Filed 1/19/22 Prim e Care v. Nguyen Phat Real Estate Inves tment CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

PRIME CARE, INC.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

NGUYEN PHAT REAL ESTATE

INVESTMENT, LLC ET AL.,

Defendants and Respondents. B304910

(Los Angeles County Super.

Ct. No. 19STCV12513)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles

County, Dennis J. Landin, Judge. Affirmed.

Martin E. Jacobs and Martin E. Jacobs, Inc. for Plaintiff and

Appellant.

Michael J. Shilub and Law Office of Michael J. Shilub for

Defendants and Respondents.

________________________2 INTRO D UCTI

O N

Plaintif f Prim e Car e

, Inc

. bro u ght s u it, a lleging t hat defenda n ts

N g uyen Phat R e al Es t ate I n vestme n t, LL C ( N g uyen Phat)

, and Sam

Ho misr e prese n ted t hat th e c omme r cial property they l e as e d to

plaintiff was s uitab l e for the o pera t ion o f a cann a bis b usine s s

.

Plaintif f app e als fr o m a jud g ment of di s missal i n favor of defenda n ts

af t er the trial cou r t sus t ain e d their d emurre r s. Pla i ntiff a rg u es the

co u rt err e d in concludi n g the te r ms of th e leas e agre e men t absolv e d

def e ndan t s o f liab i lit y f

o r th eir allege d neglig e nce, f raud, ne g ligent

mis r epresen t ation, resciss i on, and da m age s

. P l aintiff also c ontends i t

sho u ld h a ve been gr a nted l eave t o amen d

. We a ffirm.

FACTS AND PR O CEDU R AL B A C K GROU

N D

1. Lease A

gree m ent

On Jan u ary 2 9, 2 0 1 9, defendant Nguy e n Ph a t ag r eed to r e nt

pla i ntiff a n indu s trial b uild i ng locat e d i n M ont e bello, C aliforn i a

.

Defendant S am Ho ma n aged the Nguy e n Phat company a t the tim e.

Th e c omme r c i al leas e s tated t h at the a gre e d use of the pr e mises

was “Comme r cial C ann a bis distr i buti o n, manufa c turing, cul t ivation

and re t ail d e livery in accor d ance with al l stat e an d l oca l l i c e nses a n d

la w s.” W hen plaintiff and N guy e n Phat e ntered into the leas e

, pla i ntiff h ad not obt a ined t he Ci t y of Mon t ebell o ’s a p proval for th e

a gre e d use.

The lea s e con t ained the foll o wing p r ovis i ons:

P aragr a ph 2. 3 : “NOTE: Lessee is responsible for

determining whether or not Applicable Requirements, and especially

the zoning are appropriate for Lessee’s intended use, and3

acknowledges that past uses of the Premise may no longer be

allowed.” (Bold in t he or i gina l .) 1

P aragr a ph 2. 4 : “L e ssee ack n owle d ges t hat

. . . ( b) it has

been advi s ed by Lessor a nd/or Bro k ers to s a tisfy itsel f wi t h res p ect to

the size and c o ndit i on of the Premises (incl u ding but not limit e d to

. . . compl i ance with A p plicab l e Re q uiremen t s

. . . ) a nd t h eir suitabil i ty

for Less e e’s inte n ded u s e. (c) Lessee h as mad e su c h inv e stig a tio n a s

i t de e m s ne c essar y w i th reference t o such m atters a nd as s umes all

respons i b ility t here f

or as the same rela t e to i ts occupancy of the

P r emises

. . . .”

An addendum to the lease: “51E) Licenses and permits

– Prior

to Lease execution, Lessee must satisfy itself of all permits and

licenses needed with the City of Montebello and State of California in

order to operate their business at the subject pr operty. Lessee shall

be responsible for all associated permits and licensing costs and shall

provide Lessor copies of all permits.”

Paragraph 22: “No Prior or Other Agreements; Broker

Disclaimer. This lease contains all agreements between the Parties

with respect to any matter mentioned herein, and no other prior or

contemporaneous agreement or understanding shall be effective.

Lessor and Lessee each represents and warrants to the Brokers that

it has made, and is relying solely upon, its own investigation as to

the nature, quality, character and financial responsibility of the

other Party to this Lease and as to the use, nature, quality and

character of the Premises.”

After signing the lease, plaintiff paid a $150,000 deposit,

advance rent, and other charges. Before plaintiff commenced

1 The lease defines “Applicable Requirements” as the

building codes, applicable laws, covenants or restrictions of

record, regulations, and ordinances.4

operations, the C ity of Montebello determined the property was not

suitable for cannabis distribution because of its proximity to a

residential area.

2. Lawsuit

On April 9, 2019 plaintiff sued Nguyen Phat, its manager, Sam

Ho

, and the brokers on both sides of the transaction

. Claims against

the brokers are not at issue in this appeal, and we do not discuss

them. 2

The ori g inal c omp l aint all e ged f i ve ca u ses of action :

( 1 ) negligen c e ag a inst Nguyen Phat and H o; (2) fra u d ag a inst Ng uyen

Phat; ( 3) n e gligent misrep r ese n tation a gainst Ngu y en Phat ;

(4) rescis s ion based u pon fr a ud a g ainst N g uyen Phat; and

(5) res c ission ba s ed upon unila t eral mista k e aga i nst N g uyen Phat

. A

copy of the l e ase was at t ached as E x hibit 1 t o th e c omp l aint

. As to

damag e s, pla i ntiff a lleged tha t i t h a d suf f ere d “$8,0 0 0 i n p r ofessi o na l

fees, ” an d ha s o r will expend a nother “ $20

, 000 [ ] to o btain an

e xt ension of time t o fi n d another s ite as well as other expe n ditu r es

inher e nt in t he extensio n .” In the resciss i on cause of action, p lainti f f

so u ght retu r n of its $1 5 0,000 d eposit with t en percent i n terest per

annum

.

3. First D e mur r er

Defendants demurred to the complaint. 3 They argued “the

Lease establishes that Prime Care had sole responsibility for

2 Subsequent use of “defendants” refers to Nguyen Phat and

Ho only.

3 The only claim against Ho was the first cause of action for

negligence. Defendants shared counsel and filed joint briefs, so

unle ss otherwise indicated, we discuss defendants together.5

determining whether the premises are suitable for the Agreed Use

. Prime Care also represented that it was not relying on any purported

representation by Nguyen Phat not set forth in the Lease,” citing

paragraph 22. Defendants asserted plaintiff could not prove

negligence because defendant did not have a duty to determine

whether the property was suitable for plaintiff’s intended use.

Defendants’ argument as to Ho was twofold: (1) the complaint lacked

any factual allegation th at Ho had acted negligently, and (2) Ho

could not be liable as Nguyen Phat’s agent because there was no

physical injury, citing Michaelis v. Benavides (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th

681, 686

- 87 (liability imposed upon agents for active participation in

tortious act s of the principal restricted to cases involving physical

injury, not pecuniary harm, to third persons).

For the f r aud a nd n egligent misre p res e ntation c laim s

,

defenda n ts as s erted there w a s no j u stif i able rel i ance b ecau s e “ Prime

C are r e pres e nted and war r anted in the L ease t h a t it made a nd was

rely i ng solely on its own investi g ation as to t he suitabil i ty of t he

pr e mises for the A gre e d Use. ” (Defend a nts a l so a s serted t h e fraud

cla i m was n ot pl e aded with specifici t y.) Defe n d a nts cont e nded t he

rescission and r e sti t ution cla i ms f a iled f or the s a me re a so n

— because

plain t iff a g reed it w as re s pons i ble for i n vesti g ating the suitabil i ty of

t he pr e mises for marij u ana distrib u tion, p laint i ff could n o t prove

f r audul e nt c o nduct o r mis t ake

.

T he trial court sus t ained t h e de m urrer to the fir s t cau s e of

action for negli g en c e again s t defe n dan t s withou t lea v e to a men d

, an d

sustained th e d e mur r ers to the f our rem a ining causes of acti o n

ag a inst Nguyen Phat with l eave

. Th e cou r t’s or d er s t ated th e leas e

“clea r l y s h ow s tha t th e d efen d ant s ha d n o d u t y to determi n e

sui t abili t y for the ‘ Agre e d U s e’ ” and “allo c ates t h e entire ri s k of a

f ut u re contin g ency t o P r ime Car e

. ”6 The court conti n ue d : “ As to the n e glig e nce caus e s of ac t ion

concerning Defe n d a nt Ho, t h ere is n o f a ctual al l egati o n th a t he did

any t hing t hat w ould a m ount to tort i ous cond u ct

. Mo r e o ver, Ho, as a

corpo r ate o fficer can n ot inc u r l i ability where t he i nj ury i s econo m ic

,

a s opp o se d to p e rsonal or p roperty d ama ge .” The c o urt con c luded

t h at t h e com p laint fa i led “to pro p erly alleg e t h e fra u d cla i m s wit h th e

s p ecifi c it y req u i r e d by law. ”

L astly, t h e court held that the fourth and fifth causes of action

for resciss i on failed in l ight of t h e lea s e’s langua g e plac i ng t h e onus

on plai n tiff t o assess whet h er it was entitled to use the p roperty f o r

can n abis distrib u tion

.

4. First A mend e d C o mplaint

Plaintif f filed a first amend e d co m plain t

, a mendi n g onl y its

causes of action for negligen c e (as t o w h ich leave had not been

granted )

, f

raud a nd negligent misr e pre s entatio n

. Plaintif f did n o t

a m end eith e r of t h e t w o c a uses of act i on f o r resciss i o n

, but s im p ly

repea t ed its orig i nal all e gatio n s in i t s amend e d com p laint.

Even th o ugh it had been de n ied l e ave to amend the negligen c e

cla i m, p l aintiff’s ame n ded c o mplaint inclu d ed its original claim for

negli g ence w ith al l e gatio n s that read i n part: “ defend a nts so

negl i gently l i sted, adver t ised, le a sed, b r oker e d, advised

, resea r ched

. . . inves t igate d

, rep r esente d and/o r carr i ed out their duties and

activiti e s with res p ect to the said prop e rty an d lea s e a s t o c a u s e and

pe r mit t he pl a intiff to e nter i n to Exhibit ‘ 1 ,’ w hich p l aintiff w ould n ot

h a ve done if plai n t i ff h ad bee n a w are t h at the property was n ot

s u itable f

o r the i nten d ed cannabis busi n ess o f the pl a intiff. ” Pl a intiff

asserted that r ent u nder the l ease was higher t h an it wou l d have

been for n on

- ca n na b is uses

. In the s e c ond c a use of act i on for fra u d,

p laint i ff ‘s allegat i on s n o w inc l ude d t h at “T h e def e ndants

misrep r ese n ted and conc e aled f r om th e pla i n t if

f a n d the plaintif

f ’ s7

br o ker t h at th e prop e rt y w a s n o t suita b l e for c ann a bis ope r ations due

t o its proximi t y to t h e res i dential areas

. Def e ndant P hat R e al E s tate

Investm e nt, L LC, b y and th r ough i ts m anager S am H o, represen t ed

to plai n tiff Pr i m e Care Inc

. , by and throu g h P h at ’ s broker

. . . in or

ab o ut Febr u ary 2 019 w hen neg o tiati o ns st a rted tha t th e build i n g t o

b e leas e d wa s i n th e prope r l o catio n and zoning for cann a bis use

.

Ind e ed, P hat a nd Sam Ho a d vised p l aintiff ’ s bro k er th r ough P h at ’ s

b r oker t hat the l ease r ent w ould b e grea t er for c ann a bis use t han

n o n

- c a nnabis u se

. T h e s a me represen t ation as to the p ro p er loc a tion

and zo n i ng was rep e ated t o [plai n tiff’s r e pre s entative] at t h e

Au t omobile Club of S o u thern Californ i a loc a tion i n Anahe i m,

C a lifor n ia while going thro u gh th e sign i n g pro c e ss on or ab o ut

M a rch 1

, 2019

. P hat and S a m Ho also rep r esent e d to t he City o f

Mon t ebel l o that S am Ho had r ead th e Cit y o f Mo n tebe l l o Mun icipal

C od e a n d Z onin g C o d e pr o visi o ns regarding co m merc i al cann a bis

b u sine s s at the r eal p r oper t y in questio n an d t ha t t he y c o ns e nte d t o

p l a intiff pro c ee d ing wi t h the proposed com m erci a l canna b is bu s iness

at the l o catio n

. . . . Fu rther, on or a bout Februa r y 6, 2 019 t he

defen d ants f

urn i shed t o th e p l aintif f b y e mai l a z onin g ma p

, . . . on

w h ich it was indicat e d i n h a ndw r itin g a n d em p hasiz e d tha t t h e

pro p erl y was locate d a 1,0 0 0 feet [sic] from a resi d en t ial area which

was a sufficient dist a nce t o permit the c a nna b is opera t ions

. A

minim u m of 6 00 fe e t from t h e resi d ent i al area was n e eded f or

cannabis oper a tions and the actu a l d is t ance was less t han 600 feet. ” 4

4 The amended complaint alleged that defendants had

emailed a zoning map to plaintiff with the notation that the

premises were 1,000 feet from a residential area. At the hearing

on the demurrer, plaintiff’s counsel agreed that neither Nguyen

Phat nor Ho provided the map to plaintiff.8 In the t h i rd ca u se of action f o r negl i g e nt misrepr e sent a tion,

plaintiff re

- all e ged p revious p arag r aphs and ass e rted t hat

“Defen d ants m ade t he misr e presen t ati o ns and c o nceal e d t h e

unsuita b ility o f the leased p r emis e s for cannabis negl i gent l y and

withou t an y r e aso n abl e b a si s fo r doin g so.”

5. Second De m urrer

Nguyen Phat d emu r red to t h e seco n d a n d third c auses o f action

for fraud and neglige n t mis r epr e sentati o n (the other causes of action

we r e not a m ended ). 5 Ngu y en Phat ar g ued t h at b o th causes of ac t ion

f ail because plain t iff c a nnot d e monst r ate j u stifiable relia n ce on any

allege d s tat e ment s r egardi ng th e a ppro p riatene ss o f th e bui l ding for

cann a bis d i stri b ution be c ause p lain t iff a greed in wr i ting that

defenda n ts h a d no d uty to d e term i ne t h e suita b ility f o r the agreed

u se and tha t i t wa s p laint i ff who wa s to assess the suitabil i ty of t he

lo c ation

.

The trial court sus t ained t h e de m urre r s without lea v e to

amend

. The c o urt a g a i n found t hat t h e le a se pre c lud e d plaint i ff from

sh o wing the jus t ifiab l e rel i ance necessary for fra u d or negligent

misrepre s enta t ion

. Th e c o u r t expla i ne d t h at plaintiff ’ s “a d ded

a l l egations rega r ding o ral stat e ments or annota t ed zon i ng m ap do n o t

have any effect, as the l a ngu a ge of th e Lea s e Agr e eme n t specifi c ally

5 Ho did not demurrer to the first amended complaint,

apparently because the single cause of action against him was

fully disposed of by the ruling on his demurrer to the initial

complaint. Although the trial court could have struck the

amended first cause of action as a sham pleading, it did not.

( Ricard v. Grobstein, Goldman, Stevenson, Siegel, LeVine &

Mangel (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 157, 162.) The trial c ourt did not

further address the cause of action against Ho, and, as to Ho,

plaintiff appeals only the sustaining of the demurrer to the

original complaint.9

p r ecl u des any prior or contemp o rane o us a greement or un d er s tanding

other t han t he Leas e i t sel f t o b e ef f ective. ” The cou r t sta t ed “ t he

consent f

o rm si g ned by P h a t only c onta i ns a rep r esent a tion regarding

Pha t ’s a c knowle d geme n t and consent t o Pla i ntiff ’ s cannabis busi n ess

o n the pr e mises but not rega r ding i t s complia n ce wi t h the Ci t y of

Monte b ello’s zoning p r ovisi o ns.”

The trial court observed th a t it had grant e d pla i ntiff lea v e to

a mend it s fourt h an d f i ft h r escission c auses of a ctio n

, b u t pla i ntiff d id

not am e nd

. The court sustain e d the dem u rrer withou t l eav e t o

a m en d a s t o th e s econ d throug h f ift h c a u se s of action

.

On Jan u ary 3, 20 2 0, the trial court ent e red jud g ment of

dismiss a l in f

a vor of Nguyen Phat and Ho. Plaintif f app e ale d

.

DISCUS S ION

Plaintiff argu e s that the court erred i n s ustaini n g demurrers to

t h e fi r st three c auses of a c tion, and in re f using leave to ame n d the

f irst and f

ourth c au s es of act i on

. It does not appeal the court’s ruling

sustain ing the demurrer to the fifth cause of action. “ O n a p peal from

a j u dgme n t di s missing an ac t ion a f ter sust a ining a demurrer with o ut

l e ave to a mend, the s t andard o f revi e w is well settled

. We g i ve the

compla i nt a r e aso n able in t erpre t ation, reading i t as a who l e and its

parts in t h eir conte x t

. Fu r the r

, we treat the dem u rrer as adm i tting

all ma terial fa c ts pr o perly pleaded, but d o not as s ume the tr u th of

contenti o ns, d e duct i ons or conclus i ons of l a w

. When a d e murr e r is

sust a ined, we determi n e whe t her the com p laint states facts suf f icient

to constitu t e a c a use of action

. And w hen i t is sus t ained with o ut

leave to ame n d, we decide w hether t he r e is a r e ason a ble possibil i ty

th a t the defect c a n be cu r ed by ame n dme n t : if it can be, the t r ial

c o urt h as abu s ed its discre t ion and we rev e rse.” ( City of Dinu b a v.

C o unty of Tulare ( 20 0 7) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865 (internal citat i ons

o mitted).)10

1. Plaintiff Failed to Allege Duty in the First Cause of

Action for Negligence

The trial court sustained the demurrer to the first cause of

action for negligence in the original complaint without leave to

amend. Nevertheless

, plaintiff repeat e d its negligen ce claim in its

first amended complaint

. Plaintiff argues on appeal only that the

court erred in sustaining the demurrer to th e first cause of action in

the original complaint

. 6

“ An ess e ntial e lem e nt of an action f or n egligence is the

existence of a d uty o f care to t he p l ainti f f

. [Cita t ion. ] The ex i stence

and s c ope of a def

e ndant ’ s du t y is an i s sue of law t o be decided by the

cour t

. ” ( Eriks s on v. Nu n nink (2 0 11) 1 91 Cal.App

. 4th 8 26, 8 3 8

. )

Here

, th e t r ia l c our t fou n d tha t pla i ntiff failed to alle g e duty because

the a t tach e d lease “ clearly sh o w[ed] tha t def e ndan t s ha d n o duty t o

de t ermi n e th e s ui t abil i ty for the ‘agree d u se. ’ ”

On app e al, p l aintiff does not squa r ely t a ke on th i s argument

.

It d o es n ot sugge s t , for example, an alter n ative in t erpre t ation of the

lease

. I n stea d

, pla i ntiff ta k es a d i ffer e nt tack

– asse r ting t hat,

despite t he le a se l a nguage, defen d ants owed a “ gener a l” d u ty of care

.

P l aintiff arg u es defen d ants brea c hed this duty i n the i r listing

,

advert i sing

, leasing

, an d r e pres e ntation s abo u t the property that

c aus e d plaint i ff to e nter i nto the l ease, w hich p l aintiff wou l d not h a ve

do n e if it had been a ware th a t the prop e rty wa s uns u itab l e for i ts

inten d ed ca n nab i s busine s s

. Plaintif f cites c ases tha t hold a d uty of

c are may be p l eaded “gen e rally.” ( Se e Wiley v. C o le ( 1 921)

52 Cal.App. 61 7, 618 ( “negl i gence m ay be charg e d in g ene r al term s ” ) .)

6 Because plaintiff frames his argument in terms of the original

complaint we address it in th at ma nner. We have observed that

in the amended complaint, plaintiff merely repeated the critical

allegations from his original complaint.11 Tha t a duty of care can be p l ead e d gen e rally is n ot rea l ly th e

poin t

. Pl a intiff

’ s argum e n t as s um e s a dut y e xist s even i n

contr a venti o n o f t he alloc a tion of duty in the w r itten agreem e nt

be t ween the part i es

. T his is not a pl e ading issu e

, but one of

s u bstan t ive l aw, for w hich p l ain t iff cites n o legal au t hority. (See

Eis e nberg et a l

., Ca l

. P r actice Gui d e: Civil Appea l s and Writs ( T h e

Rut t er G roup 2 0 21) ¶ 9: 2 1 [ “ appel l a te court can treat as wai v ed or

meritl e ss any i s sue t h at, a l though r aised i n the briefs, is not

s u ppo r ted by p ertine n t or c ogniza bl e leg a l arg u ment or proper

c itati o n of authori t y”]. ) P laint i ff must a ll e ge a du t y tha t exi s t s wi t hin

t he fram e work of it s pleaded facts

. ( Jon e s v. Dal y (1 9 81)

1 22 C a l .App.3d 500, 50 8

. ) T he only d uty a c tual l y allege d i s that

cont a ined in t he pa r ties’ a g reem e nt at t ached to th e com p lain t. The

agreem e nt st a tes p l ainly t h at def e nda n ts had no such d uty.

Lease p aragr a ph 2

. 3 states in bo l d th a t “ Lessee is respon s ible

f or d e termin i ng w h eth e r or not the A ppl i cable Requir e men t s, a n d

espe c ially t he z o n ing a r e ap p ro p riate fo r Les s ee’ s i nte n de d us e

. . . . ”

As we have rec o unted i n o ur “ Facts And Proc e dural B a ckgro u nd”

section, i n par a gra p h 2.4, p l aintiff simi l arly war r anted that it

investi g ate d t o th e e xten t i t deem e d ne c essary w hether the premises

were s uit a ble for i t s inte n ded use an d assu m ed all respons i b ility f or

s u ch an in v estig a tion

. In parag r aph 2 2, p l aintiff r e presen t ed and

war r anted that “it has made, a nd is r elying solely u pon, i t s o w n

investi g ation

. . . as t o the use” of t h e pr e mise s. In an add e n d um t o

th e l e ase

, p l ainti f

f agreed to “s a tisfy i tself of a ll pe r mits a nd license s

n eede d wi t h th e Ci t y o f M o nt e bell o a n d St a t e of Californ i a in o r der t o

opera t e their b us i ness at t he su b ject property

. ” L astly, the lease

stated t hat i t contain e d “ all a gre e ments b etween the parties

. . . and

no oth e r prior or conte m pora n eous agreem e nt or u nde r standing shall

be effective. ”12 In sum, the lease agreement provided that it was p l a intiff that

had e xp r e ssly cov e n ante d it was not re l ying on defen d ants to ascertain

the suitabil i ty of t he property

. Inst e a d

, t he duty was fi r mly placed o n

plai n tiff t o asses s w hethe r i t c o ul d ope r at e the ca n nabis d i strib u tion

busines s a t th e location

.

Plaintif f argu e s that the lea s e prov i sions which we have quot ed

and p a raph r as e d

, co n stitu t e un e nforceab l e “exc u lpa t ory” langua g e

that purp o r t s to in s ulate defe n dants fr o m the i r o w n negligen c e

.

P l ainti f f cites V i otti v. Gio m i (1964) 230 Cal. Ap p.2d 730, 7 3 9 ( Vi o tti ),

wh ich stat e s that “[a]n agreem e nt ins u lati n g one from liabi l ity f o r his

own negli g ence must s p ecifica l ly so provide and is stric t ly constr u ed

a g ainst the par t y ass e rting the exempt i on, es p ecial l y where h e is t h e

a u thor of t h e agreem e nt. ” In Vi o tti

, the Court of Appe a l fo u nd that a

titl e c o mpa n y cou l d no t a v oi d li a bilit y fo r a n err o neou s tit l e report

s i mply b eca u se t he t o p of t h e re p ort stat e d: “P r elim i nary report o n l y.

No lia b i li t y here u nde r.” ( I b i d .)

Viott i is i napt

. The lease pr o visio n s he r e do not exem p t

defenda n ts fr o m li a bility

. On the contrary, the lease expressly

provides that plaintiff has the contractua l obligat i on to inv e stiga t e

wh e ther the premi s es a r e appropr i ate for its b usiness a nd t o obta i n

gover n ment a ppr o val for its c a n nabis operation

. T h e lea s e do e s not

ex e mpt d efen d ants from an y thing; it e s tablish e s that plai n t iff had no

duty to ensure that the property was suitable for plaintiff’s business

.

Plaintiff also relies on Civil Code section 1668 (section 1668 )

for the proposition that defendants cannot contract away their

liability. 7 Section 1668 likewise is unhelpful. “[T]he statute

7 Section 1668 provides: “ All contracts which have for their

object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility

for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of13

prohibits contractual releases of future liability for ordinary

negligence when ‘the “public interest” is involved or .

. . a statute

expressly forbids it.’ ” ( Frittelli , Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP

(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 35, 43. ) Plaintiff makes no cogent argument

that the commercial lease transaction is either in the “public

interest” or that “a statute expressly forbids” placing the obligation

on plaintiff rathe r than defendants. Nor does the lease purport to

excuse defendants from future liability. The claimed wrongs all

occurred, if at all, before the lease was executed.

2. Plaintiff Fail e d to Allege Reas o nab l e Relia n ce as to

Fraud a nd N

e gli g ent Mis r epr e sen t ation (S econd and

Third C auses of A ction)

Among t he el e men t s necess a ry to e sta b lish fraud and negligent

misr e pre s entation i s th e plai n tiff’s rea s onab l e rel i ance on defen d ant’s

false statem e nt

. (

A pollo Capital Fund LLC v. Rot h C a pital P artn e rs,

LLC ( 2007) 158 Cal.App

. 4th 2 26, 2 43

– 244.) W e concur wi t h the tr i al

court th a t plaint i ff did not al l ege th e ele m en t o f r eas o nabl e re l ianc e to

s u pport the fraud and negligent misr e pre s entation clai m s

. As w e

hav e expl a ined, plaintiff agre e d in t he lease that i t wou l d not rely on

a n y represen t ations by Nguyen Phat r egar d ing the z o ning a nd t hat

plaintiff was r e spo n sible for obta i ning p ermits fr o m the city to run its

b usiness at t he prop e r ty

. On a p peal, p l aintiff does n ot even ad d ress

r e lia n c e

, focusi n g ins t ea d o n plai n tiff’ s p urpo r ted misrepre s enta t ions

.

Plaint i ff’ s fa i lur e t o assert an ar g um e nt directed t o the basis of trial

c ourt’s r ul i n g forfeits the p o int o n appeal

. ( Kinse l la v. Kinsella ( 2020)

45 C al.App. 5 th 4 4 2, 4 6 4 [“Where a n ap p ell a nt fai l s t o pres e nt

another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are

against the policy of the law.”14

a rgument or le g al authori t y, he or she forfeits a ppell a te c o nsiderat i on

of t he issue.”].)

3. Plaintiff Does Not Appeal the Court’s Ruling Sustaining the

Demurrers to t he F

o urth and Fif

t h Ca u ses of Acti o n for

Res c ission

Plaintif f doe s n o t a r gu e th e t ria l c o ur t e rre d i n s u stain i ng

demurrers to t h e f

o urth and fifth c aus e s of acti o n for re c is s io n

. We

therefore presume these rulings correct. ( Keye s v

. Bowe n ( 2 0 10)

189 Cal

. App.4 t h 647, 6 55.)

4. Plaintiff Failed to Show that Amendments Would Cure

the Defective Pleadings

Plaintif f argu e s tha t th e cour t erre d i n d enyin g l e ave to amen d

c auses of ac t ion one t hrough fo u r . P laintiff provi d es no explan a tion

a s to h ow it w o uld a mend i ts allegat i on s t o suffic i ently al l ege e a ch

el e ment of e ach c a use of actio n

. “Becaus e a d e murr e r test s t h e leg a l

sufficiency of a c o m plaint, t he pl a intiff must sh o w the com p laint

allege s f acts s u ffici e nt to es t ablish every element of ea c h ca u se of

action. ” ( Rake s traw v. Califo r nia P h ysi c ians’ Ser v ice (2 0 00)

81 Cal.App

. 4th 3 9, 4 3

. ). “The p l aintiff has t he burd e n of pr o vi n g that

an ame n dme n t wou l d cure the defec t

. ” ( Campbell v. R e gents of

Universit

y o f Cal i fo r ni a (20 0 5) 35 Cal. 4 t h 311, 320.) Plain t i ff has not

carri e d its bu r den. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend.15 DISPOS

I TION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants and respondents

Nguyen Phat Real Estate Investment, LLC and Sam Ho shall recover

their co sts on appeal.

RUBIN, P. J.

WE CO N CUR:

BAKE R

, J

.

KI M, J.