NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 18-1846

_____________

TERRY SUTTON, d/b/a Cinkaj Brogue Limited Partnership; BRENDA SUTTON, d/b/a 

Cinkaj Brogue Limited Partnership; CHRIS CINKAJ, d/b/a Cinkaj Brogue Limited 

Partnership

v.

CHANCEFORD TOWNSHIP; TIMOTHY J. BUPP, Solicitor, 

Chanceford Township in his individual and official capacities; 

JOHN SHANBARGER, JR., Chair, Chanceford Township 

Planning Commission, in his individual and official capacities; 

BRUCE MILLER, Vice Chair, Chanceford Township Planning 

Commission, in his individual and official capacities; 

MARK A. BUPP, Vice Chair, Chanceford Township Planning Commission, 

in his individual and official capacities; RALPH DAUGHERTY, 

Member, Chanceford Township Planning Commission, 

in his individual and official capacities; THOMAS GIZZI, SR., 

Member, Chanceford Township Planning Commission, 

in his individual and official capacities; ROBERT LYTER, Member, 

Chanceford Township Planning Commission, 

in his individual and official capacities; BRENDA GOHN, 

Secretary, Chanceford Township Planning Commission, 

in her individual and official capacities; BRADLEY K. SMITH, Chair, 

Chanceford Township Board of Supervisors, in his individual 

and official capacities; KENT E. HEFFNER, Vice Chair, 

Chanceford Township Board of Supervisors, in his individual and 

official capacities; CLIFTON M. BALDWIN, Member, Chanceford Township 

Board of Supervisors, in his individual and official capacities; 

DAVID HOPKINS, Chair, Zoning Hearing Board Chanceford Township, PA, 

in his individual and official capacities; MARK FREY, Member, 

Zoning Hearing Board Chanceford Township, PA, in his individual 

and official capacities; DAVID J. HIVELY, Member, Zoning Hearing Board 

Chanceford Township, PA, in his individual and official capacities; 

JEFFREY L. KOONS, Zoning Officer, Chanceford Township, PA, 
2

in his individual and official capacities; GRANT A. ANDERSON, 

Township Engineer, in his individual and official capacities

TERRY SUTTON; BRENDA SUTTON; CHRIS CINKAJ,

 Appellants

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(No. 1-14-cv-01584)

District Judge: Honorable Martin C. Carlson

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 22, 2019

Before: CHAGARES and BIBAS, Circuit Judges, and SÁNCHEZ, Chief District

Judge+.

(Filed February 13, 2019)

___________

OPINION*

____________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Terry Sutton1sought to operate an adult entertainment club inside a 

shopping center he owned in Chanceford Township, Pennsylvania. But the Township’s 

Zoning Hearing Board rejected his application for a permit. So Sutton sued the 

 

+ The Honorable Juan Sánchez, Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.

1 Terry Sutton’s wife, Brenda, and his business partner, Chris Cinkaj, are also 

appellants. Because they all advance the same claims, we refer only to Terry for ease of 

reference.
3

Township and many of its officials, arguing, among other things, that the Township’s

special requirements for adult entertainment facilities violate the First Amendment, both 

facially and as applied, and that the Board’s rejection of his application also violated his 

right to substantive due process. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor 

of the Township, and, for the following reasons, we will affirm.

I.

Because we write solely for the parties, we recite only the facts essential to our 

disposition. 

Chanceford Township, like many municipalities, has a zoning ordinance to 

regulate development. The ordinance divides the Township into five zones, and within 

each one, some uses are generally permitted, some are prohibited, and others are 

permitted by “special exception.” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 165–66.

2 A use permitted by 

special exception requires a permit from the Zoning Hearing Board. Before granting any

application for a special exception, the Board must make several findings, including that 

the applicant has established that the proposed use will comply with certain sewagedisposal and ground-water recharge requirements. 

One use permitted in the Township’s General Commercial Zone as a special 

exception is an “adult oriented facility.” J.A. 165. As such, it must be approved by the 

Zoning Hearing Board, no different from any other use permitted by special exception. 

 

2 We note that two consecutive pages in the Joint Appendix are labeled as J.A. 

165. When citing this page, we refer to the second page labeled J.A. 165, which contains 

a table of permitted and special exception uses. 
4

But the ordinance also subjects adult oriented facilities, specifically, to several additional 

requirements: 

 that there be no outward display of any materials or signage related to the 

adult entertainment offered inside;

 that the facility be windowless or not viewable from the outside; 

 that it contain a notice on every entrance explaining that people under 

eighteen are not permitted and that others may be offended by the 

entertainment; 

 that it have a certain number of parking spaces; 

 that it be at least 1,000 feet “from any public or parochial school offering 

education below the college level, church, library, child day care, or nursery 

school, including church related nursery school”;

 that, if that 1,000-foot distance “cannot practically be achieved,” the facility 

still must be more than 500 feet from such places, and there must be a sixfoot tall “security fence” around the facility; and

 that the facility have trees or shrubs around its perimeter “to form an 

effective visual barrier between [it] and any residence, school, recreation 

facility, or other non-commercial or non-industrial use.”

J.A. 206–07. 

In March 2013, Terry Sutton applied for a special exception to use part of his

property as an adult cabaret featuring nude female dancers. The Zoning Hearing Board 
5

held a hearing and then, in a written decision, denied the application. It first explained 

that, under the zoning ordinance, a shopping center can consist only of “stores,” which 

the cabaret was not. J.A. 957. The Board further explained that, regardless, the 

application failed to demonstrate that the proposed use would meet the sewage-disposal 

and ground-water recharge requirements required for any special exception under the 

zoning ordinance. And finally, the Board explained that the cabaret, because it would 

feature nude dancing while also permitting patrons to bring in their own alcohol, would 

violate state law, which prohibits lewd entertainment in a “bottle club.” 18 Pa. Cons. 

Stat. § 7329. Because the proposed use would be unlawful, the Board found that it would

constitute a “nuisance” prohibited under Section 301.1 of the ordinance. J.A. 961.

In response, Sutton filed a complaint against Chanceford Township3in federal 

court, asserting claims under both federal and Pennsylvania law. Most relevant to this 

appeal, he claimed that the Township’s ordinance violated the First Amendment, both 

facially and as applied, and that the Township, in denying his application, violated his

Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The District Court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the Township, and Sutton timely appealed. 

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the District Court had 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. Our review of a grant of summary 

judgment is de novo. Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). 

 

3 The lawsuit also named various Chanceford officials as defendants. 
6

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the non-movant, “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a)).

III.

Sutton presents three arguments: that the Township’s ordinance’s restrictions on 

adult entertainment facilities facially violate the First Amendment; that those restrictions 

were unconstitutional as applied here; and that the Board, in rejecting his application,

violated his right to substantive due process. None have merit. 

A.

We start with the facial challenge. The Supreme Court has held that “zoning 

ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of [adult] businesses are 

to be reviewed under the standards applicable to ‘content-neutral’ time, place, and 

manner regulations.” City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986). 

That is, such zoning ordinances are valid when “they are narrowly tailored to serve a 

significant or substantial government interest” and also “leave open ample alternative 

channels of communication.” Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 

1997) (en banc) (quoting Mitchell v. Comm’n on Adult Entm’t Establishments, 10 F.3d 

123, 130 (3d Cir. 1993)). In applying the “secondary effects” doctrine, we have required 

municipalities to “identify the justifying secondary effects with some particularity,” and 

“offer some record support for the existence of those effects and for the [o]rdinance’s 

amelioration thereof.” Id. at 175. But a municipality need not “conduct new studies or 
7

produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as 

whatever evidence [it] relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem 

that [it] addresses.” Renton, 475 U.S. at 51–52. 

Sutton argues that the Township failed to prove that the purpose of its restrictions

on adult entertainment facilities was to combat their secondary effects. But even viewing 

the record in the light most favorable to Sutton, we conclude otherwise –– there is no 

genuine dispute that the Township acted to address the secondary effects of adult 

entertainment facilities. To be sure, as Sutton point outs, the evidence of the Township’s 

consideration of secondary effects is thin. But the evidence is there. The Township has 

produced sworn affidavits from multiple officials involved in passing the adult 

entertainment restrictions demonstrating that the “principal concerns” were with “orderly 

growth, traffic, health and safety, and crime.” J.A. 156; see also J.A. 516–17; 1210. And 

the Township has “offer[ed] some record support for the existence of those effects and 

for the [o]rdinance’s amelioration thereof.” Phillips, 107 F.3d at 175. The Township’s 

then-Chairman of the Board stated, under penalty of perjury, “that studies had been 

performed in other municipalities demonstrating a direct relationship between the 

presence of [adult] facilities and increases of crime and decreases in surrounding property 

values.” J.A. 157. Moreover, the Township’s then-Solicitor testified that he reviewed 

various court decisions, as well as legislative findings, discussing the negative secondary 

effects of adult entertainment businesses. See J.A. 1051–53; see also 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 

5501(a)(1) (“There are within this Commonwealth a number of adult-oriented 

establishments which require special regulation by law and supervision by public safety 
8

agencies in order to protect and preserve the health, safety and welfare of patrons of these 

establishments, as well as the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of this 

Commonwealth.”). And we have held that municipalities are entitled to rely on the 

legislative findings of their home state. See Ben Rich Trading, Inc. v. City of Vineland, 

126 F.3d 155, 160–62 (3d Cir. 1997). Sutton does not contest these findings. In sum, the

record demonstrates that the ordinance “was passed to control the socially undesirable 

effects incidental to the operation of adult entertainment establishments.” Mitchell, 

10 F.3d at 137.

The ordinance, accordingly, passes constitutional muster so long as it is “narrowly 

tailored” and “leave[s] open adequate alternative channels of communication.” Id. at 

139. That is the case here. Indeed, Sutton offers no argument to the contrary beyond 

claiming that the Township did not identify with enough precision the secondary effects 

it sought to target. But the Township did identify the concerns underlying its zoning 

ordinance –– “surrounding property values, crime, noise, and harmonious development 

with other uses.” J.A. 157. As the Supreme Court has stressed in this context, a 

municipality “must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to 

admittedly serious problems.” Renton, 475 U.S. at 52 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini 

Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Sutton’s facial challenge fails.

B.

Sutton next argues that, even if the ordinance’s restrictions on adult entertainment 

facilities are facially valid, they were unconstitutional as applied. In other words, he

contends that the Board denied his application not for content-neutral reasons but 
9

specifically “because of its content.” Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 

(1972). 

This argument fails. The record demonstrates that the Board rejected the

application not out of animus to nude dancing but for legitimate, content-neutral reasons. 

For starters, the Board found that, under the ordinance, only “stores” could be part of a 

shopping center, and the cabaret was not a store.4 Perhaps most significantly, the Board 

found that Sutton failed to establish that the cabaret would meet the ground-water 

discharge and sewage-disposal requirements applicable to all special uses. Sutton claims

that he established compliance with the ground-water discharge requirements by 

explaining that the shopping center’s compliance had been approved when it was

originally built and that the cabaret would not require more water than other prior uses 

there. But Sutton admitted to the Board that he had not “conducted any water supply 

studies or engineering to indicate the current status of [the shopping center’s] water and 

whether that’s going to be changed” with the cabaret. J.A. 937. And Sutton even

admitted that he did not “have any studies or testimony to provide to the Board” showing 

that his proposed use met the ordinance’s sewage-disposal requirements. J.A. 938. 

There is thus no genuine dispute that Sutton failed to meet the ordinance’s ground-water 

discharge and sewage-disposal requirements. That was a legitimate, content-neutral 

reason for the Board to reject his application. 

 

4 Sutton argues that this misreads the ordinance, pointing out that the shopping 

center at issue also contains a bank and a church, neither of which seemingly are a 

“store.” But the Board noted that it had “never been asked to decide the appropriateness 

of any of the uses within the Shopping Center prior to this application.” J.A. 959. 
10

Finally, the Board found that the cabaret, by featuring lewd activity and permitting 

patrons to bring in alcohol, would violate Pennsylvania law. Sutton claims that he would 

have changed the cabaret’s alcohol policy if necessary to comply with state law, but,

ultimately, the application for the cabaret did include a provision permitting patrons to 

“bring their own beverages.” J.A. 1199. The Board cannot be faulted for evaluating the 

application on its stated terms.5

In short, the Board articulated multiple permissible reasons for denying the 

application. The record, therefore, does not support Sutton’s as-applied challenge. 

C.

Lastly, Sutton claims that the Township violated substantive due process when it 

rejected his application.

We have long explained that “executive action violates substantive due process 

only when it shocks the conscience.” United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of 

Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399–400 (3d Cir. 2003). While “the meaning of this standard 

varies depending on the factual context,” id., it is “designed to avoid converting federal 

courts into super zoning tribunals,” Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d 

Cir. 2004). Thus, “only the most egregious official conduct” violates substantive due 

process. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). 

 

5 Sutton also argues that “the content of any adult materials or speech cannot 

constitute a nuisance,” citing Ranck v. Bonal Enters., Inc., 359 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1976). 

Sutton Br. 31. But the Board did not find the cabaret to be a nuisance because of its 

obscenity; rather, it found that it would be a nuisance simply because of its illegality. 

And Sutton does not challenge here the underlying constitutionality of the Pennsylvania 

statute. 
11

Sutton argues that the conduct here meets that standard. He contends that the 

Township Solicitor, who wrote the final decision denying his application, did so without 

the approval of the Zoning Board members and purely out of animus toward nude 

dancing. But Sutton assumes unconstitutional conduct that is unsubstantiated by the 

record, even when viewed in the light most favorable to him. As discussed, the Board 

ultimately offered several permissible reasons for denying his application that had 

nothing to do with the morality or expressive nature of nude dancing. We cannot 

conclude that such conduct “shocks the conscience.” United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.