AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

On the Wings

of the White Eagle

Poland’s Air Force Reform and

Modernization, 1989–2001

PAMELA J. WOLOSZ

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 18

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

October 2004
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

versity, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any othe

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series ar

available electronically at the Air University Research

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU

Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wri

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and S

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of 

best” student research projects from the prior academ

year. The ACSC research program encourages our stude

to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their o

professional development and in “advancing air and sp

power.” The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate 

pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airm

Projects selected for publication combine solid resear

innovative thought, and lucid presentation in exploring w

at the operational level. With this broad perspective, 

Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrin

technological, organizational, and operational questio

Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar pr

lems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind 

pursuing new possibilities. By making these research st

ies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to 

courage critical examination of the findings and to stimul

further research in these areas.

RONALD R. LADNIER

Brigadier General, US

Commandant

iii
Preface

As a student in early 2000 at the Defense Systems M

agement College (DSMC), Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, I became 

terested in understanding how the newest North Atlan

Treaty Organization (NATO) members procured weapo

systems. I wondered how they would transform their f

mer Warsaw Pact militaries and weapons systems to c

tribute to the NATO alliance. I centered my research 

Poland, which I admired first for its Solidarity movem

that toppled the Soviet-controlled establishment, and s

ondly, because Poland strongly supported NATO memb

ship. Did the country with the greatest will to be a stro

NATO member have a good plan to modernize its milita

Using research opportunities at DSMC, I found there w

a void of information about Poland’s acquisition and m

ernization processes—no formal processes existed. T

led me to dig deeper for answers as an Air Command a

Staff College (ACSC), Maxwell AFB, Alabama, student d

ing academic year 2000–2001.

I owe thanks to my research advisor Dr. Matth

Schwonek, ACSC, for helping me focus my research a

giving me fine doses of encouragement during the writ

of the paper. I could not have completed this paper wi

out outstanding Air University librarian Diana Simps

who quickly and cheerfully responded to my numerous 

quests for information. Lt Col (P) Peter Podbielski, Uni

States Army, chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, Am

can Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, offered plenty of fir

hand insight into the Polish air force’s journey of mode

ization and reform. He is the real expert in this area a

has my admiration for charting a potential acquisit

process for the Polish military. Finally, I thank Dr. Rich

Muller, ACSC, for reviewing my paper and suggesting 

provements. I give my sincere appreciation to all.

v
Abstract

In 1989 years of Soviet control over political, econom

and military systems had left Poland unprepared to sig

icantly contribute to NATO. However, Poland accepted 

challenge of building a capable air arm for NATO as 

began to reform its political system, modernize its 

force, and strengthen its economic system to support 

force modernization. This research paper analy

Poland’s progress in implementing these reforms and 

grounded in three themes: (1) the political progress of 

forming the civil-military structure, (2) the econom

progress of reforming Poland’s defense budget and defe

industry to support air force modernization and, (3) 

military’s progress in modernizing its air force weapo

This study does not provide specific solutions but inst

gives a general understanding of the long road Poland h

embarked upon to transform itself from a Soviet satel

into a valued, all-around NATO contributor.

Poland’s attempts at political reform have mostly s

ceeded, whereas its economic reforms have failed to s

port air force modernization. Air force modernization 

stymied behind a series of plans much too ambitious to 

implemented within the country’s unstable defen

budget. Poland is, however, investigating more econom

ways to modernize its air force such as leasing an inte

modern-fighter capability. The speedy incorporation 

Poland into NATO may be followed by years, if not decad

of continuing military and economic reform to lift Pola

to the level of NATO partnership of which it dreams.

An afterword is included to inform readers of signific

changes in Poland’s defense posture and potential air fo

modernization between the time this paper was origin

researched in 2001 and its publication in 2004.

vii
Introduction

The winds of change blew swiftly. The accession of th

countries into NATO in March 1999 was an unpreceden

Western welcome to the new democracies of the Republi

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. That the blan

of NATO protection now falls over these three countries 

amazing considering that a little over 10 years ago, they w

members of NATO’s nemesis, the Warsaw Pact.

Unfortunately, the once-swift winds of change have sla

ened in bringing these countries up to NATO standards fr

a political, economic, and military perspective. The years 

Soviets controlled the political, economic, and military s

tems have left these countries unprepared to contribute 

nificantly to NATO. Poland, a proud country that has h

torically desired to be a contender on the world sce

willfully accepted the challenge of providing NATO with 

strong air arm. In order to succeed, it began three crit

tasks: (1) reforming its political system to embrace a b

anced civil-military relationship; (2) modernizing its Pol

Wojska Lotnicze (Polish air force) to contribute to NATO m

sions; and (3) strengthening its economic system to su

ciently support air force modernization.

The following analysis of Poland’s progress in imp

menting these reforms to cement NATO membership 

grounded in three themes: (1) the political progress of 

civil-military structure as expressed in Poland’s guid

documents such as its constitution and national secu

strategy; (2) the economic progress of Poland’s defe

budget and defense industry to support air force moder

zation; and (3) the military progress in modernizing its 

force for NATO. This paper does not offer specific solutio

but instead provides a broad brushstroke of the comp

political, economic, and military issues surrounding Polan

contribution to NATO and its Western allies. The inten

to provide a general understanding of the long road Pola

has traveled in its transformation from a Soviet satellite 

a country determined to become a valued, all-around c

tributor to NATO. We owe this understanding to our n

partner in an alliance that ensures peace and stability 

Europe.

1
Poland’s Politics, Economy,

and Military in 1989

Poland was one of the first Warsaw Pact countries 

emerge from Soviet rule under which it had been chaf

since the end of World War II. Polish citizens were ne

faint of heart in voicing their discomfort with the situati

In 1956, worker riots in the western city of Poznan for

the Polish government to direct the Soviet-led Polish ar

to restore order.1 In 1970 the Poles expressed dissatisf

tion with Communist government control by rioting o

food prices.2 Finally, the last blow to Soviet rule came 

the early 1980s when a cohesive group of trade unio

(Solidarity) led strikes in the country’s industrial cente

The government declared martial law in December 1981 

restore order to the disrupted functions. The Polish Co

munist Party revealed its bankruptcy and relinquished 

power to the Polish military, commanded by Gen Wojci

Jaruzelski, to enforce martial law.3 The Communist Pa

was never able to regain its lost authority. Unpreceden

“roundtable” discussions between Solidarity leaders a

the Polish government opened the door to the collapse 

Communism and military rule. The rise of democracy th

followed with free Senate and limited Sejm (Polish par

ment) elections in 1989.4

The end of the Cold War ended Soviet control of Pola

and voided the Warsaw Pact. The newly elected Polish g

ernment, led by conservative president and 1983 No

Peace Prize recipient Lech Walesa, thus sought to real

itself with Western political, military, and economic s

tems to reinforce its independence. As Poland soon disc

ered, a country’s political, military, and economic syste

are intertwined. Fixing one of the systems requires the o

ers to be aligned and healthy. In 1989 the three syste

were extremely out of kilter with the Western styles and 

liefs the Poles sought to emulate.

The new political situation was one never witnessed 

Polish history. Although Polish “republics” had existed 

the past, they were never true democratic republics. In 

seventeenth century, the elite class enjoyed a liberum v

whereby a single representative to the parliament, or Se

could nullify a decision despite majority consensus.5 Int
war parliaments were weak and did not always repres

the values and concerns of the common citizen. In fa

Poles held the parliament, the state administration, a

the judiciary system in low esteem.6 Despite those feelin

the number of political parties grew during 1989–91 fr

one, the Polish Communist Party (PZPR), to almost 30.

is unclear whether direction from a legislative branch w

so many political parties can be anything but muddled a

fragmented. Whatever the case, the Poles emerged fr

Communism politically challenged.

At the end of Communist rule, the military was a vest

of Soviet rule. Extremely politicized and unaccustomed 

civilian control, it was flush with outdated Soviet weapo

systems but limited in funds to employ and/or maint

them. Military doctrine under Soviet control was one 

massive offensive forces and firepower pointing tow

Central Europe to engage the Western threat.8 In fact, 

Polish army was the second largest in the Warsaw P

with approximately 450,000 personnel.9 The military a

acted as an arm of the centralized political system to 

sure Party control. Joseph Stalin set this doctrinal conc

in motion when he purged the post–World War II Pol

military and put a Soviet officer in control of the Pol

army.10 In addition to acting as chief of the armed forc

this Soviet officer also assumed the position of ministe

defense. In Western regimes this is usually a civilian po

tion that is established to maintain a system of checks a

balances between the military and civil government.11 T

aspect of Communist-era doctrine allowed the Soviet g

ernment to quell the actions of the Polish populace aim

at toppling state government. This guidance culminated 

the military enforced the 1981–83 martial law against 

Solidarity uprising. At that time, the military became 

ultimate political tool when the Communist Sejm elec

General Jaruzelski as president. He became head of 

military as well as the civilian executive body.12 The Po

had to eliminate the strong political influence of the m

tary in hopes of NATO accession.

Poland’s economy reflected Communist control, requ

ing many reform measures to support a free market. It w

solidly agricultural—dependent on the owners of sm

outdated farms. The country’s state-owned industries 
lied on heavy, inefficient, smoke-belching factories such 

steel and chemical manufacturing that were not au

mated or computerized.13

The in-place formal economy was divided into two d

tinctly different economies. An informal economy of b

tering, hoarding, and under-the-counter transactio

filled gaps left by the formal economy that was riddled w

shortages. Swirling around this Soviet-based economy w

the economic burden of an extensive social safety 

common to Communist countries. Regardless of the da

aging effect to the economy, the government provided sh

ter, employment, and health care to the Polish peopl

Based on agriculture, inefficient industry, and ramp

bartering, Poland’s economy needed a strong dose of 

form before it could fund the military transformation n

essary for NATO accession.

In 2001 the government, a coalition of “post-Communis

from the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Polish Pe

ant Party (PSL), was in the hands of Pres. Aleksan

Kwasniewski and Solidarity Electoral Alliance (AWS) me

ber Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek. This government has 

shied away from pushing Poland’s political, economic, a

military reforms. Politically, it ratified Poland’s 1997 c

stitution; militarily, it presided over Poland’s 1999 acc

sion into NATO; and economically, it eagerly pursued 

next victory—membership into the European Union (E

in 2003.15

The Proud Tradition of Polish Airpower

Airpower in Poland was born before Communist con

stifled the country. Its history is steeped in proud tradit

and surprising prowess dating to a time before World W

I when Poland was partitioned between Russia, Prus

and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As early as 1910, Po

from the Russian-controlled partition were complet

pilot training in France.16 World War I offered Polish pil

a chance to hone their combat flying skills and airm

ship. The Poles flew aircraft donated by the French g

ernment as World War I drew to a close, and the pa

tioned Poland became the Republic of Poland.17 Polan
aviation-glory days peaked during World War II. Althou

the Germans overwhelmed the Polish air force in the ea

days of the Nazi invasion, Polish pilots based in Fra

and then England flew throughout the war. These pil

flew over 105,000 operational sorties and destroyed 7

enemy aircraft.18 Finally, during the Communist era, 

Poles fell under the wings of the Soviets. As such, Pol

military aviators trained in Soviet-designed aircraft to 

hold the Warsaw Pact against the Western threat.

Tradition tells of not only a capable and sometimes o

standing air force but also an aviation industry suited 

producing weapons systems of foreign designs. The earl

Polish aviation plants maintained only foreign-design

foreign-built aircraft. In the early 1920s companies su

as the Central Aviation Workshop, Warsaw, the Krak

Workshops, Kraków, and the Lwów Workshops, Lwów, fou

their niche by repairing imported Fokkers, Breguets, a

Balilas aircraft.19 By the mid-1920s, two Polish compan

bought licenses for the French Potez and Hanriot aircr

resulting in the production of a high-quality aircraft.

The budgetary drawdown typical of the interwar period 

the aircraft industry hard and resulted in cancelled orde

Subsequent consolidation of the private, independent fac

ries and workshops resulted in nationalistic, governme

controlled entities. Following World War II, the Soviets 

sumed control of Poland’s aviation industry. By the ea

1950s, Stalin effectively continued the tradition of limit

organic Polish military aircraft designs by halting all n

Polish aircraft initiatives except for a Polish-design

trainer. Instead, Polish aircraft factories, renamed transp

equipment manufacturing centers (WSK), focused on build

Polish variants of another country’s design. For examp

WSK-Mielec built the LiM-5, a Polish variant of the M

17.20 The Poles obtained licenses to produce the Sov

designed YAK-12M utility plane and the Mi-1 helicopter. T

Polish aviation industry’s success in manufacturing forei

designed aircraft is best exemplified by WSK-Mielec beco

ing the world’s sole source for the Soviet-designed A

Colt utility biplane. Jerzy Cynk, official historian of 

Polish Air Force Association, notes that the Polish aviat

industry was a leader within the Warsaw Pact, produc

10,000 aircraft from 1950 to 1970.21
Despite its strength in the midst of the Communist e

the Polish aviation industry at the end of Communist r

was adept only at building variants of Soviet designs a

selling its wares to a captive Warsaw Pact market. Th

inefficient aviation plants survive, dependent on nation

zation. The plants probably cannot support the extens

present-day modernization of the Polish air force at a r

sonable cost.

Poland’s Air Force Today

Poland’s air force merged with the air-defense forces a

the end of the Cold War to form the Wojska Lotnicze i Obr

Powietrznej (WLOP), or air and air-defense forces.22 This n

structure established a more simplified command and c

trol (C2) system for homeland defense. The WLOP enco

passes air forces, air-defense forces, and early-warning ra

forces. The bulk of the WLOP force counters airborne atta

The 2d Corps covers the northern section of Poland, wh

the 3d Corps covers the south. Each is independent of 

other’s fighter and bomber units, missile units, C2 forc

and logistics support. Commander-in-chief of the WLOP

Gen Andrzej Duleba, is responsible for protecting Pola

from air attack and protecting “regrouping forces, convo

and sea bases.”23

As of 1 January 1999, 43,000 soldiers—of whom 17,2

were professionals—filled the ranks of the WLOP.24 T

force structure includes 282 combat aircraft, 146 trai

aircraft, 95 troop helicopters, 38 air-defense missile un

and 260 mobile radar stations.25 The WLOP’s inventory 

Soviet-combat aircraft testifies to its former Warsaw P

membership. The most advanced fighter is the MiG

Fulcrum, an all-weather, medium-range, air-to-air figh

The MiG-21 “Fishbed” is a light fighter-interceptor; ho

ever, the WLOP uses the Fishbed only for pilot training a

will retire it in the near future.26 The WLOP flies the Su

fighter-bomber in air-to-ground missions. All combat 

craft entered the WLOP inventory in the 1980s except 

MiG-21, which first appeared in the 1960s. In addition 

combat fighters, the WLOP also flies jet and turbo-p

trainers and transports.
Even under an improved organizational structure co

bining air and air-defense forces, the WLOP margin

meets its mission of homeland air defense. More imp

tantly, obsolescence and lack of interoperability prev

the WLOP from contributing significantly, if at all, to NA

operations across the operational spectrum from det

rence to precision air strikes. Even the most advan

fighters, the MiG-29 and Su-22, require basic global po

tioning system (GPS) and identification, friend or foe (I

upgrades before NATO can even consider them poten

assets.27 On top of that, training on these aircraft is d

couragingly low. In 1999 Polish pilots averaged only 

training hours per year, compared to the NATO standard 

180 hours annually.28

The condition of Poland’s political, economic, and milit

affairs in 1989 foretold that air force modernization wo

not happen in a matter of months or even years but perh

in a matter of decades. However, the Poles staunchly push

forth with reforms despite a lack of precedence for tra

forming a Communist, Warsaw Pact country into a dem

cratic, NATO country.

Success: Creating the Basis

for National Defense

Poland’s governments from the end of the Cold War 

the present have never doubted the necessity of becom

a NATO member. In an unprecedented show of solidar

nearly the entire gamut of Polish political parties s

ported the ratification of the NATO membership treaty 

1999.29 Polish citizens also supported NATO access

with a 72-percent approval rating as of January 1996

Working toward a goal of NATO integration, presidents 

diverse as right-of-center Lech Walesa and leftist Aleksan

Kwasniewski supported democratic reforms leading to 

improved civil-military relationship.

Underlying Documents

After considerable debate, President Kwasniewski sig

his country’s governing constitution on 16 July 1997.31 T

document closed the chapter on Communism and open
the door to democracy. The new constitution establis

freedoms such as those found in the US Bill of Righ

freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right of 

sembly. From the military perspective, Poland’s constitut

defines the powers of the president over the military. T

democratically elected president holds the position 

supreme commander of the armed forces in peacetime a

executes this function through the minister of defe

(MOD). The president also appoints a prime minister. 

times of war, the president names a supreme commande

the armed forces with the recommendation of the pri

minister. However, the prime minister rather than the pr

dent names the cabinet, or council of ministers, includ

the MOD. The council of ministers is important becaus

formulates the annual government budget, including tha

the defense ministry. The legislative body of Poland’s rep

lic is a democratically elected parliament made up of 

lower body, or Sejm, and the upper body, Senate. This b

formulates laws for the military, such as legislation gove

ing the length of service of conscripts. These elected offic

provide legislative checks and balances normal to a democra

One of the newest documents underpinning governm

reform is the Security Strategy of the Republic of Pola

adopted on 4 January 2000. This document replaced 

Tenets of the Polish Security Policy and Security Policy and 

fense Strategy of the Republic of Poland from (Secu

Strategy) 1992. These documents were sorely in need of 

placement because they did not reflect Poland’s NATO me

bership. Their emphasis was on the solitary defense of 

homeland versus the collective defense found under 

NATO umbrella. This updated Security Strategy recogni

that Poland has no external threat and focuses on the d

trine of defense with a small standing army versus the Co

munist doctrine of offensive mass with a large army. T

document also recognizes global threats such as the pro

eration of weapons of mass destruction, economic threa

terrorism, refugee flow, environmental disasters, and 

gional conflicts, especially from its neighbors to the east.

Although Poland reserves the right to maintain its s

ereignty and territorial integrity, it links its own security 

the NATO alliance and the European community. The 

curity Strategy outlines Poland’s desire to integrate w
NATO via “active participation in developing the Organi

tion’s political and strategic decisions and full military 

tegration.”32 The Security Strategy also calls for the gove

ment to maintain, restructure, privatize, and modernize 

national-defense industry in order to accomplish “full in

gration.”33 Additionally, stressing the need for a stable s

tem for planning and financing the procurement of weap

systems similar to the US Department of Defense’s Pl

ning, Programming, and Budgeting System, today Pola

lacks such a system. The process described in the Secu

Strategy is based on a six-year program that will “ren

the forces interoperable, as soon as possible, with NA

structures, and to gradually bring them up to the allianc

organization and technological standards.”34 Ten ye

after the Cold War, the underlying constitution and se

rity strategy mark Poland as a democratic nation wit

modern military doctrine.

Poland’s Civil-Military Relationship

Given the politicization of the military under the form

Communist regime, the democratic Polish government 

compelled to reform its civil-military relations as early 

possible to gain acceptance into NATO. Civilian contro

the military is important in establishing strategic secu

goals that reflect the interests of the newly democra

country and provide the budget necessary to achieve th

goals. Civilian control provides stability and legitimacy 

military actions and defense.

Although the 1997 constitution provides the guiding str

ture for presidential responsibilities, it does not outline auth

tative responsibilities of other civilian positions such as 

MOD. In addition, political and military cultures historic

prevented sound civil-military relationships. Civil-milit

control is an old problem that dates back to the 1920s.3

the recent past, confusion reigned as leaders tried to unt

gle the incongruity of the responsibilities of the ministry 

defense, who answers to the Sejm and the responsibilitie

the president, who is the supreme commander. In 1994 m

ters between then-Pres. Lech Walesa and Sejm-suppor

MOD Piotr Kolodziejczyk flared as they both vied for dir

control of the military.36 A serious crisis ensued and resul
in the fall of Prime Minister Wlademar Pawlak and his gove

ment. The ascent of leftist President Kwasniewski produce

more consolidated approach to civil-military control. 

though his government passed the Law of the Office of 

fense Minister in 1996, civil-military relations remain an 

going problem.37 As late as September 2000, Defe

Minister Bronislaw Komorowski railed against the lack 

necessary laws to “conclusively resolve” the problems of “

overall command of defense.”38

The relationship between the MOD and the chief of 

general staff has also traveled a rocky road and rema

unresolved. In the early 1990s, reform of the civil-milit

relations resulted in separation of the civilian and milit

branches of the defense ministry.39 This separation led 

a struggle between the chief of the general staff and 

MOD as to where command functions lie. The current ch

of the general staff Brig Gen Czeslaw Piatas believes 

law is in his favor and defines his roles as commande

the armed forces on behalf of the MOD. On the other ha

Defense Minister Komorowski believes he commands 

armed forces through the chief or with his assistanc

Whether the general staff is a planning organization, as 

defense minister believes, or a command organization 

the chief believes, the debate is a distraction from press

military issues such as air force modernization.

The final piece in the civil-military relationship puzzl

the Sejm. As a democratically elected legislative body, 

Sejm should support a stable, realistic, long-term defe

policy through its National Defense Committee. Instead, 

Sejm has left military direction to the MOD.41 In late 19

Sejm speaker Maciej Plazynski blamed previous Sejms 

relying on either the ministry of defense or the Polish g

eral staff to draft all defense-related laws.42 This is a wo

some sign, showing its lack of maturity and parliament

expertise about military issues. 

Disappointment: The Long Road

to Air Force Modernization

Despite the radical changes within the political struct

accommodating the NATO partnership, Poland’s air force h
not changed much in the past decade. Although Pola

promised NATO it would modernize much of its air and a

defense forces, the defense budget currently does not s

port such an ambitious program. Despite Poland’s search 

creative ways to obtain modern aircraft without breaking 

meager budget, the end of the road in 2001 was not in sig

The Defense Budget:

Room for Modernization?

Facing overwhelming odds, Poland’s economy has gro

at a comfortably impressive rate of approximately 5 perc

annually since its transformation from central control to f

market.43 Poland has made great progress in growing a 

brant economy due in part to the shock-therapy treatm

also known as the “Economic Transformation Program,” 

by Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz in the early year

the new Polish Republic. Under this program, the Po

painfully stabilized the ex-Communist economy and int

duced market-driven mechanisms.44 Also during this tim

the Poles focused on reforming domestic matters such 

health care, education, social security, and the transpor

tion infrastructure instead of addressing military modern

tion issues.45 However, in an action that continues to d

the Polish economy down, the Polish state maintained c

trol of many troubled industries such as the defense a

steel industries. Politicians foresaw a much more politic

unappealing outcome by privatizing these ailing econom

sectors. For example, up to 18,000 defense-factory wo

ers, or 28 percent, stand to lose their jobs under defen

industry privatization.46 Until the Polish government dive

itself of inefficient industries, it will continue to bolster th

with money better used for air force modernization.

Although Poland enjoyed the fastest economic growth 

the Central European region from 1995 to 1999, the grow

has not been sufficient to fund air force modernization

fact, the 2001 defense budget is only 1.95 percent of 

gross domestic product—less than the 2 percent guida

specified in the “Strategy for the Defense of the Polish 

public” and recommended by NATO and less than the 3 p

cent target set by 1995 legislation.47 Defense modernizat
is an even more insignificant percentage of the total defe

budget. For example, the 2000 defense budget targets o

10.7 percent of defense funds for modernization, includ

procurement and research and development (R&D).48 The

fore, out of only $350 million available for modernizati

just $52.4 million was earmarked for R&D.49 Military p

sions and personnel spending absorb the bulk of the bud

Pensions accounted for 26.6 percent, and personnel accoun

for 32 percent of the total expected expenditures in the 20

defense budget.50

During 2001 the chief of the general staff recognizes t

budgetary constraint but does not advocate further red

tion in troops to fund modernization programs. He did 

want to cut below 150,000 soldiers—the minimum num

needed to fulfill the armed forces’ NATO and domestic se

rity goals.51 Raiding the military pension funds to bols

modernization funding would be political folly as well.

In comparison to military expenditures of other NA

countries, Poland’s per capita expenditure ranks near 

bottom. In 1998, Poland spent less than half per capita 

military expenditures than Spain, a NATO country of roug

the same population. Poland ranks between the other 

new NATO members from Eastern Europe—the Czech 

public and Hungary—for military expenditure per cap

Considering Poland must not only maintain but also m

ernize its forces, its defense budget is very lean in contras

other NATO countries.

Poland’s Defense Industry

A thriving in-country defense industry could fuel m

ernization of Poland’s air force. An efficient, productive 

fense industry is important in many respects. First, fore

companies seeking to sell modern aircraft to Poland wo

have more flexibility and options to partner with inter

tionally competitive Polish defense contractors if the Po

boasted such qualifications as contemporary tooling a

computerized work planning. These options run the gamu

cooperation in contractor/subcontractor relationships a

R&D partnering, to a license agreement allowing Polish 

craft manufacturers to produce foreign-designed aircr

in Poland. For years Poland’s defense contractors h
successfully produced foreign-designed weapons system

For example, Poland manufactured many Soviet-design

weapons systems, including the T-72 tank and the An-2 

craft.52 However, the British have more recently been at 

forefront of Western countries instituting some of these pa

nering concepts. The Polskie Zaklady Lotnicze (PZL) aviat

plant in Mielec, Poland, produces parts for the British Ae

space Hawk jet-trainer.53 One of the Polish army’s prim

procurements, a 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer, 

be manufactured under license in Poland but will be ba

on the British AS90 Braveheart’s design.54 In 2001 Defe

Minister Komorowski had invited Britain and all other in

ested countries to partner with Polish industry by licensin

foreign design for a modern wheeled armored fighting veh

(AFV) to be manufactured in Poland.55

Poland must modernize its aircraft industry to succe

fully compete in the international marketplace. In 19

31 of 90 Polish factories producing defense articles form

the core of the organic industrial base.56 More importan

in 2001 only six companies currently meet world technol

standards.57 The Polish Council of Ministers recogni

the need to upgrade these outdated facilities and th

manufacturing processes by supporting the Defense a

Aircraft Industry Transformation Program: 1996–2010

The Defense and Aircraft Industry Transformation Fu

established by the program of the same name, provided 

nancing for factory and process modernization. Its int

was to kick-start the aircraft industry out of the vicio

cycle of not attracting customers because of its ine

ciency, which generated no income to update factories 

attract new customers. It is unclear whether this fu

benefited Poland’s aircraft industry, since as late as 19

high pressure was on the Polish government and minis

of defense to create another national defense industry fu

and to award military modernization contracts to indi

nous defense plants. For example, the Solidarity and A

Poland Alliance of Trade Unions orchestrated defense 

dustry labor strikes calling for increased governm

orders for Polish-produced arms and denouncing the g

ernment’s “lack of support for defense plants.”59 In ad

tion, two-thirds of Poland’s defense plants were deeply 

debted, owing more than $245 million.60 A major aviat
plant, PZL-Mielec, declared bankruptcy in 1998 and 

ceived $10 million in new capital from the Polish gove

ment to continue operations.61

Ministry of defense leadership is acutely aware of the 

gency to transform not just the aviation industry but a

the entire defense industry into a competitive sector of 

Polish economy. In 1999 then-Defense Minister Jan

Onyszkiewicz stressed restructuring and privatization 

keys to a viable Polish defense industry. However, the 

tial pain of privatization has rendered the minister’s 

tions ineffective. Not impervious to political pressu

Onyszkiewicz personally visited a firearms plant in cen

Poland in 1999 to deliver the news of a contract award 

the Lucznik steel firm versus a foreign company.62 Ho

ever, the steel firm had been struggling financially for so

time. This contract may merely prolong the governm

lifeline to an unhealthy company that’s virtually “hang

on by a thread.”

Fear of privatization is hindering the aviation indust

conversion to a modern industry. Unlike many of the sm

to midsized companies the Polish government and the in

national community helped transform to privately owned 

tities, the aviation industry remains in the shadow of 

Communist era as a state-controlled entity.63 The state p

vides a sustaining lifeline to these companies, exemplified 

the $10 million government bailout of PZL-Mielec. Prod

tion orders generated by Poland’s aircraft-modernization p

gram will unlikely generate enough business to keep all 

aviation plants alive. At the height of the Cold War, Polan

aviation industry approached an output of 1,000 aircraft 

year.64 However, after the collapse of its Warsaw Pact trad

partners and a decrease in defense spending around 

world, Poland’s aviation industry could no longer succe

fully compete in the global aviation market.

In late 1999 the Polish government took its first step 

privatize the aviation industry when it passed two laws. T

first law supports defense industry privatization, while 

second law, enacted on 10 September 1999 and known 

the Offset Act, supports offset requirements for foreign m

tary-equipment purchases.65 The first law allows defe

companies to write off privatization costs. In addition, it t

gets government profits from the sale of defense plants 
fund R&D, promote Polish weapons systems to foreign m

kets, and procure modern Polish-made weapons system

The law is not a fire sale—the government is planning 

maintain ownership of seven defense plants.66 Despite ex

ing legislation to ease the Polish defense industry’s privat

tion, neither the government nor the defense industry h

made any substantial progress. The Sejm’s defense comm

tee is worried that up to 80 percent of Polish defense wo

ers could retire, retrain, or simply become unemployed d

to restructuring.67 Once the Polish government and the 

fense industry deal with the initial pain and the surviv

plants are competitive and capable, the defense indust

future will be secure.

The Offset Act directly generates contracts for the defe

industry. It requires foreign companies entering into milit

supply and equipment contracts with Poland to also en

into contracts to provide offsets at least equal to the valu

the original contract to the Polish defense industry or ot

Polish industry.68 The act applies to contracts worth m

than five million Eurodollars.69 Poland awarded its first 

set contract in November 2000—probably a result of 

law’s direct benefits to the defense industry and the rela

ease of enforcement.70.

Air Force Modernization Plans

The lack of modernization funds and a healthy defense 

dustry require the defense ministry to develop a coher

plan to best use its limited assets. Shortly after political 

form, Polish leaders adopted a string of reform packages 

guide the structure and priorities for the military. Struct

1992 and Armed Forces 2010 attempted to set policy and t

gets for military reform.71 However, they were unrealistic 

their scope and thus, not widely accepted. Next came Ar

2012: The Foundation of the Modernization Program for 

Armed Forces 1998–2012 (Army 2012).72 This document 

vided priorities for modernization and acquisition into 11 ca

gories, including aircraft and helicopters and also gui

changes to the budgetary process and the defense industr

Eventually the government expanded Army 2012 to inclu

65 NATO target-force goals of 1998.74 However, the Po
were too optimistic with their forecasted defense budgets a

Army 2012 seemed to be in a coma, if not dead. In ea

2000, the Defense Affairs Committee of the council of min

ters determined the Army 2012 goals for 2000 were too a

bitious and the defense budget too small to fund many of 

projects.75

Despite the problems with Army 2012, the Poles h

not given up formulating modernization plans. The lat

modernization plan as of 2001 was The 2001–2006 P

gram for the Development of the Armed Forces (Six-Y

Plan). Using A Strategy of Public Finance and Econo

Growth for Poland in 2000–10 as a financial foundati

this plan covers the years 2001–06 and is in step wit

similar NATO plan to meet additional NATO target-fo

goals.76 The Six-Year Plan prioritizes requirements, est

lishes milestones, programs resources to meet objectiv

and provides guidance for modernization of the arm

forces. Among the designated projects are multirole fig

ers, data-link and satellite communication, strategic air

and computer-aided exercise capability.77 In 2001 Defe

Minister Komorowski characterized the plan as “allow

us to stop dreaming and start real life.”78 This plan stan

out from former defense plans thanks to an unpreceden

associated law to guarantee funding for the program’s 

tire six years instead of one year at a time.79 Howev

given the fiscal realities of austere budgets, out-year fu

ing must be substantial if the Six-Year Plan is to beco

more useful than discarded plans of the past.

Air Force Modernization Alternatives

Poland’s air force modernization program is a reflection 

the military, economic, and political realities discussed 

this point. Militarily, to fulfill Poland’s desire to recapture 

pride of its early air force days and to hold its head h

among the ranks of NATO nations, air force modernization 

a must. The Poles retired the minimally capable MiG-23 

1999, and the MiG-21 is slated for retirement.80 Additiona

the Su-22 and the MiG-29 require modernization to comp

on today’s battlefield. The Poles promised NATO they co

supply NATO-compatible fighters for the NATO rapid react

force by 2003.81 Although Edgar Buckley, chairman 
NATO’s Defense Review Committee, applauded Poland for 

“complete” political integration into NATO, he stressed 

country has a long way to go before military integration 

satisfactory.82 Gen Joseph Ralston, NATO Supreme Al

Commander Europe in 2001 communicated directly to 

Polish leadership his concern that defense spending is “

low” to properly modernize the armed forces.83

Economically, Poland’s desire to participate in NAT

doctrine of engagement at all levels of conflict is limited 

its shoestring budget. Therefore, Poland’s air force m

use creative, relatively inexpensive methods to jump-st

its modernization process such as loans, credit, leasi

offset manufacturing, and surplus weapons. Some of 

new methods are already being integrated into the Pol

air force’s sister services. In June 2000, the United Sta

delivered one of two surplus Oliver Hazard Perry-cl

guided missile frigates to the Polish navy; the frigate is 

first navy vessel to be fully compatible with NATO.84 T

United States granted the Poles the ships according to 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.85 In addition, Germa

has offered to lease its Leopard tanks to the Polish arm

Lastly, the Polish navy has been searching for a couple 

secondhand submarines to replace its obsolete Foxt

class subs. France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sw

den are potential sources for the submarines.87

In its attempt to inexpensively procure modern, ma

tainable fighter aircraft, the ministry of defense in 20

planned to lease fighters from another country as an 

terim solution until funds to procure technologically 

vanced aircraft such as the Joint Strike Fighter are av

able. Leasing is an effective way to attain capability quic

with little up-front cash. But, depending on the terms 

the lease, leasing is usually more expensive over time th

outright purchasing. The Poles were not always conte

plating leasing. The Polish government gave the legal af

mation to begin full-scale modern, multirole aircraft p

curement as early as 1995.88 However, funding to supp

this political decision never materialized. Promises o

shiny new Polish air force melted away under a stream 

rhetoric as yearly attempts to procure a new fighter fo

failed due to lack of funding.
The Poles are attempting to pull together an interim 

force that will meet NATO demands until 2012, when 

purchase of the latest-model fighter is more economically 

alistic. The first step in this process keeps Su-22 and M

29 aircraft flying and makes them interoperable with NAT

In September 2000, WLOP commander General Duleba 

nounced the WZL-2 depot in Bydgoszcz would manag

structural-life-extension program for 98 Su-22s to keep th

flying until 2015.89 Part of the Su-22 force may undergo 

pensive upgrades to its avionics, communications, data li

radar, and munitions capabilities. WZL-2 has also upgra

approximately half the MiG-29 fleet with IFF and GPS equ

ment. Germany’s DaimlerChrysler Aerospace offers a sta

of-the-art radar, fire-control, electronic warfare and life-

tension program for the MiG-29.90 However, the program 

potentially cost prohibitive for the Poles, who are merely 

ing to keep their jets in flyable condition. 

Besides hanging on to their MiG-29 and Su-22 capabil

the Poles are contemplating filling out their fighter force w

12 to 16 Western jets using a lease concept. The two fro

runners in this competition were surplus F-16 A/B mo

aircraft from Lockheed-Martin and the JAS-29 Gripen fr

a British Aerospace/Saab concern. The ministry of defe

originally set the cost of the lease at $72.5 million just 

the year 2001.91 However, the Sejm included only $2

million in the 2001 budget to initiate the multirole fight

lease.92 “Inexpensive” alternatives such as leasing or acce

ing surplus weapons systems usually have hidden co

in the required infrastructure to support these weapo

systems, as well as in training, facilities, and logistics. 

portedly, the F-16 lease offered the actual airframes at 

cost; however, refurbishment and pilot/maintenance tra

ing costs could reach $250 million over five years.93

Politically, air force modernization is a divisive is

within the Polish government. Finger-pointing, favoritis

and false starts surround the interim fighter-select

process. Because Poland does not have an established 

quisition process, politicians heavily influence the biddi

For example, Defense Minister Komorowski in 2001 

clared the F-16 offer as the only one being considered 

the Polish government.94 A radical leftist political week

Nie, grumbled the defense minister was planning to “trick 
European partners” by “luring them with bids and civili

procedures whilst quietly settling a deal with the Uni

States.”95 As such, the government was lining up on opp

ing sides: The SLD and the president favored the Grip

while the ministry of defense favored the F-16.96

Other political influences on an interim fighter lease co

not from within Poland but from without. As a membe

the EU, Poland may be forced to maneuver within the c

straints of a common European defense procurem

agency, similar to the already-established Organisme C

jointe de Cooperation en Matiere d’Armament, or OCCA

whose members are France, Germany, Italy, and Britain

The EU may affect the fighter competition before Poland 

even a member. In 2001 Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek c

firmed that a decision on the interim fighter-aircraft p

chase would take EU accession negotiations into accoun

Sweden, who was offering the JAS-29, coincidentally h

the EU presidency for the first half of 2001.

Military realities of an aging fighter force, the economic 

alities of an empty defense budget, and political infighting 

well as contractual restrictions to aid the defense indus

keep the White Eagle from rising to become a respec

power on the battlefield. Poland was quick to recognize 

need for modernization but has been slow to implement 

difficult solutions that are necessary.

Conclusion

Poland dreams of becoming a strong NATO partner po

cally, economically, and militarily. However, its attem

have met with more disappointments than successes. T

Polish people set out early to become a strong NATO mem

and, politically, they have succeeded. The 1997 constitut

reflects the desires of the country to become a contender 

the Western democratic arena. Despite ongoing differen

between the ministry of defense and the general staff, 

Polish government created a sound civil-military relations

whereby the defense minister and president guide the milita

However, Poland has not become a strong modern milit

partner in NATO with a solid defense budget to support t

strength. The force structure of the armed forces, the 
force in particular, is deteriorating under a series of pl

that are too ambitious and lack a stable defense budget. T

current Six-Year Plan is a concerted effort for the Pol

government to finally make good on its promises to mode

ize the air force. Yet, the 2001 budget is lower than previ

years and indicates the Six-Year Plan may end up as 

overly ambitious plan that is eventually discarded. St

control of the plodding, burdensome military-aviation ind

try is dragging down a sector that, if forced to privatize, co

emerge as a self-sufficient, income-producing industry. 

compensate for disappointments in the slow progress m

toward increasing the budget for modernization of the 

force, Poland is looking for innovative ways to make the b

of the situation. They are investigating economical ways 

modernize the air force such as leasing an interim mode

fighter capability. 

There are many long-term implications for Poland’s s

cessful reform and modernization. For the first time in ma

years, Poland’s future seems secure and free from threat

invasion or external political control. A reformed and mod

Polish air force will further stabilize the Eastern European 

gion if neighboring countries judge Poland capable of a

quate homeland defense. In addition, Poland’s air force 

gain respect within NATO as a contributor, not as an inef

tive air force. The Polish success with military, economic, a

political reform will legitimize acceptance of former Wars

Pact countries into NATO. Using the Polish experience a

template, the next group of candidates for NATO may th

vicariously learn of promising programs as well as poten

pitfalls of realigning with NATO and Western democracies

the end, Poland must be honest with itself, its people, a

NATO about what reforms and modernization it can acco

plish quickly. If not, it will gain a reputation of “empty pro

ises” from which it may never recover.

The seemingly speedy demise of Communism was actu

a result of several decades of Cold War realities. Likewise, 

seemingly speedy incorporation of Poland into NATO may 

followed by years, if not decades, of continuing military a

economic reform to bring Poland to the level of NATO partn

ship that it dreams of.
Afterword

On 27 December 2002, Poland took a giant step forw

toward the modernization of its air force by announcing 

intent to sign a contract to purchase 48 F-16 aircraft fr

the US manufacturer Lockheed Martin Corporation. In t

single, surprising move, Poland overcame two import

hurdles blocking their advanced fighter buy; first, a $

billion US loan provided the cash to finance the repla

ment F-16s for Poland’s aging MiG fighters, and seco

Lockheed Martin designed its team around Polish subc

tractors, suppliers, and developers, thus allowing a large 

nancial offset back to the Polish economy.

On 18 April 2003, the Polish government signed a $3.5 

lion contract, sealing their unprecedented rapid leap forw

to modernize its air force and become a true contributor 

NATO and its Western allies. This is an amazing leap forw

given the status of the Polish air force modernization at 

time of this paper’s original writing. For additional inform

tion, see (Leslie Wayne, “Polish Pride, American Profi

www.nytimes.com, 12 January 2003; and Tribune Ne

Services, “Deal Struck to Buy F-16s for $3.5 Billion,” Chic

Tribune, 19 April 2003).

Notes

1. Andrew A. Michta, The Soldier-Citizen: The Politics of the Polish A

After Communism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 33.

2. Jerzy J. Wiatr, The Soldier and the Nation: The Role of the Milita

Polish Politics, 1918–1985 (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1988), 1

3. Frances Millard, The Anatomy of the New Poland: Post Communist 

itics in Its First Phase (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1994), 56

4. Ibid., 62.

5. Wiatr, Soldier and the Nation, 33.

6. Millard, Anatomy of the New Poland, 27.

7. Ibid., 115.

8. Dale R. Herspring, “Civil-Military Relations in Post-Commu

Poland; Problems in the Transition to a Democratic Policy,” Commu

and Post-Communist Studies 33, no. 1 (March 2000): 72.

9. Eugeniusz Jendraszczak, “The Structuring of the Polish Ar

Forces in a Defensive Strategy,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studie

no. 4 (December 1995): 757.

10. Wiatr, Soldier and the Nation, 108.

11. Michta, Soldier-Citizen, 33.

12. Wiatr, Soldier and the Nation, 175.

13. Millard, Anatomy of the New Poland, 24.
14. Ibid., 27.

15. Leszek Balcerowicz, “Poland’s Transformation,” Finance and 

velopment 37, no. 3 (September 2000): 16.

16. Jerzy B. Cynk, History of the Polish Air Force 1918–1968 (Read

England: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1972), 3.

17. Ibid., 5.

18. Jerzy B. Cynk, “Dedication and Motivation: 80 Years of Pola

Air Force,” Air Pictorial 61, no. 3 (March 1999): 148.

19. Cynk, History of the Polish Air Force, 39.

20. Ibid., 242.

21. Ibid., 246.

22. Cynk, “Dedication and Motivation,” 150.

23. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland; CD-ROM (Wars

Bellona Publishing House, 1999).

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Gen Czeslaw Piatas, interviewed by Radio Zet, 24 January 20

in FBIS [Foreign Broadcast Information Service] Report: East Eur

EUP20010124000116, 5 March 2001, n.p.

27. LTC (P) Peter Podbielski, chief, Office of Defense Cooperat

Warsaw, Poland, telephone interview by author, 8 February 2001.

28. Dr. Paul Latawski, The Transformation of the Polish Armed For

Preparing for NATO (London: The Royal United Services Institute for 

fence Studies, 1999), 49.

29. “Poland’s Buzek: Main Political Forces Back NATO Entry,” Po

News Agency PAP, 11 March 1999, in FBIS, FTS19990311001844

March 1999, 1.

30. Polish Attitudes Toward Poland’s Integration with NATO: Find

based on CBOS Polls, 1993–1996, 1997, 1; 1 March 2001, http://w

msz.gov.pl/english/nato/cbos1993 1996.html.

31. Poland’s 1997 Constitution: Summary of Key Provisions.

32. Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 4 January 2000, 8

January 2001, http://www.msz.gov.pl/english/polzagr/security/se3.h

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Joseph Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup d’Etat (New York: Colum

University Press, 1966).

36. Herspring, “Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Poland,” 

37. Andrew A. Michta, America’s New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and 

Czech Republic in NATO (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999)

38. Bronislaw Komorowski, “I Am Fighting for a Good Program,” Po

Zbrojna, 22 September 2000, in FBIS, EUP20000922000424, 1 March 2

16–18.

39. Michta, America’s New Allies, 51.

40. Krystyna Romanowska, “A Tanker and a Humanist,” Zycie, 24 

vember 2000, in FBIS, FBIS-EUP20001124000393, 7 February 2001, 4

41. LTC (P) Peter Podbielski, chief, Office of Defense Cooperatio

author, e-mail, subject: AFSC RFI Response, 5 February 2001.

42. “Sympathy Instead of Empty Promises,” Polska Zbrojna, 24 Dec

ber 1999, in FBIS, FTS20000105001138, 1 March 2001, 3–6.
43. Podbielski interview.

44. Balcerowicz, “Poland’s Transformation,” 14.

45. Podbielski interview.

46. Dr. Eugene Kogan, “Polish Defense Industry: Slow-motion Shake

Interavia 56, no. 649 (January 2001): 17.

47. “Trybuna 29.12,” 2 February 2001, http://www.wp.mil.pl/engl

news.

48. Ministry of National Defence (MoND), Basic Information on 

MoND Budget for 2000 (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense Press 

Information Office, 2000), 13.

49. http://www.xe.com; used to convert zloty currency to US doll

On 17 March 2001 the exchange rate was $1 US = 4.14 zloty. Original 

ures were 1.46 billion zlotys and 217 million zlotys, respectively.

50. Basic Information on the MoND Budget, 14.

51. Maria Wagrowska and Janusz Grochowski, “A Difficult Balan

Polska Zbrojna, 14 November 2000, in FBIS-EUP2001114000282, 14 

vember 2001, 5–7.

52. Ibid.

53. Leszek Zmijewski, “New BAe Contract for Mielec,” The War

Voice, 24 October 1999, 7 October 2000, http://www.warsawvoice.c

pl/v574/Busi05.html.

54. Wojciech Luczak, “Stop Dreaming and Start Real Life,” Mili

Technology 24, no. 8/2000 (August 2000): 23.

55. Ibid.

56. Elzbieta Firlej et al., Estimated Cost of NATO Enlargement: A 

tribution to the Debate, 17 January 2000, http://www.polishworld.c

polemb/nato/end.html.

57. Zofia Sobiepanek, Defense Modernization, US Dept. of Comme

Market Access and Compliance, 1 March 2000, http://www.mac.

gov/eebic/countryr/poland/market/defense.htm.

58. Firlej et al., Estimated Cost of NATO Enlargement.

59. “Solidarity, OPZZ Launch Protests over Defense Industry,” Po

News Agency PAP, 5 May 1999, in FBIS-EEU-1999-0505, 6 May 1999

60. Michta, America’s New Allies, 66.

61. Kogan, “Polish Defense Industry,” 18.

62. “Polish Defense Minister: Army to Use Polish Weapons,” Po

News Agency PAP, 14 October 1999, in FBIS-EEU-1999-1015, 1.

63. United States General Accounting Office, Poland: Economic Res

turing and Donor Assistance NSIAD-95-150 (Washington, D.C.: Governm

Printing Office, 1995), 48.

64. Cynk, History of the Polish Air Force 1918–1968, 246.

65. “Poland: Sejm Passes 2 Defence Industry-Supporting Laws,” P

News Agency PAP, 12 September 1999, in FBIS-EEU-1999-0912, 1.

66. “Poland Adopts Bills on Defense Industry Restructuring,” Po

News Agency PAP, 22 June 1999, in FBIS-EEU-1999-0623, 1.

67. Ibid.

68. Grzegorz Holdanowicz, “Polish Air Bases to Get Radar Upgra

International Defense Review 33, no. 11 (November 2000): 12.

69. Andrzej Szumanski, “Defence Offset in Poland,” Military Techno

24, no. 8/2000 (August 2000): 35.
70. Holdanowicz, “Polish Air Bases to Get Radar Upgrade.”

71. Latawski, Transformation of the Polish Armed Forces, 37–38.

72. Michta, America’s New Allies, 51.

73. Latawski, Transformation of the Polish Armed Forces, 51.

74. Michta, America’s New Allies, 51.

75. Z.L., “How to Spend NATO Funds?” Rzeczpospolita, 4 Janu

2000, in FBIS-EEU-2000-0104, 14 January 2000, A2.

76. Maj Ryszard Choroszy, “A Vision without a Picture,” Polska Zbro

24 December 1999, in FBIS-FTS20000105001138, 1 March 2001, 3–6.

77. Podbielski interview; and Luczak, “Stop Dreaming and Start 

Life,” 21.

78. Luczak, “Stop Dreaming and Start Real Life,” 21.

79. Lentowicz, “Antitank Cut,” Rzeczpospolita, 11 December 2000

FBIS-EUP200012130000161, 7 February 2001, A5.

80. LTC (P) Peter Podbielski, chief, Office of Defense Cooperatio

author, e-mail, subject: Research Paper Review, 24 March 2001.

81. Grzegorz Holdanowicz, “Poland in Bid to Lease F-16s from U

Jane’s Defense Weekly 34, no. 16 (18 October 2000): 4.

82. “Poland: NATO Defense Committee Reviewing Progress of Mili

Reform,” Polish News Agency PAP, 28 June 2000, in FBIS, EUP20000

000223, 1 March 2001, 1.

83. “NATO Commander says Polish Defence Modernization Spen

Too Low,” Polish News Agency PAP, 23 January 2001, in FBIS, EUP

10123000160, 5 March 2001, 1.

84. “Poland Seeks to Update Its Submarine Force,” International 

fense Review 33, no. 8 (August 2000): 4.

85. To Authorize the Transfer of Naval Vessels to Certain Foreign C

tries, 106th Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 1908.

86. Lentowicz, “Antitank Cut,” A5.

87. “Poland Seeks to Update Its Submarine Force,” 4.

88. Luczak, “Stop Dreaming and Start Real Life,” 23.

89. Grzegorz Holdanowicz, “Poland Extends Service Life of Fighter 

craft,” Jane’s Defense Weekly 34, no. 10 (6 September 2000): 16.

90. John Fricker, “NATO Compatibility Needs Fuel Eastern Europ

Upgrades,” Overhaul and Maintenance VI, no. 7 (September 2000): 7

91. Luczak, “Stop Dreaming and Start Real Life,” 23.

92. TS, “Negotiations in the Shadow of Gripen,” Gazeta Polska

February 2001, in FBIS, EUP20010221000252, 1 March 2001, 6.

93. PW, “In Default of 100 Million Zlotys; F-16 Will Not Fly to Pola

Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 November 2000, in FBIS, EUP20001121000217

February 2001, 5.

94. Robert Rochowicz, “The Loop,” Polska Zbrojna, 12 November 2

in FBIS, EUP20001113000044, 14 February 2001, 16–17.

95. Marek Baranski, “Government is Lying,” Nie, 26 October 2000

FBIS, EUP20001024000241, 1 March 2001, 1.

96. TS, “Negotiations in the Shadow of Gripen,” 6.

97. Philip Butterworth-Hayes, “EU Common Defense Procurem

Nears,” Aerospace America (December 1999): 4.

98. TS, “Negotiations in the Shadow of Gripen,” 6.