lieutenants who may not have been in service long enough to have
had any opportunity to go to a CTC. Of the 154 respondents,
some individuals had been to only one CTC, others to several; 31
had been to none.

Table 1

Numbers and Percentages of Soldiers Reporting Attendance at
Officer/NCO Courses*

Active Reserve
OFF NCO OFF NCO

Total Respondents 11 63 11 #69
Ranger 9 12 4 1
Airborne 11654 6 14
Air Assault 3° 34 7 21
CLS 1 29 2 9
PLDC 0 59 0 61
BNCOC 0 34 0 33
ANCOC 0 10 0 12
OBC 11 0 11 0
OAC 4 0 1 0

Note. * Combat Life Saver (CLS), Primary Leadership Development
Course (PLDC), Basic and Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course
(BNCOC and ANCOC), Officer Basic and Advanced Course (OBC and
OAC).

Table 2

Numbers and Percentages of Soldiers Reporting Experience at Each
of the Combat Training Centers

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer _NCO Officer _NCO Total

n & a & n & n & n &
JRTC 6 55 50 79 5. 45 35 51 96 62
NTC 30°27 34 54 1 9 24 35 62 40
CMTC 1 9 10 16 2 18 4 6 17°~«11
Any CTC 7 64 59 94 7 64 50 72 123 80
None 4 36 4 6 4 36 19 28 31 20

Notes. JRTC, the Joint Readiness Training Center, for light
infantry, is located at Fort Polk, LA; NTC, the National Training
Center, for armored/mechanized units, is located at Fort Irwin,
CA; the CMTC, Combat Maneuver Training Center, for
armored/mechanized units, is located at Hohenfels, Germany.



Although these ciasses were generally excei
teamwork exercises, ail three s ed from naving o many

participants. There was considerable waiting time, sometimes
described by e soidiers as wasted time. This compounded
perceptions that some personnei were selective in tneir

participation in training, that senior personnel primarily
attended the team building events, not the daily routine
training.

Physical training. The RTB had planned a physical training
(PT) program for the MFO. Occasionally, MFO personnel led
exercises; more often the RTB cadre led instruction. There were
complaints that the PT program was less strenuous than that
previously established at Fort Bragg. with less running and less
stamina building. However, further “toughening” was accomplished
through the unit’s marching, by company element, from the Ranger
cantonment area to the daily training sites. Additionally, there
were early morning tactical road marches of four, five or six
miles, with soldiers in complete uniform with load carrying
equipment, rucksacks and weapons.

Classroom instruction. The classroom/bleacher instruction
was generally presented by the RTB instructors to the MFO
battalion as a whole. The success of the instruction varied;
some classes, like Train the Trainer, After Action Reviews, How
to Train, and How to Brief, were well received; another, Troop
Leading Procedures, was extremely popular and received
considerable praise from almost everyone, particularly the RC
soldiers who said they were "rusty." For these classes, most of
the NCOs were present; the officers attended only irregularly.

An opportunistic class on principles of Unaided Night Vision
was offered one evening as an experimental class to 33 personnel
from the battalion. This class was one of the most popular and
was highly praised. Other classes, e.g., Land Navigation, were
called too basic, too long, or just not relevant. Pace count and
compass check, while a refresher for some, were considered boring
for most. Classes on the Global Positioning System (GPS) varied;
the validity of the class was questionable because the GPS system

used in the Sinai was not the one available for training.

Weapons training. The M16 rifle live fire and weapons
classes were completed in one day, at three different ranges.
The soldiers zeroed their rifles, qualified, and then fired on
the advanced rifle marksmanship (ARM) ranges. The ranges were
very slow, due to the large number of people using the same
firing line and because the students were assisting as range
controllers. Controversy arose when the soldiers were not
permitted to score their own zero targets as many, thoroughly
experienced in running ranges, resented being treated like “basic
trainees."

29



The other issues and concerns apparent during the ILC itself
had not diminished at the time of this survey. Fifty-seven
percent of the respondents still rated the course as having been
somewhat ineffective, ineffective or very ineffective. The
negativity was slightly more pronounced for the AC than the RC.
As in previous surveys, the majority of the soldiers felt that
more MFO tasks should have been included in the ILC. These
included aircraft identification, reporting procedures, MFO rules
of engagement, OP operations, and Arabic classes. A very few
respondents felt that emphasizing basic infantry tasks was the
correct approach; a similar number noted that ILC was acceptable
as a means of building teamwork and evaluating soldier competency
in infantry skills. Several expressed the opinion that the
Ranger instructors had been underutilized.

The final question solicited the soldiers’ help in planning
for future MFO rotations. As before, the majority of the
responses focused on three themes: the ILC as developed for this
particular rotation was a waste of time; not enough time was
spent on MFO specific tasks; and the training could have been
done more cheaply and more effectively at Fort Bragg. One said
that although the ILC was to have been a Leader Course, they had
been "treated like basic trainees." One commented that "more
time should have been spent on leadership, how to train, train
the trainer and troop leading procedures."

Impact _of Class Size and Structure

Personnel. Within this class, in addition to most of the
personnel suggested by the ILC, there were many others present.
The stipulated 104 man class size was not adhered to; neither was
the requirement that all personnel attending be of the rank of
sergeant and above. There were 154 soldiers present; they ranged
in rank from Lieutenant Colonel (the battalion commander) to
Private First Class (his driver).

Typical battalions bring the commander, three or four
company commanders and the platoon leaders. The MFO had a major
(the $3), and additional captains (S3 shop, legal officer) who
participated in training only occasionally. Each of the four
companies had only two platoon leaders; however there were six
additional lieutenants assigned to HHC (staff, finance) and
occasionally present for training. The command sergeant major
attended some training, as did all four company first sergeants.
There were extra NCOs (not slotted specifically as platoon
sergeants, squad or team leaders) as well as several specialists
and corporals. Some were assigned to HHC; others to the maneuver
company rosters.

HHC maintained a tactical operations center (TOC) which
included the Commander, the S3 and the S-3 Air, several officers
who worked on battalion specific items, a financial officer, the

25



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Recommendations

inal recommendations on what kind of course would be most
uset and its best ultimate location may not be determined until
the 4-505th has finished its deployment. It does seem clear,
however, that whatever course is given, the content thereof must
appear to be related to the unit’s objectives and METL.

A composite unit, or any all volunteer force not previously
pattle rostered, needs some form of training experience like the
ILC (put not necessarily the ILC) to assess readiness status.

The ideal situation would probably have a special mobile training
team of RTB or similarly qualified instructor cadre, training the
unit in a desert-like environment, teaching a mixture of core
infantry and MFO specific tasks. Some MFO related tasks must be
included to maintain the Army's philosophy of METL training and
to "train as you fight" (or peace keep). The precise location
would depend on other resources available and possibly on the
locations from which most of the personnel are drawn.

Ideally, too, the unit should have everyone on site far
enough in advance to have begun unit bonding before the start of
the actual training, regardless of location. The plan to have
senior leaders observe and gauge junior leader performance
translated into some persons not participating in training and
concomitant leadership problems. There is very little for the
senior level leaders and staff to do at the ILC. The leader’s
role in the Sinai is considerably different from a normal mission
environment; direct command and control are dispersed, and lower
level leaders have more autonomy than in a typical environment.
The time to start the independence of the junior leaders is
during their initial training event, and it is important, for
unit spirit, for the senior leaders to avoid the appearance of
failing to participate. With the RTB as instructors, within
battalion senior leaders could be utilized in preparing for and
welcoming the enlisted personnel into the battalion at home
station, permitting all platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, squad

leaders and team leaders to participate in training.

What to do with the senior leaders also addresses the issue
of the number of personnel being trained. The logistic and
administrative strain of 154 trainees outweighed any possible
benefit to the battalion of having these individuals present.
Staff officers could begin to run their TOCs at home station,
rather than taking up training slots. Extraneous personnel could
create professional development classes on culture, customs,
tours, etc., to further promote unit cohesion when the lower
level leaders have returned to the battalion. Linguists, rather
than taking ILC slots, should be available and encouraged to help
build spirit by teaching battalion personnel to begin to, for
example, read and count in Arabic.

34



Thompson, Thompson, Pleban and Valentine (1991); Dyer, et al.
(1992); Pleban, Thompson, and Valentine (1993); Fober, Dyer and
Salter (1994); Salter (1994); Salter (in press); and Thompson,
Pleban and Valentine (1994).

The Infantry Leaders Course

The ILC focuses on Infantry doctrine and tactics and
collective infantry skills. A "train-the-trainer" course, it is
offered by the elite Ranger Training Brigade (RTB) at Fort
Benning and has three primary stated purposes: 1) to ensure that
personnel are trained on current squad/platoon level collective
task doctrinal standards, 2) to ensure that leaders are ready to
conduct training to standard in their units, and 3) to promote
teamwork and cohesion through shared common experiences. (Full
information on the course is found in the U.S. Army Infantry
School’s Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet SH 21-75-7, 1993.)

For all units, learning the most recent doctrine is
important; for the 4-505, this was a critical training goal. The
AC/RC configuration of the battalion and the fact that it was a
newly formed unit gave greater than normal need to promote
cohesion and to ensure that all leaders were prepared to train to
the same standards.

The ILC is available for Light and Mechanized Infantry units
and other selected agencies. Initial contact is made between the
ILC and the unit about six months prior to the start of the
course. The unit provides the ILC with its Mission Essential
Task List (METL) and together the ILC and the unit develop a
tentative training schedule. The training schedule is finalized,
with equipment and resources requested 12-14 weeks prior to the
start of the course.

Training is based on a 28-day cycle at Fort Benning.
However, units have the option of decreasing the duration of the
course or even of requesting a Mobile Training Team (MTT) to
teach the course at home station. The average training day is 12
hours; usually seven days a week. The emphasis throughout is on
developing the ability of each student to train soldiers in
infantry skills. The course presumes that soldiers are
proficient in the tasks appropriate to their rank and military
occupational specialty (MOS), that all personnel, regardless of
rank, will participate in all training events.

Normally, maximum course capacity is 104 personnel.
Suggested attendees are the battalion commander, three line
company commanders, nine platoon leaders and nine platoon
sergeants, 27 squad leaders and 54 team leaders. All personnel
attending hold at least the rank of sergeant (E5).



Appendix E
Leadership Skills
Leadership Skills in Need of Improvement - Pre ILC (percentages)

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO
Set Goals & Objectives 27 21 18 39
Developing Strategies 36 33 36 44
Establishing Priorities 27 27 55 22
Delegating Duties 27 10 46 26
Tactical Proficiency 18 33 64 68
Technical Proficiency 27 37 36 61
Convey Facts/Requirements 36 18 27 33
Listening & Comprehension 36 18 9 26
Task Monitoring . 55 11 55 23
Providing Feedback 27 18 9 33
Problem Identification 27 19 9 28
Develop & Analyze Solutions 27 19 18 42
Making Timely Decisions 27 13 27 23
Involve Others in Planning/ 55 25 46 44

Decision Making Process ,

Team Building - 18 25 . 27 41

Leadership Skills Improved - Post ILC (percentages)

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO
Set Goals & Objectives 0 14 18 38
Developing Strategies 9 24 27 32
Establishing Priorities 18 17 27 35
Delegating Duties ~ 9 17 18 32
Technical Proficiency 9 33 45 57
Tactical Proficiency 27 40 54 55
Convey Facts/Requirements 18 21 9 29
Listening & Comprehension 9 16 9 30
Task Monitoring 9 16 18 25
Providing Feedback 36 27 18 35
Problem Identification 9 24 27 26
Develop & Analyze Solutions 9 29 18 30
Making Timely Decisions 9 14 9 38
Involve Others in Planning/ 18 33 45 54.

Decision Making Process

Team Building 73 46 45 68



a

When you got to the MFO. whai did you wish you had spent more time on?

9. What is the worst part about an MFO deployment?

10. What is the best part?

11. Did your experiences match the "job preview" you were given on what you would be
doing?

In the future, what points should be emphasized? What should be minimized?

ANSWER FOR THIS TIME - 4/505

1. Did you volunteer? or come down on levy?
Did you try to get out of the assignment?
[If you tried, it didn’t work. What happened? Do you still want to get out?]

Would you volunteer again?

2. Do you feel that you still know most of the MFO Precis things like vehicle/boat/plane
1D?

3. Do you still remember the reporting procedures?

4. Do you need any MFO Precis refresher training? On what?

5. Have you talked with the people in this unit (4/505) about your past experiences in the
MFO?

What kinds of things have you told them?

A-7

ta



3. Please use the scale below to rate your immediate superior’s
skills in the following areas. We understand that this 1s a
newly formed unit and your knowledge may be limited.

= Excellent
Very good
Good

= Adequate
Weak

= Cannot rate

DUPRWYNE
W

Planning

Job Knowledge

Warfighting

Communication
Supervision
Decision Making
Team Building

For questions 4-6 use the scale below.

= Extremely confident

= Very confident

Fairly confident

Somewhat confident

Not very confident

Not applicable/Cannot rate

DANPRWNE

4. How confident are you that the ILC will prepare you to
train your subordinates in the tasks/drills listed in item 1?

5. Given the unique nature of your mission and the makeup of
your unit, how confident are you that you could develop training
plans for your unit element right now?

6. Again, considering your unique mission and the makeup of
your unit, how confident are you that you can execute training
plans for your unit element right now?

* * * * *

7. The purpose of the ILC is to "reblue" cadre in the skills
required to lead soldiers, train them, and fight to win. Given
the unique nature of your mission anc the makeup of your unit,
what do you expect this course to do for you and your specific
unit element?



INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE
MFO POST-TRAINING SURVEY

SSN (last four)

ILC Training Assessment

For questions 1-2 use the scale below.

= Extremely confident
= Very confident
= Fairly confident
= Somewhat confident
Not very confident
= Not applicable/Cannot rate

DAuewNH

1. As a result of your participation in the ILC, how
confident are you’now that you could develop training plans for
your element?

2. Based on your participation in the ILC, how confident are
you that you could execute training plans for your unit element?

3. Are there any other specialized skills or tasks which should
have been included in the course to help you better prepare for
your unit’s mission? ‘If yes, please list those skills or tasks.

Use the scale below for questions 4-5.

Very effective

Effective

Somewhat effective
Somewhat ineffective
Ineffective

Very ineffective

Not applicable/Cannot rate

YHNGBWNE

4. Overall, how effective do you think this course was in
preparing you to train your unit to standard on the tasks
presented in the ILC?

Ss. How effective do you think this course was in promoting
unit-leader bonding and cohesion in your unit element?

A-11



6. Even if you feel another MFO battalion should not attend the ILC, what changes
would you make to the ILC if you had to train another MFO composite battalion?

POI or procedural changes

What duty positions should attend

7. Do you have any additional comments?



INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE
MFO UNIT PREPAREDNESS SURVEY

SSN (last four)

Tactical and Technical Proficiency

1. During the ILC you will receive refresher training in how to
conduct training to standard on selected infantry squad and
platoon collective tasks. Please use the matrix below to
indicate your level of preparedness. Put an X in the appropriate
column to show how prepared you feel to train the following tasks
at the present time (i.e., before the ILC).

very Prepared | Somewhat | Not
COLLECTIVE TASKS Well Prepared | Prepared

Lt Prepared

Disengage |
Hasty Ambush |
Point Ambush

Defend

Occupy Assembly Area

Move Tactically

Cross Danger Area |

Occupy ORP

Occupy Patrol Base

Linkup

Cross Defile

Reconnoiter Zone

Reconnoiter Route

Occupy OP

Surveillance

Prepare for Combat

Consolidate and
|_Reorganize



Generally, the AC soldiers were less confident in the
ability of the ILC to meet their needs than were the RC. The RC
over all were also less confident in their pre-course ability to
develop and execute training, although many NCOs, both AC and RC,
admitted not being overly confident in their ability to execute
training.

The final question asked the leaders’ expectations from the
course, given their unique mission and make up of the unit. The
question was open ended; some did not answer, others gave more
than one response. Responses clustered in five broad categories.
One was bonding, cohesion and team building; it was the item most
stressed by the battalion commander ("...put people from
different units all on the same sheet of music"). Another
category focused on assessment of unit strengths and weaknesses
("...identify the strong team players"). A third response
category highlighted specific skills and refresher training ("I
expect ILC to reinforce skills that have already been taught in
previous courses. It will allow us to take those skills and
redefine them to our MFO mission"). A fourth category covered
troop leading procedures (TLPs) (This course should teach us to
be teachers and to be able to lead and train our troops"). The
fifth category was one of negativity (responses of "nothing" or
"not much").

Percentages are shown in Table 6. Second responses (if any)
are shown in parentheses. Differences in expectations
appeared to be more between officers and NCOs, than between AC
and RC soldiers although, as before, the RC officers and NCOs
were highly focused on refresher training and TLPs.

Table 6

Percent of Soldiers Reporting Specific Expectations from the ILC:
First and (Second) Responses

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2
Bonding 55 (25) 22 (21) 10 (50) 17 (21)
Assessment 0 (25) 16 (16) 0 (0) 6 (0)
Skills 27 (13) 31 (26) 60 (0) 35 (38)
TLPs 18 (38) 17 (32) 30 (50) 37 (38)
Not Much 0 (0) 14 (5) 0 (0) 5 (4)

Prior MFO experience survey results. Three officers and
sixteen noncommissioned officers had been on the MFO mission
before, and two, twice before. Ten were volunteers for this
rotation; nine were not. They were asked to look back at their

12



One cause of slow zeroing was that while the AC soldiers
were all familiar with the M16A2 rifle, most RC had fired only
the M16Al. The two rifles have slightly different zeroing
procedures; this caused delays until those who had not fired the
M16A2 before became familiar with the process. The computerized
ARM range had target malfunctions; the soldiers, by then very hot
and very tired, voiced their irritation at the equipment and
blamed performance deficiencies on the range. Another factor
causing general dissatisfaction with the training was that some
battalion senior leaders left the site early, while the more
junior leaders did not have that option.

Another part of a day was devoted to familiarization with
the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW). This training was very
well received, as many of the soldiers had never seen the SAW
before. However, they did not have a chance to fire it.

Collective training and STXs. Week two began training on
the previously selected collective tasks. In contrast to the
previous week’s procedures, most training was presented by
student instructors to the rest of the unit. The tasks covered
were: move tactically, consolidate and reorganize, react to
contact, break contact, disengage, react to indirect fire, cross
danger area, cross defile, perform leader reconnaissance, occupy
an observation post, occupy a patrol base, sling load/cargo net,
use arm and hand signals.

The MFO students prepared these classes one or two days
prior, using manuals and materials provided by the cadre; they
lead their platoons through performance of the activities using
the Army’s "crawl, walk, run" method. After a short period of
time when they explained the task to be performed, the instructor
and an assistant demonstrated the actions or elicited student
demonstrators and talked them though the steps (crawl phase) .

The unit practiced several iterations of the task, with critiques
(walk phase), and finally performed the task from start to finish
without interruption (the run phase). This was followed by a
student-led AAR, then by a cadre critique for the student
instructor. The classes varied according to the skills of the
student instructor, and, as noted previously, according to the
presence and attitudes of more senior leaders.

Student-led field exercises continued in the third week.
Tasks included self-extraction from a minefield, occupy an
observation post, perform surveillance, and make a terrain model.
For the last of these, the RIs had constructed an example, and
after discussion, each of the training platoons broke down into
small groups and constructed their own terrain models.

The final portion of the third week set the stage for the
fourth week’s situational training exercises (STXs). The
battalion practiced reconnaissance (area, zone, and route) and

30



Decision Making

Team

Excellent
very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Cannot Rate

Building
Excellent
very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Cannot Rate

Active Component

Reserve Component

officer

NCO

16
19
24
18
14
10

16
14
24
19
13
14

officer NCO

46 17
36 30
18 23
0 16
0 9
0 4
27 25
55 17
9 23
9 15
0 12
0 9



Research Report 1677

Sinai Task Force Leaders
at the Infantry Leaders Course

Margaret S. Salter, Gene W. Fober, Robert J. Pleban,
and Patrick J. Valentine

U.S. Army Research Institute

Infantry Forces Research Unit
Thomas J. Thompson, Acting Chief

Training Systems Research Division
Jack H. Hiller, Director

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army
June 1995
ed
Army Project Number Training Systems and Education
20263007A793

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.



Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

Decision Making

Excellent 33 16 36 17
Very Good 11 18 0 28
Good 22 25 9 23
Adequate 0 20 9 16
Weak 0 11 18 8
Cannot Rate 33 10 27 8
Team Building
Excellent 33 16 36 23
Very Good 11 11 18 30
Good 11 15 0 17
Adequate 0 18 0 13
Weak “11 13 9 8
Cannot Rate 33 26 36 9



Appendix F

Post-Training Ratings of Immediate Superiors (Percentages)

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

Respondents 9 61 11 64
Planning
Excellent 22 13 55 13
Very Good 44 26 0 42
Good 0 21 ie) 16
Adequate 0 18 9 16
Weak 0 11 9 6
Cannot Rate 33 10 27 8
Job Knowledge
Excellent 44 20 55 28
Very Good 22 25 0 25
Good 0 16 9 23
Adequate 0 18 0 9
Weak 0 “a1 9 6
Cannot Rate 33 10 27 8
Warfighting
Excellent 33 13 36 19
Very Good 0 15 9 23
Good 11 23 0 19
Adequate 0 20 0 11
Weak 0 15 9 6
Cannot Rate 56 15 45 22
Communication
Excellent 11 18 36 23
Very Good 11 21 9 25
Good 22 16 9 19
Adequate 0 21 9 16
Weak 22 15 9 8
Cannot Rate 33 8 27 9
Supervision
Excellent 11 18 27 23
Very Good 33 21 18 28
Good 11 15 0 16
Adequate 0 25 9 17
Weak 11 10 9 6
Cannot Rate 33 13 36 9



|

Task

C&R
Aeromedevac
Sling Load/

Cargo Net

Use Arm &
Hand Signals

Occupy Obj.
Rally Point

Occupy
Patrol Base

Occupy
Observ. Post

Perform
Surveillance

Recon
Defend
TLPs

How to

Train

After Action
Review

Train the
Trainer

Rappelling

Unaided
Night Vision

Too Much OK Too Little
BOURC)OUN «OAC. URC)UN «GCC CORREO
17 13 30 15 18 33 2 3 5
49% 33% 44% 43% 46% 48% 6% 8% 7%
1 2 3 14 10 24 18 23 41
3% 5% 4% 40% 26% 35% 51% 59% 60%
3 5 8 20 12 32 11 18 29
9% 13% 12% 57% 31% 46% 31% 46% 42%
13 9 22 18 22 40 2 5 7
37% 23% 32% 51% 56% 58% 6% 13% 10%
21 18 39 «612 15 27 1 2 3
60% 46% 56% 34% 38% 39% 3% 5% 4%
22 18 40 10 15 25 2 2 4
63% 46% 58% 29% 38% 36% 6% 5% 6%
17 9 26 13 19 32 4 7 11
49% 23% 38% 37% 49% 46% 11% 18% 16%
11 6 17 14 19 33. 9 11 20
31% 15% 24% 40% 49% 47% 26% 28% 29%
17 11 28 12 15 17 5 9 14
49% 28% 41% 34% 38% 25% 14% 23% 20%
19 13 32 13 13 26 2 8 10
54% 33% 47% 37% 33% 38% 6% 21% 15%
8 6 14 15 18 33 11 11 22
23% 15% 20% 43% 46% 48% 31% 28% 32%
8 7 15 14 20 34 12 9 21
23% 18% 21% 40% 51% 49% 34% 23% 30%
9 5 14 1 24 42 7 7 14
26% 13% 20% 51% 62% 60% 20% 18% 20%
9 7 16 16 19 (35 10 10 20
26% 18% 23% 46% 49% 49% 2% 26% 28%
17 7 24 14 17 31 3 11 14
49% 18% 35% 40% 44% 45% 9% 28% 20%
14 13 17 13 15 28 7 14 21
40% 8% 26% 37% 38% 42% 20% 36% 32%
(These numbers are not valid because only 33 (16 AC and 17 RC)

personnel took the unaided night vision class.)

G-2

Iz

68

68

69

69

69

69

69

70

69

68

69

70

70

71

69



It is apparent that the battalion, on arrival, was less
proficient than had been expected but did improve somewhat over
time. Asked about this battalion’s performance in relation to
the other units whom they had observed before, seven said "about
the same," nine said "worse," three said "much worse," and two
had no answer. One ILC instructor noted "National Guards have
always been weak. Some of the Active Component NCOs were lazy.
With good NCOs lots of problems could have been avoided."

They were asked to give their opinions on what should be
done to train the leaders of future MFO battalions. Several gave
more than one answer but the majority (13 of 21 responses)
indicated that the MFO should "deploy to a desert terrain using a
mobile training team of ILC cadre." Two suggested remaining at
home station with an ILC team; three said to repeat what had been
done for the 4-505th battalion.

The primary concern that surfaced, however, was the need to
make sure that both the battalion and the ILC were clear, in
advance, as to the exact intent of the course. Some suggested
that no MFO tasks should be included and that the decision be
publicly stated before the start of the course ("Units need to
understand that the ILC is not MFO oriented", "ILC is not
mission prep", "There should be a clear understanding that there
will be no attempt to relate to or simulate MFO experiences or
MFO specific missions while at the ILC."). Others thought ILC
should be tailored to the MFO mission ("They would be better
served by doing tasks that apply in the desert", "Conduct an MFO
tailored ILC in the desert environment with MTT of ILC cadre").
The primary concern was the need to publicize the decision.

Several commented on the need for everyone to participate in
training and the morale problems that occurred when senior
leaders did not train, but watched. Comments included: "The
entire unit needs to be focused when attending, including
officers--be prepared to play the game"; "4-505 lost an
opportunity for team building and establishing an effective chain
of command from the start"; "Chain of command and leadership
problems created a major training distractor."

These attitudes were reflected in the final two open-ended
questions where the cadre reiterated what the battalion had said.
Either ILC as a traditional ILC course or the ILC adapted to
include MFO tasks would have been acceptable as long as everyone
had been apprised of it in advance. Changing focus in the
middle, or not having a focus at all, was a source of great
frustration for the cadre, and the frustration impacted on their
attitudes and performance as well as on their impressions of the
battalion.

MFO in the Sinai questionnaire results. Of the original 154
soldiers who attended the ILC, only 74 could be reached to

23



MFO Unit Preparedness Survey results. The pre-training
survey documented the MFO task force's pre-course preparedness to
train specific tasks. They were asked to rate each of the
collective tasks, drills and individual specialty tasks according
to whether they felt "very well prepared", “prepared", "somewhat
prepared", or "not prepared" to train those tasks before the
start of the course. Table 3 shows percentages of the AC and RC
officers and NCOs who considered themselves either "prepared" or
"very well prepared" to train 17 collective tasks prior to ILC.
(Full data are at Appendix C.)

Table 3

Collective Tasks: Percent Rating Themselves as “Very Well
Prepared" or "Prepared" to Train Their Soldiers to Standard

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO
Disengage 82 55 79 48
Hasty Ambush 100 73 84 56
Point Ambush 91 63 87 53
Defend 100 73 85 55
Occupy Assembly Area 82 73 83 67
Move Tactically 100 73 94 80
Cross Danger Area 91 72 92 74
Occupy ORP* 91 82 84 66
Occupy Patrol Base 100 82 84 66
Linkup 72 55 68 36
Cross Defile 45 46 53 20
Recon Zone 100 64 70 51
Recon Route 100 63 75 47
Occupy OP* 100 64 82 64
Surveillance 82 55 80 52
Prepare for Combat 91 82 88 72
Consolidate/Reorganize 90 54 83 67

Note. ORP (Objective Rally Point); OP (Observation Post)

No AC officers and very few AC NCOs admitted to being "not
prepared" in any category. Although there were AC soldiers (both
officers and NCOs) who admitted being only "somewhat prepared" to
train some tasks, many more RC perceived themselves as less than
"prepared." Similarly, a larger percentage of the AC soldiers
rated themselves as "very well prepared" overall.

There were, however, differences between tasks. For
example, every respondent rated himself as at least "somewhat
prepared" to train the task move tactically; no one said he was
"not prepared." In contrast, the task Cross Defile had more than
25% of the NCOs, both AC and RC, rate themselves "not prepared."

9



that by the end of the STXs and at the end of the month, all
personnel were eager to get home and not particularly interested
in training or in answering any questions about the ILC.

Highlights of the survey are detailed below. The first two
questions parallelled the pre-training survey and asked how
confident respondents were in their ability to develop and
execute training plans. Table 7 shows the numbers and
percentages of respondents selecting each confidence level at the
end of the ILC.

Table 7

Soldiers Reporting Confidence in Their Abilities After the ILC

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO
n & nh & n & n &
Develop Training Plans After ILC
Extremely Confident 6 75 23 41 3 27 #12 19
Very Confident 1 13° «24 43 3 27 34 54
Fairly Confident 0 0 9 16 2 18 12 19
Somewhat Confident 1 13 0 0 1 9 4 6
Not Very Confident 0 0 0 0 2 18 1 2
Total = 8 56 11 63
Execute Training Plans After ILC
Extremely Confident 7 88 24 43 3 27 #17 27
Very Confident 1 13 22 39 3 27 30 48
Fairly Confident 0 0 8 14 2 18 #11 17
Somewhat Confident 0 0) 2 4 1 9 3 5
Not Very Confident 0 0 0 0 2 18 2 3
Total = 8 56 11 63

Two of the primary purposes of the course were to enhance
the soldiers’ ability to develop and execute training plans.
Both AC and RC described themselves as “very" or "extremely"
confident that they could develop (AC 84%, RC 70%) and execute
(AC 84%, RC 72%) training plans for their units.

In a direct comparison of these results with the pre-
training ratings, most overall confidence ratings appear to have
increased after the course. Table 8 shows the comparisons. NCO
shifts toward greater confidence over time indicate that the
course, despite difficulties, had the desired effect for those
who were actually going to be responsible for daily training.

15



Operations where very few of any group felt prepared to train to
standard--not surprising given the small number of personnel who
had attended Pathfinder School.

Other questions covered leadership abilities. Generally the
AC soldiers rated themselves less in need of improvement than the
RC did, but differences were small, except in self-perceptions of
tactical proficiency. The soldiers were also asked to rate the
leadership skills of their immediate superiors. Generally most
respondents were fairly favorable about their superior, with the
RC slightly more so than the AC. These ratings, at the start of
the course, were given with the knowledge that most personnel did
not really know their superiors; they were taken as a rough
baseline, to assess the change over time. (See Appendix D.)

Three questions asked for soldiers’ confidence in their
ability to develop and execute training plans, before the ILC,
and for their confidence in ILC being able to prepare them to
train their subordinates. Percentages are shown in Table 5.

Table 5

Soldier Confidence Ratings in Their Abilities to Develop and
Execute Training and in ILC to Prepare Them to Train

( Percentages

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO
Can Develop Training Now
Extremely Confident 46 10 36 6
very Confident 46 36 9 20
Fairly Confident 9 24 36 36
Somewhat Confident 0 20 9 25
Not Very Confident ie) 10 9 13
Can Execute Training Now
Extremely Confident 36 18 9 6
very Confident 27 31 36 29
Fairly Confident 36 26 27 36
Somewhat Confident 0) 16 18 17
Not Very Confident 0 8 9 12
ILC Will Prepare to Train
Extremely Confident 9 19 46 18
very Confident 64 39 46 60
Fairly Confident 27 25 9 21
Somewhat Confident 0 10 0) 0
Not Very Confident 0 7 0 2

11



complete this survey. Since all four line companies and HHC were
tapped for respondents (the number per company ranged from 8 to
24), the data are probably adequately representative, although
limited. The sample contained 9 officers (4 AC, 5 RC) and 64
NCOs (31 AC and 34 RC). Approximately 70% of the respondents
were either team or squad leaders; 17% were in traditional
company level leader jobs--company commander, first sergeant,
platoon leader or platoon sergeant.

Although other comments were collected, the primary intent
of this survey was to determine if there were any tasks that the
MFO soldiers wished they had spent more (or less) time on during
the ILC. They were first asked for open ended responses, and
then later to rate the actual tasks from the POI. The five point
rating scale consisted of "Way too much time", "Too much time",
"About the right amount of time", "Not quite enough time", "Not
nearly enough time." (See Appendix G for full data.)

A sizeable percentage of the soldiers felt comfortable with
the amount of time allocated to each of the 29 rated tasks. The
highest percentage in this group was for the task After-Action
Review where 60% of the respondents marked “about the right
amount of time." Land Navigation (59%), Use of Hand and Arm
Signals (58%), and Self-Extraction from a Minefield (54%) also
scored high in this category. All of these tasks can be
considered tasks which may be performed during the MFO mission.

There were also several tasks with high ratings for "too
much time" or "way too much time." The tasks with the highest
incidence of this perception were Ambush (64%), Cross Danger Area
(62%), Occupy an Assembly Area (60%), Move Tactically (58%),
Occupy a Patrol Base (58%), Objective Rally Point (56%), and
Perform Linkup (53%). These tasks are traditional infantry
tasks.

Conversely, some tasks received high "Not enough time" and
"Not nearly enough time" ratings although there were far fewer of
these. Most nominated tasks were Aeromedical Evacuation (60%)
and Perform Sling Load Operations (42%). These tasks are

especially important to successful performance of the MFO
mission.

There were only limited differences between the AC and the
RC in their perceptions, although AC tended to more frequently
select "Too much time" or "Way too much time" for their
responses. The only task which showed a large difference between
the two groups was M249 Squad Automatic Weapon Familiarization.
For the AC, 41% said there was too much training, where only 16%
of the RC felt that way. This is easily explained by the fact
that for many RC soldiers this was their first experience with

the M249; most AC soldiers were familiar with it, and many had
fired it.

24



MFO 4-505 Officers and NCO Survey. This final instrument
was administered to the soldiers in the Sinai, about five weeks
into the deployment, and five months after the ILC. The intent
of this questionnaire was to see if perceptions had changed over
time.

Procedures

RTB cadre. Before the MFO Sinai leaders arrived at the ILC
to begin their training, the Ranger Instructors (RIs) and staff
met as a group with ARI to discuss the overall MFO mission, and
typical ILC POI contents, procedures, and outcomes. During this
time period, the RIs became acquainted with the ARI personnel and
began to understand the types of things ARI was interested in
observing and the kinds of information sought from the
instructors. We stressed the importance of the individual cadre
observations and opinions, as well as the need for candor.

This group interview procedure was repeated at the end of
the course as an after action review (AAR). The situation was
deliberately kept very informal to elicit as much information as
possible from the cadre. For some of the instructors, this ILC
had been their first. Others had been RIs for several years.
Some had a great deal of information to use as a basis of
comparison; others had little. However, all spoke at length and
contributed to the overall discussion. Generally they were in
complete agreement with each other on the various issues.

MFO Questionnaires. Procedures varied for administration of
surveys. On the afternoon the 4-505 leaders arrived at Fort
Benning, they were given the experience and pre-training surveys.
The soldiers were in one large group, with four ARI personnel
present. We introduced ourselves and explained our role in their
training experience. We explained that we would be present every
day and would sometimes ask specific questions. We said we would
at any time welcome comments or questions from them. As with the
cadre, we stressed the importance of candor, and assured them
that every soldier's opinion was of value.

For the Prior MFO Rotation survey, the respondents answered
the questions at their own convenience and returned them to ARI
when finished, typically three days later. Instructions stressed
that they were to take their time in responding. The post-
training survey was planned for group administration by ARI, but
the battalion changed its schedule at the last minute and staff
personnel distributed and collected the survey. The Sinai
questionnaire was administered on site by ARI personnel.

Training observations. Finally, the ARI researchers
observed the leaders’ training throughout the entire four week
period. We saw both classroom and field events and watched the
group begin to take shape over time. By our nearly constant

6



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Appendix G

Post-Deployment Ratings of Tasks Trained During the ILC
(Frequencies and Percentages)

Ratings: Too Much Time/Way Too Much Time (Too Much)
About the Right Amount of Time (OK)
Not Enough Time/Not Nearly Enough Time (Too Little)

See Appendix A, Final Questionnaire, for Task Names

Too Much OK Too Little
Task AC RC N ac RC N ac RC N
Prep for 19 13 32 9 14 23 6 6 11
Combat 54% 33% 48% 26% 36% 35% 14% 15% 17%
M16 Zero, 7 9 16 16 14 30 11 11 22
Qual, ARM 20% 23% 24% 46% 36% 44% 31% 28% 32%
M-249 14 5 19 12 12 24 8 15 23
Familiariz. 40% 13% 29% 34% 31% 36% 23% 38% 35%
Occupy AA 23 18 41 9 11 20 2 5 7

35% 46% 60% 26% 28% 29% 6% 13% 10%
Land 10 7 17 21 19 40 3 8 11
Navigation 29% 68% 25% 60% 49% 59% 9% 21% 16%
Move 24 16 40 9 16 25 1 3 4
Tactically 69% 41% 58% 26% 41% 36% 3% 8% 6%
Cross Danger 22 21 43 10 11 21 2 3° 5
Area 63% 54% 62% 29% 28% 30% 6% 8% 7%
Self-extract. 7 5 12 14 22 36 12 7 19
Minefield 20% 13% 18% 40% 56% 54% 34% 18% 28%
Linkup 21 15 36 11 14 25 2 5 7

60% 38% 53% 31% 36% 37% 6% 13% 10%
React to 18 14 32 11 17 28 5 4 9
Contact 51% 36% 46% 31% 44% 41% 14% 10% 13%
Break Contact 18 14 32 12 15 27 4 5 9

51% 36% 47% 34% 38% 40% 11% 13% 13%

Disengage 18 13 31 13 18 31 2 3 5
51% 33% 46% 37% 46% 46% 6% 8% 71%

Ambush 22 20 42 10 10 20 1 3 4
63% 51% 64% 29% 26% 30% 3% 8% 6%

G-1

4

66

68

66

68

68

68

69

67

68

69

68

67

66



Leadership Skills

12. Based upon your participation in the ILC, please indicate
which of your leadership skills you feel improved over the
course. Check as many as apply.

Setting goals and objectives.
Developing strategies.
Establishing priorities.
Delegating duties.
Technical proficiency.
Tactical proficiency.
Conveying facts and requirements.
Listening and comprehension.
Task monitoring.
Providing feedback.
Problem identification.
Developing and analyzing solutions.
Making timely decisions.
Involving others in the planning/decision making process.
Team building.

13. As a result of your participation in the ILC, how would you
currently rate your immediate superior’s skills in the following
areas. Use the scale below for your responses.

Excellent
Very good
Good
Adequate
Weak

Cannot rate

AuRWNE

nnn

Planning

Job Knowledge
Warfighting
Communication
Supervision
Decision Making
Team Building

14. Did you volunteer for this mission? Yes No . if

you answered Yes, have you had any second thoughts about your
decision? Yes No

A-13



SINAI TASK FORCE LEADERS AT THE INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The 4-505 PIR MFO Battalion Task Force

The U.S. Army Research Institute’s Role
The Infantry Leaders Course
Purpose of the Research

METHOD...

Subjects
Materials
Procedures

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION .

Questionnaire Data .

Impact of Class Size and Structure

Training Observations

CONCLUSIONS .

Training Infantry Skills

Teamwork and Bonding
Impact of MFO on ILC

Is the ILC the Place for the MFO ‘to Train?

RECOMMENDATIONS .....

REFERENCES .
APPENDIX A.
B.

c.

QUESTIONNAIRES AND SURVEYS
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
PREPAREDNESS TO TRAIN COLLECTIVE

TASKS, BATTLE DRILLS, SPECIAL SKILLS
AND INDIVIDUAL TASKS

PRE-TRAINING RATINGS OF IMMEDIATE
SUPERIORS (PERCENTAGES)

LEADERSHIP SKILLS

Page

Ww UNE

ane



Table 15

Pre and Post Course Ratings of Skills of Immediate Superiors

(Percentages Selecting Each Rating)

n =
Planning
Excellent
very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Job Knowledge
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Warfighting
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Communication
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Supervision
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Decision Making
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Team Building
Excellent
very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak

Active Component
Officer
Pre Post Pre Post

Reserve Component

11

46

9

33
67
0
0
0

67
33
0
0
0

75
0
25
0
0

17
17
33

0
33

17
50
17

0
17

50
17
33
0
0

50
17
17

0
17

NCO
63 61
15 15
21 29
26 24
25 20
13 13
14 22
27 27
29 18
19 20
12 13

9 15
15 17
4l 27
15 23
21 17
11 20
26 23
26 18
19 23
18 16
10 20
24 24
35 17
14 28
17 11
18 18
21 20
26 27
19 22
16 13
19 18
17 31
28 16
22 20
15 15

Officer NCO
Pre Post Pre Post
11 11 69 66
27 75 #15 14
36 0 29 46
36 0 29 17
0 13 20 17
0 13 8 7
36 75 20 31
55 0 36 27
ie) 13027 25
9 o 14 10
0 13 3 7
20 67 16 24
30 17° «19 30
20 0 44 24
20 o 19 14
10 17 3 8
27 50 14 26
46 13° 27 28
9 13 30 21
18 13 #417 17
0 13. 13 9
10 43 16 26
60 29 33 31
30 0 30 17
0 14 13 19
7 14 8 7
46 50 18 19
36 0 32 31
18 13. 24 25
0 13 =«417 17
0 25 9 9
27 57 27 26
55 29 19 33
9 0 25 19
9 Oo 16 14
0 14 13 9



Cross Danger Area
very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Occupy Objective Rally Point
very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Occupy Patrol Base
Very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Linkup
Very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Cross Defile
Very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Reconnoiter Zone
Very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared:
Not Prepared

Reconnoiter Route
Very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Occupy Observation Post
Very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Active
OFF NCO

33
25
5
0

OWwWuUwW ooujo OoOrrRD orrRO
bh b
a °

onuo
ND
P

15
29
18

oot.

15
32
14

COMW

25
36
12

N COOP

Reserve
OFF NCO

BROW oun

onunwn

NNUN wWwwWue

NN BW

RPWOArR

FE HO

19
32
17



Land Navigation
very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Construct Fighting Positions

very Well Prepared
Prepared

Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Aeromedical Evacuation
very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Pathfinder Operations
very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Unaided Night Vision
very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Report Enemy Information
Very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared .

Active

Reserve

OFF NCO OFF NCO

PRPaAN NUWE ORPWUP ORD OrPwW A

CcOMWw

29
31
2
1

21
35
6
1

10
23
21

9

14
22
20

17
26
12

31
28

NP UW orBW

WNuUr

WNP

owMw

Wu re

18
36
14



Pre-Training Ratings of Immediate Superiors (Percentages)

Appendix D

Active Component

Respondents

Planning
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Cannot Rate

Job Knowledge
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Cannot Rate

Warfighting
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Cannot Rate

Communication
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Cannot Rate

Supervision
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Adequate
Weak
Cannot Rate

Officer

11

wu
owonue

36
36

27
36
18

9

NCO

63

10
24
24
18
16
10

Reserve Component

Officer

a1

27
36
36
0
0
0

36

55
0
9
0
0

18
27
18
18
9
9

27
46

9
18

NCO

69

19
33
25
13

13
25
28
16
12

16
32
29
13



In explanation of their ratings, most who were positive
noted that the ILC and the RTB, are the standard, the best of
Infantry training, and that any training they provided would be
of benefit ("Yes, because regardless of mission, ILC trains units
on standards of training and how to train"). Others mentioned
the teamwork opportunities fostered by the environment. Those
who were not in favor of the course focused on the lack of MFO
specific classes, and noted their opinions that a Fort Bragg-
based course (specifically the Airborne Leaders Course), could
have done as well or better ("Could have done the training at
Bragg with MFO oriented tasks and classes more specific to our
mission").

Table 11 shows responses and percentages for the questions
which asked if, given the makeup of their battalion, team
building and/or training could have been accomplished better
somewhere else. The battalion was about evenly divided with
respect to bonding. However, 68% of those who answered said that
the training could and would have been done more cost effectively
at home station; very few overall were supportive of ILC’s
location. These responses echo an overall dissatisfaction with
the ILC as conducted. Several mentioned the economic aspects of
having moved so many personnel from one location to another. The
high number of uncertain, undecided or "yes and no" responses
shows that many could see benefits to the training focus of, for
example, being away from home or away from the other home station
training distractors. As before, several mentioned the ILC as a
mini-deployment and a test of the battalion’s internal logistics
system.

Table 11

Personnel Favorable to a Change of Location

Active Component Reserve Component

Qfficer NCO Officer NCO
For Team Building
Yes 4 (50%) 29 (52%) 8 (80%) 32 (57%)
No 4 (50%) 27 (48%) 2 (20%) 24 (43%)
n= 8 56 10 56

For Training
Yes 4 (44%) 47 (77%) 8 (73%) 40 (63%)

No 2 (22%) 7 (11%) 0 ( 0%) 3 ( 5%)
? 3 (33%) 7 (11%) 3 (27%) 21 (33%)
n= 9 61 11 64

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FOREWORD

The 4-505 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) Multinational
Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Task Force is a composite
battalion comprised of Activate Component (AC) and Reserve
Component (RC) personnel. Its senior leaders deployed from Fort
Bragg, NC, to Fort Benning, GA, from August 26, 1994 through
September 23, 1994, to attend the Infantry Leaders Course (ILC).
This course, specializing in Infantry doctrine and tactics and
collective Infantry skills, was the initial training event for
the leaders, both officers and noncommissioned officers of the
newly constituted battalion, and their first opportunity to
function as a group.

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences (ARI) was tapped as the primary assessor of the
training. The Infantry Forces Research Unit (IFRU) element of
ARI’s Training Systems Research Division, located at Fort
Benning, observed the task force leaders’ ILC training. The IFRU
has had considerable experience in observation and assessment of
small unit Infantry training.

The lessons learned about the MFO assignment and training
experiences will be of great importance for future rotations as
the MFO mission continues and other composite battalions are
formed to accomplish the mission. Information contained in this
report, one of many focusing on the MFO, has been briefed at all
levels, including the Chief of Staff of the Army.

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director



Blank Pages



attendance during training (to include road marches and evening
and weekend classes), we gained the confidence of the 4-505
leaders. They spoke candidly about their concerns and
impressions. These findings, although less rigorous or
systematic than the questionnaires, provided excellent
information and answers relevant to the previously articulated
research questions. They also serve as validation of the
questionnaire data.

Results and Discussion

_The MFO composite battalion’s training at ILC differed in
many ways from that of the typical battalion. The tasks selected
were quite different from those of most light infantry
battalions. The mixture of Active and Reserve Component soldiers
was anticipated in advance to be a problem; the newness of the
battalion turned out to be a critical issue. Since the unit had
no history, no overall training status could be determined in
advance. The effects of these and other issues will be detailed
below. The questionnaire data are reported first. The
logistical impact of 154 students on the training system is
discussed next; the training observations are discussed last.

The overall guiding research questions are addressed as a part of
the Conclusions section.

Questionnaire Data

Experience surve: nd demographic data. The brief
demographic questionnaire elicited student background and
experience. Of the MFO leaders (N=154) who responded, 74 were AC
soldiers (11 officers and 63 NCOs). The remaining 80 were RC (74
Army National Guard, 6 Army Reserve). Of the RC, 11 were
officers, 69 NCOs. Although in the group there were some
officers with prior enlisted service and one NCO who had been an
officer, data for this and all other surveys were tabulated
according to the respondent’s present status. Also, because
there were a great number of National Guardsmen with prior Active
Duty service, it is impossible to verify when (or in what
capacity) they attended specific schools.

In terms of both experience and advanced military education,
the AC leaders exceeded the RC. This disparity was particularly
striking in the elite courses, €.g., Ranger and Airborne Schools.
Demographic highlights are shown in Table 1 and full data are at
Appendix B.

The Combat Training Center (CTC) experience was somewhat
greater for the AC soldiers (see Table 2). The relatively high
RC attendance probably reflects the high number with prior Active
Duty service. The relatively low percentage for the officers as
a whole may reflect the fact that 14 of the 22 officers were

7



Another question centered on the ILC’s suitability as a
predeployment training event for the MFO. Both course content
and the location of the training arose as issues. The pre-course
decision to include only Infantry tasks during the ILC
disappointed those who expected that they would receive MFO
specific training, and the non-desert terrain reduced the face
validity of the course. A training venue more similar to the
Sinai, with more MFO tasks or vignettes added to the training
content, would have been useful to the battalion.

Utilization of Findings:

The lessons learned from this, the first iteration of an
MFO-bound battalion at the ILC, were many and will benefit future
MFO battalions in their unit training, regardless of the
composition of the battalion or the location of their training.
The findings will also assist decision makers in preparing units
for MFO deployment.

viii



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earlier rotation (for some only 6 months prior; for others nearly
10 years) and answer questions based on their experiences. They
said that they remembered most of the MFO precis items (reports,
identification), but 15 admitted that they needed/desired
refresher training.

In response to a question about train up tasks other than
MFO tasks their prior unit had used, 11 of the nineteen reported
MFO tasks anyway. Others mentioned common task training; there
was little consensus on this question or one which asked what
they wished they had spent more time on. Asked what, based on
their experiences, most units need to train on, other than MFO
tasks, eight again cited the need for MFO tasks. This continuing
emphasis on MFO tasks ("vehicle, aircraft and license ID; first
aid because of the civilian accidents over there"), by those who
had already been on the mission, no doubt intensified feelings
that the ILC was not focused on the right kinds of training,
especially as they talked about their experiences with their
peers. Two specifically mentioned the desirability of Arabic
language training.

A critical question asked whether MFO battalions need the
ILC or something like the ILC. Nine said yes, they needed
something like the ILC; six said no; the other four hedged with
yes and no. Fifteen indicated that something else (i.e., not
ILC) would have been useful; nine thought that tasks from the
long range surveillance course might be beneficial.

Asked what problems they perceived as coming from using a
volunteer force, nine said none ("You have people who want to be
here"); five focused on uneven ability levels. Five mentioned
the possibility of volunteering for the wrong reasons or of RC
personnel being able to change their minds after they had
started. On the other hand, asked about the benefits of using
volunteers, 15 commented on the high levels of motivation.
Eleven felt that unit cohesion could easily be developed under
the present circumstances; five said no, and three were unsure.
One said "I wish we had more than one month." Ten said that
cohesion was not a problem to begin with.

The perceived worst parts of the Sinai deployment were
confusion brought by the mission and some chain of command
issues. The leaders also commented on the hardship of being away
from their families. The best part of the deployment was the
training or "travel and culture." Some mentioned opportunities
for personal growth, getting to know other people, or "belonging
to a good squad or team."

Asked their opinions on whether the MFO mission should be
conducted by AC units, RC units or a mixture, eleven opted for
the combined composition. Six added that such a mixture would be
of benefit to both the Reserve and Active Components. In

13



U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Research Report 1677

Sinai Task Force Leaders
at the Infantry Leaders Course

Margaret S. Salter, Gene W. Fober, Robert J. Pleban,
and Patrick J. Valentine

U.S. Army Research Institute

19960215 059

DTIC QtiaLiny iNSPECTED 2

June 1995

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.



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References

Department of the Army (1988a). Mission training plan for the
infantry rifle platoon and_squad (ARTEP 7-8 MTP). Washington,
Dc.

Department of the Army (1988b). Training the force: Soldiers,
units & leaders (FM 25-100). Washington, DC.

Department of the Army (1990). Training the force: Battle
focused training (FM 25-101). Washington, DC.

Department of the Army (1991). A _leader’s quide to after action
reviews (Coordinating Draft) (TC 25-20). Washington, DC.

Department of the Army (1992). Infantry rifle platoon and_squad
(FM 7-8). Washington, DC.

Department of the Army (1993). Infantry leaders course pamphlet
(SH 21-75-7).- Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Army Infantry School.

Dyer, J. L., Fober, G. W., Pleban, R. J., Salter, M. S.,
Valentine, P. J., & Thompson, T. J. (1992). Light infantry
performance at the combat training centers: Home station
determinants (ARI Research Note 92-33). Alexandria, VA: U.S.
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences. (AD A250 502)

Fober, G. W., Dyer, J. L., & Salter, M. S. (1994). Measures of
performance at the Joint Readiness Training Center: Tools of
assessment. In R. L. Holz, J. H. Hiller, & H. H. McFann
(Eds.) Determinants of effective unit performance: Research
on measuring and managing unit training readiness (pp. 39-67).
Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Pleban, R. J., Thompson, T. J., & Valentine, P. J. (1993). The
commander’s battle staff handbook: An introduction to staff
functional area duties for new battalion staff officers (ARI
Research Product 94-02). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A276
139)

Pleban, R. J., Valentine, P. J., & Thompson, T. J. (1994,
November). Measurement of physiological and cognitive
performance capabilities in continuous operation environments:
Methodological strategies for the assessment of collective and

individual work load requirements. Paper presented at the
33rd U.S. Army Operations Research Symposium, Fort Lee, VA.

Salter, M. S. (1994). The Officer’s Advance Course: Prior

37



CONTENTS (Continued)

Table

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Personnel Favorable to a Change of Location

Strengths of the ILC: Frequencies of
Response in Each Category rs

Weaknesses of the ILC: Frequencies of
Response in Each Category .......-

Numbers of Soldiers Reporting Perceived
Improvements in Team Building, Tactical
Proficiency or Technical Proficiency

Pre and Post Course Ratings of Skills of
Immediate Superiors (Percentages Selecting
Each Rating) ... 2... ee eee eee

ILC Cadre Expectations of MFO Performance

xi

Page

18

19

20

20

21

22



CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

APPENDIX F. POST-TRAINING RATINGS OF IMMEDIATE
SUPERIORS (PERCENTAGES) . - + ++ + + e+ 2 F-1

G. POST-DEPLOYMENT RATINGS OF TASKS
TRAINED DURING THE ILC .- +--+ + + + © © # & G-1

H. TRAINING CALENDAR AND SCHEDULE ..-.+-+ ++: H-1

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Numbers and Percentages of Soldiers
Reporting Attendance at Officer/NCO Courses . 8

2. Numbers and Percentages of Soldiers
Reporting Experience at Each of the Combat
Training Centers . . + se ee ee ee eee 8

3. Collective Tasks: Percent Rating Themselves
as "Very Well Prepared" or "Prepared" to
Train Their Soldiers to Standard ...+-+-:+- 9

4. Battle Drills, Special Skills, Individual
Tasks: Percent Rating Themselves as "Very
Well Prepared" or "Prepared" to Train Their
Soldiers to Standard . ..-. 5. s+ + eee eee 10

5. Soldier Confidence Ratings in Their Abilities
to Develop and Execute Training and in ILC to
Prepare Them to Train (Percentages) we eee 11

6. Percent of Soldiers Reporting Specific
Expectations from the ILC: First and
(Second) Responses . - . + + + + e+ e+ es ee 8 e 12

7. Soldiers Reporting Confidence in Their
Abilities After the ILC re 15

8. Confidence Ratings: Comparison of Pre and
Post Training Ratings (Percentages) oe eee 16

9. Soldier Ratings of Course Effectiveness and
Usefulness . 6. 2 ee ee ee ee ee ee 17

10. Should the ILC Continue to Be Used to Train
MFO? 2. 6 6 © 6 6 ee ee oe ee ew ee ee 17



6. Having completed the ILC, how useful do you think this
course is in preparing units like yours for MFO missions? Use
the scale below for your response.

Extremely useful
very useful
Somewhat useful
Not very useful
Not at all useful

UbBWNP
uuu ut

7. In your opinion, should the ILC continue to be used to train
MFO battalions like yours for future rotations? Yes No.
If yes, why? If no, why not?

8. Given the makeup of your battalion, could team building be
done more efficiently or effectively through other courses or
training than through the ILC? Yes No. If yes,
please explain.

9. Could some of the training you received be taught more
economically/effectively somewhere else? Yes No
Not sure. If yes, list what could be taught at other

sites.

10. What were the major strengths and benefits of the ILC?

11. Were there any weaknesses in the ILC? If yes. please list.

A-12



in advance

receive MFO training. Those who knew of the intent
chose who

did not appear, by their comments, ‘to be happy with

were unaware of ¢ Gec nm until it became appare its own
were even more dissatis ssension caused the
varying perceptions on lave Deen taugnt erfered

with the training itseif--some blaming the ILC cadre, others
blaming the 4-505th chain of command.

Teamwork and Bon a

The second major question, of primary concern to the 4-
505th, focused on the unit's ability to become a cohesive unit.
Most of the original concerns about this issue dealt with the
AC/RC mixture aspect of the question--whether two disparate
elements could be combined and work together. However, very
early in the course it became obvious that most personnel in each
group accepted each other as members of the common MFO unit and
that the AC/RC difference per se was irrelevant. Some AC
soldiers admitted to being pleasantly surprised by the
capabilities of individual RC members. Cohesion was personality
dependent, and somewhat dependent on the specific situation. A
company might unite in irritation at what was perceived as wasted
training time when a class started late, or at the absence of MFO
specific tasks, but be totally divided when it came to perception
of leader effectiveness.

The only way to answer the bonding and teamwork question
becomes: it varied. Some of the unfortunate aspects of the
course (confusion about the mission, over crowding, perception
that leaders were not really working very hard) interfered with
bonding. In a more well-defined training environment, the month
long course could have promoted a strong within-unit bond; as it
was, the results were more piecemeal and variable from day to
day. One indication that traditional bonding had not yet
occurred was that there was very little friendly competition
observed, either within the battalion or between companies.
There was little banter and camaraderie between soldiers.

Impact _of MFO on ILC

Another major question asked what changes were required to
the ILC to accommodate the MFO. The logistic problems have been
detailed at length. The primary impact of so many personnel was
that they could not all be usefully employed in the training day-
-or that they did not interpret themselves as being effectively
utilized. The ILC intent, as stated in the prospectus and
understood by the cadre, is for everyone to train; the MFO
battalion had planned for some to serve as permanent TOC
personnel, not attending training. Additionally, some personnel
participated in training only sporadically. This created
dissatisfaction, and dissension within the battalion and between
the battalion and the ILC.

32



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improvement in these areas were included in the tabulation. For
these, "Improved" or "Did Not Improve" responses were counted.
Overall, therefore, the self-assessment numbers are very small.
Table 13

Weaknesses of the ILC: Frequencies of Response in Fach Category

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO
Communication 4 7 1 5
No MFO tasks 2 8 3 9
Content; logistics 1 8 2 7
Level of instruction 1 41 3 14
Bad attitude 0 13 2 13

Note. Frequencies total more than the number of respondents
because several offered more than one response.

Table 14

Numbers of Soldiers Reporting Perceived Improvements in Team
Building, Tactical Proficiency or Technical Proficiency

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

Team Building

Needed Improvement 2 15 3 26

Improved 2 9 1 14

Did not Improve 0 6 2 12
Tactical Proficiency

Needed Improvement 3 21 4 40

Improved 1 10 4 28

Did not Improve 2 11 0 12
Technical Proficiency

Needed Improvement 2 20 7 45

Improved 0 7 3 31

Did not Improve 2 13 4 14

They also rated their immediate superior on seven specific
leadership dimensions (see Appendix F). Since they performed
this rating at the beginning and at the end of the course, it is
instructive to look at the changes in ratings over time. Pre-
and Post- survey response percentages are as shown in Table 15.

20



experience survey (ARI Research Note 94-30). Alexandria, VA:

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences. (AD A285 306)

Salter, M. S. (in preparation). Rifle company performance at the
Joint Readiness Training Center: Analysis of take home
packages (ARI Research Report). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Thompson, T. J., Pleban, R. g., & Valentine, P. J. (1994).
Battle staff training and synchronization: The integration of
functions critical to combat operations. In R. L. Holz, J. H.
Hiller, & H. H. McFann (Eds.) Determinants of effective unit
performance: Research on measuring and managing unit training
readiness (pp. 179-230). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Thompson, T. J., Thompson, G. D., Pleban, R. J., & Valentine, P.
J. (1991). Battle staff training and synchronization in light

infantry battalions and task forces (ART Research Report
1607). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences.

(AD A245 292)

38



The next two questions asked opinions on the major strengths
and weaknesses of the ILC. Strengths of the ILC responses again
clustered into predictable categories, as shown in Table 12.
Table 12

Strengths of the ILC: Frequencies of Response in Each Category

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO
Instructors 1 7 0 10
Team building 5 26 7 41
Skill evaluations 2 21 3 21
Away from distractors 2 2 4 0
Bad attitude 1 6 1 5
n= 7 50 11 59

Note. See text for explanation of descriptors. Several
respondents offered more than one response.

For both AC and RC, the major benefit of the ILC was team
puilding or confidence enhancement. Refresher training and
“reblueing" on Infantry skills were also praised. One noted:
"ILC kind of shook people up and put them into the military
mode." As before, a few could find nothing positive to say (bad
attitude); however, several made more than one good comment. For
these, only the first two responses were tabulated.

Similarly, identified weaknesses are shown in Table 13. They
focused on communication problems, primarily the lack of within
battalion communication of commander’s intent ("...coordination,
and use of downtime"). The mismatch between the student
expectations and the RTB course content created confusion and
dissention based on the absence of MFO specific material and the
perceived lack of insurance that the soldiers’ needs were being
satisfied ("ILC instructors hands were tied too much. The course
was weak for our needs because it was not MFO related"). Some
noted that the instruction was "OK for the Guard" or otherwise
too basic; others repeated the bad attitude responses ("nothing
good about it").

Two questions focused on leadership skills. The questions
were identical to those on the first pre-training questionnaire.
Overall, no one said that leadership skills improved much. For
perceived self-improvement, the critical areas of concern are
those which parallel the aims of the course: team building and
tactical and technical proficiency. Table 14 shows perceptions
for these areas; other data are at Appendix E. Only respondents
who had indicated on the first survey that they needed

19



Appendix C

Preparedness to Train Collective Tasks, Battle Drills, Special
Skills and Individual Tasks

Active includes Active Component (AC) personnel (74);
Reserve includes all the Reserve Component (RC) personnel--
National Guard (74), Army Reserve (5), and Individual Ready
Reserve (1). OFF represents officers (Lieutenant through
Lieutenant Colonel) and NCO represents all others (Private First
Class through Sergeant Major).

Active Reserve
OFF NCO OFF NCO

Total Number of Respondents 11 63 11 69
Disengage
Very Well Prepared 4 14 1 4
Prepared 4 36 5 29
Somewhat Prepared 2 10 5 25
Not Prepared 0 3 0 11
Hasty Ambush
Very Well Prepared 4 17 2. 4
Prepared 7 36 6 34
Somewhat Prepared 0 9 2 25
Not Prepared 0 1 1 5
Point Ambush
Very Well Prepared 4 16 3 3
Prepared 6 39 4 33
Somewhat Prepared 1 7 3. 25
Not Prepared 0 1 1 7
Defend
Very Well Prepare: 4 16 2 11
Prepared - 7 38 6 26
Somewhat Prepared 0 7 2 24
Not Prepared 0 2 1 6
Occupy Assembly Area
Very Well Prepared 4 22 2 #14
Prepared 5 30 6 31
Somewhat Prepared 2 10 3. 22
Not Prepared 0 1 0 1
Move Tactically
Very Well Prepared 6 34 6 21
Prepared 5 25 2 33
Somewhat Prepared 0 4 3 #414
Not Prepared 0 0 0 1



SINAI TASK FORCE LEADERS AT THE INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

The 4-505 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) Multinational
Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Task Force is a composite
battalion composed of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component
(RC) personnel. In leadership positions, half are Regular Army,
the other half National Guard or Army Reserve. It is an
"experimental" battalion, both in its composition and in its
availability to accomplish the MFO Sinai peacekeeping mission.
The purpose of the research described in this report was to
document the battalion’s initial training event—the Infantry
Leaders Course (ILC) at Fort Benning. Specific research
questions focused on whether the ILC was able to accomplish its
training mission—were the leaders trained to standard and
prepared to conduct training? Further, were the leaders able to
become a cohesive unit?

Procedure:

Subjects of the research were the 154 soldiers who attended
the ILC. There were 11 AC and 11 RC officers and 132
noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel, 63 from the AC
and 69 from the RC. Researchers collected data through written
questionnaires, interviews, and first-hand training observations
throughout the month-long course.

Findings:

Based on all observations, it was apparent that the
composite battalion would be able to conduct both its internal
training and the MFO mission. Part of this is due to the caliber
of the ILC instruction, part due to the high quality leaders in
the battalion. Although some portions of the training went more
smoothly than others, those who had skill deficiencies when they
arrived at the course were highly motivated and benefitted most.
Early concerns over unit cohesion focused on the AC/RC mixture
and whether the two elements could be combined and work together.
Most individuals in each group readily accepted each other as
members of the common MFO unit—the AC/RC difference was
irrelevant.

vii



Besides Cross Defile, only three tasks (Disengage, Perform Linkup
and Reconnoiter Route) had less than half of the respondents rate
themselves as either prepared or very well prepared, and all of
these were RC NCOs.

Therefore, prior to the start of the course, more than half
of all personnel thought they were already prepared to train
other people on the subjects they were about to receive training
on. Even though there was no way to measure the accuracy of
these self-perceptions, their impact cannot be ignored: many
felt ILC was a waste of time. This was coupled with the fact
that many felt that they should have been receiving training in
the MFO tasks which they did not know. The mismatch between
perceived needs and course expectations and the actual conduct
and content of the course caused problems (described below)
throughout the duration of the ILC experience.

For the four battle drills polled, AC respondents were very
confident in their ability to conduct training; 87% of all
respondents rated themselves as "Prepared" or “Very Well
Prepared" on React to Contact and Break Contact, and React to
Ambush, and React to Indirect Fire (see Table 4). In contrast,
for the RC soldiers, the highest percentage for any drill was
81%.

Table 4
Battle Drills, Special Skills, Individual Tasks: Percent Rating

Themselves as "Very Well Prepared" or "Prepared" to Train Their
Soldiers to Standard

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO
React to Contact 91 94 64 71
Break Contact g1 89 64 66
React to Ambush 91 87 73 65
React to Indirect Fire 91 95 73 81
Leader Reconnaissance 91 76 64 57
Land Navigation 91 95 64 72
Construct Fighting Posns 91 89 73 68
Aeromedical Evacuation 91 52 55 24
Pathfinder Operations 36 33 46 12
Unaided Night Vision 55 68 50 34
Report Enemy Information 100 94 73 78

The: overall pattern (AC more likely to rate themselves
prepared or very well prepared than RC) continued for the other
tasks and skills, with the exception of the task Pathfinder

10



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9. UNAIDED NIGHT VISION NA A B Cc D E

10. TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES A B Cc D E

ll. STXs : A B Cc D E

12. WAS THE TRAINING YOU RECEIVED BENEFICIAL?
_YES ; NO
COMMENTS:

13. WAS THE MATERIAL PRESENTED ON A LEVEL APPROPRIATE FOR YOU?
YES NO
COMMENTS:

14. WAS THE INSTRUCTION PRESENTED IN AN ORGANIZED MANNER?
. NO
COMMENTS:

15. DID THE INSTRUCTORS PRESENT THEIR TRAINING IN A PROFESSIONAL
MANNER?

YES NO
COMMENTS:

16. WHAT WAS YOUR UNITS MISSION WHILE HERE AT THE INFANTRY LEADERS
COURSE? :

A-10



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8. The ILC POI covered all of the tasks listed below. Now that you have been here on the
MFO mission for a month, and based on what you know now, assess the amount of time you
spent on these tasks while you were at the ILC. Use the following scale:

1 = Way too much time

2 = Too much time

3 = About the right amount of time

4 = Not quite enough time

5 = Not nearly enough time

X =I did not attend this part of the training

Prepare for Combat

M-16 Zero, Qualification, Advanced Rifle Marksmanship
M-249 Familiarization

Occupy Assembly Area

Land Navigation

Move Tactically

Cross Danger Area

Perform Self-Extraction from a Minefield
Linkup

React to Contact

Break Contact

Disengage

Ambush

Consolidate and Reorganize
Aeromedevac Procedures

Sling Load/Cargo Net Operations
Use Arm and Hand Signals
Occupy an Objective Rally Point
Occupy a Patrol Base

Occupy an Observation Post
Perform Surveillance

Perform Area, Route, Zone Recon
Defend

MIP ITTE PETE EEE EPEEEE

Troop Leading Procedures
How to Train

After Action Reviews
Train the Trainer

tT

Rappelling
____ Unaided Night Vision

9. Help us help future rotations: in retrospect, is there anything else you would like to say
about ILC?

A-17



inexperienced ju + leaders were made to seem more important
than they actual ere pecause of the boredom (and lack of
something specific =o do) experienced by the rest of the company.

Additionally, because so many in the chain of command were
present at train , internal company leaders (platoon sergeants
and first sergeants, company commanders) often intervened to
assist the platform instructor; this reduced the roles of the RTB
ILC cadre to AAR cr. ue personnei, rather than coach or
teacher. Although it was important for the chain of command to
make itself known thin the company, some perceived it as
wasting the RI si s, and undermining the benefits of the
course. This contributed to an impression that training could as
easily have been done in another location.

The course is usually conducted to insure that each person
is actively involved in training every day; with so many extra
people, there was little for many of them to do on a daily basis.
This was particuliariy true for the officers; most of the HHC
personnel stayed at the TOC except during the confidence building
events. Erratic participation caused morale and organization
problems.

Training Observations

Training schedule/content. The overall training schedule
and POI content (see Appendix I) were finalized before the
company commanders and first sergeants reported to the battalion,
and no company driven changes occurred after the class started.
Company leaders said they felt that they were at the ILC with
little to do. Most just stood (or sat) and watched training;
only a few platoon leaders actually role-played rifleman within
the training events. The published training schedule times were
not adhered to, often because of longer than typical throughput
problems or because the battalion declined to continue training
into the evening or weekend.

A further and probably more important consequence of the
lack of widespread input to the training schedule was that the
overall intent of the training was lost to almost everyone
outside the battalion staff. For example, the NCOs had expected
practice in MFO specific tasks; such expectations were evident
from initial questionnaire data and from daily conversations with
the soldiers. Although the 4-505th Battalion had never planned
for ILC to include MFO specific training, the student soldiers
did not learn it until well into the second week of training. By
then they had begun to question course content and push for
changes. The training, all light infantry oriented, was
perceived by most of them as nearly irrelevant to their MFO
mission; they did not know that RTB had not been asked to include
MFO tasks and that MFO tasks would be the focus when the unit
returned to Fort Bragg.

27



Appendix H

Training Calendar and Schedule

Hel



the communication >
=raining with an MFO siant bu
and could not change focus in the middle
of the course wil i instruction. This tende
create confusion and dissent and reducea the face vaiidity of the
course as a precursor to the MFO mission. Another detractor was
that the wooded areas of Fort Benning do not look like the Sinai.

The cadre
They could have
been requested

Team building events. The commander’s METL inciuded "form
an Infantry Task Force (receive, organize, equip and train the
force)." A major element of this task was the cohesion and team
building required to make a unified battalion from the diverse
group of the soldiers who arrived at the ILC. Team building,
always important, was perceived as critical for the MFO in the
integration of Active and Reserve Component soldiers.

Several classes were held to enhance cohesion. The first
was the Water Confidence Course where all personnel were required
to perform tasks requiring a public display of courage. These
involved a climb to the top of a 30 foot tower, a slide down a
pulley line across water, and an over-water walk across an eight
inch wide "log" pathway. This event provided an excellent
beginning for the battalion; spirits were high, and the soldiers
encouraged and cheered each other on, rallying behind those who
found the task especially difficult.

The second confidence and team building event was held on
the first full training day. The Leaders Reaction Course (LRC)
was offered by the Combined Arms and Tactics Branch of the U.S.
Army Infantry School. The officers, first sergeants and platoon
sergeants did not participate; if present they joined the RTB
cadre as observers. The soldiers were not assigned according to
their unit element, but were divided into eight man groups.

The course consisted of seventeen stations, ten involving
water hazards, seven so-called dry stations. At each station the
soldiers were presented with a problem or scenario. The intent
was to force the group to come up with creative solutions to the
problem and to work together as a team. There were several
possible ways to solve each problem, but each required that the
personnel cooperate and rely on each other. This training event
was very well received; laughter and high spirits were very
apparent. Between group competition was high, and within group
motivation appeared to be good.

The final scheduled teamwork and bonding event, rappelling,
from both low and high platforms and from a helicopter, was held
at the end of the second week. Bad weather precluded the
helicopter portion, but the entire battalion participated in the
rappelling. Some were experienced rappellers; others had never
done it before. Again, this was a very spirited event, with
considerable overall competition and camaraderie.

28



Infantry Leaders Course - Soldiers with Prior MFO Experience

SSN (last four)
Name - OPTIONAL
PLEASE TAKE YOUR TIME IN ANSWERING - GIVE TO ME WHEN DONE.

ANSWER FOR THE LAST TIME YOU WERE ON THE MFO MISSION (not 4/505)

1.

i)

How many times have you been on the MFO Task Force before this one? —_[If more
than once, give dates and units for all.]

When? What unit(s)?

What was your duty position for your most recent rotation?

Looking back, what did you do most of the time in Sector Control Centers or OPs or at
check points (or wherever you were)?

Was your workload too heavy? —_ too light?

Did you have more or fewer responsibilities than you had expected?

Lower level leaders have more independence and responsibilities in the MFO than they
normally do. How well did this work?

What kinds of things did you do to keep occupied while you were off duty or on R&R?
Were you bored? .

Did you take any educational courses? Do you plan to this time?

Other than the MFO Precis tasks, what kind of special or refresher training did your other
unit do to get ready before you went to the Sinai?



An open ended question asked which other specialized skills
or tasks should have been included in the ILC POI; many did not
answer. For those who responded, first responses clustered into
five categories: MFO tasks in general (39), specific MFO tasks
(20), other 11 series tasks (11), troop leading procedures (5),
and, again, responses indicating overall bad attitude (4). The
focus on the MFO tasks remained strong. One volunteered "I don’t
think ILC was suited to our unit’s mission. We have one week
until our soldiers arrive. We need to be studying and having
classes on our MFO precis..."

Table 8

Confidence Ratings: Comparison of Pre and Post Training Ratings

( Percentages )

Active Component Reserve Component
Officer NCO Officer NCO
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Develop Training
Extremely Confident 46 75 10 41 36 27 6 9
Very Confident 46 13 36 43 9 27 20 54
Fairly Confident 9 0 24 16 36 18 36 19
Somewhat Confident 0 13 20 0 9 9 25 6
Not Very Confident 0 0 10 0 9 18 13 2
Execute Training
Extremely Confident 36 88 18 43 9 27 6 27
very Confident 27 13 31 039 36 6027 29 48
Fairly Confident 36 0 26 14 27 18 36 17
Somewhat Confident 0 0 16 4 18 9 17 5
Not Very Confident 0 (0) 8 0 9 18 12 3

The next two questions asked about the effectiveness of the
ILC in preparing the unit to train to standard, and in promoting
leader bonding. The ratings are shown in Table 9. Approximately
half (48% to 58% of each group) thought the course was
"effective" or "very effective" in preparing them to train. Most
soldiers--officers (AC 77% and RC 81%) more than NCOs (AC 48% and
RC 58%)-- thought it was "effective" or "very effective" in
promoting bonding. The negativity of two RC officers is
reflected in the "Very Ineffective" training response.

Another question asked how useful the 4-505 felt the ILC was
in preparing units like theirs for MFO missions. Only 22% of the
AC officers and 40% of the RC officers thought that the ILC could
be rated as very useful or better; the AC NCOs (25%) and the RC
NCOs (23%) were similarly unconvinced. The high percentages for
"Not Very Useful" or "Not at all Useful" undoubtedly reflect the

16



ILC -- END OF COURSE CRITIQUE

RANK: UNIT: . DUTY POSITION: - . ;
YEARS SERVICE: ___- STATUS: ACTIVE NG _ RESERVE IRR
MILITARY SCHOOLS:

Evaluate the instruction using the following scale:
A. EXCELLENT
B. VERY GOOD
C. SATISFACTORY
D. ADEQUATE
E. POOR

1. HOW TO TRAIN/AFTER ACTION REVIEW A B Cc D E

2. BASIC LAND NAVIGATION A B Cc D E
3. M-16 ZERO/QUAL/ARM . A B Cc D E
4, TRAIN THE TRAINER A B c D E
5. M-249 FAMILIARIZATION A B Cc D E
6. SUING LOAD/CARGO NET A B Cc D E
7. RAPPELLING A B Cc D E
8. AERO MEDEVAC A B Cc D E



Appendix B
Demographic Data.

Active includes Active Component (AC) personnel (74);
Reserve includes all the Reserve Component (RC) personnel--
National Guard (74), Army Reserve (5), and Individual Ready
Reserve (1). OFF represents officers (Lieutenant through
Lieutenant Colonel) and NCO represents all others (Private First
Class through Sergeant Major) .

Active Reserve

OFF NCO OFF NCO

Total Number of Respondents 11 63 11 69
Ranger 9 12 4 1
Airborne 11°4«(54 6 14
Pathfinder 1 8 2 2
Air Assault 3 34 7 221
Sniper 0 8 1 2
Combat Life Saver . . 1 29 2 9
Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) Leader Course 0 2 1 0
Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) 0 59 0 61
Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) 0 34 0 33
Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) 0 10 0 12
Battle Staff NCO Course (RC only) 0 0 0 1
Battle Skills Course (RC only) 0 0 0 4
Officer Basic Course (OBC) 11 0 11 0
Officer Advance Course (OAC) 4 0 1 0
Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS’) 3 0) 0) 0
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) 2 0 0 0
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 6 50 5 35
National Training Center (NTC) 3 34 1 24
Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) 1 10 2 4
Any Combat Training Center (CTC) 7 = ~=59 7 50
No Training Center Experience 4 4 4 19



ARI Research Report (Continued)

the Active/Reserve mixture and whether the two elements could be combined and
work together. Concerns proved unfounded, as the members of the units

| 13. ABSTRACT (Continued)
| readily accepted each other as members of the common MFO unit.

ii



Training objectives must be identified eariy on, and the
training schedule developed accor ly. The schedule must then
be executed according to the plan--with cognizance, compliance
and cooperation of i personnei. The schedule was based on team
pbuilding, identit g leader strength ana weaknesses, and
improvement of squad level drills and collective tasks. When it
became apparent that there was interest in a shift of emphasis
from training infantry leaders to training peacekeepers, the end
result was training objectives that did not match the training
schedule.

It is important also to utilize the strengths of the
training cadre, whoever they are. The ILC cadre’s acknowledged
strength is Infantry doctrine. They are sufficiently competent
and flexible to learn to teach related skills. It was therefore
perceived (by the ILC themselves and by the MFO leaders) as a
waste of RTB skills not to use them regularly as the primary
trainers. Clarifying training objectives prior to initiation of
training would assist in resolution of these problems.

The lessons learned from this first iteration of the MFO
Sinai at the ILC were many, often learned the hard way, at
considerable cost. Unit performance data may address the
question as to how useful the ILC actually was and the wisdom of
hindsight plus the passage of time may change the evaluations of
the ILC as the unit bonds through time in its common mission.
The ILC lessons will, however, if noted, enable future MFO
battalions to have a more effective and focused training
experience.

35



Is the ILC the Place for she MFO to Tra

A final question was whether the Fort Benning located ILC is
an appropriate pre-deployment training event for the MFO. This
question must be separated into various aspects--content ot che
course, the face validity of the location, the RTB instructors
and the advantages of being away from home station.

Any battalion derives benefit from an external evaiuation of
its training; when the evaluators are of the professional caliber
of the RTB, the advantages can be very great. The MFO. composite
battalion profited from the evaluation of unit readiness,
strengths and weaknesses.

The location of the training is more questionable. The
terrain was primarily wooded, or grassy with open spaces. Signs
of the Fort Benning civilization (telephone and electrical wires,
roads, installation signs) were never far from the training
sites. While these aspects of Fort Benning did not interfere
with training, they reduced the face validity of the course,
primarily for those who had expected an MFO-related course. A
training venue which was more nearly representative of the area
where the battalion was going for its mission would have
increased the palpability of the course.

Similarly, the decision to include no MFO specific classes
should be reevaluated before another iteration. Although there
is no need to have all training MFO specific, inclusion of some
of the MFO-related tasks or training vignettes would have helped,
and student concerns could be allayed by reiteration that time at
home station would be allocated to MFO specific tasks.

Although there were comments from soldiers who wanted to be
anywhere in the world except at the ILC, and an overall question
as to why their training was not being conducted at Fort Bragg,
most admitted that being away from the distractors of home
station was a good idea and helped promote unity. Some also
recognized it as a test separation for National Guardsmen who had
not been deployed recently. It also served as a preliminary test
of the battalion’s operations and logistics functions (payroll,
mail, communication with the rear detachment, emergencies, etc.).

Many MFO students insisted that an already existing course
given at Fort Bragg, the Airborne Leaders Course (ALC), would
have been more appropriate for them. However, this suggestion
appeared to be made primarily by those persons already stationed
at Fort Bragg, who had not wanted to leave there, and without

regard for whether the course was appropriate in terms of POI
contents or logistics. Some also commented on tne high cost of
the temporary duty (TDY) to Fort Benning. However most of the
comments reflected battalion unhappiness at what they perceived
was happening (or not happening) in the course itself.

33



Surveillance
very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Prepare for Combat
Very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Consolidate/Reorganize

Very Well Prepared
Prepared

Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

React to Contact
very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Break Contact
very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

React to Ambush
Very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

React to Indirect Fire

Very Well Prepared
Prepared

Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Leader Reconnaissance
Very Well Prepared
Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Not Prepared

Active Reserve
OFF NCO OFF NCO

1 20 0 10
8 30 6 25
2 11 4 27
0 2 1 6
4 25 1 16
6 30 8 34
1 8 1 18
0 0 1 1
5 27 1 14
5 25 5 31
1 121 4 20
0 0 1 3
7 25 3 10
3 34 4 38
1 3 4 18
0 1 0 2
6 25 30 (12
4 31 4 32
1 6 4 20
ie) 1 0 3
7 27 5 10
30 27 3 33
1 8 3 23
0 1 0 0
7° 27 5 16
3. 33 3 39
1 3 30412
0 0 0 1
5 19 3 7
5 29 4 32
1 13 4 24
0 2 0 5



The key focus of the course is dismounted small unit (squad
and platoon) infantry tactics. The battalion selects the
contents of the program of instruction (POI) based on its METL,
training status, and any special needs. Training options are
based on the seven infantry squad and platoon missions (movement
to contact, attack, raid, ambush, reconnaissance & surveillance,
defend, retrograde) detailed in the platoon mission training plan
(MTP) (DA, 1988a); collective tasks and battle drills are also
available. (Field Manual (FM) FM 7-8 (DA, 1992) details
doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for infantry rifle
platoons and squads.)

Special skills training offered includes such subjects as
land navigation, aeromedical evacuation, how to train (develop a
training plan) and train the trainer (execute training). The
collective tasks and drills are combined into Situational
Training Exercises (STXs) and Field Training Exercises (FTXs) ;
the specifics are the decision of the unit.

Training is conducted based on the Army crawl-walk-run
philosophy where initial training (learning the tasks) is
followed by refresher training (training to standard) and
finally, sustainment training (training with realism) (DA, 1988b
and DA, 1990). Training events are followed by after action
reviews (AARs) (DA, 1991).

Central to the bonding and cohesion portions of the course
is the selection of activities from team building exercises: the
Camp Darby Confidence Course (obstacles); the Water Confidence
Course at Victory Pond (physical challenge above water hazard) ;
rappelling (tower and helicopter) ; Leadership Reaction Course
(small-group problem solving); hand to hand combat; student-led
instruction; and Bayonet/pugil stick training.

Purpose of the Research

The purpose of this paper is to document the conditions and
constraints of the training that took place while the leadership
elements of the 4-505 were at the ILC, and to answer several
questions related to the effectiveness and efficiency of the ILC
as a training event for an MFO task force.

Specific questions include determination of whether the ILC
accomplished its training mission--were the leaders trained to
standard and were they prepared to conduct training? Did the
leaders bond and become cohesive? What changes were required of
the ILC to accommodate the MFO-bound task force?

Method

Four ARI researchers conducted several different activities
and collected data designed to answer the overall research

3



3

6. What tasks (other than MFO Precis tasks) do you think soldiers gctiing reacy to go to the
MFO need to practice on before they go?

7. Do MFO battalions need something like the ILC to make sure that the leaders are ready
to train their troops?

Should it be ILC, or something else? Why?

Would MFO soldiers benefit from the Long Range Surveillance (LRS) course?

Should there be more LRS tasks included in the ILC?

8. What do you see as the major problems, if any, in using volunteers for MFO task forces?

What are the major advantages?

9. Can unit cohesion be built fast enough for this composite battalion to execute its MFO
missions as well as you would like?

Is cohesion a problem with this type of volunteer unit?

10. In the future, should MFO Task Forces be Reserve Component units or Active
Component units or, like this one, a mixture?
Why did you choose the answer you did?

11. What else would you like to say about MFO?

THANKS!



MFO COMPOSITE BATTALION TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE

Number of ILC rotations since you were assigned to E Company

For questions 1-3 use the scale below.

Excellent
Good
Adequate
Weak

1
2
3
4
5 = Poor

oun on

___ 1. Based on your expectations before seeing the MFO Battalion, rate what you
thought their technical and tactical proficiency would be.

__ 2. In your opinion, rate the MFO Battalion’s level of technical and tactical
proficiency on at the beginning of the ILC.

___ 3. In your opinion, rate the MFO Battalion’s level of technical and tactical
proficiency at the end of the ILC.

\
4. Using your past experience with other units training at the ILC, rate the performance
of the MFO Battalion in relation to other units. Please check the response that best
reflects your opinion. .
_ Much better
_— Better
About the same

Worse
Much worse

5. Other composite battalions will follow this one. They will need to train for the MFO
mission. In your opinion, should they ___?

a. Do the same as this one (come to Ft. Benning, ILC).
b. Remain at home station using a mobile training team of ILC cadre.
c. Deploy to desert terrain using a mobile training team of ILC cadre.

d. Go to a different course. If so, what course?

e. Other.

A-14



and impressions. The first portion of the survey asked about
their duties in the Sinai, workload and free time activities.
They also described the training their other unit had focused on
prior to departure for the Sinai and any tasks they wished they
had spent more time on.

The second portion focused on their present situation,
including how much MFO specific training they remembered from the
prior rotation. They were asked their opinions on whether MFO
units need courses like the ILC to prepare for deployment,
whether the ILC was the proper course, and whether they perceived
any specific problems derived from the use of a volunteer (as
opposed to a command selected standard battalion) task force.
These questions, all open ended, were designed to elicit "lessons
learned" from previous rotations.

ILC Post Training Survey. At the conclusion of the course,
the 4-505 leaders completed a questionnaire to assess current
levels of performance and changes resulting from their training.
They were asked about their confidence in developing and
executing training and what other skills or tasks they would have
liked to have had included in the POI for the ILC. They gave
their opinions about the effectiveness of the ILC course in
preparing them to train other soldiers and in promoting bonding
within the unit. They also listed strengths and weaknesses of
the course. The final questions repeated the leadership skills
questions from the original survey, to determine both self-
perceptions of leadership growth and whether they had become more
aware of the capabilities and shortfalls of their immediate
superiors and leaders. Finally, they were asked if, based on the
perspective gained from their first full month of MFO training,
they would volunteer again.

Infantry Leaders Course End of Course Questionnaire. An
additional source of data was the RTB produced end of course
critique. The MFO were asked to evaluate each block of
instruction (e.g., Land Navigation, Train the Trainer, M249
Familiarization), the STXs, and the overall training--materials,
level of instruction, organization and instructors. A final
question asked “What was your unit’s mission while here at the
Infantry Leaders Course?"

ILC MFO Composite Battalion Training Questionnaire. Another
source of data was a survey administered to the Fort Benning ILC
cadre two months after the MFO battalion had concluded its
training. The intent was to solicit input on the MFO experience
from the instructors with the perspective gained from the passage
of time. They were asked for overall assessment of this
battalion in comparison to other battalions and for their
personal opinions on how the course should have been conducted or
might be used for future MFO battalions.



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OM8 No. 0704-0188

SET an SOT SE
eo ano aah eee ang compeung nore
gatreg ana ramtarng te gat eco andcomatg tne olecon ot nlomatin, sara Comment
Be een ne a erst ReseON PS

‘average | hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructicns searching exsting Gata sources.
ing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this Durden estimate or any other aspect of this
for information Operations and Reports, 1215 JeHterson

ject (0704-0188), wwasnington, OC 20563.

TD AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave bianx) | 2. REPORT DATE
1995, June Final

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

Aug 94 = Feb 95

. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Sinai Task Force Leaders at the Infantry Leaders Course

‘5. FUNDING NUMBERS
63007A
793
6952

6. AUTHOR(S)
Salter, Margaret S.; Fober, Gene W.; Pleban, Robert J.;
and Valentine, Patrick J.

HOL

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences

P.O. Box 52086

Fort Benning, GA 31995-2086

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

ARI Research Report
1677

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue

Alexandria, VA 22333-5600

‘10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

41. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

72a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

Infantry Leaders Course (ILC). The 4-505 is a composite or

keeping mission. In leadership positions, half are Regular

a group.

The senior leaders of the 4-505 Parachute Infantry: Regiment (PIR) Multinational
Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Task Force deployed from Fort Bragg, NC, to Fort
Benning, GA, from August 26, 1994 through September 23, 1994, to attend the

"experimental" battalion,

both in its composition and in its availability to accomplish the MFO Sinai peace-

Army, the other half

National Guard or Army Reserve. The ILC, specializing in Infantry doctrine and
tactics and collective Infantry skills, was the initial training event for 154
leaders of the newly constituted battalion and their first opportunity to function as

Data were collected through written questionnaires, interviews, and first-hand
training observations. Research questions focused on training and within unit
bonding. Observations confirmed that the composite battalion would be able to
conduct its mission; the leaders were trained. Those with skill deficiencies were
highly motivated and benefitted most. farly concerns over unit cohesion focused on

(Continued)

14. SUBJECT TERMS

Infantry Leadérs Course (ILC)
Multinational Ferce and Observers (MFO)
Reserve Component/Infantry training

‘15. NUMBER OF PAGES
92

16. PRICE CODE

OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified Unclassified

Unclassified

47. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

Unlimited

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Presenbed by ANS! Std, 239-18
298-102



JAG officer, and at times, the command sergeant major. There
were several MPs, an NBC officer, several corporals/specialists,
the commander’s driver and one of the battalion’s two linguists.

Resources. The oversubscription to the course taxed
resources available. The requirement to house so many extra
personnel forced one company to live in an about-to-be condemned
barracks; two buildings had no air conditioning, a problem in
Georgia's late summer climate. The RTB did everything possible
to make the MFO comfortable, but other personnel were also
located in the general RTB area, including a large class of
Ranger Course students. This created long lines at the common
dining facility and coupled with the limited shower facilities,
created early morning logistics problems due to requirements for
large throughput in a short time. Problems also occurred in, for
example, the use of laundry facilities where the number of
washers and dryers usually adequate to accommodate 104 students
became barely sufficient for 154.

Transportation was an issue. Normally the battalion marched
to the Todd Field training site; long distances to training,
however, required bus transportation. Mismatches between student
load and numbers of buses and trips per bus delayed training on
several occasions. Although the battalion learned to deal with
these problems and with long lines for telephones or breakfast,
these conditions became overall training distractors.

Class structure. The personnel who arrived at the ILC were
generally divided into training platoons based on their four line
company designations, Alpha, Bravo, Charlie and Delta. Some of
the extraneous HHC personnel participated in training only on an
erratic basis. Some, like the MPs, were arbitrarily assigned to
specific platoons.

Throughout much of the course, student-lead instruction was
the norm; generally the lowest ranking personnel were tasked to
teach classes to the rest of their platoon members. The student
as the teacher did not work well at all. Typically, the most
junior man was selected (usually one or two days prior) to teach
a course; this meant that he had in his audience not only the
other team and/or squad leaders in his company but all of the
platoon leaders and platoon sergeants and frequently his company
commander and first sergeant. Occasionally the battalion
commander, CSM or S3 observed as well.

The senior leaders in each company had already received
training on these tasks--they were long past the "crawl" stage
prior to attending the course. This tended to emphasize any
disconnect between the junior leader’s presentation abilities and
the abilities of his target audience, and it highlighted any
shortcomings of the RC personnel, many of whom were selected as
student instructors. The inadequacies of the well-meaning but

26



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response to the final question which invited any overall comments
they cared to make about the MFO mission, nine volunteered that
the MFO is a good mission ("Great tour but not to be taken
lightly"). One suggested that it be made a one year tour.

ILC end of course critique results. This survey was
developed and administered by the RTB. There were only 144
respondents; most of the missing were officers. Although it
asked for Active, Reserve, or National Guard status, some RC
personnel identified themselves as "active" based on current
status. Thus AC/RC differences in responses cannot be documented
with certainty.

Eighty seven percent of the respondents said the ILC
training was beneficial; 75% said it had been presented at an
appropriate level for them. Over 90% said the training was given
in an organized manner’ and that the instructors were
professional. Soldiers made comments, however, on individual
instructors or specific blocks of instruction which they felt did
not meet their expectations.

They were asked to rate the cadre-lead instruction on a

scale of "Excellent", "Very Good", "Satisfactory", "Adequate",
and "Poor." The top rated classes were Unaided Night Vision,

Pathfinder/Sling Load, How to Train/AAR, and Rappelling, with
excellent or very good ratings from 85%, 75%, 70% and 68% of the

respondents. (The rating on the Unaided Night Vision class is
problematic to interpret because it was only offered to 33
soldiers and 59 provided ratings for it.) The lowest rated
classes were M16 Zero/ Qualification (20% said adequate or poor),
the STXs (18%), Aero Medevac (15%), and Land Navigation (13%).
The only complaint offered on the Medevac class was that the
weather curtailed the helicopter operation.

No ratings were requested for the MFO student-lead
collective tasks and battle drills. Based on observations of
this training and the peer group behaviors during training, most
of these classes would probably have been rated only adequate or
poor. The actual execution of the tasks was better than the
"training," due no doubt to the fact that all of the students had
received prior training on the tasks. Few of the student
instructors did very well, and they had little support from the
class.

ILC post-training survey results. This questionnaire was
administered on the final day of training. Only 147 of the
original 154 soldiers responded to this questionnaire, 70 from
the AC, 77 from the RC. Missing were 2 AC officers and 5 NCOs
(two AC and three RC). Also, and of unknown impact on results,
the battalion changed its schedule and administered the
questionnaire without ARI personnel present as was originally
intended. A final caution on interpretation of these data is

14



U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency Under the Jurisdiction
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director

Technical review by

Dale R. Palmer

Ruth Phelps

Guy L. Siebold

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this report has been made by ARI. Please address correspondence
concerning distribution of reports to: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,
ATTN: PERI-POX, 5001 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600.

FINAL DISPOSITION: This report may be destroyed when it is no longer needed. Please do not return it to
the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

NOTE: The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position,
unless so designated by other authorized documents.



Appendix A
Questionnaires and Surveys

Infantry Leaders Course - Experience

Infantry Leaders Course - MFO Unit Preparedness Survey
Infantry Leaders Course - Soldiers With Prior MFO
Experience

End of Course Critique

Infantry Leaders Course MFO Post-Training Survey

MFO Composite Battalion Training Questionnaire (Cadre)
MFO 4-505 Officers and NCO Survey



Leadership skills of immediate superiors were in both cases
rated on a five point scale. The NCOs, both AC and RC, made full
use of the scale, with responses overall fairly favorable but
with some rating of superiors as only adequate, or weak, on both
the initial and final surveys. For NCOs, no pre-post rating
aifference was twenty percentage points or higher. Both AC and
RC officers showed an overall increase in favorable ratings, many
with as high as 20% or greater percentage point increases.

The final question on the post training survey asked the 4-
505 leaders if they had volunteered for the MFO Sinai mission.
Although it had been stated in advance that all MFO personnel
were volunteers, comments during training gave rise to
indications that this was a false perception and, additionally,
that some of those who were volunteers were having second
thoughts about it. Only five of the nine AC officers responding
said that they were volunteers, and one admitted that he was no
longer convinced that it had been a good decision. All of the RC
officers were volunteers; one said he was no longer sure about
wanting to stay.

For the AC NCOs responding, however, only half said they
were volunteers; of those 31, nine said they would like to
rethink the decision. For the RC respondents, only one said he
did not volunteer for the mission, but twelve who did said that
they would like to reconsider. There is no way to determine the
cause for the dissatisfaction, whether it was ILC dependent or,
probably more likely, due to other factors. (One RC soldier, for
example, was known by his peers to have changed his mind, even
before his arrival at ILC.)

ILC MFO composite battalion training questionnaire results.
Of the ILC cadre who had participated in training MFO leaders, 21
were still available two months afterwards and completed a final
survey. The number of prior ILC classes each had taught varied
from one to twenty-one. For three, it was their first class; two
had over 20 classes; the mean was seven.

Table 16 shows cadre ratings of what their expectations had
been of the MFO battalion’s technical and tactical proficiency
before they arrived at the course, at the beginning of the
course, and at the end of the course.

Table 16

ILC Cadre Expectations of MFO Performance

Excellent Good Adequate Weak Poor

Prior to Arrival 0 4 8 8 1
Beginning of ILC 0 0 4 11 6
End of ILC 0 4 8 9 0

22



surveillance as a part of and in preparation for the fourth
week's defend mission. There were numerous complaints that
training time was wasted by having the platoons march to the
training site--that more time should have been spent in actions
on the objective, with focus on consolidation and reorganization.

Based on complaints late in the third week that some
personnel were no longer attending training, a directive was
given that everyone would participate. However, there was little
for the senior leaders to do, and when they were on site but
unoccupied, unit morale deteriorated. That factor, coupled with
the leaders’ overall fatigue, made the entire STX process less
than beneficial as a culminating training event.

Conclusions

Several conclusions can be drawn from the experiences of the
MFO composite battalion at the Infantry Leaders Course. Caveats
which have been included all along, however, must be remembered,
as well as the fact that this was, in effect, the first iteration
of a pilot experiment. The lessons learned, by everyone, will be

important for future rotations.

Training Infantry Skills

The first research question dealt with whether the ILC was
able to accomplish the training mission, whether the MFO leaders
were trained, to standard, and prepared to conduct training of
their own troops upon their return to home station. Although as
noted, some portions of the training went more smoothly than
others, generally, the answer is yes, the MFO leaders were
trained and will be able to conduct internal training.

Part of the success is due to the caliber of the RTB cadre
who were directing much of the training, part to high quality
performers in the volunteer battalion. The ILC cadre are
experienced in training leaders; they are aware of not only the
doctrinally correct standards and procedures but also the
pitfalls experienced by other units. The good qualities of the
volunteers of the MFO composite battalion helped to overcome any
performance based inequalities between the RC and the AC. Those
who had skill deficiencies when they arrived at the course were
highly motivated and generally benefitted most. Some AC leaders
adopted mentoring roles and helped their RC counterparts where
possible.

However, a larger training issue arose because of the pre-
course decision not to have MFO specific tasks included. This
decision, in line with the ILC’s mission statement which focuses
on rebluing infantry skills, was perceived as wrong by much of
the Sinai Task Force leaders who had expected that they would

31



Table 9

Soldier Ratings of Course Effectiveness and Usefulness

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer _NCO Officer _NCO

N & n & n & non &
Prepare to Train
very Effective 1 13 8 13 0 0 10 15
Effective 3 38 26 44 6 55 28 43
Somewhat Effective 2 25 13 22 3° 27 22 34
Somewhat Ineffective 2 25 6 10 0 0 4 6
Ineffective 0 0 4 7 0 0 1 2
very Ineffective 0 0 2 3 2 18 0 0
Promote Bonding
very Effective 3 33 14 23 4 36 17° 26
Effective 4 44 15 25 5 45 21 32
Somewhat Effective 2 22 21 34 2 18 20 30
Somewhat Ineffective 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 3
Ineffective 0 0 4 7 0 0 4 6
very Ineffective 0 0 5 8 0 0 2 3

Preparing for MFO Missions

Extremely Useful 12611 5 8 1 10 3 5
Very Useful 12611 10 17 3. 30 12 18
Somewhat Useful 6 67 19 32 2 20 31 «(47
Not Very Useful 0 0 16 27 3 30 16 24
Not at all Useful 1 11 9 #15 1 10 4 6

mismatch between perceived needs and course content for this
particular battalion.

Table 10 shows numbers and percentages of responses to the
question “Should the ILC continue to be used to train MFO
Battalions like yours for future rotations?"

Table 10

Should the ILC Continue to Be Used to Train MFO?

~Ketive Component § Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO
Yes 7 (78%) 27 (47%) 5 (56%) 40 (63%)
No 2 (22%) 30 (53%) 4 (44%) 24 (38%)
n= 9 57 9 64

17



SINAI TASK FORCE LEADERS AT THE INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE
Introduction

The senior leaders, both officers and noncommissioned
officers (NCOS), of the newly constituted 4-505 Parachute
Infantry Regiment (PIR) deployed from Fort Bragg, NC, to Fort
Benning, GA, from August 26 through September 23, 1994, to attend
the Infantry Leaders Course (ILC). The ILC, the initial training
event for the leaders of this battalion and their first
opportunity to function as a group, was intended to prepare the
4-505 leaders to conduct training for their troops later at Fort
Bragg. Further training was to occur with the battalion’s
enlisted soldiers, in October through December, prior to their
January, 1995 deployment to the Sinai as members of the
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Task Force
(Rotation 28).

The 4-505 PIR MFO Battalion Task Force

The 4-505 PIR is a composite battalion task force, comprised
of a mixture of Active and Reserve Component officers, NCOs, and
soldiers, with a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)
strength of 583. Within the leadership positions, half are
Regular Army, the other half National Guard or Army Reserve. All
soldiers below the rank of sergeant are members of the National
Guard. The Reserve Component personnel, like most of the Active
duty soldiers, volunteered for the MFO-Sinai mission.

This is an "experimental" battalion, both in its
composition, and its availability as a unit to accomplish the MFO
Sinai peacekeeping mission. The experimental nature of combining
Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) soldiers under
one chain of command, mixing Regular Army, National Guard, and
Reserve soldiers within companies, platoons, and squads is
obvious, and merits both careful scrutiny and evaluation.
Additionally, the MFO mission has heretofore always been
conducted by Active Duty battalions--sent for six month tours to
the Sinai. The concept of sending a newly formed composite unit,
whose readiness status and training level are unknown, is also
unusual and warrants assessment.

The U.S. Army Research Institute’s Role

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences (ARI) was tapped as the primary assessor of the
experiment. The Infantry Forces Research Unit (IFRU) element of
ARI’s Training Systems Research Division, located at Fort
Benning, GA, was given the mission of observing the 4-505th’s ILC
training experience. The IFRU has had considerable recent
experience in observation and assessment of small unit infantry
training. Examples of prior research in the area may be found in



If you did not attend the Infantry Leaders Course (ILC) in August/September, 1994, do
not complete this survey. If you did attend ILC, please answer all the questions!

MFO 4-505 Officers and NCO Survey

SSN (last four) Officer = «9 NCO __
Regular Army ____ National Guard, Reserve or IRR __
1. Is this your first rotation on an MFO-Sinai Task Force? YES __. NO

2. What is your duty position here? (e.g., TL, SL, PAC NCO, CO CDR)

3. Are your experiences matching the "job preview" you were given? Explain.

4. What is the worst part about this MFO deployment so far?

5. What is the best part?

6. How effective was the training you received at ILC in preparing you for this mission?
Please check the appropriate response.

__ Very Effective ___ Somewhat Ineffective
_— Effective __ Ineffective
___ Somewhat Effective __ Very Ineffective

7. Looking back on your ILC trainup for this mission, were there any tasks or activities that
you wish you had spent more time on? Please be specific!



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Infantry Leaders Course - Experience

SSN (last four)

|. Please indicate your service status (prior to 4/501). (Mark only one)

Regular Army
___ Army Reserve

Army National Guard

Individual Ready Reserve
2, At which Combat Training Centers have you participated in a rotation? (Mark all that
apply)

____ Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
National Training Center (NTC)
____ Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)

3. Indicate your Army and professional development training. (Mark all that apply)

Ranger

Airborne

Pathfinder

Air Assault

Sniper

Combat Life Saver

Bradley Fighting Vehicle Leader Course

ITT T

Primary Leadership Development Course
Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course
Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course
Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officers Course
Battle Skills Course (RC)

naan

Officer Basic Course

Officer Advance Course

Combined Arms Services Staff School
Command and General Staff College

Other (please specify)



BATTLE DRILLS/ | very Prepared | Somewhat

SPECIAL SKILLS/ Well Prepared
INDIVIDUAL TASKS Prepared

Not
Prepared

React to Contact

Break Contact

React to Ambush

React to Indirect
Fire

Leader Reconnaissance

Land Navigation

Construct Fighting
Positions

Aeromedical
Evacuations

Pathfinder Operations

Unaided Night Vision

Report Enemy

Leadership Skills

)

Information
Le

2. Based on your own self-assessment, please indicate the
particular leadership skill(s) that you feel need to improve.

Check as many as apply.

Setting goals and objectives.
Developing strategies.
Establishing priorities.
Delegating duties.
Technical proficiency.
Tactical proficiency.
Conveying facts and requirements.
Listening and comprehension.
Task monitoring.
Providing feedback.
Problem identification.
Developing and analyzing solutions.
Making timely decisions.
Involving others in the planning/decision making
Team building.
2

|

I

process.



questions articulated above. Information was gathered through
written questionnaires, interviews, and training observations.
These varied but complementary approaches and data sources are
detailed sequentially below. All surveys are reproduced at
Appendix A to this report.

Subjects

The 154 personnel from the 4-505 PIR who attended the ILC
comprised 74 AC and 80 RC soldiers. The RC included 74 National
Guardsmen, five Army Reservists, and one officer from the
Individual Ready Reserve. There were 11 AC and 11 RC officers.
There were 132 NCOs and enlisted personnel--63 from the
AC and 69 from the RC. Some of the original personnel
departed before the end of a course; a few personnel arrived
late.

Materials

Experience and MFO Unit Preparedness Survey. These
instruments were designed to elicit self-assessment of readiness,
leadership qualities, and their expectations from the course.
The experience survey provided demographic information on the
soldiers’ AC or RC status, their Combat Training Center
experience, and on their Army and professional development
training. The purpose of this instrument was to identify
variations in training experience within the battalion
leadership.

The pre-training questionnaire, MFO Unit Preparedness
Survey, asked them to rate themselves on their level of
preparedness to train seventeen specific collective tasks (e.g.,
Disengage, Defend, Cross Danger Area, Reconnoiter Route, Occupy
Observation Post) and eleven battle drills, special skills and
individual tasks (e.g., React to Ambush, Land Navigation,
Aeromedical Evacuation) .

A second section asked for self-assessment of leadership
skills in need of improvement; the next part asked them to rate
their new immediate superior in some broad areas of leadership
(e.g., Planning, Supervision) .

The final sections asked for ratings on their confidence
that the ILC would prepare them to train their subordinates and
whether they felt confident, before the course, in their ability
to develop and execute unit training plans. The last question
asked for the respondent's expectations as to what the ILC course
would do for him and his specific unit element.

Prior MFO Rotation Questionnaire. The nineteen personnel
(officers and NCOs) who had been on the MFO mission with other

units, completed a questionnaire detailing their prior training

4