* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-31099

Summary Calendar

LARRY C. WALTERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

RUBICON INCORPORATED; R.H. LANE; LEONARD B. SANFORD;

JOHN DELANEY,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Middle District of Louisiana

(95-CV-1927)

May 14, 1997

Before JONES, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Larry Walters (“Walters”) appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment to defendant-appell ee Rubicon, Inc. on

his Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim. Walters argues

on appeal that his high blood pressure condition, which wasa ggravated due to stress related to his job, constituted a

disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), and thus under the ADA, his

employer Rubicon, Inc. was obligated to provide him with reasonable

accommodation.

We review orders granting summary judgement de novo

, employing

the same standards as the district court. G uillory v. Domtar

Indus., Inc.

, 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996). In order to

demonstrate a violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must show (1) that

he suffers from a disability; (2) that he is qualified for the job;

and (3) that an adverse employment action was taken against him

because of his disability. R izzo v. Children’s World Learning

Ctrs, Inc. , 84 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 1996).

To demonstrate a disability under the ADA, a plaintif f must

demonstrate a (1) physical or ment a l impairment substantially

limiting one or more major life activitie s, (2) a record of such

impairment, or (3) that the plaintiff is regarded as having such an

impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

In order to show a substantial limitation in working , there

must be an impairment significantly restricting the performance of

a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. See

Bridges v. City of Bossier

, 92 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.

denied

, -- U.S. --, 117 S. Ct. 770, 136 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1997);

Weiler v. Household Finance Corp.

, 101 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir.

1996); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) & (i). Walters’ condition

did not co nstitute a disability under the ADA. In this case,Walters’ only restriction on work was an inability to work with his

stress-inducing supervisor. Thus, without an inability to perform

a class or broad ra nge of jobs, he did not present the requisite

disability. S ee Weiler

, 101 F.3d at 525 (cit ing cases) (if a

plaintiff “can do the same job for another supervisor, [he] can do

the job, and does not qualify under the ADA.”) In addition, high

blood pressure, where not the source of limitations on “major life

activities,” as required by the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), is not a disability. O swalt v. Sara Lee Corp.

,

74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1996).

Walters did not demonstrate a disability under either of the

alternative criteria. Walters did not present a record of

disability, nor did Rubicon regard him as having a disability.

Rather, it indicated a concern about his well-being. See Ellison

v. Software Spectrum, Inc. , 85 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1996).

Walters failed to demonstrate a disability, the first of the

three requirements necessary to an ADA claim, and we AFFIRM the

district court.