COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

FAYE L. PRICE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1271-96-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 APRIL 1, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Robert W. Duling, Judge 

 Matthew T. Paulk, Assistant Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Faye L. Price (appellant) appeals her conviction of 

possessing heroin in violation of Code § 18.2-250. She contends 

that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress 

evidence obtained during a search incident to her arrest at a 

roadblock. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 I. 

 FACTS 

 During the evening of September 19, 1995, appellant rode as 

a passenger in a car driven by James E. Walker, Jr. that 

encountered a roadblock in the City of Richmond. The roadblock 

was operated by Sergeant Hicks and Officer Tovar. At the 

roadblock, Officer Tovar checked Mr. Walker's driving record with 

a police dispatcher and discovered that his driver's license had 

been suspended with notice. Officer Tovar informed Mr. Walker 
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that he could not drive his car from the roadblock and that Mr. 

Walker's only options were to arrange to have the vehicle towed 

or to find a licensed driver to drive the car away for him. 

 Appellant then stated that she was willing to drive Mr. 

Walker's car. Sergeant Hicks asked appellant for some 

identification so that he could verify with the dispatcher that 

appellant possessed a valid driver's license. Appellant gave her 

Social Security number to Sergeant Hicks. Sergeant Hicks 

contacted a dispatcher, who accessed appellant's DMV record from 

a computer. 

 While checking appellant's driving record, the police 

computer automatically searched its data base of outstanding 

warrants. This search disclosed an outstanding warrant for 

appellant's arrest. Officer Tovar then executed the warrant by 

arresting appellant. During a search of appellant incident to 

her arrest, Officer Tovar found heroin in her purse. Appellant 

then waived her Fifth Amendment rights and admitted that the 

heroin was hers. 

 Appellant was charged with the unlawful possession of heroin 

in violation of Code § 18.2-250. Appellant filed a motion to 

suppress both the heroin and her statement, which the trial court 

denied. The trial court also denied appellant's motion to 

reconsider and convicted her of possessing heroin. 
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 II. 

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT ROADBLOCK 

 Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied 

her motion to suppress. She argues that she was unlawfully 

seized when Sergeant Hicks asked to check her driving record, or 

in the alternative, that Sergeant Hicks arbitrarily exceeded the 

parameters of the roadblock plan when he checked the police data 

base for outstanding arrest warrants. She asserts that the trial 

court should have excluded the heroin and her statement because 

this evidence was a fruit of the officers' unconstitutional 

conduct. We disagree. 

 "On appeal, the burden is on appellant to show, considering 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

that the denial of his [or her] motion to suppress constituted 

reversible error. This Court will not disturb the trial court's 

ruling unless it is plainly wrong." Richmond v. Commonwealth, 22 

Va. App. 257, 260, 468 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1996) (citations 

omitted). 

 We hold that the detention of appellant at the roadblock 

while Sergeant Hicks verified the validity of her driver's 

license did not violate appellant's Fourth Amendment rights. 

First, we agree that appellant was seized for Fourth Amendment 

purposes when she agreed to drive Mr. Walker's car and Sergeant 

Hicks took measures to check her driver's license before allowing 

her to leave the roadblock. "[D]etaining the operator [of a 
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motor vehicle at a roadblock] constitute[s] a 'seizure' within 

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of 

the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief." 

Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 349, 337 S.E.2d 273, 275 

(1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084, 106 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed.2d 

720 (1986). But, appellant's seizure was lawful because the 

record indicates that the officers detained appellant in 

accordance with an explicit and neutral roadblock plan. A 

seizure of the driver of an automobile at a roadblock does not 

violate his or her Fourth Amendment rights if the roadblock is 

"'carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral 

limitations on the conduct of individual officers.'" Id. at 350, 

337 S.E.2d at 276 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 

S. Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)). 

 The record establishes that the police department issued a 

plan authorizing the roadblock carried out by the officers. The 

plan restricted the officers' activities during each stop at the 

roadblock to inspecting the stopped vehicle for defects, 

examining the physical condition of the driver, and verifying the 

status of the driver's operator's license. The record indicates 

that the officers performed these activities on every vehicle 

that passed through the roadblock. After the officers informed 

Mr. Walker that he could not drive his vehicle from the roadblock 

and appellant agreed to drive it for him, she became the next 

"driver" through the roadblock. Pursuant to the roadblock plan, 
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the police were permitted to examine her physical condition and 

to verify the status of her driver's license. 

 Appellant also challenges the constitutionality of the 

officers' actions after she was seized at the roadblock. 

Specifically, she argues that Sergeant Hicks exceeded the 

restrictions set forth in the roadblock plan when he conducted a 

warrant check of appellant in conjunction with the review of her 

driving record. We disagree. 

 When police officers stop vehicles at a roadblock pursuant 

to a pre-approved plan, the Fourth Amendment requires the 

officers to act in accordance with the rules set forth in the 

roadblock plan. Brown v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 21, 25-26, 

454 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1995). 

 "To allow the [police] to do anything short 

of complying in full with [their] own 

guidelines would inject an element of 

discretion into the [checkpoint] procedures 

and thus undercut the very foundation upon 

which the [checkpoint] seizure is 

constitutionally justified." 

Id. at 25, 454 S.E.2d at 759 (quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 

406 Mass. 343, 547 N.E.2d 1134, 1137-38 (1989)). 

 We hold that the warrant check of appellant was not a 

deviation from the procedures set forth in the roadblock plan. 

The roadblock plan authorized the review of an individual's 
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driving record, and the warrant check was one component of the 

neutral police procedure for such a review. The officers 

testified that confirming the validity of a driver's license 

involved requesting a police dispatcher to access by computer the 

individual's DMV record. The evidence established that police 

procedures mandate the performance of a warrant check whenever an 

officer in the field makes such a request. Specifically, 

Sergeant Hicks testified that the police computer is programmed 

so that any time the dispatcher accesses an individual's driving 

record, the computer automatically performs a simultaneous 

warrant check on the individual. 

 Thus, the warrant check of appellant was performed in 

accordance with the roadblock plan. Pursuant to the roadblock 

plan, Sergeant Hicks was authorized to verify the status of 

appellant's license after she volunteered to drive Mr. Walker's 

car. He did so by requesting the dispatcher to review her 

driving record. After Sergeant Hicks made this request, the 

computer search of appellant's driving record automatically 

triggered the warrant check that revealed the outstanding warrant 

for her arrest. Sergeant Hicks did not arbitrarily request the 

warrant check of appellant. The check was performed 

automatically, regardless of the requesting officer's desire for 

this information. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction of 

possessing heroin in violation of Code § 18.2-250. 
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Affirmed.