REL: December 22, 2022

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 

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printed in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

________________________

2210282

________________________

John Lester

v.

Amber Lester

Appeal from Lee Circuit Court

(DR-10-39.07)

EDWARDS, Judge.

In May 2019, Amber Lester ("the mother") filed a complaint in the 

Lee Circuit Court ("the trial court") seeking to have John Lester ("the 

father") held in contempt for his actions in April 2019 that allegedly 
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violated certain provisions of a 2018 judgment prohibiting the father 

from having direct or indirect contact or communication with, or being 

within 100 feet of, the mother's husband, Brian Manderson. The mother 

also sought an ex parte order restraining the father from attending the 

activities of the parties' children and requiring that the father's visitation 

with the children be supervised. The trial court entered an ex parte order 

suspending the father's visitation with the children and prohibiting 

contact between the father and Manderson, the mother, and the children; 

it also entered a protection-from-abuse order ("the PFA order"), which 

prohibited the father from being within 300 feet of the mother, the 

children, the mother and the children's residence, the mother's place of 

employment, and the children's school. The father filed a motion seeking 

reconsideration of the ex parte order and the PFA order, and the mother 

filed a motion seeking to have the father held in contempt for alleged 

actions occurring in October 2019 that the mother contended were in 

violation of the ex parte order and the PFA order. The trial court entered 

a pendente lite order in November 2019 that, among other things, 

required the father to commence an anger-management course. The 
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3

father later filed in this court a petition for the writ of mandamus relating 

to the ex parte order and the PFA order; we granted that petition in part

and ordered the trial court to set aside the ex parte order and to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on the issue of visitation. Ex parte Lester, 297 So. 

3d 477 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019). 

Over the next year, the parties filed several motions, the father filed 

a counterclaim seeking a modification of custody and to hold the mother 

and Manderson in contempt for alleged violations of provisions in the 

2018 judgment prohibiting the consuming of alcoholic beverages during 

the mother's custodial periods and Manderson's disciplining of the 

children, and the trial court held several hearings, including an 

evidentiary hearing in June 2020 that focused on the visitation issue. 

However, the trial court stayed the trial on the contempt allegations 

raised by the mother because the father had been arrested and charged 

with various crimes in Alabama and in Georgia stemming from the 

incidents giving rise to the contempt allegations. The trial court entered 

a pendente lite order in July 2020 awarding the father supervised 

visitation with the children on the second and fourth Saturdays of each 
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4

month from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.; the order required visitation to be 

supervised by Christopher Statin. 

Ultimately, although the father's criminal cases were not yet 

resolved and the father was exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination regarding the incidents giving rise to the 

contempt allegations, the trial on the parties' claims commenced on 

December 10, 2020. On January 11, 2021, the trial court entered an order

that, among other things, found the father to be in contempt based on his 

actions in April 2019 and in October 2019, assessed a $1,000 fine for each 

incident of contempt, and modified the visitation provisions of the 

judgment divorcing the parties, which had been entered in March 2010, 

and any subsequent judgment by awarding him unsupervised visitation 

with the children on the second and fourth Saturdays of each month

between 9:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. The father filed a purported 

postjudgment motion seeking reconsideration of the January 2021 order. 

In that motion, among other things, the father challenged the assessment 

of $2,000 in fines, arguing that the trial court was limited to a $500 fine 

for each finding of what, he alleged, was criminal contempt. 
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In response to the father's purported postjudgment motion, the trial 

court entered an order on May 5, 2021, explaining that it had found the 

father to be in civil contempt and stating that, pursuant to United States 

v. United Mineworkers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947), and

Chestang v. Chestang, 769 So. 2d 294 (Ala. 2000), a trial court is 

permitted to assess fines in conjunction with a finding of civil contempt 

"to encourage a contemnor's future compliance with the court orders" and 

that, pursuant to United Mine Workers, Chestang, and Pate v. Guy, 934 

So 2d 1070 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), a trial court is permitted to award 

damages "in order to compensate the injured party and/or to encourage 

the contemnor's future compliance with court orders." The father filed a 

notice of appeal, which was assigned appeal number 2200734. However, 

because the trial court had not resolved the father's counterclaim in the 

January 2021 order, we dismissed appeal number 2200734 as having 

been taken from a nonfinal judgment. Lester v. Lester (No. 2200734, 

Sept. 21, 2021), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (table).

After we issued our certificate of judgment in appeal number 

2200734, the father filed a motion to finalize the January 2021 order. 
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After a hearing, the trial court entered a final judgment on November 23, 

2021, finding the father in civil contempt based on the two incidents 

alleged by the mother, assessing what it described as a $1,000 civil fine 

for each incident of contempt, awarding the father unsupervised 

visitation with the children on the second and fourth Saturdays of each 

month from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., ordering the father to pay the mother 

$8,000 to reimburse her for her attorney fees, and ordering the father to 

pay $3,700 toward the fee for the children's guardian ad litem. The

November 2021 judgment denied all other requests for relief by either 

party and did not award the father any specific holiday or summer 

visitation. The father filed a timely notice of appeal. 

The record contains transcripts of three evidentiary hearings: the 

November 2019 hearing on the father's request to set aside the ex parte 

order, the June 2020 hearing on the visitation issues, and the December 

2020 trial. Most of the testimony at each of the evidentiary hearings 

centered on the incidents of contempt that the mother alleged had 

occurred in April 2019 and October 2019. The father exercised his Fifth 
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and did not testify about 

the circumstances surrounding his allegedly contemptuous behavior.

Manderson testified that, in April 2019, he took his youngest 

stepdaughter, M.L. ("the younger child"), to softball practice, where, he 

said, he observed the father in the parking lot at the softball-practice 

field. Manderson said that he dropped the younger child off and had 

informed her that he would be going to a nearby store. According to 

Manderson, he soon noticed that the father had followed him from the 

practice field. Manderson testified that the father had followed him to 

the store parking lot and that the father had initially parked an aisle 

away but, soon thereafter, moved into a nearby parking space. 

Manderson said that he had called the mother when he had noticed the 

father following him and that she had advised him to contact the police, 

which, he said, he had done. Manderson said that the father approached 

Manderson's truck and tried unsuccessfully to open the driver's side door, 

after which, Manderson said, the father returned to his own truck and 

left the parking lot. 
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According to Manderson, he drove back to a parking lot adjacent to 

the softball-practice field and parked in a manner that would allow him 

to observe the entrance to that parking lot. Manderson said that he did 

not observe the father return to the practice-field parking lot. Despite 

that fact, Manderson testified, the father had returned to the parking lot 

and approached him as he sat in his truck. Manderson said that the 

father screamed profanities and attempted to hit Manderson in the face. 

Manderson said that the father's fist only grazed him but that the father 

also grabbed and tore the shirt Manderson was wearing. Manderson said 

that persons returning from the practice field witnessed the altercation, 

which, Manderson said, ended when he drove his truck forward and the 

father jumped clear of the truck. Manderson pressed criminal charges 

against the father based on that incident.

Regarding the October 2019 incident, Manderson testified that he 

was driving from property that he owned on a road upon which the 

father's house was located; Manderson said that his two-year-old 

daughter was in his truck with him. He said that he noticed the father's 

truck behind him and that he grew concerned. Manderson admitted that, 
2210282

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when the father attempted to pass his truck, Manderson sped up to 

speeds of approximately 80 miles per hour to prevent the father from 

passing him. According to Manderson, he observed the father point a gun 

out of his window and heard the father fire that gun three times. 

Manderson testified that he called the mother and then called 911 to 

report the father's behavior. Manderson said that, after some time, the 

father was able to pass him and that the father had then stopped his 

truck on the roadway. Manderson said that he executed a three-point 

turn and proceeded to return the way he had come to avoid the father. 

Ultimately, Manderson said, he and the father later passed each other as 

they headed in opposite directions, and, Manderson testified, the father's 

truck damaged the side mirror of Manderson's truck. Manderson 

testified that he had sworn out an arrest warrant for the father.

The mother testified at the November 2019 hearing that the father 

had violated the provision of the 2018 judgment requiring him to remain 

more than 100 feet from Manderson because, she testified, the father had 

attended a softball game of one of the children in April 2019. She 

admitted that the father and Manderson had not spoken to each other 
2210282

10

and that nothing had happened during or after the game. The mother 

also testified at the November 2019 hearing that she had felt threatened 

by the father and that the children were "petrified" of the father. She 

admitted, however, that the children loved the father and wanted a 

relationship with the father. She then specifically explained that the 

children were "petrified" that the father would hurt someone in their 

family. At the June 2020 hearing, the mother testified that she could not 

identify any danger that the father posed to the children. She also 

testified that the children appeared to blame Manderson for the problems 

between the adults. 

The mother testified at the December 2020 trial that she desired a 

"regular" or "set" visitation schedule so that the children would know 

when they would be visiting the father. She also testified that she desired 

for the father, who is an electrician, to work in the local area instead of 

out of town because his work schedule had been difficult to work around. 

Although the mother testified that she did not believe that the father 

"would physically, intentionally hurt [the children] at all, not 

intentionally," she said that she believed that the father emotionally 
2210282

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abuses and manipulates them. The mother did not elaborate on the 

alleged emotional abuse of the children by the father.

At the June 2020 hearing, the father testified that he had completed 

an anger-management course as required by the trial court in the 

November 2019 pendente lite order. According to the father, although he 

did not believe that he had an anger-management problem, he had 

learned from the class to "walk away and not to pursue someone in a 

harmful way." He said that he had been visiting the children and that 

his visitations had been supervised by the mother's former stepmother. 

He indicated that he had suggested other supervisors to the mother but 

that she had not agreed to those persons. He also explained that he 

worked in Augusta, Georgia, and that he worked every day except for 

Sundays. The father testified that the mother had not been willing to 

cooperate with his work schedule in setting up visitations. 

At the December 2020 trial, the father testified that he had been 

able to exercise only minimal visitation because of issues with the 

availability of the current visitation supervisor, Christopher Statin; his

own work schedule; or the children's extracurricular activities. He 
2210282

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commented that neither the mother nor the guardian ad litem had been 

willing to approve alternate supervisors to facilitate more visitation. He 

testified that he loved the children and that he wanted to resume normal 

visitation with them.

Sloane Fitzgerald, a therapist with East Alabama Mental Health, 

testified at the June 2020 hearing that she had counseled the younger 

child between November 2019 and February 2020. Fitzgerald said that 

the younger child had described her relationship with the father as "good" 

and had said that she missed the father. Fitzgerald also testified that 

the younger child had shared in her sessions that Manderson made her 

uncomfortable, that she was concerned about Manderson's drinking, and 

that she did not like it when Manderson tickled her.

The younger child, who was then 12 years old, testified at the June 

2020 hearing that she wanted to resume regular visits with the father. 

She said that she did not feel that she was in any danger from the father. 

The younger child complained that Manderson tickled her and that, 

despite her having told him that she did not like to be tickled, he had 

recently resumed doing so. She described Manderson as being "in 
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charge" and said that she was aware that Manderson did not like the 

father. She also commented that Manderson drinks "throughout the 

day."

The older child, K.L. ("the older child"), who was then 14 years old, 

testified at the June 2020 hearing, as well. Like the younger child, the 

older child testified that she had a good relationship with the father and 

that the father had not done anything that had made her scared of him. 

She said that she wanted to spend a normal weekend with the father. 

She described the relationship between the mother and Manderson as "in 

between" good and bad, and she indicated that the mother and 

Manderson argued and that Manderson would sometimes "get in [the 

mother's] face." The older child also said that, when the father had been

quite ill in the hospital, Manderson had become angry when she had 

asked to call or visit the father. According to the older child, she was 

aware that Manderson was prohibited from drinking around the children 

but, she said, he did so anyway; she also said that his drinking bothered 

her. 
2210282

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Christopher Statin, the approved visitation supervisor, testified 

that he had agreed to assist with supervising visitations between the 

father and the children but that, when he had agreed to do so, he had 

understood that he would be one of several supervisors. He said that he 

had informed the guardian ad litem that he worked every other Saturday 

and that he would therefore not always be available to supervise visits 

for the father. He said that he was surprised to see that he was the only 

named supervisor in the trial court's June 2020 order. According to 

Statin, he had been available to supervise only two visits between the 

entry of the June 2020 order and the December 2020 trial. He testified 

that those visits had gone well and said that the children had enjoyed 

being around the father. 

On appeal, the father first challenges the trial court's contempt 

findings and the associated imposition of $2,000 in fines and the award 

of attorney fees. First, the father contends that the trial court must have 

found him in criminal contempt, which, he says, is not supported by the 

evidence. Within that argument, the father also briefly asserts that, even 

if the trial court found him in civil contempt, that finding is not supported 
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by clear and convincing evidence. Secondly, the father argues that the 

$2,000 in fines imposed by the trial court exceeds the statutory limit of 

$100 per incident of criminal contempt prescribed by Ala. Code 1975, §

12-11-30(5). Finally, the father complains that the trial court could not 

have awarded attorney fees based on its findings of contempt.

As noted, the trial court specifically stated that it was holding the 

father in civil contempt and explained that it had imposed the $1,000 fine 

for each incident of contempt as a means of coercing the father's future 

compliance with the provisions of the 2018 judgment and any subsequent 

judgment prohibiting him from being in close proximity to, or having 

contact with, Manderson. The father argues that the contempt findings

must be criminal in nature because the record lacks evidence "of a 

continuing failure or refusal to abide by the trial court's orders" and 

because the trial court imposed punitive fines, albeit, he asserts, ones in 

excess of the fines permitted under Alabama law, see § 12-11-30(5). We 

disagree.

We have previously explained that the distinction between a 

finding of criminal contempt and one of civil contempt is a fine one. 
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"Rule 70A(a)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part:

"'(C) "Criminal contempt" means ...

"'....

"'(ii) Willful disobedience or 

resistance of any person to a court's 

lawful writ, subpoena, process, order, 

rule, or command, where the dominant 

purpose of the finding of contempt is to 

punish the contemnor.

"'(D) "Civil contempt" means willful, 

continuing failure or refusal of any person to 

comply with a court's lawful writ, subpoena, 

process, order, rule, or command that by its nature 

is still capable of being complied with.'

"Criminal contempt imposes punishment for failure to 

obey a trial court's judgment or order, and a key element of a 

finding of criminal contempt pursuant to Rule 70A(a)(2)(C)(ii) 

is that such a finding is intended to 'punish the contemnor.'

Sanctions for criminal contempt are statutorily limited to a 

maximum fine of $100 and imprisonment not to exceed five 

days. § 12-11-30(5), Ala. Code 1975. A key element of a finding 

of civil contempt is that such a finding is intended to compel 

compliance, and sanctions for civil contempt may exceed the 

limits provided by § 12-11-30(5) and 'may continue 

indefinitely until the contemnor performs as ordered.' Pate v. 

Guy, 934 So. 2d 1070, 1072 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); see 

also Kalupa v. Kalupa, 527 So. 2d 1313, 1317 (Ala. Civ. App. 

1988) (citing Charles Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 

361 So. 2d 1033 (Ala. 1978)).
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"... In Lightsey v. Kensington Mortgage & Finance 

Corp., 294 Ala. 281, 315 So. 2d 431 (1975), our supreme court 

explained that contempt can have elements of both civil and 

criminal contempt and be treated as civil contempt.

"'One of the most quoted cases on this subject 

is Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 

418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797 [(1911)], where it 

was said:

" '"Contempts are neither wholly 

civil nor altogether criminal. And 'it 

may not always be easy to classify a 

particular act as belonging to either 

one of these two classes. It may partake 

of the characteristics of both.' Bessette 

v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 24 S.

Ct. 665, 48 L. Ed. [997 (1904)]. But in 

either event, and whether the 

proceedings be civil or criminal, there 

must be an allegation that in contempt 

of court the defendant has disobeyed 

the order, and a prayer that he be 

attached and punished therefor. It is 

not the fact of punishment, but rather 

its character and purpose, that often 

serve to distinguish between the two 

classes of cases. If it is for civil 

contempt the punishment is remedial, 

and for the benefit of the complainant. 

But if it is for criminal contempt the 

sentence is punitive, to vindicate the 

authority of the court. It is true that 

punishment by imprisonment may be 

remedial as well as punitive, and many 
2210282

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civil contempt proceedings have 

resulted not only in the imposition of a 

fine, payable to the complainant, but 

also in committing the defendant to 

prison. But imprisonment for civil 

contempt is ordered where the 

defendant has refused to do an 

affirmative act required by the 

provisions of an order which, either in 

form or substance, was mandatory in 

its character. Imprisonment in such 

cases is not inflicted as a punishment,

but is intended to be remedial by 

coercing the defendant to do what he 

had refused to do. The decree in such 

cases is that the defendant stand 

committed unless and until he 

performs the affirmative act required 

by the court's order ."'

"Lightsey, 294 Ala. at 285-86, 315 So. 2d at 434-35; see 

also Fludd v. Gibbs, 817 So. 2d 711, 714 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001), 

and Norland [v. Tanner], 563 So. 2d [1055,] 1057-58 [(Ala. 

Civ. App. 1990)]."

J.S. v. L.M., 251 So. 3d 61, 66-67 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).

The trial court stated clearly in its May 5, 2021, order that it had

found the father to be in civil contempt and that its purpose in imposing 

the $1,000 fine per incident of contempt was to coerce future compliance 

with the provisions of the 2018 judgment and any subsequent judgment 
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prohibiting close contact or communication between the father and 

Manderson. Although the trial court imposed significant fines, that fact 

alone does not compel the conclusion that the trial court found the father 

to be in criminal contempt. As the trial court stated in its May 5, 2021, 

order, a trial court may impose a monetary sanction based on a finding 

of civil contempt, either as a method of coercing future compliance with 

court orders or as a method of compensating the complainant for losses 

resulting from the contemptuous actions of the contemnor. See United 

States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. at 303-04; Lightsey v. 

Kensington Mortg. & Fin. Corp., 294 Ala. 281, 287, 315 So. 2d 431, 436 

(1975); and Chestang v. Chestang, 769 So. 2d at 298 (awarding damages 

to compensate the complainant for losses incurred as a result of the 

contemnor's actions). We therefore conclude that the trial court held the 

father in civil contempt. 

Insofar as the father contends that the record lacks clear and 

convincing evidence to support the trial court's findings of two incidents 

of contempt, we reject that argument. "[A] finding of civil contempt must 

be supported by clear and convincing evidence." Kizale v. Kizale, 254 So. 
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3d 233, 238 n.3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017); see also Marshall v. Marshall, 346 

So. 3d 1008, 1021 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021). 

"Clear and convincing evidence is

" '"[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence 

in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier 

of fact a firm conviction as to each essential 

element of the claim and a high probability as to 

the correctness of the conclusion. Proof by clear 

and convincing evidence requires a level of proof 

greater than a preponderance of the evidence or 

the substantial weight of the evidence, but less 

than beyond a reasonable doubt ." '"

Dyess v. Dyess, 94 So. 3d 384, 386-87 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (quoting L.M. 

v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting in turn Ala. 

Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)).

Manderson testified about both incidents of contempt. His 

testimony is sufficiently clear and convincing to support the conclusion 

that the father violated the provisions of the 2018 judgment and 

subsequent orders prohibiting the father from being in close proximity to 

Manderson or from engaging in direct or indirect contact with Manderson

by approaching Manderson's vehicle and attempting to commit battery 

and by purposefully chasing Manderson's vehicle down a road and 
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attempting to force a confrontation between them. The father's decision 

to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, while protected, is also 

support for the conclusion that the incidents described by Manderson 

occurred, because the invocation of the right against self-incrimination 

may form the basis of an adverse inference against the party invoking 

the privilege. Rule 512A(a), Ala. R. Evid. ("In a civil action or proceeding, 

a party's claim of a privilege, whether in the present action or proceeding 

or upon a prior occasion, is a proper subject of comment by judge or 

counsel. An appropriate inference may be drawn from the claim."); see

Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d 776, 795 (Ala. 2003) (explaining that, if a 

party in a civil action invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and 

refused to answer deposition questions, "the jury ... could be instructed 

at trial that an adverse inference could be drawn against him as a 

result"). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as it 

found the father to be in civil contempt.

As mentioned above, the trial court's imposition of $2,000 in fines 

does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the trial court 

determined that the father was in criminal contempt, because a trial 
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court may impose a monetary fine as a judicial sanction for civil 

contempt. See United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. at 303-04; 

Lightsey, 294 Ala. at 287, 315 So. 2d at 436. When imposing a fine for 

civil contempt as a method for coercing future compliance with a trial 

court's orders, however, a trial court must provide a method by which the 

contemnor may avoid the fine through such future compliance. 

International Union, Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 

(1994). The United States Supreme Court has explained:

"A contempt fine accordingly is considered civil and remedial 

if it either 'coerce[s] the defendant into compliance with the 

court's order, [or] ... compensate[s] the complainant for losses 

sustained.' United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-

304 (1947). Where a fine is not compensatory, it is civil only if 

the contemnor is afforded an opportunity to purge. 

See Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947). 

Thus, a 'flat, unconditional fine' totaling even as little as $50 

announced after a finding of contempt is criminal if the 

contemnor has no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid 

the fine through compliance. Id., at 588."

Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829.

The trial court's imposition of a $1,000 fine for each incident of 

contempt is not an appropriate fine for civil contempt because the fine is 

a "'flat, unconditional fine . '" Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829 (quoting Penfield 
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Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 588 (1947)). We also note that the trial 

court's announcement that future incidents of contempt by the father 

would result in the imposition of a $1,000 fine per incident also appears 

to be a criminal sanction as opposed to a prospective fine for future civil 

contempt. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 836-37. We therefore reverse that 

portion of the trial court's judgment imposing the $1,000 fine per incident 

of contempt because the trial court lacked the authority to impose those 

fines as a sanction for civil contempt.

Because we have concluded that the trial court found the father to 

be in civil, as opposed to criminal, contempt, we reject the father's 

argument that the trial court could not award attorney fees to the mother 

based on the finding of criminal contempt. See Ex parte Collins, 860 So.

2d 1259, 1260 (Ala. 2003) (explaining that an award of attorney fees is 

not proper in a criminal-contempt action). As our supreme court 

explained in Moody v. State ex rel. Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116, 1119 (Ala. 

1978):

"As a general rule, and in the absence of contractual or 

statutory provisions, attorneys' fees are not recoverable either 

as costs of litigation or as an element of damages. State v. 
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Alabama Public Service Commission, 293 Ala. 553, 307 So. 2d 

521 (1975); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cosby, 277 

Ala. 596, 173 So. 2d 585 (1965); and Taylor v. White, 237 Ala. 

630, 188 So. 232 (1939). There are, however, a number of 

exceptions to this general rule. One widely-accepted 

exception, and one which we specifically accept, is that in 

proper circumstances a reasonable attorney's fee may be 

allowed the prevailing prosecuting party in a civil contempt 

proceeding. This award, though not mandatory, is allowed 

within the sound discretion of the trial Court."

The father does not develop his argument or cite any authority

indicating what evidence is required to support an award of attorney fees

in a civil-contempt case. We have cautioned against such an approach in 

the past. 

"'Rule 28(a)(10)[, Ala. R. App. P.,] requires that arguments in 

briefs contain discussions of facts and relevant legal 

authorities that support the party's position. If they do not, 

the arguments are waived.' White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS 

II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008); see also Bishop v. 

Robinson, 516 So. 2d 723, 724 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) 

(quoting Thoman Eng'g, Inc. v. McDonald, 57 Ala. App. 287, 

290, 328 So. 2d 293, 294 (Civ. App. 1976)) (noting that an 

appellant should 'present his issues "with clarity and without 

ambiguity"' and 'fully express his position on the enumerated 

issues' in the argument section of his brief); accord United 

States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ('It is not 

enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most 

skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create 

the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.')."
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Hudson v. Hudson, 178 So. 3d 861, 865 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014). 

Accordingly, the father's argument on this issue is waived.

The father next complains that the trial court failed to apply the 

doctrine of unclean hands to prevent the mother from asserting her rights 

under the divorce judgment and any subsequent judgment, including the 

2018 judgment. The father apparently contends that, because the 

mother and Manderson admitted that they had violated certain 

provisions of the 2018 judgment, presumably by Manderson's 

consumption of alcohol during the mother's custodial periods and his 

alleged disciplining of the children, the mother should not have been 

permitted to pursue her contempt claims. 

"'The purpose of the clean hands doctrine is to prevent 

a party from asserting his, her, or its rights under the law 

when the party's own wrongful conduct renders the assertion 

of such legal rights "contrary to equity and good 

conscience ."' J & M Bail Bonding Co. v. Hayes, 748 So. 2d 

198, 199 (Ala. 1999) (quoting Draughon v. General Fin. Credit 

Corp., 362 So. 2d 880, 884 (Ala. 1978)). It is well settled that 

the decision whether to apply the clean-hands doctrine is 

within the sound discretion of the trial court. Borcicky v. 

Borcicky, 763 So. 2d 265 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000); Grant v. 

Smith, 661 So. 2d 752 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). See also Fitzhugh 

v. Fitzhugh, 634 So. 2d 565 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (trial court's 

failure to apply the clean-hands doctrine was not an abuse of 
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26

discretion in a custody-modification case); Holman v. 

Holman, 612 So. 2d 492 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (affirming the 

trial court's decision to allow a husband who was under a 

contempt finding for his failure to pay child support to bring 

an action seeking to have the wife held in contempt related to 

the enforcement of a property-division provision of the parties' 

divorce judgment)."

Burkett v. Gresham, 888 So. 2d 505, 509 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).

The mother's contempt petition was premised, initially, on the 

father's attempted battery on Manderson; she later amended the petition 

to include the allegation that the father had engaged in the incident on 

the road in October 2019. The father does not explain how the fact that 

Manderson might have violated the provisions of the 2018 judgment by 

drinking alcohol during a custodial period or by imposing discipline on 

the children would render the mother's contempt petition "'contrary to 

equity and good conscience .'" Burkett, 888 So. 2d at 884 (quoting J & M 

Bail Bonding Co., 748 So. 2d at 199). In fact, other than quoting the 

general principles contained in Burkett, as quoted above, the father 

merely states that the mother is in contempt of the same judgment upon 

which her contempt claims are based. See Hudson, 178 So. 3d at 865; see 

also Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.; White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, 
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LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008) ("Rule 28(a)(10)[, Ala. R. App. P.,]

requires that arguments in briefs contain discussions of facts and 

relevant legal authorities that support the party's position. If they do not, 

the arguments are waived."). 

We will not construct an argument relating to the clean-hands 

doctrine for the father. Spradlin v. Spradlin, 601 So. 2d 76, 79 (Ala. 1992) 

(explaining that an appellate court is not required to do a party's legal 

research or to develop an argument on behalf of a party); Hudson, 178 

So. 3d at 865. Additionally, application of that doctrine rests in the 

discretion of the trial court, Burkett, 888 So. 2d at 509, and we see no 

abuse of the trial court's discretion in this case. Furthermore, we note 

that the trial court did not hold the mother in contempt, as the father had 

requested, and the father has not appealed from that aspect of the 

judgment. 

The father next challenges the trial court's judgment insofar as it 

modified the visitation provisions of the divorce judgment and any 

subsequent judgment to allow the father to visit with the children only

on the second and fourth Saturdays of each month from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00
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p.m. He contends that he does not pose a danger to the children and that 

the children are not frightened of him and desire to visit with him.

"This court has held that a noncustodial parent's 

visitation rights may be restricted '"in order to protect 

children from conduct, conditions, or circumstances 

surrounding their noncustodial parent that endanger the 

children's health, safety, or well-being ."' B.F.G. v. C.N.L., 204 

So. 3d 399, 404 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (quoting Pratt v. Pratt,

56 So. 3d 638, 641 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)). However, a 

restriction on a noncustodial parent's visitation must not

'"do[] more than necessary to protect the children."' Id. See 

also Norrell v. Norrell, 473 So. 2d 523, 525 (Ala. Civ. App. 

1985) ('When justified and supported by the evidence or 

reasonable inferences therefrom, a trial court cannot be 

faulted in visitation matters for being reasonably careful in 

establishing restrictions upon the visitation rights of a parent 

so as to attempt to assure a young child's safety and 

welfare.')."

Wells v. Tankersley, 244 So. 3d 975, 984 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). Although 

a trial court has broad discretion over the issue of visitation, a 

noncustodial parent should be given the opportunity to maintain a 

meaningful relationship with his or her child. Carr v. Broyles, 652 So. 

2d 299, 303, 304 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). 

The evidence indicates that the father might pose a danger to 

Manderson and that he has certainly exercised extremely poor judgment 
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when managing his apparent dislike of Manderson. However, no 

evidence indicates that the children were present during either incident 

of contempt. Because the trial court's modified visitation award permits

the father to exercise unsupervised visitation for several hours at a time, 

we presume that the trial court concluded that the father did not pose 

such an extreme risk to the children's safety that supervision of the 

father during his periods of visitation was necessary. In light of the 

award of unsupervised visitation, we cannot discern why the trial court 

modified the father's visitation to preclude overnight visitation and to 

provide no extended summer or holiday visitation when no evidence 

indicated that overnight visitation posed a peculiar danger to the 

children. We have previously explained that, "if a ... judgment is 

modified to limit a parent's visitation based on misconduct, the limitation 

ordered must be supported by evidence that the misconduct of the parent 

is detrimental to the child." Carr, 652 So. 2d at 304. Although we do not 

hold that a trial court cannot place limits on a parent's visitation unless 

the children involved have first suffered harm a result of the parent's 

misconduct, the record must disclose that the limitations imposed on a 
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parent's visitation are to protect the children from anticipated harm 

resulting from the noncustodial parent's behavior. In this instance, 

because the mother testified that she did not believe that the father 

would intentionally cause physical harm to the children, the children 

testified that they had no fear of the father and strongly desired to 

resume normal visitation with him, and no evidence indicates that the 

father's misconduct was directed at or occurred in the presence of the 

children, we cannot conclude that the trial court's limited visitation 

award is supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the trial 

court's judgment insofar as it modified the father's visitation.

Finally, the father argues that the trial court erred in requiring him 

to pay $3,700 toward the guardian ad litem's fee. He specifically 

complains that the trial court failed to conduct an "audit" of the guardian 

ad litem's fee statements and, relying on Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, 

N.A., 530 So. 2d 740, 750 (Ala. 1988), contends that the trial court should 

have conducted a hearing on the guardian ad litem's fee request. We 

begin by noting that "'[t]he matter of the guardian ad litem's fee is within 

the discretion of the trial court, subject to correction only for abuse of 
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discretion.'" Townsend v. Hogan, 73 So. 3d 702, 706 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) 

(quoting Englund v. First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, 381 So. 2d 8, 12 

(Ala. 1980)).

In Van Schaack, our supreme court reversed the award of a 

guardian ad litem's fee and remanded the cause for a hearing on that fee, 

noting that 

"the record discloses no evidence regarding the services 

performed by the guardian ad litem other than his presence 

at the July 21, 1986, hearing on the Bank's petition for final 

settlement, at which he asked several questions of [a witness]. 

However, there was no testimony offered at that hearing 

concerning the services the guardian ad litem had performed, 

nor does the trial court's order refer to the nature or character 

of the services performed by the guardian ad litem."

530 So. 2d at 750. In contrast, in the present case, the record contains 

two itemized bills presented by the guardian ad litem setting out the 

tasks she conducted and the amount due for each task. Because the 

record in the present case contains evidence indicating the tasks 

performed by the guardian ad litem and the fees incurred for her services, 

we do not agree with the father that Van Schaack compels reversal of the 

guardian ad litem's fee in the present case. In fact, we have affirmed the 
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award of a guardian ad litem's fee based on an itemized bill. Roberts v. 

Roberts, 189 So. 3d 79, 85 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). 

Insofar as the father complains that the guardian ad litem "literally 

paid a witness that had nothing to do with the minor children to testify 

in support of the [mother's] contempt petition," we are disinclined to 

reverse the award of the guardian ad litem's fee on that basis. The father 

provides no authority providing that the guardian ad litem is not 

authorized to subpoena or pay witness fees to a witness that the guardian 

ad litem believes will present relevant testimony. See Hudson, 178 So. 

3d at 865.; Rule 28(a)(10) (requiring an appellant to present applicable 

legal authority in his or her brief on appeal); see also Rogers v. Rogers, 

307 So. 3d 578, 590 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019) (indicating that a guardian ad 

litem "may participate in the litigation through activities associated with 

the role of an attorney, such as examining witnesses and presenting 

arguments to the court in the same manner as counsel for a parent"). We 

therefore affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as it required the 

father to pay $3,700 of the guardian ad litem's fee.
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In conclusion, we reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as it 

modified the father's visitation and insofar as it imposed $2,000 in fines 

based on the conclusion that the father was in civil contempt, and we 

remand the cause for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion. 

We affirm all other aspects of the trial court's judgment. 

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. 

Thompson, P.J., and Hanson and Fridy, JJ., concur. 

Moore, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.