IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ALBERT L., 

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, B.T., 

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0126 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD37099

The Honorable Karen Mullins, Judge Retired

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Rideout Law PLLC, Tempe

By Steven Dorr Eckhardt, Wendy Marcus

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson

By Jennifer R. Blum 

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 4-19-2022
ALBERT L. v. DCS, B.T.

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION 

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge David B. Gass joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Albert L. ("Father") appeals from the superior court's order

dismissing him from dependency proceedings after finding that DNA 

results rebutted a presumption of paternity created by his signed 

acknowledgment of paternity under A.R.S. § 25-814(C). Because we hold 

the superior court lacked statutory authority to disestablish Father's 

paternity, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Erica Y. ("Mother") gave birth to a child in 2012, and, 

according to Father, he cared for the child as his daughter until these 

proceedings began. In 2014, Father and Mother filled out an 

acknowledgment of paternity ("AOP") and submitted it to the Arizona 

Department of Health Services' Office of Vital Records. Father and Mother 

used an official AOP form from the Arizona Department of Economic 

Security but left blank the box titled "Soc. Sec. No." under "Father's 

information." Nonetheless, the Office of Vital Records accepted the AOP 

and placed Father's name on the child's birth record.

¶3 In 2019, Mother and Father were arrested and incarcerated, 

leaving no one to care for the child. The Department of Child Safety ("DCS") 

then filed a dependency petition. In its original petition, DCS 

acknowledged that Father had "established his paternity . . . by 

acknowledgement of paternity."

¶4 Later that year, the child's guardian ad litem ("GAL") asked 

the superior court to order Father to submit to a paternity test, and the court 

eventually granted that request. Based on the test results, in October 2019, 

DCS moved to set aside the AOP, remove Father's name from the child's 

birth record, and dismiss him from the dependency. The GAL joined the 

motion, and Father objected. The court set an evidentiary hearing on the 

issue, which was delayed more than a year for various reasons. 
ALBERT L. v. DCS, B.T.

Opinion of the Court

3

¶5 After the hearing, the court ruled the AOP lacked the force 

and effect of a judgment under A.R.S. § 25-812(D), but nevertheless denied 

DCS's motion. In its order ("November 2020 order"), the court reasoned 

that, because Father failed to include his Social Security number as required 

under § 25-812(A)(1), the AOP created only a rebuttable presumption that 

he was the child's father under A.R.S. § 25-814(A)(4). 

¶6 DCS then moved for a judicial determination of competing 

paternity presumptions under A.R.S. § 25-814 and for an order removing 

Father from the child's birth record and dismissing him from the 

dependency. The GAL joined the motion, and Father objected. After 

another evidentiary hearing, the court found that DCS had rebutted 

Father's presumption of paternity by clear and convincing evidence 

("March 2021 order"). The court then dismissed Father from the 

dependency but declined to order Father removed from the child's birth 

record. Father appealed. 

¶7 On appeal, this Court requested, and received, supplemental 

briefing about the superior court's subject-matter jurisdiction to disestablish 

Father's paternity in the absence of a competing claim to paternity. We have 

appellate jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-235.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Father raises several challenges to the superior court's March 

2021 order. Dispositive here is Father's argument that the court erred in 

disestablishing his paternity under A.R.S. § 25-814(C) without a concurrent

claim to establish paternity in another individual.

1

I. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.

¶9 Father asserts that the superior court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction to enter the orders regarding his paternity. He argues that legal 

actions to determine paternity are governed by Title 25 ("Marital and 

Domestic Relations") and, if no party seeks to establish paternity, those 

actions may not be raised in a dependency pending under Title 8 ("Child 

Safety"). We disagree with Father's jurisdictional argument.

1 Because we resolve the appeal based on the March 2021 order, we 

need not address Father's arguments pertaining to the November 2020 

order. See Schwab v. Matley, 164 Ariz. 421, 422 (1990) (stating where one 

issue is dispositive, a court need not reach other issues presented on 

appeal).
ALBERT L. v. DCS, B.T.

Opinion of the Court

4

¶10 Subject-matter jurisdiction "refers to a court's statutory or 

constitutional power to hear and determine a particular type of case." State 

v. Maldonado, 223 Ariz. 309, 311, ¶ 14 (2010). It is not synonymous with a 

"court's inability to enter a valid judgment," see Ader v. Estate of Felger, 240 

Ariz. 32, 44, ¶ 42 (App. 2016), but rather is "the power to deal with the 

general abstract question, to hear the particular facts in any case relating to 

this question, and to determine whether or not they are sufficient to invoke 

the exercise of that power," Sil-Flo Corp. v. Bowen, 98 Ariz. 77, 81 (1965)

(quoting Foltz v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 60 F. 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1894)).

¶11 Here, the superior court's jurisdiction was properly invoked

once DCS filed for a dependency. See A.R.S. § 8-202(B) ("The juvenile court 

has exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings brought under the 

authority of this title except for delinquency proceedings."); A.R.S. § 25-801 

("The superior court has original jurisdiction in proceedings to establish 

maternity or paternity."). And, because it had jurisdiction, the superior 

court had authority to rule on a paternity matter relevant to the 

dependency. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JD-05401, 173 Ariz. 634, 641 

(App. 1993) ("A juvenile court may determine issues under Title 25 that are 

properly before it if its jurisdiction has been properly invoked."); see also 

Peterson v. Speakman, 49 Ariz. 342, 348 (1937) (noting the superior court is 

one court, and "[t]he jurisdiction of the court . . . is that of the whole court, 

and not of one judge nor division thereof"). The court had the power to 

hear the general abstract question of paternity.

II. Statutory Authority.

¶12 Because the superior court had subject-matter jurisdiction, the 

question is whether the superior court lacked authority under A.R.S. § 25-

814 to issue the March 2021 order. Any order that exceeded the court's 

statutory authority would be voidable. See State v. Bryant, 219 Ariz. 514, 

518, ¶ 14 (App. 2008) ("[A]n order is voidable, rather than void, when the 

trial court has subject matter jurisdiction but errs in issuing an order."). 

¶13 This Court reviews issues of law, including statutory 

interpretation, de novo. David C. v. Alexis S., 240 Ariz. 53, 55, ¶ 8 (2016). 

Our primary task is to give effect to the legislature's intent. See Redgrave v. 

Ducey, 251 Ariz. 451, 456-57, ¶ 22 (2021). We apply the plain wording of the 

statute when it is clear and unambiguous. Andrew R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. 

Sec., 223 Ariz. 453, 457, ¶ 16 (App. 2010). We also "seek to harmonize and 

attain consistency among related statutory provisions in the context of the 

overall statutory scheme." Id.
ALBERT L. v. DCS, B.T.

Opinion of the Court

5

¶14 In the dependency proceedings, DCS made allegations that 

may ultimately justify terminating Father's parental rights. However, the 

superior court dismissed Father from the dependency proceedings solely 

based upon its finding that DCS "presented clear and convincing evidence 

under A.R.S. § 25-814(C) to rebut the presumption under A.R.S. § 25-

814(A)(4) that [Father] is the father of the Child." Section 25-814(A) states 

that a "man is presumed to be the father of the child if . . . [a] notarized or 

witnessed statement is signed by both parents acknowledging paternity" or

"[g]enetic testing affirms at least a ninety-five per cent probability of 

paternity." Section (C) then states the following:

Any presumption under this section shall be rebutted by clear 

and convincing evidence. If two or more presumptions 

apply, the presumption that the court determines, on the 

facts, is based on weightier considerations of policy and logic 

will control. A court decree establishing paternity of the child 

by another man rebuts the presumption.

¶15 DCS responds to Father's argument that the superior court 

erred in disestablishing his paternity by arguing that Father "never 

established paternity" under A.R.S. § 25-812. While A.R.S. § 25-812(C) and

(D) provide that a completed and filed AOP has the same force and effect 

as a superior court judgment, DCS's argument fails because it presumes 

Father's only claim to paternity was through the "force and effect [of] a 

judgment" under § 25-812. One may also "establish" paternity under § 25-

814. See A.R.S. § 25-401(4) ("Legal parent does not include a person whose 

paternity has not been established pursuant to [A.R.S.] § 25-812 or 25-814");

McLaughlin v. Jones, 243 Ariz. 29, 36 (2017) (noting a "presumptive father 

under § 25-814(A)(1) must pay child support unless clear and convincing 

evidence shows 'paternity was established by fraud, duress or material 

mistake of fact.'" (emphasis added) (quoting A.R.S. § 25-503(F))). Thus, 

whether the court lacked authority to disestablish paternity pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 25-814 does not turn on whether Father had established paternity 

via a judgment under A.R.S. § 25-812 or a rebuttable presumption of 

paternity under A.R.S. § 25-814(A)(4).

2

2 Father filed the AOP in 2014. If it were entitled to the force and effect 

of a judgment under A.R.S. § 25-812, it could be challenged "only in 

exceptional circumstances, such as fraud on the court." Johnson v. Edelstein, 

252 Ariz. 230, 231-32, ¶ 2 (App. 2021) (citing A.R.S. § 25-812(E)). Because 
ALBERT L. v. DCS, B.T.

Opinion of the Court

6

¶16 Because testing only showed that Father was not the genetic 

parent, DCS has not established any competing presumption. See A.R.S. 

§ 25-814(A)(2) (providing that a man is presumed to be the father of a child 

if "genetic testing affirms at least a ninety-five per cent probability of 

paternity" (emphasis added)). Thus, the issue is whether, in the context of 

a Title 8 dependency proceeding, A.R.S. § 25-814(C) authorizes the superior 

court to disestablish Father's paternity in the absence of a competing claim 

of paternity and solely based on the results of Father's paternity test. DCS

argues that A.R.S. § 25-814(C) applies because the statute specifies a 

procedure a court should follow "if two or more presumptions apply," and 

implicitly acknowledges the court's authority to rule in a situation in which 

there is no other claim to paternity and no competing presumption. We 

agree that the language of A.R.S. § 25-814(C) contemplates circumstances in 

which there may be only one paternity presumption as between two 

paternity claims. That does not mean, however, that DCS's interpretation 

is correct. 

¶17 DCS focuses on the word "if" in A.R.S. § 25-814(C), but that 

language must be read "in the context of related provisions and of the 

overall statutory scheme" with a goal of achieving consistency among 

related provisions. Goulder v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 (App. 

1993), aff'd, 179 Ariz. 181 (1994). As part of the context, we will consider "a 

contemporaneous preamble or statement of purpose and intent . . . even 

where the text is not ambiguous." Redgrave, 251 Ariz. at 457, ¶ 22. Title 25's 

express purpose is "[t]o promote strong families" and that "absent evidence 

to the contrary, it is in a child's best interest . . . [t]o have substantial, 

frequent, meaningful and continuing parenting time with both parents" and 

"[t]o have both parents participate in decision-making about the child." 

A.R.S. § 25-103(A)(1), (B); see also McQuillen v. Hufford, 249 Ariz. 69, 72-73, 

¶¶ 10-11 (App. 2020) (noting in the context of Title 25 proceedings, "the 

legislature has unambiguously expressed a preference for finality in 

paternity determinations — however obtained"). 

¶18 Statutes within Title 25 enable individuals to assume the legal 

duties of parenthood while gaining fundamental protections under the law. 

See A.R.S. § 8-531(4), (5) (listing rights and responsibilities of a legal 

custodian of a child); McLaughlin, 243 Ariz. at 36, ¶ 29 ("A primary purpose 

of the marital paternity presumption is to ensure children have financial 

support from two parents."); Steward v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 227, 229 

we find for Father on other grounds, we need not decide whether the AOP 

in this case satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 25-812. 
ALBERT L. v. DCS, B.T.

Opinion of the Court

7

(App. 1989) (noting parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care,

custody, and management of their child). Consistent with that purpose, 

Title 25 confers on the superior court "original jurisdiction in proceedings 

to establish maternity or paternity." A.R.S. § 25-801 (emphasis added); see 

also A.R.S. § 25-806 (requiring petitions to commence paternity proceedings 

to allege "the respondent is the father of the child or children"). The use of 

the word "establish" is repeated in several other provisions in Chapter 6 of 

Title 25, entitled "Maternity and Paternity Proceedings." See, e.g., A.R.S. 

§§ 25-802; -803(A), -807(A). 

¶19 Disestablishing a person's paternity in the absence of a 

competing paternity claim and solely based on a negative paternity test is 

the very opposite of A.R.S. § 25-801's express directive conferring 

jurisdiction on the superior court to "establish" paternity. "Context is a 

primary determinant of meaning." State v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, CV-21-0134-

PR, --- Ariz. ---, ---, ¶ 14 (April 5, 2022) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 

Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012)). Thus, § 25-

814(C) must be construed to promote the establishment of paternity and 

resolve competing claims of paternity. Authorizing a court to disestablish 

paternity in the manner attempted here, by rebutting a long-standing 

presumption without a competing paternity claim, is inconsistent with the 

context and purpose of the statutory scheme.

¶20 In Title 8, the legislature created a detailed structure under 

which DCS, or an individual, may terminate the rights of a parent that a 

court has found to be unfit. Interpreting A.R.S. § 25-814(C) as DCS suggests 

would allow termination where a parent is the only father the child knows 

and has cared for a child for years, without any inquiry into parental fitness

or the child's best interests.

3 While DCS has made serious allegations 

regarding Father's unfitness, we express no opinion on the merits of the 

underlying dependency proceedings. Those allegations must be 

adjudicated in manner that complies with due process. See Santosky v. 

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that a parents' fundamental liberty 

interest in the care, custody, and management of their children "does not 

evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost 

3 If we adopted DCS's interpretation, a mother who knows that her 

husband or ex-husband is not the child's biological father could use Title 25 

and DNA testing to disestablish long-standing paternity, without any 

showing of parental unfitness or regard for the child's best interests. We 

presume the legislature did not intend such a result. See Patches v. Indus.

Comm'n, 220 Ariz. 179, 182, ¶ 10 (App. 2009) (encouraging courts to 

construe statutes to avoid "absurd or unconstitutional results").
ALBERT L. v. DCS, B.T.

Opinion of the Court

8

temporary custody of their child to the State"); Alma S. v. Dep't. of Child 

Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 13 (2018) (stating that a court must find 

termination of parental rights will be "in the child's best interests" such that 

"(1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if 

severance is denied"); Pima Cnty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 

Ariz. 86, 93 (1994) ("[P]arents with an existing parental relationship, either 

in fact or law, are entitled to the highest constitutional protection.").

¶21 Accordingly, we hold that, within a Title 8 dependency 

proceeding initiated by DCS, A.R.S. § 25-814(C) does not authorize the 

superior court to disestablish an individual's long-standing presumptive 

paternity based solely on a negative paternity test and in the absence of 

another competing paternity claim. 

CONCLUSION

¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the superior court's 

March 2021 order disestablishing Father's paternity and dismissing him

from the dependency. We remand this case for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.