In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-3389

SHAQUILLE GRIFFIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RICHARD BELL,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 09-cv-06549—Arlander Keys, Magistrate Judge.

ARGUED JUNE 1, 2012—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 4, 2012

Before FLAUM, ROVNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Shaquille Griffin, a Chicago

public high school student, sued Richard Bell, a

Chicago police officer who was working as a security

supervisor at Griffin’s school, for using excessive force

in arresting Griffin. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A jury rejected

Griffin’s claim and found in favor of the officer. Griffin

seeks a new trial, asserting that the district court conducted a flawed jury selection process and erred in excluding certain evidence. We affirm.
2 No. 11-3389

The record does not reveal whether the uniform violation 1

was the sole reason that Griffin was sent home. According to

testimony at trial, Griffin was sent home approximately thirty

minutes after arriving at the school.

The other security officer was busy restraining Griffin’s 2

brother and two friends who tried to join the scuffle, and

thus was unable to assist Officer Bell in arresting Griffin.

I.

On November 1, 2007, Griffin, a freshman at Corliss

High School, arrived at school wearing blue jeans, a

jacket and a baseball cap. Corliss has a dress code that

requires students to wear white shirts and black pants

and so Griffin was told to go home. According to 1

Officer Bell, as he accompanied Griffin out of the school,

he asked Griffin to remove his hat. When Griffin did not

comply, Officer Bell removed Griffin’s cap, and handed

it to him. Griffin put the hat back on, and Officer Bell

removed it again, this time telling Griffin that he would

return the hat when they reached the exit. At that

point, Griffin struck Officer Bell in the face with his

left hand. When Griffin attempted to hit Officer Bell a

second time, a second security officer grabbed Griffin’s

arm. Officer Bell then told Griffin that he was under

arrest, and managed to get one handcuff on Griffin

before Griffin began to struggle with Bell. The struggle 2

continued for approximately twenty or thirty minutes

before Officer Bell managed to get the second handcuff

on Griffin. Other police officers then led him away.

At trial, the second security officer, a teacher-librarian,
No. 11-3389 3

3 At his deposition, Griffin testified that he was in uniform

when he arrived at the school. After reviewing a short video

of the incident prior to the trial, Griffin changed his story.

We address the video infra.

and a third security guard corroborated Officer Bell’s

version of the events.

Griffin told the jury a very different story. At trial, he

acknowledged that he was not in compliance with

the dress code that day. He told the jury that he was 3

headed to his locker to get his uniform when Officer Bell

told him to remove his hat. Griffin testified that he complied with the officer’s request but that the officer then

grabbed him from behind and threw him into a wall.

According to Griffin, the officer then head-butted him,

knocking him to the floor in the process. The officer

then handcuffed him and dragged him across the

floor by the handcuffs. After Griffin managed to stand

up again, the officer knocked him to the floor a second

time. Once on the floor, Griffin told the jury, Officer Bell

pounded his head into the floor whenever Griffin tried

to raise his head, resulting in bruises to his face. Griffin’s

mother told the jury that he suffered an injury to his

lip, “carpet burn on his face,” and bruises all around

his head.

Before trial, Bell moved in limine to exclude from evidence a short video of part of the incident. The twominute video was recorded by Heather Brown, a friend

of Griffin’s, with either a cell phone or camcorder. Brown

e-mailed the video to Griffin’s lawyer, and the video
4 No. 11-3389

was made available to Bell near the beginning of the

lawsuit. Four years passed between the incident and

the trial, and Griffin apparently lost track of Brown

during that time. Bell contended that, without presenting

Brown as a witness, the plaintiff could not establish a

proper foundation for the video. Bell also argued

that the video was confusing, misleading and unfairly

prejudicial because it showed only a small part of the

incident and included gaps where the camera was not

pointed at the struggle between Griffin and Bell. Without

Brown as a witness, Bell contended, there was no

way to determine whether the video was edited or why

certain parts of the struggle were not visible. For

example, the video did not show the beginning of the

altercation, when Griffin attacked Bell, but showed only

parts of the scuffle that appeared favorable to Griffin.

At the start of the video, Griffin is wearing one handcuff with the second dangling from his wrist. Bell also

objected to the admission of still pictures extracted

from the video for similar reasons, although Bell agreed

that certain pictures could be used to refresh a witness’s

recollection so long as they were not displayed to the

jury. The court ultimately decided to exclude the

video, excerpts from the video, and still photos created

from the video because the video lacked a proper foundation, showed only part of the incident, and was

unfairly prejudicial.

After Griffin testified that he was not in uniform when

he arrived at school, Bell’s attorney impeached him with

his deposition testimony to the contrary. Griffin’s lawyer

wished to account for the inconsistency to the jury by
No. 11-3389 5

having his client explain that he had viewed the video

before testifying at trial and that the video refreshed

his recollection that he was wearing jeans and not black

pants on the day of the incident. In keeping with the

ruling excluding the video and all excerpts from it, the

court ruled that Griffin’s lawyer could not ask his client

why his testimony was different at trial than it was at

his deposition “if his answer will be that he viewed a

video.” Tr. at 210. Griffin now appeals the jury’s verdict

in favor of Officer Bell.

II.

On appeal, Griffin complains that the district court

applied an erroneous standard in denying challenges

for cause to prospective jurors. He also contends that

the court erred in refusing to allow him to use still photographs extracted from the video in his case-in-chief, in

his cross-examination of defense witnesses, and in explaining to the jury how he refreshed his recollection

before testifying at trial. Finally, he maintains that the

court erred in allowing Officer Bell to testify that his

actions in arresting Griffin complied with Chicago

Police Department rules and regulations regarding arrests.

A.

The district court rejected every challenge for cause

that Griffin raised during the jury selection process.

Griffin appeals the court’s decision in three of those

instances: jurors Susan Mahoney, Nadine Maamari, and
6 No. 11-3389

Griffin’s lawyer initially omitted from his required short 4

appendix the district court’s oral rulings on the juror issues.

See Circuit Rule 30(b). After the appellee brought this omission to the court’s attention, Griffin moved to supplement

the appendix. Although we initially granted Griffin’s motion,

after receiving the appellee’s motion to reconsider, we vacated

the appellant’s corrected brief, reinstated his original deficient filing, and allowed him to file the omitted rulings as

a supplement to his opening brief. R. 32. We deferred ruling

on the treatment of the omitted materials so that the merits

panel could consider the issue. We now grant Plaintiff’s

Motion to Correct Inadvertent Omissions in his Short Appendix. R. 23. For each of the jurors challenged, Griffin cited to

the transcript and in a few instances quoted the district court’s

ruling in the body of his brief, supporting his claim that the

omissions from the short appendix were in fact inadvertent.

Tracey Carel. In each instance, Griffin argues that the

juror indicated that she would give more credit to the

testimony of a police officer than to that of a fourteen-yearold student. We review the district court’s rulings on

juror challenges for abuse of discretion. United States v. 4

Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.

398 (2011) (because of the district court’s ability to

evaluate juror credibility during voir dire, we accord

great deference to the court’s ruling on a challenge for

cause); United States v. Hicks, 635 F.3d 1063, 1067-68

(7th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Scott, 267 F.3d 729,

743 (7th Cir. 2001) (the process of empaneling a jury is

left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and we

will not disturb the district court’s rulings absent an

abuse of discretion). Moreover, we will overturn a
No. 11-3389 7

verdict based on the district court’s refusal to remove

a juror only if the party challenging the ruling can demonstrate prejudice. Fletcher, 634 F.3d at 409.

1.

Griffin exercised one of his three peremptory challenges to eliminate juror Mahoney from the jury pool,

and so she was not part of the panel that ultimately

decided the case. Because Mahoney did not participate

in deciding the case, Griffin cannot demonstrate prejudice from the district court’s refusal to remove her for

cause. Fletcher, 634 F.3d at 409 (no prejudice shown

when allegedly biased juror served as an alternate who

did not participate in deliberations or assist in deciding

the case). “[O]ur focus at this stage must be on the impartiality of the jury that actually sat, not on [the juror] who

was struck.” United States v. Lott, 442 F.3d 981, 984 (7th

Cir. 2006). See also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528

U.S. 304, 313 (2000); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988).

Because Mahoney was not a member of the jury that

decided the case, the court’s refusal to excuse her for

cause could not have prejudiced Griffin unless the loss

of that peremptory challenge somehow harmed him.

But Griffin did not make any argument in the district

court or in his opening brief on appeal regarding the

loss of a peremptory challenge. Although Griffin used

all three of his available peremptory challenges, he never

claimed that he was wrongly deprived of the use of a

peremptory challenge by the district court’s refusal to

remove Mahoney for cause. More precisely, Griffin did
8 No. 11-3389

not raise this argument until his reply brief, and arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are deemed

waived. Mendez v. Perla Dental, 646 F.3d 420, 423-24

(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Wescott, 576 F.3d 347, 354

(7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1546 (2010).

We therefore will not consider that claim on the merits.

2.

Griffin’s next challenge for cause was to juror

Carel. When the court asked Carel what she thought

in general of police officers, Carel responded that they

have a “really tough job,” and a “dangerous job.” Tr. at 84-

85. The court then asked, “Do you believe that if an individual is a victim of excessive force which causes

injuries, that a person should be able to sue the police

officer for the excessive force if the evidence shows that?”

Carel replied, “I guess if the evidence shows that, yeah.”

Tr. at 85. The court asked Carel whether she would be

able to suspend her judgment and not make up her mind

until she heard everything, and whether she would be

able to remain neutral until all of the evidence was in.

She replied that she “would try, certainly.” Tr. at 86. She

explained that she worked on a busy corner where

she could see the police make stops. She added that

she had customers and friends who were police officers,

that she sometimes saw the police get aggressive

with persons who were breaking the law, but that the

law breakers sometimes had weapons and she was

glad that the police were aggressive in their enforcement

of the law. The court then sought to clarify her answer,
No. 11-3389 9

asking whether, “in this particular case, you would be

able to listen to all the testimony, and if the evidence

convinced you that the defendant—that is, the police

officer—used excessive force which caused injury to the

plaintiff, then you would have no problem awarding

damages, money to them?” Carel replied, “I guess if

the money is going to go for bills, but if the money is

going to just go for—I’m not sure. Do you know what

I’m saying?” Tr. at 86-87. Carel then clarified that she

could not judge because she did not have the evidence.

With this clarification, the court asked once again

whether she could award money damages to the plaintiff if she was convinced by the evidence that the police

officer was wrong and caused injuries, and she answered

an unequivocal, “Yes.” The court then asked if she was

convinced by the evidence that the officer had not used

excessive force, whether she would be able to send the

plaintiff home with nothing, and she again answered

with an unequivocal “Yes.” Tr. at 87.

After this exchange with the court, Griffin’s counsel

questioned Carel directly. In particular, he asked what

type of evidence she would like to see in an excessive

force case. Carel said it depended on the case. Tr. at 95.

Counsel then posited that if the police officer said one

thing, and the fourteen-year-old plaintiff said another,

would Carel “start out saying, Well, I’m going to

believe the police officer, why would he lie?” Carel responded, “Most likely.” Tr. at 96.

When challenging Carel for cause, counsel for Griffin

told the court, “I thought she said that she wanted
10 No. 11-3389

real evidence, that if it was just—it had to be bills and

records and evidence that’s concrete rather than testimony.” Tr. at 141. The court stated that although Carel

said she would expect that kind of evidence, she did

not say she could not award damages in the absence

of such evidence. Counsel for Griffin then added,

“I think she said she couldn’t be fair.” Tr. at 141. The court

then denied the challenge for cause. On appeal, Griffin

contends that Carel indicated that she would give more

credit to the testimony of a police officer, and that the

court never asked her if she could set aside her bias in

favor of police officers and decide the case fairly and

impartially. Bell contends that Griffin waived this particular challenge by not raising it below, but we disagree. In addition to his contention that Carel wanted

hard evidence, Griffin’s counsel also objected to Carel on

the ground that she said she “couldn’t be fair.” In the

context of the back-and-forth discussion between

counsel and the district court, it is clear that the court

understood Griffin’s objection as relating to the juror’s

supposed preference for the testimony of a police officer.

We therefore consider the argument on the merits.

Carel, of course, never said that she could not be fair.

At most, she indicated that her first inclination, if

faced with conflicting stories from a police officer and a

fourteen-year-old boy, would “most likely” be to

believe the officer. After Carel said her initial inclination

would be to believe the police officer, Griffin’s counsel

asked:

And would you consider that, Well, Shaquille Griffin,

he is here in court because he wants money from
No. 11-3389 11

the police officer as a reason why you would say, I am

not going to believe what Shaquille says?

Tr. at 96. Carel replied, “I don’t know that.” Tr. at 96.

The prior careful questioning from the trial court judge

established that Carel also said that she could not

judge whether she could award damages without

hearing the evidence. She also clarified that she could

award damages if the evidence proved that the officer

used excessive force and caused injuries to the plaintiff.

In light of her answers to all of the questions, we

cannot say that the district court abused its discretion

in finding that Carel was not a biased witness who

should be excluded for cause.

Carel’s responses to the questions do not resemble

those of the juror in Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248

F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2001), a case on which Griffin relies

in part. In Thompson, the plaintiff brought a race discrimination case against her employer. A juror who owned

a business expressed her belief that employees sometimes bring lawsuits against their employers just

because they did not get something that they wanted

from the employer:

I think I bring a lot of background to this case, and

I can’t say that it’s not going to cloud my judgment.

I can try to be as fair as I can, as I do every day.

Thompson, 248 F.3d at 624. After conceding that she

had this bias, and that it would cloud her judgment, the

court never clarified whether the juror could set aside

her beliefs and follow the court’s instructions on the

law. We remarked that “[t]he question in this case was
12 No. 11-3389

not whether [the juror’s] belief that some claims against

employers are spurious was true or false . . . but

whether this belief would somehow impede her in

giving due weight to the evidence and following the

judge’s instructions.” 248 F.3d at 626. Because the

juror expressly said that her prior experience would

cloud her judgment, we found that the court should

have asked her whether she would follow its instructions

on the law and suspend judgment until she heard all of

the evidence.

In the instant case, Carel resisted giving definitive

answers to questions on how she would decide the

case because she did not yet have the evidence. We

think Carel’s answers more closely resembled those of

the jurors in United States v. Ricketts, 146 F.3d 492 (7th

Cir. 1998). In that case, the defendants were accused of

participating in a prison riot. During voir dire, the

potential jurors were asked whether they would give

more weight to the testimony of a prison guard than an

inmate. 146 F.3d at 495. Nine jurors indicated that they

would listen more to the guards. We found that the

record was inadequate to establish that the jurors

were biased in a way that required their exclusion from

the jury:

In the abstract, it is certainly not unreasonable for

an ordinary person to say she would generally tend

to believe a prison guard over a prison inmate. But

that certainly doesn’t mean that in a given case,

after hearing sworn testimony under oath and considering all the facts and circumstances, that that
No. 11-3389 13

same juror would automatically believe a given

guard over a given inmate. Generalized questions of

the sort asked here are a slim basis upon which to

base a challenge for cause. 

Ricketts, 146 F.3d at 496. In Thompson, we clarified that

the problem in Ricketts was that a tendency to believe

guards over inmates was not itself a sign of bias but

was simply indicative of a prior belief. Thompson, 248

F.3d at 625. We noted a critical difference between a

prior belief and a bias in the sense that requires disqualification of a juror or judge: 

Everyone brings to a case a set of beliefs that may

incline him in one direction or another. A person told

that X had been indicted, and asked whether

he thought X guilty, might reply that he thought X

probably was guilty because few innocent people

are indicted. That would be a prior [belief]. It would

be a bias only if it were irrational or unshakable, so

that the prospective juror “would be unable to

faithfully and impartially apply the law,” Wainwright

v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d

841 (1985) (emphasis added), would be, in other

words, “adamant,” Fleenor v. Anderson, 171 F.3d 1096,

1099 (7th Cir. 1999)—in our hypothetical if, for example, the person added, “Nothing will ever convince

me that the government would indict an innocent

person.”

Thompson, 248 F.3d at 625. In this case, although Carel

expressed an initial inclination that police officers are

more credible than teenagers, she never expressed an
14 No. 11-3389

irrational or unshakeable bias that indicated an inability

or unwillingness to faithfully and impartially apply

the law. Instead, she tried to qualify her answers by

indicating that she could not say how she would rule

without hearing the evidence. That is the opposite of bias,

and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to strike Carel for cause. See also United States

v. Allen, 605 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131

S. Ct. 1475 (2011) (when a prospective juror fails to

express herself carefully or consistently, the trial judge

is best situated to determine competency to serve impartially).

3.

Griffin also sought to strike juror Nadine Maamari

for cause. When the district court asked how she felt

about police officers in general, Maamari replied that

they “do a difficult and dangerous job.” Tr. at 70. The

court also asked whether she believed that police

officers sometimes use excessive force against citizens.

Maamari replied, “We have seen it on the news. It does

happen.” She confirmed that she thought money

damages were appropriate to redress injuries from excessive force, but that she would also send the plaintiff

home with nothing if he failed to prove his case. Tr. at

70. The court further asked, “[W]ould you be able to

suspend judgment in this case and listen to all the evidence, keep an open mind until all of the evidence has

been presented?” Maamari answered, “I hope so, yes.”

Tr. at 71. Finally, the court asked, “And if once I give
No. 11-3389 15

you the instructions on the law to apply to the facts, do

you believe you’d be able to apply that law even

though you don’t totally agree with the law?” Maamari

answered, “Yes.” Tr. at 71-72.

Griffin’s counsel later asked a number of follow-up

questions. Counsel asked Maamari whether she would say

that a police officer is probably telling the truth because

he is a police officer, and Maamari answered, “No.” The

following exchange then occurred:

Counsel: Would you think that a police officer must

have had a good reason to do whatever he

tells you he did because he is a police

officer?

Maamari: I would—could you rephrase this? Or

repeat it, please?

Counsel: You are going to hear testimony, you are

going to be asked to resolve credibility,

who is telling the truth. Would you be—

would you start out—would you analyze

that question by thinking—by thinking to

yourself, Well, the police officer must have

had a reason to do whatever he did, he

didn’t just beat this kid up for no reason?

Would you think that?

Maamari: I probably would. I probably would.

Counsel: And that would make you more likely to

say, Well, the officer is telling the truth

because he must have had a good reason

to do what he did?
16 No. 11-3389

Maamari: You, know, as I am hearing your questions

and answers, it’s getting more and more

confusing because we are not going to

hear just his side of the story and

Shaquille’s side of the story. I mean, there

must be some evidence and something

more to it than just hearing—

Counsel: Well, you will be able to decide that if you

are selected as a juror after you hear all the

testimony. If that’s all you hear, the police

officer and Shaquille, am I right that you’d

be more likely to say the police officer—

Maamari: No. You are not right. I am very, very

uncomfortable in making a decision.

Counsel: Would you give more weight to what the

police officer said because he is just doing

his job, he must have had a reason [for]

whatever he did?

Maamari: Probably.

Tr. at 117-19.

Griffin challenged Maamari on the ground that “she

could not be fair.” Tr. at 139-40. Counsel again indicated

that he intended to challenge for cause any juror who

said they would give more weight to the testimony of a

police officer than to a fourteen-year-old student. The

court disagreed that any juror had expressly indicated

that they would prefer the testimony of a police officer

just because that person was a police officer. Moreover,

the court remarked:
No. 11-3389 17

I believe I asked all of them that—whether you would

keep an open mind, listen to all of the evidence and

the court’s instruction before making up your mind

as to what the verdict should be, and they all said yes.

Tr. at 140.

Maamari, like Carel, indicated a prior belief that a

police officer would probably be more credible than a

teenager but she also indicated that she would keep an

open mind and judge the case by the evidence and by

the law as stated by the trial court. She did not evince

an irrational or unshakeable bias that would prevent her

from ruling impartially on the case. Thompson, 248 F.3d

at 625. And, like Carel, she indicated that she would

keep an open mind and not make up her mind until she

heard all of the evidence. In light of all of the answers

that Maamari gave to the questions of both the court

and counsel, we cannot say that the court abused its

discretion in declining to strike Maamari from the jury

for cause.

B.

Griffin next challenges the district court’s rulings that

he could not use the still photographs that he had

extracted from the video in his case-in-chief, in his crossexamination of defense witnesses, or to explain to the

jury how he refreshed his recollection about certain

facts before testifying. We review the district court’s

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Everroad v.

Scott Truck Systems, Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir.
18 No. 11-3389

2010); Common v. City of Chicago, 661 F.3d 940, 946 (7th Cir.

2011).

Griffin initially sought to introduce the entire twominute video, but on appeal complains only that he was

unable to introduce still photographs from the video.

The district court’s ruling initially focused on the full

video, but the court found that its reasoning was applicable to still photos taken from the video as well.

The court excluded the video because (1) Griffin was

unable to authenticate the video with the testimony of

the person who made it; and (2) the video was unduly

prejudicial because it showed only a small part of the

confrontation. The court excluded the still photos that

had been extracted from the video for the same reason

the court prohibited the use of the video itself:

Griffin lacked any witness who could authenticate

the images, and the selective presentation of the

images was unduly prejudicial. Griffin contends that the

court erred when it required Griffin to produce the

person who created the video in order to authenticate

it. Griffin argues that he himself could have authenticated

the video. Griffin does not challenge the court’s ruling

that photos were unduly prejudicial.

Griffin’s failure to challenge the district court’s

alternate reason (undue prejudice) for excluding the

photos is fatal to his claim of error. When a district court

gives two independent, dispositive reasons for ruling

against a party, and the party challenges only one of those

grounds, any challenge to the alternate basis is waived

and we may affirm. Hess v. Reg-Ellen Machine Tool Corp.,
No. 11-3389 19

423 F.3d 653, 664-65 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. ZunigaLazaro, 388 F.3d 308, 314 (7th Cir. 2004); Senese v. Chicago

Area I.B. of T. Pension Fund, 237 F.3d 819, 823 (7th Cir. 2001).

But even if we were to consider Griffin’s claim that

the court erred in its finding that Griffin could not authenticate the video or the still photos extracted from

the video without the videographer, we would still

affirm. According to Griffin’s lawyer, the two-minute video

was e-mailed to him by Heather Brown, another student

at the school who knew Griffin. Counsel could not say

whether the video was taken with a cell phone or a camcorder, and conceded that there was no date or time

stamp on the video. Nor could he verify if the video

had been altered at any time. He affirmed that the video

portrayed only a small part of the incident. The still

photos, of course, displayed even less of the incident

than the two-minute video, and even more selectively.

Griffin contends that none of that information was required because he could have testified that the photos

were what he claimed them to be; his testimony, he argues,

is sufficient for authentication under Federal Rule of

Evidence 901(b)(1). That Rule, titled “Testimony of a

Witness with Knowledge,” provides that “[t]estimony

that an item is what it is claimed to be” is sufficient to

satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying

an item of evidence. But Griffin was not a “witness with

knowledge.” By his lawyer’s own admission, he could

not say how the video was made, or whether it had ever

been altered. There were many valid reasons to call into

question the authenticity of the video and still photographs, and many questions about the video that could
20 No. 11-3389

be answered only by the student who produced the

recording. The court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Griffin to produce the maker of the video

before allowing admission of still photos extracted from it.

C.

We may dispense with Griffin’s remaining issue in

short order. He objected to Officer Bell’s testimony regarding police department rules on making arrests. Even

if it was error to allow a brief reference to compliance

with departmental procedures, Griffin fails to explain

how this error prejudiced him in a manner that would

require a new trial. “Unless justice requires otherwise,

no error in admitting or excluding evidence—or any other

error by the court or a party—is ground for granting a

new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating,

modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order.

At every stage of the proceeding, the court must

disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any

party’s substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Evidentiary

errors satisfy this standard only if there is a significant

chance that they affected the outcome of the trial.

Mihailovich v. Laatsch, 359 F.3d 892, 913 (7th Cir. 2004).

Griffin does not argue that admitting this evidence

affected the outcome of the trial, and there is thus no

basis for his claim for a new trial.

AFFIRMED.

9-4-12