Al-Anbar Awakening

Volume II

Iraqi Perspectives

From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency

in Iraq, 2004-2009

Edited by

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Marine Corps University

United States Marine Corps

Quantico, Virginia

2009
Marine Corps University Press

3078 Upshur Avenue

Quantico, VA

22134

1st Printing, 2009

PCN 10600001200
Al-Anbar Awakening

Volume II

Iraqi Perspectives

From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq

2004-2009

Edited by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery and

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A View of Daily Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Interview 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Miriam (pseudonym)

Religious Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Interview 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Dr. Mamer Ibrahim Tahir al-Assafi and

Sheikh Abdullah Jallal Mukhif al-Faraji

Tribal Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Interview 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Sheikh Ahmad Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi

Interview 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Sheikh Wissam Abd al-Ibrahim al-Hardan

al-Aeithawi

Interview 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Sheikh Jassim Muhammad Saleh al-Suwadawi

and Sheikh Abdul Rahman Janabi
Interview 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Sheikh Aifan Sadun al-Issawi

Interview 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .106

Sheikh Ali Hatim Abd al-Razzaq Ali

al-Sulayman

Interview 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120

Sheikh Majed Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman

Interview 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138

Sheikh Sabah al-Sattam Effan Fahran

al-Shurji al-Aziz

Political Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148

Interview 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150

Governor Mamoun Sami Rashid al-Alwani

Interview 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162

Mr. Kamis Ahmad Abban al-Alwani

Perspectives of the New Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . .176

Interview 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .178

Major General Tariq Yusif Mohammad

al-Miyabi

Interview 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .194

Staff Brigadier General Nuri al-Din Abd

al-Karim Mukhlif al-Fahadawi and

Colonel Said Muhammed Muad al-Fahadawi

Interview 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

Staff Major General Abdullah Mohammad

Badir al-Jaburi

Interview 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

Staff Brigadier General Haqi Isma’eel Ali

Hameed

Interview 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

Staff Colonel Abbas Ayed Radad
Perspectives of Former Regime Elements . . . . . . . . . . 246

Interview 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

Staff Major General Jasim Muhammad Salih

Habib

Interview 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

Staff Major General Khadim Muhammad

Faris al-Fahadawi al-Dulaymi

Interview 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

Lieutenant General Raad al-Hamdani,

Lieutenant General Abdul Aziz Abdul Rahman,

Major General Ghazi Khudrilyas,

Brigadier General Muhammed al-Azzawi,

and Ambassador Sa’doon J. al-Zubaydi

Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312

Foreword

by Major General John F. Kelly

Words like “won” or “victory” really do not apply when speaking

of counterinsurgency operations. Insurgencies grow from problems

and discontent within a given society. Solve the problems, and the

insurgency goes away, as opposed to being defeated. ^e difficulty is

that a government is not always willing to address the root causes of

the insurgency because it is often the government itself that the

insurgents want to eliminate.

In Iraq to a very large degree,

we—the U.S. military and civilians—

were the source of the insurgency.

Honest men and women can argue

the whys, what-ifs, and what mighthave-beens, but ultimately, it was

mostly about unfulfilled promises

and the heavy-handed military

approach taken by some over the

summer of 2003 that caused events

to spiral out of control. No doubt the

insurgency radicalized over time with

al-Qaeda and Shi’a extremists

playing a key role, but the insurgents

did not initiate the war and only took

advantage of the discontent.

If you asked Anbaris during my third tour in Iraq in 2008 why

the insurgency began, most would look away and try to find a way not

to answer.^ey would tell you that “we are friends now, and the causes

are unimportant. It’s all water under the bridge now.” If pressed, they

would talk about mutual misunderstandings and a lack of cultural

awareness on both sides. ^ey would say that expectations were too

high on the part of the Iraqis about what America could do for them

and how fast, but they seldom if ever blamed us directly. Press them

further and they would mention the 29 April 2003 “massacre” in

Fallujah, but more about the lack of an apology than the 70-plus

unarmed citizens allegedly shot that day.

vii
Another factor they would bring up was the shock and

humiliation of having their army disbanded. ^e army was the one

institution in Iraq everyone was proud of—Shi’a and Sunni alike—

especially for what it had accomplished in protecting the nation against

the Iranians in the 1980s.^ey perceived the disbanding as intentional

contempt directed toward Iraq as a nation and as a people. ^ey also

saw it as the disarming of the nation. In the minds of many, this is

when our status as liberators ended and that of occupier began.

Press the Anbaris one more time, and they would look you in the

eye—but only if you are considered a friend—and they would state

that after Baghdad fell and throughout the summer of 2003, the

Americans overreacted to small acts of resistance or violence and

fought in a way that was cowardly and without honor. Here they would

talk about the senseless use of firepower and midnight raids on

innocent men. ^ey said that by our escalation, we proved true the

rhetoric of the nationalist firebrands about why we had invaded, and

our actions played directly into the hands of organizations like

Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq and Sadr’s militia.

Ask the same Anbari citizens why sometime in 2006 they began

to turn against the by-then al-Qaeda-led insurgency, and the answer

would be more direct. To them, their alliance with the radicals was a

marriage of convenience to fight the U.S. occupation. Al-Qaeda

brought dedication, organization, funding, and a willingness to die.

Over time, however, it overplayed its hand and wore out its welcome

by forcing an extreme Islamic agenda on a generally secular and very

tribal culture. Al-Qaeda’s campaign evolved from assistance, to

persuasion, to intimidation, to murder in the most horrific ways, all

designed to intimidate Anbari society—tribes and sheikhs alike—to

adopt the most extreme form of Islam. At a certain point, al-Qaeda’s

agenda became too much for the average Anbari to bear. It was

increasingly directed at the sheikhs themselves, and just as importantly,

it began to have an impact on the business interests of tribal leaders.

^e 17 paramount-dignified sheikhs of the major Anbari tribes

and tribal federation turned away from al-Qaeda for survival

purposes and toward U.S. forces for the same reason. ^ey will tell

you that Iraqis were being hunted down and killed by both the

terrorists and the Coalition forces in Anbar. ^ey knew the

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Al-Anbar Awakening
unbending terrorists would never meet them halfway, but they were

confident that the Americans would—and they were right. Many of

these men were once as much a part of the insurgency as Zarqawi

was, albeit for different reasons. Over time, it became glaringly

obvious to them that it was in their personal interests, and the

interests of their tribes, to put a stop to the war.

When I returned to Iraq in February 2008 as commander of I

Marine Expeditionary Force and Multi National Force-West (MNFW), I was amazed at what I found. Violent incidents, once over 400 a

week in al-Anbar Province, were down to 50 and had been in steady

decline for months. Where Iraqis once avoided us, as any interaction

jeopardized their lives and those of their families at the hands of alQaeda terrorists or nationalist insurgents, they were now aggressive in

wanting to engage with us. ^ings had turned. ^e obvious questions

were why had the change occurred, and was it sustainable, or was it

simply due to an operational pause in the insurgent’s effort? For months,

Major General Walt Gaskin and his superb II Marine Expeditionary

Force team, our immediate predecessors as MNF-W, had been wrestling

with the answers. ^eir conclusions were ours to verify.

For MNF-W’s part, since March 2004 we had extended the hand

of friendship and cooperation, even as we were forced into a brutal

fight that knew no quarter on the part of the Iraqi insurgents and

foreign fighters. It was the major theme of our campaign plan, and it

never changed. ^e command philosophy, a philosophy programmed

into every Marine and U.S. Army unit that served in al-Anbar since we

took the province, was that we had come to Iraq not to conquer, but

to free, that we would always endeavor to “first, do not harm.”^is was

often difficult, and sometimes you simply had to do a Fallujah II, even

if Fallujah I had been ill-advised and totally counterproductive to what

you were trying to do in the first place.

No single personality was the key in Anbar, no shiny new field

manual the reason why, and no “surge” or single unit made it happen.

It was a combination of many factors, not the least of which—perhaps

the most important—was the consistent command philosophy that

drove operations in Anbar from March 2004 forward. Each MNF-W

commander and the troops under him continued to build upon the

work of all those who came before.^ey took what their predecessors

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Iraqi Perspectives
had done and ran with it, calling audibles as opportunities presented

themselves. Consistency counts, and persistent presence on your feet

puts you in more danger, no doubt, but also stacks the deck in your

favor as you see more, hear more, know more, and engage more. It is

these Americans—Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen, as well as

civilians—who deserve the individual and collective credit for our part

in the miracle that took place in al-Anbar Province.^ey slogged it out

for more than six years to help the Anbaris create a miracle that spread

to other regions of the country in late 2007, throughout 2008, and now

into 2009.

I urge a note of caution to those who might have an overly inflated

opinion of the role they played in the Awakening, or to the “experts”

who write today as if they, with complete clairvoyance, predicted the

change in loyalties in al-Anbar. ^e sheikhs, politicians, Iraqi security

force officials, and even the former Ba’athist members of the military

who reside in Anbar have a different opinion.^ey will tell you it was

the sense of hopelessness the war had brought to the citizenry. ^e

only hope for the future they could see was to be found in what

members of MNF-W had done and were doing on their behalf despite

the heat, the criticism from home, and the killing and casualties.^ey

began to see us as a force that was sharing in their agony. Once they

tried reaching out to some soldier or Marine’s outstretched hand in

friendship, it was over.

^e interviews collected in the two volumes of this anthology do

what no previous work has done—they attempt to tell the story of the

al-Anbar Awakening from both sides, American and Iraqi. Not all the

voices could be included, but there are many pertinent ones.^e story

they tell is a complex but important one, and it should be read with

interest by all who want to truly understand what happened in Iraq

between 2004 and 2009.

John F. Kelly

Major General, U.S. Marine Corps

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Al-Anbar Awakening
Preface

^is two-volume anthology of interviews tells the story of the

al-Anbar Awakening and the emergence of al-Anbar Province from

the throes of insurgency. It presents the perspectives of both Iraqis

(volume two) and Americans (volume one) who ultimately came to

work together, in an unlikely alliance of former adversaries, for the

stabilization and redevelopment of the province. ^e collection

begins in the 2003-2004 time frame with the rise of the insurgency

and concludes with observations from the vantage point of earlyto-mid 2009.

^e anthology demonstrates that there is not one history of the

Awakening, but several histories intertwined. It is not a complete

collection, but one that provides a broad spectrum of candid,

unvarnished perspectives from some of the leading players.

^e American volume focuses on the roles and views of U.S.

Marines, who were the primary Coalition force in al-Anbar from

spring 2004 onward. At the time of their arrival, many military experts

considered the province irredeemable. ^is collection chronicles the

efforts of the Marines, and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and civilians

who worked with them, to consistently employ counterinsurgency

tactics and to continue to reach out to the Iraqis during even the

darkest days of the insurgency.

^e Iraqi volume collects from many of the key Awakening

players their views on how and why Anbaris came to turn against the

insurgency that many had initially supported and seek the aid—both

military and economic—of the Americans.^ose interviewed include

former Ba’ath Party military officers, senior officers in Iraq’s new

military, tribal sheikhs, Sunni imams, governmental representatives,

and civilians.

^is anthology is drawn from oral history interviews collected by

field historians of the U.S. Marine Corps History Division, based at

Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. Field historians

assigned to the History Division have collected hundreds of interviews

since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom I to serve as primary

resources for future scholarship. In support of this anthology project,

xi

Iraqi Perspectives
Colonel Gary W. Montgomery and Chief Warrant Office-4 Timothy

S. McWilliams deployed to Iraq in February and March of 2009 to

interview Iraqis and additional American military and civilian

personnel. Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler had conducted more

than 400 interviews in earlier deployments.

Like courtroom testimonies, oral histories are told from one

person’s perspective and may include discrepancies with, or even

contradictions of, another witness’s views. ^ey are not a complete

history, but they provide the outlines for one, to be fleshed out with

documents and other sources not often collected or declassified this

soon after events.

^e interviews in this collection are edited excerpts drawn from

longer interviews.^ey have been transcribed and edited according to

scholarly standards to maintain the integrity of the interviews. Only

interjections, false starts, and profanity have been silently omitted.

Details added for clarity and accuracy are indicated by brackets.

Omissions are noted by three-dot ellipses for partial sentences and

four-dot ellipses for full sentences or more. With the Iraqi interviews,

the interchange with interpreters has been omitted except in a few

cases where the interpreter is attempting to clarify a point. Much of

what has been left out of the American interviews is material that is

duplicated in other interviews in the anthology.^e full interviews and

complete transcripts are part of the oral history collection of the

Marine Corps History Division.

Ranks of officers, particularly American officers, reflect the rank at

the time of the deployment under discussion. We have not tried to insert

“then”in front of the ranks of all officers who have since been promoted.

We have attempted to verify the Iraqi person, place, and tribe names

as best as possible, but undoubtedly there are several discrepancies,

particularly in the Iraqi volume, where language barriers, dialects, the

use of interpreters, and the mentions of many minor actors and areas

made accurate transcription and identification challenging. ^ere are

also many variations in the transliteration of Iraqi names and terms.

* * *

xii

Al-Anbar Awakening
^e editors of this anthology acknowledge and thank a wide array

of people for their support on this project. First and foremost, we thank

the people whose stories are included for their time and candor. We

particularly acknowledge Major General John F. Kelly, who wrote the

foreword and who expedited the 2009 deployment of Colonel

Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 McWilliams. In addition

to the editors, those who conducted interviews included in the

anthology are Colonel Jeffrey Acosta, Colonel Stephen E. Motsco,

Colonel Michael D. Visconage, Lieutenant Colonel Craig H. Covert,

Lieutenant Colonel John P. Piedmont, Lieutenant Colonel John R.

Way, Staff Sergeant Bradford A. Wineman, Dr. David B. Crist, and

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer.

Dr. Neimeyer, director of the History Division; Mr. Charles D.

Melson, chief historian; and Dr. Nathan S. Lowery, Field History

branch head, provided guidance for the project. Mr. Kenneth H.

Williams, senior editor for both the History Division and Marine

Corps University Press, oversaw the editing and publication, assisted

in the editing by Ms. Wanda J. Renfrow. Mr. Vincent J. Martinez

provided layout and design for both volumes. Mr. Anthony R.

Taglianetti, the History Division’s oral historian, coordinated the timely

transcription of the interviews. Lieutenant Colonel David A. Benhoff

and Gunnery Sergeant Michael C. Coachman provided logistical

support. Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser, History Division historian, and Mr.

Colin M. Colbourn, History Division intern, helped verify information.

Beyond the History Division, we are especially grateful to the

interpreters.^ose currently working in Iraq shall remain anonymous

because of the inherent vulnerabilities peculiar to their vocation.

Sometimes underappreciated and often overworked, their knowledge

and perseverance was absolutely essential to our effort.

Many others labored to bring this project to fruition. ^ose who

work outside of the normal publishing process are listed below. If we

omitted anyone, it was inadvertent and not from lack of gratitude.

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Multi National Forces-West):

Lieutenant Colonel Bradley E. Weisz (G-3 Air Officer);

Lieutenant Colonel Todd W. Lyons (G-9 Foreign Affairs

Officer/Marine Corps Intelligence Activity); Major Adam T.

Strickland (Engagement Officer); 1st Lieutenant Timothy J.

xiii

Iraqi Perspectives
Malham (Economic and Political Intelligence Center);

Sergeant Luke O. Vancleave (Economic and Political

Intelligence Center); Corporal Travis L. Helm (Economic

and Political Intelligence Center); Corporal Lamont J. Lum

(Economic and Political Intelligence Center); Lance Corporal

Cassidy C. Niblett (Economic and Political Intelligence

Center); Lance Corporal Orell D. Fisher (Economic and

Political Intelligence Center).

II Marine Expeditionary Force: Colonel Robert W. Lanham

(G-9 Assistant Chief of Staff ); Lieutenant Colonel Bowen

Richwine (G-9 Engagements OIC); Major Steven K.

Barriger (G-9 Governance); 2d Lieutenant Anthony M.

Bramante (Economic and Political Intelligence Center); Staff

Sergeant William J. Rickards (G-9 Support); Sergeant Robert

A. Pittenridge (G-9 Governance); Lance Corporal ^omas

P. Wiltshire (Combat Camera); “Jack” Mahmood S. AlJumaily (Interpreter); Mythm Hassin (Interpreter).

Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Quantico:

Mr. Richard C. McPherson; Ms. Basema Maki (Interpreter);

Mr. Hamid Lellou (Interpreter).

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Quantico: Colonel Philip

D. Gentile (Commanding Officer); Mr. Dan J. Darling

(^reat Analyst).

U.S. Marine Corps MARCENT LNO Cell, Kuwait: Gunnery

Sergeant John M. Neatherton.

Marine Air-Ground Combat Training Center, Twentynine

Palms, California: Staff Sergeant Michael A. Blaha (Combat

Camera); Lance Corporal Ricky J. Holt (Combat Camera).

Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California: Captain

Scott M. Clendaniel (Aide to General Kelly); Sergeant Eric

L. Alabiso II (Combat Camera).

xiv

Al-Anbar Awakening
xv

Iraqi Perspectives
xvi
Introduction

I cannot describe the horror we lived in. Mose were very bitter days. Mose

days we lived in hell. We looked like ghosts out of a cemetery. We were very

tired. We had a lot of complaints to take to the Coalition forces, but we were

afraid. Some days we wished to be dead just to be rested. But I have seven

children. I was very tired.

Miriam, wife of a police officer,

describing life under al-Qaeda rule1

In an insurgency, the populace

is the battlefield, and victory for the

insurgent or the counterinsurgent

tends toward the side better able to

understand, influence, exploit, and

satisfy the interests of the populace.

Consequently, Miriam and

hundreds of thousands of largely

anonymous Anbaris were the final

arbiters of the great issues of this

period. So to understand the

development of the insurgency, the

rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and the alAnbar Awakening, one must first

understand the Anbaris.2

1

1. All block quotations in the introduction are from interviews in this volume. “Miriam” is a

pseudonym for the first interviewee in the book.

2 ^is introduction is significantly informed by a massive report compiled by Marine Corps

Intelligence Activity, “Study of the Insurgency in Anbar Province, Iraq,” dated 13 June 2007.
The Anbaris

We are a country that is transforming from Bedouin to civilization. We

depend on the elite and the notable. And these elite people are the link

between us and you, the Americans. Where are the elite people? Where are

the notable people? Me civilization gap between us, I can say it reaches up

to 200 years. Who is responsible for closing this gap between us? So you are

the people who came from the future, and the elite people we’re talking about

understand you and understand Iraqi society.

General Ra’ad al-Hamdani

Former Republican Guard Corps Commander

General Ra’ad was referring to Iraq as a whole, but his comments

are especially applicable to al-Anbar Province. Nearly all Anbaris are

Sunni Arabs, and Sunni Arab elites have governed the Mesopotamian

region for almost 500 years, first as surrogates under the Ottoman and

British empires, and then outright in an independent Iraq. ^ey had

greater access to education, more opportunities for employment, and

dominated the higher levels of government and the military. Over

time, many developed a sense of entitlement and superiority relative to

other Iraqis, and perhaps even a belief that they are the only ones

capable of governing Iraq. If one’s objective is a unified Iraq, then the

latter opinion is also logical: the Kurds, though Sunnis, have strong

separatist tendencies; and the Shi’a, though Arabs, are coreligionists

with Iran, which is Iraq’s arch enemy.

While al-Anbar’s elites may be world-class in quality, they are

relatively few in quantity. ^eir importance in society is probably

reflected in the design of the first post-Ba’athist provincial council

(roughly equivalent to a state legislature). ^e Anbaris chose to

apportion representation according to vocational classification, not

geographic precinct. Of the 49 seats comprising the council, 39 were

designated for various professionals, such as doctors, engineers, and

educators. ^e remaining 10 were reserved for tribal sheikhs.3

2

Al-Anbar Awakening

3.Interview with Mr. Kamis Ahmad Abban al-Alwani, deputy chairman of the provincial council,

interview 11 in this volume.
Districts of Al-Anbar Province

Al-Anbar is the most tribal of the 18 provinces of Iraq.^e tribal

system is poorly understood in the West, even though it is similar to

the familiar, though defunct, Scottish clan system. In both systems,

membership is based on kinship, loyalty is to clan or tribe ahead of

the state, there are shifting rivalries and alliances among individuals

as well as groups, and the leaders resist outside control, even while

seeking support and patronage from the central government.

^e two systems are also similar in that “sheikh”and “clan chief ”

are hereditary titles. However, this is where the systems diverge.^e

Anbari tribes do not practice primogeniture. A sheikh must be the

son of a sheikh, but he may be any son of a sheikh. He is chosen by

the consensus of the tribesmen; quite simply, he is the one whom

the people trust and follow.

Furthermore, a sheikh’s position is rarely secure. In this respect,

he is similar to a Western politician. If his tribesmen (constituents)

lose confidence in him, they will follow someone else—and he has

3

Iraqi Perspectives
many relatives and many rivals. His status and influence depend on

his ability to bring patronage and security to the members of his

tribe. ^ey look to him for leadership, but he can only lead them

where they are willing to go. Sometimes, tribal leadership is a matter

of knowing the direction that the tribe is already going and getting

out in front. Notably, in the interviews that follow, whenever an

Anbari tribal leader made a significant decision, the announcement

was preceded by an “education program” among his people.

Although the tribal system is deeply rooted in al-Anbar’s history

and actually precedes the introduction of Islam, in recent decades,

two crises have endangered the system’s continued existence. ^e

first occurred when Saddam Hussein began providing state

patronage to the tribesmen via their sheikhs. ^is development

would seem to have enhanced the standing of the sheikhs, but

Hussein simultaneously created the Office of Tribal Affairs and

required the sheikhs to register with it. Each sheikh was assigned a

classification reflecting the measure of his influence, which gave

Hussein the ability to manipulate the sheikhs by manipulating

classifications and patronage. In effect, the sheikhs became officials

of the state. He also had his people register men without the

requisite pedigree, thereby dramatically expanding the number of

sheikhs.^e result was the term “fake sheikh,”as well as many tribal

disputes that linger to this day.4

^e second crisis occurred when al-Qaeda in Iraq began targeting

tribal leaders, a tactic that intensified in late 2005. A number of sheikhs

were assassinated, and many more either fled the country or were sent

away by their tribes for their own protection.5 Over time, the exiled

sheikhs lost influence, while the younger men who remained behind in

Iraq assumed many of their duties.Tribes were often (perhaps usually)

internally divided in regard to which cause or faction to support during

the insurgency.

For Americans serving in al-Anbar Province, there were additional

complications. ^e title “sheikh” is also an honorific that is frequently

4

Al-Anbar Awakening

4. Lin Todd et al., “Iraq Tribal Study—Al-Anbar Governorate: ^e Albu Fahd Tribe, the Albu

Mahal Tribe, and the Albu Issa Tribe” (Department of Defense study, 18 June 2006). See also

the interview with Sheikh Majed Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman in this volume.

5 See the interview with Col Michael M. Walker in the first volume of Al-Anbar Awakening.
used in addressing highly respected men or assumed by scoundrels

seeking opportunities for personal gain at the expense of unwitting

Americans. Also, a single sheikh may serve in many roles and represent

different constituencies who have conflicting interests.6

Setting the Conditions for Insurgency

Everybody wanted to change the previous regime, but no one wanted it in

this way. We really hoped that we could change the regime from inside Iraq,

but it was too hard. No one could do it. Even all the other countries around

the world accepted the idea that it wasn’t going to happen from inside Iraq.

General Haqi Isma’eel Ali Hameed

Commander, 2d Region Directorate of Border Enforcement

Saddam Hussein led Iraq into one disaster after another. A year

after assuming the presidency, he invaded Iran. ^e war dragged on

from 1980 until 1988 with a devastating cost in blood and treasure.

^e economy was ruined and the national debt was impossible to meet.

In 1990, just two years after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, he

invaded Kuwait, which resulted in the 1991 Gulf War. American-led

Coalition air forces pummeled Iraqi infrastructure, military forces, and

facilities for six weeks, and then Coalition ground forces drove the

Iraqi army out of Kuwait in disorder.

Defeat opened the door for simultaneous insurrections in the

Kurdish north and the Shi’a south. With 15 of 18 provinces in revolt,

Hussein turned to the Sunnis for support. He warned that if the

uprisings were successful, Iraq would become like Lebanon—a land

of warring factions and utter chaos. Sunni fears of Iran and suspicion

of Iraqi Shi’as were confirmed when Iraqi Shi’a forces of the Supreme

Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq crossed the border from

their safe haven in Iran to participate in the southern uprising. ^e

Sunnis chose to support Saddam, and their response was swift and

5

Iraqi Perspectives

6. For a detailed example, see William S. McCallister, “COIN and Irregular Warfare in a Tribal

Society” (pamphlet, published by the Small Wars Journal, 2007), 30 (online at http://

smallwarsjournal.com/documents/coinandiwinatribalsociety.pdf ).
brutal. ^e largely Sunni Republican Guard crushed both uprisings

with great slaughter, which included the use of chemical weapons in

both the north and south.

Even though these actions left both Iraq and its leader

weakened, Hussein refused to comply with the international

economic sanctions. Instead, he tried to game his way out of them

and failed, for more than a decade. In order to maintain his grip on

power at home, he made major departures from Ba’ath Party

ideology by embracing both the tribes and religion.

In Ba’ath socialism, the individual’s duty to the state comes before

his duty to his tribe.^erefore, tribalism was not only regarded by the

Ba’athists as backward, but also as a threat to the government.

Nevertheless, in shoring up his Sunni power base, Hussein granted

greater autonomy and state patronage to the tribes. And, though

Anbaris were not immune from the economic pain of international

sanctions, Hussein ensured that they suffered less than most Iraqis.

Government officials and military officers received extra rations,

government cars, subsidized loans, and access to specialty shops with

luxury goods. Furthermore, the sanctions increased the profits to be

made from smuggling, which became a pillar of the Anbar economy.

Anbaris used their transnational tribal connections to smuggle scrap

metal, sheep, and oil into Jordan and Syria, where they were relatively

expensive.^ey returned to Iraq with cigarettes, alcohol, and electrical

appliances. ^ese same smuggling routes and connections eventually

served equally well as “ratlines” during the insurgency.

Regarding the second change, a religious revival transformed

Iraq in the 1990s. Iraqi Shi’as had become more religious following

the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and Iraqis of all sects and ethnicities

had witnessed the religiously inspired enthusiasm of Iranian troops

during the Iran-Iraq War. By the 1990s, religion was increasingly

supplanting Ba’ath Party ideology, which had lost its relevance.

Hussein disapproved of this trend, but unable to turn back the tide,

he decided to co-opt it with a national “Return to Faith”campaign.

Piety became a facet of Saddam’s public image. ^e government

closed bars and cinemas and spent large sums on mosques, clerics

received salary increases and new services, and compulsory Quranic

6

Al-Anbar Awakening
classes were instituted at all levels of education and even within

the Ba’ath Party. Consequently, mosques became social centers, and

clerical prestige increased until imams rivaled local sheikhs and

party leaders in social influence. ^e secular Ba’ath Party was

Islamicized, most people became more religious, and some became

Islamic radicals.

As 2003 approached, Hussein prepared for the Gulf War of

1991. More specifically, he prepared for a repeat of the domestic

uprisings that followed the Gulf War. Believing that the Coalition

would be stopped by international political pressure and that

Americans were too casualty-averse to conduct the ground

operations necessary to overthrow his regime, he foresaw the worstcase scenario as a protracted air campaign followed by a limited

invasion. ^erefore, the bigger threats to his way of thinking were

domestic uprisings and the potential for Iranian intervention.

So far, no evidence has surfaced suggesting that Hussein

developed any plans for a post-invasion insurgency. Nevertheless, his

war preparations had an irregular element, which served equally well

for suppressing an uprising or starting an insurgency. Specifically, he

established irregular and paramilitary organizations, such as the

Saddam Fedayeen and al-Quds Army, which were tasked with

containing and suppressing an uprising until the Republican Guard

could arrive and destroy those who were rebelling. Second, he gave

large quantities of weapons to loyal tribal sheikhs for the purpose of

guarding the borders and suppressing dissidents. And third, in early

2003, Hussein decentralized command and control of the military in

order to ensure that commanders had sufficient forces, support, and

authority to respond quickly at the earliest signs of an uprising. He

thereby enabled them to conduct preliminary planning for guerrilla

and terrorist activities without central direction.

As war appeared imminent, some government mosques

prepared the public for war by preaching anti-American and antiIsraeli sermons and urged Iraqis to jihad and resistance if the

Americans invaded the country. ^is message was reinforced when

the Islamic Research Center at al-Azhar University in Cairo, most

prestigious Sunni theological center in the Islamic world, announced

7

Iraqi Perspectives
that an American invasion of Iraq would compel all Muslims to

jihad. ^is pronouncement further legitimized anti-Coalition

violence even among Islamists who hated the Saddam regime.7

Meanwhile, actions (or the absence thereof ) by those aligning

again Hussein also set conditions for insurgency. In January 2003,

U.S. President George W. Bush established the Organization for

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance inside the

Department of Defense to develop plans for democratic governance

and rebuilding Iraq following regime change. ^e United States

developed a branch plan for insurgency, but it did not write a

detailed contingency plan, and it allocated no resources for

counterinsurgency in the final war plan.

Development of the Insurgency

In March 2003, the Coalition invaded Iraq in Operation Iraqi

Freedom. To everyone’s surprise, Baghdad fell in a matter of weeks.

^e first Coalition forces to enter al-Anbar Province were British,

Australian, and American special operations forces who were searching

for Scud missiles in the western desert, hunting Ba’ath regime leaders,

and securing important facilities and infrastructure such as Haditha

Dam and al-Asad air base.^ey were followed by conventional forces

from the U.S. Army. Since al-Anbar was only lightly defended, there

were a couple of sharp engagements but no major battles.

In post-Saddam Hussein al-Anbar, resistance was initially

disorganized and engaged in by small groups or individuals. Still, most

Anbaris were cooperative with Coalition forces.

In May 2003, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III announced the deBa’athification policy and the dissolution of the Iraqi Armed Forces,

which threw hundreds of thousands of Iraq’s most capable men into

the ranks of the unemployed with no hope of future prospects.8 A great

many of these men were Anbaris.

8

Al-Anbar Awakening

7. Associated Press, 10 March 2003.

8. “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society” (Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1, 16 May

2003); “Dissolution of Entities” (Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2, 23 May 2003).
^e number of armed groups proliferated and violence increased.

^ese groups varied greatly in organization, capabilities, and goals, but

they fell generally within certain broad categories. Sunni nationalists

could be subdivided into two groups: former regime loyalists, who

wanted the Ba’ath regime and Saddam Hussein restored to power; and

former regime elements, who wanted the former regime restored

without Hussein. ^ere were also Sunni religious extemists, and

another category, smaller than the others, of al-Qaeda-associated

organizations.

9

Iraqi Perspectives
^e Coalition responded to the developing insurgency by focusing

on tracking down former regime leaders. By the end of the year, Husay

and Qusay Husseinwere dead and Saddam Hussein was in custody.

^e former regime loyalists became dispirited and splintered by

rivalries. In defeating this segment of the insurgency, however,

Coalition force methods contributed to the alienating the population

and strengthened other elements of the insurgency.

Also in 2003, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an al-Qaeda associate

and leader of Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Group of Monotheism

and Jihad) moved his center of operations from the Kurdish north

to al-Anbar, Diyala, and Baghdad. Over the next year, he kept a low

operational profile while building his organization through the

absorption of discouraged former regime loyalists and by attracting

foreign fighters. In early 2004, he did not think that he was receiving

sufficient support from the Iraqis, and in a communication with alQaeda senior leadership, he argued for provoking a sectarian war

against the Iraqi Shi’as in order to radicalize the Iraqi Sunnis. ^e

proposal was rejected because it would jeopardize Iranian support

for al-Qaeda.

By October of 2004, al-Zarqawi agreed to subordinate himself to

al-Qaeda’s higher objectives, and he announced that Jama’at al-Tawhid

wal-Jihad was incorporated into al-Qaeda. In return, he received access

to al-Qaeda’s global network of resources, personnel, propaganda

support, and financing.

By early 2004, the former regime elements and the Sunni religious

extremists had matured from splintered groups into organized forces

that were able to engage in pitched battles. Incompatible goals

prevented the unification of these two major categories of insurgents,

or even the unification of the various factions within a single category.

Nevertheless, the creation of local coordinating councils enabled shortterm tactical cooperation.

Increasing cooperation brought about a rise in Islamic sentiment

among the nationalists.^e rank and file began to see Iraqi supporters

of the Coalition as apostates as well as collaborators; the Coalition

Provisional Authority was an enemy of Islam as well as an occupying

power; and the Shi’a were heretics as well as agents of Iran. However,

10

Al-Anbar Awakening
neither the nationalists nor the Sunni religious extremists were willing

to support al-Qaeda in Iraq or endorse mass casualty attacks.

In April 2004, the insurgent groups felt strong enough to face U.S.

Marines in open battle in Fallujah. ^ey were no match for the

Marines, but political pressure forced the Marines to halt their attack

(Operation Vigilant Resolve) and withdraw from the city. ^e

insurgents regarded this as a victory, and insurgent morale soared.

Subsequent negotiations between the Marines and insurgents

resulted in the establishment of the Fallujah Brigade, which was

intended to provide local control of security within Fallujah. However,

the unit was compromised by insurgents and soon disbanded.

While events attendant to the Fallujah Brigade were unwinding

in al-Anbar, Talal al-Gaoud was hosting meetings with U.S. Marine

officers and officials of the U.S. Department of Defense in Amman,

Jordan, in an attempt to negotiate an agreement between the

Americans and Anbar’s secular elites.9 Talal al-Gaoud was a member of

the al-Gaoud subtribe of the Albu Nimr tribe.^e Albu Nimr rebelled

against Saddam Hussein in the 1990s, and Talal al-Gaoud’s relative,

Fasal Raikan Najris al-Gaoud, was appointed governor of al-Anbar

Province not long after the negotiations in Amman ended. While the

negotiations did not result in an agreement, the meetings were an early

indication that influential Anbaris were interested in engagement.

In November 2004, as Fasal al-Gaoud assumed the governorship,

U.S. Marines and soldiers were storming Fallujah (Operation Phantom

Fury/al-Fajr). ^e major insurgent groups suffered a severe blow.

^ousands of fighters were killed or captured. ^e leadership spent

several months reorganizing, and their men retreated into their

remaining strongholds in western al-Anbar, unable to interfere with

elections in January 2005.

However, antipathy for the Coalition led to a Sunni boycott of the

election. Coalition diplomatic efforts during the remainder of the year

focused on engaging Sunni leaders in the political process. ^ese

efforts, and a sense of hopelessness among insurgents following the

storming of Fallujah, eventually bore some fruit. Sunni voter turnout

11

Iraqi Perspectives

9. David Rose, “Iraq: Heads in the Sand,” Vanity Fair, 12 May 2009.
increased for the summer’s constitutional referendum and the

December 2005 election. ^ese developments created a division

between the more nationalist insurgents, led by Mohammed

Mahmoud Latif, and the Islamists, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

The Rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq

Beginning in April 2005, insurgents stepped up attempts to target

Baghdad, which led to Coalition military action against their

strongholds in western al-Anbar. By the end of the year, insurgent

participation in the political process was increasing, and nationalist

motivation for the insurgency was declining. In-fighting ensued, which

paved the way for the eventual dominance of al-Qaeda in Iraq the

following year.

In late 2005, Operation Sayyad II had created a serious disruption

in the al-Qaeda in Iraq network in western al-Anbar, which continued

into 2006. Many other insurgents and emerging political groups used

the opportunity to break away and seek political engagement with the

faction under the direction of Mohammed Mahmoud Latif. Al-Qaeda

in Iraq regrouped by early 2006, however, and it began targeting

insurgent and tribal leaders who favored political engagement. ^is

strategy was so successful that al-Qaeda in Iraq became the dominant

insurgent group in all of al-Anbar. ^e magnitude of its success

brought unparalleled power and created difficulties in maintaining the

ideological integrity of the organization. Al-Qaida’s murder and

intimidation campaign also alienated large numbers of Anbaris, which

created opportunities for both Coalition forces and insurgent rivals.

^e death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June 2006 reinforced these

opportunities, but it also allowed less volatile leaders to step forward

within the organization, including Abu Ayyub al-Masri.

Al-Anbar Awakening

According to the Anbaris, the Albu Mahal tribe in al-Qaim

initiated what became the Awakening in 2005 when they engaged in

open warfare against al-Qaeda in Iraq throughout the spring and

12

Al-Anbar Awakening
summer. ^is Awakening did not spread, probably because only local

tribal interests were at stake. Nevertheless, tribes at the opposite end of

al-Anbar were aware of it, and it seems to have served as a precedent.

^e celebrated Awakening, which cleared the entire province,

probably began in early 2006 and perhaps even in late 2005. It is

difficult to determine a precise start date because the Al-Anbar

Awakening began as the insurgency began: secretly and separately, with

differing organizational structures, various capabilities, tactics adapted

to local circumstances. Many of these stories and details can be found

in the interviews that follow. By September 2006, the separate

elements of the Awakening had coalesced and matured to the point

where the movement was prepared to go public.

By the summer of 2007, al-Anbar Province was largely cleared of

al-Qaeda in Iraq. Without the common bond of a common enemy,

the Awakening began to splinter as the groups that had come together

started to pursue divergent interests.

^is is an outline of the backdrop against which the Awakening

was set. ^e story of how it played out follows in the words of many

of the brave Anbaris who made it happen.

In addition to the details in the preface on the editorial method

applied across both volumes of this collection, here are some additional

notes on the Iraqi interviews. ^e interviews in this volume were

conducted between English and Arabic speakers who communicated

through interpreters. Native Arabic speakers were integrally involved

in each interview, using consecutive, and occasionally simultaneous,

interpretation.

^e single exception to these practices was the interview with the

woman we has called Miriam (the first interview in the volume). ^e

alternative procedures used to protect her identity are described in the

introductory note to her interview.

13

Iraqi Perspectives
Each interview was recorded on electronic recording devices. Upon

the interviewers’return to Quantico,Virginia, the English portions were

transcribed by a contracted transcription service. For publication, the

transcripts were edited for clarity and abridged for relevance.

Problematic passages were taken to the Marine Corps Center for

Operational Culture and Learning (CAOCL), where native Arabic

speakers listened to the original recordings and clarified the meanings.

^e resulting changes were reviewed and edited again, as necessary.

In the interviews, the Iraqis normally distinguished between

Britons and Americans; however, they often used the terms soldier and

Marine or Army and Marines interchangeably.

^e Iraqis tend to use the word “division”in the same manner that

English speakers use the word “unit.”^erefore, only actual divisionsized units are indicated by a capital letter.

^e tribal system is hierarchical and contains words for

confederations, tribes, clans, and families. As is the usual practice in

interpreted conversation, tribe is most commonly used here.

Gary W. Montgomery

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

14

Al-Anbar Awakening
15

Iraqi Perspectives


Interview 1
19

Miriam

Head of an Iraqi Women’s

Nongovernmental Organization

“Miriam” is a pseudonym. All personally identifiable information

has been concealed for her safety and for the security of her family.

Her husband is a high-ranking Iraqi policeman who was targeted by

insurgents. Also, Miriam is prominent in her own right due to her

humanitarian and political activities.

In the first half of the interview, she discusses daily life during the

insurgency and her efforts to support her family while concealing her

husband. In the second half, she describes her interaction with Marine

civil affairs and the activities of her nongovernmental organization.

Miriam was interviewed by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery and

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams on 17 February

2009 at the Provincial Government Center in Ramadi. In accordance

with Miriam’s wishes, audio and video equipment were not used.

Colonel Montgomery, Chief Warrant Officer-4 McWilliams, and an

Iraqi interpreter made handwritten notes, and the separate versions

were merged into a single draft. Miriam reviewed the draft and made

corrections. Miriam was accompanied by three Iraqi women who

occasionally interjected additional details, but the words reproduced

here are primarily Miriam’s. Also present were Captain Stephanie

[surname deleted], a Marine civil affairs officer who was on her fourth

deployment to Iraq, and two female Iraqi interpreters, one translating

and the other taking notes.

Miriam: At the beginning, the Iraqi police worked openly under

Chief Ja’adan.* In 2003 to 2004, they were coming to work freely

and working very well. When the terrorists started in al-Anbar,

they attacked the police first, causing a massive scare. During the

night, al-Qaeda threw threatening notes onto their doorsteps or

into their gardens so that they would find them in the morning

* Major General Ja’adan Muhammad al-Alwani, Provincial Director of Police, 2003-2004.
before work. ^e notes told them to quit working for the police

and to go to a mosque, publicly declare that they are no longer

police, and ask for forgiveness.

^e terrorists called for jihad to get public support, but they

misused the word. Jihad is for defending our home and family

against people trying to take us by force. It does not mean cutting

people into little pieces.^e terrorists used the word as a cover for

their evil acts. ^ey used the word to win the sympathy of the

people. It is a very big word. ^e terrorists targeted illiterate

minds—a certain level of society—and used them as a front.

^ey threatened the Iraqi police and made them quit. ^en when

the policemen were unemployed, they offered them a lot of money

to work for al-Qaeda. People who didn’t cooperate got “the

discipline.” Whoever did not cooperate was taken from his house

in a hood, stripped down to his boxers, and whipped with a bike

chain or cable in front of the people to set an example.

^e ugliest torture was committed by al-Qaeda. If the discipline

didn’t work, the people were abducted and slaughtered. ^e head

was put in a container and thrown away, or the neck cut and the

head placed on the back.

In 2005, our 16-year-old neighbor was killed during Ramadan. At

the beginning of Allahu Akhbar,* he was hanged from a threestory flag pole. When the last note sounded, his body was dropped.

My cousin’s husband worked at a police station.^ey drove a tanker

through the station and detonated it. Everyone was killed or

burned. He lived, but he was badly burned. His wife took him to a

doctor for treatment. ^e doctor referred him to Ramadi General

Hospital. However, she was afraid to go there because al-Qaeda

had taken over the hospital, so she treated him at home. Al-Qaeda

suspected he was there, so they sent some ladies to the house to

find out. A lot of women joined al-Qaeda. ^ese women were

seamstresses, and they managed to get in the house under the

20

Al-Anbar Awakening

* A broadcast from the mosque that signals that eating is permitted.
pretense of discussing some sewing work. ^ey saw the husband

and informed al-Qaeda. ^e house was raided and the husband

abducted. ^ey put rocks on his legs and put him into the river.

Al-Qaeda brainwashed people. If we heard gunshots, we went

inside our homes. It was a signal that they were going to do

something.^ey announced on a loudspeaker why they were killing.

Al-Qaeda also incited hatred between the Shi’a and the Sunni.

^ey accused everyone wearing a precious stone on his ring of

being a Shi’a and murdered him. Sometimes they fired shots into

doors to scare them.

One time they caught three men going to Baghdad and killed

them. ^ey killed three young, tall men who were wearing rings

with precious stones. ^ey said that because they were wearing

rings with precious stones that they were Shi’a. Our [Sunni] men

don’t usually wear rings with precious stones.^ey tortured, killed,

and mutilated them and then left their bodies on the street for

three days.^ey told everyone not to touch them. But their families

recognized them.^ey were former policemen.^ey weren’t Shi’as,

they were our men.

^ey killed doctors and leaders. ^ey killed doctors and said that

it was because they treated Americans.^e doctors fled the country.

^ey killed mullahs and said that it was because they liked

Americans. Soon there were no men left to kill, so they started

killing women and children. ^ey killed women and said that it

was because their husbands were policemen. ^ey killed children

and said it was because their fathers were policemen.

I cannot describe the horror we lived in.^ose were very bitter days.

^ose days we lived in hell.We looked like ghosts out of a cemetery.

We were very tired. We had a lot of complaints to take to the

Coalition forces, but we were afraid. Some days we wished to be

dead just to be rested. But I have [many] children. I was very tired.

My husband let his beard and hair grow so that they wouldn’t think

he’s working. We had no income, and I started selling our property

to pay the rent. I heard that this officer was killed, that officer was

killed. I sent my husband to hide sometimes.

21

Iraqi Perspectives
Al-Qaeda started rumors. On the streets, they accused Americans

of being killers. People welcomed al-Qaeda into their homes as a

custom, but they killed families, raped wives, and took over. If one

of them killed 60 people, he was called emir.

Interpreter: Each al-Qaeda cell consisted of six people. If you kill

60 people, then you become an emir automatically.^e cells didn’t

know each other.

Miriam: Each home they take over becomes a cell that doesn’t

work with the others. Every group of insurgents was in charge of

some area. Al-Qaeda had their own patrol groups driving around

making scary noises to terrorize neighborhoods and let them know

they were there.

Fear made me very cautious. Sometimes if a door was opened, an

entire family was killed—old people, women, and children. I had

four huge locks on the front door. It looked like a protected holy

place. I would only open the door for family. We had a way of

knocking that was a signal.

Al-Qaeda started targeting college graduates. My father-in-law is

a former [deleted] and a college graduate. We are an educated

family. I had a family member at the government office. He offered

me a job. So I covered my face and went for the interview. Women

were not allowed to drive, so I taught my 11-year-old son to drive.

He took me to work. He had a lot of accidents. He also used to

take me shopping.

^ree or four times I was stopped at al-Qaeda checkpoints. ^ey

asked,“Where is your husband? Tell him to come in or we will kill

him.” I started crying and told them that he ran away after he lost

his job and that we are separated. So they let me go.^e al-Qaeda

commander in our area started watching me himself from a vehicle

outside the fence.

I used to take my younger son walking. Females were not allowed

to walk by themselves.^ey had to have a husband or male relative

with them. So my son had to go with me.

22

Al-Anbar Awakening
Al-Qaeda controlled all fuels. ^e al-Qaeda group commander

refused to allow them to sell fuel to me. I covered my face, but he

recognized my eyes.

I felt like I had no life in Ramadi. I used to bring hairdressers home

sometimes. But al-Qaeda asked why a male was in my home if my

husband was not there, so I had to stop.

^ey were not mujahedeen; they were low-life people. A true

enemy will face you and fight. ^ese were cowards, cheaters, and

backstabbers.^ey threatened my son at school. I told him,“If you

see their cars, jump the back fence of the school.”

Many of our original neighbors fled the city, and the insurgents

lived in their homes in [other] areas. We are thankful for [name of

prominent person, deleted]. He deserves a lot of credit. A friend of

my in-laws heard of our situation and told [him]. He sent a force

to get us out. He hired my husband back as a police officer. He

worked six months at a station for [title deleted]. My husband lived

in the station while I lived at home with the kids.

I was afraid of the Coalition forces and the insurgents. I used to

leave the house at 6 a.m.. Before 7 a.m., there was a Coalition forces

curfew. After 7 a.m., the insurgents were out. I used to carry a white

flag with me. It was my husband’s undergarment. ^e Coalition

forces know the white flag. Nothing works with the insurgents.

^is is the first time I’ve told my story without crying. I am happy.

I just want to protect my family and love them. My husband and I

were in love before marriage.^at is rare here. Most marriages are

arranged. If they killed us, I wanted them to kill me first. I can’t

bear to see him dead.

Our neighbors were on watch and asked questions. ^e neighbors

were collaborating with al-Qaeda. Sometimes I disguised my

husband as a woman or an old man. Every day was a different story.

It was like living in a different movie every day.

^e neighbors were asking questions, so we moved to a different

neighborhood. I hid my husband in the back of my car. I took out

the seat and put a blanket over him.^ere was no room to park the

23

Iraqi Perspectives
car at the new house, but our neighbors were so kind and let me

park the car in their garage. ^e husband turned out to be a big

insurgent. I told them that my husband was gone. I never told them

the true story.

I asked my husband’s boss to move my husband to [a different

place]. Life was better there. ^ings were running smoothly there,

and Ramadi was a ghost town.

^e Awakening started with Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha because alQaeda killed many of his family. ^e police started coming down

slowly. People started coming out.

We had the first woman’s meeting on December 15, 2006, at the

[place deleted] elementary school. Sheikh [name deleted] attended

the meeting. He paid attention to the women’s movement.

Captain Tina [pseudonym] of the Coalition forces was present at

the first meeting, and she worked with us.We set up literacy classes

for females. I worked with her, but I was also afraid. I stayed in the

house for a week after the first meeting. I had a photo taken with

Captain Tina, and it was posted all over town. She e-mailed it to

my organization, and one of the women in our office let it leak out.

Now women are going back to have pictures made with the

Coalition forces.

After Captain Tina we got Captain Stephanie, and we met at the

elementary school. Some women refused to shake hands with

Stephanie, but she is very patient. She tamed them like taming wild

animals: she brought them gifts and listened to problems. She won

them over slowly. Stephanie opened literacy programs and

classrooms at three places.

Stephanie is a great American woman. She taught us how to

depend on ourselves. She gave us a financial mind. Our mindset

was to get a degree, get a job, get married, cooking and kids.

Stephanie taught us to do finances, fight gossip, depend on

ourselves, and fight the insurgency. For example, a woman can’t

read. Her son comes in with money and says that he is on a holy

mission.We should ask questions like,“What kind of holy mission?

Who is telling you this?”^e first thing is to teach kids morals.

24

Al-Anbar Awakening
25

Iraqi Perspectives

Women who didn’t like Stephanie are now trying to pull her away

to their side. Stephanie distributes products. We call her “Santa”or

“Mamma Claus.”

Stephanie helped people love security. She helped women get jobs.

She put rules on who should be hired: target unemployed college

graduates to maximize employment.

In 2007, we organized as a united women’s organization. We met

at Sheikh [name deleted]’s house and discussed having more

literacy classes. It’s the only way to open the female mind. And

women need to get more involved in their children’s lives.

We opened our first classroom at a school. Stephanie asked us to

make it succeed so the public would accept it and it would expand.

We gathered new members in Ramadi, but the women were scared.

We started with friends, and some came from Fallujah. We

succeeded and now have 400 members in different parts of Anbar.

At the time, it was raging with insurgency. ^ere were no rations

available, except through Stephanie. She brought in a truckload of

food and supplies—1,500 shares. Stephanie asked me to hand out the

clothes today so that the kids could wear them tomorrow. I was fasting

and it was hot, but I spent 12 hours handing out clothes. Some of the

kids were so excited that they changed clothes immediately.

Stephanie is really great, comes all the way from America. I don’t fear

anymore. Stephanie showed me the way, how to love the responsible

role that I take. She taught me not to fear but still be cautious.

We help women get jobs—jobs for widows, cleaning courtyards. If a

woman can’t make it, her kids do it, so that she still gets a paycheck.

^e first meeting was with Donna [surname deleted] in [place

deleted]. She asked for the number of widows. I gave her a record of

each widow and the number of kids. We met with the director of

social services in Ramadi.We identified the greatest need and formed

a project. She was replaced by Lieutenant Carla [surname deleted].

Stephanie built women into leaders and gave them confidence. She

inspired everyone. We are getting more organized and getting
better government support. But we still need more support for the

orphans.* ^ere are 850 orphans just in Ramadi. Families shelter

them, but they need help. We’re collecting backpacks, mittens,

shoes, caps, and sun block. We need classes in nursing, English,

cooking, computers, making artificial flowers, painting on ceramic.

We need a new hospital. ^ere is no room in the existing hospital

to deliver babies.

Iraq once had female doctors, judges, and scientists, and they were

also good wives and mothers. We want you to separate us from

Saudi women and the Gulf States. Twenty-five years ago, we had

an Iraqi female minister. ^e world thinks all the women are like

the ones in Saudi Arabia and other countries. We are not like that.

Before Saddam [Hussein], women were free to get out. We had

equal education. We’re coming back. ^e wars, the insurgency, the

Sunni and Shi’a conflict were a setback. ^e people who started

the Sunni-Shi’a conflict were not Iraqis.

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams: Are you in touch

with the rest of the world?

Miriam: We have satellite TV now. We’re careful about what is on.

Not all of the programs are good. We have the Internet. It’s

expensive though, about $50 a month. We’re interacting with the

rest of the world now. It’s a sign of civilization. Iraqis are

conservative but not extreme.

26

Al-Anbar Awakening

* In al-Anbar, the term “orphan” includes children with only one parent.
27

Iraqi Perspectives


Interview 2
Dr. Thamer Ibrahim Tahir al-Assafi

Muslim Ulema Council for al-Anbar

(Council of Muslim Scholars)

Professor of Religious Studies, al-Anbar University

Senior Meologian to the Sunni Endowment

Ramadi City Council Member

Sheikh Abdullah Jallal Mukhif al-Faraji

Head of the Sunni Endowment for al-Anbar

Regent Sheikh of the Abu Faraj Tribe

Ramadi City Council Member

Dr. ^amer Ibrahim Tahir al-Assafi is a cleric in Ramadi who

chose a religious path after serving as a commando in the Iran-Iraq

War. He is influential in Iraq and well-regarded among Muslim

endowments in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. His nexus of

influence is al-Anbar University, where his credibility is magnified by

his combined status as a member of faculty, combat veteran, and cleric.

He was an early proponent of engagement, and throughout the

insurgency he used his sermons in the mosque and his lectures at the

university to publicly call for moderation and restraint. He was shot in

the shoulder during an assassination attempt against Governor

Mamoun Sami Rashid al-Alwani, but he continued undeterred.

Sheikh Abdullah Jallal Mukhif al-Faraji is a former Olympic

athlete, a cleric, and one of the original members of the Anbar

Salvation Council. He is addressed as “sheikh” as an honorific. He is

neither a true lineal sheikh nor a pretender.^e true sheikh delegated

most of his responsibilities to Abdullah, who is popular among his

fellow Faraji tribesmen. His influence is concentrated around Ramadi

and eastward toward Fallujah. During the insurgency, he used his

influence to temper the insurgent movement, anti-U.S. rhetoric, and

infighting among the various militias. He was wounded several times,

including a gunshot to the arm during an assassination attempt against

Governor Mamoun. ^e governor seems to regard him as a personal

31
spiritual advisor and trusted agent.While recovering from the gunshot

wound to his arm, Sheikh Abdullah was mistakenly arrested by

Coalition forces. Brigadier General James L. Williams was

instrumental in securing his quick release, an act which established a

greater degree of trust and resulted in more Sunni leaders entering the

political process.

Dr. ^amer and Sheikh Abdullah were interviewed by Colonel

Gary W. Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S.

McWilliams on 12 February 2009 at Camp Ramadi.

Dr. >amer Ibrahim Tahir al-Assafi: History speaks for people, for

communities, so from us it necessarily is required to write down

history. Whether we like it or not, we have been joined with you in

history.We have to clarify for distant people and for later generations.

^ere is one overriding fact that you will have to know: there was

no terrorism in Iraq prior to your coming here, except state

terrorism. After the invasion of Kuwait [1990-91] and the total

embargo that was placed on Iraq, it created a generation of people

that was destitute and corrupt. ^ey would be taken to court, and

they would be imprisoned, and most of them were angry. Just

before the time of Baghdad’s fall to the Americans, Saddam

[Hussein] freed all these prisoners in a general amnesty. ^ose

people were set free among society.

After the fall of Baghdad, you noticed there was chaos, and you

noticed that government institutions were looted, and particularly

after the dissolving of the Iraqi army by [Ambassador L. Paul]

Bremer.^e internal security apparatus was dissolved, also. So there

was a general freedom, and there was freedom of movement.

Saddam also opened the borders to allow foreigners to come in

before the battle with the Americans, and a lot of them did come

in. Most of these people were Syrians. Most of these people

gathered in our province. We tried to get rid of them. We gathered

a lot of money, and we hired vehicles, and we tried to kick them out.

But they went out to the surrounding villages and hamlets, and

there they organized themselves into cells under the guise of

resistance to the Americans and the occupation.

32

Al-Anbar Awakening
After the fall of Baghdad, which was on a Wednesday, eventually we

established a government in Ramadi with a new police chief. He

chose new policemen. ^ese policemen, some of them were bad

elements, from among the people that Saddam let out of prison. I

raised the issue with the police chief, and I asked him, “Why would

you put bad elements in charge of the community?” He said, “Look,

when I bring these people in here, I’m in charge of them. I keep watch

on them, rather than turn them loose in society to create mayhem.”

Negotiations ensued between the tribes of Anbar and the

American forces. Coalition Forces were located primarily in

Rutbah and the west of Anbar, and they wanted to come in from

Baghdad, and they wanted to come in peacefully. An agreement

was struck between some of the tribal sheikhs and the American

forces for a peaceful entry. After they entered Ramadi, there was a

big demonstration, a peaceful demonstration, because they did not

approve of an occupier coming into their capital. ^e American

forces did not respect the people who were demonstrating. ^ey

dealt with them rather violently. ^e people’s reaction was to pelt

the Americans with rocks and tomatoes, and it was a rather

negative reaction. ^ey provoked the citizens. ^at was the first

thing that started hatred.

^e next day, they demonstrated again, and the Americans treated

them in the same manner, meaning their armored vehicles went

right through them. A young man, an 18-year-old youth, threw a

rock at an American tank, and the soldiers shot him dead. We are

a tribal people, and in our tradition, we know revenge. If someone

gets killed from your family, you have to kill the killer, or at least a

relative of his.

When the Iraqi army was dissolved, they left a lot of armaments,

including armored personnel carriers, heavy machine guns, and a

lot ordnance. People took them and hid them in their houses, not

to have a future confrontation with the Americans, but in fear of a

confrontation with Iran. Keep in mind we are military-trained

people as a society because of the battles—the Gulf War, the Iran

War, the Kurds in the north. Most of us were in the army, so using

weapons was something we could do with ease.

33

Iraqi Perspectives
So these people whose youth was killed by the Americans, they

formed a cell, and they started looking for revenge.^ey found out

that placing an IED [improvised explosive device] is a simple

matter, so a lot of cells began forming all over the place.

When the foreign Arabs came in, they came in with suitcases full

of dollars, and they started organizing cells.^ey got in touch with

the Iraqi people, and they started organizing them better. We had

a weak police force, a weak army.

^e Americans did not want to get involved unless they were

directly attacked. If an American patrol was on the highway, and

they saw a dead person, they would just leave him there. And this

really started to create hatred toward the American GIs, because

they couldn’t care less what happened to Iraqis. If they were killed

right in front of them, they did not get involved. So that reaction

of the Iraqi people was like, we hated the Americans.

When the terrorists attacked the national mosque in 2005, Sheikh

Abdullah was attacked, I was attacked, Sheikh Tarek was killed—

the head of the Sunni Endowment.^e American forces were 200

yards away. ^ey were watching and did not interfere.

^ere was a gap between the American forces and the Iraqi people,

and there was strong hatred. ^ey did not improve the police. ^e

police essentially got dissolved. ^ere was only one unit, the

highway patrol, and they stayed to themselves.^ey stayed in their

headquarters. . . .

We had a huge conference with the American commanders and

the tribal sheikhs to develop the Iraqi police and Iraqi army. In

2005, we had people gather to volunteer for the police, and two

terrorists infiltrated the place and blew themselves up. ^e

American forces did not even give first aid to the wounded. And

the civilians who aided those wounded, the terrorists would catch

them down the road and slaughter them. Another conference was

held, and we interceded with them to develop the police and the

army, and, again, they intervened. ^e terrorists said we deserved

death, and many among us were killed.

34

Al-Anbar Awakening
Being clerics, we used to incite people against the terrorists through

our sermons in mosques and speeches.^e last election, the one in

2005, we defied the terrorists, and we went out to cast our votes.

Afterward we were subjected to the wrath of the terrorists for the

people that went out and voted.

Had the American forces allowed us to carry arms at that time, we

would have eradicated terrorism much sooner. Any of us who

carried a personal sidearm was arrested, while the terrorists had

plenty of heavy armaments and were walking freely. So we were

lost, and the American forces did not stand with us. ^ere were

many people that got killed by the terrorists, and the Americans did

not stand with us, so our backs were open, so to speak.We could not

get help, not even from the Iraqi government. Life became very

difficult, because the banks were looted by the terrorists.

In the meeting, I accused the commander, [Brigadier General

James L.] Williams, of being in cahoots with the terrorists, for

looting the banks. I said, “Look, how can the terrorists go into a

bank and take the money out, and you’re right there—and you’re

not in cahoots with them?”

^e province of Anbar became so paralyzed that even the

employees of the banks could not receive their own salaries. Many

fatwas were issued by the terrorists to close the universities. Ramadi

became a ghost town. Universities, schools, factories, and

institutions were all shut down, so we were pressed. ^e

government did not pay us our salaries. Life became intolerable.

So we started looking for salvation, no matter who it was.

Salvation came through the Anbar Awakening with the leadership

of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha. I tell you frankly, we all disliked Sheikh

Abdul Sattar Abu Risha.^is being because he was not a religious

person, so there was a distance between us. When Sheikh Abu

Risha proposed the Awakening, we looked into it deeper, and we

found it to be a really good thing to do. So I got Sheikh [Abdullah]

Jallal [Mukhif al-Faraji], and we said this is the thing to do. We

have to do it. And so we carried on, and with the help of Colonel

[ John W.] Charlton [USA] and Lieutenant Colonel Warner, we

were able to get rid of the terrorists. ^e religious establishment

35

Iraqi Perspectives
started working hand in hand with the Awakening. When they

liberated a street or a town, we used to go in and open the mosques

that were closed by the terrorists. Some of the mosques were also

closed by the American forces.

We lost many innocent people. Some of them were loaded down

with blocks and put into the river. Some of them were taken out to

the desert and beheaded. Some of them were imprisoned.

We were hoping after the Awakening—after getting rid of the

terrorists—we were hoping that new building would take place,

but it hasn’t happened. A lot of money was paid out by the

American forces to many contractors, but nothing came of it;

nothing useful, that is. ^e streets that were paved got destroyed.

^ey did a lot of painting of buildings and shops. We were not

exactly happy about what these people did, all this money that was

stolen. All the money was given to affluent people—tribal sheikhs

and contractors—which could be considered as a sort of bribe.

We were hoping for the civilization of America to be transferred

into Iraq. Maybe you’re not a colonial power; this is new to you.

We’re hoping for many institutions. When Great Britain occupied

Iraq, they left many institutions, bridges, hospitals. People can go

right now and say,“^ere is the bridge that was built by the British.

^is is a hospital built by the British.”When you leave Ramadi, or

Anbar all together, what will your legacy be? It’s total destruction.

People will say you just came in, destroyed, and left. You’re going to

help us rebuild our country? A translator asked me a while ago, “If

I come to Ramadi on vacation or to spend some time, where do I

go?” I told him, “^e street, where else? ^ere are no hotels, no

motels, there aren’t even parks to go into.”^is is all I have to say.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: What was your impression of the

foreign Arabs?

>amer: We totally reject the foreign Arabs because we have prior

knowledge of their doings in Afghanistan, in Chechnya, in BosniaHerzegovina, and in Algeria.^ey were hired hands, and Iran hired

them. We knew that beforehand, but the security situation was

really bad when they came in.^e Ba’athists harbored them. I was

just joking.

36

Al-Anbar Awakening
Sheikh Abdullah Jallal Mukhif al-Faraji:^e most glaring mistake

committed by Coalition forces was leaving the borders unattended.

From these borders, the foreign Arabs entered. ^e second most

glaring mistake they made was dissolving the army. Initially when

the Americans came in, there was a peaceful coexistence between

the people and the Americans. ^ere was a great understanding

between the tribal sheikhs in Anbar, especially [Ali Amar Limand],

and there was no tension.

^e foreign Arabs, when they came into Iraq, they changed the

mindset of the Iraqi people and told them to use bombs.

I see things from a different perspective than Dr.^amer, so I have

a disagreement with how he sees things. I don’t want Dr. ^amer

to forget al-Ghazaliyah, Baghdad. He and I and our peers joined

with the Americans.We killed four terrorists in Baghdad, so I don’t

want him to forget that they helped us in 2007.

>amer: Yes, that’s true, but that’s after the inception of the

Awakening. If it were before the Awakening, they would have

killed us. . . .

Abdullah: And I liked Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, even though

Sheikh ^amer hated him.

>amer: Look, I hated him before the Awakening.We even met with

him, and I told him personally that I hated him before the Awakening.

But since the inception of the Awakening, no, I liked him.

Abdullah: Truthfully, Iraq had no foreign Arabs before.^e reason

the foreign Arabs came into Iraq is because they were following

their arch enemy, the Americans. It’s apparent that the United

States will fight these foreign Arabs all over the world, and when

they came into Iraq, that’s where the battle took place, right here

in Iraq.

Now, the American forces assaulted some Iraqis in their houses, and

everywhere else, and that created a negative reaction toward the

Americans. To be truthful, the U.S. forces didn’t distinguish between

who is a foreign Arab and who is an Iraqi, so they shot everybody. . . .

37

Iraqi Perspectives
I represent the Sunni Endowment Organization before the

Awakening and before the religious people. ^is is, right here, the

telltales of them shooting me. Right here. He [Dr.^amer] got shot,

too.^e governor, Mamoun, got shot. We were in the same building

when they attacked. We took their own weapons, my force, and we

fought them with their own weapons. I don’t want to talk too much,

but now I want to say this is the inception of the Awakening.

What Dr. ^amer explained is sufficient enough. We came in as

the religious side with Sattar. We gathered this bridged duality of

the religious people and the tribal people, and they were bound

together. When finally the people realized that the clerics were in

with the Awakening, they came in and joined Sattar. ^at’s why

the Awakening succeeded. . . .

And one cannot forget [Lieutenant] Colonel [^addeus]

McWhorter [USA], [Lieutenant Colonel Michael] Silverman

[USA], and Charlton. . . .^ey knew how to treat the tribal people.

^ey knew how to treat educated people in the cities, and village

people. ^ey trained their minds, their military minds, their civil

minds, to understand all this. Please, if you write down history, do

not forget these people. I’m a religious person who speaks only the

truth, and I don’t know who is who, but I just tell you the facts as

they are.^ey’ve established a great legacy for the Coalition forces.

^ey were loyal to their country; they were loyal to their military.

Abdullah: I want to talk about politics, reconstruction, education,

and economics. ^is election taught Iraqis to understand what an

election is. ^ere is a political awareness among the Iraqi people.

As far as education goes, we need an exchange of ideas, of views

between us and the other religions, and not just religions, but

civilizations. We’ve demanded the establishment of a university, an

American university in Anbar, or anywhere in Iraq, so there will be

an educational exchange between the United States and Iraq.We’ve

demanded the establishment of libraries that will have all kinds of

books—American, Arabic.We have demanded the establishment of

an English-teaching institution, because we need these institutions.

^ere are promises to that effect.We need an educational institution

to rid the people of all the negative ideas in Iraq and the

38

Al-Anbar Awakening
surrounding areas. We need a monument left for the American

forces in Iraq, a hotel, a bridge [conversation with interpreter].

Interpreter: Again, he is speaking about the bridges that the British

built.

Abdullah: When you cross over it, you say, “^is is the British

legacy.” We need something to establish your legacy. What have

you left? Sometimes it’s paint.

As for economics, a lot of money was wasted, as Sheikh ^amer

said, to specific people. About four to seven days ago, U.S. Forces

Command in Iraq spoke of these financial mistakes. And the chief

cause of it is corruption, whether among Iraqi society or the U.S.

forces themselves.

At the end, I will wish you the best in writing history, but we don’t

want to forget what you went through.

Colonel Charlton knew how to treat people. When a person came

to him raging mad, he used to smile in his face, calm him down,

and deal with him positively.

Colonel Silverman knew how to treat Arabs, because he lived in the

Arabian Gulf. So when they put him here in Iraq, he knew how to

treat the Iraqi people, and he treated them well.

One other person is Major [Adam T.] Strickland, and another guy

who called himself [name deleted for security reasons]. He was an

American. ^ose people knew how to treat Iraqis.

Not to forget General [ John F.] Kelly’s role, because he used to

shuttle between the tribal areas.We can never forget it. He knew how

to treat people and to win them over. He would release detainees. He

honored sheikhs. He would release a detainee as an honor to sheikhs.

He supported those who are starting service projects.

^ey knew how to connect society with the rule of law. Everything

about the military, they knew how to connect it.To be honest with

you right now, I cannot think of everything good that you’ve done,

because it doesn’t come to mind.

39

Iraqi Perspectives
And we cannot forget Brigadier General Williams, who I have

mentioned, who was here before the Awakening in 2006. . . .

You must know the period between 2003 and 2009 is not an easy

period. It was a very complex period. I want you to know that some

of the clerics did side with the terrorists because they had religious

tendencies. So we talked to them, and we told them the right way,

and we won them over.

Sheikh Sattar even sent me to Oman to talk to Sheikh Harith alDhari and to tell him to stop all the fiery speeches, the negative

things about the police and the army. We calmed him down, and

we won him over, and no more fiery sermons.We said that we want

security—the army, the police, everything—in our own country.

We said, “Sooner or later, American forces will leave our country,

and we will have to stay and rebuild it.”He was somewhat satisfied

with our suggestions, so for a year or two he did not say anything

negative.

Montgomery: What part did al-Qaeda in Iraq play in the troubles

here?

Abdullah: ^eir role was simple. ^ey are the primary mischief

makers in Iraq.^ey did not know what resistance meant.^ey did

not know what jihad meant. ^ey did not know what humanity

meant. And I speak in front of the camera, and I say it forcefully.

^ey did not know what life meant.^ey wanted to kill everybody

that existed and everybody that did not agree with them. So,

therefore, [inaudible], and that’s why they had to be kicked out of

this country and any other country. And I’m not saying this to be

nice to you. And, if you get me madder, I will say much more. So,

please, leave me be.

Montgomery: I think that we definitely don’t want to get him angry.

Abdullah: I’ll tell you what they used to do. ^ey used to kill the

doctor, who is in the business of bringing people back to life. ^ey

used to kill the children.^ey used to kill the women.^ey used to kill

the engineers, whose job is to rebuild. How can you kill everybody?

You ask them the question, “Why do you kill?”

40

Al-Anbar Awakening
^ey said, “Well, this guy’s not a Muslim.”

“Okay, why don’t you call him Muslim?”

“Oh, because he’s a Shi’a, or because he’s Kurdish, or because he’s

a Sunni backslider.”

^ey had a reason for killing everybody. “^is is a Sunni backslider.

^is is a Shiite.^is is a Kurd.^is is a policeman.^is is a soldier.”

So they had a reason to kill anybody and everybody they wanted to.

We tried to understand who the real enemy was.We just didn’t know

who it was. ^ey consider a little baby, a woman, to be an enemy?

You may not know this; perhaps you do. ^e religion of Islam

prohibits the killing of a child or a woman, even the cutting of a

tree or destroying a building.^is is not done in Islam. Islam means

peace—peace and mercy for all people, not just for Muslim people.

^ey used Islam as a cover, a pretense. I, being the head of the

Sunni Endowment organization in Anbar, I say, and I declare it to

everyone everywhere. And I would like to tell you, there are very

few, and soon enough we will be rid of them. It is a dark spot in a

bright room.

And, you know what? We can say frankly that there are some

Christians who destroy the Christian religion also. ^ere are very

few of them, but they do exist. It’s not only in Islam, but even in

Christianity, though not the slaughter. Many sects pretend to be

religious, but their aim is to kill people.

I said what I said, and I ask God for forgiveness. I wish success for

everyone. I thank you for this meeting. And I’m ready and able and

willing to start writing history as it is. History will record the bad

deeds of the people who did evil. And good words will be written

for those who are good people.

41

Iraqi Perspectives


Interview 3
Sheikh Ahmad Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi

Paramount Sheikh, Albu Risha Tribe

President of Mutammar Sahwat al-Iraq

(Iraqi Awakening Party)

Sheikh Ahmad Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi is a brother of the late

Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who was the founder and iconic

leader of the Anbar Awakening Council. After his brother’s

assassination, he was elected to succeed him as paramount sheikh and

president of the council. He was interviewed in his home in Ramadi,

adjacent to the guesthouse where the Awakening was announced, by

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy

S. McWilliams.

Sheikh Ahmad Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi: We took the Iraqi

commander to the American forces at K-160 [kilometer marker

160 on the highway], and we told them he was ready to talk. ^ey

said, “Bring him forth.” Sheikh Khamis* wanted a guarantee from

the American forces that if he brought the Iraqi commander, he

would not be apprehended.^ey said,“No,”and that was a promise.

Sheikh Mohammed went along with them to K-160. Brigadier

General Ahmed Sadag also went. ^ey signed a peace treaty—no

need for fighting—and he promised them he would discharge his

soldiers. So the American forces entered Anbar with no fighting.

^at was 2003. A government was established in Anbar with the

support of the American forces. Basic services, and everything else,

were excellent.

Some people started inciting people to fight the Americans. ^ey

described those among us who cooperated with the Americans as

stooges, and they gained a lot of popularity. ^ey marshaled the

people against us, so we left them. Right then and there, they

started attacking the government of Iraq, the Iraqi police, and the

American forces. And then, at that time, al-Qaeda came in. And

that resistance, the foreign Arabs, the emirs, came in place.

45

* Possibly Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi al-Issawi, paramount sheikh of the Albu Issa tribe.
^ey killed a lot of personnel from the police. ^ey destroyed the

Iraqi army. ^ey destroyed the infrastructure of the country. ^ey

attacked schools.^ey attacked university professors.^ey forbade

involvement in any political dialogue. ^e situation became

unbearable. ^e sheikhs and the brains left the province—

professors, teachers, and doctors—they all went to Jordan and

Syria. Al-Qaeda roved the country. We set up security forces

around our compounds, and we stayed here. We did not migrate.

^ey started lobbing mortar rounds on us in order to make us run

away. We did not. We kept being friends with the Americans.

Infrastructure services were really bad. Education and health care

were bad. Al-Qaeda took over the Ramadi hospital, the

Department of Education, the university, the oil infrastructure, and

they were the rulers. ^e governor of Anbar was protected by the

American forces. Not many people stayed with him, except a few

accountants who were working on the budget. Some of the budget

was going to finance al-Qaeda via some contracts or projects. It

wasn’t given directly to al-Qaeda; it was channeled to them in

various ways.

We realized that the people had had it with the situation. People

started murmuring, saying that if we had obeyed the people who

started work in 2003, the situation would not have deteriorated to

this point. So they started the blame game, due to the losses that

were inflicted among their ranks and their tribesmen. So Sheikh

[Abdul] Sattar [Abu Risha] and I, we started thinking that we’ve

got to get in touch with the tribal sheikhs and their cousins, the

ones who were active, so we could incite them to fight al-Qaeda.

Sheikh Sattar told me, “Leave it to me. I’ll take care of it.” So he

started moving, talking with the tribal sheikhs, one by one. He told

them that he was ready to do something, and he gathered them for

a conference on the 14th of September 2006. A communiqué was

issued, containing 11 points:

First, to bring back the army in Anbar and to bring the tribal sons

into the police and army.

Second, to declare war on al-Qaeda—and he described them as

thugs and criminals.

46

Al-Anbar Awakening
To bring back the respect that is due to the tribal sheikhs.

^e American forces were to be considered friendly, and attacking

them was forbidden.^at was the first conference ever held in Iraq

with the American forces to be considered friendly.

To treat the Ba’athists humanely.

And no cooperation or negotiation with al-Qaeda.

To reopen the judiciary, and to bring the criminals before the law.

To be presented as government officials, as people who follow the

law, and not as militias.

To enter the political system, and to enter into dialogue on a large

scale, and to participate in the election.

^ese were the most prominent points that were announced at the

conference.

Also, getting in touch with the Iraqi central government will be

considered as reconciliation. And the formation of a council, which

was called the Anbar Salvation Council, to take the place of the

provincial pouncil that ran away to Syria. ^e central government

refused that request, but they put eight people from the Salvation

Council into the provincial council.

^e central government agreed to let the people of Anbar enroll in

the army and the police. ^e war on al-Qaeda started right then,

and we began to take their men before the law. ^e American

forces started organizing the police by taking their applications,

screening them, training them, and, whenever we had a ready force,

we established a police station with them. American forces helped

us with training, with salaries, with transporting salaries, and with

arming the police.

^e war against al-Qaeda was waged first in Ramadi, and then in

every other tribal area. Whenever we cleared a tribal area of alQaeda, we set up a police station. We elected a representative

company from every area. We took these people, and we went to

the city of Ramadi, and we attacked in Ramadi. ^at’s how we

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Iraqi Perspectives
liberated Ramadi. Tamim was also liberated. Malab was liberated.

Albu Fayed was liberated. Tajiria, Khalidiyah, Amariyah, Fallujah,

Saqlawiyah, Karma, Jazeera, the outskirts of Hit, Albu Issa. ^e

city of Hit proper was liberated. Baghdadi city was liberated. ^e

city of Haditha and all the adjacent territories, Rawah territory,

Ana. Al-Qaim was liberated by the Albu Mahal tribe.^ey started

before the inception of the Awakening. Al-Qaeda started a fight

with them, so they counterattacked with their sons, and they were

able to liberate their area.

We opened a new page with the tribes in the south. After the fight

with al-Qaeda and the victory against them, we renounced

sectarian violence, so we invited tribal sheikhs from the south to

Anbar. ^ere was a dispute among the Shiites and Sunnis, and we

wanted to alleviate that. We wanted to cooperate with them as one

people, as Muslims.

We opened up the highway. We put many checkpoints on the

highway. ^ose people who were intercepting travelers—the

criminals—we started fighting them, and we detained many of

them and put them before the law. As you see, the highway right

now is the most secure road in all of Iraq.

^arthar, which contained many mass graves—the ^arthar area

was attacked by the emergency response units. It was liberated.^e

Samarra road.

Al-Qaeda was broken, with the help of God, and they will not be

able to conduct any military operations. You hear, now and then,

about VBIEDs [vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices] or

someone committing suicide.^is is the choice that we gave them:

you can either surrender to us or you can be suicided.^ey despaired

of accomplishing any victories, so now they resort to suicide.

^e organization concentrated on my brother, peace be upon him.

^ey conducted 12 suicide attacks against him.^e twelfth operation

finally hit him exactly a year after the inception conference.

We changed the Awakening into a political entity. We became a

political movement.We brought in people with high degrees: tribal

sheikhs and their sons and relatives, tribal sons from the educated

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Al-Anbar Awakening
people who are able to lead, and we concentrated on them being

clean and capable. We waged a campaign for the election, and we

achieved significant progress. We encouraged the people to go and

cast their votes. We encouraged the people to go and participate.

We emphasized to them that their vote was very important and

crucial at that juncture. We encouraged them for change. We

obtained very good results in the election. We surpassed all the

parties that used to be dominant. We overcame them. After the

election results are announced, we will form alliances with the

people that garnered enough votes to have a majority and form a

government. ^is is the Awakening. . . .

I used to pay salaries to the police, who did not receive a salary for

four months. Uniforms were imported from Jordan. I did not want

them to look like militias by wearing civilian clothes. I wanted them

to look official. We were careful not to conduct any military

operations in civilian clothes, only in military uniforms.^e martyrs

who fell in battle, we used to go to their funerals and help their

families monetarily. Weapons were short. We didn’t have enough

weapons, so we had to purchase what we could. ^ese expenditures

came out of our own pockets. At the time, we did not receive any

support from the government of Iraq or the American forces.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: Where was the conference where

they came up with the 11 points? What was the location?

Ahmad: At this house, right here.

Montgomery: So in this building we were just in. And I understand

all of the tribes freed their own areas, their own tribal areas, but it

happened in succession. Once a tribal area was free, did that tribe

go to help another tribe, and so forth, or did they just each

separately clear their own areas?

Ahmad: No, they elicited the help of other clansmen, from other

tribes. But once they liberated a place, they left people from that

tribe to be policemen in that police station.

Montgomery: So they did both.^ey protected their own area and

also . . .

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Iraqi Perspectives
Ahmad: And helped other tribes. When we went out there, and we

inquired about who was in al-Qaeda, we got a lot of help from the

tribe’s people in the area.

Montgomery: When they met with the Shi’a to get rid of their

differences, who did they meet with? What was that like?

Ahmad: With many other sheikhs, al-Zargan sheikhs, al-Fetna

sheikhs.^ey wanted to keep Iraq united, and they wanted to avert

any internal conflict. It was a successful meeting.

Montgomery: Was that here, also?

Ahmad: At the guesthouse. No one was willing or able to undertake

such an endeavor, to fight al-Qaeda in Anbar. No one was even

willing to stand before the television camera and announce that he

would fight al-Qaeda. We announced, right from this house, an

open war against al-Qaeda, right on TV.

^e organization got wind of it. ^ey were right there. ^ey had

many weapons. ^ey lobbed a lot of mortar rounds on us to get us

to back off, but we never did. We never wavered.

Unknown: What actions did he think could have been done

differently in the very beginning to possibly start this sooner? Was

there anything either the Coalition forces, or the chiefs, or even the

local government could have done to possibly get this going sooner?

Ahmad: As the American forces, per se, you could not have done

anything. I’ll give an example. If a contractor took money from you

to build a school, he was killed because he was a collaborator. He

says, “Look, please, look, I built a school.”^ey said, “Yes, but you

took money from the Americans,” so they killed him. ^erefore

you all would have been very limited, if not at all.

As for us, we were able to convince the people that the situation was

dire, and we needed to rise up against al-Qaeda and live like normal

people, like advanced people. When we used to meet with the tribal

sheikhs, we asked them—we lectured them, “Look, when are you

going to have a normal life? When are you going to be able to get

your dues from the government? When are you going to be able to

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Al-Anbar Awakening
send your children to school? When are you going to live a normal

life, when these thugs are in charge? ^ese people are wearing masks.

^ey cannot build the country. People that can build government

and sustain it are the police and the army. You cannot get your rights

if you have no police and no army to protect you.”

Unknown: You said that the Coalition forces had a hard time

distinguishing, sometimes, between the Iraqis and al-Qaeda. How

easy is it for you to distinguish? Are they still hiding out here, or

have they left?

Ahmad: It is very easy for us to distinguish, and there are no foreign

Arabs here now. It is hard for you to even distinguish between the

guilty and the innocent, but we know them by their faces.^is is a

criminal, this is not. Some of the mistakes you made were in Bucca

prison. It was better to have referred those criminals to the Iraqi

justice system than to Bucca, because they started having a school,

and they indoctrinated other detainees.

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Interview 4
53

Sheikh Wissam Abd al-Ibrahim

al-Hardan al-Aethawi

Former First Deputy

Sahawa al-Anbar/Sahawa al-Iraq

Current President of Iraqi Popular Front

Sheikh Wissam Abd al-Ibrahim al-Hardan al-Aethawi is a

member of the al-Hardan clan, which is the paramount family of the

Aethawi tribe and among the most respected families in al-Anbar and

Salah ad-Din provinces. He was a member of the Tribal Affairs

Council and among the founding members of the Anbar Salvation

Council. He is not influential by way of a large following; rather,

because he is from a very prominent family, he knows many important

people and knows the background of many important people and

significant events.

Sheikh Wissam was interviewed by Colonel Gary W.

Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams

on 15 February 2009 at Camp Ramadi.

Sheikh Wissam Abd al-Ibrahim al-Hardan al-Aethawi: After too

many killings had taken place, to the Iraqis . . . the nationalists rose

up. I was the head of that movement. We gathered about 500 army

officers from the last army, and we rose in 2005. I went to Sa’doun

al-Dulaimi. He was the defense minister at the time. He was my

relative. I asked him to give the fighters permission to carry arms.

I was not successful in that endeavor. We could not get

government’s permission for them to carry arms.

Most of the officers left the country because they were subject to

being eliminated. ^ey were traced, and they were killed by the

terrorists, many of them were. One of their leaders, Muhammad

Ishmael al-Jabawi, was eliminated. He was from the previous Iraqi

army. He was a leader in the national resistance. A general in the

air force, Waji, was also killed. My brother, Mohir al-Hardan, who

was a judge, was also killed. He was a deputy to the governor.

Sheikh Naser [Abdul Karim al-Miklif ] was also killed. Sheikh Jai
Tehan Abu Risha was also killed, and many more notables—

nationalists who would serve the country—were eliminated.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: ^ese were all outside the country?

Wissam: No, inside the country.

Montgomery: Inside the country?

Wissam: So those who remained immediately left the country.

Montgomery: Right, okay.

Wissam: ^e militias also had a role in making people flee the

country, based on sectarian divide. Some people were displaced. So

the last of the national resistance movement that I envisioned was

left with very few people. You could count them on your hands.

I don’t want to make the story too long, because if I am to talk

about the Awakening and its history, it would take months. Sheikh

[Abdul] Sattar [Abu Risha] called me by phone. He said, “Please,

I want you to come to Anbar.” I was living in a village. ^e name

of the village was al-Mish Haniyah. ^at’s where my grandfather

lived. It’s about 70 kilometers from here. I asked what he had in

mind. He said there was a conference about to take place in

Amman, and I told him I did not wish to attend any conferences,

because they are to no avail. He insisted that I attend, or more

likely, he pleaded with me. His cousin is my wife, so he kind of

pressured me into attending. Sa’ad Hamid al-Douish, his cousin,

also was martyred. His mother is also from the same family, the

Tehan family. I brought Ali with me to Anbar.

When he saw me, when he laid his eyes on me at his house, he said,

“We are victorious by the God of al-Kaaba.” When I asked him

what he had in mind, he said, “We have a huge undertaking, and

nobody can take care of it, except you.” Before he even said hello,

which is customary in the Arab world, he started telling me what

he had in mind. He said, “I want to fight al-Qaeda.”

I said, “How many do you have?”

He said, “I have 7,000.”

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Al-Anbar Awakening
I knew for a fact he had maybe 70, not 7,000, but I told him,“Your

70 would be considered as 7,000.”

So all night long, we sat down, and we were planning and plotting

for this huge revolution we’re about to undertake. My plan was as

follows. ^e first phase of the plan was to start an educational

program toward the tribes.^e second one, when the people finally

saw that I was involved in it, they became courageous.

It was hard for the tribal people to come into Abu Risha’s

compound because he was considered an agent of the Americans.

When I sent for groups to come in, a lot of times, out of four you

may get two killed on the road. ^at’s because too many terrorists

were about on the road looking for people that would cooperate

with us, and they would eliminate them. ^e difficult places, both

topography-wise and infested with terrorists, were Albu Aetha,

Albu Faraj, Albu Beit, and Albu Bali.

I planned to make a nucleus of 50 men in each tribe.^ose 50 men

would be ready after we went to the conference in Jordan and

announced the revolution against the terrorists. ^ey would be

ready to move right then.

Okay, this meeting started with me and him in the evening. It

ended up in the morning with 10 more people.^e notables would

be Hamid al-Hayess, Shalan Nouri, Jabar Ajaj, Muriad Maieshi,

Abdul Sattar, and a name I cannot recall. He is from the Albu

Gharraf tribe. Sheikh Fara Sabar Deri from the Ghali tribe, and

Sheikh Khalid Araq.

After the killing of Sheikh Khalid Araq al-Ataymi, who is from

the Albu Aligasim tribe—they severed his head, they left him out

in the open. His head may have never been recovered.We used that

as a pretense to start the revolution. ^is guy was killed merely

because he wanted to start a revolution, even though he had not

even begun it. He wanted to start fighting terrorism. ^e name of

his organization would be Anbar’s Revolutionaries. We used his

tribe under the pretext of vengeance. We elicited his tribe to help

us.^eir tribe also, because it is a part of Albu Aetha, wanted to do

something, but they are not politically savvy. ^ey do not have the

political will, but we elicited their help nevertheless.

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Iraqi Perspectives
So Sheikh Sattar provided me with an office, with a computer, with

papers to write on. His brother, Sheikh Ahmad, who was living in

Dubai, wired me $5,000. At the time, Sheikh Ahmad was not

known. And I started putting the group together for the revolution

against al-Qaeda. Sheikh Ahmad was asking me to stay with

Sheikh Sattar, because he did not have staying power, and if I left,

he would be hanged.

^e first people I tried to get were the religious clerics. I implored

them that there was no sanctity left for travelers or for anybody

else. Notable among them were Abdul Malik al-Saidi and Ahmed

Al-Kubaisi. I exhorted them to Islamic principles. ^e second

people I tried to get help from were the tribal sheikhs.^rough the

Internet, we got a fatwa to start the fight against terrorism.

^e commander of the American forces at the time was constantly

in touch with Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, but I didn’t meet them.

^e most important part was to finish off terrorism so that people

would become free again, regardless of who we cooperated with.

So we started preparing for that conference we spoke of, and we let

it be known that 90 percent of the tribal sheikhs were in Jordan.

From over there, from abroad, we faced stiff resistance to the

initiation of a counterterrorism undertaking. ^ey accused us of

trying to take over the tribes, trying to be sheikhs.^ey said,“You are

not sheikhs. You cannot do this. You cannot do that.”^ey mocked

us. ^ey said, “You’re trying to take on al-Qaeda—the ones who

fought America?” ^ey laughed at us. ^ey said, “You people are

simple-minded. You cannot do what you think you’re going to do.”

Montgomery: Who told them this?

Interpreter:^e sheikhs, the 90 percent of sheikhs that were living

in Amman. Do you want me to ask him that? ^at’s what he just

told me.

Montgomery: No, if that’s what he said. I just missed a word.

Interpreter: ^e sheikhs, the tribal sheikhs who were living in

Amman, who were scolding them that he tried to take our place.

^ey said, “How are you trying to fight al-Qaeda? And besides,

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Al-Anbar Awakening
you’re not even real sheikhs.We are the sheikhs.You’re trying to use

our place. You’re trying to pretend to be us.”

Montgomery: No, I missed the word Amman.

Wissam: Even in Syria, even in Jordan and Egypt.

^e Marine commander at the time pledged his support to the

undertaking.

Montgomery: Does he remember his name?

Wissam: ^e 14th of September 2006, if you look at that date, you’ll

find his name.* ^ere was a common interest between us and them,

and that is security for all. I asked the commander at the time to help

us by removing the concrete barriers, because they sectioned Ramadi

into too many places. So he immediately said, “Yes, I will give you

fuel, water, rations, remove the barriers.” He said, “^is would be a

good step forward, the people will find out we are here to help them,

not to harm them as the terrorists have done in the past.”

What I’m speaking of at this time is the day before the conference. On

the eve of that conference, a civilian vehicle came to Sheikh Abdul

Sattar’s. I think it was from the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency].

I was not able to meet with them. After the meeting, he informed me

of all that went on because it was his habit to inform me of everything.

He told me, “^is is the speech that we have to give,” and as I

understood, the speech was from President [George W.] Bush.^ese

are secrets that nobody is privy to except me and Sattar.

I was able to read the speech. Sheikh Sattar was not able to read it

because he was illiterate. He did not finish school. And I told him, “If

you read it at the conference, you will be laughed at, because this

translation is verbatim, and they can tell this is not our writing. It is

American writing.”I changed quite a bit in the speech that we received

from President Bush. ^e substance of the speech was left intact, but

I changed the wording to grammatically correct Arabic that would be

easily understood by the participants of my conference. Had it been left

the way it was, there would have been a misunderstanding.

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Iraqi Perspectives

* Major General Richard C. Zilmer was commander of I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)

at the time.
On 14 September 2006 we started.

Interpreter: And he did say a while ago, the speech contained

something about the rebuilding of Iraq and pulling the troops out.

Wissam: We readied the place for the conference I’m speaking of.

^ere were no television stations present at the time, so we brought

a very simple camera to the conference. In that conference, we

made a committee, which I personally called the Awakening and

the Anbar Salvation Council. We chose 41 people to represent the

governing council for Anbar, which was not present at the time.

Sheikh Sattar was chosen as governor, and I was his administrative

deputy. Sheikh Hamid al-Hayess was the head of the Salvation

Council. Many more names are documented.

Here the political phase started. How do we implement the

decision? ^e tribes began fighting, each one in its own territory.

Each tribe knew who was a terrorist, so he was either killed, given

to the government, to the police, banished, whatever. I admonished

them not to kill as al-Qaeda was killing because if that was the

case, then we’d never see the light of day; meaning give them to

the law. Let the law take care of them. Most of the people in the

Awakening did not have political savvy.^ey did not know the law.

^ey did not have political awareness, and I warned them that

should they kill anybody, they might end up in detention centers.

[conversation with interpreter]

Interpreter:^e Awakening started in Jazeera, in all these places he

mentioned, except Albu Beid and Albu Bali. He mentioned Albu

Aetha, Albu Diyad, Albu Faraj. Okay, Albu Faraj was the first to

raise the surrender flag, so Albu Bali and Albu Baid—Albu Aetha,

Albu Bali. Okay, so those are four places: Albu Aetha, Albu Beid,

Albu Bali, and Garban.

Montgomery: And those are where the bad guys surrendered?

Interpreter: No, the bad guys surrendered in Albu Faraj.

Wissam: In Sufiyah and Street 17, the terrorists were entrenched.

^ey were killing in the street. No man could raise his head. One

day, when we were meeting, Sheikh Jassim Suwadawi from Albu

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Al-Anbar Awakening
Soda—and there was another person with him, who came from

Shamiyah—they came in, and they pledged their allegiance to the

Awakening, and they asked for help. We gave him very simple

assistance, a few rifles. Why? Because we were not helped by the

army, by the government, or by the Americans. We were simply

that involved, and we were told,“^e enemy is behind you, and the

sea is in front of you.”

Interpreter: Meaning “between a rock and a hard place.”

Wissam: ^e first cell was constituted to fight in Shamiyah with

the leadership of Jassim [Muhammad Saleh] al-Suwadawi. I was

called “the engineer of the Awakening.”As far as Sheikh Jassim alSuwadawi is concerned, believe me, he has many chapters. I lived

them. He got involved in many battles with me. He had a great

role, and he will never be given his just dues.

Now we come to the Americans’ role. Now we come to the

promises that were made by the American commander, as far as

lifting the barriers, giving out fuel, kerosene, gasoline, what have

you. We got in touch with Baghdad, specifically with Methal alAlousi. We had no way of communicating with the prime minister.

Methal al-Alousi was a friend of mine. We told him what we were

undertaking. And he said, “You are heroes. Tomorrow I’m getting

my bags, and I’m coming to join you.”

We got a date to meet with the prime minister, [Nouri Kamil

Mohammed Hasan al-] Maliki. ^e political entities started

pressuring the American commanders in Anbar not to help us. We

met with al-Maliki, and a verbal confrontation ensued, and we

threatened him. If we were not given any assistance from them, we

were going to push the terrorists into their territory, close the

borders, and let them worry about the terrorists. Mowaffak alRubaie, the national security advisor, was writing, and he never said

a word. But two days later he came on television and said,“Men of

Anbar, we are supplying you with men and materiel.”

When the people got wind of the fact that the government was

about to help us out with men and materiel—meaning guns—they

said immediately that we sold out to the government. Now we’re

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Iraqi Perspectives
lining our pockets, we’re taking ammo and not giving it to the

people. We’re taking weapons and not giving them to the people,

meaning the revolution is not genuine anymore, meaning his

speech was full of landmines.

I got in touch with Methal al-Alousi. I said, “Okay, when are you

coming? Bring your bags and come join us.”

He said,“Look, we were told by President Bush,‘Whoever goes to

the governor’s office is to be shot.’”

I asked, “Why?” ^e political entities in Baghdad understood our

Awakening to be against them, and that we were about to go into

Baghdad and take care of them. So there was pressure from these

political entities on the ambassador, and the ambassador on Bush,

and back.

We came back, and the American commander at the time in Anbar

had switched his thinking 180 degrees. I asked him about his

pledge to help us. He said, “Look, I cannot help you. As far as

Jazeera goes, I’m not going to help you with logistics, or weapons,

or what have you.” As for the governor’s office, he said, “Do not

advance against it.”

Interpreter: I think I’m misunderstanding, because he said there is

no help coming through for Jazeera. Do you want me to ask for

that again, because he’s saying now that “six months later we were

able to liberate the governor’s office in Ramadi.”

Montgomery: Yes, make sure you’re understanding.

Wissam: [Conversation with interpreter.] ^ese were his

instructions. You can go ahead and fight in al-Jazeera, but if we

find any terrorist weapons, he would take them himself and not

assist us with any kind of weapons.

^e one thing that you have to understand is that the Americans

were not sure of the loyalty of the Awakening people because the

people that were working with the Americans told them, “^ese

men are just wearing masks.^ey’re going to turn against you, and

they’re going to kill you.” It is a fact that some of the police were

members of al-Qaeda.

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Al-Anbar Awakening
Everything was confused in the meantime, except the

determination of the Awakening people. Many problems ensued

between the Awakening and the Islamic Party, so the American

command suggested a meeting between us and them. ^e Islamic

Party became wary of the Awakening. . . .

It’s a long history, and it cannot be recalled in one hour. I went to

al-Rashid.^ere was a conference there, and they said,“Here comes

the engineer of the Awakening.” So all the television reporters

came and gathered around me because they were trying to make a

documentary on the Awakening.

As I said, they suggested that we meet with the Islamic Party

representative, along with the American command. Sa’doun

Dulaimi, who was not at the Ministry of Defense at the time,

advised me not to enter the meeting. I asked him why, and he said,

“Because those are politicians, and they spin everything. You will

never be able to advance an argument with them, because they will

overwhelm you.”

I told him there was no problem. We’d meet in Fallujah. ^e

meeting was between me, Sattar Abu Risha, the governor, and his

deputy. ^ey took us from here via helicopter. . . . We didn’t know

what the future held. Are these guys going to dump us somewhere?

I’m being frank. Sheikh Sattar was sitting right next to me. He

said,“Look, any moment, these guys are going to push us out of the

plane, because these guys like the governor.”In the helicopter, with

our garb, and the wind was flowing violently, so we were disheveled,

but when we got to Fallujah, [Major General Richard C.] Zilmer

greeted us. He had a complete team from the American embassy.

I had written down in a small booklet 24 points on Mamoun [Sami

Rashid al-Alwani], who was the governor. Sattar asked me,“What

am I to say?” I said, “Just start anything, and I will take over.”^at

is because he was the head of the Awakening, and I was his deputy.

He went in, and he said, “Greetings my brother, and this is Sheikh

al-Hardan, and he will inform you about everything.”

^e discussion was bitter and sorrowful. When I confronted

Mamoun with the 24 points I had laid out, he said, “Should I

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Iraqi Perspectives
answer?”I said,“No, you answer one after the other.”I said,“Write

down one by one, and then answer.” He said, “I don’t have a pen.”

I said, “Your deputy has a pen.”. . . When his deputy said, “I don’t

have a pen, either,”I told Commander Zilmer,“Look, this is a very

hot province, and this man is incapable of defending himself or

carrying a pen. How can we leave him to be a governor?” It was

the knockout punch to Mamoun. He came to me, and he pleaded

with me to be his friend.

Zilmer suggested we form two committees to govern—five people

from the Awakening and five people from the Islamic Party. After

that, we kissed and made up, and we took pictures, and Zilmer went

home. But then Mamoun abrogated the agreement.^ey started a

division between me and Sheikh Sattar through his brother, Sheikh

Ahmad, who was the closest to the Islamic Party, which led me to

stay away from Sheikh Sattar for three months. From that day on,

the Awakening was either infiltrated or sold—however you want to

characterize it—and it ended with the killing of Sheikh Sattar.

^ese are the highlights, and there are a lot more. I was involved in

a battle against al-Qaeda. ^e Americans helped me with it. So

there is a lot more to be said, but I’m going to tell you when the film

is over, so you’re not recording.

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Al-Anbar Awakening
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Iraqi Perspectives
Interview 5
65

Sheikh Jassim Muhammad Saleh

al-Suwadawi

Contesting Sheikh of the Albu Soda Tribe

President of the Sufiya Awakening Council

Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-Janabi

Member of the Awakening

Sheikh Jassim Muhammad Saleh al-Suwadawi served as a warrant

officer in the Iraqi air force for 30 years. He was an ordnance expert

who specialized in armaments for MiG-23 and MiG-29 aircraft. After

the true, lineal sheikh of the Albu Soda tribe fled the country, Jassim

became the de facto head of the tribe, primarily because of his actions

during and after the battle of Sufiyah.

Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-Janabi is a kinsman and a member of

the adjacent Albu Mahal tribe. He served as a company-grade officer

in Iraqi special forces during the Iran-Iraq War and was wounded

twice. After leaving military service in 1991, he was recalled to the

army and served as a company commander from 2001 to 2003.

Sheikh Jassim and Sheikh Abdul Rahman worked closely together

before, during, and after the battle of Sufiyah. In the first interview,

they provide an overview of events leading up to the battle, the battle

generally, and subsequent developments. In the second interview, they

give detailed descriptions of tactics and techniques employed during

the battle and subsequent operations.

Estimates vary widely as to how many al-Qaeda fighters attacked the

Albu Soda tribe on 25 November 2006. Coalition estimates are much

lower than those of the men who were actually under fire, but all agree

that Sheikh Jassim and Sheikh Abdul Rahman were heavily outnumbered.

Sheikh Jassim and Sheikh Abdul Rahman were interviewed by

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy

S. McWilliams on 12 and 20 February 2009 in the Albu Soda tribal

area east of Ramadi city.
Sheikh Jassim Muhammad Saleh al-Suwadawi: After the

disbanding of the Iraqi army and some other ministries, I had

nothing to do. I had no job. I tried to help the Coalition forces, but

it was difficult.

On 5 November 2003, I met a guy named Ayham al-Samarie to

coordinate activities with the Coalition forces. He was the

electricity minister. It was difficult to meet as frequently as I wanted

due to the inherent danger of traveling to Baghdad and terrorism

being rampant. I tried to elicit the help of the government of Iraq

and Coalition forces through Ayham al-Samarie, and I tried to

establish a covert chain of command. We gave periodic reports to

Coalition forces and to the Iraqi government from November 2003

until September 2006.

On 28 September 2006, one of my brothers and three of my

tribesmen were kidnapped.^en I declared open hostilities against

the terrorists, and I established checkpoints in my territory.

I’m a member of the Tribes Council in Iraq. In September 2006, I

had only 17 people fighting with me, so I got in touch with Sheikh

Sattar Abu Risha and Hamid al-Hayess to get their help. I did not

resort to them because I was defeated. No, I wanted to get

permission to carry arms in my own territory. I met with General

[Richard C.] Zilmer at the time. I met with Lieutenant Colonel

[ James] Lechner [USA]. I tried to get the help of Coalition forces.

I tried to get better arms for my men, but there was somewhat of

a mistrust in the Coalition forces to my aim because they thought

it was foolish for 17 men to try and take on the entire terrorist

apparatus around here.

^e way I got through to Sheikh Abdul Sattar and Sheikh Hamid

al-Hayess, I used to swim the river to get there safely, and come

back by swimming the river. ^e distance was about 200 or 300

meters. It was very tiring, and one time I almost drowned, but, with

the grace of God, I survived. I resorted to swimming the river

because the place was infested with terrorists, even inside my tribe.

^ey tried to kill me several times. ^ey set up a lot of ambushes

around the river to try to catch me and dispose of me.

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^e first thing I ever got from General Zilmer and General Murthi

[Mishin Rafa Farahan], the commander of the Iraqi Army 7th

Division, was a handwritten note saying it was okay for me to cross

the river using a boat. . . . ^ere was a combined American and

Iraqi army checkpoint on the other side. ^at’s why I wanted that

authorization, so I could show it to them.^at paper was dated 28

October 2006. . . .

On 20 November 2006, Coalition forces came in at night and

arrested my men who were manning the checkpoints.^ere was no

coordination between me and Battalion 1-9 of the Army. ^ey

didn’t have prior knowledge that I had set up checkpoints to prevent

the terrorists from lobbing mortars on them. My brothers and my

cousins pleaded with the Americans that “we are here because

Sheikh Abdul Sattar, Sheikh Hamid al-Hayess, and Sheikh Jassim

put us in here. ^ey need us in here to fight terrorists.” ^ey still

handcuffed them and brought them in to meet with me.

Interpreter: He did say “with the permission of Lieutenant Colonel

Lechner,” too, that they were in there.

Jassim: ^e last thing I did, I sold my last cow to purchase a

^uraya phone to get in touch with Sheikh Abdul Sattar and

Sheikh Hamid al-Hayess to coordinate with them. After they

verified with Sheikh Abdul Sattar, Lieutenant Colonel Lechner,

and Sheikh Hamid al-Hayess, they said, “Okay, you’re okay.” So

they untied their hands and let them continue.

On the 24th of November, I negotiated with some of the chieftains

in al-Qaeda to try to avert mayhem. It’s because I squeezed them.

I prevented them from accomplishing their missions because I set

up the checkpoints, and I prevented them from going about in my

territory. So they wanted to defuse the situation and try to convince

me to let them do what they wanted to do. . . .^ey negotiated with

me to lay down my arms, and they offered me as much as 1 billion

Iraqi dinars.

At the time, they had already decided beforehand that if I couldn’t

turn an agreement with them right then and there, they would

kidnap me and do away with me. ^ey had prepared 17 vehicles

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Iraqi Perspectives
loaded with men and weapons to kidnap me.^e meeting took place

at Sheikh Hamid Jabour’s house. I wanted to delay the confrontation

with them to a later time when I could better equip myself with men

and materiel, but I kind of sensed they were up to no good. I had five

armed men with me, and we pulled out of the meeting.

We wanted to renegotiate in a week so as to reassess our situation and

to avert conflict. But at the same time, one of the Albu Mahal tribe was

assassinated—which is adjacent to me—by al-Qaeda.^e Albu Mahal

are my cousins. ^ey are my children’s uncles. ^ey are relatives.

I went back and reproached them. I said, “Look, you’ve opened

another wound. You’ve just killed one of my tribesmen from Albu

Mahal.We’ve just agreed that there will be no killing.^erefore, no

agreement, no peace with you, period.”

^e next day, 25 November 2006, there was a huge attack by 850

armed men, armed with all kinds of weapons, from al-Qaeda and

some other militia groups.^ey lobbed between 62 and 67 mortar

rounds on my tribe that day. Afterward, they came in with their

light machine guns. We fought back with the 17 men that I had. I

suffered seven casualties, which I considered to be my brothers, but

they were my tribesmen. And we killed more than 90 people from

al-Qaeda. Among my tribesmen, I suffered 10 more casualties,

consisting of women, older people, children—innocent people.^e

terrorists came into their houses and just slaughtered them.

^e battle took place from 1:00 in the afternoon until 9:00 at night.

We exhausted our ammunition. ^ey were able to penetrate my

house and my brother’s house and burn them to the ground with

all the furniture in them.^ey burned 11 vehicles that belonged to

me and my brothers. At 10:00 at night, Coalition forces intervened,

1-9 Battalion.

We were able, with Coalition forces, with the Iraqi army, with my

men—they were called Jassim’s Militia at the time—to raid the

places where the terrorists were concentrating. We were able to

capture quite a few terrorists, and from interrogating them, we were

able to get a lot more. Some of them I turned over to Coalition

forces; some of them I turned over to the Iraqi justice system.

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When Lieutenant Colonel [Charles] Ferry [USA] found out that

I could confront the terrorists, he had enough trust in me, and I

gave him prior knowledge as to where my target was. He started

assisting me.^rough that, I was able to clear the area little by little.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: When you’re outnumbered so very

much, how do you fight that many men? What tactics do you use?

Were you at a house? What was the battle like?

Jassim: We used rooftops and ground emplacements, and we

picked them off. We knew who they were because they were

wearing masks. Our faces were open. We used maneuver to our

advantage. Whenever we got pushed back, we pulled back.

Whenever the force was overwhelming, we pulled back to other

secure places until nighttime. And they were more busy picking up

their wounded and dead comrades than trying to fight. By

nighttime, they were finally convinced it was a lost battle.^ey were

busy picking up their men because they didn’t want to be identified.

In addition, American jet fighters joined in. With the sound, I

guess they got scared.

At 1:30 p.m. I called some security organizations. I told them

there’s a big fight in my area, but the American infantry did not

join in, but the air force did join in late. After the terrorists pulled

out, two of their vehicles were burned by the jets. . . .

I started an education program, trying to educate people to the fact

that we were a small band of men who defeated a huge number of

men. ^at is because God granted us the victory because we were

in the right and the terrorists were in the wrong. So I was able to

bring in many people on my side. Eastern Ramadi has about 12

tribes. Within three months, I was able to enlist many of these

tribes into the police fold.

Sheikh Abdul Sattar asked me to gather the tribal sheikhs on 22

February, along with Colonel [ John W.] Charlton [USA], and

Abdullah [Muhammad] Badir, of the 1st [Iraqi] Division. I must

try and praise him. ^ere is a lot of praise for him because he

participated in helping me establishing security in this area. . . .

In March of 2007, we started to change the tone of things from

combat to providing infrastructure services to the people. So we

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Iraqi Perspectives
started a council like the al-Jazeera council, and we nominated four

people from each tribe. From 44, I was able to garner 41 in the

council.^rough that council, and with the help of Coalition forces,

we were able to provide the people with many services. ^rough

that initiative, we were able to provide the people with drinking

water, with many services, and with jobs, because the area had been

neglected since 2004. ^rough the Coalition forces, I was able to

get enough projects going, such as pumping stations, paving roads,

repairing and refurbishing schools, clinics, building schools. We

were able to put people to work. We were able to put engineers to

work . . . to repair the electricity and water. . . .

And now I will turn it over to Sheikh Abdul Rahman. He will give

you the highlights. I really have done a disservice, because I didn’t

even mention his name, even though he really is one of the heroes

that I depended on in the fight. . . .

Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-Janabi: On 17 September 2003, to be

exact, Brigadier General Ibrahim Sijil Said, my uncle, got in touch

with me. We used to work internal security in the former regime.

Later, he was kidnapped by al-Qaeda, along with his son and my

other cousin, and got killed. He wanted me to help him due to my

extensive contacts with other tribes in the middle of Anbar, and in

order to not let the Iranians penetrate into Anbar or Iraq as a

whole. I agreed with him, and he told me there were some people

in Baghdad who would support us. After he got their agreement, I

went to Baghdad, and we met with them. (I don’t want to mention

who those people were.) We agreed to cooperate with them, and we

formed a cell. We called it the Eagles Cell, and both I and my

brother, Sheikh Jassim, belonged to it. From that point, we started

our work, and we expanded it, providing the security apparatus with

information about the terrorists. And that was 5 November 2003.

February 2004, the martyr Fatha, who also coordinated and

cooperated with us; he used to carry my ^uraya phone because I

couldn’t bring it to Ramadi, and the GPS [global positioning

system], he used to keep it for me, too. He was killed right in front

of his house in 2004 in al-Dour by a terrorist squad. From then on,

we worked with great caution and excluded any unit that had an

Iraqi interpreter.

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Al-Anbar Awakening
We still suspect that those interpreters are the ones who related

information about us to the terrorists. One of the mistakes that

Coalition forces made was using local interpreters instead of

bringing interpreters from the United States. And we tried to alert

them to the fact that those interpreters were duplicitous.

We worked until the ominous day of 29 April 2004. I call it

ominous because my brother and three of his children were

kidnapped that day. He was kidnapped on his way to Baghdad by

a cell headed by Omar Hadid in Fallujah.

To tell you the truth, not only al-Qaeda fought us. All the armed

militias fought us.^ey issued fatwas against us, and they sent out

a lot of leaflets. ^at’s why our work became very difficult and

inherently dangerous for us and our families. Our support was

minimal—you could say nonexistent—from our Coalition

partners.

Now, not only were we supporting our families from our meager

resources, but we were supporting the families of the martyrs who

were killed supporting us. Coupled with that, we were not working

our regular jobs, because the terrorists did not allow us to live like

ordinary people. ^ey fought us, and our resources, and our

working areas. . . .

We attempted an uprising against al-Qaeda many times, and I will

mention one. It was at the end of 2004, beginning of 2005. I met

with the electricity minister of Ayad Allawi’s government, Dr.

Ayham al-Samarie. He mentioned a tribal uprising against alQaeda, and he said that he would provide me with support through

Coalition forces in Baghdad. Indeed, we started that endeavor,

Sheikh Jassim and me, and we made many contacts in Anbar and

Baghdad, and Salah ad Din, Diyala and Kirkuk, in Baghdad, and

Latifiya. We were trying to establish a public base to fight

terrorism, but because of his frequent travels and lack of knowledge

of the support people, and the change of government from Allawi

to another government, that project was abandoned. . . .

All along, from 2003 until the uprising, terrorists were constantly

picking at the people who got in touch with us, and, as we say, “It

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Iraqi Perspectives
reached up to here.”When they kidnapped my uncle, Abdul Sattar

Sijil—that was the 18th of October, 2004—that’s when my fight

began with them officially. With the help of Sheikh Jassim

Muhammed, I succeeded in saving my uncle from their hands. We

wounded one of the people who kidnapped my uncle.

In July or August 2006, they kidnapped my brother. I rescued him

and found him between life and death due to the extensive torture

that he suffered. After all of that was done to us, Sheikh Jassim and

I started gathering information relating to these terrorists and their

places, their emplacements, and their arms, until the day that I call

the ominous day, when his brother—

Interpreter: He wants to say something. ^e brother of Sheikh

Jassim was kidnapped on that day.

Jassim: ^ere was a general consensus among the people in the

street that those people were resistance fighters, so we started a

campaign of education that these people, if they are truly resistance

fighters, why are they kidnapping our men? So during that, we were

able to garner a lot more information about the terrorists.

Abdul Rahman: In that operation, Sheikh Jassim Muhammad had

only a pistol, but he was able to save his brother. He fought them

with his pistol and wounded one, but they got away.

On 20 November 2006, that’s when Sheikh Jassim made the

courageous stand in open warfare against them and placing

checkpoints all over the place—him, his brothers and his

children—despite the objections of some of the tribal chiefs in the

area. ^ose sheikhs were in cahoots with the terrorists.

^is movement that Sheikh Jassim started, started the Awakening

in eastern Ramadi and the tribes of Ramadi, along to the Abu Risha

sector, along to al-Fallujah from the side of Ramadi. . . . He got in

touch with Sheikh Abu Risha, God bless him, and he officially

provided him with support, and Sheikh Abdul Sattar was in the

forefront in giving the blessing for this initiative. He and the tribal

sheikhs called him the Lion of Eastern Ramadi, and well deserved.

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At the time, al-Qaeda started planning an offensive against the

sheikh’s tribe.^ey perpetrated many assassinations of people that

were close to him, but he remained steadfast despite all the

obstacles and challenges. He spent all of his resources in support of

that initiative. He did it so people could live in security and safety.

Again, the offensive began on 25 November 2006. At 1:30 in the

afternoon, the criminals started their offensive with probably more

than 850 fighters. ^ey started by lobbing more than 67 mortar

rounds. But the courageous fighters, despite their low numbers,

were able to withstand and thwart the offensive.

At the time, I was at the funeral of a sheikh from the Albu Mahal

tribe, Salman Adnan Hallawi. When the fight started, . . . my uncle

from Albu Mahal tribe came in support. Only six men came with

him from the Albu Mahal tribe. I was one of them. Two of them

were martyred. And from the fighters that Sheikh Jassim had, there

were 17 fighters, and some of them were martyred. From the

information we gathered after the battle, the enemy suffered about

90 dead and 170 wounded.

Right then and there, the barrier of fear was broken in all of

Ramadi, so open warfare against the terrorists took place. We had

a great role in clearing the areas I’m about to mention—Sheikh

Jassim and me. ^e sector from eastern Ramadi to Khalidiyah, alJazeera, Albu Beid; al-Jazeera, Abu Ali; wal-Karma; Ibrahim Ibn

Ali, which is located east of Karma toward Baghdad. Our fight

against the terrorists continued up until now, and right now, we are

fighting them in seven provinces.

Second Interview

Jassim: In order to protect my tribesmen from outside terrorists

and from internal terrorism within my tribe, I had 17 fighters. I

placed points at the entrances of the tribe.^eir main objective was

to search vehicles coming in and going out.

Two simple attacks took place upon the people that were manning

these checkpoints. ^ey lobbed some mortar rounds at the tribal

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Iraqi Perspectives
area where we live.^is took place about a month before the main

battle. And we had skirmishes with small arms between the

members of my tribe and the terrorists.

We had small Motorola radios, and that’s how we communicated.

I had four checkpoints. Each had one radio. At no given time was

there less than two to four people manning each checkpoint. ^ey

changed shifts day and night. My men carried AK-47s [assault

rifles]. Each one had 30 to 40 rounds. One PKC [machine gun]. So

for the 17 fighters I had, I had 16 AK-47s and one PKC.^ey were

very vigilant all the time. . . .

^e attack began, and they entered the area from three different

points. ^ere was no equality in the forces. We had 17 fighters,

while they had about 850 fighters on their side. Even in the

weaponry, there was no parity, because 850 fighters would carry a

lot more than 17, and ammunition as well.

After sunset, some of my men started pulling out from their

positions because they ran out of ammunition. Because of my men

pulling out, the terrorists were able to penetrate the area. ^ey

started killing children, old men, and women. ^ey burned two

houses that belonged to me. ^ey killed cattle and sheep. ^ey

burned vehicles. Even electric generators—they started shooting

at them, and burning them, and destroying them.

I had a ^uraya phone, and I was getting in touch with my men in

the field and the American forces as well.^e battery ran out in the

^uraya. Coalition forces were able to locate exactly where the

battle was taking place through the GPS [global positioning

system] in the ^uraya phone. ^ey sent fighter planes to fly over

the area.^e Coalition forces were asking me for exact locations of

the enemy, but when the enemy penetrated my area, everything

was intermingled. In military terms, when everything is

intermingled, there is no specific target, so the battle is lost. So I

told them, if they want to hit the terrorists when they pull back,

start hitting them, so we would inflict heavier losses on the enemy

than on ours. And indeed, they were able to burn three vehicles

after they pulled out, with all the occupants in them, about 15

kilometers from here.

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We assessed our losses after 9:00, after the battle. We found that we

had 17 martyrs from the men, children, and women, and seven of my

fighters were also killed.^ose seven were missing, I should say. We

couldn’t find their bodies. ^ey had tied up their corpses, and they

were pulling them behind their vehicles for about 20 kilometers. Five

of them were my brothers. ^ey were dragging them.

We found many of the enemies’ corpses on the battlefield, even

though they had taken many with them. Some of their corpses

stayed on the battlefield for about three days. We tried to exchange

corpses with the enemy, but it did not take place.

^e Iraqi army and the 1-9 [battalion, USA] came into the field at

10:00 at night.^ey set up positions within the houses of my tribe,

so we started raiding the enemy’s hiding places, day and night. . . .

Because of my military background—I had 30 years in the military

and had studied psychology—I was supervising the interrogations

myself. I would send a raiding party for five people. My men would

bring me 30. Believe it or not, I put the people in a room like this,

the 30 of them. In addition to the information that I had already

gathered on them, I knew who was a terrorist and who was not just

by studying the expression on their faces. I was accurate most of the

time. So the people I let go were honorable people, and they carried

arms with me, not against me.

What I used to do with them, I used to gather them in a room like

this, and I would make a speech about the evil of terrorism and the

destructive nature of it, and after that, they would believe in my

cause. After two or three days, they would come back to ask me to

let them become policemen. Within a very short period of time,

we were able to organize 12 tribes against terrorism, despite the

knowledge there were some sleeper cells entering the tribes. . . .

Abdul Rahman: I want to give you an abbreviated synopsis of what

happened to the plan. ^e sheikh, when he laid out the plan in

advance, he did not imagine the amount of force that was coming

against him. His plan was a defensive one, for a very small force. .

. . But because of his dogged determination, with the help of the

Almighty, the whole, full-fledged battle took place on his hands.

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Iraqi Perspectives
Some of the men who sympathized with him but could not help

him, they helped him a little, either directly or indirectly. I’ll give

you an example. When al-Qaeda came to attack, they did not

expect the Albu Mahal tribe to resist them at all.^ey thought they

would have safe passage, but the Albu Mahal attacked them and

sniped at them.

So the plan, as it was set up, was defensive in nature; but as the battle

developed, it was spontaneous.^e battle itself imposed on us what

we had to do. Initially, he relied on his own resources and his cousins’

resources, but as the battle developed, he started asking for help

from Abu Risha, from Coalition forces, from the Iraqi army.

Montgomery: We say that no plan survives contact with the enemy.

You always have to adjust.

Abdul Rahman: Exactly. After the battle, we considered three

months to be the golden months, because the battle developed

square-by-square, and it was to our advantage. First, we were able

to win the people over against al-Qaeda.^rough the good people,

we were able to educate the people about terrorism and against it.

We encouraged the opening of police stations so the law can take

hold. Despite the fact that the youth were reluctant to join the

police because of fear, our education and our lectures got them into

the fold, and we were able to open the first police station. It was

named Karameh, which meant “dignity.”

After that, smaller battles took place all throughout al-Jazeera.^ey

saw the example of what we had achieved with small means. ^ey

rose up, and they helped clear al-Jazeera. I got in touch with

Mohiad, Ibrahim, and Ahmed, and through the media I was able

to announce that this tribe had joined us and that tribe had joined

us. Despite the fact that maybe one or two of the tribe came with

me, I said the whole tribe was with me. So people starting enlisting

on our side, because they’re saying, “Look, the whole tribe’s with

them.”^at way, I won them over, and I was able to outwit the alQaeda through the media.

After the battle, we did not just lay back and say, “Okay, it’s over.”

We kept gathering intelligence on their cells. We found many a

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Al-Anbar Awakening
weapons cache, because the terrorists had relied on them—like you

see a fighter coming from Diyala to here, his weapons are already

here, but we had already confiscated them.

We used the media to our advantage. If we had a 10 percent

success, we said it’s 90 percent.

Montgomery: Right. Information operations.

Abdul Rahman: Yes. So, you see, when a tribal sheikh started

talking about a success, even if only 2 percent was true and 98

percent was false, well, when the terrorist heard it, it’s grand, it’s

big. So they started to flee the area by themselves.

We used the counterattack. Instead of waiting for the enemy to

attack again, we pressed the attack on them. When they got

confessions from detainees as to the existence of other places, despite

the fact that they have no communication gear, no vehicles to travel

with, they would conduct four raids a night on these targets.

^ere was a well-known saying that Sheikh Jassim was going to

get a chopping machine that would chop the terrorists to pieces, so

everybody knew to avoid Sheikh Jassim. ^e truth of the matter,

everyone was dealt with fairly, either through the Albu Risha,

Coalition, or Iraqi army, the government, what have you. But the

general consensus was Sheikh Jassim was chopping people up—

just to let the terrorists get wind of it and instill fear in their hearts.

After the battle, the sheikh formed a cell to gather intelligence and

another unit to raid the terrorists. At the same time, he extended

his hand to the central government and established law and order

in his territory. He told them, “Look, I am a tribal sheikh, but I

cannot be the police. I cannot be the interrogator. I cannot be

everybody. Let’s divide the jobs, one for each.”

After the success of this battle, many a tribesman came in from alJazeera and from the surrounding areas, trying to learn from the

sheikh’s experiences.

One of the misinformation campaigns that I conducted, I would

pledge that a person is good. I’d sign it, and put my seal on it, and

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Iraqi Perspectives
give it to his people, saying, “Look, there is nothing on your man

or on your son. Let him come back.” And when he came back, we

detained him.

I would like to relay one incident that took place. ^e terrorists

came into this man’s house, who’s from the Albu Mahal tribe, and

they took his rifle so he could not shoot at them. After the battle,

we went out in the sector that I was in. We found a dead terrorist,

among many, who had the man’s rifle next to him. So we took the

rifle, and we gave it to its rightful owner.

Jassim: ^e three months that followed the battle, we were

surrounded.We were under an embargo.We could get no medicine,

no food, no water, no fuel, and it was a very severe winter. If they

got wind of anyone supplying us with fuel, food, anything to sustain

life, they would kill him. With my meager means, I bought three

boats. We started buying things to sustain life, fuel, food, medicine

for the sick and all of that, from al-Jazeera, through the three boats,

because Jazeera was more peaceful, more stable than us. . . .

Whenever I wanted to go on a mission, say, a raiding party, I used

misinformation. Like, I’d tell Coalition forces that I’m going to the

Albu Alwan area on a raiding party at night, and I asked them for

lights so they can identify my men.^at night, I changed the plan.

Why? Because these phones are easily infiltrated, and they would

know my plan ahead of time, so I used misinformation. I kept them

guessing at what I was doing. And I changed the plan right when

we were working toward the objective, so that nobody knew there

was a change of plan, and without informing Coalition forces of my

change of plan.

Montgomery: Wasn’t that dangerous?

Jassim: Yes.

Montgomery: Did Coalition forces ever shoot at you because you

weren’t where they thought you’d be?

Jassim: No, no, because we had the chemical lights.

Interpreter: He’s talking about the chem lights that the Coalition

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Al-Anbar Awakening
forces supplied him with. So that was their signal. Because they

carried them, they knew who they were.

Montgomery: ^at’s what I thought.

Jassim: Twice I had raids on terrorists, and I did not find the

targets, so I knew the Motorolas were infiltrated. It could be

infiltrated easily. ^at’s what made me think, what if those people

have it? . . .

So at times, when I told the Coalition forces I’m going here, I

changed my plan and went there. And that’s where I found the

targets. Not here, but there.

One time Lieutenant Colonel Ferry asked me why I changed plans.

I told him why: “Because I think these radios are infiltrated. ^e

terrorists could easily listen to the Motorolas.” Indeed, 10 of these

Motorolas were found with the terrorists. Some of them had the

Iraqi army signal, and some of them had the Coalition signal. . . .

I was able to enlist the help of one of the people of the Albu Fahd

tribe. I gave him a ^uraya telephone, and he would call me and tell

me where the terrorists were, and we’d raid them. He used to come

from his bedroom, and you know the ^uraya telephone is not very

effective from inside buildings, so I used to hear his voice breaking

up, but still, through his talk I was able to know exactly where the

terrorists were located.

I set up a task force, no more than 30 fighters. I obtained some

chem lights from the Coalition forces. We used to used this road

right here, which is called Seda Road. I was in constant

communication with my men from the beginning of the raid until

coming back. I’d give them the exact location of the target, and

within an hour, they’d call me and say how many men they got and

how many weapons.

^e Coalition forces wanted to join me in many raids, and I

refused. Why? Because Coalition forces, when they go, they use

vehicles. Vehicles make noise. Noise alerts the enemy to run away,

so I prefer to go dismounted. So I preferred the Coalition forces to

be at least 300 meters away from my raiding party, as a backup.

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And the roads we took to get these people were infested with IEDs

[improvised explosive devices].^ese IEDs were rigged with wires

and a battery to initiate an explosion to kill my men. Because of my

military background, working in the air force, I was able to show

my men how to disarm these IEDs by cutting the wires.^ey used

to bring me terrorists, and along with them they used to bring

IEDs on their shoulders. . . . ^e terrorists surrounded themselves

with IEDs.

Montgomery: On the roads?

Jassim: On the roads, right. . . .

Some of the terrorists were very close to the encampments of the

Americans. Why? Many a terrorist camped right here [pointing

on a map to a neighborhood adjacent to an American compound],

close to the Coalition forces. Why? ^ese areas right here, nobody

can stay in them except with the permission of Coalition forces.

So what we did, we got the Coalition forces’permission to get into

this area close by them, and we found many terrorists.

^is is also a camp of the Coalition forces [pointing to another

place on the map]. ^ese houses right here [points to adjacent

neighborhood], we found many a terrorist.^ey have many ways of

hiding—misinformation—you cannot count them. . . .

Montgomery: Did you have to go at night?

Jassim: Day and night.

Montgomery: Did there seem to be more in one place, or about the

same number coming from all the directions? Was there like a main

attack and supporting attacks, or was it equal all the way around?

Jassim: Let me explain to you. [He points to various locations on

a map as he describes the disposition of forces and scheme of

maneuver.]. . . . All of them wore face masks, and they were in

succession. ^e guys that wore red head bands were on suicide

missions.^en yellow bands, and then black, and their clothes were

black.^ere were terrorists coming from Hit, from Baghdad, from

Fallujah, from Diyala. ^ey all joined in this attack, and it was a

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huge attack.Why did they concentrate so much in this attack? ^ey

theorized that if I succeeded in clearing this area right here, all the

surrounding areas would follow suit, so they wanted to finish me off

right here. But thanks to the almighty, their thinking was faulty.

Montgomery: When they attacked, were they on line or were they

moving like we do, in groups that are in formations, or was it sort

of disorganized? What did it look like?

Jassim: ^e attack took stages. Like I said, those terrorists who

came in on a suicide mission, when they achieved an objective,

others came in and took their places, and so forth and so on.

Interpreter: It’s not exactly the answer to your question.

Montgomery: No, but it helps. . . . Did you have anyone carrying

ammunition up to the checkpoints before they ran out?

Jassim: No, I didn’t have any men resupplying my men. Everyone

relied on his 30 or 40 rounds. I was not able to buy ammo. Nobody

ever gave me any ammo. People with ammo were afraid to sell me

any, because terrorists were killing them.

Montgomery: What about your wounded? Did you have wounded,

and what did you do with them?

Jassim: Yes, Coalition forces were able to treat my wounded and

took some of them all the way to Balad, and I thank them for it.

Montgomery: You faced a very highly coordinated attack.

Jassim: Yes indeed. It was a military plan, and it had plenty of

intelligence, and I tell you, some of the intelligence came from my

own tribe. ^ey got the exact location, who was carrying what in

the checkpoint, and the numbers of my men. ^ey had already

known beforehand they did not have a whole tribe fighting them,

just 15 or 17 men against all of them, so they imagined it was very

easy to finish us off, and quickly. We were able to capture or detain

some of the men who were relaying information to them and who

let the terrorists stay in their own houses prior to the attack. ^ey

are still being detained.^ey confessed to everything they did, and

hopefully they will get their due from the justice system.

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Montgomery: Did you have any thoughts of trying to fall back

across the river?

Jassim: Some of my own relatives fell back and crossed the river.

Interpreter: And I asked him why your relatives?

Jassim: Because they were fearful of being slain and their heads cut

off.^ese men did not have any weapons, and they were afraid that,

because they were my relatives, the enemy would capture them and

chop off their heads. Some of my relatives—men, women and

children—they had no weapons, but they killed them just because

they were my relatives. ^is cousin right here, they killed his sister

and they chopped off her head, just because she was my sister, and

they cut off her breasts. . . .

Unknown: Did he have enough time, advance knowledge of the

attack, to do any defensive preparations? And if he did, what did he

do to prepare?

Jassim: I didn’t have any. No, I had no prior knowledge as to the

exact time of attack.

Unknown: Could you ask him, of the terrorists, how many were

foreign, how many were Iraqi?

Jassim: Due to the fact that we found no identification papers on

them, we did not know who they were, but I estimate there were

about 50 foreign Arabs. We found some corpses that, from the

looks of them, were not Iraqis.

Montgomery: ^en when you brought in the captured prisoners

from these raids, for interrogation, you said you looked at them,

and a lot of times you could tell with good accuracy who was an

insurgent and who wasn’t. What were you looking for?

Jassim: When I gathered these men—and based on the intelligence

that I’d already gathered—when I asked one of them a specific

question, I saw his hands shake a little bit, or he couldn’t look

directly in my eyes. I knew, and he was afraid. ^ese were some of

the signs that I used to identify the terrorists from the nonterrorists.

I used to look at their features, everything in their faces—even their

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ears. And I would ask him a question—how far in education did he

go? If he had no education, I knew he was influenced by the

terrorists.^e uneducated were easily swayed to be on the terrorist

side, and so I would concentrate on him and ask him more

questions because they used ignorant people, uneducated people.

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Interview 6
Sheikh Aifan Sadun al-Issawi

Fallujah Representative

Iraqi Awakening Political Party

Sheikh Aifan Sadun al-Issawi’s father opposed the Iraqi

nationalists of the 1960s because they were interfering with family and

religious traditions. In 1967, he killed a man at a meeting in Fallujah

and fled with his family to Saudi Arabia, where King Faisal provided

him with land, homes, and support. He subsequently died during a

visit to Helwan, Egypt, and his family believes that he was poisoned

by agents of the Iraqi government.

Sheikh Aifan was born in 1972 in Ar Ar, Saudi Arabia, on the

border with Iraq. He studied computers and mathematics in college

and worked in Saudi Arabia until 2001, when he moved to Iraq to take

care of his mother after her second husband died. Nine of his brothers

still reside in Saudi Arabia, and two live in the United States.

Sheikh Aifan is the nephew of Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi alIssawi, the paramount sheikh of the Albu Issa tribe. Sheikh Khamis

exercises leadership of the tribe, but he is aged and not very active.

Consequently, Sheikh Aifan tends to represent the tribe in dealings

with Coalition forces.

Sheikh Aifan was interviewed by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery

and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams on 14 February

2009 at Camp Ramadi.

Sheikh Aifan Sadun al-Issawi: As we feared, there was a war. We

believed there would be a war, so as a normal precaution, we all

armed ourselves and prepared for it. I was almost certain the

Iranians would enter Iraq.

^e collision came quickly. Baghdad was finished, but Fallujah was

still under control. We contacted Abdul Dureb, the director of

security in Fallujah. He asked me to visit him, so I went to his

office. I found about 50 people there. ^ey were foreign Arabs. I

remember one of them. I knew him. He’s from the Emirates.^ere

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were Syrians and Tunisians—a lot of people. Some were Fedayeen

Saddam. I heard Abdul Dureb tell the Fedayeen Saddam, who were

wearing black uniforms, to take these young people [the foreign

Arabs] and prepare them to fight. He told me that we all had to

fight. I told him that Iraq was finished, to just stand by because

fighting was useless. After that, I left.

A few days later, I heard that he had disappeared, and the Coalition

forces had arrived at K-160 [highway kilometer marker 160]. ^e

tribal sheikhs had a meeting in our guesthouse. As I recall, they

had many ideas, but in the end, we decided to let the Coalition

forces enter the cities.We made an invitation to meet the American

force at K-160. We negotiated with them. We even had lunch

together in the desert. We said, “If you want to go inside the city,

come on in, but without fighting.” We had a deal, and they came

to Ramadi and Fallujah, and the surrounding cities like

Habbaniyah. ^ey made a temporary camp at the big bridge by

Fallujah, but they didn’t enter the city.

I stopped to talk with them. ^ey had an interpreter, an Egyptian

named Ennis. And there was a captain named Hickey. ^ey were

my points of contact. I told them I would give them advice on how

to behave when they went into the city. I also told them about an

Iraqi army base in front of Taqqadum, Habbaniyah. It was full of

weapons. Any weapons you can think of, it was full of them. It was

so big you needed a car to go around it. It was huge. Captain

Hickey told me,“We'll go together, and I’ll see it.”We went in two

helicopters, and I showed them the location. ^ey were surprised.

When we came back, they told me they would send a force to

surround this camp, but they didn’t do anything after that.

After the Americans went into Fallujah, people started going into

the bases and taking weapons because they were not secured. I took

about 80 RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades], PKCs [machine

guns], and other things.

^e Americans had no experience with our culture. ^e British,

when they went to Basrah, they knew the area, because they’ve been

there.^ey knew how to deal with the sheikhs and with the people.

^ey had ways of communicating with the sheikhs and the people.

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But the Americans, when they got inside Fallujah, they started to

arrest people. ^ey arrested sheikhs.

^ey shot me by mistake when we had a meeting in Karma. ^ey

shot me in the left leg. My tribe took me to our hospital.You know

that I am a son of the sheikh of the Albu Issa tribe, so many people

know me. Everyone was surrounding the hospital to find out what’s

happening to me. And it was at the beginning. It was a new thing.

So when they heard that the Americans shot someone, everyone

was surprised. In our culture, they go to find out what’s happening.

^en the Americans visited me in the hospital and said they would

take me to Germany for treatment. We have our habits and our

traditions, and it was too great a favor. ^e Americans were a new

force in our lives, and it seemed strange, so I refused their offer.

^ey went to the government people in Fallujah to get them to

make me accept their offer, because the wound was a bad one.^e

bones were broken. So they put some Iraqi security people around

me in the hospital to protect me. I was bleeding, and it was a very,

very dangerous situation. ^ey gave me blood transfusions to

stabilize me so they could fly me to Germany. ^e Americans

visited me in the hospital and said that if they didn’t take me to

Germany, my leg would have to be amputated.

Some of the sons of Albu Issa, my tribe, were very brave people.

^ey took me from the hospital by force. My friends, my sons, my

people—they know me in the tribe.^ey surrounded the hospital.

^ey went to the policemen who were protecting me and locked

them in a room. ^en they took me to Amman, Jordan. My

brothers came from Saudi Arabia to Jordan, and they were waiting

at the border. ^ey put me in Khalidi Hospital, which is the best

hospital in Amman. ^ey took care of me over there, and they

operated on my leg. ^ey replaced the demolished bone with a

platinum tube. ^ey found that my blood had been poisoned, and

they thought the bullet that shot me contained some kind of

poison. I stayed there about four months. After six months, I came

back to Iraq. I was on crutches. I had a very hard time.

So I arrived home from Amman one night, and the second night,

the Americans surrounded the area where my house is. ^ey even

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Iraqi Perspectives
had helicopters over my house. ^ey arrested me and my

brothers—Sheikh Barakat, Sheikh Jamal, and their sons. So the

whole group was about nine. ^ey took us to Fallujah town.

General King* was responsible for the campaign; his headquarters

was in Baghdad, but he was responsible for this campaign

[conversation with interpreter]. He was upset with me because,

maybe, first because I refused their offer and went to Jordan. And

he was upset because Barakat, my brother, refused to shake hands

with him.

^en they took us to Abu Ghraib jail. I stayed there nine months

without being charged with anything. We didn’t know the charges,

and I was very sick. ^ere were demonstrations in Fallujah to

release me, a delegation of sheikhs interceded for my release, and

many things happened like that. But any time they asked General

King to release me, he refused very strongly.

^en Jalal Talabani, the Iraqi president, asked President [George

W.] Bush to release me. So they came to Abu Ghraib jail, and they

took us by helicopter. ^ey took us to the Iraqi president, Jalal

Talabani. We stayed in his palace as his guests for about three days.

^en they put us under house arrest for about six months.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: Could you describe what it was like

being imprisoned in Abu Ghraib?

Aifan: It was like a grave. I wore the same clothes for nine months,

and I was very sick, and it was often very cold. We didn’t know what

was happening outside. ^ere were always mortars falling on the jail.

^ey put us in a tent, and many of my friends inside the tent were

killed by mortars. ^ere were foreign Arabs with us. Abu Ghraib jail

was very bad. ^ey scared us with attack dogs during interrogations.

And this lady—you know the pictures?** When the thing

happened in Abu Ghraib? ^is lady with the short hair? I know her

personally, and she knows me personally. I was one of her prisoners.

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* Possibly then-Col R. Alan King, USA.

** Probably Pvt Lynndie R. England, USAR, who was shown in many of the infamous

photographs from the prison.
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Iraqi Perspectives

But when some of the Americans came and learned that I can speak

English and saw me on my crutches, they sympathized with me.^ey

took my detainee number, and after one or two days, they came back

and said,“You have a big, big problem. We know you are a good man,

but we can’t help you. We need to help you, but it’s a big problem.”

[inaudible] I had the crutches, so [inaudible]. ^ey allowed me to go

to my house in Fallujah, on one condition—that I won’t leave Iraq.

During the time we were in Abu Ghraib, the situation was getting

bad in Fallujah. Fighting started to increase between the Americans

and some fighters in Fallujah. So when we were with the president

of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, he talked with us in the presence of some of

the Americans.^ey said,“We’re going to release you to cool things

down in Fallujah.” So it’s a deal. When I came back to Fallujah,

the situation was very critical, and the insurgents were rising up.

After we went home, the Americans visited me in my home.^ere

was no one being visited by the Americans in his home. It was

strange, because the insurgents, if they had any suspicion that a guy

had any relationship with the Americans, they cut off his head.^e

leaders of the insurgents in Fallujah at that time were Abdullah alJanabi and Omar al-Hadid. ^ese were the top leaders of the

fighters there. ^ere were a lot of foreign Arabs with them. After

the Americans visited me, the insurgents posted a lot of papers

around saying that I was an agent for the Americans.

^en I was meeting the Americans at the center called FLT

[Fallujah Liaison Team], which is from the American and the

[inaudible] hospital in Fallujah, which is on the highway.

Montgomery: Is that the small compound just east of the Jordanian

hospital?

Aifan: Yes. It had some old rooms that had been used for the Iraqi

army, but I rehabilitated it and made some offices for the

Americans, so they could use it as an office for reconstruction or

compensation for the people. People were coming to ask about

their compensation. If someone was hit by the Americans, or his

car was burned by the Americans, he came, and the Americans paid

him for it. And the Americans, for history and to be honest, they

helped the people too much.
^e head of it was Major Gregory [G.] Gillette. He is a lawyer

who was responsible for the Civil-Military Operations Center. And

there was Colonel [Colin P.] McNease, Colonel [ John A.] Toolan

[ Jr.]—he’s a general now. He was the top leader of the forces in

Fallujah. He is a very close friend, a very dear friend. McNease and

Gillette were very close friends to me.

So I was going to this place daily. I helped people get

compensation, and I was still on crutches.^en the Americans did

the paperwork for me to get compensation for my leg. ^ey asked

for the invoices from Khalidi Hospital in Amman. ^ey saw how

much it cost me, and they paid me back.

I started to develop a stronger relationship with the Americans, so

the insurgents made me a target. ^ey couldn’t hit me, because I

have my own people who protect me, so they couldn’t face me face

to face. But they kept me in mind as a target, watching for me. We

kept each other afraid of each other. ^en they hit one of my cars,

and they killed one of my people.

So I called a huge meeting in Fallujah. I collected all the people—

the imams of the mosques, and the sheikhs, and everyone high level

in Fallujah. I have a videotape of the meeting.

Montgomery: Do you remember what time this was, approximate

date?

Aifan: I have the tape, and I have the date and the time.

Montgomery: Was it between the battles of Fallujah, or was it

before the fighting started?

Aifan: Before the big fighting in Fallujah.^ere were some people

who were insurgents or mujahideen, but they were not against me.

^ey attended this meeting. ^ere were armed people around all

the roads. ^ey went all over the area. I held this meeting in

coordination with the Coalition forces. I let the imams start to talk

and tell the people that the insurgents who come from outside Iraq

and cover their faces, they are not mujahideen. ^ey are criminals.

And they warned people that they were letting surrounding

countries, like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, interfere inside Iraq.

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Sheikh Hamza [Abbas al-Issawi, Mufti of Fallujah], God bless

him, was the head of the imams in Fallujah. He attended that

meeting. After that, he was killed. ^ey killed him in front of the

mosque. Sheikh Jamal [Shakir al-Nazzal] and Sheikh Kamal

[Shakir al-Nazzal] were the top imams in Fallujah. Sheikh Kamal

was killed.* Sheikh Jamal fled to Syria, and he’s still there.

After this meeting, the fight between us was announced. We started

to coordinate and work with the Coalition forces, and we started to

target the leaders of al-Qaeda. We killed some of the big leaders.

I started fighting al-Qaeda publicly in 2005. During this time,

from my cousins, my families, and my tribe’s sons, about 37 were

killed because of this fighting. In 2006, after the big battle in

Fallujah, the situation was getting very bad, and people were going

after to the foreign Arabs. People wanted to live peacefully, so they

started to follow al-Qaeda. ^ere were just seven people being

faithful and staying with me. I was surrounded, so I couldn’t even

leave my house. If I wanted to go outside, it meant too much

security, and I might have to fight at any second. So I started to

not go out much. Even my uncles, who are just across the road from

my house, told me, “Don’t come to us, because you are a suspect.

^ey might kill us because we know you.”

Montgomery: What year is this, you’re talking about?

Aifan: ^e end of 2005.

Montgomery: Okay.

Aifan: At the start of 2006, they ambushed one of my cars. We

tried to visit Sattar Abu Risha. No one could visit Sattar Abu Risha

at that time, because whoever visited him would be slaughtered.

I had a good relationship with Sheikh Sattar and Sheikh [Hamid]

Jabour. So I went to Sheikh Sattar’s house, God bless him. I found

just two people with him. We approached his house and waited on

the highway, going back and forth until the highway was

completely empty.

* Sheikh Hamza was assassinated on 29 November 2005, and Sheikh Kamal met the same end

on 7 February 2006.
Interpreter: Because his guesthouse is very close to the highway,

less than 100 meters.

Aifan: We left Sattar’s house after lunch. We took the old

Habbaniyah road to Fallujah. Al-Qaeda was at the Boston and Ira

intersection.* ^ere were about seven cars waiting for us, and we

only had three cars. We faced them and started fighting. Of my

people, four were killed and one was very seriously shot. We killed

one of them and seriously wounded three.

^e four who were killed had been in one car, which was disabled,

and we had killed one of them [al-Qaeda]. We kept going until we

reached home with our wounded man.^e situation was very bad.

I took my family to Amman, Jordan. I have my own house in

Amman, so I stayed with my family—my wife and my children—

in Amman. And even Sheikh Sattar fled to Amman for a little

while. He visited me, and we talked about the situation, saying

“what are we going to do?” ^en Sheikh Khamis [Hasnawi alIssawi, paramount sheikh of the Albu Issa tribe] and Sheikh

Khalid, my uncles, fled to Amman.^ey refused to fight al-Qaeda.

^ey came to Amman and lived with me in my house. I stayed

about four months in Amman.

^e Americans visited me in Amman. General [David G.] Reist—

and there was colonel—

Interpreter: ^ere was a colonel who was responsible. He doesn’t

remember his name.

Aifan: He visited me in Fallujah, and it was very bad. We are still

in 2006. He wanted me to come back and fight al-Qaeda.

Sattar came back, and he started fighting al-Qaeda. ^en Sattar

called me and said, “Hey, look, I’m in Ramadi, you are in Fallujah.

Let’s cooperate and start fighting al-Qaeda and finish them.”^e

biggest problem that had kept us from fighting al-Qaeda was that

we didn’t have weapons. ^e Americans at that time took any

weapons they found, anywhere in any house. So I made a deal with

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* Boston and Ira are the Coalition names for these two roads.
the Americans. I will come back to Fallujah from Amman, but

keep away from my weapons. We had a deal with them. So that’s

why I came back and started fighting.

^e first day I came back, I was attacked by mortars. You know the

news in Iraq—everybody knew that Aifan was back, so they started

shooting at me with mortars. ^e Americans made a brave stand.

^ey stayed with me at my house for a long time.^ere were many

attacks on my house, and they were on the roof. ^ey stayed with

me. We fought together on the roof of the house.

So al-Qaeda started to expand their shooting. ^ey started

shooting all the houses around me, and it was an advantage for

me—expanding the fighting, so it’s not just me. Because if I stay

alone, and I fight alone, and they’re targeting me alone, they will hit

me. I would be a very easy target. So it’s better for me to expand it

and make it bigger.

And the other advantage, if I expand the battle, there will be too

many people with me. So we expanded the fighting for the Albu

Yusuf, Albu Jamali area, Albu Khalid—around my house, around

my area.

^en al-Qaeda sent a letter to Sheikh Khamis, my uncle.^e letter

was delivered by Sheikh Abdullah Shuesh, one of the Albu Issa

tribal sheikhs.^e letter said,“We want to meet Sheikh Khalid and

stop the fighting.” So Sheikh Khalid met them. ^ey said, “We

don’t have problems with you, the Albu Issa tribe. We have a

problem with Aifan, and Aifan is an agent. Either you kill him, and

the problem will be finished, or bring him to us, and the problem

with you will be finished.”

After this situation, my cousins sympathized with me. Some of my

cousins joined me, and they are heroes. I had eight PKCs. ^e

Americans helped me with some ammunition, so I started getting

stronger.^e first operation I did was in a center for al-Qaeda, and

I did it with the help of the police.

I had three black BMWs, and I was always changing cars so nobody

knows which one I’m riding in—three of them, same type, same

color, everything. So they put some IEDs [improvised explosive

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devices] on the road. One of my cars was blown up. With me was

Mushtar, my uncle Khalid, Othman, and my uncle Majid. Mushtar

lost both legs, Othman lost one leg, and the driver was killed.

^e Americans helped. ^ey took them to al-Asad by helicopter.

And then I took them to Amman to take care of them, to Germany,

and now they are back, but without hands and without legs.

After they were wounded, their families turned against me, but I

kept fighting. Al-Qaeda sent a tanker of chlorine against me.^ey

blew it up in the first checkpoint, which is very close to my house.

My mother was killed—her name was Turkiyah—and five children

were killed, and one of my guards.^is gave me another great push

to fight them. I still kept my arms on me, and we joined the

American operations to fight al-Qaeda. And we kept fighting until

God, by his blessing, gave us the victory.

In 2006, the Awakening was announced publicly. I think I’m a

person who was close to Sattar and Ahmad Abu Risha, and they

made a very big sacrifice.^e Americans supported us very strongly

through the projects they put in our areas, and also through the

police and the Iraqi army, which we started with them and the

Americans trained.

In 2006, I established an ERU [emergency response unit] battalion

in Fallujah, and I was the leader. It is a very strong, very well-trained

battalion, and it protects Fallujah. And thanks for that.

In my house, I have hundreds of pictures. If we spent three days or

a week just talking about writing, you would not understand exactly

what was going on as well as if you saw the pictures, the videotape.

We filmed our operations. We documented everything. I have

pictures of the Iranian we caught in 2006.Two people who tried to

kill me in 2007, I have a picture of them. ^ree weeks ago, they

sent a guy with a vest.

Interpreter: ^ree weeks ago?

Aifan: To blow himself up. And I still have one guy, a foreign Arab.

He’s Yemeni. I have him in my jail now. You know, we can’t just

kill him. If I kill him now, they will be happy, but other people will

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come after a couple of years and take me to court and punish me

because I killed him. It’s happened. We have law. We should send

him to the court and the law, and if the court decides to kill him,

they can kill him in the street.

Interpreter: I told him, “Sir, if somebody came to kill me, I would

slaughter him, I would kill him.”

Aifan: When we were fighting with PKCs, face to face, we killed

many people.

Interpreter: Yes, in fighting.

Aifan: Yes, one from Sudan, one from Saudi Arabia. Me, I killed

them.

Interpreter: During battles, yes.

Aifan: But if we catch someone, and we know we have rules and

our religion, we can’t kill him. A Syrian, if he killed my mother, and

I catch the guy, I can’t kill him.

Interpreter: In our religion, if you catch someone, it’s not good to

kill him. He’s helpless. He’s hopeless. So for that, he said, he’s had

for two months now a guy that has been arrested, and he can’t.

Aifan: Eleven times they tried to kill me. Last year, they killed my

captain and two of my guards. ^ey came to my checkpoint and

said they were British priests. ^ey came to my area, and they had

American uniforms and a British badge. He was Tunisian, I think.

His face looked American, and he made himself American. He

said, “We need to talk to Sheikh Aifan.” But I went to Jordan that

morning, and he came to my gate at 1:00 in the afternoon. When

they told him I was outside Iraq, he went crazy. ^ey were sure I

was at home. He said, “I need to talk to whoever is the chief of

security around Sheikh Aifan. Who is it? I need to talk to him.”

Captain Mahmoud was my security guy.When he came to him, he

caught him like this, and he blew himself up.

^ere was a woman with pistols.When they came to detain her, she

blew herself up.

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Montgomery: You said he made himself look American.

Aifan: Yes.

Montgomery: Do you know where he was from?

Aifan: He was Tunisian.

Montgomery: Tunisia, Okay.

Aifan: ^e Americans know about that.^ey did an investigation.

He was from Tunisia, and he had a fake police badge.

Interpreter: And he looked white, with blue eyes.

Aifan: Yes. A week before that, they sent two kids with vests to the

mosque on a Friday, and they were waiting for me to enter the

mosque to blow themselves up. But we ambushed them behind the

mosque and caught them. We called the Americans. ^ey came

and took the TNT and all of that stuff, and we sent them to jail.

^ey are in jail now.

Montgomery: Do you think they’re after you now for political

reasons, or out of revenge?

Aifan: Before, they tried to kill me because we fought al-Qaeda,

and I am sure they will keep looking to kill me. I have heard the

Americans say,“He is a target for the rest of his life,”and they gave

me letters for the American government saying that “he did this

and that, and he helped us. We think he deserves to be an

American citizen, he and his family, because he will remain a target

for the rest of his life—him and his kids.”

I have four kids. I didn’t put them in school.^ey will kill them, and

you know they will kill them, especially now.

When we fought al-Qaeda, we didn’t have a big problem, because

we fought al-Qaeda, and 1920 [Revolution Brigade] fought alQaeda, the Islamic Party fought al-Qaeda, the Islamic army, the

mujahideen army—all these groups fought al-Qaeda the same as

me, so that we destroyed al-Qaeda completely, on the ground and

on the table. Underground, we still have sleeper cells. On the

ground, under your eyes, we destroyed al-Qaeda.

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Now we face a big problem. Some of those groups who fought alQaeda with us had a different agenda. Yeah, they fought al-Qaeda

with us, because we had the same enemy. But after they finished alQaeda, they started looking to kill us, because we are “agents” who

work with the Americans.

Me and my people, we didn’t fight al-Qaeda because we have

religion or ideology or something. We fought al-Qaeda because

they are bad people. ^ey killed people and did evil things, so we

fought them. I don’t care if they pray or don’t pray, if they believe

in God, or have some other reason. I don’t care. But the Islamic

Party, the Islamic army, the mujahideen army—all these groups,

1920—they have ideologies, different agendas. Some of those

groups have foreign agendas, maybe from Iran or Syria.

Now we’re a bigger target, more than when we fought al-Qaeda,

because now I am sure 1920 are bad people. ^ey tried to kill my

people. And the Islamic Party, I know they mean to kill me. I am

sure. We have proved it.

Interpreter: Before, you saw them. Now, you don’t see them.

Aifan: Now, some of the people who were in those groups are in the

government. He is captain or major or something, so that he has

the ability to move very freely, and they can watch me, and they

can listen to my radio. So it’s very, very difficult.

Interpreter: More risky now.

Aifan: I am sure they will keep on targeting me because I am not

in one of those groups. And they’d fight with me. And they always

visit me.

Interpreter: To join them?

Aifan: Yes, they told me, “We will make you a big head,” and

“Come with us.”“You are the sheikh.”

Yes, I am the son of the sheikh. But everything ends—everything.

^e soldiers, the leaders, the mayor, the governor, the minister,

[Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki, Jalal Talabani—for some

reason, they will all be changed. But I will still, for all of my life, be

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the son of the sheikh. I am a good man. I have my respect and my

people. I think my level is very high—the highest.

Interpreter: Of course, they’re going to lose their positions, but your

position is for life.

Aifan: If I am poor, I am the same Sheikh Aifan. If I am rich, then

I am still Sheikh Aifan.

Montgomery: So you don’t need them, but they need you.

Aifan: Yes, sure. We are still a big target. I can’t move, except with

my guards, with my armored vehicle. I have very high security

around my house. It’s difficult.

I have a Saudi passport. I have a Jordanian passport.

Interpreter: I told him,“You have a passport, why don’t you leave?”

He said, “What about my history? ^is is my history, my life.”

Aifan: My people, my tribe. I can’t just leave.

Interpreter: He has to be faithful for them. It’s easy for him; he has

his passport.

Montgomery: What would happen to your tribe if you do leave?

Would a brother take your place here?

Aifan: No, I don’t think so. We should be honest. Life won’t stop

if I leave, but I have a thousand people who trust me. ^ey follow

me blindly. A thousand people. Leave Iraq now?

Interpreter: It’s not faithful to leave them.

Aifan: It would be a black point in my history if I leave them. We

have to be willing participate more in the government. We have to

have balance in the government—the government of Iraq and

Anbar—because these people’s rights are my responsibility. I should

take care of them.

God’s will made me honored. I am the son of the sheikh, and I am

the leader, and I am the youngest one in the family. I have 16

brothers, and 14 brothers are older than me, but God chose me. And

the people chose me. ^ey came to my house. ^ey didn’t go to my

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brothers’ houses. So if you see, if you know my life and how hard it

is, and how the people came to me and asked for my help, you can’t

just leave them. It would be unfaithful to leave them and run away.

Montgomery: I think with so many brothers, and so many brothers

who are older than you, I guess it’s not like in Europe with the

nobility, where the oldest brother gets the title. How are you chosen

from among your brothers?

Aifan: ^ey chose me. Nine brothers are Saudi, and they were

already in Saudi Arabia. ^ree of my brothers have no interest in

the tribes. ^ey are businessmen, and they are not ready to spend

one hour listening to the people. And Barakat, who is the oldest, I

have not agreed with him for the last five years. He is very hard, and

he’s against me being a friend of the Americans or making any

relationship with them. He was against the fight against al-Qaeda.

He lives in Jordan. He was just back for a couple of months. So the

people look for the guy who guided them, who showed them, who

made something a fact—not some big shot, but someone who

helped them.

I am not strong through my muscles; I am strong through my

people.When I make a celebration in Fallujah, thousands of people

attend. I think you saw the celebration for the Awakening that was

on TV. It was the biggest celebration in al-Anbar by attendance,

because people love me, and I am very strong through them. I am

not strong through my money, or the Americans, or through my

muscles. When I am upset, I stand up, and hundreds of people

stand up with me. ^at’s what I’m working for, and I’m ready to

sacrifice all my life for these people.

Montgomery: I understand better now, and it sounds to me like it’s

not even something like a formal election so much as the people just

sort of begin to follow the person whom they trust most and have

the most confidence in, among the brothers.^ey are drawn to you.

Aifan: And because I’m the son of Sadun, and I was the closest

one to my father in his behavior. I was very similar to my father.

When they saw me, how I behaved, they said you look like your

father. I’m very proud of that.

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Montgomery: What was it like in Fallujah between the two battles?

And what was the effect of the battle of Fallujah?

Aifan: ^ey hated the Americans. It was a very big mistake. ^ey

could have taken care of it a better way. From the beginning, if they

dealt with the right people, they wouldn’t need to fight by

themselves here.

Montgomery: Since we’ve been here, since 2003, what are the

biggest mistakes we’ve made, and what have we done right?

Interpreter: In Fallujah particularly, or in Iraq, sir?

Montgomery: In his opinion, and in any regard—wide open

question.

Aifan: ^e biggest mistake was the incident in Abu Ghraib. After

that, there was something—American soldiers raped an Iraqi

woman. I think you remember this story. Even if the Americans

punished him, and I am sure the main government didn’t agree

with these mistakes. But sometimes you have to be responsible for

what you’ve done.

And the other mistake, which made these mistakes go on and on,

was that the Americans dealt with the wrong people. ^ey didn’t

mean to do it, but they believed—because they are honest, they

believed anyone—so they dealt with the wrong people. It’s not the

Americans’ mistake.

We can’t—I should be honest—we can’t trust the Americans

completely yet. We have a theory. ^e Americans don’t have

continuous friendships. ^ey always have their interests. ^eir

relationships with people are based on how much benefit they can

get from a person. When we were fighting al-Qaeda, the

Americans were in my house every two days. I even met President

Bush. [Barak H.] Obama—I saw him; [David H.] Petraeus [USA],

all the generals.

Each MEF [Marine expeditionary force] changed. ^e generals

invited me to celebrations, and we made relations stronger between

us.^e situation got better in Fallujah. When General [Walter E.]

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Gaskin [Sr.] and General [ John R.] Allen left, General [ John F.]

Kelly came in. Kelly visited me one time in my house, and General

[Martin] Post, I didn’t see him except in a general celebration. Now

they are gone, and new generals are coming, and I don’t know them.

^is is a big mistake. It means the advantage of having a

relationship, a friend, is finished for me. We have a good situation.

It’s safe. But a new person could say,“^at’s it—we don’t need him

anymore.” I still have very good relationships with some of the

Americans, mainly the leaders and generals. I should be in the

meeting if they came, and they are leaving. At least call and tell me.

^is is a mistake.

Even I—and I’m very close to the Americans—am starting to be

distanced from them. ^e government of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki

called me the “American sheikh.” ^ey know I have very strong

relationships with the Americans, which makes me happy. I don’t

feel ashamed of it. I used my friendship with the Americans to

build a secure Iraq.

^is is what we have achieved, because it’s God’s wish, and with his

blessing and the work between us and the Americans. Now I’m

involved with the police, and we’re taking care of the security

situation in Fallujah and the surrounding area. And we are cutting out

this cancer, al-Qaeda and the insurgents. And we won the election,

thank God, and I am a provincial council member. Maybe I will be

more than a provincial council member in the future. Maybe.

And we have deals on the table. Sheikh Ahmad [Abu Risha] was

in Baghdad yesterday, and we have a meeting every day with

someone on [inaudible] politics.We are working. Maybe we can get

something bigger on the table. We keep going, working to build

and secure our Iraq.

And a big mistake, which they will regret—the Americans pull out

of the checkpoints very fast.^is is a killer mistake. We have a lot of

police, with good equipment and weapons, but they are compromised.

We have some bad people among them. ^ey change their faces.

Montgomery: Among those who are manning the checkpoints now?

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Aifan:In the police. We detained some people who planted IEDs

against the Americans. We caught them in the act. When they

were detained by the police, they stayed in jail two days, and they

released them, because they were placing IEDs against Americans,

not against Iraqis.

And I’m very sure and very confident that there are policemen

using police vehicles to place IEDs. And I’m very sure that the

insurgents and al-Qaeda have keys to the checkpoints, and they

can get through without any questions. ^is is a big mistake. But

the Americans do it very fast.

Maybe it’s Obama. I told him, when I talked to him. I gave him a

letter. If you become president, be alert. Don’t pull out very fast. I

personally talked to him more than 20 minutes, but he is still

young. He’s going on with it.

Montgomery: During the fighting against al-Qaeda, was the

Awakening a single organization, or several organizations that were

fighting at the same time? ^roughout Anbar, was there coordination

between the anti-al-Qaeda fighters in each city across the province?

Aifan: ^ere were many people that were fighting. ^ere was the

Islamic Party, 1920, [Interpreter and Aifan simultaneously naming

various groups].

Some people from al-Qaeda changed their faces. ^ey are in the

Awakening now. ^ey didn’t join us because they believe we are

good, but to protect themselves. ^ey saw who’s winning, so they

said they were with the Awakening. But when al-Qaeda was in,

they were al-Qaeda.

Montgomery: ^ere are always people like that.

Aifan: People without any principles, like these people, you cannot

trust them. ^e proof of it is the bad people infiltrating the police.

And the proof of that is the incident when they killed Sheikh

Abdul Sattar.^e guy who planned it and did it was in his security

detail, and he was captured.

Chief Warrant Office-4 Timothy S. McWilliams: ^e colonel asked

about the period between the battles of Fallujah, from April 2004

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and November 2004. Could you tell me what was going on in

Fallujah during that time?

Aifan: After the first battle of Fallujah, they established a security

force. ^ey were all faithful to al-Qaeda. ^ey were al-Qaeda, and

they proved it. After that happened, there were no police on the

street; just the people who wear masks and their drivers, which is

al-Qaeda. It was a very big mistake.

I told Colonel Toolan and Colonel McNease, “One of these days,

the Fallujah people will fight you with these weapons that you gave

to the police,” and that happened. ^ey used police vehicles and

the guns from the Americans to fight the Americans.

^e Americans didn’t listen to advice. ^e Americans don’t trust

anyone. ^ey have the principle, “don’t trust anybody, so you can

protect yourself.”^ey came to my house and slept in my house. We

fought shoulder to shoulder. I have a long history with the Americans.

And yet when I visited the FLT every Monday, they searched me.

One time I remember, at the center of operations in our area, they

spent eight days in my house. ^ey brought the screens and the

satellite, the big chairs, and everything. We spent eight days in my

house, like my brothers.

Interpreter: And they’re still searching you.

McWilliams: You mentioned Abdullah Janabi and Omar Hadid,

and I’ve heard they’ve done some terrible things. Can you describe

some of those?

Aifan: ^ey put evil thoughts into the minds of the people of

Fallujah.^ey established the Shura council in Fallujah.^ey gave

authorization to kill anyone who worked with the Americans and

anyone who volunteered to be a policeman. And they were thieves.

Abdullah Janabi owned buildings and factories in Syria. Omar

Hadid was an outcast. In the Saddam [Hussein] regime, he was

accused, and charged, and wanted in many sex crimes.

Who were the people who joined al-Qaeda? Violent and

irresponsible people. He had no value in society. His mother or his

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sister was a prostitute. He’s homosexual. He found a chance to

control the people, and he was being humiliated by the people, so

he joined al-Qaeda. So al-Qaeda are bullies. ^ey were all named

with their mothers’names, not with their fathers’. Did you find any

sheikhs, any high-level people, who were involved with al-Qaeda?

No way. Only outcasts joined al-Qaeda.

^e most important thing is that we woke up from this bad dream.

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Interview 7
Sheikh Ali Hatim Abd al-Razzaq Ali

al-Sulayman al-Assafi

Heir Apparent to the Paramount Sheikh

of the Dulaimi Tribal Confederation

and

Head of the National Salvation Front Political Party

Born in 1971, Sheikh Ali Hatim Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman

al-Assafi is relatively young, which is typical of leaders of the

Awakening movement. He is also the true lineal heir of Sheikh Ali alSulayman, who was one of the most powerful sheikhs in al-Anbar

during and after the transition from Ottoman to British rule

(described in the writings of Gertrude Bell).

^e role of paramount sheikh is nominally filled by his great

uncles, Sheikh Amer and Sheikh Majed, who serve as co-regents.^e

former resides in Ramadi and the latter supports from Amman, Jordan.

Sheikh Ali Hatim is the de facto paramount sheikh, though he

declines to claim the title publicly out of respect for his uncles.

After the assassination of Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, the

Awakening movement fractured and Sheikh Ali Hatim formed his

own political party.

Sheikh Ali Hatim was interviewed by Colonel Gary W.

Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams

on 16 February 2009 at Camp Ramadi.

Sheikh Ali Hatim Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman al-Assafi: We

went through a difficult period that rattled us during the Saddam

[Hussein] era. Before Saddam, we knew Ali Sulayman and two

more sheikhs, and that was it [referring to his lineage]. During

Saddam, we had 460 sheikhs. ^is would be considered

interference in our independence.

^e second difficult period that we experienced was the uprising of

the sheikhs opposing al-Qaeda. I want to emphasize the fact that

we did not bring al-Qaeda into Anbar.^ere were mistakes on both

107
sides, on the tribal side and on the American side.^ere was a gap

between the American forces and the tribes.^ere was no meeting

of the minds, so to speak.

In 2004 al-Qaeda began to appear, and we warned General

[Charles H.] Swannack [ Jr., USA] at the time.^eir presence after

2004 intensified, and if you look in the al-Qaeda ranks, you will

find a lot of lowlifes. ^eir aim was to destroy the Islamic religion

by attacking the Christians and Shiites, not just the Anbari sheikhs.

In 2005, we met with the defense minister and the interior minister

at the time, and we asked them to institute a force to protect the

western desert. We proposed to them that we had 2,500 fighters,

and we were willing, able, and ready to attack al-Qaeda. We got

permission to institute this force, but we found cowardice in our

own men. I asked why, and they said because they were intimidated

by al-Qaeda and its brutality.

At the beginning of 2006, the Albu Mahal tribe in al-Qaim, that

was the first spark, between Albu Mahal and al-Qaeda. ^ey

instituted a company called al-Hamza Company, but they got no

help, neither from the Americans nor from the Iraqi government.

Al-Qaeda started buying people, buying their consciences, and this

is what we warned about. ^e reason being there was a lot of

unemployment, so they exploited that factor. We exploited the

spark that took place in al-Qaim. We started educating the people

here and tried to incite them to stand up to al-Qaeda. We

succeeded in taking some people from Anbar to Baghdad to

demand support from the government, because support was almost

nil. We were followed by al-Qaeda, and the first attack occurred in

a place called Sadiyah, in Baghdad.

Interpreter: I asked him what time that attack was on his person

in Sadiyah.

Ali Hatim: In the beginning of 2006. And before that, they

attacked me right here in my guesthouse.^ey totally wiped it out.

Sheikh Amer [Abd al-Jabbar Ali al-Sulayman al-Assafi] was at the

guesthouse at the time. Nevertheless, we insisted on finishing the

endeavor that we had undertaken.

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About mid-2006, we had a conference, which the American

ambassador [Zalmay M. Khalilzad] attended, and some other

notables. We gathered the most important sheikhs, even from the

south of Iraq, and we proposed raising arms against any militias,

whether Iranian-backed or al-Qaeda. Very few reacted positively,

because they were fearful.

I tell you that right now, there are some new people who rose up

that were unknown before. ^ere was a movement called Anbar’s

Revolutionaries, which started three months prior to the

Awakening.^e first confrontation that they undertook was in the

Rahman Mosque, right here in Ramadi. ^ey detained 12 people,

nine of whom were emirs of al-Qaeda, and they executed them.

^e second incident was in Haditha. ^ey detained two people.

^ey brought them to the Tash area and executed them.

We got in touch with Abdul Aziz al-Kabasi, the intelligence chief

in Baghdad, and we asked him for a copying machine so that we

could make leaflets to incite people to rise up against al-Qaeda.To

be truthful with you, we tried to stay away from working with the

Americans because we didn’t want it to look like an American

initiative, because people were opposed to that.We wanted to show

that it was wholly Iraqi and to incite them and to bring them into

the fold.

Montgomery: About what time period was this?

Ali Hatim: About two months before the inception of the

Awakening. ^at was with the agreement of the American

command in Baghdad. We got the American commander in

Baghdad to agree to the wording that we were using, because the

situation was not really solid here. It was probably a secret endeavor

that we were undertaking.

^e second spark, like I spoke of al-Qaim and the Albu Mahal

tribe, the second spark, there was an officer who was traveling along

the highway. His wife was the daughter of Hamid al-Odda, who

was the sheikh of the Albu Ali Jassim tribe. Al-Qaeda was

questioning him, and they got hold of his wife’s hair and pulled

her out of the vehicle.

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We exploited that, and that was the second main spark that took

place. We used that incident, of pulling the woman by her hair, to

give the people passion, saying, “Arise! Look! ^is is your

cowardice! ^is is your complacency! ^is is your ignorance! ^is

is what it has done! Look what we have descended to!” So we

poured gasoline on the fire, so to speak.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: Where was the incident?

Ali Hatim: Close to Jarash, which is here in Jazeera, here in

Ramadi. ^e officer’s name was Hamid Zivin.

^e true campaign that took place against al-Qaeda, to be honest

with you, was started by Hamid al-Hayess, long before Sattar Abu

Risha. Right at Hamid al-Hayess’s guesthouse, that’s where the

meetings took place and the incitement to fight off al-Qaeda.

Hamid al-Hayess got hurt the most by al-Qaeda.^at was the step

that we took forward in calling the revolution against al-Qaeda.

We used what we call our right, which is tribal right, to fight alQaeda. So Sheikh Hamid al-Hayess asked the tribal sheikhs to

gather, to incite people, to bring people into the fold to fight off alQaeda. ^ere was no safe place to go, except Sheikh Abdul Sattar

Abu Risha’s house. And we made many decisions that were very

dangerous, and they were dangerous to implement.^at is because

al-Qaeda possessed lethal weapons, and we lacked support from

anybody, Americans or the government.

And you know something? When we started talking about this

initiative, many of the sheikhs thought we were a little bit mad,

because here we are trying to take on al-Qaeda. ^ey thought we

were crazy, and most of them ran away. And you know something?

I’m willing to confront them to their faces and show them their

cowardly stance. Right now, when they meet with the Americans,

they boast about how courageous they were, but the fact of the

matter is that their own people know who they were and their

cowardly stance.

So when we decided to have that meeting I talked about a while

ago, we got in touch with Sattar Abu Risha, and I said, “You are

welcome. My house is yours.”So the Awakening revolution—now

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we’re into the Awakening phase—was started by Sattar Abu Risha,

Hamid al-Hayess, and me, and we also have some heroes. Notable

among them is Mohayed Maish, Fathal Maklef, and there was a

brigadier general. His name was Hamid Ibrahim Jazza. Sorry to

tell you, he was detained by the Americans. Americans killed many

al-Qaeda members. Another person that was with us, his name was

Shalan al-Nouri. Some other men had the heart to join with us.

And open warfare against al-Qaeda started. Now, thanks be to the

Almighty, it started.

Afterward, we turned our attention to Nouri al-Maliki, the prime

minister. Hamid al-Hayess and I and some other men, we met with alMaliki, and it was a very long meeting that lasted from 10:00 in the

morning to 6:00 in the evening.When we went, we asked him for many

things.We asked him to create emergency response units, a police force,

bring in the army, and without hesitation he did. He had a long meeting

with his security staff, and they fulfilled all our demands.

^e Awakening was basically a conference, and we decided, okay,

after this conference, what is it we’re going to do? What is the end

result of this? So the end result was the Anbar Salvation Council.

I’m going to speak frankly.^e Anbar Salvation Council was to be

in the forefront in the fight against al-Qaeda, and to lead Anbar

Province, and to have people from that council appointed to the

governorship, and to lead the government. At the time, there was

no provincial council. At the time, the Islamic Party had run away

from the province. It was like a vacuum. It is well known that the

Islamic Party used the vacuum that it had created to take over the

government in Anbar. People started coming to our side, seeing

the government of Iraq was helping us, and seeing what we

accomplished. I’ll tell you something, the American side was

important, even though it was a little bit late.

We had a conference in Baghdad to nominate someone who would

lead the Anbar Salvation Council, and we nominated Hamid alHayess and Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha. Hamid won by 70 points.

Sattar Abu Risha pulled out, and he said, “Look, I’m going back

with the Awakening,” and here the division took place. What we

started was a great step, but what took place was the division that

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we had really feared. I don’t know what it was, maybe a different

point of view or whatever, but there was a difference.

Montgomery: About what date was that?

Ali Hatim: At the end of 2006, beginning of 2007, right about there.

Montgomery: You were attacked twice, once in Baghdad and once

in your guesthouse. Could you describe the attacks?

Ali Hatim: I was traveling from Jadriyah to Sadiyah, visiting my inlaw, and we had four vehicles. Once we made a right turn into

Sadiyah, hell broke loose, fire from everywhere. I had four men

killed and many more injured. Most of the vehicles were disabled,

except one. I don’t know how I was saved, except by the grace of

God, because it was a one-sided confrontation. ^ey had six

vehicles. ^ey had PKCs. ^ey had heavier machine guns. I don’t

know how I was saved.

^e second confrontation, after we came from Baghdad, we started

going about in Shamiyah and Ramadi proper and holding

education sessions with the people. One day, we’re meeting—we

tried to incite them to fight, not intelligence gathering. We were

not really military commanders who knew what to do really. All

that we wanted to do was fight, fight, fight. One day we’re meeting

with my people in my guesthouse, and a young kid came in. He

was about 151⁄2 years old, at about 7:30 in the evening, and he stood

right in front of me and started pushing a button, like he was

drugged. You could see the wire coming right here from his cuffs,

so he started pushing, pushing, and nothing happened. I guess it

malfunctioned. So my men came in and took him out to the

ditches and killed him. And the American forces came in the next

day and detonated his explosive payload.

But we insisted on finishing the undertaking we had started. We

had accomplished something great.We had contacts with the Iraqi

government, but to be truthful with you, between us and the

Americans, there was a gap.^at was during the time of the general

who preceded [Major General John F.] Kelly.* To tell you the truth,

* ^e time frame before MGen Kelly arrived was February 2007 to February 2008, during which

time MGen Walter E. Gaskin Sr. was Multi National Force-West commander.
we did not concentrate on the gap between us, because we were

really busy doing what we had to do. We did what we could to

strengthen the security apparatus in Anbar, to strengthen the

institutions in Anbar.

We had some confrontations with the Islamic Party. We started

demanding to know the Anbar budget. We tried to find out where

the money went from the budget of 2006 and 2007. ^e money

belongs to the Anbaris.^ey are the rightful owners of that money.

And I tell you frankly, we insisted on kicking out the Islamic Party,

even if we had to resort to the use of force.

^e American command, to be truthful with you, before Kelly, was

exasperating the situation, not making it better, and we gave up on

it. It almost came to a confrontation between us and that general

I spoke of. It is not really a good thing to bring a military man,

who only wants to assert his dominance through the use of force.

You have to bring someone who has the political savvy, the

knowledge of the people, the tribal inner workings of the people,

because Anbar is a tribal place.

We got an invitation from [Mahmoud Dawud al-] Mashhadani,

who was the Iraqi head of the parliament. He asked us to be patient

and not to have any conflict with the Islamic Party. At the same

time, there was a change of the American command in Anbar.

^at’s when General Kelly came in and took charge, him and

General [Martin] Post. We really did not know who they were.

When we met with Mashhadani, the head of the Iraqi parliament,

we threatened them that within a month, if the Islamic Party was

not removed, it would be subject to confrontation, maybe attack.

^e first meeting between us and Generals Kelly and Post took

place in Habbaniyah. I’ll tell you something, if there are generals

like Kelly, kind and important—General Kelly and General Post

worked with us using our mentality, not the Marines’ mentality.

^ere was a consensus that there was a huge difference in the

command between the one that preceded Kelly. And Kelly himself

listened to us, tried to understand the problem, and solved it.

Maliki wanted to see us, and we met with al-Maliki to solve this

dispute. Kelly invited us for a lunch, and he asked us to be patient

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and said, “You have my support for anything you face.” We found

that Anbar Province was open to all: the prime minister, the Iraqi

parliament, and the American command. For that, we met, we

thought, and he helped us in many things, like how to solve our

problems before we use force. So after the confrontation with alQaeda, the confrontation with the Islamic Party was the most

notable, and I’ll tell you, General Kelly was able to defuse it.

You know what really makes us mad? It is seeing that the

Americans were able to spend money and fulfill projects much

more than the Iraqi government, or I should say the Anbari

government that’s headed by the Islamic Party. What the

Americans have done is great. What they have been able to

accomplish is great, but also the flip side of it is, “What if the

Americans had the Anbari government’s money?”^ey would have

accomplished a lot more.

President [George W.] Bush’s visit to Anbar was an important

thing as a political message, but not in substance. Nothing really

came out of it. [Barak H.] Obama’s visit to Anbar, along with the

two senators, the Democratic senator and the Republican one, was

an important one.* We met with them, and we gave them a clear

message.^e true test right now for the Americans is to leave Iraq

standing on its own feet, not lying on its back.

And to tell you the truth, rockets, scientific things like genes and

the science of genes, and stuff like that, are not as important as

leaving Iraq standing on its feet. ^e true test for America is to

leave a new Iraq, as we were promised. I’ll tell you what, the true

test of democracy came in this election, not the one preceding it,

nothing before that, ever.

^ere are three things to note that were of very great importance.

^e first is the appearance of al-Qaeda in Iraq. It was something

that was not imagined. ^e second thing was that the Americans

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* ^en-Senator Obama, who was at the time the presumptive Democratic Party nominee for

president, visited Ramadi on 22 July 2008 as part of a congressional delegation that also included

Senator John F. “Jack” Reed, a Democrat from Rhode Island, and Senator Charles T. “Chuck”

Hagel, a Republican from Nebraska.
stood with us, how they backed us up.^at was not imagined. And

the third thing was Maliki’s stand, and how he did not look at

himself as being Shiite. He stood with us, regardless of his sect.

So there were three noted things that were of great importance that

one must look at, after which we had two meetings in preparation

for these last elections. I went to the council in Baghdad, and two

VBIEDs [vehicle borne improvised explosive devices] came in and

attacked us. ^ey brought down the building on us and, thanks be

to the Almighty, I was saved.

General Hickman* paid me a visit, the deputy ambassador paid me

a visit, and many more people from the American command and the

embassy came in and paid me a visit. Even at those precarious times,

we still insisted that Iraq would be clean and clear of al-Qaeda.

I think the reason I was attacked was because, two weeks prior to

the attack, I had made a statement on the air that the trouble and

the problems were neither the Americans nor the Iraqi

government, but it was the Iranians. I also said that there is no

connection between the Iranians and the Shiites of Iraq. So, with

the help of the Almighty, we are on this steadfastly.^e rebuilding

of Iraq, getting Iraq rid of all the militias. I espouse no chair, no

position, nothing, just the service of Iraq.

Montgomery: I’d like to go back and ask two questions about what

you said earlier. First, at one point you were facing al-Qaeda, who

was armed with lethal weapons, but you could not go to the

Americans because then it would look like you were their puppets.

So how could you fight under those circumstances? What do you

do to fight? It sounds like you’re organizing, but how do you fight?

Ali Hatim: It’s not the fact that the people would think we are

American stooges. No.^ere was a huge mistrust between us and the

Americans due to the fact—if you remember the attack on Fallujah?

Montgomery: Yes.

Ali Hatim: ^ere was a huge gap between us and the Americans.

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* Possibly Col William B. Hickman, USA.
^at’s why we didn’t want to ask them. As far as your questions,“How

did we fight off al-Qaeda,” we were able to buy weapons. Everything

was on the market.To buy a PKC [machine gun] was like 500 bucks.

We were able to buy French weapons. We were able to buy heavy

armaments, Dushka—a Russian Dushka antiaircraft [heavy machine

gun]. So there was plenty of it going around. And due to the distrust

that existed between us and the Americans, had we asked the

Americans for weapons, they would not have given them to us because

of the fear factor. ^ey did not know who we were.

Just to let you know, it’s a known fact that Iraq is awash with

weaponry. ^at’s one thing.

And the second thing that we counted on, the fact that the

Americans would come on our side once we started the fight—and

this is exactly what took place. To tell you the truth, if you look at

the Americans’ role, and what they did in here, they were more

interested in the welfare of the Iraqi people than the government

of Anbar was. Tell you some facts—the way they stood behind us,

the way they supported us, the way they kept overwatch on the

police apparatus, on the security apparatus. One thing about it, they

even counted the gasoline, how to disperse it among the police,

who took it in turn and sold it. So the Americans kept watch over

everybody and anybody. ^ey really kept everybody in line, and if

it weren’t for them, it was chaos.

Montgomery: You’re leading into my second question. You said

there was a change in the American approach when there was a

change in command. Could you give some examples of how things

were changed, before and after?

Ali Hatim: ^e difference between the two commands, the first

guy was sort of moody. He tried to please some people, very few

people, mostly the people that were outside, by giving them

contracts that really didn’t matter too much.

Montgomery: Outside where?

Ali Hatim: Outside the country, to the sheikhs who lived maybe in

Syria or Emirates or Jordan. So he was trying to please these

people, rather than to do the right thing in Anbar, like I said. He

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was moody. He didn’t have the political savvy. He did not know

how to work the Anbar people.

Whereas General Kelly, no, no, no—he started using reason with

us. He helped us. He did everything possible to defuse the situation

against the Islamic Party because, I’ll tell you what, if the

confrontation had taken place between us and the Islamic Party,

not even 100 American tanks would have defused it.

We had intended to finish off the Islamic Party.^e thing we detest

the most is Islamic Parties in Iraq. I’ll tell you a synopsis of how he

treated Anbar. He treated it like his own garden. He paid a great

deal of attention to the cowards who ran away from here, the

people who stayed in Jordan or Syria, or what have you. He gave

armored vehicles to some people—some people who did not

deserve it. He put people who did not deserve to be in leadership

ahead of the real leaders.^ey purposely wanted to insult, dishonor,

and create disputes between people. So he really did not—this is

the first commander.

Montgomery: Isn’t that what Saddam did, created new sheikhs?

Ali Hatim: Yes.

Montgomery: So it’s the same thing again.

Ali Hatim: And this is what we refused to accept.

I’ll tell you something else. Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, Sheikh Ali—

we did not kill anybody with our own hands. It was the fighters

from the field who did the killing, yet Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha

was made too prominent. He was given much more prominence

than he deserved. I’ll tell you the truth, and I’m going to speak

frankly, he was given too much money under the guise of various

projects, meaning arming of the people. But truthfully, just to be

frank about it, it was too much money, much more than he

deserved. It has to be noted and has to be acknowledged that

Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha made a great stand. His stand against alQaeda was well known, but not as much as the Americans made it

to be. For instance, the fighter in the street, to me, was much more

deserving of attention than Abu Risha.

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When General Kelly came in, he leveled the field, so to speak. He

spoke with everyone equally. ^ere was equality in his treatment.

And this is what really we’re looking for, this treatment. Do not

treat me better than Sheikh Hamid, or Hamid better than Sattar,

or Sattar better than so forth and so on—everybody equally.

Montgomery: ^at prominence is probably what got him killed,

though, isn’t it?

Ali Hatim: I think you’re probably right. ^e way that his

prominence rose may have led to his demise, but Sheikh Sattar

Abu Risha had to be fair with his own self, because a man has to

be truthful to himself and to the Almighty, too.

When I went to Jordan and tried to get the sheikhs to come back

to Iraq to fight, you could see cowardice in their faces: “No, man,

leave me alone. I’m not going back.”

When the American soldiers go back to the United States, they

don’t go back there and boast about what they did in Iraq. ^ey

simply did their duty, and that is what we did. We did our duty to

our country, to our province. ^e American government provides

medical coverage. ^ey pay salaries to their men. In other words,

they’re taken care of. It’s well deserved.

Whereas these sheikhs, when they come back here and say, “Well,

look, I am and I am and I am,” and they start boasting about their

doings, which are false. General Kelly, when he came in, he realized

who was who, and he gave each his due. I hope that the new

general, who is taking General Kelly’s place, will follow in his

footsteps.*

What we started in Anbar, we finished in Baghdad. Sheikh Hamid

al-Hayess took 24 fighters and went to Hamdiya, and he fought off

al-Qaeda. We started many Awakenings in Baghdad. I’ll tell you,

in one section of Baghdad, the Americans were paying as much as

$52 million a month for the Sons of Iraq. In Abu Ghraib, we took

part. In southern Baghdad, we took part. Ameriyah, Ghazaliya, also

* MGen Kelly was succeeded as commander of Multi National Force-West by MGen Richard

T. Tryon on 9 February 2009.
Adhamiyah. We went forward toward Salah ad-Din,Taji. We used

our tribal affiliation and interaction to push this initiative forward.

And what was great, when we traveled about in Baghdad, in Salah

ad-Din, everywhere else, we found that the American response and

cooperation with Iraqis was as good, maybe even better.

I admonished and reminded Obama of the fact that you’ve

accepted the fight in Iraq, so you must pull out responsibly. Do not

go out of Iraq as losers because that will be a sad reflection on your

legacy, so pull out of Iraq responsibly. Make a responsible pullout,

not just because you vowed in your election campaign that you’re

going to pull out of Iraq—not just to fulfill that vow. No. Make it

a responsible pullout, even though, to be frank with you, we are

opposed to occupation. We don’t want to be occupied, but at the

same time, we have to look for a responsible pullout. ^e most

volatile place in Iraq is Anbar Province. But we have to think with

our heads and not be emotional.

What we notice right now, the Obama administration is trying to

repair things inside the United States. But to be honest with you,

the United States proper is affected by what takes place around the

world. Obama’s emphasis is to go to Afghanistan and do what is

right in Afghanistan.Well, let me tell you something: Anbar is much

more volatile than Afghanistan. Considering the undercurrent of

animosity that exists among various entities, the only reason it is

contained right now is because of your presence. It’s like a car. You

lift your foot off of the accelerator, and the vehicle dies.

I have said what I said as a warning and to be remembered in future

years. ^e security situation right now in Iraq is relevant to many

things. ^erefore, if we have an irresponsible pullout, it might do

more damage, and the situation will become much more dangerous

than in 2005.

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Interview 8
Sheikh Majed Abd al-Razzaq Ali

al-Sulayman

Co-Regent

Dulaimi Tribal Confederation

Sheikh Majed Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman is a descendant of

Sheikh Ali al-Sulayman, who was one of the most powerful sheikhs in

al-Anbar Province during and after the transition from Ottoman to

British rule (described in the writings of Gertrude Bell). He is a great

uncle of Sheikh Ali Hatim (interview 7 in this book), who is the heir

apparent and de facto paramount sheikh of the Dulaimi tribal

confederation. Sheikh Majed and his cousin, Sheikh Amer Abd alJabbar Ali al-Sulayman al-Assaf, initially served as co-regents due to

Sheikh Ali Hatim’s youth, with Sheikh Amer residing in Ramadi, Iraq,

and Sheikh Majed supporting from Amman, Jordan. Now Ali Hatim

has matured, but he continues to honor this protocol out of respect for

his uncles.

Sheikh Majed and his family fled to Jordan after coming under

government scrutiny following a failed coup against Saddam Hussein

in the 1990s. King Hussein of Jordan gave him sanctuary, and he began

working with exiled Iraqi opposition groups.

Sheikh Majed was interviewed by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery

and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams on 25 February

2009 in Amman, Jordan.

Sheikh Majed Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman: ^e first one who

contacted me, and we are still very close, was Dr. Ayad Allawi. He

traveled here to Amman, and I met with him.Two Americans were

with him. I don’t know who they were. Apparently he informed

the Americans in London about Sheikh Majed, and they were

astonished and surprised to meet Sheikh Majed here in Amman.

I met with Ayad Allawi and the Americans for about two or three

hours, and Ayad Allawi was translating for me. ^ey said, “We’ll

meet you later,” and they went back to the States.

121
A month, two months later, I traveled to London. I met with the

opposition in London, [Ayatollah Sayed Muhammad Baqir] alHakim—not this Hakim that’s here, but the one who was

assassinated—Massoud Barzani, and Ahmed Chalabi.

[Conversation with interpreter on what time frame Majed is discussing.]

Majed: ^at was in the year of 2000. ^ey were talking about the

next movement, and where they’re going to go, and how they’re

getting ready to overthrow the regime, and they decided to go and

meet in the north of Iraq. I objected to that. I told them, “Look, if

I want to enter Iraq, I will not allow myself to get in from the north.

If I want to assist, I will enter Iraq from the right road, which is

from Jordan to Trebil, and from Trebil to Anbar.”

We talked for a long time, and there were so many warnings and

objections. You have to be frank, because we’re talking about

history, and I have to be right in what I’m saying.^e only one who

spoke who was a patriot to Iraq was Ayad Allawi. He was not

sectarian at that time.

I came back to Amman, and we continued our meetings here in

Amman. I had a phone call from Dr. Ayad Allawi and Nouri

Badran, who was the first interior minister during Ayad Allawi’s

era. I think that was in 2001 or the end of 2000. He said,“^ere are

highly important VIPs coming from the States, and they want to

meet you in person. ^ey want to meet you in Abu Dhabi in the

United Arab Emirates.”

I traveled to Abu Dhabi, and we met continuously for two or three

days. ^ey introduced themselves, but I don’t think they gave me

their real names. I understood from Nouri Badran that one of them

was the assistant to the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and

the other one was a very important person in the Department of

Defense. So we met for two or three days, and they even showed

me the plans on how they’re going to enter Iraq on a map.^is was

a long talk. And they told me that a person would be coming from

the United States to coordinate with me in person.

At the beginning of 2002, a person came from the States, and I

met him here in Amman. His name was George. We used to meet

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from hotel to hotel for security reasons, and he used to go to the

States and come back, but we continued our meetings. He asked

me, “What’s your influence on the military officers in Anbar

Province?”. . . I told him, “I’ll contact the officers in Anbar in

person, right in front of you now.”And I said,“I will show you that

most of them are not supporters of Saddam Hussein.”^ere were

about nine Americans sitting in that meeting. Some of them spoke

Arabic. One of the American gentlemen, called Yahir, was

translating for me. And I contacted three generals in Anbar. ^ey

were listening to what I told them on the other line. One of them

was in the Republican Guard, one of them was in military industry,

and one was in the artillery. I spoke to them, and they said,“Please,

sheikh, assist us in overthrowing this regime today, not tomorrow.

We have had enough of Saddam Hussein's regime.”

^e year 2003 came. We continued meeting during that time. I

went to London and back again, and I went over to the United

Arab Emirates again. George came back—a very nice gentleman.

I think George stayed with me here for two months. We met three

or four times a week with his groups, as you know, and we kept

looking at Iraqi maps, how to enter Iraq. I showed them how to

enter Iraq from the Saudi side, and I even showed them the Iraqi

checkpoints. And I told them,“What we need now is to have some

people working for us inside Iraq, so they can tell us the Iraqi

military movements, the Fedayeen Saddam movements. To check

the movements between Abu Ghraib and the border with Jordan,

to keep an eye on the borders—the Saudi border, the Jordanian

border, and the Syrian border.”

^e first people we used for formation were the sheep smugglers

because nobody keeps an eye on them or thinks of them as spies.

^ey brought their sheep, they kept an eye on Iraqi military

movements, and they passed the information to us.

^ere was a gentleman we met once a week because it was so

dangerous at the time to send any written messages. Another

gentleman came with George later on, by the name of Roy. George

told me that we needed to get some ^uraya satellite phones into

Iraq. ^ere were some military guys with them, but they were

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wearing civilian clothes. At the time, as you know, anyone who had

a satellite phone in Iraq would be executed on the spot.

He said, “Let’s smuggle 100 satellite phones into Iraq.”

I said, “No.”

He said, “Let’s smuggle 20, 25, up to 30 at a time.”

So we used these cell phones between the Syrian border and the

Saudi border. ^ey watched the H-3 base and H-2 base, and they

kept an eye on the Iraqi checkpoints. ^ey kept passing

information every hour.

And we used to meet in hotels for our safety: the Holiday Inn, to

the Sheraton, to the Four Seasons—no, the Four Seasons wasn’t

open—the [Radisson] SAS Hotel. And we used to contact them at

10:00 every night. We used to call everyone, and then we expanded

the area. We took it from just the borders to all the way to Ramadi.

^e first cell phone I handed over to my cousin, Sheikh Amer Abd

al-Jabbar, in Ramadi, and that put his life in so much danger. And

I handed some to our guys in Fallujah, and some into Abu

Ghraib—nearer to the Abu Ghraib base.

^en we had another meeting in London. ^at was January 2003.

I wasn’t very happy about that meeting, which was between us, the

oppositions.^ey wanted to go back to the States, and I decided to

come back here to Amman. At the meeting, there were the Shi’a

Iranians and the Kurds, al-Hakim and Chalabi, Massoud Barzani

and Jalal Talabani.^ey were insisting on dissolving the Iraqi army,

and we were objecting to that. We really objected to their idea of

dissolving the Iraqi army, and they asked me, “What is the

solution?” I said that the Coalition forces enter Iraq, we call it a

military coup, and all will be accountable then. ^e high officers

during Saddam Hussein’s era, and the politicians, and the

Ba’athists, put them aside—the high ones. And the country

continues with its organization, with the ministries as they are.

^ose guys went to the States, and I came back to Jordan.

To be frank, Ahmed Chalabi had a lot of influence in Congress

and the Department of Defense. And at State, they talked about

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the same subject, and Ayad Allawi was objecting to dissolving the

Iraqi army. I came back here to Amman, and we continued meeting

with our friends. It’s a long, lengthy talk. I’ve got it summarized.

^e day that they were warning of invading Iraq from Basrah, the

plan changed completely in the last minutes. Roy and George and

the other friends took me and some of the opposition from Amman,

and they put us on a Jordanian base called H-4, I think, nearer to the

Iraqi-Jordanian border. I think 40 of us were there—me, Ayad

Allawi, and his groups. Some of the sheikhs from the south were

there as well.We stayed there for about 15 or 20 days, I think, maybe

15 days. ^e war had started by then, and they were telling us how

to put on gas masks. I received a phone call from here in Amman.

^e American embassy wanted me and Dr. Ayad Allawi for an

urgent meeting at the American embassy. My people stayed there.

We had satellite channels as well at the H-4 base. We were advising

the Iraqi military, the Iraqi civilians, “Do not fight the Coalition

forces. ^ey are a Coalition of liberation.” And we had some Iraqi

military officers, generals from the opposition, supporting us as well.

One of the generals was Salim al-Imam. He was an ambassador and

a soldier. And there was another guy called Ahmad Shabib, who was

a military guy, too. And the third one was Ibrahim Janabi. ^ey

stayed at the H-4 base, and we came back to Amman.

When I got here to Amman, I was surprised with the news that

they attacked Barzan’s farm, which was a big disaster to me. ^e

house they attacked was my sister’s house, and I lost my sister and

her children. I lost 22 members of my family in that attack. My

sister and her children and her grandchildren all died in this attack.

I was devastated. ^ey hit my old house by mistake, and I think

somebody passed wrong information to them. ^ey told them, I

think, that this was Barzan’s farm and that [Saddam] Hussein was

hiding in this house.

I remained here in Amman, and I had my sister waking me up for

three days. I received a phone call at 12:00. ^ey said, “Get ready.

We are ready to move into Ramadi.” Prior to that, the Americans

asked me, “What do you think if we start bombing the military

bases in Ramadi—in Anbar Province? What do you think of that?”

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Iraqi Perspectives
I told them, “Please do not shoot even one bullet in Anbar

Province. I can assure you that once you enter Anbar Province,

nobody will resist you, neither the tribes nor the military. And I

am responsible for what I say. And anything that happens in Anbar

Province, I will be responsible.” At that meeting, when I said what

I just said, the Iraqi ambassador to Egypt was attending that. His

name is Raad al-Alousi. But I advised the Coalition forces, “Do

not bomb the province, above all else.”

So we left Amman. I think we left Amman about 9:30, 10:00 in the

morning, and we were accompanied by our Jordanian friends to

protect us. When we got into Iraq, we were very disappointed. I

saw that the Trebil border crossing had been looted.^ere were no

employees there. ^e border was open. ^ere was a big picture of

Saddam Hussein at the border. We shot at it with our weapons

until it fell on the ground, and we continued into Iraq.

Roy and Ibrahim Janabi entered Iraq before us, and they were

waiting for us at the K-90 [highway kilometer marker 90] area.

^e tribes were waiting for me in my guesthouse, and I was in

contact with them all the way by satellite phone, just making sure

I was traveling all the way to Ramadi.^ere were American forces

all the way to Ramadi. When I introduced myself to them, they let

me go through immediately.

I think we got to Ramadi at around 8:00 in the evening. Ayad

Allawi and his group, and Roy and his group, were astonished and

amazed at the reception and the welcome that we received from the

tribes when we got there.^is was recorded by Ayad Allawi on his

own camera. ^ere were about 2,000 or 3,000 people from my

tribe, and all of them were armed. ^ey were dancing and

celebrating. And all the sheikhs were waiting for me, too. We had

dinner, and Dr. Ayad Allawi remained in my guesthouse for three

or four days. ^en he moved into Baghdad after it was secured.

Roy and his group contacted me.^ey said we needed to have other

meetings regarding Anbar Province. I said, “Prior to having our

meeting, tomorrow morning I have a meeting with all the tribes of

my province. And during our meeting, we’ll appoint a governor for

the province.”^e Americans did not believe that we could do that

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so quickly, and it was the first province in the whole of Iraq. We

appointed Abdul Karim Burjis al-Rawi as the first governor for

Anbar, and we appointed the first chief of police. His name was

Ja’adan [Muhammad al-] Alwani. So what we did, the main thing

is that we stabilized the province. We appointed the governor, we

appointed the chief of police, and 10 days later, all the government

offices reopened, and everybody started going back to work.

So when I went to meet with the Americans, they were very happy

about what we had achieved in the province.^ey called it the first

step for democracy and liberation. After 15 days in Anbar, I insisted

on reopening and securing the border crossing points by putting

sheikhs and Anbaris in charge of the Trebil and Tanf border

crossing points.

I remained in Ramadi, and I had several meetings with a general

who lived in Saddam Hussein’s palace. When we entered the

palace, we saw it had been looted completely. ^e ^urayas had

been looted.^ieves looted the whole place. It was a really difficult

time that we passed through.

After being in Ramadi 25 days, they requested me for a meeting in

Baghdad. Ambassador [ Jay M.] Garner was there. All the overseas

opposition was there. Some of the opposition from inside Iraq was

there, too. ^at meeting took about three or four hours. “What’s

next? What’s the next step now? What are we going to do?” We

said it again, the same as I said it before,“Everything should remain

as it was prior to the liberation.”

But we faced the biggest tragedy by changing Garner for [L. Paul]

Bremer. Bremer came over, and the first thing he did was dissolve

the Iraqi army and create an armed enemy against us. ^is is what

we were warning against prior to the liberation. He dissolved all the

Ba’athist parties.^is is the other disaster he made. He dissolved all

the government institutions and ministries.What he did is just like

putting a bomb in this room, and the bomb explodes the whole

room. He decimated everything.

I wasn’t very happy at all then. I was not optimistic. I went out with

my American friends to take me back to a meeting with Bremer in

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a palace in Baghdad. ^ere were 12 of us, me and Adnan Pachachi,

Massoud Barzani, Ahmed Chalabi. Ayad was sick. He didn’t attend

the meeting, but he sent his representative, Nuri Badran. Hoshyar

Zebari, the foreign minister, [was there, as was] [Ayatollah Sayed

Muhammad Baqir] al-Hakim, the one who was assassinated. We

discussed a lot in that meeting regarding the mistakes that he was

making by dissolving the Iraqi army and the government institutions,

but he insisted on his decisions. ^e Iranian Shi’as and the Kurds

had brainwashed him, and I could not change his mind at all.

^e border now became open to everybody who ever wanted to

enter in and out of Iraq. Nobody was controlling it. Millions of

people entered from Iran. Hundreds of thousands from al-Qaeda

and the terrorists entered from Syria.

^ey wanted to form a governmental committee. Roy contacted

me, and the general, and they asked me to come and meet them at

Saddam’s airport. ^e road was very dangerous, but they said,

“^ere is an important meeting. You have to attend.”^ey said to

enter the palace through the Radwaniyah side. ^ey took me in

armored cars. I think there were about six cars. And for history, I

have to be straight and frank about what the Americans did. Each

American sat on one side, just to secure my life.

I entered the republican palace at the airport, and this was the first

time I had entered this palace. All of the government’s members,

who they wanted to choose, were there. Ghazi al-Yawer was there, as

were Pachachi, Allawi, Chalabi, Hakim, Massoud Barzani, and Jalal

Talabani. ^ere was seating for groups of people. ^e Americans,

with their arms and their body armor, secured my life, standing next

to me, protecting me. And somebody came and asked who I am. It

was the British ambassador there. I don’t remember his name.

He said to me, “We’re going to have a meeting with Bremer now.”

And I said, “What for?”

He said, “Once you have the meeting with Bremer, he’ll tell you

why he wants to talk to you.”

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It was a lengthy talk with Bremer then, and he was snobby. I told him

that I will not be a member of this governing council, and he asked

me why. “Because,” I said, “you are forming the council wrongly.”

And he said, “What am I doing wrong?”

And I told him, “^e first mistake you made was dissolving the

Iraqi army.” I told him then that all the weapons that Saddam

Hussein bought for the last 30 years had been looted. I told him,

“Go out on the street and see. ^ey’re selling weapons on the

pavement in streets of Baghdad. ^is is the first thing.” And

secondly, now you’re starting to form a government on a sectarian

basis by choosing from Shi’as, Sunnis, Arabs, and Kurds. I would

rather go back and help build my province.^at’s better than being

a member of your government.”

So I left. My American friends, who I used to meet here in Jordan,

asked me about the meeting. I told them what happened, and they

were very sad then.

So I went back, and we made a governing council in Anbar

Province. ^e borders were open. ^e terrorists started coming in.

Every day, there were demonstrations against us. ^ere were no

schools at the time. ^ere was no army. ^ere was no Ba’ath Party.

^ere were no security forces.^ere for two or three months, I was

calming people. None of them were receiving salaries, so I was

trying my best to keep them quiet.

^e governor at the time was an intelligence provider. He said,“We

have stores and warehouses full of cement, wood, and metal. I will

sell all this stock and get the money for the government before

somebody loots it.”^en people started looting and stealing what

they wanted from the stores. He sold it, and he collected some

money. We started paying salaries and calmed the situation.

^en the governing council was formed in Baghdad. I went to

Baghdad and used my influence to appoint some Anbaris as guards

just to keep them quiet, so they could receive salaries, and the

Americans assisted me then, too.We employed about 2,000 or 3,000

Anbaris.^e teachers, the lecturers—we managed to get them some

salaries, too, with pressure, of course, from the American general.

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After that, people started to lose trust. ^ey had enough of people

lying to them.^ey regarded me as if I was the one who contacted

President [George W.] Bush and told him to invade Iraq. ^at’s

the way people looked on me. ^e first bomb in Iraq exploded in

my guesthouse. As a family, I don’t know how God blessed us, and

none of us were killed. Some of my guards and people outside were

killed. About 25 houses around my guesthouse were demolished

completely. ^e car was a Toyota Land Cruiser, and it was filled

with 500 kilograms of TNT. So the American forces came into alAnbar straightaway and surrounded our area.^ey were shocked at

the amount of TNT that was in this car. With that amount of

TNT, they could have demolished half of the city. Anyway, we got

out of it safely.

I went to Baghdad for a meeting, me and my bodyguards. I had a

license from the general to carry weapons. On the way back from

Baghdad (al-Qaeda had taken over Fallujah), I had about 16 or 17

cars in my convoy, and they’re all similar, so they didn’t know which

car I was in. We got to the Saqlawiyah district, and they opened fire

on us. Hundreds of thousands of bullets were shooting at us. My

guards were brave. Straightaway, they came out of their cars and laid

down on the ground. We had PKC [machine guns] with us, and we

resisted. It was a valiant resistance. I continued on my way, and my

bodyguards stayed and fought.^ey told me to just leave and go, and

there was another car guarding me. I think the Americans heard

what was happening. Two Apaches [helicopters] came over, and alQaeda ran away. I didn’t see, but my bodyguards told me they killed

seven al-Qaeda. Of my bodyguards, I think five or six people were

injured. Eight of my cars were demolished completely.

We got back to Ramadi, and we continued our work. One day I

was calling the governor and coordinating with him. Since my

guesthouse was bombed, we were sitting in one of our houses.^ere

was a gentleman trying to get in, and my bodyguard asked him,

“Who are you?”He told them,‘I came to see Sheikh Majed, to ask

him to appoint me to the police or the army or on the borders.”

^ey let him in. It was a shortcoming of my bodyguards. ^ey

didn’t search him.^e important thing is that he entered my house.

I was on the phone, speaking to the governor. About 30 of us were

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sitting there. Sheikh Amer was sitting next to me. My cousin, God

bless his soul, Sulayman was sitting there. And Sheikh Ra’ad was

by my side as well, and my people were sitting all over.

He asked, “Who is Sheikh Majed.”^ey pointed at me.^ey just told

him in good faith. I asked him straightaway—a boy of 24 or 25 years

old—I asked him, “Where are you from?” He said, “I’m a Dulaim,”

but he said it in a different dialect from Baghdad. I started wondering

who this guy is. He started pressing a button. It was winter, and he

was wearing a coat. God saved us. He tried to detonate a bomb.

He asked one of the guys who was sitting there, “Is there a toilet

around?” We said, “Yes, there is one on the right.” My cousins and

my nephew said, “^ere is something wrong with this guy. I think

he is full of explosives.” Straightaway I told my guards, “Don't let

him come in.” He went to the toilet. I think the wire wasn’t

connected to the suicide belt, so he went and connected it. He came

running toward me. My bodyguards caught him by both arms.^ey

took him outside the house and threw him into the street. As he fell

down, he exploded. Even from a distance, it broke all the glass.

[Rest break. Conversation omitted, except for the following exchange.]

Majed: One thing I would like to mention in your record—you

must write it: when I appointed Abdul Karim Burjs al-Rawi as the

first governor, I appointed Ahmad Abu Risha as one of his

bodyguards—the head of the Awakening.

Interpreter: I said, “Oh, did you appoint Ahmad or Abdul Sattar?”

He said,“No, I appointed Ahmad, because Abdul Sattar was a road

gangster. He was robbing in the streets.”

[end of break]

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: Could you tell us how the

Awakening came about?

Majed: ^e Awakening—I’m going to speak frankly—the

Awakening wasn’t built by one person. Unfortunately, credit was

given to one man, and from others it was taken.^is is the biggest

mistake the Americans made, too.

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Iraqi Perspectives
Al-Qaeda started to enter Ramadi city. We don’t have it in

humanity, not in Islam, not in any other religion, that somebody

can come and cut off someone’s head. Al-Qaeda started to prohibit

people from doing things and to allow other things to be done in

the name of Islam, as if they were messengers from God, and it

was all lies and wrong. ^ey started to steal.

^ey did what they did in Fallujah, and I warned the people of

Fallujah about them, too, and I told them at the time. I warned the

people of Fallujah that al-Qaeda members are not Islamic. ^ey

are members of the Iranian groups, and they want to shove us in

front of the Americans. ^is is an Iranian strategy: that we, the

Sunnis, are against the Americans and against humanity, and the

Shi’as are a peaceful and poor people. Nobody believed me.

When people started to recognize al-Qaeda for what they were,

after they destroyed and damaged what they did, it was too late to

say, “I’m sorry.”^ey started to realize what I said was right about

al-Qaeda, and I told them afterward.

Let’s start about the Awakening, how it started. ^e first thing alQaeda did, they started attacking the women. And we, the Arabs, as

you know, when you pull a woman’s hair, it’s a big thing. ^is can

start a war. And there was a woman from the Albu Ali Jassim tribe.

She was the daughter of one of the sheikhs. I won’t mention names.

So the tribes started to rise up after they attacked this woman.

We, all the sheikhs, had a meeting here in Amman. We met to start a

revolution, to start the Awakening. We went to [Prime Minister Nouri

al-] Maliki and got his advice. He said, “I will not accept the

Awakening unless it’s blessed by the al-Sulayman tribe.”I’ve got a letter.

I think General [ John R.] Allen came to see me at the time, and

he asked me, “What’s your opinion?” I told him, “What you are

doing now, you should have done three years ago.”

And, as we say of someone who dies, we just say “God bless him.”

Sattar was with them, too. Everybody knows the reputation of

Sattar, I’m sure you know, and of his brother Ahmad. So we, the

sheikhs, discussed among ourselves who will head the Awakening.

I tell you frankly—and this is being recorded, so I’m speaking

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frankly—if any other sheikh denies it, it’s on record.^ey say,“^e

right job for the right man, and the bad will be accountable unto

the bad.” So we chose the bad one, which was Sattar, because he

was a troublemaker, and he had a bad record, so we chose Sattar.

And, as you know, his tribe is a very small tribe.

And in the circumstances that occurred, everyone started to rise up

against al-Qaeda. So we sent an e-mail, and I have it here with me.

I sent an e-mail to the prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, advising

him that the al-Sulayman tribe blesses this movement, and he can

supply them with weapons. And all the Dulaimi tribes signed it,

supporting this move. Even General Allen was happy about it.

We held a forum in Ramadi.^e whole tribe started supporting it.

Each tribesman started to fight against the people within his tribe

who were with al-Qaeda, from Fallujah to Rutbah, to Rawah, to alHit, to al-Anah, al-Qasiyah, to al-Qaim. Each tribe fought

al-Qaeda. ^is brave work was done by the tribesmen. But

unfortunately, it was credited to only one or two people. ^is is

what is not fair.

After we finished, and we cleared al-Qaeda—and thank God we

kicked them out—the head of the Awakening, one or two of them,

started to abuse it for personal gain, to gain more contracts, only for

financial gain.

Now, as you know, the Awakening has been breaking down because

al-Qaeda has been kicked out. Each tribe is proud of its

achievement, and unfortunately, some of them have been directed

into financial gains only. And if you remember, I spoke to General

[Martin] Post directly about this matter when he came here. I told

him to stop that work. I advised him to stop supporting a few men

because it will reflect badly on you. Because the tribes know what

is up. ^ey know me, they know you, they know each and every

one of us. And they know what you earned and what your financial

capability was two or three years ago. Now, after two or three years,

I see the difference in them, how much they changed. Now, they

have wealth. ^ey’re worth millions of dollars. Previously, most of

the people who became multimillionaires were road gangsters.^ey

were robbing cars on the highway. So they have been awarded more

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than they deserve. Now we have to stop the support—quietly and

gently, because, as you know, the tribes are very sensitive.

Saddam, with all his power, wanted to play on problems among the

sheikhs and open doors for himself. You have to keep this in its

history, and keep the tribes to themselves. Each sheikh and each

tribe has his history and his position. Saddam made some sheikhs

in the ’90s, and you know them. And when the Americans came

over, they made two or three fake sheikhs, and they’re all playboys

and road gangsters. ^is is one of the negative things being done.

And, as a friend, I warn my friends in all frankness and honesty.

Montgomery: How can Saddam—or in two or three cases, the

Americans—how can they make a sheikh?

Majed: I’ll tell you. Saddam opened an office for the tribes, and he

started to register the sheikhs: A, B, C. ^en, he mixed it up. B

became A, C became B. He started mixing the names of the

sheikhs as he liked. ^is is history. You cannot play with history,

but he wanted to play with history. ^e older tradition has its life,

has its history.

Now when the Americans came, at the beginning, when we sat

with them, they used to call and meet only the main tribal sheikhs

in al-Anbar, that is, me and the governor, and the general who used

to sit on the panel. And this has all been documented, I’m sure,

documented by you. I am the head of all the tribes. [Interpreter—

name deleted], for example, is from this tribe, so I bring the head

of that tribe. I don’t know what Saddam did by changing the names

from A to B, B to C and all this, but it does not work with us,

because we go back to history, and we know who the head of the

tribe is. So in our way, when we met with the Americans, we were

on the right path. But once I came to Amman, chaos started—and

al-Qaeda. Unfortunately, the Americans don’t know our tradition.

Everybody who was wearing a scarf like me, they called him sheikh.

If he is a sheikh, yes, but any sheikh we meet, go and ask him for

his history first.

Montgomery: You mentioned that Sattar was the right man for the

right job, and at the same time, you also said that he was from a

small tribe. Was it important that he was from a small tribe?

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Majed:^ey are very small. Ask the whole province about the Abu

Risha tribe. ^ey are one of the smallest tribes.

Montgomery: What I’m wondering is—

Unknown: Was that part of the criteria for him being chosen?

Interpreter: No, it was the criterion because he was a gangster.

Montgomery: But to start a revolution, wouldn’t it be better to have

a sheikh from a big tribe?

Majed: Okay. I’ll tell you how we chose him. We were hesitant.

First of all, we went to Sheikh Tariq, and he said,“Look, I’m a tribal

head, and I’ve got a history. I cannot be a cowboy in the street. It

doesn’t suit my position.”

So we chose someone. He was a son of a tribe. Sattar, God bless his

soul. He’s dead now. He was a brave man. You have to be fair. And

he was not like Ahmad, who loves financial rewards. And he used

to talk to everyone. And he educated and civilized himself. He left

the past behind, but unfortunately, he was assassinated, and God

bless him.

Montgomery: I guess that a small tribe minimizes the risk to other

people, doesn’t it?

Interpreter: I asked the sheikh, “Was it you chose him because of

a small tribe or because he was a gangster?” He said, “^at’s why,

because he was a gangster, and that's why we chose him.”

Montgomery: I’ve heard that some of the inspiration for the

Awakening came from a very local uprising in al-Qaim that did

not spread anywhere, but it kind of gave an example that people

refer back to frequently. What do you think about that?

Majed: I told you before that the Awakening revolution started

when al-Qaeda attacked the woman that I mentioned earlier.

Montgomery: And that was in al-Qaim?

Majed: No, it was in Anbar—it was in the Albu Ali Jassim tribe.

^ere was a conflict in al-Qaim, because some of the tribes—if you

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Iraqi Perspectives
walk in one path, it’s okay, but once you start walking in several

paths, you will be discovered. As you know, al-Qaim was the first

place al-Qaeda entered. ^en they started fighting among

themselves. But it didn’t last long. It was quieted immediately. But

the Awakening started from Ramadi when they took this woman

by the hair.

Montgomery: ^e reason I’m asking these questions is I’ve

interviewed a lot of people, and, as you said earlier, each tribe had

its own Awakening, so to speak.

Majed: It’s so, it’s so.

Montgomery: But when I’m interviewing people, sometimes I hear

the same facts from each person, and sometimes I hear things that

were more important locally, but not for the whole province. So I ask

other people to see if this was a province-wide thing or a local thing.

Majed: I’ll tell you why. When you talk to each tribe, it’s talking

about itself, because each tribe knows who’s the infiltrator in the

tribe, and they know who’s the thief in the tribe. But when I speak,

I speak on the whole of the province. ^e effort we started when

we, the sheikhs, met—all of us—in Amman here, we wanted to

gather and unite all the efforts of the tribes in one group. And we

moved in the right path.

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Interview 9
Sheikh Sabah al-Sattam Effan Fahran

al-Shurji al-Aziz

Principal Sheikh

Albu Mahal Tribe

Sheikh Sabah al-Sattam Effan Fahran al-Shurji al-Aziz is the

principal sheikh of the Albu Mahal tribe in al-Qaim, on the Syrian

border. He and his tribe led some of the earliest Iraqi resistance to alQaeda in Iraq, in 2005, which is cited by some as one of the first

organized “awakening” efforts.

Sheikh Sabah was interviewed by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery

and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams on 25 February

2009 in Amman, Jordan.

Sheikh Sabah al-Sattam Effan Fahran al-Shurji al-Aziz: ^e

western side of Iraq, as we say, is from Haditha to al-Qaim and alRutbah. In the beginning, it was invaded by British forces. After

two or three months they changed—the American forces took over

from the British forces.When they entered as invaders, for sure, it’s

the right of the people to resist invaders.

One of the biggest mistakes the Coalition forces made at the

beginning was getting intelligence information from people that

were not trustworthy. And when they got the information, they acted

blindly.^ey started by humiliating the people, scaring children and

women. ^is was the first mistake by the Coalition forces.

Two weeks after, I was detained by the British forces—having done

nothing—they detained me on the 17th of April in 2003. It was for

false information passed to them by a false man.

We are—we inherited this from our fathers, and grandfathers, and

great-grandfathers—we are a brave and traditional tribe in alQaim. And we are brave and strong. Some of the tribes—and I say

some of them—used to concern some of the smaller tribes, and

they wanted to retaliate against us by using the Coalition forces.

We, as a tribe, we did not want to create any conflicts among us,

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especially after the invasion of the Coalition forces. On the

contrary, we wanted to keep stability with the Coalition forces and

our tribe and other tribes, too, and our traditions.

When the American forces took over from the British forces,

unfortunately, the mistakes started to increase. For history and for

honesty, the British treatment of us was much better than by the

Americans, as the British had more experience with Iraqi people,

and in general with the Middle East as a whole. No assassinations

were done by the British. It was much less than was done by the

Americans, I can say about 70 to 80 percent less killing done by

the Coalition than by the Americans.

Unfortunately, the Americans used to deal with violence and

toughness. I’m talking about the first two years of the invasion. And

they didn’t listen to us at all when we told them that the tribes are

the keys to solving Iraqis’ problems. After the weakening of the

tribes, terrorists started entering our province—not only the

province, but the whole of Iraq.

We used to meet with the Americans, either through the

governor’s office or through the local mayor. And we used to tell

them frankly in our meetings that the Americans will pay a high

price for these mistakes.

It was a disaster when al-Qaeda entered our country, killing and

executing Iraqis. Whatever the Tatars did against humanity, alQaeda did it worse, worse than anyone that you can think of.

^e reason for our conflicts and disagreements with al-Qaeda,

there are many points that we disagree on with al-Qaeda.^e first

thing was al-Qaeda tried to isolate and to humiliate the tribals in

the areas. . . . ^e other thing they did was trying to stop the

opinions of the tribal people, to stop the Iraqis themselves from

having any opinions on the ground.^e only people that we should

listen to were them—to al-Qaeda—and these people were not even

Iraqis. ^ey were foreigners who entered from Yemen, Saudi

Arabia, Syria, and they called themselves emirs. ^ey wanted to

have their word and their opinion over us.

In our personal experiences with them, they dealt violently and

toughly with all Iraqi citizens. ^ey accused every Iraqi of being a

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Al-Anbar Awakening
traitor or a spy for the Americans. And if you weren’t a spy for the

Americans, then you should listen to them and kill Iraqis, and

execute them, and steal money from Iraqis, and then they can think

you are better to them than to the Americans.

^e other point is that they chose to have supporters in our areas.

^ey entered from the gate of martyrdom.^ey said,“We came to

help you fight the invaders who invaded Iraq.” In this matter, they

used two paths.^e first path was by scaring people, and the other

path was financial.^e families were in financial difficulties. None

of them had any finances left on them. ^ey were spending huge

amounts of money, giving to the people. So in this way, they

gathered supporters around them. And if anyone in the area said

that al-Qaeda were not Muslims, nobody supported him or

believed what he said.

People like us, and others who were quite wise and educated and

professional, started to realize who these people were. Some of

them were from the former army. Some of them were notable

people who had the wrong vision. ^ey started to know that these

came in, abusing the religion of Islam, and they were abusing their

people by executing innocent people. People started to realize that

they were blackening the word “Muslim,” so they realized what

their mission was.

^en, at the end of 2004, the conflicts between us and them started.

And we continued these conflicts on a low level up to May 2005.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: ^at began in 2004?

Interpreter:^at began in 2004, when the conflict started, the lowlevel conflicts, and then up to May 2005.

Sabah: When you start to find the bold lines among the lines, we

realized what their mission was, we in al-Qaim, especially our tribe,

the Albu Mahal—and the whole of Iraq. We started to understand

their mission was to destroy our tribe.

^e first thing they did, they assassinated the chief of police, who

was a member of our tribe. And then I said, “^at’s it. Now the

time has come.” And we started fighting them, and we removed

them from the center of al-Qaim.

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Unfortunately, we didn’t have the arms to fight them at that time

because the Coalition forces were surrounding us. Despite the

American forces around us, we managed to get rid of al-Qaeda

inside our cities, our villages. But militarily, al-Qaeda was even

more in control after we kicked them out, because they started to

surround the area. ^ey sent a representative to us to have a

dialogue so they could reenter al-Qaim. We rejected that.

^e big conflict was in August 2005 after they arrested the governor,

who was one of our cousins. Unfortunately they assassinated him

later. And then after they assassinated our cousin, we said, “^at’s

it. We have to fight against them.” I called the minister of interior,

Mr. Sadoon al-Dulaimi, and he was here in Amman.

I want to go back to what I said. In August 2005 and the fighting

with al-Qaeda, I wanted to mention to you that al-Qaeda won.

^ey reentered al-Qaim, and we had to withdraw. I think the

number who entered al-Qaim were about 4,000 to 5,000 al-Qaeda

members. And this is where the Americans made a mistake again.

^ese al-Qaeda members who came all this distance—they came

from Bayji and Mosul all the way to al-Qaim, and the Americans

couldn’t even stop them. ^ey used to see them, but the Coalition

forces didn’t do anything. I think this was a big mistake by the

Coalition forces in the human rights of the women and children

who lost their lives.

So what I did, we built a military division with the minister of

interior, and we called it the Desert Protectors—less than 400

people, 98 percent of them from my tribe.With God’s blessing and

the support of a small number of the Iraqi army, we managed to

prevent al-Qaeda from entering al-Qaim again. And thank God,

things got better from that time until now. We cleaned it up.

And then after a year, a year and a few months, the Ramadi

Awakening started. A number of people speak about the

Awakening in Ramadi. I’m not a member of the Ramadi

Awakening. And another Awakening started in Haditha prior to

Ramadi. But there were only a small number in Haditha. And then

the whole province united, and the Awakening started to move to

Mosul and Salah ad-Din and Baghdad and Diyala. And Iraq, as

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you see it, has been stabilized, and we thank the Lord for his

assistance and the tribal leaders. Just to emphasize without going

back again, as I said earlier, the tribes are the key to stabilization

and security in Iraq.

Montgomery: What role did the Americans play in the Awakening,

if any?

Sabah: In the Ramadi Awakening, the Americans played a big role.

It was the American support for the Awakening that made it really

successful, because they are the main force on the ground. And then

we felt that the Americans started to change their behavior, and

they were working in the right way. But they did play a big role, I

have to admit.

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams: What year did

they change their behaviors?

Sabah: In 2006.

Montgomery: Which officers do you remember playing a role in

the Awakening?

Sabah: I believe General [ John R.] Allen.

Montgomery: What effect did the two battles in Fallujah have on

Anbar Province as a whole?

Sabah: In the first conflict, there was support for the resistance. In

the second Fallujah, it changed the balances. In the first, as I said,

many people sympathized with the resistance, and the second one

changed the view and the vision of the people against al-Qaeda,

because they started to realize who al-Qaeda are. Al-Qaeda are

people who kill, demolish houses, rape people, so the people started

to change their view of the resistance.

Montgomery: Is that because of the behavior of al-Qaeda in

Fallujah in between the battles?

Sabah: Yes. It was in the whole of the province, not just Fallujah.

Montgomery: Okay. Did the battle of Sufiyah have a larger effect

on the rest of the province? Are you familiar with it?

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Iraqi Perspectives
Sabah: As you know, I’m far from Ramadi. I’m 300 kilometers away

from Ramadi. ^e same thing that happened, the conflicts

happened in al-Qaim, happened in Haditha and Ramadi.

Montgomery: Right. We’ve heard about al-Qaeda grabbing a

woman by the hair and pulling her out of a car. Are you familiar

with such an incident?

Sabah: ^ey did worse things than that. I’ll give you an example of

one of the things they did. Four members of one family in the alQaim district—not from my tribe, from the Salman tribe—they

were former soldiers.^ey brought them out and killed them in the

middle of the street.^ey cut off their heads, and they put each head

on the back of the body. ^is was in August of 2004. ^e family

came to pick them up, to take them and bury them. Al-Qaeda

stopped them. I contacted the director general for the phosphate

factory to bring a shovel so he can just bury the bodies. It was

starting to smell. ^ey stopped them. After a week or 10 days, if a

car wanted to pass through this area, he had to put a mask on his

face from the smell. What they did, they came and put TNT on

each body, and they called the family to come pick them up. When

the family came at dawn, they exploded them. With these four

people, they killed another eight, and they injured many others.

I will ask a question. If you are a Muslim, a Christian, Jewish,

Buddhist, any religion, for what reason do you allow something

like this to happen? “I am a martyr” is the excuse that al-Qaeda

used. ^is is one of the hundreds of thousands of cases that

happened. ^is is what alienated people from the real resistance.

^is is what I’ve seen from my own eyes. I’ve seen the bodies. And

we tried to bury them, but we couldn’t.

For example, I went to Baghdad. From al-Qaim to Baghdad is 400

kilometers. In these 400 kilometers, I would see about 10 to 20

bodies lying on the street beheaded. So for them to pull a woman’s

hair is nothing compared to what they did to the other bodies.

A man was accused of killing four Shi’as in the al-Qaim district. I

said to him, “You are accused of killing these four people.” His

father was with him. He said, “No, I didn’t kill anyone. But if the

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Saudi emir tells me that I killed them, I will say ‘Yes, I killed them.’”

^is is the mentality that I’m trying to explain to you, that alQaeda were brainwashing the people. ^e same man told me, “If

the al-Qaeda emir told me to assassinate my father, I will

assassinate him.”^ey were brainwashed to that extent.

We went through hard times, very, very hard times.

Montgomery: Where do you think their funding came from? You

said they spent a lot of money.

Sabah: Iran. Iran was the number one in supplying the financial

aid. And I can say tens of millions of dollars were supporting alQaeda. Imagine a boy of 15 or 16 years old. Imagine he’s got five

or six cars outside his house. Where would he get this money?

Montgomery: How is it that if these men were from Yemen, Saudi

Arabia, and other places, which is on the Sunni side of things.Why

would they work with Iran?

Sabah: He came to assassinate the Sunnis because he’s being paid

to kill the Sunnis.

Montgomery: Even though he’s from a Sunni country?

Sabah: Yes.

Montgomery: Would it be accurate to say that they could make

that arrangement because religion was not involved?

Sabah: ^is is political and traditional in what they believe. ^ey

will agree to assassinate and kill anyone. He will change his religion

and his tradition and his belief for the sake of money.

Montgomery: So this was really political and criminal.

Sabah: Yes, exactly. . . .

Of course after the Awakening formed, the most important thing

is that the killing had stopped in the province. In one or two

months, you see nobody has been killed, while prior to that, five

people were being killed on a daily basis.^at’s why it goes back to

what I’m saying, that the Americans put the tribes aside, and what

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Iraqi Perspectives
the right thing is, is that the tribes did play a role. ^is is the most

important thing, that civilians can walk on the street safely.

^e mistake that has been made on the national level is that you

brought people that are not Iraqis into the central government, and

up to this minute, most of them are not loyal to Iraq. And this is

the worst, if the Americans withdraw.

I think if the Americans withdraw, two things will happen. Iran will

enter through the militias.^at is one.^is is a big danger to us.^e

second one, the Kurds will start all over again, the violence will start.

My advice to the Americans: we are not a democratic nation, and

democracy does not suit us at present. It’s going to take 10, 15 to

20 years for the people to understand the meaning of democracy. I

tell you this as advice for history. ^e Sunnis have to play a role,

their natural role, and all of these things about elections, and this

and that, is all forgery. Take the election in Anbar two weeks ago,

where most of them are Sunnis.^ere was forgery and corruption.

So what I can advise is that we are not ready for democracy yet.

People are not ready for it.We have to be fair with the Sunnis. And

I believe that for the benefit of America that the one who rules

Iraq should be Sunni, and he will protect Americans’ interest.

We have a saying that “you cannot hold two pomegranates in one

hand.”One of the pomegranates is America, which is big. Just a little

bit smaller than the other pomegranate is Iran. So any Shi’a rulers

who come to Iraq—especially the Islamic ones—he is linked directly

in his beliefs to Iran. He can never serve American and Iranian

interests at the same time, which are in opposition to each other. So

what we say, that a man who comes, it could be a secular gentleman,

who could be a Sunni or a Shiite.^is is an exit for the Iraqis’ crisis.

^is is my opinion. We believe this is the right solution for Iraq.

Montgomery: ^is is for clarification. You said the Americans

brought non-Iraqis into the government. Are you referring to Iraqi

Shi’as and Kurds, or are you referring to Iraqis who are in the pay

of Iran, or something else?

Sabah: ^eir loyalty. ^eir loyalty is not to their country. [Abdul

Aziz] al-Hakim, in one of his speeches—and he was the head of

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the governing council—asked Iraq to pay compensation to Iran.

At the same time, many of the international countries were writing

off Iraqi debts. So his loyalty is not to Iraq. Look at their militias

and the killing they’ve been doing.We, as the Sunnis, we fought alQaeda, and we eliminated al-Qaeda. As you know, at the Ministry

of Interior, there are people who speak Iranian, and other locations,

too. Iranian intelligence—I don’t know what they call it—they are

the ones who are ruling the country. ^e Iranian infiltration into

Iraq is very strong.

So for the present government, preparing themselves for the new

coming election, they are just speaking with the Sunnis for the time

being, just wasting their time. And if this present government is

reelected again, you will see for yourself that Iranian influence and

Iranian power will increase more than it is now. Even the Sunnis

who are in the government now do not represent all the Sunnis.

So my advice to the Americans: they should know how to deal with

the Sunnis so they can gather maximum support from the Sunnis.

And I hope many matters can be changed, because Iraq has

sacrificed a lot, economically and in blood.

Look at Jordan. Jordan’s a respectable country.Two days ago, I came

from Egypt. It’s a nice country. Why in Iraq, up to this moment, is

there no development? We have no roads. People are talking about

security, security, security. Why? It’s been six years since Iraq was

invaded. ^ere’s no electricity, no clean drinking water, and to my

knowledge, Iraq is the richest country in the world. We have gas,

oil, agriculture, and professional people with great minds.We know

the answer.^e answer is the people who are responsible for ruling

the country are not Iraqis. We were wishing, with the oil prices

going up so high, we were expecting some construction and

infrastructure stuff to start to erupt. Billions of dollars have been

spent from the American treasury and the Iraqi treasury. ^e

money they spent could develop two countries, not one. Where is

the development? Where is it? Nothing. You don’t see anything.

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Interview 10
Governor Mamoun Sami Rashid

al-Alwani

Governor

al-Anbar Province

Governor Mamoun Sami Rashid al-Alwani is a member of the

Iraqi Islamic Party. Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, he worked as

an engineer in the housing and construction industry. In 2004, he

ran for political office and was elected to the Anbar provincial

council, which chose him as its chairman at the beginning of 2005.

In June 2005, the provincial council selected him to serve as

governor of the province.

In accepting the position, he would have been acutely aware

that his predecessor, Governor Raja Nawaf Farhan Mahalawi, was

kidnapped and killed. Also, he would have known that Governor

Abdul Karim Burghis al-Rawi had resigned in 2004 after his sons

were kidnapped and his house set ablaze.

Governor Mamoun was protected by Marines and his own

personal security detail. Nevertheless, he was the target of 45

assassination attempts during his term as governor, and his 12-yearold son was kidnapped in September 2005. Governor Mamoun

took an advance on his salary, paid a $6,000 ransom, and his son

was returned the next day. He continued to work.

On 1 September 2008, he had the satisfaction of representing

al-Anbar in the Provincial Iraqi Control ceremony, which

transferred security responsibilities in al-Anbar province from

American to Iraqi control.

Governor Mamoun was interviewed by Colonel Gary W.

Montgomery, Lieutenant Colonel Bradley E. Weisz, and Chief

Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams on 16 February 2009 at

the Provincial Government Center in Ramadi.

Governor Mamoun Sami Rashid al-Alwani: ^e problem with

Anbar is that it’s a tribal-oriented society. ^e tribes are a bunch

151
of groups that are attached to one entity, and these tribes are

spread throughout the districts here in Anbar, which is made up

of eight districts.

After the fall of the [Saddam Hussein] regime, there was a big

vacuum government-wise.^e province did not get into a struggle

and did not play a role in the fall of the regime.^e Coalition forces

and the government that was in place here kept the government

working normally, so to speak. ^e tribal leaders were very careful

to ensure that they kept the province secure and stable and

protected the people. ^e quiet period lasted until April 2004,

maybe even until the end of 2004.

At that time, an ideology developed that went against the security

of the province. ^at ideology included religious extremism,

sectarianism, which was just being established.^ere were military

operations, starting in Fallujah. In 2004, there were great battles

that caused the destruction of the city and caused many people to

leave the city. ^ere were also, at the same time, people who were

trying to establish security and establish the rule of law, to establish

a mayor, a council, specifically in Fallujah.

Unfortunately—because we did not have conscientious people, and

because of speeches given by imams that misled the people—they

created an internal struggle. ^at caused attacks against the

Coalition forces, and of course they started challenging the legal

system. It required a lot of sacrifices from many, many people, but

in the end, the biggest loss was the city itself. Terrorism found a

door by taking advantage of uneducated people and implanting

extremist religious ideology, supported by money.

^ere was also administrative or governmental breakdown. One of

the biggest breakdowns was the open borders that we had with

other countries, which gave access to people to come into Iraq.

Many foreigners spread out in the province. We felt, as soon as that

happened, that these people were not actually resisting the presence

of the Americans inside the country, but they came to politicize

their own agendas on the people. Many people were drawn into

their ideology, and we felt it tangibly.

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At the same time, the Coalition forces that were here did not know

the makeup of the society and the people in this province, so they

dealt with the people in a harsh way. ^ose two reasons—not

having people that are conscientious about what was taking place

here during the fall of the regime and not having the Coalition

forces understand the society and the culture and the makeup of

the tribes here—led to failures and disorganization. We did not

expect that from a modern country such as the United States,

where we are used to hearing about dialogue, human rights,

freedom, and democracy. So the behavior of the Coalition forces

and the mistakes that they committed accumulated. It fell right

into the hands of the insurgents, and they took advantage of it.

Actually, the presence of some wise leaders and generals and

representatives from the embassy, and when the troops abandoned

their previous cruel behaviors, created new groups, which wanted

to cooperate with Americans.

Interpreter: What behaviors?

Mamoun: Before, there were cruel actions that created negative

reactions. When new generals and ambassadors, especially in 2005

and 2006—big generals like General [ James L.] Williams and Mr.

Smith from the embassy—were assigned, this created a

transformation in relations with the Americans.

^ese actions created sympathy—

Interpreter: Sympathy?

Mamoun: Resistance. Resistance against the Americans, especially

late in 2004.^e beginning of 2004 was quiet, but when the attacks

started in Fallujah in the middle of 2004, it created a totally new

direction. But this changed in 2005 because we and the generals

could—

Interpreter: Stop it?

Mamoun: More than that—we could win the support of the

sheikhs. Although it was slow, this compelled the generals and

sheikhs to reach this consensus.

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Iraqi Perspectives
^ere are three main elements in Anbar.^e first element is the local

government. It was a civilian government and basically had no power

because nobody was actually coming forward and volunteering for

the police and the army. ^e second element is the presence of the

tribes, which did not want to work hand in hand with the

government. One part of the tribes was working with the insurgents,

and the other one wanted to be neutral. And the third element that

played a role here is the Marines and the American Army.

I wanted to start a dialogue to bring everybody together—the three

elements: the tribes, the local government, and the Coalition forces.

^e first people I was able to win over were the Coalition side. So I

and the Americans were looking for the third missing element,

which was the tribes. As I said, we were trying to hold conferences—

meeting after meeting—in order to win over that third side, to be

one hand, so to speak, one side, to try to face the insurgency.

But unfortunately, we were too slow to gather the support of the

tribes, the third element, and meanwhile the insurgency events

were rising so rapidly that it was hard for us to control. As soon as

things got calm in Fallujah, things started getting worse in alQaim. Tribes started fighting. ^ey wanted peace and stability in

the country, and there were great battles taking place. ^ere were

some tribes that stood and fought for the whole country, and there

were tribes that helped out the insurgents. Because of that struggle,

and because of the open borders, the struggle continued until the

situation calmed down in al-Qaim and then started rolling over to

Haditha and Rawah. Some people were on the side of the law, the

government, the Coalition forces, and some people were working

for the insurgency, and the situation stabilized in Haditha. ^e

same thing happened in Hit, and then it ended, too.

To be truthful, and to be fair to Hit, historically it was ahead of

other districts, because there is a specific tribe whose name is Albu

Nimr, together with many of the good people of Hit, who fought

the insurgency and tried to stabilize their own city themselves.^e

same thing happened in Baghdadi.

After the insurgency left Fallujah, Hit, Baghdadi, and al-Qaim, the

battle moved into Ramadi. At the time, new replacements took

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over. General [David G.] Reist was present at the time. We were

looking for that same accord between the three elements: the local

government, the tribes, and the Coalition forces. ^ankfully, there

was a tribe that specifically played a role in this great changeover.

In the meantime, there was already peace in Fallujah, al-Qaim, and

Haditha. We would sit, General Reist and I, to see how we could

win those tribes.

In August 2006, Sheikh Khalid Araq was assassinated. He was one

of the Albu Allehi tribal leaders. His body was thrown in the street

for three days. He was beheaded, God rest his soul. ^at incident

drove the people to vengeance for this person against the insurgents

and the terrorists.

I sat down with General Reist, and I recommended the following:

since there is a big tribal drive, let’s establish police stations inside

the tribes that were harmed.^e idea succeeded. Four or five tribes

were chosen, and many of the sons of the tribes volunteered for

those specific police stations. My tribe, Albu Alwan, also

established a police station inside Ramadi, and the rest were

outside.^ey were south and north of the river. All we asked from

them is to get rid of the insurgents—of the bad elements—from

their own tribes. Some of the tribes took it upon themselves to do

that, to take out all the bad elements within their tribes.

^ey announced the formation of the Awakening movement on

September 14, 2006. ^e person who took over that conference

was Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, because he was a brave man, God

rest his soul. He didn’t want the insurgency and the terrorists to

touch his own people. Sheikh Sattar’s father and three of his

brothers were killed just before the Awakening started. I mentioned

before that the most injured tribes started the uprising, and his

tribe was among the most injured by the insurgents. From there

started the Awakening, so we are clear when the Awakening

started. It started on that date in Ramadi, and the rest of the

province was quiet and peaceful, thank God.

When the other tribes saw the great victories, these are the forces

that stood up to the insurgency. It was having the local government,

the tribes, and the Coalition forces. ^e tribes started recruiting

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Iraqi Perspectives
their own people into the police force.^at encouraged other tribes

to follow in their footsteps, because it sparked the other tribes to

do the same thing. And, truthfully, that was the spotlight in

Ramadi at that time.

If we discuss generally how the province of Anbar became stable,

and we start from eastern Anbar—starting from Fallujah—you will

see that two tribes, Albu Issa and Albu Alwan, started to stabilize

their own areas, and some of the allied tribes that worked in the

Amariyah area in Fallujah, for example.^e credit goes to the Albu

Issa tribe, period. Albu Issa gets all the credit for having a stable

area in Fallujah.

Unfortunately, Karma started late in the stability of Fallujah for

one reason—a very important reason—because it’s open to the

borders of Baghdad and Samarra, so enemies come forth from two

sides. Sometimes our police, and even sometimes Coalition forces,

are helpless because their area of responsibility goes only so far. So

that was the second calm state after Ramadi. ^e people who

contributed to that were the following tribes: al-Jumali, alHallabsa, Albu Aefa. Albu Alwan also played a role in Karma, and

other areas included the Zoba, and some of the Tamim tribes, and

some of the other allied tribes with them.

I remember one of the historical stories that the Zoba tribe fought

against each other. Half of them fought for the insurgency, half of

them fought for the country. ^at’s the way it was in Fallujah.

Al-Hamda takes credit for stabilizing the third area—in

Saqlawiyah, in Fallujah—and together with some of the allied

tribes with them. ^ese are the tribes I mentioned that played a

role in stabilizing the Khalidiyah area and the Habbaniyah area,

coming toward Ramadi.

Same thing in Ramadi, there was the Albu Alwan tribe, together

with Albu Assaf, Albu Soda, and Albu Jaber. One of the first tribes

to stabilize the area of Sufiyah and Ramadi was the Albu Soda

tribe. Albu Mahal, Albu Ranem, and Albu Fayed also allied with

that tribe in order to conquer the insurgency.

And the same situation applies to Hit. At the forefront was the Albu

Nimr tribe, as I mentioned earlier. In Baghdadi, it was the Albu

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Al-Anbar Awakening
Abed tribe. In Haditha, it was the Jahaifa tribe. It was allied to the

Mola tribe. It rolled over into Ana, Rawah.^ey also tried to stop the

insurgency, going all the way to Rutbah. ^e same thing applies to

al-Qaim, which was stabilized by Albu Mahal and its allies.

If you notice, the places where the three powers united stabilized

first. ^at’s how our story goes.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: What role did Coalition forces play

in the Awakening?

Mamoun: ^ey were supporting first the local government,

whether it was the governor or provincial council. In addition, they

were supporting us and starting dialogue with the tribes. So they

will start the dialogue with the tribes in order to work together to

stop the insurgency, together with the local government. Because

the military force was in the hands of the Americans, that

reinforced the position of the governor, helped the legislation and

execution of the laws or orders issued from the provincial council.

^ey were recruiting and establishing the police.^ey trained those

people. ^ey equipped them with weapons, vehicles, and fuel.

Sometimes, the military relied on the Coalition forces to feed them.

^ey played the main role. I always called them the main referee,

who refereed the whole game.

In the end, the mind, the dialogue, and the logic won over, and we

were able to establish a government.We were able to establish local

police throughout. Most of the government offices started

operating again. Fortunately, the picture turned from black to

white. ^at was finalized during the Provincial Iraqi Control

ceremony, when authority was transferred to the local government

of Anbar on September 1, 2008.

What I talked about previously was only the military side of the

story. Aside from that, there was a great amount of money spent on

reconstruction, reconstruction of simple things like removing litter

from the streets, building light posts on the streets, schools, and

medical units. ^ey bought furniture for the schools. ^ey bought

furniture also for the local government offices, gifts for many of

the local citizens.

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Iraqi Perspectives
^ere is one side I wanted to get involved in—the supervision of

the management of those funds and the way they were spent. I was

hoping that we would get involved with the expenditure that was

taking place, but unfortunately, it went against the rules and

regulations. ^ey were partners in allocating some of the projects,

but they did not partner with us during the execution and

supervision of the projects. Sometimes you try to get into all the

details, but unfortunately, you can’t get into all the details. ^is is

the story that we had with the Marines, and also together with the

Army that was present here. We kept very good relationships until

now, whether it’s the military side or the civilian side. What else

would you like to ask?

Montgomery: If I could back up a minute, you mentioned resistance

against al-Qaeda in Haditha, I think. It was around the time of

Fallujah, but I’m not sure if it was before or after the battles there.

Mamoun: Fallujah is where resistance started—the uprising against

the Americans.

Montgomery: Oh, against the Americans. Okay.

Mamoun: Of course resistance started against the Americans.^ere

is no country that doesn’t want to rise up against the people who

are occupying it, but there are different kinds of resistance. We

actually made agreements with the Americans, that they would

come into our city without even fighting. We spent eight months

together with the Coalition forces without any incidents. When

the resistance started against the Americans, it took another path.

We wanted to work with the Americans, to start a dialogue based

on logic and understanding.

Part of the Americans, unfortunately, made mistakes, and some of

the resistance that was facing the Americans, they were looking at

it as if there was no way but to use a weapon against the

Americans—the only way to talk to them. Unfortunately, this

manner was not taking the interest of the province into mind. For

example, I was trying to build a dialogue, in order to rebuild my

institutions here in the province; but instead, I was faced with

people—my own people—fighting against me. ^ere were

numerous—45—assassination attempts, VBIEDs [vehicle-borne

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Al-Anbar Awakening
improvised explosive device] and so forth, against my life. Of

course, when your only solution is fighting in order to win over

your province, you have to, at the same time, think of the blood

that you’re going to give in return when you’re fighting the

Coalition. When I decided to go into the provincial council, I also

wanted to start a dialogue and a relationship with the Coalition

forces, and I succeeded because that’s what I wanted. I wanted to

establish a relationship through dialogue.

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams: I understand this

compound, this building, was under attack by al-Qaeda in 2005

and 2006?

Mamoun: No, it wasn’t under the control or the siege of al-Qaeda.

^is building here, nobody entered it whatsoever. Ever since I was

here, nobody entered this compound, for two reasons. First, because

there was a Marine force present here, in addition to my personal

security detail, and I never left this desk or office whatsoever. I was hit

three times [pointing to various places in his office], from here, from

there, and from there. When that happened, I moved to the second

room, but we used to get hit with mortar shells. I was also targeted on

the way from my home to the provincial government center; and,

when I was leaving the compound, I would also be targeted.

May 2nd, I think, 2007, when I was coming over, they blew up a

VBIED, trying to target me right on Michigan Avenue [Main

Supply Route Michigan] in front of the judicial center.^ankfully,

I got out of the incident alive, so the Americans asked me,“Where

do you want to go?” I told them I’m going to come here to the

provincial government center. I just wanted to challenge al-Qaeda.

I stayed here for two to three hours, and then I left and went back

home. And the second day, I went back to work.

I don’t want to mention the rest of the attacks, the regular attacks:

PKC [machine gun], mortar shells on my home, blowing up my

home, and so forth. I was hit with two VBIEDs. First, I lost some

of my personal security detail. ^e second attack—and of course

some of the houses were demolished. ^e second hit, two of my

nephews were killed, not to mention some of my cousins who were

beheaded, their heads thrown in the streets.^ey were 16 years old.

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Iraqi Perspectives
^ankfully, because I was trying to take the right path, I was trying

to build a good relationship with the Coalition forces, and thanks,

as you can see, to all my friends here [referring to photographs on

the wall].We were visited by President [George W.] Bush. I visited

him back in 2007 in the White House. I visited him again in 2008.

And President [Barak H.] Obama came here to visit me, and we

were visited many times by Ambassador [Ryan C.] Crocker. I

visited Mr. [Robert M.] Gates in his own office in 2008. General

[David H.] Petraeus [USA].^at picture is in my office.^is is his

present to me. ^e relationships are good, thank God.

^is is a very dear general to me, General [ John R.] Allen. General

[John F.] Kelly, who just left a few days ago. General Reist, General

[Martin] Post, [Ambassador John D.] Negroponte. . . . ^ese are

friends.

Lieutenant Colonel Bradley E. Weisz: What type of actions did

General Reist take that caused him to develop such a strong

relationship?

Mamoun: It was a friendly relationship.^e relationship that I led

with the generals resulted in the great accomplishments that we

made. For example, in 2005, we had General Williams. . . .We used

to meet together with the tribes, numerous times, but the fruit of

those meetings, the fruit of the labor, was gathered by General

Reist. After him, we also started building more, planting. By the

way, General Allen is now General [David H.] Petraeus’s second,

I think, his deputy. He came after General Reist, and we also

reaped many of the fruits that he sowed. After him, General Post

and General Kelly came.

As I know right now, and you know the area of Anbar is not small—

there are organizations I don’t want to leave out; for example, the

United States Agency for International Development, International

Relief and Development, and the Research Triangle Institute.^ey

all played a big role in activating the province, whether it was with

men or with women. In general, those organizations promoted

projects, but there were some elements, some contractors, that did

not execute their duties as they should have.

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McWilliams: What is your outlook for al-Anbar?

Mamoun: First of all, it’s the main security artery of Iraq. Second,

it put an end to al-Qaeda in Iraq. Of course, al-Qaeda raises the

Sunni flag.^ey’re mostly Sunnis, and they were beaten by Sunnis.

Anbar also proved that terrorism is a crime. If you ask anybody on

the streets, “^ose al-Qaeda terrorists, what are they?” ^ey will

answer you back that they’re terrorists, they’re criminals. We also

defeated them politically, not just ideologically, but politically we

defeated them—al-Qaeda—and religiously, because we proved to

the people that they do not have religion. And it was the only

province that liberated itself by itself, but with the help of our

friends, the Coalition.

Our friends in other provinces—why didn’t they free themselves?

^e Coalition forces helped to also free some of the other

provinces.^e province of Anbar helped liberate some of the—the

army and the police—helped liberate some of the other provinces:

Baghdad, Basrah, Maysan, Diyala, and Mosul. What do you

expect? ^is is Anbar.

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Iraqi Perspectives
Interview 11
163

Mr. Kamis Ahmad Abban al-Alwani

Vice Chairman

Anbar Provincial Council

Mr. Kamis Ahmad Abban al-Alwani has a degree in management.

He served in the old Iraqi army for nine years during the Iran-Iraq

war and the Gulf War. He was elected to the al-Anbar Provincial

Council in 2004 and has served two terms. He was interviewed by

Colonel Gary W Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy

S. McWilliams on 16 February 2009 at the Provincial Government

Center in Ramadi.

Mr. Kamis Ahmad Abban al-Alwani: After the invasion of Iraq,

Anbar had something special. Some sheikhs and some educated

people at high levels in the province wanted to negotiate with the

Coalition forces. ^ere was a conference near al-Rutbah city. ^e

deal was that the Coalition forces would not go inside the city (as

a military, to be specific). It was very quiet, and there was a very

good relationship between the Coalition forces, and sheikhs, and

some of the educated people.

^en we started to build our institutions. One of them was the

provincial council. From 2003 until 2004, they gathered the

sheikhs, and they formed a city council in each area, and they had

certificates from the Coalition forces about this issue. ^e year

2004 was very good stability-wise, and we held free elections for

the provincial councils. ^e civilian from the Coalition forces was

Mr. Keane,* who was responsible for doing this.

After that, the Coalition forces started going inside the cities, and

they settled down in the government center. I don’t mean the whole

military of the Coalition forces, but the civilian side of the

Coalition forces. ^ey had posts for the military people in the

palaces and in camps outside the city.

* Possibility Gen John M. Keane, USA (ret).
^e first elected provincial council was established in 2004. People

were elected according to their skills, meaning different social

categories were represented, like engineers, doctors, educators, tribal

sheikhs, etc. It had 49 members: 10 sheikhs, and the others. Some

social categories had two representatives, and others had one

representative.

First, they elected Amar Abdul Jabbar Sulayman the provincial

council chairman. ^e deputy was Mr. Mamoun [Sami Rashid alAlwani], who is now the governor. After that, we elected a governor.

^e former governor was Raja Nawaf [Farhan al-Mahalawi], an

engineer. He was a general director. Also, he was a provincial

council member and one of the al-Qaim sheikhs. He was a cousin

of Sheikh Sabah al-Sattam in al-Qaim. We saw he was qualified to

be governor, but after he went to his house and came back, he was

confronted by terrorists, and they kidnapped him and his son. His

son was released by the terrorists. ^ere are two stories about him.

Some said there was random shooting on the house where he was

being held, and he was killed.^e other story says he was killed by

the terrorists.

So there was a gap. ^ere was no governor. So we decided to elect

someone else, and we chose another engineer. We chose Mamoun

Sami Rashid, who is the governor now, as the Anbar governor.^is

was between 2004 and 2005. We kept going, and there was an

election for another council in 2005. We established a new

provincial council, but there were very few candidates. So about

three lists won at that time. ^ere was the [Iraqi] Islamic Party;

the Reconciliation and Liberation Party, which is led by Sheikh

Mish’an al-Juburi; and another, smaller party, under the name of

Falah al-Naqib. He was the former minister of interior.

Before Raja, the governor who was killed, there was a guy called

Fasal [Raikan Majris al-Gaoud], when Ayad Allawi was the prime

minister. He came to office by force. After them, Mamoun took over.

Until this time, the situation was good. After the 2005 election,

especially after the election, the situation got worse, for many

reasons. First is the location of al-Anbar Province. It borders with

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five other provinces in Iraq and has international borders with

Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. With the provinces inside Iraq—

Mosul, Salah ad-Din, Baghdad, Babil, and Karbala—these borders

are open. ^e terrorist element started to be active in these areas,

and they found people to accommodate them, especially in the

countryside around outside the cities.

^en the situation started to get worse and worse. First they killed

a former provincial council member named Khadher, and then they

killed another provincial council member. ^ey killed city council

members of Fallujah and its provincial council members. ^ey

assassinated many people in the cities and districts, so these places

were controlled by al-Qaeda. ^ey started kidnapping and raping

and stealing.

At that time, the police were very weak in al-Anbar, because the

Coalition forces weren’t satisfied with their qualifications or work.

So the Coalition forces wouldn’t give us good heavy weapons to

fight the terrorists because they didn’t trust the police not to sell or

pass these weapons to the terrorists. ^e police saw that the

terrorists had better weapons, and they couldn’t even protect

themselves. At the same time, the Coalition Forces wouldn’t supply

them with weapons for fear that they would sell or give them to the

terrorists. ^e situation stayed like that, and the terrorists gained

control of some of the main offices. ^e police broke up—

dissolved—and the Coalition forces went inside the city and

pushed away the police. Only some people were given salaries, and

we do not know why. Maybe they were working at the south

palaces or the north palaces for the Coalition forces.

After that, we were forced to bring in a director of police. His name

was Chaaban. Chaaban started to work in the province. He’s a

resident of Fallujah, but he couldn’t give us anything because there

were no people volunteering to be policemen because the terrorists

would kill them.^ey were pushing back. No one would volunteer

for the police, or the army, or any security organization, because of

the terrorists. So this is a major point, which made the province

unstable, that people couldn’t volunteer for these organizations for

fear the terrorists would kill them.

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^e Iraqi police or Iraqi army that were present in the province were

from outside the province, not sons of al-Anbar, and they were just

on the major checkpoints. ^ey were named the national guard.

At that time, we were looking to find men for the police, the army,

and the government. We contacted many high-level people in

Baghdad on this subject, and there were many suggestions that we

put forward. One of these suggestions was to put 10 guards for

each provincial council member, and between 20 and 50 for the

sheikhs, to protect them. Our idea was that you are planting seeds,

building policemen, so the sheikhs and these people will stay inside

the country, and they can move and start to think about growing or

building. ^is didn’t happen.

We started with our personal connections to people in Baghdad.

We started to build a council, called the rescue council. We visited

Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the former prime minister. He issued some

money for reconstruction, but the situation was very bad. Al-Anbar

Province was considered a hot spot. ^ey started killing many

people, starting with the tribal sheikhs.^ey killed Sheikh Nasser.

^ey killed some sheikhs from the Albu Risha tribe. Some

others—I can’t remember their names—they were killed because

they had no weapons to protect themselves. So, because the

Coalition forces—and we don’t know; we call them Coalition

forces whether they are Marines or Army—they were checking the

houses, and they wouldn’t let people have private weapons. ^ey

couldn’t have weapons to save themselves, so they started killing

all the sheikhs.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: What year are you talking about?

What time period?

Kamis: It’s between the end of 2005, beginning of 2006.^ere was

a military tone, and the only ones who were controlling the area

were Americans. ^e terrorists were very strong, and they were

marching in the streets. It felt like they were controlling everything.

Life just stopped, except for some departments like Health and

Education. ^ey kept working.

We were moving—me, as the provincial council deputy, or

Mamoun, as governor—we moved with the convoys of Americans.

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Iraqi Perspectives

We stayed in this situation more than six months. In that time,

they killed the deputy governor. ^ey killed the private secretary

for the governor. ^ey threatened all the other government

organizations not to work.^ey controlled the banks, and they stole

some of the employees’ salaries. ^ey robbed the Rafidain Bank

and al-Rasheed Bank. ^e situation got very bad. We had a very

difficult time.

After that, I think some of the people from the Awakening started

forming groups. ^ey had weapons, I think with the agreement of

the Coalition forces. ^ey liberated areas district by district. ^ey

started with the Jazeera area. ^ey liberated suburb by suburb.

People hated the names of the terrorists, because the terrorists were

getting anyone. ^ey had many excuses. ^ey liked to kill. One of

the excuses: “Maybe he belonged to the Islamic Party.” “^is one

did contract work with the Americans.”“^is guy is an interpreter

working for the Americans.” Many excuses. “He works for the

Americans.” “^is guy gives information to the Americans.” So

many excuses. ^ey were false excuses, just to make the people

believe in them. When they killed someone, they said, as an excuse,

that he was a spy, but they were from the honest resistance.

At first there was a movement called “resistance.”Some people were

convinced that even President [George W.] Bush said, “If anybody

invades my country, I will resist him.”So some chose to take up arms

like the military. Some worked as terrorists. Some just wanted to

demolish and terrorize, and some did political work. Also, agendas

came into Iraq from abroad. All this came into al-Anbar Province.

Since we don’t have communications like TV, radio, electricity, and

mail, or anything, you cannot tell people what is right and what is

wrong, even simple things.^ere is no electricity, so there is no TV,

no speakers. You cannot start anything. I think there are many

things you can build up and make people believe through the

media. But we didn’t have a chance to explain to the people through

the media what was right or wrong, except some sky channels* that

are on the air. We didn’t have power to put it on TV.

* Possibly satellite channels.
^e first time they started killing the terrorists was in the al-Qaim

area, in the Albu Mahal and Karabla tribes.^ese tribes resisted and

killed the terrorists in that area only. ^ey had support from the

national guard and the army over there. So they started killing

terrorists in al-Qaim, before the al-Anbar Awakening; also in the

Kubaysah and Amariyah area, and also Khalidiyah. ^ese areas

started before the Anbar Awakening. But at that time, they couldn’t

use the media to declare themselves.^e thing that was in the media

was the Anbar Awakening, so it was distributed to what you see now.

I think the most important point is the Awakening—the first point

to start awakening, the area where they could move—was the

Jazeera area, and the support and help of the Coalition forces.

And the other point, which is a major one, is that the people didn’t

believe the terrorists anymore. ^is caused a reaction from the

people. No one would accommodate them. Also, the people started

to own weapons, so they defended themselves, and the situation

continued until what we’ve got now.

After that, some of the Awakening council got into the provincial

council, so there was coordination between them and us to build a

good future for al-Anbar. We work together now, as a provincial

council.

We have some problems, like the police, unemployment. Some

unwanted elements got inside the police. Now the police are

infiltrated. Some of them receive many salaries. Now we have

unstable safety because many things interfere in the police. I think

we need to empower and evaluate many elements in the police. We

want to train and develop the police because we on the Anbar side,

we want to achieve stability through construction and investment.

Some people, when they speak in the media, they send a message

to people outside that al-Anbar is unstable. We want to have a

partnership with the U.S. government, and the countries that are in

the Coalition with them, to build investments and shared

organizations. ^is is one of our goals in the provincial council.

^ere were many excuses for the terrorists. ^ey thought that the

American forces were invasion forces. ^ey didn’t bring them

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electricity, or reconstruction, or anything good.^at was the message

that was being delivered to the poor people. Also, many of the

government offices stopped working, and many people lost their

salaries. ^ere were many people who had no chance for work, so

the terrorists used them, gave them some money to work for them.

^ere were many mistakes. We—the Americans and we—suffered

for these mistakes. Many sacrifices were made by the Coalition

forces; many sacrifices were made from al-Anbar Province

especially. ^e random arrests on false information. ^ere were

30,000 arrested just from al-Anbar Province, and this figure is from

the Red Cross. Many mistakes happened in that time. ^ey made

terrorists sprout up because, as I said, the excuses were already there.

When some of the family has been killed, like a husband or a son

or a brother, and the other person was arrested, and a third guy is

unemployed, this is one of the things that makes terrorists grow.

^at’s all I have. Do you have any questions?

Unknown: Did you see any difference between the Marine Corps

forces in Ramadi and the U.S. Army forces in Ramadi? Was there

any difference or distinguishing factors?

Kamis: At first, we couldn’t distinguish. Anyone wearing a uniform

was U.S. Army. All of them were U.S. Army. Later, we knew that

this was a Marine uniform, and that was an Army uniform. We

learned the difference. Most of people don’t know how to recognize

between the uniforms, except for those of us who work closely with

them. At the end, we knew it. And this time the Army was coming,

and they were very well behaved. Some of the units of the Marines

were not good. At some specific time, some of them were not good,

and you know they always change. Some here called them the

“dirty division.”

Interpreter: He said, are there any names under this one, “dirty

division?” Is there something the Marines call the “dirty division?”

Unknown: “Dirty division?” No, you have 1st Marine Division, 2d

Marine Division, 3d Marine Division.

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Kamis: Maybe the terrorists called them that name. Or some of

the works they did, the people called them by this name, because

some of the units in other areas were very good. And it depends on

the time, because sometimes they changed.

Montgomery: In this “dirty division,” if you give us a location and

time, then we can go back and look it up.

Kamis: I think in 2006—at the end of 2005, beginning of 2006. I

heard it from people. . . . Maybe it’s a small unit. You know, maybe

it’s a brigade or a company, but in Iraq, in the Islamic language, we

call it “division.” We make it something bigger, but it’s maybe a

small unit doing some jobs during that hard time, and they called

them the “dirty division.” Maybe they were just a company.

Montgomery: All of the battalions and some of the brigades have

nicknames for themselves.

Kamis: We don’t know, but the people were talking because maybe

this company did something not good, and they started saying,“all

the division is that.”^is is for history, as you say it.

I want to say something for history. Some of the units were very

good. Some of the, particularly the officers who were working here,

and especially those whose location was inside the cities. And the

other point is the commander of the patrol. It depends on how

personal he is. Also, the interpreter, sometimes he makes mistakes.

Some interpreters, sometimes they harm U.S. forces. ^at’s what

we saw in our province. Most of the time, the interpreter changed

the facts. ^is affects even the American side. Sometimes I say

something, and the interpreter says it differently or from his point

of view. It makes problems at a time we are hoping, and we need,

to live together. We need to hear you and you need to hear us, but

the only way between us is the interpreter. So if the interpreter was

faithful, our point of view was delivered well. Sometimes, maybe he

means to intentionally change the facts; sometimes maybe he

doesn’t have the qualifications or the ability to transfer the idea.

At that time, many of the Coalition forces came with

reconstruction teams and gave contracts and projects and did good

things. So they were giving contracts only to some limited number

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of people. Other people considered them as traitors. ^ey gave

contracts to some chosen people. Maybe they trusted them, or these

were the only people that believed in them, or they had dealings

with them, but they just chose people and gave them contracts

when they started reconstruction.

Montgomery: ^ey weren’t put up for competitive bid? ^ey’d just

hand it out?

Kamis: No, there was no competitive bid.^ey just gave it directly

to people. So people started to hate these people, the Coalition

forces and the guy who took the contract. So to give people

evidence that we had a good relationship and we were working for

the city or the province, we asked the Coalition forces to help us get

back power—to buy generators for the hospitals, for immediate

services—but they didn’t cooperate at that time by siding with us

so we could make the people believe in us. For example, the way we

sit, like we sit now, otherwise it’s a military side or a civilian side in

the Coalition forces.

Sometimes, they had some general request that was fair: when you

are raiding a house in the middle of the night, if you want someone,

you can get Iraqi policemen or somebody, and they can get the guy

for you. And then after you investigate him, if you don’t find

anything, release him after two or three days.

But the raids in the middle of the night, making noise and scaring

people, broken doors, forcing your way into houses, the snipers on

the buildings around the area, sometimes random shooting—when

people sometimes put an IED [improvised explosive device] for a

convoy and a Hummer blew out, they started shooting randomly

around everywhere and shooting anyone on the road.

I think they didn’t plan how to stay in Iraq. ^ey were planning to

get inside Iraq, and they thought it was very difficult. But the reality

is that it’s very easy to get inside Iraq. When they had reasons for

invading Iraq, one of these reasons was that we had nuclear

weapons.^en destroy the dictator, and then distribute democracy.

So the terrorists used these reasons, which they thought were false, to

make the people not believe the Coalition Forces. People on the street

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were confused, except for some people who benefit from stealing

money from the central government or the government over here.

Montgomery: You just gave three reasons for the invasion of Iraq.

Did you know those things before the invasion? What did you

expect before the invasion?

Kamis: ^ey started the 2003 war. It started in the media first. So

the people start to believe, when the Americans come in, they will

free us and kill this dictator. And we knew before that the Coalition

frces had a good relationship with the neighbors around Iraq, like

their relationship with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries

around us. ^ey also thought the same way, when you came inside

Kuwait and reconstructed, the same way you were going to do it in

Iraq. People believed that’s what’s going to happen when the

Americans come in, but this didn’t happen. . . .

^e terrorists had reasons that convinced people. When people

don’t find work, there’s no income, he’s got no food, no health care,

no power, no water. For all these reasons, it’s going to make the

terrorists exist. Let’s talk about Europe, where they have a

demonstration over there of unemployment or a decrease in their

salaries. Iraqis didn’t have anything. So what can he do?

Montgomery: I understand that they were desperate, and so they

did whatever they had to do to get money. But do you think that

they trusted the terrorists or had confidence in them? Did they buy

into the program, so to speak, the philosophy?

Kamis: If we’re going to explain it, we will do it according to

different mentalities.^ere are simple people.^ey don’t have much

education. ^ey don’t think too much, and it depends on the

agenda that the person has, and depending on how much he’s going

to pay him—the money, the amount. Add to that the things that

these people are missing in their lives. He needs it. Second step,

they will trust the terrorist. ^at’s why you will see that Anbar

people are not all terrorists. A small percentage—the terrorists are

no more than 100 or 200 at best.

Montgomery: Would this be the criminal element, or these were

more of the fanatic types?

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Kamis: Until now. A few things. ^e leaders, we couldn’t capture

the leaders. Sometimes we couldn’t get anything out of people. We

arrest him. Maybe there are some people who said something about

him, but he doesn’t confess. Sometimes people use pills, and he’s

out of his senses, he doesn’t know what he’s saying. And it’s

different from area to area.

To answer this question, you have to study it and go inside it, and

think about it more, about the reasons. Like the militias in Baghdad

are totally different from the terrorists in Ramadi, but the goal is

one, which is killing, demolishing, and terrorizing. For example,

when Prime Minister [Nouri al-] Maliki visits Basrah in the south

of Iraq, the militias and the terrorists are on the same side against

the law. And some of them are just gangs of thieves. ^ey have no

religious beliefs; their only thoughts are just to kill and to steal.

Also, there are many people who were released from Abu Ghraib

prison who had criminal records. ^ey are criminals, originally

criminals.^ey had no means, so they were on the street.^is is one

part of terrorism.

Montgomery: You said they had a meeting and suggested, in

Baghdad, that each provincial council member have 10 guards.

Kamis: Yes.

Montgomery: Did you have any guards before that at all?

Kamis: No, they didn’t have any.

Montgomery: And so before that—so there was a time when there

were terrorists, and the Coalition forces would not let them have

weapons, and you were involved in government at that time. Is

that correct?

Interpreter: He was on the provincial council.

Montgomery: How did he stay alive?

Kamis: Well, it’s by the blessing of God. He wanted it this way.

^e last budget in al-Anbar, we have the projects in 2006. We were

forced to go into Baghdad and work on it for six months, so we

can finish the budget for the 2006, so they will take their work and

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start working over there. Many people left to Syria, Jordan, the

north of Iraq. ^at’s what happened.

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams: Sir, in 2004,

Fallujah was the site of two key battles here. How did that affect

this area?

Kamis: At that time, I was a provincial council member. ^e

governor, now Mamoun, was the provincial council deputy

chairman. ^e reason of the battles was to finish the terrorists in

Fallujah. So the first battle of Fallujah, as they called it, after three

days of battle, some people representing the embassy came, and we

went to Fallujah. A big delegation from the imams and sheikhs

went to Fallujah, also me and some of the local government. We

met some of the imams and sheikhs over there in mosque al-Khafel,

where they gave first aid.^e negotiators for the government of Iraq

in Baghdad was a guy called Hacham al-Hosseni, and the president

of Iraq, Ghazi al-Yawar, was present. So that delegation came from

Baghdad to meet some people in Fallujah, and we met them as the

al-Anbar government in Fallujah, but the meeting was just for

certain persons. It was not public. ^e deal was for a cease-fire in

Fallujah. After a few days, they stopped firing.

McWilliams: After the second battle, did the second battle affect

Ramadi and al-Anbar?

Kamis: Of course. It’s a part of al-Anbar Province.^e link between

us to go to Baghdad is Fallujah.We have to pass through it. So when

Fallujah was finished, we couldn’t go in and out to Baghdad. So most

of the patients, people were taking them into Salah ad Din, north

of—it was best for them. If they could, they took them to Syria

because it was safer and better than going to Baghdad. ^e militias

were in Baghdad. ^ey were killing by identification card and by

name. ^e name is Sunni or Shi’a—they followed the name.

McWilliams: You mentioned a delegation that went out to meet

Coalition forces. When was that, and were you actually part of that

delegation?

Kamis: No, I wasn’t part of them. ^ere was Sheikh Amer, Sheikh

Albu Chillet, one of the Abu Risha, some of them, I don’t know them.

You can ask Sheikh Amer about it, he can give you the right names.

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Iraqi Perspectives


Interview 12
Major General Tariq Yusif Mohammad

al-Thiyabi

Provincial Director of Police

Al-Anbar Province

Major General Tariq Yusif Mohammad al-^iyabi was born in

Ramadi in 1964. He graduated from the police college and worked

on the borders of Iraq in the 1980s and into the 1990s. During the

war with Iran, he worked with the Iraqi army, which guarded the

borders jointly with the border police. When the war ended, the

border police took over again. In 1992, General Tariq was courtmartialed in absentia and sentenced to death. (He stated that his

offense was helping Marsh Arab fishermen in southern Iraq, but he

did not go into the details.) He evaded arrest until the Ba’ath regime

fell 11 years later.

General Tariq was interviewed by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery

and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams on 17 February

2009 at the Provincial Government Center in Ramadi.

Major General Tariq Yusif Mohammad al->iyabi: Saddam

Hussein’s regime fell, and the Coalition forces entered Iraq. I came

back and worked the borders. We established—myself together

with the Marines—the borders along the Syrian and Jordanian

side. ^ings were going very well. ^ings were looking bright,

because it was a new country.^ere was no resistance, no terrorism,

none of that at all, all the way from 2003 to the beginning of 2004.

^en the operations in Fallujah started. ^e Americans started

getting attacked, and they called that resistance. Former Ba’ath

Party members were involved in that resistance, along with other

people, and sometimes they referred to them as mujahideen—

strugglers for a religious cause. ^at’s not our subject to explain

why the resistance started, why the uprising started, but you came

here to know about the history of the Awakening.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: I think how the insurgency

developed and the rise of al-Qaeda may give a little background

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for how the Awakening came about, but you can describe this in as

much or as little detail as you want to. It’s whatever you want to say,

however you want to do it.

Tariq: ^e people were making excuses as to why they were

attacking the Coalition forces. ^e entry of American forces into

Iraq scared some of the neighboring countries, specifically Syria and

Iran. As you know, Syria has a Ba’athist regime. So did Iraq. ^e

Ba’athist regime members from Syria used to roam the streets of

Iraq normally. ^ey used to call them the “Syrian mujahideen.”

Saddam Hussein personally received those Syrian mujahideen before

the American forces entered Iraq. ^is was a historical event for

Syria to get rid of those mujahideen and throw them onto the Iraqis.

Certainly wherever those people go, they will influence the place

that they enter, so they were more than happy to get rid of them.

Initially, the American forces were liberators. ^en they became

invaders, so to speak. When the terminology changed to invader or

occupier, it gave people an excuse to attack. When you classify

American forces as occupiers, psychologically it’s not acceptable.

Syria and Iran took advantage of that to back the resistance fighters

here in Iraq. ^e media also took advantage of the opportunity.

^e American force’s misunderstanding of Iraqi culture also

contributed to this. For example, the way they conducted searches

and raids created friction between them and the local people. Iraqis

have learned modern ways of searching people. In the beginning,

when an Iraqi was being searched, he looked upon it as an assault.

^e way the American forces searched a person, they stopped him,

made him turn around, raise his hands, and they searched his body.

^at sort of posture is insulting for Iraqis. It’s even insulting for

me to speak about it in front of people.*. . . ^at’s why friction

started, and other people who were against the American forces

took advantage of the opportunity and used it for themselves, such

as the media and the resistance forces.

* In an omitted portion of the interview, Gen Tariq explained that Western frisking techniques

had homosexual connotations for Iraqi males. ^e cultural differences were exacerbated by a

shortage of interpreters.
And so the problems arose in Fallujah for the first time, and then

the second time. ^at contributed to the disbanding of the police

force in al-Anbar. Criminals infiltrated the police force at that time,

also. Major General Ja’adan [Muhammad al-Alwani], when he sat

at this desk, he supported those organizations.^at’s why the police

failed and were disbanded. ^at’s why terrorist organizations

generally controlled society here in Anbar.

To exercise control even further, they started beheading and

slaughtering and killing people. For them, to kill a person with a

pistol is normal. But to slaughter someone, to behead someone in

front of other people—it’s a monstrous scene that is supposed to

terrorize people. ^ey used to slaughter people just like they

slaughter sheep. ^ey would take advantage of any opportunity to

kill people.

If we had an American convoy roll down the street, and one of the

people happened to wave to them, that person could consider

himself dead. Terrorist organizations started killing people just on

suspicion. ^ey did not need absolute proof—or any proof—in

order to kill a person. ^ey just acted on suspicion alone. ^is is

the way the ideology works: if we kill him, and he’s made a mistake,

then he deserved what he got; but if we kill him by mistake, then

God will forgive us for what we have done. ^ey act as if they are

sent from God—lawyers from God. ^at’s radical ideological

thinking.^at’s why they terrorized people with their ideology and

were able to control the province.

^ey started killing officers—high-level officers, tribal leaders,

former police officers. Any person that was part of establishing the

police again was killed. If they didn’t find a police officer, they killed

his relative—his father, or his brother, or his next of kin.^at’s why

they were able to control all the areas. It reached a level where they

were able to walk down the streets in the neighborhoods without

even being armed.

You’re going to ask me, “Who were those terrorist organizations?”

In mid-2004, 2005, all the way to the beginning of 2006, the emirs

were foreign Arabs. ^ey were Lebanese, Algerian, Saudi

Arabian—they were foreign Arabs. As far as why foreign Arabs

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were in charge instead of Iraqis, I’m not sure why. I think it was

because they wanted to bring financial means to support the

organization.^at’s why they didn’t use the lowlife people that they

used to work here.

^e prince could not be talked to or discussed. Nobody could talk

to the prince at all. No one in his organization was authorized to

look him in the eye. He was authorized to give a sentence over his

people, or over anyone else. Each emir was given control over a

certain area. For example, al-Jazeera had an emir. Ramadi, there

was an emir in charge of that area.

Every emir had a group of people working under his control. Every

group was independent of the other. ^ey did not know what was

happening in other areas where other emirs were operating. Inside,

the groups were subdivided into subgroups. ^ere were people

called security. ^ey were the strongest people within the group.

^ey were responsible for gathering information and executing

people.^ere were groups within the cells that were administration,

or management. ^ey prepared the place and took care of the

location. And there were people within the group that they called

“the eyes.”^eir function was just to bring information. Even these

subgroups working within the cell were working independently.

^ere was no connection between them. And each group within

that cell had a leader, and not all of them met the emir. ^e emir

had a wide span of authority. Nobody in the world had such a wide

span of authority as this emir.

Iraqis were working with them, of course. I can’t say whether the

Saudis and Yemenis working here were dirty, but I can tell you about

the Iraqi people, because I know them. ^e lowlife elements, the

criminals, the basest of the base, were the only ones working with

these terrorist organizations. ^is lowlife person hated all the legal

elements in society: the police, the [government] employees. He did

not respect them, because he lacked respect himself. Society did not

respect this person to begin with, because they were dirty, and they

were lowlifes. You can imagine those criminal, lowlife people rising

up and terrorizing people. Some of those people would slaughter

in the middle of the street. He would order as he wished. He would

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kill as he wished. He would go into any shop, as he wished. And so,

sure, he’s going to have blind authority over other people. ^at’s

why they started killing all the high-level people within society, the

tribal leaders, former officers, and so forth.

^e destruction in Anbar got to the state where in some areas you’d

think that a tsunami went through.^at’s how bad the destruction

was.^ey would fire against the Coalition forces, and the Coalition

forces would fire back, and—destruction.^e areas were destroyed.

Work completely stopped in the province. ^e life cycle basically

stopped here in Anbar.

^e teacher was killed right in front of his students, and the student

was killed in front of his friends. ^ey reached a level of

criminality—monstrosity. ^ey would behead a person, and they

would bring his head to his mother and say, “Here’s your son’s

head.”^ey overstepped all the red lines.^ere was a sense of revolt,

but because of fear, people could not revolt. It got to the point

where three or four or five people could not gather together and

talk against these so-called mujahideen, because you’re exposing

yourself to death if you do that.^ere were some people who were

aggressive, and they talked, but they were killed. ^ey were able to

control all the areas. Nobody could open his mouth.

On the Ramadi level, there were two areas they weren’t able to

control, though: the area where the deceased Sheikh Sattar Abu

Risha and his family lived, and the area where I used to live. In 2005,

I was in a confrontation with them. I was injured as a result. I was

able to kill two of them. ^ey killed several of my men in return. I

left my position as a border policeman and came back. I declared in

public that I was going to fight al-Qaeda. At the end of 2005,

beginning of 2006, I declared war on al-Qaeda. ^e only people

who were fighting al-Qaeda at the time were Sheikh Sattar Abu

Risha and me. I don’t mean myself alone, but the people in my area.

^en we started to reestablish the police. I tried to meet with one

of the American officers at the time, but it was really dangerous for

us to meet any of the Americans. You were basically putting your

life in danger.When we stopped the Americans and told them that

we wanted to establish the police again, they would laugh at us,

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Iraqi Perspectives
and they would say,“What are you talking about? Are you serious?

You must be dreaming.” ^e terrorists used to kill people on the

slightest suspicion that they worked with the police. If they couldn’t

kill him, they’d kill his father. So everyone that was associated with

the police ended up killed.

On the personal level, I was cooperative with the Americans from

2003 until now. But the relationship strengthened at the end of

2005, all the way to the beginning of the Awakening movement,

because we fought together even before the police was established.

We used to go on missions. We used to go out and fight. We did

not have much to fight with, but the Coalition forces did. So we

used to show the Coalition forces where the terrorists were hiding

so they could attack them and kill them.

^en the Americans were convinced that there was a need to

reestablish the police again at the beginning of 2006. We were able

to convince them all the way to the end of March 2006. I was one

of the people who was most insistent on reestablishing the police.

I was a colonel at the time. And so they asked me if it were possible

to get volunteers. We had guards working in our area. I was able to

gather 60 people. We took them directly to Camp Blue Diamond.

^ey put them in vehicles, rolled them up all the way to the airport,

and flew them to Amman, Jordan, for the academy.

I waited for two months for these recruits to come back again. I

went through many sleepless nights because when I sent those 60

men to Amman, Jordan, while only 13 people remained here with

me. My area consisted of a five-kilometer square stretch,

surrounded by al-Qaeda from all over. Sheikh Sattar’s area is right

after the river. Below him is Shamiyah, and above him is Jazeera.

We did not have that in-depth of an area to fight in. ^e mortar

shells were raining down on my area all the time. I had 13 men to

fight with, some number of rifles, and one PKC [machine gun]. I

started fighting with them, of course. We would raid them, and

they would raid us.

^en I started a media war, so to speak. I was able to get some radios

from the Ministry of Interior and get the message out with these

Motorolas. I could contact the Americans. I could contact air support

if I wanted to. I was using scare tactics, spreading the message.

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Sometimes I sent these 13 men away from my house to do patrols or

to go on missions. ^e only people that remained with me were my

two young sons. Now they’re a little taller, but back then they were

very small.^ey didn’t know how to use a weapon.^ey couldn’t even

carry a rifle. I was so tired; I hungered for just a half hour’s sleep. So

it got to the point where I would load my rifle with a bullet and have

it ready for my son to fire. And I would instruct him,“As soon as you

hear any strange noise, just fire the round.” And that would give me

a signal to wake up again. I was sleeping right beside him.

We were going through a tragic time, where your son would look

at you in strange ways and wonder whether we’re going to win this

fight or not. And you would have questions and concerns from your

wife, too, looking at you and saying, “Are you sure you’re up to this

challenge?”Keeping in mind all the mortar fire that was raining on

our area.

^e United States, as powerful as it is, couldn’t control al-Qaeda.

You wanted to control al-Qaeda? I think President [George W.]

Bush concurred with me. I think he declared that al-Qaeda was

out of control. He was almost declaring that Anbar was out of

control in 2005, if it wasn’t for the Awakening. At any rate, I stayed

as I was. I did not compromise at all. ^e 13 men used to be

employees, working with me previously on the borders.^ey know

my history. ^ey know the challenges that we faced. ^ey know

that I challenged Saddam Hussein for 11 years, being an escapee

from his regime. We are challenging al-Qaeda right now. ^ere

will come a day when al-Qaeda will come and bend and kneel right

in front of us.

One of the men used to criticize me. He said, “We’re only 13 men.

Counting yourself and your two sons, that’s 15 people. You think

al-Qaeda is going to come and kneel in front of 15 people?”

I said, “Just wait until those 60 men come back from Amman, and

you’ll see how al-Qaeda will kneel right in front of you.” Right

after that, the 60 men came back.

Waiting for those 60 men to come back—I might have gone

through that period too quickly and didn’t explain it in detail—but

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you can imagine yourself with 13 men, trying to defend yourself

with al-Qaeda all around you. It was a very difficult period we went

through.^is was a historical challenge for us, especially living right

among our families: our wives, our mothers, our children, our

families. So I said that was a historical challenge for us to make

against al-Qaeda. We were encouraged even by our children. Even

my mother said,“Well, you’ve taken this route.We’re with you until

the end.” My wife and my men’s wives, they all stood with us.

^en the 60 men came back, and we were able to open up the first

police station in Anbar—al-Jazeera Police Station. We opened alJazeera Police Station with 60 men and two vehicles. ^ere was a

Coalition team with them, and then the two vehicles became four

with the support of the Americans. ^ey patrolled the area, about

a kilometer or two kilometers around the station. Of course they

were targeted by mortar shells and fire.

I received information right after we opened that al-Qaeda was

really shaken by the news of a police station opening. ^is was

going to be either the end of our beginning or the end of their

beginning. ^ey hit that police station with a VBIED [vehicle

borne improvised explosive device] carrying, I think, a ton of

explosives with gasoline and so forth.We opened that police station

in May 2006. It was attacked the same month. I don’t remember

what date, but it was attacked the same month. Many policemen

were burned. ^e Coalition forces rescued as many people as they

could. Many of them were burned alive at the station. ^at was a

very big blow against us, because that was our only police station.

Fortunately, we had a couple of vehicles in the back of the police

station that were not damaged. We were able to turn them on and

use them again. I asked Colonel Adnan, the police station chief at

the time—even with the damage the vehicles had: the windows

were broken, but the lights still worked—and I asked the colonel

if we could still go and patrol the area, a kilometer or two

kilometers around. He agreed, and we went and patrolled. Keep in

mind there were injured. Some of them were partially burned.^ey

were greatly shaken by the attack, but they were still defiant. We

went and patrolled the area.

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Montgomery:^is was the same day of the attack, right? ^ey went

right out and patrolled?

Tariq: ^at was about an hour after the attack. We went out to

patrol, knowing that there were bodies that were basically coal

black. We couldn’t even identify them. So I told my men to leave

them aside. We needed to go out in patrol vehicles and show these

people that we were still here, because I was challenged.

At the same time, we were planning to gather more men from the

tribes around the area to send them to Amman. We had only a

roster of their names. Many sheikhs would come in and simply give

us the names of volunteers to join the police force, and we were

able to gather about 200 names for the next run to Amman.

Because of the attack, we were afraid that we might not get those

volunteers to go to Jordan. We encouraged them to go, and in fact

they did go.

Our popularity started going up, and al-Qaeda’s popularity started

going down. Other areas started looking at our area, and they were

encouraged by our standing up the police station and wanted to do

the same thing. So al-Qaeda started getting shaken up by the fact

that people were rising up against them. It got to the point where

al-Qaeda couldn’t roam the streets as they wished. It got to the

point where the martyr, Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, and I were able

to keep in touch with cell phones that were given to us by the

Coalition forces. We maintained communications among myself,

Sheikh Sattar, and the Coalition forces. So our communications

were very fast.

^e sheikhs were a little more liberal than they used to be,

movement-wise.^e tribal leaders started gathering courage more

than before and weren’t as afraid of al-Qaeda as they had been.^e

roads were liberated. ^ey were not under the control of al-Qaeda

anymore. ^ey used to set up checkpoints along the routes all the

time, and they couldn’t do that anymore. ^e Coalition forces

supported the Iraqis with about 12 vehicles, and they patrolled the

roads and kept al-Qaeda off them. You could tell the area was

secure because the police sirens and the police lights were roaming

that area.

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Iraqi Perspectives
^ere were Coalition forces and Iraqi army forces, but they couldn’t

do anything because people were afraid to approach them. ^ey

were afraid that as soon as they got in touch with them, they would

end up dead, so these forces lacked information.

^e tribes started working again, and we could feel the movement

coming back again. Who could gather all these people so that we

could have one voice? We had to hold a conference. Sheikh Sattar

was the only person capable of doing that because he was the

sheikh who openly declared against al-Qaeda. He was a descendent

of a great family and a big tribe. His house was adjacent to the

Coalition camp, and that gave easy access for the Coalition forces

to visit Sheikh Sattar. Also, he was very rich. Because of his status,

he was able to secure barracks for these sheikhs—food,

transportation, whatever they needed in order to stand up against

al-Qaeda. Many sheikhs were suffering financially, and he helped

them so that they could manage their affairs properly to encourage

their own people to rise up against al-Qaeda.

^e conference was held at the home of Sheikh Sattar.^at was the

first meeting in two years where the tribal leaders were able to

gather at Sheikh Sattar’s house and declare openly to the people

that they were going to fight al-Qaeda. ^at first meeting, they

called it the Awakening council, and to this date, even the political

party name is the Awakening council. And so the sheikhs met. He

declared in that conference, in front of the media, the TV, that he

was going to fight al-Qaeda.^at was right in the open, in front of

everybody. We refused any armed militia or organization. We did

not accept any so-called “honorable resistance.” We considered all

of those to be terrorist organizations. We declared that publicly,

and it was announced on TV.

^e person in charge of Ramadi at the time was Colonel [Sean B.]

MacFarland. He was from the Army, but his higher up was a

Marine officer. We opened more police stations as more recruits

came back from Jordan. Albu Risha Police Station opened, Albu

Faraj, Albu Hajasa, Albu Hassaf. And then we entered al-Tamim

neighborhood. Most of the police stations were established in the

villages on the Jazeera side. ^at was our first step inside the city.

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^e police were involved in great battles against al-Qaeda. We

suffered the deaths of many policemen.

We were careful that this would be a legal revolution, not a tribal

revolution. As soon as we appeared on TV, the government wanted

to meet us. Of course, going to Baghdad was very difficult at that

time. Sectarianism was at its maximum level. But when we came

out on TV and declared a fight against al-Qaeda, and declared that

there is no difference between Sunnis and Shiites, we won over

many of the Shiites from the south as friends. Nevertheless, going

to Baghdad was like going to an unknown fate. We did not want

to go in a convoy escorted by the Coalition forces. We wanted to

go alone to show that we were a nationalist movement. In fact, we

did. We went in a convoy by ourselves, protected by patrol vehicles

from the police stations that we opened. We were received very

strongly by the prime minister.

^e local government here did not accept our behavior at the time.

^ey were very upset at our movement, knowing that we were

protected by the Americans. ^ey were upset when they heard us

declaring that there was no resistance, that all resistance groups

were classified as terrorists. ^ey were indicating that there is

honorable resistance and there is dishonorable resistance. What

they meant by honorable resistance is that people were allowed to

kill Americans and not kill Iraqis. How can a governor protected

by the Americans declare that there is honorable resistance? Why

am I being protected by these people then? Where is the honor in

that? ^ere is a person protecting me—the Coalition forces. By the

same token, I am saying,“^ere is honorable resistance. It’s okay to

kill the person who is protecting me.” So the local government

stood against us from the first day. But we did not care too much

about that matter.

^e Coalition forces tried to get us closer together. We held a

conference: the governor, the sheikhs, the provincial director of

police, and the Coalition forces. At that time, I was not the police

chief. I was a military planner, working along with the Americans.

I was in charge of planning the battles against al-Qaeda with the

Americans. All the battles that were fought by the police were

planned by the Coalition forces and me.

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Iraqi Perspectives
Governor Mamoun [Sami Rashid al-Alwani] did attend that

meeting.^is is history. History is not merciful to anyone. I am not

in a position to be complimentary to anyone. History has to be told

truthfully. We asked the governor to appear on TV and to say, just

as we said,“We are against al-Qaeda. We will fight al-Qaeda.”But

he refused. He did not want to appear on TV and publicly

announce that he was fighting al-Qaeda. He refused to do that. He

couldn’t ask the citizens to fight al-Qaeda. Because he was the

governor, we wanted him to clarify that there is no honorable and

dishonorable resistance. We didn’t want him to differentiate

between types of resistance. We wanted him to classify them all as

terrorists, and for the citizens to rise up and fight them, but he

refused. He refused completely.

So we went and met with the government. We met with the prime

minister, Nouri al-Maliki, and the minister of the interior.We were

able to get hiring orders for thousands of police recruits throughout

the province. ^e federal government asked us to establish

emergency battalions throughout the province. I was personally in

charge of those battalions. We successfully formed three battalions.

We established them very quickly, and the Coalition forces

supported us with vehicles, weapons, ammo, and training. We

abandoned sending people to Jordan.We were incapable of sending

them to Jordan because there were thousands. Instead, the

Coalition forces were put in charge of training them, and they

would sometimes jointly go out on operations.

^e local government, who are part of the Islamic Party, objected

to the support given by Nouri Maliki, the prime minister, to—as

they were labeled by the Islamic Party—“the villagers”who led this

movement because they were seeking more support for the

governor because his position was weak at the time. ^e prime

minister started calling Sheikh Sattar, started calling the police

chief, instead of calling the governor, because the governor did not

follow up. He did not even follow up with the central government.

^e prime minister said that the situation in Anbar was so bad

from 2005 until now, but he never approached us in order to help

him out. Why did he not come forward and ask for help from us?

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Al-Anbar Awakening
^e Islamic political parties in the parliament, which the governor

is part of, started working against us.^is is the truth. You can ask

more than one source about it, because all of the Islamic political

parties stood against us, and they were openly talking against us in

public.^ey were pressuring the prime minister to stop supporting

us, but the prime minister insisted. We told him to look at our

accomplishments, look at our security, how it’s improving day after

day. And look at these people, and all he can hear is them objecting

and talking in the parliament against us. So all he heard was talk

from one side, but look at our accomplishments on the other side.

So security moved forward in Anbar. We entered Ramadi then.

^e first forces that moved into Ramadi were Sheikh Sattar’s and

mine. ^e first people who were able to appear right here in front

of this building were Sheikh Sattar and me, in front of the

governor's building. ^ere were so many weeds in front of the

governor’s building that they went all the way to the roof of the

gate. ^ey were so high you couldn’t see the gates.

We were attacked by terrorists here. Fortunately, we were able to

protect ourselves behind the concrete barriers. As a military person,

I took cover behind the concrete barriers. I have to declare for

history’s sake that Sheikh Sattar did not want to hide. Knowing

that he was wearing a white robe, and it made him conspicuous

from a long distance, I told him to take cover behind the concrete

barrier. He said,“No.”He remained standing. He said,“I will stand

and fight.”Colonel [^addeus] McWhorter [USA] contacted me.

He was pleading with me to pull Sheikh Sattar out because the

danger was escalating and Sheikh Sattar had become a symbol for

all of Anbar. ^ey were afraid that something would happen to

him, and it would cause a great downfall to Anbar. I used all my

means to pull Sheikh Sattar out of danger so he wouldn’t get hurt.

And then we liberated Ramadi. We were pleading with the

provincial council, which was meeting in Baghdad at the time, to

come and work here. But they refused because they said it was still

unsafe. We told them that we knew there were dangers here and

there—IEDs,VBIEDs—but it was safer than it used to be. And we

told them, “Come over here. You’re a provincial council. You’re

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supposed to come here and perform your duty from your city.”

Finally they agreed to meet here in Ramadi, but they were brought

here by Coalition forces, by General [ John R.] Allen, by helicopter

from Baghdad to Camp Blue Diamond. ^ey considered that an

accomplishment—a miracle—to meet here in Ramadi, even

though it was at Blue Diamond, and even though it was under the

protection of the Coalition forces. As soon as the meeting was over,

they went back to Baghdad. I attended that meeting. ^ey were

proud to tell themselves that they met in Ramadi, but in actuality,

we didn’t feel that we were meeting in Ramadi, because this is

Ramadi, here, not Blue Diamond. When you are meeting in a

fortified camp such as Blue Diamond, it’s not really a brave thing.

It’s not bravery. Bravery is coming here, right in the middle of the

city, and walking freely. When it was 100 percent clear, they came

and met at the provincial council building, right here.

And then they started interfering in police business.^ey brought

a police chief affiliated with the Islamic Party and put him in

charge. He was scared. He couldn’t patrol the streets. He couldn’t

know how his police were working. He was working out of Blue

Diamond. We were forced to go to the government and tell them

that the police chief was a failure. It’s no good.^e prime minister

told me, “^ere is no other way but to appoint you as the police

chief.”I didn’t want to be a police chief, but I became a police chief.

^e Islamic Party objected to that decision, and to this date they’re

still objecting. I was the one who established the police.

Nobody could come and say,“We fought al-Qaeda.”Sheikh Sattar

and I were the first people to fight al-Qaeda. You will hear a lot of

people saying that they were the first, but the truth is right here.

^e first people to fight al-Qaeda were Sheikh Sattar and me, but

unfortunately, Sheikh Sattar died ahead of me.

And now the Islamic Party is coming here and telling us to our

face that the police basically are not that good, not fit to be police,

or “You are a failed police chief.” I am the failed police chief who

started with 30 fighters, and now I have 28,000 police. I know the

areas one by one. I know where the fights took place. I know all

the hot zones, all the dangerous areas, one by one. When I give a

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brief in a conference or in a meeting, I don’t need to rely on notes

because I can speak freely off the top of my head.^e map is right

in my head. And I think the Coalition forces were present

throughout those meetings, and they were with us, and I was also

present. Now the Islamic Party comes and evaluates me, and they

tell me that I am not fit to be a police chief.

Al-Qaeda was able to infiltrate some of Sheikh Sattar’s personal

security detail, and he was killed as a result. It was a great blow to us,

but we are used to challenge. I am a person who challenges all the

time. I challenge mistakes, and I challenge danger, since I have faith

that what I am doing is right, and I’m working to better my country.

^e relationship that developed here between the American forces

and the Iraqis was unlike any other relationship in the world.

During meals, we offered the Americans spoons to eat with, but

they refused. ^ey ate just like Middle Easterners, with their own

hands. Everybody supported our movement. ^e Army and the

Marines—I can’t say one supported us more than the other. Even

the local international police advisors supported us.

And of course, it’s an ongoing movement. ^e Awakening

movement developed into a political entity.^ey had good presence

in the election, if it wasn’t for the counterfeiting and forgery.

^ere are many points in history that we are proud of, and there are

also many tragedies that we remember. I lost many friends from

2005 until now. But the road to freedom is filled with good. If we

read the history of nations that fought for freedom, we see that

they offered many sacrifices.

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Interview 13
Staff Brigadier General (Pilot) Nuri al-Din

Abd al-Karim Mukhlif al-Fahadawi

Head

Directorate General of Intelligence and Security

Al-Anbar Province

Colonel Said Muhammed Muad

al-Fahadawi

Director General

Iraqi Special Weapons and Tactics

Staff Brigadier General Nuri al-Din Abd al-Karim Mukhlif alFahadawi entered his current position on 21 May 2007; prior to that,

he served in the Directorate General of Planning in the Ministry of

Defense. Also, he occasionally worked in the office of the Ministry of

Defense for Planning on operations to rescue al-Anbar.

Colonel Said Muhammed Muad al-Fahadawi is a graduate of the

National Security College with a degree in military science. He is the

founder, as well as the current director general, of Iraqi Special

Weapons and Tactics.

General Nuri al-Din and Colonel Said were interviewed by

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy

S. McWilliams on 12 February 2009 at Camp Ramadi.

Staff Brigadier General Nuri al-Din Abd al-Karim Mukhlif alFahadawi: When the Coalition forces entered Iraq, the

headquarters for the Coalition force was at K-17 [kilometer marker

17 on the highway]. ^is was in April 2003. ^e security situation

was good at the time. ^e sheikhs of the tribes agreed to send a

delegation to the headquarters of the Coalition force to negotiate

with them to go into the cities without forces and without any

fighting so we could avoid destroying the buildings and the

infrastructure. One of the delegates was Staff Brigadier General

195
Mohammed ^umay [al-Jarawi], who was later killed by the

insurgents. When they actually got inside the cities, it was very

quiet, very normal. Even the government officials were in their

offices in Ramadi.^ere was no looting like in Baghdad.^ey were

being protected by the tribes, and there were police in the province.

^e rise of the mujahideen and some military action began in 2004

with some armed groups operating in the name of jihad. ^ey

started easy at the beginning of 2004 and increased to the end of

2005.^ey were being called by the imams of the mosques. As you

know, in our religious tradition, they say jihad is one of the main

pillars Islam when they are attacked by an occupier. Speaking

outside this subject, jihad law states that there should be

equivalence in the fighting forces so that it abides by Sharia law. If

the forces are not proportionate, it is forbidden in Islam to resist.

So this is the rule of jihad.

Many people sympathized with this invocation from the imams

because they believed the calling was a religious one. People started

to support the mujahideen with ammunition and weapons, housing

and accommodations—everything. ^ere were too many armed

groups around. Al-Qaeda was one of these groups. In time, alQaeda rose up and controlled everything.^ey had a lot of support

from outside the border, and they started to attract people with

money, because they had a lot of support and a lot of supplies.^ey

had millions of dollars from outside Iraq. When they became

stronger, they started negotiating with the other groups: “If you are

with us, okay. If you are not with us, you are our enemy, and we’re

going to kill you.” And honestly, they killed a lot of other groups

because they didn’t want to be with them. Most of them joined alQaeda under threat.

^e American forces started to arrest and detain a lot of people.

^e Coalition forces couldn’t identify, through the people, who

wanted peace and who was a terrorist, so there were a lot of

arrests—and tending not just to arrest, but also to beat. Whoever

passed along the main road, the snipers might kill him, or he might

be arrested, or they might do anything to him. ^ey didn’t let him

move. ^e problem we had was that even an innocent person who

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was arrested during that time, he went to jail, and after a year they

released him. His mind was changed to be with al-Qaeda.

^en al-Qaeda started to work against the Americans and the Iraqi

forces, and even the common people. And the public started to

have the feeling that al-Qaeda had a connection with the

Americans through some indicators. ^e terrorists had the same

handcuffs that were used by the Americans. ^ey had American

weapons. People started to wonder,“^e Americans took innocent

people, and the insurgent is free to go in and out—they don’t even

come close to him.”

^e terrorists started killing many, many, many people. Every day

there were killings. ^ey killed sheikhs, officers, pilots, engineers,

doctors—in public—many people. And there were many excuses.

^ey killed him, cut off his head, and put a paper on his body: “He

is an agent of the Americans.”

So what do you do? We started talking with people: “^ese

terrorists are not working with the Americans. But the Americans

don’t know the good guys from the bad guys. ^ey are confused.”

People thought, “No, the Americans have two armies: this army

with the tanks and the Marines and everybody, and the other army

is the militias and the terrorists.”

We started to work, and we started forming groups, and started

working against al-Qaeda. We made connections with people that

worked with the American Department of Defense, Iraqi

intelligence, and the American embassy. We provided them with

information about who’s a terrorist, who’s an insurgent, and where

they’re working—locations, any location that was available. ^at’s

the foreign terrorists, because most of the terrorists were foreign.

^e leaders were foreigners—not Iraqis. Some Iraqis worked under

them. We started to give them information on where they were. We

gave it to intelligence, intelligence passed it to the Americans, and

the Americans started attacking them from the air and killing them.

We started to form groups for the tribal sons, and they were

civilians. We started to work against the terrorists. One of the

groups was commanded by Colonel Said, and he passed us

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information through the Internet. We didn’t have any other

communication system except the Internet. He was passing

information about the locations of the terrorists. We started to

collect intelligence elements and people in the areas around us.

^e terrorists, when they wanted to do an IED [improvised

explosive device], every three days they came back to maintain it.

Our elements started putting an IED next to their IED, and when

they came back to maintain their own, they blew up.^e terrorists

thought their own IEDs blew up. ^ese are just introductions to

what we did before we grew.

^is was before we announced the Awakening under the name of

Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha. We started working like this in

March 2006, and the Awakening was announced publicly in

September 2006, so we started working before we announced the

Awakening. After we announced the Awakening, a delegation

came from Baghdad, from the Ministry of Defense and others, to

meet Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha. I couldn’t communicate with

them, but they were told through friends that I was working on

this side and taking care of it. ^ey gave them my mobile number.

^ey called me, so I met them at the Mansour Hotel in Baghdad.

^ey asked for my support. I answered that I was working in the

same direction for the last six or eight months, so we were one

team, and we had one aim.

I was able to get a large quantity of weapons from the government:

exactly 100 PKCs [machine guns]—it’s a medium weapon, not a

big one—500 Kalashnikovs [assault rifles], and thousands of

rounds of ammunition; also 25 vehicles.

I called Sheikh Abdul Sattar to say: “You control your place. Also,

go to the media and make an announcement and talk on TV. Leave

the rest to me. I will go down to the street.”

I gave the minister a plan. He said to let the headquarters

leadership of the [inaudible] and Lieutenant General Ali Ghaidan

was working [conversation with interpreter]. I explained my plan

on the maps. And so the minister asked me how much time I

needed to implement it. I told him 45 days. He laughed at me. He

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didn’t believe it. He said, “^e American forces and Iraqi forces

have been three, four years—and they can’t achieve anything that

you’re saying you can do in 45 days.” I told them the story is very

simple, but there is a problem. ^e American forces are confused.

^ey don’t know who’s good and who’s bad. And they depend on

reports, half of them wrong. And the Iraqi army just started. ^ey

are weak. ^ey have more training to do. ^ey’re too weak to do

something like this.

So he asked me, “What are you going to fight with?” I told him, “I

have groups of the tribal sons. I have reports. I have been working

with these people for 10 months. I have accurate reports about the

terrorists, where they are, how they work, what they wear, their cars’

numbers, their IDs, and even their crimes—sometimes specifically

which month, which day, and which hour.”

We called these groups the Anbar Revolutions. We gave them

^uraya phones, and each one had a recharge card. We bought

them from the local shops in Baghdad. ^e money was, honestly,

my brothers gave it to me—Sheikh Hamis and Sheikh Hamater.

^ey gave me money to buy these things, and I gave my people

salaries. It was a simple one, but at least it enabled them to live.

People came for me in Habbaniyah. I met the 1st Division leader,

Brigadier General Bada al-Azawi, in Habbaniyah. I didn’t know

him before, but I handed him a letter from the Ministry of

Defense. He said, “We need to help you.” I only needed weapons

and food for my people. ^e man cooperated and helped me a lot.

We started doing jobs. We started from inside Ramadi to inside

Fallujah city, and up around the left and right shoulders of the river.

^e Coalition forces and the Iraqis secured the area around us, but

the actual job was done by Anbaris, because they knew their targets

exactly. ^ey didn’t ask for IDs to know the terrorists. ^ey could

identify their faces not just their names because these people were

from the area.^ey knew the people.We continued doing operations

for 45 days. We went out at sunset, and we came back at sunrise.

I forgot to say something. ^ere is an idea about these terrorists

that people started identifying, which is wrong. Ninety-five percent

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of the people were against the terrorists, but they couldn’t do

anything because they were afraid they would be killed. You can

tell people, “Come on, stand up and help me.” But he won’t unless

he sees the results himself. So I was very keen to take action and go

to the streets so the people would see me. I’m moving; I’m there to

protect them—so they can help me.

I remember one night I brought in 77 terrorists. Lieutenant

Colonel [James F.] McGrath came to me and said,“General, you’re

going to make a problem for me. In one night, you brought in 77

terrorists.” I’ll tell you something, all these 77 were real terrorists.

I don’t move randomly; I plan and then move accordingly. I know

my target; I know what their crimes are; then I arrest them. And I

went to arrest them every night. He said,“Now society will be upset

that we captured all these people.” I told him he was wrong:

“Society will be happy because they know all these men are real

terrorists. Let’s go among the people, and you will see the happiness

in their eyes.”I rode with him in the Humvees.We had our security,

and we went in the suburbs and in the city.^e people were waiting

for us, and they were happy. He said, “Look at the happiness in

their eyes. You’re right.”

And we continued our jobs. We brought in hundreds in 45 days.

We had some fighting, where we killed many very dangerous

terrorists. Some of our people were killed during the fighting. After

that, I publicly introduced myself, and I told them,“I am Brigadier

General Nuri al-Din.” ^ey started to celebrate and clapped for

me, and they were happy to see me. ^ey got on the loudspeaker

and said, “General Nuri al-Din came here. Maybe he will be the

leader of the army. He is definitely a good guy.”

We started establishing police stations and centers for the army

volunteers. ^e people were happy, and they cooperated with

security, but only when they saw something real. If you just keep

talking, they won’t answer you. When they saw us, and they saw

our weapons and our fighting, and we told them, “We’re going to

protect you,” the people came out and helped us.

We established police stations. We supported them with weapons

and vehicles, but there was still one problem—salaries. For eight

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months, the minister of interior didn’t issue salaries for them.

During this eight months, Sheikh Ratta, my brother, was helping

with some money. He gave some furniture for the offices and some

communications devices. After eight months of going in and out

of the minister of interior’s office and the prime minister’s office to

get the employment order so they could issue salaries, they finally

had salaries.

I started to get former military officers back on duty—about 400

from the army, about 10,000 soldiers, and the situation continues

as you see now. And the police—I brought back policemen from

eastern Ramadi down to Fallujah, about 5,000 to 6,000 policemen.

^is is the general idea.

Lieutenant McGrath, the battalion commander, came to my office

one night very upset. I asked him, “What's wrong?” He said,

“General, I finished my duty here, and I’m going back to America,

and I don’t know what’s going to happen.” He said, “Where there

were mortars and IEDs all the time, suddenly the people just come

up, and they are happy, and they say ‘It’s secure. We need the rule

of law. We need everything.’ So I don’t know what’s happening. I

will be embarrassed when I go back to America, and they ask me,

‘What’s happening? Why are things changed like that?’ I don’t

know how to answer them.”

So I will tell you briefly what happened. When the terrorists came

into Anbar, and the people felt that the terrorists worked with the

Americans, we went inside and told them, “No, the terrorists are

not with the Americans, and the Americans have a real desire to get

rid of the terrorists.” So we put this idea on the people’s minds:

“^e Americans want security and peace.”We placed some people

secretly, and we started working with them, and we worked with

the cooperation of the Coalition forces and the Iraqi forces. ^e

people needed it. ^at’s it. ^at’s the whole story.

It started with a few people, and the people cooperated [inaudible].

West of Ramadi, Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha started to work. And

from east Ramadi down to Fallujah, Colonel Said, General

Khadim Muhammad Faris, and I worked. We volunteered, and

many hundreds of Anbaris volunteered to work with us. We

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worked seriously and with a lot of courage because inside we really

wanted to get rid of these killers and keep them away.^ank God,

we achieved something good and successful. I don’t think it was

just the people who worked with me, the sons of the tribes; there

was also a really big effort from the ranks of the Iraqi army, which

was represented by the 1st Division.

^at’s the general idea. If you don’t have any questions, I will turn

it over to Colonel Said.

Colonel Said Muhammed Muad al-Fahadawi: Before I start, I want

to follow up on some of the points that General Nuri al-Din

mentioned. ^e delegation that went to negotiate with the

Coalition forces in 2003—the staff general, Mohammad, was my

brother-in-law.^e delegation was three persons.^e first one was

Mohammad ^umay al-Jarawi, and he was chosen by the tribes

because he was the commander of the army in al-Anbar. ^e

second one was Brigadier General Ahmed Sadak al-Zebawi.

Before 2003, he was the leader of the Saddam Fedayeen.^e third

one was called Faris Hamid Sadak. He was the cousin of Ahmed

and the driver who took them over there.

^ey said they went and negotiated with the Coalition forces.^ey

wished them well and everything and said that we’re going to

cooperate. But in reality, Mohammad told me—he told me the

truth, because we are brothers—they felt very sorry because of the

way they needed them and why they needed them. My brother

said, “We volunteered to go over there to negotiate with them, so

that we could give them al-Anbar Province without any fighting.

What happened? ^ey put us in a very small room, like a jail, for

three days. ^ere wasn’t even a pillow to sleep on. We took our

shoes and used them as pillows.”^is was a very big insult.

In 2003, there was Iraqi army inside al-Anbar before the fall of

Baghdad.

My brother continued, “After three days, and after this insult, the

Americans said, ‘We want you to go with us to prove your story.

Get in a helicopter with us and show us where those Iraqi army

units were.’So we got in a helicopter, and I started pointing to false

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areas. And because of this insult, I wished that we would get shot

down and everybody would get killed.”

After that he came back, they told him, “We will call you back.”

And until 2006, the year he was killed by terrorists, no one called

him from the American side. ^is is the first comment.

^e second comment is in regard to the feeling people had that

the terrorists were being helped by the Coalition forces. We have

a good connection now, and the relationship with the Americans

is strong, but we still have to know why that feeling existed. I spoke

with leaders of the Coalition forces about this subject. I related that

on the American side there is a judge, there is a law, there is a court,

and there are human rights. Many people were arrested by the

American forces. ^ere were no witnesses, so they said, “He’s

innocent,” and they released him.

Interpreter: You understand what he means, sir? ^e Americans

arrested people, but no one from the public would be a witness,

because he would be killed.^e Americans had no witnesses that he

is a terrorist. So they released him. So the people started feeling the

Americans were working with the terrorists. ^at’s what he means.

Said: Well, I tell you, they still have the same regulations. ^ree

months ago, Mohammed Dohatch Lobom, the leader of al-Fatihin

Army, was released from Bucca. Now they ask us to go find him

again so we can arrest him. People start to wonder why they would

release him and then come back and want to arrest him. But I know

that, according to American law, he was punished, and they couldn’t

extend his time in jail. ^ey had to release him.

^e third comment is regarding the Coalition forces in al-Anbar.

Honestly, they made a very courageous decision. ^e central

government does not support the idea of establishing a strong

police and Iraqi army in the province. But on this occasion, I want

to be clear about something. I want to extend my appreciation and

thanks to Colonel [ John W.] Charlton [USA]. . . And the second

guy is Lieutenant Colonel [Charles] Ferry [USA]. He was the

commander of the battalion east of Ramadi. What they did, these

brave people—they were Army, not Marines—in the beginning of

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establishing the police, they made a brave decision. ^ey took all

the police and took care of them, gave them weapons, trained them,

and gave them uniforms. And they gave them help, monthly—

$200, $300.^ey gave them weapons, HESCO barriers to protect

their offices, and furniture.

I attended a meeting between Colonel Charlton, Lieutenant

Colonel Ferry, and the police in Ramadi. We made the police a

reality and forced the government center to deal with that reality.

^ey couldn’t say no. And that’s what happened.

About Brigadier General Nuri al-Din, he has the right military

rank, and he’s the sheikh of a tribe. His tribe is the biggest tribe in

Anbar by area and by population. His brother was Sheikh Massab

Abdul Karim, the paramount sheikh. He had a PhD and gave

lectures in al-Anbar University. He was killed by terrorists. ^e

other tribes awakened because the Albu Fahd tribe awakened, so it

goes with them. ^at’s what I have here.

Going back to the Awakening—to be honest and for history—the

Awakening started in al-Qaim in the middle of 2005. ^e Albu

Mahal tribe revolted and started to awaken. ^ey’re on the border

with Syria. After the Islamic State in Iraq, which is terrorist,

announced that they’re in al-Qaim, these tribes rose up. And to be

honest, these were the first people to awaken. ^ey established

police, and they are still there.

^e second announced Awakening, Abu Risha, happened in

September 2006 in the Jazeera area. From Sheikh Abdul Sattar’s

announcement in September until the 5th of February 2007, when

the Albu Fahd tribe came out, there was only Sheikh Abdul Sattar.

It was confined to the Jazeera area. Some Awakening councils were

established, but they couldn’t establish any government until the Albu

Fahd tribe came out. ^en everything started to return to normal.

About the Albu Fahd tribe, their location is from the center of

Ramadi city to Fallujah. Also, they are with the [Dubad], and

across the river in the Jazeera area.

As for me, personally, the terrorists killed my sister’s husband, Staff

General (Pilot)—he was the commander of the air base in

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Nasiriyah; Ali Air Base, which is now Tallil. ^is was requested

very strongly by the Iranians because he was involved in the IranIraq War. ^e terrorists killed him in Haditha City.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: ^e terrorists killed him because he

was involved in the Iran war?

Said: We think that al-Qaeda was supported by the Iranians, so we

guess it was revenge. Pilots were killed by al-Qaeda. General

Mohammed, whom we talked about, was killed by al-Qaeda. Too

many officers were killed by al-Qaeda. My house was blown up by

al-Qaeda, and I was not involved with the police or anything.

^e 1st of April 2006, General Nuri al-Din was in Baghdad. He

sent someone to tell me that he wanted to see me. After he found out

what happened to me and who al-Qaeda had killed from my family,

we met in Baghdad. He also sent for Staff General Khadim

Mohammad Faris. And he was talking about what we have to do to

face al-Qaeda after they killed our sheikhs, and our officers, and our

families. ^e Americans and the Iraqi army couldn’t do anything.

^e terrorists were getting stronger with the presence of the

Coalition forces. ^ey enforced some habits which we didn’t have

before. Females shouldn’t work. Schools for girls were not allowed.

^ey changed the way we pray. ^ey changed the call to prayer in

the mosques.^ey controlled all the resources of the province.^ey

controlled some of the government offices: the Department of

Education, the Health Department, the Facilities Protection

Service. Each director general had someone sitting beside him

from al-Qaeda.

After they controlled the people by terrorism, by killing, they went

back to the groups that were working with them, the jihad or

mujahideen groups like the Islamic Army, the 20th Revolution

Brigades, the Islamic Movement, the Mujahideen Army, and other

groups, and told them, “Either you give us your weapons and your

vehicles, and you work under our control, or you will not be allowed

to shoot a single bullet, even if you are shooting at the Americans.”

According the information we have, about 60 percent of these

groups cooperated with them. ^e 40 percent who were against

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them were either killed or fled abroad, mostly to Syria. And the

rest, some people just sat at home and did nothing. ^ey stopped

their activities.

Going back to the meeting in Baghdad between me and General

Nuri al-Din and General Khadim, we met in an apartment, and

we talked together and discussed our thoughts. One idea was to

buy some sniper rifles and go hide somewhere and start shooting

them like snipers. But then we remembered what happened to a

guy called Sheikh Rijad. He resisted them. ^ey killed him, and

they killed his family, even the women. So General Nuri al-Din

said the best thing is to work with the government of Iraq and with

the help of the Coalition forces. So the suggestion was that he

should stay in his area and continue working with the Iraqi Army.

I met with Iraqi intelligence, and there were also some people from

the American CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] there. ^e

suggestion in this meeting was that we establish a directorate

general of the Office for Iraqi Intelligence inside al-Anbar.

We had seen how communication would be—it was very hard for

me to physically go in and out of Baghdad. So we started

exchanging information through the Internet.^uraya phones were

very hard to deliver into al-Anbar because there were terrorist

checkpoints. If they checked us and found them, they might kill us.

So General Nuri al-Din took care of it, and he delivered it to alAnbar for us.

I started collecting people who were very close to me, starting with

my family, my close friends whom I trust, and we established a

group of about 15 people. ^ey covered the whole of al-Anbar in

person. Each city had two or three people.

After that, they gave us some GPS [global positioning system]

devices. ^e only way of communicating with Baghdad was

through the Internet. Al-Qaeda had some very good technicians.

^ey usually watched the Internet cafes and monitored

information on the Internet, so they gave me a laptop that was

encoded so they couldn’t hack it.^e targets were documented with

grids and pictures on the Internet, and we pushed them to

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American and Iraqi intelligence. Also, I cc’ed General Nuri al-Din.

I documented everything, and I kept copies for myself.

In one of the reports that I saved from before Sheikh Sattar’s

Awakening was announced, I told them there would be an uprising

in western Ramadi. It would control only the Jazeera area and the

highway. But the center of Ramadi and eastward to Fallujah would

not be controlled. I mention these documents because I want you

to understand that there were people fighting al-Qaeda secretly.

For us, in reality and as something for history, the Awakening

started in February 2006, but it was announced to the people in

September 2006.^is is documented. I have it as a person who was

responsible for the intelligence office in al-Anbar. Also General

Nuri al-Din has the same documents, as does the Iraqi army.

As General Nuri al-Din said, we started working with the Sons of

al-Anbar. So the decision was to go and become known to the

people and not remain secret.

Nuri al-Din: Some comments. ^e real work was between 15

December 2006 and 1 February 2007. ^is 45 days was hard and

real and a very brave job. ^ere was work before that in February

2006 in the east of Ramadi. But the real work, in which we

achieved everything, was from 15 December 2006 until 1 February

2007. ^is period of time was secret, and we worked just at night.

After 1 February 2007, we appeared to the people. Before, we were

top secret; and now the people are with us, and we went public.

Said: On 5 February 2007,only four days after going public, we

established the first police station, so the people could believe in us.

In addition to my job as the director of the intelligence office in alAnbar, I was the commander of this police station, so that the

people will believe in us. During this time, I was the commander

of the al-Shibadah police station in the eastern Ramadi area and

also the intelligence director of al-Anbar.

I was going in and out to the offices of the government of Iraq in

Baghdad, so I asked to open a real office of intelligence in al-Anbar,

so we would be known and available to assist the army with

information. ^e Coalition forces and the Iraqi army agreed, and

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they supported me. But the CIA people and Iraqi intelligence

wanted to wait six or seven months.^ey didn’t believe it could be

settled down in just two or three months, because we did it

before—opening some offices for intelligence and information in

Salah ad Din Province, and also in Kirkuk Province, and the

terrorists killed them.

I resigned and came back. I got Colonel Charlton and Lieutenant

Colonel Ferry to agree to establish an intelligence office for the

police. It was established and became an office for fighting

terrorists. We started with 50 employees in Ramadi city.^ey were

very brave. ^ey supplied me with weapons, with vehicles and

furniture, and buildings. After that we developed our office and the

Coalition forces helped us and supported us. One of them was

Lieutenant Colonel [Bolin?]. We worked with the Navy. We kept

going. ^ere were weekly meetings. I established branches of our

office in the whole of al-Anbar. And we changed the name to Iraqi

Special Weapons and Tactics.

In my office, I have documents about al-Qaeda, and the targets we

did, and the jobs we did. We had the honor of liberating two very

hot areas in al-Anbar Province, which are the [inaudible] area and

also [Ali Bahi?] area. ^ese are north of Baghdad. We have many

documents from the Coalition forces and the Navy.

I have some small comments. One time Sheikh Hamis, General

Nuri al-Din’s brother, met us in Baghdad. He was a teacher, and he

read history. He knew about our work against the terrorists. He

told me,“You know how all the revolutions happened in the world?

^ey were planned and executed by a small number of people.” I

feel very honored, very proud, that I was one of the persons who

helped do this one and rescue al-Anbar from the terrorists.

Nuri al-Din: For history, military action started because of

mistakes the Coalition forces made. One of the reasons behind it

was the dissolution of the army. [L. Paul] Bremer’s dissolving the

army was a very big mistake. It was a direct reason for the rise of

military action. Some of the behavior of the Coalition forces was a

mistake. I remember one of these situations. ^e public was

protesting for some reason.^ere were no essential services, so they

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started protesting until the American forces shot them. ^e

reaction against these people, it made them angry.

^e second thing was the Americans were taking advice from only

one side. If we want to be precise, they took advice from Shiites.

^ey described Anbaris as Saddam’s people, as Ba’ath Party people.

^is is not true. It is unjust to describe them like that. It’s not good

for the Anbaris. Because of this, the Americans didn’t trust these

people and didn’t support them. In time, the situation started to be

clear to them, and they understood it.

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Interview 14
Staff Major General Abdullah

Mohammad Badir al-Jaburi

Commanding General

7th Iraqi Army Division

Staff Major General Abdullah Mohammad Badir al-Jaburi joined

the new Iraqi Army in 2004. He served in the 1st Iraqi Army Division

as a battalion commander, the division operations officer, the chief of

staff, and as a brigade commander. He subsequently commanded the

2d Division, and then the 7th Division. He served mainly in Taji,

Habbaniyah, and Ramadi.

Staff Major General Abdullah was interviewed by Colonel Gary

W. Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S.

McWilliams on 22 February 2009 at Camp Mesi, al-Asad, Iraq. An

unknown officer who was present also asked a couple of questions.

Staff Major General Abdullah Mohammad Badir al-Jaburi: During

this last five years, we have been in different phases working against

the terrorists.^e terrorist activities have changed during the time

from 2004 until today. ^e main highlight of terrorist activities is

just to terrify people—the civilians, the Iraqi army, and the police—

in order to accomplish their agenda.^ey do this, they try to attain

their goal with a different type of technique.

In the beginning, we were Iraqi security forces. We were in the

defense, and they are attacking, especially during 2004 and 2005.

And after the Iraqi people understood the goal of the terrorist cells

and organization, our work entered different phases.

In the beginning, facing a very critical situation at the time, the

people didn’t want to cooperate with the Iraqi security forces for

two reasons: either they were terrified of the terrorists, or they were

cooperating with them. ^en, when the terrorists conducted

criminal activities in the area, when they destroyed our

infrastructure, people understood that they had to work against the

terrorist organizations, and that’s when we started the Awakening.

211
^is was the Awakening: when the people started working against

al-Qaeda.

And the other point, U.S. forces weren’t proficient in dealing with

the Iraqi population in the beginning, or they didn’t understand

how to treat Iraqis at that time. So many Iraqis turned against U.S.

forces because of their behavior during raids. ^ey didn’t treat

family members in a good way. Consequently, most Iraqis did not

accept the U.S. presence in their areas. If the U.S. forces want to

treat the Iraqi people in a better way, they shouldn’t treat them the

same way that they treat the British or Americans. ^ey have to

understand Iraqi culture. ^at’s going to help them do their job.

But this wasn’t there.

At the same time, the Iraqi people looked on the Iraqi security

forces as traitors or collaborators to the U.S. forces, so they didn’t

accept them, either, in the beginning. But later on, when they

worked in their areas, they treated the people better than the U.S.

forces did, and we became closer to Iraqi society.

We had three points: what we call the igniting of the Awakenings,

when the U.S. forces became culturally advised regarding Iraqis;

when the people understood that the Iraqi security forces were

willing to work for them, not against them; and when the people

understood that the terrorist organizations were working against

the Iraqi people willingly. All these things together ignited what we

call the Awakening groups. Also, the people started understanding

that the new government was willing to work for them.

At the beginning, the Awakening group didn’t have their weapons

with them. ^ey were just participating and helping Iraqi security

and the U.S. Marines with intelligence information about any

terrorist activities in their area. ^ey identified them for us: “He is

the emir of a group. ^at one is a cell leader. ^is one is a member

in the organization.” ^is kind of information. We call this the

beginning phase of the Awakening. Even now, we expect that, just

theoretically, if there were a new terrorist organization coming to

their area, as soon as the Iraqi people know, they will provide us

with the information, and we could deal with them, and we could

defeat them. But without any intelligence information, it’s going to

be hard for us to identify the target and deal with it.

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I will be frank with you. We still have terrorist activities to this day.

^ere are many IEDs [improvised explosive devices] that are

planted in our area every day, but the good thing is that we get

information from the public. ^ey tell us where the IED is, and

we can deal with it right away. ^is is the benefit of the people,

when they cooperate with us. ^is is a simple explanation for the

Awakening: when a common man comes to the Iraqi security

forces and tells them where an IED was planted. ^is is the good

result of our success. ^is kind of cooperation between the Iraqi

people and the security forces indicates that the Iraqi security forces

have to improve their technique during searches in a way that

adheres to Iraqi culture. Nowadays, we are maintaining this kind of

cultural awareness with the Iraqi people, which induces them to

provide more information to us.

For the last few years, we worked with the Marines, and during

this time our friendship and cooperation got to the level where we

could deal with any situation, under any circumstances.^at brings

us to the way the Marines understand Iraqi culture more than they

previously did. Also, civil affairs operations have been maintained

by the Marines, bringing the people in the area to a better level of

cooperation with the Iraqi security forces.

Interpreter: He’s covered everything on the Awakening, sir. He

wanted to know if you had any specific questions, or what you

might want him to cover next.

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams: I do, sir. You

described the Awakening, but I’m curious, what did Coalition forces

do before the Awakening to help gain the trust and turn the people?

[Me question was translated into Arabic as, “How did American

forces help in the Awakening?”]

Abdullah: I think that there are many elements here that prepared

the ground for the Awakening. ^ere are al-Qaeda mistakes, like

when they attacked civilians. U.S. cultural awareness improved.

Iraqi security’s dealing with the civilians—these three elements

help together. ^ere is not just one side here.

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Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: Did you see U.S. cultural awareness,

did it change quickly or very slowly over a long time? Was there any

time where you could say, “^is is when it changed?”

Abdullah: I think that during 2003 and ’04, the U.S. forces

committed lots of mistakes regarding cultural awareness, but after

that, they came to the conclusion that they had to change their

technique in how to deal with Iraqi civilians. Plus, they started to

cooperate more with Iraqi security. Joint operations—that helped

the situation.

Unknown: What would he also recommend to win the hearts and

minds of the folks? As far as from his perspective, what are the

things the Americans can do better, could have done better, as well

as what we could do in the future to make sure that we’re winning

the hearts and minds of the folks. . . .

Abdullah: Good treatment for the Iraqi civilians will bring better

cooperation and better information providers. ^e U.S. forces

changed their technique. In the beginning, everybody was afraid of

their convoys. I have an example from my village. All the kids, when

they saw a U.S. convoy, they ran away. But day by day, we’re getting

to better cultural awareness. People, day by day, don’t become afraid

of U.S. convoys. I believe it’s a good accomplishment. I think that, for

an answer to your question, more involvement with Iraqi culture and

society, and they will be more cooperative.

Montgomery: During the actual Awakening, or once the fighting

began clearing al-Qaeda, was there a lot of coordination and a

strategy, or was it more of a psychological thing, that everyone just

rose up at about the same time?

Abdullah: In the beginning, Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha awakened

for revenge for his family members who had been assassinated by

the terrorists. ^en it became larger when he started coordinating

some of the tribe members with him to start this Awakening, and

then the government of Iraq started helping him, and the U.S.

forces also started helping him.^at all improved the Awakening.

Interpreter: General Abdullah said he was there since day one, and

he had many meetings with the Awakening group at that time.

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Unknown: When they started beginning the Awakening, we had

heard through previous interviews that they initiated it in the alQaim area, although it stayed out there, and then it slowly made its

way east. I just want to know how he thought about that, if that was

the initial “Awakening.”

Abdullah:^at’s right.^e Awakening started, but it did not extend

all the way. It started there and stopped there. All the tribal leaders

in that area supported the 1st Iraqi Brigade from the 1st Division.

I wasn’t there. All the area of al-Karablah, al-Qaim, and al-Ubaidi

was surrounded by two or three layers of [inaudible], but when the

army started showing progress, when people were very much

suffering from terrorism, they directly cooperated. So in al-Qaim,

the Awakening started there and stopped there. But in 2006, they

resumed in Ramadi. It stopped before Haditha’s borders; it didn’t

extend, but it emerged again in west Ramadi.

Unknown: Were there other locations? Were there other cities out

here in the al-Anbar area that it was possibly some sort of initial

beginning as well?

Abdullah: It wasn’t immediately after the Awakening stopped in alQaim. It wasn’t ignited again in another area for six months, when we

had it in Ramadi under the leadership of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha.

Interpreter:^e commanding general had many meetings with the

Awakening groups, and we had a lot of cooperation at that time.

And Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha got lots of support from the U.S.

side to enable him to stand up and be a good leader.

Montgomery: In 2003, do you think, was it possible to avoid an

insurgency of some type?

Abdullah: At that time, there was no coordination. ^ere was no

Iraqi police, no Iraqi army.^ere was no coordination between the

U.S. and Iraqi security forces. Since there was no coordination

between all these elements, I don’t believe we could stop any kind

of insurgency at that time.

Montgomery: My impression is that the Iraqi security forces and

the American security forces, neither one could defeat the

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insurgency alone, and even together, they could not defeat the

insurgency without the support of the populace. Is that accurate?

Abdullah: Definitely. I will give you an example of this. In the

beginning, when we arrested any terrorist suspect, he had a fake

ID [identification]. When we asked him about his name, he would

say he was someone else and present a fake ID.We didn’t know. But

later, when we had cooperation with the people, they said, “Don’t

worry, this is a fake ID. He is the real guy. He is the terrorist.”Since

the Iraqi people started cooperating with us and identifying the

real terrorists, we get them in their homes. Even if we don’t ask

him about his ID, it doesn’t matter. If they tell us he is there, we

grab him, and he starts to confess whatever he’s done in the past.

Unknown: He spoke very highly of the military transition teams

[MTTs], that they worked well with the Iraqi security forces. As we

continue to go forward with the Awakening, is there anything else

that he would recommend that would continue the progress or

allow us to even go to a next level, to continue the improvement

between the American forces and the ISF?

Abdullah: ^e relationship between the MTT team and the Iraqi

army is based on a good foundation. It can improve, but what we

have now is not bad. . . . In the beginning, the American supervisor

would listen but would not take anything we said seriously. But

later they started taking the information we passed to him seriously.

When we ask, they go to their higher, and they discuss it, and they

bring us the answer we need to improve ourselves.

Most of the Iraqi security forces get their logistical support these

days from the Ministry of Defense, and in many occasions the

MTT team is working hard to push our higher to support us better

that way.^at’s the better way to deal.^e MTT team has reached

a level where they can understand the details inside our units. Every

time, when we discuss any matter, he knows. He has the response:

what to answer, how to answer.

Unknown: Could you give us a quick comparison between the

Awakening in al-Anbar Province as compared to possibly Ninawa,

Diyala, some of the other provinces? Were there some similarities,

differences, that kind of thing?

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Al-Anbar Awakening
Abdullah: ^e difference between the Awakening group in Anbar

and in other provinces, the Awakening group in Anbar was

established in the beginning. So they had the opportunity to join

the Iraqi security forces as policemen or soldiers. But what

happened in Diyala or Ninawa, they were late in awakening. ^ey

don’t have any place for them to join.^e Iraqi organizations have

been completed. So they are like militias now. ^ey are civilians.

^ey were getting paid by the U.S. Now they’re getting paid by the

Iraqi government, but there is no explanation for them.^ere is no

name for them. Are they Iraqi army, or police? Or are they some

other organization? ^is is the problem of the Awakening groups

in Diyala, and Salah ad Din, and in Ninawa.

Montgomery: Al-Qaeda tried to start sectarian warfare, tried to

start a civil war, but it didn’t work. Why is that? I think that’s

something we don't understand very well as Americans.

Abdullah: Al-Qaeda is continuing to do this. Al-Qaeda continued

to have this technique. ^ey started last week when there was a

pilgrimage in south Iraq. ^ey attacked the pilgrimage in order to

have sectarian violence.^ey continue to do this because if we have

a civil war, the U.S. can’t intervene. ^ey can’t identify who is who.

And they would let the Iraqi security forces deal with this sectarian

violence. We’ll be busy with it, and they will have enough time to

bring people who support them from abroad and come in and

control the country. ^is is their goal, to let Iraqis live in chaos.

When Iraqis live in chaos, they can control the country easily by

their ideology.^ey succeeded, at certain times, at igniting civil war.

But, thank God, people understood the reason for this, and they

stopped it, and we defeated that ideology.

Montgomery: So the Iraqi people saw through that tactic?

Abdullah: Yes. ^ere is no difference between the Iraqi people. On

April 9th, 2003, when the regime fell, at that time there was no

police, no army, and there was no law, but we didn’t have civil war.

^ere was no difference between Iraqis. But later on, the interests

of foreign countries led to helping these terrorist organizations,

feeding them with money, and letting them start with their civil war.

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Montgomery: During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Shi’a fought

with the Iraqi Sunni against the Iranians, even though they are

Shi’a, so I’m wondering if perhaps the Sunni-Shi’a thing is

exaggerated in the West.

Abdullah: As I mentioned from my example, in 2003 when the

regime had fallen, there was no law, no Iraqi forces, and we didn’t

have a civil war. I have to say that this kind of hatred, we don’t have

it inside our hearts and minds. But interference from foreign

countries helped these organizations to develop in that direction. Iraq

is not just Shi’a and Sunni. ^ere are Kurds, there are Yazidis, there

are Assyrians. ^ere is a mixture here. We don’t have that difference

unless someone has intervened, and he has his special interest.

McWilliams: I’d be curious if there are any other significant events

or successes against al-Qaeda that you led or witnessed that you

would like to tell us about.

Abdullah: I think that all Iraqis now understand that the

Awakening was the best thing for them. ^ey had to “wake up,”

and the ideology of al-Qaeda has to stop. ^is is the way they are.

In the future, when any kind of such ideology appears on the

ground, I think there is no way for them to succeed.

Montgomery: So the Awakening is permanent?

Abdullah: Yes. Definitely, the Awakening will be permanent,

because the people experienced when they were sleeping what kind

of danger happened to them. Now there is no way for them to go

back to those dark days.

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Iraqi Perspectives
Interview 15
Staff Brigadier General Haqi Isma’eel Ali

Hameed

Commander

2d Region Directorate of Border Enforcement

Staff Brigadier General Haqi Isma’eel Ali Hameed was born in

1958 and graduated from military college as a lieutenant in 1979. He

served in the air force and the Ministry of Defense. He finished in the

top of his class at the staff college, and was subsequently retained as a

lecturer there. He holds a PhD in military science. He left military

service in 1995, but after the fall of Saddam Hussein, he returned to

take command of the 2d Region Directorate of Border Enforcement.

General Haqi was interviewed by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery

and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams on 19 February

2009 in Ramadi.

Staff Brigadier General Haqi Isma’eel Ali Hameed: Before the

invasion, when we listened to the news—at that time, we didn’t

have the satellite channels. It was forbidden. ^e people of Iraq

expected something different than what they actually saw after the

operation. Everyone thought there would be democracy and an

improvement in the scientific and technological fields, and the

quality of life would improve. ^ey thought that all of this would

happen after the operation.

Everybody wanted to change the previous regime, but no one

wanted it in this way. We really hoped that we could change the

regime from inside Iraq, but it was too hard. No one could do it.

Even all the other countries around the world accepted the idea

that it wasn’t going to happen from inside Iraq.

After the invasion of Iraq by the Coalition forces, and after they

were inside all the cities and towns, we saw some really strange and

weird behavior by the Coalition forces, especially what they did

with honest Iraqis who were unarmed. It’s because the Coalition

forces were relying on information from people who came with

221
them from outside Iraq.^e information that the Coalition forces

received from them was 100 percent wrong. We saw some really

weird behavior from them toward Iraqis. We were shamed to the

point where there was no trust toward the Coalition forces, and

the Coalition forces didn’t trust any Iraqis. It created a very bad

impression among Iraqis toward the Marines, and the Coalition

forces in general.

Some honest Iraqis were killed for no reason. For example, some

people were walking in their usual way, and there was a snap

checkpoint. ^ey walked by and got killed. ^ey didn’t know that

they shouldn’t go that way because the checkpoint wasn’t there

before. Several people didn’t do anything to deserve to get killed,

but they were killed for no reason.

People didn’t know how to act with the Marines, how to

communicate with them. ^is lack of information caused them to

make mistakes that cost them their lives. And if they didn’t get

killed, they would be arrested and spend several years in jail for

nothing. All these behaviors from the Coalition forces made the

Iraqis feel that they had to fight.

On the other hand, I can say that I talked with some American

generals and officers in the Marines. I told them there is a

distinctiveness to each town, and city, and area in Iraq, and they

should treat people in one area differently from people in another

area of Iraq. ^ey shouldn’t just treat all Iraqis same because we

have different communities inside these towns. In the countryside,

where you have tribes and sheikhs, you have to deal with them

differently than people living in Baghdad or in the cities. People

living in the south of Iraq should be treated totally different from

people in the north of Iraq.

But the problem was that they didn’t listen.^ey didn’t believe what

I said. ^ey didn’t accept what I said because they didn’t trust us.

We were giving all this advice because we wanted to reduce the

casualties and to stop the fighting before it begins. But they didn’t

listen to us; they listened to the people who came with them from

outside Iraq.^e people who came with them don’t know anything.

^ey continued listening to them until we came to a deadlock, to

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a point where there’s no way forward and no way to go back. ^ey

were in a position to maintain good relationships with Iraqis, but

they didn’t use it.^ey didn’t invest in a good relationship. I hoped

they would listen to the good people of Iraq, who really wanted to

improve the situation at that time and to stop all the casualties and

all the fighting, but they didn’t do that.^ey listened to the people

who came with them.

As an example, in the countryside, in the tribal areas, they have a

tradition of getting revenge when someone kills one of them. So

when one of them—just one individual of that tribe—gets caught

by the Coalition forces, they do everything they can to take revenge

on the Coalition forces.

In addition to that, resistance to invasion is the right of all Iraqis.

^ey have the right to fight back and to protect themselves. It’s a

right.^ey don’t have to ask for it. It’s the right of anyone who gets

invaded and occupied by another country’s forces. And since we

are an Islamic country, meaning a majority of Iraqis are Muslims,

it made people feel that they needed to fight back and to protect

themselves.

^at’s what led the people of Iraq to start fighting the Coalition

forces, in three different ways. ^ere was a strong feeling among

the national, or the good Iraqis that they had to fight back. ^ey

had to get their country back from another people.^ey wanted an

independent country. On the other hand, there was that religious

desire to fight back, because that’s what their religion told them—

that you have to fight back, and get your freedom back, and to

protect yourself. And the third way was the Iraqi response to the

bad treatment that they received from the Coalition forces. ^is

point includes the main tradition that I talked about—that the

tribe has to take revenge on people who kill one of them.

^at’s why they started to form small groups of insurgents. Some

were religious groups, and others were nationalist groups, and some

were military groups. Some of them were from the previous army,

and some of them were from the previous security forces. Some

groups were Ba’ath Party members and people who were close to

the previous regime. At that time, we thought that they had the

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right and the privilege to fight back and to protect themselves. So

that’s why they received wide support from the Iraqi people,

especially in the middle area, like Baghdad, Diyala, Salah ad Din,

and at the top of the list, al-Anbar. And also Ninawa and Mosul.

^ese groups started by attacking the occupation forces. ^ey

depended on light weapons. ^ey were funded by people who

believed in their cause, or maybe they donated their own money.

^at leads us to the emergence of the al-Tawhid wal-Jihad groups,

who were linked to al-Qaeda. ^ey worked tirelessly against the

Coalition, but we found out that they had a hidden agenda. ^eir

agenda was to destroy Iraq. Especially in 2005 and 2006, they had

many excuses and tried to confuse the issues. At that point, people

weren’t able to recognize which of these operations was resisting

and which one was against both the Coalition forces and the Iraqis,

too. ^ey were targeting the Iraqi vehicles that were in Coalition

force convoys, even if it was Iraqi police or Iraqi army, but not the

American vehicles in those convoys. ^ey attacked some of the

American vehicles, but only to give them a cover story or to give

them something for the news. ^en they went and killed honest

Iraqi people who had nothing to do with this.

^ey had huge financial support and huge resources of weapons.

We—the Iraqi people, the civilians—we were forbidden from even

having a stick inside our cars to protect ourselves. We were

forbidden from having any kind of weapons with us. But we could

see that all these groups of al-Qaeda, and some other groups, had

weapons in their cars and on their persons. We were surprised. We

thought that they were cooperating and working together with the

Coalition forces because they controlled everything in al-Anbar

Province. People would address them as al-Qaeda and members of

al-Tawhid. It was easy to address them. ^ey controlled all the

government buildings and facilities, and they controlled all the

roads.^ey were charging fees for people to use these facilities and

to use the roads.

In the last days of their era, they tried to fund their operations by

abducting people and holding them for ransom. ^ey proclaimed

fatwas that this thing is forbidden, and that thing is approved and

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Al-Anbar Awakening
accepted in Islam—according to what was useful to them. ^ey

didn’t believe in the development of the scientific and technological

fields.^ey didn’t believe in technology at all, and they didn’t accept

it. ^ey didn’t think about or improve the quality of life for Iraqis.

^ey really wanted to keep all the people in a very bad situation.

^ey were evil to a point that they didn’t want anyone to be better

than them. ^ey killed the best people in Anbar. ^ey killed some

of the distinguished officers in Anbar, some of the distinguished

sheikhs in Anbar, some of the distinguished, well-educated people

in Anbar. ^ey were killing anyone who was in charge during the

Iran-Iraq War.^ey killed the most distinguished of Iraqi military

officers who fought in the Iran-Iraq War and stopped Iran from

invading Iraq. ^ey killed the best, the most distinguished pilots,

who fought against Iran in that war. By killing those people, they

made the people of Iraq start to think. It made Iraqis understand

that these groups were not working for the benefit of Iraq. ^ey

were just trying to destroy Iraq.

But we have to be honest and say that they were planning, in a smart

way, since they could scam the Iraqis and make them think that they

were working for the benefit of Iraq and according to the Islamic

religion. ^ey got support from foreign intelligence services and

foreign media support, which enabled them to do all that. Without

foreign support, they would never be able to get above all those people.

During that time, some of the most important tenders for rebuilding

projects had been given to some Western and some Iraqi construction

companies. But they were given to bad people. ^e implementation

of these construction projects was really poor, and it wasn’t according

to engineering standards. Supervision by the Marine Corps wasn’t

good. It was really weak. Large amounts of money were spent, and a

lot of bad people benefitted from it. A lot of construction companies

benefitted, but project implementation was poor.

In my personal opinion, I think that these tenders were given to

people who had a special relationship with the Marine Corps.

Some of these construction projects and tenders were given to some

distinguished sheikhs and to some other people that must have a

special relationship with the Marine Corps. My personal opinion

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is that it was done to support certain people financially and to get

them to side with the Marine Corps. Some of those people were

really bad. Before the operation, they were considered bad by the

people in this area. ^en, after the operation, when the Marine

Corps gave them all these tenders and all that money, they became

distinguished and considered good. Of course they’re regarded as

good guys by the Marine Corps, and that creates negative feelings

among the Iraqi people in this area, and they don’t accept it. And

a lot of money was stolen, and many projects would not get

completed and many would be partially completed.

We are an oriental culture. Giving financial support to people who

are disreputable inside the community makes the rest of the

community feel uncomfortable with contacting the Marine Corps

and working with them. People here thought the tenders were

distributed dishonestly, and that everyone should benefit from the

financial support. So the Marine Corps wasn’t successful in

establishing a good relationship with the Iraqi people, and they

weren’t as successful in making the Iraqi people like them. If they

did it a better way, they would be able to have that good

relationship, and then the Iraqis would love them. We know that

the Marine Corps spent a lot of money, but it was not well spent.

Now I’m going to talk about the Awakening at the end of 2006,

specifically in September. Because of the criminal activities of the

al-Tawhid wal-Jihad groups—the al-Qaeda groups—and because

of the fighting they did, all the people here had the feeling that

these groups were bad for Iraq. ^ey were trying to destroy Iraq,

except for a small portion of people who were benefitting from

them and being protected by them. ^e people got involved with

these groups because they thought that they were good people who

were doing something good for Iraq.^ey were just a small number

of people. Most of the people who were involved with them didn’t

believe in their ideology. I guess they were only working with them

because they needed the money, the big financial support that these

groups got from other countries.

Because these groups were targeting the good people—the

distinguished officers and tribal sheikhs, and all the well-educated

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people here—it made people change their minds. ^ey changed

their minds 180 degrees, and everyone here started to believe that

these groups didn’t want anything good for Iraq. ^ey were

destroying bridges, schools, clinics, hospitals and police stations, all

the military facilities, all the government facilities.^ey prevented

people from going to their jobs.

Because of all that, and because we got to a point where we couldn’t

talk with those people—we couldn’t do anything with them—

because of all that, a small, limited-attendance meeting was held in

Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha’s house. It was 14 September 2006.

All the people who attended the meeting believed that we must

start to fight the terrorists by using anyone we had to fight. At that

meeting, they decided which side they’re going to work with and

who is going to support us. And at that meeting, we decided who

would provide financial support, who would provide weapons and

ammunition, who be on our side, and who would be on the

opposite side—from the Iraqi people, the Iraqi government, and

the Americans.

After asking for God’s blessing, and after we talked with the

Americans and the Iraqi government, we got approval to start this

project—but in a formal way, according to Iraqi law and human

rights, with all the judgments in an official court, according to Iraqi

law.^at’s why the tribal sons started enlisting in the police forces.

^e Iraqi government approved the establishment of the police in

al-Anbar Province, and they were going to support us with

weapons and salaries. ^ousands of tribal sons enlisted, and they

were inducted immediately into the police forces. ^en we got

training support from the Americans and from the Iraqi army. And

the Americans gave us very good intelligence support, and we got

very good support for the prime minister, the minister of internal

affairs, and the minister of defense. And that was an official

announcement to start fighting back against the insurgents,

according to Iraqi law.

After starting all that, which was just limited to a small area where

there was popular support, all the people throughout the whole of

al-Anbar started to support this operation. We opened official

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offices for the Awakening in all al-Anbar towns and cities. And

people started enlisting in the police forces by visiting the

Awakening offices directly.

We got very good support from the Iraqi army. ^e 12th Division

and the 7th Division came to Anbar and provided good support.

And the support that we got from the Iraqi prime minister, by

visiting the sheikhs in Anbar, and the Awakening leaders, and other

people who were involved in this operation—it was a very good

thing from him, and he really encouraged us and made it better.

All Anbaris were together in support of the Awakening. We held

a lot of big conferences that were open to all Anbaris to attend,

and we described and explained this big project, the Awakening. I

personally attended more than 10 conferences to explain and

describe this subject, and to tell all the people about the

Awakening, and to encourage them to enlist in the army and police,

and to fight the terrorists according to Iraqi laws and regulations,

and to tell them that we won’t accept any arresting without a

warrant from a judge. When we arrested people to put them in jail,

we were informing them that they can [inaudible].

At that time, we had very good intelligence cooperation and

intelligence support from the Americans. We worked together and

informed each other about people we arrested and jailed. And we

continued that cooperation with the Marine Corps until we

destroyed al-Qaeda in Anbar Province in about the middle of 2007.

Al-Qaeda members really got the point that Anbaris didn’t like

them. ^ey didn’t want them—except for just a few, who were

gaining financially from al-Qaeda. And that’s why they escaped to

other provinces, like Ninawa, Salah ad Din, and Diyala.We followed

them, and we fought them there, and we arrested most of them.

In our security assessments now, we think that there are some sleeper

cells, and we think that there are some people who might support the

terrorists again, later on. ^e majority of the people don’t want to

work with al-Qaeda or support them anymore. We believe that they

are the kind of people who cannot fight face to face.

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If the Marine Corps had accepted the idea of giving weapons to the

regular individuals, to the people in al-Anbar, there would never

have been that kind of fighting at that time. But the terrorists knew

that the normal people—who had civilian cars or were walking to

schools and offices—they didn’t have weapons. ^at’s why they

were easy targets. ^at’s why they started to kill a lot of people—a

lot of people.

Now we believe that al-Qaeda will not come back as they were

before, and they’re going to escape to another country. We will have

a very good security situation in Iraq when we finish building our

security forces—the police, the army, all of them. And also because

I believe that the Iraqi people really, really understand that these

groups from al-Qaeda are bad for Iraq. ^ey are trying to destroy

Iraq. People won’t support them again or give them any place to stay.

We will enjoy peace and security after founding a strong army, and

police, and border guards. ^ose forces will be the key to stopping

the terrorists from coming back.^e thing that we really hate about

al-Qaeda is that they targeted the good people—the distinguished

officers, the distinguished, well-educated people, the distinguished

sheikhs—and all the good people in Iraq. ^eir ideology is not

logical. It’s not something that we can accept.^ese ideas that they

have don’t work, and they aren’t compatible with the development

of the country, and the developed world, and how the conditions of

life should be for the Iraqi people.

Without the Awakening and the sons of the tribes who enlisted in

the police and the army, we couldn’t stop the terrorists in al-Anbar,

and we couldn’t have this good security situation in al-Anbar.

So from this stage, I want to send my greetings and my support to

the Awakening—all of them. I pray to God to bless Sheikh Abdul

Sattar Abu Risha. I worked with him very closely until he was

killed by those evil people. And I am going to send a greeting and

a prayer for his brother, Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha. I want to

express my support and my appreciation for all those people who

laid the cornerstone for the Awakening in September 2006. And I

want to express my thanks and appreciation for all the Anbar sons

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who enlisted in the police and the army, and who fought al-Qaeda

and did their jobs to make Anbar secure.

Also I want to thank the Iraqi government, and especially Prime

Minister Nouri al-Maliki, because he supported all the security

forces in Anbar. His first visit to al-Anbar, when the security

situation was bad, was very supportive. It was a very good thing

that he started talking with the sheikhs here in Anbar, and they

felt good when they found that the prime minister was here with

them. I also want to thank the minister of interior affairs, Jawad

al-Bulani, and the minister of defense, Hamid Abdel Qadir.

And also I want to send my thanks to all the Albu Fahd tribal

sheikhs, who were responsible for east al-Anbar on the right and

on the left of the river.^at’s all that I have, and if you want to ask

me for anything more, I am ready.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: In the months before the conference

in September, were there small groups of Iraqis starting to resist

al-Qaeda?

Haqi: Yes. We called them al-Anbar Revolutionaries. Some of them

were cooperating and coordinating with the Marine Corps in alHabbaniyah, and some of them were supported by the Iraqi army.

^is group of Anbar Revolutionaries that was working with the

Marine Corps went out with them on missions to arrest the

terrorists in their areas, because they lived in the same areas where

the terrorists were living and making hits. So they already knew

where to find them, and they told the Marines how to catch them.

So they were working together. I recall that there were 22 individuals

working with that group. ^ey were going on missions at night,

almost every night, with the Marine Corps and with the Iraqi army.

^e Marines supported them by surrounding the area where they

thought the insurgents were, and this group of Iraqis went inside

the houses and arrested them by themselves, and then they gave

them to the Marine Corps. And that was the most important, and

the best, thing that happened in the story of al-Qaeda.

Montgomery: What is that “thing?”

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Interpreter: It was that this group of people was working together

with the Marine Corps to arrest those insurgents. ^at was the

most important weapon against al-Qaeda.

Haqi: At that time, this group with the Marines, they arrested most

of the insurgents and terrorists. Just a few of them were outside the

houses at that time. It was just a timing issue that they couldn’t

arrest all of them; but they worked hard, and they did their best to

arrest them later, and they did it.

Montgomery: You mentioned getting intelligence from the

Americans. I would think that the Americans would want

intelligence from you. Without getting too specific, because things

like that should not be talked about openly, what was the nature of

the intelligence that they needed from the Americans that was

useful to them? Was it signals intelligence—intercepted radio

signals, or something like that?

Haqi: ^e Marine Corps had very accurate—not semi-accurate,

but very accurate—intelligence about the terrorists and insurgents

in these areas with the help of the Iraqi people who were living

there.^ey were coming to the Marines and telling them about all

that was going on there and where the insurgents were living. So

they already had very accurate information about these things.

When I talked about the cooperation and intelligence support that

the Awakening received from the Marines, I wasn’t talking about

very specific details and deep professional intelligence work. I just

wanted to say that the Marine Corps got some good, accurate

information from the Iraqi people in these areas; and they invested

that information by sharing it with the Awakening so they could

go on missions together.

Montgomery: So the great value was that they were sharing that

information? It was the cooperation that mattered?

Haqi: I can talk from personal experience on this subject, and I’m

going to give you an example. I attended some meetings with

Sheikh Abu Risha in his house, with Marine officers there in the

meeting.^ey were telling us about some intelligence they got from

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Iraqi Perspectives
some Iraqi people about the insurgents in their area. Sometimes

we corrected them and told them it wasn’t accurate. You’ve got to

be accurate. In other cases, at other times, we offered intelligence

to the Marine officers, which we thought was really accurate. But

the Marine officers corrected us and told us something totally

different, which made us change the mission.

So in general, we were correcting each other, working together,

trying to support each other for a common goal—to destroy the

insurgents and al-Qaeda. ^e most important thing was that the

goal was the same for the Marine Corps, for the Iraqi government,

and for the Awakening—to destroy the terrorists, to keep the

security situation in good condition, to stop these groups from

targeting honest people, and to stop these groups from targeting

the Coalition forces.

So that’s why we cooperated very well in everything, and we

supported each other, and provided each other with whatever we had.

And because we were working in a good way, all the people in alAnbar supported us and supported the Awakening. And after that,

we got to a point where it became normal to have meetings with the

Marine officers and with people who provided us with information

attending these meetings. So at that time, the Marine officers were

visiting the tribal sheikhs’ houses, and they were eating lunch with

them, and it was something normal to be together as friends.

Before the Awakening, it was strange to have an American inside

the house of a sheikh, and you didn’t want anyone to know about

it. When American forces came to Iraq at the beginning of 2003,

we had hoped that it would work this way. We hope that the Iraqis

from 2003 to 2007—we hope that Iraqis truly believed that the

Americans came to Iraq to maintain an independent Iraq, and just

to change the regime and support the Iraqi people in developing

their country. But the bad things that happened during these years

made the Iraqis feel something different.

We’d really love to develop the Iraqi country through cooperation

with the Americans—to improve the scientific fields, the

technological fields, health, and all of the other areas. We really

need that, and we would really love to have that.

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From my point of view, the reason that all of these bad things

happened during the first years was because of your relationship

with those people who came with you from outside of Iraq and

provided you with inaccurate information about Iraqi culture and

about the country. You should listen to people who were living

inside Iraq at that time, because they know everything about this

country. You shouldn’t listen to people that left 20 years ago.

Montgomery: Can I ask one more question? ^e Awakening

conference was in September 2006. Approximately one month later

there was a battle at Sufiyah.

Haqi: Yes.

Montgomery: Was that a local event, or did it have an effect on the

entire province? What was the effect of that battle?

Haqi:^e battle at that location was between al-Tawhid wal-Jihad

groups and Sheikh Jassim [Muhammad Saleh al-Suwadawi] and

the Albu Soda tribe. Do you mean the battle when they even killed

some of the women, and some of the houses were burned down?

Montgomery: Yes, he had 17 men.

Haqi: Seventeen, yes. Yes, I know about this event. I know about it.

Montgomery: What effect did it have on the province as a whole,

or did it?

Haqi: Two points on this. ^e first point is al-Tawhid wal-Jihad

got the idea that there was going to be a police station in this area.

And before this event, some people from al-Tawhid wal-Jihad were

killed, and they thought that the people responsible for the killings

were living in this area. ^ey thought that Sheikh Jassim was in

charge and leading his tribe against them. ^ey thought he was a

member of the Awakening, and his brother was the commander of

the police station. ^at’s why al-Tawhid wal-Jihad attacked the

families. ^ey burned down some of the houses. ^ey killed 17

people—some of them were women, some of them were children.

^is was one of the events that made us believe that they really

wanted to destroy us. After that, everyone started working against

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Iraqi Perspectives
these groups. It was really revolting. People hated to hear what

happened there. It was like the first part of the whole operation

against these groups. And also the killing of General Khalid Araq

al-Ataymi. And Sheikh Jassim from the [Abu Ali] tribe. Killing

him also made people really hate those people. He was a good

person. I knew him personally. He was a friend of mine.^ey killed

him when he was coming back from visiting a sick person. ^ey

killed his son and his nephew, too. His family wanted to take his

body for burial, and they couldn’t.^ey had to leave the body there

for several days.^ey cut off his head. His family was begging and

pushing for all the tribal sheikhs to get approval from al-Qaeda to

take his body back.

^ese evil groups did hundreds of repugnant things in Anbar.

^at’s why the people started a revolution against them, because

from our point of view, people who do such loathsome things don’t

deserve live. It’s not acceptable in any religion that an honest person

gets cut up in this appalling way.

I want to tell them, these criminals, that from this moment, we will

never allow them back unless they’re going to walk over our dead

bodies. It’s us or them. We cannot work together. We will never

accept them back in Iraq. Even a little child will not accept them.

Many children have seen their fathers and their brothers killed in

hideous ways, right in front of them. ^ey watched that, and they

will never forget it. After they killed someone, they cut off his head,

and they cut off his hands and his arms and his legs. ^at’s not

acceptable. ^at’s truly unacceptable.

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Iraqi Perspectives
Interview 16
Staff Colonel Abbas Ayed Radad

Commanding Officer

3d Battalion, 29th Brigade

7th Division, Iraqi Army

Staff Colonel Abbas Ayed Radad was born in 1967. He served in

mortar and tank units in the old Iraqi army, in which he attained the

rank of lieutenant colonel in 2002. On 24 March 2004, he joined the

new Iraqi army. After three months of training in Jordan, he was

assigned to the infantry and participated in establishing Battalion 21

of the 8th Brigade, 3d Iraqi Army Division. He served in Kirkuk and

al-Taji, then Mosul, followed by Rabiah, near the Syrian border.

In 2005, Colonel Abbas assisted the election process, participated

in combined U.S.-Iraqi clearing operations in the Tal Afar area, and

then entered staff college in August. After graduating the following

year, he was assigned to the 7th Iraqi Army Division as deputy G-3.

He subsequently served in the G-1 and G-5 sections before being

promoted to the rank of colonel in July 2007. In February 2008, he

took command of 3rd Battalion, 29th Brigade in the 7th Division of

the new Iraqi army.

Colonel Abbas was interviewed by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery

and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams on 23 February

2009 at Camp Korean Village, near ar-Rutbah, Iraq.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: Could you go back and tell us how

things were after the invasion, after Baghdad fell and as the

insurgency developed, what was it like?

Staff Colonel Abbas Ayed Radad: I expected a lot of the Arab

countries to support us because we had been imprisoned, but the

opposite happened. A lot of Arab countries, and terrorists, and

money, took over this country.

Montgomery: Could you describe, as the insurgency started to

develop, what you think caused it and what you remember from

that time?

237
Abbas: ^ere were so many different causes, both internal and

external. First, the internal causes—the spread of weapons. ^e

armories were not secured, so the weapons fell into the hands of

insurgents.^at affected us in a bad way, and the Coalition forces, too.

And secondly, the government—the army, the police, everything—

didn’t work anymore. If they had left some units, at least to secure

the armories, they would have been able to control the insurgency.

On the external side, the neighboring countries did not want a

democratic system in Iraq because their systems are not democratic.

Excluding Turkey, the rest of the neighboring countries are not

democratic. Jordan has a more democratic system, so those two

countries do not support terrorism.

Political conflict between the different sects was one of the factors

that created insurgency. Money from abroad was also a

contributing factor.

Montgomery: I understand that there were a lot of militias and a lot

of different groups at the time. Did you ever see them start to

consolidate into one large group, or was it all largely separate?

Abbas:^ey were always in separate groups, except in the first battle

of Fallujah, where they formed one group. ^e commanders were

led by external forces.

Interpreter: ^ey controlled them, and they called them emirs.

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams: Who were these

emirs?

Abbas: ^ere were some emirs from outside, like [Abu] Musab

[al-] Zarqawi, and another guy called Shami.

Interpreter: He’s from the capital of Syria, Damascus.

Abbas: And he got killed, this guy, Shami. He died in Fallujah.

[inaudible] ^ere were small groups, and big groups like the Mahdi

army.

Montgomery: What’s it like being in the new Iraqi army?

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Al-Anbar Awakening
Abbas: ^e new army is getting better each day. ^ere is the level

that governs the country, and we have the army, which protects the

country. We are trying to build the national institutions of Iraq,

institutions that don’t allow the military to get involved in the

political system. What I mean is, the constitution doesn’t allow the

army or anyone else, such as the Iraqi police, to get involved in the

political system. And now the army is respected by all the people

of Iraq, whatever their religion, whatever their tribe. We don’t have

enough equipment and logistical support, but we are getting there.

And all the people—like the Kurds, the Sunni, the Shi’a, the

Bedouin, the big tribes—they all respect us, and they trust us, too,

especially after the operations in al-Basrah.

McWilliams: Were you down there in Basrah?

Abbas: ^ere was an organization interfering in civilian life there.

^ey controlled the port and some government buildings. So our

law wasn’t working there. Nothing worked well, and they were taking

government funds for themselves. ^ey enforced their own rules. I

know that they killed more than 75 women in Basrah at that time.

So our mission was a success.We returned the honor of the country,

and we gained the trust of the people, and we took democracy back.

Montgomery: What other operations have you been in? Which

unit were you with at that time?

Abbas: In 2005 we were in Tal Afar. We used to work with the

American armored cavalry regiment. We had a really bad situation

there, and it was hard on us. Every day there were people dying,

and a lot of bad things happening. A lot of the civilian population

of Tal Afar left. ^ere was no government there, and the terrorists

controlled that area. ^ey used to come from Syria to Ba’aj, and

then to Tal Afar. ^ey moved one by one.

We made a plan with the Americans.We divided the city into small

parts, and the mission lasted 30 days. We brought in concrete

barriers and set up checkpoints everywhere, and we cleared a

section and moved to another one. A lot of terrorists were killed.

Most of them were from Saudi Arabia and Syria. ^e hospital

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Iraqi Perspectives
started working again.^e government started operating again.We

returned the mayor to work. So it was an excellent operation.

Afterward, there were no more VBIEDs [vehicle-borne improvised

explosive devices]. But the situation was not really that good.^ey

still have some issues.

McWilliams: In 2003 and 2004, what were your impressions of the

U.S. military, and how have those changed to the present?

Abbas: Actually, the Americans were welcome, and we all expected

you to rebuild the country faster than it was. We thought that the

economy here was going to be really good after that. And the

dollars used . . .

Interpreter: Like, if you want to buy Iraqi dinars, one dollar can

buy 150 dinars, but after you came, guys, you can buy 135 dinars.

In the beginning, it was like 75 dinars for the one dollar.

Abbas: We got a lot of new equipment, new vehicles, new cars,

universal phones. And we got the satellite, because we weren’t

allowed to use it in the past.

Montgomery: How has the satellite changed Iraq?

Abbas: We were surrounded, and the borders were blocked. So after

satellite came, we started looking at the world, turning to the people

around us and the people abroad, and satellite brought that.We have

a totally different picture than before about the outside world.

Montgomery: Can you tell us about your experiences during the

Awakening?

Abbas: ^e organizational base for the terrorists pressured the

civilian population and created a dictatorship. People started

forming groups to rebuild themselves, and they called themselves

the Awakening. And the army really helped them a lot, helped to

build the Awakening. And the friendly forces helped them.

Now we want the Awakening to melt into one pot in the national

map. But now they trust it, and they did well in the election. As

Iraqis, we want each force to put Iraq first. ^e government has

tried to pull the Awakening people into the army and the police.

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Al-Anbar Awakening
It’s pretty hard. ^e hard times are not over. But time and wise

political men will solve this problem. We want their loyalty to be

to Iraq, not to their tribes.

McWilliams: You said that the army helped the Awakening. In

what ways?

Abbas: I’m just speaking from my experience in al-Anbar. We were

with the friendly forces, giving them some light trucks—just

normal vehicles. We helped them by taking some of them to join

the police, and we built some police stations for them, and we

helped them in training with the friendly forces.

Montgomery: What was the training like in Jordan?

Abbas: Our training was in the military college. For two weeks, we

learned only military subjects. And then there were civilian subjects.

We learned about the Geneva Conventions, human rights,

international law, civil-military relations, and peace operations. So

those two weeks were new for us. I had some training on the M16,

the M4, the 81mm mortar, and some western weapons, and the

AK [assault rifle], PKM [machine gun], and RPG [rocketpropelled grenade]. . . .

Montgomery: What was the training like under the Saddam

[Hussein] regime?

Abbas: It was just military. All the training in the military college,

we just talked about military topics, nothing else.

Montgomery: During the insurgency and the rise of al-Qaeda,

what did you think about the insurgents’ training? Could you see

differences from one group to the next? Were the insurgents well

trained? I guess that’s the question.

Abbas: Some of them came from abroad and some from inside of

Iraq.^ose from the inside, most of them used the same techniques

as the old Iraqi army.^e VBIEDs came from outside of Iraq. We

wouldn’t know what a VBIED is. Only the military engineers knew

about this.

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Iraqi Perspectives
^ere are some really horrific ways of slaughtering people. ^ey

used to kidnap people and cut off their heads. ^at stuff we never

had that before. ^ey came from abroad.

^ere was a group that was controlled by the Iranians, which used

IEDs [improvised explosive devices] made with uranium.We don’t

know those things. We heard that those IEDs came from Iran. I

think they’re high-quality. I think they’re made in Russia and pass

through Iran. I don’t know exactly where they came from. I think

it’s just going through Iran. ^ey used it for a while, and now it’s

not here anymore. So this is an enemy technique.

We saw some other techniques in Tal Afar.^ere were abandoned

houses there. ^ey emplaced explosives all around those houses,

and when Americans or Iraqis get inside, they detonate the

explosives, and the roof falls on them.

Montgomery: What do you think caused the Awakening?

Abbas: It’s because the religious edicts and the self-appointed

dictatorship were too hard. So they gathered themselves and

formed groups. Most people couldn’t leave their homes. People who

left their homes and went to the city were captured and accused of

being an agent and passing information to the Americans. ^ey

just killed anyone who went outside. Some of them they captured

and killed in front of their families. And they caught members of

the army and the police and killed them, too.

^en the Awakening began, and they saw the noose getting tighter

every day. ^ey saw that they were not really human beings

anymore. It’s not worth prolonging [inaudible]. So they sat down

with the army and the police, and they asked for law.

At the beginning they were with the Americans, so the Americans

helped them at first. After that, with the Iraqi government, with

the police and the army, so the experience in al-Anbar was

successful. In some places in Baghdad, it was successful, too. And

now they’ve succeeded in [Tarmiya]. But I don’t know about the

other provinces.

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Al-Anbar Awakening
McWilliams: You said that in 2003, the people expected the United

States and the Coalition to rebuild Iraq, and that didn’t happen fast

enough.

Abbas: Yes, we expected to get electricity at least.

McWilliams: Do you feel that we’re helping rebuild Iraq now?

Abbas:^e American Marines and the American government still

did a lot of things to rebuild Iraq, especially in building democracy

and the political system.^e results showed in the election in each

state, and we expect the next election at the end of 2009 to be more

successful than this one. And the Americans have been rebuilding

the army and the police, too. And now America looks to be

building a new banking system.^ey are building new universities,

like the American University in Sulaimaniyah. And now they are

trying to fix electricity and fuel. In 2004, 2005, it was really hard to

get fuel. Now whenever you stop at a station, you can get fuel. . . .

^ere is not enough time to fix all the problems in Iraq, but we can

do some things. What the common people have a problem with

now is electricity. Electricity can solve unemployment by 75

percent. Restaurants, factories, people working as engineers, even

farming—all these need electrical power. From the people who

have small ice cream shops or small juice shops to the big factories,

all those people need electricity. So electricity helped a lot by

helping people who are not working and giving them jobs. We saw

progress in the oil department, but electricity is not yet solved. It

might even have gotten worse. And the reason for that, some of

the insurgency groups destroyed the electrical towers. And if we

insist on electricity, I think it’s going to get better.

So Iraq’s like, you know, we put our money into communications,

cell phones, and now we have weak communication between each

other. Now we need to put our money into electricity, because even

communication needs electricity, the fuel sector needs electricity,

too—manufacturing and farming—everything. . . .

If I want to say anything else, it’s just about the army getting better

all the time by working with you guys. It’s just a matter of the time

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Iraqi Perspectives
is kind of good now, so we will be done on time. We need some

equipment and some training. Especially the border vehicles, they

need radar so they can figure out who’s flying over the country. It’s

really hard to cover all of the border in vehicles on the ground.

McWilliams: A lot of people are very curious about Iraq because we

didn’t know very much about Iraq before we came here, and we’re

learning. What would you like to tell us about Iraq that you think

the rest of the world needs to know?

Abbas: Iraq used to be called a black-earth place. Black earth means

agriculture, and a lot of people lived this way. And it’s really a

cultured place. It’s cultured, and in the past there used to be so

many people who came from abroad to trade. ^ere were four

civilizations here: Babylon, Asshur, Akkad, and Sumer. ^ose four

civilizations were here. It’s the grant for the prophets [discussion

with interpreter regarding whether “prophet” or “messenger” is the

correct term in English] like the messenger Abraham, Jonah,

Elisha, David, Noah. ^ose are the names of messengers. All of

them were born in Iraq.

Iraq is better now than in the old years. Even though we went

through a lot for it, even though there were wars and fighting and

blood around, we know we are better off. We have our freedom

now. We make our decisions by ourselves, and we decide who is

going to be in political office through our elections. And now we

know where we spend our money. We’re looking forward to

working with all the world outside.

In Pakistan, there was earthquake. Among the first companies to go

over there to help Pakistan and to build their tents was an Iraqi

company.^is was the first humanitarian assistance mission for us

outside the country. . . .

McWilliams: How is Anbar different from the rest of Iraq, or is

Anbar different from the rest of Iraq?

Abbas: It’s different—the tribes and culture.^ese people are kind

of Bedouin, but they have their own traditions and their culture.

You can say that they’re beautiful and truthful, generous, honest.

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McWilliams: How is security out there in this part of Anbar?

Abbas: ^e Coalition forces, and the border forces, the army, Iraqi

highway patrol, need some work to improve their working together,

but they’re doing a good job. Now, the ways to Syria and Jordan

work. So this helps our economy. Everything Iraqis need—like big

generators—goes through this way. And everything else, like

chlorine, too.

McWilliams: What are some of the challenges or problems you

have out here?

Abbas: For the Iraqi army, it’s logistical support. For me, the same

thing, logistical support. We’re missing fuel. We need more spare

tires and some equipment. We don’t have all of those.

McWilliams: Do you still have foreign fighters or terrorists coming

across the border?

Abbas: Jordan is helpful all the time. ^e way from Jordan, Iraqis

control the road, and they’re doing a good job.

And Syria, I guess they still bring some terrorists over, especially

through Mosul, al-Qaim, and Rabiah.

^ere are some people who are wanted. ^ey are outside the

country, and they come back. One of them was in Fallujah. We

captured him, and he had committed a lot of crimes.

McWilliams: Who are they?

Abbas: He was originally from Iraq, but he left while security was

bad. He ran away to Syria. Maybe he expected his situation was

going to be more normal, but the police captured him—a terrorist.

^ey investigated him, and they took him to every place he

committed crimes. He showed them exactly what he did, and we

learned from this guy. . . .

But one of the big challenges for Iraq now is to bridge the gap

between people, to build trust.

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Iraqi Perspectives


Interview 17
Staff Major General Jasim Muhammad

Salih Habib

Chairman of Research Center comprised of former

Iraqi General Officers

Former Director General of Inventory, old Iraqi Army

Former Commander, 38th Division, old Iraqi Army

General Jasim Muhammad Salih Habib fought in Iran-Iraq War

and commanded a battalion in the invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf

War. He lived in the Soviet Union for two years, and he was a highranking member of the Ba’ath Party.

General Jasim was interviewed by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery,

Lieutenant Colonel Bradley E. Weisz, and Chief Warrant Officer-4

Timothy S. McWilliams on 14 February 2009 at Camp Ramadi.

General Jasim Muhammad Salih Habib: After the first battle of

Fallujah, Mohammed Abdullah al-Shahwani, the intelligence

director in Baghdad, called me. I met with him and General [ James

T. ] Conway, and we agreed to establish an army in Fallujah to control

the city and let the American forces leave. I established the first

battalion in Fallujah, and after the city settled down, I left because I

was a division commander. It’s not good to go back to a lower level.

I remained available as an advisor, and I met frequently with General

[ John F.] Kelly and the leaders of the Marines in al-Anbar.

We established a research center to provide advice on how to

establish the Iraqi army. We presented a lot of studies on how to

reestablish the Iraqi army and put them back in active service in alAnbar. We conducted many studies on the interference of the

Iranians and other countries, and how to make al-Anbar more

secure, and many other things. Six months ago [mid-2008], we

started to write—other former officers and I—started to do many

studies on these subjects. . . . And we, as the former leaders of the

Iraqi army, conducted many studies on how to build the new Iraqi

249
army, and how to train them, and how to establish a system to

sustain them. I am the chairman of the center, and I have about 40

generals with me. We conducted research on the Gulf threats, and

the Kurdish subject, and other things.

One of the important studies I did was on how even the oldest

armies are victims of their countries’policies. I researched from the

time of [Adolf ] Hitler until now. ^e army is a tool in the hands

of the politician. Sometimes we execute orders that we are not

satisfied with. When we invaded Kuwait [in 1990], I was a

battalion commander. I executed the orders, but I wasn’t happy, and

I didn’t think what we did was good or right. We did our jobs over

there, but we kept our dissent inside.

^rough these studies, we keep current, and we exercise our minds,

and we stay in touch in our lives, and we preserve our experience.

^is experience will be for our sons—a history, after we pass away.

^e Marines over here support us financially to cover the costs of

writing and printing these studies. And I suggest that this support

continue in order to maintain the relationship.

To be honest with you, there is strong enmity between us and Iran.

^ey killed many officers from the former army. Some of us left

Iraq for a time. Now it’s safer, so we came back. And I’m certain

that one day you will fight Iran, if only to drive them out of Iraq.

And if you do that, I will be the first to volunteer to fight with you,

because this country has settled down, and it is known throughout

history that the Iranians are the enemies of the Iraqis, and now is

their opportunity to fight us. We know the land, and we know

what’s on the land.We know the ways—how to progress.We know

their locations and their cities on the border. If we were blind, we

would still know how to go over there.

And you have a responsibility: don’t leave Iraq without driving the

Iranians out of Iraq. I’m not talking for myself; I’m speaking on

behalf of the officers I work with. All these leaders have very great

experience, and recent experience. All of them will support you very

well if you throw these people out. So we give you our experience,

our lives, what we know, so make it useful for you before you leave.

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We, friends, we didn’t do anything wrong. We just defended our

country. Every one of us is proud of himself and his country. We

don’t make problems; we obey orders and defend our country.

You fought the British when they occupied your lands. You fought

them, and you had the honor to liberate your country. ^e British

left, and now you are friends with them.We are the same.We could

be your dear friends, and we could take care of your national

interests and our own. We don’t hate Americans as a people, or

anything related to America. As a former leader in the Iraqi army,

it’s been very useful to have experience from the Western countries.

We used to have French systems, the Super Étendard aircraft, and

we used German technicals. During the Iran-Iraq War, we learned

a lot from Western experience and, but for the mistakes of our

political people, we should have continued working with them.^is

was a big mistake by Iraq’s political leaders.We know that the West

helped us to destroy the Iranian army. But politicians don’t do what

the army likes.

Now you, as leaders, have to be here because of your orders. You

cannot stand up in front of political leaders and tell them, “I won’t

go.”So it’s not right that the Iranians and the Shi’a parties that are

with the Iranians want revenge against the entire old Iraqi army.

^is is not logical. One day you will leave Iraq. No one will have the

right to ask you why you invaded Iraq, because you are respected

soldiers, and you obey orders. ^at’s your job. . . .

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: To cover how we got to where we

are, could you back up a little bit and describe how the insurgency

came about?

Jasim: In the beginning, when the Americans were threatening to

invade Iraq, Saddam [Hussein] called for foreign fighters. Under

the circumstances, they came as Arabs to fight with their brothers

against the Americans, and most of them came through Syria.

After the invasion and occupation of Iraq, most of them left. A few

remained, but they started to increase again, especially in 2004.

^e Syrians and the Iranians felt that the Americans were going to

invade them, so the Syrians started to push a lot of people into Iraq.

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^e Iranians did the same thing.^e purpose for this was to keep the

Americans busy inside Iraq so the U.S. Army couldn’t go into Iran or

Syria.^e political leaders in Iran and Syria expected to face the same

thing that Saddam faced. So Syria welcomed all the international

volunteers, and Iran secured ways from Afghanistan and Pakistan

through to Iraq. ^ey distributed their people throughout all the

provinces to keep the Americans busy fighting them.

^ey formed cells and used religious cover to gain the sympathies

of some of the groups that were already fighting. Some people

believed this deception, and they gained the support of many Iraqis

under the excuses of resistance and jihad.

^en they started slaughtering Iraqis. ^ey killed former army

officers, and they killed the sheikhs, and the imams, and the

university professors. People saw it very clearly and started to

realize that these people didn’t come to fight Americans.^ey came

to loot and steal, and to execute Iranian and Syrian policy.

As you know, deceit cannot last long. Consequently, their excuses

[inaudible] hundreds of thousands of people that had helped them,

especially in al-Anbar Province, Salah ad-Din Province, Baghdad, and

Mosul Province. Diyala Province still has problems because it is very

close to the border with Iran, and it’s a transit area for these groups.

And I will tell you something: looking carefully, 75 percent of the

resistance is connected to Iran, and about 10 percent from alQaeda, which is connected to the Kurds.^ey want to make a weak

Iraq, a very weak army, and a weak administration, so that the

Kurds can take half of Iraq, and Iranians can take the south, and

Syria can take some of the lands in the west. But the good people

of Iraq and their efforts [inaudible].

Al-Qaeda works for whoever pays.^e Iranians pay.^e Kurds pay.

Syria pays. And Syria pays through the Iranians.

And now, with your efforts and the good Iraqis, we broke alQaeda’s back. Maybe we’re going to have some small groups in the

future, because there is a difference between quiet and safe. It may

be quiet for a week, a month, a year, but security is still not 100

percent. But there is a percentage, and there is a percentage of

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quietness. If you want complete security, and almost all the time, I

advise you to bring back the Iraqi army—not me, but those who

have been with me. I am ready, but don’t send for me. I can give you

the best leaders in the former Iraqi army, and this is in your interest

and in ours. We respect your interests, and we care about our own.

We believe in God. ^e way you respect our people, we respect

yours. We are military leaders, we know how to behave, and how to

be riflemen, and we don’t lie. Just the opposite—we sacrifice

ourselves, and this is the highest level of generosity.

Now for the future: bring back the former Iraqi army, make a

balance between the Shi’a and Sunni, make a force against the

Iranians, make the Kurds behave, and keep Syria and Hezbollah

and their problems away. Iraq is a store of resources, but this

treasury needs a force to protect it.

All the people in government, the politicians, they do not offer

protection.^ey don’t protect the people, and they don’t protect the

resources, and they don’t protect the borders. ^ey just protect

themselves. We can’t trust them to keep a country. We are pleading,

and we trust you. You are honest people who make an honest effort.

We met with you more than 20 times, but there is something

missing. We need you to force the government of Iraq to protect the

country. A long time has passed, and we haven’t seen any strength.

^e Shi’a parties, which came from Iran, don’t like the army. ^e

Kurds don’t like the former Iraqi army. ^e Kuwaitis don’t like the

Iraqi army. Syria doesn’t like the former Iraqi army. Even the Saudis

don’t like the former Iraqi army, which was creating [inaudible]

from their countries. But what did we do wrong? We have

resources, and there was always an army preserving these resources.

And honestly, I will tell you. We didn’t follow Saddam and his

politics. Saddam’s terrible mistakes brought us into this bad

situation. I have researched it, and historically, good armies are

victims of bad policies.

We need a leader, a very honest leader, who will look out for all

Iraqis, who will lead all Iraqis—Shi’a, Sunni, Arabs, Kurds—and

keep a good relationship with the whole world, someone faithful

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Iraqi Perspectives
and honest in protecting Iraqi resources and putting the country on

the right path. Please, you and President [Barak H.] Obama, look

for this person. Among Iraqis, there are thousands of such people,

just as there are thousands of leaders in America. At least in Iraq,

there are hundreds of leaders. ^ank you.

Montgomery: Can you tell us how the Awakening came about? Or

maybe I should say Awakenings, plural.

Jasim: As I told you, al-Qaeda started to humiliate people, and they

started smuggling on the highway. Most of them were criminals

and prison convicts. So when they started attacking our elite

people—the scientists or imams or other leaders—people turned

against them.

And when the Americans were fighting them with helicopters, or

in other ways, a lot of houses were destroyed by the shooting. For

example, if they are at this point [pointing to top of table], when

the Americans attack them, many of the surrounding houses will

be damaged [gestures to surrounding area].

^en they, themselves, when they detonated IEDs [improvised

explosive devices], thousands of innocent people were victims.

Because of that, the Iraqi people hated for them to be here.

^ey kept going back into the area until they lost the trust of the

people. As you know, to survive, a resistance movement needs an

atmosphere where people will accommodate them when they need

help—help with fuel, with weapons, with whatever. But the people

didn’t want them. After a number of sheikhs were killed, the tribes

started talking. Groups of tribesmen started working together, and

the people took an oath to not just drive them out, but to follow

them and kill them.

In the first phase, many of the sons joined the police or the army.

^ese new volunteers were targeted by al-Qaeda. So there was

direct fighting between them, and the police and army were

supported by the tribes.

^ey lost the atmosphere of trust. ^ey couldn’t move freely. ^ey

could only move on the highways. And so the areas where they

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were concentrated became dangerous, and people started killing

them. ^e sheikhs started fighting al-Qaeda in al-Qaim near the

Syrian border, and it went down to the Abu Risha area, and went

down to Baghdad.

And there is another point I would like to bring to your attention.

^e transgressions of the militias in Baghdad gave the Awakening

the opportunity to appear in Baghdad.^e Awakening in al-Anbar

fought al-Qaeda. In Baghdad, in Diyala, they fought the militias.

So the Awakening had two responsibilities: fighting al-Qaeda and

fighting the militias. It’s my opinion that the awakenings in the

east and south of Baghdad stopped the militias.

But don’t believe that the government of Iraq is finished with

militias.^e government of Iraq made the militias. What killed the

militias was the Awakening. Consequently, the aovernment of Iraq

now blocks the Awakening from joining the army and the police.

Without your forces, they wouldn’t have accepted any of them.

^e Awakening in Baghdad was responsible for three things.^ey

increased the military. ^ey made a balance inside the army

between Shi’a and Sunni. And they fought the militias very bravely

and killed them—in the Karkh area, the Adhamiyah area, in the alJamia district, in al-Doura district.^ese Awakenings, you just give

them the green light and they stop the militias permanently. Now,

if we don’t have the Awakening in Baghdad, the militias will come

back again.

Could any part of the Shi’a parties be from Iran? All of them have

their own militias. ^erefore, they don’t want the Iraqi army to

come back because the appearance of the former Iraqi army will

kill them.

So I’m telling you, take it from us, we don’t need a personal

advantage, because these people are your responsibility.^e military

is supposed to protect people. You are defending the American

population, which is thousands of kilometers away. When we

volunteer, we swear to defend the country and protect the people.

You and us, we create a force that respects the people, creates

stability, and defends resources, protects the borders, and maintains

a good relationship with the world.

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Iraqi Perspectives
Now we have to make a stand. ^e stars of the political coalition

are falling one by one, and I will tell you something. As I said

before, I am a very analytical officer. After this election, former

members of the provincial council intend to flee abroad. Some

people have called for their passports to be taken to prevent them

from leaving, because they are thieves, and they took the national

treasure. ^ey have no vested interests here, so they can take their

passports and just run away. And the people in parliament now,

after this year ends, and they can feel that no one is going to deal

with them—they’re going to run away too—after Iraq is destroyed.

^erefore we want to cooperate and have a human relationship and

have the military honored.^is is a matter of human responsibility.

We need to put the right person in the right place. I was very

honest with you—90 percent of the current Ministry of Defense

was among the worst in the Iraqi army. I can give you the history

of each one. ^ey are very bad people, and they are very poor

soldiers. And they have the highest ranks. Honestly, you have to

take care of them. ^is is totally honest. If there was a guy selling

something on the street, you would make him a general. . . .

Lieutenant Colonel Bradley E. Weisz: As we get ready to possibly

downsize here in Iraq, what forces or capability do you think needs

to stay behind?

Jasim: ^is is a very good question.^e nature of the force is more

important than the size. You have to choose a force that can move

fast, that has helicopters. Also, they should have good information

resources. And, in my opinion, don’t work too hard on training.^e

former Iraqi army is full of instructors. You go for operations. If

you put a division in Mosul, and one division in Baghdad, and one

division in Diwaniyah or Nasiriyah, that is more than enough. . . .

^ree divisions in our system is a corps. ^e number would be

about—with administration, with service people, logistics, medical,

everything—50,000 people is more than enough, if concentrated on

these points. Make a good, active border force. Give the tanks and

weapons to the Iraqi army, because I know if you transport them

back to America, it will cost you more than leaving them over here.

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Al-Anbar Awakening
You have high-technology weapons, and it takes a long time to

train on them. But if we go to the main problem, if we bring back

the Iraqi army, we could relieve you of this responsibility.You would

have the main force and take care of the strategic things. But leave

the technical things to Iraqis.

Don’t depend on this army and leave a small force here, because

you’re going to be in trouble. Make a national, faithful army. Don’t

believe in the Iranians, and don’t believe in the Kurds, and don’t

even believe in the Sunnis. We don’t care. Iraq has Shi’as, Sunnis,

and Kurds, et cetera. Bring back some military leaders.^ey didn’t

listen to them, and there are a lot.

Also, you’ve got to institute human rights. You will respect that

army. It will be like your army. History will mention you in good

ways if you leave this country, but not if it is demolished and

fighting continues in a civil war.^e consequences of that would be

your responsibility.

If I were an American leader, I could withdraw all of my forces and

not keep anyone here. But the results? Not good. It’s not just your

army. I could keep a personnel chart and make the numbers go

down day by day, until I put the last ones on an airplane and took

them away. But this is not in your behavior. It’s not good. It is not

the job you came here to do, and it’s not good for your efforts in

relations with Iraq or for American global relations.

In the meantime, I think 50,000 in three divisions, with firepower,

mobility, and very good intelligence systems. Don’t worry about

training and everything. ^at’s not going to get you anywhere.

You can’t achieve quietness and security just by force, by

reconstruction, and by good relationships.^e government of Iraq

must be forced to respect the people and to obey the rule of law.^e

other day, Mr. [ Joseph R.] Biden [ Jr., U.S. vice president] came.

He forced the government of Iraq to follow a rule and stay together,

and the government of Iraq was upset by this. And [Nouri Kamil

Mohammed Hasan al-] Maliki, the prime minister, says “^e days

of American controls on the Iraqi are gone.”If I were in your place,

I would clip his wings and keep him on a perch, because the

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Iraqi Perspectives
Americans take better care of the people than he does. So suppose

there were a declaration that told him, “Behave or we’re going to

throw you out.”

What we have, your forces are a reality for us here and now. So

make stability in the meantime. Sometimes political action is more

effective than force. Maybe General [Raymond T.] Odierno

[USA]—and my regards to him—can tell the government of Iraq

that if they don’t have a deadline for getting the politicians on

board, then we, the Americans, have the force to throw you out and

force you to do it in a way that gives us a limited time. Make them.

Six months ago, a delegation came from the Ministry of Defense

in Baghdad and collected all the former military leaders here, and

they interviewed us. I was there, and they talked nicely with us.

“We are brothers. You are my friend. We are under your request.

Who wants to go back?”

All of us said, “Yes, we’d like to go back and serve our country.”

But in fact, they didn’t return anyone. ^ey lie on you; they lie to

the American administration.^ey passed the election the way they

wanted, and they didn’t bring back the service. And they do it

repeatedly. ^ey go to Syria, Jordan, the Emirates, everywhere the

former leaders are, and try to get them to come back—and they

are lying.^ey won’t do it.^ey are liars. But the former Iraqi army

is sleeping now. But if they are still having unfair [inaudible],

otherwise he’s going to go up and kill himself. ^at’s what I have.

After that, I will make sure we are friends. You and us, we have

responsibility. Please correct the mistake that was made by

[Ambassador L. Paul] Bremer. I believe it’s not his fault.^ere was

something—foreign reasons, and there were internal reasons. But,

please, as long as you know that dissolving the former Iraqi army

was a mistake, correct it before you leave. ^ank you.

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Iraqi Perspectives
Interview 18
Staff Major General Khadim Muhammad

Faris al-Fahadawi al-Dulaymi

Former Deputy Commander,

al-Anbar Operations Center

Former Staff Major General under the Ba’ath regime

Former 60th Iraqi National Guard Commander

Staff Major General Khadim Muhammad Faris al-Fahadawi alDulaymi was born in 1952. Following graduation from military college

in 1977, he was stationed in the Kirkuk area, where he commanded a

company in the 31st Special Forces Brigade. During the Iran-Iraq War,

his unit moved to a sector east of Amarah and worked with the 9th

Division, conducting direct action and surveillance and reconnaissance

missions. In 1984 he attended a special operations course in Egypt.

Immediately upon his return, he conducted a successful operation

behind Iranian lines, for which he was highly decorated and tasked

with establishing Unit 999, based on the Egyptian curriculum and his

own experiences.

From 1984 to 1986 he earned a master’s degree in military science

and staff rank. Upon graduation, he was selected to create a special

forces capability within the Republican Guard. He commanded the

16th Special Forces Brigade during the1990 invasion of Kuwait and

the 1991 suppression of the Shi’a uprising in the south. About 1995,

he was transferred to the Fedayeen Saddam, where he remained until

assuming command of the 15th Division from 2000 until 2003. Little

is known about his activities in 2003 to 2004; however, he became part

of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in 2004 and then the Iraqi National

Guard in 2005 when the Civil Defense Corps was disbanded. He left

military service in 2005.

General Khadim was interviewed by Colonel Gary W.

Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams

on 15 February 2009 at Camp Ramadi.

261
Staff Major General Khadim Muhammad Faris al-Fahadawi alDulaymi: If we start with al-Anbar as it was before 2003, it was a

normal province, like other provinces in Iraq. ^ere was a security

organization—Iraqi police, and other security. ^ey worked as

Iraqis under the laws of Iraq. But it was also different from the

other provinces in that there was a tribal culture here. ^e tribes

had their own traditional laws, and they didn’t interfere with the

security systems of the central government.

When the Americans entered Iraq, and the country collapsed—

the whole organization—al-Anbar was one of these. Before the

American forces entered the province, the sons of al-Anbar went

out to the street and protected the government offices and kept the

province secure. ^e tribes worked together to keep the province

settled down, and there was good coordination between the army

and other forces and the tribes and the sheikhs.

When the American forces arrived at K-70 [kilometer marker 70

on the highway], some of the leaders and the sheikhs went out to

meet the American forces. ^ere was rumored to be a deal: the

sheikhs and the tribes would remain in control of the situation

inside the cities, and the American military forces would stay

outside of the cities. ^e sheikhs and the tribes were going to take

over administration and security in the cities, and the American

forces were going to open an office, which was, maybe, under the

name of reconstruction.

It was about April 2003, approximately between [inaudible] and K-70.

I wasn’t in the delegation, but I heard about it. One of the delegates

was one of my friends, General Mohammad Jarawi, who has been

killed, God bless him. He was the leader of the army responsible for

protecting al-Anbar Province under the previous government.

A local government was established.^e sheikhs and the Coalition

forces had a deal and brought a governor and put him in as

governor of al-Anbar. He was former Iraqi police officer.^ere was

also a general called Ja’adan who took care of the police. And all the

government offices kept working.

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When the American forces went inside the city, they demolished

the deal. It was quite secure for about six months. ^e

reconstruction office was working, giving contracts to people. ^e

government was working. ^e police were working. Everyone was

working normally. And the Marines were walking around the

streets. No one was attacking them or saying anything against

them. Sometimes they were even buying from the stores, buying

from the restaurants.

During this period of time, which was about six months, there were

too many mistakes.^e local government made mistakes, and some

of the sheikhs who were very close to the Americans. ^ere were

some things done by the Americans that were wrong by the rights

of the culture of al-Anbar. And there were other mistakes, which

led to some small groups firing on the Americans. We heard and

saw small groups hiding and shooting at American convoys when

they passed by.^ey called themselves mujahideen. All the mistakes

that I mentioned I detailed in a study. ^ese small groups started

getting support from both inside and outside of Anbar, and they

started to grow and grow. As they grew, the mistakes of the other

side—the Coalition, the sheikhs—became bigger and bigger. Many

movements started to appear, like the Islamic Movement and the

Army of Muhammad, and they were all fighting under jihad. And

the people of al-Anbar sympathized with these groups.

Because of the mistakes, not for other reasons, until about the end

of 2004 there was a new movement infiltrating these groups.^ey

called themselves al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. ^ey took all the kids and

the people who lived in poverty or had low social standing, and

they provided them with extraordinary support. Many people went

for these things and said it was jihad, just like the other groups said.

^is movement got stronger very quickly and started to control the

other groups of mujahideen. And they started to close in on the

imams, the sheikhs, and the high-ranking officers of al-Anbar

because they were dealing with the Americans.

^eir leaders had a new name; they were called emirs. Each emir

had too much authority—to kill, to steal, to do anything he liked.

He had the authority, and people obeyed him.^e people working

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Iraqi Perspectives
with him adhered to his ideas on killing or stealing or anything.

People began to recognize that this was not jihad. ^ese people

came to kill. So people were alienated from them.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: Did this emir get his authority from

someone else, or just from the barrel of a gun?

Khadim: No, from high-level people, from his leaders.

Montgomery: From inside Iraq, or outside Iraq?

Khadim: ^is title, emir, came from foreign Arabs. ^ey brought

this title from abroad.^ese emirs, almost all of them were foreign

Arabs—not of Iraqi nationality.

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams: Are you talking

about Abu Musab al-Zarqawi?

Khadim: He was the big guy. What I mentioned were the local

emirs. I was talking about al-Anbar, not Iraq. Abu Musab alZarqawi was the emir of the Islamic Country in Iraq, but I was

talking about the local leaders.

McWilliams: So they worked for him?

Khadim: ^ese emirs were distributed in al-Anbar in sectors. Each

sector had an emir to control it, and they all belonged to the big guy.

Anbar started to suffer from destruction and poverty. And the

mistakes became bigger and bigger. I’ll give you an example of how

the Coalition forces behaved at the time. ^ey would attack and

search houses, and they searched the houses of innocent people. So

people saw the Americans trash houses and arrest innocent people,

while the insurgents—the bad guys—were moving about freely.

No one even talked to them. ^at means, in my opinion, the

Americans didn’t have good advisors to tell them how to behave in

such a situation. And the people who the Anbaris saw close to

them were only interested in how to benefit and to profit. ^ey

didn’t care about improving al-Anbar.

In 2004, a national guard brigade was established under the

supervision of the Coalition forces and with the advice of the

sheikhs and the local government. ^is brigade contained bad

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elements because it wasn’t established skillfully.^is was at the end

of 2004.^ere were security forces, local government, and Coalition

forces, but the situation was unbearable. Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha

came to me at the end of 2004. He told me about the brigade and

said it was already established with all its people, supplies, and

everything. He asked me to be the commander. I was interested in

having security back in the province, so I accepted the position.

I met the American generals of that time. ^ey gave me written

orders to start my job. But I couldn’t make it go in the right

direction to achieve security and stability. I tried to make it work,

to activate this brigade, but the brigade was compromised. Many of

the people inside it were loyal to the jihad groups, and some of

them were there for the personal benefit of some sheikhs. So the

brigade failed.

In 2005, the situation was getting worse, and everyone left his job.

^e police left, the national guard left, the local government left.

^ey were just cornered. ^ey couldn’t move. ^ey couldn’t do

anything. ^e government offices shut down, and the insurgents

completely controlled the province.

^e first experiment in trying to destroy the terrorists was in 2005

in the al-Qaim area. ^ere was a group of tribes cooperating with

the Coalition forces in that area, and they started fighting alQaeda. But al-Qaeda was a strong force.^ey were very aggressive

and very active against anyone even suspected of dealing with these

sheikhs. Consequently, this experience was limited; it didn’t go all

over the province. It was just in and around al-Qaim, but there were

a lot of big sacrifices.

^e way it started, al-Qaeda was getting stronger, killing on the

road every day, and getting bigger and bigger. So the good people

started forming small, secret groups to fight al-Qaeda. Publicly,

fighting al-Qaeda was like committing suicide, so they started

secretly in small groups, cooperating with the Coalition forces, and

working the same way that al-Qaeda worked.

Some of these groups—which they gave names like the Anbar

Revolution, and the Secret Police, or the Karama Companies—

they started working in secret, and they did a beautiful job. First,

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Iraqi Perspectives
because they were working secretly, al-Qaeda couldn’t identify the

members. ^e emirs started losing confidence in the people who

worked with them because they couldn’t fight or identify these

secret groups. ^ey attacked most of al-Qaeda’s central groups

where they lived. ^is is when al-Qaeda started to crack.

By the way, I mentioned that al-Qaeda started controlling other

groups. At this time, al-Qaeda already controlled the others, and

those who didn’t obey, they pushed away.

While these secret groups were working, some of the sheikhs had the

idea to go back and fight al-Qaeda. Some of these sheikhs lost many,

many members of their families. In September 2006, a group of

sheikhs appeared publicly at a meeting in the Jazeera area with Sheikh

Abdul Sattar Abu Risha.^ey announced,“We are a group of sheikhs,

and we are going to fight al-Qaeda and clear them from our areas.”

^at was good news. It was a very happy day for Anbaris when they

knew that a group of sheikhs was starting to fight al-Qaeda.

Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha started fighting from west of

Ramadi to the Jazeera area. In this area, the al-Qaeda groups were

not very strong.^ere were people working under al-Qaeda, but they

were not the main groups. ^e Coalition forces started moving out

of the cities and started making their bases out of the cities, not just

inside the cities, which gave people hope that the Coalition forces

would protect them. So they started to be courageous and to help.

Al-Qaeda started collecting all its groups and increasing its strength

in order to suppress Abdul Sattar’s movement.^ey used very strong

people, and they used all the support they had. But with the help—

especially in the Albu Soda and Habbaniyah areas—but with the

help of the central government, the Coalition forces, and the good

people in al-Anbar, they couldn’t face Abdul Sattar’s movement.

At the same time, the secret groups were very active, which helped

the situation, and they became bigger and bigger. Al-Qaeda was

being tracked down and hit by these groups in areas where Abdul

Sattar wasn’t fighting; that is, in their main base areas. When the

Coalition forces opened an area, it helped the Awakening to spread

to other areas.

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I remember in October of 2006, I was sitting in my home, and a

force under Lieutenant Colonel [DeGrossi?] showed up. ^ey

came inside my house and arrested me. ^is was the second one,

not the first one, and they took me to a place in Taqqadum. ^ey

said, “We want to finish al-Qaeda.” I asked —as a civilian, not as a

military man—I asked if they were serious. Because people thought

that the Coalition forces were helping al-Qaeda. As I mentioned

before, the criminals were moving about freely, and no one attacked

them; but innocent people were attacked and arrested and

humiliated, so people lost confidence in the Coalition forces.

^ey said, “Yes, we are serious about finishing al-Qaeda, but we

need your help.”

I said, “If you ask me, I can give you advice about my area, my

thoughts about al-Qaeda, the locations where they work, and how

you can finish them.” So I mentioned many locations for weapons

caches, and the places where they met and did their planning, and

the roads they used.

We discussed making a plan for finishing al-Qaeda. During the

discussion, I said, “Part of the plan is that you have to deliver a

letter to the people saying that you’re going to finish al-Qaeda. Part

of the plan is to be open, put your soldiers in 11 locations in these

areas. And part of the plan, too, is that when you’re searching

houses, you do it in a friendly way. Talk with them, help them. If

they need something, give it to them. Have tea with them. Have

food with them. Be a friend. Show them that you are here to help

them, not to hurt them.”

And honestly, this man implemented everything we agreed upon.

From the second day after the discussion, he started putting

checkpoints on the road to control the insurgents, and he attacked

their centers, and he found the weapons caches. Every day he had

a schedule to sit with people, with the sheikhs, with the officials. He

discussed things like a friend. And in eastern Anbar, he opened 11

posts. People started to trust the Marines. People started contacting

the Marines and giving them information about the caches,

weapons, and people, so the Americans could attack them and

arrest them.^e Marines were going inside houses, and they started

eating the food.

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In November 2006, so I could serve my people and my country in an

official capacity and not as a civilian, I went to the Ministry of Defense

and volunteered to fight the terrorists. And I started giving people over

there in the Ministry of Defense plans for how to fight terrorists and

kill them. And we got some help from the Ministry of Defense for

Sheikh Sattar, to help him fight, like weapons and supplies.

One of the officers in the Ministry of Defense was the brother of

Sheikh Nasser. He is Staff Brigadier General Nouri Abdul Karim. We

started working, he and I together, in the Ministry of Defense to

support Abu Risha, and also to formulate plans for clearing the areas

where Sheikh Abdul Sattar couldn’t go. We succeeded in this, and we

gave a plan to the Ministry of Defense. He agreed to execute it, and we

went back to Taqqadum and established a new center there.

We asked all the people to cooperate and to work with us on the

eastern Anbar area. ^ey had a lot of information about the

terrorists—where they were, their locations, their weapons. We got a

lot of information from these people, and we executed this plan in

January 2007 in the Juaiba area with a lieutenant colonel from the U.S.

Army. I don’t remember his name. After we discussed our plan with

him, we divided the people who worked with us between us and the

Marines, and they started implementing this plan in three directions.

It took 12 days, and we arrested 47 terrorists. We found many stores

of weapons and ammunition and a lot of vehicles that had been used

by the terrorists, and the area settled down.

After that, we came to east Husaybah, which is in Khalidiyah. We

worked with a lieutenant colonel from the Marines with the same

plan, and we accomplished a lot.^en we went over the Khalidiyah

and the Falahat area. After that, we went down, with our Iraqi

vehicles and the people who were working with us, and went to

these areas with the sheikhs, with the high-level people, and

discussed how we would work in the future. We found all

cooperation from them.

In Taqqadum—it’s in Falahat and this area—the lieutenant

colonel—I remember his name was [ James F.] McGrath—we

cleared these areas, and we established Iraqi police stations. We

opened all the area Iraqi police stations, and many of our area’s sons

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volunteered to work in them. ^ey wore the uniform, and had

weapons, and worked officially. ^en they asked the government

center for orders to keep working and to pay them. And we had

orders for them. ^ey worked officially and normally, and they are

still working.

In the beginning of 2007, we had some areas, like Fallujah, the

Albu Issa area, some of the western areas, that were still under

terrorist control.

Montgomery: You said that in October 2006, you were sitting at

home and Lieutenant [DeGrossi’s] forces arrested you and took

you to Taqaddum.

Khadim: Yes.

Montgomery: And you came up with a plan.

Khadim: Yes.

Montgomery: Did you make the plan with Lieutenant Colonel

DeGrossi, or his boss? What I’m trying to figure out is whether

you were working with Lieutenant Colonel DeGrossi, or if he just

came to get you.

Khadim: When the lieutenant colonel took me to Taqqadum, I met

many people higher than lieutenant colonel—his bosses.^en they

released me, and I came back home. Lieutenant Colonel DeGrossi

started negotiating the plan with me in my house.

Montgomery: Right, and then you went to the Marine battalion’s

area of operations?

Khadim: Yes. [DeGrossi’s] bosses, when we met in Habbaniyah,

they told me, the situation is like this and this and this. So we

discussed the situation, and they asked me if I could help them. I

said, “Yes, and this is my plan.”

About March 2007, after we had the security and stability situation

in the east of al-Anbar, Lieutenant Colonel McGrath came to me.

He was the commander of the Marines that had been in this area,

and he moved to the Fallujah area where the Albu Issa tribe was.

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Iraqi Perspectives
He told me he contacted one of the sheikhs in the area, Sheikh

Aifan Sadun al-Issawi. And he asked me to be a liaison between

the sheikhs and the Marines in this area, because I had experience.

So we met with the Marines near the Fallujah bridge where Sheikh

Aifan was located. We went over the highlights of the plan, how

we’re going to work to finish the terrorists. And we did another

couple of things. We met in Sheikh Aifan’s guesthouse with a

group of the area sheikhs, and some of the official security officers,

and the army that worked in this area. Some of the sheikhs were

afraid to work because of the aggressiveness and killing of alQaeda. And we started working the Albu Issa area, and they used

the cooperation of the people who helped them in this area,

supported by the Marines, and they cleared the area of terrorists.

Many things happened over there.^ey tried to kill Sheikh Aifan.

Many things happened.^is work gave hope to the Anbaris. Some

of the sheikhs came by themselves—without help from the

Marines or Abu Risha or Aifan or the central government—and

took control of the area and cleared it of al-Qaeda people. For

example, Iraqi police followed the army, which was the Iraqi army

in Fallujah. ^ey worked together to clear the center of the city of

al-Qaeda people. After that, we moved on to the western Jazeera

area, the Albu Bali and over there, which was the headquarters of

al-Qaeda there. And the same way we used the cooperation at the

meetings, and with the sheikhs, with the Marines and the U.S.

Army, the adviser asked them to fight and to clear the area, to move

on in the areas of the Albu Bali, the Albu Issa, the Albu Hazil, and

so on and so on.

^e areas up to the west of al-Anbar, they cleared of al-Qaeda

terrorists the same way, with the help of the sheikh, by the support

of the Marines and the U.S. Army. ^ey cleared it, and it settled

down, and there was security over there.

After that, we worked in the Karma area and al-^arthar. We

cooperated with Sheikh Mishtem, and some of his tribe, and some

of the Iraqi army. ^ey cleared the area of terrorists. ^e last

location, the ^arthar area, we brought some people to cooperate

with us.^ey gave us a lot of information about the terrorists: their

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people, their locations, their weapons, and their weapons caches.

Units from the Iraqi army and the police established posts in these

areas. Also, the Marines and Army put some units in these areas.

^e area was cleared, and we opened the ^arthar road.

About June or July 2007, we can say we cleared the province of

terrorists, and the police and the Iraqi army were officially working

and performing their duties.

^ere’s one thing I’d like to mention before I finish. ^e Awakening

was not a military leader’s movement, where you move from area to

area to clear it. It was a psychological movement.^ey could rise, the

people hoped, and many of the good people rose up—sheikhs, officers,

good people.^ey all worked together to clear the area, whether they

worked with the Marines, or with the Iraqi army, or by themselves. No

one held favor above the other, but they all cooperated and worked

together to clear al-Anbar. ^e people who now say they were the

leaders of the Awakening, they were not leaders.

^e Awakening was not a military thing; it was a movement. It

was a psychological movement. ^ey say, “We cleared al-Anbar.”

^ere was no one person who cleared al-Anbar. ^ere were

experiments and work in areas.^is area is different from that area.

But the public announcement of the Awakening gave people hope

to come on board. Fear and hope. ^ere were civilians who

sacrificed more than these people who now say,“We are the leaders

of the Awakening.” But they’re not on the political stage.

I will add something.^e people didn’t understand the letter from

the Marines. ^ey couldn’t do anything. When the convoys of

Marines were moving in the streets, the children threw rocks at

them. ^ey opened up to the people and made the people

understand what they wanted to achieve.^en the children clapped

for them and were happy with them, and talked with them, and

respected them, and invited them to their houses. Also, the other

good people, the sheikhs, started to work with them.

While you are writing history, here is something for history: they

didn’t finish the job. In my opinion as a military man, they quit

while the job was half finished. ^e size of the sacrifice by the

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Marines and other people was big, and the accomplishment was

big—indeed, it affected the whole country—but did we achieve

permanent stability and peace? I say “No.” Because we built in a

very critical and a very difficult time and gave everything to build

this one.^e government of Iraq didn’t help us with anything.^ey

knew the Coalition forces were paying the salaries of the police,

but they will need maintenance afterward. So they didn’t cooperate

in this. Now our building is not on a good foundation for the long

term, and it needs a good foundation so it can grow. ^at’s briefly

what I told you.

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Interview 19
Lieutenant General Ra’ad al-Hamdani

Lieutenant General Abdul Aziz Abdul

Rahman

Major General Ghazi Khudrilyas

Brigadier General Muhammed al-Azzawi

Ambassador Sa’doon J. al-Zubaydi

Lieutenant General Ra’ad al-Hamdani was the final commander

of the 2d Republican Guard Corps, and he is the founder and

chairman of the Association of Former Officers of the Iraqi Armed

Forces. Lieutenant General Abdul Aziz Abdul Rahman is former

chairman of the Scientific Board at Al-Bakr University for Higher

Military Studies in Baghdad and a former commander of the 4th

Division of the new Iraqi army. Major General Ghazi Khudrilyas was

wounded and left disabled in the Iran-Iraq War. He was a military

advisor to the Minister of Interior (1986-89) and served as the director

of the National Joint Operations Center ( July 2004-July 2006) under

the new regime. Brigadier General Muhammed al-Azzawi was a

special forces officer in the Republican Guard, and he commanded a

Ministry of Interior Special Police Commando under the new regime.

Ambassador Sa’doon J. al-Zubaydi was educated in Great Britain

initially worked as a professor of English Literature. Under the Ba’ath

Party regime, he served as Iraqi ambassador to Indonesia and

Singapore, director general of research and data analysis for the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and political advisor to the president of

Iraq. ^ey were interviewed by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery and

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams on 24 February

2009 in Amman, Jordan.

Lieutenant General Ra’ad al-Hamdani: I tried to warn the

politicians, in one way or another, during the period between 1991

and 2003—as a commanding officer in the war and a commander

in the Republican Guard—that the danger of the American

275
strategic objectives was the fall of the regime in Baghdad. But what

do you expect? Many of them misunderstood, which enabled

American decision-makers to achieve it after weakening Iraq for

15 years with the sanctions and the air war that continued during

that time.

I warned President Saddam Hussein precisely on this subject in

September 1994, in November 1995, and at a meeting with the

generals in June 2002. I explained myself before President Saddam

Hussein for a period of 45 minutes in a meeting at the Republican

Palace next to the international airport. I asked to change the

method of our thinking and to prevent our losses in the decisive

coming war for the Iraqi state because we were a weakened army,

and a weakened country, and a weakened people. As a military, we

didn’t have any air force protection. We didn’t have one jet that

could fight any of the Coalition air forces. Our anti-air weapons

were so weak that I can say we didn’t have any. We had only a little

artillery that we could defend ourselves with. And in the area of

rockets, we hardly had any.

But despite it all, Saddam Hussein listened to us and did not agree

with my suggestions. We can not blame Saddam Hussein himself

only, but the people at that meeting and his advisers, too. And this

conflict between the commanders and me continued up to 18

December 2002, when we were called to present our defense plan

to the leadership. I was responsible for it because we were the

biggest division at the time. ^ere was a contest between us, with

my vision and my thought, and with the military commanders, and

with the politicians, too, regarding my plan.

^e main point of contention was that I didn’t want the conflict to

be inside Baghdad. It wasn’t the same circumstances as it was in

the battle of Stalingrad. It wasn’t like war in the Middle Ages. . . .

My decision was that when the war started with the Coalition

forces, we would attack them with small groups of soldiers and not

in large formations, which would cause us more casualties.

We knew for sure what air power the enemy had. Personally, I

joined the wars against Israel in Jordan and Syria, and in 1991

against the Americans and the Coalition. We knew for sure what

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superpower air forces mean. Our weapons would be like bows and

arrows if we fought as an organized army without air force cover.

And I explained that precisely to Saddam Hussein since 1994. . . .

^ere was a huge misgiving in me that these big American forces,

this great army, this civilized army, this great country—I felt the

sorrow of our nation that our future depended on them. I knew

that the fighting in Baghdad would not take but a few days. I said

to myself at that time, “^is is our fate. We lost the war.” Despite

the stupidity of the political leadership, this complaint was

something that was just as bad. I would rather have this civilized,

strong, brave army coming in better than an Iranian invasion.

I continued from 9 April 2003 until I handed myself over to the

American forces on 11 June 2003. I was observing the way that the

American Army surrounded Baghdad, and this is where the big

warning bell started to ring.^is is where I discovered the strategic

mistake of the Americans after the liberation of Baghdad.^ey left

the borders open, and I saw Iranian trucks with Iranian plates

entering the country. ^ere were two types. One type was

transporting personnel. ^e other was the big kind, and they were

stealing our military industries and transporting them into Iran.

^e decision to dissolve the Iraqi army came on 23 May 2003.^en

I had a meeting with seven commanding generals on one of the

farms south of Baghdad. I told them that the Americans were

starting to make their biggest mistakes, and all of their sacrifices of

lives and their gains would be handed over to the Iranians as a free

gift. In summarizing my stand at the time, I suggested that I would

hand myself over to the American forces. Maybe then I could warn

the Americans that they were making many mistakes that they

might regret in the future. But to us, it was decimating the area.

^ere is a fact that I noticed when I was watching the American

Army movements at the time. We have to say it before the

historians leave us, and I mentioned it in my book, that the

American soldiers were highly polite. ^ey are well-trained and

qualified soldiers. We used to think that the Israeli soldier was

exemplary, but when compared with the American soldier, the

Israeli soldier is Middle Eastern. With respect to all the armed

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forces, there is a big gap with the professionalism of the American

and British soldiers. Despite the conflicts and wars between us and

the Iranians and Israel, I have to make the point—the bad points

and the good points—and this is to respect the military forces,

whoever they are. . . .

Lieutenant General Abdul Aziz Abdul Rahman: After the fall of

Baghdad, when the Kurdish leadership came into Baghdad, I met

the president of Iraq, Mr. Jalal Talabani, and there were a number

of people with him. And what they were talking about—what I

understood from that meeting—was that all the former military

should be either sacked or killed. Mr. Talabani’s answer was, “You

are mistaken. A lot of these soldiers are linked to us, to the Kurds.”

And he turned around to me and asked, “What are you going to

answer them?”

I didn’t know who the attendees were. I introduced myself, “I’m

General Abdul Aziz of the Iraqi army. I continue to serve, and I’m

not a Ba’athist. I’m an independent gentleman. I’m Kurdish. With

my relations with my old friends in here, I’ll give you a guarantee,

and I tell you that 80 percent of the Iraqi officers are not supporters

of Saddam Hussein. And members of the Republican Guard—

they’re the elite of the Iraqi army. I can say [inaudible] they are

professional people. ^ey chose professional and qualified soldiers

to join the Republican Guard. So all these units don’t belong to

Saddam Hussein or to anyone else. ^ey are units of the national

Iraqi army.^ere is a small percentage somewhere in the hierarchy,

maybe some of them are related to Saddam Hussein.”

A few days after that—after they found out some people are still

with the Iraqi army and still not Ba’athists—they contacted me at

the Rashid Hotel. I attended a meeting at the Rashid Hotel with

many of my American friends, and they asked many questions.

At that time, the Iraqi people were clapping for the American

soldiers and giving them roses and flowers. I saw it with my own

eyes. In the Ameriya district, I saw an American soldier eating at

a restaurant, and his weapon was over by his tank. He felt safe there.

^e people supported him. During that time, I informed my

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American brothers that the day will come when it will be hard for

an American soldier to walk in Iraq’s streets.^at is because of the

mistakes that occurred by soldiers or junior officers behaving badly

to the Iraqi people.^at is what got us to that stage.^e resistance

started and terrorism against the situation that we were in. ^ese

matters could be solved by several meetings with some well-known

leaders of the Iraqi army.^ey were known even to the Americans,

too. ^ese meetings did not happen. And this is why, for about six

years, Iraq has not improved in the right way.

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery: When we changed tapes, you were

discussing the beginning of the resistance.

Abdul Aziz: At one time, the Americans called me to attend a

meeting at the presidential office. ^ere were about 60 people

sitting there—some ladies, gentlemen, and officers.^ey asked me

many questions, but they were concentrating on just one thing,

which was the governing council. And one of the American

gentlemen asked me, “What do you think of the governing

council?” I told him, “I don’t know them.”

He was surprised at what I said. He said “^is governing council,

which we just appointed,” precisely concentrating on certain

names. He asked me about [Adnan al-] Pachachi. I said, “I don’t

know him.” I wanted to do a comparison. Pachachi was a former

minister, this and that. I was a child. I vaguely knew the name. He

was a former minister, and you’re asking me about him coming

back. ^is gentleman has been out of Iraq for 30, 35 years. How

can he control Iraq?

^en he asked me what I thought of Ahmed Chalabi. And I said,

“I don’t know him, either. But from your information, you said that

he has come back from Jordan. He was outside of Iraq since he was

15 years old. What does he know about Iraq?”

And he asked me about another gentleman. He mentioned the

name, and he said two divisions of the Iraqi army had been

searching for him. It’s because he was a gangster between Nasiriyah

and Amarah and Kut. How can you make these gentlemen rule

Iraq and rule us?

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Al-Anbar Awakening

I told him what I think. “We respect some of the gentlemen with

the governing council. ^ey have the political background. ^ey

were in opposition to the former regime. Like Jalal Talabani and

Massoud Barzani, and some of the Islamic Party. ^ey are

respectable people.We know about them, and we can’t ignore them.

But most of the people, we didn’t know them at all.”^is is one of

the subjects we discussed.“As we know, the population of Iraq is 28

million. It cannot be acceptable that there are not 28 patriotic

nationalist Iraqis who are willing to serve Iraq. When you tell us

these 28, I don’t know how it happened.”

I’ll give an example of the secrecy in some matters. I was in the

artillery divisions. ^ere was a colonel with me from Tikrit. One

day I went to my office, and he wasn’t there. I didn’t say anything.

^e next day, he didn’t come to the office again. I asked, “Where is

this colonel? Why was he taken away?”

^ey said to keep quiet.

I asked, “Why?

^ey said, “He has been executed.”

“Why has he been executed?”

“Because there was an attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein.”

I tried to take him down myself. I’m an independent Kurdish guy.

^is officer sat in my office. If he had this thought in his head, he

should have talked about that to me because I was always against the

regime. I was the closest man to him, and I didn’t have this

information.^is was one of the attempts.Who gave the information

to Saddam Hussein? In my mind, it was the American agents.

One of the American officers asked me at one of the meetings,

“Why didn’t you start a coup against Saddam Hussein?”I gave him

this as an example. ^ere have been 28 attempted coups in Iraq so

far. ^irty-two hours before, a list of names was handed over to

Saddam Hussein, names of the guys who attempted a coup against

him. Who used to pass this information to Saddam? ^is is the

secret. It was 50 percent from the Iraqi military to save the regime.
But I think Saddam was backed by you, the Americans. . . .

Major General Ghazi Khudrilyas: On the 10th of April, I joined

with the Marines at the Meridian Hotel. I did not join the people

who raped my country as a voluntary soldier. No, I joined them to

advise them on how to control the looting and to form the new

police and army. I met the chief of the Marines at the Meridian

Hotel.^ey had our names in a computer.^e things that he asked

me were, do I say un-Christian? ^ey had all the information about

all the officers then, and he knew that I was an adviser to the former

interior minister.

I gave him my opinion on how to integrate the police into the

Coalition. And we started to go and form the new police. ^ere

was someone from the Marines in charge of the Interior Ministry.

His name was Major Mark Stilberg.* He provided me with maps

of Baghdad and an operations room inside the office of the Interior

Ministry. And we started sending Iraqi police out with the

Americans in Baghdad.

^e first information we had that the Badr brigade was entering

Iraq from Iran, which General Ra’ad mentioned earlier, I

immediately informed the Americans that we should close the

borders to prevent the Iranians from entering. ^ey did not

implement what I wanted.

On 20 April 2003, we had information on the location of the

former finance minister, Mr. Hikmat al-Azzawi. Immediately,

American and Iraqi police forces went to that location. I told the

Americans,“Please, do not enter the minister’s house. Let only the

Iraqi police enter to arrest him, because he was one of the 55

wanted men whose work we respected.”I informed the Americans

then that these former ministers are highly-qualified ministers, and

they got to their positions by their qualifications.When we brought

him with us, I made sure that he brought all his medicine with him

because I knew that he had heart problems. . . .

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* No Marine by this name has been identified.
And precisely on this date—the American Army was taking over

from the Marines on the Sadr side of Baghdad—I had an interview

with the commander of the Marines at the CNN super channel to

thank me in person for the capture of one of the first 55 wanted

men, which I assisted in capturing. And the chief of the Marines

told me “Now we’ve liberated you from Saddam Hussein.” So I

told him, “You didn’t come here to liberate us from Saddam

Hussein, but to control the other side of the world, and to control

the oil in Iraq and the region, and to ensure the safety of Israel for

years to come.” He said to me, pointing his thumb up, “You are

absolutely correct.”

After that, I had many of the police joining me to start taking

control of the borders. I made a presentation to Colonel King* of

the American Army. I presented him with all the names of the Iraqi

border police, and I told him where to locate the police officers and

set the checkpoints to start controlling the borders. Colonel King

went in to the civilian governor, [ Jay M.] Garner. I think that was,

to be precise, on 2 May 2003.^e ambassador wanted to postpone

planning for border control and to postpone it indefinitely.

A month later, we had information that the Badr brigade had entered

Baghdad, and they were controlling an area called [the Shaab

neighborhood], and they were controlling the cars and the people.

During that time, the American forces started forming the new

Iraqi police from elements which were sacked by the old regime.

^ese officers had been sacked mainly for managerial or corruption

reasons, or for betraying the country.

In late May 2003, Colonel King brought me another Iraqi colonel

and asked me to appoint him to a position. And the colonel, I didn’t

know him, but his name was [Ahmed Kabul]. Later on, I found

out that this [Ahmed Kabul?] was a colonel at the Ministry of

Defense, and he was sacked from his duty. So I called him, and I

said, “Are you a colonel or are you a lieutenant? What are you?”

And he said, “Sir, I was only a lieutenant, but the Americans

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* Probably Col R. Alan King, USA.
promoted me to colonel.” It was part of the American

administration’s mistakes. Can you believe it? ^is is what’s

happened to us by bringing unqualified personnel into the police

[multiple voices]. And you couldn’t believe it. . . .

Ambassador Sa’doon J. al-Zubaydi: He is not our representative. He

was actually thrown at our office in New York because they had

nowhere to keep him.

Ghazi: Can you believe this [Ahmed Kabul?], who has been

promoted by the Americans? ^ey promoted him from the army to

become the Iraqi representative at the United Nations office.

Sa’doon: We have a representative, officially. We have a

representative by the name of Samir Sumaidaie. He is the

ambassador. But [Ahmed Kabul?], they had nowhere to put him.

^ey wanted to put him somewhere out of Iraq to keep him safe

and to give him privileges, so he was put at our office in New York.

So he’s not representing us to the United States, but to the United

Nations. . . .

Ghazi: After that, I was appointed to the National Joint Operations

Center. ^at was in July 2004. I worked with the security

organizations and with the Coalition forces, and I worked with

General [George W.] Casey [ Jr., USA], too. Unfortunately, much

of the information that we passed to the Americans to implement

on the ground was wrong.^e American generals did not know the

patriotic Iraqis from the false Iraqis who were passing them false

information. Many people suffered, especially in certain areas,

because false information was passed to the Americans that they

were terrorists, which caused them to go and attack them. And I

used to tell them,“^ese are patriotic Iraqis. Do not attack this area.”

^ere was a problem on 6 June 2006. ^e Americans complained

that they had not managed to control the armed militias inside Iraq

and outside Iraq. ^ere was a meeting between the Ministry of

Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the Coalition forces. And I

attended that meeting as well. ^e Americans were wondering

what step to take next, and the Interior Ministry and Ministry of

Defense had no idea how to control the militias. General Casey’s

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deputy, I believe, General [Sir Robert Alan] Fry [British Royal

Marines]—he’s a British general—was attending that meeting.

General [Peter W.] Chiarelli [USA] of the American forces was

there, General [ James D.] ^urman [USA], the commander of the

4th Division from the American forces, and I was there with the

Coalition officers, too.

I suggested something to them to solve this matter, and I told them

that this mistake is a mistake of American strategic planning. ^e

mistake was in joining religion with politics. ^is experience has

not happened in any country around the world, and I suggested

that you correct your mistake by separating politics from religion

so that the country of Iraq is either a religious country or a secular

country. I told them, “If you want this country, look at the

experience that we had with Iran, our neighbor. Iran is a stable

country with no terrorism, and it’s developing. In a few years, it

will have nuclear weapons. Or bring us a secular system, and the

religious people can have their time in their religious places, such

as churches, mosques, or husseiniyas, where the Shi’as worship.”

Most of the American officers whose names I mentioned

supported my idea, and the minister of interior and the minister of

defense supported me, too.^e one who objected to my suggestion

was Mr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie, the national security advisor.

^e biggest problem we have now is protecting our borders, especially

the Iraqi-Iranian border. We have 300 kilometers in the north that is

uncontrolled, and Iraqis and Iranians are using this border for

smuggling.^e border from Khanaqin to the south of Basrah should

be protected and secured by independent elements. Because of this

mistake of mixing religion into politics, the Iraqi government has

integrated 400 militia members into the border police. And these

Badr militias are counted as enemies by the Americans.

Mr. Ahmed al-Khafaji, the deputy interior minister for support

forces, stated this in front of General [ Joseph F.] Peterson [USA],

the American general, on 28 May 2006 when Mr. [ Jawad] Bulani

was becoming the new minister of interior. When General

Peterson said at the meeting that the Badr militia is a terrorist

militia, Major General Ahmed Janabi answered him, “No, they’re

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not terrorist militias. I personally appointed 400 of these militias to

control the borders.”

Unfortunately, the Americans know for a fact that the Iraqi-Iranian

border is controlled by the Iranian-supported Badr militias. And it

surprises me when the Americans are astonished that new weapons

or new bombs have entered Iraq, when they know for a fact that the

border is controlled by Iranian militias. And with this point, I can

say on the record that I think the Americans are joining the

Iranians to increase terrorism in Iraq. And I can say that the

Americans are supervising the entry of these weapons into Iraq

from Iran. I’ve been to the border. I’m a military officer, and I’m an

authority on the border. And the amount of arms that has been

entering Iraq, I can tell you, you cannot transport it on animals or

by humans—it must be transported on heavy trucks. So these

weapons are entering Iraq by road, which is controlled, along with

the border, by these militias, as well as supervised by the American

checkpoints.^is was the main point, which I think General Ra’ad

would like to speak about.

Ra’ad: I think there is one more left, gentlemen. ^e subject is

rather important. As former Iraqi officers, whether in service or out

of service, our aim is the independence of our country. As for the

American administration and the American force, we take it as the

responsibility of the Americans, as a historical thing and as a matter

of integrity, or there is no hope for Iraq. Now we have taken the

American administration as a friend, and we have to keep them as

a friend forever and have them consider the Iranian danger that

we are facing.

We spoke a lot about the resistance, and the terrorists, and the

[inaudible] of the insurgency. Some of these formed the

Awakening, and now we call them the Sons of Iraq. We would like

to discuss this matter of the Awakening in three main points. How

to describe this Awakening? We have Brigadier Muhammad here

with us, who has assisted the Marines in fighting the terrorists.

And what is the solution for our future?

On the 29 February 2004—as you know, the 29th of the February

comes every four years.^is date was a great date because my name

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was crossed off of the black list. I was a professional commander. I

have not committed any crimes.

And then I had a meeting at the Republican Palace. I was surprised,

because it was a year after I met President Saddam Hussein in this

palace, which had been so quiet and pleasant, and only a few people

were permitted to enter and see it. Now the whole world was in this

palace, I believe. I even saw red Indians. Italians, Fijians—the whole

world was in this palace. Some were military. It was a shock to me.

Anyway, I entered the palace, and there were three gentlemen

standing over there. One of them was a colonel from the American

Army, one from the inspector corps; his name was James.^e other,

I don’t remember his name, but there were three gentlemen. ^e

important thing, we had a meeting in Baghdad with the Americans

and the British. And he asked me,“General, explain to us what you

see.” And I spoke generally about the new strategic situation, but I

really spoke about what could have avoided the war. And at that

point, we talked about their victory in the war. It was clear to us

that you were going to win the war anyway. We assume that you,

with the superpower you have, you’re going to achieve your

objectives. But the question for the wise commander is,“When you

achieve your objective, how do you keep it?” And so your biggest

mistake was dissolving the former Iraqi army. And the second point

that I mentioned to them was, “Why did you leave the border

open? And where is the civil-military organization that you have?

So you did the same as us. When we invaded Kuwait, we made

mistakes, the same mistakes you made when you invaded us. I used

to [shout and scream] in Kuwait, and I was the one who led the

invasion of Kuwait, before I lost control of the situation. Where is

the military government for civil affairs? ^is is what we learned.

It’s impossible for us, for a military, to be changed into police—so

it was the case. You can do it in a stage where you couldn’t see the

Kuwaiti streets anymore.

^en I directed this speech to the military officers in front of me.

“We are a ^ird World army. We are expected to make mistakes.

You, the American Army, you’re the most powerful army in the

world. An army like yours cannot make mistakes. ^e result is the

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situation we are living in now, because of the mistakes that have

been done by a great army like the United States Army.” I told

them that “Vietnam will be a red rose compared to the crisis you’re

going to face here in Iraq. I’m not warning you for your sakes only.

I told you—I’m afraid for my country.

“We are a country that is transforming from Bedouin to

civilization. We depend on the elite and the notable. And these

elite people are the link between us and you, the Americans.Where

are the elite people? Where are the notable people? ^e civilization

gap between us, I can say it reaches up to 200 years. Who is

responsible for closing this gap between us? So you are the people

who came from the future, and the elite people we’re talking about

understand you and understand Iraqi society. Some of them, like

Ambassador Sa’doon, were educated in the United Kingdom.”

I could see the concern on their faces. One of them asked me,“Can

you assist in forming the new Iraqi army?” And I said to him, “I

cannot see that you want to form a new Iraqi army, because any

army in the world—whether it’s a superpower army like the United

States Army or the smallest army in the world, such as the

Jordanian Army, for example—it depends on elements and

principles to organize or form. And that’s what we learned from

you—that we should be united on the political aims, and united

on the commandership, the authorization for each Iraqi officer, and

there are other things that we can speak about. And so the state

you are in now, I cannot believe you are ready to form a new Iraqi

army. So, for this, I have to decline to assist you. And for other

reasons, like people will record in history that you picked a

Republican Guard Command officer to assist you in helping

destroy the country.”

^e Iraqi army had great professional officers who were positioned

better than me in education, and who retired prior to the war.^is

means there is a network of officers who could assist you in

building this army, but it will not be an army with independent,

professional men united to serve the country. What you’re going to

form is a military force that is different. Each unit will follow its

own politico-religious party, and we are in a situation now where

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all the religious parties are competing for control of the country.

And the competition among the religious parties will gradually

grow in the military force, and we will have a civil war among these

religious parties.

So, see if what you expect will happen. ^e borders are open and,

as you know, we have problems with the six neighboring countries

surrounding Iraq. And each of these countries wishes to gain an

advantage over Iraq. We have a lot of complications. We have

indications, and we have the right to say that Iran has chosen the

biggest opportunity to infiltrate into Iraq. And you have identified

Iran in all of our regions, and they are entering.

^e invasion of Iraq created a huge gap, a gap in leadership, because

one man was leading the whole country, and he was overthrown

suddenly. With this gap created, anti-American and anti-Coalition

forces entered the country. With the gap that was there because of

the invasion and the lack of control in governing Iraq, many

opportunists entered Iraq, such as the Iranian influence that’s

infiltrating Iraq.^ey used the opportunity to locate and choose places

where they can gain control and bring their ideology into the country.

Unfortunately, the day the Americans invaded Iraq, they had no

knowledge of whom to speak to or whom to approach within the

country to get the right advisors. ^ey came in, they took control,

and they won the war, but they had no one to advise them at the

time regarding whom to speak to and whom to avoid.

^e Iranians, as you know—and I’ve said it many times—the

Iranians have a grudge against the Iraqis, not because of the IranIraq War, but because of hereditary enmity going back 2,500 years.

Another thing that we, the Iraqis, talk about is that there was an

agreement between the Iranians and the Americans for removing

Saddam Hussein, and this was an opportunity to take revenge

against us.

I come to the other point that I would like to address: resistance

and terrorism. I have spoken several times with American generals

regarding an appreciation of the difference between resistance and

terrorism. ^ey have never agreed to separate the resistance from

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the terrorists. ^ere is a country that has been invaded by foreign

forces. ^ere is bound to be resistance. And there is some

resistance—and I said it in several meetings—that a dialogue must

be opened between the nationalist resistance and the Americans.

^e opportunity by the terrorists . . . with the nationalists and

patriots seeing the country invaded by foreign forces, with the

Coalition forces not understanding the difference between the

resistance and the terrorists, the terrorists gained control of many

areas. ^e Americans did not understand at the beginning. Now

they realize that we have to distinguish between terrorists and

national resistance against foreign countries.

I give the chair now to my brave friend who served with me in the

Republican Guards, and who has assisted the Americans. He

worked for me, and he was with the Marines, too.When he wanted

to join the Marines, he contacted me. He said, “Sir, what do you

think? I asked to join the Iraqi forces and assist the Americans.

Should I work with the Americans or not?” I advised him, “Please

do. Please join the military. Give your advice to the Americans. We

need somebody who is a patriot, who is nationalist, to advise the

Americans.”I supported him in joining and helping the Americans

in every way he could to help them understand our culture, our

traditions, and the differentiation between us and the Iranians. And

I give the chair to him now to speak of his experience.

Brigadier General Muhammed al-Azzawi: I worked at Balad Air

Base in September 2003. I worked with the Chinook unit as a

deputy of the division. Colonel Arnold was there. He was a great

man. I worked with him to implement operations in the

[Yudhumariya] district and the [Bamiya] district. ^ese were the

most dangerous military areas.

After that, they spoke to me in January 2004 about joining the

special forces of the Interior Ministry. I had a friend there, Major

General [ Jalad?], God bless him, who has passed away. Major

General [Salman?], God bless him, and Colonel [Suran Ubaysi?],

God bless him, and Colonel Abdul Karim Jubaili, and Major

General [Mahi al-Rallawi?]. All the martyrs that I just mentioned,

they were all assassinated by government militias. It wasn’t in

combat against terrorists.

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We formed special forces units with our orders in June 2004. I was

the commander of the first division, which was linked directly to

the Ministry of Interior. General Adnan ^abit was the general

supervising.

After we implemented and achieved Fallujah I, we began to see

something new. ^ere was a new militia forming in Fallujah, and

they were from the Iraqi divisions.^ey started to have checkpoints

from the southern provinces and the Fallujah district.^ey started

to form militias under the cover of the Ministry of Interior. We

started kicking them out of Fallujah by order of the Ministry of

Interior, and we retook their positions in the Fallujah area.

After that, in November 2004, the same year, Anbar Province fell.

^e minister of interior, Mr Falah al-Naqib, visited with General

[David H.] Petraeus [USA] and General [Renefo?]. ^ere was

movement toward Anbar with an extra division, and we began to

liberate Anbar the same day. ^ere was combat [inaudible]

gangsters [inaudible]. I was in special forces, and most of my

friends are from special forces, and there was direct support from

the American forces, especially from the 8th Division and the

commander at the time, Colonel Patton.

[Conversation with Interpreter.]

Interpreter: ^e thing what he said about the war—that “we took

the province of Anbar.”I said,“What do you mean the province of

Anbar?” He said, “the headquarters at Ramadi, I mean.”

Muhammed: When the headquarters at Ramadi fell, they went

there and they looted the headquarters of Ramadi—the

government center.*

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams: When was that,

sir?

Muhammed: ^at was in November 2004, and then we took

control of the government offices. ^en we started distributing

operations, and the [1st division became 4 divisions]. So I was in

* He seems to be referring to Fallujah, even though he said Ramadi.
charge of operations on the western side of Iraq.We started moving

checkpoints on the highways between Baghdad and Syria. We

captured many of the gangsters, of many nationalities.

^e Americans expressed appreciation for the work that we had done.

General Casey was there, General Petraeus, General [inaudible], by

the Ministry of Interior, and the director of the operation, Major

General Muthir. ^e American forces requested from the Minister

of Interior at the time, Falah al-Naqib, [that the 3d division would

take the 4th division to remain in Anbar Province].

After that, they withdrew me from Anbar to Baghdad to start

forming a new division. During this period, power was turned over

to Ibrahim al-Jafaari. ^e first meeting with the new minister of

interior, Baqir [ Jabr Al-Zubeidi], was held at Adnani palace on 4

May 2005. We all attended the meeting: General Ghazi was there,

Mr. Casteel,* Major General Mahmoud al-Wahali, Major General

Adnan ^abit, Major General Muther al-Rawi, Major General

Rashid Fayed, Hamid Hezejedan, and Major Maqabi. At present, he

is in prison in Bucca. He was linked to an operation against the

Sunnis using Interior Ministry cars. And this man was highly liked

and respected at that time, especially by the new minister of interior.

I want to point out a very important thing. An American

delegation visited Iraq headed by a Colonel [McMahon?]. He

came to Anbar province on 1 March 2005. We sat with Colonel

Patton and the commanders of the units. He asked me, “What’s

your opinion of the new interior minister, Baqir?” I said, “As an

Iraqi, in my opinion, he was the one who was in charge of the

operations of the Badr Brigade.”And he thanked me for saying so.

And the day of the meeting that we’re talking about, I realized that

the Americans had passed the message to the interior minister that

I had told them he was the leader of the militias.

As evidence, in our tradition, the minister, or anyone, whenever you

meet, you kiss them on the cheek. He greeted everyone except me.

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* Although the name on the recording sounds like “Steel,” the reference likely is to Mr. Steve

Casteel, a career Drug Enforcement Agency employee and the Coalition Provisional Authority’s

senior advisor to the Ministry of Interior.
^ese officers that we met in Anbar, they worked in Baghdad. And

I am from Anbar. He took my hand just slightly. I am Sunni, and

I fought in the Sunni areas. What about me, as a Sunni, fighting in

the Shi’a areas? I was kicked out of my position and transferred to

operations as a staff officer.

Immediately then, I requested R&R for seven days from Major

General Adnan ^abit to visit my family here in Jordan. As you

know, my son is disabled. I got to Jordan on 14 May 2005. At dawn

on 15 May 2005, I received a call from my mother that the

commando brigades that I was commanding were surrounding the

area. ^ey took my brother and 11 people from my area . . .

[inaudible] under official order [inaudible].^ey were wearing the

same uniform that I was wearing. ^ere were 40 cars surrounding

our residential area at 5:30 in the morning.

Straightaway, I went back to Iraq. I went to see Major General

Adnan ^abit. We searched everywhere for my brother and the 11

people that had been taken.^e minister of interior was so sorry for

me—as a comedian. He was doing comedy. Major General Adnan

told me about it. On the 18th, Major General Adnan told me that

the minister of interior wanted me to be at his office at 8:00 in the

morning. After that, someone called me. He said,“I am your friend.

My name is this-this.”I won’t mention his name, because he is still

working in the Interior Ministry. He informed me that “the

minister of interior has given an order for your arrest, and he is

sending four cars now to arrest you.”

So I was careful. I’m a human being, and I’m cautious of people

like this. I know for sure that Ahmed and the rest of the guys who

were working over there are all from the Badr brigades. ^ey are

gangsters, and they are working for him now.

At this time, the 1st division commander was arrested. His name

was Major Kana’an al-Gheisi, and he was an officer from the

Sadiyah camp. Eleven buses carrying al-Khona militia—and this

whole militia is from the south—came into the al-Sadiyah camp.

^ey started destroying the camp, and they told them,“We have an

order directly from the minister to destroy this camp.” ^e

commander of the division phoned me, and at the time I was

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concerned because my brother had been kidnapped. I informed

Major General Adnan that “12 buses of al-Khona militia have

entered your camp, and they are destroying it.” ^ey had beards

and banners around their heads saying,“^e Martyr Hussein.”^ey

were supporters of a pro-Iranian group. We have Shi’as in our

divisions, but they don’t wear banners saying “Hussein.” Only the

Iranians do it, and they arrested Mahmoud and 11 other officers.

And I started to understand my problem then. A few days later, I

found my brother and 11 of his friends in the Sadr area. ^ey had

been tortured with drills. And after they drilled them and killed

them, they burned them.

After that, I submitted my resignation, and attempts to assassinate

me started. After that, I moved to Iraqi intelligence in the beginning

of 2006.^ere was a link between the head of Iraqi intelligence and

special forces. He had heard that I was special forces, and he had

followed the circumstances that I had been through.

During that time, 40 cars with militias were sent by the interior

minister to the residential area where I was staying. Two of my

brothers were arrested and kidnapped. We found them 40 days

later, five kilometers inside Iran. ^is CD shows the bodies

[holding a compact disc in his hand]. It shows you the bodies and

the way that the Interior Ministry gave the orders, by the orders of

the interior minister and Ibrahim Jafaari, the prime minister.

And intelligence? After the information from so many intelligence

reports, and the media, and tens of thousands of files—it’s Iran,

Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran. I’ve read 10,000 reports showing the

Iranian penetration and the entering of Iranian intelligence across

the border from the north, south, and everywhere into Iraq. ^e

Iranians know how many Iranian militias have been entering Iraq,

and I am sure you will see this in the Iraqi intelligence headquarters

files, the same as you, the Americans, hold files on how many

Iranians have been entering Iraq.

I don’t want to make my speech long, because the more I speak,

the more I spoil my meaning. But I attended a security meeting in

September 2006, and these were the nationalist ministers: Dr.

Salam al-Zaubai, the head of the operations from the Interior

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Ministry, and the deputy interior minister. We started to speak

about the Mahdi militias. And everybody agreed that the Mahdi

militias must be arrested, except one man, and that was Mowaffak

al-Rubaie, who stood and said, “Now you are saying these militias

are not good? ^ey’re good, patriotic people.” A conflict started

between Jawad Bulani, the minister of interior, and the operations

commander, Major Aziz Robeidi, regarding the authorizations and

responsibilities of the checkpoints. So the minister of interior,

Jawad Bulani, emphasized that the Mahdi militia is a traditional

army, and they would never fight civilians.

^e last position I held was in operations for Iraqi intelligence in

2007, with a liaison officer called Tony—and he’s a great liaison

officer, because all our talk was about the Iranians.

I’ll summarize for our talk. We have been working with the

Americans. I fought side by side with the Americans for the sake

of my country. But the Americans betrayed me. Americans have

assisted by the killing of three of my brothers and my mother.

Americans have allowed Bayan Solagh, the interior minister at the

time, to kill the whole family. Americans have given the order for

the 40 cars to kill the civilians in Baghdad.

I’ll tell you, I was a division commander, and when I used to go out

on patrol, the Americans allowed me to take only four cars on

patrol—only. How can you explain to me now—with the CD that

you are going to see—there are 40 trucks going around with flags—

with the permission of the Americans. I have made complaints to

all the generals. I can’t even count the number.

And I gave them evidence regarding al-Islam, and regarding the

militias belonging to [ Jalal al-Suria?]—the young Jalal. And I gave

them evidence on the [ Jadriya shelter]. And I was with General

[Host?], and I freed all the detainees from the shelter. And I

worked as a civilian for the sake of my country, not just for my

brothers only. But I worked to release all the innocent detainees

who were inside the shelter.

Hadi al-Amri, in charge of the Badr brigade, was going from one

side to the other in Iraq. What did the Americans do to him?

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Americans fought in Afghanistan to change the white turbans—

Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.You go to Iraq, the black Iranian

turbans—did they ask the Americans?

^e new airport that has been opened in Najaf—did you ask about

the military air movement between Mashhad, Qom, Tehran, and

Najaf? Or the military weapons being flown into Iraq? Is there one

American soldier in that airport? ^e Iranians are not accountable

to the Americans in Najaf and Karbala?

Deputy Iraqi [inaudible] [Muhammed al-Daini?]—his whole

family has been assassinated because he objected to the Iranian

penetration of Iraq.

What is the difference in your views? ^e one who fights the

Iranians? Iran has invaded Iraq, as the general just said. I myself

believe, and all Iraqis believe, that the Americans are working on a

plan side by side with the Iranians.

How do you explain this to me? How do you explain to me that

Mowaffak al-Rubaie is the advisor for security and intelligence—

and he’s not an Iraqi. How do you explain to me that Baqir Solagh

is the minister of finance now—and he’s not Iraqi. He’s Iranian.

Or explain to me about Ali al-Adeeb, the Iraqi spokesman. His

name is Ali Esdid. He changed his name—he is Iranian. Explain

to me about Ibrahim Jafaari, the prime minister. He is Iranian.Will

you explain to me about the Iranian ambassador in Iraq meeting

with Iraqi officers? And what about [Amar Hakim?], who was

meeting with the ambassadors and the Interior Ministry officers?

Explain all this to me. Who is lying to whom? America is lying to

us. When we looked at America, we were looking at this great

American rose flower in front of us.

And I can say, as the general said earlier, that the Americans are

working to create different militias for one reason—not to build

Iraq, but to disintegrate Iraq. I have been asked to go back to Iraq,

but I refuse to work in any ministerial or governmental

organization controlled by the Iranians.

And [Nouri al-] Maliki and [inaudible], as you know, they are all

spies and traitors to Iran. And the Americans have evidence. ^ey

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have their bank accounts and records of the amount of money they

have been transferring to Iran.

One day prior any Muslim feast, just watch Baghdad Airport. Just

look and see if any members of the government or the Iraqi members

of parliament are in Baghdad. ^ey go back to their shrines.

How do you explain to me [al-Farqay?] in Iraq? Can you believe

that we are controlled by Ali [al-Husayni al-] Sistani? ^at quiet

man—Iranian origin, sectarian, traditional—and he is working on

changing Iraq into an Iranian territory, with the assistance or

friendship of the Americans.

I’ll just say something so I can change the atmosphere here. I was

in the division on Balad air base. Colonel Ibrahim was taking two

jerry cans of gas with him. Colonel Arnold called him. He said,

“Look at this colonel. He stole two jerry cans of gas, and he’s a

ranking officer.”^e American group was standing together. I said

to him,“Colonel, you invaded Iraq and stole all the oil and gas from

us, and nobody said anything. So, are you going to arrest him for

taking these two jerry cans of gas?” He said, “We are friends now.”

^ank you.

Ra’ad: Excuse me. He has been through difficult circumstances. He

has a big crisis in his life, a massive crisis in the last few years. ^is

is a reflection. I met him prior to being here. I asked him, “How do

you find the work with the American forces?” And that was in the

beginning. And he said, “It is a great opportunity for me to work

with an army as powerful and principled as the Americans. You

always talk to us about civilizations, and now I have the opportunity

of living and practicing with another civilization.”

^is is what I have said. I have said it in front of you, and I have said

it in front of many members of Congress, and I said this to

Ambassador [Ryan C.] Crocker—that we can understand and

separate between a political administration and American

civilization. We are thirsty for American civilization, and American

civilization is not represented by the big hamburgers or the big Pepsi

bottles. And that’s what we wish to see—American civilization.

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^e problem now with the political administration, if you see Iraqis

sitting among them—whether there are two Iraqis, four Iraqis, six

Iraqis, or 12 Iraqis—at the end of the day, you will see them divided

into two groups. Since the invasion, Iraq has been divided. Has it

been done on purpose to destroy Iraq, or is it by mistake? Since I

have been a major, I never understood American policy.

Ambassador Crocker’s answer was so straight. He said, “I am

Crocker. I am the American ambassador here in Baghdad. I myself

don’t understand American policy.” So this is an example in front

of us of how bad political administration destroys a lot of civilized

achievements. So people who are uneducated—simple people—

how do they look at the United States with this pressure on them?

Especially now, when many of the provinces have been cradling

terrorism. ^ese simple men do not differentiate between great

gentlemen like yourselves sitting here, and other great American

soldiers, and people like President [George W.] Bush, and Richard

[N.] Perle, and [Secretary of Defense Donald H.] Rumsfeld. But

they devastated our country. ^ese simple people, they do not

understand that there are psychological mistakes, like in Samuel

Huntington’s Me Clash of Civilizations or Francis Fukuyama’s

book, Me End of History. ^e simple Iraqi does not differentiate

between these things. It all reflects on the American soldier who

is on the front.

I am a soldier. I sympathize with any soldier standing there. I feel

sorry for all the sacrifices that any soldier pays, because in front of

you, we are a people who have been victims of bad politicians. I

have joined in six wars—and violent wars. I understand the

meaning of the decimation of war, and that gives me an

understanding of the people.

But we have to learn our lessons. What happened in Iraq were bad

American political mistakes. We have met many great American

soldiers and technicians, whom we look at as our future.

^roughout the education and culture of the Middle East,

compared to the American administration and institutions, there is

a gap between our civilizations and education. Now we have a

saying that “it’s stupid to trust the American administration

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policies.” Another is that “it is ignorant to object to the American

political decisions.”^is is a very difficult equation.

We wish that we would benefit from the mistakes that were made.

I am sorry that the mistakes occurred, because the civilization

occurred over 500 years. We wish that we would benefit from the

mistakes that occurred, because the civilization occurred over 500

years, and we don’t know how to explain it in our region. I am one

of the soldiers and an Iraqi citizen. Somehow I have no

understanding of American civilization. And I’m a Muslim. I’m

not sectarian. I studied all the religions—Jews, Christianity, and

many other religions. ^ere is a great appreciation between

Muslims and other religions, but what we have is a gap between the

civilizations—this great gap. We wish for more American friends

coming in the future to narrow the gap between us. But,

unfortunately, what we’re finding now is that the gap is getting

bigger, not smaller.

^e last thing I would like to speak about, the Awakening and the

circumstances of the Awakening.

We have a small number of professionals, like Dr. Sa’doon, on all

levels. Unfortunately, the American administration did not consider

and appreciate people like him who could have assisted in rapidly

moving to democracy.

But unfortunately the American policy—I can say the American

policy presented by the governor, [L.] Paul Bremer—he wanted to

take a shortcut to democracy. Unfortunately, the shortcut was using

the religious people.

And 2006 was like 1994 in Rwanda, despite the gap between the

civilizations in Rwanda and Iraqi, and the exact people taking

power were farmers. We started to be ashamed to call ourselves

Iraqis, having these uneducated people leading us.

[Referring to Dr. Sa’doon again] It’s very unfortunate for a man

with his dignity, with his intelligence, seeking to start over again

and seek a new way for his livelihood because thieves were let loose

in his own country. ^e American policy should be to find proud

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people, to find persons like these people, to prove to the future that

America put a seal on helping to develop democracy and a new

civilization in Iraq. And we have a saying that “you know a person

by his friends.”You take a person like Mahmoud Mashhaddani or

Adnan al-Dulaimi. Do we count these as friends of America?

Ghazi: Excuse me, General. ^e last mistake by President Bush’s

administration, which encourages Iraq to stay at the level it is, is the

new Status of Forces Agreement [SOFA]. One of the articles in it

says that you have to follow the former regime elements.

Sa’doon: Chase.

Interpreter: Follow or chase?

Sa’doon: Chase. ^ey are criminals.

Ghazi: ^is article includes all the former regime employees. ^is

is a bad agreement. ^is article has stopped one thing, and that is

Iraqi national reconciliation. ^e Iraqi government sent a

delegation to the regional countries regarding the reconciliation of

the former military and other civilian employees, and if you noticed,

nobody has signed on to going back to work. ^e reason is this

article in the SOFA agreement, which means that anyone who goes

back will be assassinated immediately.

I know that I, myself, can go back to Iraq and have no problem. But

if anyone chooses to inform on me to the Americans and say, “^is

gentleman is a former regime element,” according to the SOFA

agreement, I could be chased. According to the SOFA agreement, I

could be arrested immediately. And I have no problem. I am not a

criminal. My job was a former ministry employee.

Sa’doon: ^is problem has closed the door before a long soughtafter amendment of the new Iraqi constitution. ^e Iraqi

constitution was drafted in a spirit of vengeance. I was a member

of the drafting committee representing the alienated communities,

and I was witness to a constitution that was drafted in a spirit of

vengeance, which consequently contained mishaps and mistakes

that we have suffered from, and will continue to suffer from.

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One of these problems is the reference to former employees, and

former Ba’athists, and former members of the old system of

government—exactly the subject that is being referred to today,

now, by General Khudilyas, who is actually right in seeing that this

problem, rather than being an assistant element, to help us amend

the constitution, has actually reinstated and strengthened the

presence of this concept of vengeance in the constitution.

I, as a reformist, as a member of a community that wants to reform

the constitution, now find it more difficult to attend to this problem

in the constitution, with the agreement signed with the United

States. ^e significance of this problem is twofold. One is human,

and the other is legal, as the general has indicated. It’s made it

difficult now for us to approach it because it’s there in the

agreement, and I could not see why—excuse the expression—in

the hell would an agreement between two sovereign states refer to

former employees of an older regime. I mean, what have you got—

you Americans, the United States—got to do with people

belonging to a former political system in the country? You’re not

the police here. You’re not the legal system here.^is is part of the

legal system. ^is is such a drastic mistake, and I don’t know how

the American side accepted to see it incorporated in an agreement

of that nature. It’s impossible to accept.^at’s how significant this

reference is by General Ghazi.

Ghazi:^e other point is, regarding the former military, everybody

agreed and accepted that dissolving the former Iraqi army was a

mistake by President Bush and Bremer. And the Iraqi government

itself, from the president to the prime minister to other sectarian

groups, agreed and accepted that it was a mistake to dissolve the

Iraqi army. ^e former Iraqi army was an independent army,

following orders from the political leaders. And now they’re trying

to facilitate reconciliation by recognizing that the former Iraqi army

only did its duty at the time. Most of the former Iraqi army officers

agreed with this reconciliation effort being made. And I say—and

many of us say—if they’re admitting that the former Iraqi army

has not committed a crime, then I ask you why, until this time, the

former defense minister has not been released from prison, if he has

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not committed a crime, and other officers with him, who have been

put on death row? What crime have they committed?

General Hussein Rashid was the head of operations, and I worked

as the head of the operations 2003. General Hussein Rashid was

put on death row for implementing the orders of the political

leaders at the time. I implemented the orders of the political leaders

after 2003. We planned and supervised operations in Fallujah, in

Najaf, in Tal Afar, and north of Babil. If there is regime change

again, am I going to be executed, or will the political leaders be

executed, too?

I just want to explain to you, to the new American administration, if

there is a wish for reconciliation with the former military, we do not

wish for you to give us our rights or our pensions—because we do not

believe we will ever receive our pensions. If there are good intentions

in the government, the first thing they should do is release all the

former officers who have been detained by the government.

We hear the Ministry of Defense spokesman, Mohammed alAskari, saying that the files of the former military officers will be

closed, and they will be receiving all their rights back. But I can

tell you now, it’s all talk in front of the television cameras. ^e

former military officers are not going to the embassy here to check

on going back to Iraq, because they know it’s a trap for them to go

back and be assassinated. If the intention is true, the best way to

give our rights back is to publish a statement of amnesty for all the

former military officers.

Two weeks ago, Major General (Pilot) Jawad Kathem al-Dulaimi

was assassinated, him and his son, in the Adhamiyah district of

Baghdad. ^e checkpoint there took him, and at this checkpoint

they are wearing commando uniforms. ^ese are linked to the

Ministry of Interior. ^ey assassinated him and his son.

To this minute, about 450 high-ranking officers have been

assassinated. ^e American administration announced that the

Iraqi security forces are up and running. So how come 450 highranking Iraqi officers have been assassinated and no one has been

arrested? ^ese are security forces?

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Will you, or I, or the system that is going on now, encourage me to

go back to Iraq at this moment? ^at is because of the American

invasion, because it depended on personnel who are not

nationalists, and they did not find nationalist and patriotic people

to give them advice. . . .

Ra’ad: To speak about the Awakening—it resulted from an

environment that had accepted terrorism under the umbrella of

resistance against invaders. We mentioned many of the reasons

previously. On the ground, it was discovered that these people did

not work for the benefit of Iraq.^eir objective was to destroy Iraq.

Accepting them turned into rejecting them, and for the lack of real

security forces, the people who started fighting them were the

people who suffered because of them. And that was done by

absorbing and using the tribal forces in the areas to fight and hold

the main target of the terrorists.

At the beginning of the Awakening, one of them was Sattar Abu

Risha.^e success of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha broke the fear barrier.

^e credit does not go only to Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, but we

appreciate him for firing the first shot.^ere are tens and hundreds

of thousands of Iraqis better than Sattar Abu Risha who fought

the terrorists and al-Qaeda, but they have not come to the surface.

As you know, Sattar Abu Risha was not a nationalist, as the

Americans understand it. As you know, he was a road gangster, and

he committed crimes against Iraqi society previously. For the

benefit of the area, and the benefit of the Americans at that time,

Sattar Abu Risha was raised above the surface.^ere are thousands

of Iraqi nationalists and patriots who did the same thing he did.

^at’s why we need actions and reactions.^is is a natural thing in

Iraqi society, and from the beginning, we knew there was no future

for such a thing. It resulted from danger and the mistakes that

occurred, as we mentioned earlier. Society was protecting itself.

Iraqi society wants to go back to its natural self, which is a peaceful

people. But there was no national leadership to take control and

resist terrorists coming into the country. Because of the chaos at

the time, and Abu Risha, assisted by the Americans, which made

it happen and a success, people started to raise Sattar Abu Risha.

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And then, suddenly, he started meeting President Bush, meeting

the Congress—and these persons, such people do not represent the

whole of Iraqi society. And the most surprising thing, these people

are now entering the political process.

In 2004, I was called on here in Jordan by the Marine commander,

[Colonel] John [C.] Coleman, and he was looking for gangsters to

fight the gangsters that we had in Iraq. I told him at that time,“You

are a general, and I know that you are intelligent. And there is a

principle: when you have gangsters, use another gangster to fight

gangsters. You’re benefiting from the successful result in the short

term, but the results are disastrous in the long term.”

I advised him to go back and form new, independent, professional

security forces, and let these security forces fight instead of allowing

gangsters to take control. And we sat there a while, and his assistant

was there. I believe it was Colonel David.* At my next meeting with

him, I discovered that there was a political rejection of my opinion.

^e problem started to get worse and worse, and the American

Army sacrificed heavily in al-Anbar Province. We could have

avoided Fallujah I and Fallujah II. I gave my word that we—

through me and my officers—we could form a security force for

al-Anbar Province to defend it and fight al-Qaeda. We could kill

al-Qaeda in a very short time.

^is general and his assistant are in the United States, and you can

ask him what happened in that meeting. We could have avoided

many of the losses to the Americans and to the Iraqis if they had

listened to me at that time.

But we get back to the point where there is another political

opinion that they cannot explain logically to us. And that occurred

in the capital here, Amman, in July 2004, even though I was being

followed and chased in Iraq. I was here for advisory reasons only,

and I was met by high-ranking Iraqi officers and by the Americans,

too. One of them at the meeting was Jerry [H.] Jones, who was the

adviser to the officers at the time.Trust me when I tell you, if they

had taken my advice then, things would have been different. . . .

* Probably Lieutenant Colonel R. David Harlan.
^en I went to Athens, and I presented a study criticizing the

strategic military planning in Iraq. And we gave studies of how to

destroy all the terrorism in Iraq. And the well-known professional

expert, Anthony [H.] Cordesman, was there at that meeting, too.

Raoul [H.] Acala, the American adviser to the Iraqi minister of

defense was at the table, and high-ranking professionals of the

American Army. I said to Anthony Cordesman, “How do you do

listen to advice from the Iraqi ministers and advisers? ^ey’re so

small-minded. With your personality, how do you accept it? ^ey

have no professional advisors. It’s surprising.”It was a very lengthy

and long discussion. But they’re all alive, and you can meet with

them and discuss what I said in that meeting.

I know the people from the Iraqi army, but we became caught

between the hammer and the anvil. Our wish is to serve our

country and respect the friendship with the Americans. But the

Iraqi government is against us, and the previous Iraqi regime’s

policies are counted as a traitorous by the Americans. See, we are

before you here with big responsibilities and worries.^e stupidity

of the American administration was in getting the right

opportunity and sacrificing so many American soldiers and

innocent Iraqi people, too.

I met again with Jerry Jones, and the personal advisor to President

Bush. And they told me, “Oh, we are so sorry we didn’t take your

advice the first time.” Every time we used to talk to them or to the

American Congress, they wanted to say, “Oh, the American clock

is too fast. We have a short time.”. . .

Ra’ad: ^e distance between us in Iraq and the United States is

the same distance between us and Mars.^is talking is painful, and

we are patient, and you are happy when you see our faces here. We

smile with intelligence and dignity, so we can tell you about our

worries and our concerns.

^is is the Awakening, and the other thing—it’s nothing to be proud

of, taking somebody like Abu Risha to the United States and meeting

President Bush.^is is a short-term success. It’s nothing to be proud

of as a superpower, as the president of a great country, to meet with

someone like this.^is is a leader who is on for a short time and out.

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If I were an American general, I would rather pass this stage and not

mention it again, because this is an embarrassment. I am sorry to take

your time. I’ll give the chair to Dr. Sa’doon.

Sa’doon: Colonel Montgomery, gentlemen, I would like to say at

the outset that I truly feel we are today, my friends and I, at an

opportune moment, especially in view of the kind of thinking that

we have indulged in for the past few months. We have given up on

a lot of options that we tried during the past few years in order to

contribute to the betterment of the Iraqi situation, but we have

been faced with such difficulties that we have now opted for the

more intellectual approach to the Iraqi problem.

Our intellectual approach is twofold. One has been championed and

founded by Lieutenant General Ra’ad al-Hamdani, who pioneered

the establishment of the Association of Former Iraqi Officers in

order to fight for their civilian rights, for their and their families’

rights.^at has been a difficult job, but because it’s such a just cause,

it has met with a limited success, not in terms of the government

response as much as in terms of the popular response to such a just

cause. General Hamdani, deserves credit and gratitude by both his

colleagues and the Iraqi society for this response.

^e other page of our practical response to this Iraqi challenge is

the establishment of a research center, which we’re going to call

the National Center for Dialogue and Democracy, in which we

address various issues. ^e National Center for Dialogue and

Democracy, which we abbreviated to NatCDD. NatCDD is going

to try and address all of our problems, the first of which is going to

be the security and military situation.^at is why I feel what we are

up against today is an opportune moment, because it is this

challenge of addressing the military confrontation between Iraq

and the United States and its allies that has not yet actually been

discussed jointly by Iraqis and the Americans in the same room.

^at has not been done. We would like to do that. We would like

to embark on that kind of job, which I believe is important.

Gentlemen, I belong to this group of people who actually believe

that both the Iraqi armed forces and the United States armed

forces have been victims to stupid policies by politicians. It is the

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reputation of the Iraqi armed forces, as well as the reputation of

the great forces of the United States, that have been victimized by

aberrant, impulsive, and blindly ideological mentalities leading the

political situation on both sides, in Iraq and in the United States.

I used to be part of the political echelon of Iraq. I was in the

hierarchy. I was close to the leadership. I was chief interpreter to the

head of state, and I was an ambassador and chief political advisor,

and I could see the blindness of the decisions. But I also was

extremely sorry to see that political blindness is not a monopoly of

Iraq. It extends to other countries and other leaderships.

When the Americans came with their forces to Iraq, they were told,

the leadership was told by stupid Iraqis that they would be received

with flowers. ^ese stupid Iraqis had forgotten that there were no

flowers in Iraq anymore in those days. Iraq had been turned into a

barren country. After 13 years of sanctions, Iraq had no flowers, so

the people of Iraq would not even have flowers even if they wanted

to.^ey couldn’t have flowers to meet the soldiers. But two months

after the invasion, you couldn’t see roses in Iraq. You couldn’t see

tulips. You couldn’t see carnations. You couldn’t see flowers. Iraq

became a car nation afterwards, when they opened the borders for

cars to be imported to Iraq where you couldn’t move, so we became

a car nation rather than having carnations in our flower shops.

We could not receive soldiers with flowers, but the general, alMufti, told you that he could see—and so could I—American

soldiers actually resting two or three meters away from their tanks,

with their guns not with them, because they felt secure, because

the people of Iraq did not want to fight them. Why the people of

Iraq didn’t want to fight them is a reflection more on the old regime

than on the American invasion.^at is my interpretation, which is

a fact, I think.

Did the Americans know how to deal with the situation? I don’t

think they did. I don’t think they dealt with it correctly, and I could

give you examples. I was invited one day—well, “invited” is a very

nice word, but actually it wasn’t that—by Ambassador Bremer to

his office. He invited me by sending a few Humvees to my humble

abode to pick me up and take me. I didn’t know where I was going,

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but it turned out I was going to see him. Apparently, he had invited

me to make sure that a photograph, which had me with Saddam

Hussein and Dan Rather from a meeting in 1991—you know Dan

Rather, the anchorman. . . . Somebody had told him that this was

Saddam’s office, and that he had this photograph, which was taken

with that door behind us, in an interview. And he wanted to make

sure that that photograph, which was a photocopy, was stuck on

the right door, because there were four doors of the same shape in

four corners of the palace. And he said,“Is this the door where you

were sitting?”

So I asked, “Have you sent for me to ask me this question?” He

said, “Yes.” I said, “^ank God for that. I thought you had sent for

me for something else.” So I said, “No, this is not the door.”

Actually, I wasn’t sure, because things had been changed. But I

wanted to behave meanly with him. I was mean. It may have been

Saddam’s room, but I said, “No, this is not Saddam’s room. You’re

actually working in his secretary’s room.”

^en he invited me in, and we sat, and he said, “I’ve heard about

you.^ey tell me you are so-and-so, whatever.” He mentioned one

or two good things, and he handed me a piece of paper, which was

written in Arabic and in English. ^e Arabic side said, “I, so-andso, hereby pledge that I will abide by this, and that I will have

nothing to do with the bad Ba’ath regime, and that I am not a

criminal, and that, and that,”and it says the same thing in English.

I can’t remember exactly, but it was so infuriating at that moment.

As you might gather, this was an application for a job. Actually, at

the top, it said “Application for Recruitment.”And he had a phone

call on his mobile. By then, we had mobiles in Iraq, and he was

talking, and he gave me this. But while he was talking, I put it back

on his desk. He took it, and he thought I had signed it, but I hadn’t.

He said, “You haven’t signed this. How come?” I said, “Well,

ambassador, you’re asking me to sign an application for a job.”And

he said, “Yes.” I said, "Ambassador, I have two problems with that.

In order to apply for a job, I need to have been sacked from my old

job, and I haven’t. I simply am lost. Nobody told me I had been

dismissed or anything. Neither have I resigned my job.”

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He said, “No, no, don’t worry about that. ^at is a legal; it’s only a

small problem. Don’t worry about it.” I said, “But, ambassador,

there’s another problem. You are an ambassador, aren’t you?” And

he said,“Yes.”I said,“Do you expect ambassadors to apply for jobs?

Aren’t they usually invited to do a job? Don’t you think it would be

more proper for you to write to me a letter and say that you’d like

me to do this job? And then I will respond to you in kind and say

‘thank you,’ whether I accept it or not. Don’t you think that this is

the kind of civilization that Iraq expects from the United States?”

He looked at me, and he accepted it, and he asked his secretary to

throw me out of his office.^is is the kind of management that we

have been given from the outside in Iraq.

Now, leave management, come to the reading of Iraq. Research on

Iraq and its problems, and the confrontation with Iraq has been

not done by Iraqis. We have not taken part in this effort. You in

the United States have your own—the Cordesmans and the

^omas [L.] Friedmans and the rest.^ey write, we translate their

work, and our people read their work. We haven’t done any. ^at’s

why we would like to embark on a job ourselves of that nature. I

believe it is also our responsibility.

One of the problems in which we find ourselves has been referred

to by General Hamdani, and this is that we truly find ourselves

between the edge and a hard rock.We’ve been judged negatively by

the former regime, because we sit with you, and we talk to you—

but not the former regime, I mean, by extremists in the former

regime. And we have been rejected by the current system as

remnants of the former regime. So we are like the Untouchables of

India. We are the political untouchables of Iraq. Nobody would

want to talk to us. ^at is why we believe it is our job to try and

express ourselves, through this center.

Unfortunately, the American behavior in Iraq has given the former

regime of Iraq a clean bill of health by allowing this kind of system

to be in power, to commit such horrific crimes, and to drag the

country into the worst lists, international lists of corruption, of

poverty, of lack of education, of unproductivity that the former

regime has been given a clean bill of health by comparison—a clean

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bill of health, which in truth the former regime does not fully

deserve. But by comparison it does. Can you see the discrepancy in

the intention of the whole change of regime? Can you see the irony

in the situation that happened? ^ere is a huge irony here.

Gentlemen, history’s judgment on the armed conflict which broke

out in 2003 can only be guessed at now. But there is plenty of

guessing going on. ^e majority of the guessing is not in favor of

the United States.^e United States will be lucky to find someone

who praises it for what it did in Iraq. ^e United States will be

extremely lucky to find anybody defending what it did in Iraq. But

that is not our intention.^at is not, because, for many critics of the

invasion, the invasion of Iraq will prove to have been irresponsible,

a violation of international law, and George Bush and Tony Blair

would not really appear to have taken the right decisions at the

moment, or adopted the right policies in dealing with Iraq. ^e

results that we deal with are based on misconceptions, allegations,

bad reports by the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], or

intelligence reports. ^is needs to be addressed.

How could you have committed such mistakes? Do you in the U.S.

Marines, or you in the U.S. armed forces, in your research, do you

actually intend to attend to these questions, because we would like

you to attend to these questions. We would like to sit with you on

those questions.We would like to show you how wrong you were—

I mean, your forces, your leadership—was on Iraq, so that a thing

of that nature can never happen again.Western electorates, western

legislators have been deceived in order to give the U.S. forces, or the

Western forces, the go-ahead. ^ey have been deceived by bad

reports. Shouldn’t that be looked at in order to be avoided?

What I propose at this moment is that I have seen a lot of good

work done, but not in the United States. I have seen some good

work done even in Japan on the war policy against Iraq. I have seen

some good work done in German institutions, and I certainly have

seen some good work done in British institutions. One of them is

a friend of mine who has written extensively on the war strategy

against Iraq, and especially at the King’s College, London, they

have an academy, a defense academy, which has produced some

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good work. Professor Michael Clarke, who is a specialist in war

studies, has done a lot of good work. Lord [Timothy] Garden, who

won his peerage in 2004—Tim Garden has done some good work

on Iraq.

But we have not read true academic analysis, objective analysis, of

the war on Iraq from an American source. I have seen a lot of work

done by Anthony Cordesman, because he’s a strategist, but I have

never accepted Anthony Cordesman’s objectivity as something that

I can trust. Never. He was one who went on urging George Bush

to attack Iraq because he jumped on the bandwagon of the WMD

[weapons of mass destruction] issue—and he was a strategist, a

long-term strategist. And he never bothered to make sure whether

Iraq did have WMDs. He just jumped on the bandwagon, and

that’s the kind of strategist that I wouldn’t trust easily today.

Gentlemen, we need to address the military concepts, military

planning, that was used in relation to Iraq, and here you have the

experts. And we need to also look at Iraq’s counter-strategy, which

was by my definition anything but symmetrical. It was

asymmetrical, it was confused, definitely. But why was it confused?

You can learn from our generals. General al-Hamdani did mention

aspects of the asymmetrical nature of the Iraqi war counterstrategy, but this needs to be explored. ^is needs to be elaborated

on, as you might. Now, the question of the CBNs [chemical,

biological, and nuclear weapons] or the WMDs and their existence

and the programs, I mean, are we going to see this repeated against

North Korea? Are we going to see it repeated against Iran? Because

it was done against Iraq. Should we allow them to commit such

mistakes in the future?

^is is your job, as historians, to tell the people. We are here to

cooperate with you. We extend a hand of intellectual discussion

and dialogue, and we can sit with you all the time. We can talk to

you. But are we going to have the opportunity to do that? We invite

you to look into it and see whether we can work together. You have

the generals, and I am sure we can also have the political analysts

who can join in to establish a kind of intellectual and research

rapport with your institutions so that we can come with something

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that both our nations can benefit from. I invite you to consider that,

because now we have the institutions. We have the officers’

associations and we have the research center that is being made

now. And the first major activity that we would like to launch, our

project, would be a serious study of the war strategy against Iraq.

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Appendix

Acronyms and Abbreviations

I MEF I Marine Expeditionary Force

II MEF II Marine Expeditionary Force

ACE Air Combat Element

ANGLICO Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

AO Area of Operation

AOR Area of Responsibility

APC Anbar People’s Committee

AQI/AQIZ Al-Qaeda in Iraq

Arty LnO Artillery Liaison Officer

ASR Alternative Supply Route

BAT Biometric Assessment Tool

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

BIAP Baghdad International Airport

BCT Brigade Combat Team

BTT Border Transition Team

CA Civil Affairs

CAG Civil Affairs Group

CAP Combined Action Platoon

Casevac Casualty Evacuation

CBN Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear

Weapons

CentCom U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL

CERP Commander’s Emergency Relief Program

CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component

Command

CG Commanding General

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CHF Cooperative Housing Foundation

CJTF-7 Combined Joint Task Force 7

CLC Concerned Local Citizens

CMO Civil-Military Operations

CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center

CNN Cable News Network

CO Commanding Officer

COA Course of Action

COC Combat Operations Center

COIN Counterinsurgency

COP Combat Outpost

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CSP Community Stabilization Program

CSS Combat Service Support

DCG Deputy Commanding General

Det Detachment

DG Director General

DoD U.S. Department of Defense

DoS U.S. Department of State

ECP Entry Control Points

ECRA Emergency Council for the Rescue of alAnbar

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ePRT Embedded Provincial Reconstruction

Team

ERU Emergency Response Unit

EWS Expeditionary Warfare School, Quantico,

VA

FAO Foreign Area Officer

FLOT Forward Line of Troops

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FLT Fallujah Liaison Team

FOB Forward Operating Base

FSSG Force Service Support Group

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GCE Ground Combat Element

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GOI Government of Iraq

H&S Headquarters & Support

HUMINT Human Intelligence

HVI High Value Individual

IA Iraqi Army

IC Intelligence Community

ICDC Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

ID Identification

IECI Independent Election Committee of Iraq

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IIP Islamic Iraqi Party

IO Information Operations

IP Iraqi Police

IRAP Iraq Rapid Assistance Program

IRD International Relief and Development

ISF Iraqi Security Forces

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

ITAO Iraq Transition Assistance Office

IZ International Zone, Baghdad [“Green

Zone”]

JCC Joint Coordination Center

JMD Joint Manning Document

JSS Joint Security Stations

JTAC Joint Tactical Air Controller

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KIA Killed in Action

LAPD Los Angeles Police Department

LD Line of Departure

LNO Liaison Officer

LOC Line of Communication

LOO Line of Operation

LRAD Long Range Acoustic Device

MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MARCENT Marine Corps Central Command, Tampa,

FL

MARDIV Marine Division

MarForPac Marine Forces Pacific

MCIA Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MLG Marine Logistics Unit

MML Mohammed Mahmoud Latif

MNC-I Multi National Corps-Iraq

MND Multinational Division

MNF Multinational Force

MNF-I Multi National Force-Iraq

MNF-W Multi National Force-West

MNF-West Multi National Force-West

MOD Minister of Defense

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

MP Military Police

MSR Main Supply Route

MSI Mutamar Sahwa al-Iraq

MTT Military Transition Team

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

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NPR National Public Radio

O&M Operations and Maintenance.

OGA Other Government Agency

OIF I Operation Iraqi Freedom I

OIF II Operation Iraqi Freedom II

OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

OPA Office of Provincial Authority

OP Observation Posts

OpsO Operations Officer

OVR Operation Vigilant Resolve

P&R Programs and Resources

PA Public Address

PAO Public Affairs Officer

PDOP Provincial Director of Police

PFT Physical Fitness Test

PIC Provincial Iraqi Control

PGM Precision Guided Missile

PJCC Provisional Joint Coordination Center

PM Prime Minister

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSD Personal Security Detail

PsyOps Psychological Operations

PTT Police Transition Team

QRF Quick Reaction Force or Quick Reaction

Funds

R&S Reconnaissance and Surveillance

RCT Regimental Combat Team

RFF Request for Forces

RIP Relief in Place

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RIPTOA Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority

ROC Required Operation Capacity

ROE Rules of Engagement

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade

RTI Research Triangle Institute

SAA Sahwa al-Anbar

SAI Sahwa al-Iraq

SASO Stability and Support Operations

SeaBees Construction Battalions (CBs)

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SOFA Status of Forces Agreement

SOI Sons of Iraq

SPTT Special Police Transition Team

SVBIED Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised

Explosive Device

TACON Tactical Control

TECOM Training and Education Command

TO Table of Organization or Task

Organization

TOA Transfer of Authority

TPT Tactical PsyOps [Psychological

Operations] Team

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UN United Nations

USAID United States Agency for International

Development

VBIED Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive

Device

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

XO Executive Officer

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About the Editors

Colonel Gary W. Montgomery,U.S.

Marine Corps Reserve, deployed to Iraq

once as field historian for the U.S.

Marine Corps History Division and

twice as a civil affairs officer. He served

as the civil affairs capabilities integration

officer for the Marine Corps. In his

civilian career, he worked as a policy

analyst for the Department of Defense; a military analyst for the U.S.

Marine Corps; an artillery trainer for the Bosnian Federation Army

under the Military Stabilization Program; and as a United Nations

border monitor in Montenegro under the International Conference on

the Former Yugoslavia. He holds a master’s degree in international

relations and international commerce from the Patterson School of

Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky.

Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S.

McWilliams, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve,

served in Fallujah in 2004 as a logistics

officer. He joined the U.S. Marine Corps

History Division in 2007 and has deployed

to both Iraq and Afghanistan as a field

historian. McWilliams has worked in the

marketing and communications field and

recently earned a master’s degree in history from California State

University, Chico.