J-S24034-17, J-S24035-17, J-S24036-17

2017 PA Super 117

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

GREGG ANDREW TCHIRKOW 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1602 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered September 28, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0003939-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

GREGG ANDREW TCHIRKOW 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1807 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered October 18, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0003939-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

GREGG ANDRES TCHIRKOW 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1808 WDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 24, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County 
J-S24034-17, J-S24035-17, J-S24036-17

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Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0003939-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 21, 2017

This case involves three separate appeals1from matters arising 

following Gregg Andrew Tchirkow’s (hereinafter “Appellant”) pro se filing of 

his first petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act2in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Westmoreland County. For the reasons that follow, we 

find that the Orders entered on September 28, 2016, and October 18, 2016, 

were not final orders and that Appellant’s failure to make any coherent legal 

arguments in his appellate brief and to meet other requirements prevents us 

from providing meaningful review of his appeal from the PCRA Order entered 

on October 24, 2016.3 Accordingly, we quash these pro se appeals. 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This Court sua sponte consolidated these appeals for ease of review.

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

3

For example, Appellant’s “Table of Authorities” lists three: “1. The 

development team behind ‘Miami Vice.’ 2. The Lord our God. 3. The 

‘Constitution.’” Appellant’s Brief at 2 (unnumbered). In addition, Appellant’s 

Statement of Jurisdiction reads as follows: 

First I would like to say that AL Yerkovac has jurisdiction 

over the best television show of all time, “Miami Vice.” Ground 

breaking and ahead of its time. Especially the episodes directed 

by Don Johnson shot in film noir. They perfectly embody the 

steamy and sultry Miami twilight. A show most likely written by 

former cocaine dealers about cops chasing cocaine dealers. Pure 

genius.

On a topic that is a distant second in importance, the 

Honorable Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The background of this case is a procedural quagmire due chiefly to 

Appellant's myriad pro se filings. We confine our recitation of the procedural 

history and facts to only the pertinent background we have gleaned upon 

our review of the certified record as follows: In a Criminal Information filed 

on October 17, 2014, Appellant and his codefendant brother, Stephen 

Tchirkow, were charged with several violations of The Controlled Substance, 

Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act following a shooting.4 On March 2, 2015, 

Appellant entered a guilty plea to Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession with 

Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance (marijuana) and to Possession of 

Drug Paraphernalia. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation and 

indicated sentencing would be held within ninety (90) days. N.T. Guilty Plea, 

3/2/15, at 6. 

On June 8, 2015, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate prison 

term of eighteen (18) months to thirty-six (36) months with credit for time 

served along with two years’ probation to be served consecutively. 

Appellant filed his “Motion to Reconsider Sentence at Count 3,” and upon 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

over the instant matter pursuant to the Constitution of the 

United States of America. However, you are free to throw in 

your own two cents. 

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (unnumbered). Appellant has submitted the same brief 

in support of his appeal from all three orders. 

4

 35 P.S. 780-113 §§ (a)(30), (16), and (32). A separately filed charge of 

Aggravated Assault was dismissed as result of the refusal of Appellant and 

his brother to testify against each other at their preliminary hearing. A 

Person not to possess firearm charge ultimately was dismissed as well. 
J-S24034-17, J-S24035-17, J-S24036-17

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consideration thereof, the trial court granted the motion. In its Order filed 

on June 19, 2015, the court amended its June 8, 2015, Order to reflect that 

Appellant’s length of probation at Count 3 shall be one (1) year of state 

probation; the court further directed that all other terms of its June 8, 2015, 

Order remained the same. Appellant did not file a direct appeal, and trial 

counsel’s motion to withdraw his appearance was granted on August 27, 

2015. 

On February 22, 2016, Appellant filed a PCRA petition pro se. 

Counsel was appointed and filed an Amended Petition for Post Conviction 

Relief on April 25, 2016, wherein he averred Appellant’s constitutional rights 

had been violated and that plea counsel had been ineffective. The PCRA 

court conducted an evidentiary hearing on May 26, 2016. Prior to the 

commencement thereof, Appellant demanded that Attorney Timothy 

Andrews be dismissed as his counsel. The PCRA court granted Attorney 

Andrews leave to withdraw as counsel and permitted Appellant to proceed 

with the evidentiary hearing pro se. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 5/26/16, at 10-12. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the PCRA court indicated Appellant would 

have thirty days from the date upon which he received the transcript of the 

proceeding to file a brief, and the Commonwealth was directed to respond 

within thirty days thereafter. 

On June 23, 2016, Appellant filed pro se his “Petition for post 

conviction relief appeal for immediate dismissal of charges and release from 
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custody” which the PCRA court treated as an amended PCRA petition. On 

July 11, 2016, the Commonwealth filed its response thereto. On July 27, 

2016, Appellant filed an “Amendment to the Amended Post-Conviction Relief 

Appeal Petition,” wherein he requested a second evidentiary hearing. On 

July 29, 2016, the Commonwealth filed its response to Appellant's 

Amendment. On August 25, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se Motion for New 

Counsel, and the PCRA court held a hearing thereon on September 9, 2016. 

At that time, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s motion for appointment of 

counsel and re-appointed Attorney Andrews. Pursuant to Appellant’s 

subsequent demand, Attorney Andrews filed a motion to withdraw. 

On September 26, 2016, the PCRA court held a hearing on Attorney 

Andrews’ motion to withdraw. At that time, Attorney Andrews explained 

Appellant had left a voicemail message at his office indicating he did not 

want counsel to act on his behalf in the PCRA proceedings and sent a letter 

directing counsel to withdraw immediately. Appellant expressed the same 

sentiment in an email sent on his behalf by his sister to Attorney Andrews; 

consequently, Attorney Andrews filed his motion to withdraw. N.T. PCRA 

Hearing, 9/26/16, at 2-3. The PCRA court proceeded to conduct a colloquy 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 at which time it inquired as to whether 
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Appellant understood the ramifications of proceeding pro se. Id. at 9-10.5 

At various times throughout the proceeding, Appellant requested new 

counsel. 6 The PCRA court stated that it had appointed him counsel as it was 

required to do. Id. at 6-8, 13. 7 The PCRA court further advised Appellant 

that he had the choice to proceed with current court-appointed counsel or 

pro se. Id. at 4-8, 11. Appellant stated that he wanted to proceed pro se. 

Id. at 12. After further discussion with Appellant and Attorney Andrews, the 

PCRA court found the two had no irreconcilable differences and determined 

there were no substantial reasons to appoint new counsel. Id. at 14.

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(C) provides that “[w]hen the defendant seeks to waive 

the right to counsel after the preliminary hearing, the judge shall ascertain 

from the defendant, on the record, whether this is a knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent waiver of counsel.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(C).

6

In its Notice of Intention to Dismiss for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief the 

PCRA court stressed that “[Appellant] has continuously and irrationally 

argued with counsel and the [c]ourt during all proceedings. [Appellant] has 

demonstrated to the [c]ourt that he will not cooperate with any attorney 

who does not strictly follow his instructions to litigate and argue all claims 

brought forth by him, despite the claims’ lack of merit.” Notice of Intention 

to Dismiss for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief, filed 9/28/16, at 3 n. 1. 

7 An indigent petitioner is entitled to assistance of counsel throughout the 

entire appellate process including a first petition filed pursuant to the PCRA. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C); Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 100 

(Pa.Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Notwithstanding, were the PCRA court 

to have granted Appellant’s request for new counsel, such action would have 

constituted a third court-appointed attorney. Upon our review of the record 

herein, we are satisfied that the PCRA court repeatedly provided Appellant 

with the assistance of competent counsel and that Appellant knowingly and 

voluntarily expressed his desire to proceed pro se. 
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 On September 28, 2016, the PCRA court filed its Notice of Intention to 

Dismiss for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief. Therein, the court indicated it 

had reviewed the record along with Appellant’s PCRA and Amended PCRA 

petitions and ultimately concluded there were no genuine issues concerning 

any material fact and that, consequently, Appellant was not entitled to relief 

under the PCRA. See Notice of Intention to Dismiss for Post-Conviction 

Collateral Relief, filed 9/28/16, at 3-10. On October 12, 2016, Appellant 

filed his “Response to Notice of intention to dismiss Motion for Postconviction Collateral Relief.” In its Order entered on October 24, 2016, the 

PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition, and Appellant filed a timely 

notice of appeal on November 14, 2016. 

Throughout the course of the proceeding, Appellant filed numerous pro 

se motions. Among them was his “Petition for Transcripts and Court 

Records” filed on September 23, 2016.8 In its Order entered on September 

28, 2016, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Appellant’s 

petition and in doing so stated the following:

This [c]ourt enclosed a copy of the G[uilty]P[lea] Hearing 

on 3/31/16 for [Appellant]. This [c]ourt enclosed a copy of the 

____________________________________________

8 While the document is time-stamped September 28, 2016, it is 

accompanied by an envelope postmarked September 23, 2016; thus,

pursuant to the “prisoner mailbox rule,” we shall deem the petition to have 

been filed on September 23, 2016. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 931 

A.2d 710 (Pa.Super. 2007) (discussing prisoner mailbox rule).
J-S24034-17, J-S24035-17, J-S24036-17

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Sentencing Hearing on 7/10/15 for [Appellant]. This [c]ourt also 

enclosed the Motion to Withdraw hearing transcript held on 

9/26/16. Regarding the Prelim[inary] Hearing transcript held 

9/5/14, this [c]ourt informed [Appellant], that the charges were 

Dismissed and the transcript was never requested by Defense or 

C[ommon] W[ealth], the digital recording of said hearing has 

been purged per policy of the Westmoreland Co. CAO. 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the PCRA court’s September 28, 

2016, Order with this Court on September 29, 2016. In doing so, Appellant 

indicated his appeal lay from the PCRA court’s order entered on September 

9, 2016, disposing of his petition for the appointment of counsel; however, a 

review of the docket entries reveals that in its Order entered on September 

9, 2016, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s motion for appointment of 

counsel and provided that “Attorney Tim Andrews will be re-appointed as 

counsel on this case. Counsel has 60 days to submit an amended brief in 

support of [Appellant’s] PCRA Petition.” 

In addition, on October 11, 2016, Appellant filed a “Petition for 

Records.” Therein he requested “all crime scene photos associated with 

incident #RI14-148” and indicated his belief that he is “entitled to any and 

all evidence in any case that has been brought before any court on my 

behalf.” Appellant posited the fact that trial counsel had not requested these 

items “further proves his incompetence.” The PCRA court ordered the 

Commonwealth to file a response to Appellant’s petition, and the 

Commonwealth did so on October 13, 2016. In its Order entered on October 

18, 2016, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s Petition for Records. Appellant 
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filed a notice of appeal on October 18, 2016, wherein he indicated he was 

appealing from the trial court’s order entered “on the 27th day of September, 

2016, refusing to provide [Appellant] transcripts of his preliminary hearing 

held on the 5th of September 2014.” 

Initially, prior to addressing any issues Appellant presents on appeal, 

we must determine whether the PCRA court’s September 28, 2016, and 

October 18, 2016, Orders are final orders. As this Court recently has held:

“The appealability of an order directly implicates the 

jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order.” Estate of 

Considine v. Wachovia Bank, 966 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa.Super. 

2009). “[T]his Court has the power to inquire at any time, sua 

sponte, whether an order is appealable.” Id.; Stanton v. 

Lackawanna Energy, Ltd., 915 A.2d 668, 673 (Pa.Super. 

2007). Pennsylvania law makes clear:

[A]n appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or 

an order certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); 

(2) an interlocutory order as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); 

(3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 

312, 1311, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)); or (4) a 

collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313).

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 defines “final 

orders” and states:

Rule 341. Final Orders; Generally

(a) General rule. Except as prescribed in 

subdivisions (d), and (e) of this rule, an appeal may 

be taken as of right from any final order of an 

administrative agency or lower court.

(b) Definition of final order. A final order is any 

order that:

(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or

(2) is expressly defined as a final order by statute; 

or

(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision 

(c) of this rule.

(c) Determination of finality. When more than 

one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether 

as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
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claim...the trial court...may enter a final order as to 

one or more but fewer than all of the claims...only 

upon an express determination that an immediate 

appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. 

Such an order becomes appealable when entered. In 

the absence of such a determination and entry of a 

final order, any order...that adjudicates fewer than 

all the claims...shall not constitute a final order[.]

Pa.R.A.P. 341(a)–(c). [Thus,] [u]nder Rule 341, a final order 

can be one that disposes of all the parties and all the claims, is 

expressly defined as a final order by statute, or is entered as a 

final order pursuant to the trial court's determination under Rule 

341(c).

Bloome v. Alan, 154 A.3d 1271, 1273-74 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant’s petition for transcripts and his petition for 

records were filed while his PCRA petition was pending. Accordingly, until 

Appellant obtained the PCRA court’s determination of finality of his PCRA 

petition, this Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeals as filed. For 

this reason, we quash Appellant’s purported appeals from the Orders 

entered on September 28, 2016, and October 18, 2016; however, as 

Appellant’s timely appeal from the PCRA court’s Order of October 24, 2016, 

was an appeal from a final order, we next turn to a consideration of the 

issues Appellant presents with regard thereto. 

Initially, we note that Appellate briefs must conform materially to the 

requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this 

Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if the defect in the brief is substantial. 

Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 497-98 (Pa.Super. 2005); 
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Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials 

filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special benefit. 

Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural rules set forth 

in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 

A.2d 245, 251-52 (Pa.Super. 2003). “This Court will not act as counsel and 

will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Coulter v. 

Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa.Super. 2014).

The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide guidelines 

regarding the required content of an appellate brief as follows:

Rule 2111. Brief of the Appellant

(a) General Rule. --The brief of the appellant, except as 

otherwise prescribed by these rules, shall consist of the 

following matters, separately and distinctly entitled and in the 

following order:

(1) Statement of jurisdiction.

(2) Order or other determination in question.

(3) Statement of both the scope of review and the 

standard of review.

(4) Statement of the question involved.

(5) Statement of the case.

(6) Summary of argument.

(7) Statement of the reasons to allow an appeal to 

challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence, if applicable. 

(8) Argument for the appellant.

(9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.

(10) The opinions and pleadings specified in Subdivisions 

(b) and (c) of this rule.

(11) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, filed with the trial court 

pursuant to Rule 1925(b), or an averment that no order 

requiring a statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was entered.
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Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1)–(10) (emphasis added). Rules 2114 through 2119 

detail the material to be included in briefs on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2114–

2119. Specifically, Rule 2119 addresses the argument section of appellate 

briefs and provides, in part, as follows:

Rule 2119. Argument

(a) General rule. The argument shall be divided into as many 

parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have 

... such discussion and citation of authorities as are 

deemed pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

It is well-established that “[w]hen issues are not properly raised and 

developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present 

specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits thereof.” 

Commonwealth v. Sanford, 445 A.2d 149, 150 (Pa.Super. 1981). 

Herein, Appellant's brief not only fails to provide any coherent legal 

arguments, but it also utterly fails to comply with our rules of appellate 

procedure. For example, Appellant’s “Statement of Question[s] Presented” 

reads verbatim as follows: 

Whether or not armed banditos can break into and ransack a 

wounded man’s Home, file false paperwork in a pirate court, 

plant false propaganda in the local media outlets to bias public 

opinion and a potential jury, then assigning a money grubbing 

bootlicking saboteur, Michael Dematt, to derail a case all while 

you are severely injured, held in solitary confinement and denied 

your legally prescribed psychiatric medication, releasing the 

scum who shot you in your own home, essentially rewarding 

them for their act of drunken violence.
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Finally, assigning another saboteur for a PCRA hearing, that, at 

the behest of the district attorney purposefully tries to bungle 

your release. When you catch them in the act, you are denied 

counsel outright; they ran out of bootlicking saboteurs.

And, whether or not delicious freshly squeezed Florida orange 

juice should be the new natural beverage. 

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnumbered) (unnecessary capitalization and boldface 

type omitted). 

In addition, the entirety of Appellant’s argument is comprised of one 

sentence: “I have been abducted and the cost of my captivity are, at this 

very moment, being extorted from the good people of the United States and 

being used to fund terrorism.” Id. at 9 (unnumbered). 

Because of the considerable defects in Appellant’s brief, we are unable 

to perform appellate review. We, thus, quash the appeal from the PCRA 

Order entered on October 24, 2016. 

Appeals quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2017