Filed 10/2/20 P. v. Celeya CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v.

JUAN CARLOS CELEYA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B298988

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA268597)

APPEAL from a post-judgment order of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, George Lomeli, Judge. Affirmed.

Charlotte E. Costan, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Steven E. 

Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

A jury convicted Juan Carlos Celeya (defendant) of second 

degree murder and found true an allegation that he personally 

and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death or great 

bodily injury. After enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate 

Bill 1437), defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to 

Penal Code section 1170.95.1 The trial court denied his petition

without appointing counsel. We consider whether the jury’s 

personal discharge of a firearm finding means defendant is 

ineligible for section 1170.95 relief as a matter of law.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2004, at a backyard party to celebrate a college 

graduation, a gang-related altercation broke out between two 

men. Defendant joined the fight in defense of one of the men, and 

one of the party-goers, Enrique Cruz (Cruz), sought to defuse the 

situation by pleading with the men to stop fighting. That didn’t 

work, and Cruz was drawn into the fight.

As later found by a trial jury, defendant pulled a semiautomatic handgun and fatally shot Cruz. Described in legal 

terms, the jury convicted defendant and a co-defendant of the 

second degree murder of Cruz and the attempted willful, 

deliberate, and premediated murder of another guest at the 

party. The jury was instructed on the natural and probable 

consequences theory of murder, but the jury made a finding—

alleged in connection with the count charging him with the 

murder of Cruz—that defendant personally and intentionally 

discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death

1 Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the 

Penal Code.
3

(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a 

term of 115 years to life in prison. 

On direct appeal, this court affirmed the judgment in an 

unpublished opinion. (People v. Pineda (Dec. 12, 2011, B222913) 

[nonpub. opn.].) The opinion explains “the prosecution’s theory 

was that [defendant] shot Cruz, his [co-defendant] shot [the other 

victim], and [defendant] aided and abetted [the other victim’s] 

attempted murder.” With regard to the personal use of a firearm

sentencing enhancement, we held “sufficient evidence support[ed] 

the prosecutor’s theory that [defendant] shot Cruz.”

In January 2019, defendant filed a section 1170.95 petition 

seeking vacatur of his murder conviction. Section 1170.95 was 

enacted as part of Senate Bill 1437, which “amend[ed] the felony 

murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, 

as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not

imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with 

the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the

underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human 

life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)

The People opposed defendant’s petition, contending in the 

main that Senate Bill 1437 was unconstitutional. More pertinent 

for our purposes, the People also argued defendant was ineligible 

for section 1170.95 relief because the jury’s findings establish he

was Cruz’s “actual killer,” which meant he was not “[a] person 

convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and 

probable consequences theory” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)) and it was 

not true he “could not be convicted of first or second degree 

murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made [by Senate 

Bill 1437]” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3), italics added). Attached to the 

People’s opposition were two exhibits: a minute order 
4

memorializing the jury’s verdict in the underlying criminal case 

and our unpublished opinion in the prior People v. Pineda appeal. 

The trial court summarily denied defendant’s section 

1170.95 petition on the papers submitted, without appointing 

counsel and without holding a hearing. The court reasoned “the 

petitioner herein was the actual shooter who was responsible for 

the victim’s death. Thus, as the actual killer[,] Mr. Celeya is not 

eligible for sentencing relief pursuant to P.C. 1170.95.” In 

addition, as a second and independent ground for denying the 

petition, the trial court concluded section 1170.95 is 

unconstitutional. 

II. DISCUSSION

We need not discuss the trial court’s incorrect 

constitutional ruling (see, e.g., People v. Smith (2020) 49 

Cal.App.5th 85, review granted Jul. 22, 2020, S262835 (Smith); 

People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241) because the 

court was right that defendant is not eligible for section 1170.95 

relief as a matter of law. The jury’s finding that defendant 

personally discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily 

injury establishes defendant was not convicted of murder on a 

felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory and 

the amendments to the murder statutes (§§ 188, 189) made by 

Senate Bill 1473 would not stand as a bar to his conviction for 

murder. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a); People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 

Cal.App.5th 54, 58, review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260410

[affirming summary denial of section 1170.95 petition where the 

jury convicted defendant of second degree murder and found true 

a personal firearm discharge allegation that meant the jury found 

the defendant was the actual killer and the changes to sections 
5

188 and 189 were “‘inapplicable’”] (Cornelius).) That, in turn, 

means defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law and 

the trial court was within its rights to deny his petition without 

first appointing counsel.2 (See, e.g., Smith, supra, at 92, rev. gr.; 

Cornelius, supra, at 58, rev. gr.; see also Dillon v. United States

(2010) 560 U.S. 817, 828-829 [holding Sixth Amendment 

inapplicable to sentence modification proceedings]; People v. 

Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156 [“[T]he retroactive 

relief . . . afforded by Senate Bill 1437 is not subject to Sixth 

Amendment analysis”]; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 780 

[constitutional due process guarantees demand appointment of 

counsel in postconviction proceedings “if a petition attacking the 

validity of a judgment states a prima facie case leading to 

issuance of an order to show cause”], italics added.)

2 Defendant maintains the trial court erred by relying solely 

on our prior opinion to conclude defendant was convicted of 

murder as the direct perpetrator. (But see People v. Verdugo

(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 333, review granted Jan. 15, 2020, 

B296630.) On our own motion, we judicially notice the record in 

the prior People v. Pineda appeal, which defendant cites in his 

opening brief and which removes any need to discuss whether the 

trial court appropriately relied on this court’s prior opinion to 

determine the prosecution argued defendant shot Cruz and the

jury found defendant personally discharged a firearm causing 

death or great bodily injury. (See People v. Selivanov (2016) 5 

Cal.App.5th 726, 774 [“We review the ruling, not the 

rationale . . .”].)
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DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s section 1170.95 petition is 

affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

MOOR, J.