BLD-143 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-4024

___________

TERRY NELSON,

Appellant

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, COUNTY OF DELAWARE, et al; 

THOMAS F. LAWRIE; CHARLES HOWLEY; SAMUEL DEVECCHIS, 

(Each) Individually and Collectively, In Their Official Capacities, Et Al

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-02224)

District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 

Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

December 27, 2013

Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 8, 2014)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Terry Nelson appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his motion 
2

filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a).

1

 Appellee Charles Howley has 

moved to quash the appeal as time-barred. For the reasons that follow, Howley’s motion 

is denied and we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.

I.

In 2008, Nelson filed a civil rights action in the District Court against Howley and 

others pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Some of Nelson’s claims were dismissed in 2009. On

April 30, 2010, the District Court granted summary judgment against Nelson as to the 

remaining claims. The District Court docket reflects that a copy of the April 30, 2010 

order was mailed to Nelson; the docket does not indicate that this order went undelivered.

In September 2013, Nelson filed a Rule 60(a) motion with the District Court, 

claiming that he did not learn of the April 30, 2010 order until July 2013, when he 

inquired about the case’s status. The motion indicated Nelson’s “desire[] to exhaust his 

appeals on the federal level through the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.” On 

September 18, 2013, the District Court denied the motion, concluding that Rule 60(a) was 

inapplicable and “does not provide courts a mechanism to set back the clock so that Mr. 

Nelson can appeal the Court’s judgment.” (Dist. Ct. Order entered Sept. 18, 2013, at 2.)

On October 1, 2013, Nelson filed this appeal. Thereafter, Howley filed his motion 

to quash, and the Clerk of this Court listed the appeal for possible summary action.

II.

 

1 Under Rule 60(a), a district court “may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising 

from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of 
3

Howley’s argument that this appeal is time-barred appears to be premised on his 

belief that Nelson is appealing from the District Court’s April 30, 2010 order. But 

Nelson’s notice of appeal clearly states that he is appealing from the District Court’s 

September 18, 2013 order. Because that notice was filed within 30 days of the date of the 

latter order, this appeal is timely. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Accordingly, Howley’s 

motion to quash is denied.

Turning to the merits of this appeal,2 we review the District Court’s denial of 

Nelson’s Rule 60(a) motion for abuse of discretion. See Pfizer Inc. v. Uprichard, 422 

F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2005). For substantially the reasons provided by the District Court 

in its September 18, 2013 order, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Nelson’s motion.3 Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, 

we will summarily affirm that order. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

 

the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a).

2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

3

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), a district court may, under 

certain circumstances, grant a party’s motion to reopen the time to file an appeal based on 

his failure to receive proper notice of the court’s judgment. But such a motion must be 

filed within 180 days after the judgment is entered or within 14 days after the movant 

receives proper notice of the entry, whichever is earlier. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). 

Because Nelson’s Rule 60(a) motion was filed more than 180 days after the District 

Court’s April 30, 2010 order, liberally construing that motion as a request for relief under 

Rule 4(a)(6) would not have changed the outcome here.