SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1740-16T3

SEIDMAN & PINCUS, LLC, and 

MITCHELL B. SEIDMAN, 

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

RICHARD J. ABRAHAMSEN, and

ABRAHAMSEN LAW FIRM, LLC, 

Defendants/Third-Party 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

NICHOLAS G. SEKAS, 

Defendant/Third-Party 

Defendant,

and 

SEKAS LAW GROUP, LLC, and

SEKAS & ABRAHAMSEN, LLC,

Defendants/Third-Party 

Defendants-Respondents.

____________________________________

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-1740-16T3

Argued September 13, 2018 - Decided October 4, 2018

Before Judges Ostrer and Mayer.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-2961-14.

Richard J. Abrahamsen argued the cause for pro se 

appellants.

Mitchell B. Seidman argued the cause for pro se 

respondents Seidman & Pincus, LLC, and Mitchell B. 

Seidman (Mitchell B. Seidman and Andrew Pincus, on 

the brief).

Nicholas G. Sekas argued the cause for pro se

respondents Sekas Law Group, LLC, and Sekas & 

Abrahamsen, LLC.

PER CURIAM

Defendants/third-party plaintiffs Richard J. Abrahamsen and Abrahamsen 

Law Firm, LLC (Abrahamsen defendants) appeal from thirteen separate Law 

Division orders issued in connection with this litigation.1 We affirm all of the 

orders appealed by the Abrahamsen defendants.

 

1

 The orders that are the subject of this appeal are as follows: a May 4, 2015 

order denying appointment of a custodian and compelling arbitration; a May 12, 

2015 order denying disqualification of counsel and indemnification; a 

November 6, 2015 order denying a motion to strike co-defendants' answer for 

failure to provide discovery; a November 6, 2015 protective order; a January 8, 

2016 order quashing subpoenas and granting attorney's fees; a February 5, 2016 

order quashing subpoenas and granting attorney's fees; a February 5, 2016 order 
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A-1740-16T3

In August 2014, plaintiffs Seidman & Pincus, LLC (S&P) and Mitchell 

Seidman filed a complaint in Passaic County against Sekas Law Group, LLC 

and Sekas & Abrahamsen, LLC (Sekas defendants) and the Abrahamsen 

defendants, alleging defamation and tortious interference (defamation action). 

The law firm of Sekas & Abrahamsen, LLC (S&A), consisting of Nicholas G. 

Sekas and Richard J. Abrahamsen, dissolved in December 2013, prior to the

filing of the defamation action. Litigation related to the dissolution of S&A was 

filed in Monmouth County (dissolution action) two weeks after plaintiffs filed 

their defamation action.

2

 

The underlying facts are not complex. However, the procedural history is 

convoluted based on the sheer number of motions filed by the Abrahamsen 

 

denying a motion to compel discovery; a February 17, 2016 order compelling 

payment of counsel fees; a February 26, 2016 order vacating the February 17, 

2016 order and awarding counsel fees; a February 26, 2016 order awarding 

counsel fees; a December 5, 2016 order denying reconsideration; a December 5, 

2016 order compelling reimbursement; and a December 5, 2016 order denying 

sanctions. 

2

 In the dissolution action, Sekas sought to enforce the terms of S&A's 

partnership operating agreement and recover assets taken by Abrahamsen when 

he left S&A in December 2013. Sekas claimed Abrahamsen was responsible for 

his percentage share of debts and obligations of S&A, and for fees and costs on 

S&A cases that Abrahamsen took to his new law firm. Abrahamsen claimed the 

partnership's operating agreement required S&A to indemnify him against 

plaintiffs' defamation action.
4

A-1740-16T3

defendants. The procedural background related to the defamation action is 

further muddled due to the Abrahamsen defendants' repeated conflating of the 

issues in the defamation action and the dissolution action. Consequently, a more 

detailed recitation of the procedural background is required to provide context 

for this appeal. 

Plaintiffs filed the defamation action against the Abrahamsen defendants 

and Sekas defendants on August 6, 2014, alleging all defendants caused S&P to 

lose a long-time client. One month later, the Abrahamsen defendants sent a 

notice to plaintiffs demanding withdrawal of the defamation action as frivolous. 

In response, plaintiffs requested a copy of a memorandum authored by

Abrahamsen to assess the merits of their claim and determine whether the 

memorandum caused the loss of a long-term client. Instead of replying to 

plaintiffs' request for a copy of the memorandum, the Abrahamsen defendants 

filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs then filed a cross-motion to 

amend the complaint. 

Leave to amend the complaint was granted and, in January 2015, plaintiffs 

filed an amended complaint, adding Sekas Law Group, LLC as a defendant and 

asserting a new claim based on fraudulent transfer. The Abrahamsen defendants 
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A-1740-16T3

filed an answer, cross-claim for indemnification against the Sekas defendants, 

and third-party complaint against the Sekas defendants and Nicholas G. Sekas. 

In March 2015, the Abrahamsen defendants moved to consolidate the 

defamation action with the dissolution action. The judge denied consolidation. 

In May 2015, the judge dismissed the third-party claims against the Sekas 

defendants. The judge also issued an order on May 4, 2015 denying a motion 

by the Abrahamsen defendants to appoint a custodian and compel arbitration of 

the dispute between the Abrahamsen defendants and the Sekas defendants. A

motion to compel the Sekas defendants to indemnify the Abrahamsen defendants 

in the defamation action was denied on May 12, 2015. 

Failing to succeed in their earlier motions, the Abrahamsen defendants 

requested discovery from the Sekas defendants. In the fall of 2015, the 

Abrahamsen defendants moved to strike the Sekas defendants' answer for failure 

to provide discovery. In response, the Sekas defendants sought a protective 

order related to the discovery requests. The judge denied the motion to strike 

and granted the motion for a protective order. These orders, dated November 6, 

2015, granted attorney's fees to the Sekas defendants. The judge expressly 

warned the Abrahamsen defendants that additional sanctions would be imposed 
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A-1740-16T3

for their "continued contempt and violation of the intent and spirit of the prior 

[o]rders issued by the [c]ourt." 

Notwithstanding the unequivocal warning issued by the judge in the 

defamation action, the Abrahamsen defendants served multiple subpoenas on 

individuals and companies associated with the Sekas defendants. The Sekas 

defendants demanded the Abrahamsen defendants withdraw the subpoenas, but 

the Abrahamsen defendants refused. The Sekas defendants then filed a motion 

to quash the subpoenas, a motion for a protective order, and sought to hold the 

Abrahamsen defendants in contempt of the court's prior orders in the defamation 

action.

On January 8, 2016, the judge quashed certain subpoenas and granted the 

request for a protective order in favor of the Sekas defendants. The order also 

denied discovery sought by the Abrahamsen defendants; ordered the 

Abrahamsen defendants to stop demanding discovery from the Sekas 

defendants; barred the Abrahamsen defendants from requesting discovery 

without leave of the court; ordered Abrahamsen, individually, to show cause 

why he should not be held in contempt; found the Abrahamsen defendants to be 

in contempt; and ordered the Abrahamsen defendants to pay attorneys' fees to 

the Sekas defendants. One month later, the judge quashed additional subpoenas 
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A-1740-16T3

served by the Abrahamsen defendants and reiterated his prior warning regarding 

the imposition of sanctions for continued service of improper discovery 

demands. On February 17, 2016, the judge awarded counsel fees to the Sekas 

defendants in the amount of $6,310. On February 26, 2016, the judge vacated

the February 17, 2016 award of counsel fees and, instead, awarded counsel fees 

to the Sekas defendants in the amount of $5,740. The judge also awarded

additional counsel fees to the Sekas defendants in the amount of $11,410.

The Abrahamsen defendants sought reconsideration of the judge's orders 

issued in January and February 2016. Because the Abrahamsen defendants 

claimed the judge who issued the January and February 2016 orders had a 

conflict based on his law clerk's employment with Sekas as of April 2016, a 

different judge heard argument on the motions for reconsideration, 

indemnification, and sanctions. These motions were denied by order dated 

December 5, 2016.

The factual history preceding the filing of the defamation action is 

relevant to understanding the issues on appeal. In 2003, Mariner's Bank retained 

plaintiffs to handle various legal matters, including litigation actions, 

bankruptcy matters, and foreclosure proceedings. 
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A-1740-16T3

Around July 2009, Mariner's Bank retained plaintiffs to pursue an action 

against Carver Federal Savings Bank (Carver) for default of a loan.

3

 Around the 

same time, Mariner's Bank decided to sell thirteen defaulted loans to Purchase 

Partners, LLC (Purchase Partners). Carver asserted counterclaims in the Carver 

action against Mariner's Bank before its loan was sold to Purchase Partners. 

Because the interests of Mariner's Bank and Purchase Partners were aligned, 

plaintiffs discussed whether they could represent both parties in the Carver 

action. Plaintiffs asked Mariner's Bank and Purchase Partners to sign a conflict 

waiver letter before plaintiffs would undertake dual representation of the parties 

in the Carver action. Mariner's Bank and Purchase Partners signed the conflict 

waiver letters, and agreed to equally share payment of plaintiffs' legal fees in 

the Carver action.

Purchase Partners fell behind on its payments to plaintiffs for legal 

services. Plaintiffs requested payment in return for continued representation of 

Purchase Partners in the Carver action. Purchase Partners was unable to pay

plaintiffs' legal fees. Purchase Partners then sought a more economical 

arrangement with another law firm to represent it in the Carver action. 

 

3

 The action, entitled Mariner's Bank v. Carver Federal Savings Bank, was filed 

in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Carver 

action).
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A-1740-16T3

Thereafter, Purchase Partners retained S&A to represent its interest in the 

Carver action. Plaintiffs filed a motion in the Carver action to impose a charging 

lien against Purchase Partners for outstanding legal fees and for any recovery 

obtained by Purchase Partners in the Carver action. The federal judge handling 

the Carver action granted plaintiffs' motion.

Plaintiffs then filed a motion in federal court to establish the amount of 

the charging lien against Purchase Partners. S&A advised Purchase Partners to 

oppose the motion, and dispute plaintiffs' outstanding fees based on an alleged 

conflict of interest arising from plaintiffs' dual representation of Mariner's Bank 

and Purchase Partners. Plaintiffs' motion to establish the amount of the charging 

lien was not decided by the federal judge handling the Carver action until early 

2014.4 

In August 2013, the parties settled the Carver action. At that time, 

Abrahamsen authored a confidential memorandum to Purchase Partners 

regarding the Carver action. The memorandum, entitled "Memo on 

Mariner[']s Bank and Purchase Partners and the Dual Representation of Seidman 

& Pincus," discussed the events that transpired after S&P undertook 

 

4

 On February 5, 2014, the federal judge in the Carver action determined 

plaintiffs had no conflict of interest and awarded the fees owed by Purchase 

Partners to plaintiffs for legal work related to the Carver action.
10 A-1740-16T3

representation of both Mariner's Bank and Purchase Partners in the Carver 

action. The memorandum opined that "S&P turned on his client [Purchase 

Partners] and was [Mariner's Bank] against [Purchase Partners] on this point 

while still counsel of record for both parties." 

Mariner's Bank received a copy of the Abrahamsen memorandum and 

stopped paying plaintiffs for legal services in the Carver action and other 

matters. After receipt of the Abrahamsen memorandum, Mariner's Bank did not 

hire plaintiffs to represent it in any new matters. In early 2014, plaintiffs 

requested overdue payment for legal services from Mariner's Bank. A 

representative of Mariner's Bank told plaintiffs the bank was discontinuing 

S&P's legal services based on the Abrahamsen memorandum and Abrahamsen's

advice that plaintiffs had a conflict of interest due to S&P's dual representation 

of Mariner's Bank and Purchase Partners in the Carver action.

Believing the bank's decision to discontinue plaintiffs' legal services was 

due to the Abrahamsen memorandum, plaintiffs filed the defamation action

seeking damages against defendants. Soon after commencing the defamation 

action, plaintiffs sought a copy of the Abrahamsen memorandum. Rather than 

provide a copy of the memorandum or explain why the memorandum could not 

be produced, the Abrahamsen defendants filed a series of motions for discovery 
11 A-1740-16T3

and other relief unrelated to plaintiffs' defamation action as described earlier in 

this opinion. The defamation action then proceeded for nearly two years. 

On March 28, 2016, plaintiffs served a subpoena on Mariner's Bank,

seeking the Abrahamsen memorandum. Mariner's Bank provided the document 

to plaintiffs on April 1, 2016. The Abrahamsen memorandum opined S&P had 

a conflict of interest based on the law firm's dual representation of Mariner's 

Bank and Purchase Partners in the Carver action. 

Three months after receipt of the Abrahamsen memorandum, plaintiffs

deposed several individuals affiliated with Mariner's Bank. Based on the

deposition testimony, plaintiffs determined they would be unable to prove the 

Abrahamsen memorandum caused Mariner's Bank to terminate S&P's legal 

services. Therefore, on July 28, 2016, plaintiffs elected to discontinue the 

defamation action. Plaintiffs and the Sekas defendants promptly signed a

stipulation dismissing the complaint. However, the Abrahamsen defendants did 

not sign the stipulation until January 2017. 

While the defamation action was pending, in or around April 2016, the

judge's law clerk accepted employment with Sekas and his new law firm. The 

judge handling the defamation action had not issued any orders in the 

defamation action subsequent to February 2016. The Abrahamsen defendants
12 A-1740-16T3

did not file a motion for reconsideration and other relief until around March 

2016. Due to an alleged conflict based on the judge's law clerk's acceptance of 

a position with the Sekas firm, the reconsideration motion and other motions 

filed by the Abrahamsen defendants were heard by the presiding judge of the 

Civil Division. The presiding judge denied those motions on December 5, 2016. 

The parties filed a stipulation of dismissal in the defamation action on 

January 17, 2017, and the Abrahamsen defendants then appealed from thirteen 

separate orders issued in the defamation action. On appeal, the Abrahamsen 

defendants argue four points.5 First, they argue plaintiffs' complaint constituted 

frivolous litigation because it was without basis in law or in fact, and the judge 

erred in failing to impose sanctions against plaintiffs. Second, they argue 

entitlement to indemnification and counsel fees from the Sekas defendants

pursuant to S&A's partnership operating agreement related to plaintiffs' claims 

in the defamation action. Third, they contend the judge handling the defamation 

action improperly denied discovery, quashed subpoenas, granted protective 

orders, and awarded counsel fees. Fourth, they claim all orders issued by the 

 

5

 The Notice of Appeal lists the May 4, 2015 order, the February 5, 2016 order 

denying a motion to compel discovery; and the December 5, 2017 order denying 

reconsideration of prior orders. However, because the issues related to these 

orders were not briefed, the issues are deemed waived. Gormley v. Wood-El, 

218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014). 
13 A-1740-16T3

original judge assigned to the defamation action should be vacated because his 

law clerk was subsequently hired by Sekas' new law firm. 

We review the issues raised in this appeal for abuse of discretion. An 

abuse of discretion arises when a decision is "made without a rational 

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an 

impermissible basis." Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571

(2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 

779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). 

Our review of a trial court's imposition of sanctions is similarly reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 

2005). We likewise review a judge's decision to impose discovery sanctions and 

award attorney's fees as a discovery sanction under an abuse of discretion 

standard. Shore Orthopaedic Grp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 

397 N.J. Super. 614, 629-30 (App. Div. 2008); Innes v. Carrascosa, 391 N.J. 

Super 453, 496 (App. Div. 2007). 

A judge, in his or her discretion, has the inherent authority to sanction a 

party for behavior that is vexatious, burdensome, and harassing. See Brundage 

v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 610 (2008) (recognizing the inherent power 

of courts to sanction parties as means of enforcing ordinary rules of practice); 
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Abtrax Pharm. v. Elkins-Sinn, 139 N.J. 499, 513 (1995) (recognizing the 

inherent power to punish for discovery violations); Dziubek v. Schumann, 275 

N.J. Super. 428, 439-40 (App. Div. 1994) (reasoning a court's inherent power 

may include awarding attorney's fees in the form of a sanction). Although the

power to sanction should be invoked sparingly, the circumstances presented in 

this case support the award of attorney's fees as the proper sanction for the 

Abrahamsen defendants' vexatious and harassing motion practice in the 

defamation action. 

We conclude there is sufficient, credible evidence in the record to support 

the judge's award of attorney's fees as a sanction against the Abrahamsen 

defendants. The Abrahamsen defendants repeatedly sought discovery and filed 

motions relating to the dissolution action in the defamation action. The judge's 

orders clearly and unambiguously instructed that issues and discovery requests

related to the dissolution action had to be pursued in the dissolution action. The 

judge expressly warned that if the Abrahamsen defendants continued to file such 

applications in the defamation action, rather than in the dissolution action, he 

would impose sanctions. The Abrahamsen defendants failed to heed the judge's 

admonition to cease filing repetitive discovery motions and other motions 

unrelated to the defamation action. 
15 A-1740-16T3

Because the Abrahamsen defendants disregarded the judge's orders related 

to motion practice and discovery in the defamation action, the judge awarded 

attorney's fees as a sanction for the Abrahamsen defendants' improper use of the 

defamation action to gain discovery in the dissolution action. The judge found 

the Abrahamsen defendants were acting in bad faith, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-

59.1, by attempting to use the defamation action to obtain information relevant

to the dissolution action. 

The judge also imposed further sanctions against the Abrahamsen 

defendants in accordance with Rule 1:4-8(c). When an attorney signs a 

pleading, motion, or other paper, the attorney certifies that the "paper is not 

being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 

unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." R. 1:4-8(a)(1). 

We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to sanction 

the Abrahamsen defendants by imposing attorney's fees in favor of the Sekas 

defendants. The Sekas defendants were forced to oppose a barrage of motions 

filed by the Abrahamsen defendants unrelated to the defamation action. The 

record does not reflect favorably on the Abrahamsen defendants' litigation 

tactics, which lead the judge to impose sanctions in the form of attorney's fees 

to deter continued violations of the court's orders regarding discovery and 
16 A-1740-16T3

motion practice in the defamation action. The filing of continued requests for 

discovery by the Abrahamsen defendants, after the judge's issuance of a warning 

not to seek such discovery, was contrary to Rule 1:10-3, and the judge did not 

abuse his discretion under the circumstances. 

The Abrahamsen defendants also contend the judge should have 

sanctioned plaintiffs because the defamation action was frivolous. The frivolous 

litigation statute permits a court to award reasonable counsel fees and litigation 

costs to a prevailing party in a civil action if the court determines that the 

complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or defense is frivolous. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-

59.1. 

A claim is considered frivolous when: "no rational argument can be 

advanced in its support"; "it is not supported by any credible evidence"; "a 

reasonable person could not have expected its success"; or "it is completely 

untenable." Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124, 144 (App. Div. 1999). 

"[F]alse allegations of fact [will] not justify [an] award . . . unless they are made 

in bad faith, 'for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury.'" 

McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 132 N.J. 546, 561 (1993) 

(quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b)(1)). An honest attempt to pursue a perceived, 
17 A-1740-16T3

though ill-founded, claim is not considered to be frivolous. Id. at 563. The 

burden of proving bad faith is on the party who seeks fees and costs. Id. at 559. 

Rule 1:4-8 supplements N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1, and governs the conduct of 

attorneys. A Rule 1:4-8 sanction is "specifically designed to deter the filing or 

pursuit of frivolous litigation." LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 98 (2009). 

"For purposes of imposing sanctions under Rule 1:4-8, an assertion is deemed 

'frivolous' when 'no rational argument can be advanced in its support, or it is not 

supported by any credible evidence, or it is completely untenable.'" United 

Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 389 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting 

First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419, 432 (App. Div. 

2007)). "Where a party has [a] reasonable and good faith belief in the merit of 

the cause, attorney's fees will not be awarded." Ibid. 

The Abrahamsen defendants sought counsel fees, claiming plaintiffs 

"persist[ed] in frivolous litigation" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and Rule

1:4-8. We reject this argument. When plaintiffs filed the complaint, they knew 

their long-term relationship with Mariner's Bank was abruptly terminated after 

the bank received the Abrahamsen memorandum. However, plaintiffs also knew 

as of the date they filed the defamation action that a federal judge determined 

S&P did not have a conflict of interest in the Carver action. 
18 A-1740-16T3

In deciding the Abrahamsen defendants' motion for sanctions against 

plaintiffs, the judge stated: 

I do think it's a close call. I don't think its mere 

speculation. . . . I think there was some indicia that 

defamation could have occurred. It didn’t. And I agree. 

But – but, you know, [plaintiffs] also ha[d] a problem 

with obtaining a memo which . . . is the smoking gun 

that, in fact, wasn't smoking. But the only way to obtain 

it would have been to file litigation. And, obviously, 

through discovery or subpoena power [plaintiffs have] 

been able to obtain it through that method. He did. And 

then he dropped his complaint. 

The judge found plaintiffs never conceded the defamation action was without 

merit. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the defamation action after obtaining the 

Abrahamsen memorandum (sixteen months after requesting a copy of that 

document) and deposing several representatives of Mariner's Bank. Only after 

receipt of the Abrahamsen memorandum and completion of depositions in July 

2016 did plaintiffs conclude they lacked direct or admissible evidence to prove 

their claims in the defamation action. 

Plaintiffs' claims were not frivolous. Based on circumstantial evidence, 

plaintiffs believed the Abrahamsen memorandum resulted in the loss of 

Mariner's Bank as a client, facts sufficient to establish a claim for defamation 

and tortious interference against one or more defendants. Based on the refusal 

of the Abrahamsen defendants to provide the Abrahamsen memorandum, 
19 A-1740-16T3

plaintiffs had a good faith basis as to the merits of their claims, and the complaint 

was not frivolous under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-29.1 or Rule 1:4-8. 

We next review the Abrahamsen defendants' argument related to the 

judge's denial of indemnification from the Sekas defendants. The judge 

determined the indemnification issue should be resolved in the dissolution 

action, not the defamation action. Rule 4:38-2 "vest[s] [a] determination 

whether or not to sever claims to the sound exercise of a trial court's discretion." 

Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 310 (1995). 

The judge denied the Abrahamsen defendants' motion to consolidate the 

defamation action with the dissolution action, finding the matters "do not share 

'the same transaction or series of transactions' warranting consolidation under 

Rule 4:38-1." The judge then dismissed the Abrahamsen defendants' third-party 

complaint against the Sekas defendants seeking indemnification. The judge 

noted the Abrahamsen defendants could seek indemnification from S&A in the 

dissolution action as that court had "appropriate venue" to decide the issue and 

was the forum where the "matter properly belongs." The judge instructed that 

the indemnification issue be determined in the dissolution action, and denied the 

motion without prejudice to allow the filing of the indemnification claim in the 

dissolution action. We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision 
20 A-1740-16T3

directing the Abrahamsen defendants to pursue their claim for indemnification 

in the dissolution action rather than the defamation action.

We turn to the claim by the Abrahamsen defendants that the judge abused 

his discretion in denying various discovery requests in the defamation action. 

The Abrahamsen defendants did not appeal from the order dismissing the 

defamation action. When a party fails to appeal from the dismissal of an action, 

that party is barred from appealing any prior adverse discovery orders. Mac 

Auto Imports, Inc. v. Jaguar Cars, 244 N.J. Super. 254, 257 (App. Div. 1990). 

"Discovery is provided to prepare for trial. In light of plaintiff's dismissal of its 

complaint, there will be no trial. Thus, the discovery issues are moot." Ibid.

As the claims against the Abrahamsen defendants were extinguished by the 

execution of a stipulation of dismissal, the Abrahamsen defendants have no 

reason to obtain discovery, and their appeal of any discovery orders is moot.6 

Lastly, we address the argument that the judge's orders should be vacated 

based on his law clerk's subsequent employment with Sekas Law Group. 

"[A]ppellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly 

 

6

 Because we decline to address the Abrahamsen defendants' appeal of 

discovery orders as moot, we similarly decline to address the Abrahamsen 

defendants' appeal of the judge's orders related to the issuance of protective 

orders and the quashing of subpoenas.
21 A-1740-16T3

presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is 

available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the 

trial court or concern matters of great public importance." Nieder v. Royal 

Indemnity Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (internal citation omitted). The 

Abrahamsen defendants never raised the issue to the trial court despite the

motion for reconsideration being heard several months after the law clerk began 

his employment with Sekas. Because the question does not relate to jurisdiction 

or constitute a matter of great public importance, we decline to reach this issue 

on appeal. Moreover, the judge who issued most of the orders in the defamation 

action did not issue any orders after February 2016. Therefore, there is no 

evidence in the record the judge was influenced by his law clerk's acceptance of 

a job with Sekas in or around April 2016. 

Affirmed.