GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

December 2000 COURTHOUSE 

CONSTRUCTION

Sufficient Data and 

Analysis Would Help 

Resolve the 

Courtroom-Sharing 

Issue

GAO-01-70

Page 1 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

Contents

Letter 3

Results in Brief 7

Background 9

Limited Data and Analysis Leave the Courtroom-Sharing Issue 

Unresolved 11

EY’S Analysis of Opportunities for Sharing was Problematic 16

Conclusions 20

Recommendations for Executive Action 21

Matter for Congressional Consideration 21

EY and Judiciary Comments and Our Evaluation 22

EY Comments 22

AOC Comments 25

Comments by the Chair, Judicial Conference Committee on 

Security and Facilities 34

Appendixes Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology 38

Appendix II: Comments From Ernst & Young 40

Appendix III: Comments From the Administrative Office of the 

U.S. Courts 43

Appendix IV: Comments From the Chair, Judicial Conference, 

Committee on Security and Facilities 57
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Letr

December 14, 2000

The Honorable Ben Nighthorse Campbell

Chairman

The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Chairman

The Honorable David Obey

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bud Shuster

Chairman

The Honorable James L. Oberstar

Ranking Democratic Member

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bob Franks

Chairman

The Honorable Bob Wise

Ranking Democratic Member

Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings,

Hazardous Materials, and Pipeline Safety

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

This report responds to Senate and House reports1

 that direct us to review 

and comment on part of the May 2000 Ernst & Young (EY) study on the 

1

 S. Rep. No. 106-500, at 66 (2000); H.R. Rep. No. 106-756, at 65 (2000).
Page 4 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

judiciary’s space and facilities program.2 Specifically, we were asked to 

review the study as it relates to courtroom use and sharing. The House 

report directed us to report our results to the House Committee on 

Appropriations and the House Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure. The Senate report directed us to provide our results to 

Congress. We are providing our results to the Chairman and Ranking 

Member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury and 

General Government to fulfill the Senate report requirement. The Chairman 

and Ranking Democratic Member of the House Subcommittee on 

Economic Development, Public Buildings, Hazardous Materials, and 

Pipeline Safety also asked us to review the study as it pertains to 

courtroom use and sharing. 

The judiciary is in the midst of a multibillion-dollar courthouse 

construction initiative. New courthouses are being built to accommodate 

new judgeships created because of increasing caseloads and to replace 

obsolete courthouses occupied by existing judges. For several years, there 

has been much debate about whether district judges could share 

courtrooms—operate in a courthouse with fewer courtrooms than 

judges—to save taxpayer dollars without compromising effective judicial 

administration. There has been a belief among certain key stakeholders 

outside the judiciary—various subcommittees and Members of Congress as 

well as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—that courtroom 

sharing may be possible and could lead to cost savings. The judiciary has 

instituted a policy for sharing courtrooms among visiting judges—judges 

from other locations who temporarily use courtrooms—and senior judges 

who have reduced caseloads.3

 However, the judiciary and other key 

stakeholders believe that the judiciary should retain its one-judge, onecourtroom policy for active district judges because of the negative effects 

courtroom sharing may have on effective judicial administration. 

Nonetheless, many stakeholders and some organizations that have done 

research in the area have recognized that existing data and analysis on 

courtroom use were limited and could not resolve the courtroom-sharing 

debate, and more data and analysis were needed. 

2

 Independent Assessment of the Judiciary’s Space and Facilities Program, Ernst & Young, 

May 2000.

3

 The judiciary has two categories of district judges who hear cases and use courtrooms. 

Active district judges carry full caseloads. District judges with senior status, who we refer to 

in this report as senior judges, have resigned from their active judgeships, but continue to 

carry a full or partial caseload.
Page 5 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

In 1997, we issued a report that called for better courtroom use data and 

analysis to enhance facility planning and decisionmaking.4

 In that report, 

we recognized that the process for administering justice is dynamic and 

complex and that the availability of a trial courtroom is an integral part of 

the judicial process because judges need the flexibility to resolve cases 

efficiently. However, we also noted that trial courtrooms, because of their 

size and configuration, are expensive to construct—EY estimated in its 

study that a typical courtroom costs about $1.5 million. In doing the work 

for the 1997 report, we found that the judiciary had not compiled data on 

how often and for what purposes courtrooms were actually used and did 

not have analytically based criteria for determining how many and what 

types of courtrooms were needed to effectively administer justice. Given 

this, we analyzed various detailed records and documents at seven 

geographically dispersed court locations—Dallas, TX; Miami, FL; 

Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Las Cruces, NM; San Diego, CA; and 

Washington, D.C.—to develop data on actual courtroom use. 

Our 1997 analysis of actual courtroom use for trials and nontrial activities5

at these locations suggested there may be opportunities to reduce costs by 

building fewer full-sized trial courtrooms. Although our results were not 

generalizable to all district courtrooms, our analysis showed that during 

1995, courtrooms on average were used for trials less than one-third of 250 

federal workdays. Active district judges used their courtrooms, on average, 

about 65 percent of the days for trial and nontrial purposes; senior judges 

used their courtrooms only about 38 percent of the days. We also noted that 

for a significant number of days, the courtrooms were used for only 2 hours 

or less, and at least one courtroom in each of two courthouses was unused 

every workday of the year. However, in reporting these results, we 

recognized that our data collection and analysis effort was limited in scope 

in that we visited only seven locations and collected data for only a 1-year 

period. Because of the lack of data, we were also unable to reflect other 

factors in our analysis, such as latent use—using an available courtroom 

and the scheduling of that courtroom as leverage to encourage case 

settlements—and scheduling uncertainties that the judiciary believes are 

important in determining the number of courtrooms needed. These 

4

Courthouse Construction: Better Courtroom Use Data Could Enhance Facility Planning 

and Decisionmaking (GAO/GGD-97-39, May 19, 1997).

5

 Nontrial activities include events such as arraignments and motion hearings.
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limitations prevented us from conclusively determining whether and to 

what extent courtroom sharing may be feasible.

Consequently, we recommended that the judiciary design and implement 

cost-effective research to fully examine the courtroom use issue. 

Specifically, we recommended that as part of this research, the judiciary 

should (1) establish criteria for determining effective courtroom utilization 

and a mechanism for collecting and analyzing data at a representative 

number of locations so that trends can be identified over time and better 

insights obtained on court activity and courtroom usage; and (2) design and 

implement a methodology for capturing and analyzing data on latent use, 

courtroom scheduling, and other factors that may substantially affect the 

relationship between the availability of courtrooms and judges’ ability to 

effectively administer justice. The development of actual courtroom use 

data may be time-consuming and difficult to pursue because of the lack of 

readily available court records or other mechanisms for capturing 

information on how courtrooms were used. However, given the results of 

our 1997 courtroom use report and the significant taxpayer dollars being 

invested to replace obsolete facilities and accommodate new judgeships, 

this research would be worth pursuing because significant savings could 

result if fewer million-dollar trial courtrooms need to be constructed. 

Further, without actual courtroom use data that could be used to analyze 

the potential for sharing, the debate over sharing will continue to be based 

on judgment that is not, in our view, supported by a methodologically 

sound analysis of empirical evidence. 

In commenting on our 1997 report, the Administrative Office of the U.S. 

Courts (AOC), which is the judiciary’s administrative arm, said the judiciary 

should aggressively monitor both the effects of its ongoing efforts to 

reduce space usage and its newly adopted initiatives related to courtroom 

sharing among senior and visiting judges before it embarks on an extensive 

and time consuming study of courtroom use. AOC went on to say that the 

continuing study of the need for courtrooms should be conducted by those 

who are most knowledgeable in this area, that is, federal judges.6

 In 1999, to 

address the courtroom-sharing issue and identify ways to improve its space 

and facilities efforts, AOC contracted with EY to conduct a study of the 

judiciary’s facilities program. As part of the study, AOC asked EY to 

conduct a thorough analysis of courtroom utilization, assignment, and 

sharing by judges. As agreed with your offices, our objective was to 

6

 AOC’s comments and our evaluation of them are contained in our 1997 report.
Page 7 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

determine whether the EY study provided sufficient data and analysis to 

show if, and to what extent, courtroom sharing may be feasible. To meet 

this objective, we obtained the EY study and analyzed those areas that 

pertained to courtroom use and sharing and discussed our analysis with 

AOC officials and the EY staff who worked on the study. We also discussed 

the study with representatives from OMB and the Congressional Budget 

Office (CBO). In addition, we reviewed previous studies on or related to 

courtroom use as well as AOC’s contract file for the study. We did our work 

between June and September 2000 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. A more detailed description of our 

objective, scope and methodology is in appendix I. We received written 

comments on a draft of this report from EY, AOC, and the Chair of the 

Judicial Conference’s Committee on Security and Facilities. These 

comments are discussed near the end of this letter.

Results in Brief The EY study, as it pertained to the need for courtrooms, was informative 

in that it provided current information on issues related to courtroom use 

and the potential for sharing courtrooms. However, the EY study was not 

designed to provide the type of data and analysis we and other research 

organizations such as the Rand Institute for Civil Justice (Rand) and the 

Federal Judicial Center (FJC), the judiciary’s research arm, have 

determined would be needed to help resolve the courtroom-sharing issue. 

AOC did not specifically require EY to develop these data and analysis; and, 

according to EY, to do so would have involved a level of resource 

commitment and time frames that were beyond the scope of its work. 

According to EY, such a data collection effort would have been extensive 

because court records do not adequately track courtroom usage; the 

frequency of proceedings; or uncertainties, such as delays and 

cancellations. In short, there continues to be a lack of actual courtroom 

usage data and analysis that show (1) how often and for what purposes 

courtrooms are being used and (2) the impact that other factors—such as 

courtroom scheduling uncertainties and latent use—may have in 

determining the need for courtrooms. 

According to our work and assessments by these other research 

organizations, a cost-effective, empirical assessment that would generate 

actual courtroom use data is key to informed decisionmaking about the 

feasibility of courtroom sharing. Without these data, it is not possible to 

determine more conclusively whether courtroom-sharing opportunities 

exist. It is important that expert judgment and experience be used in 

interpreting empirical data on courtroom use. However, it is also important 
Page 8 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

that such judgment supplement, not serve as a substitute for, empirical data 

and analysis on courtroom use. Given the significant taxpayer dollars being 

invested to replace obsolete courthouse facilities and accommodate new 

judgeships that are projected, it appears that the judiciary, Congress, and 

the administration would be well served by a methodologically sound, 

empirical study of the courtroom-sharing issue. 

Although the EY study did not provide any new courtroom use data or 

perform the type of quantitative analysis we and others have 

recommended, it contained conclusions and recommendations that were 

based on an analysis of the potential for courtroom sharing. Our review 

showed that this analysis was problematic. The analysis, which suggested 

that five active judges cannot share four courtrooms, was based on a 

mathematical formula that (1) used a questionable flexibility factor to 

account for various uncertainties that may affect a courtroom scheduling 

process, such as whether a trial will actually take place and how long a trial 

will last, and (2) incorrectly used courtroom usage data from our 1997 

report. Although the study identified several uncertainties that may affect 

courtroom scheduling, it provided no data, rationale, or analytical basis to 

support the 20 to 25 percent flexibility factor it used in its formula other 

than to say it was appropriate. According to EY staff, the 20 to 25 percent 

flexibility factor was based on the professional judgment of the staff doing 

the study, because there were limited empirical data available on how 

various uncertainties actually affect the need for a courtroom. 

Furthermore, the flexibility factor could be viewed as excessive, 

considering that it was used in conjunction with a courtroom use measure 

we developed for our 1997 report that already contained a degree of 

flexibility that may have accommodated various uncertainties. Moreover, 

the formula incorrectly used our courtroom usage measure as a lights-on 

measure—the number of hours judges spent in the courtroom—when it 

was actually a measure of workdays when there was any use at all, even if 

the events lasted for less than an hour. Using our data as a lights-on 

measure overstated the number of hours judges actually spent in the 

courtrooms. It also did not recognize that a significant number of the 

workdays had events that lasted only 2 hours or less, leaving sufficient time 

to possibly accommodate unanticipated events. Both of these limitations 

raised questions about the merits of the analysis and the study’s 

conclusions and recommendations regarding courtroom sharing. 

This report contains recommendations to AOC that address the problems 

we identified. In commenting on a draft of this report, AOC had several 
Page 9 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

serious concerns with the draft and did not agree with our 

recommendations. However, AOC did not provide any data, analysis, or 

rationale that would give us an adequate basis for changing or dropping our 

recommendations. Accordingly, we continue to believe that our 

recommendations are appropriate. Furthermore, given AOC’s reluctance to 

implement our recommendations and the potential for savings if fewer trial 

courtrooms were built, we believe Congress should consider requiring AOC 

to provide persuasive courtroom use data and analysis, along with its 

views, to justify the number of courtrooms being requested in future 

courthouse construction projects before funding is approved. 

Background The judiciary is in the midst of a multibillion-dollar courthouse 

construction initiative. The judiciary’s most recent 5-year construction plan 

proposed 50 new courthouse projects that are estimated to cost about $3 

billion. The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for 

building these facilities with input from various stakeholders, including 

Congress, OMB, and the judiciary. The Judicial Conference of the United 

States is the policymaking body for the judiciary. Currently, the judiciary 

follows a practice that each active district judge is assigned a dedicated 

courtroom, although the judiciary has taken steps to implement courtroom 

sharing among visiting judges and senior judges who have reduced 

caseloads. Over the years, there has been considerable debate about 

whether district judges should share courtrooms in new courthouse 

facilities to save taxpayer dollars—according to EY, each courtroom costs 

about $1.5 million. 

The debate over courtroom sharing has revolved around whether it would 

negatively affect the judiciary’s efficiency and effectiveness. As previously 

mentioned, in 1997, we reported that our analysis of actual courtroom use 

for trial and nontrial activities at seven locations suggested there may be 

opportunities to reduce costs by building fewer full-sized trial courtrooms 

in the judiciary’s multibillion-dollar courthouse construction initiative.7

 Our 

report recommended that the judiciary fully examine the courtroom use 

issue to form a better basis for determining the number and types of 

7

 At the request of a House Subcommittee, we also issued a companion report—Courthouse 

Construction: Information on the Use of District Courtrooms At Selected Locations

(GAO/GGD-97-59R, May 19, 1997)—that provided data on courtroom use at four additional 

locations. Our findings on courtroom use at these additional locations were similar to our 

findings associated with the initial seven locations previously discussed.
Page 10 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

courtrooms needed and whether each district judge needs a dedicated 

courtroom. Before our report was issued, Rand and FJC had made similar 

recommendations. In commenting on our 1997 report, AOC requested that 

we recast the recommendation. Instead of recommending what it thought 

would be a time-consuming and expensive study of the courtroom usage 

issue, AOC requested that we recommend that the judiciary monitor the 

implementation of its policy initiatives on courtroom sharing among senior 

and visiting judges and facilities planning with regard to the impact on case 

management and effectiveness in contributing to its efforts to reduce space 

costs. 

We chose not to recast our recommendation as AOC requested; it was our 

view that just monitoring these initiatives would be an incomplete basis for 

courtroom construction decisions because it would not include 

information and analysis on actual courtroom usage. Without actual 

courtroom use data, there would always be questions about how many fullsized trial courtrooms are really needed. There is a belief among certain 

key stakeholders outside the judiciary—various subcommittees and 

Members of Congress as well as OMB—that courtroom sharing may be 

possible and could lead to cost savings. 

According to AOC officials, the judiciary and other stakeholders, including 

certain Members of Congress and several U.S. Attorneys, believe that the 

complexities associated with courtroom availability and effective judicial 

administration reduce the likelihood that sharing is feasible. The judiciary’s 

position is that some sharing may be possible among visiting judges and 

senior district judges with reduced caseloads, but active district judges and 

senior judges with full caseloads need dedicated courtrooms. According to 

AOC officials, the judiciary and others believe that in addition to trial and 

nontrial activities, such as motion hearings and arraignments, other factors 

of uncertainty affect the need for courtrooms and make courtroom sharing 

more of a challenge. These factors include whether a case will go to trial, 

how long a trial will take, and whether an emergency proceeding will 

require immediate courtroom use. In addition, latent use would also have 

to be considered in determining the need for courtrooms. However, there 

currently is limited information to determine how often these factors may 

affect the need for a courtroom and the degree to which they may actually 

impede courtroom sharing. As we have reported in the past, the judiciary 

lacks data and analysis on courtroom use and, is therefore not in a good 

position to support its practice of providing a trial courtroom for every 

judge.
Page 11 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

In 1999, in an effort to address the courtroom-sharing issue and improve its 

space and facilities efforts, AOC contracted with EY to conduct a 

comprehensive review of its facilities program. With regard to courtroom 

sharing, AOC directed EY to conduct a thorough analysis of courtroom 

utilization, assignment, and sharing by judges. The EY study, among other 

things, concluded that courtroom sharing (1) would not be feasible in 

courthouses with fewer than 5 district courtrooms and (2) would result in 

significant scheduling problems in courthouses with 6 to 10 district 

courtrooms. The study also recommended that the judiciary retain its 

policy of providing a courtroom for every active district judge; however, it 

said that sharing at large courthouses—those with more than 10 district 

judges—may be possible and that senior judges can share courtrooms after 

the first 2 years of senior status. 

Limited Data and 

Analysis Leave the 

Courtroom-Sharing 

Issue Unresolved 

The EY study was informative in that it provided current information on 

issues related to courtroom use and the potential for sharing courtrooms. 

In doing their work, EY staff, among other things, visited federal 

courthouses, interviewed key stakeholders and judiciary personnel, and 

conducted focus groups with judges. A top AOC official who was involved 

with contracting for the study pointed out that as part of its work, EY 

visited 14 court locations, observed courtroom use and spoke with users, 

examined calendars, analyzed statistical data and courthouse planning 

documents, conducted interviews with dozens of individuals who had 

different experiences and views, and held focus groups. 

Nevertheless, the EY study did not provide the type of research we and 

other research organizations, such as Rand and FJC, have said would be 

needed to help resolve the courtroom-sharing issue. The EY study clearly 

stated that EY did not attempt to collect new data on the use of courtrooms 

because, to be nationally representative, such a data collection effort 

would have involved a research commitment and a time frame that were 

beyond the scope of the study. The study also said that Rand concluded 

that fully researching the impact of courtroom sharing would require a 2- to 

3-year study period. Through discussion of the study with AOC and EY staff 

and a review of the contract file for the study, we found that AOC did not 

specifically require EY to develop the type of data and analysis we and 

other organizations have recommended. According to a top AOC official 

involved with contracting for the study, AOC was under pressure from 

OMB and Congress to have the study completed within a year. According to 

this official, this time frame and budget restraints prevented AOC from 
Page 12 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

having EY develop the type of data and analysis we and other organizations 

have recommended.

In 1997, we recommended that the judiciary design and implement costeffective research to fully examine the courtroom use issue to form a better 

basis for determining the number and type of courtrooms needed as well as 

whether each district judge needs a dedicated courtroom. We reported that 

this effort should include

• establishing criteria for determining effective courtroom utilization and 

a mechanism for collecting and analyzing data at a representative 

number of locations so that trends can be identified over time and better 

insights obtained on court activity and courtroom use;

• designing and implementing a methodology for capturing and analyzing 

data on latent use, courtroom scheduling, and other factors that may 

substantially affect the relationship between the availability of 

courtrooms and judges’ ability to effectively administer justice;

• using these data and criteria to explore whether the one-judge, onecourtroom practice is needed to promote efficient courtroom 

management or whether other courtroom assignment alternatives exist; 

and

• establishing an action plan with time frames for implementing and 

overseeing these efforts.

The courtroom use data we developed for our 1997 report, although not 

generalizable to all federal district courtrooms, suggested that there may be 

opportunities for the judiciary to reduce costs by building fewer trial 

courtrooms. We reported that opportunities to reduce costs would depend 

on the potential impact or benefits and costs of options, such as instituting 

courtroom-sharing practices; changing the configuration of courtrooms by 

building a mix of full-size and smaller, less expensive courtrooms or 

hearing rooms; or holding meetings or proceedings in facilities other than 

trial courtrooms, possibly by using audio or video technology.

Research prior to the issuance of our report also called for better data and 

analysis in this area. In March 1996, a study commissioned by AOC was 

released that used quantitative methods to recommend that the judiciary 

and GSA continue to build one courtroom for every active district judge.8

The Judicial Conference’s Committee on Court Administration and Case 

Management asked FJC, the judiciary’s research arm, to critique this study. 

In August 1996, FJC praised the report for pointing out some of the limits of 

current data and the complexities of dealing with matters such as 
Page 13 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

courtroom scheduling.9 However, FJC concluded that the “limitations of 

the analysis, some of which are acknowledged in the report, substantially 

limit its value as a basis for any policy decisions.” FJC concluded that the 

findings and recommendations went beyond the data presented and that 

other more useful techniques might have been developed.

Rand also expressed concern about the March 1996 AOC-commissioned 

report. In September 1996, Rand issued a project memorandum, prepared 

under contract with AOC, that reviewed available research on courtroom 

sharing.10 Rand found that previous research had been limited and did not 

resolve the courtroom-sharing issue. Similar to FJC, Rand questioned 

whether the March 1996 report explored various analytical techniques that 

could be applied to the courtroom- sharing concept. These techniques 

included advanced computer simulations using detailed, actual data on 

how courtrooms are used. Rand also questioned the assumption in the 

report that an additional scheduler would have to be employed by the 

judiciary in courthouses operating under a sharing scenario. Most 

importantly, Rand emphasized the need for further study on courtroom use 

issues, stressing the need for the judiciary to understand the effects of 

courtroom sharing on the judicial system when making facility decisions. 

Rand concluded the following:

“Making decisions without such an understanding presents two kinds of risks. On the one 

hand, reducing the courtroom-per-judge ratio may unacceptably impair the ability of the 

federal court system to meet its judicial obligations and may have other potentially negative 

effects. On the other hand, not reducing the ratio may forego an opportunity to save 

taxpayer dollars.”

Rand suggested that the judiciary, Congress, AOC, and GSA would be well 

served by a methodologically sound, empirical study that would require 

investigating the effects of varying the courtroom-to-judge ratio. A more 

detailed description of the March 1996 AOC-commissioned study, the FJC 

8

 Edward H. Leekley and William T. Rule II, The Impact of Providing Fewer Than One 

Courtroom Per Judgeship: Report to the Committee on Security, Space, and Facilities of the 

Judicial Conference of the United States, Washington, D.C., March 1996.

9

 Federal Judicial Center Research Note on The Impact of Providing Fewer Than One 

Courtroom Per Judgeship, Federal Judicial Center, August 28, 1996.

10 Terence Dunworth and James S. Kakalik, Research on Courtroom Sharing, Project 

Memorandum, Rand Institute for Civil Justice, PM-598—1-ICJ, September 1996.
Page 14 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

critique, and the Rand report is contained in our May 1997 report on 

courtroom use.11

As previously mentioned, AOC did not require EY to carry out the research 

we and others recommended. The EY staff we interviewed said that such 

an effort would have involved much more time and resources than they had 

allotted to the subject, which was part of a broader study they were tasked 

with completing. Given this, there continues to be a lack of actual 

courtroom usage data that show (1) how often and for what purposes 

courtrooms are being used and (2) the impact that other factors—such as 

courtroom scheduling uncertainties and latent use—may have in 

determining the need for courtrooms. Although expert judgment should be 

considered in determining the merits of courtroom sharing, it is clear to us 

that the courtroom-sharing issue is not going to be resolved without better 

data and analysis on actual courtroom use.

Terence Dunworth, a co-author of the 1996 Rand study and consultant to 

AOC on courtroom use issues, agreed that the existing research did not 

resolve the issue of whether courtroom sharing can take place without 

adverse consequences. Dunworth said that the judiciary still needs to 

invest in an empirical assessment of the courtroom-sharing issue; 

otherwise, decisions will continue to be made on the basis of opinion and 

judgment. Given the results of our 1997 report on courtroom use and the 

significant taxpayer dollars that will continue to be invested to replace 

obsolete facilities and accommodate growth, it is our view that the 

judiciary, Congress, and the administration would be well served by a 

methodologically sound analysis of the courtroom- sharing issue that is 

based on empirical evidence. 

This type of study may be time consuming and involve an extensive effort 

to develop actual courtroom use data because of the lack of readily 

available court records or other mechanisms for capturing information on 

how courtrooms were used. In addition, once these data are collected, the 

study would have to carefully consider the type of analytical techniques to 

be used. For example, in EY’s opinion, it would not be possible to use the 

regression analysis technique because of the difficulties of predicting trial 

length. However, as Rand indicated, advanced forms of computer 

simulations show the best potential for exploring the feasibility of overall 

courtroom sharing. Despite these challenges, this research would be worth 

11 GAO/GGD-97-39.
Page 15 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

pursuing because significant savings could result if fewer million-dollar 

trial courtrooms need to be constructed now and in the future. Further, 

without actual courtroom use data that could be used to analyze the 

potential for sharing, the debate over sharing will continue to be based on 

speculation rather than on a methodologically sound analysis of empirical 

evidence.

It is important to recognize that AOC has taken some actions that relate to 

courtroom sharing, such as the EY study, policy changes made by the 

judiciary to consider sharing among senior judges with reduced caseloads, 

and changes made to the judiciary’s courthouse construction design guide 

to consider sharing opportunities. Regarding sharing by senior judges, each 

federal circuit now has some type of policy to encourage courtroom 

sharing among senior judges on the basis of criteria established by each 

circuit. These criteria include workload, the number of years judges are 

expected to continue working, and an evaluation of how courtrooms are 

used in existing facilities. According to the EY study, 38 of the proposed 

projects in the judiciary’s 5-year construction plan that EY analyzed 

anticipate courtroom sharing, with 274 courtrooms planned for 347 judges. 

With the exception of one of these projects, this sharing involves only 

senior and visiting judges and not active district judges. Nonetheless, we 

view these initiatives as steps in the right direction. However, despite these 

steps and AOC’s and EY’s efforts to contact various stakeholders during the 

study on the judiciary’s space and facilities program, the judiciary has not 

reached up-front agreement with key stakeholders on what type of costeffective research could be pursued—including development of study 

objectives, potential methodologies, and reasonable approaches—that 

would help resolve the debate over the courtroom-sharing issue and 

identify the full potential of courtroom sharing. 

We made recommendations to the judiciary in this report to do the needed 

research to help resolve the courtroom-sharing issue. In commenting on a 

draft of this report, AOC disagreed with the recommendations because it 

believes that implementing them would be costly and unproductive. 

However, AOC provided no support for its assertions and offered no other 

options, other that to say that the judiciary has no interest in constructing 

courtrooms that are not needed. Given AOC’s reluctance to do the needed 

research and the potential savings that could be derived from building 

fewer expensive trial courtrooms, Congress should consider requiring AOC 

to provide persuasive courtroom use data and analysis, along with its 

views, to justify the number of courtrooms being requested for each 

proposed courthouse construction project before funding is approved. 
Page 16 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

The actual courtroom use data and analysis could supplement the 

standardized courtroom utilization studies that are currently required by 

the annual appropriations acts that fund courthouse construction projects. 

Since fiscal year 1997, appropriations acts providing funding for 

courthouse construction have contained this requirement.12 However, the 

utilization studies provided were general in nature and were primarily 

limited to identifying courtroom assignments for judges. They did not 

contain actual data and analysis on how often and for what purposes 

courtrooms were being used or the impact that other factors—such as 

courtroom scheduling uncertainties or latent use—may have on 

determining the need for courtrooms.

EY’S Analysis of 

Opportunities for 

Sharing was 

Problematic

Although the EY study did not provide new courtroom use data or perform 

the type of quantitative analysis we and others have recommended, it 

contained conclusions and recommendations that were based on an 

analysis of the potential for courtroom sharing. Our review of this analysis 

showed that it was problematic. The analysis was based on a mathematical 

formula—which EY acknowledged was simplistic in the study—that used a 

questionable flexibility factor to account for various uncertainties that may 

affect courtroom scheduling and incorrectly used data from our 1997 

report on courtroom use. Both limitations raised questions about the 

merits of the analysis and the study’s (1) conclusions that courtroom 

sharing would not be feasible in courthouses with fewer than 5 district 

courtrooms and would result in significant scheduling problems in 

courthouses with 6 to 10 district courtrooms; and (2) recommendations 

that the judiciary should retain the 1-judge, 1-courtroom policy for active 

district judges and provide 1 courtroom for every 2 senior judges. 

More specifically, in using its formula to conclude that five judges could not 

share four courtrooms, EY used a flexibility factor of 20 to 25 percent to 

account for various uncertainties that may affect courtroom scheduling, 

such as whether a trial will actually take place, how long a trial will last, 

and whether an emergency proceeding will require immediate courtroom 

use. However, the study was silent on how the flexibility factor was 

determined. The study provided no data, rationale, or analytical basis to 

support the 20 to 25 percent flexibility factor, saying only that EY decided 

that the estimates were appropriate. Thus, there is no link between the 

12See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 

No. 106-58, §404, 113 stat. 430, 453 (1999) for this provision.
Page 17 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

basis for EY’s judgment—stakeholder input and observations—and the 

specific percentages that EY decided to use. EY staff said that they 

developed the estimate using their professional judgment based on the 

work they did on the study, including discussions with judges and other 

judiciary officials, because there were limited empirical data available on 

how various uncertainties actually affect the need for a courtroom. Also, it 

is interesting to note that if a 15 percent flexibility factor were used in the 

formula, the results suggest that five judges could share four courtrooms.13

Furthermore, as discussed below, the 20 to 25 percent flexibility factor 

could be viewed as excessive considering that it was used in the formula in 

conjunction with a courtroom use measure that already contained a degree 

of flexibility that may have accommodated various uncertainties. Without 

better data on the impact that these uncertainties may have on the need for 

a courtroom, it is difficult to gauge whether they are obstacles to the 

potential for sharing. 

In addition to our concerns with the flexibility factor, we also noted that EY 

incorrectly used the courtroom use data from our 1997 report. EY’s 

mathematical formula used the 65 percent courtroom use measure for 

active district judges as an actual, lights-on courtroom use measure—the 

number of hours judges spent in the courtrooms—when in fact it was a 

percentage of workdays that the courtroom was used for any activity. As 

pointed out in our report, if courtroom events took less than an hour and 

the courtroom was unused for the rest of the day, we credited the 

courtroom with a full day of use for that day. We did not pursue a lights-on 

measure because, at the time of our review, court records did not allow us 

to determine the exact number of hours courtrooms were actually used for 

trials. However, we were able to determine the number of hours and the 

specific days that courtrooms were used for nontrial activities, and in our 

report we presented a separate analysis showing how many of these days 

had events lasting a total of 2 hours or less. Because trial and nontrial times 

were recorded differently, we chose to present the actual courtroom use 

data in terms of the percentage of workdays used. Consequently, by using 

our courtroom measure as a lights-on measure, EY overstated the number 

of hours judges spent in the courtrooms and did not recognize that a 

significant number of workdays had events that lasted 2 hours or less. 

13 It is important to note that it was not our intent to suggest that five judges can actually 

share four courtrooms, but rather to demonstrate the limitations associated with EY’s 

analysis.
Page 18 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

When EY used our courtroom use measure as a lights-on measure in its 

formula, the results suggested that five judges could not share four 

courtrooms. For example, the EY study contained the following 

calculation: 

• .65 (utilization rate) + .25 (flexibility factor) = .9 (courtrooms per judge)

• .9 x 5 = 4.5 (equivalent courtrooms)

This analysis showed that using the 25 percent flexibility factor and 

rounding the 4.5 figure upward result in the conclusion that five judges 

would need five courtrooms. 

Because EY’s analysis is predicated on using a lights-on measure of 

courtroom use, we tested EY’s formula to determine if EY’s incorrect use of 

our data affected its results. We converted our 65-percent measure to more 

of a lights-on measure by removing some of the hours for which we were 

certain that no activity occurred. Specifically, when the courtrooms were 

used for 2 hours or less for nontrial activities on a given day, we credited 

the courtrooms with 2 hours of use instead of a full day, as was done for 

our 1997 report. This yielded a courtroom use percentage of about 50 

percent, which, although not a pure lights-on measure, is closer to the type 

of measure upon which EY’s formula was predicated.14 Using a 50-percent 

use measure and incorporating EY’s 25-percent flexibility factor, EY’s 

analysis suggested that five judges could in fact share four courtrooms, as 

shown in the following formula: 

• .50 (adjusted utilization rate) + .25 (flexibility factor) = .75 (courtrooms 

per judge)

• .75 x 5 = 3.75 (equivalent courtrooms)

EY staff acknowledged that there was a discrepancy in their portrayal of 

our data as a lights-on measure. However, the EY staff said that they 

understood our data and, for the purpose of their analysis, the discrepancy 

was insignificant. They said they used the 65-percent figure because it was 

the best available measure of actual courtroom use. We do not share EY’s 

view that this discrepancy was insignificant. As mentioned before, we 

14 The objective, scope, and methodology section of this report, which is contained in 

appendix I, fully explains how we made this adjustment. Also, as mentioned before, it was 

not our intent to suggest that five judges can actually share four courtrooms, but rather to 

demonstrate the limitations associated with EY’s analysis.
Page 19 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

recorded a day of use even if courtroom events lasted less than an hour. 

For example, about one-half of the days reflected in the 65 percent had only 

nontrial activity, and most of these days involved events that lasted 2 hours 

or less. Given this, there were a significant number of days when the 

courtrooms had time that may have been sufficient to accommodate 

various uncertainties or other events that may have been scheduled. 

Readers of the EY study could easily make the mistake of assuming that 

judicial business was actually being conducted 65 percent of the available 

hours. As shown above, if we adjusted our measure to more of a lights-on 

measure, the analysis would show a different result. The imprecise 

portrayal and use of our data, combined with the judgmental flexibility 

factor, raised questions about the merits of the analysis and EY’s 

conclusions and recommendations regarding courtroom sharing.

We also noted that EY reported that 91 percent of courthouses have five or 

fewer active district judges, and EY used this fact to provide additional 

support for its recommendation that the judiciary retain the one-judge, onecourtroom practice. In EY’s opinion, the potential for courtroom sharing 

throughout the country is small because most courthouses have five or 

fewer judges. We agree that, intuitively, sharing in smaller facilities may 

present more of a challenge for the judiciary than sharing in larger ones. 

However, we also believe that better data and analysis are needed to 

definitively determine the circumstances under which sharing is actually 

feasible. It is also interesting to note that even though 91 percent of the 

courthouses may have five or fewer active district judges, as EY reported, 

about 40 percent of all current, active district judges are located in the 

remaining 9 percent of the courthouses. From this perspective, the data 

show that a considerable percentage of active district judges are in large 

courthouses where, according to EY, sharing is likely to be more feasible.

We also were concerned about EY’s use of the courthouse in Brooklyn, NY, 

to illustrate that scheduling courtrooms in an actual sharing scenario 

would be problematic. AOC officials told us that they urged EY to use 

Brooklyn as a case study because it was the only facility that was operating 

with fewer courtrooms than active district judges. Appendix B of EY’s 

study points out that this facility has been partially demolished in 

preparation for a new courthouse and that it was difficult for EY to 

determine the extent to which operational difficulties were caused by 

courtroom sharing or by inadequate facilities. However, in the body of the 

study, EY said that operational difficulties in the Brooklyn courthouse 

demonstrated that courtroom sharing has been costly to administer in 

terms of staff time, disruptions, and ineffective administration of justice. 
Page 20 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

Given the presence of the other variables related to the inadequacy of the 

facility, it is our view that the Brooklyn courthouse may not be a good 

example for demonstrating courtroom-sharing feasibility.

We also noted that the study provided data and analysis directly related to 

courtroom sharing for senior judges and in large courthouses with more 

than 10 district judges.15 EY suggested that sharing is possible in these 

areas and, in particular, recommended that the judiciary provide one 

courtroom for every two senior judges. However, as previously discussed, 

the analysis used to determine if active district judges can share 

courtrooms—which was similarly applied in analyzing larger courthouses 

and senior judges’ use—was problematic. As a result, although data from 

our 1997 report indicated low levels of use among senior judges with 

reduced caseloads, we cannot comment on the merits of EY’s 

recommended 2-to-1 ratio. In our view, a reasonable ratio of courtrooms to 

senior judges and the specific circumstances under which senior judges 

should share courtrooms are still unknown. Regarding large courthouses, it 

seems from an intuitive standpoint that the potential for sharing does 

increase with the number of judges in a facility. However, better data and 

research are still needed to demonstrate empirically that this is the case. 

Conclusions Courtroom sharing in the federal judiciary has been a highly visible and 

much-debated issue in recent years across all three branches of 

government. Proponents of courtroom sharing argue that sharing is 

feasible because of low use levels and that taxpayer dollars could be saved 

by reducing the number of courtrooms needed. Opponents of courtroom 

sharing argue that the complexities associated with courtroom availability 

and effective judicial administration reduce the likelihood that sharing is 

feasible. We and certain other organizations have reported that more 

research is needed to develop data on the major factors that influence 

courtroom use and availability. Without these data and analyses, it will be 

difficult to reach consensus on if and to what extent courtroom sharing 

could be instituted. Furthermore, the judiciary, key stakeholders, and the 

organizations that have done research in this area have not reached any upfront agreement on what type of cost-effective research should be done. 

15 EY’s study defines a large courthouse in two slightly different ways: The executive 

summary defines a large courthouse as having “more than ten district judges,” but chapter 

IV refers to them as having “ten or more active judges.” We used “more than ten district 

judges” for the purpose of our review.
Page 21 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

Although the EY study provided useful information on the various factors 

that may affect courtroom sharing, it was not the type of research needed 

to help resolve the courtroom-sharing issue. Also, the study’s limitations 

raised questions about the sufficiency of the data and analyses presented to 

support its conclusions and recommendations regarding courtroom 

sharing. We recognize that expert judgment should be considered in 

determining the merits of courtroom sharing. However, it is clear to us that 

the courtroom-sharing issue is not going to be resolved without better data 

and analysis on actual courtroom use, including factors that may affect the 

need for a courtroom, such as trial length and whether a trial will actually 

take place. Also, the credibility of any further research could be enhanced 

if it recognized the views of all key stakeholders in developing the study’s 

objectives, methodologies, and approaches for doing the work. Costeffective research along the lines of what we and others have 

recommended has not been performed and is needed if the government is 

to make informed, sound decisions on courtroom use and sharing issues. 

Although AOC is reluctant to do this type of cost-effective research, we 

continue to believe it should be done. Given the judiciary’s position, we 

believe that Congress, as a minimum, should have access to actual 

courtroom use data and analysis for locations where new courthouse 

projects are proposed so that the judiciary’s justification for the number of 

courtrooms in these projects can be assessed before funding is approved.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

We recommend that the Director, AOC, in conjunction with the Judicial 

Conference’s Committee on Court Administration and Case Management 

and Committee on Security and Facilities, design and implement costeffective research more in line with the recommendations in our 1997 

report. These recommendations, which were similar to those made by 

Rand and FJC, were aimed at developing the type of data that would 

convincingly illustrate whether, and under what circumstances, 

opportunities for courtroom sharing exist. We also recommend that AOC 

establish an advisory group made up of interested stakeholders and experts 

to assist in identifying study objectives, potential methodologies, and 

reasonable approaches for doing this work.

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

Given the controversy surrounding the courtroom-sharing issue, the 

potential savings that could be derived if fewer expensive trial courtrooms 

are built, and AOC’s reluctance to design and implement cost-effective 

research to help resolve the issue, Congress should consider requiring AOC 
Page 22 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

to provide persuasive courtroom use data and analysis, along with its 

views, to justify the number of courtrooms being requested in future 

courthouse construction projects before funding is approved.

EY and Judiciary 

Comments and Our 

Evaluation

We received written comments on a draft of this report from EY on 

November 9, 2000. (See app. II.) We received written comments from AOC’s 

Associate Director on November 3, 2000. (See app. III.) We also received 

written comments on October 31, 2000, from the Chair of the Judicial 

Conference’s Committee on Security and Facilities. (See app. IV.) OMB did 

not provide comments on the draft. An overall description of the comments 

and our evaluation are discussed below. In addition to our evaluation of 

AOC’s major comments below, appendix III contains comments on other 

specific points AOC made. In October 2000, EY and AOC also provided us 

with oral technical comments on a draft of this report, which we 

incorporated where appropriate.

EY Comments In its letter, EY provided general comments to add context to the work it 

did and clarify its overall objectives and scope. EY explained the design 

and objectives of its study and pointed out that the chapter on courtroom 

utilization was part of a broader, comprehensive review of courthouse 

planning. EY said that the chapter on courtroom utilization should not be 

read and/or used separately from the entire report. EY went on to say that 

empirical data and research on courtroom utilization were sparse and that 

the judiciary reported that data on courtroom utilization were generally 

unavailable. EY said that it considered various approaches that others had 

developed to attempt to study this issue empirically; but it became clear 

that such approaches would entail a data collection effort that was beyond 

the scope, time frame, and resource commitment of its engagement. 

Given this, EY said that it used the empirical assessment of courtroom 

utilization in federal district courts that was available in our 1997 report, 

which provided a measure of courtroom utilization. EY said that it 

recognized that the assessment had limitations, but it attempted to build on 

it by examining what factors would influence the ability of district judges to 

share courtrooms, given the levels of utilization measured by GAO. EY said 

that the value of this type of analysis was that it showed that even in high 

levels of utilization, some courtroom sharing would be possible, although 

complex to implement. EY said that its view was that it would be possible 

for larger courthouses and senior judges to share courtrooms. However, it 
Page 23 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

did not feel that its analysis was sufficient to recommend formally to the 

Judicial Conference that it change its national policy of providing one 

courtroom per active district judge. 

In addition to general comments, EY had specific comments related to 

issues discussed in our report. For example, EY recognized that the 20 to 25 

percent flexibility factor used in its mathematical formula to determine if 

five judges could share four courtrooms is not based on empirical data and 

analyses. EY said that on the basis of discussions with stakeholders and 

visits to courthouses, it identified factors that would require some degree 

of flexibility in its mathematical formula. EY said that the flexibility factor 

is a judgmental decision that cannot, at this time, be supported by empirical 

data. We share EY’s view that some degree of flexibility may be needed to 

account for uncertainties that may affect the need for a courtroom, such as 

the trial length and whether trials will occur. However, a more reliable 

flexibility factor that would better reflect these uncertainties has not yet 

been developed. Therefore, we had concerns with EY’s use of a subjective 

flexibility factor in its mathematical formula, given that the results of EY’s 

analysis using the formula formed the basis for its conclusions and 

recommendations on the merits of courtroom sharing. As we stated in our 

report, had EY used a flexibility factor of 15 percent instead, the results 

would have suggested that five judges could have shared four courtrooms. 

We continue to believe that a persuasive assessment of the potential for 

sharing should be rooted in actual data on how often and for what purposes 

courtrooms are used. This could lead to a more analytically based 

assessment of the interrelationship of various events and a more defensible 

estimate of the flexibility needed to account for uncertainties.

In commenting on our assessment that the study provided no data, 

rationale, or analytical basis to support the flexibility factor, EY said that it 

listed multiple factors in the study that supported the need to take 

flexibility into account when considering courtroom sharing. EY explained 

that because these factors were derived from interviews with stakeholders, 

including judges, they constitute a rationale, particularly in the absence of 

empirical data. We agree that the factors EY listed generally constitute a 

rationale for why EY believed a flexibility factor was needed. However, our 

concern was that no rationale was provided for the specific flexibility 

factor—20 to 25 percent—that EY used in its formula. On the basis of EY’s 

comment, we clarified this point in our report. We continue to believe that 

the EY report does not provide an adequate rationale for how EY 

determined that a flexibility factor of 20 to 25 percent should be used to 

account for the factors EY identified. Without such a rationale, there is no 
Page 24 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

link between the basis for EY’s judgment—stakeholder input and 

observations—and the specific percentages that EY decided to use.

In commenting on our conclusion that it incorrectly used data from our 

1997 report on courtroom usage, EY acknowledged that it did not 

adequately describe our data in its assessment. However, EY continues to 

believe that its assessment of the potential for courtroom sharing is 

appropriate, in part, because the GAO data could not distinguish between 

factors that affect partial days and multiple days in the scheduling process. 

We do not see how distinguishing between factors that affect partial days 

and multiple days has any bearing on the interpretation of our data. As 

stated in this report, EY’s courtroom utilization model used our 65 percent 

courtroom use measure as an actual lights-on courtroom use measure—the 

number of hours judges spent in the courtrooms—when in fact it was a 

percentage of workdays that the courtrooms were used for any activity, 

even if the activities lasted less then an hour. Using our courtroom use 

measure as a lights-on measure overstated the number of hours that judges 

spent in the courtrooms. Also, it does not recognize that on a significant 

number of the days, the courtrooms were used for only 2 hours or less. 

Regarding our point that the Brooklyn courthouse may not be a good 

example to demonstrate courtroom-sharing feasibility, EY said that its 

assessment noted the limitations of using Brooklyn as a case study and that 

the limitations were disclosed. We recognized in our report that EY 

identified the limitations of using the Brooklyn case study in appendix B of 

its study. However, as indicated in our report, the body of EY’s study does 

not mention these limitations and is definitive in saying that the Brooklyn 

courthouse demonstrated that sharing has been costly to administer in 

terms of staff time, disruptions, and ineffective administration of justice. As 

a result, readers of the chapter on courtroom sharing may mistakenly 

conclude that the problems in Brooklyn were due to courtroom sharing 

alone and not the presence of operational difficulties caused by inadequate 

facilities. In our October meeting with EY to discuss the draft report, EY 

staff said that on the basis of our concern, they would have considered 

modifying the body of their report to reflect the limitations with using 

Brooklyn to draw conclusions about sharing. 

Finally, EY said that the chapter on courtroom utilization should not be 

read and/or used separately from its entire report because its analysis on 

courtroom utilization was part and parcel of a comprehensive review of 

courthouse planning. Although we were specifically requested to examine 
Page 25 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

the courtroom utilization chapter, we did review it in the context of the 

other chapters in the report.

AOC Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, AOC disagreed with our conclusion 

that the EY study did not provide the type of data or analyses needed to 

resolve the courtroom-sharing issue. AOC also disagreed with our 

recommendation to design and implement cost effective research to 

develop actual courtroom use data that we believe could more 

convincingly illustrate whether, and under what circumstances, 

opportunities for courtroom sharing exist. AOC said that the EY study was 

comprehensive; it believes that no further statistical study would be 

productive, expert judgment needs to be applied, and that it is highly 

unlikely that we would accept any result short of our previous conclusions. 

AOC also said that decisions on courtrooms should not be based on purely 

economic reasons, sharing beyond what the judiciary has agreed to would 

impair the effective and fair administration of justice, and those who think 

that the judiciary is unfit to determine its requirements might ask 

themselves why.

We do not believe that AOC’s comments are persuasive and continue to 

believe that our conclusions and recommendations are appropriate and are 

fully supported by the evidence and analysis in our report. As discussed in 

this report, EY’s assessment of the courtroom-sharing issue was not the 

type of research we and others—including Rand and FJC—have concluded 

would be needed to resolve the courtroom-sharing issue. The EY report 

itself essentially supports this assessment. EY’s analysis of the courtroomsharing issue was problematic, as we discussed in our report, and neither 

EY nor AOC provided any additional data or analysis that resolve the 

problems we identified. 

We do not believe, as AOC indicated, that decisions on courtroom sharing 

should be made solely on the basis of empirical data, nor do we believe that 

(1) cost savings should override considerations related to the effective 

administration of justice, (2) courtroom-sharing decisions should be made 

without the application of expert judicial judgment, or (3) existing data 

support the need for active district judges to share courtrooms. Our 

position is that given the amount of time expensive trial courtrooms appear 

to go unused, more should be done to determine if sharing is feasible 

without impairing the judicial process. Also, it is our view that decisions on 

courtroom sharing should entail the application of expert judicial judgment 

to complement more empirical data on courtroom use than currently exists 
Page 26 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

and should reflect more sophisticated methodological approaches than 

were included in EY’s study. Contrary to AOC’s view, we are not locked into 

a preconceived conclusion or specific methodological approach. We do 

believe, however, that the courtroom-sharing issue needs to be addressed 

through a more empirically based study than EY’s, and, we note that EY 

itself characterized its study as “...exploring the context of courtroom 

sharing....” 

Furthermore, although we agree with AOC that courtroom sharing should 

not be implemented if it impedes the effective administration of justice or 

infringes on constitutional rights, AOC provided no evidence or analyses to 

show that this would be the case. In addition, EY itself raised questions 

about drawing conclusions from the Brooklyn courthouse experience. 

Finally, in neither this nor our prior reports have we questioned the 

judiciary’s fitness to determine its requirements. At the same time, it is a 

normal part of the congressional appropriations and oversight process to 

review and question the basis for the stated resource requirements of any 

federal agency or department, including the judiciary. Currently, the 

judiciary has presented virtually no empirical data to support its position 

that it is essential for each active district judge to have a dedicated 

courtroom. We are not, as AOC suggests, proponents of courtroom sharing, 

but we are proponents of having persuasive data and analysis for making 

informed decisions about the use of public resources. It would be both 

appropriate and desirable for the judiciary to be directly involved with any 

independent research that we and others are recommending; decisions on 

courtroom sharing should not be made without full consideration of the 

judiciary’s views. However, AOC remains reluctant to undertake the type of 

research we and others have said is necessary to make informed decisions 

about the number of courtrooms needed. Consequently, we believe 

Congress should consider requiring AOC to provide persuasive courtroom 

use data and analysis, along with its views, to justify the number of 

courtrooms requested for future courthouse construction projects before 

funding is approved. 

In its November 3 letter, AOC raised seven specific concerns with our draft 

report. These concerns, and our evaluation, are discussed below as well as 

in the GAO Comments section that follows AOC’s letter in appendix III.

Stakeholder Involvement in 

the EY Study

AOC’s first major concern was that our report did not credit the judiciary’s 

actions to involve stakeholders in the EY study. AOC states that the 
Page 27 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

judiciary has taken the concerns raised by a few stakeholders about 

courtroom needs seriously and, among other things, undertook the study 

by EY in 1999. AOC said the EY study was comprehensive and inclusive and 

that the study had a requirement for the consultant to seek out and 

consider the views of all stakeholders. AOC said that the judiciary invited 

39 officials in Congress and the executive branch to participate in the 

assessment and that EY interviewed many to consider their suggestions in 

framing its approach. AOC went on to say that GAO wrongly faults the 

judiciary with failing to obtain stakeholder agreement on the study 

objectives and approaches. 

AOC is correct that our draft did not recognize AOC’s and EY’s efforts to 

contact various stakeholders in doing its overall study on the judiciary’s 

space and facilities program, and we modified our report to recognize these 

efforts. However, our point that agreement has not been reached with 

stakeholders on the type of study that should be done to help resolve the 

courtroom-sharing issue remains valid, as evidenced by our discussions 

with AOC, OMB, congressional staff, and one of the authors of the Rand 

study. Further, when EY staff met with us at the beginning of the study, we 

gave them an overview of our prior work and the recommendations we 

made related to the type of research that we believe is still worth pursuing. 

However, the EY staff who interviewed us did not ask us to comment on a 

specific, proposed approach or methodology for its study. Thus, we were 

not given the opportunity to comment on EY’s planned approach prior to 

its implementation. 

Portrayal of Stakeholder 

Views

AOC’s second major point was that our draft report did not accurately 

portray the views of stakeholders. AOC stated that the draft suggested that 

there is a courtroom debate with two distinct sides—with the judiciary on 

one side and most other stakeholders outside the judiciary on the other 

side. AOC went on to say that those directly involved in the justice system 

have voiced concerns similar to those of the judiciary. AOC provided 

examples of others, such as a number of U.S. Attorneys and the President 

of the Federal Bar Association, who are concerned about the merits of 

courtroom sharing. AOC said that to suggest that the judiciary stands 

nearly alone in its views about courtrooms is simply not accurate. AOC’s 

point is valid. It was not our intent to portray the judiciary as the only 

opponent of courtroom sharing, and we modified the text to reflect the fact 

that other stakeholders besides the judiciary have concerns about sharing. 

On the other hand, AOC also said that a few individuals who are involved 

with funding have expressed a view on sharing different from the 
Page 28 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

judiciary’s view. We believe that AOC’s characterization understates the 

concerns that have been expressed. As AOC later acknowledges, OMB 

proposed courtroom sharing in projects included in the President’s budget 

request. The Senate report that mandated our work dedicates a section to 

the courtroom-sharing issue that states that AOC “fails to pursue a policy of 

fiscal restraint” and indicates that the Appropriations Committee “will 

continue to pursue all avenues with respect to cost containment.” The 

House Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, 

Hazardous Materials, and Pipeline Safety has also raised questions on the 

sharing issue. In addition, CBO has explored the courtroom-sharing issue.

Finally, AOC cited comments made by those opposed to courtroom sharing 

that discussed the negative effects they believe sharing would have on the 

administration of justice. These concerns are important and need to be 

explored, but AOC provided no additional evidence on the validity of these 

concerns or that would address the courtroom use results discussed in our 

1997 reports on courtroom utilization. 

Recognition of Judiciary 

Actions to Share 

Courtrooms and Potential 

for Additional Savings

AOC’s third area of major concern was that our report gives insufficient 

recognition to the fact that the judiciary’s actions have already reduced the 

number of courtrooms planned in new facilities and that it oversimplifies 

the potential for additional savings. AOC pointed out that the EY study 

reported that some sharing already occurs in the judiciary. It also stated 

that for future projects, 274 courtrooms are planned for 347 judges. AOC 

said that this important information is not mentioned until near the end of 

our report. AOC also stated that the idea that further reductions in 

courtrooms will result in savings is not as simple as we suggested in our 

report. AOC said that according to the EY study, if courthouses are not built 

to accommodate a court’s operational needs and future growth 

requirements, substantial future expenditures could be incurred sooner. 

AOC said that if even one annex or new courthouse is required a few years 

hence because an insufficient number of courtrooms were provided in a 

courthouse project, millions of additional dollars would have to be spent. 

Therefore, AOC said that to avoid added costs, it is as important not to 

underbuild the number of courtrooms in a new or expanded courthouse as 

it is not to overbuild. According to AOC, courtrooms are built to be used for 

at least 50 years, but the number of courtrooms built in a new facility is 

based on only a 10-year projection of need. According to AOC, with the 

growing workloads in the courts, short-term savings can readily be 

overshadowed by additional costs to expand facilities later. 
Page 29 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

In raising these concerns, it is important to note that the sharing AOC 

refers to, including the sharing reflected in almost all future projects, is for 

visiting judges and senior judges who carry reduced caseloads, not active 

district judges. Only one location among the future projects—Seattle—

plans sharing among active district judges. According to the AOC official 

who oversaw the EY study, it is not yet clear whether sharing will ever 

actually occur in Seattle. To reflect AOC’s concern, we modified our report 

to recognize the judiciary’s actions on sharing earlier in our report. That is, 

the judiciary has decided that some sharing is feasible. However, the issue 

of whether active district judges can share courtrooms was the central 

issue addressed by EY’s analysis and its resulting conclusion and 

recommendation that the judiciary retain the one-judge, one-courtroom 

policy. AOC and EY officials told us during our review that Brooklyn was 

the only location where active district judges were currently sharing. As 

mentioned earlier, EY acknowledged that various limitations made it 

difficult to determine if the problems in Brooklyn were due to sharing. 

Regarding potential savings, AOC did not provide evidence to support its 

assertion that building fewer courtrooms in a project will accelerate the 

need for future expansion. The EY quote that AOC uses to make this point 

states that additional expenditures could be incurred sooner if courthouses 

are not built to accommodate future growth requirements. We did not say 

in this report that courthouses should not be built to accommodate future 

growth. Instead, our work has shown that the number of courtrooms that 

may be needed to accommodate growth efficiently while maintaining 

effective judicial administration may be less than the number that are 

currently being constructed. Our assessment was based on the low levels 

of courtroom use we observed and documented in our prior work. 

Furthermore, in our 1997 report, we noted that of the six locations with 

more than one trial courtroom, all courtrooms at any location were seldom 

used for trials and nontrial activities the same day. For example, of the 250 

workdays in 1995, Miami and Washington each had at least one unused 

courtroom on each of the workdays. We believe that judgments about how 

many courtrooms are needed to efficiently accommodate the judiciary’s 

needs without compromising effective judicial administration would be 

better supported by sound methodological analyses of empirical data on 

how often and for what purposes courtrooms are actually used. 

It is also important to point out that the EY economic analysis AOC 

mentioned was inconclusive. The analysis suggested that any potential 

savings from constructing fewer courtrooms could be offset by the costs of 

hiring schedulers to enable courtroom sharing to take place. To be 
Page 30 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

conclusive, such an analysis would need to consider exactly how many 

fewer courtrooms could be built, and how many—if any—new personnel 

would have to be hired as schedulers. These are empirical questions that 

could be addressed in the type of cost-effective research we and others 

have recommended needs to be done to help resolve the courtroom-sharing 

issue. 

Focus on GAO’s 1997 Report AOC’s fourth major concern was that the report’s organization and 

presentation pay attention to promoting GAO’s earlier conclusions rather 

than to presenting a thorough consideration of EY’s approach to the 

subject. AOC states that from the start, our report focuses on restating our 

conclusions and recommendations from our 1997 report instead of on the 

current assignment to review the EY study. AOC said that nearly half of the 

draft report’s text has little or nothing to do with the EY study. AOC said 

that it had previously documented serious reservations about the accuracy 

of our earlier assessment and the validity of conclusions that are repeated 

in this report. 

We believe that AOC’s concern about the organization of our report is not 

valid. Given the complexity of this issue, we would be remiss if we did not 

include a discussion of what we and other researchers—including Rand 

and FJC—have reported in this area. In meeting our objective to determine 

whether the EY study provided sufficient data and analysis to show if, and 

to what extent, courtroom sharing may be feasible, we used the results of 

our prior work and the research of others as criteria for evaluating the EY 

study. This is a common and widely accepted practice in social science 

research. In addition, because EY relied heavily on data from our 1997 

report for its analysis, we believed that readers of this report needed 

information on our earlier study to fully understand EY’s use of our data 

and our assessment of EY’s study. Nonetheless, on the basis of AOC’s 

concern, we added an explanation of why we used our past work and that 

of others in the detailed discussion of our objective, scope, and 

methodology contained in appendix I. It is also important to point out that 

in its comments on our 1997 report, although AOC disagreed with our 

conclusions and recommendations, it did not take issue with the accuracy 

of our data on courtroom use, as was implied in its comments related to 

this report.
Page 31 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

Empirical Data Versus 

Expert Judgment

AOC’s fifth major concern was that our report overstates the likelihood that 

more data will resolve the courtroom-sharing issue. AOC said that our 

report reflects scant respect for expert judgment, dismisses the 

professional judgment applied by EY, and shows a high degree of 

skepticism about the value of the opinions of judges and other primary 

users and schedulers of courtrooms. AOC went on to say that there are 

many questions for which data will not provide answers and that the EY 

study describes many factors relevant to the courtroom issue that are 

highly variable, unpredictable, or cannot be measured empirically. 

AOC’s explanation of this concern inaccurately portrays our view of the 

role that methodologically sound analysis of empirical data can play in 

helping to resolve the courtroom-sharing issue and contains several 

assertions that it has not provided sufficient evidence to support. Two 

important facts in this debate are that available data show that courtroom 

use levels appear low, and trial courtrooms are expensive to build. To date, 

there has been much debate by experts on both sides of the issue. However, 

this debate—which reflects the expert judgment that AOC mentions—has 

resulted in an impasse regarding whether sharing is feasible. Our view is 

that more empirical research could be done to further the debate and 

provide empirical support for either side’s argument. We do not, as AOC 

asserted, believe that this research will provide all the answers or that 

there is no place for expert judgment. We modified our report to make 

these points clearer. 

We have a number of other points that raise questions about the validity of 

AOC’s fifth major concern. AOC mentions factors that are difficult to 

measure and are highly variable and implies that these issues cannot be 

studied empirically. It is our view that this has not been conclusively 

determined. In fact, our interviews with EY staff and review of AOC 

documents show that EY proposed a study of courtroom sharing similar to 

what Rand proposed. A Rand-type study would attempt to study these 

factors empirically. This proposal was rejected because the additional cost 

and time frame involved went beyond the scope of EY’s broader study of 

the judiciary’s space and facilities program, not because it was definitively 

determined that these factors could not be studied empirically. We also 

disagree with AOC’s statement that most of the analysis we have 

recommended would be theoretical, not empirical. Although a 

methodologically sound analysis of this issue—such as modeling or the 

computer simulations that Rand suggests—would involve making 

assumptions, it would be based on data on how courtrooms are actually 
Page 32 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

used and thus would be considered an empirical assessment according to 

standard practice in social science research. 

Further, although AOC believes it is impossible to find a scientific way to 

measure what does not happen, we believe that social science research has 

been developed to do just that. In fact, the approach we discuss in our 

report is not dissimilar to the one that AOC uses in its long-range planning 

model for predicting its space needs. AOC forecasts its future workload 

using the available data on past workload and statistical models that are 

based on standard theories and assumptions. Essentially, AOC uses 

scientific methods to measure what has not happened. In another example, 

the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) routinely uses computer simulations to 

estimate the effects of potential changes in sentencing legislation on the 

size of the federal prison population. The results of these simulations are 

used to project the financial impact of potential legislative changes. 

According to BOP, the results of these simulations are also used in 

deliberations by Congress and other bodies, such as the U.S. Sentencing 

Commission and the Department of Justice. 

Value Added by Additional 

Study

AOC’s sixth major concern was that our report uses confusing figures to 

support the idea that another extensive study is worth pursuing. AOC said 

that there is no compelling justification provided in our report to explain 

why another study of the subject would be cost effective. AOC said that we 

acknowledged the study would be lengthy and costly and referred to data 

that it believes show that the potential for sharing is small given the size of 

most courthouses. We disagree with AOC’s contention that some of our 

figures are confusing. Our point was to show that although 91 percent of 

courthouses have five or fewer active district judges, the remaining 9 

percent of these courthouses contain 40 percent of all active district 

judges. Therefore, close to one-half of active district judges are located in 

courthouses where EY concluded that sharing is likely to be more feasible. 

Furthermore, although we agree that sharing in smaller courthouses would 

pose more of a challenge, our work showed that the mathematical analysis 

EY used to examine the potential for courtroom sharing in smaller 

courthouses was problematic. As a result, we disagree with AOC’s premise 

that it has been definitively determined that sharing at smaller courthouses 

is not possible. 

Regarding the cost-effectiveness of future research, we disagree with 

AOC’s view that our report does not contain a compelling justification. As 

stated in our report, available data suggest that courtrooms are not used 
Page 33 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

very often, the need for new judgeships will continue to grow, and 

significant amounts of taxpayer dollars are being spent to replace obsolete 

facilities and accommodate growth. Cumulatively, these factors form a 

basis to suggest that further research would be worth pursuing because 

significant savings could result if fewer million-dollar trial courtrooms need 

to be constructed. In our 1997 report on courtroom use, we said that AOC 

workload projections indicated that the number of district judgeships 

could double or perhaps increase more significantly by the year 2020—

from 647 judgeships in 1996 to between 1,280 and 2,410 judgeships over this 

period. Although AOC officials said that these previous projections were no 

longer valid, they acknowledged that workloads would continue to 

increase. AOC told us that for budgeting purposes, it was planning for an 8-

percent increase in judgeships by 2006. Although the timing and rate of 

increase in new judgeships remain unclear, it is apparent that the judiciary 

is planning to accommodate growth and replace obsolete facilities in the 

future, as evidenced by its multibillion-dollar courthouse construction 

initiative. 

Related to the cost-effectiveness of further research, AOC also incorrectly 

stated that we acknowledged in our report that such a study would be 

costly. We recognized that data collection for the effort would be timeconsuming because of the lack of data on courtroom use, but we did not 

conclude that such an effort would be too costly to consider. In fact, the 

cost of such a study is unknown because the objectives, scope, and 

methodology have not been determined. And, whether such a study would 

be considered costly would have to be determined within the context of the 

potential savings that may be achieved by building fewer expensive trial 

courtrooms. It is our view that AOC’s reasoning that such research is too 

costly is not supported by facts and analysis and that at least some of the 

data we believe are important could possibly be gathered without incurring 

any or significant additional costs. For example, the judiciary could ask 

court personnel to track courtroom use on a real-time basis for a period of 

time. Such an approach would not require a special, separate study in 

which researchers would have to examine records or interview personnel 

to obtain historical data.

Criteria for Effective 

Courtroom Use 

AOC’s seventh major concern had to do with part of a recommendation 

made in our 1997 report to establish criteria for determining effective 

courtroom use. AOC said that our proposal to establish courtroom use 

criteria is alarming. AOC said that if efficiency was valued more in our 

society than fairness, fewer courtrooms could be built. AOC went on to say 
Page 34 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

that focusing on use and cost of courtrooms may overlook more 

fundamental values and indicated that it is neither possible nor feasible to 

establish a standard for courtroom use. 

AOC’s basis for this concern appears to be its assumption that delays and 

other problems would occur if courtroom usage criteria were adopted. 

However, AOC did not provide any convincing evidence to support its view. 

We are not suggesting, as AOC pointed out, that the judicial system should 

operate under factory-like standards. In fact, we stated in this report that 

efficiency and cost savings should not override considerations related to 

the administration of justice. However, we do not find it unreasonable for 

the judiciary to develop and analyze actual courtroom use data so that 

informed decisions could be made on whether courtroom sharing is 

feasible. As part of collecting and analyzing courtroom use data, it is 

important that criteria be developed to determine what constitutes efficient 

and effective courtroom use so that judiciary officials can consistently 

interpret usage levels and apply an agreed-upon standard to identify the 

number of courtrooms needed to conduct efficient operations without 

compromising effective judicial administration. Establishment of criteria 

would not preclude the use of expert judgment which could be applied to 

empirical data and sound analyses to draw conclusions and determine 

appropriate actions. 

Comments by the 

Chair, Judicial 

Conference Committee 

on Security and 

Facilities

The Honorable Jane R. Roth, Chair of the Committee on Security and 

Facilities of the Judicial Conference of the United States, also provided 

comments on a draft of the report. Ms. Roth said that in her capacity as the 

Chair of the Committee on Security and Facilities, she was familiar with the 

methodologies EY used to analyze the subject of courtroom sharing and 

was satisfied that the consultant’s approach was sound. She went on to say 

that in her view, the recommendations made by EY regarding the 

courtroom needs of active district judges were reasonable. She said that 

given the complexities of the subject of courtroom sharing, she does not 

agree that a matter of such importance to the administration of justice can 

be answered by the collection and manipulation of data. She said that there 

are too many unmeasurable ingredients to achieve the clarity of results or 

the uniform answer that is sought by GAO. She said that she concurred 

with the comments provided by AOC on our draft report. 

We agree that the issue of courtroom sharing cannot be resolved only 

through the collection and manipulation of data. However, we strongly 

believe that the development of actual courtroom data is a critical starting 
Page 35 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

point to fully understanding the issue. That is, knowing how often and for 

what purposes courtrooms are actually used and how the various events 

interrelate would form the basis for further research on the potential for 

courtroom sharing and the application of expert judgment. In our view, it 

seems reasonable for decisionmakers to want information on actual 

courtroom use, especially given the high cost to construct trial courtrooms. 

In fact, in our 1997 report, we pointed out that FJC believed that “it seems 

likely the judicial branch can expect the current pressure for economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness to continue and quite probably to intensify” 

and that “expenditures for features beyond the most Spartan will have to be 

defended with hard data.” Furthermore, FJC proposed major changes to 

the judiciary’s regular data collection “so that the elements, dynamics, and 

effects of court operations can be substantively reported without 

assembling an ad hoc study each time a specific aspect of the system is 

questioned and singled out for scrutiny.” Without better data, it is difficult 

to make informed decisions about the feasibility of courtroom sharing. 

Given this, the debate over courtroom sharing will continue to be based on 

speculation and qualitative judgment that is not based on the 

methodologically sound analysis of empirical evidence. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority 

Members of congressional committees with jurisdiction over the judiciary 

and GSA. We are also sending copies of this report to the Honorable Jane R. 

Roth, Chair of the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Security and 

Facilities; the Honorable John W. Lungstrum, Chair of the Judicial 

Conference’s Committee on Court Administration and Case Management; 

the Honorable L. Ralph Mecham, Director, AOC; the Honorable Jacob J. 

Lew, Director, OMB; and the Honorable David J. Barram, Administrator, 

GSA. We will also send copies to interested congressional committees and 

make copies available to others on request.
Page 36 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

Major contributors to this report were James G. Cooksey, Martin H. de 

Alteriis, David E. Sausville, and Gerald Stankosky. If you or your staff have 

any questions, please contact me on (202) 512-8387 or at 

ungarb.ggd@gao.gov.

Bernard L. Ungar

Director, Physical Infrastructure 
Page 37 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing
Page 38 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

Appendix I

Objective, Scope, and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

Our objective was to determine whether the Ernst & Young (EY) study 

provided sufficient data and analyses to show if, and to what extent, 

courtroom sharing may be feasible. To meet this objective, we obtained and 

analyzed the EY study, with a focus on the parts of the study that pertained 

to courtroom use and sharing, including the executive summary; chapter 

IV, “Assessing the Need for Courtrooms”; appendix A, “Study Approach and 

Methodology”; and appendix B, “Brooklyn Courthouse Case Study.” We 

assessed EY’s interpretation and use of data from our 1997 report and 

examined and tested the mathematical formula EY developed and applied 

to determine whether courtroom sharing was feasible. We used our 1997 

report and research done by other organizations as criteria to evaluate the 

EY study. In focusing on the parts of the study that pertained to courtroom 

use and sharing, we reviewed those elements that were directly related to 

supporting the study’s conclusions and recommendations on courtroom 

use and sharing. These included the mathematical formula EY used to 

examine the potential for sharing, the Brooklyn courthouse example, and 

the qualitative arguments that EY developed to support its positions.

In order to test the EY formula used to illustrate courtroom sharing 

opportunities, we adjusted data from our 1997 report to reflect a measure 

that more closely resembled lights-on use—that is, the number of hours 

judges spent in the courtrooms. We used this measure in EY’s formula to 

determine how it would have affected EY’s results. In our 1997 report, we 

had credited courtrooms with a full day of use when there was any trial or 

nontrial activity, even if it lasted less than an hour. To adjust our data to 

more of a lights-on measure, we were able to remove some of the hours for 

which we were certain that no activity had occurred. Specifically, when 

there were 2 hours or less of nontrial activity, we credited the courtroom 

with 2 hours of use instead of a full day’s use as was done for our 1997 

report. We made this adjustment relying completely on the data available in 

our 1997 report and on the basis of an 8-hour day. This adjustment creates 

more of a lights-on measure, but it still is conservative because it continues 

to contain time with no use because we credited the courtrooms with a full 

2 hours of use even though less than 2 hours of use could have occurred. 

Also, we made no adjustment to the days when there was nontrial time that 

lasted more than two hours but may not have lasted the whole day. In 

addition, we made no adjustment for days when trials took place because 

our data source did not always allow us to determine the actual number of 

hours trials were held each day. 

We reviewed the qualitative information presented in the study, including 

information on issues related to the potential for courtroom sharing and 
Appendix I

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

the Brooklyn, NY, courthouse case study. We examined EY’s conclusions 

and recommendations in relation to the data and analysis presented. We 

interviewed officials from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 

(AOC), Office of Management and Budget, and Congressional Budget 

Office to obtain their views on the EY study and courtroom-sharing issues. 

We also interviewed the EY staff who worked on the study and one of the 

authors of a 1996 Rand Institute for Civil Justice (Rand) study on 

courtroom use. 1

 We reviewed previous studies on or related to courtroom 

use by us, AOC, Rand, and the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) to determine if 

the EY study represented the type of research and analysis that we and 

others have recommended. We also examined AOC’s contract file for this 

study. We did our work between June 2000 and September 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We 

received written comments on a draft of this report from EY, AOC, and the 

Chair of the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Security and Facilities. An 

overall description of these comments and our evaluation are discussed 

near the end of the letter. Appendix III also contains comments on other 

specific points made by AOC.

1

 Terence Dunworth and James S. Kakalik, Research on Courtroom Sharing, Project 

Memorandum, Rand Institute for Civil Justice, PM-598—1-ICJ, September 1996.
Page 40 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

Appendix II

Comments From Ernst & Young ApendxiI

See pp. 22-23.

Now on pp. 6-7.
Appendix II

Comments From Ernst & Young

Page 41 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

See pp. 23-24.

Now on p. 8.

Now on p. 8.
Appendix II

Comments From Ernst & Young

Page 42 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

See p. 24.

See pp. 23-24.

See p. 24.

Now on p. 8.

Now on p. 8.

Now on pp. 19-20.

Now on pp. 19-20.
Page 43 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts ApendxiI

Note: GAO’s comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the 

end of this appendix.

See pp. 26-27.

Now on p. 15.
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 44 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

See pp. 27-28.
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 45 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 46 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

See pp. 28-30.
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 47 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

See p. 30.
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 48 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

See GAO comment 1.

See GAO comment 2.

See GAO comment 3.

See GAO comment 4.
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 49 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

See GAO comment 5.

See pp. 31-32.
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 50 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

See pp. 32-33.
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 51 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

See pp. 33-34.
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 52 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

See GAO comment 6.
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 53 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 54 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

The following are GAO’s comments on AOC’s letter dated November 3, 

2000.

GAO Comments 1. AOC said that our report had the effect of suggesting that GAO began this 

current task with the premise that there was only one valid approach to 

studying the courtroom issue. Our objective was to determine whether the 

EY study provided sufficient data and analysis to show if, and to what 

extent, courtroom sharing may be feasible. As stated in the report, certain 

stakeholders and organizations we identified that have done research in 

this area recognize that existing data and analysis on courtroom use were 

limited and could not resolve the courtroom-sharing debate and that more 

data and analysis were needed. Given this, our focus was to examine the 

study from the perspective of whether it provided this type of data and 

analysis. 

2. AOC said that our report ignored or dismissed without much attention 

significant parts of EY’s analysis. AOC went on to mention EY’s use of a 

study completed in 1998 by the National Center for State Courts that 

demonstrated the unpredictability of trial length. AOC also mentioned the 

difficulty of predicting accurately whether a scheduled case will settle 

before trial. Although we did not specifically mention the National Center 

for State Courts study, we discuss various uncertainties throughout the 

report—such as whether a trial will take place, how long a trial will last, 

and whether an emergency proceeding will require the immediate use of a 

courtroom—that may affect courtroom scheduling. The important issue 

here is that the impact these uncertainties actually have on the need for a 

courtroom is unknown because there is very little data and analysis. For 

example, the judiciary cites predicting trial length as a major uncertainty in 

scheduling courtrooms. However, it has not provided any convincing data 

or analysis showing how this uncertainty would affect a scheduling 

process, especially considering that available data suggest that courtroom 

use is low. As previously mentioned, our data showed that district 

courtrooms we examined were used for trials, on average, less than onethird of the 250 federal work days in 1995 and that the use of courtroom for 

trials varied by location. Also, our data showed that in 1995, at least one 

courtroom in two courthouses was unused every workday of the year.

3. AOC said that EY concluded that “data analysis alone cannot adequately 

assess the effect of courtroom availability on settlement rates, trial delays 

and delivering justice.” AOC said that EY decided to examine “the factors 

that determine how easily judges can share courtrooms, and the potential 
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 55 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

cost and operational impact of courtroom sharing... to establish whether 

courtroom sharing would significantly reduce courtroom construction cost 

and the implications for administration of justice.” We agree that data 

analysis alone cannot resolve the courtroom-sharing issue. However, as 

pointed out in the report, a cost-effective empirical assessment that would 

generate actual courtroom use data and analysis is key to informed 

decisionmaking about the feasibility of courtroom sharing. Without these 

data, it will be difficult to determine more conclusively whether courtroomsharing opportunities exist. 

4. AOC said that our report does not mention Rand’s recognition that 

expert input on the implications for the administration of justice and 

consideration of cost and potential benefits would be major components of 

research on courtroom sharing. AOC said that EY addressed these aspects 

and we did not. AOC also said that EY obtained expert input through 

interviews and focus groups and through observing the impact of 

courtroom sharing in a district and discussing the implication with judges, 

staff, attorneys, and others affected. We disagree that we did not recognize 

many of EY’s efforts in doing its study. We pointed out in our report that 

the EY study was informative and that EY staff, among other things, visited 

federal courthouses, interviewed key stakeholders and judicial personnel, 

and conducted focus groups with judges. Our report also said that EY 

visited 14 locations, observed courtroom use and spoke with users, 

examined calendars, analyzed statistical data and courthouse planning 

documents, conducted interviews with dozens of individuals who had 

different experiences and views, and held focus groups. To address AOC’s 

concern, however, we clarified our report to reflect our point that expert 

judgement is important but that it needs to supplement, not be a substitute 

for, empirically based data and analysis on courtroom use.

5. AOC said that we denigrated EY’s use of the empirical information it 

collected related to the Brooklyn case study. We disagree—our intent was 

to show that EY had reservations about using Brooklyn to assert that the 

problems there were due entirely to sharing. As pointed out in the report, 

we had concerns about EY’s use of the Brooklyn courthouse to illustrate 

that scheduling courtrooms in an actual courtroom-sharing scenario would 

be problematic. We explained that in appendix B of EY’s study, EY points 

out that the Brooklyn facility has been partially demolished in preparation 

for the new courthouse and that it was difficult for EY to determine the 

extent to which operational difficulties were caused by courtroom sharing 

or by inadequate facilities. However, in the body of the study, EY said that 

operational difficulties in the Brooklyn courthouse demonstrated that 
Appendix III

Comments From the Administrative Office of 

the U.S. Courts

Page 56 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

courtroom sharing has been costly to administer in terms of staff time, 

disruptions, and ineffective administration of justice. Given the presence of 

the other variables related to the inadequacy of the facility, it was our view 

that the Brooklyn courthouse may not be a good example for 

demonstrating courtroom sharing feasibility. EY staff we interviewed 

agreed with our assessment, and we stand by our observation. 

6. AOC’s conclusion states that for those who may be largely unfamiliar 

with the judicial process, it seems unquestionably wasteful for judges to 

have dedicated courtrooms. AOC then goes on to present analogies to 

demonstrate why each judge needs a courtroom, comparing the reasons 

judges cannot share courtrooms to the reasons neighbors do not share a 

car and workers do not share phones. AOC’s point is that cars and phones 

are not used full-time, yet it is accepted that they will not be shared 

because of the unpredictable nature of their use. AOC’s reasoning is 

problematic because cars and phones cost much less than courtrooms, 

which EY reported cost $1.5 million each. Furthermore, to use AOC’s 

analogy, if the cars in question were used by public officials and data on the 

use of the cars were comparably as low as available data on courtroom use, 

we believe having one car for two or more officials would be worth 

considering to save taxpayer dollars. This would certainly be a logical 

reason for an organization to maintain a “pool” of vehicles for staff to use 

when needed rather than providing a dedicated vehicle to each person. 

Also, AOC’s observation that it seems unquestionably wasteful to those 

outside the judiciary for judges to have dedicated courtrooms is exactly 

why we believe the judiciary needs better justification for this practice.
Page 57 GAO-01-70 Courtroom Sharing

Appendix IV

Comments From the Chair, Judicial 

Conference, Committee on Security and 

Facilities ApendxiIV

(240411) Letr

See pp. 34-35.
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