NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JULIO MENDOZA, Petitioner Employee,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, 

ARLEDGE HAY COMPANY, Respondent Employer, 

COPPERPOINT INSURANCE COMPANIES, Respondent Carrier.

No. 1 CA-IC 20-0006

Special Action - Industrial Commission

ICA Claim No. 20003-460054

Carrier Claim No. 0034301

The Honorable Michael A. Mosesso, Chief Administrative Law Judge

DISMISSED IN PART AND AWARD SET ASIDE IN PART

COUNSEL

Stevens & Van Cott, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Charles C. Van Cott

Counsel for Petitioner Employee

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix

By Gaetano J. Testini 

Counsel for Respondent

CopperPoint Insurance Company, Phoenix

By Sharon M. Hensley, Mark A. Kendall

Counsel for Respondent Employer and Carrier

FILED 02-04-2021
MENDOZA v. ARLEDGE/COPPERPOINT

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Julio Mendoza petitions for review of Industrial Commission 

of Arizona orders designating him a vexatious litigant and denying his 

most recent request for leave to be heard under A.R.S. § 23-1061(J). We lack 

jurisdiction over his vexatious litigant designation but set aside the 

Commission’s denial of his request for leave.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mendoza severely injured his left hand in 2000 while working 

as a machine operator for Arledge Hay Company. A finger was amputated,

and Mendoza has suffered chronic pain ever since. Mendoza successfully 

applied for worker’s compensation benefits from CopperPoint Insurance 

Company. The Commission closed Mendoza’s claim in 2008, assessing a 

permanent impairment of 40 percent and terminating active medical care 

and temporary compensation. Even so, the Commission ordered 

CopperPoint to pay for some of Mendoza’s continuing physician visits and 

pain medication.

¶3 Since then, Mendoza has filed several petitions for the 

Commission to reopen his claim. Mendoza first petitioned the Commission 

to reopen his claim in November 2009 based on his treating physician’s 

diagnosis of Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy (“RSD”), also known as 

Complex Regional Pain Syndrome. CopperPoint countered with the 

opinions of two physicians who disagreed with the diagnosis. An ALJ 

denied Mendoza’s request, finding the physicians retained by CopperPoint

to be more reliable and persuasive. The ALJ ordered, however, that 

Mendoza could receive pain treatment from a pain management specialist

at CopperPoint’s expense. On review, this court affirmed.

¶4 Mendoza again sought to reopen his claim in 2011. The 

Commission denied Mendoza’s request for active medical care relating to 

symptoms on his left side. Still, it reopened the claim to increase his 

permanent impairment to 45 percent.
MENDOZA v. ARLEDGE/COPPERPOINT

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3

¶5 Mendoza next petitioned to reopen in April 2012, claiming 

head, neck, back and leg pain. An ALJ received evidence and argument, 

including testimony from several physicians over four days. Mendoza’s 

treating physician, Dr. Michael Carlton, testified that “the lack of findings 

on [Mendoza’s] head and neck MRI convinced him that the pain is coming 

from the industrial injury and not from some other undiagnosed 

condition,” but the industrial injury was “not a [sic] responsible for 

[Mendoza’s] left leg pain.” After conducting three independent medical 

exams (“IME”) in 2005, 2008 and 2012, Dr. Paul Guidera testified “he could 

not relate the pain in any of [Mendoza’s] other body parts to the industrial 

injury,” and saw “nothing new.” The ALJ denied Mendoza’s request to 

reopen in January 2013, holding:

There is a conflict between [the physicians] regarding 

whether [Mendoza] has suffered a new, additional or 

previously undiscovered condition related to his industrial 

injury. To resolve this conflict, I accept the opinions of Dr. 

Guidera. I am persuaded that Mendoza’s injury involved 

solely his fingers and hand and that cervical nerve blocks are 

not indicated. . . . Finally, no doctor related [Mendoza’s] head, 

neck, back, or leg pain to the industrial injury and therefore 

treatment for those body parts is not part of this case.

¶6 More petitions to reopen followed in March 2013 and January 

2016. CopperPoint recognized Mendoza’s continuing pain and pain 

treatment but still disputed his RSD diagnoses. The Commission denied 

Mendoza’s requests for epidural cervical injections but authorized stellate 

ganglion block injections and medication to ameliorate pain radiating from 

Mendoza’s injured hand.

A. Vexatious Litigant Designation (January 2017)

¶7 CopperPoint moved to designate Mendoza a vexatious 

litigant in January 2017 pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-941.02(D)(1).

1 Mendoza did 

1 Section 23-941.02(D)(1) defines “vexatious conduct” as: (a) repeated 

filing of requests for hearing, pleadings, motions or other documents solely 

or primarily for the purpose of harassment; (b) unreasonably expanding or 

delaying commission proceedings; (c) bringing or defending claims 

without substantial justification; (d) engaging in abuse of discovery or 

conduct in discovery that has resulted in the imposition of sanctions against 

the pro se litigant; (e) pattern of making unreasonable, repetitive and 
MENDOZA v. ARLEDGE/COPPERPOINT

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not respond. After reviewing “the entirety of the Commission file,” the 

Chief ALJ granted CopperPoint’s motion in March 2017 and designated 

Mendoza a vexatious litigant. The ALJ’s order recounted Mendoza’s 

“repeated filing of requests for relief that had been previously ruled upon 

in this claim.” A.R.S. § 23-941.02(D)(1)(f). The ALJ wrote:

2. The filing excesses of vexatious litigants interfere with 

the orderly administration of justice by diverting judicial 

resources from those matters filed by litigants willing to 

follow the rules and those meritorious matters that deserve 

prompt judicial attention.

* * *

11. Throughout this lengthy litigation history the only 

condition consistently considered related to the industrial 

injury is [Mendoza]’s left upper extremity (left hand). 

Problems related to the cervical spine, GERD, RSD, left-sided 

body symptoms and head, neck, back, and leg pain have all 

been denied as being unrelated to the industrial episode

during reopening litigation. . . . These have been litigated to a 

conclusion and are final. These fit within the designation of 

A.R.S. § 23-941.02(D)(1)(f) of repeated filing of requests for 

relief that had been previously ruled upon in this claim.

¶8 The ALJ assured Mendoza that the designation “Order does 

not foreclose [his] access to filing in the future” but instead “requires any 

new filings to be reviewed to ensure they were not previously raised and 

that they are not harassing or vexatious. If it is found that the filing is not 

vexatious or harassing, it will be allowed to proceed.” Moving forward, the 

ALJ directed that “[a]ny motion for leave to file shall be captioned 

‘Application Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File.’”

B. Petition for Investigation (October 2019)

¶9 Mendoza filed a “Petition for Investigation” in October 2019 

under A.R.S. § 23-1061(J), which the Chief ALJ treated as a request to file. 

See A.R.S. § 23-1061(J) (“The commission shall investigate and review any 

claim in which it appears to the commission that the claimant has not been 

granted the benefits to which such claimant is entitled.”). Mendoza sought 

excessive requests for information; or (f) repeated filing of documents or 

requests for relief that have been the subject of previous rulings by the 

commission in the same claim.
MENDOZA v. ARLEDGE/COPPERPOINT

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coverage for a spinal cord stimulator to redress his RSD and phantom limb 

pain. In support, he attached recent medical reports from his physician, Dr. 

Ajay Narwani. The first indicated the stimulator would help Mendoza’s 

“phantom limb pain” and other pain.

¶10 A month later, Mendoza visited Dr. Kevin Ladin at 

CopperPoint’s request for an IME. After reviewing Mendoza’s medical 

records and conducting a personal examination, Dr. Ladin concluded:

There are absolutely no objective findings and quite frankly 

no subjective complaints consistent with a diagnosis of 

complex [RSD] affecting the left upper extremity. . . . Mr. 

Mendoza is not felt to be an appropriate candidate for a trial 

of spinal cord stimulation nor a spinal cord stimulator 

implant.

Dr. Ladin still acknowledged, however, that Mendoza’s “current subjective 

complaints and symptoms are causally related to the industrial injury . . . 

and its aftermath,” and “supported by objective clinical findings.”

¶11 CopperPoint opposed Mendoza’s petition, arguing the ALJ 

and the Commission already found “that [Mendoza’s] injury involved 

solely his fingers,” that “no doctor related [his] head, neck, back, or leg pain 

to the industrial injury,” and thus “treatment for those body parts is not 

part of this case.” CopperPoint conceded it only assumed that Mendoza’s 

pain-management physician recommended the spinal cord stimulator to 

treat other, non-industrial related conditions.

¶12 In January 2020, the Chief ALJ denied Mendoza’s “request to 

allow the processing of [his] October 18, 2019 [petition under] A.R.S. § 23-

1061(J),” reasoning the request “appears” related to his RSD diagnosis, 

which the Commission had determined was unrelated to the industrial 

injury and therefore not covered:

Throughout this lengthy litigation history the only condition 

consistently considered related to the industrial injury is 

[Mendoza’s] left upper extremity (left hand). Problems 

related to the cervical spine, GERD, RSD, left-sided body 

symptoms and head, neck, back and leg pain have all been 

denied as being unrelated to the industrial episode during 

reopening litigation. These have been litigated to a 

conclusion and are final.
MENDOZA v. ARLEDGE/COPPERPOINT

Decision of the Court

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¶13 The ALJ added he reviewed Mendoza’s attached medical 

records and then cited earlier ALJ decisions from January 2013 and January 

2010, which “decided that any cervical spine issues were unrelated to the 

industrial injury,” and “denied that [Mendoza] had RSD related to the 

industrial episode and principles of res judicata apply.” The order included

no finding that Mendoza’s request was repetitive or harassing. Mendoza 

seeks review by this court. 

DISCUSSION

A. Vexatious Litigant Designation

¶14 Mendoza first contends the ALJ erroneously designated him 

a “vexatious litigant” in March 2017. This court must independently 

determine whether it has appellate jurisdiction. Baker v. Bradley, 231 Ariz. 

475, 479, ¶ 8 (App. 2013). We do not. Mendoza needed to challenge the 

ALJ’s “vexatious litigant” designation within thirty days after the decision 

was issued and mailed to the parties in March 2017, A.R.S. § 23-943(H), but 

he first sought review in 2020. See Smith v. Indus. Comm’n, 27 Ariz. App. 

100, 101 (1976).

B. Denial of Leave

¶15 Mendoza next challenges the ALJ’s order declining to process 

his request for hearing in January 2020. He argues the ALJ “included no 

finding designating [his] Petition as either harassing or vexatious, as 

required by the [earlier] Vexatious Litigant Order.” CopperPoint counters 

that the Commission already considered and rejected Mendoza’s cervical 

spine condition as causally related to his industrial injury, adding that an 

earlier ALJ found that “treatment of the cervical spine” would not alleviate 

pain from Mendoza’s industrial injury.

¶16 As a vexatious litigant, Mendoza needed leave from the Chief 

ALJ to file a request for a hearing. A.R.S. § 23-941.02(B) (“[A vexatious]

litigant may not file a new request for hearing, pleading, motion or other 

document without prior leave of the administrative law judge.”). We 

review procedural rulings for abuse of discretion, Unisource Corp. v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 184 Ariz. 451, 453 (App. 1995), and will affirm the decision if 

reasonably supported by the evidence, Lovitch v. Indus. Comm’n, 202 Ariz. 

102, 105, ¶ 16 (App. 2002).

¶17 Section 23-941.02 does not describe what a vexatious litigant 

must show to secure leave to file a request for a hearing. Mendoza and 

CopperPoint, however, accept the Chief ALJ’s standard:
MENDOZA v. ARLEDGE/COPPERPOINT

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Any new filings must be reviewed to (1) ensure they were not 

previously raised and (2) that they are not harassing or 

vexatious. If it is found that the pleading is not vexatious or 

harassing, it will be allowed to proceed.

¶18 Mendoza contends his October 2019 Petition and attached 

medical reports facially satisfied this standard because it was “the first 

time” he sought a spinal cord stimulator to redress phantom limb pain.

A.R.S. § 23-1061(J) (“The commission shall investigate and review any claim 

in which it appears to the commission that the claimant has not been 

granted the benefits to which such claimant is entitled.”). 

¶19 On this record, the Chief ALJ erroneously denied Mendoza’s 

request for hearing or investigation. Although the ALJ correctly concluded 

that problems related to RSD “have all been denied as being unrelated to 

the industrial episode during reopening litigation,” the ALJ did not address 

whether the Commission had considered and rejected a spinal cord 

stimulator for Mendoza’s phantom limb pain.

CONCLUSION

¶20 We lack jurisdiction over Mendoza’s untimely challenge to 

his vexatious litigant designation. We set aside the Chief ALJ’s order

denying Mendoza’s request for a hearing on his claim for a spinal cord 

stimulator to treat his phantom limb pain.