SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1332-18T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CLYDE GAYLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted March 31, 2020 – Decided May 1, 2020

Before Judges Yannotti and Firko.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 12-08-2273.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Charles P. Savoth, III, Designated Counsel, 

on the brief).

Jill S. Mayer, Acting Camden County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, Special Deputy 

Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Clyde Gayle appeals from an order entered by the Law Division 

on August 27, 2018, denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) 

without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I.

The facts and procedural history in this matter were previously 

summarized in our decision on defendant's direct appeal, State v. Gayle, No. A0575-14 (App. Div. Mar. 17, 2017), in which we affirmed defendant's conviction 

and sentence. We briefly restate the facts pertinent to this appeal.

On August 30, 2012, defendant was charged with second-degree unlawful 

possession of a weapon, specifically, a .38 caliber handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) 

(count one); fourth-degree possession of hollow-nose bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

3(f) (count two); and second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) (count three).

We affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 

evidence regarding ShotSpotter, a system developed by the military to pinpoint 

when a firearm is discharged. Gayle, slip op. at 8. Following a two-day jury 

trial, a jury convicted defendant of all three counts. Id. at 9. The sentencing 

judge found defendant was eligible for an extended term, and sentenced him to 

an aggregate term of fourteen years of incarceration, with a seven-year period 
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of parole ineligibility. Ibid. The record shows defendant turned down a plea 

offer of three years imprisonment under the Graves Act,1 without parole.

On November 15, 2017, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR, and the 

court appointed counsel to represent defendant. PCR counsel argued that 

defendant had been denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial 

counsel failed to advise him to accept the plea offer. Defendant's PCR counsel 

also argued that while defendant was in the hallway in the proximity of several 

jurors, a probation officer stated, "Didn't I have you before[?]" and trial counsel 

was deficient for failing to bring this to the trial court's attention.

On August 27, 2018, the PCR court, who was also the trial court, heard 

oral argument on the petition and denied relief. In an oral opinion, the PCR 

court determined that trial counsel was not ineffective because the decision to 

accept or reject the plea offer was left to defendant, who decided to reject it and 

proceed to trial.

The PCR court was also unpersuaded by defendant's argument that his 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to bring the probation officer's comment 

to its attention because the trial court made it abundantly clear to the jurors that 

they were not to interact with any of the parties, and therefore, it was unlikely 

 

1

 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c).
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they overhead the passing comment. In addition, the PCR court found the 

comment was innocuous and could not have improperly influenced the jurors.

Defendant's counsel raises the following argument in his brief:

IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE 

PCR COURT TO DENY DEFENDANT AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING REGARDING: (1) THE 

FAILURE OF BOTH PLEA AND TRIAL COUNSEL 

TO ADVISE DEFENDANT CONCERNING THE 

CONSIDERABLE RISKS HE FACED IN 

PROCEEDING TO TRIAL AND (2) THE FAILURE 

OF TRIAL COUNSEL TO SEEK A CURE FOR 

JURORS' EXPOSURE TO EXTREMELY 

PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION.

Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that the arguments 

presented on appeal are entirely without merit. We affirm the denial of PCR 

substantially for the reasons stated by the PCR court. We add the following.

Defendant's claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 

as required by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is 

considered under the standards enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, a defendant first must 

show that his attorney's handling of the matter "fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness." Id. at 688. A defendant also must show that there exists a 

"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. Our Supreme Court 
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has adopted this standard for evaluating ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claims under our State constitution. State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).

We reject defendant's contention that his plea and trial counsel were 

deficient for failing to advise him about the risks in proceeding to trial. 

"Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right that extends to 

the plea-bargaining process." Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012). The 

Strickland test has also been applied to "challenges of guilty pleas based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 456 (1994).

However, in those cases where the Strickland test has been applied to 

rejected plea deals, specific instances of attorney ineffectiveness existed, such 

as assuring a client that the plaintiff had no proof of their case. Lafler, 566 U.S. 

at 161.

In providing such assurances, the Court stated "that this [was] not a case 

where petitioner's counsel merely offered a prediction about the outcome of the 

trial," rather, "[c]ounsel here advised petitioner that a conviction was not 

possible, even though it was. As the district court held, this erroneous advice 

was objectively unreasonable, and was indisputably so." Cooper v. Lafler, 376 

Fed. Appx. 563, 571 (6th Cir. 2010).
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In the matter under review, defendant asserts that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to advise him to accept the State's plea offer. The record 

shows defendant's counsel offered him a reasonable prediction of the outcome, 

but defendant chose to try the case instead. Unlike the situation in Lafler, 

defendant here clearly understood his decision to reject the plea offer, and he

was not improperly assured of any outcome by his counsel. As the PCR court 

stated:

Here, the -- the [d]efense contends he asked his attorney 

to attempt to negotiate a three-year prison sentence. 

Despite his attorney's reservations about the leniency of 

the offer, the State allegedly accepted.

Based on the acceptance, the [defendant] surmised the 

case against -- against him must have been weak, 

however, his attorney apparently never explained the 

strengths or weaknesses of the case. Then before trial, 

the State offered a three-year sentence, one year to be 

served without parole, for the possession charge and 

indicated it was the last chance to accept the offer. 

The -- the attorney explained it was the last offer and 

-- and could accept or -- and stated his . . . the decision 

was up to him. [Defendant’s] sister has submitted a 

certification stating that she was present during the plea 

deal discussions between [defendant] and his attorney, 

and she confirms [defendant]’s factual assertions.

As the State argues, and the [c]ourt agrees, this case is 

considerably different from the facts in Lafler, and 

particularly, there’s no are -- erroneous advice offered 

in this instance unlike the Lafler case. Here, [t]rial 
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[c]ounsel left the decision to accept the deal up to 

[defendant]. He alone made the decision to reject the 

deal and to proceed to trial. 

He does not allege any . . . inaccurate advice from 

[c]ounsel. Counsel merely told him the proceeding was 

doing well, and in no way does that constitute any type

. . . or guarantee of success at trial.

Rather, [defendant] argues [c]ounsel was deficient for 

not advising him to accept the deal. This is completely 

distinguishable from advising a [d]efendant to reject a 

deal based upon erroneous impressions of the case.

Ultimately, [defendant] was the only person who knew 

if he was guilty or not guilty. If he was innocent, it 

would have been wholly improper of [c]ounsel to 

advise him to falsely admit guilt. In sum, the decision 

to reject the plea was made by [defendant] and is not 

attributable to any deficient performance by [t]rial 

[c]ounsel.

Accordingly, prong one of the Strickland test has not 

been met and this argument does not constitute a basis 

for [PCR].

We are convinced the PCR court properly rejected defendant's argument 

that his counsel was deficient for not advising him to accept the plea offer.

We similarly reject defendant's argument that the PCR court failed to 

conclude that his counsel was ineffective for not bringing the comment made by 

the probation officer in front of several jurors to the trial court's attention. The 

record shows the probation officer was dressed in civilian attire, not a police 
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uniform or any clothing that would indicate he was affiliated with law 

enforcement. The comment itself was not prejudicial in nature, and there was 

no proof that any juror heard the comment. The PCR court aptly recognized he 

was also the trial court, and made "it abundantly clear to the [j]urors at all times 

they're to have no interaction with any of the parties, including the [d]efendant."

Additionally, the PCR court noted the alleged comment was "sufficiently 

innocuous to prevent any improper outside influence on the [j]urors." 

Furthermore, defendant's argument is not founded upon facts supported by an 

affidavit or certification warranting consideration. See State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 

298, 312 (2014). Thus, we reject defendant's argument.

We also reject defendant's contention that the PCR court erred by failing 

to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his petition. A hearing on a PCR petition 

is warranted when the defendant presents a prima facie case in support of PCR, 

the court determines that there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot 

be resolved by review of the existing record, and the court finds that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary. R. 3:22-10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 

354 (2013).

As we have explained, defendant failed to present a prima facie case of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant did not demonstrate prejudice 
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under the Strickland standard, and as a result, did not establish a prima facie 

case of ineffective assistance of counsel warranting a hearing. Moreover, the 

existing record was sufficient to resolve defendant's claims. The PCR court 

correctly determined that an evidentiary hearing was not required.

Affirmed.