[Cite as State v. Murr, 2023-Ohio-1934.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF LORAIN )

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee

v.

ANGEL MURR

Appellant

C.A. No. 22CA011833

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO

CASE No. 21CR104398

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: June 12, 2023

FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.

{¶1} Angel Murr appeals her conviction from the Lorain County Court of Common 

Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} A grand jury indicted Ms. Murr on one count of possession of a fentanyl-related 

compound in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), and one count of possessing drug abuse instruments 

in violation of R.C. 2925.12(A). The State later dismissed the count of possessing drug abuse 

instruments. The matter proceeded to a jury trial wherein the following testimony was adduced. 

{¶3} On May 28, 2020, an officer from the Lorain Police Department responded to a call 

regarding suspected drug use in a residential area. The caller indicated that an SUV was parked in 

a driveway, and that it looked like the occupant was using drugs. The officer responded to the 

scene and pulled behind Ms. Murr’s SUV. As soon as the officer exited his cruiser, Ms. Murr 
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exited the driver’s side of her SUV, and R.T. exited the passenger’s side. The officer described 

Ms. Murr’s behavior as hyper and overwhelmed. 

{¶4} Less than one minute later, a corporal from the Wellington Police Department 

arrived at the scene. The corporal observed what appeared to be drugs wrapped in cellophane in 

plain view on the passenger seat of Ms. Murr’s SUV. The officer testified that Ms. Murr admitted 

to purchasing drugs in Cleveland with R.T. earlier that day. The officer also testified that Ms. Murr 

claimed that the drugs were not hers, and that she denied ingesting any drugs that day.

{¶5} The corporal secured the substance as evidence, which was later tested and 

confirmed as being .13 grams of a fentanyl-related compound. The corporal testified that Ms. Murr 

appeared to be under the influence of something, but he could not confirm whether Ms. Murr was 

under the influence of the drugs found in her SUV. The corporal and the officer placed Ms. Murr 

and R.T. under arrest and searched Ms. Murr’s SUV. They then discovered a syringe in the 

passenger-side cupholder of the center console. 

{¶6} The woman who owns and lives at the house where Ms. Murr parked her SUV 

testified at trial. She testified that she and her husband were having work done on their roof, and 

that their contractor asked if one of his workers (i.e., R.T.) could come later that evening to finish 

certain work. The homeowner testified that she and her husband acquiesced, and that the worker 

arrived in the evening with a woman (i.e., Ms. Murr). The homeowner testified that the woman 

had one shoe on and was dancing in the driveway, yet there was no music playing. The homeowner 

described the woman’s behavior as erratic and testified that her husband called their roofing 

contractor to tell him what was happening. The homeowner also testified that she called her 

daughter to tell her what was happening, and that her daughter was the person who called the 

police. 
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{¶7} The State rested and the defense did not present any witnesses. The jury found Ms. 

Murr guilty, and the trial court sentenced her to community control. Ms. Murr now appeals her 

conviction, raising two assignments of error for this Court’s review. 

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE JURY’S VERDICT WAS BASED UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS 

TO POSSESSION OF DRUGS.

{¶8} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Murr argues that the State failed to present 

sufficient evidence to support her conviction. For the following reasons, this Court disagrees. 

{¶9} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that 

this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009-Ohio-6955, ¶ 

18, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the 

prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a 

conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency analysis, this 

Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the State. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it 

allows the trier of fact to reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The trier of fact is entitled to rely on direct, as well as circumstantial 

evidence. See id.

{¶10} R.C. 2925.11(A), under which Ms. Murr was convicted, provides that “[n]o person 

shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” 

A person acts “knowingly” when the person “is aware that the person’s conduct will probably 

cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). “‘Possess’ or 
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‘possession’ means having control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from 

mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which 

the thing or substance is found.” R.C. 2925.01(K). 

{¶11} “This Court has repeatedly held that a person may knowingly possess a substance 

or object through either actual or constructive possession.” State v. Higgins, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

27700, 2018-Ohio-476, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Rowe, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27870, 2016-Ohio5395, ¶ 9. “Constructive possession exists when an individual knowingly exercises dominion and 

control over an object, even though that object may not be within h[er] immediate physical 

possession.” Id. “As this Court recognizes, ‘[t]he crucial issue is not whether the accused had 

actual physical contact with the article concerned, but whether the accused was capable of 

exercising dominion [and] control over it.’” (Alterations sic.) State v. Pari, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

28098, 2017-Ohio-4165, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Reis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26237, 2012-Ohio2482, ¶ 7. “Nevertheless, ‘constructive possession may be inferred from the drugs’ presence in a 

usable form and in close proximity to the defendant.’” Pari at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Figueroa, 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 22208, 2005-Ohio-1132, ¶ 8. “Circumstantial evidence is itself sufficient to 

establish dominion and control over the controlled substance.” Pari at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Hilton, 

9th Dist. Summit No. 21624, 2004-Ohio-1418, ¶ 16. “Additionally, [p]ossession of a drug includes 

possessing individually, or jointly with another person. Joint possession exists when two or more 

persons together have the ability to control an object, exclusive of others.” (Alteration sic.) Higgins

at ¶ 17, quoting Rowe at ¶ 9.

{¶12} Here, Ms. Murr solely argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 

prove that she constructively possessed the drugs. In support of her argument, Ms. Murr asserts 

that the police found the drugs on the passenger seat, and that no testimony connected her to the 
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drugs. Ms. Murr also asserts that R.T. was the passenger in her SUV, and that he had immediate 

access to the drugs. Ms. Murr concludes that the mere fact that drugs were found in her SUV is 

insufficient to prove possession. 

{¶13} Ms. Murr’s argument lacks merit. As this Court has acknowledged, “constructive 

possession may be inferred from the drugs’ presence in a usable form and in close proximity to 

the defendant.” Pari at ¶ 10, quoting Figueroa, ¶ 8. The State presented evidence indicating that 

Ms. Murr owned the SUV and was sitting in the driver’s seat before the officer arrived. The State 

also presented evidence indicating that the corporal saw the drugs wrapped in cellophane on the 

passenger seat of Ms. Murr’s SUV. Additionally, the State presented evidence indicating that Ms. 

Murr admitted to driving to Cleveland earlier that day with R.T. to buy drugs, although she denied 

that they were her drugs. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, this Court 

concludes that the State presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to reasonably conclude that 

Ms. Murr had constructive possession of the drugs. See Pari at ¶ 10; Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 273 

(1991).

{¶14} Additionally, Ms. Murr’s argument ignores case law regarding joint possession, 

that is, “when two or more persons together have the ability to control an object, exclusive of 

others.” (Alteration sic.) Higgins at ¶ 17, quoting Rowe at ¶ 9. Thus, despite Ms. Murr’s argument 

to the contrary, the fact that R.T. also had access to the drugs does not establish that the State failed 

to present sufficient evidence to prove that Ms. Murr possessed the drugs. 

{¶15} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, this Court concludes 

that the State presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to reasonably conclude that the State 

proved that Ms. Murr possessed a fentanyl-related compound beyond a reasonable doubt. Jenks, 

61 Ohio St.3d at 273 (1991). Accordingly, Ms. Murr’s first assignment of error is overruled. 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

APPELLANT’S CONVICTION AS TO POSSESSION OF DRUGS WAS 

AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶16} In her second assignment of error, Ms. Murr challenges the manifest weight of the 

evidence presented at trial. When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence, this Court must: 

review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider 

the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for 

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing State 

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).

{¶17} Ms. Murr’s challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence is an almost verbatim 

recitation of her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. But the testimony and the evidence 

summarized above similarly show that Ms. Murr’s conviction is not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. See State v. Johnson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 13CA010496, 2015-Ohio-1689, ¶ 14 

(addressing a manifest-weight argument premised upon the same grounds as a sufficiency 

argument); see State v. Reye, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010770, 2016-Ohio-3495, ¶ 29, citing 

State v. Henry, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27758, 2016-Ohio-680, ¶ 17 (“We also reject [the appellant’s] 

manifest weight challenge to his conviction * * * since it relies on the same grounds as his 

sufficiency challenge.”). Additionally, while Ms. Murr told the responding officer and corporal 

that the drugs were not hers, the jury was not required to accept her version of the events. See State 

v. Bersch, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 20AP0018, 2021-Ohio-3957, ¶ 16. Having reviewed the record, 

this Court concludes that this is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily 
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against Ms. Murr’s conviction. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d at 340. Accordingly, Ms. Murr’s second 

assignment of error is overruled. 

III.

{¶18} Ms. Murr’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County 

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

JILL FLAGG LANZINGER

FOR THE COURT

SUTTON, P. J.

HENSAL, J.

CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:

BRETT F. MURNER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

J.D. TOMLINSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.