This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 VENNESSA ARBELAEZ, individually, 2 and as Natural Parent and Next Friend of 3 JEREMIAH SINGLETON, a minor, and as 4 Personal Representative of the Estate of 5 JENESSA ARBELAEZ, deceased; and OMAR 6 ARBELAEZ, individually, and as Personal 7 Representative of the Estate of NORA 8 ARBELAEZ, deceased, 9 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 10 vs. No. 32,526 11 JEREMY SINGLETON, deceased, and 12 AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY 13 AND CASUALTY COMPANY, 14 Defendants-Appellees. 15 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANDOVAL COUNTY 16 George P. Eichwald, District Judge 17 Carter & Valle Law Firm, P.C. 18 Richard J. Valle 19 Criostoir O’Cleireachain 20 Albuquerque, NM 21 for Appellants 22 Montgomery & Andrews, P.A. 23 Sean E. Garrett 242 Paul E. Houston 1 Albuquerque, NM 2 for Appellee 3 MEMORANDUM OPINION 4 VANZI, Judge. 5 {1} Plaintiffs, Vennessa Arbelaez and Omar Arbelaez, individually and in various 6 representative capacities, appeal from the di strict court’s order denying their motion 7 for relief from judgment. [RP 136, DS 3] We issued a no tice proposing to affirm, and 8 Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition. We remain unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ 9 arguments and affirm the decision of the district court. 10 BACKGROUND 11 {2} On November 26, 2006, Jeremy Singleton was driving a vehicle with multiple 12 passengers in Douglas County, Colorado, whenhe struck a deer in the middle of the 13 roadway, causing the vehicle to roll over. [RP 3, 70] Jeremy Singleton and Jennessa 14 Singleton, a minor, were killed in the accident. [RP 3, DS 1] Nora Arbelaez sustained 15 serious injuries, ultimately resulting in her death. [RP 3, DS 1] Vennessa Arbelaez, 16 Omar Arbelaez, and Jeremiah Singleton, a mi nor, sustained serious injuries. [RP 3-4, 17 DS 1] 18 {3} On November 4, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a co mplaint in state district court against 19 Jeremy Singleton and American National Property and Casualty Company (ANPAC), 203 seeking to recover damages for wrongful death and personal injuries. [RP 1] The 1 parties stipulated that, under the applicableinsurance policies, $500,000 was available 2 for liability coverage and $150,000 was available for unins ured/underinsured motorist 3 (UM/UIM) coverage. [RP 9, MIO 5-6] Th e parties entered into a settlement pursuant 4 to which ANPAC agreed to pay $650,000 to Plaintiffs. [MIO 6] The district court 5 entered an order approving the settlement, and the case was dismissed with prejudice 6 by order dated November 25, 2008. [RP 24, 26] 7 {4} On April 18, 2011, counsel for Plaintiffs sent a letter to ANPAC stating that 8 Plaintiffs intended to make a claim for additional insurance benefits pursuant to two 9 decisions from our Supreme Court. See Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Weed Warrior 10 Servs. , 2010-NMSC-050, ¶¶ 13-15, 149 N.M. 157, 245 P.3d 1209 (holding that 11 insurers must affirmativel y offer UM/UIM coverage inan amount equal to the 12 policy’s liability limits and an insured’s decision to purchase a lesser amount of 13 UM/UIM coverage cons titutes a rejection); Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 2010-NMSC14 051, ¶¶ 22-24, 149 N.M. 162, 245 P.3d 1214 (hol ding that, if an insurer does not 15 obtain a valid rejection of UM/UIM coverage, the policy will be reformed to provide 16 UM/UIM coverage equal to th e policy limits). [RP 72] 17 {5} On May 23, 2011, ANPAC filed a decl aratory judgment action in federal 18 district court, seeking a declaration that Plaintiffs were bound by the terms of the 19 settlement agreement. [RP 69, 73] On June 20, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a complaint 204 against ANPAC in state district court based on ANPAC’s failure to reform the 1 insurance policy at issue to provide greater UM/UIM coverage . [RP 73-74] ANPAC 2 removed this case to federal district c ourt on July 11, 2011, and on September 8, 2011, 3 the federal district court consolidatedANPAC’s declaratory judgment action and 4 Plaintiffs’ action. [RP 74] On March 19, 2012, the federal district court granted 5 summary judgment in favor of ANPAC, concluding that although Jordanapplies 6 retroactively, it cannot provide a basis for reopening the final judgment or the 7 settlement agreement in this case. [RP 76-82, 128-32] 8 {6} On May 4, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a mo tion for relief from judgment in state 9 district court pursuant to Rule 1-060(B) NMRA. [RP 51] Plaintiffs sought to set 10 aside the settlement on the grounds thatit was inequitable in light of Weed Warrior 11 Servicesand Jordan . [RP 51-53] Following a hearing, the district court issued an 12 order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for relief from judgment. [RP 136] The district court 13 explained that it would have granted Plaintiffs’ motion “but for the collateral estoppel 14 effect of Judge James A. Parker’s granting of summary judgments against Plaintiffs 15 in the [federal action.]” [RP 136] 16 DISCUSSION 17 {7} Plaintiffs continue to argue that the di strict court erred in denying their Rule 1- 18 060(B) motion for relief from judgment. We generally review a district court’s ruling 19 under Rule 1-060(B) for an abuse of discretion. See Edens v. Edens , 2005-NMCA- 205 033, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 207, 109 P.3d 295. However, where the issue is one of pure law, 1 our review is de novo. Id. The question presented here is a question of law, as the 2 facts are not in dispute. See Rosette, Inc. v. United St ates Dep’t of the Interior, 2007- 3 NMCA-136, ¶ 31, 142 N.M. 717, 169 P.3d 704 (“When the facts are not in dispute, 4 the preclusive effect of a prior judgment is a question of law reviewed de novo.”). 5 Thus, our review is de novo. 6 {8} Collateral estoppel “operates to bar the relitigation of ultimate facts or issues 7 actually and necessarily determined in the previous litigation.” Id. ¶ 39. 8 The four elements of collateral es toppel are (1) the issue previously 9 decided is identical with the one pres ented in the action in question, (2) 10 the prior action has been finally adj udicated on the merits, (3) the party 11 against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a 12 party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the 13 doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the 14 prior action. 15 Id. (internal quotation marks and citati on omitted). In their memorandum in 16 opposition, Plaintiffs contend the federal c ourt action was not finally adjudicated on 17 the merits because the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. [MIO 18 8-9, 11] 19 {9} We will not allow Plaintiffs to challengethe subject matter jurisdiction of the 20 federal district court inthis proceeding. In State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families 21 Department v. Andree G. , we explained that “our appellate decisions [subsequent to 22 a case decided in 1937] have held that a party may not collaterally attack a final 236 judgment on subject matter jurisdiction grounds when the party had the opportunity 1 to challenge subject matter jurisdiction during the original action.” 2007-NMCA-156, 2 ¶ 20, 143 N.M. 195, 174 P.3d 531. In Andree G. , we quoted the Restatement (Second) 3 of Judgments § 12 (1982) for “the proper test to be applied to a challenge of subject 4 matter jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding[.]” Andree G. , 2007-NMCA-156, ¶ 21. 5 The Restatement provides: 6 When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the 7 judgment precludes the parties from litig ating the question of the court’s 8 subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except if: 9 (1) The subject matter of the acti on was so plainly beyond the court’s 10 jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of 11 authority; or 12 (2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the 13 authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or 14 (3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to make an 15 adequately informed determinati on of a question concerning its own 16 jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness the party seeking to 17 avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the 18 court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 19 Id. ¶ 21 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982)). Plaintiffs do not 20 argue that this case falls within one of these three exceptions, and we will not make 21 their argument for them. See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 22 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (“ We will not review unclear arguments, or guess 23 at what [a party’s] arguments might be.”). 247 {10} Plaintiffs also contend the district court “improperly disregarded its role as a 1 court of a separate soverei gn with inherent power independent of the federal district 2 court.” [MIO 15] They cite numerous cases discussing general principles of 3 sovereignty, but none support their argument here. Where a party cites no authority 4 to support an argument, we may a ssume no such authority exists. In re Adoption of 5 Doe , 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984). 6 {11} Our Supreme Court has recognized that“in deciding whether to apply the 7 doctrine of collateral estoppel, the trial judgemay determine that its application would 8 be fundamentally unfair and would not further the aim of the doctrine, which is to 9 prevent endless relitigation of issues.” Silva v. State , 106 N.M. 472, 474, 745 P.2d 10 380, 382 (1987). The district court did not determine that the application of the 11 doctrine of collateral estoppel would be fundamentally unfair here. On the contrary, 12 the district court judge concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Plaintiffs 13 from re-litigating the question of whether the underlying case, which was dismissed 14 with prejudice in 2008, should be re-opened. We agree with the district court’s 15 conclusion and its reasoning. 16

CONCLUSION 17 {12} For the reasons stated above and in our previous notice, we affirm the district 18 court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for relief from judgment. 198 {13} IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

__________________________________ 2 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 3 WE CONCUR: 4

_________________________________ 5 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 6

_________________________________ 7 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 8