NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

LISA W., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, K.W., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0299

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 31079

The Honorable John R. Ditsworth, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By JoAnn Falgout

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety

FILED 12-14-2017
LISA W. v. DCS, K.W.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Patricia A. Orozco1 joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Lisa W. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental 

rights to her child, K.W., who was born in 2008.2 For the following reasons, 

we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In August 2015, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took 

custody of the child after receiving multiple reports of Mother’s substance 

abuse, domestic violence, and neglect. DCS filed a dependency petition 

alleging the child was dependent due to substance abuse, physical abuse, 

and neglect. 

¶3 Before the superior court ruled on the dependency petition, 

DCS offered reunification services to Mother. She was referred to TASC for 

random urinalysis testing, and to Terros for substance abuse treatment. 

Mother also was assigned a case aide to facilitate visits and was informed 

she could have a parent aide once she demonstrated 30 days of sobriety. 

DCS provided Mother transportation services and identified the behavioral 

changes she needed to make to reunify with the child. As relevant here, the 

changes revolved around Mother maintaining sobriety, understanding 

how substance abuse impacted the child, recognizing how unhealthy 

relationships and domestic abuse can traumatize a child, and implementing 

a safety plan to address domestic violence. 

¶4 In January 2016, the superior court found the child dependent 

and approved a case plan for family reunification. In furtherance of the 

 

1 The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco, retired Judge of the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter 

pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

2 The child’s father is not a party to this appeal. 
LISA W. v. DCS, K.W.

Decision of the Court

3

case plan, DCS continued with the services previously offered to Mother, 

together with counseling and a psychological evaluation. 

¶5 While the child has been in DCS’s custody, Mother was in 

Colorado from September through November 2015 and she returned to 

Arizona in December. In October 2016, Mother moved to Colorado, but 

returned to Arizona in February 2017 to attend court proceedings and visit 

the child, intending to return to Colorado. DCS referred Mother to 

urinalysis testing in Colorado. She was directed to self-refer to counseling 

and substance abuse assistance.

¶6 Mother did not complete the services DCS provided. She

consistently missed the random urinalysis tests and, for that reason, was 

closed out of TASC eight times. Of the urinalysis tests Mother took, almost 

one-quarter of the samples tested positive for alcohol. Because Mother did 

not demonstrate or report 30 continuous days of sobriety, she was never 

provided a parent aide referral. Nor did Mother complete substance abuse 

treatment, despite being referred to Terros several times. Mother attended 

a substance abuse clinic in Colorado where she received substance abuse 

treatment, group and individual counseling. Although DCS confirmed by 

phone that Mother was participating in these services, DCS requested 

treatment records from the Colorado facility but never received them. 

¶7 Mother participated in some visits with the child when she 

was in Arizona, but did not self-refer to parenting classes as requested by 

DCS. DCS referred Mother to domestic violence counseling in April 2016, 

but the service was closed out after Mother failed to engage in the services. 

Mother testified that she participated in domestic violence classes in 

Colorado, but DCS never received confirmation of such participation. DCS 

also referred Mother to a psychological evaluation; she was notified of the 

appointment and a taxi was provided to Mother, per her request. Mother 

was not present when the taxi arrived. The appointment was rescheduled 

but Mother did not attend. When Mother asked DCS to schedule another

appointment, DCS declined. 

¶8 DCS filed a motion for termination of Mother’s parental rights 

under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 8-533(B)(3) (chronic 

substance abuse), 8-533(B)(8)(a) (nine months’ time in care), and 

8-533(B)(8)(c) (fifteen months’ time in care). Following a contested hearing, 

the superior court granted the motion on each of the three statutory 

grounds and determined that termination was in the child’s best interests. 

This timely appeal followed.
LISA W. v. DCS, K.W.

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶9 To terminate parental rights, the superior court must find by 

clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one of the statutory 

grounds for termination enumerated in A.R.S. § 8-533(B), and must also 

find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s 

best interests. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(C); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000). “[W]e view the evidence and reasonable 

inferences . . . in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s decision.”

Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009). We 

will affirm the termination order if it is supported by reasonable evidence. 

Id. 

¶10 To prevail on its motion to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), DCS was required to show that the child 

was in an out-of-home placement for at least fifteen months, she was 

“unable to remedy the circumstances that cause[d] the child to be in an outof-home placement,” and a “substantial likelihood” exists that she “will not 

be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in 

the near future.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). DCS is also required to show it 

“made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services”

before termination of parental rights. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); see also Christina G. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 14 (App. 2011) (“The juvenile 

court is to consider the availability of reunification services to the parent 

and his or her participation in those services, and must find that ADES 

made a diligent effort to provide such services.”). 

¶11 Mother argues the superior court erred in finding DCS made 

diligent efforts to provide her rehabilitative services and that termination is 

in the child’s best interests. As an initial matter, we note Mother waited 

until the severance hearing to alert the court as to adequacy of the services 

DCS had offered throughout the dependency proceeding. Nonetheless, we 

decline to find waiver on this record but urge parents and their counsel to 

raise such concerns much earlier in the process. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz.

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179, ¶ 18 (App. 2014) (explaining that if the 

mother believed that services were inadequate, “it was incumbent on her to 

promptly bring those concerns to the attention of the juvenile court, thereby 

giving that court a reasonable opportunity to address the matter and ensure 

that [DCS] was in compliance with its obligation to provide appropriate 

reunification services as ordered by that court”). 

¶12 Mother asserts that DCS should have offered her more 

services when she was in Colorado, that DCS never notified her to call into 
LISA W. v. DCS, K.W.

Decision of the Court

5

TASC when she returned to Arizona, and that DCS did not provide 

sufficient visitation services when she returned. Contrary to Mother’s 

assertions, we conclude that reasonable evidence supports the superior 

court’s finding that DCS made diligent efforts to provide appropriate 

reunification services. The services provided to Mother, as outlined above, 

were explained by the DCS case manager at the severance hearing, are welldocumented in the numerous exhibits admitted at the hearing, and were 

summarized in the court’s detailed severance ruling. 

¶13 Mother also argues the superior court erred by terminating 

her parental rights pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) because DCS failed to 

prove that Mother is unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the 

child to be in an out-of-home placement and that Mother is incapable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. 

The court found that Mother has been unable to remedy the circumstances 

that caused the out-of-home placement because she was still drinking 

several months before the severance hearing and remained in a relationship 

involving domestic violence. The court believed it would take over one 

year to rectify these problems which she had “done nothing to address.” 

¶14 The record supports the court’s findings. Mother participated 

sporadically in substance abuse testing and treatment throughout the case. 

Notably, she tested positive for alcohol throughout the case, relapsed 

several months before trial, and failed to complete the services offered in 

Arizona or provide proof of completion for services in which she 

participated in Colorado. The DCS case manager testified it was unlikely 

Mother would be capable of exercising parental control in the future 

because she did not address her issues with substance abuse and because 

she remained in a relationship involving domestic violence. Thus, 

reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that termination was 

warranted based on fifteen months’ time in care.3

¶15 Finally, Mother asserts the superior court erred by concluding 

that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests. 

Termination is in the child’s best interests if the child will “derive an 

affirmative benefit from termination or incur a detriment by continuing in 

the relationship.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 6 

(App. 2004). “In making the determination, the juvenile court may consider 

evidence that the child is adoptable or that an existing placement is meeting 

 

3 Because we find the evidence supports the superior court’s order 

based on fifteen months’ time in care, we need not address the other 

grounds for termination. 
LISA W. v. DCS, K.W.

Decision of the Court

6

the needs of the child.” Mario G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 282, 

288, ¶ 26 (App. 2011). Here, the court found that the child is in an adoptive 

home, the placement meets the child’s needs, and the severance provides 

her with permanency and an environment free of alcoholism and domestic 

violence. 

¶16 The juvenile court’s ruling is supported by the record. The 

case manager testified the child is adoptable and an adoptive home has 

been identified. Moreover, the case manager explained termination would 

provide the child permanency, safety, and she would not need to witness 

domestic violence or alcoholism. Therefore, the court did not err in finding 

termination of Mother’s rights is in the child’s best interests. 

CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing, we affirm the superior court’s termination 

of Mother’s parental rights.