U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–496PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 20, 2018

Serial No. 115–155

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Alice G. Wells, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau 

of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ....................... 3

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Alice G. Wells: Prepared statement ............................................. 5

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 40

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 41

Written responses from the Honorable Alice G. Wells to questions submitted 

for the record by: 

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York ...................................................................................................... 43

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Florida .......................................................................................... 50

The Honorable Lois Frankel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida ........................................................................................................... 51

The Honorable Joaquin Castro, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas ................................................................................................... 54

The Honorable Thomas R. Suozzi, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York ............................................................................................ 59

(1)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing on U.S. policy toward Afghanistan will come to order. 

Afghanistan has been at war since 1979. The human suffering 

has been horrendous. Real threats to U.S. national security have 

followed. 

As a result, the U.S. has had no choice but to engage in Afghanistan. First, we helped counter the brutal Soviet invasion and then 

we helped dislodge the Taliban and combat al-Qaeda after the September 11 attacks. 

Afghanistan has been called ‘‘America’s longest war.’’ Thousands 

of Americans have lost their lives. We have spent hundreds of billions of dollars. 

This investment aims to achieve a stable Afghanistan that does 

not harbor international terrorists. Should the Afghan Government 

fail, the vacuum surely would be filled. 

ISIS and the ayatollah would be among those who would benefit. 

So today we will ask: Where should we go from here? 

We currently have 14,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. This is 

dramatically down from a high of 100,000 in 2011. Their current 

focus is training Afghan security forces and counterterrorism, and 

there has been some success. 

Fortunately, many allies are still with us. But Afghans need the 

ability and also the will to fight for their own country. 

Last week, there was a brief cease fire and renewed Afghan Government outreach to the Taliban, which the administration endorsed. 

Yet, the Taliban continues the fight and has rejected all offers to 

enter into negotiations with the internationally recognized and 

backed Afghan Government. 

This conflict does not need a sustainable political resolution of 

some sort that is going to fall apart. What it needs is a wellthought through sustainable situation that will hold for the people 

of Afghanistan and that leads to a credible competent Afghan Government. 

2

And the administration moved these things in the right direction 

by scrapping restrictive rules of engagement that had hamstrung 

U.S. forces. It dropped a politically-driven time line for our engagement established by the previous administration. 

It’s putting more pressure on Pakistan, which aids and abets the 

Taliban and other jihadist groups, and Taliban finances are being 

targeted. 

These are good steps, but it’s unclear if they will change the fundamentals that have frustrated an acceptable resolution for so long. 

After all these years, what do we really know about the Taliban? 

How fragmented is it? Can it ever be brought into a durable political settlement? 

Would Pakistan, or Russia and Iran, both increasingly engaged 

with the Taliban, sabotage any settlement? 

We should be proud of our many contributions to development in 

Afghanistan, including dramatically expanding education and the 

cause of women, despite rampant corruption. 

I’ve met with some of these women. The girls can now go to 

schools. That was prohibited, of course, under the Taliban. I’ve 

talked to teachers who’ve had the soles of their feet lashed when 

they were caught teaching girls. 

The stories of these girls are incredibly inspiring. The stories of 

women who are now part of the government in Afghanistan are inspiring. 

But, frankly, in other ways, we’ve been treading water. While 

leaving today would do more harm than good, our substantial military and development commitment to Afghanistan cannot be openended. 

We need to see more progress. And with that, if we have—our 

ranking member is not with us yet but he’ll make his statement, 

Ambassador Wells, after your opening statement. 

So this morning, I am pleased to welcome Alice Wells, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian 

Affairs to the committee. 

Ambassador Alice G. Wells has been serving as the Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian 

Affairs since June 2017. 

She is a career Foreign Service officer and she has previously 

served as the United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Jordan. 

She has held numerous positions within the Department of State 

and has extensive experience in South and Central Asia, and we 

very much appreciate her being with us today. 

Without objection, the witness’ full prepared statement is going 

to be made part of the record. Members are going to have 5 calendar days to submit any statements or questions or extraneous 

material for the record. 

And I’ll ask Ambassador Wells if she would summarize her remarks and then afterwards we will go to questions. 

Thank you. 

3

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALICE G. WELLS, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF SOUTH 

AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador WELLS. Chairman Royce and Ranking Member 

Engel, thank you for inviting me to appear today to discuss the administration’s strategy in Afghanistan. 

This is a timely hearing. Just last week, a cease fire—the first 

in 17 years—brought peace to Afghanistan during the period of Eid 

and, like many Americans, I was struck by the images of Afghan 

soldiers and Taliban praying together, side by side. 

If Afghan troops and Taliban foot soldiers can pray together, 

then the Afghan people have every reason to believe that their 

leaders can come together and negotiate an end to this war. 

Helping to jumpstart an Afghan peace process is among Secretary Pompeo’s highest priorities and has been my primary focus 

since assuming responsibility for this account 1 year ago. 

The President’s South Asia strategy, announced last August, is 

making a difference. Its conditions-based approach has signaled to 

the Taliban that they cannot win on the battlefield, and has provided President Ghani with renewed confidence to pursue a negotiated political settlement. 

His February 2018 invitation to the Taliban to enter into a peace 

process without preconditions as unprecedented. Equally unprecedented was President Ghani’s announcement of the temporary 

cease fire for the weeks surrounding the Eid holidays. 

The national outpouring of relief and joy last weekend was unlike anything Afghanistan has seen. Taliban fighters wandered the 

streets of the cities. They took selfies with Afghan soldiers. 

The sampled Eid treats with Afghan citizens and they worshiped 

alongside those they had been exchanging fire with just a few days 

earlier. 

For many Afghans, Taliban and pro-government alike, it was an 

exhilarating first taste of what peace might look like. 

The United States has made clear that we are prepared to support, facilitate, and participate in direct negotiations between the 

Afghan Government and the Taliban. 

We will support all Afghan stakeholders as they work to reach 

a mutually agreeable negotiated settlement that ends the conflict 

and ensures Afghanistan is never again used as a safe haven for 

terrorist groups. 

Our desired outcomes for any peace process are clear and have 

not changed. The Taliban must renounce violence, break ties with 

al-Qaeda, and accept the Afghan constitution, including its protections for women and minorities. 

Although the Taliban and ISIS Khorasan remain potent enemies, 

the South Asia strategy is having an impact on the battlefield. 

With tactical level support from U.S. military advisors, the Afghan 

security forces have slowed the Taliban’s momentum. 

Improved air support, a generational shift in leadership, and a 

doubling of the size of special forces are creating conditions for a 

political process to achieve a lasting peace. 

Alongside our military campaign we are working with our partners, especially in the Gulf, to help strangle the Taliban’s illicit 

revenue from foreign sources and narcotics trafficking. 

4

We are supporting the Afghan Government’s outreach to the 

global Muslim community to delegitimize the religious 

underpinnings of the Taliban’s violent campaign and we are also 

calling on Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan, to take additional steps in support of peace. 

Despite some positive indicators, we have not yet seen Pakistan 

take the sustained or the decisive steps that we believe it should 

pursue, including arresting or expelling Taliban elements who will 

not come to the negotiating table. 

We are also encouraging the Afghan Government reforms in a 

bid to further sap the insurgency of support. Upcoming Afghan 

elections for Parliament in October and for President in early 2019 

must be timely, transparent, and credible. 

We are providing targeted assistance to Afghan electoral institutions to assist with voter registration and reduce electoral fraud. 

More than 6 million Afghans have registered to vote and more than 

5,000 candidates will be standing for public office. 

President Ghani is an economic reformer, but Afghanistan still 

ranks near the bottom in Transparency International’s rankings. 

There has been some institutional progress, including the establishment of an anti-corruption justice center. 

But progress has been slow. However, there have been bright 

spots as well. Over the last year, the Afghan Government has improved its fiscal performance and is a funding a greater share of 

its budget. 

The U.S. share of pledged donor support has dropped from about 

50 percent in 2012 to 25 percent today. The Afghan people who 

face the deadly toll of this war every day understand the need for 

peace and so too do the thousands of U.S. personnel working to implement the administration’s strategy. 

As I noted earlier, the key questions remains: Will the Taliban 

join the peace process and make the compromises necessary to end 

the war? 

We are prepared to test this proposition. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee. Congress’ support is crucial to our strategic progress and I look forward to addressing your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wells follows:]

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Statement for the Record by Ambassador Alice G. Wells 

Senior Bureau Official for South and Central Asian Affairs 

Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Wednesday, June 20,2018, 10:00 a.m. 

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel- thank you for inviting me to appear 

here today to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. Thousands of U.S. servicemembers, diplomats, and development specialists are working every day alongside 

our Afghan and international partners to achieve our strategic objective of a more 

stable and secure Afghanistan that is never again a platfonn for terrorists to plan 

and execute attacks against the United States. 

It has been almost a year since I was asked to lead our diplomatic efforts. Over the 

course ofthis year, I have seen the President's South Asia Strategy make a 

difference. Afghan security forces are now fighting with renewed confidence and 

are slowing the Taliban's momentum. Pakistan is on notice that we expect its 

m1equivocal cooperation ending sanctuaries that the Taliban have enjoyed since the 

remnants of their toppled regime fled into Pakistan in 2001. And, for the first time, 

a ceasefire brought peace to Afghanistan during the period ofEid, with Afghan 

soldiers and Taliban praying together, side-by-side. If Afghan troops and Taliban 

foot-soldiers can pray together, then the Afghan people have every reason to 

believe that their leaders can come together and negotiate an end to this war. 

Achieving progress toward this goal is among our highest diplomatic priorities and 

I want to take this opportunity to update you on our efforts. 

Jumpstarting an Afghan Peace Process 

The Administration's conditions-based South Asia Strategy ensures the Taliban 

cmmot win on the battlefield. But it recognizes that a resolution to the conflict will 

be through a negotiated political settlement. Our desired outcomes for any peace 

process are clear m1d have not chm1ged. The Taliban must renounce violence, 

break ties with ai-Qaida, and accept the Afghan Constitution- including its 

protections for women and minorities. 

The path to achieving these outcomes will likely be filled with obstacles and 

unanticipated setbacks. Nevertheless, after more than 16 years of war, we see a 

real opportunity this year to start an Afghan peace process that could lead to a 

durable settlement of the conflict. Such a settlement would help secure vital U.S. 

interests and ultimately reduce the costs associated with our long-tem1 engagement 

in Afghanistan. 
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The basis for our cautious optimism starts with the Afghan government, which 

under President Ghani's strong leadership is doing everything possible to signal its 

ope1mess to a dialogue with the Taliban. In February 2018, President Ghani 

invited the Taliban to enter into a peace process without preconditions- an 

unprecedented gesture by the Afghan government. More recently, President Ghani 

took another unprecedented step and mmounced a temporary ceasefire in offensive 

operations against the Taliban for the week surrounding the Eid holidays. The 

Tali ban responded with a three-day ceasefire. This was the first national ceasefire 

in the last 17 years of the Afghan conflict, a11d the national outpouring of relief and 

joy this past weekend was unlike anything Afghanistan has seen in many years. 

Tali ban fighters wandered the streets of major cities, leaving their weapons at the 

gates. They took selfies with Afghan soldiers, sampled Eid treats with Afghan 

citizens, and worshipped in mosques alongside those they had been exchanging 

fire with the previous week. For many Afghans, Taliban and pro-government 

alike, it was an exhilarating first taste of what peace might look like. 

Ghani's bold move to reduce violence can1e on the heels of three historic religious 

edicts ("fatwa"). The first was a fatwa issued in 2017 by leading Pakistani clerics 

that declared suicide attacks to be forbidden under Islam and reserving to the state 

the authority to declare jihad. Then in May ofthis year, lslan1ic scholars from 

Indonesia, Pakista11 and Afghanista11 issued a trilatateral declaration calling for 

peace in Afghanistan and reiterating that suicide attacks are contrary to Islam. 

Finally, this month, roughly 2,000 Afghan religious leaders gathered in Kabul and 

issued a fatwa with the san1e themes and calling for intra-Afghan peace. These 

scholars are adding their powerful voice to the message of countless ordinary 

Afghans who are increasingly demanding that their political leaders set aside 

longstanding differences and come together in pursuit of peace. 

The United States has long held that Afghans must ultimately determine their own 

future and that a peace deal cmmot be dictated by outside powers. As President 

Trump emphasized when announcing our South Asia Strategy, "We are a partner 

and a friend, but we will not dictate to the Afghan people how to live, or how to 

govern their own complex society." Nonetheless, this Administration also 

recognizes the decisive role that American leadership can have in catalyzing 

progress toward a peace agreement. With Secretary Pompeo's energetic 

leadership, we are reinvigorating U.S. diplomatic efforts to support an intraAfghan peace process. 
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In the past four months, the United States and 28 other countries have endorsed 

President Ghani's peace vision. Ambassador Bass and his team in Kabul are 

lending support to Afghan-led etiorts to extend the recent ceasefire, while our 

diplomats in other capitals are pressing influential international partners to publicly 

support it. The United States has made clear that we are prepared to support, 

facilitate, and participate in direct negotiations between the Afghan govermnent 

and the Taliban. We will support the government and all Afghan stakeholders as 

they work to reach a mutually agreeable negotiated settlement that ends the 

conflict and ensures Afghanistan is never again used as a safe haven for terrorist 

groups. 

Recently, there have been signs that the Taliban's Pakistan-based leaders are 

debating the merits of joining a peace process; however, the group has not 

responded to President Ghani's offer of unconditional talks. We are pursuing a 

multi-track strategy to make clear to the Tali ban that negotiations are their best 

option. The strategy has a number of distinct lines of effort quite apart from the 

military effort. These include a diplomatic effort to rally regional support for the 

Afghan Government and isolate the Taliban, and a financial component designed 

to eliminate the Taliban's ability to raise funds from donors and from narcotics 

trafficking. We are also working to end the sanctuary that the Tali ban have 

e1~oyed for decades in Pakistan and to encourage fighting elements within the 

Taliban to consider local arrangements to de-escalate the levels of violence. 

I want to focus on four key areas where we are working to help bolster prospects 

for an eventual settlement of the conflict. 

First, we are supporting Afghan efforts to reduce violence and protect a peace 

process from spoilers. Taliban momentum has slowed, as a result of both our 

own modest troop increase, as well as the renewed commitment of our NATO 

Resolute Support Mission (RSM) Allies and partners who currently contribute over 

6,500 troops to train, advise, and assist the Afghan military. Afghan security 

forces are steadily improving, consistent with President Ghani's four-year roadmap 

tor security sector refom1. Inetiective generals and conmmnders are being 

replaced by younger, more dynamic officers. Afghan Special Forces are on track 

to double in size, from roughly 15,000 to 30,000 personnel, and they are 

increasingly targeting irreconcilable elements of the Taliban who aim to prevent a 

peace process from gaining steam. These and other military eftorts are part of a 
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concerted efiort, as the President articulated in August 2017, to strategically apply 

force in order to create the conditions for a political process to achieve a lasting 

peace. 

Of course the Taliban remains a resilient foe. Afghan forces are still laboring to 

regain control oflarge areas of rural Afghanistan. Equally- if not more troubling 

-ISIS Khorasan has increased the pace and scope of its attacks against urban 

targets, often with a devastating civilian toll. These attacks, which have 

increasingly focused on ethnic and religious minorities, are clearly aimed at 

stoking sectarian and political tensions and undern1ining A(ghan popular support 

for a peace process. 

President Ghani, to his great credit, has signaled his steadfast conunitment to 

pressing ahead with a peace process, despite these attacks. But this is obviously a 

challenging balancing act for him and other Afghan leaders. Through our military 

and intelligence cooperation with the Afghan government, we are doing everything 

possible to ensure that ISIS and Tali ban hardliners do not succeed in derailing 

peace efforts. Additionally, we have aggressively countered Russia's false and 

outrageous claims that the U.S. supports ISIS. 

Second, we are encouraging Afghans from across the political spectrum to 

come together in support of peace and to put the interests of their country 

first during upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. One 

paradoxical result of the Unity Government is that more Afghans see their 

governing structures as the spoils of ethnic rivalry. We know from past experience 

that the upcoming elections- for parliament in October 2018 and for President in 

early 2019- will be a real test for Afghans and could lead to further political 

polarization. Consequently, we are engaging on a daily basis with a broad range of 

Afghan political figures, in and out of govenunent, and stressing the importance of 

an inclusive, timely and credible election process. We are also working with other 

donors to provide targeted capacity building assistance to Afghan electoral 

institutions to assist with voter registration and ensure more robust measures aimed 

at reducing electoral fraud. Our assistance appears to be having an impact; an 

estimated six million Afghans have registered to vote and over tive thousand 

candidates have stepped forward to run for local and national-level office. 

Of course, there are going to be political concerns raised by any progress toward a 

peace process. The prospect of the Taliban returning to Afghan political life in 
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whatever fonn is unsettling to many Afghans. Our strong desire is that Afghans 

will use their upcoming elections as an opportunity to not only engage in a national 

dialogue on these and related issues, but also to coalesce around a peace vision that 

will further reinforce to the Taliban the stark choice they face. 

Third, we are supporting Afghan government reforms, in a bid to further sap 

the insurgency of support President Ghani's efforts to increase transparency and 

accountability are promising, but corruption in Afghanistan will not be eliminated 

overnight. Economically, we have seen small improvements in growth, but it is 

not keeping pace with the birth rate, and poverty is increasing. A devastating twoyear drought has hit Afghanistan's northem and westem provinces especially hard, 

and will further increase poverty and drive internal displacement. 

U.S. assistance is designed to improve the conditions for peace by helping to build 

Afghan capacity and address these govemance challenges. For example, we 

provide assistance to help the Afghan government improve its delivery of health 

and education services and partner with Afghan govemment organizations to 

counter-corruption. We work with the Afghan private sector to increase exports 

that generate revenue and provide altemative livelihoods to joining the insurgency 

and the narcotics trade. Our enhanced bilateral and regional dialogues foster a 

significant and still growing increase in Central Asian trade with Afghanistan, 

including increased exports of electricity to Kabul. Alongside our partners in 

Afghan civil society, we press to increase the participation of youth and women in 

the formal economy, while also supporting the Afghan govemment's priority of 

developing English as a medium of instmction in higher education so that 

Afghans' can increasingly contribute to socio-economic development. We also 

continue our work to improve Afghan justice systems, so they can effectively 

prosecute narcotics traffickers and criminal networks that fuel the insurgency and 

cormption. 

Although the Afghan govenm1ent's progress in these areas is slower than we 

would prefer, we have seen real progress. The clearest evidence of this is that the 

Afghan people are now living longer, healthier lives than at any point in recent 

memory. Over the past 17 years, an entire generation of Afghans has had an 

opportunity to go to school instead of going to war. This generation of Afghans 

also lives in one of the most open media environments in South Asia, with access 

to htmdreds of private radio and TV stations where political debate is free and 

vigorous. It is this cohort of politically infonned Afghans who are now driving 
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calls for additional refom1 and for peace. And so we will continue our targeted 

civilian assistance and keep encouraging Afghan govemment reforms. 

Afghan leaders understand that our conditions-based approach is not a blank 

check, and through the Afghanistan Compact have asked us to hold them 

accountable for meeting clear benchmarks. Over the last year, the Afghan 

govenm1ent has improved its fiscal perfom1m1ce and is funding a greater share of 

its budget, reducing its dependence on the United States and other donors. 

Specifically, the U.S. share of pledged donor support for Afghanistan has fallen 

from about 50 percent in 2012 to about 25 percent. As such, we have requested 

$632.8 million in civilian assistance for FY 2019, down 85 percent since FY 2010. 

The upcoming Geneva Conference, slated for November 2018, will offer another 

opporttmity to review Afghm1 progress on govennnent refonns. A central theme of 

that conference will be how donors can work with the Afghan govemment to 

energize the peace process. I hope Congress will join us in putting the United 

States in a strong position to leverage generous contributions from other donors as 

we work together toward that goal. 

Fourth, we are engaging with all of Afghanistan's neighbors and nearneighbors to build regional support for the Afghan government's peace vision 

and discourage spoilers. Pakistan has an important role to play and has legitimate 

interests that it wm1ts to ensure are met during any peace process. The dialogue 

that we have with Pakistan seeks to address those concems while also encouraging 

additional concrete support for Afghan peace efforts. For example, with U.S. 

support, Pakistan and Afghanistan entered into a constructive dialogue to develop 

the Afghanistan-Pakistm1 Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS), an 

initiative to which we have given our full support. However, despite some positive 

indicators, we have not yet seen Pakistan take the sustained or decisive steps that 

we would have expected to see ten months after the announcement of the South 

Asia strateh'Y, including arresting or expelling Taliban elements who will not come 

to the negotiating table. 

More broadly, all of Afghanistan's neighbors- from Iran and Russia, to India, 

China, m1d the Central Asian states - have repeatedly stated their support for m1 

Afghm1 peace process. All of these countries feel a strong stake in Afghanistan's 

future security and stability. They all would benefit from a political settlement in 

Afghm1istan, which would help to reduce the terrorist m1d narcotics threat to their 

own citizens and also bolster regional economic cooperation. And so we are 
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expanding our regional engagement and utilizing every diplomatic mechanismfrom the C5+ 1 process with the Central Asian Republics to the Heart of Asia 

process- to encourage additional concrete support for Afghan-led peace process. 

Way Ahead 

This is an ambitious agenda and Secretary Pompeo is conmritted to strengthening 

our diplomatic effort going forward. That means exploring opportunities to build 

on the fragile opening created by President Ghani's February 2018 peace offer and 

by the recent ceasetlre. 

Congress' support for these efforts remains crucial to our continued progress. I am 

optimistic that progress can be made in the coming months- if we continue to 

apply the necessary resources and align our military campaign to increasingly 

support our diplomacy. 

The Afghan people, who face the deadly toll of this war every day, understand that 

reality. In March, a car bombing outside a sports stadium in Helmand killed 16 

civilians and injured more than 50 bystanders. Within hours, family members and 

other mourners convened a sit-in at the blast site. Their message was simple: it's 

time to end the senseless violence. In subsequent days, peaceful activists, many of 

them women, fonned a small tent city and began planning a march for peace. And 

within days, there were "peace tents" being erected in far-flung provinces around 

the country. 

Today, more than three months after the horrific attack, those peace tents are still 

outside the sports stadium in Helmand and across the countryside. Those 

courageous marchers earlier this month finally reached Kabul. Along their long 

journey, they struck a chord with ordinary Afghans of all backgrounds and 

latmched what is now recognized as the first popular movement in favor of peace 

since this war began- a grassroots movement that started in the heartland of the 

Taliban's insurgency. 

So, the Afghan people and Afghan govermnent have made clear that they want an 

end to war. In pursuing that goal, they have the United States as their equally 

determined partner. The key question remains: will the Tali ban join us in a peace 

process? Are they prepared to sit across the table from the Afghan government 

and United States, and to make the compromises necessary to turn the page on four 
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decades of violence? As I have outlined to you today, the men and women ofthe 

Department of State are doing everything possible to help jump start that peace 

process and achieve this elusive but important goal. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you again for this opportunity to 

appear before your committee. I look forward to discussing our strategy and 

addressing your questions. 
13

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Well. 

We now go to Mr. Eliot Engel of New York, the ranking member 

of the committee. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this 

hearing, and Ambassador, thank you for your time and for your 

service. 

Our policy, obviously, toward Afghanistan is critical. Fifteen 

thousand American troops remain on the ground there fighting 

America’s longest war and we provide billions in assistance every 

year. 

In the 17 years since Americans first deployed to Afghanistan 

after September 11th, our troops and those of our allies have performed heroically. There has been significant progress on the counterterrorism front against al-Qaeda. 

Once estimated as many as 5,000, the number of al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan is now thought to be in the low hundreds. Unfortunately, those gains against al-Qaeda aren’t comparable to the 

fight against the Taliban, which most experts consider a stalemate. 

The Trump administration announced its approach to deal with 

the stalemate nearly a year ago in what it termed a new strategy 

for Afghanistan and South Asia. 

It is meant to be a so-called conditions-based approach that emphasizes fighting to win, downplays nation building, includes a 

stronger line against Pakistan, and a larger role for India, eliminates time tables, expands targeting authorities for U.S. forces and, 

notably, commits to sending additional troops. 

In sum, the administration seems to be planning to escalate the 

war in order to break the stalemate, forcing the Taliban to the negotiating table. 

But what happens if that stalemate is not broken? In its April 

2018 report, the U.S. special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction—what we call SIGAR—found that the share of districts in Afghanistan under government control or influence is 56 

percent. 

Unfortunately, that ties the lowest level ever recorded by SIGAR. 

So we need to be honest. Even with the best military in the world 

it’s impossible to kill every member of the Taliban. 

Despite the President’s talk, even members of the administration 

acknowledge that the war in Afghanistan will not be won on the 

battlefield. The President needs a strategy based on the facts as 

they are, not as he wishes them to be. 

So I thank all of the countries which have committed troops to 

the fight in Afghanistan for so many years. But I worry with attacks on NATO and our allies coming from the President we are 

undermining the very alliance which binds the coalition fighting for 

the future of Afghanistan and our security. 

So rather than putting more Americans in harm’s way, the administration should focus its resources on achieving a political resolution to the conflict. It’s a tough pill to swallow, no doubt about 

it. 

Many brave Americans have perished at the hands of Taliban 

fighters. The Taliban’s continued existence is a fact we need to deal 

with and the old adage remains true—you don’t make peace with 

your friends. 

14

Taliban refuses to talk directly with the Afghan Government. 

They view it as illegitimate. That’s, obviously, made progress on 

reconciliation impossible. 

However, the Taliban has maintained an interest in talking with 

the United States, even after the President told the U.N. Security 

Council this past January that the U.S. wasn’t prepared to talk 

right now. 

That’s a mistake. If American interests are best served by negotiating directly with the Taliban, then we should stop kicking the 

can down the road. 

The Taliban claim that they will completely separate themselves 

from international terrorism and respect the rights of women and 

minorities—it’s time to see if they are serious. 

Recent developments may give us an opening—the recent Afghan 

Government cease fire, the Taliban separate but reciprocal cease 

fire, a potential convergence of interests against the growing threat 

of the ISIS offshoot in Afghanistan. 

So far, we have squandered the opportunity. We have heard 

nothing about how we plan to seize on the cease fire, and that’s no 

real surprise because, as I have been finding for many, many 

months now, the administration doesn’t prioritize diplomacy. 

The State Department Office of the Inspector General found that 

the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs ‘‘lost both staff and 

expertise’’ as a result of the reckless hollowing out of the State Department. 

Among those cuts were the experts on peace talks with the 

Taliban and reconciliation. 

So, Ambassador Wells, now that the hiring freeze is over we will 

be interested in hearing how the administration plans to reconstitute this expertise. We cannot miss the next diplomatic opportunity 

because we don’t have diplomats up to the job. 

And diplomacy is going to be at the center of solving this challenge. After many years of war, it’s crystal clear that there is no 

military solution to end the fighting in Afghanistan. 

But that doesn’t foreclose a path to peace that advances American security interests. Now is the time to make peace and security 

our number-one goal and to implement a strategy in Afghanistan 

that will help us achieve it. 

We owe this to the women and men who serve our country in 

uniform, to those who gave the ultimate sacrifice fighting this war, 

and to those who perished on September 11, 2001, in my home city 

of New York. 

So I look forward to your testimony. I know you’ve started and 

we are very happy to have you here. 

I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

So, Ambassador Wells, I think the key question here in terms of 

the willingness of factions in the Taliban or the overall organization to reach some kind of settlement goes to their intentions, and 

there have been cease fires. But yesterday there were 30 Afghans 

killed by Taliban soldiers when, on the Taliban side, they lifted 

that cease fire. 

15

Let me ask you, in your judgment is the Taliban, at the end of 

the day, interested in a political settlement? What do circumstances tell you and how would we get there? 

We saw President Ghani offer a series of moves, of prisoners releases, medical aid for wounded soldiers, this latest cease fire, and 

fraternization that presumably might bring down the tensions. 

And yet, here was the attack yesterday. Give me your view on 

this. 

Ambassador WELLS. The Taliban have long said that they do 

support a political—or negotiations but only with the United 

States, not with the sovereign Government of Afghanistan, and I 

think what we learned from this cease fire that was very interesting was just how much the foot soldiers and the commanders inside of Afghanistan do desire peace, and the celebration of the Eid 

was spontaneous and it was countrywide. 

And so I think where we are right now is the Taliban leadership, 

many of whom enjoy sanctuary outside of the country and don’t feel 

the pressures of day-to-day war, have not yet been convinced to 

come to the negotiating table, despite what has been an extremely 

forward-leaning offer of peace put forward by President Ghani in 

February. 

That peace offer, which was unconditional without any preconditions attached to it and included the offer of considering constitutional amendments to ensure that the Taliban’s views were 

better reflected in the institutions and structure of the Government 

of Afghanistan, that offer has been endorsed by the international 

community. 

And so our strategy right now I think has to be focused on increasing the pressure that the Taliban feel to take up that offer of 

negotiation. 

Chairman ROYCE. And one of the difficulties in all of this, in getting an organization—a terrorist organization like that to the table 

is the financing for that organization that makes cash ready at 

hand every time they are moving narcotics. 

I guess one of the great frustrations is for the last 15 years the 

U.S. Government has spent $8 billion focused on trying to shut 

down that and today it is still the biggest cash crop in Afghanistan. 

What, in theory, could be done to try to diminish that narcotics 

trade and all the illegality that that drives as well as the support 

for the Taliban from a financial standpoint? 

Ambassador WELLS. I agree. The narcotics, we assess, account 

for about 60 percent of the Taliban budget but, more than that, 

they fuel a criminal network and eat away at the institutions of 

state through the corruption that they also cause. 

What we have done, partly, it’s a problem of security. Eighty-five 

percent of opium is grown in areas that are controlled or contested 

by the Taliban. 

So a key element in combating the Taliban finances is continuing 

to improve on the battlefield, which we are starting to see a decline 

in the Taliban’s momentum as a result of the South Asia strategy 

and the new authorities and the new approach that has been 

adopted underneath that strategy. 

But we are also building the institutional capacity of the Afghan 

Government to prosecute and go after narco criminals and that has 

16

been through working with the ministry of counter narcotics, building special investigative units and national investigation units, 

working with President Ghani in support of a national drug action 

plan. 

And there have been some successes. Rather than going after individual farmers, we focused on drug labs. Last year, we had 84 

joint raids. We interdicted about $360 million worth of drugs. 

There is now a counter narcotics justice center which is prosecuting these narcotics cases. They have a 99 percent conviction 

record. 

So security is a key part. The institutional capacity is important 

and as is the fact that over the last 16 years we have built up a 

cadre of Afghans so that the responsibility for undertaking these 

actions now resides in these Afghan institutions. 

Chairman ROYCE. But one of the other things that has to be a 

prerequisite here is within the Government of Afghanistan that 

government has to credibly combat corruption, and that has been 

a longstanding problem. 

We have got our Special Investigator General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction where we spend $55 million per year just to make 

sure our funds aren’t misused, and I would—my time has expired. 

I am going to go to Mr. Engel. But I would suggest that tripling 

down in terms of the pressure we apply on the government there 

to have transparency and to end those practices is the only sure 

way to rally confidence on the part of the Afghan population and 

international community. 

We go to Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ambassador. Let me say this. I am glad that you 

support negotiations with the Taliban. 

But as far as I am concerned, your support only adds to the 

mixed signals we are hearing from the administration. So when 

you and Secretary Pompeo and General Miller say that we should 

negotiate, I am not sure if you’re speaking for yourselves or for the 

administration because, frankly, the White House hasn’t been so 

clear. 

The way I see it, if we can talk to Kim Jong-un, certainly, we 

can talk to the Taliban, and we know the Taliban is interested in 

direct talks with the U.S. 

So why won’t the administration accept the offer, if only as a 

bridge to broader talks that would eventually include the Afghan 

Government? 

Ambassador WELLS. Thank you, sir. 

The South Asia strategy is premised on achieving a pathway to 

a dignified political settlement. I mean, that’s victory under the 

South Asia strategy, and we have worked diplomatically in support 

of the military campaign to build an international consensus behind a peace proposal that has been put forward by President 

Ghani and have undertaken various lines of effort to put pressure 

on the Taliban to bring them to the table. 

The Taliban have had a de facto office for many years in Doha 

and there has been no lack of talking—of other countries talking, 

of track two talking, of the Taliban hearing from the international 

17

community and from the Afghan Government—the sincere desire 

to begin a negotiated political process. 

And so the offer is on the table. I think we have been very clear 

about how we see ourselves playing a role in a negotiation, both 

as participants and supporting the process. 

We are a party to this conflict. But the Taliban leadership has 

to understand that the very nature of a peace settlement, when you 

talk about forms of governance, the rights of individuals under the 

constitution, prisoner releases, confidence-building measures—

these are sovereign issues. These are issues that have to be negotiated with Afghans and not over the heads of Afghans. 

So we will play our role. But the Taliban, if we recognize them 

as part of the legitimate political fabric of Afghanistan, they have 

to recognize that the Afghan Government and the many communities of Afghanistan are also part of that legitimate fabric—political fabric of Afghanistan. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you this question. In your testimony, you 

state that we have a conditions-based strategy in South Asia. But 

those conditions, however, have never been spelled out. 

So what conditions are you referring to specifically? If you could 

list them, I’d be grateful. 

Ambassador WELLS. Again, the conditions that we are seeking to 

achieve in Afghanistan are cessation of violence, a rejection of terrorism, and respect for the constitution and this is all under the 

umbrella of not allowing Afghanistan to ever again become a safe 

haven for terrorists that are planning to attack the United States 

or its allies. 

I think what’s significant in those conditions is that they are not 

preconditions. We have not sought to impose any obstacles to the 

beginning of a political negotiation between the Taliban and Afghan Government. 

What we want to see is what comes out of that process. 

Mr. ENGEL. All right. Thank you. 

And let me ask you this. We have 40 countries contributing 

troops to the NATO support mission in Afghanistan, and the operation remains one of the most enduring examples of how we can 

work with our allies. Germany is the second largest troop contributor, after the United States. 

The President seems to indicate that he doesn’t agree with or understand the values of alliances or multilateral partnerships such 

as how the NATO mission in Afghanistan continues to serve the interests of the United States. 

So I am concerned about the repeated remarks by the President 

denigrating the NATO alliance. So I want to just ask you a simple 

question. 

Do you agree that the U.S. is best served by continuing to work 

with allies and partners around the world? Obviously, the answer 

would be yes. But I’d like to hear that. 

As the President continues to attack the very countries fighting 

with us in Afghanistan—fighting on our side, how strained cooperation with our allies made it harder to implement our South Asia 

strategy? 

Ambassador WELLS. Having a united international force and diplomatic effort is essential the campaign to stabilize Afghanistan 

18

and we are deeply grateful for the support of our NATO allies and 

our partners in the Resolute Support mission. 

I think you see it in the—what we have been able to do is to 

spread the burden, which is a key goal of the administration in 

order to ensure that we are all playing a part and playing a fair 

part in the contributions to Afghanistan’s stability and I think it’s 

a telling statistic that since 2012 our contribution to civilian assistance has gone from 50 percent to 25 percent, and I think we want 

to continue in that direction to make sure that we and our partners 

are all pulling in this same direction with the same intensity. 

Mr. ENGEL. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you, Ranking Member. 

And it’s a pleasure to see you again, Ambassador Wells. When 

the President first announced our new strategy in Afghanistan last 

year, the administration told Congress that it would seek a coordinated effort to get the Taliban to the table, as we have been discussing, using layers of diplomatic efforts, and this, we were told, 

left open the possibility of including Russia and Iran. 

If you could elaborate on what extent would you say that Russia 

and Iran are supporting the Taliban and, if they are, how does that 

impact our layered diplomatic approach. 

And I also wanted to follow up on Pakistan. I know that the administration suspended military aid to Pakistan. It was part of our 

strategy to get Pakistan to change how it does business when it 

comes to the Taliban and providing safe harbors, and you testified 

that Pakistan was on notice that we expect its unequivocal cooperation ending sanctuaries. But also, we haven’t really seen Pakistan 

do the sustained or decisive steps that we would have expected 

when this new strategy was announced. 

Do you have any evidence that Pakistan has taken any steps to 

cut off the flow of arms, of fighters, or support for the Taliban and 

have we, in the U.S., allowed for any waivers or made any exceptions to military assistance to Pakistan since the suspension of the 

aid was announced? 

Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador WELLS. Thank you. 

We are concerned when we see reports of countries that are seeking to hedge their bets in Afghanistan by—typically by viewing the 

Taliban as a legitimate force in fighting ISIS Khorasan. 

Our strong view is that the only way to defeat terrorism and to 

bring peace to Afghanistan is to strengthen the Afghan Government and strengthen the government’s ability to fight terrorists. 

That said, both countries like Russia and Iran do have an important role to play in the future stabilization of Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan’s neighbors are going to have to support any peace 

process that emerges between the Afghan Government and the 

Taliban and that’s why we worked very hard in a variety of diplomatic formats to ensure that the region is part of this process, informed by the process, and is informed by the principles of peace 

that have been put forward by President Ghani. 

19

Next week I’ll be going to an international contact group meeting 

of over 30 countries that will be gathering, including Russia and 

Iran, to reinforce or support for the efforts of President Ghani and 

our support for peace in the region and we will continue those diplomatic efforts. 

Pakistan has a particularly crucial role to play. As General Votel 

testified, without Pakistan’s active support it’s going to be much 

more challenging to achieve our objectives under the South Asia 

strategy. 

We would like to see Pakistan arrest, expel, or bring to the negotiating table Taliban leadership and to date, while we have seen 

some positive steps, our assessment has been that we have not 

seen the sustained and decisive actions that are really required to 

ensure that the Taliban take this peace process seriously. That——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And then one little nugget, just to leave you with that—the 

Kabul compact, and President Ghani had said they were going to 

take a lot of steps for reform. 

They announced 100 initiatives, and I hope that in the question 

and answer you can give us an update on—I haven’t heard too 

much about the reforms. 

And we have got a minute—maybe you could tell us what benchmarks does the President have and how do we tend to use those 

as commitments for preconditions, et cetera. 

Ambassador WELLS. We have—the Afghan Government, on its 

own volition, established the Afghanistan compact. It has over 200 

metrics to measure a performance—reform, anti-corruption in the 

areas of security, governance, economic performance, and then reconciliation efforts. 

We meet quarterly with President Ghani to review progress 

under those metrics. Again, this is an Afghan Government initiative and not something that we have put forward as part of our aid 

conditionality. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Do you think that they are making progress? 

Ambassador WELLS. We do, and we see serious efforts. There are 

areas where we make progress faster and areas where, when there 

is less progress, we have been able to have the kinds of top level 

political conversations to keep the momentum behind reform. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Good to see you, Acting Assistant Secretary and 

Ambassador, which raises the question—when is the administration going to appoint a permanent assistant secretary for South 

and Central Asia? Has the administration indicated that? 

Ambassador WELLS. Secretary Pompeo, when he testified, indicated that he would be moving soon to make appointments, including for the assistant secretary. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Did he criticize or apologize for the fact that 

throughout the tenure of his predecessor no one had been nominated to a position as important as the one you’re acting in? 

Ambassador WELLS. I am very grateful that both under Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Pompeo I’ve been given full writ to 

undertake this job. 

20

Mr. SHERMAN. But still, the word acting in front of your title undercuts what you do—the uncertainty of whether you’ll keep doing 

it. If the administration had had the wisdom to simply give you the 

position I wouldn’t be asking this question. 

It’s my understanding that some 30 personnel positions were cut 

between the South Central Asia office and the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Is there any chance that those cuts are going to be restored? 

Ambassador WELLS. Sir, some of——

Mr. SHERMAN. And are they needed? 

Ambassador WELLS. Right. Sir, some of the cuts were the result 

of two bureaus being merged and, you know, when you overlap two 

bureaus some of the administrative staff, the front office staff, and 

so we were able to take advantage of efficiencies from the reintegration of the two bureaus. 

We have decided to expand our staff who are focused on reconciliation. That team is being built up both here in the State Department as well as in our Embassy in Kabul. 

But I would also note that we benefit from what is very much 

a whole of government approach—that the experts that we have, 

whether in DoD or the intelligence community, all are part of this 

one team as we look for ways to move the peace process forward. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Does the United States and does India and does 

Pakistan recognize the Durand line—the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

Ambassador WELLS. Afghanistan has not recognized——

Mr. SHERMAN. I know Afghanistan hasn’t. 

Ambassador WELLS. Right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But what about Pakistan, India, and the United 

States? Do those three countries recognize the line or you don’t 

know? 

Ambassador WELLS. Right. The Durand line serves as an international boundary. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And——

Ambassador WELLS. We recognize the sensitivities associated 

with it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But is it the U.S. position that that is the international boundary? 

Ambassador WELLS. That is how we approach the Durand line, 

yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But is there equivocation there or is that——

Ambassador WELLS. No. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. So it’s just as much an international border 

as——

Ambassador WELLS. But we believe that the border management 

is going to be best done when you have the countries working together and so——

Mr. SHERMAN. What about India? Does India recognize that as 

the international border? 

Ambassador WELLS. I actually don’t know India’s position, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I hope you respond to that, because India is a poor 

country. It does provide foreign aid to a limited degree. There are 

crying needs for aid to countries that are even closer to India than 

Afghanistan is, namely, Myanmar, Burma, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka. 

21

But India is instead providing substantial aid and has a substantial involvement in Afghanistan. 

Is there any harm—what degree of harm does that cause by 

making the Pakistanis nervous and causing them to support the 

wrong elements in Afghanistan or at least not to help us go after 

the wrong elements? To what extent is India’s generosity to the 

people of Afghanistan causing a problem with Pakistan? 

Ambassador WELLS. First, we see India’s support to Afghanistan 

as very important. They are a responsible aid provider. They have pledged $3 billion in assistance through 2020. The Afghan Government welcomes that assistance and the Afghan Government welcomes and seeks a strategic partnership with India. 

When it comes to Pakistan’s tensions over and its concerns over 

encirclement or——

Mr. SHERMAN. So let me interrupt you. Afghanistan wants a 

strategic partnership with India. 

Ambassador WELLS. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Afghanistan claims a huge chunk of Pakistani territory and we are surprised that Pakistan, although you won’t 

admit it and they won’t admit it, is working against our interests 

for a strong united Afghanistan, which longs to be an effective strategic partner of India. 

Ambassador WELLS. We have welcomed the recent Afghan-Pakistan discussions to deal with these issues that you raise, including 

management of the border, and there is been an agreement recently to establish liaison officers and to be able to collaborate more 

effectively on the border. We are supporting that——

Mr. SHERMAN. I am sure there is some collaboration. There is 

also substantial support for Pakistan from bad elements in Afghanistan. 

I’ll just make one final comment and that is you have a very 

tough job. The only tougher job would be to come to any of our districts and explain why we haven’t destroyed the poppy fields, because Afghanistan is a battlefield but so are the towns and cities 

of the country and many of our neighborhoods. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

We go to Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening 

this very important and timely hearing. 

Ambassador Wells, thank you for your leadership and for your 

sober but, I think, cautiously optimistic take on the prospects for 

peace. It is encouraging but, of course, the way forward is strewn 

with obstacles and you know it better than anyone. 

But thank you for giving us that insight that there was an exhilarating first taste of what peace might look like. I think that 

that, again, offers more encouragement that this can happen. 

I would like to ask you, if I could, discerning the intent of the 

Taliban leadership. Taliban is, as you know, as we all know, within 

the last few hours attacked a base—a Afghan base in Badghis and 

killed 30 Afghan soldiers, according to Reuters. Perhaps eight or 

more were wounded. 

And there is always a concern that a hostile power will use the 

prospects of peace or the facade, the cover of peace, as cover to acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:12 Sep 11, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\062018\30496 SHIRL
22

celerate their violence and I wonder how that has factored into the 

thinking, yours as well as the administration. 

Secondly, on aid conditionality, which you mentioned a moment 

ago, entities of the Government of Afghanistan, particularly the Afghan local police and Afghan national police, which are on the front 

lines of combatting the Taliban, as we all know, are known to have 

recruited children to serve as combatants or as servants, including 

as sex slaves. 

In fact, a 10-year-old boy was assassinated in February 2016 by 

the Taliban after he had been publicly honored by the Afghan local 

police forces for his assistance in combat operations against the 

Taliban. 

As you know, the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 requires, 

subject to an national interest waiver, the United States will cease 

military aid where the government is allowing children to be trafficked in its forces as child soldiers. 

I wonder if you could convey to us how seriously we are raising 

that issue with the Afghan Government and what steps, if any, did 

the Government of Afghanistan take in 2017 and into 2018 to cease 

using child soldiers in its forces? 

Ambassador WELLS. Thank you. 

I think when it comes to the Taliban resuming violence after the 

cease fire, this is going to be a critical time, I think, to underscore 

the dispute within the Muslim world over the raison d’etre—the 

reason why they are fighting this war. And we have seen some 

very important developments. 

Pakistan issued a fatwa. Over 1,000 members of their ulama, the 

religious establishment, condemning suicide bombing, condemning 

some of the tactics of the Taliban. 

The Indonesians gathered Afghan and Pakistani ulama and reiterated this condemnation and called for peace and reconciliation. 

The Afghan fatwa—over 2,700 gathered and signed a fatwa in 

favor of peace, against suicide bombing, in favor of peace negotiations. 

The OIC is gathering in the next 2 weeks to also have a conversation. I mean, this is, I think, a real moment of changing of 

opinion in the Islamic world about what is going on in Afghanistan 

and taking greater ownership and trying to frame that this is the 

time to negotiate for the Taliban with an Islamic Government of 

Afghanistan. 

And so we will continue to encourage these developments and to 

put as much pressure as we can on the Taliban through all of the 

various lines of effort that now is a moment to seize the opportunity of. 

At the same time, you’re so right that the reforms that the government take are critical. So, when it comes to, for instance, children sex slaves, we have worked with the Afghan Government over 

many years. That practice is now criminalized in the penal code 

and in other regulatory measures. 

We do extensive Leahy vetting for all of our military assistance 

and who we work with in Afghanistan to ensure that we are not 

supporting Afghan officers who are engaged in that behavior. 

23

We have extensive human rights training that we provide, and 

through USAID we have done vocational rehabilitation of 6,000 of 

these victims of this sex slave practice. 

On child soldiers, same, I think, commitment by the Afghan Government. It’s been criminalized. There are active measures to ensure that children are not recruited including 22 centers around 

the country that interdict when they see efforts for children to be 

inducted into the service. 

And so this is very much on our agenda, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Wells, thank you very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Albio Sires of New Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Ambassador Wells, thank you for coming. We appreciate having you here today. 

Ambassador, I just have an observation, then I am going to ask 

you a question. 

I am very hopeful that we do have a prospect for peace in Afghanistan. But I look at the Colombia peace pact and I see what 

it’s done to the drug growth in that country, and I just want to 

make sure that when we talk about peace, we do take in consideration that this is a very lucrative business in Afghanistan and I 

don’t know if we want to continue just, basically, saying it’s okay 

for them to keep growing this—the opium growth. 

So we have seen the growth that has been in Colombia and I 

hope if we do have a peace in Afghanistan that we focus on that 

because I would hate to have peace and have such a growth in the 

opium drug growing. 

My question is, we have a growing concern that Afghan politics 

and society is becoming increasingly fragmented alongside ethnic 

and ideological lines. 

What impact do you think that’s going to have for political stability in that country? 

Ambassador WELLS. Thank you. 

On the issue of narcotics, I agree, again, this is not just an issue 

that involves the Taliban. This is an issue that is a perversion 

throughout all of Afghan society—the criminal networks and their 

ability to corrupt the institutions of the state and society, and it’s 

something that we take very seriously. 

We are limited right now because of the security situation and 

where the opium is grown. But to go back to a point that was 

raised earlier, rather than undertake eradication, which is not supported by the Afghan Government at this stage, the effort is to go 

the step up through the drug labs, through targeting of the drug 

networks to get to that level of individuals who are benefitting 

more and who are a greater part of the drug trade. 

So the efforts continue. The institutional development of the Afghan Government to respond to the narcotics threat and the criminal networks behind them is very much an investment that we 

have made and will continue to make. 

But I agree, we learn from the example of the Colombia peace 

process and how hard it is. On——

Mr. SIRES. Well, I just make—I want to—just want to make sure 

they don’t look the other way for the sake of peace. 

Ambassador WELLS. No, absolutely, sir. 

24

And then on the issue of Afghan society being fragmented, I 

think you can look at it two ways. I mean, first, the Eid last weekend showed the incredibly unity that still exists in Afghanistan. 

The fact that combatants and pro-government supporters gathered together, tens of thousands of people praying together in 

places like Kandahar is the heartland of the Taliban and the conflict I think gives hope that the basic sinews of Afghan nationalism 

and nationhood are there. 

But yes, we have seen greater ethnic polarization over the last 

couple of years. The government of national unity has had to deal 

with issues of inclusivity, of trying to ensure that all facets of Afghan society are represented in government and I think there is 

going to be a great deal of importance attached to the credibility 

and the conduct of the elections that are coming up. 

And elections have always been a sensitive event in Afghanistan 

and it’s one that we are supporting very carefully and supporting 

the independent election commission to ensure that as much can 

be done to reduce the chances for industrial scale corruption and 

to increase the chances that voters across Afghanistan and voters 

both female and male will be able to participate. 

Mr. SIRES. Are the Russians being obstructionist? I read an article where they are funneling arms into the Taliban. 

Ambassador WELLS. The Russians have been very unhelpful in 

falsely accusing the United States and undertaking propaganda 

campaigns to suggest that somehow we have introduced ISIS 

Khorasan into Afghanistan and seek to artificially keep the terrorist battles going. 

And so we believe that Russia has an important role to play in 

being a supporter of peace in Afghanistan. They certainly benefit 

from a stable Afghanistan. 

Mr. SIRES. Are they funneling arms to the Taliban? 

Ambassador WELLS. We have seen—Russia denies that but, certainly, we see Russia adopting a posture that the Taliban are a legitimate bulwark against ISIS and we do not buy that as a justification of engagement with the Taliban. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much, Ambassador. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much, and I am sorry 

that I don’t join in your optimism, and watching people pray together is not—I mean, the next thing we know—we could say, well, 

the next step would be sitting around a campfire singing kumbaya, 

as it that has anything to do with creating peace in this war-torn 

country. 

Afghanistan is a society that is based on tribalism and ethnicity, 

and our greatest and what has been reconfirmed today, Mr. Chairman, is that we continue down a road of trying to remake Afghanistan into a democratic system, and that’s why we are failing. That’s 

why that will not succeed because it is totally inconsistent with 

their national character. 

And we did this from the very beginning, over my objection many 

times, we created the most centralized constitution of almost any 

country in the world and over a people who are the most decentralized people in the world, and then we are surprised when it doesn’t 

work and people are upset and join military units. 

25

Let me ask you, are the Pashtuns still the major element if not 

the dominant element of the Taliban? 

Ambassador WELLS. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And so now we have the Pashtuns and 

people who understand that area—that half the Pashtuns are in 

Afghanistan and half of them are in Pakistan, and let me just say 

that we have to understand that and deal with that or we are 

never going to have peace. 

We made a mistake in the beginning, trying to, as I say, recreate 

this centralized government in Kabul and then we permitted crooks 

and criminals to take over that government and loot the country 

of billions of dollars and we expect the Afghans just to say, oh well, 

now we can have a democratic process—look at what it’s doing for 

us. 

Let me just note also, the major opium production areas—poppies, in that country is in the Pashtun areas, is it not? 

Ambassador WELLS. It’s dominated in the Pashtun areas. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. And we have done nothing. 

And let me just note, when I say, yes, we have gone through a 

lot of PR type of things that make it look like we are doing something. 

If we wanted to eliminate the poppy production in Afghanistan, 

we could do it within a week. We have technological capabilities 

and we have not done that and thus, we have thus permitted the 

Pashtuns—the Taliban—to have a major source of billions of dollars of input, which permits them to have the bullets and the guns 

that are necessary to have the terrorist organization and the radical Islamic type of regime they are trying to build. 

Do you know what the status, for those who are watching or 

reading this? We realize that what really worked in Afghanistan—

what really worked after 9/11 was when we allied ourselves with 

the anti-Taliban forces that were also basically made up of Uzbeks 

and Tajiks, and the leader of that group was General Dostrum. 

For anyone who has seen ‘‘12 Strong,’’ he’s the man who actually 

organized at our effort to drive the Taliban out of power in the first 

place. 

Where is General Dostrum today? 

Ambassador WELLS. Turkey. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And he is in Turkey because there 

was—there have been major assassination attempts against him. 

Are the assassination attempts against General Dostrum motivated 

by Taliban or by people in the Afghan Government that we are 

supporting? 

Ambassador WELLS. My understanding is that General Dostrum 

is in Turkey for health reasons but that when he does return to 

Afghanistan there are legal processes that have been brought 

against him and some of his security officials for the sodomy of a 

political figure that had been in the custody of General Dostrum’s 

security forces. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Yes, you can bet that the people hate 

us and hate the man who helped us drive the Taliban are willing 

to say anything about General Dostrum. 

And yes, he is outside of Afghanistan for health reasons because 

they tried to murder him, and 50 of his bodyguards were killed by 

26

the time he and 10 others escaped from an ambush that was not 

a Taliban ambush. 

The American people—we are in a murky situation here. The 

Pakistanis, who we have been treating with kid gloves, are, clearly, 

a pro-terrorist element and a pro-Taliban element in this whole 

fight, and until we start realizing this, all these things about praying together or all the reforms you’re talking about and the democratic centralized process in Afghanistan will mean nothing and 

more Americans will die. We can either get real or we will lose for 

good. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Tom Suozzi of New York. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ambassador, for being here today. I have to admit 

I am very frustrated in this process of trying to discover what the 

civilian strategy of the United States of American in Afghanistan 

is. 

I’ve only been here for a short time, but I’ve had the opportunity 

to ask Secretary Tillerson about this. I’ve had a chance to ask Secretary Pompeo. I’ve spoken to you over the telephone. I’ve asked 

Secretary Mattis. I’ve asked USAID. 

What is our civilian strategy? We hear about the whole of government approach, but I can’t get the details of what it is we are 

actually doing. 

So you referenced earlier about the 25 percent contribution toward the civilian efforts that are being made by the United States 

Government and I want to determine, first, are you referring to the 

$3.7 billion a year that was agreed to at the Brussels Conference 

of which America is putting up $1 billion a year of that money? 

Ambassador WELLS. Yes. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. So that was done in 2016 under the previous 

administration. So that commitment is the commitment that still 

stands from the Brussels Conference in October 2016? 

Ambassador WELLS. Our aid levels are lower than that $1 billion 

figure but, in general, that is guiding the approach by us and the 

international community. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So but is the number $3.7 billion a year that’s being 

spent by the international community or is it lower than that number? 

Ambassador WELLS. I would have to get a breakdown of what 

has actually come through in terms of——

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. Well, that’s what I’ve been trying to get for 

a long time. I would like that breakdown of what the international 

commitment for civilian efforts is, specifically, what the number is, 

because I had to get this from outside of the U.S. Government to 

determine what this number was. 

I’d also like to know—and I’ll send you a follow-up letter if necessary—I’d like to know what are we spending our money on and 

what is the international community spending its money on. So it’s $3.7 billion a year, but what are the specific programs 

that it’s being spent on? We heard a lot about poppy eradication. 

We have heard about a whole bunch of different things. 

I’d like to know specifically how much money is being spent on 

each of the efforts by the Department of State, by USAID, by the 

27

DOJ, by the DEA, specifically, and I’ve been asking for this for 

some time. That’s why I am frustrated. 

I want to know specifically what are we spending our money on 

and to what effort, because I don’t feel like we have a comprehensive strategy. 

I feel like we have a list of a lot of good work that’s being done 

by a lot of good people that are working very hard. But I don’t see 

it as being a strategy and I think that’s a big contribution. I think 

the military strategy is clear and we are clearing and holding property. 

But in our efforts to transition and to redevelop the areas I don’t 

know what that effort is. 

So I am very frustrated, because I’ve asked this question many 

times, and I’d like to get specifics about how much money we are 

spending and what programs we are spending that money on. 

Could you, off the top of your head today, give me a rough idea 

of the billion dollars a year, approximately—or if it’s a different 

number—what percentages are being spent on different efforts? 

Like, how much is being spent on infrastructure, as a percentage? How much is being spent on poppy eradication? How much is 

being spent on schools or on sewers or on teaching prosecutors to 

be prosecutors? 

Can you give us a rough idea of how that money is being spent? 

Ambassador WELLS. I am happy to provide and talk to my 

USAID colleagues to provide a more detailed letter to you with a 

breakdown of assistance. 

As I am sure you heard from USAID, the overall principles that 

drive the new development strategy are trying to improve the government responsiveness to citizens to increase a private sector-led 

and export-led growth and to consolidate the social gains in health 

education and women’s empowerment. 

Outside of USAID we have INCLE funds which are providing the 

training for the counter narcotics and the law enforcement capacity. We have the bureau of counterterrorism providing specific assistance programs including to enhance the security of Kabul and 

other urban areas. 

But it is a complicated topic. The numbers are confusing, and we 

can provide a very detailed letter for you with that breakdown, sir. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. That would be very helpful, because even the 

things that you just told me now—out of the billion dollars, how 

much is being spent on poppy eradication? 

Ambassador WELLS. First off, I want to clarify that it is not $1 

billion. And so when we talk about Afghanistan for 2017, the numbers that I have that are actual, the INCLE moneys were about 

$160 million. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So if it’s not $1 billion, could you give me a rough 

idea of what the number is overall? 

Ambassador WELLS. The 2019 request that we have is $632 million. 

Mr. SUOZZI. And how about the actual for the——

Ambassador WELLS. That is for the billion—it’s $160 million. 

The—I am sorry, the Afghanistan numbers are $632.8 million request for 2019. 

Mr. SUOZZI. And how about 2018? 

28

Ambassador WELLS. For 2018, it was $782.8 million. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. So we made a billion dollar commitment at 

the Brussels Conference in 2016. We went down—I don’t know—

you wouldn’t happen to have the 2017 number, would you? 

Ambassador WELLS. $847.6 million. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. So we are spending $45 billion a year on military aid, which is not—I am not asking you about that—and we 

have reduced our commitment from $1 billion a year. We are now 

going down to $632 million a year on civilian aid. 

Ambassador WELLS. Yes. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Mr. Ted Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ambassador. Lieutenant General Austin Miller said 

yesterday that the biggest problem in Afghanistan are the sanctuaries in Pakistan to shelter terrorists. Would you agree with that 

assessment? 

Ambassador WELLS. I agree with the assessment that without 

Pakistan’s support it will be very challenging to achieve our goals 

in Afghanistan and that Pakistan continues—sanctuaries continue 

to exist in Pakistan for Taliban Haqqani network leaders and fighters. 

Mr. POE. So, over the years, we have had our troops down there 

in Pakistan. I’ve been down there on the border, as many other 

Members of Congress have, and they are doing the best job they 

can. 

But during the day, the Talibanis come across the border, commit mischief, then run back into Pakistan and hide. The Pakistan 

Government has hidden terrorist leaders in the past. 

They are a sanctuary for terrorist leaders, and somehow we still 

give Pakistan money with the promise that they will do better. 

They sweet talk us and say oh, give us more American aid—we will 

go after the terrorists. We do that every year. 

We continue to do it. We have done it for I don’t know how many 

years—17—and yet nothing changes. They harbor terrorists. They 

fight terrorists in their country but they pay for terrorists to go 

across the border into Afghanistan that kills Americans and our allies and Afghans. 

I think it is nonsense that we continue to send money to Pakistan with the promise they will do better. That’s just my opinion. 

How much money have we spent—taxpayer money—over the last 

17 years in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador WELLS. On the civilian side, we have spent approximately $29 billion. 

Mr. POE. How about the military side? 

Ambassador WELLS. I don’t have the figures for that. 

Mr. POE. Do you have any estimate? 

Ambassador WELLS. I don’t. 

Mr. POE. So it’s $29 billion on the civilian side and who knows 

how much on the military side. 

Secretary Mattis stated I think in October of last year that the 

United States has planned—will stay, if necessary, in Afghanistan 

indefinitely. 

29

Now, to me, that is problematic. No end in sight. We have been 

there 17 years—no end in sight. You know, history says the War 

of the Roses lasted 32 years with, basically, no resolution. 

The 100-Year War lasted 116 years, between France and England—indefinitely. I find that very alarming that there is no end 

in sight or that we are prepared to stay there for as long as possible and that the situation hasn’t changed—continually, the 

United States sends money to Afghanistan. 

Someone has said that Afghanistan is where empires go to die. 

I don’t know if that’s true or not. But nobody ever won in Pakistan—excuse me, in Afghanistan. 

So are we, the United States, in the nation building business of 

Afghanistan? Are we building Afghanistan into a new nation, as 

Mr. Rohrabacher said, in our image—a democracy? 

Are we in the nation building business with that $29 billion we 

spent on civilian programs? 

Ambassador WELLS. President Trump has been very clear that 

we are not in the nation building business and I think rather than 

terming the war an indefinite war, what the administration has 

sought to counter was the idea of having a troop surge and announcing the departure at the same time, allowing the Taliban to 

wait us out. 

And so we are no longer giving the Taliban the luxury of knowing when the United States plans to leave. Instead, the United 

States will leave when we are assured that Afghanistan is not 

again is not again going to become a safe haven for terrorists plotting against us. We can’t—we can’t——

Mr. POE. And that may be indefinitely. I only have a few seconds. That may be indefinite because we don’t know that that’s 

happening. Has the situation changed in the last 17 years? 

Aren’t we in the same place that we were 17 years ago? We have 

Pakistan still supporting terrorists. There are terrorists. The government is shaky in Afghanistan. Aren’t we in the same situation? 

But yet, we say—and I am not arguing with the President’s policy—we say we will be there indefinitely if need be to make sure 

that we obtain victory. 

Ambassador WELLS. The situation has changed because the Afghan national security forces are the lead. We are not. The situation has changed because we are putting unprecedented pressure 

on Pakistan, including the suspension of $1.6 billion in military assistance and $900 million in coalition support funds. 

And so the administration’s strategy is being much more 

proactive in trying to put pressure on those countries and actors 

that we think can make peace possible. 

Mr. POE. I am out of time. I think we should cut off all aid to 

Pakistan until they come to the table and there is proof that they 

are not harboring terrorists in their own country and sending them 

across the border. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Judge. 

Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

30

Welcome, Ambassador Wells. It’s been more than a decade and 

a half since we entered Afghanistan and a military solution is becoming more and more unlikely as violence continues to wage. 

And we haven’t heard enough about the administration’s longterm plans outside of the addition of more troops. Many have 

pushed for dialogue and negotiations with the Taliban. 

The Taliban today killed 30 Afghan soldiers. The Taliban entering a political playing field and renouncing violence is absolutely 

an appealing image. But dialogue with them is also an incredibly 

dangerous endeavor, I think. 

After 17 years of our military combatting the Taliban and facing 

casualties and destruction, the Taliban continues to engage in terror tactics targeting civilians, the Afghan Government, and U.S. 

forces, and then the introduction of ISIS-aligned groups has further 

complicated the field. 

I support integrating moderates defecting from the Taliban who 

aren’t committed to the Taliban’s radical and evil ideology, and absorbing them in a responsible and safe way is an important step 

if we can do it. 

The recent truce had some promise. But now the Taliban has resumed attacks and further ethnic, tribal, and religious groups who 

were targets of the Taliban’s cruelty and brutality have vested 

themselves in Kabul’s government and the promise of a better future, and the Afghan Government hasn’t been hardened to a point 

where its institutions—its reach, and, I think it’s clear, its stability 

are firm enough to support negotiations from a position of power. 

So the main question I have is given, for example, the Taliban’s 

efforts decades past when they went house to house to identify and 

kill Hazaras, thousands of them being killed, what reaction do we 

expect from religious, ethnic, or tribal groups in the Afghan Government who have suffered so mightily at the hands of the Taliban 

if negotiations with the Taliban are entered into? 

Ambassador WELLS. Again, we have—we are letting the Afghan 

Government take the lead in putting forward a peace proposal, 

which has been, by everyone’s account, both visionary and forward 

leaning. 

And so President Ghani has judged that the Afghan people continue to seek peace. That’s supported by all the polling data that 

we see which, regardless of the incredible violence—and you’ve only 

mentioned one horrible chapter of violence in Afghanistan. 

But regardless of the horrible violence that Afghans have seen, 

they remain committed to peace, and the celebrations that took 

place during the Eid are, I think, are a manifestation of what is 

a broad nationwide desire for peace. 

The Higher Peace Council in Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic body. 

Peace cannot be made between Pashtuns. Peace has to include all 

of the ethnic and social groups of Afghanistan and, I would argue, 

it has to include the women of Afghanistan. 

So, any peace process is going to have to be broad based. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that. Do you—and I understand the 

way Ghani views it and I understand what we have seen during 

Eid. 

But are you confident—is our Government confident that the 

government in Afghanistan is strong enough to be able to do this—

31

strong enough to be able, specifically with respect to the Taliban, 

to include them in negotiations. 

Ambassador WELLS. Again, I think, because we are not trying to 

put up hurdles to peace negotiations, where the United States’ interests lie is in what comes out of a negotiation process, and so we 

can—we can live with negotiations that produce the end to violence 

and the cessation of ties to terrorists and respect for a constitution—a constitution that can be amended, per President Ghani’s 

offer. 

And so rather than prejudge whether it can happen or not, we 

are ready to support the process, facilitate it. We want there to be 

a negotiated and dignified political solution. 

If the Taliban are unprepared and unwilling to make peace, we 

have made it very clear that we will deny them a military victory. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And in—as it relates to providing that support, 

what are the range of diplomatic tools that we have to support that 

process and are we utilizing all of them? 

Ambassador WELLS. Yes, I think we are utilizing many different 

levers to support efforts to create a diplomatic process or a negotiated political process. 

And, of course, the military pressure is one portion of it. The 

pressure on Pakistan is important—the pressure we are bringing 

to bear against Taliban financing. 

What we are seeing the Government of Afghanistan do to mobilize religious messaging against the very basis or justification for 

the Taliban’s actions, the international consensus we have built 

diplomatically and that involves bilateral engagements and multilateral engagements and, of course, always willing to see whether 

other groups within Afghanistan are prepared to create separate 

peace. 

And so all of these are designed to raise the stakes for the 

Taliban to create incentives for them to take up what we think is 

both a fair offer and an offer that can produce a Taliban that plays 

a part in the political life is an important part of the political life 

of Afghanistan. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Ambassador Wells, I appreciate you being here and 

I am sincerely grateful for the commitment that you make to this 

important work. Thanks. 

Ambassador WELLS. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Ann Wagner of Missouri. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this 

hearing, and thank you, Ambassador Wells, for your service. 

I appreciate the opportunity to evaluate the new direction this 

administration has taken in resolving America’s longest war. 

Pakistan has a clear interest in preventing the cessation of hostilities in Afghanistan but has made itself central to American operations. In the past, Pakistan has wagered, correctly, that the 

United States would rather accept Pakistan’s incomplete support 

than lose it entirely. 

Ambassador Wells, I believe the President was correct to demand 

full cooperation from Pakistan last August. How well is the administration communicating its resolve to hold Pakistan accountable 

for its support of terrorism? 

32

Ambassador WELLS. I think there have been very not only direct 

talks with the senior leadership of Pakistan but action under the 

Trump—under President Trump’s administration we have taken 

the unprecedented step of suspending military assistance and coalition support funds as a result of our assessment that Pakistan had 

not been undertaking the decisive and sustained steps that are necessary. 

I think we agree that Pakistan has a lot to gain by peace in Afghanistan, and so the challenge is how do you secure Pakistan’s 

support for a negotiated political process rather than its tolerance 

of proxies. 

And we have heard very positive statements, for instance, from 

the chief of army staff of Pakistan who says that there can be no 

room for nonstate actors—that Pakistan can’t be normal state as 

long as there are extremist groups on its soil. 

But what we need to see are actions that are taken to ensure 

that that is the case, and we do not deny that Pakistan has fought 

its own heroic battles against terrorism. It defeated in large part 

the Pakistani Taliban. It’s just now reintegrated the federally administrated tribal areas into the governing system of Pakistan. 

But we treat all terrorist enemies of Pakistan as our terrorist enemies and we expect that Pakistan should do the same. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Well, I hope we continue to withhold that funding 

until we see measurable action, Ambassador. 

How is the administration building relationships with Central 

Asia countries to reduce our dependence on Pakistan? 

Ambassador WELLS. We have had excellent relations with the 

Central Asian countries—longstanding efforts to create the northern distribution network that helps to support our military efforts 

in Afghanistan. 

We had the visit of Kazakhstan’s President, Nazarbayev, in December of last year and Uzbekistan’s President, Mirziyoyev, last 

month. 

Both leaders are important in not only providing the kind of support for the northern distribution network but in stitching Afghanistan back into the region. 

And when President Ghani went to Uzbekistan for the first 

time—first time any Afghan leader went to Uzbekistan was in December—he said Afghanistan is a Central Asian nation, and so 

through our engagement with the Central Asian states, and we engage in a C-5 format with all of the Central Asians—we very much 

are supporting their efforts to proactively increase trade with Afghanistan and increase exchanges, give Afghanistan options as it 

builds out its economy and its diplomatic relations. 

Mrs. WAGNER. How do U.S.-Russia relations affect the feasibility 

of northern supply lines through Central Asia and the Caucuses? 

Ambassador WELLS. Well, the northern distribution network has 

operated successfully and continues to operate successfully. I would 

just argue, more generally, Russia has important interests and concerns in Afghanistan and an important role to play in helping to 

stabilize Afghanistan, and we would like to see Russia do more to 

provide the kind of assistance to the Government of Afghanistan so 

that both militarily and diplomatically it can defeat or bring the 

Taliban to the negotiating table. 

33

Mrs. WAGNER. Although India declined to put boots on the 

ground in Afghanistan, it has shown a keen interest in strengthening the Afghan Government’s capacity. How is the administration encouraging deeper Indian involvement, briefly? 

Ambassador WELLS. We have worked with India. We do joint 

training programs. USAID—some of its training programs are conducted in India. We have a trilateral with Indian officials and Afghan officials to coordinate our efforts and make sure that we are 

lashed up in the development approach and diplomatic approach. 

And India has play an important role in hosting business conferences so that private sector companies interested in investing in 

Afghanistan can use India as a launching pad. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Ambassador Wells. My time has expired. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. I’d just remind the members we are expecting 

votes momentarily. So members don’t need to use all of their time. 

And we are going to go to Robin Kelly of Illinois. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I won’t use all of my 

time. 

How will the October elections influence possible peace talks and 

if elections do not take place will the U.S. position that the Taliban 

should negotiate directly with the Afghan Government and not directly with the U.S. change? 

Ambassador WELLS. We think it’s important that the elections 

take place in a timely and credible way. It sends a strong signal 

about the inclusivity and the strengthening of democratic institutions in Afghanistan. 

So our efforts to date are very much focused on helping to empower the independent election commission, make sure they have 

the resources and the capacity to undertake what is a critical reform this electoral season by having voting be based on polling centers so that you stop the industrial level stuffing of ballot boxes. 

I think that the Afghan people, as we have seen in both the numbers who have registered and the number of candidates who have 

come forward are vested in this democratic process. 

Ms. KELLY. I’ll stop so my colleague can get his question in. 

Chairman ROYCE. And we go to Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thanks to my colleague, Ms. Kelly. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Wells, thank you for being here. This is just one of 

those things that everybody wants to come to an end. But yet, I 

don’t see a clear strategy of how we are going to do that. 

Answering Ted Poe’s question about the cost of U.S. military, 

since 2001, we have spent $752 billion is the number I have—so 

we are well over $1 trillion—trying to bring peace to Afghanistan. 

As Dana Rohrabacher brought up, it’s a very tribal and separated culture. The Pashtuns—half in Afghanistan, half in Pakistan—and they are the major opium areas, and if I understand my 

notes correctly, there is more opium being grown in Afghanistan 

today than there was before we started our war on drugs, as is 

there is more cocaine in Colombia after we started the war on 

drugs and, of course, now Mexico has 72,000 acres of opium. 

34

And so it seems like we are going backwards. With the amount 

of money, the time, resources, and the loss—tragic loss of life on 

both our sides and the Afghan, we need a new game plan to do 

this. 

My question to you, is any process you brought up you were talking about in Afghanistan must include the Pashtuns, the women, 

and things like that, and I agree. I think those would all be good. 

But does the system in Afghanistan allow for that with the 

amount of corruption in the government? What’s your thoughts? 

Ambassador WELLS. I think the government has been organizing 

itself in preparation for the possibility of peace negotiations. 

You have the establishment and the reenergization of a Higher 

Peace Council that has—it’s multi-ethnic, it has women on it, it’s 

been engaging at provincial levels. It’s brought together youth. It’s 

brought together religious leaders and part of a national conversation about what peace might look like. 

You’ve seen gathering of religious leaders, the 20——

Mr. YOHO. And I saw that, and I think that’s a great thing that 

they all came together and they had those three things they denounced. 

Let me ask you this. Do the people in Afghanistan, do they believe in a government with a democratic process—are they so ingrained into a tribal government—can they even see the possibility, 

or are we talking generations to change that situation? 

Ambassador WELLS. Well, Afghanistan has had successive elections. I am not trying to deny the tribal nature of society or the 

importance of tribal structures or tribal elders. 

But Afghans have demonstrated, by registering to vote, by stepping forward as candidates, that they’ve embraced this democratic 

experience. 

Mr. YOHO. Do they understand, believe, and support the constitution in their country? Do they understand that? Because French 

philosopher de Tocqueville, when he came through North America 

in the 1800s, he was astounded by the level of understanding that 

people had of our Constitution, and that has led us where we are 

at because it was from the bottom up. Do they have that same comprehension? The people on the street. 

Ambassador WELLS. I think certainly—I am probably not capable 

of answering that question. But what I would say, sir, is that enshrined within the Afghan constitution is the ability to change it 

and the ability to convoke a constitutional loya jirga—a traditional 

gathering of Afghan leaders. 

So I think Afghanistan’s constitution does not deny Afghanistan’s 

and traditional forms as well. 

Mr. YOHO. It doesn’t deny it. But it doesn’t empower the people, 

because—I am going to just cut it off here because we are out of 

time. But I appreciate your time and I’d love to talk to you more. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Yoho. 

Joe Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Ambassador, very much for your service, and it’s 

very personal to me, the significance of Afghanistan, and that is 

the attacks of 9/11 occurred from a cave—Osama bin Laden operVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:12 Sep 11, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\062018\30496 SHIRL
35

ating out of a cave in Afghanistan to attack the people of the 

United States and so, to me, the success of what you are trying to 

do is so important. 

And then I am also grateful—my former National Guard Unit, 

the 218th brigade led by General Bob Livingston—served there for 

a year and developed extraordinary appreciation of the people and 

the talents of the people of Afghanistan. 

And then I am also grateful my youngest son, Second Lieutenant 

Hunter Wilson, served for a year as an engineer. So I’ve seen it 

from ground up with almost 15 visits over the years to see the potential that we have and it’s so important. 

And, of course, it does relate to the global war on terrorists and 

that is that the focus of counter ISIS captain has been on Syria and 

Iraq. 

But ISIS has a foothold in Afghanistan and continues to launch 

attacks against Afghan and coalition forces. To what extent is the 

Islamic State Khorasan Province—ISKP—a threat to stability of 

the security of Afghanistan? 

Ambassador WELLS. Estimates are broad but perhaps 2,000 to 

5,000 ISIS fighters exist in Afghanistan. They are primarily drawn 

from other disaffected members of other terrorist groups, whether 

it’s the Taliban or TTP or IMU—the Uzbek dominated group. 

But I think we have to be cornered by its resilience. We take it 

seriously. We have targeted heavily in Nangarhar 

and Kunar and as well as in Jowzjan in the north where there 

is been an outpost, and it’s a reminder to us that there is something worse than an insurgency that’s nationalist in nature. 

So it is a threat we take extremely seriously and have devoted 

significant assets to eradicating. 

Mr. WILSON. And indeed, a safe haven for ISIS, for Islamic terrorists there had direct consequence here. 

Have the changes in the ISIS relationships with other groups in 

the area or activity internal cohesion or operational abilities—to 

what extent is the group a target of U.S. operations or strategic 

planning? 

Ambassador WELLS. I think ISIS is a reminder of why we are 

still in Afghanistan and need to have this commitment to Afghanistan, because the chaos and the insecurity that the Taliban insurgency has created has allowed this petri dish for other terrorist 

groups to take advantage. 

We are in Afghanistan because Afghanistan poses a threat to our 

homeland and it poses a threat to our allies, and we take it very 

seriously. 

I would defer to my military colleagues for the details of the 

counterterrorism operations that are underway. But we have intensified those operations. 

We have taken out the leader of ISIS K in Jowzjan and we continue to—I think we have conducted over 1,400 operations over the 

course of the last year directed against ISIS. 

Mr. WILSON. And, Ambassador, your comments are just so refreshing to the real world and the ultimate result, protecting American families. 

Last August, the administration announced the new South Asia 

strategy, which focused on conditions-based rather than time-based 

36

objectives. What are the conditional-based objectives are we utilizing to measure success? 

Ambassador WELLS. That is going to be the cessation of ties to 

terrorism, the cessation of violence, and support for the constitution that can be achieved through a negotiated political settlement. 

Mr. WILSON. And finally, Afghanistan is a critical point in democracy. What democratic institutions have been most reliable and 

effective in promoting voter education and rights of the Afghani 

people and are they capable of producing credible elections this 

fall? 

Ambassador WELLS. The independent election commission has 

the lead. This is going to be the first Afghan-led and conducted 

election. This is not an election that’s being put on by the international community or the U.N. 

And so that’s a reflection of the increased capacity. I think political parties also have an important role to play in educating and 

encouraging Afghans to vote and to understand the system. 

And this is very much a work in progress. There are very few 

countries that are younger than modern Afghanistan. And so I 

think we have to expect that improvements will occur over time. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Tom Garrett of Virginia. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank my colleague, Joe Wilson, and the Ambassador, 

because I heard something that really, I thought, was succinct and 

insightful and that is, I believe, paraphrasing, there are threats 

greater than an Islamist insurgency that’s nationalist in its nature. 

So we recognize that while the Taliban is bad that the ISIS, 

which has a global sort of orientation is probably worse, which 

doesn’t eradicate our responsibility to address the Taliban, particularly as it relates to sort of if you break it you buy it and the circumstances on the ground in Afghanistan. 

But let me go, for a moment, down that road. I think we fail 

when we overlap an American paradigm on the foreign affairs 

arena. Americans presume that when we deal with other nations 

there is a strong preeminent Federal Government. 

I would argue that in Afghanistan right now, try as they might, 

there is not that—that they aspire to have a strong preeminent 

Federal Government but the fact that you can’t drive from the airfield to the compound without enhanced security measures would 

indicate that in fact the control of the centralized Government of 

Afghanistan isn’t what they’d like for it to be—the security apparatus, et cetera. 

So we need to understand the reality on the ground in whatever 

country that we are dealing with, in this case Afghanistan, doesn’t 

mirror that which we have become familiar with here at home. 

Number two, we talk about the Taliban, and I would posit and 

seek your comment in a moment on the fact that I would argue at 

this juncture there is no ‘‘the Taliban.’’ There are Talibans. In 

other words, there is no unified central control of Taliban-oriented 

elements as there was, say, for example, under Mullah Omar, but 

instead sort of disparate warlords with some overlap as it relates 

37

to their interests who act, in many instances, autonomously, thus 

creating an even harder circumstance for folks like yourself, Ambassador Wells, and any NATO forces, coalition forces, and the 

Federal Government of Afghanistan to deal with because we see 

things like atrocities committed against civilian contractors driving 

supplies, et cetera, that are documented on the internet, which, obviously, the useful end to those would be many fold—that is, to intimidate those who would work for the Federal Government, to intimidate the coalition, et cetera—perpetrated by subgroups of the 

Taliban but not endorsed by other groups. 

Eliot Engel said in his opening comments, you need not make 

peace with your friends, which I thought was insightful in and of 

itself, and yet there are Taliban elements that have expressed, I 

would argue, differing degrees of willingness to sit down and talk, 

and there are those who will probably be, for lack of a better, more 

artistic term, dead enders. 

So with that as a basis, the money for the narcotics industry in 

Afghanistan does not flow, I would ask, directly to the government. 

Is that correct? 

Ambassador WELLS. Sorry. The money from where? 

Mr. GARRETT. So the money from the narcotics industries in Afghanistan—the poppy fields, et cetera—does not flow directly to the 

Federal Government—some of it ends up there. But it doesn’t, correct? 

Ambassador WELLS. No. 

Mr. GARRETT. But the aid that’s administered to Afghanistan 

from the United States, its allies—the coalition, if you will—does 

flow through the government, correct? 

Ambassador WELLS. It flows through—a portion of it flows 

through a trust fund that’s administered by the World Bank——

Mr. GARRETT. Right. 

Ambassador WELLS [continuing]. And then the remaining money 

with just a very little bit of an exception is administered separately 

on off-budget programs administered by USAID and others. 

Mr. GARRETT. What I am driving at—yes, ma’am. 

And so what I am driving at, though, is that perhaps have we 

considered a paradigm wherein we tie aid and development to Afghanistan to eradication efforts? In other words, the government 

benefits and hopefully strengthens itself as it relates to creating 

stable sustainable Afghanistan where there is this broad a spectrum of home, moving forward, as possible, more directly from revenues from the international community than from the narcoticsdeveloping community, correct? 

Ambassador WELLS. But the challenge we face is 85 percent of 

opium is produced in Taliban-controlled or contested areas and so, 

again, this is a security issue, I think, is a first cut. 

Mr. GARRETT. But you’ve said earlier today that the Government 

of Afghanistan has indicated an interest in not undergoing eradication programs at this juncture. Is that an accurate assessment? 

Ambassador WELLS. Yes. The government would assess—it 

would increase the appeal perhaps of insurgent organizations. 

Mr. GARRETT. Right. And so it’s something to talk about. I am 

not dictating that this is what I think the policy should be. But if 

you look at what the actual functioning Federal Government, to the 

38

extent that it exists in Afghanistan, derives benefit from, I would 

submit that if they were given an either/or, they would probably 

fall on the side we wanted them on. 

Going—really quickly, there is a man cap tax on contractors in 

Afghanistan that we have become aware of that stems from the 

Karzai regime, which is arbitrary and probably not consistent with 

existing agreements. 

Has anything been done to address that? Because what it does 

ultimately is it taxes the American citizens as we pay for contractor missions to develop infrastructure, security, et cetera, by 

virtue of creating additional cost. 

Has anybody done anything about this man cap tax? Are you familiar with that which I am speaking of? 

Ambassador WELLS. I am not. But we can follow up. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you so much. I’ve run out of time. 

I thank the chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Wells. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Mr. Garrett, thank you very much. 

And I thank you also, Ambassador Wells. We have heard creating the circumstances for a peaceful and stable Afghanistan is a 

very complex but very critical mission. 

The administration has taken several good steps toward that 

end. But we need to see more progress, and at this point we have 

got 1 minute left to a vote on the floor. 

So this hearing is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(39)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman 

.I nne 20, 20 I 8 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held in Room 2172 of the Honse Office Building (and available live on the 

Comm ittec website at lillill!::!£\D'GKill\:IgJtillllilmJl<:>JlS.<;..gQ"): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

The Committee on 

please call 

accommodation\ in rrencral 

tlwCommilll:'e 

Wednesday, June 20,2018 

10:00 a.m. 

U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan 

The Honorable Alice G. Wells 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of South and Central Asian Atlairs 

U.S. Department of State 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ML'IUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

Day Wednesday Datc __ -'-0-"6;-='2-={}'-"/2'-'0-=1=.8 ___ ,Room ___ 2172 ______ _ 

Starling Time /0:06AM Ending Time ___ _!!:38.~'14-- .. 

Recesses (__ ___ _to ____ .) (_ ___ _to _____ )(__ ___ to __ ) L_to __ ) L_to _) L_!o _) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Edward R. Royce 

Check all o.fthefollowing that apply: 

Open Session [2] 

Executive (closed) Session 0 Televised lZJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan 

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See attac/ied. 

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

NIA 

Electronically Recorded (taped) 0 

Stenographic Record 0 

HEARING WITNESS~;s: Some as meeting notice attached'! Yes EJ NoD 

(if "no", please list below {.md include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submit led for the record.) 

IFR -Ranking Member Eliot Engel 

QFR- Ranking Member Eliot Engel and Representalil'e.< Ileana Ros-Leh!inen, Lois Fra11kel, Joaquin 

Castro, and Thomas Saozzi 

riME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE 

or 

TIME AD.JOURNED !_!:_!_SAM 
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I PRESENT 

X 

I X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

i 

I X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

i X 

X 

X 

X 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FULL Cm.f;\4/TTEE HEARING 

MEMBER 

Edward R. Royce, CA 

Christopher H. Smith, NJ 

_Ileana Ro~l:_el_ltj_11.':~£!::. ________ 

Dana Rohrabacher, CA 

Ste'e Chabot. OR ---------------·~--

Joe Wilson, SC 

Michael T. McCaul, TX 

Ted Poe, TX 

Darrclllssa, CA 

Tom Marino, PA 

Mo Brooks, AL 

Paul Cook. CA -~-~----·-----·-

Scott Perry, PA 

Ron DeSantis. FL 

Mark Meadows, NC 

Ted Yoho, fL 

Adam Kinzinger,TL 

Lee Zeldin, NY 

Dan Donovan, NY 

James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr., WT 

Ann Wagner, MO 

Brian J. Mast, FL 

Brian K. Fitzpatrick, P A 

Francis Rooney, FL 

Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., VA 

John Curtis, UT 

PRESEST 

X 

X 

X 

__ X __ 

X 

X 

X 

X 

}vfEMBER 

Eliot L. Engel, NY 

Brad Sherman, CA 

~~_c>_II~_Meeks, NY _____ _ 

Albin Sires, NJ 

_9erald F. Co111_l_':li_lt,_~t\__ _____ _ 

Theodore E. Deutch. FL 

Karen Bass, CA 

William Keating, MA 

David Cicillinc, Rl 

Ami Bera,CA 

Lois Frankel, FL 

____ Tu!s_i___ Gabbanl,_Ji_l ______________ _ 

X Joaquin Castro, TX 

X Robin Kelly, IL 

Brendan Boyle, P A 

Dina Titus, NV 

X Nomm Torres, CA 

X Brad Schneider, IL 

X Tom Suozzi, NY 

Adriano Espaillat, NY 

X Ted Lieu, CA 
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Questions for the Record from Ranking Member Eliot Engel 

US Policy Toward Afghanistan 

June 20, 2018 

Expcmded Military Authorities 

How exactly is the Administration employing the additional military resources in Afghanistan? 

Will there also be any increase in our diplomatic presence in Kabul to match up with the increase 

in military presence? 

The US. military presence in Afghanistan focuses on two well-det!ned and complementary 

m1ss1ons: a counter-terrorism mission against al-Qa'ida and ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), and the 

NATO-led Resolute Support Mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan National Defense and 

Security Forces. We defer to the Department of Defense on the details of how these military 

resources are deployed, but would emphasize that their mission is to support our effort to secure a 

political settlement. As President Trump explained when he announced the South Asia Strategy 

in August 2017, "Military power alone will not bring peace to Afghanistan," rather "strategically 

applied force aims to create the conditions for a political process to achieve a lasting peace." 

With our conditions-based strategy we have made clear to the Tali ban that they cannot win on the 

battlefield and they cannot wait us out. The State Department has been working closely to support 

Afghan Government efforts to engage in a peace process and we have seen significant progress 

over the past 11 months since the South Asia Strategy was announced. President Ghani publicly 

invited the Taliban to enter negotiations without preconditions, and during the Eid religious 

holidays in June Afghanistan enjoyed its t!rst ceasefire in 17 years. There have also been localized 

peace initiatives since the end of the ceasefire. Though the Taliban is a resilient adversary, the Eid 

ceasefire demonstrated that many of their fighters are, like the overwhelming majority of the 

Afghan people, ready for an end to the contlict: its leadership, on the other hand, is standing in the 

way of peace. We are working actively through multiple channels to support a negotiated end to 

the war. 

Using existing resources, the Department of State has expanded its statllng for this peace etl'ort, 

with dedicated teams now operating both in Washington and in Kabul. In Kabul, the Embassy 

and our diplomatic staff in country support our national interests by facilitating political and 

economic refonn, strengthening the rule of law, countering the spread of dangerous narcotics, and 

supporting our security objectives. Further, the Embassy has a new Peace and Reconciliation 

Section (PARS), which leads Mission etTorts to support and implement the Department's strategy. 

The Department is considering adding resources to support local efforts to de-escalate violence 

and stabilize communities through increased development programming. 
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In addition, the PARS Counselor chairs an interagency mechanism, the Peace and Reconciliation 

Action Group (PRAG), to ensure close coordination among diplomatic, defense, development, and 

intelligence agencies. Working together, PRAG members optimize US and NATO cooperation 

in Afghanistan in support of our peace, reconciliation, and sustainable development goals. These 

goals include working with the Afghan government to launch trust-building and negotiating 

processes, supporting local initiatives to de-escalate violence, and bolstering development 

capabilities to deliver services that will stabilize communities. 

Diplomatic Tools 

What diplomatic tools is the Administration using to support stabilization e±Iorts in the country? 

What additional resources would help in these efforts? 

The Administration's overall goal for Afghanistan is a negotiated political settlement between the 

government and the Taliban. To this end, we are using all tools, including diplomatic tools, to 

support Afghan efforts to reduce violence, support upcoming parliamentary and presidential 

elections, encourage Afghan government reforms and engage all of Afghanistan's neighbors and 

others to build support for the government's efforts to secure peace. Our efforts also include 

development assistance, public affairs and media engagements, counter-narcotics and law 

enforcement e±Iorts, initiatives to promote human rights and the rule of law, as well as direct 

diplomatic engagements within Afghanistan, in regional countries and in the broader community 

of donors and NATO partners. 

We currently have the resources we need to protect and advance our interests in Afghanistan. 

Recognizing the centrality of a political settlement to our e±Iorts in Afghanistan and more broadly 

to our South Asia strategy, we are increasing the number of diplomats working specifically on 

peace and reconciliation issues in Afghanistan. 

Staffing 

How many people at the State Department are currently working solely on Afghan reconciliation? 

When the team is fully staffed, how many people will you have? 

Under Secretary Pompeo's leadership, we are reinvigorating U.S. diplomatic efforts to support an 

intra-Afghan peace process. We are expanding our staff focusing on reconciliation, both in the 

State Department and in our Embassy in Kabul. 
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Within the SCA Bureau we currently have three officers who work full time in the Afghanistan 

Office on peace and reconciliation issues, plus several others who support on these issues as 

required. There are many more in other bureaus who focus on intelligence, counter-terrorism, 

counter-narcotics and other aspects of the challenge. 

Our Embassy in Kabul recently established a Peace and Reconciliation Section (PARS) that leads 

Mission efforts to implement the South Asia Strategy. As currently envisaged, the PARS would 

be staffed with ten officers. The Officer who heads the PARS also chairs an interagency group, 

the Peace and Reconciliation Action Group (PRAG) that draws in interagency colleagues to ensure 

close coordination among diplomatic, defense, development, and intelligence agencies. 

Taliban-AI Qaeda 

Does the Department believe the Tali ban can separate from al-Qaeda and international terrorism~ 

Yes. lt is the Department's position that the Taliban can and must separate from al-Qaida and 

international terrorism. Our longstanding position remains that as an outcome of any peace 

agreement, the Taliban must abandon violence, respect the Afghan constitution, including its 

protections for women and minorities, and break ties with al-Qaida and international terrorism. 

Our pursuit of a negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan aligns directly with our goal of 

eliminating the transnational terrorist threat from Afghanistan. 

As President Trump said last Aue,>ust regarding our etl'orts in Afghanistan: "America's interests 

are clear: We must stop the resurgence of safe havens that enable terrorists to threaten America." 

Cease-Fire 

In response to the Afghan government's ceasefire, the Tali ban announced its own three -day 

ceasetire. What conclusions do you draw from the Taliban's otTer and the implementation? 

The overlap between the Afghan government and Tali ban ceasefires brought peace to Afghanistan 

during the most recent Islamic holiday in June, with Afghan soldiers and Tali ban praying together, 

side-by-side. This situation showed that many Tali ban tighters want peace as much as their fellow 

Afghans. Judging from the Taliban's public reaction, these events worried and confused the 

Taliban' s leadership. These leaders, who live outside Afghanistan, who retused an offer to extend 

the cease-tire, and who never ot1icially responded to President Ghani's call for peace in February, 

are the central impediments to securing enduring peace. 
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Electoral Reforms 

After the disputed 2014 elections, there were a few areas for reform that both the UN Assistance 

Mission to Afghanistan and Afghanistan's Electoral Management Bodies needed to address. What 

is the status of these electoral reforms? 

Following the 2014 Afghan presidential election, President Ghani established a Special Electoral 

Reform Commission (SERC) following consultations with Chief Executive Abdullah. The 

Commission's recommendations informed a new electoral law that went into effect in 2015. The 

government also reconstituted Afghanistan's electoral bodies, disbanding the discredited 

Independent Elections Commission (TEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and 

hiring new leadership for both bodies. 

The new IEC leadership, supported by the United States and other international donors, has 

announced a date of October 20, 2018 for parliamentary elections. Ahead of those elections, in 

April -July 2018, the IEC completed a nationwide polling-center based registration of over 8 

million voters, the first of its kind in Afghanistan. The polling-center based registration will tie 

voters to a single polling station, allowing the IEC to limit the number of blank ballots provided 

to each polling station on election day, reducing the opportunities for industrial-scale ballotstuffing seen in prior elections. 

Pakistan CT 

Six months after the suspension of security assistance, the Administration has concluded that 

Pakistan has made no irreversible progress in its relationship with terrorist groups. What's are the 

Administration's next policy steps towards Pakistan? 

The South Asia strategy recognizes that we cannot continue with business as usual with Pakistan 

as long as Pakistan does not address U.S. concerns about its policies, including its failure to address 

terrorist sanctuaries. We have made clear to the highest levels of Pakistan's government that the 

Tali ban, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e Tayyiba and other militant and terrorist groups must not 

be allowed to use Pakistani soil to plan or launch attacks against neighboring countries. 

Because Pakistan has not taken sufficient action on our requests, the United States has suspended 

the vast majority of security assistance and security-related payments to Pakistan. The United 

States is still prepared to lift the suspension of security assistance once Pakistan undertakes 
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decisive and sustained etl'orts to significantly disrupt the capacity of terrorist groups to both raise 

funds and carry out attacks against neighboring countries. 

We continue to engage with Pakistan's leadership in private, and we will use the full range of tools 

at our disposal to encourage Pakistan to take action against all militant and terrorist groups 

operating on its soil. Discussions about which specific tools to use and when to use them are 

ongoing within our Department and the interagency. We will calibrate our relationship in 

accordance with the degree to which Pakistan addresses our concerns. 

Taliban on Human Rights 

In those almost 25 years the Taliban has been around, have the Taliban's views on women and 

minority rights or girls' education evolved~ 

The Tali ban have not publicly revised their earlier positions regarding minority rights or women 

and girls. They have stated that they are in favor of women's education, and in areas of 

Afghanistan where they have control or influence, girls are encouraged to go to school, albeit in 

segregated classrooms and subject to the availability of female teachers. Female education 

generally ends when girls reach puberty and they are obliged to stay out of the public eye, whether 

in markets or schools. 

While there is no clear evidence that the Taliban's official views have changed, Afghan society 

has evolved greatly since 2001. More women are in positions of leadership and more than 40 

percent of the nine million enrolled in school are girls, of whom 2.5 million are enrolled in primary 

and secondary school. More broadly, Afghans have made real progress on human rights over the 

last 17 years, and we continue to work with the Afghan government, our allies, and our partners 

to solidify and build on that progress. 

These changes have put pressure on the Tali ban to make local accommodations with a population 

that wants better health care and education for their boys and girls. If the Tali ban evolves into a 

legitimate political movement within Afghanistan, it is possible that these local accommodations 

would be replicated on a national scale and that their positions would shift on the rights of 

minorities, women, and girls education. We would look for concrete manifestations of these shifts 

during an intra-Afghan peace process. Our desired outcomes for such a peace process are clear 

and have not changed. 
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Child Soldiers 

Last year, there was serious concern over the Administration's failure to include Afghanistan on 

the Child Soldiers Prevention Act listing, despite credible reports indicating that some children 

fought alongside Afghan national defense and security forces How would you judge 

Afghanistan's record this year as it relates to the use of child soldiers? 

We remain concerned about reports of the recruitment and use of children by the Afghan Local 

Police and Afghan National Police. We continue to emphasize to the Mghan government the 

importance of aggressive action to prevent the unlawful recruitment and use of children in security 

forces. We also continue to encourage the Afghan government to ensure adequate resources are 

allocated towards establishing and maintaining successful reintegration services. 

At the same time, we are encouraged by Afghanistan's commitment toward compliance with the 

UN Action Plan and the steps it has taken thus far to end the recruitment and use of children in its 

security forces. The government currently operates a total of 22 Child Protection Units (CPUs) 

across the country, which have to date prevented an estimated I ,300 underage recruits from joining 

the Afghan security forces. 

In December 2017, the Ministry of Defense enacted a new Protection of Children in Armed 

Cont1ict policy defining the rights of children and prohibiting child recruitment The new policy 

established procedures for monitoring and enforcement, reporting violations, and rescuing and 

caring for children involved in armed cont1ict. In February 2018, the government enacted a new 

penal code which specifically increased penalties for the use of children in armed cont1ict, in both 

combat and non-combat roles. 

Afghanistan Compact 

Can the Department please provide the committee with the set of initiatives and benchmarks that 

make up the Afghanistan Compact" How is the U.S. government using the compact to hold the 

government of Mghanistan accountable for its own progress? Is foreign assistance tied to progress 

on the Compact? What benchmarks are being used? 

The Afghanistan Compact's initiatives and benchmarks have not changed since we shared them 

with the Committee in March 2018. The Compact includes more than 1,000 specific, time-bound 

reform measures aimed at improving security, governance, and economic growth. The Compact 

is a set of commitments from the Afghan government to the Afghan people, which require relevant 
49

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Afghan ministries to report on their progress at monthly working group meetings and to answer to 

President Ghani every few months at Compact Executive Committee meetings. By 

institutionalizing an evaluation process and deadlines, the Compact has proven to be a useful tool 

for keeping the Afghan government focused on its own progress. Foreign assistance is not directly 

tied to progress on the Compact, although we use certain benchmarks in the reports required by 

the annual appropriations acts. 
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30496c.eps

Questions for the Record from Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

US. Policy Toward Afghanistan 

June 20, 2018 

Ambassador Wells, has the United States allowed for any waivers or made any exceptions to 

military assistance to Pakistan since the suspension of such assistance was announced, and if so, 

why, when, and how much in total assistance has gone to Pakistan? 

The Administration continues to discuss potential exceptions to the security assistance suspension. 

Exceptions may be made on a case-by-case basis if they are determined to be critical to US. 

national security interests, and we will ensure Congress has appropriate visibility if/when any 

exceptions are approved. We can provide more background in a classified setting. 

Can you provide an update on Afghanistan's progress on the Kabul Compact? Specifically: 

A Can you provide us with a full list ofrefonns identified by the Afghan government? 

B. What specific benchmarks or metrics are being used to assess Afghanistan's progress on 

these reforms, and are there timelines pledged by the Afghan government to meet certain 

reforms? 

C. How are we holding the Afghan government accountable for progress on these refonns, if 

at all, and how are the Afghans holding themselves accountable? 

D. Are we conditioning any of our assistance to the Afghan government on progress made 

with respect to the Compact, and if not, why not? 

The Afghanistan Compact's initiatives and benchmarks have not changed since we shared them 

with the Committee in March 2018. The Compact includes more than 1,000 specific, time-bound 

reform measures aimed at improving security, governance, and economic growth. The Compact 

is a set of commitments from the Afghan government to the Afghan people, which require relevant 

Afghan ministries to report on their progress at monthly working group meetings and to answer to 

President Ghani every few months at Compact Executive Committee meetings. By 

institutionalizing an evaluation process and deadlines, the Compact has proven to be a useful tool 

for keeping the Afghan government focused on its own progress. 

We have not conditioned foreign assistance directly on Compact benchmarks, although we use 

certain benchmarks in the reports required by the annual appropriations acts. Since the Compact 

is the Afghan government's commitment to the Afghan people, rather than a bilateral agreement, 

it was never intended to serve as the basis for a U.S.-Afghan incentive program. 
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Questions for the Record from Representative Lois Frankel 

US Policy Toward Afghanistan 

June 20, 2018 

Girls' Education 

With 43 percent of Afghanistan's districts now either under Taliban control or being contested, 

what is the State Department doing to preserve and expand the gains we've made in educating 

Afghan girls? 

Over the last 16 years, women and girls in Afghanistan have experienced notable progress, 

particularly in health and education for those in major cities. Approximately 40 percent of the 

more than 9 million students enrolled in schools are girls. While signit!cant social and cultural 

challenges remain, the government has publicly committed to improving access to education, 

naming 2018 the "Year of Education Reform', promising reforms to the Ministry of Education, 

and engaging its Citizen Charter initiative to reach more out-of-school children. 

To sustain and expand these gains, the State Department supports a number of programs and 

initiatives, including: funding university scholarships for female students to study at universities 

in Afghanistan and in the region; encouraging the Afghan government to reform and strengthen 

laws to protect the rights of women, including their right to a public education; providing 

education, training, and mentoring to Afghan legal professionals, especially those investigating 

and prosecuting violence against women; and collaborating with the US. Anny Corps of 

Engineers to provide English classes, computer skills training and tutoring in science and math in 

women's dormitories in major public universities in Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif Through 

the English Language Instruction for Women program, 308 female students participate in English 

programs at women's dormitories at Kabul and Herat Universities and 142 female students are 

enrolled in English classes at the Women's Resource Center in Balkh province. 

Are our education programs reaching districts where the Afghan government is no longer fully in 

control? 

USAID-supported education programs in Afghanistan serve the national public school system in 

all 34 provinces, reaching the most marginalized Afghan children. Examples of our educational 

programs include the provision of textbooks and education quality improvement programs through 

the World Bank-managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). 
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While some of the rural areas that receive assistance to educate Afghan school children may not 

always remain under consistent government control, the Department of State and US AID take very 

seriously our responsibility to ensure that US. taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and in support of 

US. national security objectives. It is challenging to monitor and evaluate development programs 

in Afghanistan, including through the ARTF, due to the country's insecurity. However, USAID 

and the World Bank continue to collaborate to ensure the best possible monitoring systems are in 

place to ensure etl'ective use of foreign assistance resources. In 2017, USAID and other donors 

collaborated with the World Bank to further strengthen its monitoring and oversight of ARTF, 

resulting in an enhanced monitoring plan that includes improved information-sharing mechanisms 

and periodic performance evaluations of the World Bank's monitoring entities. Starting in 

September 2018, USAID will continue its education support in Afghanistan through the ARTF's 

Education Quality Reform in Afghanistan (EQRA) project. 

Today. due to the e±l'orts of the Afghan government, the United States, and other international 

donors, more than 9.2 million Afghan children are enrolled in school, 39 percent of which are girls. 

According to the Afghan Ministry of Education this is a significant increase from around 900.000 

children enrolled, mostly boys. 17 years ago. TJ1 March, President Ghani noted that 3.5 million 

children remain deprived of education, and that his government had directed the Education 

Minisu·y to implement a plan to overcome this challenge, including opening more schools across 

the country and hiring 18,000 people for vacant posts to be announced in the education sector this 

year. President Ghani also vowed to improve women's role in the Education Ministry's leadership. 

Women, Peace and Security 

As the prospects rise for a peace settlement between the Taliban and Afghan government, what 

steps is the State Department taking to ensure that Afghan women have a seat at the negotiating 

table? 

President Ghani told the Kabul Peace Conference on February 28, "First, since peace has to be a 

national discussion, we will hold a national consultation to develop a joint peace agenda that is 

representative of the Afghan nation and not the property of any one group. It must pay particular 

attention to the experiences and demands of our women and the views of our diverse civil society.'' 

The United States continues to press all senior Afghan government otlicials, including President 

Ghani, to live up to this commitment, and that the government should carefully build a broad social 

and political consensus around etl'orts to support peace in Afghanistan. The Department, through 

an interagency agreement with the United States Institute of Peace, is funding research on the role 

of women as both peacemakers and extremists in Afghanistan to infonn the design of future 

programming on countering violent extremism (CVE) by the U.S. and Afghan governments. The 

Department continues to advocate for greater roles for women in national and local peace efforts, 

including on Afghanistan's High Peace Council, which recently increased its percentage of women 

members to nearly 20 percent. The Department of State funds media training to support female 

politicians in elections, and through USAID's Women in Government program, provides 
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opportunities for 3,000 female university graduates to receive civil service training and participate 

in internships in local and national government organizations. 

How is the State Department supporting Afghan women's efforts to prevent and counter violent 

extremism and terrorism, including building the capacity of women-led civil society groups? 

The Department, through an Interagency Agreement with the United States Institute of Peace, is 

currently funding research on the role of women as both peacemakers and extremists in 

Afghanistan to inform the design of future programming on countering violent extremism (CVE) 

by the U.S. and Afghan governments. The Department continues to advocate for greater roles for 

women in national and local peace efforts, including on Afghanistan's High Peace Council, which 

recently increased its percentage of women members to nearly 20%. 

The Department works with the Afghan Otlice of the National Security Council (ONSC) and the 

Ministry of Haj and Religious Affairs (MORRA) to promote intra-faith communication and a 

moderate vision of Islam in the country. The ONSC is finalizing a national CVE strategy. 

MORRA has worked with the Ministry of Women's Affairs to advance the goal of allowing 

women to attend mosques. 

On February 15, 2018, a Kabul-based non-governmental organization hosted an international 

summit on CVE that produced proposals to address extremism on a regional level. The summit 

was designed to build momentum for future regional CVE efforts, including future events in Kabul 

to discuss women and extremism. 

The Department is involved in ongoing efl'orts to provide training and mentoring to Afghan legal 

professionals on investigating and prosecuting violence against women. We work with civil 

society to fund and support shelters, legal aid, and counseling for survivors of gender-based 

violence and tratlicking in persons. The Department also funds media training to support female 

politicians in elections and programs to counter harassment of women serving in the security 

services and protect female journalists. 
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Pakistan 

Questions for the Record from Representative Joaquin Castro 

US Policy Toward Afghanistan 

June 20, 2018 

Has the government of Pakistan ceased its support for the Haqqani network and other terrorist 

groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba? 

As part of the US. South Asia strategy, we have made clear to the highest levels of Pakistan's 

government that the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, and other militant and 

terrorist groups must not be allowed to use Pakistani soil to plan or launch attacks against 

neighboring countries. 

Pakistan has taken some initial steps since the announcement of the US. South Asia strategy, but 

it has not taken the decisive and irreversible action against militant and terrorist sanctuaries that 

we believe are necessary. The Tali ban, Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, and other militant 

groups are still able to plan and execute attacks in neighboring countries from Pakistani soil. 

Pakistan's insufficient action against these groups prompted us to suspend the vast majority of 

security assistance and security-related payments to Pakistan. We continue to engage with 

Pakistan's leadership in private, and we will use the full range of tools at our disposal to encourage 

Pakistan to take action against all militant and terrorist groups operating on its soil. 

What e±Iorts have you and the Department of State taken to follow up restrictions on security 

assistance to Pakistan in order to end its support for designated terrorist groups, including the 

Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba? 

The South Asia strategy recognizes that we cannot continue with a "business as usual" approach 

to Pakistan as long as Pakistan has not addressed US. concerns about its policies, including its 

failure to address terrorist sanctuaries on its territory. We have made clear to the highest levels of 

Pakistan's government that the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e Tayyiba and other 

militant and terrorist groups must not be allowed to use Pakistani soil to plan or launch attacks 

against neighboring countries. 

Because Pakistan has not taken sufficient action on our requests, the United States has suspended 

the vast majority of security assistance and security-related payments to Pakistan. The United 

States is prepared to lift the suspension of security assistance once Pal<istan undertal<es decisive 
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and sustained e±Iorts to significantly disrupt the capacity of terrorist groups to carry out attacks 

against neighboring countries, and to raise funds. 

We continue to engage with Pakistan's leadership in private, and we will use the full range of tools 

at our disposal to encourage Pakistan to take action against all militant and terrorist groups 

operating on its soil. Discussions about which specific tools to use and when to use them are 

ongoing within our Department and the interagency. We will calibrate our relationship in 

accordance with the degree to which Pakistan addresses our concerns. 

What impact has the Government of China's China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) had on 

US.-Pakistan relations? 

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has had a limited overall impact on US.-Pakistan 

relations. Pakistan needs to take aggressive steps to complete major economic reforms, and the 

overall business climate remains challenging for US. t!rms to invest in Pakistan- concerns that 

pre-date CPEC. While the Pakistani government publishes general information about CPEC 

projects to promote a nominal level of transparency, US. finns are generally not provided bidding 

information. Pakistani officials, companies, and citizens have expressed concerns regarding the 

inclusivity and transparency of CPEC projects, as well as their ability to meet basic standards for 

debt sustainability and good environmental and fair labor practices. The United States continues 

to press Pakistan on creating conditions for a level economic playing field. Pakistan has not made 

any meaningful changes in the way that CPEC projects are being managed since the Corridor's 

conception in May 2013. 

Does the Department of State support the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)? 

We have a shared interest with China in a stable and prosperous Pakistan. We believe that the 

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has the potential to contribute to stability and 

prosperity in Pakistan and the region, as long as it confonns to international norms with respect to 

transparency, anti -corruption, environmental and labor standards, foreign participation, and debt 

sustainability. Any such shortcomings would limit the program's benefits to the Pakistani people. 

We have encouraged China to ensure its adherence to international norms, so that it can play an 

important role in expanding and improving Pakistan's infrastructure and promoting power 

generation projects. 
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How would you describe China's commitment to US. interests in Afghanistan? Have they been 

supportive of peace and reconciliation in the country? 

China regularly consults with the United States on security and stability in Afghanistan, and we 

have worked together with Afghanistan and Pakistan to facilitate an Afghan peace process through 

the Quadrilateral Coordination Group. China also participates in the International Contact Group 

and other multilateral fora that coordinate international support for Afghanistan. China has 

consistently expressed its support for an Afghan peace process, and recently offered public support 

for President Ghani's announcement of the Eid ceasefire 

China has worked to improve Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, particularly through its trilateral 

format, which we hope will contribute to both sides working cooperatively to counter terrorist 

groups and to prevent cross-border attacks. We continue to urge China to use its close relationship 

with Pakistan to push for a substantive and irreversible strategic shift that would see Tali ban senior 

leaders in Pakistan arrested, expelled, or brought to the negotiating table with the Afghan 

government. 

With Chinese exports to Afghanistan (over $1 billion) far exceeding Chinese imports from 

Afghanistan (around $5 million in 2016), China could do more to balance its trade with 

Afghanistan by increasing development assistance or by importing more Afghan goods. 

Withtfrawalfrom Afghanistan 

Under what conditions would the Department of State support negotiations or a negotiated 

settlement with the Tali ban? 

The Administration's overall goal for Afghanistan is to support a negotiated political settlement 

between the government and the Taliban. Our longstanding position remains that as an outcome 

of any peace agreement, the Taliban must abandon violence, respect the Afghan constitution, 

including its protections for women and minorities, and break ties with al-Qaida and international 

terrorism. 

What specific steps are the Department of State taking to achieve these conditions? 
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The Administration's overall goal for Afghanistan is to support a negotiated political settlement 

between the government and the Tali ban. To this end, we are using all tools, including diplomatic 

tools, in concert, to support Afghan efforts to reduce violence, support upcoming parliamentary 

and presidential elections, encourage Afghan government reforms, and engage all of Afghanistan's 

neighbors and near-neighbors to build regional support for the government's efforts to secure 

peace. This includes development assistance, public affairs and media engagements, counternarcotics and law enforcement etl'orts, initiatives to promote human rights and the rule of law, as 

well as direct diplomatic engagements within Afghanistan, in countries in the region, and in the 

broader community of donors and NATO partners. 

VistL~ for Afghan Translator.~ 

The United States provides a Special Immigrant Visa for Iraqi and Afghan Translators/Interpreters 

who risked their lives to support U.S. forces and diplomats. 

• How many Afghan nationals are currently waiting for a visa under this category? 

• How many Afghans have been killed while waiting for such visa" 

As of June 2018, there are approximately 17,600 Afghan principal applicants at some stage in the 

SIV pipeline. 

We are committed to supporting those who have helped US military and other government 

personnel perform their duties often at great personal risk to themselves and their families. The 

embassy is sometimes notified of an applicant's death from natural causes, violence, or otherwise, 

although the Department does not officially track such data. Because these applicants often still 

reside in Afghanistan, we collectively work with our interagency partners to process these cases 

as quickly as possible. 

In the period from January 27, 2017, to March 16, 2017, did the policy enacted by Executive Order 

13769 (the Muslim Ban) deny any Iraqi-national recipients of the Special Immigrant Visa for Iraqi 

and Afghan Translators/Interpreters the ability to travel to the United States? 

Executive Order 13769 did not apply to any Afghan nationals, including Afghan Special 

Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants. While E.O. 13769 did apply to certain Iraqi nationals, on 

January 31, 2017, the Department issued guidance to posts advising consular officers that Iraqi 

nationals could continue to apply for SIVs and, if the applicants were otherwise qualified, the 

consular officer could issue SIVs. All admissions data belongs to the Department of Homeland 
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Security, however, the Department also notified posts on January 31, 2017, that Iraqi SIV holders 

were able to apply for admission to the United States. On February 3, 2017, the US. government 

ceased implementation ofE.O. 13769's visa and entry suspensions per federal court order. 

Have any such individuals or Iraqi-national holders of such Special Immigrant Visas been admitted 

to the United States since March 16~ 

The Department does not have access to admissions data for SN holders as this data belongs to 

the Department of Homeland Security. From March 2017 through May 2018, the Department 

issued approximately 336 SNs for Iraqi principal applicants, and 3,669 SNs for Afghan principal 

applicants. In that same time period, the Department issued approximately 956 SNs for Iraqi 

derivative applicants (family members) and 15,217 SIVs for Afghan derivative applicants. 

Have visas been denied to the spouses or unmarried children under the age of 21 of any such 

Special Immigrant Visa holder as a result of Executive Order 13769 (Jan 27 2017), Executive 

Order 13780 (March 6, 20 17), Presidential Proclamation 9645, or any other visa restrictions on 

Iraqi or Mghan nationals implemented since January 20, 2017? 

Afghan nationals, including applicants for Special Immigrant Visas, were not subject to Executive 

Order (E.O.) 13769, E.O. 13780, or Presidential Proclamation (P.P.) 9645. While certain Iraqi 

nationals were subject to travel restrictions under E.O. 13769, E.O. 13780 and P.P. 9645 did not 

impose travel restrictions upon Iraqi nationals. From January 27, 2017 to January 31, 2017, Iraqi 

SIV applicants were not interviewed and were not able to enter the United States. On January 31, 

2017, the Department advised posts that Iraqi SIV applicants found eligible for an SN could seek 

entry to the United States with a valid SN. Iraqi nationals could also apply for SNs, and, if 

qualitied, could be issued a SN. Very few Iraqi applicants were affected by Executive Order 

13769, and any who were affected were subsequently remedied on January 31, 2017. On February 

3, 2017, the US. government ceased implementation of any visa and entry restrictions under E.O. 

13769 per federal court order. 
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Questions for the Record from Representative Thomas R Suozzi 

U.S. Policy Towards Afghanistan 

June 20, 2018 

While our military spending in Afghanistan is approximately $45 billion for FY 18, the money for 

the civilian side is seeing a steady decrease. At the 2016 Brussels Conference, the US committed 

to $1 billion per year, then reduced its commitment to $847.6 million in 2017, $782.8 million in 

2018, and is requesting a further reduction to $632 million for 2019. This is deeply troubling. 

Furthermore, I am concerned that our civilian commitment and that of our partners is a list, as 

opposed to a strategy with well thought out goals and objectives. 

I would respectfully ask your office to provide the following: 

a) What is the total amount offunding for civilian programs in Afghanistan for FY17, FY18, 

and proposed for FY19; 

b) A detailed list of these civilian programs in Afghanistan and their budgets, broken down 

by agency (USAID, DOD, DOJ, Commerce, etc.) that would reflect the totals in item (a); 

c) An explanation of how these programs are meant to further American interests; 

d) Metrics that show whether or not these programs are achieving their goals; 

e) A similar detailed listing of how much and what our partners are spending their money on. 

Our FY 2017 civilian assistance level for Mghanistan is $847.7 million. The Department has not 

yet decided allocations for FY 2018. The President's budget request for Afghanistan was $782.8 

million for FY 2018 and $632.8 million for FY 2019. 

Foreign assistance is a critical instrument of the President's South Asia strategy, which seeks to 

protect our national security interests by facilitating a sustainable political settlement between the 

Afghan government and the Taliban. Civilian assistance helps set the conditions for peace and 

lasting stability in Afghanistan by bolstering the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan 

government, undermining the capabilities and in±luence of the Tali ban, and strengthening the 

social and economic foundations of the country. 

Please see our February 15, 2018 and Au6'l!St 17, 2018letters to your office detailing the range of 

assistance programs in support of U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and further addressing your 

questions. The enclosures for each letter contain Sensitive but Unclassified information and will 

be sent via secure courier separately.