparrow's fall,—will shape the country's ends, "rough-hew them

how we will."

This sentence was added to the published version.
113

harmony on most matters concerning the navy. There is such a thing as a naval policy. The building up of a navy without a definite plan is like

the directing of a number of artisans to build some houses without

stating how many houses were required, of what material they were to

be constructed, or for what purpose they were to be used. The naval

policy of England, for example, is very simple. It is known as the

"two-Power standard "-that is to say, the strength of the English navy

must at all times be maintained at a strength equal to that of any two

naval Powers that may be combined against it. In the House of

Commons not long since, the Prime Minister 1 ! was asked if it was the

policy of the Government to make equality with the two next strongest

fleets the standard of England's naval strength. The Prime Minister's answer was: "The present strength of the British navy is in excess of the

two-Power standard." That is the naval policy, in a nutshell, of the

greatest naval Power of the world.

In more specific terms, we find the First Lord of the Admiralty

saying, 12 "The test the Admiralty applied to naval efficiency and the

standard they had set up for years past, as that which must be

maintained, was that we must be strong enough in battleships alone to

defeat any combination of any two Powers, and that we should have a margin over and above this, for contingencies, of some ten per cent.

This was the minimum which they had considered safe. With respect to our cruiser power," he added, "we need, and must maintain, far more."

The word "efficiency" as used here refers to the strength of the line

of battle.

13

Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman (1836-1908), Liberal Party Prime Minister from

December 1905 to his death in April 1908. He made this statement in Parliament on 12

November 1906. See Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 4th series (London: H.M.

Stationery Office), vol. CLXIV, p. 1067.

1

Edward Marjoribanks, second Baron Tweedmouth (1849-1909), First Lord of the

Admiralty from December 1905 to April 1908. He made this statement on 3 November

1906, according to Luce's notation in the typescript; Luce's source for this quotation

has not been located.

1

The 1907 manuscript continues here with the following:

It has been the naval policy of France since Trafalgar, as we gather from the

foreign press, to keep two objects steadily in view. One, that it shall not be so far inferior to that of England as to put her diplomacy completely at the mercy of

the British Government; the other that it shall be equal in strength to the navies

of any two other naval powers in Europe, next in importance to those of England

and her own. It has been found by experience that a proportion of battleships of

the first class (which constitutes the real strength of navies) of two-thirds of those

of England, satisfies, in the main, those conditions.

It is obvious that while France maintains its navy in about this proportion it can, by alliance with one or more of the other naval powers, be in a position not

far short of that of England; and the British Government would, consequently, be

compelled to think seriously before attempting to force the hands of France at any time when the relations between the two countries might become strained. In this connection a distinguished statesman of England frankly admitted that,

whatever confidence Englishmen may have in the sense of justice and moderation

of their own Government they must admit that in any difficulty with France,

their language, and attitude, on many international questions would be different,

and less conciliatory, if the navy of France were reduced to a point where it would give them no concern whatever. It cannot be denied, then, that looked at
114

Naval Policy. -The expressions "Naval Policy" and "Naval Efficiency," it may be observed, have been used by certain writers as convertible terms. This has led to no little confusion of thought on

naval matters. England's naval policy, as we have seen, is to maintain

the two-Power standard; while the naval policy of France is to keep the

main body of her fleet in the Mediterranean, for France applies the

principles of the Monroe Doctrine to certain sections of the north of

Africa. In the one case it is a question of the number of battleships of

the first category; in the other the disposition made of those ships.

"Naval Efficiency" is construed by some authorities as meaning the

number of battleships available for war, as in the case just quoted from

the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty; by others again as the

normal state of discipline of the fleet, and the judicious use made of it. There have been fleets powerful in numbers of ships and guns, manned

by a personnel of good fighting material, and yet wholly inefficient for

purposes of war. Mere numbers do not constitute efficiency. To the

unskilled, excess of numbers means discomfiture.

From the English we get the very expressive term "fighting

efficiency." Thus, in "A Statement of Admiralty Policy," 14

we gather

from the Navy Estimates Committee that the following considerations

obtained: "first, the whole object of the Navy Estimates is to secure the

fighting efficiency of the Fleet and its instant readiness for War;

secondly, the least amount [of money] compatible with that end."

The Hon. Joseph G. Cannon, 1 5 Speaker of the House of Representatives, is represented in an alleged interview as saying: "Our navy will be

of no benefit to us unless the men know how to handle the ships, and

how to work the guns. Efficiency is more important than any other

consideration, and it can be gained only through practice. I feel there is a strong sentiment throughout the country in favor of maintaining an

efficient navy, and, as I said before, efficiency is more important than

size. " These words are the words of wisdom.

Efficiency is the power to accomplish a desired end: the possessing

of adequate skill for the performance of a duty. "The swordfish can kill the whale," said an American gentleman 1 6 when asked, in 1894, of the

probable outcome of the War then imminent between China and Japan.

Naval policy, in its broadest sense, comprehends Statesmanship. It is the relative rank, as a naval Power, which the State aims to assume and

by the light of experience in such matters the policy of France in this respect is wise, and gives to its diplomacy a force, which, otherwise would be wanting.

Nelson said, a line-of-battleship was a great aid to diplomacy.

14 Dated 30 November 1905.

Joseph Gurney Cannon (1836-1926) served in the U.S. Congress as a Representative from Illinois between 1875-91, 1893-1913, and 1915-1923. "Uncle Joe" served as Speaker of the House from 1901 through 1911.

16 William Alexander Parsons Martin (1827-1916) was a Presbyterian missionary,

educator, and author. He served as President of Imperial University in Peking, China, and

wrote a number of books on international law, natural science, Christianity, and Chinese

affairs. This quotation is from his book, The Awakening of China (New York:

Doubleday, Page & Co., 1907), p. 171.
115

maintain in the family of nations. It includes: first, the creation of a

floating force adequate to make good its pretensions; and, secondly, the

ability to use that force effectively -in brief, the weapon and the skill to wield it. Despite its alleged structural defects, no American can have looked

upon the fleet of battleships now circumnavigating the globe without a

feeling of pride. 1 7 The Navy Department is certainly entitled to credit

for this imposing display of sea power. But the credit must be shared by

others -it must be shared with the iron and steel industries of the

country and by the great ship-building plants now in operation.

To the Navy Department alone belongs the credit of initiating the

movement which has led to this result-a movement which has given the

country for the first time in its history a fleet in the true technical

sense. The genesis of what is called the "new navy" was in 1881. In that

year the first Advisory Board convened by the Secretary of the Navy,

the Hon. W.H. Hunt, 18 recommended the building of steel ships on the

ground "that such a step would give an impetus to the steel industries

of the country." 19 That end has been accomplished far beyond what

the most fervid imagination could have pictured; and it is largely to

those same steel and shipbuilding industries that we are indebted for

the formidable line of battle we now have. 20 Taken together they have

trained up a body of skilled artisans which it would be difficult to

duplicate in any part of the world. Congress is wise and far-seeing in

providing them with work.

By what means soever the fleet has been brought into being, its existence is an established fact, and its continued growth is assured. The

weapon has been forged. Where is the hand to wield it? Where is the

power to insure efficiency? These are very present questions, and call

for intelligent answers. As to Naval Efficiency. -In a speech delivered on June 22nd, 1905,

President Roosevelt is reported to have declared that he would give up

the Monroe Doctrine and the Panama Canal, rather than refuse the

means which can alone render our attitude as a nation worthy the

respect of mankind. "Therefore," he added, "keep on building

1 7 The manuscript version of this sentence reads: "No American could have looked

upon the fleet of battleships assembled in Hampton Roads, to assist at the Jamestown

celebration, without a feeling of pride." Luce is referring here to the naval review which

was part of the Jamestown Ter-Centennial Exposition. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Final

Report ... of the Jamestown Exposition, Senate Doc. 735, 60th Congress, 2d sess., 1909.

William Henry Hunt (1823-1884). Born in South Carolina, he served as an

Associate Judge of the U.S. Court of Claims and then Secretary of the Navy in 1881-82.

After a brief administration in the Navy Department, he became Ambassador to Russia,

1882-84.

19

See Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 28 November 1881, Appendix I: "The Advisory Board-Proceedings" (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1881), pp. 27 ff. 20

Here the manuscript adds: "The South Bethlehem Steel Works, the Midvale Steel

Works, the Fore River Ship Building Co., the Cramps, and the Newport News Ship

Building Co., and others on the Pacific Coast, all representing millions of dollars of

capital, must not be suffered to languish for want of work."
116

[battleships] and maintaining at the highest point of efficiency the

United States Navy, or quit trying to be a big nation."2 1 That, in brief,

is the President's Naval Policy. It includes the power, coupled with the

ability to wield that power effectively.

The building programme of Congress has supplied the power. It only

remains to consider the question of efficiency -the consummate ability

to wield that power.

2 2 The duty of devising measures for securing naval

efficiency rests, under wise laws, exclusively with the Executive. This

all-important factor of Naval Policy the President must, perforce, leave

to his Secretary of the Navy. The latter, a civilian, well versed in public

affairs, but unfamiliar with naval or military arts, must in turn defer to

his advisers in the Navy Department. The Secretary on assuming office

finds himself associated with a civilian Assistant Secretary and eight

"admirals," so called,

23 each one of the latter presiding over one of the

eight Bureaus of which the Navy Department is composed. 24 Five of

these admirals belong, singular to say, to the non-combatant class, and

three of them to the combatant class.

25 The five non-combatant

admirals naturally regard questions of naval efficiency from the

non-military point of view: the admirals of the combatant class from

the military point of view. Moreover, each of the offices over which

these admirals preside -combatant and non-combatant alike-belongs to

the civil branch of the Department, and have to do with material and

finance. It does not take long for the Secretary of the Navy on

assuming office to discover that naval efficiency is a very broad and

comprehensive subject, and one which belongs exclusively to the

military side of his office. With this discovery is revealed the fact that

the military side of his office does not exist. There is no such thing.

This fact, taken in conjunction with the fact just stated, that there is a

radical and irreconcilable difference of opinion on the part of his

advisers on vital questions affecting naval efficiency, would, in time of

2 1 Theodore Roosevelt speech at commencement, Williams College, Williamstown,

Mass. See report "Big Navy or No Canal," The New York Times, 23 June 1905, p. 1:5.

2 2' The manuscript adds here: "Naval efficiency rests under wise laws solely, and

exclusively with the executive."

23 The phrase "so called" has been added to the published version. In another draft

copy of this article in the Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Luce has made a footnote

here in his own hand: "Swiss admirals all." The reference is from Jacques Offenbach's La

Vie Parisienne.

24

Section 7 of the Personnel Act of March 3, 1899 prohibits the changing of titles of

officers. [Luce's footnote.]

25 The Act of July 5th, 1862 provided that the Chiefs of four of the Bureaus should

be appointed from the list of officers of the Navy not below the rank of commander.

This gave the advisers of the Secretary of Chiefs of four line Bureaus and the Chiefs of

four staff Bureaus. As this equal division did not accord with the views of the civics, a

clause was introduced in the naval appropriation bill of June 29th, 1906, providing "that

the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks (which, by the Act of '62, had been assigned

to the line officer) shall be selected from the members of the corps of Civil Engineers of

the Navy, having not less than seven years' active service." This gave the non-combatants

a majority. [Luce's footnote.]
117

war, leave the Secretary of the Navy in an unenviable position. Divided

counsels are fatal to military operations.

A navy that requires time for preparation after war has been declared

is far from being in an efficient condition. On February 5th, 1904,

Japan severed diplomatic relations with Russia, and at midnight of the

8th Port Arthur was startled from its slumbers by the guns of the

Japanese fleet. It was a complete surprise. 26 Three days after the

diplomatic rupture Japan struck the first blow at Port Arthur and

Chemulpo. There was no such trifling as is said to have occurred at

Fontenoy: "Fire first, gentlemen," about the military movements of

the Japanese. They knew the great moral and military advantages of

taking the offensive, and they assumed it at once and effectually.

2 7 But

they were enabled to do so only by a long and thorough course of

preparation during peace. So much for the readiness to strike. The

point where the first blow is to fall can be determined best by those

who have made such questions the subject of careful study, undisturbed

by administrative duties. There must be no mistake as to the true

objective. To be master of the situation at the outset may prevent a

war. Some of the most important strategic moves are those made during

peace.

It may be stated right here once for all, without circumlocution, that

naval efficiency, in its true sense, is unattainable under our present

form of naval administration. It is far better that the people should

know this in order that the responsibility may be placed where it belongs. The truth of this statement we now purpose showing.

How the American method of governing the fleet, a purely military

organization, works in practice may be illustrated by examples taken

from official documents of recent date, documents which are easily

accessible to all the world.

The President, recognizing the inherent defects in the constitution of

the Navy Department, knowing that the efficiency he has so much at

heart is not attainable under existing conditions, urged Congress to

amend the law under which the Navy Department is organized with a

special view to increasing the efficiency of the navy. In his message to

Congress of December, 1903, Mr. Roosevelt said: "We need the

establishment, by law, of a body of trained officers who shall exercise a systematic control of the military affairs of the navy, and be the

authorized advisers of the Secretary concerning it."

28

In order to carry

out the views of the President, the Secretary of the Navy prepared and

presented to the Naval Committee of the House "a bill to increase the

2

This sentence has been added to the published version.

27Compare the prompt action of the Japanese with ours when we left it to a British

Colonial Governor to "request" Commodore Dewey to leave Hongkong, April 24th,

1898. See Luce, "Naval Administration II," United States Naval Institute Proceedings,

vol. XXVIII, No. 4, December 1902, pp. 848-49. [This is Luce's footnote. See item

117.]

2 8* Theodore Roosevelt, "Third Annual Message to Congress, 7 December 1903," The

Works of Theodore Roosevelt, State Papers as Governor and President, 1899-1909 (New

York: Scribner, 1925), p. 234.
118

efficiency of the Navy," the object of which was to legalize the General

Board. In presenting the bill to the Naval Committee of the House, its adoption, by Congress, was ably advocated in person by the Secretary

of the Navy, the Hon. William H. Moody. 29 He was followed by the

Admiral of the Navy (Admiral Dewey)30 and by the Chiefs of three

Bureaus representing the combatant class of the Department. Secretary

Moody's presentation of the case, on the part of the administration,

was lucid, logical and learned, leaving absolutely nothing to be said in

advocacy of the President's plea for naval efficiency. But the majority

of the Secretary's advisers-the non-combatant admirals -would not

have it. The bill was vehemently opposed by the non-combatants,

represented by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy of that day, and the

Chiefs of what are known in the navy as the five Staff Bureaus.

3 1 As

the bill has never been heard of since it was presented to the Naval

2 9 William Henry Moody (1853-1917) was a Massachusetts-born Harvard graduate

who had studied in the law offices of Richard Henry Dana, Jr., author of Two Years

Before the Mast. Later, while serving as District Attorney for eastern Massachusetts,

Moody gained wide recognition for his prosecution in the famous "Lizzie Borden Case"

at Fall River, Mass. A popular chant of the day proclaimed,

"Lizzie Borden took an axe And gave her mother forty whacks;

When she saw what she had done

She gave her father forty-one!"

Although legally acquitted, she was convicted in the popular mind, and the case became

the subject of plays, novels, a ballet, an opera, and a musical revue. Elected to Congress,

Moody served in the House of Representatives from 1895 until 1902. A pugnacious

master of fact and detail on the floor of the House, he attracted the attention of

President Theodore Roosevelt who appointed him Secretary of the Navy in 1902. He

served in the Navy Department until Roosevelt selected him as Attorney General in 1904. During his 2-year tenure in the Department of Justice, he attracted attention again

by personally arguing the Government's successful position in the Beef Trust Case (Swift

& Co. v. U.S. 196 US 375). In 1906 he was appointed to the Supreme Court where he

served until forced to retire by failing health in 1910.

30Admiral of the Navy George Dewey (1837-1917), the victor of the Battle of

Manila Bay in 1898, was given the rank of Admiral of the Navy by a grateful Congress.

As the senior officer in the Navy, he served as President of the General Board from its inception until his death in 1917. His personal prestige did a great deal to increase the

effectiveness of the Board.

3 1 The Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts [Rear Admiral H.T.B. Harris]

publicly criticised the President's plea for naval efficiency. (See "Admiral Harris on

General Staff" Army and Navy Journal, 30 January 1904, vol. XLI, no. 22, p. 574.) This

flagrant violation of Navy Regulations seems to have elicited no comment.

[This is Luce's footnote. In Harris' statement he criticizes Luce's and Mahan's

proposal for a British style staff. In April 1904 the following men were the Navy's

Bureau Chiefs: Rear Adm. M.T. Endicott, Bureau of Yards and Docks; Rear Adm. H.T.

Mannly, Bureau of Equipment; Rear Adm. H.C. Taylor, Bureau of Navigation; Rear

Adm. G.A. Converse, Bureau of Ordnance; Rear Adm. W.L. Capps, Bureau of

Construction and Repair; Rear Adm. C.W. Rae, Bureau of Steam Engineering; Rear

Adm. H.T.B. Harris, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; Rear Adm. P.M. Rixey, Bureau of

Medicine; Capt. S.C. Lemly, Judge Advocate General. The Assistant Secretary of the

Navy was Charles Hial Darling.]
119

Committee on April 11th, 1904, it is natural to suppose that it received

its quietus then and there.

3 2 The motives of the Committee in thus turning down the General

Board are not open to question. But, as the record stands, it would

appear, to the world at large, that the Chiefs of the five Staff Bureaus

had influence enough to defeat an urgent measure of the administration

to increase the efficiency of the navy.

In plain terms, the President was defeated by Bureaucracy. This was

the literal fulfilment of a prophecy. During the "Investigation of the

Navy Department" in 1875-6, Commodore D. McN. Fairfax, U.S.N.,

33

stated, in his testimony before the House Naval Committee, that "the

Bureau system was gradually undermining the discipline of the Navy

Department and must sooner or later be changed." The time for the

change has arrived. "If a house be divided against itself that house

cannot stand." 34

True, the General Board continues a potentiality, but this is due to

the President and not to Congress. The General Board was established

by the Navy Department, General Order No. 544, March 13th, 1900,

which order was embodied in the Navy Regulations of 1 905, thus giving

it for the time being the force of law (Sec. 1547 R.S.). But as it is competent for some administration of the future to rescind this order

and delete it from the Navy Regulations, it is obvious that the character

of the General Board lacks the quality of permanence which statute law

alone can give. To insure this permanency of character was the request

preferred by the President, as we have seen; a request to which the

House Naval Committee declined to accede.

Some Functions of the General Board. 35 -The General Board

represents the military element of naval administration -hitherto

wanting-as distinct from the civil branch represented by the eight

Bureaus. It is the legitimate Council of War of the civilian Secretary of

32 Those interested in this subject should read U.S. Congress, House, Hearing before

the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, April 11th, 1904, on "A Bill (H.R. 15403) to Increase the Efficiency of the Navy." 58th Congress, 2d sess., pp. 909-989.

33

Rear Adm. Donald McNeill Fairfax (1821-1894) was Commandant of the Naval

Station at New London, Conn., when this testimony was given. In 1861 he had been

executive officer in U.S.S. San Jacinto under Capt. Charles Wilkes when that ship

captured the Confederate agents James M. Mason and John Slidell from the English ship

Trent. Taking charge of the Confederates, Fairfax is credited with such tact that he was

able to take the men into U.S. custody without allowing the English captain to surrender

his ship as a prize. Fairfax served as Commandant at New London from 1873 to 1878.

He then served as Governor of the Naval Asylum before retiring in 1881. See Fairfax's

testimony in 44th Congress, 1st sess., House Miscellaneous Doc. No. 170, serial 1703-05.

This quotation from Abraham Lincoln's speech of 16 June 1858 was added for the

published version at this point. In the manuscript it appears several pages beyond. See

footnote 39.

35 The following four paragraphs were added for the published version. For a detailed

study of the General Board in this period, see Daniel J. Costello, "Planning for War, A

History of the General Board of the Navy 1900-14," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., 1968.
120

the Navy on all matters pertaining to war and to the preparation for war.When the Spanish War broke out, it was seen at once that, to meet a

foreign naval Power on the ocean, further trifling with our radically

defective system of naval administration must cease at once. One of the

first steps, therefore, in this direction was the convening of a Naval War

Board, a body separate and distinct from the Bureaus, but in close

touch with the office of the Secretary of the Navy. To this Board was

intrusted the very responsible duty of a careful study of the whole

theatre of the war, and of watching closely the movements of the

enemy's fleet, squadrons or single cruisers, as far as could be done by

means of the reports which were constantly reaching the Department,

day and night, by wire or mail. These reports, sometimes of a

conflicting nature, had to be carefully sifted, differences reconciled,

and the real designs of the enemy penetrated as far as possible. The

questions arose: "What was the objective of Cervera's36 fleet?" and,

after the battle of Manila Bay, May 1st, 1898, and the destruction of

the Spanish squadron, "What would be Spain's next move in that

direction?" These were questions the members of the War Board were

obliged to study carefully and to answer out of their knowledge of

naval strategy. As a result of these studies, the Naval War Board was

enabled to keep the Secretary of the Navy fully informed, at all times,

of the movements of the enemy, and to place before him recommendations for such counter movements of our own forces as the conditions,

varying from day to day and even from hour to hour, required.

Incredible as it may appear, these highly important military duties had

not been provided for in our scheme of naval organization. It will be

seen from this that the Naval War Board was not of the nature of an

advisory board, as that term is understood in the Navy. It had higher,

and vastly more responsible, functions: The transactions of the War

Board cover 860 typewritten pages of copies of communications sent

and received. This was departmental duty performed mainly by officers

having no part in the organization of the Department; hence its extra-legal character. The nature of the War Board and the necessity for

its existence are so clearly set forth by Secretary Moody in his

testimony before the House Naval Committee, on April 11th, 1904, as to leave little to be said.

On the conclusion of the war with Spain, the Naval War Board,

through some singular misconception, was dissolved. But it had proved

itself so indispensable as a part of the organization of the Navy

Department that the Secretary of the Navy issued General Order No.

544 with a view to its permanent establishment under the title of the

"General Board."

Once more the President essayed to induce Congress to increase the

efficiency of the Navy. In his special message to Congress of December

36 Adm. Pascual Cervera y Topete (1839-1909) commanded the Spanish squadron in

the Caribbean during the Spanish-American War. He had served as the Spanish Minister

of Marine when Luce represented the United States at the Columbian Exposition in Madrid in 1892. Cervera was captured by the U.S. Navy when his squadron was

destroyed at Santiago de Cuba in July 1898.
121

17th, 1906, 37

on the Personnel of the Navy, Mr. Roosevelt made

certain specific recommendations, failure to adopt which, "by judicious

legislation, the future of our Navy will be gravely compromised." "In

my last three annual messages I have invited the attention of Congress

to the urgent necessity of such legislation ..." but the Commander-inChief of the Navy did not take into the account the deep-seated

defection in the ranks of his own immediate command, in his own

official family, as it were. The Personnel Bill, so earnestly advocated by

the administration, was strangled in its birth. Congress has thus,

through its House Naval Committee, put itself on record as opposing

measures which have for their object the increasing of the efficiency of

the Navy. It is clear that the views of the administration on naval affairs

carry little weight with the Naval Committees of the two houses of

Congress. There is a good reason for this. The Navy Department is divided against itself, and the majority of the Secretary's Colleagues38

are opposed to any change in the present method of administering the

affairs of the Navy. Congress has endowed them with great powers, and

it is only natural that they should exert those powers to protect their

vested rights-rights which must be safeguarded though the heavens

fall. 39

As political power goes with the control and expenditure of the revenues of the State, so power, patronage and influence go with the

expenditure, with limited accountability, of considerably over one

hundred million dollars a year by the Chiefs of the eight Naval Bureaus.

This explains why a Chief of Bureau has in certain directions, far more

influence than the responsible head of the Department -the Secretary

of the Navy himself. It is scarcely necessary to say that in this

discussion of the business methods of the Department, not the slightest

reflection is intended to be cast, either directly or by implication, upon

the high character and strict integrity of the Chiefs of the several

Bureaus. We sincerely trust that goes without saying. One may be

permitted to criticise a system without impugning the high character of

the components of that system-the Bureaus.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the navy, a distinctively

military body, is governed, practically, by an oligarchy of non-military

men. To govern, in its original sense, means to pilot or to steer. Hence

we are led to conclude that our fleet is piloted or steered by

"admirals," who belong neither to the military nor to the seaman class.

This method of governing a navy is saved from being preposterous only

because of the fiction that it is in accordance with the will of the

people, as expressed through their representatives in Congress. Mr.

3 7 Roosevelt's message was reprinted in the Army and Navy Journal, vol. XLIV, No.

17, 22 December 1906, p. 450.

38The Secretary's Colleagues.—This is the only Executive Department where the law

places the Secretary and his associates in office on an equal footing. [This is Luce's

footnote.]

The "House divided" quote from Lincoln originally appeared here. The following

paragraph was added to the published version.
122

Secretary Bonaparte40 acted wisely in recommending, as he did in

effect, the total abolition of this archaic and demoralizing form of naval

government by Bureaus. Put none but militant seamen at the helm.

Bureaucracy. -"My experience during the past year," declared

Secretary Bonaparte, in his annual report of November 28th, 1906,

"has greatly strengthened my belief, as expressed in the last annual

report of the Department, that the system of autonomous Bureaus is open to very grave theoretical objections; and that only the very high

character of the personnel employed in these Bureaus . . . prevents

these theoretical objections from seriously affecting the efficiency and

economy of the Department's work. It seems to me, therefore,

desirable that a very radical and thoroughgoing change should be made

in the organization of the Department."4 i He then outlines a plan (the

appointment of a commission on the Navy Department) which, he says,

appears to afford a reasonable promise of satisfactory results and which

in effect would, as already observed, abolish the present archaic system

of trying to govern the navy by Bureaus.

Secretary Bonaparte's diagnosis of the case was perfectly correct. His

prescription -a commission to examine into, and report upon, the

whole subject of naval administration, pointing out the defects of the

present system, and suggesting the remedy therefor, would result in

immediate relief at the hands of Congress. There can be little doubt of

that. To insure intelligent legislation Congress must have bed-rock facts

to go upon; and those facts can be ascertained and formulated best by a board of experts appointed for the purpose. Such is the disease which

afflicts the Navy to-day and its remedy.

Bureaucracy aims exclusively at augmenting its own official powers

at the expense of more extended interests. It is characterized, asserts one authority, "by the inefficient and obstructive performance of duty

through minute subdivisions of functions, by inflexible formality and

pride of place." A Bureaucrat is defined as "an official who endeavors

to concentrate administrative powers in his own bureau."

All the privations and suffering of the English Army in the Crimean

War, through lack of provisions and clothing, resulting in the loss of

thousands of lives, was due directly to army bureaucracy; and English

army bureaucracy repeated its mismanagement fifty years later in the

Boer War. Bureaucracy greatly damaged our own military prestige

during the war with Spain, and might have been fatal to the navy but

for the timely advent of the Naval War Board. It was Russian

40Charles Joseph Bonaparte (1851-1921) served as Secretary of the Navy from 1905

to 1906. He was a Harvard educated lawyer from Baltimore, Md., and had attracted the

attention of Theodore Roosevelt by his activity in the area of civil service reform. In 1906 he succeeded W.H. Moody as Attorney General; he left office in 1909 with

Roosevelt. Bonaparte was a grandson of Jerome, King of Westphalia, one of Napoleon

Bonaparte's brothers.

41

U.S. Navy Dept., Annua] Report of the Navy Department for the Year 1906,

(Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1907), p. 5.
123

bureaucracy, not Togo,42 that defeated Rodjestvensky4 3 in the Sea of

Japan. Togo simply gave the coup de grace. Villeneuve,44 Du Pont,45

Cervera and Rodjestvensky, each in turn, was the victim of inefficient

naval administration. Is there a demand for another American victim?

Said Premier Stolypin: 46 "My hope and purpose are, with the aid of the

Duma, to get rid of the bureaucratic system. Such is the Emperor's firm

and unshakable will." Bureaucracy defeated President Roosevelt in his

efforts to promote naval efficiency in 1904; and Bureaucracy dominates the Navy of the United States to-day. Let this truth be pondered

by that portion of an irresponsible press that so airily fans the flame of

enmity between this country and our good friend, Japan.

A decision of the United States Supreme Court defining the

administrative authority of the Secretary of the Navy sanctioned the

exercise by the Secretary, of the military functions of the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The principle enunciated in that

decision has been applied to the relations sustained by the Chiefs of the

several Bureaus to the Secretary and through him to the President. Thus

the Chiefs of the several Eureaus have become the representatives of the

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and clothed with all his authority

touching the affairs of their respective Bureaus. Their orders must be

respected and obeyed as the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. The

Act of August 31st, 1842, makes this very clear. It declares explicitly

that "the orders of a Chief of Bureau shall be considered as emanating

from the Secretary himself, and shall have full force and effect as such." But, as the orders of the Secretary are to be regarded as the

orders of the President, it is plain that the orders of a Chief of Bureau

must also be regarded as the orders of the President. This makes

practically nine Secretaries of the Navy, with power in their respective

spheres, equal to those of the constitutional Commander-in-Chief. All

the evils of bureaucracy are thus aggravated by the law which put it in

operation. Sixty-five years' experience and the testimony of numerous

Secretaries of the Navy show conclusively that this unbusiness-like

42 Count Heihachiro Togo (1847-1934) was a Japanese admiral trained at Greenwich,

England. He was Commander in Chief of the Japanese Navy in the Russo-Japanese War

in 1904-05. He bombarded Port Arthur and defeated the Russian Fleet at the Strait of

Tsushima on 29 May 1905.

43 Adm. Zinovi Petrovich Rozhdestvenski (1848-1909) was Commander of the Baltic

Fleet that was sent to the Pacific in the Russo-Japanese War. He was defeated by Togo at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905.

44 Vice Adm. Pierre Charles Jean Baptiste Sylvestre Villeneuve (1763-1806) opposed

Nelson at Trafalgar.

45

Rear Adm. Samuel Francis Du Pont, USN (1803-1865), led the South Atlantic

Blockading Squadron in the victory at Port Royal, S.C., in 1861 and in the defeat at Charleston in 1863. Luce served under him during the time he was at sea in the Civil War. He dedicated his Seamanship to him. See John D. Hayes, ed., Samuel Francis Du

Pont: a Selection From His Civil War Letters (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,

1969), 3 vols.

Petr Arkadievich Stolypin (1862-1911) was Premier of Russia from May 1906

until his assassination in September 1911. He was the sponsor of the last major

government reform attempt before the Revolution.
124

system is conducive neither to efficiency nor to economy, but the very

reverse. It insures the greatest amount of extravagance with the least

amount of accountability, and is fatal to efficiency.

While we are vainly struggling to increase the efficiency of the navy,

Germany continues building big ships according to a carefully matured

plan.47 She remembers that the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was

the precursor of a great war.48In her next conflict she does not

purpose being found wanting either in ships or in naval efficiency.

Japan indulges in no idle dreams of universal peace, or Utopian

restrictions of sea power. In the late war she demonstrated to all the

world the absolute necessity of an efficient naval administration,

without which naval efficiency is absolutely impossible. This she

devised and perfected long in advance of the collision she saw to be

inevitable. Russia, also, taught us the equally valuable lesson that naval

efficiency does not consist in the number of ships alone. The battle is not always to the strong. Strength, to be effective, needs intelligent

direction.

Fortunately, Congress has authorized the building of two more

20,000-ton battleships,4 9 coupled with the assurance of a continuous

building programme. But on the vital question of naval governmentthe power to handle the forged weapon, the means of insuring naval

efficiency-it is the purpose of the oligarchy which shapes the conduct

of our naval affairs to maintain the status quo.

It is now the naval oligarchy versus the people. The question of the

hour is: Which shall prevail? 50

S.B. Luce

47The typescript version reads: "... Germany, regarding with ill concealed

contempt the solemn mockery of a Hague Conference for the limitation of armaments,

continues building big ships according to a carefully matured plan." For two excellent

studies of the origins of German seapower in the 1890's see Jonathan Steinberg,

Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Fleet (London: MacDonald,

1965), and Holder H. Herwig, The German Naval Officer Corps: a Social and Political

History 1890-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

48 Luce is referring here to the International Peace Conference held at the Hague,

May-July 1899, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. A.T. Mahan was a delegate to the

Conference at the Hague.

4 9 Luce is probably referring to the Act of 2 March 1907 which authorized the

20,000 ton battleship U.S.S. North Dakota (BB-29) and to the Act of 29 June 1906

which authorized the 20,380 ton Delaware (BB-28).

50The last paragraph was added for the published version.
125

CHAPTER VII

FLEET CONTROL:

NAVAL STRATEGY

By Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy

Editors' Introduction

The work of the Moody Board was completed on 26 February

1909 when its final report was sent to the President. The

statement which serves as the philosophical basis for its recommendations, the section entitled "General Principles Governing

Naval Organization" was actually written by Mahan, but the

document clearly shows the influence of Luce. 1 Most importantly,

the board's proposals incorporated Luce's concept of an office for

"Naval Operations," but there were still difficulties to be

surmounted. While the general public seemed confused over the

subtlety of the issue, a large number of professional officers did

not understand or appreciate the rationale behind the proposal. In

addition, Roosevelt's term as President had only a few days to run

when the final report was submitted to Congress. Luce feared that

the reform effort might easily fail without a nationally known

standard bearer. It was essential, therefore, that professional

opinion support and sustain the President's initiative. An article in

the spring of 1909 would help to keep the issue alive, and at the

same time it could help to clarify the nature of naval strategy and

to delineate the area of responsibility for the proposed office. To

accomplish this Luce resurrected a lecture that he had delivered on

17 July 1902, during the summer course of the Naval War College.

He revised it and nearly doubled its length in order to focus on the

most current issues. Then he submitted it for publication to the

United States Naval Institute Proceedings, where it appeared in

April 1909.2 In contrast to his article on "The Fleet," which concentrated on

the inadequacy of the Bureaus in dealing with the fleet, this essay

focuses directly on the problem of fleet control. The conclusion,

however, is the same; the Navy needed a group of officers who

U.S. Congress, Senate, Certain Needs of the Navy: Message from the President of

the United States Transmitting Two Preliminary Reports of the Commission Appointed

to Consider Certain Needs of the Navy, 25 February 1909, Senate Doc. 740, 60th

Congress, 2d sess., pp. 2-3. 2 "Naval Strategy," U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXV, No. 1, 1909, pp. 93-112.
126

were trained to deal with the broad problems of naval operations

and educated in the principles of strategy.

Published toward the end of his writing career, this article is

significant in that it illustrates the balance which Luce maintained,

at the end of his life, between his exhaustive reading and his

practical knowledge of the Navy.

His reliance on Mahan for historical data is, of course, a change

from his earlier work. Taken as a historical document, it provides

an interesting contrast between the naval writing in the pre-Mahan

era, as illustrated in chapters III and IV. Like many others, Luce,

too, had come to rely on his prodigy. He did not, however,

become totally absorbed in the maritime view. He retained his old

interest in all aspects of warfare. He continued to read the latest

military studies, as well as to keep up with the new developments

in naval thought. Luce went so far as to emphasize the importance

of military history for the naval student. "... Military movements

on land," he wrote, "suggests the continuity of similar rules in

military movements at sea." Luce's insistence on this relationship

between military and naval thought seems to have had an impact

upon his friends and colleagues at the Naval War College. For it

was at about this time that the War College staff began to become

interested in the ideas developed by the German General Staff. 3 The "applicatory system" and "the philosophy of the order form"

would develop into the American military planning process used

during World War II. In the years between 1909 and 1912, the

seeds were being planted for the adoption of these ideas. Luce's

writing was undoubtedly one of the influences that contributed to

the acceptability of these concepts in the U.S. Navy.

In March 1909, while this essay was in the press, Luce received

a letter from the editor of Navy Magazine, who asked "As to the

present status and outlook of our reform movement." Luce

replied confidentially,

The "present status" is the old status of chronic friction

between line and staff; and the "outlook for reform" is not

encouraging. The campaign of reform is scarcely yet begun,

and while I am not without hope of ultimate success, I realize

that the struggle for reform will be long and arduous.4

3 See Charles W. Cullen, "From Kriegsacademie to the Naval War College: The

Military Planning Process," Naval War College Review, January 1970, pp. 10-15; and J.B. Hattendorf, "Technology and Strategy: A Study in the Professional Thought of the U.S.

Navy, 1900-1916," Naval War College Review, November 1971, p. 31.

4 Luce to W.D. Walker, 29 March 1909, Luce Papers, LC.
127

Luce in his later years. Photo: Newport, R.I. Historical Society
128

The first results of the reform movement appeared before even

Luce may have hoped for them. Within a month after the "Aid

system" was established by Navy Secretary George Meyer, W.S.

Sims wrote to Luce:

I congratulate you with all my heart upon the final success

of the long fight you have made for a military organization of

the navy. Too many forget that you began this fight before

we youngsters understood much about its object and its

importance. You planted the seed, and you may repose for

years in the shade of the sturdy tree that sprang from it. We

kids have the satisfaction of knowing that we got in a good

lick now and then, but your work prepared the service to

brave the pain of a (to us) new idea and finally to see the

light. 5 Sims was certain that the Congress would fully support Meyer's

action. His optimism was premature, but his analysis of Luce's

contribution was accurate.

War is not a game of chance, as so often asserted. The saying is true

only when the game is undertaken by those unprepared for it by

previous study. There are games in which there is a large element of

chance; but we see proofs every day of that element being discounted,

or neutralized, by the superior skill of one or the other of the players.

Ordinary participants in the game, guided by a few fixed rules, are often surprised to find that, although favored by fortune at the outset,

they yet lose the game. The skill of their opponent had offset the

advantages which in the beginning had been all their own. The truth is forced upon them that a superficial knowledge of a few elementary

rules of the art is no match for an opponent's familiarity with the

principles on which the rules are founded, and an automatic readiness

to apply them.

The same may be predicated of the great game of war. A knowledge

of the principles of the science, combined with skill in the application

of the rules deduced from them, will reduce to a minimum the chances

of defeat, and enable an adept in the art to convert the errors of a more

powerful adversary into a means of success. War in its more extended sense may be regarded as a science. The

growth of a science is simple. The science of law, for example, founded

upon human rights and the principles of truth, equity and justice, could

not have been built up save by the enunciation of those principles by

eminent jurists. The precedents established by the recorded opinions of

great lawyers, and the rulings of the bench, have been handed down

through long lines of judges, carrying with them all the weight and

force of law; indeed the findings of the courts have not infrequently

been formulated into statute law. The principles of the science would

lie dormant did not man breathe into them the breath of life by giving

5 W.S. Sims to Luce, U.S.S. Minnesota, 13 December 1909, Luce Papers, LC.
129

expression to them in due form. Thus has it been with the science of

war. Its principles have found expression in the deeds and maxims of

eminent seamen and soldiers. Great captains, gifted by nature with a genius for war, have illustrated its principles in their campaigns and

have put them down in writing, or have had them recorded by

competent writers. We owe the graphic account of the "Retreat of the

Ten Thousand," so famous in military annals, to Xenophon6 himself,

and Thucydides, an admiral of the Athenian Navy, 7 was the best naval

historian of antiquity. His works should be read by every naval student

to-day. In reading Arrian, 8 observes Sir Edward Creasy, 9 we read

General Aristobulus 1 ° and General Ptolemy 1 J -two of the generals of

Alexander the Great -on the campaigns of the Macedonians, and it is like reading General Jomini or General Foy 1 2 on the campaigns of the

French. Achilles, 13 who according to an ancient belief was of divine

origin, his mother being Thetis, a sea-nymph, served as the model

warrior on whom Alexander aspired to form himself. This belief no

doubt suggested to Napoleon the idea that war should be represented

by the head of Achilles., to indicate its divine origin. Hannibal and

Xenophon (ca. 430 B.C. - after 355 B.C.), Greek historian, was one of the "Ten

Thousand Greeks" who went to Asia to seek their fortunes. In his Anabasis he recorded

his experiences as a leader in the Army of Cyrus during the rebellion against Artaxerxes

II of Persia. His description of the retreat northward along the Tigris toward the Black

Sea prompted the historian J.B. Bury to remark that Xenophon could have made his

fortune as a war correspondent.

7Thucydides (ca. 460 B.C. - ca. 404 B.C.) is best known for his history of the

Peloponnesian War. However, in 424 B.C. he was elected 1 of the 10 strategoi for the

year in Athens and given command of the fleet based at Thasos. Unable to prevent the

capture of the city of Amphipolis, he was recalled, tried, and exiled. His Peloponnesian

War was written during his 20 years of exile. a Flavius Arrianus Arrian (ca. A.D. 96 - ca. A.D. 180) was a Greek historian and

philosopher whose Anabasis of Alexander is the most reliable source for the military

career of Alexander the Great. Arrian served as Governor of Cappadocia under the

Emperor Hadrian and Archon of Athens.

9

Sir Edward Shepherd Creasy (1812-1878) was an English historian. The reference

here is to his most popular work, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World from Marathon to Waterloo (New York: Alden, 1885), p. 88.

Aristobulus of Cassandreia (fl. fourth century B.C.) was one of the Greek

technicians who accompanied Alexander the Great's army. He wrote an account of

Alexander's campaigns which, while best for its geographical and ethnological information, was used as a source by Arrian, Strabo, Plutarch and others.

Ptolemy I Soter (367-283 B.C.) was the founder of the Ptolemaic dynasty in

Egypt. He was one of Alexander's most trusted generals. Upon Alexander's death he was

appointed Satrap of Egypt.

1 2 General Maximilien Sebastien Foy (1775-1825) was a French general during the

Napoleonic Wars. His Histoire de la guerre de la Peninsula sous Napoleon was published

from his notes in 1827.

1

Achilles was the great warrior and hero of the Trojan Wars.
130

Scipio 14 studied the character and achievement of Alexander and

emulated his example ; while Caesar studied all three and wrote his own

incomparable works, which form the basis of the science of war. Each

successive school of war was founded upon the campaigns of the

successful leaders who had gone before, till Napoleon came to

reconstruct the art and adapt it to modern conditions. He, too, studied

the campaigns of the great captains who had preceded him, and bore

witness to the truth that the principles of the science never change: that

what was true in the time of Alexander and of Hannibal and of Caesar

was true in his own day.

Thus step by step has the science of war been built up. The

principles form the basis of the rules; and, other things being equal, he

is most successful in war who has the greatest aptitude for applying

those principles and putting those rules in practice. When it is found,

observes one writer, that a general always attacks the key of an enemy 's position with superior forces, well supported; or, in receiving an attack,

opposes the enemy with greater numbers or with men securely

intrenched, we need only enough instances to know that he is superior

to chance. He may, in one or two cases, be called lucky; but when he is found always to do the same thing, and is always on the right spot, at

the right time, with his men rested and his trenches dry, we then

understand that he knows his business -that he is a past master in the

art of war. Thus has it been going on for ages. The maxims of Napoleon

alone form a compendium of the art of war, and their interest to the

naval student is that they apply in many cases to the operations of a

fleet just as well as they do to the operations of an army.

It is well understood that rules cannot be given to suit in every

instance, and when they do cover a given case, blind aherence to them

does not always ensure victory. During the War of the Spanish

Succession, Lord Galway, 15 an experienced soldier, thought it more

honorable to fail according to rule than to succeed by innovation. This

great commander, we are told, conducted the campaign of 1707 in the

most scientific manner. On the plains of Almanza 1 6 he encountered the

army of the Bourbons. He drew up his troops according to the methods

prescribed by the best writers and in a few hours lost eighteen thousand

men, one hundred and twenty standards, all his baggage and all his

artillery.

1 7

14 Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, the elder (236- 184 B.C.), was the Roman

general who fought Hannibal and the Carthaginians in the Second Punic War.

Henri de Massue de Ruvigny, second Marquis de Ruvigny, Earl of Galway

(1648-1720), was the son of a French general who became a naturalized Englishman

following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In 1707 he was appointed Commander

in Chief of all English forces in Spain.

1

The Battle of Almanza was fought in June 1707.

17The War of the Spanish Succession gave to England Gibraltar and Minorca,

separating the southern parts of France from the western, neutralizing Toulon, which

Louis XIV had designed as a great naval depot. Gibraltar and Port Mahon in the hands of

England enabled her to control the trade of the Levant. The war was terminated by the

treaty of Utrecht in 1713. [This is Luce's footnote. His source for this information was

T.B. Macaulay, "War of the Succession in Spain," The Miscellaneous Works of Lord
131

A knowledge of military and naval history shows us what errors in

war have been committed, and instructs us how they may be avoided. A

knowledge of principles enables us to form our own rules to meet

special needs, and a knowledge of the rules will often enable one to

avoid committing blunders which have become historic. The most that can be claimed for a knowledge of the science of war is that it so

prepares the student that he may make the least number of mistakes.

The greatest captains known to history have made mistakes in war.

Caesar, it is said, accomplished his self- training in war by dint of many

errors. His knowledge of the art was acquired by the mistakes he had

made and intelligently profited by. Turenne, on being asked how he

had lost the battle of Muriendahl,

8 replied, "by my own fault; but,"

he added, "when a man has committed no faults in war he can only

have been engaged in it but a short time." The great Frederick 19

candidly acknowledged that no general had ever committed greater

faults than he had. But to the reverses of the campaign of 1744 he

always ascribed his subsequent successes. It was in the midst of

difficulty and disgrace that he caught the first clear glimpse of the

principles of military science. Napoleon, himself, confessed that he had

been so often mistaken that he no longer blushed for it. "Don't be

discourgaged! It was my fault this time!" cried out General Lee20to

the retreating Confederates on the third day's fighting at Gettysburg; a frank admission that disarms all criticism.

Military and naval histories, observes one authority, while warning

the student against such mistakes, are yet the depositories of maxims

which genius has suggested and experience confirmed. They both

lighten the way and shorten the road of the traveler and render the

labor and genius of past ages tributary to our own. These teach us most

emphatically that the secret of successful war is not to be found in

mere legs and arms, but in the head that shall direct them. If this be

either ungifted by nature or uninstructed by study and reflection, the

best plans of campaigns are of no avail. This is true of naval operations.

Ships and guns may be all that the most advanced science and the

highest state of art can produce; but if the genius to combine the

various units to the greatest advantage, to direct their movements with

skill, and supply their needs, be wanting, they can contribute but little to success in war. What the great soldiers of past ages have done for the military art,

the great seamen have in a measure failed to do for the naval art. The

Macaulay (New York: Knickerbocker Press, n.d.), vol. Ill, p. 200, and Burrows, Life of

Lord Hawke, p. 16.]

1 8 In the Battle of Marienthal (Mergentheim), half of Turenne's army was lost to the

Bavarians in 1645.

1 9 Frederick II the Great (1712-1786), King of Prussia. Luce is referring to Frederick's disastrous campaign in Silesia against Austria. It was followed in 1745 by a

series of victories for his army.

20

Gen. Robert Edward Lee (1807-1870), Confederate general. See Douglas Southall

Freeman, R.E. Lee: a Biography (New York: Scribner, 1935), vol. Ill, p. 130, for a

different version of this incident and quotation.
132

latter were not men of letters. The orders of battle of many of the

celebrated admirals known to history, the maxims by which they have

been guided, the opinions on naval operations they have given utterance

to have seldom been recorded, or when they have been, the records are not always easy of access. Up to a very recent date no one had appeared

to gather together the mass of valuable material that lay scattered about

in all but forgotten volumes, classify and arrange in order all that was of

value, and sift out and reject the volume of fable interwoven with

serious history and from the residuum deduce the science of naval

warfare.

The naval student has not as a rule appreciated the full value of

military history as a guide and helper in his studies. And yet the

constant recurrence of the application of certain rules of the art of war

observable in military movements on land suggests the continuity of

similar rules in military movements at sea. "I am struck," writes General Lord Wolseley, 2 ! in his articles on our

Civil War, "I am struck throughout the whole story of the minor

operations of this period by the illustrations they afford of the

regularity with which the old rules and principles of war assert their

supremacy." He then instances two battles (Wilson's Creek, May 10,

1861, and Pea Ridge, March 7, 1862) "curiously alike in the military

lessons they furnish." "Both failed," he adds, "as might have been

predicted."22 That is to say, failed through ignorance of first

principles.

Colonel Henderson, R.A., 23 observes that, of the mighty host put in

the field of the Civil War, by the North, and the thoroughness of its organization as a fighting machine, one factor was overlookedintelligent control. This was during the earlier days of the war. "Men

who, aware of their own ignorance, would probably have shrunk from

assuming charge of a squad of infantry in action, had no hesitation in

attempting to direct a mighty army, a task which Napoleon has assured us requires profound study, incessant application, and wide ex- perience." Strategy is an art in itself, to attain success in which one

must serve a long apprenticeship. The rules of strategy are few and

simple and may be mastered in a week. But such knowledge will no

more enable a man to lead an army as Napoleon did, or conduct a naval

campaign as Nelson did, than a knowledge of English grammar will

teach a man to write as Gibbon did.

24 A truly pathetic picture is drawn

of the great and good Lincoln poring night after night, while all

Field Marshal Garnet Joseph Wolseley, first Viscount Wolseley (1833-1913),

visited America during the Civil War. He met Gen. T.J. "Stonewall" Jackson and Robert

E. Lee. Wolseley published his observations of the war in Blackwood's Magazine in 1863.

This has been edited by James A. Rawley, The American Civil War: An English View

(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1964).

22 Rawley, ibid., pp. 129-30.

23

Col. George Francis Robert Henderson (1854-1903) was a military writer,

historian, and lecturer at Sandhurst.

24 Edward Gibbon (1737-1794), English historian, author of Decline and Fall of the

Roman Empire.
133

Washington was asleep, over the pages of Jomini and Clausewitz, 25

trying to master the art of war and only too glad to shift the load onto

Grant. "I do not ask for your plans," he said; "go ahead, and when you

need assistance call on me." He had learned that a man cannot become

a strategist by cramming!

"It is a significant fact that during the three years the control of the

armies of the North remained in the hands of the Cabinet the balance

of success lay with the Confederates. But when Mr. Lincoln abdicated

his military functions in favor of Grant, the Secretary of War had

nothing more to do than comply with his (Grant's) requisitions."26

This practice-the Cabinet directing the operations of war-was re- peated at the outset of the Spanish War, and with equal want of

success. We failed to profit by our own experience in war and are still in

the same condemnation.

General Sherman,27 in a very interesting and instructive article,

points out that in our Civil War it was the "educated soldiers" who

made the fewest mistakes; and that, when mistakes were made, the

movement was in violation of the "lessons taught by the great masters

of the art."

28 Hence the necessity of studying the great masters, a

necessity imposed upon the seaman as well as upon the soldier.

"Out of the experience of great soldiers," says General Sherman,

himself a great soldier, "arose certain rules which made the art of war. These rules are as true as the multiplication table or the law of

gravitation; their operation is as certain as that of any of the physical

laws. The art of war has grown into a science demanding as much, if not

more, study than most of the sciences in which the human mind is interested." "Grant's29 attack on Grand Gulf, and subsequent landing

at Bruinsburg; the movement on and battle at Port Gibson; the rapid

march to Jackson, whereby he drove Pemberton3 ° to his trenches and

then invested him till his surrender, July 4, 1863, all these operations

illustrated the highest principles of war, one of its maxims being to

2 5 Gen. Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Prussian military theorist. Luce appears to be mistaken here. Jomini's works were known in the United States before the Civil War,

chiefly through the efforts of Dennis Hart Mahan, A.T. Mahan's father. Clausewitz'

works were not translated into English until 1873 or French until 1886. By the late 1880's, Clausewitz' thought had penetrated the most important military circles in those

two countries. His work was not well known in the United States until after 1900.

G.F.R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (London:

Longmans, Green, 1898), vol. I, p. 255. Luce also quotes this in his review of this book

in The Critic, See chapter VI. 27

Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-1891), Union general. During the Civil War, Luce's encounter with Sherman at the siege of Savannah, Ga., in January 1865, was

the beginning of Luce's interest in strategy. Luce describes this in his article, "Naval

Administration HI." See bibliography item 122.

28

W.T. Sherman, "Grand Strategy of the War," Century Magazine, vol. XXXV,

February 1888, pp. 582-598.

29

Gen. Ulysses Simpson Grant (1822-1885).

30

Lt. Gen. John Clifford Pemberton (1814-1881) was the Confederate general who

held Vicksburg against Grant.
134

divide your enemy and beat each moiety in detail." The same principles

precisely apply to naval operations. It was through ignoring this sound

maxim that the English Admiral Graves, in 1781, permitted the

junction off the Cape of Virginia, of the French fleets under de Grasse

and de Barras, respectively, and missed his great objective, the

beleaguered army of Comwallis at Yorktown; and during the Trafalgar

campaign the English Admiral Comwallis3 1 made a similar mistake.

Another well established rule applicable alike to an army operating

on land and an army operating on the high seas is that an army having

assumed the offensive must maintain the offensive. This General

Sherman illustrates by the series of movements of the Union Army

under Grant in 1862 and 1863, having Chattanooga for its objective.

"All these movements were made strictly according to the lessons of

war as taught by the great masters."

The object of General Sherman's admirable article is to show that

the Civil War brought forth, on both sides, the knowledge, talents, and

qualities necessary to the occasion ; that success resulted from the same

qualities, the same knowledge of, and adherence to, the rules of war,

which have achieved success in other ages and in other lands, and that

military knowledge acquired beforehand was most valuable, though not

always conclusive. The same knowledge might have been and was

acquired in actual war, though often at a terrible expense of human life and misery.

General Sherman's conclusion is that "there may be such men as born generals; but I have never encountered them, and doubt the

wisdom of trusting to their turning up in an emergency." The whole

tenor of this instructive article is to emphasize the value in war of the

educated seaman and soldier and is the strongest possible appeal for the

higher education of officers of the military and naval services. "Of all the professions of life," observes Prof. John Fiske, 32 in writing of our

Civil War, "there is none in which the imperative need of professional

training is so forcibly demonstrated as in warfare, where errors of

judgment are visited with such prompt and terrible penalties."33 Says

that profound thinker, the "father of modern political economy,"34

"the art of war is the noblest of all arts and has become the most

complicated. In order to carry it to any degree of perfection it is

3 1 Luce is referring to the division of Adm. Sir William Comwallis' squadron in

August 1805. Comwallis retained 18 ships of the line to guard the entrance to the

channel and sent 18 of the line under Rear Adm. Sir Robert Calder to blockade

Villeneuve at Ferrol. Mahan severely censured Comwallis for this in his The Influence of

Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire. Other historians have not agreed

with Mahan. See Julian S. Corbett, The Campaign of Trafalgar (London: Longmans,

Green, 1910), pp. 250-51.

32John Fiske (1842-1900), historian and philosopher, was an important exponent of

the ideas of Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley in America. He was professor of American

history at Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., from 1884.

33 John Fiske, The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War (New York and Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1900), p. 207, in a section entitled "The Evils of Amateur

Generalship."

34Adam Smith (1723-1790).
135

necessary that it should become the sole or principal occupation of a

particular class of citizens."3 5 Naval Strategy. -If we now consider the subject of naval strategy, it will be found that in this branch of the art of war the analogy between

military operations and naval operations loses itself in identity. In the

definitions of strategy given by military writers one has only to

substitute the word fleet for army. The field of battle, observes

Hamley,3 6

is the province of tactics. The whole theatre of war is the

province of strategy. It is the object of strategy so to direct the

movements of a fleet that when the decisive collision occurs, it shall

encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage. When the

movements of one of two fleets have been so directed as to increase the

chances in its favor, by forcing the enemy either to engage at a

disadvantage, or to abandon a strategic point, or position of advantage,

under penalty of worse disaster, there is proof of a power (brain power)

which differs from the mere ability to fight. The Trafalgar campaign,

which deserves careful study, furnishes illustrations of the soundness of

these views.

Of two fleets, each having equal chances of victory, the defeat of

one may be simply a reverse, with a large residuum of recuperative

power; while, to the other, defeat would be absolute ruin. The defeat of

the American squadron at Manila, May 1, 1898, would have been a

disaster, the effect of which it would be difficult to compute. Failure to

gain a decisive victory, even, would have been almost as fatal as actual

defeat, for Admiral Dewey had no base to fall back upon, no point

d'appui. The risks taken were enormous, but fully justified by the

event.

The triumph of strategy is complete when the commander of one of

two originally equal forces succeeds by the combinations of the

campaign in bringing his adversary's fleet into a position where the

chances of victory are greatly against it, and where defeat will entail

disasters beyond the mere loss of the battle. Had the Spanish squadron

under Cervera, on first reaching the West Indies, fallen in with a small

portion of the American forces in those waters, the defeat of the latter

would have been of comparatively minor importance, whereas the

defeat of the Spaniards would have resulted, as it actually did, in ruin so complete and results so far-reaching as to practically end the war.

It may, and sometimes does, happen that the results of a campaign

depend more upon strategy than upon tactics, more upon movements

than upon victories gained in battle. From the French army of the

Danube the left wing of General Kray37 marched rapidly through

35 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.

Book V, chap. I, pt. I. 36

Gen. Sir Edward Bruce Hamley (1824-1893). See his The Operations of War

Explained and Illustrated (London: William Blackwood, 1878), pp. 59-62.

37Field Marshal Freiherr Paul Kray von Krajova (1735-1804) commanded Austrian

troops in Italy, and later on the Rhine, in the Napoleonic Wars. In 1800 he was defeated

at Biberach and Misserkirch and then driven to Ulm. By a skillful march around the flank

of the French Army, Kray's army escaped into Bohemia.
136

Switzerland to the right extremity of the Austrian line and by that

movement alone conquered all the country between the Rhine and the

Danube without pulling a trigger. In 1805 the army of Mack38

was

completely paralysed and the main body forced to surrender at Ulm

without a single important battle. In 1898 Spain ordered Admiral

Camara3 9 with a squadron to proceed to the Philippines to retrieve the

loss of Montojo's40 command and regain Manila. He got as far as the

Suez Canal, when the squadron under Rear-Admiral Watson4

* threatened, through the press of the country, the coasts of Spain. The news

of this projected movement caused the immediate recall of Camara. (It

was a well-known practice of Napoleon to contrive to have his

emissaries, carrying important dispatches, captured by the enemy.

These dispatches were so artfully worded as to completely deceive the

enemy. This led to the suggestion that there should be in our Navy

Department a Bureau of Misinformation.)

It is one of the oft-quoted sayings of Napoleon that to acquire the

secret of the art of war one must read, again and again, the campaigns

of the great captains. "Model yourself upon them," he said. But of

strategy he has assured us that there is only one means of mastering it, and that is by incessant study and exhaustive thought. And Nelson's

legacy to us, observes a recent English writer, is that "strategy and

tactical study is that which above all things a naval officer should

occupy himself with."42

Of all the great games of war of modern times, the one possessed of

most interest to the naval student is that in which the British Admiralty

was pitted against one of the greatest masters of the art of war of all times -Napoleon. The stake played for was nothing less than an empire.

Great Britain, including her entire colonial system, was the prize. It was

a struggle against sea-power by the first captain of the age, and

sea-power prevailed. The theatre of the war embraced practically the

four quarters of the globe.

The story of Trafalgar has been so admirably well told in a course of

lectures delivered at the Naval War College, and now to be found, under

3 8 Lieutenant Field Marshal Freiherr Karl Mack von Leibrich (1752-1828) was

Quartermaster General of the Austrian Army. He was the responsible commander of the

army which opposed Napoleon in Bavaria.

3 9

Rear Adm. Manuel de la Camara commanded the Spanish reserve squadron which was to have sailed from Spain through Suez and the Red Sea for the Pacific to relieve

Montojo.

Rear Adm. Don Patricio Montojo y Pasaron (1839-1917) commanded Spanish

naval forces in the Philippines against Dewey.

4 Rear Adm. John Crittenden Watson (1842-1923). As a commodore, Watson had

command of the North Cuban Blockading Squadron in May and June 1898 under Rear

Adm. W.T. Sampson. From June to September 1898 he commanded the "Eastern

Squadron" which was organized and ready to be dispatched to the Spanish coast. Its purpose was to force the recall of Camara's reserve squadron and prevent the

reinforcement of Montojo's fleet in the Philippines.

The source of this quotation has not been identified; however, it is the thrust of

J.K. Laughton's comments in his articles, "The Scientific Study of Naval Warfare" and

the "Last Great Naval War."
137

the title of Sea Power,4 3 in every library, as to leave little to be said save in the way of drawing from it lessons for our instruction.

"Let us be masters of the English Channel for six hours," said

Napoleon, "and we shall be masters of the world!"44 That was the war

problem he undertook to solve. But the British Admiralty understood

the game better than its opponent, and Napoleon lost. The first object

of Napoleon was to lure away the English fleet in order to get control

of the Channel. With that view the French fleet, under Villeneuve, was

sent to the West Indies to threaten the English possessions in that

quarter. Nelson followed in pursuit. On June 4, 1805, the hostile fleets were about 100 miles apart, Nelson with 12 ships of the line at

Barbadoes, Villeneuve at Martinique with 20.

June 1 2, Nelson, then off Antigua, feeling convinced that the French

fleet had sailed for Europe, hurried off the brig Curieux, Captain

Bettesworth,4 5 with dispatches to the Admiralty conveying the

intelligence that Villeneuve had left the West Indies but that his

destination could only be surmised. Captain Bettesworth was to deliver

the dispatches in person. Carrying a heavy press of sail, the Curieux

reached Plymouth July 7. Captain Bettesworth posted to London,

where he arrived at 11 o'clock on the night of the 8th. The First Lord

of the Admiralty, Admiral Lord Barham, 46 having gone to bed,

Nelson's dispatches were not given him till early next morning. He

exclaimed angrily, on receiving them, of the loss of so many precious

hours. Without waiting to dress, he at once dictated orders, with which,

by 9 a.m. of the 9th, Admiralty messengers were hurrying to Plymouth

and to Portsmouth.

Cornwallis was directed to raise the blockade at Rochefort, sending

5 ships to Sir Robert Calder,4 7 who was then watching off Ferrol with

10. The latter was ordered, with the 15 ships thus united under his

command, to cruise 100 miles west of Cape Finisterre to intercept

Villeneuve and prevent his junction with the Ferrol squadron. Cornwallis received his orders on the 11th, and on the 15th, eight days after

the Curieux anchored in Plymouth Sound, the Rochefort ships joined

Calder. The latter at once proceeded to the post assigned him. On the

22d the sudden lifting of a dense fog revealed to each other the hostile

forces of Calder and Villeneuve, the British 1 5 sail of the line, the Allies

20. This was one of the most dramatic scenes of the whole campaign.

Was it mere chance that brought these two opposing forces to confront

43

A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire

(Boston: Little, Brown, 1893), 2 vols. 44

Ibid. f vol. II, p. 130.

45

Capt. George Edmund Byron Bettesworth (1780-1808) was given a post captain's

commission by the First Lord of the Admiralty for delivering the dispatches. Three years

later, at age 28, he was killed while in command of the frigate H.M.S. Tartar during

action with a schooner and five gunboats near Bergen.

Admiral of the Red Charles Barham, first Baron Barham (1726-1813).

47Admiral of the White Sir Robert Calder (1745-1818).
138

each other at that particular time and place? Was it not rather a fine

exhibition of skill of two accomplished strategists?

"It is difficult," observes the author, "to praise too highly the

prompt and decisive step taken by Admiral Lord Barham when so suddenly confronted with the dilemma of either raising the blockade

off Rochefort and Ferrol or permitting Villeneuve to proceed un- molested to his destination, whatever that might be. To act instantly

and rightly in so distressing a perplexity, to be able unhesitatingly to

make a sacrifice of advantages, long and justly cherished, in order to

strike at once one of the two converging detachments of an enemy,

shows generalship of a high order."4 8 Napoleon, himself, was entirely misled by Lord Barham 's prompt

measures, whose rapidity even he could not have surpassed. "The

Curieux," he said, "only reached England on the 9th, and the

Admiralty could not decide on the movement of its squadrons in 24

hours."

Charles Middleton, Admiral Lord Barham, was at this time 80 years

old, too old, some English writers maintain, to be at the head of the

Admiralty during a time of war or even in peace. He had been but two

months in office. His prompt action on the morning of the 7th, they

say, was simply the carrying out of plans already matured by the Board

of Admiralty. However that may be, the plans were well conceived by

somebody in the Admiralty, be the credit for them whose it may, and

the strategic combinations were identical with those laid down by the

best military authorities.

The rest of the story, omitting details, is soon told. Sir Robert

Calder was unequal to the task imposed upon him. After an indecisive

action the two fleets separated. Villeneuve was enabled to reach Vigo

on the 28th of July; few days later, favored by the wind, he reached

Coruna (August 1) and effected the junction with the allied forces in

the harbor of Ferrol, which it had been the very object of the English

Admiralty to prevent. On learning (August 13) that Villeneuve had

reached Coruha, Napoleon wrote to his Minister of Marine. "If with

thirty ships my admirals fear twenty-four British, we may as well give

up all hope of a navy." No more forcible illustration could be given to

show that numbers do not mean efficiency. It is not an uncommon cry

with us to-day: "Give us more ships, for we must have an efficient

navy." Numbers do not constitute efficiency. The fighting qualities of

the Spaniards none can dispute. And yet Napoleon reckoned one

French ship of the line as equal to two of the Spanish; it was simply a question of the relative efficiency of the two navies.

Calder now joined Cornwallis49 off Brest, raising, with some of

Nelson's ships, that force to 34 ships of the line, all admirably

disciplined. The Allies had in Brest 21 ships, in Ferrol 29, neither of

which was equal in number, still less in quality, to those under

Cornwallis. The naval situation, continues the author, was now

48Mahan, French Revolution, vol. II, p. 169.

4 9 Admiral Sir William Cornwallis, brother of Lord Cornwallis who surrendered at Yorktownin 1781. [Luce's footnote.]
139

comparatively simple. Cornwallis was superior to either of the enemy's

detachments, and he held the interior position. In case Villeneuve

approached, it was scarcely possible that the two hostile fleets,

dependent upon the wind, which, if fair for one, would be foul for the

other, could unite before he could crush one of them. It was equally

improbable that, with all their lookout frigates, or, as we now call

them, scouts, Villeneuve could elude the British fleet and gain so far the

start of it as to cover the straits of Dover during the time required by

Napoleon.

"In his concentrated force, therefore," continues the author, "and

his interior position, Cornwallis controlled the issue."

50 But to borrow

General Sherman's form of expression, he acted "in violation of the

lessons of war as taught by the great masters." He threw away his great

advantage. On learning that Villeneuve had put to sea with 27 or 28

ships of the line, he at once dispatched Sir Robert Calder towards

Ferrol with 18 sail, keeping 16 for himself. This separation of the two

parts of his fleet, says the author, is condemned by the simplest and

most generally accepted principles of warfare. It transferred to

Villeneuve all the advantage of central position and superior force and

was stigmatized by Napoleon himself as a glaring blunder. So much for

not knowing one's business!

"While the British squadrons were concentrating in the Bay of

Biscay, and the diligence of Nelson was bringing the Mediterranean

ships to the critical center of action, Napoleon, from the heights

overlooking Boulogne, was eagerly awaiting news from Villeneuve, from

whose skill, zeal and courage everything was to be hoped."5

* He leaned

upon a broken reed. Villeneuve 's heart failed him. Instead of making

for the Straits of Dover he steered for Cadiz! -and the game was

practically up.

52

The sudden collapse of all of Napoleon's long and carefully

thought-out plans of invasion calls to mind another occasion, when a thoroughly efficient but comparatively small fleet turned back what

promised to be a tidal wave of subjugation of a free people:

A king sate on the rocky brow

Which looks o'er sea-born Salamis;

And ships, by thousands, lay below,

And men in nations; -all were his!

He counted them at break of dayAnd when the sun set, where were they? 5 3 Let us now go back and ask who it was that directed all these great

movements of the English fleets? For even Nelson himself, with all his

genius for war, was but a single factor in the hands of the supreme

Mahan, French Revolution, vol. II, p. 176.

Luce identifies his source here as simply "Mahan." The sentences in quotation

marks are a paraphrase of Mahan, French Revolution, vol. II, p. 173.

52At this point the close similarity of the text to the 1902 lecture ends. Luce wrote

the remainder of the article for the published version in 1909.

53 George Gordon Noel Byron, sixth Baron Byron (1788-1824), Don Juan, LXXXVI,

4.
140

directorate of the various strategic movements. It matters not whether

the master mind was Lord Barham's or that of his staff. For our purpose it was the British Admiralty. And therein lies the question for our navy to consider- the creation of a directive agency to project

strategic movements covering the entire theatre of war, embracing, it may be, the four quarters of the globe. The study of naval battle tactics

is eminently proper-say rather, indispensable; but it is, after all, providing for contingencies more or less remote; while the creation of an intelligent directive force that can, during peace, foresee and provide

for the contingencies of war, and efficiently direct the operations of the

fleet when war does come, is a practical question of the present.

To avoid the possibility of misapprehension it is proper to state, in

this connection, that our form of government, and the genius of our

people, demand that the Secretary of the United States Navy must, and

always should be, a civilian, selected by the President with a special

view to his fitness for the office. Our insistence is, that the civilian who

occupies this high and responsible position shall have at his elbow, at all times, able and responsible advisers on all questions relating to war and

to the preparation for war. He should be furnished, by law, with a Board of Directors, by what name soever it may be called.

Having defined strategy as it is applied to military and naval

operations, and shown by ample illustrations what a prime factor it is in

war, let us now proceed to inquire how the United States manages such

matters. The head of our Admiralty5 4 has put it on record that for the

first seven months of the Civil War, "butj for some redeeming naval

successes at Hatteras and Port Royal, S.C., .... the whole belligerent

operations would have been pronounced weak and imbecile failures."

Per contra, the Prussian campaign of 1866, during which the naval

battle of Lissa5 5 was fought, lasted but seven weeks, resulting in the

consolidation of the German Empire

In regard to one of the greatest strategic movements of the Civil War,

the capture of New Orleans and the control of the Mississippi river, the

head of our Admiralty wrote: "In general and desultory conversation

with military and naval men and others, the passage of the forts and the

capture of New Orleans was spoken of as desirable, but not a

practicable undertaking. " The views of the Department on the subject were "speculative and uncertain."56 The movement which led to the

54Gideon Welles (1802-1878), Secretary of the Navy 1861-69. See John Niven,

Gideon Welles (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

Luce is referring to the second Battle of Lissa which was fought during the

Austro-Prussian War between Italian and Austrian squadrons off the Dalmatian island of

Lissa in the Adriatic on 20 July 1866. The Italians were defeated in this, the first battle

fought at sea by fleets of modern ironclad warships. The first Battle of Lissa was fought

between the British and a Franco-Venetian squadron, 13 March 1811.

Gideon Welles, "Admiral Farragut and New Orleans, with an Account of the Origin

and Command of the First Three Naval Expeditions of the War," The Galaxy, vol. XII,

Nos. 1 1-12, November- December 1871. This article has been reprinted in Albert Mordell,

comp., Civil War and Reconstruction: Selected Essays by Gideon Welles (New York:

Twayne, 1959), pp. 129-30.
141

capture of New Orleans and the ultimate control of the Mississippi was

the result of fortuitous circumstances, and the active part taken by

parties not connected with the Navy Department. The latter heartily

cooperated in the movement, it is true; it simply did not take the

initiative, as it should have done, and would have done had the

Secretary of the Navy enjoyed the advantages of presiding over a Board

of Directors, and listening to the counsel of expert advisers. It is submitted to an intelligent, patriotic and practical people if that is the

way to carry on naval operations in war-by "desultory conversations

of a civilian with military and naval men"? An endeavor has been made

to show that war is, in one sense, a science, to master which requires

profound study. In another sense it is an art, to become an adept in

which a man must devote all the faculties with which nature has

endowed him. To assign to the control of the Admiralty, with all its vast responsibilities, a civilian, however eminent, without a staff of

naval experts, is only to imperil the highest interests of the country, to

sacrifice precious lives, to waste munitions of war, and place the civilian

head of the navy in an utterly false position. That is what was done in

the Civil War and repeated up to a certain point in the Spanish War. In

respect to naval affairs Americans seem incapable of profiting by their

own mistakes in war. A generation after the Civil War came the war with Spain, only to

find our Admiralty as incompetent as ever. The battleship Maine was

destroyed in the harbor of Havana, February 15, 1898. Ten days later

(February 25) the Assistant Secretary of the Navy telegraphed to

Commodore Dewey at Honkong: [sic]

Secret and confidential. Order Squadron, except Monocacy, to Hongkong.

Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war [with] Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish Squadron does not leave the Asiatic Coast, and then

[begin] offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until further

orders.

(Signed) ROOSEVELT.

From the date of the Assistant Secretary's dispatch, February 25, to

the actual breaking out of the war, April 21 -nearly two months-much

precious time was lost in preparing for hostilities.

58 Three days later,

April 24, came the dispatch from Commodore Dewey which ran as follows:

Hongkong, April 25, 1898. Secretary of the Navy, Washington. In accordance

with the request of the Governor of Hongkong, the Squadron leaves to-day for

Mirs Bay, China, to await telegraphic instructions. Address, Hongkong. I will communicate by tug.

(Signed) DEWEY.

5 7 The cruiser Olympia had been ordered home. From this time on all the dispatches

sent out from the Navy Department indicate that the Government fully anticipated a war with Spain. [Luce's footnote.]

58

For additional information on the preparation for and details of the Battle of

Manila see Nathan Sargent, Admiral Dewey and the Manila Campaign (Washington:

Naval Historical Foundation, 1947), and U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Reports of the Navy

Department for the Year 1898 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1898), vol. II,
142

One would have supposed that with all our experience during the

four years of the Civil War prompt measures would have been taken to

meet the crisis which everybody saw was at hand; and that Commodore

Dewey would not have been left so long in suspense and finally placed

in the humiliating position of being requested to leave Hongkong. Such,

unfortunately, was not the case. The dispatch to Commodore Dewey from the Assistant Secretary of

the Navy, who seems to have been the only one of the administration

to comprehend the necessity of action, was dated February 25, 1898.

The dispatch from Commodore Dewey announcing the action of the

Governor of Hongkong was dated April 25, an interval of sixty days.

Now it required but 54 days for the powerful monitor, Monterey, and

the collier, Brutus, to go from San Francisco to Manila. Had those

vessels been ordered to join Commodore Dewey at the date of the

dispatch of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, they would have

reached their destination in time, if not to take part in the action of

May 1, they would have at least exercised a wholesome moral effect on

natives and foreigners alike, and would have relieved Commodore

Dewey of all cause of anxiety. As a matter of fact the Monterey did not

leave San Francisco till 41 days after the battle of Manila! The excuse is that the monitor was not ready for sea. Of course she was not: How

could she be ready? The Commandant of the Mare Island Navy Yard,

California, where she then was, could not fit her out for sea without

orders from headquarters, and there was no one at headquarters upon

whom that duty devolved. The civilian Secretary of the Navy knew

absolutely nothing about such things, and his advisers, the several

Chiefs of Bureaus, foreseeing that war was imminent, were fully taken

up with matters pertaining to their respective bureaus which had to do

with other matters. The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, who has a

quasi-military character, in default of a special office for the direction

of military operations, was already overloaded with the details of his

own bureau. The Naval War Board did not come into existence till May

2, the day after the battle of Manila.

The dispatch from Commodore Dewey of April 25 informing the

Secretary of the Navy that he had been "requested" to leave Hongkong

was received at the Navy Department on Sunday morning. The

Department was practically deserted. But the Bureau of Navigation was

never closed, during the war. The dispatch was received by Lieut. H.H.

Whittlesey, U.S.N.,

5 9 then on duty in the Bureau. Lieut. Whittlesey took

it at once to the house of Captain Crowninshield, 60 the Chief of the

Bureau of Navigation. Captain, the late Rear-Admiral, Crowninshield,

Appendix to the Report of the Bureau of Navigation. [Documents relating to the

operations of the war with Spain.]

59

Lt. Comdr. Humes Houston Whittlesey (1861-1943) was a graduate of the U.S.

Naval Academy in 1884. He retired from the Navy as a lieutenant commander in 1905.

Rear Adm. Arent Schuyler Crowninshield (1843-1908) served as Chief of the

Bureau of Navigation from 1897 to 1901.
143

under date of July 9, 1901, 61

gave out the following very interesting

account of the dictating by President McKinley of the now "famous

dispatch" to Admiral Dewey. This account, we may premise, is now of

no little historic value as an incident of our naval annals:

On Sunday, April 24, 1898, Lieutenant H.H. Whittlesey called at my home

with a despatch from Admiral Dewey, stating that the Governor of Hongkong had

notified him that he must leave that port with the force under his command

within forty-eight hours.

Deeming it of the greatest importance that a reply should be sent as soon as possible to Admiral Dewey, I took the despatch to the White House and laid it before the President. The President directed me to go and find Mr. Long,62 the

Secretary of the Navy, and Judge Day,63 the Secretary of State, and bring them

to the White House. Upon returning to the White House, I was shown to the

western end of the upper corridor, where the President was sitting with the

following persons: Secretary Day, Attorney-General Griggs, 64 Senator Hale65

and one other, possibly Secretary Bliss,66 though I am not sure. The late Senator

Davis67 joined the party later. A discussion of the despatch from Admiral Dewey and the reply which should

be sent to him was taking place when I arrived, in which I took part for several

minutes. The President then turned to Attorney-General Griggs and said: "Griggs,

you write a despatch for Dewey to proceed to Manila and attack the Spanish

naval force assembled there," whereupon Attorney-General Griggs turned to me

and said: "Captain, you know how to write that better than I do; you go and

write it. You will find some blanks in the Cabinet room."

I at once proceeded to the Cabinet room and wrote the despatch. Returning to the Presidential party I handed the despatch I had prepared to Attorney-General

Griggs, who said it was satisfactory and handed it to the President, who read it aloud.

The only change that was made in the despatch as I wrote it was the addition

of either the word "capture" or the word "destroy." The despatch as originally

written by me contained but one of these words, but which one I do not recall.

The Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, addressed the Massachusetts Club at Nantasket, Mass., on 2 July 1901. His remarks were published in the local papers and

read by A.S. Crowninshield at his home in Peabody, Mass. The following day, 3 July

1901, the admiral wrote Long correcting him and pointing out that he, Crowninshield, was the author of the telegram to Dewey. This letter from which Luce took the

quotation and other correspondence relating to this incident was published in the Papers

of John Davis Long (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society Collections. 1939), vol. LXXVIII, pp. 379-82, 387.

John Davis Long (1838-1915) was a Governor of Massachusetts, Congressman, and

Secretary of the Navy, 1897-1902.

63 William Rufus Day (1849-1923) was Assistant Secretary of State in 1898-99 and

later an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

64John William Griggs (1849-1927), Attorney General, 1898-1901; member of the

Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, 1901-12; president of the Marconi

Wireless Telegraph Company.

65 Eugene Hale (1836-1918), U.S. Senator from Maine, 1881-1911. Hale was a prominent supporter of the Navy in the Senate.

66 Cornelius Newton Bliss (1833-1911), Secretary of the Interior, 1896-98. Bliss was

offered the Vice Presidency by McKinley in 1900, but he declined it in order to continue

his career in textile manufacturing.

67Cushman Kellogg Davis (1838-1900), lawyer; Governor of Minnesota, 1873-75;

U.S. Senator from Minnesota, 1887-1900. An outspoken expansionist, Davis served on

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1891 until his death.
144

I then went over to the Navy Department, handed the despatch to Lieutenant

Whittlesey and directed him to go ahead and put it into cipher. Lieutenant

Whittlesey reported to me the same evening that the Secretary had signed the

despatch and that it had been sent. The experiment that had failed lamentably in 1862 was tried again

in 1898. During the first three years of the Civil War, as already related,

the President had exercised his military functions as constitutional

commander-in-chief, with what unfortunate results we have seen. The

President was now to try it again in the war with Spain with no better

success. As early as March 9, Congress voted $50,000,000 for national

defense; and Admiral Dewey testified before the Senate Committee,

June 26, 1902, that war with Spain was regarded out there (China) as certain as early as April 1, and that if he had had timely reenforcements

the insurrection which cost so many precious lives would have been

averted. 68

It is a fatal mistake to adapt the amenities of peace to the

prosecution of war. "If there be any truth established by the universal

experience of nations, it is this, that to carry the spirit of peace into

war is a weak and cruel policy. The time of negotiation is the time for

deliberation and delay. But when an extreme case calls for that remedy

which is, in its own nature, most violent and which, in such cases, is a remedy only because it is violent, it is idle to think of mitigating and

diluting."69

The Naval War Board came into existence not a day too soon. It stood for a Naval Staff, and was successful in pulling the Department

through the war. The Secretary of the Navy of that day pays it the

following well merited compliment: "The Board [Naval War Board]

possessed high intelligence and excellent judgment and its service was

invaluable in connection with the successful conduct of the war."70

And yet it was summarily dissolved at the close of the war! Its great

value as a permanent office was not understood.

The Naval War Board had to do with the very questions of naval

strategy, the subject of which we have been dealing. Some of the most

important strategic measures are those adopted during peace -adopted

perhaps many years in advance of even the prospect of hostilities. The

British Admiralty has matured plans for the construction of a large

dockyard, comprising about fifty-two acres, at Rosyth, on the north

side of the Firth of Forth. It will become in no great while one of the

most important naval stations in the kingdom. As a strategic point it will furnish a base for naval operations in the North Sea, should the tide

of war ever tend in that direction.

It may readily be seen, from what has gone before, that by the

timely occupation and security, during peace, of an important strategic

68

See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Philippines, Affairs in the Philippine

Islands, Hearing before committee, 31 January-28 June 1902, Senate Doc. 331, 55th

Congress, 1st sess., 1902.

The source of this quotation has not been identified.

70John D. Long, The New American Navy (New York: Outlook, 1903), vol. I, p. 163.
145

point, a war may be averted. It is that consideration that makes a Naval

Staff an indispensable part of an enlightened system of naval

administration, not less in peace than in war. Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, is another illustration of the wisdom of securing during peace an

important strategic point. The value from a military point of view of a

naval base in those islands can scarcely be exaggerated. The navy is indebted for this great acquisition to the happy accident of a gentleman, in no way connected with the executive branch of the

government, visiting Hawaii not long since.

71 Becoming convinced,

from personal observation, of the manifold advantages of Pearl Harbor

for naval and military purposes, he resolved that active measures for the

establishment there of a naval base should no longer be delayed.

In 1893, while Captain A.T. Mahan, the President of the Naval War

College, was still engaged in his studies and resultant lectures on naval

strategy, there appeared in the Forum of March of that year an article

from his pen entitled "Hawaii and our Future Sea Power."72 This

article attracted just enough attention, at the time, to cause the author

to be summarily detached from the War College and sent to sea, the

administration of that day not being in favor of the taking over of the

Hawaiian group. But the cogent arguments advanced by the eminent

author, showing the great advantages, from a strategic point of view, of

the possession of those islands, served to crystallize current thought of

the past sixty years on the subject, and matters finally began to take

definite shape. On the 6th of April last, bill H.R. 20308 to establish a

naval station at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, being under discussion in the

House, there were disclosed some interesting facts in connection with our methods of conducting the affairs of the navy.

73 For whereas the

naval station at Rosyth was established by the English Admiralty, the

naval station at Pearl Harbor was established by Congress on its own

initiative.

In the hearing before the Naval Committee of the House, January

29, 1908, on the subject of Pearl Harbor, one of the delegates from

Hawaii 74 said: "The importance of Pearl Harbor as a naval and military

base has been repeatedly urged by men able and experienced in military

and naval science, among them Captain A.T. Mahan, who pointed out

with unanswerable arguments the commanding importance of Pearl

71

Luce may be referring to the railroad promoter and sugar plantation promoter,

Benjamin Franklin Dillingham (1844-?) whose firm eventually received the contract for

dredging and drydock construction at Pearl Harbor.

72

A.T. Mahan, "Hawaii and our Future Sea Power," Forum, vol. XV, March 1893,

pp. 1-11. The article was included as chapter One in The Interest of America in Sea

Power, Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897).

73

See Congressional Record, 6 April 1908, pp. 4562-63. [Luce's footnote.]

74

Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole (1871-1921) was a Prince of the Kingdom of Hawaii

and a cousin of Queen Liliuokalani. He served as a Delegate to the U.S. Congress from

1903 to 1921. See A.L. Bates, "Report from the Committee on Naval Affairs Favoring

H. 18120 to Establish a Naval Station at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," 2 March 1908, House

Report 1132, 60th Congress, 1st sess., serial 5225; and "Report ... Favoring H.

20308 ..." House Report 1385, 60th Congress, 1st sess., serial 5226.
146

Harbor as the key to the Pacific." The Hon. A.L. Bates,

75 having in

charge the bill for the "establishment of a naval base at Pearl Harbor,"

in his report, March 2, 1908, quotes the opinions of Captain Mahan as to its great importance from a naval and military point of view. And

Senator George C. Perkins, 76 member of the Naval Committee of the

Senate, in a powerful plea for the establishment of a naval base at

Hawaii, states that "in 1893 our greatest authority on sea power and

naval strategy, Captain A.T. Mahan, wrote with reference to the

proposed annexation of Hawaii," etc. The Senator then quotes from

the Forum article of March, 1893, in which the strategic importance of

the islands is fully set forth.

We put it fairly and squarely to the naval profession and to the

public generally, if the operations of war, involving naval strategy, as we

have endeavored to define and illustrate it, can be successfully

conducted save by a directorate composed in part, at least, of those

who have made the study of the Science and Art of War their chief

occupation? 77

75 Arthur Laban Bates (1859-1934) was a member of the House Naval Affairs

Committee who introduced the bill which made Pearl Harbor a naval base. He was

Congressman from the 25th Pennsylvania District from 1901 to 1913.

76

George Clement Perkins (1839-1923), shipowner, banker, Governor of California,

1880-83; U.S. Senator from California, 1893-1915; Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, 1909-13.

77Perhaps Luce meant to say here: "We put it fairly and squarely to the naval

profession and to the public generally, that the operations of war, involving naval

strategy, as we have endeavored to define and illustrate it, cannot be successfully

conducted save by a directorate composed in part, at least, of those who have made the

study of the Science and Art of War their chief occupation."
147

CHAPTER VIII

NAVAL BASES:

THE NAVY AND ITS NEEDS

By Rear Admiral S.B. Luce, U.S.N.

Editors' Introduction

Even at the age of 83, Luce still had much to teach the Navy.

The perspective which he had gained in six decades of naval

service, along with his broad vision, allowed him to gage

dispassionately the growth of the Navy into a properly functioning

organization. He saw clearly that the ideas which he had advocated

in the past had not been fully appreciated. There were many in the

service and in Congress who failed to understand, in broad terms,

the meaning of a navy. As the battleship building race in Germany

and Britain caught the attention of his contemporaries, he could

see that many still focused solely on the instruments of iron and

steel, the details of battleships, and the size of guns. They seemed

unable or unwilling to grasp the intricate interrelationship between

administration and strategy, between ships and men, between

fleets and bases.

In one of his last major lectures at the Naval War College, "A

Short Study in Naval Strategy," Luce turned directly to the

problem of naval bases. Speaking before the Naval and Military

Conference on 27 August 1910, he pointed out that the U.S. Navy

had made considerable improvement since 1881. It had a fleet, its

administration had been bettered, but the subject of bases still had

not become prominent. Little attention was being given to the

new requirement for base development for the "new Navy." Few

had bothered to consider bases in terms of their strategic as well as

their technical significance. In order to bring this issue clearly to

the forefront, Luce delivered his lecture at the Naval War College,

and then submitted it for publication in the North American

Review. l As he had done so many times before, Luce extensively revised

his work before it appeared in print. In his original lecture2 he

l4 'The Navy and Its Needs," North American Review, vol. CXCIII, No. 665, April

1911, pp. 494-507.

2 "A Short Study in Naval Strategy," Lecture Collection, 1910, Naval Historical

Collection, Naval War College.
148

devoted several pages to the sudden rise of Germany as a naval

power. He noted the influence of Mahan on Kaiser Wilhelm, and

he went on to speculate.

If it should so happen that Germany should seize the island

of Jamaica what would be the course of the United States?

We know that many Germans regretted that at the termination of hostilities of the Franco-German War they had not

exacted in part payment the ceding of the island of

Martinique, for Germany has long wanted a naval base in the

West Indies. Does all this explain the reason for the Canadian

Navy?3 England could be starved into submission in a week

were it not for her fleet.

As interesting as such comments are to us todav, Luce took them

out of the published version of his lecture. He wanted to focus

directly on the issue of bases, so he removed most of the

peripheral comments from his lecture. He retained, however, the

part which promoted Narragansett Bay, R.I., as the best site for a

naval base on the eastern seaboard. Luce had first become

attracted to this area in 1862 while assigned to the Naval Academy

which had been temporarily located in Newport during the Civil

War. He strongly supported the effort to permanently locate the

school there instead of returning it to Annapolis after the war. In

the 1880's he located the Training Squadron in Narragansett Bay,

and in 1884 his report to the Secretary of the Navy specifically

placed the location of the proposed Naval War College on Coasters

Harbor Island. Luce lived out the remainder of his life in Newport,

on the shore of Narragansett Bay.

This essay appeared in the April issue of the North American

Review, which also featured a biographical sketch of the author. A

few days after its appearance, Capt. Bradley Fiske, then a member

of the General Board, wrote Luce:

I have read your article in the North American very

carefully, and I think it is very, very good. Admiral Dewey

spoke of it to me this morning, and asked if I had read it,

adding "it is a splendid article."

I don't know when we are going to get any money for

bases. Congress has been educated up to a dim appreciation

of a battleship—but no further; except that some of them

appreciate submarines a little too much.4

3 The Canadian Navy was established by the "Naval Service Act," 9-10 Edward VII,

ch. 43. Assented to 4 May 1910.

4

B.A. Fiske to Luce, 12 April 1911, Luce Papers, LC.
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150

Luce published this article precisely for the purpose of

educating the general public and their representatives in Congress

in the importance of the Navy's need for something more than

ships alone.

History furnishes some notable examples of the degeneration of

navies after a great war. It is the natural result of action and reaction.

Such was the experience of the United States Navy following the Civil

War. For twenty years after the close of that war the United States had

dropped out of the list of naval powers.

In undertaking the building up of the "new navy,"

5 as it has been

called with questionable propriety, there are certain well-established

facts that must be taken into account. First of all, we are, as a people,

averse to "entangling alliances." We abjure the use of force. We "seek

peace and ensue it." The genius of our people lies in the direction of

trade, commerce, the industries and the development of the vast resources of the country. We have no known enemies. Our only fear,

and that a remote one, is in being drawn into the quarrels of others.

President Taft6 well expressed the feeling of our people when he

declared recently that all international disputes should be settled by

arbitration. But while awaiting the establishment of the International

Court of Arbitral Justice, so earnestly advocated by Mr. Root, 7 when

Secretary of State, every American must subscribe to the sound views

of Mr. Roosevelt as expressed in his address before the Nobel Prize

Commission-to wit: "Each nation must keep well prepared to defend

itself until the establishment of some form of international police

power competent and willing to prevent violence as between nations."8 That our development as a naval power is to proceed on those lines-the

prevention of hostilities by preparation for them-has already been

declared by Congress through its building programme of two first-class

battleships a year and by its liberal appropriations for the maintenance

of the naval establishment. Such being the naval policy of Congress, it is

"The Forty-seventh Congress during its sessions of 1881-82 and 1882-83

authorized the construction of three steel cruisers and one steel despatchboat. These

ships were the nucleus of the New American Navy, the development of which, in peace,

has potently aided the upbuilding of numerous industries of the nation and the

achievements of which in war rival in glory and results those for which the Old Navy is justly famous." John D. Long, The New American Navy, vol. 1, p. 1. [This is Luce's

footnote. ] 6 William Howard Taft (1857-1930) succeeded Roosevelt as President and served

from 1909 to 1913. After serving as Kent Professor of Constitutional Law in Yale

University from 1913 to 1921, he was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

7 Elihu Root (1845-1937) was Secretary of War, 1899-1903; Secretary of State,

1905-1909; U.S. Senator from New York, 1909-15. He was awarded the Nobel Peace

Prize in 1912.

Roosevelt's mediation of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 won him the Nobel

Peace Prize. He addressed the prize committee at Christiana (now Oslo), Norway, on 5

May 1910. See Herman Hagedorn, ed., The Works of Theodore Roosevelt (New York:

Scribner, 1925), vol. XVIII, pp. 410-15.
151

in order to examine into the constituents of a navy to the end that a

healthy, all-round growth may be assured.

With the regeneration of the United States Navy in 1881 there arose the necessity for the adoption of three measures of the highest

importance-namely

1

The placing of the administration of the affairs of the navy on a war footing.

2. The creation of a fleet.

3. The establishment of naval bases.

The first measure is in a fair way of accomplishment. The second, a

fleet, is an accomplished fact, leaving only the third measure to be

considered.

In the building up of a navy the public mind seems to be centred on

ships alone. Tables are published from time to time showing the

comparative strength of navies as measured by the number of

battleships of each country, together with their tonnage and gun power.

Engrossed by the continued development of the battleship, we overlook

the important fact that there should be maintained a fixed ratio

between tonnage and personnel. With the increase of number and size

of battleships, moreover, comes the increased demand for the means of

taking proper care of them, which necessitates ample docking facilities

and repair-shops. Keeping the under body of a battleship clean enables

her to maintain her normal speed (her cruising radius) without an undue expenditure of coal (or oil), a very important factor during

hostilities. A battleship should be docked for cleaning at least once

every six months.

But the very important item in the process of naval development is the establishment of naval bases. A base, in a military sense, is simply a

basis of operations or a point from which supplies may be drawn. 9 A

naval base means that and much more. The term "naval base," it may be observed, is new to our naval

vocabulary. Naval students knew of such things only through reading of

them. For, having no fleet, naval bases did not enter as a factor into our

naval life. Our first ships after the termination of the Revolutionary

War-those built during the latter part of the eighteenth century -were

set up, some of them at least, in private shipyards which were

conveniently located for the purpose. These were utilized by the

Secretary of the Navy and their purchase was subsequently authorized

by Congress. Such was the shipyard owned by John Jackson. It was

situated on or near a mud flat on Wallabout Bay, Brooklyn, New York.

It was here that the "Adams," a small twenty-eight-gun frigate, was

The first point in a plan of operations is to be assured of a good base; this name is applied to the extent of the frontiers of a state from whence an army will draw its resources and reinforcements; that from whence it will have to depart for an offensive

expedition and where it will find a refuge in time of need." [This is Luce's footnote. The

quotation is from Baron de Jornini, Summary of the Art of War or a New Analytical

Compend of the Principles of Strategy, Grand Tactics, and of Military Policy (New

York: Putnam, 1854), art. XVIII, pp. 88-89. This translation was by Maj. O.F. Winship

and Lt. E.E. McLean of the U.S. Army.]
152

built for the Government by Jackson 1 ° in 1779. It seems to have been

the policy of that day to utilize whatever happened to be at hand and

to make the most of it. Those private shipyards, coming under

Government control, gradually took on the character of, and came to

be known as, navy-yards. They served their purpose in their day, but

for some of them that day has long passed. The utilitarian policy no

longer obtains. In looking to the further growth of the navy, we must

adjust, and readjust, our focus to modern conditions, as they grow and

expand, that all the various elements that go to make up a navy may be

seen in their true proportions and their proper relations. The old

navy-yards were naval bases only in such a very limited sense that they

were never known as such. The selection of sites was dictated by utility,

not by reason of their strategic position or their value in a military

sense. In fitting out a fleet and its auxiliaries during war, or in anticipation

of war, a permanent naval base in a situation favorable for operations in

the field of hostilities is of the first importance. After a battle a naval

base is a necessity, whatever may be the result of an engagement. We

know from recent naval history that even a victorious fleet will suffer

serious losses and will be obliged, in parts at least, to fall back on its base for supplies and repairs. If worsted in the fight, then the whole

fleet, or what is left of it, will have to seek the shelter of its base, and

badly damaged ships -ships, perhaps, in a sinking condition -must be

speedily docked, or beached, or go down in deep water. A naval base,

moreover, is necessary for the assembling of the reserves of battleships

of the second category -ships with all but perishable stores on board

and ready at short notice to fill gaps in the line of battle. A glance at

foreign Naval Powers will show the military value attached to naval

bases and to the imperative necessity of organizing the reserves of the

line of battle.

The great military ports of England, Germany, France, Russia, Italy

and Japan serve as illustrations in point. After the unification of Italy in

18591 ! there was constructed at Spezia a dockyard that for capacity

and completeness was equal to all of our navy-yards of that day

combined. It was designed for nine building-slips and ten dry docks. At

Kiel and at Wilhelmshaven the Germans boast of two of the finest

dockyards in the world, the creation of recent years. The magnificent

roadstead and dockyard of the former (Kiel) has been rendered

impregnable by the defensive works planned by a commission presided

10Adams was launched 8 June 1799 by the firm of Jackson and Sheffield. In 1801

the land for the New York Navy Yard was purchased from Jackson. It was part of the

decision by Congress to appropriate funds for the establishment of shipyards at Washington, Norfolk, Philadelphia, Boston, Portsmouth, and New York. Luce obtained

much of this information while preparing the report of the Commission on Navy Yards

(see item 70) and in writing "On Navy Yards and Their Defense" (see item 102).

Italy was unified in March 1861 at the time Victor Emmanuel was declared King

of Italy. La Spezia, a part of the Duchy of Genoa in the Kingdom of Sardinia, became a naval headquarters after the military fleet was transferred from Genoa in 1857.
153

over by von Moltke 1 2 himself. Wilhelmshaven, with its three dry docks,

each one capable of taking in a battleship of 25,000 tons displacement,

gives one an idea of what constitutes a primary or permanent naval

base. In addition to these, there was begun in May, 1909, at Brunsbettel

on the Elbe, just at the entrance of the Kiel Canal, two dry docks which

surpass any yet constructed. They are in length 330 metres (1,072.50

feet) and 45 metres (146.25 feet) wide, to cost thirty million marks. 1 3 England, fully alive to the possibilities of the near future, has

established new naval bases at Malta, Gibraltar (new by reason of the

new dry docks), Dover and Rosyth. It is the intention of the Admiralty,

according to recent reports, to establish still another naval base.

Harwich, on the North Sea, is the place designated. It is already

strongly fortified. The old dockyards at Chatham, Sheerness, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Pembroke and others no longer suffice. The

Government dry dock No. 1 at Gibraltar is 863 feet long and 95 feet

wide. The harbor recently opened at Dover is said to be the largest

artificial harbor in the world. It encloses an area sufficient for the

accommodation of a fleet of twenty-five first-class battleships and

auxiliaries. Dover harbor was begun in 1898 and is said to have cost

$20,000,000.

"This harbor has taken eleven years to construct and has cost the Government

$20,000,000. By its erection the ancient English port of Dover has been

transformed into a powerful naval base. The reason for this transformation is not

far to seek. It is the policy of the British Admiralty to have the strength and bulk

of their ships lie nearest their strongest rival. That rival to-day is Germany, hence

the desirability of equipping Dover with an efficiently protected harbor, where

the ships can lie safely at anchor and yet be in a position to strike quickly at the

North Sea."

14

Rosyth, on the north side of the Firth of Forth, Scotland, is now

nearing completion. 15 Japan has at Yokohama three dry docks and

four at Yokosuka. The French have their principal military ports at

Brest, Cherbourg, Toulon and Bizerta, near Tunis, where there are three

dry docks. Then we have Port Arthur and Vladivostok as other

examples of great military ports.

In the scheme for the rehabilitation of the Chinese navy, one of the

very first steps has been the establishment of a primary naval base. This

has been done, not at one of the commercial ports, but at Hai Fu Wan

1 2 Field Marshal Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke (1848-1916), the younger, was Quartermaster General in 1903 and Chief of the General Staff in 1906. He was the

nephew of Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke (1800-1891), the victorious leader

of Prussian forces in 1866 and 1871.

13 About $6% million (U.S.) in 1911.

14 The recent proposition to fortify the mouth of the Scheldt with a view to the

establishment there of a naval base is fraught with danger. If carried into effect it would

not only prove a serious menace to England, but would lead, undoubtedly, to

international complications of the gravest character. [This is Luce's footnote.]

15

Luce's source here was Engineering, vol. LXXXV, No. 2202, 13 March 1908

[London] , p. 348. This untitled and unsigned article provides details and a chart of

Admiralty plans for Rosyth.
154

in Nimrod Sound. This strategic point bears about the same relative

position to the Sea of Japan that Dover (England) does to the North

Sea.

There are military ports, it may be observed in passing, and there are commercial ports. Out of the experience of long and exhausting wars,

as in the past between England and France, the importance of certain

harbors on either side of the Channel and in the Mediterranean became

manifest. They were those most conveniently situated for projecting

naval campaigns against an enemy and as harbors of refuge in cases of

disaster or defeat. They were the principal strategic points within the

theatre of belligerent operations. As bases for such operations they

gradually developed into military ports. In the absence of the stern

school of war naval students, in anticipation of possible hostilities of

the future, have determined the most important strategic points on

their coasts for the establishment of naval bases, such as we have seen at

Wilhelmshaven in Germany, and Dover, England, and Rosytn in

Scotland, looking to coming events forcing the centre of disturbance in

the North Sea. Commercial ports, on the other hand, grow out of the

necessities of commercial enterprises without regard to military

considerations.

The following in regard to German naval bases is taken from a recent

English paper:

16

1 7 "Wilhelmshaven and Emden, Borkum and Heligoland, the greatest quadrilateral of naval fortresses the world has ever beheld, are nearing completion.

Within two-thirds of a day's steaming of the British coasts, within half a day's

reach to the entrance of the Baltic, they proclaim to the world that Germany is preparing for a great naval conflict."

The recent transfer of the principal German naval base from Kiel to

Wilhelmshaven

"is the announcement that the fortified island of Borkum combines with Emden

to accentuate the importance of the Ems estuary in the new scheme for the

future, while Borkum connects with Heliogoland through the impassable chain of

the East Frisian Islands; and Heligoland—the northern Gibraltar—closes to an enemy the estuaries of the Weser and the Elbe and completes, with the mighty

fortress harbor of Wilhelmshaven, the vast quadrilateral, Emden, Borkum,

Heligoland, Wilhelmshaven, which encloses in its enormous bastion configuration

—one hundred miles long on each of its faces and sixty on each of its flanks—

score of islands bristling with forts, together with linking positions on the

mainland of huge strength and extent. The great waterways of the Ems, the Weser

and the Elbe bring the resources of populous provinces to the wharves and quays.

A vast system of strategic railways can carry thousands of trained soldiers to the

mighty embarkation docks of Emden. It is appalling to think of the situation if those unparalleled preparations and armaments represent enemies or rivals." The foregoing, while somewhat hysterical in style, presents some

interesting features of Germany's naval projects and conveys a good

idea of what constitutes a permanent naval base of the first order. From

our point of view the great works the writer describes are all in the

interests of peace. From an examination of these and other of the great

16

F. Hugh O'Donnell in the Pall Mall Gazette, 8 April 1908. [Luce's footnote.]

17Heligoland is an islet only about one-fifth of a square mile in area. [Luce's

footnote.]

18

Pall Mall Gazette, 8 April 1908. [Luce's footnote.]
155

military ports of the world we are led to conclude that the constituents

of a naval base of the first order are, roughly speaking, about as follows:

1Its situation must be at the best strategic point within the area under consideration.

2. It must afford a safe harbor for a fleet of at least from

twenty-five to thirty battleships with their auxiliaries, aggregating a

total of about sixty heavy-draught ships and numerous small craft.

3. Such anchorage must be within the lines of defence.

4. It must afford ample docking facilities, at one and the same

time, at least four ships of 45,000 tons displacement, each of, say,

thirty-eight feet draught.

5. The interior lines of communication to the sources of supply

should be such as may be fully secured in time of war.

6. It should be easy of access and egress and admit at mean low

water, and without constant recourse to dredging, ships of the heaviest

draught of water-say, thirty-eight feet.

1

7. It should be in proximity to a community able to furnish skilled

labor in the departments of iron shipbuilding and marine enginery.

8. The facilities of the neighborhood for furnishing the materials

which enter into these industries should be ample.

9. The character of the soil of the littoral should be such that the

dry docks and wet basins in numbers sufficient to meet all probable

demands of the future can be constructed at moderate cost and its area

sufficient for all the structures that may be needed for a repairing yard

and a naval arsenal combined.

10. It should enjoy a salubrious climate.

11. It should be difficult to blockade.

With the exception of Wilhelmshaven and one or two other of the

great military ports of Europe, it is not to be assumed that all these

conditions can be found at any one place. But accepting the principal

points, it is plain that the United States has no naval bases. All the

components of naval bases exist save only the will to assemble them.

Twenty years ago America had no fleet. All the various parts that go

to make up a battleship lay scattered about in every direction. By the

exercise of the creative power the thousand and one units have been

marshalled into order, and first a battleship and then a fleet have sprung

into existence. So far so good. But our naval development has been

one-sided. In the ardor of building a fleet naval bases have been

overlooked. In this respect the constructive genius is still wanting. We

have navy-yards, naval stations, naval rendezvous; but, in a technical

sense, we have no naval bases. The elements have yet to be assembled.

This one-sided growth is not progress. We may double the number of

battleships and still make no naval progress unless the other constituents of sea power keep pace with the building programme.

1

We have not yet reached the limit of size of ships. The White Star liners "Olympic"

and "Titanic" are 860 feet long, 92 feet beam and at 37% feet draught have a displacement of 60,000 tons. These ships could be docked at Gibraltar. [Luce's

footnote. These were the largest ships of the day.]
156

With the development of the battleship goes, or should go, the

development of all that makes her an efficient instrument of war; her

motive power, armament, personnel, munitions, victualing, means of

repairing, docking, and so forth. And as battleships increase in numbers

and size so must all the heterogeneous elements that contribute to their

efficiency increase, otherwise there is no real naval progress. The visible

manifestations -the great ships and their war-like appearance -delude

the public into thinking increase of tonnage is progress. Those of the

profession know better. It is their duty to point out defects and

instance cases of retarded development in the several parts.

On examining the map of our Atlantic seaboard, to which this

discussion is confined, three principal strategic points20

at once attract

attention: Narragansett Bay, Chesapeake Bay and the Florida Keys.

Chesapeake Bay has the making of a permanent or primary naval base.

In the days of the old navy, Hampton Roads fulfilled all the

requirements of our little floating force. Fort Monroe furnished the

necessary defence, and the navy-yard at Norfolk, established in 1801,

with its narrow approaches and limited facilities, was equal to the light

demands made upon it. Those advantages no longer suffice. The army is already planning for an advanced line of defences. In 1906 the "Taft

National Coast Defence Board," so called because the Hon. William H.

Taft, then Secretary of War, was its president, in recommending the

fortification of the entrance of Chesapeake Bay reported in part as follows:

"Commercially and strategically Chesapeake Bay is to-day, as it always has

been, of the very first importance. With the entrance unfortified, as it is now,

should a hostile fleet gain control of the sea, it could establish a base on its shores

without coming under the fire of a single gun. It could pass in and out at pleasure,

have access to large quantities of supplies of all kinds and paralyze the great trunk

railway lines crossing the head of the bay."

The proposition is to create an artificial island on the Middle Ground

whereon to erect a fort mounting heavy guns. These, with heavy guns

on Capes Charles and Henry, would effectually close the entrance of

the bay to an enemy.

If, coincident with the construction of these defensive works by the

army, the navy should build up-to-date dry docks at some carefully

selected point in the bay for the docking of the 30,000-ton ships now

provided for, Chesapeake Bay would become in time a naval base of the

first order.

20

"Every point in the theatre of war which should have a military importance, either

from its situation at the centre of communication or from military establishments and

fortified works of whatever description which would have an influence over the strategic

field, will be, in reality, a territorial or geographical strategic point"—not a geometrical

point. [This is Luce's footnote. The quotation is from Jomini, ibid., art. XIX, p. 97.]

2 1 U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the National Coast Defense Board, 5 March 1906,

Senate Doc. 248, 59th Congress, 1st sess., serial 4913.
157

Key West, Florida, is the most important strategic point on the

southern coast. The prospect of the early completion of the Panama

Canal emphasizes its value from a naval point of view. Its great natural

advantages have been materially enhanced by the construction of the

Florida East Coast Railway, which connects it with the mainland. An

interesting report on Key West as a naval base will be found in the

"Congressional Record" of April 5th, 1910, page 4436.

Guantanamo, Cuba, is valuable as an advanced post or rendezvous

for the same reasons that apply to Key West. In the event of the

Caribbean Sea becoming the theatre of naval operations, it would prove

as a strategic point of very great importance. It cannot, however, come

within the category of permanent naval bases, unless Congress should

authorize the expenditure of money for defensive work, machine-shops

and dry docks. Situated in an alien country and its lines of

communication and sources of supply liable to be cut off by an enemy,

its defences should be of the most formidable character. It would still be wanting in skilled labor.

Limon Bay, Panama, itself furnishes an advanced naval base. The

entrance to the Canal must be strongly fortified and ample docking

facilities will without doubt be provided: dry docks of at least 1,000

feet in length and wide in proportion.

At the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Convention, Norfolk, Virginia,

November 17-20, 1909, President Taft22

is quoted as speaking of

Norfolk as the "most important navy-yard and navy base that we have

in the United States .... and Chesapeake Bay as the greatest strategical

point of naval rendezvous in the United States."

Accepting that authoritative statement, it may be confidently

affirmed that next after Chesapeake Bay comes Narragansett Bay,

which is the "greatest strategical point of naval rendezvous" north of

the Capes of Virginia. Narragansett Bay seems to have been intended by

nature for a permanent naval base of the first order.

English naval officers who had become familiar with our coasts and

harbors were quick to recognize that fact at an early day. In 1773-74

British engineers made a careful study of Narragansett Bay with a view

to the establishment of an extensive naval station with dry docks,

shipyards, marine hospital and a system of fortifications. In a report to

the Board of Admiralty, under whose instructions the work was

undertaken, it is stated that:

"The whole bay is an excellent man-of-war harbor, affording good anchorage,

sheltered in every direction and capacious enough for the whole of His Majesty's

navy were it increased fourfold. There are no dangerous ledges or shoals within

the bay or near its entrance, which is easy of access with all winds. Another

advantage it possesses over any other harbor on the northern coast in the winter

season is that it is very seldom obstructed by ice, and the tide is not sufficiently

strong to render drift ice dangerous to ships lying at anchor. The harbor has not

been frozen up so as to prevent ships coming in to safe anchorage since 1740, and

the oldest inhabitants do not recollect to have heard that it was ever so frozen up

before since the settlement of the colony. It has other advantages that cannot be

found elsewhere in America. A whole fleet may go out under way and sail from

three to five leagues on a tack, get the trim of the ships and exercise the men

22

See report in "No Cash, Says Taft, for Foolish Plans," The New York Times, 20

November 1909, p. 5:3-5.
158

within the bay, secure from attack from an enemy. The vicinity of the ocean is such that in one hour a fleet may be from their anchorage to sea or from the sea to safe anchorage in one of the best natural harbors the world affords. Its central

situation also in His Majesty's North-American colonies and its proximity to the

West Indies are advantages worthy of consideration, as it regards the protection of

every part of His Majesty's widely extended possession in this quarter. . . . "Whether it is feasible of defence is a question which your lordship [the Earl

of Sandwich] very justly considers of the highest importance and to which my

particular attention is directed. ... Of expense I say nothing. . . . Suffice it to say

that it is completely feasible and that the importance of the position as a naval

station is worth the expense, be what it may."

Written one hundred and thirty-seven years ago, the natural

advantages pointed out in this report which Narragansett Bay affords as a naval staton exists to-day, while the defensive works suggested in the

report have been thoroughly carried out by our own military engineers.

The breaking out of the Revolutionary War put a stop to all further

proceedings in this direction on the part of the English Admiralty.

Mr. Joshua Humphreys, 24 Naval Constructor, who designed the

"Constitution" class of forty-four-gun frigates, having been ordered by

the Secretary of the Navy under date of January 29th, 1802, to

examine sites for naval stations on the eastern coast, reported, in part, as follows:

"Having compared and considered the advantages and disadvantages of

situation, with capacity of harbor, depth of water, rise of tide, expense in building

docks, prices of land, facility of navigation and capability of defence previously

stated at each port, I am decidedly of opinion that Newport, Rhode Island, is by

far the most suitable port for the establishment of dry docks and a great naval

port for our navy for the ease and safety of entry at all seasons of the year. Its

eligibility, in preference to any other eastern port, is universally acknowledged.

The principal and only objection is the great expense of fortification, which may

amount to more than a million of dollars."

Under date of April 25th, 1802, the Secretary of the Navy, Hon.

Robert Smith, 26 transmitted to the President the report of Mr.

Humphreys. In the letter of transmittal the Secretary wrote:

"Mr. Humphreys was also instructed to examine the different ports and

harbors eastward of New York with a view to the selection of the situation for one of the docks for repairing ships directed by Congress. . . . His report on that

subject corresponds with the opinion the Secretary of the Navy has long

entertained from the best lights in his power that Newport, Rhode Island, affords

advantages which give it a superiority over other places. ... It is easy of access and can be gained under circumstances which would render it almost impossible

23 "A British Navy Yard Contemplated in Newport, R.I., in 1764," Rhode Island

Historical Magazine, vol. VI, No. 1, 1885, pp. 42-47. This article attributes the report to Robert Melville, Governor of Grenada, in 1764 or 1765. Internal evidence leads one to doubt this attribution; however, extensive search in the Public Record Office, National

Maritime Museum, Ministry of Defence Hydrographic Office, and the British Museum,

London, failed to locate the original report at the time this study went to press. 24 Joshua Humphreys (1751-1838), shipbuilder, and naval architect, was considered

the leading designer in America. His ships were famous for their speed and individual

accomplishments.

25

U.S. Congress, American State Papers; Naval Affats (Washington: Gales and

Seaton, 1834), vol. XXIII, p. 91.

26 Robert Smith (1757-1842), Secretary of the Navy, 1801-09; Secretary of State,

1809-11.
159

for a ship in a crippled state to reach any other port to the eastward of

Chesapeake Bay. It has a capacious and very safe harbor in all kinds of weather,

and it is the very point of which a maritime enemy would endeavor to get

possession for the purpose of annoying our own coast, our own trade and of

cutting off one-half the maritime strength of our country from the other half. "The objection to this place is the expense of fortifying it. . . . France or England could take possession of Rhode Island and make it a second

Gibraltar."

27

No one can read the exhaustive report of Mr. Humphreys, to which

the Secretary gives such hearty approval, without feeling that he was

thoroughly well qualified to deal with the subject under discussion.

Our own officers were not slow to recognize the importance of these

waters from a naval as well as a military point of view. Agreeably to the

terms of a Senate resolution of February 13th, 1817, a mixed

commission of naval officers and officers of the United States Army

Engineer Corps examined and reported upon a proper site "for a naval

depot, rendezvous and dockyard" east of Delaware Bay. The commissioners were General Swift2 8 and Colonel McRee2 9 of the Corps of

the United States Engineers and Commodore Bainbridge30 and

Captains Samuel Evans3 ! and Oliver H. Perry of the Navy.

As between Boston and Newport Commodore Bainbridge preferred

the former, as it was "favorably situated for obtaining timber for

shipbuilding "-all the others favoring Narragansett Bay. The majority

report, dated Navy-Yard, New York, October 30th, 1817, states that:

"The commissioners (except one), [Commodore Bainbridge] are of the

opinion that Narragansett Bay presents the best site for a naval depot in the

Union north of Chesapeake Bay. . . . "An examination of this bay has satisfied the commissioners (with one

exception) that the best site for a great naval depot east of Chesapeake Bay is to be found in this bay [Narragansett] and the various positions upon the waters of

it "The commissioners have in their survey and examination only determined

where it will be best to locate a great naval depot and where sites for defence

should be selected.' The three lookout stations at Gay Head, 33 Block Island and

2 7American State Papers, ibid., p. 87.

28

Brig. Gen. Joseph Gardner Swift (1783-1865) saw his first tour of duty as a cadet

at Fort Adams, Newport, R.I., in 1800-01, before joining the first class at West Point. He

served as Chief Engineer of the Army, 1812-18. Swift is considered the first engineer of

distinction to have received his training entirely within the United States. 29McRee did not serve on this commission, but on another similar one which

considered, at the same time, possible navy yard sites in the South.

30

Capt. William Bainbridge (1774-1833), hero of the Barbary Wars. He dissented

from this report. See note 32.

31

Capt. Samuel Evans (? - 1824) joined the U.S. Navy in 1798, served in the

quasi-war with France.

3 2 This admirable report may be read with profit to-day. [This is Luce's footnote.

The report is printed in American State Papers, ibid., pp. 490-92. Bainbridge's dissenting

report is on pp. 487-88.]

33 The western point on the island of Martha's Vineyard.
160

Montauk Point, 34 which in time of war would give notice of the

approach of an enemy's fleet, gives an exceptional advantage to

Narragansett Bay as a naval base. It is the natural outpost of New York

City. As an industrial centre it ranks high. During the Civil War a firm

in Providence, 3 5 Rhode Island, made a large quantity of shot and shell

for the navy and more than 300 6.4-inch guns. Since 1891 the same

firm has made for the United States Government seventy-three 1 2-inch

breech-loading rifled mortars with cast-iron bodies hooped with steel

and fifty with steel bodies similarly hooped. Altogether Narragansett

Bay and its tributaries can furnish all the skilled labor a naval base

could need during peace or in time of war. The fact that it has a channel forty feet deep which can be carried ten miles up from the

entrance, and that, too, without dredging, furnishes another advantage

enjoyed by no other harbor on our Atlantic seaboard.

On the northwest shore near Greenwich3 6 will be found an excellent

place for a fresh-water basin for destroyers, torpedo-boats and small

craft generally, an advantage that can be claimed by no other harbor on

the coast save Philadelphia, which is too far from the sea.

3 7 The one and only objection to Narragansett Bay in 1773, 1802 and

1817 as "a great naval port" was the expense of fortifying it. That

objection has been overcome. Narragansett Bay is now well fortified. 38

It has, therefore, all the constituents of a naval base of the first order

save the docking facilities. It only awaits the time when its exceptional

advantages shall have been passed upon officially by a duly appointed

mixed commission of army and navy officers, as has been our practice

in the past, and the question of its adoption taken up by Congress.

It was a very wise move to establish a naval base at Pearl Harbor, two

thousand miles off the coast of California. It would be equally wise to

establish one at home right at our door. The argument against the

establishment of a naval base in Narragansett Bay is that we have too

many naval stations already and that the administration would scarcely

be justified in asking Congress for the large sum necessary to erect

another and an entirely new one. That question is for Congress to

decide, not for the navy. It is for Congress to decide whether the

paramount necessities of the entire country are to be sacrificed to the

political interests of localities having little or no military value.

We have seen from what has been said the importance, from a

military point of view, attached to naval bases by the great naval

34The eastern point of Long Island.

3 5 Builder's Iron Works.

36

East Greenwich, R.I. 3 In the manuscript of his 1910 lecture, Luce notes here, "One very great advantage

of Narragansett Bay and one which must not be overlooked is that it is not a commercial

port."

38

"In 1900, Narragansett Bay was defended by a half dozen separate forts, all well

within the bay, whose armament in 1900 comprised three dozen heavy pieces." E.R.

Lewis, Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: an Introductory History (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1970), p. 9.
161

Powers abroad. We have noticed that naval bases are not placed up

narrow streams nor at commercial centres. It has been made plain that

naval bases are at the most important strategic points near the sea and

that, while easily accessible to friends, they are yet strongly fortified

against foes.

To recapitulate: The question of naval bases has not been until

recently seriously considered for reasons not far to seek. As long as America had no fleet the need of naval bases did not exist. With the

regeneration of the navy and the creation of a fleet the establishment of

naval bases became a prime necessity. Again: The great majority of

Americans are prone to shut their eyes to the possibilities of war, hence

they are averse to preparing for such a contingency. The Spanish War

was an illustration of that fact. Is the next war to prove that we are incapable of profiting by the mistakes of the Civil War and of the war

with Spain? But the principal reason why the question of naval bases

received no consideration was the defective system of naval administration commonly known as the "Bureau System," now happily extinct.

Bureaus are indispensable to any form of naval administration, under

what name so ever they may be designated. But they all had to do with

materiel and belonged to the civil branch of naval administration. The

military branch did not exist. The sole reason for the existence of the

Navy Department and its several bureaus is the preparation for war. One of the first essentials in war is the mapping out of naval campaigns

and one of the essentials in campaigns is naval bases. The subject of

naval campaigns, in which naval strategy forms so large a part, can be

dealt with only by specialists, and the "Bureau System" discouraged

the training of specialists in the very branch to which the Navy

Department owes its existence -the art of war. The current work of the Navy Department was, and still is, ably

carried on by specialists in the arts of ordnance, navigation, naval

architecture, steam engineering and the rest, but, strange to say, there

was no specialist in the art of war, the art to which the Navy

Department owes its existence, as we have already stated. The art of

war includes the subject of naval strategy and naval strategy deals with

naval bases. One of the chief requisites of a naval base is that it shall be

placed in the most advantageous strategic point in the field of possible

operations. These points can be determined only by careful study of

the question in all its bearings, and when the site has been settled much

time and money is required for its development. Military history

furnishes examples of fortifications erected at great cost of time and

labor only to serve as monuments to the lack of foresight of those who

designed them. The point selected was of no strategic importance. It is a curious fact that the navy, up to the present time, has failed to

appreciate its own character as a strictly military organization. A

one-sided development seems no longer possible. The "Bureau System,"

by which is meant the control of the navy by independent bureaus

belonging to the civil branch of the Navy Department, has no part in

the "new navy."

S.B. Luce
162

Lieutenant S.B. Luce, ca. 1861

As head of the Seamanship Department at the Naval

Academy Luce wrote to the Commandant of Midshipmen on 26 February 1861: "Compared to the Army with their

wealth of professional literature, we may be likened to the

nomadic tribes of the East who are content with the vague

traditions of the past. Does it seem creditable then, Sir, to

this institution that it should possess no textbook on the

most important branch taught within its hall?" Luce's Seamanship first appeared in 1862, and it remained the

leading textbook in the field until 1901.

Photo: U.S. Naval Academy
163

CHAPTER IX

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LUCE'S WRITINGS

ACTIVE DUTY YEARS: 1862-1888

Editors' Introduction

The enduring quality of the writings of Stephen B. Luce

becomes readily evident when one considers the large number of

his articles that were either reprinted within his lifetime or were

expanded by sequels. Indeed, the maritime world today could still

gain a great deal from the inheritance left by this gifted officer,

and it would be valuable to publish all of his writings in the

manner of the first seven chapters.

However, the sheer volume of Luce's published words, over 148

separate pieces, makes such an effort clearly prohibitive so the

balance of his writings will be presented in abstract form. This

appears as the best practical substitute. A similar effort made

almost 20 years ago was evidently beneficial to the scholars who

sought it out and, to some degree, inspired this work. 1 This and the following chapter include all the identified

material that Luce published in the period from 1862 through

1911—essays, book reviews, letters to the editors, newspaper

articles, interviews, encyclopedia pieces, instructions and reports

in Government publications, introductions to articles and books

by other authors, short pieces repeated in several publications and

editions of his books.

There are 58 of his essays, including one translation from the

French, which must be reckoned as the core of his writings. Added

to these are 12 book reviews which, in many cases, equal the

impact of his essays. The well-known text on Seamanship went

into eight editions, five of them in 10 years, the last still in print.

His second and lesser known book Naval Songs had two editions

and three added printings, but even today this work remains

relatively unknown despite a continuing interest in sea songs and

the shanties of the sailing age.

Many of Luce's earlier writings appeared anonymously, thus

following a practice customary in publishing well into the 19th

^ohn D. Hayes, "The Writings of Stephen B. Luce," Military Affairs, vol. XIX,

Winter 1955, pp. 187-196. See also Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Belknap Press, 1957), pp. 232-233, 236-237, 492, 493; John A.S. Greenville

and George B. Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 1873-1917 (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 15-18.
164

century. Also, bearing in mind the restrictions of active duty, Luce

was careful to what he signed his name, particularly near the end

of his naval career when he held high public office and many of his

articles dealt with the sensitive issues of Navy Department reform.

Identifying much of this anonymous material was as difficult as

it was fascinating. Numerous tearsheets and newspaper clippings

among Luce's papers appear to bear the stamp of his ideas and

interests, and attributing to him material written by others was a constant temptation. This was particularly the case with service

periodicals such as the Army and Navy Journal, where Luce was

virtually naval editor for 15 years. However, only those pieces

which we can be reasonably certain to have come from his pen are included here. The primary means of identification was Luce's

own correspondence and initialed or signed copies of articles

found in his papers and books. Nevertheless, numerous of his

writings were found to which there are no references or even

indications in his papers. He may have forgotten them or may have

simply wished them to remain unknown.

Abstracts of most of the pieces herein are necessarily short, but

the more significant articles are given comparatively extensive

treatment with appropriate historical references. Each article,

book, issue, and edition has been arranged chronologically and

given a number for ready reference. Cross-references within these

two chapters use the bibliographical item number to specific

works, listed here with their full citations. The appendix to

chapters IX and X provides interested readers with item numbers

of articles that specifically treat subjects within the categories

listed.

1. Instruction for Naval Light Artillery, Afloat and Ashore. New

York: Van Nostrand, 1862. Prepared and arranged for the U.S.

Naval Academy by William H. Parker, Lt., USN., 2d ed. f revised

by Lt. S.B. Luce, USN, Asst. Instructor of Gunnery and Tactics

at the U.S. Naval Academy.

This first literary work of Stephen B. Luce may be said to be

Civil War induced. Lieutenant Parker, an intellectual like Luce,

had originally written the work in 1 859 while on duty at sea in

the steam frigate Merrimac, after a 4-year tour as instructor at

the Academy. It was published and adopted as a textbook in

1860 after he had returned to Annapolis for his second tour on

the faculty. Parker resigned his commission when his native

state, Virginia, seceded on 19 April 1861 and joined the

Confederate Navy. In 1863 he became Superintendent of its Naval Academy on board CSS Patrick Henry. He served after

the war as master of Pacific coast steamers and as president of

Maryland Agricultural College, later the University of Maryland.
165

An inveterate raconteur, his Recollections of a Naval Officer 1 is a delightful sea classic.

Luce assumed Parker's duty as instructor in gunnery.

Continuing to use at the U.S. Naval Academy a text by a "rebel" officer would have been unthinkable, so the Superintendent, Comdr. George S. Blake, had Luce revise it. It was dated

Naval Academy, Newport, R.I., March 29th 1862. This revision

contained an added section by the ordnance specialist, Capt.

John A.B. Dahlgren, USN.

See W.H. Parker, Recollections of a Naval Officer (New York: n.p., 1885).

2. Seamanship: Compiled from Various Authorities for the Use of the

United States Naval Academy, Newport, R.I. Newport, R.I.: Atkinson, 1862.

This first edition of the Seamanship text was compiled by

Luce with the assistance of Lt. E.O. Matthews, a fellow

instructor on the staff of the Naval Academy. In the preface to

this anonymous volume, the compilers remark, "The materials

composing this volume have been hastily drawn from Totten,

Murphy, Boyd, and Nares, and given to the printer to publish in

time for the use of the Midshipmen, during this summers cruise.

It is too crude and imperfect to be considered as a text book."

The preface is dated "Newport, R.I., May 12, 1862."

3. Seamanship: Compiled from Various Authorities and Illustrated

with Numerous and Selected Designs, for the Use of the United

States Naval Academy. 2d ed., Newport, R.I.: Atkinson, 1863.

The second edition appeared with the name of Lt. Comdr.

S.B. Luce on the title page. In the preface dated "Naval

Academy, Newport, R.I., Feb. 1863," Luce points out

That for the present at least, the introduction of Steam

and Iron-Clads into the Navy, in no degree lessens the

necessity that officers should be skillful seamen, skillful in

the management of ships under canvas, and fertile in all the resources known to seamen, as well as prompt in the

application of them when meeting the accidents and

disasters incident to men-of-war.

He goes on to point out that the text will assist midshipmen in

acquiring a knowledge of the duties of seamen, petty officers,

and lieutenants, in learning how to take charge of a watch and a

"division of great guns." Admitting that proficiency in seamanship can only come from practical experience on deck and in

the tops of seagoing men of war, he believed that the text would

be useful as a guide for observation and instruction. In support

of his view that young seamen should continue to be trained in

the way of a sailing ship, Luce faces his preface with an

extensive quotation from Sir Howard Douglas' Naval Warfare

with Steam which concludes, "It must not, therefore, be

assumed, in preparing for steam-warfare, that the sail will be
166

entirely supplanted by steam, or that steam fleets may dispense

with crews of able seamen."

The volume is dedicated to Rear Adm. Samuel F. Du Pont

under whom Luce had recently served as a watch and division

officer in the flagship of the South Atlantic Blockading

Squadron. Upon his detachment in January 1862, Du Pont had

written a complimentary letter on Luce's behalf which allowed

him to be returned to his proper position for promotion on the

Navy List. Luce had been dropped 72 numbers in 1850 because

of his participation in a demonstration against the decision of

the Superintendent of the Naval Academy not to allow

midshipmen to participate in the inauguration of President

Zachary Taylor.

This edition includes a translation of "Le Manoeuvrier" by

Bourde de Villehuet. The translation in part two, "Theory of

Working Ship," was not done by Luce, but he has made a number of corrections to it.

4. Seamanship: Compiled from Various Authorities and Illustrated

with Numerous Original and Selected Designs: for Use of the

United States Naval Academy. 2d ed. New York: Van Nostrand,

1863.

This edition is identical to item 3. Like the Newport issue,

the title page also states that it is the second edition.

Apparently, Van Nostrand used it without alteration when he

published it for a larger audience.

5. "On Training-Ships, No. 1," Army and Navy Journal, vol. I, No. 9,

24 October 1863, p. 132.

This is the first of a series of articles which Luce submitted

to the Journal. (See items 5-9.) They comprise his first

publication in a periodical and were the fruits of his inspection

of British and French naval training ships during the summer

cruise to Europe by the Naval Academy practice ship Macedonian, his first command. 1 Luce's reporter friend William C. Church, whom he met

while the latter was covering the Battle of Port Royal, had

founded the Army and Navy Journal the previous August. Luce

submitted this material to him in two parts, the first two articles were sent shortly after his return from Europe, and the others

from the monitor Nantucket, the command of which he

assumed on 10 November 1863 at Wassaw Sound, Ga. These

pieces were all unsigned, as were subsequent articles by him in

this magazine.

Luce claimed that with the Naval Academy well established,

something must be done for the seamen, "the bone and sinew of

the Navy," who were basically artillerists. He asked for a system

that would keep these men in the Navy and make them a part of

it. He then describes how the French and British had succeeded

in doing this, primarily by long-term enlistments of boys and

training them in special schoolships. He indicated also that boys
167

could be trained in cruising men-of-war if they were kept

separate from the rest of the crew and their instruction closely

supervised by the commanding officer. "It is the future we must

look to-the future."

The official report of this cruise is in Luce to G.S. Blake,

Superintendent of the Naval Academy, 23 September 1863, Luce Papers,

LC.

6. "Seamen and Training-Ships, No. II." Army and Navy Journal, vol.

I, No. 10, 31 October 1863, p. 150.

This installment is devoted to the French Navy.

7. "Training Ships. Educated Seamen and Warrant Officers." Army

and Navy Journal, vol. I, No. 16, 12 December 1863, p. 250.

This installment discusses the French training system in

detail and quotes at length from British reports of 1858-59 on

naval training. Beginning with this article, the remainder of this

series was written in the cramped quarters on board the monitor

Nantucket.

8. "Training Ships. Educating Boys for Seamen." Army and Navy

Journal, vol. I, No. 17, 19 December 1863, pp. 260-261.

Luce discusses in detail his visit to the English training ships.

He goes on to explain,

But how is it that in our country, where education is so popular and where public schools are scattered broadcast

over the land, the Navy should form an exception to the

general rule? Where are all the philanthropists? What are they doing? They have succeeded in ejecting "cats" and the

"grog-tub" from the Navy, and with them the old school

of seamen: let them go on with their work and give us

training ships and a "new school," that our ship's boys

may be well instructed and thoroughly trained to their

business, their moral tone elevated and their whole nature

improved. ... to improve the men, they must begin with

the boys.

9. "Training Ships. Instruction of Ship's Boys." Army and Navy

Journal, vol. I, No. 18, 26 December 1863, pp. 276-77.

In this installment, Luce discusses the training of boys in

general, as well as outlining a proper course for them to follow.

10. "What the Navy Wants." Army and Navy Journal, vol. I, No. 34,

16 April 1864, p. 564.

Here Luce publicly stated for the first time that the U.S.

Navy needed some form of a Board of Admiralty. Written in the

form of a letter to the editor, this was the initial step in a half

century of untiring effort to get line officer direction of the

Navy Department.
168

To make his point, he uses some previous Journal material by

other writers: a long article, two published letters to the editor,

and an editorial by Church himself. These appeared in the issues

of 16 January, 12 March, and 19 March. The first (vol. II, pp.

322-323) was a long unsigned piece with the title: "About

Promotions in the Navy," which might have been written by

Luce himself, but positive verification has not been made. This

piece first discusses the value of competition in all endeavors

and the need for more of it in the U.S. Navy. To this end the

writer recommends selection for promotion, similar to the

French Navy where up to the rank of lieutenant, one-third of

the promotions were by selection; up to commander, one-half;

and all in the grades of captain and flag ranks.

The letter of 12 March 1864 (vol. II, p. 489) signed with the

pen name, Sam Pennant, also recommended selection, but by

boards of officers and not by political favoritism, as he charged

was the case in the U.S. Navy. Church's editorial of the same

date (vol. II, p. 489), on the need for systematic training of

seamen, was based entirely on Luce's 1863 Journal articles (see

items 5-9). The 19 March letter (vol. II, pp. 499-500)

recommended measures to correct the deplorable officer promotion situation in the Marine Corps.

Luce used the four pieces to summarize convincingly the

major personnel improvements required in the Navy at that

time: selection of officers for promotion, education of marine

officers, and the training of seamen. He wanted to know, however, what was to become of such

earnest expression of ideas. "Who is to take it in charge and

bring it before Congress in the proper form? or who even is to

bring it to the notice of the Secretary?" At this time he was

engaged in a frank and fruitful exchange of correspondence with

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox2 on training of

seamen and boys.

Although signed with the initials "J.F.P." this item is identified as Luce's by his letter to W.C. Church enclosing "a

few lines." 3

From Reglement sur Service de Interior, then available at Van

Nostrand's. The letterwriter advised every officer desiring professional

improvement to read it. 2 See Luce to Fox, 27 January and 15 March 1864; Fox to Luce, 1 March 1864, Luce Papers, LC. See also John D. Hayes, "Captain Fox—He

is the Navy Department," U.S.N.I., Proceedings, vol. XCI, September

1965, pp. 64-71.

3 Luce to Church, 30 March 1864, Church Papers, LC.

11. Seamanship: Compiled from Various Authorities, and Illustrated

with Numerous Original and Select Designs, for the Use of the

United States Naval Academy. 3d ed., rev. and enlarged. New

York: Van Nostrand, 1866.

Luce revised and enlarged his seamanship book shortly after
169

he returned to the Naval Academy as Commandant of Midshipmen. In this edition he removed the translation of the "Theory

of working ship," since other departments at the Academy

would teach the principles involved. In addition, the recent

publication of new naval regulations allowed him to remove the

sections on shipboard routine and the duties of officers. In the

place of this information, additional chapters on seamanship were added.

With this edition, the textbook became one devoted entirely

to the art of seamanship. The book earned its fame as the

leading seamanship text in the United States essentially in the

form of the 1866 revision. The preface to this edition is dated,

"U.S. Naval Academy, May 1866."

12. "A Nautical College." Army and Navy Journal, vol. IV, No. 14, 24

November 1866, p. 217.

This item is a short letter to the editor. In his letter, Luce

mentions the incident which had moved him to action: the

sinking of the coastal steamer Evening Star on 3 October 1866.

En route from New York to New Orleans, with 278 people on

board, the ship was struck by a hurricane. Only 34 survived. An

inquiry showed that the disaster was caused by an incompetent

master who had taken no precautions, an insufficiently trained

crew, and defective lifeboats.

13. "Nautical Schools." Army and Navy Journal, vol. IV, No. 18, 22

December 1866, p. 281.

This offering for Church's paper was part of his endeavors at

this time to promote safety in American flag passenger ships

through training of merchant marine officer candidates in state

schoolships. He had been shocked by a series of serious

accidents at sea with heavy loss of life, and he recalled the

limitations of officers of the Volunteer Navy during the Civil

War, most of whom came from the merchant service.

Characteristically, Luce decided to do something about this.

On 17 November 1866 he sent a circular letter to a large

number of public officials, prominent businessmen, and leaders

in education, including the Secretary of the Treasury Hugh

McCulloch and his friends, Senator Charles Sumner and Mr.

Robert B. Forbes, a prominent shipowner, China merchant, and

writer on maritime affairs. He argued for "establishing a nautical

school for the professional instruction of such as are now or may desire to become officers of the merchant marine."

Response was encouraging. On 24 November there appeared a

brief letter signed "L" on the same subject, in which he

emphasized the reserve of trained seamen that would be

available in event of a foreign war. (See item 12.)

14. "Nautical Schools." Army and Navy Journal, vol. IV, No. 19, 29

December 1866, p. 298.

In a long letter of 29 December, also signed "L" (item 14),
170

he described the proposed school. The first third of the work is a long extract from the 1864 Report of the Board of Visitors to

the Naval Academy. It had been written by one of the board

members, Henry Barnard. Barnard was president of St. John's

College, Annapolis, Md. (1866-67) while Luce was Commandant

of Midshipmen at the Naval Academy. Founder of the American

Journal of Education, Barnard was the first U.S. Commissioner

of Education, 1867-70.

15. "Routine for Fleet Maneuvres under Sail." The Naval Signal Book

of the United States of America. Prepared under the authority

of Hon. George M. Robeson, Secretary of the Navy, Bureau of

Navigation, Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1869.

This three-page section provides the standard commands,

signals, and basic procedures for fleets to get underway, come to

anchor, furl sails, loose sails, cross topgallant and royal yards,

send down light yards, and reef topsails.

This section remained unchanged when the Signal Book was

amended in 1873.

16. "French Naval Tactics-No. I." Army and Navy Journal, vol. VIII,

No. 49, 22 July 1871, p. 782.

On 23 June 1871 Luce wrote W.C. Church from the U.S.S.

Juniata at Gravesend, England, that he had personally obtained

a copy of Considerations Generales sur la Tacticque Navale

Escadre devolutions 1868-18701 by Vice Adm. Jean Baptiste

Edmond Jurien de la Graviere (1812-1892). He had made a free

translation under the title "French Naval Tactics" and offered it to Church for publication in his Journal. He stated, however,

I should observe that the style of the original is far from

elegant or classical. It will not for a moment compare with

the writings of De Joinville for example, hence it is hard

for an inexperienced scribbler to make a hasty translation

of an inelegant style read smoothly in the vernacular. I do

not wish to be known as the translator.

2 He did not have to be ashamed of his new type of literary

effort. Examination indicates that it was superior to one done

for the Royal Navy, shortly after the original publication. Luce

had requested a copy of this translation from the Admiralty

when he was in England, but he never received the copy

promised by the First Lord of the Admiralty, George J. Goschen's private secretary. While visiting Villefranche, Luce

went to Jurien himself, who obliged him with a lithograph copy

of the original manuscript. This autographed copy is in the Luce

Papers, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College.

Jurien had taken command of the French Mediterranean

Fleet in 1868. Its ironclads were formed into a Squadron of

Evolution for the purpose of developing a system of tactics as well as a signal book for this new type of warship. Church

divided the translation into seven segments for publication in

serial form (items 17-23). In the first three, Jurien outlined the
171

history of tactics in the age of sail and the complete

transformation in this art and science required by the introduction of the steam ironclad fitted with a ram. He told of

efforts made with the new signal book of 1861 to adapt to the

change. The success of ramming tactics of the Austrians against

the Italians at the Battle of Lissa off the Dalmatian coast on 20

July 1866, however, forced the two leading maritime nations to

hurriedly revise their ironclad tactics. (See item 104 for Luce's

excellent account of this battle in "Naval Warfare Under

Modern Conditions.") As usual, the French were first and did

the more thorough job.

In the final four segments, Jurien recounts how this job was

done and surprisingly gives details of the general instructions

proposed for the new signal book such as, orders for steaming

and of battle, formations, evolutions, getting underway, and

coming to anchor, et cetera.

Jurien de la Graviere was the son of an admiral who served

through the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The young

Jurien entered the navy in 1828 and commanded the squadron

that convoyed the French forces to Mexico in 1861. His literary

accomplishments matched his professional ones. He was a

prolific author of naval history and biography, although only

one of his works, Guerres Maritimes sous la Republique et

I'Empire (1845-1846) has been translated into English. It was

published under the title Sketches of the Last Naval War

(London, 1848). In 1866 he was elected to the Academie des

Science and to Academie Francaise.

See Vice Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, "Considerations Generates

sur la Tactique Navale apropos de la revision du livre des signaux," Revue

Maritime et Coloniale, vol. XXIX, June 1870, pp. 429-54.

2 Luce to Church, 23 June 1871, Luce Papers, LC.

17. "French Naval Tactics-No. II." Army and Navy Journal, vol. VIII,

No. 50, 29 July 1871, p. 798.

In this installment Graviere discusses the difference between

a maneuver and an evolution.

18. "French Naval Tactics-No. III." Army and Navy Journal, vol.

VIII, No. 51, 5 August 1871, p. 814.

In this installment Graviere discusses battle tactics in the age

of the ironclad warship.

19. "French Naval Tactics-No. IV." Army and Navy Journal, vol.

VIII, No. 52, 12 August 1871, p. 829.

Here, Graviere discusses "natural tactics" and the relationship between ships' captains and the admiral in the midst of

battle.
172

20. "French Naval Tactics-No. V." Army and Navy Journal, vol. IX,

No. 1, 19 August 1871, p. 10.

In this section the topic is the organization of the fleet and

orders for steaming, sailing, and battle.

21. "French Naval Tactics-No. VI." Army and Navy Journal, vol. IX,

No. 2, 26 August 1871, p. 22.

This installment discusses formations and evolutions.

22. "French Naval Tactics Conclusion." Army and Navy Journal, vol.

IX, No. 3, 2 September 1871, p. 42.

This installment discusses general instructions for getting

underway and coming to anchor, the fleet underway, and the

fleet in battle.

23. "Regina Dal Chin." The Galaxy, vol. XIII, No. 5, May 1872, pp.

685-92.

Luce's first nonprofessional article and also the first with his

own byline was a testimonial to the Italian woman who treated

his son's dislocated hip. He begins it with:

"This is the story, short, simple, and imperfect as it may be,

of one of the most remarkable women of our day. It is the story

of a female surgeon, and as I hope the reader will presently

admit, the story of a veritable disciple of Hippocrates." 1 The essay appeared in the periodical that W.C. Church and

his brother Frank2 founded in 1866. Described on its title page

as "A Magazine of Interesting Reading," it remained in

publication until 1 878 when it was absorbed by its competitor,

The Atlantic Monthly of Boston.

Luce had several articles in The Galaxy which put him in

good literary company. (See items 42 and 44.) Among its contributors were Walt Whitman, Mark Twain, Henry James,

John W. De Forest, Sidney Lanier, Bayard Taylor, Bret Harte,

Anthony Trollope, and Gideon Welles.

Hippocrates (ca. 460 - ca. 377 B.C.) Greek physician, who is often

called "The father of medicine."

2 Francis Pharcellus Church (1839-1906), after the demise of The

Galaxy, served until his death as editorial writer for the New York Sun

specializing in religious and theological subjects. One of his editorials,

"Yes, Virginia, There Is a Santa Claus" is still frequently reprinted. See

New York Times, 12 and 13 April 1906.

24. "Nautical Schools in the U.S., a Historical Sketch." The Nautical

Gazette, vol. IV, No. 86, 15 February 1873, p. 266.

In this letter to the editor, Luce refers to an article of 18

January 1873, which he may also have written, and gives the

text of a bill providing for examination of merchant marine

officers and the establishment of marine schools.

In this piece he recalls that Mr. Thomas Goin of New York, a

ship booker, started a naval school in 1835 that was received
173

with much enthusiasm along the Atlantic coast. At that time

only 9,000 of the 100,000 seamen sailing under the American

flag were, in fact, Americans. Goin's enterprise did not succeed.

Two years later, in 1837, Congress enacted a law providing

for the enlistment of boys. The Secretary of the Navy in his

report of 1839 was very sanguine, and, at one time, there were

2,000 boys enlisted, but there had been no well-thought-out

plan. Boys were herded into receiving ships and sent to cruising

vessels where they learned the bad habits of the older crew

members. Initially, many had expected to become midshipmen,

but requests for discharges swamped the Navy Department.

Enlistments were eventually stopped although the law remained

on the books and provided the executive authority for

apprentice training when it was tried in 1 863 and again in 1 875.

All of this history was introduced to support the bill which

proposed that the Federal Government examine merchant

marine officers and provide schools which look "directly to the

elevation in tone and professional improvement of the personnel

of the entire body of our great commercial navy."

Bradley S. Osbon (1828-1912), editor of The Nautical

Gazette, was a merchant marine officer turned maritime

reporter. He had met Luce while covering the Port Royal

operation for the New York Herald. Flag Officer S.F. Du Pont

considered his report the best newspaper account. Osbon was

later Farragut's clerk and also reported the Battle of New

Orleans in April 1862. He established The Nautical Gazette and

remained its editor-owner until 1876. Luce sent him news items

from time to time, one in October 1871 after his ship suffered

heavy damage in a Bay of Biscay storm.

The popular biographer Alfred C. Paine wrote A Sailor of

Fortune: Personal Memoirs of Captain B.S. Osbon (New York:

n.p., 1906), a delightful yarn, but an unfortunate historical

fabrication.

25. Seamanship: Compiled from Various Authorities, and Illustrated

with Numerous Original and Select Designs, for the Use of the

United States Naval Academy. 5th ed., rev. and enlarged. New

York: Van Nostrand, 1873.

No copy of Seamanship has been located for the fourth

edition. The publishers may have taken into account the two

"second editions." See items 3 and 4. This is the fifth issue of

Luce's book under this title. It appears to be identical with item

11 which was published in 1866. Although no new preface was

written for this edition, this item includes the 1863 preface as well as that of 1866.

26. Manning and Improvement of the Navy. Address Delivered at the

United States Naval Academy, by Capt. Stephen B. Luce of the

U.S. Navy, n.p., n.d.

A copy of this item is in the Library of Congress. Research

has shown that it is not a Government document and there is no
174

record of its publication by the Naval Academy. It may possibly

be an early imprint of the Naval Institute before its journal was

being published, or it might have been printed by Van Nostrand.

The early records of both organizations have been destroyed.

The text of this piece is nearly identical to item 27, including

the introductory paragraph, the discussion after the address, and

the synopsis of the bill on maritime schools that would amend

the Act of 28 February 1871.

27. "The Manning of Our Navy and Mercantile Marine." The Record of

the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. I, No. 1,

1874, pp. 17-37.

"Our uneducated seamen will not stand a chance against the

trained gunners of England and France." So wrote Luce early in

this opening article in the initial issue of the Proceedings. 1 In it Luce outlines what he had advocated throughout his 1863 and

1866 pieces in the Army and Navy Journal, the need to improve

the education of officers of the merchant service and the general

character as well as the training and discipline of the Navy's

enlisted men. He again discusses the excellent system for

training boys in the British and French navies and the steps

taken to provide capable officers for Great Britain's merchant

marine. He explains at length his proposed bill to promote the

efficiency of masters and mates and to encourage the establishment of public maritime academies.

Luce presented this as the second lecture at the Annapolis

chapter of the newly formed United States Naval Institute. He

had been invited by his friend Commodore Foxhall A. Parker, an intellectual like himself, who was the moving spirit in

founding the Naval Institute. Parker had given the first lecture

before the institute on the Battle of Lepanto, but he withdrew

his paper from publication to incorporate it into his book The

Fleets of the World (New York: Van Nostrand, 1876). Luce,

therefore, had the good fortune to be harbinger of this

long-lived professional journal.

Early issues of this journal carried titles of both The Record and The

Papers and Proceedings. Publishing was intermittent until 1880. From

then the title Proceedings only was used. The magazine became a quarterly with the first issue of 1881. Further references in this bibliography will use "U.S.N.I. Proceedings."

28. "Chapter II." History of the United States Marine Corps by M.

Almy Aldrich. From official reports and other documents

compiled by Capt. Richard S. Collum. Boston: Shepard, 1875,

pp. 21-30.

Luce wrote this chapter in 1874 while at the Boston Navy

Yard. At that time Captain Collum was in command of the

Marine Barracks at Boston. While serving there from 1872,

Collum collected documents for this volume and wrote a rough

draft which he submitted to Boston publisher Henry L. Shepard
175

before being detached for duty in Washington and on the

Asiatic Station. Apparently Shepard asked the journalist M.

Almy Aldrich to edit Collum's work and put it into publishable

form. The first edition appeared under Aldrich 's name in the

centennial year of the Marine Corps. Appearing at a time when

the separate existence of the Marine Corps was being seriously

questioned, this volume made a notable contribution defending

the corps. This volume was rewritten by Collum in 1890, and

his new work saw a second edition in 1903. Luce's chapter

dated "Navy Yard Boston, December 20, 1874," was included

without alteration. (See items 90 and 120.) Collum is remembered today as the first Marine Corps historian in uniform.

Luce presents in his chapter the general subject of marines in

three sections: (1) their employment in antiquity, (2) the Royal

Marines of Great Britain, and (3) a closing tribute to American

Marines. He devotes these early pages to an account of marines

in the navies of Greece and Rome. The Greek word, Epibatae,

has been defined by various scholars as "marines," the heavy

armed soldiers who served on board ships. The crews of swift

triremes consisted of two classes: the Epibatae appointed to

defend the vessel and the sailors. These marines were entirely

distinct from the land soldiers. They belonged to the ship.

The Epibatae used arrows and darts at a distance, spears and

swords in close combat, and, as ships increased in size, they

added ballistae (large stone throwers) and naves turritae

(turrets) and fought with these as though from castles on land.

In earlier periods of naval history, when issues of battle were

decided by hand-to-hand ship combat, the number of marines

was as large as could be accommodated on board. However,

when naval tactics became more of an art, skillful maneuvers

were then used to disable enemy craft. The number of marines

in a trireme was reduced to 10 in a crew of 200.

The Corps of Marines was established in the Royal Navy in

1664. They were trained in sea fighting and in ship maneuvers in

which many hands were needed. In 1774 three regiments were

raised in the colonies. In 1760 the sea soldiers in the British

Navy numbered over 18,000. Marines did not join in the general

mutinies at Spithead and the Nore in 1797. Marine guards put

down several mutinies on ships between that time and 1802. As

a reward for this loyalty to the crown, the corps was designated

Royal Marines in 1802, and in 1804 the Royal Marine Artillery

was established. Luce includes one pertinent remark. "Happily

for us, our seamen have never been driven to mutiny." But he

always contended that marines should be retained on board ship

for the contribution they made to the ship's military at- mosphere.

The education of Royal Marine officers was thorough, and

Luce wished that something similar could be made available to

U.S. Marine officers. The U.S. Marine Corps Commandant had

attempted to get graduates of West Point without success. Luce's final sentences support improved education for Marine
176

officers and urge improved organization for the U.S. Marine

Corps.

29. The Young Seaman's Manual. Compiled from Various Authorities,

and Illustrated with Numerous Original and Select Designs. For

the Use of the U.S. Training Ships and the Marine Schools. New

York: Van Nostrand, 1875.

This manual was published anonymously by Luce as a textbook for the schools that he had helped to establish. The

material in the volume was taken directly from his Seamanship

text. Luce very carefully restricted the contents of this manual

to the basic material which would be useful in the education

and training of cadets. It includes chapters on the compass and

lead, knotting and splicing, the log, rope, blocks, tackles, the

mast and rudder, cutting and fitting rigging, masting, rigging

ship, sails, and boats. There is some evidence which indicates

that two issues of this manual may have been made in 1875.

30. "Modern Navies. No. I-Navy of the United States." Army and

Navy Journal, vol. XIV, No. 1, 12 August 1876, p. 7. This article is devoted to an outline history of the Continental Navy and the origins of the U.S. Navy between the years

1775 and 1781.

Four of this series of six articles analyze the U.S. Navy; the

fifth, the navies of Great Britain and France; and the last, the

other navies of Europe. (See items 31-35.) Those on the Navy of

the United States offer its political and administrative history,

stressing the superiority of American warship design before the

Civil War. In the third article he reminds his readers of the

Navy's peaceful achievements: the Naval Academy, Coast

Survey, Hydrographic Office, Torpedo School, the scientific

expeditions, suppression of the slave trade, and the opening of

Japan.

The proper duty of the U.S. Navy, he claimed, was not coast

or river defense, but that of the offensive on the high seas. Luce

ended his series on the U.S. Navy with a statement by Lewis

Cass:

1 "It is on our maritime frontier that we are most

exposed . . . Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought,

and we shall gain nothing by shutting our eyes to the nature of

the struggle, or to the exertions we shall find it necessary to

make."

Lewis Cass (1782-1866), brigadier general in the War of 1812,

Governor of Michigan Territory, 1813-31; Secretary of War, 1831-36;

Ambassador to France, 1836-42; U.S. Senator from Michigan, 1845-48,

1849-57; Secretary of State, 1857-60; Democratic candidate for Presi- dent, 1848.

31. "Modern Navies. II -Navy of the United States." Army and Navy

Journal, vol. XIV, No. 2, 19 August 1876, p. 26.

This installment continues the outline history of the U.S.

Navy from 1783 to 1812.
177

32. "Modern Navies. No. Ill-Navy of the United States." Army and

Navy Journal, vol. XIV, No. 5, 2 September 1876, p. 62.

This installment outlines the U.S. Navy's contributions to

naval science between 1842 and the Civil War.

33. "Modern Navies. No. IV-Navy of the United States." Army and

Navy Journal, vol. XIV, No. 6, 9 September 1876, p. 71.

In this installment Luce discusses privateering and the

relationship of the Navy to deep sea commerce.

34. "Modern Navies.-V." Army and Navy Journal, vol. XIV, No. 8, 23

September 1876, p. 110.

This installment is divided into two sections under the

headings "Great Britain" and "France."

In the section on the Navy of Great Britain, Luce refers to

the British Admiralty, to the training of boys for which there were 22 school and drill ships, and to the ironclad fleet. He

draws attention to the Royal Navy's steam reserve, consisting of

vessels in reduced commission, some prepared to go to sea within 48 hours, others kept in thorough repair with all required

armament and equipment on board.

In describing the Navy of France, Luce first gives a brief

description of the organization of that country's Navy Department and then compliments its ironclads, especially the squadrons of evolutions.

35. "Modern Navies -V. The Navies of Europe." Army and Navy

Journal, vol. XIV, No. 10, 7 October 1876, p. 135.

This article devotes a brief descriptive paragraph and comment each to the navies of Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece,

Italy, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Turkey, and the

navies of South America and Asia.

Luce, in command of Juniata in 1870, had been sent, during

the Franco-Prussian War, to observe the French blockade of

German North Sea ports. He took advantage of this to gain

considerable information on the new German Navy which was

first organized in 1849. The Germans, he claimed, were carrying

out a farsighted naval policy that would provide a balanced fleet

with 23 ironclads by 1882. Their naval ports then were at Kiel,

Danzig, and Williamshaven on the North Sea. The last had one

of the finest dockyards in the world. He notes that Japan then

had the former Confederate ship Stonewall and one other

ironclad. The Imperial Naval College at Yeddo [Tokyo] had

150 cadets, with a schoolship.

36. "Sovereignty of the Sea." Potter's American Monthly, vol. VII,

November 1876, pp. 345-63.

During the winter of 1876-1877, Luce published three

articles in Potter's American Monthly 1 (see items 37 and 43),

his first attempt to reach directly the general public on

professional subjects. Two of these pieces were signed, the third
178

appeared under a thinly veiled pseudonym. To make his

professional subjects appealing to the magazine's readers, he

included a great deal of history.

Luce defined the term, "Sovereignty of the Sea," the title of

the first, as "a certain predominance of maritime influence

possessed by one particular state over all others." In ancient

days it meant trade dominance as in the case of Phoenicia or

naval power in the case of Athens. In the Middle Ages the

concept of maritime strategy became one of domination of large

water areas, in some cases including whole seas or segments of

the ocean. Where such areas were virtually enclosed within a country's landform, this construction has survived in international law. Luce pointed to the case of the United States

asserting the right of domain over Long Island Sound. The Kings

of England, beginning in the 13th century, asserted a control over the English Channel and North Sea based on the then

Norman possession of both bordering coasts that they did not

relinquish until 1807. Luce then devotes about half the article

to a history of Britain's claim to sovereignty of the sea. It is known that Luce had read English history since his days as a midshipman in 1845, when one of his shipmates on board

U.S.S. Congress presented him with a history of the Royal

Navy. Since Luce was acquainted with many English journals,

he may have used an article by John Knox Laughton as the source for this piece. (J.K. Laughton, "The Sovereignty of the

Sea," Fortnightly Review, vol. V, August 1866, pp. 718-33.) No

connection with Laughton has been documented for this early

date; however, 3 years later, Luce obtained a copy of

Laughton's 1879 article from the Journal of the Royal United

Service Institution, "The Heraldry of the Sea-Ensigns, Colours,

and Flags." The item in the Luce Papers, Library of Congress, is inscribed, "Captain Luce with kind regards. J.K. Laughton, 21

March 1879."

While Laughton's work was devoted to England's claim to

the "narrow seas" of the English Channel, Luce was interested

in the analogy to the littoral problems of the United States.

American writers 2 on international law in Luce's time agreed

that the extent of our coasts and the shallowness of the waters

off them, together with the natural boundary of the Gulf

Stream, entitled the United States to freedom from belligerent

warfare out to that limit. He was concerned most about the

Florida Channel, then as now, a great highway of ocean commerce. Spain at the time held Cuba and also had seven

ironclads, whereas the United States did not have an effective

fighting ship.

Named the American Historical Record, edited by Benson J. Lossing,

until January 1875 when John E. Potter became its publisher and made it more general in character. See Mott, A History of American Magazines,

vol. II (1865-1885).
179

Theodore W. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International

Law (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, 1874), p. 85; Henry Wheaton,

Elements of International Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1866), pp. 214ff;

Henry W. Halleck, Elements of International Law and the Law of the Sea

(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1872), pp. 76-84.

37. "Reorganization of the Navy." Potter's American Monthly, vol.

VII, December 1876, pp. 422-25.

Luce's previous article in Potter's "Sovereignty of the Seas"

may have been a screen for this, a subject on which he wanted

to address himself directly to the American people. It would

have been improper for him to sign it without permission from

the Navy Department, but the pen name he used, "Luke B.

Stephens," was certainly sufficiently close that he could be

recognized as the author. However, there was no marked official or service opposition to his efforts at this time, and Luce

evidently enjoyed good relations with George M. Robeson,

Secretary of the Navy in Grant's administration.

Luce liked all things French, and he was particularly partial

to France's naval administration which he depicted clearly for

his civilian readers. He pointed out, however, that in France and

other continental countries the Navy Minister is selected from

the active list of admirals. This practice would not be acceptable

in Great Britain or in the United States where a supposedly

eminent statesman is placed in charge of the sea arm. In the

United States the Secretary, as a Cabinet member, is also an

adviser to the President on naval policy. But at that time, there

was no senior officer assigned to advise him on professional and

technical matters. Here, Luce contended, was the fatal defect in

the organization of the U.S. Navy Department.

He then discussed Lt. Matthew Fontaine Maury's part in

creating the bureau system of organization. Maury wrote a series

of articles in 1841-1842 entitled "Scraps from the Lucky Bag"

which appeared under his pseudonym "Harry Bluff" in the

Southern Literary Messenger of Richmond, Va. He proposed

that the bureau type organization be adopted for the Navy

Department to replace the Board of Commissioners. This was

enacted into law in 1842. However, his additional proposal for an under secretary who would be a post captain was ignored by

Congress.

Luce ends the article with a proposal that he was to reiterate

for the next 30 years. "The proper way of proceeding to

reorganize the Navy is to have a commission especially

organized to make an exhaustive study of the subject and to

report to Congress, in the form of a bill, exactly what is needed."

Luce was not the only author writing on this subject.

Richard W. Meade anonymously wrote a remarkable series of 18

articles on a proposed naval organization for the United States

which ran in the Army and Navy Journal from October 1875 to
180

May 1876. Its title was "Thoughts on Naval Administration -the

Nation that Controls the Sea Controls the World."

38. "Naval Government." Army and Navy Journal, vol. XIV, No. 21,

30 December 1876, p. 329.

Although no documentary evidence has been found in the

Luce or Church correspondence to attribute concretely this

item and the following item to Luce, the style is so characteristically Luce and the subject matter so parallel to his corre- spondence at this time that this assumption may be made. 1 The first paragraph outlines the American difficulties in

endeavoring to achieve ideal naval government. The best

possible would include a well-qualified naval administration and

the limitations of the American methods.

Comments by Chancellor Kent and Justice Story were

included which supported the concept of a naval adviser.

2

Luce to D.D. Porter, 17 November 1874, Porter Papers, LC; Luce to W.C. Church, 22 December 1875, Church Papers, LC; Luce to W.C.

Whitthorne, 8 February 1876; Luce to Jurien de la Graviere, 1 May 1876,

Luce Papers, LC.

o James Kent (1763-1847), jurist, legal writer, Chancellor of the New

York Court of Chancery, 1814-21, author of Commentaries. Joseph

Storey (1779-1845), Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, was

noted for his masterful opinions, many of which concerned admiralty

matters and the law of war at sea. He was an early supporter of a strong

navy.

39. "The Mixed Commission." Army and Navy Journal, vol. XIV, No.

22, 6 January 1877, p. 344-45. See item 38.

The content of this article is the same as a letter Luce wrote

to Washington C. Whitthorne, 1 Chairman of the House Naval

Affairs Committee. In his article and letters, the naval officer

mentions an editorial from the Army and Navy Journal vol.

XIII, No. 49, 15 July 1876, p. 787, which he may also have

authored. Luce had drafted a bill for Whitthorne establishing a mixed commission to investigate the organization of the Navy

and to propose the legislation needed to provide for a proper

reorganization of the Navy. Luce wanted the commission to

include two naval officers, an Army officer, and two distinguished civilians. The Army officer would enable the commission to define the military function of the Navy, while the

civilians could judge the moral effect of the Navy on the Nation.

In his letter to Whitthorne, which paralleled this article, Luce

suggested that Charles F. Adams and George Bancroft be the

"eminent civilians" appointed to the commission. 2 Luce had obtained many of his ideas for a joint commission

from his correspondence with French Vice Adm. Jurien de la

Graviere. Jurien described for him the appointment of the

French parliamentary inquiry appointed 31 October 1849.

However, Jurien himself placed little faith in the work of such

commissions. He personally preferred general inspections by
181

competent officers.

3 That commission achieved for the French

Navy what Luce wanted for the United States. In essence, this

came about through the Moody Board in 1909.

*Luce to W.C. Whitthorne, 8 January 1876, Luce Papers, LC.

2 Charles Francis Adams (1807-1886), diplomat, Minister to Great

Britain during the Civil War, son of President John Quincy Adams.

George Bancroft (1800-1891), historian, diplomat, Secretary of the

Navy, 1845-46, founder of the Naval Academy, Ambassador to Great

Britain, 1846-49, and to Germany, 1867-74.

3 Luce to Jurien de la Graviere, 1 May 1876; Jurien de la Graviere to Luce, 30 May 1876, Luce Papers, LC.

40. Seamanship: Compiled from Various Authorities, and Illustrated

with Numerous Original and Select Designs, for the Use of the

United States Naval Academy. 6th ed., rev. and enlarged. New

York: Van Nostrand, 1877.

This edition appears to be identical to item 25. The title page

still carries the author's name, "S.B. Luce, LieutenantCommander, United States Navy," in spite of the fact that he

had been promoted to captain. See items 11 and 25.

41. "Fleets of the World." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. Ill, No. 1, 1877,

pp. 5-24.

This second Luce article for the Naval Institute has the same

name as a book published recently by his friend Foxhall A.

Parker. In fact, the article was a commentary based on two

books by Parker, Fleet Tactics Under Steam, New York: Van

Nostrand, 1870, and Fleets of the World: The Galley Period,

New York: Van Nostrand, 1876. This paper was read before the

Naval Institute on 20 April 1876.

Luce was supposed to produce a book review, but the subject

carried him away and he ended up with a 20-page naval history

of the world, treating the subject in three maritime ages: Oar,

Sail, and Steam. Parker had limited his volume to galley warfare

by the Mediterranean powers and by the Norsemen, expecting

eventually to compile a trilogy on the subject. However, he died

suddenly in 1879, while Superintendent of the Naval Academy.

Luce begins his long "review" with definitions, the most

significant being the word "tactics." The Greeks not only

coined this word but became masters of the art of war at sea. The Romans adopted the Greek systems of maneuvers, applying

it to their wide experience in land warfare.

The first seafight entirely under sail, according to Luce, was

in 1217 at North Forelands in the English Channel; the last

decisive battle under oars was Lepanto, 1571. Tactics for the

age of sail, notably the line ahead, finally evolved after the

Battle of Texel, 1665. Luce calls attention to the first scientific

treatment of naval warfare under sail by Paul Hoste.

In this article Luce demonstrates the similarity between

ancient tactics and Parker's tactics for steam warships. By
182

footnoting the exact signal from the U.S. Naval Signal Book,

Luce brings together a detailed knowledge of ancient naval

warfare and current U.S. naval tactics. Parker's Fleet Tactics

Under Steam and Squadron Tactics Under Steam were the basis

for U.S. Naval Signal Book, Naval Tactics, 1874, an 85-page

supplement to the general U.S. Naval Signal Book.

Luce notes:

in establishing the fact of similarity between two tactical

systems widely separated by time . . . there is no intention

of holding up the tactics of the ancients as worthy of

imitation. Though we acknowledge the Greeks to be our

masters in the art of war, yet tactics change with the

change in weapons; what may have been admirable in

their day might prove, therefore, utterly impracticable

now. With strategy it is not so . . .. In summation, Luce remarks "... We are forced to the

conclusion that the true way to study naval tactics is to do so in

connection with the study of Military and Naval history and the

science of war as taught at the best military schools." Looking

back to the books under review, Luce sees them as "a brilliant

illustration of the change from the 'rough and tough old

Commodore' to the higher culture of the modern school." He

also remarked with some compunction: "In the ardor of

pursuing the theme we have been led somewhat beyond the

range of the volumes under consideration." He closes with a

tribute to Parker's scholarship and takes occasion to mention

the great but now almost forgotten sailor-poet of English

literature, William Falconer. 1 For another review of this book

by Luce, see item 44.

William Falconer (1732-1770), author of the epic poem The

Shipwreck, based on his own experience in a disastrous stranding on a Greek island in the Aegean Sea. He was one of three saved. He lost his life in another shipwreck while en route to India. The first edition of The

Shipwreck, London: n.p.. 1762, is superior to the revised 3d edition

(1769). See his Poetical Works with a biography by J. Mitford in the

Aldine Edition, London, 1836; Philadelphia, 1852. He is also author of

the Universal Marine Dictionary, London: n.p., 1769, Luce probably read

Falconer's Works, Boston: n.p., 1877.

42. "The Modern Pythia." The Galaxy, vol. XXIII, February 1877, pp.

209-16.

This unusual essay on extrasensory perception shows the

range of Luce's interests and reveals his tendency toward

dilettantism. 1 In Greek mythology, Pythia was the high priestess of the

oracle of Apollo at Delphi. Luce's "modern Pythia" was

planchette, later called Ouija, a small, heart-shaped board

supported by two casters and a pencil. This device, when

touched by two persons mentally concentrating on a question,

moved apparently by itself across a surface marked with letters

and symbols. In doing this, it traced messages revealing evidence
183

of extrasensory perception, telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition.

The article details Luce's own experience with planchette

while on board a Pacific Mail Steamer2 in November 1868 en

route from Panama to San Francisco to take command of the

gunboat Mohongo at Mare Island. He actually conducted

experiments with the assistance of a lady partner, evidently a

Civil War widow en route to a new life in California. The essay

lists over a page of test questions put to planchette, with all of

its replies. When he received answers that he already knew, he

first thought that he was being hoaxed, but he soon realized

that this vehicle was only revealing information implicit in the

inquiries that had been made.

Passengers crowded the room to ask questions and to hear

predictions. One can easily picture the personable and alert

Luce captivating these people. Answers to factual queries, such

as the recent presidential election or the position of ships at sea, were found to be glaringly wrong when checked with the actual

facts.

Luce decided that what needed to be investigated was not

the degree of faith to be placed in planchette, but why it should

be consulted at all. He immediately falls back on history and

comes to the conclusion that the explanation lies in man's

twofold nature: the outward side that we present to the world

and the inner depth about which we know little. Xenophon

indicated this twofold nature in his Cyropaedia 3 as had St. Paul. 4 Luce gives the several Greek words that distinguish

differences in our inner nature but for which there are no

English equivalents. The poet Byron alludes to the mystery

"with no less truth than beauty."5 Luce explained the

phenomenon of telepathy by analogy to the popular scientific

wonder, electricity. It was not difficult to understand how

psychic stimuli on nerve fibers were transmitted to the muscles

and, thus, to planchette and the letters and symbols on the

board. Practitioners were in no way aware of the operation,

except through its results.

The phenomenon was known to the ancients in the time of

Nebuchadnezzar (ca. 605 - ca. 562 B.C.) the King of Babylon.

The Chaldean priests, magicians, astrologers, and Magi, with

their understanding of visions and dreams, possessed all the

knowledge in this sphere which was transmitted to Egypt and

then to Greece. The intellectual Greeks, however, were not to

be imposed upon by a priesthood. Themistocles made a tool of

them, and the great orator Demosthenes denounced them.

Because of this, much of this ancient knowledge was lost.

Luce concludes that few observers of human nature would

doubt that "we are bound by an 'electric chain,'" and that there

are abnormally sensitive individuals, but professional mediums

fail to show the slightest use, despite the antiquity of their

profession. "It remains to be shown wherein the modern
184

medium is entitled to a particle more of respect than the

medium of Endor."6

In the Luce Papers, LC, there is an additional undated piece by Luce on dreams. He had it published about this time in an unidentified

Germantown, Pa., periodical.

2 See J.H. Kemble, The Panama Route 1848-1869, New York: De

Capo, 1972. Ships in which Luce might have taken passage were Golden

City, Golden Age, and Montana, it is interesting to note that W.H. Parker was a master of Pacific Mail Line ships between 1865 and 1874. See item

1. 3 Xenophon. Cyropaedia, Book VI, i, 41. Walter Miller, trans., Xenophon Cyropaedia (London and New York: The Loeh Classical

Library, 1914), vol. II, pp. 141-142.

4 Hebrews 4:12; 1 Corinthians 15:15-44.

George Gordon Lord Byron, Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, canto IV,

XXIII, 4 to IV, XXIV, 2. Samuel 28:7. In the King James versions, the medium is termed the

"Witch of Endor."

43. "Signals and Signaling." Potter's American Monthly, vol. VIII,

April 1877, pp. 297-302.

In this article Luce attempts to present a popular, entertaining history of naval signaling. This same material is better

presented in his article, "Naval Signals," in Johnson's Cyclopedia (see item 45). In this piece Luce reveals his wide range of

sources for his research in professional subjects. In addition to

classical writers such as Homer, Polybius, Plutarch, Caesar,

Thucydides, and the Bible, Luce has also consulted Sir Harris

Nicolas' history of the Royal Navy, George Preble on the

history of the flag, as well as the current International Code of

Signals and information on the Army's signal system. Luce was

particularly interested in the subject of signaling in this period.

In early 1877, while in command of U.S.S. Hartford, he noticed

that the United States Code list assigned signal letters to all vessels in the U.S. Navy and merchant marine, but the vessels of

the Revenue Marine were omitted. In a letter to the Chief of the

Bureau of Navigation on 22 January 1877, Luce formally

recommended that the next code list include these vessels and

that an order be issued to all naval ships requiring them to

exchange numbers with Revenue vessels, as was common

practice between naval ships. "The object of this," he wrote, "is

to bring the Commercial Code of Signals into more frequent use and familiarize officers and men with them of both services."

44. "Literature." The Galaxy, vol. XXIII, May 1877, pp. 717-18.

This unsigned book review of Foxhall Parker's Fleets of the

World appeared in a section of The Galaxy devoted to reviews

of current literature. It has been identified by a letter to W.C.

Church 1 in which Luce states:
185

By note from Mr. Van Nostrand I learn that you are

willing to accept a notice of "Fleets " for the

"Galaxy". I have never before written a book notice, &

am so much engaged now that I have no time to study up

on methods. I have done my best, however, in this

instance and hope it will suit, as I wish to do something in

that line out of my friendship for the author.

In the review itself, Luce summarizes the volume and concludes

that it is a valuable contribution to the profession. He felt that

the book amply demonstrated that "naval archaeology is not a mere idle amusement, suited to the elegant leisure of the

scholar." It had practical value in that it enabled an officer to

understand his profession more thoroughly.

l Luce to W.C. Church, 12 February 1877, Church Papers, LC.

45. "Marines, U.S. Corps of." Johnson's New Universal Cyclopedia: a

Scientific and Popular Treasury of Useful Knowledge. Editorsin-chief Frederick A.P. Barnard and Arnold Cuyot with Numerous Contributors from Writers of Distinguished Eminence in

Every Department and Science in the United States and in

Europe. New York: Johnson, 1878, vol. IV, p. 734.

Luce contributed five articles to the first edition of this

popular encyclopedia. (See items 46-49.) Foxhall A. Parker was

the naval editor for this edition. Luce succeeded him in this

position for later editions.

The first piece on the Marine Corps is a typical encyclopedia

article, condensed and more informative than the one he did for

Collum (see item 28).

46. "Naval Signals." Johnson's Cyclopedia, vol. IV, p. 734.

The article on naval signals treats this means of distance

communication in ancient time, during the Eastern Roman

Empire, and in British naval history. He discusses in considerable detail, day and night signals in the U.S. Navy and explains

the U.S. Army Myer system which was used extensively by the

Navy during the Civil War. The primary advantage of this system

is that it does not require a code book. The international code

of signals provided a universal language for the entire maritime

world. One system of flags had been adopted by all maritime

nations with a common signal book but each printed in the

user's language. This system is still employed.

47. "Naval Tactics." Johnson's Cyclopedia, vol. IV, pp. 734-35.

In the article on "Naval Tactics," Luce separates the periods

of naval history as he did in the review of Parker's work (item

41) into the Ages of Oars, Sails, and Steam and pointing out the

resemblance of the tactics of the third with that of the first.

48. "Navy." Johnson's Cyclopedia, vol. IV, p. 744.

The article "Navy," 2,000 words long, includes a definition
186

of the term, a philosophical discussion of warfare at sea, and the

unqualified requirement that a nation exposed to the sea or with large overseas trade must have a good navy. He uses the

Persian-Greek War and the Battle of Salamis to aptly illustrate

the function of a navy. He inserts his claim that powerful navies

are not dangerous to civil liberties (see item 53).

A short history of the U.S. Navy describes its organizations,

officer corps, ships, and navy yards. The President, he points

out, is authorized to keep as many ships in commission during

peace as he thinks proper, but Congress really determines the

size of the active Navy by the amount annually appropriated for

its maintenance.

49. "Rope-Making." Johnson's Cyclopedia, vol. IV, pp. 1718-19.

Luce's piece on "Rope-Making" was derived from personal

experience. The famous ropewalk at the Boston Navy Yard had

been under his jurisdiction from 1872 to 1875.

50. "Naval Training Schools." Brentano's Aquatic Monthly and Sporting Gazetteer, new series vol. I, No. 1, April 1879, pp. 34-36.

This piece is a long letter written to the editor of a yachting,

rowing, and swimming magazine which was published under

various names between 1872 and 1891. Luce informs his readers

of the activities of the apprentices of his Training Squadron. He

points out that in the sailing days, seamen were equally familiar

with merchant ships and men of war, and that it was only

necessary to train them to handle marine artillery and to use boarding pikes and cutlasses. But in 1879 guns were heavier and

seamen were often called upon to land ashore under arms,

therefore more extensive training was needed. At this time Luce

was frequently landing the apprentice battalion for exercise,

training, and parades. He then goes on to explain the training,

pay, cruises, and other details of preparing his naval apprentices

to become petty and warrant officers. The piece is signed and

dated U.S. Frigate Minnesota, Brooklyn, March 1879.

Articles on the Training Squadron and its apprentices

appeared in the Providence Commercial Journal, Newport

Mercury, Waterbury (Conn.) American, Norfolk Landmark,

New York Herald, Times, and Sunday Star, papers in Poughkeepsie and Newburgh, N.Y., and in Frank Leslie's Illustrated

Newspaper.

51. "United States Naval Training Ships." The United Service, vol. I, July 1879, pp. 423-43.

Ici on parle Anglais. -This notice, frequently seen in

the shop windows of Paris, was not very long ago

placarded in the starboard gangway of one of the ships of our Mediterranean squadron: "English spoken here." The

few American sailors who belonged to that ship had good

reason to give such notice a conspicuous place .... The

jest had at least the merit of a good point, and that point
187

was a severe commentary on the character of the crews we

have been for years employing to maintain the honor and

integrity of the American flag upon the ocean. So goes the first paragraph. The humorous reference was to

Luce's own command, the steam sloop of war Juniata. Shortly

after his return in her from the European station in 1872, he

made an official detailed report to the Secretary of the Navy on

the deplorable personnel situation, not only in his own ship, but

in those of the entire squadron. 1 About this time Capt. R.W. Shufeldt became head of the

Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting. He soon established

procedures to enlist and train American boys in order that the

Navy could acquire a body of native-born petty officers and

leading seamen. Moreover, changes in the methods of warfare were requiring a higher type of men-of-warsmen, able to

perform an extended range of enlisted duties, many of which

were mechanical.

In 1877 Luce was assigned command of the steam frigate

Minnesota, stationed at New York with the mission of recruiting

and training these boys. It is such training that Luce describes in

this article. He stresses that the discipline and routine of ship's

life is of far more consequence in training and character

development than formal instruction. The schoolship, to suc- ceed, must be a school of practice.

"On board a well-disciplined ship exercises are carried on and

everything is kept in beautiful order, while the crew has plenty

of spare time on their hands. It is this 'spare time' that, on

board the school ship, is devoted to study."

In 1964, this article was reprinted in pamphlet form by the

Naval Historical Foundation, Washington, D.C.

Luce to Navy Department, 12 November 1872, Luce Papers, LC. The

copy of this report in his papers was requested from the Navy

Department by Luce while preparing this article.

52. The Young Seaman's Manual, Compiled from Various Authorities,

and Illustrated with Numerous Original and Select Designs. For

the Use of the U.S. Training Ships and the Marine Schools. 2d

ed. New York: Van Nostrand, 1880. (This issue is identical to

item 29.)

53. "A Powerful Navy Not Dangerous to Civil Liberty." The United

Service, vol. II, No. 1, January 1880, pp. 109-13.

In this first of three articles on military ethics, Luce takes

issue with the view, expressed by Theodore D. Woolsey, then

President of Yale College, in his work, An Introduction to the

Study of International Law, par. 122, p. 210. The article in The

United Service was basically the same as a letter Luce had

addressed to Woolsey shortly after the book appeared. ! Luce took issue with the view that powerful navies are detrimental to national prosperity and dangerous to civil liberty.
188

He showed from both ancient and modern history that navies

are compatible with democratic institutions. He also established

that an American Navy of respectable size could be maintained

from one-sixth of the custom revenues provided by foreign

commerce. This article was reprinted in 1906. (See item 128.)

Luce to Woolsey, 13 April 1875, Luce Papers, LC.

54. "Administration, Naval." A Naval Encyclopedia: Comprising a Dictionary of Nautical Words and Phrases; Biographical Notices,

and Records of Naval Officers; Special Articles on Naval Art and

Science, Written Expressly for This Work by Officers and Others

of Recognized Authority in the Branches Treated by Them.

Together with Descriptions of the Principal Naval Stations and

Seaports of the World. Philadelphia: Hamersly, 1881, pp. 19-21.

[Hereafter referred to as Hamersly 's Encyclopedia.]

This excellent volume is still a useful literary tool for

maritime historians, writers, editors, yachtsmen, and naval

students. Contributors to L.R. Hamersly 's volume numbered 66,

most of them naval officers. Major contributors were Lt. F.S.

Bassett who wrote 26 articles; Medical Director Edward

Shippen, a talented naval historian, contributed 23 articles; Lt.

E.T. Strong, 13 articles; and Luce, who contributed 12. (See

items 54-65.)

55. "Admiralty." Hamersly 's Encyclopedia, p. 23.

This article discusses the office of Lord High Admiral of

England and the commissioners for executing that office.

56. "Anchoring." Hamersly 's Encyclopedia, pp. 35-36.

This article discusses anchoring by square-rigged vessels,

schooners, and steamships, along with anchoring by the stern

and with a spring.

57. "Commission." Hamersly 's Encyclopedia, p. 154.

Here, Luce draws a contrast between an officer's commission, a commission of inquiry, and the commission of a vessel.

58. "Corvette." Hamersly 's Encyclopedia, p. 174.

Luce discusses the use of this term in France and Britain.

59. "Emergencies at Sea." Hamersly 's Encyclopedia, pp. 244-45.

This article discusses shipboard procedures during a fire at

sea, collision, grounding, springing a leak, a squall, man

overboard, and loss of the rudder.

60. "Government, Naval." Hamersly 's Encyclopedia, pp. 316-17.

In this article Luce contrasts the British and American

systems of government. His last paragraph reads: "The proof of

the inefficiency of this [the U.S.] form of naval government is to be found in the fact that it utterly failed to stand the test of
189

war. The foregoing will serve to illustrate the principle of naval

administration."

61. "Mooring." Hamersly's Encyclopedia, pp. 502-03.

Here Luce discusses the procedures in mooring a ship, a

flying moor, mooring to a buoy, and unmooring.

62. "Naval Songs." Hamersly's Encyclopedia, pp. 515-16.

In this long article Luce outlines the history of songs in

men-of-war and points out the songs that came from American

seamen in the early history of the U.S. Navy. He later used this

entire piece as the preface for his anonymous collection of naval

songs. See item 69.

63. "Naval Tactics." Hamersly's Encyclopedia, pp. 518-20.

In this two-page article illustrated with a full-page diagram,

Luce discusses the problems involved in fleet tactics and ship

maneuvers, basic formations, and the order of battle.

64. "Naval Training Systems." Hamersly's Encyclopedia, pp. 520-22.

This article outlines the history of naval training in the

United States from the 1835 proposal made by John Goin

through 19 October 1880, when this article was apparently

written. He concludes,

The present system has been in operation about five years;

just about the lifetime of the experiments of 1837 and

1864. It is yet to be seen whether it will meet with the

fate of its predecessors, or justify the hope expressed by

Mr. Secretary [James K.] Paulding in 1839, that it will be

a great and lasting benefit to the navy.

65. "Organization." Hamersly's Encyclopedia, pp. 628-29.

This article is devoted to the problem of organizing a ship's

company and establishing a watch, quarter, and station bill.

66. "Our Naval Policy." The United Service, vol. VI, No. 5, May 1882,

pp. 501-21.

"A brief review of the history of our navy during the first

century of its existence will show that the United States have

never had what is commonly known as a naval policy." These

are the opening lines of Luce's most comprehensive article to

date on the subjects of naval administration and line officer

direction within the Navy Department.

The want of a naval policy, he held, was due to failure of

Congress to heed the executive branch. Congress, on the other

hand, never received a clear and coordinated presentation of the

Navy's needs. Luce recommends an independent commission as the means for establishing a wise policy. He notes that France in

1847 and Great Britain in 1861 and 1870 had marked success in

improving their maritime arms by this method.

Luce concludes this piece with this statement, "The organic
190

laws on which our naval establishment rests require revision, and

none more so than that on which our naval administration is based." In a copy in the Naval Historical Collection, Naval War

College, Luce has added in his own hand, "Congress did not do

so, thus adding one more illustration to the long list. L

" This piece, which was unsigned, has been identified as Luce's

from a signed copy at the Naval War College and by an

interesting exchange of letters between two of his friends, John

N. Maffitt and George H. Preble.

1

Maffitt to Preble, 2 May 1882, Preble Papers, Massachusetts

Historical Society, Boston. Preble to Maffitt, 7 May 1882, Maffitt Papers,

Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

67. "Christian Ethics as an Element of Military Education," The

United Service, vol. VIII, No. 1, January 1883, pp. 1-16.

"Religion and war are the two great central facts of

history . . . Religion gave birth to education. War led the way to

civilization."

With his usual historical approach, Luce explains how the

ritual of ancient pagan worship necessitated an educated

priesthood. Man's highest faculties were developed in doing

homage to the Supreme Being whose presence was everywhere

felt and whose wisdom and justice in ordering affairs were

everywhere acknowledged in the known civilized world.

Next in scale of influence was the military or warrior caste. War was the school wherein men of intellect could cultivate

their genius and gratify their ambition.

Cicero, Gibbon, and Carlyle, according to Luce, all agreed

that the Romans singularly blended the warlike and the

religious. He also discusses the amalgam of religion and war in

the German, Hebrew, Arabic, and Chaldean cultures. Life, in all, was represented as a battle between good and evil.

Under the Christian dispensation, the central idea of Love

was introduced. As a result, the word Duty assumed a wider and

deeper significance, and Honor became one of the cardinal

virtues of military ethics.

The remainder of the article is critical of the teaching of

Christian ethics within the educational system of the United

States, especially at the two national Academies. The naval

officer held that while the Articles of War declared commanding

officers should show in themselves good examples of virtue,

honor, patriotism, and subordination, "We can find in the list of

subjects taught at these academies no study which inculcates the

practice of virtue, none in which a correct standard of honor is given ; no instruction as to the nature and duties of patriotism,

in the obligations of duty or the necessity of subordination."

The piece was unsigned when first published, but he added

his name to the revised reprinting 24 years later. (See item 1 29.

In the revision he added several significant footnotes. One of

these, concerning a recent hazing scandal, reflected on the Naval
191

Academy. It brought heated reaction from some faculty

members and cadets.

68. "War Schools." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. IX, No. 5, 1883, pp.

633-57.

Luce here addressed the recently formed Newport Chapter of

the U.S. Naval Institute on the subject of higher education for

naval officers. He describes the several U.S. Army institutions

devoted to that purpose, the Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort

Leavenworth, Kans.; the Engineer Post and Depot of Willets

Point, N.Y.; and, in particular, the U.S. Artillery School at

Fortress Monroe, Hampton Roads. This school had become a model institution of higher learning in the military under the

direction of the foremost artillery officer of the U.S. Army,

William F. Barry, and later, under Luce's friend Emory Upton.

Luce devotes over half the article to the details of its curriculum. He also remarks on the Infantry and Cavalry School

at Fort Leavenworth and the school for the Engineer Corps at

Willets Point, N.Y.

This article gives evidence of being hurriedly put together. He

does, however, get his chief point across near its end when he

claims that the naval officer also should possess a knowledge of

the science and practice of war. He should be led into a philosophic study of naval

history, that he may be enabled to examine the great

naval battles of the world with the cold eye of professional criticism, and to recognize where the principles of

the science have been illustrated, or where a disregard for

the accepted rules of the art of war has led to defeat and

disaster.

69. Naval Songs: A Collection of Original, Selected and Traditional Sea

Songs. New York: Pond, 1883.

This collection of 200 songs was published anonymously.

The first portion of the preface was published earlier as part of

Hamersly's Encyclopedia. See item 62. Luce states in the

preface,

The sea victories achieved by the heroes of modern times

have not lacked poets to celebrate them in verse, and the

sailor, with all that pertains to his perilous life and to his

home on the trackless deep, has been sung by minstrels of

all degrees .... This collection has been undertaken to revive the old

songs which commemorate our early naval victories, and to

cultivate in our young sailors not only a love for the sea, but also that devotion to their flag which distinguished

those who laid the foundation of our naval reknown.

Luce strongly believed that these songs were particularly

valuable in training apprentices.
192

70. U.S. Congress. Senate. Report of the Commission on Navy-Yards, 1 December 1883. Executive Doc. No. 55, 48th Congress, 1st sess. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1884.

Under the authority of the act of Congress of 5 August 1882,

a commission was appointed to investigate the condition of the

navy yards. Commodore Luce was appointed President of the

Commission with members Charles H. Loring and A.B. Mullett.

In an interim report of 11 October 1883, the commission stated

among its recommendations:

To a proper understanding of the subject, it should be

stated, that the present wasteful extravagance in employing so great an excess of non-producers, and the inefficient system of doing business which has for years past

been steadily increasing in our navy-yards, is but the

natural outgrowth of the constitution of the Navy

Department itself. There can be no manner of doubt of

this. . . .For what ever changes may be introduced now,

and how beneficial soever they may be, still the same

causes remaining in active operation must inevitably

produce the same results. . . . Hence we conclude that to

organize our navy yards on a just and permanent basis, to

consolidate their several plants, to introduce thrift in the

management and promptness in the methods of doing

work, with a proper system of accountability ; to secure in

short, in each of our yards unification, method economy,

and dispatch, with an administration of its affairs agreeable to the principles of business as understood in civil

life, it is absolutely necessary to begin within the Navy

Department itself, (p. 44)

This report was the basis for Luce's later article, "On Navy

Yards and Their Defense," item 102.

71. Text-Book of Seamanship. The Equipping and Handling of Vessels

Under Sail or Steam For the Use of the United States Naval

Academy. Revised and enlarged by Lt. Aaron Ward, ! U.S. Navy,

with illustrations by Lt. S. Seabury, 2 U.S. Navy. New York:

VanNostrand, 1884.

Because Luce was deeply involved in the Navy Yard

Commission, the establishment of the Naval War College, and

the acquisition of Coasters Harbor Island in Narragansett Bay

for the Navy, he left the new edition of Seamanship largely up

to Aaron Ward. In late October 1882, Luce sent out a circular

letter to a number of officers in the Navy announcing his

intention to issue a new edition of his textbook and soliciting

information. He wrote that "the book as it now stands needs to

be made fuller in all that relates to the handling of steamers and

fore and aft sailing vessels. Information concerning various

emergencies, accidents, etc. would be particularly valuable."

Ward's revision of the book was the first substantial revision

since the edition of 1866. (For earlier editions see items 11, 25,
193

and 40.) Luce's preface is dated, "Training Squadron, Newport,

R.I., Feb. 1883."

^ear Adm. Aaron Ward (1851-1918) was graduated from the Naval

Academy in 1871. He commanded Wasp in Cuban waters during the

Spanish American War. Commended for gallantry at the Battle of

Santiago, he was promoted to lieutenant commander. Ward commanded

the Third Division, Atlantic Fleet, in 1911-12, and was Supervisor of

New York Harbor until his retirement in 1913.

2 Lt. Samuel Seabury joined the Navy as an apprentice in 1865. He

was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1871. He served with Luce on

the staff of Commander, Training Squadron, in 1883-84, and in 1887-88

in the flagship of the Commander in Chief, North Atlantic Squadron. He

was retired for medical reasons, in 1 896, as a lieutenant.

72. Johnson's New Universal Aecyclopedia. Davenport, Iowa: Brown,

1884.

This is a new edition of item 45. Luce was naval editor for

this edition.

73. "United States Naval War College," The United Service, vol. XII,

No. 1, January 1885, pp. 79-90.

Luce here outlines the aims of the new War College and

describes the courses of study that will be undertaken. A sizable

part of this article is devoted to reviewing and quoting from the

report of the board from which resulted the founding of the

institution by a general order of Secretary of the Navy William

E. Chandler, dated 4 October 1884.

Early in the essay, he listed Jomini's six branches of the

Science of War: -Statesmanship, Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering, and Minor or Elementary Tactics. He gives the

naval application of each. "The naval student reading military

history" he claims, "can hardly fail to be struck by the

similarity between hostile operations on shore and those

afloat."

The plan of the first War College President was to have the

naval students study military science with a parallel course in

naval history so that they might formulate principles for the

guidance of a sea-army preparatory to and during war. This was

the comparative method of research. In closing, he quotes at

length the board's report on what he believed naval students

should study

Campaigns that have depended for success upon the

co-operation of a fleet; campaigns that have been frustrated through the interposition of a fleet; the transfer, by

water, of a numerous Army to distant points and their

landing on an enemy's coasts under the guns of a fleet; the

various results of engagements between ships and shore

batteries; naval expeditions that have ended in disasters

that could have been foretold by an intelligent study of

the problem beforehand; and the great naval battles of

history, even from the earliest times, which illustrate and
194

enforce many of the most important and immutable

principles of war should be carefully examined and

rendered familiar to the naval student.

74. U.S. Congress. Senate. Report Upon the Comparative Merits of

Anthracite and Bituminous Coal for Naval Use. Executive Doc.

No. 26, 48th Congress. 2d sess. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.

Off., 1885.

Luce served as President of this Board with members Capt.

D.B. Harmony, Chief Engineer Charles H. Baker, Chief Engineer

Fred G. McKean, and Lt. Comdr. C.F. Goodrich. On 5 July

1884 Luce submitted a brief preliminary report of the Board,

concluding that anthracite coal was better suited to naval use than bituminous coal. He went on to state that the Board felt

that semibituminous coal was preferable to either of these types

of coal, especially if a smokeless variety was available. Luce was

detached from this duty shortly after the preliminary report was

submitted and before the final report could be written. The job

of completing the report fell to Captain Harmony as the next

senior member, consequently the final report shows little of

Luce's influence. The chart showing the location of coal

deposits and repairing facilities may well have been something

that Luce would have elaborated on had he written the final

report.

75. U.S. Congress. Senate. Letter from the Secretary of the Navy

Reporting in Answer to Senate Resolution of the 4th Instant,

the Steps Taken by Him to Establish an Advanced Course of

Instruction of Naval Officers at Coaster's Harbor Island, Rhode

Island. Executive Doc. No. 68, 48th Congress, 2d sess. Washington : U.S^Govt. Print. Oft\, 1885^

This document includes the "Report of Board on a PostGraduate Course," dated 13 June 1883. The report was

submitted by the Board headed by Luce and with members:

Comdr. W.T. Sampson and Lt. Comdr. C.F. Goodrich. Written

in Luce's flagship for the Training Squadron, U.S.S. New

Hampshire, the report is divided into three sections: (1) reasons

for establishing such a school, (2) outline for the proposed

course and practical exercises, and (3) location. Very obviously

written by Luce himself, the report states in the first section:

In the earnest prosecution of what is but a means to an

end, the officer is too apt to lose sight of the ultimate

object of all. Thus, electricity in its application to

torpedoes, chemistry in application to explosives, metallurgy in relation to ordnance, and steam as a motive

power, are only means to the end of which a navy may be

said to exist -success in war. The establishment of the

proposed school, by opening to officers the higher

branches, will serve to correct any misapprehension on

this point and to dissipate the haze, which, to a greater or
195

less extent, obscures the perception in regard to the true

aim of naval education and the duties of naval officers.

76. U.S. Navy Dept. Bureau of Navigation. Office of Naval Intelligence.

"Landing of the Naval Brigade of North Atlantic for Instruction

on Gardiner's Island, August 1884." Papers on Naval Operations

During the Year Ending July, 1885. Information from Abroad,

General Information Series, No. IV. Washington: U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1885, pp. 103-10.

According to reports provided by S.B. Luce as Commander,

North Atlantic Station, this exercise took place 11-13 August

1884 during the period of his first and temporary command of

the North Atlantic Station, July to October 1884. Landing

forces totaling 660 officers and men from Tennessee (flagship),

Vandalia, Swatara, Yantic, and Alliance took part. The brigade

landed comprised two battalions of infantry, one of them

marines, the other seamen; an artillery battalion of six pieces;

plus pioneers, commissary, medical, and signal personnel. No

exercises other than normal drills were undertaken. Capt. J.N.

Miller, commanding Tennessee, commanded the brigade ashore

and was charged with all arrangements.

The operation was a surprise movement. The order was

issued while the squadron was en route to Newport. Two days were allowed for preparation. The report stated that such an

exercise had never before been previously attempted in secrecy

in the U.S. Navy, on such a large scale.

77. Inauguration of the Perry Statue, September 10, A.D. 1885, with

the Addresses of William P. Sheffield, and the Remarks in

Receiving the Statue by Governor Wetmore and Mayor Franklin, with the Speeches at the Dinner of the Governor, Mayor,

Hon. George Bancroft, Justices Blatchford and Durfee, Admirals

Rodgers, Almy and Luce, the Letter of Col. William H. Potter,

&c. with an Appendix. Newport, R.I.: Sanborn, 1885, pp.

42-45.

This volume is devoted to the dedication of the statue of

Oliver Hazard Perry in Washington Square, Newport, R.I. Newport was the home of both Oliver Hazard and Matthew

Calbraith Perry. The statue stands today in its original location

in the center of town, nearly in front of O.H. Perry's former

home.

Luce was one of several speakers, and he restricted his

remarks to the new Naval War College which was soon to have

its first session. He praised the school of the quarterdeck which

developed Lawrence and Perry, but the college, he said, had

been called into existence by the necessity of keeping pace with

the advancement of science and of keeping fresh the lessons of

history. Luce then extols the sailors to whom Perry owed his

victory and quotes two ballads about the Battle of Lake Erie.

He does not forget to mention the Naval Apprentice Battalion

which paraded on the occasion.
196

78. Text-Book of Seamanship. The Equipping and Handling of Vessels

Under Sail or Steam. For the Use of the United States Naval

Academy, New York: Van Nostrand, n.d. [1885?]. Revised and

enlarged by Lt. Aaron Ward, U.S. Navy. With Illustrations

drawn by Lt. S. Seabury, U.S. Navy.

This is a reissue of item 71. When a copy was received by the

Navy Department Library, Washington, D.C., in 1898, it was

cataloged as the 1885 edition. There are a number of differences

in typography, as well as the publisher's name, in this issue.

79. "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XII, No. 2, 1886, pp. 527-46.

Reprinted here with annotation in chapter III.

80. "Merchant Marine and Navy: Admiral Luce Mourns the Disappearance of the American Sailor." New York Herald, 9

January 1887, p. 15.

This is a newspaper interview with Luce while he was serving

as Commander in Chief of the North Atlantic Squadron. The

interview clearly demonstrates Luce's flair for public relations.

The interviewer notes that in his sailor talk, the accent is strong

and the emphasis pronounced. The admiral told his interviewer

that the Herald had pumped the subject of naval improvement

and of coast defense, "as dry as a purser's biscuit." Then he goes

on to inundate the reporter with the differences between the

modern sailor and the tar of yesteryear, the relations as they

should be between the merchant marine and the Navy but are

not, on the importance of schoolships, and of sentiment and

traditions in a military and naval service, and, above all, the

difficulty in getting Americans to go to sea. This means the sad

fact that the U.S. Navy must still depend on foreign seamen,

despite years of effort with the naval training systems. "It is with sorrow that I say this, but the truth remains."

81. "On the Study of Naval History (Grand Tactics)." U.S.N.I.

Proceedings, vol. XIII, No. 2, 1887, pp. 175-201.

Reprinted here with annotation in chapter IV.

82. "Annual Address, 1888." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XIV, no. I, 1888, pp. 1-8.

Luce was still on the active list, Commander North Atlantic

Station, when elected president of the U.S. Naval Institute in

1888, an office he held for 11 years. He opens his address with

congratulations on the organization's success but immediately

counsels: "Let us look ahead."

He is not long in introducing his recurring subject: the

absence of proper naval administration by which a navy should

be held together and its policy shaped. Bad as this is in time of

peace, it would be intolerable in war. "We present to the world

the extraordinary spectacle of having an organization confessedly unfit for war."
197

"Now the corner stone of the Institute," Luce reminded his

listeners,

is the "advancement of professional knowledge in the

Navy," but of what use is the use of that knowledge if it cannot be applied? It is the application of knowledge that

makes it valuable. . . . The question for the Institute to

ask itself, then, is: Can we continue forever to disseminate

useful knowledge without a hope of substantial benefits

therefrom?

The Institute, he claimed, should be able to point to reforms

and progressive steps which will keep the profession abreast, if not in advance, of the nautical world, but he warned that essays

on reforms must be followed by action to effect them.

This article is similar in theme to his article in the Army and

Navy Journal, 16 April 1864. See item 10.

83. U.S. Navy Dept. Bureau of Navigation, Office of Naval Intelligence.

"Combined U.S. Naval and Military Manoeuvres, November,

1887." Naval Reserves, Training, and Materiel June 1888.

General Information Series, No. VII. Washington: U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1888, pp. 167-78.

The second major exercise of the North Atlantic Squadron

under Luce's command received detailed reporting by the Office

of Naval Intelligence. This information was based on Luce's

official report and orders. The training exercise which took

place 10 November 1887 consisted of (1) the passage of the

warships through a minefield protected by the guns of Fort

Adams, and (2) a landing on Coddington Point with a simulated

advance, repulse, and reembarkation, covered by the guns of the

fleet. Ships participating were Richmond (flagship), Atlanta,

Ossippee, Galena, and Dolphin. The attacking party against

Coddington Point consisted of 10 companies of seamen and a

battery of artillery totaling 396 men. The defense comprised

one army battalion, one seamen battalion, one marine battalion, a battalion of artillery, and a company of naval apprentices,

totaling 396 men.

The attacking force comprised the five ships above plus four

steam launches acting as torpedo boats. The harbor defense

consisted of the Fort Adams battery, a line of submarine mines,

and two steam launch torpedo boats.

Luce had made arrangements for ample newspaper coverage.

Reporters embarked sent in long articles which appeared in The

New York Times and Herald and the Army and Navy Journal.

Editorial reaction was favorable. Numerous photographs were

taken by E.H. Hart, the New York photographer who produced

a beautiful pictorial volume, the first of several he was to do on

the growing U.S. Navy of this period. E.H. Hart's Squadron

Evolutions, As Illustrated by the Combined Military and Naval

Operations at Newport, R.L, November, 1887, North Atlantic

Squadron, Rear Admiral S.B. Luce. New York: Hart, n.d., is sometimes attributed to Luce since his name appeared on the
198

title page. He undoubtedly approved its publication, but no

documentary evidence has been found to indicate that he took

an active part in compiling it. The only written portion in this

volume of portraits and action photographs is an introductory

chapter entitled, "Applied Tactics, as Illustrated by the Combined Military and Naval Operations at Newport, R.I., November, 1887." This chapter is a revision of an anonymous article,

"The Sham Battle at Newport," Army and Navy Journal, vol.

XXV, No. 17, 19 November 1887, p. 329.

A month previous, on 11 October, a torpedo exercise had

been conducted in which a flotilla of steam launches from other

vessels made a night attack on Atlanta while at anchor.

However, Atlanta's searchlights proved so efficient that the

boats of the attacking torpedo flotilla were all out of action

within 1 5 minutes.

The report of the board of umpires for the 10 November

exercises included the statement: "It is hoped that these

maneuvers are only the beginning of what may, on a more

comprehensive scale, give our service an equivalent of autumn

maneuvers in Europe."

Such plans never came to pass. Luce prepared for more

extensive joint exercises on Fisher's Island in Long Island Sound

off New London in the fall of 1888. In this he had the hearty

approval of Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, commanding the

Army's Department of the Atlantic. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan

also gave his approval, and Secretary of the Navy Whitney

appeared favorably inclined. Lt. Tasker H. Bliss, USA, and

Comdr. Colby M. Chester made extensive preliminary plans. The

plans failed, however, when Capt. W.S. Schley, Chief of the

Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, expressed the Navy's

intention to charge the Army for transportation of the troops to

be embarked at New England ports in the Navy's ships. This was

an example of Luce's complaint that the power of the Bureau

chiefs equaled that of the Secretary.

A successful landing operation of several days' duration,

however, was held at Pensacola in April 1888, following the

winter cruising in the Caribbean.

The innovation of such fleet exercises is a major contribution

by Luce. They were part of his concept of a squadron of

evolution which would be an adjunct to the Naval War College,

testing the theory and practice of sea warfare being worked out

there. These exercises were as close to this as he would get, a

creditable accomplishment considering the ships with which he

had to work.

Luce seemed fond of landing operations, perhaps because

they involved so many men, were different from the drills on

board ships, required good administration, and kept the crews

involved and interested. Most importantly, joint exercises were more realistic training for actual combat. This kind of exercise

paralleled the stress which Luce placed in promoting the
199

comparative study of military and naval subjects at the Naval

War College.

84. "Naval Administration." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XIV, No. 3,

1888, pp. 561-88.

Government, in the abstract, is the operation of law,

and law has been defined as a rule of action.

Naval Government may be said to be the system of

rules by virtue of which the affairs of the navy are regulated.

Administration, signifying Management, means, in a

political sense, to manage and direct the affairs of

Government, and belongs to the Executive as distinguished from the Legislative Branch.

Thus, by defining the terms he is to use, Stephen B. Luce

introduced his three published lectures on Naval Administration

(see items 117 and 122) which formed the core of his efforts to

reform the Navy Department. These efforts spanned a period of

about 50 years. As indicated above, 15 years separated the

composition of the first from the other two, yet all are closely

knit. The second and third, published in 1902 and 1903, in

some features repeat the first, but they mostly provide

documentations for the principles of military management set down in the piece of 1888.

In 1 885 Secretary of the Navy Whitney presented a report to

the President, extracts from which Luce quoted in these papers.

Whitney had pointed out that the separate executive responsibilities of the Bureau chiefs made it impossible for them to

provide him with intelligent guidance on the "art of war." S.P.

Huntington in his study on national security and civil-military

relations, The Soldier and the State, wrote:

His [Whitney's] statement touched off a debate on naval

organization which continued for thirty years until the

establishment of the Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations in 1915. This debate took the form of an

outpouring of articles, reports, discussions and proposals

which may well be unique in the history of American

public administration. The focus of the controversy was

the role of the professional military chief in relation to

the bureau heads and Secretary.

1 Stephen B. Luce led off the debate with his "Naval

Administration" and kept it going with two sequels and at least a half dozen more of the same sort. Luce held that knowledge of the naval organization in

England was necessary for intelligent understanding of the

weaknesses of that in the United States. So the first part of his

study explains the Office of the Lord High Admiral, which dates

back to the 13th century, and the Board of Admiralty and the

Navy Board, both established by King Henry VIII. He then

discusses at length how well or poorly these offices had

functioned in directing the military and civil affairs of the Royal
200

Navy. He praises the creditable organization of the French

Navy.

Then comes his severe commentary on the U.S. Navy

Department, starting with the inadequate naval government

which from 1798 to 1815 poorly provided for the needs of the

early American Navy. He follows with his favorite theme to

which he would often return, the potential for good naval

government inherent in the Board of Naval Commissioners.

These senior officers, after the experiences of the War of 1812, were placed in the office of the Secretary in order that he might

have military advice. But the wording of the Act of 1815

assigned them civil duties also and they became overburdened

by the latter. Their military and civil functions were mixed

instead of being kept apart.

The Board itself in 1839 advised a reorganization of the

Department. "The obvious remedy," wrote Luce, "was to

unburden the Commissioners of all but their military duties and

place the civil functions in the hands of another set of persons."

Instead, the Board was abolished and replaced by five bureaus,

later increased to eight. The civil branch was thus provided for,

but the Secretary was deprived of professional assistance and

the Navy Department was without a truly military branch.

The rear admiral then condemns the bureau system in

which each bureau chief managed his own share of the Navy

independently of others. "While each individual bureau of the

Navy Department is progressive in its character, the tendency of

the Navy as a body has been retrogressive."

He pointed out that during the Civil War, Gustavus V. Fox, a former naval officer, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, filled

the gap between the Secretary and the bureaus, "the need of

which had been felt for twenty years previous to the war and

has wrought much evil during the twenty years following."

Luce concludes with a set of 15 rules that should obtain in

the organization of a properly functioning naval government.

A discussion of this article by Rear Adm. E. Simpson and Lt. Richard Wainwright appeared in U.S.N. I. Proceedings, vol. XIV,

No. 4, 1888, pp. 725-737.

Samuel P. Huntinqton, The Soldier and the State. (New York:

Belknap Press, 1957), p. 248.
201

CHAPTER X

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LUCE'S WRITINGS

THE RETIREMENT YEARS: 1889-1911

Editors' Introduction

A striking change can readily be detected in the writings of

Stephen B. Luce after his retirement, an ease and maturity not

found in the earlier material. They bore the mark of an accepted

writer as they appeared in some of the foremost journals of the

period: The North American Review, The Critic, and The Youth's

Companion.

The pressure to find proper vehicles for both service and public

expression was gone as was the need to gain legitimacy by writing

for encyclopedias. More important, his literary efforts became

increasingly less connected to the role of legislative lobbying. His

special talent for the written word was no longer restricted by

need within the service, and a wide variety of subjects could now

be chosen on their own merit. Of course, he maintained his deep

involvement in the affairs of the Navy and continued to apply

pressure in those areas he felt necessary.

The series in Youth's Companion must have been a particular

joy for him as were his book reviews. With these he was able to

comment on the fine work being done by others and to share with

the future sailors of the Nation the wealth of experience found in

his career. For the first time, during the decade after 1889, he was

able to vacation as he wished, make extended visits to Europe, and

turn his attention to these subjects that he had hitherto been

forced to put off.

After the Spanish-American War, however, he was recalled to

active duty, first on the Board of Awards, then to the faculty of

the Naval War College, and again his writing became linked to

politics but toward one goal only -line officer direction of the

Navy Department. The future infighting would be tough, but the

lifetime goal would be achieved in 1909.

Two years of intense writing remained, eight long articles

published in 2 years, a summation of a half century.

85. "Just the Boy That's Wanted for the Navy." The Youth's

Companion, vol. LXII, No. 22, 30 May 1889, p. 285.

The first piece that Luce wrote following his retirement from

active service in February 1889 was one of a series published in

this popular periodical during the first half of 1889 under the
iii'ii 'ji^i.juitmji iii i i wi uii jaij i i i jMjitiliii

vfcitiiit

**

Naval War College Class of 1896

Luce, in civilian clothes is seated on the far right. Standing to his left is Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright, Chief Intelligence Officer of

the Navy, the future hero of Santiago and the first Aide for Operations.

Seated on the steps, two men to the right of Luce, is the inventor and future

Aide for Operations, Lieutenant Bradley A. Fiske. Directly above Fiske is the President of the War College, Captain Henry C. Taylor. Standing two

rows directly above Taylor is Ensign William A. Moffett.

Photo: Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College
203

general title "Just the Boy That's Wanted ..." All the articles were by distinguished men in their fields:-" ... In the Law" by

Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes; "... In the Army" by Gen.

Nelson A. Miles; "... In Journalism" by E.L. Godkin, eminent

editor of The Nation and the New York Evening Post.

Luce outlines the many requirements officers must fulfill in

the new Navy. He stresses that, above all, a naval officer must

have love for his profession, to keep him in its frontline, for he

cannot advance his temporal fortune or hasten his way along the

slow road of promotion. "If the aspirant for naval glory believes

in himself, and is of a robust constitution, if he has a decided

taste for the sea, and carries his heart in the right place, I should

say he is 'just the boy that is wanted in the Navy."'

86. "Our Future Navy." The North American Review, vol. CXLIX, No.

392, July 1889, pp. 53-65.

The year 1889 saw Luce's retirement in February; the

passing from the naval scene a few days later of his nemesis,

Secretary of the Navy W.C. Whitney ; his renewed hope of saving

the War College with the new Secretary, Benjamin F. Tracy,

assuming office; and his finally achieving a publishing vehicle

with which to reach directly an opinion-forming segment of the

American people. This was The North American Review to

which he contributed often during the next two decades.

Thirteen years before, when Henry Adams was its editor and

Henry Cabot Lodge his assistant, Luce had tried unsuccessfully

to get a piece on naval administration published in it. Shortly

after, in 1878, North American Review acquired a new life under the editorship of Allen Thorndyke Rice, Lloyd Bryce,

and William H. Rideing, also managing editor of The Youth's

Companion. By 1889 Luce had become a colorful and prominent public figure, whose offerings to these periodicals and to

The Critic, a weekly review of books, were welcomed.

"Our Future Navy" was reprinted in the winter issue of the

U.S.N.I. Proceedings. (See item 87.) Its theme was the pressing

need for battleships in the new Navy which the United States

had begun creating in 1881. Up to that time only cruisers had

been built. However, Luce wrote, a navy of cruisers without the

support of battleships would prove as ineffective in war as an army of cavalry without infantry.

He gave a history of efforts to acquire battleships for the

U.S. Navy, only four of which were ever placed in commission.

He pointed out that Great Britain's program for 1889-1894

called for building 10 battleships, as well as 60 other types.

A navy without battleships, he states, is no navy at all in the

real sense. "A solitary American steel cruiser, with the delusive

prefix, 'protected,' represents the latent possibility of a great

country placidly awaiting some national disaster to generate its mighty force."

The naval race between Great Britain and France and the

growing power of a united Germany plus the strong economy
204

but military weakness of the United States worried a small

number of thoughtful naval officers like Luce, members of

Congress like Representative Washington C. Whitthorne and

Henry Cabot Lodge and some businessmen and industrialists, all with national rather than local viewpoints. Luce had been

convinced by Mahan's deductions that a battle fleet was the

foundation of seapower and the sine qua non of a maritime

nation. The pragmatic Luce immediately related this to the

United States, weak and exposed.

His letters of this period indicate his conviction that the way

to correct this situation was to get Mahan's manuscript into

print. On 5 August 1889, Luce wrote his good friend, wealthy

John S. Barnes, endeavoring to enlist his help. He described

Mahan's work in detail and related his own extensive efforts to

find a publisher. As late as 21 September, Mahan did not have

one and was about ready to give up. But on 16 October he

wrote Luce that Little, Brown & Co. had "undertaken to

publish the work."

Luce's prime concern at this time, however, was saving the

War College. He had advanced his retirement a month to that

purpose and on 14 March 1889, 10 days after the inauguration

of President Harrison, he addressed a letter direct to Secretary

Tracy in which he reviewed the entire subject of location and

future existence of the Naval War College. This effort was

successful.

Luce had always aimed his professional attention to personnel, not materiel -to officer education, enlisted training, and

naval administration. He subsequently wrote extensively in

these fields. The subject of the battle fleet, however, he hardly

mentioned in his writings until the piece on naval bases of April

1911 (item 146) and then only to state "we had one." His essay

"The Fleet," Chapter VII (item 138), is essentially a summation

of his three articles on naval administration.

B.F. Cooling, in his Benjamin Franklin Tracy, Father of the

Modern American Fighting Navy (Hamden, Conn.: Archon,

1973), states that the impact of "Our Future Navy" on the new

Secretary was marked. Tracy without doubt was impressed by

the unusual officer whose long letter of 14 March he had

recently received. The Luce documents, however, indicate that

the effort in The North American Review was a one-shot affair

for Mahan. If it influenced Tracy, that was an added gain. This

fine essay, on the other hand, may have had the reciprocal

effect of inducing the new Secretary to accept Luce's recom- mendations on the Naval War College.

87. "Our Future Navy." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XV, No. 4, 1889,

pp. 541-52.

This is a reprint of item 86. Pages 553-59, immediately

following this article, contain a discussion of Luce's paper.

Among the comments, Capt. A.T. Mahan notes,

If I am right in my opinion, which I understand to be that
205

of Admiral Luce as well, that a war against an enemy's

commerce is an utterly insufficient instrument, regarded

as the main operation of war, though doubtless valuable as a secondary operation, the United States and its people

are committed to an erroneous and disastrous policy. No

harm has been done in building the new cruisers, for new

ships of that kind are wanted; but great harm has been

done by the loss of so many years in which have not been

built any battleships, which are undoubtedly the real

strength of the navy.

To this Lt. Richard Wainwright added,

The great value of this article is that he [Luce] so clearly

and interestingly exemplifies the point as to impress it upon the general public. All naval officers must be

convinced that the real reason for their existence as such

is to fight in case of need, and that while useful and

ornamental in time of peace, they will be of little ornament and no use in time of war without battle-ships.

The public have heard so much of the fine navy that has

been building for some years past that they imagine the

United States Navy has considerable fighting power.

Admiral Luce's paper is well calculated to disenchant their

minds of this fallacious impression.

88. "The Influence of Sea Power upon History." The Critic, vol. XVII,

No. 343, 26 July 1890, pp. 4 1-4 2. (This book review of Mahan's

work is reprinted in chapter V.

89. "Naval Training." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XVI, No. 3, 1890, pp.

367-96.

Luce, in this long article, enlists the aid of psychology,

strategy, and logistics to convince his brother naval officers that

boys of the steam navy should be trained in sailing ships. He did

not succeed, but his arguments were original, fascinating, and

plausible.

He reminded them then that the best training for war was

war itself. Readiness to face death ennobles the profession of

soldier and sailor. The sailor's life is always attended by danger

in battling the elements, hence his quality of reckless daring that

is of inestimable value in war. Luce then argued that to retain

these qualities in the seaman of the steel and steam navy, it will

be necessary to train them in sailing ships.

He then took another tack, using strategy and logistics to

prove the point that modern men-of-war men should be trained

in sail. For the United States, with no overseas coal depots,

cruisers must have full sail power in order to reach their stations

with bunkers filled. Luce's arguments, however, were easily

refuted by young officers who pointed out that chartered

colliers, not sail power, provided the solution to the requirement of full bunkers.

Luce failed, in this instance, to prove logically what he knew
206

intuitively. Time has sustained him, however, for today most

foreign navies still train their prospective officers in sail as does

the U.S. Coast Guard.

The discussion on sail power for modern cruisers was

continued at length in The New York Times of 26 October

1890.

In the next quarterly issue of the Proceedings, Lt. William F.

Fullam 1 in the title: "The System of Training and Discipline

Required to Promote Efficiency and Attract Americans" held

that a navy should not be formed of men less skillful and less

trustworthy than soldiers. He claimed that when marines were withdrawn from warships, a better class of men, native-born

Americans, would enter the service and discipline would

markedly improve. As long as the Marine Guards remained, he

believed that the officers would not learn to rely upon the sailor nor trust and develop the petty officer.

Fullam, of course, sent Luce a copy of the article. The older

man answered, 2 but did not join in the public discussion which

brought forth over 40 pages in the Proceedings from some 22

officers. Luce agreed with Fullam in regard to the Navy's lack of

esprit de corps and the absence of native born, but he could not

agree that the Marine Guards deterred Americans from entering

or remaining in the Navy. It was rather the harsh treatment they

received from officers and the lack of inducement to remain in

the service. "It is the one great weaknesses of our naval

organization that we cannot, or will not, keep American Seamen

in the Navy."

*Rear Adm. William Freeland Fullam (1855-1926). According to Rear

Adm. Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret.), who was a naval cadet under the

strict regime of Fullam as Superintendent of the Naval Academy,

1915-1916, Fullam had wanted a commission in the Marine Corps when

he graduated at the head of his class in 1873. The Navy Department

would not allow this. The first Academy graduates commissioned in the

Marine Corps were from the class of 1882.

2 Luce to Fullam, 24 November 1890, Fullam Papers, LC.

90. "Introduction." History of the United States Marine Corps by

Richard S. Collum, Maj., USMC, New York: Hamersly, 1890,

pp. 14-21.

This introduction is a reprint of item 28. Luce adds one

footnote to this edition. To the last sentence recommending the

education of young Marine officers at West Point, he notes:

"The officers of the Corps, since 1881 [sic], are appointed from

the graduates of the Naval Academy, a course advocated by

progressive members of the Corps many years before the passage

of the law. -Author."

91. "High Praise for Captain Collum's History and the Marine Corps."

The Army-Navy Register, vol. XII, No. 5, 31 January 1891, p. 74.

In this letter to the editor, Luce remarked on the book's
207

value as support for the corps against its detractors. He

commented, "these periodical attacks on the Corps must be

expected; but they never amount to much."

92. "How Shall We Man Our Ships?" The North American Review, vol.

CLII, No. 410, January 1891, pp. 64-69.

William H. Rideing, managing editor of the Review, had

requested a short article on this subject from Luce since the

public had been recently showing increasing interest in the new

and growing Navy. The naval officer first reviewed how the

problem was solved in Great Britain. During the Crimean War its Government, still depending on the volunteer system and the

short-term enlistment of one cruise, had great difficulty

providing their men-of-war with adequate crews. The solution

adopted was a continuous service system; seamen were induced

to serve for terms of 10 years with a liberal pension provided at

the end of the second enlistment; boys were also enlisted, who,

from early association, became attached to the service and

formed the most valuable crewmembers in ships of the Royal

Navy.

The U.S. Navy had no such workable system for manning its ships. It still depended on short-term enlistments by nomads of

the sea. All attempts at a permanent enlisted force had so far

failed. Fifteen years after the naval apprentice system had been

first organized, only 15 of 450 in the crew of the recently built

U.S.S. Trenton had passed through the naval apprentice system,

and only one-third were native born. The young American

"seamen gunners" were trained as machinists, gunsmiths, and

electricians in the Navy and could easily find civil employment

at the end of their short-term enlistments.

Luce offered no new solutions. He was still hopeful that the

naval apprentice system would work with renewed effort. He

felt that its achievements demonstrated that it would ultimately

succeed. In his concluding paragraphs, Luce noted that the

question of manning ships was divided into two distinct parts:

providing a peacetime Navy and providing a reserve of seafaring

people on which the Navy could draw in wartime. He

encouraged congressional support of an American merchant

marine and recommended that a Department of Commerce be

added to the executive branch.

93. "The Powder Monkey." The Youth's Companion, vol. LXIV, No.

17, 23 April 1891, p. 248.

For his second piece in this essentially boys' magazine, Luce

chose to exalt the smallest and youngest members of the crew in a man-of-war. They were the ones who had one of the most

dangerous jobs on board, carrying powder from the magazine to

the gun. Monkey was a sailor term applied to any small object.

It was derived from the little monkeys kept on board as pets.

Luce recalled Farragut performing duties of powder boy, and he

alluded to another powder monkey who was his shipmate in the
208

line-of-battleship U.S.S. Columbus. He was a sailor who became

a famous journalist and author, Charles Nordhoff (1830-1901).

In conclusion, Luce noted that the days of the powder

monkey were gone. The heavy guns of the new Navy required

charges of 250-425 pounds. The powder boy had been replaced

by purchase and tackle.

94. "The Benefits of War." The North American Review, vol. CLIII,

No. 421, December 1891, pp. 672-83.

This is one of the best, certainly the most heartfelt, of Luce's

essays. Into it he poured both his religious feelings and his love

and respect for his profession. His choice of the title was

unfortunate, however, and it brought forth reactions in the

press and in personal letters. When he republished this article

some 13 years later (see item 124), he changed the title to what

the piece was really about: "War and Its Prevention." He

claimed,

War was one of the great agencies by which human

progress is affected. War is the malady of nations; the

disease is terrible while it lasts but purifying in its results.

There is a wisdom that comes only of suffering, whether

to the family or to the aggregation of families, the nation.

The Battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea were only so many steppingstones toward an ascendancy of Hellenic civilization, the influence of which on human affairs shall never die.

"Without war, Greece would have lived on aestheticism and

wasted its life in idle dreams."

Our own Civil War, he pointed out, furnished a notable

example of the operation of this law of strife by which human

progress is achieved.

Nevertheless, the continued existence of war was still charged

as a failure of Christianity. Luce argued that, on the same

grounds, dreadful railroad accidents might be charged to

Christian failure or disease regarded as a reproach to human

nature. Christianity, he reminded his readers, has to do with the

regeneration of the human heart and not with changing the laws

of nature.

It was by war and pestilence that the children of Israel were

disciplined. Moses conducted his campaigns in accordance with

instructions received from God. From the lowest and most

abject state of Egyptian bondage, the children of Israel, trained

by war, became a powerful race and, through the imperishable

literature of the Bible, gave to all succeeding ages the principles

of the highest civilization.

As a science, war should be cultivated by the few qualified to

undertake it; as an art it should be constantly practiced by the

entire body set apart for that purpose, with the implements to

be used in war actually in hand. By a perfect state of

preparedness, a collision of arms is avoided and the shedding of

blood spared.

The United States, he said, is known not to be disposed to
209

utilize its abundant resources for military purposes. Ready as they are to wage commercial warfare, our people close their

eyes to the possibilities of an actual collision of arms. "Let practical Americans," he stated in conclusion, "recognize the truth that war is a calamity that may overtake the most

peaceful nation, and that insurance against war by preparation

for it is the most businesslike, the most humane, and the most

in accordance with the teachings of the Christian religion."

95. "The Caravels of Columbus." The Youth's Companion, vol. LXV,

No. 22, 21 June 1892, pp. 281-82.

In this centennial year of the discovery of America, it was

proper to include a piece on the three ships that made the

landfall on San Salvador Island, 12 October 1492. Models of

these caravels were under construction at Cadiz, Spain, under

the supervision of Lt. William McCarty Little, USN (Ret.)

1 Manned by Spanish sailors, they were to be part of the

Columbian Exposition in Chicago.

Luce discusses the difficulty of constructing the models, as paintings of the caravels did not agree with the written

descriptions in Columbus' journal and other trustworthy

accounts.

Santa Maria had a lofty poop for the officers, a high prow for

the crew, with four masts of which two were square rigged and

two had lateen sails. She was 90 feet long at the keel and decked

over. Luce includes description of the smaller ships, as well as an

account of the voyage. Listing the ships in the U.S. Navy named

for Columbus' ships, he mentions the line-of-battleship Columbus in which he had served and the sloop-of-war St. Mary's,

named for the Santa Maria and which he himself had converted

into a schoolship for the State of New York.

Capt. William McCarty Little (1842-1915), who was retired for

medical reasons in 1884, served with Luce in the training ship U.S.S. Minnesota and assisted with the early organization of the War College. He

introduced the Naval War Game at the Naval War College, where he

remained on the faculty until 1910. For additional information relating to Little and his work in Spain at this time, see W. McC. Little Papers,

Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College.

96. "My First Ship." The Youth's Companion, vol. LXV, No. 51, 22

December 1892, pp. 673-74.

For his fourth article in Youth's Companion, Luce chose to

describe the 74-gun line-of- battleship North Carolina, to which

he reported as a newly appointed midshipman in October 1841.

She was then anchored off the Battery, in New York's upper

bay.

North Carolina, after 20 years service at sea, was serving as a

receiving ship, on board which were assembled the crews that were to serve in ships being commissioned for active service. No

Naval Academy existed in those days, and new midshipmen
210

went directly to cruising vessels after a few months indoctrination on board the receiving ship.

Luce graphically describes such incidents as reporting on

board, living in the semidarkness of the orlop deck, and his first

duty as boat officer.

He goes on to briefly comment on the change to more

modern naval education and refers to his own article in 1889

outlining the curriculum at the Naval Academy. (See item 85.)

In conclusion, he notes that neither the old system nor the new

would produce good results if it had poor quality to work with.

Every boy has his own specific gravity, -if the figure be

allowed, -which gives him his relative place among his

associates. If he is very dense, and is determined to remain

so, then the most learned professor and the best textbooks cannot float him above the plane where the laws of

gravitation place him. If he is determined to rise, he will

rise though he should have neither books nor professor to

buoy him up. The best results flow from a combination of

taste for a vocation with the opportunities for cultivating

it.

97. "Captain Mahan's 'Admiral Farragut.'" The Critic, vol. XXI, No.

563, 3 December 1892,p. 309.

This brief review of Mahan's biography of Farragut was

written while Mahan was the President of the Naval War College.

After summarizing the work, Luce concludes,

in a word, here is a model biography. It is the story of a

sea-king told by a seaman to whom the pen is as familiar

as the sword or rope. It will interest the young reader and

the student of the great war, but it will be a delight to

those who value also a fine gloss of style and a profound

philosophy crystallized in simple language.

98. "England and France on the Sea." The Critic, vol. XXII, No. 569,

14 January 1893, p. 17. (This book review of Mahan, The

Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and

Empire: 1 793-1812, has been reprinted in chapter V.)

99. A Standard Dictionary of the English Language: Upon Original

Plans Designed to Give, in Complete and Accurate Statement, in

the Light of the Most Recent Advances in Knowledge, and in

the Readiest Form for Popular Use, the Meaning, Orthography,

Pronunciation, and Etymology of All the Words, and the

Idiomatic Phrases in the Speech and Literature of the English

Speaking Peoples. Prepared by more than 200 specialists and

other scholars. Isaac L. Funk, Editor-in-Chief. New York and

London: Funk and Wagnalls, 1893.

In December 1890 Luce agreed to undertake editing the

department of naval terms for this work edited by Isaac K.

Funk. Luce was paid $3.00 per hour for this work.
211

Luce's name appeared also in the editions of 1895 and 1903

as the "naval and nautical terms editor." For the edition of

1913, he was succeeded by Rear Adm. John Elliott Pillsbury,

USN, former Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and Adm. Sir

Cyprian Bridge.

100. "Orders and Signals of the Venetian Fleet. Commanded by Mr.

James Dolfin, A.D. 1365," and "Ancient Naval Warfare,"

U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol XX, Nos. 3 and 4, 1894, pp. 541-553

and 721-745.

The above essays were written by Rear Adm. Luigi Fincati

of the Italian Navy whose avocation was naval archeology.

Medical Director Philip Lansdale, 1 Luce's brother-in-law,

translated both while Luce wrote their introductions and

added footnotes and comments. Lt. Albert Gleaves, his future

biographer, assisted.

The introduction to the first article explains Luce's interest

in signaling around 1877. Sufficient material remained from

his entry "Naval Signals" in Johnson's New Universal Cyclopedia for him to compose another article which appeared in

Potter's American Monthly (items 43 and 46).

His research for these pieces had impressed on Luce the

need for more published history of the medieval naval

operations of Venice and Genoa. He sent a copy of the Potter's

essay to a friend in the Italian Navy, a Captain Martinez, whom

he had probably met during his Juniata cruise, 1869-1872.

Martinez communicated the American's desires, with the copy

of the article to Fincati. The latter wrote the two essays based

on research in the Italian State Archives.

Luce in his introduction apologized for the delay in

publication caused by translation difficulties and the press of

other duties. But he also observed:

Though written fifteen years ago, these articles have lost

none of their value. On the contrary, with the dissipation

of the false idea that modern naval science had nothing

to learn from the past, there has been a decided

tendency of late years towards what may be called the

philosophical study of history.

In the second of his essays, Fincati mainly discussed naval

tactics in ancient Greek and Roman wars. Excellent diagrams

accompany this piece. He quotes the Greek historian Diodorus

Siculus on the danger of offering a flank to attack and adds in

italics: "So with us at Lissa!" See item 104.

No reference to the Fincati articles has been found in Vice

Adm. William L. Rodgers, Naval Warfare Under Oars (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1940, 1967).

Philip Lansdale (1817-1894), physician and naval officer, was a graduate in medicine of the University of Pennsylvania, entered the U.S.

Navy as an assistant surgeon, November 1846, was surgeon in Hartford

at the Battle of Mobile Bay, and retired in 1879 as Medical Director

with the relative rank of captain. He married Olivia, Stephen B. Luce's
212

next older sister, in September 1841. Their son, Philip Van Horn

Lansdale, USN, was killed in action, 1 April 1899, at Apia, Samoa.

Margaret Luce, the oldest sister married Capt. Andrew A. Harwood,

USN, a widower. Jane, the youngest, never married. John, the oldest in

the family, settled in Arkansas. William, the next, was killed in action in

1863. See the interesting, but not biographically dependable, Two

Colonial Families: the Lansdales of Maryland and the Luces of New

England by Maria Hornor Lansdale (Philadelphia: n.p., 1938).

101. Commemoration of the Fourth Centenary of the Discovery of

America. Columbian Historical Exposition, Madrid. History of

the Participation of the United States in the Columbian

Historical Exposition at Madrid. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.

Off., 1895, pp. 7-15.

At the instigation of Secretary of State James G. Blaine,

Secretary of the Navy B.F. Tracy, and Senator Henry Cabot

Lodge, President Benjamin Harrison appointed Luce the

Commissioner General of the United States to the Columbian

Historical Exposition in Madrid. Luce served in this capacity

from May 1892 until May 1893.

Luce reports in the form of a letter, undoubtedly written

by himself, to Walter Q. Gresham, Secretary of State, * dated 2

May 1893, at Washington, D.C. As Commissioner General he

first introduced the other members of the Commission which

included James C. Wellings, President of Columbian University

(later George Washington University), and the Assistant Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, the noted naturalist

George Brown Goode.

The American portion of the exposition in Madrid had the

task of depicting the state of civilization in the New World in

the period during which American history was most closely

identified with Spain, that period from 1492, when the

Spanish caravels first reached the New World, to 1620, when

the Mayflower brought the English Puritans to New England.

Luce then described the extensive American exhibits. The

exposition opened 30 October 1892 and closed 31 January

1893. The admiral regretted being excluded, because of lack of

diplomatic status, from the most singular affair held, the

unveiling of the monument at La Rabida2 commemorating the

fourth centenary of the discovery of America.

The Luce letters for this period indicate his friendly

association with Adm. Pasqual Cervera y Topete, the Spanish

Minister of Marine and later the Commander of the Spanish

Squadron defeated at Santiago, 3 July 1898. Cervera was not

the Minister of Marine during the Exposition, but when he

succeeded to that position immediately afterward, he obtained

for Luce the Grand Cross of the Order of Naval Merit (White

Badge).

Walter Quinton Gresham (1832-1895) served as a major general

during the Civil War. He served as Postmaster General, 1883-84;

Secretary of the Treasury, 1884; Judge of the U.S. Circuit Court,

1884-92; Secretary of State, 1893-95.
213

2 The Franciscan monastery of Santa Maria de la Rabida, near Palos,

Andalusia, on the Gulf of Cadiz. It was at this monastery that Columbus

left his 5-year-old son, Diego, when he first came to Spain in 1485. The

prior of the monastery, Fray Juan Perez, arranged for Columbus' first contacts at the court of Queen Isabella in 1491. The monument to which Luce refers is a large statue of Columbus. A replica of the

monastery was in Chicago for the World's Columbian Exposition in

1893. See Samuel E. Morison, Admiral of the Ocean Sea (Boston:

Little, Brown, 1942), pp. 80-81, 98-99, 158-59.

102. "As to Navy Yards and Their Defense." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol.

XXI, No. 4, 1895, pp. 679-89.

Luce produced two articles based on his research and work

in connection with the Commission on Navy Yards 1882-1883

of which he was the senior member. One of these, "The Navy

and Its Needs," has been reprinted in chapter VIII. The

second, abstracted here, is based upon the research he did

among the naval records in Washington preparing himself for

this duty.

This article is limited to the history of the location of the

shipbuilding sites selected for the six frigates of the new Navy

to be built under the Act of 27 March 1794. No expressed

provision was made by Congress for the building of these six

ships. Joshua Humphreys, the naval constructor who designed

them, did visit possible sites along the Atlantic coast, and the

Secretary of the Navy reported to Congress that ground had

been purchased at Portsmouth, N.H., Charlestown (near

Boston), Philadelphia, Washington, and Norfolk and would

soon be obtained at New York. Nothing in the original act

authorized the sum expended, $240,906, so the formation of a permanent Shore Establishment can be credited also to the

executive department.

All navy yards, with the exception of that at Washington, were selected because of their availability, the Government

taking over shipyard facilities already established. The best site

for a naval base, however, is remote from the seaboard where it cannot be subject to attack. The Hudson beyond West Point

was thus considered for New York and the James River for

Norfolk. But it was eventually determined that the great

centers of population on the coasts were the more suitable

locations since the yards would be included within the

protection required for such regions of wealth and commerce.

Luce concludes the article by discussing briefly the relationship between ships and bases. He discusses the terms "battleship" and "line-of- battle ship," and then goes on to state,

The naval tactician of to-day requires that there shall be

a certain measure of homogeneity in the ships that are to

compose the main body of the fleet with which he may

be called upon to guard our coasts and navy-yards. In

other words, his line of battle must be composed of

line-of-battle ships.
214

103. "A Fo'castle Court Martial." The Youth's Companion, vol.

LXVIII, No. 3570, 24 October 1895, pp. 501-02.

Luce is at his storytelling best in presenting this most

unusual of all his "yarns" published in this youth's magazine.

He portrays also the men whose memories he cherished, the

American sailors of his first ships.

He tells of an occasion one night aboard Columbus in the

harbor of Monterey, Calif., in 1846 when virtually all officers were ashore and the best of the crew took discipline into their

own hands. He represents the occasion as a case showing the

aptitude of the Anglo-Saxon race for self-government in

correcting abuses that the law has failed to reach.

What Luce tells with charm is how the Americans in the

crew took the occasion to punish those of the large foreign

element who had blatantly displayed their disrespect for the

flag and for American institutions, especially after a return

from a drunken liberty. These men were brought before a "mock" court-martial held on deck, tried in accordance with

court procedures, found guilty, and made to swear allegiance

and kiss the flag. The supreme penalty could have been

disappearance over the side at night while underway.

104. "Naval Warfare Under Modern Conditions." The North American

Review, vol. CLXII, No. 470, January 1896, pp. 70-77.

The defeat of the Italians by the Austrians at Lissa in the

Adriatic Sea during 1866 offered painful lessons in the need

for intelligent naval planning and for proper organization

within a navy department.

This Italian defeat and the Japanese victory over the

Chinese in 1894 at Yalu furnished striking illustrations, in

Luce's opinion, of naval warfare under modern conditions. The

victors proved how naval success may be assured by careful

training of personnel during peace, by study of the operations

of war as conducted by the great masters, and by applying

immutable principles of naval strategy. The defeated demonstrated how a want of discipline and drills in tactics and

gunnery and a disregard for elementary principles of the

science of war lead to disaster.

An indispensable condition for the creation of an efficient

navy is the creation of the power to use it intelligently.

Developing his thought from the concepts of Jomini, Hamley,

and Mahan, Luce states,

Naval strategy is more comprehensive than military

strategy. The latter is confined to the theater of the war,

the former may embrace all the navigable waters of a

continent. Military strategy is called into play only

during war. Naval strategy adopts some of its most

important measures during peace, in anticipation of war.
215

105. "Joe Hardy." The Youth's Companion, vol. LXIX, No. 22, 28

May 1896, p. 274.

This article recounts the true tale of a sailor in the U.S.S.

Wabash, a topman and favorite of the crew, whose cap blew

off as he descended from the yard. He jumped overboard to

save it because in its brim was his sweetheart's picture. The

boy was drowned or attacked by sharks, but not before Luce,

the officer of the deck at the time, and the quartermaster of

the watch jumped in the water to save him. The two would-be

rescuers almost lost their lives.

Luce does not identify himself as one of the heroes, but he

does state that after the man went down the two clung to the

life buoy that had been thrown to them. It was not until they were in the rescue boat that the sharks were seen. This brought

terrible dreams that night.

This story reached print in three different forms. James

Barnes, the author and newspaper correspondent, published it in Harper's Weekly. He had evidently heard it from his father,

Luce's old shipmate and friend, John Sanford Barnes. Another

version appeared in a newspaper, the Albany N.Y., Journal,

during one of Luce's visits to his birthplace while the Training

Squadron was in the North River in the 1880's. An Albany

policeman who in 1861 had been a member of the Wabash

crew gave this story to a reporter. The true name of the

drowned man was William Emmet.

106. "The Life of Nelson." The Critic, vol. XXVII, No. 789, 3 April

1897, p. 321.

In this review of A.T. Mahan's biography of Nelson, Luce

observed that the author had made Nelson reveal himself.

"... The hero stands before us in all his naked humanity."

Mahan had produced "abundant evidence to show that the

so-called 'dash' of Nelson, a term which, in such connection,

carries a latent idea of recklessness, was in truth the result of

plans carefully matured long in advance of the occasion."

After mentioning Emma Hamilton, their child Horatia, and

the estrangement from Lady Nelson, Luce remarks, "All this

sad phase of Nelson's life, including the execution of [Admiral] Caracciola, which bears the stigma of judicial murder, is treated with absolute impartiality by Capt. Mahan. He shows

the duplicate nature of the man."

In a later edition of The Critic,* it was reported that Dr.

Edward Everett Hale of Massachusetts had requested that

Captain Mahan consider writing a history of the American

Navy, now that his Nelson was completed. Mahan responded

that an effort would depend on the interest of the American

public. "So far as I can at present observe, that interest is not

very great. There is no use of a man writing what he has no

reason to believe that many will read."

Mahan also refused to have his War College lectures

published in the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute. His
216

main reason was that readers of the Proceedings would not

have the advantages of student listeners at the War College,

freedom from all diversions, and with minds fresh and without

preoccupation. Moreover, the rapport between lecturer and

listener could not be created between author and reader. In the

Proceedings, the lecturers on the art of war would be

competing with all the articles on material phases of the naval

profession which seemed to interest officers more. "Why should I go to the College? I can read that which is taught there."2 This was what Mahan feared-an end to the

college.

1 "Notes on Authors," The Critic, vol. XXVII, No. 799, 12 June

1897, p. 413.

2 "Letter of Captain A.T. Mahan," U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XV, No.

1, 1889, pp. 57-60.

107. "A History of the Royal Navy." The Critic, vol. XXVIII, No. 808,

14 August 1897, pp. 84-85.

Luce reviewed five of the seven volumes of this monumental work individually as they appeared over 6 years. (See

items 110, 114, 115, 123.) In the review of the last two

volumes which goes up to the death of Queen Victoria, he is able to congratulate the principal author on being selected for

knighthood.

Luce is never altogether complimentary in his opinions of

this work. In the review of the first volume, he lauds the style,

but he takes the editor, William Laird Clowes, severely to task

for the General Preface, which was carelessly prepared,

inaccurate, controversial, and not in keeping with a work of

this character.

In this first review Luce reveals his extensive knowledge of

the literature of English naval history by comparing Clowes'

work to that of Sir Harris Nicolas, Edward Pelham Brenton,

and William James.

The structure in each volume was by chronological periods,

three chapters devoted to each period, one dealing with civil

history, a second with military history, and the third giving an

account of maritime discoveries and scientific expeditions.

This makes for ready reference, but does provide a distracting

and disjointed story.

Illustrations are numerous, and the indexing leaves nothing

to be desired. "We wish as much could be said for the style in

which much of the valuable information is conveyed. In a number of chapters it lacks dignity and precision of ex- pression."

108. "The Interest of America in Sea Power." The Critic, vol. XXIX,

No. 831, 22 January 1898, pp. 55-56.

This is a book review of A.T. Mahan's The Interest of

America in Sea Power, Present and Future. This book, a
217

collection of detached papers published at intervals in periodicals during the previous several years, does constitute a definite

part of Mahan's early seapower presentation before he turned

from historian to pundit and prophet.

In this review Luce came to his first philosophical difference with Mahan. His argument was that while the author

refers to ocean commerce, Mahan did not give it due

prominence as a factor of seapower. In Luce's view he had

allowed the views of the naval strategist to dominate those of

the political economist. Seapower in its military sense is the

offspring, not the parent, of commerce. Both from the military

and the economic view, an extensive marine commerce is a

necessity to a country aspiring to become a naval power.

109. "A False Alarm." The Youth's Companion, vol. LXXII, No. 7, 17

February 1898, p. 11.

In December 1863 the monitor Nantucket was stationed in

Wassaw Sound, Ga., to watch for the coming out of an

ironclad which the Confederates were reported to be building

in Savannah.

On a bright Sunday morning, church services were being

held on the berth deck, with Captain Luce reading the liturgy

of the Protestant Episcopal Church. It was 11 o'clock. All

nature seemed hushed; not even the note of a bird broke the

stillness of the air. Overhead the sky was beautifully bright and

clear; but on the quiet waters and on the low, marshy ground

that lay between the river and the mainland, there hung a light

mist that curiously distorted distant objects.

Suddenly a messenger came down from the deck and

whispered in the captain's ear. "The officer of the deck told

me to report that the rebel ram is coming down the river, Sir!"

The captain turned to the executive officer and told him to

go on deck to verify the report. The executive, a cool,

clearheaded officer, lost no time in getting there. Meanwhile,

the captain was almost overcome with anxiety which he could

not show, although the crew sensed that something was afoot.

The executive, on first looking, saw what appeared to be a

rooflike structure, like the casemate of the Merrimac with

broadside in full view. He was just about to sound "general

quarters" when the character of the ram changed, with the

roof separating and giving the appearance of two turrets. Keeping his glasses riveted on the object, it finally turned out

to be a small boat with two refugees who used the misty

weather to escape. Both refugees were white and declared

themselves to be Union sympathizers.

A clipping of this signed article by Luce with magazine title,

date, and page number is in the Luce papers in the Library of

Congress. However, when checked against bound copies of the

periodical at Brown University, it could not be found.
218

110. "The Royal Navy." The Critic, vol. XXIX, No. 848, 21 May

1898, pp. 342-43.

This is a review of Clowes, A History of the Royal Navy,

volume II. (See items 107, 114, 115, and 123 for review of

other volumes.)

111. "The Dawn of Naval History." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXIV,

No. 3, 1898, pp. 441-50.

In this article Luce defined a navy as designed primarily for

the preservation of peace by the exercise of that wholesome

moral influence inseparable from a judicious exhibition of

adequate material force, also for policing the ocean highways,

patrolling its own coasts, exploring distant seas for the benefit

of commerce and navigation, sharing the labors in the field of

science, standing guard on the frontiers of civilization, and for

offensive and defensive operations of war. Luce reached back to Homer's Odyssey and follows this by

several quotations from the Iliad illustrating the accuracy of

Homer's nautical descriptions. Then Luce describes the Biblical

navies from the Ark of Noah, 525 feet long, 87^ feet beam,

three decks, 19,000 tons, to the ships of Tarshish of the navies

of Solomon and King Hiram of Tyre. The Phoenician Navy and

that of Minos of Crete followed. These gave way to those of

Carthage, Greece, and Rome after the dawn of naval history.

112. Text-Book of Seamanship, the Equipping and Handling of Vessels

Under Sail or Steam for the Use of the United States Naval

Academy. New York: Van Nostrand, 1898. By Rear Admiral

S.B. Luce, USN. Rev. by Lt. W.S. Benson, USN, with

illustrations drawn by Lt. S. Seabury, USN.

In this edition the general arrangement which had been

established for this text in the revision by Aaron Ward was

retained. (See item 71.) This last revision of Seamanship was

undertaken by Lt. William S. Benson, 1 then an assistant

instructor in the Department of Seamanship at the Naval

Academy. In his preface to this edition, dated "Newport, R.I.,

August 5th, 1898," Luce commented that "Lieutenant Benson's labors have been attended with marked success, notwithstanding the distractions due to the breaking out of the war

with Spain." In a reviser's note written on the receiving ship

Vermont in New York, 27 September 1898, Benson states that an attempt has been made in this revision to eliminate all obsolete material and to introduce as much new information as time and space would permit. A chapter on storms was added

with the latest information on sounding machines, patent logs,

steam capstans, and steampower steering equipment. The

chapter on shipboard organization was omitted since no

system of organization had yet been given official sanction.

Although the preface to this edition is labeled "Fourth

Edition," it is the fifth edition which makes substantial

changes to the text and the ninth known issue since 1862. (See
219

items 2, 3, 4, 11, 25, 40, 71, and 78.) This edition was

reprinted in 1950 by Cornell Maritime Press, Cambridge, Md.,

with an introduction by M.V. Brewington.

1 Adm. William Shepherd Benson (1855-1932) graduated from the

Naval Academy in 1877. He commanded the Albany (CL-22), Missouri

(BB-11), Utah (BB-31), and the Philadelphia Navy Yard. In 1915 he was

appointed the first Chief of Naval Operations, an office which he held

through World War One, until his retirement 25 September 1919.

113. "Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War." The Critic, vol.

XXXIV, No. 859, January 1899, pp. 65-67. (This review of

G.F.R. Henderson's study has been reprinted in chapter V.)

114. "The Royal Navy." The Critic, vol. XXXV, No. 867, September

1899, pp. 856-58.

This piece is a review of Clowes, History of the Royal Navy,

volume III. Luce gives high praise to the chapter in this volume

authored by Mahan, "by far, the most readable portion of the

book." Luce concludes his review with the statement that,

"the book contains much that is curious in the way of old

naval customs, much that is very interesting; and to Americans,

now that we have outlying colonies, much that is very

instructive, from a political as well as from a naval and military

point of view." (See items 107, 110, 115, and 123 for review

of other volumes.

115. "Privateers and Men-of-War." The Critic, vol. XXXVI, No. 4,

April 1900, pp. 359-64.

This is a review article which comments on Edgar Stanton

Maclay, A History of American Privateers; William Laird

Clowes, A History of the Royal Navy, vol. IV, and Edward

Kirk Rawson, Twenty Famous Naval Battles-Salamis to

Santiago. (See items 107, 110, 114, and 123 for reviews of the

other volumes in Clowes' multivolume study.)

In this article Luce disagrees with Maclay 's assertion that

privateering was being practiced by the United States in the

Spanish-American War. He goes on to correct the erroneous

impression given by Maclay in stating that Olympia and her

class have taken the place of privateers in their roles as commerce destroyers.

In discussing Clowes' work, the reviewer singles out the fair

treatment given the American Navy in this book. He agrees

with Clowes that William James' History is notable for its accuracy up to the War of 1812 when it suddenly becomes

biased and untrustworthy. This he traced to James' experience

during that war when he was detained in Boston.

Luce gives the work by Rawson high praise, but strongly

disagrees with him that the great Dutch admirals were fighting

for the "honor" of their nation and to win fame for

themselves. "Honor," he comments, "cut but a small figure in

the business. It was the greed of commercial gain."
220

116. Naval Songs: a Collection of Original, Selected, and Traditional

Sea Songs, Songs of Sailors and Shanties. 2d ed., rev. and corr. New York: Pond & Co., 1902.

In this edition Luce rearranged the songs, made several

deletions and additions. In his revised preface dated "Newport,

R.I., June 17, 1902," Luce points out that

this collection was originally undertaken with a view of

the revival, as far as practicable, of the old Songs which

commemorate our early naval victories, in hope that

they would serve in no small degree, to cultivate in our young sailors, not only a love for their vocation as Seamen, but also that devotion to their flag, which

distinguished those who laid the foundation of our Naval

renown. The work has been only partially successful,

however, owing to the fact that while many songs of the

old navy were to be found, the airs to which they were

sung have been lost. Some of the best were never published -they were handed down, words and music,

from generation to generation till about the time of the

Civil War, since when with few exceptions they have

been hopelessly lost.

As a midshipman in the 1840's, Luce had remembered some of

these songs; his scrapbooks and journals for this period contain

some of the songs that he later published. With the help of old

sailors, he was able to rescue such songs as "Constitution and

Guerriere," "Paul Jones' Victory," "Ye Parliament of England," "The Yankee Man of War," and "The Constellation and

the Insurgente."

Just before his death Luce arranged for another printing of

this book. It appeared in 1918 without any change from this

edition.

117. "Naval Administration, II." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXVIII,

No. 4, December 1902, pp. 839-49.

This article was written as a sequel to his 1888 piece,

"Naval Administration." (See item 84.) An early paragraph in

this article summed up the dilemma as Luce saw it: "It was

through the want of a Military Branch that the Navy

Department has, on several notable occasions, in the not very

remote past, been thrown into such states of panic as to fully

demonstrate its incapacity to perform the very duties for

which it was created." Several cases documenting this are offered.

In 1812 Captains Charles Stewart and William Bainbridge

had to protest vigorously to prevent the laying up the entire

Navy as the administration feared it should be swept out of

existence by English cruisers.

The lessons of the Civil War outlined earlier went unheeded,

and so in 1898 the Naval War Board or Strategy Board had to

be formed to advise the President.

In closing, Luce outlines the prompt action of First Lord
221

Barham and the British Admiralty in 1805 when notified by

Nelson of the sailing of the French Fleet from the West Indies,

which led to the successful campaign of Trafalgar. He

compares this favorably with the dilatory action of our Navy

Department in April 1898 in failing to send instructions to

Adm. George Dewey until 3 days after war had been declared

and after he had been forced to leave the harbor of Hong Kong

by orders of the British Governor. Luce commented on the

victory Dewey achieved:

Had a Board of Navy Commissioners come down to us in an unbroken line, Admiral Dewey would not have

been left so long in the isolated and trying position in

which he found himself after the victory of May 1. The Navy Commissioners would have started re- enforcements from San Francisco, knowing that war was

inevitable, and that, in any event, Dewey would need

them. By the timely arrival of such re-enforcements, the

Philippine insurrection would have been averted and

much blood and treasure saved.

Another article was published the following year as part of

the same series, "Naval Administration, III." (See item 122.)

118. "The Story of the Monitor." Naval Actions and History

1799-1898, Massachusetts Military History Society Papers.

Boston: Griffith-Stillings Press, 1902, vol. XII, pp. 127-54.

Luce told this story many times and in many places,

beginning in 1876 when in the U.S.S. Hartford he related it to

the naval apprentices and other members of the crew. He

stressed then and always the moral results of the battle. "Of

every decisive battle fought on land or at sea, there may be

said in general to be three results, viz., the strategic, the

tactical, and the moral." To these the historian has added a fourth -the political.

In this action between the Monitor and the Merrimac,

fought on the 9th of March 1862, all four results followed, but

Luce was interested only in the moral effect. This battle,

confined to two vessels and not at all decisive, nevertheless

exercised an influence and importance far beyond our shores

and to a degree that is hard to overestimate.

Great Britain feared the North as a growing commercial

rival and so was favorable to the secession of the Confederacy

as was France. The Trent affair all but precipitated war. A few

months later, in the midst of preparations for the Union

assault on the peninsula of Virginia, the Confederate ironclad

appeared in Hampton Roads on 8 March and easily sank two

warships with the indication that several more would be sunk

the next day. Instead, the Monitor from New York arrived that

night, and a drawn battle took place the next day. Merrimac

eventually withdrew, leaving the scene of battle to Monitor.

The result of this action was a sensation abroad. Opinions

on the military and naval efficiency of the United States
222

immediately underwent a startling change. The London Times

admitted that the Navy of England would have to be

reconstructed on lines suggested by Monitor, especially the

adoption of turrets. The Government of Great Britain also

changed its attitude toward the type of maritime warfare the

North had adopted. The blockade was accepted.

The Monitor story was given as a lecture to the Naval War

College in September 1886, and the following January Luce

delivered it at Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., and at Wells

College for Women, Aurora, N.Y. It was presented in this

article form to the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts

on 7 January 1896.

After reading the published version, Harvard historian

Albert Bushnell Hart wrote Luce, on 18 November 1902,

commenting on the piece. Hart disagreed with Luce on

Britain's attitude at the outbreak of the Civil War and on some

points of international law. He wrote:

My point is that the success of the Merrimac could not

have meant the sweeping away of our blockading

squadrons, and though it might have given cause for the

recognition of the Confederacy, that is a different thing

from breaking the blockade; and surely the destruction

of the Monitor would hardly have been as conclusive

evidence of the probable success of the south as the

actual defeat of McClellan, Pope, practically McClellan

again and Grant during the summer and fall of 1862. The

Monitor-Merrimac struggle was undoubtedly a great

turning point in naval warfare, and in the Civil War, and I hesitate to differ from the opinion of a renowned officer

and authority. Is it a civilian's lack of humanity which

makes me feel that when a nation goes to war, no matter

how righteous its cause, it must accept the effects of war?

I am not in favor of abolishing privateering or the

capture of private property at sea, because I think these

are two methods of bringing about peace; and the

attitude of the United States towards captures of

merchant vessels during the Civil War, is one which we

may find turned against us in time of need.

119. "First Visit to Japan." The Newport Mercury, vol. CXLV, No. 35,

7 February 1903, p. 7. Luce's hometown newspaper reprints a long letter which he

had written to the editor of the Japan Daily Mail. Dated 26

January 1903, the letter was contributed when he learned that

a distinguished Japanese scholar proposed to write a history of

modern Japan. In his letter Luce recounts his experiences as a midshipman on board U.S.S. Columbus when she visited Japan

in 1846 under Commodore James Biddle. (See item 126.)

120. "Introduction." History of the United States Marine Corps, by

Richard S. Collum, Maj., U.S.M.C. New York: Hamersly, 1903,

pp. 13-20. (This is a reprint of items 28 and 90.)
223

121. "An Address Delivered at the United States Naval War College,

Narragansett Bay, R.I., June Second, Nineteen Hundred and

Three." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXIX, No. 3, 1903, pp. 1-8.

(This address has been reprinted in chapter II.)

122. "Naval Administration, III." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXIX, No.

4, 1903, pp. 1-13.

"Naval Administration, III" portrayed the failures of our

naval administration during the Civil War, which as Luce puts

it, was regarded with such scant respect as to border, at one

critical period, on contempt.

He describes the abortive attempt to relieve Fort Sumter in

April 1861 -which caused the opening of the war-and then he

goes on to discuss other Navy Department administrative

failures, to which he attributed the repulse of Du Pont's

ironclad squadron at Charleston on 7 April 1863. Luce

remarks, "there was no staff attached to the Secretary's office

to prevent placing Admiral Du Pont and his command in the

utterly false position of being called upon to solve an insoluble

problem, viz.: the capture of Charleston without adequate

co-operation by the Army."

This series of three essays ends on a happy note for it is here that Luce told a delightful story of meeting Gen. William

T. Sherman, in January 1865, when the general explained the

Navy's strategic failures in a few pithy sentences and showed

how he would bring about the fall of Charleston without a

battle. "And that is just what actually came to pass."

Luce concludes this study on naval administration with:

"The Civil War demonstrated conclusively the necessity of a War College and of a General Staff. We have the one; let us now have the other without more ado." (See items 84 and 117

for the first two portions of this study.

123. "The Queen's Navy." The Critic, vol. XLIII, No. 6, December

1903, p. 566.

In this signed review of the last volume of Clowes'

multivolume history of the Royal Navy, Luce comments that

"it is very suggestive of change in feeling wrought by time that

the names of two American authors [A.T. Mahan and

Theodore Roosevelt] should be found among the collaborators

in a work on the British Navy!" (See items 107, 110, 114, 115

for reviews of other volumes.

124. "War and Its Prevention." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXX, No. 3,

1904, pp. 611-22.

This is a reprint of item 94. In a footnote to this article,

Luce notes that it has been "reprinted, by permission, from

The North American Review of December, 1891; where it appeared under the misleading caption of: 'The Benefits of

War.'"
224

125. "The Department of the Navy." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXI,

No. 1, March 1905, pp. 83-96.

Luce received an honorable mention for this article in the

Naval Institute's prize essay contest of 1905, taking second

place to Bradley Fiske's American Naval Policy. As he was

almost 20 years before, Luce is again critical of the Naval

Institute for not following up on its articles to insure what is recommended gets done. That meant the Department of the

Navy must be reformed.

"There is something radically wrong with the Department,"

wrote Secretary of the Navy Whitney in his annual report to

Congress, dated 30 November 1885. "The universal dissatisfaction is the conclusive proof of this." He then proceeded to

dissect the bureau system and list a record of mismanagement,

of wasteful expenditure, and of injudicious and ill-advised

disposition of the public moneys.

Even with such overwhelming evidence, no reorganization

was attempted during Whitney's tenure. So, in an annual

report of November 1903, another Secretary, Charles Bonaparte, repeated what had been said 20 years before. President

Theodore Roosevelt, shortly after, recommended that a Naval

General Staff be provided who should control military affairs

of the Navy and be the authorized advisers of the Secretary of

the Navy. This recommendation met with violent opposition

from those on whose support the President had every moral

and legal right to count.

Luce then gives a review of the whole history of naval

organization, including the English system on which ours was

originally modeled. He concludes,

What is needed is legislative action based on a liberal and

enlightened consideration of the whole subject of naval

organization, from both the military and the civil point

of view, to the end that the several parts may be so evenly balanced and nicely adjusted that our naval

administration may become a model of efficiency and

economy.

126. "Commodore Biddle's Visit to Japan in 1846." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXI, No. 3, September 1905, pp. 555-63.

"The influence of the West upon the ancient civilization of

Japan and the phenomenal progress made by that country

toward becoming a formidable naval power, furnishes one of

the most remarkable epochs of modern times." Luce then

presented an entertaining and knowledgeable article on the

first attempt of the United States to gain entry into Japan. It was written 59 years after this little-known event in which he

had participated as a midshipman. The 50th anniversary of

Matthew C. Perry's opening of that country to the West had

been celebrated the year before. Biddle's visit with the

line-of-battle ship Columbus and sloop-of-war Vincennes had

been from 20 to 29 July 1846.
225

Luce's claim was that the total absence of display of any

hostile intentions by Commodore Biddle and his officers

impressed the Japanese officials and disposed them to receive

with favor the demanding overtures of Perry. He retained a

vivid recollection of these events and in his research learned of

three enlisted men of the Columbus crew still alive. He

discovered as well two etchings, originally created by two

enlisted men, of Columbus and her consort Vincennes in

Tokyo Bay. Both prints were published with the article, and

copies were furnished the Japanese Government. (See item

119.)

In this article Luce recounts his reunion with Charles

Nordhoff, a famous author and newspaper editor, who had

served in the Columbus at this time, serving as a powder boy in

Lt. Percival Drayton's division. Nordhoff's first book was

about this voyage, and in it he favorably commented on the

Japanese. "There was not one, old or young, whose appearance

would not command respect in any society." 1 On Nordhoff, Luce comments with his characteristic

modesty: "Of the midshipman and the powder boy, the latter

was by far, the more apt scholar."

Charles Nordhoff, Man-of- War Life: A Boy's Experience in the U.S. Navy. (New York: n.p., 1855).

127. "A Plea for an Engineer Corps in the Navy." The North American

Review, vol. CLXXXII, No. 590, January 1906, pp. 74-83.

This article considers one aspect of the problem of officer

specialization in the Navy. Luce had long been interested in

engineering education for naval officers, and as early as 1875

he endeavored to get Professor William B. Rogers of the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology to establish a school of

naval architecture and marine engineering. He did not believe,

however, that study of the technical sciences and the art of

war were compatible. For this reason he was against training

naval engineers at the Naval Academy and the amalgamation in

1899 of the Engineer Corps with the line.

This amalgamation brought many able engineer officers into

the line but few line officers to engineering duty. In July 1905

a boiler explosion in the gunboat Bennington at San Diego

killed over 60 men. This accident prompted Luce to consider

the question of whether a man can simultaneously master two

professions; an officer of the Navy and a marine engineer.

George Melville, Chief Engineer of the Navy, at first saw the

amalgamation as a way to end the historical fight between line

and staff, but later disavowed it. * Other officers, especially Lt. Comdr. L.H. Chandler, in a Naval Institute Proceedings article,

considered amalgamation a success and claimed Luce had no

extensive experience with steam engineering qualifying him to

be a judge in this case. A compromise in this controversy was finally achieved in
226

1908 with the creation of the "engineering duty only"

designation and the establishment of the postgraduate school

to provide education for those officers.

George W. Melville to Luce, 20 October 1905, Luce Papers, LC.

128. "A Powerful Navy Not Dangerous To Civil Liberty." U.S.N.I.

Proceedings, vol. XXXII, No. 3, October 1906, pp. 1069-75.

This is a reprint of item 53 which appeared in The United

Service in January 1880. Luce has made some minor changes

in this publication in order to bring it up to date. The major

changes from the original article occur in the last three

paragraphs of the 1880 piece. He deleted the final paragraph

quoting Secretary Robeson, updated the figures for customs

revenues, and removed the sentence stating that one of the

Navy's primary source of recruits was the merchant marine.

129. "Christian Ethics an Element of Military Education." U.S.N.I.

Proceedings, vol. XXXII, No. 4, November 1906, pp. 1367-86.

This is a reprint of item 67 which appeared in The United

Service in January 1883.

130. "Calhoun's Opinion of the Navy." The Newport Mercury, vol.

CXLIX, No. 10, 18 August 1906, p. 4.

Written by Luce, unsigned of course, this editorial appeared

in the oldest Rhode Island newspaper whose manager and

editor was his friend J.P. Sanborn. The pieces are identified as having been composed by Luce from initialed copies in his

papers at the Library of Congress.

The above article was on John C. Calhoun's advocacy, in

1816, of a strong navy for the United States. In a speech as U.S. Senator from South Carolina, he stated that a navy was

"the most safe, most effective and cheapest means of defense."

Luce then mentioned Calhoun's effective reorganization of the

U.S. Army while Secretary of War in President Monroe's

administration. Later Mercury editorials, written almost a year

apart, were part of the admiral's efforts at this time to get

drydocks in the Narragansett Bay area. (See items 133, 134,

137.)

131. "Narragansett Bay as a Naval Base." Newport Daily News,

Wednesday, 31 October 1906, p. 4.

The second group of editorials were in the other local

newspaper, the Newport Daily News. The subject of all was the

same, the prospects of a naval base and dockyard in the Rhode

Island area. In the first editorial Luce lauded the policy of

concentrating our naval strength in home waters with a force

of 1 2 battleships and accompanying cruisers and destroyers. Of

course, the proper place to have that fleet based was

Narragansett Bay.
227

132. "Dangerous Dry Docks." Newport Daily News, Friday, 2 November 1906, p. 3.

In this article Luce called attention to the troubles

experienced with building the drydocks at the Brooklyn Navy

Yard in New York. He noted that similar problems with other

drydocks which had been built in wet soil had occurred at

Charleston and Port Royal, S.C. He concludes, "On the shores

of Narragansett bay may be found sites for half a dozen dry

docks, where the soil is in every respect suitable and where the

money spent will not be thrown away."

133. "Great Naval Depot." Newport Mercury, vol. CXLIX, No. 21, 3

November 1906, p. 1. This front-page story was in the form of a well-prepared

article in the usual Luce form of presenting historical evidence

first. He discussed the extensive survey that British engineers

had made in 1773-4 and their favorable report on a base in

Narragansett Bay -centrally located, near the West Indies, deep

water, little ice; a whole fleet might go from anchorage to sea

area on one tack and in not more than 1 hour. Defense was

feasible and worth the cost. A similar favorable report was submitted in 1817 by a mixed commission of officers of the U.S. Navy and Corps of

Engineers, stating Narragansett Bay was the best site for a

naval base north of Chesapeake Bay. The time was ripe, Luce

claimed, to start this base with its defensive works now

completed. See chapter VIII for an expanded version of this

same data.

134. "Navy and Dock Yards." Newport Mercury, vol. CXLIX, No. 22,

10 November 1906, p. 1. In this short article which appeared on the front page of the

Mercury, Luce discussed the Navy's need for a dockyard and

drydocks. Noting that for the first time in American history

the United States had "a fleet that is a fleet," it must be

properly maintained. He pointed out the requisites for a good

dockyard and concluded that "all these requirements are to be

found in an eminent degree in Narragansett Bay."

135. "Up-To-Date Dock Yards." Newport Daily News, Monday, 19

November 1906, p. 4.

Luce starts this article with the shocking statement,

"Japanese battleship Satsuma, 19,000 tons was launched last

week. Her tonnage exceeds that of the English Dreadnought by

about 1,000 tons." He goes on to warn that Japan, as well as England and Germany, were building suitable docks for their

dreadnoughts. Great Britain already had 5 government and 10

private docks that could handle them. The United States

would soon have ships of that type, and it takes as long to

build a dock as it does the ship it will serve. Congress should

appropriate funds for the construction of such a dock as soon
228

as possible. For ships drawing 28-30 feet of water, Narragansett Bay is the only place on the coast where all the

requirements for a dockyard are available.

136. "An American Dreadnought." Newport Daily News, Tuesday, 4

December 1906, p. 4.

In his last article for the Daily News, Luce discusses the new

large ships under construction, the Connecticut-class battleships, the Invincibie-class of armored English cruisers, mer- chant ships like the White Star Line's Baltic and Adriatic,

Cunard's Lusitania, and the German Kaiserin Auguste Victoria.

In view of these figures it behooves us to see that our new dockyard shall be built to meet all possible

contingencies, and that the site shall have all the

advantages demanded by its importance. Narragansett

bay possesses all those advantages in a marked degree. To

build a dry dock today, of given size only to increase

that size tomorrow in order to meet new conditions, is to throw away money. We have had already too much of

that policy.

137. "The Value of the Dry Dock." Newport Mercury, vol. CL, No.

24, 23 November 1907, p. 4.

The final article on the subject of drydocks appeared in the

Mercury almost a year after the others. Like the previous

editorials in that weekly, it was well thought out and ably

presented. "We cannot close with the enemy" had been the cry

of British seamen in the 1 8th century when French ships were

sheathed and the British not. Copper sheathing for iron ships

had proved infeasible, and so the only remedy for their heavy

bottom fouling was frequent docking in order to scrape, clean,

and paint. Luce explains how fouling affects speed and coal

consumption as well as the special need for frequent docking

in wartime. His final editorial again invited interest in

Narragansett Bay and pointed out the fallacy of the drydock at

Brooklyn.

138. "The Fleet." The North American Review, vol. CLXXXVIII, No.

635, October 1908, pp. 564-76. (This article is reprinted with

annotation in chapter VI.)

139. "Wanted-an Admiralty Staff." Army and Navy Life, 1 vol. XIV,

No. 1, January 1909, pp. 13-19.

This presentation with an appropriate title represents Luce's

final effort to bring the defects of the Navy at this time to

public notice. It forms a succinct summary, but without

repetition, of his several articles on naval administration,

including "The Department of the Navy."

He begins, as usual, with early administrative history. The

Navy Department, at the behest of Secretary William Jones,

was properly organized with a military and a civil side only
229

after the War of 1812. Its primary feature was the inclusion of

three post captains appointed as commissioners to advise the

Secretary. The defect in this organization was that no

provision was made for a similar staff on the civil side.

The result was that the three commissioners had to perform

these duties. This became a heavy burden, so in 1842 the

Bureau system was adopted. But this had the effect of

separating the senior officers in the Department from the

Secretary and also from each other. The Secretary was without

counsel. An outstanding Navy declined to such a discreditable

state that by 1889 the country was without any form of naval

defense.

Luce sums up: . . . naval administration includes two separate and distinct parts, each one indispensable to the other, the

military and the civil. The employment of vessels of war

should be under the military head; construction, armament,

and equipment belongs to the civil branch.

The Secretary should be chosen from civil life. And there

must be a small but select board of naval officers to act as advisers to him on policy and on all questions relating to the

employment of vessels of war. The senior officer of this board

should be one of high rank and wide experience. This board

would form an admiralty staff and be a part of the secretariat.

Army and Navy Life was the successor to The United Service and

The Bluejacket. The former had been sold in late 1905 to W.D. Walker,

who founded Army and Navy Life. The new periodical was well

illustrated, contained news of all armed services, and advocated

increased armaments. Its "big navy" policy attracted both abuse and

praise from newspapers. The magazine was not a financial success, and

in August 1909 Walker abandoned it.

140. "Naval Strategy." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXV, No. 1, 1909,

pp. 93-112. (This article is reprinted with annotation in

chapter VII.)

141. "Naval Training, II." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXVI, No. 1,

1910, pp. 103-23.

This article was delivered as a lecture at the Naval War

College in October 1910. It was the fourth Luce had delivered

on the subject since the one printed in the Proceedings in

1874, and it was designed as a sequel to item 89 published in

1890. Despite these efforts, the Navy was still plagued with

enlistment problems. Luce had recommended industrial education methods in 1874, and he had put them into effect in the

Training Squadron. The Spanish War and the expansion of the

Navy after the war had forced the abandonment of the

Training Squadron and the naval apprentice system. Instead,

men of from 21 to 25 were being trained in barracks or camps

ashore in a manner that did about everything, in Luce's

opinion, to make them unfit for life on board ship.

A movement to supplement industrial education for general
230

education was being adopted at this time, and Luce supported

this strongly in his article.

The desertion situation at this time was deplorable with

5,000 missing annually from an enlisted strength of 38,500.

The Department's methods for correcting this were (1) making

service in the Navy more attractive; and (2) increasing

punishments. This was the carrot and stick technique, but

Luce claimed a third way had more merit: naturalizing youths

to ship life during their formative years with enlistments at age

14 to 17 years. Older recruits with fixed habits and social

affiliations can never adjust to life on board ship, whereas for

the young naval apprentice "that little warlike world" within

the ship, with all its privations, becomes to him a second

nature.

Luce's program for providing the Navy with skilled seamen

remained always the same:

1. Get boys inured early to ship life. 2. Provide advancement for ability, efficiency, and good

conduct.

3. Seek legislation for liberal pensions and retirement.

142. "The U.S. Naval War College." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXVI,

No. 2, 1910, pp. 559-86.

During the period from September 1910 to September

1911, Stephen B. Luce published his swan song on the Naval

War College in the form of three articles in the Proceedings:

first, a long piece in two parts on its history (items 142 and

143) and two shorter articles (items 144 and 145) on what he

believed should be the relations between the War College and

the Navy Department and between it and the line officers of

the Navy.

In the first part of the historical piece, Luce recounts the

early stages, and especially the early difficulties, of the

institution. He gives a summary of the 10 sessions held

between the first in 1885 and that of 1897. He goes into

considerable detail on the efforts of Secretary William C.

Whitney in 1888 to close the institution by wrongly joining it with the Torpedo School. Secretary Benjamin F. Tracy, in

1889, reversed the Whitney closing orders. The next Secretary,

Hilary A. Herbert, at first held that if the War College should

be allowed to exist at all, it should be at the Naval Academy.

He changed his views after reading Captain Mahan's Influence

of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 and became an ardent

supporter. But the man who, in fact, put the War College on a permanent basis was Capt. Henry C. Taylor, President of the

Naval War College, 1893 to 1897.

143. "The U.S. Naval War College, (concluded)." U.S.N.I. Proceedings,

vol. XXXVI, No. 3, 1910, pp. 683-96.

This piece is a continuation of item 142. The second part

paid tribute to Capt. William McCarty Little and his Naval War
231

Game; Luce discussed American Kriegsspiel at some length. He

reviewed the numerous war colleges that had followed the

American naval institution, including the U.S. Army War

College at Washington.

He quotes from the writings of Maj. W.R. Livermore, the

U.S. Army expert on war gaming who had served on the staff

of the Naval War College. In discussing the Royal Naval War

College, Luce quotes extensively from Sir Julian Corbett's

articles in the London Times l in which he points out the value

of the "War Course" and mentions that it was designed

broadly on the lines of the American War College when it was

established in 1901. Luce then goes on to discuss the French

and German Naval War Colleges.

However, this section in the main was devoted to the

success at Newport of the study of marine international law

under Rear Adm. C.H. Stockton, Professor John B. Moore of

Columbia University, and Georg G. Wilson of Brown. The

recognition of the work of the Naval War College in international law had by 1910 become worldwide, and the International Law Situation volumes, the "blue books" published

annually, have become authoritative texts in this field of

study.

Luce went on to discuss the curriculum of the college in

detail. He noted that the study of international law had

momentarily outstripped the study of the art and science of

warfare, the subject that should be the principal branch of

study at the college. Speaking about the methods of teaching

used at the college, Luce noted,

The value of lectures on professional subjects must not

be underrated. They are indispensable. But it is one of

the principles of the Science of Education that throughout youth and in maturity the process in the acquisition

of knowledge shall be one of self-instruction. Knowledge

which the student has himself acquired, a problem which

he has himself solved, becomes by virtue of the conquest

much more thoroughly his own than it could otherwise

be.

For this reason, Luce always encouraged independent study

which did not rely on the lecture method of instruction. He

quoted from Herbert Spencer to support his thesis and then

pointed to Mahan as an example of a scholar who achieved his

position by individual application.

Turning to the field of naval history itself, Luce observed

that for the most part it was a collection of isolated and

independent facts. While the story of engagements was

fascinating in itself and worthy of study, the student must go

on and discover the relationship between these apparently

isolated facts.

What then had appeared to him as a series of independent, unrelated facts, he finds out to be phenomena

which fall within the province of law. In short he has, by
232

self effort, gained knowledge, and has worked out for

himself the science of Naval Strategy. "Science is organized knowledge."

Of course this was not all that Luce saw to the study of

strategy. "There is a still higher field of inquiry. Why were

those two nations at war?"

In his final words, Luce expressed the hope that there

would be a few officers who were willing and anxious to

specialize along the lines that Mahan had laid down. "To such

the War College extends a cordial welcome."

^.S. Corbett, "Naval War Course," The Times, Tuesday, 5 June

1906, p. 6, and "Naval War Course, No. II," The Times, Saturday, 9

June 1906, p. 6.

144. "On the True Relations Between the Department of the Navy and

the Naval War College." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXVII,

No. 1, 1911, pp. 83-86.

1. The sole reason for the existence of the Navy

Department is the probability of war.

2. The most important office in the Navy Department (after that of the Secretary of the Navy) is the

office of naval operations.

3. All other offices in the navy are merely subsidiary

to that one particular office -the Office for the Conduct

of War.

There follows in this 4-page article 20 more numbered

paragraphs which give a striking summation of the relationships that should exist between these two pillars of naval

preparation for war. The last summary paragraph states flatly that the purpose

of the Naval War College is educational, not functional, that it

is neither a war board nor a naval general staff. Herein is the

difference, still existent today, between the Naval War College's approach to higher education and that of many other

service schools.

145. "On the Relations Between the U.S. Naval War College and the

Line Officers of the U.S. Navy. U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol.

XXXVII, No. 3, 1911, pp. 787-99.

This article embraces the last address that Luce made before

the institution he founded. It was presented at the Naval and

Military Conference on 2 June 1911, in the presence of

Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer, the man who

transformed the report of the Moody Board into the reality

that, by 1915, became the Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations.

Luce was now 84 years old, and he had returned to inactive

duty the previous year. He could have taken this as an

opportunity to reminisce historically, as he loved to do.
233

Instead, he chose to make a fighting speech about the future of

the Navy.

He was frankly worried because there was so much interest

in the new postgraduate school of engineering and still so little in the War College, showing that the majority of officers still cared little about the main purpose of their profession.

Instead of 4 months, Luce wanted a course of 2 years.

! Let officers who have completed their terms of

sea-service in their respective grades, come here for a two-year course of study; not for discussion, but for

study. On the completion of such a course they will then

be eligible as conferees to discuss intelligently questions

relating to naval warfare -and not before.

He cites the dangers of the crude views of bright, but untrained

minds that go forth with the imprimatur of the college.

"Your profession is the art of war and nature will be

avenged if you violate one of its laws in undertaking to make a

part greater than the whole."

*In 1911 the War College Course was extended to 1 year from a course of several months.

146. "The Navy and Its Needs." The North American Review, vol.

CXCIII, No. 665, April 1911, pp. 494-507. (This article is reprinted with annotation in chapter VIII.)

147. "The Spanish-American War." The North American Review, vol.

CXCIV, No. 671, October 1911, pp. 612-27.

Presumably a book review of Rear Adm. French E.

Chadwick, The Spanish-American War (New York: Scribner,

1911), this piece was actually a tribute to and defense of

Luce's good friend, Rear Adm. William T. Sampson, commander of North Atlantic Squadron that engaged the Spanish

Squadron off Santiago de Cuba on 3 July 1898. Chadwick was

commander of the flagship New York and acted as chief of

staff for Sampson.

Luce in the review confined himself to the Battles of Manila

Bay and Santiago; Chadwick, in his two volumes, devoted

himself to the history of hostilities only and did not discuss

the unfortunate Schley-Sampson controversy after it. Luce

confined himself to arguing the point of whether Sampson had

control during the battle or whether it was a "Captain's fight,"

with the issue determined by the actions of the ships'

commanders on their own volition. In this case, however, Luce

showed that Sampson had planned the method of attack,

everything was done as he had ordered, and the situation at all times was the same as if he had been there.

Luce gives examples of soldiers' fights on land such as Missionary Ridge in the Civil War and the battles of British

naval history. He mentions the Battle of the Nile where victory
234

was achieved by the individual actions of Nelson's four leading

captains "without stripping one leaf from Nelson's laurels."

The country that Sampson had served well paid him no

mark of honor. He died without receiving the thanks of

Congress or promotion in rank. He became instead the victim

of a controversy for which he was in no way responsible and in

which he took no part.

148. "The Board of Navy Commissioners. Commissioners for Executing the Office of Constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the

Navy of the United States." U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol.

XXXVII, No. 4, 1911, pp. 1113-35.

It must be left to conjecture whether or not this last

published article of Stephen B. Luce was so by intent or

accident. There can be no doubt that the subject of this article

was among his favorites, and it can be justifiably surmised that

he wanted to have this piece presented in indisputable form

before the end of his writing career. His prolific output

suddenly ends in December of 1911, a year in which he

published two articles in The North American Review and four

in the Proceedings. The previous year he had published his

"Naval Training II." The subject of this article, "The Board of Navy Commissioners," was discussed in virtually every piece of writing on

naval administration that Luce did in over 30 years of

endeavoring to get military direction in naval affairs. At only

one period in our history did the Navy have this form of

direction, from 1815 to 1842.

What made his last treatment of this subject novel was his

placing of an examination of the organization of the Navy with

his recommendations regarding it into an easily understood

tabular form. For purposes of analysis, he divides the naval

administrative functions into two columns. On the left side are the executive and military branches charged with the employment of vessels of war. On the right are the civil and industrial

branches for the procurement of naval stores and materials,

construction, armament, and equipment for vessels of war. The first table is that showing that the Act of 1789 which

created the organization of the Navy Department failed to

provide for its military or civil direction, except by the

Secretary of the Navy. The second table, dated 1815, however,

does show a provision for the Board of Commissioners and for

military direction. The third table shows the impact of the Act

of 1842, which transferred direction, providing for the civil

but not military direction. As Luce put it, "The Act supplied

the left arm of the militant body; but cut off the right arm."

Luce then offered a table that would provide both right and

left arms; "a scheme of naval administration based on sound

military and business principles." He proposed the following:
235

The President (Commander in Chief)

The Secretary of the Navy

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy

Military and Executive Branch: Civil and Industrial Branch:

Navy Commissioners. Bureau of Yards and Docks.

The chairman of the board Bureau of Navigation.

to be "the one responsible Bureau of Ordnance.

Adviser to the Secretary." Bureau of Construction and Repair

Bureau of Steam Engineering.

Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Without executive authority

This is followed by three pages, extracted from the Moody

Board Report of 1909 entitled "General Principles Governing

Naval Organization." This had been written by Mahan, but its ideas had come from Luce.

The conclusion states: ... It should be distinctly laid down as a cardinal

principle that no scheme of naval organization can

possibly be effective which does not recognize that the

requirement of war is the true standard of efficiency in an administrative military system; that success in war

and victory in battle can be assured only by that

constant preparedness and that superior fighting efficiency which logically result from placing the control

and responsibility in time of peace upon the same

individuals and the same agencies that must control in

time of war. "We have fashioned the instrument-the fleet;" concluded

Luce, "but we have failed to provide the power to wield it as a weapon of war.

This power was finally acquired in 1915. But no reaction

was to come from Stephen B. Luce. He had laid down his pen;

he had "written himself out."
236

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237

CHAPTER XI

CHRONOLOGY OF LIFE AND WRITINGS

1827 March 25

1835

1841 Oct. 19

Born Albany, N.Y., third son and fifth child to

reach adulthood of Vinal and Charlotte

Bleecker Luce.

Vinal Luce, a druggist, obtained employment as a clerk in the new independent Treasury

Department, and the family moved to

Washington, D.C.

Appointed midshipman by President Martin

Van Buren.

1841 Nov. 4

1842 April 2

1843 May 3

1845 March 14

1845 May 26

1846 July 20

1847 March 3

Ordered to U.S.S. North Carolina, receiving

ship at New York.

Ordered to new 50-gun frigate Congress at

Portsmouth, N.H. Reported 20 April. Ship

commissioned 7 May, sailed 15 July for

Mediterranean. Transferred to South Atlantic

Station, December 1843, serving there until

January 1845.

Warranted midshipman after an 18 months

probationary period.

Congress decommissioned at Norfolk. Luce

granted 3-months leave.

Ordered to report without delay to 92-gun

ship-of-the-line Columbus at New York. Reported 28 May. Ship departed 3 June on

3-year cruise around the world.

Columbus in Yeddo (Tokyo) Bay, Japan.

Departed 29 July for Honolulu and California.

Columbus arrived Monterey Bay; at San

Francisco 23 June, departed for Norfolk, Va.,

25 July.
238

1848 March 13 Columbus decommissioned at Navy Yard, Norfolk. Luce to report to Naval Academy, 1

April.

1848 June 22 Summer leave from Naval Academy until 10

October.

1849 March 6 Involved in a disturbance at the Academy,

punished by loss of 72 numbers in a class of

135. Position on active list restored in January

1862.

1849 Aug. 20 Ordered to 20-gun sloop of war Vandalia,

Pacific Squadron.

1849 Sep. 29 Warranted as passed midshipman from 10

August 1847.

1851 April 30 Requested furlough of 1 year to enter merchant service, repeating a similar request made

in June 1850. Refused because only lieutenants were allowed this privilege.

1852 Oct. 12 Detached Vandalia at New York with 3

months leave.

1852 Dec. 31 Ordered to duty with Lt. James M. Gillis,

astronomer, at Navy Yard, Washington, assisting with calculations connected with his observations of Venus and Mars, 1849-1852.

1853 May 9 Ordered to steamer Vixen, Home Squadron.

1854 Feb. 4 Detached Vixen with 3 months leave, suffering

from yellow fever.

1854 May 18 Ordered to Coast Survey serving along Atlantic

Coast in Madison, Crawford, and Bibb under

Lts. John N. Maffitt and C.R.P. Rodgers.

1854 Dec. 7 Married childhood friend Eliza Henley of

Washington, D.C., youngest daughter of Commodore John D. Henley. She was a grandniece

of Martha Washington.
239

1855 Sep. 15 Promoted to master and lieutenant on suc- Sep. 16 ceeding days due to large number of officers

retired or separated by the Naval Efficiency

Act.

1857 Nov. 16 Ordered to sloop of war Jamestown, 20 guns,

Home Squadron, stationed on east coast of

Central America.

1860 March 2

1861 May 2

Detached Jamestown and reported to Naval

Academy, assigned as instructor of Seamanship.

Ordered without delay to steam frigate

Wabash. Orders were received while Luce

family was being transported to Newport, R.I.,

where Naval Academy was located during the

Civil War.

1861 Oct. 10 Ordered back to Naval Academy but delivery

of orders delayed until 11 January 1862 to

allow Luce to take part in Port Royal campaign.

1862 March 29 Revised W.H. Parker's Instructions for Light

Artillery, Afloat and Ashore. Second edition

published under Luce's name in New York by

Van Nostrand.

1862 May 12

1862 Aug. 5

1863 June 4

First edition of Seamanship text prepared and

published at Newport, R.I. Third printing by

Van Nostrand under Luce's name appeared in

1863.

Promoted to lieutenant commander from 16

July.

Ordered to command frigate Macedonian for

cruise with midshipmen to England and

France.

1863 Sep. 29 Report submitted on practice cruise, forwarded to Navy Department.
240

1863 Oct. 13 Ordered to command monitor Nantucket of

South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

1863 Oct. 24 Earliest published article appeared in Army

and Navy Journal, first of a series of five

entitled "Training Ships."

1864 Sep. 2 Assumed command of double-ender gunboat

Pontiac, SAB Squadron.

1865 Jan. 13 Luce with Pontiac ordered to report to Gen.

W.T. Sherman to guard crossing of Savannah

River by left wing of his army, moving north.

1865 June 9 Pontiac placed out of commission at Navy

Yard, N.Y.

1865 July 26 Request for leave of absence to enter merchant

service disapproved.

1865 Sep. 26 Ordered to Naval Academy, reestablished at

Annapolis, Md., as Commandant of Midshipmen.

1866 July 25 Promoted to commander.

1866 Nov. 17 Circular letter from Luce sent to prominent

citizens proposing establishment of nautical

colleges.

1868 Sep. 30 Detached from Naval Academy to command

double-ender Mohongo, Pacific Fleet. Traveled

to Mare Island, Calif, via Pacific Mail Steamer.

Took command 10 November. Cruised in Gulf

of California.

1869 May 26 Detached from Mohongo; returned from

Pacific coast by railroad.

1869 July 1 Took command of steam sloop-of-war Juniata,

commissioned 19 July at Philadelphia for duty

in Mediterranean Squadron.
241

1870 Aug. 26 Juniata ordered to Helgoland Island, North

Sea, to observe French naval blockade of

Germany during Franco-Prussian War.

1871 July 22 First of seven articles on "Naval Tactics" by

Vice Adm. Jean Pierre Edmond Jurien de la

Graviere, translated by Luce and published in

Army and Navy Journal. Last appeared 2

September.

1871 Oct. 24 Letter in London Times from Griffen and Co.,

publishers of G.S. Nares' text on Seamanship

accused Van Nostrand, and Luce indirectly, of

plagiarism.

1872 May 1 Essay, "Regina dal Chin" published in The

Galaxy, vol. XIII.

1872 July 1 Detached Juniata. Assumed duty as Equipment Officer, Boston Navy Yard, 14 September 1872.

1872 Dec. 28 Promoted to captain.

1873 July 11 Ordered to consult with Board of Education,

City of New York, on establishment of a

nautical school.

1873 Nov. 13 Lecture, "The Manning of the Navy and

Mercantile Marine," before Annapolis Chapter

of Naval Institute, published as first article in

U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. I, No. 1 (1874).

1874 June 20 Prepared bill which became law authorizing

loan of naval vessels to a state for purposes of

nautical schoolships and the detail of officers as instructors. St. Mary's so fitted out by Luce,

ready January 1875.

1874 Dec. 20 Wrote Introduction to History of the United

States Marine Corps by Capt. Richard S.

Collum, USMC, published 1875, 1890, and

1903.
242

1875 Oct. 15 Detached Navy Yard, Boston, and on 26

October assumed command of Hartford at

Hampton Roads.

1876 Feb. 7 Met Representative Washington C. Whitthorne

of Tennessee, Democratic Chairman of House

Naval Affairs Committee.

1876 April 20 Lecture "Fleets of the World" before U.S.

Naval Academy Chapter of Naval Institute.

Published in U.S.N. I. Proceedings, vol. Ill

(1877).

1876 Aug. 12 First of six articles on "Modern Navies"

published in Army and Navy Journal. Last

appeared 7 October 1876.

1876 Nov. 1 First of three articles that appeared in Potter's

American Monthly.

1877 Feb. 1 Essay, "The Modern Pythia," The Galaxy, vol.

XXIII.

1877 May 1 Book review, Fleets of the World by Commodore F.A. Parker, The Galaxy, vol. XXIII.

1877 Aug. 21 Detached Hartford for temporary duty in

connection with training ships. Assumed command 31 December 1877 of steam frigate

Minnesota, training ship.

1879 July 1 Essay, "United States Naval Training Ships,"

The United Service, vol. I.

1879 Oct. 21 Bailey Medal, established by Luce, first

awarded to the outstanding naval apprentice.

Medal endowed in honor of Commodore

Theodorus Bailey.

1880 Jan. 1 Essay, "A Powerful Navy Not Dangerous to

Civil Liberty," The United Service, vol. II. Reprinted in U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXII

(September 1906).
243

1880 Dec. 18 Board of which Luce is a member selects

Coasters Harbor Island, Newport, as permanent base for naval training.

1881 Feb. 15 Detached from command of Minnesota, 11

April 1881; took command of newly formed

Training Squadron.

1881 Nov. 25 Promoted to commodore.

1882 May 1 Essay, "Our Naval Policy," The United Service, vol. VI.

1882 April 17 Departed on naval apprentice training cruise to

Europe on board Portsmouth accompanied by

Saratoga. Returned to Narragansett Bay, 8

October 1882.

1882 Aug. 5 Appointed senior member, Commission to

Investigate Navy Yards. Final report submitted

1 December 1883.

1883 Jan. 1 Essay, "Christian Ethics as an Element of

Military Education," The United Service, vol.

VIII. Reprinted in U.S.N. I. Proceedings (December 1906).

1883 April 4 Lecture "War Schools," to Newport branch of

U.S. Naval Institute. Published in U.S.N.I.

Proceedings, vol. IX.

1883 June 17 Naval Songs, compiled by and with an introduction by Luce, published. First edition

reprinted in 1888, second edition 1902, with

reprintings in 1908 and 1918.

1884 July 16 Detached from command of Training Squadron and took temporary command of North

Atlantic Station 27 July 1884. Appointed

acting rear admiral 23 July 1884.

1884 Sep. 20 Assumed duty as President, Naval War College.
244

1885 Jan. 1 Essay, "United States Naval War College," The

United Service, vol. XII.

1885 Sep. 4 Introductory lecture, "On the Study of Naval

Warfare as a Science," at opening session Naval

War College. Repeated 6 September 1886 and

published in U.S.N. I. Proceedings, vol. XII

(1886).

1885 Sep. 5 Lecture, "On the Study of Naval History

(Grand Tactics)," Naval War College. Repeated

7 September 1886 and published in U.S.N.I.

Proceedings, vol. XIII (1887).

1886 Jan. 30 Commissioned rear admiral with date of rank 5

October 1885.

1886 June 18 Detached as President, Naval War College, to

command North Atlantic Station.

1887 Aug. 6 Canadian fisheries dispute. Secretary of the

Navy W.C. Whitney ordered Luce to withdraw

his instructions to American fishermen on

basis that it reflected Canadian and not U.S.

interpretation of treaty on fishing rights.

1888 March 1 Presidential Address to U.S. Naval Institute,

published in U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XIV.

1888 June 6 Lecture "Naval Administration," published in

U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XIV (September

1888).

1888 Sep. 11 Passage through inland waterways from New

York to Norfolk in Herreshoff steam launch

Vixen. Reached Annapolis 14 September and

Norfolk 18 September 1888. Delayed by bad

weather which damaged launch to extent that

continuation to Ferandina, Fla., had to be

abandoned.

1888 Dec. 8 Luce in Galena with Yantic ordered to Port au

Prince, Haiti, to obtain surrender of American
245

steamer, Haytian Republic, charged with

running a blockade by government forces

during a recent rebellion. Luce commended by

State Department for conducting negotiations

with tact, judgment, and discretion.

1889 Jan. 18 Letter about retirement to Mrs. Luce from

Galena en route to Key West: "I will then have

done with the Navy for the rest of my natural

life."

The Retired Years

1889 Feb. 1 Relieved all active duty. Transferred to the

retired list 25 March 1889.

1889 March 14

1889

Letter to Secretary Benjamin F. Tracy, giving

the reasons why the proposed plan for amalgamating the Naval War College with the Torpedo School should be reviewed. Thirteen

typescript pages.

May 30 Article, "Just the Boy That's Wanted for the

Navy," the first of seven that appeared in The

Youth's Companion, 1889-1898.

1889 July 1 Essay, "Our Future Navy," the first published

in The North American Review. Reprinted in

U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XV (December

1889).

1890 March 1 Lecture, "Naval Training," to Naval Institute,

published in U.S.N. I. Proceedings, vol. XVI

(September 1890).

1890 June 26 Book review of A.T. Mahan's Influence of Sea

Power Upon History, 1660-1783 in The Critic,

beginning a 16-year period of reviewing in that

periodical, including all Mahan's works, G.F.R.

Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (1898), and William L. Clowes, A

History of the Royal Navy, seven volumes,

1897-1903.
246

1890 Sep. 22 Letter to Secretary opposing amalgamation of

the Revenue Marine with the Navy.

1890 Dec. 15 Accepted position of naval editor of Funk and

Wagnalls, Standard Dictionary of the English

Language, first edition, 1894.

1891 May 1 Essay, "How Shall We Man Our Ships," North

American Review, vol. CLII.

1891 Dec. 1 Essay, "The Benefits of War," published in

North American Review. Reprinted under title

"War and Its Prevention," U. S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXX (September 1904).

1892 May 13 Appointed Commissioner General of the

United States Commission for the Columbian

Historical Exposition at Madrid, Spain, 11

November 1892 to 31 January 1893.

1893 May 27 Permission granted to leave the United States

for 1 year.

1895 Dec. 1 Essay, "As to Navy- Yards and Their Defense,"

U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXI.

1896 Jan. 1 Essay, "Naval Warfare Under Modern Conditions," North American Review, vol. CLXII.

1896 Jan. 7 Lecture, "The Story of the Monitor," before

the Military History Society of Massachusetts,

published in the Society Papers, vol. XII

(1902). This lecture had been delivered many

times, the first to the apprentice boys and

crew of Hartford in 1876.

1898 Sep. 1 "The Dawn of Naval History," U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXIV.

1901 Aug. 13 Ordered to active duty, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
247

1902 Dec. 1 Essay, "Naval Administration II," published in

U.S.N. I. Proceedings, vol. XXVIII, a sequel to

"Naval Administration" in vol. XIV (1888).

"Naval Administration III" appeared in vol.

XXIX (December 1903) having been given as a

lecture 11 June 1903.

1903 June 2 Address delivered at the Naval War College,

published in U.S.N. I. Proceedings, vol. XXIX

(September 1903).

1904 April 11 First efforts by Navy Department to get a April 26 naval general staff enacted into law fails.

1904 July 26 Death of Henry C. Taylor in Toronto, Canada.

1905 March 1 Essay, "The Department of the Navy," won

honorable mention in U.S. Naval Institute's

prize essay contest. Published in U.S.N.I.

Proceedings, vol. XXXI.

1905 Sep. 1 Narrative essay, "Commodore Biddle's Visit to

Japan in 1846," published in U. S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXI. A shorter version appeared in the Newport, R.I. Mercury, 7 February 1903.

1906 Jan. Essay, "A Plea for an Engineer Corps in the

Navy." North American Review, vol.

CLXXXII.

1906 Nov. 17 First letter to W.S. Sims, relating to his article,

"The Inherent Tactical Qualities of All-Big

Gun, One Caliber Battleships of High Speed,

Large Deplacement and Gunpower," which

was to appear in the U.S.N. I. Proceedings, vol.

XXXII (December 1906).

1907 April 30 Submitted to Secretary T.H. Metcalfe, a plan

for naval administration reform which included his unpublished "Memorandum on

Naval Efficiency" of 25 March 1907.
248

1907 Oct. 1 Lecture, "The Fleet" delivered at the Naval

War College and published in North American

Review, vol. CLXXXVIII (October 1908).

1907 Oct. 1 George H. Putnam expressed a desire to

publish Luce's autobiography or reminiscences. Putnam eventually published Gleaves'

biography of Luce.

1907 Dec. 10 Dinner given by W.C. Church at the Union

League Club to surviving male contributors to

The Galaxy. Luce did not attend.

1908 April 30 Luce sent W.S. Sims a copy of 'The Fleet"

and also unpublished "Circular for Naval Officers," 1904, relating to the attempt to get

Congress that year to establish a general staff

for the Navy.

1909 Jan. 1 Essay, "Wanted-An Admiralty Staff," published in Army and Navy Life, vol. XIV.

1909 Jan. 7

1909 Feb. 26

1909 March

1909 March 4

1909 Oct. 6

Appointed to Board of Naval Reorganization,

which was reinstituted 27 January 1909, by

President Roosevelt, independent of Secretary

Truman H. Newberry, as the Moody Commission to recommend how best to emphasize the

military character of the Navy Department.

At Luce's suggestion, Moody Commission Report was submitted so as to reach Congress

before adjournment.

Lecture, "Naval Strategy," published in

U. S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXV.

George V.L. Meyer appointed Secretary of the

Navy by President Taft.

Lecture, "Naval Training II," delivered at

Naval War College and published in U.S.N. I. Proceedings, vol. XXXVI (March 1910).
1909 Dec. 1

1910 March 1

1910 Nov. 20

249

Moody Commission recommendations implemented by Secretary Meyer's appointment of

Naval Aides for Operations, Personnel, Material, and Inspections.

Essay, "The Naval War College," published in

two parts in U.S.N. I. Proceedings, vol. XXXVI.

Released from active duty, on the insistence of

Senator Eugene Hale of the Naval Affairs

Committee.

1911 March 1

1911 April 1

Essay, "On the True Relations Between the

Department of the Navy and the Naval War

College," U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXVII.

Essay, "The Navy and Its Needs," North

American Review, vol. CXCIII.

1911 June 2

1911 Oct. 1

1911 Dec. 1

1917 July 28

1917 Aug. 11

Lecture, "On the Relations Between the U.S.

Naval War College and the Line Officers of the

U.S. Navy," published in U.S.N.I. Proceedings,

vol. XXXVII (September 1911).

Book review, "The Spanish American War,"

North American Review, vol. CXCIV.

Essay, "The Board of Navy Commissioners,"

U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXXVII.

Died, 15 Francis St., Newport, R.I. Age 90.

Buried, St. Mary's Episcopal Church graveyard,

Portsmouth, R.I.

Obituary by Frank W. Hackett in Army and

Navy Journal included the sentence: "A writer

equal to the task may well take up betimes the

work of giving to his countrymen a complete

story of the character, and of the great

achievements of Admiral Luce."

251

APPENDIX

CATEGORY LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

CITED IN CHAPTERS IX AND X

Naval Organization and Administration: Items 10, 37, 38, 39, 66, 70, 84, 102,

117, 122, 125, 138, 139, 144, 146, 148.

Naval Warfare: Items 16-22, 53, 79, 81, 86, 87, 102, 104, 140.

Maritime and Naval History: Items 28, 30-35, 36, 41, 43, 111, 118, 119, 126,

130, 147.

Officer Education: Items 1, 3, 68, 73, 75, 121, 127, 142-143, 144, 145.

Sea Training: Items 5-9, 13, 24, 27, 29, 50, 51, 89, 92, 141.

Interesting Youths in the Sea Life: Items 85, 93, 95, 96, 103, 105, 109.

Military Ethics: Items 53, 67, 94.

General Subjects: Items 23, 42, 101.

Book Reviews: Items 44, 88, 97, 98, 106, 107, 108, 110, 113, 114, 115, 123,

147.

Encyclopedias and Dictionaries: Items 45-49, 54-65, 99.

Textbooks: Items 1, 3, 29, 69, 71, 112, 116.

Public Relations: Items 10, 50, 80, 82.

253

INDEX

Achilles 129

Actium, battle of 62,76

Adams, Brooks 29,33

Adams, Charles F. 180, 18 In

Adams, Henry 203

administration, Naval see Naval administration and government

Agamemnon 43

Agassiz, Jean L.R. 55

Agrippa, Marcus V. 75

Ahab, King 43

Albemarle, Duke of see Monk 58n,77,89

Aldrich, Almy 174

Aldrich, Nelson W. 15

Alexander the Great 50,62,63,76,101,

129-30

Alger, Philip R. xi

Almanza, battle of 130,130n

American frontier 2

Amherst, Jeffrey, Baron Amherst 103

anchoring 170,171,188

Anson, George, Baron Anson 91

arbitration, international 150

Arbuthnot, Mariot 82,82n

Aristobulus of Cassandreia 1 29

Army schools ll,47,49,49n,191

Arrian, Flavius A. 129

art of war 38,44,76,101,106,134-40,216,

233

astronomy 6,52-53

B

Bainbridge, William 159,220

Bainbridge-Hoff, William 95,95n

Baker. Charles H. 194

Bancroft, George SecNav 180, 18 In, 195

Bannerman, St Henry C. 113

Barham, Baron see Middleton 137,138,

140

Barnard, Frederick A.P. 185

Barnard, Henry 170

Barnes, John S. 204-215

comment on Luce 24-25

Barnette, William J. 110

Barras, Comte Louis de 86,87,134

Barry, William F. 191

Bartlett, Samuel C. 65

Basseterre Road, St. Kitt 61

Bates, Arthur L. 146

Bates, Richard W. 206n

battle, the moral effect of 54

battleships 16,112-16,124,148,150,203-

05,228

Benson, William S. 218-19

Bettesworth, George E.B. 137

Bidder, Friedrich H. 55

Biddle, James 222,224

Bigot, Sebastien F. 85,85n. See Morogues

Blaine, James G. 212

Blake, George S. 165

Blake, Robert 58,58n,77

Bliss, Cornelius N. 143

Bliss, Tasker 32,47,67,67n

blockade 9,76-77,85,137-38,177,222

Boer War 122

Bolingbroke, Viscount 74n. See St. John

Bonaparte, Charles J. SecNav 22,122,224

Bonaparte, Napoleon 50,61,62,63,87,101,

104,105,107,129,130,131,132,136,

137,138,139

Boscawen, Edward 91,103

Bouet-Willaumez, Comte Louis E. 59,67,

67n,71

Bowles, Sir William 59,59n

Brahe, Tycho 52,52n,54

Brenton, Edward P. 216

Brewington, M.V. 218

British Navy see Navy, British

Brooklyn Navy yard 227

Brown-Se'quard, Charles E. 55

Bryce, Lloyd 33,203

Buckle, Thomas H. 46,51n,53n,55

Bureaus, Naval see Naval Bureaus

Burrows, Montagu 88n,93n

Byng, John 61,78,79,82,83,90

Byron, George G., Baron Byron 139,183

Byron, John 82,82n

Caesar, Julius 50,62,63,101,107,130,131

Calder, Sir Robert 137,138

Calhoun, John C. 226

Camara, Manuel de la 136

Canadian fisheries question 13-14

Canadian Navy 148,148n

Cannae, battle of 75,75n

Cannon, Joseph G. 114

Caroline and Ladrone Islands 19

Cass, Lewis 176

Cervera y Topete, Pasqual 120,123,135,

212

Chadwick, French E. 32,233

Chandler, Lloyd H. 225

Chandler, William E. SecNav ll,12,47n,

49,193

Charnock, John 89

Chatham, Earl of see Pitt 103,105

Chesapeake Bay 156-57,159,227

Chesney, Cornwallis 106

Chiefs of Naval Bureaus see Naval Bureaus,

Chiefs of

China—Open Door Policy 42,42n

Christian ethics 29,43,190,226

Church, Francis P. 172
254

Church, William C. 11,33,166,168,

170,172,180,184,185

Churchill, John 50,101. See Marlborough

civil liberty 187-88,226

Civil War 1-2,107,108,132,133,140,141,

142, 144, 160,208,220,222,223

civilization 40,42,190

Clausewitz, Karl von 107,123

Clemens, Samuel (Mark Twain) 172

Clerk, John 59,59n,69,75,81,81n,82,83,

87,88,89

Clinton, Sir Henry 86,86n

Clive, Robert, Baron Clive 10,103

Clowes, William L. 216,219,223

Coal report 1 94

Coasters Harbor Island 14,15,49,148,194

Coligny, Gaspard 58,58n

Collingwood, Cuthbert, Baron Collingwood 93,93n,104

Collum, Richard S. 174-75

Colomb, Philip H. 46,66, 66n,69, 222

Columbian Historical Exposition, Madrid 16,212

Columbus, ships of 209

commercial ports vs. military ports 154

comparative method 27,54-57,60,65

compass, magnetic (Mariner's) 40,40n,41

competition, need for in Navy 168

Contentin, Anne H. de 84n. See Tourville

Cooling, Benjamin F. 204

Copernicus, Nicolas 52,52n

copper sheathing of ships 53,228

Corbett, Julian S. 73n,231,232n

Cornwallis, Charles, Earl and Marquis

Cornwallis 85,85n,86,134

Cornwallis, Sir William 134,137,138,139

court-martial, a fo 'castle 214

Cowles, William S. 23

Creasy, Sir Edward S. 129

Creswell, John 73n

Crimean War 76,76n,122

Crowninshield, Arent S. 142-43,143n

Cullen, Charles W. 126n

Cuvier, George L.C.F.D. 52,52n,54,55

D

Dahlgren, John A.B. 59,59n,165

Dalton, John C. 54,54n

Davis, Charles H. 33

Davis, Cushman K. 143

Day, William R. 143

Dayton, Alston G. 23

Deane, Richard 77

De Barras, Comte Louis see Barras De Forest, John W. 172

De Grasse, Francois J.P.M. see Grasse

Demosthenes 183

Desertions, Naval see Naval personnel

Dewey, George 21 ,117n,118,135,141,

142,143,144,148,221

Digby, Robert 87

Dillingham, Benjamin F. 145

Diodorus Siculus 211

dock, dry see drydocks

Douglas, Sir Howard 28,46,59n,61,88,

165

Dover, artificial harbor 153

Drake, Sir Francis 91

Drayton, Percival 3

drydocks

European 152-53,227

in Narragansett Bay 226

in Brooklyn Navy yard and Narragansett Bay 227

Japan 153

value of 228

Dreux, battle of 58

Duncan, Adam, Viscount Duncan 88,92

DuPont, Samuel F. 29,123,166,173,223

Dutch Navy see Navy, Dutch

E

education of officers

Christian ethics as an element 1 90

courses at Naval War College 193-94

an engineer corps 225,233

failures in Naval administration 223

purpose of the War College 37-41 same regulations for all crews 7

texts Luce wrote at Academy 164-65

training ships 167

War College and line officers 232-33 war gaming at War College 230-31

Edward III, King 77

Effingham, Baron of see Howard 58n,91

Ekins, Sir Charles 69,83,83n,90,91-92

Elchingen, battle of 62

elements of a balanced Navy 151

Emmet, William 215

Engineer Corps, Naval 225,233

Epibatae, The 175

d'Estrees, Comte Jean 88

ethics, Christian 29,43,190,226

Eugene, Prince of Savoy 101,107

Evans, Robley D. 23,25,32

Evans, Samuel 159

extrasensory perception see Luce—on ex- trasensory perception

Fabius, Quintus 108

Fairfax, Donald McN. 119

Falconer, William 182,182n

Farragut, David G. 108,140n,148,173,

207.210

Fincati, Luigi 211

Fiske, Bradley A. 24,32,134,224

comment on Luce 25

Fiske, John 29

Flodden, battle of 57,57n

Folger, William M. 23
255

Forbes, Robert B. 169

Fox, Gustavus V. 168

Foy, Maximilian S. 129

Frederick the Great 50,62,63,101,107,

131_

Fremantle St Edmund R. 66,66n,69,94n

French colonies in America 105

French Navy see Navy, French

Frobisher, Sir Martin 91

Fullam, William F. 206

Funk and Wagnall's Dictionary 32,210

Fyffe, Charles A. 104

Galileo 52,52n

Galway, Earl of see Ruvigny 130

Gardiner, Arthur 90

General Board, The 20,21,119-20,223,

224

General Order #325 12,49,49n

General Staff, Navy see General Board

German General Staff 126

German Navy see Navy, German

Gibbon, Edward 132

Gilder, Joseph B. ix, 33,99

Giron, Vicomte de see Grenier

tactics 85,85n

Glorious First of June, battle of 73,73n

Goin, Thomas 172-73

Goodrich, Caspar 12,47n,48,194

Goschen, George J. Viscount Goschen 170

government, Naval see Naval administration and government

Grand tactics see Naval tactics

Grant, Ulysses S. Pres. 107,108,133,179

Grasse, Francois J.P.M. de 85,85n,86-87,

92,134. See Tilly

Graves, Thomas 82,82n,86-87,134

Graviere, Jurien de la 71,170-71,180,

181n

Great White Fleet 22

Grenier, Jacques R. 85,85n. See Giron

Gresham, Walter Q. 212

Griggs, John W. 143

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 157

Guibert, Comte Jacques A.H. de 61,61n,

64

Guillot, Louis 81,81n,84n. See Orvilliers,

de

Gunnery see Naval Light Artillery

Gunzburg, battle of 62

Gustavus, King 107

Guyot, Arnold 185

Guzman, Perez de 62. See Medina-Sidonia

H

Hale, Edward E. 215

Hale, Eugene 143

Halleck, Henry W. 179n

Hamersly's Encyclopedia 32,188-89

Hamilcar 68

Hamilton, Emma 215

Hamilton, Sir William 5 In

Hamley, Edward B. 31,107,135

Hannibal 50,62,63,68,101,107,129-30

Harmony, D.B. 193

Harrison, Benjamin F. Pres. 15,212

Hart, Albert B. 222

Harte, Francis B. 172

Harvey, William 55

Hattendorf, John B. 126n

Hawaii 41,145-46,160

Hawke, Lord Edward 81,88,90,94,103

Hawkins, Sir John 91

Hayes, John D. 163n

Henderson, G.F.R. 28,100,105-06,132,

219

Herbert, Hilary O. SecNav 10,32,230

Herodotus 75

Hipparchus 52,52n

Hiram of Tyre 218

Hobson, Richmond P. 24

Holmes, Oliver W. 203

Hood, Samuel, Viscount Hood 61,82,82n,

83,92

Hoste, Paul 59,59n,69,75, 78,84,88,96,

181

Howard, Charles 58,58n,91. See Effingham

Howe, Richard, Earl Howe 72,73,88

Hughes, Sir Edward 88,90

Humphreys, Joshua 158,159

Hunt, William H. SecNav 115

Huntington, Samuel P. 200

I

Imperial Naval College at Yeddo 177

The Influence of Sea Power upon History

1660-1 783 by Alfred T. Mahan 99,

101-103

The Influence of Sea Power upon the

French Revolution and Empire

1793-1812 by Alfred T. Mahan 100,104-108,210

international law

maritime 39,1 78,1 79n,231

Naval War College "blue books" 231

study of 16,47,231

J

Jackson, Thomas J. (Stonewall) 105-06

professor at V.M.I. 108,219

James, Duke of York 88

James, Henry 172

James, William 216,219

Japan 123,177,222,224-25

Jaques, William H. 102

Jarnac, battle of 57,57n,58

Johnson's New Universal Cyclopedia 32,

185,193,211
256

Jo mini, Baron Henri 68,75,75n, 107, 133

Jones, William SecNav 228-29

K

Kent, James 180

Kepler, Johann 52,52n,54

Keppel, Augustus, Viscount Keppel 80,80n,81,82,84,85,90

Key, Albert L. 23

Knox, Dudley W. 25

Kray von Krajova, Paul 135-36

Key West, Florida 15,157

Ladrone Island see Caroline and Ladrone

Islands

Lake Erie, battle of 76,76n

Lake Champlain, battle of 76,76n

Land and Naval warfare

and military science 64-68

fleet evolutions 59-61

German General Staff 126

military character of 132

rules of the art of war 132-40

a study needed 31

tactics and strategy 96-97

to learn Naval history 131

Lanier, Sidney 1 / z

Lansdale, Philip 211

Laughton, Sir John K. 71,84,84n,91,99,

178

Lavoisier, Antoine L. 52,52n

LeConte, Joseph 55

Lee, Robert E. 131,131n

Leibrich, Karl M. von 136

Lepanto, battle of 58,77,174,181

Lestock, Richard 79

Lieber, Francis 5 1,5 In

Lima Bay, Panama 157

Lincoln, Abraham Pres. 107,132-33

Lissa, battle of 170,211,214

Little, William McC. 32,209 war gaming 13,47,230-31

Livermore, W.R. on war gaming 231

Lodge, Henry C. 10,20,31,33,203,204,

212

Long, John D. SecNav 143,144

Loring, Charles H. 192

Louis XV King of France 103

Luce, Stephen B. The Luce family

Caroline(daughter) 6n

Charlotte( daughter) 6n

Eliza Henly(wife) 6,238

Jane (sister) 212n

John(brother) 212n

John Dandridge Henly(son) 6n

Margaret(sister) 212n

OHvia( sister) 212n

William(brother) 212n

Life of Luce Chronology 237-249

born(1827) 3

midshipman(1841) 1,3

giftbook on Greece(1848) 5

2d class of Naval Academy(1848) 5

in Coast Survey(1850-53) 6

married(1854) 6,238

to Newport with Academy

(1860) 8

visited English and French developing navies( 1 863) 9

Commandant of Academy

(1865) 10,240

President of Commission on Navy

Yards(1882) 11,192

appointed to head a Board to en- large Naval War College plans

(1884) 11-12

established Naval War College in

March 1884—became first Presi- dent 11-13

North Atlantic Squadron

(1885) 13,45

President of U.S. Naval Institute

(1888) 196,244

retired February 1889 1,15,203

ordered to Naval War College fac- ulty(1890) 16

Commissioner-General of the

United States at Columbian Historical Exposition, Madrid

(1892-93) 16,212

Revenue Cutter Service(1893) 16-

18,246

personal contacts outside of the

Navy 33

home in Newport(1911)—became

ill—wrote no more 24

died July 1917 1,24

obituary by Bradley A. Fiske 25

photographs 4,127,162, cover

Influence of Luce on the Navy

acknowledged leader of intellec- tuals in the Service 32

avant-garde ideas from European

military thought 34

breadth of Naval officer outlook 37

breadth of reading 46

catalyst for new ideas on the

Navy 35

chooses Naval War College fac- ulty 12

commended for exercies in North

Atlantic Squadron 14

contributions to the Navy 24

influence in Navy's new age 2,3

influence on American Naval

thought 1 influences on tactics and strategy in

history 31
257

opposition to Navy reform 34

reform of the merchant training

system 9

relationship to Mahan 17

reliance on Mahan 126

suggested "chief of naval operations" 21

a teacher 27

uniform rules for all ships 7

Writings of Luce

categories of writings 26,251

enduring quality of writing 163

literary critic 98-108 on extrasensory perception 182-83 on land and Naval tactics 28 on military ethics 187-88 on Naval education see education

of officers on Naval organization and administration 28,115-16

on Naval organization in tabular

form 234-35 on Naval science 51-52

on Naval training for seamen see Naval personnel on Naval War College see Naval War

College on preferred anthracite coal 194 on religion and war 29,190,208-09 on rope-making 1 86 on youths into the sea life 26-27,

201-02,207-08,209-10,214,215,

217

pugnacious quality of writing 34

Seamanship(text) 8,10,26,163,165-

66,168-69,173,176,181,192,

196,218

spiritualism 29,30

writing becomes diversified 20

writings reflect intellectual foundation of the 20th century U.S.

Navy 35

writings for Youth Companion 26

Young Seaman 's Manual 10,26

M

Macaulay, Thomas B. 57,84

Maclay, Edgar S. 219

Maffitt, John N. 190

Maguire, Edward 64

Mahan, Alfred T. Admiral Farragut article 210

August 1886 at Naval War College 45

became president of War College 13

chapter in Clowes' History of the

Royal Navy 219-223

first to reach fame 47

footnotes to 137,139

historical data for Luce 1 26

importance of base at Pearl Har- bor 145-46

Laughton to be his British critic 71

Luce's review of his first book 99-105

Luce's review of Nelson's biography 215-17

Luce suggested Naval Strategy 21-22

Moody Board report 125,235

the "Naval Jomini" 68n

need of battleships 204-05 on the Moody Board 23

photograph 98

publisher for Mahan 204

a scholar 231

Secretary Herbert influenced by 230

tactics, strategy and national power in

lectures 29

Manila, battle of 142,233

Marines, Greek and Roman 175

maritime international law, see international law

Marjoribanks, Edward 113. See Tweedmouth

Marlborough, Duke of see Churchill 50,101

Martin, William A.P. 1 14

Martinique, ceding of 148

Marvin, Winthrop L. 19

Massachusetts Military Historical Society 221-22

Mathews, Thomas 78,79,80,83,90

Matteucci, Carlo 55

Matthews, Edward O. 165

Maury, Matthew F. 179

McArthur, John 83,83n,84,84n

McCulloch, Hugh 169

McDonough, Thomas 76n

McKean, Fred G. 194

McKinley, William Pres. dispatch to Admiral Dewey 19,143-44

Meade, Richard W. 179-80

Medina-Sidonia, Duke of see Guzman 62

Mercantile Marine see Merchant Marine

Mercantile Marine Commission 19

Merchant Marine

officers of 9,173

personnel training 173,174,196

shipping interests 41

Merrimac see Monitor

Metcalf, Victor SecNav 22

Meyer, George von L. SecNav 23,128,232

Middleton, Charles 137,138,140. See Bar- ham

Miles, Nelson A. 203

Military and Naval operations at Newport,

R.I. 197-98

Military and Naval tactics, ancient 57

Military art and education, Greece 67-68

Military science and art 54,101. See also land and Naval warfare

Miller, J.N. 195

Missionary Ridge, battle of 233

Mississippi River 140-41
258

Mobile Bay, battle of 21 In

Mobility 62-63

Moltke, Helmuth J.L. von 153

Moltke System 108

Moncontour, battle of 57,57n

Monitor and the Merrimac 1-2,221-22

Monk, George 58,77n,89. See Albemarle

Monroe Doctrine 41,114,115

Montague, Edward 89,89n. See Sandwich

Montecuccoli, Count Raimondo 50,50n

Montojo y Pasaron, Don Patricio 136

Moody Board 11,110,125,181,232,235

Moody, William H. SecNav 20,21,23,32,

33,110,118

Moore, John B. on international law 231

Morison, Samuel E. 213n

Morogues, Vicomte de see Bigot 85,85n

Morrill Act, 1862 9,10

Morton, Paul SecNav 23

Muller, Friedrich M. 46,56,56n

MuUett, A.B. 192

N

Narragansett Bay, R.I. best site for Naval base 148,156

British engineers survey 157-58

drydocksin 226,228

U.S. engineers in favor of 159-60,227

Nautical schools 169,172,189

Naval Academy at Newport, R.I. 148,

190-91,210

Naval administration and government

the future Navy 203-04

Hamersly 's on administration 1 88

Luce devoted major writings to 28

Luce duty on Moody Board 110

Naval base on Hawaii 1 45

Navy yards 213

need for Board of Admiralty 167-68,

228-29

recommendation for Naval reform in table form 234-35

reorganization of Navy 179-80

report of Commission on Navy

yards 192

to reform Navy Department 199,220,

223,224

Naval archeology 104,185,211

Naval artillery 1 64-65

Naval bases

British bases 153

Chesapeake Bay 156

eleven components of 155

German bases 1 54

in China 153-54

in the Caribbean 18

Narragansett Bay 148,149,159-60,

226-28

need for 147

Newport, R.I. best Atlantic site 148

on Pearl Harbor 145-46

summary on 161

Naval Bureaus, Chiefs of 19,20,49,116-

19,121-23,125,142,161

Naval customs 219

Naval efficiency 109,112-18,124,138

Naval encyclopedia see Hamersly 's Encyclopedia

Naval government see Naval administration and government

Naval history

History of the United States Marine

Corps 174-75

Naval actions and history 1799-1898

221-22

the Navy and Japan 224-25

Navy to preserve peace 218

of Naval fleets 171-82

of Naval signalling 184

of wars 128-140

review of Mahan's Influence of Sea

Power upon History

1660-1783 101-03

Spanish-American war 233-34

summary of "modern" navies 176-78

Naval Light Artillery, Afloat and Ashore

by Luce 164-65

Naval officers as a profession 58-59

as engineers 225

condition of Naval officers 7

contribution of Naval War College

to 37-41

promotion of 168

requirements to be filled 203

Naval officers see also education of offi- cers Naval Operations, Chief of 21

first "chief of" realized 232

proposed office of 23-24

Naval personnel

apprentice system 10,207

desertions 230

enlisted men's training 7,174

training schools 186

training ships 166,167,186,205-06

training squadron 10,148,186,187,229

Naval policy 112-13,114-15,116,189-90

Naval safety 188

Naval science see science

Naval Signal Book (British) 38,72,74,88,

94-95,96 refers to Manual of Fleet

Evolutions 73

Naval Signal Book of the United States of

America 170,182,184,185

Naval Songs by Luce 10,163,189,191,220

Naval strategy

and Naval bases 161

applied by G.F.R. Henderson 100

at the War College 39

needs aid of a fleet 76
259

"one must serve a long apprenticeship

in" 107

strategic plans 144

strategy and narrow seas 178

strategy during peace 214

triumph of 135-46

Naval tactics 182,185,189

fleet and military tactics 56

fleet tactics under steam 50,60

Grand tactics 69,73-76,92,95,96,196

Naval and land tactics 64

"Naval Tactics" by Luce 71-97

speed as an element 63

tactics as an art 38-39

under sail 90-91

Naval tactics, British 63,65,71-79,83,84,

91,92,93,94,95

Naval tactics, French 63,87-91,92,

170-71,172

Naval War Board 120,122,142,144,220-

21

Naval War College

consolidated with Torpedo Station 15-16

employs no teachers 38

established by General Order #325 under Luce 11-13,194

extension of courses to one year 233

history of 230-33

"is educational not functional" 16,

232

Luce appointed to faculty 201,246

Luce Hall 36

mission 38-40

Narragansett Bay site for 148

photographs 36,70,202

review of Mahan's lectures 101

statement of intellectual concept 46-

47,193-94

use of war gaming boards 14-15

Naval War College, French 231

Naval War College, German 231

Naval warfare, study of

battleships essential to Naval warfare 203-05

during peace, anticipating war 214

French Naval tactics 1 70-72

Naval warfare and Naval tactics 88

Naval warfare as a science 54-56

Navy yards are essential 213

similarity of land and Naval tactics 28 some history of Naval warfare 101-03

Naval warfare under steam 59,65-67,165,

196

Navy, British

battle in broad oceans with the Dutch

and French 79-82

Board of Admiralty and Navy

Board 199

British Admiralty and ironclad

fleet 177

British battleship 203

British schoolships 166-67

during U.S. Civil War 221-22

England and France on the sea 104-08

government, Naval 188-89

history of Royal Navy 216,218,219,

223

interchange of Naval and Army officers

in command 57-58

Naval policy of England 1 13,1 14

practical training of crew and offi- cers 77-78

"The Queen's Navy" 223

system of tactics needed 65-67

volunteer system for crew 207

William Pitt defeats French 103

Navy Commissioners, Board of 234

Navy, Department see U.S. Navy Department

Navy, Dutch 78-79

Navy, French

Corvette 188

efficiency of British and French navies 174

Luce praises organization of 200

Naval policy of France 1 13n-l 14n

Naval race between Great Britain and

France 203-04

Navy of France 177

policy of manoeuvre 79-87

ships are sheathed 58,228

Navy, German 124,148,177,203-04

Navy, Greece 177,181

Navy yards 152,175,192,213,227

Nebuchadnezzar 183

Nelson, Horatio, Viscount Nelson 61,62,

63,72,73,74,88,89,92,93,94,102,

103,104,105,108,132,136,137,

139,215,221,233-34

Newberry, Truman SecNav 110

New Orleans, battle of 140-41, 173

Newton, St Isaac 52,52n

Nicolas, Sir Harris 216

Nordhoff, Charles 208,225

North Atlantic Squadron see North Atlantic Station

North Atlantic Station 13,32,45,195,

197,233

Onslow, Sir Richard 93,93n

Orford, Earl of see Russell 75,75n,90

Orvilliers, Comte de see Guillot 8 1,8 In,

84n

Osbon, Bradley S. 173

Paine, Alfred C. 173

Palliser, Sir Hugh 80,80n

Panama Canal 41,41n,115,157,181

Parker, Foxhall A. 60,60n,174,181,184,

185
260

Parker, William A. 164-65

Paulding, James K. SecNav 189

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 145,146,160

Pemberton, John C. 133

Periodicals

Periodicals of Reference

American Journal of Education 170

Atheneum 99

Atlan tic Mon thly, The 99, 1 72

Blackwood's Magazine 132n

Century Magazine 133n

Congressional Record 145n

Edinburgh Review 65n,71

Fortnigh tly Revie w 1 78

Forum 65n,145n

Journal of the History of Ideas 5 In

Journal of the Royal United Service

Institution 66n,71n,94n

London Times, The 231

Mariner's Mirror 53n

McClure's Magazine 22

Military Affairs 163n

Nautical Gazette 172,173

NavaJ Chronicle 83n

Naval War College Review 126n

New York Times, The 99,1 16n,

157,206

PaJI Mall Gazette 154n

Past and Present 77n

Revue Maritime et Coloniale 171n

Rhode Island Historical Magazine 158n

Southern Literary Messenger 179

Periodicals—published Luce's writings

Army and Navy Journal 9,32,33,

121n,164,166,167,168,169,170,

172,174,176,177,179,180

Army and Navy Life 228,229n

Army-Navy Kegister, The 206

Brentano's Aquatic Monthly and

Sporting Gazetteer 186

Critic, The 32,33,99,101n,104n,105n

201,205,210,215,216,219,223

Galaxy, The 33,172,182,184

Harper's New Monthly Magazine 33

Harper's Weekly 215

Japan Daily Mail 222

Magazine of American History 33

Newport Daily News 226,227,228

Newport Mercury, The 222,226,

227,228

New York Herald 196

North American Review 23,32,33,

60, 109n, 147n,20 1,203,207,208,

213,214,223,225,228,233,234

Potter's American Monthly 177,

178n, 179, 184,211

Record (U.S. Naval Institute) 77n,

78n

United Service Magazine, The 32

90n,186, 187,189, 193,226

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 32,

37,45,55n,69,77n,78n,117n,

125n,168,174,181, 191, 196,199,

203,205,206,211,213,215,218,

220,223,224,226,229,230,231-

32,234-35

Youth's Companion 26,32,33,201,

202,208,214,215,217

Perkins, George C. 146

Perry, Matthew C. 224

Perry, Oliver H. 75,75n,159,195

Pharsalia, battle of 75,75n

Philippines, The 41

Phoenician Navy 218

Phormio 75,75n

Phythia, Robert L. 10

Pillsbury, John E. 211

Pitt, William 103,105. See Chatham

Pocock, Sir George 82,82n,85

Popham, Edward 77

Port Arthur, battle of 117,123

Port Royal, battle of 54,54n,166,173

Porter, David D. 3,108,180

comment on Luce 25

Porto Praya, battle of 63

Posnett, Hutcheson M. 57

Potter, John E. 178n

Potter, William H. 195

powder monkey 207-08

Preble, George H. 190

Privateers 177,219

Ptolemaeus, Claudius 52,52n

Ptolmey I (Soter) 129

Quiberon, battle of 91

R

Raleigh, Sir Walter 58

Ramatuelle, Audibert 85,85n

Randolph, Sir George C. 69,95n

Rawson, Edward K. 219

reasoning, inductive and deductive 46,

52,53

Reuterdahl, Henry 22

Revenue Cutter Service see U.S. Coast

Guard

Rice, Allen T. 203

Rideing, William H. 33,203

Robeson, George M. SecNav 170,179,226

Rodgers, Christopher R.P. 195

Rodney, George B., Baron Rodney 62,

82,82n,83,88,89

Rogers, William B. 225

Roosevelt, Theodore Pres. 20,31,33,109,

110,115,117,121,123,141,150,223

Root, Elihu 150

Royal Marines of Great Britain 175
261

Royal Naval War College 231

Royal Navy see Navy, British

Rozhdestvenski, Zinovi P. 123

Russell, Edward 75,75n,90. See Orford

Russell, William C. 102

Rupert, Prince, Count Blatine of

Rhine 58,58n,77,88,89

Ruvigny, Henri de Massue de 130. See

Galway

Ruyter, Michiel A. de 89

S

safety in ships 169

sailing ship training see Naval personnel

St. John, Henry 74n. See Bolingbroke

Salamis, battle of 40,62,76,139,186,208,

219

Sampson William T. 12,47n,48,136n,194,

233

Sanborn, John P. 226

Sandwich, Earl of see Montague 89,89n

Santiago, Battle of 219,233

Saxe, Comte Hermann de 62

Schmidt, Carl 55

science

and art of war 38,146,232

and technology growth 2-3,46,51-52

of Naval warfare 30,31,53-54,68

of war 38,93-94,100,101,128-31,177,

182

scientific method 55-56

Scipio Africanus, Cornelius 108,130

Seabury, Samuel 193,196,218

seamanship see Luce—Writings of—Sea- manship (text) sea power 17,22,115,145,155

Secretaries of the Navy

1801 Smith, Robert 158-59

1838 Paulding, James K. 189

1 845 Bancroft, George 180,181n,195

1861 WeUes, Gideon 140,172

1869 Robeson, George M. 170,179,

226

1881 Hunt, William H. 115

1882 Chandler, William E. 11,1 2,47n,

49,193

1885 Whitney, William C. 14,32,199,

203,224,230

1889 Tracy, Benjamin F. 15,32,203,

204,212,230

1893 Herbert, Hilary O. 10,32,203

1897 Long, John D. 143,144

1902 Moody, William H. 20,21,23,32,

33,110,118

1904 Morton, Paul 23

1905 Bonaparte, Charles J. 22,122,224

1906 Metcalf, Victor 22

1 908 Newberry, Truman 110

1909 Meyer, George von L. 22,128,

232

Seven Years War 89,103

Shepard, Henry L. 174-75

Sherman, William T. 108,133,134,139,

223

Ships, U.S.

Adams(frigate) 151-52

Bennington(gunboat) 225

Bru tus(collier) 142

Colum bus(line-of-battleship) 3,208,

213,222,224-25

Congress(frigate) 3,5

Delaware (battleship ) 1 24n

Evening Star(coastal steamer) 169

Galena 15

Hartford 10,184,21 ln,221

Jamestown (sloop-of-war) 6

Juniata(sloop-of-war) 170,177,187,211

Macedonian(midshipman practice ship)

9,166

Maine (battleship) 14

Mercury(schoolship) 33

Merrimac( steam frigate) 1,164,217,

221,222

Minnesota (frigate) 128n,186,187n,236

Monitor(steam frigate) 1-2,221-22

Monterey(monitor) 142

Nantucket (monitor) 9,166,167,217

New Hampsh ire (ship-of-the-line) 48,

194

New York(flagship) 233

North Carolina (line-of-battleship) 3,

209-10

North Dakota (battleship) 23,124n

Patrick Henry(CSS) 164

St Marys(schoolship) 10,33

Tennessee (flagship) 45,195

Vandalia ( sloop-of-war) 6

Vermont(receiving ship) 218

V

Tincennes(sloop-of-war) 224-25

Wabash 215

Shipyards became Navy yards 152

Shufelt, Robert W. 187

Signal Book see Naval Signal Book

Simpson, Edward 200

Sims, William S. 22,23,32,109,110 on Luce's contribution 128-29

photograph 111

Sluys, battle of 77,77n

Smith, Adam 134-35

Smith, Robert SecNav 158-59

Smollett, Tobias 84

Soley, James R. 16,47

South Atlantic Blockading Squadron 8,

166

Spanish-American War 41-43,120,122,

141,144,161,201,229,233-34

speed, a necessity in war 62-64

Sperry, Charles S. 19

Stevens, John A. 33

Stewart, Charles 220

Stockton, Charles H. 231

Stolypin, Petr A. 123

Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War by G.F.R. Henderson 105-06
262

acceptance compared to the acceptance

of Mahan's writing 100

Storey, Joseph 180

strategy see Naval strategy

Suffren, Pierre A., de 63, 85,85n, 88,90

Sumner, Charles 169

Swift, Joseph 159

Swift, William 23

Luce cautious in writing about 1 64

Luce's plea for reform 224

need of centralized direction 20-24

"outlook for reform" 126,128

reforming Navy Department 10-11

reorganization of Navy 179-80

tabular form of reorganization 234-35

Upton, Emory 11,28,31,191

tactics, Grand see Naval tactics

Taft, William H. Pres. 23,150,156,157

Taylor, Bayard 172

Taylor, Henry C. 20,33,230

Taylor, Zachary, Pres. 166

Technology see science

Texel, battle of 181

Themistocles 38,183

Thucydides 75,129

Tilly, Comte de see Grasse 85,85n,86-87,

92,134

Togo, Count Heihachiro 123

Torpedo Station at Newport, R.I. 15,49

Tracy, Benjamin F. SecNav 15,32,203,

204,212,230

Trafalgar, battle of 62,76,88,89,92,93,

104,134,135,136-37,221

training ships see Naval personnel

Trinity Church, Newport, R.I. 24

Trollope, Anthony 172

Tromp, Maarteen H. 89

Tourville, Comte de see Contentin 84,84n

Turenne, Henri de la T. d'A. 50,50n,58,

107,130

Tweedmouth, Baron see Marjoribanks 113

Tyndall, John 54

Tyre, Siege of 76,76n

u

U.S. Army War College 47,67n,231

U.S. Artillery School 191

U.S. Coast Guard

Letter by Luce to Secretary opposing

Revenue Marine with the Navy 246

Revenue Cutter Service 16-18

U.S. Marine Corps 168,174,175,176,185,

206,222

U.S. Naval Signal Book see Naval Signal

Book of the United States of

America

U.S. Navy Department, reorganization

administration reform—the fleet 109-

10,112-124 an Admiralty staff 228-29

Board of Navy Commissioners 200

Van Nostrand, Daniel 33

Velpeau, Alfred A.L.M. 55

Villaret de Joyeuse, Louis 73

Villehuet, Bourde de 166

Villeneuve, Pierre C.J.B.S. 123,137-39

w

Wagram, battle of 75,75n

Wainwright, Richard 32,200,205 war

effects of 42

preparation for 43

prevention of 208,223

study of 47

war gaming see Little

War of 1812 219,220

Ward, Aaron 192,192n,196,218

Ward, James H. 6 1,6 In

Watson, John C. 136

Welles, Gideon SecNav 140,172

Wellesley, Arthur 50,101,106,108. See

Wellington

Wellings, James C. 212

Wellington, Duke of see Wellesley 50,

101,106,108

Wheaton, Henry 179n

Whitman, Walt 172

Whitney, William C. SecNav 14,32,199,

203,224,230

Whittlesey, Humes H. 142,143

Whitthorne, Washington C. 10,180,181n,

204

Wilson, Georg G. 231

Wolfe, James 103

Wolseley, Viscount Garnet J. 132

Woods, Sir Henry F. (Pasha) 60,60n

Woolsey, Theodore W. 179n, 187-88

Xenophon 129,183

Young Seaman's Manual see Lucewritings of

t

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