UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1496

SLOAN PLEASANTS,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

TOWN OF LOUISA; ROBERT RIGSBY, sued in his individual capacity,

 Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon, 

Senior District Judge. (3:11-cv-00032-NKM-BWC)

Argued: March 22, 2013 Decided: May 7, 2013

Before SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Joseph R. GOODWIN, 

District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia, 

sitting by designation.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by unpublished 

opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion in which Judge Floyd and 

Judge Goodwin joined.

ARGUED: Jeffrey Edward Fogel, Steven David Rosenfield, 

Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Maurice Scott Fisher, 

Jr., HARMAN, CLAYTOR, CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia, 

for Appellees. ON BRIEF: David P. Corrigan, Jeremy D. Capps, 

HARMAN, CLAYTOR, CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellees. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

Sloan Pleasants filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, alleging that Officer Robert Rigsby unlawfully entered her 

home and arrested her. The district court granted summary 

judgment to Officer Rigsby on the unlawful-entry claim and 

dismissed the false-arrest claim. We affirm the grant of 

summary judgment on the unlawful-entry claim, reverse the 

dismissal of the false-arrest claim, and remand the case for 

further proceedings.

I.

A.

Before setting out the facts of this case, we pause to note 

the peculiar procedural posture of this case. After the 

defendants filed a motion to dismiss all of Pleasants’s claims, 

the district court granted limited discovery on Pleasants’s 

unlawful-entry claim. J.A. 16–17. The parties engaged in 

discovery on this issue, but based on the depositions of 

Pleasants and Officer Rigsby included in the Joint Appendix on 

appeal, this discovery also encompassed testimony about the 

false-arrest claim. See J.A. 55–63 (Pleasants’s deposition); 

J.A. 115–18 (Rigsby’s deposition). Those parts of the 

depositions related to the arrest, however, were never put 

before the district court, which decided the unlawful-entry 

claim under the summary judgment standard and the false-arrest 
3

claim under the motion to dismiss standard.1 J.A. 196–204 

(unlawful-entry claim); J.A. 205–10 (false-arrest claim). Thus, 

we can consider the developed record in evaluating the district 

court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the unlawful-entry 

claim, but in reviewing the district court’s decision to dismiss 

the false-arrest claim, we are limited to the allegations in the 

complaint, without any benefit of the facts developed in 

discovery.

B.

We review the facts relevant to the unlawful-entry claim in 

the light most favorable to Pleasants, the nonmoving party. See

Laing v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 2013).

On November 1, 2009, Kevin Pleasants, Pleasants’s exhusband, called the police and asked for an officer to go with 

him to Pleasants’s home to pick up his eleven-year-old daughter, 

K.P., who “was bawling . . . [and] hysterical on the phone with 

him” because Pleasants was threatening to throw her out of the 

house. J.A. 89. During this time, Mr. Pleasants was in a 

custody battle with Pleasants over their daughter. Mr.

Pleasants wanted an officer to witness the interaction because 

 1 Had this evidence been before the district court when it 

made its decision, we could have considered it on appeal and 

evaluated the false-arrest claim under the summary judgment 

standard. See Dean v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 395 F.3d 471, 474 

(4th Cir. 2005).
4

Pleasants had accused him of having intimidated her in the past, 

and he told the dispatcher that his ex-wife was “very violent” 

and “possibly intoxicated.” J.A. 131–32. After Officer Rigsby 

and Mr. Pleasants arrived at Pleasants’s house, Officer Rigsby 

stood back, observing the conversation but not participating. 

Pleasants initially refused to let K.P. leave with Mr. Pleasants 

and shut the door, but K.P. eventually came out and left with 

her father, to which Pleasants acquiesced. During these events, 

Officer Rigsby could not hear all of the conversation, and 

although he noticed that Pleasants had bloodshot eyes, he could 

not detect that Pleasants had been drinking.

On December 13, 2009, Mr. Pleasants again called the police 

to have an officer go with him to Pleasants’s house and perform 

a “welfare check” on K.P. Mr. Pleasants had returned a missed

telephone call from K.P., but Pleasants would not let him speak 

with K.P. During this call, Mr. Pleasants heard K.P. screaming 

and crying in the background. Officer Rigsby again went with 

Mr. Pleasants to Pleasants’s home. Pleasants opened the door 

and told them both to leave. Mr. Pleasants said that he wanted 

to see K.P., who was standing approximately ten feet inside the 

doorway. As Pleasants was trying to close the door, Officer 

Rigsby entered the house to talk to K.P. and check on her.
5

C.

In reviewing the allegations in the complaint relevant to 

the false-arrest claim, “we accept as true all well-pleaded 

allegations and view the complaint in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff.” Philips v. Pitt County Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 

176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

Two paragraphs in the complaint discuss the false arrest. 

See J.A. 7–8 (¶¶ 12–13). Pleasants alleges that after Officer 

Rigsby entered the house, he began to question K.P. 

In response to one of [Officer] Rigsby’s 

questions, [K.P.] stated that [Pleasants]

had slapped her on her leg where her arm was 

resting. [K.P.] also told [Officer] Rigsby 

that her mother grabbed her by her wrist and 

told her to take a shower. [Officer] Rigsby 

saw no welts or other indicia of even a mild 

or minor physical injury.

 

J.A. 7–8 (¶¶ 12–13).

Based on those statements, Rigsby arrested Pleasants, and 

she was charged with assault and battery against a family 

member, in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-57.2. The charge was 

ultimately dropped by the Commonwealth’s Attorney. 

D.

Pleasants then filed this suit against the Town of Louisa 

and Officer Rigsby. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she sued 

Officer Rigsby under theories of unlawful entry, false arrest, 

and malicious prosecution; she also filed state-law claims of 
6

malicious prosecution and gross negligence against him. She 

sued the Town, pursuant to § 1983, for failure to train.

The Town and Officer Rigsby filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss the complaint. Before deciding this motion, the 

district court granted limited discovery on the unlawful-entry 

claim. After this limited discovery, the court dismissed all of 

Pleasants’s claims. Pleasants now appeals the district court’s 

decision to grant summary judgment to Officer Rigsby on the 

unlawful-entry claim and to dismiss the false-arrest claim.2

II.

Section 1983 “is designed to provide a comprehensive remedy 

for the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Smith v. Hampton 

Training Sch. for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir. 1966). To 

state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must establish three 

elements . . . : (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the 

Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3) acting 

under color of state law.” Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 

1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997).

Not all violations of a plaintiff’s rights, however, will 

subject a defendant to liability. The doctrine of qualified 

 2 Although Pleasants’s notice of appeal challenges the 

district court’s entire decision, J.A. 220, she pursues only her

unlawful-entry and false-arrest claims on appeal, Appellant’s 

Reply Br. at 11 n.4.
7

immunity protects government officials performing discretionary 

functions “from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). It is 

“an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of 

litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

Qualified immunity is a two-step inquiry “that asks first 

whether a constitutional violation occurred and second whether 

the right violated was clearly established.” Henry v. Purnell, 

652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Melgar v. 

Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2010)). We need not, 

however, necessarily address these inquiries in that order. 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

III.

We first address Pleasants’s unlawful-entry claim. She 

argues that Officer Rigsby is not entitled to qualified immunity 

because his entry into her home on December 13, 2009, was not 

justified by any exigency. We disagree. 

A.

On this claim, the district court permitted limited 

discovery and considered this evidence in holding that Officer 

Rigsby was entitled to qualified immunity. When matters outside 

the pleadings are considered, a motion to dismiss must be 
8

treated as a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(d). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying 

the same legal standards as the district court.” Pueschel v. 

Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 563 (4th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment 

should be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law,” based on the “materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56. At this stage, we must view all evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rowzie v. Allstate Ins. 

Co., 556 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2009).

B.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to 

be secure in their . . . houses . . . against unreasonable 

searches.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Because “the Fourth 

Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house,” a

warrantless entry into a home by police is “presumptively 

unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591, 586 

(1980). A warrantless entry is permitted, however, in certain 

instances “because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 

Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 

547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).

One such instance is exigent circumstances. Coolidge v. 

New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971). One type of 

exigency is the emergency-aid exception to the warrant 
9

requirement, which allows police to enter a home “to protect an 

occupant from imminent injury.” Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 

1849, 1856 (2011) (quoting Brigham City, Utah, 547 U.S. at 403). 

Courts have shown particular concern for emergency situations of 

domestic violence, given their “combustible nature,” Tierney v. 

Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1998), as well as for 

children who may be in danger, see Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 

546, 555 (4th Cir. 2009) (relying in part on the fact that a 

child was in a home in which she was not supposed to be in 

holding that an officer reasonably believed that exigent 

circumstances existed to enter that home); see also Doe v. Heck, 

327 F.3d 492, 517 n.20 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing “that the 

exigent circumstances exception . . . gives the State the 

ability to take immediate action to ensure the physical safety 

of a child suspected of abuse who is located on private 

property”). In determining whether an officer’s entry into a

home was justified under this doctrine, “we ask whether the 

circumstances known to [the officer] would create an 

‘objectively reasonable belief that an emergency existed that 

required immediate entry to render assistance or prevent harm to 

persons or property within.’” Hunsberger, 570 F.3d at 555 

(quoting United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673, 678 (4th Cir. 

1992)). 
10

When Officer Rigsby went with Mr. Pleasants to Pleasants’s 

home on the night of December 13, Officer Rigsby was making his 

second visit to the home in six weeks because of circumstances

that placed the child in a volatile and potentially dangerous 

situation. Despite Pleasants’s attempt to characterize her 

behavior during the November incident as “cooperative, friendly, 

and gracious in allowing her daughter to go with [Mr. 

Pleasants],” Appellant’s Br. at 13, this incident was far more 

contentious than that. Although Pleasants eventually acquiesced 

in K.P. leaving with Mr. Pleasants, Officer Rigsby could have 

reasonably viewed her shutting the door before K.P. finally 

reopened the door to leave as hostility and a desire to keep 

K.P. away from Mr. Pleasants, no matter K.P.’s safety or

condition.

On the night of December 13, Officer Rigsby was told that 

K.P. was screaming and crying in the background of the telephone 

and that Pleasants would not let Mr. Pleasants speak with K.P. 

Mr. Pleasants explicitly requested that Officer Rigsby do a 

welfare check on K.P., reflecting his concern about his 

daughter. When Officer Rigsby arrived at the house and in 

contrast to the November incident, Pleasants refused to let K.P. 

speak with Officer Rigsby or Mr. Pleasants. This refusal left

Officer Rigsby unsure of K.P.’s well-being.
11

Ultimately, we need not decide whether these facts3 created 

an exigency permitting Officer Rigsby to enter Pleasants’s home 

pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Under the doctrine of 

qualified immunity, an officer is not liable for his actions, 

even if those actions would have actually violated the 

Constitution, if no clearly established law prohibited those 

actions. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

Although courts have long held that the sanctity of the 

home is “[a]t the very core” of the Fourth Amendment, Silverman 

v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961), numerous recent 

decisions have shown great concern for domestic violence, see, 

e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118–19 (2006), and for 

children who may be in danger, see, e.g., Hunsberger, 570 F.3d 

at 555; see also United States v. Taylor, 624 F.3d 626, 632 (4th 

Cir. 2010) (“[T]he absence of responsible adult supervision of 

children is an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless 

entry.” (quoting Georgia v. Peterson, 543 S.E.2d 692, 696 (Ga. 

2001))). In the absence of caselaw addressing what 

 3 That much of what Officer Rigsby knew was told to him by 

Pleasants’s ex-husband does not mean that Officer Rigsby could 

not credit that information. The record reflects no reason why 

Officer Rigsby should have disbelieved Mr. Pleasants’s 

statements. Furthermore, given the dangers of domestic violence 

and the need to protect children, that a police officer errs on 

the side of believing a statement and subsequently checking on 

the child is often the preferable choice.
12

circumstances are sufficient to constitute an exigency under the 

emergency-aid exception to allow police to check on a child, 

Officer Rigsby cannot be charged with having notice that the 

emergency-aid exception was unjustified here. See Robles v. 

Prince George’s County, Md., 302 F.3d 262, 270-71 (4th Cir. 

2002) (“Although notice does not require that the ‘very action 

in question has previously been held unlawful,’ it does mean 

that ‘in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be 

apparent.’” (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 

(1999))). 

Because no clearly established law prohibited Officer 

Rigsby’s warrantless entry into the home to ensure K.P.’s wellbeing, the district court properly granted summary judgment to 

Officer Rigsby on this claim. 

IV.

We turn now to Pleasants’s false-arrest claim. Pleasants 

argues that Officer Rigsby is not entitled to qualified immunity 

based solely on the allegations in the complaint because under 

Virginia law, a parent is allowed to use corporal punishment on 

a child, meaning that any touching of a child by a parent cannot 

automatically create probable cause for arrest. We agree.

A.

Unlike the unlawful-entry claim, the district court 

dismissed this claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
13

12(b)(6), looking only at the allegations in the complaint.4 We 

review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Decohen v. 

Capital One, N.A., 703 F.3d 216, 222 (4th Cir. 2012). “To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007)).

B.

The Fourth Amendment also protects “[t]he right of the 

people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable 

. . . seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. An arrest is a seizure 

under the Fourth Amendment, and such a seizure is reasonable 

only if based on probable cause. Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 

392, 398 (4th Cir. 2003). Probable cause “to justify an arrest 

means facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge 

that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of 

reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, 

that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to 

commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 

(1979). Whether probable cause exists must be determined “in 

 4 At oral argument, Officer Rigsby insisted that this is the 

proper procedural posture of this case.
14

the light of all of the surrounding circumstances.” Porterfield 

v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998). In determining what 

amounts to probable cause, we have noted that “[p]robable cause 

requires more than ‘bare suspicion’ but requires less than 

evidence necessary to convict.” Id.

Virginia maintains the common-law definition of assault and 

battery. Montague v. Virginia, 684 S.E.2d 583, 588–89 (Va. 

2009). Thus, the slightest touching may be sufficient to 

constitute a battery. Lynch v. Virginia, 109 S.E. 427, 428 (Va. 

1921). Yet Virginia allows parents to use corporal punishment 

with children, although that “right cannot be used as a cloak 

for the exercise of uncontrolled passion, and that such person 

may be criminally liable for assault and battery if he inflicts 

corporal punishment which exceeds the bounds of due moderation.” 

Harbaugh v. Virginia, 167 S.E.2d 329, 332 (Va. 1969). Given 

this parental right, some touching of a child by a parent—even 

if such a touching between people without a parent-child 

relationship could be a battery—must be legally permissible.

This conclusion requires us to reject Officer Rigsby’s 

contention that any touching by a parent of a child creates 

probable cause for an officer to arrest the parent and then a 
15

jury is left to determine whether that force was excessive.5 

Such a position is legally untenable in light of Virginia law. 

A parent often must use de minimis force to reprimand or even 

protect his children, and such force cannot always lead to the 

possibility that a police officer can arrest the parent. We do 

not attempt to define here what level of force must be used by a 

parent to create probable cause for arrest, for such 

determinations are typically fact-specific. We simply state for 

purposes of this case that the application of de minimus force 

by a parent does not automatically create probable cause for 

arrest.

Turning to the facts alleged in the complaint, Pleasants 

has stated a plausible claim for relief. The complaint alleges

that Officer Rigsby knew Pleasants touched her daughter twice—a 

slap on the hand and a grab of the wrist. It also alleges that 

Officer Rigsby saw no visible injuries on K.P. Based on these 

allegations alone, Pleasants has pled a plausible claim that 

Officer Rigsby lacked probable cause to arrest her. Virginia 

 5 Officer Rigsby’s reliance on Va. Code § 19.2-81.3(B), 

which requires an officer to arrest a person who the officer 

believes has violated Va. Code § 18.2-57.2, is misplaced. 

Section 19.2-81.3(B) still requires the officer to have probable 

cause for arrest. As we explain here, probable cause cannot 

always exist solely from a witness’s statement without any more 

context because Virginia recognizes the right of corporal 

punishment, thereby permitting some level of physical force 

against the child by the parent.
16

law permits some physical contact of a child by a parent, and 

without more factual development of the details of Pleasants’s 

contact with K.P., Pleasants’s allegations can support a claim 

that contact as described in the complaint is permissible under 

Virginia law. Thus, at this stage, we cannot say that Officer 

Rigsby did not violate Pleasants’s constitutional right to be 

free from arrest without probable cause.

Furthermore, we cannot say, based on the complaint’s 

allegations, that Officer Rigsby’s decision to arrest Pleasants 

did not violate clearly established law. Virginia expressly 

allows some degree of corporal punishment by a parent. 

Harbaugh, 167 S.E.2d at 332 (stating that “parents or persons 

standing in loco parentis may administer such reasonable and 

timely punishment as may be necessary to correct faults in a 

growing child”). At this stage, Pleasants has pled a plausible 

claim that, based on Virginia law allowing corporal punishment

and in the absence of more factual context for Pleasants’s use 

of force, probable cause for her arrest was so lacking that 

Officer Rigsby violated her clearly established right not to be 

arrested without probable cause. See Henderson v. Simms, 223 

F.3d 267, 273 (4th Cir. 2000) (“This Court has held that the 

Fourth Amendment right to be arrested only on probable cause is 

clearly established.”). Thus, Officer Rigsby is not entitled to 

qualified immunity at this point. See Pinder v. Johnson, 54 
17

F.3d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“Where the law is 

clearly established, and where no reasonable officer could 

believe he was acting in accordance with it, qualified immunity 

will not attach.”). 

On these pleadings, Pleasants has stated a claim for false 

arrest, and on the limited record before us, Officer Rigsby is 

not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Therefore, 

the district court erred in dismissing the false-arrest claim.6

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the grant of summary 

judgment to Officer Rigsby on the unlawful-entry claim, reverse 

the dismissal of the false-arrest claim, and remand the case for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, 

REVERSED IN PART, 

AND REMANDED

 6 Of course, whether Pleasants will ultimately prevail on 

this claim is a different question. On remand, Officer Rigsby 

may present to the district court evidence from discovery 

relating to the false-arrest claim and move for summary 

judgment. The district court would then evaluate Pleasants’s 

claim in light of this more developed factual record.