U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–900 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

BORDER SECURITY, COMMERCE, AND TRAVEL: 

COMMISSIONER MCALEENAN’S VISION FOR THE 

FUTURE OF CBP 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

BORDER AND 

MARITIME SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 25, 2018 

Serial No. 115–62 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

RON ESTES, Kansas 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

STEVEN S. GIAIER, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona, Chairwoman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

WILL HURD, Texas 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

PAUL L. ANSTINE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

ALISON B. NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Arizona, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16 

The Honorable Lou Barletta, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16 

WITNESS

Mr. Kevin K. McAleenan, Commissioner, U.S. Customs And Border Protection, U.S. Department Of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security: 

Statement of Anthony M. Reardon, National President, National Treasury 

Employees Union .............................................................................................. 5 

Letter From the Electronic Privacy Information Center .................................. 8 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairwoman Martha McSally for Kevin K. McAleenan ........... 47 

Questions From Ranking Member Filemon Vela for Kevin K. McAleenan ........ 58 

Questions From Honorable Mike Rogers for Kevin K. McAleenan ..................... 59 

Questions From Honorable Lou Barletta for Kevin K. McAleenan ..................... 60 

Questions From Honorable Nanette Diaz Barraga ́n for Kevin K. McAleenan ... 75 

(1) 

BORDER SECURITY, COMMERCE, AND TRAVEL: COMMISSIONER MC ALEENAN’S VISION 

FOR THE FUTURE OF CBP 

Wednesday, April 25, 2018 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:16 p.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Martha McSally [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McSally, Rogers, Bacon, Thompson, and 

Vela. 

Also present: Representatives McCaul, Barraga ́n, Correa, 

Demings, and Richmond. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine Commissioner 

McAleenan’s vision for the future of Customs and Border Protection. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

I would like to start by welcoming the newly-confirmed U.S. Customs and Border Protection commissioner, Kevin McAleenan, to 

testify before our committee today. Congratulate him on your Senate confirmation last month. The Commissioner and CBP have 

been and will continue to be the focal point for many of the Trump 

administration’s border security priorities. 

The Nation is fortunate that the Commissioner is a seasoned veteran, a consummate professional who knows the agency and its 

issues well having been with CBP since the early days of its creation. 

CBP is a massive law enforcement agency created from the fusion of several legacy agencies established in 2003. In fact, today 

it is the largest law enforcement organization in the Federal Government. But up until 2015 it was not even authorized in statute, 

a situation that was finally addressed by the work of this subcommittee. 

The 19 codified duties of the commissioner are some of the most 

important responsibilities that Congress has given any single official: Securing the border, facilitating legitimate travel and commerce, and administering important National security programs 

that prevent bad actors from gaining access to the country. With 

any organization this large, there are significant challenges. 

2 

Staffing shortages at both the ports of entry and in the Border 

Patrol exacerbated both by a hiring process that takes far too long 

and retention challenges that have persisted for years with no 

signs of abatement, CBP is critically understaffed and remains well 

below its Congressionally-mandated staffing levels by more than 

1,000 CBP officers and 1,900 Border Patrol agents. 

Combined with the growing crisis along the Southwest Border, 

this shortage has the potential to put our Nation’s National security at risk. The number of illegal border crossings during this 

month of March show an urgent need to address the on-going situation. We witnessed a 203 percent increase from March 2017 to 

March 2018 and a 37 percent increase from last month to this 

month, the largest increase in month-to-month since 2011. 

Before 2013, approximately 1 out of every 100 arriving aliens 

claimed credible fear or asylum. Today more than 1 out of 10 do. 

Saying the words, ‘‘credible fear’’, just as many aliens are coached 

by the drug cartels and mules to do, often permits them to be released into the country regardless of the merit of such claims to 

await for a court date years in the future that many do not even 

show up for. 

We also continue to see our system plagued by increased levels 

of fraud among individuals crossing the border, which then makes 

it more difficult to help those who need it the most. In the past, 

over 90 percent of arriving aliens were single adult males; today 

40 percent are families and children. The traffickers and smugglers 

know that if you arrive with a family you have got a better chance 

of being released into the United States, with most families only 

able to be detained for less than 20 days due to court rulings. 

We have seen smuggling organizations advertise this as an enticement and we have seen traffickers use children as leverage to 

gain entry into the country. Since the beginning of this fiscal year, 

almost 22,000 unaccompanied minors and 40,000 families arrived 

at the border under these policies that enrich the cartels. 

In other words, because of the insanity of the loopholes in our 

current law, the next generation of DACA-like people are crossing 

the border and disappearing into the community. 

We are a Nation of immigrants and we welcome about a million 

legal immigrants into our country each year, but we are being 

taken advantage of, and it needs to stop. 

In addition to the border wall, we also need a policy wall, as well, 

which is why I have been calling for these border security loopholes 

to be closed. 

We must change our immigration policy to enable the agencies 

charged with protecting our border to do their job and quickly remove dangerous public safety risks from our communities. 

Thankfully, in response to these troubling border security trends, 

the President has called for the deployment of thousands of National Guard troops to support the effort of the men and women of 

CBP. 

National Guard personnel have supported border security operations several times in recent years. They have built fences and 

roads, conducted ground surveillance along the border, flown aviation support missions, monitored camera feeds, and provided intelligence support. 

3 

They are truly a force multiplier that can provide unique skills 

to boost our border security. I would like to thank Arizona Governor Doug Ducey and other Governors along the border who have 

answered the call to partner with the Federal Government to deploy these border security reinforcements and support the CBP 

mission. 

The additional men and women deployed on our border will reduce threats posed by violent drug cartels and other bad actors 

that threaten border communities, and the Nation as a whole. 

In addition to the deployment of the Guard, Congress has also 

recently provided CBP with billions of dollars to invest in technology, wall replacement, and new wall construction that will serve 

as a powerful deterrent to illegal entry. 

We look forward to hearing an update on the status of wall construction and a concrete—no pun intended—time line for its completion. 

I called this hearing today to allow the commissioner an opportunity to present to our subcommittee, which has principal oversight responsibility of the agency, what his vision is for CBP. 

I look forward to his testimony, followed by a thoughtful discussion. 

[The statement of Chairwoman McSally follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN MARTHA MCSALLY

APRIL 25, 2018 

I would like to start by welcoming the newly-confirmed U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection Commissioner Kevin McAleenan to testify before our committee today, 

and congratulate him on his Senate confirmation last month. 

The Commissioner and CBP have been, and will continue to be, the focal point 

for many of the Trump administration’s border security priorities. The Nation is fortunate that the commissioner is a seasoned veteran—a consummate professional 

who knows the agency and its issues well, having been with CBP since the early 

days of its creation. 

CBP is a massive law enforcement agency, created from the fusion of several legacy agencies and established in 2003. In fact, today it is the largest law enforcement 

organization in the Federal Government, but up until 2015 it was not even authorized in statue—a situation that was finally addressed by the work of this subcommittee. 

The 19 codified duties of the Commissioner are some of the most important responsibilities that Congress has given to any single official—securing the border, facilitating legitimate travel and commerce, and administering important National security programs that prevent bad actors from gaining access to the country. 

With any organization this large, there are significant challenges. 

Staffing shortages at both the ports of entry and in the Border Patrol, exacerbated 

by both a hiring process that takes far too long and retention challenges that have 

persisted for years, with no signs of abatement. 

CBP is critically understaffed and remains well below its Congressionally-mandated staffing levels by more than 1,000 CBP officers and 1,900 Border Patrol 

agents. 

Combined with the growing crisis along the Southwest Border, this shortage has 

the potential to put our Nation’s security at risk. 

The number of illegal border crossings during the month of March shows an urgent need to address the on-going situation at the border. 

We witnessed a 203 percent increase from March 2017 compared to March 2018 

and a 37 percent increase from last month to this month—the largest increase from 

month to month since 2011. 

Before 2013, approximately 1 out of every 100 arriving aliens claimed credible 

fear, or asylum. Today, more than 1 out of 10 do so. 

Saying the words ‘‘credible fear,’’ just as many aliens are coached by the drug cartels to do, often permits aliens to be released into the country, regardless of the 

4 

merit of such claims to await a court date years into the future, that many do not 

even show up to. 

We also continue to see our system plagued by increased levels of fraud among 

individuals crossing the border which then makes it more difficult to help those who 

need it the most. 

In the past, over 90 percent of arriving aliens were single adult males. Today 40 

percent are families and children. 

The traffickers and smugglers know that if you arrive with a family, you have 

a better chance of being released into the United States with most families only able 

to be detained for less than 20 days due to court rulings. 

We have seen smuggling organizations advertise this as an enticement and we 

have seen traffickers use children as leverage to gain entry into our country. 

Just since January, almost 22,000 unaccompanied minors and 40,000 families arrived at the border under these policies that enrich the cartels. 

In other words, because of the insanity of loopholes in current law, the next generation of DACA-like people are crossing the border and disappearing into our communities. 

We are a Nation of immigrants and we welcome about a million legal immigrants 

into our country each year, but we are being taken advantage of and it needs to 

stop. 

In addition to a border wall, we also need a policy wall as well, which is why I 

have been calling for these border security loopholes to be closed. 

We must change our immigration policy to enable the agencies charged with protecting our border to do their job and quickly remove dangerous public safety risks 

from our communities. 

Thankfully, in response to these troubling border security trends, the President 

has called for the deployment of thousands of National Guard troops to support the 

effort of the men and women of CBP. 

National Guard personnel have supported border security operations several 

times in recent years. They have built fence and roads, conducted ground surveillance along the border, flown aviation support missions, monitored camera feeds, 

and provided intelligence support. 

They are truly a force-multiplier that can provide unique skills to boost to our border security. I would like to thank Arizona Governor Ducey and the other Governors 

along the border who have answered the call to partner with the Federal Government to deploy these border security reinforcements and support the CBP mission. 

The additional men and woman deployed on our border will reduce threats posed 

by violent drug cartels and other bad actors that threaten border communities and 

the Nation as a whole. 

In addition to the deployment of the Guard, Congress has also recently provided 

CBP with billions of dollars to invest in technology, wall replacement, and new wall 

construction that will serve as a powerful deterrent to illicit entry. 

We will look forward to hearing an update on the status of wall construction and 

a concrete, no pun intended, time line for its completion. 

I called this hearing today to allow the Commissioner an opportunity to present 

our subcommittee, which has principal oversight responsibility over the agency, with 

his vision for CBP which has an outsized role in our National security. I look forward to his testimony, followed by a thoughtful discussion. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for a statement he may have. 

Mr. VELA. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally, for holding today’s 

hearing and thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member 

Thompson, for your leadership on the Homeland Security Committee, as well. 

Commissioner McAleenan, congratulations on your recent confirmation and thank you for joining us today. I know you have been 

at CBP for more than a decade now and that you are very familiar 

with the Office of Field Operations side of CBP. 

My office and I receive daily notifications and press releases from 

CBP about the volume and value of the narcotics that are seized, 

coming through our ports of entry. For example, CBP officers at the 

5 

Pharr port of entry seized 45 pounds of cocaine, valued at more 

than $347,000, earlier this month. 

At the Progreso International Bridge, CBP officers seized nearly 20 pounds of crystal meth, valued at more than $381,000, in early 

April, as well. CBP publishes its enforcement statistics monthly, 

and I have noted that, over the past several years, more drugs are 

seized, on average, by the Office of Field Operations than Border 

Patrol. The only exception to that is marijuana, which Border Patrol interdicts at a much higher rate. 

In addition to keeping people and contraband from entering illegally, CBP is also responsible for facilitating legitimate trade and 

travel, both of which are major drivers for economic growth. 

This means CBP officers inspects $6.5 billion worth of cargo on 

a daily basis. CBP officers are also responsible for screening and 

vetting foreign and U.S. citizen travelers headed to the United 

States and at our international airports, cruise terminals, or land 

ports of entry. 

The fact that CBP continues to rely on temporary duty assignments and back-to-back shifts to make up for its officer shortage 

remains a major concern. I have stated on multiple occasions that 

CBP’s officer staffing shortage and difficulty in retaining professional Border Patrol agents are self-inflicted vulnerabilities. 

These CBP staffing issues are critical to border security, yet the 

administration continues to avoid these problems. Commissioner, I 

introduced the Border and Port Security Act to give you the ability 

to hire more officers and agriculture specialists, but we need your 

commitment to address the internal problems that are making it 

difficult to keep new personnel on board. 

I am glad that my bill has bipartisan support, and I know that 

Chairwoman McSally has her own proposal to address CBP’s officer 

staffing shortage. My hope is that we can work on this issue in a 

bipartisan way, much like we did with the Public-Private Partnership Authority granted to CBP to address infrastructure need at 

our ports of entry. 

The city of Donna and CBP have been working to establish the 

model port concept or the new way to streamline cargo and passenger vehicle inspections through the Donation Acceptance Program. 

This project is an example of the many ways investments in our 

port infrastructure effects positive change along the border. I hope 

that your confirmation gives you a greater ability to ensure that 

the administration uses the facts when considering changes to border security. 

Madam Chairwoman, I ask for unanimous consent to enter statements from NTEU and the Electronic Privacy Information Center 

into the record. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY M. REARDON, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL TREASURY

EMPLOYEES UNION

APRIL 26, 2018 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony on the vision for 

6 

the future of CBP. As president of the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 

I have the honor of leading a union that represents over 25,000 Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) Officers and trade enforcement specialists stationed at 328 land, 

sea, and air ports of entry across the United States and 16 PreClearance stations. 

Any vision of CBP’s future must include the hiring of new personnel at the ports 

of entry. CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) is the largest component of CBP responsible for border security—including anti-terrorism, immigration, anti-smuggling, trade compliance, and agriculture protection—while simultaneously facilitating lawful trade and travel at U.S. ports of entry that are critical to our Nation’s 

economy. CBP OFO has a current need to hire 2,516 additional CBP officers and 

721 agriculture specialists to achieve the staffing target as stipulated in CBP’s own 

fiscal year 2018 Workload Staff Model (WSM) and Agriculture Resource Allocation 

Model (AgRAM.) As of February 3, 2018, CBP OFO has 23,002 CBP officers onboard at the ports of entry—1,145 short of its fiscal year 2018 target of 24,147. 

Trade and travel volume continue to increase every year, but CBP OFO staffing 

is not keeping pace with this increase. New and expanded Federal inspection facilities are being built at the air, sea, and land ports, yet CBP OFO staffing is not expanding. For example, in June, a new Federal inspection terminal will open at the 

San Diego Airport. Inspection volume will increase from 300 air passengers an hour 

to 1,000 air passengers an hour. Currently, there are a total of 53 front-line officers 

split between the airport and seaport. CBP needs to hire and assign an additional 

38 officers to the airport alone to staff this new inspection facility. At the San Ysidro 

land port, 12 new pedestrian lanes, and 8 new vehicle lanes come on line in June. 

There are no new CBP officers assigned to this port and beginning on April 1, 2018, 

150 CBP officers have been sent from other short-staffed ports to the seriously 

short-staffed ports of Nogales and San Ysidro for 90-day temporary duty assignments (TDYs). 

To address CBP OFO staffing shortages and to address the ever-increasing volume of trade through the ports of entry in the future, Ranking Member Vela and 

others recently introduced H.R. 4940, the Border and Port Security Act, stand-alone, 

bipartisan legislation that would authorize the hiring of 500 additional CBP officers, 

100 agriculture specialists, and additional OFO trade operations staff annually until 

the staffing gaps in CBP’s various Workload Staffing Models are met. NTEU strongly supports this CBP officer and agriculture specialist—only staffing authorization 

bill and urges every Member of Congress to support this bill. 

NTEU also asks Homeland Security Committee Members to request from the House Appropriations Committee up to $100 million in fiscal year 2019 direct appropriations for the hiring of 500 CBP officers, 100 CBP agriculture specialists, and 

needed non-uniformed trade operations and support staff. 

The President’s fiscal year 2019 budget request does support the hiring of new 

CBP officers to meet the current staffing need of 2,516, but seeks to fund these new 

positions by increasing user fees. The President’s budget proposal only provides appropriated funding to hire 60 new CBP officer positions at the National Targeting 

Center. The President’s request seeks no appropriated funding to address the current CBP officer staffing shortage of 2,516 additional CBP officers as stipulated by 

CBP’s own fiscal year 2018 WSM or to fund the additional 721 CBP agriculture specialists as stipulated by CBP’s own fiscal year 2008 AgRAM. 

User Fees.—As in the past, the administration’s budget proposes significant realignment of user fees collected by CBP. Currently, 33 percent of a CBP officer’s 

compensation is funded with a combination of user fees, reimbursable service agreements, and trust funds. The fiscal year 2019 budget proposes to reduce OFO appropriated funding by realigning and redirecting user fees, including redirecting the 

Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) fee that would require a statutory change. The fiscal year 2019 budget proposal would redirect approximately 

$160 million in ESTA fees from Brand USA to CBP. Rather than redirecting the 

ESTA fees to fund the additional 2,516 CBP officer new hires needed to fully staff 

CBP officer positions in fiscal year 2019 and beyond, as stipulated by CBP’s WSM, 

the budget would in fact reduce CBP’s appropriated funding by $160 million. Therefore, while the budget proposes to increase the number of CBP officer positions 

funded by ESTA user fees by 1,093, it decreases appropriated funding by $160 million, and reduces the number of CBP officer positions funded by appropriations by 

1,093 positions. 

Once again, the President’s budget includes CBP officer staffing numbers that are 

dependent on Congress first enacting changes to statutes that determine the 

amounts and disbursement of these user fee collections. To accomplish the ESTA 

fee change in the President’s budget, Congress must amend the Travel Promotion 

Act of 2009 (Pub. L. 111–145). The President’s request also proposes fee increases 

to the Immigration and Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 

7 

(COBRA) user fees, not a direct up-front appropriation, to fund CBP officer new 

hires as stipulated by the WSM. However, Immigration and COBRA user fees cannot be increased without Congress first enacting legislation. A proposal to increase 

user fees has been part of the administration’s annual budget submission since fiscal year 2014 to fund the hiring of new CBP officers. These user fee increase proposals are again in the fiscal year 2019 budget request, even though the committees 

with jurisdiction have never shown any interest or even held a hearing to discuss 

this long-standing legislative proposal and the administration has not pressed upon 

these committee Chairs to do so. 

Opioid Interdiction.—CBP OFO plays a major role in addressing the Nation’s 

opioid epidemic—a crisis that is getting worse. The smuggling of fentanyl and other 

opioids has increased markedly from 2.4 pounds in fiscal year 2013 to 71,195 pounds 

seized in fiscal year 2017 by CBP OFO. The scourge of synthetic opioid addiction 

is felt in every State and is a threat to the Nation’s economic security and wellbeing. The majority of fentanyl is manufactured in other countries such as China, 

and is smuggled primarily through the international mail and express consignment 

carrier facilities (e.g. FedEx and UPS) and through ports of entry along the Southwest Border. According to CBP, over the last 3 years, there were 181 CBP employees assigned to the 5 Postal Service International Service Centers and 208 CBP employees assigned to the Private Express Carrier Facilities. 

Due to the on-going OFO staffing shortages, 208 CBP employees at express consignment hubs is an extremely low number. In the past year, the FedEx hub in 

Memphis processed 38 million imports and 48 million exports—equaling 86 million 

in total package volume. There are approximately 24 CBP officers in total screening 

all 86 million shipments, and on average, about 15 CBP officers are working the 

main overnight FedEx ‘‘sort’’ shift. Considering the volume at the FedEx hub, NTEU 

has been told that the port requires a minimum of 60 CBP officers to facilitate the 

flow of legitimate freight and ensure successful interdiction of these synthetic 

chemicals. NTEU’s CBP OFO appropriation request supports this critical need at 

international postal and express consignment hubs. 

Agriculture Specialist Staffing.—Despite CBP’s release of its risk-based AgRAM 

that documents an on-going shortage of CBP agriculture specialists—by 721—at the 

ports of entry, the budget request includes no direct appropriation to hire these critical positions needed to fulfill CBP’s agriculture quarantine inspection (AQI) mission 

of pest exclusion and safeguarding U.S. agriculture and natural resources from the 

risks associated with the entry, establishment or spread of animal, plant pests, and 

pathogens. NTEU’s appropriations request includes a direct appropriation to begin 

to hire the 721 agriculture specialists as stipulated in their fiscal year 2018 AgRAM. 

CBP Trade Operations Staffing.—CBP has a dual mission of safeguarding our Nation’s borders and ports as well as regulating and facilitating international trade. 

CBP employees at the ports of entry are the second-largest source of revenue collection for the U.S. Government. In 2017, CBP processed more than $2 trillion in imports and collected approximately $40 billion in duties, taxes, and other fees. Since 

CBP was established in March 2003, however, there has been no increase in nonuniformed CBP trade enforcement and compliance personnel even though inbound 

trade volume grew by more than 24 percent between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 

2014. Additionally, CBP trade operations staffing has fallen below the statutory 

floor set forth in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and stipulated in the fiscal year 

2017 CBP Resource Optimization Model for Trade Positions. NTEU strongly supports the funding through direct appropriations of 140 additional positions at the 

CBP Office of Trade to support implementation of Trade Enhancement and Facilitation Act (Pub. L. 114–125) requirements. 

Increasing CBP officer staffing at the ports-of-entry is an economic driver for the 

U.S. economy. According to the Joint Economic Committee (JEC), ‘‘every day 1.1 

million people and $5.9 billion in goods legally enter and exit through the ports of 

entry’’ and finds that border delays cost the U.S. economy upwards of $5 billion each 

year. CBP estimates that the annual hiring of an additional 500 CBP officers at the 

ports of entry would increase yearly economic activity by $1 billion and result in 

an additional 16,600 jobs per year to the U.S. economy. 

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this request on behalf of the men and 

women represented by NTEU at the Nation’s ports of entry. NTEU asks that the 

Homeland Security Committee Members seek up to $100 million from the House 

Appropriations Committee for direct appropriated funding for new CBP officers, agriculture specialists, and support staff to build on the CBP OFO staffing advances 

made in the fiscal year 2018 omnibus measure. 

8 

1 Border Security, Commerce and Travel: Commissioner McAleenan’s Vision for the Future of 

CBP, 115th Cong. (2018), H. Comm. on Homeland Security, Subcomm. on Border and Maritime 

Security, https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/border-security-commerce-and-travel-commissioner-mcaleenans-vision-for-the-future-of-cbp/ (Apr. 25, 2018). 2See About EPIC, EPIC.org, https://epic.org/epic/about.html. 3 EPIC, EPIC Domestic Surveillance Project, https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/, Statement of EPIC, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Innovation, Successes, and Challenges, Hearing Before S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Mar. 13, 2017, https:// 

epic.org/testimony/congress/EPIC-SCOM-Drones-Mar2017.pdf; The Future of Drones in America: Law Enforcement and Privacy Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 

113th Cong. (2013) (Statement of Amie Stepanovich, EPIC Director of the Domestic Surveillance 

Project), available at https://epic.org/privacy/testimony/EPIC-Drone-Testimony-3-13- 

Stepanovich.pdf; Comments of EPIC to DHS, Docket No. DHS–2007–0076 CCTV: Developing 

Privacy Best Practices (2008), available at https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/ 

epiclcctvl011508.pdf. 4 EPIC FOIA Cases, EPIC, https://epic.org/foia/; Marc Rotenberg et al, The Open Government Clinic: Teaching the Basics of Lawyering, 48 IND. L. REV. 149 (2014); EPIC, Litigation 

Under the Federal Open Government Laws 2010 (2010). 5Samantha Schmidt, Border wall with Mexico won’t be built ‘from sea to shining sea,’ DHS 

secretary says, Washington Post, April 6, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/04/06/border-wall-with-mexico-wont-be-built-from-sea-to-shining-sea-dhs-secretary-says/. 6 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(4). 

7 Exec. Order No. 13,780 § 8. 

8 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Deploys Facial Recognition Biometric Technology 

at 1 TSA Checkpoint at JFK Airport (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/nationalmedia-release/cbp-deploys-facial-recognition-biometric-technology-1-tsa-checkpoint. 

LETTER FROM THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER

APRIL 24, 2018. 

The Honorable MARTHA MCSALLY, Chairwoman, 

The Honorable FILEMON VELA, Ranking Member, 

U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, H2–176 Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515. 

DEAR CHAIRWOMAN MCSALLY AND RANKING MEMBER VELA: We write to you regarding the hearing on ‘‘Border Security, Commerce and Travel: Commissioner 

McAleenan’s Vision for the Future of CBP.’’1 EPIC welcomes your continued leadership on CBP oversight and looks forward to opportunities to work with you and your 

staff. 

The Electronic Privacy Information Center (‘‘EPIC’’) is a public interest research 

center established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging privacy and civil 

liberties issues.2 EPIC is focused on the protection of individual privacy rights, and 

we are particularly interested in the privacy problems associated with surveillance.3

EPIC also manages one of the most extensive open Government litigation programs 

in the United States.4

EPIC understands that enhanced surveillance techniques will be part of the discussion over border security.5 EPIC writes to warn that enhanced surveillance at 

the border will almost certainly sweep up the personal data of U.S. citizens. Before 

there is any increased deployment of surveillance systems at the U.S. border, an assessment of the privacy implications should be conducted. Additionally, deployment 

of surveillance technology should be accompanied by new policy and procedures and 

independent oversight to protect citizens’ rights. And any law enforcement agency 

that uses surveillance tools should be prepared to comply with all current laws, including all open government obligations. The privacy assessments, policies and procedures, and oversight mechanisms should all be made public. Most critically, if the 

CBP chooses to create or expand a system of records that contains personal information which is retrievable by name, it must comply with all of the requirements of 

the Privacy Act, including publishing a System of Records Notice and a Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking so that the public is able to comment on a record system established by a Federal agency.6

BIOMETRIC ENTRY/EXIT TRACKING SYSTEM

Recently, new privacy risks have arisen with the deployment of facial recognition 

technology at U.S. airports. An Executive Order recommends that agencies ‘‘expedite the completion and implementation of biometric entry exit tracking system,’’7

and Customs and Border Protection (‘‘CBP’’) has deployed facial recognition technology at several U.S. airports.8 But corresponding privacy safeguards have not yet 

been established. 

9 

9 EPIC, Bankruptcy of Verified Identity Pass and the Privacy of Clear Registered Traveler 

Data, https://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/clear/. 10The Future of Registered Traveler, 109th Cong. (2005), H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 

Subcomm. on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity (testimony of 

Marc Rotenberg), available at http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/rtltestl110305.pdf. 11 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Southern Border Pedestrian Field Test Summary Report, https://epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/biometric-entry-exit/Southern-Border-Pedestrian-Field-TestReport.pdf (December 2016). 12 EPIC v. FBI—Next Generation Identification, EPIC, https://epic.org/foia/fbi/ngi/. 13DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NEXT GENERATION 

IDENTIFICATION (NGI) SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT VERSION 4.4 at 244 (Oct. 

1, 2010), https://epic.org/foia/fbi/ngi/NGI-System-Requiremets.pdf. 14 EPIC v. CBP (Biometric Entry/Exit Program), EPIC, https://epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/biometric-entry-exit/. 15 Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in 

Commercial Gender Classification, Proceedings of Machine Learning Research (2018) at 11, 

available at http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf. 

EPIC would like to remind the committee that in 2009, Verified Identity Pass, 

Inc., a corporate participant in the Transportation Security Administration’s (‘‘TSA’’) 

Registered Traveler program ceased operations after declaring bankruptcy, following 

a massive data breach concerning personal data, including biometric identifiers.9

Verified Identity Pass, Inc. operated ‘‘Clear,’’ a TSA recognized Registered Traveler 

program. Clear was the largest Registered Traveler program in the Nation operating out of 20 airports with about 200,000 members. 

EPIC had warned this committee back in 2005 of the risks of the Registered Traveler program.10 We explained that without ensuring compliance with Federal Privacy Act obligations, the agency was placing at risk the privacy and security of the 

American public. We said: 

‘‘The Privacy Act creates critical and necessary safeguards not simply to protect privacy, but also to ensure accuracy and accountability. Any government-approved security system that keeps personal information on individuals should meet the Privacy Act requirements for necessity, relevance, and openness, including individual 

access and correction. It should be made clear that these requirements apply whether the information originates with the agency or with information provided by the 

individual.’’ 

Facial recognition continues to pose significant threats to privacy and civil liberties. Facial recognitions techniques can be deployed covertly, remotely, and on a 

mass scale. Additionally, there is a lack of well-defined Federal regulations controlling the collection, use, dissemination, and retention of biometric identifiers. Ubiquitous identification by Government agencies eliminates the individual’s ability to 

control the disclosure of their identities, creates new opportunities for tracking and 

monitoring, and poses a specific risk to the First Amendment rights of free association and free expression. 

Transparency about these biometric surveillance programs is essential, particularly because their accuracy is questionable. In December 2017, a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit pursued by EPIC produced the public release of a CBP report 

on iris imaging and facial recognition scans for border control. The ‘‘Southwest Border Pedestrian Field Test’’ revealed that the CBP does not perform operational 

matching at a ‘‘satisfactory’’ level.11 In a related FOIA lawsuit, EPIC obtained documents from the FBI concerning the Next Generation Identification database which 

contains facial scans, fingerprints, and other biometrics of millions of Americans.12

The documents obtained by EPIC revealed that biometric identification is often inaccurate.13

The use of facial recognition at the border has real consequences for U.S. citizens 

as well as non-U.S. citizens. All people entering the United States, including U.S. 

passport holders, could be subject to this intrusive screening technique. EPIC has 

filed a FOIA lawsuit to obtain documents to determine if there are proper privacy 

safeguards in place for the collection of biometric information at U.S. airports.14

There is also a new study from the MIT Media Lab which found that facial recognition is less accurate for persons of color. The MIT study found that the error 

rate in face recognition software for dark-skinned females was 20.8 percent—34.7 

percent, while the error rate for light-skinned males was 0.0 percent—0.3 percent.15

As the New York Times explained, ‘‘[t]hese disparate results, calculated by Joy 

Buolamwini, a researcher at the M.I.T. Media Lab, show how some of the biases 

in the real world can seep into artificial intelligence, the computer systems that inVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:00 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18BM0425\18BM0425.TXT HEATH
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16Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, if You’re a White Guy, New York Times, Feb. 

9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html. 17 Asma Khalid, Facial Recognition May Boost Airport Security But Raises Privacy Worries, 

NPR, June 26, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/06/26/534131967/ 

facial-recognition-may-boost-airport-security-but-raises-privacy-worries. 18 Ben Mutzabaugh, Delta to test facial-recognition tech on new self-service bag drop, USA 

TODAY, May 15, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/2017/ 

05/15/delta-test-facial-recognition-tech-new-self-service-bag-drops/101703956/. 19 Russel Brandom, The US Border Patrol is trying to build face-reading drones, The Verge, Apr. 6, 2017, http://www.theverge.com/2017/4/6/15208820/customs-border-patrol-drone-facialrecognition-silicon-valley-dhs; Dept. of Homeland Security, Other Transaction Solicitation (OTS) 

HSHQDC–16–R–00114 Project: Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Capabilities, Jul. 15, 

2016, https://www.fbo.gov/spg/DHS/OCPO/DHS-OCPO/HSHQDC-0916-R-00114/listing.html. 20 EPIC, EPIC FOIA—US Drones Intercept Electronic Communications and Identify Human 

Targets, Feb. 28, 2013, https://epic.org/2013/02/epic-foia-us-drones-intercep.html (record received available at https://epic.org/privacy/drones/EPIC-2010-Performance-Specs-1.pdf.) 21Performance Spec for CBP UAV System, Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol, https:// 

epic.org/privacy/drones/EPIC-2005-Performance-Specs-2.pdf. 22 EPIC, Domestic Drones Petition, https://epic.org/droneslpetition/. 

form facial recognition.’’16 If it is correct that that facial recognition as a form of 

identification discriminates against persons of color in ways that other forms of 

identification do not, there is a substantial civil rights concern that the committee 

should investigate. 

The involvement of private companies raises additional concerns. CBP has enlisted airlines such as JetBlue and Delta to implement face recognition technology 

in U.S. airports.17 JetBlue is running a self-boarding program using facial recognition in lieu of checking boarding passes. Delta aims to use facial recognition as part 

of baggage drop off.18 It is unclear whether access to biometric identifiers by JetBlue 

and Delta will lead to non-security uses of biometric identifiers. 

These airlines are promoting facial recognition as a convenience, but it’s clearly 

part of a larger effort by the government to implement a biometric surveillance program that will capture the facial images of all air travelers. And travelers do not 

understand how this system, once in place at airports, could be deployed in other 

settings. 

The CBP and the TSA now plan deploy facial recognition technology at TSA 

checkpoints—further expanding the use of a privacy-invasive technology without 

regulations in place to provide proper protections. 

Commissioner McAleenan should be asked the following questions: 

• Has the CBP conducted the necessary Privacy Impact Assessments prior to deployments? 

• Are there plans to increase the use of facial recognition? 

• Has CBP detected racial bias in the deployment of its facial recognition systems? 

• What safeguards are currently in place to protect facial scans from hacking or 

breaches? 

• What restrictions on the use of biometric identifiers by private companies have 

been established? 

DRONES AT THE BORDER

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is already deploying aerial drones with facial recognition technology at the border.19 In 2013, records obtained by EPIC under 

the Freedom of Information Act showed that the CBP is operating drones in the 

United States capable of intercepting electronic communications.20 The records obtained by EPIC also indicate that the ten Predator B drones operated by the agency 

have the capacity to recognize and identify a person on the ground.21 The documents were provided in response to a request from EPIC for information about the 

Bureau’s use of drones across the country. The agency has made the Predator 

drones available to other Federal, State, and local agencies. The records obtained 

by EPIC raise questions about the agency’s compliance with Federal privacy laws 

and the scope of domestic surveillance. 

Following the revelations about drone surveillance at the border, EPIC, joined by 

30 organizations and more than a thousand individuals, petitioned CBP to suspend 

the domestic drone surveillance program, pending the establishment of concrete privacy regulations.22 The petition stated that ‘‘the use of drones for border surveillance presents substantial privacy and civil liberties concerns for millions of Americans across the country.’’ Any authorization granted to CBP to conduct surveillance 

11 

23See generally EPIC, Drones: Eyes in the Sky, Spotlight on Surveillance (2014), https:// 

www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/1014/drones.html. 24M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 Stan. L. Rev. Online 29, 30 (Dec. 12, 

2011); See also Jeffrey Rosen, Symposium Keynote Address, 65 Rutgers L. Rev. 965, 966 (2013) 

(‘‘[A]s police departments increasingly begin to use drone technologies to track individual suspects 24/7, or to put areas of the country under permanent surveillance, this possibility of 24/ 

7 tracking will become increasingly real.’’). 25 Bruce Schneier, Surveillance And the Internet of Things, Schneier on Security (May 21, 

2013), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/05/theleyeslandlea.html. 26See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that a police helicopter flying more than 

400 feet above private property is not a search). 27State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161 (N.M. 2015); see Brief of Amicus Curiae EPIC, id., available 

at https://epic.org/amicus/drones/new-mexico/davis/State-v-Davis-Opinion.pdf. 

28President Barack Obama, Presidential Memorandum: Promoting Economic Competitiveness 

While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Feb. 15, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/ 

15/Presidential-memorandum-promoting-economic-competitiveness-while-safegua. 29 Id. at § 1(e). 30 Id. at § 1. 

at the border must require compliance with Federal privacy laws and regulations 

for surveillance tools, including drones. 

Much of this surveillance technology could, in theory, be deployed on manned vehicles. However, drones present a unique threat to privacy. Drones are designed to 

maintain a constant, persistent eye on the public to a degree that former methods 

of surveillance were unable to achieve. The technical and economic limitations to 

aerial surveillance change dramatically with the advancement of drone technology. 

Small, unmanned drones are already inexpensive; the surveillance capabilities of 

drones are rapidly advancing; and cheap storage is readily available to maintain repositories of surveillance data.23 Drones ‘‘represent an efficient and cost-effective alternative to helicopters and airplanes,’’ but their use implicates significant privacy 

interests.24 As the price of drones ‘‘continues to drop and their capabilities increase, 

they will become a very powerful surveillance tool.’’25 The use of drones in border 

security will place U.S. citizens living on the border under ceaseless surveillance by 

the government. 

The Supreme Court has not yet considered the limits of drone surveillance under 

the Fourth Amendment, though the Court held 20 years ago that law enforcement 

may conduct manned aerial surveillance operations from as low as 400 feet without 

a warrant.26 No Federal statute currently provides adequate safeguards to protect 

privacy against increased drone use in the United States. However, some border 

States do limit warrantless aerial surveillance. In 2015, the Supreme Court of New 

Mexico held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless aerial surveillance of, and interference with, a person’s private property.27 Accordingly, there are 

substantial legal and Constitutional issues involved in the deployment of aerial 

drones by law enforcement and State and Federal agencies that need to be addressed. 

A 2015 Presidential Memorandum on drones and privacy required that all Federal 

agencies to establish and publish drone privacy procedures by February 2016.28 Emphasizing the ‘‘privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties concerns’’ raised by the technology,29 President Obama ordered agencies to ensure that any use of drones by the 

Federal Government in U.S. airspace comply with ‘‘the Constitution, Federal law, 

and other applicable regulations and policies.’’30

However, the DHS has failed to produce reports required by the 2015 Presidential 

Memorandum. EPIC has submitted a FOIA request for DHS’s policies and reports 

required under the Presidential Memorandum, but the DHS has failed to respond. 

Commissioner McAleenan should be asked: 

• How will CBP comply with State laws prohibiting warrantless aerial surveillance when deploying drones? 

• When will CBP publish the drone privacy procedures report required by the 

2015 Presidential Memorandum? 

12 

We ask that this letter be entered in the hearing record. EPIC looks forward to 

working with the subcommittee on these issues of vital importance to the American 

public. 

Sincerely, 

MARC ROTENBERG, 

EPIC President. 

CAITRIONA FITZGERALD, 

EPIC Policy Director. 

JERAMIE SCOTT, 

EPIC National Security Counsel. 

CHRISTINE BONNAN, 

EPIC Policy Fellow. 

Mr. VELA. I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Vela follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER FILEMON VELA

APRIL 25, 2018 

My office and I receive daily notifications and press releases from CBP about the 

volume and value of the narcotics that are seized coming through our ports of entry. 

For example, CBP officers at the Pharr Port of Entry seized 45 pounds of cocaine 

valued at more than $347,000 earlier this month. At the Progreso International 

Bridge, CBP officers seized nearly 20 pounds of crystal methamphetamine valued 

at more than $381,000 in early April as well. 

CBP publishes its enforcement statistics monthly, and I have noted that, over the 

past several years, more drugs are seized on average by the Office of Field Operations than Border Patrol. The only exception to that is marijuana, which Border 

Patrol interdicts at a much higher rate. 

In addition to keeping people and contraband from entering illegally, CBP is also 

responsible for facilitating legitimate trade and travel—both of which are major 

drivers for economic growth. This means CBP officers inspect $6.5 billion worth of 

cargo on a daily basis. 

CBP officers are also responsible for screening and vetting foreign and U.S. citizen 

travelers headed to the United States, and at our international airports, cruise terminals, or land ports of entry. However, the fact that CBP continues to rely on temporary duty assignments and back-to-back shifts to make up for its officer shortage 

remains a major concern of mine. 

I have stated on multiple occasions that CBP’s officer staffing shortage and difficulty in retaining professional Border Patrol agents are self-inflicted 

vulnerabilities. These CBP staffing issues are critical to border security, yet the administration continues to ignore these problems. 

Commissioner, I introduced the Border and Port Security Act to give you the ability to hire more officers and agriculture specialists, but we need your commitment 

to address the internal problems that are making it difficult to on-board new personnel and keep them. 

I am glad that my bill has bipartisan support, and I know that Chairwoman 

McSally has her own proposal to address CBP’s officer staffing shortage. 

My hope is that we can work on this issue in a bipartisan way, much like we did 

with the public-private partnership authority granted to CBP to address infrastructure needs at ports. 

In my district, the city of Donna and CBP have been working to establish the 

Model Port concept, or the new way to streamline cargo and passenger vehicle inspections, through the Donation Acceptance Program. This project is an example of 

the many ways investments in our port infrastructure affects positive change along 

the border. 

I hope that your confirmation gives you a greater ability to ensure the administration uses the facts when considering changes to border security. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the full committee, 

the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally and Ranking 

Member Vela, for having this hearing. First, I would like to congratulate you, sir, Commissioner McAleenan on your Senate conVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:00 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18BM0425\18BM0425.TXT HEATH
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firmation last month. Well done. I am glad the Senate finally got 

that accomplished. They have a lot more to do in my judgment, but 

that is another point of view. 

Our country, though, is fortunate, I think, that you were willing 

to answer the President’s call and serve as commissioner of this 

very vital, important agency. CBP has a broad and important mission from securing our border to facilitating legitimate trade to ensuring those who enter our country do so legally. 

Commissioner, you have a lot on your plate. I am confident, 

though, that you are up to the task. Despite this historic drop that 

we saw in apprehensions last year, more must be done to secure 

the border. As you know and know very well, during the last few 

months we observed a troubling spike in illegal immigration, over 

200 percent more crossings this year than last. 

Many who are apprehended at the border are not looking to even 

evade capture, but rather they simply turn themselves in to the 

nearest Border Patrol agent or CBP officer and claim a fear of persecution and an asylum claim for persecution in their country. That 

is what the drug cartels have coached them to say, and that is 

what they do. 

Unfortunately, the cartels understand the weakness of our immigration laws all too well. They have marketed the use of immigration loopholes to entice illicit migrants. I support Secretary 

Nielsen’s call to close these legal loopholes. 

We need to change the law that treats unaccompanied minors 

from Mexico and Central America differently. We must also reform 

our asylum policies and ensure the prompt removal of anyone who 

crosses the border illegally, regardless of where they come from. 

In response to the recent surge, mainly in south Texas, the President deployed thousands of National Guard troops to support the 

efforts of men and women of CBP. I applaud this effort, but sending the National Guard to the border is nothing really new. Guard 

troops helped build the fence in Operation Jump Start under President Bush and provided much-needed aviation support to supplement CBP’s air and marine operations under Operation Phalanx 

during the Obama administration. 

I also want to thank my Governor, Governor Abbott, for his leadership on border security. My home State of Texas, I believe, has 

been leading the way when it comes to securing the border. For 

years we have used the National Guard on our border at our 

State’s expense, to help ensure the safety of Texans, despite years 

of inaction by previous administrations. 

Congress has recently provided CBP with billions of dollars to invest in technology, barrier replacement, new levee wall construction in the Rio Grande Valley sector. I believe all of this is desperately needed down there. 

I believe this will serve as a powerful deterrent to illegal entry 

as well as provide flood protection against the Rio Grande Valley 

from the river. So this is a very important issue and I look forward 

to an update on how CBP prepares to—as this caravan, they call 

it, prepares to come up north into the United States and other 

threats, as well. 

Madam Chair, with that, I yield back. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

14 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

APRIL 25, 2018 

First, I would also like to congratulate Commissioner McAleenan on his Senate 

confirmation last month. 

Our country is fortunate that you were willing to answer the President’s call and 

serve as the commissioner of this agency. 

CBP has a broad and important mission—from securing our border and facilitating legitimate trade, to ensuring those who enter our country do so legally. 

Commissioner McAleenan, you have a lot on your plate. But I am confident you 

are up to the task. 

Despite the historic drop in apprehensions last year, more must be done to secure 

the border. 

During the last few months, we observed a troubling spike in illegal immigration—over 200 percent more crossings this year than last. 

Many who are apprehended at the border are not looking to evade capture. They 

simply turn themselves in to the nearest Border Patrol agent, or CBP officer and 

claim a fear of persecution in their country. 

This is what the cartels have coached them to do. 

Unfortunately, the cartels understand the weakness of our immigration laws all 

too well. 

They have marketed the use of immigration loopholes to entice illicit migrants. 

I support Secretary Nielsen’s call to close these loopholes. 

We need to change the law that treats unaccompanied minors from Mexico and 

Central America differently. 

We must also reform our asylum policies and ensure the prompt removal of anyone who crosses the border illegally. 

In response to the recent surge, mainly in South Texas, the President deployed 

thousands of National Guard troops to support the effort of the men and women of 

CBP. 

Sending the National Guard to the border is not new. 

Guard troops helped build the fence in Operation Jump Start and provided muchneeded aviation support to supplement CBP’s Air and Marine Operations under 

Operational Phalanx. 

I would like to thank Governor Abbott for his leadership on border security. My 

home State of Texas has been leading the way. 

For years we have used the National Guard on the border—at our State’s expense—to help ensure the safety of Texans, despite years of inaction by the previous 

administration. 

Congress has recently provided CBP with billions of dollars to invest in technology, barrier replacement, and new levy wall construction in the Rio Grande Valley Sector. 

This will serve as a powerful deterrent to illegal entry as well as provide flood 

protection against the Rio Grande River. 

This is a very important issue and I look forward to hearing an update on CBP’s 

progress in South Texas. 

I yield the balance of my time. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chairman yields back. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member for the full committee, gentleman from 

Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Chairwoman McSally and 

Ranking Member Vela, for holding today’s hearing. Commissioner, 

good seeing you again. It is always nice to have a permanent title 

after your nomination. 

You officially have been head of CBP, for only a month, but your 

many years in leadership positions within CBP will, no doubt, 

serve you well in this new position. I encourage you to use your 

deep knowledge of CBP to meaningfully inform the Department’s 

approach to border security. 

Our border security challenges are more nuanced than simply 

building a wall. At a time when the Department’s own data show 

that illegal entries are at the lowest level they have been since the 

1970’s, it makes little sense as to why we should heavily rely on 

15 

building walls for the foreseeable future or deploy National Guard’s 

troops to the Southern Border. 

During last month’s subcommittee hearing, the Government Accountability Office witness testified that U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection still does not have the metrics to measure how a wall 

contributes to border security, in general. I urge you to correct this 

immediately. 

Given that CBP has received more than $1 billion for barriers 

and requested another $1 billion for the upcoming fiscal year, I am 

concerned that we are bound to repeat many mistakes if we do not 

know what we are getting in return. 

I also echo Ranking Member Vela’s frustration that the Trump 

administration continues to overlook critical staffing problems 

within CBP, and particularly the shortage of officers manning our 

ports of entry. Both Border Patrol and the Office of Field Operations are losing trained, experienced agents and officers at a faster rate than CBP is able to replace them. This is another problem 

that I urge you to address quickly. 

Additionally, I am concerned by the policy proposals and practices CBP and other components within DHS are using to deter illegal immigration. In February, all 12 of the Democrats on this 

committee and 63 other Democratic colleagues sent a letter to Secretary Nielsen asking her to halt the practice of separating migrant 

parents from their children when they are apprehended at the border or in immigration detention in cases that do not warrant it. 

The practice is inhumane, excessively punitive, and can deliberately interfere with their legal right to request asylum. I reiterate my opposition to this practice and I caution CBP from pursuing other such practices that do not honor our values as a Nation 

of immigrants. 

In your testimony, you commit to enhancing internal integrity 

programs, transparency, and professionalism measures. I take this 

to mean that misconduct and lack of professionalism by errant 

agents and offices will be swiftly addressed. 

A number of videos have circulated in recent months that show 

CBP personnel acting in ways that do not seem to comply with this 

policy. We know that the overwhelming majority of CBP personnel 

work hard, conduct themselves professionally, and are a credit to 

their agency. I hope that you are investigating these incidents to 

ensure that they are not indicative of a problem within CBP’s 

ranks. 

Last, Mr. Commissioner, I hope you are able to share with us 

how your priorities for CBP align with the administration’s. As we 

have seen on multiple occasions, experts at CBP and DHS are neither informing, nor even being notified in advance of major policy 

changes to border security operation. The rollout of the first travel 

ban Executive Order last year and the recent National Guard deployment announcement come to mind as examples. 

I hope that your first-hand knowledge that more than walls are 

required is well utilized. 

I thank you for agreeing to testify before us today and look forward to your testimony and yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

16 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

APRIL 25, 2018 

Our border security challenges are more nuanced than simply building a wall. 

At a time when the Department’s own data show that illegal entries are at the 

lowest levels they have been since the 1970’s, it makes little sense why we should 

heavily rely on building walls for the foreseeable future or deploy National Guard 

troops to the Southern Border. 

During last month’s subcommittee, the Government Accountability Office testified 

that U.S. Customs and Border Protection still does not have metrics to measure how 

a wall or even land-based technology contribute to border security in general. 

I urge you to correct this immediately. 

Given that CBP has received more than $1 billion for barriers and requested an- other $1 billion for the upcoming fiscal year, I am concerned that we are bound to 

repeat many mistakes if we do not know what we are getting in return. 

I also echo Ranking Member Vela’s frustration that the Trump administration 

continues to overlook critical staffing problems within CBP, in particular the shortage of officers manning our ports of entry. 

Both Border Patrol and the Office of Field Operations are losing trained, experienced agents and officers at a faster rate than CBP is able to replace them. 

This is another problem I urge you to address quickly. 

Last, I am concerned by the policy proposals and practice CBP and other components within DHS are using to deter illegal migration. 

In February, all 12 of Democrats on this committee and 63 other Democratic colleagues sent a letter to Secretary Nielsen asking her to halt the practice of separating migrant parents from their children when they are apprehended at the border or in immigration detention in cases that do not warrant it. 

The practice is inhumane, excessively punitive, and can deliberatively interfere 

with their legal right to request asylum. 

I reiterate my opposition to this practice, and I caution CBP from pursuing other 

such policies that do not honor our values as a Nation of immigrants. 

In your testimony, you commit to enhancing ‘‘internal integrity programs,’’ transparency, and ‘‘professionalism measures.’’ 

I take this to mean that misconduct and lack of professionalism by errant agents 

and officers will be swiftly addressed. 

A number of videos have circulated in recent months that show CBP personnel 

acting in ways that do not seem to comply with policy. 

We know that the overwhelming majority of CBP personnel work hard, conduct 

themselves professionally, and are a credit to their agency. 

I hope you are investigating these incidents to ensure they are not indicative of 

a problem within CBP’s ranks. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman yields back. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Mr. Barletta follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE LOU BARLETTA

Thank you commissioner for coming before this committee today to discuss the 

importance of securing our borders, and for your service to this country. 

We have immigration laws for two reasons, to ensure the National security of the 

United States, and to protect American jobs. I am pleased that the American people 

finally have a partner in the White House whose main priority is representing their 

interests. 

There are many victims of illegal immigration; I do not need an expert to explain 

the issue to me because I have lived it. When I was the Mayor of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, we had a massive illegal immigration problem, as our population grew by 50 

percent, but our tax revenue stayed the same. 

Hospitals and schools were overcrowded, our police force was overwhelmed by the 

increased crime, and resources were stretched thin and diverted from tax-paying 

Americans and legal immigrants. 

We are a compassionate Nation, one with a proud and diverse history. However, 

too often I am told we must have compassion for the illegal alien who broke the 

law to enter our country. But I have sat at the tables of Pennsylvanians who have 

lost loved ones to the violent acts of illegal aliens, and it is those people for whom 

I have compassion. 

17 

We as a Congress have failed by not enforcing the laws of our land and refusing 

to put the safety and well-being of the American people first. 

For example, in Philadelphia, multiple child molesters have been released back 

onto the streets because of the city’s sanctuary policy. 

Deadly narcotics like fentanyl continue to flood across our borders. In Pennsylvania alone, drug overdose deaths rose by 37 percent in 2016 according to the Drug 

Enforcement Administration. 

It is time to secure our borders, enforce our Federal laws, and put America first. 

Ms. MCSALLY. We are pleased to have Commissioner Kevin 

McAleenan before us today to discuss a wide range of issues facing 

CBP. Commissioner McAleenan was sworn in on March 20, 2018, 

as the fifth commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

Prior to his confirmation, Mr. McAleenan served as the acting 

commissioner since the beginning of this administration. As the 

agency’s chief executive, Mr. McAleenan oversees 60,000 employees, manages a budget of over $13 billion, and ensures the effective 

operations of CBP’s mission to protect National security while promoting economic prosperity. The witness’s full written statement 

will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Commissioner McAleenan for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF KEVIN K. MC ALEENAN, COMMISSIONER, U.S. 

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking 

Member Vela. It was nice to see the full committee Chairman 

McCaul as well as Ranking Member Thompson here and Members 

of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. It is 

a privilege to speak to you about my priorities as commissioner and 

to represent the nearly 60,000 strong men and women of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

The opportunity to lead and work alongside these men and 

women is the biggest privilege of my professional life. CBP is central to many priorities for the American people and the administration, from countering terrorism, to enhancing border security, to securing and facilitating trade and travel. 

Our dedicated officers and agents, specialists, pilots, and support 

personnel are relentlessly perusing a more secure and economically 

competitive Nation. My vision for CBP is that we aspire to become 

the most effective, most innovative, and most trusted and transparent law enforcement agency in the United States while remaining the premier border security and management agency in the 

world. 

During my tenure as CBP commissioner, I have committed to 

five overarching priorities: Attracting, retaining, and developing 

the most qualified and resilient workforce to serve our Nation and 

meet tomorrow’s challenges; accelerating the adoption of innovative 

technologies to keep America and our people safe; building and 

strengthening partnerships across Government and with international counterparts; transforming the ways that our stakeholders 

interact with CBP and our operations; and investing in our culture 

through Unity of Effort initiatives that further develop a common 

18 

purpose and a mission commitment across all CBP’s operational 

and support components. 

My written testimony submitted to the committee further elaborate CBP’s on-going efforts to enhance our security and strengthen 

our organization, keeping our Nation safe my priority strategies for 

continuing to improve. 

With the support of Congress to provide the resources, authorities, and legislative changes we need, I believe that CBP will continue to make great strides across our core missions and in every 

area of our operations. 

We will also enhance her internal integrity programs and pursue 

transparency and professionalism measures that will help us increase and maintain the trust of the public we are sworn to serve. 

But even as we continue to enhance border security at and between ports of entry, increasing our effectiveness at identifying and 

interdicting threats, apprehensions of those crossing our borders illegally or who are determined to be inadmissible at ports of entry 

continue to rise. 

Seizures of illicit hard narcotics are also increasing across all categories, both at and between ports of entry, especially methamphetamine and synthetic opioids like fentanyl. As we strengthen our 

screening and vetting across multiple agencies to identify potential 

threats before they enter the United States, we continue to face a 

multifaceted and dispersed terrorist adversary. 

We need to continue to invest in and deploy critical capabilities 

to prevent and interdict illegal crossings between ports of entry: A 

modern border wall system, situational awareness sensors, airborne mobile and fixed, access and mobility and mission readiness, 

our virtual agents, pilots, and air interdiction agents and support 

personnel. 

At our ports of entry, we need enhanced nonintrusive inspection 

equipment to detect deep concealment of drugs and CBP officers 

and agriculture specialists, for trade enforcement mission will augment our dedicated an expert team with additional specialists, 

auditors and attorneys, and we need to continue to build our worldleading capabilities at the National target center and develop the 

new National vetting center as well as supporting increase capacity 

for international partners. 

But CBP is ultimately only one part of a much larger system, one 

that neither begins or ends at our borders. To address threats of 

illegal immigration and human smuggling, narcotics trafficking 

and terrorism, we need to close legal loopholes in our immigration 

enforcement system, expand our investigative and interdiction 

reach, and strengthen international partnerships and policy alignment. 

Illegal and irregular immigration will continue at increasing levels unless a systemic vulnerabilities in our statutory regime are addressed. If only a small percentage of those border crossings apprehended by the Border Patrol in certain categories are effectively repatriated, others drawn by strong economy, the prospect of family 

reunification, and the promise of a successful crossing will continue 

to follow. 

19 

These loopholes create a powerful magnet, draining energy and 

youth from Central America even as we work to invest and partner 

in the security and prosperity of the neighboring region. 

They put children at risk of violence and assault, they enriched 

transnational criminal organizations, and they threaten the security of our international neighbors and our domestic neighborhoods. 

The administration’s legislative priorities on the unaccompanied 

children family units, asylum and credible fear, along with the requested investments in Central America and elsewhere would help 

address these issues. 

I urge Congress to act on these priorities and I look forward to 

working with Members on both sides of the aisle to address these 

challenges. Border security is National security; it is a nonpartisan 

issue. 

With the on-going support of Congress, CBP will continue to secure our Nation’s borders while facilitating international trade and 

travel. Our dedicated front-line workforce and our supporting team 

will ensure it. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McAleenan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KEVIN K. MCALEENAN

APRIL 25, 2018 

INTRODUCTION

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf 

of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). I was deeply honored to be confirmed 

by the Senate, and sworn in by the Secretary on March 20, as the fifth commissioner of CBP. It is a privilege to continue working alongside some of the finest professionals in Government service to tackle the most compelling mission set in law 

enforcement. 

CBP is central to so many priorities for the American people and the administration, from countering terrorism, to enhancing border security, to securing and facilitating trade and travel. In our relentless pursuit of a more secure and economically 

competitive Nation, we aspire to be the most innovative and trusted law enforcement agency in the world. During my tenure as CBP commissioner, I am committed 

to streamlining CBP efforts and focusing on Unity of Effort through a ‘‘One CBP’’ 

culture; to attracting and retaining the best workforce to serve our Nation and meet 

tomorrow’s challenges; to accelerating the adoption of innovative technology to keep 

America and our workforce safe; to building and strengthening partnerships across 

Government and with our international counterparts; and to transforming the ways 

our stakeholders interact with CBP. 

My testimony today discusses CBP’s on-going efforts to keep our Nation safe and 

my priority strategies for enhancing those efforts. I also appreciate the important 

oversight responsibility of this committee and pledge to continue working with you 

to ensure we carry out our missions in a manner consistent with the law. 

With the support of Congress to provide us the resources, authorities, and legislative changes we need, I believe that CBP will make strides across our core missions 

and in every area of our operations, from border security, counterterrorism, agriculture protection, and travel and trade facilitation to trade enforcement. We will 

also enhance our internal integrity programs and pursue transparency and professionalism measures that will help us increase and maintain the trust of the public 

we are sworn to serve. 

My vision for the organization is that CBP become the most effective, most innovative, and most trusted and transparent law enforcement agency in the United 

States, while remaining the premier border security and management agency in the 

world. Investing and focusing on developing our culture, supporting and building 

our workforce and its resiliency, and capitalizing on emerging technologies will help 

20 

us deepen partnerships and enhance how we engage our stakeholders, for the traveling public and trade communities and others that we regulate or interact with. 

CBP UNITY OF EFFORT AND ‘‘ONE CBP’’ 

As America’s unified border agency, CBP protects the United States from terrorist 

threats and prevents the illegal entry of inadmissible persons and contraband, while 

facilitating lawful travel and trade. Before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CBP, border security, trade and travel compliance, and the 

facilitation of international travel and trade were conducted by multiple agencies. 

After September 11, 2001 I was extraordinarily fortunate to have the opportunity 

to help lead the new focus on counterterrorism within the United States Customs 

Service and then support the transition to our unified border security agency as 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection. On March 1, 2003, CBP became the Nation’s 

first comprehensive border security agency with a focus on maintaining the integrity 

of the Nation’s boundaries and POEs. The consolidation of these roles and responsibilities allowed CBP to develop seamless security procedures while ensuring compliance with the Nation’s immigration, health, and international trade laws and regulations. 

Because of the work of CBP employees, the Nation’s borders and the American 

communities around them have never been more secure. But there is much more 

to be done. As CBP progresses into its second decade, the Nation will see a fully 

integrated approach to international security, trade, and travel that makes the 

world safer, facilitates international travel and trade, and pushes forward the continuous improvement of CBP’s operations. I am honored to lead these efforts. 

ATTRACT AND RETAIN A WORLD-CLASS WORKFORCE

CBP’s U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) and Air and Marine Operations (AMO) agents 

patrol our Nation’s borders, maritime approaches, and associated airspace to prevent the illegal entry of people and goods into the United States. CBP officers and 

agriculture specialists are multi-disciplined and perform the full range of inspection, 

intelligence analysis, examination, and law enforcement activities relating to the arrival and departure of persons, conveyances, and merchandise at air, land, and sea 

POEs. The people of CBP do the critical, sometimes dangerous work of keeping 

Americans safe, often in remote locations and in all kinds of environmental conditions. I am proud of their dedication, integrity, and commitment, and it is a privilege to work for and alongside each and every one of them. 

CBP has faced challenges in the past to meet our hiring goals. However, we have 

taken decisive action, while recognizing that much work remains to be done to ensure we have enough officers and agents to meet our needs well into the future. In 

the last 2 years, more than 40 individual improvements to CBP’s hiring process 

have resulted in significant recruitment and hiring gains—despite record low unemployment around the United States and intense competition for highly-qualified, 

mission-inspired people. With support from Congress, we are making investments 

in our capability and capacity to hire across all front-line positions. CBP is focusing 

on efforts to attract qualified candidates and expedite their progress through the 

CBP hiring process. 

In the last 2 years, CBP has undertaken a comprehensive effort to look across all 

of our recruitment and hiring process areas. We implemented process changes that 

have resulted in significant recruitment and hiring gains. We embraced the use of 

social media, and are working to more effectively identify the best return on investment in digital media. We have also introduced a mobile app for applicants in our 

hiring pipeline to keep them engaged during the process. We are going to introduce 

an ‘‘applicant care’’ component whereby we assign a dedicated employee to an applicant to help them navigate the process. We are also leveraging private-sector expertise and experience in recruiting and human resources to provide additional capacity. 

CBP’s streamlined front-line hiring process has led to significant reductions in the 

average time-to-hire. In the last 12 months close to 70 percent of new USBP agents 

and 60 percent of new CBP officers on-boarded in 313 days or fewer, with 17 percent 

of each occupation on-boarding within 92 days. While work remains to be done to 

improve the process, this is a significant improvement from the 469-day overall 

baseline established in January 2016. This streamlined process has helped us to 

grow our workforce by reducing the number of qualified candidates who drop out 

due to process fatigue or accepting more timely job offers elsewhere. CBP’s background investigation time is approximately 90 days for a Tier 5 level investigation, 

which is required for all of CBP’s law enforcement officer applicants and 90 percent 

of CBP applicants overall. This is considerably faster than the Government average 

21 

for the same level investigation. CBP is also recognized as having a best practice 

quality assurance program, which other agencies regularly visit CBP to learn about. 

As a result of these improvements, CBP’s fiscal year 2017 hiring totals surpassed 

fiscal year 2016 totals, including increases of 21 percent for CBP officers, 4 percent 

for USBP agents, and 91 percent for AMO air interdiction agents. In fiscal year 

2017, CBP reached the highest number of USBP agent hires since fiscal year 2013, 

and the highest number of air interdiction agents and marine interdiction agent 

hires since fiscal year 2014. The total number of front-line applicants increased by 

73 percent between fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2017, including a 41 percent increase from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2017. 

CBP is also actively working to minimize attrition and fill positions in ‘‘hard-tofill’’ locations that are often remote and offer very limited amenities compared to 

metropolitan locations. A stable relocation program will help meet USBP operational requirements and alleviate the workforce’s concerns about lack of mobility, 

which is significantly contributing to increased attrition. CBP is thankful for the 

continued dedication of Members of Congress to working collaboratively with CBP 

to find a variety of targeted solutions to address our complex hiring challenges. 

Consistent with the Explanatory Statement accompanying the fiscal year 2017 

Consolidated Appropriations Act concerning the alternative polygraph exam format, 

CBP conducted a 6-month pilot program that allowed the agency to compare data 

points from applicants tested with the new, alternative format against applicants 

tested with the previous format. CBP developed this pilot in collaboration with the 

National Center for Credibility Assessment, which governs all Federal polygraph 

programs. Before making any determination on whether to continue with the piloted 

test or return to the previous test, CBP is carefully evaluating these metrics and 

measures to maintain CBP’s high standard of integrity for future applicants, and 

we ensure on-going communication with Congress on this area of interest. While its 

format may change, the exam retains all of the critical test topics of the previous 

exam and maintains CBP’s commitment to high integrity standards for its personnel. 

Additionally, DHS supports the Anti-Border Corruption Reauthorization Act of 

2017, which was ordered as H.R. 2213 in the House of Representatives and S. 595 

in the Senate. The House passed H.R. 2213 on June 7, 2017, thanks to the strong 

support of this subcommittee and the co-sponsorship of Chairwoman McSally, and 

the bill is currently pending vote by the Senate. This pending legislation grants the 

Commissioner authority to waive the polygraph requirement for three groups of applicants who have a demonstrated, long-standing history of public trust and meet 

specific criteria: Current, full-time State and local law enforcement officers; current, 

full-time Federal law enforcement officers; and veterans, active-duty service members, and reservists. We thank the Members of Congress for your continued support 

as we seek to hire the men and women who will fulfill CBP’s complex and crucial 

mission in the months and years to come. 

EMPOWER WITH INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY

Technology enhances CBP’s operational capabilities by increasing our ability to 

detect and apprehend individuals illegally crossing the border, to detect dangerous 

goods and materials concealed in cargo and vehicles, and to detect and interdict illegal activity in the air and maritime domains. Advanced detection and surveillance 

technology is a critical element of CBP’s multi-layered border security strategy to 

deploy the right mix of personnel, technology, and tactical infrastructure to enable 

us to meet the everyday challenges of a dynamic border threat environment. For 

CBP, the use of technology in the border environment is an invaluable force multiplier that increases situational awareness. It allows us to more quickly deter, and 

more safely detect illegal activity, including unauthorized border-crossers, and interdict illicit materials, including illicit narcotics, and those who attempt to smuggle 

them. 

Border Security 

President Trump has directed CBP toward a new standard of border security between the POEs, and defined operational control as the ability to prevent or interdict all illegal border crossings. To make progress toward this standard, CBP will 

need substantial investments in impedence and denial capabilities, surveillance 

technology, access and mobility, and mission readiness and personnel. For 

impedence and denial, a modern border wall system will significantly enhance 

CBP’s efforts to attain operational control of the border between the POEs. Border 

barrier systems are comprehensive solutions. A wall system that integrates sensors, 

cameras, lighting, and access and patrol roads, has the support of our USBP agents 

working our borders and is the direct result of an in-depth analysis of existing capaVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:00 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18BM0425\18BM0425.TXT HEATH
22 

1 Alexandria Bay, NY, Lewiston Bridge, NY, San Luis I, AZ, Otay Mesa, CA, Blaine, WA, 

and Calexico West, CA have been identified as priority requirements in the President’s fiscal 

year 2019 budget. 

bility gaps. Between the POEs, tactical infrastructure, including physical barriers, 

has long been a critical component of CBP’s multi-layered and risk-based approach 

to securing our Southwest Border. It is undeniable that border barriers have enhanced—and will continue to enhance—CBP’s operational capabilities by creating 

persistent impedance and facilitating the deterrence and prevention of illegal entries of people and contraband. 

Constructing and improving CBP’s physical infrastructure is also essential to 

keeping Americans safe. CBP is investing in modernizing our land POEs along the 

Northern and Southern Borders to ensure that CBP’s physical infrastructure is 

operationally viable for front-line and mission support functions. Thanks to the 

funding provided in the fiscal year 2018 Omnibus, CBP is working with the General 

Services Administration (GSA) to ensure that our priority requirements in locations 

including Otay Mesa, CA, and Alexandria Bay, NY receive much-needed updates. 

We look forward to working with GSA and Congress to ensure that our physical infrastructure meets CBP’s needs now and in the future.1

CBP is actively engaging with our Nation’s best minds in and outside of Government to find innovative solutions to the challenges facing our country. For example, 

groundbreaking software developed by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory is giving AMO agents the edge in combating international smugglers 

intent on evading law enforcement. Minotaur, as the software is called, links sensors, cameras, radar, and communications equipment into a single, automated system, allowing operators to more efficiently identify and track any suspicious or illegal activity on both land and sea. This technology, when coupled with robust spacebased satellite links, allows AMO to increase the situational awareness of its law 

enforcement partners by sharing video and radar track data real-time. As the 

Minotaur system evolves, it will allow multiple aircraft to share information from 

multiple sources, providing a never-before-seen level of air, land, and maritime domain awareness for a larger number of users. 

CBP is also partnering with DHS Science and Technology to access emerging 

technologies and tools from startups and others. From innovative surveillance approaches that can provide multi-sensor data direct to our agents, to tools to protect 

our canines, to analyzing data feeds, to empowering our agents on the ground with 

portable small unmanned aircraft systems capability, CBP will continue to push for 

more efficient and effective ways to support our personnel and carry out our mission. 

But CBP is part of a system which neither begins nor ends at our borders, and 

which innovative technologies and enhanced interdiction capabilities alone cannot 

prevent illegal crossings. The administration seeks support from Congress to amend 

current law to facilitate the expeditious return of Unaccompanied Alien Children 

(UACs) and family units who are ineligible for relief. The administration supports 

correcting the systemic deficiencies that created the asylum backlog, and supports 

providing additional resources to reduce the immigration court backlog and ensure 

the swift return of illegal border crossers. I look forward to working with Congress 

on the legislation needed to enhance the security of our country, ensure effective immigration and enforcement, and protect American workers and taxpayers. These 

legislative needs have a direct impact on CBP and our ability to perform our mission. 

Narcotics Interdiction 

As America’s unified border agency, CBP plays a critical role in preventing dangerous drugs, including opioids, from reaching the American public. CBP uses advanced detection equipment and technology, including Non-Intrusive Inspection 

(NII) equipment and radiation detection technologies, to maintain robust cargo, commercial conveyance, and vehicle inspection regimes at our POEs. NII technologies 

deployed to our Nation’s land, sea, and air POEs include large-scale X-ray and 

gamma-ray imaging systems, as well as a variety of portable and hand-held technologies. NII systems enable CBP officers to examine cargo conveyances such as 

shipping containers, commercial trucks, and rail cars, as well as privately-owned vehicles, for the presence of contraband without physically opening or unloading them. 

CBP is establishing the Model Port concept as the guiding framework to streamline 

the cargo and passenger vehicle inspection process to increase the volume of vehicles 

examined. We anticipate completing testing and evaluation of drive-through X-ray 

system pilots this year. Additionally, we anticipate completing the technical architectural framework that will be used within the design for the Donna, Texas land 

23 

2https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics-fyl2017. 

POE through the Donations Acceptance Program. We will continue to adapt our deployment of NII systems so that we can work smarter and faster in detecting contraband, while expediting legitimate trade and travel. Additionally, Operations Support’s Laboratories and Scientific Services Directorate plays a critical role in the detection of opioids and in identifying the chemical screening devices that will help 

CBP target new designer drugs, including opioids. 

All told, in fiscal year 2017 CBP officers and agents seized or disrupted over 1.9 

million pounds of narcotics across the country, including over 60,000 pounds of 

methamphetamine, over 330,000 pounds of cocaine, over 4,800 pounds of heroin, and 

approximately 1,476 pounds of illicit fentanyl.2 More than 790 pounds of illicit 

fentanyl have already been seized in fiscal year 2018. 

CBP, with the support of Congress, has made significant investments in and improvements to our drug detection and interdiction technology and targeting capabilities at and in between our POEs, including in the international mail and express 

consignment carrier (ECC) environments. The United States Postal Service (USPS) 

receives international mail from more than 180 countries, the vast majority of which 

arrives via commercial air or surface transportation. An increasing number of foreign postal operators provide advance electronic data (AED) to USPS, which is then 

passed on to CBP. 

CBP and the USPS are currently conducting an AED pilot on express mail and 

e-packets from select countries at five of our main International Mail Facilities 

(IMFs) to target high-risk shipments, with plans for further expansion. USPS is responsible for locating the shipments and delivering them to CBP for examination. 

Thus far in fiscal year 2018, CBP has interdicted 186 shipments of fentanyl at the 

John F. Kennedy International Airport IMF, a participant in the AED pilot program. One hundred and twenty-five of those interdictions can be attributed to AED 

targeting. We support efforts to expand the ability of USPS to collect fees to help 

offset the additional cost associated with building the capacity of foreign postal operators to implement AED collection, to develop new scanning technology, and to 

greatly increase the availability of AED for international mail. 

Recent agreements between USPS and foreign postal operators regarding AED 

have increased CBP’s ability to target high-risk shipments. Currently in the international mail environment CBP receives AED on over 40 percent of all international 

mail shipments with goods. The volume of mail and the potentially hazardous nature of various types of illicit drugs presents challenges to CBP’s interdiction efforts 

in the international mail environment. CBP will continue to work with USPS and 

the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to address the issue of AED and, through its 

participation on U.S. delegations to meetings of the Universal Postal Union (UPU), 

is working to expand the use of AED globally in ways consistent with the United 

States’ international obligations as a member of the UPU. 

BUILD AND DEVELOP PARTNERSHIPS

CBP is committed to fulfilling our complex missions and to do that, we are working with our partners across the country and around the world. I am actively seeking to deepen our partnerships across all levels of government and with our international counterparts to ensure that information is shared quickly, resources are 

spent where they are most needed, and that the American people and economy are 

kept safe. 

Counter-Terrorism 

Since September 11, the U.S. Government has improved information sharing regarding known or suspected terrorists (KSTs), including by creating the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC). The TSC is a multi-agency organization administered by 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and is responsible for managing and 

sharing the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) which contains identity information on international and domestic KSTs. We have also worked closely with our foreign partners to deepen bilateral and international information sharing to enhance 

the depth and quality of our information holdings. 

For example, CBP offers its automated targeting system-global (ATS–G) software, 

along with technical assistance, to potential international partners. ATS–G is similar to the software used at the National Targeting Center (NTC) and evolved from 

decades of experience designing and operating passenger and cargo targeting systems. The software can vastly improve how travelers flying in and out of a country 

are vetted. 

24 

3https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration. 

CBP also created the global travel assessment system (GTAS). GTAS permits foreign countries to independently perform vetting activities without the collaboration 

involved with ATS–G. Launched in 2016, GTAS is free and designed for rapid use. 

The software is easily downloaded from a special CBP website and ready to use. It 

can also be used to improve an existing vetting system because the coding allows 

nations to customize the software or just download the portions that meet their 

needs. 

GTAS is comparable to ATS–G because GTAS also automatically evaluates passenger manifests in real time to identify suspicious travelers or crew members who 

may pose a National security risk and require a closer assessment. Using GTAS, 

governments can screen suspects before they enter or leave that nation. Since the 

software is new, CBP is working with the World Customs Organization in Brussels, 

a group that promotes trade and supply chain security, to promote this software. 

In an interconnected world, it is more important than ever that countries conduct 

these risk assessments, and CBP is helping advance global security through ATS– 

G, GTAS, and the expertise of the NTC. 

National Targeting Center (NTC) 

At CBP’s NTC, advance data and access to law enforcement and intelligence 

records converge to facilitate the targeting of travelers and cargo that pose the highest risk to our security in all modes of inbound transportation. The NTC takes in 

large amounts of data and uses sophisticated targeting tools and subject-matter expertise to analyze, assess, and segment risk at every stage in the cargo/shipment 

and travel life cycles. As the focal point of that strategy, the NTC leverages classified, law enforcement, commercial, and open-source information in unique, proactive 

ways to identify high-risk travelers and shipments at the earliest possible point 

prior to arrival in the United States. 

To bolster its targeting mission, the dedicated men and women of the NTC collaborate with critical partners on a daily basis, including ICE Homeland Security 

Investigations (ICE–HSI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the FBI, 

members of the intelligence community (IC), and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service 

(USPIS). ICE–HSI and USPIS investigative case data is fused with CBP targeting 

information to bolster investigations targeting illicit narcotics smuggling and trafficking organizations. Moreover, NTC works in close coordination with several pertinent task forces, including the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces 

(OCDETF), the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, the Joint Interagency Task 

Force—West (JIATF–W), the HS Joint Task Force—West (JTF–W), and DHS Joint 

Task Force—Investigations (JTF–I). 

National Vetting Center 

On February 6, 2018, President Trump ordered the establishment of a National 

Vetting Center (NVC), to be managed by DHS under the guidance of a newly-established National Vetting Governance Board. CBP will be a key component helping 

lead the implementation of the NVC. The NVC will be co-located with the NTC to 

leverage its existing capabilities, workforce, system capabilities, network connections, and interagency presence. The NVC will provide front-line Government personnel with the information they need to keep terrorists, criminals, and other 

threats out of the country. Consistent with applicable law and policy, it will ensure 

that international travelers and visa and immigration benefit applicants are vetted 

against all appropriate U.S. Government information to identify National security 

and public safety threats. 

Border Security 

The number of individuals apprehended while trying to enter the country illegally 

in between established POEs, and in those presenting themselves for entry without 

proper documentation along our Southwest Border, increased by 37 percent from 

February to March 2018. When compared to March 2017, the increase is an extraordinary 203 percent.3 CBP is committed to working with our domestic and international Government partners to secure our border and anticipate—and even prevent—increases in apprehensions. 

To enhance CBP’s capability in Southwest Border sectors the U.S. Department of 

Defense (DOD), in conjunction with border State Governors, has begun deploying 

the National Guard to assist in stopping the flow of deadly drugs and other contraband, gang members and other criminals, and illegal aliens into this country. Initial 

forces are already on the ground. The National Guard will assist CBP by providing 

logistical and administrative support, operating detection systems, providing mobile 

25 

4Title 10 U.S.C. § 124 statutory obligatory. 

communications, augmenting border-related intelligence analysis efforts, and repairing border infrastructure. National Guard members will provide added surveillance, 

engineering, administrative, and mechanical support to our agents on the front line 

to allow them to focus on their primary responsibility of securing our border. National Guard personnel will not conduct law enforcement activities, will not be assigned responsibilities that require direct contact with migrants, and will not be assigned missions that require them to be armed. This deployment will allow CBP to 

send front-line personnel back to the border and raise our interdiction and efficiency 

rates. CBP is working with DHS and DOD to ensure a seamless coordination of efforts. 

Throughout Central America, CBP leverages its Attache ́ and Advisor network to 

engage local immigration, border management, and police authorities, as well as our 

Federal partners such as the DOS International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

(INL), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and ICE to enhance security and promote prosperity in the region. CBP efforts in the region include training, mentoring, and sharing best practices with local law enforcement; making customs processes more efficient and transparent to enhance trade facilitation; and 

build the capacity of law enforcement in each country to counter drug smuggling 

activities, monitor, track, and deter the illicit migration of third-country nationals, 

and facilitate cross-border coordination. 

CBP hosts monthly briefings/teleconferences with Federal, State, and local partners regarding the current state of the border—both Northern and Southern—to 

monitor emerging trends and threats and provide a cross-component, multi-agency 

venue for discussing trends and threats. The monthly briefings focus on drugs, 

weapons, and currency interdictions and alien apprehensions both at and between 

the POEs. These briefings/teleconferences currently include participants from: The 

Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico, the Government of Australia, 

ICE, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), DEA, FBI, DOD’s U.S. Northern Command, U.S. 

Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Southern Command, Joint 

Interagency Task Force—South (JIATF–S), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs), Naval Investigative 

Command, State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, and other international, 

Federal, State, and local law enforcement as appropriate. 

The Office of Intelligence (OI) hosts a bi-weekly fusion forum to facilitate an open 

discussion with CBP’s Federal, State, local, and international partners on emerging 

trends and patterns, specific problem sets confronted by each organization, and each 

organization’s attempts to address them. Additionally, OI personnel take part in a 

variety of weekly or monthly conference calls related to a variety of issues affecting 

CBP’s mission including narcotics, terrorism, trade, and migration. 

CBP is enhancing our collaboration with other DHS components to leverage the 

unique resources, authorities, and capabilities of each agency to more effectively and 

efficiently execute our border security missions against drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and other threats and challenges. Under 

the Department’s Unity of Effort initiative the JTF–W, JTF–East, and JTF–I operations also increase information sharing with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, improve border-wide criminal intelligence-led interdiction operations, 

and address transnational threats. 

Extended Border: Source and Transit Zone Operations 

AMO’s significant contribution of aerial support to the JIATF–S mission 4 to detect and monitor aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States 

has been critical to JIATF–S’s continued success. AMO’s P–3s fixed-wing aircraft 

are an integral part of the successful counter-narcotic missions with the JIATF–S. 

P–3s patrol a 42 million-square-mile area that includes more than 41 nations, the 

Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and seaboard approaches to the 

United States. Already in fiscal year 2018, AMO involvement in the JIATF–S mission has resulted in the seizure of 52,839 pounds of cocaine, with a wholesale value 

of $711 million. 

International Trade Coordination and Facilitation 

On March 26, 2018, I was in Mexico City to sign a memorandum of cooperation 

with Osvaldo Santin, Chief of Mexico’s Tax Administration Service, to help our two 

countries better cooperate on trade and customs compliance, as well as combat illicit 

activities. Issues covered under this memorandum include anti-dumping duties, 

counterfeit merchandise, and substandard pharmaceuticals. 

26 

Additionally, CBP and the Mexican tax service signed a memorandum of understanding on a cargo pre-inspection program and Unified Cargo Processing (UCP). 

UCP currently operates at seven ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border, with 

the memorandum merging two more cargo pre-inspection sites into UCP. UCP 

eliminates duplicative inspection efforts while reducing border wait times and costs 

for the private sector. The new agreement looks to expand the process to possibly 

more than a dozen locations. CBP and the National Service for Agro-Alimentary 

Public Health, Safety, and Quality—Mexico’s agency responsible for inspecting incoming goods for pests and diseases—also signed an agreement to enable collaboration between the two agencies on agriculture safeguarding, agriculture quarantine 

inspections at ports of entry, and information sharing. The memorandum promotes 

cooperation and information sharing to enable the United States to handle legitimate and safe shipments quickly while addressing those that pose a risk. 

Collaboration with our Trade Partners in the Private Sector 

CBP is actively engaging with our trade partners in the private sector. The Trade 

Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) empowered CBP to collaborate with our partners in new ways, and CBP remains committed to enforcing 

trade law in accordance with the mandates of TFTEA and in close collaboration 

with our partners across Government and the private sector while facilitating legitimate trade. 

The Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee (COAC) advises the 

Secretaries of the U.S. Department of the Treasury and DHS on all matters involving the commercial operations of CBP, including advising on significant proposed 

changes to regulations, policies, or practices. The trade environment is changing 

rapidly. Most notably, CBP has seen a nearly 50 percent increase in express consignment and international mail shipments over the past 5 years. In fiscal year 

2013, CBP processed over 76 million express bills and, in fiscal year 2017, CBP 

processed approximately 110 million bills. In fiscal year 2013, CBP and the USPS 

processed approximately 150 million international mail shipments. By fiscal year 

2017, the number of international mail shipments had swelled to over 400 million. 

As new e-commerce participants may not know they are importers, or understand 

the responsibilities of being an importer, COAC identified the need for a mechanism 

to educate the public. COAC also identified the need for better data collection, automation, and a legal framework for sharing data. The working group also identified 

education and outreach as a need. As a follow-up to recent meetings, the working 

group developed recommendations that CBP is working to implement. 

TRANSFORMING CBP

As international trade and travel grow, so too does CBP’s workload and the expectations on our people and systems. I am committed to ensuring that we meet those 

expectations, and the new and changing demands placed on CBP, with the utmost 

professionalism in keeping with the CBP vision: To serve as the premier law enforcement agency enhancing the Nation’s safety, security, and prosperity through 

collaboration, innovation, and integration. 

Biometric Exit 

Since fiscal year 2013, CBP has led the entry/exit mission, including research and 

development of biometric exit programs. A comprehensive entry/exit system that 

leverages both biographic and biometric data is key to supporting DHS’s mission. 

Adding biometrics provides greater assurance of the information already collected 

by CBP and will allow for future facilitated processing upon both entry and exit. 

CBP will use a traveler’s face as the primary way of identifying the traveler to facilitate entry and exit from the United States, while simultaneously leveraging fingerprint records from most foreign visitors, such as are collected during entry processing, to check derogatory holdings and perform other law enforcement checks. 

This innovative structure will make it possible to confirm the identity of travelers 

at any point in their travel, while at the same time establishing a comprehensive 

biometric air exit system. 

Using the Traveler Verification Service (TVS), CBP has re-architected data flows 

and data systems to pre-stage biometric data throughout the travel process. TVS, 

a robust cloud-based service, serves as the backbone to verify traveler identity 

across the air, land, and sea travel modes of operation. TVS uses biometric data to 

retrieve all associated traveler facial images from DHS holdings and segregate them 

into smaller, more manageable data sets, for example, by flight, by cruise, or by frequent border crossers. It fuses biometric and biographic information, enabling the 

biometric data to be the key to verifying traveler identity with the advance data. 

27 

5Washington Dulles International Airport (June 2017); Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (June 2017 upgrade demonstration capability; original pilot in 2016); Houston 

George Bush Intercontinental Airport (June 2017); Chicago O’Hare International Airport (July 

2017); Las Vegas McCarran International Airport (July 2017); Houston William P. Hobby Airport (August 2017); John F. Kennedy International Airport (August 2017); Miami International 

Airport (October 2017) 

CBP has demonstrated the capabilities of TVS at airports across the United States 5

as well as in the sea environment and plans to pilot the capability at land POEs 

in 2018. 

CBP is continuing to discuss with additional airlines how they can be incorporated into the program, and we are ready to partner with any airline or airport 

that wishes to use biometrics to expedite the travel process for its customers. One 

of our biometric exit partners has told us that the new process allows it to board 

an A380, the largest passenger plane in wide operation in the world, in less than 

20 minutes. 

In the land border environment CBP will conduct a technology demonstration for 

‘‘at speed’’ facial biometric capture camera technology on vehicle inbound and outbound travelers at our land POEs. CBP will utilize operational facilities at the 

Anzalduas, Texas, POE to evaluate performance of ‘‘at-speed’’ facial technology including determining optimal equipment placement, number of cameras necessary to 

capture photos beyond the driver, and establish performance baselines. 

Comparative analysis will be performed on facial recognition matching algorithms 

being developed by academia and industry on images captured during the technology demonstration against traveler photos on file in Government holdings. CBP 

will create a gallery of expected border crossers and validate the concept of ‘‘face 

as a token’’ and close the arrival departure reporting gap in the vehicle environment. The technology demonstration will begin in 2018. 

Simplified Arrival 

Our new simplified arrival process quickly and reliably uses the traveler’s face to 

biometrically verify identity and retrieve traveler records from our systems. This 

eliminates manual, time-consuming steps for most travelers, such as document 

scans and fingerprint captures, which speeds up the inspection process. Simplified 

Arrival is the first step in re-envisioning the entirety of how travelers arrive in the 

United States. With a faster clearance process, airlines, airports, and travelers benefit from shorter connection times and standardized arrival procedures. Our initial 

pilot programs in Miami have shown that arriving passengers can clear the immigration and customs area 35 percent faster using the new biometric process. 

CBP is committed to working with our travel industry partners to transform the 

international travel process and enhance the passenger experience. CBP’s goal is to 

integrate best practices into existing processes and infrastructure to ensure a seamless, secure travel experience for everyone. 

Web-based service 

We are committed to making sure that travel is secure and straightforward. For 

example, in January 2018, CBP launched two new traveler compliance initiatives 

to make it easier for Visa Waiver Program (VWP) travelers to check the status of 

their stay in the United States and remain in compliance with the terms of their 

admission. A new feature added to the I–94 website under the ‘‘View Compliance’’ 

tab allows VWP travelers to check the status of their admission to the United 

States. This check will inform travelers of the number of days remaining on their 

lawful admission or the number of days they have remained past their admitted 

until date. In addition, CBP will now send an email notification to VWP travelers 

who are still in the United States 10 days prior to the expiration of their lawful 

admission period. CBP has taken these proactive steps to help inform and remind 

travelers of the terms of their admission and to prevent travelers from overstaying. 

Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) 

With the strong support of Congress, CBP reached an historic milestone on February 24, 2018, deploying the last of the major scheduled core trade processing capabilities in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). ACE is the ‘‘Single Window’’ through which all import and export data are reported by industry to more 

than 47 partner Government agencies, automating 269 different forms and streamlining trade processes. Built on a modernized platform, ACE has resulted in a 44 

percent reduction in wait times for truck processing at land POEs and the 68 times 

faster processing of bonds. 

Looking ahead, CBP will focus on sustaining all deployed ACE capabilities and 

ensuring ACE operates as a highly available, reliable system. There is an on-going 

28 

6 Excluding the euthanasia of an animal and AMO vessel disabling fire or warning shots. 

7https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhscbppia-052-incident-driven-video-recording-systemsidvrs-evaluation. 

demand for additional and enhanced ACE capabilities, and CBP will continue to collaborate with the trade community, partner Government agencies, and stakeholders 

to implement automated solutions that advance secure shipments, streamline trade 

processes and support the strong enforcement of trade laws. This includes increased 

focus on the rise of e-commerce and high-volume, low value shipments, an aspect 

of the U.S. economy that presents enforcement and trade facilitation challenges. 

System enhancements to enable de minimis functionality will provide CBP access 

to previously unavailable admissibility data for low-value shipments, resulting in 

improved cargo processing and use of enforcement resources. 

Transparency and Accountability 

As commissioner, I am committed to ensuring transparency and employee accountability regarding the use of force. The CBP National Use of Force Review 

Board (NUFRB) is a review committee established to review all significant use of 

force incidents—those that result in serious bodily injury or death and those that 

involve the discharge of a firearm,6 regardless of the outcome. The NUFRB is comprised of senior officials from across CBP, as well as officials from DHS and DOJ. 

As of October 2017, there have been 11 meetings of the board. These meetings have 

reviewed 36 significant use of force incidents. CBP recently completed a web-based 

tracking system for recommendations made by the NUFRB. 

Local Use of Force Review Boards (LUFRBs) were established to conduct an objective review of the use of less-lethal devices not addressed by the NUFRB. The 

LUFRBs provide CBP senior leadership with an objective assessment of less-lethal 

force incidents from a regional committee of leadership from components within 

CBP. CBP recently initiated the development of a web-based tracking system for 

cases that come before the LUFRB. This system will track the consideration and 

disposition of cases heard by the LUFRBs. These systems will help us hold one another accountable to the public—and to ourselves. 

As part of CBP’s continued emphasis on transparency and accountability, CBP is 

also beginning to implement Incident-Driven Video Recording Systems (IDVRS). 

CBP is first conducting a thorough field evaluation (March–September 2018) and 

analysis to provide more thorough information concerning the expansion of audio 

and video recording capabilities through the incorporation of IDVRS. In an effort to 

maintain a high level of transparency, CBP recently conducted a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). The goal of the evaluation was to determine the effectiveness of 

fixed, vehicle, and body-worn camera technology to provide an accurate representation of law enforcement encounters, while allowing CBP officers and agents to safely 

perform their duties. CBP published the PIA to evaluate the privacy concerns associated with CBP’s use of incident-driven video recording technology at and between 

POEs and to inform the public of potential privacy concerns associated with the deployment of body-worn cameras and other audio/video recording devices, as well as 

CBP’s planned efforts to mitigate those potential privacy concerns. The PIA is now 

available on the DHS website.7

Body-worn cameras alone may not be the proper solution. CBP seeks to determine 

the most effective and efficient solution to an IDVRS strategy, including a comprehensive incorporation of body-worn, vehicle-mounted, and permanently-fixed 

camera systems, to help CBP further fulfill our commitment to transparency and 

accountability. We will continue to pursue initiatives that advance our integrity and 

transparency. 

CONCLUSION

The border environment in which CBP works is dynamic and requires continual 

adaptation to respond to emerging threats and rapidly changing conditions. I am 

proud of CBP’s dedicated workforce, who continue to meet these challenges with integrity and commitment. The challenges facing our Nation are considerable. However, with the talents and energy of the people of CBP, along with the support of 

the administration and Congress, we will continue to make great strides in the 

months and years ahead. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to working with you and your colleagues in Congress, and I look forward to your questions. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Commissioner, and I recognize myself 

for 5 minutes for questions. 

29 

We have been working on closing these legal loopholes for a 

while, and I want to recognize that my bill, along the Chairman 

McCaul and Goodlatte and Labrador, we address these issues, but 

for the public out there, the layman, our constituents, maybe they 

don’t understand what we are talking about, right? 

We are talking about how even if you have the will and the desire in order to secure the border and with your CBP personnel and 

your Border Patrol agents, if you catch someone, you are able to 

swiftly be able to send them back and then that deters others from 

coming and then it also stops the profits of the cartels, that these 

loopholes do not allow that to happen and we referenced it today. 

But can you paint it in layman’s terms what the issue is and how 

it is being exploited by these cartels? 

This caravan has gotten a lot of attention where there is a large 

group of people coming here. Many of them will also exploit this 

loophole, but it is happening every single day in the communities 

along the border. So can you—give you an opportunity to just talk 

through those and why it is so important that we in Congress close 

these loopholes so that you can do your job. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Sure. Thank you, Chairwoman. I would be 

happy to talk through the loopholes. 

What we are facing at the border—and our sector chief and Rio 

Grande Valley, which is seeing about 50 percent of our apprehensions Nationally, has invented a new term to address the increasing traffic. 

You highlighted some of it in your opening statement. As opposed to 90 percent adults in a migrant workforce that we saw in 

the past, we are now seeing 40 percent kids and families crossing 

the border. He is taking the calling of these populations 

nonimpactables, meaning that there is no consequence, there is no 

response to an illegal entry for these groups. 

For unaccompanied children, I think you need only look at the 

disparity between Mexican nationals and children from Central 

America and further away. About 96 percent of Mexican unaccompanied children are returned within 3 years. That number drops to 

3 percent for people from other countries. 

Essentially, once a Border Patrol agent apprehends them, and 

usually they are actually looking for a Border Patrol agent once 

they cross the border, they are taken into custody, processed, and 

quickly turned over via our partners at Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement to Health and Human Services where they can be 

properly cared for. 

They then have their sponsor vetted and they are turned over by 

Health and Human Services to someone living in the United 

States, possibly illegally. So that is the process for an unaccompanied child. 

For a member of the family unit, if they are apprehended, and 

again, they are not always seeking to evade Border Patrol agents. 

Sometimes they are picked up relatively routinely right at the border line. They are turned over to ICE. ICE takes them to a family 

residential facility where they are processed and detained, generally for less than 20 days. That is the expected standard due to 

court decisions in the Ninth Circuit. 

30 

They are then released pending a court hearing, which could 

happen many years out, and in the mean time they are living here 

with authorization to be employed. This is a real challenge, because 

that first threshold of determining whether somebody may have a 

fear of returning to their country is very low, so a very high percentage gets that. But the ultimate court decision doesn’t come for 

many years, so it creates a significant pull factor for others. 

Then the third category is adults that claim fear, that also go 

through that asylum process and spend time here in between that 

initial determination of fear and that ultimate court decision, 

which could be many years out due to the significant backlog in our 

immigration courts. 

So, for a Border Patrol agent on the border, they want to protect 

the American people from threats. They don’t want to interdict and 

process people that are coming to claim asylum between ports of 

entry. It is not a good process. The status quo is not acceptable. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. I appreciate you expanding on that. I 

mean, the thing that is—the insanity is that essentially the message is to any transnational criminal organization or really anybody, just get yourself, get your kid, just get to the boarder, look 

for someone, turn yourself in, say the right words, and then you 

can disappear into the interior of the United States with a very 

small percentage showing up for their court date in the future. Correct? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. That is correct. That is exactly right. The 

transnational criminal organizations are preying on these individuals. They are charging them $5,000 to $10,000 to smuggle them 

to the border and allow them to use their area of the border to 

cross. That enriches organizations that are threatening the security 

and safety of Mexican citizens. It puts those children at risk of assault and violence in the process. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. So can you talk about the caravan 

then? Then I will yield back and we will do another round, but can 

you talk about the caravan and how this is impacting—everyone is 

sort of watching this all happen with this big caravan, but this is 

happening every day in smaller numbers. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Right. I think the caravan highlights the challenge that the loopholes present. If we don’t have alignment in migration policy between countries, destination and transit countries, 

if we don’t have a statutory regime that has loopholes closed, this 

invites groups like this to try to come to our border and come into 

the United States in this irregular fashion. 

So we are going to enforce the immigration law. We are going to 

absolutely treat claims of fear and protection fairly as we encounter 

this group. But it presents a challenge and I just think is highlighting publicly the issues that we are facing in the statutory regime. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, and I yield back. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Vela. 

Mr. VELA. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally. After we passed— 

after the House passed the spending bill, the House Democratic 

leader issued this statement. Democrats want explicit language restricting border construction to the same see-through fencing that 

was already authorized under current law. 

31 

What I am wondering if that is true or not, because when we 

take a look at the provision for $445 million in primary pedestrian 

levee fencing, that comes out to $17 million a mile. Can you elaborate on that? Because $17 million a mile doesn’t sound like it is 

just see-through fencing. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. So I think we are maybe covering a couple different topics together. The 2017 appropriated funding is for a replacement wall in El Paso sector, in El Centro sector, and San 

Diego—— 

Mr. VELA. Yes, 2017. I am talking 2018. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Two-thousand eighteen, there is specific appropriations for Rio Grande Valley levee wall in Hidalgo County. That 

is a similar wall to what we built in 2008. That is actually not seethrough, because it is a concrete wall that helps protect the levee. 

It is a hydraulic wall. That is consistent with the appropriations 

language, and it is something that we are working on planning and 

designing right now to build. 

Mr. VELA. Yes, and that was precisely my question, because the 

statement seemed to be untrue, because that money is for a concrete levee wall, right? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Yes, the language restricted to previous and 

similar designs, to previous efforts, and that concrete wall is very 

similar. 

Mr. VELA. Now, in anticipation of our hearing today, I had some 

constituents actually e-mail, because representing the Rio Grande 

Valley sector, you can imagine there are people watching what we 

do. But I had one question from a constituent. In its end of year 

report, CBP reported a 45 percent increase in assaults over fiscal 

year 2016, over 847 assaults in fiscal year 2017. 

Assaults against law enforcement personnel were led by U.S. 

Border Patrol, accounting for 93 percent of overall assaults and— 

reporting 6 percent of total assaults. I understand that the method 

for counting and tracking assaults on CBP personal changed a few 

years ago. Can you describe how these types of incidents are counted and if the methodology changed or not? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Sure. First, I am very proud of the men and 

women who secure our border and face dangers every day on behalf 

of the American people. They are often subject to assault and violence in carrying out their duties. 

We are talking about violent transnational criminal organizations that are often heavily armed that are prepared for encounters 

with law enforcement, and I am very proud of how they conduct 

themselves. 

One of the areas where we have taken steps to increase our 

transparency is publishing a lot of data on our enforcement encounters, both in terms of our use of force by our agents and officers 

but also on the force that they face as they are patrolling the border. 

So for our agents, we published two different sets of data simultaneously, the number of incidents of assault and the number of assaults, which could include the number of people mounting an assault, the number of agents that are impacted, or the weapons that 

are used in an assault. 

32 

So those two numbers are both transparently reported. We did 

see a spike, an increase last year in the assaults. I think that is 

a testament to the intensity of those incidents. We think it is appropriate to report both numbers to inform the public what our officers and agents are facing. 

Mr. VELA. I know you and I are going to meet afterwards, so I 

will go into some of this other stuff later. Let me ask about this. 

With respect to infrastructure, can you tell us how much funding 

is needed to fully modernize land ports of entry? Is the donation 

authority program sufficient to make up this funding shortage? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. So, you know, that is a great question, Congressmen. Our land ports of entry are critical to the economy of the 

United States, to the legitimate flow of trade and travel. You are 

absolutely right, there is a deficit in investment in ports of entry 

that is decades-long that we need to continue to work with Congress to fund. 

CBP has developed a prioritized list in partnership with GSA, 

the Department of Transportation, the Department of Commerce, 

and our cross-border international partners where we need port of 

entry investment. Each year, we work to fit as much of that as we 

can in concert with GSA within the annual budget caps. But really, we have about a $4 billion deficit in ports of entry. 

So the donation acceptance program which allows us to work with 

private-sector entities, with cities and State and local governments 

like you referenced in South Texas, meet some of that need and 

provides flexibility where there is a return on investment. 

But we are going to continue to need appropriated support for 

those gateways of international commerce that support all 50 

States. 

Mr. VELA. Well, thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes Mr. 

Rogers from Alabama. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It was obvious from 

your first remarks in your opening statement that you recognize 

that the most valuable component of your border security system 

are people. We will talk about that more in a minute. But aside 

from that, when you look at border infrastructure, what do you 

think is the most critical component that you have to have to secure that border, the Southwest Border? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. For security? So it is not coming from me. It 

is coming from our agents and our chiefs on the ground, who 

through a process every year called the capabilities gap analysis— 

that is then analyzed by our headquarters operations team—tell us 

what they need to secure that border. 

They have consistently identified four master capabilities. The 

first is impedance and denial. That is the ability to stop someone 

from easily crossing and disappearing—we call it vanishing time— 

into the United States, into infrastructure and U.S. side. 

The second is situational awareness, being able to see what is 

happening on that border through technology. 

Third is access and mobility, the ability to reach that border and 

move laterally along it so that they can affect interdictions. 

Last is mission readiness. That is our people and the communications equipment they carry with them to get to those spots. 

33 

Mr. ROGERS. The No. 1 ability to impede is a wall or barrier, correct? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Border barrier is a proven technique. We have 

got 654 miles of it. It has been effective where we have applied it, 

reducing crossings 90 percent and more in key areas of San Diego, 

Yuma, El Paso, Nogales. It is a critical capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. You just talked with the Ranking Member about 

the funds that you have had to work with. Do you have enough to 

be able to meet that challenge on that first component of border security? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. So, first of all, we appreciate the President’s request, listening to agents on the ground and what they need to secure the border between ports of entry. This is a significant investment in 2017 and 2018 in border wall. Almost $2 billion combined. 

That will help us get started. 

It is certainly a significant replacement wall. The RGV wall that 

Congressman Vela alluded to, both a levee wall, which we are 

working on 25 miles of levee wall in Hidalgo County as well as 8 

miles now in Starr County are important investments in our highest traffic sector that we are working hard to get built. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it was obvious from your outline of your priorities that border security is a system. It is not any one thing. One 

of the things that you have listed—I think it was your No. 3 item— 

was technology. When it comes to procuring technology, can you describe for us your process for what you decide you need next and 

how you pursue that? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Sure. Actually, we have had a lot of innovation 

in that side of our process lately by working with DHS science and 

technology to try to access more innovative technologies that are 

being developed by start-ups and provide a much faster cycle from 

identifying a capability that we could use in the hands of our 

agents and officers and then a contracting with a start-up to start 

piloting it and ultimately apply it. 

We are doing that in multiple areas. A situational awareness system for our Border Patrol agents where they can have right there 

on a smartphone the picture from all the sensors in their area. 

They can know where their fellow agents are. For our trade professionals that are working on identifying threats, intellectual property rights, or supply chain elements that are by forced labor. 

We have a contract on big data to help us analyze all the trade 

information flowing at us. For our canine teams that are working 

in 120 degree heat, say, in Calexico, California, we are looking at 

wearable technology to keep them safe and really trying to keep it 

that cutting-edge. 

So it is really two things. It is the long-term planning on things 

that our integrated fixed towers where we have an on-going yearover-year contract with capable major systems integrators, but also 

trying to access that emerging technology and apply it more quickly and get it in the hands of our agents. They don’t want to show 

up at work and put their smartphone on the dashboard. They want 

to be able to take that with them and apply its capabilities as they 

patrol. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, speaking of that, in March, the Acting Deputy 

Commissioner Vitiello told the subcommittee that fiber optic detecVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:00 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18BM0425\18BM0425.TXT HEATH
34 

tion was something they wanted to incorporate. Is that something 

you still plan to do into your security systems? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Absolutely. That is a core component of what 

we are calling a border wall system. I didn’t answer that part of 

Congressman’s Vela question fully. The difference in cost of what 

we are proposing now from what we built in 2006 or 2008 is that 

instead of just building a physical structure, we are integrating the 

entire system, the sensors, the lighting, the cameras and the access 

and control roads that we need to make it effective. So it is a total 

cost, and for the property acquisition, it is a total cost, not just one 

piece of it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I hope you have success, because I have been 

trying to do that for the 16 years I have been here. It has never 

been a challenge that was met. Last, I hope you have success on 

trying to deal with your retention problems. It is hard to keep 

those folks on that border when they can make so much more 

money in a big urban area. 

It is such a difficult environment to work in, but I hope you are 

successful. With that, I am sorry, my time is expired. I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes 

Mr. Correa from California for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CORREA. Thank you, Madam Chairperson McSally and of 

course Chairman McCaul for your time and Ranking Member 

Thompson and Ranking Member Vela and of course Commissioner 

McAleenan for being here today. 

I come from the State of California. Today we are probably the 

fifth or sixth largest economy in the world, and we are probably 

looking at becoming the No. 4 economy in the world since we 

passed up Great Britain. Unemployment right now in my county 

is less than 3 percent. 

Big ag industry in my State, my farmers keep talking about the 

need for more workers. I think we can all agree that our immigration laws are broken in this country. Maybe not. But one thing we 

can all agree on is the issue of drug addiction, opioids, heroin, and 

the challenges it presents to our country. It is my understanding 

that addiction deaths up about 500 percent in this country right 

now, all over the country so the issue of illegal drugs is a major 

one for all of us and I think all of us can agree on that. 

As we talk about those precious taxpayer dollars we have in this 

country, I wish we would have a matrix to measure what is effective and what is not in terms of, as we call it, addressing the border. Thirty years ago, the major port of entry for a lot of our drugs 

was Miami and as we tightened down on Miami the shift in drugs 

went from the seas to inland going through Mexico. Results were 

Mexico was effectively destabilized because of all the drugs running 

through Mexico, as well as the money, as well as the arms. 

As we began to squeeze in that area, we will probably find Canada to be a major port of entry. Just where you are sitting Commissioner a few months ago, we had the commandant of the Coast 

Guard speaking. His testimony 2016, 580 ships that he knew were 

caring drugs could not be stopped because they didn’t have the assets in the Coast Guard to interject those ships as they were coming in from Latin America; 580 ships with drugs could not be 

stopped that we knew were heading to our shores. 

35 

So as we are looking at the effectiveness of a wall, in your words, 

it is an effective, proven tool. How does that compare to, for example, additional border agents at our ports of entry? I have gone to 

San Ysidro, California, the biggest entry, the biggest port, the biggest crossed border port in the world, and I have talked to those 

agents. What they have told me is give us more dogs, give us more 

X-ray machines, give us more trained personnel we can do better 

job. 

As I talk to those agents, you can see them smiling from one end 

of their face to the other when I asked them about, tell me, how 

is it that you were able to spot that big shipment of drugs coming 

through? It wasn’t about a wall. It was about trained agents being 

able to spot something irregular in that vehicle coming across the 

border. 

So as we look at the American taxpayer, looking at how much 

we need to spend and we need to spend more on interjecting drugs, 

where would you say our priority is in terms of investment, on a 

wall, X-ray machines, trained personnel, trained dogs? I know you 

are going to say all of it is good, but if you had a buck, what would 

you spend it on first? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. 

You predicted accurately that I was going to tell you it is a balanced package of all of that. 

Mr. CORREA. Sir, I know it is balanced, but if I had to prioritize, 

where would you place your money first? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Well, Congress is helping prioritize by investing in our personnel. 

Mr. CORREA. Sir, how would you prioritize that investment? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. I would prioritize it in an even posture, because—— 

Mr. CORREA. So you say all of the above. 

Mr. MCALEENAN [continuing]. Because we can’t put it all in one 

area and not the other. 

Mr. CORREA. Dogs, trained agents, X-ray machines, a wall, they 

are all equally—— 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Right. 

Mr. CORREA [continuing]. Effective at the border in stopping 

drugs. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. The fiscal year 2018 budget, which we appreciate greatly, has a nice balanced investment in all of those things. 

It is—nonintrusive inspection—— 

Mr. CORREA. But, sir, in your opinion as a professional, where do 

you think those dollars are the most effectively invested? I know 

what those border agents told me in San Ysidro. In your opinion, 

where are they most effectively invested? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. So, at the ports of entry, there are two things. 

It is nonintrusive inspection technology, which includes the X-rays 

so we can get more vehicles through them. These are deep 

consealants that challenge our officers, more canines—— 

Mr. CORREA. I am running out of time, so let ask you—— 

Mr. MCALEENAN. And more CBP officers. 

Mr. CORREA. Compared to that border, it is not one, it is the 

whole border, where is that money most effectively invested to 

interdict drug shipments? 

36 

Mr. MCALEENAN. For hard narcotics, it is nonintrusive inspection 

technology. That is the most important. 

Mr. CORREA. Madam Chair, I am out of time. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Demings from Florida for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you so much, Madam Chairwoman, and to 

the Ranking Member, as well. Commissioner, it is good to see you. 

Congratulations on your confirmation. 

Since 2009, the Orlando International Airport has seen its international passenger arrivals increase by 89 percent, yet the number 

of Custom and Border Patrol officers have stayed relatively flat. 

As a former law enforcement officer, I was assigned out at OIA 

for a good number of years and so I know the critical role that your 

agency serves. The airport authority has invested millions of dollars in automatic passport control kiosks and other technology. But 

in 2007, Customs and Border Patrol officers serving at Orlando 

International Airport were notified that some of the officers would 

be redeployed for about 90 days to the Southwest Border crossings. 

These temporary assignments would definitely—would continue 

indefinitely. At the time, CBP official also made statements—or officials also made statements that these assignments are beneficial 

to both the temporary duty locations as well as to their permanently assigned place because they had gained broader experience. 

Could you please tell me, how does CBP determine which ports 

of entry will temporarily deploy officers to the Southwest Border? 

More broadly, how are you prioritizing personnel and resources for 

the ports of entry? I understand the—I guess I would say marching 

orders to—to the border but we are also extremely concerned about 

our ports of entry, as well. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Sure. Thank you for that question. First of all, 

we have tremendous relationship with Orlando International Airport. Recently we have been piloting facial recognition technology 

with Orlando, and they are so impressed by the effectiveness that 

they are looking at expanding that partnership with us. 

You are absolutely right. They have invested through a similar 

program to the donation acceptance program that we were talking 

about earlier by partnering with us to facilitate that travel, so that 

89 percent growth in 2013 and 2014 were actually able to reduce 

wait times. We have been able to stay on top of that, through that 

partnership and through applying enhanced technology, increased 

global entry membership, and I think facial recognition is going to 

take us to the next level on facilitating those entries. 

I am also glad you asked about staffing at ports of entry more 

broadly—— 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Yes, how do you prioritize which ports you are 

going to take from—— 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Sure. 

Mrs. DEMINGS [continuing]. To deploy somewhere else? Because 

that certainly concerns me. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Understood. Just I guess the first point is, our 

Southwest Border ports of entry, some of the biggest, San Ysidro 

is represented as Correa mentioned as well as Calexico, Nogales, 

Laredo. These are some of the toughest places we have in terms 

of staffing and the traffic at the land border is relentless, and that 

37 

panoply of threats that we face at that border provides a tremendous experience for our officers. 

So we try to pull in a balanced way, from ports of entry when 

we do these temporary TDYs to augment our abilities at the Southern Border port of entry. So Orlando was probably asked for staff 

at the same time that ports along the Eastern Seaboard, in the 

Midwest, even the West Coast for seaports and airports were asked 

to support those TDYs. So that is a rolling basis. It is based on who 

is closest to their capacity for staffing, and who needs help the 

most. So, that will continue to be a future as we increase our hiring. 

That said, we have hired 850 officers in the last 3 years. We 

hired 200, a net 200 last year. We are expecting significant 

progress this year thanks to the funding for 328 additional officers. 

That continues to be a hiring priority for us. 

I think it is maybe misunderstood that we are not asking for officers. We actually are. We are sending a workload staffing model to 

Congress every year. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Let me ask you about that. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Yes. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Particularly about attrition, you know, I agree 

that you having worked along with your officers and agents that 

they are fine men and women who do a great job. But what are 

you doing to deal with attrition? What steps are you taking to hold 

on to your current staff? I don’t know what is going on with the 

attrition rate, because it is high. What are you doing to attract additional persons into the profession? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. So first and foremost, the hiring is going to be 

the best way to hold on to our current staff, as well, because it is 

going to balance that workload out. There was a reference to the 

overtime hours, to double shifts. We want to limit that as much as 

we can. So that is one key piece. 

Two, we are clarifying our career paths and offering mobility— 

predictable mobility for our officers and agents. One of the No. 1 

reasons we see people leaving the CBP is that they feel like they 

can’t move to other locations. Maybe they have taken a job on the 

border. They have been excited about the opportunity to serve, but 

then they would like to move back to a major metropolitan area, 

or go back home. They haven’t had the mobility within our system 

to do that. We now have a web-enabled predictable process were 

we are supporting moves, thanks to Congress. 

This year, we are going to have almost 1,200 moves for front-line 

personnel between our officers and agents through multiple opportunities. So we think that mobility is going to be key. 

Then we are investing in workforce resilience. We have created 

a National resiliency task force. We are trying to look at the whole 

person, and not just the individual, but their family. We are trying 

to address suicide prevention. We are trying to address issues with 

stress, and provide that support in that environment that shows 

our professionals that we care about them and we care about their 

career progression. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you, Commissioner. I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentlewoman yields back. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Barraga ́n from California for 5 minutes. 

38 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, and our 

Ranking Member. Commissioner, thank you for being here today. 

I want to follow up a little on the questions of my colleague, Mr. 

Correa from California. I also have concerns about staffing levels 

at the ports of entry. I happen to represent the port of Los Angeles. 

It is a—as you know, a very busy port. We call it America’s port. 

I want to start by thanking you and CBP for the terrific personnel that is down there and the partnership with the port of Los 

Angeles. So I think the use of the ACE program has been very 

helpful, the Automated Commercial and Environment program, to 

help efficiency and the supply chain there. 

But I remain concerned about the adequate staffing at major 

points of entry, especially in our seaports and our airports, where 

I happen to believe is the larger target of a terror threat. 

I know you alluded to this a little bit, but how do you decide, 

when you are balancing CBP officers, between something like the 

seaports, the airport, and then the border wall, the Southwest Border? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Sure. So I mentioned the workload staffing 

model. This is where we submit to Congress, every year, based on 

a number of workload factors and threat vectors, how many personnel we need in each area of our operations. It is actually granular down to the specific port of entry. 

So we have requested another 2,500 officers Nation-wide on a 

prioritized basis. We have provided recommended fee proposal for 

Congress to consider that would allow us to hire that staffing, and 

the Port of Los Angeles is included. 

We do appreciate—by the way, I had the leadership of the Port 

of Los Angeles visit, I think, about a month ago. Tremendous partnership there, and that communication and dialog is, I think, critical. 

The other way we try to balance that staffing is recognizing the 

impact of our innovation. You mentioned the Automated Commercial Environment single window, which is providing significant capability, but we have also done several things to help make us 

more efficient. 

Our Radiation Portal Monitors, which we have at every exit to 

the terminal at the Port of Los Angeles—those are now more finely 

tuned so that they detect threats, but they don’t trigger on so many 

naturally occurring materials that are backing up trucks. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Right. You mentioned the 2,500 additional officers. Is that from—I think I saw a most recent CBP Office of Field 

Workload Staffing Model—is that where that comes from? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Correct. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. I have been reading and looking, and I have seen 

the administration put request in for more border agents, but I 

haven’t seen a request—rather, I haven’t seen a request from the 

administration for any of those 2,500 additional CBP officers that 

you identify are needed. 

Have you heard back on whether that is going to be coming down 

the pipeline anytime soon on this administration making that a 

priority? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. It was actually in the President’s 2018 budget 

as a fee request, and we sent that legislative proposal forward the 

39 

last 4 consecutive years to Congress. So there was a formal request 

for officers against that requirement. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. OK. It is also my understanding that there is a 

shortage of front-line CBP officers at the L.A. Long Beach port 

complex, and that is also concerning to me. Is CBP forecasting increased staffing at the seaports down in Los Angeles and Long 

Beach? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. So it is an important point. We have to not 

only work on the land border ports of entry, which have that 

present crush of traffic every day, but we have to support our seaports, as well. 

So, in that 2,500 that we have requested, a significant number 

would go to seaports, including the Port of Los Angeles Long 

Beach. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. So do you have a forecast at all on increasing 

staffing down at those two ports? Do you have any idea—like, are 

we talking about 6 months, a year? Do you have any idea? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Well, it is dependent on increased funding for 

us to hire new staff. If the workload balance changes in a way that 

L.A.-Long Beach seaport needs staff more than another port of 

entry, then we rebalance within that year and are able to reassign 

through that mobility program that I referenced. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Got it. Thank you. 

I have heard from the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association— 

the PMSA—about a new policy to charge terminals for scanning operations outside of normal hours, which go from 8 o’clock a.m. to 

3 o’clock—outside the hours of 8 o’clock a.m. to 3 o’clock a.m. 

Many of the terminals work outside of those hours, either to 

build trains or have trucks lined up by 7 o’clock a.m. so they are 

ready to leave once 8 o’clock a.m. hits. Now, they have to pay by 

the hour for those operations which is—and these costs, as I am 

hearing, are becoming unpredictable at times. Are you committed, 

at all, to working with the PMSA—will you commit to working 

with them to see what can be done to reduce some of the impact 

and the cost? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. I would be happy to work on that issue with 

the PMSA. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Great, thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentlelady yields back. We are going to do another round here. So, fully support the deployment of the National 

Guard to the border. We have—representing a border community 

myself, it is just taking too long to get the political will for Washington, DC, to be able to meet the President’s intent to secure our 

border. 

So I fully support it. Can you talk about the status of the deployment, what the National Guard troops are doing and should we see 

additional National Guardsmen and women deployed, as well, for 

the mission? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. CBP—we very much the opportunity to work 

with the Guard again. As you noted, we did it in 2006. We did it 

in 2010 and had on-going air surveillance support through 2016. So 

to have them back in significant numbers is going to be a huge 

augmentation to our capabilities. 

40 

We have got 600 already on the ground with us, doing missions 

like surveillance, operational support, everything from helping us 

on the radio side, to intelligence analysts, to the motor pool and 

then infrastructure. We have got to maintain all of these roads, 

these access roads to the border. They have capable units that are 

dedicated to these areas. 

So they are going to extend our capability in a number of different areas. To your point, Chairwoman, to enhance our ability to 

secure that border as we continue to invest in the resources necessary and the personnel to do so. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. So, how many are deployed right now? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Six hundred and seven as of this morning. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Is there any plan to deploy more? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. There is, of course. We have a set of missions 

that we have sent through the National Guard Bureau at main Department of Defense, chopped out to the States. The adjutants general are then the responding entities under the command of the 

Governors, under Title 32, including Governor Ducey who has been 

very supportive. 

Then we are going to be applying those assets through our sector 

command leadership to the specific mission we need. We are also 

hoping to have support for our cargo and our counternarcotics missions at ports of entry and for aviation surveillance, as well, in the 

coming weeks. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great, thanks. So this frees up the Border Patrol 

agents to be able to be patrolling the border and intercepting the 

illegal activity while you the Guardsmen doing, many times within 

their core competencies in the military, right, to provide some of 

those support functions, but also concerned about the Border Patrol 

agents that we have really being focused on the border. 

There were some media reports on one station in particular, I 

think had 700 agents assigned, and on any—or on one snapshot, 

had only about 12 percent available out patrolling the border. I always use my military analogies, right? 

I commanded a fighter squadron, we had a small number of 

fighter pilots and then we had other people that were trained in 

all the other support functions, but if you want us to be doing all 

the support functions, we probably won’t do a good job, No. 1. But 

we are the ones trained to be the fighter pilots. 

So, when you have got Border Patrol agents, highly-trained law 

enforcement officers that are doing things like fleet management 

and other admin—really other people should be trained to do in 

other positions. How do we—you know, what is the issue there? Because 12 percent is not adequate. We need to make sure that these 

highly-trained agents are out there patrolling the border. 

What else can we do to partner with you to free them up to do 

that job, while having less trained people or more specified trained 

people, doing these other support functions, what we call in the 

military, sometimes, some of the admin things and the paperwork—I won’t tell you what we call it, but anyways—we are on the 

record here. But, you know, it is really an important part of the 

mission, but you don’t want the agents doing all of that because it 

takes them away from the main mission. 

41 

Mr. MCALEENAN. I could not agree more with you, Chairwoman, 

that we want our highly-trained professionals out on the border, 

doing their core law enforcement work and patrolling. One of the 

areas that you highlighted, not just the mission support side, but 

also processing. This goes back to the loopholes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. The time it takes to properly process and care 

for family units and kids is much more extensive than other 

groups. The station that you cited is in Rio Grande Valley sector 

where we see the most crossings of this type. 

During that time we had about 60 percent of our agents doing 

patrol work, sector-wide. So we understand the scrutiny. We want 

to make sure those agents are out on the line; that is where we 

need them. But that processing issue, supporting them by—with 

remote processing, closing the loopholes, and then, looking at, 

maybe, a more balanced workforce investment. 

I know it is very important to invest in our very highly-trained 

law enforcement professionals, but we need to support them with 

a variety of occupations, that might be able to hire to more quickly, 

to really free them up to do their work. 

As you noted, we are going to realize a number of agents back 

to the border from having the National Guard support us in operational and mission support functions. But I think we can do the 

same on a sustained basis, with a more balanced staffing profile. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Because you don’t need to be an agent to do the 

processing, right? That could be a GS–7 who is doing that, who is 

trained specifically for that? Or do you have to be an agent? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. That is an immigration officer function. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK . 

Mr. MCALEENAN. So—but we are doing things like remote processing for stations that are not as busy in other sectors. They are 

doing the interviews and processing via VTC, via Skype, if you will. 

That has been helpful because we are trying to alleviate those 

high-traffic sectors so they can get out on the border doing their 

mission. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK , thanks. I am out of time, so, gentleman from 

Texas, Mr. Vela. 

Mr. VELA. Are we using Department of Defense dollars or Department of Homeland Security dollars to pay for the National 

Guard deployment? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. The National Guard deployment is funded by 

the Department of Defense. 

Mr. VELA. With respect to the issue of hiring, I mentioned this 

to Chief Vitiello, I think. You know, we passed that polygraph bill 

out of the House. But even then, even if we were able to get that 

through the Senate and signed by the President, you know, given 

the shortfall—and I appreciate the numbers you were throwing out, 

with respect to 800 hires over 3 years and—but even then, that is 

still really well short of the goals. 

I am not really suggesting it is anybody’s fault, but it just seems 

to me that we need to take a really new look at the way we are 

addressing that, right? What I have—and ever since I brought this 

up with Chief Vitiello, back home, I talked to one of our sheriffs 

just last week. 

42 

It seems to me that one of the things we might want to really 

take a look at is, you know, focusing on hiring people that are closer to the location of wherever they are going to be sent. 

Because what I am hearing from law enforcement personnel on 

the ground, not necessarily who are in Border Patrol, but who handle—you know, who supervise municipal police and sheriff’s deputies is that—one of the things is, you know, if you live in the city 

of—if you live in the Rio Grande Valley, which is Brownsville and 

McAllen, and you are not sure that you are going to be able to be 

stationed within a 30- or 45-mile radius of where you live, you 

know, even being stationed at the checkpoint in Kingsville, for example, which doesn’t look like that far, but if that means you are 

going to commute and hour-and-a-half back and forth each day or 

move your family to Kingsville. 

That appears to be one of the major challenges, I think, we are 

confronting, at least from what I am hearing on ground. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. So, that is an important policy that we have for 

our Border Patrol agents, for their initial duty station, to not be 

right there at home. We want to make sure that that is an integrity and anti-corruption measure, to ensure that they are not in a 

cycle with neighbors who might be involved in cross-border criminal activity and be susceptible to that. 

So we want to start them off in the agency in a location that is 

a little bit further away. But there is a mobility factor later in the 

career, and that is something that we are trying to emphasize. 

But to your point, taking a fresh look at every aspect of our hiring cycle is my top mission support priority. It was my first statement in what my vision is for CBP. Even though we have made 

40 separate process improvements, we have reduced the time to 

hire, we have partnered with DOD on veteran hiring, all of that 

is helping, but it is not enough. 

We need to do more. That includes accessing the expertise of the 

private sector, doing digital recruiting and marketing in a more 

precise and targeted way, increasing our capacity at different choke 

points in the hiring cycle, and then to your point, effective administration of the polygraph, and ideally a limited waiver for those that 

we can trust based on their military and law enforcement service 

in other capacities. 

Mr. VELA. Yes, I don’t know. I think it sounds to me like we 

probably ought to take a fresh look at that original policy you mentioned, because it seems—it just seems from what I am hearing is, 

is that every time I ask people that are on the ground that appears 

to be the major challenge. 

I think we ought to have a little bit more faith, you know, in the 

system that we set up and in the agents that we hire. Because I 

think if we are able to—I think our best chance at being able to 

fulfill that shortage is going to be to address the location issues. 

So you know, maybe that is something that we can work on further. 

I also—and we can talk about this when we are done, but I submitted a letter, I think, requesting details on plans and, you know, 

for what, when, and where with respect to the border wall. I don’t 

know if you have had a chance to respond to that in writing, or 

when we might be able to get that. 

43 

Mr. MCALEENAN. I have a signed copy to deliver to you in our 

meeting. 

Mr. VELA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. OK . 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Correa from 

California for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CORREA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Commissioner, just there was a lot of discussion in this committee and other places that the polygraph test was being a major 

issue, in terms of your hiring goals. What is the latest on that 

issue? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. So we have been working to streamline our administration of the polygraph and also to ensure that we have the 

right polygraph protocol for a pre-employment test at an agency of 

our size and scope. 

So over the last 10 months, we have been piloting an alternative, 

Federally-certified protocol for our pre-employment polygraph. It is 

showing very good results. 

It has reduced the time of the exam. It has maintained the disqualification numbers that we had before. So we are still identifying those people that haven’t disclosed something in their background that would be disqualifying, because we have very stringent 

background standards. 

But we are not seeing a physiological response in as many cases 

that creates an inconclusive. So our pass rates have increased 

using this protocol. 

We are in the process of completing our pilot analysis and certifying it and looking at it as something we are going to use going 

forward. So we have really tried to improve our polygraph administration on multiple levels. 

Mr. CORREA. Thank you. Shifting gears a little bit, talking about 

National defense, terrorism. Folks that have been where you are at 

right now have stated that if any terrorists or drugs reach our borders, we have essentially lost the war. So what we have got to do 

is really interdict the terrorist bad folks as far as can from our border, as well as drugs. 

Any thoughts, any comments on the progress or what we need 

to do to help you with your cooperation with other countries, other 

agencies, other attorney generals around the world that may help 

us identify those bad folks before they get here? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Thank you for that comment, Congressman. I 

could not agree more with you that addressing the threats as early 

as possible in a travel cycle toward the United States is the best 

way to secure our border. 

We are doing that through our National Targeting Center. Last 

year, over 2,800 individuals who turned out to be known or suspected terrorists were prevented from even getting permission to 

travel to the United States through a visa—through an electronic 

system for travel authorization. Another 900 in the air environment were denied boarding before they could fly to the United 

States. 

Working with our allies around the world through PreClearance 

programs so that we can clear travelers heading to the United 

States before they even board a flight is another method that is 

44 

critical, and really just building the capacity of our international 

partners. 

We have had two U.N. Security Council resolutions that highlight the importance of collecting data, from analyzing it, from 

sharing watch list information, and from partnering across borders 

so that we can protect this global travel cycle, has been a very positive development. 

CBP has been spearheading efforts to help allies around the 

world, in the Western Hemisphere, in Europe, in Asia to develop 

and utilize this capability, because we think it is critical to our security going forward. 

So Congress’s support to those programs which were authorized 

in our—in the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 

2015 has been very helpful. We intend to continue those advances. 

Mr. CORREA. Anything else we can do to help you build those relationships overseas? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. On the relationships overseas, I think the—we 

need to tackle this challenge on being able to protect privacy between—and the sharing of data between countries, while still addressing the threats. 

We think with advanced technology, the ability to check data in 

an anonymized way, and only see and share the hits, that we have 

a process to do that. So being able to invest and demonstrate that 

technology capability will enhance our sharing. 

Mr. CORREA. So you do have some protocol for sharing certain information with foreign governments that may be of interest—mutual interest to all involved, so to speak, for National securities 

purposes? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. We absolutely do, both at CBP and with our 

partners in the Federal law enforcement and intelligence communities. 

Mr. CORREA. Would those consider Mexico, Colombia, and some 

of those other Latin American countries? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Absolutely. Our partnership with Mexico is 

about as active as any global partnership in the world, including 

sharing information on trade violations, on potential security 

threats, on immigration issues. 

I just signed three agreements in Mexico City last month on 

trade enforcement collaboration and information sharing. It is a 

critical partnership. 

Mr. CORREA. I would like to get more information on those agreements. Thank you very much, sir, for again, to your service, and 

to your personnel for the good job they do. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Thank you. 

Mr. CORREA. Madam Chair, I yield. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Gentleman yields back. I have a few more questions. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Right. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The first is on land ports of entry. These are so 

critical for both economic opportunity and increasing cross-border 

commerce, which is going to provide economic development and 

jobs in America, but also for security. 

The potential for additional hard drugs—we have seen the vast 

majority of drugs are coming through the ports of entry, as you 

45 

mentioned, plus other contraband and things that could make it 

through the ports of entry. 

So this is the—these ports of entries, they are a part of border 

security, but they are also a part of economic development and opportunity. They are—many of them are woefully inadequate, like 

the Douglas Port of Entry in my district. 

Built in 1933, this needs to be replaced. We have been advocating for it since I have been here. Glad to see that it is—there 

is a feasibility study going on now. There is an opportunity for it 

to be funded in the future. 

Have you been to the Douglas Port of Entry? Can you talk about 

the importance to upgrade ports of entry like this, both for economic opportunity and for security and counterterrorism mission? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Absolutely. I have been to the Douglas point of 

entry multiple times, a challenging facility to say the least especially given the growth in traffic since the 1930’s. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yes. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. The change in our mission, the change in our 

agency composition, it wasn’t designed for where we are today. So 

the imperative to invest both in the physical infrastructure to accommodate the flow but also the security technology, the offices, 

the detention areas, all of that is critical so we can facilitate that 

cross-border trade and travel. 

So we have initiated a feasibility study on the Port of Douglas. 

That is going to tell us both the planning factors for additional 

cargo flow, as well as the regular travel. We are going to need to 

then put a budget wedge against that study to see if we can modernize the port itself and we have in our planning but also in what 

is the right structure for the future of the port. 

That is an area that we need to invest in across the board on the 

border as well as in partnership with Mexico and Canada, because 

if we don’t align our investments and our priorities we can create 

real challenges. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I agree. Can you tell me where the Douglas Port 

fits in your priorities right now on the list? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. The modernization of the Douglas Port of entry 

is a top 10 priority that we have budgeted in the out years. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. Top ten, but I mean we—just usually only get 

0 to 2 it seems over the last few years. So it was in the 5-year plan. 

Top 10 doesn’t sound as high as I would like it to be. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. I believe it is a 2019 or 2020. I will get back 

to you, Chairwoman, on exactly where—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. In fiscal year 2019 or fiscal year 2020, you 

mean—— 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Yes. 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. As working through—OK, great, 

thank you. The other element that has been talked about already 

is the opioid crisis, fentanyl specifically, coming through the ports 

of entry. Do you have the adequate technology to detect it—it can 

be deadly to our agents, as well—and the training that they need 

in order to identify and be able to respond quickly should they be 

exposed to it? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. So middle of last year, I commissioned a 

counter-opioid strategy at CBP. It is attacking everything from the 

46 

advanced data for instance in the international mail environment 

to the technology we need to detect small vials of fentanyl, which 

is extraordinarily potent, as you referenced. 

The ability to test it, not only for the safety of our officers and 

ICE specialists and canines, but also give us the quick reaction so 

that we can do with an investigator partner a controlled delivery 

and address the network that is bringing that into the country, and 

not just make that individual seizure. 

So we have benefited from support from Congress to invest in 

testing technology both in 2017 and now in 2018. We are getting 

that out to all of the key ports of entry that need it, and we are 

also buying naloxone, so that if there is an accidental exposure that 

creates a health hazard for our personnel, that they have naloxone 

on-site to address that quickly, and it works also for our canines, 

as well. 

Ms. MCSALLY. You said you are buying naloxone. Is it not available right now at all ports of entry? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. It is available at all ports of entry, but we want 

to deploy more, so it is more readily accessible—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Because of how quickly and how potent this 

drug acts. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. All right. 

Mr. Correa, do you have any more questions? 

OK, I want to thank our witness for your valuable testimony and 

Members for the questions. 

The Members of the committee may have some additional questions for the witness. I ask you respond to those in writing. Pursuant to committee Rule VII(D), the hearing record will be held open 

for 10 days. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(47) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN MARTHA MCSALLY FOR KEVIN K. MCALEENAN

Question 1a. Commissioner McAleenan, we have heard that U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection is interested in joining the intelligence community. This subcommittee firmly believes that Congress needs to be consulted before any steps are 

taken. 

From CBP’s standpoint, where is the breakdown between CBP and the IC happening that would warrant CBP gaining membership to the IC? Can you provide 

specific examples? 

Answer. CBP continues to work with its partners, including the IC, to facilitate 

the sharing of data and information, as appropriate. Later this month, senior CBP 

and DHS leadership will meet with the principal deputy director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) to discuss potential options to further strengthen the sharing of 

data and information, especially in exigent and rapidly-evolving situations. 

Question 1b. Are there specific reforms that can be made within the intelligence 

community or the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis that could fix some of 

these problems without restructuring the IC? 

Answer. We are working very closely with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

(I&A) to increase CBP’s ability to deliver on the President’s objectives on border security, trade enforcement, and countering transnational organized crime. I&A leadership has implemented important changes to manage and integrate intelligence 

across the DHS intelligence enterprise, and CBP and I&A continue to work together 

to facilitate the sharing of data and information, as appropriate. 

Question 2. Commissioner McAleenan, the fiscal year 2018 enacted budget includes $196 million for border security technology acquisition and deployment. Can 

you provide us with a breakdown of each technology line item that this $196 million 

will fund? 

Answer. The $196 million in the fiscal year 2018 enacted budget refers to the additional funds provided for border security technology acquisition and deployment. 

The table below identifies the allocation of those funds by line item. The paragraphs 

below the table describe the use of all funds enacted in fiscal year 2018 for border 

security technology acquisition and deployment. 

Technology ($ in Thousands) 

Fiscal 

Year 2018 

Request 

Fiscal 

Year 2018 

Plus Up 

Fiscal 

Year 2018 

Enacted 

Integrated Fixed Towers ........................................ $27,238 $12,000 $39,238 

Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) .......... 46,193 41,000 87,193 

Northern Border (NB) RVSS ................................. 0 7,000 7,000 

Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) .......... 4,838 42,000 46,838 

Innovative Towers .................................................. 0 10,000 10,000 

Cross Border Tunnel Threat (CBTT) .................... 11,955 30,000 41,955 

Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) ........ 0 16,000 16,000 

Linear Ground Detection System (LGDS) ............ 0 16,000 16,000 

Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) ........... 0 10,000 10,000 

Maritime Detection Project (MDP) ........................ 0 9,000 9,000 

Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) .................. 0 3,000 3,000 

Total Technology .......................................... 90,224 204,000 294,224 

IFT: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $39.2 million funds partial deployment of the 

IFT system in Tohono O’odham Nation, including 7 surveillance towers in Casa 

Grande and one in Ajo–2, the associated Command and Control Center in the 

Tohono O’odham Nation in Tucson Sector, and Program Planning and Control 

48 

(PP&C) requirements, completes two towers of the final IFT system in the Tohono 

O’odham Nation, and funds some of the IFT Deferred ORD/Sensor Fusion/TSM Integration requirements. 

RVSS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted funds the design and construction of 43 RVSS 

Upgrade Sensor & Relay towers for Brownsville, Falfurrias, Ft. Brown, Harlingen, 

Kingsville and Weslaco USBP Station Areas of Responsibility (AORs) and the design, construction, and deployment of approximately 30 Relocatable towers, surveillance/communication technology, and 3 Modular Command and Control (C2) centers 

in Rio Grande Valley Sector. NBRVSS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $7.0 million funds approximately 4 NB 

RVSS towers in Swanton Sector. 

MVSS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $46.8 million funds Program Planning and 

Control (PP&C) to develop documentation for a follow-on MVSS contract and completes the procurement and deployment of approximately 49 MVSS systems to El 

Paso Sector and planning for additional units in other sectors. Innovative Towers: Fiscal year enacted of $10 million funds acquisition of additional towers if they pass T&E, additional test and evaluation, and transition planning. CBTT: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $42.0 million funds CBTT system procurement, including test and evaluation, IT security, and engineering change proposals, 

alternative analyses, technology demonstrations, test bed, and approximately 10.7 

miles of persistent tunnel detection technology. APSS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $16.0 million funds approximately 39 systems 

that will be deployed on the Northern and Southern Border based on USBP priorities. 

LGDS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $16.0 million funds approximately 60 miles 

of LGDS technology deployed in conjunction with the Wall System in RGV. sUAS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $10.0 million funds approximately 9 SUAS 

suites in RGV sector and 2 SUAS suites in Big Bend sector. 1 sUAS Suite consists 

of 1 fixed wing sUAS, 1 Vertical takeoff and landing sUAS and 1 Hybrid sUAS. MDP: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $9.0 million funds approximately 5 MDP towers in Buffalo Sector. 

ATAK: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $3.0 million funds planning, servers, phone 

acquisition, user training, and dedicated TAK development team. 

Question 3a. Commissioner McAleenan, Chief Scott Luck testified before this subcommittee last July about border security technology. He noted that the Border Patrol was testing small unmanned aerial systems in Arizona, Texas, and Vermont to 

help fill domain awareness gaps. 

Can you update us on that status and results of that testing? 

Answer. USBP conducted field demonstrations of small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS) September 2017 to March 2018. These demonstrations helped familiarize USBP with SUAS in their operational environment, demonstrate the effectiveness and suitability of SUAS, and help refine operational and acquisition documentation supporting a Program of Record. SUAS deployments will supplement current fixed-wing technology and manned aircraft thereby reducing surveillance and 

situational awareness gaps. Further, ease of mobility and portability enable SUAS 

to be moved to high-risk areas, allowing agents to adapt to changing threats. 

Question 3b. CBP has requested $300 million for small UAS, what exactly will 

that money go toward? 

Answer. The SUAS funding will be used to procure and maintain SUAS, and train 

BP agents. Doing so will meet the USBP’s Full Operational Capability (FOC) requirement for SUAS based on a documented 245k fiscal year flight-hour capability 

gap. 

Question 3c. Is there a specific time line or plan for a small UAS strategy in the 

works? 

Answer. Yes, the plan for SUAS is to award a contract(s) in fiscal year 2019. The 

procurement of commercially available, high technology-readiness systems will help 

to accelerate the procurement and deliver capability to the field in an expedited 

manner. 

Question 4a. Commissioner McAleenan, we have non-intrusive inspection equipment and other innovative force multiplying technologies deployed at our ports of 

entry, however, drugs are still pouring in through these ports. 

Do we have the technology but not the volume needed or are there technical capabilities we are missing? 

Answer. As threats and hazards evolve and trade volume increases, smugglers 

will continue to seek ways to exploit the border environment. To address this area 

with NII, CBP is actively working to integrate our NII technology across operations, 

with an objective of reducing processing time to examine a greater portion of conveyVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:00 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18BM0425\18BM0425.TXT HEATH
49 

ances, or redirect officers to other high-priority operations. The key limitations to 

achieve this objective include stand-alone NII technology and the lack of pre-primary/primary NII imaging capability/capacity. 

Currently, NII systems are stand-alone systems, in that they do not integrate 

with other hardware systems or transmit data across the CBP Network. The lack 

of interoperability results in increased processing time as officers and agents must 

complete manual, and often redundant, data entry/data transfer activities. Additionally, NII scanning is largely a secondary inspection process largely due to the size 

of the technology and footprint of the port. 

To address these areas, CBP is assessing technologies and operational concepts 

that place NII in pre-primary or primary inspection operations. Within this concept, 

CBP is assessing the ability to transmit NII data to CBP IT systems and local command center operations, and to perform remote health monitoring to support system 

maintenance. Collectively, this would allow CBP to increase the volume of conveyances examined without negative impact to facilitating lawful trade and travel. 

Question 4b. Why don’t we have multi-lane scanning capabilities at our land ports 

of entry? 

Answer. CBP is actively exploring concepts that include placing drive-through NII 

systems, inclusive of multi-lane scanning systems, in pre-primary or primary operations. This would allow CBP to process both commercial trucks and passenger vehicles. 

CBP, together with DHS Science and Technology (S&T) and technology vendors, 

are planning to initiate operational assessments of drive-through passenger and 

cargo vehicle X-ray imaging systems along the Southwest Border. The assessments 

will be used to determine the feasibility of conducting pre-primary and primary NII 

scanning using commercially available drive-through X-ray imaging technologies in 

a new concept of operations. As commercial trucks and passenger vehicles arrive at 

the port of entry, they will drive through the NII system; a license plate reader will 

package the plate with the scan and send the package into a command center, secondary, and/or to the primary officer. As part of the assessment, CBP will evaluate 

how and where the image is transmitted for officer review. The assessment will consider the dynamic operational tempos and resources across ports, so CBP can employ a flexible and adaptable concept to support the varying environments. For example, one port may transmit to a Command Center and another port may transmit 

to primary or secondary operations. 

Question 5a. Commissioner McAleenan, this subcommittee believes that the border security technology acquisition process needs serious improvement. 

Does CBP utilize the DHS Silicon Valley Innovation Program, which reaches out 

to innovation communities across the Nation and around the world to harness the 

commercial R&D ecosystem for technologies with Government applications? 

Answer. CBP has utilized the DHS Silicon Valley Innovation Program (SVIP) 

since its inception as a way to identify commercially available, innovative technology 

which can be rapidly developed, piloted, and brought into CBP operations. These 

technologies can directly support CBP by allowing front-line agents and officers to 

carry out our mission more safely and effectively. We now have a portfolio of 13 

commercial start-ups piloting innovative technologies such as near-autonomous 

small UAS, low-cost/high-performing sensors, travel technologies, and machine 

learning capabilities. CBP views SVIP as a strategic partner and a key mechanism 

for bringing innovative technology into the CBP ecosystem. 

Question 5b. What efforts are being made by CBP to work with the private sector 

on technology innovation? 

Answer. CBP has established the Commercial Technology Innovation Program 

(CTIP) in order to identify, pilot, and deliver cutting-edge commercial technology 

that makes our front-line personnel safer and more effective. Through strategic 

partnerships such as the DHS Silicon Valley Innovation Program, In-Q-Tel, and others, CBP is pursuing innovation in three key capability areas: (1) Autonomous capabilities, (2) advanced analytics and artificial intelligence, and (3) communications, 

sensors, and data. As an example, CBP is piloting 4 fully autonomous, low-cost surveillance towers in the San Diego Border Patrol Sector. The towers require no external power source and have the ability to autonomously detect, identify, classify, and 

track targets through a novel combination of radar and machine vision. Due to their 

autonomy, the towers have enhanced situational awareness without requiring additional personnel to operate them. 

Question 5c. Is there a mechanism in place for the private sector to initiate a proposal for scaling current border security technology or to submit ideas for improving 

port of entry functions, or are all CBP technology considerations Department initiated? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

50 

Question 6. Commissioner McAleenan, the Interdict Act was signed into law in January of this year, authorizing and providing CBP the appropriation of $9 million 

for new opioid and other illicit substance screening devices, laboratory equipment, 

facilities, and personnel for support during all operational hours to expedite the 

testing of suspected opioids seized at our borders and ports of entry. Has CBP begun 

the procurement and hiring process for any of these appropriations? 

Answer. CBP thanks Congress for its support contained in the INTERDICT Act 

authorizing language. The language will improve our ability to interdict fentanyl, 

synthetic opioids, and other narcotics and psychoactive substances illegally imported 

into the United States. CBP assumes the enactment of this Bill drove some of the 

decisions in the Appropriations Committees to appropriate the one-time $30.5 million for Opioid Detection and Labs and the additional Non-Intrusive Inspection acquisition funding. CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) and Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) have partnered in anticipation of receipt of funds by building 

a spend plan. The funding was allocated to OFO and LSS during the week of May 

14, 2018, and acquisitions are under way. There is no hiring process possible with 

these appropriations as the funding appropriated was non-pay and only available 

for 1 year. 

Question 7. Commissioner McAleenan, there are independent companies in existence that can test, verify, and evaluate solutions to ensure that all border security 

technology products and services are performing to their defined capabilities. Is CBP 

looking at utilizing independent verification and validation in its technology acquisition programs? Why or why not? 

Answer. Yes, CBP is utilizing independent verification and validation (IV&V) in 

its technology acquisition programs in accordance with DHS IV&V Annex to the 

DHS Systems Engineering Life Cycle (SELC) Guidebook. 

Question 8a. During our hearing on April 25, 2018, Commissioner McAleenan indicated that fiber optic detection would be integrated into a ‘‘Border Wall System.’’ 

What are CBP’s near-term plans to test and evaluate potential fiber optic intrusion detection solutions? Please provide the committee with a time line for LGDS 

testing and evaluation. 

Answer. CBP anticipates testing and evaluating potential fiber optic intrusion detection solutions as part of source selection, and after contract award in fiscal year 

2019. 

Question 8b. Has CBP established testing criteria, evaluation considerations, and 

key performance parameters? If so, can this information be shared with the committee? 

Answer. As part of the normal acquisition and procurement process, CBP is developing test criteria, evaluation considerations, and key performance parameters. The 

information will be documented in the solicitation which will be released by Q1 fiscal year 2019. 

Question 8c. Will the fiber optic detection be deployed along the Northern Border 

or just the Southwest Border? 

Answer. Yes, the fiber optic detection system will be deployed along the Northern 

Border and Southwest Border. 

Question 9a. Commissioner McAleenan, in the past, CBP has outlined the need 

for hiring an additional 5,000 Border Patrol agents, 540 AMO agents and over 2,500 

CBP officers in order to secure the borders. In order to meet these new mandates, 

CBP is faced with the necessary task of bringing on more than 750 additional mission support personnel. It is my understanding that you have signed a contract with 

Accenture to help the agency fill these positions. 

Can you give us a ballpark estimate on how long it will take to meet these ambitious staffing goals? 

Answer. The Accenture contract allows CBP to front-line (BPAs, CBPOs, and 

AMO agents) surge hiring requirements over the next 5 years, while also allowing 

CBP to benefit from any innovation and efficiencies Accenture brings to the recruiting and hiring process. The contractor will help CBP hire 5,000 BPAs, 2000 CBPOs, 

and 500 AMO agents only. CBP HRM resources will maintain focus on addressing 

front-line attrition and non-front-line hiring needs to support the agency mission. 

While this contract is specific to CBP’s 5-year hiring goals, CBP strives to constantly evolve to support its operational needs, understanding that what worked 

just a few years ago quickly becomes obsolete as technology advances, how we think 

about the workforce environment advances, and the very nature of CBP’s mission 

changes. CBP’s hiring demands are complex, interdependent, and driven by National security objectives, Executive-level policies, Congressional mandates, and 

component-specific operational requirements. There are always opportunities to improve, and we’re committed to continuously reassessing and refining our organizational structure to maximize effectiveness and process efficiency, as well as keep 

51 

pace with evolving demands. Our focus continues to be on front-line hiring and ensuring CBP reaches Executive Order-mandated hiring targets for front-line personnel, while at the same time providing the highest possible level of support to our 

current employees. 

While providing an estimated time frame for achieving all of our hiring goals is 

difficult and subject to many variables, we believe that leveraging Accenture’s expertise, in addition to recent refinements to our recruitment and hiring processes, 

responds to the unique hiring challenges we face today. We are committed to ensuring that our front-line staffing effort remains focused but agile, centralized but precisely calibrated to the various, changing threat environments across the border and 

through the ports. 

Question 9b. Can you give us an overview of how that contract is going so far? 

Have you seen progress in the speed and quality of the hiring process? 

Answer. The Contract had a 120-day start-up and transition period for the Contractor to learn the CBP process, hire staff, and get them cleared to work at CBP 

and process applicants. The Contractor began marketing and recruiting in February 

and initial processing in March 2018, and the first EODs are scheduled in late fiscal 

year 2018. The contractor currently has over 1,700 applicants in process. 

The Contractor is using advanced data analytics to try new recruiting methods 

and will also be developing innovative technology solutions that will be leveraged 

by CBP. Some of their processing and technology expertise has already been adopted 

into the CBP hiring process. 

Question 10. Commissioner McAleenan, there have been recent media reports that 

state in certain Border Patrol sectors only about 13 percent of agents are patrolling 

along the border. What is the actual percentage of agents that patrol the line each 

day per Border Patrol sector on the Southwest Border? 

Answer. The Southern Border sectors have, on average, 69 percent of the agents 

on duty operating in border enforcement activities, at or within the immediate border environment. Due to certain terrain challenges and accessibility issues, our border enforcement posture will not always be at the immediate border, but within a 

reasonable distance where the U.S. Border Patrol can perform their law enforcement/interdiction duties. 

The other 31 percent of agents, on duty, not assigned to patrol the border are 

tasked to a myriad of other activities such as performing, processing/prosecutorial 

functions, intelligence-gathering operations, collaborative operations with partner 

agencies, strategic planning duties, and performing other necessary functions such 

as serving as command and control staff. These numbers vary by sector and by area 

of operation, but USBP’s recognizes and adheres to the border security mission 

through a proper, forward-deployed, methodology to deter, identify, and mitigate incursions within the closest proximity to the border as possible. The USBP recognizes 

that the ability to mitigate incursions at the earliest identified point will greatly improve our enforcement posture and deterrence capabilities. 

Question 11a. Commissioner McAleenan, the workforce attrition rate among 

agents in the Border Patrol has been an issue since the early 2000’s. The Border 

Patrol has implemented mobility programs and opportunities before, but here we 

are today still talking about attrition. 

What programs or incentives have worked to curb attrition in the Border Patrol? 

Answer. U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) has a systemic need to stabilize the workforce 

and improve retention of employees with mission-essential competencies. Our 3-year 

average attrition rate of 4.8 percent continues to outpace the annualized 3-year hiring average of 2.3 percent; highlighting the immediacy of our need for retention incentives. 

Based on both internal and external surveys, Border Patrol agents cite the primary reason for leaving is a lack of mobility. Mid-career BPAs feel there is no opportunity to either relocate to a more desirable location or advance from their current position, leading to decisions to leave U.S. Border Patrol. The Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), HRM surveys, and the USBP Human Capital 

Study show a strong correlation between a lack of agent mobility and lower morale 

and higher attrition rates. Analysis of CBP’s hiring and attrition challenges revealed that USBP needed a program that improved operational response capabilities 

with the flexibility to address continually changing threats, and improve retention. 

The Operational Mobility Program meets both criteria; additionally, it resolved the 

No. 1 reason for agent attrition—lack of mobility. 

USBP’s Operational Mobility Program provides a stable relocation program for 

the USBP workforce to address declining morale and attrition. To achieve needed 

mobility, CBP implemented an incremental mobility program in fiscal year (+$25 

million above $14 million in baseline funding), with the goals of achieving a 12 percent workforce mobility target by fiscal year 2000. 

52 

Question 11b. You talk about mobility programs, but what specific programs do 

you plan to implement in the future to address the high attrition rates? 

Answer. CBP will continue to use its operational mobility program to address attrition, and will continues to look for new approaches to improve attrition rates for 

mission-essential competencies. CBP is also working to make improvements to its 

hiring process so that attrition of seasoned agents is less of an issue than it is currently. 

Question 12a. Commissioner McAleenan, deploying the National Guard to the 

Southwest Border is not a permanent solution to address CBP’s manpower shortage. 

While efforts to improve hiring and retention at CBP have not proven to be successful so far, it’s time to look at the full range of options available. Particularly, in 

terms of tasks that do not require the skill set that our agents and officers have, 

contracting out that work might make sense. 

Has CBP considered contracting out work that does not require a law enforcement 

skill set, such carrying out day-to-day scanning and screening functions, and image 

analysis, to the private sector? 

Answer. CBP is interested in further exploring the ability of having a cadre of 

personnel that are focused on image analysis and manifest reconciliation, specifically as CBP continues to evaluate the ability of pre-primary/primary NII Scanning 

with command center operations. CBP has discussed utilizing image analyst personnel, either contractor or non-law enforcement personnel (CBP technicians), to 

reconcile the CONSIST manifest information and review the X-ray image for the 

presence of anomalies. If an anomaly were discovered during the image analysis, the 

analyst would notify an on-site CBP officer for final adjudication. A CBP officer 

would always be on-hand to provide supervision and/or guidance to the analysts. 

This concept would optimize the role of the CBP officer by allowing them to focus 

on other high-priority law enforcement duties. 

CBP has implemented several business transformation initiatives to optimize CBP 

officer resources and increase efficiency. Initiatives such as Automated Passport 

Control (APC), Mobile Passport Control (MPC), Vehicle and Pedestrian Ready 

Lanes, Trusted Traveler Programs, and the CBP Mobile Program continue to result 

in significant savings. From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, CBP saved 

over 1.4 million inspectional hours through business transformation. It is estimated 

that through fiscal year 2019 CBP will save an additional 523,000 hours. Overall 

savings estimates from fiscal year 2012–fiscal year 2019 equate to $52 million in 

salaries and expenses. 

Question 12b. What are the logical next steps for CBP to make this a reality? 

Answer. The most logical next steps would be to develop analysis as to the benefits and issues associated with this approach. Fortunately, the Office of Field Operations is developing a data-driven staffing model that analyzes mission and operational support positions, activities, and functions in an effort to alleviate some of 

the administrative burden of CBP officers and CBP agriculture specialists. Some of 

the activities that we are considering within the context of the Mission and Operational Support Resource Allocation Model (MOSRAM) is operator support to NonIntrusive Inspection (NII) equipment such a Z-portals, fixed and mobile X-ray systems. While actual review and adjudication of scanned images must be performed 

by a CBP officer or CBP agriculture specialist there are other roles that could be 

performed by a CBP technician. 

Question 13a. Commissioner McAleenan, CBP deploys a variety of personnel at 

its 15 PreClearance locations with different skill sets, ranging from front-line officers to agricultural specialists. 

For PreClearance locations, how do you determine the number and type of personnel needed? 

Answer. The deployment of CBP officers and agriculture specialists to our 

PreClearance locations serves an important role in the CBP mission of strengthening our ability to identify terrorists, criminals, and other National security threats 

prior to encountering them on U.S. soil. PreClearance operations places a trained 

law enforcement professional at foreign points of departure to enforce our country’s 

laws and to protect the traveling public destined for the United States. These law 

enforcement professionals already have many years of service and experience prior 

to their potential selection for a PreClearance location. They are required to apply 

for the position and be selected through consideration of these skillsets and experience. 

CBP works closely with foreign stakeholders, airlines, and agency partners to provide and accommodate the appropriate number of personnel at our PreClearance locations. These continual and on-going discussions address any potential fluctuations 

due to economy, weather, and industry, regionally or nationally, which could impact 

the staffing overseas. 

53 

1 Update on Integrated Scanning System Pilot—Reported to Congress: May 29, 2008; June 12, 

2008; January 4, 2010; July 15, 2010; January 24, 2011; May 20, 2011; February 29, 2012; October 3, 2012; March 11, 2013; July 29, 2013; April 8, 2014; July 7, 2014; December 15, 2014; 

April 14, 2015; December 17, 2015; June 30, 2016; March 2, 2017; February 9, 2018. 

Question 13b. What is the average cost associated with deploying one front-line 

CBP officer abroad? One support specialist? 

Answer. The average cost of a CBP PreClearance employee abroad in fiscal year was approximately $275,000 dollars. However, the cost of stationing a PreClearance 

employee abroad can cost upwards of $400,000 dollars or more depending on a number of variables specific to each individual deployment (e.g. relocation costs due to 

family size/housing/location, Department of State allowances, and support costs at 

a particular post, etc.). These numbers take into account any cost reimbursement 

that CBP gets at certain PreClearance locations. It should also be noted these costs 

do not include any State-side ‘‘overhead’’ support costs. 

At this time, CBP PreClearance has limited support positions overseas. However, 

CBP PreClearance is exploring the possibility of increasing the number of mission 

support specialists and CBP technicians overseas allowing officers and agriculture 

specialists to be relieved of administrative duties that they are currently required 

to complete. CBP PreClearance believes the average cost for a support position 

would be around $225,000 dollars per year but could be higher depending on the 

variables listed above. 

Question 13c. How long is it currently taking to deploy a front-line officer abroad 

to PreClearance locations? 

Answer. The deployment of a front-line officer takes anywhere from 6–9 months, 

starting with extending the job offer and finishing with the employee entering on 

duty in PreClearance. The time frame depends on how soon the employee completes 

the pre-employment process, which entails obtaining medical clearances and diplomatic passports for the employee and their dependents from the Department of 

State, completing all mandatory training, and obtaining a security clearance, if applicable (required for supervisory positions). 

Question 14a. Commissioner McAleenan, CBP is currently using a risk-based approach to scan ‘‘high-risk’’ containers which amounts to scanning 3–4 percent of all 

U.S.-bound cargo. There is a large gap between the requirement in the law of scanning 100 percent of all cargo containers before they are bound for the United States 

and the current practice of scanning relatively few containers once they arrive on 

shore. 

Could you reasonably scan more containers, using a risk-based approach? 

Answer. As previously reported, DHS implemented both full-scale and limited-capacity deployments of integrated scanning systems in foreign ports under its Secure 

Freight Initiative (SFI). Due to challenges identified during the initiative’s pilot program, all operations, with the exception of Port Qasim, Pakistan, have reverted from 

the 100 percent scanning model to the risk-based targeting approach of the Container Security Initiative (CSI) program to optimize results through advanced analysis of manifest data and identification of high-risk cargo. 

As noted in 20 previous reports titled Update on Integrated Scanning System 

Pilot,1 initial SFI operations at pilot locations afforded DHS the opportunity to test 

possible solutions to the complex challenges posed by scanning 100 percent of U.S.- 

bound maritime containers, particularly at transshipment and high-volume ports. It 

was determined that while scan data can be useful, operational costs are significant 

even in limited environments. DHS documented numerous challenges associated 

with implementing 100 percent scanning, including diplomatic and operational challenges, port reconfiguration issues, the potential for reciprocal requirements on 

United States ports, and the lack of available technology to efficiently scan transshipped cargo. 

The DHS recognizes the need to proceed with container security programs in a 

responsible, practical manner that maximizes the security of maritime cargo, as well 

as facilitating its movement and enhancing global supply chain resilience. 

CBP is committed to a risk-based approach to cargo security. In fiscal year 2017 

less than one-half of 1 percent of maritime containerized cargo was determined to 

be high-risk using the Automated Targeting System (ATS). CBP scans all containers 

identified as high-risk and also scans a significant number at random. Scanning 

more containers would put an undue burden on CBP and foreign government resources without adding any additional security. 

CBP continues to refine and improve its targeting for potentially high-risk cargo 

in all modes of transportation. As part of this process, in May 2017, CBP introduced 

a new risk assessment methodology for maritime cargo. The risk assessment methodology is based on the latest available intelligence and incorporates scenarios and 

54 

anomaly detection capabilities. All available advance data, including manifest, importer security filing, and entry, are assessed for risk through ATS, which is one 

of the most advanced targeting systems in the world. 

With the implementation of the new methodology, there has been a reduction in 

the number of high-risk shipments identified, but an increase in overall confidence 

that CBP is targeting the right shipments for further scrutiny. 

The maritime shipping environment is large, complex, and includes a host of private and public sector stakeholders. To be successful, we will need to continue to 

seek models for scanning and other supply chain resilience solutions that make 

sense for industry stakeholders to incorporate into their business processes, and 

from which other governments can also realize value. 

Question 14b. Of the 3–4 percent of containers that you do scan, how often do you 

find contraband like illicit drugs or weapons? 

Answer. As part of CBP’s Container Security Initiative, CBP officers are stationed 

in foreign seaports to work together with their host counterparts to share information, develop investigative leads on potential threats, and identify and examine 

high-risk shipments. During fiscal year 2017, collaborative targeting efforts between 

Container Security Initiative CBP officers and their foreign counterparts resulted in 

the detection and seizure of approximately 15,200 kilograms (16.75 tons) of cocaine, 

$41.5 million in undeclared merchandise, 18 stolen vehicles, $96,000 in undeclared 

currency, and 11 arrests. 

CBP officers in overseas locations do not seize prohibited items, but rather the 

host country authorities make a determination on the disposition of illicit goods. 

CBP officers in foreign locations have been instrumental in assisting their counterparts in disrupting and dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations and effecting controlled deliveries, which have led to arrests of those involved in illicit activity. 

Question 14c. Through partnerships, such as the Container Security Initiative, 

what percentage of high-risk cargo is scanned overseas? 

Answer. Approximately 82 percent of all high-risk cargo passes through a CSI 

port. One hundred percent of that cargo is reviewed, researched, and either mitigated or examined (scanned or physical examination) by CBP officers in conjunction 

with foreign counterparts. 

CBP has a dedicated team of CBP officers at the National Targeting Center (NTC) 

that reviews the approximately 18 percent of high-risk cargo that does not originate 

in a CSI port prior to that cargo leaving the foreign port. The team will further research all potentially high-risk cargo and either mitigate the risk or explore other 

avenues to have the cargo examined. 

Question 15a. Commissioner McAleenan, there are currently 61 Container Security Initiative (CSI) ports in 35 countries. For a port to be considered part of CSI, 

CBP officers do not necessarily have to be present at that port. 

Is CBP considering adding more CSI ports? If so, will they have CBP personnel 

on-site, or utilize a regional model of cooperation, like in Italy, where one CBP officer has relationships with multiple ports in the country? 

Answer. CSI is always exploring opportunities to expand to additional locations. 

When considering any possible expansion, some of the factors which are considered 

are: Potential risk from certain locations, political will of the host government, regular recurring container volume to the United States, the type of technology utilized 

by the host government (such as non-intrusive inspection equipment), and/or their 

ability to procure such. 

When expanding into a new location, CSI would, at least initially, have CSI staff 

on-site in order to develop and enhance the working relationship with host counterparts. At such a time when CSI feels a level of confidence in the commitment, relationship, and responsiveness of the host counterparts, CSI could then explore the 

feasibility of adapting the operational model to a remote or regional targeting model. 

Question 15b. How does CBP vet foreign customs officers tasked with scanning 

containers that are cause for concern? 

Answer. CBP is prohibited from vetting foreign customs officers with whom they 

work in foreign locations due to sovereignty concerns. In the vast majority of CSI 

ports, CBP officers do, however, actively participate in the scanning and examination process in conjunction with the host country counterparts. This close cooperative working relationship allows CBP officers to identify any potential anomalies 

during the scanning process. 

CBP has provided and continues to provide training to foreign counterparts in 

areas such as anomaly detection to increase capability of the foreign counterparts. 

Question 15c. Have there been instances of corruption in foreign work forces at 

CSI ports? 

55 

Answer. CBP is unaware of any instance of corruption in foreign work forces at 

CSI ports. The port authorities, local law enforcement, and the terminal operators 

with whom CSI engages have steps in place to mitigate or thwart potential corruption in the seaport environment. Such steps include access controls, vetting of personnel with port access, CCTV camera systems CSI personnel can access, roving patrols, and the use of GPS devices on vehicles entering port facilities. 

Question 16a. Commissioner McAleenan, we are currently giving suppliers expedited screening privileges when they can prove they take steps to secure their supply chain under CBP’s C–TPAT program. 

What percentage of U.S.-bound cargo originates from a C–TPAT member? 

Answer. Twelve different entity types are eligible for C–TPAT certification. These 

entity types include, among others; importers, exporters, highway carriers, sea carriers, and U.S. Customs brokers. Of these 12 entities, U.S. importers are the largest 

entity, accounting for 4,139 of the 11,562 certified members. The importers represent 54.1 percent of all cargo imported into the United States. 

Question 16b. Has CBP had incidents where C–TPAT suppliers falsify information 

or abuse the system? What are the consequences for doing so? 

Answer. The C–TPAT program was codified into law by the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006. This law imposed strict oversight requirements, including requiring C–TPAT to suspend or remove program benefits/membership from any Partner that fails to meet program requirements. Reasons for suspending/removing a partner include, but are not limited to, the following: Failure 

to meet the minimum security criteria; failure to meet eligibility requirements; failure to comply with other rules, laws, and regulations; and security breaches resulting in an enforcement action. 

Typically, each suspension, removal, or determination of ineligibility is preceded 

by extensive outreach efforts in order to provide Partners with the opportunity to 

demonstrate compliance with program requirements. In 2017, CTPAT suspended 32 

partners and removed 118, for a total of 135 suspension and removal actions. In addition, subsequent to suspending/removing a partner, additional outreach efforts are 

conducted to help the Partner address the gaps, vulnerabilities, or weaknesses that 

led to the suspension, removal, or ineligibility determination. These efforts aim to 

help the Partner move toward reinstatement. However, in accordance with the 

SAFE Port Act of 2006, cases involving a potential threat to National security, or 

situations involving false/misleading information, may require immediate action to 

suspend or remove a Partner. 

Question 16c. A common concern from industry, is that they often do not perceive 

tangible benefits from participation in the C–TPAT program. Are you considering 

any additional benefits that can be applied to members of the program? 

Answer. CBP affords tangible trade facilitation benefits to C–TPAT members to 

recognize their demonstrated commitment to adopt stronger security practices 

throughout their international supply chains. C–TPAT membership has value that 

exceeds dollars and cents. The benefits of program membership includes risk avoidance, a communal approach to a safer supply chain, and the advantage of the credibility that C–TPAT membership brings. The C–TPAT benefits package has increased over the years, and the program continues to explore additional benefits 

with the trade community. 

The program is also focusing on executing the Trusted Trader strategy, which was 

developed in cooperation with the Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee (COAC). Under the strategy, C–TPAT is working to transition the current 

Importer Self-Assessment (ISA) Program into CTPAT Trade Compliance by the end 

of fiscal year 2018. This transition will create the United States’ equivalent of an 

Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) that addresses both security and Customs 

trade compliance. As part of this effort, C–TPAT is working with Trusted Trader 

stakeholders to test over 30 benefits and measure their impact. The ultimate goal 

is for members to be able to document their return on investment and quantify the 

value for their participation in the program. 

Additionally, in an effort to combat Importer Identification (ID) theft and provide 

a new benefit to C–TPAT importers, the National Targeting Center’s (NTC) Tactical 

Trade Targeting Unit (T3U), Cargo and Conveyance Security (CCS), and the CTPAT 

program have developed a multilevel approach to protect C–TPAT participants from 

exploitation of ID theft. They have created a notification and verification system 

within CBP’s automated system. The identification of anomalies can represent a legitimate business change or vulnerability within the importer’s supply chain and 

serve as an ‘‘ID monitoring’’ tool. 

CBP is also in the process of fully implementing the Advanced Qualified Unlading 

Approval Lane pilot, or AQUA lane, at most major U.S. seaports. AQUA Lane is 

an effort to cut down on costs for the trade and better manage the CBP workforce 

56 

by focusing resources on high-risk sea carriers. Currently, AQUA Lane is in a pilot 

phase at 20 U.S. seaports. 

C–TPAT has signed 11 mutual recognition arrangements (MRA) with the following countries/AEO programs: New Zealand, Canada, Singapore, Mexico, Dominican Republic, European Union (EU), Japan, Korea, Israel, Jordan, and Taiwan. C– 

TPAT is also expanding its MRAs to include incentives for C–TPAT members exporting to those nations. Currently, benefits are afforded to CTPAT members exporting to Canada, Mexico, Singapore, Israel, the European Union, and Japan. 

C–TPAT is currently working with South Korea and New Zealand to incorporate 

export incentives through the MRA and will be looking to do the same, in the future, with the remaining MRA partners, Taiwan, Dominican Republic, and Jordan. 

Question 17. Commissioner McAleenan, the House passed H.R. 3551, the C–TPAT 

Reauthorization Act of 2017 back in October. The bill reauthorizes the cargo prevetting program for the first time in 11 years to ensure that the program is ready 

to meet the dynamic threats currently facing the global supply chain and that C– 

TPAT participants receive tangible benefits for their partnership with CBP. Knowing you cannot officially endorse, would you say CBP generally supports the measures within and intent of this bill? 

Answer. C–TPAT has been an integral part of the CBP mission for over 15 years. 

The program is currently undertaking major efforts to modernize its approach so as 

to best respond to the threats facing the current trade landscape. The measures 

within the bill and the intent of the bill will allow C–TPAT to evolve into the program it needs to be today and CBP generally supports both the measures within 

and intent of this bill. 

Question 18a. Commissioner McAleenan, 10 + 2 data and cargo manifests are currently transmitted to the National Targeting Center for vetting by CBP officers before cargo is bound for the United States. Through that information, CBP determines if a shipment is considered high-risk. 

Can you discuss what triggers a container being designated as ‘‘high-risk’’? 

Answer. The National Targeting Center (NTC) is an integral part of CBP’s layered security strategy and works closely with Container Security Initiative (CSI) 

targeters stationed overseas as well as domestic-based targeters located at our many 

ports of entry (POE) to identify and mitigate high-risk cargo and conveyances prior 

to its arrival in the United States. The strategy is highly reliant on advance electronic data (AED) and CBP’s Automated Targeting System. 

In the maritime environment, CBP receives manifests and importer security filings 24 hours prior to loading of U.S.-bound vessels. CBP also receives container 

status messages within 24 hours of creation, or receipt, within a carrier’s tracking 

system, and vessel stow plans either 48 hours after departure of the last foreign 

port, or any time prior to arrival for short hauls. The data is fed into ATS where 

it is automatically risk-assessed and made available for additional targeting by 

thousands of users throughout CBP as well as the broader DHS community. 

As part of the automatic risk-assessment process, the NTC has developed a set 

of targeting models that judge conditional risk factors based on current intelligence 

on smuggling pathways. The data is periodically updated and methodology refreshed 

to ensure a robust, up-to-date, well-sourced approach to identify high-risk shipments. An analyst can modify and deploy risk factors into the targeting modules as 

intelligence is received to rapidly address and target changing threats. 

ATS also compares containers declared on vessel stow plans to containers that 

have been declared on manifests in order to identify arriving containers that are not 

manifested. Each year, CBP identifies thousands of these potentially unmanifested 

containers prior to arrival, which gives CBP time to contact the carrier and mitigate 

the issue. 

Question 18b. Have there been instances of shippers falsifying 10+2 data or using 

vague information to mask a shipment’s true contents? And if so, how many? 

Answer. There is no doubt that this occurs, since falsifying customs and other 

supply chain documentation is a time-honored tradition amongst smugglers. However, the NTC is not aware of any entity or system within CBP that regularly 

records these type of metrics in a way that can be easily retrieved and analyzed. 

Please see the additional background information provided below. 

The targeting, examination, and seizure process is very transactional and the 

focus is on the merchandise and violation itself (e.g., ‘‘smuggling’’ or ‘‘counterfeit 

goods’’), rather than recording the precise underlying reason a shipment was targeted (e.g., the consignee on the importer security filing did not match the consignee 

on the manifest). While the official seizure narrative may provide more details regarding why a shipment was targeted, these underlying reasons are often listed in 

the text field in the Seized Asset and Case Tracking System (SEACATS), which 

makes retrieving the exact metrics extremely burdensome and time-consuming. 

57 

2 BAPLIE is a widely used UN/EDIFACT message in the shipping industry. It is used by and 

between various parties to advise the exact stowage positions of cargo on an ocean vessel. 

Question 18c. Are there any other data points you think CBP should include in 

10+2 data collection? 

Answer. As technology continues to progress, CBP may want to incentivize the 

supply chain community to provide scanned copies of their purchase orders, invoices, packing lists, and even digital pictures of their merchandise and the smallest 

external packing materials as early as practicable. This would allow CBP officials 

to conduct a ‘‘virtual examination’’ before goods are placed on a U.S.-bound vessel. 

CBP has requested that the carrier community provide the following data on a 

voluntary basis in order to perform targeting and compliance operations more efficiently and effectively: 

• Each carrier’s global container status message (CSM) feed. (Will help with 

coast-wide and outbound targeting and tracking) 

• Each carrier’s global vessel stow plans (BAPLIE)2 feed. (Will help with coastwide and outbound targeting and tracking) 

• Electronic copies of all vessel documentation to include: 

• Registry/Certificate of Nationality 

• Tonnage Certificate 

• Certificate of Financial Responsibility 

• Certificate of Financial Responsibility (Alternate) 

• Continuous Synopsis Record 

• Safety Construction Certificate 

• Safety Equipment Certificate 

• Radio Certificate 

• Dangerous Goods Compliance 

• Ship Security 

• Safety Management Certificate 

• Load Line Certificate 

Question 18d. How does CBP measure the effectiveness of its algorithm that determines whether a shipment is ‘‘high-risk’’ or not? 

Answer. The NTC reviews results from enforcement operations and current intelligence to judge efficacy. With rapidly-changing threat streams, CBP leverages both 

domestic and international partners to rapidly deploy targeting rules and models 

that address current threats. Feedback from the field, the trade community, law enforcement agencies, and data analytics are also considered. The research is shared 

throughout the CBP Intelligence Enterprise and reviewed for validation against 

Classified materials. 

Question 19a. Commissioner McAleenan, a viable biometric exit system to track 

visa overstays has been a statutory mandate for over a decade. What is the current 

time line for the implementation of a full biometric exit system at all U.S. international airports? 

Answer. Since receiving the mission in 2013, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) advanced an entry/exit strategy by conducting a series of pilot programs and 

technical demonstrations, which resulted in CBP developing a realistic and achievable biometric exit plan. CBP has: 

• Deployed demonstrations to 8 airports across the Nation; 

• Facilitated pilot programs with 3 airlines and 1 airport to integrate biometrics 

with the airline boarding process; 

• Transformed the entry process for certain flights at 7 airports, including 

PreClearance locations; 

• Facilitated a pilot program with one cruise line for biometric disembarkation; 

• Launched a facial matching pilot with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at a security checkpoint as a proof of concept for enhancing the travel experience; 

• Enabled mobile devices to collect biometrics; and 

• Solidified plans to deploy facial recognition technology in the land border vehicle and pedestrian environments. 

These tests have assisted in defining the technical architecture for the end-state 

solution. CBP’s Traveler Verification System (TVS) uses biographic data from the 

passenger manifest and previously-collected photos contained in Government databases to perform facial matching on-site to verify a traveler’s identity. In early 2018, 

CBP completed the TVS and remains committed to partnerships with all airlines 

and airports across the United States. CBP is working toward full implementation 

of biometric exit in the air environment within the next 4 years to account for over 

97 percent of departing commercial air travelers from the United States. 

58 

CBP is leveraging advances in technology from the biometric exit solution to 

transform the entry process by using facial photographs to identify travelers. This 

innovative approach uses the traveler’s face to unlock their electronic travel record, 

in turn providing an immediate facilitative benefit, while at the same time 

leveraging previously-collected fingerprints to run applicable law enforcement 

checks in the background. CBP is piloting this concept at 7 airports, to demonstrate 

that facial recognition technology facilitates frictionless travel by reducing inspection time and creating an improved customer experience for the traveling public. 

Question 19b. Is biometric exit finally something that is going to be accomplished? 

Answer. CBP’s partnership with stakeholders is critical to accomplish implementation of a biometric entry/exit system. CBP is committed to a process that meets 

the needs of all stakeholders to fulfil the biometric entry-exit mandate. CBP’s primary responsibility is to facilitate legitimate trade and travel. CBP employees are 

working diligently to ensure stakeholders—travelers, airline authorities, air carriers, and other industry partners—are able to navigate these changes seamlessly 

and with the least amount of disruption to our economy. 

If CBP were to deploy a Government-only solution, without stakeholder input and 

support, cumbersome layers would be added to existing travel processes which, in 

turn, would have adverse effects on travel as a whole. Travelers would spend additional time going through security and/or boarding processes. Additionally, significant enhancements and modifications would be necessary to manage the expected 

increase in air travel. 

CBP is cognizant of limitations posed by existing infrastructure. As a whole, operationally, there are significant differences between the air, land, and sea environments. Each environment will require a different strategy and method of implementation. CBP is currently conducting field tests in the land and sea environments to 

validate technology and operational processes to inform strategy and planning activities going forward. 

Enactment of the fiscal year Consolidated Appropriations Act authorizes funding 

for a biometric exit program of up to $1 billion to be collected in fees on H–1B and 

L–1 applications over a period of up to 10 years. Based on actual collections in fiscal 

year 2016, fiscal year 2017, and fiscal year 2018, the current 10-year projection for 

fee fund collections is $585 million. CBP continues to closely monitor fee collections 

to ensure that there are adequate resources to meet this mandate. 

Question 20. Commissioner McAleenan, CBP recently enacted a process to allocate 

and prioritize AMO flight hours across various operational needs within CBP and 

DHS. There is a significant gap between funded hours of about 95,000 compared to 

the Border Patrol requirement of about 220,000. Do you support the use of contractual air support to fill this gap? 

Answer. CBP is exploring a number of potential opportunities to increase its situational awareness, close the gap in air support, and increase law enforcement presence. We believe the 52 initiatives contained within the Border Security Improvement Plan address these gaps through additional investments in U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection infrastructure and personnel. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER FILEMON VELA FOR KEVIN K. MCALEENAN

Question 1. During the hearing you stated that CBP has a prioritized list of port 

of entry infrastructure improvements developed in partnership with GSA, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Commerce, and international partners. Please provide the committee with this prioritized list. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. Attrition is a significant problem for CBP as a whole and given that 

the component has not been able to meet the minimum staffing level for CBPOs 

over several years, I am concerned that CBP may not be doing enough to keep the 

workforce it currently has. Please explain what is driving OFO’s attrition rate. 

Answer. The CBP officer (CBPO) attrition rate is based on retirements, separations, and series losses. It counts CBPOs who leave CBP or leave the 1895 series 

and therefore represents true attrition to the CBPO population. The CBPO attrition 

rates have historically been in the range of 3 percent to 3.5 percent. This attrition 

rate is considered low. 

For fiscal year Year-to-date (pay period ending April 28, 2018), we have seen the 

attrition rate for CBPOs increase to 4.2 percent from the 3.3 percent seen through 

the same pay period in fiscal year 2017. This is largely attributed to a spike in retirements. OFO has experienced 35 percent more retirements this year compared to 

the same time frame last year. CBP monitors attrition rates throughout the fiscal 

year and strives to close the staffing gap between our onboard and our authorized 

59 

staffing levels regardless of whether the gap is new, positions yet to be filled, or 

backfills due to attrition. 

Question 3. In recent years, Border Patrol has lost hundreds more agents each 

year than it has been able to hire. What steps is CBP taking to increase its retention of qualified Border Patrol agents? 

Answer. CBP’s Office of Human Resources Management (HRM) is engaged with 

U.S. Border Patrol and other CBP operational components to advise and inform decision makers of appropriate attrition mitigation strategies. CBP is assessing funding requirements and prioritizing incentives that will have the greatest impact in 

retaining the workforce. 

Engaging in open conversation with employees and their families will enable CBP 

to identify factors leading to job satisfaction, quality of life, and other issues influencing attrition. We are also developing a CBP-wide Exit Survey. The exit survey 

results will allow the agency to better understand the causes of attrition with the 

goal of improving retention. 

Last, CBP established the Workforce Resilience and Engagement Division within 

HRM, which is dedicated to identifying and promoting programs and initiatives to 

enhance work-life balance for employees and their families, and to address issues 

like affordable and available child care in remote locations, employee and family 

health and wellness, and the impact of working in high-stress environments. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE MIKE ROGERS FOR KEVIN K. MCALEENAN

Question 1. Since April 2017 apprehensions on the Southwest Border have been 

on a steady rise. What new operations or policies, if any, have you put in place to 

try to deter or address the rise in apprehensions and illegal crossings? 

Answer. The U.S. Border Patrol has initiated several operations in an effort to 

decrease the flow of illegal entries into the United States via the Southern Border 

with Mexico. These initiatives and operations include planning aimed at returning 

agents to border security missions, enhancing situational awareness reporting, and 

decreasing ‘‘pull factors’’ for those entering the United States from countries other 

than Mexico. These initiatives and operations are the Zero Tolerance Prosecution, 

Operation Guardian Support, and Operation Department of Interior Support. 

Zero Tolerance is an initiative aimed at criminally prosecuting 100 percent of 

those entering the United States illegally between the ports of entry. USBP is working with the Assistant U.S. Attorneys across the Southwest Border to successfully 

implement this initiative. 

The Zero Tolerance Prosecution Initiative continues to be implemented in accordance with the President’s June 20, 2018 Executive Order titled Affording Congress 

an Opportunity to Address Family Separation. The Executive Order clearly directs 

USBP to enforce this and other criminal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act until and unless Congress directs otherwise. It also directs USBP to maintain family unity, including by detaining alien families together where appropriate 

and consistent with law and available resources. 

Operation Guardian Support is an initiative to use National Guard personnel for 

support in non-enforcement operations to increase the numbers of agents working 

border security operations. This effort places qualified National Guard troops in duties as camera operators, mechanics, construction efforts, and in helicopters to increase enforcement efficiency. National Guard troops will not be used in any enforcement activities. 

Operation Department of Interior Support is a collaborative effort where additional Law Enforcement Officers from the Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park 

Service, and Bureau of Land Management are working routine enforcement activities in Federal Lands that fall within the border areas aimed to improve overall border security. Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, Del Rio, and Rio Grande Valley Sectors are 

closely coordinating with DOI for this operation. This increase in DOI enforcement 

support also enhances USBP situational awareness reporting capabilities. 

Question 2a. On April 5, 2018, The Washington Times published an article regarding how the Border Patrol is deploying its manpower resources on the Southwest 

Border, specifically at the McAllen, Texas Station. (https://m.washingtontimes.com/ 

news/2018/apr/5/border-patrol-agents-stuck-desk-duty-amid-trump-ca/) 

What is the percentage of agents, out of those that are on duty, that are actually 

assigned to patrol the border on a daily basis in a ‘‘zone’’ that is along the border 

(broken down by station and sector)? 

Answer. The percentage of agents assigned to patrol the border on a daily basis 

are broken down by stations with border zones in the Rio Grande Valley Sector are 

stated below. As stated in the response to question No. 10, the lower percentages 

in certain zones is due to certain terrain challenges and accessibility issues. Our 

60 

border enforcement posture will not always be at the immediate border, but within 

a reasonable distance where the Border Patrol can perform its law enforcement/ 

interdiction duties. • Brownsville–63 percent • Fort Brown–68 percent • Harlingen–32 percent • McAllen–69 percent • Rio Grande City–79 percent • Weslaco–64 percent 

Question 2b. Additionally, what was the percentage of agents, out of those that 

were on duty, that were actually assigned to patrol the border on a daily basis in 

a ‘‘zone’’ that is along the border for the month of March 2018, including on the date 

in question in The Washington Times story (also broken down by station and sector)? 

Answer. The percentage of agents assigned to patrol border duties on a daily basis 

for the month of March broken down by stations with border zones in the Rio 

Grande Valley Sector are stated below. 

• Brownsville–63 percent 

• Fort Brown–68 percent 

• Harlingen–32 percent 

• McAllen–69 percent 

• Rio Grande City–79 percent 

• Weslaco–64 percent 

On March 18, 2018 agents assigned to patrol border duties broken down by stations with border zones in the Rio Grande Valley Sector are stated below. 

• Brownsville–82 percent 

• Fort Brown–82 percent 

• Harlingen–44 percent 

• McAllen–62 percent 

• Rio Grande City–77 percent 

• Weslaco–71 percent 

Question 3. As the deputy commissioner, acting commissioner, and now commissioner, you’ve overseen a workforce attrition rate among agents in the Border Patrol 

greater than any other since the early 2000’s. What steps have you taken or do you 

intend to take, besides the operational mobility program, to address this significant 

problem? 

Answer. CBP will continue to use its operational mobility program to address attrition, and will continues to look for new approaches to improve attrition rates for 

mission essential competencies. CBP is also working to make improvements to its 

hiring process so that attrition of seasoned agents is less of an issue than it is currently. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE LOU BARLETTA FOR KEVIN K. MCALEENAN

Question 1. Commissioner MacAleenan, the CBP is requesting $33.25 billion in 

funding, approximately $18 billion of which would be allocated for 722 miles of border wall, 316 of which is new. 

Can you detail the problems with our current border infrastructure, and explain 

why replacing, expanding, and enhancing it is vital to the National security of the 

United States? 

Answer. In certain areas of the border, the border barrier has been in place for 

many years and the effects of aging, along with numerous incidents of breaching 

and patching, have diminished their effectiveness over time. Barriers are integral 

to achieving the requisite level of impedance and denial needed to establish operational control of the border and operational control is an essential element of a safe 

and secure border. Replacing, expanding, and enhancing border barrier will increase 

the Border Patrol’s ability to impede and deny illegal activity at the border, effect 

a proper law enforcement response, and bring border incursions to an appropriate 

resolution. These activities are essential to both the border and National security 

of the United States. 

Question 2a. While I support the President’s plan of building a wall along our 

Southern Border, I also recognize this alone will not stop illegal immigration. Approximately 40 percent of illegal aliens in the United States are here because they 

overstayed their visa. 

How close are we to fully putting in place a biometric entry/exit system as outlined in the 9/11 commission report? 

Answer. Since receiving the mission in 2013, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) advanced an entry/exit strategy by conducting a series of pilot programs and 

61 

technical demonstrations, which resulted in CBP developing a realistic and achievable biometric exit plan. CBP has: • Deployed demonstrations to 8 airports across the Nation; • Facilitated pilot programs with 3 airlines and 1 airport to integrate biometrics 

with the airline boarding process; • Transformed the entry process for certain flights at 11 airports, including 

PreClearance locations; • Facilitated a pilot program with one cruise line for biometric disembarkation; • Launched a facial matching pilot with the Transportation Security Administration at a security checkpoint as a proof of concept for enhancing the travel experience: • Enabled mobile devices to collect biometrics; and • Solidified plans and began deploying handheld mobile devices to collect biometrics and verify identity in the land border vehicle and pedestrian environments. 

These tests have assisted in defining the technical architecture for the end-state 

solution. CBP’s Traveler Verification System (TVS) uses biographic data from the 

passenger manifest and previously collected photos contained in Government databases to perform facial matching on-site to verify a traveler’s identity. In early 2018, 

CBP completed the TVS and remains committed to partnerships with all airlines 

and airports across the United States. CBP is working toward full implementation 

of biometric exit in the air environment within the next 4 years to account for over 

97 percent of departing commercial air travelers from the United States. 

CBP is leveraging advances in technology from the biometric exit solution to 

transform the entry process by using facial photographs to identify travelers. This 

new innovative approach uses the traveler’s face to unlock their electronic travel 

record, in turn providing an immediate facilitative benefit, while at the same time 

leveraging previously collected fingerprints to run applicable law enforcement 

checks in the background. CBP is piloting this concept at 7 airports to demonstrate 

that facial recognition technology facilitates frictionless travel by reducing inspection time and creating an improved customer experience for the traveling public. 

Question 2b. Can you explain what obstacles we are facing that have delayed its 

implementation? 

Answer. CBP’s partnership with stakeholders is critical to accomplish implementation of a biometric entry/exit system. CBP is committed to a process that meets 

the needs of all stakeholders to fulfill the biometric entry-exit mandate. CBP’s primary responsibility is to facilitate legitimate trade and travel. CBP employees are 

working diligently to ensure stakeholders—travelers, airline authorities, air carriers, and other industry partners—are able to navigate these changes seamlessly 

and with the least amount of disruption to our economy. 

If CBP were to deploy a Government-only solution, without stakeholder input and 

support, cumbersome layers would be added to existing travel processes which, in 

turn, would have an adverse effect on travel as a whole. Travelers would spend additional time going through security and/or boarding processes. Additionallly, significant enhancements and modifications would be necessary to manage the expected increase in air travel. CBP is cognizant of limitations posed by existing infrastructure. As a whole, operationally, there are significant differences among the air, 

land, and sea environments. Each will require a different strategy and method of 

implementation. CBP is currently conducting field tests in the land and sea environments to validate the technology and operational processes to inform strategy and 

planning activities going forward. 

The Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act authorizes funding for a 

biometric exit program of up to $1 billion to be collected through fee surcharges over 

a period of up to 10 years. Based on actual collections in fiscal year 2016, fiscal year 

2017, and fiscal year 2018, the current 10-year projection for fee fund collections is 

$585 million. CBP continues to closely monitor fee collections to ensure that there 

are adequate resources to meet this mandate. 

Question 3a. Commissioner, can you explain how the current hiring process for 

Border Patrol agents prevents CBP from being properly staffed? 

Answer. All BPAs undergo a rigorous, multi-step pre-employment process that 

evaluates them for a range of distinct qualities and skills. Finding the right people, 

the most trustworthy and capable of American citizens, to join us on the front line 

is one of the most crucial functions of the agency and one of our greatest challenges. 

CBP’s rigorous process ensures only the best qualified applicants are hired, and includes an entrance exam, interview, medical test, polygraph examination, background investigation and physical fitness test. Because CBP’s recruiting and hiring 

processes are complex, they require significant investment to meet the agency’s hiring goals. 

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Question 3b. What are the biggest challenges you face in the hiring process and 

what do you think must be changed? 

Answer. CBP is committed to improving its pre-employment hiring process 

through continuous evaluation, analysis, and refinement of its practices. While 

many modifications to CBP’s hiring process are considered, we carefully weigh all 

risks and risk mitigation measures to ensure the agency’s high standards of integrity remain uncompromised. 

In the last 2 years, numerous refinements have streamlined CBP’s front-line hiring process and led to reductions in the average time-to-hire. This has directly contributed to reducing the number of otherwise qualified candidates who drop from 

the hiring process due to process fatigue or accept more timely job offers elsewhere. 

In January 2016, CBP required approximately 195 applicants for one BPA to enter 

on duty. Today, CBP only requires on average 52 applicants for every one BPA hire. 

CBP continues to develop and implement initiatives designed to attract applicants 

suited to the unique CBP mission demands, expedite the pre-employment time line, 

and refine the hiring process. Of the 11 steps in CBP’s hiring process, the polygraph 

phase continues to see the highest combined failure and discontinuation rates. CBP 

is actively focusing on increasing capacity in this area. 

CBP supports the Anti-Border Corruption Reauthorization Act of 2017 (H.R. 2213 

in the House of Representatives and S. 595 in the Senate). The House passed H.R. 

2213 on June 7, 2017, thanks to the strong support of this subcommittee and the 

co-sponsorship of Chairwoman McSally. This legislation would grant CBP authority 

to waive the polygraph requirement for three groups of applicants who demonstrated long-standing histories of public trust and meet specific criteria: Current, 

full-time State and local law enforcement officers; current, full-time Federal law enforcement officers; and veterans, active-duty service members, and reservists. CBP 

thanks Members of Congress for your continued support as we seek to hire women 

and men to fulfill CBP’s complex and crucial missions in the months and years to 

come. Question 4a. A great deal of media coverage has been centered on the ‘‘caravan’’ 

of men, women, and children approaching the Southern Border in hopes of entering 

the United States from Honduras. Most of these individuals would likely try to 

enter the country by seeking asylum, the backlog of which is extensive and susceptible to fraud. 

Do you believe that our asylum process, specifically, the credible fear standard 

has to be improved? 

Answer. Under section 235(b)(1)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the 

term ‘‘credible fear of persecution’’ means that there is a ‘‘significant possibility’’ 

that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum. In assessing whether this standard has been met, an officer must take into account the credibility of the statements 

made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known 

to the officer. The standard is lower than the standard required for asylum itself; 

the latter requires proof of either ‘‘past persecution’’ or ‘‘well-founded fear of persecution.’’ Currently, between 80 and 90 percent of applicants are found to have a 

credible fear of persecution or torture. 

In its list of Immigration Principles and Policies released last year, the White 

House stated that, as part of its push for asylum reform, it sought to ‘‘[e]levate the 

threshold standard of proof in credible fear interviews.’’ The Department acknowledges the importance such a proposal would have in deterring fraud in the asylum 

process and is supportive of the measure. 

Question 4b. What additional resources, such as immigration judges, are necessary to be able to quickly and efficiently process these individuals when they arrive at the border? 

Answer. A greater presence on the part of asylum officer staff is also necessary, 

given the challenges we currently face in the asylum process. In fact, in response 

to the President’s Executive Order 13767 entitled ‘‘Border Security and Immigration 

Enforcement Improvements,’’ the Department has already increased USCIS asylumofficer deployments to a larger number of Southwest Border detention facilities. Up 

to 60 asylum officers are currently deployed at 10 detention centers along the border. Regarding additional immigration judges, DHS defers to the Department of 

Justice. 

Additional prosecutorial resources are also needed. The Department recently announced it would begin referring more cases where individuals have entered illegally between Ports of Entry for prosecution by the Justice Department. The cooperative effort is one the Department completely supports as an important deterrent 

against frivolous asylum cases. 

Further, the Department has returned to a ‘‘last in, first out’’ interview schedule, 

which will allow USCIS to focus quickly on those applications that should be apVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:00 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18BM0425\18BM0425.TXT HEATH
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proved while also identifying frivolous, fraudulent, or otherwise non-meritorious 

asylum claims earlier and quickly place those individuals into removal proceedings. 

Last in/first out asylum-application processing was first established by the asylum 

reforms of 1995 and was used for 20 years until 2014. The aim then, as now, was 

to deter those who might try to use a backlog as a means to obtain employment 

authorization and build equities in the United States. 

Question 5a. When was the assessment completed that identified deployment of 

the National Guard as necessary? 

Answer. On April 4, 2018, the President of the United States sent a mission directive to DoD specifying that DoD would assist DHS with operational support personnel and air support. At this time, DHS began to coordinate with DoD on mission 

directives that could assist the overall mission of CBP in securing our borders. 

Question 5b. What factors or criteria were used to determine this approach would 

be the most effective and cost-efficient alternative? 

Answer. As soon as the Presidential Directive was given to Department of Defense, the Border Patrol began its planning process by referencing its fiscal year capabilities gap assessment document and its list of air requirements that Air and 

Marine Operations was unable to meet in fiscal year 2018. These areas were identified as support missions that the Department of Defense and National Guard could 

immediately fill given the limited scope of the Operation Guardian Support. 

Question 5c. Did you recommend such a deployment and were you aware of the 

President’s plan regarding the National Guard prior to his announcement earlier 

this month? 

Answer. While the United States Border Patrol has a long working relationship 

with the National Guard and Department of Defense, this specific Operation was 

not pre-coordinated prior to April 4, 2018. The Border Patrol was not aware of the 

President’s plan until he made his proclamation on April 4, 2018. 

Question 7. How does this deployment impact the U.S. Border Patrol’s overall border security strategy? 

Answer. CBP has identified operational support positions where National Guard 

Personnel can assist that will allow Border Patrol agents to return to border enforcement activities between the ports of entries. This will allow CBP personnel to 

return to their primary roles as law enforcement officers. 

As more agents return to the border along with the additional 12,000 hours of air 

support, CBP will gain a greater amount of situational awareness along the Southwest Border. This will enhance the Border Patrol’s ability to impede and deny illegal 

border crossing and apply the appropriate law enforcement response between the 

ports of entries. 

The increased situational awareness, impedance, denial, and appropriate law enforcement resolution are all elements of the Operational Control model for the U.S. 

Border Patrol. The readiness of personnel and equipment allows Border Patrol to 

execute the elements of Operational Control. 

Question 6a. Acting Deputy Commissioner Vitiello has mentioned the possibility 

of using National Guard personnel at ports of entry, specifically to assist with cargo 

inspections. 

Can you please tell us under what authority this would be allowed? 

Answer. National Guard personnel are authorized under title 32 of the U.S. Code, 

by request of the President of the United States, to conduct operations in support 

of Department of Homeland Security Southern Border security missions. 

Question 6b. Have National Guard personnel been assigned to ports of entry in 

the past? 

Answer. National Guard personnel have been assigned to ports of entry in the 

past, assisting with cargo operations and dismantling activities. Operation Jump 

Start, 2006–2010, and Operation Phalanx, 2012–2013, provided National Guard to 

assist at the ports of entry. For example, National Guard personnel assisted in preprimary inspections of vehicles on the land border, using portable contraband detectors (busters) and fiber optic scopes. They assisted in secondary inspections in the 

passenger and cargo environment in the land border, including cab checks. They 

searched vehicles, trucks, aircraft, and vessels. They unloaded, landed, and searched 

cargo shipments under the supervision of CBP officers in the air, land, and sea environment. They performed traffic control in seaport and land borders. They performed landed quantity verifications in the sea environment. They dismantled vehicles or cargo suspected or found to contain narcotics, and retrieved the packages of 

illegal substances under CBP officer supervision. They participated in narcotic 

transport activities. They performed counter-drug surveillance operations. The National Guard assistance was a valuable force-multiplier, allowing CBP personnel to 

inspect more and intercept more illegal shipments. 

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Question 6c. How they interact with general public and what guidance will be required to govern that interaction? 

Answer. Their duties will not bring National Guard members in contact with illegal immigrants/detainees, or persons presenting themselves for entry. National 

Guard members will have limited contact with the public related to their duties, 

e.g., GSA vehicle vendors/dealers, maintenance garages, and parts vendors. National 

Guard personnel will have limited contact with vehicle drivers for the purpose of 

ground guidance and directional movement of vehicles in designated controlled 

areas. Question 8a. Given that CBP does not have metrics in place to accurately measure 

the contributions of existing fencing and surveillance technology, how did CBP determine that it needs to heavily rely on its ‘‘impedance and denial’’ capabilities, 

seemingly at the expense of other capabilities? 

Answer. Since the construction of barriers, USBP has made significant operational gains in border security. Illicit drug and human smuggling activity have decreased in those areas where barrier is deployed, but illicit cross-border traffic has 

also shifted to areas with limited or no border barrier. This reduction and shift in 

traffic demonstrates the effectiveness of deploying physical barriers along the border 

as well as the need for more I&D infrastructure. 

Today’s border wall is a part of an integrated system that will deter and prevent 

illegal entries. The physical barriers are the backbone of an integrated Border Wall 

System that will include all-weather roads and lighting, as well as enforcement 

cameras and sensors and detection technology as well as adequately staffed agents 

to support that infrastructure. Future investments in Border Wall Systems, while 

rooted in I&D, will also include the integration of additional capabilities such as domain awareness and access & mobility to increase certainty of arrest, agent safety, 

and overall public safety. 

Question 8b. How, if at all, have the plans for the construction of the wall system 

affected plans for deployments of surveillance technologies along the Southwest Border? 

Answer. Both the Linear Ground Detection System (LGDS) and Remote Video 

Surveillance System (RVSS) Programs are part of the Border Wall System Program 

(BWSP) Integrated Product Team (IPT) to ensure efficient and effective deployment 

of surveillance technology as each wall segment is constructed. In addition, 

relocatable RVSS surveillance technology will be installed in certain areas where 

wall will be constructed instead of the planned fixed RVSS surveillance technology 

to provide current domain awareness capability in these locations and avoid costly 

relocation of fixed infrastructure if the exact location of fixed RVSS surveillance 

technology does not match the BWSP needs as each wall segment is designed. When 

each wall segment is constructed and fixed RVSS surveillance technology installed, 

the relocatable RVSS surveillance technology will be redeployed to another location. 

Question 9a. The border wall prototypes in San Diego have undergone a long period of testing and evaluation. What is the status of the results of this evaluation 

period? 

Answer. CBP constructed 8 border wall prototypes in San Diego County: 4 segments constructed of reinforced concrete and 4 segments constructed of alternate 

materials. The purpose of the prototypes was to explore additional border wall design attributes. CBP began testing the border wall prototypes in late November 

2017 and completed testing and evaluation in March 2018. Two of the most important testing criteria were how easily the wall can be scaled and how easily the wall 

can be breached. During the evaluation and assessment phase, CBP identified attributes from the prototypes that support Border Patrol’s operational criteria for 

possible addition to the existing border wall design toolkit. 

Question 9b. What are CBP’s anticipated next steps for this project? 

Answer. CBP has identified attributes from the prototypes and is currently working with a design firm to incorporate those attributes into the existing border wall 

design toolkit. 

Question 9c. How do you anticipate using these prototypes? 

Answer. The current plan is for the prototypes to remain in place along the current eastern terminus of the San Diego Secondary Wall. As the prototype location 

is part of the site of the fiscal year 2018 San Diego Secondary Wall, the long-term 

plan for the prototypes is still being determined. Once the design for the San Diego 

Secondary Wall is complete, CBP will be better-positioned to provide more information on the future of the prototypes. 

Question 10a. How has DHS estimated the costs associated with planned barrier 

segments? 

Answer. When CBP constructs border infrastructure and associated cost estimates, CBP evaluates each segment of the physical border against CBP border barVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:00 Oct 15, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18BM0425\18BM0425.TXT HEATH
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rier requirements. CBP carefully considers the unique operational requirements and 

terrain associated with each border segment to identify the border barrier solutions 

and supporting technology necessary to maximize effectiveness and provide situational awareness for the Border Patrol. CBP continues to refine cost estimates for 

the border wall program based on site-specific characteristics, including the environment, land acquisition, and terrain factors, as well as lessons learned from previous 

border wall construction. 

Question 10b. To what extent has DHS factored in the costs of land acquisition 

and terrain into those estimates? 

Answer. CBP continues to refine cost estimates for the border wall program based 

upon the terrain and land acquisition for each specific site. Each segment of the 

wall construction has varying requirements and associated real estate costs. CBP 

cannot yet determine the anticipated total costs to survey, appraise, and acquire any 

necessary real estate until rights of entry have been obtained, which will allow the 

Government and its contractors to go enter privately-owned property to conduct necessary pre-acquisition activities. 

Question 11. Border Patrol staffing nearly doubled between fiscal year 2004 and 

fiscal year 2014 but staffing at ports of entry increased less than 25 percent during 

this same time period and has continued to lag. How are you prioritizing personnel 

and resources for the ports of entry? 

Answer. By effectively using targeted, monthly, port-specific, entry-level vacancy 

announcements, CBP has closed, or nearly closed, staffing gaps along the Southern 

and Northern Borders. Major Southern Border ports such as El Paso, San Ysidro, 

Brownsville, Hidalgo, and Eagle Pass either are at their authorized staffing level, 

or are projected to be within the next month. The Port of Laredo is over 93 percent 

staffed and has 18 trainees scheduled to enter on duty in the month of June. Additionally, the Port of Otay Mesa, CA, was recently included on the May CBP officer 

vacancy announcement to help close their staffing gaps. 

The Arizona border ports and the Port of Calexico, CA, have proven to be exceptionally difficult locations for hiring. Therefore, CBP requested, and received approval, to increase the recruitment incentive for these ports from 25 percent to 33 

percent of an employee’s basic pay plus locality for a 3-year service period. Although 

it is too early to see the long-term impact of this increase in recruitment incentive, 

it is expected that the focused recruiting initiative and increased recruitment incentive will result in increased staffing in these difficult-to-hire ports. 

Since the Office of Personnel Management approved an increase to the recruitment incentive for the Arizona border ports and the Port of Calexico, CA from 25 

percent to 33 percent of an employee’s basic pay plus locality, 77 applicants have 

accepted CBP officer job offers with the 33 percent incentive. In comparison, in the 

2 prior years combined, 150 applicants accepted the 25 percent incentive for the AZ 

border ports and the Port of Calexico. Therefore, in 3 short months, CBP has experienced a marked increase in applicants accepting CBP officer job offers to these 

ports. The average increase in incentive pay is approximately $3,500 per applicant, 

per year of a 3-year service agreement. Over a 3-year service period, the increased 

incentive for these applicants is expected to cost approximately $810,000. Attrition 

has yet to fully stabilize in these ports, however, the Port of Nogales has experienced a net increase in staffing of 6.5 percent since the recruitment incentive was 

first offered in February 2016. 

Key ports along the Northern Border in Maine, Vermont, Washington, and Montana have reached their authorized staffing levels. The Port of Portal, ND, which 

has proven to be very difficult to staff, is over 91 percent staffed as of the beginning 

of July 2018. 

The Port of San Francisco has had 16 applicants accept CBP officer job offers 

since the recruitment incentive was approved in May 2018. The average incentive 

is $12,611 each year for a 3-year service period. The port’s attrition has yet to stabilize, but increased numbers of applicants are clearing pre-employment and accepting job offers. It is expected that in the coming months that the port will experience 

a net gain in staffing. The airports in Seattle and Boston recently received additional CBP officer positions. Both airports have applicants scheduled to enter on 

duty in the coming months, and applicants in pre-employment, which is expected 

to satisfy the hiring requirements. For John F. Kennedy Airport, there are nearly 

600 applicants in the pre-employment process with 49 applicants scheduled to enter 

on duty over the coming months. 

For the monthly CBP officer vacancy announcement for May 2018, posted vacancies included the following airports: Dulles International Airport (IAD), Los Angeles 

International Airport (LAX), and San Francisco International Airport (SFO). Collectively, these locations received nearly 1,500 applications in just 15 days. 

66 

Dulles International Airport received over 1,200 applications in May 2018. Of 

those, nearly 500 applicants are in the pre-employment process with 21 applicants 

scheduled to enter on duty in the coming months. Los Angeles International Airport 

received nearly 2,000 applications in May 2018. Of those, nearly 700 applicants are 

in the pre-employment process with 11 applicants scheduled to enter on duty in the 

coming months. 

Question 12a. CBP has the authority to provide additional inspection services to 

private stakeholders through the Reimbursable Services Program. 

How many of these agreements does CBP have in place now? 

Answer. As of May 14, 2018, CBP has signed Reimbursable Services Agreements 

with 100 stakeholders. 

Question 12b. How does CBP help its partners estimate the costs for entering 

these kinds of agreements? 

Answer. CBP emphasizes that partners are subject to the actual costs linked to 

the salaries and benefits of the specific CBP employees that process requests for 

services made by program partners. As a general estimate, CBP will provide interested parties with tables that include a variety of possible annual and hourly base 

salary and overtime rates to represent the range of grade levels that might perform 

the work under reimbursable services agreements. Estimates include benefit rates 

to reflect Government contributions which are required for employees earning overtime under the Customs Officer Pay Reform Act (COPRA): 

Rate (Percent) Type Calculation Basis 

1.45 ........... Medicare ..................... Applied to all COPRA overtime earnings. 

6.20 ........... FICA ............................ Applied to all COPRA overtime earnings. 

1.00 ........... FERS One Percent ..... Applied to the first $22,500 of COPRA overtime earnings. 4.00 ........... FERS Matching* ........ Applied to the first $22,500 of COPRA overtime earnings. 28.8 ........... FERS Annuity ............ Applied to the first $22,500 of COPRA overtime earnings. 

* [Sic.] 

Also included are summaries of laws related to overhead, overtime, and premium 

pay regulations that could be applicable contingent upon the nature of the partner’s 

request for reimbursable services. As partners begin to request services, CBP provides points of contact to address any questions tied to billing. 

Question 12c. How do you determine which officers are assigned to fulfill these 

agreements? 

Answer. CBP uses the assignment procedures set forth in Article 35 of the National Collective Bargaining Agreement (NCBA) between CBP and the National 

Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) for the assignment of all overtime including assignments filled under the auspices of the Reimbursable Services Program. Overtime assignments are made on least-cost, low-earner principles; and in accordance 

with a call-out order found in the NCBA. 

Question 13a. Has CBP been successful in getting Congress to increase Customs 

user fees to fund CBP officer new hires since the initial request in the fiscal year 

2014 budget proposal? 

Answer. On December 4, 2015, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act 

(FAST Act, Pub. L. 114–94) was signed into law. Section 32201 of the FAST Act 

amended section 13031 of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 

(COBRA) of 1985 (19 U.S.C. 58c) by requiring certain COBRA user fees and corresponding limitations be adjusted to reflect certain increases in inflation. While 

this ability to adjust COBRA fees for inflation was formally requested by CBP, the 

FAST Act does not allow CBP to retain the fees collected as a result of the inflationary adjustments. Congress has not granted approval on recent legislative proposals to increase user fees to support increased CBP officer hiring. 

Question 13b. If not, can you please explain why CBP has chosen to not request 

dedicated appropriations to hire the more than 3,500 officers needed to address 

OFO’s staffing shortage? 

Answer. CBP is committed to continued cooperation with the Congress in order 

to assess the optimal resource solutions to support additional CBP officer hiring efforts. Consistent with CBP’s fiscal year 2017 Resource Optimization Strategy and 

prior budget requests, CBP has submitted user fee increase legislative proposals to 

support additional CBP officers. The proposed increases to the Immigration User 

Fee (IUF) and COBRA User Fee would help CBP keep pace with travel volumes and 

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meet the requirements identified by CBP’s Workload Staffing Model. These fees are 

an important source of revenue for CBP field operations, but have not kept pace 

with the rising cost of providing inspection services or with rising inflation. Adjusting these fees will allow CBP to recover more of its costs through user fees, rather 

than annual appropriations, providing a funding source more closely aligned with 

trends in travel demand. Fee increases for these programs allow DHS to dedicate 

discretionary funding to programs for which user fees are not authorized. 

Question 14a. CBP has previously committed to fully implementing biometric exit 

by the end of 2018. In your written testimony, you describe this effort as the Traveler Verification Service, but you do not mention a time line for full deployment. 

Is CBP on track to meet the original 2018 deadline? 

Answer. Since receiving the mission in 2013, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) advanced an entry/exit strategy by conducting a series of pilot programs and 

technical demonstrations, which resulted in CBP developing a realistic and achievable biometric exit plan. CBP has: 

• Deployed demonstrations to 8 airports across the Nation; 

• Facilitated pilot programs with 3 airlines and 1 airport to integrate biometrics 

with the airline boarding process; 

• Transformed the entry process for certain flights at 7 airports, including 

PreClearance locations; 

• Facilitated a pilot program with one cruise line for biometric disembarkation; 

• Launched a facial matching pilot with the Transportation Security Administration at a security checkpoint as a proof of concept for enhancing the travel experience: 

• Enabled mobile devices to collect biometrics; and 

• Solidified plans and began deploying handheld mobile devices to collect biometrics and verify in the land border vehicle and pedestrian environments. 

These tests have assisted in defining the technical architecture for the end-state 

solution. CBP’s Traveler Verification Service (TVS) uses biographic data from the 

passenger manifest and previously collected photos contained in Government databases to perform facial matching on-site to verify a traveler’s identity. In early 2018, 

CBP completed the TVS and remains committed to partnerships with all airlines 

and airports across the United States. CBP is working toward full implementation 

of biometric exit in the air environment within the next 4 years to account for over 

97 percent of departing commercial air travelers from the United States. 

CBP is leveraging advances in technology from the biometric exit solution to 

transform the entry process by using facial photographs to identify travelers. This 

innovative approach uses the traveler’s face to unlock their electronic traveler 

record, in turn providing an immediate facilitative benefit, while at the same time 

leveraging previously collected fingerprints to run applicable law enforcement 

checks in the background. CBP is piloting this concept at 7 airports, further demonstrating that facial recognition technology facilitates frictionless travel by reducing inspection time and creating an improved customer experience for the traveling 

public. 

Question 14b. What remains to be addressed? 

Answer. In order to fully implement biometric exit, CBP must continue making 

progress in three key areas: Funding, stakeholder engagement, and expansion to additional modes of travel. 

First, while CBP received initial funding for the biometric exit program through 

the fiscal year 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act, CBP must continue to closely 

monitor fee collections to ensure that there are adequate resources to meet this 

mandate. The Act authorizes funding for a biometric exit program of up to $1 billion 

to be collected through fee surcharges over a period of up to 10 years. Based on actual collections in fiscal year 2016, fiscal year 2017, and fiscal year 2018, the current 10-year projection for fee fund collections is $585 million. It is imperative that 

CBP monitor the funding forecast in order to inform the time line of the biometric 

implementation strategy (in all modes of travel) and future planned activities, to include field tests, demonstrations, and partnerships with travel industry stakeholders. 

Second, CBP’s partnership with stakeholders is critical to accomplish implementation of a biometric entry/exit system. CBP is committed to a process that meets and 

the needs of all stakeholders to fulfill the biometric entry-exit mandate. CBP’s primary responsibility is to facilitate legitimate trade and travel. CBP employees are 

working diligently to ensure stakeholders—travelers, airline authorities, air carriers, and other industry partners—are able to navigate these changes seamlessly 

and with the least amount of disruption to our economy. While CBP has already 

begun collaborating with certain airlines and airports to implement biometric entry 

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and exit operations, CBP must continue to support these on-going partnerships, 

while also expanding our collaborative relationship to other industry partners. 

If CBP were to deploy a Government-only solution, without stakeholder input and 

support, cumbersome layers would be added to existing travel processes which, in 

turn, would have adverse effects on the travel as a whole. Travelers would spend 

additional time going through security and/or boarding processes. Additionally, significant enhancements and modifications would be necessary to manage the expected increase in air travel. 

Third, while CBP has made substantial progress in implementing biometric exit 

in the air environment, due to limitations posed by existing infrastructure, a different strategy and method of implementation will be required for other modes of 

travel. Operationally, there are significant differences among the air, land, and sea 

environments. CBP is working to finalize a comprehensive biometric land and sea 

strategies. In order to do so, CBP will be conducting field tests in the land and sea 

environments to validate technology and operational processes to inform strategy 

and planning activities going forward. 

Question 15a. In your testimony you mention that CBP is working with airlines 

about incorporating the Traveler Verification Service in their operations. What are 

some of the concerns airlines have about this program? 

Answer. The airlines are primarily concerned about integration costs (e.g. equipment) associated with the Traveler Verification Service (TVS). However, CBP’s longterm vision for seamless travel is the use of facial recognition technology for identity 

verification. The passive application of this technology has the potential to replace 

manual identity checks and boarding pass scans from curb to gate. This will reduce 

friction points and save time for travelers, airlines, and airports, without requiring 

new governmental processes that add complexity to travel. CBP will utilize TVS to 

implement CBP’s next generation processing system for arriving travelers. This will 

allow CBP to use facial recognition to match arriving passengers to the flight manifest, reducing the need for passports to be opened, fingerprints to be taken, and will 

streamline the entry process. The vision and path forward provides airlines with the 

assurance that the system is both financially viable and identifies the return on investment. 

Question 15b. How are roles and responsibilities being determined? 

Question 15c. Do they vary by airline or is there a standard set of responsibilities 

that all airline partners will need to assume? 

Answer. CBP is working with industry partners to standardize our policies, requirements, and arrangements that outline all respective responsibilities. Generally, 

the set of responsibilities is as follows: 

Using APIS data, CBP creates a temporary gallery of photographs and Unique 

Identifiers (UIDs) for passengers on all departing and arriving U.S. flights. These 

photos and UIDs are securely pushed to a cloud-based matching service. CBP provides TVS web services and a secure gateway for partner airlines and airports to 

submit traveler photos through an internet Application Program Interface (API). 

Partners can verify traveler identity using TVS throughout the travel process by 

simply capturing a live traveler photo. The captured photo is compared against the 

TVS photo gallery in real-time. TVS responds with identity verification match results, eliminating manual and time-consuming processing such as document checks 

or the use of boarding passes. CBP currently does not require, but recommends that 

its partners also delete: (1) Matching results within 14 days and (2) newly-captured 

photos as soon as they are no longer needed for business purposes. Airlines and airport authorities that do not require short-term retention for business purposes will 

not use or retain the photos. 

Question 15d. How are costs for operating this program going to be shared? 

Answer. CBP invested heavily in robust infrastructure and built a matching service, the Traveler Verification Service (TVS), to support the end-to-end vision for 

seamless air travel that meets the biometric exit mandate. CBP will offer this service to all stakeholders. However, because airlines and airports are responsible for 

many of the passenger interactions, it is imperative they collaborate with CBP to 

co-create a process to meet business, traveler, and security needs. As the TVS is a 

device-agnostic biometric service, airline and airport partners have flexibility when 

selecting and purchasing front-end cameras to capture traveler photos to ensure the 

matching service aligns with their business model and customer service experience. 

Question 16a. We understand that certain groups have expressed concerns about 

passenger privacy in this program. What are CBP and its airline partners doing to 

inform the public about their privacy rights? 

Answer. CBP takes its privacy obligations very seriously. CBP provides general 

notification of the biometric exit program and its various pilots through airport signage as well as through Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), published on 

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1 Current PreClearance locations include: Dublin and Shannon in Ireland; Aruba; Freeport 

and Nassau in The Bahamas; Bermuda; Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; and Calgary, Toronto, Edmonton, Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Vancouver, and Winnipeg in Canada. 

www.dhs.gov/privacy, and through program information, such as Frequently Asked 

Questions, readily available on www.cbp.gov. The PIAs account for the purpose of 

the information collection in relation to the DHS mission and address individual 

participation, security, data quality and integrity, and the sharing of data, including 

its minimization and use limitation, as well as auditing and accountability transparency. 

CBP works with airline and airport partners to incorporate notifications and processes into their current business models (i.e. signage, gate announcements). 

Question 16b. How are you engaging with groups concerned about privacy and 

civil liberties? 

Answer. CBP complies with all Privacy Act requirements and Departmental policies that govern the collection, use, and maintenance of personally identifiable information. DHS has published 5 PIAs, available at www.dhs.gov/privacy, related to 

the biometric matching system that supports biometric exit. As each pilot phase has 

commenced, CBP has updated the required privacy documentation. CBP has also 

published PIAs for the various biometric exit pilots. CBP has also published information concerning biometric exit on its website, which contains Frequently Asked 

Questions, links to privacy documentation and exemplars of the signage that is posted at each boarding gate where photographs are being collected. 

In addition, CBP has met with privacy advocates twice regarding biometric exit 

and has engaged in privacy discussions through DHS’s Data Privacy and Integrity 

Advisory Committee (DPIAC). The meetings with privacy advocates occurred in August 2017 in Washington, DC and January 2018 in San Francisco, California. Each 

meeting included a lengthy Q&A session. Discussions included review of current pilots, retention policies, future biometric vision, and alternative screening procedures. 

CBP briefed the DPIAC in September 2017 and again in May 2018, where CBP provided programmatic updates. 

Question 17. Under the previous administration, CBP was aggressively moving 

forward with negotiating and selecting new sites for PreClearance, and this committee worked on a bipartisan basis to help improve these efforts. What is the status of PreClearance today? 

Answer. Today, CBP has law enforcement officers and agriculture specialists stationed at 15 aviation PreClearance locations in 6 countries.1 In fiscal year 2017, 

CBP personnel stationed abroad precleared more than 19 million travelers, representing over 15 percent of all commercial air travelers to the United States. 

CBP has hosted two open periods to-date, during which foreign airports were invited to submit letters expressing their interest in PreClearance operations. These 

airports underwent an evaluation by DHS and the U.S. Department of State in collaboration with stakeholders across the Government and with the aviation industry. 

Prior to beginning PreClearance operations, the United States and the host government must sign and enter into a PreClearance Agreement granting CBP personnel the authority to inspect U.S.-bound travelers, goods, and aircrafts. 

In late 2016 the United States signed agreements to implement PreClearance operations at Stockholm Arlanda Airport in Sweden and Punta Cana International 

Airport in the Dominican Republic. Implementation efforts currently await ratification and/or approval by our international partners. CBP also continues to engage 

with several of the host governments of other prioritized locations. 

Question 18a. Now that you are Commissioner, how do you envision using 

PreClearance? 

Answer. CBP firmly believes that establishing PreClearance operations in strategic locations will assist our efforts in identifying terrorists, criminals, and other 

National security threats prior to their boarding aircraft bound for the United 

States and this is a critical step in CBP’s continued efforts to enhance National security and facilitate growing international travel and commerce. The aviation security benefits of PreClearance are substantial because a uniformed U.S. law enforcement officer interviews the precleared passenger before he or she boards the plane. 

This added security layer provides an additional opportunity to detect and stop 

threats as early in the process as possible. 

In addition to enhancing security, PreClearance has the potential to increase capacity and growth opportunities for airports and air carriers in the United States 

and abroad, while improving the passenger experience. PreClearance generates the 

potential for significant economic benefits for the United States and our international partners by facilitating travel through all gateways creating an overall increase in clearance capacity, and maximizing aircraft and gate utilization. 

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PreClearance can lead to faster connections and provides passengers with the ability 

to exit the airport immediately upon landing the United States. 

Question 18b. Do you have plans to expand the program further? 

Answer. Building upon the success of existing PreClearance operations, CBP continues to work to expand the PreClearance program. 

Question 18c. Or will you focus on developing what the previous Commissioner negotiated? 

Answer. CBP firmly believes in establishing PreClearance operations in additional 

strategic locations. CBP is currently negotiating with several countries prioritized 

during the open periods of expansion while simultaneously working to support efforts by the governments of Sweden and the Dominican Republic to bring the two 

agreements concluded in 2016 into force. 

Question 19. CBP awarded Accenture with a nearly $300 million contract to assist 

in recruiting additional CBP law enforcement personnel. That translates to about 

$40,000 per new hire going to the contractor. I understand that funding was reprogrammed from a salaries account that was not being used given the lack of hires 

this fiscal year. Did CBP consider using that funding for retention incentives instead? If not, why not? 

Answer. CBP’s staffing challenges are complex and require a multi-pronged strategy that cuts across several lines of effort. These range from developing our recruitment and hiring capacity, which includes leveraging Accenture’s expertise in Federal staffing, to reducing the attrition rate of the existing workforce. Funding has 

been utilized for our successful Operational Mobility Program for BPAs. Nearly 400 

BPAs accepted relocations during the program’s first cycle, more than 100 of whom 

received relocation incentives. CBP is currently exploring other ways to curb attrition, including multiple employee engagement initiatives and the expanded use of 

incentives. 

Question 20. We understand the Accenture contract is ramping up. What are 

CBP’s plans for monitoring the contractor and ensuring that the law enforcement 

personnel it recruits and hires meet CBP’s standards? 

Answer. CBP has stood up a robust Program Management Office dedicated to this 

contract to monitor Accenture’s work through regular touch points and oversight 

meetings. The contract imposes numerous reporting and metrics development requirements upon Accenture, and senior leadership meets regularly with the Program Manager and the contractor to review status. CBP has already seen improvements in applicant interest based on Contractor marketing, and applicants will 

enter on duty through the same rigorous process currently used by CBP HRM. 

There are also several inherently Governmental steps in the hiring process where 

Government personnel will review contractor work. Final suitability determinations 

will only be made by CBP employees with expertise in the hiring process. 

Question 21. Several advocacy groups have noted that CBP personnel are behaving in ways that do not seem to align with policy. For example, Border Patrol agents 

have been filmed boarding passenger trains and buses without a warrant. They 

have also been filmed improperly transferring custody of a migrant to Mexican officials based on the person’s appearance only. Please describe how you intend to enhance CBP’s internal integrity program. 

Answer. U.S. Border Patrol agents are committed, and have demonstrated that 

commitment daily, to treating everyone with professionalism, dignity, and respect 

while enforcing the laws of the United States. 

U.S. Border Patrol agents routinely engage in enforcement operations at transportation hubs that fall within the border areas (up to 100 miles from a U.S. border), 

and along points of ingress into the U.S. Border Patrol agents conduct numerous 

immigration inspections on buses to identify passengers who are in the United 

States illegally. Many times those determined to be in the United States illegally 

are found to have recently crossed, have overstayed their visa, or have violated the 

terms of their legal entry and are thus amenable to removal, and/or have active 

warrants for their arrest. Inspections conducted in transportation check operations 

are part of a layered approach to prevent illegal aliens from traveling further into 

the interior of the United States. Inspections are conducted at strategic locations 

that serve as conduits for both human and narcotic smuggling, and as a result, disrupt criminal organizations from further exploiting certain modes of transportation. 

Enforcement operations at transportation hubs will continue to play a vital role in 

the U.S. Border Patrol’s National security efforts. 

U.S. Border Patrol agents perform their duties with great professionalism in the 

face of an often hostile public. They regularly ignore taunts from passengers recording their lawful actions, and treat all individuals questioned with courtesy and respect. The Border Patrol does not condone or permit ‘‘profiling’’ based on appearances. The Border Patrol regularly apprehends illegal aliens and smugglers of all 

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nationalities and ethnicities. There is no prototypical subject to whom Border Patrol 

agents look for to the exclusion of others. While CBP always strives to maintain the 

utmost level of professionalism during each encounter with the public, it remains 

CBP’s foremost responsibility to ensure that Border Patrol agents conduct a thorough examination of every person questioned and to do so free of bias, racial 

profiling, and within the authorities granted to them by law. 

The public is entitled to fair, impartial, and courteous treatment. The U.S. Border 

Patrol does not tolerate unprofessional or demeaning behavior by its agents. CBP 

makes every effort to ensure that our operations treat all members of the public in 

both a professional and fair manner and inconvenience them as little as possible. 

The incident captured in the March 27, 2017 video was an isolated incident. El 

Centro Sector Border Patrol leadership resolved the situation quickly and satisfactorily with the Mexican Consulate, reaffirming the daily cooperation and coordination between the two nations. On that date, U.S. Border Patrol agents encountered 

an individual with mental health issues. This individual’s mental state complicated 

an often straightforward repatriation process. In the video, our actions were not consistent with established operational procedures. Corrective action was taken to ensure all Border Patrol agents understand their obligations to following established 

processes, practices, and policies. In this incident, like many others taking place 

every day, the U.S. Border Patrol worked with their Mexican Consulate counterparts who identified the individual as a Mexican national who entered the United 

States illegally. That individual was properly repatriated in coordination with Mexican immigration officials. 

While the video of this incident was not available at the time (it was seen after 

the fact by CBP/USBP), the agency immediately followed proper protocol and referred this particular incident to the CBP Office of Professional Responsibility, as 

per policy. Additionally, the U.S. Border Patrol used this case as an educational scenario with the CBP Integrity Advisory Committee. The Integrity Advisory Committee educates and trains CBP personnel on integrity issues to improve. 

CBP has a workforce of dedicated men and women who are among the finest civil 

servants in the world, who carry out their duties with the utmost professionalism 

and efficiency. We are proud of the fact that our work is defined by the core values 

of vigilance, service, and integrity. The vast majority of CBP’s agents and officers 

embody our core values, perform their duties with integrity and are dedicated to our 

mission of securing the American people and our borders while facilitating legitimate trade and travel. The men and women of CBP perform their duties professionally and treat those with whom they come in contact with dignity and respect. 

DHS and CBP take allegations of employee misconduct seriously. Under a uniform system, allegations of misconduct are documented and referred to the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) for independent review and assessment. Some cases 

are retained by the OIG for investigation while others are referred back to the component for appropriate handling. If misconduct is substantiated, appropriate corrective action will be initiated. 

Question 22a. Though apprehensions are at historic levels, migrant deaths continue to be high. As enforcement operations drive more migrants to remote areas. 

Border Patrol agents have also been found to have destroyed water supplies left in 

the desert by humanitarian groups. Can you please explain why and how CBP 

changed the methodology for counting migrant deaths? 

Answer. USBP reports any deaths that their employees come across in the course 

of their duties. 

Question 22b. Are you investigating these allegations of Border Patrol agents purposefully destroying water left for people stranded in the desert? 

Answer. U.S. Border Patrol takes all allegations seriously. The actions depicted 

in the 2010–2013 videos re-released by the group No More Deaths, were investigated by the CBP Office of Professional Responsibility and the U.S. Border Patrol. 

As a result of the investigation, disciplinary action was taken against the identified 

agents involved and USBP reinforced guidance was issued to prevent incidents like 

this from happening again. 

Question 23a. Can you please explain why CBP changed its methodology for 

counting assaults on CBP personnel? 

Answer. Law Enforcement Safety Compliance (LESC) began collecting and reporting assault and use of force data on February 5, 2016. In May 2017, the Office of 

Public Affairs began publishing the number of use of force and assault incidents, 

in addition to the singular counts. The inclusion of incidents provided additional 

context to the uses of force and assaults, as there may be multiple actions—assaults 

and/or uses of force—during a single incident. Presenting these actions within the 

framework of incidents depicts the circumstances more clearly and reduces the variability created by the singular counts in the month-to-month statistics. 

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Question 23b. Does the year-to-year comparison that noted a 45 percent increase 

from 2016 to 2017 take into account this new methodology? 

Answer. The 45 percent increase in singular assaults from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2017 was driven in large part by incidents which included multiple assailants using multiple weapon types to assault USBP agents. Statistics are derived 

from counting weapon/assault types, subjects, and officers/agents. Singular uses of 

force and singular assaults are both calculated using the same method: [number of 

officers/agents] x [number of subjects] x [number of weapon types involved]. Incidents are counted once for each type of activity they include. An assault incident 

is counted once regardless of the number of singular assaults involved; likewise for 

uses of force. An incident involving both assaults and uses of force generates one 

assault incident and one use of force incident. 

Question 23c. Please describe how this methodology is different from previous 

ones. 

Answer. There has been no change to the assault counting methodology. The 

Intercept article titled, ‘‘How the Border Patrol Faked Statistics Showing a 73 Percent Rise in Assaults Against Agents,’’ states that, ‘‘A review of the LEOKA (Law 

Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted) data shows that for years, the number 

of assaults on Border Patrol agents reported to the FBI exactly matched the figure 

published by CBP.’’ The phrase ‘‘for years’’ is somewhat selective, as it matched for 

only 3 years (2012, 2013, and 2014). The FBI publishes LEOKA each year to provide 

information about officers who were killed, feloniously or accidentally, and officers 

who were assaulted while performing their duties. The FBI does not independently 

track assaults on law enforcement officers; agencies report their own numbers to the 

FBI. The LEOKA report publishes calendar year numbers of officers assaulted and 

assailants, while CBP publishes fiscal year incidents and singular assaults. The 

Intercept article’s chart titled, ‘‘The Border Patrol’s False Assaults Data,’’ erroneously displays both CBP and LEOKA statistics as being fiscal year on its axis. 

The table below displays the numbers of assaults reported from 2009 through 

2017: 

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YEAR (FISCAL YEAR FOR CBP, CALENDAR YEAR FOR LEOKA)* 

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

USBP Assaults ......................................................................... 1,073 1,061 675 555 468 373 378 454 786 LEOKA USBP Agents Assaulted ........................................... 1,167 888 699 555 468 373 349 397 432 

* (2016 and forward reported by LESC; pre-2016 reported by USBP.) 

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Question 24. Which recommendations from the Homeland Security Advisory Committee’s CBP Integrity Advisory Panel’s reports issued in 2015 and 2016 has CBP 

implemented? 

Answer. The Homeland Security Advisory Committee’s CBP Integrity Advisory 

Panel made 53 recommendations (14 in the 2015 Interim report and 39 in the 2016 

final report) related to Integrity/Transparency, Use of Force, and Discipline. To date, 

CBP has implemented/completed 42 of the recommendations. A few notable ones are 

as follows: 

• Under the direction of the CBP Commissioner, should develop and implement 

a comprehensive, proactive strategy for preventing, deterring, identifying, and 

promptly investigating potential corruption and acceptance of bribes by CBP 

personnel. 

CBP’s Integrity and Personal Accountability Strategy is predicated on the concepts of corruption prevention, detection, investigation, and response, along 

with cross-cutting initiatives of organizational integration and integrity awareness. 

• Adequately staff CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs (now Office of Professional Responsibility) with sufficient and experienced 1,811 criminal investigators to 

timely and effectively investigate allegations of corruption and use of excessive 

force involving CBP personnel. Allocate and budget for 550 Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) 1,811 criminal investigators in OPR, for a net increase of 350 FTE. 

CBP has expanded its cadre of 1,811 criminal investigators in order to improve 

quality, timeliness, and capacity to investigate allegations of misconduct and 

corruption. Additionally, CBP is expanding its specialty investigative units such 

as Cyber, Technical Operations, and the Corruption Research Investigative Unit 

to increase use of complex investigative techniques and increase proactive efforts. 

• Establish clear goals and time lines for each step of the discipline process to 

achieve agency-wide deterrence as well as no action/closing of investigations as 

promptly as possible, to include competent, appropriately prioritized and timely 

investigations of all misconduct allegations, speedy and thorough investigations, 

and prompt and appropriate discipline and/or closure. 

The Human Resources Management (HRM) Enterprise Dashboard was 

launched in December 2016, and is available for senior leadership review. HRM 

utilizes this data on a continuing basis to identify potential opportunities for 

improvements to the discipline process and other efficiencies. HRM will then leverage the data collected from the case tracking system, via the Enterprise 

Dashboard, and validate whether the metrics and goals are appropriate or need 

revision. 

• Acknowledge all complaints received from the public by CBP. If the complaint 

amounts to allegations of misconduct potentially warranting discipline, CBP 

should acknowledge with a letter or other documented communication to the 

complainant, verifying receipt of the complaint and assuring a fair and objective 

investigation. 

The CBP Information Center (CIC) serves as the primary intake and triage for 

the processing of all complaints, compliments, and allegations. The CIC manages all public complaints through its Compliments and Complaints Management System (CCMS). For complaints received via the website or over the 

phone, CCMS sends immediate notifications to the complaints with their incident number for tracking purposes. For complaints received via regular mail, 

CIC mails a letter of acknowledgment to the complainant. Status updates are 

provided throughout the complaint process, until the final status of ‘‘closed’’ is 

achieved once it has been resolved. The response reaffirms that CBP takes employee misconduct seriously and such complaints are fully investigated. 

Certain allegations of misconduct however, require review by the OPR, DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, or another CBP/DHS office (i.e. discrimination or malfeasance). For those types of complaints, the CIC transfers 

the complaint to the appropriate office. These complaints are recorded by the 

Joint Intake Center (JIC) through the Joint Integrated Case Management System (JICMS). OPR maintains JICMS; however, DHS OIG holds the right of first 

refusal to investigate such cases. 

• Require all CBP law enforcement personnel to immediately self-report misconduct whether or not it leads to arrest. 

OPR developed a new directive, for reporting allegations of misconduct, including a requirement to immediately report allegations of misconduct that result 

in arrest and/or jeopardize the agency’s mission that has been signed by the 

Commissioner and issued to employees. 

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• Develop local/regional Use of Force Incident Team (UFIT); expand the role of 

the Use of Force Review Board (UFRB); pilot mandated use of body armor in 

operational assignments. 

CBP has implemented the UFIT and the local UFRB. As detailed in the Use 

of Force Incident Guide, both the National and Local UFRBs consist of representatives from all operational and training components, as well as legal 

counsel to ensure consistent and comprehensive incident reviews. The National 

UFRB will analyze each incident and make observations and recommendations 

concerning the application of deadly force, training and tactical issues, policy, 

equipment, and any potential misconduct arising from the incident. • Consider making these use of force policies openly available for public inspection; policies on the use of force should clearly state what types of information 

will be released, when, and in what situation to maintain transparency. 

The CBP Use of Force Policy, Guidelines, and Procedures Handbook is publicly 

available on cbp.gov. Moreover, on April 8, 2016, the UFCE (now LESC) and 

Office of Public Affairs (OPA) collaborated to release 2015 and 2016 YTD use 

of force and assault against agent/officer statistics on CBP.gov. LESC submits 

updated statistics to OPA on the 8th day of each month reflecting the previous 

month’s numbers. OPA posts the updated statistics to cbp.gov after vetting with 

the appropriate DHS and CBP entities. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N FOR KEVIN K. MCALEENAN

Question 1a. DHS officials have said that families are being separated to protect 

the interests of minor children because CBP is unable to verify the parental relationship or otherwise believe that the child is in danger. 

How many cases have been confirmed as false presentation as a family unit? 

Answer. Based on existing Federal law, including the Homeland Security Act of 

2002 and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, DHS policy states that a family unit is an alien parent or legal guardian and alien children. 

Therefore, if a child arrives with a non-parent or legal guardian adult relative, such 

as an aunt, uncle, grandparent, or adult sibling, the child is treated as an Unaccompanied Alien Child (UAC). 

In addition, there have been instances of human traffickers and aliens smugglers 

using minor children to pose as a family unit to receive favorable discretion regarding DHS custody pending processing in accordance with either credible fear interviews with USCIS and/or placement into INA Section 240 removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge. In fiscal year 2018 from October 1 to April 30, there 

were 148 fraudulent family units encountered between the ports of entry along the 

Southwest Border. 

CBP policy (Transportation, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS)) states in part 

that, CBP will maintain family unity to the greatest extent operationally feasible, 

absent a legal requirement or an articulable safety or security concern that requires 

separation. In accordance with this policy, CBP strives to maintain the family units 

of illegal aliens in our custody. However, there are numerous situations that would 

require the separation of family units, such as: (1) The criminal or immigration history of an adult in the family unit; (2) evidence of abuse that would indicate that 

the child’s safety is at risk; and (3) questionable familial relationships (fraud). 

Question 1b. What, if any, specific procedures have been put in place to determine 

the validity of a bona-fide family relationship? 

Answer. CBP treats all individuals with dignity and respect, and complies with 

all relevant legal and policy requirements, including the requirements of the Flores 

Settlement Agreement (FSA). 

In addition to adhering to the requirements of the FSA, CBP’s National Standards 

on TEDS, states in section 1.9 that ‘‘CBP will maintain family unity to the greatest 

extent operationally feasible, absent a legal requirement or an articulable safety or 

security concern that requires separation.’’ 

In accordance with this policy, CBP strives to maintain the family unity of aliens 

in custody to the greatest extent operationally feasible, and that any operational decision to separate a family unit is not made without taking the well-being of the 

child into account. 

During the processing of a purported family unit, CBP agents and officers review 

all available forms of identification, such as birth certificates and passports, and all 

available electronic records to determine the relationship between various members. 

CBP will also contact the respective consulate to verify the documentation presented 

to ascertain if a family relationship exists. CBP will observe and document the 

interaction between the travelers to learn whether a familial relationship exists. Additionally, if agents/officers suspect the claimed familial relationship is false, agents/ 

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officers may separate the adult and juvenile parties and interview them individually 

to verify statements and detect deception. 

Question 2a. CBP has acknowledged that one main indicator CBP uses when deciding to separate a family is based on interviews with children. 

Is a child welfare professional present when the CBP officer is conducting such 

questioning? 

Answer. As a Federal Government agency, CBP does not operate as part of Statemanaged child welfare systems. Nonetheless, CBP is committed to ensuring child 

welfare when conducting interviews with minors. CBP officers are trained to question children in an ‘‘age-appropriate’’ manner to elicit responses. In addition, CBP 

officers are trained in observational techniques and observe the interaction between 

the adult and children to determine whether the relationship is bona-fide. 

In October 2015, CBP published National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS) that set forth Nation-wide standards governing CBP’s 

interactions with detained individual including provisions related to sexual abuse 

and assault prevention and response. The TEDS standards have been implemented 

in all CBP facilities. TEDS reinforces/reiterates the need to consider the best interest of children and mandates adherence to established protocols to protect at-risk 

populations to include transporting, detaining, and caring for children. 

U.S. Border Patrol agents routinely question children while in custody. The majority of the time those questions are referenced to their immediate needs such as 

water, food, blankets, showers, etc. USBP facilities are short-term holding facilities 

and as such are not staffed with child welfare personnel. A child welfare professional may be brought into our facilities once USBP has determined that a child 

is a UAC, after which placement under HHS/ORR oversight begins and CBP transfers custody of the child to their staff to facilitate placement. 

All Unaccompanied Alien Children are screened for potential risks to being victims of human trafficking. This is captured on CBP form 93 Unaccompanied Alien 

Child Screening Addendum. 

Question 2b. Is there a training guide or protocol that CBP officers use to interview children coming across the border to determine whether the parent/child relationship is bona-fide? 

Answer. CBP officers receive training on interviewing techniques to determine relationships amongst travelers. In addition, CBP officers observe the interaction between the adult and child to assess whether the relationship is bona-fide. 

Question 2c. Are children of all ages questioned about family ties to the individual 

they enter the United States with? 

Answer. The decision to question children is made on an individualized basis, 

based on the observation of CBP officers and supervisors. 

Question 3. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach operate more hours than 

any other cargo gateway in the country because they are processing cargo every day 

of the year. These ports handle over 17 million TEUs a year, which involves processing over 35,000 truck moves a day, and over 100 trains a week with cargo destined for major cities throughout the country. Container volumes are forecasted to 

grow approximately 5 percent this year. In order for cargo to flow efficiently, CBP 

needs to operate the radiation portal monitors for a minimum of two shifts a day. 

Is CBP forecasting increased staffing at the seaports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 

for the radiation portal monitors to they can handle the increased volume? 

Answer. The Los Angeles Field Office operates the Nation’s largest, and the 

world’s 10th largest, sea port of entry. Recognizing the forecasted trends, CBP is 

taking active measures to ensure scanning operations are adequately staffed with 

the current workforce, and implementing projects to enable efficiencies across radiation scanning operations. 

In February 2017, CBP expanded the Reimbursable Services Program (RSP) to 

the seaport environment. CBP Leadership and port personnel at Los Angeles/Long 

Beach have since conducted a number of outreach and engagements with port and 

terminal stakeholders. 

CBP, the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association (PMSA), and other terminal operators, have collectively agreed to utilize a phased approach to implement the RSP 

at the Port, beginning June 10, 2018. 

• Phase 1.—June 10–July 7: Any time before 0730 shift start time; 

• Phase 2.—July 8–September 30, 2018: Saturday evening (1500–0300); and, 

• Phase 3.—Dates TBD: Full implementation for all coverage outside of core 

hours. 

Another key efficiency we are working to address this forecasted demand is implementation of Radiation Portal Monitoring (RPM) Remote Operations, including a 

Command Center, which will also reduce resource issues related to RPM monitoring 

and adjudication. 

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CBP is committed and has agreed to remain in close communications with PMSA, 

and all Marine Terminals, to promote and gain efficiencies to minimize the impact 

and costs to stakeholders. 

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