[DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 14

- 10356 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 5:13

- cr - 00009

- MTT

- CHW

- 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus JOHN EDWARD BAKER, Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia

________________________ ( February 12, 2015 ) Before MARCUS , JULIE CARNES and FAY , Circuit Ju dges. PER CURIAM: John Edward Baker appeals his conditional guilty plea for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). On

Case: 14-10356 Date Filed: 02/12/2015 Page: 1 of 62 appeal, h e argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppr ess the firearm found inside of his residence. After careful review, we affirm. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual determinations for clear error, and its application of law to the facts de novo

. Uni ted States v. Jordan , 635 F.3d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 2011). We
construe t he facts in a light most favorable to the prevailing party below, and afford substantial deference to the factfinder’s explicit and implicit credibility determinations. United State s v. Lewis , 674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012). We review a district court’s determination of reasonable suspicion de novo

. Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). To enter a residence based upon an arrest warrant, an officer must have a reasonable belief that the subject of the warrant is using the location as a dwelling, and the officer must have a reason to believe that he is within the dwelling. United States v. Magluta , 44 F.3d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1995). A dwelling may be a
suspec t’s residence even if the suspect sometimes lives in other places. United States v. Bennett , 555 F.3d 962, 965 (11th Cir. 2009). We are sensitive to commonsense factors when evaluating the totality of the circumstances to determine whether both prongs of the test are met. United States v. Bervaldi , 226 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2000).

Case: 14-10356 Date Filed: 02/12/2015 Page: 2 of 63 An officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if he has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Griffin , 696 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 2012). The investigatory detention must be justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances. Id . An officer does not exceed the scope of the stop by asking questions if those questions do n ot measurably extend the duration of the stop, even if the questions are unrelated to the initial reason for the stop. Id . at 1362. Reasonable suspicion is a commonsense, nontechnical conception, and is not reducible to a set of legal rules. Ornelas , 5 17 U.S. at 695

- 96. It is met when an officer has a particularized and objective basis to suspect a person of criminal activity. Id . at 696. R easonable suspicion requires less information than probable cause, and the officer’s information may be less rel iable. Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). In assessing reasonable suspicion , w e examine the totality of the circumstances, and give due weight to the officer’s experience. United States v. Briggman , 931 F.2d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1991). Because r easonable suspicion is examined from the position of an objectively reasonable officer, we do not examine whether a specific officer had a reasonable suspicion at the time of the detention. United States v. Nunez , 455 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006). W e’ve said that a n officer is permitted to conduct a warrantless search of a probationer’s

Case: 14-10356 Date Filed: 02/12/2015 Page: 3 of 64 residence when he has a reasonable suspicion that criminal conduct is occurring. United States v. Carter , 566 F.3d 970, 973 (11th Cir. 2009). Here, i t is unclear whe ther the officers’ warrantless entry into Baker’s residence was justified as a probation search since the officers did not know that he was a probationer when they entered the residence. We nevertheless affirm the denial of Baker’s suppression motion base d on the district court’s alternate conclusion that the officers were permitted to enter Baker’s residence to serve an arrest warrant against Tiffany Gordon. See United States v. Caraballo , 595 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that w e may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the record )

. A s the record reveals, a n informant told the officers that Gordon had lived at Baker’s residence, and one of the officers personally knew that Gordon moved to different residences for short periods of time. The informant confirmed that Gordon was inside the residence, and an officer saw Gordon inside the residence before enter ing . Th us , the officers had sufficient information to reasonably believe that Gordon was residing with Bak er and was present at the residence. Magluta , 44 F.3d at 1533. The officers’ temporary detention of Baker was also constitutional because it was based on a reasonable suspicion that he was harboring a fugitive. The record shows that when an officer asked Baker if Gordon was at the house, Baker did not

answer. When the officer asked if anyone was at the house, Baker lied and said

Case: 14-10356 Date Filed: 02/12/2015 Page: 4 of 65 that he was not sure whether anyone was present. After Baker was restrained, he was told that a warrant was outstanding for Go rdon, but he did not tell the officers that Gordon was at the house. Based on the officers’ observations that multiple people were inside the house and one officer ’s sighting of Gordon, the officers could have reasonably suspected that Baker was harboring Gordon when they detained him. See 18 U.S.C. § 1071 (criminalizing the concealment of a person with an arrest warrant after the defendant is given notice of the warrant). Moreover, b ecause the detainment was justified, the officers were permitted to
que stion Baker about unrelated matters that did not lengthen the detention, including his probation status. Griffin , 696 F.3d at 1362. Finally, the officers’ second search of the house

-- for the firearm

-- was a valid probation search. At that point, the officers were aware of Baker’s probationary status, as well as the probation conditions (including a consent to searches) that he had agreed to after his conviction on state drug charges . Thus, because the officers knew about his prob ationary status and his search condition , they only needed reasonable suspicion to search Baker’s house for the firearm. Carter , 566 F.3d at 973. The record reveals that Gordon had informed one of the officers that Baker had a silver firearm , thus giving the officers reasonable suspicion that Baker illegally possessed a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (criminalizing possession of a firearm if the owner has been convicted of felony).

Case: 14-10356 Date Filed: 02/12/2015 Page: 5 of 66 Accordingly , the second search of Baker’s residence was constitutional, and the district court did not err by denying Baker’s motion to suppress the firearm. AFFIRMED

. 1

1 In addition, Baker’s Motion for Bail Pending Disposition of Appeal is DENIED.

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